The INF Treaty and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific Security 9789814377126

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THE INF (INTERMEDIATE -RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES) TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

THE INF (INTERMEDIA TE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES) TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATION S FOR ASIA-PACIFI C SECURITY

Thierry de Montbrial

ASEAN Economic Research Unit Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

This paper was delivered at a Public Lecture sponsored by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore on 10 March 1988.

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1989 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data

Montbrial, Thierry de. The INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and its implications for Asia-Pacific security. 1. Nuclear arms control. 2. Asia -- National security. 3. Pacific Area -- National security. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore). II. Title. JX1974 M76 1989 ISBN 981-3035-23-4

Printed in Singapore by Kefford Press Pte Ltd

Contents

Introduction ............................................................................. vii K.S. Sandhu

The INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty .............. ! and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific Security Thierry de Montbrial

Question and Answer Session ................................................. 10

Introduction K. S. Sandhu Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Ladies and Gentlemen It is my pleasure to introduce to you our distinguished visitor, Dr Thierry de Montbrial from Paris. As those of you who got his curriculum vitae would have gathered, he is a winner of many distinctions, many prizes, and many honours. He is trained as a mathematician, as a strategist, and as an economist, among many other attributes. His Ph. D. in economics is from the University of California in Berkeley where he worked under the nobel laureate Gerard Debreu. Prior to assuming his present position as Director of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), he was Head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Concurrently with his present positions, he also holds several other responsibilities including that of Chairman of the Department of Economics at the Ecole Polytechnique. He is also a consultant to a number of international firms. In short, he comes to us with a wealth of expertise and experience which should make the topic of this afternoon's deliberations all the more intriguing and interesting. The topic is "The INF Treaty (Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces Treaty) and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific". Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you Dr de Montbrial.

The INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific Security

Although I will try not to forget the last point of the title, since the core of the topic tonight is Europe and the implications of the evolutions in Europe, I will start with some reflections about the future of Europe or to be more precise, about the Soviet Union and its policy towards Europe. Indeed, with regard to the future of Europe, for obvious geographical, physical, and historical reasons, the most important factor to consider is the Soviet Union. Then, I will turn to the INF Treaty which was signed last December between the United States and the Soviet Union and I will try to explain why, although it is a major achievement in the field of arms control, there may also be reasons to be worried about future developments. In my next point, I will underline the stakes for the next few months and years. The next few months of this year might be crucial in some important respects. To end with, I shall try to give you a few thoughts on the implications of these developments for the rest of the world.

I.

IS THE SOVIET UNION REALLY CHANGING?

Glasnost, perestroika- these two words have been ringing in our ears for some time. What does lie behind them? And more fundamentally, is the Soviet system really about to change? If so, in what direction? Is the hawk turning into a dove? Should we trust this dove and assume that the Soviet Union is now entirely concentrating on the prosperity of its people? And therefore, should we help them and, to show our goodwill, should we even agree to give up our nuclear arsenal? These questions raise some preliminary remarks.

