The Huthi Movement In Yemen: Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf 9780755644254, 9780755644285, 9780755644292, 9780755644261

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THE HUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN

ii

THE HUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN

Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf

Edited by Abdullah Hamidaddin

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2022 Copyright © Leila Seurat, 2022 Leila Seurat has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. xiv constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover image: Hussein al-Houthi's funeral, Yemen, 2013. (© Mohamed al-Sayaghi/REUTERS/Alamy) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-7556-4425-4 PB: 978-0-7556-4428-5 ePDF: 978-0-7556-4426-1 eBook: 978-0-7556-4427-8 Series: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies Series

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CONTENTS Contributorsviii Acknowledgmentsxiv INTRODUCTION Abdullah Hamidaddin

1

Section I HUTHI IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF SYSTEM Chapter 1

THE HUTHI MOVEMENT’S RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ZAYDISM IN YEMEN

Bernard Haykel

17

Chapter 2

TRANSFORMATION OF DOMINANT POLITICAL THEMES FROM THE FOUNDER TO THE CURRENT LEADER OF THE HUTHI MOVEMENT

Mohammed Almahfali

37

Chapter 3

THE “SOFT WAR” AND THE PAST: THE HUTHI MOVEMENT’S USE OF HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AS SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY

Alexander Weissenburger

57

S­ ection II RECONFIGURING YEMEN’S SOCIETY Chapter 4

TRIBES AND RULERS, 3.0—DOMINANCE AND THE “SUBALTERN” IN HUTHI YEMEN

Marieke Brandt

77

Chapter 5

WOMEN UNDER THE HUTHI REGIME: GENDER, NATIONALISM, AND ISLAM

Ewa K. Strzelecka

93

Contents

vi

Chapter 6

HUTHI INFLUENCE ON EDUCATION: AN INVESTIGATION OF INTERVENTIONS AND POLICIES

Shaker Lashuel

113

Chapter 7

PROPAGANDA, CREATIVITY, AND DIPLOMACY: THE HUTHIS’ ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MEDIA AND PUBLIC MESSAGING

Hannah Porter

139

Chapter 8

THE HUTHI ZAMIL: FOLK LITERATURE OR PROPAGANDA?

Emily J. Sumner

159

­Section III RE-ENGINEERING THE STATE Chapter 9

“STATE” AND COERCIVE POWER IN YEMEN: THE HUTHIS AND THE TRIBAL-SECTARIAN FIELD

Anthony Chimente

181

Chapter 10

HUTHI VISIONS OF THE STATE: A HUTHI REPUBLIC WITH AN UNOFFICIAL IMAM

Charles Schmitz

199

Chapter 11

BECOMING THE STATE: HOW ANSAR ALLAH TOOK OVER AND ADAPTED FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Joshua Rogers

217

­Section IV REGIONAL IMPACT Chapter 12

HYBRID WARFARE—LESSONS FROM THE SAUDI-LED COALITION’S INTERVENTION IN YEMEN 2015–202?

James Spencer

235

Contents

vii

Chapter 13

THE YEMENI-SAUDI BORDER: THE HUTHIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Eleonora Ardemagni

259

Chapter 14

MORE THAN A PROXY—THE HUTHIS AS A NON-STATE ACTOR WITH A FOREIGN POLICY?

Maria-Louise Clausen

273

Index286

CONTRIBUTORS ­ Name

Chapter

Bio

Bernard Haykel S1_Chap1

Bernard Haykel is a scholar of the Arabian Peninsula, focusing on the history, politics, and economics of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC). He is professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University where he is also director of the Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Haykel has supervised over ten PhD dissertations that deal with Arabian politics and history and has received several prominent awards. He earned his D.Phil. in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford.

Mohammed Almahfali

Mohammed Almahfali is an affiliated researcher at the Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, Sweden. He obtained his PhD in Arabic literature from Cairo University in 2014, and worked as an assistant professor at Hadhramout University, Yemen. Mohammed’s research interests include Arabic political, media and literary discourse analysis, access to health, capacitybuilding in higher education, and sustainable post-conflict recovery strategies to address the challenges in Yemen for the coming years. In 2017, he was awarded a two-year fellowship from the Institute of International Education's Scholar Rescue Fund (IIE-SRF) to work as a researcher at Lund University, Sweden. Among his recent research is the RAPP project for an annotated bibliography about Human Rights in the Arab world. Mohammed has also been involved in

S1_Chap2

Contributors

ix

work concerning how art and media can be used as tools to enhance democracy, gender equity, and social justice in Yemen. He is currently working in the EU-funded EMME project (Environmental Management in the Middle East), which aims to develop capacity in universities in Yemen and Iran, to deal with environmental issues in these countries. Alexander Weissenburger

S1_Chap3

Alexander Weissenburger holds a Master’s degree in Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asian Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews and an MA in Islamic Studies from the University of Vienna where he also taught courses in Arabic grammar and politics of the Middle East. He is an associated researcher at the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and a PhD candidate at the University of Vienna. Alexander Weissenburger’s PhD project investigates the ideology of the Huthi movement.

Marieke Brandt S2_Chap4

Marieke Brandt is a researcher at the Institute for Social Anthropology (ISA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. Her research focuses on tribalism, tribal genealogy and history, and tribe-state relations in Southwest Arabia. She was a PhD fellow of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, DAAD fellow in Sanaa, Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow of the European Union, and project leader of the New Frontiers Groups Programme (NFG) project “Deciphering Local Power Politics in Northern Yemen” funded by the Austrian National Foundation for Research, Technology and Development. She is the author of the award-winning Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Hurst/Oxford University Press 2017).

Contributors

x

Ewa K. Strzelecka

S2_Chap5

Ewa K. Strzelecka is a research associate at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. She holds a PhD degree in Social Science from the University of Granada. Before she came to the Netherlands, she was an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Granada in Spain. She also held positions at universities and international organizations in the UK, the United States, Germany, Poland, Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Western Sahara, Morocco, Mozambique, Bolivia, and India. She is the author of Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe: construcción de una cultura política de resistencia feminista en Yemen (Women in the Arab Spring: the Construction of a Political Culture of Feminist Resistance in Yemen, CSIC, 2017). She leads a research project Rethinking Peace-building: women, revolution, exile, and conflict resolution in Yemen, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement.

Shaker Lashuel

S2_Chap6

Shaker Lashuel is a Yemeni-American educator and writer. As an educator working for the public school system, he worked as a teacher and later as a district administrator serving the children of New York City for more than fifteen years. In 2013, he moved to Saudi Arabia, where he’s been working as the Manager of Scientific Programs for a nonprofit foundation. Shaker graduated with a BS in Geology from Brooklyn College, an MS in Secondary Science Education from Long Island University, a Master’s in Educational Leadership from Moreland University, and a Doctorate in Educational Technology from Pace University. As a writer, Shaker has focused on the Yemeni-American community and issues relating to education in the Middle

Contributors

xi

East.  He has published several books in Arabic (Yemeni American Stories, Steps to Contentment, Improving Education: Practical Field Experiences and has one book currently under review: Professional Learning and Teaching Communities); he has also served on the editorial board of the Yemeni American News since it was established in 2008. Hannah Porter

S2_Chap7

Hannah Porter is an analyst at the international development firm DT Global where she works on projects related to Yemen's conflict and media. She earned her Master's from the University of Chicago and wrote her thesis on Huthi rhetoric and propaganda. 

Emily J. Sumner

S2_Chap8

Emily J. Sumner is a doctoral candidate in Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures and Media at the University of Minnesota. Her research rests at the intersection of Arabic literature, anthropology, and performance studies. Her dissertation traces the transformation and popularity of the Yemeni poetic genre called zamil during the civil war, especially its instrumentation by the Huthis in their international media and local recruitment campaign. It attends to the embodied experiences in which the Huthi zamil is embedded, including the ways that gender, social position, and ideology structure these experiences. Emily is also a researcher at the Yemen-based Arabia Felix Center for Studies, where she recently published “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil” (2020). She presented an iteration of this paper at the Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA) annual conference, where she also presented her Master’s thesis, an analysis of poetic sparring between Yemeni and Saudi poets on social media. She currently works as a graduate instructor of Arabic for the University of Minnesota. Her professional experiences include working as an Arabic language translator and coordinator in American hospitals. Emily is a superior speaker of Arabic and has spent extensive time in Yemen, Oman, and Syria.

Contributors

xii

Anthony Chimente

S3_Chap9

Dr. Anthony Chimente is a researcher and advisor with Gulf State Analytics who focuses on civil–military relations and the fragmentation of state power and the subcommunalization of violence around militias. Dr. Chimente previously taught at Durham University, where he earned his PhD and MA.

Charles Schmitz

S3_Chap10

Charles Schmitz is professor of Geography at Towson University in Baltimore, Maryland where he has taught since 1999. Dr. Schmitz is a specialist on the Middle East and Yemen. He began his academic career as a Fulbright Scholar and American Institute for Yemeni Studies Fellow in Yemen in the early 1990’s. Dr. Schmitz’ current research interests include Yemeni political economy and the sociology of contemporary Yemeni society.

Joshua Rogers

S3_Chap11

Joshua Rogers is an Advisor and Senior Project Manager at the Berghof Foundation, where he works on political dialogue around the conflict in Yemen. He advises on issues of local governance in Yemen and leads Berghof ’s efforts to integrate thinking about corruption into peace processes and political dialogue efforts. His research interests focus on the political economy of conflict, state formation, and rebel governance. He previously taught at SOAS, University of London, and worked for Saferworld, the EU Delegation in Sanaa, and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility. He holds a PhD in Development Studies from SOAS.

James Spencer

S4_Chap12

James Spencer is a retired infantry commander who specialized in low-intensity conflict. He is a strategic analyst on political, security, and trade issues of the Middle East and North Africa and a specialist on Yemen.

Eleonora Ardemagni

S4_Chap13

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert of Yemen, the Gulf monarchies, and Arab military forces. She is an associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies

Contributors

xiii

(ISPI), a teaching assistant (“History of Islamic Asia”; “New Conflicts”) at the Catholic University of Milan, and Yemen contributor for The Armed Conflict Survey, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Former Gulf Analyst for the NATO Defense College Foundation (2015–20), she is also Adjunct Professor on Yemen at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations). Maria-Louise Clausen

S4_Chap14

Maria-Louise Clausen holds a PhD in Political Science from Aarhus University, Denmark, and is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) and a fellow in the Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project. Her work centers on external state-building as both administrative practices and a site for competing notions of legitimate governance. More broadly, her research critically reflects on ideas and actors involved in political governance at local, national, and international levels. Geographically her work focuses on the Middle East, particularly Yemen and Iraq. She has published on these issues in journals such as Third World Quarterly, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Public Administration and Development, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism as well as International Affairs.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Neol Brehony, who was behind the idea of this volume. A special note of thanks to Dr. Saud al-Sarhan, whose enthusiasm, support for the concept, feedback, and encouragement were essential in me taking on this project and overcoming key challenges throughout. I also want to thank the Bloomsbury editorial team Sophie Rudland, Faye Robinson, Viswasirasini Govindarajan, and KFCRIS researchers Ayael Al-Qarni, and Heba Albeity, for their assistance, reviews, corrections, and patience throughout the process. Without them this work will not have been possible.

I N T R O DU C T IO N Abdullah Hamidaddin

Th ­ e Huthis1—who prefer to refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (supporters of Allah)2—are a quasi-state actor leading a political coalition, and social movement with a strong paramilitary core and an Islamist, anti-American ideology. Its beginnings can be traced to January 2002, when Husayn al-Huthi called on Muslims everywhere to publicly denounce the United States—and Israel—in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan (in 2001). He believed that the invasion was the prelude to a new phase of American control of the region, one that would be more assertive and aggressive than during the Cold War, benefiting Israel and undermining Arabs and Muslims across the Middle East. For al-Huthi,3 a necessary condition to avert this prospective American hegemony was to raise awareness on US plans, mobilize Muslim states and publics to reject US entreaties, and revitalize the role of the Quran in the Muslim umma. He adopted the slogan “God is Great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Cursed be the Jews. Victory be to Islam.”4 Al-Huthi enjoined his then small number of disciples to repeat the slogan at every possible opportunity, especially in mosques after communal prayers. He also gave sermons from his home in Marran, a small village about seventy kilometers west of Sa’ada. The sermons were recorded and disseminated via cassette tape to different cities in the upper north of Yemen. Meant for a general audience, the sermons emphasized the threat America posed, the downtrodden situation of Muslims, and al-Huthi’s prescription—namely, to uphold the Quran, in its proper interpretation, in Muslims’ daily lives. Little in his sermons was something unique or different from what many radical Islamists in the region believe or pronounce.5 What marked out al-Huthi as distinctive was his emphatic encouragement of his disciples and audience to publicly chant the aforementioned slogan. Soon it became common to see young men, mostly under eighteen years of age, chanting the slogan in mosques in Sanaa and Sa’ada after Friday prayers or other ritual gatherings. One of the early labels given to Husayn and his followers was As-hab al-Shi’ar (People of the Slogan). The Yemeni government reacted to the public chanting with arrests, which only convinced Husayn and his growing band of followers that the slogan was effective and that the United States perceived it as a threat to its presence in the region. One thing led to another, and in 2004, Yemen’s

2

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

President Ali Abdullah Saleh decided to arrest Husayn al-Huthi. He resisted arrest, instead volunteering to travel to Sanaa to meet President Saleh in person on the condition that he not be harmed. Saleh rejected the offer, and after several failed mediations, a limited military confrontation took place between the government’s forces and Husayn and his followers, leading to his death in September 2004. This might have been the end of it, but the situation in the upper north of Yemen was already ripe for a broader confrontation with the government. The local economy was in dire straits, and the frustration of the communities around Sa’ada was approaching a threshold.6 Against this backdrop, Saleh decided to go after Husayn’s father, Badr al-Din al-Huthi, and younger brother, Abdulmalik alHuthi, and other loyal followers. The result was five more military confrontations between 2005 and 2010, which were much more devastating than the initial clash, covered a wider geographic area, and brought tragic collateral consequences. The Huthis survived the wars and, under the leadership of Abdulmalik al-Huthi, grew to become a formidable military force. Husayn al-Huthi may have been the instigator behind the events leading to the confrontation with the Yemeni government, but the founding of the movement is more accurately attributed to his younger brother. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2010–11, the Huthis found themselves at the center of Yemeni political activity in Sanaa. The nature of the uprisings differed from country to country across the region. It was less a popular uprising in Yemen and more a confrontation between the tripartite ruling elite. Since 1978, Yemen had been ruled by an uneasy coalition of three main powerbrokers: President Ali Abdullah Saleh (with ready access to state resources), Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armored Division and now vice-president, from the village of Bayt al-Ahmar (“House of al-Ahmar”), from which Saleh also hails, and Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar,7 the paramount shaykh of Hashid. Shaykh Abdullah died in 2007, after which his sons, mainly Husayn and Hamid, assumed his mantle. In 2011, Saleh, Ali Muhsin, and the al-Ahmar family clashed, leading to Ali Saleh’s ouster through an initiative negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC deal forestalled Yemen’s slide into a civil war, with then Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi assuming the presidency in February 2012. President Hadi’s position remained precarious. He needed to balance the powers of Ali Muhsin and the al-Ahmar family and address the power vacuum caused by Saleh’s ouster, while at the time deal with the economic destitution, and implement donor demands for the unpopular austerity measures.8 The Huthis would benefit from this situation, and through a series of deft political maneuvers and several military confrontations with the al-Ahmar family and Ali Muhsin, the Huthis took control of Sanaa in 2014, announcing a “revolution” on September 21 of that year. The president soon found himself under the absolute control of the Huthis and fled from Sanaa to Aden and from there to Saudi Arabia. On March 26, 2015, a coalition of Arab countries under Saudi Arabia’s leadership launched “Operation Decisive Storm” or “Storm of Resolve” against the Huthis. The operation had two key goals, one internal and the other regional. Its

Introduction

3

main internal goal was to restore authority to the state, and its main regional goal was to deter Iran from further intervention in the region. At the time of writing, the war is already in its seventh year, and regardless of the final result, it seems that the Huthis will remain a key player in Yemen’s cultural, social, economic, and political scenes for the foreseeable future.9 The Huthis experienced multiple phases between 2002 and 2014. Starting as a small paramilitary movement, they later evolved into a social movement and then became a full-fledged political organization—by 2014, the group had morphed into a quasi-state actor. Due to their long confrontation with the Yemeni government and then the 2015 war, much of the focus on the Huthis has been through the prisms of war and conflict. This perspective may have narrowed our understanding of the essence of the movement and limited our ability to grasp the specific ways the Huthis think and believe and—just as importantly—their impact on Yemen and the region. The Huthis have created a religio-political organization that has altered the power configuration in Yemen and generated a social movement aspiring to fundamentally reshape the country to fit their local and regional ambitions. Those ambitions, in turn, are shaped by the imperatives of power preservation, social and political constraints, the dictates of a distinctive Islamist ideology, and a vision of sociopolitical order. The Huthis are changing Yemen’s religious landscape, challenging traditional religious authority, reshaping tribal values and roles, constructing collective memories and identities, infusing Yemen’s mediascape with their ideological creed, and positioning Yemen’s foreign policy within a regional policy of resistance to the United States. It is vital to understand all of these dynamics and how they impact the region. The purpose of this volume is to provide a comprehensive critical analysis of the Huthi movement and its impact on Yemen and subsequently on the security of the Arab Gulf region. Many academic papers have been written about the Huthis, and some books on Yemen have discussed various aspects of the group. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (2010),10 a principal monograph on the Huthis, is ten years old, and its focus is on their history and the socioeconomic and political factors leading to their rise. There are also very important and recent books on Yemen that have analyzed various aspects of the Huthi movement, such as Marieke Brandt’s Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict (2017), which is the most up-to-date and authoritative work on the Huthis,11 Helen Lackner’s Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State (2017),12 and Laurent Bonnefoy’s Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity (2018).13 Other important collections include Lackner and Varisco’s Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis (2017)14 and Day and Brehoney’s Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemeni Crisis (2020).15 Together they provide important insights into contemporary Yemeni dynamics and many key aspects of the Huthi experience, albeit through different methods and using varying frameworks of analysis. Yet, many key issues remain to be addressed, which is the objective of this volume. In filling this gap, the book, taking a synchronic rather than diachronic perspective, addresses religious, cultural, political, and social

4

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

issues that have not been discussed before. It does so in light of the impact of these issues locally, providing a holistic view on the movement and the way it is changing Yemen and influencing the region.

Historical Context For detailed review, I would refer the reader to the several aforementioned historical studies. Here, I present but a brief overview that necessarily omits much while highlighting the critical contexts that have enabled the rise and expansion of the Huthis. The Huthi movement emerged in a complex multidimensional context that includes republican anti-Hashimite/Zaydi rhetoric and constructed exclusionary memories, a fractured state, economic breakdown, an elite cold war, a Zaydi religious revivalist movement, anti-imperialist ideologies, Islamic movements, and changes in the meaning of traditional Islam and the role of the ͑ ulmā͗, the breakdown of Yemen’s political order, high illiteracy in the rural areas, and the convergence of threat perceptions among the tribal communities of the upper north. The trajectory the movement took was largely an outcome of the key actors’ actions, reactions, and decisions. Nothing was inevitable in the movement’s trajectory, the development of its ideology, or its impact on Yemeni society, politics, and history. Nevertheless, I think that the context generated two enabling factors: the readiness of a broad popular base to be galvanized and the weakness of the tripartite ruling elite. The following sections unpack some of the aforementioned contextual factors in greater detail. Republican Anti-Hashimite/Zaydi Rhetoric and Constructed, Exclusionary Memories Yemen is a country of contested, competing, and contradictory memories. Various movements and social and political actors tell different histories of the past, thereby constructing and shaping the memories of their respective followers. Different actors select distinct moments in history as their imagined beginning or to mark milestones. Sometimes the same historical events are interpreted differently, creating different memories. These memories also serve competing political and social goals. In this way, the past remains alive, if only as a shorthand marker in the present.16 The al-Huthi family is from the Hashimi clans17 that migrated to Yemen in the tenth century CE.18 Hashimites are also referred to as sāda or ashrāf. Historically they had played political and scholarly roles in various Muslim communities. There are two distinct histories of Hashemis in Yemen. One is the story of Ahmad bin Isa al-Muhajir, who arrived in Yemen in the late tenth century CE and established a presence lasting until today. From the twelfth century CE, his descendants’ focus turned to spiritual and religious matters though they were always players in the politics of the southern areas of Yemen. This spiritual

Introduction

5

legitimacy was a target of the communist regime in the south after 1967, and many of their religious leaders were executed, brutally murdered, or exiled. Today, families such al-Jifri, al-Attas, al-Bidh, al-Aydarus, and al-Fagih all come from that lineage. The first to arrive in the upper north of Yemen in the early ninth century CE was Yahya ibn al-Hussayn, better known as Al-Imam al-Hadi (The Guiding Imam), a sayyid scholar invited by some tribal leaders of Yemen to mediate between fighting tribal factions in the Sa’daa region. His arrival and leadership launched an imamate that waxed and waned for the next 1100 years until the coup of 1962. The primary role of mediation that al-Hadi was invited to play would continue to be the primary source of sustainability and durability of the imamate in the upper north and the main factor defining the role of the sayyids. Competing Yemeni tribes considered this outsider to be a neutral player and sometimes a solution to the ongoing tribal competition over power. This mediating role would arguably sustain the authority and legitimate the discourse of the Zaydi imamate. Zaydi imams claimed that only sayyids are eligible to compete for the leadership of the umma. For 1100 years, it appeared that the social and political structure in the upper north benefited from this mediating role, which fitted well with that discursive monopoly of entitlement. The end of the imamate era did not end the mediating role of the sayyids nor their social status, especially in the rural areas. The Huthi movement would later tap into this historical reservoir for legitimacy and mobilization, recreating the myth of the sayyid as the leader who can best rise against oppression and unify the umma. From the early 1940s, the political and social opposition to the imamate regime developed a counternarrative to the Zaydi religious discourse. And after the fall of the imamate regime in 1962 (1970), the republican regime adopted that opposing narrative, fostering what would come to be a binary “Manichaean” memory of pre1962 Yemen: the imamate was all evil, ugly, dark, and medieval, and the republic was all good, beautiful, enlightened, and modern. Very quickly, this denigration of the imamate extended to the Hashimites and then to the Zaydis, and a narrative developed that framed these groups as a threat to the republic and its enlightened values. The new narrative could be framed as that of the “master-serf.” In this narrative, all sayyids—not just the existing imam or the imamate as a regime—forced themselves as masters onto the Yemeni people, who were treated through the centuries as serfs. In this view, the 1962 revolution was the historical moment when the serfs gained freedom and created a new relationship, framed as one of “free serfs–restrained master.” The sayyid was depicted as the master toppled from his throne, who now required careful monitoring and restraint lest he break his chains and attempt to re-exert control. And the non-sayyids in Yemen were depicted as the unchained serfs who had secured their freedom but needed to guard it jealously and maintain it at all costs. This narrative—which presented the former sayyid ruling class as an essentialized and monolithic entity—was disseminated by the republican intelligentsia through every vehicle available to the state—schoolbooks, public holidays, official speeches, and the like.

6

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Hashimite identity has been depicted as a transhistorical and static fact—a constant against a shifting historical backdrop. In fact, like all identities, it is a historical concept, conceptualized, articulated, and expressed variously in different sociopolitical and historical contexts. It is not easy to assess the actual impact of this narrative and the memory it sought to create. Still, it would not be inaccurate to say that it forcibly excluded Hashimites and Zaydis, who did not want to downplay their social or religious identities, from the republican project. And in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a Zaydi-Hashimite counternarrative developed— that of a community being forced to suppress its identity and renounce its religious heritage. A sense of victimization and perception of being oppressed would become defining characteristics among many Zaydis and Hashimites from this period onward.19 Thus, when the Huthi movement started to grow in power, many young sayyids and Zaydis felt empowered by it, relating to it to varying degrees. It became a source of a lost pride for these young people. In contrast, many older Zaydis and Hashimites feared it would jeopardize the meager gains made in the 1990s. This ambivalence would change after the Huthis entered Sanaa. For many, there was an underlying sense of “we are back” or “you cannot suppress us forever,” even among Zaydis and sayyids who did not support the Huthis. Fractured State, Elite Conflict: The Arab Spring and the Breakdown of Yemen’s Political Order The rapid rise of the Huthis is hard to grasp outside the context of the weak and highly fractured Yemeni state. Indeed, Yemen has long been more a constellation of powers than a coherent state. As mentioned, the key power brokers formed a tripartite structure—President Ali Abdullah Saleh, General Ali Muhsin alAhmar, and the Ahmar family (Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar and his sons after him, especially Hamid al-Ahmar). As president, Saleh was strong, but the state was weak. The “state,” in a very loose meaning of the term, lacked effective control over all Yemini territory and frequently competed with local communities. There was a weak sense of legitimacy and a total absence of modern statehood’s defining attribute—namely, a monopoly of legitimate violence. The key power actors were behaving as agents within the country, where just one of the powers had control of state institutions. Thus, the state was simply one power among many.20 Yemen’s tripartite ruling system was briefly disrupted after Yemen’s unification in 1990 with the entry of a new force—namely, the Socialists of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The tripartite elite immediately sought to suppress southern influence and exploit the newly acquired resources of South Yemen. This led to the 1994 civil war, in which the Socialists were pushed out. After that, a schism started to grow within the tripartite structure, evolving by the end of the 1990s into a cold war between them. The situation grew tenser when Saleh floated the idea of his son Ahmad as his successor. This further distanced him from his former allies. This schism would last until the

Introduction

7

Arab Spring when it transformed into direct confrontation. That cold war would play a role in determining the course of the conflict between the government and the Huthis in 2004–10, and the direct confrontation would influence the course of events after 2012. As touched on, the events of the so-called Arab Spring unfolded in different ways according to the particular situation in each country. In Yemen, there was no revolution per se. As has become clear, the various revolutionary activities did little more than facilitate a reshuffle of power among the existing Yemeni rulers. The cold war between the three power centers turned into direct conflict when Saleh, the Ahmar family, and Ali Al-Ahmar raised arms against each other, and Saleh was almost killed in an assassination attempt. The political order finally collapsed in 2014. The only thing that saved Yemen from what could have been a devastating civil war was the aforementioned GCC initiative. Since then, Yemen’s politics have been shaped by the quest for a new order. ­ eligious Revivalism, Mosque Politics, and Changes in the Meaning of Traditional R Islam and the Role of the ͑ulmā͗ In highlighting these points here, it is important to underplay the effect of sectarianism as a factor in the rise of the Huthis.21 If sectarianism is used as an analytical category referring to group identities founded on religious differences, it does not apply to Yemen. It is undoubtedly true that distinct notions of Zaydism and Sunnism exist in Yemen and that most individuals consider themselves either Sunni or Zaydi. Moreover, some of those individuals speak ill of the other and may express hate or exhibit animosity based on that difference. But it is inaccurate to assume that there is a sense of a homogeneous group identity inward and outward, entailing or implying group loyalty, roles, expectations, and group interests based on Sunnism or Zaydism. Considering Zaydism and Sunnism as group identities overlooks and obscures the multiple identities, affiliations, class differences, and diversity of interests expressed by individuals subsumed under one religious label. Zaydis and Sunnis in Yemen are not monolithic groups whose members are equally committed to the group and a common theology. In other words, Zaydis and Sunnis do not prioritize theological commitments and religious differences when determining social and political interests. Yemen’s religious landscape was historically divided between Zaydis, Shāfi͑ īs, and, in some cases, Hanbalis. “Zaydism” is an umbrella term that encompasses diverging religious opinions. Some lean toward Shi’ism, others toward Sunnism, some more to rational theologians, such as the Mu’tazila, and others still more toward textualists, such as Ahl al-Hadith.22 What mattered about Zaydism in the debates of the twentieth century was that the imams of Yemen were Zaydis and that the political theory of most Zaydis demanded that the imam (the legitimate leader of the community) be a descendant of the Prophet (in addition to exhibiting knowledge, piety, and wisdom). In the aftermath of the 1962 coup, this did not present a problem, as there were Zaydi scholars whose opinions accommodated a political system that did not demand a sayyid as leader. Also,

8

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

the initial republican rhetoric focused on the imamate and sayyids. But as mentioned above, the imamate, Hashimites, and Zaydism were soon conflated, and pious Zaydis would find their religious heritage a target of the government and some of its allies. Thus, the Zaydi revivalist movement was, in one way, a reaction to the post1962 narrative. Some of the revivalists were only concerned with revitalizing Zaydi religious teachings in the community. Some of them, influenced by the Islamist discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution, were more concerned with Islamizing the community while at the same time reviving Zaydi history and religious heritage. In the 1980s, Zaydi activism was limited due to the state’s concerns, but the 1990 unification of the two Yemens opened the country’s political and media landscape. Zaydi activists simply exploited this opportunity to revive their ancient traditions and teachings. The Grand Mosque in Sanaa was the center of much of this activity in Yemen’s capital and some of the rural areas, as well as the Markaz Badr (Badr Center)—a newly formed entity by Murtadha al-Muhatwari. In Sa’ada, some of the young activists also initiated summer youth camps under the label Forum of the Faithful Youth (Muntada al-Shabab al-Mu’min), sometimes also known as the Believing Youth. Some senior, more traditional ͑ulmā͗ supervised other types of youth camps focused more on religious preaching and scholarly grounding. Before this, the principal organized religious activism was divided between traditional Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood activists. Zaydi youth activism was soon to be perceived as a turf war over mosques (being religious centers) and followers. The Salafi and Brotherhood response to Zaydi revivalism generated intense counteractivity among the Zaydi, leading to the politicization of religious affiliation, on the one hand, and to the revival of the role of traditional and modern Zaydi ͑ulmā͗ in the upper north, on the other. Husayn al-Huthi—and other members of his immediate and extended family— was active in this revival until the late 1990s, when he left for Sudan to acquire a master’s degree in Quranic exegesis. He returned to Yemen with new religious ideas and preached a new approach to revivalism, which most traditional and modernist Zaydis did not accept. His ideas are covered in two chapters in this volume, so I will not discuss them in detail here, albeit to note that Saleh’s response to Husayn and later to the Huthi movement occurred against the background of those ideas. The strong legitimacy of Hashimism in Yemen’s upper northern regions and the spiritual influence of Zaydism played an essential role in creating a strong front, albeit in different ways. If Hashimism helped the leadership of Abdulmalik alHuthi gain legitimacy, Zaydism played a vital role in creating the puritanical core on which the fighting depended greatly. The volume’s purpose is to present an overview of the Huthi movement and its impact on the region. For that purpose, it is divided into four sections. The first investigates the Huthi ideology and belief system through three interrelated issues. Husayn al-Huthi’s thought marked a break with Zaydism and Islam as understood by traditional ͑ulmā͗. Today some Huthis consider his religious ideas as the new

Introduction

9

Islam, while others are followers in politics but not in religion. Bernard Haykel’s chapter examines the teachings of the movement and how its ideology fits into broader Zaydi currents of thought and the contemporary political and intellectual history of Yemen and that of the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Mohammed Almahfali examines the Huthi ideology and belief system by comparing the key themes of the Malazim of Husayn al-Huthi and his younger brother and leader of the movement Abdulmalik, highlighting the development of the Huthi ideology between the movement’s inception and evolution into a quasi-state actor. Alexander Weissenburger’s chapter examines the movement’s use of Yemeni and Islamic history as reservoirs to generate historically based ideological narratives to bolster its legitimacy. The second section investigates how the Huthis are reconfiguring Yemen’s society and the tools deployed to that end. Specifically, this section focuses on three aspects of Yemeni society and the Huthi impact on them—namely, tribes, women, and education. The tribe as a social unit has always played a key role in Yemeni political and economic dynamics and has continuously adapted itself to survive and thrive. Marieke Brandt examines changes made by the Huthis in the relationship between tribes and rulers in the northern highlands of Yemen, comparing the periods of the imamate and the republic. Women have always played a critical role in various radical movements and militant organizations as a resource for mobilization and legitimacy. Ewa Strzelecka discusses how the Huthis have influenced gender dynamics and the role and status of women, contrasting views of the “Huthis as a movement” and the “Huthis as a quasi-state actor.” Shaker Lashuel investigates the Huthi movement’s influences on education and assesses the extent to which education has been used to further their ideology and promote their cause and aspirations. The section also focuses on two key tools of influence—indoctrination and narrative construction—and how these have been used to saturate the Yemeni public sphere with the Huthi narrative. Hannah Porter discusses the evolution of the Huthi media landscape and media productions that weave together key themes of Huthi ideology through a network of programs, social media, and artistic and poetic productions. Emily Sumner discusses the Huthi zamil (poetic tradition) and the key differences between it and the traditional zamil. As a poetic tradition, zamil is deeply embedded in Yemen’s cultural character and social practice. The Huthis have appropriated this in their objective to normalize Huthi ideology and indoctrinate their base. The third section examines the ways the Huthis are changing the state and its structures. It revisits the concept of the state as applied to Yemen, discusses Huthi visions of the state, and examines aspects of change in the institutional structures. Anthony Chimente examines the nature of state power and civil-military relations in Huthi-dominated territories using a conceptual framework that situates nonstate actors, rather than the state, as the focal point of power. Charles Schmitz assesses how the Huthis present their vision of a future state—namely, a revolutionary model of a republican government guided from the outside by the

10

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

leader of a revolutionary movement. Joshua Rogers focuses on the impact of the war and Huthi policies on reconfiguring the Yemeni state by focusing on changes to the local authorities and practices of administration. The fourth section looks beyond Yemen and investigates the impact the Huthi rise will have on the region writ large. James Spencer examines conventional and asymmetric warfare, taking the 2015 war as a case study. Eleonora Ardemagni examines the impact of the Huthi wars since 2004 on the securitization of the Saudi-Yemeni relationship. Maria-Louise Clausen examines Huthi ambitions for a regional role through their attempts at building foreign relations and how this will be influenced by the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the volume aspired to present a holistic view of the Huthis through the variety of themes covered, more needs to be done. As the reader will notice, the chapters face limitations, highlighted by the authors themselves, such as limitations of access to Yemen, which has been almost impossible since 2014. More themes need to be discussed, especially those related to identity such as Hashimism, Huthi resilience factors, command and control structure, culture of militarism, relationship to the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” among other themes that are key to a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the movement. Moreover, comparative research needs to be done between the Huthis and other similar phenomenon, as well as explicitly place them within the broader research on the ideological, social, and political transformations of the Middle East, postcolonialism, militant organizations, Islamism and Islamist movements, political media, and contemporary Islamic schools of thought. Finally, and most challenging, there needs to be a reflexive turn in Yemen studies, a critical exploration of the assumptions almost unconsciously embedded in the theoretical frameworks, concepts, and methods utilized to understand Yemen.23 This is especially necessary as scholarly attention toward Yemen increases, demanding a revisit to the scholarship of the past decades, to discover blind spots, highlight epistemological and methodological biases, and point out inaccurate essentializations all too common in any human intellectual endeavor. Having said that the authors of this volume bring multiple methods, variety of horizons, and diversity of backgrounds, presenting multiple theoretical starting points of observation and analysis, which can lead to some diverging opinions among them and expressed in this volume, which is most appropriate when studying a complex phenomenon, especially one that is controversial, contentious, and polarizing. Coherence has its strengths, but it sometimes comes at the expense of reflexivity, diversity, balance, and internal debate. The authors also bring to the topic a wide array of scholarship on radicalism, social movements, international relations, politics, social anthropology, sociopolitical identity, discourse analysis, collective memory, media, and Islamism with the goal of providing readers a nuanced and multilayered approach to the understanding of this movement and its local and regional impact. I am grateful to the authors who, despite the Covid-19 restrictions, produced this collection and who privileged and humbled me with the honor of being associated with their scholarship.

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Notes 1 The use of the spelling “Huthi” is widespread in English publications; following the transliteration guidelines of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) I prefer the spelling “Huthi.” Some contributors to this volume used the former spelling and others used the latter. 2 The Huthis formally adopted this as the name of their movement during the uprisings in Yemen 2011, taken from the Quranic verse “O you who have believed, be supporters of Allah, as when Jesus, the son of Mary, said to the disciples, ‘Who are my supporters for Allah?’ The disciples said, ‘We are supporters of Allah.’ And a faction of the Children of Israel believed and a faction disbelieved. So We supported those who believed against their enemy, and they became dominant.” Others have translated it as “helpers of Allah.” See Saheeh International, “As-Saf—61:14,” https://quran.com/61/14? translations=17,20,21,22,84,85,18,19,95,101 (accessed April 11, 2021). 3 “Al-Huthi” is a place-surname used by more than one family associated with the city of Huth in Amran Governorate north of Sanaa. The followers of Husayn al-Huthi and then his brother Abdulmalik were called Huthis by the Yemeni government and the name continues to be used to this day, although as mentioned above, the Huthis prefer Ansar Allah. To distinguish between the use of Huthi as a surname from that of an eponymic designation, I will use al-Huthi for the former and the Huthis for the latter. 4 For a brief history of the slogan, see Adam Taylor, “The History of ‘Death to America’,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ worldviews/wp/2015/02/18/the-history-of-death-to-america/. 5 Calling for a “return to the Qur’an” is an all-too-common trope among Muslims. The difference is in interpretations. Most of the calls posited by Islamists refer to variants of Seyyid Qutb’s interpretation of the Qur’an. It is also worth noting that Muslim Brotherhood Islamists and Salafis in Yemen rejected Husayn al-Huthi’s position on matters of mutual agreement due to disagreement and competition on the local religious landscape. For hating America and anti-imperialist Islamist discourse compared between the Huthis and bin Laden, see Robert S. Snyder, “Hating America: Bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary,” Review of Politics 65, no. 4 (2003): 325–49, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500039061; Bin Laden, Osama. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence and trans. James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005). 6 The sources mentioned below on the history of the Huthis highlight this all too well. Also see Andreas Gros, Alexander Gard-Murray, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Conflict in Yemen: From Ethnic Fighting to Food Riots,” New England Complex Systems Institute, July 24, 2012, https://necsi.edu/conflict-in-yemen-from-ethnic-fighting-tofood-riots; Brian M. Perkins, “Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 4 (2017): 300–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/105761 0X.2016.1205368 7 Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar is not related to Abdullah al-Ahmar. 8 Ala’a Jarban, “Supporting and Failing Yemen’s Transition: Critical Perspectives on Development Agencies,” Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen, The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) no. 29 (January 2018): 46–50, https:// pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/POMEPS_Studies_29_Yemen_Web-REV. pdf.

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

9 For the history of the movement, see Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2017); Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2010), https:// www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.html. See also Abdullah Hamidaddin, “Yemen: Negotiations with Tribes, States and Memories,” in Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2015), 116–14; International Crisis Group, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa,” 2014, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabianpeninsula/yemen/huthis-saada-sanaa; Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway, Yemen on the Brink (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010). 10 Salmoni et al., Regime and Periphery. 11 Brandt, Tribes and Politics. 12 Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State (London: Verso Books, 2019). 13 Laurent Bonnefoy, Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 14 Helen Lackner and Daniel Martin Varisco, eds, Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018). 15 Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony, Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). 16 See Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition (Contemporary Anthropology of Religion) (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 17 While there are no accurate, official, or reliable sources on the number of Hashimites in Yemen, some estimate them to be between 7 and 12 percent of the population. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Yemen: Relationship and treatment of Hashemites by authorities and other groups, including Houthis [Huthis] and extremist groups (2012–August 2015), September 9, 2015, YEM105277.E, https:// www.refworld.org/docid/56a775a94.html. 18 Very little has been written in English about the sāda of Yemen. Two excellent examples are vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality, and Luca Nevola, “Blood Doesn’t Lie: Hierarchy and Inclusion/Exclusion in Contemporary Yemen,” PhD thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2014–15, https://boa.unimib. it/bitstream/10281/88750/ 1/PhD_unimib_064148.pdf. There have been some interesting works covering other regions. See, for example, Kazuo Morimoto, ed., Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017); Lurencee Gautier and Julien Levesque, “Introduction: Historicizing Sayyid-Ness: Social Status and Muslim Identity in South Asia,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 30, no. 3 (2020): 383–93, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S1356186320000139 19 Nevola, “Blood Doesn’t Lie,” 19, 51–79; Luca Nevola, “Houthis in the Making: Nostalgia, Populism, and the Politicization of Hashemite Descent,” Arabian Humanities 13 (2020), https://doi.org/10.4000/cy.5917; vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality. 20 The concept of the state is elusive, and its association with Yemen especially in the context of terms such as “weak state” and “failed state” has been a source of debate and controversy. See Lisa Wedeen, “Don’t Call Yemen a ‘Failed State,’” Foreign Policy,

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March 30, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/30/dont-call-yemen-a-failedstate/; Kamilia al-Eriani, “Mourning the Death of a State to Enliven It: Notes on the ‘Weak’ Yemeni State,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (March 2020): 227–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877918823774; Sophia Dingli, “Is the Failed State Thesis Analytically Useful? The Case of Yemen,” Politics 33, no. 2 (June 2013): 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01453.x. There are many sources for a discussion on the meaning of a “state” and the debate surrounding it; for example, see Clifford Geertz, “What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign?: Reflections on Politics in Complicated Places,” Current Anthropology 45, no. 5 (December 2004): 577–93, https://doi.org/10.1086/423972; Pierre Bourdieu, Loic J. D. Wacquant, and Samar Farage, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 1, https://doi. org/10.2307/202032 21 See Vincent Durac, “The Limits of the Sectarian Narrative in Yemen,” Global Discourse 9, no. 4 (2019): 655–73, https://doi.org/10.1332/20437891 9X15718898814430; Abdullah Hamidaddin, “From Social Category to Social Identity: The Emergence of a New Zaydism,” in Precarious Belongings: Being Shiʿi in Non-Shiʿi Worlds, ed. Charles and Tripp and Gabriele vom Bruck (London, UK: Centre for Academic Shiʿa Studies (CASS), 2017). 22 Bernard Haykel and Aron Zysow, “What Makes a Madhab a Madhab: Zaydi Debates on the Structure of Legal Authority,” Arabica 59, nos. 3–4 (2012): 332–71, https://doi. org/10.1163/157005812X629284; Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad Al-Shawkani (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 23 See Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology (London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010).

