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THE INDIAN CABINET A Study in Governance

THE INDIAN CABINET A Study in Governance

V.A. PAI PANANDIKER AJAY K. MEHRA

under the auspices o f

Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

vm

KONARK PUBLISHERS PVT LTD

KONARK PUBLISHERS PVT LTD A-149, Mail. Vikas Marg, Delhi 110092 (India)

Copyright © Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1996

All rights reserved. No part o f this work may be repro­ duced or utilized in any form or by any means, elec­ tronic or mechanical, including photocopying, record­ ing, or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers.

Typeset by Dexter Services, Delhi and

Printed at Gopsons Papers Ltd. A-28 Sector-IX, NOIDA.

Foreword

HE Cabinet is symbolically the most significant in­ stitution of Parliamentary democracy. The executive authority of the state representing the supreme legislative branch of government brings into focus the day to day responsibility of the government to the representa­ tives of people and in turn establishes the supremacy of the people in the governance of their lives. Yet some cabinets work, some do not. In India the Cabinet since independence in 1947 epitomises the hopes and aspirations of the people. Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and others gave hope that finally India was going to meet its tryst with destiny with the help of sound and stable political institutions. Inevitably the Cabinet, its composition, its leadership, especially of the Prime Minister, has evoked the largest interest' of the people of India. Will the Cabinet perform? Will it meet the aspirations of the people? How will it work? Will it work democratically? How does the Prime Minister relate to his/her colleagues? These are questions which have been raised in all Parliamentary democracies and have found their echo in India too. In particular the office of Prime Minister. In the Indian psyche the Prime Minister is the nation’s “karta”—the doer. He or she determines to a great extent how Indian democ­ racy works or does not work. For the Centre for Policy Research (CPRJ a study of the Indian Cabinet was the logical conclusion of its search for source of policy making and governance. Cabinet is where most of the policy action lies. In undertaking this study, the CPR’s objective was not to

T

vi

The Indian Cabinet

study the sensational aspects of the Cabinet but its more academic dimensions. How has the Cabinet system worked in India? Who has shaped the Cabinet system? Who are the people serving as Cabinet Ministers? What is the role of the Cabinet in economic, security and policy matters? Because of need for adequate data support, the study covers the period from 1946 to 1990. The brief Chandra Shekhar regime and the full term of P.V. Narasimha Rao have been left out except in passing. It is our feeling that this omission does not detract from the academic aspect of policy study of the Cabinet especially as an institution of governance. Our hope is that the study will benefit the academic and policy community in understanding the Indian cabinet as it has evolved over nearly five decades. Centre for Policy Research New Delhi June 1996

V A PAI PANANDIKER Director

Introduction

HIS book studies the Indian Cabinet and its relation to the governance of India from 1946 to 1990. Refer­ ences to the system of Cabinet, even without a democratic framework, are found in many ancient Indian texts. Kautilya (4th century B.C.) in particular, expounded, at great length, on the role and nature of the Council of Ministers, the Mantri Parishad, which he viewed essentially as an institution of governance, though under a monarch! cal system. The present Indian system is derived largely from the British model and the Indian experience following the Re­ form Act of 1919 and the Government of India Act of 1935. Like other institutions in India, the Cabinet reflects the working of the Indian democracy with all the positive and negative aspects. Like all other institutions, the Cabinet, too, has evolved from the national ethos, philosophy and even character Historically, India is not unused to the Cabinet system or the collegial system. In fact, even the monarch in India, often operated through a collegial set up. Shivaji, the great Maratha ruler, developed a highly refined Cabinet system of his own. Shivaji’s successor left the actual running of the government to the Peshwa, who was, in essence, the Prime Minister. In a way the Prime Ministerial system of the Indian variety developed extensively by the early 1700s and continued well into the 19th century with Poona as it capital. This was the period when the Maratha empire had already overshadowed the Moghul empire, and the British colonial ambitions in India were just taking shape.