First, the Soviet Union is a communist country and as such it continues to stick to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mr Gorbachev is himself a purest offspring of the system through his education first, later through his career: he climbed the ladder as a faithful communist and a member of the Party. Let us not forget that in the USSR, to get to the top without playing the game wholeheartedly is hardly conceivable. This is my first point. My second point is an historic one. Since 1917, the history of the Soviet Union has taught us that the Soviets are an extremely realistic people. This is probably the only country which is up to make U-turns without any preliminary precautions if its leadership believes it to be in its own interest. They did it in the thirties under Stalin, and again when Hitler emerged. Remember also the strategy that Lenin implemented in 1921. What we are experiencing today is a new version of Lenin's "New Economic Policy (NEP)" and there are some grounds to welcome cautiously President Reagan's assumption that the new economic trends illustrate the positive changes underway in Gorbachev's Russia. In fact, Lenin very clearly said that the NEP was but a tactical move to gain time and his successors - Stalin, in particular - confirmed the argument. In the light of history, facts should make us extremely cautious. For the time being, many questions remain unanswered. Is the Soviet Union on the road to being a democratic country in line with the United States? One may have doubts. But let us not preclude such developments in the very long term maybe in a hundred years' time. However, it is probably more relevant to assume that basically, the Soviets are trying to improve the existing system in order to save the communist regime and to strengthen it on new bases. As Western Europe's leaders bear responsibilities, they cannot take the risk not to consider this hypothesis very seriously. This being said, what are the Soviet Union's fundamental objectives? The domestic ones are very clear: to enhance the Soviet economy's performance, to improve its achievements. A lot has been written in this regard and I will rather focus on the external objectives. We can easily discern what they are: first, because they are described at length by the Soviets themselves; second, because once again past developments give us a clue to understand current ones. Some people acknowledge that, had they read Hitler's writings before the war broke out, they might have avoided some mistakes. Soviet objectives have been widely published. As far as Europe is concerned, they are twofold. The first is to create a so-called collective security system that would be controlled from Moscow. Closely related to this is the newly elaborated common house concept which in particular is being developed in Gorbachev's book, Perestroi"ka. It applies to Europe. According to the Soviet view, Europe's vocation is to be a big house with a big room, a dining room, and a living room 2

which should be occupied by the Soviets, and a number of small rooms for everybody else, with two small rooms for the two Germanies, and no room at all for the United States. This is the common house concept. What is most surprising is that once again it has been hailed as a new idea. As a matter of fact, this is just the old collective security concept re-emerging under new clothes. What lies underneath is obvious: it aims at pushing the United States aside ("decoupling") to remain the only hegemonic power. Concretely, even if every country is supposed to be free to choose its own system, it means that the Soviet Union would have a say on any move in Western Europe. To achieve this, the Soviet Union does not need to invade Western Europe. This is not its objective. The process it considers is much more subtle and much more insidious. The second objective is to draw on, to pump, Western resources - in technical terms, to shift the terms of trade - to improve their own economy. The Soviets are very well aware of the fact that they will not be able to solve their economic problems without external help. As they cannot import manpower - Western brains and engineers - as Peter the Great did since it would jeopardize the regime, they have no other alternative. The best way to achieve this is within the collective security concept. However, although the Soviets do not intend to wage a war, still they need military power and a favourable balance of power to exert indirectly the kind of pressures that could lead to the situation described above; hence their security policy, the cornerstone of which is the denuclearization of Europe, that is the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe west of the Urals. Again this is not a new trend. This would mean that it would no longer be possible to hit Soviet assets with nuclear weapons from Europe. However, the reverse would still work: Europe could still be reached by nuclear weapons remaining in the Soviet Union. In the name of peace, the Soviet Union would then enjoy an extraordinarily favourable position. It is very unlikely that the Europeans could make up for this situation with conventional forces. Because of geographical reasons (we lack strategic depth), of demographic and social reasons (not to speak about the division of Europe which is still not a united country), we will never be able to offset the Warsaw Pact forces even if they are somewhat cut down. This is why the denuclearization of Europe is such a big stake for the Soviet Union.

II.

THE INF TREATY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

This leads me to the analysis of the INF Treaty. This treaty concerns all nuclear missiles or cruise missiles (missiles that fly at very low altitudes) with a range 3