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Section I HUTHI IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF SYSTEM

16

­1 T H E H U T H I M OV E M E N T ’ S R E L IG IO U S A N D P O L I T IC A L I D E O L O G Y A N D I T S R E L AT IO N SH I P T O Z AY D I SM I N Y E M E N Bernard Haykel

The doctrines of the Huthi movement (aka Ansar Allah or the “partisans of God”) represent a radical rupture with Zaydi tradition as well as with the generally accepted teachings of Islamic theology and law.1 This can be gleaned from the movement’s ideology with its wholesale rejection of the traditional interpretive methodologies of Islamic theology and law. Instead, the movement offers a highly politicized, revolutionary, and intentionally simplistic, even primitivist, interpretation of the religion’s teachings and their implementation in practice. This is encapsulated in the movement’s slogan or “shout” (sarkha), which appears on its flag and is ritualistically repeated by its followers: “God is the greatest; Death to America; Death to Israel; Cursed are the Jews; Victory to Islam.” In this regard, the Huthis are not unlike certain other Islamist movements that disregard elements of the tradition while radically and selectively reinterpreting those that prove useful to their aims. Members of the movement base their views principally on the oral lessons— delivered in both classical Arabic and colloquial Yemeni—of Sayyid Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn al-Hūthī (d. 2004), the founder of the movement. These teachings are transcribed and collected in a 2129-page online Adobe Acrobat document titled the Malāzim (Fascicles), which has become the reference text for the movement—a credal document for its followers.2 So important is this text that there are Android smartphone applications of the Malāzim that provide easy-to-use didactic and search functions.3 The Malāzim are now akin to the collected works of Lenin or Mao for providing guidance to the movement’s followers. And, according to a number of Yemenis I have interviewed, the Malāzim have surpassed the older canonical works of the Zaydi sect in political and religious authority. This has engendered criticism and resistance from traditional Zaydis, and while the Huthis have at times tried to accommodate the traditionalists, in more recent years, we see real tensions arising between the two groups, including violence being used to silence the traditionally oriented Zaydis. The recent destruction by the Huthis of one of Sanaa’s oldest mosques, Jāmi‘ al-Nahrayn, may perhaps be a manifestation of such a clash.4

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

The Malāzim are now being taught as a core text by the Huthi’s Ministry of Religious Endowments in its “Higher Institute for Orientation and Guidance” (al-Ma‘had al-‘ālī li-l-tawjīh wa-l-irshād).5 In addition, members of the Huthi movement have produced multiple studies about the teachings of Husayn al-Huthi, who is referred to not only as the “Martyr Leader” (al-shahīd al-qā’id) but also as “The Quran’s Companion” (qarīn al-Qur’ān) and more recently as “The Quran’s Martyr” (shahīd al-Qur’ān).6 Among these books are some that focus on his views on nurture and education.7 Through such works, his followers hope to elevate his status to that of a global and historical revolutionary figure, comparable to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam or Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. And, as with Khomeini, they see his message and program to be universal in their applicability. This chapter aims to introduce the salient aspects of Husayn al-Huthi’s teachings and will try to situate them in the modern political and intellectual history of Yemen and that of the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Husayn alHuthi’s intellectual formation remains somewhat obscure, and his biography is increasingly shrouded in myth and legend. His life was cut short at the age of fortyfive, when he was killed and decapitated by Yemeni government troops in 2004. We do know that he received a traditional Zaydi religious education and was the son of one of the most prominent, and prolific, Yemeni scholars of modern times, Sayyid Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2010). He was well versed in the Islamic sciences and his views, as reflected in the Malāzim, are in no way the result of ignorance of the Islamic tradition and its attendant sciences, unlike, say, Muammar al-Gaddafi’s views as expressed in the Green Book. Still, it is difficult to trace the source of his idiosyncratic and anti-traditional views or to understand how he imagined these teachings would be implemented in practice, despite the fact that activism (ḥaraka) occupies a central place in his oeuvre. His teachings appear to have been only partially developed at the time of his death, and he no doubt intended to elaborate further on the modalities of their implementation. What we have in the Malāzim was elaborated during a relatively short period of about three years, from 2002 to 2004. These doctrines have reached us through transcribed oral lessons and some video and audio recordings that he mostly gave in his native village of Marrān and in the town of Sa‘da.

The Political Context By contrast with the opacity of the sources of his ideological formation, the political context in which al-Huthi developed his views is well known. Yemen had suffered from decades of poor governance, authoritarian abuse, and systemic corruption under the rule of President Ali Abdullah Salih (d. 2017). It was, and remains, the poorest Arab country and is buffeted by chronic political and economic instability as well as internal divisions based on tribal, sectarian, regional, and genealogical affiliation. Foreign interference in its internal affairs, whether by neighboring states or global powers, has been a constant feature since at least the republican revolution of 1962.

1. Huthi Movement’s Religious and Political Ideology

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Al-Huthi was keenly aware of the above, and his lectures and speeches express his frustrations with Yemen’s politics as well as his views about the predicaments of  the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Thus, we can glean from the Malāzim how  he felt about the condition of the Zaydis in modern Yemen and how they fared  vis-à-vis other Muslim sects. Although al-Huthi considers other Muslim groups as perhaps somewhat better off than the Zaydis, he describes them all as being politically weak and economically backward. He generally laments the plight of the global Muslim community (umma) in the modern world. For him, the Zaydis in Yemen were especially marginalized, oppressed, and backward, and this was a source of extreme personal anguish.8 He particularly chafed at the discrimination that sayyid families, like his own, had experienced, especially in the Sa‘da region, under republican rule since the early 1970s—a situation that got worse during the rule of President Ali Abdullah Salih due to his divisive politics and the increasing presence and dominance of the Salafi Sunnis in the country. Domination by the Salafis was the result of the Yemeni and Saudi governments’ political support and financial patronage of this group from the early 1970s. The aim of the Salafization policy in Yemen was to produce across the country a homogenized and hadith-oriented Sunni form of Islam, one that would be politically quietist and obedient to the authority of the state. A second goal of this policy was to produce co-opted Salafi religious leaders who would replace the traditional religious elites, and especially those from the various families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad (sayyids). It was they who had historically headed the Zaydis in the north as well as the Sufi Shafi‘i Sunnis in the south.9 One of the leading figures among the Salafis was the late Shaykh Muqbil al-Wādi‘ī (d. 2001), who established a major center—called Dār al-Ḥadīth—for the teaching of Salafism in his native village of Dammāj in the region of Sa‘da. From here he and his students polemically engaged the Zaydis and provoked vituperative and at times violent exchanges over questions of religious belief and practice. This also included the destruction of graves in Sa‘da’s main cemetery by the Salafis. The Huthis crushed the Salafis in this region in 2014 and destroyed this institution of Salafi proselytism.

Husayn al-Huthi’s Political and Intellectual Itinerary To understand Husayn al-Huthi, we must draw on what little we know about his personal, intellectual, and political itinerary. He was elected to parliament in 1993 as a member of Hizb al-Haqq. This was a Zaydi political party that was formed in the aftermath of the unification of the two Yemens in 1990 and that sought to represent Zaydis in the new climate of political liberalization. The relatively open political environment lasted until the civil war of 1994, after which the country’s politics became dominated by President Saleh’s divisive political activities. Yemen reverted to authoritarianism, witnessed increasing acts of political violence, and saw the promotion by the government of Islamism of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi varieties. This atmosphere led to Husayn al-Huthi’s frustration and

20

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

disappointment with electoral politics, and he did not run again for parliament in the elections of 1997. During this period, he continued to be deeply involved with a Zaydi revivalist movement called al-Shabab al-Mu’min (The Believing Youth) in the Sa‘da region and elsewhere. Al-Huthi had helped establish this group in the 1980s, and it engaged in opening teaching institutions, summer camp activities for students, and the publication of manuscripts. Members of this group also developed relations with the religious seminaries (ḥawza) in Qom in Iran as well as those in Najaf in Iraq. Al-Huthi traveled to Iran with his father during this time. There is no evidence, however, that either converted to Twelver Imami Shiism or that they openly adopted Khomeini’s ideas, as Husayn al-Huthi did later.10 It is clear that al-Huthi was concerned about the preservation of the Zaydi heritage and community and was seeking ways to revive its political and religious fortunes. He decided to pursue advanced Islamic studies for an MA degree in the Sudan, and it is possible that he thought this academic credential would help him in a leadership role after his return. The 1990s was a period of considerable Islamist political ferment in the Sudan. The regime of Omar al-Bashir and its principal ideologue, Hasan al-Turabi (d. 2016), hosted large international gatherings and sought to unite in Khartoum a plethora of Islamist groups and leaders, including various Shiite Islamists as well as Osama bin Laden and the members of Al-Qaeda. Al-Huthi was exposed to numerous revolutionary Islamist ideologies during his stay in Khartoum in the late 1990s, and it is likely that this influenced his own political thinking. The subject of his thesis was a study and critical edition of Kitāb al-Burhān, a commentary on the Quran by the Zaydi imam Abū ’l-Fatḥ al-Daylamī (d. 444/1052–3).11 While there is no evidence that al-Huthi adopted any of al-Daylamī’s specific teachings, he may have found inspiration in this imam’s life and in the short-lived imamate that he established in Yemen.12 What is certain, however, is that al-Huthi regarded the early Zaydi imams, such al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911) and his forefathers, as the last exemplary scholars and leaders. The later imams—those after the fifth AH / eleventh CE century—he deemed to have deviated from the “original” beliefs of Islam, which implied that their teachings were not to be followed. He saw the later imams, including even such eminent ones as al-Manṣūr ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), as having adopted and elaborated complex theological and legal principles and interpretive methodologies that create barriers between the Muslim believers and the direct and uncorrupted message of the Quran. Such criticism of the medieval scholarly tradition is common among reformist religious thinkers, including both Zaydis and Salafis. They each, in their own way, argue that the later scholastic tradition adopted and developed complex positions that amount to reprehensible innovations (bida‘) and must therefore be rejected. Huthi’s dismissive view of the later imams, and in effect of much of the later Zaydi tradition, is one of the main reasons for the tension between the Huthis and the more traditionally minded Zaydis. As mentioned, while overseas, al-Huthi was also exposed to the Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir and the ideas of Hasan al-Turabi and those of the Muslim Brotherhood more generally.13 He also was a keen reader and admirer of Ayatollah

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Khomeini whose opinions—particularly those that pertain to Islam’s revolutionary revival as well as the vilification of the West and America—al-Huthi often cites in his lectures in the Malāzim. Last though certainly not least, al-Huthi was fully informed of the ideas of the global jihadis, and in particular Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and militant activities, which culminated in the 9/11 attacks. These events, as is well known, provoked a sustained global American political and military response, which had violent repercussions on Yemen and the wider Islamic world, and which al-Huthi described as a frontal attack on Islam, both as a faith and as a community. Like al-Qaeda, he saw and seized upon this conflict as an opportunity to mobilize Muslims in self-defense, and 9/11 effectively became the launching pad for his political movement of resistance to Salih’s rule. It was after 9/11 that the Huthi’s slogan or “shout” was first heard.14 In other words, Al-Qaeda’s presentation of world politics—as a campaign by the forces of unbelief against Islam and Muslims—was one al-Huthi used in his effort to mobilize Yemenis against the government in Sanaa. This is because after 9/11 Ali Abdullah Salih’s government publicly allied itself with the United States in the so-called War on Terror, and began receiving training and materiel from Washington with which to fight the jihadis who were active in Yemen. Al-Huthi saw this as an opportunity to criticize Salih, even though as a Zaydi, al-Huthi viewed the Salafi jihadis as mortal enemies because of their abiding hatred for and attacks on Shiites. Al-Huthi’s reformist project should probably be understood as a reaction to the dire political, economic, and intellectual conditions in Yemen in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The radical and simplistic characteristics of his views and those of the movement he spawned, best captured in the Huthi “shout,” perhaps explain his broad appeal among many Yemenis. These features may also have contributed to the political and military success of his followers in the civil war that continues to rage in the country. One way to think of Huthism is as an ideology of deliberate simplism and revolutionary activism. Yet, the influences that have contributed to al-Huthi’s own thinking and the formulation of his ideology are neither simple nor few—his worldview is composite, quite modern, and, as with other Islamist ideologies, represents a radical rupture with the past. Let us now turn to the two most salient features of this ideology.

The Guidance of the Quran and that of the Prophet’s Family There are a number of different ideological streams that feed into Husayn alHuthi’s worldview and teachings, and it is therefore difficult to slot him into a neat ideological category. These include Khomeinism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, Salafi-jihadism, Shi‘i-sayyid particularism, Zaydism, Yemeni nationalism, as well as third-world anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It is hard to disentangle these diverse threads or to assign greater importance to one than another. That said, there are two distinctive, albeit undertheorized, ideas that al-Huthi propagated and which seem to capture the entirety of his reformist political project and ideological outlook.

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

The first is the notion of the guidance of the Quran (hady ’l-Qur’ān) or what is also sometimes referred to as the “way” or the project of the Quran (masīrat alQur’ān, al-mashrū‘ al-Qur’ānī). Al-Huthi claims that the Quran contains all that is needed for Muslims to implement the reforms necessary to empower the Muslim community (umma) and to retrieve its lost glory. And his followers often refer to al-Huthi himself as the "Speaking Quran" (Qur’ān nāṭiq), and in so doing elevate him to being the embodiment of the holy text. The second is the guiding role of the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Ahl al-Bayt or al-‘itra) in leading the entire Muslim community throughout history. By following the lead of what he terms the “leaders of guidance” (͗a͑lām al-hudā), the community is able to apprehend and then implement the Quran’s guidance and thereby establish the order that God has decreed for mankind. In what follows I will discuss each of these ideas and show how the first marks a radical break with Islamic intellectual and religious tradition, while the second constitutes a covert repackaging of the Zaydi doctrine of the imamate.

The Exclusive Reliance on the Quran and the Denial of Tradition Even cursory investigation of the Malāzim shows the centrality of the Quran in al-Huthi’s discourse. Most of these lessons, each a discrete fascicle, consist of commentary on chapters and verses of the Quran, among them sūras of Āl ͑ Imrān, al-Nisā’ or al-Nisā’, and al-Mā͗ida. The “Program for Ramadan” (al-Barnāmaj al-ramaḍānī) is characterized as “Lessons in the Guidance of the Noble Quran” (Durūs min hady ’l-Qur’ān al-karīm). Even when not directly commenting on the Quran, the lessons invariably revert to the idea of its guidance as a means of reforming Muslim belief and practice. Al-Huthi’s obsessive focus on the Quran, and the centrality he accords to it, is eminently practical for his political project. All Muslims agree on the prime importance of the Quran, and it can therefore help overcome the sectarian and ideological affiliations that have divided Yemenis as well as the global Muslim community. In other words, al-Huthi’s appeal to the Quran’s guidance and his claim that it provides the only way to overcome the divisions and problems of the Islamic world appear at face value to be a powerful and effective argument. Yet, this is not where his argument ends, and it is his additional claims about the Quran and how the Islamic tradition relates to it that have proven most controversial, not least to his fellow but more traditionally minded Zaydis. At the center of al-Huthi’s program lies the claim that Muslims have deviated from the Quran’s teachings and must therefore correct their relationship to what it preaches (khiṭāb). Only then can the Quran’s mission, which is to produce an ideal community of believers, be accomplished. The deviation that has taken place is the result of effects that theology (‘ilm al-kalām) and jurisprudential theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) have had on how to understand the Quran. Each discipline has created conceptual and hermeneutic principles that have no basis in the Quran itself or in the period of Islam’s emergence in Mecca and Medina. As a result, the Muslims have fallen into disagreement (ikhtilāf) and discord (shiqāq) and are no longer able

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to read the “ocean of guidance and truth,” that is, the Quran. Instead, the Quran has become ensnared in (conceptual) webs (hadhā al-baḥr mushabbak ‘alayhi).15 Here is how al-Huthi describes how disagreement prevents the application of the Quran’s message. Disagreement about the Quran prevents its implementation (iqāmat al-kitāb). This is exactly the same issue that is raised in the verse (“Those who differ regarding the Quran,” 2:176). . . they have prevented the truth from being implemented in practice and realistically from within [the teachings of] the Book among the people. God has created the truth in such a manner that means exist to establish it among the people.16

For al-Huthi, the Quran offers a unique framework, which he labels “the rightlyguided laws or practices that are preached by the Quran” (nawāmīs aw sunan alhidāya fī al-khiṭāb al-Qur’ānī).17 It also presents a comprehensive vision (ru’ya shāmila) and a methodology (manhajiyya) which is sufficient for establishing its aims (maqāṣid) of building both man, as an individual, and society, as a collective. Furthermore, “it presents issues in an integrated fashion” (yuqaddim al-qaḍāyā amāmaka mutarābiṭa).18 By contrast, al-Hūthi held that the science of jurisprudence has an approach that disaggregates issues, treating matters discretely and thereby producing a welter of contradictory views and rulings. Even more dramatically, al-Huthi goes on to criticize the entire religious tradition for having developed the “instrumental sciences” (‘ulūm al-āla), that is, auxiliary fields such as grammar, syntax, morphology, rhetoric, because, as a Huthi official ‘Abd alMalik al-‘Ijrī explains, “these [sciences] stripped the Arabic language of its spirit and transformed it into dry rules that do not aid in understanding the ways Arabs address one another.”19 Another consequence of this is that the Quran is now considered to have multiple meanings, to suit the needs of whoever is quoting it. This is why al-Huthi goes on to criticize those who argue that the Quran can bear multiple meanings (al-Qur’ān ḥammāl wujūh) when he says: This is absolutely not true. For if this were so, the Quran would be deceitful (mudāhin) . . . But no, all of it provides a single meaning . . . error arises when you approach the Quran and you are no longer your natural self (mā ‘ādak ṭabī‘ī),20 no longer an Arab, and your apprehension of the Quran is through your theoretical knowledge of the Arabic language, and language techniques. Those who, for example, claim to use an instrumental science (ālah) to understand the Quran, or to derive a ruling [from it], are not natural. This is an unsound method . . . The Quran is as Imam al-Qāsim [ibn Ibrāhīm] stated: “When you turn your back on it, it turns its back on you.”21

Al-Huthi appears to attribute to the entirety of the Quran an all-encompassing and unequivocal message, one not open to various interpretations. He also denies the principle of abrogation (naskh) and a number of other hermeneutic principles that are fundamental to the way in which the text has been traditionally interpreted.

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

The critique continues beyond the science of Quranic commentary (tafsīr) when al-Huthi attacks the traditions of Islamic theology and law. He rejects, for example, the legal principle of independent reasoning (ijtihād) because this allows for different opinions and rulings, leading to confusion and division. For him, the highly individualistic nature of ijtihad prevents a unified understanding of the text and thwarts unified action by the community as a whole. Additional details of al-Huthi’s critique of the scholarly tradition are beyond the scope of this article, but it should be clear that his program, which is now labeled by his followers as the “Quranic Way,” involves a radical break with the religious tradition and as well as a reordering of religious authority around a new interpretive methodology.22

The Doctrine of the “Leaders of Guidance” or the Imamate by Another Name? The imamate is the institution that mainly distinguishes Zaydism from other sects of Islam. Unlike Twelver Shiism, the Zaydis have maintained that a living descendant of the Prophet Muhammad—one who satisfies a number of rigorous qualifications—must make a “call” (da‘wa) to himself as the imam, be recognized by the community as such and, if necessary, “come out” (khurūj) against unjust rulers to establish a righteous Islamic state. This was the dominant doctrine of rule from the time of the first Zaydi imam in Yemen, al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911) and it theoretically remained so until the death of the  last ruling imam al-Nāṣir Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ḥamīd al-Dīn in 1962. The imamate, however, was vilified in republican ideology and historiography after the 1962 revolution. It was depicted as racist because it privileged the political and social domination of the Prophet’s descendants (sayyids), who claimed northern Arab descent (‘Adnānīs), over Yemenis of non-sayyid descent and who claimed to be of southern Arab origin (Qaḥṭānīs). Numerous republican intellectuals, among them Muḥammad Maḥmūd al-Zubayrī, Qāḍī Ismā‘īl al-Akwa‘, and the Arab nationalist Dr. ‘Abd alAzīz al-Maqāliḥ, promoted this view, which in turn legitimized the marginalization if not outright persecution of traditional Zaydi scholars and prominent sayyid political families. As recently as 2004, Yemen’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism reprinted Muhammad al-Zubayri’s The Imamate and Its Threat to Yemen’s Unity (al-Imāma wa khaṭaruhā ‘alā wiḥdat al-Yaman) with a preface by President Saleh, in which he warns Yemenis of the Huthis and their desire to revive “the non-Islamic clerical rule of the imams” (ḥukm al-͗a͗imma al-kahanūtī). The idea of imamic rule as being racist is still prevalent among Yemenis. Because of this, Zaydi sayyids, whether members of the Huthi movement or otherwise, who have sought to become politically active have been extremely reluctant to discuss the imamate let alone claim a desire to restore it as a system of rule. For instance, the Ḥizb alḤaqq, a party largely led by Zaydi sayyids and founded after the unification of the two Yemens in 1990s, formally abjured the institution of the imamate, and the Huthis themselves have not invoked it in their public statements.23 In fact, the

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Huthis have officially remained committed to a republican form of government, and have made a point of celebrating September 26, 1962—the day on which the Hamid al-Din dynasty was toppled by republican army officers—as a day of national independence. They also celebrate the “September 21 Revolution,” which marks the day they captured Sanaa in 2014. This is likely to supersede the other commemoration. While not explicitly mentioning the imamate, Husayn al-Huthi in the Malāzim does discuss the topic of wilāya (rulership) after the Prophet Muhammad, by which he means specifically the alleged designation of Imam Ali by the Prophet Muhammad as his successor in 10 AH/632 CE during a sermon he gave at a location called Ghadīr Khumm.24 This is an event that Zaydis have traditionally celebrated, since at least the eleventh/seventeenth century, and which was banned by the republic until the 1990s. Since their takeover of Sanaa, the Huthis have revived this celebration across the regions they control. Al-Huthi argues that since Islam regulates all aspects of life, including the affairs of the family and inheritance, it is inconceivable that it would not also regulate affairs of the Muslim community as a whole. Islam, he states, “is both a religion and a state (dīn wa dawla), and Islam has come down from God as a comprehensive system for all of life’s affairs (niẓām shāmil li-l-ḥayāt kullihā), and would not ignore any aspect.”25 As a system of rule, traditional Zaydism restricted leadership to an imam from the Prophet’s family. But perhaps because the term got a bad reputation in republican times, al-Huthi developed a new terminology and asserted that leadership can still be found in a person called a “Leader of guidance” or “the Guiding Eminence” (‘alam al-hudā).26 This is a term that has no precedent in the Zaydi tradition and appears to signify a universal leader for the world—a super-imam whose role is more encompassing than that of a traditional Zaydi imam. The doctrine of ‘alam al-hudā is not elaborated in al-Huthi’s Malāzim, but some discussion about it can be found in a lesson al-Huthi provides on the chapter of Āl ‘Imrān in the Quran.27 Here he explains that there must at all times be a guide who can lead the community and embody the guidance of the Quran. While this person is to be a descendant of the Prophet, it is not clear how he is to be identified or what exactly his prerogatives are. The person is not defined in the way that an imam is, with a set number of qualifications and prerogatives. Instead, he represents a cosmic revolutionary ethos and acts as a guide for the community and the world. Here is how al-Huthi explains the role of the ‘alam al-hudā: The community needs guidance from God in the form of books and living leaders of guidance. God did not say “God’s revelations are recited to you” and stop there. He continued “and amongst you is His Messenger” (Quran III:101), a leader, a man from among you. A leader of guidance, embodying this Quran, revolving around it, guiding through its guidance, embodying the mercy and guidance of the Quran. . . . The Quran here states that the community is in need of the Quran, in need of a leader in whom the Quran is embodied and who is a continuation of the Messenger [Muhammad] (bi-ḥāja ilā ‘alamin yatajassad fīhi al-Qur’ān wa huwa imtidād li-l-rasūl), an heir to the Messenger in every

26

The Huthi Movement in Yemen age. Does this mean that the community will need leaders of guidance around whom to revolve? [Indeed], they embody the Quran and guide and lead by it and endeavor to apply it in the community.28

According to ‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Ijrī—the high-level official and intellectual in the Huthi movement—the ‘alam al-hudā concept refers to a well-guided and divinely inspired leadership (qiyāda musaddada wa mulhama), consisting of a model person (insān namūdhajī). This is not a traditional religious scholar, nor a rank comparable to the Guardian Jurist (al-walī al-faqīh) in Twelver Shiism nor yet an executive office such as an imam in the Zaydi tradition. Rather, for al-‘Ijrī, the ‘alam al-hudā is an epistemological concept (maqūla ma‘rifiyya) that supplants these other categories of person, and is “a social and historical force that aims to transform individual and social consciousness, and is closer to being a doctrine of ethical leadership (qiyāda akhlāqiyya).”29 Whatever the ‘alam al-hudā is in theory or in practice, and it is far from being clearly articulated in the movement’s writings, it is an institution that has a practical manifestation in the figure of ‘Abd al-Malik al-Hūthī, the late Husayn’s brother and the leader of the movement since 2004. The rule of the Huthi movement indicates that a new religious and political ideology is being spread in Yemen. That rule includes a series of unprecedented decrees such as calling the Huthi supreme leaders “The Speaking Quran,” the establishment of a 20  percent tax (khums) on certain forms of wealth (e.g., metals extracted from mines, oil), and the proceeds to be distributed to indigent Zaydi sayyids, the revamping of the educational curriculum along Huthi ideological lines, and the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn b. Ali (d. 61 AH/680 CE). The leader of the movement is an authoritarian figure who brooks no dissent, not unlike the Supreme Leader in Iran. And while some Yemenis are willing to adopt these views, others are being coerced into accepting them. What is most intriguing, however, is the fraught relationship the Huthis have with traditional Zaydis, some of whom have found Husayn al-Huthi’s revolutionary ideas to be unacceptable because they violate the sect’s teachings.

Traditional Zaydis versus the Huthis The relationship between the Huthi movement’s leadership and traditional Zaydis is opaque. By traditional Zaydis, I mean those who adhere to the teachings of the Zaydi sect as developed in Yemen over the centuries, beginning with al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn and coalescing in the canonical legal and theological writings of imams such as Yaḥyā Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1436) and al-Manṣūr al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620). It is clear that Husayn al-Huthi’s ideas, as presented in the Malāzim and through the action of his followers, have provoked a negative reaction among traditional Zaydis. This has to do with al-Huthi’s views on the irrelevance, indeed the misguidance, of the traditional Islamic sciences, his invention of the ‘alam al-hudā doctrine, his reformulation of Islam as a

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revolutionary political ideology strongly inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas on global politics, and his elevation of active hatred for America and Jews to a creedal belief. Tensions arose in the aughts of this century over these issues and over whether military action against the Saleh government in Sanaa was the best way to advance Zaydi interests. The first public reaction to the Huthis by the traditionalists was in 2004, when Husayn al-Huthi was still alive. It took the form of “A Declaration by Zaydi Scholars” (Bayān min ͑ulamā͗ al-Zaydiyya) and was published in Hizb al-Haqq’s newspaper al-Umma. At the time the party had become weak and was under the leadership of the late Hasan Zayd. The declaration was signed by a number of the leading scholars in Sanaa.30 In it, these scholars warn against Husayn al-Huthi’s teachings in the Malāzim and declare them to be reprehensible innovations and errors (bid`a wa ḍalālāt) that are in no way associated with the Zaydi sect or the teachings of the Prophet’s family. The scholars informed the public that it is impermissible to listen to, approve of, or affirm al-Huthi’s views. In particular, two passages are singled out from the Malāzim as evidence of the heinous nature of al-Huthi’s views. These deserve to be reproduced because they underscore the rupture that traditional Zaydis assert al-Huthi’s teachings represent. Speaking in the plural, al-Huthi states in the Malāzim: We have found ourselves in the end spending our days with books that are entirely error-filled, from start to finish, such as the books on jurisprudence and its principles. These lie at the heart of all the error we find ourselves in, [they are] the reason for the immobility and defeat of the Zaydis, the reason for the low vitality of the Zaydis. This is wholly different from what had prevailed [in times past] among our ancestors of the Prophet’s house and their supporters. [These books] are what we spend our nights studying and we carry them to the mosques, and yet how far they are from the reality of the mosques.31

Switching to the first person singular and in a different lesson in the Malāzim, al-Huthi states: I feel from my study of the Noble Quran and from my contemplation of reality— and in the minds of many I may be wrong—that the Zaydis live in a state of humiliation that is worse than that which was imposed [by God] on the Children of Israel (Banū Isrā’īl). Our scholars, students and our entire society live in a state that is more demeaning and humiliating than that which God almighty inflicted on the Children of Israel because we have abandoned our responsibility. . . . I personally believe that the worst thing that has afflicted us and distanced us from the Quran, from God’s religion, from a sound vision of life and religion, from God almighty is the science of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). I will state it clearly: The science of jurisprudence is among the worst sciences, and the science of theology, which the Mu‘tazila invented, is the vilest cause that has led us to this dreadful state and has distanced us from God, from His Messenger and from His prophets.32

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

­Husayn al-Huthi’s attack on the Mu‘tazila and their influence is not new in Zaydi history. Many premodern imams and scholars were critical of their sway.33 What is new, however, is the wholesale dismissal of the Islamic scholarly tradition. And more troubling still is the Huthi movement’s replacement of this tradition with the Malāzim. This is what has generated a sustained reaction from the traditional scholars, who are mostly based in Sanaa and who see their teachings under attack. The clash between the Zaydi scholars in Sanaa and the Huthis also has a social dimension, in that each represents a distinct group of Zaydi sayyids. On the one hand, the Huthis are provincial sayyids, drawn mostly from the Sa‘da region, and have experienced sustained persecution from the republican government in Sanaa, especially during President Saleh’s rule. The six wars that Saleh waged against the Huthis, between 2004 and 2010, were important in generating a particular martial ethos and a political experience that is not shared by other sayyids in Yemen. In contrast, the learned sayyid families of Sanaa constitute an elite scholarly group who feel themselves to be the guardians of the Zaydi tradition as well as the leaders of the national community. And while the Sanaa sayyids did lose power after 1962, most still kept their properties and held positions in the judiciary, public administration, and in business. In other words, their relationship with the central government, while at times tense, did not involve sustained persecution. A fraught tense relationship existed, but it ultimately resulted in an attempt at a formal reconciliation between the Huthis and the traditional Zaydi scholars. This took place during the Arab Spring events that shook Yemen in 2011 and resulted in political instability. The various Zaydi constituencies felt the need to unite their ranks in the debates that were taking place between different political factions over the future constitution of the country. The form the reconciliation took was a public document of common principles that the Huthi leaders and eminent Zaydi religious scholars signed in 2012. Titled “The Intellectual and Cultural Charter” (al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya) and published online, this document reiterated the commitment of all the parties to traditional Zaydi theological and legal doctrines (e.g., divine attributes, justice, punishment, ijtihād) as well as to the chosenness and guiding role of the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt) and the historical Zaydi imams.34 While the Huthi signatories sought to address the concerns of the traditional scholars, they also insisted that certain elements of Huthi ideology be included in the statement. For instance, mention is made of the United States and Israel as the principal enemies of Islam. Here is how this is stated: Commanding right and forbidding the wrong, armed struggle against the oppressors, and standing up to the arrogant ones are among the greatest religious duties, imposed on all persons. Loyalty to God’s friends and enmity towards God’s enemies is a religious duty—as God has legislated—especially against the leaders of unbelief who are represented in our time by America and Israel and those who help, are loyal to, and stand with them in enmity to Islam and Muslims. [This is] imposed by God [as an obligation] on His worshippers.35

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­ owever, the Huthis also tried to assuage the sensibilities of the traditionalists H by downplaying Husayn al-Huthi’s contempt for the tradition’s scholars and their books. This delicate matter is treated as follows: The criticism of the scholars is not directed at the scholars of the Ahl al-Bayt, nor at their active partisans, nor at their sciences. Rather, it is directed at those who reject the obligation to engage in armed struggle (jihād) against the oppressors as well as the obligation to command right and forbid wrong. Indeed [the criticism is directed] at those who advocate silence and obedience to those to whom obedience is forbidden.36

Yet even within the Zaydi tradition itself, the teachings of the early imams are to be privileged over those of later ones, which is in keeping with Husayn al-Huthi’s own views. Here is how the document presents this point: In general, all are in agreement about the method (manhaj) of the Ahl al-Bayt with respect to their principles and beliefs and to which the guiding imams have adhered from the dawn of Islam to our present time, from the earliest to the most recent. Yet, we prefer (nurajjiḥ) the method of the earliest imams such as al-Hādī [Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn] and al-Qāsim [b. Ibrāhīm] because they are closer to the Quranic method (al-uslūb al-Qur’ānī) and the divine nature (al-fiṭra alrabbāniyya).37

As for the question of the restoration of the imamate, the document says nothing about whether and how this would take place, preferring instead to use allusive language. Prevarication on this point is to be expected given the highly divisive nature of the imamate in republican Yemen. The document handles this in a section titled “chosenness” (isṭifā’), which highlights the special role that the Ahl al-Bayt play as leaders of the community of believers, but leaves unanswered whether the imamate is to be restored and how an imam would be selected. We believe that God Almighty chose the People of the House of His messenger and made them guides to the community (umma) and the heirs of the Quran after the messenger until Judgment Day. God arranges for someone in every age to be a lighthouse for His worshippers, able to command the community and to advance all its needs. Our method for establishing and selecting the leader is the methodology of the People of the House [Italics added].38

With this Charter issued and signed, it appeared that the Huthis had rejoined the fold of the tradition or at least were seeking to accommodate its adherents. This attempt at resolving differences did not last long. According to my Yemeni interlocutors, the Huthis’ commitment to the traditional teachings was not sincere, and once their political and military fortunes improved, they abandoned the principles articulated in the document. In fact, the Huthis insisted on propagating the views in the Malāzim, including those which denigrated the teachings of the

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Zaydi sect. In particular, the Huthis appeared again to dismiss the standard books on theology and jurisprudence, which Zaydi traditionalists held in great regard as sources of religious authority. In the ongoing civil war, which began in 2014, many of Sanaa’s sayyids have fought on the side of the Huthis, and many men from elite scholarly families have lost their lives. This has created strong bonds between certain members of the two groups, so that many sayyids now see a secure future only in a Yemen controlled and dominated by the Huthis. Nonetheless, there are other sayyids, as well as non-sayyid Zaydis, who consider the Huthis and their teachings to represent a threat to traditional teachings and a danger for their survival in Yemen. The latter have to be cautious in their criticism because the Huthis are brutal in their treatment of those they consider to be dissidents. One of these dissidents is a sayyid and a scholar called Yaḥyā b. Ḥusayn al-Daylamī, who until recently preached and taught in the Jāmi‘ al-Nahrayn mosque. This is one of Sanaa’s oldest and is located within the UNESCO built-heritage protected area. Al-Daylamī has criticized the Huthis in his sermons during the last six years. It appears that because of this the mosque had become a locus of Zaydi opposition, and for this reason, it was recently demolished by the Huthis. The pretext was that its prayer niche (miḥrāb) was not properly oriented toward Mecca.39 Since then, the Huthis have warned other preachers of serious consequences if they do not support the movement’s program.40 As long as the Huthis remain in power and are willing to use force to enforce their will, it is likely the traditional Zaydis will avoid a direct confrontation and seek to preserve the tradition in whatever way they can without provoking the Huthis’ wrath.

Conclusion The teachings of Husayn al-Huthi represent a radical break not only with Zaydi teachings but with the Islamic scholarly tradition as a whole. In this respect, it is similar to other Islamist ideologies, such as Khomeinism or that of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, which also constitute modern ruptures with the past, while often claiming to represent an authentic continuation of the true Islam of the early centuries. As an ideological framework and a means by which sayyids can recover their political status in Yemen, the Huthi movement represents an extreme form of revolutionary activism. If they should be defeated on the battlefield, they will have placed the Zaydi tradition and the survival of Yemen’s Zaydi sayyid communities in extreme danger. The vengeance that non-sayyids and non-Zaydis will seek to exact is terrible to contemplate. The context of systematic persecution of the sayyids in Sa‘da helps explain the emergence of the Huthi movement and its revolutionary ideology. The latter consists of largely giving up the Zaydi tradition, replacing it with a mixture of Khomeinism, global jihadism, and a willfully simplistic worldview. These are encapsulated in the Huthi “shout” and the rambling and disorganized lectures in Husayn al-Huthi’s Malāzim. It is hard

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to see how this ideology can produce a successful and stable political project. That said, the Huthis’ focus on redressing the corruption of the past regime and the obsession with producing a culture of political defiance (ṣumūd), while developing strong relationships with the tribes and adopting many of their cultural practices, are new features of Yemen’s political landscape and may lead to resilience of the Huthi phenomenon. Only time will tell. Nonetheless, Huthism is perhaps best understood as a manifestation of the destruction wrought upon Yemen by decades of poor governance, corruption, and the abuse of power by the late Ali Abdullah Saleh and his regime. And while this might be a fitting epitaph for a brutal dictator, Yemen certainly deserves better than to be ruled by no less brutal revolutionaries; while Zaydism, which is one of Islam’s richest intellectual traditions, is unjustly maligned by being falsely identified with the Huthis.

Notes 1

2

3 4

I would like to thank several interlocutors for providing me with texts, references, and insights as well as for their willingness to talk to me at length about the Huthi movement. They are: Dr. Abdallah Hamidaddin, Dr. Ali Muhammad Zaid, Mr. Salem Bahfi, Mr. Ahmad Abd al-Ali al-Shami, Mr. Ali al-Bukhayti, and Mr. Abd al-Malik al-‘Ijri. I wish to thank Michael Cook and Frank Stewart for reading and commenting on a draft of the chapter. I extend my gratitude to all who have helped me better understand Yemeni history and politics, and any errors of fact and interpretation are entirely my own. For more on the Huthi movement, refer to the following titles: Abdullah Lux, “Yemen’s last Zaydī Imām: The shabāb al-muʾmin, the Malāzim, and ‘ḥizballāh’ in the thought of Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434; Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962. html (accessed March 30, 2021); Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst, 2017); Luca Nevola, “Houthis in the Making: Nostalgia, Populism, and the Politicization of Hashemite Descent,” Arabian Humanities, no. 13 (2020), http://journals.openedition.org/cy/5917 (accessed March 30, 2021); ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project), “Yemen: the Houthi Supervisory System,” June 17, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/ files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf (accessed March 30, 2021). This file titled Malāzim al-shahīd al-qā’id Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī—ḥuzma kāmilatan (“Fascicles of the Martyr Leader Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi—the Complete Collection”) can be downloaded from the following site: https://alsarkh. blogspot.com/2018/09/pdf.html (accessed December 14, 2020). See, for example, https://apkpure.com/ar/‫القرآن‬-‫هدي‬-‫من‬/quraan.courses.malazim (accessed December 16, 2020). See ‘Iṣām Ṣabrī, “al-Asbāb al-ḥaqīqiyya allatī dafa`at al-Ḥūthiyyīn ilā hadm Jāmi‘ alNahrayn,” al-Mushāhid, February 16, 2021, https://almushahid.net/72960/ (accessed March 30, 2021).