vtii

The Indian Cabinet

The modem Indian Cabinet system clearly emerged in the formative years of independence, especially between 1947 and 1956. Two individuals who influenced the devel­ opment and evolution of the Cabinet system were Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel. The two differed on many issues, especially the role of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the other ministers. But they valued the importance of the Cabinet system and worked closely within the formal and informal structures of the Cabinet system. They knew that the governance of India was in a critical historical phase and wanted to ensure that the Cabinet system helped the governance, the transfer of power and the painful partition of the country. Nehru and Patel were backed by the great Congress party which was assiduously built with the organizational genius of Mahatma Gandhi. Nehru and Patel had to work within the framework of a party which had eminent regional lead­ ers who did not owe their position either to Patel or to Nehru. This institutional character of the party was an important factor in the evolution of the Indian Cabinet. Moreover, India has a long political, economic and ad­ ministrative tradition. The Karta—literally, the doer—in effect, the head, is a part of the Indian ethos. The Karta may be of the family or an institution or the country. Mahatma Gandhi was in a sense the great Karta of the Indian Na­ tional Congress and the freedom movement and thus be­ came the Father of the Nation when India became indepen­ dent. The concept of the Karta runs through the Cabinet tradition from Nehru’s time to the present day. In a way tradition and modernity combined in the creation of the special role of the Karta in the Prime Minister under the Indian system. This study of the Cabinet system is built around the issues of governance, which are far broader than that of government. Governance encompasses the management of the affairs of state and include the, whole gamut of social, economic and political life of the people. Unlike politics, governance is not concerned with power, its use and abuse. It is concerned with the life of people and how that life is

Introduction

ix

affected by the various societal forces. The Cabinet is essentially an institution of government and it operates as such. Most Cabinets do not manage governance well. The role of the Cabinet is more of govern­ ment than of governance. However, the interests of govern­ ment and governance do converge. If the government does not help governance, it is unlikely to last either in the temporal sense or even in the theoretical sense. The study, therefore, focuses on the Cabinet as an institution of gov­ ernment and its relationship to the issues and problems of governance of India. Access to authentic information on the Indian Cabinet is not available. Regrettably all Cabinet papers are official secrets and even though a great deal is supposed to be available after thirty years, in India this is observed only in its breach. Secrecy, however, is a habit of government in India which is neither helpful for the government itself nor for the governance of the country. Apart from this aspect of unnecessary almost pernicious secrecy, there is also a great deal of reticence in India among Presidents, Prime Ministers. Cabinet Ministers, and other political leaders to writing memoirs. In Britain, many Cabinet Ministers and Prime Ministers right upto Margaret Thatcher have made a great deal of information public. Perhaps to undo Official Secrets Act, it should be made mandatory for former Prime Ministers and Cabinet Minis­ ters to write their memoirs which would help people under­ stand better how they made mistakes in electing their representatives and also how much or how little wisdom governed those who governed on their behalfl In July 1994, former President R. Venkataraman pub­ lished his memoirs. My Presidential Years. As the first such publication by an Indian President, it deserves to be wel­ comed. Mr Venkataraman has made his memoirs a narra­ tive of his years as President, rather than focussing on the central political and governance issues which he had to deal with. And Mr Venkataraman did have to deal with a difficult political period during which he had to work with four Prime Ministers. Hopefully more memoirs covering central

X

The Indian Cabinet

issues facing the country will be published and they will help both researchers and laymen to understand the work­ ing of the Indian democracy. For practical reasons we have confined the study to 1946-1990 period although stray references have been made to the later period. And although we have not covered the 1991 to 1996 period, the basic system of Cabinet gover­ nance has not undergone any major change. We have, however, no illusion that the present volume is a definitive study of the Indian Cabinet system in relation to the twin issues of government and governance of India. Like all researchers we only seek to develop knowledge about a key institution of governing India. However, since the Cabinet is and will remain an important institution, we hope that this study will lead to more and better development of knowl­ edge on the Cabinet system. We are most thankful to a large number of former Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, Cabinet Secretaries, and other officials connected with the Indian Cabinet for helping us with their insights. In particular, we would like to thank former Prime Minister Mr Morarji Desai, Former Secretary to the Cabinet and later Home Minister Mr H.M. Patel, Mr Inder Kumar Gujral, former Foreign Minister for their help. Mr Gujral encouraged us to add a chapter on The Cabinet and National Security. We are also grateful to our senior colleagues at the CPR for their help and advice at every stage of this work. We were particularly lucky to have former Home Secretary, and Governor, Mr. L.P. Singh, and former Home and Cabinet Secretary, Mr. N.K. Mukarji, as our colleagues at CPR. We wish to record our deep gratitude to both, as also to several other faculty colleagues at the CPR who helped us in this study. We also wish to thank our Chief Librarian, Mr Kamal Jit Kumar, Librarian, Mr Tariq Ashraf for their help, and Mr N.A. Ramachandran, Ms Neelam, Mr Naresh Kumar Mehendiratta, Mrs Anita Wanchoo, Ms Uma and several others who helped in preparing the various drafts of this study. We also wish to record our deep appreciation of the