of 500-5.500 kilometres. According to the agreement reached, all these missiles will be eliminated; hence, the zero option or the zero-zero option. Zero-option means the full elimination of these weapons, that is essentially the SS-20s on the Soviet side and the Pershing 2 and the highly sophisticated cruise missile systems on the Western side. This achievement as such is noteworthy since it is the first time indeed that there will be physical destruction of non-obsolete weapons. Moreover, the Soviets have accepted on-site inspections (because the Treaty implies very delicate verification problems). They will destroy twice as many missiles as will the United States. This creates a precedent in the field of arms control and it is important. Also important is the scope of the operation. On the Soviet side, for instance, nearly 900 highly sophisticated systems 1 will have to be destroyed within three years, which means roughly one system a day. As can be imagined, destroying these weapons is technically an extremely delicate matter. Being given the array of problems it raises -pollution, among others - this is a very significant move. This being said, let us assess the consequences of the Treaty. First, compared with the total amount of weapons stocked by the two superpowers, the quantity of weapons to be eliminated is relatively negligible: it represents less than 4 per cent of the total. However, the implementation of the treaty theoretically, within a period of three years - will have very serious strategic consequences which are at the heart of the current strategic debate. Indeed, on one side, the remaining Soviet systems, including the intercontinental systems, will continue to be able to reach any target in Europe. One of these is the SS24, a new mobile system which is very accurate and very precise. This means that the implementation of the Treaty will not alter the Soviet's military options. In other words the actual threat is not proportional to the number of weapons: it is not reduced by 4 per cent. The threat is subordinated to the actual margin of manoeuvre of the adversary. The Treaty does not reduce the threat that faces Western Europe. For Western Europe, however, it implies a radical change since the Treaty deprives it of one major option: it leaves Western Europe with no land-based systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union. This asymmetry in favour of the USSR has very serious implications. Let us imagine the case of a conventional Soviet attack against Western Europe, that is an attack in which nuclear weapons would not be used immediately. As you know, the capacity of the Alliance to resist conventionally is measured in terms of days. Suppose that, after a few days, the Soviets have occupied one third of the German territory, that is more than one third of its total industrial capacity. The only options left for the This consists of 851 launchers and I ,836 nuclear heads on the Soviet side against 294launchers and 859 nuclear heads on the U.S. side.

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Western side would be to use either short-range nuclear weapons (with a range of less than 500 kilometres) or strategic weapons. Most analysts and politicians believe that neither option could be implemented. The first one because, to hit the Warsaw Pact forces, short-range weapons would have to destroy the German territory; the second one because, since the use of strategic weapons could immediately trigger a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, the latter would probably not take such a step. This means that the elimination of weapons capable of reaching the Soviet territory from Europe apparently creates a gap. What should be done in terms of strategy to fill that gap? This question, which was at the core of the 3 March NATO meeting in Brussels, raises another issue, the so-called "modernization process". This embraces the kind of steps that the Atlantic Alliance should take to keep the same strategic capacity as before, that is to achieve a strategic stability at a lower level. A number of options have been considered: a.

the stationing of more F-111 (strategic bombers) in Great Britain;

b.

the deployment of an upgraded version of the short-range Lance missile, the range of which would be increased but remaining short of the 500-kilometre limit (which does not solve the problem); and

c.

the deployment of SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles), that is cruise missiles equipped with nuclear weapons but based on ships. This perspective meets a very strong opposition in West Germany.

III.

THE STAKES AHEAD

More generally, the INF Treaty has triggered a new debate on the objectives of the Alliance as a whole. As you know, during the past twenty years (which have coincided with a period of detente in East-West relations) the NATO policy has been based on the Harmel Report which was elaborated in 1967. The assumption sustaining the Harmel Report is that NATO should essentially pursue two objectives regarding the Soviet Union: detente, that is dialogue and cooperation, and at the same time, defence, that is maintaining the adequate level of military capabilities. The central idea of the Report is that both approaches are complementary and not incompatible. In political terms however, stressing detente and dialogue makes it very difficult to modernize at the same time, in particular with regards to public opinion. Public opinion is very sensitive to