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5 Based on an interview with a Yemeni religious scholar who wishes to remain anonymous. 6 See http://althawrah.ye/archives/617031 (accessed March 15, 2021) and http:// www.d-althagafhalqurania.com/newsDetail/1alrYwwUcg26bp5SDpdzYA== (accessed March 15, 2021). 7 See Ḥamūd b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ahnūmī, al-Tarbiya fī fikr al-shahīd al-qā’id al-sayyid Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī, Sanaa: al-Majlis al-Zaydī al-Islāmī, 1438/2017. 8 See Malāzim, Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān, al-dars 1, 10, where al-Huthi compares the inferior condition of the Zaydis to that of other Shi‘i sects who are more successful in defending their rights. He writes: “the Zaydis are trifled with by a school headmaster, a provincial head, a thief, a local district head, a governor or a soldier, in order words [they are in] a very bad condition. . . . Why have [the Zaydis] become like humiliated Arabs under the feet of Jews and Christians? It is because we have abandoned that which we have been summoned to follow [i.e., the Quran], so that we are now under the feet of those who were humiliated [by God], those upon whom [He] imposed humiliation and abasement [cf. Quran 2:61]. Are we the Zaydis not under the feet of the Sunnis? [This is] because we have abandoned our prime responsibility, and pretend to be the Ahl al-Bayt, and [yet] no longer believe in the cause of the ‘two weighty things’ (thaqalayn): ‘God’s Book and My [i.e., the Prophet’s] family.’ Others believe in these, though they have not applied them. They believe in them because the [thaqalayn] is a sound prophetic tradition. . . . So long as we don’t believe in the thaqalayn, we will remain downtrodden, and we will not be rewarded with glory, power, and dominion. And we will remain unable to offer anything [substantive] to Islam.” 9 For more on the Salafi influence in Yemen, see Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam (Cambridge: Hurst, 2003), Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen (London, 2011), and Samy Dorlian, La mouvance zaydite dans le Yémen contemporain: une modernisation avortée (Paris: Harmattan, 2013). The Zaydi sayyids of the north are not the same group as the sayyids of the south. They have different lineages (northerners are overwhelmingly descendants of al-Hasan b. ‘Ali, whereas the eponym of the southern sayyids is al-Husayn b. ‘Ali) and different sectarian affiliations (Zaydis in the north and Shafi‘is in the south). For the sayyids in southern Yemen, see Abdallah Bujra, The Politics of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South Arabian Town (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) and Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 10 During fieldwork in Yemen in the mid-1990s I was able to find only one Twelver Shii bookstore in the entire country, Maktabat al-Zahrā’ in Sanaa. Its owner told me that about forty Yemenis had converted to Imami Shiism. There is no doubt that the Iranian revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini held a particular fascination for some Zaydis, but Khomeini’s doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) and the political system represented by the Islamic Republic were largely deemed to be inapplicable in Yemen. 11 It is not known whether al-Huthi ever completed this and obtained his degree. A copy of al-Burhān can be found in Firestone Library, Princeton University, https://catalog. princeton.edu/catalog/7849550 (accessed December 19, 2020). 12 s.v. Deylamī, Abū’l-Fatḥ Nāṣer, Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. VII, Fasc. 3 (2011), 338 (Wilferd Madelung), https://iranicaonline.org/articles/deylami-abul-fath-naser (accessed December 19, 2020). Al-Daylamī was a Zaydi imam who in the fifth/

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33

eleventh century left the Caspian regions of Iran for Yemen, where he established a short-lived imamate before being killed by an Isma‘ili political rival. Imam al-Daylamī is alleged to have held eccentric theological and legal views, and it is possible that he inspired al-Huthi as a model of independent scholarship and political adventurism. This conjecture requires further study before it can be firmly established. It is in part based on interviews with followers of al-Huthi, including Aḥmad ‘Abd al-‘Alī alShāmī (interview on December 11, 2020). 13 For more on the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Husayn al-Huthi, see Muḥammad al-Maḥfalī, Athar Ḥasan al-Bannā fī khiṭāb Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, Arabia Felix Center for Studies, 2021, https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/94759755/_Arabia_ Felix_Studies.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021). 14 The first public display of the Huthi movement’s “Shout” (sarkha), in the form of flyers on the walls of Sa‘da, occurred after the events of 9/11/2001 during and after the commemoration of ‘Īd al-Ghadīr, which fell on March 3, 2002. The ‘Īd al-Ghadīr annually commemorates the 18 Dhū `l-Ḥijjah 10 AH, the day on which, according to Shi‘is, Ali Ibn Abi Talib was designated by the Prophet Muhammad as his successor. 15 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars al-thāmin, 2003, 24. Also see ‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh: al-khiṭāb wa-l-ḥaraka,” Muqāraba siyāsiyya, no. 2, Jan– Mar (2017) 14, http://www.yecscs.com/article/85 (accessed December 21, 2020). This article is a study and analysis of Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī’s views and ideology by a prominent member of the movement. It offers a sophisticated and well-informed analysis of his views and teachings. Al-‘Ijrī is the head of the Yemeni Center for Strategic and Advisory Studies (Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Istirātījiyya wa-l-Istishāriyya al-Yamanī), a member of the political council of the Ansar Allah movement, and a frequent commentator and spokesman for the movement in the media. He appears to be an influential member of the movement’s leadership. Al-‘Ijrī can be seen at meetings between representatives of the Huthi movement and such figures as Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Hasan Nasrullah, the general secretary of Hezbollah in Lebanon. He kindly exchanged WhatsApp messages with me and provided me with published and online sources, and we had a telephone interview on December 12, 2020. 16 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars al-thāmin, 2003, 24. 17 al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh,” 15. 18 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars thālith, 2003, 1; Sūrat al-Nisā’, al-dars althāmin ‘ashar, 2003, 23; Sūrat al-An‘ām, al-dars al-rābi‘ wa-l-‘ishrūn, 2003, 3. 19 Al-‘Ijrī, 16. 20 This is colloquial Yemeni Arabic. 21 Al-Malāzim, Madīḥ al-Qur’ān, al-dars al-thānī, 2003, 8. 22 For more details on al-Huthi’s critique of the tradition, see al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh,” which is cited earlier. Al-‘Ijrī is a high-ranking member of the Anṣār Allāh movement and is clear in his exposition of al-Huthi’s views and in acknowledging their radical departure from the tradition. 23 For more on Hizb al-Haqq’s political program and its view of the imamate, see Bernard Haykel, “Rebellion, Migration or Consultative Democracy? The Zaydis and Their Detractors in Yemen,” in Le Yémen contemporain, ed. Rémy Leveau, Franck Mermier et Udo Steinbach (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 193–201. 24 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Amr al-wilāya,” in al-Malāzim, 1577–81. 25 Ibid., 1581 or 4 of the treatise.

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26 Al-Huthi uses the term in both the singular and the plural, seeing a guiding role for the Ahl al-Bayt as a collective, but also for a select individual among them, the ‘alam, who is to be considered the leader of the entire umma. 27 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Durūs min hady al-Qur’ān al-karīm Surat Āl ‘Imrān,” in alMalāzim, 369–84. 28 Ibid., 374 or 5 of the treatise. 29 al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh,” 28. 30 For a copy of this declaration as well as a partial reading of its contents, see http:// alhamdinews.blogspot.com/2013/03/blog-post.html and https://www.facebook.com/ Kashefnews/videos/660749364017319/ (accessed March 30, 2021). 31 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Ma‘rifat Allāh wa‘duhu wa wa‘īduhu, dars 15,” in al-Malāzim, 181 or 18 of the treatise. 32 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Mas’ūliyyat ṭullāb al-‘ulūm al-dīniyya,” in al-Malāzim, 1747–8 or 11–12 of the treatise. 33 Imam al-Qasim b. Muhammad in the eleventh/seventeenth century was quite critical as were others who had abandoned Zaydism, such as Hadith-oriented traditionists like Ibn al-Amir and Shawkani. For more on this, see Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), and Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 34 al-Ḥūthī, ‘Abd al-Malik et al. “al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya,” February 13, 2012, https://www.nashwannews.com/oldnews/16669 (accessed March 30, 2021). 35 al-Ḥūthī, “al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya,” February 13, 2012, 5. 36 Ibid., 5. 37 Ibid., 6. 38 Ibid., 7. 39 See ‘Iṣām Ṣabrī, “al-Asbāb al-ḥaqīqiyya al-latī dafa‘at al-Ḥūthiyyin ilā hadm Jāmi’ alNahrayn,” al-Mushāhid, February 16, 2021, https://almushahid.net/72960/ (accessed March 30, 2021). 40 See “‘Ulamā’ wa murshidūn: al-shahāda wa-l-shahīd kalimat ḥaqq rabbāniyya li-man yuqātil al-kufr wa ahlah,” al-Thawra, March 26, 2021, http://althawrah.ye/ archives/665233 (accessed March 30, 2021).

Bibliography Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS). “Yemen: The Houthi Supervisory System.” June 17, 2020. https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_ yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf al-Ahnūmī, Ḥamūd b. ‘Abd Allāh. al-Tarbiya fī fikr al-shahīd al-qā’id al-sayyid Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī (Sanaa: al-Majlis al-Zaydī al-Islāmī, 1438/2017). Bayān min “ulamā” al-Zaydiyya. http://alhamdinews.blogspot.com/2013/03/blog-post. html Bonnefoy, Laurent. Salafism in Yemen (London: Hurst, 2011). Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Bujra, Abdallah. The Politics of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South Arabian Town (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

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Dorlian, Samy. La mouvance zaydite dans le Yémen contemporain: une modernisation avortée (Paris: Harmattan, 2013). Haykel, Bernard. “Rebellion, Migration or Consultative Democracy? The Zaydis and Their Detractors in Yemen.” In Le Yémen contemporain, ed. Rémy Leveau, Franck Mermier et Udo Steinbach (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 193–201. Haykel, Bernard. Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad b. Ali alShawkani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Ho, Engseng. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). al-Hūthī, ‘Abd al-Malik et al. “al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya.” February 13, 2012. https://www.nashwannews.com/oldnews/16669 al-Hūthī, Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn. Malāzim al-shahīd al-qā’id Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī— ḥuzma kāmilatan. https://alsarkh.blogspot.com/2018/09/pdf.html al-‘Ijrī, ‘Abd al-Malik. “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh: al-khiṭāb wa-l-ḥaraka.” Muqāraba siyāsiyya, no. 2, Jan–Mar (2017): 14. http://www.yecscs.com/article/85 al-Maḥfalī, Muḥammad. Athar Ḥasan al-Bannā fī khiṭāb Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, Arabia Felix Center for Studies, 2021. https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/94759755/_Arabia_Felix_ Studies.pdf Lux, Abdullah. “Yemen’s last Zaydī Imām: The shabāb al-muʾmin, the Malāzim, and ‘ḥizballāh’ in the thought of Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434. Madelung, Wilferd. Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965). Madelung, Wilfred. “Deylamī, Abū’l-Fatḥ Nāṣer.” Encyclopaedia Iranica, vii, fasc. 3 (2011), 338. Nevola, Luca. “Houthis in the Making: Nostalgia, Populism, and the Politicization of Hashemite Descent.” Arabian Humanities, no. 13 (2020). http://journals.openedition. org/cy/5917 Ṣabrī, ‘Iṣām. “al-Asbāb al-ḥaqīqiyya al-latī dafa‘at al-Ḥūthiyyin ilā hadm Jāmi‘ alNahrayn.” al-Mushāhid, February 16, 2021. https://almushahid.net/72960/ ­Salmoni, Barak, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA, 2010). https://www.rand.org/pubs/ monographs/MG962.html

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­2 T R A N SF O R M AT IO N O F D OM I NA N T P O L I T IC A L T H E M E S F R OM T H E F OU N D E R T O T H E C U R R E N T L E A D E R O F T H E H U T H I M OV E M E N T Mohammed Almahfali

Introduction An all-out war in Yemen began in March 2015, after five months from the Huthi siege of the Yemeni capital, Sana‘a, and the presidential palaces, and the takeover of the government in September 2014. Yet the current all-out war was preceded by six rounds of conflict between the Yemeni government and the Huthi group: round 1 from June 2004 to September 2004, round 2 from March 2005 to May 2005, round 3 from November 2005 to early 2006, round 4 from January 2007 to June 2007, round 5 from March 2008 to July 2008, and round 6 from August 2009 to February 2010.1 The chapter not only is limited to this conflict but also considers other factors that helped the emergence of the movement, such as the failure of the international community to provide supportive measures toward resolving the conflict,2 in addition to other internal and external factors, socially, economically, and ideologically. From the first round until the current ongoing war, the conflict has often been defined against regional contexts, such as the Iranian-Saudi proxy war or the Sunni-Shiʿa divide,3 wherein Saudi Arabia supports its ally, the internationally recognized Yemeni government, while Iran secretly supports the Huthis with arms and money, with obvious media and political support.4 On September 10, 2004, during the first round of the war, the Yemeni Ministry of Defense announced the killing of Husayn al-Huthi in the Jarf Salman area in the Marran district of Sa‘da governorate, by the army troops. Since then, the Huthis celebrate this day as an anniversary of “martyrdom of the leader” every year.5 The killing of Husayn al-Huthi represented a pivotal stage in the history of the Huthi movement, and it also signified a shift in the creation of its discourse. In addition, the discourse changed shape, with the movement’s shift from the advocacy stage to the fighting stage. Affiliated researcher, Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, Sweden.

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

The movement before 2004 grew mainly through lectures given by Husayn al-Huthi, which are called “the Huthi Malazim.”6 They were originally recorded on cassette tapes while he was delivering them in mosques and at gatherings in the Sa‘da governorate between 1999 and 2004, in order to publish his ideas. These recordings have been transcribed by one of his students, who worked on converting the audible text in the tapes into written text.7 Some believe that the original recordings contained some issues that were avoided in the transcript, including repetitions and other flaws. The importance of the Malazim also lies in providing researchers with the material through which to explore the ideology of the Huthi movement: the discourse can be analyzed in order to support the arguments with clear evidence. Reference can be made here to Hamad Albloshi,8 who studied the ideology of the Huthi movement by analyzing Husayn al-Huthi’s Malazim. He addressed these lectures to answer two main questions: Is the Huthi insurgency sectarian-based, and is it part of the overall competition between Sunni and Shi‘a in the Middle East? The paper’s findings importantly reveal the ideological foundations of the Huthi movement and clarify the movement’s starting points, which are based on two main axes—Muslim/non-Muslim and Sunni/Shi‘a—with other details related to these two axes, such as defining the problem and solution for Muslims, jihad, and the relationship with Iran, as well as the relationship between Muslims and the West. Despite the apparent convergence between this chapter and Albloshi’s study, we aim here to conduct a comprehensive analysis that does not only discuss religious ideology but seeks to explore the dominance of political themes as well the transformation of these themes from the stage of the founder of the movement to the current leader, using empirical tools to support our theses. We argue that an analysis of the political themes in Malazim may reveal some of the essential causes of the Yemeni conflict and the emergence of the Huthi movement and its ideological roots. The discourse of Malazim represents some of the most important literature of the Huthi movement, which relies on expanding and recruiting new followers and strengthening its control over Yemeni society. Meanwhile, the speeches of Abdulmalik al-Huthi, the current leader of the Huthi group, were one of the main pillars guiding the movement’s path with regard to domestic politics or communicating with external actors. After the killing of Husayn al-Huthi in 2004, his brother Abdulmalik led the movement,9 through a period of political upheavals in Yemen including the Arab Spring, the events that followed, and the ongoing conflict which started in 2015.10 The Huthi leader’s speeches work as political statements that define the Huthis’ position on political developments and the war.11 Meanwhile, Husayn’s lectures help to define the frame of reference for the group, on the one hand, and play a major role in mobilization, on the other. Against this background, the chapter addresses the transformation of the dominant political issues in Huthi discourse from the founder to the current leader. In order to analyze these themes and their reflections, the chapter attempts to answer the following questions: (1) What are the dominant political themes

2. Transformation of Dominant Political Themes

39

in Malazim’s discourse and in Abdulmalik’s speech, (2) how were these themes transformed between the founder and the current leader, (3) what themes have emerged and/or disappeared, and (4) what are their relationships with the political and social contexts in Yemen and the region?

Methodology This study relies on multiple methods of discourse analysis, starting with the new digital tools as well as the use of basic ideas of Critical Discourse Analysis when analyzing texts and the content of other discourses. The discourse concerns how various sentences flow, one after the other, and how they relate to each other to create meaning or to facilitate interpretation.12 This helps us reach a clear view that can help to uncover the direction of these discourses and measure their relationship to what surrounds them at the social and political level. In order to determine the data, more than sixty of Husayn al-Huthi’s lectures (Malazim) were reviewed, although only forty of them were eventually selected. Special criteria were adopted in selecting these samples, which have comprehensively to include political, intellectual, and religious topics that he was discussing. Repeated issues were excluded, especially lectures concerning religious topics and interpretation of the Quran. More than half of Husayn’s lectures discuss the interpretation of the Quran, so a random sample was taken from them and repeated lectures were excluded. Although some of these lectures have religious titles, they include “political content because Husayn al-Huthi relied heavily on religion as a tool for recruiting his adherents.”13 Likewise, only forty speeches for Abdulmalik were chosen. I was eager that the sample is randomly selected without considering the content, but taking into account the context in which it was delivered, in parallel with the context in which Husayn’s lectures were delivered, for example, Day of Ghadeer, the Wilayah, International Quds Day. These are common themes between the two speeches, but the chapter seeks to uncover how the two speeches addressed these issues. This will allow us to compare the content of the discourses in the contexts. The selection criteria are as follows: 1. Repeated topics were mostly excluded; for example, for the interpretation of the Quran only five lectures were selected. 2. Contexts that are similar in Husayn’s lectures and Abdulmalik’s speeches, such as Welayah, ʿīd al-GhadĪr, and International Quds Day, were included. 3. The sample contains various political, religious, and intellectual issues. For the analysis of the data, the Ghawwas application (“diver” in English) was used, as it provides more features than any other freely available corpus processing tool for Arabic, including n-gram frequency.14 Ghawwas was used to determine the dominant words, leading us to use the other Critical Discourse Analyses approaches to dig deeply into the political themes, as well as allowing us to discover

40

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

how they emerge and disappear, and to link these findings with the political and social situations. The first step in analyzing the discourse based on the corpus linguistic is to obtain the data that represent the state of the discourse to be analyzed and then revealing it and then revealing the initial lists of frequency.15 In this chapter, eighty texts were selected for both: Husayn al-Huthi, forty texts with a total of 217,493 words;16 Abdulmalik al-Huthi forty texts, with a total of 149,279 words,17 after deleting the prepositions, conjunctions, and pronouns. Although the number of samples is equal, there is a difference in the number of the words because Husayn’s lectures were distinguished by being long. Meanwhile, Abdulmalik’s speeches became shorter; I believe that this is due to the fact that Abdulmalik seeks to address a wider range of people, and this calls for the speech to be shorter and more focused. I did not predetermine the words with political connotations but instead the studied texts were examined in a neutral manner in order to ascertain the most used words, identify those words that hold political meaning, and then analyze them by examining their contexts and discover how they are expressed and presented to the public. All of this is compared with the accompanying political and social variables with an attempt to achieve an objective explanation of why these themes appear or fade away, based on the data provided by the words themselves. In order to analyze political themes, the tools of the Critical Discourse Analysis were used to analyze the data, especially the methodology of framing from Robert Entman, who described the strategy of framing that makes some topics salient by placement or repetition, or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols, or which excludes some of those topics,18 and then analyzing the contexts and their implications and how they build arguments. The political themes and their transformations are not only analyzed but rather are placed within the framework of the political discourse in general that envelops the discourse of the movement. So, in the first step, we entered the eighty texts into the Ghawwas application to extract the most frequent words in the discourse. Second, the word list was extracted, adding the number of occurrences of each work to an Excel document, ordered from most to least frequent. Third, we excluded prepositions, conjugations, pronouns, and words that have no political connotation. Fourth, the twenty most political words in each discourse were selected and ordered from most to least. Fifthly, we explored the political themes within these words. Finally, we analyzed the themes by examining the dominant words in their contexts within the texts and their political, social, and cultural situations, as well as comparing between the two discourses.

Data Analysis An analysis of the political discourse of the Huthi movement helps to reveal the great difference in its status. For example, a previous study argued that Huthis were constructed themselves as an oppressed group whose members are bound

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Table 2.1  The twenty most frequent political words in the two discourses Political Words Frequency Husayn

Abdulmalik

No

Theme

Frequency

Theme

Frequency

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Allah Qur’an Jews Umma Israel USA Issue Islam Yemen Imam20 Terrorism Enemies Christians Jihad Movement Iran Party Slogan Khomeini Legitimacy

5843 2085 753 636 569 496 450 427 351 348 286 262 245 146 120 114 111 94 89 85

Allah People (Sha‘b) Umma Yemen Aggression (al-ʿUdwān) Israel Qur’an USA Saudi Policy Regime Islam Imam Issue Governmen Welayah21 Corruption al-Husayn Qaidah Army

2035 1699 1429 942 639 512 412 352 344 334 240 209 167 167 156 109 96 81 74 66

by religion and oppression, rather than by a nationalist bond.19 However, it may have been different later, when the Huthis were in control of state institutions and became almost completely integrated into them. Arguably, the movement’s shift from the opposition position to power may change many of the political concepts that can be explored through analysis.

Findings The most frequent words extracted by Ghawwas were numbered, starting with the most frequent (Table 2.1) as a first step, and then the emergence of these themes and their dominance over other political themes were studied and analyzed and a comparison made between them. The second step included identifying the five most important words that appeared in one discourse and disappeared or faded away in the other, with the reason for all of this being clarified.

­Religion and Political Discourse The first observation on these themes is the domination of religious tendency, which occupies first place in both discourses; even those that try to discuss the

42

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

political issues move toward that from a religious standpoint. Both discourses use the same strategy; for example, Husayn used religion by interpreting verses from the Quran. In addition, he relied on stories of the struggles of Shiʿa imams with the authorities of their day, to encourage Zaydis to stand against repression and  injustice.22 Likewise, Abdulmalik used some of these interpretations in his speeches. In the two discourses, the first word repeated after the prepositions and conjunctions was the word of Allah (God). This seems normal as a result of the use of many verses from the Quran, supplications and others, in addition to the repetition of hadiths, sayings, and religious arguments. The word of Allah in this context constitutes 2  percent of the total words of Husayn’s discourse, and 1 percent of the total number of words in Abdulmalik’s discourse. This difference appears to be consistent with the movement’s transformation, as well as the shift in discourse from a religious discourse dealing with political issues to a political discourse that uses religious concepts. The word “Allah” is associated with the word “Quran” in the two most frequent words in this discourse, which brings it into line with the religious literature.23 Because the Huthi movement was a religious movement, Albloshi believes that it was important for them to rely on Islamic terms, to give religious justification to their uprising.24 Religious rhetoric in political discourse can overwhelm people with an array of different emotions, leading individuals to identify with a broad and varied range of interests, where people receive political speech with the influence of religious feelings.25 In Yemeni society especially, the religious sector is one of the key factors that can be used as a weapon by politicians to promote their ideologies.26 It seems that the Huthi movement understands this strategy, as it produces a political discourse using a lot of religious terms and promotes religious concepts; this is obvious in Abdulmalik’s discourse. And in return, in Malazim we find religious lectures, but they discuss many political issues. Even when interpreting the Quran or when celebrating religious occasions, Husayn al-Huthi sought to link current political events with religious debate. In this way they employ religious discourse in political discourse and vice versa. In Husayn’s discourse (the word “Allah”) is related to one of jihad principles, where (true) believers spread the truth to non-believers;27 he says in one of his lectures: “Muslims basically when they are asked to carry one message, they unite to spread the religion of Allah, and to raise the word of Allah, to spread this religion among other nations.”28 He believes that the mission of the Umma is to spread religion to the world, and it is the same jihadist principle that all jihadist discourses use. That is why the word of Allah is repeated either by verbal association with the (word of Allah) or in other contexts. It appears in its religious contexts or in other intellectual and political contexts. In Abdulmalik’s discourse, verbal association with (the word of Allah) was not mentioned, and instead, he uses (the path of Allah): “The obligation of jihad for the path of Allah in its correct and constructive sense to ward off injustice, to ward off tyranny, to face evil, to protect the umma, to protect its independence and

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dignity.”29 Abdulmalik used the concept of the path of Allah instead of the word of Allah, and both concepts are used from a religious perspective, which understands jihad as a “struggle or exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path against that which is evil; its goal is to destroy evil, to spread belief in Allah and to make His words supreme in this world.”30 Most of the titles of Husayn’s Malazim have a religious connotation such as “Interpretation of the Qur’an,” Wilayah “‘Guardianship’,” and “Lectures from the Quraan,” while most of Abdulmalik’s titles have political significance or discuss political topics such as “After 24 days of Aggression,” “After the Attack on the Protesters,” and “The First Anniversary of the 21 September Revolution.” In this scenario, the dominance of religious themes seems to be to some extent justified for Husayn by describing what he provides as religious lectures. Therefore, it appears from the aforementioned results that he passes on political concepts in the context of religious discourse, whereas Abdulmalik passes on religious concepts in the context of political discourse.

Bigoted Discourse There is no doubt that the Huthi speech is fundamentally based on an essential idea that places hostility to the Jews clearly and explicitly, based on their famous slogan: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam,” which was used for the first time in a religious school in Sa’da on January 17, 2002, and was adapted from a similar Iranian slogan.31 But the assertion of the phrase “a curse upon the Jews” confirms that the motivation behind including this line in the slogan is simply anti-Semitism,32 in addition to also being antiChristian, as we will see. The Huthis try to justify that the notions of cursing and death have political connotations,33 but it did not convince others,34 since this is incitement against the Jewish community, which forms an essential part of the environment of Yemeni society in Sa’da—the same environment from which the Huthi movement was launched. Nevertheless, bigotry is not limited to the well-known Huthi slogan, as this chapter has clarified another serious result, reflecting the bigotry contained in the movement’s discourse in general. It turns out that the word “Jews” occupied third place among the total words used in the overall speeches of Husayn al-Huthi studied (Table 2.1). Husayn affirms, in all his lectures, the idea of ​​cursing the Jews, stressing that this curse is a consolidation of the idea of ​​cursing found in the Quran. He is, rather, re-activating these (Qura‘nic) concepts, according to him, stressing: “We will curse the Jews and the Christians, we will curse America and Israel.”35 In another context, he says: “Jews are enemies of all believers,”36 and that “the Jews and the Christians are the evil.”37 Jews also hold the responsibility for the poverty of Islamic peoples: “Millions of dollars go into the pockets of our enemies from the Jews and the Christians.”38

44

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Then he turns to accuse everyone who is not hostile to the Jews and Christians, starting with the Sunni Muslims: “It is known that the Jews and the Christian are second class among the Sunnis, and they do not classify them as Mushrekīn (polytheists) as we classify them.”39 Moreover, he focuses on Jews, using many words that are downright negative, such as “the malice of the Jews” and “the hostility of the Jews,” and connects all of that with the Christians, although sometimes he reconsiders this judgment and says: “As for the Christians, they have become victims of the malice of the Jews.”40 The clear and direct language of bigotry that dominates Husayn’s lectures begins to decline, significantly, in Abdulmalik’s discourse, so that the word “Jews” appears, in the entirety of the discourse, almost fifty times, and most of what is mentioned talks about the Jewish lobby, or links Zionism and Judaism. Indeed, the language of bigotry toward the Jews did not completely disappear from Abdulmalik’s discourse; rather, it took an indirect form. Most of the phrases with which he mentioned the Jews seemed to criticize what he called the loyalty of Muslims to them or the dependence of politicians on Jews, in an apparent continuation of the conspiracy theory consolidation. Also, and extensively, he directed hostile language toward Israel, which ranked the sixth most frequent word in his speeches, and he worked to link Israel with other movements’ enemies, internally and externally. In one of his speeches, he says, skeptical of the national belonging of the Jewish citizen: “The Jew continues to live generation after generation in the Arab region and he feels that he is not from this Umma.”41 This quote shows Abdulmalik’s view on the Jewish community; although his speech is less directly bigoted, he doubts the Jews’ feelings of belonging to their homeland, and therefore he considers them traitors who cannot be trusted. As for the discussion of Christians, the word was only mentioned seven times, and emerged in the context of clarifying the concept of Ahl al-Kitāb (the people of the holy books, which are the Jews, Christians, and the Sabians), as used in the Quranic context. It was also mentioned in another context describing the deviations occurring in humanity as the result of deviations in Jews and Christians. In the comparison between Husayn and Abdulmalik’s discourse, we found that Husayn’s discourse was direct in the language of hostility toward other religions, while Abdulmalik used a less harshly bigoted language. This can be understood as the Huthi movement’s attempt to transform into a political movement; they do not want to show the world that the movement is hostile to other religions or cultures, especially Christianity.

­Identity Determinators The nation, Islam, homeland, and other terms are among the most important components of identity in its political form42 and are used to achieve several gains. Like other Islamic religious groups, the Huthi movement employs the term

2. Transformation of Dominant Political Themes

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“Umma” to address a wide range of people beyond modern national concepts and simple religious affiliation using historic interpretations of what constitutes nationhood.43 We argue that focusing on the term “Umma” in this context is an essential part of knowing the determinators of identity and how it was formed in the Huthi movement discourse. Hence, the two discourses are almost identical in the use of the word “Umma.” However, the significant and decisive difference between its use in the discourses is that it harmonizes with other ingredients of identity in Husayn’s discourse, while there are other determinants of identity in Abdulmalik’s. For example, determinants of identity appear in Husayn’s discourse as follows: Umma and Islam, while the word “Yemen” appears later. On the other hand, the word “people” appears as the second word in Abdulmalik’s discourse, with a frequency of 1,699 times, before the word “Umma.” It is a major shift between the two discourses, as the word of the people was not dominant in Husayn’s lectures, which focused on a wider and greater level than the level of the people. Husayn, in the entirety of his discourse, seeks to address the Umma, and the recipients are all Muslims; even when he returns to address the Yemenis, he only looks on them as part of the Islamic nation. For him, the Umma are all Muslims, not just the Yemenis. For example, we see Husayn talking about the Umma and what he means by this term, explaining its roles and what it should do, saying: What we are seeing today is that this Umma, which was required to be the one who roamed the seas, length and width, so it would stand on the coasts of Europe and the coasts of America, unfortunately, is the same Umma that, along with its leaders, are subjected to be humiliation, shame and surrender.44

As for the word “people,” even if it appears in Husayn’s discourse, it is intended to describe the people in general (the Palestinian people, the Arab people, the American people, etc.) or the people in exchange for governments. In a few places, not more than twenty times in the entirety of his lectures, he meant the Yemeni people. On the contrary, Abdulmalik tried to balance addressing the Umma in general, as this speech as an extension of the foundations of the movement discourse, and the people (the Yemeni people) he introduces himself not only as the current leader of the movement but also as a supervisor of the Yemeni state officials after Huthi gained control. Abdulmalik’s discourse now targets not only the Yemeni people but has become more precise in the details of what he is addressing: categories of the people, attitudes of the people, demands of the people, values of the people, and money of the people. Therefore, it becomes clear that the shift in the discourse path is a shift from the transnational to the national track, by assigning the discourse from Islam to the homeland, and from the Umma to the people.

46

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Who Is the Enemy? Defining identity in the political context may require identifying the enemy. This occurs in order to manage political power internally and externally45 by directing the literature of the discourse toward a specific enemy who bears the blame for mistakes and failures, as well as in order to give people justifications for accepting the actions that are being taken, especially in theocratic and dictatorial regimes and by populists46 who are looking for justifications for their continuation in the power or for their expansion and coming to power. The matter is no different for groups, as they play the same role by ordering the other both structurally and psychologically by turning the stranger (Jews and Christians and others in this discourse) into an enemy, so that a discourse of exclusion is constructed, thus creating a common belief system to strengthen the foundation of the group/movement and its followers.47 It appears from the analysis that identifying the enemy was one of the most dominant aims of the discourse, which is in line with this orientation in which the group seeks to form a unified vision, about who they are and who is their enemy. Husayn al-Huthi focused on America and Israel as two clear political entities, which he saw as the cause of all the devastation of the Umma, and he also linked it to other religious entities that are closely related to both America and Israel, namely the Jews and Christians. In his discourse he repeatedly emphasized the nature of hostility toward the Umma, as he claims, by America and Israel, and that they are one entity, behind which stands the “historical hostility of the Jews and the Christians,” and that all the tragedies that people are facing are due to America, even confirming that terrorism has its sources and roots in America. Hence, he indicated that the relationship of Shiʿa with this entity (the enemy) is a relationship of conflict and confrontation, as he believes that true Shiism is standing in the face of America and the Jews. He made America and Israel the first enemy and that the people should stand behind this Shiʿa movement in order to confront them. He answered the question of what Shiʿa means by saying: “It means the responsibility and duties of this religion for the Umma. The Shiʿa are the ones who stand in the face of [America and Israel], and in the face of the Jews.”48 When he approaches Saudi Arabia, he puts it close to friendship with America; however, he does not accuse it of being a direct enemy, except from this collusion, like the rest of the other regimes that he sees surrendering to American hegemony. Elsewhere, he accuses it of spreading Wahhabism. From this point of view, it becomes clear that the enemies of the Umma, from Husayn’s perspective, are primarily America and Israel, and then other parties who are helping America and Israel in several ways, such as collusion, surrender, and not taking responsibility. Abdulmalik takes the same direction: the enemy remains America and Israel as one of the starting points of the movement’s basic discourse that forms the foundation of the argument from which it starts. However, the transformations of the discourse begin to take on more subtle dimensions, starting with the creating of “local enemies” who work as proxies for the external enemy (America and Israel).

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The Huthi’s discourse still describes America as the primary cause of all Yemen’s problems, even calling the current war “the Saudi-American aggression.” Moreover, it appears that Saudi Arabia was included in the list of enemies of the movement. Abdulmalik’s discourse added new enemies to the list, such as Saudi Arabia and its allies, claiming that whether they are from the internationally recognized governments or other groups, they are mere proxies for Saudi Arabia and, surely behind it, America.

Iran, between Attendance and Absence The chapter does not seek to discuss the doctrinal relationship between the Huthis (the Zaydis) and Iran (the Twelvers), despite its importance, as this matter was addressed in a previous study examining the relationship between the Huthis and Iran.49 It is difficult to determine the extent of the religious relationship or doctrinal connection between the Huthis and the Iranian regime; however, there certainly is a relationship, and Husayn al-Huthi did not conceal his fascination with the Iranian model, holding Ayatollah Khomeini to be a just and righteous leader, whose efforts to resist Western influence in the Middle East should be imitated.50 From this standpoint, it becomes obvious that there are two main words that reflect the dominance of Iran in the mind of Husayn Al-Huthi, as they are among the twenty most frequently used words in his discourse, namely Iran (114) times and Khomeini (89) times. This result, which is deduced on a quantitative basis, illustrates the extent of Iran’s influence on Husayn’s thought, not Iran as a state but as an ideology for the Islamic Revolution with its symbols, such as Khomeini. In his view, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the best example to follow, and its founder, Khomeini, was the best leader to imitate. He referred positively to Khomeini because of Iran’s position in the world and because of Iranians’ ability to resist Western pressures and remain self-reliant. In his discourse, Khomeini was a just and righteous leader and a great man who was able to humiliate his enemies; he was also impressed by Khomeini because he had planted the seeds of animosity toward Israel and the United States in Iran.51 The link between Iran and Umma in general is noticeable from Husayn’s discourse when he says, for example: “The enemies target not only Iran and Hezbollah but the entire nation.”52 He also considers Iran the protector of Umma, as he stressed that Iran is the only one who can protect the nation. This power makes him proud of the Iranian model and that it is more capable of confronting the enemies: After the Iranians had been threatened, they said: If America strikes, or if it thinks about striking, they will be hit by a direct and severe blow. They know Iran, and they know the people of Iran, as well as they know that Iran has been able to build itself militarily, economically and culturally.53

48

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Elsewhere he says: “The West takes Iran into account but, it does not consider the rest of Muslims and Arabs.”54 In general, it can be said that Iran’s presence as a state and ideology dominates all his discourse, as he places the Muslims represented by Iran against the West represented by America and Israel. Iran, as mentioned above, overlapped in Husayn’s awareness with Khomeini, and the Islamic Revolution and its ideology. In many places in his lectures, he expressed this mixing by saying: “Khomeinian Iran.” More precisely, Imam Khomeini’s influence over Husayn al-Huthi appears to be very profound. This is evidenced by Husayn’s discourse, where he describes Khomeini as “Ibn Ali” (Ali’s son),55 which is a high rank in Shiʿa thought that reveres Ali as the legitimate heir to power in the Welᾱyah (Guardianship loyalty). He also quotes many of Khomeini’s political, intellectual, and religious phrases, which provides a clear vision of Khomeini’s position in the thought and awareness of Husayn al-Huthi. The presence of Iran in Abdulmalik’s discourse is different. He tried to distance himself from praising Iran or Khomeini, and when he mentions Iran, he might add in the context of its praise that it is involved in the anti-Israel project regarding the issue of the Arab-Palestinian conflict. He also sometimes seeks to deny the relationship between Iran and the Huthis, as he says in one of his speeches: “There is no Iranian hegemony in Yemen.”56 In some contexts, he praises Iran in a completely neutral way, such as when he says: “Iran is a major Islamic country.”57 Likewise, in other places, although it does not deviate from the neutral description, he mentions the “siege of the Iranian people” and he discusses “the strategic relations between Iran and other countries in the region.” As for Khomeini, he has never been mentioned in Abdulmalik’s analyzed discourse except in reference to his declaration of the last Friday of each Ramadan as International Jerusalem Day. It is paradoxical that this absence of Iran’s presence and its dominance in Abdulmalik’s discourse comes in light of the practical presence of Iran in the context of its direct support for the Huthi movement and its current war with the internationally recognized government supported by the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. International reports have confirmed that Iran is involved in illegally supplying the Huthis with arms, fuel, and money.58 So, by comparing the two discourses, we find that Iran is strongly present in Malazim, but it is absent from Abdulmalik’s speeches. However, Iran is now present in the reality of the current conflict in Yemen, which means that Iran’s dominant presence in Husayn’s discourse is matched by Iran’s dominant actual presence in the movement’s and Yemen’s political scene.

Transformation of Political Themes Although approximately 50  percent of the themes are identical in the two discourses, there is an important observation: that is, the emergence of other themes and disappearances. This emergence and disappearance are closely related to the movement and its political transformations, from the stage of advocacy and mobilization to the stage of confrontation and then control and governance.

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Table 2.2  Five Words That Are Dominant in Abdulmalik’s Discourse and Nondominant in Husayn’s Husayn’s Non-dominant Political Themes Policy Regime Government Saudi Army

11 12 29 34 40

Table  2.3  Five Words That Are Dominant in Husayn’s Discourse and Nondominant in Abdulmalik’s Abdulmalik’s Non-dominant Political Themes Khomeini Christians Terrorism Iran Jews

3 7 9 22 28

The important observation here is the emergence of political terms that refer to the structure of the state, such as the word “people,” which defines the relationship between the authorities and the citizens. Likewise, the government and army words were not completely hidden in Husayn’s discourse; however, they were marginal, while the focus at that time was on a broader level. The discourse was not only general but the target group of the discourse seemed to be broader than the small community from which Husayn al-Huthi started. It is clear that the brgoted discourse that was directly dominant in Husayn’s discourse, by attacking the Jews and Christians and linking them to the conspiracy  theory against Muslims, has decreased to a small degree in Abdulmalik’s discourse, and when it appears at a few points, it takes an indirect way. This transformation of the discourse seems to be justified with the transformation of the Huthi movement into the political action, where it wants to show the international community that it is a peaceful political movement that is neither racist nor hostile to the other, while the racist discourse against other religions is still active. It is also possible to notice the shift in Iran’s dominance within the discourse. Iran, the Islamic Revolution, and Khomeini were dominant themes in Husayn’s discourse, while Iran at that time did not directly intervene in the Yemeni reality in general and/or even in support of the Huthis in particular. At the outbreak of the last war and before, and with the increasing accusations directed against Iran of being involved in supporting the Huthis, Iran’s hegemony over the speeches does not appear. Rather, Khomeini’s name is rare in Abdulmalik’s discourse.