Introduction.

xi

editing of the text done by Ms Swati Mitra with great thoroughness. Special thanks to Mr Abhay N. Firodia, Chairman and Managing Director of Bajaj Tempo who made several facili­ ties available to Dr. V.A. Pai Panandiker in Pune for prepar­ ing the final manuscript of this study for publication. Needless to say the views expressed in this study, with all their limitations, are clearly ours and not of either those who helped us in understanding the complex institution of the Cabinet, or the Centre for Policy Research which gave us support for the study. VISHVANATH A. PAI PANANDIKER AJAY K. MEHRA

Contents

Foreword Introduction

v vii

1.

The Cabinet System: The Indian Design

1

2.

Origin and Growth of Indian Cabinet System

20

3.

Profile of the Indian Cabinets

69

4.

Cabinet Committees

92

5.

The Politics of Cabinet Reshuffle

105

6.

The Budget and the Cabinet System

150

7.

The Cabinet and National Security

167

8.

The Cabinet: View From the Inside

193

9.

Cabinet Secretariat andPrime Minister’s Office

211

10.

Prime Ministerial Government

233

11.

Future of the Cabinet System in India

252

Appendices I. Interim Government I (2 September 1946-24 October 1946)

276

II.

Interim Government II (25 October 1946-18 July 1947)

277

III.

Interim Government III (19 July 1947-14 August 1947)

279

IV.

List of Respondents

280

xiv

The Indian Cabinet

V.

Indian Cabinets

281

VI.

Regions and States

282

VII. Standing Committees of the Cabinet

284

Select Bibliography

288

INDEX

295

C h apter

1

The Cabinet System: The Indian Design

HE nature of the Indian executive has evoked in­ tense debate. To understand the debate, especially in the Constituent Assembly, between 1947 and 1949, it is necessary to underline the historical context in which India’s founding fathers were discussing the system of political executive necessary to govern India. The violence and carnage that followed the partition of India was not anticipated in adequate measure. The law and order situa­ tion in many parts of northern and eastern India was alarming. When the Constituent Assembly debated on the system of government for the country, it had to contend both with the enormity of the problems arising from the partition and the problems inherent in the transfer of power from the British to the Indian people. Great historical moments have always been cataclysmic. Jawaharlal Nehru’s independence speech of 15 August 1947, proclaiming India’s “Tryst with Destiny” heralded the great historical movement which moved not only the Indian people but also other colonized peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Independence and transfer of power brought with them enormous responsibility to govern a huge and diverse sub­ continent with more than 500 princely states. One way to deal with the system of government was to make a complete break with the British legacy and to begin on a clean slate. But which slate? The only system of government with which India was familiar before the British rule was the Princely