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the milder tone adopted by Mikha'il Gorbachev and it does not perceive the hard facts of the power game. Therefore, it would not understand that the two approaches could be conducted simultaneously. This state of mind is particularly acute in West Germany. We cannot ignore public opinion. If it is hostile to one term of the Harmel equation, the Harmel equation will hardly be feasible politically. Given the middle-term aims of the Soviet Union, there is however a risk in not keeping the balance poised between the two approaches. First, the Soviets are now pushing for the elimination of the systems with a range below 500 kilometres, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons not covered by the INF Treaty. Negotiations on these systems are also demanded by the majority of the parties in West Germany the main concern of which is not to be the nuclear battlefield of Europe and the first victims of the tactical nuclear weapons based on the German territory. For the time being, such negotiations have been deferred although they have not been precluded by NATO in a gesture to please the Federal Republic of Germany. Let us be clear: the elimination of this category of missiles would be tantamount to the denuclearization of Europe I mentioned earlier. Indeed, for the Warsaw Pact forces, tactical nuclear weapons do represent an important threat because these weapons would force them to disperse. Were the obstacle removed, the Soviets could concentrate their forces and they could have a chance to lead a successful blitzkrieg. The next Soviet step will be to try to include all the remaining nuclear forces in Europe, in particular the airborne weapons such as the NATO F-Ills and the French and British independent nuclear deterrents, into the negotiations. To sidestep difficulties, the Soviet Union will try to achieve its first aim through the Conventional Stability Talks which should start in the forthcoming months. They are based on the idea of huge asymmetric cuts in conventional forces on both sides. According to Western calculations, to correct existing asymmetries, reductions should bear on at least five divisions on the Eastern side for one Western division. Soviet preoccupation in these talks is twofold: a.

to trade tanks for aircraft; and

b.

to involve the dual-capable systems, that is systems (aircraft and artillery) which can be equipped with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

As most of the systems are dual-capable, this will be the occasion for the Soviet Union to reintroduce indirectly the negotiation on nuclear weapons. To push this plan, we can expect that once again Mikhail Gorbachev will woo Western Europe's public opinion in order to drive wedges between the European allies, applying the strategy recommended by the Chinese strategist Sun Tsu 6

some two thousand and four hundred years ago: to defeat the enemy without fighting him. Along this same line, Moscow will also try to thwart any European move aimed at strenghtening the European pillar of the Alliance, in particular, French-German and French-British co-operation and modernization of French nuclear forces. France will be Moscow's main target since the Soviets are well aware that it will be a major stumbling-block in their plans. As for the collective European efforts to develop a Western European security concept through the Western European union, it meets the Soviets' frank disapproval.

IV.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

According to a widespread view, Soviet moves in favour of disarmament would be part of a rational scheme to improve the economy by alleviating the burden of defence. Indeed, estimates show that the Soviet Union spends between 14 and 17 per cent of its GNP on defence, which is considerable compared with 6 per cent for the United States and less than 4 per cent for the European countries. But although it may appear as a paradox, disarmament is a very costly process. In the short run, disarmament even raises the level of military expenditures. This may be explained by a number of reasons: a.

Destroying weapons is expensive.

b.

Moving divisions also costs very much. (If the United States wanted to take ten divisions away from Europe to reduce their share of the burden, it would cost them some billions of dollars.)

c.

Verification is also costly.

Modernization adds a new weight on defence budgets for there is a balance which has to be maintained. Disarming does not only mean removing weapons but also adjusting, that is replacing these weapons with others, if possible at a lower but more sophisticated level. In a first phase, modernization requires new investments. Major savings will most likely materialize only in the long run, that is in ten to fifteen years' time. Even if the Soviets were genuinely willing to shift priorities, they are quite aware that arms cuts will not yield results before many years. What we should have in mind, however, is that while disarming they will make sure to restructure their military capabilities in order to strenghten their security posture. They have proven that they can do so; that is what they have successfuly reached with the INF Treaty and we can expect them to go along this line. 7

Disarmament as such is a praiseworthy goal. However, there may be "good" disarmament and "bad" or dangerous disarmament. The logical sequence of negotiations has been distorted. Logically, disarmament should have started with strategic systems, then with real conventional asymmetries and chemical weapons; the elimination of theater nuclear weapons should be last on the agenda. But, politics and diplomatic calculations have taken the lead.