50

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Conclusion The analysis of the dominant political themes in the discourse of the Huthi movement gains its importance from the status of the content on which it works, as it concentrates on analyzing two of the movement’s most significant entities: Malazim, the lectures of the founder Husayn al-Huthi, and the political speeches of the current leader Abdulmalik al-Huthi. The choosing of the Ghawwas application enabled us to access as much data as possible in order to extract the dominant themes and then reach conclusions based on empirical methods that contribute to strengthening the analysis and clarifying its dimensions and implicit significances. Ghawwas showed the most frequently used words, and the first twenty were chosen from the frequency list, after deleting prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, and words that have no political connotation. By specifying the twenty most frequently used words that have political meaning or refer to political significance in the two discourses, it became clear that nine of the twenty words, almost 50 percent of the discourse, are identical, despite the objective difference between the position of the movement in the era of Husayn and its position now. The analysis showed the domination of the religious orientations that cover the rest of the aspects, in approaching local issues or those related to the international situation more broadly. It was also found that Husayn al-Huthi’s discourse in his Malazim was dominated by the language of bigotry against other religions in a clear and direct way either by attacking the Jews or by promoting a conspiracy theory that claims that Jews are the cause of all the world’s miseries, especially in the Islamic world. He also attacks Christians, even though he considers them, in some places, to be victims of the Jews as well. Meanwhile, Abdulmalik’s discourse tries to reduce the intensity of bigotry, in line with the movement’s attempt to deal with the international community in order to present itself as an acceptable political alternative in the future of Yemen. Although this bigoted language has not disappeared, he uses it indirectly, as well as transforming hostility toward the Jews as a religion to Israel and linking all the movement’s enemies internally and externally with Israel and the United States. The analysis revealed how the terminology that defines political identity is transformed, starting from the word “Umma” in Husayn’s discourse and ending with the use of the word “people,” which is a shift from generality to specificity, in line with the movement’s shift from calling for global change to working on control in its local context. The same appeared in the selection of the enemy, from America and Israel to Saudi Arabia, as well as local enemies. Interestingly, the chapter showed the movement’s position on Iran, and how the Malazim discourse demonstrated Iranian dominance, through the presence of the words “Iran” and “Khomeini” among the most dominant words in Husayn al-Huthi’s lectures. Correspondingly, both words disappeared from the list of dominant words in Abdulmalik’s speech, at the time when international reports show direct interference in supporting the Huthi movement in reality.

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Notes 1 Christopher Boucek, Yemen: On the Brink War in Saada from Local Insurrection to National Challenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 5–8. 2 Bakil Ghundol and Abdulghani Muthanna, “Conflict and International Education: Experiences of Yemeni International Students,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2020.1846119 3 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 2). 4 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’,” research paper, Middle East and North Africa Programme: Chatham House, February 2015, https://www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150218YemenIranSaudi. pdf. 5 Abdulrahman al-Ahnumi, “al-Shahid al-Qa’id Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Min-al-Sarkha ila al-Muwajaha al-Kubra (The Martyr Leader Husayn Badr Al-Din Al-Huthi . . . from the Cry to the Great Confrontation),” Ansar Allah, March 22, 2020, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/326891. 6 In Yemen, Malazim is a group of notes, lectures, or lectures that are put in copied papers, and they are often written in a nonacademic way, which may contain linguistic errors and show a lack of arrangement. 7 Yeḥya Qassem Abo Awaẓah, one of Husain al-Huthi’s most ideologically close associates who has published several books promoting the movement and its ideas, including al-Masirah al-Quraaniah Fi al-Yaman [Quranic Path in Yemen]; and Safaḥat Moshreqah Min Ḥayat al-Shahied al-Qaed Husain Badr al-Din al-Huthi [Bright Pages of the Life of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Huthi]. 8 Hamad H. Albloshi, “Ideological Roots of the Ḥūthī Movement in Yemen,” Journal of Arabian Studies 6, no. 2 (November 2016). 9 United Nation Security Council, Abdulmalik Al-Huthi, April 14, 2015, https://www. un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials/summaries/individual/abdulmalikal-houthi. 10 Sama’a Al-Hamdani, “What Is Needed in Yemen’s Post Conflict Phase?” The Fourth Conference on National Dialogues and Non-Formal Dialogue Processes, June 11–12, 2019. 11 al-Batati, Saeed, “Analysis: What Is Yemen’s Al-Huthi Really Saying?” Middle East Eye, February 13, 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-what-yemens-alhouthi-really-saying-0. 12 Paul Gee James, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, Theory and Method, 4th ed. (London: Routedge, 2014), 17–19. 13 Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 150. 14 Abdulmohsen al-Thubaity et al., “New Language Resources for Arabic: Corpus Containing More Than Two Million Words and a Corpus Processing Tool,” International Conference on Asian Language Processing, Urumqi, August 17–19, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1109/IALP.2013.21 15 al-Mojaiwel, Sultan. “al-Muᶜalajah al-ᵓᾹlĪah Lelsuḥuf al-ᶜArabih, TaḥlĪl al-ᵓAnmᾱṭ al-Khetᾱbyah bi-Manāhij BCU [Digital Processing of Arab Newspapers: An Analysis of Discourse Patterns Using BCU Approach],” in Lughawiyyāt al-Mudawanah alḤassūbiyya, Taṭbīqāt Taḥlīliyya ʿAlā al-ʿArabiyya al-Ṭabīʿiyya [Corpus Linguistic . . .

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16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

The Huthi Movement in Yemen Applied Analysis on the Natural Arabic], ed. Sultan al-Mojaiwel et al. (Riyadh: King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Center for the Arabic Language, 2016), 17–19. Husayn al-Huthi, “al-Malazim [Lectures],” Huda al-Qur’an, https://www.huda.live/ malazem (accessed August 2, 2020). Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “al-Kheṭabat [Speeches],” Huda al-Qur’an, https://www.huda. live/speech (accessed August 10, 2020). Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, 4 (1993): 52. Gibreel Alaghbary, “Identity and National Belonging in Ansaruallah’s Political Rhetoric: A Transitivity Analysis,” International Journal of English Linguisticsm 7, no. 4 (2017): 247. Imam terms may refer to several political and ideological significances as in (1) AlImama system, (2) Al-Imama belief (as in the Imama of Ali, or of the Imama of Ahl al-Bayt), and (3) Imam as a title (Imam Ali, or Imam Khomeini). Although the word “Wilayah” has spiritual, political, and theological meanings, it can be considered as the central tenet in the Shiʿa belief system, which is based on the understanding that Imam Ali is more entitled to Wilayah (authority) and after him the imams from the descendants of Ali bin Abi Talib. The ideal way in such a state of matter, for the imams, was to keep the concept of Wilayah to themselves and their close companions: Raziq Hussain, “The Centrality of ‘Wilayah’ in Shiʿa Political Thought,” Quarterly Noor-e-Marfat, https://nmtisb.com/wp-content/ uploads/2021/01/The-Centalityt-of-Wilayah-in-Shia-Political-Thought.pdf. An analysis of al-Huthi ’s discourse showed its use in the context of this theoretical conception of Shiʿa thought. Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 150. See, for example, Adnan al-Nahawi, Letkon Kalemat Allah Hya Alʿulya [Allah’s Word Should Be the Highest] (Riyadh: Dār al-Nahawi, 2009). Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 153. Christopher B. Chapp, Religious Rhetoric and American Politics: The Endurance of Civil Religion in Electoral Campaigns (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Norman Cigar, “Islam and the State in South Yemen: The Uneasy Coexistence,” Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1990): 186. Vinod Saighal, “Jihad and Crusades: Concepts, Meanings and Adherence,” World Affairs: The Journal of International 19, no. 1 (2015): 24. Husain al-Huthi, “al-Waḥda al-ʾImāniyya [Faith Unity],” al-Malazim. Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “Bi-monāsabat Ikhtitām al-Marakiz al-Ṣayfyah [On the Occasion of the Conclusion of the Summer Centers],” al-Khiṭābāt. Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 385. Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 152. Hannah Porter, “Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant: Understanding the Logic and Symbolism of Yemen’s Huthi Movement,” Masters thesis, University of Chicago, Master of Arts in Middle Eastern Studies (2018): 28. Abbas al-Daylami, “ʿan al-Ṣarkhah Wa Shiʿār Anṣar Allah [About the Scream and Ansar Allah Slogan],” Althawrah, April 22, 2018, http://althawrah.ye/ archives/519168. Seth J. Frantzman, “‘Curse the Jews,’ Yemen’s Huthi Rebel Slogan Handed Out at University,” The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/middleeast/curse-the-jews-yemens-houthi-rebel-slogan-handed-out-at-university-569074.

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35 Husain al-Huthi, “Dūrūs Min Hady al-Qurān al-Karīm [Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an],” al-Malazim. 36 Husain al-Huthi, “Masʾūliyyat Āl al-Bayt [Responsibility of Ahl Albait],” al-Malazim. 37 Husain al-Huthi, “al-ʾIrhāb Wa-Assalām [Terrorism and Peace],” al-Malazim. 38 Husain al-Huthi, “al-Muwālāt Wal-Muʿādat [Loyalty and Hostility],” al-Malazim. 39 Husain al-Huthi, “Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an.” 40 Husain al-Huthi, “Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an.” 41 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “ʿAshyat Yawam al-Quds al-’ᾱlamy [On the Eve of International Quds Day],” al-Ketabat. 42 Mostafa Shehata, “Supportive, Transformative and Reverse Effects of Media on Tunisian Diaspora’s Political Identity,” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 13, no. 1 (2020): 85. 43 Robert Saunders, “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons Affair’,” Nation and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008): 303. 44 Husain al-Huthi, “Terrorism and Peace.” 45 See, for example, Ted G. Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After the Cold War (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992); Shoon Kathleen Murray and Jason Meyers, “Do People Need Foreign Enemies? American Leaders’ Beliefs after the Soviet Demise,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999): 555–6. 46 Nadia Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019). 47 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 754. 48 Husain al-Huthi, “Ḥadīth al-Wilāya: ʿīd al-Ghadyr [Hadith of Guardianship: ʿīd alGhadĪr Occasion],” al-Malazim. 49 Mohammed Almahfali and James Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Huthi Rule in Northern Yemen,” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, February 13, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050. 50 Almahfali and Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Huthi Rule.” 51 Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 155. 52 Husain al-Huthi, “Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an.” 53 Husain al-Huthi, “Lā Taḥdhawna Ḥathw Banī ʾIsrāʾīl [To translates the Example of the Israelite],” al-Malazim. 54 Husain al-Huthi, “Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an.” 55 He means Imam: “‘Ali Ibn Abi Ṭaleb (599–661 CE) he was the first cousin and sonin-law of the Prophet Muhammad, the fourth of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (alkhulafāʾ al-rāshidūn), and the first of the Imams deemed by all Shiʿa Muslims to be appointed by divine mandate”: Reza Shah-Kazemi, “‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭaleb,” The Institute of Ismaili Studies (n.d.), https://www.iis.ac.uk/academic-article/ali-ibn-abi-talib. 56 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “Baʿd 24 Yawman mina al ʿudwᾱn [After 24 Days of Aggression],” al-Khetabat. 57 al-Huthi, “Ba‘d 24 Yawman Men al-’Udwᾱn.” 58 See Security Council, Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council, Security Council, January 25, 2019, and Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017), Security Council, January 26, 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1639536?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1664359?ln=en and Letter Dated 26 January

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Mandated by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017), Security Council, January 26, 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/1639536?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.

Bibliography al-Ahnumi, Abdulrahman. “al-Shahīd al-Qāʾd Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Min-alSarkha ilā al-Muwājāha al-Kubrā [The Martyr Leader Husayn Badr Al-Din Al-Huthi . . . from the Cry to the Great Confrontation].” AnsarAllah, March 22, 2020, https://www. ansarollah.com/archives/326891 Alaghbary, Gibreel. “Identity and National Belonging in Ansaruallah’s Political Rhetoric: A Transitivity Analysis.” International Journal of English Linguisticsm 7, no. 4 (2017): 247–56. Albloshi, Hamad H. “Ideological Roots of the Ḥūthī Movement in Yemen.” Journal of Arabian Studies 6, no. 2 (2016): 143–62. Almahfali, Mohammed and James Root. “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Huthi Rule in Northern Yemen.” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, February 13, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050 al-Batati, Saeed. “Analysis: What Is Yemen’s Al-Huthi Really Saying?” Middle East Eye, February 13, 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-what-yemens-alhouthi-really-saying-0 Boucek, Christopher. Yemen: On the Brink War in Saada from Local Insurrection to National Challenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010). Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Carpenter, Ted G. A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances after the Cold War (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992). ­Chapp, Christopher B. Religious Rhetoric and American Politics: The Endurance of Civil Religion in Electoral Campaigns (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Cigar, Norman. “Islam and the State in South Yemen: The Uneasy Coexistence.” Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1990): 185–203. al-Daylami, Abbas. “ʿan al-Ṣarkhah Wa She’ar Anṣar Allah [About the Scream and Ansar Allah Slogan].” Althawrah, April 22, 2018. http://althawrah.ye/archives/519168 Entman, Robert. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–8. Frantzman, Seth J. “‘Curse the Jews,’ Yemen’s Huthi Rebel Slogan Handed Out at University,” The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/ curse-the-jews-yemens-houthi-rebel-slogan-handed-out-at-university-569074 Ghundol, Bakil and Abdulghani Muthanna. “Conflict and International Education: Experiences of Yemeni International Students.” Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education (2020). https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2020.1846119 al-Hamdani, Sama’a. “What Is Needed in Yemen’s Post Conflict Phase?” The Fourth Conference on National Dialogues and Non-Formal Dialogue Processes, June 11–12, 2019. Hussain, Raziq. “The Centrality of ‘Wilayah’ in Shiʿa Political Thought.” Quarterly Noor-eMarfat. https://nmtisb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Centalityt-of-Wilayahin-Shia-Political-Thought.pdf

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al-Huthi, Abdulmalik. “al-Khiṭābāt [Speeches].” Huda al-Qur’an https://www.huda.live/ speech (accessed August 10, 2020). al-Huthi, Husayn. “al-Malazim [Lectures].” Huda al-Qur’an https://www.huda.live/ malazem (accessed August 2, 2020). James, Paul Gee. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, Theory and Method, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 2014). Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–67. Mohammad, Noor. “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction.” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 381–97. al-Mojaiwel, Sultan. “al-Muʿālāja al-Āliyya lil-Ṣuḥuf al-ʿArabiyya, TaḥlĪl al-ᵓAnmᾱṭ alKhiṭābiyya bi-Manāhij BCU [Digital Processing of Arab Newspapers: An Analysis of Discourse Patterns Using BCU Approach].” In LughawĪat al-Mudawanah al-ḤasubĪah, Taṭbyqat TahlĪlyah ᶜAla al-ᶜArabĪah al-ṬabĪeyah, [Corpus Linguistic . . . Applied Analysis on the Natural Arabic], ed. Sultan al-Mojaiwel et al (Riyadh: King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Center for the Arabic Language, 2016), 12–56. Murray, Shoon Kathleen and Jason Meyers. “Do People Need Foreign Enemies? American Leaders’ Beliefs after the Soviet Demise.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999): 555–69. al-Nahawi, Adnan. Letkon Kalemat Allah Hya Alʿulya [Allah’s Word Should Be the Highest] (Riyadh: Dār al-Nahawi, 2009). Porter, Hannah. “Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant: Understanding the Logic and Symbolism of Yemen’s Huthi Movement.” Masters thesis, University of Chicago, Master of Arts in Middle Eastern Studies, 2018. Saighal, Vinod. “Jihad and Crusades: Concepts, Meanings and Adherence.” World Affairs: The Journal of International 19, no. 1 (2015): 20–41. Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’.” Research paper, Middle East and North Africa Programme: Chatham House, February 2015, https://www.chathamhouse. org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf Saunders, Robert. “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons Affair’.” Nation and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008): 303–21. Security Council. Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Mandated by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017), Security Council, January 26, 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1639536?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header Security Council. Letter Dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council. Security Council, January 25, 2019. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1664359?ln=en Shehata, Mostafa. “Supportive, Transformative and Reverse Effects of Media on Tunisian Diaspora’s Political Identity.” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 13, no. 1 (2020): 85–103. al-Thubaity, Abdulmohsen, et al. “New Language Resources for Arabic: Corpus Containing More Than Two Million Words and a Corpus Processing Tool.” International Conference on Asian Language Processing, Urumqi August 17–19, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1109/IALP.2013.21 United Nation Security Council, Abdulmalik Al-Huthi, April 14, 2015, https://www.un.org/ securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials/summaries/individual/abdulmalik-al-Huthi Urbinati, Nadia. “Political Theory of Populism.” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 111–127.

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­3 T H E “S O F T WA R” A N D T H E PA ST: T H E H U T H I M OV E M E N T ’ S U SE O F H I ST O R IC A L NA R R AT I V E S A S   S OU R C E O F L E G I T I M AC Y Alexander Weissenburger

In his introduction to Gabriele vom Bruck’s Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen, Fred Halliday observed that Yemen, like only a handful of other countries, has a continuous historical and cultural heritage dating back 3,000 years.1 Perhaps not surprising for a country with such a long history, Yemen has a rich tradition of historical writing. From the beginning, however, this tradition served to shape opinions at least as much as to satisfy the desire to merely record and preserve: parts of al-Hamdani’s al-Iklil have an anti-Zaydi subtext,2 the biographies of various imams were clearly written in order to legitimize imamic rule,3 and Imam Yahya encouraged historical writing in order to foster Yemeni nationalism.4 With regard to the last example it is therefore no wonder that ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ al-Wasiʿi’s Tarikh al-Yaman begins with the birth of Muhammad, thereby omitting Yemen’s pre-Islamic history, of which Imam Yahya as a sayyid, a descendant of Muhammad, could not claim to be a part of, as will be shown later in more detail. Furthermore, al-Wasiʿi’s history, first published in 1928, at a time of heightened tensions between the imamate and the Saudi Kingdom, mentions details of Yemeni history in relation to Saudi Arabia, which were conveniently eradicated from the second edition published around the volatile time of Imam Yahya’s assassination in 1948.5 Historic events, eras, and persons are strategically selected, mentioned, portrayed in a certain light, or omitted. This tendency, while being neither surprising nor unique to Yemen, took on a special political relevance in the context of the current conflict in the country. The Huthi movement uses historic narratives in a calculated manner in order to solidify its rule over the north of the country. It conceptualizes these efforts as part of its fight against the so-called “soft war” (al-harb al-naʿima), which it claims I would like to thank Marieke Brandt, Abdullah Hamidaddin, and Shaker Lashuel for reading and commenting on this chapter. The research for this chapter was supported by the Austrian Nationalstiftung FTE and the Institute for Social Anthropology at the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

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the West wages against Yemen. This war, the movement argues, is fought by the Western “imperialists” by projecting soft power al-quwwa al-naʿima in order to corrupt society and distort the truth, thus ultimately trying to sway the Yemeni population to their side. Citing Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of soft power in the 1990s, the Huthis argue that the West, and specifically the United States and Israel, tries to undermine Muslim states in order to be able to rule them in accordance with their own interests. The fact that Nye served in several official capacities during the Clinton administration is taken as proof by the movement that the concept is now official state policy of the United States in its efforts to extend its rule over the Middle East.6 As one of the articles states: “Basis of the Soft War is the substitution of tanks with the media, of armies with lackeys, of material occupation with an occupation of ideas and ideologies, of the occupation of bodies with the occupation of souls and minds.”7 Or, as ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi put it: ­ e war that we call the Soft War, is a war of misguidance and corruption. It is a Th war that the enemies wage upon our entire Islamic world and on all our Arabic and Islamic peoples. Part of this of course targets our Yemeni people. . . . It has two sides. The first is the intellectual side, it seeks to influence the mind. It seeks to influence the general outlook and to generate ideas, orientations and visions that support the enemies and implement their goals and ambitions. The other side is the moral side. It seeks to impact morals and values.8

One of the most important aspects of the fight against the Saudi-led coalition is therefore, as ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi stated in a speech commemorating the second anniversary of the start of the intervention, to actively engage in this war of ideas.9 While it is highly interesting how the Huthi movement conceptualizes and legitimizes the necessity of its propagandistic efforts, it would be naïve to think that the movement’s vast media network’s sole purpose was to ward off enemy disinformation. Looking at the narratives the Huthis use, they clearly also serve the need of the movement to increase its own legitimacy. The movement quite obviously understands that coercion does not suffice to legitimate and normalize its rule over the country. What it wants to achieve is true hegemony in a Gramscian fashion. “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion,”10 as Gramsci put it. Without going into a closer examination of his interpretation of the concept of civil society,11 Gramsci argued that power ultimately resides in the consensus about its legitimacy. To rule, one must therefore win the battle for the hearts and minds of the population. This is where the movement’s pragmatic use of Yemeni and Islamic history comes in. History for the movement is a reservoir of “lectures and lessons that give us better understanding and vision. Our history of revolutions and jihad, standing up to the raids, is filled with stations in which our forefathers laid out beautiful lessons of freedom, dignity and honor befitting their Yemeniness, their faith, manliness, freedom and dignity.”12

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As in the case of the examples given above, historic narratives serve the movement as vast reservoir of ideological resources, which it can draw from at will and portray in a manner conducive to its intentions. These efforts are apparent in every aspect of the movement’s current ideological output. While Husayn al-Huthi seldom referred to Yemen’s past, primarily using Quranic accounts to underline his arguments, the movement became more specific in its references after 2015. Most important events are now contextualized and explained with reference to past events. The takeover of the movement in Sanaa in September 2014, known as the revolution of the 21st of September, is now frequently associated with the revolution of 1962, and the unification of 1990;13 the role assigned to women is legitimized by likening it to the biography of Fāṭima al-Zahrāʾ;14 and Wahhabism is said to find its antecedent in the Kharijites.15 The list goes on, and any attempt to give a comprehensive account would inevitably lack in analytic depth. This chapter thus focuses on three distinct narratives, relating to events situated in different timeframes. The first is the attempt to tie the ahl al-bayt’s lineage to the Yemeni genealogical heritage. The second narrative is the movement’s frequent recourse to the early days of the Zaydi imamate, and the last revolves around a massacre in 1923, when several hundred Yemeni pilgrims were killed by Ibn Saʿud’s Ikhwan militia. These narratives are chosen specifically for the frequency and vehemence with which they are spread. Due to the current lack of personal access to Yemen as well as the strong personal opinions on the ground, it would be unjustifiable to try to make assumptions about the impact of the chosen examples. The examples will, however, give a valuable insight into the movement’s strategy to normalize its rule over wide parts of Yemen by giving historic legitimacy to its authority and actions.

Making the Huthis Part of Yemeni Genealogic Heritage16 The al-Huthi family is one of the Yemeni families tracing their descendance back to Muhammad through Fatima and Ali. The ahl al-bayt are consequently descendants of the Meccan tribe Quraysh and thus belong to the north Arabian, ʿAdnānī, tribal confederation. Most of the ancestors of today’s ahl al-bayt, commonly referred to in Yemen as sāda (sing. sayyid) or ʾashrāf (sing. sharīf), arrived together with Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq in the end of the ninth century CE.17 That means that the ahl al-bayt are neither part of the Yemeni tribal society, which traces its ancestry back to Qahtan, nor of Yemen’s pre-Islamic history.18 While constituting an undoubtedly heterogeneous group, with members of the ahl al-bayt present in all socioeconomic strata of society, the ahl al-bayt made up most of the intellectual and political elite of the country. The ahl al-bayt held the highest scholarly, religious, and administrative offices in the country and provided the imam, who, according to Zaydi political theory, had to be from among the ahl al-bayt.19 With the fall of the imamate and the establishment of the republic in 1962, the role of Zaydi Islam as well as the ahl al-bayt declined. At the same time the republican state began to foster a sense of Yemeni nationhood based on Yemen’s

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Qahtani genealogic heritage and, related to this, with Yemen’s pre-Islamic history.20 The strong resentment caused by the exclusionary nature of these narratives is one of the key factors for the appearance of the Zaydi revivalist movement in the 1990s, out of which the Huthi movement emerged in the early 2000s.21 The fact that the Huthi movement is primarily led by members of the ahl albayt means that it is difficult for the movement to portray itself as truly indigenous. This problem was already addressed by Husayn al-Huthi, who clearly separated between the “true” Yemenis and the ahl al-bayt: In their history, the people of Yemen (ʾAhl al-Yaman) always fought under the banner of the ahl al-bayt. They abandoned the indigenous rulers (sulṭānāt ʾukhrā qāiʾma ʿalā turāb al-waṭan). . . They did not say: “These are the sons of our homeland and those are intruders”, they stood with the ahl al-bayt.22

­ specially since the Huthis’ rise to power in 2014, the movement has come under E sharp criticism on the basis of its “foreignness.” The Huthis are now frequently accused of trying to reinstate the ahl al-bayt to their former leading societal position, a claim that under the expression “sulala”23 is now frequently substantiated by long lists of Huthi-appointed members of the ahl al-bayt in high administrative offices spread on social media24 and books about the allegedly negative influence of the Zaydi imamate25 and of the ahl al-bayt, which in this context are often also referred to as Hashimites.26 In order to counter such accusations, the Huthis now try to bridge that gap and portray themselves as quintessentially Yemeni by proclaiming a special bond between the Yemenis and Ali and his descendants. It was this bond, the movement claims, that instilled an enduring revolutionary spirit in the Yemeni population: The bond of the Yemenis with Ali and his sons—ʿalayhim al-salām—explains the constant uprising against the authority of the tyrannous Umayyads and Abbasids  .  .  . This is because Ali—ʿalayhi al-salām—and his descendants are bearers of the banner of revolution against the tyrants and spearheads of change. . . . Their loyalty as the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid caliphs waged rabid campaigns against their country in order to divert them from their love for Ali— ʿalayhi al-salām—and to quell the revolutions that these Yemeni inspired by Ali and his sons led, brought forth a spirit of proud refusal, bravery and sacrifice, that returns today for the same reasons as the House of Saʿūd commits daily massacres against the rights of the Yemenis.27

This bond, however, was not forged as Ali was sent to Yemen by Muhammad but before that, with ʾIsmāʾīl the son of the prophet Ibrahim/Abraham. According to Islamic tradition, Ismaʿil and his mother Hagar settled in Mecca after being abandoned there by Ibrahim, who was a forefather of ʾAdnānī and therefore of Muhammad and the ahl al-bayt. Later, Ismaʿil married a woman from the Banu Jurhum, a Meccan tribe of South Arabian, provenance.28 In 2018, the pro-Huthi

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Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami published a book called al-Yaman wa-ahl al-bayt fī ṣadr al-ʾIslām (Yemen and the Ahl al-Bayt in the Beginning of Islam), which recounts this bond and its importance. In Noble Mecca were the Amalekites, which were vanquished by the Qahtani Jurhum after a while. The prophet of Allah, Ismaʿil—ʿalayhi al-salām—married into Jurhum and begat many children. This familial relationship constituted the first intimate encounter between the Yemeni Jurhum and the children of Ismaʿil—ʿalayhi al-salām—that influenced the later strengthening of the historic relationship between the two sides.29

Over time this relationship grew stronger, and as the Kingdom of Sabaʾ declined in the third century CE, the Banū al-Aws and Banu al-Khazraj moved north and settled in Medina, where both Muhammad’s great-grandfather, Hashim b. ʿAbd alManaf, and grandfather, ʿAbd al-Mutallib, married women from Banu al-Khazraj.30 Muhammad was thus of south and north Arabian background, which is interpreted by the movement as contributing to the strong affection between the ahl al-bayt and the people of Yemen. Yemen was in fact so important to Muhammad that he sent Ali there several times, where he converted the tribal confederation Hamadan to Islam.31 From this time onward, Yemen was not only an Islamic country, the author argues, but its way toward Shiʿism was inescapable.32 The book, which was consequently made into a documentary movie, shown on the movement’s news outlet, al-Masira in 2018,33 thus tries to establish a historical connection between Yemen and the ahl al-bayt that precedes the establishment of the first imamate in 897 and the consequent permanent settlement of larger numbers of ahl al-bayt in Yemen. In the Huthi movement’s interpretation of Yemeni pre-Zaydi history, the bond between the ahl al-bayt and the Yemenis is the product of a quasi-primordial, genealogical, and religious link, dating back to pre-Islamic times. In order to bridge the gap between the descendants of the prophet and the rest of the population, the Huthis therefore portray the ahl al-bayt, and by extension themselves, as a distinct, yet integral, part of Yemeni society. Being Yemeni is thus not merely a question of being of Qahtani descent but also to be affiliated with the descendants of the prophet and thus with Shiʿism and ultimately Zaydism. This bond, however, is more than a historical fact; it imbues the Yemeni people with a revolutionary drive to seek justice in the face of tyrannical adversaries, the movement argues.

The Biographies of Early Zaydi Imams as Analogies for the Current Situation Thematically related to the place of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemeni society, the Huthi movement also uses the concept of the Zaydi imamate for its own purposes. While not openly calling for the re-establishment of the imamate, the Huthis use the example of the first imams, mainly Zayd and al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, in order to draw parallels to today’s situation. While topically related to the first subchapter,

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the movement’s employment of the imamate does not serve to normalize its rule per se but to explain and legitimize its actions and in fact the conflict in general. Zayd b. Ali was the grandson of Husayn b. Ali b. Abi Talib and fifth imam of the Zaydiyya. In 740 CE, Zayd led a revolt in Kufa against the Umayyads. Abandoned by his followers, he was eventually killed by the forces of caliph Hisham. Zayd’s revolt and martyrdom are commemorated by the Huthis in several publications34 and online articles.35 Perhaps more importantly, however, the revolt is remembered annually in a speech by ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi commemorating the martyrdom (istishhād) of Imam Zayd. In his 2017 speech, al-Huthi links Imam Zayd’s revolt to the uprising of al-Husayn at Kerbala sixty years earlier: The Umayyad tyranny is a black and unjust episode in the history of the umma and its negative prolongations have not ceased until today. If we go back into history in order to understand the truth of this tyranny and what it did to the umma and what it did in the umma, we find nothing but tragedy and the legitimacy of this great act of Imam Zayd—ʿalayhi al-salām—becomes apparent to us. [It is] just like the actions of al-Husayn, his grandfather and the grandson of the Prophet of Allah—ʿalayhi al-salām.36

Al-Huthi then continues to accuse the Umayyads of committing a list of crimes: the Umayyads conquered Medina, burned the Kaʿba, and killed many of the ahl al-bayt, of the muhājirīn, and the ʾanṣār. Perhaps worse, however, Caliph Hisham confessed to not fearing God and, in a narrative reflecting the movement's aversion for Judaism, reprimanded Zayd for admonishing a Jew who had talked ill of Muhammad. For the movement “the tyranny of the Umayyads was from the beginning a project to overthrow Islam’s basic principles, its true values, its sincere morals. An overthrowal in every sense of the word. The religion of Allah became corrupted.”37 Feeling the responsibility to save the umma, Imam Zayd led his revolt against the Umayyads but failed. Consequently, the umma deviated from the right path and succumbed to tyranny: The history of the umma today, and the periods of past generations is filled with injustices. A well-known history, the period of the Umayyads, the period of the ʿAbbasids and all the following periods, a history filled with injustices, filled with tragedies and a condition of deception (taḍlīl) and distortion of Islamic and religious concepts. . . . Today in our situation, we see in our dear Yemeni, Muslim people that what the American-Saudi aggression did to our country is modelled after this tyranny which is always similar.38

Or, as it is put in a book on Imam Zayd: What the Saudi regime does in various regions of the Islamic world, be it directly or through their intermediaries (ʿabr ʾadawātihi), is nothing but a continuation . . . of the hypocritical movement we see in every age of Islam, in all of the history of the Islamic umma. Yet today, its possibilities are greater

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on account of its greater power and larger fortune. Today it possesses satellite channels and modern weaponry. . . . The actions of the Saudi regime are truly hypocritical in every sense of the word.39

In order to fight and change this miserable situation, the umma should heed the example of another imam, of Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, who actually built an Islamic state in Yemen: “What distinguishes Imam al-Hadi Yayha b. Husayn from the two great imams al-Husayn b. Ali and his grandson Zayd b. Ali—ʿalayhima alsalām—is that Allah paved the way for al-Hadi—ʿalayhi al-salām—and prepared . . . the establishment of a state.”40 His biography, the movement states in a collective volume on al-Hadi, was “far from the racism (ʿUnṣuriyya), doctrinarianism (madhhabiyya) and sectarianism (ṭāʾifiyya) that was nourished in the past by the Wahhabiyya.”41 It was therefore upon the movement to “take him as a good example in our situation as rulers and ruled.”42 In his contribution to the collective volume, Hamud al-Ahnumi, one of the most prolific writers associated with the movement, builds explicitly on the biography of al-ʿAlawī, the main historic source on the life of al-Hadi, and develops the concept of a “social jihad” (al-jihad al-ijtimaʿi) that guided the actions of al-Hadi. This “social jihad” is an “effort to improve society and elevate its condition from a standpoint of society. It is a jihadi project derived from the correct understanding of the Quran and the sunna of the prophet.”43 The “social jihad” is based on a feeling of responsibility that al-Hadi had for Yemen. In this narrative, al-Hadi united the fragmented Yemeni society by settling longstanding feuds between the tribes and laid out the responsibilities of the ruler and the ruled in a “social contract” (al-ʿaqd al-ijtimāʿī). This social contract stated that it was upon the ruler to rule in accordance with Quran and sunna, to give precedence to the ruled when receiving offerings and to be the first to stand against the enemies. The ruled on the other hand had to support the ruler with advice and to follow him as he follows Allah. Clearly, the book states, al-Hadi introduced this contract in order to control himself as well as the people. “[The contract] decreed: ‘I command you and me to command what is right and do it and to forbid evil and leave it.’”44 The book then continues to lay out al-Hadi’s fairness toward women, Christians, and Jews as well as his efforts to form a “resisting economy” (al-iqtiṣṣād almuqāwim) to strengthen society in times of war. This economy mainly relied on the zakat and the imam instructed his governors to collect it and explain its importance. The money should help to support the poorest and the orphans, especially those of the martyrs. According to the author, al-Hadi instructed his governors to lead by example and to abstain from burdening the population unnecessarily. All economic measures should strike a balance between the needs of the state and the preservation of popular support. As long as people understood the need to pay to the state, they would be willing to do so, as was exemplified by the readiness of the people of Sanaa to pay additional taxes in order to compensate for the expenses of defeating the Qarmatians, the book argues.45 Al-Hadi’s life is therefore quite clearly laid out in a way beneficial to the movement’s interests. At a time that the Saudi-led coalition is also employing

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economic means in its war efforts, specific examples from al-Hadi’s life, like the resisting economy, acquire special relevance in order to legitimize concrete political measures. Indeed, the book states in another chapter: It is obligatory for the leaders and politicians to provide alternatives and solutions, even if only partly, to alleviate this crisis and suffering. It is also necessary to explain to every stratum of society with complete understanding and to point the finger on the primarily culprit of this ongoing crisis, and he is the Saudi-American enemy and the fugitive [ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr] Hadi. Everybody has to implement and support the idea of the resisting economy and improve the sources of state income.46

The book, briefly summarized here, is the outcome of a conference held by the Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami in 2016. In 2017, the movement, again through the Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, released a second, more extensive book on the issue. The anniversary of the arrival of Imam al-Hadi is celebrated every year and reported by the main media outlets of the movement, including al-Masira. Similar to Imam Zayd, who was the first imam exclusive to the strand of Shiʿism that carries his name, Imam al-Hadi is arguably also an untouchable point of reference for every Zaydi. It is hard to imagine an adherent of Zaydism denouncing the very persons on which his or her faith is founded. The implementation of concrete actions and concepts based on al-Hadi’s example is therefore hard to oppose for any Zaydi. Imam al-Hadi serves the movement with the perfect historic precedence to draw parallels for its rule over the north of the country. Having now outlined how the Huthi movement tries to accord its ahl al-bayt pedigree with Yemeni nationhood and how the movement uses the examples of early Zaydi imams in order to, on the one hand, disparage their enemies and give a positive counterexample of just and correct leadership on the other, the last subchapter will now address a narrative that in its function is quite similar to the account of Imam Zayd’s revolt against the Umayyads. Unlike in the case of the latter, however, the massacre of Wadi Tanuma does not have to be related to Saudi Arabia by analogy.

The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma In 1923, a caravan of pilgrims from northern Yemen was attacked by Saudi forces in the Valley (wādī) of Tanuma in the ʿAsir region in Saudi territory. The massacre is well attested in British diplomatic cables, the contemporary international media, as well as Saudi and Yemeni historiographic sources alike.47 One of the earliest accounts of the massacre is found in ʿAbd al-Wasiʿi’s Tarikh al-Yaman, which, published in 1928, is among the most important examples of modern Yemeni historiographic writing: In this year, the great misfortune and momentous suffering befell the pilgrims of Yemen on their Hajj. When they came to Tanuma, they were obstructed by

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followers of King Ibn Saʿud. They killed them when they were in a protected state (wa-hum aminun). They did not have weapons and were not prepared to fight. The number of Yemeni pilgrims coming this way—via the land route—was 3,000 men. Their animals and goods were taken. Only five people survived. They were at the end of the caravan and saved themselves fleeing.48

While most sources agree on this core narrative, with regard to certain controversial aspects, however, the different narratives betray the different interests of the involved actors. In general, the Saudi side tries to blame the killing on a mistake on the side of its forces, mistaking the pilgrims for soldiers, while the Yemeni accounts mainly lay the blame on the Saudi side. These two narratives of the incident crystallized immediately after the event itself and can be observed in Yemeni and Saudi historiographic writing until this day; accusations of Saudi guilt, however, became far more vitriolic after the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention.49 Around two months after the start of the intervention, former president and then-Huthi ally Ali ʿAbd Allah Ṣāliḥ stated in an interview that the rift between Yemen and Saudi Arabia was old, going back to the massacre at Wadi Tanuma. In 2016 he repeated that idea, stating that “[t]his unjust war that started on March 26, 2015 is not the first, but was preceded by earlier wars from the side of the Saudi regime. They started with the killing and robbing of the pilgrims at Tanuma.”50 The same year, the Huthi movement started an extensive campaign, in the course of which practically every major media outlet affiliated with the movement reported on the incident. Interestingly, also the Lebanese Hizb Allah’s al-Manar51 and Iran’s al-Alam52 news networks ran basically the same report about the massacre on September 15, 2016. After attention decreased significantly after 2018, the campaign was stepped up again in 2020 in order to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the incident according to the Islamic calendar.53 Following the aforementioned general tendency of Yemeni sources of the event, the Huthis accuse the Saudi state and its leader Ibn Saʿud of intentionally causing the massacre, thus laying the groundwork for a century of enmity. As an article of the homepage ansarollah.com puts it: The massacre of Wadi Tanuma is a historic product of the criminal SaudiZionist-American aggression against Yemen and the ideas of the Wahhabiyya and of DAʿISH are the reason behind it. The same ideas are present today, they are responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Yemenis in cold blood.54

While the framing of the massacre in terms of religion is already evident in earlier accounts, with the Huthis that tendency strongly increased. Connecting the massacre not only to the Saudi state but to its religious, Wahhabi-Salafi underpinning goes beyond merely giving an example of Saudi anti-Yemeni activity unrelated to the movement, but puts forth a deeper lying explanation for the enmity of the Saudi state toward Yemen.55 To further underline the point that the massacre was only one example for a wider tendency of the Saudi state to split, weaken, and ultimately destroy the

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umma, the movement explicitly relates the massacre to the Hadith of the Horn of Satan (Qarn al-Shayṭān). According to the hadith by al-Bukhari, Muhammad said in a sermon: “O Allah bestow your blessings on our Sham. O Allah bestow your blessings on our Yemen.” The people said, “O Messenger of Allah, and our Najd.” The Prophet—ṣalla Allahu ʿalayhi wa-sallam—said, “There will occur earthquakes, trials and tribulations, and from there arises the Horn of Satan (Qarn alShaytan).”56

The propagandistic use of this hadith in order to set Yemen apart for the north of the peninsula goes back at least to the thirteenth century CE.57 By now regularly referring to Saudi Arabia as the “Mamlakat Qarn al-Shaytan” (Kingdom of the Horn of Satan), the Huthis tie the massacre of Wadi Tanuma and the current war in Yemen to far older narratives of an essential struggle between the forces of “good and evil,” on which the whole future of the umma, and by extension the whole world, rests. Just as in the case of the other narratives surrounding the ahl al-bayt’s genealogical heritage and the early Zaydi imams, the massacre of Wadi Tanuma becomes complementary to the movement’s wider ideological claims, thereby helping the movement to gain legitimacy through recourse to Yemen’s rich historic heritage.