2

The Indian Cabinet

system. Whatever may have been the ancient legacy of elected representative institutions, India’s system of gov­ ernment, as that of Europe and other parts of Asia, was monarchical. Making a complete break with the past would probably mean anarchy, which in the aftermath of the holocaust of partition, no sane Indian was willing to consider. Besides the history of five thousand years of India is a history of incremental change. It is possible to argue that this is the greatest weakness of the Indian civilization. But it is also possible to argue that any revolutionary change in a large and diverse country was neither possible nor desirable. The dangers of chaos and anarchy which prevailed before and after independence in many other countries of Asia and Africa may well have been India’s fate. The founding fathers were men of caution. Most of them had fought long and hard during India’s struggle for free­ dom. Even Jawaharlal Nehru, somewhat younger by com­ parison to the other great freedom fighters, was at the time of independence nearly fifty eight years old. Vallabhbhai Patel was seventy two. However, most members of the Constituent Assembly, especially the active members, were highly qualified and distinguished men and women drawn from different walks of life, representing different regions of the country. In its wisdom the Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly decided In favour of incremental change — in the system of parliamentary democracy with which they were familiar. In the course of the debates in the Constituent Assembly between 9 December 1946 when the first session of the elected Constituent Assembly was held, and 26 November 1949 when the Constitution of India was adopted by it, the present system of governance of India, including the Cabi­ net System was evolved. The Constitution of India formally came into force on 26 January 1950. Article 74 of the Indian Constitution elucidates the main features of the Indian Cabinet System: “There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head to

The Cabinet System: The Indian Design

3

aid and advise the President in the exercise of his func­ tions.” The relationship of the President with the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers became a controver­ sial issue even in the early years. The first President of India, Rajendra Prasad and the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru held differing positions. However, neither wanted to create a political crisis on the issue. Nehru, in any case had clarified his preference for the Parliamentary system in his speech in the Constituent Assembly. The Presidential system, he felt,“. .. would not be desirable first because we want to emphasise the ministerial character of the government—that power really resided in the Ministry and in the Legislature and not in the President as such. At the same time we did not want to make the President just mere a figure-head like the French President. We did not give him any real power but we have made his position one of great authority and dignity” (India. 1985c:IV:713). The issue became realty contentious in the 1970s, espe­ cially after Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency in June 1975. The 42nd constitutional amendment was made whereby the President was left with no discretion about the advice of the Council of Ministers. The President “shall in the exercise of his functions act in accordance with such advice”. The 44th Amendment to the Constitution made during the Janata Government headed by Prime Minister Morarji Desai in 1978 added: The President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. «

The constitutional provisions governing the executive as of 1995 therefore stand as follows: Article 74(1)

There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head to aid and advise the President who shall in the exer­

The Indian Cabinet

4

(2)

Article 75(1)

(2) (3)

cise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice:1 Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsi­ deration.2 The question whether any and, if so, what advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be enquired into by any court. The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President, and other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. The Council of Ministers shall be collec­ tively responsible to the House of People.

These provisions under the Constitution of India thus prescribe the precise governmental structure of the execu­ tive for India. The President, as the executive head of the country, was required to act on the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. The 42nd Amendment of the Constitution made during the Emergency between 1975 and 1977, removed any doubts regarding the relationship between the President and the Council of Ministers. This was slightly qualified during the Janata government which came to power in 1977 and brought forth the 44th Amend­ ment to the constitution as mentioned earlier. Articles 74 and 75, which elaborate the Presidential right to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers, also lay down collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to 1Italicised portions substituted by the Constitution (42nd Amend­ ment Act), 1976. 2 Inserted by the Constitution (44th Amendment Act), 1978.

The Cabinet System: The Indian Design

5

the House of People. Though the word Cabinet has not been used in the Constitution, the broad features of the Council of Ministers clearly indicate that the Indian executive has been, by design, modelled on the Cabinet system operating in Britain. A former Cabinet Secretary pointed out that whereas the Cabinet system in India is now taken for granted, the Constitution mentions only the “Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the Presi­ dent," which, “shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People”. This, however, does not mean that the Cabinet is an extra-constitutional body and rests solely on conventions. It stems from the Rules of Business made under Article 77(3) which is built on the principle of “more convenient transaction of business”. Clause 3 of Article 77 of the Constitution of India, which relates to “conduct of Business of the Government of India”, reads: The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said busi­ ness. Collegial functioning, which is considered one of the key requirements of the Cabinet system though not to be con­ fused with collective responsibility, also found no mention in the Constitution and was covered by the Rules of Busi­ ness. The Cabinet system in India thus puts together the two ideas of a smaller cabinet within the Council of Minis­ ters and its collegial functioning, not to speak of the impor­ tant aspect of collective responsibility. Features of the Cabinet System The Cabinet system as it has evolved in Britain, is said to have four basic features, namely, (a) political homogeneity, (b) accountability to the Lower House of the legislature, (c) collective responsibility and (d) the ascendancy of the Prime Minister. These features, based more on the analysis of the