V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA

There are many. One of them has been avoided. Just remember that before agreeing on the zero-option, both sides envisaged the possibility of fixing a ceiling allowing each of them to keep a number of intermediate range nuclear weapons (a hundred). The plan on the Soviet side was then to move the remaining SS-20s east of the Urals, which would have given the Soviet Union a new leverage power on its Asian neighbours - China and Japan to begin with. Major disarmament moves in Europe would provoke a shift of Soviet military power eastwards. We may not ignore this linkage. In the longer run, if the Soviet Union succeeded in consolidating its posture in Europe through a combination of both diplomatic steps and military agreements securing its western flank, we can imagine that it would get more interested in the East. This would be a rational timing since the Soviets would have a freer hand to concentrate their efforts on one spot. We could then expect them to strenghten ties with a number of countries such as India or Vietnam in order to get more involved in the Asian affairs. To end with, I will add some remarks on the relationship between economic and security factors. As for me, I believe that in the long run there has to be some rough compatibility between the Alliances' economic interests and their security interests. There is an interaction between the two spheres and any dramatic change in the economic context has consequences on the security context and vice-versa. Were the international economic system to break down, it would have major consequences on the security network, particularly on the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, and NATO. Conversely a serious modification in the security dimension altering the very fabric of NATO would have major economic consequences. I mentioned earlier the economic dimension of Soviet objectives. The achievement of Soviet aims would mean a radically different economic system within two or three decades: flows of goods and resources would undergo dramatic changes. These major trends would spare no one, not even those countries which have a limited

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involvement in world affairs. Asian countries would be at the centre of the storm. The location of Singapore, which makes it a success story (among other reasons), is also a factor of vulnerability to external events of all kinds. We are living in a precarious equilibrium. This does not mean that we should keep from any change, and particularly that we should reject any dialogue with the Soviets or refuse any disarmament undertakings. On the contrary, we should be receptive, deal with them in the open, but we should also remain on our guard. Let us not forget that we have built our post-war situation on some basic democratic values and some basic economic principles. All of us are in the same boat.

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Question and Answer Session

Question Would you like to comment on the American reasoning which led to the signing of the Treaty? de Montbrial Indeed, the first to propose the zero-option were the Americans and not the Soviets. The proposition was made in 1980 by Richard Perle. The idea sustaining it was that the Soviets would never accept and that therefore it would bring the overall process to a dead-end. The first lesson to be drawn from this episode is that, if one is not prepared to assume the consequences, one should never make a proposal on the assumption that it would be rejected. In that sense, this was a mistake. It took a very long time for the Soviets to reach the conclusion that eventually, it was in their interest to put this proposition forward. Incidentally, we may witness the same process in Afghanistan. We wanted the Soviets to leave Afghanistan without conditions, without having prepared for the future. They are doing it. But what will happen next? We cannot preclude a situation in which (the Soviets, having manipulated the different factions to their advantage) a new Soviet-dominated government would be installed in Kabul which, after a while, if need be, would again call the Soviets back for protection. Generally speaking, the Soviets have proved to be excellent calculators, looking at several "strikes" in advance. Coming back to the INF Treaty, I would like to make a special point about the weight of anti-nuclear public opinion in the United States and in parts of Western Europe. There has been a sort of collusion between the right intellectual wing in the United States and the left intellectual wing in Germany. For both of them, nuclear weapons were the evil and had to be eliminated; hence, the 23 March 1983 speech of President Reagan on the SDI. The myth sustaining the SDI project was the elimination of weapons. The ideologic factor was very important in the whole American process. So was also the psychological one: Mr Reagan badly needed a treaty which would enhance his popularity. Moreover, the process developed at a time when the Reagan administration was getting weaker. For all these reasons (although the Americans are much stronger