Conclusion This chapter examined the Huthi movement’s use of historical narratives as a weapon against what it calls the “soft war.” From its inception, but perhaps even more so after taking power in 2015, the movement perceives itself as engaged in a war of ideas with its enemies, struggling for the hearts and minds of the population. The Huthis understand that coercion does not suffice to secure the regime it installed. In the long term, the movement has to legitimize and then normalize its rule in the eyes of the population. One of the strategies employed by the movement in this struggle for hegemony in a Gramscian sense is its frequent recourse to history. While only three examples have been analyzed here in more detail, hardly any major historic epoch or event is not related to the current war in the country. One major exception is Yemen’s pre-Islamic history. The Huthi family, as ahl al-bayt, do not share the same lineage as the Yemeni tribes. As descendants of Muhammad, they only arrived from the end of the ninth century CE onward. As Yemeni national identity after the fall of the imamate in 1962 became increasingly defined in terms of South Arabian tribal lineage and an assumed national continuity from the days of the old South Arabian kingdoms to the present day, the ahl al-bayt became, conceptually speaking, outsiders. By trying to establish a genealogical as well as emotional connection between the family of Muhammad and Yemen’s Qahtani lineage that goes back to the mythical time of Ibrahim, the movement not only makes itself part of Yemen’s pre-Islamic history, but at the same time tries to

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establish a deep rooted, almost primordial Yemeni affinity toward Shiʿism, which according to the movement, does not only manifest itself in affection for the ahl al-bayt but also in a defiant spirit inculcated in the Yemeni nation through their relationship with the ahl al-bayt. By defining Shiʿism as well as defiance as integral part of “Yemeniness,” the foundational figures of the Shiʿism, and more specifically in the case of Yemen, Zaydism, can be credibly portrayed as authoritative points of reference. This is exemplified in the second set of historical narratives analyzed here. The Huthi movement uses the struggles of the early imams of Zaydism to draw historical analogies to today’s situation in Yemen. Imam Zayd b. Ali’s defeat in Kufa in 740 is depicted as the event ultimately drawing the umma away from the leadership of the ahl al-bayt, leading it into tyranny. Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen and the wider Islamic world thus become an extension of the despotism of the Umayyads. Only in the geographic periphery of the Islamic world, like in Yemen, did people not stray and stand with the ahl al-bayt, as the narrative around Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq wants to have Yemenis believe. Imam al-Hadi was invited to Yemen, united it, and established a just state, which, according to the movement, should serve as a model for contemporary Yemen. Due to the pivotal importance of both Imam Zayd and Imam al-Hadi for Zaydism, as well as the reliance—however selective—on respected historical sources, these narratives give the movement’s claims credibility, which would be hard to achieve without this recourse to history. The potency of these historical narratives perhaps becomes most palpable with regard to the massacre of Wadi Tanuma. The incidence is not merely presented as a historical example of Saudi transgressions against Yemen that pre-date the appearance of the Huthi movement but as part of a wider dualistic struggle between the forces of “evil,” manifested in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and the partisans of Allah, with whom the movement identifies itself as well as the Yemeni population in general. These three different narratives serve the same purpose: to normalize Huthi rule. In making Zaydism and the ahl al-bayt integral parts of Yemeni nationhood, drawing on analogies between today’s war and the struggles of earlier imams, and, finally, by pointing to atrocities Saudi Arabia committed before the appearance of the movement as part of its fight against Yemen, the umma, and the forces of “good” in general, the Huthis use well-established historic events and developments and connect them to their own interests. The movement thus portrays itself not only as an indigenous as well as legitimate religious and political actor but in the last consequence as the inevitable and indisputable manifestation of the nation’s resolution in its fight against tyranny, which is dictated not by the movement per se but instead from a sense of national and religious belonging as well as a revolutionary spirit, which the movement claims is residing in all “true” Yemenis. While the recourse to historical narratives is only one of several strategies the Huthis use to counter their enemies’ “soft war,” it is clearly one to which they pay a lot of attention and which, as a method of political argumentation, finds ample precedence in Yemeni historiographic writing.

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Notes 1 Fred Halliday, “Foreword,” in Islam, Memory, and Morality: Ruling Families in Transition, ed. Gabriele vom Bruck (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xv. 2 Daniel Mahoney, “Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics in Early Medieval South Arabia,” in Southwest Arabia across History: Essays to the Memory of Walter Dostal, ed. Andre Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014), 67–78. 3 Johann Heiss and Eirik Hovden, “Zaydī Theology Popularised: A Hailstorm Hitting the Heterodox,” in Cultures of Eschatology Volume 1: Empires and Scriptural Authorities in Medieval Christian, Islamic and Buddhist Communities, ed. Veronika Wieser, Vincent Eltschinger, and Johann Heiss (Oldenburg: De Gruyter, 2020), 418–19. 4 Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 123–31. 5 For this, see Alexander Weissenburger, “The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma and the Politics of its Remembrance,” currently in peer review with ARABICA. 6 “Al-Harb al-Nāʿma . . . al-maʿraka al-ʾashad khuṭūra,” Ansarollah, September 1, 2019, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/144879 (accessed March 27, 2021). 7 Loc cit. 8 ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi, “Naṣ ḥiwār al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī maʿa Qanāt al-Masīra”, Ansarollah, April 23, 2019, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/244815 (accessed March 27, 2021). 9 ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi, ʿNaṣ + Vīdyū: Kalimat al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī fī Dhikr Murūr ʿĀmayn min al-ʿUdwān ʿAlā al-Yaman’, Saadah News, n.d., http://www. saadahnews.com/?p=38235 (accessed March 27, 2021). 10 Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 358. 11 For this, see John Schwarzmantel, The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (London: Routledge, 2015), 199–204. 12 Hamud al-Ahnumi, “al-Tārīkh Yaṣnaʿu Waʿyanā,” Althawrah, June 20, 2018, http:// althawrah.ye/archives/528471 (accessed March 27, 2021). 13 Al-Ruʾya al-Waṭaniyya: li-Bināʾ al-Dawla al-Yamaniyya al-ḥadītha (Majlis al-Siyāsī al-ʾAʿlā, 2019), 15. 14 Hamud al-Ahnumi, Tilka hiyya Fāṭimah al-Zahrāʾ—ʿalayhā al-salām (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydī al-ʾIslāmī, 2017). 15 “al-Wahhābīyūn . . . khawārij al-ʿasr,” al-Shahra 7 (2016): 12–14. 16 For a more intricate account of some of the arguments made in this subchapter as well as the general implications of the ahl al-bayt’s rule in a tribal society, see Alexander Weissenburger, “al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah? The Ḥūthī Movement and the Idea of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society,” in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2021). 17 Johann Heiss and Eirik Hovden, “Competing Visions of Community in Medieval Zaydī Yemen,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 59 (2016): 375n26. 18 On the ʿAdnani-Qahtani split, see Eva Orthmann, Stamm und Macht: Die Arabischen Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hijra (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2002), 210–11. On Yemen’s tribal society, see Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

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19 See Dresch, Tribes, Government, 140–5, 160–1. On the imamate, see also Rudolf Strothmann, Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner, 1912). 20 Daniel Varisco, “Yemen’s Tribal Idiom: An Ethno-Historical Survey of Genealogical Models,” Journal of Semitic Studies 62, no. 1 (2017): 241; Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 24. 21 On Zaydi revivalism, see Gabriele vom Bruck, “Regimes of Piety Revisited: Zaydī Political Moralities in Republican Yemen,” Die Welt des Islams 50, no. 2 (2010): 185– 223 and James R. King, “Zaydī Revival in a Hostile Republic: Competing Identities, Loyalties and Visions of State in Republican Yemen.” Arabica 59, no. 3 (2012): 404–45. On the emergence of the Huthi movement, see François Burgat, “The Ṣa‘da War in Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism,” The Muslim World 101, no. 2 (2011): 182–201. 22 Husayn al-Huthi, Masʾuliyyat Ahl al-Bayt, 2002. 23 The term denotes the claim to the supremacy of the ahl al-bayt. At least since the 1950s, the term is used in a derogatory manner. For an example, see Muhammad al-Zubayri, Al-ʾImāma wa-khuṭūratuhā ʿalā wiḥdat al-Yaman (Sanaa: Wizārat alThaqāfa w-Assiyāḥa), 26–8. 24 For a list of alleged Huthi affiliates in the health sector, see “Bil-ʾAsmāʾ: Sayṭara Ḥūthiyya Shāmila ʿAlā Jamīʿ manāṣib wa-Waẓaʾif Wizārat al-Ṣiḥḥa,” Bawabatii, March 6, 2019, https://bawabatii.net/news237900.html (accessed March 27, 2021). 25 See, for example, Ahmad b. Daghr, al-Yaman Taḥt Ḥukm al-ʾImām ʾAḥmad: 1948– 1962 (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 2004). 26 Sam al-Ghubari, al-Qabīla al-Hāshimiyya: ʾAlf ʿĀm min al-Dam (Cairo: Markaz Rawiyya li-l-Dirasāt, 2019). “Hashimiyya” is a term often used interchangeably with ahl al-bayt. Specifically, however, a Hashimi is a descendant of Muhammad’s great-grand father. The term “ahl al-bayt” is therefore significantly narrower than Hashemite, and whereas every member of the ahl al-bayt is a Hashemite, the opposite is not true. 27 Ali al-Sharafi, “Wāqiʿ al-Yaman Qabla Qudūm al-ʾImām al-Hādī’,” in al-Imam al-Hadi (ʿalayhi al-salām): ʾAnmūdhaj al-dawla al-ʿĀdila: Majmūʿa min al-Kitābāt al-mukhtāra, ed. Rābiṭat ʿUlamāʾ al-Yaman (n.p.: Rabita ʿulmāʾ al-Yaman, 2019), 14–15. 28 Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Isḥāq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, trans. Alfred Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 45–6. 29 Hamud al-Ahnumi, al-Yaman wa-ahl al-bayt fī ṣadr al-ʾIslām (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2018), 10. 30 Ibid., 11–12. 31 Ibid., 20–1. 32 Ibid., 28. 33 The movie was presented with a large conference at Iqraʾ University in Sanaa: “Faʿāliyya thaqāfiyya li-l-Majlis al-Zaydī bi-Ṣanʿaʾ bi-Munāsabat al-Intihāʾ min .... al-Fīlm al-Mawwadda al-Khālida’,” al-Masirah, April 05, 2018, https://www. almasirah.net/post/21873/%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8 %A9-%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9 %84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7% D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8 %A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D

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8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%85-%26quot%3B%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 %85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D 8%AF%D8%A9%26quot%3B (accessed March 27, 2021). 34 See, for example, Yaḥyā ʾAbū, ʿAwwada. Thawrat al-ʾImām al-Shahīd Zayd bin ʿAly (Dārʾira al-Thaqafa al-Qurʾaniyya, 2017). 35 See, for example, ʿAbd al-Rahman Hamid al-Din, “Al-Imam Zayd b. Ali . . . qudwat al-thāʾrīn,” al-Masirah, September 29, 2019, http://www.almasirahnews.com/45776/ (accessed March 27, 2021). 36 ʿAbd al-Malik Al-Huthi, “Nass Khitab al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi fi Dhikra Istishhad al-Imam Zayd b. ʿAli ʿalayhi al-salām 1438 AH,” Ansarollah, October 15, 2017, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/116616 (accessed March 27, 2021). 37 Ibid. 38 Loc. cit. 39 Abu ʿAwwada, Thawrat al-Imam al-Shahid, 76. 40 Khalid al-Qaruty, Malāmiḥ al-Dawla al-ʿĀdila: Dawlat al-ʾImām al-Hādī Namūdhajan (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2018), 22–3. 41 Muqqadima in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād al-fāʿila wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed, Majlis al-Zaydī al-ʾIslāmī (Sanaa: Majlis alZaydi al-Islami, 2017), 5. 42 Loc. cit. 43 Hamud al-Ahnumi, “Thāniyan: al-Jihād al-ijtimāʿī fī ḥarakat al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā alḤaq,” in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād al-fāʿila wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi Al-islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 19. 44 Ibid., 29. 45 Ibid., 35–52. 46 Ali Muhammad al-Sharafi, “Thālithan: ʿAhd al-ʾImām al-Hādī li-wilāyatihi..naẓra wa-taḥlīl,” in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād al-fāʿila wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi Al-islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 54–5. 47 Weissenburger, “The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma”. 48 ʿAbd al-Wasiʿ al-Wasiʿi, Tārīkh al-Yaman: al-Musamma Furjat al-hummūm wa-lḥazan fī ḥawādith wa-tārīkh al-Yaman (Cairo: al-Matbaʿat al-Salafiyya, 1928), 264. 49 For a comprehensive account of the different narratives, see Weissenburger, “The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma”. 50 Ali ʿAbd Allah Salih, “Fī khiṭāb tārīkhī..al-zaʿīm Ṣāliḥ sanuqāḍī Ḥukkām ʾĀl Saʿūd ʾammāma al-maḥākim al-duwaliyya wa-yudhakkiru bi-majzarat Tanūma,” Lahj News, September 25, 2016, http://www.lahjnews.net/ar/news-34932.htm (accessed March 27, 2021). 51 ‘Dhikrā Majzarat Tanūma al-murawiʿa al-latī irtakabahā jaysh ʾAl-Saʿūd bi-ḥaqq al-ḥajīj al-Yamaniyyīn, al-Manar, September 15, 2016, https://almanar.com.lb/704482 (accessed March 28, 2021). 52 ‘Dhikra Majzarat “Tanuma” al-maruʿa allati irtakabaha jaysh Al Saʿud bi-Haqq al-hujaj al-Yaman’, al-Alam, September 15, 2016, https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1862006/%D 8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B 1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8

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54 55 56 57

71

%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D8%A2%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D 9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86 (accessed March 27, 2021). See, for example, “Rābiṭat ʿUlamāʾ al-Yaman: Maʿa murūr 100 ʿām ʿalā majzarat Tanūma al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī lā yazāl yaṣṣubu ghaḍabahu wa-ḥiqdahu ʿalā al-shaʿb al-Yamanī ʾilā al-yawm,” al-Masira, July 8, 2020, https://www.almasirah.net/post/161700/%D8%B1% D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9% 85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-100-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8% B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA% D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8% A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8% B5%D8%A8 (accessed March 27, 2021). “Majzarat Tanūma: Imtidād tārīkhī li-l-ʿudwān al-ʾijrāmī ʿalā al-Yaman,” Ansarollah, July 08, 2020, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/354800 (accessed March 27, 2021). “Tanuma: Dimāʾ mansiyya...fīlm wathāʾiqī ʿan majzarat Tanūma 1923,” Majlis alZaydi al-Islami, n.d., http://www.zaidiah.com/video/6392 (accessed March 27, 2021). Zitiert in Hamud al-Ahnumi, Majzarat al-ḥujāj al-kubrā: Madhbaḥat ḥujāj al-Yaman fī Tanūma wa-Sadwān ʿalā yad ʿiṣābat Ibn Saʿūd ʿām 1923AD, 51–2. Ettore Rossi, “Il Diritto Consuetudinario delle Tribù Arabe del Yemen,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali 23 (1948): 11.

Bibliography Abu ʿAwwada, Yahya. Thawrat al-ʾImām al-Shahīd Zayd bin ʿAly (Dārʾira al-Thaqafa alQurʾaniyya, 2017). al-Ahnumi, Hamud. Majzara al-hujaj al-kubra: Madhbaha hujaj al-Yaman fi Tanuma waSadwan ʿala yad ʿisabat Ibn Saʿud ʿam 1923 AD (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017). al-Ahnumi, Hamud. “Thaniyan: al-Jihad al-ijtimaʿi fi harakat al-Imam al-Hadi ila alHaqq.” In al-Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn: Qiyadat al-Jihad al-Faʿila wa-Riyadat al-Dawla al-ʿAdila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 19–41. al-Ahnumi, Hamud. Tilka hiyya Fāṭimah al-Zahrāʾ—ʿalayha al-salām (Sanaa: Majlis alZaydi al-Islami, 2017). al-Ahnumi, Hamud. “Al-Tārīkh Yaṣnaʿu Waʿyanā.” Althawrah, June 20, 2018. http:// althawrah.ye/archives/528471 (accessed March 27, 2021). al-Ahnumi, Hamud. Al-Yaman wa-ahl al-bayt fi sadr al-Islam (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi alIslami, 2018). al-Ghubari, Sam. Al-Qabila al-Hashimiyya: Alf ʿam min al-dam (Cairo: Markaz Rawiyya li-l-Dirasat, 2019). “Bi-Asmaʾ: Saytara Huthiyya shamila ʿala jamiʿ manasib wa-wataʾif Wizarat al-Sihha.” Bawabatii, March 6, 2019. https://bawabatii.net/news237900.html (accessed March 27, 2021). Brandt, Marieke. “Inhabiting Tribal Structures: Leadership Hierarchies in Tribal Upper Yemen (Hamdān & Khawlān b. ʿĀmir).” In South Arabia across History: Essays in

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Memory of Walter Dostal, ed. Andre Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), 91–116. vom Bruck, Gabriele. “Regimes of Piety Revisited: Zaydī Political Moralities in Republican Yemen.” Die Welt des Islams 50, no. 2 (2010): 185–223. Burgat, François. “The Ṣa‘da War in Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism.” The Muslim World 101, no. 2 (2011): 182–201. “Dhikra Majzara ‘Tanuma’ al-maruʿa allati irtakabaha jaysh Al Saʿud bi-Haqq al-Ḥujjāj al-Yaman.” al-Alam, September 15, 2016. https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1862006/% D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B 1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8 %B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D8%A2%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AD %D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9 %85%D9%86 (accessed March 27, 2021). “Dhikra Majzara ‘Tanuma’ al-maruʿa allati irtakabaha jaysh Al Saʿud bi-haqq al-hajij alYamaniyyin.” al-Manar, September 15, 2016. https://almanar.com.lb/704482 (accessed March 28, 2021). Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). “Fiʿaliyya thaqafiyya li-l-Majlis al-Zaydi bi-Sanaa bi-munasaba al-intihaʾ min aʿmaʾ [sic] al-film ‘al-Mawadda al-Khalida’.” al-Masirah, April 05, 2018. https://www. almasirah.net/post/21873/%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8 %A9-%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9 %84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7% D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8 %A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D 8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%85-%26quot%3B%D8%A7%D9%84%D9% 85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 %AF%D8%A9%26quot%3B (accessed March 27, 2021). Gramsci, Antonio. Selection from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). “al-Harb al-Naʿima . . . al-marʿrika al-ashidda khatura.” Ansarollah, September 1, 2019. https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/144879 (accessed March 27, 2021). Halliday, Fred. “Foreword,” in Islam, Memory, and Morality: Ruling Families in Transition, ed. Gabriele vom Bruck (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2005), xv–xix. Heiss, Johann and Eirik Hovden. “Competing Visions of Community in Medieval Zaydī Yemen.” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 59 (2016): 366–407. Ḥamīd al-Dīn, ʿAbd Arraḥmān. “Al-Imam Zayd b. Ali . . . qudwat al-thaʾirin.” al-Masirah, September 29, 2019. http://www.almasirahnews.com/45776/ (accessed March 27, 2021). al-Huthi, ʿAbd al-Malik. “Nass khitab al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi fi dhikra istishhad al-Imam Zayd b. Ali ʿalayhi al-salām 1438 AH.” Ansarollah, October 15, 2017. https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/116616 (accessed March 27, 2021). al-Huthi, ʿAbd al-Malik. “Nass hiwar al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi maʿa qanah al-Masira.” Ansarollah, April 23, 2019. https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/244815 (accessed March 27, 2021).

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al-Huthi, ʿAbd al-Malik. “Nass + fidiyu: Kalima al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi fi dhikr murur ʿamayn min al-ʿadwan ʿala al-Yaman.” Saadah News, n.d. http://www. saadahnews.com/?p=38235 (accessed March 27, 2021). al-Huthi, Husayn. Masʾuliyyat Ahl al-Bayt (2002). Ibn Daghr, Ahmad. Al-Yaman taht al-hubkm al-Imam Ahmad: 1948–1962 (Cairo: Maktaba Madbuli, 2004). Ibn Ishaq. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Isḥāq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, trans. Alfred Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967). King, James R. “Zaydī Revival in a Hostile Republic: Competing Identities, Loyalties and Visions of State in Republican Yemen.” Arabica 59, no. 3 (2012): 404–45. Mahoney, Daniel. “Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics in Early Medieval South Arabia.” In Southwest Arabia across History: Essays to the Memory of Walter Dostal, ed. Andre Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014), 67–78. “Majzarat Tanūma: ʾImtidād tārīkhī li-l-ʿudwān ʿalā al-Yaman.” Ansarollah, July 08, 2020. https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/354800 (accessed March 27, 2021). Messick, Brinkley. The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). “Muqqadima.” al-Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn: Qaḍiyyat al-jihād al-fāʿla wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi alIslami, 2017), 5–8. ­Orthmann, Eva. Stamm und Macht: Die Arabischen Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hijra (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2002). al-Qaruty, Khalid. Malamih al-dawla al-ʿadila: Dawla al-Imam al-Hadi “ʿ” namudhijan (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2018). “Rabita ʿUlamaʾ al-Yaman: Maʿa murur 100 ʿam ʿala majzara Tanuma al-nizam alSaʿudi la yazala yasubb ghadabahu wa-huqdahu ʿala al-shaʿb al-Yamani ila al-Yawm.” al-Masira, July 8, 2020. https://www.almasirah.net/post/161700/%D8%B1%D8% A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-100-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8% B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86 %D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88% D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%A8 (accessed March 27, 2021). Rossi, Ettore. “Il Diritto Consuetudinario delle Tribù Arabe del Yemen.” Rivista degli Studi Orientali 23 (1948): 1–36. al-Ruʾiya al-Wataniyya: li-binaʾ al-dawla al-Yamaniyya al-haditha (Majlis al-Siyasi alʿAla, 2019). Salih, Ali ʿAbd Allah. “Fi khitab tarikhi . . . al-zaʿim Salih sanuqadi hukam Al Saʿud amama al-mahakim al-duwaliyya wa-yadhkuru bi-majzara Tanuma.” Lahj News, September 25, 2016. http://www.lahjnews.net/ar/news-34932.htm (accessed March 27, 2021). Schwarzmantel, John. The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (London: Routledge, 2015). al-Sharafi, Ali. “Thalithan: ʿAhd al-Imam al-Hadi li-wulatihi . . . nahtra wa-tahlil.” In alImam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn: Qiyadat al-jihad al-faʿila wa-riyadat al-dawla al-ʿadila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 42–55.

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al-Sharafi, Ali. “Waqiʿ al-Yaman qabla qudum al-Imam al-Hadi ‘ʿ’.” In al-Imam al-Hadi (ʿalayhi al-salam): Anmudhij al-dawla al-ʿadila: Magmuʿa min al-kitabat al-mukhtara, ed. Rabita ʿUlamaʾ al-Yaman (n.p. Rabita ʿulmāʾ al-Yaman, 2019), 7–21. Stookey, Robert W. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978). Strothmann, Rudolf. Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner, 1912). “Tanuma: Dimaʾ mansiya . . . film wathaʾiqi ʿan majzara Tanuma 1923.” Majlis al-Zaydi alIslami, n.d. http://www.zaidiah.com/video/6392 (accessed March 27, 2021). Varisco, Daniel. “Yemen’s Tribal Idiom: An Ethno-Historical Survey of Genealogical Models.” Journal of Semitic Studies 62, no. 1 (2017): 217–41. “al-Wahhabiyun . . . Khawarij al-ʿasr.” al-Shahra 7 (2016): 12–14. al-Wasiʿi, ʿAbd al-Wasiʿ. Tarikh al-Yaman: al-Musamma al-furja al-humum wa-l-hazn fi hawadith wa-tarikh al-Yaman (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya, 1928). Weissenburger, Alexander. “al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah? The Ḥūthī Movement and the Idea of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society.” In Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2021), 121–36. ­Weissenburger, Alexander. “The Massacer of Wadi Tanuma and the Politics of Its Remembrance.” Currently in peer-review with Arabica. al-Zubayri, Muhammad. Al-Imama wa-khataruha ʿala wahdat al-Yaman (Sanaa: Wuzara al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha).

­Section II RECONFIGURING YEMEN’S SOCIETY

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­4 T R I B E S A N D RU L E R S , 3 . 0 — D OM I NA N C E A N D T H E “SU BA LT E R N ” I N H U T H I Y E M E N Marieke Brandt

This chapter examines changes in the relationship between tribes and rulers in northern highland Yemen through three case studies: the imamate, the republic, and the Huthi state. Throughout history, in one way or another, the tribes of northern highland Yemen formed the power base of any government based in their realm. For this reason, rulers strove to exert and maintain their influence among the tribes, to gain and retain their allegiances, and to mobilize and rally them for their causes. The relation between tribes and rulers was always, and still is, a complex and changeful bargain, in which relatively weak rulers had to “persuade” (in Caton’s phrase) the strong tribes to support them.1 Given the situation that the northern tribes were almost always more numerous and better armed than their respective overlords, power has been exercised much more efficiently through persuasion than through coercion, and over the centuries, rulers of different political systems employed different approaches and arguments in order to persuade the tribes of the need to cooperate with them. With the ascent to power of the Huthis, the war-related tribal mass mobilizations, and the recalibration of power relations in the republican state, the relationship of tribes and rulers again undergoes a process of transformation that in some, but not all, respects shows parallels to imamic times. The issue of rule and dominance can be viewed from different angles, and “persuasion” is just one of many possible aspects. In this chapter, I would like to address a further aspect that is certainly more perceptible and evident for the Yemeni people than for the external observer: the aspect of the “subaltern.” I enclose this term in quotation marks because the debate revolving around the concept of subalternity can only be transferred to the North Yemeni context with due caution. The term “subaltern” was coined in the 1930s by Gramsci, who used it to explain the cultural hegemony of colonial groups that excludes native groups from the socioeconomic institutions of society, in order to deny their agency and voices in colonial contexts. The term was taken up again in the 1980s by the Subaltern Studies Group, a group of South Asian historians who defined subalternity as a social construct, the result of hegemonic discourses brought about by the practice of social exclusion of colonial or native populations from the hierarchy of power.2

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Yemen’s northern highlands have never been colonialized in this sense; yet we encounter a similar relationship between rulers and the subaltern in the relationship of the native Yemeni tribes with the descent group of the ahl albayt or sada (sing. sayyid), whose members constitute a considerable part of the religious, social, and administrative elite in imamic and, again, in Huthi times. It is evidently problematic to describe the group of the sada, which has been based in Yemen for more than 1100 years and forms an important part of the social fabric, as an external hegemonic power. Given the often extreme differences in education, social status, wealth, and authority among the sada, they cannot even be spoken of as a monolithic group. And, not to forget, also the “native” Yemeni tribes are in some cases the result of processes of fusion and fission with immigrant, nonYemeni tribal groups. Yet while immigrant tribal groups have been completely absorbed into the Yemeni context, the sada have been working since their arrival in Yemen a millennium ago to position and maintain themselves as an external descent group and governing elite. Much of the criticism of the tribal (and nontribal non-sayyid) population of Yemen directed at the sada-dominated Huthi leadership therefore revolves around their claim for “sayyid supremacy” (locally called sulaliyya)—a delicate, emotionally charged discussion that inflames the passions of the Yemenis across the nation. This chapter aims to review the main stages of tribe-ruler relationship in Yemen, and to discuss them against the background of the concepts of “persuasion” and the “subaltern.”

Imamic Rule It is almost impossible to provide a brief but comprehensive picture of the relation of tribes and rulers during the more than 1000 years of imamate history in Yemen’s northern highlands. The imamate has neither been a homogeneous nor a monolithic institution, with each imam and each dynasty pursuing more or less distinctive policies with the tribes.3 The first Zaydi imam, Yahya b. al-Husayn (d. 911), came to the northern town of Saada in 897 CE, when the Saada region and large parts of the northern highlands were ravaged by protracted tribal conflict. Since the involved tribes found themselves unable to resolve this conflict, they invited Yahya b. al-Husayn, a descendant of the Prophet and follower of the Zaydi branch of Islam, from Medina to Saada, where he managed to solve the conflict through mediation and arbitration according to Islamic law.4 After this, Yahya b. al-Husayn remained in Saada, where he worked toward the foundation of a kind of Zaydi state—a political entity that in the centuries to come turned out to be of wildly varying influence and often intermittent authority and that existed until the September Revolution of 1962, when the last imam was ousted and the Zaydi imamate replaced by the republic. The legal teachings and judgments of Yahya b. al-Husayn are the basis for the socalled Zaydi Hadawi school of law. One main emphasis of Zaydi Hadawi teaching is its insistence on righteous rule through a member of the ahl al-bayt, in Yemen called sada (“lords”): the descendants of Ali b. Abi Talib through the line of either

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al-Hasan or al-Husayn. According to Zaydi Hadawi doctrine, the imamate has to continue in the Prophet’s lineage, and being a sayyid is one of several conditions for leadership.5 Sada henceforth occupied the position of the imam (the leader of the Zaydi community) as well as—together with members of the quḍāt6 estate— leading positions in government administration and the military apparatus. In effect, these leaders from the ranks of the sada were mostly the scions of a few great families; many other sada, if not to say their larger part, lived a rather unprivileged life.7 However, due to the sada’s “foreign” origin, the Yemeni tribes still consider them as an immigrant community of putative ʿAdnani (northern Arab) descent living among the tribal communities of putative Qahtani (southern Arab) descent, and the sada’s restrictive marriage policy proved an appropriate strategy to survive as a coherent group clearly distinguished from the other strata of Yemeni society.8 Over the centuries, the imams encountered support, but also hostility and opposition among the tribes. Their reign often resembled one of constant warfare to restore discipline over rebellious tribes, to halt intertribal conflicts, and to extend Zaydi influence. Imamic rule over the tribes has been based on three main pillars. First, the imams framed their calls on the tribes to support them in religious terms, and those tribes that opposed their calls were depicted as jāhil (pagan) and enemies of Islam.9 Also, faith was one of the principal motivations in fighting foreign aggressors: during the first (1538–1636) and second (1849–1918) Ottoman occupation, the imamic struggle against the foreign occupiers was framed in religious terms, and the imamate served as the religio-political institution to unite and mobilize the Zaydi highland tribes against the common enemy, who was seen as un-Islamic and corrupt.10 Likewise, also the mobilizations of the 1960s civil war bore an element of faith. In his memoirs, Shaykh ʿAbdallah al-ʾAḥmar (who was leading the republican tribes) described the openly denominational nature of the civil war, saying that It was a fight about faith, belief and conviction, and the princes of the House of Hamid al-Din [the royal family] sent us letters which intimidated us and discouraged us from supporting the “pharaonic colonists and their slaves”, as they said, and which pointed out the royalist role in the resistance against the infidels, and called us to support them and to fight for the sake of Allah.11

A further pillar of imamic rule was the taking of hostages from shaykhly families in order to keep the tribes, who were its ultimate mainstay, under control. In the hostage system, the conduct of the shaykhs and their tribes determined if the hostage lived in comfort and received an education or if he was thrown in a dungeon or even executed. The hostage system met its heyday in the first half of the twentieth century, when the Hamid al-Din imams, inspired by Ottoman practice, began to take tribal hostages in great numbers.12 Trustworthy shaykhs, however, were rewarded; one of the principal ways the imams also managed and co-opted the tribes was by giving the shaykhs from the northern highlands fiefs or landed estates in Lower Yemen. The agricultural surplus of Lower Yemen meant that tribal shaykhly families from the north could extract revenues from

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the south. There was a constant circulation of northern tribal families into the southern lands: those areas south of Yarim and down to Hujariyya—regions that are considered Sunni-Shafiʿi and in which the tribes were relatively less powerful and not organized as martial forces. In other words, this aspect of imamic rule was not merely denominational or coercive but rather resembled a political economy.13 A further pillar of imamic rule was a relatively bold approach toward the tribes; albeit most imams were so prudent to reward (and remunerate) their allies and faithful followers (and some shaykhly families of the Zaydi highlands would, as champions of the Zaydi cause, literally write the word “fidelity” on their banners), they did not shy away from direct interference in the affairs of disobedient tribes, by way of punitive campaigns, as well as attempts at the steering of shaykhly succession and the replacement of shaykhly lineages.14 In case of success, this approach gave the imams immense influence and power, as they were able to divest authority from shaykhs who were less loyal and to appoint “trustworthy” tribal leaders instead. The tribes were violently opposed to this policy of interference that also met its heyday in the first decades of the twentieth century during the reign of Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din and his successor, Imam Ahmad. Their policy of interference and (at times treacherous) coercion, which was regarded as a blunder by many tribes, became one of the principal reasons for the protracted tribal insurrections that in the 1950s fused with the nationalist Free Yemeni Movement, and eventually ushered in the September Revolution and overthrow of the imamate in 1962.

Republican Rule The revolution of 1962 led to a fundamental change in the relationship between tribes and rulers. We recall that before 1962 political power and leadership were mainly ascribed to the social stratum of the sada (even if by far not all of them were effectively leaders) and the support of the tribes for the imams was framed in religious terms. The September Revolution led to the overthrow of the imamate and pledged to the Yemeni people the abolition of social inequality and birthright privilege, and a more equitable distribution of political participation, economic resources, and development. Sayyid authority was downgraded to that of local religious leaders, in contrast to the elevated positions as the religious, political, and administrative leaders many sada had occupied during the imamate. Republican discourse identified the sada with reactionary backwardness and oppression, sometimes despised in a fashion somewhat akin to the French Republican aversion for aristocracy and royalty.15 The newly established Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) worked toward creating a new national identity based on non-sectarian state Islam and historic and tribal heritage. It delegitimized the sada’s claim to leadership not only for political and religious but also for genealogical considerations.16 Combining the belief that Yemenis are the “original Arabs” (al-ʿarab al-ʿāriba) with the genealogical construct that “true Yemenis” were descendants of Qahtan, the eponym and symbol of unity

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of the South Arabian tribes, in republican Yemen “the tribe” and Qahtanism became invoked as the basis of North Yemeni society. Public representations of the sada as an “immigrant” community and “strangers in the house,” as well as the refusal to recognize them as ʾawlād al-balad (“genuine Yemenis”), were based on their putative foreign, ʿAdnani origin.17 At the same time, the tribes, which claim descent from Qahtan, were depicted as rooted in remotest antiquity and being the indigenous inhabitants of Yemen. This was a very old line of reasoning against the sada, which is already evident in the historical writings of al-Hasan al-Hamdani (tenth century CE) and Nashwan al-Himyari (twelfth century CE).18 Since the 1962 revolution and the abolition of the imamate, republican ideologues evoked a tradition which was both Qahtani and Islamic as an alternative to the taqlid ahl albayt (the judicial opinions and practices of the scholars who belong to the House of the Prophet) and Zaydi-Hadawi history. It is noteworthy that a community that has lived in Yemen for a millennium and forms a central part of the Yemeni social fabric is still viewed as “immigrant,” but on the other hand the sada themselves have always energetically worked toward maintaining this genealogical distinction between them and the other strata of Yemeni society. With regard to the tribes, republican rule was based on three pillars, (1) the empowerment of (selected) shaykhs; (2) an enormous increase in efforts to purchase tribal (or, better yet, shaykhly) loyalties; and (3) the politics of divide and rule. This system of governance became a hallmark of ex-president Ali ʿAbdullah Salih’s reign, who entered into a political “truce” with the shaykhs after his predecessors (notably ʿAbdul Raḥmān Yaḥā Al-ʾIryānī and Ibrahim al-Hamdi) had pursued a more confrontational course towards the shaykh, but ultimately failed to prevail against their resistance.19 The tribal shaykhs, notably those who had fought on the side of the republic in the 1960s civil war (many of them from the ranks of the Hashid tribal confederation), had never been more powerful than in the republican era. In Yemen’s northern highlands, sayyid hegemony was more or less substituted by a hegemony of the major shaykhs. The shaykhs had shaken off their former sayyid overlords and many of them now became part of the government themselves, highly patronized and paid by the state, and holders of parliamentary seats, which they practically inherited within their families.20 Little did change for the rural tribal masses, either in terms of political participation or in terms of their economic situation and living conditions. The situation of the ordinary tribespeople often remained as dire as it had been during imamic times, and stood now in glaring contrast to that of their own shaykhs. It was precisely this discontent of the tribal masses, together with that of the sada who were generally “othered” and ostracized regardless of their former role, that would later play into the hands of the Huthis and serve them well in recruiting them. Certainly all rulers who sought to superimpose their rule on the template of tribalism have occasionally resorted to the strategy of divide and rule. During the Salih era, in particular, this strategy became the method of choice for keeping the tribes under control. Until 2001, Salih shirked from openly challenging unruly tribes (exceptions exist, such as the suppression of the protracted Bakil riots

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in ʿAmran and Arhab in the 1980s during and after the war against the Adensponsored NDF, and the “Maʾrib Revolution” of 1989).21 By causing rivalries and fomenting discord among dissident tribes, Salih aimed at breaking up larger concentrations of tribal power into pieces and prevent smaller tribes from linking up against him. His “soft approach” was no less harmful than open intervention. Among the tribes of Bakil, in particular, conflict, infighting, and feuding became endemic. Power had passed into local, “indigenous” hands, but inequality and discontent among many tribes remained.

