The Infrastructures of Security: Technologies of Risk Management in Johannesburg 0472075470, 9780472075478

Citation preview

The Infrastructures of Security

African Perspectives Kelly Askew and Anne Pitcher Series Editors

The Infrastructures of Security: Technologies of Risk Management in Johannesburg Martin J. Murray There Used to Be Order: Life on the Copperbelt after the Privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Patience Mususa Animated by Uncertainty: Rugby and the Performance of History in South Africa Joshua D. Rubin African Performance Arts and Political Acts Naomi André, Yolanda Covington-Ward, and Jendele Hungbo, Editors Filtering Histories: The Photographic Bureaucracy in Mozambique, 1960 to Recent Times, by Drew A. Thompson Aso Ebi: Dress, Fashion, Visual Culture, and Urban Cosmopolitanism in West Africa, by Okechukwu Nwafor Unsettled History: Making South African Public Pasts, by Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley, and Ciraj Rassool Seven Plays of Koffi Kwahulé: In and Out of Africa, translated by Chantal Bilodeau and Judith G. Miller edited with Introductions by Judith G. Miller The Rise of the African Novel: Politics of Language, Identity, and Ownership, by Mukoma Wa Ngugi A complete list of titles in the series can be found at www.press.umich.edu

The Infrastructures of Security Technologies of Risk Management in Johannesburg Martin J. Murray

University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Copyright 2022 by Martin J. Murray All rights reserved For questions or permissions, please contact [email protected] Published in the United States of America by the University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America Printed on acid-­free paper First published August 2022 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-­0-­472-­07547-­8 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-­0-­472-­05547-­0 (paper : alk. paper) ISBN 978-­0-­472-­22040-­3 (ebook)

Contents

Abbreviations List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Preface

vii xi xiii xvii

Introduction1 Chapter One Policing the Post-­Liberal City: Paradoxes and Contradictions

34

Chapter Two Johannesburg in the Geographic Imagination: Agoraphobia and Other Obsessions

70

Chapter Three Vulnerable Bodies: Self-­Protection in a Risky World

103

Chapter Four The Surveillant Assemblage: The Hyper-­Panoptic Imagination

142

Chapter Five The CCTV Surveillance Revolution [With Nicky Falkof]

171

Chapter Six Colliding Worlds in Microcosm

221

Chapter Seven Security by Design: Spatial Management in the Hypermodern City

240

vi • Contents

Epilogue Introduction Epilogue 1 Jane Alexander Security Exhibition

265

Epilogue 2 Mosquito Lightning [Carla Busuttil and Gary Charles]

268

Notes

281

Bibliography

367

Index

437

Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11628530

Abbreviations

African Housing Company artificial intelligence automatic license plate recognition Bordeaux South Residents Association Braamfontein Business Improvement District Braamfontein Spruit Rehabilitation Project British American Tobacco Business against Crime central business district Central Sharonlea Residents Forum City Improvement Districts City of Johannesburg Civil Aviation Authority Civilian Crime Intelligence Network closed-­circuit television Community Active Protection community policing forums Council for Scientific and Industrial Research Craighall Residents Association Democratic Republic of Congo fiber-­to-­the-­home First National Bank Forum for Integrated Risk Mitigation Future City Fourways geographical information system global positioning systems Global Systems for Mobile Communications high-­definition Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall Residents Association identification documents

AFHCO AI ALPR BSRA BraamBID BSRB BAT BAC CBD CSRF CIDs CoJ CAA CCIN CCTV CAP CPFs CSIR CRA DRC FTTH FNB FIRM FCF GIS GPS GSM HD HGC IDs

viii • Abbreviations

Independent Police Investigative Directorate information and communication technologies Institute for Security Studies Integrated Intelligent Operation Centre intelligent surveillance and detection systems Internet of Things internet protocol internet service providers Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer Johannesburg International Airport Johannesburg Municipal Police Department Johannesburg Property Company Johannesburg Roads Agency Kids Custodian Initiative Melville Residents Association Metropolitan Trading Company National Crime Prevention Strategy National Recognition Centre National Traffic Information System nongovernmental organizations off-­site monitoring oleoresin capsicum Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa passive millimeter imaging Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Promotion of Access to Information Act Protection of Personal Information Act radio frequency identification registered pilot’s license Remote Operating Certificate remotely piloted aircraft remotely piloted aviation systems South African Civil Aviation Authority South African Defense Force South African Electrical Fencing Installers Association South African Informal Traders Forum South African Insurance Crime Bureau

IPID ICT ISS IIOC ISDS IoT IP ISPs ITMS JIA JMPD JPC JRA KCI MRA MTC NCPS NRC eNaTIS NGOs OSM OC PRABOA PRASA PMI PSiRA PAIA POPIA RFID RPL ROC RPA RPAs SACAA SADF SAEFIA SAITF SAICB



South African National Defense Force South African National Traders Retail Alliance South African Police Service sports utility vehicle stolen vehicle recovery tilt, pan, and zoom unmanned aerial vehicles vehicle identification number vehicle of interest video management system Waterfall Investment Company

Abbreviations • ix

SANDF SANTRA SAPS SUV SVR TPZ UAVs VIN VOI VMS WIC

List of Illustrations

Figure 1. Beagle Watch Security Team and Private Security Vehicle 47 101 Figure 2. Reaction Services—­Helicopter Pursuit Figure 3. Upper-­Middle-­Class Perimeter Security 106 Figure 4. CPS (Community Protection Services) Private Security Logo 109 112 Figure 5. Melville Koppies Security Alert Figure 6. Montage of Four Logos for Various Private Security Companies 122 130 Figure 7. High-­Voltage Electric Fencing—­Perimeter Defense Figure 8. Layered Security Regimes 149 Figure 9. Vumacam—­Clustered CCTV Cameras 179 180 Figure 10. Vumacam CCTV—­Unblinking Eyes in the Sky Figure 11. Map 1: Northern Suburbs: Placement of Fibrehoods Cables and Vumacam CCTV Camera Network, 2016. Designer: Olaia Chivite Amigo. 184 Figure 12. Organizational Chart: Vumacam/Vumatel Networked Connections202 Figure 13. Map 2: CCTV Surveillance Cameras Blanket the Suburban Neighborhood of Greenside. Designer: Olaia Chivite Amigo. 206 Figure 14. Map 3: The Braamfontein Spruit Watercourse. Designer: 222 Olaia Chivite Amigo. Figure 15. Living behind Walled Enclosures: The “Bubble Lives” of Suburban Residents 247 Figure 16. CSS Tactical: Private Security “Armed Response” Vehicle Built for Speed and Maneuverability 259 Figure 17. Faux Logo for Make-­Believe Private Security Company Mosquito Lightning270 Figure 18. Mosquito Lightning Security Team, Assembled 278 and Ready for Action

Acknowledgments

This book originated out of a long-­term engagement with Johannesburg that has spanned four decades. I first ventured to this glittering “City of Gold” for a short visit in 1977. Except for an eight-­year period of time in which I was unable to obtain an official entry visa to travel to South Africa, I have regularly traveled to Johannesburg, both as a temporary resident (1984, 1993, 1998, in addition to a number of long-­term “stays” starting in early 2000s) and as a visitor for short research trips. Over the years, I have developed a serious observer-­research “connection” with Johannesburg, a city always open to fresh opportunities for starting over, yet at the same time an unforgiving place for those who fall by the wayside in the competitive struggle to get ahead. The point of departure for The Infrastructures of Security: Technologies of Risk Management in Johannesburg is my previous book called Panic City: Crime and the Fear Industries in Johannesburg (Stanford University Press, 2020). What Panic City left unresolved and unfinished on the subject of the intersection of power, space, and security governance, I have tried to address here in The Infrastructures of Security. Taken together as companion pieces, these two books effectively constitute the final contribution to a series of scholarly efforts seeking to make sense of space and power in Johannesburg. In a real sense, then, I have written a trilogy on Johannesburg. My first book in the three-­volume set, Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg after Apartheid (Cornell University Press, 2008) focused on the simmering conflicts over land use in the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region after the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy. The second pillar in the trilogy, City of Extremes: Spatial Politics of Johannesburg (Duke University Press, 2011), critically examined city building in Johannesburg as an expression of class power. My aim here was to account for the entrenchment of spatial inequalities through the lens of the evolving built environment and the turn of property-­owners toward “siege architecture.” In research and writing for The Infrastructures of Security, I have moved back and forth between different social worlds and I have relied upon a vari-

xiv • Acknowledgments

ety sources of information. A central element of my research strategies here has been an approach that might be called “traveling ethnography” in order to capture conditions as they exist on the ground in specific sites. As a mode of data-­gathering, “traveling ethnography” puts a premium on immediate experience and participant observation. I really enjoy observing what people do and talking with them about why they do what they do. In order to make sense of the social worlds I explore, I have been compelled to become a bit of a voyeur and a spy. Over the more than fifteen-­year period of concrete research and writing on Johannesburg, I have depended upon a host of friends, colleagues, and casual acquaintances, all of whom have assisted me in countless ways in bringing this book to completion. It would be impossible to acknowledge them all. The thinking behind this book is the outcome of many journeys, conversations, and collaborations that I have undertaken starting a long time ago. It goes without saying that one accumulates a great number of debts to people and institutions. I met Nicky Falkof at a seminar held at the School of Architecture at the University of the Witwatersrand. After a conversation, we decided that she and I would do some joint work together. Nicky Falkof is a writer and academic from Johannesburg, where she holds the position of Associate Professor in the Wits Media Studies department. She is the author of numerous books and articles. She has been a resident at the Rockefeller Bellagio Centre and a visiting scholar at the University of Dar-­es-­Salaam in Tanzania, Sussex University (UK), and UNAM in Mexico. Nicky and I jointly collaborated on the research and writing for Chapter Five. She provided some invaluable information derived from a series of interviews in Johannesburg. Lily Maniom offered sage advice on a number of occasions. The outbreak of the COVID pandemic brought to an abrupt close a few last remaining interviews and onsite visits we had planned to do. Some of the final interviews for this book were conducted online, via Zoom. At one point (and I cannot remember where or when), I came across the Mosquito Lightning project constructed by Carla Busuttil and Gary Charles. Carla Busuttil is a South African–­born artist working across mediums; primarily paint, but also film, installation, digital media, and sculpture. By interrogating the parallel themes of growing economic inequalities and information abundance, Busuttil has focused much of her work on an exploration of the tendencies toward increased isolation, privatization, and fortification in urban spaces. Her practice engages with ideas around social structures and



Acknowledgments • xv

the genealogies of power, partly informed by her experience of growing up in late apartheid South Africa. A graduate of the Royal Academy, London, Busuttil was included in the significant survey Newspeak: British Art Now at the Saatchi Gallery, London, and AGSA, Adelaide, as well as the Jerwood Contemporary Painting Prize and John Moores Painting Prize exhibitions in London and Liverpool, and in solo shows at Goodman Gallery in Johannesburg and Cape Town and Josh Lilley, London. Carla Busuttil lives and works in Birmingham, UK. Gary Charles is an interdisciplinary researcher and artist, working across sound, moving image, installation, and conceptual practice. He has released music under a number of monikers, including releases on High Strung Young and Flash Recordings as The Static Hand, and performs improvised electronics as part of Birmingham-­based band, Low Red Moon. His most recent research looks at the emergence of Artificial Intelligence approaches in cultural production, particularly in relation to creativity within contemporary art and music cultures. Through both research and practice, Gary focuses on uncovering the assumptions, misdirections, and biases embedded in generative models, as well as the protocols that underpin them. Gary has lectured in Audio Fundamentals and Cultural Studies at BIMM (British & Irish Modern Music Institute), and is currently a PhD candidate at University of Birmingham. In April–­June, 2016, when we were all living in Oxford, I used to meet Carla and Gary about once a week at the King’s Arms, one of my favorite pubs. From these casual interactions was born the idea of including their work as an Epilogue to my book. I do believe that the arguments in this book are greatly assisted by the inclusion of an Epilogue dealing with the fake private security company, Mosquito Lightning. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Anthony Chase. As an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan, Anthony wrote a research paper based on a long interview with Sonnett Ehlers, the creator of Rape aXe, an anti-­rape device sold in South Africa. He generously agreed to let me tap into this material. Sarah Charlton’s research and writing on the shelterless people eking out a living in the vicinity of the Braamfontein Spruit was an inspiration for Chapter Six. I used her work as a launching pad for my own excursion into how middle-­class residents along the Spruit mobilized to exclude the shelterless poor from their imagined Edenic worlds of recreation and leisure defined by the meandering stream passing through their neighborhoods.

xvi • Acknowledgments

Through our joint collaboration on earlier research, Andy Clarno and I became good friends. His approach to research still inspires me. Other friends like Sean Jacobs, Danny Herwitz, Adam Ashforth, Lucia Saks, Howard Stein, Phil Harrison, Alex Wafer, and many more have in their own ways encouraged me to think “big thoughts.” I have benefited greatly from the generosity of folks in the School of Architecture (John Moffat Building) and the Centre for the Built Environment at University of Johannesburg, who have always offered me a “research home.” Participants in various seminars sponsored at the School of Architecture offered constructive criticisms that I absorbed into my thinking. I would like to thank University of Michigan Press and the Chief Editor of the African Perspectives Series, Ellen Bauerle, and the Series Editors, Kelly Askew and Laura Fair. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Flannery Wise (editorial associate), Marcia LaBrenz (project manager), and Jill Hughes (copy editor). While it proved to be a long journey, the project did eventually find the light of day. As always, my best friend, Anne Pitcher, has contributed a great deal to this project in ways in which she is probably unaware. She stressed that I needed to have my research and writing speak to wider audiences than simply academics in Johannesburg. As always, she was correct. When I write, I always ask myself, “What would Anne think of this chapter?” Anne has recently rediscovered horseback riding, a true passion in her youth. This undertaking is a good thing. My children always hover in the background, not always physically there but certainly as real figures nonetheless. Andrew is about to embark on journeys other than academic after receiving his PhD in Sociology. Jeremy has forged his own path as a colleague in a different department at University of Michigan. Alida has set her sights on becoming a lawyer with the aim of actually helping people and advancing good causes. Each in their own way, they inspire me to research and write. January 19, 2022. Aiken, South Carolina

Preface

In the aftermath following the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy, Johannesburg has been consistently plagued by persistent insecurity and lawlessness in both public and private realms. This criminal violence occurs in a national historical context in which the formal consolidation of electoral democracy and the constitutional guarantees of individual rights have proceeded in the absence of corresponding processes related to the institutionalization and protection of democratic citizenship. The enforcement of civil and human rights, juridical reform, and a concern with the broader issues of social and economic justice have lagged behind the promises that leading political figures made at the time of the 1994 transition to parliamentary democracy. Despite the efforts of those who are genuinely committed to building a “new South Africa” along the lines of non-­racialism and respect for human rights, the protections of democratic citizenship continue to function less as a universal right than as a privilege of dominant groups. Class, race, and gender remain crucial axes in the unequal distribution of justice in Johannesburg and other cities in South Africa. Placed in the wide arc of historical transformation, Johannesburg was founded on exploitation (of nature and persons), violence and victimization, and lawlessness and thievery.1 From its inception in the late nineteenth century, this so-­called city of gold lured countless numbers of “strangers” who arrived en masse from the four corners of the earth, seeking to take advantage of whatever opportunities for enrichment materialized before their eyes.2 These ambitious fortune hunters gave shape to the kind of reckless, rapacious capitalism that emerged hand in hand with the spread of the mining frontier. Despite the veneer of the rule of law, crime and violence have always lurked just below the surface of the city’s social fabric. Lawlessness has remained an enduring feature of the sprawling urban landscape of Johan-

xviii •

Preface

nesburg. Settled residents have long looked upon “newcomers”—­embodied in the figures of “strangers” and “outsiders”—­with suspicion and distrust. When wariness of the unknown Other metastasizes into fear, extralegal calls to expel, exclude, and banish come to the fore. Under these circumstances, urban sociability comes to be governed by trepidation, stigmatization, and anxiety. Taken together, these sentiments have crystalized into a fixation on “securitization”—­structures of feeling that converge on the fortressing of private homes and their surroundings, the protection of personal property, and the self-­fortification of the body itself.

I In highly inequitable and racially divided cities like Johannesburg, at the hard edge of hypermodernity, one dominant feature of everyday life is the inescapable tendency to blend the urban design of the built environment, the architecture of enclosure, and the policing of public space into an all-­ encompassing, single-­minded security effort to protect the aspiring well-­ to-­do from the permanently poor. “Security” combines an almost paranoid obsession with personal safety along with the search for degrees of social separation in residential living arrangements, in work environments, and in leisurely consumption, where insulation from the perceived danger and risk associated with urban living is the ultimate goal. In the (largely but not exclusively) white middle-­class imagination, fears of bodily harm and loss of personal property as a result of armed robbery are magnified “through a demonological lens.”3 The specter of dangerous criminals lurking everywhere has gone hand in glove with a pervasive nervousness that accompanies everyday life, or what Loren Kruger has called a kind of “edginess” that marks the dystopian mirror image of the distinctive Johannesburg “vibe.”4 As Daniel Goldstein has persuasively argued, the security paradigm has emerged as the leading framework for organizing contemporary social life.5 “Security economies” have cleverly exploited the collective anxieties of the propertied and privileged urban residents (the “haves”) who fear the property-­less urban poor (the “have-­nots”) who threaten to overwhelm them with their ubiquitous presence and who refuse to accept their social status as permanently marginalized and excluded. “Securitization” has insinuated itself in everyday life to the extent that the presence of surveillance and mon-



Preface • xix

itoring systems has become so routine that they are normalized and taken for granted. Private companies have not only taken advantage of opportunities to sell comprehensive “security systems,” but they have also helped to create markets for new “designer” security products that cater to personal preference and lifestyle choices. While public law enforcement agencies operate on the principle of the collective consumption of safety and protection, private security companies have no such mandate, offering custom-­built, specialized security systems and devices for sale to affluent consumers.6 Johannesburg consists of a patchwork of such “islands of security” as enclosed shopping malls, gated residential estates, cocooned office parks, and fortified homes, juxtaposed against such no-­go “danger zones” as vast informal settlements, clustered zones of dereliction and ruin, unguarded parking lots, and unprotected streets. This variegated hodgepodge of spatial typologies—­or what Andrea Pavoni has eloquently described as a “poli-­ atmospheric kaleidoscope of safety and danger”—­offers little solace to urban residents who move nervously about the city.7 The syncopated rhythms of city life veer back and forth between the securitized comforts of enclosure and the trepidation of navigating the places in between. “Circumventing danger” and “outsmarting” crime entail careful preparation and considerable forethought. Amassing a repertoire of “survival skills” involves learning from experience, studying “safety tips,” spatial literacy (knowing where you are), access to technological devices, and participation in information-­sharing communities. In what Christine Hentschel has called “survive-­style,” “crime avoidance becomes a way of life,” where literally “everybody is in competition with everybody else for the best bubble that offers the least attractive target for criminals.”8 In the turbulent rhythms of risk and danger, preplanned journeys, point-­to-­point movement, minimal stops, and constant vigilance while in a locked car or on the street are integral elements in the performative art of “navigating the city.” As Hentschel has put it, “Everyone becomes a route-­planner in the dense traffic of crime and disorder.”9 The aim of attentive walking and driving around the city is not to prevent crime but to know where and when carjackings, robberies, and home burglaries are more likely to occur so as to circumvent them, time “again and again,” in a kind of endless cycle of risk and avoidance.10 Middle-­class urban residents have become self-­taught experts, as David Garland says, in the field of “criminologies of everyday life.”11

xx • Preface

II This book considers the complex entanglements of the existential preoccupations with personal safety and security, the turn toward technological solutions to manage risk, and the vacuum in public law enforcement that private companies are eager to fill via the provision of “security services” for a profit. A critical examination of the triangulation of these three poles reveals a complex assemblage of material interests, near-­apoplectic (and all-­consuming) fear of the unknown, and dystopian projections of the danger both far and near. To dismiss fear of crime as an overreaction to unproven belief (or an expression of obsessive paranoia) is to ignore its social and collective dimension. To reduce these anxieties about crime to individual psychosis deprives such sentiments of their collective expression and shared realities. The power of uncertainty to motivate people to act cannot be pigeonholed as merely an ideological construction or framed as a feature of the “superstructure” of ideas alone. As with all research and writing that take the historical present as the point of departure, the chapters in this book remain inextricably tied to the circumstances under which they were produced. In this sense they represent, as Roslyn Deutsch wrote in another context, “conditional interventions in historically specific—­and ongoing debates” regarding urban insecurity.12 Each chapter constitutes a relatively autonomous contribution to an overall argument about the shifting modalities of crime, fear, and insecurity in Johannesburg. All in all, the chapters explore a diverse range of themes—­the militarization of urban space, the turn toward CCTV surveillance, various efforts to combat the scourge of carjacking, and the social life of miniaturized security gadgets—­that taken singly reveal only a partial understanding of the ever-­deepening logic of securitization. But when stitched together, they form a montage-­like structured totality that assists us in exposing the fault lines, fissures, and contradictions that crisscross the efforts of neighborhood associations, private security companies, and public law enforcement agencies to prevent crime and manage risk. Seeking to unravel the common threads that bind the introduction of new technologies of risk management together into a coherent “security paradigm” brings to light a disturbing story in which the social cohesion of affluent residents around protection and security is matched by the exclusion and marginalization of the urban poor. In this historical moment of uncertainty and insecurity, the headlong race between criminal ingenuity and increasingly technological solutions to crime prevention has continued unabated with no end in sight. The central claim



Preface • xxi

of this book is that the evolving infrastructures of security management have gradually yet inexorably moved away from reliance on the physically limited capacities and judgments of individual “agents of security” and adopted instead machine-­driven technologies that manage risk through the application of new technical innovations. In large measure, this turn toward new technologically driven strategies of security governance are barely understood and inadequately theorized in the scholarly literature. One aim of this book is to fill in some of these gaps. I focus on four discrete arenas of security management: (1) the shift from “soft” to “hard” policing and the militarization of urban space; (2) the avoidance and prevention of carjacking, one of the most feared crimes in Johannesburg; (3) armoring the vulnerable body with a variety of prosthetic devices to protect against armed robberies; and (4) guarding residential neighborhoods with a network of CCTV surveillance cameras outfitted with artificial-­intelligence technologies that accelerate the speed of response. In rejecting the inevitability of increasingly technical sophistication of security systems encased in a conception of linear time/single history, I operate with the idea of multiple times/hybrid histories. In breaking away from a monochromatic perspective suggesting that the introduction of technological solutions to the risk of crime follows a single pathway, I argue that a variety of different problems (carjackings, street robberies, home invasions) gave rise to different solutions (remote tracking devices, CCTV surveillance, and mobile armed response). Treating technical innovations in security governance as a singular, monolithic process runs the risk of telescoping crucial geopolitical distinctions into a “one-­size-­fits-­all” historical abstraction stripped of nuance and historical specificity. Adopting a hybrid approach to syncretic and multidimensional time enables me to decenter the historical unfolding and evolution of discrete technologies of security. The development of technologically driven security systems does not correspond to a dominant logic governing the replacement of the sensory skills and judgment of human actors with machine-­aided artificial intelligence (AI). On the contrary, this shift has taken place incrementally and largely through trial and error and experimentation.

III In so many ways, critically examining the architecture of security systems in Johannesburg serves as a laboratory for making sense of the techniques and technologies of control that embody the politics of separation keeping the

xxii •

Preface

“haves” protected from the “have-­nots.” Anxious middle-­class residents take extraordinary precautions in negotiating the urban terrain, locking doors and closing windows when driving, parking in underground lots and never leaving cars outside of perimeter walls at night, and keeping a vigilant lookout for potential danger, especially at the security gate when leaving or returning home. The uncertainty and instability brought about by the persistent threat of crime allows enhanced security technologies to be invoked in order to justify increasingly intrusive measures.13 This book is not concerned simply with the fears and anxieties associated with crime; it also seeks to bring to light and lay bare the evolving social worlds that the fixations on securitization have produced. Laden with the promise of keeping threats at bay, securitization seeks to allay polymorphous fears of the unknown. My stress on the technologies of security—­CCTV surveillance, mobile armed response, anti-­hijacking tracking devices, and the like—­acquires their significance and meaning not because they represent new and more sophisticated tools in the anticrime arsenals adopted by private security companies and marketed to apprehensive urban residents, but because of the ways they reveal deeper anxieties about potential disruptions to the comfortable lifestyles associated with property, money, and power. Crime—­unannounced, unsuspected, and lightning fast—­rudely upends the comfortable “structures of feeling” that come with class privilege. Looking beyond these assembled stories focusing on CCTV surveillance systems, the technological responses to carjacking, and the ramping up of “body armor” presents a new set of questions, offers new interpretations, and provides new frameworks for the analysis of fragile, divided cities where entrenched structural inequalities come to the fore along lines of class and race. The distinction between danger and endangerment (a framing device creatively developed by Austin Zeiderman) can assist us in understanding how and why “securitization” of urban space in Johannesburg seems to have taken on a life of its own. While both ideas suggest the real possibilities of imminent harm, danger typically indicates an immediate, specific threat that can dissipate over time or when circumstances change. In contrast, endangerment refers to the more general condition of open-­ended, enduring, yet ephemeral threats to bodily harm that persist over time.14 Following this line of reasoning, Infrastructures of Security is less focused on the direct and immediate experience of danger than on how endangerment—­as a lasting condition of everyday life in Johannesburg—­shapes the perceptions of suburban residents, harmonizes popular opinions, and animates collective action. What is



Preface • xxiii

well known is that the trauma associated with crime “persists in the bodies and memories and attitudes of persons” who have personally experienced its deleterious impact. It is also true that persistent criminality, violence, and lawlessness “produce cultures of fear” that do not easily fade away.15 This book seeks to explore the extent to which this persistent condition of endangerment has shaped the seemingly never-­ending search for “fail-­ safe” solutions to risk and threat. This notion of endangerment enables us to make sense of how private security companies establish and maintain their legitimacy as “crime fighters,” and how the mesmerizing appeal—­the siren song—­of “security utopias” (where safety is guaranteed and risk is perfectly managed) has gained such a firm foothold in the middle-­class imagination.

IV Located at the margins of modernity, cities like Johannesburg have typically fit into conventional urban theory as somehow trailing behind the leading cosmopolitan global cities located at the core of the capitalist world economy. In the conventional understanding, the laggard cities that straggle behind those ambitious globalizing cities with world-­class aspirations seek to catch up by copying, mimicking, or even plagiarizing the “good ideas” that originate elsewhere. Yet the incremental experimentation with novel strategies of “security governance” has suddenly propelled cities like Johannesburg, Bogota, Mexico City, Manila, and São Paulo to the forefront of discussions about cutting-­edge approaches to managing urban insecurity.16 In a reversal of the direction of key “traveling ideas,” the architecture and infrastructure of risk management coming to fruition in cities at the margins of modernity have gradually appeared in embryonic form in the so-­called leading global cities at the core of the world economy.

V In writing about Johannesburg (and South Africa more generally), I have tried to avoid the temptation to frame relations of power and privilege solely through the prism of rigidly demarcated social categories of race and class. In seeking to understand power, space, and security governance in Johannesburg, I have worked with the anti-­essentialist idea that race and class are mal-

xxiv •

Preface

leable and contingent social constructions, assuming kaleidoscopic meanings under evolving circumstances that have changed over time. Seen in this light, the making of the evolving security landscapes in Johannesburg do not map onto the social realities of race and class in easily identifiable ways. It is the entrenched inequalities of propertied wealth and organizational power that have created the great chasm between “haves” and “have-­nots”—­divisions that are less directly associated with racial categories than they once were. Extended security networks consist of loosely connected assemblages of disparate elements drawn together with the aim of producing safe and secure environments. In trying to make sense of these new modes of security governance in Johannesburg, I have had to let go of any expectation of finding a hidden order, coherence, or stability. There is no single underlying organizational logic. To paraphrase Joan Didion, I have had to acknowledge the necessity for me to “come to terms with disorder.”17 The Infrastructures of Security offers a partial glimpse into this social world that has been marked as the retreat of public law enforcement, the ascendancy of privatized security, and the overdetermined role of self-­mobilized propertied and privileged urban residents. Assuming roles that were once beyond their reach, affluent suburban residents have taken it upon themselves to act as an “alert rights-­bearing citizenry.” Mobilized through the organizational format of dozens of neighborhood associations, they have turned the ordinary meaning of the term citizenship on its head, adopting not an inclusionary logic of common membership in a shared project but instead operating with an exclusionary impulse aimed at limiting and restricting the boundaries of belonging.18 My story begins with the disappearance of the fleeting promise of “police reform” that came to the fore in that brief moment in the immediate aftermath of the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy. At the start, postapartheid reformers dreamed of constructing a new approach to responsive and responsible policing grounded in respect for human rights and protection of civil liberties across the lines of race and class. Over time, public law enforcement agencies in Johannesburg have moved away from establishing a new role for themselves as a protective force grounded in community policing. Instead, they gradually reverted to modes of security governance that involve the imbrication of two roles: first, a stress on “pacification” of urban space, focusing on the eradication of the popular illegalities of the urban poor, and, second, providing protection for the propertied classes and their privileged lifestyles.



Preface • xxv

My excursions into extended security networks led me into trying to make sense of the truism that the weakest link in the effective provision of security is the human element. Human capabilities—­the powers of eyesight and hearing to assess one’s surroundings, and even the alleged benefits of common sense as a reliable method for bypassing threats to bodily harm—­ pale in comparison with the power of machines. Recognizing the frailties of the human sensorium as a means for avoiding danger has gone hand in hand with the development of automated technologies to enhance the powers of sensing, thinking, and interpreting. I began with an examination of the idealized “anxious body” festooned and outfitted with prosthetic devises meant to considerably enhance the capacity to protect oneself. Just as Karl Marx identified the commodity form as the basic kernel for understanding the secrets behind the operational logic of capitalism, the “anxious body” constitutes the elemental component, the bedrock principle, which opens the door to making sense of the wider world of risk management and danger avoidance. South African films like Tsotsi, District 9, Hijack Hijack Stories, and more, provide ample testimony to the powerful image of “stranger danger” as a visceral source of personal anxiety. In all of these films, the anxiety associated with the unknown (and often unseen) is imbricated with the vulnerability posed by the unprotected body. In Johannesburg the fear of carjacking plays an inordinately powerful role in the crystallization of danger. For middle-­class urban residents going about their daily lives, carjacking is both an extremely frightening experience and a personal affront to one’s sense of being in the social world. Conducting carjack-­avoidance experiments has become a cottage industry of sorts, bringing together both bizarre solutions and new commodified forms of protection. CCTV cameras have become perhaps the most ubiquitous expressions of mechanical devices designed to extend the capacity to “see” the world. Outfitted with automated systems linked with artificial intelligence capabilities, new “smart” CCTV cameras assumed a kind of robotic role in watching and analyzing the threat of crime. In Johannesburg the creation of an interlinked system of visual surveillance by a single private company, Vumacam, represents a historically specific example of the merger of private enterprise with the perceived need for enhanced security. Unlike the installation of sophisticated CCTV systems in New York, London, and most if not all cities in China, the Vumacam experiment in Johannesburg has bypassed municipal authorities and public law enforcement agencies.

xxvi •

Preface

The Infrastructures of Security is not an effort at a systematic comparison across space and time. Framed as a montage of vignettes cobbled together to form an uneasy whole, the assembled micro-­stories that constitute the chapters of this book amount to only one set of many equally valid, although not necessarily equally compelling, accounts of the sometimes gradual, sometimes abrupt, but always uneven, march toward the adoption of new and more sophisticated technologies of security in Johannesburg. These micro-­ stories are like pieces of a puzzle, fitting together in ways that at first glance might not appear to logically connect in any coherent way. Methodologically speaking, they fall under the rubric of relational or truncated comparisons­–­ that is, efforts to draw out associations but not necessary to infer any causal connections. Alternatively, I could have focused more on the technological turn in security governance from the perspective of global urbanism and the worldwide shift toward biometric identification and surveillance monitoring of unruly populations.19 In The Infrastructures of Security, I have stressed how the use of automated machines and prosthetic devices in Johannesburg are associated with the entrenchment and perpetuation of class/racial segregation. But beyond this claim, I could have delved more deeply into how privileged urban residents have come to see it as their duty and responsibility to protect themselves and their property by engaging in proactive approaches to combating crime that sometimes operate outside the rule of law and official sanction. The normalization of neoliberal values of personal and individual responsibility has gone hand in hand with the ideological turn that celebrates individual fulfillment over collective responsibility. What is lost in this entrenchment of the ethos of “responsibilized citizenry” is any collective sense of mutual aid and assistance under circumstances where legions of city dwellers are without regular work and without decent accommodation. In order to keep some semblance of control over an already lengthy manuscript, I have avoided being drawn into a more thorough engagement with scholarly discussion and debates that certainly would have aided in the analysis presented here but may well have led to unhelpful tangents and blind alleys. What has remained hidden from view in The Infrastructures of Security is a critical examination of those deep structural transformations in the nature of capitalism and its relation to state power. The exponential proliferation of privatized biometric data gathering and data processing has transformed rights of citizenship and modes of belonging.20 Entirely new fields of inquiry clustered around such new terms as carceral capitalism, biometric



Preface • xxvii

capitalism, digital capitalism, and surveillance capitalism reflect an awareness that modes of capital accumulation have evolved in ways unthinkable even two or three decades ago. This troubling turn—­captured by such terms as the carceral state and the biometric state—­has marked a watershed moment in the seismic shift toward the rollout of new modes of spatial governance that rely on automated technologies to monitor urban residents.21

Introduction The Permanent State of Emergency in the Post-­Liberal City For the inhabitants of the first world—­the increasingly cosmopolitan, extraterritorial world of global businessmen, global culture managers or global academics, state borders are leveled down, as they are dismantled for the world’s commodities, capital and finances. For the inhabitant of the second world, the walls of immigration controls, of residence laws, and of “clean streets” and “zero tolerance” policies, grow taller; the moats separating them from the sites of their desire and of dreamed-­up redemption grow deeper, while all bridges, at the first attempt to cross them, prove to be drawbridges. —Zygmunt Bauman1

Johannesburg emerged from the long shadow of white minority rule as a schizophrenic city divided into different socioeconomic camps housing people of quite different outlooks, aspirations, and life chances. Its original sin was tying so much of the fate of the city to the fortunes of the gold mining industry, a dependence that has faded exponentially over the decades since 1886 when itinerant miners George Harrison and George Walker made their serendipitous discovery of gold-­bearing outcroppings on the farm Langlaagte along the Witwatersrand. The roller-­coaster ride of the colossal gold mining industry produced enormous wealth for a handful of Randlords and their hangers-­on at the top but left scarred and contaminated landscapes, shattered lives, and intractable impoverishment in its wake at the bottom. Despite its flashiness and vibe, Johannesburg has remained a deeply divided city where the class and racial chasms of over a hundred years of greed and indifference lurk underneath the shiny surface. The “boosterist” image of Johannesburg at the start of the twenty-­first century as an emergent “world-­class” city is the by-­product of a narrowly framed

2 • the infrastructures of security

narrative that conceals desperation, poverty, and homelessness behind the comforting façade of cosmopolitan glitz and upscale luxury consumption. For the majority of urban residents, precarity is the condition of existence for everyday living. The steady accretion of such fortified, “post-­public” enclaves as citadel office complexes, enclosed shopping malls, gated residential communities, and themed entertainment zones has become a visible symptom of intensified spatial fragmentation, where urban residents are polarized between the extremes of the frightened rich and the desperate poor.2 The disjointed patchwork pattern of new city-­building efforts has given rise to what Paul Goldberger has aptly called “urbanoid environments”: sealed-­off, private places of luxury masquerading as sites of public congregation.3 The ludic, playful qualities of these fortified enclaves seem consciously designed to close off the gritty features of city life, to block out the distasteful, disreputable underside of urban poverty.4 The celebratory language used to hail the success of these revitalization efforts—­“world-­class” African city, the “Heartbeat of Africa,” the “City of Gold,” the “Gateway to Africa,” and so on—­is a triumphal gloss laid over the enduring class inequalities and racial divisions inherited from the apartheid past and perpetuated in the new urban aesthetic of fortification and exclusion.5 The steady expansion of privatized sites of enclosed luxury that have spread across the urban landscape of Johannesburg not only reflects the entrenchment of class privilege, where urban residents are polarized along a continuum divided between ostentatious wealth at one extreme and dire impoverishment at the other, but also signals the emergence of new mechanisms of social exclusion. While the propertied rich and the property-­less poor negotiate the same space, they live in entirely different worlds. On the one side, well-­to-­do residents of Johannesburg inhabit a cosmopolitan, extraterritorial world of global enterprise and transnational consumer culture. The dismantling of restrictions on the unimpeded flow of commodities, capital, and information has created a veritable smorgasbord of new opportunities for the propertied middle classes to experience the kinds of frictionless “global connections” available to the wealthy everywhere. In contrast, the casually employed, the poor, and the jobless are confronted with a withering array of barriers—­controlled access to post-­public places, immigration regulations, “clean streets” ordinances, and “zero tolerance” policies—­that restrict their movements, their opportunities, and their life chances on the market.6 Johannesburg resembles a hermetic city where places are sealed off from each other, removed from easy access, and sequestered behind protective



Introduction • 3

barriers. Open spaces—that is, sites without restricted access—­elicit a kind of primal fear associated with uncertainty and risk. Fortification is a kind of seduction, crystalizing space into a kind of permanent “fetish state” that brings to mind a still-­life photographic image of a walled compound. The message is clear: look, but do not come too close. The permanence of these highly visible, fortified enclosures—­with their sense of arid corporate calculation, their bunker architecture, private security patrols, sentry boxes, boom gates, and protected entrances—­stands in stark contrast with the impermanence of city life after apartheid: lively streetscapes peopled with curbside hawkers, itinerant peddlers, overcrowded taxi ranks, idle youth loitering on busy corners, tired women trudging homeward with their overloaded shopping bags. Hawking, squatting, and petty thievery are certainly not the only ways that urban poor have sought to appropriate the places of the imagined Wealthy City, but they are perhaps the most visible expressions. Laboring at menial jobs in small shops, at construction sites, and in wealthy suburban neighborhoods, the impoverished inhabitations of the marginalized zones of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Region move daily into the central city, arriving by train, taxi, or bus, and filling the downtown streets with their presence. The city could not function without this massive movement of casual workers across social and geographical boundaries. Yet the largely white middle-­class urban residents, who under apartheid had previously grown accustomed to rigid racial compartmentalization of city life, have now become suspicious of, if not hostile toward, the black underclass presence in the public spaces of the city.7 Efforts to implement this corporate-­driven strategy to “remake” the central city in the radiant image of a cosmopolitan, “world-­class” city has revolved around three interrelated spatial practices: the privatization of urban governance, the hardening of architectural design of the built environment, and the militarization of the streetscape. First, municipal authorities have introduced all sorts of new city ordinances, code enforcement bylaws, and other legal-­juridical instruments that have enabled them to more effectively police the streetscape and oversee the orderly use of urban space. This “militarization of urban space” has allowed city officials to promote the regulation of the volatile taxi industry, to clear hawkers off the pavements, to condemn and demolish derelict buildings, and to roust the homeless from their unsightly encampments. The policing of the streetscape has involved the installation of a state-­of-­the-­art closed-­circuit television (CCTV) surveillance system to monitor suspicious movements of street users, the deployment of mobile

4 • the infrastructures of security

police foot patrols to saturate the streetscape with “more cops on the beat,” and the constant harassment of the poor, the homeless, and the downtrodden who venture into the central city and wealthy suburban neighborhoods in search of ways of eking out a living.8 Second, the privatization of urban governance has involved the establishment of incorporated entities that, under the guise of public-­private partnerships, have usurped the kinds of duties and responsibilities that municipal authorities have conventionally assumed in ordering the cityscape. Under the aegis of City Improvement Districts (CIDs), large-­scale property owners have partitioned the urban landscape into distinct territorial enclaves over which they assert the legal right to regulate and control their use.9 The territorial reconfiguration has carved the urban landscape into variegated “islands of governmentality” where governance structures are neither uniform nor homogeneous.10 These modes of “polycentric governance” involve a multiplicity of diverse kinds of autonomous authorities (both public and private)—­ with “differing capacities, forms of power and resources, and operating at different scales”—­that overlap, and sometimes contradict, each other.11 CIDs represent a distinct kind of entrepreneurial approach to property-­led development, one that has relied on private security companies to provide armed mobile units working hand in glove with low-­paid security guards who are known as downtown “street ambassadors” and “outreach” foot patrols. Kept orderly and secure by an assortment of private security operations, these scattered islands of sequestered privilege stand in sharp contrast to the dwindling, atrophied public spaces that surround them.12 Third, and finally, hardened architectural design has involved the construction of citadel office complexes and other fortified enclosures that have turned their backs, both literally and figuratively, on the cityscape. With such social amenities as retail shops, eateries, and sites of social congregation locked away inside under the “watchful gaze” of private security, authorized users have no reason to venture into the surrounding streetscape.13 The “ferocious architecture” of high perimeter walls, road closures, and restricted entry to sequestered places has partitioned the urban landscape into a heterodox agglomeration of cocooned “sites of luxury” carved out of the disorderly, dangerous cityscape.14 Juxtaposed against the surrounding urban landscape of derelict open space, abandoned buildings, and littered streets, the “fortress effect” of such sequestered megastructures as BankCity, the Standard Bank precinct, and the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (Absa) “family of buildings” appear not as the unintended consequence of overly exuberant



Introduction • 5

architectural excess, but as “an explicit—­and in its own terms, successful—­ socio-­spatial strategy” of containment of urban blight, colonization of the surrounding streetscape, and exclusion of the poor and unwanted.15 These city-­building efforts have contributed to the suffocation of the kinds of open, congregating public spaces celebrated in the liberal imagination.16

New Modes of Urban Governability: Post-­Liberal Planning Principles and Spatial Regulation You take your life in your hands when venturing on to the streets of Johannesburg’s city centre. If the muggers don’t get you, the cowboy drivers will. —Shoneez Bulbulia17

In Johannesburg since the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy, city planners, policy experts, and municipal authorities have experimented with new modes of urban governance that have been adopted in aspirant world-­class cities in Europe and North America. Unlike conventional disciplinary strategies of social control that are organized around law enforcement and the apprehension of criminal offenders, these new approaches of urban governance seek to regulate the spaces urban residents occupy through “risk management” strategies that identify and minimize exposure to harm or danger.18 City officials, municipal authorities, and policing agencies seek to rationalize space by making the city intelligible through the establishment of clear lines of demarcation between public (open, accessible) and private (domesticated, protected) space.19 These mechanisms of spatial regulation—­or what some theorists have called “spatial governmentality”—­represent a new kind of preemptive “crime control,” an approach that seeks to produce safe and secure environments in site-­specific locations through the reduction, redistribution, and isolation of the risk of crime rather than its prevention or elimination altogether.20 Risk management strategies look upon and analyze the urban landscape through various “categories of menace,” where all non-­monitored territories, and those who inhabit them, are classified as potentially dangerous and hence worrisome.21 The expansion of this kind of punitive suspicion has gone hand in hand with the transformation of urban landscapes into attractive playgrounds geared toward middle-­class sensibilities.22 During the heyday of modernist city-­building, the liberal approach to

6 • the infrastructures of security

crime control typically amounted to a compromise, whereby a measure of individual liberty (including unencumbered movement and the right to assemble) was exchanged for collective security. Crime control consisted of responding to transgressions of the law, taking criminal suspects into custody after the alleged commission of a crime. In contrast, the post-­liberal approach has moved in the opposite direction, involving a trade-­off that allows collective security to take precedence over the maximization of individual choice. This imbalance has translated into the logic of fortification and exclusion.23 Unlike conventional law enforcement strategies that stress the apprehension of criminal offenders and punishment of offenses, these new post-­liberal modes of urban governance focus on the regulation, management, and control of urban space. By concentrating on specific locations (territory) instead of persons per se, these strategies of spatial regulation aim to produce a desirable normative order by pacifying, sanitizing, or purifying space, creating cocooned “liberated zones” for security-­conscious, middle-­ class urban residents, where those permitted to enter are shielded from unwanted aberrant behavior.24 These new modes of spatial management seek to regulate the use of urban space through the architectural design of enclosed places, the expanded use of electronic security paraphernalia, and the formation of novel kinds of privatized “property regimes” where title holders make use of legally binding restrictive covenants to limit place access to authorized users only. Spatial governance typically relies on various kinds of controlled access to build protective shields around such post-­public places as citadel office complexes, enclosed shopping malls, exclusive “members only” clubs, festival marketplaces, and gated residential estates. These exclusionary practices frequently include prohibitions against such “incivilities” as vagrancy, panhandling, loitering, and informal trading, targeting “offensive” and “deviant” behavior and people, usually the poor and homeless, who appear mischievous, annoying, unkempt, threatening, dangerous, or disorderly.25 The turn toward these new modes of spatial regulation is part of a complex reconfiguration of urban governance that is particularly apparent in those cities characterized by great socioeconomic inequalities and partitioned into fortified enclaves of luxury, on the one side, and abandoned and neglected places of confinement, on the other. Municipal authorities have turned to these new spatial management strategies in cities where “the contracting and retreating neo-­liberal state (and its security apparatus) is increasingly helpless in the face of escalating levels of violent crime and social disorder.”26 Spatial



Introduction • 7

regulation promotes safety for the privileged few by excluding those who are classified as dangerous, offensive, or unwanted.27 Crime is an outward sign, a disturbing symptom of a social order no longer tied together by social trust and shared values. Fear of crime “saturates” everyday conversations “about how public spaces and personal safety are understood.” The difficulties with clearly defining “fear of crime” endows the term with an aura of inexplicability. What we call fear of crime “might better be understood as a socio-­cultural construct” that addresses agoraphobic anxiety about unprotected public spaces as much as anything else. Narrative accounts of fear of crime in public spaces are often framed through the binaries of belonging/exclusion, insider/outsider, and order/disorder. Figuratively speaking, fear of crime has frequently translated into hostility to all strangers and often becomes conflated, blurred, and disguised with a visceral discomfort toward disorder and prejudice against the disruptive, unruly use of public space by unwanted Others, such as beggars, the homeless, and idle youths.28 Framed in this way, calls that promote “safer cities through environmental design” often boil down to demands to cleanse the streets and public spaces of “undesirables.”29 As Murray Lee has argued, fear of crime and the associated risk-­avoidance strategies are tools of neoliberal governance that construct “responsibilized” subjects as those persons who take it upon themselves to proactively manage their own safekeeping. Framed through the lens of “fear of crime,” risk avoidance becomes a shared responsibility that mobilizes urban residents to promote safety through collective action.30 The plethora of security initiatives undertaken by suburban neighborhood associations epitomizes this shared yearning for secure environments—­or what Hans Boutellier has called “safety utopia[s]”—­an elusive goal that is desired but never fully accomplished. To neglect the duty to steward one’s own personal safety amounts to a failure to fulfill the moral obligation attached to becoming an active and alert citizen responsible for collective safety.31 The fixation with crime (and the fear it engenders) has manifested itself in the feverish construction of protected enclaves, the installation of sophisticated security systems, and the adoption of stringent zoning regulations. As Nan Ellin has argued, “Form follows fear,” meaning the evolving shape of the built environment increasingly conforms to a preoccupation with danger and risk.32 Ironically, changes to the urban fabric intended to reduce risk and crime actually serve to exacerbate the fear of crime. Barriers, walls, and electronic surveillance systems—­the visible signs of defensive architecture—­have

8 • the infrastructures of security

contributed to the accentuation of urban fear “by increasing paranoia and distrust among people.”33 In response to the fear of crime, powerful stakeholders clustered around dominant real estate interests have tried to “retake” the central city through a combination of new urban management strategies (City Improvement Districts), fortification (spatial enclosures, siege architecture, street barriers), and private security policing (including CCTV surveillance and armed patrols). The normative rhetoric of city rejuvenation has focused on the insalubrities and disorderly chaos of the central city (appropriately captured in repeated references to the “crime and grime” syndrome). City improvements have concentrated on the specific parts of the city that the property market could support, thereby further exacerbating the fragmentation of the urban landscape, or what Peter Marcuse has called the “concentrated decentralization” of city space.34 Security has become the justification for stringent measures that undermine the ideal of free and open use of urban space, “from the physical barricading of particular places to the social exclusion of the unwanted.”35 Municipal authorities in Johannesburg have looked upon risk management strategies as essential to maintaining the competitive edge of the Johannesburg central city in the global economy. City builders have cobbled together an entrepreneurial vision of the postapartheid urban landscape that has enabled real estate capitalists and the forces of the market to take possession of the cityscape and reshape it to their own specific interests and ends, leaving the mass of the urban poor with a sense of loss, alienation, and estrangement.36 The fragmentation of the urban landscape into such territorial enclaves as enclosed shopping malls, cocooned commercial and retail centers, high-­rise office clusters, and entertainment districts, where an array of fortification and surveillance devices are superimposed onto the existing cityscape, has resulted in the emergence of radically new and complex logics of segregation, displacement, and dispossession.37

Oversized Role of Neighborhood Associations Beginning in the mid-­1990s, the expanded role of privately governed residential neighborhoods overseen by homeowners associations has signaled a “pivotal innovation” in the management of urban space.38 While the distinct spatial typologies commonly referred to as (master-­planned, privately managed) “gated communities” adopted restrictive covenants and other conditionalities



Introduction • 9

from the outset, the privatization of neighborhood governance in residential suburbs has taken place incrementally and in stages.39 The battle over illegal road closures starting in the late 1990s marked the opening wedge in the erosion in the power of city officials to control the public management of urban space and entrenchment of private interests to make and enforce their own rules. This shift in the locus of power from public authority to private interests has marked what amounts to a “quiet revolution” in urban “secessionist” politics. Almost without exception, homeowners and commercial business owners in the affluent and less-­than-­affluent residential suburbs of Johannesburg have banded together to create legally sanctioned neighborhood associations with clearly demarcated spatial boundaries separating one from another. While these neighborhood associations deal with such mundane vexations as vehicle parking, the maintenance of local parks, and trash removal, their principal focus is security governance and crime prevention. These associations have become the voice of residential homeowners in negotiating contracts with private security companies to ensure that they adequately provide collectively consumed protection services, including patrolling the public streets and armed response to criminal predations. These neighborhood associations have also assumed a principal role in working with local South African Police Service precincts to establish officially sanctioned community policing forums (CPFs). While the balance varies considerably, the security initiatives attached to neighborhood associations rely on paid staff (often part-­time) and a plethora of unpaid volunteers. Neighborhood associations rely on voluntary payments from homeowners and local businesses to fund their activities (including the publication of newsletters, the staging of regular meetings, and paying cleanup crews). As always, the “free-­rider” problem—­ circumstances in which residents decline to contribute to the general funds—­ means that they are frequently cash-­starved.40 Neighborhood associations do not form the kind of unitary and coherent entity invoked and imagined in the uplifting language of “community.” Rather, they constitute loose “constellations of multiple and often competing or coalescing social fragments,” divided along all sorts of personal rivalries and material interests. In the end, what holds neighborhood associations together is shared consensus over the sanctity of private property, the right to self-­defense, and the collective desire for safety and security.41 One particularly significant mode of privatized micro-­ governance revolves around transforming atomized property-­holding residents of suburban neighborhoods (who are sequestered in their own private domiciles)

10 • the infrastructures of security

into “self-­governing citizens who perceive themselves to be ethically attached to a community of homeowners.”42 Insecurity and fear of crime are the ties that bind otherwise self-­interested (and self-­serving) residents into a like-­ minded assemblage of self-­aware citizens who rally around strategies to combat crime.43 The construction of “self-­governing citizens” entails the inculcation of new values–­–­namely, an awareness of one’s surroundings that involves perpetual alertness and individual preparedness. This collective logic of governing through community dovetails with “the individualized ethos of neo-­ liberal politics: choice, personal responsibility,” and “[self-­]control over one’s own fate.”44 “Self-­governing citizens” are constantly on guard “against the emergence of any and all possible threats.” Suspicion is a key component of this preemptive disposition, with every individual “encouraged to assume a habitually anxious, cautious engagement with anyone or anything deemed unfamiliar and potentially threatening.”45 While the private initiatives undertaken in suburban neighborhoods might appear to be a purely local affair, the work that neighborhood associations perform is inextricably linked to wider social transformations in urban governance that extend well beyond the boundaries of any particular places. Couched in the uplifting language of responsibilized citizenry and local accountability, this shifting of the conventional tasks undertaken by the municipal administration to private neighborhood associations suggests a reconfiguration of the social contract between public authorities and private citizens, thereby enabling market rationality to shape decision-­making.46 The impetus behind the calls for citizens to take responsibility for their own protection arises not only from the inability of conventional law enforcement agencies to guarantee security but also from shifting structures of power whereby municipal authorities have deliberately and self-­consciously withdrawn from providing all but the most rudimentary policing services for suburban neighborhoods, ceding effective sovereignty to private security providers.47 Insecure and fearful because of the lack of public law enforcement, suburban residents have thrown their lot in with private security companies, who are only happy to oblige. With the assistance of such companies, neighborhood associations seek to establish micro-­regimes of spatialized power that operate semi-­autonomously from public law enforcement.48 In Johannesburg as elsewhere, the “policing landscape” is inhabited by a hybrid collection of social organizations, companies, and groups who engage, in varying ways, in the practice of maintaining order and providing security.49



Introduction • 11

Those who perform this security function use a broad range of strategies to achieve the varying visions of what they consider “acceptable conduct.” By undermining the classical liberal ideal of the state monopoly over the use of force and violence to achieve law and order, the practice of everyday policing unsettles ideas about uniform sovereignty monopolized by state agencies. This shifting terrain of urban governance has allowed social organizations and groups outside the formal legal jurisdiction of public law enforcement to negotiate what Caroline Humphrey in another context has referred to as “localized forms of sovereignty,” or “nested sovereignty.”50 In Johannesburg, public policing agencies do not always have the administrative capacity to fulfill their official role in the work of crime prevention. Private security companies, voluntary neighborhood watch groups, and what amounts to semi-­organized vigilante groups have often filled in the void left by the retreat of public law enforcement agencies from the field of crime prevention. To borrow a concept developed by Sarah-­Jane Cooper-­Knock, private security companies, along with a host of other unofficial, non-­state organizations and groups that function as “providers” of security, effectively negotiate compromises with public law enforcement agencies to construct “permissive spaces” where they acquire a modicum of de facto sovereignty to “perform security” with a great deal of impunity outside the rule of law. This idea of “permissive space” is an elastic and flexible one. As Cooper-­Knock has argued, “Those within permissive spaces can act as sovereigns but this sovereignty is as fragile as the negotiated space itself.”51 The tenor and tone of the negotiations that create permissive spaces take place along a spectrum that ranges from amicable to antagonistic. “Permissible spaces” are the negotiated outcome of tacit arrangements that arise out of ongoing exchange. “This exchange need not be symmetrical,” Cooper-­Knock says, “and the ‘consensus’ reached in such negotiations may be fraught and shallow.”52 These negotiated compromises and tacit arrangements that enable non-­ state organizations to exercise extralegal coercion without fear of legal reprisals or accountability take place under circumstances in which the legal framework supporting de jure state sovereignty is formally in place.53 While public law enforcement agencies have never completely abandoned de jure sovereignty, they have often conferred de facto sovereignty within permissible spaces to non-­state organizations, including private security companies, neighborhood associations, and community watch groups. By turning a purposeful and selective blind eye to violations of the rule of law, public law

12 • the infrastructures of security

enforcement agencies effectively cede de facto sovereignty within permissible spaces, enabling private security companies to engage in unabated extralegal coercion carried out in the name of crime prevention.54 Within these permissible spaces, neighborhood associations have unilaterally closed off roads with iron fences and installed unauthorized boom gates, claiming the moral right to protect themselves from crime. While municipal officials have complained and threatened lawsuits, in the end they did next to nothing.55 Defying the rule of law, private security companies have typically engaged in “spatial cleansing,” often stopping vehicles and searching occupants without permission, physically assaulting suspected criminals, forcefully escorting unwanted persons out of neighborhoods, using pepper spray to drive away prostitutes, and “roughing up” vagabond “street kids.”56 Within the permissive space of well-­to-­do residential neighborhoods, public law enforcement agencies have allowed extralegal practices, carried out in the name of providing security, to continue unabated and have even conferred some degree of legitimacy on the kinds of everyday policing that pay little attention to the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties.57

Exclusionary Urbanism and the Hardening of the Urban Landscape The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule. —Walter Benjamin58

However noble the intentions of urban planners, the overall effects of the municipal “cleanup” programs have been to chase the urban poor away from where they are not wanted. Besides frequent efforts to eliminate informal curbside trading, military-­like offensives aimed at forcibly removing unauthorized squatters from dilapidated buildings were part of a broader strategic campaign to effectively “bleach away” the poor.59 While the worst “slumlords” managed to evade payment of arrears owed the municipality for water and electricity services, city officials have tried to coax landlords who have neglected their properties back to the inner city with promises of tax write-­ offs. In order for city authorities to achieve their aim of luring business investments in residential and commercial property in the inner city with all sorts of incentives, they have focused on squeezing out the poor.60 For most inner-­



Introduction • 13

city residents, rents are arbitrarily high, water and electricity supplies are haphazard at best, and environmental conditions are unhealthy. Insecurity and danger are everyday realities. Yet eviction orders routinely shift the blame for hazardous, unhealthy, and dangerous living conditions onto the poor. The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) officers have targeted sidewalk hawkers, using the stringent enforcement of city bylaws to effectively criminalize their meager enterprises. By confiscating their goods and issuing huge fines to those least likely to afford to pay, municipal authorities have brought severe hardship to the poorest and most marginal street traders who cannot secure places for themselves in the authorized informal marketplaces scattered around the cityscape. Police officials have defended their aggressive street patrols and periodic roadblocks as a requisite step to apprehend criminals and reduce the crime rate, but these actions have also disguised a strong xenophobic current. Immigrants and dark-­complexioned South African citizens have been routinely victimized by overzealous police and private security officials.61 The relentless assault on poor inner-­city squatters has transformed the marginal spaces of the inner city into spatial battlefields. Municipal authorities have enlisted the muscle of public policing agencies and private security companies to mount draconian “crime blitzes” in inner-­city neighborhoods. A long litany of documentary films, including Law and Disorder in Johannesburg (2008; director, Louis Theroux), The Battle for Johannesburg (2010; director, Rahid Desai), and Fighting for a Living: The Streets at Stake and The Road Home (2016; Socio-­Economic Rights Institute [SERI]) have chronicled persistent battles over access to decent housing pitting municipal authorities against poor residents of the Johannesburg inner-­city neighborhoods. Time after time, law enforcement agencies, including the JMPD, the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the South African National Defense Force (SANDF), along with private security companies (particularly the infamous “Red Ants”) have carried out raids in inner-­city neighborhoods in search of illegal weapons, stolen property, drug caches, and suspected criminals. Municipal authorities have consistently argued that criminals have routinely used (so-­called) hijacked buildings as springboards for drug dealing and armed robberies in the area.62 These security practices, which amount to a kind of militarized policing, produce “separate and unequal” spaces.63 Police raids have also included cleanup campaigns and street sweeps in blighted neighborhoods like Yeoville, Bertrams, Berea, Joubert Park, and Hillbrow. Law enforcement agencies have regularly targeted unauthorized she-

14 • the infrastructures of security

beens, unlicensed street traders, and unregistered telephone kiosk operators. They prefer to carry out these “crime blitzes” during the festive season just before Christmas, since criminal activities have tended to rise at this time.64 Despite a flattening of crime rates in the central city, Johannesburg has remained South Africa’s most dangerous city. In the years 2018 and 2019, law enforcement officials reported an average of 220 street robberies a day. SAPS spokespeople advised potential victims of street crime to walk in groups and not entertain strangers who approach with questions. Despite the seriousness of aggravated street robberies, most go unreported.65 City officials concluded that the only way to tackle the mayhem was to use military-­style raids on crime-­ridden buildings. These invasions typically net scores of suspected criminals, particularly undocumented immigrants. Top-­ranking police officials have acknowledged that undocumented immigrants are no more crime-­prone than ordinary South African citizens, but they are more likely to be lured into the thriving criminal underground—­or to be preyed upon—­because of their desperation to survive, homeless, and their desire to secure official permission to remain in South Africa, often by illegal means. Faced with suspicion, distrust, and hostility from ordinary South African citizens, immigrants have gravitated to the anonymity of such inner-­city neighborhoods as Hillbrow, Joubert Park, Berea, and Yeoville. By the mid-­1990s, Hillbrow had become South Africa’s “main refugee camp,” for which most illegal entrants to the country make a beeline, settle in for a few months to get their bearings and to establish residency through false identity papers, and then move on to somewhere else. The central elements in keeping alive criminal networks in the inner city are buildings and residential hotels that have degenerated into nodes of prostitution, drug dealing, gun running, and other nefarious enterprises.66 These places provide criminals with staging areas from which they are able to ply their trade locally as well as coordinate criminal networks not only throughout the metropolitan region but across Southern Africa as well. These dilapidated buildings in decaying high-­rise residential neighborhoods have provided itinerant work seekers, along with undocumented immigrants and those engaged in crime, with inexpensive places to stay where they can easily blend into the overcrowded surroundings without attracting undue attention from public policing agencies and city officials.67 The socioeconomic inequalities that are so evident in Johannesburg are symptoms of the yawning gap that has opened between affluent urban residents who have benefited from private property ownership and accumulated



Introduction • 15

wealth and people who have suffered from joblessness and lack of opportunities for upward mobility. This blend of inclusionary sources of privilege and exclusionary mechanisms of marginality are structural in nature. While these socioeconomic inequalities were inherited from the long history of white minority rule, unequal life chances and differential power relations have endured since the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy. The structural violence (often invisible and silent) associated with profound inequalities, exploitation, and poverty has shaped the ordinary, taken-­for-­granted patterns of everyday life, thereby reinforcing and reproducing the social distances between the comfortably rich and the desperately poor. The operations of this structural violence—­what Rob Nixon has termed “slow violence”—­are deeply embedded in the urban social fabric. “Slow violence” is “neither spectacular nor instantaneous” but rather is incremental and cumulative. With slow violence, victimization often goes unnoticed and unrecognized. It is “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction,” where victimhood is often “dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.”68 As Nancy Scheper-­Hughes has suggested, “structural violence ‘naturalizes’ poverty, sickness, hunger, and premature death, erasing their social and political origins so that they are taken for granted and no one is held accountable except the poor themselves.”69 The accumulated effects of this slow violence invariably spill over into a range of illicit survivalist tactics, ranging from unauthorized squatting, unlawful trading, and petty theft to organized criminality. The sheer scale and ubiquity of these “desperate measures” undertaken by the urban poor to “get by” or “muddle through” means that uncertainty, fear, and insecurity have become “routinized” or “normalized” as integral features of everyday life.70 The realities of these popular illegalities have triggered a myriad of “fear-­management” strategies designed to exclude the urban poor from places where they are not wanted. The fear of crime has served to legitimate the punitive violence of public law enforcement agencies and private security companies that operate with a great deal of impunity.71

The New Military Urbanism Innovative technologies designed for modern asymmetric warfare have gradually made their way into the terrain of urban crime fighting. Thermal

16 • the infrastructures of security

imaging, lasers, facial and behavioral recognition systems, remote satellite monitoring, and biometric measurements like fingerprint identification and retinal scans have gradually accumulated in the militarized arsenal of new weapons at the disposal of policing (both public and private) agencies. The use of automated and autonomous “machine systems” that store and analyze vast quantities of data information embedded in sensor devices has enabled policing agencies to track movements of individuals and to surreptitiously target suspected criminals.72 According to Stephen Graham, the new military urbanism consists of an evolving terrain of combat readiness (and assertiveness) where the ideas, doctrines, rules, techniques, and application of officially sanctioned force and violence that are associated with “state war-­making” are deployed to identify danger, manage risk, and prevent criminal violence in urban space.73 In tackling unlawful practices that have produced the disorderly city, public policing agencies have adopted policies that resemble what Paul Watt has termed the “nomadic war machine.”74 In conducting “crime blitzes” in the inner city, in establishing temporary roadblocks, in saturating crime “hot spots,” and in carrying out sweeps of homeless encampments, public policing agencies restlessly move about, rushing from one insecure site to another, temporarily occupying space with the aim of eradicating lawlessness and enforcing by-­law infringements. Yet, as Paul Watt has argued, “it is precisely this temporary holding of space which is central to that nomadic war machine.”75 Couched in the rhetoric of normative order, neutral-­sounding terms like “public safety,” “security,” and “risk management” suggest a defensive posture in response to (real or imagined) threat and danger. A whole range of overlapping and intersecting “monitoring mechanisms”–­–­including neighborhood watch schemes, gated residential communities, CCTV cameras, security guards (both static and mobile), police stop-­and-­search, and access control systems for workplaces, private residences, and office complexes–­–­ have formed the backbone for governing the policing of “everyday insecurities.” In contrast, the practice of “urban pacification” involves offensive action directed at perceived lawlessness and disorder through not only the aggressive policing of popular illegalities and delinquent activities but also elimination of what are regarded as criminal spaces.76 Pacification strategies adopt an exclusionary law enforcement approach rather than an inclusive urban management one, not only targeting those categories of “lawless” persons who are considered the main agents of chaos but also criminalizing and eliminating basic survivalist strategies, such as begging, itinerant hawking,



Introduction • 17

and informal street trading.77 Put in a wider framework, pacification involves not only the protection of private property rights as the bedrock of the rule of law but also the maintenance of the existing social order rooted in gross social inequalities.78 City officials have linked the goals of regulating urban space with the need to combat crime, which (in their minds) includes everything from bylaw infractions and street begging to armed robberies and carjacking.79 Undeterred by appeals to basic civil rights and due process, high-­ranking municipal authorities have identified homeless people, unlicensed traders, unlawful squatters, panhandlers, and petty criminals as the principal threats to urban order and the main culprits standing in the way of making an “African world-­ class city.”80 Public policing agencies have sought to reshape the administrative mechanisms of regulatory governance by introducing sweeping municipal ordinances and bylaws prohibiting begging, panhandling, “sleeping rough” in public parks, and loitering in order to cleanse the social gathering places that appeal to the privileged sensibilities of affluent residents. City officials have portrayed these efforts to criminalize behavior that is offensive or unpleasant to affluent residents as necessary to secure their comfortable lifestyles. This discourse of safety and security is the legitimating rhetoric that public policing officials have used to justify increasingly violent assaults on the livelihood activities of the urban poor and on the marginal spaces they inhabit.81 In their public pronouncements, law enforcement agencies have employed the shrill language of “zero tolerance” policing to justify their moral crusades aimed at “cleaning up” disorderly urban landscapes.82 The discourses of crime and insecurity discursively divide the urban landscape into opposing and antagonistic camps: on the one side, what are figuratively constructed as social congregating spaces for respectable, law-­ abiding urban residents and, on the other, what are imagined as disorderly spaces inhabited by lawless city dwellers.83 Security governance—­or the securitization of urban space—­involves both the production of disposability and the practices of punitive outlawing of those deemed too disorderly to belong to the city in a rightful way. Punitive law enforcement measures thus produce distinctive “castaway categories” to designate “undesirables”—­urban outcasts and unwanted “outsiders”—­who are at once disposable and unlawful.84 This stigmatization has reinforced the boundaries separating those who belong to the mainstream of urban life and those who may be “contaminating others.”85 Grounded in the rhetoric of law and order, these revanchist modes of policing create a liminal state of extralegal abjection for these “unwanted persons”

18 • the infrastructures of security

who exist outside the protection of the law and are deprived of its benefits while at the same time being subject to its constraints.86 This stigmatized class of individuals—­emblematic of uncanny strangers who allegedly “survive by parasitism and by their wits”—­constitutes a surplus population for whom there is no regular work, no stable source of income, and no fixed domicile. They are forced to occupy those nomadic, in-­between spaces of abjection that exist at the margins of urban respectability.87 These defamed groups of people are guilty of no crime but that of occupying a nomadic space disconnected from the mainstream of urban life—­“potential criminals,” as Anthony Vidler has put it, “outside the law not for a crime committed but for what might be committed in the future as the product of a wayward life.”88 Despite the great diversity between individuals who happen to come under the scrutinizing gaze of CCTV cameras, the common denominator in the determination of “criminal suspects” consists of a narrow blend of physiognomic characteristics. Those deemed “suspicious persons” conform to a narrow profile: young black males, especially two or more riding in a car or several walking along suburban streets. To be sure, public policing agencies and private security companies typically treat criminal suspects as a clearly identifiable social group. Of course, the idea of “suspicion” is socially constructed. Under circumstances in which crime is rampant, public law enforcement agencies and private security companies have become preoccupied with constructing otherness, monitoring perceived outsiders, and harassing those at the margins of urban life. Yet this transformation of “suspicious persons” into an ill-­defined, all-­encompassing category formed the groundwork for collapsing all varieties of crime (ranging from opportunistic petty theft to well-­planned and -­executed house burglaries) under a single generic “type” and for justifying the use of extralegal coercion in expelling the urban poor from places where they were not wanted.89 The stress on securitization emanates from an imagined set of protocols regarding the proper use, design, and aesthetic displace of urban space.90 The creation and implementation of various legal instruments (bylaw enforcement), policing tactics (“crime blitzes”), and social control strategies aimed at the “cleansing of the built environment and the streets of the physical and human detritus” that stands in the way of realizing the vision of an “African world-­class city” have made the securitization of urban space possible.91 Taken together, these punitive measures aimed at “securing insecurities” reflect how public policing agencies have routinely engaged in what has amounted to a



Introduction • 19

low-­intensity war against perceived “disorder”: security operations intended to control and discipline spaces.92 Public policing practices have been key to the maintenance of a certain kind of order—­a condition of precarious fluidity where the fear and distrust of ordinary people havee overshadowed their respect and confidence. All in all, disorder and instability exceed the capacity of law enforcement agencies “to discipline or punish.”93 In a porous culture of law enforcement and law breaking, public policing agencies have turned to the performative use of force and violence to establish their presence. The performances of police power involving the massive use and choreographed display of force aim more to symbolically assert authority than they seek to establish order and stability per se.94 City officials have sought to temper public anxiety about crime and insecurity through high-­profile police raids and visible policing. As a general rule, “anticrime” blitzes have included mass arrests and roundups of “illegal immigrants,” roadblocks, seizures of contraband goods, nighttime raids on unauthorized squatters in “bad buildings,” and crackdowns on informal trading. Taken as a whole, these law enforcement operations amount to a kind of theatrical performance, a choreographed display of force “calibrated for the maximum visual impact.”95 It is this “spectacle of security itself ” that enables public policing agencies to make themselves visible to urban residents “in ways that could only serve to remind” rich and poor residents alike, as Lisa Weeden has argued in another context, of how “absent” they usually are. Under circumstances where crime prevention strategies are not particularly effective, public policing agencies have routinely produced “sporadic, intermittent assertions of power” that give the impression of firm control.96 Paramilitary policing in the name of crime prevention allows the formal apparatus of law and order “to act like a state,” in Weeden’s words, before a captive audience of rich and poor alike. These spectacular theatrical displays of force are a constant reminder to the urban poor that the repressive arm of the state apparatus “is there after all.”97 This turn toward the “militarization of urban space” raises questions about the stability and endurance of the postapartheid ideals of tolerance, social rights, and respect for civil liberties. Punitive policing practices have brought about the erosion of the “basic organizational and normative architectures” that laid down guarantees of formal equalities under the law, even under conditions of extreme disparities of wealth and income. The liberal

20 • the infrastructures of security

social contract that defined the end of white minority rule and the inauguration of parliamentary democracy hangs in the balance.98 Although public law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system are privileged social institutions that establish the juridical framework for the rule of law, there is nothing that inherently makes them bound by existing legal norms. This ambiguity makes public law enforcement agencies vulnerable to crossing over what Giorgio Agamben called “the point of indistinction between violence and law,” or that “threshold on which [extralegal] violence passes over into law and law passes over into [extralegal] violence.”99 This blurring of the distinction between the legitimate use of force and the illegitimate display of extralegal violence calls into question a singular conception of the rule of law.100

New Modes of Urban Discipline Crime in Johannesburg has become “territorial in nature.” Traffic gridlock, darkened streets, and busy intersections provide opportunistic sites for “armed highwaymen” to steal from unsuspecting drivers.101 The spatial dimensions of anticrime initiatives are essential to an understanding of the various approaches seeking to address the transformation of urban space into a virtual battlespace involving armed security operatives, mobile patrols, shootouts with suspected criminals, surveillance, target hardening, road closures, the extralegal tactics of stop-­and-­frisk, and the forcible removal of those perceived as criminal threats. The idea of territory and territorial control have become central features of urban life, giving a spatial dimension to concerns with urban security in which specific locations (crime hot spots and “no-­go” areas) become contested sites subject to military-­like intervention and saturation.102 Armed confrontations between private security operatives and criminal gangs are common occurrences and often involve the use of extreme force that results in death or serious injury.103 Driven by the real fear of harm, the response to crime is largely coercive and punitive. The conjoined forces of social order—­for instance, city officials, neighborhood associations, public law enforcement agencies, and private security companies—­have largely abandoned hope of transforming those marginalized urban residents who fall outside the mainstream of urban life into subservient subjects who obediently abide by the law.104 Those urban dwellers who struggle to find decent work and stable housing are increasingly



Introduction • 21

policed in ways that focus less on strategies designed to improve their conditions of existence and more on mechanisms designed to ensure that they do not jeopardize or disrupt the normative expectations of affluent, property-­ owning urban residents who seek predictable encounters and stable interactions. The forces of social order have fashioned new modes of discipline that produce tranquil, sanitized urban spaces that allow for affluent residents to practice the consumerist lifestyles that serve as the cornerstone of their claims to urban citizenship. These “territorial technologies of rule” seek to manage risk through the deliberate monitoring of those circulating persons who enter and exit tightly controlled spaces.105 As a general rule, private security companies “stretch the law”–­–­that is, they bend formal legalities to conform to the circumstances in which they find themselves in the field. Private security operatives possess rights no different from those of ordinary South African citizens. They can detain (make a “citizen’s arrest” of) individuals suspected of committing Section 1 offences–­ –­that is, serious crimes including armed robbery, burglary, and assault. The vagueness of existing legal statutes allows for citizens to detain persons who have not only committed Section 1 offenses but also those who may be suspected of about to commit one. The looseness of the term “suspicion” provides private security armed response teams with a great deal of latitude to arbitrarily and unilaterally decide on the spot to act at their own discretion. It is almost true by definition that two or more young black men walking or riding in a vehicle qualify as “suspicious characters.” Private security armed response teams routinely stop these young men for questioning. If the men cannot account for why they are where they are and their precise intentions, private security operatives regard this lack of clarity as “suspicious behavior.” Suspicion by itself provides sufficient legal justification enabling private security operatives to detain these young men against their will. As a general rule, private security operatives ask occupants of a vehicle if they can open the trunk. Security teams regard the refusal to comply with this request as tantamount to “suspicious behavior,” thereby legitimating their arbitrary decision to detain the occupants and search the car.106

The Technological Turn in Security Governance Infrastructural and technological innovations aimed at improving the effectiveness of security systems have transformed how policing agencies seek to

22 • the infrastructures of security

make urban landscapes safe and secure. Residential neighborhoods, business strongpoints (banks and corporate office buildings), gated residential estates, and commercial complexes (upscale shopping malls) have become theaters of operation for private security governance. Surrounded and interlaced with layers of protection designed to ward off criminality, these fortified enclaves resemble “bubbles of security” floating in a tempestuous sea of uncertainty.107 Yet urban security is never an “accomplished fact” but always a continuously negotiated, disputed, and contingent terrain. In this sense it is more appropriate to talk of “spaces of securitization,” which are “always-­already in-­the-­making,” never quite settled and stabilized, and always susceptible to breakdown.108 Securing the urban landscapes of tomorrow necessarily entails more than simply the extension of such conventional strategies of high perimeter walls and electrified fencing, road closures and security gates, armed guards and sentry posts, mobile patrolling and neighborhood watch groups. In marketing their commercial products to willing buyers, security professionals have experimented with all sorts of technoscientific solutions to preemptive crime prevention and risk management.109 At a time when cyber-­digital technologies have come to dominate the realm of security, border making has experienced a profound transformation. The “artificial perimeters” provided by CCTV cameras and other remote technologies like GPS tracking devices have supplemented those existing barriers like high perimeter walls, security gates, and electrified fencing, which physically enclose space.110 Over the past several decades, advances in information (and communication) technologies have created new opportunities for revolutionizing security infrastructures. Enabled by high-­speed computer processing software capabilities and marked by the collection and analysis of vast amounts of real-­time information, new technologies geared toward surveillance and monitoring have often intentionally surpassed the limited scope of the human senses. Technological advances in such devices as high-­ quality surveillance cameras, biometric personal identification, and security systems for office complexes and gated residential estates offer the promise (but not yet fully realized) of acquiring “the seemingly infinite catchment and infinitesimal account of human actions.” As Gretchen Soderlund has argued, “charting, tracking, and mapping functions” of advanced technological systems have greatly expanded the capabilities for “quantifying social behaviors and detecting misbehaviors,” completely unsettling conventional approaches to urban safety and security that relied on antiquated notions of “eyes and ears” on the street.111



Introduction • 23

Increasingly, automated, robotic technologies and “capacious, ubiquitous, and networked machines” animate and mobilize future security imaginaries. Securing urban landscapes through self-­learning machines has moved from the realm of science fiction into actual practice. The so-­called fourth industrial revolution of robotic and automation technologies has triggered technical innovation in networked security systems. Enabled by unprecedented expansion in computing capacity, vast quantities of data filtered “through powerful algorithms embedded in digital platforms,” the capability of machines to do the work of security has expanded greatly. Technological innovations have opened up vast new horizons for significantly extended application of robotics and automation to security production, focused specifically on the surveillance and profiling of crime and criminals.112 Technology companies make all sorts of promises about the efficiencies and effectiveness of their security products. Corporate clients and homeowners alike seem mesmerized by a withering array of new “smart” gadgets. Advances in motion-­and seismic-­sensing technologies and automated “smart” system design have greatly expanded the capabilities of remote surveillance. Securitizing space is increasingly conducted via complex, autonomous, and networked sensor systems, digital technologies, and automated CCTV surveillance cameras. Instruments for the management of public space have increasingly drawn on novel alliances between artificial intelligence, machine-­learning capabilities, and automated platforms designed to respond autonomously without direct human intervention.113 The “technologization of security” rests on the imagined condition of the possibility of control from a distance.114 This emergent “technostructure” of security consists of the introduction of ubiquitous information and biometric technological devices, such as body scans, automatic facial recognition systems, smart cards, national ID cards, location (geospatial) satellite-­tracking devices, CCTV surveillance cameras, and a plethora of other data-­driven technologies aimed at collecting “intelligence.”115 The collection, storage, assemblage, interpretation, and analysis of huge quantities of raw data/information provide the necessary platform for what Jeremy Crampton has called “algorithmic governance.”116 New security practices increasingly rely on “remote control” triggers, biometric measurement devices, smart technologies, digitized data capture and storage, and a host of other filtering, screening, and scanning mechanisms.117 These “dataveillance” techniques amount to an “almost hyper-­inductive world of new ‘facts’  .  .  . generated by bits and bytes of data smashed together and parsed through algorithms both humanly created and artificially generated

24 • the infrastructures of security

through machine learning technologies.”118 Hybridized systems of charting, tracking, and mapping produce vast quantities of real-­time information about particular social spaces and the activities that take place in them. They create time-­sensitive visual and quantitative records available for scrutiny and analysis, proactive response, and crime detection.119 The vast assemblage of novel information technologies has come to resemble systems of command and control. As Gretchen Soderlund has argued, the meteoric rise of “real-­time surveillance and monitoring technologies operating across an array of sense and cognitive modalities, together with high-­speed and reflexive informational feedback mechanisms, performance-­ driven auto-­ regulatory mechanisms, and computational algorithms for ‘viewing’ and responding to large-­scale transactional processes” have fundamentally transformed the capacity to integrate coincident information and hence to act quickly and decisively in response to circumstances.120 What Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson call the “surveillant assemblage” consists of a heterogeneous collection of intelligence gathering and command-­ and-­control systems whose connectivity depends upon their seamless and transparent interoperability.121 Building sophisticated machines that “can process and recognize images as accurately as human monitors has been “a holy grail of artificial research since the early 1960s.” Over the past five years, advances in “deep learning” approaches to AI, in which algorithms that process input data “learn through trial-­and-­error cycles,” have enabled computers to correctly recognize objects or faces with a reasonable degree of accuracy (under somewhat ideal conditions). At root, the aim of these security technologies is to create data mosaics to identify potential criminals and predict criminality.122 This technophilia has spilled over into a fixation with the aerial dimension of security systems.123 New, innovative “technologies of power” have captured the skyways and the atmosphere above.124 In cities around the world, security experts have increasingly experimented with a wide range of up-­to-­date technologies of military origin for the “top-­down” surveillance of urban landscapes from the air.125 Rooted in the military fantasies of technological omnipresence and risk assessment, all objects in the field of vision that are not transparent and easily identifiable become a suspicious threat to security.126 Military surveillance technologies have increasingly penetrated the design of urban environments and infrastructure, watching over terrain, restricting certain forms of movement, interfering with particular kinds of social interaction, and enhancing control over urban landscapes.127



Introduction • 25

The “verticalization” of security systems foregrounds a host of infrastructural and technological innovations that have transformed the way policing agencies monitor and protect urban space.128 Aerial technologies like CCTV cameras and pilotless aerial vehicles (or drones) constitute a kind of “virtual fence” that closes over urban space. These socio-­technological “apparatuses” provide a unique and strategic vantage point from which to survey the operational terrain, observe crime hot spots, and monitor “persons of interest and anomalous activities.”129 The development of technologically driven “vertical security” systems depends upon both a “hard” (material) infrastructure of utility poles, underground cables, command-­and-­control centers, information storage facilities, and locational tracking devices, along with the “soft” (immaterial) infrastructure of high-­speed wireless signaling and such synoptic technologies as digital imaging, high-­resolution cameras with enhanced night vision capabilities, global positioning system (GPS), and geographical information system (GIS) techniques and software. Camera-­fitted drones, remote sensor devices, locational tracking devices, utility poles, and helicopters bring together technologies and mechanical instruments that bridge the gap between the ground and the sky. Taken together, “assemblages of the vertical”—­to borrow a phrase from Jeremy Crampton—­“not only reconfigure the material and digital architectures of securitization, but also project it through a three-­dimensional Cartesian grid of depth, breadth and height.”130 The increasing fascination with “going aerial,” or using vertical space above the terrain of the urban streetscape, has become a new frontier in security governance.131 In the imagination of security experts, aerial superiority—­or the “politics of verticality”—­offers the fantasy of “full spectrum dominance”–­–­that is, in military terminology, the ability to achieve superiority over all dimensions of a targeted battlespace.132 The enhanced capabilities of aboveground technologies have greatly extended what Anna Feigenbaum and Anja Kanngieser have called “atmospheric policing.”133 By functioning as an extension of the human eye, these innovative aerial devices, such as CCTV surveillance cameras, drones, satellites, helicopters, and even telesurveillance balloons, introduce a “machinic-­prosthetic view,” which effectively extends human vision capability across space.134 The vertical gaze of these instruments of surveillance offers a kind of unobstructed view by transforming the field of vision from a “two-­dimensional surface on a horizontal plane into three-­dimensional volume.”135 The use of aerial technologies amounts to the “vertical militarization” of urban landscapes.136 Policing agencies mobilize the vertical capabilities of

26 • the infrastructures of security

“seeing from above” in carrying out surveillance as a way of overcoming the limitations of a horizontal gaze focused on two-­dimensional space, or what James Scott referred to as the “friction of terrain.”137 The “aerial gaze,” or view from above, “complements and addresses the shortcomings of a horizontal gaze.”138 The use of a wide range of atmospheric devices has expanded the panoptic surveillance reach for policing agencies. This colonization of atmospheric space has not only embodied the technological turn in security infrastructures, but it has also entrenched the logic of a permanent vigilance.139 Crime prevention strategies involve sequences of intelligence gathering combined with data analysis and interpretation. By sifting through masses of accumulated information, data processing machines equipped with AI use algorithmic calculations to assemble objects—­“suspicious persons” engaging in questionable behaviors—­that have been identified within some environment or milieu.140 These objects—­which Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, Alison Williams have described, using military terminology, as “air-­targets”—­refer to suspicious persons on the ground that are identified for monitoring from above. These practices of air targeting are not merely the outcome of improvements and refinements within technologies of vision but also an expansion in the capacities to sort through, analyze, and interpret vast amounts of data through the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning. Aerial targeting focuses on the construction of objects that are in themselves signs, or “markers,” of a relational network of criminal activities. By way of illustration, carjacking is not simply the act of stealing vehicles. It is first and foremost only a single moment in a chain of transactions and monetary exchanges bringing together all sorts of shady characters engaged in a criminal enterprise.141

Shadow Policing As an inherently ambiguous term, the notion of “policing” refers to the myriad forms of social regulation and control that operate within and across urban space rather than to any singular or coherent institution. Put another way, policing—­as a mode of social control—­is a social practice that is undertaken by social groups and organizations of all kinds: private companies and public law enforcement agencies, technological systems, and other mechanisms of day-­to-­day governance. Taken together, these constitute the core elements of the governance assemblage through which social regulation takes place.142



Introduction • 27

For all intents and purposes, policing (or “order maintenance”) is an elastic concept, typically associated with a variety of public security functions, including law enforcement, order maintenance, crime prevention, responding to criminal incidents, and the use—­if necessary—­of various instruments of coercion (such as firearms) “to assist in any of these roles.” The nature of these functions means that policing is widely regarded as “an inherently public good” that requires oversight in order to ensure accountability and consistency.143 As commercial enterprises offering products for sale on the market, private companies have become security providers in their own right.144 In Johannesburg, as in other cities, private security companies have expanded their roles to include armed response to reported crime, static guarding of public and private property, mobile street patrolling, order maintenance, the apprehension of criminal suspects, the searching of premises, managing CCTV surveillance systems, crime detection, traffic control, crowd marshalling, transportation of cash and personal/escort protection, and carrying out evictions of those involved with unauthorized occupation of buildings. In carrying out these duties, private security operatives “bear firearms and other means of coercion” to impose their will. Private security operatives typically stop pedestrians who appear out of place. They often use take photographs with cell phones and obtain digital fingerprints with a mobile touch machine in order to construct profiles of people who frequently enter zones under their control. The choreographies of power and performance come into play in the everyday policing practices of private security, where the use of physical force and violence is, if not routinized, at least not unexpected or exceptional. To put it succinctly, public law enforcement agencies and private security companies engage in similar efforts at maintaining order that are often conducted independently of each other without coordination or cooperation. This blurring of duties and expectations reflects a kind of parallel, shared sovereignty over territory.145 In places where perceived risk and danger have become obdurate features of daily life, respect for civil liberties and commitment to the sanctity of legal rights are in sharp decline.146 Urban residents have come to regard public law enforcement agencies as incompetent and sometimes brutal, under circumstances in which large numbers of crimes are never reported or investigated and the criminal justice system is overburdened and ineffective in consistently carrying out its mandate. Affluent residents who distrust public authority routinely bend or subvert the law to their own advantage.147

28 • the infrastructures of security

With the retreat of public law enforcement agencies from residential suburbs, private security companies have filled the void.148 In turn, affluent residents have come to rely on private security companies to protect their private homes, guard commercial establishments, and patrol the public streets. Private security operatives have become what might be called front-­line “professionals in the management of unease.” Decoupled from the conventional protocols governing the behavior of public law enforcement officials, private security operatives treat the provision of security as a sphere of activity where “exceptional measures,” or extralegal practices not sanctioned by the law, are necessary in order to manage risk and combat uncertainty.149 Private security companies operate as “irregular armed forces,” or paramilitary auxiliaries, who have monopolized the “means of coercion” in the territories where they work. They derive their legitimacy from the commercial business owners who hire them and the neighborhood associations that contract for their services. Private security companies conduct their business in ways that are relatively autonomous from interference by public law enforcement agencies. They operate in the shadowlands of extralegality outside the glare of public scrutiny.150 The expanded role of private security in providing protective services in residential suburbs has meant that public law enforcement agencies no longer exercise the monopoly of legitimate violence. De facto sovereign power—­the right to detain, punish, and even kill—­has shifted into the hands of private security companies. Sovereign power “originates in acts of violence characterized by excess”—­not only in the impunity of offenders but also in their disdain for legal rights.151 The inability or unwillingness of public law enforcement agencies to exert state monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence demonstrates the fragility, incompleteness, and provisional character of sovereignty. De facto sovereignty appears “in many overlapping and competing forms at many levels within the same territory and temporal frame.”152 Private security companies have effectively carved out little fiefdoms in the residential neighborhoods where they have contracts to perform proactive public space policing.153 The production of security outside public law enforcement agencies amounts to a kind of “shadow policing” that insinuates itself into every layer of the social fabric. These new forms of private policing do not replace public law enforcement but operate in tandem to provide security for frightened suburban residents.154



Introduction • 29

Customized Security Products Together with the expanded role of private security companies in “guarding” such mass private property entities as shopping malls, gated residential estates, and tourist entertainment sites, there has been a growing, seemingly insatiable, “demand amongst affluent consumers [living in upscale residential neighborhoods] for ever more customized security ‘products.’”155 Whether collectively consumed via the security initiatives of organized neighborhood associations or privately purchased as individual homeowners, the range and sophistication of security products available to affluent consumers has proliferated almost beyond imagination with no end in sight.156 No longer seen as the sole preserve of state-­sponsored monolithic policing bureaucracies, the security landscape “is cluttered with a multiplicity of state and non-­state, commercial and informal organizations whose agendas, resources and operational methods often vary in the extreme.”157 The expansion of demand for the protection services of private security companies operating in affluent residential neighborhoods and upscale shopping and entertainment venues has gone hand in hand with the turn toward more informal mechanisms of security provision in low-­income and impoverished residential settlements on the fringes of the city. In the absence of public law enforcement, residents of low-­income neighborhoods have often banded together to engage with a variety of semi-­legal vigilante groups and even criminal organizations to provide security.158 These operations range from voluntary self-­ help networks to specialist fee-­for-­service providers.159 Vigilante groups and other semi-­organized grassroots responses to the absence of public policing “operate in a liminal zone where the boundaries between legality and criminal conduct are often blurred or simply irrelevant to those left unprotected by a distant, negligent or impotent state.” Under circumstances where the application of public law enforcement is inconsistent or absent, the proactive capacity to instrumentally deploy coercive force becomes a much valued asset and resource, commanding both begrudging “respect and deference” and, in many instances, fear and resentment throughout the wider communities.160

Technological Innovation Takes Command The broad contours of the “electronically mediated future” in security systems have already taken shape. One way or another, these disparate ele-

30 • the infrastructures of security

ments of an emergent trend toward the creation of technologically sophisticated security infrastructure have appeared incrementally in urban settings through ongoing processes of technical innovation, experimentation, new miniaturized infrastructures, and adaptive reuse of conventional infrastructures. The crucial ingredients of surveillance and monitoring systems consist of digital information, including storage, transmission, networking and processing hardware, together with the requisite software and complex interface capabilities. Everyday mundane objects—­from wristwatches to cell phones and from implanted tracking devices to wireless communication devices—­ have been increasingly enlisted in in the headlong rush to provide personal safety and security. The “eyes-­on-­the-­street” approach, often associated with the thinking of Jane Jacobs, has become antiquated and ineffective. Like their predecessors, new security innovations that rely on digital communications networks will not create entirely new surveillance systems overnight but will gradually replace the redundant infrastructures that came before.161 Physical objects are programed to operate as “active agents of smart places.” For the most part, so-­called smart devices typically “require specialized sensing capabilities appropriate for their particular roles.” Often equipped with miniature cameras and tiny microphones, they function as prosthetic devices, extending the capacity of visual and aural sensibilities (or the “eyes and ears” on the street).162 Like living organisms, smart devices must be able to accumulate vast quantities of raw data from multiple sources, process this information seamlessly, and interpret the proper response. In order to process information quickly and respond appropriately, smart devices not only need the sensory components to gather data but also require “embedded memory and machine/artificial intelligence.” Optical technologies like barcodes, fingerprint identification, and facial recognition systems “read” patterns to detect matches and regular patterns. Acoustic technologies emit ultrasonic signals to recognize sound. Electromagnetic technologies embedded in automatic teller machine (ATM) cards and radio frequency identification (RFID) chips register and record transactions. GPS satellite monitoring, linked together with miniature receivers embedded in cell phones or secreted in vehicles, can provide location coordinates for these objects. Various electromagnetic, optical, and acoustic sensors (with pressure-­sensitive and motion detection capabilities) implanted in homes and commercial buildings function like artificial nervous systems that can detect unusual disturbances and follow the movements of unwanted intruders, altering private security armed response teams in real time.163



Introduction • 31

The Turn toward Smart Surveillance Technologies The use of surveillance technologies in public spaces, and in particular the installation of closed-­circuit television for security purposes, has steadily expanded over the past two decades.164 For private security companies, the use of automated (“smart”) CCTV cameras has replaced their dependence on stationary “spotter” guards positioned in wooden guardhouses at street intersections in residential suburbs. Regarded as too costly and too unreliable, private companies have found these low-­paid observers to be expendable when compared to the introduction of sophisticated “spy machines” in the sky. CCTV-­based surveillance systems have evolved from simple configurations consisting of a handful of cameras connected directly to monitoring screens with low-­paid observers viewing footage from a stand-­alone, secure control room, watching for incidents of vandalism or more serious “crime events,” to complex networked systems involving geographically dispersed cameras tied to multiple computers capable of keeping a lookout for targeted individuals. Driven by AI algorithms and “deep learning” capacities, these state-­of-­ the-­art computerized systems carry out image processing, object recognition and identification, and “scene analysis” and interpretation before presenting “incident reports” to observers stationed in control rooms. Intelligent CCTV surveillance systems of this caliber offer sophisticated recording and playback technologies, typically outfitted with advanced searching capabilities, enabling monitoring agents to track and trace persons and vehicles moving through space in real time, and suitable for “presenting observed results as evidence in legal proceedings.”165 In what might be regarded as a transition from a Foucauldian “disciplinary state” to a Deleuzian “control state” in which “big data,” surreptitious tracking, and software algorithmic forecasts are paramount, new kinds of surveillance have replaced earlier, less sophisticated modes of monitoring and tracking. What began as stepped-­up airport security and enhanced border controls has spilled over into everyday policing.166 Early steps in this evolution involved the addition of manual camera controls (pan, tilt, and zoom [PTZ] functionalities) in order to focus more intently or to track events over time and across space. As the numbers of cameras in each system increased, they not only exceeded the capabilities of monitoring screens to record everything, thereby requiring sequential switching, but they also overloaded the capacity of overstretched observing teams (with limited attention spans) to monitor the multiple screens effectively. In order

32 • the infrastructures of security

to meet these challenges, the designers and makers of surveillance technologies introduced greatly enhanced computational intelligence to alert observers to “image sequences which contained events of possible significance,” thereby relieving them of the necessity to watch every camera at all times.167 The expanded deployment of more complex and sophisticated CCTV surveillance systems is made possible by technical innovations in integrated circuit technologies, the enhanced capabilities of digital cameras to “see” with greater clarity, the introduction of image synthesizing and data-­fusion techniques, and new communications methodologies (wireless local area networks, or LANs, backscatter x-­ray and biometric identification systems, and mobile phones outfitted with apps). The incorporation of advanced sensory devices like thermal imaging, unobtrusive audio recording capabilities, and automated recognition of behavior patterns has given automated visual surveillance systems additional powers to observe and monitor public spaces.168 The material practices of enhanced visual surveillance systems have evolved in tandem with the development of new kinds of institutional monitoring. Dataveillance (that is, the collection, organization, and storage of information about persons) and biometrics (that is, the measurement and analysis of unique physical or behavior characteristics linked to the verification of personal identities) have become common features in the everyday lives of urban residents, who are increasingly subject to unobtrusive observation and monitoring. Among other things, these technological innovations have fundamentally reconfigured the “organization, practice, and effects of surveillance relationships, making them at once” more dispersed and fluid, pervasive and invisible. The introduction of these new surveillance technologies has generated a great deal of policy interest and philosophical debate, focusing on issues of privacy and civil liberties. Debate has revolved around whether these invasive forms of monitoring “herald more repressive forms of social control,” or whether they introduce new technological breakthroughs in risk management strategies designed to make urban residents feel safer and more secure under unsettled circumstances.169 In operationalizing new techniques of inspection, surveillance systems rely on a combination of vetted flows of information, software algorithms, and pre-­calculated forecasts, or what might be called “qualculation,” a neologism coined by marketing expert Franck Cochoy to refer to a redefined notion of calculation to include judgment.170 The introduction of “smart” CCTV monitoring systems has signaled a tectonic shift in the reliance on vast amounts of digitalized data. The rapid



Introduction • 33

development of networked digitalized platforms linked with advances in AI algorithms has made possible the capture, storage, and sorting of vast quantities of information. Data collection on the scale required to operate smart CCTV surveillance systems has put in motion a “cascading logic of automation.” Video sensors embedded in state-­of-­the-­art cameras “automate data capture, generating quantities of information that can only be handled by automated data process and, increasingly, automated response.” Automated systems of surveillance monitoring effectively displace the need for human judgment and, hence, appear to operate outside of politics.171 The “security chain” consists of an elongated assemblage of interconnected networks that function to funnel information to collection points where it is stored, analyzed, and repackaged in order to arrive at “security facts.”172 The production of “security knowledge” involves following the passage of a single bit of data from simple digital registration (e.g., an image on a screen), to a sign of suspicion, and eventually to (possible) evidence of wrongdoing. Unlike scientific knowledge, security knowledge is considerably more speculative in nature, involving a kind of situated judgment.173 In this sense the production of security rests on a particular kind of practical knowledge “oriented toward preemptive action.”174 With the installation of CCTV surveillance cameras, public streetscapes have become spaces of “constructed visibility.”175 Surveillance operationalizes the “asymmetrical power relations between watcher and watched.”176 Ironically, CCTV surveillance systems both produce a temporary sense of security and function as a constant reminder of the need to be vigilant. As performance, surveillance cameras identify, track, and record movements of potential and possible crime suspects. Surveillance is an ambivalent practice: it seeks to prevent crime yet simultaneously casts a suspicious gaze on those who come under its watchful gaze. CCTV cameras have become the iconic manifestation of contemporary surveillance technologies. The use of these technologies marks the turn away from reliance on static barriers, such as security gates, high perimeter walls, and window bars, and toward more sophisticated, flexible devices that are unseen yet ubiquitous. This transition from a territorially fixed to a territorially mobile approach to security has signaled a paradigm shift of sorts where invisible bordering practices have replaced reliance on visibly demarcated barriers that physically sequester protected spaces.177

Chapter One

Policing the Post-­Liberal City Paradoxes and Contradictions

The end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy in South Africa was accompanied by increased popular anxiety about rising crime and lawlessness. National surveys conducted in the mid-­to late 1990s indicated that there was a growing consensus, across the class and racial divides, that prioritized criminality and violence as significant threats to the political stability of the liberal democratic order.1 Rather than receding as overtly political violence has declined in significant ways, consistently high murder rates, armed home invasions, commercial burglaries, carjackings, and the entrenchment of criminal syndicates have remained stubborn facts that have not gone away despite concerted attempts to strengthen law enforcement efforts. The persistence of lawlessness has undermined confident and optimistic projections about the future.2 Instead of a background condition that only tangentially affects everyday life, crime and the insecurity it produces have become a preoccupation and target of the regulatory efforts of public policing agencies, private providers of security, and local communities alike.3 Determined to establish their legitimacy in the field of safety and security, city officials in Johannesburg tried (through a variety of means) to create and foster a positive image of the municipal police—­divided between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD)—­as effective and unbiased public agencies responsible not only for overseeing law enforcement and crime reduction but also for carrying out their duties in an impersonal and professional manner.4 Faced with a steady barrage of criticism about the ineffectiveness of the police force in curbing persistently high crime levels, municipal authorities have reacted defensively, sometimes going so far as to accuse their detractors of having 34



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 35

ulterior motives and of seeking to undermine the postapartheid democratic project.5 They have issued repeated assurances that they are aware of the problem areas and that much-­needed improvements are imminent. On the other side, vociferous critics of public policing agencies have stressed the incompleteness of the transformation efforts, charging that the police officers are incompetent, ineffective, and inept, on the one side, and untrustworthy, abusive, and corrupt, on the other. By taking a normative projection of the public police force as a modern, professional public institution in a liberal democratic order as their point of departure, both those who imagine an idealized future for “good policing” and critics who focus on how far the public policing agencies have fallen short of realizing this goal have tended to become mired in a debate over what should be, what should not be, and what has not yet occurred.6 What has often been overlooked in these heated exchanges is a critical assessment of how the blurred boundaries between public law enforcement and private policing have irretrievably reshaped what it means to talk about safety and security.7

Public Policing and Law Enforcement During the apartheid era, public policing agencies were a central part of a largely impersonal and distant machinery of state repression.8 Most particularly, the South African Police (SAPs) gained a much-­deserved reputation as the most feared and detested branch of the authoritarian state apparatus dedicated to protecting the apartheid regime. Organized along strict military lines and led by die-­hard supporters of the white minority rule, the public policing agencies concentrated their efforts not only on enforcing the racially inscribed regulatory regime of socio-­spatial segregation that characterized apartheid but also on suppressing all manner of political dissent, real or imagined. While routine policing in white residential neighborhoods focused on law enforcement, the protection of private property, crime fighting, and criminal investigative work, the SAPs approached the racially segregated black townships from an entirely different vantage point. In an increasingly desperate attempt to extinguish political unrest during the dying days of apartheid rule, public policing agencies—­and eventually the South African Defense Force (SADF)—­subjected township residents to a brutal regime of everyday violence and terror. In short, these agents of state sovereignty operated with little restraint and with virtual impunity, both above the law and outside it.9

36 • the infrastructures of security

Without a doubt, the new safety and security initiatives introduced after the transition to parliamentary democracy in 1994 marked a decisive break with the kinds of racially defined policing systems that maintained “law and order” under white minority rule.10 One of the most important promises made by the new government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), was the commitment to completely overhaul the public police service and transform the criminal justice system. The key features that undergirded this rethinking were “visibility,” “accountability,” and “pro-­active policing.”11 From the start, the political reformers put in charge of rebuilding the security forces were acutely aware that in order to provide effective policing, the public perception of the police as an occupying, oppressive force that served the narrow, sectional interests of white minority rule had to be changed. To this end, they promised to establish a stable, professional, and nonpartisan public police force that would play a positive role in facilitating the consolidation of democratic rule. This restructuring required the transformation of a largely unaccountable auxiliary of white minority rule into a legitimate public agency enjoying a degree of trust and confidence in both wealthy and poor communities and capable of serving the common good as a custodian of security under the banner of the rule of law.12 Yet because they feared a political backlash, the ANC-­led state administration postponed the promised reform of the public policing agencies for several years after the historic 1994 democratic elections. The overhaul of the police force did not begin in earnest until 1999–­2000 with the appointment of a new powerful public prosecution office, an independent complaints directorate, and a national commissioner of police who was recruited from outside the ranks of the old discredited police force. The renaming of the police force as the South African Police Service (SAPS) marked what reformers hoped would be the start of a new style and ethic of policing that upheld human rights, established a more effective administration of detection, operated in accordance with evidence-­based detective work, and put service to the community as its highest priority.13 The unveiling of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1998 marked a turning point in the rethinking of a comprehensive framework for policing in the “new South Africa.” The NCPS revolved around a multidimensional approach to crime prevention that stressed community partnerships, public outreach aimed at building trust and fostering new social values, and building safer cities through environmental design. What seemed remarkable about this set of new guidelines was that they “challenged the conventional



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 37

wisdom about policing being fundamentally police business.”14 The cornerstone of the NCPS strategy was the commitment to the idea that security governance is most effective when it elicits civic engagement and involves public participation. This approach to policing revolved around mobilizing local community resources to reduce the risks of crime rather than relying exclusively on building a more effective administration of detection, arrest, and incarceration.15 While the original goal of the NCPS strategy stressed a comprehensive approach to crime and security that went beyond the framework of restructuring conventional law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system, its actual implementation did not extend too far beyond structural reform of the existing police services. The administrative response to rising crime focused on providing “legal empowerment to the administration of justice” and the creation of “mechanisms which improve the efficiency and scope of the criminal justice system through the employment of more police personnel and prosecutors.”16 Despite the laudable goal of building a coherent unified public police force responsible for effective crime reduction, progress toward this end has proven to be elusive.17 At the start, the “old guard” who remained in the police force scarcely comprehended the genuine meaning of this new style of policing. The combination of high turnover, low recruitment, under-­resourcing, institutional stasis, and widespread disillusionment resulted in a somewhat impotent public police force incapable of adequately carrying out the tasks of serving and protecting embattled communities at risk from high crime.18 Seen in retrospect, the confident forecasts in the years following the end of apartheid about the prospects for substantial police reform turned out to be overly optimistic.19 The prospects for policing reform began to erode even before new ideas could even be tried. The previous policing culture, deeply rooted in practices inherited from the past, has always operated at cross-­purposes to calls for transparency, accountability, and adherence to professional codes of conduct. While the overly “politicized” and sectarian functions undertaken by the police and the army to protect and defend the white minority dissipated with the collapse of the apartheid rule regime, public law enforcement agencies have increasingly reverted to the “bad habits” of “harsh” policing. Since around 2010, the SAPS has increasingly relied on a kind of militarized “public order policing” in an effort to combat crime, control civil unrest, and manage protests. The institutional linchpin of accountable policing—­the inauguration of community policing forums attached to

38 • the infrastructures of security

SAPS precincts—­has never lived up to expectations. The ambiguities inherent in the idea of community policing have mutated into unequal security services that vary across neighborhoods. The criminalization of the workless and shelterless urban poor and the treatment of “foreign nationals” (especially immigrants without official documentation) have provided ample testimony to the abandonment of a human rights–­based ethos of policing. The original vision of police reform has given way to a new emphasis on the “war on crime.”20 Ideas like “garrison state,” “pacification,” and “securitization” provide conceptual frameworks that can help to account for the drift of everyday policing in cities toward enhanced militarized approaches to treating untamed zones (for warehousing the poor) of cities as battlespaces. The constant shifting back and forth between excessive and spectacular forms of police violence and the routine law enforcement and order-­maintenance functions of policing agencies represent the capricious elements of security governance. This Janus-­faced police power—­captured in the metaphors of the “iron fist” (coercion) and the “velvet glove” (consent)—­suggests that the practice of pacification unfolds unevenly across the urban landscape.21 Marginal zones of the city that function primarily to warehouse the poor become violent battlefields, while affluent resident suburbs become platforms for the “happy talk” of community engagement and police-­citizen cooperation. The militarization of policing and the pacification of unruly communities are logical extensions of the kind of security thinking that proceeds “with little regard for the citizenship, human rights and the protections promised to communities by virtue of their equality before the law.”22

New Styles of Policing after Apartheid Over the past several decades, the entire field of policing in cities has experienced a great deal of rethinking. A completely new vocabulary, constructed around such newly minted terms as “problem-­oriented policing,” “community policing,” “zero tolerance policing,” “soft and hard” policing, “visible policing,” “sector policing,” “partnership policing,” and “intelligence-­driven policing,” has emerged as a way of describing these new approaches to crime prevention and law enforcement in cities around the world. In the triumphalist neoliberal language of security governance, public policing agencies (reinvented as “partners against crime”) have become engaged “service providers”



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 39

working in partnership with local communities to jointly combat crime. The idea of “sector policing,” for example, puts its emphasis on tackling micro-­ level crime patterns and addressing them with creative problem-­solving techniques.23 “Sector policing” creates a convenient platform for the involvement, integration, and coordination of local communities. In contrast, the notion of “visible policing” stresses the use of concentrated patrols (foot, vehicle, and mounted on horseback) involving high-­density (saturation or “flooding”) operations that combine roadblocks and cordoned-­off areas, stop-­and-­search tactics, and helicopter air support in targeted high-­risk crime areas (or priority “hot spots”) in selected communities.24 Generally speaking, the shift over the past three to four decades toward new styles of urban security management (and order maintenance) has oscillated between what might be labeled “hard” policing, with its emphasis on a “law-­and-­order” approach to crime prevention and strict enforcement of “quality-­of-­life” offenses, and “soft” policing, with its focus on proactive engagement with local communities and its stress on more persuasive modes of social control.25 Whereas “hard” policing relies upon the direct implementation of the coercive use of force, “soft” policing places its emphasis on citizen-­focused engagement, negotiation, and interaction. In practice, however, “hard” and “soft” policing strategies largely coexist as two faces of the same coin, operating more or less in tandem under the umbrella of multi-­ agency social control mechanisms that bring together state-­sponsored public police, private security companies, and social service agencies.26

Zero-­Tolerance Policing “Zero tolerance” is a popular slogan commandeered by politicians and other public figures who like to “talk tough” on crime. The roots of this particular kind of “hard-­edge” policing can be traced to the “no broken windows” thesis put forward by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in an influential article published in 1982. Wilson and Kelling argue that armed robberies, violent assaults, and other serious street crimes tend to gain a foothold and flourish in disorderly environments where seeming innocuous, “antisocial” behavior goes unreported and unchecked.27 The “no broken windows” paradigm is premised on the view that when city officials ignore such petty nuisances (and incivilities) as excessive noise, uncollected garbage, littering, public urination, vandalism, graffiti, and other “quality of life” offenses that trou-

40 • the infrastructures of security

ble ordinary citizens going about their own business, larger criminal offenses such as burglary, armed robbery, and violent assault inevitably follow. The core idea behind “zero-­tolerance policing” is the proposition that harshly clamping down on even the slightest kinds of misconduct, such as public drunkenness, panhandling, or simply loitering, is the first step toward preventing more serious crime from spiraling out of control.28 The zero-­tolerance approach to crime fighting received a great deal of laudatory media attention in the mid-­1990s when then New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his police chief William Bratton credited this aggressive policing strategy with successfully “taking back” the streets and “cleaning up” Manhattan. Highly touted as an effective approach that yields quick and tangible results, this hotly contested but highly publicized American model of “no nonsense” aggressive policing became a global phenomenon virtually overnight.29 The zero-­tolerance doctrine became one of those key “travelling ideas” that captured the attention of law enforcement agencies struggling to combat crime in cities around the world. Taking advantage of this fashionable trend, city officials transformed themselves into consultant-­entrepreneurs and toured the globe, advising law enforcement agencies on how to effectively implement key elements of this approach.30 This proactive approach to policing stressed the strict enforcement of such minor infractions (“no broken windows”) as unauthorized street trading, drug dealing, and prostitution as the opening wedge toward creating safe and clean urban environments. Yet one of the oddest features about zero-­ tolerance policing is that its popularity with politicians is equaled only by the alarm with which those key figures most often associated with its implementation have tended to greet the suggestion that they might have been instrumental in inventing it. In proclaiming their distaste for aggressive “overzealous policing,” many consultants have sought to distance themselves from the crude simplicities attributed to “zero tolerance.”31 After he abruptly left the New York City Police Department in 1996, William Bratton reinvented himself as a crime consultant, a true-­to-­life “globo-­cop,” advising police and security forces on six continents about the implementation of “New York–­ style” policing strategies.32 In 1996 he came to South Africa, where he gave a series of workshops on effective policing drawn from his experience in New York City.33 Like so many other security consultants, he deliberately adopted the language of “community policing,” “reassurance policing,” “quality of life” policing, and “order maintenance policing” so as to soften the decisiveness of zero-­tolerance approaches.34



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 41

The widespread use of the zero-­tolerance rhetoric in a great many cities does not mean that implementations of aggressive policing strategies are identical. To a great extent, what gave zero-­tolerance policing such traction as a key “travelling idea” is its inherent flexibility and lack of precision. As with much of the practice of policy transfer, policing agencies, which are under local pressure to do something about rising crime but also motivated by pragmatic and even opportunistic concerns to appear as if they are “doing something,” typically filter out those innovative features of the zero-­ tolerance approach that they can realistically implement, while discarding the remainder.35 By referring to their policing initiatives as “zero tolerance,” municipal authorities in cities around the world were able to discursively link their “tough-­on-­crime” stance to the “New York success story.”36 As symbolic markers, “zero tolerance” and “no broken windows” have operated more as rhetorical devices that indicate the endorsement of a much more assertive style of policing. These prescriptive catchphrases are ideological weapons in a repressive toolbox that stand for, as Christian Parenti has suggested, “the science of kicking ass.”37 But at the end of the day, the zero-­tolerance framing is essentially a somewhat crude restatement of long-­standing approaches to crime control that fit well into wider shifts toward punitive law enforcement in the criminal justice system.38 Critics of zero-­tolerance policing have pointed to the danger of repackaging the New York City model as the template for a global, post-­liberal revanchism where those law enforcement agencies in charge of implementing these harsh policing methods justify their actions by pointing to their alleged successes in the United States.39 The language of “no broken windows” and “zero tolerance” gives a professional and pseudo-­scientific justification for the excessive militarization of urban space that has occurred in such places as Rio de Janeiro, Sâo Paulo, Mexico City, Manila, and elsewhere.40 Zero-­tolerance and the associated “quality of life” styles of policing have achieved a great deal of popularity not because of their successful implementation on the ground but because of their currency in popular discourse. While it is principally thought of as a crime prevention strategy, zero-­tolerance policing actually represents only part of a much larger shift in urban governance initiatives directed at urban revitalization and the gentrification of derelict urban spaces. The “no broken windows” approach to policing was in fact originally conceived as not simply a law enforcement strategy but an integral component of a more comprehensive urban renewal strategy for inner-­city neighborhoods in the United States trapped in the vicious cycle of blight and

42 • the infrastructures of security

neglect. Its underlying aim was to attract “respectable” law-­abiding residents back to the core downtown areas.41 To talk of “zero tolerance” is in many ways to caricature what advocates of “hard policing” advocate. As law enforcement agencies understand from a practical point of view, policing is about discretionary judgements–­–­that is, knowing when to use the battery of coercive powers available to police officers on the ground and when not to use them. Whatever the terminology, law enforcement agencies influenced by zero-­tolerance policing all agree that the police need to be much more assertive, proactive, and even aggressive in maintaining order and supporting communities torn apart by crime, fear, and insecurity.42 For municipal authorities in Johannesburg, the experimentation with a modified variant of zero-­tolerance policing offered a convenient way of appealing to the sensibilities of middle-­class residents who were alarmed at the rising crime rates after the end of apartheid. The zero-­tolerance idea enjoyed a great deal of popularity with the media because of its no-­nonsense approach to unwanted criminal behavior. In practice, zero tolerance has often led to very strict enforcement of bylaws that target antisocial mischief and petty crime.43 The implementation of the zero-­tolerance approach to crime fighting requires the replacement of the conventional reactive, impersonal model of crime prevention with a new, proactive strategy of risk management. Since the late 1990s, city officials have pushed for the implementation of policies aimed at transforming Johannesburg into a world-­class city with African roots.44 Municipal authorities adopted a new set of bylaws, allowing the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) wide discretion to arrest and detain beggars, vagrants, and even “loiterers”–­–­that is, those who are defined as people “who unlawfully and intentionally lie, sit, stand, congregate, loiter or walk or otherwise act on a public road in a manner that may obstruct the traffic.”45 This vague and loose definition of loitering give the JMPD a great deal of discretionary power to harass and arrest the urban poor who have nowhere else to go but the public streets of the city.46 Critics have charged that such “hard” policing has effectively criminalized urban poverty by making it more difficult for unemployed people to earn money in the public spaces of the city.47 This revanchist approach to policing inherits and mobilizes a disciplinary logic that posits a geographically imagined urban landscape in which spaces take on fixed moral attributes where orderly spaces define respectability and disorderly places require strict reg-



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 43

ulation. As long as the intolerance and brutality of apartheid policing has remained a part of living memory in poor black communities, the aggressive tactics associated with zero-­tolerance policing have invariably conjured up images of the past and have given rise to comparisons with the brutality and indifference of the apartheid regime. Despite the end of white minority rule and the transition to parliamentary democracy, policing agencies have not shed the lingering noir image of an occupying force. Yet rather than acting as a protective shield reinforcing the pillars of racial segregation as they did in the past, the forces of law and order have largely become a bulwark protecting class privilege.48

Two-­P ronged Approach to Public Policing In order to build public support for the postapartheid police services and to combat the widespread perception of lawlessness, city officials and law enforcement agencies have worked together to promote a two-­ pronged approach to combat rampant criminality: on the one hand, they have adopted what amounts to a hard-­line approach to law enforcement and crime prevention, and on the other hand, they have enlisted the compliance, if not active support, of local communities in taking an active role in the production of their own security.49 With its stress on local communities and individual responsibility for risk management, zero-­tolerance policing is an integral element in the shift toward punitive modes of urban governance. Since the transition to parliamentary democracy, property owners and neighborhood associations (particularly in affluent residential suburbs) have spearheaded the formation of literally hundreds of local community policing programs and neighborhood watch projects all around Johannesburg.50 What these local, homegrown initiatives share with the zero-­tolerance approach is the promise to effectively combat crime through the adoption of proactive, if not outright aggressive, tactics.51 If the zero-­tolerance policing symbolizes the hard edge of the iron fist, then community policing represents the soft touch of the velvet glove.52 The establishment of community policing forums epitomized the turn toward cooperative policing and civilian oversight over public law enforcement at the local level. The legislation that created CPFs mandated the formation of partnerships between neighborhood associations, the SAPS, the JMPD, and private security companies at the local police precinct level. CPFs have

44 • the infrastructures of security

taken the lead in organizing weekly meetings at local police stations, fostering information sharing, and pressuring public policing agencies to enforce compliance with the law (particularly regarding such seemingly mundane issues as public intoxication, rubbish removal, and loitering in public parks). Some civilian security initiatives assumed under the auspices of the CPFs have overstepped the boundaries of legally authorized behavior, sponsoring volunteer patrols where participants (often referred to as “cowboys”) wear bulletproof vests, carry concealed weapons, and engage in extrajudicial violence directed at criminal suspects.53 By promoting crime prevention strategies that rely on the participation of local communities in the production of their own security, public law enforcement agencies have handed over wide discretionary powers to wealthy propertied groups, including business and residential associations, to engage in the practice of social exclusion of unwanted persons. By promoting zero-­ tolerance approaches to petty crime and unwanted incivilities, public security policies have paradoxically encouraged extreme kinds of social ordering at the local level, particularly self-­organized policing that frequently metastasizes into “vigilante (popular) justice” and the illegitimate use of force and violence. A range of volunteer auxiliary forces operate in the shadowlands of legality, typically with the endorsement of local neighborhood associations and often with the tacit approval of public law enforcement agencies.54 Despite the rhetorical commitment to civil liberties and personal freedoms, high-­ranking municipal authorities have mobilized key public agencies to design and create regulatory frameworks and legal instruments that have enabled the implementation of social control strategies (code enforcement, bylaws governing the use of space) and policing tactics aimed at establishing the “proper” use and design of urban space. Public law enforcement agencies have actively participated in the rollout of cleanup programs designed, as David Harvey has suggested, to guarantee the free operation of property markets, “by law, authority, force, and, in extremis, by violence.”55 Public policing agencies have legitimated this “securitization” of urban space by means of the discourse of “exception” to justify aggressive measures, arguing that the suspension of civil liberties is a necessary ingredient in keeping cities and neighborhoods safe from the ambient threat of criminal behavior.56 With revanchist approaches to law enforcement and order maintenance on the rise, it might seem paradoxical that soft policing has remained an essential component of the growth and development of extended secu-



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 45

rity networks. With its gestures toward liberal tolerance and paternalistic concern, soft policing provides a convenient masquerade—­a façade—­that enables middle-­class residents and business property owners to entertain the self-­congratulatory, consoling mythology that they “care about the poor.” Yet as house break-­ins, carjackings, and street crimes increase, this veneer of tolerance quickly disappears.57 As a general rule, scholars have argued that what can be called extended security networks consist in the main of a hybrid alliance between public policing agencies, private security companies, and community-­based local voluntary groups, such as neighborhood associations, street patrols, and community policing forums. Yet as Till Paasche has suggested, it might be helpful to revise these ideas of policing and social control by expanding our theorizations of extended security networks to include the participation, within particular urban governance arrangements, of social development agencies operating with a “social work” outreach agenda. By absorbing street people, beggars, and the homeless into shelters and informal work arrangements (like car guarding), social development agencies engage in what might be termed “policing by default.” This type of outreach agenda typically reproduces the conventional distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. By providing a social safety net for those deemed worthy of support, social development agencies act to soften the blow of draconian policing strategies. Yet at the same time, this approach amounts to a kind of triage, abandoning the “undeserving” poor to the vagaries of “bare life” and the repressive embrace of imprisonment through the criminal justice system.58 What leaders of security initiatives for neighborhood residential associations and managers of business improvement districts have found is that private security companies and hard policing strategies are only partially effective when they use overly aggressive tactics to clear the streets of such visible nuisances as panhandlers and itinerant work seekers.59 In acknowledging and responding to the limitations of strictly draconian approaches, business associations and neighborhood groups have sometimes turned to various social development programs that target social collectivities such as “street people” (beggars and panhandlers), vulnerable homeless families, and runaway children for special assistance. By getting unwanted poor people off the streets (and hence rendering them invisible), social development agencies are actively engaged in the production of the “softer side of security.” Seen from a wide-­angle lens of middle-­class aesthetic sensibilities, hard policing

46 • the infrastructures of security

and soft policing complement each other. The urban poor who refuse offers of social welfare assistance become subject to the “street cleansing” tactics of public policing agencies and private security companies.60

Governance Technologies Generally speaking, the urban landscape of Johannesburg is divided between business activities, an urban glamour zone of concentrated commercial-­ upscale leisure and entertainment sites, and affluent residential suburbs, on the one side, and spaces of confinement for the urban poor, on the other.61 Each of these distinct zones is governed in different ways. In practice, municipal authorities have pursued two distinct modes of security governance. On the one hand, policing strategies directed at securing and protecting key business nodes, upscale leisure and entertainment sites, and affluent residential suburbs have stressed the “management of risk.”62 For the most part, private security companies have formed the backbone of these policing strategies. They concentrate their efforts on crime prevention through spatial cleansing rather than law enforcement and the apprehension of criminal suspects. This “pro-­active policing for development” has employed zero-­tolerance strategies to manage space: concentrating on the protection of private property, securing of commercial zones, and projecting an image of safety and stability. Private security operatives carry out spatial cleansing through the strict enforcement of health and safety codes and bylaws outlawing loitering, panhandling, curbside trading, and hawking. This approach has involved aggressive policing of the boundaries, preventing the contamination of luxury places with such “unwanted persons” as homeless vagabonds, panhandlers, beggars, and idlers. Concerns with safety and security have preempted considerations regarding the free flow of persons and unimpeded access to public space. This kind of zero-­tolerance policing has provided the crucial foundations for the success of market-­driven development strategies that seek to respond to the “quality of life” concerns of middle-­class and affluent urban residents.63 On the other side, policing operations directed at cleaning up derelict inner-­city neighborhoods, eliminating unregulated trading, and clearing away unauthorized squatter encampments on the fringes of the central city resemble something akin to trying to catch all the raindrops in a single barrel.64 Law enforcement agencies have adopted a two-­pronged strategy of containment and quarantine involving high-­profile campaigns designed to pre-



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 47

FIGURE 1: Beagle Watch Security Team and Private Security Vehicle

vent the spread of disorder by sealing off sections of the urban landscape. The adoption of aggressive kinds of public policing has led to considerable abuse, including seemingly indiscriminate violence directed at foreign immigrants, mass protest rallies, and such popular illegalities as begging, street trading, and “sleeping rough.”65 In the mind-­set of liberal reformers, law enforcement agencies consist of neutral public servants who have been led astray by a combination of ill-­ conceived policies, poor training, and too many “bad cops” whose unprofessional behavior and lack of proper training have poisoned relations with ordinary residents.66 This way of thinking assumes the fundamental legitimacy of public policing agencies as the main institutional bulwark for ensuring law and order, contending that they have somehow deviated from their mandate to impartially protect property and serve ordinary citizens “within bounds set by the law.” In contrast, more critical observers have suggested that public law enforcement agencies lack legitimacy not only because of their ineffective performance, widespread corruption, and routine use of force and violence, but also because of their continual protection of class privilege, private prop-

48 • the infrastructures of security

erty, and accumulated wealth.67 The aggressive “war on the poor” amounts to a defense of class privilege of private property and accumulated wealth.68 Political observers, journalists, and academics have argued that the frequency and militancy of popular protests have come to indicate what amounts to an ongoing embryonic “rebellion of the poor,” fueled by enduring socioeconomic inequalities, high levels of chronic unemployment, and underfunded social services, all of which have failed to protect the most vulnerable.69 Under circumstances where public policing agencies seek to maintain law and order, the distinctions between petty criminality and serious crime of a violent nature, and between popular illegalities and mass protest gatherings that surge into the streets, are often lost or ignored.70 By targeting unauthorized squatters, undocumented immigrants, informal street traders, and unrecognized shack settlements, the “war against crime” has metastasized into “an implicit war on the poor.”71 Far from the quiet residential neighborhoods where affluent homeowners carry out their comfortable lives in suburban bliss, Sipho Hlongwane has argued, “the supposed protectors and servants of the people are waging a low-­key war against political dissent.”72 In carrying out “public order” operations designed to contain local “service delivery” protests, the SAPS has turned to increasingly harsh and brutal methods of crowd control, including the use of rubber bullets at close range, live ammunition, and physical assaults on protesters.73 Public policing agencies “both attack dissent and enforce socio-­spatial order.” Rather than operating as neutral managers of law enforcement, both public and private security forces function to uphold and maintain the social mechanisms that reproduce the socioeconomic inequalities underlying the postapartheid liberal order.74

The Paradoxes of Everyday Policing: The Banality of Everyday Police Misconduct and Violence Unlike its repressive role under authoritarian regimes, policing under parliamentary democracy rests its legitimacy on projecting a positive image of transparency and accountability in fulfilling its duties of protecting and serving communities from the unwanted predations of criminals.75 Yet despite the expectations of police service under the rule of law, actual policing inevitably takes place in a murky gray zone where the arbitrary and discretionary use of force threatens to exceed the limits of what is legally justified or



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 49

even morally permissible. Public policing agencies in Johannesburg are often despised for petty corruption and somewhat arbitrary brutality, but they do loosely symbolize law and order. Police officers always test—­and often violate—­the boundaries of what is legal, what is appropriate, and what is politically acceptable. Public policing agencies typically try to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency to ordinary urban residents through highly visible crackdowns on suspected criminal activities by cleaning up notorious crime-­ridden neighborhoods and by taking a zero-­tolerance approach to even minor infractions of the law.76 In responding to periodic calls for a “war on crime,” it is not uncommon for the police to suspend legal protections “in the name of enforcing the law and protecting the public.”77 Public policing agencies in Johannesburg are responsible for addressing crime and violence on a scale and of a character that have few parallels in comparable cities around the world. Law enforcement agencies—­and the criminal justice system more broadly—­have remained trapped in circumstances where criminal violence and lawlessness have become stubborn facts ingrained in the social fabric of everyday life. In order to deal with persistent lawlessness, top law enforcement officials have tried to justify their support for harsh policing tactics by emphasizing that they are embroiled in a protracted “war on crime” with no end in sight.78 The ability to combat crime has become “a test of the legitimacy” for law enforcement agencies. The tension between the legitimate use of legally sanctioned force to uphold the law and maintain order and the unaccountable deployment of unrestrained violence to institute order through the suspension of the law has remained unresolved. Along with their counterparts in private security companies, public policing agencies have often shown little restraint in using excessive physical force in apprehending criminal suspects.79 As a normative and regulative ideal, the triangular relationship between public law enforcement agencies, the rule of law, and the mantle of legitimate authority forms the bedrock for the consolidation and extension of democratic governance.80 Yet the breakdown of this three-­sided relationship undermines the possibilities of strengthening effective instruments of public order and security. Lawlessness and unregulated violence, along with disorder and insecurity, thrive in circumstances where public authority and the rule of law have lost their legitimacy.81 Under circumstances where the culture of legality and respect for legal norms have deteriorated, public policing agencies sometimes stray over the line into extralegal criminal behavior such that “it is no longer clear who is within the law and who is outside it.”82

50 • the infrastructures of security

Instead of spearheading the anticrime strategies endorsed by high-­ranking state officials, the everyday practices of public policing in Johannesburg have often become part of the problem of lawlessness rather than the solution to illegality. As mediating powers regulating relations between ordinary residents and the criminal justice system, law enforcement agencies have at their disposal a great deal of discretion in interpreting what constitutes illicit activities and what does not. This murky “gray zone” of legal ambiguity associated with the capriciousness of public policing in the conduct of their official duties actually creates new terrains of arbitrary power where the normative boundaries between the impartial enforcement of the rule of law and unaccountable abuse dissolve. This clouded in-­between space undermines any clear Manichean distinction between the rule of law and lawlessness.83 Under the guise of eliminating urban disorder, public policing agencies are compelled by necessity to ignore some unlawful activities while simultaneously forcibly cracking down on others. In short, police discretion is not only inherently unbalanced and unsymmetrical but often prejudiced and biased as well.84 In practice, the methods of public policing in dealing with lawlessness and criminality often involve complicity with illicit activities and collusion with lawbreakers rather than unambiguously enforcing the rule of law. By tolerating, if not enabling, unauthorized and even unlawful activities, police officers nurture an extralegal zone that operates through coercion and subterfuge and where the “transactional politics” of illicit trade, bribery, and fraud create a parallel universe that competes with the rule of law.85 Hence, everyday policing practices often reinforce abuse and, as a result, merely animate popular distrust in ways that drive the vicious cycle of violence and disorder. Outside observers have repeatedly accused public police officers of regularly extorting bribes from vulnerable and powerless residents. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest that “cops on the beat” regularly confiscate drugs from drug dealers only to resell them. Migrants are habitual victims of street violence by police officers and citizens alike.86 Public policing agencies routinely and “sometimes overzealously profile, interrogate and arrest suspected undocumented migrants.”87 In the process of negotiating the enforcement of immigration laws, police officers and foreign migrants have shaped an informal economy consisting of discretion and secrecy as well as extortion and money exchange. Human rights advocacy groups have accused police of threatening undocumented immigrants with arrest and deportation unless they pay a “fee.” It has been reported that police officers, especially on Fridays before the weekend, sar-