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on the economical and technical levels and although their ideology is much stronger) the Soviets were in a better position to play a long-term game. Question On a comparison between China's and the USSR's evolutions, I am wondering why you appear to rule out that Perestroika and Glasnost would produce the same changes that are taking place in China? de Montbrial There is no contradiction. On one hand both countries face the same problem which is not to get rid of communism but how to adjust communism and how to maintain the Communist Party in power and organize its survival. There is also a major power struggle going on in China, but apparently no one there envisages any alternative to the rule of the Communist Party. On the other hand, there are major differences. For historic and cultural reasons among others, Chinese Marxism is very different from Soviet Marxism. Moreover, the existence of China as a nation-state is one of the oldest realities on the planet. The only region where there are some minority problems is Tibet. China does not have an existential problem. It has development problems and some basic security problems, but it is under no vital threat. By the end of the twenty-first century, if Deng Xiao Ping takes up his bet, China could become a superpower in the traditional sense of the term. The Soviet Union has an existential problem. It is the only "empire" left in the world. It has acute minority problems - in the Islamic Republics, in the Baltic Republics, in Caucasus. It also faces a serious existential problem in Eastern Europe. These are challenges to its survival. This being said, I do not rule out that the Soviet Union could become one day a major democracy, prosperous and sharing its prosperity with its neighbours. However I remain sceptical. If we make the wrong assumption about the Soviet Union the cost would be heavy and immediate. This is not the case regarding China. The stakes are very different. Any wrong assumption about the future evolution of China would have no immediate dramatic consequences. Both China and Soviet Union are watching each other. Question You spoke of the denuclearization of Europe. I'm wondering to what extent, if any, does the successful conclusion of the INF and similar negotiations have any bearing or give any impetus to nuclear-free zone treaties, and whether you feel as pessimistic about these sort of treaties as you do about the INF. de Montbrial I am very sceptical about the very concept of nuclear-free zones. This concept is biased unless you could think of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons

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on the planet. Unfortunately, would it be but for technical reasons, viable agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons is not feasible. The concept of nuclear-free zones has emerged in the Third World in connection with very specific problems such as the Pakistan-Indian issue. I do understand the position of a country like India. But I do not think that the concept of nuclear-free zones would solve the problems better than bilateral agreements because this concept is a way to shift the burden of verification to other parties. It is also not a satisfactory solution to regional problems. In this regard, the French position is very clear. It is related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We never signed the NPT because we considered that it was a way for the "haves" to forbid the "have-nots" to "have". We go along the same line today with the proposed elimination of chemical weapons and the ban of chemical stocks. There are reasons to believe that the Soviet stocks of chemical weapons reach hundreds of thousands of tons while the American stocks amount to tens of thousands of tons. Why should we agree to destroying our stocks before there is an agreement on total actual verifiable elimination? Why should we accept that those who have nothing commit themselves to have nothing whereas the others still have? This is the reason why we consider this kind of treaties to be highly discriminatory. Regarding India and Pakistan, I think that the most relevant step would be a bilateral agreement forbidding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. But as they are unable to do so, they are trying to shift the problem aside or to legitimize their problem. I would add that I believe that, at least in Europe, we owe peace to the existence of nuclear weapons. Because they are dreadful weapons, nuclear weapons are not used: this is what makes strategic stability possible. History, in particular in the twentieth century, shows that pure conventional stability does not work. This is to say that nuclear weapons should not be considered only as negative factors.

Question Don't you think that the neutron bomb brings in a new dimension to the problem? And, why is France so reluctant to actually build this when it seems to have the technology to do so? de Montbrial As you say, it seems that France has the technology and that it could develop the neutron bomb and deploy it very fast if it decided to do so. However, any kind of weapon has to fit a strategic concept. Today the French concern is to increase its European commitment, to make more effective, credible, and acceptable its participation in the defence of Europe, and Germany to be more precise. The deployment of the neutron bomb would serve that purpose. This raises, however, a fundamental problem which is at the heart of our talks with 12

West Germany: the doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. If the neutron bomb is "cleaner" than other bombs, it is nevertheless a dreadful weapon. Given the current, very sensitive context in defence issues, it would probably not be wise today to introduce such a weapon. But, it is not ruled out in the future.