Huthi Rule Huthi rule in Yemen again brought about changes to the relation between tribes and rulers. Before we proceed, however, we should define how the terms “Huthis” and “tribes” relate to one another and what social groups these terms denote. Media reports often suggest a dichotomy between “Huthis” and “tribes,” which actually does not exist because the Huthi group itself is largely composed of tribes. On the other hand, it is possible (mostly, but not always) to draw a distinction between the Huthi supporters—the masses at the grassroots level that also form the Huthi “armed forces”—and the Huthi leadership, since most of the former are Qahtani Arabs, whereas the latter largely (but not exclusively) belong to the social stratum of the sada. When siding with the Huthis, tribes do not cease to be tribes. Moreover, we should not forget that the tribes of Yemen take very different positions toward the Huthi movement; some of them as supporters, others as opponents, and yet others as an indifferent, “neutral” mass that has been drawn into the conflict by chance and often against its will. Many of those fighting along the Huthis do not support their ideology but joined them for tactical and strategic reasons.22 Huthi supporters can mainly be found in Zaydi-majority highland Yemen, while many Sunni tribes in Lower and Eastern Yemen have positioned themselves as a bulwark against Huthi expansionism. And, not to forget, a considerable part of Yemen’s people belongs neither to the social stratum of the sada nor to that of the tribes. After they had successfully navigated the ordeals of the six “Saada wars” (2004–10) and captured the capital in 2014, the Huthis have started to recalibrate power relations according to their vision.23 At the domestic level, three main characteristics of Huthi rule vis-à-vis the tribes have become visible: Huthi rule rests on (1) the re-activation of sayyid leadership, (2) the re-activation of religious rallying calls, and (3) a policy of interference in tribal affairs. The al-Huthi family, which gave the movement its name, is of sayyid origin, and ever since the Huthi movement came into being in the early 2000s, sada have played an important role in its leadership. In the first few years, this claim to leadership was not overtly obvious, but since about 2014, when the Huthis held the reins of power in their hands and gained access to the apparatus of the state, they began openly working toward the institutionalization of a sayyid elite in important state posts, reflecting the key tenet of Hadawi Zaydism that believes in the innate right to rule of descendants of the Prophet. Albeit the presidents of the Supreme

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Political Council24 (Salih al-Samad, succeeded by Mahdi al-Mashat) were/are of non-sayyid origin, the Huthi leaders placed a large number of sada in senior positions—often called “supervisors” (mushrifūn)—in government, military, and administration. The core of them seems directly connected with the al-Huthi family by kinship and marriage relations.25 By installing sada in positions of privilege and political dominance in the Huthi regime, the Huthi leaders are also ensuring that they benefit economically; the new regulations in taxation that impose a khums tax, whose income in this case predominantly seems to be used for the benefit of sada, might also be viewed in this light.26 Weissenburger has observed that, interestingly, Huthi propagandists are working toward highlighting pre-Islamic genealogical connections between the ʿAdnani sada and the Qahtani tribes of Yemen, undoubtedly in order to rectify their stigma as “foreigners” and “strangers in the house.” In order to avoid falling into the trap of the dominance-subaltern dilemma, Huthi propaganda energetically works toward portraying sayyid rule as a form of indigenous rule fit to be emulated in today’s struggle.27 The purchase of tribal loyalties is not confined to republican times but has always been a more or less effective instrument to garner tribal support. The republic, however, and especially ex-president Salih, excelled in “buying” tribal loyalties by financial and political patronage of the major shaykhs. In Huthi Yemen, in contrast, the mobilization of the tribes—and the populace at large—takes place again through religious campaigns and, to a certain degree, rallying calls of an anti-Western, anti-imperialist hue. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi’s public speeches are a combination of religiously enshrined sermons and third-worldist political slogans that remind the audiences first and foremost of their religious duties in the fight against the imperialist and corrupt West and its regional and local allies (i.e., the Coalition partners). Religion (of a pan-Islamic rather than a specifically Zaydi hue) has once again taken the role as a means of motivating and mobilizing the masses against the common enemy, plus a political element that revolves around anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism. A third main pillar of Huthi rule over the tribes is their inclination to interfere directly in tribal affairs. The republic, and especially ex-president Salih, we recall, preferred an indirect style of government that, in addition to the “soft approaches” of co-optation and patronage, also included the politics of divide and rule, with the aim of weakening rebellious tribes in internal conflicts and preventing them from “ganging up” against the government. On the other hand, the Huthi leaders (at this point in time, at least) need and want strong tribes that stand united behind them, serve as a bulwark against foreign military advances, and protect the borders. However, the actual extent of the tribes’ commitment for the Huthi visions seems to vary. It is true that the Huthis pursue a strategy of persecution and brutal repression toward their critics that resembles, if not surpasses, that of the House Hamid al-Din pre-1962. There are disturbing reports of Huthi squadrons intimidating and killing critical shaykhs and forcefully subjugating tribes who refuse to submit to Huthi rule or send their sons to the fronts.28 On the other hand, the sheer military strength and manpower of the Huthi movement is an

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indication that a large portion of the northern highland tribes is cooperating with the Huthis. Those Bakil tribes, in particular, who had felt sidelined ever since Salih came to power (Salih himself being a Hashid tribesman and mainly promoting his Hashid brethren), seem to work more or less smoothly with the Huthi leaders and administer the recruitment of their tribesmen for the Huthi forces in their common war against the Coalition. Their loyalty and fidelity are rewarded accordingly; they receive attention and visits from the Huthi leaders, and the martyrs of their shaykhly families receive huge, televised funerals at which high-ranking representatives of the Huthi leadership show up. In other words, the management of relations between the Huthi leaders and the shaykhs is intimate and personal and needs to be constantly tended to. Particularly important tribal loyalists are elevated in Huthi Yemen; the former governor of al-Maḥwīt (in 2021 he was appointed governor of al-Jawf), for example, is shaykh of a strategically important Bakil tribe from ʿAmran, whose father supported the Hamid al-Din in the 1960s civil war and whose family was in particularly acrimonious conflict with ex-president Salih and Abdullah al-Ahmar. By and large, however, the role of the shaykhs remains limited to the representation of their tribes and mediation in their conflicts (their core tasks according to tribal custom), bereft of grand political ambitions and excessive financial patronage that had become the trademark of the republic. In his evaluation of Huthi speeches and publications, Weissenburger found that after 2014 the Huthis hardly address tribalism as such, but refer to the tribes as mere descent-based entities, avoiding references to tribal law or self-governance. Tribes are portrayed as conceptually equal to other strata within Yemeni society, undercutting notions of a specific tribal quality of Yemeni society.29 This is not surprising, for the Huthis’ aim at gaining the support of an audience that is much broader and also includes the large nontribal parts of the Yemeni populace. Nevertheless, the Huthi leaders know that they need the tribes and that they can only win their cooperation through appreciation. Asked about the role of tribes in an al-Masirah TV interview of 2019, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi replied that “we are proud of the role of the Yemeni tribes in all historical periods. In the past, the tribes have sacrificed. Today and in the present, they are continuing this great and positive role,” referring to the major contributions of the “faithful tribes” in the army and at the front, where they, despite the difficult humanitarian situation, support the Huthis’ war with men, money, weapons, and materiel from their own arsenals.30 Huthi leaders work toward developing personalized relationships with loyal shaykhs (while punishing those whom they deem disloyal). In addition, and along the same lines, the Huthi leaders set out to establish relationships with the tribes and enter into a new social contract with them on the basis of certain grand documents. For this purpose, in late 2018 the Huthi leadership has drawn up a “Tribal Document of Honour” (Wathiqat al-Sharaf al-Qabīliyya), a kind of declaration of commitment by the tribes, and submitted it to the shaykhs for signature.31 The Wathiqat al-Sharaf corresponds to the “National Vision” that serves to legitimate Huthi political dominance.32 Moreover, the Wathiqat

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al-Sharaf is vaguely reminiscent of the National Charter (al-Mīthāq al-Waṭanī) of 1980, which served ex-president Salih to establish patronage relations with shaykhs and other social and political stakeholders after the “War of the Central Areas” with the Aden-sponsored National Democratic Front (NDF); the Mithaq was the first step toward consolidating Salih’s rule and turning old enemies into (dubious) friends.33 Likewise, in the agreement between the Huthi leadership and the shaykhs, the latter undertake to recognize the Huthi leadership’s supremacy over tribal leadership, to act against the poison of sedition, and to close their ranks and unite with their new Huthi suzerains against the “true enemy.” This social contract serves many purposes: it serves to sort the wheat from the chaff, to establish and cement hierarchies, and to mobilize the tribes against the common enemy. The invocation of tribal honor in the title of the contract (which rarely misses its purpose) is interesting, as is the flattering invocation of the merits of the tribes and the “original qualities that characterize the populace (shaʿb) of Yemen since ancient times, such as courage, fraternity, and rejection of oppression and enslavement.”34 The social contract formulated in the Wathiqat al-Sharaf finds its embodiment in the Tribal Cohesion Council (Majlis al-Talāḥum al-Qabīlī) with branches in the governorates that cooperate closely with the Supreme Political Council. The name Majlis al-Talahum borrows from the Talahum initiative of the early 1990s, the tribal grassroots movement after Yemeni unity whose main concern was to pacify and unite the northern tribes and to recalibrate the relation between the tribes and the government of united Yemen.35 The new Majlis al-Talahum has similar high-pitched goals: it serves the “fortification of the tribe,” the “preservation of the social fabric and national constants,” and the “declaration of a general peace by postponing all disputes and conflicts . . . in coordination with official bodies.”36 Yet, in contrast to the original Talahum initiative of the 1990s, the Huthi Majlis al-Talahum is not a broad tribal grassroots initiative working through bottomup approach, but rather steered and controlled from “above,” through the Huthi leaders.

Conclusion This chapter enquired into the specific characteristics of tribe-ruler relation in northern highland Yemen in three epochs: pre-1962 imamate, post-1962 republic, and post-2014 Huthi Yemen. It goes without saying that only with due caution can the complexities of tribe-ruler relation be reduced to a few features, in particular where they concern the 1100 years of the Zaydi imamate, but also the manifold varieties of tribe-ruler relation in republican times. Existing evidence should nevertheless make it possible to deduce the following aspects. Imamic rule over the tribes was largely based on sayyid leadership, religiously framed rallying calls, hostage taking, and a policy of interference in tribal affairs, with the last two features particularly coming to the fore during the Hamid alDin period that preceded the revolution of 1962, and that was characterized by

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stronger state centralization than the previous periods. After 1962 the republic, based on an ideology of Qahtanism, pursued a strategy of empowerment and financial patronage of (selected) shaykhs and a policy of “divide and rule” vis-à-vis the tribes: a two-pronged strategy that aimed at securing the loyalty of influential tribal leaders while simultaneously preventing unity and concentrations of power among the tribes. After 2014, Huthi leaders seem to resort again to religious rallying calls and interference in tribal affairs—approaches that show certain analogies with tribe-ruler relations in pre-1962 Yemen. Another similarity between pre-1962 and Huthi Yemen is the prominent role of the sada, since both the Zaydi imamate and the Huthis believe in the innate right to leadership of descendants of the Prophet, a key tenet of Hadawi Zaydism. Nevertheless, the Huthi leaders do not seem to pursue a re-installation of the imamate. Rather, they superimposed their rule on the template of the republican state, minus the post-1990 democratic element. It is, above all, the concentration of sada in the higher echelons of Huthi power that engenders concern and unrest among the population—not only among many Qahtani Zaydis but also, beyond the northern highlands, in the vast Sunnidominated parts of Yemen. After 1962, republican discourse had identified the sada with reactionary backwardness; the republic pledged to the Yemeni people the abolition of social inequality and birthright privilege, and a more equitable distribution of political participation, economic resources, and development. However imperfect the implementation of this promise had been (for new inequalities soon arose), over the fifty years of republican rule, the ideology of equality and Qahtanism has sunk deep into the minds of the citizens and has shaped the thinking of entire generations. Against the backdrop of this conflict of belief and ideology, it becomes understandable why the putative “indigenous,” Qahtani part of the population sees itself increasingly excluded from the hierarchy of power and being degraded to a “subaltern” social class by the putative “immigrant,” ʿAdnani/sayyid community. This unease prevailing among many people is reinforced by the reign of terror and fear that characterizes Huthi rule in Yemen. The discussion about sulaliyya, that is the question of the pros and cons of the sadas’ claim to leadership, is not just an academic debate but the expression of an epic struggle for the future configuration of Yemeni society at large. The fundamental question is whether the Huthis are willing and able to achieve a balance between the various strata of Yemeni society, or whether (as it seems) they disregard the opinions of the others and cement new inequalities. It is also about the question of whether, after five decades of more or less equal citizenship, the Yemeni populace will be inclined or disinclined to bow again reverently before a new-old “nobility.” In this dispute, both sides feel misunderstood and unjustly treated: while the tribes and other non-sayyid strata of Yemeni society see themselves as having again been degraded and “subaltern-ed,” the sada feel unjustly “other-ed” and excluded from the fabric of Yemeni society of which they, regardless of their origin, indeed form an important part. The continuation or cancellation of Huthi rule through the highland tribes will eventually depend on the outcome of this immensely important dispute. Let

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me conclude by quoting a shaykh of the tribe of Waʾilah: “To control the tribes you need to control their hearts first. The important thing: Lest you incite their savagery, be careful with regard to blood, dignity, and honour. Only after this come the material things. You can turn them into savages, or you can turn them into angels, all according to your leadership.”37

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Nadwa al-Dawsari, Abdullah Hamidaddin, Bernard Haykel, Charles Schmitz, Ewa Strzelecka, and Alexander Weissenburger, all of whom kindly read the draft chapter and offered, from their often profoundly different vantage points and situations of personal involvement, numerous valuable remarks and suggestions. The Austrian Nationalstiftung FTE and the Institute for Social Anthropology at the Austrian Academy of Sciences supported this research.

Notes 1

Steven Caton, “Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique of the Segmentary Model in the Middle East.” IJMES 19 (1987): 77–102. 2 See, for example, Ranajit Guha, Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) and Dipesh Chakrabarty, Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 3 See, for example, R.B. Serjeant, “The Interplay between Tribal Affinities and Religious (Zaydi) Authority in the Yemen,” in al-Abhath 30 (1982): 11–50; and Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 158–235. 4 Ali b. Muhammad al-ʿAlawi, Sirat al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn b. al-Qasim (Beirut: Dar al-fikr li-l-tibaʿa wa l-nashr wa l-tawziʿ, 1981). On the relationship between al-Hadi and the tribes of Saada, tribal societies, and tribal self-governance at the time of al-Hadi, see Johann Heiss, “War and Mediation for Peace in a Tribal Society (Yemen, 9th Century),” in Kinship, Social Change and Evolution: Proceedings of a Symposium Held in Honour of W. Dostal, ed. Andre Gingrich, Sylvia Haas, and Gabriele Paleczek (Horn: Berger, 1989), 63–74. 5 See ʿAbd Allah Ibn Miftah, Kitab al-muntazaʿ al-mukhtar min al-ghayth al-midrar almaʿruf bi-Sharh al-Azhar, Vol. 10 (Sanaa: Maktab al-Turāth al-ʾIslāmī, 2004), 414–20. Serjeant summarizes Ibn Miftah’s list of qualifications of eligibility for the office of the imam as follows: “In facing the task of government an Imam must combine the qualities of a courageous and resolute warrior with those of a scholar, diplomat and administrator. He must be an arbiter of upright character, and he must have an almost encyclopaedic knowledge of people, especially of the tribes and families with intricacies of their relationships.” See R.B. Serjeant, “The Post Medieval and Modern History of Ṣanʿaʾ and the Yemen, ca. 853–1382/1515–1962,” in Sanʿaʾ: An Arabian Islamic City, ed. R.B. Serjeant and Ronald Lewcock (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1983), 78.

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6 The quḍāt (sing. qāḍī) are hereditary jurist-administrators, who are considered of tribal stock. Among the tribes, they are given special esteem and status because of their education; see R.B. Serjeant, “South Arabia,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 237; Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen, 136–40; Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 52. 7 See Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen, 141. 8 Although the sada did intermarry with women of Qahtani (here: tribal) descent, they maintained their difference through marriage practices that prevented sayyid women from marrying out of their descent group. On marriage patterns of Yemeni sada and the question of suitability in marriageā, see Gabriele vom Bruck, “Enacting Tradition: The Legitimation of Marriage Practices amongst Yemeni Sadah,” Cambridge Anthropology 16, no. 2 (1992): 54–68. 9 David Thomas Gochenour, The Penetration of Zaydi Islam into Early Medieval Yemen, Dissertation Thesis (Harvard University, 1984) and Johann Heiss, Tribale Selbstorganisation und Konfliktregelung: Der Norden des Jemen zur Zeit des ersten Imams (10. Jahrhundert), Dissertation Thesis (University of Vienna, 1998), 7, 10. 10 See, for example, Abdol Rauh Yaccob, “Yemeni Opposition to Ottoman Rule: An Overview,” Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 42 (2012): 411–19. 11 ʿAbd Allah al-Ahmar, Qaḍāyā wa-Mawāqif, Vol. 3 (Sanaa: al-ʾAfāq li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa l-nashr, 2008), 85. 12 On the hostage system in Yemen, see Manfred Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918–1966 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 78–80; Weir, A Tribal Order, 273–5; and Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London/New York, Hurst, 2017), 40–2. 13 See, for example, Husayn al-Sayaghi, Ṣafḥāt majhūla min tārīkh (Sanaa: Markaz alDirāsāt al-Yamaniyya, 1978), 125–6. 14 Wenner, Modern Yemen, 65; Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 42. 15 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory and Morality in Yemen, 199–202. 16 After national reconciliation in 1970, some sada managed to recover economic and social influence and gain high positions in the government for qualifications rather than for noble birth; see Robert W. Stookey, “Social Structure and Politics in the Yemen Arab Republic.” Middle East Journal 28, no. 3 (1974): 248–60 (accessed February 23, 2021), p. 250. 17 On the emergence of this discussion in the 1950s, see vom Bruck 2005, Islam, Memory and Morality in Yemen, 52–63. 18 See, for example, ʾIsmāʿīl al-Akwaʿ, “Nashwan Ibn Saʿid al-Himyari and the Spiritual, Religious and Political Conflicts of His Era,” in Yemen: 3000 Years of Art and Civilization in Arabia Felix, ed. Werner Daum (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurt am Main, Umschau-Verlag, 1987), 212–31. 19 I refer here to ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Iryani’s resistance against excessive patronage payments. Ibrahim al-Hamdi’s “Revolutionary Correction Movement” of the mid1970s that aimed to get rid of a “legacy of decadence,” to calm tribal feuds, and to put an end to favoritism and bribery. Al-Hamdi’s Correction Movement, which is highly regarded by many tribes to this day, was not directed against tribes and tribalism per se (as it was later purported by al-Hamdi’s enemies), but against the excesses of power of a handful of senior (Hashid) shaykhs.

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20 The funding for the shaykhs was mainly distributed through the Tribal Affairs Authority (maṣlaḥat shuʾūn al-qabāʾl). On the inheritance of parliamentary seats, see Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 129, 213. 21 On the conflicts between tribes and the government in the second half of the 1980s, see Muḥammad al-ʿAbbasī, Shāwyish al-Baʿth: ʿAly ʿAbdallah Ṣāliḥ (Cairo: AlZahrāʾ li-l-ʾIʿlām, 1990), 134–41; Sinnn Abu Lahum, Al-Yaman: Ḥaqāʾq wa-Wathāʾiq ʿIshtuhā, Vol. 3 (Sanaa: Muʾssassat al-ʿAffīfī, 2004), 342–4. 22 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 199–202 and passim. 23 On statehood as envisioned by the Huthis, see the chapters of Schmitz and Rogers in this volume. On the six Saada, wars, see Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 153–342. 24 The Supreme Political Council is the highest political authority in the Huthicontrolled territories. 25 For further details, see ACAPS, “The Houthi Supervisory System: The Interplay of Formal State Institutions and Informal Political Structures,” ACAPS Thematic Report, June 17, 2020, and Helen Lackner (forthcoming), “Tribes in the Neo-Liberal Era: Transformation of Yemen’s Social Structure,” in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften) and Joshua Roger’s chapter in this volume. 26 “Tax and Rule: Houthis Move to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with ‘One-fifth’ Levy,” The Sanaa Center, https://sanaacenter.org/files/Houthis_Move_to_Institutionalize_ Hashemite_Elite_with_One-Fifth_Levy_en.pdf (accessed February 4, 2021). 27 Alexander Weissenburger (forthcoming), “Al-Mawaddah al-Khalidah? The Huthi Movement and the Idea of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society,” in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften). 28 Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Analysis: Tribal Shaykhs and the War in Yemen,” https://almasdaronline.net/national/345 (accessed February 4, 2021). 29 Alexander Weissenburger (forthcoming), “Al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah?” 30 Yemen Extra, “Full Text of Sayyed Abdulmalik First TV Interview with Almasirah TV,” https://www.yemenextra.net/2019/05/05/36349/ (accessed February 4, 2021). 31 Yemenipress, “Taʿarraf ʿalā ʾaham bunūd wathīqat al-sharaf al-qabīliyya,” https:// www.yemenipress.net/archives/137188 (accessed February 4, 2021). 32 On the National Vision, see Charles Schmitz’ chapter in this volume. 33 On the National Charter and the NDC of the 1980s, see Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962–1986 (New York, Routledge, 1987), 111–13. 34 Yemenipress, “Taʿrraf ʿala ahammi bunud wathiqat al-sharaf al-qabiliyya,” https:// www.yemenipress.net/archives/137188 (accessed February 4, 2021). 35 For the Talahum initiative of the early 1990s, see Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 163–5 and Paul Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis,” in The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences, ed. Jamal al-Suwaidi (London: Saqi, 1995), 47–52. 36 “Al-raʾīs al-Mashāṭ yuddashin al-ʾijrāʾāt al-tanfīdhiyya li-wathīqat al-sharaf al-qabaliyya,” https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/227285, (accessed February 4, 2021). 37 Online interview with a shaykh from Wāʾilah in January 2018, with whom I discussed the leadership styles of Imam Aḥmad, ʿAlī ʿAbd Allah Ṣāliḥ, and the Huthis.

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Bibliography al-ʿAbbasi, Muḥammad. Shawīsh al-Baʿth: Ali ʿAbdullah Salih (Cairo: Al-Zahraʾ li-l-Iʿlam, 1990). Abu Lahum, Sinan. Al-Yaman: Haqaʾiq wa wathaʾiq ashtuha, 4 volumes (Sanaa: Muʾassassat al-ʿAfif, 2004). ACAPS. “The Houthi Supervisory System: The Interplay of Formal State Institutions and Informal Political Structures.” ACAPS Thematic Report, June 17, 2020. al-Ahmar, ʿAbd Allah. Qadaya wa mawaqif (Sanaa: al-Afaq li-l-tibaʿa wa l-nashr, 2008). al-Akwaʿ, Ismaʿil. “Nashwan Ibn Saʿid al-Himyari and the Spiritual, Religious and Political Conflicts of his Era.” In Yemen: 3000 Years of Art and Civilization in Arabia Felix, ed. Werner Daum (Frankfurt am Main: Umschau-Verlag, 1987), 212–31. al-ʿAlawi, Ali b. Muḥammad b. ʿUbayd Allah. Sīrat al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq Yaḥyā bin alḤusayn bin al-Qāsim (Bayrūt: Dār al-fikr li-l-ṭibāʿa w-l-nashr wa-atawzīʿ, 1981). Ansarollah. “Al-raʾis al-Mashat yudashshin al-ijraʾat al-tanfidhiyya li-wathiqat al-sharaf al-qabaliyya.” https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/227285 (accessed February 4, 2021). Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London/ New York: Hurst, 2017). Burrowes, Robert D. The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962–1986 (New York: Routledge, 1987). Carapico, Sheila. Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Caton, Steven. “Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique of the Segmentary Model in the Middle East.” IJMES 19 (1987): 77–102. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Al-Dawsari, Nadwa. “Analysis: Tribal Shaykhs and the War in Yemen.” https://almasdaronline.net/national/345 (accessed February 4, 2021). Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Dresch, Paul. “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis.” In The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences, ed. Jamal Al-suwaidi (London: Saqi, 1995), 47–52. Gochenour, David Thomas. The Penetration of Zaydi Islam into Early Medieval Yemen, Dissertation Thesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1984). Guha, Ranajit. Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). ­Ibn Miftah, ʿAbd Allah. Kitāb al-Muntazaʿ al-mukhtār min al-ghayth al-midrār al-maʿrūf bi-Sharḥ al-ʾAzhār, Vol. 10 (Sanaa: Matktab al-Turath al-Islami, 2004), 414–20. Lackner, Helen. “Tribes in the Neo-Liberal Era: Transformation of Yemen’s Social Structure.” In Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2021), 145–58. The Sanaa Center. “Tax and Rule: Houthis Move to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with ‘One-fifth’ Levy.” https://sanaacenter.org/files/Houthis_Move_to_Institutionalize_ Hashemite_Elite_with_One-Fifth_Levy_en.pdf (accessed February 4, 2021). al-Sayaghi. Husayn. Safahat majhula min tarikh al-yaman (Sanaa: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Yamaniyyah, 1978). Serjeant, R.B. “South Arabia.” In Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 226–47.

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Serjeant, R.B. “The Interplay between Tribal Affinities and Religious (Zaydi) Authority in the Yemen.” al-Abḥāth 30 (1982): 11–50. Serjeant, R.B. “The Post-Medieval and Modern History of Sanʿaʾ and the Yemen, ca. 853–1382/1515–1962.” In Sanʿaʾ: An Arabian Islamic City, ed. R.B. Serjeant and Ronald Lewcock (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1983), 68–107. vom Bruck, Gabriele. “Enacting Tradition: The Legitimation of Marriage Practices amongst Yemeni Sadah.” The Cambriitrdge Jobtnal of Anthtopology 16, no. 2 (1992): 54–68. vom Bruck, Gabriele. Islam, Memorty, and Motalrty rn Yemen: Rblrng Famrlres rn Ttansrtron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Weir, Shelagh. A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007). Weissenburger, Alexander. “Al-Mawaddah al-Khalidah? The Huthi Movement and the Idea of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society.” In Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2021). Wenner, Manfred W. Modern Yemen 1918–1966 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). Yaccob, Abdol Rauh. “Yemeni Opposition to Ottoman Rule: An Overview.” Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 42 (2012): 411–19. Yemen Extra. “Full Text of Sayyed Abdulmalik First TV Interview with Almasirah TV.” https://www.yemenextra.net/2019/05/05/36349/ (accessed February 4, 2021). Yemenipress. “Taʿrraf ʿala ahammi bunud wathiqat al-sharaf al-qabiliyya.” https://www. yemenipress.net/archives/137188 (accessed February 4, 2021).

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5 WOM E N U N D E R T H E H U T H I R E G I M E : G E N D E R , NAT IO NA L I SM , A N D I SL A M Ewa K. Strzelecka

Introduction This chapter discusses the ways in which gender dynamics in Yemen have shaped and have been shaped by the Huthis (Ansar Allah) since 2011. It has a particular focus on gender implications of the Huthis’ transition from a movement to a state-in-the-making, and how within that move the woman question became an important matter of the Huthis’ politics and public discourse. It provides answers on the importance of women’s mobilization by the Huthi-led authoritarian regime. What kind of women’s participation has been incentivized by the Huthi authorities? And what type of women have been discouraged from political engagement? Looking at women’s participation allows us to understand how the Huthis have built alliances with certain groups of women to extend their political authority in the northern provinces of Yemen, implement new gender-related policies, and reshape the Yemeni society according to their precepts and interests. It also provides insights into the emergence of resistance against the Huthis’ conceptualization of state and nation-building. The research hypothesis is that the nature and extent of women’s roles in the Huthi regime have been gradually changing over the past years to better respond to new challenges and needs related to war and state-building enterprises. The Huthis’ transformation from a sociopolitical movement to a powerful political actor in state formation is fundamental to explain why women and sexuality became central to the Huthis’ politics. Since the Huthis’ takeover of the government in Sanaa in 2015, gender-state alliances shifted. Women have been widely mobilized through all-female institutions like zaynabeyat to enforce gender segregation policies and play more proactive roles in the Huthi-led state projects. Women have played a significant role in the legitimation and support of the regime in a war-torn country. At the same time, the dissident women opposing the Huthi regime have been systematically silenced through repressive campaigns aimed at restricting their sociopolitical influence.

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The significance of women for the success and legitimation of the Huthi-led regime includes also an Islamic revival that reinforced social identification with moral values constructed around a virtuous Muslimah (Muslim woman) as the marker of cultural difference and authenticity.1 Through a symbol of woman, the Huthi regime expressed its anti-Western, anti-Semitic, and anti-Saudi stance and reclaimed its Islamic Zaydi heritage for the renewal of national identity. Contextualizing these experiences within the situated context of Yemen allows us to understand that the Huthis’ state-in-the-making is not only about the creation of new institutions and controlling apparatus of the state. Attention must be paid to the reinvention of cultural identity, which is a necessary component of nationbuilding.

Women, Nationalism, and War: General Considerations Women as a signifier of nationalism have been documented worldwide.2 The existing studies have shown that the mobilization of women for political support has been most prominent in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, when a new regime needed greater popular support for its legitimation and state-building.3 Gender analysis of revolutions and national liberation struggles has also produced a notable body of knowledge on previously overlooked ways in which nationalist projects rely on and reproduce patriarchy.4 It has been recorded that women played an extensive role in nationalist movements and revolutions across the world. However, their significant participation did not provide them equality with men once victory was achieved and a new state was built.5 The Huthi state movement is not an exception in this regard. Women’s roles and rights under the Huthi-led regime have been subjugated to what Valentine Moghadam called a “woman-inthe-family model of revolution.”6 This type of revolution, in contrast to the “women’s emancipation model of revolution,” “excludes or marginalizes women from definitions and constructions of independence, liberation, and liberty. It frequently constructs an ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism, and the religious order. It assigns women the role of wife and mother, and associates women not only with family but also with tradition, culture, and religion.”7 The Huthi revolution is based on ideological confluences between patriarchal values, Shia Islam, and nationalism.8 It considers women’s mobilization for political support, but not a transformation of a male-dominated structure of politics and decision-making. Women loyal to the Huthis have been recently drawn into certain areas of public life and new professions, but gender imbalances persisted in the distribution of power and decision-making positions. Women’s mobilization for political support has been a significant step in the pursuit of nation-building. Yet, the participation of women in the Huthi-led regime is a complex phenomenon. An analysis of the Huthis’ discourses and actions shows a notable divergence between rhetoric and practice with respect to gender equality. The existence of differences in the Huthis’ view on women’s rights is due to the variances of interests and the fact that the Huthis are not a homogeneous group.

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In general, the dominance of men in leadership positions has been an enduring feature of Yemen’s politics, having significant consequences on gender-based policies. Yemen has been already one of the lowest-ranking countries in all global indices related to gender equality and women’s rights for decades.9 The current war has affected this even more, with a gender gap estimated today of 90 percent or more.10 Six months after the eruption of the conflict in 2015, incidents of sexual and gender-based violence have increased in Yemen by over 60 percent.11 Human rights violations and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war have been reportedly used by both sides of the conflict, the forces loyal to the Saudiled Coalition and President Hadi, and the pro-Huthi groups.12 However, there is something particular with the Huthi perpetuation of violence and discrimination against women. Often it has been done in the name of Islam. For example, testimonies of victims provide insights into how the Huthi perpetrators enshrine a “theology of rape.” There are documented cases of two women who were asked to recite a prayer before they got raped in Huthi detention.13 Rape has been justified by the perpetrators as a purification from sin. Thus, violence has become an act of religious devotion. It was used particularly against politically active women who dared to disagree with the Huthis’ policies and practices.14 Authoritarian regimes often use repression as a means to maintain political power, extend social control, and close down the opposition. In this particular case, Islamically justified coercion against “rebel” women may be a source of regime legitimacy in the eyes of certain parts of the population.15

Women and the Yemeni Revolution: From the 2011 Uprising to the Huthi-Led Government Yemeni women of different social, tribal, and ethnic backgrounds, and educational levels, have widely participated in the “peaceful and popular youth revolution” (althawra al-shabābiyya al-sha’biyya al-silmiyya) of 2011. The Huthi women were one of them. According to some authors, like Raima Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner, the Huthis used their participation in the wide national revolutionary movement to spread their political and ideological beliefs, as well as to gain experience in civil society activism.16 In 2012, they joined the transitional process in Yemen in accordance with the Implementation Mechanism for the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Eight women (22.8%) were included in the Huthis’ 35-member representation at the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), held in Sanaa from March 2012 to January 2014.17 In total, 565 delegates representing different social and political parties and groupings worked together to reach a consensus on the NDC recommendations for a new constitution of Yemen.18 Women were granted a record representation of 28  percent out of the 565 delegates at the NDC. As members of the NDC, female leaders and activists seized the opportunity to push for women’s rights and strategic interests to be officially approved as conference outcomes. As a result, the draft constitution of 2015, following the NDC recommendations, endorsed the child marriage ban and established a minimum

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age for marriage at eighteen years for both sexes, introduced a 30 percent quota for women to boost their political representation, and ensured protection laws against all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.19 Nevertheless, the draft constitution has never been ratified and implemented. Its presentation to the public on January 17, 2015, triggered a renewal of conflict. The Huthis’ initial objection to the draft constitution of 2015 was mainly related to the division of Yemen into six federal regions. They did not formally oppose gender equality issues at that time. In the NDC, six Huthi representatives (two women and four men) were part of the Rights and Freedoms working group that focused specifically on debating human rights and women’s discrimination in Yemen. The committee consisted of seventy-nine members, of whom 48 percent were women. The Huthis delegates did not stand against reform proposals related to women’s rights discussed within that group, causing a positive impression among women and progressive NDC members. The findings from the interviews that Nadia al Sakkaf 20 conducted with Amani Al-Makhadhi, an NDC member from the women’s list, and Mohammed Al-Bukhayti, an NDC member from the Ansar Allah’s list, in November 2013, suggested that the Huthis did not consider women’s issues as a priority to them, and thus did not have any problem with accepting the NDC liberal outcomes in this regard.21 The Huthi delegates were more absorbed by the outcomes of the “Saada issue” working group that aimed at addressing their core grievances at the NDC. Nabila Al-Zubayr, a women’s rights activist and writer, elected to the NDC from the women’s list, became a chairwoman of the Saada committee, despite opposition from conservative Islahi and tribal leaders. The Huthi NDC delegates chose to put their collective efforts into lobbying and defending their solution for the Sa’ada and Yemeni crisis. By accepting the NDC gender-related outcomes, the Huthis gained sympathy and support for their cause from other, more progressive NDC factions.22 A similar strategy for gaining support for the Huthi agenda was pursued during the 2011 uprisings or even earlier. According to the Huthi male and female militants, I interviewed in Sanaa in 2010 and in 2011, issues related to the 2004–10 conflict in Saada should be sorted out first before addressing women-specific problems. Nevertheless, leaders such as Hassan Zaid, former secretary-general of the Al-Haq Party and later the Minister of Youth in the Huthi-led National Salvation Government, declared support for the advancement of women’s rights, their political participation, and professional development.23 Furthermore, the Huthis did not object to any initiative carried out by women’s rights activists in revolutionary squares during the 2011 uprising. For example, on March 8, 2011, female leaders organized a celebration for International Women’s Day at Change Square in Sanaa. During the event, female activists publicly announced their demands for a civil state that would guarantee women’s human rights and freedoms.24 As a result, they received positive feedback and declarations of support from other anti-government protesters, including the Huthis.25 Later on, when the goals and politics of the Yemeni uprising were officially defined, women activists realized that their demands for gender justice were not really heard or seriously taken into consideration by the revolutionary leaders. For example, calls for women’s rights were not included as a specific goal

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in the Declaration of the Youth Revolution Demands announced at Change Square on April 12, 2011.26 Progressive sociopolitical changes for women’s empowerment and gender justice, however, were enshrined in the NDC outcome document and in Yemen’s draft constitution of 2015. Despite the initial engagement in the national dialogue, the Huthis’ violent power grab unsettled the transition to democracy and created an additional concern about the future of Yemeni women and gender equality.27 Since the Huthis’ takeover of the government in Sanaa at the beginning of 2015, a more conservative approach to women’s rights, gender hierarchies, and civil liberties was adopted. There were significant changes in women-state alliances to better fit the Huthis’ interests of power and their concept of social and tribal stratification. The new policies aimed at remodeling gender relations and reinforcing a sectarian and caste-like dynamic in Yemen.28 An interplay of gender, caste, religion, and class became a critical determinant to women’s access to political power.29 While women and girls from previously disenfranchised groups30 have been largely mobilized for political support of the Huthi regime, most of them have been relegated to the secondary, subordinate positions. Only a small number of elite women loyal to the Huthis came to occupy positions of certain relevance in the new administration. Moreover, women working for the new regime became part of a repressive and confrontational form of political engagement established to discourage other women from opposing the Huthi leaders and their regressive policies.

Women’s Political Representation in the Huthi-Led Regime On February 6, 2015, the Huthis issued the Constitutional Declaration and officially announced the government takeover.31 A so-called Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC) was established as the representative of the Huthi revolution. It included two women out of fifteen members (13.33%). Both were coming from a political elite allied with the Huthis: Ibtisam Muhammad Al-Hamdi and Alia Faisal Abdullatif Al-Shaabi.32 There are no women in the ten-member Supreme Political Council (SPC) to which the SRC partially handed power on August 15, 2016.33 The ten seats in SPC are divided among the Huthis and their allies from the General People’s Congress (GPC), the former president Saleh’s party. In November 2016, the Huthis and their allies established the National Salvation Government (NSG), appointing three women out of forty-two ministries (7%). Faiqah al-Sayed Baalawy was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Alia Faisal Abdullatif al-Shaabi as Minister of Human Rights, and Radhiyah Mohammad Abdullah as Minister of State.34 In January 2020, ministerial posts were exchanged between Alia Faisal Abdullatif Al-Shaabi, who became Minister of State,35 and Radhiyah Mohammed, who was appointed as Minister of Human Rights.36 The presence of women from the well-known Yemeni families in the National Salvation Government and in the SRC became an important aspect of the Huthis’ state-building and a legitimacy-seeking strategy. This alliance of convenience with

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the political and tribal elites contributed to consolidating and extending the Huthis’ power and control over a large part of Yemen’s territory. In addition, the inclusion of women has been seen as an indispensable prerequisite for credible claims to political legitimacy in a pro-democratic world. Therefore, women’s presence in the Huthi-led government provides a visible reminder of what the Huthi leaders have declared as their support for a “united and democratic” Yemen.37 For instance, Alia Faisal Abdullatif al-Shaabi, former NDC delegate of the Yemeni Socialist Party and the daughter of Faisal al-Shaabi—prime minister of the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1969—embodies the link between the north and the south of Yemen. It is important to mention that the National Salvation Government is an executive body, but its political role is regarded as subservient to the SPC and the SRC.38 Moreover, the unequal distribution of power between the Huthis and their allies persists. For example, the SPC leadership has remained until now with the Huthis, despite a rotation agreement between them and the GPC. In addition, the Huthis established a supervisory system that operates as a direct link between the  inner circle of the Huthi leadership and the local governance system.39 A number of ministers from the GPC even complained about the Huthis interfering in their work.40 In 2017 several ministers, including the mentioned Minister of Human Rights—Alia Faisal Abdullatif al-Shaabi, threatened resignation from their posts after being assaulted by the Huthi militia gunmen.41 As mentioned earlier, the political mobilization of women plays a role in the Huthis’ state-in-the-making and their power consolidation strategy. The Huthis’ alliance with the elite and certain class of women has been needed for political support and legitimization. Women’s presence in the National Salvation Government became instrumental in the quest for regime legitimacy. Despite the fact that their power is dependent rather than autonomous, it is worth noting that the representation of women in the Huthi-led government is currently higher than in the all-men government of Hadi.42 Hadi’s new cabinet, formed on December 16, 2020, included delegates from the Southern Transitional Council, but left out women for the first time in two decades. The Yemeni female activists organized a campaign #NoWomenNoGovernment, reminding President Hadi that democracy cannot be built without women.43 Noncompliance with the NDC outcomes concerning human rights and a quota system of 30 percent for women have been observed on both sides of the conflict. Women have gained new roles, but have not broken away from male-controlled social and political structures. They have remained largely marginalized in decision-making and peace processes. Since 2015, five rounds of UN-brokered peace talks have been held between Hadi’s government and the Huthi authorities.44 In total, four women politicians sat at negotiation tables: three in peace talks in Kuwait in 2016 and one in Sweden in 2018.45 The Huthi delegation has not included any women among their members so far.46 This happened despite the fact that in 2019 the Huthis published their National Vision for building a “modern, democratic, stable and united” state and committed themselves to protecting and strengthening women’s rights and freedoms.47 The strategy includes twentyfive objectives to be pursued by 2030. It sets specific goals for women’s economic

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empowerment, their access to justice, participation in labor force, prevention of gender-based violence, and the creation of an independent National Commission for Women.48 It also aims at increasing women’s participation in family and public life, and in public health jobs, security, and police.49

New All-female Institutions in Non-inclusive State-building: Turning Women against Other Women Women’s participation in the Huthis’ politics is not a sign of empowerment for gender equality but rather is related to particular power interests. Since the Huthi takeover of the capital of Sanaa in 2014, all-female institutions like Zaynabeyat were established to recruit new women members and to participate in security forces and moral policing.50 Mostly drawn from Hashemite families, the zaynabeyat form an intelligence apparatus directed at women.51 The name refers to the Prophet’s granddaughter Zaynab, the daughter of Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, and his wife Fatima. The institution shares significant similarities with the female Basijis, a paramilitary militia established by Ayatollah Khomeini in Post-Revolutionary Iran in 1980. Some of the female Basijis were organized into Zaynab Sisters units (Khaharan-e-Zaynab) to serve as morality police to interrogate and intimidate other women.52 Comparably, the Huthi zaynabeyat became infamous among human rights activists and the opposition for suppressing women’s protests and enforcing gender segregation policies and the ultraconservative rules of dressing and public behavior.53 The United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Yemen documented the cases of zaynabeyat used to perpetrate violence, injustice, and abuse against other women.54 According to the UN reports, the Huthi female militia actively participated in ideological indoctrination, order maintenance in female prisons, searching women and houses, arbitrary arrest and detention of women, looting, sexual assault, beatings, torture, and facilitating rape in the Huthis’ detention centers.55 A significant number of victims of intensified intimidation, harassment, threats, torture, imprisonment, abduction, and surveillance were political activists and women who dared to protest against the Huthi policies and practices.56 The “divide and rule” principle was successfully applied by the Huthi leaders to segregate and keep patriarchal control over women. It attempted to undermine the longstanding efforts of Yemeni female activists who tried to unite women and build solidarity across political, religious, cultural, and socioeconomic divisions.57 During the 2011 uprising and the short-lived democratic transition, women from different political and social backgrounds made significant progress in getting together to consolidate, protect, and defend their own agenda and address what Maxine Molyneux called “strategic gender interests.”58 In the current context of an armed conflict, divisions in Yemeni society have become increasingly irreconcilable and contentious. New institutions like zaynabeyat drew on the exploitation of the ideological differences between women. Women loyal to the Huthis were set against women representing a potential threat to a new regime. It is evident that the

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right of women activists to occupy the streets and taking a leading part in politics was the subject of ideological battles. Scaring the activists away from the political public sphere facilitated the implementation of gender-discriminatory policies in the areas remaining under the Huthis’ control. However, the resistance against gender-related injustice has not disappeared but rather turned to online activism. At the beginning of 2021, Yemeni human rights defenders launched a social media campaign using the hashtag #IWantMyRights to condemn the Huthis’ restrictions on women’s rights and freedoms, and call on the international community to take action against the violation of human rights in the country.59 Within the Huthis’ transition from a movement to a state-in-the-making, gender and sexuality became central to Huthi politics. Along with the traditional roles of wives, sisters, and mothers, women loyal to the Huthis have been granted more proactive roles in state formation and on the battlefield against the opposition fractions. According to the UN-backed investigators, the Huthi recruited also nearly three dozen teenage girls, some of them survivors of sexual violence, as spies, medics, guards, and members of zaynabeyat.60 Women and girls have played a significant role in disseminating and implementing the Huthi ideology in media, education, health, defense, and security sectors. Female agents have been required to properly enforce the new laws and policies in a gender-segregated context of Yemen. The Huthi female militias and mothers of martyrs have been praised by the supporters as national heroines. Motherhood and womanhood became politicized and militarized, and thus highly significant for nationalism. Women who engaged in the Huthi call for jihad were often symbolically portrayed in the media and propaganda campaigns with a child in one arm and a weapon in the other. Massive all-female rallies, organized by the Huthis in Sanaa since 2016, show fully veiled women and teenage girls holding rifles and heavy artillery and pledging to protect their country and fight the enemies.61 That show of force by zaynabeyat became a symbol of the national liberation struggle almost as powerful as the Huthi slogan: “God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam.”