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 51

castically refer to foreign residents, particularly those from Mozambique and Zimbabwe as “our ATMs.”88 Undocumented immigrants who have jobs are regularly paid in cash once a week on Fridays. Fully aware of this opportunity, police officers are on the lookout for vulnerable people to rob. These are the “messy actualities” of security governance in practice: the arbitrary use of physical force and intimidation, routine racial profiling of criminal suspects, abuse of detainees, robbery and extortion, and the like.89 Public policing agencies were plagued by a host of internal grievances that undermined their capacity to work effectively in the field of law enforcement. Simmering tensions came to a boil in in June 2008 when more than four hundred JMPD police officers abandoned their duties and blockaded the busy M2 freeway. When ordered to disperse by a hastily formed SAPs “riot squad,” and coming under fire with a fusillade of rubber bullets, the striking JMPD members retaliated with live ammunition. To bring an end to a series of violent protests and strikes, JMPD management agreed to wage increases and promised to investigate charges of widespread nepotism and favoritism in the department.90 Illicit encounters between police officers and criminal syndicates operating outside the law are grounded in both conflict and cooperation. The deeply embedded system of negotiated “give-­and-­take” that can be mutually beneficial to law enforcers and lawbreakers alike. When it occurs, the collusion between police officers and criminals has established and reinforced new circuits of power grounded in illicit exchange. The extensive network of officially unauthorized and illicit activities—­what Paul McNally has likened to a “vast crime eco-­system”—­operates outside the law and beyond the reach of individual participants.91 “Corruption” is one of those terms with a negative connotation that conceals more than it reveals. Misconduct can vary from tampering with and manipulating evidence related to court appearances to extorting bribes from vulnerable people and from deliberately ignoring or overlooking illicit activities to actual engagement in criminal activities. In shocking revelations made public in mid-­2014, SAPS headquarters acknowledged in an internal audit that close to 1,500 serving police officers were convicted criminals, among them a major general, 10 brigadiers, 21 colonels, 10 majors, 43 lieutenant colonels, 163 captains, 84 lieutenants, and 716 warrant officers. The figures were indeed shocking, but numerous experts suggested that they failed to reveal the full extent of criminality and corruption in the public law enforcement agencies. For example, David Bruce, a leading independent researcher, estimated

52 • the infrastructures of security

that these numbers represented about 1 percent of the entire police force, but he surmised that the true figure was likely to be dramatically higher. The list of “serious crimes” for which active-­duty police offers were convicted ranged from “murder and attempted murder to rape, assault, corruption, theft, robbery, house-­breaking, drug trafficking, domestic violence and aiding escapees.” At least 64 of these convicted criminals worked at SAPS headquarters.92 Revelations about police misconduct have appeared with alarming frequency. A few examples should suffice. In mid-­2008, for example, a rogue team of police officers, including a superintendent of the Alexandra police station, a captain with close to thirty years of service, a reservist sergeant, and four police constables, were involved in an armed robbery of a factory facility in Wynberg. The armed intruders were on active duty, dressed in their police uniforms, and used a marked police van, stealing tools, cell phones, wallets, and computers while spraying their victims with tear gas and handcuffing and beating them.93 By 2014 the number of hijacked trucks reached epidemic proportions. On average, the elite anti-­hijacking unit (attached to the JMPD) routinely recovered about forty abandoned trucks per month in Gauteng. Hijackers cast them aside after stripping them of valuable cargo. At this time at least two senior-­level SAPS officers were under investigation for working with their subordinates to orchestrate truck hijackings and to resell the stolen merchandise. If these charges were not sufficiently alarming, there were suspicions that high-­ranking police officers were actually “fighting each other for control of truck hijacking syndicates.”94 The modus operandi for these truck hijacking syndicates was ingenious in its simplicity. Uniformed police officers in marked police vehicles used their blue lights to stop commercial trucks traveling on highways. As the police drove off, thieves pounced. Once they commandeered the trucks, the hijackers used network-­jamming devices to ensure they could not be tracked.95 Crime experts suggested that truck hijackings once again increased after 2015, when it became more difficult for thieves to steal cars, due to enhanced security measures.96 Trucks carrying cell phones, copper wiring (and wiring made of other precious metals), alcohol, cigarettes, and even coal have long remained coveted targets for hijackers.97 High-­value cargo hijacking forced the commercial trucking industry to use new technologies and adopt innovative strategies in order to stay ahead of criminals. Private security companies specializing in combating vehicle hijacking have competed aggressively with one another, showcasing their latest high-­tech surveillance systems that



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 53

enable their customers to monitor entrance and exit points at all loading and delivery bays in real time. When in use, this stepped-­up security greatly reduced theft. In addition, commercial trucking companies installed tracking devices that alerted operators stationed at monitoring sites when trucks deviated from their designated routes or when they made unscheduled stops. New technologies have made it possible to disable trucks by shutting off their engines whenever they diverge from their prescribed itineraries. In recent years, a variety of new technologies has vastly improved the capacity to stop theft of goods in transit, including remote-­controlled locking and opening of truck containers and the introduction of tracking technologies to monitor every cargo consignment in real time.98

Endemic Misconduct As a general rule, public policing agencies in South Africa and elsewhere are always trapped between the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, public law enforcement agencies adopt a normative framework that envisions policing practice as organizationally effective and freed from bias, totally committed to a “crime-­free, democratic South Africa.” In the imaginary world of make-­ believe, this idealized endpoint of a democratic police service is “an enchanted vision, directed towards the future: it is an as-­yet-­unfulfilled dream.” On the other hand, the practicalities of everyday policing entail negotiated compromises, cutting corners, and deliberate withdrawal from messy situations. The work of law enforcement and order maintenance requires “turning a blind-­ eye to survive the difficult task of policing.”99 Policing practices typically oscillate between these alternative visions, one enchanted with an imagined endpoint of successful execution of their duties and responsibilities and the other practical, rooted in the stark realization that the “imperatives of everyday [police] functioning” often fall far short of expectations. As the authorized agents of law and order but with insufficient infrastructure, inadequate skills and training, and incomplete information, public policing agencies often produce results that fail to achieve desired ends. Despite the rhetorical commitment to uniform respect for civil liberties and human rights, front-­line police officers on the ground often have “to bend the rules to make policing work.” In order to invoke this imaginary goal of upholding the ideals of respect for civil liberties and human rights, they routinely ignore, overlook, and take little notice of transgressions and “rule

54 • the infrastructures of security

bending” that allow policing practices to work under the actual conditions of everyday life.100 Despite formal constitutional guarantees that promote the rule of law and protect civil liberties, public policing agencies have actively resisted pressures for greater accountability and transparency under circumstances where they believe that criminality has gotten out of hand. Generally speaking, street-­ level policing practices operate in the murky terrain of extralegality. For the most part, police officers on the ground conduct their business with impunity and with almost limitless discretion, thereby making room for bribery and petty extortion. Yet care must be taken not to fall into a simplified view of labeling public policing agencies as corrupt and uniformly prone to extralegal violence in the treatment of criminal suspects. Disaggregating such static categories can bring greater clarity to understanding the dynamics of everyday policing.101 As Darshan Vigneswaran and Julia Hornberger have cogently argued, the simple “good cop/bad cop” dichotomy cannot explain why police officers engage in ethically and morally questionable behavior. Nor does this distinction provide any indication of the broader circumstances in which the extralegal “borderline activities” take place. Focusing narrowly on the questionable behavior of individual police officers almost invariably overlooks and ignores a critical examination of the structural frameworks, the organizational cultures, and the social dynamics of public law enforcement in South Africa. Public policing practices are deeply embedded in habits, conventions, and customary ways of doing things inherited from the past. Despite the hollow rhetoric of police management committees that blame misconduct on individual officers acting in “rogue isolation,” fixing the problem of corruption and misconduct has less to do with rooting out the “bad apples” than with restructuring the historically ground organizational ethos of public policing.102 Behind this carefully crafted façade of well-­trained professionals dedicated to the efficient discharge of crime prevention tasks, public police officers are subjected to a host of on-­the-­job pressures that impede their competent performance of duties. As Andrew Faull discovered in his investigation of the SAPS in urban South Africa, police officers rigidly adhere to a code of silence, expressed in the oft-­repeated mantra “What happens on the shift stays on the shift.”103 In June 2011, a three-­month special investigation conducted by the Mail & Guardian turned a shocking spotlight on the heavy-­handed, military-­ style approach of the SAPS leadership in the training exercises for fresh



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 55

police recruits, tactics that included harsh punishment for minor infractions, sleep deprivation, and physical assault.104 A study conducted in 2012 under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) reported that at least one out of eight police officers showed willingness to cover up internal malfeasance, physically assault prisoners, accept bribes or kickbacks, file false reports on drug possession or traffic violations, and protect fellow workers from charges of wrongdoing.105 Small-­scale, petty corruption involving SAPS and JMPD officers is not the exception but an everyday occurrence in the conduct of law enforcement work.106 Police violence appears in many forms, from the legitimate use of force in the conduct of official duties to illegitimate ill treatment of criminal suspects and outright criminal abuse of power.107 For public law enforcement agencies, the “power of discretion in responding to ‘situational exigencies’ is always already outside” of the formal rule of law, bestowing on police officers on the ground—­“and burdening them with—­authority to use force in ways that are not always clearly regulated by legal rules” despite normative ideals of fair, just, and equitable treatment inscribed in their own training documents. This extralegal power to act prejudicially and to intervene in situations with coercive force is perhaps the main reason why police officers are both feared and avoided. This acquired “social status” of public policing officers as untrustworthy and unwelcome agents of state repression makes it so that “their legitimacy is always already questionable,” even under the best of circumstances.108 The kinds of ill treatment that routinely occur under the watchful eye of public policing agencies include sustained abuse and systematic torture of criminal suspects in high-­profile cases, callous disregard for the homeless and the vulnerable, the use of excessive force in arresting criminal suspects and in dealing with volatile crowd situations, and dehumanizing and degrading treatment of prisoners in detention. The use and abuse of force seems to have permeated the everyday culture and conduct of the public policing agencies to the extent that it has become banal and ordinary.109 According to a researcher from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), a prominent human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), police officers in Kagiso on the West Rand (just outside Johannesburg) habitually beat and even subjected suspected criminals to electric shocks in order to extract confessions to crimes.110 Investigative reporters have pointed to brutal methods for torturing suspects in custody (as a way to obtain information)—­particularly via suffocation by “tubing” (functionally equivalent to waterboarding)—­are remarkably consistent across precincts

56 • the infrastructures of security

and provinces.111 Elsewhere around Johannesburg, it has been reported that police officers sometimes place plastic bags filled with pepper spray over the heads of criminal suspects in order to punish them and elicit information from them.112 In late February 2013, a Mozambican immigrant and taxi driver named Emidio Josias “Mido” Macia was killed while in the custody of the SAPS. A crowd of onlookers (including a bystander who filmed what happened) witnessed the incident. Handcuffed to the rear of a police van, Macia was dragged for about 500 meters along a street in Daveyton (township) on the southeastern outskirts of Johannesburg. The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) released a preliminary postmortem report indicating that Macia had died in police detention with head injuries and internal bleeding.113 As clearly shown on graphic surveillance video footage released in late 2015, a uniformed SAPS officer shot an unidentified man in the head at point-­blank range as he lay on the ground. This instance, and similar cases, provides vivid evidence of a shocking pattern of widespread police abuse of criminal suspects.114 These everyday realities of horrific abuse have prompted one keen observer to suggest that official commitment to a normative culture of respect for human rights amounts “to ‘fakery’ and ‘counterfeit rights.’”115 With the end of white minority rule, confident observers declared that the repressive policing of the apartheid era had finally been unceremoniously relegated to the dustbin of history. As the new post-­1994 era of parliamentary democracy dawned, public policing agencies replaced the “autocratic, bureaucratic, and militarized style of command” with an enlightened “managerial style” dedicated to “problem solving” and community engagement, packaged under the rubric of respect for human rights. This transformation of the deeply rooted militarized ethos of public policing included the introduction of civilian ranks, the adoption of new uniforms and emblems, basic training in human rights, a stress on local community policing, and the establishment of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) to investigate and adjudicate charges of abuse.116 Yet less than two decades later, the return to militarized policing triggered an outpouring of criticism, where critics warned of “the danger” of the reintroduction of “an apartheid-­era lack of accountability,” the erosion of a culture of respect for human rights, and the end of the commitment of public law enforcement agencies to subject their everyday practices to civilian oversight.117 Critical observers raised growing concerns that over time the security forces, which under the South African Constitution have a duty-­bound



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 57

responsibility to protect the rights of citizens, increasingly shed the ostensible veneer of ensuring equal treatment under the rule of law and became a willing agent of repression directed at the survivalist tactics of the urban poor and a threat to the safety of public protest gatherings.118 With scores of police officers dying or suffering serious injuries in the line of duty, public policing agencies have moved toward “paramilitary approaches” to combating crime, including the escalation of the use of lethal force.119 The restructuring of the public police as a paramilitary force—­ symbolized in early 2010 by the formal reintroduction of military ranks in the SAPS chain of command—­paralleled broader trends in the direction of increasingly popular acceptance of draconian measures to deal with issues of safety and security.120 The sensational murder trial in 2013 of Oscar Pistorius—­the Paralympic champion known as the “Blade Runner”—­who fatally shot his girlfriend, the model Reeva Steenkamp, brought attention to the permissive gun culture of South Africa and the widespread private ownership of handguns. In court, Pistorius defended himself by claiming that he was only protecting himself and Reeva from unknown intruders.121 Self-­defense and the “legal license to kill” have widespread popular support among ordinary South African citizens.122 In Johannesburg there are literally dozens of instances where gun-­ wielding civilians and off-­duty police reservists have engaged in wild car chases and shootouts with suspected criminals, sometimes with disastrous consequences for innocent bystanders.123 It is not unusual for shopkeepers, customers, and even armed bystanders whose lives are not in danger to actively intervene into a crime in progress, coming to the aid of potential victims “by retaliating with their own firearms,” sometimes resulting in the deaths of criminal suspects.124 In one particularly bizarre instance, an anonymous motorist literally ran over an unsuspecting gunman as he was robbing and attempting to carjack a woman driver who was stalled in early morning traffic. This “Good Samaritan” sped off without leaving a name. Of course, the popular media heaped praise on this anonymous crime-­fighting “avenger” because he jumped into action to assist a victim.125 Ever vigilant, armed civilians have become pseudo-­police auxiliaries in the “war on crime.” Confronted with attempted break-­ins, homeowners have often shot intruders. Sensing they are about to be carjacked, motorists, with concealed firearms at their disposal, have often killed or wounded their would-­be assailants.126 As public law enforcement has retreated, private security companies—­with their dedicated armed response tactical units and mobile patrols—­have assumed

58 • the infrastructures of security

the lion’s share of on-­the-­ground policing.127 Despite their carefully calculated veneer of legitimacy, private security operatives typically engage in heavy-­handed policing practices designed to intimidate and humiliate suspected criminals.128 According to the 2018/2019 annual report of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA), there were a rising number of “unfortunate incidents” where private security operatives “overstepped their mandate to serve the interest of their private clients, under the guise of legitimate self-­protection,” and “unlawfully infringe[d] on the rights of ordinary [people].”129 Community policing initiatives in low-­income neighborhoods have often veered into vigilantism and “mob justice.”130 These forms of collective security and individual self-­protection constitute what Walter Benjamin referred to as “law-­making violence”—that is, outside the rule of law per se, operating in that murky terrain of extralegality and beyond the normal boundaries of state legitimacy.131 “It is sovereign violence at its purest,” Thomas Blom Hansen has argued, “instituting an order through its very lack of restraint, instilling fear and fascination by being unpredictable and largely hidden.”132 All in all, these popular sentiments calling for a tougher stance in combating criminality, or what Julia Hornberger has termed “civilian militarism,” reflect widespread skepticism in the effectiveness of the performance of public law enforcement, the lack of trust in the judicial process, and the belief that the criminal justice system has failed to provide for safety and security.133 This rising tide of multiple kinds of extralegal violence targeting suspected criminals has underscored a “crisis of governance,” where state law enforcement agencies no longer maintain the monopoly over the legitimate use of lethal force and violence and where all sorts of self-­appointed groups and private citizens have filled the void left by the absence of public policing.134 The enlistment of neighborhood associations, community policing patrols, “Domestic Watch” programs (which call on domestic workers, gardeners, and child-­care workers to act as the eyes and ears on the street), and informal street guards—­all of which Stephen Graham has likened to “citizen solders” or what others have termed “citizen security”—­as active participants in a surveillant assemblage layered over urban space has marked the opening gambit in what amounts to a new military urbanism.135 The crime-­fighting “heroics” of businessperson Gayton McKenzie clearly illustrate how the idealized celebration of “citizen-­police” willing to take action has captured the imagination of crime victims who vicariously revel in tales of self-­styled vigilantism. A former bank-­robber-­turned-­motivational-­ speaker, McKenzie used his experience as a former “general” of the “26 Gang”



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 59

to track down and apprehend the alleged kingpin of Madrid, a purportedly infamous carjacking syndicate operating in Johannesburg. The kingpin (colloquially known by his street name, “Devil”) and his gang of thieves “pounced on Christians from different denominations in the middle of a prayer meeting” held in Midrand, robbing the congregants of cell phones, computers, jewelry, passports, and driver’s licenses. They fled the scene in a stolen BMW 5 Series luxury car. Mobilizing some of his friends, McKenzie “combed the streets of Joburg,” looking for the “ruffians.” When the vigilantes arrived at the syndicate’s hideout, a nondescript house in the ramshackle suburb of Bramley, the car thieves had already changed the BMW’s number plates. Devil, the alleged mastermind behind a series of carjackings around Johannesburg, escaped in a car. But, “understanding how gang generals operate,” McKenzie gave chase, cornering him in a cul-­de-­sac. As it became clear that “the thug was unwilling to go down without a fight,” McKenzie physically overpowered the robber, who surrendered. The SAPS was called to the scene and Devil was transferred into their custody. The stolen BMW was recovered.136 Apocryphal stories like this tale of private vigilantism have circulated widely, inspiring like-­minded citizen-­soldiers to act with impunity in carrying out their brand of extrajudicial pogroms against suspected criminals.137

Doctrine of Maximum Force The doctrine of maximum force did not emerge overnight but evolved gradually over time. Beginning in the early 2000s, escalating gun violence, including a spate of high-­profile armed robberies, drive-­by killings, and dramatic shootouts between police officers and criminal gangs, shocked even the most crime-­hardened South Africans. But it was a widely publicized incident in June 2006—­in which law enforcement officers and a heavily armed gang of twenty robbers engaged in a six-­hour shootout where four policemen who had been held hostage were executed and eight criminal suspects were shot dead—that dramatically tipped the scales in favor of the implementation of the doctrine of maximum force.138 This event, which became known as the “Jeppestown massacre,” triggered an outpouring of public support for high-­ ranking law enforcement officials when they publicly announced their intention to proactively use lethal force when confronted with armed criminals.139 Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula took the lead when he told police officers not to hesitate to shoot armed criminals.140

60 • the infrastructures of security

In the aftermath of the Jeppestown massacre, the SAPS opened an investigation into suspected links between the criminal gang and the security forces from Zimbabwe. Organized crime syndicates, many originating from neighboring countries, often operate sophisticated crime rackets, including sales of illegal drugs, carjacking, and smuggling. They seem to have a virtually unlimited supply of people from the squatter camps willing to enlist to do their dirty work.141 In response to widespread public perception that crime had begun to spiral out of control, law enforcement officials put into motion a range of policy initiatives that amounted to a “remilitarization” of public policing agencies.142 Less than two years later, in April 2008, Deputy Minister of Security Susan Shabangu rekindled the simmering controversy about lethal use of force when she declared in a public address to police station commanders at an anticrime meeting in Pretoria, “You must kill the bastards if they threaten you or the community. You must not worry about the regulations—­that is my responsibility. Your responsibility is to serve and protect.” As if to ensure that her message was understood, she continued: “I want no warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill shot. Criminals are hell-­bent on undermining the law and they must now be dealt with. End of story. There are to be no negotiations with criminals.”143 These remarks sent shock waves through human rights organizations. What Shabangu said in her speech amounted to a dramatic break from previous pronouncements from high-­ranking government officials about harsh policing and the use of lethal force.144 While human rights organizations condemned such intemperate pronouncements from high-­profile leaders as irresponsible and in violation of international and national laws, the leading ANC luminaries, including State President Jacob Zuma, expressed wholehearted support for the deputy minister.145 Around this time, the rising numbers of cash-­in-­transit heists once again undermined public confidence in law enforcement agencies to provide for safety and security. The criminal syndicates specializing in armored car robberies were not only heavily armed with automatic weapons (outfitted with military-­issue armor-­piercing bullets) but were also understood to include trained combatants from former guerrilla armies from South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique among their number.146 As cash-­in-­transit heists began to decline because of tightened security, criminal syndicates shifted their attention to bombing automatic teller machines, using sophisticated explosive devices (stolen from gold mining facilities) and working in teams that sometimes numbered between eight and ten well-­armed members. Start-



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 61

ing slowly in 2005 and reaching a peak in 2008, ATM bombings skyrocketed 3,000 percent as criminal gangs sought to exploit what they regarded as the soft underbelly of commercial businesses and an easy target.147 According to experts in the field, the planning and execution of these ATM bombings indicated that the criminal syndicates consisted of “highly trained individuals with firearm training and military backgrounds.”148 Because of growing frustration with ineffective strategies to deal with criminality, political leaders ratchetted up their rhetoric, calling on police to “kill the bastards,” to “teach them a lesson,” and to show “no mercy” through the stepped-­up use of lethal force.149 During a briefing of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Security on November 12, 2008, Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa declared, “We are at war with criminals. [We need] to fight fire with fire.”150 In justifying the doctrine of maximum force to combat lawlessness, the rhetoric of “getting tough on crime” easily mutated into the language of an all-­out “war on criminals.”151 The reintroduction of “public order policing” strategies, including the use of special paramilitary units and highly trained “tactical response teams” responsible for crowd control, marked the turn toward the remilitarization of the public police.152 In 2011, law enforcement agencies lobbied Parliament to relax existing legislation in order to expand the powers of police to use lethal force.153 The turning point came on August 16, 2012, when specialized paramilitary police units fired into a crowd of striking miners at the Lonmin platinum mine at Marikana, killing thirty-­four persons and seriously injuring seventy-­eight others. Instead of engaging in a conventional crowd management exercise to disperse the crowd, police units used live ammunition to direct their concentrated fire into the mass gathering of miners, chasing down many who fled the scene, shooting defenseless men as they pleaded for mercy. In the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1960, claims of self-­defense rang hollow.154 In the aftermath of the Marikana massacre, a crescendo of critical voices talked of “a brutal police state,” “police brutality,” and “police state depravity” as a way of highlighting what they considered the repressive drift of policing in violation of the spirit of accountability and human rights enshrined in the constitution.155 In condemning the police action at Marikana, a civil liberties advocacy group called the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) declared that the SAPS “deliberately and consciously violated the rights to freedom of assembly, demonstration, picket, and petition provided under section 17 of the Constitution.”156 The

62 • the infrastructures of security

boundaries between the legally justified use of lethal force and extralegal violence directed at criminal suspects is indeed very porous and indistinct. With pressure mounting on public policing agencies to reduce crime and expand conviction rates, officers have pushed the boundaries of legality and propriety, engaging in widespread physical abuse and torture aimed at extracting “confessions” from suspected criminals.157 Evidence has mounted that public police officers sometimes shoot and kill defenseless criminal suspects.158 One particularly heated exchange following a memorial service in August 2015 for a police officer killed in the line of duty illustrates the escalating war of words pitting high-­ranking police officials against human rights advocates. The Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) organization reacted strongly to the hyperbolic rhetoric of Deputy Police Minister Makhotso Sotyu, calling on her to retract her “derogatory and offensive remarks” after she proclaimed, “Our strategic implementation plan must always intend to treat heinous criminals as outcasts . . . They must be treated as cockroaches!”159 As one astute observer proclaimed, this self-­justificatory logic assumed “a language of [unaccountable] state-­killing, which envisages a form of pure violence and pure justice that is, almost by definition, not mediated through the authority of the law.”160

Crime Control as Low-­I ntensity War: Heav y Metal in the Streets As soft law enforcement and crime prevention strategies have failed to yield the hoped-­for results, public policing agencies have increasingly come to depend on conventional hard policing approaches. These tactics have involved such visible manifestations of “get tough on crime” as coordinated SAPS and South African National Defense Force “high-­density” operations that mobilize large numbers of police and military personnel in order to saturate areas identified as crime hot spots, employing zero-­tolerance measures to strictly enforce law and order.161 As a matter of routine, law enforcement agencies have often assembled large task forces (including calling on the assistance of private security companies) to carry out roadblocks, cordon-­and-­search operations, and inspection of vehicles and premises.162 While police violence is formally condemned and publicly repudiated, officials at the highest levels of police management accept harsh treatment as a necessary tool for maintaining law and order.163 The expanded sophistication of security measures rolled out for sports



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 63

mega-­events around the world have increasingly taken shape as militarized operations that resemble something akin to operational war planning. The feverish preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, hosted by South Africa, provided a convenient platform for experimentation with new kinds of militarized urbanism.164 Political and business leaders in South Africa hoped to use the event as a vehicle to “rebrand” the country as a safe and secure tourist and entertainment destination. These city boosters looked upon the intense media coverage of such sporting events as an opportunity to promote a distinctive image of Johannesburg as an “African World Class City” to an attentive global audience. Reducing crime and violence during the World Cup events was central to this “imagineering” effort aimed at dispelling the country’s global reputation as a violent and dangerous place. Security efforts served as a training ground for preemptive militarization of urban space.165 In preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the state administration embarked on a “beautification campaign” meant to make cities hosting events more attractive to middle-­class football fans and overseas visitors. In Johannesburg this cleanup effort took a particularly brutal and ruthless turn when city officials authorized the demolition of shack settlements on the fringes of the inner city and the evictions of hundreds of shelterless squatters from derelict buildings in and around Doornfontein, near Ellis Park Stadium, one of the principal venues for World Cup events. City officials outsourced the “dirty work” of these largely indiscriminate forced removals to a notorious private security company called Wozani Security, otherwise known as the Red Ants because of their fire-­engine red overalls and crimson helmets.166 Waving iron bars and pickaxes, the Red Ants carried out their evictions with wanton disregard for the victims of their violence, pulling entire immigrant families from their meager shelters, scattering their belongings, and beating anyone who refused to leave. What critics have described as a company of state-­sponsored mercenaries, Wozani Security has a long history of conscripting their mob army of “rent-­a-­thugs” by tapping into the vast reservoir of unemployed men languishing in the informal settlements and squatter camps surrounding Johannesburg. Because they are paid very little, it is not surprising that the Red Ants often steal from the people whom they evict, and they have acquired a much deserved reputation for brutality and callousness. In the words of Braam Hanekom, the chairperson of the well-­known refugee rights organization called People against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP), the Red Ants “are essentially a [private] militia that ruthlessly and forcefully displaces people

64 • the infrastructures of security

from their shelters under government instructions. They are notorious for their brutal and violent approach towards the poor.”167 For the most part, the public safety measures rolled out for the 2010 World Cup focused on the creation of security zones involving the highly visible presence of paramilitary policing units, the extensive use of fencing and road barricades, traffic restrictions, and the linkage of extensive CCTV camera surveillance to mobile command centers.168 The SAPS deployed over forty-­one thousand police officers to the World Cup events and engaged in a major procurement drive to accumulate all sorts of new operational equipment, including such automated technologies as attack helicopters and remote-­operated bomb disposal devices, mobile CCTV monitoring systems, and state-­of-­the-­ art riot gear. Preparations for the countrywide FIFA World Cup involved the largest ever domestic mobilization of the SANDF, exceeding in size even its missions during the various declarations of states of emergency during the high point of state repression in the 1980s. These highly militarized security operations served as a coordinated training ground for greater cooperation between public policing agencies and the SANDF in future joint paramilitary operations. Most notably, the SAPS used their high-­visibility mobilization for the World Cup tournament “to project an image of efficiency and power in contrast with their public reputation for brutality and incompetence.”169 The logic of security for the World Cup events oscillated between spectacle and discipline–­–­that is, between high-­profile displays of paramilitary force, on the one side, and the implementation of stringent measures designed to ensure safety through management of risk, on the other.170 In the aftermath of the 2010 World Cup, public policing agencies continued and even intensified their militarized approach to law enforcement and the maintenance of order. Public policing agencies have approached housing evictions and crowd control in particularly aggressive ways, reflecting the entrenchment of zero-­tolerance rhetoric and “the adoption of ‘shoot first’ pre-­emptive response tactics.”171 In late October 2013, high-­ranking city officials authorized, without prior consultation with interested parties, the forcible removal of somewhere between five thousand and eight thousand informal street traders, the majority of whom were in possession of legal permits to conduct their curbside business, from downtown Johannesburg. Carried out under the code name Operation Clean Sweep, this highly coordinated policing effort epitomized the rapid turn toward the militarization of public law enforcement.172 City officials admitted that lawful informal traders were removed along with alleged illegal traders during Operation Clean Sweep but



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 65

justified their draconian actions on the grounds that it was necessary in order to prevent unauthorized trading, illegal dumping, littering, land and building invasions, and other egregious contraventions of bylaws.173 What municipal authorities seemed to overlook in Operation Clean Sweep was the fate of the estimated thirty thousand dependents of the evicted traders, who were deprived of a means of survival and cut off from their tenuous attachment to social services like schooling and housing.174 In November 2013, city officials unveiled plans to launch the second leg of Operation Clean Sweep that would extend far beyond the forcible removal of street traders to target so-­called bad buildings in the inner city, closing them down and evicting “land invaders” and shack dwellers who found temporary accommodation in encampments of various kinds on vacant properties close to the central city. City managers proposed the creation of new controversial bylaws that would give code enforcement officials discretionary authority to unilaterally declare buildings, roads, and public parks—­actually, “any piece of land of whatever nature”—­a “problem property.” The goal of these expanded (“unconstitutional”) powers was to enable city officials to evict occupants of “problem properties” and to demolish shack encampments without the proper court orders and arrangements for alternative accommodation that the constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act have long required.175 At the end of 2013, representatives from the South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF) and the South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) took the City of Johannesburg to the Constitutional Court over conduct of public law enforcement agencies during Operation Clean Sweep. In arriving at its judgment, the court found that city officials had “gone about achieving its objectives in flagrant disregard of the traders’ rights.” In addition, the court condemned police action as “indiscriminate” and “flawed,” resulting in the “humiliation and degradation” of thousands of informal traders and their children, leaving them virtually destitute without the means to earn even a meager living.176 Despite progressive city policies and programs directed at assisting informal traders in securing a decent living, municipal authorities have often pursued exclusionary law enforcement approaches rather than inclusive urban management ones. In February 2015, the City of Johannesburg launched Operation Ke Molao (“It’s the Law”), the goal of which was to reclaim the public streets after a reported upsurge in street crimes.177 In carrying out the operation, the JMPD targeted beggars, hawkers, vagrants, informal vendors,

66 • the infrastructures of security

and window washers for arrest or removal from busy intersections and bridge entry-­exit points, and impounded “unsafe” taxis.178 In targeting activities that city bylaws deemed illegal, municipal authorities were seeking to effectively eliminate and hence criminalize basic survival strategies of the most destitute urban residents. According to the upside-­down logic professed by city officials, crime invariably goes hand in hand with people using public space to make a living in informal economic activities. Because at its core city officials were unable to differentiate between anticrime approaches and anti-­poor practices, Operation Ke Molao was chillingly reminiscent of Operation Clean Sweep.179 Policing agencies have not restricted their “crime blitzes” to the inner-­city neighborhoods alone. Both public law enforcement agencies and private security companies have also responded to the complaints of middle-­class suburban residents who fear the encroachment of their leafy neighborhoods by legions of unwanted squatters. A few examples should suffice. In mid-­2004, law enforcement agencies conducted a major crime blitz involving about fifteen JMPD police vehicles along with Pikitup trucks in the northern suburbs with the aim of enforcing bylaws and cleaning up problem spots in Killarney, Saxonwold, Parkwood, Orange Grove, and Kew. Police officials identified abandoned houses, issued violations to people with building rubble on pavements, drove away hawkers, and removed illegal dumping. The raid also targeted two once-­beautiful mansions (one owned by Orlando Pirates chairperson Irvin Khoza) that were occupied and vandalized by squatters in affluent suburbs of upscale Saxonwold—­where properties routinely sell for R3 million to R7 million.180 Small-­scale skirmishes pitting policing agencies against homeless squatters have remained an enduring feature of suburban life in Johannesburg. The forcible removal of a small cluster of squatters (some of whom had been clandestinely living there for more than fifteen years) in George Lea Park in Sandton sparked a legal and moral controversy over the legality of evicting unlawful homesteaders without prior notification.181 City officials have tried to justify their strict code enforcement of bylaws, their reliance on the “hired help” of private security companies to carry out forcible evictions, and their ceding of sovereignty over zones of the cityscape to large-­scale property owners in City Improvement Districts (CIDs) as necessary steps required to achieve the goal of establishing a stable urban environment and an orderly city. Law enforcement agencies have identified three crucial components in their crime prevention strategy and public safety



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 67

initiatives: first, increased intelligence about the causes of crime, the main perpetrators, and criminal networks; second, mobilizing urban residents to not only report crime but also to not aid and abet criminal behavior by purchasing stolen goods; and, third, the establishment of multidisciplinary policing–­–­that is, intensive and high-­visibility patrols in coordination with efficient city management and public safety initiatives, particularly persistent crackdowns on public alcohol consumption, illegal possession of weapons, and bylaw enforcement.182

Everyday Policing at a Time of Crisis Despite the short hiatus brought about by the end of white minority rule and the transition to parliamentary democracy, public policing in Johannesburg has not only emulated military modes of organization and borrowed their terminology, but it has also adopted their operational practices and technologies for crowd control and order maintenance.183 Despite efforts to demilitarize public policing agencies in the early years after the transition to parliamentary democracy, the SAPS and the JMPD have remained embedded in a militarized organizational ethos. This resistance to reform can be traced to long-­standing militaristic policing traditions, the hierarchical institutional nature of public policing agencies, and the persistent “war on crime” discourse of the South African political leadership in South Africa.184 While public policing agencies have a mandated duty and responsibility to protect law-­abiding citizens from danger and disorder, they have sometimes become a threat to the safety of ordinary urban residents. According to annual reports filed by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), the numbers of police assaults on ordinary people and deaths in custody have experienced a “frightening upward trajectory” over the past decade.185 By declaring participants to be threats to safety and security, public law enforcement agencies have effectively delegitimated popular protests through legally sanctioned prohibitions against organized picketing, street demonstrations, and mass marches giving voice to inadequate service delivery and other grievances. By employing heavy-­handed crowd management tactics (including intimidation through the disproportionate “show of force”), public security forces have undermined popular participation in popular protests.186 The display and deployment of coercive force by public policing agen-

68 • the infrastructures of security

cies stands as perhaps the single most significant feature of the range of “the most pervasive, insidious, yet mundane rationalities and mandates of emergency power.” The suspension of the ordinary application of the “rule of law” enables policing and security agencies to act with impunity to enforce social order at a time of emergency. Yet these exceptional powers are already firmly situated within “existing ‘ordinary’ architectures of security, policing,” and the maintenance of law and order.187 The “state of emergency” is “‘always already’ normalized within liberal jurisprudence,” that is, the suspension of the rule of law is not particularly exceptional, but is “most insidiously made ordinary.” “The law refuses to limit police discretion by literally refusing to define it,” as Tyler Wall has put it, “that is, the mystical power of police discretion is its resistance to any legal definition.”188 The rules of engagement defining the relationship between public policing agencies and criminal suspects are never reciprocal and symmetrical. From the public law enforcement perspective, “suspects” are first and foremost considered “threats,” not rights-­bearing subjects protected by the rule of law against intimidation and harassment.189 In short, “the citizen who is deemed to be suspect stands stripped of his canopy of rights,” according to Satnam Choong. “The law does not recognize suspects as having a right not to be stopped, searched, arrested or detained without charge or trial.”190 To paraphrase Nicos Poulantzas, who argued quite some time ago that state-­sanctioned policing aimed at maintaining social order “always overflows the banks of law” and that it is always those public policing agencies, “as the practitioner[s] of legitimate violence and physical repression, which take precedence over law.”191 Rather than being treated as an extraordinary “exception or a radical break from what is normal,” policing powers during states of emergency function as an extension of the ordinary, an unexceptional display of state-­sanctioned legitimate violence under the guise of the rule of law.192 The open-­endedness of the powers of policing resembles something akin to a slippery slope where discretion and arbitrary practices are almost infinitely elastic and malleable.193 The emergency regulations in place during the coronavirus outbreak starting in March 2020 gave police officers on the ground wide latitude to act as if they were both outside and above the rule of law. Widespread circumstantial evidence has suggested that “corrupt” law enforcement officers used the “state of emergency” to extort bribes from unsuspecting motorists by claiming that they had violated “stay-­at-­home” directives.194 Video postings on various social media outlets showing abuse by public law enforcement



Policing the Post-­Liberal City • 69

officers during the first weekend of the national lockdown outraged ordinary South Africans, who were shocked by wanton displays of indiscriminate use of rubber bullets and sjamboks (leather whips). These images brought to light the deeply rooted culture of impunity that has persisted within the ranks of public law enforcement agencies. The routine practices of police abuse have outstripped the capacity of public officials to enforce oversight and accountability.195

Chapter Two

Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination Agoraphobia and Other Obsessions The most ballyhooed new entry into self-­protection is a flame thrower that a driver can ignite by stepping on a switch next to the accelerator, which can effectively braai an oncoming carjacker with 2m tall flames. —Let’s Go South Africa 20011 I don’t think they’ll be killed, but their hijacking days will be over. Best of all, there is no damage to the paint-­work or any part of your car. —Blaster inventor, Charl Fourie2

In the minds of ordinary South Africans, the terrifying story is a familiar one: a flashy BMW coasts to a smooth stop at a quiet suburban intersection. Before it can pull away, several menacing figures abruptly emerge from the shadows, brandishing guns, urging instructions for the driver and passengers to get out of the car and leave the engine running. But then suddenly and without warning the hijackers surrounding the car are enveloped in a roaring sheet of blue flame, the BMW screeches away, and the would-­be car thieves stagger helplessly into the darkness, dazed and confused, with clothes ablaze and hair smoldering.3 This foiled carjacking scenario is not just the idle fantasy, or the wishful thinking, of carjacking victims dreaming of revenge but the grim work of a new, much-­publicized, anti-­hijacking device, known appropriately enough as the Blaster, that was once available to South Africa’s crime-­weary motorists. Although the Blaster is definitely a novelty item that appeals to safety-­obsessed South Africans, for a brief period this flame-­throwing device became a par70



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 71

ticularly macabre weapon in the security arsenal that marks a dramatic addition to the escalating arms race between South African citizens and violent criminals.4 The invention is pretty simple: in the event of an attack, the driver of the vehicle activates the electronic ignition system by a foot switch near the accelerator, opening a rapid flow of liquefied gas from a canister concealed in the trunk. The gas exits over an electric spark via small nozzles (from two to eight) fitted beneath the driver and front passenger doors, and a wall of flame jets forth from both sides of the vehicle, engulfing the intending hijackers in a seven-­foot-­high raging inferno. Adding insult to injury, the inventors of this ghoulish pyrotechnic device have assured car owners that the huge fireball only gushes outward, without endangering the passengers or damaging the car’s paint. If the attackers are very lucky, they will probably be blinded and, possibly, seriously burned. If they are not, they will be roasted and charred beyond recognition.5 The Blaster is a bizarre instrument of destruction bordering on the ridiculous and the absurd, but the fact that it was taken seriously at the time shows how desperate South African motorists had become in response to the car hijacking scourge.6 It is the fantasy toy of every well-­prepared road warrior venturing into the mean streets of Johannesburg after dark. But the Blaster is not alone. As a result of the alarming specter of unexpected carjacking, a competitive new market has developed to transform vehicles into mobile fortresses fit for a James Bond movie. Gone are the days when simple steering wheel immobilizers like the Club (an oblong steel ring easily bolted to the steering wheel) would pass muster in the anti-­carjacking campaign; instead, an escalating “weapons build-­up that would put die-­hard Cold Warriors to shame” has underscored these efforts “to stave off the scare” of car theft. In the frantic effort to stockpile a formidable arsenal of anti-­hijacking devices, the Blaster ranks primus inter pares but it is just one of many new and equally outlandish and lethal devices to join the formidable armory of personal security weapons deployed by an exasperated citizenry. Other defensive deterrents include a pepper spray version of the Blaster named the Bingo (an aerosol dispenser that immobilizes would-­be attackers with an irritating mist of droplets), a loaded rifle placed under the driver’s seat that detonates when the ignition key is turned, and a grisly system that unleashes sharpened steel blades from the side of the car to ward off anyone foolish enough to move within range. These hideous mechanical devices may have temporarily provided drivers with a slight edge in the escalating battle over carjacking. Nevertheless, the protracted war between street-­smart criminals and intended

72 • the infrastructures of security

victims is far from resolved. In the popular imagination, wary motorists can never be overprepared to meet the challenge of car theft.7 Despite its obvious appeal to crime-­fighting fetishists, the Blaster did not sell in large numbers beyond the initial surge of popularity. But regardless of its commercial success, this teratoid product is just another strange and disturbing benchmark in South Africa’s torturous, nonlinear journey from white minority rule to postapartheid parliamentary democracy. The sinister image of the Blaster, and what ghoulish damage it can do, lurked ominously for a few years over the unique and positive features of the “new South Africa,” a grim reminder that the country has remained under siege, rigidly compartmentalized into haves and have-­nots, and divided along the lines of race and class.8

Revenge Fantasies in the Popular Imagination: The Symbolic Landscape in Urban South Africa Something as weird as The Blaster can only really emerge in a social environment such as South Africa’s: one cluttered by suspicion, violence and fear, housed under the colourful, liberal umbrella of a new democracy. Despite Madiba [Mandela] Magic we have fast become a nation of paranoiacs. The prevailing social ethos is simple—­no one can be trusted. —Andrew Miller9 An inventor says he has a solution to South Africa’s soaring carjacking rate: barbeque the carjackers.10

Launched amid great fanfare in November 1998, the Blaster became an overnight sensation, an iconic symbol of the paranoid obsession with crime. Almost immediately, it was featured on the SABC3 science and technology program In Touch as part of an in-­depth story on how novel technologies can be brought to bear to effectively combat crime. After this widely publicized television debut, orders for the invention began to pour in from all over South Africa, creating a huge waiting list of would-­be buyers willing to purchase the relatively expensive gadget at the retail price of between $690 and $1,050 [R3,900 at the time]. The Johannesburg couple who invented the Blaster applied for international patents for this concealed flame-­throwing device, which, they proclaimed, could prove the ultimate deterrent in combating vehicle theft. With many ordinary South African motorists living in terror of armed hijackers, Charl Fourie, a former-­lawyer-­turned-­



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 73

entrepreneur and marketing expert from Vereeniging (south of Johannesburg), and his Singapore-­born wife, Michelle Wong, were convinced that the Blaster could prove the most popular car accessory since the heyday of the halogen headlight and the magnesium steering wheel. Wong, who moved to crime-­ridden Johannesburg in 1997 from a city that has succeeded in both outlawing chewing gum and policing public littering, insisted that having the chassis-­mounted, flame-­throwing contrivance has made a huge difference for her peace of mind. “I feel much safer as a woman,” she said. “I don’t even have to bring my gun out anymore.”11 From the start, the Blaster attracted worldwide attention, including sensationalized reports that appeared on CNN, BBC, and Sky TV.12 Because of the instant notoriety of this auto-­mounted flame-­throwing device, its developers did not even bother trying to obtain marketing endorsements from car manufacturers or the insurance industry. In a slick advertising campaign, they put together a carefully orchestrated, two-­and-­a-­half-­minute promotional video of the Blaster in vivid action. In the first two months of 1999, this spot commercial was shown at more than a thousand venues, including government post offices with their captive audiences of queued customers. In response, anxious retail store owners inundated the inventors with queries about whether the Blaster could be adapted for use in shop counters.13 Police Superintendent David Walkley, head of the crime intelligence unit for Johannesburg, was the first person to purchase the Blaster. He appeared in the promotional video, where he assured viewers that the flame-­throwing device was perfectly legal as long as it was used in self-­defense. While police regulations forbid him to publicly endorse the product, he did so in his capacity as a private citizen, and in order to dramatize the point, he had one fitted to his own car.14 Blaster inventor Charl Fourie reassured potential customers that the device was carefully designed to deactivate in the event of a crash and that it met all the safety requirements set by the South African gas safety authority. He also dismissed concerns that the concealed flamethrower—­on which the breadth and depth of the blast can be adjusted to need and the flammable fuel is supplied by gas canisters in sizes ranging from 6.6 to 19.8 pounds—­could ever be responsible for a death. “The driver should raise his hands when he is confronted, and then step on the gas,” Fourie advised. “[Robbers] like to be able to see what you are doing with your hands. They can only do this when they get close to the driver’s window. That’s when you get him,” he explained. “This [device] is definitely nonlethal,” Fourie cavalierly proclaimed. “A person won’t just stand there and let you roast him.”15

74 • the infrastructures of security

Yet critics were not convinced. Human rights advocates expressed shock and dismay at such a powerful device capable of spraying gouts of a burning napalm-­like substance up to three meters away. In the hands of teenage joyriders or gangsters who fear attacks by rivals, or indeed who fear arrest, a stolen car outfitted with this powerful flame-­throwing device could potentially add another dangerous element to the roadways, where, at the time, an average of one South African citizen in forty per year perished as a result of car accidents or crime. Up close, the Blaster looks and sounds like a space shuttle launch as massive jets of flame arc outward and upwards with a loud “whoompf ” and a blast of intense heat that is uncomfortable ten meters away. During carefully choreographed “demonstration” tests, the Blaster completely incinerated a mannequin that had been placed outside the driver’s window. Both sides of the car fire simultaneously, regardless of whether the attack is coming from just one side of the vehicle—­or whether innocent passersby are on the other side.16 In fact, fantasy can sometimes become reality. In 2000 a frightened driver, confronted at a stoplight on a busy Johannesburg street by a carjacker brandishing a child’s gun, burned him to death with a homemade flamethrower. In terms of South African legal statutes, drivers who injure or kill attackers must be able to show that they were justified in using such force. Rarely if ever have so-­called law-­abiding drivers been prosecuted for striking back at would-­be thieves.17 It is the frustrations of frightened motorists that have led to the demented fascination with such freakish incendiary devices as the Blaster and to the increasing number of drivers who regard a vicious pit bull in the backseat or cocked-­and-­loaded 9mm pistol at the ready as a modern motoring accessory.18 South Africa has long suffered from one of the highest crime rates in the world: murders, rapes, home burglaries, and criminal assaults have occurred for decades on end in epidemic proportions. But for many people, nothing symbolizes the country’s crime plague or inspires more agoraphobic dread more dramatically than carjacking. It combines the terrifying trauma of armed robbery with the shocking horror of random violence. All too often, carjacking is accompanied by assault, rape, or murder, swelling a homicide toll that reached 11,453 in the first six months of 1998.19 Some surveys suggested that as many as 87 percent of South African drivers of every color believe they will be hijacked soon or later. In 1998, according to the South African Safety and Security Ministry, the number of reported car hijackings in the country exceeded 16,000 cases, a figure eighteen times as great as the



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 75

U.S. rate at the time. These numbers gradually declined to record lows in 2011–­2012 but spiked upward in subsequent years due in part to an overall increase in violent organized crime but also because enhanced security precautions have made it more difficult to steal parked cars rather than those that are already running.20 In 2015–­2016 the SAPS recorded 14,602 carjacking incidents in South Africa, a 14.3 percent increase from the previous year. By 2019 the number of vehicle hijackings once again exceeded 16,000 per year. Put another way, at least one motorist was hijacked every thirty-­two minutes. Fifty percent of these car thefts have consistently occurred in Gauteng. More than two-­thirds of hijacked vehicles are less than ten years old, but older models are still hijacked and sold for spare parts.21 It has been estimated that over the past two decades fewer than one in 10 such hijacking cases ever reach court, and only one in 50 ended in a conviction. For every 280 carjackings, one person is murdered.22 Understaffing, corruption, and disorganization in the police force have not helped the authorities in containing the crime wave. Police officers are poorly paid, often ill-­trained, and often outgunned. In Johannesburg, the crime capital of South Africa, where armed carjackings take place at twice the rate of any other province, the number of vehicle thefts has remained consistently high from the mid-­1990s to 2021. Reliable estimates in 2019 suggest that car thieves hijacked a vehicle in Johannesburg on average every hour. In what is a grim irony, security experts have warned that thieves often choose more aggressive methods to bypass improved security on cars. While they sometimes have used pepper spray to immobilize their victims, carjackers, almost without exception, brandish firearms when they steal cars. In many of these incidents, these armed assailants have resorted to shooting drivers who hesitate or resist rather than drag them out of the car, because so many South Africans cradle a pistol on their laps to ward off criminals.23 According to internal records released by Tracker, a leading automobile recovery company, hostage takings during hijackings have occurred in about 30 percent of car-­theft incidents.24 Newspapers have routinely published “survival guides” for motorists, warning against driving flashy SUVs and expensive imported sedans, and offering suggestions about regularly changing routes from home to work, avoiding driving at night, and always carrying extra cash and an ATM card as bargaining items in case of attack. The nightmare experience with carjacking prompted a road safety organization named Arrive Alive to publish (and republish) a highly detailed guide under the rubric “how to avoid a hijack situation.” In order to encourage drivers to stay alert at all times, insurance

76 • the infrastructures of security

companies have routinely issued all sorts of safety tips, including warning motorists to always lock car doors, roll up windows, look out for possible escape routes in the event of an attack, keep in mind nearby “safe places,” and watch for potential dangers, such as continually checking for vehicles that may be following. Private security experts have offered recommendations, cautioning drivers that the “‘golden rule’ is to not antagonize” would-­be car thieves, advising victims of a hijacking in progress to lift their arms to show that they have no weapons, use their left hands to undo their seatbelt, put the car in neutral, and obey all instructions. As a general rule, alert drivers on the road at night rarely if ever even slow down at stoplights. Traffic police never stop drivers for this evasive anti-­carjacking tactic.25 On a wider front, South Africa has remained a country at war since the 1990s, and murder rates have consistently hovered around fifty persons killed every day. Under these circumstances, violating conventional traffic regulations is a legitimate, although illegal, tactic in the effort to avoid danger.26 According to figures released in 2001 by NetStar, a subsidiary of Altech and a leading company in Southern Africa’s stolen vehicle tracking and recovery market, South African drivers have at least a one in thirty-­seven chance of having their car stolen or being hijacked.27 These figures have remained stubbornly consistent for the past two decades. According to information supplied in 2015 by the vehicle security company DataDot, 10 percent—­or 1.6 million—­of the 11 million cars operating on South African roads are stolen. Of these numbers, 60 percent are resold to buyers locally, 30 percent are transported outside South Africa (with 25 percent ending in African countries and 5 percent elsewhere), and 10 percent are stolen for spare parts.28

The Carjacking Menace The average motorist is a basket case, dreading the tap on the car window from the barrel of a hijacker’s automatic pistol.29

According to data collected from the leading tracking and recovery companies, Saturday is the day of the week when most carjacking and vehicle thefts take place. The data has also indicated that most hijackings are reported between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., followed by the two-­hour period between 12 noon and 2 p.m., regardless of the day of week. Vehicle thefts and carjackings increase in October and November before tailing off during the holiday sea-



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 77

son.30 According to the crime reports (and collaborated by tracking companies), most hijackings occur in the vicinity of townships and inner cities and inner-­ring suburbs.31 Stealing cars requires a degree of boldness and some simple tools. Operating in gangs from three to five, thieves often prowl around parking lots with cars outfitted with cloned license plates. They bring along car-­jamming devices (to prevent drivers from remotely locking their car doors), steel-­ cutting tools, screwdrivers (for hot-­wiring engines), gloves (to avoid leaving fingerprints), and several license plates to confuse pursuers.32 Some carjacking scams are ingenious in their simplicity. According to vehicle recovery companies, thieves claiming to be from a car dealership have sometimes phoned unsuspecting owners to alert them to a problem with their newly acquired luxury vehicles, luring them into a trap by promising to dispatch a skilled mechanic to investigate. Vehicle owners have been easily tricked into giving car keys over to the “mechanic from the dealership” only to discover their car has gone missing. Often operating in league with dishonest employees at car dealerships, criminals go for the “big ticket” items, targeting such high-­end vehicles as Bentleys, Land Rovers, Ferraris, and Lamborghinis.33 In another inventive scam, thieves posing as police officers contact victims of a carjacking, claiming to have recovered their vehicle and agreeing to return it for a substantial fee.34 The majority of carjackings occur when an unsuspecting victim arrives at home and the driver slows to open the entrance gate. Seizing the opportunity, carjackers pull up behind the carjacking victim to block an escape path. Victims who resist or fail to comply with demands are often seriously injured or even killed. It is also the case that car thieves sometimes resort to violence and brutality without provocation.35 In many scenarios, thieves force victims into the house, rob them of their valuables, and abscond with the vehicle. Carjackers also prey on drivers at traffic lights and stop signs. Motorists have found that it is dangerous to pick up hitchhikers or stop on isolated roads. Sometimes masquerading as police officers, hijackers may wear blue uniforms and flash blue lights to trick motorists into stopping their cars. Car thieves also force vehicles off the roads, use metal spikes or nails hidden in pieces of fruit to puncture car tires, or block roads with rubbish or large rocks to get motorists to stop their cars. They have also used children as human shields to block roads long enough to pounce on unsuspecting motorists. As if these tactics were not enough, carjackers have been known to place fake bodies on the road to trick unsuspecting drivers into stopping to lend assis-

78 • the infrastructures of security

Tips to Avoid Smash-­and-­Grab Theft and Carjacking 1. Leave a gap between you and the car in front of you to [give you] room to escape if anything should happen. 2. Be wary of people standing at the intersections—­they may be innocent, but they could also be perpetrators waiting for an opportunity to pounce. 3. Lock all your doors and close the windows when driving. Never open vehicle windows or doors for strangers. 4. Don’t have bags, cell phones, briefcases or other valuables visible inside the vehicle—­ valuables attract thieves who may break your window. 5. Always be conscious of your surroundings and remain alert when approaching an intersection or stopping your vehicle. 6. Avoid opening your windows or getting involved in discussions with street vendors or anyone handing out flyers. Be consistently on the lookout for suspicious activity and trust your instinct. 7. If it’s late at night, slow down well in advance so that the light changes to green by the time you reach the intersection. 8. If you encounter obstacles such as rocks or tyres, do not get out of your vehicle to remove them. Reverse and drive off in the opposite direction. Source: Staff Writer, “How to Avoid a Smash-­and-­Grab,” Midrand Reporter, February 25, 2019. See also Staff Reporter, “Smash-­and-­Graps Still an Issue at Various Johannesbug Intersections,” Northeastern Tribune, May 29, 2019.

tance. What might seem terribly brazen, if not bizarre, car thieves have been known to carjack private security vehicles at gunpoint in broad daylight on busy streets.36 Crime experts have alleged that ADT security guards often ride alone without partners, making them popular targets for criminal gangs, who hijack their vehicles to steal the weapons, ammunition, and flak jackets they always carry.37 While white middle-­class suburban residents are the most vociferous in their complaints about carjacking, black drivers are the most likely victims. Statistics consistently reveal that approximately 60 to 70 percent of the people hijacked are black men, and taxi drivers are the most vulnerable of all. Carjackers prefer early evening as their favorite time to strike, with the crowded rush-­hour roads offering the criminals opportunities to merge quickly with the rest of the traffic and elude possible pursuers. Public policing agencies find it nearly impossible to catch hijackers without helicopter air support, an added expense they often cannot afford due to their tight budgets. In the typical case, carjackers drive the stolen vehicles into one of the dozens of depressed townships surrounding Johannesburg, where they are quickly



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 79

stripped for parts at secret “chop shops” (sometimes operating under the convenient cover of legitimate motor vehicle repair garages), sold outright to car dealerships, or sold to criminal syndicates who take over from there.38 Like all moral panics, the heightened hysteria over the carjacking menace is constructed out of a mélange of truths, half-­truths, and outright falsehoods, where fact and fiction blend imperceptibly into rumor, myth, and urban legend. Statistics sometimes conceal as much as they reveal. Carjacking is only the most visible expression of a much deeper pattern of fraud, deception, and official corruption that is largely hidden from view. Public law enforcement officials estimate that perhaps one-­third of the car owners who report their vehicles as stolen have actually fabricated their stories in order to collect insurance payments. A study conducted by the Market Shop, an independent motor vehicle research organization, indicated that as many as two-­thirds of truck theft and hijacking take place with the assistance of drivers. Observing that poorly trained and paid drivers were often entrusted with vehicles and goods worth up to R1 million, the study recommended better background checks on operators and the introduction of polygraph tests.39 Substantial evidence—­ some based on court testimonies and some merely circumstantial—­suggests that the “carjacking economy” is a highly organized and resilient criminal enterprise involving all sorts of participants in commodity chains of illegal transactions that extend well beyond South Africa’s borders. Stealing cars is only the most visible manifestation of a vast underground network of illicit business operations. Operating at the top of the pyramid, carjacking syndicates with links to other organized crime operations orchestrate a vast stream of activities that begins with subcontracting “specialist teams” to steal cars.40 Leaving aside small-­time thieves who steal cars whenever the opportunity presents itself, carjacking syndicates tend to be highly selective in their choice of targets. Syndicate leaders typically place “orders” (somewhat akin to a shopping list) for particular vehicle models and brands with young hijackers who scour the city streets in search of what they want. These carjacking teams usually consist of three or four armed thieves and a getaway driver.41 In 2017 the trade magazine Business Tech reported that the Volkswagen (VW) Polo is the most hijacked passenger vehicle in the country, while the Toyota Fortuner is the most hijacked sport utility vehicle. Moreover, the most targeted cars tend to be the most popular, with the Polo Vivo, Fortuner, and Ford Eco Sport featuring in the top ten list of best-­selling vehicles. The theft of the Toyota Fortuner and Hilux models is so prevalent that automobile insurance

80 • the infrastructures of security

companies require two hidden tracking devices plus a Telematrix signaling apparatus, which notifies the car owner via text message anytime the vehicle is tampered with, to be installed before insuring it.42 Hijacked cars are often secreted in the strangest places. For example, a vehicle tracking crew once traced a stolen car to a conventional-­looking home near Katlehong. From the outside, the living room was decorated with broad windows lined with white lace curtains and appeared to be a normal part of the front of the house. But inside, the entire front wall was constructed on a hinge mechanism that was able to swing open, like a barn door, allowing thieves to drive cars inside. Vehicle tracking units have also recovered stolen cars concealed in pits in the ground, wrapped in aluminum foil to counteract signals from anti-­hijacking devices. In still another case, a tracker company discovered a stolen car in the back of a moving truck as it was being disassembled.43 Some stolen cars are sold to unscrupulous buyers either for their own personal use or for resale. Once the carjacking syndicates obtain the stolen vehicles, they typically locate and dismantle all tracking devices, remove their chassis and engine numbers, and alter their original appearance by changing parts and repainting their exteriors.44 “Orders” for specific vehicle brands frequently originate from unscrupulous leasing agents or private car dealerships in neighboring countries. These car-­theft rings depend in large measure on the assistance of corrupt police officials to illegally reregister and relicense the stolen vehicles, on unscrupulous agents in government licensing departments (who “legitimate” stolen vehicles by illegally registering them on eNaTIS, the National Traffic Information System), and on bribed customs officials who allow them to transport the cars across the porous borders.45 Car-­theft syndicates frequently use back roads into Swaziland as convenient corridors for stolen vehicles destined for the export market of Mozambique. Swaziland is also a favorite “cooling-­off ” zone, where stolen cars and trucks from neighboring countries are cleaned up and refitted at dozens of chop shops and eventually transported further afield once the “heat” is off.46 The lucrative black market for stolen vehicles stretches from bordering countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, and as far Zambia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).47 In order to elude suspicion, the profile of individuals employed as cross-­border drivers of stolen vehicles has changed dramatically. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, criminal syndicates used young men from Zimbabwe or Mozambique to drive the cars across the border. Over the past decade, they have increasingly relied upon well-­



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 81

dressed, trendy young couples to drive the fancy 4x4s, which are filled with travel items to make it appear that they are going on holiday.48 In early 2017 a bold gang of intrepid car thieves absconded with six luxury cars worth nearly R15 million from two luxury car dealerships. They clearly knew exactly what they were doing. In order to escape detection, the thieves entered the premises, bypassing the surveillance cameras by taking advantage of their blind spots. They made their way to the computer server room‚ where they disabled the CCTV cameras. The car thieves were also able to override the specialized security (tracking) systems secreted in the cars and then escape without activating the alarms. The theft of luxury cars from Johannesburg dealerships exposed what had become a rapidly growing trend in the targeting of South African supercars for buyers from neighboring countries and from the Middle East. Private investigators specializing in cross-­border crime investigations suggested that there was a definite demand for luxury German cars‚ especially in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. Truly “super high-­powered vehicles‚” some of “which are valued at R2-­million and more,” are quickly transported straight to the Maputo harbor, where they are “loaded into shipping containers and put onto ships” bound for Dubai.49 Many stolen cars are stripped for usable parts. Anti-­hijacking experts claim that a vehicle can be completely disassembled and “boxed” in anywhere between forty-­five minutes and an hour. These dismembered pieces—­ engines, gearboxes, electrical switches, headlights, and more—­quickly vanish into countless numbers of auto repair shops, scrapyards, and automobile dealerships.50 Recovery teams have come across the skeletal remains of vehicles that have been reported missing for less than a day, their disassembled parts unceremoniously splayed across hastily abandoned chop shops. Sometimes the only part left is a chassis with a tracker attached to it.51 The fluidity of these criminal networks, which consist of a core group that draws on the support of loosely affiliated partners downstream in the supply chain, makes it difficult for even specialized law enforcement agencies to crack open such criminal enterprises.52 There is widespread circumstantial evidence to support the claim that legitimate taxi (kombi) companies enlist the support of carjackers to steal specific models and makes of cars. Because the parts are interchangeable, owners of taxi companies rely on a steady stream of pilfered components from stolen cars to repair broken-­down vehicles. In this way, legitimate businesses operate as “fronts” to hide the illegal connections with carjacking syndicates.53

82 • the infrastructures of security

In the most extreme cases, many suburban residents adamantly refuse to venture out of their high-­walled, electric-­fenced, burglar-­alarmed, and steel-­gated homes in their immobilizer-­equipped vehicles without a loaded gun or a vicious guard dog prominently displayed on the backseat.54 Beginning in the late 1990s, frightened motorists began to arm themselves with increasingly desperate defensive devices. At the time, the armory of defensive gadgets included satellite tracking systems, handheld pepper spray, panic alarms, tinted glass, and bulletproof windows. It is also not at all uncommon for vigilant motorists to conceal a loaded weapon under the front seat of their car for use in an emergency. Keeping a vehicle permanently unwashed is prudent, since it discourages potential care thieves.55 Anti-­carjacking consultants advised motorists to install a luminous emergency release handle in the trunk of the car in the event car thieves lock the driver in it. Another popular anti-­ carjacking device is the AutoTaser, a contrivance that attaches to the steering wheel, just like the Club. When mobilized, the AutoTaser contains a motion detector that triggers a 130-­decibel alarm when an unsuspecting intruder enters the car. If the loud noise is not a sufficient deterrent, the AutoTaser unleashes a 50,000-­volt charge to anyone occupying the driver’s seat.56 In 2001, for every ten thousand residents in Greater Johannesburg there was only one uniformed police officer on duty to protect them against crime.57 These figures have remained constant. In light of the often violent nature of road crimes, motorists have fantasized about taking all sorts of extreme measures to deter potential criminals and to protect themselves. The popular media routinely report on a long litany of instances when armed motorists have shot and killed would-­be carjackers.58 In recounting his own anticrime strategy, Ulf Gunther says he never leaves his driveway without stashing a bottle of brandy laced with cyanide in his glove compartment, just in case hijackers are able to wrest his car away from him. This deadly “gift” is what he calls his “small solution” to the scourge of violent car theft in urban South Africa. “If hijackers get my car, they’ll go through the glove box, find the bottle and maybe drink it. They won’t get far then,” the fifty-­six-­year-­ old chemical engineer proudly boasted. “I know it’s probably illegal, but so is thieving and carjacking.” More and more ordinary South Africans, angered by astronomical levels of violent crime and frustrated with official efforts to combat it, have begun to look for ingenious ways to protect themselves and their families and to vengefully hit back at criminals. The inspiration for Mr. Gunther’s poison ploy came to him after a gang of youths tried to steal his car near his home in Koster, about an hour’s drive northwest of Johannesburg.59



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 83

In the fantasy-­ filled world of crime-­ obsessed motorists, all sorts of macabre solutions to the carjacking scourge have entered into public discourse, including such ingenious but highly impractical “trickster devices” as under-­the-­dash nerve gas canisters, electrified steering wheels, retinal-­ burning instrument lamps, poisonous snakes concealed in backseat containers, scorpion-­dispensing headliners, and concealed homemade firearm devices rigged to shoot unsuspecting carjackers.60 But in the quest for surefire, extreme measures to combat gun-­wielding car thieves, these oddball solutions pale in comparison with recent high-­powered security hardware inventions, all designed to shoot, maim, blind, poison, or roast would-­be vehicle thieves “at the flick of a switch.”61 The widespread fear of hijacking and the popular perception that the police can neither prevent nor catch the thieves have created a huge potential market for enterprising entrepreneurs who can devise a fail-­safe system to thwart carjackers—­and, in the process, make them suffer. These monstrous devices are straight out of a lethal video-­ game fantasy arsenal, and Chris Bezuidenhout, who tests car theft prevention devices for the South African insurance industry, knows them perhaps as well as anyone. Inventors seek his imprimatur because buyers then qualify for lower insurance rates and manufacturers have a better opportunity to attract financing. Although carjacking has increased dramatically since the demise of apartheid, anti-­theft devices for vehicles consisted mainly of such simple and conventional devices as steering wheel clamps, toughened steel gear locks, ignition immobilizer switches, automatic fuel cutoff systems, and electronic vehicle-­tracking devices. Yet beginning in the late 1990s, anti-­ hijacking gadgets have turned more sinister and deadly, designed not just to deter crime but also to inflict severe pain and suffering on the perpetrators. The South African courts legally tolerate lethal action if judges and prosecutors can be convinced that someone acted in defense of their life. But many proposed inventions would not come close to passing that test. One of the more surreal devices submitted to Bezuidenhout for his inspection was a gun barrel that secretly fits under the driver’s seat. The barrel is loaded with a huge bullet, called a 308, typically used by big-­game hunters to bring down African water buffalo weighing in excess of two tons. With this invention, if someone tried to start the car without deactivating the secret device, “they would be terminally tenderized from the bottom up,” Bezuidenhout declared cheerfully. Inventors from Durban sought Mr. Bezuidenhout’s endorsement for a system that uses two three-­foot swords connected to a powerful spring underneath the car. With the quick press of a button, the razor-­sharp blades

84 • the infrastructures of security

swing out from under the car and amputate the legs of anyone standing near the doors. A working model of this guillotine-­like device proved successful in demonstrations with dummies.62 In emergent “cellular cities” like Johannesburg, movement has increasingly metamorphosed into rapid transit between one controlled, closed-­off zone and another. The privately owned automobile represents the mechanical triumph of individual desire over collective good. Enthroned in these moving devices, motorists speed from one appointed time and place to another, circumnavigating prearranged routes and sticking to “known” parts of the city while avoiding the “unknown.” The threat of carjacking has given birth to a new growth industry: vehicle security. In the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Region, where the threat of carjacking has remained the biggest fear of motorists driving around the city, private security companies offer a withering array of anti-­hijacking devices, including assault-­proof glass, puncture-­resistant tires, digitalized satellite tracking systems for vehicles, and concealed gadgets like sophisticated transponder immobilizers (designed to frustrate thieves with code-­hopping scanners). Anti-­hijacking experts have advised car owners to purchase and install two separate anti-­theft devices—­ one wireless and one wired—­from two different security providers as a reasonable safety precaution.63 A private company called Force Products has produced and marketed the high-­voltage Shock Ejector Anti-­Hyjack System that promises to give potential car thieves “the shock of their lives.” Features include long-­range remote-­control activation, a 50,000-­volt shock that is automatically activated when doors are opened, and timers to release an ear-­ piercing siren from inside the vehicle.64 Public law enforcement agencies and private security companies typically operate with a kind of “shoot first” mentality. This approach frequently ends in violent confrontations with the result that criminal suspects and innocent bystanders alike are often the victims of indiscriminate shootings.65 Vehicle recovery teams are particularly notorious for their aggressive policing tactics, often leading to high-­speed chases, vehicle accidents, and unintended civilian casualties.66 Public law enforcement agencies and private security company operatives have justified their willingness to open fire even without provocation, claiming that criminals have deliberately “waged a silent war on security guards.”67 Whether individual or collective, vengeful rage is one response to extreme anxiety and feelings of powerlessness in the face of unannounced crime. It is not uncommon for passing motorists to give chase to getaway cars fleeing the



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 85

scene of armed robberies and even exchanging gunfire with suspected criminals. Potential victims often act with no hesitation to shoot to kill suspected criminals even before a criminal act has been perpetrated. In the popular media, these vigilantes are typically greeted as heroes who have done their part to make the streets safe for law-­abiding citizens.68 Paradoxically, these Wild West cowboy antics sometimes end in terrible tragedy. For instance, an intoxicated driver fatally shot a person who approached his car when he mistakenly mistook the person for a carjacker.69

Clever Camouflage Buying a car in Johannesburg for me at least does not entail the usual criteria of cost, performance or reliability. It is all about carjackability. —Liz MacGregor70

In the ongoing battle between audacious car thieves and wary motorists, whenever new technologies aimed at preventing carjacking enter the commercial market, these novelties are invariably matched by the introduction of newer and bolder (and sometimes more violent) carjacking tactics. In a classical Catch-­22 situation, conventional systems of vehicle security have generally failed to prevent carjacking and, ironically, have often simply worked to escalate the danger to drivers. Paradoxically, carjacking itself is in part a response to improved security for parked cars. Enhanced anti-­theft measures—­various kinds of immobilizers, steering wheel locks, and loud sirens—­have forced car thieves to adopt new tactics. In the past, urban South Africa was plagued by ordinary auto thefts, where thieves stole cars while their owners were away from the vehicle. As the number of auto thefts increased dramatically, car owners invested in more sophisticated anti-­theft devices, like specialty “immobilizers,” which ensured that the ignition switch would work only with the original key. Realizing that they needed the original keys to start the car, thieves moved from car theft to carjacking. Security devices on many luxury vehicles have become so sophisticated “that sometimes the only way to steal them is with the driver inside.”71 To combat the threat of hijacking, car owners have installed new kinds of ignition switches outfitted with combination locks requiring a correct numerical sequence to be punched into the device to start the vehicle. Invariably, carjackers have turned more violent, forcing code information from

86 • the infrastructures of security

hijacked victims at gunpoint or knifepoint or by the threat of doing bodily harm to their children. In response, the auto security industry invented what they advertised as a fail-­safe solution: a concealed device that could neutralize the car engine by remote control from a distance of several kilometers. The idea was that a victimized driver could allow thieves to drive off with the vehicle and then immobilize the engine from a safe distance. In order to counteract this measure, carjackers have resorted to taking drivers and passengers hostage, temporarily abducting them to withdraw cash from ATMs. This inherently volatile situation has resulted in an escalating number of deaths. A similar scenario is played out with regard to satellite-­guided tracking devices concealed in the body of the vehicle. A worrisome trend in the car theft prevention industry is the fact that many carjackers simply assume their victims have these tracking devices attached to their vehicles, and they know the only way to keep them from being activated is by seriously injuring or killing the driver.72 Every time private security companies introduce a new technology, criminal syndicates do not take long to figure out how to bypass its effectiveness. It is the unsophisticated carjackers who are more likely to be apprehended. Carjackers typically assume that cars and trucks are outfitted with at least one tracking device that emits electronic signals to vehicle recovery teams. Beginning in the late 1990s, early mechanical tracking devices were simply wired to car batteries, and hijackers learned to easily disable them by blowing the fuses. In response, companies selling tracking systems strengthened the short-­circuit protection on their units, yet hijackers quickly discovered other workarounds. To locate radio tags (which provide more precise locational data than GPS), car thieves have used portable FM stereo systems, dangling them around the car like metal detectors. To nullify GPS signals (which is a more effective system over long distances), car thieves park stolen vehicles in underground parking garages, where tracking devices do not work effectively, or on deserted streets, where they wait and watch for several days to determine if the stolen vehicle has been located.73 Urban residents of Johannesburg have become virtual prisoners of their own fear. Armed robbers pounce on unsuspecting victims at traffic lights, at entrances to homes, in shopping mall parking lots, outside banks, and at ATMs. Moving around the city at night has become a cat-­and-­mouse game, intrepid road warriors routinely avoid crowded intersections, never stop for red lights, and travel recklessly at excessive speeds. Frustrated with the unrelenting numbers of carjackings a year in Gauteng Province (nick-



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 87

named “Gangsters’ Paradise” in a not-­so-­subtle reference to the “GP” suffix on automobile license plates), special police “anti-­carjacking units” have moved closer to zero-­tolerance policies in their pursuit of car thieves, using heat-­seeking detection devices and sophisticated tracking technologies coupled with highly motivated armed recovery teams in high-­speed vehicles and backed by helicopter support.74 In the ongoing battle with car thieves on the streets of Johannesburg, the introduction of microdot technology is one of the latest asset-­identification technologies that has made theft and the resale of stolen property less viable for criminals. The purpose of microdotting is to make it extremely difficult for car thieves to conceal the true identity and ownership of vehicles. If thieves try to resell a car, potential buyers can determine at once that it has been stolen, and illicit chop shop operators can become wary of handling “hot” merchandise.75 Originally introduced during the Franco-­Prussian War at the end of the nineteenth century to enable carrier pigeons to transport a higher volume of messages across the battlefield, the microphotographic technique that came to be known as microdotting was a widely used espionage technique developed for its covert security applications during World War II. As technological improvements have made even more miniaturization possible, microdot identification has transformed the automobile security industry. Perfected in Australia in the 2000s, this technique has made it much easier for law enforcement agencies and car recovery companies to disrupt illicit supply chains of stolen car parts. Microdots are laser-­printed adhesive tags, a millimeter or less in diameter, that are easily sprayed onto removable car parts. Registered technicians apply more than ten thousand of these microscopic identification markers at a time, dispersed to as many as fifty different locations, with each tag etched with a code bearing the unique identification number of a particular car.76 Without exception, professional car thieves first remove or change the license plates of a stolen vehicle. In the past, there were basically two ways to identify a vehicle without its plates–­–­the engine number and the stamped vehicle identification number (VIN) affixed to the chassis. It was relatively easy for skilled criminals to modify or clone these numbers in order to resell stolen vehicles. As a kind of individualized miniature marking, microdotting indelibly stamps car parts with a unique “tag” that cannot be copied or counterfeited. Because the tags are permanent, they can be traced to illegal chop shop salvage operations and secondary markets. According to Chad Thom-

88 • the infrastructures of security

son at DataDot, South Africa’s biggest microdotting company, this procedure “contaminates” vehicles with so many microscopic markers that the parts of stolen cars are very easy to identify.77 Some private companies, like Recoveri Trace, offer tracking services that can locate stolen vehicles. This microdot tracking system operates via a transmitter that continually emits its own unique identity signal that is picked up by beacons situated around the country and transmitted to a centralized control center with a database that contains the details about car ownership. Although the system is in its infancy, this kind of tracking capability greatly increases the chances of recovering stolen vehicles.78 The exposure of surface areas of cars to ultraviolet lighting enables trained “inspection teams” to spot and then remove individual microdots and view the information they contain. The principal goal of microdot technology is to provide a rather formidable deterrent to the resale of stolen car parts. By allowing law enforcement officials to check components against the national stolen car registry, this technique offers a means for vehicle recovery in the event of theft. New legislation enacted in 2012 made it compulsory for all new cars to be microdotted in South Africa—­the only country to require this practice as a matter of law. By 2019 around five million cars and trucks were outfitted with these tiny identification markers, or nearly 40 percent of the country’s total number of vehicles.79

Private Security Solutions My father recently bought himself a fancy new Mercedes. When he presses a secret pedal twice, a helicopter appears in the sky above the car within minutes. —Liz MacGregor80

Needless to say, private security companies do a brisk business since drivers can only get their cars insured if they have an up-­to-­date satellite tracking system on board. Vehicle recovery companies like Matrix Vehicle Tracking (the third largest in South Africa, with thirty thousand subscribers in its first six years of operation) promise cutting-­edge technological solutions to the problem of car theft, including onboard computers, CCTV monitoring systems, hidden wireless recovery beacons, voice stress analysis, and vital sign detectors (adapted from Israeli fighter jet systems), cellular networking, and helicopter-­assisted global positioning systems. Along with its major compet-



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 89

itors, Altech NetStar (along with its recovery partner Rentrack), CarTrack, and Tracker, Matrix dispatches an armed posse of “recovery experts” (where “high-­risk” recovery units carry military-­issue R1 rifles) in a combined ground and air (helicopter) armada to quickly track down stolen vehicles before they are stripped clean at any number of illicit chop shops spread across the urban landscape. If the situation becomes too dangerous even for well-­armed vigilante recovery teams, these private tracking companies call for the assistance of special SAPS police “anti-­carjacking” units.81 Those who drive luxury cars like Range Rovers and BMWs, which insurance companies contend run the most serious risk of hijacking, have flocked to “risk aversion” courses, like the one organized by the BMW Advanced Driving School at Kyalami racetrack, where they learn safety tips (like how to spot a potential attack), practice evasion techniques, and conduct simulated carjacking scenarios—­interspersed with information videos filled with horrible cautionary tales about the necessity of staying alert and driving defensively.82 According to records kept by the vehicle recovery company Tracker, during 2018 an average of eighteen of their customers per month experienced physical injury through gunshot wounds, stabbings, or assault in hijackings. Ten percent of these incidents resulted in fatalities. Apart from AK47s, R4 and R5 high-­powered rifles (with steel core, armor-­piercing bullets), the 9mm Parabellum (often stolen from public law enforcement agencies) is the most commonly used handgun in hijackings in Johannesburg. Because of the success of car tracking devices, hijackers have resorted to kidnapping drivers. Kidnapping drivers and their passengers quickly became the preferred carjacking tactic because, first, it takes longer to steal a parked vehicle; second, taking hostages actually gives car thieves even more time before thefts can be reported; and, third, and it gives the car thieves time to locate the tracking units and remove them.83 In order to prevent smash-­and-­grab robberies and carjacking, affluent residents have set their sights on the purchase of luxury armored vehicles. Once the preserve of state presidents, drug barons, and perhaps the new superrich, the purchase of armor-­plated vehicles, as anti-­hijacking experts have noted, has gone mainstream in a big way.84 In 2019 more than ten of these expensive (at around R1 million each) vehicles were sold each month, mostly to affluent residents in Johannesburg and Midrand.85 As journalist Kevin Ritchie put it, “You can now literally pop down to the shopping mall, pick up your groceries and pick out the level of the ballistic protection you’d like your new SUV clad

90 • the infrastructures of security

in: B4 if your threat is a handgun wielding Rolex thief waiting for you on the way home, or B6 if you fear you might be hemmed in by a gang of AK-­47 wielding thugs trying to hijack you.”86 In addition to the personal attire of stylish bulletproof fashion accessories, car owners have looked to ways to protect themselves while driving. In response to rising demand, manufacturers of civilian armored vehicles, such as Armormax, Conquest Vehicles, and many others, have done a brisk business in outfitting high-­end luxury cars with the latest extra security measures, ranging from electroluminescent bulletproof glass (able to withstand high-­ powered rifle bullets), puncture-­resistant tires, and synthetic armor-­plated doors, to the creation of a “complete ballistic cocoon,” including blast-­proof coating to envelop the passenger cabin, steel-­reinforced roof protection, special floor armoring (with “detonation protection” guarding against explosions and fire), safety bars, custom-­made bumpers, tamper-­proofing for the engine block, and front and rear night vision cameras are standard with onboard screens to enable both the driver and passengers to monitor their surroundings.87 Retrofitting luxury cars into armored security vehicles—­or what Cynthia Weber and Mark Lacy have termed “designer survival equipment”—­ “exemplifies how design is deployed not just to make a product fashionable but to make it appear to be safe.”88 Companies specializing in armoring vehicles preferred to convert high-­end SUVs, such as Range Rovers, Land Cruisers, Volvos, BMW X5s, Nissan Patrols, as well as Porsche Cayennes and Bentley Bentaygas.89 Affluent buyers do not just purchase a car; they also buy “into the idea of the ‘consumption of protection.’”90 Some wealthy motorists have turned to such top-­of-­the-­line solutions to the carjacking problem as outfitting their cars with a full metal jacket of protective armor, including reinforced door frames, steel-­plated paneling, and shatter-­resistant glass. For those few who can afford its expensive purchase price, the BMW 540i Protection vehicle is a virtually impenetrable, bulletproof limousine that enables hired drivers and their wealthy passengers to face off hijackers “with considerable élan.” This armored vehicle has a public address system on board that allows drivers to heap scorn and verbal abuse on frustrated would-­be hijackers as they roar off, unharmed, at high speed.91 Fully mindful of the ongoing threat of carjacking, the local subsidiary of Mercedes Benz used the 2010 World Cup tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest ranges of luxury armor-­plated vehicles. Advertisers proclaimed that the Mercedes-­Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-­Benz E-­Guard have sufficient protective armor to “resist military-­standard small-­arms projectiles that



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 91

have almost twice the velocity” of ordinary handguns, in addition to providing protection against fragments from hand grenades and reinforced fireproof underarmor to block incendiary devices.92 The introduction of these seemingly “hijack-­proof ” automobiles in the commercial marketplace is an exemplary expression of what Kisho Kurokawa has called “capsule architecture”: completely cocooned and self-­enclosed devices that minimize social interaction with the ‘outside’ world by forming their own artificial time-­space environments.93 Less affluent motorists do not have the financial luxury to purchase top-­ of-­the-­line retrofitting to protect themselves from more mundane street crimes like smash-­and-­grab thefts. According to official South African crime statistics, a total of 125,076 smash-­and-­grab incidents were reported from April 2018 to March 2019.94 Automobile service shops offer tinted window glass as a way to prevent opportunistic criminals from spotting purses, laptops, or other merchandise inside vehicles. Frightened motorists can also purchase shatterproof windowpanes to prevent thieves from smashing car windows with bricks or heavy rocks to get inside.95

Criminal Ingenuity Matrix, one of the leading anti-­hijacking companies, routinely outfits all of its products with their “advanced stolen vehicle recovery technologies,” including GPS pinpoint positioning devices and wireless recovery beacons, to ensure that stolen vehicles are always “in sight.” In the event of carjacking, criminals frequently conceal stolen vehicles in underground parking facilities or in containers in order to avoid detection. Matrix uses such sophisticated tracking technologies as radio frequency and GSM (Global Systems for Mobile Communications) linked with cell phones to detect the precise location of the hidden vehicle, regardless of underground interference.96 Despite the increased technological sophistication in tracking vehicles, criminal syndicates have persistently engaged in cash-­in-­transit robberies, ambushing cash vans at scheduled stops or using high-­speed chase cars to drive them off the highways. Operating with as many as three or four vehicles, gangs of up to twenty members have frequently attacked in broad daylight, using stolen or hijacked vehicles, striking their vulnerable targets with military-­like precision and using armor-­piercing bullets and explosives to gain entry to the cash-­in-­transit vans.97 Robbery teams have preferred to use

92 • the infrastructures of security

heavy vehicles, like old-­style BMW and Mercedes-­Benz C-­class cars, as “rammers” to crash into armored vehicles to precipitate a heist. Law enforcement agencies worried that thefts from national defense arsenals of rocket launchers (including 88mm antitank weapons) and mortars, which can be used to knock out armored vehicles, opened up the possibility of an escalation of lethal weaponry that can be used in cash-­in-­transit heists.98 The foiled truck hijacking on March 4, 2021, in Kelvin (near Sandton in northern Johannesburg) illustrates the audacity of criminal gangs. Undoubtedly following a tip from an undercover informant, a SAPS special unit surprised a large criminal gang who were attempting to hijack a delivery truck transporting cell phones with an estimated value of R60 million. During the ensuing shootout, one security guard and one suspect were killed. The SAPS arrested nineteen suspects, recovered three AR-­15 assault rifles and two AK-­ 47 rifles (in addition to multiple handguns) at the scene, and confiscated eight stolen cars used in the attempted robbery. This incident bore all the telltale signs of an “inside job,” in which the hijackers knew in advance what the cargo truck was hauling.99 Inventive criminals have experimented with various remote-­controlled, electronic signal “jamming devices.” The purpose behind these easy-­to-­ obtain devices is to fool unsuspecting motorists into believing that they have locked their car doors via alarm remotes as they hurry off to the shopping mall when they have actually left the car unlocked. Criminals can easily purchase a range of different illegal GSM-­and GPS-­jamming devices on the black market, which they then use in the hijacking of vehicles and trucks. Many of these illegal devices originate in the Far East, where they are mass produced in factories and then shipped to South Africa in mislabeled containers. These “remote blocking” devices vary in size from small handheld gadgets to large industrial briefcase–­size units. Their operating feature is to transmit signals that metaphorically form a “bubble of interference” around the vehicle, disrupting smartphone communications and very effectively “silencing” positional signaling by preventing car-­tracking telematics devices from receiving and transmitting messages.100 Jamming devices that are simply plugged into the vehicle’s cigarette lighter socket can scramble and block all tracking signals, with the result that the private security control center loses contact with the stolen vehicle. In response to this escalation in criminal ingenuity, private security companies have developed an anti–­car jamming device that notifies motorists when carjackers are electronically disrupting their remote signals.101



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 93

Criminal syndicates that specialize in hijacking commercial vehicles use a variety of tricks to fool vehicle recovery efforts. After commandeering a tractor-­trailer, thieves detach the cab from the cargo unit, driving one in one direction and the other in another. Carting the cargo unit off on the back of a flatbed truck renders tracking devices useless unless they send out signals on a wireless frequency. These hijacking syndicates also often use sophisticated, customized communication-­intercepting devices—­commonly known as “Grabbers” (worth R15 million each)—­to intercept the cell-­phone conversations of law enforcement agencies to pinpoint the location of mobile tracking units. Obtained overseas, these “superspy gadgets”—­with their ability to monitor cell phone conversations and to track and locate police patrols—­ enable criminal syndicates to avoid roadblocks, evade ambushes and “sting operations,” and ascertain whether or not they are being followed.102

Embodied Geographies of Vulnerable Space Armed-­response units prowl the streets [of Johannesburg] day and night. In every suburb, signs along the road warn robbers they may be shot or seized by private guards. Homes bristle with panic buttons, infra-­red sensors, and electric fences. Cars have anti-­ hijack devices, even bullet-­proof glass.103

In June 2000, three armed intruders burst into St. Matthew’s Anglican Traditional Church twenty minutes into the Sunday morning service, relieving the frightened parishioners of their cash, jewelry, and cell phones. This episode, and others like it across Johannesburg in the preceding months, marked the beginning of a disturbing new trend in South African crime: armed robberies of entire congregations during Sunday religious services. These profane violations of sacred space seemed to suggest, to the faithful at least, that criminals no longer feared either the police or God. In recent years, other places where large numbers of people typically congregate—­hospitals, courts, doctors’ offices, youth hostels, and even entire apartment complexes—­have been targeted in similar mass holdups. The church robberies, which have struck congregations across the racial spectrum, spurred an expanded lobbying effort by the South African Council of Churches for stricter gun-­control legislation. Churches have long been targets for criminals, but until the last several years the conventional modus operandi was nighttime burglary. Then several years ago, robbers began to hold up church staff on their trips to the bank to deposit weekly collections. Increasingly aggressive armed robbers

94 • the infrastructures of security

began raiding churches on Monday mornings as clergy or secretaries were counting collections, with cell phones and computers added to the booty. These changing circumstances forced the Reverend David Jones, pastor of St. James Free Presbyterian Church in Bedfordview, to transform the church, situated on a meadow’s edge in Johannesburg’s northeastern suburbs, into a well-­protected fortress. In 1997 church leaders replaced the quaint knee-­high white border surrounding the property with a six-­foot chain-­link fence. The next year, after four burglaries, an alarm was installed and armed guards were hired to transport the weekly collections to the local bank. In 1999, high-­tech surveillance cameras were placed along the perimeter of the church property. Despite these measures, caretakers living on the property discovered two holes cut into the church’s perimeter fence and the lenses of the security cameras disabled. Frightened about possible harm to the congregation, the Reverend Jones hired armed guards to stand watch during Sunday services and instituted a new rule: the church’s entrance doors are locked ten minutes after the start of the Sunday morning services, and anyone arriving late is unable to gain entry. Other churches have followed suit, responding to the fear of armed robbery by questioning newcomers and installing heavy metal gates over entryways and locking them during services.104 Thieves have long regarded church congregations as soft targets. In July 2014, armed robbers broke into a mosque in the Johannesburg city center, forcing the two hundred startled worshippers to lie on the ground as they were stripped of cell phones and cash. The thieves also stole a safe that contained donation money. Because most of the worshippers were foreign immigrants, they were too frightened to open a formal police investigation.105 Pretending to be delivering donations for the needy, two young men robbed six women of their jewelry, handbags, cell phones, and R10,000 in cash at the Invana Trinity Methodist Church in Turffontein in March 2015.106 In June 2017, around fifteen heavily armed men (disguised in head-­to-­foot black clothing and masks) stormed into the Centre of Praise International Church in Selby (the southern rim of downtown Johannesburg) during a prayer session on Sunday morning. After physically molesting and assaulting the assembled worshipers, the thieves took the members’ valuable possessions.107 Yet, on occasion, targeted victims have foiled attempted robberies. For example, engaged churchgoers at a prayer service in Berea in September 2014 overpowered the would-­be thieves, brutally beating the “gun-­wielding thugs” before they were rescued by SAPS officers.108 So-­called follow-­home robberies have become particularly popular with



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 95

criminals. Paid spotters keep watch at airports for passengers arriving from overseas with fancy bags or exchanging large sums of money. The criminals follow the travelers to their homes or hotels, where they are robbed at gunpoint. In similar cases, affluent shoppers are followed home from high-­end malls. In an incident in 2017, a gang of thieves stopped and looted a van carrying businessmen on the off-­ramp leading into the O. R. Tambo International Airport. The hired driver was shot and killed.109 So-­called blue-­light robberies and carjackings have posed a particularly vexing problem for law enforcement. In a typical scenario, heavily armed men, posing as police officers on routine investigations, pull over unsuspecting motorists using flashing blue lights on their vehicle. In February 2020, an elderly woman was found dead after she and her husband were pulled over and hijacked by suspected blue-­light robbers in Vereeniging. The couple was returning home after attending a prayer meeting in Meyerton. In other instances spanning many years, blue-­light gangs have followed victims from O. R. Tambo International Airport, forcing them to pull over on the road, robbing them of their luggage, and stealing their cars.110 On the lookout for high-­end luxury cars, gangs of carjackers pay no attention to the status or reputation of those from who they are stealing. In 2003 presidential spokesperson Bheki Khumalo was accosted by nine gunmen who stole his BMW outside the home of a friend in Pretoria. A few days later, Deputy Public Minister Musa Zondi, along with his driver and bodyguard, were robbed by gunmen who stole money and his car.111 The sheer number of high-­profile cases of carjacking lends weight to the claim that drivers in and around Johannesburg live in constant dread of vehicle theft. For example, in February 2020, ANC Member of Parliament Judith Tshabalala was carjacked and held hostage by three armed assailants near Sebokeng in the Vaal area. Released after several hours, she was traumatized but unharmed. Tshabalala was the second MP to be hijacked in 2020. An MP for the Democratic Alliance, Cameron Mackenzie, was shot and wounded during his hijacking ordeal a few weeks earlier as he was driving into the luxury Dainfern gated estate.112 A child rights activist, Saira Khan, who operates an organization called Rise against Hunger, narrowly escaped death when a carjacker fired into her car in downtown Johannesburg. She had also been carjacked a year earlier.113 In 2016, C. J. Small, an African American city council member from Mobile, Alabama, was shot and seriously injured when armed robbers ambushed the tour bus on which he was traveling. The thieves escaped with cell phones, jewelry, and other valuables.114 In 2018 the mayor of South Afri-

96 • the infrastructures of security

can capital Pretoria/Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, was “carjacked” outside a restaurant by an armed gang that stole his silver Mercedes Benz.115 Followed home by three armed assailants, Kaizer Chiefs owner Kaizer Motaung’s wife, Valeta Julegka Motaung, was hijacked and robbed of jewelry and cash valued at R2.5 million inside the walled perimeter of their family home in the upscale residential suburb of Bryanston.116 In 2020, Njabulo Nzuza, a member of the national cabinet, was carjacked after leaving a shopping mall in Johannesburg by two men he thought were police officers. They followed him in a Volkswagen and pulled him over with flashing blue lights. Besides stealing his blue Range Rover, mobile phones, and wallet, the two gunmen drove him between cash machines to empty his bank accounts before dumping him in a township.117 Off-­duty police officers have been known to “moonlight” as carjackers.118 Countless examples of carjacking–­–­sometimes conducted in broad daylight on busy streets—­combined with robbery and kidnapping could be repeated ad infinitum.119 But it was the murder in October 2007 of South Africa’s most famous reggae star, Lucky Dube, that provided shocking proof that no one was immune from random criminal violence. The singer was shot and killed in a botched carjacking as he dropped off his teenage son and daughter at their uncle’s house in Rosettenville, south of the Johannesburg central city. On the lookout for a late-­model Chrysler luxury sedan to steal, the three men approached the car and shot the forty-­three-­year-­old singer at close range. The senseless killing reignited criticism of the failure of public law enforcement agencies to curb violent crime. At their trial, the three accused—­who were ultimately convicted and sentenced to life in prison—­ admitted that they believed Dube was a Nigerian and that they did not realize his true identity until they read about the robbery attempt the next day in newspaper reports.120 The casual manner of Lucky Dube’s death cast an unwelcome “spotlight on the visceral anxieties” and uneasy tensions deeply entrenched in the country’s social fabric in the decades after the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy. The extraordinary response to this tragedy expressed through public outpouring of grief from around the world ensured that “it was impossible to regard this [event] as simply another ordinary South African death by [violent] crime.”121 This mindless killing exposed the lack of a strong moral compass to guide the conduct of everyday life.122 These kinds of brazen robberies and random killings underscore the climate of fear that pervades affluent residential neighborhoods, commercial zones, and entertainment sites. For many middle-­class white South Africans,



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 97

emigration is the solution to what they regard as a disorderly urban situation bordering on chaos and anarchy. Since the mid-­1990s, South Africa has experienced a silent “brain drain”—­the “chicken run” as it is sardonically referred to—­as countless numbers of highly educated, skilled, and talented professionals leave the country for Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Western Europe, and elsewhere. In 2000 it was estimated that between 12 and 16 percent of South African citizens lived abroad, and a recently published survey of business executives and professionals all over the world indicated that only Russians are more eager to leave their country than South Africans of all races. If current trends continue, soon there will be more South African–­ trained physicians practicing in California than in Cape Town. Around 96 percent of all those who emigrate cite escalating criminal violence and murder as the principal reason for their decision to leave the country of their birth.123

Stolen Vehicle Recovery (SVR) Industry I have been hijacked twice and I am fortunate to be alive . . . [Hijacking] is a crime against human rights . . . That is what [hijackers] are—­terrorists. They deserve nothing less than life [in prison], or death. —Louis Harris124

Vehicle tracking companies have come to regard hijackings as life-­and-­death situations, where quick response is essential. Working with the latest “integrated GIS-­based automated vehicle tracking and management systems,” where signaling devices hidden in cars provide exact locational coordinates, these companies immediately dispatch highly trained recovery teams once a vehicle theft is under way. Their stated goal is to recover and return hijacked vehicles within minutes of the crime taking place, and they respond swiftly before carjackers can conceal or dispose of the stolen vehicles. To reduce the number of hijackings, vehicle tracking companies typically station “recovery teams” in hijack hot-­spot areas so that they can immediately go into action.125 Installing tracking devices such as those offered by companies like Tracker, Matrix, CTrack, and NetStar is the most common way car owners try to protect their vehicles. Spending money on tracking devices is commonly referred to as a “grudge purchase”—that is, a necessary expense but annoying nonetheless. The simplest devices just track the location of stolen cars, while

98 • the infrastructures of security

other, more sophisticated systems automatically cut the engine shortly after a theft takes place. NetStar introduced a new product on the market, called the Planetron Ghost (priced at R4,999), that allows unsuspecting hijackers to drive for a few hundred meters before the engine automatically turns off. If the driver is held at gunpoint inside the vehicle, the car performs normally so as not to endanger the victim’s life. This system is unlike earlier anti-­hijacking devices that beeped loudly or immediately cut the engine, irritating the hijackers and putting the driver at grave risk of injury. Experienced carjackers routinely jam GSM signals during vehicle theft. The standard GSM stolen vehicle recovery systems supplied by all tracking companies have proved to be ineffective against this new threat. Not to be outfoxed by car thieves, NetStar launched a jamming-­resistant solution, called Jamming Resist, which enables GSM signals to continue transmitting despite interference.126 Anti-­carjacking companies have also experimented with seemingly simple ploys. It may seem that a thin layer of vinyl is not a particularly effective anti-­hijacking tool. But considering that for hijackers the point of stealing a car is to get away unnoticed, the more car owners make their vehicles stand out, the less likely it will become a target. A whole range of exotic and luxury cars have been wrapped in standout plastic—­“including one in a riot of psychedelic rainbow colours.” Yet even an ordinary bakkie (small truck) or SUV brilliantly stands out in the crowd with a distinctive and unusual vinyl covering.127 Vehicle recovery companies use a combination of air and ground teams to ensure the fastest, safest, and most efficient tactical response to car theft. Whether they supply their own air fleet or subcontract with a handful of commercial companies to assist in vehicle tracking from above, private security companies like Matrix, Tracker, Rentrak, and CarTrack (the leading specialists in recovery of hijacked automobiles) consider helicopter assistance to be a crucial element in the recovery process. Helicopter pilots not only directly communicate with control rooms but also provide intelligence to ground teams in order to avoid high-­risk situations and bring about quick vehicle recoveries. Pilots are “trained in tactical response and undergo regular training to ensure they are well prepared to respond to any theft and hijacking situation.” Helicopter pursuits are dangerous work, and the fatal crash of a Matrix Vehicle Tracking helicopter (operated by Henley Air), in which two pilots lost their lives, provides sobering confirmation for the inherent dangers of air flight.128 The stolen vehicle tracking and recovery industry is overcrowded with



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 99

companies, large and small. The industry leader, Tracker, has captured close to 50 percent of market share in the business of providing innovative tracking products and recovery services. With a staff of twelve hundred nationwide and a 25 percent market share, Altech NetStar is the second leading company. With so many companies competing for market share in the narrow tracking and vehicle recovery business, profit margins are low. Leading companies with large operational budgets have branched into other product markets, like subcontracting with freight and hauling companies to oversee cargo fleet management, including tracking fuel consumption and monitoring crew activities to reduce theft and pilferage. Many companies also offer background investigations and preemployment screening, providing tactical armed support for vehicles with valuable cargo, and protection services for corporate executives.129 When the vehicle tracking industry was originally launched, its sole purpose was to monitor the location of vehicles and to assist in recovering them if they were stolen. Yet in the past decade, such companies stopped differentiating themselves by reference to their stolen vehicle recovery rates, instead referring to the use of huge amounts of data they acquire from tracking devices concealed in the cars and trucks of their paying clients. As GSM and telematics signaling became the dominant technologies for location and positioning, massive amounts of new information poured into data storage facilities, and companies began exploring new and creative ways to make use of it—­for example, by passing along traffic data to satellite navigation providers. With hundreds of thousands of devices attached to moving vehicles at any given moment, tracking companies were uniquely positioned to identify heavy traffic buildup, traffic accidents, and gridlock.130 Recovery of stolen cars and commercial trucks is no longer the main source of revenue in the vehicle tracking industry. For leading companies like Tracker, Cartrack, and Matrix, the installation of onboard tracking devices has become the first step in a more diversified business model linked to the gathering and interpretation of “big data.” Vehicle recovery companies have begun to sell access to huge quantities of information gathered from tracking devices to corporations like TomTom and Google, enabling these companies to alert their clients to adverse traffic conditions. Vehicle recovery companies have set their sights on selling data to urban planning consultancies, advertising agencies, marketing firms, financial institutions, and insurance companies.131 The biggest outlet for the provision of accumulated data, however, has

100 •

the infrastructures of security

been corporate customers. Tracking companies collect and collate data ranging from driving style and traffic conditions to fuel consumption and wear and tear. They sell this information to client companies that use it to improve efficiency and reduce costs. By ascertaining which of their clients visit particular shopping malls or pass particular advertising billboards at certain times of day, tracking companies can accumulate information, which they sell to marketing firms and advertising agencies.132

Air Patrols: Helicopter Pursuits In the typical case, tracking companies have employed a triangulated approach for vehicle recovery. After receiving signals from transponder units hidden in vehicles, operators at the command and control center mobilize both mobile ground units and helicopter support with the assistance of GPS pinpoint positioning technologies. In many instances, vehicle recovery companies have subcontracted with well-­known private security companies to provide ground support via dedicated armed response teams consisting of one or many high-­speed vehicles with no less than two operatives per car armed with assorted weaponry (pistols, rifles, and pepper spray), outfitted with communications devices, and protected with bulletproof vests. Because tracking signal strength is much better in airspace and because aboveground sight lines are not impeded, helicopter support units are an invaluable resource. Tracking and vehicle recovery teams typically wait until the “last mile” (industry jargon) to call for the assistance of SAPS recovery teams. Recovery of stolen vehicles is a dangerous job, as shootouts can occur between armed recovery teams and car thieves, who sometimes are willing “to go down with guns blazing.”133 Helicopters, in particular, have enforced a vertical form of security. These aerial machines epitomize visual prosthetic devices. Pilots and spotters combine their own sensory powers with the mechanical capacity of “sighting” machines to electronically extend the field of vision and hence more clearly illuminate the terrain below. In engaging with high-­risk tactical situations, helicopters actively perform the long-­standing role of “making legible” the terrain stretching out below. In military discourse, helicopters commonly provide enhanced “situational awareness” capabilities in their targeted field of operations.134 The assistance of helicopters, which are equipped with precision cameras and sophisticated global positioning devices, is a crucial element of the recovery process, and pilots offer the fastest means of communication to



Johannesburg in the Geographical Imagination • 101

FIGURE 2: Reaction Services—­Helicopter Pursuit

the control room and ground teams. Helicopter spotters also provide intelligence to recovery teams on the ground, helping them to avoid blundering into high-­risk situations and to bring about quick vehicle recoveries.135 To give an example, Henley Air, a small charter and helicopter flight training company, sells its airborne flight services to a variety of companies that range from hospital emergency services (Netcare 911), aerial surveillance of mining and industrial facilities (Lonmin, Sasol, Rand Refinery), and tracking of stolen vehicles. Besides vehicle tracking, Henley offers group charters, scenic flights for vacationers, and emergency medical rescue. Its pilots ferry gold and platinum to refineries from the mines. But the core business for Henley Air is vehicle recovery. On a busy day, Henley airborne recovery teams respond to over thirty cases of hijackings and stolen cars in cities around the country.136

Defensive Driving Courses Dozens of private companies, such as National Hijack Prevention Academy, MasterDrive, and SSC Equity Training, offer training courses covering situa-

102 • the infrastructures of security

tional awareness, vehicle hijack avoidance, and survival skills in the event of a carjacking. The main goal of defensive driving courses and “urban survival skills” is to instill confidence in drivers by reassuring them that they have the requisite training, knowledge, and skills to proactively assess situations and reduce hijacking risks. Professional driving instructors instill in motorists the awareness to be particularly alert for potential hijacking in the three areas where they are most vulnerable: their own driveways, traffic intersections that require stopping their vehicle, and in the exposed parking lots of shopping malls. According to professional experts in conducting training exercises to avoid carjacking, vigilance in following particular protocols are key elements in reducing the risk of carjacking: driving in reverse into driveways or parking spots enables drivers to quickly escape in threatening situations. Moreover, parking against a wall or similar barrier prevents unwanted persons from sneaking up from behind. Motorists are warned to watch front gates until they are fully closed after one enters the premises of a home or business. Drivers are told to familiarize themselves with the people who normally congregate at usual intersections, carefully observing those who appear out of place. Carjackers often try to distract motorists at traffic lights, so drivers need to be aware not to fall into this trap. Defensive driving instructors always tell drivers to anticipate traffic light changes so as to avoid having to come to a full stop, and to avoid being blocked in stationary traffic so as to always have an escape route. Finally, drivers are instructed to be ready with car keys in their hand before reaching parked cars and not to waste any time when putting groceries or purchased items in the trunk of their car.137

Chapter Three

Vulnerable Bodies Self-­Protection in a Risky World Every fashion couples the living body to the inorganic world . . . Fashions are a collective medicament for the ravages of oblivion. —Walter Benjamin1

The moral panic about crime projects fear onto defenseless, vulnerable bodies. The agoraphobic imagination treats bodies as if they are under siege, where “corporeal boundaries” require protection and fortification against outside threats and “against all transgressing [urban] invaders.” Bodies are always inescapably encoded by cultural norms that reflect their socioeconomic circumstances and their historical moment in time. By focusing attention on such transgressive acts as assault, rape, and murder, spatial narratives of urban danger treat the figure of the violated body as a metaphor for what has gone wrong with the city. These stories bring home the point that bodies are not generic and equally fungible entities. Instead, each bears the markers of different degrees of pregnability. The alert, well-­armed, mechanized body prepared for urban warfare offers the reassuring illusion of invulnerability as a defense against anxiety and the apoplectic fear of the urban unknown.2 Technical innovations in the booming field of security protection involve a reweaving of the relationships between the body and its place in space as well as a reshaping of the operative rules, assigned roles, and physical connections that give substance to practices of navigating public spaces of the city. In the imaginary cyborg future, technological implants operate as prosthetic extensions of the human body and its sensory capacities.3 As Langdon Winner has argued, “The creation of new technical devices presents occasions around which the practices and relations of everyday life are powerfully

103

104 • the infrastructures of security

redefined, the lived experiences of work, family, community, and personal identity, in short, of some of the basic cultural conditions that make us ‘who we are.’”4 The introduction of biometric measures (such as fingerprint identification systems, retinal scans, voice activation, and facial recognition identification) for traveling through securitized spaces has signaled the systematic use of biological and bodily data as a means to identify and manage risk for affluent residents of Johannesburg.5 While biometric measures constitute a new kind of urban surveillance, they also form what amounts to an invisible protective armor insulating those inside the “safety shield” against those outside.6 Metaphorically at least, security technologies replace complex individuals with “databased selves” whose characteristics can be observed, mapped, and measured in relation to algorithmic calculations. The introduction of all sorts of new technologies such as imaging radiometers, spectroradiometers, scatterometers, and laser altimeters have greatly enhanced the capacity to locate, identify, and observe objects in space. The development of what has been called “close sensing” consists of the use of x-­ray machines, magnetometers, radio frequency identification, and trace-­sensing devices that “scrutinize personal belongings and their fragments, the body and its interior.”7 In earlier iterations, the introduction of “secured by design” objects and services aimed at buttressing conventional security measures, such as the construction of physical barriers and the installation of protective shields around specific locations. Instead, the newer versions of these objects and services “focus on connectivity, tagging, and personal ‘body armor’”—­that is, wearable security outfits that combine ordinary clothing attire with new technologies of protection that blend “into everyday life . . . seamlessly,” like such modern accessories as mobile smartphones, panic buttons on lanyards worn around the neck, hand-­dispensed pepper spray canisters, and digital watches. Woven into the daily routines of navigating the city, such strategies of “securing by design” project the promise of delivering increased security, safety, and protection by using new (and sometimes experimental) technologies to provide a welcome “technological fix” to protect against risk and danger.8 Digitally connected electronic devices have become the “central nervous system” of anxious bodies traveling in space not only because they enable direct communication and real-­time connection with extended security networks but also because they provide early warning detection against potential threats to bodily harm.9 In Johannesburg, technologies of surveillance that are integrated with CCTV camera networks have penetrated the world of social



Vulnerable Bodies • 105

media. New digital technologies have connected wary residents through various social media outlets, including such networked rallying points as Facebook, neighborhood chat groups like WhatsApp, and other collaborative information-­sharing forums. These online platforms have enabled vigilant and security-­conscious “crime fighters,” who are always on the lookout for “suspicious persons,” to report their observations in real time to private security companies, public policing agencies, and voluntary neighborhood watch groups in the battle against crime. These means of communication endow their users with a sense of purpose.10 Digital platforms like WhatsApp groups have become important tools for sharing crime information, including posting real-­time “crime alerts” and circulating pictures of people suspected of criminal activities. Technically speaking, individuals cannot legally take public pictures of someone’s face if a court case against the person has not been opened. But within “closed” networks, like giant telegram group chats such as the CCIN (Civilian Crime Intelligence Network), members share pictures of “suspected criminals” with impunity.11

Psychasthenia and the Armoring of the Anxious Body 12 As a general rule, concern with personal safety began with the fortification of the private home. Besides the ubiquitous physical barriers like high walls, steel gates, and burglar bars, private homes—­which have been transformed into the impregnable “safe house”13—­affluent neighborhoods have experienced a security “makeover” of sorts. Up-­to-­date, “smart” automated technologies for home security have come to play a major role in the construction and retrofitting of affluent homes. Put simply, smart homes frame the parameters of domestic environments in which interconnected technologies respond “to human presence and actions and adjust themselves” automatically.14 Long understood as the locus of personal autonomy and individual identity, the private home has assumed an entirely new cultural meaning when it is seen to be under threat from outside forces. The introduction of security devices has increasingly transformed homes into fortified enclaves with the dual function of secured redoubts for retreat from danger and platforms from which to launch forays into the dangerous world beyond the gates. Homeowners in upscale residential suburbs have increasingly installed personalized home surveillance equipment, especially strategically placed CCTV cameras

106 • the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 3: Upper-­Middle-­Class Perimeter Security

and access control devices, into their private dwellings. Generally speaking, these small-­scale surveillance systems are not connected with the command and control rooms of private security providers but function autonomously as an independent “home safety apparatus.” In writing about the “home under surveillance,” Michelle Rapoport demonstrates how this surveillance assemblage consists of a tripartite conjunction of site (private home), user (family of occupants), and technologies (surveillance systems).15 Privately operated CCTV cameras and access control devices in private spaces function differently from street-­level CCTV cameras located outside the private dwelling. Homeowners make use of these surveillance technologies in their daily lives in ways that they are both participating operators and targeted objects of these systems.16 The constant gaze of CCTV cameras “offer[s] those under observation a sense of physical and mental well-­being, that is, a confidence and freedom that is a result of their being watched, protected, and secured.”17 These CCTV cameras provide images of unknown persons at the front gate, offer surreptitious glimpses of domestic staff going about their daily chores, serve as a family communication system, and can function as nothing more than an advanced baby monitor. By solidifying the private home as the site



Vulnerable Bodies • 107

of personal and familial privacy and as an expression of partial retreat from public life, automated domestic technologies “take on vital roles in defining physical perimeters and enclosed spaces, in materializing dichotomies between inside and out, private and public, safety and threat, the familiar and the strange.”18 As one pillar of the so-­called trio crimes, home invasions have elicited such consternation and anxiety among residents of suburban neighborhoods that the fear of household break-­ins and robberies has provoked a genuine moral panic.19 As a particularly evocative term, “home invasions” is a distinctive locution that conjures up something akin to entire middle-­class suburban neighborhoods under systematic siege by invading armies bent on conquest. According to the Statistics SA’s Victims of Crime 2018/2019 official report released at the end of 2019, homeowners across South Africa experienced more than 1.3 million house break-­ins per year, and less than half were reported to public law enforcement agencies.20 Experienced burglars have experimented with various tricks of the trade to gain entry into even the most well-­guarded homes. Criminals have been known to ring the bell at the outer gate, dressed as police officers or employees of gas and electric companies, requesting entry to the premises. Surprisingly, this ruse often works. Criminal syndicates and common thieves alike have adopted a wide range of clever tactics to take advantage of innocent and unsuspecting citizens. Undeterred by physical barriers, burglars routinely smash through boundary walls and dig under security fences to gain entry to premises. Potential home invaders sometimes “mark” walls or pavements around homes to identify those with weak security systems. Besides the age-­ old problem of poisoning guard dogs, thieves also short-­circuit electric fences or cause unexpected power outages just prior to scheduled load shedding in order to cover their break-­ins.21 Burglars have artfully managed to bypass electronic beams and alarms by various means, including bribing home workers ( gardeners, child-­care workers, domestic staff, etc.) to identify weak spots in home security systems, using reconnaissance tactics such as taking selfies outside houses to get video footage of security measures and triggering electronic beams by tossing stones into yards over a period of time to test activation and response times. Other thieves use tools to remove windowpanes for quick access into ground-­ floor rooms in search of easy-­to-­steal items like laptops and iPads. Still others have cut holes in roofs to slip into houses undetected. Gangs of enterprising thieves have been known to work with young children who gain surreptitious

108 • the infrastructures of security

entry by deftly squeezing through burglar bars. For the most part, house robbers want to get in and out as quickly as possible and mostly want to avoid any and all confrontations with homeowners.22 One common practice for thieves is to use clandestine spotters in shopping malls or at airport arrivals to identify potential victims, following these unsuspecting motorists home and accosting them with firearms at their front security gates before entering the premises to duct-­tape homeowners and domestic staff, and then ransacking their homes in search of valuables.23 A group of thieves nicknamed the “Tall and Short Gang” carried out a series of house break-­ins over many months before they were caught. In itself, this series of house burglaries was not unusual, but the fact that the robbers used a private security vehicle (owned by the company Top Security) as their getaway car was bizarre.24 Yet what has compounded the fear associated with house burglaries is that these “home invasions” are sometimes accompanied by physical assaults, threats to children, and even abductions.25 Security experts have offered all sorts of tips—­such as trimming trees and shrubs in order to reduce hiding places; making sure the alarm system is armed overnight or when anyone is home alone; testing alarm and panic buttons at least once a month; and getting to know your neighbors, who can alert security teams when they spot something amiss—­in order to curb home invasions. Despite the steady stream of cautionary advice, alert homeowners probably reduced the likelihood of home invasion but did not prevent them.26 In response to more formidable security designed to protect against break-­ins in residential neighborhoods, criminals have altered their methods of attack and devised more dangerous tactics. In past decades, gangs of at least three robbers armed with handguns represented the standard modus operandi for home burglaries. Over the past decade, the choreographed practice of home invasions has escalated to almost surreal proportions. Criminal gangs numbering eight to ten men brandishing semiautomatic rifles have converged on their targets in as many as three high-­end 4x4 SUVs, each with a designated driver, with one of the three vehicles acting as a lookout. Acting with military-­like precision, criminal gangs can enter and exit a home in about five minutes or less.27 Faced with the seemingly arbitrary randomness of house burglaries, anxious homeowners have often succumbed to paranoid suspicions about their domestic workers (house cleaners and cooks, gardeners, child-­care workers, and static guards), giving in to feelings of distrust and doubt. Leaders of neighborhood security initiatives have routinely passed along unfounded

FIGURE 4: CPS (Community Protection Services) Private Security Logo

110 • the infrastructures of security

rumors masquerading as truth that domestic workers are easily scammed, bribed, or threatened into aiding and abetting (whether deliberately or unwittingly) criminals with home burglaries.28 Taking advantage of these fears of “the danger lurking within,” private security companies have offered the assistance (for a fee) of “specialist consultancies” to conduct thorough background checks on “domestic staff ” before hiring them.29 As a general rule, private security companies offer their clients a range of investigative services as part of their security package. In falling victim to unfounded fears, these homeowners have often allowed their private security providers to subject their domestic workers to intimidating interrogation, including off-­site polygraph (lie detector) testing, as part of their routine investigations into home break-­ins.30 Private security companies uniformly claim—­with no concrete evidence or proof—­that as high as 90 percent of home burglaries are “inside jobs.”31 Despite studies showing that polygraph tests are notoriously unreliable, homeowners have allowed their fears and unfounded beliefs to overcome good judgment.32 The widespread use of home security systems has gone hand in hand with the “ideological normalization of surveillance,” where the absence of “watching” appears to homeowners as abnormal.33 Despite hiring private security companies to provide round-­the-­clock armed patrols to monitor activities on the public streets of their residential neighborhoods, suburban homeowners have continued to feel unsafe. In seeking to extend the layers of security even further, neighborhood associations in residential suburbs have petitioned municipal officials—­in a time-­consuming application process that can often take at least two years—­to allow them to effectively seal off their streets with security fences and sentry posts, effectively creating what amounts to a de facto “gated residential estate.” Sometimes not waiting for official permission, they have taken matters into their own hands, blocking off streets and defying city officials.34 For truly well-­to-­do homeowners, up-­to-­date smart technologies have replaced the proverbial “eyes and ears on the street” mentalité associated with New York City community activist Jane Jacobs, adopting a modus operandi where individuals carefully monitor their surroundings, watching for suspicious activities, and neighbors look out for neighbors. The human eye is not to be trusted. Automated ambient technologies in the home are interactive, ubiquitous, and often invisible. Homeowners have high-­definition (HD) video surveillance of their properties that they can observe on their mobile devices at a distance. Besides using mobile devices to open and close gates



Vulnerable Bodies • 111

and doors remotely, keyless fingerprint entry provides another layer of security. The installation of “intelligent” intrusion and fire alarm sensors monitors both inside the house and the perimeter of property, dispatching alarms within seconds of a security breach to mobile devices. Smart HD intercoms automate the control of metal roller shutters and electronic gate barriers.35 The introduction of biometric technologies has provided digitalized mechanisms for “recognizing and verifying individual identity.” Biometric technologies ranging from fingerprint identification access codes, facial recognition, iris scans, and voice commands have played an increasingly important role in the automated monitoring of movement and circulation, “as they trace both the physiology of the body and behavioral patterns.” In the design of “smart homes,” even such biometric identification systems as footstep recognition apparatuses with weight pressure sensors that monitor and distinguish movement have become commonplace for wealthy homeowners. What makes biometric measures different from other security systems is that they depend squarely on “the intrinsic properties of their users that cannot be substituted, copied, lost or shared.” Promoted and marketed as virtually tamper-­proof, “biometric technologies see the body itself ” (and not exchangeable or replaceable objects) as the key instrument of identification.36 For anxious urban residents of suburban neighborhoods, venturing outside the private home and into the streets presents cause for alarm. In the absence of a personal bodyguard, self-­protection has assumed new meaning in urban South Africa. Extensions, enlargements, or additions to the human body—­or what Diane Nelson has referred to as “prosthetic rationality”—­ amount to a kind of enhanced “bodily capital,” or capsular amour that shields the body from harm.37 The unsettled urbanism at the start of the twenty-­first century has created a veritable cult of the armor-­plated body, “with its repetitive [routines] and compulsive rituals” of danger avoidance.38 Metaphorically speaking, security gadgets and accoutrements (tailored prosthetic devices) attached to the body—­“arming,” as it were—­transforms bodies into weapons.39 This fetishized behavior manifests itself in the proliferation of commodified devices, gadgets, and paraphernalia designed to protect against (and ward off) thieves, muggers, panhandlers, and other alien space invaders of the urban dystopia. In addition to long waiting lists for enrollment in anti-­carjacking driving courses, anxious urban residents have expressed increased interest in acquiring expertise in martial arts and in engaging with professional training sessions in VIP “close protection” and armed robbery survival skills.40

112 • the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 5: Melville Koppies Security Alert

As Arjun Appadurai has argued, “Commodities, like persons, have social lives.”41 Literally dozens of private companies do a brisk business in offering custom-­designed personalized self-­protection equipment services. These commodities cannot be regarded simply as things in themselves. They are entangled in a variety of sociocultural meanings that are framed by the sociopolitical context of their social construction. Self-­protection equipment and services are thus symbolically animated by “their sociality [social lives] as well as by their links to hierarchy and power.”42 To make use of protective gear



Vulnerable Bodies • 113

and equipment is to empower oneself, to shift the terms of engagement with potential danger, to introduce an element of surprise into encounters with criminals, and to tip the scales to one’s own advantage.43 The development of new security technologies is characterized by three features: miniaturization, mobility, and connectivity.44 In South Africa after apartheid, social status for middle-­class urban residents is already defined by the acquisition of a wide variety of “electronic guardian angels” to watch over them and monitor their movements across the urban landscape. The use of portable networked devices, ranging from smartphones, handheld video cameras, and personal “panic buttons” instantaneously linked with home security systems, has expanded exponentially. These devices combine the promise of convenience with real-­time connectivity to private security operational headquarters and their armed response teams.45 New technological devices, such as location-­tracking cell phones and wristwatches, microchip-­embedded clothing, and all sorts of portable gadgets easily attached to the body, typically include such navigation and tracking systems as GPS. As a matter of necessity, these smart devices become routine bodily accessories that provide a platform allowing frightened residents to maneuver their way through the city. Because thieves routinely steal cell phones when robbing unsuspecting victims, security experts have urged residents who venture into exposed public places to secretly hide panic buttons with a GPS locational signaling device directly linked to a private security company somewhere on their body. Hence, the loss of a cell phone does not render the victim totally helpless, completely out of contact with armed response teams.46 While these “body nets” have a number of useful applications, they represent the expanded reach of the locational technologies of self-­tracing.47 The miniaturization and mobilization of these technological devices enable users to function as both receivers and senders of huge quantities of digitally transmitted information at the same time. Tethered to a sophisticated matrix of tracking and monitoring systems (including CCTV cameras), intrepid urban travelers venture forth, encased in a seemingly “seamless continuity of surveillance over daily routines.”48 This surreal idea of arming the defenseless body is not as preposterous at it might appear at first glance. More than sixty years ago, Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline first coined the term cybernetic organism (or cyborg) to raise the possibility of adapting the human body to adjust to, and survive, the extraterrestrial environments of space travel.49 For the longest time, both

114 • the infrastructures of security

Risk-­Averse Guide to Staying Safe Guidebooks and local residents give lots of advice about how to keep oneself safer (there is no talk of avoiding crime altogether): • Do not walk around outside after sunset, anywhere. • Carry money in your front pocket. • Do not leave packages or purses sitting on the backseat of your car. When you are stopped at a stoplight, someone might break your window, reach in, and grab the item. • When you come to a stoplight behind another car, leave enough space in front of you in case you have to make a quick getaway from an assailant. • Keep alert. Scan ahead as you walk for potential signs of trouble. • Did I mention not going outside at night? Source: Louise Whitworth, “Johannesburg: How to Stay Safe on Holiday in South Africa,” Sunday Independent, February 15, 2018.

science fiction writing and popular film have explored this fantasy projection of the extended and transformed body equipped with super strength and enhanced senses. More recently, the idea of animal-­human-­machine hybrids has become a key theme in what has been termed posthumanist theorizing. For example, in the “Cyborg Manifesto,” cultural theorist Donna Haraway proclaimed that “the cyborg is a rejection of rigid boundaries,” notably those separating the natural from the artificial, and the human from the machine.50 As a concocted amalgamation of human, animal, and technological parts, the machine-­like cyborg hybrid plays a role in envisioning the imagined possibilities of self-­protection in dangerous circumstances.51 Perhaps not so surprisingly, this fantasy of the securitized body, intrepidly venturing into the public spaces of the city, offers a vivid counterpoint to the distressing (and symbolically powerful) image of the dazed and confused motorist, the hapless victim of a carjacking, just relieved to be alive.52 For virtually every fear, “there is at least one object designed to allay that apprehension.” Where the “normalcy of danger” pervades everyday life, fear of bodily harm has become a “primary motor of invention.”53 The turn toward individual self-­help solutions has generated an entirely new field of practical ingenuity loosely called “securing by design”—­that is, harnessing design to new technologies in order to produce security and ensure safety.54 As design critic Paola Antonelli has said, “Today, the simple need for protection has mutated into the complex universe we call fashion.” In a “risk society,” safety involves more than simply modifying behavior to confront perceived threats; it also requires adapting personal “‘armor’ for safe living.”55 Personal “body



Vulnerable Bodies • 115

armor” combines everyday wearable accessories with new “safety” technologies aimed at “designing out insecurity” and “designing in protection.”56 Harnessing “survival equipment” to the human body has made it, as Celeste Olalquiaga has suggested, “more and more difficult to distinguish between our organic and technological selves.”57 Personal security devices have become more individualized, more versatile, and, of course, more modular.58 The security of heavy modernity—­ defensive shields, fortified bunkers, and protective rings—­has mutated into more malleable technologies of what Zygmunt Bauman has called “liquid modernity.”59 Advances in technology have made personal body armor “lighter and more flexible, hence allowing for more freedom of movement and agility, an important feature when a rapid escape becomes necessary in case of an emergency.”60 The idea of the “consumption of [personal] protection” has given rise to numerous security products that vary along a continuum from the practical and the functional, to the fanciful and the preposterous.61 Science fiction Robo-­Cop fantasies of indestructibility have spilled over into the microworld of personalized body armor. Reconfiguring the anxious body in the latest urban “designer” security gear has become a performative act, ranging from a stylized protection to nothing less than a theater of the absurd. The “armored body” is embedded within the everyday social worlds of public interaction, chance encounter, and negotiations over space. The choice of security accessories has become a form of “situated bodily practice,” whereby urban residents try to orient themselves to the particular circumstances of perceived urban danger.62 Attached to the human body, these protective prosthetic devices amount to a kind of surreal “ambulant architecture” that provide a moving cordon sanitaire separating frightened city travelers from what they perceive as a hostile urban environment.63 Adorning oneself in prophylactic body armor represents a kind of boundary marking, a means for creating imagined distance between safety and danger. As mechanisms for transforming the vulnerable body into the semblance of a unified and coherent self, security accessories have a fantasy life of their own.64 As Cynthia Weber has persuasively argued, the design of “protective products” involves more than merely the production of security devices but also their seductive appeal as fashionable accessories. Dressing up in body armor furnishes unprotected bodies with a simulacrum of strength and invulnerability. As a magic elixir, the putative apotropaic powers of these self-­protection devices enable their users to avert evil. This coupling of tech-

116 • the infrastructures of security

norationality of “fail-­safe” security devices with aesthetic design amounts to a recognition that security systems “must be seductive enough to be desired and exchanged if they are to be used at all.” In thinking about the design of “safe living,” colorful wrapping functions to endow commercially available safety products with bewitching appeal. As Weber has suggested, “It is not about building a better mousetrap” but rather “about building a mousetrap that appears to be better because it is better looking.” According to this commercially driven logic, the allure of security products is linked with branding, clever advertising, and attractive packaging. Seen in this way, “aesthetics and aesthetic capital are at the service of techno-­rationality.”65 Fear and fashion combine to produce safety products with both a practical use and a seductive appeal. Besides “combat readiness” training, there are plenty of fashion accessories on offer. “Who says you can’t be stylish while avoiding gunfire?” a journalist writing for the Sunday Times reported. Once the exclusive domain of bodyguards, riot police, and military soldiers, bulletproof vests, which sell for between R2,500 and R3,700, are increasingly the protective clothing option of choice for ordinary people frightened by the prospect of being victimized by crime.66 In seeking to avert bodily harm, alert citizens have a variety of self-­defense tools at their disposal to fight back against sexual assault, robbery, and even “smash-­and-­grab” incidents. The visible expressions of urban anxiety also include such accoutrements as walkie-­ talkies, batons, handheld panic buttons connected to armed response security teams, Alaska bear spray, loud horns and shrill whistles, sound-­flash grenades, pepperball flash launchers, retractable dog leashes with pepper spray holsters (nicknamed PAWS), handheld mace dispensers, stun guns affixed to brass knuckles or hidden in walking canes that unleash a lethal 40,000 volts of electricity, tasers disguised as cell phones, tactical knives, semiautomatic paintball pistols and short-­stock rifles with assorted cartridges, and pepper spray canisters hidden in lipstick cases or fixed to front doors. Pepper spray cartridges shoot at a range of eight meters outdoors and twenty meters indoors. If sprayed directly into the face and eyes of a would-­be assailant, this self-­defense weapon causes temporary blindness, severe pain, burning, nausea, coughing, and difficulty with breathing. What is more, it is relatively inexpensive and can be purchased from almost any security shop. If these self-­defense gadgets are not enough, there are always the bizarrely named Femme Fatale Micro and Nano handheld pistols—­the smallest and lightest CO2 gas pistols available in the world. Finally, there is the Airtaser, a strange



Vulnerable Bodies • 117

device that functions like a fishing rod, “hooking a suspect and shocking him within a 150m range.”67 Handheld devices are particularly popular for those afraid to venture into public streets or parking lots. For example, the MeMeZa Personal Safety Alarm (MPSA) is “a compact, trendy, and colourful personal alarm & keyring that is operated by a pull pin attached to a strap.” If one is threatened, “the strap attached to the pin is easily pulled, activating a very loud, high-­pitched alarm with a sound level of 130 decibels.” The deafening, irritating sound frightens the would-­be attacker, alerting passersby to the pending assault. The device “comes in a variety of bold fashion colours. It can be worn around the neck attached to a lanyard” or affixed to a handbag, schoolbag, or gym bag “for easy access in case of an emergency.”68 But perhaps what best exemplifies the seemingly inexorable trend toward the rapid militarization of personal space is the powerful “Handi-­Blaster,” the handheld flamethrower offered by Blaster Anti-­Hijack Systems, the same company that produces the auto-­mounted incendiary contraption. According to promotional materials found on the company website, this small, personalized version of the mighty Blaster provides a reliable and easy-­to-­ use portable “self-­protection system” guaranteed to “stop any attacker in his tracks.” Besides its inexpensive selling price of R280 [US$70], “its user-­ friendly design ensures safety and is also ideal for women.” With its quickly dispensed, two-­meter-­long flame-­throwing capabilities designed to severely burn an attacker, “no person can afford to walk anywhere in South Africa today without the protection of this life-­saving device.”69 In the cultural imagination, these security accessories are boundary markers, prophylactic devices designed to protect one from the danger that lurks beyond in the urban unknown. The selection of such protective apparel makes apparent the various roles that vestimentary practices play in representing the existential state of mind of individuals and the moral order of everyday life. Dressing up in such protective body armor as lightweight bulletproof vests, steel-­toe footwear, leather pants, and spike-­studded gloves creates an illusion for anxious urban residents that they are something other than themselves. These new codes of protective dress link the biological body to its lived milieu. The selection of such protective apparel functions to fabricate the subject in relation to the social order and “forces us to recognize that the human body is more than a biological entity,” as Elizabeth Wilson puts it in another context. “It is an organism of culture,” an overdetermined

118 • the infrastructures of security

artifact—­a paradoxical figure that at once absorbs, refracts, and condenses urban fears and anxieties.70 Faced with the rising fear of urban violence, crime, and disorder, geographical mobility is unthinkable without the ubiquitous regulation and control of urban space. Whereas the disciplinary order that Foucauldian-­inspired theorists have identified largely functions by means of self-­imposed “interiorization,” the post-­liberal kinds of regulation and control of urban space operate externally through militarization of the cityscape. Smooth spaces that facilitate easy mobility, such as broad pedestrian boulevards, crowded city sidewalks, and open parking garages with their soft, almost invisible thresholds, give way to the visible expressions of social exclusion: electrified fences, high walls, cement barriers, steel gates, and road barricades.71 Whereas the apartheid city sought to become a gilded “homogeneous empire” with racially defined territorial boundaries and clearly demarcated zones of white affluence and black impoverishment, the postapartheid city has evolved into a well-­defended archipelago of discontinuous fortress-­like enclosures, citadels, and strongholds.72 At the macro level, urban security strategies typically proceed through three distinct stages. The first is the management of the urban landscape, where a variety of spatial and temporal regulations impose a loose sort of order, stability, and predictability on the use of social space. If shared norms are not sufficient to produce the intended outcome, then the forces of law and order are called upon to ensure conformity with the rules. The second stage is fortification, where design specialists, architects, and builders introduce defensive measures such as walls, barriers, and gates, all of which enhance the physical segregation of the landscape. This security strategy is captured in the discourse of “safer cities through environmental design,” “defensible space,” and “target-­hardening” initiatives.73 The third stage is surveillance, where the explicitly visual presence of security guards and policing agencies control and manage the use of space. This kind of “human shield” approach to security is typically supplemented by electronic devices such as CCTV cameras and sensory fencing.74 In urban South Africa at the start of the twenty-­first century, property owners have combined these three strategies in a new security aesthetic that signals the early stages of the full-­scale militarization of urban space.75 As a general rule, many of the new self-­protection products on the market are designed to fill in the “security gap” between the occurrence of a crime and the time it takes for private security teams and public policing agencies



Vulnerable Bodies • 119

to respond accordingly and arrive at the scene. Self-­activated and even automatic security systems enable potential victims of crime to protect themselves before professional help arrives. For security technology companies, this sort of feigned peace of mind is a significant selling point.