6

The Indian Cabinet

emerging constitutional practices by political scientists and jurists than on established and explicitly defined constitu­ tional norms, are widely believed to be part of the Cabinet system the world over. Not surprisingly, wherever parlia­ mentary system exists, the system of governance is believed to be of the Cabinet variety and these features are applied as yardsticks to examine its working. Political homogeneity means that the members of the Cabinet must share common political objective and outlook, as well as ideologies and principles. This is ensured by the fact that the Cabinet ministers come from the same political party. Where they do not, as in a coalition government, the members of the Cabinet must share collective responsibility and function on a common programme. The members of the Cabinet are responsible to the Lower House of the legislature for all their policies and actions. This responsibility is ensured by choosing members of the House as Cabinet ministers. The members of the Upper House can also be included in the Cabinet, but their ulti­ mate responsibility is to the Lower House. It is for this reason that in the UK, a convention has developed, that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of Exchequer are always from the House of Commons. “That Ministers are ‘collectively responsible’ is undoubted constitutional convention” of the Cabinet form of govern­ ment (de Smith and Brazier, 1990:181). It implies that “all Cabinet Ministers assume responsibility for Cabinet deci­ sions and action taken to implement those decisions” (de Smith and Brazier, 1990:187) and ensures, to quote Lord Morley, “that every piece of departmental policy is taken to commit the entire Cabinet and its members stand or fall together”. In other words, a minister may not publicly disagree with a Cabinet decision and continue to remain in office. This, however, has not prevented dismissal or resigna­ tion of the minister for individual acts of omission and commission. Collective responsibility of the Cabinet does not overshadow the individual responsibility of ministers,

The Cabinet System: The Indian Design

7

which has historically preceded the doctrine of collective responsibility. Though it is generally agreed that “All Minis­ ters, whether they be in or outside the Cabinet, are respon­ sible for their personal acts, the general conduct of their Departments and acts done (or left undone) in their name by departmental officials” (de Smith and Brazier, 1990:182), controversies regarding whether a minister should or should not have resigned over a particular issue have erupted from time to time in countries having the Cabinet system. This has been one of the central issues in the discourse on the Cabinet Government.3 The Prime Minister, who initially was regarded as the primus inter pares in the Cabinet system, gradually estab­ lished his ascendancy in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, who is the leader of the House and the party, has the option to choose members for his Cabinet. The extent to which the 3 Sir Thomas Dugdale, then the British Minister for Agriculture, took a personal decision to resign in 1954 because of the exposure of maladministration by senior officials in the over-celebrated Crichel Down affair. It has been argued that the resignation was not de­ manded by convention and has never been emulated (de Smith and Brazier, 1989:185). It has, however, kept the debate over individual responsibility of minister alive. In India, Lai Bahadur Shastri’s resignation over rail accident in 1956 also remains unemulated. Nehru appreciated it. But Moraiji Desai felt that being a skilled political tactician, Shastri had taken the decision to resign to enhance his political prestige. He was of the opinion that “if ministers have to resign in this manner, and if it became a rule, hardly any minister would be able to work for any length of time” (Desai. 1974:148). This debate resurfaced recently in the Securities Scam case (1992), when the Joint Parliamentary Committee in its report held that the Finance Minister had “constructive responsibility" for the scam and stated that “the principle of constructive ministerial responsibility is equally applicable to other departments and ministries where acts of omission and commissions have taken place in the discharge of func­ tions and duties at different levels” (India, 1993:207-13). It elicited disagreements from experts that “To affirm the general principle of constitutional responsibility of a minister to Parliament is one thing but to apportion blame to a minister on a particular case irrespective of the specific circumstances is another” (Pai Panandiker, 1994).

8

The Indian Cabinet

Prime Minister can dominate the Cabinet depends largely on his personality and his political acumen (Venkateswaran, 1967:40-42). The Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, constituted in 1961 by the Government of India described three basic functions of the British Cabinet as (