Nation-building: Women, Islam, and Body Politics In the aftermath of the government takeover in Sanaa, the Huthis have been seeking to remodel Yemeni society according to their precepts and revolutionary ethos. They started updating the already conservative Yemen’s gender policies with stricter rules. An extremist interpretation of Islam has been used to impose stricter codes of dressing, moral order, segregation between men and women (ikhṭilāt), banning women from certain jobs, and limiting family planning access and utilization.62 Beauty centers, fitness clubs, clothing stores, and coffee places for women have been raided, and many eventually were closed by the Huthi authorities. Since 2015 women in Amran and other places under the Huthis’ control have been banned from having parties and celebrations after the Maghrib

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prayer, bringing cameras to wedding halls, and hiring male bands and singers at their women-only celebrations.63 Gender-based regulations have been announced through circulates, edicts, fatwas (religious verdicts), Friday prayer sermons, ministerial directives, cultural programs, educational curriculum, and employment directives. Institutions like zaynabeyat were created to ensure proper enforcement of new regulations. Noncompliance with rules and obligations was sanctioned with fines and other punishments such as intimidation, arrest, interrogation, torture, humiliation, kidnapping, and sometimes imprisonment of defiant women. Repressive measures related to the moral and dress code campaigns affected all people living in the areas under the Huthis’ control. However, the gravest sanctions, such as accusations or formal charges of prostitution, have been frequently used to justify politically motivated cases to scare women’s activists and their families away from further opposition attempts.64 New rules addressed women’s bodies and sexuality. In the context of an armed conflict, demographic race and reproduction have been highly significant to ensure the survival of a nation. Mothers of heroes and martyrs have been cherished in the national discourses for producing the next generation of children needed to protect the country. The Huthis’ control of women’s bodies and reproduction focused not only on hindering women’s access to abortion and the use of contraceptives.65 Physical violence against women was used to reshape their political and community participation and marriage relationships. In October 2018, for example, the Huthi militia detained two brides at Abu Hashim checkpoint in the district of Rada’a, in Baida province, shaved their heads, and forced them to turn back from their way to their weddings with men from Marib, which is a government-controlled area.66 Shams Al Deen Bin Sharaf, the Huthis’ Mufti, justified the incident by issuing a fatwa that prohibits people living in the areas under the Huthis’ control to marry off their daughters or sisters to enemy nationals.67 Stricter regulation on dress code targeted mainly women and the youth who choose to dress differently. The Huthis’ authorities issued orders to ensure compliance with strict codes of Islamic conduct and dress modesty at universities. Female students in Sanaa were banned from wearing narrow, shorter, and transparent abayas, showing any hair in public, wearing hijab scrunchie volumizers and high buns, and using makeup and perfumes. Students were also ordered not to mix with the opposite sex at university and graduation parties, among others.68 The Huthi militia’s policing women’s clothing has included raids on women’s fashion stores to confiscate and destroy Western-style attire.69 Female mannequins were identified as symbols of nudity and immorality and were taken down from women’s stores. On January 20, 2021, the Huthi authorities closed the Rainbow restaurant in Sanaa, because its colorful pictures and rainbow logo presumably alluded to a symbol for LGBT pride.70 According to the Huthis, such images violate Yemen’s religious identity. In February 2021, after the restaurant owner changed paintings and colors in the shop’s decor, he was allowed to reopen the business.71 The Huthi regime aims at re-educating society through exemplary sanctions and banning of everything they associate with the “Western decadence” and

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“Jewish amorality.” The symbolic representation of the Islamic veil, gender segregation, and moral order has been juxtaposed against the egalitarian models of gender, human rights, and women’s freedoms, labeled as Western influences in the Huthis’ eyes. The representation of a fully veiled Muslim woman as a marker of cultural difference became important for the triumph of Huthis’ nationalism. Re-Islamization and anti-Westernization have been strategically vital for the Huthis’ power consolidation and legitimation. During the ongoing war of 2015, a number of Yemenis sided with the Huthis not because they were supportive of them but rather because they resonated with their nationalist populism. In the context in which Yemen’s exiled president Hadi was seen as a traitor and a puppet in the foreign hands, the Huthis claimed to defend Yemen from internal and external threats.72 They mobilized supporters by using fear of “outsiders,” such as Saudi Arabia-led coalition, the United States, the Jews, and the Wahhabi and Salafi movements. In the process of “othering,” gender, Islam, and public morality became central to the discursive construction of national identity.73 For example, on January 29, 2021, Huthis’ Islamic scholar Muhammad Al-Mu’ayyad delivered a Friday sermon in Dhamar, and blamed the Western culture, the Jews, and Wahhabis for causing moral degradation, corruption, and exploitation of women in Yemen.74 He said: A woman cannot be freed from the system of Islam in order to join the system of the West. Haven’t we seen what the Jews have done to women all over the world? Haven’t these women become immodest and morally depraved? Haven’t women in many countries in the world abandoned all morals and principles and begun traveling unaccompanied? Haven’t we seen a rise in the number of fatherless children? In many Western countries, the percentage has risen to 20%. Haven’t the Jews been working on destroying the family and breaking social ties? For that purpose, they have exploited women and turned them into means of corruption. . . . The Jews, by means of the Wahhabis, strive to wipe out every [Islamic] symbol.75

Al-Mu’ayyad’s speech is a good example of a strategic building of the national identity by warning against the loss of Yemen’s autonomy and authenticity, by highlighting Islamic difference and superiority, and by preserving and defending nationhood. An idealized Muslimah, constructed within the Huthis’ political and religious narratives, is an important aspect of national identity and a signifier of cultural difference. The Huthis’ views on femininity and masculinity and women’s rights in Islam became a marker of identity in the rhetoric: “us versus them.” A woman in the Huthis’ revolution acquired new responsibilities: she became the guardian of religion, state, and society. Thus, women loyal to the Huthis epitomized nationalism and anti-Western ethos by embracing the ultraconservative rules of veiling, moral code, and gender segregation. They have been encouraged to create a closer bond with a Huthi-led state through the institution of zaynabeyat to defend Islam and the country against the enemies.

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­Conclusion Over the past years, the Huthi leaders have cast themselves as great patriots and defenders of “Yemen’s authentic revolution.” Their political attempts to reshape Yemeni society after their takeover of the government in Sanaa at the beginning of 2015 have been often seen through the influence of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.76 As a matter of fact, the Huthis’ state-in-the-making seems to represent more accurately an Islamic Revolution for the time being rather than a constitutional imperative based on the NDC consensual outcomes negotiated within the context of Yemen’s uprising. The Huthi leaders applied an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam to justify gender inequalities and the subjugation of women in similar ways in which Daesh, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other radical Islamic fundamentalist groups did to perpetuate oppressive practices against women.77 At the same time, the Huthis opened up new spaces for the participation of women in public affairs, increasing their multifaceted roles in the movement and state-building. Gender relations are diverse and changing over time as a consequence of the complexity of social, political, and economic factors that determine a culturespecific construction of patriarchal ideologies. This study has demonstrated that women’s roles in the Huthi-led Yemen have been shaped and transformed by the context of war and state formation. The Huthis’ support for women’s rights has been selective and conditional, and related to a strategy to attain regime stability, legitimacy, and survival. During the war, the main Huthis’ expectation for men has been to defend the country against the enemies, while women’s role has been to perpetuate the nation. Women have been needed to produce and reproduce both the particular ideology of nation and national identity and the children for the nation’s survival. That is why the control of women’s bodies and sexuality became central to the Huthis’ politics in the state-in-the-making. Women’s participation in support of the Huthi populist nationalism and authoritarian state has also been about their role in reproducing patriarchy, political divisions, and other social stratification in Yemen’s society—the very hierarchies that human rights activists seek to challenge to create an inclusive and peaceful society based on equality, justice, and human dignity, in which all people would feel safe and represented, and where exclusive nationalism is no longer appealing.

Notes 1 See Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 2 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation,” Millennium 20, no. 3 (1991): 429–43. Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Anne McClintock, “‘No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Women and Nationalism in South Africa,” Transition no. 51 (1991): 104–23. Nira Yval-Davis,

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Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997). Valentine Moghadam, ed., Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies (London: Zed Books, 1994). Theresa O’Keefe, Feminist Identity Development and Activism in Revolutionary Movements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 3 Valentine Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutions,” in Theorizing Revolutions, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997). Verta Taylor, “Gender and Social Movements,” Gender & Society 13, no. 1 (1999): 8–33. Jack Goldstone, “Revolution,” in The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 319–47. Ewa Strzelecka, Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe: Construcción de una Cultura Política de Resistencia Feminista en Yemen (Madrid: CSIC, 2017). 4 Theresa O’Keefe, Feminist Identity Development and Activism in Revolutionary Movements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Nira Yval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997). Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 199–220. 5 Maxine Molyneux, “Women and Revolution in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen,” Feminist Review 1, no. 1 (1979): 4–20. Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutions.” Victoria Bernal, “From Warriors to Wives: Contradictions of Liberation and Development in Eritrea,” Northeast African Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 129–54. Julia Denise Shayne, “Gendered Revolutionary Bridges: Women in the Salvadoran Resistance Movement (1979–1992),” Latin American Perspectives 26, no. 3 (1999): 85–102. 6 Valentine Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutionary Transformation: Iran 1979 and East Central Europe 1989,” Gender & Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 328–58. 7 Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutions,” op. cit., 139. 8 In the Huthi-led state, there is almost no room for teaching Islamic thought that is not aligned with the Huthis’ cultural manifesto and their interpretation of religion. See Houthi’s Intellectual and Cultural Manifesto, 2012, https://karmanysa.com/houthimanifesto/. “Houthi militia closes a women’s center to teach the Quran in Sana’a,” News Yemen, October 29, 2019, https://www.newsyemen.net/new/47372. 9 Yemen has consistently ranked the lowest on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index since 2002. See World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report, 2020, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf 10 World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, 9, http://www3. weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf. 11 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence, S/2018/250, March 23, 2018, 24, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_250.pdf/. 12 UNSG, Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, July 17, 2020, 35, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-unitednations-secretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf. UNSC, Final report of the Panel of Experts, S/2021/79, January 22, 2021, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N20/372/40/PDF/N2037240.pdf?OpenElement. UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, January 27, 2020, https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686.pdf?OpenElement. UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/45/6, September 28, 2020, https://www. ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf.

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13 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020, op. cit., 61. 14 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, September 3, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A_ HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF. 15 See Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimise Repression: Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan. GIGA Working Papers, no. 299 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2017), 5. 16 Raiman Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner, Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans Can Promote Peace in Yemen, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2020, https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_ peace_in_yemen/. 17 The following women represented the Huthis in the NDC: Akhlaq Abd al-Rahman Ali al-Shami, Ummat al-Quddus Abd al-Bari Muhammad al-Gharabani, Ummat al-Mujeeb Hammoud Naji al-Qahoum, Amal Muhammad Ali Al-Mukhdi, Amal Muhammad Abbas Ishaq, Bushra Ahmed Abdullah Al-Dharafi; Halima Abdullah Nasser Jahaf, and Rudaina Muhammad Ahmad Jahaf. See ʾAsmāʾ mummathilī jamāʿat al-Ḥūthiyyīn fī muʾtamar al-ḥiwār al-waṭanī al-shāmil Al Masdar Online, February 5, 2013, https://almasdaronline.com/article/41311. 18 National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document (Sanaa: NDC, 2014), https:// uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5b54ded3eadb58942db8e365/5fad75a5ac09a94bceb760 8b_NDC%20Doc%20Eng%20V1.pdf. 19 Yemen’s Draft Constitution of January 15, 2015, https://www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/Yemen_2015D.pdf?lang=en. 20 Later on, the Huthis considered Nadia Al-Sakkaf, who became the Minister of Information in Hadi’s government, as an enemy. Her assents in Yemen have been confiscated. A Huthi-run court in Sanaa sentenced her to death on charges of treason. See UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79, January 22, 2021, op. cit., 218. 21 Nadia Al Sakkaf, “Negotiating Women’s Empowerment in the NDC,” in Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after the Arab Spring, ed. Marie Christine Heinze (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 154. 22 Ibid., 154. 23 Interview with Hassan Zaid, Sanaa, October 2010. 24 Wameedh Shakir, Mia Marzouk, and Saleem Haddad, Strong Voices: Yemeni Women’s Political Participation from Protest to Transition (London: Safeworld, 2012), 12–13. 25 Interviews with women’s rights activists and the Huthi youth leaders conducted during my fieldwork in Sanaa in March and April of 2011. 26 The Coordination Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), The Declaration of Youth Revolution Demands, 2011, https://www.facebook.com/media/se t/?set=a.170147653034903.34939.169040416478960. 27 Ewa Strzelecka, “A Political Culture of Feminist Resistance: Exploring Women’s Agency and Gender Dynamics in Yemen’s Uprising (2011–2015),” in Yemen and the Search for Stability, ed. Marie‐Christine Heinze (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 47–70. 28 For an example of the Huthi-led policy that institutionalized social inequality in favor of the Hashemite elite, see Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, Tax and Rule: Houthis Move to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with “One-Fifth” Levy, October 6, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628.

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29 On social hierarchies in North Yemen, and how they have been changing, see Gabriele vom Bruck, “Being Worthy of Protection: The Dialectics of Gender Attributes in Yemen,” Social Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1996): 145–62. Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen. Ruling Families in Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst and Company, 2017). 30 See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Yemen: Relationship and Treatment of Hashemites by Authorities and Other Groups, Including Houthis and Extremist Groups (2012–August 2015), YEM105277.E, September 9, 2015, https://www.refworld.org/ docid/56a775a94.html. 31 Constitutional Declaration (Sanaa: Revolutionary Committee of the 21 September Revolution, February 6, 2015), https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/ constitutional_declaration_of_houthis_6_feb_2015_-_english.pdf. 32 List of Supreme Revolutionary Committee members, February 16, 2015, https:// hournews.net/news-39130.htm. 33 “Political Council Formed,” Saba Net, August 6, 2016, https://www.saba.ye/en/ news435947.htm. 34 “President Issues Decree to form National Salvation Government,” Saba Net, November 29, 2016, https://www.saba.ye/en/news448091.htm. 35 “President al-Mashat Appoints Alia Faisal as Minister of State,” Saba Net, January 18, 2020, https://www.saba.ye/en/news3085187.htm. 36 “Republican Decree Issued to Appoint Minister of Human Rights,” Al Thawra, January 19, 2020, http://en.althawranews.net/2020/01/republican-decree-issued-toappoint-minister-of-human-rights/. 37 Naser Shaker and Faisal Edroos, “Mohammed al-Houthi: We Want a United and Democratic Yemen,” Al Jazeera, December 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/ features/2018/12/25/mohammed-al-houthi-we-want-a-united-and-democraticyemen. 38 Al-Hamdani and Lackner, Talking to the Houthis, op. cit. 39 ACAPS, Yemen: The Houthi Supervisory System, June 17, 2020, 1, https://www.acaps. org/special-report/yemen-houthi-supervisory-system. 40 “Bin Habtour Resigns as Head of National Salvation Government in Yemen,” Middle East Monitor, April 6, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170406-binhabtour-resigns-as-head-of-national-salvation-government-in-yemen/. 41 Al Matari, Kamel, “Houthi Minister Quits after She was ‘Beaten up by Militias’,” Al Arabiya, May 10, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2017/05/10/ Houthi-minister-quits-after-she-was-beaten-up-by-militias-. “Bin Habtour Resigns as Head of National Salvation Government in Yemen,” Middle East Monitor, April 6, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170406-bin-habtour-resigns-as-headof-national-salvation-government-in-yemen/. 42 According to some analysts, the National Salvation Government is currently having greater legitimacy on the ground than the internationally recognized government of President Hadi. See Ahmed, Omar, “It’s Time for the International Community to Stop Recognizing Hadi’s Government,” Middle East Monitor, December 14, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191214-its-time-for-the-internationalcommunity-to-stop-recognising-hadis-government/. 43 Shaima Bin Othman, “Does this Government Deserve Our Participation?,” Yemen Policy Center, January 2021, https://www.yemenpolicy.org/does-this-governmentdeserve-our-participation/. “Yemen: Anger as Newly Sworn-in Cabinet Excludes

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Women for First Time in 20 Years,” Middle East Eye, December 27, 2020, https://www. middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-cabinet-excludes-women-anger. 44 UN does not recognize the Huthis’ self-proclaimed National Salvation Government. Iran and North Korea are reported to be the only countries that recognize the Huthi state administration. 45 Naraghi Anderlini, Sanam Rasha Jarhum, Rana Allam, and Devin Cowick, Bringing Peace to Yemen by Having Women at the Table, U.S. CSWG Policy Brief, 2017, 5, https://icanpeacework.org/2017/10/11/bringing-peace-yemen-women-table/.pdf. Nasser, Afrah, “Yemen’s Women Confront War’s Marginalization,” MERIP 289, 2018, https://merip.org/2019/03/yemens-women-confront-wars-marginalization/. 46 Abdulkarim Qassim, Loay Amin, Mareike Transfeld, and Ewa Strzelecka, The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in Yemen, CARPO Brief 18, 2020, https://carpo-bonn. org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/carpo_brief_18_04-05-20_EN.pdf. 47 Supreme Political Council of the Republic of Yemen, National Vision for the Modern Yemeni State, March 26, 2019, 8 and 38, http://yemenvision.gov.ye/en/upload/ National%20Vision%20For%20The%20Modern%20Yemeni%20State.pdf. 48 Ibid., 32, 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 60, 72. 49 Ibid., 43, 68, 72. 50 “Yemeni Activists Blast Houthi Recruitment of All-Female Militias,” Asharq Al-Awsat, April 24, 2019, https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1692801/yemeni-activistsblast-houthi-recruitment-all-female-militias. 51 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686. pdf?OpenElement, p. 10. 52 Golkar, Saeid, “The Feminization of Control: Female Militia and Social Order in Iran,” Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 11 (2013): 19. 53 “Zaynabeyat: Houthi Female Police Hunting Yemeni Women,” MENA- Studies, May 5, 2020, https://mena-studies.org/zaynabiyat-houthi-female-police-hunting-yemeniwomen/. Saeed Al-Batati, “Yemeni Activist Who Endured and Challenged Houthi Repression,” Arab News, March 11, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1639776/ middle-east. 54 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020, 9, 10, 44 and 62, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/ PDF/N2010686.pdf?OpenElement. 55 Ibid., 10 and 62. 56 Ibid., 21–3 and 60. 57 Strzelecka, “Political Culture of Feminist Resistance,” op. cit. Strzelecka, Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe, op. cit. Shakir et al. Strong Voices, op. cit. Al-Sakkaf, Nadia, “Negotiating Women’s Empowerment in the NDC,” op. cit. 58 Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua,” Feminist Studies 11, no. 2 (1985): 227–54. 59 Tamara Abueish, “ISIS-like Behavior: Iran-backed Houthis Implement Extreme Measures against Women,” Al Arabiya English, February 3, 2021, https://english. alarabiya.net/features/2021/02/03/-ISIS-like-behavior-Iran-backed-Houthisimplement-extreme-measures-against-women. 60 “Iran-backed Houthis Recruited Teenage Girls in Yemen, Says New UN Report,” The National, September 9, 2020, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/iranbacked-houthis-recruited-teenage-girls-in-yemen-says-new-un-report-1.1075297.

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61 See Rua’a Alameri, “Houthis Recruiting Women to Fight in Yemen War,” Al Arabiya English, September 7, 2016, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middleeast/2016/09/07/Houthi-militias-recruiting-women-to-fight-. “Yemen Houthi Women Hold a Parade in Sana’a,” Middle East Monitor, January 19, 2017, https://www. middleeastmonitor.com/20170119-yemen-houthi-women-hold-a-parade-in-sanaa/. 62 Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, “What a Houthi-controlled Yemen Means for Women,” Al Monitor, March 18, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/ yemen-women-activists-revolution-houthis-saleh.html. “Amnesty Slams Houthi Ban on Yemeni Women,” January 30, 2021, http://independentpress.cc/amnesty-slamshouthi-ban-on-yemeni-women/2021/01/31/. 63 Ibid., op. cit. 64 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, September 3, 2019, op. cit. Mina Aldroubi and Ali Mahmood, “Dozens of Yemeni girls and women face secret Houthi trials on false prostitution charges,” The National, May 2, 2019, https://www. thenationalnews.com/world/mena/dozens-of-yemeni-girls-and-women-face-secrethouthi-trials-on-false-prostitution-charges-1.856588. Samia al-Aghbari, “Abduction, Torture, Ransom, Stigma: How Female Houthi Militias Silence Women in Yemen’s War,” Almasdar Online, December 29, 2019, https://al-masdaronline.net/national/221. 65 “Women Banned from contraceptive,” Aden Press, February 3, 2021, http:// en.adenpress.news/news/32132. 66 “Houthis Stop Wedding Procession in Abu Hashim Point,” Aden News, October 15, 2018, https://adennews.net/en/50263. 67 Fatima Abo Alasrar, “Houthis’ Disregard for Yemeni Customs Leaves Women at Risk,” Arab News, March 11, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1640106. 68 Mwatana for Human Rights, Another Year of Impunity in Yemen. Press Briefing on Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2020, January 5, 2021, https://mwatana.org/ en/2020-press-briefing/. 69 Ali Mahmood, “Houthi Militia Raid Women’s Clothing Shops and Cafes in Sanaa,” The National, January 27, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/houthimilitia-raid-women-s-clothing-shops-and-cafes-in-sanaa-1.1154125. 70 The Yemen Review: Houthis at the Gates of Marib (Sanaa: Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021), 11, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/13365 71 See Rainbow restaurant in Sanaa, https://www.facebook.com/rainbo11. 72 In 2017, a pro-Huthi court in Sanaa sentenced President Hadi and his six government officials for high treason, convicting them of “incitement and assistance to the aggressor state of Saudi Arabia and its allies.” See “Pro-Houthi Court Sentences Yemen President to Death for Treason,” Reuters, March 25, 2017, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-yemen-security-court-idUSKBN16W0UF. 73 See Helen Ting, “Social Construction of Nation: A Theoretical Exploration,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14, no. 3 (2008): 453–82. 74 “Houthi Friday Sermon by Yemeni Islamic Scholar Muhammad Al-Mu’ayyad,” video clip from Huthi-run Al-Eman TV, January 30, 2021, https://www.memri.org/tv/ houthi-yemen-sermon-muhammad-muayyad-jews-exploit-muslim-women-breakdown-family-society-corruption-fatherless-babies-america. 75 Ibid. 76 See Mohammed Al Mahfali and James Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Houthi Rule in Northern Yemen,” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, February 12, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050. Lockie,

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Alex, “Why the US Confronted Iranian-backed Militants in Yemen, and the Risks That Lie Ahead,” Business Insider, October 13, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/ us-yemen-strike-houthi-iran-saudi-arabia-2016-10. 77 See Tamara Abueish, “ISIS-like Behavior: Iran-Backed Houthis Implement Extreme Measures against Women,” Al Arabiya English, February 3, 2021, https://english. alarabiya.net/features/2021/02/03/-ISIS-like-behavior-Iran-backed-Houthisimplement-extreme-measures-against-women.

Bibliography ACAPS. The Houthi Supervisory System, ACAPS Thematic Report. June 17, 2020. https:// www.acaps.org/special-report/yemen-houthi-supervisory-system Anderlini, Naraghi, Sanam Rasha Jarhum, Rana Allam, and Devin Cowick. Bringing Peace to Yemen by Having Women at the Table, U.S. CSWG Policy Brief (Washington: USIP, 2017). https://icanpeacework.org/2017/10/11/bringing-peace-yemen-womentable/ Badran, Margot. Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Baron, Beth. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Bernal, Victoria. “From Warriors to Wives: Contradictions of Liberation and Development in Eritrea.” Northeast African Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 129–54. Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst and Company, 2017). CCYRC. The Declaration of Youth Revolution Demands (Sanaa: The Coordination Council of the Youth Revolution of Change, 2011). https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set =a.170147653034903.34939.169040416478960 Constitutional Declaration. Sanaa: Revolutionary Committee of the 21 September Revolution, February 6, 2015. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/ constitutional_declaration_of_houthis_6_feb_2015_-_english.pdf Edel, Mirjam and Maria Josua. How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimise Repression: Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan. GIGA Working Papers, no. 299 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2017). Foran, John, ed. Theorizing Revolutions (London: Routledge, 1997). Goldstone, Jack, “Revolution.” In The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 319–47. Golkar, Saeid, “The Feminization of Control: Female Militia and Social Order in Iran.” Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 11 (2013): 16–40. Al-Hamdani, Raiman and Helen Lackner. Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans Can Promote Peace in Yemen. European Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2020. https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_ peace_in_yemen/ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Yemen: Relationship and Treatment of Hashemites by Authorities and Other Groups, Including Houthis and Extremist Groups (2012–August 2015), YEM105277.E, September 9, 2015. https://www.refworld.org/ docid/56a775a94.html Kandiyoti, Deniz, “Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation.” Millennium 20, no. 3 (1991): 429–43.

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Al-Mahfali, Mohammed and James Root. “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Houthi Rule in Northern Yemen.” Sanaa: Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, February 12, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050 McClintock, Anne. “‘No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Women and Nationalism in South Africa.” Transition, no. 51 (1991): 104–23. ­Moghadam, Valentine. “Gender and Revolutions.” In Theorizing Revolutions, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997). Moghadam, Valentine, ed. Genderand National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies (London: Zed Books, 1994). Moghadam, Valentine. “Gender and Revolutionary Transformation: Iran 1979 and East Central Europe 1989.” Gender & Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 328–58. Molyneux, Maxine. “Women and Revolution in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.” Feminist Review 1, no. 1 (1979): 4–20. Molyneux, Maxine. “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua.” Feminist Studies 11, no. 2 (1985): 227–54. Nasser, Afrah. “Yemen’s Women Confront War’s Marginalization.” MERIP 289, 2018. https://merip.org/2019/03/yemens-women-confront-wars-marginalization/ NDC. National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document (Sanaa: NDC, 2014). https:// uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5b54ded3eadb58942db8e365/5fad75a5ac09a94bceb760 8b_NDC%20Doc%20Eng%20V1.pdf O’Keefe, Theresa. Feminist Identity Development and Activism in Revolutionary Movements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Qassim, Abdulkarim, Loay Amin, Mareike Transfeld and Ewa Strzelecka. The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in Yemen. CARPO Brief 18 (Bonn: Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, 2020). https://carpo-bonn.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/05/carpo_brief_18_04-05-20_EN.pdf Al-Sakkaf, Nadia. “The Politics of Gender in Yemen.” PhD diss., University of Reading, 2019. http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/89042/1/23855685_Al-Sakkaf_thesis.pdf Al-Sakkaf, Nadia. “Negotiating Women’s Empowerment in the NDC.” In Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after the Arab Spring, ed. MarieChristine Heinze (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018). Sedghi, Hamideh. Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Shakir, Wameedh, Mia Marzouk, and Saleem Haddad. Strong Voices: Yemeni Women’s Political Participation from Protest to Transition (London: Saferworld, 2012). https:// www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/666-strong-voices Shayne, Julia Denise. “Gendered Revolutionary Bridges: Women in the Salvadoran Resistance Movement (1979–1992).” Latin American Perspectives 26, no. 3 (1999): 85–102. Strzelecka, Ewa. Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe: construcción de una cultura política de resistencia feminista en Yemen (Madrid: CSIC, 2017). Strzelecka, Ewa. “A Political Culture of Feminist Resistance: Exploring Women’s Agency and Gender Dynamics in Yemen’s Uprising (2011–2015).” In Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after the Arab Spring, ed. Marie‐Christine Heinze (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018). Supreme Political Council of the Republic of Yemen. National Vision for the Modern Yemeni State, March 26, 2019. http://yemenvision.gov.ye/en/upload/National%20 Vision%20For%20The%20Modern%20Yemeni%20State.pdf Taylor, Verta. “Gender and Social Movements.” Gender & Society 13, no. 1 (1999): 8–33.

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Ting, Helen. “Social Construction of Nation: A Theoretical Exploration.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14, no. 3 (2008): 453–82. UN Human Rights Council. Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, September 3, 2019. https://www.ohchr. org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A_HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF UN Human Rights Council. Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/45/6, September 28, 2020. https://www.ohchr. org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf UNSC. Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2021/79, January 22, 2021. https:// documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/372/40/PDF/N2037240. pdf?OpenElement ­UNSC. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, January 27, 2020. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686. pdf?OpenElement UNSC. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686. pdf?OpenElement UNSC. Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence, S/2018/250, March 23, 2018. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_250.pdf/ UNSG. Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, July 17, 2020, 35. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/ uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-united-nationssecretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf vom Bruck, Gabriele. “Being Worthy of Protection: The Dialectics of Gender Attributes in Yemen.” Social Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1996): 145–62. vom Bruck, Gabriele. Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Yemen’s Draft Constitution of 2015, January 15, 2015. https://www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/Yemen_2015D.pdf?lang=en Yval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997).

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­6 H U T H I I N F LU E N C E O N E D U C AT IO N : A N I N V E S T IG AT IO N O F I N T E RV E N T IO N S A N D P O L IC I E S Shaker Lashuel

Introduction The rise of the Huthi militant group, and their takeover of the government in 2014, has given them access to and control over all aspects of Yemeni livelihoods, institutions, and resources. Since then, the Huthis have taken many steps to solidify their power and control over governmental and societal institutions by spreading their ideology to deepen loyalty among Yemenis to their cause. Despite their engagement in a fierce war across Yemen, the Huthis have not wasted time in implementing their vision of governance by shaping policies that support their ideology and helping them to expand their power. As part of their quest to control societal institutions, Huthis undertook the management of all institutions of learning through the appointment of Huthi followers and sympathizers, implementation of policies advancing their cause, and alterations of educational curriculum for the introduction and popularization of their ideology. This chapter will investigate how the Huthi movement influences education, and assess the extent to which education is used to further their ideology and promote their cause and aspirations. The artifacts examined for this chapter include a selection of speeches and lectures by the late leader of the al-Huthi movement, Hussein al-Huthi as well as his brother, the current leader, Abdulmalik al-Huthi (malazim), educational policies implemented since 2015, along with educational textbooks modified and published by Huthis after 2015. Our discussion begins with a historical background defining the Huthi movement identity, and a brief historical background on the state of education in Yemen, a country where formal education was nonexistent and the form of schooling that existed was a privilege for the elite. This historical context is followed by a discourse analysis of the words of Hussein al-Huthi as they are found in malazim and the speeches of his brother Abdulmalik al-Huthi. Huthis’ interventions in the sphere of formal education are presented through the strategies, and utilization of educational institutions like the use of schools as hubs for recruitment. A special section is devoted also to assess the extent to which Huthis have implemented curriculum changes. The chapter goes on to explore Huthi educational and cultural

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efforts beyond the boundaries of the formal educational system. Huthi summer centers, and educational publications for children and other cultural trainings are presented as additional tools in the process of Huthification. This chapter represents an attempt to contextualize the interventions and explore the motivation and goals behind the actions and policies pursued by Huthis in the education sector. The evaluation of educational policies and curriculum interventions mandated by the Huthi Ministries of Education and higher education will help us understand their views on education, its value for them, and the extent to which they are using education to further support their movement’s aspirations locally and regionally.

Huthi Identity and Source of Guidance On September 21, 2014, the Huthis, a militant group opposed to the Yemeni central government since 2004, seized the capital of the country and declared their revolution. Until that date, Huthis were regarded by Yemenis as a mountain guerrilla group seeking greater autonomy in the northern region of Sa’ada. The Huthi is the name of a family from the Marran mountains in Sa’ada province, but today, the term represents an alliance along tribal and sectarian lines dominating the most populated parts of Northern Yemen.1 The Huthi family, who are Hashimites (descendants of the Prophet), command the most prominent influence on the movement. At present, Abdulmalik al-Huthi is the religious and political leader of the Huthi movement. He inherited the leadership of the group from his brother, the late Hussein al-Huthi and their late father, the religious scholar Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Their sermons and printed lectures, malazim, which represent their voice and vision for their followers, are revered and referenced by the group to guide their policies and actions. The malazim2 serve as a source of guidance and provide the Huthi militia with a stream of ideas and quotes to fuel their propaganda machine which set the tone for the decision-making and policies of the Huthi era. As we begin this exploration of their influence on education in Yemen, it is important to consider some of the recent history as well as the inspirational words and voices of their leaders in order to understand the motivation behind their policies and practices.

History of Education in Yemen As we begin our investigation of Huthi influences on education in Yemen, it is of great importance to review some of Yemen’s recent education history relating to education. This historical background is relevant and significant as it can help us appreciate not only the transformation and progress that was achieved in the field of education but also the risk and the magnitude of loss that can result from interventions that target universal access, quality of education, and the values of citizenship, equality, tolerance, and coexistence.

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Northern Yemen was ruled by a Zaydi imamate from 897 CE until 1962 CE. While nations across the globe advanced through cross-boundary exchanges, Yemenis were kept isolated from the rest of the world. Until 1962, education in the  northern part of Yemen and much of the south was mostly a community effort that took place under a tree or on mosque grounds. Except for a few formal schools that existed in Sanaa, Taiz,3 and Aden,4 Yemeni children (the majority of them for only a brief period of their childhood) attended religious schools known as ma’alamah,5 where they learned to read and memorize Quranic text. Some would manage to learn to read and write, but the majority would eventually stop attending and begin helping their families in their farms or by performing chores like collecting water, or herding livestock to graze. Education in Sanaa, Taiz, and Aden for the most part was regarded as an elite pursuit reserved for sons of affluent individuals.6 For most families in the North Yemen, the purpose of education was to read the Quran, but for the affluent, it was key in enabling them to serve the imam in governance or in maintaining status in their communities. The southern part of Yemen differed only in that a few British-sponsored schools existed exclusively in Aden with limited numbers of students in attendance.7

Education after 1962 The 1962 revolution overthrew the monarchy that controlled North Yemen for centuries and replaced it with a constitutional republic that set a precedent as it viewed most Yemenis as citizens of equal rights and responsibilities. It also inspired the revolution for independence from Britain in South Yemen. The six main goals of the revolution in the north entailed the uplifting of Yemenis socially, economically, and culturally. The significance of the 1962 revolution comes from its transformational impact and its call for social justice and economic development.8 It brought Yemen into the footsteps of the twentieth century. Education was both a product of the revolution and a catalyst for Yemen’s forthcoming transformation. The new Yemeni republic in the North made education a priority by building schools and instituting an education curriculum that focused on secular subjects like geography, math, history, and science. The Yemeni government also sponsored the scientific institutes as schools with greater religious focus. Despite their low numbers, these institutes provided religious teachings informed by Sunni interpretations and triggered opposition from different quarters including Huthis, who viewed them as a threat to Zaydism. The republic that was born out of the 1962 revolution called for equal citizenship and opportunities, and promoted universal access to schools as a means to social and economic empowerment. By 2014, the number of schools in Yemen had reached 16,912.9 The revolution against the imamate in the north and the British in the south opened the doors for freedom, a sense of dignity, equality, and rights to opportunities for a better life, for all Yemenis. North Yemen and South Yemen were transforming into republics with growing cities and institutions, in addition to engaging in greater interactions with a globalized world. Education was relocated

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from under the shadows of trees to specially designed buildings and classrooms as formal schools were built, and a secular curriculum was introduced in both the north and the south of the country. In North Yemen, teachers from Egypt, Sudan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were recruited to teach in the schools, but after the unification of Yemen in 1990, the country became self-sufficient in deploying its own educational workforce. By 2007–8, the number of teachers in primary and secondary schools was approaching 200,000 in the country.10 The move to educate the population and push them to their highest potential was a revolution in and of itself in a country that had, until then, reserved education for the lucky few.

Huthi Constitutional Declaration Yemen had been a republic for fifty-two years when the Huthis, also known as Ansarallah (as they began calling themselves since 2011),11 overran Sanaa in 2014. Many Yemenis today fear that it was an undoing of the republican revolution and a return of Yemen to the Zaydi imamate. After their takeover of Sanaa in 2014, Yemenis waited in anticipation for the Huthis to make some kind of official declaration to shed light on where they wanted to take the country. It took five months for the Huthis to issue a constitutional declaration on February 6, 2015. Out of fifteen articles, only one article referred to public rights and freedoms. Article No. 312 of the declaration guaranteed public rights and freedoms and asserted the state’s commitment to protecting them. The declaration failed to address the economic plight of Yemenis and neglected to include the uplifting of Yemenis socially, economically, and educationally in their articles as the 1962 revolution had done. In the sections below, we will explore Huthi ideology, as informed by the malazim, and reflect on how their policies and practices are shaping education in Yemen.

Huthi Vision for Education In February 2019, the Huthis released their vision for building a modern Yemen. In the field of education, the stated purpose in the vision was to provide “A highquality education for all members of society based on imparting knowledge and skills, instilling values and ethics, meeting development needs and keeping pace with scientific and technological progress.”13 The initiatives in this area include increasing access to education for children aged three to five years old, lowering the illiteracy rate to below 10 percent, increasing the number of students enrolling in secondary school for youth aged fifteen to seventeen, improving the quality of primary and secondary education, activating electronic education, and providing salaries for teachers. In the area of higher education, their initiatives include increasing the number of students (ages 19–23) enrolling in higher education, ensuring equity between genders and urban and rural areas, and improving the quality of higher education and its institutions.