The New Spatial Geography of Urban Anxiety: The Fractured City in the Popular Imagination The “new South Africa” bears the imprint of the territorial stratification and spatial polarization inherited from the apartheid past. The social geography of crime reflects the spatial dispersal of vulnerability. Urban planning policies under apartheid rule—­the aim of which was to divide the urban population and to control movement in the city in accordance with racial categories—­ achieved disproportionate degrees of safety and security in some areas while simultaneously fostering danger and insecurity in others. The urban poor and the black working class have always borne the brunt of crime, and this situation has not changed appreciably since the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy. Focusing on the spatial distribution of crime in Johannesburg reveals that the geographical areas most disadvantaged or least protected under apartheid—­the townships and informal settlements on the urban fringe—­have remained the most vulnerable to murder, armed robbery, rape, and violent assault. Under white minority rule, these places have experienced the most extreme forms of socioeconomic hardship and political disempowerment. In contrast, residents living in the wealthier suburbs tend to be victimized by property crimes, such as car theft and burglary. While townships have experienced a degree of socioeconomic differentiation since the end of apartheid, they are still largely fragmented, disjointed, and demeaning places, lacking in proper amenities and basic infrastructure. Sporadic policing, inadequate street lighting, vast open spaces, and poorly developed recreational sites increase the vulnerability to crime. Informal settlements and shantytowns on the edges of townships and the outskirts of major cities are “in-­between” spaces that are beyond the reach of visible technologies seeking to impose rational order. They are overcrowded repositories of the unemployed and unemployable who exhibit high levels of domestic violence, violence against women, rape, murder, and assault. Single-­ sex hostels, typically forlorn outposts of degraded living that were originally designed for warehousing migrant labor, are particularly defenseless against

120 • the infrastructures of security

predatory gangs of criminals. The stretch of mining lands, disemboweled and abandoned, that separates Soweto from the inner city is particularly prone to these violent crimes against the body. Rapes, murders, and serial killings frequently take place on this polluted and infertile waste ground.76 Likewise, the inner city (Hillbrow, Berea, Joubert Park), where levels of serious crime are exceedingly high, is intensely overcrowded, dirty, and uncared for, marked by deteriorating buildings and collapsing infrastructure. It is “owned by no one,” yet there is no lack of people wanting to lay claim to particular places. Gradually abandoned from the mid-­1980s onward by prescient property owners fleeing its anticipated demise, the economic and social base of the inner city has moved substantially beyond the rule of law. While a slow recovery of sorts has taken place, inner-­city properties and housing markets have remained in a “contested state” of uncertainty. Some landlords have stopped making repairs, subletting their buildings to shadowy “management companies” that sometimes transform small hotels into “long-­stay” flophouses, nightclubs, and brothels. Newcomers to the inner city and its surrounding areas (Bertrams, Yeoville, Doornfontein, Lorenzville, Bezuidenhout Valley) seek low-­cost accommodation on almost any terms, cramming large numbers of people into once-­stylish homes and apartment buildings originally built for the upwardly mobile middle class living close to the historic downtown core.77 Itinerant homeless people erect makeshift shelters wherever they find unused space or simply invade abandoned buildings, negotiating with other squatters over whatever sources of comfort are available. Criminal gangs take advantage of the situation, collecting “rent” in exchange for protection. Aspiring micro-­capitalists struggle for sidewalk space, displaying their cheap commodities in pavement stalls. Streets are cluttered with discarded litter, refuse, and the abandoned detritus of urban living.78 Crime is typically fast and armed, anonymous and impersonal, and unsuspected and invisible.79 With a murder rate eight times that of the United States and a rape rate three times as high, the statistics are appalling. But the crimes that most disturb middle-­class residents are brazen carjackings, home invasions, and daytime robberies, which “can hit literally anyone.” The patterns of criminal violence were imprinted in the first years after the formal end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy and have not changed significantly in subsequent decades. In addition to the president of the Constitutional Court, six Johannesburg judges or close family members were either robbed or carjacked at gunpoint in the three years



Vulnerable Bodies • 121

between 1998 and 2000. Thieves stole the car and personal valuables from the police superintendent of a crime-­ridden slum. Even police stations have been looted of such items as an automated teller machine, a supply of cash and diamonds, and electronic equipment, “in what were either brazen robberies or inside jobs.”80 Following a spate of armed robberies, attempted carjackings, and assaults that escalated in December 2018, lawyers, judges, and court staff threatened to take legal action against the Justice Department to emphasize the point that they were under siege by armed thieves operating with seeming impunity in the vicinity of the High Court precinct in downtown Johannesburg. In one particularly egregious incident, thugs chased an advocate through the foyer of the courthouse, assaulting her in an elevator while security guards stood idly by.81 In many ways it seems that South Africa’s protracted “low-­intensity” war that pitted the white minority regime against the antiapartheid opposition quickly evolved into an equally violent conflict of a different kind, “where the threatening armies are bands of criminals with no specific political persuasion other their own predatory needs.”82 Acting alone or in organized gangs, criminals are quick and dangerous. They are armed with everything from knives to sharpened bicycle spokes and from pistols to AK-­47s (which can be rented in the townships by the hour). Largely white, middle-­class, residential neighborhoods, particularly those bordering on inner-­city districts, are most susceptible to less serious crimes like car theft, burglaries, and petty pilferage. Yet these so-­called less serious crimes are increasingly accompanied by gratuitous brutality: violent assault, rape, the taking of hostages, and even murder. Well-­armed gangs cruise suburban neighborhoods after sunset, outfitted with such sophisticated weaponry as laser-­sighted pistols, Uzi semiautomatic submachine guns, and military-­issue R5 assault rifles. They typically hit their targets with military precision and employ all sorts of “terror tactics” to intimidate and overpower unsuspecting families. Ironically, those aesthetic features, which are the defining marks of social distinction for white, middle-­ class suburban life—­spacious homes largely left vacant during the day, high barrier walls, sprawling lawns, thick shrubbery, empty suburban streets, and long curvilinear driveways—­offer definite advantages to burglars committed to their nefarious work.83 In Johannesburg, fear of crime has engendered new spatial practices. Whether petty or grand, random or organized, opportunist or calculated, visible or invisible, brutal or merely inconvenient, crime has indelibly marked “the surfaces of the city,” producing a new cultural landscape of fear and

122 • the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 6: Montage of Four Logos for Various Private Security Companies

anxiety whose “properties lie deep within and yet far beyond the spatial and social economies of the past.” Spatial restructuring of the city has brought the poor underclasses into closer physical proximity to the well-­to-­do, propertied middle-­classes. The availability of mini-­taxis provides would-­be thieves with opportunities to move quickly and freely around the city. Venturing into the non-­places of the city—­streets, public thoroughfares, and other social gathering-­sites—­is tinged with a certain degree of uncertainty and anxiety. Not surprisingly, “new divisions between victim and criminal, fear and bravado, vulnerability and immunity” have begun to crisscross, and sometimes even erase, the old cleavages of race, class, and gender in the construction of the new economic, social, and spatial order of Johannesburg.84 One consequence of the geographical dispersal of crime has been an



Vulnerable Bodies • 123

increasing privatization of the public realm. New legislation has given precincts of private property the legal right to decide about and provide their own security services over and above those of local municipal authorities. In many instances, the functions of security and policing, licensing of street trading, gatekeeping of public parks, and expulsion of unwanted vagrants and homeless people have passed into the hands of neighborhood associations and their private security firms. New rules of exclusion, exemplified by entitlements granted to private property owners to unilaterally bar entry to their premises, have fundamentally reshaped public space and its use.85 Perhaps not surprisingly, the vulnerability of children has ensured that schools have become a real focal point of fear. Responding in part to anxious parents worried about the safety of their children, school officials introduced new guidelines to transform schools into fortresses in an effort to clamp down on crime. Because they are often regarded by criminals as soft targets, school properties have been increasingly plagued by serious crime, including the murder of teachers and pupils, rape, assault and armed robbery. Plans to protect schools have included the placement of CCTV surveillance cameras, protected by tamper-­proof and anti-­vandal glass, in reception areas and outside administration offices, in corridors, around playgrounds, and in areas overlooking main entrances. These guidelines also included recommendations for the installation of thick slabs of reinforced (“high security mesh”) concrete above the ceilings of computer labs, strong rooms, multimedia centers, and rooms where records are kept. Finally, the wish list for cocooned schools also consists of detailed specifications for steel-­linked fences, with “anti-­cut, anti-­climb and anti-­burrow features.”86 Even schools in the former townships were not immune from the threat of theft. In October 2019, Esithebeni Primary School in Soweto was broken into on a Friday night, and thieves stole over R3 million worth of equipment, including office computers, computer lab materials, and smartboards. Between January and October 2019, 263 criminal cases involving theft were registered in the 256 schools in Gauteng Province.87

Security Paraphernalia Necessity is the mother of invention. The Securex IFSEC trade exhibition, the 1995 brainchild of TML Reed Industrial Exhibitions, is an annual event that caters to private companies looking to display the newest security, protection,

124 • the infrastructures of security

and safety products, services, and technologies. Held at Gallagher Estates Convention Centre in Midrand, the exhibition draws hundreds of corporate exhibitors, thousands of visitors, and worldwide participation from such disparate places as South Africa, the United States, Europe, Israel, and China. The annual event provides an excellent platform for security trade professionals, organizational risk managers, senior corporate decision-­makers, and public officials linked with law enforcement agencies to engage with leading commercial security suppliers. The assembled products on display range from the mundane to the absolutely bizarre. Corporate participants typically include such top industry brands Elvey Security Technologies, Ideco, Hitek Security, Nobain, Hikvision, ADI Global Distribution, and NEC Corporation. These companies proudly showcase their latest innovations in security products, including state-­of-­the-­art CCTV and video camera equipment, electronic communications, night vision optics, personal identification technologies, remote monitoring, sensory devices, access control, intruder alarm technologies and proactive response systems, perimeter protection, biometrics, risk management, vehicle tracking and recovery systems, guarding and protection services, and firearms-­and weapons-­reinforced armor systems, protective clothing, emergency services, perimeter security, alarm devices, surveillance technologies, vehicle security, and VIP protection services.88 Companies like Ace/Clear Defense have spotlighted their bulletproof and shatter-­resistant laminated glass, a product adopted for use for car windows, bank teller booths, and building façades. Another company, Transaction Control Technologies, has often displayed its Smokecloak machine, a device that emits odorless smoke when it is activated. Although it is specifically designed to secure business premises after hours, the gadget can easily be put to use during office hours should robbers enter the building. As soon as the system is activated, smoke fills the room where it is installed, making it impossible to see objects for about forty-­five minutes. The smoke does not damage electronics, leather goods, fur, silk, or paintings and is not harmful to people, since it is made from vegetable extracts. A similar product, called the Bandit Fog Generator, is a battery-­operated enhanced security device marketed for home use. The Bandit FG can be connected to any existing alarm system and even activated through radio remote control. Camouflaged as a typical hi-­fi speaker, the machine discharges a powerful, harmless cloud of dry fog (propylene glycol) at a super-­quick speed sufficient to saturate a 504-­cubic meter room in just eighteen seconds. “The beauty of Bandit,” says Roberto Stabile,



Vulnerable Bodies • 125

vice director of the company, “is that the fog prevents an intruder from moving or operating for up to 40 minutes.” As an added incentive, consumers have the option of enhancing the fog with irritating substances that produce burning sensations on the skin and in the eyes.89 Still another company called Intisec has featured an upgraded closed-­ circuit monitoring system that it claims “may revolutionize” surveillance systems by making hired security guards redundant. The company’s Eyesite 400 can be concealed in laptop computers, installed in television sets, or connected to existing security cameras. This sophisticated eavesdropping device enables security personnel to monitor a remote site with both sound and live-­action color pictures and to follow movements when zoomed in on a particular object. If an alarm is triggered, this surveillance system automatically transmits sound and pictures to a central command post. Finally, a company called Aludi Services has hailed its automated “sniffing” device called the Vapotracer, as the latest technology available for detecting such substances as narcotics and explosives. This machine, used by airport and corporate security guards, uses an “Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer” (ITMS) in order to distinguish the smells of concealed objects.90 Axis Communications is a typical example of a large corporate entity with global reach seeking to market their security products in South Africa. Based in Lund, Sweden, as a semi-­autonomous subsidiary of the Canon Group (Tokyo), Axis is a leading provider of advanced network video surveillance technologies, with local operations in fifty-­one countries around the world. Its sales representatives regularly display their products–­–­particularly, their IPS loitering detection system, sophisticated night vision CCTV camera systems, and embedded license plate recognition technologies–­–­at trade conventions around the world. In their glossy promotional material, corporate executives claim that Axis Communications is the global market leader in network cameras and video encoders, in large measure because the company invented the world’s first network camera, which revolutionized the image-­ making industry by transforming video surveillance capabilities from analog into digital. As part of their focus on networked technology (what executives have called the “Internet of Security Things”), Axis launched the world’s first thermal network cameras (the revolutionary Lightfinder camera) in 2011, the world’s most light-­sensitive camera in the world, capable of seeing colors, even at night.91 In particular, Axis has boasted that their weather-­resistant, tamper-­proof, multisensor, and multi-­megapixel cameras (with both outdoor and indoor

126 • the infrastructures of security

capabilities) can deliver total round-­the-­clock perimeter security. With its advanced swivel and zoom capabilities, the AXIS P3365-­VE 2 panoramic dome cameras can produce HD-­quality images. What Axis promoters have referred to as their “open architecture” enables trained operatives to integrate their camera systems with existing gate controllers in matching authorized license plates with their stored vehicle database records in order to identify suspicious activities. Operatives monitoring camera display screens can remotely open and close security gates from the safety of a secure control room.92 The model approach for protection systems is the layering and interlacing of security systems. The turn toward technological solutions to security problems has come in response to the acknowledgment by leading “technology security” companies, whose product lines are filled with electronic devices, that the least dependable (or weakest) links in security management chains are security guards or monitoring agents.93 These companies argue that technological solutions offer the best way to meet the challenges of personal security. The monitoring of CCTV screens from off-­site control centers has moved away from dependence on constant watching by low-­paid operatives. The introduction of “digital analytic software” packages has replaced the reliance on human monitoring. Psychological studies have suggested that persons who monitor CCTV screens are incapable of concentrating on particular screens for more than twenty minutes at a time before their minds wander to other concerns and their eyes fail to pick up telltale signs of improper activities.94 Boredom and distraction are the enemies that undermine the effectiveness of human watchfulness. Managers of private security companies have pointed out that the worst solution to home protection is a single static guard with a weapon; not only is this person susceptible to inattentiveness, but he also becomes an immobile target for criminals wanting to steal his weapon.95 The goal behind the adoption of this new digital analytic software technology is not only to obtain high-­quality video footage for use in court proceedings but also to act as a first-­line defense that can alert control room monitors in the event of a problem. For example, by tying into the NRC (National Recognition Centre) license plate recognition system, technologically advanced cameras can effectively differentiate between the registered vehicles of known residents (displayed as green pixels), visitors and unknown vehicles (displayed as amber pixels), and vehicles of known criminal suspects (displayed as red pixels). With automatic boom gates, residents and visitors wishing to pass are required to push an entry button that activates a camera to record not only the license plate number but also a facial image of the driver.96



Vulnerable Bodies • 127

As a general rule, the pledge of fail-­safe security relies on the use of innovative problem-­solving approaches to provide protection from unwanted risk. These new technologies provide new layers of security that did not exist before. Yet, ironically, at the same time that these devices promise to deliver residents from insecurity, these new technological fixes often increase the collective sense of anxiety.97

Body Armor as Performance To be without such personal protective devices as GPS-­aligned cell phones, remote control panic buttons, and handheld mace dispensers at the ready is to risk harm by bringing one too close to the unsettling circumstances of urban living. Armoring the body with self-­protection accessories has become a routine ritual for anxious urban residents of Johannesburg. What Torin Monahan and Tyler Wall have called “somatic surveillance” represents the invasive technological monitoring of body functions. Through sensor technologies embedded in clothing or implanted under the skin, body-­monitoring systems represent a new type of surveillance that originated in both military and medical domains. Various kinds of body-­monitoring systems represent new modalities in micromanagement of the self. Security experts have imagined how miniaturized medical devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) implants can be put to use tracking individuals. Body-­monitoring devices exemplify the potential of somatic surveillance to the extent that they translate information derived from attachment to human bodies into assessments of danger and risk.98 A company called Liquid Bullet specializes in the supply of an extensive range of security and self-­defense products. Besides supplying a full repertoire of custom-­made bullet-­resistant vests (including tactical jackets with metal plate inserts, stab-­proof wraparound coverings, and lightweight camouflage versions for undercover purposes) for individual clients, Liquid Bullet provides “close-­quarters’” self-­protection devices like stun guns and pepper spray for sale to largely anxious well-­to-­do residents of suburban neighborhoods. Product names include Liquid Bullet Keyring (along with a smaller version known as the “Terminator”), the Lady Liquid Bullet, and the Liquid Bullet Maxican (with an attachment device enabling the unit to be placed at strategic positions such as underneath a car dashboard or at a front door). As promotional materials have attested, the Maxican is part of a “Hijack

128 • the infrastructures of security

Lifesave” vehicle protection system that “gives the driver a fighting chance to protect his/her life.” The Liquid Bullet formula was devised to replace chemically derived mace and all other types of tear gas aerosols. These Liquid Bullet devices consist of a mixture of active ingredients including oleoresin capsicum (OC) derived from hot habanero peppers combined with a blend of powerful spices. This combination of natural ingredients and a state-­of-­ the-­art propellant delivery system makes Liquid Bullet (including its “direct stream” and “fogger” variants) far superior to its competitors. Unlike conventional tear gas, Liquid Bullet is effective on mucous membranes, physically disabling attackers and even subduing attack dogs. When hit with a blast of Liquid Bullet, would-­be attackers experience acute respiratory problems, including choking and gagging, in a matter of seconds, in what promotional materials referred to as “rapid knockdown.” In the event of a house break-­in, the company also markets what it calls a Liquid Bullet grenade, which homeowners can activate when attempting to evacuate and escape in the event of a house burglary.99 Another company, called ClickOn Communications, which specializes in the design and implementation of electronic access control methods, provides a state-­of-­the-­art remote-­controlled system for secure access to security gates, garage doors, alarm systems, and lighting. With over five hundred contracts with commercial and residential clients in Gauteng alone, the company promises a “single integrated solution” to access control and management for gated residential communities, prestigious golf estates, mega-­residential developments, townhouse clusters, and business office parks, consisting of a range of access services, including vehicle registration and driver’s license scanners, biometric fingerprint access controls, facial recognition and photographic imaging, industrial-­grade card readers, and preclearance codes, to ensure the monitoring of entry and exit of all visitors. These security gadgets add a high level of security and comfort in the home, while maintaining elegance and simplicity.100 While the great majority of security tools on the market cater for affluent urban residents, a nonprofit organization called MeMeZa Shout Crime Prevention focuses on providing affordable and innovative “Connected Community Safety Technology” to lower-­income communities. MeMeZa’s specialized products range from an easy-­to-­carry personal alarm to a GPS tracker in the form of a necklace. The personal alarm is particularly targeted at vulnerable women and is convenient to carry as a part of a key ring. This personal alarm features a flashlight and an incredible alarm that produces a



Vulnerable Bodies • 129

sound that is louder than a jet engine at takeoff. MeMeZa also offers women a clever pepper spray dispenser disguised as lipstick. The nonlethal spray effectively blurs the vision and causes attackers to choke.101

Vengeful Thoughts Security companies engaged in an escalating war of words, offering products with ominous names like “razor ribbon,” mounted “wall spikes,” “ripper razor flatwrap,” and “ripper razor diamond mesh.” What were once considered unconventional solutions to crime have become standard features of integrated security systems. But in Johannesburg, innovations in the field of security have constantly changed. There are plenty of bizarre, if not outright macabre, products for sale to residential end users.102 Sometimes it is the rather awkward nature of their stated purpose to do grievous bodily harm that accounts for their freakish novelty. For example, the so-­called Rotary Razor Spike is an aggressive anti-­ scaling device designed as a nearly impregnable “protective shield” against anyone wishing to climb over perimeter fencing or walls. Developed first in South Africa, this contrivance incorporates two rails consisting of long, rotating spikes with sharp, serrated edges arranged at awkward angles mounted on a one-­piece horizontal steel tube that rotates freely. Originally designed as a secure perimeter barrier at such highly sensitive installations as military bases and out-­of-­the-­way mining operations, the Rotary Razor Spike has entered the home security market in Johannesburg. Mounted on walls, gates, or fences, this device does not simply raise the height of existing barriers but also acts as a formidable and highly visible deterrent to unwanted entry. As would-­be criminals try for a sure grip or footing in order to propel themselves over the top of physical barriers, this mechanism rotates, causing them to lose their balance. They either fall forward, impaling themselves on the “razor spikes,” or they fall backward, instinctively grabbing onto the nearest object for support—­the razor-­sharp projections in this case. Upbeat advertisements proclaim that “the overall appearance of the product is harmonious with the lines of a building and looks very smart, whilst maintaining a robust deterrent to a vandal or burglar.”103 High-­voltage electric fencing has become a standard anticrime device for home perimeter security in middle-­class residential neighborhoods. What gives electric fencing added cachet for security-­conscious homeowners is

FIGURE 7: High-­Voltage Electric Fencing—­Perimeter Defense



Vulnerable Bodies • 131

that it is a multipurpose device that performs a range of safety functions. Besides delivering a serious but nonlethal shock to would-­be intruders, electric fencing sets off audible alarms, thereby providing early perimeter detection, and can be easily integrated with private security providers and their armed response reaction teams. The key element in effective electric fencing is the capacity of the power source to produce the high-­voltage electrical pulse transmitted around a multi-­wire perimeter fence. Company names like Shock Em leave little to the imagination about the purpose of this type of barrier. In one especially memorable advertisement, a retailer highlighted the versatile nature of electric fencing, saying, “We can decide if we want to cook you, fry you or bake you.”104 Responding to mounting concerns that the haphazard and often faulty installation of electric fencing constituted an unwanted threat to personal safety, municipal authorities began in early 2013 to implement a new set of regulations designed to establish uniform standards for quality control. Almost immediately, some irate residents reacted with anger to these new regulations, claiming that so-­called safety precautions protect only thieves and criminals.105 Cynical observers suggested that legitimate companies who were grouped together in the South African Electrical Fencing Installers Association (SAEFIA) were instrumental in advocating for these new guidelines in order to exclude fly-­by-­night, nonspecialist enterprisers—­unreliable entrepreneurs whom insiders referred to as the “bakkie brigade of cowboy electric fence installers”—­in order to monopolize the business for themselves.106 Security experts have warned that standard electric fencing is not a comprehensive security feature for private homes. From using rubber mats, digging through or under perimeter walls, or just immobilizing the electric current, enterprising criminals have figured out ways to bypass electrified fencing. A company called ElectroMesh has offered what it regards as a groundbreaking innovation. Its security barricade system combines galvanized and welded steel-­mesh barrier fencing with electrified features carrying a high-­or low-­voltage charge into “one unique and fully-­functional security setup.” Company managers claimed that their “revolutionary security product” could easily “dissuade [even] the most determined of intruders.”107 Unlike other security options, electric fencing is a potentially dangerous intruder deterrent due to faulty connections, poor installation, or noncompliance with existing regulatory frameworks. Lawyers warned that homeowners who do not obtain a valid certificate of compliance, issued by a qualified electric fencing installer registered with the Department of Labour, can be held

132 • the infrastructures of security

civilly and criminally liable for injuries or death caused by electrified fencing, even when it is working properly.108 In the heyday of the apartheid era, scientists at a private company called Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises (under contract with the South African security forces) imported six northern gray wolves from North America in an effort to breed a new kind of particularly vicious attack dog with the intelligence, power, stamina, and acute sense of smell of a wolf (along with stronger teeth, better heat resistance, and immunity to various canine diseases). The South African Defense Force secretly sponsored the original wolf-­dog experiments, which first involved crossbreeding Alsatians with a Russian gray wolf from the Ural Mountains, nicknamed Big Red. A German geneticist, Dr. Peter Gerrtshen, introduced Russian wolf genes into Alsatians in an effort to improve the strain.109 These “howling, yellow-­eyed animal[s]” were the product of trial-­and-­error efforts to improve patrol dogs deployed in the border wars in Angola and Namibia and to track down insurgents crossing into South Africa through inhospitable terrain. One of the first-­generation “weaponized” wolf-­dogs, named Jungle, served with distinction in the SADF as a tracker along the border areas. From its experience in the army, this wolf-­ dog came to loathe black people.110 These wolf-­dog hybrid creatures were “South Africa’s genetically engineered answer to the quest for the perfect security dog.” Although only one-­ eighth wolf, these wolf-­dogs have “abnormally large fangs and five times the strength of an Alsatian.” These über hybrids, which weigh between 90 and 110 pounds, are similar in appearance to Alsatians. However, they have a fierce temper, requiring trainers and handlers to wear extra protective clothing to guard against severe bites. At the end of the day, these secretive experiments failed, not because the wolf-­dog hybrids were not sufficiently aggressive but because they were difficult to train and did not respond well enough to the orders of their handlers.111 The macabre project was abandoned in 1988, when the frontier “bush wars” came to an end. The remaining animals “that were once part of a bizarre scheme to turn the cold-­weather carnivores into man-­ hunters on an African battlefield” were “retired,” housed in huge cage enclosures at the Tsitsikamma Wolf Sanctuary.112 With the end of apartheid, fascination with the wolves and wolf-­dog hybrids reappeared, this time as iconic signifiers of added security and reassuring peace of mind.113 As crime began to escalate in the affluent residential suburbs, many anxious homeowners came to believe that “no dog is a better deterrent than a dog-­wolf hybrid or pure wolf.” In the decade or so after the



Vulnerable Bodies • 133

end of apartheid, owning one of these wolf-­dogs, as the hybrids are known, became a coveted status symbol, and a brisk trade for these animals developed through newspaper advertisements and through sales on the internet. Breeders of wolf-­dogs published glowing testimonials from happy clients who claimed the animals were both good family pets and vicious personal guardians.114 Yet homeowners who bought pure wolves seeking savage guard dogs were often disappointed to discover that they made unpredictable pets and terrible watchdogs. Trainers found it difficult to teach the wolf-­dogs to inhibit their rough and unpredictable behavior. Hence, owners were required to exhibit a great deal of caution when these vicious wolf-­dogs were around small children. In addition, the owners were legally liable for damages when their wolf-­dogs attacked unsuspecting visitors without provocation—­as was frequently the case. At the other end of the spectrum of animal responses to unknown persons, these supposedly ferocious animals sometimes shied away from confronting intruders without explicit instructions from their handlers. As the initial attraction to wolf-­dogs as “guardian protectors” soon waned, homeowners turned to conventional dog breeds like German shepherds, pit bulls, Rottweilers, and Doberman pinschers to patrol their yards. Yet watchdogs do not offer a foolproof method of foiling break-­ins. Would-­be burglars often used a clever trick: after tossing a piece of poisoned meat over the fence, they simply waited for the wolf-­dog to gobble it down before entering the property.115

Gendered Dynamics and the Risky Urban Landscape Anxious residents of middle-­class residential suburbs typically select their daily routes through the urban labyrinth in accordance with mental maps derived from a combination of personal experience and hearsay. Mental maps are social constructs that guide everyday decision-­making.116 Fear of crime lies at the heart of social perceptions of threat. As Peter Shirlow and Rachel Pain have argued, “Fear is not known, nor wholly measurable.” As such, fear is diffuse and kaleidoscopic and, hence, open to wildly different interpretations, which in turn produce divergent responses.117 Just as foreign immigrants are under constant threat from upsurges of xenophobic violence, women who venture outside their protected homes and into public space are particularly vulnerable to assault, rape, and even mur-

134 • the infrastructures of security

der. “Fear discourses” are power-­laden along gender lines because they clearly define different safety standards (“ground rules”) for men and women.118 As Benjamin Solomon has suggested, “‘acting through fear’” (to borrow, from another context, a term from Benjamin Smith) is a key component of the ways women are forced to negotiate urban space.119 Specialized courses in women’s self-­defense filled a void in the perceived security vacuum. Companies with names like The Edge Shooter Academy, C.O.B.R.A. Defense JHB (“A Police Academy for Civilians”), Tactical Advantage, and Storm Combat have taken advantage of the great fear of “contact crime” involving physical confrontations between would-­be criminals and potential victims to attract paying customers to acquire self-­protection skills and other “combat-­ready” proficiencies. Relying on such catchy slogans as “Don’t be a victim . . . be your own hero . . . fight back!!!,” these companies offered a host of services ranging from rape avoidance workshops and crime prevention (and anti-­abduction) seminars, to self-­defense training sessions in “advanced knife-­fighting skills,” kickboxing, and mixed martial arts. To cite just one example of dozens, The Edge has advertised itself as a state-­of-­the-­art training facility designed around the principle “Train like your life depends on it, and when it does, its second nature.” Led by trained and licensed Special Forces instructors, the women’s self-­defense course is designed to empower any woman to fight back against a criminal attack. Starting with the questionable premise that “most assaults on woman are due to the fact that they are easy targets, they don’t pay attention and get surprised,” The Edge courses have provided the kind of training to empower women to “win the battle before there is one, don’t make yourself a target, be aware, be alert and survive.” “If you are caught up in a fight,” the promotional materials proclaimed, “then make a conscious decision to fight, and live.”120 After a spate of assaults, killings, and rapes seemed to reach a peak in mid-­2019, activists began to warn of an “epidemic” of violence directed against women and girls in South Africa. According to a government report released in 2019, a woman is murdered every three hours in South Africa, and many are assaulted and raped before being killed. At least 137 sexual offenses are committed per day in South Africa, mainly against women. These brazen attacks prompted women’s rights activists to raise the alarm that the “battleground is no longer nighttime and dodgy spaces,” declared Given Sigauqwe, spokeswoman for the rights group Sonke Gender Justice—­there is “no safe place.”121 A cascading outpouring of protest marches, demonstrations, and sit-­ins starting in September 2019 drew attention to the enduring sense of



Vulnerable Bodies • 135

vulnerability experienced by women and girls across the lines of race and class. These events underscored the distinct imbalance in the actual risks and dangers that women and girls have faced in negotiating everyday life.122 Left to fester on its own, fear metastasizes into panic.123 Untethered and unbound, fear attaches itself to objects that offer the promise of security. First unveiled in 2005, an anti-­rape condom-­like device, colloquially labeled the “penis flytrap,” “rape trap,” or the “barbed revenge,” is concealed inside a woman’s body and deploys upon penetration, ensnaring the penis in a vice-­ like grip. Trademarked under the ominous name “Rape aXe,” the plastic latex contraption, bristling with internal hooks designed to snare rapists, ignited a firestorm of controversy over the moral and practical limitations of responses to South Africa’s alarming rape rate.124 This bizarre device was created in a hostile environment: South Africa has perhaps the highest rape rate in the world coupled with a low rate of successful convictions; one in four men have admitted to raping someone, and the current state president, Jacob Zuma, once stood trial (and was acquitted) for this crime. The Rape aXe is a latex sheath embedded with shafts of sharp, inward-­facing barbs that would be concealed by a woman inside her body and worn like a female condom. In the event of penetration, razor-­sharp rows of metal teeth would fold around the penis and attach themselves with microscopic hooks, causing the attacker excruciating pain during withdrawal and giving the victim the opportunity to escape. The condom would remain attached to the attacker’s body when he withdrew and could only be removed surgically.125 The amateur inventor, fifty-­seven-­year-­old Sonette Ehlers, who worked for years as a researcher and technician at the South African Institute for Medical Research, began experimenting with different anti-­rape devices after she grew weary of hearing so many shocking stories of rape and violence directed against women and girls.126 Besides the Rape aXe device, Ehlers also invented what she has called a “tamperproof undergarment”—­an anti-­rape device that amounted to a chastity belt for young girls.127 Supporters hailed this macabre device as a genuine godsend—­a cheap, easy-­to-­use invention that could free millions of South African women from fear of rape.128 While this Rape aXe invention mimicked the properties of a spiked defensive condom called “the Trap” patented in 1994, the South African version seemed to acquire a distinctive life of its own. In promoting this wearable anti-­rape device, Ehlers mobilized the support of engineers, gynecologists, and psychologists to defend her claim that, while the backward-­

136 • the infrastructures of security

facing teeth clamping down on the male organ caused considerable pain, this so-­called female condom did not result in lasting damage. Marketed under the catchy slogan “It’s time to fight back,” the Rape aXe device became an instantly recognizable object of attention that triggered a visceral response from advocates and detractors alike. Responding to the controversy, critics likened the anti-­rape contrivance to a medieval instrument of torture, a brutal and barbaric gimmick “based on male-­hating notions,” a false solution that “fundamentally misunderstands the nature of rape and violence against women.” According to Charlene Smith, a leading anti-­rape campaigner in South Africa (and a victim of rape herself), the Rape aXe “is vengeful, horrible, and disgusting. The woman who invented it needs help.”129 “We don’t need these nut-­case devices,” she continued, which are promoted “by people hoping to make a lot of money out of other women’s fear.”130 Some detractors worried that the use of this “killer tampon,” “rat trap,” or vagina dentata (Latin for “toothed vagina”) would incite injured rapists to severely injure or even kill their victims.131 Undeterred by criticism, Ehlers insisted that the condom-­like gadget “should become a part of every woman’s daily routine, just like brushing her teeth.” In defending the device, she argued that it was far safer than the reported instances where women actually inserted “razor blades wrapped in sponges in their private parts.” Yet on the practical side, skeptics questioned the usefulness of the device. In order to ensure protection, women would have to wear the apparatus every day.132 Even though Ehlers promoted the anti-­ rape condom online and announced that it was to go into production in 2006, the device never achieved success on the market.133 CNN reported in 2010 that Ehlers planned to distribute thirty thousand devices for free in venues hosting World Cup football matches. She planned to make the Rape aXe available for public sales after a “trial period,” but there is little evidence to suggest that the product has ever been released to vendors. In 2017 Ehlers and her business partners launched a GoFundMe campaign with the aim of continuing to develop a version of the Rape aXe product and offer it for sale in stores alongside feminine products. By early 2020 the effort was still far short of its goal of raising $310,000.134 To be sure, this anti-­rape contraption is bizarre. Yet it fills a niche in the feminist imagination of reversing the structural imbalance between victims and victimizers. Prosthetic anti-­rape technologies are products designed to reconfigure female bodies in ways that enable them to combat sexual assault



Vulnerable Bodies • 137

and violence. For at least the past forty years, inventors have experimented with fashioning “wearable sexual armor”–­–­that is, protective accessories designed as weapons of self-­defense. These wearable anti-­rape accessories represent a turn toward the politics of empowerment, which links increasing personal capacities for self-­defense with decreasing individual vulnerabilities.135

Airport Security as a Template Airport security systems, in particular, have become ideal testing grounds for the domestication of the electronic battlefield.136 As Peter Adey has suggested, “The airport is now a surveillance machine—­an assemblage where webs of technology and information combine.”137 The aim of airport security is to facilitate the circulation of expectant passengers and new arrivals alike, moving them seamlessly through a labyrinthine maze of checkpoints and monitoring stations. By “entering the virtual border space of the airport,” travelers become “not only a virtual passenger (shadowed by the ‘data double,’ a kind of informational penumbra), but also a virtuous passenger (performing virtue and virtuosity).” Through these unfolding activities of consensual self-­surveillance, “the securitized air passenger” contributes to the social construction of the other–­–­that is, “the non-­virtuous” body of the unwanted trespasser.138 This way of thinking has become, by analogy, the model for evaluating movement through the public spaces of the urban landscape. New remote surveillance technologies seek to create what amounts to a virtuous kind of border, one that appears less intrusive, less physically obvious, and less aesthetically menacing than physical barriers like high walls, electric fencing, and road checkpoints.139 As a general rule, new security regimes put into place at international airport entry and exit points around the world provide a template for the regulation of crowds at shopping malls, commercial strips, banks, and similar post-­public places where anonymous strangers congregate.140 As the main port of entry ushering thousands of visitors into the country every day, the newly refurbished Johannesburg International Airport (JIA) has become a virtual testing ground for sophisticated experiments in border control and surveillance, a genuine security gateway into the “new South Africa.”141 The introduction of new, cutting-­edge security measures designed to catch thieves, expose drug couriers, and spot concealed weapons at the JIA exemplified the broadening scope of surveillant technologies applied to

138 • the infrastructures of security

an ever-­expanding variety of sites and settings.142 South African companies like Midrand-­based Westbury Electronics stand poised to take advantage of these new opportunities for up-­to-­date surveillance technologies. Westbury Electronics, which developed an identification system based on facial recognition, has forged business links with UK-­listed company Image-­Metrics to work together to break into the emerging market for computer-­based identity verification systems. Image-­Metrics specializes in face-­matching technology, and its Optasia image-­understanding software package can scan up to one million faces a minute stored on its database. The identification system can readily be adapted for use at airports to validate passport holders or at banks and shopping malls to reduce the use of forged or stolen bank cards.143 In carrying out their periodic raids in the inner city, law enforcement agencies have employed the new “Morpho-­Touch” device, a portable “fingerprint recognition” machine, to assist them in identifying suspected criminals. While only a short time ago such devices were considered unreliable because of high false reject ratios, these biometric “access control systems”—­using a variety of metrics from fingerprints and palm profiles to retinal scanners and voice identification—­have become commonplace at state-­of-­the-­art workplaces and securitized office complexes throughout Johannesburg.144 In Johannesburg after apartheid, the expanding use of surveillant technologies as instruments of law enforcement and crime control marks a dramatic shift in modes of urban governance. The proliferation of such mechanical instruments of disciplinary technology as security cameras, biometric scanning devices, metal detection devices, bar-­coded access cards, and x-­ray scanners has become so much part of the urban landscape that they are virtually taken for granted. The placement of CCTV cameras at key physical junctures incorporates the urban landscape into a manageable grid of visible spaces.145 These video monitoring devices routinely observe commercial strips, shopping malls, airports, banks, and ATMs, along with the entrances, lobbies, elevators, and hallways of office buildings. Technologies of visibility represent a shift in the modus operandi of policing, from concern with motivation to “categorical suspicion” or a “new behaviorism” focusing on suspicious visible performance.146 The broad assemblage of recording devices that align biometric technologies, surveillance cameras, command consoles, computers, security staff, and telecommunications in a vast interconnected matrix of information flows has transformed citadel office complexes into sentient entities, wrapped in layers of such sensory systems as motion detectors, devices sensitive to smell, and monitors recording temperature and humidity.147



Vulnerable Bodies • 139

City of Checkpoints Concerns with personal safety have become an almost paranoid fixation for affluent urban residents. It is not enough to outfit oneself with personalized body armor. Extensions of the individual armored body have pushed outward across urban space and upward into the skies. At the start, a few key symbolic gestures geared toward “securitizing” space and guaranteeing personal safety began to incrementally emerge in what were once exclusively white-­owned residential neighborhoods. What originated in the late 1990s as a largely ad hoc series of hastily improvised measures quickly blossomed into full-­fledged efforts to systematically provide collective security. Early experiments with an embryonic kind of shared security included road closures and boom gates blocking off access to suburban neighborhoods, the installation of strategically placed sentry posts staffed by underpaid “watchers,” and static security guards in front of commercial shops. These largely defensive improvisations represented the first iteration of what amounted to the extension of the individual human body into the collective body (with multiple “eyes and ears” on the street) in providing security across residential spaces in upscale suburban neighborhoods.148 The steady accretion of security checkpoints that screen and record access to building complexes, gated residential estates, and similarly fortified enclaves provides ample testimony to the intensification of “securitization through technology.” By monitoring movement through the use of sophisticated biometric technologies like fingerprint identification and facial recognition systems, checkpoints compel persons to submit their everyday circulation through the city to the disciplinary power of the machine. As physical barriers that partition the urban landscape into discrete zones, these technological instruments of security function as the principal infrastructures of surveillance and control.149 Because they function as measures designed to promote safety and security by monitoring and verifying personal identities, checkpoints acquire a “façade of legitimacy” that justifies their intrusive placement in discontinuous pockets across the city.150 Checkpoints amount to border-­crossing mechanisms that enable “insiders” (that is, authorized users) “peace of mind,” while simultaneously providing safeguards against the unwanted entry of unauthorized “outsiders.” The construction of various forms of closure (physical barricades, security fences, biometric checkpoints) has intensified the partitioning of the urban landscape into fortified enclaves. Despite their shared characteristics, check-

140 •

the infrastructures of security

points vary considerably in material form–­–­their size, placement, and function. Rudimentary mobile (or “flying”) checkpoints include temporary roadblocks where public law enforcement agencies (with the assistance of private security companies) arbitrarily stop vehicles, checking license and plates and driver’s licenses, and looking for weapons and drugs. In contrast, reinforced checkpoints make use of a wide array of tactical interventions, including biometric screening (facial recognition and fingerprint identification) to inspect motorists and pedestrians alike, license plate identification linked to public law enforcement databases, and verification of identification documents.151 As socio-­spatial assemblages of technocratic and biometric elements, checkpoints constitute “bubbles of governance” that blend architecture, technology, and surveillance into “a single, comprehensive security effort.”152 The systemic emplacement of reinforced checkpoints has transformed the basic right to freely circulate across public space into an exclusive privilege, stratifying everyone who uses the public spaces and streetscape of the city “on the basis of whether one had access, and to what degree, to freedom of movement.”153 Functioning somewhere between whimsical arbitrariness and deliberate calculation, the construction of all manner of security apparatuses that aim to manage border crossings operate both within the rule of law and simultaneously outside of it.154

Microworlds of Self-­P rotection Taken as a whole, the fascination with these somewhat eccentric measures to address urban insecurity reveals the power of the imagination to arrive at what promise to be solutions to the never-­ending “crime problem.” These steps to outfit individual bodies with lethal weaponry would be almost unthinkable under seemingly normal circumstances. This “arms race” in protective accessories seeks to reduce criminal offenses by increasing the difficulty through which criminals can successfully break into homes, steal automobiles, and rob and physically assault unsuspecting victims at will. At the same time, they try to impress upon potential criminals the dire consequences of their ill-­ conceived actions.155 Put into a wider perspective, this turn toward taking personal responsibility for managing risk has enabled public law enforcement agencies to offload the onus for safety and security onto private security companies, neighborhood associations, and even individuals themselves. Proactive approaches



Vulnerable Bodies • 141

to manufacturing one’s own safety and security signal an embrace of a kind of individualizing, self-­optimizing empowerment in the management of risk. This turn toward self-­reliance, self-­surveillance, and responsible self-­help marks a retreat from dependence on public law enforcement agencies as the main providers of safety and security.156 These discourses of active citizenship, community involvement, and local participation are neutral-­sounding mantras that, in endorsing self-­help and personal responsibility, can mask a more invidious turn toward exclusionary communitarianism. This ethos of proactive self-­protection has nurtured a kind of punitive approach to those persons suspected of criminality or even deemed potential threats to perceived insecurity.157 The widespread turn toward technologically enhanced security measures indicates a dissatisfaction with conventional approaches to crime fighting that are largely reactive. Danger lurks in the present, whereas threat looms in the future. Preemption is the attempt to deal with a danger—­a threat—­ that has not yet fully emerged or materialized. Metaphorically speaking, “seeing in advance” suggests presumptive effort to identify and preempt danger before it becomes an actual threat.158

Chapter Four

The Surveillant Assemblage The Hyper-­Panoptic Imagination1

George Orwell’s “Big Brother” and Michel Foucault’s “Panopticon” are disturbing metaphors that draw our attention to important attributes of visual regimes of surveillance and their connections to new kinds of social discipline. In borrowing the idea of panoptic observation from Jeremy Bentham, Foucault not only extended Orwell’s dystopic vision of everyday life stripped of personal privacy and intimacy but also situated the logic of surveillance in the context of a distinctive “molecular” theory of power.2 While these Orwellian and Foucauldian cautionary tales highlight how panoptic systems of unimpeded visual observation function to maintain social order through constant vigilance of bodies in space from a central hub, they fail to grasp the extent to which contemporary surveillance technologies are able to subject even the most obscure and out-­of-­the-­way places and anonymous individuals to the probing gaze of intense scrutiny.3 The rapid convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems—­brought about in large measure because of the synergistic marriage of warp-­speed computer technologies, digitalization, and electro-­optics—­amounts to what can be called a “surveillant assemblage.” These new surveillance technologies rely on increasingly sophisticated machines to make and record discrete observations. They operate by abstracting individuals from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete “data points” that form information flows. By transforming and reducing bodies in space to pure information, the surveillant assemblage effectively reassembles individuals into virtual “data doubles” (or digital duplicates) that can be analyzed and classified in accordance with preconceived ideas about “danger” and “risk.”4 The concatenation of monitoring technologies, grounded in the mechanical gaze of intricate machines 142



The Surveillant Assemblage • 143

(photography, video cameras, CCTV, x-­ray scanners, license plate recognition, biometric fingerprint identification systems, heat-­sensing devices, retinal scans, motion detectors, and voice recognition), enables machine operators to anonymously and surreptitiously track the movements of unknown strangers, deemed “out of time and out of place,” who can be targeted for swift intervention if the need arises.5 The fantasy dreamscape of contemporary surveillance technologies is no longer conveyed by the operative logic of the Panopticon.6 It has become enshrined in the science fiction of “virtual reality” video games. The primary function of surveillance is border control.7 Whereas the regulatory logic of the Panopticon focused on fostering self-­discipline among individuals, the operative principles of contemporary surveillance technologies stress displacement of unwelcome activities rather than their elimination. The logic of zoning has replaced the logic of correcting.8 The surveillant assemblage can be understood as an integral part of an elaborate “social ordering” strategy, built around a “normative ecology of place,” that singles out certain types of “profiled” individuals and suspicious behaviors as inappropriate and undesirable. This normative scheme of spatial and temporal classification undergirds a postmodern politics of inclusionary respectability and exclusionary otherness, one that designates who can (and cannot) legitimately make use of post-­public space.9 The surveillant assemblage has replaced the abstract notion of the citizen who enjoys the formal rights to move freely in the postapartheid “open city” with carefully crafted sorting mechanisms that distinguish between legitimate users of urban space who expect protection, on the one hand, and suspicious intruders who require “watching,” on the other.10 These new urban management strategies have replaced the conventional stress on crime prevention through law enforcement with the operative logic of risk aversion through “punitive suspicion.”11 As an elemental feature of administering the city, municipal authorities—­ always and everywhere—­seek to wrest control over inaccessible and untamed parts of the urban landscape in the name of respect for the rule of law and the necessity of spatial order. While ordinary urban users typically find ways to make the cityscape familiar and intelligible for the purposes of their day-­ to-­day activities, the dictates of efficient and rational order require that the urban landscape be fully domesticated in accordance with the expectations of predictability and regularity as well as legibility and transparency. This protracted process of domesticating the city involves an ongoing struggle over

144 • the infrastructures of security

the regulation, management, and control of urban space. The goal of these “space wars” is the subordination of social space to “one and only one officially approved and state-­sponsored” cartographic instrument for classifying, measuring, and mapping the urban landscape.12 Disciplinary order, as Foucault has suggested, begins with a collective fear of the darkened, obscured places of the cityscape, the shadowy, opaque zones where light and vision are unable to penetrate. These are the spaces of the urban landscape where the perpetrators of crime, drifters, vagabonds, and other antisocial deviants can hide. In the pursuit of civility and propriety, the orderly city requires that these hidden places be exposed to the light of regulation and subjected to the rule of law. Discipline proceeds from the distribution and management of individuals in space: it “requires an enclosed area, a space divided into intricate partitions where everything has a place and every place its order of things.”13 The introduction of new surveillance technologies reflects the limitations of the human eye to expose the urban landscape to the power of vision. As an early expression of technological representation, photography produces a kind of iconic classification that one could conceive of as a radical extension of the unaided human eye. The subsequent introduction of such technical innovations as the flashbulb and the zoom lens not only expanded the capacity of the “seeing eye” but also disrupted the conventional distinction between public and private space. In turn, the use of panoramic photography set the stage for the moving image. The frame-­by-­frame motion of concatenated pictures moving over time marked a dramatic shift in disciplinary power. As a distinctive mechanism for capturing sequences of action, cinematic representations were able to record movement through space and over time.14 In the post-­panoptic age, however, disciplinary power is not restricted to a specific fixed location or a single recording device. The distribution of multiple cameras across many spatial locations has enhanced even further the power of observation. With the introduction of smart CCTV cameras, “surveillance has become rhizomatic”–­–­that is, spread horizontally across far-­flung networks operationalized through partnerships “acting at a distance” rather than arranged hierarchically.15 As exemplary expressions of “fluid processes that trespass across time and space,” “vision machines” like CCTV surveillance systems supersede the limitations of static observation points anchored in place by providing the ability to follow the movements of subjects as they move in and out of camera range by zooming in close, panning wide, or switching to other cameras.16 More importantly, advances



The Surveillant Assemblage • 145

in the technologies of sensing and recording have triggered qualitative breakthroughs in the abilities to monitor and track individuals without the need for direct and continuous visual observation. Electromagnetic surveillance systems have been replaced by digital technologies. As Antonia Bardis describes it, “This transformation entails the translation of each part of the continuous tone analogous image by way of computer, into a map of distinct blocks of electronic data.” Digital images are nothing more than a concatenated series of mathematical algorithms. They have no closure–­–­that is, with proper computer software they are “always open to rapid transmission” and “endless circulation with little or no image degradation.”17 New advances in digitalization not only enable monitoring to take place across widening geographical distances and with little time delay, but they also allow for the active identification, sorting, and prioritized tracking of bodies, characteristics, and behaviors of large numbers of people on a continuous, real-­time basis. By facilitating the translation of visual information into abstract data, digitalization has brought about a significant transformation in the power, intensity, and scope of surveillance.18 The work of trained operatives has shifted from static observation of CCTV screens in a control room to mobile monitoring of automated or semiautomated surveillance systems.19 In the digital age of electronic networks, virtual memory, and the unprecedented capacities for almost unlimited storage and near-­instantaneous retrieval, digitalization has given rise to what Mark Poster has called a “Superpanopticon,” or “a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers, or guards.”20 To the extent that conventional digital monitoring software packages enable operatives to compare digital images from CCTV cameras with information stored on vast databases, they become algorithmic systems with expanded capacity to identify and classify individuals in accordance with preestablished categories.21 In the paradigm of surveillance, visibility is equated with security, where the “gaze” operates as the all-­powerful, omnipresent, central deus ex machina.22 As a kind of visual prosthesis, CCTV cameras enable the human eye to be “extended far beyond its biological capacity.”23 The mechanical gaze becomes a synecdoche for the human body as a whole. Surveillance technologies promise a continuous, disembodied gaze that transcends the constraints of distance. CCTV cameras become a proxy for human presence.24 The aim of CCTV monitoring systems is to reduce the unexpected and unanticipated to a complex calculus of risk management. CCTV cameras have become the perfect icon for disciplinary urbanism, summing up the

146 • the infrastructures of security

nature of the changing relationship between civil society and the politics of fear. They are the visible reminders of how many activities in the city take place out of sight. The verticality of CCTV cameras contrasts with the horizontality of the streets. Sitting like static steel crows on their perches above the streetscape, they are truly emblematic of the intrusive disciplinary power of the new “security guardians” whose job is to monitor suspicious persons and atypical activities.25 Yet not unlike the architectural gaze of the Panopticon, CCTV surveillance systems require visual linearity–­–­that is, an unobstructed view–­–­to actualize their subjects by capturing them in their sight lines. Even though CCTV cameras can be positioned at any height or angle, the mobility of the surveillance system is limited to a linear gaze. It is only with the introduction of technologies of the invisible (such as night vision cameras with infrared capabilities to see in the dark)—­defined variously as simulational, virtual, or cybernetic systems—­that such obstacles can be overcome by making visible the hitherto unseen, or even unforeseen.26

Spies in the Sky In Johannesburg and other South African cities, organized systems of surveillance have come to function as a distinctive kind of spatial disciplinary practice where the quotidian exercise of constant vigilance is surreptitious, comprehensive, and elusive. Panoptic forms of disciplinary power have spilled out of their conventional institutional enclosures—­prisons, schools, factories, asylums, clinics, and military installations—­and have embedded themselves in everyday social spaces, such as public gathering places and thoroughfares, city streets, suburban neighborhoods, corporate office buildings, gated residential communities, central business districts (CBDs), shopping malls, entertainment sites, and commercial strips. Routine monitoring of movement and behavior is no longer restricted to specialized spaces requiring quarantine, incarceration, or confinement, but has spread into previously untouched zones, circulating much more freely across the urban landscape.27 As Nelson Smith imaginatively puts it, surveillance assumes a “policing power as dispersed and flexible as property itself in a commodity-­flooded world.”28 New surveillant regimes of technologized hypervisibility enable anonymous security personnel to penetrate hazy spaces beyond the power of vision. Such remote control technologies as camouflaged, microminiature



The Surveillant Assemblage • 147

CCTV cameras, infrared sensoring devices, digitalized pass codes, swipe cards, silent alarm systems, metal-­detection devices, x-­ray capsules, fingerprint identification, iris scans, and bar codes are a “form of electrified mass communication” that unobtrusively frames routine transactions in everyday life. They represent technological extensions of the capacity to watch, guard, and defend, and, as such, they suggest a boundless expansion of external authority into shadowy space. In their broad, geographical reach, they imply the attachment of private property to a formidable enemy: immediate armed response.29 These new hyper-­surveillant modes of spatial management have become less obtrusive, disruptive, and visible in their physical presence and yet more detailed, microscopic, and intrusive in their operating procedures. Spaces of surveillance can be “stealthy” (camouflaged), “slippery” (unreachable), “jittery” (actively monitored), “crusty” (obstructed), or “prickly” (uncomfortable): they are so seamlessly woven into the ordinary fabric of everyday life that they are largely overlooked and ignored.30 New rituals of security dictate that where individuals once entered new places by means of physical gateways, they now pass through a routinized audiovisual protocol in which the methods of bodily scrutiny have transformed even the forms of public greeting and conventional reception.31 As a technology of exposure and recording, surveillance is both everywhere and nowhere, assumed to be ubiquitous but always out of sight. Its power lies with its ambiguity: surveillance cameras create the impression of omnipotence operating as a visual deterrent. All those who enter post-­public places, such as fortified office citadels, enclosed shopping malls, gated residential communities, and festival marketplaces, find themselves caught in the “faceless gaze” of CCTV cameras, never sure exactly when they are being observed or by whom. Because it is constant and anonymous, surveillance internalizes the regulation of behavior and, consequently, promotes self-­control. It tends to become, as Foucault said in another context, “permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action.”32 CCTV surveillance technologies “call for a three-­dimensional approach to territorial space which moves beyond questions of area to take account of depth, height, volume and verticality.”33 In the view of Stephen Graham, CCTV surveillance systems have become “the fifth utility,” an integral feature of the infrastructure of aspirant “world-­ class” cities, alongside water, gas, electricity, and telecommunications networks.34 As a new mode of urban social control, CCTV has transferred the illiberal politics of social hygiene away from inspection of individual bodies,

148 • the infrastructures of security

and their quarantine and isolation, and into the spaces in which these bodies circulate.35 These intricate machineries of surveillance function as the spatial tableaux for a disciplined and perfectly controlled space: here the disorder and chaos of public (and post-­public) places are met by a perfect rationality, a spatial order that deals with confusing situations by making distinctions between safe, secure, and relaxing places as opposed to threatening, unruly, and dangerous ones.36 The power of CCTV surveillance is twofold: first, the network of cameras expands the policing apparatus across physical and temporal boundaries, and, second, real-­time images compress the distance between “event” and “response.”37 CCTV surveillance systems constitute the central building blocks of what Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong have called the “social construction of suspicion.”38 New regimes of visibility impose a panoptic grid over open, congregating social space, bringing to life a plethora of microphysical power relations that insinuate themselves into the capillaries of everyday life with a seeming naturalness that belies their underlying purpose. As people negotiate their way around the urban landscape, they are inexorably drawn into the orbit of various kinds of surveillance technologies, surreptitiously enveloped or wrapped within one all-­seeing “sheath of authority” after another. Routine visits to the bank, to cite one obvious example, are regularly subjected to the disciplinary gaze of x-­ray machines, metal-­detecting scanners, the “watchful eye” of armed security guards, and hidden video observation cameras feeding into backroom monitoring stations. The construction of buffers, partitions, and barriers creates defensible spaces of protective, shielded visibility allowing those who take refuge behind them to enact their own theaters of discipline. The strategic placement of gates, entryways, and corridors enables vigilant security personnel to discourage the poor, the marginal, and the disreputable from entering where they are not wanted.39 This widening array of security measures is directed against ever-­broadening definitions of who and what constitutes a potential threat to order, stability, and privilege. This near-­paranoid preoccupation with safety and security generates all sorts of new boundaries demarcating “the swelling inventories of exclusionary space” from the diminishing supply of genuinely (open and accessible) public places in the urban landscape.40 In the moral ecology of crime fighting, an affinity between urban bunker architecture and virtual reality video games is often expressed, and it involves speculating on how the spatial design of the built environment might affect



The Surveillant Assemblage • 149

FIGURE 8: Layered Security Regimes

patterns of crime and how new modes of hyper-­surveillant monitoring of urban space can cleanse the disorderly city of the unwanted detritus of urban living: muggers, thieves, loiterers, homeless panhandlers, prostitutes, street urchins, drifters, and other pariah groups. Much of this thinking assumes implicitly that a profound mutation has taken place, one that recognizes that urban policing involves more than fully saturating the city streets with more “cops on the beat” but entails bringing together self-­interested parties—­ private security companies, neighborhood associations, community policing forums, voluntary street patrols, and alliances of local merchants and shopkeepers—­in complex public-­private “partnerships” with the goal of combating urban crime. This new “etherealization of [urban] geography” alters the space and time of ordinary vision. This transformation replaces the conventional notion of street policing (uniformed police on foot patrol) with new forms of hyper-­surveillant technologies involving high-­resolution cameras with pan, tilt, and zoom capabilities; monitoring screens; and security operatives. The camera’s eye transfers digitalized, electro-­optical images of real

150 • the infrastructures of security

time and real space from the computer screen to the memory bank, to the video disk, and to an imaginary matrix of electronic impulses linked to systems of storage and retrieval.41

Panoptic Regimes of Visibility: Colonizing the Streetscape of the Carceral City Criminals using the Johannesburg CBD as their hunting ground had better beware: big brother will soon be watching their every move.42

In Johannesburg after apartheid, obsession with security has become the master narrative of urban design. The sight lines of the urban scanscape have extended beyond the protective envelope shielding private property from harm and have spilled over into the wider realm of public space.43 In the new post-­public city, the soft images of spontaneity and chance encounter function to disguise the hard realities of carefully administered space. This “fortress impulse” in urban management combines architectural design of the built environment, state-­of-­ the-­art surveillance technologies, and security policing.44 The surgical insertion of CCTV cameras into the downtown streetscape as part of a “Safer City” initiative illustrates the increasingly managerial and market-­driven approach to hybrid policing that combines local business associations, the city police force, and private security companies in various partnership arrangements. What began as a pilot project with twelve anticrime cameras (now considered very primitive indeed) installed to cover such crime hot spots as Jeppe, Noord, Klein, and Von Brandis streets, and outside Park Station (the downtown train and bus terminus that had acquired a notorious reputation for robberies, muggings, assaults, car thefts, and hijackings), quickly blossomed into a comprehensive plan to blanket key downtown redevelopment zones with state-­of-­the-­art video surveillance capable of unobtrusively monitoring such out-­of-­the-­way places as parking facilities, alleyways, corporate plazas, and doorways. The initial R4 million CCTV surveillance project evolved out of a joint partnership spearheaded by Business Against Crime (BAC), and involving the Gauteng provincial government, the South African Police Service, the Central Johannesburg Partnership, and the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.45 Building on its experience with CCTV surveillance systems in the Cape Town city center, BAC estab-



The Surveillant Assemblage • 151

lished its operational headquarters on the sixth floor of the Carlton Centre and hired the Sensormatic Electronics Corporation (Boca Raton, Florida) to install and maintain the surveillance equipment.46 By the end of 2002, BAC had installed two hundred surveillance cameras, covering about 40 percent of the central city, and claimed to have reduced crime by 60 percent. Municipal authorities, property owners, and anxious street users hailed the introduction of these new surveillance technologies in the Johannesburg central city as a necessary step in taking back the streets from muggers, pickpockets, and other unsavory characters and in restoring “business confidence” in the viability of property investments in the central business district. Company officials touted the system as not only an effective tool for crime prevention and deterrence but also a monitoring device to assist city management in traffic control, fire detection, and emergency service alerts. As part of a proactive approach to city management, BAC promised quick response time to not only reported crime but also to such infrastructure breakdowns as broken traffic lights, burst water mains, and uncollected garbage.47 According to Sensormatic promotional materials, the CCTV monitoring system installed on the sixth floor of the Carlton Centre used the most sophisticated surveillance technologies in the world at that time, including easy-­to-­install dome cameras that were programmed to swivel through a full 360 degrees. These state-­of-­the art, “ultramodern” digital analog cameras operated in real time with a night vision capability that far exceeds the human eye. The zoom capacity of these high-­tech surveillance cameras enabled trained operatives to focus on people up to 3 kilometers away, and to read the wording on a T-­shirt or hat. The feed from each camera was captured digitally and on an analog recorder. In the event of a power disruption, a backup system delivered power for thirty-­six hours, and when that ran out, an in-­house generator took over. With an operational staff that exceeded two hundred employees by the end of 2002, the BAC CCTV anticrime system pioneered an extensive crime detection and evidence gathering operation, including the preservation and storage of video footage for possible use in criminal investigations.48 From the start, BAC Surveillance Technology worked closely with the downtown City Improvement Districts and their private security companies. The establishment of an auxiliary police station on the sixth floor of the Carlton Centre enabled BAC personnel to foster closer working relationships with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) and the South

152 • the infrastructures of security

African Police Service (SAPs). BAC also coordinated its CCTV surveillance with various municipal departments, reporting to traffic management on auto accidents and gridlock, monitoring uncollected refuse, and maintaining vigilance on graffiti defacement of buildings. Its first clients included such corporate giants as Spoornet, with its vast City Deep container terminal at Kaserne (with its extensive railyards and warehousing facilities), and the First National Bank (FNB)—­with its fourteen branch banks and dozens of ATM outlets in the central city. In the years 2001 and 2002, these FNB facilities had become frequent targets of heavily armed thieves working in small groups who made quick getaways on highways leading away from the city center. After thirteen successful robberies in thirteen months, FNB officials installed high-­resolution security cameras both inside and outside banking halls, linking these with the CCTV monitoring system operated by BAC at the Carlton Centre. Once this new integrated system with its twenty-­four-­hour-­per-­day surveillance was put into place, bank robberies quickly came to a halt. As an added crime deterrent, the surveillance cameras at FNB branches and ATM outlets were outfitted with special sound detection devices that enabled operatives in the Carlton Centre to eavesdrop on conversations and to pick up real-­time evidence of robberies in progress.49 At the end of 2002, the BAC(SA) Surveillance Technology Unit dissolved as a nonprofit Section 21 company, only to remerge in the following year as a privately owned entity rechristened Cueincident Surveillance Technology. The metamorphosis into a self-­standing, profit-­making enterprise enabled Cueincident to profitably market the BAC CCTV model for other cities not only in South Africa but elsewhere, and to sell its security services and surveillance expertise to corporate clients and public agencies.50 In addition to signing a commercial contract with the Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) to monitor the main highways around Johannesburg, Cueincident also reached an agreement with city managers in Pretoria/Tshwane, where it oversaw the installation of a macro “public area” surveillance system in the central city. At the nearby industrial hub at Rosslyn, Cueincident entered into long-­term contracts to manage electronic surveillance monitoring systems for companies like Nissan, SABMiller, and BMW. Setting its sights on transnational expansion, Cueincident moved quickly to form a number of joint ventures in other African countries. In 2004 it exported its technology and management expertise to Côte d’Ivoire, installing a surveillance system for the city of Abidjan to cover ports, harbors, the city center, and traffic management.51 By the



The Surveillant Assemblage • 153

middle of the same year, Cueincident expanded and upgraded its surveillance system to cover sixty-­seven square blocks of the central city, including the Newtown and Braamfontein precincts to the west and north, respectively, with two hundred stationary CCTV cameras linked to the central command and control headquarters.52 The installation of this Big Brother–­type surveillance system has imposed a “panoptic” logic of social control over the downtown streetscape. CCTV monitoring of the central city represents the prosthetic extension to urban public spaces of a kind of optical surveillance previously found only in such post-­public places as shopping malls and commercial arcades, parking garages, and entryways to buildings. Its power lies in its ambiguity: surveillance monitoring systems create the illusion that they see and record all aberrant movement and uncivil behavior. This new disciplinary mode of social control operates less formally and more inconspicuously than conventional policing strategies for maintaining law and order. The effect of these intrusive technologies of visibility is to regulate the use of urban space by “normalizing” behavior–­–­that is, by predisposing street users to behave in collectively acceptable ways.53 “The greatest value lies not in the cameras themselves,” said John Penberthy, managing director of Cueincident, “but the knowledge amongst street predators that the system is there. They all watch the cameras closely. Word moves on the streets like wildfire.”54 The long-­term aim of the CCTV surveillance system was to create an effective and highly visible crime deterrence strategy for the central city. Having lost faith in the capability of the ill-­equipped municipal police to maintain law and order, company officials at Cueincident looked upon the effectiveness of CCTV monitoring as a potential catalyst for other safety and security initiatives in the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region. For early pioneers like Penberthy, the surveillance system represented a new paradigm of “macro-­facilities management,” where the CCTV cameras form part of an extensive matrix linking private security companies, local police, downtown businesses, and neighborhood watch groups via an electronically communicated early warning system. The introduction of these new technologies of visibility formed the foundation upon which to construct the integrated security management of the cityscape. While the reduction in street crime was the primary purpose, the surveillance system also recorded everything from faulty traffic lights, electricity outages, broken power lines and water

154 • the infrastructures of security

mains, overflowing sewage, the buildup of uncollected refuse, fire alarms, traffic accidents, to medical emergencies.55 Yet liberation from insecurity is not simply a technical exercise in rational planning, efficient management, and imaginative thinking. As an all-­encompassing concept, surveillance cannot be reduced to the unproblematic notion of control but must incorporate some kind of slippage or blind spot.56 “Vision machines” like CCTV surveillance systems require uncontested views of their subjects in order to be effective. While provocative phrases like “zero-­tolerance policing” indicate a hardening attitude toward urban crime, what has remained an open question is the extent to which crime has been prevented or merely displaced. Police officials have claimed that surveillance cameras, or “spycams,” which are sometimes referred to as “electronic bobbies on the beat,” did the work of fifty police officers on foot patrol. Enthusiastic supporters of the surveillance system boasted that camera operatives consistently filed fifty incident reports a day, including reports on faulty traffic lights, accidents, sewer leakages, and general crime. Cueincident has consistently claimed that the installation of surveillance cameras was instrumental in dramatically reducing crime levels in the central city by more than 80 percent since they were first introduced in 2001.57 But at the same time, some private security agencies working in the Johannesburg central city expressed doubts about the accuracy and reliability of such high figures.58 Experts who have studied crime-­filled, high-­density cities like New York contended that CCTV surveillance has limited capabilities and that the only way to effectively police the streets is to literally “saturate the pavements with uniforms.”59 Ironically, success in crime deterrence typically led to displacement: once these cameras were in place in downtown Johannesburg, crime quickly gravitated to the peripheral areas on the edge of the central city, like Fordsburg-­Mayfair-­Brixton, forcing business owners and residents to hire additional private security guards to protect their properties. Despite the presence of CCTV cameras, criminal incidents continued unabated in the central city. Shop owners have confirmed that “just about every shop” on Wanderers Street had experienced a violent robbery in 2006. The effectiveness of CCTV cameras spotting crime in action did not seem to deter “the brazenness of the robbers.” In less than a decade, the typical size of a criminal gang engaged in downtown robberies expanded from smaller groups of maybe three of four to a large crew consisting of fifteen people—­a figure that by 2006 was “considered normal.”60



The Surveillant Assemblage • 155

The Militarization of Urban Space: The Origins of Omega Risk Solutions No challenge is too big for Omega. I think we have the best knowledge and intellectual capital in Africa, to provide a service in the physical risk management industry, to be the service provider of choice. —Alex de Witt, chief executive officer, Omega Risk Solutions61

In 2007 the City of Johannesburg transferred responsibility for day-­to-­ day management of the citywide CCTV surveillance system to Omega Risk Solutions, a private military contractor with a great deal of expertise in integrated approaches to security and risk management.62 From the start, Omega promised to replace and upgrade the outdated Cueincident technology with a new high-­tech electronic surveillance system worth R42 million, In December 2008, Omega unveiled its much anticipated, state-­of-­the-­art surveillance system consisting of an integrated network of 216 separate digital cameras strategically located throughout the inner city. Extending outward from the new central Macro Surveillance Centre located at Benmore Towers at 1 Rissik Street at the southern edge of the central city, the cameras cover a “radius of impact” of more than 50 kilometers. This electronic surveillance system relies on a digital virtual matrix using fiber-­optic cables that link street-­level CCTV cameras strategically placed on the sides of buildings or atop specially designed poles to the work stations and monitoring screens at the Macro Surveillance Centre. This method ensures faster response time (less than one hundred milliseconds latency) not available with radio or satellite communications systems. If the fiber-­optic cables were laid out end to end, they would extend all the way from Johannesburg to the west coast of Namibia. Omega also maintains the largest storage capacity for its video recordings anywhere on the African continent.63 From their comfortable surroundings at the Macro Surveillance Centre, nearly fifty vigilant operatives (around 75 percent of whom are women) sit in front of close to a dozen separate work stations where they stare intently at moving real-­time images displayed on fifteen separate large forty-­inch LCD video screens arranged in rows and columns. Each separate work station covers a different section of the streetscape. The Macro Surveillance Centre has the charged atmosphere of a virtual combat-­ready “war room”; trained operatives monitor these video consoles for twenty-­four hours a day, scanning the streets for suspicious activities and unlawful behavior. With their remotely

156 • the infrastructures of security

controlled technical capabilities of pan, tilt, and zoom, these cameras are able to swivel a full 360 degrees and provide either close-­up or wide-­angle images. From their seats in the central command headquarters, trained operatives can manipulate the direction and angle of the cameras in order to capture digitalized images of what is happening in their field of vision any time of day or night. In the event that they detect suspicious activities on any specific monitor, these operatives are able to reroute this information to a single dedicated computer screen for better scrutiny.64 This elaborate network of urban observation points bends the spaces of the city to conform to a set of visual protocols that enable anonymous “invisible watchers” to follow the movements of anonymous individuals and easily zoom in on suspicious behaviors. The use of face and behavioral recognition software designed to identify unusual or suspicious activities has given trained operatives one more weapon in the “war on crime.” The flexibility of these visual monitoring systems allows operatives to conduct aggressive surveillance of particular parts of the streetscape, flooding “dense incident” (or high crime hot spot) areas with multiple cameras. Trained operatives maintain constant, round-­the-­clock radio contact with dedicated mobile reaction units of roving SAPS patrols to alert them to any criminal behavior or suspicious activities. More than 330 uniformed JMPD police are scattered around the central business district, with an additional 50 undercover plainclothes officers driving unmarked vehicles. The JMPD have also enlisted “community” (i.e., property-­owning) stakeholders to assist in the fight against crime. Business owners and property managers have paid for the low-­wage services of close to 200 “Safety Ambassadors” (smartly dressed in distinctive blue overall uniforms and tethered via cell phones to the JMPD) who operate as the “eyes” guarding the outer perimeter of the numerous securitized zones scattered around the central city. The ultimate goal of this surreptitious monitoring of street activity is to enable the SAPS and the JMPD to achieve a response time of less than thirty seconds to any incident in the central city.65 Officers from the JMPD and SAPS were stationed alongside Omega monitoring staff in the surveillance center, from where they were linked to patrolling the city streets all day and all night. The capacity of the CCTV surveillance system to identify vehicles through license plate recognition enabled JMPD officers to track stolen cars or those whose owners had outstanding traffic fines within an astounding two seconds—­a “world-­first,” according to boastful officials at Omega.66 In addition, the Metro Police introduced three “smart unmarked vehicles outfitted with the latest camera and software cars”—­



The Surveillant Assemblage • 157

technology–­–­that enabled police officers on patrol to identify false license plates and stolen vehicles. With the capacity to scan about ten thousand cars a day, and linked to databases of the National Traffic Information System (called eNaTIS), city officials hailed this new technology as a breakthrough in crime fighting.67 Omega executives pledged that their flagship Johannesburg surveillance system, when it became fully operational, would rank as one of the largest and most sophisticated of its kind in the world. Immediate plans for the fully implemented CCTV monitoring system for the Johannesburg central city included the initial installation of at least 360 high-­tech crime prevention cameras operating twenty-­four hours a day and covering a vast geographical area bounded by the Braamfontein Ridge in the north, by Ellis Park and Doornfontein in the east, the M2 motorway in the south, and Newtown and the M1 motorway in the west.68 In addition, a special high-­powered panoramic viewing device installed on top of Benmore Towers provides security operatives in helicopters with a bird’s-­eye view of the whole city, enabling them to track stolen cars or crimes in progress.69 In imagining the Johannesburg Future City, Omega drafted ambitious plans to extend the CCTV monitoring system outside the central city grid (30 square kilometers), to include such places as Hillbrow, Alexandra, Bruma, Kempton Park, Parktown, Rosebank, Sandton, Randburg, and Midrand.70 The planners of this future electronic surveillance network have envisioned the installation of an extensive network of thirty-­five hundred CCTV cameras covering all major freeways, tourist sites, and the Johannesburg International Airport in an interlocked grid of electronic surveillance. In addition, safety and security officials anticipated that improvements to existing surveillance technologies enabled city officials to generate added revenue through the use of surreptitious “speed traps,” to prevent the theft of water and electricity and to monitor the “work effectiveness” of municipal employees on the job.71 Omega executives proudly pointed out that their approach to surveillance was not one that just passively monitors and records “street action” but instead proactively seeks out potential criminals and tries to anticipate their behavior. Omega managers instruct their operators in risk profiling, surveillance techniques, and incident management, training them to read body language of people “going about their business” in the streets. The primary function of CCTV surveillance is to surreptitiously evaluate conduct. According to company officials, a “well-­trained eye” can spot someone intent on unlawful action because potential criminals invariably display almost imperceptible

158 • the infrastructures of security

signs. Once they detect suspicious activities, operators direct the roving reaction units to the scene with a view to preventing criminal acts from taking place. In addition to its primary goal of crime deterrence, the CCTV surveillance system also functions as a detection mechanism to police the violation of traffic regulations and city bylaws and to address service delivery issues, such as broken water mains, missing manhole covers, faulty traffic lights, obstructions to traffic flow, and motor vehicle accidents. With such constant electronic surveillance across the city, operators were able to immediately dispatch emergency services personnel to assist in any troublesome situation.72 Because of its extensive experience in military security, Omega Risk Solutions achieved a reputation in private policing circles for its innovative and holistic approach to risk management. Besides its flagship operation for the Johannesburg historic city center, the company worked with other cities in South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) and elsewhere in Africa to install and operate its state-­of-­the-­art interactive electronic surveillance systems. In addition to managing its CCTV surveillance systems in public places, Omega advertised and marketed a wide range of security systems for a number of private businesses and gated residential estates. According to company officials, monitoring systems available to private businesses were far more sophisticated than others on the market. Surveillance cameras are used not only to monitor and prosecute criminal offenses but also to monitor a host of traffic offenses and municipal bylaws. Whereas the aim of conventional CCTV systems is to identify unlawful activities, Omega offered considerably more in its arsenal of commercial products. In the event that unwanted intruders triggered an alarm on the premises of a private business, the Omega surveillance system enabled its operators to visually identify the culprits and to use loudspeakers to issue verbal warnings. Should unauthorized intruders ignore these cues, Omega employed a range of other security measures, including pepper spray, electric shock, or filling the rooms with smoke, until the mobile armed response teams arrived to take control of the situation.73 Integrated security systems have formed a new kind of urban infrastructure that relies on fluid connectivity through cyberspace while at the same time contributing to the physical fragmentation of the urban landscape. The steady expansion of all sorts of advanced CCTV surveillance systems has created an elaborate security blanket over the central city. Private security companies working at the behest of corporate clients have not only protected their premises with heavily armed private security patrols equipped with trained dogs and assault rifles, but they have also established their own



The Surveillant Assemblage • 159

CCTV security systems that monitored the interior areas of buildings and surrounding streetscape. Because Johannesburg is covered by the wireless broadband company WiMAX and cellular networks, CCTV cameras were able to be installed and wirelessly connected to a central monitoring centerr in literally a matter of hours.74 Concerned with petty crime that threatened to disrupt their street-­level business operations, a consortium of large bank complexes with extensive property holdings in the central city banded together to fund the installation of CCTV security cameras (at a cost of R14 million) in areas near their premises with high crime rates. These cameras fed digital images to a central “control and operations” room linked to the Gauteng 10111 “flying squad” (i.e., mobile units) center. These state-­of-­the-­art, high-­tech camera systems contained rudimentary facial recognition capabilities, enabling police operatives at the provincial crime management center to match real-­time digital images with stored profiles of “wanted criminals.”75 Perhaps a dozen or more private security companies that managed their own CCTV cameras linked their surveillance monitoring systems with the Omega-­administered Macro Surveillance Centre.76 By entering into various partnership agreements with other private security companies, Omega effectively created a vast surveillance network that included in its portfolio more than seven hundred separate cameras.77 In 2010 city officials in Johannesburg loudly proclaimed their appreciation for what they considered the remarkable success of the R42 million CCTV surveillance system operated by Omega Risk Solutions. They proclaimed that the more or less 240 CCTV cameras in the inner city recorded an estimated 46,000 incidents between December 2007 and the start of 2010, with an average of around 260 arrests made each day by public policing agencies and private security operatives for crimes “ranging from bag snatching, pick pocketing, cellphone theft, assault, robbery, car hijackings, vandalism, and smash-­and-­grab attacks.” With training, crews monitoring any of the ten 1.5m plasma screens that displayed images from about fifteen cameras each, were able to read body language and hence to supposedly anticipate incidents almost before they happened.78 The vast network of surveillance cameras, some mounted on city lampposts and others attached to buildings and rooftops, had lenses that can zoom in accurately up to three kilometers. By this time the CCTV surveillance network had been gradually extended to cover the historic downtown core, Braamfontein, Hillbrow, Joubert Park, Berea, Doornfontein, and Johannes-

160 • the infrastructures of security

burg Stadium, in addition to areas outside the CBD, like parts of Yeoville, Fordsburg, and Mayfair. The zoom function on the state-­of-­the-­art surveillance gave operators a view of Soccer City in the south and the Sandton CBD in the north. To ensure rapid response time to reported incidents, a team of forty plainclothes JMPD and SAPS officers who were scattered around crime hot spots were ready to respond immediately to crime incidents. These undercover police officers, disguised in soiled jeans and torn T-­shirts, were able to quickly apprehend unsuspecting crime perpetrators. The “game-­changing” electronic surveillance system cost R1.2 million a month to operate.79

The Other Omega: Military Contracting and the Global Reach Omega Risk Solutions established its South African division in 2003 with an estimated two thousand employees. By 2009 the company and its affiliates claimed more than sixty-­five hundred employees. As a private security company providing much-­needed assistance in combating street crime in South African cities, Omega Risk Solutions confidently portrayed itself as a crime fighting company whose primary goal was to serve the “public good.” Yet behind this carefully manicured image there was another, more sinister reality. Key members of the company leadership—­chief executive Alex de Witt, Fanie de Witt, Cobus de Kock, Clive van Ryneveld, and Sias Claassen—­served in the apartheid-­era South African Defense Force, eventually retiring from military service with the rank of at least lieutenant colonel. Eight executive officers worked at such well-­known private security companies as Cueincident, Chubb, and Securicor Gray before they joined the Omega team.80 The escalating violence that consumed Iraq in the aftermath of the United States invasion in 2002 provided fertile ground for hundreds of private security companies, including such prominent global players as Halliburton, DynCorp, Global Risk Strategies, Edinburgh Risk, and Blackwater to market their security services. Winning lucrative contracts, these companies employed “thousands of foot soldiers to guard officials, oil wells, government buildings, and banks.”81 Lured by the promise of a daily paycheck of at least $1,000 [about R7,200] (a sum ten times higher than typical wages earned at home), countless thousands of South African citizens enrolled with hundreds of different private security companies seeking to take advantage of highly lucrative contracts to provide armed protection services.82 These “hired guns” (or



The Surveillant Assemblage • 161

mercenaries) performed a variety of military functions, ranging from guarding oil installations, carrying out logistical operations, driving the first car of a convoy traveling through hostile territory, to actual armed combat and the interrogation of prisoners.83 Several prominent South African–­connected security companies, including Omega Risk Solutions, Reed, and Safenet, took the lead in recruiting South African citizens with military experience. By 2004 an average of one South African a month was killed in combat-­related incidents. Senior staff with the SAPS elite Special Task Force complained that around 60 percent of its active members left their jobs in South Africa in exchange for work in Iraq. Official estimates put the number of South African citizens working for South African, British, and United States security companies at four thousand, but security experts suggest a higher figure closer to ten thousand.84 In October, two South African employees of Omega Risk Solutions, Johan Botha (a former soldier who had worked for a private security contractor in Angola) and Louis Campher (a former police officer), were ambushed and killed about six miles south of Baghdad while escorting a convoy of U.S. construction engineers to a building site near the then volatile capital Baghdad. In response to the death of former South African policeman Francois Strydom in a suicide bombing attack in Baghdad in January 2004, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), under the chairmanship of Kader Asmal, declared it illegal for South African citizens or companies to render foreign military assistance without the proper authorization. One popular loophole for South African security companies to get around existing regulations was to register as a demining company, thereby automatically receiving permission to operate in theaters of war. Insiders suggested that companies like Omega Risk Solutions used the cover of engaging in demining activities to work as private security contractors.85 By the end of 2010, the number of South Africa casualties reached thirty-­eight, the third-­ highest country total for private military contractors who had died in Iraq.86 Over time, Omega established business offices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and across Africa. It has business contracts to provide security with such corporate giants as Nissan, BMW, General Motors, the South African Mint, Mercedes SA, Sasol Secunda, and De Beers. It has created subsidiaries in Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Malawi, Sudan, Yemen, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia, where it has provided specialty services like personal protection, port security, armed guarding, and surveillance monitoring.87 In Angola, Omega has contracted with the Angola LNG Project—­a joint venture

162 • the infrastructures of security

between an assortment of oil companies (Chevron, British Petroleum, Total, and Sonangol)—­to conduct demining operations, including site clearance and deep search of land mines and unexploded ordinance. This site is located 500 kilometers north of Luanda, next to the Congo River. In Luanda, Omega entered into a long-­term security contract with Shoprite Checkers, a South African retail chain, to provide “loss control management.” In Mozambique, Omega has provided security for the British American Tobacco (BAT) company. Omega has provided security services throughout Africa to the oil and gas industry, engineering and construction industries, mining industry, harbors and airports, financial institutions, hospitality industry, shopping centers, and office complexes. In addition to guarding, Omega also offers highly specialized services such as risk audits and surveys, in-­company investigations, integrity assessments, VIP protection, security technology assessments and the project management of the installation and maintenance of technological solutions, mining clearance, cash management services, customs and excise and immigration services, and security training. Omega executives have boasted that their experience in high-­risk conflict (both government-­ and rebel-­controlled) zones such as Uganda, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Kosovo, and Angola provides them with a huge advantage over other companies.88 The oversize presence of South African “guns for hire” in various trouble spots underscored the global reach of Omega Risk Solutions and the diversity of its business operations. For example, in May 2006 fifteen South Africans employed by Omega Risk Solutions were arrested (and later released), along with seventeen other alleged “mercenaries,” in the DRC on suspicion of plotting a coup against the government of then president Joseph Kabila in advance of scheduled national elections in July. In coming to the defense of their employees, Omega argued that these men worked for its Congolese subsidiary upgrading security operations at three port facilities and providing “VIP protection services” for Oscar Kashala, a Congolese presidential candidate who held dual U.S. and Congolese citizenship. Most of the arrested South Africans were former members of the notorious SADF 32 (“Buffalo”) Battalion that fought in Angola and Namibia during the country’s liberation war. Several had just returned from Iraq, where they were hired to protect water purification plants at Al Rustamiyah and Anumaniyah.89 In late 2009 it was reported that close to fifty South African mercenaries were recruited to lend armed support to the military junta in control of Guinea. While not confirmed, it was rumored that Omega Risk Solutions



The Surveillant Assemblage • 163

was involved in supplying weapons for these “security specialists.” Security experts maintained that the military junta in Guinea paid for the security contract in gold and other mineral mining concessions. Guinea is one of the world’s largest suppliers of aluminum ore.90

JMPD Takeover of CCTV Surveillance Over time, the once-­cozy relationship between Omega Risk Solutions and the City of Johannesburg came unraveled in stages. In retrospect, the legal dispute in early 2011 between Omega and the City of Pretoria court over a R122 million closed-­circuit television offer that the company lost to a more expensive rival bidder, Morubisi Technologies, marked the opening wedge in declining fortunes of the company.91 The CCTV surveillance system in question formed a substantial part of the Pretoria security network aimed at protecting government leaders as well as visiting dignitaries, tourists, and ordinary people in public places. But even a cursory glance at the profile of Omega fueled the suspicions of skeptics who came to regard this controversial company as “an unlikely guardian of the capital’s security network.” In 2007 former Democratic Alliance leader Tony Leon exposed in Parliament that the Department of Foreign Affairs had paid huge sums to Omega for the use of its private security services. The baggage that Omega carried extended well beyond its role as private security contractor overseas, especially in Iraq. The links to the late business executive Sandile Majali, found dead in his Sandton hotel room in 2010, were murky. Majali first came into the limelight with his R11 million donation to the African National Congress after his sanction-­ busting oil dealings with the Iraqi dictatorial regime under Saddam Hussein. According to court documents related to the case, an audit report revealed that Omega’s bid for the Tshwane CCTV surveillance contract was rejected because “it did not comply with tender conditions and misrepresented facts to influence the awarding of the tender.”92 From its initial contract in 2007 to operate and manage (at a cost of R2 million or R3 million a month) the CCTV surveillance system for the City of Johannesburg, Omega Risk Solutions was able to negotiate extensions under circumstances where the bidding and tender process was always last-­minute and fraught with ambiguities.93 Matters came to a head in mid-­2016, after the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), won citywide elections in Johannesburg and Herman Mashaba replaced the ANC’s Parks Tau

164 • the infrastructures of security

as the new mayor. The new DA city administration reached the conclusion that the CCTV surveillance contract with Omega was not managed well, and the huge amounts of data that were collected were not used to their capacity and not sufficiently share with interested partners. As negotiations for contract renewal stalled, the DA city administration canceled the long-­standing contract with Omega Risk Solutions on April 31, 2017, with no new agreement to manage the surveillance system in place.94 As an interim measure, staff from JMPD were put in charge of monitoring the CCTV cameras. Almost immediately, complaints accumulated that the CCTV system was dysfunctional, that maintenance was virtually nonexistent, that replacement of frequently vandalized cameras did not take place, and that consoles were “virtually unmonitored.”95 The abrupt cancellation of the security contract with Omega Risk Solutions and the relocation of control room to JMPD headquarters in Martindale left the surveillance system virtually useless.96 Despite its promises to assist in the transition to new facilities at Martindale, Omega failed to train operational staff and to even provide temporary oversight of the CCTV cameras.97 The politically motivated assassination on April 21, 2018, of a prominent Ethiopian political activist, Gezahegn Gebremeskel, exposed the near-­total breakdown of the CCTV surveillance system managed by the JMPD. The targeted hit took place in broad daylight in downtown Johannesburg. Despite the presence of CCTV cameras nearby, no video footage was available for law enforcement officials to review. Key SAPS officials claimed (off the record) that there had been virtually no CCTV coverage in central Johannesburg for more than a year. The CCTV surveillance system was in tatters.98

Necessity Is the Mother of Invention: Integrated Drone Surveillance The start of major repair work in August 2018 on the M2 freeway encircling the underbelly of the CBD resulted in road closures that diverted traffic through the city, triggering massive traffic congestion in downtown Johannesburg and causing major inconvenience to business and residents. On average, an estimated twelve thousand to fifteen thousand motorists typically use the motorway during the morning and evening peak traffic periods.99 Already flooded with pedestrians, buses, street vendors, and minibus taxis, the narrow downtown streets became a nightmare for commuters working



The Surveillant Assemblage • 165

in downtown office blocks, large banks, and government buildings. Having to find new ways to get to and from work, motorists were forced “to battle congestion, detours and frustration.”100 Always inventive and attentive, these “armed highwaymen” took advantage of motorists stalled in heavy traffic, seemingly robbing them at will, making off with cell phones, laptops, handbags, and briefcases.101 “In a city that’s no stranger to crime,” one reporter wrote, “the snarl-­ups made [drivers] sitting ducks as thieves struck one car after the next, stealing whatever they can at gunpoint.”102 Perhaps ironically, the temporary closure of the M2 freeway was a blessing in disguise for the crime-­ridden CBD. Frustrated with this upsurge of opportunistic street crime, large-­scale banks (Standard Bank, Absa Bank, FNB Bank City), business conglomerates (like AngloGold Ashanti) still operating in the CBD, and city officials came together to spearhead a major new security initiative aimed at addressing traffic gridlock and confronting security risks for their customers and staff.103 This group of corporate enterprises and public law enforcement agencies joined forces to create an organization called Forum for Integrated Risk Mitigation (FIRM) to find solutions to the crime problem. The head of Specialized Security Support Services at Standard Bank, Wayne Dawson, assumed leadership of the FIRM. Under the umbrella of this hastily cobbled-­together group, corporations and banks with facilities located downtown scheduled weekly meetings with city officials and public law enforcement agencies to establish an integrated security system as a collective response to crime and insecurity.104 Major financial institutions banks like Standard Bank Group and Absa extended their existing security perimeters, hiring approximately seven hundred extra “traffic wardens” wearing distinctive colored vests bearing company logos. Some were outfitted in Absa’s trademark red logo, while others stood watch in bright yellow or orange vests from other companies, including around Standard Bank offices. These traffic wardens were also equipped with two-­way radios and nightsticks to watch key street corners and bridge crossings as far as 3 kilometers away from the M2 highway. In order to provide extra security, Absa Group and First National Bank provided shuttle services for staff, encouraging them to work during off-­peak times and allowing employees to work from home or use satellite offices outside of downtown.105 Realizing the unprecedented security risk for its staff (estimated at ten thousand working in the central business district) and clients, Absa managers took the lead in initiating new security plans. Before the M2 road closure, Absa had strategically placed twenty-­two security monitors along what they

166 • the infrastructures of security

referred to as “Safe Corridors”–­–­that is, “protected” routes connecting Absa parking facilities with highways leading out of the CBD. The number of security guards increased over time. With the closure of the M2 freeway, Absa bolstered the number of security monitors to 180 guards deployed along the designated “Safe Corridors” in response to the new risk profile. This increased number only supplemented the already existing 160 private security officers monitoring the Absa “family of buildings” in its seven-­block complex in the CBD. In addition to sponsoring the expanded numbers of static sentries monitoring major exit-­entry roadways into the CBD, Absa also enlisted the support of five security motorcycles and four tactical vehicles.106 The historic downtown core of Johannesburg came to resemble a war zone organized to protect “strong points” around major banking institutions. The Operational Risk Management Centre at Absa’s downtown headquarters boasted of a state-­of-­the-­art “operations room” that maintained an unencumbered line of sight on the precise location of all active security officers on the ground. These uniformed foot patrollers were outfitted with body cameras (or what were termed “interactive surveillance jackets”) and two-­way radio communication with mobile armed response units. These jackets enabled security officers to take photographs of suspicious activities that provided instantaneous moving images in real time and were also fitted with panic buttons to send alerts to the risk command center in the event of a security emergency.107

Bolstering CCTV Surveillance Capabilities Following a steady stream of complaints by downtown property owners about escalating crime in the CBD, caused in part by the closure of the M2 freeway and the near-­collapse of the CCTV surveillance system, city officials announced the start of a major upgrade of its CCTV camera network in September 2018. Officials arrived at this decision after a delegation of parliamentarians traveled to Shanghai to study how they might improve municipal policing strategies.108 Acting on behalf of the JMPD, the city-­ sponsored Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) undertook the installation of fifty new, highly advanced, “intelligent” surveillance cameras in high-­intensity crime areas. Outfitted with high-­tech fiber-­optic networks and wireless connections, these cameras were equipped with special features, including the capacity to rotate at a 360-­degree angle and to cover



The Surveillant Assemblage • 167

a distance of up to a kilometer with consistently clear visual images not available on older camera models.109 The rollout of these new high-­tech CCTV cameras was part of the first phase in the pilot project intended to complement the existing 450 ones with their lower-­quality capabilities. This surveillance network was scattered across the downtown core and extended into nearby inner-­city neighborhoods. Unlike the older cameras, the up-­to-­date newer versions were not yet able to communicate with municipal agencies, including the Johannesburg Roads Agency, City Power, Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo, and Joburg Water, to alert them to problems such as traffic congestion, potholes, water main leaks, and faulty traffic lights.110 In May 2019, in response to pressure to deal with the persistent downtown crime problem, city officials announced the launch of an upgraded security plan under the rubric of the Integrated Intelligent Operation Centre (IIOC), with the overall aim of fostering better decision-­making between law enforcement agencies and emergency services. Located at the JMPD headquarters in Martindale, this new off-­site command center combined the monitoring of an extensive network of close to five hundred new smart CCTV cameras strategically located across the downtown streetscape with proactive policing. The JMPD identified 145 locations (crime hot spots) as focal points for this new anticrime initiative, in which police officers were deployed in the morning and afternoon peak hours to assist with traffic control and crime prevention. One key role of the IIOC was to manage and monitor the newly installed quick-­reaction JMPD anticrime unit, a special task force charged with expeditiously responding to crime events. In addition to flooding the streets with hundreds of new traffic wardens and security officers, public law enforcement agencies deployed around eighty undercover agents to crime hot spots to report on suspicious activities during peak traffic hours.111 The IIOC established a new system to maintain direct radio contact with security officers on patrol, which made it easy for them to respond swiftly to crime as it unfolded, as well as clamp down on criminals by monitoring suspicious activity.112 At the start, the IIOC control room functioned twenty-­four hours a day and was staffed by fully trained operators who worked closely with law enforcement teams placed around the CBD. The nerve center consisted of more than fifty large screens (one meter by half a meter in size) that monitored about fifteen cameras each. Each shift was comprised of a staff complement of twenty-­five operators, supplemented by seven JMPD and SAPS

168 • the infrastructures of security

officers.113 Once it became operational, city officials claimed that the new high-­tech CCTV surveillance system yielded positive results in reducing inner-­city crime, ranging from bag snatching, pickpocketing, and cell phone theft to smash-­and-­grab attacks, physical assault, robbery, and other serious offenses.114

Drone Technologies Not to be deterred from thinking outside the box, Absa security personnel took the bold step of experimenting with unpiloted aerial vehicles—­drones—­to supplement anticrime efforts in the CBD. Bank officials identified a promising vendor that had spearheaded the anti–­rhino poaching drone initiative in Kruger National Park. According to an official statement from Riaan Crafford, the head of physical security and violent crime investigations for Absa, “If all goes well, we will be the first city in the world to deploy and make use of drones in this way: flying in a CBD area and monitoring the grid.”115 In imagining a future of virtual watertight security for downtown banks and businesses, key officials at Absa’s Operational Risk Management Centre looked forward to a time when drones could play an enhanced role in an integrated security assemblage. This imagined spatial configuration included designated “security corridors” and “exclusion zones” watched over by a network of CCTV cameras on the street and complemented by drones flying predetermined routes in real-­time communication with mobile armed response units on the ground.116 For private companies and individuals, legally owning and operating remote-­controlled aircraft was subject to strict oversight.117 In seeking to circumvent existing regulations and bypass bureaucratic “red tape,” Absa encouraged public law enforcement agencies to take charge of operating the drone initiative. Handing over management of the drone surveillance to the SAPS and JMPD allowed the “flying spy machines” to be considered “police helicopters,” and hence subject to less stringent regulations than if they were operated by private companies. Thinking ahead, Absa was seeking to ensure that the drone project could continue “long after the M2 reopens.”118 What should be clear is that the use of drones by public authorities was not unprecedented. As early as 2018, city agencies deployed drones to patrol the vast expanse of city parks and public lands such as ridges, bird sanctuaries, water bodies, koppies (small hills), and nature reserves.119 In March 2020



The Surveillant Assemblage • 169

the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) began using drones as a last-­ditch effort to deter cable thieves, who regularly stripped overhead wires along rail lines servicing freight and passenger trains.120 Different departments and agencies within the city—­the JMPD, disaster management, fire and rescue, and engineering departments—­spent huge sums on hiring helicopters for aerial surveillance. Planning for the future, security experts argued that the acquisition of drones (for around R600,000 each) offered a more cost-­effective approach to providing municipal services. What is clear is that public law enforcement agencies have inched ever closer to bringing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into their arsenal of emergency services and crime-­fighting tools, useful for investigating traffic congestion and car accidents as well as monitoring social protests, unauthorized land invasions, crime hot spots, squatter occupations, scrapyards whose owners are suspected of harboring stolen vehicles, shack fires, and burning buildings.121 Yet critics warned that the acquisition and use of state surveillance drones posed a number of threats to democratic freedoms and rights to privacy. These potential dangers included “mission creep”—­the process by which technologies originally acquired for benign purposes become pervasive or are hijacked by public law enforcement agencies and private security companies for “more controversial purposes.” The expanded use of surveillance drones was emblematic of the gradual militarization of public law enforcement agencies.122

Revamped Smart CCTV Surveillance The projected goal of the IIOC was to deploy available smart technologies in order to collect and collate various streams of complex data and scattered information accumulated from a variety of sources onto a single platform. This functional coordination enabled city officials across departments and agencies to integrate all existing municipal systems and to use available resources in a more efficient manner. Operated by the city-­owned Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), the system was powered by an extensive broadband network that enabled high-­quality access to internet-­delivered services. As part of their future projections with the aim of incorporating “smart cities” initiatives, city officials have looked upon the IIOC as an “intelligent” data-­driven clearinghouse, allowing for the “seamless interoperability, transmission, sharing, and exchange” of information between all city-­owned

170 • the infrastructures of security

agencies and departments. With guidance and support from the IIOC, the new CCTV cameras have accommodated smart applications like license plate and facial recognition technology capabilities, aimed at assisting SAPS and JMPD tactical units to respond within three minutes of crime incidents. The future goal of the CCTV surveillance system, which is an integral component of the IIOC, is to combine crime detection and prevention capabilities with real-­time monitoring and analysis of traffic flow and congestion, the establishment of active control over the maintenance of municipal infrastructure and services, the improvement of emergency response times, and the overall enhancement of service delivery.123 The IIOC has employed a futuristic surveillance model that has incorporated up-­to-­date features and technologies, making the Johannesburg CCTV system “one of the most modern and sophisticated in the world.” According to city officials, this state-­of-­the-­art facility has enabled Johannesburg “to compete comparatively with international peers from across the globe. Each smart CCTV camera is equipped with powerful lenses “that can zoom in accurately up to two kilometres,” with the ability to track and trace criminal suspects in real time. A particularly powerful camera placed on the roof of the Martindale JMPD headquarters gives operators a virtual “helicopter view” of the city. CCTV surveillance cameras are carefully arranged at strategic locations, “including access routes into the CBD, Vilakazi Street (Soweto), Mayfair, Fordsburg, Joubert Park, Doornfontein, as well as Auckland Park, Selby and busy [traffic] intersections.” Security experts have imagined a future in which the CCTV surveillance system will be upgraded to incorporate more reliable facial recognition capabilities and expanded to cover all regions of the city.124

Chapter Five

The CCTV Surveillance Revolution South Africans normalise what is crazy for anyone else. —Mandy Pienaar, Johannesburg media executive (hijacked in her car and robbed at gunpoint in 2016)1

Beginning in the mid-­1990s, around the time of the end of apartheid and the transition to parliamentary democracy, affluent residents in Johannesburg’s northern suburban neighborhoods reacted in largely defensive ways to what they perceived as a rising tide of crime. In seeking to protect their homes, persons, and property, they turned to a combination of protective measures, including the installation of higher and higher perimeter walls, electrified fencing, burglar bars on all windows, security gates, road closures at main exit and entry points to their residential neighborhoods, and the hiring of private security companies to provide armed response in the event of an armed robbery or home invasion.2 The principal aim of this turn to security infrastructure was to provide those living in suburban neighborhoods a sense of their own personal safety by retreating into their own fortified bunkers.3 The underlying logic behind these security measures was to manage risk and to “design out” potential crime threats through the creation of “defensible space.”4 At the end of the day, these personalized and largely defensive responses to rising crime proved less effective than what anxious residents originally imagined and longed for. Beginning in the early 2000s, the adoption of security measures began to shift from reactive approaches to perceived risk and danger and toward proactive and preemptive solutions—­what Yee-­Kuang Heng has called “active anticipation and ‘reflexive’ risk management strategies.”5 Security governance strategies moved away from individualized responses of homeowners acting on their own accord to fortify their own homes and properties and toward collective approaches in which neighborhood asso

171

172 • the infrastructures of security

ciations assumed principal responsibilities for proactively extending the boundaries of crime prevention measures to the public spaces of residential suburbs. As designated agents acting at the behest of member households, these neighborhood associations hired private security companies, which in turn relied on armed response teams operating with high-­speed vehicles to continuously patrol public streets, parks and open areas, commercial thoroughfares, and other places of social congregation in these upscale residential neighborhoods. The aim of these proactive private security patrols was to be on the lookout for any suspicious persons whom they deemed as potential criminals.6 The creation of high-­intensity security zones has come to depend on a combination of hard borders, which are visible and physically defined, and soft boundaries, which are flexible, and malleable, and often invisible. In short, smart surveillance technologies embedded in new modes of security governance have transformed and recast the rigid demarcation between public and private space into a much more diffuse, modulating continuum that enables intelligent machines to track movement “over multiple lines of displacement.”7 Despite the promises of private security companies and the assurances of sellers of protection devices for individual homes, these “target-­hardening” measures only met with “varying degrees of success.”8 As a general rule, capsular solutions to the fear of crime tend inexorably to lurch in the direction of technological fixes. As Lieven de Cauter has persuasively argued, the fixation on security has moved from experiments with extensions of the body (physical armoring and prosthetic attachments) to extensions of the mind (information technologies and machine-­ driven artificial intelligence).9 Always on the lookout for the next best fail-­safe option in the battle against crime, neighborhood associations have turned to new high-­tech surveillance systems, putting their faith in the massive rollout of thousands of interconnected CCTV street cameras “that use military-­grade intelligence software to detect criminal behavior in real time.”10 The steady expansion of anticrime surveillance technologies has exemplified what Mike Davis has termed the “militarization of urban space.”11 Instead of fashioning an urban social order grounded in respect for civil liberties and for the rights of unconstrained free movement, the new military urbanism that has taken hold in the relatively affluent residential suburbs of northern Johannesburg marks a paradigmatic shift in security governance. Rather than reacting to criminal incidents after they have taken place, the adoption of new proactive strategies of security governance seeks to pre-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 173

emptively anticipate where and when crime might occur through the systematic subjection of individuals, behaviors, and places to the algorithmic rational calculation of risk profiling. The deployment of up-­to-­date surveillance technologies designed to observe, track, and target unwanted strangers and suspicious persons who are “out of place” (and hence do not belong) has become the centerpiece of coercive strategies of containment, pacification, and dispersal.12 CCTV surveillance sutures power to the observation of space. Rather than submit to the conventional understanding of public streets and open thoroughfares as an inviting terrain of unplanned social congregation, chance encounter, and uninterrupted movement, the new military urbanism treats these public spaces as sites of potential risk and possible danger.13 The dramatic expansion of techniques of monitoring of “suspicious activities” amounts to what Rem Koolhaas has called the “evacuation of the public domain,”14 or what others have regarded as the strangulation or death of public space.15 Acting almost with impunity and outside the conventional understanding of the rule of law, private security companies have flooded the public spaces of residential suburbs with mobile armed patrols. Their armed response teams function like faux “surrogate police,” or “pop-­up armies,” to cleanse the streets of alleged crime threats, including homeless persons, aimless youths, and itinerant work seekers.16 The introduction of smart surveillance systems has exemplified the shift in the logic of urban governance away from the focus on disciplining “criminally inclined” populations through identification, entrapment, and incarceration, and toward the governance of territory—­that is, the exertion of power over place/location.17 The “technologization” of urban security has its roots in border controls and military applications aimed at achieving superiority on the battlefield.18 Surveillance technologies, identification techniques, and risk assessment and management have become central elements in security governance. Security technologies that were initially introduced in pilot programs targeting undocumented immigration, smuggling, and various kinds of criminal enterprise along national borders have broadened their scope and reach over the past several decades to encompass a much more expansive field of operations.19 Smart surveillance technologies have introduced a new domain of “expert” knowledge and power into the policing of urban landscapes. The effectiveness of surveillance has been considerably enhanced through “multiple procedures of information gathering to support practices” of social control over urban public spaces. Those security operatives who gather and store

174 • the infrastructures of security

information have proclaimed that their intentions are only benevolent and are otherwise aimed at the common good. Yet the production of safe and secure environments in affluent residential neighborhoods invariably problematizes only the poorest and most marginalized urban residents, “criminalizing” their survival strategies and subjecting them to undue scrutiny. Considerable advances in the technical capacity of targeted surveillance systems have allowed novel assemblages of security professionals (including IT experts and professional “anticrime” advisers) to work in close collaboration with armed response tactical teams on the ground to “keep irredeemably ‘dangerous’ and problematic [persons] at bay,” where security measures range from random stop-­and-­frisk tactics to (extralegal) forcible removal at gunpoint.20

CCTV Surveillance State-­of-­the-­art technologies developed originally for exclusive use by military and defense purposes have spilled over into public law enforcement agencies and private security companies.21 The steady proliferation of so many CCTV cameras in cities around the world has signaled a “surveillance surge” where the expansion and intensification of ever more refined technologies embedded in smart monitoring systems has marked a turn toward more holistic approaches to security governance that have replaced largely ad hoc defensive arrangements with comprehensive systems. Cutting-­edge technologies, such as photonics and the application of electro-­optical devices, wireless sensor networks, stationary and roving surveillance monitoring, thermal imaging, behavioral recognition systems, biometric DNA testing, and retinal scanning, have found their place among the traditional crime-­fighting weapons in policing agencies.22 CCTV video surveillance technologies have experimented with all sorts of automated sorting techniques, particularly the analysis of physical movement and facial recognition. These consist of both biometric identification, which relies on the evaluation of human bodily characteristics to categorize and classify, and behaviometric recognition, which depends on detection of “abnormal” patterns of behaviour.23 The latest versions of smart surveillance systems integrate high-­resolution video cameras, often with remarkable resolution and infrared nighttime capabilities, with an embedded repertoire of automated software-­driven analytics. The technologies of data collection are linked with sophisticated storage and retrieval facilities offering easy access



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 175

and reliable “informatics.”24 The introduction of passive millimeter imaging (PMI) creates the capacity for “invisible” surveillance cameras hidden within walls or attached to the façades of buildings.25 New PMI technologies use the radiated wavelengths that objects emit to construct a composite image of a body (and everything carried on the body) regardless of the number of layers of clothing worn.26 The application of these technical innovations is tantamount to “filling space with power.”27 Security experts have hailed CCTV cameras as “unblinking eye[s],” prosthetic devices that offer “an omnipresent view” of the terrain within their range and capabilities.28 The real-­time images produced by CCTV cameras are more than just representations of actual conditions on the ground; they are also cognitive devices that have the power to alter the conditions under which they operate. As Charles Suchar has argued, “seeing” is “largely a latent quality”; what is observed needs to be extracted from its setting; enhanced through tilt, pan, and zoom manipulation; and “given greater acuity” through the application of smart techniques that reveal underlying patterns, forms, and sequences.29 As a technique directed at producing particular outcomes, surveillance is a means to an end. By linking digital cameras with image database technology, smart CCTV surveillance systems can be outfitted with algorithmic capacities to automatically detect unexpected events and out-­ of-­the-­ordinary suspicious behaviors, such as vehicles going too fast or too slow, persons climbing over perimeter walls, and individuals loitering near parked cars or ATMs. Relying on information and communication technologies (ICT), sophisticated “algorithmic” CCTV surveillance systems can be preprogrammed to automatically scan for specified vehicle license plates and to ensure that people do not stray into areas where they do not belong.30 Vehicles moving the wrong way down a street or returning again and again to the same location trigger CCTV cameras to monitor the situation and alert security operatives. The attention that these smart CCTV cameras—­armed with these enhanced capabilities—­devote to real-­life situations on the ground “is not random, occasional or spontaneous,” but calculatingly “deliberate.”31 Surveillance is a technique for the typological profiling and social sorting of individuals and objects in space.32 Despite the benign appearance of a technical solution to managing risk under conditions of uncertainty, the introduction of surveillance systems is inextricably entangled with deeply embedded power relations. Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson have described contemporary surveillance systems as assemblages of multiple components that “operate by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and

176 • the infrastructures of security

separating them into a series of discrete flows.” Security operatives then reassemble these flows into “distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention.”33 Unlike those older kinds of direct supervisory techniques that relied on constant direct observation (which Foucault so famously analyzed under the rubric of “panopticism”), the “new surveillance” has assimilated innovations in the technologies of sensing and recording that have allowed for massive expansion in the capacity for monitoring of individuals and groups “without the need for constant direct observation.”34 In the panoptic disciplinary model, those being watched are aware of outside observation, thereby ensuring “the internalization of the priorities of the monitoring gaze.” In contrast, the goal of the post-­disciplinary, automated model is to observe and record the “undisciplined” behavior of “those being monitored.” In short, the new kinds of post-­ disciplinary surveillance no longer rely upon those being observed internalizing the monitoring gaze by bringing their behavior into conformity with expected norms.35 These post-­panoptic disciplinary regimes focus on managing urban space instead of “improving” populations by disciplining bodies. Expressed more broadly, “if the disciplinary model relies upon deterrence” in the form of internalized self-­control, then the automated one depends on preemptive intervention through “the exercise of external force.”36 Both the disciplinary and post-­disciplinary models imagine contrasting objects of surveillance. In the panoptic scenario, the objects of the gaze appear as obedient subjects resigned to their fate. In contrast, post-­disciplinary subjects appear as antisocial, irrational, and unrestrained, unable to respond to the “corrective” discipline of reform and rehabilitation. Hence, they must be excluded and barred from places rather than “trained” to conform to acceptable behavior.37 The incorporation of digitalized techniques into surveillance technologies has not only enabled monitoring “to occur across widening geographical distances and with little time delay,” but it has also allowed for the active identification, classification, “prioritization, and tracking of bodies, behaviours and characteristics of subject populations on a continuous, real-­time basis.”38 Because their implementation is typically accompanied by the rhetoric of “serving the common good” through the minimalization of risk, “digital surveillance systems tend to be developed, designed, and deployed in ways that hide the social judgements that such systems perpetuate.”39 Increasingly, private companies in the business of selling security services have taken the lead in developing and perfecting digital surveillance



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 177

technologies. With a huge market for complex uses on military battlefields and borderland security initiatives, all sorts of innovative startup companies have flooded the marketplace for state-­of-­the-­art security paraphernalia.40 The demand for the collection and analysis of vast amounts of data has been the driving force behind the expansion of digital surveillance technologies, such as automatic license plate recognition, biometrics, and facial recognition. This convergence of private corporations and “big data” (combining creation, storage, and retrieval)—­something Shoshana Zuboff has labeled “surveillance capitalism”—­signals the emergence of a new business model that leverages the hoarding of information for sale as the primary source of profit.41 This monetization of data flows embodies what Thomas Linder has called “the extractive logic of digital accumulation.”42 The production of these “soft commodities” has triggered an entirely new terrain for entrepreneurship and capital accumulation.43

The Thinking Eye in the Sky The technical capabilities of CCTV surveillance cameras have improved exponentially since they were first introduced decades ago as an integral part of broad crime-­fighting strategies. The principal difference between first and subsequent generations of CCTV surveillance technologies is the dramatic shift from reliance on “dumb cameras,” relaying video images to security operatives monitoring banks of screens in faraway control rooms, to smart computer software–­assisted systems that have the built-­in capacity to automatically evaluate their own video footage. By taking advantage of digital technologies and the evaluative capabilities of artificial intelligence software, second-­generation (and beyond) CCTV surveillance technologies significantly reduce the dependence on human monitoring and address some of the deficiencies associated with first-­generation surveillance systems, such as data swamping and information overloads, boredom and inattentiveness of screen monitors, and voyeurism (i.e., aimless observation).44 Advancements in artificial intelligence—­along with its “machine learning” algorithms—­have equipped CCTV systems with sophisticated video analytic capabilities that can track a wide range of street activities, distinguish between different types of movements and postures, recognize discrete objects, and classify behavioral patterns along a continuum varying from normal to abnormal, in addition to identifying individuals through facial recognition technologies.45

178 • the infrastructures of security

Second-­generation intelligent surveillance systems “subject digitalized images to automated processing” through the use of “computer-­based pattern recognition software.”46 A typical second-­generation CCTV arrangement includes an automated surveillance system comprised of a network of stationary cameras, strategically “positioned to observe dynamic, but structured environments,” such as streets, parking lots, and entry and exit points, which are in turn linked to smart computer software programmed to detect and focus attention on unusual behavior, irregular vehicle activity, or “surprising and unexpected changes.”47 The advanced capabilities of second-­generation surveillance technologies typically include the capacity to watch people in outdoor environments, to track multiple people using a coordinated network of video cameras, and to analyze and evaluate individual behaviors in real time.48 Technologically speaking, the ultimate goal is to create smart surveillance systems working through a decentralized grid of intelligent CCTV cameras operating “with embedded algorithms.” In addition to being linked within a network of cooperating cameras, each individual camera possesses its own independent data analysis capabilities.49 Outfitted with these multiple functions and capacities, advanced CCTV surveillance systems aim to “provide an automatic interpretation of scenes and understand and predict the actions and interactions of the observed objects.”50 The latest generation of smart CCTV surveillance systems increasingly make use of the fusion of multiple remote “sensor devices” that operate with heterogeneous functions. For example, the special properties of optical and infrared sensors complement each other under different lighting and adverse weather conditions. Other smart surveillance systems combine fixed cameras and active TPZ cameras that work in tandem with each other. The main application of this use of cooperating cameras is to develop a digital, networked, and fully automated system that can track movement through space. These multisensor visual surveillance systems rely on automatic calibration and registration algorithms that require minimal human intervention and are self-­adjusting.51 State-­of-­the-­art visual surveillance systems depend primarily on hybrid analog-­digital streaming or completely digital video communications and generation surveillance networks take processing methods. These latest-­ advantage of the greater flexibility offered by video processing algorithms that are themselves capable of directing the attention of stationary screen operators to particular situations deemed to be out of the ordinary, or “abnormal.” For example, machine-­driven camera systems are programmed to iden-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 179

FIGURE 9: Vumacam—­Clustered CCTV Cameras

tify what are deemed suspicious activities, such as persons carrying heavy objects, youth idling on street corners, or individuals running.52 Smart surveillance systems yearn for a condition of “seeing in advance” (providence, in Latin)—­that is, the capacity to preempt potentially dangerous or criminal situations. Technological advances make it possible to identify and recognize future possibilities through algorithmic calculation of incipient or potential criminal behavior, thereby enabling armed reaction teams to respond to incidents before they actually occur. Perhaps traceable to a hallucinogenic fascination with science fiction, professional security experts imagine a time when they have the technological capacity to forecast future scenarios with a degree of precision, a kind of prescient “futurology” allowing security forces to anticipate what has not yet happened.53 With the introduction of AI capabilities and supercharged by the Internet of Things (IoT), surveillance technologies have reached the next level of technical innovation. The ubiquitous use of digitally connected devices, with the

180 • the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 10: Vumacam CCTV—­Unblinking Eyes in the Sky

added capabilities to analyze video feeds in real time through AI techniques like “deep learning,” has meant that untapped footage from existing passive cameras can be reclassified as data, which in turn can be used to identify patterns, trends, and anomalies. Using AI capabilities to enhance surveillance technologies has effectively provided these monitoring systems with a “digital brain” that is capable of analysis and interpretation of vast amounts of raw data. Those earlier-­generation surveillance procedures, which depended on the vigilance of human operators (often the lowest-­paid staff within an organization) watching over valuable assets, are outdated and out of step with the latest technological advances. Watching an uninterrupted flow of moving video images can be tedious and tiring, leading invariably to inattention and mistakes. The introduction of AI capabilities to surveillance systems has meant that data generated by CCTV cameras can be easily sorted and classified based on a number of different variables, including color, facial recognition, object identification, direction correlation, automatic license plate recognition, and more. The application of self-­learning behavioral analytics to surveillance systems has dramatically reduced the sheer amount of video images that operators monitor by close to 95 percent. Rather than viewing video on monitoring screens as a constant stream of ever changing images,



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 181

operators are alerted to investigate only abnormal patterns or out-­of-­the-­ ordinary events.54

Surveillance Ambition In May 2018 a private company called Vumacam, the CCTV surveillance camera division of Vumatel, announced plans to spend R500 million (approximately $47 million) to blanket the affluent suburban neighborhoods of northern Johannesburg with at least fifteen thousand high-­tech CCTV cameras mounted on tall poles and capable of capturing ultra-­high-­definition video footage. Integrally linked to a state-­of-­the art, solid fiber cable network, these surveillance cameras promised to deliver consistent, reliable, and high-­quality images in real time.55 Almost overnight, dozens of shiny new poles, some (but not all) outfitted with CCTV cameras trained in all directions, appeared as if by the magic of some invisible hand on street corners across the length and breadth of the residential suburbs.56 This strange sight of circular, pod-­like capsules attached to tall utility poles rising twenty feet off the ground took suburban residents and public law enforcement agencies almost completely by surprise, sending shock waves across social media outlets. Even paid-­up members of neighborhood associations often did not learn about the CCTV system until workers showed up to install poles for the surveillance cameras.57 The CCTV cameras promised to function as key “anchor points” in an interlocking network of visual surveillance. These new infrastructures of security resemble an elastic geography that stretches and bends across, over, and around the uneven terrain of the residential neighborhoods. Powerful cameras equipped with night vision capabilities have extended the limited capacity of the naked eye. These mobile modes of visual supervision do not replace the fixed fortification of physical walls, gates, and fences but add a vertical dimension to an already fulsome arsenal of security.58 This speedy (and surreptitious) installation of such an extensive privately owned and managed surveillance system amounted to a fait accompli that left public law enforcement agencies and municipal authorities scrambling to present a response. Without a comprehensive public policy or in-­place regulatory guidelines on CCTV surveillance, city officials were caught flat-­ footed. Neither public law enforcement agencies nor city officials (with the exception of what seemed to be secret “backdoor” dealings) were consulted about the erection of a vast network of tall poles with CCTV cameras on pub-

182 • the infrastructures of security

lic property along the edges of public roads.59 Drawing attention to the lack of clarity regarding the use of public property (road shoulders) and infrastructure (existing utility poles) for private gain, critics proclaimed loudly that Vumacam—­operating with a great deal of stealth and with astonishing speed—­did not meet the terms of legal compliance with existing city bylaws and failed to properly consult with suburban residents in residential neighborhoods where cameras were installed.60

Historical Origins of the CCTV Surveillance Revolution The unveiling of this proposed plan to deploy CCTV surveillance cameras across the residential neighborhoods of Johannesburg was the culmination of years of preparation. The story of the CCTV surveillance revolution can be traced back more than a decade to 2006 when the extended Croock family founded an investment holding company named Imfezeko Investment Holdings. Starting with its initial investment in the private security company CSS Tactical, Imfezeko Investment Holdings gradually branched into security-­ and technology-­related fields, with investment stakes in businesses that range upstream and downstream along “the CCTV value chain,” from hardware to software and from information storage to commercial sales.61 Residential neighborhoods in Johannesburg have long been frustrated by unreliable and slow internet services. Seizing this opportunity to make inroads into what was becoming a rapidly growing market, Imfezeko Investment Holdings teamed with the Waterfall Investment Company (WIC) in 2014 to found a startup technology company called Fibrehoods as a joint venture specializing in high-­speed internet connectivity. As an innovator in the field, WIC pioneered the use of cutting-­edge “smart city” concepts at its megaproject called Waterfall City located in Midrand. Using the infrastructural linchpin of fiber-­optic cable, WIC created a network that linked all city services (high-­speed internet, CCTV cameras, water, power, and the like) connecting fourteen separate precincts (including thirty-­five hundred homes in discrete residential neighborhoods) into a single, all-­encompassing system. Recognizing the inherent commercial value of using high-­speed internet to connect a variety of services, Fibrehoods adopted this “smart city” model as its forward-­looking business model.62 Seeking to mimic the tangible benefits available in gated residential estates, Fibrehoods promised to combine fiber-­to-­the-­home (FTTH) inter-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 183

net services with a network of state-­of-­the-­art CCTV surveillance cameras spread across the residential suburbs of northern Johannesburg. This ambitious plan involved establishing partnerships with neighborhood associations and the various private security companies with which they had contracts for “public space” policing. Working in collaboration with the private security company CSS Tactical, Fibrehoods began its operations in the residential neighborhoods of Craighall, Craighall Park, Winston Ridge, Atholl, Inanda, Illovo, and Elton Hill, using the installation of FTTH connections to jump-­ start the rollout of a network of high-­quality CCTV security cameras.63 By 2015, Fibrehoods had penetrated the emerging high-­speed internet market in Sandton, Bryanston Ext. 3, and other nearby residential neighborhoods.64 Fibrehoods tapped into the existing infrastructure of streetlight poles and power lines in the residential suburbs to install its network of aerial fiber-­ optic cables. The company claimed that the advantages of aboveground cables was that “it is easier to maintain, quicker to deploy, and most importantly, there is no trenching which means that there is less disruption to residents.”65 From the start, Fibrehoods faced stiff competition from another startup company, Vumatel, which was also founded in 2014. Both companies entered the market to bring much desired but previously unavailable high-­speed internet service (with their state-­of-­the-­art fiber-­optic connections) to business customers and suburban households in residential neighborhoods.66 Several years earlier, Vumatel pioneered FTTH internet connections in South Africa with a pilot project in the upscale Johannesburg suburb of Parkhurst. Unlike Fibrehoods, which preferred aboveground cables, Vumatel choose the alternative method of digging trenches and laying the fiber-­optics underground. By employing an aggressive marketing strategy promising its customers stable, high-­speed connectivity to open-­access internet services, Vumatel was able to edge out larger, established companies (like Vodacom, Telkom, and MTN) in winning a contract to install an underground fiber-­optic network to connect the twenty-­one hundred households in Parkhurst to high-­speed internet.67 From these rather modest beginnings, Vumatel quickly expanded its business operations to include nearby residential suburbs of Greenside, Saxonwold, Parkwood, Killarney, Riviera, and Parktown North, and by 2015 had moved even further afield into Victory Park, Linden, Bryanston South, and Blairgowrie.68 These initial forays into the market for FTTH internet services triggered a turf war, pitting established telecommunications giants against a host of newcomers in the battle to provide high-­speed internet connectivity at the

FIGURE 11: Map 1: Northern Suburbs: Placement of Fibrehoods Cables and Vumacam CCTV Camera Network, 2016. Designer: Olaia Chivite Amigo.