Question There are two strategic developments which are of importance here. One is that if the Soviets are willing to talk about conventional disarmament or a reduction in conventional forces and the second, and of far more importance, is the recent report that in the Soviet military doctrine there has been an apparent change from offence to defence. If this happens, all your arguments against the INF Treaty do not hold ground. Please explain. de Montbrial First, let me correct a wrong impression. I am not hostile to the INF Treaty. My point is that it is a dangerous treaty, but all depends on what happens next. It very much depends on us. Although, as I said earlier, the logical sequence of disarmament should have been different, the INF Treaty could ultimately tum out to be a positive issue. But we have to be extremely watchful. Now, regarding conventional defence, the proposals put forward by NATO in its 3 March communique are not different from the Soviet proposals. It states that there should be negotiations on conventional weapons. The trouble is that interests of both parties diverge very much. As I said, estimates show that the exchange rate should be around five Warsaw Pact divisions for one NATO division. It is hard to believe that the Soviets may accept it. Moreover, there are very difficult problems to solve, to begin with the method of counting weapons or divisions which are not made of the same number of men, on-site inspections, readiness and mobility of divisions. There are a lot of technical obstacles which means that there is a lot of room for propaganda. Still more worrying are the Soviets' exigence to include dual-capable weapons, that is conventional weapons which in fact may carry nuclear devices. This is the case with the F-111 s which they would like to exchange against some of the WTO's (Warsaw Treaty) tanks and which are now the only weapons left that could reach the Soviet Union. For this reason, they are at the top of our priorities. The argument of the dual-capable systems may allow the Soviet Union to reach its aim, the inclusion of nuclear forces. As far as public opinion is concerned, all these developments will be extremely difficult to explain. This will make the whole game much more difficult to play. Your last point regarding doctrine raises two or three remarks. The Soviets themselves proposed to discuss about doctrine precisely because we repeatedly stated that they have an offensive doctrine, which is confirmed by all sources.

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However, if doctrines are important, capabilities are even more important. Because doctrines are flexible, you can adjust them. The real question is what kind of doctrines are compatible with the forces you have. To raise the question publicly gives them the opportunity to speak about it and progressively, to persuade public opinion that they have a defensive attitude (the idea of "nonoffensive defence"). The time-lag for a proper impact on Western public opinion is two or three years. Usually, Germany is the more receptive, followed by the United States. As for me, I should say that we should rather wait and see.

Question If under this INF Treaty both parties reduce arms and if there is a proper verification, then I think you get around the problem of the "prisoners dilemma". Would you agree? de Montbrial The situation is much more complex because the evaluation of the consequences is dependent on the next steps. This is the game theory concept. The point is to evaluate the consequences of the different players' moves. You cannot do it without making assumptions on the following steps. This is the difficulty because different hypotheses may lead to very different conclusions. Another point is the fact that among so many weapons, the elimination of a very small part may modify a situation because it is not only the number of forces which is at stake, but the structure of these forces as well. Nuclear weapons have very precise tasks. All these developments have to be analyzed in very realistic terms, in political and strategic terms, and not only according to moral standards. Question Both the Soviet Union and the United States are developing and deploying a new generation of more potent air and sea-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Could you give us an assessment of the likely impact on the security of both the Atlantic theatre and the Pacific theatre of these new generation of weapons if they are not brought within the arms control framework? de Montbrial The problem in arms control is that unless you cover every kind of weapon, there are loopholes which create the possibility for the development of the weapons which are not taken into account. The Soviets have seized the opportunity and they have accumulated vast numbers of weapons outside arms control agreements, for instance, the newly developed SS-24s. They also Remember that the interim deployed the SS-20s at the time of detente. agreement between Brezhnev and Ford about SALT II in Vladivostok broke

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down precisely because of the cruise missiles and the backfire bombers which had not been taken into account. It is extremely difficult to have a clear definition of the weapons you take into account. The other problem is verification. All these illustrate the conceptual difficulty of partial disarmament.

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THE AUTHOR Thierry de Montbrial is Director of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) and former Head of the Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. He has been Professor and the Chairman of the Department of Economics at the Ecole Polytechnique since 1974. Dr de Montbrial has authored several books (a number of which on economic theory) the most recent being La Science Economique: Modeles et Methodes (1988), La Revanche de l'Histoire (1985), and Energy: The Countdown (Report to the Club of Rome) (1978), which has been translated into several languages. He has also contributed numerous articles to professional journals.