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 185

cheapest prices in residential suburbs and business districts in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Cape Town.69 Large telecommunication companies such as Telkom, Vodacom, MTN, and Cell C were slow to invest in infrastructure facilitating high-­speed internet connectivity. This sluggishness in responding to demand in the underserviced, high-­end residential suburbs created opportunities for smaller fiber-­optic companies, such as Vumatel, Fibrehoods, Link Africa Group, and Dark Fibre Africa. By delivering better prices and higher speeds, these “nimble new entrants” were able to carve out a substantial market share.70 In 2016, industry leader Vumatel purchased its main FTTH competitor, Fibrehoods, in a landmark deal with the aim of strengthening its marketplace bargaining power.71 This acquisition enabled Vumatel to expand its fiber-­ optic footprint into Atholl, Beverley Gardens, Bordeaux North, Bordeaux South, Bryanston Ext. 3, Craighall, Craighall Park, Dunkeld, Dunkeld West, Elton Hill, Illovo, Inanda, Lyme Park, Norwood, Oaklands, Orchards, Rivonia, Savoy, Vandia Grove, Waverley, and Winston Ridge. With more than two dozen companies competing in the market for FTTH internet services, business experts expected the Vumatel purchase of Fibrehoods to kick-­start rapid consolidation in the industry.72 Frustrated with poor-­ quality internet service available to individual households, neighborhood residents welcomed the rollout of fiber-­optic cables capable of providing internet service with reliable high-­speed connectivity. What they may not have realized at the time was that these fiber-­optic internet services were linked with a wider initiative to provide high-­tech CCTV surveillance to residential neighborhoods. For many years, a handful of private security companies (including CSS Tactical, RSS Security Services, and others) installed CCTV cameras in strategic locations in the residential neighborhoods as part of their package of protection services they offered. For the most part, these CCTV cameras were the old-­fashioned variety that resolution, often blurry, used outdated technologies: they provided low-­ images that were fed over copper wire or unreliable Wi-­Fi internet into a centralized control room where low-­paid operatives, often bored and inattentive, watched over a giant panel of monitoring screens, seeking to detect suspicious activities. Without a doubt, these human monitors, with their frailties and limited visual capabilities, have long been the least reliable link in the long chain of security protection.73 In 2016, Imfezeko Investment Holdings and Vumatel (after absorbing its main competitor, Fibrehoods) joined forces to create a subsidi-

186 • the infrastructures of security

ary called Vumacam, a technology hardware company that specializes in the installation and maintenance of CCTV surveillance cameras.74 The formation of this joint venture enabled these parent companies to establish what amounted to a high-­tech “surveillance empire.” The network of high-­quality fiber-­optic cables was the essential infrastructural bedrock necessary to support state-­of-­the-­art CCTV cameras. This convenient business partnership between Vumatel and Vumacam enabled the two technology companies to establish a virtual marketplace monopoly over the distribution, installation, and management of the huge network of CCTV cameras. The success of this ambitious business venture depended on the installation of fiber-­optic cables across the length and breadth of the residential suburban neighborhoods in conjunction with the uninterrupted rollout of thousands of virtually indestructible steel poles, each of which was capable of accommodating multiple CCTV cameras.75 Whereas Vumatel spearheaded the drive to strategically deploy new high-­ speed internet services to homeowners and businesses in the residential suburbs through its contracts with neighborhood associations, Vumacam took advantage of technological advances in AI capabilities to greatly enhance the capacity of surveillance cameras to analyze and interpret in real time vast amounts of raw video footage.76 Vumacam directly addressed three separate challenges faced by earlier CCTV networks. The first challenge concerned problems related to connectivity–­–­that is, the dependability and reliability of connections from the camera source to control-­room monitors. The installation of high-­speed fiber-­optic cables resolved this stumbling block. The second challenge was grounded in the existence of multiple private security companies working with their own CCTV infrastructures. Vumacam overcame this obstacle by allowing security companies to piggyback onto the new camera infrastructure. Under this arrangement, private security companies were no longer faced with the financial burden of installing and maintaining their own separate CCTV cameras and surveillance monitoring operations. The third, and final, challenge was related to the multiplicity of CCTV systems that operated autonomously, with the resulting “silo effect” that closed off communication between rival networks. By creating a single platform that aimed at integrating existing CCTV surveillance systems into a common network, Vumacam offered shared “communications” between the extended network of CCTV cameras across space.77



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 187

Critical Objections The Vumacam announcement about the proposed rollout of CCTV surveillance cameras triggered a firestorm of alarm from both advocates for civil liberties and staunch supporters of the constitutional rights to privacy.78 Shocked and dismayed, critics raised legal and ethical objections to the specter of Big Brother surreptitiously tracking the movements of unsuspecting drivers and pedestrians traveling across the boundary lines covered with CCTV surveillance cameras.79 Yet at the same time, well-­to-­do residents and business owners in the affluent suburban neighborhoods mounted a vigorous counterargument. Homeowners in these crime-­plagued residential suburbs have long believed that public law enforcement agencies have offered them little to no protection from house break-­ins, burglaries, and carjackings. The logic of mass CCTV surveillance originated from the widely held view that residential neighborhoods are extremely vulnerable to crime since they offer so many “target-­rich” environments that invite the predations of criminals.80 The ideology of fear is so pervasive that it has become normalized. Even before the emergence of Vumacam, a number of private security companies encouraged the strategic placement of CCTV cameras at main entry and exit points in the residential suburbs, at key intersections, along commercial streets, and at entrances to parkland and other under-­policed areas. While well-­intentioned, these efforts produced mixed results.81 The rollout of Vumacam CCTV surveillance system represented a localized response to the security challenge of crime that originates in the public spaces of the residential suburbs.82 The intensity of these debates revolved around “the balance between the constitutional rights to privacy and the right to live in a safe and secure environment.”83 Critics expressed fears that the massive deployment of CCTV surveillance cameras across the residential suburbs amounted to giving carte blanche permission to private companies to trample on the inalienable rights of citizens to privacy. Without a proper regulatory framework in place, city officials were in no position to curb how Vumacam collected the data from surveillance cameras and to oversee what the company did with the information.84 One of the fiercest opponents of the Vumacam project, Jane Duncan of the University of Johannesburg’s Department of Journalism, pointed out that the rapid installation of CCTV cameras took place in secrecy and without proper consultation with neighborhood residents. Aside from possible legal

188 • the infrastructures of security

improprieties, Duncan argued that “before embarking on privacy-­invasive projects, the City of Johannesburg really should have developed a policy and consulted the public on it, so that residents could have an opportunity to shape what happens to their data.” Moreover, a mass surveillance network owned and managed by a single private company with inadequate public oversight or a coherent legal framework “is a recipe for disaster,” she suggested. “Imagine what could happen if personal information about your daily movements in and out of your house got into the wrong hands.”85 Operating at the behest of the City of Johannesburg, the Johannesburg Roads Agency has long functioned as the authorized custodian of the extensive network of roads within the city. The edges or shoulders of roads fall under what is called the “Road Reserve.” According to existing statutes, Vumacam was required to obtain authorization—­in the form of what is known as a wayleave approval—­from the JRA to install pole infrastructure anywhere within the road reserve. Skeptical observers questioned how a single private company was able to obtain blanket authority via wayleave approvals for the fifteen thousand utility poles installed on public property without public consultation, and without “Requests for Proposals” through the conventional tender process.86 Stalling for time, the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) did not develop a clear policy through which to regulate the use of the surveillance cameras, let alone issue an official statement describing the manner in which Vumacam was able to obtain wayleaves to install poles on public property. Existing legal statutes require that before a CCTV system can be installed, there should be a process that allows for public consultations so that residents can be informed of surveillance plans for their neighborhoods and that they consent to the use of cameras in the areas where they live.87 Despite the scourge of crime across the entire metropolitan landscape, the initial location of these surveillance cameras in affluent neighborhoods provided clear evidence that this security monitoring system favored “a specific class of people that are able to pay their way to secure their private property.”88 Skeptics further suggested that private companies using up-­to-­date security technologies have been able to mask their discriminatory (“racial profiling”) practices of spatial exclusion behind the rhetoric of scientific precision, objective observation, and bland neutrality. Crime experts also noted that while the installation of CCTV cameras could indeed function as an effective crime-­fighting tool, the presence of these surveillance technologies



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 189

only in affluent neighborhoods simply displaced crime to poorer areas at the marginal edges of the city.89 In countering these objections, leaders of neighborhood associations made it very clear that they welcomed the installation of CCTV cameras as another weapon in the “war against crime,” claiming that the rights of suburban residents to safety and security overshadowed the minor inconveniences and personal discomfort associated with possible violation of rights to personal privacy.90 Skeptics argued that limited oversight of the CCTV surveillance sector of the private security industry has resulted in poor accountability. Civil liberties groups like the Right2Know Campaign (and its spokesperson, Thami Nkosi) claimed it was illegal for Vumacam to install CCTV cameras to observe people coming in and out of an area without informing them. Unchecked surveillance poses a direct threat to the democratic principles of rights to privacy. Cyber security experts expressed concerns about whether a private security company can sell information not related to crime and criminal incidents to third parties. Other critics have suggested that even though Vumacam operated like a private security provider, the company was not registered with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, the regulatory body for the private security industry, when it entered into the “security business” of engaging in the sale of CCTV surveillance footage. Forced to comply with existing regulations governing private security companies, Vumacam was able to “register in retrospect,” thereby voiding its earlier transgressions of the law and escaping having to pay the exorbitant fines it owed.91 True to form, spokespeople for Vumacam disputed the allegations of noncompliance and dismissed these concerns, claiming that their company was in legal conformity with the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA), the legislative framework overseeing the protection of personal information by public and private bodies.92 For the most part, leaders of neighborhood associations dismissed the privacy concerns of those few homeowners who dared to speak out, brushing them aside as merely unreasonable protestations of meddlesome cranks and narrow-­minded civil libertarians. At the end of the day, the groundswell of enthusiastic support for the “watchful eye” of CCTV cameras swamped what limited suspicions surfaced about the dangers of “mass surveillance” and the autocratic power of Big Brother. Strangely enough, even public law enforcement agencies were locked out of unencumbered access to the private CCTV security system.93

190 • the infrastructures of security

Secrecy and Deception Objections to the emergent private monopoly over CCTV surveillance cameras were not limited to questions regarding civil liberties and privacy concerns. A great deal of suspicion involving fraudulent agreements, invalid authorizations, and irregular dealings swirled around the initial efforts of Fibrehoods and Vumatel to obtain official permission to string aerial fiber-­ optic cables along city-­owned poles on public property (or to dig trenches on the shoulders of streets) in the upscale residential suburbs. The drawn-­ out process through which Vumatel and Vumacam were able to initiate their ambitious CCTV surveillance scheme was not only shrouded in mystery but also mired in controversy. Matters came to a head in early 2018 when CoJ officials challenged Vumatel’s claim that it had obtained legally appropriate permission from authorized JRA officials to install CCTV surveillance poles.94 At the end of the day, it is virtually impossible to unravel the intrigue that accompanied the CCTV rollout and to uncover the truth about what happened and why. All the major players remain deeply divided over the interpretation of events. Suffice it to say that Vumacam/Vumatel used the pretext of supplying much-­desired high-­speed internet to residential customers in the northern suburbs to inaugurate their state-­of-­the-­art CCTV surveillance camera system. At root, the controversy has revolved around private companies (Fibrehoods, Vumatel, Vumacam) inappropriately using public space (the edge of roads) and public infrastructure (tall utility poles or cell towers) for their commercial gain. The dispute centered on whether or not these private companies obtained proper legal authorization both from city agencies and from homeowners in residential neighborhoods before they pushed forward with their program of laying down (aboveground and underground) fiber-­optic cables for their internet service and installing the CCTV surveillance monitoring system.95 The entire process through which Vumacam/Vumatel ushered in the CCTV surveillance network provoked a host of questions about corporate transparency and proper public engagement. What seems abundantly clear beyond a shadow of a doubt is that while Vumacam broached the subject of CCTV cameras with leaders of some neighborhood associations, with a selected few ward councilors, and with private security companies contracted with neighborhood associations to provide public-­space mobile street patrols, the company rarely, if ever, consulted with or informed homeowners of its intentions.96 This story is one of subterfuge, misdirection, and decep-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 191

tion. Besides Vumacam/Vumatel, the main players include City Power, JRA, and Johannesburg Property Company (JPC). Surprisingly, the South African Police Service and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department have played only minor roles in this process, left pretty much on the sidelines as passive observers.97 Despite proposals introduced in 2017 that would have required the use of surveillance technologies in public spaces to be managed or at least overseen by municipal authorities, CoJ officials have never really developed a coherent policy regarding the use of CCTV cameras mounted on city-­owned poles and on municipal property. Herman Mashaba, the former mayor from the Democratic Alliance, issued an official directive in 2018 prohibiting private companies from installing CCTV cameras on cell towers (or poles) until the city administration finalized its policy discussions. Vumacam clearly ignored this order.98 Let us start at the beginning. In terms of the bureaucratic chain of command inside the administrative structure of the CoJ, the JPC was charged with the mandate to manage all forms of cellular and telecommunications infrastructure installations that used city-­owned physical assets and were placed on public property. As far back as 2013, the JPC entered into a contract with an obscure telecommunications company named Altivex 705 to produce a master plan for regulating cell tower applications involving city-­ owned street poles. According to officials at the CoJ, this agreement did not in any way allow Altivex 705 to install aerial fiber-­optic cables or cede these rights to other companies. Here is where the plot thickens. Altivex 705 interpreted its agreement with the JPC as a management contract stretching over thirty years to “monetize” the city-­owned poles, charging a subscription fee for those companies that wanted to string fiber along them and sharing these funds with the city.99 In 2017 the CoJ nullified its contractual agreement with Altivex 705 because of its failure to produce the agreed-­upon proposed master plan in a reasonable amount of time. In what city officials blasted as a “tangled web of intrigue,” Altivex 705 management claimed that before the city contract was terminated, the company had ceded its contractual rights to Fibrehoods (which subsequently ceded them to Vumatel) to use public property for private commercial undertakings.100 Mounting CCTV cameras on existing cell towers or installing new poles requires official permission consisting of a document called a wayleave. The wayleave application applies to a specific pole or a collection of poles in a specific residential neighborhood. Plenty of circumstantial evidence accumu-

192 • the infrastructures of security

lated to suggest that various city agencies issued blanket wayleaves to Fibrehoods for the installation of fiber-­optic cables without proper authority and without proper agreements in place.101 Two early “permissions”—­both of which turned out to be ill-­advised and fraudulent—­marked the opening wedge of the chicanery and questionable legality of the CCTV surveillance scheme that Vumacam so cleverly engineered. In March 2015, the acting manager of intelligence and compliance at City Power granted permission to a private security company, CSS Tactical, and a startup internet company, Fibrehoods, to install an aerial fiber-­ optic network for high-­speed internet services along with CCTV cameras on the cell tower infrastructure managed by City Power in Vandia Gardens, Bryanfern, Saxonwold, Parkwood, Norwood, Bordeaux South, Sandown, and Houghton. This agreement acknowledged that City Power was to have reasonable access to the digital feeds from the surveillance cameras. Again, in February 2017, a middle-­ranking official at the JPC issued a directive to Fibrehoods, confirming more or less blanket permission to install aerial fiber on city-­owned infrastructure. In both instances, as it turns out, these two officials—­both operating on their own initiative—­did not have the requisite authority to grant such wide-­ranging permissions, which upon closer inspection held no legal weight. Fibrehoods and Vumatel used these fraudulent permissions to convince JRA officials to issue wayleaves on demand. With a rapid turnaround time between the request and the granting of wayleaves, Vumacam effectively circumvented the requirement of public consultation and participation of local residents before they introduced their camera network. Buttressed with privileged access to basic infrastructure in the public domain, Vumacam began to slowly but surely move forward on its ambitious goal of installing CCTV cameras across the northern suburbs.102 In 2017, elected ward councilors in several residential neighborhoods charged that Vumacam contravened city bylaws, blatantly deceived residents, and ignored due process when they began placing tall utility poles outfitted with CCTV surveillance cameras in residential neighborhoods. Critics charged that Vumacam engaged in an underhanded campaign of drawn-­out legal wrangling, threats involving litigious retaliation, and duplicity to coerce elected officials and municipal authorities into supporting the installation of the network of CCTV cameras. Representatives from the company pressured staff at the JRA, threatening to sue them in their individual capacity if they did not approve their steady stream of wayleave applications. This intimidation involving threats of legal action, some outside observers have surmised,



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 193

prompted high-­ranking staff at the JRA to cave in to the pressure and press ahead with blanket wayleave applications. This behind-­the-­scenes provocation can help explain how and why the network of CCTV poles sprang up so quickly despite the standing directive issued from the mayor’s office withdrawing permission for Vumacam to install cameras.103 A host of skeptical observers have suggested that Vumacam officials consistently made false claims on their wayleave applications. In July 2017, the JRA suspended the granting of wayleaves to Fibrehoods due to its contravention of existing bylaws. At this time, the company officials created several wholly owned “shell companies” (including one called Green Matters) to submit wayleave applications on their behalf, claiming that local organizations like neighborhood associations and suburban “watch groups” had requested CCTV surveillance. According to critics, this subterfuge enabled Vumacam to secretly orchestrate the process of requesting permission for the installation of CCTV camera poles from behind the scenes. Although using public property and infrastructure without an open bidding process was prohibited by the directive issued from the mayor’s office, it seems that the installation of these CCTV camera poles was approved because the JRA (perhaps naively) lent its support to what city officials at the time believed were locally driven, and self-­funded, community security initiatives, not part of a large commercial enterprise aiming to monopolize the CCTV surveillance system.104 Despite claims made by Vumacam and its shell company subsidiaries that they were building this surveillance infrastructure on behalf of neighborhood associations after consultation with residents, elected officials were never formally invited to participate in open-­ended discussions or asked to give their permission. For the most part, representatives from Vumacam bypassed proper public consultation with residential homeowners and instead reached agreements with leaders of neighborhood associations, community policing forums, and private security companies. None of these bodies necessarily represent the collective views of homeowners in residential neighborhoods, nor do they have the legal authority to act on behalf of all residents. But by treating understandings with neighborhood associations, CPFs, and other residential security initiatives as tantamount to “proxy” approval or implied permission with entire residential suburbs, Vumacam plowed ahead with their CCTV installations. By working from the top down with these compliant partners, Vumacam effectively carried out what amounted to a fait accompli, calling public meetings of resident homeowners only to inform them of decisions that had already been made.105

194 • the infrastructures of security

Vumacam took advantage of a gap in the market for security technologies and quickly filled it. Despite increased security and round-­the-­clock presence of armed security protection in residential neighborhoods, crime rates have remained stubbornly high for at least the last two decades, in large measure due to entrenched unemployment. Suburban residents do not feel safe in their homes, let alone in the public spaces of the city. Vumacam and its affiliated companies have cleverly exploited these fears to carve out commercial opportunities for themselves. Vumacam began to provide new CCTV surveillance security services that many well-­to-­do residents have felt are absolutely necessary for their safety.106 Vumacam used the leverage of an established footprint in high-­speed internet services to launch a new platform around CCTV surveillance.107 What is surprising is that the company was able to carry out this business strategy without competition from rivals. In installing CCTV cameras, Vumacam effectively piggybacked off of questionable and possible fraudulent cell tower contracts that were, in fact, obtained to support high-­speed internet services and unrelated to their surveillance activities.108

Prescient Pioneers The turn toward “smart CCTV surveillance solutions” unfolded in fits and starts.109 Sharonlea, a residential neighborhood located at the northwest corner of Johannesburg proper, became perhaps the first experimental site to test the usefulness of high-­tech CCTV cameras.110 In 2008, the Central Sharonlea Residents Forum (CSRF) partnered with RSS Security Services to introduce CCTV surveillance cameras mounted on poles to combat rampant crime in the residential neighborhood. Because they adopted CCTV surveillance before anyone else, these prescient forerunners proudly announced that they were the “godfathers of the camera system.”111 One of the earliest visionaries who anticipated the turn toward smart CCTV surveillance networks was Ricky Croock, the cofounder and CEO of Vumacam. Before Vumacam was established in 2016 as a spinoff of the high-­ speed fiber-­optic internet company Vumatel, he was the CEO of a private security company, CSS Tactical, which he owned and operated along with members of his extended family. Along with other private security providers like Core Tactical, 24/7 Security Services, RSS, 7Arrows Security, and others, CSS Tactical was one of a handful of armed response companies that



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 195

spearheaded the introduction of aggressive, proactive approaches to neighborhood security management rather than the conventional reactive one that focuses on responding to crime incidents after they occur.112 By expanding the field of operations to the public spaces of residential neighborhoods, this proactive policing strategy focused surveillance efforts on those places where residents were most vulnerable: approaching their driveway security gates, walking on the streets, shopping at local commercial establishments, and relaxing in public parks.113 Beginning in the early 2000s, CSS Tactical secured contracts with a number of neighborhood associations (starting in Illovo) to provide round-­the-­ clock proactive public space policing that covered their entire residential suburbs. In a departure from typical private security policing practices, CSS Tactical was a forerunner in pioneering early experiments with CCTV surveillance cameras linked to a central control room as an integral feature of their security management approach to crime prevention.114 At the start, CSS Tactical installed what were then considered state-­of-­the-­art CCTV surveillance cameras in a handful of residential suburban neighborhoods (including Illovo, Parkhurst, Dunkeld, Craighall and Craighall Park, Atholl, Hurlingham, and Inanda). These efforts to install CCTV cameras in the residential neighborhoods where CSS Tactical had contracts for mobile security patrols really took off in 2007–­2008. By linking the camera feeds to a central control room, CSS Tactical was one of the first private security companies to integrate the use of video analytics into their communication with their mobile private security patrols.115 These early efforts at integrating CCTV surveillance into an overall neighborhood security plan faced a number of structural and logistical limitations. At first the strategic placement of CCTV cameras was limited to the entry and exit roads, along with the main intersections and traffic circles throughout the residential neighborhoods. Not only did this constrained field of vision reduce the capacity of surveillance systems to detect criminal incidents in locations without CCTV cameras, but also low-­grade, blurry street camera footage restricted the ability of monitors to actually see clearly what was happening on their screens. In early 2015, CSS Tactical partnered with Fibrehoods to install fiber-­optic cables linked to high-­speed internet service in the residential suburbs. By tapping into this fiber-­optic network, CSS Tactical was able to upgrade its CCTV cameras to relay high-­resolution video images in real time, thereby eliminating time-­consuming buffering and inconsistent transfer of camera feeds.116 In order to jump-­start their business in residen-

196 • the infrastructures of security

tial suburbs like Melville, Fibrehoods waived installation fees associated with linking individual households to their fiber-­optic cables for paid-­up members of the neighborhood association and for clients of CSS Tactical.117 From a broader angle, CSS Tactical enticed the Melville Residents Association (MRA) into allowing Fibrehoods to install FTTH with the promise of free or discounted CCTV cameras.118 By mid-­2015, CSS Tactical had overseen the installation of fifty-­nine street cameras in Dunkeld, eighty cameras in Craighall and Craighall Park in Phase 1 (and fifty more planned for Phase 2), and twenty-­four cameras altogether in Atholl, Inanda, Illovo, Winston Ridge, and Elton Hill—­with plans to upgrade eighty-­six overview cameras and nine license plate recognition cameras. In order to accelerate the process, CSS Tactical provided the initial outlay of funds to install the camera systems as part of their agreement between themselves and neighborhood associations. Over time, these associations were able to recoup the initial outlay of funds to pay for installation by passing on the cost as an increase in the fees paid by individual household units for proactive public space policing.119 The technical innovation offered by sophisticated video analytics systems is the built-­in capacity to analyze camera footage in real time and to immediately initiate a tactical response when suspicious activities are detected. Beginning in 2015, CSS Tactical installed CCTV cameras that employed an intelligent software system called iSentry, an automated, “extra-­smart” analytics tool that instead of relying on standard rule-­based protocols was designed to be “self-­learning.” By incorporating the iSentry system in their day-­to-­day operations, CSS Tactical was able to greatly reduce the effort devoted to monitoring CCTV screens. Instead of having operators watching multiple video screens, the iSentry system allowed them to ignore about 95 percent of the footage while focusing on the 5 percent determined to be “unusual” activities, such as loitering, slow-­moving vehicles at night, and persons climbing over security walls.120 The logic governing the installation of experimental CCTV systems like Vumacam is invariably expansionary in scope and reach. Once the initial outlay of CCTV cameras takes place, economies of scale suggest ever wider circles of spatial coverage. From the start, residential neighborhoods and commercial businesses were keen to be included in the coverage in order to “avoid any ‘overspill’ effects, as crime moves away from areas under coverage” by CCTV cameras and toward areas that are blind.121 “Holes” in surveillance coverage provide suspected criminals with places to hide. The turn toward



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 197

Residential Neighborhoods with Vumacam CCTV Fibrehoods, 2016 Atholl, Beverley Gardens, Bordeaux North, Bordeaux South, Bryanfern, Bryanston Extension B and 3, Craighall, Craighall Park, Dunkeld, Dunkeld West, Elton Hill, Glenhazel, Illovo, Inanda, Kensington B, Lyme Park, Melville, Norwood, Oaklands, Orchards, Rivonia, Savoy, Vandia Grove, Waverley, and Winston Ridge Vumacam, 2016 Bryanston, Beverly Gardens, Riverclub, Morningside, Hurlingham, Bordeaux, Craighall and Craighall Park, Dunkeld, Atholl, Inanda, Illovo, Melrose North, Bramley, Waverley, Norwood, Greenside, Emmarentia, Heldekruin, Little Falls, Weltervredenpark, Melville, Fairmount, Bruma, Lyndhurst, Sandringham, Sunningdale, Linksfield, Sydenham, Oaklands, Glenhazel, Kew, Highlands North, Sandton Vumacam, Mid-­2018 Parkhurst, Parkview (all in all, 48 neighborhoods)

CCTV cameras assumed the “frenzied dimensions of a residential ‘arms race’” as neighborhood associations and commercial businesses in well-­to-­do suburban neighborhoods joined the headlong rush to enroll the new Vumacam surveillance network.122 The rapid expansion of affluent residential suburbs south of the historic Johannesburg city center is a somewhat overlooked feature of the evolving spatial geography of the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region. As distinct from the “old south” commercial clusters and residential neighborhoods that straddle the scarred landscapes of derelict mining operations (slime dams and mine dumps), the “new south” represents “a more recently developed belt of middle-­to high-­income suburbs attractively located on the slopes and ridges of a range of hills known as the Klipriviersberg.”123 Stretching from just south of the east-­west mining belt to just north of Vereeniging, these burgeoning residential neighborhoods have developed their own relatively autonomous modes of living linked with their own distinctive social gathering places, such as upscale commercial complexes, enclosed shopping malls, and sites of entertainment. Private security companies have found neighborhood associations located in the “new south” to be fertile ground for marketing their “protection services.” The wide-­open spaces separating suburban residential clusters have created a demand for new kinds of security technologies, including airborne surveillance and tracking with helicopters instead of the conventional use of armed security

198 • the infrastructures of security

vehicles to patrol neighborhoods.124 In 2019, Future City Fourways (FCF), a not-­for-­profit corporation representing the sprawling mixed-­use, business-­ residential Fourways region located between Pretoria and Johannesburg, unveiled an ambitious partnership with Vumacam to install public space CCTV cameras monitoring street intersections. The initial foray into public space policing marked the opening wedge in an overall plan to blanket the entire street grid with surveillance cameras.125 In June 2020, Vumacam unveiled a business partnership with the giant private security firm Fidelity ADT to introduce a new surveillance network of CCTV cameras across a number of southern suburbs, starting with the Glenvista and Mulbarton areas. The immediate goal of this ambitious partnership was to completely “ring-­fence” the residential suburban neighborhoods of Bassonia, Glenvista, Mulbarton, and Glenanda with an integrated network of CCTV security cameras managed by Vumacam and linked to Fidelity ADT armed response teams. The long-­term plan called for expanding this security network to include nearby Meyersdal and Alberton. The video data collected from the fifty-­four CCTV cameras is streamed in real time to the Fidelity ADT command and control center located at its Ulwazi campus (Midrand). To ensure easy multitasking, security management at Fidelity ADT assigned ten controllers to separate workstations with three screens each. Company executives claimed that this integrated CCTV surveillance system added “an additional layer to the existing security ecosystem,” allowing “for more efficient, proactive monitoring and optimal response protocols.”126

Second-­G eneration CCTV Surveillance Systems Over the past several decades, vast improvements in AI capabilities and deep-­ learning technologies have revolutionized video surveillance capabilities. The key technical innovation in AI is what is loosely called “machine learning.” These sophisticated “machine learning” capabilities use state-­of-­the-­art software to perform video analytics in order to recognize and remember patterns and to detect out-­of-­the-­ordinary behaviors. By fixing the gaze of a CCTV camera on a single location and gathering the video footage over an extended period of time, the software analytics “learn” to distinguish between what is considered normal and what is abnormal. Tied to an integrated network of CCTV cameras, automated surveillance systems (outfitted with all sorts of algorithmic sorting devices) trigger alarms when the video analytics recog-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 199

nize movement or activity that is considered to be out-­of-­the-­ordinary—­like loitering pedestrians or slow-­moving vehicles—­and prioritize video footage for immediate review by operators monitoring screens in an off-­site control room.127 These smart surveillance systems are programed to alert private security operatives on the ground in real time when something deemed suspicious is detected.128 Smart CCTV surveillance networks have built-­in thermal capabilities that can sense heat and distinguish between a human body and a warm car engine. This capability has enabled screen monitors to track movements and locate objects in complete darkness. State-­of-­the-­art CCTV surveillance systems include analysis of movement and body language evaluation. The ultimate goal of these increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies is “to prevent crime” by predicting where and what might happen. If, for instance, surveillance cameras “recognize” a particular person moving past a certain location more often than is deemed normal, or displaying certain behavioral characteristics or distinctive body movements, the security system alerts operators monitoring video screens in the command and control center, who in turn can quickly notify an armed response team to rush to the site in order to prevent a crime from taking place. Similarly, these advanced visual surveillance systems incorporate gait analytics–­–­that is, the computer-­assisted capabilities to identify and measure “the tempo and length of a person’s stride to predict what they may do.” Programming AI software to identify persons who are running, or who are walking through an area at an unusually slow pace, can be used to signal suspicious activity. In short, unusual behavior is always deemed suspicious. Once alerted, screen operators call upon on-­the-­ ground security teams to investigate the situation.129

Early CCTV Experiments The early CCTV monitoring systems suffered from serious technical and organizational limitations. Some but not all private security companies offered CCTV surveillance cameras as part of their collective security package to neighborhood associations. But the layout of the CCTV camera networks was often haphazard and disconnected, creating “isolated islands” of surveillance coverage that were unable to share information with each other. These early “first-­generation” CCTV cameras typically supplied grainy, relatively poor-­quality video footage. Even with their restricted geographical

200 •

the infrastructures of security

reach, those early CCTV surveillance systems were often poorly managed and not properly maintained, and control room operatives often did not realize that cameras were down until they tried to retrieve crucial video footage. In the event of power outages (which occurred frequently), or when cameras stopped functioning property, the surveillance system shut down completely. Acting in isolation and without cooperation, these “first-­generation” CCTV systems, with their limited spatial reach, “ensure that once suspects or known perpetrators move outside” the area covered by the CCTV cameras, “they ‘ghost’ or disappear unless they happen to cross into another ‘island’” that has both sophisticated surveillance capability and LPR software.130 Instead of a fragmented approach where residential neighborhoods paid private security companies to operate their own CCTV surveillance systems independently and in isolation, the Vumacam centralized platform has offered “cross-­jurisdictional cooperation and information-­sharing.” Joining with the Vumacam surveillance system has enabled neighborhood associations to have access to massive amounts of stored video surveillance footage and hence overcome the limitations of fragmented data gathering and incomplete databases,131 or what D. Kim Rossmo in another context has labeled “linkage blindness.”132 The Vumacam centralized command system has allowed control room operators to track activities—­such as stolen cars or an individual’s movements—­across all of its CCTV networks in real time. By layering intelligent software analytics over the surveillance camera network, Vumacam has produced a kind of security blanket over the northern suburbs. In other words, through coordination and cooperation, Vumacam has actively created what might be called “a network of CCTV networks.”133 The biggest advantage of Vumacam over existing CCTV surveillance systems is “interoperability.” Existing CCTV cameras are owned and operated by specific private security companies and cover only specific areas. By installing their CCTV surveillance system across dozens and dozens of suburban neighborhoods, Vumacam can track suspicious persons and vehicles “across the entire network of cameras.” While most existing CCTV cameras often produce grainy, low-­resolution images, the Vumacam surveillance system is capable of generating high-­resolution footage that has forensic value as a crime investigation tool. By partnering with Milestone Systems, a powerful video management system (VMS), Vumacam was able to consolidate all CCTV streams into a single platform that “has built-­in functions for data protection, including encryption and immutable time-­stamping.134



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 201

Business Model: Dreams of Monopoly Power 135 In 2017, Imfezeko Investment Holdings sold the proactive armed patrols component of CSS Tactical to another private security called Beagle Watch in order to concentrate on the convergence of advanced surveillance technologies, state-­of-­the-­art security solutions, and high-­speed internet connectivity. As a corporate entity, Imfezeko operates at the intersection of security and technology, a specialized business niche that has been called “securitech.” At the time, the Imfezeko group held investments in businesses across the CCTV value chain, including both public and private space camera infrastructure, sources of financing, and software solutions. By 2020, the Imfezeko Investment Holdings portfolio consisted of close to a dozen fully owned subsidiaries and partially owned companies that it acquired or launched in earlier years, including CCTV surveillance infrastructure (Vumacam), financing (Layer 3 Finance and Secutech Financing Solutions), AI software solutions (ISDS [the company responsible for the development of the iSentry system) and Intelex Vision), high-­speed internet connectivity (Rise Telecoms), and data storage (Calabash Storage Solutions).136 In seeking to rapidly expand its business, Vumacam outsourced some of its services, such as network monitoring, system troubleshooting, and data processing, to a small startup company called Highpeak Technology Services (based in the residential suburb of Sharonlea).137 Highpeak constructed the information technology system that helped to power Vumacam’s CCTV network throughout Johannesburg. Built with the support of Tarsus on Demand and Microsoft, the system “delivers complex and real-­time analytics to assist their primary clients”–­–­namely, private security companies–­–­in order to combat crime in the city. Highpeak designed a custom-­made, cloud-­based platform to analyze hundreds of millions of data points and apply intelligent analytics to create actionable information to assist Vumacam with the CCTV surveillance system.138 The Vumacam/Vumatel business model has depended on the extraction of profits from collection, storage, hoarding, manipulation, and differential dissemination of data. Cyber-­digital technologies have enabled the accumulation of huge amounts of data/information.139 At its core, Vumacam has offered a “video-­management-­as-­a-­service platform” that uses its vast network of CCTV cameras to collect and store huge quantities of raw video footage. Vumacam does not have its own command and control center to mon-

FIGURE 12: Organizational Chart: Vumacam/Vumatel Networked Connections



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 203

itor video footage in real time. Accredited customers who purchase access to video footage can work with any private security company with a CCTV control room to monitor video footage they wish to observe.140 By combining huge amounts of stored data along with the hardware and software foundations that enable other businesses to operate, the Vumacam/ Vumatel business model has epitomized what has been called “platform capitalism.”141 As of 2021, Vumacam has retained ownership of the equipment and hard infrastructure (including the network of utility poles, CCTV cameras, and fiber-­optic cables), has stored the video footage in their own facilities, and has controlled access to all data. As part of its joint venture with Vumatel, Vumacam has leased CCTV cameras (at around R730 each, depending on how many were rented)—­along with the sale of access to high-­speed internet services—­to neighborhood associations as a package deal of bundled security services.142 However, its main source of profitable return is not so much the rental of its CCTV surveillance hardware to neighborhood associations as it is privileged access to its centralized repository of stored video data generated by its CCTV surveillance cameras. The Vumacam/Vumatel partnership business model is simple. By hoarding video data, Vumacam has effectively monopolized the marketplace for valuable information. Because Vumatel is an open-­access fiber provider of internet services, the company is able to sell access to its accumulated surveillance footage to numerous third-­ party internet service providers (ISPs), particularly private security companies. Vumacam has maintained tight control over access to the information it has accumulated, sharing it with only carefully vetted clients, for a monthly subscription fee, the amount of which has depended on how many CCTV cameras the client wants to access.143 In order to ensure that access to its video surveillance data cannot be obtained by just anyone, Vumacam releases it only to officially “registered security providers,” consisting primarily of private security companies and insurance companies. These private companies that have licensing and contractual agreements with Vumacam have only restricted access to surveillance footage in order to ensure privacy. While security companies are authorized to rewind, fast-­forward, and play back video footage, they are unable to download and store the surveillance data.144 What this stockpiling of surveillance footage has meant in practice is that any and all private companies that successfully register with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority as official “security providers,” whether they actively offer security services or not, can pay a fee to Vumacam to review video footage. Under these circumstances, large insurance com-

204 •

the infrastructures of security

panies can, for example, register as security providers and hence gain access to CCTV footage in order to find evidence that enables them to adjudicate insurance claims or query the medical fitness of individuals.145 In order to obtain permission to review surveillance footage, private security companies are required to provide Vumacam with a case number from the SAPS, verifying the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation. Yet what is common knowledge is that perhaps as many as only one in ten criminal incidents are ever formally reported to public law enforcement agencies. Under these circumstances, it is widely reported that Vumacam has provided video footage to private security providers outside the letter of the law when they request it, regardless of the inauguration of formal criminal proceedings.146 As a matter of course, private individuals are unable to get access to stored video recordings without submitting a case number indicating that they officially reported a crime to SAPS. Bureaucratic hurdles and delays often mean they have to take the alternative route of seeking redress through the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA).147 Public law enforcement agencies do not have immediate and unlimited access to the stored Vumacam surveillance data. The SAPS or JMPD can make specific requests to Vumacam for access to video footage for specific criminal incidents only after they have formally leveled criminal charges and opened a criminal case.148 Even the opening of formal legal proceedings can sometimes require a court order (subpoena) to show cause to obtain access to the video footage.149 Because security private companies that have contracts with neighborhood associations pay Vumacam for access to the surveillance camera footage, they eliminate the costs of building and maintaining their own camera network infrastructure. Vumacam does not enter into any contracts with individual homeowners. In the typical case, private security companies pass the increased cost for installation of the cameras to their clients.150 Vumacam has maintained four separate tranches for its stored video footage. Database 1 is information available to all paying customers/clients who wish to have access. Database 2 is stored information with restricted access, shared only via “alerts” to specific clients, like private security companies and security initiatives linked with neighborhood associations. Database 3 is generic information not related to criminal activities per se. In this circumstance, CCTV cameras operate as a service to clients, providing text message alerts to homeowners, motorists, and private security companies. For example, neighborhood associations provide license plate numbers to



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 205

Vumacam for all homeowners in their residential suburb. When a particular vehicle passes by a CCTV camera on a regular route toward home, Vumacam alerts the private security company in the area to automatically open the boom gates and even send armed guards to follow the resident-­driver home. Database 4 is stored information collected from private spaces, like corporate headquarters, building interiors, or even gated residential estates.151 Faced with huge profit-­making potential in the expanding market for broadband network services, larger companies began to swallow smaller ones in a frenzy of mergers and acquisitions. In 2018, Community Investment Ventures Holdings (CIVH), the owner of the internet provider Dark Fibre Africa and a subsidiary of Remgro (owned by Johann Rupert, the richest man in South Africa), acquired an initial 35 percent stake (with plans to increase the percentage in the future) in Vumatel in an effort to expand its fiber-­optic business.152 In the twelve months starting in mid-­ 2018, Vumacam successfully installed close to one thousand CCTV street cameras in forty-­eight suburban neighborhoods, including Parkhurst, Melville, Dunkeld, Craighall, Craighall Park, Bryanston, Emmarentia, Morningside, and Illovo. In order to “sweeten the deal” and accelerate the rollout of their surveillance system, Vumacam routinely offers to purchase existing outdated CCTV cameras and install their own sophisticated ones for free. Outfitted with at least two independently operating surveillance cameras, each pole features one dedicated camera that monitors its immediate surroundings as well as one that is equipped with LPR software analytics.153 As Vumacam began to install its CCTV cameras across the city, disgruntled residents accused the company of contravening city bylaws by secretly using behind-­closed-­doors third-­party financial arrangements with neighborhood residents and local business owners to illegally connect to the City Power electricity grid.154 A rising chorus of critical voices accused Vumacam of “tampering with electricity infrastructure and making illegal connections” in order to operate its CCTV street cameras. City Power issued a statement demanding that Vumacam cease and desist from this practice. In response, Vumacam feigned ignorance and dragged its feet, claiming that the company always sought to comply with existing regulations and that it was all a difference of opinion regarding the legal issues that arose. Business executives at Vumacam claimed that the electrical connections were no different from those kinds of localized arrangements whereby neighborhood associations were able to gain access to electricity hookups from the city grid in order to

FIGURE 13: Map 2: CCTV Surveillance Cameras Blanket the Suburban Neighborhood of Greenside. Designer: Olaia Chivite Amigo.



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 207

power hundreds of boom gates at entry-­exit points or to facilitate security lighting at guard huts that were located in public spaces like intersections and street corners.155 In 2017, before unveiling their CCTV surveillance network, Vumacam management teams approached City Power requesting direct access to the city’s electricity grid in order to power individual cameras. Negotiations came to a standstill over proposed commercial contracts that Vumacam considered to be prohibitively expensive. According to company executives, anxious residents and businesses grew impatient with the delays. To break the impasse, they volunteered to provide access to power for free. In response, the Vumacam legal team decided it was important to enter into direct contractual agreements to reimburse costs of electricity to residents and businesses willing to grant access to their power. In order to avoid possible disruptions to service, Vumacam negotiated to prepay homeowners a year in advance on annual contracts for access to electricity.156 Ultimately, City Power and Vumacam seem to have reconciled their differences away from the glare of the public spotlight.157 As company executives have pointed out, because advertising companies that have erected billboards, operators of boom gates, and guard huts are all located on public property and all use electricity purchased from nearby residents, the CoJ cannot deny the same rights to Vumacam. As Vumacam accelerated its efforts to install private CCTV cameras wherever it could obtain contracts with neighborhood associations, the municipal authorities retreated from adopting a firm response. This “policy vacuum” gave Vumacam carte blanche to move forward without official restrictions.158

Mundane Logistics The vertical positioning of CCTV surveillance provides new lines of sight not available on the ground.159 Unlike sentries stationed in watchtowers and armed with binoculars, CCTV cameras alternatively extend and contract fields of vision by zooming in and out and can alert nearby cameras to “pick up the trail” of slow-­moving persons and vehicles as they proceed through space. CCTV cameras occupy the “militarized airspace” that hovers above the uneven topographical surfaces below, creating what amounts to what Eyal Weizman has described as “three-­dimensional space.”160 These new surveillance technologies are superimposed on already-­existing layers of security,

208 •

the infrastructures of security

creating a “matrix of control” in a “war against crime” in which there are no fixed battle lines or agreed-­upon rules of engagement, and where camouflage and stealth—­on both sides—­are paramount. The logic of visibility—­that is, the capacity to be seen and not seen—­shapes the terrain in the battle against crime. Military terminology—­such as “battlefields,” “friendlies” and “enemies,” “warfare,” “combat readiness,” and the like–­–­has migrated from the domain of national defense to the civilian sphere.161 Leaders of neighborhood associations, private security companies, and Vumacam closely collaborated with one another to identify crime hot spots and “vulnerable streets” as a way of locating the ideal placement of CCTV poles to maximize surveillance coverage. Working with the assistance of Vumacam technicians, neighborhood associations began to strategically place cameras at entrance and exit security gates, at speed bumps, and at pedestrian entrance gates in residential suburbs where they had contracts.162 CCTV cameras were deployed in defensive formation across a theater of operations that included key road intersections, parking lots, and busy streets, with the ultimate goal of encircling the residential suburban terrain of northern Johannesburg with “eyes in the sky.”163 The monthly subscription fee that neighborhood associations pay to private security companies for their protection services also covers the rental of surveillance cameras and privileged access to the various Vumacam databases.164 One of the first private security organizations to engage with the Vumacam CCTV network was Community Active Protection (CAP), a local “self-­ protection” initiative founded in 2006 under the direction of Johannesburg chief rabbi Dr. Warren Goldstein to provide a comprehensive approach to crime prevention.165 Unlike earlier private security initiatives, which largely reacted to criminal incidents after they occurred, the CAP organizational protocols incorporated “proactive” patrolling of public streets and parks using armed response teams driving high-­speed vehicles. Having grown exponentially from its rather modest origins in the largely orthodox Jewish neighborhoods of Glenhazel, Waverley, and Sandringham, CAP expanded its operations to include armed protection of around fifty suburban neighborhoods centered at the southeastern corner of Johannesburg.166 By partnering with the Vumacam CCTV surveillance network to install high-­quality cameras to cover the suburban neighborhoods where it has operated, CAP was able to buttress its own security capabilities by taking advantage of the vast data management capabilities, the storage of information, ease of access, and protection of privacy provided under the umbrella of Vumatel.167 In order



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 209

to ensure the success of the Vumacam surveillance system, the CAP security initiative pressured neighborhood associations in residential suburbs like Emmarentia and Greenside to sign contractual agreements.168 By 2020 Vumacam had established commercial relationships with more than one hundred private business enterprises, including armed response companies, cash-­in-­transit groups, insurance companies, and vehicle tracking corporations. Well-­known private security clients include CAP Security, Tracker, MiWay Insurance, Beagle Watch, 7Arrows Security, and Fidelity-­ ADT. In addition, Vumacam also installed CCTV cameras across the Braamfontein Business Improvement District (BraamBID) and in Doornfontein to provide security for the AFHCO (African Housing Company) mixed-­use high-­rise housing complex located there. As a general rule, Vumacam has negotiated contracts with shopping malls, gated residential estates, and business office complexes, allowing these customers to plug into the surveillance network, regardless of whether or not they have intelligent cameras on par with the company standard.169 In establishing strict guidelines, Vumacam restricted the access of private security companies to their CCTV surveillance cameras only for the purpose of monitoring public space and tracking vehicles. In order to ensure that private security companies abide by strict terms and conditions, Vumacam signed contractual agreements with their clients authorizing Vumacam management to conduct periodic audits.170 According to Vumacam promotional materials, these collaborative efforts improve the effectiveness of crime prevention methods and hence have a larger impact on securing the safety of law-­abiding citizens.171 Leaving aside complex technical issues associated with surveillance technologies and processing such large amounts of raw data, the Vumacam business model is surprisingly simple. By installing fiber-­optic cables for high-­speed internet, Vumacam created the foundation for the surveillance network. As the company responsible for providing the CCTV cameras, Vumacam “follows the fibre,” promising in time to introduce its surveillance system into historically underserved areas, including Alexandra and Diepsloot. By installing fiber-­optic cables for an estimated two thousand homes in Soweto, Vumacam laid the initial groundwork to extend their CCTV surveillance network. In seeking assistance to fund the initial infrastructural costs, Vumacam partnered with a number of businesses to sponsor this project after expressing interest in improving security for the company’s employees who live in Soweto.172

210 • the infrastructures of security

Vumacam at the Cutting Edge of Technical Innovations The CCTV cameras that Vumacam has deployed are equipped with state-­of-­ the-­art video analytic capabilities, along with infrared and thermal imaging capacities. Data gathering has involved the creation of virtual storehouses for warehousing information. GPS technology has enabled Vumacam to precisely map where incidents have occurred and to follow movements of suspicious persons in real time. In a 2015 documentary titled Bringing the Internet to Africa, by the Dutch TV broadcaster VPRO, Cheryl Labuschagne, the chair of Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association (PRABOA), hailed these breakthroughs in CCTV surveillance technologies as the “start of a revolution.”173 The origins of the advanced capabilities of Vumacam CCTV surveillance cameras can be traced back to a series of business partnerships and collaborative arrangements with security-­related companies that have roots outside South Africa. An Australian development company called Sentient Vision Systems, which specialized in supplying pioneering military-­grade intelligence software to military defense and civilian projects around the world, developed the original prototype for the iSentry system. In 2009 a South African technology company called ISDS (Intelligent Surveillance and Detection Systems) was founded as a local partner of Sentient Vision Systems. ISDS was part of the Imfezeko Investment Holdings group and had overlapping business connections with Vumatel and Vumacam. From the start, ISDS incorporated the iSentry video analytics software into its portfolio of surveillance products for sale on the security market. The underlying premise behind the development of video analytics is the claim that “Artificial Intelligence and deep-­learning technologies have revolutionized video surveillance.” By harnessing advanced algorithmic capabilities, ultra-­smart video analytics software like the iSentry system “unlocks the true power of surveillance technologies” and has radically transformed [its] potential uses.”174 What makes iSentry different from other analytics systems is that instead of preprogramed algorithms that determine if something in front of a CCTV camera is of interest, this sophisticated software system uses AI technologies to “learn” to distinguish what is normal and abnormal and to highlight abnormalities. Unlike other CCTV monitoring systems, Vumacam cameras do not pan, tilt, and zoom but remain stationary. The Vumacam sys-



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 211

tem of fixed cameras enables the software analytics to learn through trial and error to distinguish the normal from the abnormal.175 Besides adopting the iSentry AI software, Vumacam has also incorporated the smart analytics platform provided by BriefCam, a leading-­edge surveillance technology company with particular expertise in the fields of network cameras, video management software, and video content analysis software. BriefCam was created in 2007 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem School of Computer Science and Engineering under the direction of a group of Israeli technology experts. ISDS became the sole distributor of BriefCam in sub-­Saharan Africa. As a machine-­learning solutions company specializing in video synopsis technology, BriefCam was responsible for the invention of a computer software program called Video Synopsis Solutions, a groundbreaking approach designed to accelerate the time required for video review and analysis of vast amounts of stored video footage in post-­incident investigations. Video Synopsis Solutions can automatically analyze surveillance video by superimposing objects on a stationary background, simultaneously displaying events that have occurred at different times (with the ability to toggle back and forth to the original video footage). This capacity allows operators to conduct careful forensic analysis of recorded material, reviewing hours of footage in minutes.176 BriefCam video analytics has enabled users to conduct forensic investigations, derive operational intelligence, and attain situational awareness at a quickened pace. Embedded directly in the multifaceted surveillance systems, BriefCam has employed deep-­learning solutions to provide rapid video review and search, facial recognition, real-­time alerting, and quantitative analytics insights. The Video Synopsis Solutions program has enabled BriefCam to create a structured database of digitalized information out of the unstructured video data for granular search, comprehensive reporting, and smart alerting. All of this technology is packaged into an easy-­to-­use, powerful video analytics solution that transforms video surveillance into actionable intelligence. BriefCam can detect and track every moving object in the field of vision of its connected CCTV camera system. For every object detected, targeted, and tracked, BriefCam has the capability to classify the properties of that object, such as its gender and bodily characteristics or vehicle type, color, speed, and direction. Cataloging this metadata in a vast digital archive has provided BriefCam with the capacity to conduct rapid video review and search, quantitative analysis, and real-­time alerts.177

212 • the infrastructures of security

Tracking Vehicles The installation of CCTV surveillance cameras outfitted with automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) capabilities across residential neighborhoods of Johannesburg has offered compelling evidence for the expanded sophistication of electronic monitoring. ALPR functionality attached to CCTV surveillance cameras ensures that all vehicles passing ALPR-­outfitted cameras have their scanned license plates checked against multiple verified databases, including SAPS lists of stolen vehicles, forged license plates, and wanted criminals. Specific intelligent software analytics can also be imposed on top of the video feeds, enabling security operators to search for specific objects during a set time period, such as looking for a red car on a particular street on a Wednesday. This makes investigating incidents reported after the fact much quicker and easier.178 For the most part, private security companies, business establishments, and individual households have depended on surveillance cameras that reach only so far. Relying on outdated technologies, these CCTV monitoring systems operate as isolated islands of connectivity, unable to communicate outside if their own limited networks. By taking advantage of cutting-­edge technical innovations in the application of intelligent digital analytics, Vumacam has transformed how CCTV surveillance can operate as an extensive network of interconnected cameras driven by the hard infrastructure of up-­to-­date fiber-­optic cables. By undertaking an ambitious rollout of an extensive network of smart cameras outfitted with machine-­learning software, Vumacam has taken the first steps toward overcoming the “silo effects” of territorially isolated camera systems.179 Perhaps the most significant breakthrough associated with the rollout of Vumacam’s integrated surveillance system has been the capacity of CCTV cameras to “communicate” with one another. The ALPR functionality of the CCTV surveillance network has enabled smart cameras to “lock onto” specific targets, tracking suspicious vehicles as they move across and through those residential neighborhoods and commercial/business zones. The power of this “network effect” enables the coordinated camera video feeds to provide “situational awareness” beyond the confines of individual residential neighborhoods with their isolated surveillance monitoring systems.180 With its advanced matching logic, the license plate identification system enables Vumacam to “interrogate” every vehicle that passes a license plate reader camera against various databases, including the SAPS Unicode



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 213

database of stolen vehicles and the South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB) “vehicle of interest” (VOI) databases. As part of a cooperative effort, private security companies working in concert have created their own VOI databases of license plate numbers of all stolen or suspicious vehicles, along with “cloned” ones (that is, plates that are attached to a vehicle other than the one to which they are registered). In addition, individual private security companies maintain their own private databases, consisting of license plate numbers of vehicles of residents of suburban neighborhoods where they operate. This information has enabled private security operatives to identify suspicious vehicles as those they do not have registered on their own databases.181 As an integral part of their operational practices, private security companies typically place ALPR-­capable cameras at the main entry and exit points to residential neighborhoods, thereby creating a “virtual fence” to “detect who enters and exits.” Real-­time access to the ALPR circulation databases has enabled security professionals stationed in a centralized video management control room to monitor suspicious vehicles passing through residential neighborhoods and across the entire network of multiple surveillance cameras. If the smart CCTV cameras detect an abnormal circumstance, such as a license plate on a vehicle linked to criminal activities, the control rooms of the security companies that pay for access to the video data are immediately alerted so that they can react quickly and in real time.182 The sheer volume of data that the Vumacam security network can generate is truly astounding. For example, CCTV cameras using ALPR analytics scan an estimated 2.5 million vehicle license plates per day, around 480 per minute, and as many as 300 per second during peak rush hours. Based on its vast collection of gathered and stored information, Vumacam has offered the results of its intelligence gathering to private security companies (working with neighborhood associations), enabling them to work in partnership with public policing agencies to react or intercept the questionable vehicles.183 By 2019, the suburban streetscape of Sharonlea was covered by more than eighty 2MP (megapixel) and 4MP CCTV thermal cameras with advanced analytics software that allowed control room monitors to “see” in the dark. The streaming video feeds from the CCTV cameras are relayed to an off-­site monitoring (OSM) control room over “a fibre and wireless mesh network which provides ample bandwidth and complete redundancy.” ALPR capabilities attached to CCTV cameras have provided security personnel with the capacity to check all vehicles against available databases that list stolen vehi-

214 • the infrastructures of security

cles and those used in the commission of crimes. By using the latest technology, the video streams recorded on camera at a point of presence in the suburban streets appear simultaneously in the control room. This complex system provides three data locations for the same video recordings to ensure that backups are never lost, “even if one of the storage solutions fail.” The OSM maintains constant contact with two dedicated armed reaction vehicles on standby, enabling these mobile security patrols to react immediately if suspicious activities are detected. The CCTV security grid also relies on various virtual zones and “trip wires” (which automatically alert security personnel to sites of suspicious activities) positioned at key points throughout the residential suburbs. The strategic deployment of smart CCTV cameras that are monitored off-­site has transformed what initially had been a largely passive and reactive system into a proactive, anticipatory approach to security governance designed to prevent crime before it happens.184 Video footage obtained from these surveillance cameras has enabled Vumacam not only to record license plates numbers but also to create a huge database through facial recognition technology, a system that stores images of the faces of those who come in and out of a neighborhood, regardless of whether they have been associated with criminal activities or not. While the use of facial recognition technologies in identifying suspected criminals is still in its infancy and has attracted the opprobrium of civil liberties advocates, companies like Vumacam anticipate a future time when this capacity will be an integral part of their crime-­fighting arsenal.185

Pressure Drop Neighborhood associations have come under increasing pressure to join with the Vumacam surveillance system and to encourage their private security companies to come along. Purchasing access to Vumacam’s CCTV surveillance services provides private security companies with a number of distinct advantages. Because Vumacam supplies the infrastructural hardware and a ready-­to-­use product (control room and video storage), private security companies can limit their own expenses by eliminating the exorbitant costs of maintaining their own CCTV surveillance cameras and focus “their time and efforts” instead on bolstering their proactive policing and armed security patrolling capacities.186 From the start, Vumacam realized that its privileged access to a treasure



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 215

trove of “rich data from reliable and good resolution video footage” offered a range of applications in the field of security—­for schools, hospitals, office complexes, shopping malls, parks, and other public facilities—­beyond residential neighborhoods. In the field of city management services, applications have also included monitoring traffic congestion in order to reduce emergency response times, or identifying infrastructure breakdowns such as traffic lights, water mains, and power outages to assist city repair crews.187 Safeguarding schools and protecting children from harm is a central concern for middle-­class residents of suburban neighborhoods. Taking advantage of rising parental concerns over school-­related violence and questions of school safety, Vumacam launched a program called “Kids Custodian Initiative” (KCI) that has envisioned the introduction of its CCTV surveillance network for public schools in Johannesburg. Because Vumatel already provides fiber-­optic cables to at least 255 schools in Gauteng, its subsidiary Vumacam could easily attach its CCTV surveillance system to the existing hard infrastructure. As a key component of its marketing strategy, Vumacam management has argued that its surveillance network technology offers the best way to “better analyze and co-­ordinate emergency procedures, bomb threat and fire evacuation plans with synchronized communication to teachers and parents alike.” The AI component integrated into the CCTV surveillance network can highlight any and all “out-­of-­the-­ordinary” behavior or “raise alerts about suspicious vehicles around school perimeters.”188 Vumatel used its acquisition of Fibrehoods as tantamount to authorization to pursue contracts with neighborhood associations to install aboveground fiber-­optic cables for high-­speed internet. These internet contracts provided Vumatel with the leverage to market the CCTV system handled by the company’s Vumacam subsidiary. If a particular suburban neighborhood already has an operative CCTV network in place—­legacy systems, which typically feature low-­resolution cameras poorly suited to the application of video analytics—­Vumacam has typically offered to replace the outdated one with its own up-­to-­date CCTV surveillance network.189 As part of the company’s aggressive marketing strategy, representatives from Vumacam teamed with private security companies like CSS Tactical and with CAP to stress the point in meetings with residential associations that they would provide the CCTV cameras for free if homeowners signed up for Vumatel’s internet service. Marketing staff from Vumacam began to text-­ message members of neighborhood associations (like Melville, Emmarentia, and elsewhere) with updates of the alleged success of their CCTV cameras in

216 • the infrastructures of security

apprehending “criminals”—­claiming that this evidence provided good reasons why residents should pay for the whole package of installing fiber-­optic cable, providing high-­speed internet, and installing CCTV cameras.190 As the Vumacam surveillance network has expanded, the addition of more CCTV cameras has made the company’s platform more useful and more valuable. The “Vumacam super-­network” is “a full-­stack, vertically-­ optic integrated, end-­to-­end CCTV solution.”191 Vumatel owns the fiber-­ cables, Vumacam owns the CCTV surveillance hardware, and various companies in the Imfezeko Holdings portfolio own and control the surveillance software along with the gathered and stored information in their data center. Once Vumacam is able to establish infrastructure networks on which residential neighborhoods depend, the company will have established a virtual monopoly.192 Ultra-­smart video analytics software, which harnesses very advanced algorithmic capabilities, allows CCTV video footage to deliver powerful security and business intelligence. Like a variety of companies marketing surveillance systems, Vumacam has explored the possibilities of providing access to its vast data collection for purposes other than identifying criminal incidents and tracking stolen vehicles. For example, the incentive for private insurance companies to purchase access to surveillance footage from Vumacam is that this information gives them a way to protect against false clams and to quickly resolve cases.193 In order to attract contracts with insurance companies in particular, Vumacam concentrated on installing CCTV cameras at well-­traveled intersections (where automobile accidents are more likely to occur) across northern Johannesburg. For their part, insurance companies welcomed the opportunity to purchase access to CCTV video data in order to verify events and adjudicate claims involving vehicle damage and personal injuries. Whereas eyewitness accounts are notoriously unreliable, camera footage does not lie.194 Vumacam has ambitious plans to market their CCTV services directly to individual homeowners and commercial businesses. This business strategy (referred to as “private site monitoring”) is to allow these individual clients to link their personalized surveillance cameras to the Vumacam network for a monthly fee. Vumacam has teamed with several private security companies to provide on-­the-­ground protection services for individual clients. For example, Beagle Watch has begun experimenting with a WhatsApp device (named “follow-­me-­home”) linked to the ALPR system at Vumacam to alert drivers, via an alarm activation, to the possibility that another vehicle with



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 217

“unknown registration” may be following them and to dispatch an armed reaction team to investigate.195 Working together with neighborhood associations, private security companies that have contracts with Vumacam use their privileged access to real-­time video footage to routinely alert homeowners and their family members of “crime incidents” in their residential suburbs, sending along (via WhatsApp messaging) information about the location of those incidents and CCTV surveillance pictures of the suspected criminals. Privacy regulations have required that full facial images be disguised, but this requirement is rarely adhered to, especially in the haste to quickly distribute information. Private security companies also send alerts in real time to homeowners, warning them if suspicious persons (whether on foot or in a vehicle) have been spotted with CCTV surveillance cameras lurking outside their premises. Despite the protestations of privacy advocates, facial recognition technologies are already operative at arrival gates at airports, entryways to gated residential estates, and security stations at office complexes. Individuals voluntarily agree to these static “mug shots” in order to gain access to desired premises. But the random and blanket use of facial recognition technologies in crowded venues with ambulatory people is not a sufficiently sophisticated technique to merit consideration as a security technique at this time.196 Business opportunities for Vumacam/Vumatel are seemingly endless. By tapping into the recent enthusiasm for networked infrastructure solutions to urban sustainability challenges, Vumacam/Vumatel has piggybacked on what is commonly referred to as “international best practices.” The Vumatel subsidiary ISDS, whose software capabilities include iSentry and BriefCam, has begun to advertise its video analytics capabilities to companies involved in property management, business intelligence, retail trade, mining and agricultural investments, school security, health-­care facilities, and even “smart cities” initiatives.197 Officials at Vumacam have gone to great lengths to enthusiastically trumpet the technological prowess of iSentry, the AI/machine-­learning software of-­ the-­ attached to CCTV surveillance cameras that can recognize out-­ ordinary behavior and unusual situations and quickly alert the control room to dispatch tactical armed response units to investigate. In their public presentations, the private security company Beagle Watch has strongly stressed the technical capability of iSentry to change the face of proactive security. Yet knowledgeable observers have suggested that the system is nowhere near as useful as its proponents have claimed. AI/machine-­learning software works

218 • the infrastructures of security

well in predictable spaces, like an empty factory floor after hours, but it is not sufficiently sophisticated to distinguish between “normal” and “abnormal” behavior on busy streets filled with pedestrians.198

Global Connections With its total revenue for 2018 at around R107 billion, China’s Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company has become the dominant player in the global video surveillance industry. Incorporated in 2001, Hikvision established a South African branch in 2015, and in 2018 they opened a branch office in Johannesburg. Vumacam contracted with Hikvision to use their state-­of-­ the-­art internet protocol (IP) cameras in their surveillance system. Each camera has a unique IP address that identifies it on the internet and allows it to communicate with other devices (just like any computers, modems, or smart TVs that are connected to the internet). This partnership with Vumacam has enabled Hikvision’s footprint in South Africa to grow substantially. Civil rights advocates have worried that an underlying aim for Hikvision is to use their presence in urban Africa to be better able to eliminate racial biases out of its facial recognition systems—­a recurrent problem that has beleaguered facial recognition companies around the world and that could give Chinese companies a vital edge in the global marketplace.199 Government officials in Zimbabwe confirmed that they were planning to use facial recognition AI technology donated by Hikvision for international border posts, state points of entry, and airports. Hikvision partnered with the city administration in Harare to install CCTV cameras in the downtown area. Advocates argued that the adoption of this state-­of-­the-­art surveillance monitoring system provided a new data-­sharing platform that enabled the municipal police to boost the capacities of digital forensics and facial recognition systems.200 Chinese companies have launched new efforts to open up markets in Africa for their cutting-­edge technologies, particularly in the fields of visual surveillance and facial recognition. A number of these companies have expressed a particular interest in “mining” data from Africa because they are looking to improve the accuracy of their facial recognition algorithms, particularly with how to better identify people with darker skin tones. For instance, a deal between a leading Chinese facial recognition company, CloudWalk, and the government of Zimbabwe has enabled this corporation to obtain data



The CCTV Surveillance Revolution • 219

on millions of African faces in order to help “train” the AI technology software packages. In 2019, the governments of Uganda and Angola confirmed the nationwide installation of surveillance cameras (supplied by the Chinese-­ based tech giant Huawei) with facial recognition capabilities.201

Security Utopias With inroads in the southern suburbs of Pretoria, contracts with upscale gated residential estates in Fourways and Midrand, an emergent footprint in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality to the east, and a presence in Glenvista and Mulbarton to the south of the Johannesburg CBD, Vumacam has already constructed a solid foothold for a CCTV surveillance network that stretches across and even beyond the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region.202 This emergent “surveillance empire” launched by the Vumacam/ Vumatel corporate partnership has formed only one cornerstone element in a wider security network. This integrated security ecosystem is built organically on the triangular relationship between an infrastructure platform with CCTV surveillance cameras as the key element (Vumacam and Vumatel), private security companies as on-­the-­ground “enforcers,” and neighborhood associations as the primary customers/clients who purchase technologically driven protection.203 The introduction of smart CCTV networks has provided a powerful upgrade to private security policing in residential neighborhoods. Strategically placed cameras supplement the already burgeoning arsenal of security accoutrements: high perimeter walls, burglar bars, electric fencing, voluntary neighborhood watch groups, guard dogs, armed security patrols, and alarm systems.204 Smart surveillance systems do not replace high perimeter walls or electric fencing but supplement them with additional layers of security. Taken together, these hodgepodge networks of protection measures form a security continuum designed to prevent crime by pushing potential criminals away. The benefit of a wide-­area surveillance infrastructure is that it removes the concerns about displacement of crime to adjoining neighboring suburbs. The “network effect” of smart cameras and centralized data is the capacity to track broad patterns or unusual events across geographically dispersed areas.205 Fear has become individualized, reduced to an anatomized level that revolves around crime, safety, and danger. Comprehensive home security systems provide “total CCTV coverage,” consisting of multiple cameras stra-

220 •

the infrastructures of security

tegically located around the perimeter of the house with viewing stations inside individual homes connected with “off-­site monitoring” at centralized command and control stations. The move toward the collection of massive quantities of biometric data (including fingerprints, retina scans identifying iris patterns, genetic codes, voice prints, and other biological data) has already begun. Middle-­class residents of affluent suburban neighborhoods have more or less agreed to the trade-­off between increased monitoring of personal behavior in exchange for enhanced security.206 With the extensive network of Vumacam cameras, CCTV surveillance has become the new urban archetype that signifies the locked-­down “securitized” future. “Made safe by technology” is a consoling myth that offers temporary respite in an uncertain world of gross inequalities. The presence of smart CCTV cameras has given rise to the illusion of “total social control through an idealized and mythologized technology.”207 The “technophilic fantasies” of perfect knowledge through surveillance have enabled private security companies to brush aside ethical and legal concerns regarding invasion of privacy.208 As a general rule, private security companies have promoted their latest protection devices as “fail-­safe solutions” to combat crime. But smart (and enterprising) criminals always seem to find ways to circumvent the roadblocks established to deter them. Well-­versed criminals often conduct “smash-­and-­grab” thefts of property during nighttime hours, driving vehicles with cloned (or stolen) license plates or with them removed, making it virtually impossible to trace them.209 The ease with which leaders of neighborhood associations have been able to convince homeowners of the intrinsic value of dotting the suburban landscape with countless numbers of smart CCTV cameras testifies to “the widespread embrace of an authoritarian surveillance culture.”210 Neighborhood associations and private security companies have colluded to “socialize” homeowners into support—­ ranging from tacit to enthusiastic—­ for super-­networked surveillance regimes. The widespread erosion of privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality has given way to new modes of surveillance that require the acquiescence of those well-­to-­do residents who trade access to personal information as the price for “feeling safe.”211

Chapter Six

Colliding Worlds in Microcosm

The Braamfontein Spruit (small river or stream) meanders slowly northward from its origins at Barnato Park High School in Berea to Paulshof in Midrand where it joins the Jukskei River. Over time, persistent overdevelopment along the watercourse steadily encroached on the original floodplain, depriving the river of its natural flow path and reducing its original footprint. Frequent highveld storms can transform this normally tranquil stream into a raging torrent, capable of tearing down trees, damaging properties, eroding riverbanks, and causing flooding of the surrounding terrain. On its 25-­to 30-­kilometer route northward, the Braamfontein Spruit cuts through some of the most notable upscale residential suburbs (Parkview, Greenside, Parkhurst, Victory Park, Blairgowrie, Craighall, Craighall Park, Bordeaux, Hurlingham, Hurlingham Village, Bryanston) in northern Johannesburg. Its scenic watershed contains perhaps the most biodiversified natural habitat in the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region. As the longest stream in Johannesburg, the Braamfontein Spruit forms a lengthy “linear park” broken into distinct parts distinguished by rocky outcrops and relatively thick vegetation juxtaposed against grasslands and open spaces.1 Despite the recent upsurge in popularity, the river course was largely ignored and unknown until the 1970s when James Clarke, a journalist with the Star newspaper, who initiated an environmental campaign to preserve Johannesburg’s “forgotten” waterways, published the first map of the spruit in 1974 as a way of drawing attention to the blatant disregard of the existing natural environment of streams, rivers, ponds, and lakes. This renewed interest in the Braamfontein Spruit reawakened in the minds of affluent homeowners an Edenic imaginary of a natural “greenspace” available at their beck and call. This newly minted environmental awareness ethos focused on the repair and preservation of the river space for recreation and enjoyment. As residential

221

FIGURE 14: Map 3: The Braamfontein Spruit Watercourse. Designer: Olaia Chivite Amigo.



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 223

suburbs developed along the watershed, the river course became a favorite site for such recreational uses as horseback riding, bicycling, hiking, walking, jogging, bird-­watching, and picnicking.2 Seen from the perspective of a seeming innocuous expression of “green infrastructure” in a water-­challenged urban environment, the Braamfontein Spruit seems an unlikely place for controversy. But it is here where the comfortable middle-­class imaginary of aesthetic beauty and undisturbed recreational activities in the green outdoors came into conflict with “bare life” needs of the “poorest of the poor” in their search for a place to stay. These opposing uses of public space have come to symbolize in microcosm the contested nature of urban life in Johannesburg. It is at this point of clashing interests where the two juxtaposed ways of living in the city have come together on a seemingly inevitable collision course. These conflicting lifeworlds illustrate how the more frayed the social fabric has become, the more policing—­in whatever guise—­has been deployed to “trim the dangling threads.”3

One Stream, Colliding Worlds The tangled story of Braamfontein Spruit offers a prism through which to make sense of how the poorest and most marginalized urban dwellers are subjected to targeted surveillance and intensified policing under circumstances that appear to be innocuous and mundane. The monitoring and control over “problem people”—­itinerant work seekers, trash collectors, recyclers, homeless squatters, runaway youth—­function as a cornerstone of policing strategies of displacement. Tethered to market logics that fail to generate work and stigmatized for their “antisocial” behavior, these “problem people” appear as criminal lawbreakers in the middle-­class imagination.4 Put into wide historical perspective, perhaps the most powerful social movements originating in the mid-­to late-­1990s can be located in the mobilizing efforts of affluent suburban homeowners who collectively coalesced around the institutional infrastructure of neighborhood associations. Above all else, these associations operated as the common expression of middle-­ class material interests, and they functioned to channel shared sentiments into a spirited defense of the status quo ante (a social condition rooted in the structural inequalities inherited from white minority rule). By invoking the parochial rhetoric of “community control,” these guild-­like organizations have focused their attention, broadly speaking, on land-­use politics. In order

224 •

the infrastructures of security

to safeguard their low-­density suburban lifestyles, they have rallied around income housing initiatives in their opposition to densification and low-­ neighborhoods. These commonly held “antigrowth” sentiments have formed the bedrock around which to express their perceived interests.5 The embryonic “war of position” centered on a defense of property values, preservation of the pristine tranquility marked by tree-­lined streets arrayed around a classical commercial “high street,” and the celebration of leisurely ways of life in rural-­like settings. While physical markers like roads and open spaces offered convenient signposts demarcating the “hard edges” of residential suburbs, the inconvenient fact of so many “soft edges” ensured that boundary making has long been a somewhat arbitrary and imaginary undertaking.6 Despite concerted efforts to find common ground within the ranks of affluent homeowners who were themselves highly differentiated along multiple fault lines, neighborhood associations have functioned less like a coherent political force than a kind of disaggregated “NIMBYism” (NIMBY meaning “not in my backyard”), an inchoate disposition focusing on the preservation of an imaginary idyllic suburban lifestyle against unwelcome overdevelopment and the outside threats of unwanted “strangers.”7 As Lindsay Bremner argued in Johannesburg: One City, Colliding Worlds, the realignments of the property power of affluent homeowners endowed them with a bloated sense of shared purpose. Above all else, neighborhood associations rallied around “the eradication of mess” that slowly bubbled up around them, threatening to undermine their “singularity of vision.” This unity of purpose that bound affluent homeowners together almost invariably came into conflict with “the countless unpredictable practices of ordinary people engaged in the complex problematic of belonging.”8 The defense of the status quo ante brought neighborhood associations into conflict with the plight of low-­wage workers and the unemployed—­those social outcasts who have struggled to find the kinds of jobs and affordable housing that offered at least a tenuous grip on the mainstream of urban life.9 These enduring conflicts can be traced to the deeply entrenched spatial inequalities that have partitioned the sprawling urban landscape into adequately resourced zones of relative affluence and under-­resourced areas of deprivation and hardship. After the formal end of apartheid and the demise of white minority rule, concerted (and genuine) “efforts to reconstruct an alternative more integrated, diverse and functional urban form have stumbled against the interests of private property owners, high land prices, the power of developers to implement exclusive development, and the finan-



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 225

cial pressures municipalities face to nurture property rates income.”10 The specter of apartheid urban design policies has continued to haunt Johannesburg and other South African cities, and these legacies of the historical past have played a central role in both reinforcing and exacerbating existing urban inequalities.11 Spatial distortions have produced a mismatch between income-­generating opportunities for low-­paid work in unskilled jobs, on the one side, and the availability of inexpensive housing accommodation, on the other.12 Those places where the legions of underemployed job seekers can find work do not offer sufficient affordable housing options. According to recent research, the widening gap in the kinds of residential accommodation under construction and completed in Johannesburg has occurred at the extremes: in 2018, in more than one in every four places to live, homes were either built in the backyards of existing dwellings or, at the other end of the spectrum, behind the security walls of upscale gated estates.13 Almost without exception, the use of language indicates deeply entrenched prejudices and ideological biases that often go unchallenged and routinely appear as common sense. Stripped of the connotations that often accompany these phrases, “vagrancy” and “homelessness”—­to borrow from Gareth Stedman Jones in an entirely different context—­“symbolize the problem of the existence and persistence of certain endemic forms of poverty, associated together under the generic term casual labour.”14 In so many ways, the goings-­on at the Braamfontein Spruit brought to light the anxieties and uneasiness associated with the presence of casual laborers and the unemployed in the public spaces of the northern suburbs. The shelterless people who “invaded” the spaces along the river represent temporary, irregular work and informal modes of income generation in their most acute form. The resulting fears engendered by this uncertainty assumed a life of their own among affluent homeowners living a cosseted life in the residential suburbs. The steady encroachment and persistent presence of large, fluctuating numbers of park dwellers—­almost always derisively dismissed as “rootless vagrants” or “homeless vagabonds”—­setting up temporary encampments along the riverbanks has long been a source of disquiet for residents of the middle-­class suburbs that border the streambed. Responding to the perceived threat of destitute people casting about for shelter close by, affluent homeowners reacted with a mixture of fear, condescension, and contempt for those “unwanted strangers” encamped literally at their doorstep.15 Diverse circumstances lured park dwellers to seek makeshift accommodations along the banks of the river. For all intents and purposes, the nooks

226 •

the infrastructures of security

and crannies of the waterway acted like a sponge, absorbing shelterless people seeking a hidden abode away from police harassment on the streets. The social composition of those who have gravitated to the spruit contained a hybrid mixture of both low-­paid wage workers, somewhat tangentially connected to formal employment, interspersed with those eking out an existence in the margins of suburban life, begging for handouts at street corners. Some earned money by doing piecework or casual jobs, taking advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves in the affluent northern suburbs. Others found occasional work as day laborers with spasmodic employment at nearby construction sites but were unable to afford the cost of transport to faraway places of accommodation. Still others labored as itinerant street vendors, with no place else to sleep but the streets, or as waste recyclers and trash collectors, who scoured nearby suburban streets in search of discarded materials for resale. In this sense, those who found temporary shelter along the riverbanks represented a microcosm of the swirling mass of nomadic, low-­wage work seekers without stable employment. These “discarded people” reflected a cross-­section of low-­wage workers and informal traders permanently attached to the lower rungs of the labor market. As a general rule, the insecure, precarious, intermittent nature of these jobs produced no security of employment. Retrenched workers and immigrant job seekers alike ended up in roofless accommodations along the riverbanks. The structural mismatch between lack of access to affordable housing close to income-­generating opportunities and relatively expensive transport costs drove park dwellers to seek shelter in undetectable out-­of-­the-­way places like the Braamfontein Spruit.16 Some were so desperate that renting a room in a backyard shack in nearby Alexandra or Soweto, or even securing a place in a faraway informal settlement, was beyond their reach.17 It is not uncommon to find “displaced people” bedding down in city parks, finding refuge next to streams, squatting in abandoned buildings, and creating rudimentary shantytowns on unused vacant land. For the most part, these impromptu encampments that house people with nowhere else to go have arisen to dense nodes of concentrated economic activity with a high agglomeration of upscale shopping malls and high-­end commercial venues. In addition to construction and building sites, these locations offer job opportunities for low-­wage casual workers.18 In pointing to the shortcomings of using such homogenizing and disparaging labels as “homeless squatters” or nomadic “beggars” to describe shelterless people, Sarah Charlton has proposed instead the alternative term



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 227

“park dwellers.” For the desperately poor, seeking shelter and refuge in the interstices of urban space and other out-­of-­the-­way neglected places—­public parks, along waterways and rail lines, on the edges of cemeteries, under bridges, and in hidden culverts—­offers a degree of respite in a compassionless world. These spaces of temporary necessity are cruel substitutes for access to the mainstream of urban life.19 The predicaments of place have encased park dwellers in social worlds not of their own making. In practicing what has amounted to an informal “politics of invisibility,” park dwellers have routinely sought “to evade the censure and punishment” of the JMPD, private security companies, and voluntary patrollers affiliated with neighborhood watch groups. Blamed indiscriminately for leaving rubbish everywhere and for harboring petty thieves, these “social outcasts” have engaged in “evasion through concealment” and through avoidance of confrontation with public authorities and their private auxiliaries.20

Our Own Private Recreational Park Affluent homeowners grouped together in neighborhood associations that line the Braamfontein Spruit have claimed their rights over their privileged use of the public greenbelt that follows the course of the waterway. In their view, home ownership has endowed them with rights that include not only sovereignty over the most intimate domestic space of the home and its enclosed gardens but also with privileged use of the surrounding public spaces. In the middle-­class imaginary of a “bourgeois utopia,” living along the watercourse offers a welcome respite, a return to nature, and a convenient place for weekend enjoyment and pleasure with walking paths and biking trails.21 For the desperately poor, however, the overgrown and out-­of-­the-­way portions of the river provide a much-­needed refuge or places to become invisible. Under these circumstances, the aesthetic appeals of the suburban dreamscape have clashed repeatedly with the survivalist instincts of “displaced people.” If alternative accommodations and realistic opportunities for securing a place in the mainstream of urban life were actually available, perhaps this conflict would dissipate if not wholly evaporate.22 Affluent homeowners have engaged in a diffuse, and constantly evolving, struggle over land use, the significance of which is often lost in shadows of misplaced rhetoric. In framing the “problem” in a particularly one-­sided

228 •

the infrastructures of security

fashion, middle-­class homeowners resorted to the hyperbolic language of melodrama and exaggerated sensationalism. The presence of an unknown number of the casual poor, indistinguishable in the minds of many affluent homeowners from workless drifters and criminals, was a persistent source of anxiety. At a fundamental level, the sentiments of affluent homeowners were grounded in a socially constructed nostalgia for a pristine suburban ambiance that never was. Over time, the skirmish lines dividing affluent homeowners and shelterless park dwellers crystalized into a zero-­sum struggle over the politics of land use. In what amounted to an orchestrated war of maneuver, neighborhood associations with roots in affluent residential suburbs located close to the Braamfontein Spruit undertook a two-­pronged campaign to “retake” what they considered rightfully theirs. While these two modes of intervention appeared as disconnected lines of march, they actually operated in tandem. On the one hand, these neighborhood associations justified their active engagement in efforts to preserve the natural habitat by cloaking themselves in the value-­ free rhetoric of environmentalism and sustainability. Seen through a wide-­angle lens, talk of “threats to nature” and “ecological destruction” always and invariably reveals deeper anxieties and apprehensions about the uncertain future. Assuming the mantle of organic intellectuals representing affluent homeowners, environmentalists warned of possible permanent damage to the river ecology and natural habitat of the Braamfontein Spruit if nothing were done to reverse the downward destructive trend. In calling for the restoration and preservation of the water route, these experts—­speaking at the behest of nearby neighborhood associations—­went so far as to proclaim that “the 22km Braamfontein Spruit area is the longest urban green lung in the world.” The proclamation anointed the meandering stream with unbounded cachet and profound significance. In warning of the imminent danger of contamination, conservationists and ecologists argued that “public open spaces, such as those along the Braamfontein Spruit, and Public Parks are becoming home to an increasing number of vagrants leading to unacceptable e-­coli levels and litter pollution, with concomitant health risks to users of these public facilities.”23 This language of environmental preservation enabled affluent homeowners to capture the mythical moral high ground that deflected attention away from their resentment of shelterless people who had encroached on what they considered their own private recreational park. In order to counteract the buildup of trash and litter, neighborhood associations orchestrated well-­



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 229

publicized semimonthly “cleanup” drives, mobilizing all sorts of volunteers, including youth and student groups, church organizations, environmental enthusiasts, bicycle-­riding clubs, and retirees, to “lend a hand” and “pitch in” collecting trash and litter from the debris-­strewn waterway. These festival-­ like events gathered the support of city parks officials, public law enforcement agencies, and even representatives of private security companies. The formation of NGOs like the Braamfontein Spruit Rehabilitation Project (BSRB) spearheaded private voluntary efforts to imagine technical solutions to the accumulation of plastic pollutants. One aim of the BSRB, for example, was “to design, manufacture, install, and maintain, plastic-­catching devices” that, once fitted onto the storm drains, would “trap plastic and other scattered pieces of rubbish” before these waste materials entered the river.24 On the other hand, neighborhood associations surged to the forefront of initiatives to rid the public watercourse of those “vagrants” whom they accused of despoiling the verdant landscape with their trash, along with those “unsavoury characters” whom they suspected (and blamed) for petty crimes, muggings, and even house break-­ins in their residential suburbias.25 They enlisted the support of public law enforcement agencies who teamed with private security companies to harass and physically remove park dwellers. These unannounced raids did not discriminate between the ways that different groups of shelterless people used the parklands and the reasons they were there in the first place. This all-­out retaliation against alleged “vagrants” and “criminals” amounted to a revanchist pogrom. Fear was refracted into a one-­ sided “security solution” where the “criminals-­hiding-­in-­their-­midst” provided sufficient justification for heavy-­handed tactics. These periodic raids functioned as insurance against the disorder of the unsightly and unseemly presence of “displaced people.” While the draconian tactics aroused disquiet among those who recognized the humanity of the park dwellers, affluent homeowners were in large measure content not to know what private security companies did in their name and to bury their possible guilt in ignorance.26 Criminal acts—­like house break-­ins, car thefts, and armed robberies—­are real. Yet the steady outpouring of rumors and hearsay about the “vagrant invasion” of the spruit only amplified the perception of threat and danger, condensing rational appraisal of the situation into a kind of pseudo-­knowledge that reduced park dwellers to lawbreakers and criminals. The hysterical reaction to the presence of workless persons rippled through the affluent residential suburbs, ebbing and flowing in rough synchronization with the buildup of trash and reports of criminal incidents.27

230 • the infrastructures of security

The Story in Sequential Acts Let us begin here. After receiving reports in 2004 from upper-­middle-­class residents from nearby suburban Craighall that criminals were using the nearby watercourses for convenient getaway routes after armed robberies and house break-­ins, a combined force of policing agencies that included the SANDF, a SAPS contingent affiliated with the Parkview precinct station, a private security company called Special Armed Services, City Parks, and the River Rangers (horse patrols) conducted a massive sweep of the overgrown banks of the Braamfontein Spruit from Jan Smuts Avenue to William Nicol Drive, looking for stolen goods and making sixteen arrests for loitering. The sweep revealed that homeless people used the grassy riverbanks for makeshift sanctuaries. The combined force destroyed these impromptu living quarters and drove the shelterless people away. In a sort of cat-­and-­mouse game, homeless people—­with nowhere else to go—­gradually reclaimed their temporary redoubts along the length of the stream. They were confronted with Randburg Police bicycle patrols who used the element of surprise to “pounce upon unsuspecting criminals” accused of regularly robbing hikers and mountain-­biking enthusiasts.28 Despite these periodic efforts to clear away homeless squatters along the spruit, the complaints of middle-­class residents did not subside. In 2015, Parkview SAPS, the JMPD, and multiple private security companies (including CSS Tactical), mounted a joint policing operation along the riverbanks. City law enforcement officials confirmed that forty criminal suspects were arrested for various crimes ranging from possession of drugs, stolen property, implements to steal cables, and dangerous weapons.29 Accumulated resentments about discarded waste and simmering grievances about petty crime in nearby neighborhoods spilled over again into renewed calls to clean up the spruit. Neighborhood associations (functioning as collective agents) and homeowners (acting as irate individuals) issued a steady stream of criticisms, blaming city officials for inaction in dealing with vagrancy, squatting, and rising crime in residential suburbs adjoining the river plain. In 2016, Chris Thomas from the Bordeaux South Residents Association (BSRA) angrily announced, “The conditions are absolutely terrible. The homeless population along our part of the spruit has increased. The areas along the footpath are now occupied, and every rock and bush that isn’t inhabited is used as a latrine.”30 The escalating chorus of complaints about the lack of response and inaction of city officials, especially public law enforce-



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 231

ment agencies, eventually turned into proactive intervention. “We are fooling ourselves if we think the City of Johannesburg is going to help us deal with the issues in this community,” one disgruntled resident of the Riverclub Neighbourhood Association openly proclaimed. “It is time to take matters into our own hands to save our communities.”31 After an escalating crime wave that included an assortment of street robberies, carjackings, and fatal shootings, terrified residents living in a townhouse complex in Rivonia bordering on the Braamfontein Spruit proclaimed loudly that they were “living under siege,” afraid to venture out of their homes. The proximity to the river gave thieves an easy escape route into the trees and underbrush.32 Initiated because of rising complaints in September 2016 about increased criminal traffic along the greenbelt area, 7Arrows Security teamed with the JMPD to spearhead a joint anticrime policing operation, sweeping through a stretch of the river on a surprise nighttime raid that began after dark and ended in the early morning hours of the next day. 7Arrows deployed its special Washa “tactical team,” along with a K-­9 dog unit, claiming that the operation was a “huge success” because they were able to arrest several criminal suspects and chase away large numbers of “vagrants.”33 Conflicts over the use of parklands reflect how policing public space spilled out of its conventional location in the hands of public law enforcement agencies and into the lap of neighborhood associations, community policing forums, and private security companies. Acting with the approval of city agencies and with the assistance of private security companies, neighborhood associations on their own initiative proactively organized cleanup campaigns that culminated in the launch in March 2108 of the Jozi Trails initiative, a not-­for-­profit company formed to manage development and maintenance of recreational trails along the Braamfontein Spruit. Regular cleanup campaigns and organized private efforts to maintain the bicycle trails and walking paths along the watercourse were hailed as fulsome expressions of community involvement and private initiative.34 As a kind of public relations gesture, 24/7 Security Services announced that it was sponsoring four “public safety ambassadors” to patrol the sections of the spruit on foot and on bicycles from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekends.35 But there was a seamy side to these efforts to upgrade the watercourse to conform to the middle-­class imaginary of aesthetically pleasing recreational space. The escalating protestations about accumulating litter and trash crystalized into proactive retaliation against the park dwellers. Neighborhood associations have consistently lobbied city officials and public policing agencies

232 • the infrastructures of security

to remove “homeless vagabonds,” evict “illegal squatters,” and carry out raids in the name of strict bylaw enforcement, all with the overall aim of making the river course “clean and vagrant free.”36 Workless job seekers and displaced people of all sorts “constituted a disquieting alien presence” in the midst of suburban plenty.37 At various times, neighborhood associations hired various private security companies, including Ghost Busters, 42nd Precinct Security, CSS Tactical, Beagle Watch, 24/7 Security Services, CAP, and ADT, to assist with the task of driving shelterless people out of the public parklands. Plenty of anecdotal evidence surfaced to suggest that private security companies recruited shelterless people—­whom they referred to as “vagrants”—­to act as informants to gather information on squatter encampments and to identify suspected bicycle thieves.38 Neighborhood associations like the Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall (HGC) Residents Association (representing approximately four hundred homes) have collected funds to pay for the installation of tamper-­proof perimeter fencing—­which leadership boastfully referred to as an impenetrable “ring of steel”—­along the river’s edge abutting their properties to prevent park dwellers from crossing into their suburban Valhalla.39 Security experts suggested that remote surveillance technologies provided by pilotless drone flyovers provided a cost-­effective solution for detecting unauthorized “vagrant encampments” in difficult terrain and in areas with dense vegetation. For sure, voluntary organizations like the Linden Community Policing Forum secretly made use of unauthorized video footage from professional-­ grade drones to expose the “hiding places” of displaced people living in the bush. After drone images of the pollution and litter in Keith Fleming Park (Victory Park) went viral on social media in early in September 2018, City Parks (with the assistance of the Linden JMPD) raided the area, confiscating tent materials, blankets, and litter.40 Lumping diverse groups of shelterless people into the all-­encompassing category of “homeless squatters” not only erases their different circumstances but also ignores the diverse routes that brought these groups to the river in the first place. Despite the voices of those seeking to draw connections between low-­wage economies and lack of housing, the dismissive language of “illegal squatters” and “invasions” has spilled over into fears of criminality. What is routinely ignored in the haste to criminalize the poor who survive in homeless encampments along the stream is the heterogeneous mixture of users of the space. Not all are bicycle thieves, muggers, home invaders, and drug users. One group of about seventy waste pickers, mostly immigrants



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 233

from Lesotho, operated out of a makeshift camp hidden away in the dense underbrush to collect and store plastic, cardboard, metal cans, and other recyclable materials. Recycling the discarded waste found in affluent suburbs and upscale commercial venues amounts to living off the “secondary economies” of excess. Waste pickers journeyed once a week to a recycling depot in Alexandra to sell their goods. In general, refuse collectors as a whole recycled as much as 90 percent of the recyclables collected from households in South Africa, saving up R750 million in landfill space every year. Waste pickers remitted as much money as they could every month to their families in Lesotho. A man who called himself “Michael Machine” complained that city agencies, including the JMPD, frequently raided the temporary shelter, “burn[ing] all our things, including our clothes and IDs. But we have nowhere else to go.” Targeting these homeless squatters amounted to the “criminalization of poverty.” Sympathetic observers suggested that the prevailing anti-­immigrant rhetoric and xenophobia played a part in this routine harassment, discrimination, and compulsory evictions.41 Forcibly removing “homeless squatters” from the Braamfontein Spruit and nearby public parks proved to be unsuccessful, as these displaced people gradually drifted back.42 Working with private security companies, a couple of local cycling clubs began to strike back at armed robbers who were targeting their expensive bicycles, some of which were worth as much as R100,000. Private companies (including 24/7 Security Services) installed CCTV cameras, placed loudspeakers at strategic locations, and sponsored armed patrols along popular biking trails that followed the winding spruit. In addition, they promised to introduce horse patrols, dog units, and drone surveillance.43

Claiming the River Like all ideological constructions, the talk of cleaning up and preserving the Braamfontein Spruit must be understood just as much from the perspective of the questions overlooked as those that were posed. The real significance of the “contentious politics” over use of the Braamfontein Spruit lies not so much with the actual circumstances produced by the structural inequalities separating the propertied “haves” from the propertyless “have-­nots” as the strength of the conjoined revanchist response of affluent homeowners to what they regarded as a violation of their imagined aesthetic of riverfront property and the extent to which the presence of vagrancy and homelessness

234 • the infrastructures of security

literally at the suburban doorstep provoked such fear and apprehension about “crime and grime.” In a real sense, evolving middle-­class thinking about the Braamfontein Spruit reveals an emergent and evolving truism: in the face of the inaction of city officials and public policing agencies to effectively clean up the river basin through bylaw enforcement, neighborhood associations have claimed the right to act on their own initiative outside the rule of law.44 There is a broader sea change at work here. Homeowners in residential neighborhoods have often assumed self-­appointed roles as “crime fighters” and “intelligence gatherers.” Operating on the front lines in the “war against crime” has endowed these self-­styled “citizen-­soldiers” with a sense of their own legitimacy. In their view, the performance of these tasks is functionally equivalent to acting as surrogate law enforcement agencies or auxiliary police. Active engagement in security governance has meant that these homeowners have come to believe that they operate with justifiable authority, even though they do so outside of official sanction. Protecting one’s home, family, and belongings against even the possibility of criminal rapacity has provided ample pretext for the self-­organization of civilian security providers.45 Acting with the tacit support (if not outright endorsement) of public law enforcement agencies, those who have volunteered for various “security initiatives” attached to neighborhood associations have taken it upon themselves to impose a particular type of order to secure their residential suburbs. As Ryan Carrier has argued, the type of order that neighborhood associations “wish to establish or preserve” may be different from the type of order that the public policing agencies attempt to guarantee.46 More specifically, the approach to order that neighborhood associations have often put into practice is often at odds with the types of policing that public policing agencies are formally authorized to carry out. The line between what neighborhood associations are legally entitled to do and “what they should hand over to the [public law enforcement agencies] is very blurred,” particularly when class prejudices and racial stereotypes come into play. Keeping criminals at bay has meant displacing the itinerant poor with nowhere else to go. Under circumstances where public law enforcement proved listless and ineffective, private extrajudicial interventions filled in the void.47 Working in concert with one another, neighborhood associations have taken the lead in planning, coordinating, and executing surprise raids along the river, calling on the “muscle” of private security companies in their employ to displace homeless squatters from their temporary shelters. Left to their own devices, efforts by neighborhood associations to establish



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 235

“community control” over their physical environments “can become paranoid and exclusive, especially when supported by the paid assistance of private security companies. “The ‘neighbourhood watch’ mentality, modernised with the use of [sophisticated] technologies,” can easily lead to “discriminatory practices” that are tolerated if not “encouraged” by the public law enforcement agencies.48 The policing practices employed by the HGC Residents Association to secure the Braamfontein Spruit illustrates the turn toward extralegal approaches to security governance. Funded by monthly contributions from homeowners, the HGC Residents Association initiated what organizers called the “Project Flower” campaign, an environmentally friendly effort that employed a team of gardeners to remove invasive vegetation (“alien plants”) along the Braamfontein Spruit, to clean up and dispose of discarded rubbish, and to provide general maintenance of the pathways. These seemingly benign efforts to “protect the environment” went hand in hand with strategic interventions designed to push unwanted park dwellers away from the public greenbelt along the river. In June 2016, three neighborhood associations—­ the HGC Residents Association, Craighall Residents Association (CRA), and Bourdeaux South Residents Association (BSRA)—­joined forces with the private management company at Sandton Gate (a new upscale mixed-­use development built along a stretch of the Braamfontein Spruit) to hire a private security firm, Urban Threat Management, to assist with policing the waterway. Beagle Watch was the main private security company operating in the area. The public space policing contract that Beagle Watch signed with paying clients covered only vehicle patrols on tarred roads and did not include armed incursions into the greenbelt. In addition, Beagle Watch management was reluctant to commit to active patrolling along the riverfront because of perceived danger to their armed reaction team members. Seizing an opportunity, Urban Threat Management offered a comprehensive package of management services, including the maintenance and monitoring of palisade fencing and security gates separating private homes from the greenbelt, the use of drones to locate hidden encampments of unwanted “space invaders,” and the deployment of demolition teams (with weapons and dogs) to tear down makeshift shelters as a way of driving illegal squatters out of the area.49 While some residents expressed uneasiness about the heavy-­handed tactics of private security operatives in harassing park dwellers, these lonely voices—­dismissed by the enthusiastic “law enforcers” as vacillating “bleeding hearts”—­largely fell on deaf ears.50 In adopting a loose interpretation of “com-

236 • the infrastructures of security

munity policing” principles, affluent homeowners seem to have internalized a zero-­tolerance sensibility aimed at the most vulnerable “poorest of the poor” in their residential neighborhoods. “It’s our Spruit,” the text on the HGC Residents Association online newsletter proclaimed, “so please let’s make it the wonderful attraction it should be—­and at the same time, remove the hiding places for un-­desirables in the suburbs.”51 Acting outside the jurisdiction of public policing agencies and independently of existing arrangements with private security companies, neighborhood associations have often fashioned their own peculiar security solutions to perceived threats to their safety. These initiatives frequently overlap and intersect with the official duties of public policing agencies and the contractual mandates of private security companies. They complement but do not duplicate existing security arrangements. One example should suffice to indicate a general pattern replicated elsewhere in the affluent residential suburbs. Located in proximity to the squatter settlement at George Lea South Park along William Nicol Drive, and virtually surrounded by the verdant greenbelts created by two river courses, the fifty-­three homeowners comprising Hurlingham Village were particularly anxious about home invasions, burglaries, and street muggings. The dense foliage and undulating terrain abutting their properties offered quick and convenient getaway routes for criminals. Homeowners occupying the twenty-­two properties along the river worked together to install their own personal CCTV cameras with the aim of detecting unwanted traffic outside their individual perimeter walls. Not connected to any larger network as yet, this CCTV camera setup provided what amounted to an “early warning system” enabling individual homeowners to quickly communicate with one another about unidentified persons—­ especially at night—­moving along the greenbelt that abutted each of their properties. Outfitted with night vision capabilities, these CCTV surveillance cameras were programmed with motion detection devices to respond to suspicious movements by triggering blaring sirens and powerful strobe lights that pierced the darkness. This neighbor-­to-­neighbor communication network enabled homeowners to literally follow movements along the greenbelt from the safety of their homes.52 At the end of the day, the fault lines of incipient guerrilla warfare pitting bike trails and scenic vistas against those regarded as “superfluous people” surviving in makeshift shelters provides a poignant prism through which to critically view how normally law-­abiding citizens can succumb to enduring class (and perhaps racial) bias and turn toward extralegal means to construct



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 237

a cordon sanitaire between themselves and the pockets of desperate poverty that inconveniently jostle against their affluent lifeworlds. The legitimate desire for personal safety has seemed to cloud all moral judgments about fairness and social justice. Blaming the incompetence of public law enforcement has functioned as a justification for suburban residents to take the law into their own hands.53

Changing Contours of Security Governance The hydra-­headed approaches to security governance along the Braamfontein Spruit illustrate how the grip over the monopoly of the legitimate use of force and violence that public law enforcement agencies once maintained as their own prerogative has come unglued. Contrary to simplistic arguments rooted in the discourse of neoliberalism, this shift in the exercise of the legitimate use of force and violence is not simply the inevitable result of the downsizing of public law enforcement functions and the privatization of public security. While not always in agreement with goals and tactics of private companies and the sometimes over-­exuberant security initiatives linked with neighborhood associations, public law enforcement agencies have willingly cooperated and collaborated in the sharing of security governance functions in the policing of public space.54 The ongoing conflicts at the Braamfontein Spruit are emblematic expressions of wider trends in the metamorphosis of security governance and the enhanced role for privatized policing of public space. Acting at the behest of neighborhood associations, private security companies—­with no apologies, no regrets, and no remorse—­regularly participate in joint efforts to remove shelterless people from where they are unwanted. This displacement strategy is motivated by the belief that so-­called homeless vagabonds, vagrants, and rootless youth are likely to engage in “crimes of opportunity,” mugging unsuspecting victims and stealing whatever they can.55 The heavy-­handed response of neighborhood associations to the alleged crime threat posed by “unwanted strangers” camping along the Braamfontein Spruit illustrates the extent to which multiple groups and social actors have claimed the right to the legitimate use of force and violence.56 As willing participants in various voluntary security initiatives, leading figures in neighborhood associations have assumed active roles in policing public spaces. Framed in the discourse of innocent law-­abiding citizens struggling to avoid

238 • the infrastructures of security

being swept away in “a tidal-­wave of crime,”57 these self-­appointed civilian “crime stoppers” have wanted to assert their right “to take justice into their own hands” in order to protect themselves and their families.58 These assertions of their legitimate authority to act unilaterally has arisen in the “space created by the regulatory gaps.” Self-­appointed guardians of law and order have found loopholes in the law, exploiting the murky terrain that bisects the space between legality and extralegality. The evolving patterns of cooperation among public law enforcement agencies, private security companies, and neighborhood associations provide ample testimony to the entrenchment of pluralized security governance in the policing of urban landscapes.59

The Expanding Mandate of Private Policing Private security companies have embraced new technological innovations in their efforts to provide security for suburban residential neighborhoods. As a general rule, security analysts accumulate vast amounts of data culled from investigations of crime incidents. The storage, retrieval, and analysis of enormous amounts of “big data” enables private security companies to adopt a proactive approach to crime fighting rather than falling back on the conventional “reactive response” to criminal incidents after they have taken place. By identifying patterns and trends over time, private security companies are able to forecast when (time of the year, month, and day), where (location of such actions as home burglaries, carjackings, and “smash-­and-­grab” robberies), and how (modus operandi of criminal gangs, for example, type of vehicle, or on foot) particular criminal incidents are most likely to occur.60 Future forecasting enables private security companies to anticipate and “plan in advance.” Mobilizing the armed reaction teams in vehicles and on the ground, they often select “ambush sites” that rely on the static “eyes” of Vumacam CCTV surveillance cameras. For nighttime stakeouts, they sometimes deploy small drones with thermal night vision capabilities, especially in residential neighborhoods that border on open parklands, greenways, undeveloped land along watercourses, or uninhabited rocky terrain (like the eighty-­hectare Koppies Nature Reserve in Melville, for instance). It is reported that private security companies have used these small, pilotless aerial vehicles to surreptitiously track the movements along arrival and escape routes for criminals using the cover of darkness to approach their victims and then disappear into surrounding unpopulated terrain.61



Colliding Worlds in Microcosm • 239

As a general rule, established private security companies have access to data gathering methods that exceed the capacity of public law enforcement agencies. They have routinely incorporated up-­to-­date technologies into their crime-­fighting arsenals. Their armed reaction teams respond much more quickly to frantic crime alerts than public law enforcement agencies. Acting in alignment with private security companies, private citizens in affluent residential neighborhoods have taken it upon themselves to assume expanded responsibility for manufacturing their own security with little public oversight.

Chapter Seven

Security by Design Spatial Management in the Hypermodern City Such is the appalling state of security in the country today that not a minute passes where an innocent, law-­abiding South African is not accosted, raped, robbed, hijacked or murdered in cold blood by thugs who break the law with reckless abandon. —Anonymous1

In the City of Tomorrow, architecture and planning have become key instruments in reshaping the urban fabric in order to ensure safety and security in the affluent “comfort zones” of work, leisure, and consumption.2 The “defensible spaces” of “fortress urbanism” have come to depend not only on physical barriers, high fences, checkpoints, and imposing gates but increasingly on the “invisible shield” of state-­of-­the-­art electronic monitoring systems, including CCTV surveillance cameras, tracking devices, and biometric verification.3 New approaches to “security by design” have relied on the modification and alteration of physical features of the urban landscape in order to control access and increase surveillance capabilities, thereby reducing or limiting the opportunities for crime to occur in designated areas.4 The purpose of CCTV video surveillance is to exercise control over urban space: to regulate behavior deemed problematic or “deviant,” to reduce street crime, and to maintain spatial orderliness. At the core of this panoptic logic of social control lies a regulative mechanism for the disciplining of street activity. This regulative mechanism consists of three discrete “moments”: observation, judgment, and enforcement. Metaphorically speaking, these three moments operate as a cycle of social control that attaches to the activities of street users as they negotiate the cityscape.5 The merger of state-­of-­ the-­art “watching” capabilities with automated AI applications has produced 240



Security by Design • 241

new methods of classifying, evaluating, and analyzing vast amounts of data in real time that far surpass the abilities of trained human experts. In seeking to normalize urban space, these “visual analytics” machines easily classify unsuspecting crowds into categorical types (criminals and their potential victims), use installed algorithms to decipher clues of criminal intent (gestures, body language, dress), and alert on-­the-­ground armed response teams to rush to respond to crimes in action. These automated “watchful guardians” aim to restore disciplinary order through the power of knowledge. The highly sophisticated CCTV surveillance systems are directed at establishing a new art of transparency that makes secrecy and camouflage almost impossible. Such computer-­assisted mechanical devices have come to represent the wishful fantasies of the power of knowledge to secure the public spaces of the urban landscape.6 As impartial contrivances, CCTV cameras train their gaze on the streets, recording the movements of black and white people, observing the law-­ abiding and the criminal, the welcome and the unwelcome. But young black men who are dressed modestly know, with a kind of visceral certainty, that the impartiality stops when the electronic signals from CCTV video feeds are transformed into knowledge: they understand that they are seen differently than others. Social differences that are embodied in race, age, gender, and class are the ones that are the most efficiently and carefully monitored. In linking “suspicion profiles” with “risk categories,” surveillance systems operate on the basis of norms, for without them they cannot identity what is considered abnormal. Norms are what enable surveillance systems to decide what information should be turned into knowledge and which persons need to be monitored. This information forms the groundwork for the social construction of a “risk aversion” profile. The capacity to produce and apply norms is a crucial social power.7 As a collection of monitoring mechanisms, the surveillant assemblage extends beyond increasingly sophisticated CCTV cameras systems and into much more diffuse methods of keeping track of persons, including private security patrolling, public law enforcement, neighborhood watch groups, informal street guards, and domestic workers recruited to the task of spying. This assemblage operates by abstracting bodies from their specific territorial circumstances and classifying them into a series of discrete flows of information. By reassembling these discrete flows into distinct “data doubles,” those who do the watching can scrutinize behavior and target individuals for deliberate intervention.8 The prevailing technocratic, nonpartisan rhetoric

242 •

the infrastructures of security

of the need for safety and security provides a convenient camouflage for a more sinister objective: protecting the “haves” from the “have-­nots.” With its overlapping layers forming an integrated pattern of control, the surveillant assemblage enshrines already existing socioeconomic inequalities under the guise of equality under the law.9

Penetrating Vision: Spatial Governance in the Hypermodern City The introduction of these kinds of comprehensive surveillance rituals in Johannesburg in the first decades of the twenty-­first century has formed the building blocks of an emergent panoptic disciplinary order, one increasingly “stripped of personal privacy, individual trust, and the kind of viable public life that supports and maintains democratic values and practices.” New hyper-­surveillant modes of visibility link knowledge, power, and space. Gated enclosures, defensive architecture, and the neo-­traditionalist New Urbanism have provided ordinary citizens with a greater sense of security. But such exclusionary settings no doubt have also contributed to accentuating fear by increasing paranoia and distrust among urban residents.10 For the anxious middle classes, the surveillant gaze of CCTV security cameras represents a benign and reassuring intrusion into the “danger zones” of the disorderly city.11 Yet for marginalized people who rely on access to city streets for their survival, the extension of surveillance systems symbolizes their exclusion and criminalization. Rather than resolve urban tensions, strategies of “defensible space” have exacerbated processes of spatial segregation and social polarization. Whether guarding a commercial strip or a casino lobby, surveillance cameras illustrate the “appeal to force [that is] implicit in the very concept of property.”12 Efforts to purify social space through privatization, zoning, or repressive policing have reduced fear of the street for mostly affluent urban residents, but they have also generated a cycle of spatial displacement that is never-­ending for marginalized social groups.13 Surveillant technologies of visibility prefigure a dystopian Future City where miniaturized “visual machines” powered by the indirect light of electro-­ optics illuminate the urban landscape, exposing even the most opaque shadowlands hidden away in marginal sites.14 The panoptic vision of unobtrusive surveillance cameras has enabled security operatives to penetrate parts of the city that are normally invisible to prying eyes. These new regimes of visibility



Security by Design • 243

create and maintain a strict moral universe that operates on the principle of basic mistrust and suspicion. Concealed cameras serve to reinforce a sense of fear-­induced authority, partially reviving, “through a sort of technological animism,” the public dread of unseen threats that unsettle public order. CCTV surveillance amounts to the social construction of suspicion, superimposing yet another layer of electronically mediated social relationships on everyday life. Urban residents going about their daily routines feel “vaguely incriminated,” while these urban places subsumed under the “watchful eye” of the CCTV cameras acquire “an aura of super-­legitimacy.”15 The adoption of new surveillance technology systems represents a transformation in approaches to urban governmentality. As Anthony Giddens argued more than twenty years ago, the increased use of surveillance techniques has involved more than simply supervision; it has also entailed the collection of information and the ordering and deployment of that acquired knowledge to be put to specific purposes.16 Just as fictionalized detective novels rely on a privileged position of imaginative spectatorial dominance to unravel the concealed mysteries of the city, the emergence of new techniques of routine visual surveillance—­precisely because they reduce individuality to a set of knowable traces (or data points)—­operates to render the cityscape legible to the anonymous gaze of power. This gaze of power functions by organizing, disciplining, and controlling urban space.17 The celebration of the operational effectiveness of surveillance technology systems simply reiterates Bentham’s Panopticon ideal: the “model prison” that signals the metamorphosis of classical liberalism into total scrutibility.18 Surveillance technologies produce a softly militarized setting, enclosing more and more usable space—­both public and post-­public—­within an expanding grid of visibility. Strategic armoring of the streets represents the desire to cleanse space of unwanted impurities. The social anxieties prompted by fear of crime have served to legitimate intensified surveillance of “people on the move.”19 The heightened suspicion of movement has led to new kinds of spatial management. These efforts to monitor, filter, and screen threatening movements through space—­with their ominous and clear racial overtones—­has proceeded with little public debate, protest, or outcry. New electro-­optical surveillance technologies are ideal devices for “non-­racist racism,” for “the ubiquity and apparent impartiality” of their uniform gaze. The neutral-­sounding and seemingly benign assumption that all urban residents benefit equally from increased public safety, tightly controlled public order, and improved traffic flow allows these regimes of technologized hypervisibil-

244 •

the infrastructures of security

ity to conceal the racialized ordering principles under which they typically operate. Their claim to serve the “common good” enables them to hide so effectively those operations that rely on racial profiling as the justification for exclusion. The apparently impartial, nonracist nature of the “all-­seeing” surveillance technologies as a technique of social order to which all city users are equally subject “masks the racial dimensions of the norms by which a threat to disorder may be recognized and dealt with.”20 The rise of new surveillance technologies represents perhaps the most visible sign of the “dispersal of discipline” from the prison to the factory and to the school, to increasingly encompass the social congregating spaces of the urban landscape. The spread of smart CCTV cameras over the streetscape has represented not only an extension but a reconfiguration of the “disciplinary power” associated with “penal modernism.” The emergence of new surveillance technologies has also given rise to new modes of social control that take us beyond the disciplinary power associated with the Panopticon. While the Panopticon was conceived with the goal of observing particular individuals whose identities are known beforehand, the aim of smart CCTV surveillance is to monitor particular places for specific time periods. By targeting particular categories of persons rather than individual suspects, the new surveillance technologies mark a paradigm shift in crime prevention from the “old penology” to the incorporation of elements of the “new penology.”21 Rooted in the conventional modernist policing paradigm, the old penology was concerned with the identification of individual criminal offenders for the purpose of ascribing blame and determining guilt. It linked criminal acts with deviant or antisocial behavior. One of its central aims was to determine “the nature of responsibility of the accused and hold the guilty responsible.” In contrast, the new penology is actuarial. Its underlying purpose is to identify, classify, and manage types of individuals who are sorted into levels and degrees of dangerousness. This new penology is concerned with “regulating groups as part of a strategy of managing danger.”22 Put broadly, one of the key differences between the old penology and the new penology is the shift from individualized to generalized suspicion.23 In this sense, the new surveillance technologies are post-­disciplinary because they adopt a proactive, preemptive, or “future-­oriented” approach to crime control that involves intervention by means of “categorical exclusion” before any behavioral discretion takes place.24 CCTV monitoring systems have become embedded in complex social and technological webs of surveillance that extend and diffuse the impact of spatial regulation to a variety of other agencies of social control. Seen in



Security by Design • 245

this light, “new modes of urban governance” cannot be understood as an expression of a putative neoliberal policy agenda of municipal off-­loading and privatizing the responsibilities for crime control and law enforcement. Instead, the construction of overlapping security networks constitutes key elements in a new “social ordering strategy” that has actually extended and reconfigured the capacity of municipal law enforcement agencies for action and influence.25 Rather than signaling a decisive and radical break with the past, the rise of new surveillance technologies represents a fusion of the old penology with the new. On the one side, public law enforcement agencies have used new surveillance technologies to identify individual criminal suspects and target known offenders. On the other side, CCTV monitoring systems have become useful tools in “situational crime prevention” by engaging in a generalized suspicion of types of individuals who seem to pose a threat to collective security. Because deregulation and privatization of crime control actually enhance the powers of municipal police by providing “extra eyes and ears,” the rise of plural policing represents not so much a “rolling back” of public law enforcement as a “rolling out” of a tangled skein of complex mechanisms of social control.26 The new penology of situational crime prevention has directed attention away from analyzing “the people who commit crime,” or predicting the behavior of criminal offenders, to a focus on “the places where crime occurs.”27 This paradigm shift in criminology has moved from offender-­centered crime prevention strategies to a place-­specific examination of the locational patterns of criminality. The “criminology of places” (to borrow a term coined by Lawrence Sherman, Patrick Gartin, and Michael Breuger) focuses prevention strategies on crime concentrations in microgeographic locations (“hot spots”).28

“Bubble Lives”: Capsular Architecture and the Spreading Security Net Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic . . . It is a product literally filled with ideologies. —Henri Lefebvre29

As an evolving city form, “fortress urbanism” has combined physical barriers, such as high walls, road closures, barricaded buildings, and steel gates, with private security guards, pedestrian partitions, CCTV surveillance, and electromagnetic monitoring systems. Social ordering strategies have depended,

246 •

the infrastructures of security

in large measure, upon transforming city spaces into fields of visibility. As a distinctive kind of contemporary city-­building practice, fortress urbanism has used controlled access to create well-­defined pockets of urban civility within an urban landscape that is generally perceived as dangerous or unsafe. Indeed, the development of the “fortress city” can be seen as symptomatic of the hypermodern city, which privileges the spatial partitioning of the cityscape over the maintenance of open public gathering places.30 The ideas and discourses associated with “defensive urbanism” have increasingly formed the cornerstone of new strategies of urban governance that seek to reconfigure and redesign urban landscapes and thereby reduce the vulnerability of urban residents to the risk of danger.31 In aiming to provide the kind of safe and secure (and attractive) environment that enhances the competitive edge of aspiring “world-­class” cities, these strategies associated with defensive urbanism have typically depended on access restriction, enhanced electronic surveillance, risk management techniques, and a bloated and overextended role for private security agencies. The result is a hardening of the urban landscape into a kind of virtual battlespace.32 New surveillant technologies of visibility have evolved in tandem with what can be called “capsular architecture”: enclosures (or “space containers”) that create an “artificial ambiance” that minimize interaction with the “outside” world by forming their own time-­space environment and that form hermetically sealed zones of comfort and security. Macro-­capsules include such sequestered places as airports, shopping malls, gated residential communities, and fortified office complexes. The process of “capilarization” has extended to the other end of the spectrum, where armored vehicles and private automobiles retrofitted to repel would-­be carjackers, bank-­teller booths encased in bulletproof and shatter-­resistant glass, tubular (air-­locked) x-­ray scanning machines at the entryways to banks and office complexes, and sentry boxes at the entrances to gated residential communities are exemplary expressions of miniaturized micro-­capsules, scaled-­down versions of closed-­ off places.33

“Drone Rangers” Come to the Rescue In the fast-­moving fantasy world of security futurism, the “vertical fix” has taken hold, animated by technophilic dreams of virtual control from above. Overhead technologies offer ways to avoid the pitfalls of operating on inhos-



Security by Design • 247

FIGURE 15: Living behind Walled Enclosures: The “Bubble Lives” of Suburban Residents

pitable terrain. Originally developed for military purposes that combined both lethal (robotic “killing machines”) and nonlethal (surveillance monitoring) uses, remotely piloted or unmanned aerial vehicles—­colloquially known as drones—­have gained widespread popularity as both an enhanced tool for public law enforcement agencies and for a wide variety of civil/civilian applications.34 As drones have become less expensive and scaled down to a more manageable miniaturized size, public law enforcement agencies have experimented with new ways to put this aerial technology to work in monitoring traffic patterns, aiding in evacuation management during natural disasters, assisting with search and rescue operations, and observing special events. Correlatively, private companies have found new ways to put drones and their surveillance technologies to use in the fields of mapping and photogrammetry, game park management, the monitoring of industrial sites and warehousing facilities, surveying land and agriculture, and reconnaissance operations.35 Because they can be flown with little to no training, hobbyists have taken to flying drones for recreational purposes.36 As the rapid incorporation of drones into nonmilitary domains has increased, regulatory frameworks designed to ensure their safe and responsible use have struggled to keep apace.37

248 •

the infrastructures of security

Drones cannot be understood as simply physical objects that fly through the sky. Rather, they constitute a socio-­technical assemblage of vertical space. They operate as a kind of socio-­technical architecture involved in data-­intensive surveillance. For private security companies, the “drone future” is filled with possibilities: less expensive than idle static guards and the endless rounds of mobile armed patrols, and much more reliable than human monitoring.38 Remotely piloted or unmanned aviation systems extend beyond the distinctive characteristics of the airborne apparatuses themselves to include ground stations (which house control units and the base for remote pilots) and communications infrastructures. Under the all-­inclusive umbrella of remotely piloted aviation systems (RPAs) lies a diverse range of operational systems and vehicle types. Some differences between RPA vehicles are immediately apparent, such as the size or weight of the flying apparatus itself. Other differences are less obvious, such as the “medium of communication between the vehicle and the ground station.” In terms of their functional capabilities, drones range in their operational logistics from those vehicles that are fully piloted from a remote location to those that are fully automated, behaving in response to preprogrammed cues independent from ground operators. There are also a variety of responses between these two extremes, with some flying maneuvers “triggered automatically through autonomous monitoring of conditions,” while at other times the commands of remote pilots can override autonomous responses. Needless to say, these variations in the functional capacities, size, and modes of operation have made it difficult for civil aviation regulators to arrive at common standards for approval of use.39 As their potential applications have continued to expand, private security companies and their clients (that is, their paying customers) have become enamored with the possibilities of mobilizing the space aboveground with new surveillance technologies. Albeit tentatively, and with many obstacles yet to be overcome, the introduction of UAVs, or drones, into the militarized arsenal of private security companies has ushered in a new era of aerial (three-­dimensional) surveillance. Like helicopters, drones facilitate a “perspective which may be distant and abstract, while also near and viscerally present.”40 In the imagination of security professionals, the “top-­down view” of drones provides an “inherent superiority” over what lies beneath the gaze. As Stephen Graham has suggested, “The drone’s-­eye view plays well on YouTube as well as in a whole host of militarized video games.”41 Unlike the relatively limited capabilities of CCTV surveillance cameras that are fixed in place,



Security by Design • 249

drones offer a high degree of maneuverability and flexibility hindered only by objects that block their flight paths. Flying at night with thermal imaging capabilities, they resemble “nocturnal surveillance airships.”42 Put broadly, the drone age is colliding with the urban age to produce a new, more intimate geography of atmospheric security. These emerging geographies of “unmanned” policing have opened up entirely new security management strategies. Outfitted with powerful surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, hovering capabilities, and aerial flexibility, drones have emerged as the cutting-­edge technological breakthrough of security governance strategies. The “repurposing” of military aerial drones as domestic security technologies has marked a turning point in crime prevention.43 Looking at the growing popularity of UAVs as functional surveillance devices offers a convenient prism through which to examine the technological politics of security governance.44 As with all sorts of state-­of-­the-­art weapons systems, drones are the product of military technoscience with the aim of providing superiority on the “electronic battlefield.”45 Recommendations for the shift of UAVs to civilian use is rooted in military fantasies of technological omnipresence. Always on the lookout to expand sales outside of military procurement cycles, defense contractors have sought to create “alternative markets” for UAVs with public law enforcement agencies and private security companies. There is increased fascination with exploring ways to apply the surveillance capabilities of drone technologies to guarding huge manufacturing and mining installations, policing unruly crowds, and providing a flashy new weapon in the “war against crime.”46 Technology experts have sought to repurpose retrofit UAVs for uses other than strictly lethal applications. Security professionals have imaged all sorts of nonlethal payloads that UAVs are capable of deploying: taser guns, tear gas, stun grenades, high-­pitched sound weapons, smoke canisters, thermal imaging and body heat detection, steel spikes for disabling tires, and rubber bullets.47 According to the Rocketmine State of Drone Report 2018, there were an estimated forty thousand to fifty thousand drones in operation in South Africa, with a majority in commercial use without proper licensing. As the main regulatory agency mandated to oversee the granting of operational licenses for drone pilots, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has established very tight barriers to entry which greatly restrict the use of “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA). The arduous and time-­consuming application process has discouraged all but the most persistent private companies, with the result that only about sixty have obtained official licenses to operate UAVs.48

250 • the infrastructures of security

Enthusiastic advocates for expanded drone use have argued that these “tele-­operated flying machines” provide an ideal solution to the problems and limitations faced by other surveillance methods, such as GPS tracking, CCTV camera observation, biometric surveillance, and ground patrols. Security experts have proclaimed that “drones are at the vanguard of new policing methods.” First and foremost, drones are “the quintessential visual prosthetic” and construct their objects of attention “through the narrow optics of tracking and targeting.”49 Unlike larger helicopters, specialized security drones are able to negotiate narrow and confined spaces with minimal noise disruption. When equipped with night vision cameras and thermal sensors, they can supply video images “that the human eye is unable to detect.” In addition, UAVs can expeditiously cover expansive locations and difficult-­to-­ reach terrain, reducing the numbers of required staff and overall costs.50 Despite existing regulatory restrictions on their commercial use, private security companies have quickly embraced UAVs as a preferred weapon in their crime-­fighting arsenal. Responding to false alarms costs valuable time and money for private security companies. The use of drones’ video capabilities enables private security personnel to discreetly investigate suspicious activities at a distance to determine whether an alarm was triggered due to an actual break-­in attempt or was just an innocuous mistake. Drone surveillance footage can also prepare security teams for potential threats before arriving at the scene.51 In effect, drones make physical borders and barriers somewhat contingent and meaningless. This “ordering without bordering,” as Christine Agius has suggested, not only reshapes the terrain of observation but also extends the methods of surveillance, tracking, and tracing of patterns of movement and behavior across space.52 The functional capabilities of RPA have made it possible to bypass such conventional security measures as fencing, walls, and gates that have been in place for decades. These pilotless airborne vehicles can range autonomously over preprogrammed flight paths for extended periods of time, providing real-­time video feeds to ground control stations and “allowing for ongoing routine patrols across wide areas such as borders, maritime regions, and high security installations.”53 In 2014, a company called Desert Wolf began production of a drone prototype, which it named the Skunk Riot Control Copter, marketing this unmanned flying device as a tool useful for dispersing protesting workers. This mini-­helicopter is outfitted with four thousand pepper spray paintballs, plastic pellets, and other supposedly nonlethal ammunition. To deliver this



Security by Design • 251

payload, the Skunk is equipped with four gun barrels firing twenty paintballs per second each, capable of “stopping any crowd in its tracks.” In addition to generic high-­definition surveillance cameras (with onboard recording) and a thermal imaging camera with nighttime capabilities for onboard recording, this heavily armed robotic device is also fitted with bright strobe lights, “blinding lasers,” and onboard speakers to broadcast loud warnings to unruly crowds.54 With the memory of the Marikana massacre (in which thirty-­four striking workers were killed by police and army units) still fresh in their minds, labor activists reacted with great alarm when it was disclosed that an unnamed corporate mining conglomerate had purchased twenty-­five units of its crowd control drones to deal with future labor unrest.55 According to security experts, pilotless aerial vehicles are the next “ultra-­ hot” security product. Private security providers have increasingly embraced this aerial surveillance technology for its ability to traverse difficult and awkward (and sometimes inaccessible) terrain, stream real-­time video footage to control rooms, and safely monitor persons and locations. Drone surveillance technologies, especially those with stealth capabilities, have already been put to use in monitoring mining operations, farmlands, freight and logistics sites, container ports, harbor installations, warehousing facilities, construction projects, railyards and train tracks, and leisure entertainment businesses.56 A private security company called Drone Guards (a subsidiary of UAV Aerial Works) was one of the first firms to enter into the emergent market of using remotely piloted aerial systems to provide perimeter security for gated residential estates.57 After two years of negotiations with the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) and undertaking a time-­consuming and costly application exercise, the company was able to obtain an official license—­ called a (Remote Operating Certificate, or ROC)—­that allows its unmanned “aerial watchmen” to fly over suburban environments.58 According to promotional materials provided by Drone Guards, trained “drone pilots” fix the coordinates of these aerial surveillance machines to follow a preprogrammed GPS route around the perimeter of gated residential estates. Drone pilots are instructed to veer off course and follow an intruder if the occasion arises. In addition to the use of high-­end cameras, these “flying surveillance machines” are also equipped with technological capacity for thermal imaging appropriate for nighttime flights. Aerial surveillance footage is streamed in real time to a ground control command post that monitors the feeds. The software installed in the UAVs incorporates machine learning (artificial intelligence) to enhance its operational efficiency.59

252 • the infrastructures of security

Rather than putting stationary security guards and foot patrollers out of work, company officials at Drone Guards have come to regard drones as just another device in the toolboxes of security companies. By offering an additional security layer, drones have enabled the company to provide a holistic security service. Unlike conventional CCTV surveillance cameras, which are fixed in place and designed to react to situations, drones—­or what Ian Shaw has called “flying robots”—­can actively patrol vast amounts of territory.60 This proactive capacity outfits drones with the additional element of surprise, since suspicious persons on the ground are usually unaware that they are being watched from above. While private companies like Drone Guards have obtained licensing permission by the national drone regulatory agency to fly over residential areas and public roads, there are still a number of strict rules that legally limit what drone surveillance can do. Private companies are required to obtain official permission from homeowners associations in gated residential estates, or from homeowners themselves, to fly over private property and from municipalities in order to fly over public roads. In addition, drones are not legally permitted to fly above 400 feet (120 meters).61 However well-­intentioned, these rules are virtually impossible to enforce. The regulations that the SACAA imposed on the use of UAVs left significant loopholes for the use of weaponized drones and seemed to overlook people’s right to privacy.62 Private companies in the business of selling UAVs have suggested that drones are an inexpensive alternative to conventional security measures and offer technologically advanced solutions to disaster management, city planning, and crime prevention. Security drones add a whole new dimension to surveillance, safety, and security. UAVs have a distinct competitive edge over stationary CCTV cameras. Because of their capacity to cover blind spots, drones can monitor areas that are normally out of reach for even the most efficient cameras.63 The security teams working with gated residential estates have expressed considerable interest in using drones to patrol their perimeters. But the high cost of deploying drones has discouraged all but a handful of gated residential estates to add aerial surveillance to their already expensive multiple layers of security. Those few private security companies that offer drone surveillance have explored various options that would allow gated residential estates to slowly introduce aerial surveillance coverage as an additional feature to supplement existing security offerings. Working in collaboration with a perimeter security company called Lixodex, Drone Guards has introduced what



Security by Design • 253

their security management team has called the “Defense in Depth” approach, an elaborate, multilayered security system that consists of the combination of drone aerial surveillance linked with on-­the-­ground sensory devices. According to Lixodex promotional materials, “A fence could be the first layer. Electric fences can be the second layer. Cameras could be an additional layer, and then there are fence intrusion detection sensors that turn fences into more intelligent barriers.”64 The repertoire of Lixodex “intelligent sensors” ranges from fence intrusion detectors, passive infrared sensors, trip wires, and in-­field connectors allowing signals from a wide range of security devices to feed information into a centralized data processing center. These sensors can be either installed permanently or moved frequently as part of a tactical plan to monitor potential threats. Their moveable sensors with GPS coordinates emitting signals to drones flying overhead can be fashioned as small, irregular objects made of silicone to resemble nondescript rocks. Scattered deliberately or randomly outside the layered security perimeter, the smart sensors effectively detect the movement of would-­be intruders well before they reach the exterior fencing. Once signaled, drones can move quickly to the location of the suspicious activities. The aim of this security solution is to quickly draw attention to where intrusions of the perimeter fence have occurred, what the intruders are doing, and where they are moving following the initial breach of security in order to deploy mobile armed response teams to deal with them.65 The great advantages of drones are speed and maneuverability. According to Kim James, director of Aerial Works, mobile armed response teams “are able to cover 5km per hour on average” with fairly limited capabilities for visual scanning of the terrain, “whereas drones fly at approximately 35km an hour” with a virtually unobstructed vantage point from above. “Imagine an efficient system which includes a series of perimeter sensors, detecting a fence breach, quick aerial surveillance response to inspect and follow suspects, and armed response to apprehend,” as James has put it. “That is if the aerial surveillance has not prevented the crime from occurring in the first instance.”66 Because they can be outfitted with thermal technology for nighttime surveillance, drones are significantly more capable of “seeing” intruders than armed reaction teams on the ground.67 Employed as a key element in visible policing efforts in gated residential estates, drones function as a supplementary force multiplier to bolster overall security. As a way of reducing the financial burden on individual homeowners, Drone Guards has taken the lead in introducing what company executives have termed a “neighbour-­model”—­a

254 • the infrastructures of security

cost-­sharing plan that allows a group of homeowners (say, five to seven) with houses located on adjacent properties to share in the collective costs of drone surveillance service. In this model, drones do not fly over all homeowners purchasing the package deal at all times but are programed to cover randomly selected properties over the course of each day or night of the week.68 Private security companies have moved into the business of providing drone services with somewhat limited functions for specific clients. For example, CORTAC has established a specialist division that uses so-­called aviation tactical teams to deploy surveillance drones equipped with high-­ definition and thermal imaging cameras. In their promotional materials, the company has suggested that drone surveillance provides a cost-­effective solution for detecting unauthorized activities in difficult terrain and wide-­ open areas. In addition, CORTAC has begun to offer training courses to assist individuals in obtaining a registered pilot’s license (RPL) and launch a career as a drone pilot.69 While private security companies have promised to provide drone surveillance for neighborhood associations representing residential suburbs, they have faced a series of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Private security companies thinking about deploying drones are fully cognizant of mounting suspicions over violations of privacy rights. According to existing regulations, drone operators need to obtain permission from residential homeowners, commercial businesses, and various municipal agencies in order to penetrate their airspace. But other official regulations governing the use of drones have remained underdeveloped. As a general rule, private security companies are keen to introduce drones into their already well-­stocked arsenal of protection devices. In their fantasy projection, private companies have expressed interest in using preprogrammed drones to respond automatically to trigger warnings to investigate suspicious activities, and to not just detect unwanted intrusions of guarded perimeters but to pursue intruders to where they seek to hide. One such fully automated UAV on the global market is called the Sunflower Home Awareness System. Hailed as the world’s first fully autonomous residential security drone, this home security technology consists of ground-­based pods called “Sunflowers,” a collection of motion and vibration sensors that are disguised as color-­changing garden lights spread around the premises. Each flower has a twenty-­foot detection radius and can accurately differentiate between the movements of people, automobiles, and animals—­or as one observer put it, to distinguish “between possums and prowlers.”70 Activated by these AI-­



Security by Design • 255

enabled sensors to detect unexpected activity, this roving aerial robot (or flying security guard), which is capable of completely autonomous flight, is programmed to literally jump out of its protective housing and charging station and scout the terrain from above, whether moving around or hovering in place (to initiate facial recognition capacities), and send an immediate alert to the homeowner and transmit visual images in real time to a computer or mobile device. In order to prevent the Sunflower from inadvertently crashing into trees or other obstructions, it is equipped with high-­precision differential GPS, rotor guards, and sense-­and-­avoid technologies consisting of an array of “ultrasonic collision-­avoidance sensors.” This versatile aerial device can be operated autonomously (responding to motion detection signals), piloted manually, or programed to automatically conduct regular patrols along designated routes.71 The actual deployment of automated drones like the Sunflower faces a host of regulatory hurdles in South Africa, particularly regarding the authorized use of airspace and concerns with privacy, before they can become operational in home or neighborhood security systems. But companies like Drone Guards have adopted a business model that seeks to work with private security companies at a time when smart automated technologies are rapidly replacing the human element in fully integrated, comprehensive security services. Private security providers fully understand that the future of security services rests with technologically sophisticated systems and fully automated surveillance-­detection-­response solutions. Because of the increasing sophistication of criminal syndicates targeting high-­value assets, static guards stationed at sentry posts or monitoring boom gates are the weakest links in security systems. Operating on the principle that security service providers need to “future-­proof ” their businesses, management at Drone Guards has sought to lease UAVs to private security companies and train their staff to operate drones themselves, in anticipation of the time when fully automated, intelligent surveillance and monitoring technologies can cost-­effectively dispense with dependence on the attentiveness, diligence, and commitment of the legions of low-­paid stationary guards, monitors of CCTV screens, and foot patrols.72 As integral features of the future “electronic battlefield,” the potential uses of autonomous drones for private security policing hover in perhaps the not so distant future. Private security companies already use automated algorithmic systems to direct armed response teams to geolocated crime hot spots. Automated aerial vehicles are merely an extension of what already exists.73

256 • the infrastructures of security

In conversations among themselves, security professionals have divided private security companies into two broad groups. The first group is referred to as “MBAs,” a reassuring label that suggests their professional, business-­ oriented approach to the cost, risk, and benefit calculations regarding the use of drones. These companies are primarily concerned with making the new aerial surveillance technologies work–­–­that is, they seek to learn how to integrate drones with already existing security systems. In contrast, the second group of private security companies—­referred to as RAMBOS—­are enamored with the military-­like potential of UAVs, armed with “weaponized” capacity to not only employ nonlethal devices like tear gas, rubber bullets, or taser-­style projectiles but to also consider the use of lethal force if necessary to stop criminal suspects in their tracks. Clearly, in the sphere of civilian use, the future of drone technologies is no longer limited to hobby enthusiasts and their benign fascination with a fancy toy.74

Border Erasure: Disappearing Frontiers Bordering practices have shifted fundamentally as a consequence of the introduction of new intelligent technologies of security governance. New security technologies like CCTV surveillance and biometric identification systems have produced, as Etienne Balibar put it in another context, “borders are no longer at the border.”75 Technological innovations in security governance have undermined the conventional understanding of borders as fixed barriers or as mechanisms to separate territories that are designed to protect what is safely sequestered “inside” against what lurks “outside.”76 In this traditional conception, borders consist of fortified lines between two points on a two-­dimensional map. In the new paradigm of security governance, however, the application of technologically sophisticated instruments of protection has rendered static, immobile borders somewhat superfluous, replacing them with mobile, flexible, and malleable boundaries. Mobile surveillance technologies seek to replace low-­tech physical barriers with high-­tech “virtual walls.” Automated technologies operate on the bordering principle of producing a continuum of security practices designed to preemptively identify, monitor, and track “suspicious persons” across space and over time.77 More specifically, borders are everywhere; they are permeable and elastic and do not act on everyone in the same ways at all times.78 No longer constrained by fixed



Security by Design • 257

border lines, security systems overlap and intersect, creating a continuum of “securitization” that folds and bends over topographical space.79 The introduction of automated surveillance technologies has transformed borders from static demarcations of hard territorial boundaries “toward much more sophisticated, flexible, and mobile devices” of identifying, tracking, and monitoring.80 The use of sophisticated identity management technologies like biometrics, facial recognition, and license plate identification tools has made borders ever more invisible, electronic, and mobile. As new technologies of surveillance evolve into practical instruments of identification, the border spaces of monitoring and tracking start at the point of contact where personal identifying markers interact with machine-­learning technologies (retinal scans, fingerprint readers, facial recognition). These new intelligent surveillance monitoring systems have pushed the boundaries of where borders begin and end.81

Emergent Technowar 82 Throughout the history of warfare, “the story of military technology has been one of prosthetic extension, especially that of sight, with weapons becoming gifted with sensory perception and intelligence.” In the relentless pursuit of efficiency and dependability, security technologies seek “to minimize human error” in the delivery of reliable information, “often taking ‘the human element’ out of the loop altogether.”83 Military strategists and “war-­making” experts have long been enamored with the fanciful projections of creating the perfect “electronic battlefield”—­a terrain consisting of overlapping networks of acoustic and seismic sensors linked to command and control centers, mobile surveillance “spy planes,” pilotless aircraft, automated targeting systems, and self-­guided missiles. Over the past several decades, law enforcement agencies around the world have experimented with automated technologies designed for military purposes and put them to use in such sites as prisons, border controls (particularly anti-­narcotics operations and unauthorized crossings), and airports.84 The threat of crime has transformed residential neighborhoods into anxious spaces that resemble something akin to the lawless frontier. Unlike a borderland, a frontier is inherently fluid, mutable, and contested—­a zone defined by the breakdown of law and order. Whereas “borders are usually

258 • the infrastructures of security

places of increased control and surveillance,” the frontier is a contradictory place “where the ‘wild’ and the ‘tamed’ do not cancel each other but play out different roles, sometimes in reciprocity, and with different levels of impact.”85 The piecemeal extension of the mechanisms of securitization, including mobile private security patrols and the placement of surveillance technologies like CCTV cameras, has produced fragmented frontiers where extralegal force and violence come into conflict with lawlessness.86

Preemptive Crime Prevention Combined with proactive public space policing initiatives, the introduction of automated CCTV surveillance systems epitomizes what academic criminologists have called “situational crime prevention”–­–­that is, efforts directed at reducing criminal opportunity, improving physical security, and managing risk through the rigorous application of a strict law-­and-­order agenda rather than addressing the root causes of criminal behavior. This stress on “making public spaces safe and secure” for business enterprise and for affluent consumers has “supplanted social welfare policies as a means of responding to crime.”87 The evocative power of naming the unwanted figure of the criminal suspect becomes a mechanism for adjudicating between who belongs and who does not. In the register of combating crime, “security” is a subtle yet highly charged “discourse that simultaneously names the enemy and is to be protected from it.”88 Framed within the “new security” paradigm, the main answer to “the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’” is the speculative practice of preemptive intervention, which identifies as its target what amount to potential threats rather than actual risks.89 Preventive and proactive approaches to policing involve a move away from post hoc crime “solving” and its replacement with a future orientation aimed at crime prevention and the management of possible danger. This paradigm shift privileges a biopolitical logic of policing through anticipation of what might happen, in contrast with conventional disciplinary approaches that focus on apprehending criminal suspects and punishing wrongdoing. This future-­oriented approach to security governance—­what Rivke Jaffe has called “speculative policing”—­entails a “conceptualization of crime as a risk that can be understood and managed through actuarial calculations.”90 CCTV cameras are the key components of “surveillance machines,” complex assemblages where “webs of technology and information combine” to



Security by Design • 259

FIGURE 16: CSS Tactical: Private Security “Armed Response” Vehicle Built for Speed and Maneuverability

monitor movement.91 Because of their capacity to intrude surreptitiously on those who are unsuspectingly captured in the field of penetrating vision, smart CCTV cameras are perhaps the most emblematic “signature of power” in the contemporary age of surveillance technologies.92 CCTV surveillance systems offer empowerment through visibility: knowing that the surrounding streetscapes are “watched” provides frightened homeowners with a sense of security.93 CCTV surveillance capabilities are premised on what Brian Massumi has termed “seeing in advance”–­–­that is, the possibility of preempting dangerous situations due to the ability to recognize incipient forms of threat through prior monitoring and algorithmic calculation of suspicious behaviors across a wide spectrum of time and context.94 “Micro-­preventive” strategies that stress combating crime through environmental design and zero tolerance for even the most innocuous infractions of the law form the backbone of situational crime prevention. Early warning systems seek to anticipate the likelihood of when and where crime might take place (so-­called crime hot spots) and identify recurrent patterns that associate types of crime with times of the day or week. The use of coercive and punitive measures by private security companies in their efforts to manage criminality is the core of proactive crime prevention. The blending of military doctrines with the operational logics of advanced

260 •

the infrastructures of security

technologies forms the cornerstone in new thinking about security governance and risk management. The expanded use of automated, digitalized surveillance technologies, such as thermal and infrared sensors, automated CCTV cameras, and other state-­of-­the-­art stealth devices, has effectively transformed residential neighborhoods into “informated” battlespaces. As Stephen Graham has suggested, “Nothing lies outside battlespace, temporally or geographically. Battlespace has no front and no back, no start nor end.”95 Rather than seeking to defend territory with defined borders and defensive barriers, new preemptive strategies of security governance combine the application of static remote surveillance monitoring from above with mobile armed patrolling on the ground. The collapse of the inside/outside distinction has gone hand in hand with the breakdown in separation between security professionals and “ordinary citizens.” The new doctrine of security governance depends on enlisting urban residents—­homeowners, shopkeepers, and employees—­into voluntary associations like neighborhood watch groups, community policing forums, and other grassroots “self-­protection” organizations. A vast armory of technological devices, ranging from smart CCTV cameras with infrared capabilities, heat and motion detection sensors, and remote control devices attached to cell phones, blankets the deterritorialized battlespaces of residential neighborhoods. State-­of-­the-­art surveillance systems represent new technocratic-­algorithmic modalities of governance. Just like military theories of “fourth-­generation war,” which envisage warfare as a permanent, boundless exercise without end, “crime threats” amount to a kind of “low-­intensity conflict” where containment, not eradication, is the only realistically obtainable goal.96 Faith in technological solutions enables private security companies to sell even more technologically sophisticated security devices. Because they are “inspired by the militaristic logics of the pre-­emptive strike,” sophisticated algorithmic technologies “hold out the promise of subjugating the future” by acting to “immobilize threats before they materialize.”97 The makeshift formation of hybrid security assemblages combines physical hardware with data-­driven software. The new “security-­industrial complex” increasingly consists of a balance between the material objects like smart CCTV surveillance systems (including utility poles and video cameras) and the fluid, liquid software of digital data and the management of information.98 In another words, security technologies are not only “hard” physical infrastructures but also assemblages of diverse “soft” elements that link material objects with procedural rules and regulatory frameworks, economic ratio-



Security by Design • 261

nalities, political institutions, discourses, and perceptions. In short, security technologies cannot be understood apart from the their organizational, logistical, symbolic, and social characteristics.99 The new technologies of remote CCTV surveillance that have emerged as the key infrastructure of security governance regimes depend on various kinds of expertise and knowledge. These security assemblages require the trained labor of a variety of active participants, including software developers; computer programmers; IT designers and management professionals; electrical engineers; builders of infrastructure; systems consultants; and technical experts in surveillance equipment, IT, and data analysts who act together to produce “virtual boundaries” around their fields of operation. These shifting surveillance regimes have intensified the production of “smart monitoring” as the key component of security governance.100

Security Utopias and the Veneer of Neutrality The assessment of the worth of these security technologies depends on their usefulness within the security assemblages rather than through any engagement with moral or ethical questions related to their application.101 Because they are “concealed in the glossy techno-­science of algorithmic calculation,”102 the application of abstract principles to calculate risk provides the aura of technological neutrality and objective scientific rationality that dispassionately distinguishes “safe” from “dangerous,” and potential victim from possible perpetrator.103 Social sorting and digital profiling practices are saturated with embedded racial stereotypes and class prejudices that shape everyday practices of security governance.104 New modes of surveillance work to reconfigure access to social spaces and, in so doing, either enhance or restrict the “network capital” of privileged insiders versus unwanted outsiders–­–­that is, their differential capacities to be mobile (what Anthony Elliott and John Urry have termed “portable personhood”) and to move through space.105 The mechanisms that foster or impede mobility through surveillance, tracking, identification, and detainment constitute a somewhat opaque “bordering practice” that often goes unnoticed.106 Over the past three decades or so, affluent property owners in Johannesburg have experimented with a variety of strategies ranging from partitioning the urban landscape into fortress-­like citadels, the construction of “safe houses” surrounded by security infrastructures, and hiring private security

262 •

the infrastructures of security

companies to maintain the kind of spatial order that public law enforcement agencies cannot or will not provide. Urban landscapes are never uniform, flat surfaces upon which abstract forms can be seamlessly etched and drawn. Order and disorder intersect in complex and often unexpected ways. Security and insecurity, predictability and unpredictability, and risk and danger are in “constant interplay,” enacted and performed in “contingent assemblages.” Static dichotomies and binary oppositions just cannot account for the fluidity and malleability of new security thinking.107

Introduction Epilogues

Art installations appear in many formats: photomontage exhibitions, displays of objects, documentary and experimental film, dramatic performance, music, and even fictional writing. Regardless of the guides under which they appear, these modes of artistic expression open up new ways of subjectively experiencing, absorbing, and making sense of the social world around us. Their goal is to stimulate the sensibilities, to heighten awareness, and to disrupt conventional understandings and ways of thinking.1 Embodying the principle of “all power to the imagination,” art installations are free to roam in the make-­believe world of fantasy and illusion, careening back and forth between utopian dreamscapes and dystopian nightmares. Because they are not bound by the rigorous methodological standards of factual accuracy and reliable truth-­telling, these modes of artistic expression can explore troubling questions in ways not available to fields of inquiry grounded in empiricist traditions. Whatever else, works of art can be powerful instruments for locating classical beauty in unpromising places or for revealing prescient warnings of possible catastrophic futures. As Georg Simmel once remarked (in an essay originally published in 1890), art exhibitions produce “judgements and reactions—­from attraction to repulsion, awe to disdain, indifference to enthusiasm and back, in rapid succession.” They “form a picture in miniature of all our mental currents of the present.”2 Works of art introduce all sorts of stylistic mechanisms to expand our horizons for thinking, experiencing, and feeling. Exaggeration, hyperbole, and caricature are useful techniques for drawing attention to aspects of social life that can go unnoticed or treated as natural or normal. Art installations ask us to suspend judgment for a time. In whatever format, modes of artistic

263

264 •

the infrastructures of security

expression inhabit the territory of the “strangely familiar,” a phantasmagoric place where the rules of rational calculation and verifiable truth do not apply. Modes of artistic expression help us to reorient our thinking away from the expected and comfortable. Poised between reverie and nightmare, they can unveil connections and relationships that are at once credible and incredible, ordinary and uncanny, real and surreal. We think we know, but art prompts us to ask again—­Are we sure? Art exhibitions can be at once subversive, transgressive, and accusatory. They can take us backward in time, inviting us to explore the lingering effects of past trauma and to suggest how they manifest themselves in the present. They can also fast-­forward to the future, conjuring up scenarios that range from imaginary worlds of contented futures or nightmare depictions of primal fears. Art installations declare their own reality and, if done successfully, convey wider meanings in ways that greatly transcend their assembled parts. By casting aside overarching, panoptic vantage points to focus instead on the microscopic view of “little things” that are often overlooked or ignored, art installations can reveal unrepaired ruptures, unhealed wounds, and unresolved tensions not visible from the wide-­angle gaze.

Epilogue I Jane Alexander Security Exhibition

Art exhibitions can sometimes reveal the underlying “existential mood” of uncertain times in ways that written texts are incapable of conveying. Jane Alexander’s sculptural installation, ironically titled Security with traffic (influx control), exhibited at the 2009 Joburg Art Fair, is an exemplary expression of art mimicking the social realities of urban fear. The Security installation is a massive, ten-­foot-­tall, prison-­like enclosure separating inside from outside with two chain-­link fences topped with razor wire. Between these parallel fences that surround the rectangular central area is an earthen pathway littered with rusted machetes and rubber work gloves. Hired as part of the exhibit, private security guards, outfitted with matching uniforms and brandishing weapons, are stationed around the perimeter—­sometimes outside of the fencing, sometimes between the two fences, and “sometimes stationary, sometimes circling, or patrolling the perimeter boundary.”1 A lone sculpted figure, a hybrid bird-­like creature with distinct humanoid features, stands like a silent sentinel inside this overbuilt cage. With a monstrous head and vulture-­like beak and menacing eyes, and an armless, wingless torso that resembles that of an old man or child with a remarkably lifelike male anatomy below the waist, this monstrous beast serves as a haunting symbol of the obsessive fixation on security in the first decades of the twenty-­first century. Festooned with the familiar urban security paraphernalia, the Security installation speaks to the ambivalent entanglements of inside and outside, or the conflict between private space embedded within the public sphere. As a visual symbol of the unsettled present, this disturbing artwork probes questions related to the unresolved legacies of racial segregation.2 In her work, Jane Alexander has experimented with blurring the evolu

265

266 •

the infrastructures of security

tionary line between the human and nonhuman, exploring the “inhuman within the human,” using code switching and anthropomorphic sculptures to respond to the dehumanizing nature of the past and present.3 She first achieved international acclaim in the mid-­1980s with The Butcher Boys, a disturbing installation exploring the dehumanizing violence and bestiality of apartheid-­era South Africa through a trio of mouthless, muscular animal-­ human hybrid creatures, figural sculptures made of plaster with the grotesque physical appearance of abject, uncanny beings, sitting together on a bench.4 By evoking vulnerability and dread of the unknown, Alexander’s artistic work seems to mirror (and even reinforce) the widespread anxiety of affluent residents of Johannesburg under circumstances where real fears of crime mix with an almost surreal fixation on security. Her exhibitions rely on a haunting amalgam of everyday experience and surreal strangeness to evoke a double image of imaginary demons inhabiting the world. Her undecidable (animal-­ human hybrid) figures produce a visual montage of “the strangely familiar, and familiarly strange” that conjures images of the abject, the alien, and the uncanny. By effectively blurring the boundaries between human and nonhuman, this art installation disrupts binary ontological certainties that enable us to distinguish between civilized/uncivilized, real/unreal, and predictable/ unpredictable. As Ruth Lipschitz has argued, “It is not simply that these figures appear to violate taxonomic laws, species categories and physiological norms; it is also that they seem to disturb a structure of realistic and logical expectations, all the while sharing the same space and time of the encounter.”5 By inviting observers of the exhibition to witness but not to participate, Alexander is able to heighten the sense of dread and uncertainty that insinuate themselves into the conduct of everyday life. With its language of surveillance and enclosure, the Security installation puts forward the illusion of physical protection to contain the threat of violence.6 While visual arts and artistic performance have played around with imaginary and fanciful scenarios, popular media outlets are filled with security recommendations and dire warnings. Polymorphous fears of the unknown have ricocheted around and across various networks of collective communication, echoing a constant message of lurking unseen danger. For example, the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a rare public warning in the country’s leading newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, cautioning Israeli visitors to South Africa to avoid public transport and not to carry too much money or expensive items, to leave natural reserves and other tourist areas before dark, and to hide valuables under their car seats when driving. In particular, the ministry



Epilogue I • 267

also advised women not to walk alone, as doing so would make them easy targets for thieves.7 Art installations like Jane Alexander’s Security constitute a way of storytelling, one that invites viewers to fill in the blank spaces and tie the disparate pieces together in a connected narrative. This installation project conveys meaning in ways that transcend its assembled parts. In its excess of the surreal and unnatural, the Security installation not only captures the present moment but also foreshadows an uneasy, unsettled future. The early warning signs of the danger that lies over the horizon are omnipresent.

Epilogue 2 Mosquito Lightning Carla Busuttil and Gary Charles

Mosquito Lightning is a conceptual art project that was conceived as a commentary, or provocation, informed by both our living experiences and our structured research into privatized policing. In 2016 we were invited to participate in an artist residency at Nirox Sculpture Park in the Cradle of Humankind, northwest of Johannesburg. While we had previously researched and discussed the privatization of policing and the role of security forces in wealth protection, this residency presented an opportunity to develop an artistic project in response. Our individual works had long taken global wealth inequality as a subject to tackle and challenge. We contacted a South African filmmaker (Chris Saunders) after seeing his music video for “Tsekeleke” by Shangaan Electro artist Nozinja. A central tenet of our project was to create a fictional television advertisement, and with extensive experience of filming commercials, Chris proved the ideal collaborator for our project. We also worked with a performance artist, who acted as a security officer undertaking fictional performative labor and an opening night performance piece. Modeled around a fictional company, Mosquito Lightning evokes the present-­day obsession with private policing. The project explores the realities and absurdities relating to an industry many have come to accept as normal or everyday. In particular, we sought to understand these corporate entities operating as explicit guardians of the wealth divide. The project is a result of research conducted into the private security industry in South Africa, engaging with firms in Johannesburg as well as undergoing training regimes and incorporating real-­life marketing, design, and visual language in the creation of our fictional company, Mosquito Lightning.1 268



Epilogue 2 • 269

Background The original concept for Mosquito Lightning stems from our own experiences living in a society deeply divided along lines demarcating economic status and race. That South Africa is one of the world’s most unequal countries (in terms of both wealth and income) is well documented. The country also boasts the highest per capita spending on private security, and these two factors of wealth inequality and privatized policing we see as intricately linked and mutually reinforcing. These overt social and economic conditions provide the background for our project and remain present throughout the development of understanding our subject, as well as in creating our artistic response. In order to narrow our focus, we chose to understand the cultural and psychological causes and impacts of these circumstances, identifying the private security industry as a totem and gatekeeper of this wealth divide. Our investigations raised a number of questions: How does this industry operate and sell itself? What does it mean for the workers in this industry? How do customers view these firms? Is there a visual language or aesthetic that reinforces messaging? And how does it impact communities and the cultural mind-­set of the populace in general? Having lived much of our lives within gated communities—­on the privileged, primarily white side of the razored fence—­we are familiar with the arguments, rationalizations, and ideologies used to support the spending of private funds on security protection. In the event of criminal activity, the response seems to always be the same: “higher fences, sharper wire,” “more security,” or “more advanced tech”—­with little attention to the underlying causes or the socioeconomic backdrop. Typically, in our experience, these discussions are underpinned by deeply ingrained racism and conservatism, as well as an unshakeable, fundamental belief in the superiority of private enterprise over collective or public venture. In a country that for so long operated under a system of state-­enforced racial segregation, patriarchy, and tribalism, this psychosocial condition has proved more difficult to remove than perhaps the “Rainbow Nation” optimism had envisaged. The systematic division of the sociocultural landscape has shifted from a coded state-­enforced system to an economic reality that has proved to be no less powerful in perpetuating a separation so stark that it can feel like members of the public inhabit completely different worlds, depending on which side of the economic divide one lies. This engrained division prevents meaningful discussion on investment in public services, security, and welfare. And for the private security indus-

270 •

the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 17: Faux Logo for Make-­Believe Private Security Company Mosquito Lightning

try this “economization” of the divide provides rich opportunity, along with a legitimized neoliberal defense of “responding to market demand.” During our research, it was this aspect we found crucial in terms of developing our artistic approach. We looked at the methods and aesthetics used by security firms, which provided rich insight into the broader social concerns that underpin the industry. Our approach to the creation of the project was to combine Carla Busuttil’s visual language that is expressed in her painting practice with the typical techniques used by security firms in corporate material, film, and web design. In her paintings, Busuttil’s approach to form and color is typically rendered in bold, expressive, and spontaneous style. The subject matter is often unflattering portrayals of power and the powerful, drawing on pageantry, visual tradition, uniform, symbolism, and signature. Her approach serves to create a parity among the subjects of the images. While her work is often based on real-­life characters or events, these are combined and mangled to create new composite characters, strange events, and alternative timelines. Her approach draws on techniques used in caricature to spotlight and draw out the grotesque, resulting in renderings that can often be viewed as both humorous and grave, repulsive yet visually appealing. This approach and aesthetic can be seen across the body of intermedia works that form the core elements of



Epilogue 2 • 271

Mosquito Lightning, which can be seen partly as parody or spoof, and visually bizarre, while retaining a serious underlying critical outlook.

The Brand Our initial research focused on the methods and approaches adopted by security firms in presenting and marketing their services, with a view to developing deeper understanding of the internal mechanisms through the decoding of their visual projections. Our immediate sense was that the design of marketing material and web-­based advertisements was uniformly simplistic, outdated, and poorly rendered (by contemporary design standards). Even large, well-­funded operators seemed to possess outdated websites, with graphics, font, and navigation seemingly from a bygone era. Visual imagery and written content felt culturally anachronistic, selling protection through the cultivation and generation of fear. This fear-­driven approach we found explicitly gendered and racialized, counterweighted with an overtly masculine solution (or service) based on power, force, weaponry, and technology. Corporate films and advertisements seemed to fit this paradigm: low-­budget productions that foreground a fearful female (or children) at risk from shadowy danger, coupled with montages of strong men with knife skills, big guns, fast cars, and military capabilities. The vast majority of the video footage appeared to be no more than do-­it-­yourself home video footage in private gardens or in parking lots. The defenders (or “heroes”) in these films, promoting their inherent ability to protect, were typically white men engaged in physical battle or demonstrating some kind of military training. We witnessed men throwing fictional assailants, performing headlocks, shooting guns, wielding knives, and even demonstrating nunchuck skills. The messaging and aesthetics coming from the footage on websites we found were so similar and uniform that we felt they revealed something of a culture within a culture—­and these media formed the conceptual starting point for our project. While these websites and promotional films were dealing with an intensely serious business, underpinned by the social and economic concerns at the heart of our project, we found many to invoke a sense of the surreal and absurd. In the “about us” section of the websites of many firms, we also found striking patterns and commonalities. The archetypical firm consisted of a white boss, a former high-­ranking apartheid-­era defense force or police officer with his team of mostly black soldiers. This setting up of labor conditions

272 • the infrastructures of security

and privatized hierarchy resonated with our real-­life experiences of dealing with security firms. Typically, the officers who were visible and interacting with civilians on a daily basis were low paid, precariously employed, and were provided limited formal training. These officers were also overwhelmingly black, while management tended to be white. While there were exceptions, this setup was so prevalent that it represented the blueprint for our own exaggerated rendering. Our own corporate structure presented on our website followed this typical schema, simply exaggerated and re-­rendered in our fictional world. We felt that the way these firms presented themselves was quite separated from reality, leaving them open to parody. In the naming of firms too we found a uniformity of approach. Particularly popular was the use of strong or dangerous animals as symbols of powerful corporate identity: “Rhino,” “Lion,” “Cobra,” “Hawk.” Any number of powerful, ferocious creatures were invoked in the branding of companies in operation. And the brands themselves were important not just as a name or cypher but also as a marker of territory, a visible warning to would-­be criminals. Branded vinyl signs dot the urban and suburban landscape, demarcating protected areas and protected property. The dual purpose of these signs as both corporate branding and emblems of caution is something we found fascinating, and we toured the suburbs of Johannesburg taking pictures of as many of them as possible. Imagery of the animal kingdom and the wild veld featured so heavily in the aesthetic and metaphoric language of the industry, we imagined these signs to be the corporate equivalent of animals demarcating territory with the unique olfactory signature of their urinary tracts. In deciding on our own name and brand, we chose the mosquito. As a member of the animal kingdom, it seemingly fit the convention yet presented an inherent contradiction to the existing aesthetic template. Many of the large, powerful animals invoked by security firms were dwindling in numbers, often victims of human development and behavior, even to the extent of nearing extinction. However, the mosquito is small and seemingly innocuous, yet it poses a greater risk to human lives than all these large animals combined. This realization of how deadly this insect is made “Mosquito” the perfect identifier for our firm, a parody of the fearsome creatures providing the template for corporate imaging yet beneath this veneer a deadly risk. The use of “Lightning,” while referencing the incredible thunderstorms of the highveld, also seeks at “recentering” the locus of rational and irrational fear—­bringing to mind human-­induced ecological disasters and the immense, uncontrol-



Epilogue 2 • 273

lable complex of weather systems. We felt there was a poetic absurdity in combining the tiny insect with the grandeur and might of an electrical storm. As South Africans currently living in Europe, those Johannesburg storms also hold a personal, deeply nostalgic resonance for us–­–­the sweet, sudden density of 5 p.m. air, clouds rolling in like charcoal curtains, and the majestic force of the storm. Being in a position to enjoy and appreciate these storms itself represents the privileged existence of sturdy and safe homes in areas secured by firms such as ours. Once we had decided on a name, the branding and corporate identity followed swiftly, and Mosquito Lightning was born.

Mediated Choices In developing material and content for the website and marketing materials, once again we focused on what could already be found in the real world. Our website contained a layout similar to that of most security firms, and at very first glance it might be difficult to differentiate from a real firm’s site. The aesthetic objective was to develop an exaggerated or overblown version of existing approaches, highlighting some of the absurdities implicit in cultivating an ever-­escalating fear and concomitant forms and desires for protection. One of the by-­products of this culture of “fear monetization” appeared as a fetishization of technological advancement and alleged solutions for security and safety issues. This opened up an active market for an array of products and services that were almost, we thought, beyond parody. These products, when considered in the context of their intended use, seemed terrifying and in many cases legally questionable–­–­from exploding and shocking suitcases to secret alarms, hidden blades, modified tools, electronic gadgets, and lie detection gear and services. Many of these existing technologies were included on our website under the Products section, along with some of our own security “innovations,” such as the Digital Scarecrow or our “patented” Audio Glassbreak Detection System. This appropriation of real-­world objects with fictionalized counterparts contributes an element of humor to the project. However, some of our fictional technologies have already become proposed realities or instruments under development. For example, artist and theorist Hito Steyerl recently discussed her project looking at artificial intelligence software “trained” to recognize the sound of glass breaking, a technology currently under development to be included in algorithmic surveillance and security protocols.2 This

274 • the infrastructures of security

attention to “broken glass” can be seen as a realization of the Audio Glassbreak Detection System, an imagined fictional technology derived from a desire to critique, or even parody, real life. Since the time of our initial research, the role and sophistication of technology has advanced dramatically, with an increased focus on computational and networked surveillance technologies. Capital investment in this area has again given rise to new demands for more “efficient” technologies and networked systems—­while once again seemingly ignoring the underlying social and economic conditions.

Boots on the Ground: Stories from the Control Center In order to develop a deeper understanding of the private security industry and how it operates, we made contact with a number of firms. While our conversations helped provide valuable insight, one particular firm invited us to spend two days working inside their operations, granting us access beyond our expectation. We interviewed owners, management, and staff; filmed on their premises; spent time in their control center; and patrolled their neighborhoods with their armed reaction teams. This firsthand experience informed much of the detail and embellishment at the heart of our own fictional firm. The most revealing discoveries during our research were often gleaned from fortuitous circumstances or seemingly meaningless asides. In our initial discussions with the owner, we discovered that the firm had a contract with a professional expert in lie detection who was due to arrive at their offices. This professional expert worked on retainer and visited the control room premises weekly in order to test “suspects” in ongoing investigations. We were told that this was standard practice for private security providers. The fortuitous timing of this weekly visit allowed us to meet the lie detection professional and discuss his practice, even to undergo a dummy test and film the interrogation process and equipment. We were informed that weekly tests were conducted on people who were suspected as being part of “inside jobs” in homes and businesses. After further discussion, we learned that “domestic servants” and “garden workers” were regarded as “criminal suspects” subject to interrogation in investigations for unsolved criminal activities that had taken place in households within secured neighborhoods. We found this admission to be rather disturbing, yet nobody we spoke to could understand our shock. Treating “domestic staff ” as criminal suspects was simply the “normal course of security business.”



Epilogue 2 • 275

We were casually informed that these low-­paid black workers were expected to undergo a lie detection test. If they refused to participate, they were simply assumed to be guilty or to be hiding something—­invariably resulting in the termination of their employment. In a country with persistently high unemployment and limited welfare provision, the risk of losing employment becomes an oversized threat, a condition wielding inordinate power over those who are precariously employed. During our conversation with the professional expert in lie detection, he showed us the room used for interrogation: a small, airless cubicle space with a simple table and chair arrangement. Affixed to the walls were signed, handwritten letters admitting guilt for some or another misdeed. The visible presence of these crude notes sought to highlight the “effectiveness” of the testing procedure and further added to the sense of intimidation and technology-­aided authority. Furthermore, we inquired what might happen if there were no “insider cases” to investigate during a particular week. We were informed that during these weeks the visits would be used to randomly test company employees working as security guards. Any of the firm’s active security officers could be called in to undergo an interrogation, with the aim of uncovering “inside activity.” We were not told how the random selection of subjects took place but were informed that white management was excluded from this process. We were unable to hide our shock at this business practice but were told that this was normal procedure and that each employee signed a contract accepting these conditions of employment. At all levels the threat of terminating employment was seen as the control mechanism, both as a service to fee-­paying customers negotiating their in-­house labor negotiations and part of managing employee conduct within their own organization. The experience with the lie detector test demonstrated with vivid clarity our concerns with the privatization of policing practices. The private security firm made it clear to us that, as a point of pride, they were the only authority with the ability to gather evidence, to investigate, and to hold individuals to account in those areas under their jurisdiction, surveillance, and protection. Due process remained at the behest of the private security firm. They owned and controlled both the expertise and the technical apparatus for policing residential suburb neighborhoods. Their main role was to protect the bodies and private property of fee-­paying residents, their affluent clients. The assumption, accepted by both the residents and the firms themselves, was that the role of private security was to replace and improve on the “traditional” role of public policing. Private security companies regarded public police in residen-

276 • the infrastructures of security

tial neighborhoods as underfunded, incapable of doing the work of policing, disinterested, and carrying little authority. Perpetual funding shortfalls have certainly taken their toll on policing services, leaving public law enforcement agencies unable to provide the equipment and officers required to protect the “wealth divide.” As a general rule, security firms operated on the premise that public law enforcement agencies were happy to let private companies actively patrol and ring-­fence suburban neighborhoods because it meant “less work for them.”

Sound and Vision In deciding the form and mode of presentation for our project, we aimed to create artworks across a range of media, all reinforcing the conceptual core of the project. The video piece (a fake TV advertisement) could be seen as the centerpiece, setting up the familiar real-­world templates and populating them with characters and settings from our bold, grotesque otherworld. We had previously created video work using masks and characters that were placed in painted sets or neatly constructed settings. For Mosquito Lightning, we focused on constructing faux papier-­mâché characters and painted props to mimic action taking place in real-­world settings. We underwent military-­ style outdoor training exercises and visited a range to shoot real weapons. As part of the theatrical stagecraft, we were dressed in military-­style uniforms and hidden behind papier-­mâché masks, allowing for limited visibility. These outer shells were uncomfortable, unwieldy, and restrictive of normal movement, further adding to the surreal sense that pervades the video footage. The civilian family members in the advertisement wear a different kind of mask, made from cricket pads as opposed to papier-­mâché. This use of cricket protection brings to mind the historic colonial roots of the wealth inequality that has endured in South Africa. Cricket, played primarily in former British colonies, is often regarded as the most fully formed sporting expression of overseas British Empire. This symbolic parallel or resonance sets apart the protected from the protectors in our film, presenting viewers with a symbolic, visual echo from the world they inhabit. Populating the screen are various props, such as jewelry, a globe, photo frames, and a computer. All of these items were found at a local thrift store and then doctored and painted in order to aesthetically integrate them into our fictional world. This crude DIY



Epilogue 2 • 277

approach sets the scene for our world and is contrasted with the imagery of undoctored technologies (CCTV, satellite dish, and screen banks). The soundtrack too adopts a lo-­fi approach, composed by using cheap electronics and sound effects. The voice-­over treatment distorts the typically gendered delineation that is played out in the real-­life examples of the medium. Busuttil reads the script, her voice pitched down to create a strange timbre that resists gendering while adding to the oblique strangeness of the visual otherworld. Coupled with the lo-­fi design approach, the Mosquito Lightning website and television advertisement can be seen as a “commedia dell’arte or culture jam, a parody and heavy subversion of the real world, yet it pierces a membrane of plausibility.”3

Exhibiting Mosquito Lightning While the corporate identity of Mosquito Lightning was derived by appropriating the approaches used by active private security firms, these “real-­world” elements were transcribed to artistic media for the project. Along with a website, faux corporate brochures and marketing materials, our fictitious company ran a television advertisement and engaged in a kind of performative art, guarding the Goodman Art Gallery in Johannesburg, which housed the first exhibition of the Mosquito Lightning project. This first showing was part of the exhibition Choice. Click. Bait. It was presented as a mixed-­media installation featuring a video screening of the advertisement within a curated space composed of items from the private security industry, including a boom gate, sentry hut, typical uniforms, and weaponry, all set against a backdrop of brightly rendered imagery from our imaginary world. The Mosquito Lightning project was also exhibited at the Newtown Market Theatre Precinct, where we installed colorful posters and stationed a uniformed, masked officer in attendance on-­site, guarding the marketplace and our display, further blurring the distinction between the real world and the artistic realm. We plastered Mosquito Lightning stickers and posters throughout central Johannesburg and distributed marketing pamphlets in high-­density areas. Large-­ scale branding images and uniformed mannequins appeared prominently in the Goodman gallery window display on Jan Smuts Avenue. On the opening night of the exhibition, a masked performance artist in full military-­style uniform patrolled the venue, shapeshifting from a passive agent protecting

278 • the infrastructures of security

FIGURE 18: Mosquito Lightning Security Team, Assembled and Ready for Action

the scene into an active, more menacing and confrontational agent over the course of the evening. The exhibition attracted some critical and media attention, and we were invited to appear on weekend morning television to discuss and promote the show. As part of this presentation, the fictional Mosquito Lightning TV commercial was aired on national television (SABC2) as a video artwork. The film created some confusion for viewers, effectively creating a strange disjuncture between the familiar format of short-­form inter-­program advertising and the more free-­form approach of video art. The Mosquito Lightning project also appeared at Josh Lilley Gallery in London (as part of an exhibition titled The Super-­Suburb Defense Authority) and continues to live online as a fictional company website. As a broader message, we think that Mosquito Lightning and the critical thinking that underpins it can inform discussions relating to the nature, forms, and methods of policing outside South Africa. Questions regarding demilitarizing police, resisting hyper-­privatization, and focusing on enduring socioeconomic inequalities and racial injustice are crucial elements that the Mosquito Lightning project



Epilogue 2 • 279

seeks to address. We believe that understanding how private security has come to function as such a powerful force in South Africa can provide rich insights into the challenges and potential pitfalls surrounding how to genuinely protect communities without resorting to harsh and unaccountable policing methods. It is our hope that, as an artistic endeavor, Mosquito Lightning can in some small way contribute to understanding or open avenues nurturing alternative perspectives.

Notes

Preface 1. See Obvious Katsaura, “Ethnopolitics: Fear and Safety in a Johannesburg Neighbourhood,” in Kosta Mathéy and Silvia Matuk (ed.), Community-­Based Urban Violence Prevention (2015), pp. 42–­60 (esp. p. 43). 2. See Charles van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886–­1914: vol. 1: New Babylon, vol. 2: New Nineveh. (London: Longman, 1982). 3. Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future of Los Angeles (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 224. 4. Loren Kruger, Imagining the Edgy City: Writing, Performing, and Building Johannesburg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 3. 5. Daniel Goldstein, “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security,” Current Anthropology 51, 4 (2010), pp. 487–­499 (quotation on 487). 6. Andy Clarno and Martin Murray, “Policing in Johannesburg after Apartheid,” Social Dynamics 39, 2 (2013), pp. 210–­227. 7. Andrea Pavoni, “Tuning the City: Johannesburg and the 2010 World Cup,” urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana 3, 2 (2011), pp. 191–­209 (quotation on p. 200). 8. Christine Hentschel, Security in the Bubble: Navigating Crime in Urban South Africa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), pp. 91, 104. 9. Christine Hentschel, “The Social Life of Security: Durban, South Africa” (unpublished PhD diss., School of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Leipzig, 2010), p. 181. 10. Hentschel, Security in the Bubble, p. 91. 11. David Garland, “The New Criminologies of Everyday Life: Routine Activity Theory in Historical and Social Context,” in Andreas von Hirsch, David Garland, and Alison Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Oxford: Hart Publishers, 2000), pp. 215–­224. 12. Rosalyn Deutsche, Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. xi.



281

282 • Notes to Pages xxii–2

13. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (New York Verso, 2007), p. 104. 14. Austin Zeiderman, Endangered City: The Politics of Security and Risk in Bogotá (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), p. ix. 15. Zeiderman, Endangered City, p. ix. 16. Zeiderman, Endangered City, p. 2; Gareth Jones and Dennis Rodgers, “Gangs, Guns, and the City: Urban Policy in Dangerous Places,” in Charlotte Lemanski and Colin Marx (eds.), The City in Urban Poverty (London: Palgrave-­Macmillan, 2015), pp. 205–­226; Goldstein, “Toward a Critical Anthropology,” pp. 487–­517; Dennis Rodgers, “Disembedding the City: Crime, Insecurity, and Spatial Organization in Managua, Nicaragua,” Environment and Urbanization 16, 2 (2004), pp. 113–­124; and Markus-­Michael Müller, The Punitive City: Privatized Policing and Protection in Neoliberal Mexico (London: Zed, 2016), pp. 17–­46. 17. Joan Didion, Slouching towards Bethlehem (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), p. xiv. 18. Lynn Staeheli, Patricia Ehrkamp, Heilda Leitner, and Caroline Nagel, “Dreaming the Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship,” Progress in Human Geography 36, 5 (2012), pp. 628–­644 (esp. pp. 634–­635, 638–­369). 19. See, for example, Shoshana Zukoff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a New Human Future at the Frontier of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2019). 20. Zukoff, Age of Surveillance Capitalism; Jackie Wang, Carceral Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018; and Shoshana Amielle Magnet, When Biometrics Fail: Gender, Race, and the Technology of Identity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 21. Keith Breckenridge, Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa from 1850 to the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, Richard Banégas, and Armando Cutolo, “Biometric Citizenship? Documentary State, Identity, and Personhood at the Biometric Turn,” Politique Africaine 152, 4 (2018), pp. 5–­29; Daniel Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking in the Global Market System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Katherine Beckett and Naomi Murakowa, “Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment,” Theoretical Criminology 16, 2 (2012), pp. 221–­244.

Introduction 1. Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998), p. 89. 2. See Nan Ellin, “Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa,” in Nan Ellin (ed.), Architecture of Fear (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), pp. 13–­45; Steven Flusty, “Building Paranoia,” in Ellin, Architecture of Fear, pp. 47–­59; Diane Ghirado, Architecture after Modernism (London: Thames and Hudson, 1996); and John



Notes to Pages 2–4 • 283

Hannigan, Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 65–­100. 3. Paul Goldberger, “The Rise of the Private City,” in Julia Vitullo-­Martin (ed.), Breaking Away: The Future of Cities (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), pp. 135–­ 147. For a comparative view from Managua, see Rodgers, “Disembedding the City,” pp. 113–­124. 4. See Mike Davis, “Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism,” New Left Review 151 (1985), pp. 106–­114 (esp. 113). 5. Mfaniseni Sihlongonyane, “The Rhetorical Devices for Marketing and Branding Johannesburg as a City: A Critical Review,” Environment and Planning A, 47, 10 (2015), pp. 2134–­2152. See also Mike Davis, “Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space,” in Michael Sorkin (ed.), Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), pp. 154–­180 (esp. pp. 156, 164–­ 166). 6. For a comparative perspective, see Bauman, Globalization, pp. 89–­91. Ideas derived from interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011; and Wayne Minnaar, July 9, 2014. The interpretation offered here is mine alone. 7. Lindsay Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape of Post-­ Apartheid Johannesburg,” in Hilton Judin and Ivan Vladislavić (eds.), Blank___: Architecture, Apartheid, and After (Rotterdam: NAi, 1999), pp. 49–­63; and Lindsay Bremner, “Closure, Simulation, and ‘Making Do’ in the Contemporary Johannesburg Landscape,” in Okwui Enwezor et al. (eds.), Under Siege: Four African Cities. Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos. Documenta 11 Platform 4 (Ostfildern-­Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2002), pp. 153–­172. For an excellent account of crime, film and the city, see Alexandra Parker, Urban Film and Everyday Practice: Bridging Divisions in Johannesburg (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2016), pp. 165–­191. 8. For comparative purposes, see Roy Coleman, “Surveillance in the City: Prime Definition and Urban Spatial Order,” Crime Media Culture 1, 2 (2005), pp. 131–­148. 9. See Martin J. Murray, City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 258–­260, 267–­268, 276–­277, and 280–­ 282. 10. See, for example, Gillian Gregory and Ismael Vaccaro, “Islands of Governmentality: Rainforest Conservation, Indigenous Rights, and the Territorial Reconfiguration of Guyanese Sovereignty,” Territory, Politics, and Governance 3, 3 (2015), pp. 344–­363. 11. Julie Berg, “Governing Security in Public Places: Improvement Districts in South Africa,” in Randy Lippert and Kevin Walby (eds.), Policing Cities: Urban Securitization and Regulation in a Twenty-­First Century World (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 161–­ 175 (quotations on pp. 161–­162). 12. Elisabeth Peyroux, “City Improvement Districts in Johannesburg: An Examination of the Local Variations of the BID Model,” in Robert Pütz (ed.), Business Improvement Districts. Einneues Governance-­Model aus Perspektive von Praxis und Stadforschung

284 •

Notes to Pages 4–6

(Passau, Germany: Geographische Handelsforschung 14, 2008), pp. 139–­162. For comparative purposes, see Kevin Ward, “‘Creating a Personality for Downtown’: Business Improvement Districts in Milwaukee,” Urban Geography 28, 8 (2007), pp. 781–­808. 13. For comparative purposes, see Gordon MacLeod, “From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a ‘Revanchist City’? On the Spatial Injustices of Glasgow’s Renaissance,” Antipode 34, 3 (2002), pp. 602–­623. 14. For this phrase, see Benjamin Muller, Thomas Cook, Miguel De Larrinaga, Phillippe Frowd, Deljana Iossifova, Daniela Johannes, Can Mutlu, and Adam Nowek, “Ferocious Architecture: Sovereign Spaces/Places by Design,” International Political Sociology 10 (2016), pp. 75–­96. 15. Davis, “Fortress Los Angeles,” pp. 156–­158 (quotation on p. 158). 16. Jon Coaffee, “Urban Renaissance in the Age of Terrorism: Revanchism, Automated Social Control, or the End of Reflection?” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29, 2 (2005), pp. 447–­454; John Punter, “The Privatisation of the Public Realm,” Planning Practice and Research 5, 2 (1990), pp. 9–­16; and Alan Reeve, “The Private Realm of the Managed Town Centre,” Urban Design International 1, 1 (1996), pp. 61–­80. 17. Shoneez Bulbulia, “If CBD Muggers Don’t Get You, the Cowboys Will,” Saturday Star, November 7, 1998. 18. For a wider discussion of some of the theoretical literature, see Ulrich Beck, Brave New World of Work, trans. Patrick Camiller (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000); David Garland, “Governmentality and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology, Sociology,” Theoretical Criminology 1, 2 (1998), pp. 172–­214; and Pat O’Malley, “Risk, Power, and Crime Prevention,” Economy and Society 21, 3 (1992), pp. 252–­275. 19. M. Christine Boyer, City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imaginary and Architectural Entertainments (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 69. 20. Sally Engle Merry, “Spatial Governmentality and the New Urban Social Order: Controlling Gender Violence through Law,” American Anthropologist 103, 1 (2001): 16–­ 29; Steven Robins, “At the Limits of Spatial Governmentality: A Message from the Tip of Africa,” Third World Quarterly 23, 4 (2002), pp. 665–­689 (esp. 665); Richard Perry, “Governmentalities in City-­Scapes: Introduction to the Symposium. Symposium on City-­Spaces and Arts of Government,” Polar: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 23, 1 (2000), pp. 65–­73; and Pat O’Malley, “Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism, and Contract,” Economy and Society 29, 4 (2000), pp. 460–­484 (esp. 465). 21. Michaelis Lianos (with Mary Douglas), “Dangerization and the End of Deviance: The Institutional Environment,” British Journal of Criminology 40, 2 (2000), pp. 261–­278; and John Braithwaite, “The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology,” British Journal of Criminology 40, 2 (2000), pp. 222–­238. 22. Coleman, “Surveillance in the City,” p. 134. 23. See, for example, Richard Scherr, “The Synthetic City: Excursions into the Real–­ Not Real,” Places 18, 2 (2006), pp. 6–­15.



Notes to Pages 6–8 • 285

24. See Richard Ericson and Keith Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 176–­197. 25. Merry, “Spatial Governmentality,” pp. 16–­17; Robins, “At the Limits of Spatial Governmentality,” pp. 665–­689 (esp. 669); and Don Mitchell, “The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-­Homeless Laws in the United States,” Antipode 29, 3 (1997), pp. 303–­335. 26. Robins, “At the Limits of Spatial Governmentality,” p. 667. 27. See also Mike Davis, “The Future of Fear,” City 5, 3 (2001), pp. 388–­390; Jennifer Light, “Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 607–­613; and Todd Swanstrom, “Are Fear and Urbanism at War?” Urban Affairs Review 38, 1 (2002), pp. 135–­140. 28. Alexandra Fanghanel, “The Trouble with Safety: Fear of Crime, Pollution, and Subjectification in Public Space,” Theoretical Criminology 20, 1 (2016), pp. 57–­74 (quotations on p. 58). See also Stephen Farrall, Jonathan Jackson, and Emily Gray, Social Order and the Fear of Crime in Contemporary Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Katsaura, “Ethnopolitics,” pp. 42–­60. 29. See, for example, Gwen Van Eijk, “Exclusionary Policies Are Not Just about the ‘Neoliberal City’: A Critique of Theories of Urban Revanchism and the Case of Rotterdam,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34, 4 (2010), pp. 820–­834. 30. Murray Lee, Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2007). 31. Hans Boutellier, The Safety Utopia: Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to Crime and Punishment (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 2004). 32. Ellin, “Shelter from the Storm,” p. 42. 33. Nan Ellin, Postmodern Urbanism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 153. 34. Peter Marcuse, “Urban Form and Globalization after September 11th: The View from New York,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 596–­606. 35. Nick Jewson and Suzanne MacGregor, “Introduction,” in Nick Jewson and Suzanne MacGregor (eds.), Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1–­17 (quotation on p. 1). 36. For a broader view, see Sharon Zukin, The Culture of Cities (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Susan Fainstein, The City Builders: Property, Politics, and Planning in London and New York (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Susan Fainstein, “New Directions in Planning Theory,” Urban Affairs Review 35, 4 (2000), pp. 451–­478; and Bob Jessop, “The Entrepreneurial City: Re-­imaging Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital?” in Jewson and MacGregor, Transforming Cities, pp. 28–­41. 37. See Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie, “Walled Cities: Surveillance, Regulation, and Segregation,” in Steve Pile, Christopher Brook, and Gerry Mooney (eds.), Unruly Cities? Order/Disorder (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 103–­148 (esp. p. 117). See also Susan Christopherson, “The Fortress City: Privatised Spaces, Consumer Citizen-

286 •

Notes to Pages 8–12

ship,” in Ash Amin (ed.), Post-­Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 409–­427; and Loretta Lees, “Urban Resistance and the Street: Spaces of Control and Contestation,” in Nicolaus Fyfe (ed.), Images on the Street (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 236–­253. 38. James Fraser, Joshua Theodore Bazuin, and George Hornberger, “The Privatization of Neighborhood Governance and the Production of Urban Space,” Environment and Planning A 48, 5 (2016), pp. 844–­870 (quotation on p. 844). 39. See Jamie Peck, “Neoliberal Suburbanism: Frontier Space,” Urban Geography 32, 6 (2011), pp. 884–­919. 40. Information derived from interviews with Vickie Drinkwater, February 2, 2016; and Danyle Nuñes, June 14, 2018. 41. Katsaura, “Ethnopolitics,” pp. 42–­60 (quotation on p. 43). 42. Fraser, Bazuin, and Hornberger, “Privatization of Neighborhood Governance,” p. 846. 43. Nikolas Rose, “The Death of the Social? Re-­figuring the Territory of Government,” Economy and Society 25, 3 (1996), pp. 327–­356 (quotation on p. 327). 44. Rose, “Death of the Social?” pp. 332, 335. 45. Goldstein, “Toward a Critical Anthropology,” pp. 487–­517 (quotation on p. 492). See also Greg Elmer and Andy Opel, “Surviving the Inevitable Future: Preemption in an Age of Faulty Intelligence,” Cultural Studies 20, 4–­5 (2006), pp. 477–­492. 46. Fraser, Barzuin, and Hornberger, “Privatization of Neighborhood Governance,” p. 848. See also Therese Kenna and Kevin Dunn, “The Virtuous Discourses of Private Communities,” Geography Compass 3, 2 (2009), pp. 797–­816. 47. Goldstein, “Toward a Critical Anthropology,” p. 492. 48. See Clarno and Murray, “Policing in Johannesburg,” pp. 210–­227. 49. Monique Marks and Jennifer Wood, “The South African Policing ‘Nexus’: Charting the Policing Landscape in Durban,” South African Review of Sociology 38, 2 (2007), pp. 134–­160. 50. See Caroline Humphrey, “Sovereignty,” in David Nugent and Joan Vincent (eds.), A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 421–­436. 51. Sarah-­Jane Cooper-­Knock, “Beyond Agamben: Sovereignty, Policing, and ‘Permissive Space’ in South Africa and Beyond,” Theoretical Criminology 22, 1 (2018), pp. 22–­41 (quotation on p. 29). 52. Cooper-­Knock, “Beyond Agamben,” p. 29. 53. Cooper-­Knock, “Beyond Agamben,” p. 28. 54. Cooper-­Knock, “Beyond Agamben,” p. 29. 55. Teresa Dirsuweit, “Between Ontological Security and the Right [of] Difference: Road Closures, Communitarianism, and Urban Ethics in Johannesburg, South Africa,” Autrepart 2, 42 (2007), pp. 53–­7 1. 56. See interviews with Tessa Turvey, June 11, 2012; Daniel Marsay, June 11, 2012; Brian Robertson, June 12, 2012; and Geoff Shapiro, June 13, 2012. 57. Cooper-­Knock, “Beyond Agamben,” pp. 29, 30, 36. 58. Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 4: 1938–­1940 (edited by Howard Eiland



Notes to Pages 12–15 • 287

and Michael Jennings) (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2003), p. 392. See also Lieven de Cauter, Entropic Empire: On the City of Man in the Age of Disaster (Brussels: NAi 010, 2013). 59. Alex Eliseev, “Jo’burg Evictions ‘Barbaric’ and ‘Unconstitutional,’” Mail & Guardian, July 14, 2005; Alex Eliseev, “Hundreds Evicted from Jo’burg Office Building,” Mail & Guardian, July 14, 2005. 60. Christopher McMichael, “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes’ in Contemporary Johannesburg,” Antipode 47, 5 (2015), pp. 1261–­1278 (esp. p. 1270). 61. Anti-­Privatisation Forum, “Johannesburg Inner City Anti-­Eviction Campaign March Saturday 14 December,” press release, December 12, 2002. Some of these ideas are derived from personal observation over many years. 62. See, for example, Staff Reporter, “138 Suspects Arrested in Hillbrow,” SAPA News Agency, September 25, 2003. See also Martin J. Murray, Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg after Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 59–­89. 63. Julia Hornberger, Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg (London: Routledge, 2011); Jonny Steinberg, “Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom, and Xenophobia in South Africa,” British Journal of Criminology 52, 2 (2011), pp. 345–­360; Monique Marks, “The Fantastical World of South Africa’s Roadblocks: Dilemmas of Ubiquitous Police Strategy,” in Leanne Weber and Ben Bowling (eds.), Stop and Search: Police Power in Global Context (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 56–­67; and Niren Tolsi and Manqoba Nxumalo, “The Scouring of Jo’burg’s Inner City,” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), October 25, 2013; and McMichael, “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes,’” pp. 1261–­1278. 64. Staff Reporter, “JHB Embarks on Clean-­Up Campaign,” SAPA News Agency, December 29, 2003. 65. Gcina Ntsaluba, “Watch Out, Street Robberies Are on the Rise,” The Citizen, January 10, 2020. 66. Municipal authorities evicted illegal squatters from the notorious Europa, Mimosa, and Rondesbosch hotels in Hillbrow. See Staff Reporter, “Joburg Spruces Up Inner City,” Business Day, October 6, 2004. 67. Peter Honey, “The Man Who Is Trying to Bring Down an Elephant,” Financial Mail, October 10, 2003. 68. Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 2. 69. Nancy Scheper-­Hughes, “Dangerous and Endangered Youth: Social Structures and Determinants of Violence,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1033 (2004), pp. 13–­46 (quotation on p. 13). 70. Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, 3 (1969), pp. 167–­191 (quotation on p. 171). See also Nancy Scheper-­Hughes, “Everyday Violence: Bodies, Death, and Silence,” in Stuart Corbridge (ed.), Development Studies: A Reader (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), pp. 438–­447.

288 •

Notes to Pages 15–17

71. For comparative purposes, see Caroline Moser, “Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap,” Environment and Urbanization 16, 2 (2004), pp. 3–­16. 72. Samuel Nunn, “Police Technology in Cities: Changes and Challenges,” Technology in Society 23, 1 (2001), pp. 11–­27; and James Byrne and Gary Marx, “Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and Policing: A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact,” Cahiers Politiestudies Jaargang 20 (2011–­2013), pp. 17–­40. 73. Stephen Graham, “Cities as Battlespace: The New Military Urbanism,” City 13, 4 (2009), pp. 383–­402 (esp. p. 383); and Stephen Graham, Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (New York: Verso, 2010), pp. xiii-­xiv, 21, 60. 74. Paul Watt, “A Nomadic War Machine in the Metropolis,” City 20, 2 (2016), pp. 297–­320. 75. Watt, “Nomadic War Machine,” p. 301. 76. See, for example, Gaetan Heroux, “War on the Poor: Urban Poverty, Target Policing, and Social Control,” in Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.), Anti-­Security (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011), pp. 107–­134. 77. Mark Neocleous, “‘A Brighter and Nicer New Life’: Security as Pacification,” Social and Legal Studies 20, 2 (2011), pp. 191–­208 (esp. pp. 192, 201). See also Dennis Webster, “Ke Molao Wa Rona: Joburg Continues Its Anti-­Poor Approach,” Daily Maverick (Online), February 27, 2015. 78. See Mark Neocleous, “The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War, and the Hunt,” Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes 9, 2 (2013), pp. 7–­31. 79. Jacob Rasmussen, “Struggling for the City: Evictions in Inner-­City Johannesburg,” in Lars Buur, Stefan Jensen, and Finn Stepputat (eds.), The Security-­Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Security in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2007), pp. 174–­190 (esp. pp. 179–­180). 80. See Tanja Winkler, “Prolonging the Global Age of Gentrification: Johannesburg’s Regeneration Policies,” Planning Theory 8, 4 (2009), pp. 362–­381; and Sihlongonyane, “Rhetorical Devices for Marketing and Branding,” pp. 2134–­2152. 81. See, for example, Lucia Zedner, “The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis,” Legal Studies 23, 1 (2003), pp. 153–­175. 82. Andy Clarno, “A Tale of Two Walled Cities: Neo-­Liberalization and Enclosure in Johannesburg and Jerusalem,” in Diane Davis and Christina Proenza-­Coles (eds.), Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 19 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2008), pp. 161–­207. See also Mitchell, “Annihilation of Space by Law,” pp. 303–­335. 83. Kedron Thomas, Kevin Louis O’Neill, and Thomas Offit, “An Introduction,” in Kevin Louis O’Neill and Kedron Thomas (eds.), Securing the City: Neoliberalism, Space, and Insecurity in Postwar Guatemala (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 1–­21 (esp. pp. 12–­13). 84. Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 35. Müller, Punitive City, pp. 7–­8. See also Graham Denyer Willis, The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press,



Notes to Pages 17–20 • 289

2015), pp. 3–­19; Daniel Goldstein, Outlawed: Between Security and Rights in a Bolivian City (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); and Loïc Wacquant, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008). 85. See Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 338–­339. 86. Goldstein, Outlawed, p. 3. 87. For the source of the quotation, see Rob Nixon, “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque,” MFS Modern Fiction Studies 55, 3 (2009), pp. 443–­ 467 (esp. p. 451). 88. See Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 210. For the classical text, see Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). See also Imogen Tyler, Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (London: Zed Books, 2013), pp. 1–­18. 89. Pablo Piccato, City of Suspects: Crime in Mexico City, 1900–­1931 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 3, 4, 9. 90. See Anna Becker and Markus-­Michael Müller, “The Securitization of Urban Space and the ‘Rescue’ of Downtown Mexico City: Vision and Practice,” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 77–­94 (esp. p. 78). 91. Wacquant, Urban Outcasts, p. 199. 92. McMichael, “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes,’” pp. 1261–­1278. 93. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 292. 94. Erika Robb Larkins, “Performances of Police Legitimacy in Rio’s Hyper Favela,” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 553–­575. For comparative work on Brazil, see Teresa Caldeira, “The Paradox of Police Violence in Democratic Brazil,” Ethnography 3, 3 (2002), pp. 235–­263. 95. Christopher McMichael, “‘Clearly Blown Away by the End of the Morning’s Drama’: Spectacle, Pacification, and the 2010 World Cup, South Africa,” Socialist Studies/ Études Socialistes 9, 2 (2013), pp. 111–­129 (quotation on p. 111). 96. Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 64, 87. 97. Jonny Steinberg, “Crime Prevention Goes Abroad: Policy Transfer and Policing in Post-­Apartheid South Africa,” Theoretical Criminology 15, 4 (2011), pp. 349–­364 (esp. p. 358). 98. Saskia Sassen, Territory ● Authority ● Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, updated ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 2–­3. 99. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 32. 100. Dennis Rodgers, “The State as a Gang: Conceptualizing the Governmentality of Violence in Contemporary Nicaragua,” Critique of Anthropology 26, 3 (2006), pp. 315–­ 330 (esp. p. 326).

290 •

Notes to Pages 20–23

101. Sibongile Mashaba, “Crime Wave Grips Joburg CBD,” The Star, November 5, 2018; and Roxanne Henderson, “Johannesburg Banks Battle against Armed Highwaymen as Road Works Lead to Employees Being Held Up at Gunpoint,” Sunday Independent, May 11, 2019. 102. Alfonso Valenzuela-­Aguilera, “Urban Surges: Power, Territory, and the Social Control of Space in Latin America,” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 21–­34 (esp. p. 21). 103. Matthew Savides, “Bullets Fly in ‘Scary as Hell’ Clash between Hijackers and Security Guards in Joburg,” TimesLIVE, July 6, 2018; AFP, “Two Suspects Shot Dead in Robbery at South African School,” The East African (Nairobi), February 21, 2019; and Staff Writer, “Suspects Injured after an Attempted Food Delivery Car Hijacking in Paulshof,” Fourways Review (Gauteng), December 5, 2019. 104. See Seth Schindler, “Governing the Twenty-­First Century Metropolis and Transforming Territory,” Territory, Politics, Governance 3, 1 (2013), pp. 7–­26 (esp. pp. 7, 12, 20). 105. Schindler, “Governing the Twenty-­First Century Metropolis,” p. 20. 106. See Tessa Diphoorn, Twilight Policing: Private Security and Violence in Urban South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), pp. 194–­229; and Andy Clarno, Neoliberal Apartheid: Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 125–­157. Information was also derived from numerous interviews with managers of private security companies. 107. See Martin J. Murray, Panic City: Crime and the Fear Industries in Johannesburg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020), pp. 69–­110. 108. Elaine Campbell, “Three-­ Dimensional Security: Layers, Spheres, Volumes, Milieus,” Political Geography 69 (2019), pp. 10–­21 (quotation on p. 14). 109. See Chiara Fonio and Giovanni Pisapia, “Security, Surveillance, and Geographical Patterns at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in Johannesburg,” Geographical Journal 181, 3 (2015), pp. 242–­248. See also Casparus Olckers, “An Examination of the Impact of Residential Security Measures on the Incidence of Residential Burglary in Two Selected Northern Suburbs of Johannesburg: A Security Risk Management Approach” (Magister Technologiae, Security Risk Management, University of South Africa, 2007). 110. On-­site observation, Beagle Watch public presentation to Melville residents, January 30, 2020 (Nicky Falkof and Lily Manion). 111. Gretchen Soderlund, “Introduction to ‘Charting, Tracking, and Mapping: New Technologies, Labor, and Surveillance,’” Social Semiotics 23, 2 (2013), pp. 163–­172 (quotation on p. 163). 112. Rachael Macrorie, Simon Marvin, and Aidan While, “Robotics and Automation in the City: A Research Agenda,” Urban Geography 42, 2 (2019), pp. 1–­21 (quotation on p. 1). 113. Vincent Del Casino, Lily House-­Peters, Jeremy Crampton, and Hannes Gerhardt, “The Social Life of Robots: The Politics of Algorithms, Governance, and Sovereignty,” Antipode 52, 3 (2020), pp. 605–­618 (quotation on p. 606). 114. Ayse Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security: Management of Uncertainty and



Notes to Pages 23–24 • 291

Risk in the Age of Biometrics,” Surveillance & Society 5 (2008), pp. 102–­123. See also Derek Gregory, “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 7–­8 (2011), pp. 188–­215. 115. For the ideas of technostructures of security, see Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson, “The Military Technocultures of Policing,” in Peter Kraska (ed.), Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), pp. 43–­ 64. See also Tyler Wall, “Unmanning the Police Manhunt: Vertical Security as Pacification,” Socialist Studies 9, 2 (2013), pp. 32–­56 (esp. p. 33); John Cheney-­Lippold, “A New Algorithmic Identity, Soft Biopolitics, and the Modulation of Control,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 6 (2011), pp. 164–­181; and Lane DeNicola, “The Bundling of Geospatial Information with Everyday Experience,” in Torin Monahan (ed.), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 243–­264. 116. Jeremy Crampton, “Assemblage of the Vertical: Commercial Drones and Algorithmic Life,” Geographica Helvetica 71, 2 (2016), pp. 137–­146. See also Michael Batty, “Big Data, Smart Cities, and City Planning,” Dialogues in Human Geography 3, 3 (2013), pp. 274–­279. 117. See, among others, Louise Amoore, “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror,” Political Geography 25 (2006), pp. 336–­351; Dennis Broeders, “The New Digital Borders of Europe: Digital Databases and the Surveillance of Migrants,” International Sociology 22, 1 (2007), pp. 51–­72; Karine Côté-­Boucher, “The Diffuse Border: Intelligence Sharing and Control and Confinement along Canada’s Smart Border,” Surveillance & Society 5, 3 (2008), pp. 142–­165; Torin Monahan and Tyler Wall, “Somatic Surveillance: Corporeal Control through Information Networks,” Surveillance & Society 4, 3 (2007), pp. 154–­173; and Benjamin Muller, Security, Risk, and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies (New York: Routledge, 2010). 118. Del Casino, House-­Peters, Crampton, and Gerhardt, “Social Life of Robots,” p. 609. See also Louise Amoore and Rita Raley, “Securing with Algorithms: Knowledge, Decision, Sovereignty,” Security Dialogue 48, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­10. 119. Soderlund, “Introduction to ‘Charting, Tracking, and Mapping,’ ” pp. 163–­172 (esp. p. 164. 120. Soderlund, “Introduction to ‘Charting, Tracking, and Mapping,’ ” p. 167. 121. Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson, “The Surveillant Assemblage,” British Journal of Sociology 51, 4 (2000), pp. 605–­622 (esp. 606). 122. John Seabrook, “Adversarial Man,” The New Yorker, March 16, 2020, pp. 44–­49 (quotations on p. 45). 123. Peter Adey, “Vertical Security in the Megacity: Legibility, Mobility, and Aerial Politics,” Theory, Culture & Society 27, 6 (2010), 51–­67 (esp. p. 52). 124. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 28, 34–­36. 125. Marta Mourão Kanashiro, “Surveillance Cameras in Brazil: Exclusion, Mobility Regulation, and the New Meanings of Security,” Surveillance & Society 5, 3 (2008), pp. 270–­289.

292 • Notes to Pages 24–26

126. Graham, Cities under Siege, p. 64. 127. Ciara Bracken-­Roche, “Domestic Drones: The Politics of Verticality and the Surveillance Industrial Complex,” Geographica Helvetica 7, 3 (2016), pp. 167–­172; Stephen Graham, “Surveillance, Urbanization, and the US ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’” in David Lyon (ed.), Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2006), pp. 247–­269; Stephen Graham, “Opinion: Digital Medieval,” Surveillance & Society 9, 3 (2012), pp. 321–­327; and Macrorie, Marvin, and While, “Robotics and Automation in the City,” pp. 1–­2. 128. Campbell, “Three-­Dimensional Security,” pp. 10–­21 (quotation on p. 10); Stephen Graham and Lucy Hewitt, “Getting Off the Ground: On the Politics of Urban Verticality,” Progress in Human Geography 37, 1 (2013), pp. 72–­92; and Chad Harris, “The Omniscient Eye: Satellite Imagery, ‘Battlespace Awareness,’ and the Structures of the Imperial Gaze,” Surveillance & Society 4, 1–­2 (2006), pp. 101–­122. 129. Campbell, “Three-­Dimensional Security,” p. 10. 130. Crampton, “Assemblage of the Vertical,” pp. 137–­146. See Campbell, “Three-­ Dimensional Security,” p. 10. 131. Francis Massé, “Topographies of Security and the Multiple Spatialities of (Conservation) Power: Verticality, Surveillance, and Space-­Time Compression in the Bush,” Political Geography 67 (2018), pp. 56–­64. See also Stuart Elden, “Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics and the Depth of Power,” Political Geography 34 (2013), pp. 35–­51. 132. See, for example, Ian Shaw, Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); Graham and Hewitt, “Getting Off the Ground,” pp. 72–­92; and Eyal Weitzman, “The Politics of Verticality,” Open Democracy (May 1, 2002), p. 2 [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-politicsv​ erticality/article_810.jsp]. 133. Anna Feigenbaum and Anja Kanngieser, “For a Politics of Atmospheric Governance,” Dialogues in Human Geography 5, 1 (2015), pp. 80–­84 (esp. p. 81). 134. Martin Tironi and Matías Valderrama Barragan, “The Militarization of the Urban Sky in Santiago de Chile: The Vision Multiple of a Video-­Surveillance System of Aerostatic Balloons,” Urban Geography 42, 2 (2019), pp. 1–­20 (quotation on p. 4); and Bracken-­Roche, “Domestic Drones,” pp. 167–­172. 135. Sven Braun, Michael Friedewald, and Govert Valkenburg, “Civilizing Drones–­–­ Military Discourses Going Civil?” Science & Technology Studies 28, 2 (2015), pp. 73–­78; and Ole Jensen, “New ‘Foucauldian Boomerangs’: Drones and Urban Surveillance,” Surveillance & Society, 14, 1 (2016), pp. 20–­33. 136. Tironi and Barragan, “Militarization of the Urban Sky,” p. 4. 137. James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 41; Adey, “Vertical Security in the Megacity,” pp. 51–­67; Derek Gregory, “The Natures of War,” Antipode 48, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­56; Ian Shaw, “Scorched Atmospheres: The Violent Geographies of the Vietnam War and the Rise of Drone Warfare,” Annals of the Association of American



Notes to Pages 26–28 • 293

Geographers 106, 3 (2016), pp. 688–­704; and Crampton, “Assemblage of the Vertical,” pp. 137–­146. 138. Massé, “Topographies of Security,” pp. 56–­64 (quotation on p. 60). 139. Ian Shaw, “The Urbanization of Drone Warfare: Policing Surplus Populations in the Dronepolis,” Geographica Helvetia 71 (2016), pp. 19–­28. 140. Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison Williams, “Introduction: Air-­Target: Distance, Reach, and the Politics of Verticality,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 7–­8 (2011), pp. 173–­187 (esp. p. 176). 141. Adey, Whitehead, and Williams, “Introduction,” pp. 173–­176. 142. Sonia Bookman and Andrew Woolford, “Policing (by) the Urban Brand: Defining Order in Winnipeg’s Exchange District,” Social & Cultural Geography 14, 3 (2013), pp. 300–­317; Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, “Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New Denizens,” Journal of Law and Society 30, 3 (2003), pp. 400–­419; and Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice (London: Routledge, 2003). 143. Bruce Baker, “Living with Non-­State Policing in South Africa: The Issues and Dilemmas,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40, 1 (2002), pp. 29–­53; and Bruce Baker, “Taking the Law into Their Own Hands: Fighting Crime in South Africa” (paper presented at the 29th Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, April 6–­11, 2001), pp. 1–­20 (quotations on p. 3). 144. Marijn Hoijtink, “Capitalizing on Emergence: The ‘New’ Civil Security Market in Europe,” Security Dialogue 45, 5 (2014), pp. 458–­475; and Darshan Vigneswaran, “The Contours of Disorder: Crime Maps and Territorial Policing in South Africa,” Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 32, 1 (2014), pp. 91–­107. 145. Baker, “Taking the Law into Their Own Hands,” p. 3. See also Keith Hayward, “The Future of (Spatial) Criminology and Research about Public Space,” in Mattias De Backer, Lucas Melgaço, Georgiana Varna, and Francesca Menichelli (eds.), Order and Conflict in Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2016), 207–­215. 146. See, for example, Jane Duncan, Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018). 147. While out of context, these ideas are derived from a reading of Thomas Blom Hansen, “Sovereigns beyond the State: On Legality and Authority in Urban India,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds.), Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 169–­186 (esp. pp. 169–­170). 148. Between the early 2000s and 2017, the number of private security guards doubled. According to industry estimates, the annual turnover was more than R50 billion ($3.7 billion) as the cost of buying security. See Krista Mahr, “High South African Crime Rates and Low Faith in Police Boost Private Security in Gauteng,” Financial Times, May 27, 2017. 149. Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmen-

294 •

Notes to Pages 28–30

tality of Unease,” Alternatives 27, 1 (special issue) (2002), pp. 63–­92 (quotations on pp. 64, 72). See also Daniel O’Connor, Randy Lippert, Dale Spencer, and Lisa Smylie, “Seeing Private Security Like a State,” Criminology and Criminal Justice 8, 2 (2008), pp. 203–­226. 150. Clarno, Neoliberal Apartheid, pp. 125–­157. 151. Hansen, “Sovereigns beyond the State,” p. 171. 152. Hansen, “Sovereigns beyond the State,” p. 172. 153. Thomas Blom Hansen, “Performers of Sovereignty: On the Privatization of Security in Urban South Africa,” Critique of Anthropology 26, 3 (2006), pp. 279–­295. 154. See John Topping and Jonny Byrne, “Shadow Policing: The Boundaries of Community-­Based ‘Policing’ in Northern Ireland,” Policing and Society 26, 5 (2016), pp. 522–­543. 155. James Martin, “Informal Security Nodes and Force Capital,” Policing and Society 23, 2 (2013), pp. 145–­163 (esp. p. 145). For the idea of mass private property, see Michael Kempa, Philip Stenning, and Jennifer Wood, “Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration of the ‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis,” British Journal of Criminology 44, 4 (2004), pp. 562–­581; Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning, Private Security and Private Justice (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983); and Alison Wakefield, Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2003). 156. Murray, Panic City, pp. 69–­114. 157. Martin, “Informal Security Nodes,” pp. 145–­146. 158. Monique Marks and Debbie Bonnin, “Generating Safety from Below: Community Safety Groups and the Policing Nexus in Durban,” South African Review of Sociology 41, 1 (2010), pp. 56–­77; Moritz Schuberth, “The Challenge of Community-­Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes,” Contemporary Security Policy 36, 2 (2015), pp. 296–­320; and Sarah-­Jane Cooper-­Knock and Olly Owen, “Between Vigilantism and Bureaucracy: Improving Our Understanding of Police Work in Nigeria and South Africa,” Theoretical Criminology 19, 3 (2015), pp. 335–­375. 159. James Martin, “Vigilantism and Informal Social Control in South Africa,” Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 23, 3 (2010), pp. 53–­70; Lars Buur and Stephan Jensen, “Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life,” Journal of African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 139–­152; and Barbara Oomen, “Vigilantism or Alternative Citizenship? The Rise of Mapogo a Mathamaga,” Journal of African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 153–­172. 160. Martin, “Informal Security Nodes,” p. 146. See also Oomen, “Vigilantism or Alternative Citizenship?” pp. 153–­172; Lars Buur, “Fluctuating Personhood: Vigilantism and Citizenship in Port Elizabeth’s Townships,” in David Pratten and Artyee Sen (eds.), Global Vigilantes: Anthropological Perspectives on Justice and Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 127–­150; and Martin, “Vigilantism and Informal Social Control,” pp. 53–­70. 161. See William J. Mitchell, E-­topia: “Urban Life, Jim, but Not as We Know It” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 12–­13.



Notes to Pages 30–34 • 295

162. Mitchell, E-­topia, p. 44. 163. Mitchell, E-­topia, pp. 44–­45. 164. See Nastaran Dadashi, Alex Stedmon, and Tony Pridmore, “Semi-­Automated CCTV Surveillance: The Effects of System Confidence, System Accuracy, and Task Complexity on Operator Vigilance, Reliance, and Workload,” Applied Ergonomics 44, 5 (2013), pp. 730–­738 (esp. p. 730). 165. Anthony Davies and Sergio Velastin, “A Progress Review of Intelligent CCTV Surveillance Systems,” IDAACS’05 Workshop (Sofia, September 2005), pp. 1–­6. 166. Tamara Vukov and Mimi Sheller, “Border Work: Surveillant Assemblages, Virtual Fences, and Tactical Counter-­Media,” Social Semiotics 23, 2 (2013), pp. 225–­241 (esp. p. 228). 167. Davies and Velastin, “Progress Review,” pp. 1–­6. 168. Davies and Velastin, “Progress Review,” p. 5. 169. Bart Simon, “The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection, and the New Surveillance,” Surveillance & Society 3, 1 (2005), pp. 1–­20 (esp. p. 1). 170. Franck Cochoy, “Calculation, Qualculation, Calqulation: Shopping Cart Arithmetic, Equipped Cognition, and the Clustered Consumer,” Marketing Theory 8, 1 (2008), pp. 15–­44. 171. See Mark Andrejevic, “Automating Surveillance,” Surveillance & Society 17, 1–­2 (2019), pp. 7–­13 (quotation on p. 8). 172. Marieke de Goede “The Chain of Security,” Review of International Studies 44, 1 (2018), pp. 24–­42. 173. Melinda Cooper, “Pre-­empting Emergence: The Biological Turn in the War on Terror,” Theory, Culture & Society 23, 4 (2006), pp. 113–­135. See also Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, “The Reality of Moral Expectations: A Sociology of Situated Judgement,” Philosophical Explorations 3, 3 (2000), pp. 208–­231. 174. See de Goede “Chain of Security,” p. 41. 175. Tiana Bucher, “Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of Invisibility on Facebook,” New Media & Society 14, 7 (2012), pp. 1164–­1180 (quotation on p. 1170). 176. Andrejevic, “Automating Surveillance,” p. 8. 177. See Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” p. 226.

Chapter 1 1. Anne-­Marie Singh, Policing and Crime Control in Post-­Apartheid South Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 1–­3. 2. Anthony Altbeker, A Country at War with Itself: South Africa’s Crisis of Crime (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007). See also interview with Antony Altbeker, June 28, 2011. 3. Singh, Policing and Crime Control, p. 1. See also Johan Burger, “Crime Combating in Perspective: A Strategic Approach to Policing and the Prevention of Crime in South

296 •

Notes to Pages 34–36

Africa,” Acta Criminologica 19, 2 (2006), pp. 105–­118; and Johan Burger, Strategic Perspectives on Crime and Policing in South Africa (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2007). 4. Steffen Jensen, “Conflicting Logics of Exceptionality: New Beginnings and the Problem of Police Violence in Post-­Apartheid South Africa,” Development and Change 45, 3 (2014), pp. 458–­478 (esp. pp. 462–­465); Julia Hornberger, “Human Rights and Policing: Exigency or Incongruence,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 6 (2010), pp. 259–­283; and Hornberger, Policing and Human Rights. 5. Steffen Jensen, “From Development to Security: Political Subjectivity and the South African Transition,” Development and Change 36, 3 (2005), pp. 551–­570; and Steffen Jensen, “The Vision of the State: Audiences, Enchantments, and Policing in South Africa,” in Andrew Jefferson and Steffen Jensen (eds.), State Violence and Human Rights: State Officials in the South (New York: Routledge-­Cavendish, 2009), pp. 60–­78. 6. Julie Hornberger, “‘My Police—­Your Police’: The Informal Privatization of the Police in Inner-­City Johannesburg,” African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 213–­230; and Sanja Kutnjak Ivković and Adri Sauerman, “Threading the Thin Blue Line: Transition towards Democratic Policing and the Integrity of the South African Police Service,” Policing and Society 25, 1 (2015), pp. 25–­52. 7. Zedner, “Concept of Security,” pp. 153–­175 (esp. pp. 161–­162); and Ian Loader and Adam White, “How Can We Better Align Private Security with the Public Interest? Towards a Civilizing Model of Regulation,” Regulation & Governance 11, 2 (2017), pp. 166–­184. 8. Mark Shaw, Crime and Policing in Post-­Apartheid South Africa: Transforming under Fire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 1–­21; and Monique Marks, Transforming the Robocops: Changing Police in South Africa (Scotsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-­Natal Press, 2005), pp. 1–­30. 9. See Mike Brogden and Clifford Shearing, Policing for a New South Africa (London: Routledge, 1993); Hansen, “Performers of Sovereignty,” pp. 279–­295 (esp. 281); Gavin Cawthra, Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from Apartheid (London: Zed Books, 1993); and John Brewer, Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 10. This and the following paragraphs are adopted from Clarno and Murray, “Policing in Johannesburg,” pp. 210–­227. See also Burger, “Crime Combating in Perspective,” pp. 105–­118; Johan Burger, Strategic Perspectives; Setlhomamaru Dintwe, “The Survival of Community Policing in a Remilitarized Police Approach: A Paradoxical Case of South Africa,” in Arvind Verman, Dilip Das, and Manoj Abraham (eds.), Community Policing: Problems and Challenges (Oxford: CRFC Press, 2012), pp. 215–­228; Roy Macfarlane, “The Private Sector Security Industry in South Africa,” African Defence Review 19 (1994), pp. 25–­29; Sarah Oppler, “Partners against Crime,” in Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, Duxita Mistry, Sarah Oppler, and Lukas Muntingh (eds.), Policing the Transformation: Further Issues in South Africa’s Crime Debate (Monograph Series, no. 12) (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1997), pp. 50–­65; and Singh, Policing and Crime Control, pp. 22–­36.



Notes to Pages 36–39 • 297

Information was also derived from interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011; Earl Stoles and Zane Callaghan, July 9, 2008; and Earl Stoles, June 20, 2012. 11. Hansen, “Performers of Sovereignty,” p. 293. 12. Suren Pillay, “Crime, Community, and the Governance of Violence in Post-­ Apartheid South Africa,” Politikon 35, 2 (2008), pp. 141–­158 (esp. 145–­146). Information was also derived from interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011. 13. See Jenine Rauch, Nadia Levin, Melanie Lue, and Kindiza Ngubeni, Creating a New South African Police Service: Priorities in the Post-­Election Period (Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1994); and Shaw, Crime and Policing, pp. 18–­35. See also interview with Anthony Minnaar, July 6, 2011. 14. See Mark Shaw and Clifford Shearing, “Reshaping Security: An Examination of the Governance of Security in South Africa,” South African Security Review 7, 3 (1998), pp. 3–­12 (quotations on p. 3). See also Singh, Policing and Crime Control, pp. 13–­26. 15. Pillay, “Crime, Community and the Governance of Violence,” p. 146; and Monique Marks and Jenny Fleming, “As Unremarkable as the Air They Breathe? Reforming Police Management in South Africa,” Current Sociology 52, 5 (2004), pp. 784–­808. 16. Pillay, “Crime, Community and the Governance of Violence,” p. 146. Information was also derived from interview with Colonel Kobus Lategan, June 20, 2012. 17. See David Bruce, “Good Cops? Bad Cops? Assessing the South African Police Service,” South Africa Crime Quarterly 21 (2007), pp. 15–­20 [online journal published jointly by Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Centre of Criminology (University of Cape Town)]. [http:/www.criminology.uct.ac.za/south-africa crime-quarterly-sacq]. 18. Marks and Fleming, “As Unremarkable as the Air They Breathe?” pp. 784–­808. 19. Ziyanda Stuurman, “Policing Inequality and the Inequality of Policing: A Look at the Militarisation of Policing around the World, Focusing on Brazil and South Africa,” South African Journal of International Affairs 27, 1 (2020), pp. 43–­66 (esp. pp. 52–­53, 59). 20. Naomi Phillips, “Challenges to Police Reform in Post-­Apartheid South Africa,” On Politics 5, 1 (2011), pp. 53–­68 (esp. p. 53). 21. Richelle Bernazzoli and Colin Flint, “Embodying the Garrison State? Everyday Geographies of Militarisation in American Society,” Political Geography 29, 3 (2010), pp. 157–­166; Richelle Bernazzoli and Colin Flint, “From Militarisation to Securitisation: Finding a Concept That Works,” Political Geography 28, 8 (2009), pp. 449–­450; Graham, “City as Battlespace,” pp. 383–­402; and Daryl Meeks, “Police Militarisation in Urban Areas: The Obscure War against the Underclass,” Black Scholar 35, 4 (2006), pp. 33–­41. 22. Stuurman, “Policing Inequality,” p. 49; and Michael Kempa, “Public Policing, Private Security, Pacifying Populations,” in Michael Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.), Anti-­Security (Ottawa, ON, Canada: Red Quill Books, 2011), pp. 85–­106. 23. Bill Dixon and Janine Rauch, Sector Policing: Origins and Prospects (Monograph no. 97) (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004) [http//www.iss.co.za.html]. See also Jonny Steinberg, “Crime Prevention Goes Abroad: Policy Transfer and Policing in Post-­apartheid South Africa,” Theoretical Criminology 15, 4 (2011), pp. 349–­364.

298 •

Notes to Pages 39–40

24. Burger, Strategic Perspectives; Burger, “Crime Combating in Perspective,” pp. 105–­118; and Bill Dixon, “Globalising the Local: A Genealogy of Sector Policing in South Africa,” International Relations 21, 2 (2007), pp. 163–­182. 25. Martin Innes, “Why ‘Soft’ Policing Is Hard: On the Curious Development of Reassurance Policing, How It Became Neighbourhood Policing, and What This Signifies about the Politics of Police Reform,” Journal of Community and Applied Psychology 15, 3 (2005), pp. 156–­169. 26. See Anthony Minnaar, “Community Policing in a High Crime Transitional State: The Case of South Africa since Democratization in 1994,” in Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe (eds.), Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), pp. 19–­56 (esp. pp. 35–­36); and Millicent Maroga, “Two Sides of the Same Coin? Sector Policing and Community Policing Forums,” South African Crime Quarterly 6 (2003), pp. 13–­16. 27. James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Public Safety,” Atlantic Monthly 3 (1982), pp. 29–­38. 28. See Andrew Karmen, “Zero Tolerance in New York City: Hard Questions for Get-­Tough Policy,” in Roger Hopkins Burke (ed.), Hard Cop, Soft Cop: Dilemmas and Debates in Contemporary Policing (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2004), pp. 23–­ 39; Bill Dixon, “Zero Tolerance: The Hard Edge of Community Policing,” African Security Review 9, 3 (2000), pp. 73–­78 (esp. 74–­75); and Bernd Belina and Gesa Helms, “Zero Tolerance for the Industrial Past and Other Threats: Policing and Urban Entrepreneurialism in Britain and Germany,” Urban Studies 40, 9 (2003), pp. 1845–­1867 (esp. 1847). 29. Judith Green, “Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City,” Crime and Delinquency 45, 2 (1999), pp. 171–­187; Johnston and Shearing, Governing Security pp. 98–­116; and Jordan Camp and Christina Heatherton (eds.), Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter (New York: Verso, 2016). 30. David Dixon, “Broken Windows, Zero Tolerance, and the New York Miracle,” Current Issues in Criminal Justice 10 (1998), pp. 96–­106; Neil Smith, “Giuliani Time,” Social Text 16 (1998), pp. 1–­20; John Flint and Judy Nixon, “Governing Neighbours: Anti-­Social Behaviour Orders and New Forms of Regulating Conduct in the UK,” Urban Studies 43, 5–­6 (2006), pp. 939–­955; Katharyne Mitchell and Katherine Beckett, “Securing the Global City: Crime, Consulting, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space,” Global Legal Studies 15, 1 (2008), pp. 75–­100; and Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones, “Symbolizing Crime Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance,” Theoretical Criminology 11, 2 (2007), pp. 221–­243. 31. See Dixon, “Zero Tolerance,” pp. 73–­78; and Martin Innis, “‘An Iron Fist in an Iron Glove’: The Zero Tolerance Policing Debate,” Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 38, 4 (1999), pp. 397–­410. 32. Neil Smith, “Global Social Cleansing: Postliberal Revanchism and the Export of Zero Tolerance,” Social Justice 28, 3 (2001), pp. 68–­74. 33. Suzanne Daley, “Apartheid’s Feared Police Prove Inept and Corrupt,” New York



Notes to Pages 40–42 • 299

Times, March 25, 1997; and Philip Boffey, “Where Even Cops Get Robbed,” New York Times, August 31, 1997. 34. Staff Writer, “South Africa: New York’s Finest,” The Economist, August 10, 1996, p. 44. 35. Kate Swanson, “Zero Tolerance in Latin America: Punitive Paradox in Urban Policy Mobilities,” Urban Geography 34, 7 (2913), pp. 972–­988; and Dixon, “Broken Windows, Zero Tolerance,” pp. 96–­106. 36. Belina and Helms, “Zero Tolerance for the Industrial Past,” p. 1847; and P. C. Bezuidenhout, “Reducing Crime in South Africa by Enforcing Traffic Laws: A ‘Broken Windscreen’ Approach,” Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering 53, 1 (2011) (no pagination). [http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1​ 021-20192011000100004]. 37. Christian Parenti, Lockdown America (New York: Verso, 1999), p. 69. 38. Maurice Punch, Zero Tolerance Policing (Researching Criminal Justice Series) (Bristol, UK: Policy Press at the University of Bristol, 2007), pp. vi-­53 (esp. p. ix); and Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, “The Convergence of U.S. and U.K. Crime Policy: Exploring Substance and Process,” in Tim Newburn and Richard Sparks (eds.), Criminal Justice and Political Cultures (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2004), pp. 123–­151. 39. Charles Pollard, “Zero Tolerance: Short-­Term Fix, Long-­Term Liability?” in Norman Dennis (ed.), Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1997), pp. 44–­61; and Bernard Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 23–­58. For New York, see Alex Vitale, City of Disorder: How the Quality of Life Campaign Transformed New York Politics (New York: New York University Press, 2009). 40. N. Smith, “Giuliani Time,” pp. 1–­20; Dixon, “Zero Tolerance,” pp. 73–­78; Diane Davis, “Zero-­Tolerance Policing, Stealth Real Estate Development, and the Transformation of Public Space: Evidence from Mexico City,” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 53–­76; Becker and Müller, “Securitization of Urban Space,” pp. 77–­94; Vaughan Crichlow, “Will ‘Broken Windows Policing’ Work in Trinidad and Tobago? A Critical Perspective on Zero Tolerance and Community Policing in a Multi-­Ethnic Society,” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 17, 6 (2016), pp. 570–­581; and Boris Michel, “Going Global, Veiling the Poor Global City Imaginaries in Metro Manila,” Philippine Studies 58, 3 (2010), pp. 383–­406. 41. Belina and Helms, “Zero Tolerance for the Industrial Past,” p. 1847. 42. Dixon, “Zero Tolerance,” p. 74. 43. Loïc Wacquant, “The Penalisation of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-­liberalism,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 9, 4 (2001), pp. 401–­412. 44. Sihlongonyane, “Rhetorical Devices for Marketing and Branding,” pp. 2134–­2154; and Mfaniseni Fana Sihlongonyane, “The Global, the Local, and the Hybrid in the Making of Johannesburg as a World Class African City,” Third World Quarterly 37, 9 (2016), pp. 1607–­1627.

300 •

Notes to Pages 42–44

45. Section 13(1) of Notice 832 of 2004: City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Public Roads and Miscellaneous Bylaws, cited in Claire Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Unbundled Security Services and Urban Fragmentation in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg,” Geoforum 39, 6 (2008), pp. 1933–­1950 (esp. p. 1938]. 46. Claire Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Community Policing and Disputed Norms for Local Social Control in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg,” Journal of Southern Studies 34, 1 (2008), pp. 93–­109 (esp. pp. 105–­106); Claire Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Who Control the Streets? Crime, ‘Communities,’ and the State in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg,” in Francesca Locatelli and Paul Nugent (eds.), African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 55–­80 (esp. 73–­75). 47. Christopher McMichael, “Hosting the World,” City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 16, 5 (2012), pp. 519–­534; and McMichael, “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes,’” pp. 1261–­1278. For a wider view, see Wacquant, “Penalisation of Poverty,” pp. 401–­412. 48. Dixon, “Zero Tolerance,” pp. 73–­78; Bill Dixon, “Development, Crime Prevention, and Social Policy in Post-­Apartheid South Africa,” Critical Social Policy 26, 1 (2009), pp. 169–­191; and Bill Dixon, The Globalisation of Democratic Policing: Sector Policing and Zero Tolerance in the New South Africa,” Occasional Paper Series (Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 2000). 49. Minnaar, “Community Policing in a High Crime Transitional State,” pp. 39–­48. See also Mafuro Kasipo, “What Is the Effect of a State Centric Approach on Policing in South Africa? A Review of Policy” (unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014); and Maroga, “Two Sides of the Same Coin?” pp. 13–­17. 50. Clifford Shearing, “Changing Paradigms of Policing: The Significance of Community Policing for the Governance of Security,” Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper no. 34 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1998). 51. See Marks and Fleming, “As Unremarkable as the Air They Breathe,” pp. 784–­ 808. 52. Bill Dixon, “Community Policing: ‘Cherry Pie’ or Melktert?” Society in Transition 35, 2 (2004), pp. 251–­272; and Monique Marks, Clifford Shearing, and Jennifer Wood, “Who Should the Police Be? Finding a New Narrative for Community Policing in South Africa,” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 10, 2 (2009), pp. 145–­155. For an excellent discussion of the conflation of the two approaches, see Steve Herbert, “Policing the Contemporary City: Fixing Broken Windows or Shoring Up Neo-­Liberalism?” Theoretical Criminology 5, 4 (2001), pp. 445–­466. 53. Interviews with Wendy Vorster-­Robertson, July 4, 2014; Anthony Modena, July 4, 2014; Eve Jammy, July 4, 2014; Cynthia Rose, July 9, 2014; and Nhlanhla Sydney Radebe, July 11, 2014, and February 26, 2016. Also attendance at Operations Meeting for “Safe Parkview” Security Initiative, June 11, 2012; and participation in community policing forum (CPF) Nighttime Patrols, June 27, 2014, and February 16, 2016. 54. Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Community Policing,” pp. 108–­109; and Diana Gordon, “Democratic Consolidation and Community Policing: Conflicting Imperatives in South



Notes to Pages 44–47 • 301

Africa,” Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 11, 2 (2001), pp. 121–­150. Aidan Mosselson points—­correctly—­to the positive role of privatized policing in protecting residents from crime in the Johannesburg inner city but (surprisingly) overlooks the oversized role of such private security companies as Bad Boyz in using extralegal force in targeting marginalized youth to protect private property and private housing investments. See Aidan Mosselson, “Everyday Security: Privatized Policing, Local Legitimacy, and Atmospheres of Control,” Urban Geography 40, 1 (2019), pp. 16–­ 36. See also interview with Danyle Nuñes, June 14, 2018. 55. David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 179. See also Loïc Wacquant, “Relocating Gentrification: The Working Class, Science, and the State in Recent Urban Research,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32, 1 (2008), pp. 198–­205. 56. McMichael, “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes,’” pp. 1261–­1278. 57. Till Paasche, “‘The Softer Side of Security’: The Role of Social Development in Cape Town’s Policing Network,” Geoforum 45 (2013), pp. 259–­265. 58. Paasche, “‘Softer Side of Security,’” p. 263. 59. Interviews with Cecile Loedolf, July 7, 2008; Cynthia Rose, July 9, 2014; Cheryl Labuschagne and Jenny Clark, June 13, 2012; Lornette Joseph, July 10, 2014; and Vickie Drinkwater, February 2, 2016. 60. See Paasche, “‘Softer Side of Security,’” pp. 259–­265; and Hentschel, Security in the Bubble, pp. 57–­88. 61. See Martin J. Murray, “The City in Fragments: Kaleidoscopic Johannesburg after Apartheid,” in Gyan Prakash and Kevin Kruse (eds.), The Spaces and the Modern City: Imaginaries, Politics, and Everyday Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 144–­178. 62. Mark Button, “Private Security and the Policing of Quasi-­Public Space,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31, 3 (2003), pp. 227–­237. 63. For urban South Africa, see Diphoorn, Twilight Policing; and Hentschel, Security in the Bubble. For a wider view, see Müller, Punitive City; Zeiderman, Endangered City; Daniel Goldstein, The Spectacular City: Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); and Caldeira, “Paradox of Police Violence,” pp. 235–­263. 64. For a case study of a particular anti-­squatting cleanup campaign at Weltevreden (northwest corner of Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area), see Sekgololo Angel Mabudusha, “The Policing of Illegal Squatting in the Greenbelts within Weltevreden Park Area” (Magister of Technolgiae, University of Pretoria, 2010). 65. Jonny Steinberg, Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2008); Steinberg, “Security and Disappointment,” pp. 345–­360; and Morten Lynge Madsen, “Living for Home: Policing Immorality among Undocumented Migrants in Johannesburg,” African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 173–­192. 66. Sean Tait and Monique Marks, “You Strike a Gathering, You Strike a Rock: Current Debates in the Policing of Public Order in South Africa,” South African Crime Quarterly 38 (2011), pp. 15–­22.

302 • Notes to Pages 48–49

67. Christopher McMichael, “Police Wars and State Repression in South Africa,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 51, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­16 (esp. pp. 5 [source of quotation], 6); and Stuurman, “Policing Inequality,” pp. 43–­66. 68. Sipho Hlongwane, “This Brutal Police State in Which we Live,” Business Day, January 22, 2014. [http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/01/22/this-brutal​ -police-state-in-which-we-live]. 69. Peter Alexander, “Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests—­A Preliminary Analysis,” Review of African Political Economy 37 (2010), pp. 25–­40 (esp. p. 37); and McMichael, “Police Wars and State Repression,” pp. 3–­16. 70. Jane Duncan, “Media Underplaying Police, State Brutality,” Sunday Independent, August 26, 2012 [http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/media-underplaying-police​ -state-brutality-1.1369675#U0z7b_mSwmM]. See also Jane Duncan, Protest Nation: The Right to Protest in South Africa (Durban: University of KwaZulu-­Natal Press, 2016), pp. 129–­141; and Jane Duncan, “Is South Africa Reverting to a Repressive State?” (inaugural professorial lecture, Council Chambers, University of Johannesburg, July 13, 2016). 71. Nicolas Dieltiens, “The Making of the Criminal Subject in Democratic South Africa” (unpublished MA thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand, 2011). See also Jane Duncan, “The Police ‘Punish before They Prosecute’ When It Comes to Public Protests,” Mail & Guardian, September 28, 2016. 72. Hlongwane, “This Brutal Police State.” 73. David Bruce, “The Road to Marikana: Abuses of Force during Public Order Operations,” South African Civil Society Information Service, October 12, 2012 [http://​ www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/1455]. 74. McMichael, “Police Wars and State Repression,” pp. 9–­11, 13. See also Andrea Royeppen, “How Does State Security Limit the Right to Protest? State Response to Popular Participation in South Africa,” African Security Review 25, 4 (2016), pp. 340–­355; M. P. Sebola, “The Community Policing Philosophy and the Right to Public Protest in South Africa: Are There Positive Developments after Two Decades of Democracy?” Journal of Public Administration 49, 1 (2014), pp. 300–­313; and Julia Hornberger, “We Need a Complicit Police! Political Policing Then and Now,” South African Crime Quarterly 48 (2014), pp. 17–­24; Marcel Paret, “Violence and Democracy in South Africa’s Community Protests,” Review of African Political Economy 42, 143 (2015), pp. 107–­123; and Mbekezeli Mkhize, “Is South Africa’s 20 Years of Democracy in Crisis? Examining the Impact of Unrest Incidents in Local Protests in the Post-­Apartheid South Africa,” African Security Review 24, 2 (2015), pp. 190–­206. 75. For comparative instances, see James Holston and Teresa Caldeira, “Democracy and Violence in Brazil,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, 4 (1999), pp. 691–­729. 76. See, for example, Gail Super, Governing through Crime in South Africa: The Politics of Race and Class in Neoliberalizing Regimes (New York: Routledge, 2016). See also Scheper-­Hughes, “Dangerous and Endangered Youth,” pp. 13–­46; and Nancy Scheper-­ Hughes, Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).



Notes to Pages 49–51 • 303

77. Hansen, “Performers of Sovereignty,” pp. 283–­284 (quotation on p. 284). 78. Andrew Faull, “Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg,” African Security Review 20, 4 (2011), pp. 53–­55 (esp. p. 53). See also Jonny Steinberg, “Policing, State Power, and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: A New Perspective,” African Affairs 113, 451 (2014), pp. 173–­191. 79. Hornberger, Policing and Human Rights, p. 80. See also Hornberger, “Human Rights and Policing,” pp. 259–­283. 80. Beatrice Jauregui, “Cultures of Legitimacy and Postcolonial Policing: Guest Editor Introduction,” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 547–­552 (esp. p. 548). 81. See, for example, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction,” in Comaroff and Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, pp. 1–­56. 82. Alfonso Valenzuela-­Aguilera, “Urban Surges: Power, Territory, and the Social Control of Space in Latin America,” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 21–­34 (quotation on p. 22). 83. See Javier Auyero, Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 31–­32. 84. Jauregui, “Cultures of Legitimacy,” p. 548. 85. See, for example, Teresa Caldeira, “‘I Came to Sabotage Your Reasoning’: Violence and Resignifications of Justice in Brazil,” in Comaroff and Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, pp. 102–­149; and Teresa Caldeira, “Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship,” in Filipe Argüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-­transition Latin America (Coral Gables, FL: North-­ South Center Press/University of Miami, 1998), pp. 263–­296. 86. Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby (eds.), Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia, and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 2008); and Madsen, “Living for Home,” pp. 173–­ 192. 87. Xolani Tshabalala, “Negotiating Movement: Everyday Immigration Policing in Johannesburg” (unpublished MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009), p. 6. 88. Benoit Dupont, “Private Security Regimes: Conceptualizing the Forces That Shape the Private Delivery of Security,” Theoretical Criminology 18, 3 (2014), pp. 263–­281 (quotation on p. 268). See also David Mathinhe, “Africa’s Fear of Itself: The Ideology of Makwerekwere in South Africa,” Third World Quarterly 23, 2 (2011), pp. 293–­313; and Themba Masuku, Targeting Foreigners: Xenophobia among Johannesburg Police (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2006). 89. Anne-­Marie Singh, “Private Security and Crime Control,” Theoretical Criminology 9, 2 (2005), pp. 153–­174; and Michael Kempa and Anne-­Marie Singh, “Private Security, Political Economy, and the Policing of Race: Probing Global Hypotheses through the Case of South Africa,” Theoretical Criminology 12, 3 (2008), pp. 333–­354. See also Corruption Watch, The Law for Sale: Endemic Corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police

304 •

Notes to Pages 51–54

Department, 2012 Special Report [[email protected]]; and Graeme Hosken, “Torture, Murder, Kidnap Rife in Cop Ranks,” Pretoria News, September 30, 2011. 90. Alex Eliseev, “Joburg Metro Cops Still Await Day of Reckoning,” The Star, July 15, 2008. 91. Paul McNally, “Corrupt Police and Drug Dealers—­Joburg’s Crime Eco-­System,” News24, May 10, 2016. 92. See David Smith, “Nearly 1,500 South African Police Exposed as Convicted Criminals,” The Guardian (London), August 15, 2013. See also Julian Rademeyer and Kate Wilkinson (researchers) and Peter Cunliffe-­Jones (ed.), “South Africa’s Criminal Cops: Is the Rot Far Worse Than We Have Been Told?” Africa Check: Sort Fact from Fiction, July 23, 2014 [https://africacheck.org/reports/south-africas-criminal-cops-is-the​ -rot-far-worse-than-we-have-been-told/.] 93. Alex Eliseev, “Another Police Big Fish Is Arrested,” The Star, July 16, 2008. 94. Solly Maphumolo and Angelique Serrao, “‘Top Cops Involved in Truck Heists,’” The Star, June 27, 2014; and Angella Johnson, “Police Chief Linked with Hijack Case,” Mail & Guardian, December 20, 1996. 95. Angelique Serrao, “More Evidence of Alleged Police Involvement in Hijacking of Trucks,” The Star, July 7, 2014. 96. Wyndham Hartley, “Truck Hijackings Up as Gangs Shift from Harder Car Theft,” Business Day, September 30, 2015. 97. Staff Reporter, “Zimbabwe: Truck Drivers Accused of Diverting 68t Copper in SA,” The Herald (Harare), May 18, 2009; Emily Mgidi, “Taximan Bust with Cop Gun,” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), July 8, 2018; and Nokuthula Khanyile, “N3 Truck Driver Escapes Heavy Gunfire,” Witness, June 7, 2019. 98. Ciaran Ryan, “Overview: The Growing Risks of Organised Crime,” Financial Mail, May 30, 2019. 99. S. Jensen, “Vision of the State,” pp. 60–­78 (quotations on p. 61). 100. S. Jensen, “Vision of the State,” p. 69. I observed firsthand this rule-bending during the course of nighttime patrols in the inner city with the Hillbrow CPF. 101. For a comparative perspective, see Caldeira, “Paradox of Police Violence,” 235–­ 263; Graham Denyer Willis, “Antagonistic Authorities and the Civil Police in São Paulo, Brazil,” Latin American Research Review 49, 1 (2014), pp. 3–­22; and Michelle Bonner, “Violence, Policing, and (In)security,” Latin American Research Review 49, 1 (2014), pp. 261–­269. 102. Darshan Vigneswaran and Julia Hornberger, Beyond Good Cop/Bad Cop: Understanding Informality and Police Corruption in South Africa (Johannesburg: Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) Research Report, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009), pp. 1–­65; and Bruce, “Good Cops? Bad Cops?” pp. 15–­20. See Daneel Knoetze, “Police Kill Three People in Three Days of Lockdown. This Is Normal for South Africa, Data Reveals,” Viewfinder, April 1, 2020. 103. Andrew Faull, Behind the Badge: The Untold Stories of South Africa’s Police Service Members (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010).



Notes to Pages 55–56 • 305

104. Kamvelihle Gumede-­ Johnson, “Police Training: Brutality Exposed,” Mail & Guardian, June 3, 2011. 105. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic and Adri Sauerman, “The Code of Silence: Revisiting South African Police Integrity,” South African Crime Quarterly 40 (June 2012), pp. 15–­25 (Publication of the Institute for Security Studies [Pretoria]). [http://www.issafrica.org/sa​cq.php]. 106. Gareth Newham and Andrew Faull, Protector or Predator? Tackling Police Corruption in South Africa (Institute for Security Studies, Monograph no. 182) (Pretoria: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2012), pp. 1–­62; and Paul McNally, The Street—­Exposing a World of Cops, Bribes, and Drug Dealers (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016). 107. Jensen, “Conflicting Logics of Exceptionality,” p. 465. 108. Jauregui, “Cultures of Legitimacy,” p. 548. 109. Jensen, “Conflicting Logics of Exceptionality,” pp. 458–­478 (esp. p. 469). For example, see Emsie Ferreira, “ICD: Rise in Police Abuse at Service Delivery Protests,” Mail & Guardian, June 14, 2011; Christopher Mbazira, “Service Delivery Protests, Struggle for Rights, and the Failure of Local Democracy in South Africa and Uganda: Parallels and Divergences,” South African Journal of Human Rights 29, 2 (2013), pp. 251–­275. 110. Malose Langa, Profiling Torture and CIDT in the Hands of the Police: A Case Study of Kagiso Township, Gauteng (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2011). See also Malose Langa, “Exploring Experiences of Torture and CIDT That Occurred in South Africa amongst Non-­Nationals Living in Johannesburg,” Occasional Paper (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2011). 111. Carolyn Raphaely, “South African Police Accused of Routinely Torturing Crime Suspects,” The Guardian (London), April 14, 2013; and Aaron Morrison, “Police Brutality on Rise in South Africa: Officers Accused of Killing, Raping Citizens,” International Business Times, January 10, 2015. 112. Rajohane Matshedisho, “‘We Must Fight Them!’ Police Violence, Torture, and Brutality,” in Vigneswaran and Hornberger, Beyond Good Cop/Bad Cop, pp. 52–­55 (esp. p. 52). 113. Staff Reporter, “Eight South African Police Arrested over Death of Man Dragged behind Van,” The Guardian (London), March 1, 2013; Zinhle Maphumulo, “Mido Macia Goes Home,” City Press, March 10, 2013; Aislinn Laing, “South African Police Officers Guilty of Murdering Taxi Driver Mido Macia by Street Dragging,” The Telegraph (London), August 25, 2015; and Staff Reporter, “South African Police Jailed for Murder of Taxi Driver Mido Macia,” BBC News, November 11, 2015. 114. Reuters, “South African Police Arrested for Killing Robber,” The Telegraph (London), November 3, 2015. 115. Hornberger, Policing and Human Rights, pp. 151, 172. 116. For an alternative perspective, see Julia Hornberger, “From General to Commissioner to General—­On the Popular State of Policing in South Africa,” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 598–­614 (quotations on p. 599).

306 •

Notes to Pages 56–58

117. See Hornberger, “From General to Commissioner,” p. 599. For criticism of the seemingly inexorable drift toward militarized policing, see Bilkis Omar, “New ‘Tough on Crime’ Policy Will Need a Better Trained Police Force,” Institute for Security Studies (Online Newsletter) [http:/www.issafricaorg/iss_todasy.php?ID=1097]; and Anthony Minnaar, “From a Service to a Force? Is the SAPS Militarizing? Understanding the Dynamics of Police Discipline and Rank,” in Garth Newman and Amanda Dissel (eds.), Conference Report: Policing in South Africa 2010 and Beyond (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), pp. 11–­12. 118. Caroline Southey, “Help, the Cops Are Coming,” Mail & Guardian, March 26, 2012. 119. Anonymous, “South Africa’s Police: Kill and Be Killed,” The Economist, August 27, 2011. 120. David Bruce, Marikana and the Doctrine of Maximum Force (Parktown, South Africa: Parktown Publishers, 2012), p. 18; and Hornberger, “From General to Commissioner,” pp. 598–­614. See also Steinberg, “Crime Prevention Goes Abroad,” pp. 349–­364; Steinberg, “Policing, State Power, and the Transition,” pp. 173–­191; and Monique Marks and Jennifer Wood, “South African Policing at the Crossroads: The Case for a ‘Minimal’ and ‘Minimalist’ Public Police,” Theoretical Criminology 14, 3 (2010), pp. 311–­329. 121. See, for example, Leslie Swartz, “Oscar Pistorius and the Melancholy of Intersectionality,” Disability & Society 28, 8 (2013), pp. 1157–­1161; and Nancy Scheper-­Hughes, “The House Gun: White Writing, White Fears, and Black Justice,” Anthropology Today 30, 6 (2014), pp. 8–­12. 122. Sophie Miller, “‘Grossly Disproportionate’: Home Owners’ Legal License to Kill,” Journal of Criminal Law 77, 4 (2013), pp. 299–­309. 123. Peter Dube, “With Guns Blazing, South Africa Ponders Disarming Citizens and Criminals Alike,” Africa Review (Kenya), September 7, 2015; Angelique Serrao and Botho Molosankwe, “How Crime Hits Your Suburb,” The Star, July 14, 2008; Gill Gifford, “I had to do it, Says Dad Who Shot Hijackers,” The Star, July 18, 2002; Kate Morrissey, “Joburg Man Shoots Intruder Dead,” The Star, November 20, 2015; and Iavan Pijoos, “4 Die in Lenasia Gunfight,” News24, September 24, 2016. 124. Reuven Blignault, “Store Owners Open Fire on Northcliff Hijackers,” Northcliff Melville Times, November 12, 2018. See also Andile Dlodlo, “One Suspect Killed and Another Seriously Wounded in Northcliff Hijacking,” Northcliff Melville Times, October 13, 2018. 125. Nico Gous, “Motorist Rams Gunman Robbing Woman Driver in Johannesburg Traffic,” TimesLIVE (Online), July 19, 2019. 126. Scott Calvert, “In Johannesburg Suburbs, an Obsession with Security—­Lonehill,” Baltimore Sun, May 22, 2005. 127. Rebecca Davis, “As SA Policing Fails, Private Security Steps In—­But at a Cost,” Daily Maverick (Online), January 15, 2019 [https:/www.dailymaverick.co.za.article/2019​ -01-15-as-sa-policing-fails-private=security-step-in-but-at-a-cost/]. The “execution” of two armed reaction officers employed by 24/7 Security Services illustrates the danger of



Notes to Page 58 • 307

their work. The two security guards were operating as part of a team providing specialized security services to a financial institution. The ambush outside the Maponya Mall in Soweto was captured by a high-­definition video camera fitted inside their vehicle. Both uniformed security operatives were wearing bulletproof vests and were armed. The SAPS tracked the suspected criminals to a shack settlement outside Durban and shot them dead, claiming they “resisted arrest.” This shooting followed the murder of two Chubb security guards who were attacked in full view of bystanders and motorists while sitting in their patrol vehicle in Hillbrow. See Iavan Pijoos, “‘Heartless Criminals’ behind Killing of Security Guards in Parked Car in Soweto,” TimesLIVE (Online), October 15, 2018; Ntwaagae Seleka, “Police Shot 2 Men Wanted in Connection with Brutal Killing of Security Guards,” News24, October 23, 2018; and Department of Community Security, “4 Security Officers Dead in 5 Months in the Hands of Ruthless Gunmen,” Soweto Urban, February 8, 2019. 128. Diana Nielle, “Private Security: A Commodity Ripe for Subversion in the Covid-­19 Crisis,” Daily Maverick (Online), April 1, 2020. 129. Stefan Badenhorst, Manabela Chauke, and N. Ngubane, “Performance Information Report,” in Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA), Annual Report 2018–­2019 (Centurion, South Africa: Government Printing Office, 2019), p. 25. 130. Staff Writer, “Lawlessness Has to Come to an End,” Sowetan, June 19, 2019; Tankiso Makhetha, “Irate Mob Castrates, Beats ‘Rapist’ to Death,” Sowetan, June 18, 2019; Ian Broughton, “Tension in Hillbrow after Residents Attack Drug Dealers,” Ground Up (Online), October 15, 2018; Tankiso Makhetha, “Parents Watch Sons Being Lynched,” Sowetan, August 17, 2018; and Christopher Clark, “South Africans Are Taking the Law into Their Own Hands,” Foreign Policy, November 29, 2018. For a wider historical analysis, see Gail Super, “What’s in a Name and Why It Matters: A Historical Analysis of the Relationship between State Authority, Vigilantism, and Penal Power in South Africa,” Theoretical Criminology 21, 4 (2017), pp. 512–­531. 131. Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Peter Demetz (ed.), Walter Benjamin: Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, and Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp. 277–­300 (esp. pp. 286–­287). 132. Hansen, “Performers of Sovereignty,” pp. 279–­295 (quotation on p. 282). 133. Hornberger, “From General to Commissioner,” pp. 603, 607; Vigneswaran and Hornberger, Beyond Good Cop/Bad Cop, pp. 1–­65; and Andy Clarno, “Rescaling White Space in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg,” Antipode 45, 5 (2013), pp. 1190–­1212 (esp. p. 1204). 134. See, for example, David Pratten and Atreyee Sen, “Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence,” in Pratten and Sen, Global Vigilantes: Anthropological Perspectives on Justice and Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 1–­24. 135. Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” pp. 605–­622. See Graham, Cities under Siege; and Bonner, “Violence, Policing, and (In)security,” pp. 261–­269 (esp. p. 262).

308 •

Notes to Pages 59–61

136. Vickie Abraham, “Gayton McKenzie Nails Gang Kingpin,” The Citizen, November 19, 2015; and Qama Qukula, “Gayton McKenzie Nabs Gang Kingpin and Urges Communities to Take Charge,” 702 [Cape Talk], October 19, 2015 [http://www.702.co.za​ /articles/5882/gayton-mckenzie-confronts-gangster-and-says-communities-must-take​ -charge]. Since Gayton McKenzie has been known for his theatric sensationalism, some of this alleged event may have been embellished to bolster his reputation. 137. Mark Gross, “Vigilante Violence and ‘Forward Panic’ in Johannesburg’s Townships,” Theory & Society 45 (2016), pp. 239–­263. 138. Terry Leonard, “‘We’re Killing Each Other at a Baffling Rate,’” The Star, August 1, 2006; Staff Reporter, “Judge Recounts Details of Jeppe Massacre,” Mail & Guardian, October 21, 2008; Alex Eliseev, “Chilling Glimpse into ‘Jeppestown Massacre,’” IOL (Independent Online), January 31, 2008; Staff Reporter, “Jeppe Accused ‘Had Common Purpose to Resist Arrest,’” Mail & Guardian, October 31, 2008; and Sandra Lieberum, “Cops Recall Jeppestown Massacre,” The Citizen, November 5, 2008. 139. Staff Reporter, “South Africa: Govt Takes Aim at Criminals, As Gun Violence Toll Rises,” IRIN: Humanitarian News and Analysis, June 28, 2006; and Craig Timberg, “South Africans Applaud Police’s Deadly Shootout,” Washington Post, December 13, 2007. 140. Editorial, “South Africa: License to Kill,” Business Day, April 11, 2008; Werner Swart, “City of Blood,” The Citizen, June 29, 2006; and Staff Reporter, “DA: Fire Shabangu over ‘Shoot and Kill’ Remarks,” Mail & Guardian, April 10, 2008. In contrast, see Hangwani Mulaudzi, “‘Shoot to Kill’ Order Spot On,” Sowetan, April 21, 2008. 141. Staff Reporter, “The Cost of Crime,” Oxford Business Group, July 22, 2010. 142. Michael Appel, “South Africa: Jeppestown Massacre Leads to Crime Initiatives,” BuaNews (Tshwane), June 25, 2007. 143. Ian Evans, “Shoot the Bastards  .  .  . and Shoot to Kill: South African Minister Tells Police to Show Criminals No Mercy,” Mail Online, April 11, 2008 [http:// www.da​ ilymail.co.uk/news/article-558689/Shoot-bastards]. See also Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, “Shabangu in the Firing Line,” IOL (Independent Online), April 11, 2008 [http://www.iol​.co.za/news/politics/shabangu-in-the-firing-line-1.396128]; and David Abrahams, “A Synopsis of Urban Violence in South Africa,” International Review of the Red Cross 92 [878] (2010), pp. 495–­520 (esp. pp. 507–­508). 144. Bruce, Marikana and the Doctrine of Maximum Force, p. 14. 145. Eric Naki, “ANC Supports ‘Shoot to Kill,’” Sowetan, April 11, 2008; and Justice Malala, “No End in Sight for Police Brutality in South Africa,” The Guardian, April 21, 2013. 146. Bruce, Marikana and the Doctrine of Maximum Force, p. 15. 147. Candice Bailey, “Bombing ATMs Is Big Business,” The Star, July 12, 2008; Candice Bailey, “Impact of Explosives,” The Star, July 12, 2008; and Thandi Skade, “Heed Warnings as ATM Attacks Sour in Gauteng,” The Star, July 15, 2018. 148. Candice Bailey, “ATMs under Siege,” The Star, July 12, 2008 [quotation from



Notes to Pages 61–62 • 309

Johan Burger, head of the criminal justice program at the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria)]. 149. Staff Reporter, “‘Kill the Bastards’—­Minister’s Astonishing Order to Police,” The Star, April 10, 2008; Staff Reporter, “SAPS Must Fight Fire with Fire,” The Citizen, November 12, 2008; and David Bruce, “An Acceptable Price to Pay? The Use of Lethal Force by the Police,” Occasional Paper no. 81 (Open Society Foundation, Criminal Justice Initiative, 2010), p. 9 [http://osf.org.za/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/CJI_Occasi​ onal_Paper_81.pdf]. 150. Submission by CASAC to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, “The Role of the South African Police Service at Marikana on 16 August 2012” (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, January 2013), p. 11 [http://www.casac]. 151. McMichael, “Police Wars and State Repression,” p. 9. See also David Bruce, ‘Fighting Crime Shouldn’t Trump SA’s Public Order Policing,” Institute for Security Studies, August 16, 2019 [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/fighting-crime-shouldnt-trump-sas​ -public-order-policing]. 152. Royeppen, “How Does State Security Limit the Right to Protest?” pp. 340–­355 (esp. p. 345). For the internal contradictions in public policing after the end of white minority rule, see Hornberger, “We Need a Complicit Police,” pp. 17–­24. 153. David Bruce, “Beyond Section 49: Control of the Use of Lethal Force,” South African Crime Quarterly 36 (2011), pp. 3–­12. 154. Bruce, Marikana and the Doctrine of Maximum Force, p. 18. See also Lydia Polgreen, “South Africa to Charge Miners in Deadly Unrest,” New York Times, August 16, 2012; David Smith and Terry Macalister, “South African Police Shoot Dead Striking Miners,” The Guardian (London), August 30, 2012; Staff Reporter, “Police Boss Says 34 Miners Killed, in Self-­Defence,” The Sowetan, August 17, 2012; Staff Reporter, “South African Defense Minister First Official to Apologize for Police Killings of Miners,” Washington Post, August 21, 2012; and Staff Writer, “South African Police Open Fire as Striking Miners Charge, Killing and Wounding Workers,” Washington Post, August 16, 2012. 155. Ronnie Kasrils, “Mr. President, Arrest This Descent into Police State Depravity,” Mail & Guardian, March 6, 2013; Hlongwane, “This Brutal Police State”; Malala, “No End in Sight for Police Brutality”; and Duncan, “Media Underplaying Police.” 156. Submission by CASAC to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, “The Role of the South African Police Service at Marikana on 16 August 2012 (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, January 2013), p. 3 [http://www.casac.] 157. Graeme Hosken, “‘Predator Police’ in Reign of Terror,” The Times, April 30, 2012. 158. Sabelo Skit, “Cops Caught on Camera ‘Executing’ Criminal,” Sunday Times, November 1, 2015. 159. Sheree Bega and Thabiso Thakali, “Outrage over Police Killings,” Saturday Star, August 8, 2015. 160. Hornberger, Policing and Human Rights, p. 6. See also Rebecca Davis, ‘Public

310 • Notes to Pages 62–65

Order Policing: SAPS Demands More Muscle,” Daily Maverick (Online), September 3, 2014 [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-09-03-public-order-policing-saps​ -demands-more-muscle/]. 161. Guy Lamb, “Police Militarisation and the ‘War on Crime’ in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 44, 5 (2018), pp. 933–­949 (esp. p. 944). 162. Minnaar, “Community Policing in a High Crime Transitional State,” p. 27. 163. S. Jensen, “Vision of the State,” pp. 60–­78. 164. McMichael, “Hosting the World,” pp. 519–­534 (esp. p. 519). 165. See also McMichael, “‘Clearly Blown Away,” , pp. 111–­129. 166. Dan McDougall, “Red Ants Clear Slums South Africa-­Style,” Sunday Times (UK), April 10, 2010 [http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4​ bd52eed5]. This information is derived from Dominique Malaquais, “Anti-­Teleology,” in Ntone Edjabe and Edgar Pieterse (eds.), African Cities Reader 11: Mobilities and Fixtures (Cape Town: Chimurenga and the African Centre for Cities, 2011), pp. 7–­23 (esp. p. 22). 167. Braam Hanekon is quoted in McDougall, “Red Ants Clear Slums.” 168. McMichael, “Hosting the World,” pp. 521–­522, 526. For comparative purposes, see Phillip Boyle and Kevin Haggerty, “Spectacular Security: Mega-­Events and the Security Complex,’’ International Political Sociology 3, 3 (2009), pp. 257–­274. 169. McMichael, “‘Clearly Blown Away,’” p. 115 (quotation on p. 117). See also McMichael, “Hosting the World,” pp. 519–­534. 170. See Boyle and Haggerty, “Spectacular Security,” pp. 259–­260. 171. McMichael, “Hosting the World,” p. 530. 172. Sarah Evans and Manqoba Nxumalo, “City of Jhb Faces Court Challenges over Informal Trader Evictions,” Mail & Guardian, November 21, 2013; and Manqoba Nxumalo, “Fate Still Unclear for Jo’burg’s Informal Traders,” Mail & Guardian, November 26, 2013. 173. Sarah Evans, “‘Convenient’ to Remove Lawful Traders in Op Clean Sweep,” Mail & Guardian, December 5, 2013; Manqoba Nxumalo, “Jo’burg Informal Trader Lays Assault Charge against Cops,” Mail & Guardian, November 28, 2013; Staff Reporter, “Verifying of Jo’burg Street Vendors ‘Total Chaos,’” SAPA News Agency, November 4, 2013; and Sarah Evans, “Vendors to File Second Interdict to Stop City of Jhb Removals,” Mail & Guardian, November 19, 2013. 174. Niren Tolsi and Manqoba Nxumalo, “Jo’burg’s ‘Clean Sweep’ Is a Dirty Affair,” Mail & Guardian, November 1, 2013; Niren Tolsi, “Jo’burg’s ‘Clean Sweep’: The City Responds,” Mail & Guardian, November 1, 2013; and Dewald van Rensburg, “Cry Me a River, Joburg Tells Traders,” City Press, November 27, 2013. See also Social Law Project, Johannesburg Street Traders Halt Operation Clean Sweep. WIEGO Law and Informality Resources (Cambridge, MA: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), 2014). 175. Dewald van Rensburg, “Brave New Joburg: Operation Clean Sweep Part Two,” City Press, November 24, 2013. See also Dewald van Rensburg, “Charges Dropped against Traders’ Lawyer,” City Press, December 6, 2013; and Dennis Webster, “’The End



Notes to Pages 65–68 • 311

of the Street?’ Informal Traders’ Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg.” Report published by Socio-­Economic Rights Institute (SERI) (September 2015). 176. Webster, “Ke Molao Wa Rona.” 177. Ashtyn McKenzie, “JMPD Sweeps Up Beggars in Operation Ke Molao,” Northcliff Melville Times, January 21, 2016. 178. Webster, “Ke Molao Wa Rona”; Phathu Luvhengo “Operation Ke Molao Infuriates Taxi Associations,” Randburg Sun, May 23, 2016; Tsholo Mosina, “Operation Ke Molao Leaves Hundreds of Commuters Stranded,” Fourways Review (Gauteng), May 13, 2016; and Staff Reporter, “JMPD Impounds Nearly 80 Taxis during Special Operation,” Kempton Express, May 19, 2016. 179. Webster, “Ke Molao Wa Rona.” 180. Anna Cox, “Police Force Squatters from Swanky Suburbs,” The Star, June 16, 2004. 181. Pascale Michael, “The Law and Squatters,” Sandton Chronicle, June 17, 2016; Margot van Ryneveld, “George Lea Squatters Spark Opinions,” Sandton Chronicle, June 13, 2016; Pascale Michael, “George Lea Park Dwellers,” Sandton Chronicle, June 3, 2016; and Pascale Michael, “Community Outrage at Squatter Camp in George Lea,” Sandton Chronicle, June 6, 2016. 182. See Steinberg, “Policing, State Power, and the Transition,” pp. 173–­191; and McMichael, “Police Wars and State Repression,” pp. 3–­16. 183. See Mark Neocleous, War Power, Police Power (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014); Micol Seigel, “Objects of Police History,” Journal of American History 102, 1 (2015), pp. 152–­161; Tyler Wall, “Ordinary Emergency: Drones, Police, and Geographies of Legal Terror,” Antipode 48, 4 (2016), pp. 1122–­1139; and Andrea Miller, “Shadows of War, Traces of Policing: The Weaponization of Space and the Sensible in Preemption,” in Ruha Benjamin (ed.), Captivating Technology: Race, Carceral Technoscience, and Liberatory Imagination in Everyday Life (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019), pp. 108–­136. 184. Lamb, “Police Militarisation and the ‘War on Crime,’” pp. 933–­949 (esp. p. 933). 185. Sarah Evans, “IPID Report: Sharp Increase in Assault by Police Cases,” Mail & Guardian, February 10, 2013; Ilse de Lange, “At least 216 People Died in Police Custody Last Year,” The Citizen (Pretoria), August 15, 2017; and Sean Tait and David Bruce, “Police Torture Continues,” Mail & Guardian, January 24, 2020. 186. Royeppen, “How Does State Security Limit the Right to Protest?” pp. 340–­355. See also Southey, “Help, the Cops Are Coming.” 187. The ideas for this and following paragraphs are derived from a reading of Tyler Wall but shaped to my specific purposes. See Wall, “Ordinary Emergency,” pp. 1122–­1139 (quotations on p. 1123). 188. Wall, “Ordinary Emergency,” pp. 1131, 1132. 189. Wall, “Ordinary Emergency,” p. 1133. 190. Satnam Choong, Policing as Social Discipline (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 217.

312 • Notes to Pages 68–73

191. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (New York: Verso, 1980), p. 85. 192. Wall, “Ordinary Emergency,” p. 1136. 193. See Nicholas Blomley, “Colored Rabbits, Dangerous Trees, and Public Sitting: Sidewalks, Police, and the City,” Urban Geography 33, 7 (2012), pp. 917–­935 (esp. p. 927). 194. Daneel Knoetze, “How the Lockdown Is Creating Even More Opportunities for Corrupt Cops,” The Citizen (Pretoria), April 15, 2020. 195. Knoetze, “Police Kill Three People in Three Days”; and Mia Swart, “S Africa Court Issues Orders to End Police Abuse during Lockdown,” Al Jazeera News, May 15, 2020.

Chapter 2 1. Staff Writer, “Gauteng,” in Nilufar Hossain (ed.), Let’s Go: South Africa 2001 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 362. 2. Charl Fourie, quoted in Robert Block, “South African Justice: Bloodthirsty Ways to Fight Carjackers—­Flamethrowers Are Selling Well; A Bottle of Poisoned Brandy Makes for a Nasty Surprise,” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1999. 3. Christian Figenschou, “Faster Than You Can Say ‘Hi Jack,’” Mail & Guardian, January 15, 1999. 4. Andrew Miller, “The Blaster—­More Violence from South Africa,” Word Magazine, December 8, 1998; and David Shapshak, “Roasting Hijackers,” Mail & Guardian, December 18, 1998. 5. Jonny Steinberg, “New Anti-­Hijacking Device ‘Burns but Cannot Kill’ Attackers,” Business Day, June 11, 1999; and Staff Reporter, “Flamethrower Fights Carjacking,” Philadelphia Daily News, December 14, 1998. 6. Figenschou, “Faster Than You Can Say “Hi Jack.’” 7. Staff Writer, “Gauteng,” Let’s Go: South Africa 2001, p. 362. See also Jan McGirk, “A Crash Course on How to Foil Hijackers,” Sunday Independent, June 3, 2001; Tracey Drury, “Pepper Spray Invention Takes Aim at Carjackers,” Business First from Buffalo, June 29, 1998; and Antony Altbeker, “Policing the Frontier: Seven Days with the Hijacking Investigation Unit in Johannesburg,” in Jonny Steinberg (ed.), Crime Wave: The South African Underworld and Its Foes (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001), pp. 24–­40. 8. Miller, “The Blaster”; and Steinberg, “New Anti-­Hijacking Device.”. 9. Miller, “The Blaster.” 10. Staff Reporter, “Flamethrower Fights Carjacking.” 11. Ed O’Loughlin, “Blaster Turns Up the Heat on Carjackers,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 12, 1998. 12. Jeremy Vine, “Africa: Firing on All Cylinders,” BBC News, December 10, 1998 [http://www.news.co.uk.html]; and Staff Writer, “Flamethrower Now an Option on S. African Cars,” CNN News, December 11, 1998 [http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Afri​ ca.html]. In 1999 the Blaster achieved the ignominious distinction of winning the Ig



Notes to Pages 73–75 • 313

Nobel Peace Prize—­an annual award given by genuine Nobel laureates (and presented at Harvard University) to individuals whose achievements “cannot and should not be reproduced.” David Le Page, “SA Company Wins Ig Nobel Peace Prize,” Daily Mail & Guardian, October 13, 1999. 13. See Jan Hennop, “Actor Fumes over Anti-­Hijack Device,” Sunday Times, February 21, 1999; O’Loughlin, “Blaster Turns Up the Heat”; Jane Flannagan, “South Africa Blasts Back at Car Thieves,” Evening Standard (London), February 5, 2002; and Shapshak, “Roasting Hijackers.” 14. Staff Reporter, “Hunka Hunka Burnin’ Carjacker,” Reuters, December 11, 1998; Brian Austin, “S. African Carjackers Face Flamethrower Threat,” St. Louis Post-­Dispatch News, December 13 1998; and Hennop, “Actor Fumes over Anti-­Hijack Device.” 15. See O’Loughlin, “Blaster Turns Up the Heat”; and Austin, “S. African Carjackers Face Flamethrower Threat.” 16. Sam Kiley, ‘Thieves Get Fiery Hijack Deterrent,” The Times (London), December 11, 1998; and Steinberg, “New Anti-­Hijacking Device.” 17. Andrew Hamilton, “In South Africa the Motorist Is a Stormtrooper,” Irish Times (Dublin), April 17, 2002; and Jane Alexander, “South Africa’s Desperate Blast Back at the Carjackers,” Evening Standard (London), February 5, 2002. 18. Figenschou, “Faster Than You Can Say ‘Hi Jack.’” 19. O’Loughlin, “Blaster Turns Up the Heat”; and Martin Schönteich, Unshackling the Crime Fighters: Increasing Private Sector Involvement in South Africa’s Criminal Justice System (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1999), pp. 63–­76. 20. Rory Carroll, “Carjacking: The Everyday Ordeal Testing South Africa,” The Guardian, March 2, 2006; Erin Conway-­Smith, “Carjackings Are on the Rise Again in South Africa,” GlobalPost, May 27, 2015); and Marc Santora and Annie Correal, “Man Dies in Carjacking at Short Hills Mall; 2 Suspects Are Sought,” New York Times, December 16, 2013. 21. Kimon De Greef, “An Elite Helicopter Force Is Fighting South Africa’s Carjacking Epidemic,” Wired, July 2, 2019 [https://www.wired.co.uk/article/south-africa-johann​ esburg-carjacking]. 22. Christopher Torchia, “4-­Year-­Old Boy Dies in South Africa Carjacking,” Associated Press, July 21, 2014. See also Anine Kriegler, “South African Crime Stats Show Police Struggling to Close Cases,” Conversation, October 31, 2017. 23. In 1994 there were more than seventeen thousand reported car hijackings in South Africa. See Marius Bosch, “Crime a Major Fear,” Cape Times, April 27, 1995. See also Lynn Burke, “Carjacking: The New Leader of South African Crime,” South Africa in Transition (1999) [http://www.journalism.Berkeley.com]; Block, “South African Justice”; and Gilbert Lewthwaite, “In South Africa, a Burning Fear,” The Sun (Baltimore), February 3, 1999. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-­xpm-­1999-­02-­03-­9902030029-­st​ ory.html]. See FACTSHEET: South Africa’s 2015/16 Crime Statistics, Fact Check [https://​ africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-201516-crime-statistics/]. See also Staff Reporter, “SA Crime Stats: Rise in Carjackings ‘Alarming,’” Wheels24, September 2,

314 • Notes to Pages 75–78

2016. What is common knowledge is that hijacked cars and trucks are standard currency in South Africa and neighboring countries, where they are often exchanged for narcotics, illicit weapons, and other contraband. It is estimated that the majority of hijackings and incidents of car theft are linked to the growth of organized crime. See Peter Gastrow, Main Trends in the Development of South Africa’s Organised Crime, Occasional Paper no. 21 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 2–­3; and Kiley, “Thieves Get Fiery Hijack Deterrent.” 24. Staff Writer, “These Are the Most Hijacked Cars in South Africa,” Business Tech, September 12, 2019; and Tom Head, “Hijacking Horror: Passenger Killed at Traffic Lights in Kyalami,” South African, January 8, 2020. 25. Josh Layton, “Watch the Alarming ‘Similarities’ between Carjackings Here and South Africa—­Learn How to Avoid a Hijack,” Staffordshire News, January 26, 2019; and Sammy Moretsi, “Tips to Avoid a Hijacking,” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), August 19, 2019. 26. Staff Writer, “South Africa ‘a Country at War’ as Murder Rate Soars to Nearly 49 a Day,” The Guardian (London), September 29, 2015; and Babalo Ndenze and Kaylynn Palm, “SA Is at War with Itself—­MPs React to Latest Crime Stats,” Eyewitness News, July 8, 2019. 27. Laura Clancy, “Hijacking and Car Theft Stats Revealed,” Moneyweb, October 10, 2001 [http://www.m1.mny.co.za]. 28. Graeme Hosken, “Is Your Car a Steal?” Sunday Times, September 16, 2015. 29. Staff Writer, “South Africa Hijacked by Crime,” African Business (April 1998), p. 25. 30. Motoring Staff [Tracker], “This Is the Day on Which Most Hijackings Occur: Tracker,” IOL(Independent Online), January 22, 2020 [https://www.iol.co.za/motoring/in​ dustry-news/this-is-the-day-on-which-most-hijackings-occur-tracker-41075740]; and Motor News Reporter, “Where and When Hijackers Are Most Likely to Pounce,” Business Day, October 24, 2019. 31. Manyane Manyane, “Time Is Critical in Recovery of Hijacked Vehicles,” Sunday Independent, September 29, 2019. 32. Staff Writer, “Two Suspects Arrested Following Commotion at Fourways Hospital Parking Lot,” Fourways Review (Gauteng), May 31, 2020. 33. Nonkululeko Njilo, “R200k Reward Offered for Recovery of R4m Lamborghini,” Sowetan, February 16, 2020. 34. Hanno Labuschagne, “Stolen Car Scam in South Africa—­Criminals Call You from Jail,” MyBroadband, June 17, 2020 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/motoring/342​ 023-stolen-car-scam-in-south-africa-criminals-call-you-from-jail.html]. 35. Jamie Pyatt, “Robbers Execute White Couple in ‘Racist Attack,’” Daily Mail (London), May 27, 2019. 36. Tim McFarlan, “Terrifying Moment,” Daily Mail (London), July 23, 2015 [https://​ www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3172162/Terrifying-moment-Google-Street-View​ -captures-carjacking-South-Africa.html]; Manyane Manyane, “Motorists Warned of Hijackings as Syndicates Target ‘Easy to Sell’ Toyota, VW,” Sunday Independent, August



Notes to Pages 78–81 • 315

18, 2019; and Angella Johnson, “Learning the New Rules of the Road,” Mail & Guardian, September 25, 1998. 37. Alistair Charlton, “South Africa: Google Street View Captures Moment Security Guard Is Hijacked at Gunpoint,” International Business Times, July 23, 2015. 38. Block, “South African Justice”; Michelle India Baird, “Blasting Carjacking: Prosecution-­Led Law Enforcement,” Crime & Conflict 16 (1999), pp. 37–­40; and Lewthwaite, “In South Africa, a Burning Fear.” 39. Staff Reporter, “Study Shows Drivers Are Assisting Hijackers,” The Star, March 18, 1997; and Sashia Jensen, “Detective Held in Crackdown on Vehicle Theft,” Saturday Star, March 15, 1997. 40. Kotie Geldenhuys, “Organised Crime-­Vehicle Crime,” Servamus Safety and Security Magazine 103, 4 (2015), pp. 38–­41. See also Witness Maluleke and Siyanda Dlamini, “The Prevalence of Organized Cross-­Border Crimes in South Africa: A Non-­Empirical Statistical Data Analysis on Stock Theft and Hijacking of Motor Vehicles,” International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies 11, 1 (2019), pp. 116–­145 (esp. p. 142). 41. Linda Davis, “Carjacking—­Insights from South Africa to a New Crime Problem,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (2003), pp. 173–­191; Liz MacGregor, “Where Your New Mercedes Comes with a Helicopter,” New Statesman, April 5, 2003; and Motor News Reporter, “Car Crime,” Business Day, August 29, 2019. 42. Staff Writer, “The Three Most Hijacked Cars in South Africa,” Business Tech, June 27, 2017 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/182049/these-are-the-3-most-hijack​ ed-cars-in-southafrica/]; and Hosken, “Is Your Car a Steal?” 43. Legogang Seale, “Stolen Vehicles Found Parked in Fake Living Room,” The Star, June 25, 2008. 44. Graeme Hosken, “Detained Boys Said to Be Part of Gang,” The Star, July 15, 2008. 45. One of the reasons why so many people are gravely injured or killed when cars are hijacked is desperation: carjackers who have been contracted to steal so many cars a week have in all likelihood already paid for the number of vehicles they must deliver to the syndicate chiefs. As a result, carjackers become desperate to ensure that they steal a sufficient number of vehicles. See Staff Reporter, “South Africa: Policemen, Customs Officials Involved in Major Hijacking Syndicates,” Africa News, February 15, 2001; Johnson, “Police Chief Linked with Hijack Case”; Adele Sulcas, “Crack Unit in Hijack Arrest Coup,” The Star, April 18, 1999; and Shaun Smillie and Anna Cox, “Lucrative Car-­Thief Syndicate Bust,” The Star, May 14, 2009. 46. See Lewthwaite, “In South Africa, a Burning Fear”; and Staff Reporter, “Suspect Sought over Hijackings,” The Star, March 3, 2002. 47. Keitebe Kgosikebatho, “Beware: Hijacked in Joburg,” The Patriot (Botswana), February 1, 2015; and Kotie Geldenhuys, “Cross-­Border Vehicle Crime—­Costs SA Billions,” Servamus Community-­Based Safety and Security Magazine 108, 11 (2015), pp. 24–­ 27. 48. Jan Bornman and Nashira Davids, “No Place to Hide as Thugs Run Riot,” Sunday Times, July 27, 2014.

316 • Notes to Pages 81–83

49. Graeme Hosken, “Luxury Car Crooks Strike Again,” Sowetan, January 24, 2017; and Graeme Hosken, Ernest Mabuza, and Jan Bornman, “Stolen Super Cars Destined for Middle East and Southern Africa,” Sowetan, January 23, 2017 (source of quotations). 50. Hosken, “Detained Boys Said to Be Part of Gang”; and Hosken, “Is Your Car a Steal?”; and Kutlwano Olifant and Pearl Khuzwayo, “Stolen Cars Found at Scrapyard,” The Star, January 17, 2014. See also interviews with Ryan Colyn, April 30, 2019; and Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 51. De Greef, “Elite Helicopter Force.” 52. Kahil Goga, “The Business of (Dis)Organised Crime in South Africa,” Institute for Security Studies, August 25, 2015 [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-business-of-dis​ -organised-crime-in-south-africa]. 53. Hosken, “Is Your Car a Steal?” 54. There are an estimated 5 million licensed gun owners in South Africa and anywhere from 1 to 4 million unlicensed owners. People carry guns for security, but they often end up being threatened or killed with their own weapons. See Burke, “Carjacking: New Leader of South African Crime.” See also Staff Writer, “Here’s How Many South Africans Own a Gun,” Business Tech, June 20, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/life​ style/252713/heres-how-many-south-africans-own-a-gun/]. A company called Protection Dogs Plus has advertised that “we specially prepare each of our personal protection dogs to defend against kidnappings, carjacking, and home invasions . . . Personal protection dogs take the element of surprise away from attackers. While a distracted traveler at a red light makes for an easy target, we can train your dog to alert you to anyone approaching the vehicle. In this situation, your dog can show full aggression and block access to the car, giving you enough time to drive away or lock the car. If the would-­be thief does manage to gain access to the vehicle, giving the ‘bite’ command will allow you to immobilize the threat until assistance arrives.” See “Specialized Security,” Protection Dogs Plus website (Accessed July 7, 2020) [https://protectiondogsplus.com/our-training​ -services/specialized-security/]. 55. Hamilton, “In South Africa the Motorist Is a Stormtrooper.” 56. Staff Writer, “Small Mercies,” The Economist, October 9, 2003. 57. Nicki Padayachee, “Cop Crisis,” Sunday Times, November 25, 2001. 58. Shonisani Tshikalange, “Hijacker Dies after Porsche Driver Opens Fire,” SowetanLIVE, January 15, 2021. 59. Block, “South African Justice.” 60. In one odd instance, an elderly car owner brought his vehicle to the Hyundai dealership on Ontdekkers Road in Roodepoort for routine servicing. Unaware that the owner had booby-­trapped the car with an amateurish firearm contrivance (consisting of a metal pipe and trigger mechanism loaded with a 22-­caliber bullet) as a vehicle theft deterrent, the unsuspecting car mechanic detonated the device, sustaining a serious gunshot wound to the stomach. See Eleanor Momberg, “Mechanic Injured by Anti-­ Hyjack Booby Trap,” Sunday Independent, July 6, 2008. 61. See Terry Riley, “Extreme Hardware: African Road Gear” [http://www.ticked​ .com/errtravel/1999/errhardware.htm].



Notes to Pages 84–87 • 317

62. Block, “South African Justice”; and Figenschou, “Faster Than You Can Say ‘Hi Jack.’” 63. Interview with Ryan Colyn, April 30, 2019; and interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 64. Staff Reporter, “Vehicle Thieves Get the Shock of Their Lives,” The Citizen, July 21, 2011. 65. Staff Reporter, “Johannesburg Flying Squad Unit Foil Carjacking in Alexandra,” Northeastern Tribune, October 12, 2019; Ahmed Areff, “South Africa: Four Killed in Joburg Shootout,” News24, July 23, 2015; and Staff Reporter, “UPDATE: Shootout in Bryanston between Police and Suspects Leads to Manhunt,” Sandton Chronicle, June 7, 2017. 66. See, for example, Penwell Dlamini, “Family Reels after Son Shot Washing Vehicle,” Sowetan, February 10, 2020. 67. Staff Reporter, “Criminals Wage Silent War on Security Guards,” The Star, October 9, 2019. 68. See Thabo Kunene, “Zimbabwean Robber Shot Dead in Johannesburg,” Bulawayo 24News, November 16, 2015; Alice Mpholo, “Shootout on Melville Koppies,” Northcliff Melville Times, November 15, 2015; Staff Reporter, “Robber Wounded after Dramatic Chase, Shoot-­Out,” News24, December 31, 2014; Staff Writer, “Tips on How to Survive an Armed Robbery,” Sandton Chronicle, March 14, 2016; and Fred Kumalo, “Like a Spaghetti Western,” Financial Mail, June 13, 2019; Staff Reporter, “Man Held for Hijacking,” Northeastern Tribune, October 2, 2019. 69. Thabo Jobo, “Drunk Man Kills ‘Carjacker’ in Joburg,” Citizen, November 23, 2018. 70. MacGregor, “Where Your New Mercedes Comes with a Helicopter.” 71. Antony Altbeker, “Cars and Robbers: Has Car Theft Crime Prevention Worked Too Well?” Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper no. 124 (2006), pp. 1–­16; and David Furlonger, “Vehicle Tracking—­Unlocking the Value in Your Car’s Secrets,” Financial Mail, April 15, 2016. 72. Staff Reporter, “Hijackers Outwit Trackers,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, September 6, 1996; Staff Reporter, “Outrage over Death of Zimbabwean Vice-­Council,” Pan African News Agency, September 13, 1999; Dianne Smith, “Cursed!” Saturday Star, March 3, 2000; Sam Web, “Robbed in Their Own Driveway,” The Sun (London), December 2, 2016; and Shaun Smillie and Tshego Lepule, “Welcome to Gauteng—­SA’s Hijack Capital,” Saturday Star, March 4, 2017. 73. De Greef, “ Elite Helicopter Force.” See also interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 74. Interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 75. ANA Reporter, “Police Launch Manhunt for Foreign National in Car Parts Crimes,” The Star, October 19, 2019; De Greef, “Elite Helicopter Force.” See also Fouche Burgers, “Managing the Risks of Theft and Hijacking: Short Term,” Enterprise Risk 3, 9 (October 2009), pp. 10–­12. 76. De Greef, “Elite Helicopter Force.” See also interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020.

318 • Notes to Pages 88–91

77. De Greef, “Elite Helicopter Force.” See also interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 78. Philip Opperman, “Microdot Technology,” ArticleCity (nd) [https://www.article​ city.com/articles/business_and_finance/article_10667.shtml]. 79. De Greef, “Elite Helicopter Force.” 80. MacGregor, “Where Your New Mercedes Comes with a Helicopter.” 81. Staff Reporter, “Evolving Systems to Combat Crime,” PMR (May 1999), pp. 102–­ 103; and Staff Reporter, “Embattled Car Drivers Hit Back in S. African ‘Gangster’s Paradise,’” Deutsche Presse-­Agentur, May 8, 2002. See also Tracker website [http://www.track​ er.co.za]; and interview with Ryan Colyn, April 30, 2019. 82. Burke, “Carjacking: New Leader of South African Crime”; and Johnson, “Learning the New Rules of the Road”; and Paula Froelich, “Attending the Ultimate Driving School: Anti-­Carjacking Class,” New York Post, September 15, 2014. 83. Helena Wasserman, “South Africans Are Paying up to R1.45m to Bulletproof Their Cars as Hijackers Use New AK47 Bullets,” Business Insider SA, February 22, 2018 [https://www.businessinsider.co.za/people-are-paying-millions-to-bulletproof-their-ca​ rs-2018-2].See also Rudolph Zinn, “The Policing of Robbery with Aggravating Circumstances: Case Studies of Incarcerated Offenders of Home Invasions, Carjackings, and Cash-­in-­Transit Heists in South Africa,” Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 30, 2 (2017), pp. 12–­26. 84. Kevin Ritchie, “Armoured Vehicles Have Gone Mainstream in Johannesburg,” Saturday Star, June 22, 2019. 85. Alex Patrick, “Nothing to Fear about This Fashion,” Sunday Times, September 1, 2019. 86. Ritchie, “Armoured Vehicles Have Gone Mainstream.” 87. Staff Writer, “How Much It Costs to ‘Bullet-­Proof ’ Your Car in South Africa,” Business Tech, September 23, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/motoring/272109​ /how-much-it-costs-to-bullet-proof-your-car-in-south-africa/]. 88. Cynthia Weber and Mark Lacy, “Securing by Design,” Review of International Studies 37, 3 (2011), pp. 1021–­1043 (quotation on p. 1022). 89. Ritchie, “Armoured Vehicles Have Gone Mainstream.” 90. Paul Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles (New York: Semiotexte, 1990), p. 61. 91. Figenschou, “Faster Than You Can Say ‘Hi Jack’”; and Staff Reporter, “Steps You Can Take to Lessen the Risk,” Saturday Star, March 3, 2000. 92. Staff Reporter, “Mercedes Looks to Boost Sales in 2010.” IOL (Independent Online), 2009. [http://www.project2010.co.za/2010_World_Cup_security.asp?PN=13]. This reference is taken from McMichael, “‘Clearly Blown Away,’” pp. 111–­129 (esp. p. 121). 93. Kisho Kurokawa, “Capsule Deceleration,” in Metabolism in Architecture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 75–­85 (esp. 75–­76). 94. Staff Writer, “Say ‘Tsek’ to Smash-­and-­Grabbers with These Precautionary Tips,” Dotsure Online Insurance, February 25, 2020 [https://www.dotsure.co.za/say-tsek-to-sm​ ash-and-grabbers-with-these-precautionary-tips/].



Notes to Pages 91–95 • 319

95. Staff Writer, “How to Avoid a Smash-­and-­Grab,” Midrand Reporter, February 25, 2019; Staff Reporter, “Smash-­and-­Grabs Continue in Sandton,” Sandton Chronicle, September 11, 2019; and Simnikiwe Hlatshaneni, “Blackouts See More Smash and Grabs in Joburg CBD,” The Citizen, March 23, 2019. 96. Interview with Ryan Colyn, April 30, 2019; and interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 97. Staff Reporter, “Money Van Heists on the Up,” The Star, September 12, 2018; Naledi Shange, “Guard Shot, Others Injured in Two Cash-­in-­Transit Heists in Pretoria,” TimesLIVE, November 29, 2019; Anneliese Burgess, “Heist Take-­Down at Dawn,” Sunday Times, April 22, 2018; and Yusuf Abramjee, “The Time Has Come to #MakeMoneySafe,” IOL (Independent Online), May 3, 2018 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/the​ -time-has-come-to-makemoneysafe-14757024]. 98. Staff Reporter, “S. Africa: Six Rocket Launchers ‘Missing’ from Defense Force’s Arsenals,” SAPA News Agency, August 24, 2010; and Staff Reporter, “Riddle of Missing SADF Arms,” Sowetan, August 24, 2010. 99. Staff Reporter, “Police Foil Sandton Heist,” ENCA (DStv, Channel 403), March 4, 2021 [https://www.enca.com/news/19-people-arrested-armed-robbery]. 100. Staff Reporter, “Robbed in Seconds: Car-­Jammers in SA,” Wheels24, June 14, 2017; and Thabiso Thakali, “Government Uses Jammers Often—­Expert,” Saturday Star, February 21, 2015. See also interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 101. Staff Reporter, “Jamming Devices Recovered,” News24, September 25, 2014; Pearl Boshomane, “Car Remote Blocking Crime on the Rise: How to Protect Yourself,” TimesLIVE, December 14, 2011; and Staff Writer, “Remote Jamming on the Rise,” Fourways Review (Gauteng), July 2, 2014. 102. Solly Maphumulo, “Truck Hijacking Syndicate Found with ‘Grabbers,’” The Star, October 17, 2016. See interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 103. Staff Reporter, “An Industry Hijacked,” The Economist, October 6, 2001. 104. Rena Singer, “Church No Sanctuary from Crime,” Christian Science Monitor, September 14, 2000. 105. Solly Maphumulo, “Shock as Gang Robs Worshipers in Mosque,” The Star, July 17, 2014. 106. James Mahlokwane, “Held at Gunpoint in Church Robbery,” Southern Courier, March 7, 2015. See also Thulani Gqirana, “Robbers Shoot at Praying Alexandra Priest—­ and Miss,” News24, October 22, 2014. 107. Naledi Shange, “Robbers Empty Congregants’ Pockets during Church Service,” Sowetan, 7 March 2017. 108. Botho Molosankwe, “Congregation Beat Church Robbers,” The Star, September 2, 2014. 109. Staff Writer, “Criminals Are Running Circles around South Africa’s Police,” The Economist, July 15, 2017. 110. Penwell Dlamini, “Blue-­Light Gang Suspects Bust Red-­Handed,” Sowetan, February 10, 2020.

320 •

Notes to Pages 95–98

111. Staff Writer, “SA Presidential Aide Mugged,” BBC News (UK ed.), July 30, 2003. 112. Lungile Matsuma, “MP Traumatized after Four-­Hour Hijacking and Hijack Ordeal,” The Star, February 24, 2020. 113. Charlene Somduth, “Child Rights Activist Escapes Hijacking,” IOL (Independent Online), February 1, 2019 [https://www.iol.co.za/thepost/child-rights-activist-escapes-hi​ jacking-18964475]. 114. Jay Reeves, “Alabama City Councilman Shot in Joburg,” The Star, May 24, 2016. 115. Staff Writer, “Mayor of S. African Capital ‘Carjacked’ by Armed Gang,” Agence France-­Presse, May 26, 2018. 116. Mduduzi Nonyane, “CHIEFS’ QUEEN TAKEDOWN!—­Thieves Steal Valuables Worth R2m,” Sunday Sun (Johannesburg), May 6, 2018. 117. Jane Flannagan, “Carjackers Take South African Cabinet Minister Njabulo Nzuza on Tour of Cash Machines at Gunpoint,” The Times (London), May 30, 2020. 118. Staff Reporter, “Johannesburg Flying Squad Police Arrest a Midrand Police Constable for Carjacking,” Midrand Reporter, 6 August 2018. 119. Miranda Raaf, “Women in Three-­Hour Hijack Ordeal as Friends Conned into Paying Money into e-­Wallet,” Sowetan, August 20, 2019. 120. Basildon Petain, “South African Reggae Star Shot Dead in Front of His Children,” Independent, October 19, 2007; David Bereford, “Reggae Star Shot Dead in Attempted Car Hijacking in Johannesburg,” Guardian (London), October 20, 2007; Stuart Moir, “Reggae Star’s Killers Get Life in Jail,” The Independent (UK), April 2, 2009; and Alex Perry, “Behind South Africa’s Reggae Murder,” Time, October 22, 2007. 121. Liz Gunner, “Burying Lucky Dube,” African Studies 68, 3 (2009), pp. 387–­401 (quotations on pp. 390, 389). 122. Barry Bearak, “3 Found Guilty in 2007 Killing of Reggae Star in South Africa,” New York Times, March 31, 2009. 123. Andreas Mayer, “Absolutely Africa,” Future Frame, September 4, 2000 [http://​ www.futureframe.de/framed/000904-elite-africa.htm]. Figures released by the Central Statistical Services in early 1998 indicate that around fifty to sixty teachers were leaving South Africa every month to work abroad. See Troye Lund, “More Teachers Emigrating,” Cape Times, March 4, 1998. Comparable data for other professions could be provided as well. 124. Louis Harris, “Opinion: Hijackers Deserve Harshest Penalties,” The Star, October 27, 2003. 125. Manyane, “Time Is Critical.” See interview with Ryan Colyn, April 30, 2019. 126. Staff Reporter, “Altech Netstar’s Jamming-­Resist™ Technology Stops Criminals in Their Tracks,” Insurancegateway, June 9, 2016 [https://www.insurancegateway.co.za/Sho​ rttermConsumers/PressRoom/ViewPress/Irn=13099&URL=Altech+Netstars+Jammin​ gResist+technology+stops+criminals+in+their+tracks+1#.Xt0V5_lKi70]. 127. Staff Reporter, “Weird and Wonderful Anti-­Hyjacking Devices,” Leisure Wheels, August 21, 2017 [https://www.leisurewheels.co.za/blogs/weird-wonderful-anti-hijacking​ -devices/].



Notes to Pages 98–104 • 321

128. Manyane, “Time Is Critical.” 129. See Willem Andries Senekal, “The Value of Vehicle Tracking Technology in the Recovery of Stolen Motor Vehicles” (unpublished MA thesis in Criminal Justice, University of South Africa, 2016). See also interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 130. David Furlonger, “Big Data Steering Tracking Companies,” Business Day, April 26, 2016. 131. Furlonger, “Big Data Steering Tracking Companies”; Furlonger, “Vehicle Tracking”; and Gugu Lourie, “Telematics the New Technology Frontier,” Sunday Times, October 6, 2013. 132. Furlonger, “Big Data Steering Tracking Companies”; and Furlonger, “Vehicle Tracking.’ 133. Interview with Dean Andrews and Charles Morgan, June 29, 2020. 134. Adey, “Vertical Security in the Megacity,” 51–­67 (quotation on p. 54). 135. Manyane, “Time Is Critical.” 136. Manyane, “Time Is Critical.” 137. C.O.B.R.A. Self-­Defense, “Carjacking, How to Improve the Odds You Do Not Get Killed for Your Ferrari,” C.O.B.R.A. Self-­Defense, October 3, 2017 [https://cobrade​ fence.co.za/carjacking-how-to-improve-your-odds-of-not-getting-killed-for-your-ferr​ ari/].

Chapter 3 1. Walter Benjamin, “Fashion,” in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 63–­81 (esp. 79, 80). 2. See Anthony Vidler, “Agoraphobia: Psychopathologies of Urban Space,” chapter 2 in Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture (London: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 25–­50; Louise Crew, “The Besieged Body: Geographies of Retailing and Consumption,” Progress in Human Geography 25, 4 (2001), pp. 629–­640 (esp. p. 633); and Kirsten Simonsen, “Editorial: The Body as Battlefield,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, n.s., 25 (2000), pp. 7–­9. The quotations are taken from M. Christine Boyer, Cybercities: Visual Perception in the Age of Electronic Communication (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), pp. 74–­75. 3. See William Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 26–­45. 4. Langdon Winner, “Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia?” Social Research 64, 3 (1997), pp. 989–­1018 (quotations on pp. 990–­991). 5. Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” pp. 225–­241 (esp. p. 229); and Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, “Taking People Apart: Digitalised Dissection and the Body at the Border,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27, 3 (2009), pp. 444–­464. 6. For a wider view, see Breckenridge, Biometric State.

322 • Notes to Pages 104–106

7. Lisa Parks, “Points of Departure: The Culture of US Airport Screening,” Journal of Visual Culture 6, 2 (2007), pp. 183–­200 (quotation on p. 190). 8. Weber and Lacy, “Securing by Design,” pp. 1021–­1043 (quotation on p. 1022). See also Paola Antonelli, “Grace under Pressure,” in Paola Antonelli (ed.), Safe: Design Takes on Risk (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005), pp. 9–­15. 9. See Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, Design Noir: The Secret Life of Electronic Objects (Basel: Birkhauser, 2001), pp. 15–­18. 10. Lily Manoim, “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence of Security Networks in Johannesburg’s Suburbs: Interrogating the Security Networks’ Legitimacy” (unpublished MA thesis, Organizational and Institutional Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 2020), pp. 50–­51. 11. Clive Maher, “Johannesburg Communities Take Initiative to Bolster Neighbourhood Security,” National Home Security SA, April 20, 2016 [https://www.nhsm.co.za/ne​ ws/2016/johannesburg-communities-take-the-initiative-to-bolster-neighbourhood-sec​ urity]. 12. Celeste Olalquiaga defines psychasthenia as “a disturbance in the relation between self and surrounding territory,” a troubling inability of individuals to locate the boundaries of their own bodies. In a climate of fear (whether real or imagined), the normal spatial parameters of the body—­that “geography closest in”—­are confused with represented spaces, leading individuals to abandon their own identities “to embrace the space beyond,” to camouflage themselves to fit anonymously into the spatial milieu, thus seeming to vanish as a corporeal body. “Bodies are becoming like cities, their temporal coordinates transformed into spatial ones,” Olalquiaga argues. “In a poetic condensation, history has been replaced by geography, stories by maps, [and] memories by scenarios. We no longer perceive ourselves as continuity but as location, or rather dislocation in the urban/suburban cosmos.” Celeste Olalquiaga, Megalopolis: Contemporary Cultural Sensibilities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 1–­2, 93. 13. See Murray, Panic City (pp. 96–­104) for a discussion of the capsular logic that governs the construction of the “safe house.” 14. Michele Rapoport, “Being a Body or Having One: Automated Domestic Technologies and Corporeality,” AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge, Culture, and Communication 28 (2013), pp. 209–­218 (quotation on p. 209). See Frank Müller, “Home Matters: The Material Culture of Urban Security,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (2020), pp. 1–­10. 15. Michele Rapoport, “The Home under Surveillance: A Tripartite Assemblage,” Surveillance & Society 10, 3–­4 (2012), pp. 320–­333 (quotations on p. 331). 16. Liisa Mäkinen, “Surveillance On/Off: Examining Home Surveillance Systems from the User’s Perspective,” Surveillance & Society 14, 1 (2016), pp. 59–­77 (esp. p. 60). See also Staff Reporter, “An Intelligent Home System Is Like an Experienced Butler,” The Star, November 16, 2018. 17. Rapoport, “Home under Surveillance,” p. 328. See also Staff Reporter, “Should You Ditch Your Home Security Company in Favour of Technology?” City Press, December 10, 2017.



Notes to Pages 107–110 • 323

18. Rapoport, “Being a Body or Having One,” p. 209. 19. See Shelly Seid, “High Walls of Horror,” Sunday Times, September 16, 2016. 20. Isaac Mahlangu, “More Than One Million House Break-­ins in SA in a Year,” SowetanLIVE, October 3, 2019. 21. Sashin Naidoo, “Criminals Are Using New Burglary Tactics,” SABC News, March 11, 2020. 22. Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall Security update—­October 2016 [www.hu​ rlingham.org.za/the-spruit-and-open-spaces]. See also Anna Cox, “Sandton Residents ‘Living under Siege,’” Star, May 20, 2020. 23. Nicola Miltz, “Far Fewer Home Invasions,” South African Jewish Report, September 19, 2019; and McDivett Khumbulani Tshehla (Halfway House), “Going Back to Spirit of Neighbourliness the Only Way to Beat Criminality,” SowetanLIVE (Online), December 10, 2019. 24. Shaun Smillie, “Bedfordview Robbers Use ‘Security Getaway Car,’” Saturday Star, February 23, 2019. 25. Chulumanco Mahamba, “Joburg Pensioner Stabbed 20 Times during Home Invasion,” The Star, January 27, 2020; African News Agency, “Woman Killed in Johannesburg Home Invasion,” The Citizen (Pretoria), April 27, 2019; Tom Head, “Home Invasions: Areas in South Africa Most at Risk,” South African, November 30, 2018; and Staff Reporter, “Home Invasion in Midrand Leaves One Dead, Another Critical,” Midrand Reporter, April 16, 2019; and Staff Reporter, “Horrific Tragedy in Johannesburg,” Yeshiva World, October 11, 2019. 26. Staff Reporter, “Top 5 Tips to Prevent a Home Invasion,” Midrand Reporter, May 20, 2019. 27. See interviews with Geoff Schapiro, February 12, 2016; and Grant Moulder, June 21, 2014. 28. Brendan Roane, “Domestic Theft Case Reports Are on the Rise,” The Star, September 6, 2013. See interviews with Vickie Drinkwater, February 2, 2016; Geoff Schapiro, February 12, 2016; and Grant Moulder, June 21, 2014. 29. Staff Reporter, “Research Thoroughly before Employing Anyone in Your Home,” Northcliff Melville Times, February 12, 2020. 30. Staff Reporter, “There Are Still Things You Can Do,” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), July 19, 2018; Staff Reporter, “Guards Polygraphed,” City Press (Johannesburg), March 12, 2017; and Staff Reporter, “Polygraph Tests Must Be Corroborated,” The Star, August 28, 2013. See interview with Mike Sears, Jason Mordecai, and Victor Tortora, June 25, 2012. 31. Interviews with Vickie Drinkwater, February 2, 2016; Lornette Joseph, July 10, 2014; Mike Sears, Jason Mordecai, Victor Tortora, June 25, 2012; Dean Peterson, June 13, 2012; Geoff Schapiro, June 13, 2012; and Grant Moulder, June 21, 2014. 32. Sarah Smit, “Use of Lie Detectors Put to the Test,” Mail & Guardian (Web ed.), October 18, 2019; Audrey Johnson, “When Consent Clauses Get Problematic,” Business Day, February 5, 2018; and Danielle Ebrahim, “Where Do We Stand with the Polygraph Testing of Employees?” The Times (Johannesburg), July 22, 2016; Staff Reporter, “Polygraph a Useful Tool Despite Accepted Flaws,” The Star, July 9, 2014; and Staff Reporter,

324 • Notes to Pages 110–113

“Polygraph Finding Is Not Sufficient Proof of Guilt—­Staff Who Were Fired over Theft Were Able to Appeal to Court,” The Star, June 25, 2014. 33. Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval, “Introduction: Internet and Surveillance,” in Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval (eds.), Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–­28 (quotation on p. 11). 34. Staff Reporter, “Driven to Despair by Crime Wave—­Police’s Lack of Capacity to Cope with ‘Out-­of-­Control’ Situation Sparks Boom in Applications for Gated Communities,” The Star, March 2, 2020. 35. Staff Writer, “Inside the Luxurious Smart Homes of South Africa’s Millionaires,” MyBroadband, October 29, 2015 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/technology/143979​ -inside-the-luxurious-smart-homes-of-south-africas-millionaires.html]. 36. Rapoport, “Being a Body or Having One,” p. 212; Peter-­Paul Verbeek, “Ambient Intelligence and Persuasive Technology: The Blurring Boundaries between Human and Technology,” Nanoethics 3, 3 (2009), pp. 231–­242. 37. Tessa Diphoorn, “‘It’s All about the Body’: The Bodily Capital of Armed Response Officers in South Africa,” Medical Anthropology 34 (2015), pp. 336–­352. See Diane Nelson, “Phantom Limbs and Invisible Hands: Bodies, Prosthetics, and Late Capitalist Identifications,” Cultural Anthropology 16, 3 (2001), pp. 303–­313; and Leslie Sharp, “The Commodification of the Body and Its Parts,” Annual Review of Anthropology 29 (2000), pp. 287–­328. 38. Boyer, Cybercities, p. 74. 39. See Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra (eds.), The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future (Boston: MIT Press, 2006). 40. There are dozens of websites that offer protection services, security equipment, and other body armor. 41. Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value,” in Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 3–­63 (quotation on p. 3). 42. Sharp, “Commodification of the Body,” p. 291. 43. Newspaper accounts are filled with personal anecdotes about how possession of a weapon or mace saved the person from harm. See, for example, Sihle Mlambo, “VIDEO: Suspect Arrested after Joburg Robbery Goes Viral,” Saturday Star, November 22, 2019. 44. Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security,” pp. 102–­123 (esp. 103). For a broader view, see Sara Rebolloso McCullough, “Body Like a Rocket: Performing Technologies of Naturalization,” Third Space: A Journal of Feminist Theory and Culture 9, 2 (2010), pp. 1–­26. 45. See, for example, Kim Harrisberg and Anastasia Moloney, “Guns or Yoga? Finding Ways to Fight Crime in South Africa and Colombia,” IOL(Independent Online), October 16, 2019 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/guns-or-yoga-fi​ nding-ways-to-fight-crime-in-south-africa-and-colombia-35086413]; Staff Reporter,



Notes to Pages 113–117 • 325

“Lenasia Crime Safety Tips,” The Star, September 6, 2019; Bongani Mthethwa, “Give Security Guards ‘Metal Detectors and Panic Buttons’ to Keep Schools Safe: Sadtu,” TimesLIVE (Online), July 10, 2019; Staff Reporter, “Ambulances to Be Escorted after Spate of Attacks,” The Star, July 3, 2019; and Kopano Monaheng, “Put the Safety of Your Family First,” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), May 3, 2019. 46. Interview with Eitan Ash, Sales Representative, Vumacam, July 13, 2020. 47. For the use of this term, “body nets,” see W. Mitchell, E-­topia, p. 54. 48. See Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Vintage, 1998), p. 367. 49. Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” Astronautics (September 1960), pp. 26–­27, 74–­76. 50. For perhaps the best-­known feminist theorist, see Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1990). See also William J. Mitchell, Me++: The Cyborg Self and the Networked City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 51. Sharp, “Commodification of the Body,” p. 311. 52. David Smith, “Twitter Helps Save South African Carjacking Victim,” The Guardian, April 11, 2012; and Carroll, “Carjacking: The Everyday Ordeal.” 53. Antonelli, “Grace under Pressure,” pp. 8–­15 (quotations on p. 10). 54. Weber and Lacy, “Security by Design,” pp. 1021–­1043. 55. Paola Antonelli, “Armor,” in Antonelli, Safe: Design Takes on Risk, pp. 80–­95 (quotation on p. 80). 56. Weber and Lacy, “Security by Design,” pp. 1022, 1021. 57. Olalquiaga, Megalopolis, p. 93. 58. Mark Lacy, “Designing Security: Controlling Society and MoMA’s Safe: Design Takes on Risk,” in Franςois Debrix and Mark Lacy (eds.), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power, and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 88–­106 (esp. p. 95). 59. Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000). 60. Antonelli, “Armor,” p. 80. 61. Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles, p. 61. 62. Joanne Entwistle, The Fashioned Body: Fashion, Dress, and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 11, 37, 66. 63. This term, “ambient architecture,” is taken from Boyer, Cybercities, p. 103. 64. See Elizabeth Wilson, Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity (London: Virago Press, 1985), p. 2. 65. Cynthia Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” Citizenship Studies 12, 2 (2008), pp. 125–­142 (quotations on pp. 130, 127). 66. Patrick, “Nothing to Fear about This Fashion.” 67. Jonathan Ancer, “This Time It’s Really, Really Personal,” Sunday Times, April 18, 1998. 68. See MeMeZa web page [http://memeza.co.za/memeza-personal-safety-alarm].

326 • Notes to Pages 117–120

69. See Blaster website [http://www.blaster.co.za]. 70. E. Wilson, Adorned in Dreams, p. 2. 71. See Steven Flusty, Building Paranoia: The Proliferation of Interdictory Space and the Erosion of Spatial Justice (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Forum for Architecture and Urban Design, 1995); Peter Marcuse, “Walls of Fear and Walls of Support,” in Nan Ellin (ed.), Architecture of Fear (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), pp. 101–­114; and Dennis Judd, “The New Walled Cities,” in Helen Liggett and David Perry (eds.), Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage, 1995), pp. 144–­166. 72. Lieven de Cauter, “The Capsular City,” in Neil Leach (ed.), The Hieroglyphics of Space: Reading and Experiencing the Modern Metropolis (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 271–­280 (esp. 274–­277). 73. Tinus Kruger, Karina Landman, and Susan Lieberman, Designing Safer Places: A Manual for Crime Prevention through Planning and Design (Pretoria: CSIR and SAPS, 2001). This manual was written by the CSIR Building and Construction Technology team for the South African Police Services (SAPS) Division for Crime Prevention (Social Crime Prevention) as a set of practical guidelines on how to retrofit the built environment in ways that deter crime. See also Tinus Kruger, Tiaan Meyer, Mark Napier, Elena Pascolo, Mabela Qhobela, Mark Shaw, Sarah Oppler, Luzuko Niyabo, and Antoinette Louw, Safer by Design: Towards Effective Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for South Africa (Monograph Series, no. 16) (Midrand: Division for Building Technology, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and the Institute for Security Studies, 1997). 74. See Jon Coaffee, “Fortification, Fragmentation, and the Threat of Terrorism in the City of London in the 1990s,” in John Gold and George Revill (eds.), Landscapes of Defence (London: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 114–­129 (esp. 114–­115). 75. See Murray, Panic City, pp. 69–­116. 76. See Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape,” pp. 55–­56. See also Sandra Bollen, Lillian Artz, Lisa Vetten, and Antoinette Louw, Violence against Women in Metropolitan South Africa: A Study on Impact and Service Delivery (Monograph no. 41, September 1999) (Midrand: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); and Antoinette Louw, Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, and Rory Robertshaw, Crime in Johannesburg: Results of a City Victim Survey (Monograph Series no. 18, February 1998) (Midrand: Institute for Security Studies, 1998). 77. See Tim Butcher, “From the Depths of Despair to the Heights of Silliness,” Daily Telegraph (London), October 21, 2000. 78. Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape,” pp. 48–­53 (esp. 56–­57); AbdouMaliq Simone, “Globalization and the Identity of African Urban Practices,” in Judin and Vladislavić, Blank ___, pp. 173–­187; and Sameer Naik, “Joburg’s Inner City Overflowing with Rubbish, Smell of Urine,” Saturday Star, January 4, 2020. 79. This litany is adopted from Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape,” pp. 55–­56.



Notes to Pages 121–128 • 327

80. Fikile-­Ntsikelelo Moya, “Top Judge Gets Taste of Hijacking,” The Star, March 8, 2000; and Boffey, “Where Even Cops Get Robbed.” 81. Graeme Hosken, “Law and Disorder: Judges and Advocates under Siege at High Court,” Sunday Times, December 19, 2018. 82. John Jenkins, “Urbanisation and Security in South Africa: The Continuation of History,” African Security Review 6, 6 (1997), pp. 1–­12. 83. Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape,” pp. 55–­56. See also Staff Writer, “South Africa: Murder and Siege Architecture,” The Economist 336, no. 7923 (July 15, 1995), p. 28; Derek Rodney, ‘Terror Teams Pillaging Jo’burg Suburbs,” The Star, March 20, 1997; C. Jacobs, “Locking Out the Criminals,” Sunday Times (Metro), May 10, 1998; and Dianne Smith, “Cursed!” Saturday Star, March 3, 2001. 84. Bremner, “Crime and the Emerging Landscape,” pp. 54–­55. 85. Sheree Rossouw, “Living Behind the Barricades,” Mail & Guardian, January 12, 2001; and Ian Fife, “Storming the Barricades,” Financial Mail, July 28, 2000, p. 85. 86. Prega Govender, “Fortress Schools,” Sunday Times, May 21, 2017). 87. Bonga Dlulane, “Lesufi ‘Devastated’ after Equipment Worth R3M Stolen from Soweto School,” Eyewitness News, October 5, 2019 [https://ewn.co.za/2019/10/05/lesufi​ -devastated-after-equipment-worth-r3m-stolen-from-soweto-school]. 88. On-­Site Visit, IFSEC South Africa 2012 Exhibition, Gallagher Convention Centre, Midrand, June 19–­21, 2012. 89. Thandi Skade, “Anti-­Burglar Device Blasts out Fog within Seconds,” The Star, July 1, 2008. 90. Staff Reporter, “From Bullet-­Resistant Windows to Discreet Surveillance, Securex Has It All,” Business Day, March 1, 2001. See also the Aludi Products home page [http://www.aludi,co.za/X-Ray.html]. 91. Staff Reporter, “Axis Communications Brings Industry’s First Open IP-­Based Access Controller to the Canadian Market,” Security Products & Technology News, March 25, 2014. [http.//www.axis.com/za/en]. 92. Interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 93. Interviews with Jack Edery, June 19, 2012, and July 1, 2014; Frederic Lancelin, June 19, 2012; Ingo Mutinelli, July 1, 2014; Ryan Nortmann, June 19, 2012. 94. Interviews with Patrick Frimat, June 19, 2012; Justin Hydes, June 19, 2012; and Russell Thomas, July 15, 2008. 95. Interviews with Rocky Scafer, July 16, 2014; and Geoff Schapiro, February 12, 2016. 96. Charles Urban, CEO Tactical Group, 24-­Hour Armed Reaction and Guarding Specialists [http://www.tacticalreaction.co.za/off-site-cctv-monitoring/]. 97. Weber and Lacy, “Security by Design,” p. 1024. 98. Monahan and Wall, “Somatic Surveillance,” pp. 154–­173 (esp. pp. 155, 162). 99. See Liquid Bullet web page [https/www.liquidbullet.net/Default.asp]. See also Kim Harrisberg, “Pepper Spray and Punches: South Africans Ready for Women’s Day,” Reuters, March 6, 2020.

328 • Notes to Pages 128–132

100. See ClickOn Communications web page [http://www.clickon.co.za]. 101. Timothy Rangongo, “This SA Startup Builds Cheap Anti-­Crime Tech for Communities,” Business Insider SA, December 21, 2018 [s://www.businessinsider.co.za/meme​ za-shout-crime-prevention-community-safety-startup-wins-millions-in-investment-fu​ nding-from-google-impact-challenge-south-africa-2018-12]; and Emma King, “Thulile Mthetwa—­MeMeZa Community Safety,” SAB Foundation, January 1, 2018 [https://sabf​ oundation.co.za/stories-1/2018/7/12/thulile-mthetwa-memeza-community-safety]. 102. Singh, Policing and Crime Control, p. 48. 103. Staff Reporter, “Anti-­Climb Rails—­‘Razor Spike,’” Hi-­Secure Ltd [http.//www​ .hi-secure.co.uk/anti-climb-rails-razor-spike.html.] Jean and John Comaroff refer to a similar burglar-­deterrent device called Eina Ivy—­rows of razor-­sharp metal spikes twisted over lengths of barbed wire and strategically placed on the tops and sides of walls, fences, and gates. One particular product line—­the Eina Thorn Spike—­conceals its metal spikes in green-­colored faux leaves in order to simulate natural vegetation, thereby effectively camouflaging its gruesome purpose. Patented in 1999, Eina Ivy stimulated a lot of copycat variations, including “shark spikes,” “razor ripper wire,” and “tiger spikes.” For a more detailed description, see the Eina Ivy web page [http:/www.eina-ivy​ .co.za]. See also Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, The Truth about Crime: Sovereignty, Knowledge, Social Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), pp. 2018–­220. 104. Singh, Policing and Crime Control, p. 48. 105. Charlotte Chipangura, “New Electric Fence Regulation to Be Implemented,” The Star, May 15, 2013. 106. Staff Reporter, “Tough New Laws for Electric Fences,” Property 24 Newsletter, February 18, 2013 [http//www.property24.com.html]. 107. For information on ElectroMesh Monitored Barrier Fencing, see web page at [https://www.electromesh.co.za/]. 108. Staff Writer, “Having These Types of Electric Fences Could Get You Arrested in South Africa,” Business Tech, December 16, 2017 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifes​ tyle/215743/having-these-types-of-electric-fences-could-get-you-arrested-in-south-afr​ ica/]. 109. Mungo Soggot and Edie Koch, “A Trip around the Bizarre World of Apartheid’s Mad Scientists,” Mail & Guardian, June 27, 1997. See also Louise Greene, “Apartheid’s Wolves: Political Animals and Animal Politics,” Critical African Studies 8, 2 (2016), pp. 146–­160. Peet Coetzee gives a slightly different account, but the differences are incidental. See Peet Coetzee, Dogs of War: Memoirs of the South African Defence Force Dog Units (Noorsekloof, South Africa: Self-­published, 2011). 110. Peter Goodwin, “Wolf-­Dog Joins Pretoria Forces,” Sunday Times (London), October 22, 1989; and Lance van Sittert and Sandra Swart, “Canis Familiaris: A Dog History of Southern Africa,” in Lance van Sittert and Sandra Swart (eds.), Canis Africanis: A Dog History of Southern Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 13–­44 (esp. pp. 30–­31). 111. Goodwin, “Wolf-­Dog Joins Pretoria Forces”; and Robyn Dixon, “Sanctuary for the Wolf Orphans of Apartheid,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2004.



Notes to Pages 132–135 • 329

112. Gavin du Venage, “Apartheid Regime Bred Man-­Hunting Wolf-­Dogs,” Wolf Songs of Alaska, May 3, 2005 [https://www.wolfsongalaska.org/chorus/node/224]. 113. Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. 36–­37; and Dixon, “Sanctuary for the Wolf Orphans.” 114. Dixon, “Sanctuary for the Wolf Orphans”; and van Sittert and Swart, “Canis Familiaris,” pp. 30–­31. 115. Dixon, “Sanctuary for the Wolf Orphans.” 116. Marcia England and Stephanie Simon, “Scary Cities: Urban Geographies of Fear, Difference, and Belonging,” Social & Cultural Geography 11, 3 (2010), pp. 201–­207 (esp. p. 202). 117. Peter Shirlow and Rachel Pain, “The Geographies and Politics of Fear,” Capital and Class 60 (2003), pp. 15–­26 (quotation on p. 18). 118. See Rachel Pain, “Space, Sexual Violence, and Social Control: Integrating Geographical and Feminist Analyses of Women’s Fear of Crime,” Progress in Human Geography 15, 4 (1991), 415–­431. For an early intervention into the discussion, see contributions to Shirley Ardener (ed.), Women and Space: Ground Rules and Social Maps (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993). 119. Benjamin Smith, “Scared By, Of, In, and For Dubai,” Social & Cultural Geography 11, 3 (2010), pp. 263–­283 (esp. p. 265, 268, 279). 120. Promotional material for the Edge Shooting Academy women’s self-­defense course is available at [https://www.edgeshooting.co.za/landing2021/]. 121. Kim Harrisberg, “‘No Safe Place’: South African Women Suffering ‘Epidemic’ of Violence, Activists Warn,” Reuters, September 3, 2019; Thuso Khumalo, “South Africa Declares ‘Femicide’ a National Crisis,” Africa, September 20, 2019; and Robin Lee Francke, “Thousands Protest in South Africa over Rising Violence against Women,” The Guardian (London), September 5, 2019. 122. Staff Reporter, “South Africa: Violence against Women Like a War—­Ramaphosa,” BBC News, September 18, 2019; and Associated Press, “South African Leader Drops UN Visit as Women Protest Attacks,” U.S. News and World Report, September 19, 2019. 123. Rachel Pain, “Social Geographies of Women’s Fear of Crime,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22, 2 (1997), pp. 231–­244; Rachel Pain, “Place, Social Relations, and Fear of Crime,” Progress in Human Geography 24, 3 (2000), pp. 355–­388; and Rachel Pain, “Gender, Race, Age and Fear in the City,” Urban Studies 38, 5–­6 (2001), pp: 899–­913. 124. Robyn Dixon, “Controversy in South Africa over Device to Snare Rapists,” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2005. Originally branded RapeX, the device’s identification was changed to Rape-­aXe due to a conflict with the European Union and its patented “warning system” of a similar name. See interview with Sonette Ehlers, December 1, 2010. 125. Laura Williams, “Modern Chastity Belts Won’t Stop Rape,” The Guardian (London), May 11, 2010; and Staff Reporter, “S. Africa ‘Rape Trap’ Condemned,” BBC News, June 10, 2005. See Sarah Nuttall, “Girl Bodies,” Social Text 22, 1 (2004), pp. 17–­33.

330 • Notes to Pages 135–137

126. Titania Kumeh, “Anti-­Rape World Cup Condoms  .  .  . with Teeth? An Armed Condom Helps Women Fight Back,” Mother Jones, June 24, 2010. 127. Charity Bengu, “Keeping Safe Below the Belt,” Sowetan, December 14, 2001; and Charity Bengu, “Mixed Feelings over Chastity Belt,” Sowetan, December 14, 2001. See interview with Sonette Ehlers, December 1, 2010. 128. Neva Chonin, “Vagina Dentata,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 2005; and Prerna Mankad, “Clamping Down on Rapists in South Africa,” Foreign Policy, April 11, 2007. See also interview with Sonette Ehlers, December 1, 2010. 129. Jonathan Clayton, “Anti-­Rape Device Must Be Banned, Say Women,” Times (London), June 8, 2005; and Faith Karimi, “South African Doctor Invents Female Condoms with ‘Teeth’ to Fight Rape,” CNN Inside Africa, June 1, 2010. 130. Dixon, “Controversy in South Africa over Device to Snare Rapists.” 131. Willem Steenkamp, “‘Killer Tampon’ to Give Rapists the Chop,” IOL (Independent Online), February 23, 2007 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/killer-tampon-to-give-rapi​ sts-the-chop-57525]. 132. Sonette Ehlers, quoted in Jillian Green, “Anti-­ Rape Device Gives Women ‘Teeth’—­but Some Fear It Will Worsen Violence,” Cape Times, June 7, 2005 (source of the first quotation); and Karimi, “South African Doctor Invents Female Condoms”(source of the second quotation). 133. Kumeh, “Anti-­Rape World Cup Condoms.”  134. Karimi, “South African Doctor Invents Female Condoms”; and David Mickkelson, “RapeX, the South African Anti-­Rape Condom,” Snopes, May 8, 2020 [https://www​ .snopes.com/fact-check/rapex/]. 135. Renee Marie Shelby, “Techno-­Physical Feminism: Anti-­Rape Technology, Gender, and Corporeal Surveillance,” Feminist Media Studies 20, 4 (2019), pp. 1–­22. 136. Joakim Berndtsson and Maria Stern, “Private Security and the Public-­Private Divide: Contested Lines of Distinction and Modes of Governance in the Stockholm-­ Arlanda Security Assemblage,” International Political Sociology 5, 4 (2011), pp. 408–­425; Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” pp. 225–­241; and Peter Adey, “Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, and the Preemptive Securitisation of the Mobile Body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27, 2 (2009), pp. 274–­295. 137. Peter Adey, “Surveillance at the Airport: Surveilling Mobility/Mobilising Surveillance,” Environment and Planning A 36, 8 (2009), pp. 1365–­1380 (quotation on p. 1375); and Mark Salter, “The Global Airport: Managing Space, Speed, and Security,” in Mark Salter (ed.), Politics at the Airport (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. 1–­28. 138. Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” p. 229. 139. Amoore and Hall, “Taking People Apart,” pp. 444–­464. 140. See Mike Davis, “The Flames of New York,” New Left Review (2nd series) 12 (2001), pp. 34–­51 (esp. 45–­46). See also Adey, “Facing Airport Security,” pp. 274–­295; Randy Lippert and Daniel O’Connor, “Security Assemblages: Airport Security, Flexible Work, and Liberal Governance,” Alternatives 28, 3 (2003), pp. 331–­358; and Mark Salter, “At



Notes to Pages 137–141 • 331

the Threshold of Security: A Theory of International Borders,” in Elia Zureik and Mark Salter (eds.), Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2005), pp. 36–­50. 141. See Paul Virilio, “The Overexposed City,” in Neil Leach (ed.), Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 381–­390 (esp. pp. 381–­382). 142. It was claimed that the installation of 120 surveillance cameras at the Cape Town International Airport reduced thefts by half. See Lindsay Barnes, “Spy Eyes Splash Airport Crime,” Cape Argus, December 10, 1997; and Staff Reporter, “Cameras Reduce Thefts at Airport,” The Star, December 11, 1997. 143. Lesley Stones, “Westbury Hopes to Capitalise on Face Recognition System,” Business Day, October 18, 2001. 144. Aphiwe Boyce, “Booze Ends in Sewers after Inner-­city Raids,” The Star, August 12, 2004; and Staff Reporter, “Biometrics Booms in SA,” Hi-­Tech Security Solutions (Online) (April 2009). 145. Interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011. See Mike Crang, “Watching the City: Video, Surveillance, and Resistance,” Environment and Planning A 28, 12 (1996), pp. 2099–­2104. 146. Nicholas Fyfe and Jon Bannister, “City Watching: Closed Circuit Television Surveillance in Public Spaces,” Area 28, 1 (1996), pp. 37–­46 (esp. 46). 147. Davis, Ecology of Fear, pp. 367–­368. 148. Murray, Panic City, pp. 69–­116. 149. Weizman, Hollow Land, pp. 139–­160. 150. See Mark Griffiths and Jemima Repo, “Biopolitics and Checkpoint 300 in Occupied Palestine: Bodies, Affect, Discipline,” Political Geography 65 (2018), pp. 17–­25. 151. Helga Tawil-­Souri, “New Palestinian Centers: An Ethnography of the ‘Checkpoint Economy,’” International Journal of Cultural Studies 12, 3 (2009), pp. 217–­235 (esp. p. 220). 152. For “bubbles of governance,” see George Rigakos and David Greener, “Bubbles of Governance: Private Policing and the Law in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 15, 1 (2000), pp. 145–­185. See Davis, City of Quartz, p. 224. 153. Tawil-­Souri, “New Palestinian Centers,” p. 219. 154. See Weizman, Hollow Land, pp. 147–­148. 155. See Doraval Govender, “Improving Physical Protection Systems to Prevent Residential Burglaries,” African Security Review 25, 4 (2016), pp. 356–­367. 156. Shelby, “Techno-­Physical Feminism,” p. 3. See also Constable Stephen Clark, “Improving the Community’s Involvement in Fighting Crime,” Servamus: Community-­ Based Safety and Security Magazine 104, 6 (June 2011), pp. 30–­31. 157. Rose, “Death of the Social?” pp. 327–­356 (esp. p. 335). 158. Charles Rice, “The Space-­Time of Pre-­emption: An Interview with Brian Massumi,” Architectural Design 80, 5 (2010), pp. 32–­37 (esp. p. 33).

332 • Notes to Pages 142–143

Chapter 4 1. Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” pp. 605–­622; Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, “The Suspicious Eye,” Criminal Justice Matters 33 (1998), pp. 10–­11; and George Rigakos, “Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice,” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 24, 3 (1999), pp. 381–­409. 2. For a wider discussion, see Hille Koskela, “‘The Gaze without Eyes’: Video-­ Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space,” Progress in Human Geography 24, 2 (2000), pp. 243–­265 (esp. 243–­244); Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power, and Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990); David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1994); Fyfe and Bannister, “City Watching,’ pp. 37–­46; Matthew Hannah, “Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review,” Geografiska Annaler (Series B) 79B, 3 (1997), pp. 171–­180; and Thomas Allmer, “Towards a Critical Theory of Surveillance Studies,” Internet & Surveillance—­Research Paper Series (Research Paper no. 11) (Vienna, Austria, Unified Theory of Information Research Group, 2011), pp. 1–­37. 3. Michael McCahill, “Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of Surveillance,” in Clive Norris, Jade Morgan, and Gary Armstrong (eds.), Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television, and Social Control (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 41–­65. 4. Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” pp. 605–­606. See also Sean Hier, “Probing the Surveillant Assemblage: On the Dialectics of Surveillance Practices as Processes of Social Control,” Surveillance & Society 1, 3 (2003), pp. 399–­411. 5. Stephen Graham, “Spaces of Surveillant Simulation: New Technologies, Digital Representations, and Material Geographies,” Environment and Planning D 16, 4 (1998), pp. 483–­504; and Jennie Germann Molz, “‘Watch Us Wander’: Mobile Surveillance and the Surveillance of Mobility,” Environment and Planning A 38, 2 (2006), pp. 377–­393. 6. For a broad survey of the main contributions to this discussion, see Dean Wilson and Clive Norris (eds.), Surveillance, Crime, and Social Control, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2016). 7. Roy Boyne, “Post-­Panopticism,” Economy and Society 29, 2 (2000), pp. 285–­307 (esp. 287). 8. Merry, “Spatial Governmentality,” pp. 16–­29 (esp. pp. 16–­17). See also Clive Norris, “From Personal to Digital: CCTV, the Panopticon, and the Technological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control,” in David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 249–­281; and David Lyon, “Surveillance, Power, and Everyday Life,” in Phillip Kalantzis-­Cope and Karim Gherab-­Martín (eds.), Emerging Digital Spaces in Contemporary Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 107–­120. 9. For a wider discussion, see Norris and Armstrong, “Suspicious Eye,” pp. 10–­11; John Fiske, “Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Black Man, and Democratic Totalitarianism,” Theory, Culture & Society 15, 2 (1998), pp. 67–­88; David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998);



Notes to Pages 145–145 • 333

William Staples, Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Postmodern Life (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Taner Oc and Steven Tiesdell, “City Centre Management and Safer City Centres: Approaches in Coventry and Nottingham,” Cities 15, 2 (1998), pp. 85–­103; Miles Ogborn, “Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space, and the Reform of Urban Policing in England, 1835–­56,” Political Geography 12, 6 (1993), pp. 505–­521; and Clifford Shearing and Phillip Stenning, “From the Panopticon to Disney World: The Development of Discipline,” in John Muncie, Eugene McLaughlin, and Gordon Hughes (eds.), Criminological Perspectives (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 424–­433. 10. See Christine Hentschel, “Making (In)Visible: CCTV, ‘Living Cameras,’ and Their Objects in the Post-­Apartheid Metropolis,” International Criminal Justice Review 17, 4 (2007), pp. 289–­303; and Roy Coleman and Joe Sim, “‘You’ll Never Walk Alone’: CCTV Surveillance, Order, and Neo-­Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre,” British Journal of Sociology 51, 4 (2000), pp. 623–­640. 11. Coleman, “Surveillance in the City,” pp. 122, 134. See also Stanley Cohen, “‘The Punitive City’: Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control,” Contemporary Crisis 3, 4 (1979), pp. 339–­363. 12. See Zygmunt Bauman, “Urban Space Wars: On Destructive Order and Creative Chaos,” Space and Culture 2, 3 (1998), pp. 109–­123 (esp. 112–­113); and Anastasia Loukaitou-­Sideris, “Cracks in the City: Addressing the Constraints and Potential of Urban Design,” Journal of Urban Design 1, 1 (1996), pp. 91–­104. 13. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–­1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 146, 152. The ideas and final quotation are taken from M. Christine Boyer, Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), p. 33. See also David Murakami Wood, “Beyond the Panopticon? Foucault and Surveillance Studies,” in Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden (eds.), Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 245–­263. 14. David Thomas, “From the Photograph to Postphotographic Practice: Toward a Postoptical Ecology of the Eye,” in Timothy Druckrey (ed.), Electronic Culture: Technology and Visual Representation (New York: Aperture, 1996), pp. 145–­153. See also Fredrika Björklund and Ola Svenonius, “Video Surveillance in Theory and as Institutional Practice,” in Fredrika Björklund and Ola Svenonius (eds.), Surveillance and Social Control in a Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1–­18. 15. Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” p. 617. 16. Monica Degen, “Fighting for the Global Catwalk: Formalizing Public Life in Castlefield (Manchester) and Diluting Public Life in el Raval (Barcelona),” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, 4 (2003), pp. 867–­880 (esp. 869–­870). 17. See Antonia Bardis, “Digital Photography and the Question of Realism,” Journal of Visual Art Practice 3, 3 (2004), pp. 209–­218 (quotations on p. 211 and p. 214). 18. See William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-­ Photographic Era (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); and Norris, “From Personal to Digital,” pp. 249–­281.

334 • Notes to Pages 145–147

19. Lianos (with Douglas), “Dangerization and the End of Deviance,” pp. 261–­278; and Stephen Graham and David Wood, “Digitalizing Surveillance: Categorization, Space, Inequality” Critical Social Policy 23, 2 (2003), pp. 227–­248 (esp. 228, 230). 20. See Mark Poster, The Mode of Information (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990). 21. See Clive Norris, Jade Moran, and Gary Armstrong, “Algorithmic Surveillance: The Future of Automated Visual Surveillance,” in Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television, and Social Control, pp. 255–­276. 22. Mark Salter, “Surveillance,” in J. Peter Burgess (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 187–­196; and Roy Coleman, “Watching the Degenerate: Street Camera Surveillance and Urban Regeneration,” Local Economy 19, 3 (2004), pp. 199–­211. 23. Ryan Bishop and John Phillips, “Sighted Weapons and Modernist Opacity: Aesthetics, Poetics, Prosthetics,” Boundary 2 29, 2 (2002), pp. 157–­179 (quotations on pp. 158, 162). 24. Rapoport, “Home under Surveillance,” pp. 320–­333 (esp. pp. 326–­331). 25. Hentschel, “Making (In)Visible,” pp. 289–­303. 26. Greg Elmer, “Diagrams, Maps, and Markets: The Technological Matrix of Geographical Information Systems,” Space and Culture 1, 3 (1998), pp. 41–­60; and Jon Goss, “’We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live’: The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems,” Economic Geography 71, 2 (1995), pp. 171–­198. 27. See Davis, “Fortress Los Angeles,” pp. 154–­180. 28. Nelson Smith, “The Alarming Invasion of Public Space,” Harper’s Magazine (March 1998), p. 17. Electronic technologies have begun to replace informal means of social control in urban environments: the eyes of the people on the street—­to use the visual metaphor famously employed by Jane Jacobs—­have given way to the “gaze without eyes” of surveillance cameras. See Jacobs, Death and Life, pp. 39–­54. 29. See N. Smith, “Alarming Invasion of Public Space,” p. 17; Rosa Ainley, “Watching the Detectors: Control and the Panopticon,” in Rosa Ainley (ed.), New Frontiers of Space, Bodies, and Gender (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 88–­100; and Boyer, Cybercities, pp. 18–­20, 162–­172. 30. See Flusty, Building Paranoia, pp. 16–­18; Flusty, “Building Paranoia,” pp. 47–­59; and Steven Flusty, “The Banality of Interdiction: Surveillance, Control, and the Displacement of Diversity,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, 3 (2001), pp. 658–­664. 31. Virilio, “Overexposed City,” pp. 381–­390 (esp. 383). 32. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977), p. 201. See also William Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 4–­5; and Andy Croll, “Street Disorder, Surveillance, and Shame: Regulating Behavior in the Public Spaces of the Late Victorian Town,” Social History 24, 3 (1999), pp. 250–­268 (esp. 251, 264). 33. Elaine Campbell, “Policing and Its Spatial Imaginaries,” Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology 8, 2 (2016), pp. 71–­89 (quotation on p. 73).



Notes to Pages 147–150 • 335

34. Stephen Graham, “CCTV: The Stealthy Emergence of a Fifth Utility?” Planning Theory and Practice 3, 2 (2002), pp. 237–­241; and Stephen Graham, “The Eyes Have It: CCTV as the ‘Fifth Utility,’” Environment and Planning B 2, 5 (1999), pp. 639–­642. See also Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV (Oxford: Berg, 1999). 35. See Boyne, “Post-­Panopticism,” pp. 285–­307 (esp. 291). See also Kelly Gates, Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of Surveillance (New York: New York University Press, 2011). 36. See Boyer, City of Collective Memory, pp. 287–­288; and Hannah, “Space and the Structuring,” pp. 171–­180. 37. See Jeff Heydon, “Sensing the Leviathan,” Journal for Cultural Research 12, 2 (2008), pp. 143–­149 (esp. p. 149); and J. MacGregor Wise, “An Immense and Unexpected Field of Action: Webcams, Surveillance, and Everyday Life,” Cultural Studies 18, 2–­3 (2004), pp. 424–­442. 38. Norris and Armstrong, “Suspicious Eye,” pp. 10–­11. 39. See Matthew Hannah, “Imperfect Panopticism: Envisioning the Construction of Normal Lives,” in Georges Benko and Ulf Strohmayer (eds.), Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 344–­359 (esp. pp. 352, 356); and Flusty, “Banality of Interdiction,” pp. 659–­661. 40. See Flusty, Building Paranoia, pp. 14–­15; and Anastasia Loukaitou-­Sideris, “Privatization of Open Public Space,” Town Planning Review 64, 2 (1993), pp. 139–­168. 41. See Boyer, Cybercities, pp. 16–­ 17; Pat O’Malley and Darren Palmer, “Post-­ Keynesian Policing,” Economy and Society 25, 2 (1996), pp. 137–­155 (esp. 137–­139); and Nicholas Fyfe and Jon Bannister, “The Eyes Upon the Street: Closed-­Circuit Television Surveillance and the City,” in Nick Fyfe (ed.), Images of the Street: Planning, Identity, and Control in Public Space (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 254–­267. 42. Staff Reporter, “CBD Cameras Will ‘Shoot’ Criminals,” Saturday Star, July 9, 1999. 43. See Hille Koskela, “Video Surveillance, Gender, and the Safety of Public Urban Space: ‘Peeping Tom’ Goes High-­Tech,” Urban Geography 23, 3 (2002), pp. 257–­278 (esp. 259); and M. Davis, Ecology of Fear, pp. 363, 366–­367. 44. Christopherson, “Fortress City,” pp. 409–­427 (esp. pp. 409–­410). 45. Interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011; John Penberthy, June 19, 2003; and Cecile Loedolf, July 7, 2008. See also Rapule Tabane, “Jo’burg Be Good: Big Brother Is Watching,” The Star, April 10, 2000; Thembisile Makgalemele, “Cameras Keep a Beady Eye on Jo’burg,” Saturday Star, April 14, 2000; and Jan Hennop, “Evildoers Will Have No Place to Hide in City,” Sunday Times, April 9, 2000; Staff Reporter, “Criminals Won’t Escape City Cameras,” Saturday Star, March 31, 2000; Tefo Mothibeli, “Cameras Zoom in on Jo’burg Crime,” Business Day, April 12, 2000; Tabane, “Jo’burg Be Good”; Staff Reporter, “Business against Crime,” The Star, September 28, 2001; Staff Reporter, “Happy New Year, You’re Busted,” The Star, January 10, 2002; Phumzile Ngwenya, “Cameras Cut Crime in Johannesburg CBD,” Business Day, March 7, 2001; and David Matsena, “‘Window Shopper’ Caught by Long Arm of Lens,” The Star, January 10, 2002.

336 • Notes to Pages 151–153

46. Dave Marrs, “Anticrime Body Forms National Advisory Unit,” Business Day, December 1, 2000. The original idea for the installation of the CCTV surveillance system for downtown Cape Town evolved out of the failed bid to host the summer Olympics in 1996. The Cape Town team, who put together the Olympic bid, had hired Bill Rathbone, the security chief for the Atlanta Olympics, as strategic adviser for security. Interview with John Penberthy, executive director, Business against Crime (BAC) Surveillance Technology, June 19, 2003. 47. Bongani Majola, “Now 150 Cameras Watch the City,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, July 16, 2002; and Staff Reporter, “Criminals Won’t Escape City Cameras.” See also interview with John Penberthy, June 19, 2003; and various on-­site visits to CCTV operations center of the premises, June 19, 2003, July 15, 2008, June 27, 2011, and June 20, 2012. 48. As John Penberthy put it, “With a lux level of Two, the cameras have the capacity to ‘see’ inside a dark broom closet.” Interview with John Penberthy, June 19, 2003. 49. Sheena Adams, “Bank Seeks Out Big Brother to Curb Heists,” The Star, March 17, 2002; and Staff Reporter, “Bank Nabs Crooks on Camera,” Business Day, March 18, 2002. See interview with Cecile Loedolf, July 7, 2008. 50. Anthony Minnaar, “The Implementation and Impact of Crime Prevention/ Crime Control Open Street Closed-­Circuit Television Surveillance in South African Central Business Districts,” Surveillance & Society 4, 3 (2007), pp. 174–­207 (esp. 187); and Ndivhuwo Khangale, “Joburg Cameras Catch Rapists,” IOL (Independent Online), May 19, 2005. 51. At its founding, BAC Surveillance Technology management owned 50 percent ownership in Cueincident. Safety, Security, and Justice Holdings (a joint venture into management of police stations and courthouses), the black empowerment group called Mvelaphanda, property asset management company Catalyst, and JCI mining and investment group owned the bulk of the remainder. Peter Honey, “Consortium Ensures Spy in the Sky Is Not Pie in the Sky,” Financial Mail, October 5, 2003; Staff Writer, “All Together Now: Public-­Private Partnerships Have Worked Wonders in Fighting Crime,” The Economist, April 8, 2006; and interview with John Penberthy, June 19, 2003. 52. Minnaar, “Implementation and Impact,” p. 186. 53. Hannah, “Space and the Structuring,” p. 175; and Matthew Hannah, “Space and Social Control in the Administration of the Oglala Lakota (‘Sioux’), 1871–­1879,” Journal of Historical Geography 19, 4 (1993), pp. 412–­432 (esp. 412–­413). 54. Quotations from Jonny Steinberg, “Hidden Cameras a Mixed Blessing?” Business Day, July 23, 2001. As the promotional materials for Cueincident proclaimed, the surveillance system “is unique because it is operator-­driven, effectively allowing all cameras in the network to ‘patrol’ environments, zoom-­in on incidents, and respond to [them] as operators analyze, predict and react in real-­time to situations. This level of intellectual involvement in the second-­by-­second application of the methodology—­ best understood as a ‘track-­and-­trace’ capacity—­is not found in any other camera surveillance system.” See Staff Reporter, “Cueincident Uses CDMA for Crime Protection



Notes to Pages 154–155 • 337

Surveillance,” Balancing Act: Telecoms, Internet, and Broadband in Africa 248 (February 4, 2005) [https://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/telecoms-en/7745/cueincident-us​ es-cdma-for-crime-protection-surveillance]. 55. Hennop, “Evildoers Will Have No Place to Hide”; Steinberg, “Hidden Cameras a Mixed Blessing?”; Cathy Lund, “Spy Cameras Drive Criminals to Suburbs,” Sunday Times, February 18, 2001; and Gill Moodie, “Crime Wave Robs Some, Pays Others,” Sunday Times, July 22, 2001. See also interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006. 56. See Mitra Tabrizian, “Surveillance,” New Formations 12 (1990), pp. 89–­96 (esp. 95). 57. Solly Maphumulo, “Cameras Catch 50 Crimes a Week,” The Star, January 9, 2002; Ndivhuwo Khangale, “Watch Out Criminals, You Could Be on CCTV,” The Star, May 19, 2005; and Staff Writer, “Survey: All Together Now,” p. 11. 58. Staff Reporter, “New Plans to Make JHB Safer: Metro Police,” Financial Times, January 30, 2002; Lynne Altenroxel, “Crime in Jo’burg CBD Down by 40%,” The Star, October 9, 2000; Maphumulo, “Cameras Catch 50 Crimes a Week”; Bafana Khumalo, “Reality TV: Smile! Joburg Is Keeping an Eagle Eye on You!” Sunday Times, 22 December 2002; and Sheenah Adams, “CBD Crime Rise Despite the Surveillance,” The Star, October 14, 2006. 59. Simon Davies, “CCTV: A New Battleground for Privacy,” in Dean Wilson and Clive Norris (eds.) Surveillance, Crime, and Social Control, pp. 243–­254; and Katherine Williams and Craig Johnstone, “The Politics of the Selective Gaze: Closed Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 34, 2 (2000), pp. 183–­210. 60. Jan Hennop, “Smile, You Are on Candid Camera!” Sunday Times, April 16, 2000; Steinberg, “Hidden Cameras a Mixed Blessing?”; C. Lund, “Spy Cameras Drive Criminals to Suburbs”; Moodie, “Crime Wave Robs Some”; Staff Reporter, “JHB Launches ‘World Class’ Surveillance System,” Financial Times, August 3, 2001; Masego Lehihi, “More Cameras Focus on the CBD,” Sunday Times, August 5, 2001; B. Khumalo, “Reality TV”; and Adams, “CBD Crime Rise.” 61. Alex de Witt, CEO, Omega Risk Solutions, Professional Management Review (July 5, 2005), n.p.; and Graeme Hosken, “We Are Not Mercenaries—­Demining Firms,” IOL (Independent Online), February 11, 2004. 62. Business executives at Cueincident greeted the city’s decision to award the surveillance contract to Omega Risk Solutions with a great deal of skepticism. They suggested that Omega’s winning bid of R69 million would require a significant reduction in services that in turn would jeopardize the quality of security. Omega executives countered that the Cueincident bid of R98 million was overcharging the city. See Alex Eliseev, “Crime Fears as Joburg’s Big Bro Shuts Eyes,” The Star, November 30, 2007; Alex Eliseev, “City CCTV Tender in Dispute,” The Star, September 13, 2007; and Christy van der Merve, “Joburg Gets R42m CCTV System to Combat Inner-­City Crime,” Engineering News, December 10, 2008 [engineeringnews.co.za/ . . . /joburg-gets-r42m-cctv-systemto-combat-innercity-crime-].

338 • Notes to Pages 155–159

63. Kashiefa Ajam, “Smile, You’re on Joburg’s CCTV,” The Star, December 29, 2007; Lesego Madumo, “Cameras Keep an Eye on the City,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, December 11, 2008; and Gill Gifford, “Joburg Surveillance Zooms In,” The Star, December 11, 2008. See interviews with Russell Thomas, July 15, 2008; and on-­site visit to the Omega Macro Surveillance Centre, July 15, 2008, and June 27, 2011. 64. Lesego Madumo, “Long Arm of the Law Gets Longer,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, October 14, 2008; and Lesego Madumo, “Big Brother Watches over Joburg,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, January 29, 2008. 65. Staff Reporter, “It’s Lights, Action, and Camera for Crime in Jo’burg,” Business Day, August 6, 2001; and Madumo, “Long Arm of the Law.” 66. Madumo, “Cameras Keep an Eye on the City”; and Gifford, “Joburg Surveillance Zooms In.” 67. Emily Visser, “Smart Cars Patrol Joburg,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, November 28, 2008; and Staff Writer, “Johannesburg Gets Teeth,” CCTV Handbook 2009, Hi-­Tech Security Solutions (Online) (March 2009) [http://www.securitysa.com/re​ gular.aspx?pklregularid=3904]. 68. Madumo, “Long Arm of the Law”; Madumo, “Big Brother Watches over Joburg”; and Staff Writer, “Johannesburg Gets Teeth.” 69. Lesego Madumo, “Big Brother Tots up Successes,” City of Johannesburg Official Website, June 19, 2008; and Madumo, “Cameras Keep an Eye on the City.” 70. Staff Reporter, “Jo’burg to Get More Police and Surveillance Cameras,” Africa News Service, January 30, 2002; Makgalemele, “Cameras Keep a Beady Eye on Jo’burg”; Altenroxel, “Crime in Jo’burg CBD Down by 40%”; and Business Against Crime, “BAC Surveillance Technology Project: City of Johannesburg and Gauteng Province” (unpublished position paper, 2002). 71. Gifford, “Joburg Surveillance Zooms In”; and Madumo, “Big Brother Watches over Joburg.” See also interview with John Penberthy, June 19, 2003. 72. Madumo, “Cameras Keep an Eye on the City”; and Gifford, “Joburg Surveillance Zooms In.” 73. Interview with Russell Thomas, July 7, 2008, and July 15, 2008; and on-­site visits to the Omega Macro Surveillance Centre, July 15, 2008, and June 27, 2011. 74. Minnaar, “Implementation and Impact,” pp. 174–­207; and Staff Writer, “Calls to Step Up 2010 CCTV Rollout,” Sports City: Home of Sports Events, May 6, 2009. 75. Staff Writer, “Gauteng Launches New Crime-­Fighting Strategy,” South Africa. The Good News, December 4, 2008. 76. Van der Merve, “Joburg Gets R42m CCTV System.” 77. Minnaar, “Implementation and Impact,” pp. 174–­207; and Hentschel, “Making (In)Visible,” pp. 289–­303. 78. Staff Writer, “Johannesburg Adjudges CCTV Project a Success,” Defence Web, December 9, 2009 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/civil-security/johannesburg​ -adjudges-cctv-project-a-success/]. See also Anthony Minnaar, “The Growth and Proliferation of Camera Surveillance in South Africa,” in Aaron Doyle, Randy Lippert, and



Notes to Pages 160–163 • 339

David Lyon (eds.), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 100–­121. 79. Staff Writer, “Johannesburg Adjudges CCTV Project a Success.” 80. See official website for Omega Risk Solutions [www.omegasol.com]. See also Raenette Taljaard, “Private and Public Security in South Africa,” in Sabelo Gumedze (ed.), The Private Security Sector in Africa (Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, no. 146) (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), pp. 69–­98. 81. Don Makatile, “R122m Tender Row,” Sowetan, February 17, 2011. 82. Boyd Webb, “Mercenary Bill Shot Down in Parliament,” Cape Times, May 26, 2006. 83. See Allister Sparks, “Columnist Sees Irony in Growing Use of ‘Private Military Firms,’” The Star, September 7, 2004. 84. Graeme Hosken, “South African Elite Cops Flock to Iraq,” Pretoria News, October 26, 2004. 85. Hosken, “We Are Not Mercenaries.” 86. Graeme Hosken, “Bodyguard Died in Iraq ‘As He Lived, Living Life to the Fullest,’” Sunday Tribune, October 14, 2004; Graeme Hosken, Boyd Webb, and Michael Roux van Zyl, “More SA Men May Die in Iraq,” Pretoria News, October 14, 2004; and Staff Reporter, “SA’s Iraq Victims Coming Home,” Sunday Tribune, October 17, 2004. 87. Eliseev, “City CCTV Tender in Dispute.” 88. Eliseev, “City CCTV Tender in Dispute”; Tina Swart, “An Overview of Security in Africa,” African Business Journal 21 (February-­May 2005). 89. Craig Timberg, “26 Security Workers Suspected,” Washington Post (Foreign Service ed.) May 24, 2006; Juan-­Jacques Cornish, “Coup Crackdown a Show of Force,” Mail & Guardian Online, May 26, 2006 [https://mg.co.za/]; Beauregard Tromp and Graeme Hosken, “Kashala Is Wanted by Police in Kinshasa,” Pretoria News, May 26, 2006; Razina Munshi, “Anti-­Mercenary Legislation,” Financial Mail (June 23, 2006); David Lewis, “Congo Candidate See ‘Coup’ Arrests as Intimidation,” Zimbabwe Independent (Harare), August 6, 2004, and Raenette Taljaard, “Implementing South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act,” in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private Actors and Security Governance (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), pp. 167–­186 (esp. pp. 180–­181). 90. Erika Gibson, “South African Mercenaries Arrive in Guinea,” Beeld, October 18, 2009; and Staff Reporter, “South African Mercenaries Arrive in Guinea,” Patriotic Vanguard, October 27, 2009[http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/south-african-mercena​ ries-arrive-in-guinea]. 91. In 2009, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Port Elizabeth) decided to terminate the contract of Omega to monitor the CCTV cameras in the CBD following complaints about service. See Makatile, “R122m Tender Row.” 92. Staff Reporter, “Tshwane CCTV Tender Court Bid Dismissed,” News24, May 17, 2011; and Makatile, “R122m Tender Row.” 93. Interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; and interview with Terius Goedhab and Andre Eckart, May 2, 2019.

340 •

Notes to Pages 164–167

94. Heidi Swart, “Activist Murder Reveals Joburg Street Cameras Are ‘Turned Off,’” Mail & Guardian, May 10, 2018. See also interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; Terius Goedhab and Andre Eckart, May 2, 2019; and Heidi Swart, April 27, 2019. 95. Nic Anderson, “Joburg’s CCTV Cameras Have Been Going ‘Unwatched’ after Contract Issues,” South African, September 1, 2017 [https://www.thesouthafrican.com​ /news/joburg-cctv-cameras-going-unwatched-after-contract-end/]. 96. Antoinette Slabbert, “Joburg CCTV Crime Fighting Cameras Unmanned,” Moneyweb, September 1, 2017 [https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/tender-inte​ rvention-sets-back-safety-in-joburg/]. 97. Interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; and Terius Goedhab and Andre Eckart, May 2, 2019. 98. Swart, “Activist Murder Reveals.” 99. Mpumzi Zuzile, “Joburg’s M2 Freeway to Reopen on November 4,” TimesLIVE, October 18, 2019. Economist Michael Shussler sardonically referred to the M2 closure as “road shedding” to mimic ESCOM’s practice of “load shedding.” See Staff Reporter, “M2: Eight Months of Traffic Hell; M2 Highway Closure Could Cost Joburg Millions, and Shred Motorists’ Nerves,” The Star, March 2, 2019. 100. Riaan Grobler and Ntwaagae Seleka, “Traffic Flowing again as Johannesburg’s M2 Highway Reopens after R160m Overhaul,” News24, November 4, 2019. 101. Henderson, “Johannesburg Banks Battle.” 102. Henderson, “Johannesburg Banks Battle.” 103. Roxanne Henderson, “Closure of M2 a Blessing in Disguise for Crime-­Ridden CBD,” Business Day, May 7, 2019. 104. Henderson, “Closure of M2 a Blessing.” 105. Henderson, “Closure of M2 a Blessing”; and Staff Writer, “A Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer—­Including Using Drones,” Business Tech, August 6, 2019 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/333431/a-look-at-absas-plan-to-make-jobu​ rg-cbd-safer-including-using-drones/]; and Bloomberg, “Joburg City Officials and Businesses Explore the Use of Drones to Tackle Crime,” Business Tech, May 7, 2019 [https://​ businesstech.co.za/news/banking/315346/joburg-city-officials-and-businesses-explore​ -the-use-of-drones-to-tackle-crime/]. 106. Staff Writer, “Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer”; and Bloomberg, “Joburg City Officials and Businesses Explore the Use of Drones.” 107. Staff Writer, “Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer.” 108. Heidi Swart, “Joburg’s New Hi-­Tech Surveillance Cameras: A Threat to Minorities That Could See the Law Targeting Thousands of Innocents,” Daily Maverick (Online), September 27, 2018; and Staff Writer, “Joburg Is Getting New CCTV Surveillance Cameras,” Business Tech, July 23, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/260151/job​ urg-is-getting-new-cctv-surveillance-cameras/]. 109. Staff Reporter, “CCTV Cameras to Guard the Streets of Joburg,” Randburg Sun, July 27, 2018.



Notes to Pages 167–171 • 341

110. Staff Reporter, “Smart-­Cams to Help Curb Crime in Hot Spots,” The Star, July 27, 2018; and Staff Writer, “Joburg Is Getting New CCTV Surveillance Cameras.” 111. Staff Writer, “Repairs to Joburg’s M2 Highway Nearing Completion,” ENCA (DStv Channel 403), August 2, 2019; and Staff Reporter, “Crime-­Combating Tech Helps Clean Up Jozi,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, May 20, 2019 [https://​ www.itweb.co.za/content/VgZeyqJAndwMdjX9]; and Kgaugelo Masweneng, “Hi-­Tech Surveillance System Makes a Difference,” The Herald (South Africa), July 24, 2019. 112. Joburg Media, “IIOC Provides for Intelligent Policing Using CCTV Cameras,” press release, 2018. [https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/Pages/Media/Newsroom/IIOC​ -provides-for-intelligent-policing-using-CCTV-cameras.aspx]. 113. Joburg Media, “IIOC Provides for Intelligent Policing.” 114. Joburg Media, “IIOC Provides for Intelligent Policing.” 115. Staff Writer, “Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer.” 116. Staff Writer, “A Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer.” 117. Staff Reporter, “New Laws Clip the Wings of Drone Pilots,” Cape Times, May 18, 2015. 118. Staff Writer, “Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer.” 119. Staff Reporter, “City Parks Drones Proving Effective,” The Star, January 26, 2018. 120. Paul Ash, “Drones Join Prasa War on Cable Theft,” Sunday Times, March 1, 2020. 121. Justin Cronjé, “SAPS and JMPD See Drones in Their Future,” Defence Web, January 5, 2020 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/saps​ -and-jmpd-see-drones-in-their-future/]. 122. Daneel Knoetze, “City of Cape Town Plans to Acquire Drones,” GroundUp (Online), September 11, 2014 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article/city-cape-town-pl​ an-acquire-drones_2226/]. 123. Staff Reporter, “Crime-­Combating Tech Helps Clean Up Jozi.” 124. Joburg Media, “IIOC Provides for Intelligent Policing.”

Chapter 5 1. Kim Harrisberg and Anastasia Moloney, “Law Enforcement: Joburg and Medellin—­Tale of Two Unequal Cities Waging War on Crime,” Sunday Times, October 17, 2019. 2. Murray, Panic City, pp. 144–179. 3. Jon Coaffee and David Murakami Wood, “Security Is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk,” International Relations 20, 4 (2006), pp. 503–­517 (esp. p. 505). 4. Coaffee and Wood, “Security Is Coming Home,” pp. 505–­506. For comparative purposes, see Rowland Atkinson and Sarah Blandy, Domestic Fortress: Fear and the New Home Front (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2017). 5. Yee-­Kuang Heng, “The Transformation of War Debate: Through the Looking

342 • Notes to Pages 172–173

Glass of Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society,’” International Relations 20, 1 (2006), pp. 69–­91 (quotation on p. 80). 6. Murray, Panic City, pp. 144–­179; and Clarno and Murray, “Policing in Johannesburg,” pp. 210–­227. 7. Corey Johnson, Reece Jones, Assi Paasi, Louise Amoore, Alison Mountz, Mark Salter, and Chris Rumsford (contributors), “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ in Border Studies,” Political Geography 30 (2011), pp. 61–­69; and Côté-­Boucher, “Diffuse Border,” pp. 142–­165 (quotation on p. 146). 8. Jeff Wicks, “Joburg’s Anti-­Crime Street Cameras Hailed as Better Than Booms,” Sunday Times, May 26, 2019. 9. Lieven de Cauter, The Capsular Civilization: On the City in the Age of Fear (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2004), p. 79. 10. Wicks, “Joburg’s Anti-­Crime Street Cameras Hailed.” 11. Davis, “Fortress Los Angeles,” pp. 154–­180. 12. See Graham, Cities under Siege, pp. xv, xx-­xxi. 13. For an example, see Eyal Weizman, “Lethal Theory,” LOG 7 (2006), pp. 53–­77. 14. Rem Koolhaas, “The Generic City,” in Office for Metropolitan Architecture, Rem Koolhaas, and Bruce Mau (eds.), Small, Medium, Large, Extra-­Large (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), pp. 1238–­1269 (quotation on p. 1251). 15. The literature is extensive, but see Don Mitchell, “The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 85, 1 (1995), pp. 108–­133; Darshan Vigneswaran, Kurt Iverson, and Setha Low, “Problems, Publicity, and Public Space: A Resurgent Debate,” Environment and Planning A 29, 3 (2017), pp. 496–­502; and Don Mitchell, “People’s Park Again, or the End of the Ends of Public Space,” Environment and Planning A 29, 3 (2017), pp. 503–­538. 16. Robert Warren, “City Streets—­The War Zones of Globalization: Democracy and Military Operations on Urban Terrain in the Early 21st Century,” in Stephen Graham (ed.), Cities, War, and Terrorism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 214–­230. See also Stephen Graham, Urban ‘Battlespace,’” Theory, Culture & Society 26, 7–­8 (2009), pp. 278–­288. 17. Schindler, “Governing the Twenty-­First Century Metropolis,” pp. 7–­26 (esp. pp. 7, 12, 20). For a comparative view of Northern Ireland, see Michael Brown, “Cities under Watch: Urban Northern Ireland in Film,” Éire-­Ireland: Irish-­American Cultural Institute 45, 1–­2 (2010), pp. 56–­88. 18. Dean Wilson, “Military Surveillance,” in Kristie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, and David Lyon (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 269–­276; and Stéphane Leman-­Langlois, “Insecurity as an Engineering Problem: The Techno-­Security Network,” in Kirstie Ball and Laureen Snider (eds.), The Surveillance-­ Industrial Complex: A Political Economy of Surveillance (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 78–­92. 19. Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, “Border Theatre: On the Arts of Security and Resistance,” Cultural Geographies 17, 3 (2010), pp. 299–­319; Dean Wilson, “Border



Notes to Pages 174–175 • 343

Militarization, Technology, and Crime Control,” in Sharon Pickering and Julie Ham (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Crime and International Migration (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2015), pp. 141–­154; Stephen Graham, “The New Military Urbanism,” in Ball and Snider, Surveillance-­Industrial Complex pp. 11–­26; and David Lyon, “The Border Is Everywhere: ID Cards, Surveillance, and the Other,” in Elia Zureik and Mark Salter (eds.), Global Surveillance and Policing (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2013), pp. 66–­82. 20. Megan O’Neill and Bethan Loftus, “Policing and Surveillance of the Marginal: Everyday Contexts of Social Control,” Theoretical Criminology 17, 4 (2013), pp. 437–­ 454 (quotations on pp. 440, 438); Mike Maguire, “Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-­Led Crime Control,” Policing and Society 9 (2000), pp. 35–­33; and D. Wilson, “Border Militarization,” pp. 141–­154. 21. Stephen Graham, “When Life Itself Is War: On the Urbanization of Military and Security Doctrine,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36, 1 (2012), pp. 136–­155; and Robert Warren, “Situating the City and September 11th: Military Urban Doctrine, ‘Pop-­Up’ Armies and Spatial Chess,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 614–­619. 22. Samuel Nunn, “Cities, Space, and the New World of Urban Law Enforcement Technologies,” Journal of Urban Affairs 23, 3–­4 (2001), pp. 259–­278 (esp. p. 259). See also Fyfe and Bannister, “City Watching,” pp. 37–­46; and Rodrigo José Firmino, Marta Kanashiro, Fernanda Bruno, Rafael Evangelista and Liliane da Costa Nascimento, “Fear, Security, and the Spread of CCTV in Brazilian Cities: Legislation, Debate, and the Market,” Journal of Urban Technology 20, 3 (2014), pp. 65–­84. 23. See Irma van der Ploeg, “Biometrics and the Body as Information: Normative Issues of the Socio-­Technical Coding of the Body,” in David Lyon (ed.) Surveillance as Social Sorting (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 57–­73; Katja Franko Aas, “‘The Body Does Not Lie’: Identity, Risk, and Trust in Technoculture,” Crime, Media, Culture; An International Journal 2, 2 (2006), pp. 143–­158; and Randy Lippert and David Murakami Wood, “The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities,” Surveillance & Society 9, 3 (2012), pp. 257–­262. 24. Coaffee and Wood, “Security Is Coming Home,” pp. 503–­517 (esp. p. 507). 25. See Mark Gaylord and John Galliher, “Riding the Underground Dragon: Crime Control and Public Order on Hong Hong’s Mass Transit Railway,” British Journal of Criminology 31, 1 (1991), pp. 15–­26. 26. Samuel Nunn, “Seeking Tools for the War on Terror,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 26, 3 (2003), pp. 454–­472 (esp. 464). 27. Coaffee and Wood, “Security Is Coming Home,” p. 504. 28. Adey, Whitehead, and Williams, “Introduction: Air-­Target,” pp. 173–­187 (p. 179, source of quotation). 29. Charles Suchar, “Grounding Visual Sociology Research in Shooting Scripts,” Qualitative Sociology 20, 1 (1997), pp. 33–­56 (quotations on p. 35). 30. Graham, “CCTV: The Stealthy Emergence of a Fifth Utility?”, pp. 237–­241 (esp. p. 238).

344 •

Notes to Pages 175–177

31. David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), p. 14. See also Maria Los, “Looking into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization, and the Totalitarian Potential,” in David Lyon (ed.), Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 69–­94. 32. See David Lyon, “Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies,” in David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 13–­30. 33. Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” pp. 605–­622 (quotation on p. 606). 34. Stephen Graham and David Wood, “Digitizing Surveillance: Categorization, Space, Inequality,” Critical Social Policy 23, 2 (2003), pp. 227–­248 (quotation on p. 228). 35. Adey, Whitehead, and Williams, “Introduction: Air-­Target,” p. 179. 36. Andrejevic, “Automating Surveillance,” pp. 7–­13 (quotations on p. 10). 37. For a wider view, see Elayne Rapping, “Aliens, Nomads, Mad Dogs, and Road Warriors: The Changing Face of Criminal Violence on TV,” in Susan Murray and Laurie Ouellette (eds.), Reality TV: Remaking Television Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2004), pp. 214–­230. 38. Graham and Wood, “Digitizing Surveillance,” p. 228. See also Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 39. Graham and Wood, “Digitizing Surveillance,” p. 242. 40. Thomas Linder, “Surveillance Capitalism and Platform Policing: The Surveillant Assemblage-­as-­a Service,” Surveillance & Society 17, 1–­2 (2019), pp. 76–­82. See also Elizabeth Joh, “The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing,” New York University Law Review 92 (2017), pp. 101–­130. 41. Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization,” Journal of Information Technology 30 (2015), pp. 75–­89; and Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2019). 42. Linder, “Surveillance Capitalism,” pp. 77–­78. See also Paul Langley and Andrew Leyshon, “Platform Capitalism: The Intermediation and Capitalisation of Digital Economic Circulation,” Finance and Society 3, 1 (2017), pp. 11–­31. 43. Schiller, Digital Capitalism; and Jonathan Pace, “The Concept of Digital Capitalism,” Communication Theory 28, 3 (2018), pp. 254–­269. 44. Ray Surette, “The Thinking Eye: Pros and Cons of Second Generation CCTV Surveillance Systems,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 28, 1 (2005), pp. 152–­173 (esp. p. 152). 45. Seungmin Rho, Geyong Min, and Weifeng Chen, “Advanced Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition for Intelligent Surveillance System in Smart Home Environment,” Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence 25, 7 (2012), pp. 1299–­ 1300; and Mitchell Gray, “Urban Surveillance and Panopticism: Will We Recognize the Facial Recognition Society?” Surveillance & Society 1, 3 (2002), pp. 314–­330. See also Michael Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks Are Driving an AI-­Powered Apartheid in South



Notes to Pages 178–181 • 345

Africa,” Vice, November 22, 2019 [https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pa7nek/smart-cc​ tv-networks-are-driving-an-ai-powered-apartheid-in-south-africa]. 46. Norris and Armstrong, Maximum Surveillance Society, p. 212. 47. Surette, “Thinking Eye,” p. 158. 48. Graham, “Eyes Have It,’” pp. 639–­642. 49. Surette, “Thinking Eye,” p. 158. See also Christian Micheloni, Gian Luca Foresti, and Laro Snidaro, “Networks of Co-­operative Cameras for Visual Surveillance,” IEE Proceedings: Vision, Image, and Signal Processing 152, 2 (2005), pp. 205–­212. 50. Maria Valera and Sergio Velastin, “Intelligent Distributed Surveillance Systems: A Review,” IEE Proceedings: Vision, Image, and Signal Processing 152, 2 (2005), pp. 192–­ 204 (quotation on p. 192). 51. See John-­Paul Renno, Paolo Remagnino, and Graeme Jones, “Learning the Fusion of Video Data Streams,” in Gian Luca Foresti, Carlo Regazzoni, and Pramod Varshney (eds.), Multisensor Surveillance Systems: The Fusion System (Boston: Springer, 2003), pp. 61–­79. 52. See Pramod Varshney, “Multisensor Fusion in Surveillance Systems,” in Foresti, Regazzoni, and Varshney, Multisensor Surveillance Systems, pp. 1–­5. See also interview with Vickie Drinkwater, February 2, 2016. 53. See Gian Luca Foresti, Christian Micheloni, Claudio Piciarelli, and Laro Snidaro, “Visual Sensor Technology for Advanced Surveillance Systems: Historical View, Technological Aspects, and Research Activities in Italy,” Sensors (Basel) 9, 4 2009), pp. 2252–­ 2270. 54. ICOM, “AI Supercharges Surveillance, enabling access to Petabytes of Untapped Data,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, January 16, 2020 [https://www.it​ web.co.za/content/8OKdWqDELEgvbznQ]. 55. Duncan MacLeod, “Vumatel to Blanket Joburg in CCTV Cameras,” Moneyweb, February 15, 2018 [https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/tech/vumatel-to-blanket-joburg​ -in-cctv-cameras/]; Craig Wilson, “Meet Vumacam, Vumatel’s Smart Security Play for Joburg’s Suburbs,” Stuff Magazine, February 14, 2019 [https://stuff.co.za/2019/02/14/me​ et-vumacam-vumatels-smart-security-play-for-joburgs-suburbs/]; Reuven Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety,” Randburg Sun, May 1, 2019; and Timothy Rangongo, “These Joburg Suburbs Are Getting 15,000 CCTV Cameras,” Business Insider SA, February 15, 2019 [https:www.businessinsider.co.za/vumatel-launcehs-cctv-security-cameras-arou​ nd-johannesbur-suburbs-2019-2]. 56. Jordan Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime,” South African Jewish Report, March 28, 2019. 57. Roelien Voster, “Is Vumacam Making South Africa a Safer Place?” Roodeport Northsider, February 25, 2019; and Tshegofatso Seleke, “Residents Boiling over Vumacam,” Roodeport Record, July 17, 2019. See also interviews with Nazira Cachalia, City Safety Programme, Johannesburg Municipal Police Department (JMPD), May 3, 2019; and Thami Nkosi, chair, Right2Know Campaign, August 10, 2020. 58. Weizman, Hollow Land, pp. 4–­5, 6–­7, 15.

346 •

Notes to Pages 182–187

59. Interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; Heidi Swart, May 27, 2019; and Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019. 60. Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020; Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; and Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 61. Toby Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer,” Business Day, February 15, 2019. 62. Craig Wilson, “Fibrehoods’ Aerial Fibre, Soon in a Johannesburg Suburb Near You,” Stuff Magazine, January 13, 2015 [https://stuff.co.za/2015/01/13/fibrehoods-aerial​ -fibre-soon-in-a-johannesburg-suburb-near-you/]. 63. Staff Reporter, “Fibrehoods Deploying Aerial FTTH in Gauteng Suburb,” MyBroadband, February 3, 2017 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/153914-fibreh​ oods-deploying-aerial-ftth-in-gauteng-suburb.html]; and Wilson, “Fibrehoods’ Aerial Fibre.” 64. Staff Writer, “Fibrehoods Brings High-­Speed Internet to Residents,” Sandton Chronicle, October 7, 2015. 65. Lloyd Gedye, “Fibre Optic Turf War Pushes Speeds Up and Prices Down,” Mail & Guardian, April 1, 2016. 66. Staff Writer, “Vumatel Acquires Fibrehoods,” MyBroadband, October 20, 2016 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/183622-vumatel-acquires-fibrehoods.html]. 67. Staff Reporter, “Faster Internet on the Doorstep,” Randburg Sun, October 5, 2015; and Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” 68. Gedye, “Fibre Optic Turf War.” 69. Gedye, “Fibre Optic Turf War”; and Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” 70. Gedye, “Fibre Optic Turf War.” 71. At the time of its purchase, Fibrehoods had successfully deployed over 2,500 kilometres of fibre cable, which passed 130,000 homes across the cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Ekurhuleni. See Craig Wilson, “Vumatel Has Acquired Fibrehoods,” Stuff Magazine, October 20, 2016 [https:/stuff.co.za/2016/10/20/vumatel-acquired-fibre​ hoods]. 72. Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” See also Staff Writer, “Vumatel Acquires Fibrehoods,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, 20 October 2016 [https://www.itweb.co.za/content/nG98Yd7LGnavX2PD]. 73. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 74. Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” 75. Wilson, “Meet Vumacam.” 76. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” See also Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. 77. Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 78. Anthony Minnaar, “Balancing Public Safety and Security Demands with Civil Liberties in a New Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Post-­1994 South Africa and



Notes to Pages 187–189 • 347

the Growth of Residential Security and Surveillance Measures,” in Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (eds.), Surveillance and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 195–­212; and Yanga Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout on Joburg Suburban Streets Raises Alarm over Privacy Rights,” Daily Maverick (Online), March 20, 2019. See also interviews with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019; and Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 79. Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; Roland Mpofu, “Mixed Feelings about Joburg’s ‘Big Brother’ Network,” Sunday Independent, March 3, 2019; Samuel Mungadze, “Vumacam Defends Joburg Smart Camera Network,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, December 3, 2019; and Sipho Mabena, “Who Watches Big Brother? Joburg’s Private Surveillance Cameras Come under Fire,” The Citizen, March 1, 2020. 80. Swanstrom, “Are Fear and Urbanism at War?” pp. 135–­140. 81. See Murray, Panic City, pp. 111, 166–­167. 82. Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; and Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” 83. Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout.”. 84. Mpofu, “Mixed Feelings about Joburg’s ‘Big Brother’ Network”; Jane Duncan, “Beware the Surveillance State,” City Press, May 20, 2018; and Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; and interview with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019. 85. Mungadze, “Vumacam Defends Joburg Smart Camera Network.”. See Samuel Mungadze, “Professor Decries Joburg’s Private Surveillance Networks,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, September 3, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co.za/content​ /Pero37ZgoYJMQb6m]. 86. Thami Nkosi, “Right to Know Raises Concerns over Vumacam,” press release, August 28, 2019 [https://blueheart.africa/hot-topics/right-to-know-raises-concerns-ov​ er-vumacam/]. 87. Nkosi, “Right to Know Raises Concerns”; and Mungadze, “Vumacam Defends Joburg Smart Camera Network.”. See interview with Thami Nkosi, chair, Right2Know Campaign, August 10, 2020 (Online). 88. Nkosi, “Right to Know Raises Concerns.” 89. Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; Chisom Jennifer Okoye, “Cameras: Security or Your Privacy?” The Citizen, March 9, 2019; Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; and interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020 (Online). 90. Mungadze, “Vumacam Defends Joburg Smart Camera Network.” 91. Interviews with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019; and Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. See also Duncan, “Beware the Surveillance State”; Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; Franny Rabkin, “SA’s Suburban Camera Creep Tests Privacy,” Mail & Guardian, May 31, 2019; and Chisom Jennifer Okoye, “CCTV Cameras Pit Security against Privacy Concerns,” The Citizen, March 9, 2019. 92. Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout”; and Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety.” See interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 93. Okoye, “CCTV Cameras Pit Security against Privacy.” See interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020.

348 •

Notes to Pages 190–194

94. Adele Bloem, “CoJ Launches Forensic Investigation into Vumatel,” Roodeport Record, March 13, 2018. See also interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019. 95. Correspondence from Leah Knott, Councillor, Ward 97, City of Johannesburg, to City Manager, City of Johannesburg. Re: Illegal Installation of Aerial Fibre, Poles, and CCTV Cameras in Ward 97 by Vumatel/Fibrehoods, February 4, 2020; and correspondence, “Altivex, Fibrehoods/Vumatel Time Line” (unpublished document, no date). See also interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 96. Phathu Luvhengo, “Residents at Loggerheads over Fibre Installation,” Randburg Sun, March 7, 2017; Siso Naile, “Camera Delays Explained,” Roodepoort Northsider, March 31, 2017; and Naledi Mokoena, “Vumatel Project on Hold in Sophiatown,” Northcliff Melville Times, March 18, 2018. 97. Memorandum from Quentin Green, Acting Managing Director City Power, to Nico de Jager, MMC: Environment and Sustainable Services. Topic: Report on Mobile Telephony Cellular Mast Installations on City Power Street Light Poles, April 7, 2017. 98. Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020; and interview with Danyle Nuñes, February 5, 2020. 99. Phillip de Wet, “Alexandra Was Supposed to Get Very Cheap,” Business Insider SA, May 8, 2019 [https://www.businessinsider.co.za/vumatel-alexandra-project-delays​ -while-mitchells-plain-due-soon-2019-5]. See interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 100. Admire Moyo, “COJ probes ‘fraudulent’ Fibrehoods, Vumatel Contracts,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, 12 March 2018 [https://www.itweb.co.za/co​ ntent/mQwkoq6K3amv3r9A]. 101. Moyo, “COJ Probes ‘Fraudulent’ Fibrehoods”; and correspondence, “Altivex, Fibrehoods/Vumatel Time Line.” 102. Correspondence, “Altivex, Fibrehoods/Vumatel Time Line.” See interview with Thami Nkosi, Chair, Right2Know Campaign, August 10, 2020 (Online). 103. Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. See also correspondence from Leah Knott to City Manager, City of Johannesburg. Re: Illegal Installation of Aerial Fibre, Poles and CCTV Cameras”; and correspondence, “Altivex, Fibrehoods/Vumatel Time Line.” 104. Jamie McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused of Illegal Connections,” MyBroadband, September 19, 2019 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/technology/320539-vumat​ els-vumacam-accused-of-illegal-connections.html]. 105. See interviews with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020; Danyle Nuñes, February 5, 2020; and Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 106. Rangongo, “These Joburg Suburbs Are Getting 15,000 CCTV Cameras”; and Staff Writer, “The ‘Secret’ Vumacam Plan,” MyBroadband, October 1, 2020 [https://myb​ roadband.co.za/news/business-telecoms/369521-the-secret-vumacam-plan.html]. 107. McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused.” See also interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. 108. Correspondence from Leah Knott to the City Manager, City of Johannesburg,



Notes to Pages 194–198 • 349

Re: Illegal Installation of Aerial Fibre, Poles and CCTV Cameras”; and interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020. 109. Staff Reporter, “CCTV Cameras to Guard the Streets of Joburg.” 110. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 111. Wicks, “Joburg’s Anti-­Crime Street Cameras Hailed.” 112. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; and Clarno and Murray, “Policing in Johannesburg,” pp. 210–­227. 113. Murray, Panic City, pp. 127–­137. 114. Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer”; and Staff Writer, “iSentry Implemented in Craighall and Craighall Park,” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 8, 2015. 115. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; and Staff Reporter, “CSS Tactical,” Sandton Chronicle, July 4, 2016. See interviews with Cheryl Labuschagne and Jenny Clark, June 13, 2012; Ryan Roseveare and Glenn du Toit, July 2, 2014; and Grant Moulder, June 21, 2012. 116. Belinda Mountain, “Eyes on the Street Cameras,” Private Property, August 25, 2015 [https://www.privateproperty.co.za/advice/news/articles/eye-on-street-cameras​ /3507]. 117. Agency Staff, “Melville Next to Get FTTH,” Tech Central, February 3, 2016. 118. Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020; and Danyle Nuñes, February 5, 2020. 119. Mountain, “Eyes on the Street Cameras.” 120. Andrew Seldon, “Automated Analytics with iSentry,” CCTV Handbook 2016, Hi-­ Tech Security Solutions (Online) [https://www.securitysa.com/7465r]. 121. Graham, “CCTV: The Stealthy Emergence of a Fifth Utility?” pp. 237–­241 (quotation on p. 238). See also Graham and Wood, “Digitizing Surveillance,” pp. 227–­248; and interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 122. Davis, City of Quartz, p. 246. See MacLeod, “Vumatel to Blanket Joburg”; Wilson, “Meet Vumacam”; and Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 123. See Philip Harrison and Tanya Zack, “Between the Ordinary and the Extraordinary: Socio-­Spatial Transformations in the ‘Old South’ of Johannesburg,” South African Geographical Journal 96, 2 (2014), pp. 180–­197 (quotation on p. 182). 124. See Philip Harrison and Tanya Zack, “The Wrong Side of the Mining Belt? Spatial Transformation and Identities in Johannesburg’s Southern Suburbs,” in Philip Harrison, Graeme Gotz, Alison Todes, and Chris Wray (eds.), Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014), pp. 269–­292. 125. Jean Berdou, “Camera Coverage for the Whole of Fourways,” Dainfern Future Living, August 2019 [https://cdn.nowmedia.co.za/NowMedia/ebrochures/EIA/Standard​ /Dainfern-Issue8-2019.pdf]. 126. Admire Moyo, “Fidelity ADT, Vumacam to Ring-­Fence Joburg Suburbs with Cameras,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, June 29, 2020. [https://www​ .itweb.co.za/content/GxwQD71ZdL5MlPVo].

350 • Notes to Pages 199–203

127. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” See also Christian Micheloni, Laro Snidaro, and Gian Luca Foresti, “Exploiting Temporal Statistics for Events Analysis and Understanding,” Image and Vision Computing 27, 10 (2009), n.p. [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imavis.20​ 08.07.005]. See also Gian Luca Foresti and Laro Snidaro, “A Distributed Sensor Network for Video Surveillance of Outdoors,” in Foresti, Regazzoni, and Varshney, Multisensor Surveillance Systems, pp. 7–­27. 128. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 129. Swart, “Joburg’s New Hi-­Tech Surveillance Cameras.” See also Heidi Swart, “Controlling Cape Town: The Real Costs of CCTV Cameras, and What You Need to Know,” Daily Maverick (Online), October 5, 2018. 130. Shapshak, “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” See also Staff Reporter, “iSentry Implemented in Craighall and Craighall Park,” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 8, 2015. 131. Nunn, “Cities, Space, and the New World,” pp. 259–­278 (esp. p. 260). See interviews with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 132. D. Kim Rossmo, Geographic Profiling (New York: Routledge, 1999); and J. Pete Blair and D. Kim Rossmo, “Evidence in Context: Bayes’ Theorem and Investigations,” Police Quarterly 13, 2 (2010), pp. 123–­135. 133. Kwet. “Smart CCTV Networks.” 134. Wilson, “Meet Vumacam.” 135. Heading comes from Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 136. Wilson, “Meet Vumacam.” 137. Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety.” 138. Highpeak Technology Services, “Interview: Highpeak MD Gavin Hill on the Tech behind Vumacam’s CCTV Network,” Tech Central, December 12, 2019 [https://tec​ hcentral.co.za/interview-highpeak-md-gavin-hill-on-the-tech-behind-vumacams-cctv​ -network-higprom/94690/]. 139. Vumacam, “Vumacam Not in the Business of Tracking Movements,” Vumacam memorandum, September 25, 2019 [https:www.vumacam.co.za/vumacam-not-in-the​ -business-of-tracking-=-movements]. 140. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” See interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 141. Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (New York: Wiley, 2018), pp. 36–­92; Nick Srnicek, “The Challenges of Platform Capitalism: Understanding the Logic of a New Business Model,” Juncture 23, 4 (2017), pp. 254–­257; Langley and Leyshon, “Platform Capitalism,” pp. 11–­31; and Frank Pasquale, “Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism,” Yale Law & Policy Review 35, 1 (2016), pp. 309–­318; 142. Interview with Heidi Swart, May 27, 2019. 143. McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused”; and Derek Davey, “Vumacam’s Eye in the Sky Solution,” Mail & Guardian, October 25, 2019. See also interview with Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020.



Notes to Pages 203–209 • 351

144. Press Release, “Vumacam Not in the Business of Tracking Movements.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 145. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; interviews with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019; and Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 146. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; interview with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019; and interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 147. Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety”; and Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout.” See also interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. 148. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” See interviews with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020. 149. Interview with Jane Duncan, April 30, 2019; and Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 150. Wilson, “Fibrehoods’ Aerial Fibre.”. See also Harrisberg and Moloney, “Guns or Yoga?” 151. Interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 152. Duncan MacLeod, “Remgro’s CIVH Pounces on Vumatel,” Tech Central, June 8, 2018 [https://techcentral.co.za/remgro-civh-pounces-vumatel/81705/]; and Staff Writer, “CIVH Buys Vumatel,” MyBroadband, June 8, 2018. 153. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime”; and McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused.” See interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019; and interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 154. McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused”; and Tebogo Monama, “City Power Accuses CCTV Company of Stealing Electricity,” The Star, September 19, 2019. 155. Monama, “City Power Accuses CCTV Company.” 156. See Ricky Croock, CEO, “Vumacam and City Power: Electrical Connections” (Vumacam memorandum, September 5, 2019). [https:/www.vumacam.col.za/vumacam​ -and-city-power-electrical-connections/]. 157. McKane, “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused”; and MacLeod, “Vumatel to Blanket Joburg.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 158. Samuel Mungadze, “Joburg Says It Has No Policy for Surveillance Cameras,” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, December 17, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co​ .za/content/O2rQGMApYn67d1ea]. 159. For an excellent discussion of the vertical dimension, see Stephen Graham, Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers (New York: Verso, 2016). 160. Weizman, Hollow Land, p. 15. 161. Weizman, Hollow Land, p. 81. 162. Interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. 163. Weizman, Hollow Land, p. 84. 164. Interview with James Feeley, February 10, 2020. 165. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime.” 166. Murray, Panic City, pp. 125–­141. 167. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime.”

352 • Notes to Pages 209–213

168. Mpofu, “Mixed Feelings about Joburg’s ‘Big Brother’ Network”; and Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout.” See interview with Nazira Cachalia, May 3, 2019. 169. Jamie McKane, “The Plan to Cover Soweto in Fibre and Security Cameras,” MyBroadband, February 19, 2020 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/339334​ -the-plan-to-cover-soweto-in-fibre-and-security-cameras.html]. See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and interview with BraamBID (Yael Horowitz, Director), June 22, 2020 170. Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety”; and Sibembe, “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout.” 171. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring down Crime.” 172. Davey, “Vumacam’s Eye in the Sky Solution”; and McKane, “Plan to Cover Soweto.” 173. VPRO, Bringing the Internet to Africa, documentary film by Dutch TV broadcaster VPRO, 2015 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlTZetW1Sy8]. 174. ISDS (Intelligent Surveillance and Detection Systems), official web page [https://​ www.isds.co.za/]. 175. Seldon, “Automated Analytics with iSentry.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 176. Ari Rabinovitch, “Israeli Firm Seeks to Revamp Video Surveillance,” Reuters, January 24, 2011. Law enforcement officials credited BriefCam’s “condensed video” technology with assisting in the apprehension of the assailants in the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. See Noga Tarnopolsky, “The Israeli Technology That May Have Helped Identify the Alleged Boston Bombers,” GlobalPost, May 9, 2013 [https://www​ .pri.org/stories/2013-05-09/israeli-technology-may-have-helped-identify-alleged-bost​ on-bombers]; and Reuven Blau, “Israeli Professor Whose Tech Helped Catch Boston Bombers to Speak at Manhattan Conference,” New York Daily News, May 22, 2017. In May 2018, Japanese digital imaging giant Canon acquired BriefCam for an estimated $90 million. 177. Michael Isaac Stein, “‘Holy Cow’: The Powerful Software behind the City’s Surveillance System,” The Lens, December 20, 2018 [https://thelensnola.org/2018/12/20/ho​ ly-cow-the-powerful-software-behind-the-citys-surveillance-system/]. 178. Vumacam, “Tracker and Vumacam Partner to Make Your Neighbourhood Safer,” Tracker, March 8, 2019 [https:www.tracker.co.za/news/news-tracerker-and-vumacam​ -partner-to-make-your-neighbourhood-safer]. 179. Vumacam, “The Facts Regarding the Integrated Smart Camera Network,” Vumacam memorandum, December 3, 2019 [http:www.vumacam.co.za/the-facts-regarding​ -the integrated-­smart-­camera-­network/]. 180. Vumacam, “Facts Regarding the Integrated Smart Camera Network.” See also interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 181. See interviews with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020 (Online). 182. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.”



Notes to Pages 213–220 • 353

183. Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety.” 184. Blignault, “Cameras for Your Safety.” 185. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks”; and interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020. 186. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring down Crime.” 187. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 188. Davey, “Vumacam’s Eye in the Sky Solution.” 189. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 190. Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime”; interview with Bridget Steer, February 19, 2020; and interview with James Feeley, February 10, 2020. See also On-­Site Observation, Beagle Watch public presentation to Melville residents, January 30, 2020. 191. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 192. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 193. Wilson, “Meet Vumacam.” 194. Sashni Pather, “Surveillance State: Big Brother Lands in Joburg,” Financial Mail, June 13, 2019; Moshe, “Intelligent Cameras to Bring down Crime”; and Harrisberg and Moloney, “Law Enforcement.” See interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 195. Interviews with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020. 196. Interviews with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020; and Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020. 197. Kwet, “Smart CCTV Networks.” 198. On-­Site Observation, Beagle Watch public presentation to Melville residents, January 30, 2020. See also interview with James Feeley, February 10, 2020. 199. Amy Hawkins, “Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces,” Foreign Affairs, July 24, 2018. 200. Chris Burt, “Zimbabwe to Use Hikvision Facial Recognition Technology for Border Control,” Biometric Update, July 14, 2018 [https://www.biometricupdate.com/2018​ 06/zimbabwe-to-use-hikvision-facial-recognition-technology-for-border-control]; and Staff Reporter, “President Hits Ground Running,” The Herald, August 26, 2018. 201. Amy Gross, Madhumita Murgia, and Yuan Yanng, “Chinese Tech Groups Shaping UN Facial Recognition Standards,” Financial Times, December 1, 2019. 202. Interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. See also Harrison and Zack, “Between the Ordinary and the Extraordinary,” pp. 180–­197. 203. Interview with Eitan Ash, July 13, 2020. 204. See Murray, Panic City, pp. 69–­114. 205. Staff Writer, “Vumacams—­Not Just Tackling Crime: There’s More Than Meets the Eye,” Sandton Chronicle, December 12, 2019. 206. David Lyon, “Liquid Surveillance: The Contribution of Zygmunt Bauman to Surveillance Studies,” International Political Sociology 4, 4 (2010), pp, 325–­338. 207. Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Community Policing and Disputed Norms,” pp. 93–­109 (quotation on p. 94).

354 • Notes to Pages 220–226

208. Graham, Cities under Siege, p. 29. 209. Mpofu, “Mixed Feelings about Joburg’s ‘Big Brother’ Network.” 210. Henry Giroux, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-­Orwellian Surveillance State,” Cultural Studies 29, 2 (2015), pp. 108–­140 (quotation on p. 108). 211. Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyons, Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). See interview with Thami Nkosi, August 10, 2020.

Chapter 6 1. Sarah Charlton, “Down by the River: Park Dwellers, Public Space, and the Politics of Invisibility in Johannesburg’s Northern Suburbs,” Transformation 101 (2019), pp. 127–­150. This article formed the groundwork for this chapter. I used Charlton’s work as a platform from which to extend and widen my analysis. 2. Charlton, “Down by the River,” pp. 127–­150. See also Aphiwe Boyce, “R5 Million for Braamfontein Spruit Investigation,” Fourways Review (Gauteng), April 12, 2016. 3. Charlton, “Down by the River,” pp. 127–­128. This metaphor is borrowed from Jill Lapore, “The Long Blue Line,” The New Yorker, July 20, 2020, pp. 64–­69 (esp. 69). 4. See Megan O’Neill and Bethan Loftus, “Policing and the Surveillance of the Marginal: Every Contexts of Social Control,” Theoretical Criminology 17, 4 (2013), pp. 437–­ 454 (esp. pp. 438, 448). 5. Murray, Panic City, pp. 69–­114. 6. See Davis, City of Quartz, pp. 154–­157. 7. See Davis, City of Quartz, pp. 209–­210. 8. Lindsay Bremner, Johannesburg: One City, Colliding Worlds (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2004), p. 25. 9. See Martin J, Murray, “Postsuburban Johannesburg,” in Alan Berger and Joel Kotkin with Celina Balderas Guzman (eds.), Infinite Suburbia (New York: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 414–­427; and Martin J. Murray, “City of Layers: The Making and Shaping of Affluent Johannesburg after Apartheid,” in Marie Huchzermeyer and Christoph Haferburg (eds.), Urban Governance in Post-­Apartheid Cities (Stuttgart: Schweizerbart, 2014), pp. 179–­196. 10. Charlton, “Down by the River,” p. 128. 11. See, for example, Dennis Webster, “Gautengers Move to Shacks and Gated Estates,” Mail & Guardian, November 12, 2018. 12. Charlton, “Down by the River,” pp. 128–­129. 13. Webster, “Gautengers Move to Shacks and Gated Estates.” 14. See Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 1. 15. Anna Cox, “Rubbish Piles Up,” The Star, August 3, 2012; and Chronicle Reporter, “River Raid Sees an Arrest,” Sandton Chronicle, October 3, 2016. 16. Charlton, “Down by the River,” pp. 140, 146. Charlton conducted interviews with twenty-­eight people seeking shelter along a 10 kilometer stretch of the river.



Notes to Pages 226–230 • 355

Her findings form the basis for my claims about the hybrid nature of income generation. See also Jim Holloway, “Letter to the Editor: Those Who Call the Riverbank Home,” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, July 8, 2014; and Christopher Clark, “Joburg Waste Pickers Face Routine Harassment,” Daily Maverick (Online), March 12, 2019. 17. Charlton, “Down by the River,” pp. 128–­129, 130–­131, 135. See also Melanie Sampson, “Accumulation by Dispossession and the Informal Economy—­ Struggles over Knowledge, Being, and Waste at a Soweto Garbage Dump,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, 5 (2015), pp. 813–­830. 18. See, for example, Stephan de Beer and Rehana Vally, “(Finding) Pathways out of Homelessness: An Engaged, Trans-­Disciplinary Collaborative in the City of Tshwane,” Development Southern Africa 34, 4 (2017), pp. 1–­14 (esp. pp. 2, 4) 19. Don Mitchell and Nik Heynen, “The Geography of Survival and the Right to the City: Speculations on Surveillance, Legal Innovation, and the Criminalization of Intervention,” Urban Geography 30, 6 (2009), pp. 611–­632. 20. Charlton, “Down by the River,” p. 140 21. For the idea of bourgeois utopias, see Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 22. See Pascale Michel, “The Law and Squatters,” Sandton Chronicle, June 17, 2016; and Pascale Michel, “George Lea Park Makeover,” Sandton Chronicle, May 30, 2016. 23. Memorandum from Councillor Anthony Still (Ward 90), to Executive Mayor Parks Tau, City of Johannesburg, regarding “Deterioration of, and Safety in, Parks, Open Spaces, and the Braamfontein Spruit,” April 1, 2016 [http://www.hurlingham.org.za/med​ ia/55424/Letter-Mayor-Open-Spaces-April-2016.pdf ]. 24. Delamo Bently, “The Braamfontein Rehabilitation Spruit Project Acts in the Interest of the Environment,” Sandton Chronicle, April 3, 2019; Chante’ Ho Hip, “Braamfontein Spruit Takes Care of Its Own,” Sandton Chronicle, March 24, 2020; Phathu Luvhengo, “Residents Will Not Participate in the Upcoming Spruit Day,” Randburg Sun, September 16, 2016; and Phathu Luvhengo, “State of Crisis at Spruit,” Randburg Sun, September 15, 2016. 25. Michael Butler, “Residents of Braamfontein Spruit Are Tired of a Dysfunctional Democracy,” Sandton Chronicle, June 27, 2017. 26. Staff Reporter, “Clean-­Up in the Spruit,” Randburg Sun, June 23, 2015; and interview with Jonica Brown, June 22, 2020. 27. Michel, “Law and Squatters”; Luvhengo, “Residents Will Not Participate”; and Butler, “Residents of Braamfontein Spruit Are Tired.” 28. Alex Eliseev, “River Raid,” Sunday Times, March 14, 2004; and Thandi Skade, “Cops on Bikes to Protect ‘the Spruit,’” IOL (Independent Online), November 11, 2008. 29. Staff Reporter, “Police Clean-­Up Results in 40 Arrests along Braamfontein Spruit,” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 20, 2015. 30. Chris Thomas quoted in Luvhengo, “Residents Will Not Participate”; and Luvhengo, “State of Crisis at Spruit.”

356 • Notes to Pages 231–235

31. Butler, “Residents of Braamfontein Spruit Are Tired”; and Luvhengo, “Residents Will Not Participate.” 32. Cox, “Sandton Residents ‘Living under Siege.’” 33. Chronicle Reporter, “River Raid Sees an Arrest.” 34. Bently, “Braamfontein Rehabilitation Spruit Project”; Hip, “Braamfontein Spruit Takes Care of Its Own”; and interview with Jonica Brown, June 22, 2020. 35. Staff Reporter, “Clean-­Up in the Spruit.” 36. Charlton, “Down by the River,” p. 143. 37. Steadman Jones, Outcast London, p. 14. 38. Tanya Steenkamp, “Improved Crime Combating on Popular Johannesburg Mountain Bike Route,” TimesLIVE (Online), March 22, 2018. 39. Tanya Steenkamp, “Peace of Mind for Cyclists and Walkers as Initiative to Boost Security along Spruit Trails Gets Legs,” Business Day, March 22, 2018. See also interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 40. Staff Reporter, “Drone Image Captures Extent of Displaced People Problem in Keith Fleming Park,” Randburg Sun, September 10, 2018; and Staff Reporter, “Police Have Their Say on Illegal Occupation of Keith Fleming Park,” Northcliff Melville Times, October 2, 2018. 41. Clark, “Joburg Waste Pickers Face Routine Harassment,” Daily Maverick (Online), March 12, 2019. 42. Gift Tlou, “Entities Seek Solutions for Displaced People,” Sandton Chronicle, October 8, 2019; and Gift Tlou, “Displaced People Happy in Hurlingham Park,” Sandton Chronicle, November 10, 2019. 43. Graeme Hosken, “Plans to Foil Bike Thieves,” Sunday Times, December 1, 2019. 44. For comparative purposes, see Mitchell and Heynen, “Geography of Survival,” pp. 611–­632. 45. Manoim, “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence,” pp. 13–­ 14; and Tessa Diphoorn and Helene Kyed, “Entanglements of Private Security and Community Policing in South Africa and Swaziland,” African Affairs 115, 461 (2016), pp. 710–­732. 46. Ryan Carrier, “Dissolving Boundaries: Private Security and Policing in South Africa,” African Security Review 8, 6 (1999), (no pagination). 47. Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Community Policing and Disputed Norms,” pp. 93–­109 (quotation on p. 95). 48. Clark, “Joburg Waste Pickers Face Routine Harassment”; and Bénit-­Gbaffou, “Community Policing and Disputed Norms,” p. 98. See also interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 49. Steenkamp, “Improved Crime Combating”; and Pascale Michel, “Community Outrage at Squatter Camp in George Lea,” Sandton Chronicle, June 6, 2016. 50. Pascale Michel, “Dweller Dilemma,” Sandton Chronicle, June 13, 2016. Interviews with Jonica Brown, June 22, 2020; and Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020.



Notes to Pages 236–240 • 357

51. HGC Residents’ Association Online Newsletter (June 2016) (Text can be found at http://www.hurlingham.org.za/). 52. Michel, “Law and Squatters”; Pascale Michel, “George Lea Park Dwellers,” Sandton Chronicle, June 3, 2016; Michel, “George Lea Park Makeover,”; Pascale Michel, “Communities Conquer Crime,” Sandton Chronicle, April 26, 2016; and Pascale Michel, “Elderly Still Feeling Vulnerable,” Sandton Chronicle, May 6, 2016. See also interview with Sonja Carghagan and Raoul Goosen, July 27, 2020. 53. Hosken, “Plans to Foil Bike Thieves”; and Clark, “Joburg Waste Pickers Face Routine Harassment.” 54. Manoim, “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence,” p. 57. 55. Ian Broghton, “Homeless Poorly Treated in Bedfordview,” GroundUp (Online), October 8, 2018 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article/homeless-poorly-treated-bedfor​ dview/]; and Staff Writer, “Smash-­and-­Grabs Continue in Sandton,” Sandton Chronicle, September 11, 2019. 56. Tessa Diphoorn and Erella Grassiani, “Introduction: Security,” Etnofoor 27, 2 (2015), pp. 7–­15. 57. Richard Ballard, “Middle Class Neighbourhoods or ‘African Kraals’? The Impact of Informal Settlements and Vagrants on Post-­Apartheid White Identity,” Urban Forum 15, 1 (2004), pp. 48–­73 (quotation on p. 68). 58. Manoim, “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence,” p. 93. 59. Marks and Wood, “South African Policing ‘Nexus,’” pp. 134–­160 (esp. p. 142); and Manoim, “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence,” pp. 92–­93, 95. 60. For comparative purposes, see Simone Tulumello and Fabio Iapaolo, “Policing the Future, Disrupting Urban Policy Today: Predictive Policing, Smart City, and Urban Policy in Memphis (TN),” Urban Geography (Online First, 2022) [DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2021.1887634]. 61. Anthony Settipani, “Spate of Attacks at Melville Koppies,” Saturday Star, May 30, 2015; Staff Reporter, “Melville’s Crime Woes,” Northcliff Melville Times, January 26, 2016; Ashtyn Mackenzie, “Crime on the Koppies—­Out of Control,” Northcliff Melville Times, May 8, 2015; Staff Reporter, “Beagle Watch Apprehends Three Suspects after Armed Robbery in Atholl,” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, July 12, 2020. See interview with Daniel Conradie, August 11, 2020.

Chapter 7 1. Staff Reporter, “Rising Crime Should Be Treated as National Emergency,” Business Day, December 4, 2001. 2. See Ellin, “Shelter from the Storm,” pp. 13–­47 (esp. 13). 3. See David Bewley-­Taylor, “Watch This Space: Civil Liberties, Concept Wars, and the Future of the Urban Fortress,” Journal of American Studies 40, 2 (2006), pp. 233–­255 (esp. 245). 4. See Taner Oc and Steven Tiesdell, Safer City Centres: Reviving the Public Realm

358 • Notes to Pages 240–244

(London: Paul Chapman, 1997); and Fyfe and Bannister, “Eyes upon the Street,” pp. 254–­ 267. For the South African variant, see Kruger, Meyer, et al., Safer by Design. 5. See Hannah, “Space and the Structuring,” pp. 171–­180; and Hannah, “Space and Social Control,” pp. 412–­432 (esp. 412–­413). 6. Koskela, “‘Gaze without Eyes,’” pp. 243–­265 (esp. pp. 251–­252); Hannah, “Space and the Structuring,” pp. 171–­180; and Boyer, Cybercities, pp. 95–­96. 7. John Fiske, “Videotech,” in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), The Visual Culture Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 153–­162 (esp. 154, 155). See Kevin Walby, “Risky Spaces, Algorithms, and Signifiers: Disappearing Bodies and the Prevalence of Racialization in Urban Camera Surveillance Procedures,” Topia (York University) 16 (2006), pp. 51–­67. 8. See Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” pp. 605–­622. 9. Randy Lippert, “Signs of the Surveillant Assemblage: Privacy Regulation, Urban CCTV, and Governmentality,” Social and Legal Studies 18, 4 (2009), pp. 505–­522; and Randy Lippert and David Murakami Wood, “The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities,” Surveillance & Society 9, 3 (2012), pp. 257–­262. See also Wang, Carceral Capitalism. 10. See Steve Herbert, “The Geopolitics of the Police: Foucault, Disciplinary Power, and the Tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department,” Political Geography 15, 1 (1996), pp. 47–­57 (esp. 49); Crang, “Watching the City,” pp. 2099–­2104; and Koskela, “‘Gaze without Eyes,’” pp. 251–­257. 11. For a particularly poignant expression of this sensibility, see Phylicia Oppelt, “Rediscovering the Lost City Where So Many Fear to Tread,” Sunday Times, November 17, 2002. Oppelt begins her piece with the following sentences: “I hate going into Johannesburg’s city centre . . . An appointment in the city centre fills me with dread.” 12. N. Smith, “Alarming Invasion of Public Space,” p. 17. 13. McLaughlin and Muncie, “Walled Cities,” pp. 103–­148 (esp. 135–­136). For an example from Canada, see Paloma Villegas, “Fishing for Precarious Status Migrants: Surveillant Assemblages of Migrant Illegalization in Toronto, Canada,” Journal of Law and Society 42, 2 (2015), pp. 230–­252. 14. Paul Virilio, “Speed and Vision: The Incomparable Eye,” Daidalos: Berlin Architectural Journal 47 (1993), pp. 96–­107 (esp. 97). 15. N. Smith, “Alarming Invasion of Public Space,” p. 17. 16. Anthony Giddens, “Surveillance and the Capitalist State,” in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 169–­176. 17. See David Frisby, Cityscapes of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 57–­60. 18. Franco Moretti, Signs Taken for Wonders (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 143–­144. 19. Ian Taylor, “Crime, Anxiety, and Locality: Responding to the ‘Condition of England’ at the End of the Century,” Theoretical Criminology 1, 1 (1997), pp. 53–­75. 20. Fiske, “Surveilling the City,” pp. 67–­88 (esp. 71). See also Thomas Levin, Ursula Frohme, and Peter Weibel (eds.), CTRL [Space]: Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).



Notes to Pages 244–246 • 359

21. Clive Norris and Michael McCahill, “CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?” British Journal of Criminology 46, 1 (2006), pp. 97–­118. 22. Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, “Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law,” in David Nelken (ed.), The Futures of Criminology (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 173–­2001 (esp. 173, 180, 185) (quotation on p. 173). See also Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications,” Criminology 30, 4 (1992), pp. 449–­474; and David Garland, “Penal Modernism and Postmodernism,” in Thomas Boomberg and Stanley Cohen (eds.), Punishment and Social Control, enlarged 2nd ed. (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 2003), pp. 45–­74. 23. Norris and McCahill, “CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?” p. 114. 24. Heidi Monk Lomell, “Targeting the Unwanted: Video Surveillance and Categorical Exclusion in Oslo, Norway?” Surveillance & Society 2, 2–­3 (2004), pp. 347–­361; Graham, “Spaces of Surveillant Simulation,” pp. 483–­504; Boyne, “Post-­Panopticism,” pp. 285–­307; Bogard, Simulation of Surveillance; Lianos (with Douglas), “Dangerization and the End of Deviance,” pp. 261–­278. 25. See David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society,” British Journal of Criminology 36, 4 (1996), pp. 445–­471; and Eugene McLaughlin and Karim Murji, “Lost Connections and New Directions: Neo-­liberalism, New Public Managerialism, and the ‘Modernization’ of the British Police,” in Kevin Stenson and Robert Sullivan (eds.), Crime, Risk, and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002), pp. 104–­121. 26. See Norris and McCahill, “CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?” p. 114; and Barbara Hudson, “Punishment, Rights, and Difference: Defending Justice in the Risk Society,” in Crime, Risk, and Justice, pp. 144–­172 (quotation on p. 156). 27. David Weisburd, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-­Ming Yang, “Introduction,” in David Weisburd, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-­Ming Yang (eds.), The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 3–­28 (quotation on p. 3). 28. Lawrence Sherman, Patrick Gartin, and Michael Breuger, “Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place,” Criminology 27, 1 (1989), pp. 27–­56. 29. Henri Lefebvre, The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), p. 31. 30. David Harvey, “The New Urbanism and the Communitarian Trap,” Harvard Design Magazine (Winter/Spring 1997), pp. 68–­70. See also Roy Coleman, Steve Tombs, and Dave Whyte, “Capital, Crime Control, and Statecraft in the Entrepreneurial City,” Urban Studies 42, 13 (2005), pp. 2511–­2530; and Steven Tiesdell and Taner Oc, “Beyond ‘Fortress’ and ‘Panoptic’ Cities—­Towards a Safer Urban Public Realm,” Environment and Planning B 25, 5 (1998), pp. 637–­792 (esp. 643). 31. See Anthony Vidler, “The City Transformed: Designing Defensible Space,” New York Times, September 23, 2001.

360 •

Notes to Pages 246–249

32. Jon Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk, and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience (Burlington, VT: 2009), p. 207. See interviews with Nazira Cachalia, May 30, 2006, and June 24, 2011. 33. De Cauter, “Capsular City,” pp. 271–­280 (esp. 275–­276). 34. Graham, Cities under Siege; Gregory, “From a View to a Kill,” pp. 188–­215; Grégoire Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” Radical Philosophy 169 (2011), pp. 2–­6; Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (New York: New Press, 2015); Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan, “Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-­Scapes,” Theoretical Criminology 15, 3 (2011), pp. 239–­254; Harris, “Omniscient Eye,” pp. 101–­122; and Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” Critical Asian Studies 46, 2 (2014), pp. 211–­234. 35. Kim James, “Drone Guards: Securing High Value Assets, in Africa,” Africa Surveyors Online, October 4, 2019 [https://www.africasurveyorsonline/2019/10/04/drone​ -guards-securing-high-value-assets-in-africa/]. 36. Francisco Klauser and Silvana Pedrozo, “Power and Space in the Drone Age: A Literature Review and Politico-­Geographical Research Agenda,” Geographica Helvetica 70, 3 (2015), pp. 285–­293 (esp. p. 285). 37. Bracken-­Roche, “Domestic Drones,” pp. 167–­172. 38. Crampton, “Assemblage of the Vertical,” pp. 137–­146. 39. See Philip Boucher, “Domesticating the Drone: The Demilitarisation of Unmanned Aircraft for Civil Markets,” Science and Engineering Ethics 21, 6 (2015), pp. 1393–­1412 (quotations on pp. 1395 and 1396). 40. Adey, “Vertical Security in the Megacity,” pp. 51–­67 (quotation on p. 52). 41. Graham, Vertical, pp. 68–­69. See also Martin Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), pp. 3–­23. 42. Dario Floreano and Robert Wood, “Science, Technology, and the Future of Small Autonomous Drones,” Nature 521 (2015), pp. 460–­466. 43. Wall, “Unmanning the Police Manhunt,” pp. 32–­56. 44. This idea is adopted from Wall and Monahan, “Surveillance and Violence from Afar,” pp. 239–­254 (esp. p. 239). 45. For the military origins of the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles, see Caren Kaplan and Andrea Miller, “Drones as ‘Atmospheric Policing’: From US Border Enforcement to the LAPD,” Public Culture 31, 3 (2019), pp. 419–­445; Katherine Chandler, “American Kamikaze: Television-­Guided Assault Drones in World War II,” in Lisa Parks and Caren Kaplan (eds.), Life in the Age of Drone Warfare (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), pp. 89–­111; and Katherine Hall Kindervater, “The Technological Rationality of the Drone Strike,” Critical Studies on Security 5, 1 (2017), pp. 28–­44. 46. See O. Jensen, “New ‘Foucauldian Boomerangs,’” pp. 20–­33; and Neocleous, War Power, Police Power. 47. Wall, “Unmanning the Police Manhunt,” pp. 45–­46. 48. Bloomberg, “Joburg City Officials and Businesses Explore the Use of Drones.” See also interview with Kim James, April 23, 2020.



Notes to Pages 250–251 • 361

49. Wall, “Unmanning the Police Manhunt,” pp. 32–­56 (quotation on p. 48). 50. Bloomberg, “Joburg City Officials and Businesses Explore the Use of Drones.” See also Staff Writer, “Drones—­Are They a Friend or Foe to Your Cybersecurity Strategy?” Cape Business News, January 9, 2020 [https://www.cbn.co.za/featured/drones-are​ -they-a-friend-or-foe-to-your-cybersecurity-strategy/]. 51. Staff Reporter, “Reducing False Alarms,” News24, July 2, 2018 [https:// w w w.ne w ​ s 24.com/S outhAf rica/L o cal/Maritzburg-Fe ver/reducing-fals ealarms-20180206 ]; and Andrew Seldon, “The End of Blind Alarms,” Security Services and Risk Management, Hi-­Tech Security Solutions, Issue 3, 2020 [https:// www.securitysa.com/10068r]. 52. Christine Agius, “Ordering without Bordering: Drones, the Unbordering of Late Modern Warfare and Ontological Insecurity,” Postcolonial Studies 20, 3 (2017), pp. 370–­ 386 (esp. p. 371). 53. Staff Writer, “Airborne Drones Set to Provide Security Patrols in South Africa,” African Aerospace Online News Service, July 10, 2017. [https://www.africanaerospace.ae​ ro/airborne-drones-set-to-provide-security-patrols-in-south-africa.html]. 54. David Smith, “Pepper-­Spray Drone Offered to South African Mines for Strike Control,” The Guardian, January 20, 2014 (source of quotations). See also Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” in Aleš Završnik (ed.), Drones and Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications for Security and Surveillance (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2016), pp. 45–­68. 55. Max Ocean, “World’s First Fleet of Riot Control Drones Ordered by Secret South African Company,” Common Dreams, June 19, 2014; Ajit Nararnjan, “South African Mining Firm Is the First to Purchase Riot Control Drone,” New Statesman, June 23, 2014; and James Joiner, “For Sale: Weaponized Drones for Corporate Use,” Esquire, June 24, 2014. See also Duncan, Stopping the Spies. 56. Shantini Naidoo, “Don’t Look Up,” Sunday Times, June 24, 2018; and Staff Writer, “Drones: The Next Big Thing for the South African Security Industry?” Security Focus Africa, March 7, 2020 [https://www.securityfocusafrica.com/2020/03/07/drones-the-ne​ xt-big-thing-for-the-south-african-security-industry/]. 57. Alan Dron, “The Drone Rangers,” African Aerospace Online News Service, December 16, 2019 [https://www.africanaerospace.aero/the-drone-rangers.html]; and Staff Writer, “South African Residential Estates Are Now Using Drones to Boost Security,” Business Tech, July 3, 2019 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/technology/326901/so​ uth-african-residential-estates-are-now-using-drones-to-boost-security/]. 58. Guy Martin, “Drones Are Patrolling South African Residential Estates,” Defence Web, July 2, 2019 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles​ /drones-are-patrolling-south-african-residential-estates/]. See also Karen Jayes, “The War on Terror Reaches South Africa in the Guise of ‘Fighting Crime,’” CAGE, October 24, 2014 [https://www.cage.ngo/war-terror-reaches-south-africa-guise-fighting-crime]. 59. Martin, “Drones Are Patrolling.”

362 • Notes to Pages 252–256

60. Ian Shaw, “The Great War of Enclosure: Securing the Skies,” Antipode 49, 4 (2017), pp. 883–­906 (esp. p. 883). 61. Staff Writer, “South African Residential Estates Are Now Using Drones.” 62. CAGE Advocacy, “Proposed Drone Regulations Leave Loopholes for Weaponised Drones in South Africa,” press release, CAGE Africa, January 26, 2015 [https://​ www.cage.ngo/cage-africa-proposed-drone-regulations-leave-loopholes-weaponiseddrones-south-africa]. See also Justin Cronjé, “Drone Con 2019: Redefining the Future of Work with Drones,” Defence Web, October 18, 2019 [https://www.defenceweb​ .co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/drone-con-2019-redefining-the-future-of​ -work-with-drones/]; and Daneel Knoetze, “Draft Drone Rules Silent on Privacy and Weapon Concerns,” GroundUp, January 27, 2015 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article​ /draft-drone-rules-silent-privacy-and-weapon-concerns_2624/]. 63. Staff Writer, “Airborne Drones Set to Provide Security Patrols.” 64. Lixodx Intrusion Detection. Always Know [http://lixodex.co.za/]. 65. Staff Writer, “Drones to Feature Heavily at Securex 2020,” Defence Web, March 5, 2020 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/drones-to​ -feature-heavily-at-securex-2020/]. 66. Kim James, “Aerial Surveillance Improves Existing Layered Security Systems,” Drone Guards, July 16, 2019 [https://droneguards.africa/aerial-surveillance-improves​ -existing-layered-security-systems/]. See also “Zoom Chat. Louise Jupp interview with Kim James, Aerial Works” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jtj-5W024bw]. 67. Staff Writer, “South African Residential Estates Are Now Using Drones.” 68. Martin, “Drones Are Patrolling.” 69. See “Welcome to CORTAC,” official web page [https://www.cortac.co.za/]. 70. Stephen Shankland, “This Home Security Drone Will Help You Tell Possums from Prowlers,” CNET, February 7, 2019 [https://www.cnet.com/news/home-security-dr​ one-could-help-you-tell-possums-from-prowlers/]. 71. Nick Summers, “I Remotely Patrolled a House with a $10,000 Security Drone,” Engadget, January 8, 2020 [https://www.engadget.com/2020-01-08-sunflower-labs-dro​ ne-home-security-impressions.html]. 72. Kim James, “Securing High Value Assets from Above,” in Louise Jupp (ed.), Drone Professional 1 (London: Writing Matters, 2020), pp. 13–­26. See also interview with Kim James, April 23, 2020. 73. See Shaw, Predator Empire. 74. See interview with Kim James, April 23, 2020. 75. Etienne Balibar, “The Borders of Europe,” in Preng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. pp. 216–­233 (quotation on pp. 217–­218). Thanks to Amanda Ndaw for getting me to think about these ideas. 76. Nick Vaughan-­ Williams, “Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen–­Detective, and the War on Terror,” Space and Polity 12, 1 (2008), pp. 63–­79. 77. Nick Vaughan-­Williams, “The UK Border Security Continuum: Virtual Biopoli-



Notes to Pages 256–259 • 363

tics and the Simulation of the Sovereign Ban,” Environment and Planning D 28, 6 (2010), pp. 1071–­1883 (esp. 1071). 78. See also Etienne Balibar, “At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?” European Journal of Social Theory 13, 3 (2010), pp. 315–­322. See also Derek Gregory, “The Everywhere War,” Geographical Journal 177, 3 (2011), pp. 238–­250. 79. Doris Wastl-­Walter, “Introduction,” in Doris Wastl-­Walter (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 1–­10; and Willem de Lint, “The Security Double Take: The Political, Simulation, and the Border,” Surveillance & Society 5, 2 (2008), p. 166–­187. 80. Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” pp. 225–­241 (quotation on p. 225). 81. Vaughan-­Williams, “UK Border Security Continuum,” p. 1881. 82. See J. W. Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000). 83. Bishop and Phillips, “Sighted Weapons and Modernist Opacity,” pp. 157–­179 (quotations on pp. 158, 161). 84. Ian Shaw, “Policing the Future City: Robotic Being-­in-­the-­World,” Antipode 2017 (Intervention Symposium—­Algorithmic Governance, Online) [http://eprints.gla.ac.uk​ /141684/7/141684.pdf]. 85. Wendy Pullan, “Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities,” Journal of Architecture 16, 1 (2011), pp. 15–­35 (quotations on pp. 16, 17). 86. See Eyal Weizman, “Principles of Frontier Geography,” in Philip Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (eds.), City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism (Basel: Birkhauser, 2006), pp. 83–­92 (esp. p. 91). 87. For a summary, see Paul Knepper, “How Situational Crime Prevention Contributes to Social Welfare,” Liverpool Law Review 30 (2009), pp. 57–­75 (quotations on p. 58). See also Rob White and Adam Sutton, “Crime Prevention, Urban Space, and Social Exclusion,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 31, 1 (1995), pp. 82–­99; and Wakefield, “Situational Crime Prevention,” pp. 124–­145. 88. Bruce Braun, “Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life,” Cultural Geographies 14, 1 (2007), pp. 6–­28 (quotation on p. 22). 89. B. Braun, “Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life,” p. 19. 90. See Rivke Jaffe, “Speculative Policing,” Public Culture 31, 3 (2019), pp. 447–­468 (quotation on p. 449). 91. To borrow from another context, see Adey, “Surveillance at the Airport,” pp. 1365–­1380 (quotation on p. 1376). 92. Mitchell Dean, The Signature of Power: Sovereignty, Governmentality, and Biopolitics (London: Sage, 2013). 93. See Michele Rapoport, “Domestic Surveillance Technologies and a New Visibility,” in Elisa Orrú, Maria Grazia Porcedda, and Sebastian Weydner-­Volkmann (eds.), Rethinking Surveillance and Control: Beyond the ‘Security versus Privacy’ Debates (Baden-­ Baden: Nomos, 2017), pp. 217–­238. See also David Lyon, “9/11, Synopticon, and Scopophia: Watching and Being Watched,” in Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (eds.), The

364 •

Notes to Pages 259–265

New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 35–­54. 94. Brian Massumi, “Translator’s Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy,” in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 11th ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), pp. ix–­xv (esp. p. ix) 95. Graham, Cities under Siege, p. 31. 96. Graham, Cities under Siege, p. 27. 97. D. Wilson, “Border Militarization,” p. 150. 98. Ben Hayes, “‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ as European Union Security Policy: On the Trail of the ‘NeoConOpticon,’” in Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (eds.), Surveillance and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 148–­169. 99. Ceyhan, “Technologization of Security,” pp. 102–­123 (esp. p. 108). 100. Vukov and Sheller, “Border Work,” pp. 225–­241 (esp. p. 226). 101. D. Wilson, “Border Militarization,” pp. 141–­154. 102. Louise Arnoore, “Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror,” Antipode 41, 1 (2009), pp. 49–­69 (quotation on p. 49). 103. Didier Bigo, “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of the Banopticon,” in Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-­Warr (eds.), Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), pp. 3–­33. 104. D. Wilson, “Border Militarization,” pp. 148–­149. 105. Anthony Elliot and John Urry, Mobile Lives (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 10, 11. 106. See Gabriel Popescu, “Controlling Mobility: Embodying Borders,” in Anne-­ Laure Amilhat-­Szary and Frederic Giraut (eds.), Borderities and the Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 100–­115; and Gabriel Popescu, “Controlling Mobilities,” in Gabriel Popescu (ed.), Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-­First Century: Understanding Borders (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), pp. 91–­120. 107. Pavoni, “Tuning the City,” pp. 191–­209 (esp. p. 196).

Introduction: Epilogues 1. Thanks for Danny Herwitz for ideas that shaped these paragraphs. 2. Georg Simmel, “On Art Exhibitions” (1890; translated by Austin Harrington), Theory, Culture & Society 32, 1 (2015), pp. 87–­92 (quotations on pp. 89 and 92).

Epilogue 1 1. Cobi Labuscagne, “Crime, Art, and Public Culture,” Cultural Studies 27, 3 (2013), pp. 357–­378 (quotation on p. 362). 2. Labuscagne, “Crime, Art and Public Culture,” pp. 362–­365.



Notes to Pages 266–277 • 365

3. Lize Van Robbroek, “Speaking Dogs: Undoing the Human in Art,” Art South Africa 6, 1 (2007), pp. 48–­53. See also Lize Van Robbroeck, “Harbinger of Night: Jane Alexander’s Posthumanism,” in Pep Subirós (ed.), Jane Alexander: Surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope) (New York: Museum of African Arts, 2011), pp. 36–­45. 4. Jennifer Bajorek, “Jane Alexander’s Anti-­Anthropomorphic Photographs,” Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 16, 1 (2011), pp. 79–­96. See Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). 5. See Ruth Adele Lipschitz, “Animality and Alterity: Species Discourse and the Limits of ‘the Human’ in Contemporary South African Art” (unpublished PhD diss., University of London, Department of Visual Cultures, 2014), p. 92. 6. Lipschitz, “Animality and Alterity,” p. 118. 7. Staff Writer, “Israel Issues Travel Warning on South Africa,” Jerusalem Post, January 1, 2020; and Staff Reporter, “Israel Warns of Dangers When Visiting SA,” Daily News (Durban), January 3, 2020.

Epilogue 2 1. Carla Busuttil and Gary Charles, Mosquito Lightning, (2016) http://www.mosquito​ lightning.com/] (Accessed March 12, 2021). 2. Hito Steyerl, “The Language of Broken Glass” [presentation, part of ‘Stop Making Sense,” sponsored by Haus der Culturen der Welt (HKW), Berlin, January 12, 2019 [https://www.hkw.de/de/app/mediathek/video/69577]. 3. William Pym, “Carla Busuttil: The Super-­Suburb Defence Authority,” press release for Josh Lilley Art Gallery (exhibition from November 14 to December 23, 2016). [https://www.joshlilley.com/exhibitions/the-super-suburb-defence-authority-2016/].

Bibliography

Primary Materials Interviews with author (with assistance of Nicky Falkof, Lily Manoim, and Anthony Chase) References to interviews, focus groups, and on-­site visits are abbreviated in the footnotes. Alexander, Anton (pseudonym), “CAP Victory Park” Neighbourhood Association. Telephone interview conducted by Lily Manoim, June 16, 2020. Altbeker, Anthony, Research and Projects Executive, Centre for Development and Enterprise, Parktown, South Africa, June 28, 2011. Andrews, Dean, Executive for Strategy and Marketing, and Charles Morgan, Operations Executive, NetStar Vehicle Tracking and Recovery. Zoom interview, June 29, 2020. BraamBID (Yael Horowitz, Director), Braamfontein Business Improvement District (BraamBID). Videocall interview conducted by Lily Maniom, June 22, 2020. Brown, Jonica, Chairperson, Bordeaux South Residents’ Association. Zoom interview, June 22, 2020. Cachalia, Nazira, City Safety Programme, Johannesburg Municipal Police Department (JMPD), May 30, 2006; June 24, 2011; May 3, 2019. Carghagan, Sonja, Chair, Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall Residents’ Association, and Raoul Goosen, Hurlingham Village Portfolio. Zoom interview, July 27, 2020. Colyn, Ryan, Regional Manager, MiX Telematics, April 30, 2019. Conradie, Daniel, Senior CCTV Manager, Beagle Watch Private Security. Zoom interview, August 11, 2020. Dooley, Danielle (editor, My Randburg, Northern Johannesburg Media), Randburg, July 12, 2011. Drinkwater, Vickie, Manager, “Safeparkview” (Security Initiative of Parkview Residents Association), February 2, 2016. Duncan, Jane, Human Rights Advocate, April 30, 2019. Edery, Jack, Chief Executive Officer, Elvey Security Technologies, Gallagher Convention Centre, June 19, 2012.



367

368 • Bibliography

Edery, Jack, CEO, Elvey Security Technologies, Greenstone Hill, Edenvale, July 1, 2014. Ehlers, Sonnette (inventor, Rape-­aXe). Telephone interview conducted by Anthony Chase (research assistant), December 1, 2010. Feeley, James (pseudonym), Representative, Melville Residents’ Association and Melville Security Initiative. Interview conducted by Nicky Falkof, February 10, 2020. Frimat, Patrick, Chief Executive Officer, RSI Video Technologies, Gallagher Convention Centre, June 19, 2012. Goedhab, Terius, and Andre Eckart, Omega Risk Solutions (Pretoria Office), May 2, 2019. Harrison, Philip (South African Research Chair, Development Planning and Modeling). School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand, June 12, 2012. Hydes, Justin, Product Sales, Spectrum Communications, Gallagher Convention Centre, June 19, 2012. James, Kim, Director, UAV Aerial Works, Johannesburg, Zoom Interview, April 23, 2020. Jammy, Eve, Chair, Rosebank Community Policing Forum, Rosebank Mall, July 4, 2014. Joseph, Lornette, Chairperson, “I Love Kensington” Neighbourhood Association, July 10, 2014. Labuschagne, Cheryl (Chair) and Jenny Clark (Lead Safety Cluster), Parkhurst Residents and Business Owners Association, Parkhurst, June 13, 2012. Lancelin, Frederic, Videofield, Gallagher Convention Centre, June 19, 2012. Lategan, Colonel Kobus, Central Senior Superintendent, South African Police Services (SAPS), Penmore Towers (1 Rissik Street), June 20, 2012. Loedolf, Cecile, Public Relations Officer, ABSA Precinct, Johannesburg, July 7, 2008. Marsay, Daniel, Hurlingham North Residents’ Association, June 11, 2012. Minnaar, Anthony, Department of Criminology and Security Science, University of South Africa, Pretoria, July 6, 2011. Minnaar, Wayne, Chief Superintendent, Johannesburg Municipal Police Department (JMPD), Martindale, July 9, 2014. Modena, Anthony, Chairperson, Section Two, Sandton Community Policing Forum, Sandton Police Station, July 4, 2014. Moulder, Grant, Operations Manager, CSS Tactical, Craighall, June 21, 2012. Mutinelli, Ingo, Sales Director, Elvey Security Technologies, Greenstone Hill, Edenvale, July 1, 2014. Nkosi, Thami, Chair, Right2Know Campaign, Zoom interview, August 10, 2020. Nortmann, Ryan, Elvey Security Technologies, Gallagher Convention Centre, June 19, 2012. Nuñes, Danyle, Neighborhood Security Forum, Melville, June 14, 2018. Nuñes, Danyle, Melville Sector Crime Forum (SCF), Interview conducted by Nicky Falkof, February 5, 2020. Penberthy, John, Executive Director, Business against Crime (BAC) Surveillance Technology, June 19, 2003. Peterson, Dean, Managing Executive, Labour Guard, June 13, 2012.

Bibliography • 369

Radebe, Nhlanhla Sydney, Hillbrow Community Policing Forum, July 11, 2014, and February 26, 2016. Robertson, Brian, Executive Manager, Parkmore Community Association, June 12, 2012. Rose, Cynthia, Chair, Melville, Community Policing Forum, Melville, July 9, 2014. Roseveare, Ryan (Chairperson) and Glenn du Toit (Security Team), Craighall and Craighall Park Community Policing Forum, Craighall Park, July 2, 2014. Sachs, Laurence, Co-­Director, “We Love Kilarney” (WLK, Unregistered Neighbourhood Association, Telephone interview conducted by Lily Manion, June 19, 2020. Scafer, Rocky, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Saber Tactical, Sandton, July 16, 2014. Schapiro, Geoff, Group Managing Director, Specialized Services Group (SSG), June 13, 2012. Schapiro, Geoff, Operations Director, 24/7 Security Services, Head Office, Wynberg, February 12, 2016. Sears, Mike (Managing Director), Jason Mordecai (Operations Manager), and Victor Tortora (Tactical Director), 7 Arrows Security, June 25, 2012. Steer, Bridget, Democratic Alliance Ward Councillor (Ward 57, which includes Melville, Parktown West, Greenside, Emmarentia, Richmond, and Auckland Park), Interview conducted by Nicky Falkof, February 19, 2020. Stoles, Earl, and Zane Callaghan, Inner-­City GFA Co-­ordinators, Johannesburg City Safety Programme, Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) Headquarters, Martindale, July 9, 2008. Stoles, Earl, Johannesburg City Safety Programme, Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), Penmore Towers (1 Rissik Street), June 20, 2012. Swart, Heidi, Journalist, Stellenbosch, May 27, 2019. Thomas, Russell, General Manager Operations, Central Johannesburg Partnership, Operational Headquarters, CCTV Surveillance System, Omega Risk Solutions, 1 Rissik Street, July 7 and July 15, 2008. Turvey, Tessa, Saxonwald and Parkwood Residents’ Association (SAPRA), June 11, 2012. Vorster-­Robertson, Wendy (Chairperson), Sandton Community Policing Forum, Sandton Police Station, July 4, 2014.

On-­Site Observations IFSEC South Africa 2012 Exhibition, Gallagher Convention Centre, Midrand, June 19–­ 21, 2012. On-­Site observation, Beagle Watch public presentation to Melville residents (BW headquarters, Fairland), Conducted by Nicky Falkof and Lily Manion, January 30, 2020. Operational Headquarters, CCTV Surveillance System, Carlton Centre (Commissioner Street), June 19, 2003. Operational Headquarters, CCTV Surveillance System, Omega Risk Solutions, Penmore Towers (1 Rissik Street), Johannesburg Central City, with Russell Thomas, General Manager Operations, Central Johannesburg Partnership, and Kobus Van Deventer, July 15, 2008.

370 • Bibliography

Operational Headquarters, Omega Risk Solutions, Penmore Towers (1 Rissik Street), with Richard Frederick Witte, Chief Superintendent, CCTV Operations, June 27, 2011. Operational Headquarters, Omega Risk Solutions, CCTV Control Room, Penmore Towers (1 Rissik Street), Johannesburg Central City, June 20, 2012. Operations Meeting for “Safe Parkview” Security Initiative, June 11, 2012. Participation in Community Policing Forum (CPF) Nighttime Patrols, Johannesburg Inner City, June 27, 2014, and February 16, 2016.

Secondary Sources Aas, Katja Franko. “‘The Body Does Not Lie’: Identity, Risk, and Trust in Technoculture.” Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal 2, 2 (2006), pp. 143–­158. Abrahams, David. “A Synopsis of Urban Violence in South Africa.” International Review of the Red Cross 92, 878 (2010), pp. 495–­520. Adey, Peter. “Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, and the Preemptive Securitisation of the Mobile Body.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27, 2 (2009), pp. 274–­295. Adey, Peter. “Surveillance at the Airport: Surveilling Mobility/Mobilizing Surveillance.” Environment and Planning A 36, 8 (2004), pp. 1365–­1380. Adey, Peter. “Vertical Security in the Megacity: Legibility, Mobility, and Aerial Politics.” Theory, Culture & Society 27, 6 (2010), 51–­67. Adey, Peter, Mark Whitehead, and Alison Williams. “Introduction: Air-­Target: Distance, Reach, and the Politics of Verticality.” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 7–­8 (2011), pp. 173–­187. Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. Agius, Christine. “Ordering without Bordering: Drones, the Unbordering of Late Modern Warfare, and Ontological Insecurity.” Postcolonial Studies 20, 3 (2017), pp. 370–­ 386. Ainley, Rosa. “Watching the Detectors: Control and the Panopticon.” In Rosa Ainley (ed.), New Frontiers of Space, Bodies, and Gender. New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 88–­100. Alexander, Peter. “Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests—­A Preliminary Analysis.” Review of African Political Economy 37 (2010), pp. 25–­40. Altbeker, Anthony. A Country at War with Itself: South Africa’s Crisis of Crime. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007. Altbeker, Anthony. “Policing the Frontier: Seven Days with the Hijacking Investigation Unit in Johannesburg.” In Jonny Steinberg (ed.), Crime Wave: The South African Underworld and Its Foes. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001, pp. 24–­40.

Bibliography • 371

Amoore, Louise. “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror.” Political Geography 25 (2006), pp. 336–­351. Amoore, Louise. “Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror.” Antipode 41, 1 (2009), pp. 49–­69. Amoore, Louise, and Rita Raley. “Securing with Algorithms: Knowledge, Decision, Sovereignty.” Security Dialogue 48, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­10. Amoore, Louise, and Alexandra Hall. “Taking People Apart: Digitised Dissection and the Body at the Border.” Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 27, 3 (2009), pp. 444–­464. Amoore, Louise, and Alexandra Hall. “Border Theatre: On the Arts of Security and Resistance.” Cultural Geographies 17, 3 (2010), pp. 299–­319. Andrejevic, Mark. “Automating Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 17, 1–­2 (2019), pp. 7–­13. Antonelli, Paola. “Armor.” In Paola Antonelli (ed.), Safe: Design Takes on Risk. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005, pp. 80–­95. Antonelli, Paola. “Grace under Pressure.” In Paola Antonelli (ed.), Safe: Design Takes on Risk. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005, pp. 8–­15. Appadurai, Arjun. “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value.” In Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 3–­63. Ardener, Shirley (ed.). Women and Space: Ground Rules and Social Maps. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993. Atkinson, Rowland, and Sarah Blandy. Domestic Fortress: Fear and the New Home Front. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2017. Auyero, Javier. Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Baird, Michelle India. “Blasting Carjacking: Prosecution-­Led Law Enforcement.” Crime and Conflict 16 (1999), pp. 37–­40. Bajorek, Jennifer. “Jane Alexander’s Anti-­Anthropomorphic Photographs.” Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 16, 1 (2011), pp. 79–­96. Baker, Bruce. “Living with Non-­State Policing in South Africa: The Issues and Dilemmas.” Journal of Modern African Studies 40, 1 (2002), pp. 29–­53. Balibar, Etienne. “At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?” European Journal of Social Theory 13, 3 (2010), pp. 315–­322. Balibar, Etienne. “The Borders of Europe.” In Preng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp. 216–­233. Ballard, Richard. “Middle Class Neighbourhoods or ‘African Kraals’? The Impact of Informal Settlements and Vagrants on Post-­ Apartheid White Identity.” Urban Forum 15, 1 (2004), pp. 48–­73. Bardis, Antonia. “Digital Photography and the Question of Realism.” Journal of Visual Art Practice 3, 3 (2004), pp. 209–­218.

372 • Bibliography

Batty, Michael. “Big Data, Smart Cities, and City Planning.” Dialogues in Human Geography 3, 3 (2013), pp. 274–­279. Bauman, Zygmunt. Globalization: The Human Consequences. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998. Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000. Bauman, Zygmunt. “Social Issues in Law and Order.” British Journal of Criminology 40, 2 (2000), pp. 205–­221. Bauman, Zygmunt. “Urban Space Wars: On Destructive Order and Creative Chaos.” Space and Culture 2, 3 (1998), pp. 109–­123. Bauman, Zygmunt, and David Lyon. Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013. Beck, Ulrich. Brave New World of Work. Trans. Patrick Camiller. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000. Becker, Anna, and Markus-­Michael Müller. “The Securitization of Urban Space and the ‘Rescue’ of Downtown Mexico City: Vision and Practice.” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 77–­94. Beckett, Katherine, and Naomi Murakowa. “Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment.” Theoretical Criminology 16, 2 (2012), pp. 221–­244. Belina, Bernd, and Gesa Helms. “Zero Tolerance for the Industrial Past and Other Threats: Policing and Urban Entrepreneurialism in Britain and Germany.” Urban Studies 40, 9 (2003), pp. 1845–­1867. Bénit-­Gbaffou, Claire. “Community Policing and Disputed Norms for Local Social Control in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg.” Journal of Southern Studies 34, 1 (2008), pp. 93–­109. Bénit-­Gbaffou, Claire. “Unbundled Security Services and Urban Fragmentation in Post-­ Apartheid Johannesburg.” Geoforum 39, 6 (2008), pp. 1933–­1950. Bénit-­Gbaffou, Claire. “Who Control the Streets? Crime, ‘Communities,’ and the State in Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg.” In Francesca Locatelli and Paul Nugent (eds.), African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces. Leiden: Brill, 2009, pp. 55–­80. Benjamin, Walter. “Critique of Violence.” In Peter Demetz (ed.), Walter Benjamin: Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, and Autobiographical Writings. New York: Schocken Books, 1978, pp. 277–­300. Benjamin, Walter. “Fashion.” In The Arcades Project, (translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin,. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 63–­81. Benjamin, Walter. Selected Writings: Vol. 4: 1938–­1940, Ed. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2003. Berg, Julie. “Governing Security in Public Places: Improvement Districts in South Africa.” In Randy Lippert and Kevin Walby (eds.), Policing Cities: Urban Securitization and Regulation in the Twenty-­First Century World. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 161–­175. Bernazzoli, Richelle, and Colin Flint. ‘Embodying the Garrison State? Everyday Geog-

Bibliography • 373

raphies of Militarisation in American Society.’ Political Geography 29, 3 (2010), pp. 157–­166. Bernazzoli, Richelle, and Colin Flint. “From Militarisation to Securitisation: Finding a Concept That Works.” Political Geography 28, 8 (2009), pp. 449–­450. Berndtsson, Joakim, and Maria Stern. “Private Security and the Public-­Private Divide: Contested Lines of Distinction and Modes of Governance in the Stockholm-­Arlanda Security Assemblage..” International Political Sociology 5, 4 (2011), pp. 408–­425. Bewley-­Taylor, David, “Watch This Space: Civil Liberties, Concept Wars, and the Future of the Urban Fortress..” Journal of American Studies 40, 2 (2006), pp. 233–­255. Bigo, Didier, “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of the Banopticon.” In Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-­Warr (eds.), Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007, pp. 3–­33. Bigo, Didier, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.” Alternatives 27, 1 [special issue] (2002), pp. 63–­92. Bishop, Ryan, and John Phillips, “Sighted Weapons and Modernist Opacity: Aesthetics, Poetics, Prosthetics.” Boundary 2 29, 2 (2002), pp. 157–­179. Björklund, Fredrika, and Ola Svenonius. “Video Surveillance in Theory and as institutional Practice.” In Fredrika Björklund and Ola Svenonius (eds.), Surveillance and Social Control in a Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 1–­18. Blair, J. Pete, and D. Kim Rossmo. “Evidence in Context: Bayes’ Theorem and Investigations.” Police Quarterly 13, 2 (2010), pp. 123–­135. Blomley, Nicholas. “Colored Rabbits, Dangerous Trees, and Public Sitting: Sidewalks, Police, and the City.” Urban Geography 33, 7 (2012), pp. 917–­935. Bogard, William. The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot. “The Reality of Moral Expectations: A Sociology of Situated Judgement.” Philosophical Explorations 3, 3 (2000), pp. 208–­231. Bonner, Michelle. “Violence, Policing, and (In)security.” Latin American Research Review 49, 1 (2014), pp. 261–­269. Bookman, Sonia, and Andrew Woolford. “Policing (by) the Urban Brand: Defining Order in Winnipeg’s Exchange District.” Social & Cultural Geography 14, 3 (2013), pp. 300–­317. Boucher, Philip. “Domesticating the Drone: The Demilitarisation of Unmanned Aircraft for Civil Markets.” Science and Engineering Ethics 21, 6 (2015), pp. 1393–­1412. Boutellier, Hans. The Safety Utopia: Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to Crime and Punishment. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 2004. Boyer, M. Christine. City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imaginary and Architectural Entertainments. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Boyer, M. Christine. Cybercities: Visual Perception in the Age of Electronic Communication. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996.

374 • Bibliography

Boyer, M. Christine. Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Boyle, Phillip, and Kevin Haggerty. “Spectacular Security: Mega-­Events and the Security Complex.” International Political Sociology 3, 3 (2009), pp. 257–­274. Boyne, Roy. “Post-­Panopticism.” Economy and Society 29, 2 (2000), pp. 285–­307. Bracken-­Roche, Ciara. “Domestic Drones: The Politics of Verticality and the Surveillance Industrial Complex.” Geographica Helvetica 71, 3 (2016), pp. 167–­172. Braithwaite, John. “The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology.” British Journal of Criminology 40, 2 (2000), pp. 222–­238. Braun, Bruce. “Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life.” Cultural Geographies 14, 1 (2007), pp. 6–­28. Braun, Sven, Michael Friedewald, and Govert Valkenburg. “Civilizing Drones–­–­Military Discourses Going Civil?” Science & Technology Studies 28, 2 (2015), pp. 73–­78. Breckenridge, Keith. Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa, 1850 to the Present. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Bremner, Lindsay. “Closure, Simulation, and ‘Making Do’ in the Contemporary Johannesburg Landscape.” In Okwui Enwezor, et al. (eds.). Under Siege: Four African Cities. Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos. Documenta 11_Platform 4. Ostfildern-­ Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2002, pp. 153–­172. Bremner, Lindsay. “Crime and the Emerging Landscape of Post-­Apartheid Johannesburg.” In Hilton Judin and Ivan Vladislavić (eds.), Blank___: Architecture, Apartheid, and After. Rotterdam: NAi, 1999, pp. 48–­63. Bremner, Lindsay. Johannesburg: One City, Colliding Worlds. Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2004. Brewer, John. Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Broeders, Dennis. “The New Digital Borders of Europe: Digital Databases and the Surveillance of Migrants.” International Sociology 22, 1 (2007), pp. 51–­72. Brogden, Mike, and Clifford Shearing. Policing for a New South Africa. London: Routledge, 1993. Brown, Michael. “Cities under Watch: Urban Northern Ireland in Film.” Éire-­Ireland: Irish-­American Cultural Institute 45, 1–­2 (2010), pp. 56–­88. Bruce, David. “Beyond Section 49: Control of the Use of Lethal Force.” South African Crime Quarterly 36 (2011), pp. 3–­12. Bruce, David. “Good Cops? Bad Cops? Assessing the South African Police Service.” South Africa Crime Quarterly no. 21 (September 2007), pp. 15–­20. Bruce, David. Marikana and the Doctrine of Maximum Force. Parktown, South Africa: Parktown Publishers, 2012. Bucher, Tiana. “Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of Invisibility on Facebook.” New Media & Society 14, 7 (2012), pp. 1164–­1180. Burger, Johan. “Crime Combating in Perspective: A Strategic Approach to Policing and

Bibliography • 375

the Prevention of Crime in South Africa.” Acta Criminologica 19, 2 (2006), pp. 105–­ 118. Burger, Johan. Strategic Perspectives on Crime and Policing in South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2007. Button, Mark. “Private Security and the Policing of Quasi-­Public Space.” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31, 3 (2003), pp. 227–­237. Buur, Lars. “Fluctuating Personhood: Vigilantism and Citizenship in Port Elizabeth’s Townships.” In David Pratten and Artyee Sen (eds.). Global Vigilantes. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 127–­150. Buur, Lars, and Stephan Jensen. “Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life.” Journal of African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 139–­152. Byrne, James, and Gary Marx. “Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact.” Cahiers Politiestudies Jaargang 20 (2011–­2013), pp. 17–­40. Caldeira, Teresa. “Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship.” In Filipe Argüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.). Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-­ transition Latin America. Coral Gables, FL: North-­South Center Press/University of Miami, 1998, pp. 263–­296. Caldeira, Teresa. “’I Came to Sabotage Your Reasoning’: Violence and Resignifications of Justice in Brazil.” In Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (eds.). Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 102–­149. Caldeira, Teresa. “The Paradox of Police Violence in Democratic Brazil.” Ethnography 3, 3 (2002), pp. 235–­263. Camp, Jordan, and Christina Heatherton (eds.). Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter. New York: Verso, 2016. Campbell, Elaine. “Policing and Its Spatial Imaginaries.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology 8, 2 (2016), pp. 71–­89. Campbell, Elaine. “Three-­Dimensional Security: Layers, Spheres, Volumes, Milieus.” Political Geography 69 (2019), pp. 10–­21. Carrier, Ryan. “Dissolving Boundaries: Private Security and Policing in South Africa.” African Security Review 8, 6 (1999), (no pagination). Cawthra, Gavin. Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from Apartheid. London: Zed Books, 1993. Ceyhan, Ayse. “Technologization of Security: Management of Uncertainty and Risk in the Age of Biometrics.” Surveillance & Society 5, 2 (2008), pp. 102–­123. Chamayou, Grégoire. “The Manhunt Doctrine.” Radical Philosophy 169 (2011), pp. 2–­6. Chamayou, Grégoire. A Theory of the Drone. New York: New Press, 2015. Chandler, Katherine. “American Kamikaze: Television-­Guided Assault Drones in World War II.” In Lisa Parks and Caren Kaplan (eds.), Life in the Age of Drone Warfare. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017, pp. 89–­111. Charlton, Sarah. “Down by the River: Park Dwellers, Public Space, and the Politics of Invisibility in Johannesburg’s Northern Suburbs.” Transformation 101 (2019), pp. 127–­150.

376 • Bibliography

Cheney-­Lippold, John. “A New Algorithmic Identity, Soft Biopolitics, and the Modulation of Control.” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 6 (2011), pp. 164–­181. Christopherson, Susan. “The Fortress City: Privatised Spaces, Consumer Citizenship.” In Ash Amin (ed.), Post-­Fordism: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 409–­427. Choong, Satnam. Policing as Social Discipline. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997. Clarno, Andy. Neoliberal Apartheid: Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Clarno, Andy. “Rescaling White Space in Post-­apartheid Johannesburg.” Antipode 45, 5 (2013), pp. 1190–­1212. Clarno, Andy. “A Tale of Two Walled Cities: Neo-­Liberalization and Enclosure in Johannesburg and Jerusalem.” In Diane Davis and Christina Proenza-­Coles (eds.), Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 19. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2008, pp. 161–­207. Clarno, Andy, and Martin J. Murray. “Policing in Johannesburg after Apartheid.” Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies 39, 2 (2013), pp. 210–­227. Coaffee, Jon. “Fortification, Fragmentation, and the Threat of Terrorism in the City of London in the 1990s.” In John Gold and George Revill (eds.), Landscapes of Defence. London: Prentice Hall, 2000, pp. 114–­129. Coaffee, Jon. Terrorism, Risk, and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience. Burlington, VT: 2009. Coaffee, Jon. “Urban Renaissance in the Age of Terrorism: Revanchism, Automated Social Control, or the End of Reflection?” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29, 2 (2005), pp. 447–­454. Coaffee, Jon, and David Murakami Wood. “Security Is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk.” International Relations 20, 4 (2006), pp. 503–­517. Cochoy, Franck. “Calculation, Qualculation, Calqulation: Shopping Cart Arithmetic, Equipped Cognition, and the Clustered Consumer.” Marketing Theory 8, 1 (2008), pp. 15–­44. Coetzee, Peet. Dogs of War: Memoirs of the South African Defence Force Dog Units. Noorsekloof, South Africa: Self-­published, 2011. Cohen, Stanley. “‘The Punitive City’: Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control.” Contemporary Crisis 3, 4 (1979), pp. 339–­363. Coleman, Roy. “Surveillance in the City: Prime Definition and Urban Spatial Order.” Crime Media Culture 1, 2 (2005), pp. 131–­148. Coleman, Roy. “Watching the Degenerate: Street Camera Surveillance and Urban Regeneration.” Local Economy 19, 3 (2004), pp. 199–­211. Coleman, Roy, and Joe Sim. “‘You’ll Never Walk Alone’: CCTV Surveillance, Order, and Neo-­Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre.” British Journal of Sociology 51, 4 (2000), pp. 623–­640. Coleman, Roy, Steve Tombs, and Dave Whyte. “Capital, Crime Control, and Statecraft in the Entrepreneurial City.” Urban Studies 42, 13 (2005), pp. 2511–­2530.

Bibliography • 377

Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff, (eds.). Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction.” In Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (eds.), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 1–­56. Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. The Truth about Crime: Sovereignty, Knowledge, Social Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. Cooper, Melinda. “Pre-­empting Emergence: The Biological Turn in the War on Terror.” Theory, Culture & Society 23, 4 (2006), pp. 113–­135. Cooper-­Knock, Sarah Jane, and Olly Owen. “Between Vigilantism and Bureaucracy: Improving our Understanding of Police Work in Nigeria and South Africa.” Theoretical Criminology 19, 3 (2015), pp. 335–­375. Cooper-­Knock, Sarah-­Jane. “Beyond Agamben: Sovereignty, Policing, and ‘Permissive Space’ in South Africa, and Beyond.” Theoretical Criminology 22, 1 (2018), pp. 22–­41. Côté-­Boucher, Karine, “The Diffuse Border: Intelligence-­Sharing, Control, and Confinement along Canada’s Smart Border.” Surveillance & Society 5, 3 (2008), pp. 142–­ 165. Crampton, Jeremy. “Assemblage of the Vertical: Commercial Drones and Algorithmic Life.” Geographica Helvetica 71, 2 (2015), pp. 137–­146. Crang, Mike. “Watching the City: Video, Surveillance, and Resistance.” Environment and Planning A 28, 12 (1996), pp. 2099–­2104. Crew, Louise. “The Besieged Body: Geographies of Retailing and Consumption.” Progress in Human Geography 25, 4 (2001), pp. 629–­640. Crichlow, Vaughan. “Will ‘Broken Windows Policing’ Work in Trinidad and Tobago? A Critical Perspective on Zero Tolerance and Community Policing in a Multi-­ethnic Society.” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 17, 6 (2016), pp. 570–­ 581. Croll, Andy. “Street Disorder, Surveillance, and Shame: Regulating Behavior in the Public Spaces of the Late Victorian Town.” Social History 24, 3 (1999), pp. 250–­268. Dadashi, Nastaran, Alex Stedmon, and Tony Pridmore. “Semi-­Automated CCTV Surveillance: The Effects of System Confidence, System Accuracy, and Task Complexity on Operator Vigilance, Reliance, and Workload.” Applied Ergonomics 44, 5 (2013), pp. 730–­738. Dalberto, Séverine Awenengo, Richard Banégas, and Armando Cutolo. “Biometric Citizenship? Documentary State, Identity, and Personhood at the Biometric Turn.” Politique Africaine 152, 4 (2018), pp. 5–­29. Dandeker, Christopher. Surveillance, Power, and Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990. Davies, Simon. “CCTV: A New Battleground for Privacy.” In Dean Wilson and Clive Norris (eds.), Surveillance, Crime, and Social Control, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 243–­254. Davis, Diane. “Zero-­Tolerance Policing, Stealth Real Estate Development, and the

378 • Bibliography

Transformation of Public Space: Evidence from Mexico City.” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 53–­76. Davis, Linda. “Carjacking—­Insights from South Africa to a New Crime Problem.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (2003), pp. 173–­191. Davis, Mike. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future of Los Angeles. New York: Verso, 1990. Davis, Mike. Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster. New York: Vintage, 1998, pp. 367–­368. Davis, Mike. “The Flames of New York.” New Left Review 12, 2nd series,(November/ December 2001), pp. 34–­51. Davis, Mike. “Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space.” In Michael Sorkin (ed.), Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space. New York: Hill and Wang, 1992, pp. 154–­180. Davis, Mike. “The Future of Fear.” City 5, 3 (2001), pp. 388–­390. Davis, Mike. “Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism.” New Left Review 151 (1985), pp. 106–­114. Dean, Mitchell. The Signature of Power: Sovereignty, Governmentality, and Biopolitics. London: Sage, 2013. de Beer, Stephan, and Rehana Vally. “(Finding) Pathways out of Homelessness: An Engaged, Trans-­Disciplinary Collaborative in the City of Tshwane.” Development Southern Africa 34, 4 (2017), pp. 1–­14. de Cauter, Lieven. “The Capsular City.” In Neil Leach (ed.), The Hieroglyphics of Space: Reading and Experiencing the Modern Metropolis. London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 271–­280. de Cauter, Lieven. The Capsular Civilization: On the City in the Age of Fear. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2004. de Cauter, Lieven. Entropic Empire: On the City of Man in the Age of Disaster. Brussels: NAi 010, 2013. Degen, Monica. “Fighting for the Global Catwalk: Formalizing Public Life in Castlefield (Manchester) and Diluting Public Life in el Raval (Barcelona).” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, 4 (2003), pp. 867–­880. de Goede, Marieke. “The Chain of Security.” Review of International Studies 44, 1 (2018), pp. 24–­42. Del Casino, Vincent, Lily House-­Peters, Jeremy Crampton, and Hannes Gerhardt. “The Social Life of Robots: The Politics of Algorithms, Governance, and Sovereignty.” Antipode 52, 3 (2020), pp. 605–­618. de Lint, Willem. “The Security Double Take: The Political, Simulation, and the Border.” Surveillance & Society 5, 2 (2008), p. 166–­187. DeNicola, Lane. “The Bundling of Geospatial Information with Everyday Experience.” In Torin Monahan (ed.) Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life. New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 243–­264. Deutsche, Rosalyn. Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Didion, Joan. Slouching towards Bethlehem. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968.

Bibliography • 379

Dintwe, Setlhomamaru. “The Survival of Community Policing in a Remilitarized Police Approach: A Paradoxical Case of South Africa.” In Arvind Verman, Dilip Das, and Manoj Abraham (eds.), Community Policing: Problems and Challenges. Oxford: CRFC Press, 2012, pp. 215–­228. Diphoorn, Tessa. “‘It’s All about the Body’: The Bodily Capital of Armed Response Officers in South Africa.” Medical Anthropology 34 (2015), pp. 336–­352. Diphoorn, Tessa. Twilight Policing: Private Security and Violence in Urban South Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016. Diphoorn, Tessa, and Erella Grassiani. “Introduction: Security.” Etnofoor 27, 2 (2015), pp. 7–­15. Diphoorn, Tessa, and Helene Kyed. “Entanglements of Private Security and Community Policing in South Africa and Swaziland.” African Affairs 115/461 (2016), pp. 710–­732. Dirsuweit, Teresa. “Between Ontological Security and the Right [of] Difference: Road Closures, Communitarianism, and Urban Ethics in Johannesburg, South Africa.” Autrepart 2, 42 (2007), pp. 53–­7 1. Dixon, Bill. “Community Policing: ‘Cherry Pie’ or Melktert?” Society in Transition 35, 2 (2004), pp. 251–­272. Dixon, Bill. “Development, Crime Prevention, and Social Policy in Post-­Apartheid South Africa.” Critical Social Policy 26, 1 (2009), pp. 169–­191. Dixon, Bill. “Globalising the Local: A Genealogy of Sector Policing in South Africa.” International Relations 21, 2 (2007), pp. 163–­182. Dixon, Bill. “Zero Tolerance: The Hard Edge of Community Policing.” African Security Review 9, 3 (2000), pp. 73–­78. Dixon, David. “Broken Windows, Zero Tolerance, and the New York Miracle.” Current Issues in Criminal Justice 10 (1998), pp. 96–­106. Duncan, Jane. Protest Nation: The Right to Protest in South Africa. Durban: University of KwaZulu-­Natal Press, 2016. Duncan, Jane. Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018. Dunne, Anthony, and Fiona Raby. Design Noir: The Secret Life of Electronic Objects. Basel: Birkhauser, 2001. Dupont, Benoit. “Private Security Regimes: Conceptualizing the Forces That Shape the Private Delivery of Security.” Theoretical Criminology 18, 3 (2014), pp. 263–­281. Elden, Stuart. “Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics and the Depth of Power.” Political Geography 34 (2013), pp. 35–­51. Ellin, Nan. Postmodern Urbanism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Ellin, Nan. “Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa.” In Nan Ellin (ed.), Architecture of Fear. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997, pp. 13–­47. Elliot, Anthony, and John Urry. Mobile Lives. New York: Routledge, 2010. Elmer, Greg. “Diagrams, Maps, and Markets: The Technological Matrix of Geographical Information Systems.” Space and Culture 1, 3 (1998), pp. 41–­60.

380 •

Bibliography

Elmer, Greg, and Andy Opel. “Surviving the Inevitable Future: Preemption in an Age of Faulty Intelligence.” Cultural Studies 20, 4–­5 (2006), pp. 477–­492. England, Marcia, and Stephanie Simon. “Scary Cities: Urban Geographies of Fear, Difference, and Belonging.” Social & Cultural Geography 11, 3 (2010), pp. 201–­207. Entwistle, Joanne. The Fashioned Body: Fashion, Dress, and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000. Ericson, Richard, and Keith Haggerty. Policing the Risk Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997, pp. 176–­197. Fainstein, Susan. The City Builders: Property, Politics, and Planning in London and New York. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Fainstein, Susan. “New Directions in Planning Theory.” Urban Affairs Review 35, 4 (2000), pp. 451–­478. Fanghanel, Alexandra. “The Trouble with Safety: Fear of Crime, Pollution, and Subjectification in Public Space.” Theoretical Criminology 20, 1 (2016), pp. 57–­74. Farrall, Stephen, Jonathan Jackson, and Emily Gray. Social Order and the Fear of Crime in Contemporary Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Faull, Andrew. Behind the Badge: The Untold Stories of South Africa’s Police Service Members. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010. Faull, Andrew. “Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg.” African Security Review 20, 4 (2011), pp. 53–­55. Feeley, Malcolm, and Jonathan Simon. “Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law.” In David Nelken (ed.), The Futures of Criminology. London: Sage, 1994, pp. 173–­2001. Feeley, Malcolm, and Jonathan Simon. “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications.” Criminology 30, 4 (1992), pp. 449–­474. Feigenbaum, Anna, and Anja Kanngieser. “For a Politics of Atmospheric Governance.” Dialogues in Human Geography 5, 1 (2015), pp. 80–­84. Firmino, Rodrigo José, Marta Kanashiro, Fernanda Bruno, Rafael Evangelista, and Liliane da Costa Nascimento. “Fear, Security, and the Spread of CCTV in Brazilian Cities: Legislation, Debate, and the Market.” Journal of Urban Technology 20, 3 (2014), pp. 65–­84. Fishman, Robert. Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia. New York: Basic Books, 1987. Fiske, John. “Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Black Man, and Democratic Totalitarianism.” Theory, Culture & Society 15, 2 (1998), pp. 67–­88. Fiske, John. “Videotech.” In Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), The Visual Culture Reader. London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 153–­162. Flint, John, and Judy Nixon. “Governing Neighbours: Anti-­social Behaviour Orders and New Forms of Regulating Conduct in the UK.” Urban Studies 43, 5–­6 (2006), pp. 939–­955. Flusty, Steven. “The Banality of Interdiction: Surveillance, Control, and the Displacement of Diversity.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, 3 (2001), pp. 658–­664.

Bibliography • 381

Flusty, Steven. “Building Paranoia.” In Nan Ellin (ed.), Architecture of Fear. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997, pp. 47–­59. Flusty, Steven. Building Paranoia: The Proliferation of Interdictory Space and the Erosion of Spatial Justice. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Forum for Architecture and Urban Design, 1995. Fonio, Chiara, and Giovanni Pisapia. “Security, Surveillance, and Geographical Patterns at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in Johannesburg.” Geographical Journal 181, 3 (2015), pp. 242–­248. Foresti, Gian Luca, and Laro Snidaro. “A Distributed Sensor Network for Video Surveillance of Outdoors.” In Gian Luca Foresti, Carlo Regazzoni, and Pramod Varshney (eds.), Multisensor Surveillance Systems. Boston: Springer, 2003, pp. pp. 7–­27. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan.. New York: Vintage, 1977. Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–­1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980. Fraser, James, Joshua Theodore Bazuin, and George Hornberger. “The Privatization of Neighborhood Governance and the Production of Urban Space.” Environment and Planning A 48, 5 (2016), pp. 844–­870. Frisby, David. Cityscapes of Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001. Fuchs, Christian, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval. “Introduction. Internet and Surveillance.” In Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval (eds.), Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media. New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 1–­28. Fyfe, Nicholas, and Jon Bannister. “City Watching: Closed Circuit Television Surveillance in Public Spaces.” Area 28, 1 (1996), pp. 37–­46. Fyfe, Nicholas, and Jon Bannister. “The Eyes upon the Street: Closed-­Circuit Television Surveillance and the City.” In Nick Fyfe (ed.), Images of the Street: Planning, Identity, and Control in Public Space. London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 254–­267. Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, 3 (1969), pp. 167–­191. Garland, David. “Governmentality and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology, Sociology.” Theoretical Criminology 1, 2 (1998), pp. 172–­214. Garland, David. “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society.” British Journal of Criminology 36, 4 (1996), pp. 445–­471. Garland, David. “The New Criminologies of Everyday Life: Routine Activity Theory in Historical and Social Context.” In Andrew Von Hirsch, David Garland, and Alison Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart Publishers, 2000, pp. 215–­224. Garland, David. “Penal Modernism and Postmodernism.” In Thomas Boomberg and Stanley Cohen (eds.), Punishment and Social Control, enlarged 2nd ed., New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 2003, pp. 45–­74. Gates, Kelly. Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of Surveillance. New York: New York University Press, 2011.

382 • Bibliography

Gaylord, Mark, and John Galliher. “Riding the Underground Dragon: Crime Control and Public Order on Hong Hong’s Mass Transit Railway.” British Journal of Criminology 31, 1 (1991), pp. 15–­26. Ghirado, Diane. Architecture after Modernism. London: Thames and Hudson, 1996. Gibson, J. W. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam, 2nd ed. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000. Giddens, Anthony. “Surveillance and the Capitalist State.” In A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 169–­176. Giroux, Henry. “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-­Orwellian Surveillance State.” Cultural Studies 29, 2 (2015), pp. 108–­140. Goldberger, Paul. “The Rise of the Private City.” In Julia Vitullo-­Martin (ed.), Breaking Away: The Future of Cities. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996, pp. 135–­147. Goldstein, Daniel. Outlawed: Between Security and Rights in a Bolivian City. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. Goldstein, Daniel. The Spectacular City: Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Goldstein, Daniel. “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security.” Current Anthropology 51, 4 (2010), pp. 487–­517. Gordon, Diana. “Democratic Consolidation and Community Policing: Conflicting Imperatives in South Africa.” Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 11, 2 (2001), pp. 121–­150. Goss, Jon. “’We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live’: The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems.” Economic Geography 71, 2 (1995), pp. 171–­ 198. Govender, Doraval. “Improving Physical Protection Systems to Prevent Residential Burglaries.” African Security Review 25, 4 (2016), pp. 356–­367. Graham, Stephen. “CCTV: The Stealthy Emergence of a Fifth Utility?” Planning Theory and Practice 3, 2 (2002), pp. 237–­241. Graham, Stephen. “Cities as Battlespace: The New Military Urbanism.” City 13, 4 (2009), pp. 383–­402. Graham, Stephen. Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. New York: Verso, 2010. Graham, Stephen. “The Eyes Have It: CCTV as the ‘Fifth Utility.’” Environment and Planning B 26, 5 (1999), pp. 639–­642. Graham, Stephen. “The New Military Urbanism.” In Kirstie Ball and Laureen Snider (eds.), The Surveillance-­Industrial Complex: A Political Economy of Surveillance. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11–­26. Graham, Stephen. “Spaces of Surveillant Simulation: New Technologies, Digital Representations, and Material Geographies.” Environment and Planning D 16, 4 (1998), pp. 483–­504. Graham, Stephen. “Urban ‘Battlespace.’” Theory, Culture & Society 26, 7–­8 (2009), pp. 278–­288.

Bibliography • 383

Graham, Stephen. Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers. New York: Verso, 2016. Graham, Stephen. “When Life Itself Is War: On the Urbanization of Military and Security Doctrine.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36, 1 (2012), pp. 136–­155. Graham, Stephen, and Lucy Hewitt. “Getting Off the Ground: On the Politics of Urban Verticality.” Progress in Human Geography 37, 1 (2013), pp. 72–­92. Graham, Stephen, and David Wood. “Digitizing Surveillance: Categorization, Space, Inequality.” Critical Social Policy 23, 2 (2003), pp. 227–­248. Green, Judith. “Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City.” Crime and Delinquency 45, 2 (1999), pp. 171–­187. Greene, Louise. “Apartheid’s Wolves: Political Animals and Animal Politics.” Critical African Studies 8, 2 (2016), pp. 146–­160. Gregory, Derek. “The Everywhere War.” Geographical Journal 177, 3 (2011), pp. 238–­250. Gregory, Derek. “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War.” Theory, Culture & Society 28, 7–­8 (2011), pp. 188–­215. Gregory, Derek. “The Natures of War.” Antipode 48, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­56. Gregory, Gillian, and Ismael Vaccaro. “Islands of Governmentality: Rainforest Conservation, Indigenous Rights, and the Territorial Reconfiguration of Guyanese Sovereignty.” Territory, Politics, and Governance 3, 3 (2015), pp. 344–­363. Griffiths, Mark, and Jemima Repo. “Biopolitics and Checkpoint 300 in Occupied Palestine: Bodies, Affect, Discipline.” Political Geography 65 (2018), pp. 17–­25. Gross, Mark. “Vigilante Violence and ‘Forward Panic’ in Johannesburg’s Townships.” Theory & Society 45 (2016), pp. 239–­263. Gunner, Liz. “Burying Lucky Dube.” African Studies 68, 3 (2009), pp. 387–­401. Haggerty, Kevin, and Richard Ericson. “The Military Technocultures of Policing.” In Peter Kraska (ed.), Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001, pp. 43–­64. Haggerty, Kevin, and Richard Ericson. “The Surveillant Assemblage.” British Journal of Sociology 51, 4 (2000), pp. 605–­622. Hannah, Matthew. “Imperfect Panopticism: Envisioning the Construction of Normal Lives.” In Georges Benko and Ulf Strohmayer (eds.), Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 344–­359. Hannah, Matthew. “Space and Social Control in the Administration of the Oglala Lakota (‘Sioux’), 1871–­1879.” Journal of Historical Geography 19, 4 (1993), pp. 412–­432. Hannah, Matthew. “Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review.” Geografiska Annaler (Series B) 79B, 3 (1997), pp. 171–­180. Hannigan, John. Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis. New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 65–­100. Hansen, Thomas Blom. “Performers of Sovereignty: On the Privatization of Security in Urban South Africa.” Critique of Anthropology 26, 3 (2006), pp. 279–­295. Hansen, Thomas Blom. “Sovereigns beyond the State: On Legality and Authority in Urban India.” In Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds.), Citizens,

384 • Bibliography

Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 169–­186. Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1990. Haraway, Donna. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Harcourt, Bernard. Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Harris, Chad. “The Omniscient Eye: Satellite Imagery, ‘Battlespace Awareness,’ and the Structures of the Imperial Gaze.” Surveillance & Society 4, 1–­2 (2006), pp. 101–­122. Harrison, Philip, and Tanya Zack. “Between the Ordinary and the Extraordinary: Socio-­ spatial Transformations in the ‘Old South’ of Johannesburg.” South African Geographical Journal 96, 2 (2014), pp. 180–­197. Harrison, Philip, and Tanya Zack. “The Wrong Side of the Mining Belt? Spatial Transformation and Identities in Johannesburg’s Southern Suburbs.” In Philip Harrison, Graeme Gotz, Alison Todes, and Chris Wray (eds.), Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014, pp. 269–­ 292. Harvey, David. Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Hassim, Shireen, Tawana Kupe, and Eric Worby (eds.). Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia, and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 2008. Hayes, Ben. “‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ as European Union Security Policy: On the Trail of the ‘NeoConOpticon.’” In Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (eds.), Surveillance and Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 148–­169. Hayward, Keith. “The Future of (Spatial) Criminology and Research about Public Space.” In Mattias De Backer, Lucas Melgaço, Georgiana Varna, and Francesca Menichelli (eds.), Order and Conflict in Public Space. New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 207–­215. Heng, Yee-­Kuang. “The Transformation of War Debate: Through the Looking Glass of Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society.” International Relations 20, 1 (2006), pp. 69–­91. Hentschel, Christine. “Making (In)Visible: CCTV, ‘Living Cameras’, and Their Objects in the Post-­ Apartheid Metropolis.” International Criminal Justice Review 17, 4 (2007), pp. 289–­303. Hentschel, Christine. Security in the Bubble: Navigating Crime in Urban South Africa. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. Herbert, Steve. “The Geopolitics of the Police: Foucault, Disciplinary Power, and the Tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department.” Political Geography 15, 1 (1996), pp. 47–­57. Herbert, Steve. “Policing the Contemporary City: Fixing Broken Windows or Shoring Up Neo-­Liberalism?” Theoretical Criminology 5, 4 (2001), pp. 445–­466. Heroux, Gaetan. “War on the Poor: Urban Poverty, Target Policing, and Social Control.” In Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.), Anti-­Security. Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011, pp. 107–­134.

Bibliography • 385

Heydon, Jeff. “Sensing the Leviathan.” Journal for Cultural Research 12, 2 (2008), pp. 143–­149. Hier, Sean. “Probing the Surveillant Assemblage: On the Dialectics of Surveillance Practices as Processes of Social Control.” Surveillance & Society 1, 3 (2003), pp. 399–­411. Hoijtink, Marijn. “Capitalizing on Emergence: the ‘New’ Civil Security Market in Europe.” Security Dialogue 45, 5 (2014), pp. 458–­75. Holston, James, and Teresa Caldeira. “Democracy and Violence in Brazil.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, 4 (1999), pp. 691–­729. Hornberger, Julie. “From General to Commissioner to General—­On the Popular State of Policing in South Africa.” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 598–­614. Hornberger, Julie. “Human Rights and Policing: Exigency or Incongruence.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 6 (2010), pp. 259–­283. Hornberger, Julie. “‘My Police—­Your Police’: The Informal Privatization of the Police in Inner-­City Johannesburg.” African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 213–­230. Hornberger, Julie. Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg. London: Routledge, 2011. Hornberger, Julie. “We Need a Complicit Police! Political Policing Then and Now.” South African Crime Quarterly 48 (2014), pp. 17–­24. Hudson, Barbara. “Punishment, Rights, and Difference: Defending Justice in the Risk Society.” In Kevin Stenson and Robert Sullivan (eds.), Crime, Risk, and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002, pp. 144–­172. Humphrey, Caroline. “Sovereignty.” In David Nugent and Joan Vincent (eds.), A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, pp. 421–­436. Innes, Martin. “Why ‘Soft’ Policing Is Hard: On the Curious Development of Reassurance Policing, How It Became Neighbourhood Policing, and What This Signifies about the Politics of Police Reform.” Journal of Community and Applied Psychology 15, 3 (2005), pp. 156–­169. Ivković, Sanja Kutnjak, and Adri Sauerman. “Threading the Thin Blue Line: Transition towards Democratic Policing and the Integrity of the South African Police Service.” Policing and Society 25, 1 (2015), pp. 25–­52. Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of the Great American Cities. New York: Random House, 1961. Jaffe, Rivke. “Speculative Policing.” Public Culture 31, 3 (2019), pp. 447–­468. James, Kim. “Securing High Value Assets from Above.” In Louise Jupp (ed.), Drone Professional 1. London: Writing Matters, 2020, pp. 13–­26. Jauregui, Beatrice. “Cultures of Legitimacy and Postcolonial Policing: Guest Editor Introduction.” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 547–­552. Jay, Martin. “Scopic Regimes of Modernity.” In Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality. Seattle: Bay Press, 1988, pp. 3–­23. Jenkins, John. “Urbanisation and Security in South Africa: The Continuation of History.” African Security Review 6, 6 (1997), pp. 1–­12.

386 • Bibliography

Jensen, Ole. “New ‘Foucauldian Boomerangs’: Drones and Urban Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 14, 1 (2016), pp. 20–­33. Jensen, Steffen. “Conflicting Logics of Exceptionality: New Beginnings and the Problem of Police Violence in Post-­Apartheid South Africa.” Development and Change 45, 3 (2014), pp. 458–­478. Jensen, Steffen. “From Development to Security: Political Subjectivity and the South African Transition.” Development and Change 36, 3 (2005), pp. 551–­570. Jensen, Steffen. “The Vision of the State: Audiences, Enchantments, and Policing in South Africa.” In Andrew Jefferson and Steffen Jensen (eds.), State Violence and Human Rights: State Officials in the South. New York: Routledge-­Cavendish, 2009, pp. 60–­78. Jessop, Bob. “The Entrepreneurial City: Re-­imaging Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital?” In Jewson and MacGregor, Transforming Cities, pp. 28–­41. Jewson, Nick, and Suzanne MacGregor. “Introduction.” In Nick Jewson and Suzanne MacGregor (eds.), Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions. New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 1–­17. Joh, Elizabeth. “The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing.” New York University Law Review 92 (2017), pp. 101–­130. Johnson, Corey, Reece Jones, Assi Paasi, Louise Amoore, Alison Mountz, Mark Salter, and Chris Rumsford (contributors). “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ In Border Studies.” Political Geography 30 (2011), pp. 61–­69. Johnston, Les, and Clifford Shearing. Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice. London: Routledge, 2003. Jones, Gareth, and Dennis Rodgers. “Gangs, Guns, and the City: Urban Policy in Dangerous Places.” In Charlotte Lemanski and Colin Marx (eds.), The City in Urban Poverty. London: Palgrave-­Macmillan, 2015, pp. 205–­226. Jones, Trevor, and Tim Newburn. “The Convergence of U.S. and U.K. Crime Policy: Exploring Substance and Process.” In Tim Newburn and Richard Sparks (eds.), Criminal Justice and Political Cultures. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2004, pp. 123–­151. Judd, Dennis. “The New Walled Cities.” In Helen Liggett and David Perry (eds.), Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage, 1995, pp. 144–­166. Kaplan, Caren, and Andrea Miller. “Drones as ‘Atmospheric Policing’: From US Border Enforcement to the LAPD.” Public Culture 31, 3 (2019), pp. 419–­445. Karmen, Andrew. “Zero Tolerance in New York City: Hard Questions for Get-­Tough Policy.” In Roger Hopkins Burke (ed.), Hard Cop, Soft Cop: Dilemmas and Debates in Contemporary Policing. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2004, pp. 23–­39. Katsaura, Obvious. “Ethnopolitics: Fear and Safety in a Johannesburg Neighborhood.” In Kosta Mathéy and Silvia Matuk (ed.), Community-­Based Urban Violence Prevention: Innovative Approaches in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Arab Region. Bielefeld: Verlag, 2015, pp. 42–­60.

Bibliography • 387

Kempa, Michael. “Public Policing, Private Security, Pacifying Populations.” In Michael Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.), Anti-­Security. Ottawa, ON, Canada: Red Quill Books, 2011, pp. 85–­106. Kempa, Michael, and Anne-­Marie Singh. “Private Security, Political Economy, and the Policing of Race: Probing Global Hypotheses through the Case of South Africa.” Theoretical Criminology 12, 3 (2008), pp. 333–­354. Kempa, Michael, Philip Stenning, and Jennifer Wood. “Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration of the ‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis.” British Journal of Criminology 44, 4 (2004), pp. 562–­581. Kenna, Therese, and Kevin Dunn. “The Virtuous Discourses of Private Communities.” Geography Compass 3, 2 (2009), pp. 797–­816. Kindervater, Katherine Hall. “The Technological Rationality of the Drone Strike.” Critical Studies on Security 5, 1 (2017), pp. 28–­44. Klauser, Francisco, and Silvana Pedrozo. “Power and Space in the Drone Age: A Literature Review and Politico-­Geographical Research Agenda.” Geographica Helvetica 70, 3 (2015), pp. 285–­293. Knepper, Paul. “How Situational Crime Prevention Contributes to Social Welfare.” Liverpool Law Review 30 (2009), pp. 57–­75. Koolhaas, Rem. “The Generic City.” In Office for Metropolitan Architecture, Rem Koolhaas, and Bruce Mau (eds.), Small, Medium, Large, Extra-­Large. New York: Monacelli Press, 1995, pp. 1238–­1269. Koskela, Hille. “‘The Gaze without Eyes’: Video-­Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space.” Progress in Human Geography 24, 2 (2000), pp. 243–­265. Koskela, Hille. “Video Surveillance, Gender, and the Safety of Public Urban Space: ‘Peeping Tom’ Goes High-­Tech.” Urban Geography 23, 3 (2002), pp. 257–­278. Kristeva, Julia. The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Kruger, Loren. Imagining the Edgy City: Writing, Performing, and Building Johannesburg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Kurokawa, Kisho. “Capsule Deceleration.” In Metabolism in Architecture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, pp. 75–­85. Labuscagne, Cobi. “Crime, Art, and Public Culture.” Cultural Studies 27, 3 (2013), pp. 357–­378. Lacy, Mark. “Designing Security: Controlling Society and MoMA’s Safe: Design Takes on Risk.” In Franςois Debrix and Mark Lacy (eds.), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power, and Foreign Policy. New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 88–­106. Lamb, Guy. “Police Militarisation and the ‘War on Crime’ in South Africa.” Journal of Southern African Studies 44, 5 (2018), pp. 933–­949. Langley, Paul, and Andrew Leyshon. “Platform Capitalism: The Intermediation and Capitalisation of Digital Economic Circulation.” Finance and Society 3, 1 (2017), pp. 11–­31. Larkins, Erika Robb. “Performances of Police Legitimacy in Rio’s Hyper Favela.” Law & Social Inquiry 38, 3 (2013), pp. 553–­575.

388 • Bibliography

Lee, Murray. Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2007. Lees, Loretta. “Urban Resistance and the Street: Spaces of Control and Contestation.” In Nicolaus Fyfe (ed.), Images on the Street. London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 236–­253. Lefebvre, Henri. The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973. Leman-­Langlois, Stéphane. “Insecurity as an Engineering Problem: The Techno-­Security Network.” In Kirstie Ball and Laureen Snider (eds.), The Surveillance-­Industrial Complex: A Political Economy of Surveillance. New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 78–­92. Levin, Thomas, Ursula Frohme, and Peter Weibel (eds.). CTRL [Space]: Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. Lianos, Michaelis (with Mary Douglas). “Dangerization and the End of Deviance: The Institutional Environment.” British Journal of Criminology 40, 2 (2000), pp. 261–­278. Light, Jennifer. “Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 607–­613. Linder, Thomas. “Surveillance Capitalism and Platform Policing: The Surveillant Assemblage-­as-­a Service.” Surveillance & Society 17, 1–­2 (2019), pp. 76–­82. Lippert, Randy. “Signs of the Surveillant Assemblage: Privacy Regulation, Urban CCTV, and Governmentality.” Social and Legal Studies 18, 4 (2009), pp. 505–­522. Lippert, Randy, and Daniel O’Connor. “Security Assemblages: Airport Security, Flexible Work, and Liberal Governance.” Alternatives 28, 3 (2003), pp. 331–­358. Lippert, Randy, and David Murakami Wood. “The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities.” Surveillance & Society 9, 3 (2012), pp. 257–­262. Loader, Ian, and Adam White. “How Can We Better Align Private Security with the Public Interest? Towards a Civilizing Model of Regulation.” Regulation & Governance 11, 2 (2017), pp. 166–­184. Lomell, Heidi Monk. “Targeting the Unwanted: Video Surveillance and Categorical Exclusion in Oslo, Norway?” Surveillance & Society 2, 2–­3 (2004), pp. 347–­361. Los, Maria. “Looking into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization, and the Totalitarian Potential.” In David Lyon (ed.), Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond. New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 69–­94. Loukaitou-­Sideris, Anastasia. “Cracks in the City: Addressing the Constraints and Potential of Urban Design.” Journal of Urban Design 1, 1 (1996), pp. 91–­104. Loukaitou-­Sideris, Anastasia. “Privatization of Open Public Space.” Town Planning Review 64, 2 (1993), pp. 139–­168. Lyon, David. “The Border Is Everywhere: ID Cards, Surveillance, and the Other.” In Elia Zureik and Mark Salter (eds.), Global Surveillance and Policing. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2013, pp. 66–­82. Lyon, David. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

Bibliography • 389

Lyon, David. “Liquid Surveillance: The Contribution of Zygmunt Bauman to Surveillance Studies.” International Political Sociology 4, 4 (2010), pp, 325–­338. Lyon, David. “Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies.” In David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination. New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 13–­30. Lyon, David. “Surveillance, Power, and Everyday Life.” In Phillip Kalantzis-­Cope and Karim Gherab-­Martín (eds.), Emerging Digital Spaces in Contemporary Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 107–­120. Lyon, David. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1994. Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Malden, MA: Polity, 2007. Lyon, David. “9/11, Synopticon, and Scopophia: Watching and Being Watched.” In Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (eds.), The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, pp. 35–­54. Macfarlane, Roy. “The Private Sector Security Industry in South Africa.” African Defence Review 19 (1994), pp. 25–­29/ MacKenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. MacLeod, Gordon. “From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a ‘Revanchist City’? On the Spatial Injustices of Glasgow’s Renaissance.” Antipode 34, 3 (2002), pp. 602–­623. Macrorie, Rachael, Simon Marvin, and Aidan While. “Robotics and Automation in the City: A Research Agenda.” Urban Geography 42, 2(2019), pp. 1–­21. Madsen, Morten Lynge. “Living for Home: Policing Immorality among Undocumented Migrants in Johannesburg.” African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 173–­192. Magnet, Shoshana Amielle. When Biometrics Fail: Gender, Race, and the Technology of Identity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Maguire, Mike. “Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-­Led Crime Control.” Policing and Society 9 (2000), pp. 35–­33. Mäkinen, Liisa. “Surveillance On/Off: Examining Home Surveillance Systems from the User’s Perspective.” Surveillance & Society 14, 1 (2016), pp. 59–­77. Malaquais, Dominique. “Anti-­Teleology.” In Ntone Edjabe and Edgar Pieterse (eds.), African Cities Reader 11: Mobilities and Fixtures. Cape Town: Chimurenga and the African Centre for Cities, 2011, pp. 7–­23. Maluleke, Witness, and Siyanda Dlamini. “The Prevalence of Organized Cross-­border Crimes in South Africa: A Non-­Empirical Statistical Data Analysis on Stock Theft and Hijacking of Motor Vehicles.” International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies 11, 1 (2019), pp. 116–­145. Marcuse, Peter. “Urban Form and Globalization after September 11th: The View from New York.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 596–­606. Marcuse, Peter. “Walls of Fear and Walls of Support.” In Nan Ellin (ed.), Architecture of Fear. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997, pp. 101–­114.

390 •

Bibliography

Marks, Monique. “The Fantastical World of South Africa’s Roadblocks: Dilemmas of Ubiquitous Police Strategy.” In Leanne Weber and Ben Bowling (eds.), Stop and Search: Police Power in Global Context. London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 56–­67. Marks, Monique. Transforming the Robocops: Changing Police in South Africa. Scotsville: University of KwaZulu-­Natal Press, 2005. Marks, Monique, and Debbie Bonnin. “Generating Safety from Below: Community Safety Groups and the Policing Nexus in Durban.” South African Review of Sociology 41, 1 (2010), pp. 56–­77. Marks, Monique, and Jenny Fleming. “As Unremarkable as the Air They Breathe? Reforming Police Management in South Africa.” Current Sociology 52, 5 (2004), pp. 784–­808. Marks, Monique, and Jennifer Wood. “South African Policing at the Crossroads: The Case for a ‘Minimal’ and ‘Minimalist’ Public Police.” Theoretical Criminology 14, 3 (2010), pp. 311–­329. Marks, Monique, and Jennifer Wood. “The South African Policing ‘Nexus’: Charting the Policing Landscape in Durban.” South African Review of Sociology 38, 2 (2007), pp. 134–­160. Marks, Monique, Clifford Shearing, and Jennifer Wood. “Who Should the Police Be? Finding a New Narrative for Community Policing in South Africa.” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 10, 2 (2009), pp. 145–­155. Maroga, Millicent. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? Sector Policing and Community Policing Forums.” South African Crime Quarterly 6 (2003), pp. 13–­16. Martin, James. “Informal Security Nodes and Force Capital.” Policing and Society 23, 2 (2013), pp. 145–­163. Martin, James. “Vigilantism and Informal Social Control in South Africa.” Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology, 23, 3 (2010), pp. 53–­70. Massé, Francis. “Topographies of Security and the Multiple Spatialities of (Conservation) Power: Verticality, Surveillance, and Space-­Time Compression in the Bush.” Political Geography 67 (2018), pp. 56–­64. Massumi, Brian. “Translator’s Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy.” In Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 11th ed.. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, pp. ix–­xv. Masuku, Themba. Targeting Foreigners: Xenophobia among Johannesburg Police. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2006. Mathinhe, David. “Africa’s Fear of Itself: The Ideology of Makwerekwere in South Africa.” Third World Quarterly 23, 2 (2011), pp. 293–­313. Matshedisho, Rajohane. “’We Must Fight Them!’ Police Violence, Torture, and Brutality.” In Darshan Vigneswaran and Julia Hornberger (eds.) Beyond Good Cop/Bad Cop: Understanding Informality and Police Corruption in South Africa. Johannesburg: Forced Migration Studies Program (FMSP), University of the Witwatersrand, 2009, pp. 52–­55. Mbazira, Christopher. “Service Delivery Protests, Struggle for Rights, and the Failure of

Bibliography • 391

Local Democracy in South Africa and Uganda: Parallels and Divergences.” South African Journal of Human Rights 29, 2 (2013), pp. 251–­275. McCahill, Michel. “Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of Surveillance,” In Clive Norris, Jade Morgan, and Gary Armstrong (eds.), Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television, and Social Control. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 41–­65. McCullough, Sara Rebolloso. “Body Like a Rocket: Performing Technologies of Naturalization.” Third Space: A Journal of Feminist Theory and Culture 9, 2 (2010), pp. 1–­26. McLaughlin, Eugene, and John Muncie. “Walled Cities: Surveillance, Regulation, and Segregation.” In Steve Pile, Christopher Brook, and Gerry Mooney (eds.), Unruly Cities? Order/Disorder. New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 103–­148. McLaughlin, Eugene, and Karim Murji. “Lost Connections and New Directions: Neo-­ liberalism, New Public Managerialism, and the ‘Modernization’ of the British Police.” In Kevin Stenson and Robert Sullivan (eds.), Crime, Risk, and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002, pp. 104–­121. McMichael, Christopher. “‘Clearly Blown Away by the End of the Morning’s Drama’: Spectacle, Pacification, and the 2010 World Cup, South Africa.” Socialist Studies/ Études Socialistes 9, 2 (2013), pp. 111–­129. McMichael, Christopher. “Hosting the World.” City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action 16, 5 (2012), pp. 519–­534. McMichael, Christopher. “Pacification and Police: A Critique of the Police Militarisation Thesis.” Capital and Class 41, 1 (2017), pp. 115–­132. McMichael, Christopher. “Police Wars and State Repression in South Africa.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 51, 1 (2016), pp. 3–­16. McMichael, Christopher. “Urban Pacification and ‘Blitzes’ in Contemporary Johannesburg.” Antipode 47, 5 (2015), pp. 1261–­1278. McNally, Paul. The Street—­Exposing a World of Cops, Bribes, and Drug Dealers. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016. Meeks, Daryl. “Police Militarisation in Urban Areas: The Obscure War against the Underclass.” Black Scholar 35, 4 (2006), pp. 33–­41. Merry, Sally Engle. “Spatial Governmentality and the New Urban Social Order: Controlling Gender Violence through Law.” American Ethnologist 103, 1 (2001), pp. 16–­ 29. Michel, Boris. “Going Global, Veiling the Poor Global City Imaginaries in Metro Manila.” Philippine Studies 58, 3 (2010), pp. 383–­406. Miller, Andrea. “Shadows of War, Traces of Policing: The Weaponization of Space and the Sensible in Preemption.” In Ruha Benjamin (ed.), Captivating Technology: Race, Carceral Technoscience, and Liberatory Imagination in Everyday Life. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019, pp. 108–­136. Miller, Sophie. “‘Grossly Disproportionate’: Home Owners’ Legal License to Kill.” Journal of Criminal Law 77, 4 (2013), pp. 299–­309. Minnaar, Anthony. “Balancing Public Safety and Security Demands with Civil Liberties

392 • Bibliography

in a New Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Post-­1994 South Africa and the Growth of Residential Security and Surveillance Measures.” In Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (eds.), Surveillance and Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 195–­212. Minnaar, Anthony. “Community Policing in a High Crime Transitional State: The Case of South Africa since Democratization in 1994.” In Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe (eds.), Community Policing: International Patterns and Comparative Perspectives. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009, pp. 19–­56. Minnaar, Anthony. “The Growth and Proliferation of Camera Surveillance in South Africa.” In Aaron Doyle, Randy Lippert, and David Lyon (eds.), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance. New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 100–­121. Minnaar, Anthony. “The Implementation and Impact of Crime Prevention/Crime Control Open Street Closed-­Circuit Television Surveillance in South African Central Business Districts.” Surveillance & Society 4, 3 (2007), pp. 174–­207. Mitchell, Don. “The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-­ Homeless Laws in the United States.” Antipode 29, 3 (1997), pp. 303–­335. Mitchell, Don. “The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 85, 1 (1995), pp. 108–­ 133. Mitchell, Don. “People’s Park Again, or the End of the Ends of Public Space.” Environment and Planning A 29, 3 (2017), pp. 503–­538. Mitchell, Don, and Nik Heynen. “The Geography of Survival and the Right to the City: Speculations on Surveillance, Legal Innovation, and the Criminalization of Intervention.” Urban Geography 30, 6 (2009), pp. 611–­632. Mitchell, Katharyne, and Katherine Beckett. “Securing the Global City: Crime, Consulting, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space.” Global Legal Studies 15, 1 (2008), pp. 75–­100. Mitchell, William J. City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Mitchell, William J. E-­topia: “Urban Life, Jim, But Not as We Know It.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Mitchell, William J. Me++: The Cyborg Self and the Networked City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Mitchell, William J. The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-­photographic Era. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. Mkhize, Mbekezeli. “Is South Africa’s 20 Years of Democracy in Crisis? Examining the Impact of Unrest Incidents in Local Protests in the Post-­Apartheid South Africa.” African Security Review 24, 2 (2015), pp. 190–­206. Molz, Jennie Germann. “‘Watch Us Wander’: Mobile Surveillance and the Surveillance of Mobility.” Environment and Planning A 38, 2 (2006), pp. 377–­393. Monahan, Torin, and Tyler Wall. “Somatic Surveillance: Corporeal Control through Information Networks.” Surveillance & Society 4, 3 (2007), pp. 154–­173.

Bibliography • 393

Moretti, Franco. Signs Taken for Wonders. London: Verso, 1988. Moser, Caroline. “Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap.” Environment and Urbanization 16, 2 (2004), pp. 3–­16. Mosselson, Aidan. “Everyday Security: Privatized Policing, Local Legitimacy and Atmospheres of Control.” Urban Geography 40, 1 (2019), pp. 16–­36. Muller, Benjamin. Security, Risk, and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies. New York: Routledge, 2010. Muller, Benjamin, Thomas Cook, Miguel De Larrinaga, Phillippe Frowd, Deljana Iossifova, Daniela Johannes, Can Mutlu, and Adam Nowek. “Ferocious Architecture: Sovereign Spaces/Places by Design.” International Political Sociology 10 (2016), pp. 75–­96. Müller, Frank. “Home Matters: The Material Culture of Urban Security.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (2020), pp. 1–­10. Müller, Marcus-­Michael. The Punitive City: Privatized Policing and Protection in Neoliberal Mexico. London: Zed Press, 2016. Murray, Martin J. City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Murray, Martin J. “The City in Fragments: Kaleidoscopic Johannesburg after Apartheid.” In Gyan Prakash and Kevin Kruse (eds.), The Spaces and the Modern City: Imaginaries, Politics, and Everyday Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 144–­178. Murray, Martin J. Panic City: Crime and the Fear Industries in Johannesburg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020. Murray, Martin J. Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg after Apartheid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Nelson, Diane. “Phantom Limbs and Invisible Hands: Bodies, Prosthetics, and Late Capitalist Identifications.” Cultural Anthropology 16, 3 (2001), pp. 303–­313. Newburn, Tim, and Trevor Jones. “Symbolizing Crime Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance.” Theoretical Criminology 11, 2 (2007), pp. 221–­243. Neocleous, Mark. “‘A Brighter and Nicer New Life’: Security as Pacification.” Social and Legal Studies 20, 2 (2011), pp. 191–­208. Neocleous, Mark. “The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War, and the Hunt.” Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes 9, 2 (2013), pp. 7–­31. Neocleous, Mark. War Power, Police Power. Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 2014. Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 338–­ 339. Nixon, Rob. “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque.” MFS Modern Fiction Studies 55, 3 (2009), pp. 443–­467. Nixon, Rob. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Norris, Clive. “From Personal to Digital: CCTV, the Panopticon, and the Technological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control.” In David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as

394 • Bibliography

Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination. New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 249–­281. Norris, Clive, and Gary Armstrong. The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV. Oxford: Berg, 1999. Norris, Clive, and Gary Armstrong. “The Suspicious Eye.” Criminal Justice Matters 33 (1998), pp. 10–­11. Norris, Clive, and Michael McCahill. “CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?” British Journal of Criminology 46, 1 (2006), pp. 97–­118. Norris, Clive, Jade Moran, and Gary Armstrong. “Algorithmic Surveillance: The Future of Automated Visual Surveillance.” In Norris, Morgan, and Armstrong, Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television, and Social Control. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 255–­276. Nunn, Samuel. “Cities, Space, and the New World of Urban Law Enforcement Technologies.” Journal of Urban Affairs 23, 3–­4 (2001), pp. 259–­278. Nunn, Samuel. “Police Technology in Cities: Changes and Challenges.” Technology in Society 23, 1 (2001), pp. 11–­27. Nunn, Samuel. “Seeking Tools for the War on Terror.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 26, 3 (2003), pp. 454–­472. Nuttall, Sarah. “Girl Bodies.” Social Text 22, 1 (2004), pp. 17–­33. Oc, Taner, and Steven Tiesdell. “City Centre Management and Safer City Centres: Approaches in Coventry and Nottingham.” Cities 15, 2 (1998), pp. 85–­103. Oc, Taner, and Steven Tiesdell. Safer City Centres: Reviving the Public Realm. London: Paul Chapman, 1997. O’Connor, Daniel, Randy Lippert, Dale Spencer, and Lisa Smylie. “Seeing Private Security Like a State.” Criminology and Criminal Justice 8, 2 (2008), pp. 203–­226. Ogborn, Miles. “Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space, and the Reform of Urban Policing in England, 1835–­56.” Political Geography 12, 6 (1993), pp. 505–­521. Olalquiaga, Celeste. Megalopolis: Contemporary Cultural Sensibilities. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992. O’Malley, Pat. “Risk, Power, and Crime Prevention.” Economy and Society 21, 3 (1992), pp. 252–­275. O’Malley, Pat. “Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism, and Contract.” Economy and Society 29, 4 (2000), pp. 460–­484. O’Malley, Pat, and Darren Palmer. “Post-­Keynesian Policing.” Economy and Society 25, 2 (1996), pp. 137–­155. O’Neill, Megan, and Bethan Loftus. “Policing and Surveillance of the Marginal: Everyday Contexts of Social Control.” Theoretical Criminology 17, 4 (2013), pp. 437–­454. Oomen, Barbara. “Vigilantism or Alternative Citizenship? The Rise of Mapogo a Mathamaga.” Journal of African Studies 63, 2 (2004), pp. 153–­172. Paasche, Till. “‘The Softer Side of Security’: The Role of Social Development in Cape Town’s Policing Network.” Geoforum 45 (2013), pp. 259–­265. Pace, Jonathan. “The Concept of Digital Capitalism.” Communication Theory 28, 3 (2018), pp. 254–­269.

Bibliography • 395

Pain, Rachel. “Gender, Race, Age, and Fear in the City.” Urban Studies 38, 5–­6 (2001), pp: 899–­913. Pain, Rachel. “Place, Social Relations, and Fear of Crime.” Progress in Human Geography 24, 3 (2000), pp. 355–­388. Pain, Rachel. “Social Geographies of Women’s Fear of Crime.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22, 2 (1997), pp. 231–­244. Pain, Rachel. “Space. Sexual Violence. and Social Control: Integrating Geographical and Feminist Analyses of Women’s Fear of Crime.” Progress in Human Geography 15, 4 (1991), 415–­431. Parenti, Christian. Lockdown America. New York: Verso, 1999. Paret, Marcel. “Violence and Democracy in South Africa’s Community Protests.” Review of African Political Economy 42, 143 (2015), pp. 107–­123. Parker, Alexandra. “Crime and the Tsotsi.” In Alexandra Parker, Urban Film and Everyday Practice: Bridging Divisions in Johannesburg. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2016), pp. 165–­191. Parks, Lisa. “Points of Departure: The Culture of US Airport Screening.” Journal of Visual Culture 6, 2 (2007), pp. 183–­200. Pasquale, Frank. “Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism.” Yale Law & Policy Review 35, 1 (2016), pp. 309–­318. Pavoni, Andrea. “Tuning the City: Johannesburg and the 2010 World Cup.” Urbe: Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana 3, 2 (2011), pp. 191–­209. Peck, Jamie. “Neoliberal Suburbanism: Frontier Space.” Urban Geography 32, 6 (2011), pp. 884–­919. Perry, Richard. “Governmentalities in City-­Scapes: Introduction to the Symposium. Symposium on City-­Spaces and Arts of Government.” Polar: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 23, 1 (2000), pp. 65–­73. Peyroux, Elisabeth. “City Improvement Districts in Johannesburg: An Examination of the Local Variations of the BID Model.” In Robert Pütz (ed.), Business Improvement Districts. Einneues Governance-­Model aus Perspektive von Praxis und Stadforschung. Passau, Germany: Geographische Handelsforschung 14, 2008, pp. 139–­162. Phillips, Naomi. “Challenges to Police Reform in Post-­Apartheid South Africa.” On Politics 5, 1 (2011), pp. 53–­68. Piccato, Pablo. City of Suspects: Crime in Mexico City, 1900–­1931. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001. Pillay, Suren. “Crime, Community, and the Governance of Violence in Post-­Apartheid South Africa.” Politikon 35, 2 (2008), pp. 141–­158. Pollard, Charles. “Zero Tolerance: Short-­Term Fix, Long-­Term Liability?” In Norman Dennis (ed.), Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society. London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1997, pp. 44–­61. Popescu, Gabriel. “Controlling Mobilities.” In Gabriel Popescu (ed.), Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-­First Century: Understanding Borders. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, pp. 91–­120.

396 • Bibliography

Popescu, Gabriel. “Controlling Mobility: Embodying Borders.” In Anne-­Laure Amilhat-­ Szary and Frederic Giraut (eds.), Borderities and the Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 100–­115, Poster, Mark. The Mode of Information. Cambridge. UK: Polity Press, 1990. Poulantzas, Nicos. State, Power, Socialism. New York: Verso, 1980, p. 85. Pratten, David, and Atreyee Sen. “Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence.” In David Pratten and Atreyee Sen (eds.), Global Vigilantes: Anthropological Perspectives on Justice and Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 1–­24. Pullan, Wendy. “Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities.” Journal of Architecture 16, 1 (2011), pp. 15–­35. Punch, Maurice. Zero Tolerance Policing (Researching Criminal Justice Series). Bristol, UK: Policy Press at the University of Bristol, 2007. Punter, John. “The Privatisation of the Public Realm.” Planning Practice and Research 5, 2 (1990), pp. 9–­16. Rapoport, Michele. “Being a Body or Having One: Automated Domestic Technologies and Corporeality.” AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge, Culture, and Communication 28 (2013), pp. 209–­218. Rapoport, Michele. “Domestic Surveillance Technologies and a New Visibility.” In Elisa Orrú, Maria Grazia Porcedda, and Sebastian Weydner-­Volkmann (eds.), Rethinking Surveillance and Control: Beyond the ‘Security versus Privacy’ Debates. Baden-­ Baden: Nomos, 2017, pp. 217–­238. Rapoport, Michele. “The Home under Surveillance: A Tripartite Assemblage.” Surveillance & Society 10, 3–­4 (2012), pp. 320–­333. Rapping, Elayne. “Aliens, Nomads, Mad Dogs, and Road Warriors: The Changing Face of Criminal Violence on TV.” In Susan Murray and Laurie Ouellette (eds.), Reality TV: Remaking Television Culture. New York: New York University Press, 2004, pp. 214–­230. Rasmussen, Jacob. “Struggling for the City: Evictions in Inner-­City Johannesburg.” In Lars Buur, Stefan Jensen, and Finn Stepputat (eds.), The Security-­Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Security in Southern Africa. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2007, pp. 174–­190. Reeve, Alan. “The Private Realm of the Managed Town Centre.” Urban Design International 1, 1 (1996), pp. 61–­80. Renno, John-­Paul, Paolo Remagnino, and Graeme Jones. “Learning the Fusion of Video Data Streams.” In Gian Luca Foresti, Carlo Regazzoni, and Pramod Varshney (eds.), Multisensor Surveillance Systems: The Fusion System. Boston: Springer, 2003, pp. 61–­ 79. Rho, Seungmin, Geyong Min, and Weifeng Chen. “Advanced Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition for Intelligent Surveillance System in Smart Home Environment.” Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence 25, 7 (2012), pp. 1299–­1300.

Bibliography • 397

Rice, Charles. “The Space-­Time of Pre-­emption: An Interview with Brian Massumi.” Architectural Design 80, 5 (2010), pp. 32–­37. Rigakos, George. “Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice.” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 24, 3 (1999), pp. 381–­409. Rigakos, George, and David Greener. “Bubbles of Governance: Private Policing and the Law in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 15, 1 (2000), pp. 145–­185. Robins, Steven. “At the Limits of Spatial Governmentality: A Message from the Tip of Africa.” Third World Quarterly 23, 4 (2002), pp. 665–­689. Rodgers, Dennis. “Disembedding the City: Crime, Insecurity, and Spatial Organization in Managua, Nicaragua.” Environment and Urbanization 16, 2 (2004), pp. 113–­124. Rodgers, Dennis. “The State as a Gang: Conceptualizing the Governmentality of Violence in Contemporary Nicaragua.” Critique of Anthropology 26, 3 (2006), pp. 315–­ 330. Rose, Nikolas. “The Death of the Social? Re-­figuring the Territory of Government.” Economy and Society 25, 3 (1996), pp. 327–­356. Rossmo, D. Kim. Geographic Profiling. New York: Routledge, 1999. Royeppen, Andrea. “How Does State Security Limit the Right to Protest? State Response to Popular Participation in South Africa.” African Security Review 25, 4 (2016), pp. 340–­355. Salter, Mark. “Surveillance.” In J. Peter Burgess (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies. New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 187–­196. Sampson, Melanie. “Accumulation by Dispossession and the Informal Economy—­ Struggles over Knowledge, Being, and Waste at a Soweto Garbage Dump.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, 5 (2015), pp. 813–­830. Sandvik, Kristin Bergtora. “The Political and Moral Economies of Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones.” In Aleš Završnik (ed.), Drones and Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications for Security and Surveillance. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2016, pp. 45–­68. Sassen, Saskia. Territory ● Authority ● Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, updated ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 2–­3. Scheper-­Hughes, Nancy. “Dangerous and Endangered Youth: Social Structures and Determinants of Violence.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1033 (2004), pp. 13–­46. Scheper-­Hughes, Nancy. Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Scheper-­Hughes, Nancy. “Everyday Violence: Bodies, Death, and Silence.” In Stuart Corbridge (ed.), Development Studies: A Reader. London: Edward Arnold, 1995, pp. 438–­447. Scheper-­Hughes, Nancy. “The House Gun: White Writing, White Fears, and Black Justice.” Anthropology Today 30, 6 (2014), pp. 8–­12. Schiller, Daniel. Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.

398 • Bibliography

Schindler, Seth. “Governing the Twenty-­First Century Metropolis and Transforming Territory.” Territory, Politics, Governance 3, 1 (2013), pp. 7–­26. Schönteich, Martin. Unshackling the Crime Fighters: Increasing Private Sector Involvement in South Africa’s Criminal Justice System. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1999, pp. 63–­76. Schuberth, Moritz. “The Challenge of Community-­Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes.” Contemporary Security Policy 36, 2 (2015), pp. 296–­320. Scott, James. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. Sebola, M. P. “The Community Policing Philosophy and the Right to Public Protest in South Africa: Are There Positive Developments after Two Decades of Democracy?” Journal of Public Administration 49, 1 (2014), pp. 300–­313. Seigel, Micol. “Objects of Police History.” Journal of American History 102, 1 (2015), pp. 152–­161. Sharp, Leslie. “The Commodification of the Body and Its Parts.” Annual Review of Anthropology 29 (2000), pp. 287–­328. Shaw, Ian. “The Great War of Enclosure: Securing the Skies.” Antipode 49, 4 (2017), pp. 883–­906. Shaw, Ian. Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016. Shaw, Ian. “Scorched Atmospheres: The Violent Geographies of the Vietnam War and the Rise of Drone Warfare.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 106, 3 (2016), pp. 688–­704. Shaw, Ian. “The Urbanization of Drone Warfare: Policing Surplus Populations in the Dronepolis.” Geographica Helvetia 71 (2016), pp. 19–­28. Shaw, Ian, and Majed Akhter. “The Dronification of State Violence.” Critical Asian Studies 46, 2 (2014), pp. 211–­234. Shaw, Mark. Crime and Policing in Post-­Apartheid South Africa: Transforming under Fire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Shearing, Clifford, and Phillip Stenning. “From the Panopticon to Disney World: The Development of Discipline.” In John Muncie, Eugene McLaughlin, and Gordon Hughes (eds.), Criminological Perspectives. London: Sage, 1996, pp. 424–­433. Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning. Private Security and Private Justice. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983. Shearing, Clifford, and Jennifer Wood. “Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New Denizens.” Journal of Law and Society 30, 3 (2003), pp. 400–­419. Shelby, Renee Marie. “Techno-­Physical Feminism: Anti-­Rape Technology, Gender, and Corporeal Surveillance.” Feminist Media Studies 20, 4 (2019), pp. 1–­22. Sherman, Lawrence, Patrick Gartin, and Michael Breuger. “Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place.” Criminology 27, 1 (1989), pp. 27–­56.

Bibliography • 399

Shirlow, Peter, and Rachel Pain. “The Geographies and Politics of Fear.” Capital and Class 60 (2003), pp. 15–­26. Sihlongonyane, Mfaniseni Fana. “The Global, the Local, and the Hybrid in the Making of Johannesburg as a World Class African City.” Third World Quarterly 37, 9 (2016), pp. 1607–­1627. Sihlongonyane, Mfaniseni Fana. “The Rhetorical Devices for Marketing and Branding Johannesburg as a City: A Critical Review.” Environment and Planning A 47, 10 (2015), pp. 213–­2152. Simmel, Georg. “On Art Exhibitions,” (1890). Trans. Austin Harrington. Theory, Culture & Society 32, 1 (2015), pp. 87–­92. Simon, Bart. “The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection, and the New Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 3, 1 (2005), pp. 1–­20. Simone, AbdouMaliq. “Globalization and the Identity of African Urban Practices.” In Hilton Judin and Ivan Vladislavić (eds.), Blank___: Architecture, Apartheid, and After. Rotterdam: NAi, 1999, pp. 173–­187. Simonsen, Kirsten. “Editorial: The Body as Battlefield.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, n.s. 25. 2000, pp. 7–­9. Singh, Anne-­Marie. Policing and Crime Control in Post-­Apartheid South Africa. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008. Singh, Anne-­Marie. “Private Security and Crime Control.” Theoretical Criminology 9, 2 (2005), pp. 153–­174. Smith, Benjamin. “Scared By, Of, In, and For Dubai.” Social & Cultural Geography 11, 3 (2010), pp. 263–­283. Smith, Marquard, and Joanne Morra (eds.). The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future. Boston: MIT Press, 2006. Smith, Neil. “Giuliani Time.” Social Text 16 (1998), pp. 1–­20. Smith, Neil. “Global Social Cleansing: Postliberal Revanchism and the Export of Zero Tolerance.” Social Justice 28, 3 (2001), pp. 68–­74. Smith, Nelson. “The Alarming Invasion of Public Space.” Harper’s Magazine (March 1998, p. 17. Soderlund, Gretchen. “Introduction to ‘Charting, Tracking, and Mapping: New Technologies, Labor, and Surveillance.” Social Semiotics 23, 2 (2013), pp. 163–­172. Srnicek, Nick. “The Challenges of Platform Capitalism: Understanding the Logic of a New Business Model.” Juncture 23, 4 (2017), pp. 254–­257. Srnicek, Nick. Platform Capitalism. New York: Wiley, 2018. Staeheli, Lynn, Patricia Ehrkamp, Heilda Leitner, and Caroline Nagel. “Dreaming the Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship.” Progress in Human Geography 36, 5 (2012), pp. 628–­644. Staff Writer. “Gauteng,” In Nilufar Hossain (ed.), Let’s Go: South Africa 2001. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001. Staples, William. Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Postmodern Life. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

400 •

Bibliography

Stedman Jones, Gareth. Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971. Steinberg, Jonny. “Crime Prevention Goes Abroad: Policy Transfer and Policing in Post-­ Apartheid South Africa.” Theoretical Criminology 15, 4 (2011), pp. 349–­364. Steinberg, Jonny. “Policing, State Power, and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: A New Perspective.” African Affairs 113, 451 (2014), pp. 173–­191. Steinberg, Jonny. “Security and Disappointment Policing, Freedom, and Xenophobia in South Africa.” British Journal of Criminology 52, 2(2011), pp. 345–­360. Steinberg, Jonny. Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing South Africa. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2008. Stuurman, Ziyanda. “Policing Inequality and the Inequality of Policing: A Look at the Militarisation of Policing around the World, Focusing on Brazil and South Africa.” South African Journal of International Affairs 27, 1 (2020), pp. 43–­66. Suchar, Charles. “Grounding Visual Sociology Research in Shooting Scripts.” Qualitative Sociology 20, 1 (1997), pp. 33–­56. Super, Gail. Governing through Crime in South Africa: The Politics of Race and Class in Neoliberalizing Regimes. New York: Routledge, 2016. Super, Gail. “What’s in a Name and Why It Matters: A Historical Analysis of the Relationship between State Authority, Vigilantism, and Penal Power in South Africa.” Theoretical Criminology 21, 4 (2017), pp. 512–­531. Surette, Ray. “The Thinking Eye: Pros and Cons of Second Generation CCTV Surveillance Systems.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 28, 1 (2005), pp. 152–­173. Swanstrom, Todd. “Are Fear and Urbanism at War?” Urban Affairs Review 38, 1 (2002), pp. 135–­140. Swartz, Leslie. “Oscar Pistorius and the Melancholy of Intersectionality.” Disability & Society 28, 8 (2013), pp. 1157–­1161. Tabrizian, Mitra. “Surveillance.” New Formations 12 (1990), pp. 89–­96. Tait, Sean, and Monique Marks. “You Strike a Gathering, You Strike a Rock: Current Debates in the Policing of Public Order in South Africa.” South African Crime Quarterly 38 (2011), pp. 15–­22. Taljaard, Raenette. “Implementing South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.” In Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private Actors and Security Governance. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006, pp. 167–­186. Tawil-­Souri, Helga. “New Palestinian Centers: An Ethnography of the ‘Checkpoint Economy.’” International Journal of Cultural Studies 12, 3 (2009), pp. 217–­235. Taylor, Ian. “Crime, Anxiety, and Locality: Responding to the ‘Condition of England’ at the End of the Century.” Theoretical Criminology 1, 1 (1997), pp. 53–­75. Thomas, David. “From the Photograph to Postphotographic Practice: Toward a Postoptical Ecology of the Eye.” In Timothy Druckrey (ed.), Electronic Culture: Technology and Visual Representation. New York: Aperture, 1996, pp. 145–­153. Thomas, Kedron. Kevin Louis O’Neill, and Thomas Offit, “An Introduction.” In Kevin

Bibliography • 401

Louis O’Neill and Kedron Thomas (eds.), Securing the City: Neoliberalism, Space and Insecurity in Postwar Guatemala. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 1–­21. Tiesdell. Steven, and Taner Oc. “Beyond ‘Fortress’ and ‘Panoptic’ Cities—­Towards a Safer Urban Public Realm.” Environment and Planning B 25, 5 (1998), pp. 637–­792. Tironi, Martin, and Matías Valderrama Barragan. “The Militarization of the Urban Sky in Santiago de Chile: The Vision Multiple of a Video-­Surveillance System of Aerostatic Balloons.” Urban Geography 42, 2(2019), pp. 1–­20. Topping, John, and Jonny Byrne. “Shadow Policing: The Boundaries of Community-­ Based ‘Policing’ in Northern Ireland.” Policing and Society 26, 5 (2016), pp. 522–­543. Tulumello, Simone, and Fabio Iapaolo. “Policing the Future, Disrupting Urban Policy Today: Predictive Policing, Smart City, and Urban Policy in Memphis (TN).” Urban Geography (Online First, 2022) [DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2021.1887634]. Tyler, Imogen. Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain. London: Zed, 2013, pp. 1–­18. Valenzuela-­Aguilera, Alfonso. “Urban Surges: Power, Territory, and the Social Control of Space in Latin America.” Latin American Perspectives 40, 2 (2013), pp. 21–­34. van der Ploeg, Irma. “Biometrics and the Body as Information: Normative Issues of the Socio-­Technical Coding of the Body.” In David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting. London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 57–­73. Van Eijk, Gwen. “Exclusionary Policies Are Not Just about the ‘Neoliberal City’: A Critique of Theories of Urban Revanchism and the Case of Rotterdam.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34, 4 (2010), pp. 820–­834. van Onselen, Charles. Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886–­1914: Vol. 1: New Babylon, Vol. 2: New Nineveh. Johannesburg. London Longman, 1982. Van Robbroek, Lize. “Harbinger of Night: Jane Alexander’s Posthumanism.” In Pep Subirós (ed.), Jane Alexander: Surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope). New York: Museum of African Arts, 2011, pp. 36–­45. Van Robbroek, Lize. “Speaking Dogs: Undoing the Human in Art.” Art South Africa 6, 1 (2007), pp. 48–­53. van Sittert, Lance, and Sandra Swart. “Canis Familiaris: A Dog History of Southern Africa.” In Lance van Sittert and Sandra Swart (eds.), Canis Africanis: A Dog History of Southern Africa. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 13–­44. Varshney, Pramod. “Multisensor Fusion in Surveillance Systems.” In Gian Luca Foresti, Carlo Regazzoni, and Pramod Varshney (eds.), Multisensor Surveillance Systems: The Fusion System. Boston: Springer, 2003, pp. 1–­5. Vaughan-­Williams, Nick. “Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen–­ Detective, and the War on Terror.” Space and Polity 12, 1 (2008), pp. 63–­79. Vaughan-­Williams, Nick. “The UK Border Security Continuum: Virtual Biopolitics and the Simulation of the Sovereign Ban.” Environment and Planning D; Society & Space 28, 6 (2010), pp. 1071–­1883.

402 •

Bibliography

Verbeek, Peter-­Paul. “Ambient Intelligence and Persuasive Technology: The Blurring Boundaries between Human and Technology.” Nanoethics 3, 3 (2009), pp. 231–­242. Vidler, Anthony. The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. Vidler, Anthony. Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture. London.: MIT Press. 2001. Vigneswaran, Darshan. “The Contours of Disorder: Crime Maps and Territorial Policing in South Africa,” Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 32, 1 (2014), pp. 91–­107. Vigneswaran, Darshan, Kurt Iverson, and Setha Low. “Problems, Publicity, and Public Space: A Resurgent Debate.” Environment and Planning A 29, 3 (2017), pp. 496–­502. Villegas, Paloma. “Fishing for Precarious Status Migrants: Surveillant Assemblages of Migrant Illegalization in Toronto, Canada.” Journal of Law and Society 42, 2 (2015), pp. 230–­252. Virilio, Paul. “The Overexposed City.” In Neil Leach (ed.), Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory. New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 381–­390. Virilio, Paul. Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles. New York: Semiotexte, 1990. Virilio, Paul. “Speed and Vision: The Incomparable Eye.” Daidalos: Berlin Architectural Journal 47 (1993), pp. 96–­107. Vitale, Alex. City of Disorder: How the Quality of Life Campaign Transformed New York Politics. New York: New York University Press, 2009. Vukov, Tamara, and Mimi Sheller. “Border Work: Surveillant Assemblages, Virtual Fences, and Tactical Counter-­Media.” Social Semiotics 23, 2 (2013), pp. 225–­241. Wacquant, Loïc. “The Penalisation of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-­liberalism.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 9, 4 (2001), pp. 401–­412. Wacquant, Loïc. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Wacquant, Loïc. “Relocating Gentrification: The Working Class, Science, and the State in Recent Urban Research.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32, 1 (2008), pp. 198–­205. Wacquant, Loïc. Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008. Wakefield, Alison. Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2003. Wakefield, Alison. “Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property.” In Andreas von Hirsch, David Garland, and Alison Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000, pp. 124–­145. Walby, Kevin. “Risky Spaces, Algorithms, and Signifiers: Disappearing Bodies and the Prevalence of Racialization in Urban Camera Surveillance Procedures.” Topia 16 (2006), pp. 51–­67. Wall, Tyler. “Ordinary Emergency: Drones, Police, and Geographies of Legal Terror.” Antipode 48, 4 (2016), pp. 1122–­1139.

Bibliography • 403

Wall, Tyler. “Unmanning the Police Manhunt: Vertical Security as Pacification.” Socialist Studies 9, 2 (2013), pp. 32–­56. Wall, Tyler, and Torin Monahan. “Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-­Scapes.” Theoretical Criminology 15, 3 (2011), pp. 239–­254. Wang, Jackie. Carceral Capitalism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018. Ward, Kevin. “‘Creating a Personality for Downtown’: Business Improvement Districts in Milwaukee.” Urban Geography 28, 8 (2007), pp. 781–­808. Warren, Robert. “City Streets—­The War Zones of Globalization: Democracy and Military Operations on Urban Terrain in the Early 21st Century.” In Stephen Graham (ed.), Cities, War, and Terrorism. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 214–­230. Warren, Robert. “Situating the City and September 11th: Military Urban Doctrine, ‘Pop-­up’ Armies and Spatial Chess.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, 3 (2002), pp. 614–­619. Wastl-­Walter, Doris. “Introduction.” In Doris Wastl-­Walter (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, pp. 1–­10. Watt, Paul. “A Nomadic War Machine in the Metropolis.” City 20, 2 (2016), pp. 297–­320. Weber, Cynthia. “Designing Safe Citizens.” Citizenship Studies 12, 2 (2008), pp. 125–­142. Weber, Cynthia, and Mark Lacy. “Securing by Design.” Review of International Studies 37, 3 (2011), pp. 1021–­1043. Wedeen, Lisa. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Weisburd, David, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-­Ming Yang. “Introduction.” In David Weisburd, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-­Ming Yang (eds.), The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 3–­28. Weizman, Eyal. Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. New York: Verso, 2007. Weizman, Eyal. “Lethal Theory.” LOG 7 (2006), pp. 53–­77. Weizman, Eyal. “Principles of Frontier Geography.” In Philip Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (eds.), City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism. Basel: Birkhauser, 2006, pp. 83–­92. White, Rob, and Adam Sutton. “Crime Prevention, Urban Space, and Social Exclusion.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 31, 1 (1995), pp. 82–­99. Williams, Katherine, and Craig Johnstone. “The Politics of the Selective Gaze: Closed Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space.” Crime, Law, and Social Change 34, 2 (2000), pp. 183–­210. Willis, Graham Denyer. “Antagonistic Authorities and the Civil Police in São Paulo, Brazil.” Latin American Research Review 49, 1 (2014), pp. 3–­22. Willis, Graham Denyer. The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. Wilson, Dean. “Border Militarization, Technology, and Crime Control.” In Sharon Pickering and Julie Ham (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Crime and International Migration. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015, pp. 141–­154.

404 •

Bibliography

Wilson, Dean. “Military Surveillance.” In Kristie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, and David Lyon (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 269–­276. Wilson, Dean, and Clive Norris (eds.). Surveillance, Crime, and Social Control, 2nd ed.. London: Routledge, 2016. Wilson, Elizabeth. Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity. London: Virago Press, 1985. Wise, J. MacGregor. “An Immense and Unexpected Field of Action: Webcams, Surveillance, and Everyday Life.” Cultural Studies 18, 2–­3 (2004), pp. 424–­442. Wood, David Murakami. “Beyond the Panopticon? Foucault and Surveillance Studies.” In Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden (eds.), Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 245–­263. Zedner, Lucia. “The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis.” Legal Studies 23, 1 (2003), pp. 153–­175. Zeiderman, Austin. Endangered City: The Politics of Security and Risk in Bogotá. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016. Zinn, Rudolph. “The Policing of Robbery with Aggravating Circumstances: Case Studies of Incarcerated Offenders of Home Invasions, Carjackings, and Cash-­in-­Transit Heists in South Africa.” Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 30, 2 (2017), pp. 12–­26. Žižek, Slavoj. How to Read Lacan. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007. Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2019. Zuboff, Shoshana. “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization.” Journal of Information Technology 30 (2015), pp. 75–­89. Zukin, Sharon. The Culture of Cities. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

Newspaper and Television Reporting Sources Abraham, Vickie. “Gayton McKenzie Nails Gang Kingpin.” The Citizen, November 19, 2015. Adams, Sheena. “Bank Seeks Out Big Brother to Curb Heists.” The Star, March 17, 2002. African News Agency. “Woman Killed in Johannesburg Home Invasion.” The Citizen (Pretoria), April 27, 2019. AFP. “Two Suspects Shot Dead in Robbery at South African School.” The East African (Nairobi), February 21, 2019. Agency Staff. “Melville Next to Get FTTH.” Tech Central (Online), February 3, 2016. Ajam, Kashiefa. “Smile, You’re on Joburg’s CCTV.” The Star December 29, 2007. Altenroxel, Lynne. “Crime in Jo’burg CBD Down by 40%.” The Star, October 9, 2000. Alexander, Jane. “South Africa’s Desperate Blast Back at the Carjackers.” Evening Standard (London), February 5, 2002. ANA Reporter. “Police Launch Manhunt for Foreign National in Car Parts Crimes.” The Star, October 19, 2019.

Bibliography

• 405

Ancer, Jonathan. “This Time It’s Really, Really Personal.” Sunday Times, April 18, 1998. Appel, Michael. “South Africa: Jeppestown Massacre Leads to Crime Initiatives.” BuaNews (Tshwane), June 25, 2007. Areff, Ahmed. “South Africa: Four Killed in Joburg Shootout.” News24, July 23, 2015. Ash, Paul. “Drones Join Prasa War on Cable Theft.” Sunday Times, March 1, 2020. Associated Press. “South African Leader Drops UN Visit as Women Protest Attacks.” U.S. News and World Report, September 19, 2019. Austin, Brian. “S. African Carjackers Face Flamethrower Threat.” St. Louis Post-­Dispatch News, December 13, 1998. Bailey, Candice. “Bombing ATMs Is Big Business.” The Star, July 12, 2008. Bailey, Candice. “Impact of Explosives.” The Star, July 12, 2008. Bailey, Candice. “ATMs under Siege.” The Star, July 12, 2008. Barnes, Lindsay. “Spy Eyes Splash Airport Crime.” Cape Argus, December 10, 1997. Bearak, Barry. “3 Found Guilty in 2007 Killing of Reggae Star in South Africa.” New York Times, March 31, 2009. Bega, Sheree, and Thabiso Thakali. “Outrage over Police Killings.” Saturday Star, August 8, 2015. Bengu, Charity. “Keeping Safe Below the Belt.” Sowetan, December 14, 2001. Bengu, Charity. “Mixed Feelings over Chastity Belt.” Sowetan, December 14, 2001. Bently, Delamo. “The Braamfontein Rehabilitation Spruit Project Acts in the Interest of the Environment.” Sandton Chronicle, April 3, 2019. Bereford, David. “Reggae Star Shot Dead in Attempted Car Hijacking in Johannesburg.” The Guardian (London), October 20, 2007. Blau, Reuven. “Israeli Professor Whose Tech Helped Catch Boston Bombers to Speak at Manhattan Conference.” New York Daily News, May 22, 2017. Blignault, Reuven. “Store Owners Open Fire on Northcliff Hijackers.” Northcliff Melville Times, November 12, 2018. Blignault, Reuven. “Cameras for Your Safety.” Randburg Sun, May 1, 2019. Block, Robert. “South African Justice: Bloodthirsty Ways to Fight Carjackers—­ Flamethrowers Are Selling Well; A Bottle of Poisoned Brandy Makes for a Nasty Surprise.” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1999. Bloem, Adele. “CoJ Launches Forensic Investigation into Vumatel.” Roodeport Record, March 13, 2018. Boffey, Philip. “Where Even Cops Get Robbed.” New York Times, August 31, 1997. Bornman, Jan, and Nashira Davids. “No Place to Hide as Thugs Run Riot.” Sunday Times, July 27, 2014. Bosch, Marius. “Crime a Major Fear.” Cape Times, April 27, 1995. Boshomane, Pearl. “Car Remote Blocking Crime on the Rise: How to Protect Yourself.” TimesLIVE (Online), December 14, 2011. Boyce, Aphiwe. “Booze Ends in Sewers after Inner-­City Raids.” The Star, August 12, 2004. Boyce, Aphiwe. “R5 Million for Braamfontein Spruit Investigation.” Fourways Review (Gauteng), April 12, 2016.

406 •

Bibliography

Broughton, Ian. “Tension in Hillbrow after Residents Attack Drug Dealers.” GroundUp (Online), October 15, 2018. Bulbulia, Shoneez. “If CBD Muggers Don’t Get You, the Cowboys Will.” Saturday Star, November 7, 1998. Burgess, Anneliese. “Heist Take-­Down at Dawn.” Sunday Times, April 22, 2018. Butcher, Tim. “From the Depths of Despair to the Heights of Silliness.” Daily Telegraph (London), October 21, 2000. Butler, Michael. “Residents of Braamfontein Spruit Are Tired of a Dysfunctional Democracy.” Sandton Chronicle, June 27, 2017. Calvert, Scott. “In Johannesburg Suburbs, an Obsession with Security—­Lonehill.” Baltimore Sun, May 22, 2005. Carroll, Rory. “Carjacking: The Everyday Ordeal Testing South Africa.” The Guardian (London) March 2, 2006. Charlton, Alistair. “South Africa: Google Street View Captures Moment Security Guard is Hijacked at Gunpoint.” International Business Times, July 23, 2015. Chipangura, Charlotte. “New Electric Fence Regulation to Be Implemented.” The Star, May 15, 2013. Chonin, Neva. “Vagina Dentata.” San Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 2005. Chronicle Reporter. “River Raid Sees an Arrest.” Sandton Chronicle, October 3, 2016. Clark, Christopher. “Joburg Waste Pickers Face Routine Harassment.” Daily Maverick (Online), March 12, 2019. Clayton, Jonathan. “Anti-­Rape Device Must Be Banned, Say Women.” The Times (London), June 8, 2005. Conway-­Smith, Erin. “Carjackings Are on the Rise Again in South Africa.” GlobalPost, May 27, 2015. Cox, Anna. “Police Force Squatters from Swanky Suburbs.” The Star, June 16, 2004. Cox, Anna. “Rubbish Piles Up.” The Star, August 3, 2012. Cox, Anna. “Sandton Residents ‘Living under Siege.’” The Star, May 20, 2020. Daley, Suzanne. “Apartheid’s Feared Police Prove Inept and Corrupt.” New York Times, March 25, 1997. Davey, Derek. “Vumacam’s Eye in the Sky Solution.” Mail & Guardian, October 25, 2019. de Lange, Ilse. “At least 216 People Died in Police Custody Last Year.” The Citizen (Pretoria), August 15, 2017. Department of Community Security. “4 Security Officers Dead in 5 Months in the Hands of Ruthless Gunmen.” Soweto Urban, February 8, 2019. Dlamini, Penwell. “Blue-­Light Gang Suspects Bust Red-­Handed.” Sowetan, February 10, 2020. Dlamini, Penwell. “Family Reels after Son Shot Washing Vehicle.” Sowetan, February 10, 2020. Dixon, Robyn. “Sanctuary for the Wolf Orphans of Apartheid.” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2004. Dixon, Robyn. “Controversy in South Africa over Device to Snare Rapists.” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2005.

Bibliography

• 407

Dlodlo, Andile. “One Suspect Killed and Another Seriously Wounded in Northcliff Hijacking.” Northcliff Melville Times, October 13, 2018. Drury, Tracey. “Pepper Spray Invention Takes Aim at Carjackers.” Business First (Buffalo), June 29, 1998. Dube, Peter. “With Guns Blazing, South Africa Ponders Disarming Citizens and Criminals Alike.” Africa Review (Kenya), September 7, 2015. Duncan, Jane. “The Police ‘Punish before They Prosecute’ When it Comes to Public Protests.” Mail & Guardian, September 28, 2016. Duncan, Jane. “Beware the Surveillance State.” City Press, May 20, 2018. Ebrahim, Danielle. “Where Do We Stand with the Polygraph Testing of Employees?” The Times (Johannesburg), July 22, 2016. Editorial. “South Africa: License to Kill.” Business Day, April 11, 2008. Eliseev, Alex. “River Raid.” Sunday Times, March 14, 2004. Eliseev, Alex. “Jo’burg Evictions ‘Barbaric’ and ‘Unconstitutional.’” Mail & Guardian, July 14, 2005. Eliseev, Alex. “Hundreds Evicted from Jo’burg Office Building.” Mail & Guardian, July 14, 2005. Eliseev, Alex. “City CCTV Tender in Dispute.” The Star, 13 September 2007. Eliseev, Alex. “Crime Fears as Joburg’s Big Bro Shuts Eyes.” The Star, November 30, 2007. Eliseev, Alex. “Joburg Metro Cops Still Await Day of Reckoning.” The Star, July 15, 2008. Eliseev, Alex. “Chilling Glimpse into ‘Jeppestown Massacre.’” IOL (Independent Online), January 31, 2008. Eliseev, Alex. “Another Police Big Fish Is Arrested.” The Star, July 16, 2008. Evans, Sarah. “IPID Report: Sharp Increase in Assault by Police Cases.” Mail & Guardian, February 10, 2013. Evans, Sarah. “Vendors to File Second Interdict to Stop City of Jhb Removals.” Mail & Guardian, November 19, 2013. Evans, Sarah. “‘Convenient’ to Remove Lawful Traders in Op Clean Sweep.” Mail & Guardian, December 5, 2013. Evans, Sarah, and Manqoba Nxumalo. “City of Jhb Faces Court Challenges over Informal Trader Evictions.” Mail & Guardian, November 21, 2013. Ferreira, Emsie. “ICD: Rise in Police Abuse at Service Delivery Protests.” Mail & Guardian, June 14, 2011. Figenschou, Christian. “Faster Than You Can Say ‘Hi Jack.’” Mail & Guardian, January 15, 1999. Flannagan, Jane. “South Africa Blasts back at Car Thieves.” Evening Standard (London), February 5, 2002. Flannagan, Jane. “Carjackers Take South African Cabinet Minister Njabulo Nzuza on Tour of Cash Machines at Gunpoint.” The Times (London), May 30, 2020. Francke, Robin Lee. “Thousands Protest in South Africa over Rising Violence against Women.” The Guardian (London), September 5, 2019. Froelich, Paula. “Attending the Ultimate Driving School: Anti-­Carjacking Class.” New York Post, September 15, 2014.

408 •

Bibliography

Furlonger, David. “Big Data Steering Tracking Companies.” Business Day, April 26, 2016. Gedye, Lloyd. “Fibre Optic Turf War Pushes Speeds Up and Prices Down.” Mail & Guardian, April 1, 2016. Gibson, Erika. “South African Mercenaries Arrive in Guinea.” Beeld, October 187, 2009. Gifford, Gill. “I had to do it, Says Dad Who Shot Hijackers.” The Star, July 18, 2002. Gifford, Gill. “Joburg Surveillance Zooms In.” The Star, December 11, 2008. Goodwin, Peter. “Wolf-­Dog Joins Pretoria Forces.” Sunday Times (London), October 22, 1989. Gous, Nico. “Motorist Rams Gunman Robbing Woman Driver in Johannesburg Traffic.” TimesLIVE (Online), July 19, 2019. Govender, Prega. “Fortress Schools.” Sunday Times, May 21, 2017. Gqirana, Thulani. “Robbers Shoot at Praying Alexandra Priest—­and Miss.” News24, October 22, 2014. Green, Jillian. “Anti-­Rape Device Gives Women ‘Teeth’—­But Some Fear It Will Worsen Violence.” Cape Times, June 7, 2005. Grobler, Riaan, and Ntwaagae Seleka. “Traffic Flowing again as Johannesburg’s M2 Highway Reopens after R160m Overhaul.” News24, November 4, 2019. Gumede-­Johnson, Kamvelihle. “Police Training: Brutality Exposed.” Mail & Guardian, June 3, 2011. Hamilton, Andrew. “In South Africa the Motorist Is a Stormtrooper.” Irish Times (Dublin), April 17, 2002. Harris, Louis. “Opinion: Hijackers Deserve Harshest Penalties.” The Star, October 27, 2003. Harrisberg, Kim. “‘No Safe Place’: South African Women Suffering ‘Epidemic’ of Violence, Activists Warn.” Reuters, September 3, 2019. Harrisberg, Kim. “Pepper Spray and Punches: South Africans Ready for Women’s Day.” Reuters, March 6, 2020. Harrisberg, Kim, and Anastasia Moloney. “Law Enforcement: Joburg and Medellin—­ Tale of Two Unequal Cities Waging War on Crime.” Sunday Times, October 17, 2019. Hartley, Wyndham. “Truck Hijackings Up as Gangs Shift from Harder Car Theft.” Business Day, September 30, 2015. Head, Tom. “Home Invasions: Areas in South Africa Most at Risk.” South African, November 30, 2018. Head, Tom. “Hijacking Horror: Passenger Killed at Traffic Lights in Kyalami.” South African, January 8, 2020. Henderson, Roxanne. “Closure of M2 a Blessing in Disguise for Crime-­Ridden CBD.” Business Day, May 7, 2019. Henderson, Roxanne. “Johannesburg Banks Battle against Armed Highwaymen as Road Works Lead to Employees Being Held Up at Gunpoint.” Sunday Independent, May 11, 2019. Hennop, Jan. “Actor Fumes over Anti-­Hijack Device.” Sunday Times, February 21, 1999. Hennop, Jan. “Evildoers Will Have No Place to Hide in City.” Sunday Times, April 9, 2000.

Bibliography

• 409

Hennop, Jan. “Smile, You Are on Candid Camera!” Sunday Times, April 16, 2000. Hip, Chante’ Ho. “Braamfontein Spruit Takes Care of Its Own.” Sandton Chronicle, March 24, 2020. Hlatshaneni, Simnikiwe. “Blackouts See More Smash and Grabs in Joburg CBD.” The Citizen, March 23, 2019. Hlongwane, Sipho. “This Brutal Police State in Which We Live.” Business Day, January 22, 2013. Holloway, Jim. “Letter to the Editor: Those Who Call the Riverbank Home.” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, July 8, 2014. Hosken, Graeme. “Bodyguard Died in Iraq ‘As He Lived, Living Life to the Fullest.’” Sunday Tribune, October 14, 2004. Hosken, Graeme. “South African Elite Cops Flock to Iraq.” Pretoria News, October 26, 2004. Hosken, Graeme. “Detained Boys Said to Be Part of Gang.” The Star, July 14, 2008. Hosken, Graeme. “‘Predator Police’ in Reign of Terror.” The Times (Johannesburg), April 30, 2012. Hosken, Graeme. “Is Your Car a Steal?” Sunday Times, September 16, 2015. Hosken, Graeme. “Luxury Car Crooks Strike Again.” Sowetan, January 24, 2017. Hosken, Graeme. “Plans to Foil Bike Thieves.” Sunday Times, December 1, 2019. Hosken, Graeme, Boyd Webb, and Michael Roux van Zyl. “More SA Men May Die in Iraq.” Pretoria News, October 14, 2004. Hosken, Graeme, Ernest Mabuza, and Jan Bornman. “Stolen Super Cars Destined for Middle East and Southern Africa.” Sowetan, January 23, 2017. Jacobs, C. “Locking Out the Criminals.” Sunday Times (Metro), May 10, 1998. Jensen, Sashia. “Detective Held in Crackdown on Vehicle Theft.” Saturday Star, March 15, 1997. Jobo, Thabo. “Drunk Man Kills ‘Carjacker’ in Joburg.” The Citizen, November 23, 2018. Johnson, Angella. “Police Chief Linked with Hijack Case.” Mail & Guardian, December 20, 1996. Johnson, Angella. “Learning the New Rules of the Road.” Mail & Guardian, September 25, 1998. Johnson, Audrey. “When Consent Clauses Get Problematic.” Business Day, February 5, 2018. Kasrils, Ronnie. “Mr. President, Arrest This Descent into Police State Depravity.” Mail & Guardian, March 6, 2013. Kgosikebatho, Keitebe. “Beware: Hijacked in Joburg.” The Patriot (Botswana), 1 February 2015. Khangale, Ndivhuwo. “Watch Out Criminals, You Could Be on CCTV.” The Star, May 19, 2005. Khanyile, Nokuthula. “N3 Truck Driver Escapes Heavy Gunfire.” The Witness, June 7, 2019.

410 • Bibliography

Khumalo, Bafana. “Reality TV: Smile! Joburg Is Keeping an Eagle Eye on You!” Sunday Times, December 22, 2002. Khumalo, Thuso. “South Africa Declares ‘Femicide’ a National Crisis.” Voice of America (Online), September 20, 2019. Kiley, Sam. ‘Thieves Get Fiery Hijack Deterrent.” The Times (London), December 11, 1998. Knoetze, Daneel. “Police Kill Three People in Three Days of Lockdown. This Is Normal for South Africa, Data Reveals.” Viewfinder (Online), April 1, 2020. Knoetze, Daneel. “How the Lockdown Is Creating Even More Opportunities for Corrupt Cops.” The Citizen (Pretoria), April 15, 2020. Kunene, Thabo. “Zimbabwean Robber Shot Dead in Johannesburg.” Bulawayo 24News, November 16, 2015. Laing, Aislinn. “South African Police Officers Guilty of Murdering Taxi Driver Mido Macia by Street Dragging.” The Telegraph (London), August 25, 2015. Layton, Josh. “Watch the Alarming ‘Similarities’ between Carjackings Here and South Africa—­Learn How to Avoid a Hijack.” Staffordshire News, January 26, 2019. Lehihi, Masego. “More Cameras Focus on the CBD.” Sunday Times, August 5, 2001. Leonard, Terry. “‘We’re Killing Each Other at a Baffling Rate.’” The Star, August 1, 2006. Le Page, David. “SA Company Wins Ig Nobel Peace Prize.” Daily Mail & Guardian, October 13, 1999. Lewis, David. “Congo Candidate See ‘Coup’ Arrests as Intimidation.” Zimbabwe Independent (Harare), August 6, 2004. Lewthwaite, Gilbert. “In South Africa, a Burning Fear.” The Sun (Baltimore), February 3, 1999. Lieberum, Sandra. “Cops Recall Jeppestown Massacre.” The Citizen, November 5, 2008. Lourie, Gugu. “Telematics the New Technology Frontier.” Sunday Times, October 6, 2013. Lund, Cathy. “Spy Cameras Drive Criminals to Suburbs.” Sunday Times, February 18, 2001. Lund, Troye. “More Teachers Emigrating.” Cape Times, March 4, 1998. Luvhengo, Phathu. “Operation Ke Molao Infuriates Taxi Associations.” Randburg Sun, May 23, 2016. Luvhengo, Phathu. “State of Crisis at Spruit.” Randburg Sun, September 15, 2016. Luvhengo, Phathu. “Residents Will Not Participate in the Upcoming Spruit Day.” Randburg Sun, September 16, 2016. Luvhengo, Phathu. “Residents at Loggerheads over Fibre Installation.” Randburg Sun, March 7, 2017. Mabena, Sipho. “Who Watches Big Brother? Joburg’s Private Surveillance Cameras Come under Fire.” The Citizen, March 1, 2020. Mackenzie, Ashtyn. “Crime on the Koppies—­Out of Control.” Northcliff Melville Times, May 8, 2015.

Bibliography • 411

Mahamba, Chulumanco. “Joburg Pensioner Stabbed 20 Times during Home Invasion.” The Star, January 27, 2020. Mahlangu, Isaac. “More Than One Million House Break-­ins in SA in a Year.” SowetanLIVE (Online), October 3, 2019. Mahlokwane, James. “Held at Gunpoint in Church Robbery.” Southern Courier, March 7, 2015. Mahr, Krista. “High South African Crime Rates and Low Faith in Police Boost Private Security in Gauteng.” Financial Times, May 27, 2017. Makatile, Don. “R122m Tender Row.” Sowetan, February 17, 2011. Makhetha, Tankiso. “Parents Watch Sons Being Lynched.” Sowetan, August 17, 2018. Makhetha, Tankiso. “Irate Mob Castrates, Beats ‘Rapist’ to Death.” Sowetan, June 18, 2019. Makgalemele, Thembisile. “Cameras Keep a Beady Eye on Jo’burg.” Saturday Star, April 14, 2000. Malala, Justice. “No End in Sight for Police Brutality in South Africa.” The Guardian (London), February 21, 2013. Manyane, Manyane. “Motorists Warned of Hijackings as Syndicates Target ‘Easy to Sell’ Toyota, VW.” Sunday Independent, August 18, 2019. Manyane, Manyane. “Time Is Critical in Recovery of hijacked Vehicles.” Sunday Independent, September 29, 2019. Maphumulo, Solly. “Cameras Catch 50 Crimes a Week.” The Star, January 9, 2002. Maphumulo, Solly. “Shock as Gang Robs Worshipers in Mosque.” The Star, July 17, 2014. Maphumulo, Solly. “Truck Hijacking Syndicate Found with ‘Grabbers.’” The Star, October 17, 2016. Maphumolo, Solly, and Angelique Serrao. “‘Top Cops Involved in Truck Heists.’” The Star, June 27, 2014. Maphumulo, Zinhle. “Mido Macia Goes Home.” City Press (Johannesburg), March 10, 2013. Marrs, Dave. “Anticrime Body Forms National Advisory Unit.” Business Day, December 1, 2000. Mashaba, Sibongile. “Crime Wave Grips Joburg CBD.” The Star, November 5, 2018. Masweneng, Kgaugelo. “Hi-­Tech Surveillance System Makes a Difference.” The Herald (South Africa), July 24, 2019. Matsena, David. “‘Window Shopper’ Caught by Long Arm of Lens.” The Star, January 10, 2002. Matsuma, Lungile. “MP Traumatized after Four-­Hour Hijacking and Hijack Ordeal.” The Star, February 24, 2020. McDougall, Dan. “Red Ants Clear Slums South Africa-­Style.” Sunday Times (UK), April 10, 2010. McGirk, Jan. “A Crash Course on How to Foil Hijackers.” Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), June 3, 2001.

412 • Bibliography

McKane, Jamie. “Vumatel’s Vumacam Accused of Illegal Connections.” Randburg Sun, September 19, 2019. McNally, Paul. “Corrupt Police and Drug Dealers—­ Joburg’s Crime Eco-­ System.” News24, May 10, 2016. Mgidi, Emily. “Taximan Bust with Cop Gun.” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), July 8, 2018. Michel, Pascale. “Communities Conquer Crime.” Sandton Chronicle, April 26, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “Elderly Still Feeling Vulnerable.” Sandton Chronicle, May 6, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “George Lea Park makeover.” Sandton Chronicle, May 30, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “George Lea Park Dwellers.” Sandton Chronicle, June 3, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “Community Outrage at Squatter Camp in George Lea.” Sandton Chronicle, June 6, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “Dweller Dilemma.” Sandton Chronicle, June 13, 2016. Michel, Pascale. “The Law and Squatters.” Sandton Chronicle, June 17, 2016. Miller, Andrew. “The Blaster—­More Violence from South Africa.” Word Magazine, December 8, 1998. Miltz, Nicola. “Far Fewer Home Invasions.” South African Jewish Report, September 19, 2019. Moir, Stuart. “Reggae Star’s Killers Get Life in Jail.” The Independent, April 2, 2009. Mokoena, Naledi. “Vumatel Project on Hold in Sophiatown.” Northcliff Melville Times, March 18, 2018. Molosankwe, Botho. “Congregation Beat Church Robbers.” The Star, September 2, 2014. Momberg, Eleanor. “Mechanic Injured by Anti-­Hyjack Booby Trap.” Sunday Independent, July 6, 2008. Monaheng, Kopano. “Put the Safety of Your Family First.” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), May 3, 2019. Monama, Tebogo. “City Power Accuses CCTV Company of Stealing Electricity.” The Star, September 19, 2019. Moodie, Gill. “Crime Wave Robs Some, Pays Others.” Sunday Times, July 22, 2001. Moretsi, Sammy. “Tips to Avoid a Hijacking.” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), August 19, 2019. Morrissey, Kate. “Joburg Man Shoots Intruder Dead.” The Star, November 20, 2015. Morrison, Aaron. “Police Brutality on Rise in South Africa: Officers Accused of Killing, Raping Citizens.” International Business Times, January 10, 2015. Moshe, Jordan. “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime.” South African Jewish Report, March 28, 2019. Motor News Reporter. “Where and When Hijackers Are Most Likely to Pounce.” Business Day, October 24, 2019. Motor News Reporter. “Car Crime.” Business Day, August 29, 2019. Mothibeli, Tefo. “Cameras Zoom in on Jo’burg Crime.” Business Day, April 12, 2000. Moya, Fikile-­Ntsikelelo. “Top Judge Gets Taste of Hijacking.” The Star, March 8, 2000. Mpholo, Alice. “Shootout on Melville Koppies.” Northcliff Melville Times, November 15, 2015.

Bibliography • 413

Mpofu, Roland. “Mixed Feelings about Joburg’s ‘Big Brother’ Network.” Sunday Independent, March 3, 2019. Mthethwa, Bongani. “Give Security Guards ‘Metal Detectors and Panic Buttons’ to Keep Schools Safe: Sadtu.” TimesLIVE (Online), July 10, 2019. Mulaudzi, Hangwani. “‘Shoot to Kill’ Order Spot On.” Sowetan, April 21, 2008. Munshi, Razina. “Anti-­Mercenary Legislation.” Financial Mail, June 23, 2006. Naidoo, Sashin. “Criminals Are Using New Burglary Tactics.” SABC News, March 11, 2020. Naidoo, Shantini. “Don’t Look Up.” Sunday Times, June 24, 2018. Naile, Siso. “Camera Delays Explained.” Roodepoort Northsider, March 31, 2017. Naki, Eric. “ANC Supports ‘Shoot to Kill.’” Sowetan, April 11, 2008. Ndenze, Babalo, and Kaylynn Palm. “SA Is at War with Itself—­MPs React to Latest Crime Stats.” Eyewitness News, July 8, 2019. Ngwenya, Phumzile. “Cameras Cut Crime in Johannesburg CBD.” Business Day, March 7, 2001. Nielle, Diana. “Private Security: A Commodity Ripe for Subversion in the Covid-­19 Crisis.” Daily Maverick (Online), April 1, 2020. Njilo, Nonkululeko. “R200k Reward Offered for Recovery of R4m Lamborghini.” Sowetan, February 16, 2020. Nonyane, Mduduzi. “CHIEFS’ QUEEN TAKEDOWN!—­Thieves Steal Valuables Worth R2m.” Sunday Sun (Johannesburg), May 6, 2018. Ntsaluba, Gcina. “Watch Out, Street Robberies Are on the Rise.” The Citizen, January 10, 2020. Nxumalo, Manqoba. “Fate Still Unclear for Jo’burg’s Informal Traders.” Mail & Guardian, November 26, 2013. Nxumalo, Manqoba. “Jo’burg Informal Trader Lays Assault Charge against Cops.” Mail & Guardian, November 28, 2013. Okoye, Chisom Jennifer. “CCTV Cameras Pit Security against Privacy Concerns.” The Citizen, March 9, 2019. Okoye, Chisom Jennifer. “Cameras: Security or Your Privacy?” The Citizen, March 9, 2019. Olifant, Kutlwano, and Pearl Khuzwayo. “Stolen Cars Found at Scrapyard.” The Star, January 17, 2014. O’Loughlin, Ed. “Blaster Turns up the Heat on Carjackers.” Sydney Morning Herald, December 12, 1998. Oppelt, Phylicia. “Rediscovering the Lost City Where So Many Fear to Tread.” Sunday Times, November 17, 2002. Padayachee, Nicki. “Cop Crisis.” Sunday Times, November 25, 2001. Patrick, Alex. “Nothing to Fear about This Fashion.” Sunday Times, September 1, 2019. Petain, Basildon. “South African Reggae Star Shot Dead in Front of His Children.” The Independent, October 19, 2007. Pijoos, Iavan. “4 Die in Lenasia Gunfight.” News24, September 24, 2016.

414 • Bibliography

Pijoos, Iavan. “’Heartless Criminals’ behind Killing of Security Guards in Parked Car in Soweto.” TimesLIVE (Online), October 15, 2018. Polgreen, Lydia. “South Africa to Charge Miners in Deadly Unrest.” New York Times, August 16, 2012. Pyatt, Jamie. “Robbers Execute White Couple in ‘Racist Attack.’” Daily Mail (London), May 27, 2019. Raaf, Miranda. “Women in Three-­Hour Hijack Ordeal as Friends Conned into Paying Money into e-­Wallet.” Sowetan, August 20, 2019. Rabinovitch, Ari. “Israeli Firm Seeks to Revamp Video Surveillance.” Reuters, January 24, 2011. Rabkin, Franny. “SA’s Suburban Camera Creep Tests Privacy.” Mail & Guardian, May 31, 2019. Raphaely, Carolyn. “South African Police Accused of Routinely Torturing Crime Suspects.” The Guardian (London), April 14, 2013. Reeves, Jay. “Alabama City Councilman Shot in Joburg.” The Star, May 24, 2016. Reuters. “South African Police Arrested for Killing Robber.” The Telegraph (London), November 3, 2015. Ritchie, Kevin. “Armoured Vehicles Have Gone Mainstream in Johannesburg.” Saturday Star, June 22, 2019. Roane, Brendan. “Domestic Theft Case Reports Are on the Rise.” The Star, September 6, 2013. Rodney, Derek. ‘Terror Teams Pillaging Jo’burg Suburbs.” The Star, March 20, 1997. Rossouw, Sheree. “Living behind the Barricades.” Mail & Guardian, January 12, 2001. Ryan, Ciaran. “Overview: The Growing Risks of Organised Crime.” Financial Mail, May 30, 2019. Santora, Marc, and Annie Correal. “Man Dies in Carjacking at Short Hills Mall; 2 Suspects Are Sought.” New York Times, December 16, 2013. Savides, Matthew. “Bullets Fly in ‘Scary as Hell’ Clash between Hijackers and Security Guards in Joburg.” TimesLIVE (Online), July 6, 2018. Seale, Legogang. “Stolen Vehicles Found Parked in Fake Living Room.” The Star, June 25, 2008. Seid, Shelly. “High Walls of Horror.” Sunday Times, September 16, 2016. Seleka, Ntwaagae. “Police Shot 2 Men Wanted in Connection with Brutal Killing of Security Guards.” News24, October 23, 2018. Seleke, Tshegofatso. “Residents Boiling over Vumacam.” Roodeport Record, July 17, 2019. Serrao, Angelique. “More Evidence of Alleged Police Involvement in Hijacking of Trucks.” The Star, July 7, 2014. Serrao, Angelique, and Botho Molosankwe. “How Crime Hits Your Suburb.” The Star, July 14, 2008. Settipani, Anthony. “Spate of Attacks at Melville Koppies.” Saturday Star, May 30, 2015. Shange, Naledi. “Robbers Empty Congregants’ Pockets during Church Service.” Sowetan, March 7, 2017.

Bibliography • 415

Shange, Naledi. “Guard Shot, Others Injured in Two Cash-­in-­Transit Heists in Pretoria.” TimesLIVE (Online), November 29, 2019. Shapshak, David. “Roasting Hijackers.” Mail & Guardian, December 18, 1998. Shapshak, Toby. “Vumacam Aims to Make Suburbs Safer.” Business Day, February 15, 2019. Sibembe, Yanga. “CCTV Surveillance Camera Rollout on Joburg Suburban Streets Raises Alarm over Privacy Rights.” Daily Maverick (Online), March 20, 2019. Singer, Rena. “Church No Sanctuary from Crime.” Christian Science Monitor, September 14, 2000. Skade, Thandi. “Anti-­Burglar Device Blasts out Fog within Seconds.” The Star, July 1, 2008. Skade, Thandi. “Cops on Bikes to Protect ‘the Spruit.’” IOL (Independent Online), November 11, 2008. Skade, Thandi. “Heed Warnings as ATM Attacks Sour in Gauteng.” The Star, July 15, 2018. Skit, Sabelo. “Cops Caught on Camera ‘Executing’ Criminal.” Sunday Times, November 1, 2015. Smillie, Shaun. “Bedfordview Robbers Use ‘Security Getaway Car.’” Saturday Star, February 23, 2019. Smillie, Shaun, and Anna Cox. “Lucrative Car-­Thief Syndicate Bust.” The Star, May 14, 2009. Smillie, Shaun, and Tshego Lepule. “Welcome to Gauteng—­SA’s Hijack Capital.” Saturday Star, March 4, 2017. Smith, Dianne. “Cursed!” Saturday Star, March 3, 2000. Smith, David. “Twitter Helps Save South African Carjacking Victim.” The Guardian (London), April 11, 2012. Smith, David. “Nearly 1,500 South African Police Exposed as Convicted Criminals.” The Guardian (London), August 15, 2013. Smith, David. “Pepper-­Spray Drone Offered to South African Mines for Strike Control.” The Guardian (London), January 20, 2014. Smith, David, and Terry Macalister. “South African Police Shoot Dead Striking Miners.” The Guardian (London), August 30, 2012. Smit, Sarah. “Use of Lie Detectors Put to the Test.” Mail & Guardian (Online), October 18, 2019. Soggot, Mungo, and Edie Koch. “A Trip around the Bizarre World of Apartheid’s Mad Scientists.” Mail & Guardian, June 27, 1997. Southey, Caroline. “Help, the Cops Are Coming.” Mail & Guardian, March 26, 2012. Sparks, Allister. “Columnist Sees Irony in Growing Use of ‘Private Military Firms.’” The Star, September 7, 2004. Staff Reporter. “138 Suspects Arrested in Hillbrow.” SAPA News Agency, September 25, 2003.

416 • Bibliography

Staff Reporter. “Ambulances to Be Escorted after Spate of Attacks.” The Star, July 3, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Bank Nabs Crooks on Camera.” Business Day, March 18, 2002. Staff Reporter. “Beagle Watch Apprehends Three Suspects after Armed Robbery in Atholl.” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, July 12, 2020. Staff Reporter. “Business against Crime.” The Star, September 28, 2001. Staff Reporter. “Cameras Reduce Thefts at Airport.” The Star, December 11, 1997. Staff Reporter. “CBD Cameras Will ‘Shoot’ Criminals.” Saturday Star, July 9, 1999. Staff Reporter. “CCTV Cameras to Guard the Streets of Joburg.” Randburg Sun, July 27, 2018. Staff Reporter. “City Parks Drones Proving Effective.” The Star, January 26, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Clean-­Up in the Spruit.” Randburg Sun, June 23, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Criminals Wage Silent War on Security Guards.” The Star, October 9, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Criminals Won’t Escape City Cameras.” Saturday Star, March 31, 2000. Staff Reporter. “CSS Tactical.” Sandton Chronicle, July 4, 2016. Staff Reporter. “DA: Fire Shabangu over ‘Shoot and Kill’ Remarks.” Mail & Guardian, April 10, 2008. Staff Reporter. “Driven to Despair by Crime Wave—­Police’s Lack of Capacity to Cope with ‘Out-­of-­Control’ Situation Sparks Boom in Applications for Gated Communities.” The Star, March 2, 2020. Staff Reporter. “Drone Image Captures Extent of Displaced People Problem in Keith Fleming Park.” Randburg Sun, September 10, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Eight South African Police Arrested over Death of Man Dragged behind Van.” The Guardian (London), March 1, 2013. Staff Reporter. “Embattled Car Drivers Hit Back in S. African ‘Gangster’s Paradise.’” Deutsche Presse-­Agentur, May 8, 2002. Staff Reporter. “Evolving Systems to Combat Crime.” PMR, May 1999, pp. 102–­103. Staff Reporter. “Faster Internet on the Doorstep.” Randburg Sun, October 5, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Flamethrower Fights Carjacking.” Philadelphia Daily News, December 14, 1998. Staff Reporter. “From Bullet-­Resistant Windows to Discreet Surveillance, Securex Has It All.” Business Day, March 1, 2001. Staff Reporter. “Guards Polygraphed.” City Press (Johannesburg), March 12, 2017. Staff Reporter. “Happy New Year, You’re Busted.” The Star, January 10, 2002. Staff Reporter. “Hijackers Outwit Trackers.” Weekly Mail & Guardian, September 6, 1996. Staff Reporter. “Home Invasion in Midrand Leaves One Dead, Another Critical.” Midrand Reporter, April 16, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Horrific Tragedy in Johannesburg.” Yeshiva World, October 11, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Hunka Hunka Burnin’ Carjacker.” Reuters, December 11, 1998. Staff Reporter. “An Intelligent Home System Is Like an Experienced Butler.” The Star, November 16, 2018.

Bibliography • 417

Staff Reporter. “It’s Lights, Action, and Camera for Crime in Jo’burg.” Business Day, August 6, 2001. Staff Reporter. “iSentry Implemented in Craighall and Craighall Park.” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 8, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Jamming Devices Recovered.” News24, September 25, 2014. Staff Reporter. “Jeppe Accused ‘Had Common Purpose to Resist Arrest.’” Mail & Guardian, October 31, 2008. Staff Reporter. “JHB Embarks on Clean-­Up Campaign.” SAPA News Agency, December 29, 2003. Staff Reporter. “JMPD Impounds Nearly 80 Taxis during Special Operation.” Kempton Express, May 19, 2016. Staff Reporter. “Joburg Spruces Up Inner City.” Business Day, October 6, 2004. Staff Reporter. “Jo’burg to Get More Police and Surveillance Cameras.” Africa News Service, January 30, 2002. Staff Reporter. “Johannesburg Flying Squad Police Arrest a Midrand Police Constable for Carjacking.” Midrand Reporter, August 6, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Johannesburg Flying Squad Unit Foil Carjacking in Alexandra.” Northeastern Tribune, October 12, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Judge Recounts Details of Jeppe Massacre.” Mail & Guardian, October 21, 2008. Staff Reporter. “‘Kill the Bastards’—­Minister’s Astonishing Order to Police.” The Star, April 10, 2008. Staff Reporter. “Lenasia Crime Safety Tips.” The Star, September 6, 2019. Staff Reporter. “M2: Eight Months of Traffic Hell; M2 Highway Closure Could Cost Joburg Millions, and Shred Motorists’ Nerves.” The Star, March 2, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Man Held for Hijacking.” Northeastern Tribune, October 2, 2019. Staff Reporter. “Melville’s Crime Woes.” Northcliff Melville Times, January 26, 2016. Staff Reporter. “Money Van Heists on the Up.” The Star, September 12, 2018. Staff Reporter. “New Laws Clip the Wings of Drone Pilots.” Cape Times, May 18, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Outrage over Death of Zimbabwean Vice-­Council.” Pan African News Agency, September 13, 1999. Staff Reporter. “Police Boss Says 34 Miners Killed, in Self-­Defence.” Sowetan, August 17, 2012. Staff Reporter. “Police Clean-­Up Results in 40 Arrests along Braamfontein Spruit.” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 20, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Police Have Their Say on Illegal Occupation of Keith Fleming Park.” Northcliff Melville Times, October 2, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Polygraph a Useful Tool Despite Accepted Flaws.” The Star, July 9, 2014. Staff Reporter. “Polygraph Finding Is Not Sufficient Proof of Guilt—­Staff Who Were Fired over Theft Were Able to Appeal to Court.” The Star, June 25, 2014. Staff Reporter. “Polygraph Tests Must Be Corroborated.” The Star, August 28, 2013.

418 • Bibliography

Staff Reporter. “President Hits Ground Running.” The Herald, August 26, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Research Thoroughly before Employing Anyone in Your Home.” Northcliff Melville Times, February 12, 2020. Staff Reporter. “Riddle of Missing SADF Arms.” Sowetan, August 24, 2010. Staff Reporter. “Rising Crime Should Be Treated as National Emergency.” Business Day, December 4, 2001. Staff Reporter. “Robbed in Seconds: Car-­Jammers in SA.” Wheels24, June 14, 2017. Staff Reporter. “Robber Wounded after Dramatic Chase, Shoot-­Out.” News24, December 31, 2014. Staff Reporter. “SA Crime Stats: Rise in Carjackings ‘Alarming.’” Wheels24, September 2, 2016. Staff Reporter. “SA’s Iraq Victims Coming Home.” Sunday Tribune, October 17, 2004. Staff Reporter. “S. Africa ‘Rape Trap’ Condemned.” BBC News, June 10, 2005. Staff Reporter. “S. Africa: Six Rocket Launchers ‘Missing’ from Defense Force’s Arsenals.” SAPA News Agency, August 24, 2010. Staff Reporter. “SAPS Must Fight Fire with Fire.” The Citizen, November 12, 2008. Staff Reporter. “Should You Ditch Your Home Security Company in Favour of Technology?” City Press, December 10, 2017. Staff Reporter. “Smart-­Cams to Help Curb Crime in Hot Spots.” The Star, July 27, 2018. Staff Reporter. “Smash-­and-­Grabs Still an Issue at Various Johannesburg Intersections.” Northeastern Tribune, May 29, 2019. Staff Reporter. “South Africa: Policemen, Customs Officials Involved in Major Hijacking Syndicates.” Africa News, February 15, 2001. Staff Reporter. “South Africa: Violence against Women Like a War—­Ramaphosa.” BBC News, September 18, 2019. Staff Reporter. “South African Defense Minister First Official to Apologize for Police Killings of Miners.” Washington Post, August 21, 2012. Staff Reporter. “South African Police Jailed for Murder of Taxi Driver Mido Macia.” BBC News, November 11, 2015. Staff Reporter. “Steps You Can Take to Lessen the Risk.” Saturday Star, March 3, 2000. Staff Reporter. “Study Shows Drivers Are Assisting Hijackers.” The Star, March 18, 1997. Staff Reporter. “Suspect Sought over Hijackings.” The Star, March 3, 2002. Staff Reporter. “Tshwane CCTV Tender Court Bid Dismissed.” News24, May 17, 2011. Staff Reporter. “There Are Still Things You Can Do.” Daily Sun (Johannesburg), July 19, 2018. Staff Reporter. “UPDATE: Shootout in Bryanston between Police and Suspects Leads to Manhunt.” Sandton Chronicle, June 7, 2017. Staff Reporter. “Vehicle Thieves Get the Shock of Their Lives.” The Citizen, July 21, 2011. Staff Reporter. “Verifying of Jo’burg Street Vendors ‘Total Chaos.’” SAPA News Agency, November 4, 2013. Staff Reporter. “Zimbabwe: Truck Drivers Accused of Diverting 68t Copper in SA.” The Herald (Harare), May 18, 2009.

Bibliography • 419

Staff Writer. “CIVH Buys Vumatel.” MyBroadband, June 8, 2018. Staff Writer. “Fibrehoods Brings High-­Speed Internet to Residents.” Sandton Chronicle, October 7, 2015. Staff Writer. “Gauteng Launches New Crime-­Fighting Strategy.” South Africa. The Good News, December 4, 2008. Staff Writer. “How to Avoid a Smash-­and-­Grab.” Midrand Reporter, February 25, 2019. Staff Writer. “Israel Issues Travel Warning on South Africa.” Jerusalem Post, January 1, 2020. Staff Writer. “Israel Warns of Dangers When Visiting SA.” Daily News (Durban), January 3, 2020. Staff Writer. “iSentry Implemented in Craighall and Craighall Park.” Rosebank Killarney Gazette, May 8, 2015. Staff Writer. “Lawlessness Has to Come to an End.” Sowetan, June 19, 2019. Staff Writer. “Mayor of S. African Capital ‘Carjacked’ by Armed Gang.” Agence France-­ Presse, May 26, 2018. Staff Writer. “Remote Jamming on the Rise.” Fourways Review (Gauteng), July 2, 2014. Staff Writer. “Repairs to Joburg’s M2 Highway Nearing Completion.” ENCA (DStv Channel 403), August 2, 2019. Staff Writer. “SA Presidential Aide Mugged.” BBC News (UK Edition), July 30, 2003. Staff Writer. “Smash-­and-­Grabs Continue in Sandton.” Sandton Chronicle, September 11, 2019. Staff Writer. “South Africa ‘a Country at War’ as Murder Rate Soars to Nearly 49 a Day.” The Guardian (London), September 29, 2015. Staff Writer. “South African Police Open Fire as Striking Miners Charge, Killing and Wounding Workers.” Washington Post, August 16, 2012. Staff Writer. “Suspects Injured after an Attempted Food Delivery Car Hijacking in Paulshof.” Fourways Review (Gauteng), December 5, 2019. Staff Writer. “These Are the Most Hijacked Cars in South Africa.” Business Tech, September 12, 2019. Staff Writer. “Tips on How to Survive an Armed Robbery.” Sandton Chronicle, March 14, 2016. Staff Writer. “Two Suspects Arrested Following Commotion at Fourways Hospital Parking Lot.” Fourways Review (Gauteng), May 31, 2020. Staff Writer. “Vumacams—­Not Just Tackling Crime: There’s More Than Meets the Eye.” Sandton Chronicle, December 12, 2019. Steenkamp, Tanya. “Improved Crime Combating on Popular Johannesburg Mountain Bike Route.” TimesLIVE (Online), March 22, 2018. Steenkamp, Tanya. “Peace of Mind for Cyclists and Walkers as Initiative to Boost Security along Spruit Trails Gets Legs.” Business Day, March 22, 2018. Steinberg, Jonny. “New Anti-­Hijacking Device ‘Burns but Cannot Kill’ Attackers.” Business Day, June 11, 1999. Steinberg, Jonny. “Hidden Cameras a Mixed Blessing?” Business Day, July 23, 2001.

420 •

Bibliography

Stones, Lesley. “Westbury Hopes to Capitalise on Face Recognition System.” Business Day, October 18, 2001. Sulcas, Adele. “Crack Unit in Hijack Arrest Coup.” The Star, April 18, 1999. Swart, Heidi. “Activist Murder Reveals Joburg Street Cameras Are ‘Turned Off.’” Mail & Guardian, May 10, 2018. Swart, Heidi. “Controlling Cape Town: The Real Costs of CCTV Cameras, and What You Need to Know.” Daily Maverick (Online), October 5, 2018. Swart, Heidi. “Joburg’s New Hi-­Tech Surveillance Cameras: A Threat to Minorities That Could See the Law Targeting Thousands of Innocents.” Daily Maverick (Online), September 27, 2018. Swart, Mia. “S. Africa Court Issues Orders to End Police Abuse during Lockdown.” Al Jazeera News, May 15, 2020. Swart, Tina. “An Overview of Security in Africa.” African Business Journal 21 (February-­ May 2005). Swart, Werner. “City of Blood.” The Citizen, June 29, 2006. Tabane, Rapule. “Jo’burg Be Good: Big Brother Is Watching.” The Star, April 10, 2000. Tait, Sean, and David Bruce. “Police Torture Continues.” Mail & Guardian, January 24, 2020. Thakali, Thabiso. “Government Uses Jammers Often—­Expert.” Saturday Star, February 21, 2015. Timberg, Craig. “26 Security Workers Suspected.” Washington Post (Foreign Service ed.), May 24, 2006. Timberg, Craig. “South Africans Applaud Police’s Deadly Shootout.” Washington Post, December 13, 2007. Tlou, Gift. “Entities Seek Solutions for Displaced People.” Sandton Chronicle, October 8, 2019. Tlou, Gift. “Displaced People Happy in Hurlingham Park.” Sandton Chronicle, November 10, 2019. Tolsi, Niren. “Jo’burg’s ‘Clean Sweep’: The City Responds.” Mail & Guardian, November 1, 2013. Tolsi, Niren, and Manqoba Nxumalo. “The Scouring of Jo’burg’s Inner City.” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), October 25, 2013. Tolsi, Niren, and Manqoba Nxumalo. “Jo’burg’s ‘Clean Sweep’ Is a Dirty Affair.” Mail & Guardian, November 1, 2013. Torchia, Christopher. “4-­Year-­Old Boy Dies in South Africa Carjacking.” Associated Press, July 21, 2014. Tromp, Beauregard, and Graeme Hosken. “Kashala Is Wanted by Police in Kinshasa.” Pretoria News, May 26, 2006. Tshehla, McDivett Khumbulani (Halfway House). “Going Back to Spirit of Neighbourliness the Only Way to Beat Criminality.” SowetanLIVE (Online), December 10, 2019. Tshikalange, Shonisani . “Hijacker Dies after Porsche Driver Opens Fire.” SowetanLIVE (Online), January 15, 2021.

Bibliography • 421

van Rensburg, Dewald. “Brave New Joburg: Operation Clean Sweep Part Two.” City Press, November 24, 2013. van Rensburg, Dewald. “Cry Me a River, Joburg Tells Traders.” City Press, November 27, 2013. van Rensburg, Dewald. “Charges Dropped against Traders’ Lawyer.” City Press, December 6, 2013. Vidler, Anthony. “The City Transformed: Designing Defensible Space.” New York Times, September 23, 2001. Voster, Roelien. “Is Vumacam Making South Africa a Safer Place?” Roodeport Northsider, February 25, 2019. Web, Sam. “Robbed in Their Own Driveway.” The Sun (London), December 2, 2016. Webb, Boyd. “Mercenary Bill Shot Down in Parliament.” Cape Times, May 26, 2006. Webster, Dennis. “Ke Molao Wa Rona: Joburg Continues Its Anti-­Poor Approach.” Daily Maverick (Online), February 27, 2015. Webster, Dennis. “Gautengers Move to Shacks and Gated Estates.” Mail & Guardian, November 12, 2018. Whitworth, Louis. “Johannesburg: How to Stay Safe on Holiday in South Africa.” Sunday Independent, February 15, 2018. Wicks, Jeff. “Joburg’s Anti-­Crime Street Cameras Hailed as Better Than Booms.” Sunday Times, May 26, 2019. Williams, Laura. “Modern Chastity Belts Won’t Stop Rape.” The Guardian (London), May 11, 2010. Zuzile, Mpumzi. “Joburg’s M2 Freeway to Reopen on November 4.” TimesLIVE (Online), October 18, 2019.

Non-­Academic Periodicals Anonymous. “South Africa’s Police: Kill and Be Killed.” The Economist, August 27, 2011. Burgers, Fouche. “Managing the Risks of Theft and Hijacking: Short Term.” Enterprise Risk 3, 9 (October 2009), pp. 10–­12. Clark, Christopher. “South African Are Taking the Law into Their Own Hands.” Foreign Policy, November 29, 2018. Clark, Constable Stephen. “Improving the Community’s Involvement in Fighting Crime.” Servamus: Community-­Based Safety and Security Magazine 104, 6 (June 2011), pp. 30–­31. Clynes, Manfred, and Nathan Kline. “Cyborgs and Space.” Astronautics (September 1960), pp. 26–­27, 74–­76. de Witt, Alex. CEO, Omega Risk Solutions, Professional Management Review, July 5, 2005. Fife, Ian. “Storming the Barricades.” Financial Mail, July 28, 2000, p. 85. Floreano, Dario, and Robert Wood. “Science, Technology, and the Future of Small Autonomous Drones.” Nature 521 (2015), pp. 460–­466.

422 •

Bibliography

Foresti, Gian Luca, Christian Micheloni, Claudio Piciarelli, and Laro Snidaro. “Visual Sensor Technology for Advanced Surveillance Systems: Historical View, Technological Aspects, and Research Activities in Italy.” Sensors (Basel) 9, 4 2009), pp. 2252–­ 2270. Furlonger, David. “Vehicle Tracking—­Unlocking the Value in Your Car’s Secrets.” Financial Mail, April 15, 2016. Border Vehicle Crime—­ Costs SA Billions.” Servamus Geldenhuys, Kotie. “Cross-­ Community-­Based Safety and Security Magazine 108, 11 (2015), pp. 24–­27. Geldenhuys, Kotie. “Organised Crime-­Vehicle Crime.” Servamus Safety and Security Magazine 103, 4 (2015), pp. 38–­41. Govender, Doraval. “Improving Physical Protection Systems to Prevent Residential Burglaries.” African Security Review 25, 4 (2016), pp. 356–­367. Gross, Amy, Madhumita Murgia, and Yuan Yanng. “Chinese Tech Groups Shaping UN Facial Recognition Standards.” Financial Times, December 1, 2019. Harvey, David. “The New Urbanism and the Communitarian Trap.” Harvard Design Magazine (Winter/Spring 1997), pp. 68–­70. Hawkins, Amy. “Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces.” Foreign Affairs, July 24, 2018. Honey, Peter. “Consortium Ensures Spy in the Sky Is Not Pie in the Sky.” Financial Mail, October 5, 2003. Honey, Peter. “The Man Who Is Trying to Bring Down an Elephant.” Financial Mail, 10 October 2003. Joiner, James. “For Sale: Weaponized Drones for Corporate Use.” Esquire, June 24, 2014. Karimi, Faith. “South African Doctor Invents Female Condoms with ‘Teeth’ to Fight Rape.” CNN Inside Africa, June 1, 2010. Kriegler, Anine. “South African Crime Stats Show Police Struggling to Close Cases.” Conversation, October 31, 2017. Kumeh, Titania. “Anti-­Rape World Cup Condoms . . . with Teeth? An Armed Condom Helps Women Fight Back.” Mother Jones, June 24, 2010. Kumalo, Fred. “Like a Spaghetti Western.” Financial Mail, June 13, 2019. Lapore, Jill. “The Long Blue Line.” The New Yorker, July 20, 2020, pp. 64–­69. MacGregor, Liz. “Where Your New Mercedes Comes with a Helicopter.” New Statesman, April 5, 2003. Mankad, Prerna. “Clamping Down on Rapists in South Africa.” Foreign Policy, April 11, 2007. Micheloni, Christian, Gian Luca Foresti, and Laro Snidaro. “Networks of Co-­operative Cameras for Visual Surveillance.” IEE Proceedings: Vision, Image, and Signal Processing 152, 2 (2005), pp. 205–­212. Moshe, Jordan. “Intelligent Cameras to Bring Down Crime.” South African Jewish Report, March 28, 2019. Nararnjan, Ajit. “South African Mining Firm Is the First to Purchase Riot Control Drone.” New Statesman, June 23, 2014.

Bibliography • 423

Ocean, Max. “World’s First Fleet of Riot Control Drones Ordered by Secret South African Company.” Common Dreams, June 19, 2014. Pather, Sashni. “Surveillance State: Big Brother Lands in Joburg.” Financial Mail, June 13, 2019. Perry, Alex. “Behind South Africa’s Reggae Murder.” Time, October 22, 2007. Seabrook, John. “Adversarial Man.” The New Yorker, 16 March 2020, pp. 44–­49. Staff Reporter. “Biometrics Booms in SA.” Hi-­Tech Security Solutions (Online) (April 2009). Staff Reporter. “The Cost of Crime.” Oxford Business Group, July 22, 2010. Staff Reporter. “An Industry Hijacked.” The Economist, October 6, 2001. Staff Reporter. “JHB Launches ‘World Class’ Surveillance System.” Financial Times, August 3, 2001. Staff Reporter. “New Plans to Make JHB Safer: Metro Police.” Financial Times, January 30, 2002. Staff Writer. “Criminals Are Running Circles around South Africa’s Police.” The Economist, July 15, 2017. Staff Writer. “Johannesburg Gets Teeth.” CCTV Handbook 2009, Hi-­Tech Security Solutions (Online) (March 2009). Staff Writer. “Small Mercies.” The Economist, October 9, 2003. Staff Writer. “South Africa Hijacked by Crime.” African Business (April 1998), p. 25. Staff Writer. “South Africa: Murder and Siege Architecture.” The Economist, July 15, 1995, p. 28. Staff Writer. “South Africa: New York’s Finest.” The Economist, August 10, 1996, p. 44. Staff Writer. “Survey: All Together Now: Public-­Private Partnerships Have Worked Wonders in Fighting Crime.” The Economist, April 6, 2006, p. 11. Valera, Maria, and Sergio Velastin. “Intelligent Distributed Surveillance Systems: A Review.” IEE Proceedings: Vision, Image, and Signal Processing 152, 2 (2005), pp. 192–­ 204. Wilson, James Q., and George Kelling. “Broken Windows: The Police and Public Safety,” Atlantic Monthly 3 (1982), pp. 29–­38.

Occasional Papers Allmer, Thomas. “Towards a Critical Theory of Surveillance Studies.” Internet & Surveillance—­Research Paper Series. Research Paper No. 11. Vienna, Austria. Unified Theory of Information Research Group, 2011, pp. 1–­37. Altbeker, Antony. “Cars and Robbers: Has Car Theft Crime Prevention Worked Too Well?” Institute for Security Studies. Occasional Paper 124 (2006), pp. 1–­16. Baker, Bruce. “Taking the Law into Their Own Hands: Fighting Crime in South Africa.” Paper presented at the 29th Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, 6–­11 April 2001, pp. 1–­20. Bollen, Sandra, Lillian Artz, Lisa Vetten, and Antoinette Louw. Violence against Women

424 •

Bibliography

in Metropolitan South Africa: A Study on Impact and Service Delivery. Monograph No. 41. Midrand: Institute for Security Studies, September 1999. Davies, Anthony, and Sergio Velastin. “A Progress Review of Intelligent CCTV Surveillance Systems.” IDAACS’05 Workshop. Sofia, September 2005, pp. 1–­6. Dixon, Bill. “The Globalisation of Democratic Policing: Sector Policing and Zero Tolerance in the New South Africa.” Occasional Paper Series. Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 2000. Duncan, Jane. “Is South Africa Reverting to a Repressive State?” Inaugural professorial lecture, Council Chambers, University of Johannesburg, July 13, 2016. Gastrow, Peter. Main Trends in the Development of South Africa’s Organised Crime. Occasional Paper No. 21. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999. Kruger, Tinus, Tiaan Meyer, Mark Napier, Elena Pascolo, Mabela Qhobela, Mark Shaw, Sarah Oppler, Luzuko Niyabo, and Antoinette Louw. Safer by Design: Towards Effective Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for South Africa. Monograph Series, No 16. Midrand: Division for Building Technology, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and the Institute for Security Studies, 1997. Langa, Malose. “Exploring Experiences of Torture and CIDT That Occurred in South Africa amongst Non-­Nationals Living in Johannesburg.” Occasional Paper. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2011. Langa, Malose. Profiling Torture and CIDT in the Hands of the Police: A Case Study of Kagiso Township, Gauteng. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2011. Louw, Antoinette, Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, and Rory Robertshaw. Crime in Johannesburg: Results of a City Victim Survey. Monograph No. 18. Midrand: Institute for Security Studies, February 1998. Newham, Gareth, and Andrew Faull. Protector or Predator? Tackling Police Corruption in South Africa. Monograph 182. Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2012. Oppler, Sarah. “Partners against Crime.” In Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, Duxita Mistry, Sarah Oppler, and Lukas Muntingh (eds.), Policing the Transformation: Further Issues in South Africa’s Crime Debate. Monograph Series, No. 12. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 50–­65. Shearing, Clifford. “Changing Paradigms of Policing: The Significance of Community Policing for the Governance of Security.” Occasional Paper No. 34. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1998. Social Law Project. Johannesburg Street Traders Halt Operation Clean Sweep. WIEGO Law and Informality Resources. Cambridge, MA: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), 2014. Staff Writer. “Calls to Step Up 2010 CCTV Rollout.” Sports City: Home of Sports Events, May 6, 2009. Taljaard, Raenette. “Private and Public Security in South Africa.” In Sabelo Gumedze (ed.), The Private Security Sector in Africa. Monograph Series No. 146. Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, pp. 69–­98.

Bibliography • 425

Unpublished Reports Business Against Crime. “BAC Surveillance Technology Project: City of Johannesburg and Gauteng Province” (Unpublished position paper, 2002). Correspondence. “Altivex, Fibrehoods/Vumatel Time Line” (Unpublished document, no date). Correspondence from Leah Knott, Councillor, Ward 97, City of Johannesburg, to City Manager, City of Johannesburg. Re: Illegal Installation of Aerial Fibre, Poles, and CCTV Cameras in Ward 97 by Vumatel/Fibrehoods, February 4, 2020. Croock, Ricky, CEO, “Vumacam and City Power: Electrical Connections” (Vumacam memorandum, September 5, 2019). [https:/www.vumacam.col.za/vumacam-and-ci​ ty-power-electrical-connections/]. Memorandum from Councillor Anthony Still (Ward 90), to Executive Mayor Parks Tau, City of Johannesburg, regarding “Deterioration of, and Safety in, Parks, Open Spaces, and the Braamfontein Spruit,” April 1, 2016 [http://www.hurlingham.org.za​ /media/55424/Letter-Mayor-Open-Spaces-April-2016.pdf]. Memorandum from Quentin Green, Acting Managing Director City Power, to Nico de Jager, MMC: Environment and Sustainable Services. Topic: Report on Mobile Telephony Cellular Mast Installations on City Power Street Light Poles, April 7, 2017.

Unpublished Master’s Theses and Dissertations Dieltiens, Nicolas. “The Making of the Criminal Subject in Democratic South Africa.” Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand, 2011. Hentschel, Christine. “The Social Life of Security: Durban, South Africa.” Unpublished PhD diss., School of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Leipzig, 2010. Kasipo, Mafuro. “What Is the Effect of a State Centric Approach on Policing in South Africa? A Review of Policy.” Unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014. Lipschitz, Ruth Adele. “Animality and Alterity: Species Discourse and the Limits of ‘the Human’ in Contemporary South African Art.” Unpublished PhD diss., University of London, Department of Visual Cultures, 2014. Mabudusha, Sekgololo Angel. “The Policing of Illegal Squatting in the Greenbelts within Weltevreden Park Area.” Magister of Technolgiae, University of Pretoria, 2010. Manoim, Lily. “Safety, Security, and the Rising Presence of Security Networks in Johannesburg’s Suburbs: Interrogating the Security Networks’ Legitimacy.” Unpublished MA thesis, Organizational and Institutional Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 2020, pp. 50–­51. Olckers, Casparus. “An Examination of the Impact of Residential Security Measures on the Incidence of Residential Burglary in Two Selected Northern Suburbs of Johannesburg: A Security Risk Management Approach.” Magister of Technologiae, Security Risk Management, University of South Africa, 2007.

426 •

Bibliography

Senekal, Willem Andries. “The Value of Vehicle Tracking Technology in the Recovery of Stolen Motor Vehicles.” Unpublished MA thesis in Criminal Justice, University of South Africa, 2016. Tshabalala, Xolani. “Negotiating Movement: Everyday Immigration Policing in Johannesburg.” Unpublished MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009.

Published Reports Badenhorst, Stefan, Manabela Chauke, and N. Ngubane. “Performance Information Report.” In Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA), Annual Report 2018–­2019 (Centurion, South Africa: Government Printing Office, 2019. Kruger, Tinus, Karina Landman, and Susan Lieberman. Designing Safer Places: A Manual for Crime Prevention through Planning and Design (Pretoria: CSIR and SAPS, 2001. Minnaar, Anthony. “From a Service to a Force? Is the SAPS Militarizing? Understanding the Dynamics of Police Discipline and Rank.” In Garth Newman and Amanda Dissel (eds.), Conference Report: Policing in South Africa 2010 and Beyond (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010. Rauch, Jenine, Nadia Levin, Melanie Lue, and Kindiza Ngubeni. Creating a New South African Police Service: Priorities in the Post-­Election Period (Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1994. Vigneswaran, Darshan, and Julia Hornberger. Beyond Good Cop/Bad Cop: Understanding Informality and Police Corruption in South Africa (Johannesburg: Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) Research Report, University of the Witwatersrand, 2009, pp. 1–­65. Webster, Dennis. “’The End of the Street?’ Informal Traders’ Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg.” Report published by Socio-­Economic Rights Institute (SERI) (September 2015.

Press Releases Anti-­Privatisation Forum. “Johannesburg Inner City Anti-­Eviction Campaign March Saturday 14 December,” press release issued by the Anti-­ Privatisation Forum, December 12, 2002. CAGE Advocacy. “Proposed Drone Regulations Leave Loopholes for Weaponised Drones in South Africa.” press release, CAGE Africa, January 26, 2015 [https://​ www.cage.ngo/cage-africa-proposed-drone-regulations-leave-loopholes weaponised-drones-south-africa]. Joburg Media. “IIOC Provides for Intelligent Policing using CCTV Cameras,” press release, 2018. [https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/Pages/Media/Newsroom/IIOC​ -provides-for-intelligent-policing-using-CCTV-cameras.aspx].

Bibliography • 427

Nkosi, Thami. “Right to Know Raises Concerns over Vumacam.” Press release, August 28, 2019 [https://blueheart.africa/hot-topics/right-to-know-raises-concerns-over​ -vumacam/]. Pym, William. “Carla Busuttil: The Super-­Suburb Defence Authority,” press release for Josh Lilley Art Gallery (exhibition from November 14 to December 23, 2016). https://​ www.joshlilley.com/exhibitions/the-super-suburb-defence-authority-2016/]. Vumacam, “The Facts Regarding the Integrated Smart Camera Network.” Vumacam memorandum, December 3, 2019 [http:www.vumacam.co.za/the-facts-regarding​ -the-integrated-smart-camera-network/]. Vumacam, “Tracker and Vumacam Partner to Make Your Neighbourhood Safer.” Tracker, March 8, 2019 [https://www.tracker.co.za/news/news-room/tracker-and​ -vumacam-partner-to-make-your-neighbourhood-safer]. Vumacam, “Vumacam Not in the Business of Tracking Movements.” Vumacam memorandum, September 25, 2019 [https:www.vumacam.co.za/vumacam-not-in-the-bus​ iness-of-tracking=-movements].

Documentary Films VPRO. Bringing the Internet to Africa, documentary film by the Dutch TV broadcaster VPRO, 2015 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlTZetW1Sy8].

Internet Sources Abramjee, Yusuf. “The Time Has Come to #MakeMoneySafe.” IOL (Independent Online), May 3, 2018 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/the-time-has-come-to-makemon​ eysafe-14757024]. Aludi Products home page [at http://www.aludi,co.za/X-Ray.html]. Anderson, Nic. “Joburg’s CCTV Cameras Have Been Going ‘Unwatched’ after Contract Issues.” South African, September 1, 2017 [https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news​ /joburg-cctv-cameras-going-unwatched-after-contract-end/]. Berdou, Jean. “Camera Coverage for the Whole of Fourways.” Dainfern Future Living, August 2019 [https://cdn.nowmedia.co.za/NowMedia/ebrochures/EIA/Standard​ /Dainfern-Issue8-2019.pdf]. Bezuidenhout, P. C. “Reducing Crime in South Africa by Enforcing Traffic Laws: A ‘Broken Windscreen’ Approach.” Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering 53, 1 (2011) (no pagination). [http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci​ _arttext&pid=S1021-20192011000100004]. Blaster website [http://www.blaster.co.za]. Bloomberg. “Joburg City Officials and Businesses Explore the Use of Drones to Tackle Crime.” Business Tech, May 7, 2019 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/315​ 346/joburg-city-officials-and-businesses-explore-the-use-of-drones-to-tackle-cr​ ime/].

428 •

Bibliography

Broghton, Ian. “Homeless Poorly Treated in Bedfordview.” GroundUp (Online), October 8, 2018 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article/homeless-poorly-treated-bedford​ view/]. Bruce, David. “An Acceptable Price to Pay? The Use of Lethal Force by the Police.” Occasional Paper No. 81\, (Open Society Foundation, Criminal Justice Initiative, 2010), p. 9. [http://osf.org.za/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/CJI_Occasional_Paper_81​ .pdf]. Bruce, David. “The Road to Marikana: Abuses of Force during Public Order Operations.” South African Civil Society Information Service, October 12, 2012 [http://​ www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/1455]. Bruce, David. ‘Fighting Crime Shouldn’t Trump SA’s Public Order Policing.” Institute for Security Studies, August 16, 2019 [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/fighting-crime-sho​ uldnt-trump-sas-public-order-policing]. Burke, Lynn. “Carjacking: The New Leader of South African Crime.” South Africa in Transition [http://www.journalism.Berkeley.com]. Burt, Chris. “Zimbabwe to Use Hikvision Facial Recognition Technology for Border Control.” Biometric Update, July 14, 2018 [https://www.biometricupdate.com/2018​ 06/zimbabwe-to-use-hikvision-facial-recognition-technology-for-border-control]. Busuttil, Carla, and Gary Charles. Mosquito Lightning, 2016 [http://www.mosquitoligh​ tning.com/]. Clancy, Laura. “Hijacking and Car Theft Stats Revealed.” Moneyweb, October 10, 2001 [http://www.m1.mny.co.za]. CLICKON Technology web page [http://www.clickon.co.za]. C.O.B.R.A. Self-­Defense. “Carjacking, How to Improve the Odds You Do Not Get Killed for Your Ferrari.” C.O.B.R.A. Self-­Defense, October 3, 2017 [https://cobradefence.co​ .za/carjacking-how-to-improve-your-odds-of-not-getting-killed-for-your-ferrari/]. Corruption Watch. The Law for Sale: Corruption Watch. Endemic Corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department, 2012 Special Report [https://corrupt​ [email protected]]. Cornish, Juan-­Jacques. “Coup Crackdown a Show of Force.” Mail & Guardian Online, May 26, 2006 [https://mg.co.za/]. Cronjé, Justin. “Drone Con 2019: Redefining the Future of Work with Drones.” Defence Web, October 18, 2019 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial​ -vehicles/drone-con-2019-redefining-the-future-of-work-with-drones/]. Cronjé, Justin. “SAPS and JMPD See Drones in Their Future.” Defence Web, January 5, 2020 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/saps​ -and-jmpd-see-drones-in-their-future/]. Davis, Rebecca. ‘Public Order Policing: SAPS Demands More Muscle.” Daily Maverick (Online), September 3, 2014 [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-09-03​ -public-order-policing-saps-demands-more-muscle/]. Davis, Rebecca. “As SA Policing Fails, Private Security Steps In—­but at a Cost.” Daily

Bibliography

• 429

Maverick (Online), January 15, 2019 [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019​ -01-15-as-sa-policing-fails-private-security-steps-in-but-at-a-cost/]. De Greef, Kimon. “An Elite Helicopter Force Is Fighting South Africa’s Carjacking Epidemic.” Wired, July 2, 2019 [https://www.wired.co.uk/article/south-africa-johannes​ burg-carjacking]. de Wet, Phillip. “Alexandra Was Supposed to Get Very Cheap.” Business Insider SA, May 8, 2019 [https://www.businessinsider.co.za/vumatel-alexandra-project-delays-while​ -mitchells-plain-due-soon-2019-5]. Dlulane, Bonga. “Lesufi ‘Devastated’ after Equipment Worth R3m Stolen from Soweto School.” Eyewitness News, October 5, 2019 [https://ewn.co.za/2019/10/05/lesufi-dev​ astated-after-equipment-worth-r3m-stolen-from-soweto-school]. Dixon, Bill, and Janine Rauch. “Sector Policing: Origins and Prospects” (Monograph No. 97) (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004) [http//www.iss.co.za.html]. Dron, Alan. “The Drone Rangers.” African Aerospace Online News Service, December 16, 2019 [https://www.africanaerospace.aero/the-drone-rangers.html]. Duncan, Jane. “Media Underplaying Police, State Brutality.” Sunday Independent, August 26, 2012. [http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/media-underplaying-police-sta​ te-brutality-1.1369675#U0z7b_mSwmM]. du Venage, Gavin. “Apartheid Regime Bred Man-­Hunting Wolf-­Dogs.” Wolf Songs of Alaska, May 3, 2005 [https://www.wolfsongalaska.org/chorus/node/224]. Eina Ivy web page [http:/www.eina-ivy.co.za]. ElectroMesh Monitored Barrier Fencing web page [https://www.electromesh.co.za/]. Evans, Ian. “Shoot the Bastards . . . and Shoot to Kill: South African Minister Tells Police to Show Criminals No Mercy.” Mail Online, April 11, 2008 [http://www.dailymail.co​ .uk/news/article-558689/Shoot-bastards]. FACTSHEET: South Africa’s 2015/2016 Crime Statistics, Fact Check [https://africacheck. org/factsheets-south-africas-20152016-crime-statistics/]. Goga, Kahil. “The Business of (Dis)Organised Crime in South Africa.” Institute for Security Studies, August 25, 2015 [https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-business-of-dis​ -organised-crime-in-south-africa]. Harrisberg, Kim, and Anastasia Moloney. “Guns or Yoga? Finding Ways to Fight Crime in South Africa and Colombia.” IOL (Independent Online), October 16, 2019 [https://​ www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/guns-or-yoga-finding-ways-to-fight-cri​ me-in-south-africa-and-colombia-35086413]. HGC Residents’ Association. (http://www.hurlingham.org.za/]. Highpeak Technology Services. “Interview: Highpeak MD Gavin Hill on the Tech behind Vumacam’s CCTV Network.” Tech Central (Online), December 12, 2019 [https://techcentral.co.za/interview-highpeak-md-gavin-hill-on-the-tech-behind​ -vumacams-cctv-network-higprom/94690/]. Hlongwane, Sipho. “This Brutal Police State in Which We Live.” Business Day, January 22, 2014. [http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/01/22/this-brutal-poli​ ce-state-in-which-we-live].

430 •

Bibliography

Hosken, Graeme. “We Are Not Mercenaries—­Demining Firms.” IOL (Independent Online), February 12, 2004 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/south . . . /we-are-not-mercenaries-demining-firms-123191]. Hosken, Graeme. “Torture, Murder, Kidnap Rife in Cop Ranks.” Pretoria News, September 30, 2011 [http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime]. Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall Security Update—­October 2016 [www.hurlingh​ am.org.za/the-spruit-and-open-spaces]. ISDS (Intelligent Surveillance and Detection Systems). Official web page [https://www​ .isds.co.za/]. Ivkovic, Sanja Kutnjak, and Adri Sauerman. “The Code of Silence: Revisiting South African Police Integrity.” South African Crime Quarterly 40 (June 2012), pp. 15–­25 (Publication of the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria). [http://www.issafrica​ .org/sacq.php]. James, Kim. “Drone Guards: Securing High Value Assets, in Africa.” Africa Surveyors Online, October 4, 2019 [https://www.africasurveyorsonline/2019/10/04/drone-gu​ ards-securing-high-value-assets-in-africa/]. James, Kim. “Aerial Surveillance Improves Existing Layered Security Systems.” Drone Guards, July 16, 2019 [https://droneguards.africa/aerial-surveillance-improves-exist​ ing-layered-security-systems/]. Jayes, Karen. “The War on Terror Reaches South Africa in the Guise of ‘Fighting Crime.’” CAGE, October 24, 2014 [https://www.cage.ngo/war-terror-reaches-sou​th-africaguise-fighting-crime]. King, Emma. “Thulile Mthetwa—­MeMeZa Community Safety.” SAB Foundation, January 1, 2018 [https://sabfoundation.co.za/stories-1/2018/7/12/thulile-mthetwa-mem​ eza-community-safety]. Knoetze, Daneel. “City of Cape Town Plans to Acquire Drones.” GroundUp (Online), September 11, 2014 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article/city-cape-town-plan-acq​ uire-drones_2226/]. Knoetze, Daneel. “Draft Drone Rules Silent on Privacy and Weapon Concerns.” GroundUp (Online), January 27, 2015 [https://www.groundup.org.za/article/draft-dr​ one-rules-silent-privacy-and-weapon-concerns_2624/]. Kwet, Michael. “Smart CCTV Networks Are Driving an AI-­Powered Apartheid in South Africa.” Vice, November 22, 2019 [https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pa7nek/sma​ rt-cctv-networks-are-driving-an-ai-powered-apartheid-in-south-africa]. Labuschagne, Hanno. “Stolen Car Scam in South Africa—­Criminals Call You from Jail.” MyBroadband, June 18, 2020 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/motoring/342023​ -stolen-car-scam-in-south-africa-criminals-call-you-from-jail.html]. Liquid Bullet web page [https/www.liquidbullet.net/Default.asp]. Lixodex Intrusion Detection. Always Know [http://lixodex.co.za/]. MacLeod, Duncan. “Vumatel to Blanket Joburg in CCTV Cameras.” Moneyweb, February 15, 2018 [https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/tech/vumatel-to-blanket-joburg​ -in-cctv-cameras/]

Bibliography • 431

MacLeod, Duncan. “Remgro’s CIVH Pounces on Vumatel.” Tech Central (Online), June 8, 2018 [https://techcentral.co.za/remgro-civh-pounces-vumatel/81705/]. Madumo, Lesego. “Big Brother Watches over Joburg.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, January 29, 2008. [http://joburg.co.za]. Madumo, Lesego. “Long Arm of the Law Gets Longer.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, October 14, 2008. [http://joburg.co.za]. Madumo, Lesego. “Big Brother Tots up Successes.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, June 19, 2008. [http://joburg.co.za]. Madumo, Lesego. “Cameras Keep an Eye on the City.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, December 11, 2008. [http://joburg.co.za]. Maher, Clive. “Johannesburg Communities Take Initiative to Bolster Neighbourhood Security.” National Home Security SA, April 20, 2016 [https://www.nhsm.co.za/news​ /2016/johannesburg-communities-take-the-initiative-to-bolster-neighbourhood​ -security]. Majola, Bongani. “Now 150 Cameras Watch the City.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, July 16, 2002. [http://joburg.co.za]. Martin, Guy. “Drones Are Patrolling South African Residential Estates.” Defence Web, July 2, 2019 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles​ /drones-are-patrolling-south-african-residential-estates/]. Mayer, Andreas. “Absolutely Africa.” Future Frame, September 4, 2000 [http://www.futu​ reframe.de/framed/000904-elite-africa.htm]. McFarlan, Tim. “Terrifying Moment.” Daily Mail (London), July 23, 2015 [https://www​ .dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3172162/Terrifying-moment-Google-Street-View-ca​ ptures-carjacking-South-Africa.html]. McKane, Jamie. “The Plan to Cover Soweto in Fibre and Security Cameras.” MyBroadband, February 19, 2020 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/339334-the-pl​ an-to-cover-soweto-in-fibre-and-security-cameras.html]. McDougall, Dan. “Red Ants Clear Slums South Africa-­Style.” Sunday Times (UK), April 10, 2010 [http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4b​ d52eed5]. MeMeZa web page [http://memeza.co.za/memeza-personal-safety-alarm]. Micheloni, Christian, Laro Snidaro, and Gian Luca Foresti. “Exploiting Temporal Statistics for Events Analysis and Understanding.” Image and Vision Computing 27, 10 (2009), np. [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imavis.2008.07.005]. Mickkelson, David. “RapeX, the South African Anti-­Rape Condom.” Snopes, May 8, 2020. [https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/rapex/]. Mkhwanazi, Siyabonga. “Shabangu in the Firing Line.” IOL (Independent Online),, April 11, 2008 [http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/shabangu-in-the-firing-line-1.396128]. Motoring Staff (Tracker). “This Is the Day on Which Most Hijackings Occur: Tracker.” IOL (Independent Online), January 22, 2020 [https://www.iol.co.za/motoring/indust​ ry-news/this-is-the-day-on-which-most-hijackings-occur-tracker-41075740]. Mountain, Belinda. “Eyes on the Street Cameras.” Private Property, August 25, 2015.

432 • Bibliography

[https://www.privateproperty.co.za/advice/news/articles/eye-on-street-cameras​ /3507]. Moyo, Admire. “COJ Probes ‘Fraudulent’ Fibrehoods, Vumatel Contracts.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, March 12, 2018 [https://www.itweb.co.za/co​ ntent/mQwkoq6K3amv3r9A]. Moyo, Admire. “Fidelity ADT, Vumacam to Ring-­Fence Joburg Suburbs with Cameras.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, June 29, 2020. [https://www.itweb​ .co.za/content/GxwQD71ZdL5MlPVo]. Mungadze, Samuel. “Professor Decries Joburg’s Private Surveillance Networks.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, September 3, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co.za​ /content/Pero37ZgoYJMQb6m]. Mungadze, Samuel. “Vumacam Defends Joburg Smart Camera Network.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, December 3, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co.za/con​ tent/Kjlyr7wdroAMk6am]. Mungadze, Samuel. “Joburg Says It Has No Policy for Surveillance Cameras.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, December 17, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co.za​ /content/O2rQGMApYn67d1ea]. Omar, Bilkis. “New ‘Tough on Crime’ Policy Will Need a Better Trained Police Force.” Institute for Security Studies (Online Newsletter). [http:/www.issafricaorg/iss_toda​ sy.php?ID=1097]. Omega Risk Solutions. Official website [www.omegasol.com]. Opperman, Philip. “Microdot Technology.” ArticleCity (nd) [https://www.articlecity​ .com/articles/business_and_finance/article_10667.shtml]. Qukula, Qama. “Gayton McKenzie Nabs Gang Kingpin and Urges Communities to Take Charge.” 702 [Cape Talk] October 19, 2015 [http://www.702.co.za/articles/5882/gayt​ on-mckenzie-confronts-gangster-and-says-communities-must-take-charge]. Rademeyer, Julian, and Kate Wilkinson (researchers) and Peter Cunliffe-­Jones (editor). “South Africa’s Criminal Cops: Is the Rot Far Worse Than We Have Been Told?” Africa Check: Sort Fact from Fiction, July 23, 2014. [https://africacheck.org/reports​ /south-africas-criminal-cops-is-the-rot-far-worse-than-we-have-been-told/ .] Rangongo, Timothy. “These Joburg Suburbs Are Getting 15,000 CCTV Cameras.” Business Insider SA, February 15, 2019 [https:www.businessinsider.co.za/vumatel-launce​ hs-cctv-security-cameras-around-johannesbur-suburbs-2019-2]. Rangongo, Timothy. “This SA Startup Builds Cheap Anti-­Crime Tech for Communities.” Business Insider SA, December 21, 2018 [https://www.businessinsider.co.za/me​ meza-shout-crime-prevention-community-safety-startup-wins-millions-in-invest​ ment-funding-from-google-impact-challenge-south-africa-2018-12]. Riley, Terry. “Extreme Hardware: African Road Gear” [http://www.ticked.com/errtravel​ /1999/errhardware.htm]. Seldon, Andrew. “Automated Analytics with iSentry.” CCTV Handbook 2016, Hi-­Tech Security Solutions (Online) [https://www.securitysa.com/7465r].

Bibliography • 433

Seldon, Andrew. “The End of Blind Alarms.” Security Services and Risk Management, Hi-­Tech Security Solutions, Issue 3, 2020 [https://www.securitysa.com/10068r]. Shankland, Stephen. “This Home Security Drone Will Help You Tell Possums from Prowlers.” CNET, February 7, 2019 [https://www.cnet.com/news/home-security-dr​ one-could-help-you-tell-possums-from-prowlers/]. Shaw, Ian. “Policing the Future City: Robotic Being-­in-­the-­World.” Antipode 2017 (Intervention Symposium—­Algorithmic Governance, Online) [http://eprints.gla​ .ac.uk/141684/7/141684.pdf]. Shaw, Mark, and Clifford Shearing. “Reshaping Security: An Examination of the Governance of Security in South Africa.” South African Security Review 7, 3 (1998), pp. 3–­12. Slabbert, Antoinette. “Joburg CCTV Crime Fighting Cameras Unmanned,” Moneyweb, September 1, 2017 [https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/tender-interve​ ntion-sets-back-safety-in-joburg/]. Somduth, Charlene. “Child Rights Activist Escapes Hijacking.” IOL (Independent Online), February 1, 2019 [https://www.iol.co.za/thepost/child-rights-activist-escap​ es-hijacking-18964475]. Staff Reporter. “Altech Netstar’s Jamming-­Resist™ Technology Stops Criminals in Their Tracks.” Insurancegateway, June 9, 2016 [https://www.insurancegateway.co.za/Short​ termConsumers/PressRoom/ViewPress/Irn=13099&URL=Altech+Netstars+Jamm​ ingResist+technology+stops+criminals+in+their+tracks+1#.Xt0V5_lKi70]. Staff Reporter. “Anti-­Climb Rails—­‘Razor Spike.’” Hi-­Secure Ltd [http.//www.hi-secure​ .co.uk/anti-climb-rails-razor-spike.html]. Staff Reporter. “Axis Communications Brings Industry’s First Open IP-­Based Access Controller to the Canadian Market.” Security Products & Technology News, March 25, 2014. [http.//www.axis.com/za/en]. Staff Reporter. “Crime-­Combating Tech Helps Clean Up Jozi.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, May 20, 2019 [https://www.itweb.co.za/content/VgZeyqJ​ AndwMdjX9]. Staff Reporter. “Fibrehoods Deploying Aerial FTTH in Gauteng Suburb.” MyBroadband, February 3, 2017 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/153914-fibrehoods-deploy​ ing-aerial-ftth-in-gauteng-suburb.html]. Staff Reporter. “Mercedes Looks to Boost Sales in 2010.” IOL (Independent Online), 2009. [http://www.project2010.co.za/2010_World_Cup_security.asp?PN=13]. Staff Reporter. “Police Foil Sandton Heist.” ENCA (DStv, Channel 403), March 4, 2021 [https://www.enca.com/news/19-people-arrested-armed-robbery]. Staff Reporter. “Reducing False Alarms. News24, July 2, 2018 [https://www.news24.com​ /SouthAfrica/Local/Maritzburg-Fever/reducing-false-alarms-20180206 ]. Staff Reporter. “Tough New Laws for Electric Fences.” Property 24 Newsletter, February 18, 2013 [http//www.property24.com.html]. Staff Reporter. “Weird and Wonderful Anti-­Hyjacking Devices.” Leisure Wheels, August

434 • Bibliography

21, 2017 [https://www.leisurewheels.co.za/blogs/weird-wonderful-anti-hijacking-de​ vices/]. Staff Writer. “Airborne Drones Set to Provide Security Patrols in South Africa.” African Aerospace Online News Service, July 10, 2017 [https://www.africanaerospace.aero​ /airborne-drones-set-to-provide-security-patrols-in-south-africa.html]. Staff Writer. “A Look at Absa’s Plan to Make Joburg CBD Safer—­Including Using Drones.” Business Tech, August 6, 2019 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/33​ 3431/a-look-at-absas-plan-to-make-joburg-cbd-safer-including-using-drones/]. Staff Writer. “Drones—­Are They a Friend or Foe to Your Cybersecurity Strategy?” Cape Business News, January 9. 2020 [https://www.cbn.co.za/featured/drones-are-they​ -a-friend-or-foe-to-your-cybersecurity-strategy/]. Staff Writer. “Drones: The Next Big Thing for the South African Security Industry?” Security Focus Africa, March 7, 2020 [https://www.securityfocusafrica.com/2020/03​ /07/drones-the-next-big-thing-for-the-south-african-security-industry/]. Staff Writer. “Drones to Feature Heavily at Securex 2020.” Defence Web, March 5, 2020 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/drones-to-fe​ ature-heavily-at-securex-2020/]. Staff Writer. “Flamethrower Now an Option on S. African Cars.” CNN News, December 11, 1998 [http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Africa.html]. Staff Writer. “Having These Types of Electric Fences Could Get You Arrested in South Africa.” Business Tech, December 16, 2017 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle​ /215743/having-these-types-of-electric-fences-could-get-you-arrested-in-south-af​ rica/]. Staff Writer. “Here’s How Many South Africans Own a Gun.” Business Tech, June 20, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/252713/heres-how-many-south-afri​ cans-own-a-gun/]. Staff Writer. “How Much It Costs to ‘Bullet-­Proof ’ Your Car in South Africa.” Business Tech, September 23, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/motoring/272109/how​ -much-it-costs-to-bullet-proof-your-car-in-south-africa/]. Staff Writer. “Inside the Luxurious Smart Homes of South Africa’s Millionaires.” MyBroadband, October 29, 2015 [https://mybroadband.co.za/news/technology/143​ 979-inside-the-luxurious-smart-homes-of-south-africas-millionaires.html]. Staff Writer. “Joburg Is Getting New CCTV Surveillance Cameras.” Business Tech, July 23, 2018 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/260151/joburg-is-getting-new​ -cctv-surveillance-cameras/]. Staff Writer. “Johannesburg Adjudges CCTV Project a Success.” Defence Web, December 9, 2009 [https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/civil-security/johannesburg-adjud​ ges-cctv-project-a-success/]. Staff Writer. “Say ‘Tsek’ to Smash-­and-­Grabbers with These Precautionary Tips.” Dotsure Online Insurance, February 25, 2020 [https://www.dotsure.co.za/say-tsek-to-smash​ -and-grabbers-with-these-precautionary-tips/]. Staff Writer. “South African Residential Estates Are Now Using Drones to Boost Secu-

Bibliography • 435

rity.” Business Tech, July 3, 2019 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/technology/326901​ /south-african-residential-estates-are-now-using-drones-to-boost-security/]. “Specialized Security,” Protection Dogs Plus website [https://protectiondogsplus.com​ /our-training-services/specialized-security/]. Staff Writer. “The Three Most Hijacked Cars in South Africa.” Business Tech, June 27, 2017 [https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/182049/these-are-the-3-most-hijack​ ed-cars-in-southafrica/]. Staff Writer. “Vumatel Acquires Fibrehoods.” IT Web: Business Technology Media Company, October 20, 2016 [https://www.itweb.co.za/content/nG98Yd7LGnavX2PD]. Staff Writer. “Vumatel Acquires Fibrehoods.” MyBroadband, October 20, 2016 [https://​ mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/183622-vumatel-acquires-fibrehoods.html]. Steenkamp, Willem. “‘Killer Tampon’ to Give Rapists the Chop.” Independent Online, February 23, 2007 [https://www.iol.co.za/news/killer-tampon-to-give-rapists-the​ -chop-57525]. Stein, Michael Isaac. “‘Holy Cow’: The Powerful Software behind the City’s Surveillance System.” The Lens, December 20, 2018 [https://thelensnola.org/2018/12/20/holy​ -cow-the-powerful-software-behind-the-citys-surveillance-system/]. Steyerl, Hito. “The Language of Broken Glass.” Presentation, part of “Stop Making Sense.” HKW, Berlin, January 12, 2019 [https://www.hkw.de/en/app/mediathek/vid​ eo/69577]. Submission by CASAC to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry. “The Role of the South African Police Service at Marikana on 16 August 2012” (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, January 2013) [http://www.casac.] Summers, Nick. “I Remotely Patrolled a House with a $10,000 Security Drone.” Engadget, January 8, 2020. [https://www.engadget.com/2020-01-08-sunflower-labs-drone​ -home-security-impressions.html]. Tarnopolsky, Noga. “The Israeli Technology That May Have Helped Identify the Alleged Boston Bombers.” GlobalPost, May 9, 2013 [https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-09​ /israeli-technology-may-have-helped-identify-alleged-boston-bombers]. The Edge Shooting Academy website [https://www.edgeshooting.co.za/landing2021/]. Tracker web page [http://www.tracker.co.za]. Urban, Charles. CEO Tactical Group, 24-­Hour Armed Reaction and Guarding Specialists [http://www.tacticalreaction.co.za/off-site-cctv-monitoring/]. van der Merve, Christy. “Joburg Gets R42m CCTV System to Combat Inner-­City Crime.” Engineering News, December 10, 2008 [https://www.engineeringnews.co​ .za/article/joburg-gets-r42m-cctv-system-to-combat-innercity-crime-2008-12-10​ /rep_id:4136]. Vine, Jeremy. “Africa: Firing on All Cylinders.” BBC News, December 10, 1998 [http://​ www.news.co.uk.html]. Visser, Emily. “Smart Cars Patrol Joburg.” City of Johannesburg Official Website, November 28, 2008. [http://joburg.ca.za]. Wasserman, Helena. “South Africans Are Paying up to R1.45m to Bulletproof Their Cars

436 • Bibliography

as Hijackers Use New AK47 Bullets.” Business Insider SA, February 22, 2018 [https://​ www.businessinsider.co.za/people-are-paying-millions-to-bulletproof-their-cars​ -2018-2]. Weitzman, Eyal. “The Politics of Verticality.” Open Democracy, May 1, 2002, p. 2 [http://​ www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-politicsverticality/article_810.jsp]. “Welcome to CORTAC.” Official web page [https://www.cortac.co.za/]. Wilson, Craig. “Fibrehoods’ Aerial Fibre, Soon in a Johannesburg Suburb Near You.” Stuff Magazine, January 13, 2015 [https://stuff.co.za/2015/01/13/fibrehoods-aerial-fi​ bre-soon-in-a-johannesburg-suburb-near-you/]. Wilson, Craig. “Vumatel Has Acquired Fibrehoods.” Stuff Magazine, October 20, 2016 [https:/stuff.co.za/2016/10/20/vumatel-acquired-fibrehoods]. Wilson, Craig. “Meet Vumacam, Vumatel’s Smart Security Play for Joburg’s Suburbs.” Stuff Magazine, February 24, 2019 [https://stuff.co.za/2019/02/14/meet-vumacam​ -vumatels-smart-security-play-for-joburgs-suburbs/]. “Zoom Chat. Louise Jupp interview with Kim James, Aerial Works” [https://www.youtu​ be.com/watch?v=Jtj-5W024bw].

Index

Absa Bank, 165, 166 Ace/Clear Defense, 124 acoustic technologies, 30, 257 Adey, Peter, 26, 137 Aerial Works, 251, 253 AFHCO (African Housing Company), 209 African Housing Company (AFHCO), 209 African National Congress (ANC), 36, 60, 95, 163 Agamben, Giorgio, 20 AI (artificial intelligence), 23, 30, 179, 210, 251; algorithms, 26, 33, 177; deep learning, 24, 180, 198, 210; drones, 254–­ 55; facial recognition, 218; machine-­ driven, 172; software, 177, 199, 201, 210, 211, 217, 219, 273; surveillance, 180, 186, 215; “train,” 219; “watching,” 240–­41 air patrols, 39, 78, 87, 88, 89, 198, 100–­101, 157, 168, 169, 170, 197, 250 airport security, 31, 137–­38 Airtaser, 116–­17 Alexander, Jane: Security with traffic (influx control) Exhibition, 265–­67 ALPR (automatic license plate recognition), 212, 213, 216 Altech NetStar, 76 , 89, 99 Aludi Services, 125 Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (Absa), 4, 165–­66; Operational Risk Management Centre, 168



ANC (African National Congress), 36, 60, 95, 163 Angola LNG Project, 161 anxiety, 34, 103, 107, 127, 228, 266; agoraphobic, 7; extreme, 84; public, 19; urban, 116, 119–­23 Appadurai, Arjun, 112 armed robberies, 13, 17, 21, 39, 40, 52, 59, 60, 73, 74, 85, 86, 93–­94, 95–­96, 111, 121, 123, 171, 230, 233 Armormax, 90 arms race, 71, 140, 197 Armstrong, Gary, 148 artificial intelligence. See AI Asmal, Kader, 161 assault rifles, 92, 121, 158 ATM (automatic teller machine (ATM), 30, 51, 60, 61, 75, 86, 138, 152, 175 Audio Glassbreak Detection, 273, 274 automatic license plate recognition (ALPR), 212, 213, 216 automatic teller machine (ATM), 30, 51, 60, 61, 75, 86, 138, 152, 175 AutoTaser, 82 Axis Communications, 125–­26 BAC (Business Against Crime), 150–­52 BAC Surveillance Technology, 151, 336n51 BAC(SA) Surveillance Technology Unit, 152. See also Cueincident Surveillance Technology Bad Boyz, 300n54

437

438 • Index

Balibar, Etienne, 256 BankCity, 4 bank robberies, 152 Bardis, Antonia, 145 BAT (British American Tobacco), 162 The Battle for Johannesburg, 13 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1, 115 Beagle Watch, 47, 201, 209, 216, 217, 232, 235, 290n109 behaviometric recognition, 174 Benjamin, Walter, 12, 58, 103 Bentham, Jeremy: Panopticon, 142, 243 Bentley, 77; Bentaygas, 90 Bezuidenhout, Chris, 83 Big Brother, 142, 150, 153, 187, 189 biometric identification, 16, 22, 23, 32, 104, 111, 128, 138, 139, 140, 143, 174, 177, 220, 240, 250, 256, 257 Blackwater, 160 Blaster, 70–­74, 117, 312n12 blue-­light robberies, 95 BMW, 70, 89, 95, 152, 161: 5 Series, 59; 540i Protection, 90; C-­class, 92; X5s, 90 BMW Advanced Driving School, 89 body armor, 104, 324n40; as performance, 127–­29; personal, 115, 139; protective, 117 “body nets,” 113, 325n47 booby-­traps, 316n60 Bordeaux South Residents Association (BSRA), 230, 235 Botha, Johan, 161 BraamBID (Braamfontein Business Improvement District), 209 Braamfontein Business Improvement District (BraamBID), 209 Braamfontein Spruit colliding worlds, 221–­39; claiming the river, 233–­37; homeless people, 225–­26, 230, 232, 233–­ 34, 237; language, 225; map, 222; private policing, 238–­39; private recreational park for affluent homeowners, 227–­29; security governance, 237–­38; sequential acts, 230–­33 Bratton, William, 40

Bremner, Lindsay: Johannesburg: One City, Colliding Worlds, 224 Breuger, Michael, 245 BriefCam, 211, 217, 352n176 British American Tobacco (BAT), 162 BSRA (Bordeaux South Residents Association), 230, 235 BSRB (Braamfontein Spruit Rehabilitation Project), 229 “bubbles of governance,” 140, 331n152 Bulbulia, Shoneez, 5 Business Against Crime (BAC), 150–­52 Busuttil, Carla: Mosquito Lightning, 268–­79 CAA (Civil Aviation Authority), 249 Campher, Louis, 161 Canon Group, 125, 352n176 CAP (Community Active Protection), 208–­9, 215, 232 Cape Town International Airport, 331n142 capilarization, 246 CAP Security, 209 capsular architecture, 245–­46, 322n13 carjacking, 17, 26, 34, 59, 70, 72, 74–­75, 76–­86, 90, 91, 95, 96, 102, 114, 120, 121, 187, 231, 238; anti-­carjacking, 71, 76, 82, 87, 89, 98, 111; avoidance, 102, 316n60; most hijacked, 79; tips to avoid, 78. See also car thieves Carlton Centre, 151–­52 car thieves, 59, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 98, 100. See also carjacking; stolen vehicles CarTrack, 98, 99 CASAC (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution), 61 cash-­in-­transit robberies, 91–­92 Catalyst, 336n51 CBD (central business district), 146, 151, 156, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 229n91; Johannesburg, 150, 219 CCIN (Civilian Crime Intelligence Network), 105



CCTV (closed-­circuit television), 3, 31, 163, 174–­77; advances in technology, 177–­81; bolstering CCTV surveillance capabilities, 166–­65; business model, 201–­7; critical objections, 187–­89; early experiments, 199–­200; global connections, 218–­19; historical origins of CCTV surveillance revolution, 182–­87; JMPD takeover of CCTV surveillance, 163–­64; logistics, 207–­9; pioneers, 194–­98; revolution, 171–­220; second-­ generation CCTV surveillance systems, 198–­99; secrecy and deception, 190–­94; security utopias, 219–­20; smart CCTV surveillance, 31, 32–­33, 144, 167, 169–­70, 175, 178, 194, 199, 214, 219, 220, 244, 259, 260; surveillance ambition, 181–­82; surveillance cameras, 23, 26, 33, 123, 170, 177, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 190, 192, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 236, 238, 240, 248, 252; tracking vehicles, 212–­14; Vumacam at cutting edge of technical innovations, 210–­11. See also Vumacam Cell C, 185 central business district (CBD), 146, 151, 156, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 229n91; Johannesburg, 150, 219 Central Johannesburg Partnership, 150 Central Sharonlea Residents Forum (CSRF), 194 Centre of Praise International Church, 94 Charles, Gary: Mosquito Lightning, 268–­79 Charlton, Sarah, 226–­27, 354n16 checkpoints, 137, 139–­40, 240 Chubb, 160, 306n127 church robberies, 93 CIDS (City Improvement Districts), 4, 8, 66, 151 City Deep, 152 City Improvement Districts (CIDs), 4, 8, 66, 151 City of Johannesburg (CoJ), 188, 190, 191, 207

Index • 439 City Parks, 230, 232 City Power, 167, 191, 192, 205, 207 city space, 8, 246 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 249 Civilian Crime Intelligence Network (CCIN), 105 Claassen, Sias, 160 Clarke, James, 221 “clean streets,” 1, 2 ClickOn Communications, 128 climate of fear, 96, 322n12 closed-­circuit television (CCTV), 3, 31, 163 CloudWalk, 218 Clynes, Manfred, 113 C.O.B.R.A. Defense JHB, 134 Cochoy, Franck, 32 CoJ (City of Johannesburg), 188, 190, 191, 207 Comaroff, Jean, 328n103 Comaroff, John, 328n103 combat readiness, 16, 116, 134, 155, 208 Community Active Protection (CAP), 208–­9, 215, 232 Community Investment Ventures Holdings (CIVH), 205 community policing forums (CPFs), 9, 37–­38, 43–­44, 45, 149, 193, 231, 260. See also Linden Community Policing Forum Conquest Vehicles, 90 Cooper-­Knock, Sarah-­Jane, 11 Core Tactical, 194 corruption, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 75, 79 CORTAC, 254 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 326n73 Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC), 61 CPFs (community policing forums), 9, 37–­38, 43–­44, 45, 149, 193, 231, 260. See also Linden Community Policing Forum CPS (Community Protection Services), 109

440 •

Index

CRA (Craighall Residents Association), 235 Craighall Residents Association (CRA), 235 Crampton, Jeremy, 23, 25 “crime and control,” 8, 234 “crime blitzes,” 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 66 crime control, 5, 6, 41, 138, 244, 245; as low-­intensity war, 19, 62–­67, 121 criminal ingenuity, 91–­93 criminal syndicates, 34, 51, 60, 61, 79, 80, 86, 91, 93, 107, 255 Croock, Ricky, 194 Croock family, 182 CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research), 326n73 CSRF (Central Sharonlea Residents Forum), 194 CSS Tactical, 182, 183, 185, 192, 194–­96, 201, 215, 230, 232”Armed Response” vehicle, 259 Ctrack, 97 Cueincident Surveillance Technology, 152–­53, 154, 155, 160, 336n51, 336n54, 337n62 customized security products, 29 cyborg, 103, 113, 114 DA (Democratic Alliance), 95, 163–­64, 191 DataDot, 76, 88 Davis, Mike, 172 de Cauter, Lieven, 172 defensive driving courses, 101–­2 de Kock, Cobus, 160 Democratic Alliance (DA), 95, 163–­64, 191 Desert Wolf, 250 de Witt, Alex, 155, 160 de Witt, Fanie, 160 digital imaging, 25, 145, 159 Digital Scarecrow, 273 displaced people, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233 doctrine of maximum force, 59–­62 Drone Guards, 251–­53, 255 drone surveillance, 25, 164–­66, 168–­69,

232, 233, 235, 238; Drone Rangers, 246–­56 Dube, Lucky, 96 Duncan, Jane, 187–­88 Dyn-­Corp, 160 Edge Shooter Academy, 134 Edinburgh Risk, 160 Eina Ivy, 328n103 Ehlers, Sonette, 135–­36 electric fencing, 107, 129–­32, 130, 137, 219, 253 ElectroMesh, 131 Elliott, Anthony, 261 eNaTIS (National Traffic Information System), 80, 157 endemic misconduct, 53–­59 Ericson, Richard, 24, 175 Esithebeni Primary School, 123 everyday policing at time of crisis, 67–­69 fail-­safe, 83, 86, 116, 127, 172, 220 fantasy, 25, 70, 71, 74, 82, 83, 114, 115, 143, 241, 263; military, 24, 249; security futurism, 246; “technophilic fantasies,” 220 Faull, Andrew, 54 FCF (Future City Fourways), 198, 242 fear, 10, 29, 42, 55, 58, 66, 72, 74, 84, 86, 90, 93, 110, 122, 123, 134, 135, 187, 219, 225, 229, 234, 242, 243, 271, 272, 273; armed robbery, 94; bodily harm, 114; climate of, 96, 322n12; collective, 144; of crime, 7–­8, 10, 15, 121, 133, 172, 232, 243, 266; fashion, 116; harm, 20; hijacking, 83; household break-­ins, 107, 108; legal reprisals, 11; management strategies, 15; monetization, 273; of ordinary people, 19; politics, 146; polymorphous, 266; primal, 3, 264; rape, 135; unfounded, 110; urban, 8, 103, 118, 265; women, 136 Feigenbaum, Anna, 25 Ferrari, 77 fetishism, 3, 72, 111, 273



fiber-­to-­the home (FTTH), 182–­83, 185, 196 Fibrehoods, 182–­83, 185, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 215, 346n71; map, 184 Fidelity ADT, 198, 209 FIFA World Cup, 64; 2010, 63, 64, 90, 136 Fighting for a Living: The Streets at Stake, 13 FIRM (Forum for Integrated Risk Mitigation), 165 “first-­generation”: CCTV cameras, 199, 200; surveillance systems, 177 First National Bank (FNB), 152, 165 FNB (First National Bank), 152, 165 follow-­home robberies, 94–­95 fortification, 2, 3, 6, 8, 103, 105, 118, 181 fortress, 4, 94, 118, 261; city, 246; impulse, 150; mobile, 71; urbanism, 240, 245–­46 Forum for Integrated Risk Mitigation (FIRM), 165 42nd Precinct Security, 232 Foucault, Michel: “Panopticon,” 142, 144, 147, 176 Fourie, Charl, 70, 72–­73 Franco-­Prussian War, 87 FTTH (fiber-­to-­the home), 182–­83, 185, 196 Future City Fourways (FCF), 198, 242 Gallagher Estates Convention Centre, 124 gangs: blue-­light, 95; criminal, 20, 59, 60, 61, 78, 90, 91, 92, 108, 120, 121, 154, 238; thieves, 59, 77, 81, 95, 107–­8; well-­ armed, 121; youths, 82 Gartin, Patrick, 245 gated community, 8, 269 Gebremeskel, Gezahegn, 164 geographical information system (GIS), 25, 97 Ghost Busters, 232 GIS (geographical information system), 25, 97 global positioning systems (GPS), 22, 25, 30, 86, 88, 91, 92, 100, 113, 127, 128, 210, 250, 251, 253, 255

Index • 441 Global Risk Strategies, 160 Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM), 91, 92, 98, 99 Goldberger, Paul, 2 Goldstein, Warren, 208 Goodman Art Gallery: Choice. Click. Bait., 277 governance technologies of policing, 46–­48 GPS (global positioning systems), 22, 25, 30, 86, 88, 91, 92, 100, 113, 127, 128, 210, 250, 251, 253, 255 Graham, Stephen, 16, 58, 147, 248 Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 150 GSM (Global Systems for Mobile Communications), 91, 92, 98, 99 gun owners, 316n54 Halliburton, 160 Handi-­Blaster, 117 Hanekom, Braam, 63 Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, 218 Hansen, Thomas Blom, 58, 293n147 Haraway, Donna: “Cyborg Manifesto,” 114 Harris, Louis, 97 Harrison, George, 1 hawking, 3, 16, 46 HD (high-­definition), 110, 111, 126, 181, 251, 254, 307 Hebrew University of Jerusalem School of Computer Science and Engineering, 211 helicopter pursuits, 25, 39, 78, 87, 88, 89, 98, 100–­101, 101, 157, 168, 169, 170, 197; mini, 250 Heng, Yee-­Kuang, 171 Henley Air, 98, 101 HGC (Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall) Residents Association, 232, 235, 236 high-­definition (HD), 110, 111, 126, 181, 251, 254, 307 Highpeak Technology Services, 201

442 •

Index

hijacking, 70, 74, 76–­77, 83, 86, 89, 90, 95, 96, 97, 101, 150, 171; anti-­, 52, 70, 71, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 93, 98; armed, 72; assault, 89; avoidance, 75, 102; buildings, 13; cars, 71, 80, 82, 98, 313n23, 315n45; commercial vehicles, 93; high-­value cargo, 52; syndicates, 93; trucks, 52, 92; vehicles, 75, 78, 79, 91. See also Blaster; carjacking; car thieves; Maxican; National Hijack Prevention Academy homeless, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 16, 17, 45, 46, 55, 66, 120, 123, 149, 173, 223, 225, 226, 230, 232, 233–­34, 237 homeowners associations, 8, 252 Hornberger, Julia, 54, 58 house robberies, 108 human rights, 36, 38, 53, 56, 61, 97; advocacy, 50, 62, 74; nongovernmental organization, 55; organizations, 60. See also Lawyers for Human Rights Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall (HGC) Residents Association, 232, 235, 236 Hussein, Saddam, 163 ICT (information and communication technologies), 175 IDs (identification documents, 140, 233 identification documents (IDs), 140, 233 Ig Nobel Peace Prize, 312n12 IIOC (Integrated Intelligent Operation Centre (IIOC), 167, 169, 170 Image-­Metrics, 138 Imfezeko Investment Holdings, 182, 185, 201, 210, 216 Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), 56, 67 information and communication technologies (ICT), 175 Institute for Security Studies, 55 Integrated Intelligent Operation Centre (IIOC), 167, 169, 170 intelligent surveillance and detection systems (ISDS), 201, 210, 211, 217

Internet of Things (IoT), 179 internet protocol (IP), 218 internet service providers (ISPs), 203 In Touch, 72 Invana Trinity Methodist Church, 94 Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS), 125 IoT (Internet of Things), 179 IP (internet protocol), 218 IPID (Independent Police Investigative Directorate), 56, 67 ISDS (intelligent surveillance and detection systems), 201, 210, 211, 217 iSentry, 196, 201, 210–­11, 217 ISPs (internet service providers), 203 Israeli Foreign Ministry, 266 ITMS (Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer), 125 Jacobs, Jane, 30, 110, 334n28 Jaffe, Rivke, 258 jamming devices, 52, 77, 92, 98 Jamming Resist, 98 JCI, 336n51 JIA (Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), 137, 157 JMPD (Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department), 13, 34, 42, 43, 51, 52, 55, 65, 66, 67, 151, 156, 160, 167, 168, 169, 170, 191, 204, 227, 230, 231, 232, 233; takeover of CCTV surveillance, 163–­64 Joburg Water, 167 Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo, 167 Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), 137, 157 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), 13, 34, 42, 43, 51, 52, 55, 65, 66, 67, 151, 156, 160, 167, 168, 169, 170, 191, 204, 227, 230, 231, 232, 233; takeover of CCTV surveillance, 163–­64 Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), 191, 192 Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA), 152, 167, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193 Jones, David, 94



Jones, Gareth Stedman, 225 John Lilley Gallery: Super-­Suburb Defense Authority, 278 JPC (Johannesburg Property Company), 191, 192 JRA (Johannesburg Roads Agency), 152, 167, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193 Kanngieser, Anja, 25 Kashala, Oscar, 162 KCI (Kids Custodian Initiative), 215 Kelling, George, 39 Khan, Saira, 95 Khumalo, Bheki, 95 Kids Custodian Initiative (KCI), 215 Kline, Nathan, 113 Koolhaas, Rem, 173 Kruger National Park, 168 Kruger, Tinus: Designing Safer Places: A Manual for Crime Prevention through Planning and Design, 326n73 Kurokawa, Kisho, 91 Labuschagne, Cheryl, 210 Lacy, Mark, 90 Lamborghini, 77 Land Cruiser, 90 Land Rover, 77 Landman, Karina: Designing Safer Places: A Manual for Crime Prevention through Planning and Design, 326n73 Law and Disorder in Johannesburg, 13 Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), 62 layered security, 149, 253 Leon, Tony, 163 LHR (Lawyers for Human Rights), 62 Lieberman, Susan: Designing Safer Places: A Manual for Crime Prevention through Planning and Design, 326n73 Linden Community Policing Forum, 232 Lipschitz, Ruth, 266 Liquid Bullet, 127–­28, 129 Lixodex, 252–­53

Index • 443 machine learning, 23, 24, 26, 177, 198, 211, 212, 217, 251, 257 Macia, Emidio Josias “Mido,” 56 Mackenzie, Cameron, 95 Macro Surveillance Centre, 155, 159 Majali, Sandile, 163 Marcuse, Peter, 8 Mashaba, Herman, 163, 191 MasterDrive, 101 Matrix Vehicle Tracking, 88, 89, 91, 97, 98, 99 Maxican, 127–­28 McKenzie, Gayton, 58–­59, 308n136 McNally, Paul, 51 Melville Residents Association (MRA), 196; Security Alert, 112 MeMeZa Personal Safety Alarm (MPSA), 117 MeMeZa Shout Crime Prevention, 128–­ 29 Mercedes Benz, 88, 96, 161; C-­Class, 92; E-­Guard, 90; S600 Guard, 90 Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), 166, 169 Milestone Systems, 200 militarization of urban space, 3, 19, 25, 38, 41, 63, 118, 155–­60, 172 military contracting, 155, 160–­63 Miller, Andrew, 72 MiWay Insurance, 209 Morubisi Technologies, 163 Mosselson, Aidan, 300n54 MRA (Melville Residents Association), 196 Msimanga, Solly, 96 MTC (Metropolitan Trading Company), 166, 169 MTN, 183, 185 Mthethwa, Nathi, 61 M2 freeway closure, 51, 157, 164, 165–­66, 168, 340n99 murder, 34, 52, 57, 74, 75, 76, 96, 97, 120, 134, 240, 306n127 Mvelaphanda, 336n51

444 •

Index

National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), 161 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), 36–­37 National Hijack Prevention Academy, 101 National Recognition Centre (NRC), 126 National Traffic Information System (eNaTIS), 80, 157 NCACC (National Conventional Arms Control Committee), 161 NCPS (National Crime Prevention Strategy), 36–­37 neighborhood associations, 7, 8–­12, 28, 29, 43, 44, 45, 58, 110, 123, 223, 230–­31; CCTV, 172, 181, 183, 186, 189, 190, 193, 196, 197, 199, 200, 203, 204–­5, 207, 208–­9, 213, 214, 215–­16, 217, 219, 220; “eradication of mess,” 224, 231; high-­ speed internet, 215; homeless, 232, 237; “NIMBYism,” 224; private security companies, 197, 214, 217, 220, 236, 237–­ 38; privileged use of public greenbelt, 227–­29, 234; “security initiatives,” 234. See also Bordeaux South Residents Association; Craighall Residents Association (CRA); Hurlingham/Glenadrienne/Craighall (HGC ) Residents Association Nelson, Diane, 111 Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Port Elizabeth), 339n91 NetStar, 76, 97; Planetron Ghost, 98 Nirox Sculputre Park, 268 Nissan, 152, 161; Patrols, 90 Nixon, Rob, 15 Nkosi, Thami, 189 nongovernmental organization (NGO), 55, 229 Norris, Clive, 148 Nqakula, Charles, 59 NRC (National Recognition Centre), 126 Nzuza, Njabulo, 96 OC (oleoresin capsicum), 128 off-­site monitoring (OSM), 213, 214, 220

Olalquiaga, Celeste, 115, 322n12 oleoresin capsicum (OC), 128 Omega Risk Solutions, 155–­60, 161, 162, 163, 164, 337n62, 339n91 Operation Clean Sweep, 64–­65, 66 Opera Ke Molao (“It’s the Law”), 65, 66 optical technologies, 30, 153, 178 order maintenance, 27, 38, 39, 40, 44, 53, 67 O. R. Tambo International Airport, 95 Orwell, George: “Big Brother,” 142 Paasche, Till, 45 PAIA (Promotion of Access to Information Act), 204 panic buttons, 93, 104, 108, 113, 116, 127, 166 panoptic surveillance, 26, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150–­54, 176, 240, 242, 244, 264; Bentham’s Panopticon, 243; Foucault’s Panopticon, 142; “Superpanopticon,” 145 Parenti, Christian, 41 park dwellers, 225–­27, 228, 229, 231, 232, 235 Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association (PRABOA), 210 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), 169 passive millimeter imaging (PMI), 175 Penberthy, John, 153, 336n48 pepper spray, 12, 56, 71, 75, 82, 100, 104, 116, 127, 129, 158, 250 perimeter security, 106, 126, 129, 130, 251, 252 Pienaar, Mandy, 171 Pistorius, Oscar, 57 PMI (passive millimeter imaging), 175 police misconduct and violence, 48–­53 policing landscape, 10 policing the post-­liberal city, 34–­69; crime control as low-­intensity war, 19, 62–­67, 121; doctrine of maximum force, 59–­62; endemic misconduct, 53–­59; everyday policing at time of crisis,



67–­69; governance technologies, 46–­ 48; new styles after apartheid, 38–­39; police misconduct and violence, 48–­53; public policing and law enforcement, 35–­38; two-­pronged approach to public policing, 43–­46; zero tolerance, 39–­43 POPIA (Protection of Personal Information Act, 189 Porsche: Cayennes, 90 posthumanist theorizing, 114 Poulantzas, Nicos, 68 PRABOA (Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association), 210 PRASA (Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa), 169 Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 65 private security, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11–­12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 66, 87, 78, 84, 86, 88, 92, 98, 100, 105, 106, 108, 110, 113, 118, 122, 123, 126, 131, 140, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 166, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 265, 268, 269–­70, 270, 274, 275, 277, 279, 293n148, 300n54 Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA), 58, 189, 203 privatization: crime control, 245; hyper-­, 278; neighborhood governance, 9; policing, 268, 275; public realm, 123; public security, 237; social space, 242; urban governance, 3, 4 Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), 204 Protection Dogs Plus, 316n54 Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA), 189 PSiRA (Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority), 58, 189, 203

Index • 445 psychasthenia, 105–­19, 322n12 public policing, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18–­19, 29, 34, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49–­50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67–­68, 78, 105, 118, 159, 213, 231, 234, 236, 275, 309n152; and law enforcement, 35–­38 public spaces, 3, 4, 5, 7, 23, 28, 31, 32, 42, 46, 66, 103, 114, 123, 133, 137, 140, 143, 150, 153, 172, 173, 183, 187, 190, 191, 194, 195, 196, 198, 207, 209, 223, 225, 227, 231, 235, 237, 258 quality of life, 39, 40, 41, 46 radio frequency identification (RFID), 30, 104, 127 “rainbow Nation,” 269 RAMBOS, 256 Range Rover, 89, 90, 96 Rape-­aXe, 329n124 RapeX, 329n124 Rapoport, Michelle, 106 Reaction Services, 101 Red Ants, 13, 63 registered pilot’s license (RPL), 254 Remote Operating Certificate (ROC), 251 remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), 247, 249, 250 remotely piloted aviation systems (RPAs), 248, 251 Rentrack, 89 revenge fantasies, 72–­76 RFID (radio frequency identification), 30, 104, 127 risk-­averse guide to staying safe, 114 risk management, 5, 8, 16, 22, 32, 42, 43, 124, 145, 155, 158, 171, 246, 260 Ritchie, Kevin, 89 River Rangers, 230 road closures, 9, 29, 22, 139, 164, 165, 171, 245 The Road Home, 13 robberies, 107, 120–­21, 124, 152; armed, 13, 17, 21, 39, 40, 52, 59, 60, 73, 74, 85, 86, 93–­94, 95–­96, 111, 121, 123, 171, 230,

446 •

Index

robberies (continued) 233; bank, 152; blue-­light, 95; cash-­in-­ transit, 91–­92; church, 93; follow-­home, 94–­95; house, 108; smash-­and-­grab, 89, 238; street, 14, 231; violent, 154. See also car thieves ROC (Remote Operating Certificate), 251 Rocketmine State of Drone Report, 249 Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises, 132 Rossmo, D. Kim, 200 Rotary Razor Spike, 129 RPA (remotely piloted aircraft), 247, 249, 250 RPAs (remotely piloted aviation systems), 248, 251 RPL (registered pilot’s license), 254 RSS Security Services, 185, 194 SABC3, 72 SABMiller, 152 SACAA (South African Civil Aviation Authority), 251 SADF (South African Defense Force), 35, 132, 160, 162 SAEFIA (South African Electrical Fencing Installers Association), 131 “Safe Corridors,” 166 “safe house,” 105, 261, 322n13 “Safer City,” 150 SAICB (South African Insurance Crime Bureau), 213 SAITF (South African Informal Traders Forum), 65 SANDF (South African National Defense Force), 13, 62, 64, 230 SANTRA (South African National Traders Retail Alliance), 65 SAPS (South African Police Service), 9, 13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 37–­38, 43, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 75, 89, 92, 94, 100, 150, 156, 160, 161, 164, 167–­ 68, 170, 191, 204, 212, 230, 306n127 Saunders, Chris, 268 sector policing, 38, 39 Securex IFSEC trade exhibition, 123 Securicor Gray, 160

security governance, 9, 17, 37, 38, 171–­73; active engagement, 234; changing contours, 237–­38; extralegal, 235; future-­oriented, 258; holistic approach, 174; “messy actualities,” 51; modes, 46; private, 22; technological innovation, 21–­26, 29–­30, 249, 256, 260, 261 security paradigm, 258 security paraphernalia, 6, 123–­27, 177, 265 “self-­governing citizens,” 10 self-­protection, 58, 70, 103–­41, 208, 260; airport security, 31, 137–­38; body armor as performance, 127–­29; checkpoints, 137, 139–­40, 240; gendered dynamics, 133–­37; microworlds, 140–­41; psychastenia and armoring of anxious body, 105–­19, 322n12; risk-­averse guide to staying safe, 114; security paraphernalia, 6, 123–­27, 177, 265; skills, 134; urban anxiety, 116, 119–­23; vengeful thoughts, 129–­33 Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, 151 7Arrows Security, 194, 209, 231 Shabangu, Susan, 60 shadow policing, 26–­28 Sherman, Lawrence, 245 Shirlow, Peter, 133 Shussler, Michael, 340n99 Sigauqwe, Given, 134 Skunk Riot Control Copter, 250–­51 Small, C. j., 95 smart CCTV surveillance, 31, 32–­33, 144, 167, 169–­70, 175, 178, 194, 199, 214, 219, 220, 244, 259, 260 smash-­and-­grab robberies, 89, 238 Smith, Benjamin, 134 Smith, Charlene, 136 Smith, Nelson, 146 Soderlund, Gretchen, 22, 24 softer side of security, 45 Solomon, Benjamin, 134 Sonke Gender Justice, 134 Sotyu, Makhotso, 62 South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), 251



South African Council of Churches, 93 South African Defense Force (SADF), 35, 132, 160, 162 South African Electrical Fencing Installers Association (SAEFIA), 131 South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF), 65 South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB), 213 South African National Defense Force (SANDF), 13, 62, 64, 230 South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA), 65 South African Police Service (SAPS), 9, 13, 14, 34, 35, 36, 37–­38, 43, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 75, 89, 92, 94, 100, 150, 156, 160, 161, 164, 167–­ 68, 170, 191, 204, 212, 230, 306n127 spatial management, 6, 147 spatial management in hypermodern city, 240–­64; border erasure, 256–­57; “bubble lives,” 245–­46, 247; capsular architecture, 245–­46; “Drone Rangers,” 246–­56; governance, 242–­45; preemptive crime prevention, 258–­61; security utopias, 261–­62; technowar, 257–­58 spatial regulation, 5, 6, 244 Special Armed Services, 230 speculative policing, 258 Spoornet, 152 spy machines, 31, 168 squatting, 3, 15, 226, 230, 301n64 SSC Equity Training, 101 Stabile, Roberto, 124–­25 Standard Bank, 4, 165 state of emergency, 1–­33, 68 Statistics SA’s Victims of Crime 2018/2019 report, 107 Steyerl, Hito, 273 St. James Free Presbyterian Church, 94 St. Matthew’s Anglicen Traditional Church, 93 stolen vehicle recovery (SVR), 91, 97–­100 stolen vehicles, 76, 78, 80, 86, 87–­88, 89, 92, 97, 101, 157, 169, 212, 213–­14, 216;

Index • 447 recovery systems, 91, 98–­99, 100. See also carjackings; car thieves Storm Combat, 134 street robberies, 14, 231 Suchar, Charles, 175 Sunflower Home Awareness System, 254–­55 surveillance cameras, 22, 81, 94, 138, 147, 151, 152, 154, 158, 159, 166, 175, 188, 219, 242, 249, 251, 331n142, 334n28; CCTV, 23, 26, 33, 123, 170, 177, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 190, 192, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 236, 238, 240, 248, 252 surveillance technologies, 24, 31–­33, 106, 144, 145, 148, 151, 157, 179–­80, 210, 245, 247, 248; aerial, 251, 256; “all-­seeing,” 244; anticrime, 172; CCTV, 147, 174, 177, 188, 191, 199, 207, 209, 210, 258, 259; automated, 257; contemporary, 142, 143, 259; digitalized, 176, 177, 260; drone, 251; electro-­optical, 243; mobile, 256; networked, 274; network video, 125; remote, 137, 232; second-­generation, 178; state-­of-­the-­art, 150, 201; up-­to-­date, 138, 173. See also BAC Surveillance Technology; BriefCam; Cueincident Surveillance Technology; Vumacam surveillant assemblage, 24, 58, 142–­70; bolstering CCTV surveillance capabilities, 166–­65; carceral city, 150–­54; drone surveillance, 25, 164–­66, 168–­69, 232, 233, 235, 238, 246–­56; JMPD takeover of CCTV surveillance, 163–­64; militarization of urban space, 3, 19, 25, 38, 41, 63, 118, 155–­ 60, 172; military contracting, 155, 160–­63; panoptic surveillance, 26, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150–­54, 176, 240, 242, 244, 264; Panopticon, Bentham’s, 243; Panopticon, Foucault’s, 142; smart CCTV surveillance, 31, 32–­33, 144, 167, 169–­70, 175, 178, 194, 199, 214, 219, 220, 244, 259, 260; spies in the sky, 146–­50; “Superpanopticon,” 145 SVR (stolen vehicle recovery), 91, 97– ­100

448 •

Index

Tactical Advantage, 134 “Tall and Short Gang,” 108 Tau, Parks, 163–­64 teachers leaving South Africa, 320n123 Telkom, 183, 185 Telematrix, 80 Thomas, Chris, 230 Thomson, Chad, 87–­88 three-­dimensional space, 25, 147, 207, 248 tilt, pan, and zoom (TPZ) camera, 178 TML Reed Industrial Exhibitions, 123 Top Security, 108 TPZ (tilt, pan, and zoom) camera, 178 Tracker, 75, 89, 97, 98, 99, 209 tracking devices, 93, 99, 240; car, 89; electronic vehicle, 83; GPS, 22; hidden, 80; implanted, 30; installed, 53, 97; locational, 25; satellite, 23, 86 Transaction Control Technologies: Smokecloak machine, 124 Tshabalala, Judith, 95 24/7 Security Services, 194, 231, 232, 233, 306n127 26 Gang, 58–­59 two-­pronged approach to public policing, 43–­46 UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), 169, 247, 248, 249–­50, 251, 252, 255, 256, 360n45. See also drone surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 169, 247, 248, 249–­50, 251, 252, 255, 256, 360n45. See also drone surveillance urban anxiety, 116, 119–­23 urban fear, 8, 118, 265 urban governability, 5–­8, 10, 11, 41, 43, 45, 138, 173, 243, 245, 246; privatization, 3, 4 urbanism: defensive, 246; disciplinary, 20–­21, 145; exclusionary, 12–­15; fortress, 240, 245–­46; military, 15–­20, 63, 172, 173; New Urbanism, 242; unsettled, 111 urban landscape, 4, 46, 47, 89, 113, 138, 139, 144, 146, 173, 238, 240, 242, 244, 261, 262, 272; cleaning up, 17; forti-

fication, 118, 139; fragmentation, 8, 158, 224; gendered dynamics, 133–­37; geographically imagined, 42; hardening, 12–­15, 246; management, 5, 118; pacification, 38; postapartheid, 8; public spaces, 137, 148, 241; securing, 22, 23; “top-­down” surveillance, 24; untamed parts, 143; “vertical militarization,” 25 Urry, John, 261 van Ryneveld, Clive, 160 vehicle identification number (VIN), 87 vehicle of interest (VOI), 213 vehicle security, 76, 84, 85, 89, 124 verticalization, 25–­26, 100, 146, 147, 181, 207, 216, 248 video management systems (VMS), 200, 201, 211, 213 Video Synopsis Solutions, 211 Vidler, Anthony, 18 Vigneswaran, Darshan, 54 VIN (vehicle identification number), 87 violent robberies, 154 virtual reality video games, 143, 148 “vision machines,” 144, 154 VMS (video management systems), 200, 201, 211, 213 Vodacom, 183, 185 VOI (vehicle of interest), 213 Volvos, 90 VPR: Bringing the Internet to Africa, 210 vulnerable bodies, 103–­41 vulnerable space, 93–­97 Vumacam, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186–­87, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193–­94, 196–­97, 198, 200, 201, 203–­5, 207, 208–­9, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215–­17, 218, 219, 220, 238; cutting edge of technical innovations, 210–­11; residential neighborhoods, 197 Vumacam/Vumatel, 203, 219; organizational chart, 202 Vumatel, 181, 183, 185–­86, 190, 191, 192, 194, 203, 205, 209, 219, 215, 216, 217, 219. See also Vumacam/Vumatel



Walker, George, 1 Walkley, David, 73 “war on crime,” 38, 49, 57, 67, 156 Waterfall Investment Company (WIC), 182 Watt, Paul, 16 Weber, Cynthia, 90, 115–­16 Weeden, Lisa, 19 WhatsApp, 105, 216, 217 Whitehead, Mark, 26 WIC (Waterfall Investment Company, 182 Williams, Alison, 26

Index • 449 Wilson, Elizabeth, 117 Wilson, James Q., 39 WiMAX, 159 Winner, Langdon, 103 wolf-­dogs, 132–­33 Wong, Michelle, 73 zero tolerance, 1, 2, 17, 38, 39–­43, 44, 46, 49, 62, 64, 87, 154, 236, 259 Zondi, Musa, 95 Zuboff, Shoshana, 177 Zuma, Jacob, 60