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­Education through the Eyes of Huthi Leaders The Malazim represent an important source of guidance for Huthi followers; therefore, it is essential to examine Huthi thinking around education through their own words. Hussein al-Huthi, the late leader of the movement, emphasized that the curricula14 taught in schools have to be based on the Quran because the Quran is a complete educational curriculum with important purpose. In his sermon al-ʾislām wa-thaqāfat al-ittibāʿ wa thaqafat al-ittiba’a (Islam and the culture of following),15 Hussein al-Huthi declared that the extent to which people engage with religious schools is a reflection of their “awareness of the importance, significance, blessing, and attractiveness of the faith and our need for it.” He alluded to the supreme and error-free constitution of the Quranic curriculum in contrast to the error-filled curricula that the Yemeni Ministry of Education had been experimenting with for forty years. He argued that a sign of the curriculum’s weakness was its continuous amendment, which could be attributed to the fact that it was man-made. His message in the sermon was clear: if you don’t follow the Quran as the basis for your curriculum, in educating people, in addressing people in mosques, and while you write and research, you will err. Therefore, he believed that building oneself, and forming a unified nation, was contingent on using the Quran as a foundation for curriculum, for the Quran is the guide that needs to be followed. Hussein al-Huthi’s definition of illiteracy had nothing to do with literacy or numeracy. Regardless of the ability to read and write, he asserted that Arab-Muslim populations could not escape illiteracy and distinguish themselves from others on the basis of their culture, stands, or vision, without the Quran. Education, to him, was learning the Quran, and culture had to be a Quranic culture, guiding people’s actions, their self-assessment, and their evaluations of everything around them, according to its principles.16 In fact, Quranic education is cited as a tool for resistance, empowering people to be rid of their fears and emerge as soldiers of Allah. Accordingly, pursuing a different kind of education yields cowardly individuals who fear the allies of Satan in Hussein al-Huthi’s framework.17 In another sermon, titled min waḥy ʿāshūra,18 al-Huthi called for connecting with the Quran and teaching it so that people could experience its holiness, status, and significance, in their own hearts, because no other book in this world would reveal truth as it did. In his seventh lesson about the comprehensive Quran,19 he asked “aren’t there theorists in education? In psychology? In the economy? In politics? . . . Everything that preoccupies people now, the holy Quran offers a better alternative to its guidance.”20 Al-Huthi quotes a verse from Surat Anaḥl “We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to Muslims” (Alnahl, 89). He built on that argument to maintain that Allah had revealed everything education needed in the Quran, including the nature of the enemy one might face. Hussein al-Huthi viewed the Quran as a foundation for unity and guidance in the struggle against those targeting Islam. In his second lesson on Madīḥ al-Qurʾān (Praise of the Quran),21 he asserted that Muslims need to educate themselves through the Quran in order to fight the war waged against Islam and

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Muslims, in Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi, and Yemen, which he considered as occupied lands. For him, Jihad was also a path to knowledge. In the third lesson on Praise of the Quran, he explains that Jihad involves engaging in problem solving and as a result, leads to increasing one’s knowledge. The late leader was also suspicious of the goals of a Western-inspired education system. In his malzamah titled man naḥnu wa man hum22 (who are we and who are they), he held that the education available to us today renders Muslims and their women “as the West wishes.” He also claimed, “the [enemies] do not want Muslims to be a strong nation, and they want women to be unable to give birth to an Arab Muslim hero. Instead, he argued that as a result of western influenced education and media, women would give birth to zionist soldiers and generations who will become servants to [zionists].”23 He equated knowledge gained from formal schools with ignorance when he contended that men and women will become educated and, in the end, they will not know anything, and they will not know [the enemy]. “Isn’t that the epitome of ignorance?,” he asked. Hussein alHuthi viewed conventional education as the enemy’s way of controlling Muslims, hence only a curriculum based on the Quran would be able to provide Muslims with the ability to understand the forces they were up against so they could face their enemies without fear. Speeches by Abdulamalik al-Huthi, the current leader of the movement, reflect a different view of the meaning of education and what it encompasses. Like his late brother, he asserts that ignorance stems from “dark concepts’’ and misunderstandings which are imagined to be valid thoughts and ideas, while they prevent one from recognizing the truth.24 He also believes that true and beneficial knowledge can be found in the Quran and in the guidance of Prophet Muhammad. While he recognizes that humans need science and knowledge, he believes that divine knowledge provides humans with the vision and approach to guide their lives in the correct manner. He also defines illiteracy as the illiteracy of understandings, remedied by returning to the true and clear source of science and divine knowledge: the Holy Quran. He argues that the Quran holds the key to building a great civilization that cultivates livelihoods with noble values and morals. Abdulmalik asserts that for the Muslim Umma, the purpose of teaching and learning has to be for Allah’s sake first and foremost, preceding other worldly pursuits. For Abdulmalik, the Quran is the ultimate curriculum for the Muslim Umma by virtue of the knowledge it holds, which is unattainable except from Allah through his Holy Book. He also suggests that harmful knowledge is delivered to people under the guise of science and knowledge, and that he is keen on encouraging Yemenis to pursue all human knowledge, provided that it is in alignment with the values of God. He added that the Quran has what it takes to prepare the Islamic nation to become the “true leader for the most distinguished civilization in the history of human beings.”25 Both Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi emphasized the necessity of the Quran to serve as the foundation of any curriculum or educational process since it contained all that is imperative to know. Their speeches, lectures, and printed malazim provided the pretext under which the education curriculum was to

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be changed, educational efforts and initiatives in Yemeni society shaped, and education of Yemenis shifted, toward Huthis’ own goals and aspirations.

Huthification of Society After September 21, 2014, the Huthis promoted their educational programs by targeting all segments of society through the media and directly through mosque sermons, lectures, and organized rallies and celebrations. While many focus on what Huthis have changed in the educational curriculum, a great deal of their efforts to spread their message extended beyond schools and colleges. The group uses mosques also to advance their ideas, and, in the process, institutionalize Huthism.26 To control governmental agencies, departments, offices, and bureaus, Huthis appointed their own loyal representatives to supervise operations and manage their educational campaigns within these entities. Huthis developed mandatory programs to be carried out by the organizations in special camps where government employees were sent for weeks. These programs, also dubbed “cultural training,”27 take place in specially prepared houses and villas in Huthi controlled areas. The trainees, usually employees seeking to gain the group’s trust and secure their salaries and jobs, attend these training sessions in secret. They disappear from their families for up to four weeks. At these sites, they live with about twenty other training candidates and follow a strict routine that begins with waking up early in the morning to perform the early morning prayer, performing some exercises, having breakfast, and commencing their daily dose of lectures and presentations. After lunch, they sit for a qat (mild stimulant) session, where they spend time learning about Huthi ideas, and the conspiracy against Yemen and the Ahl alBayt’s entitlement to rule. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Yemenis have attended these cultural trainings and have been influenced by them.28 The education sector is an understandable field for Huthis to focus on to promote their identity, attain their vision, and recruit fighters for their battles. Education allows access to thousands of institutions and educators, and millions of youths, who can potentially support their cause or join their ranks. In the sections below, we will explore how the Huthis sought to manage and influence the education sector in the country in their quest to Huthinize the Yemeni society and promote their agenda.

Huthi Management and Use of Education Adāʾra Atarbawiyya (Educational Department of Ansarallah) ­ e Educational Department of Huthis (Ansarallah) (Alda’airah Alterboyah) Th is a Huthi agency that operates in coordination with the Huthi Ministry of Education. As shown on their website, the goal of this division is to “develop

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a Quranic educational community that seeks to develop generations immune to intellectual invasion and fake cultures in order to build an independent and strong nation capable of facing challenges and creating changes to serve Islam.”29 Their website reports on Huthi educational activities in public schools, community colleges, and universities. It contains links to K–12 textbooks, as well as the speeches and lectures of Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi. The image on the top left of their website with the words “Resilience and Victory” along with a smaller text underneath “The Public Campaign for Jihad Mobilization’’ suggests they are promoting Jihad as part of a Quranic educational agenda. Although the website seems informational, the visibility and engagement of the director of the department reflect the agency’s significant role. News reports of the director’s visit to provinces like Ibb and Al-Jouf,30 and the department’s honoring of the Yemeni youth national soccer team, confirm the overarching capacity of the Educational Department of Ansarallah.31 Actually, the Education Department of Ansarallah (Huthis) is a replica of a Hezbollah educational institution called “Education Mobilization.” Ansarallah's Education Department aims to promote support for Huthis and manage the programs that propagate Huthi ideology and Shi’ite sectarian values, while Hezbollah’s Education Mobilization department engages in indoctrinating youth, strengthening Shi’ite Islam, and promoting support for Hezbollah, and Iran.32 Alda’irah Altarbawiyyah does not specify through its website how it functions and what it does but appears to be a participating entity in the education sphere of the Huthi movement. It is certainly less sophisticated than Hezbollah’s Education Mobilization, which organizes lectures, workshops, courses, visits, ceremonies, trips, contests, and exhibitions.33 The stated goal for both organizations is to prepare youth to join their struggles as operatives who can march to the battle fronts or join the ranks of the movement to promote its vision and serve its agenda. Leadership and Vision Education and schools are important for Huthis. The significance was brought to light when Abdulmalik al-Huthi appointed his brother Yahya Badr al-Din al-Huthi as a Minister of Education. Yahya al-Huthi was educated at the hands of his late father and only completed his religious studies. He is not a career educator nor a college graduate, yet the assignment of a close relative as the Minister of Education implies the relevance of education to the Huthi movement.34 Hussein Hazib, the current Minister of Higher Education, completed only his undergraduate studies in Sanaa University. He held posts as a manager in the Ministry of Education in several educational districts before becoming a governor of Almahwit province.35 The ministers’ lack of experience and credentials for the post must be considered as we explore and evaluate the Huthi policies toward education in Yemen. The selection of those individuals to lead the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education reflects a strategy to control education institutions to serve the Huthi agenda and purposes.

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Controlling Educational Institutions Huthis have systematically sought to replace the authorities of all institutions in their controlled areas with Hashimites and loyalists, and the Ministries of Education and Higher education were no exception. In commenting on new Huthi appointments, a member of the teachers’ union was quoted saying, “the disaster is the militia’s introduced replacements who lack experience and are not qualified, and many of them are just high school graduates.”36 A review of administrative decrees for appointing school principals revealed that Huthis have replaced existing principals with new ones loyal to them. Specifically, in 2018, they replaced thirty-six principals with loyalists in two districts in Sanaa.37 According to a source familiar with the structure of the ministry, Huthis have also replaced the managers and supervisors of major departments, like Assessment and Curriculum, with their appointees.38 In 2019, the Ministry of Education reclaimed all the responsibilities of hiring and managing schools from the local authorities, giving itself total control over the management of schools, appointment of principals, transfer of employees, and the creation of new positions.39 Placing strategic management and hiring decisions in the hands of the Ministries of Education and Higher Education reflect intentional and controlling moves to facilitate and support a specific agenda or to protect against perceived threats during the period of their takeover.

Schools as Hubs for Recruitment and Indoctrination Early Zaidy Schools in Sa’dah Education has been a critical component in the development of the Huthi movement. The entirety of the movement grew out of the teachings of Badr alDin al-Huthi and Sayyid al-Muaayyidi, both prominent Zaydi scholars. Their efforts, and those of their students, culminated in the establishment of educational centers that used their writings, along with that of others in the realm, as a curriculum. The Believing Youth, the organization responsible for coordinating the education of early followers, established summer camps which focused on providing a networking space for Hashemite and non-Hashemite youth to blur their tribal and regional differences and revive their sense of Zaydi identity. By 1994–5, it is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 students from governorates as far south as Taiz had attended the Believing Youth camps.40 The curriculum of these camps concentrated on providing religious studies fixated on Quranic and Zaydi teachings, while afternoons were spent on extracurricular activities like sports and drama. Muhammad Izzan, a key figure in the development of the Huthi movement, also established theological schools known as Scientific Schools (madāris ʿilmiyya). These schools helped to provide associational space, a sense of belonging, and a framed Zaydi group identity.41 This history has surely contributed to contemporary Huthi understanding of the role of organized schools

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and camps—an understanding that lends itself to propagating their ideology and values and inspiring their followers to fight on their side.

Huthi Policies in Public Schools Huthis felt threatened by public schools because of their Salafi-influenced curricula which served to “dilute Zaydi culture and identity.”42 After their 2011 takeover of the Sa’dah governorate, Huthis installed loyal principals and teachers in the schools to teach their curriculum and support their programs.43 In 2015, Huthis took over the Ministries of Education and Higher Education, and their offices, in provinces of the northern part of Yemen and began to implement similar strategies. They replaced the management for the various sectors within the ministries, that is, the Curriculum and Textbook, the Assessment sector, etc.44 At the school level, they moved to remove existing principals and assign Huthis or their supporters in their place.45 Loyal principals could assist Huthis by removing unwanted teachers, implementing Huthi programs and activities, and supporting propaganda and recruitment efforts that can take place in schools. Huthis also moved to change the names of schools from those of national Yemeni heroes to those of Huthi leaders, Shi’ite figures with a sectarian connotation and significance.46 They have also used the schools to stage their events and activities—sometimes for the public—and to address the students, who are often a captive audience. Government schools are important institutions for Huthis to promote their ideas and institutionalize them. Though most households no longer possess a source of income, monthly fees have been imposed on families, leaving many to seek employment on the streets or in some cases by joining Huthi militia in the battlefield. The monthly fees range from 500 Riyals for elementary students to 1500 Riyals for high school students. These payments help compensate teachers but fall short of replacing their official salaries.47 Thousands of teachers have left schools as a result of displacement, lack of salaries, and Huthi interventions in the school system. School Morning Assembly School morning assembly routines have been scripted by Huthi officials. A special guide on the subject was issued to schools to highlight the importance of the assembly as an educational period for informing students about “national and religious commemorations.”48 The guide asserts that the activities and topics are intended to build the Yemeni nation and reinforce their resilience against the “Saudi-American aggression targeting the country and its people.” The guide contains forty suggested programs prepared carefully to cover four areas: ­ ggression against Yemen and its consequences A Diverse cultural topics National holidays Religious holidays

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The list of topics under the first two areas is derived from sermons and lectures by Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi. The topics under the first area (Aggression against Yemen and its consequences) include: “The goals of aggression in Yemen,” “The history of aggression in Yemen,” and, among other related topics, “The crimes of American-Saudi aggression.” Some of the subjects listed under Diverse cultural topics are: “Quran: a book of guidance,” “Who are we, and who are they?,” “Jihad for Allah’s sake,” “The danger of Wahhabism,” and “Palestine: the destination of the free.” In the area of national holidays, the guide lists the anniversaries of the “Saudi-American aggression against Yemen,” the commemoration of “the Chant and the Boycott,” a remembrance of their former leader (Hussein al-Huthi), and the international day of Jerusalem. In the list of religious holidays, they added seven Shi’ite holidays besides the two traditionally recognized by Yemenis; their tenth item on the list of religious commemoration is “The danger of the people of the book.” The topics indicated above represent a mandatory menu for students to choose from according to their timeliness, but students are given some freedom to organize other small electives like poetry, or other creative productions, such as the performance of national and religious songs or sketches.

The Role of Summer Centers Since the late 1990s, summer centers have served as effective indoctrination and training hubs for the movement that gave rise to Huthis. Summer centers have evolved since then. Today, thousands of youths who attend these centers learn from a Huthi curriculum and are inspired by Huthi leaders to glorify Jihad and martyrdom against the enemies identified in the Huthis’ slogan. The Huthi chant they repeat in unison represents a collective acceptance of the movement’s ideology. Furthermore, it also represents an affirmation of the Huthis’ call to action: “Death to America, Death to Israel, Cursed be the Jews, Victory to Islam.” In an article published in 2019, Deputy Minister of Human Rights Nabil AbdulHafeez indicated that there were about 250,000 boys and girls attending 3,672 summer centers in Huthi-controlled areas in 2019.49 Under the theme “Knowledge & Jihad,” the summer centers admit boys and girls and place them in one of four levels.50 While younger children start their learning of the Huthi curricula, older youth are trained in fighting and the use of weapons. These days, Huthis organize and finance the summer centers as well compared to the government schools they oversee.51 While Huthis have not paid the salaries of teachers in government schools, they make sure to compensate the organizers and employees of these summer centers. Huthi leaders and officials make a point of paying visits to the centers and motivating students with messages to “resist aggression” and follow the “Quranic” path and the words of Hussein al-Huthi, whose malazim and words represent an important component of the summer centers’ curriculum. Their investment in supporting the summer centers stems

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from their total control over their content and programs. These centers play a major role in educating youth and instilling in them all the values that the Huthis want the young generation to accept and believe in. They also provide an environment where educational experiences are able to influence the youths’ thinking, direction, and loyalty.

Huthi Educational Publications Huthis have also produced their own educational publications in the form of textbooks for summer centers, among others. Their publications now extend to include governmental newspapers they control in Sanaa like Althawra, the most prominent newspaper in the country. The textbooks used in summer camps reflect ideological intent to instill Huthi values and inspiration in the youth. A passage in one textbook used in the summer centers of 2019, titled “Jihad for Allah’s Sake” highlights Jihad as “one of the gates to Paradise which Allah has opened for the most beloved,” and that “Allah has ordered us to fight for his cause and has promised us victory.” The passage goes on to say that “with Jihad, the faithful will vanquish their enemies [America, Israel, and their agents] and liberate their homelands from the tyrants and criminals, so truth shall reign, and falsehood shall vanish.” The paragraph ends with “let us embark on Jihad, so we can be Allah supporters [the arabic term for Allah’s supporters is Ansar Allah which is the Huthis’ favorite descriptor].” In essence, the last sentence equates supporting Allah with joining the Huthis and becoming part of the Ansar Allah group.52 The comprehension questions that follow emphasize the goal of the exercise. Questions like: Did Allah command us to embark on Jihad for his sake? What did Allah promise us if we embark on Jihad for him? What do martyrs for Allah’s sake receive? In just one text, we see the emphasis on Jihad and martyrdom, as well as on defining the enemies as America, Israel, and their agents, with a call to action concluding the passage. Part of the literature offered to youth at summer centers includes a magazine called Jihad. The magazine was created for children. Its topics, colorful pages, and pictorial tales exhibit religious stories, celebrations of Shi’ite heroes and holidays, Quranic studies, and fictional plots like “Jihad teaches the enemies a lesson” to inspire youth. In their issue number 7, published in 2017, the cover showcases an image of the Aqsa mosque and a child carrying the Huthi flag with their famous chant followed by the headline “The generation of the chant, the generation of Al-Aqsa liberation.”53 In issue number 24 of Jihad, published in 2019, one story was titled “Jihad challenges the Zionists.”54 The magazine’s educational mission is to promote Huthi ideas and values and to plant the seed of Jihad and battling the “enemies” into the minds of young readers. Jihad, the magazine, is an example of just one approach utilized to spread and reinforce Huthi ideology in the minds of youth.

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Curriculum Changes and Their Significance Discourse on curriculum is dominated by textbooks, but there is more to a curriculum. Ronald C. Doll (1988) defined curriculum as the “formal and informal content and process by which learners gain knowledge and understanding, develop skills, and alter attitudes, appreciations, and values under the auspices of that school.” Therefore, when Huthis introduce recorded lectures into the school program, they are in fact changing the curriculum, and when they hold educational events to promote their ideology, they are also introducing experiences that become part of the curriculum. Students in Huthi controlled areas are exposed to recorded lectures by the late Hussein al-Huthi and their current leader Abdulmalik al-Huthi. A high school student reported having to listen to these recorded lectures for more than an hour on a daily basis. Schools are also visited often by Huthi leaders and officials who address students with speeches that echo the group’s values and address current issues. In our discussion of curriculum changes, we will devote our attention mostly to changes in textbooks, but it is important to note that a curriculum encompasses all the experiences that influence students and shape their thinking and understanding in school.55 The spokesperson for the Yemeni Teachers’ union, Yaḥā al-Yanāʿī, has made repeated claims about curriculum changes introduced by Huthis. Alyan’ai was recently quoted saying that Huthis had made 187 changes in the year 2020, and 234 between 2015 and 2019.56 It is reported that Yahya Al-Huthi, Minister of Education in the Huthi government, organized a curriculum committee made up of 50 academics loyal to his group and charged them with modifying the curriculum.57 For the 2020–1 school year, the Huthis have published completely new “experimental” textbooks for Quran, Islamic studies, and social studies for grades 1–6. Huthis have attempted to justify their interventions in the curriculum, in the words of Yahya al-Huthi, Minister of Education, using the following arguments58: The old religious curriculum had ideas that belonged to the Wahhabism which plant the seeds of terrorist ideology. The curriculum is based on fabricated Islamic history from the time of the Mamluk Dynasty’s governance of Yemen. The curriculum contained sayings of the Prophet, his biography, and Fiqh, that were manipulated and exaggerated. The interventions implemented were intended to fix typographical mistakes.

­Emphasizing Reverence for Ahl al-Bayt A review of some of the changes implemented can illustrate the direction and motivation behind such interventions. One of the changes introduced throughout all the textbooks modified is the introduction of the word “family” following the phrase mentioning of Prophet Muhammad. Usually, the name of the Prophet is

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accompanied by “blessings and peace be upon him,” but Huthis have added the word “family” so in every textbook the phrase reads, “blessings and peace be upon him and his family.” This change holds religious significance since it bolsters Hashemites as beneficiaries of praise alongside the Prophet himself. The connotation sets the stage for a special class of individuals with rights and entitlements negating the sense of equality in citizenship and rights within Yemeni society.59 This is further reinforced by a lesson on the “necessity of loving the family of the Prophet and their followers’’ that was added to the ninth grade Islamic studies textbook. Huthis have gradually introduced changes that reflect their sectarian ideology. In one case, this was done by removing the name Omar Ibn Al Khattab, the second Caliph to rule the Muslims after the death of Prophet Muhammad who is despised by Shi’ites and replacing it with Mahmoud. In another case, the name Saleh was replaced with Hussein.60 Changing the names of historical figures in an educational curriculum is a tool for changing the identity of a people and Huthis are not shying away from efforts to popularize Shi’ite identity and values.

Preparing Students for War In a first-grade book, a picture of Israeli soldiers is presented at the top of the page as a conversation starter.61 On another page, a picture of children and their teacher learning outdoors is surrounded by a collage of images rendering destroyed buildings.62 Images of soldiers and their description as Mujahideen are followed by an image of a fighter Jet flying over flames and clouds of black smoke. In a fifth grade Social Studies textbook, there is a passage referring to Yemen as a grave for invaders,63 and that the truth in this statement can be understood from when “the American-Zionist alliance tried to invade Yemen, but they were killed in great numbers.”64 Examples of curriculum interventions also include added biographies of Huthi and Shi’ite figures, like Saleh Alsamad, the former president of the Huthi Political Council killed by a drone attack, and Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin Hussein, the imam responsible for introducing Zaydism in Yemen.

New Quranic Studies Textbooks Over the past five years, Huthis added, removed, and modified, textbooks by adding words and phrases, removing others, or introducing new lessons; but in the 2020– 1 school year, they printed their own version of the Quranic studies textbooks for grades 1–6. At first glance, it appears little was altered, but as one begins to read through the pages, one discovers the intentional and strategic interventions that have been introduced. I reviewed the Quranic Studies textbook for the fourth grade and compared it to the MoE edition published in 2014, in addition to the newly published textbook released by the Huthi Ministry of Education for the school year 2020–1. The table of contents of both textbooks are the same, which can be misleading if one reads no further. Both textbooks present the first ten

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verses of Surat Al-Muddathir preceded by a brief introduction. In the 2014 MoE version, the introduction gives the background of the ten verses, describing how Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca trembling and fearful after receiving his first message in the cave. In the Huthi version, the introduction focuses on the message of the verses and explains that the chapter began with Allah calling his prophet to prepare himself and to deliver God’s message. The Huthi textbook contains an additional passage which can be described as a commentary. The passage reads, “Despite the disbelievers’ harm to the Messenger of God and their claim that he was a magician, the Messenger of God moved to convey the message with all courage and strength, with the help of God, and equipped with the great inspiration of the verses of the Holy Qur’an.”65 In this commentary, there is intentional and strategic use of language to emphasize the disbelievers as the enemy, and the Prophet as reliant on the courage and strength bestowed upon him by God and the power of the Quran. In the following pages, within the section of “Lessons Learned from the verses,” the 2014 MoE textbook lists three lessons, while the Huthi version lists five. Three in the Huthi text bear close resemblance in meaning to their equivalent in the government textbook; however, the two newly introduced “lessons” call for following the steps of the Prophet in spreading the faith and resisting the influence and propaganda of the kāfirs (disbelievers) and the “people of falsehood.”66 Huthis also installed into the next lesson a Shi’ite interpretation of Quranic verses. To be specific, the explanation of verses 5–12 of Surat Al-Insān relates the verses to the members of the Prophet’s family.67 In the lessons learned from verses 23–31, the Huthi textbook lists two additional statements and they are (1) the faithful doesn’t fear disbelievers and tyrants because Allah can destroy them, (2) the faithful seeks the path of guidance to be among those who Allah desired to be guided. Table 6.1 Table 6.1 Differences between Newly Released Huthi Textbook and the Old MoE Textbook from 2014 Textbook Element/ Content

2014 Government Textbooks

2020 Huthi Textbook

Table of Content

Same

Same

Introduction of Surat Al-Muddathir verses 1–10

Introduction describes how Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca trembling and fearful after receiving his first message in the Hera cave.

Introduction focuses on the message of the verses and explains that the Sura began with Allah calling his prophet to prepare himself and to deliver God’s message. The introduction contains an additional passage which can be described as a commentary. The passage reads, “Despite the disbelievers’ harm to the Messenger of God and their claim that he was a magician, the Messenger of God moved to convey the message with all courage and strength, with the help of God, and equipped with the great inspiration of the verses of the Holy Qur’an.”

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Explanation of the verses 1–0

It describes how the Prophet was frightened after his experience, and how Allah commanded him to stand up and deliver God’s message.

Lessons learned from verses 1–10

Spreading Islam is a challenging The Prophet is a role model for preaching task. the message of Islam.

Here again, the explanation of the verses is followed by commentary emphasizing that the Prophet’s action, and the power of Quran left a great impact among people.

The weapon of Muslim To not be influenced by the stands, and preachers (faith, patience, moral propaganda of Kafirs and the people of character). falsehood. The day of judgment is a difficult Patience and tolerance of difficulties for one for Kafirs and easier for true Allah’s sake. faithfuls. Commitment to Islamic values like faith, (page 10) trust in Allah, cleanliness, patience. The day of judgment is a difficult one for Kafirs. Page (12) Lessons learned from verses 11–30 (Surat AlMuddathir)

A Muslim uses what Allah gave We have to use what Allah gave us in him to please Allah and worship money and children in his worship. him. We warned against vanity, arrogance, and Arrogant people are destined ingratitude. for hell. We have to believe in the Holy Quran, A Muslim fears Allah only.

because it is the word of Allah sent to his prophet.

Explanation of Surat Talks about the reward for the Al-Insan verses 5–12 faithful and does not link these verses to the Prophet’s family as the Huthi version does.

The verses are attributed to the Prophet’s family and explain that the verses describe how Ali and Fatima had promised to fast as an offering for alHassan and al-Hussein’s recovery from an illness, and that they fulfilled their promise of fasting and were feeding the poor at the same time.

Lessons learned from verses 23–31

A Muslim works for life and the hereafter.

Glorifying the Holy Quran verses, because it’s a book from Allah.

Allah can destroy those who disbelieve in him and bring those who do.

Patience in delivering Allah’s message and not obeying tyrants and Kafirs.

Kafirs work for this life and not the hereafter.

A Muslim doesn’t just love life and forget the hereafter but uses his life for the hereafter.

The Holy Quran is a book of guidance for those who Allah wishes to guide.

Praising Allah day and night.

The faithful don’t fear Kafirs and tyrants because Allah can destroy them. The faithful seek the path of guidance to be among those who Allah desires to be guided.

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highlight these differences and show that, while interventions may be considered minor, they are intentional and in alignment with the Huthi’s goal of instilling their values into the hearts and minds of students.

Huthi Policies in Higher Education Higher education in Yemen has been disrupted by the current war since its onset in 2015. The Saudi-led coalition forces attacked educational buildings and facilities from the exterior, while the Huthis focused on reshaping them from the interior. The coalition launched 133 airstrikes against universities, colleges, and other postsecondary institutions. Huthis, on the other hand, have sought to manage higher education institutions in alignment with their own agenda. They have taken over the administration of some universities through new appointees and supervisors, such as in Sanaa University, and the University of Science and Technology. New Huthi-inspired curricula in Islamic studies and history have been introduced to promote Huthi religious and political ideology.68 Huthis have also sought to control academic freedom on campuses, in some cases, arresting students who opposed their ideas. Their stronghold on higher education institutions includes the use of their facilities for military purposes. In one case, the facilities of the Community College in Thamar province have been used to interrogate and house prisoners. As a way of imposing their brand over the universities, Huthis have replaced the names lining the halls of educational institutions with those of their martyrs and leaders. In one case, the president of Thamar University changed the titles of twenty halls. Hussein Hazib, the Minister of Higher Education, sent a letter to all public and private universities in December of 2020 urging them to name colleges, centers, and halls after Huthi martyrs, and to implement research studies glorifying martyrs and martyrdom. In addition to the rising cost of living, Huthis’ refusal to pay academics their salaries has negatively impacted the higher education sector in Huthi-controlled areas.69 The greatest effect, however, comes from the group’s determination to control and influence institutions to promote their values and agenda. Government universities in Yemen have always been influenced by the ruling political parties, and many university professors typically held political affiliations, while those who opposed the ruling powers were ostracized or punished.70 University professors know that any opposition threatens their jobs. This has gone further in the Huthi administration. In one instance, Huthi officials have dismissed university professors who went on a strike to demand their wages. It continues to be clear that there is zero tolerance for opposition on public university campuses, and the same can now be said for private universities.71 The Huthis’ takeover of the University of Science and Technology and their current attempts to disrupt education in the Lebanese University in Sanaa point to a targeted effort to take control of two primary private universities in the country. The quest to take over these universities reflects their intent to bring all universities under their complete

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control, including private ones. As a result, the academic freedom of professors is curtailed by the culture of fear and intimidation that exists in university campuses in Huthi controlled areas.72 New universities supported by Huthis have also been established. The new universities, “Iqra’a for Science and Technology,” “Alma’arifah for Modern Science,” and “21  September for Medical Sciences,” were heavily promoted in Huthicontrolled media.73 Huthis’ actions toward public and private universities reveal intentional and strategic moves to use and manage higher education to strengthen their control over universities’ processes and outcomes.

Conclusion A preliminary review of Huthi education policies demonstrates a strategic use of education and schools to instill Huthi values and mobilize youth to join the fight against the coalition forces. We can infer that the definition and purpose of education for Huthis are different from that of the previous Yemeni government. Huthis are using education and schools to emphasize their identity, spread their philosophy, and raise a generation of fighters to echo their slogan and fight their battles. Education is very important for Huthis and all of their actions and decisionmaking around education are targeted to promote their agenda and win them the hearts and minds of Yemenis to support their cause. In fact, the Huthis’ evolution from a Guerrilla movement fighting in the mountains of Sa’ada north of Yemen to a powerful entity in control of half of the country owes its rise to the teachings of the late Badr al-Din al-Huthi and his son Hussein. It is no wonder, then, that Huthis’ management of education is strategic and intentional. One might question the wisdom of Huthi educational decisions when their outcomes deter from access to universal education, improvement in the learning environment necessary for quality education, rise in the standards of education, and improvement of the conditions for education sector employees. However, Huthi actions and policies are strategically and purposefully set in place to support their own struggle. Huthis’ actions and policies in education may not be consistent with human development goals for conventional nation-building efforts, but they are in alignment with the group’s state of struggle and their quest to expand and grow. They appoint powerful yet unqualified individuals to lead the Ministries of Education and Higher Education and they ensure that their loyalists are in control of important educational sectors. In addition, their control of educational sectors and entities creates a culture of fear and intimidation that, in turn, suppresses academic freedom. Huthis also gradually change the religious, Arabic, and social studies curricula for students in the areas they control, and they print their own educational material to promote values emphasizing Jihad and the state of struggle against their enemies. Furthermore, they run their own indoctrination programs in schools, summer centers, and through various organized events and workshops.

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It seems that Huthi actions in the realm of education are defined by their struggle to stand against their enemies and their quest to promote their cause in a Sunni-dominated society. Both of these goals are open-ended and stand to justify sustaining an education system that produces followers and soldiers prepared for an ongoing struggle.

Notes 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Michael Knights, 2018. “The Huthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center. no. 8 (2018): 15–23, https://ctc.usma.edu/Huthi-war-machine-guerrilla-war-state-capture/. Lux, Abdullah, “Yemen’s Last Zaydī Imām: The Shabāb Al-Muʾmin, the Malāzim, and ‘ḥizb Allāh’ in the Thought of Ḥusayn Badr Al-Dīn Al-Ḥūthī,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434, https://doi.org/10.1080/17550910903106084. Imam Yahya had established an Orphans’ School, to teach clerical skills; a Scientific School, to teach clerks for the judicial system; a teachers’ college; and a military school. Sadiq Mohmad Alsafwani, 2019. “‫تأسيس البعثات الطالبية اليمنية في مصر في ثالثينيات القرن العشرين‬ [The Establishment of Yemeni Student Missions in Egypt in the 1930s],” Arabian Humanities. Revue internationale d’archéologie et de sciences sociales sur la péninsule Arabique/International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula. Chroniques Yéménites, no. 12. Ma’alamah or kuttab represented the community’s effort to educate young kids to read and memorize the Quran. This education typically took place in a mosque or in an open area under the shades of a tree. “Yemen—Educational System-Overview,” StateUniversity.com, https://education. stateuniversity.com/pages/1687/Yemen-EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW. html (accessed March 27, 2021). Aden College, 2009. “A Short History of Education in Aden 1839–1967” (2009). Aden College. Retrieved December 22, 2020, http://adencollege.info/html/body_education.html Asher Aviad Orkaby, 2014. “The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1968,” Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, https://dash.harvard.edu/ bitstream/handle/1/12269828/Orkaby_gsas.harvard_0084L_11420.pdf?sequence=4 Abdullatif Haider, et al. Forthcoming. The Cost of War on Education in Yemen. World Bank, 2010. “Republic of Yemen Education Status Report: Challenges and Opportunities,” Washington, DC. © World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank. org/handle/10986/18516 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” Cameron Glenn, 2015. “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” Wilson Center, April 29, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-Huthis. “Yemen: Constitutional Declaration by the Huthis, February 2015,” https://al-bab. com/yemen-constitutional-declaration-Huthis-february-2015. High Social Committee of Yemen. 2019. “‫[ الرؤية الوطنية لبناء الدولة اليمنية الحديثة‬The National Vision: To Build the Modern Yemeni State],” March 26, 2019, http:// yemenvision.gov.ye/upload/Yemen%20Vision%20-%20ar.pdf. Hussein al-Huthi did not elaborate on how the science or geography curriculum has to be based on the Quran, but he did emphasize that the Quran has to be the foundation of all learning in schools.

132

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

15 Hussein Al Huthi, 2002. “‫[ اإلسالم وثقافة االتبّاع‬Islam and the Culture of Following],” September 2, 2002, https://www.huda.live/node/45. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Hussein Al Huthi, 2002. “‫[ دروس من وحي عاشوراء‬Lessons from the Inspiration of Ashura],” March 23, 2002, https://www.huda.live/node/73. 19 ‫[ الدرس السابع في كمال القرآن‬The Seventh Lesson in the Perfection of the Quran]. 20 ‫الدرس السابع القرآن الواسع‬، ‫[ القرآن كتاب الهداية‬The Qur’an is the book of guidance, the seventh lesson, the broad Qur’an]. 21 Hussein Al Huthi, 2003. “‫[ الدرس الثاني في مديح القرآن‬The Second Lesson in Praise of the Quran]” May 29, 2003, https://www.huda.live/node/77. 22 Hussein al-Huthi, Who are We and Who are they? (malzama). 23 Ibid. 24 Hussein Al Huthi, 2019. “‫هـ‬1440 ‫ ذكرى اختتام المراكز الصيفية‬4-8-2019‫[ م‬The Occasion of the Conclusion of the Summer Centers 1440 AH 4-8-2019 AD 2019-08-04],” April 8, 2019, https://www.huda.live/node/321. 25 Hussein Al Huthi. 2019. “‫هـ‬1440 ‫[ للمشاركين في إقامة المراكز الصيفية‬For the Participants in the Establishment of the Summer Centers 1440 A.H.],” March 7, 2019, https://www. huda.live/node/320. 26 Al Mashhad Al Arabiya, 2019. “‫ درس الحوثي الوحيد الذي تلقنه لطالبها في المدارس‬.‫هيا بنا نقتل‬ [Let’s Kill . . . the Only Huthi Lesson Taught to Its Students in Schools],” April 1, 2019, https://almashhadalaraby.com/news/81382#. 27 Huthis call these trainings cultural training ‫دورات ثقافية‬. 28 Asharq Al-Awsat, 2020. “‫ وضغوط على آالف الموظفين الحكوميين‬. . . ‫دورات التعبئة الحوثية تستنزف الموارد‬ ‫[ لاللتحاق بها‬The Huthi Mobilization Courses are Draining Resources . . . and Pressures on Thousands of Government Employees to Join Them],” July 12, 2020, https://aawsat. com/home/article/2384311/-‫آالف‬-‫على‬-‫وضغوط‬-‫الموارد‬-‫تستنزف‬-‫الحوثية‬-‫التعبئة‬-‫دورات‬ ‫لاللتحاق‬-‫الحكوميين‬-‫الموظفين‬ 29 Educational Department of Ansarallah. ‫الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هللا‬, http://www.altarbawy. net/. 30 “‫ بقيادة مسؤول الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هلل هادي عمار وفد تربوي يزور المحافظة‬:‫الجوف‬ Educational Department of Ansarallah, 2020. “[Al-Jawf: An Educational Delegation Is Led by the Head of the Educational Department of Ansar Allah, Hadi Ammar, Who Visits the Governorate],” March 21, 2020, http://www. altarbawy.net/2020/03/21/25624/. 31 Sahafah 24 “‫[ الدائرة التربوية تكرم المنتخب الوطني لناشئي كرة القدم‬The Educational Department Honors the National Junior Football Team . . . Sports News],” September 30, 2017, https://sahafah24.com/article/1128848. 32 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2019). Hezbollah’s “Education Mobilization”: An institution engaged in the indoctrination of Shiite students in Lebanon’s state and private educational systems, in preparation for their joining Hezbollah upon graduation. Retrieved from https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/ uploads/2019/07/E_144_19.pdf. 33 Ibid. 34 Yemen Government Gateway, Ministry of Higher Education. 2019. “‫—الحكومة اليمنية‬ ‫ الوزير‬،‫[ وزارة التعليم العالي‬Yemeni government—Ministry of Higher Education. Minister],” http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/mohe/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8 %B2%D9%8A%D8%B1/tabid/585/Default.aspx. 35 Ibid.

6. Huthi Influence on Education

133

36 A Alaqbi, 2019. “”.)‫ حوثنة الوظائف في المحويت وتعيينات ساللية وإقصاء للمخالفين (تفاصيل‬..‫باألرقام واألسماء‬ ‫[ ”موقع إقليم تهامة‬In Numbers and Names . . . Huthinization of jobs in Mahwit, Dynastic Appointments, and Exclusion of Violators (Details)],” Iqleem Tehama. July 18, 2019, http://mtehama.com/?p=58076. 37 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “(‫ مدرسة بأشخاص مواليين لها (اسما‬36 ‫ مليشيا الحوثي تغير مدراء‬:‫صنعاء‬ [Sanaa: Al-Huthi Militia Changes the Principals of 36 Schools with People Loyal to Them (Names)],” September 8, 2018, https://yemen-shabab.com/locales/38963 38 Abdullah Almikhlafy (telephone interview with the author) September 9, 2020. 39 Yemen Today, 2019. “ ‫تعميم إلبقاء تغيير واستبدال مدراء مكاتب التربية والمدارس حصرا على يحيى الحوثي‬ [A Circular to Keep the Change and Replacement of Directors of Education Offices and Schools Exclusively on Yahya Al-Houthi],” October 10, 2019, https://www.yementdy.tv/ news2651.html. 40 Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.html. Also available in print form. 41 Ibid. 42 Christopher Boucek, 2010. “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment. org/files/war_in_saada.pdf. 43 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “‫[ تغيير مدراء المدارس في صنعاء يثير مخاوف اليمنيين‬Changing school principals in Sanaa raises Yemeni fears],” Yemen Shabab, September 11, 2018, https:// yemenshabab.net/news/39077. 44 Abdullah Almikhlafy. 45 Akhbar Alyoum, 2018. “ ‫[ الحوثيون يستكملون حوثنة التعليم إدارة ومعلمين ومناهج‬The Houthis Complete the Huthization Education Administration, Teachers and Curricula],” September 9, 2018, https://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=104082. 46 Bawabaty, 2020. “ ‫مليشيا الحوثي تستبدل أسماء عددا من المدارس الحكومية في صنعاء بأسماء طائفية‬ [Huthi Militia Changes the Names of Public Schools in Sanaa with Sectarian Names],” April 5, 2020, https://sahafaa.net/show6808799.html. 47 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “‫ ”التعليم في عرين الميليشيات‬.. ‫أول تقرير خاص يرصد انتهاكات الحوثي للتعليم‬ (2018 ‫ أبريل‬-‫“[ )بصنعاء يناير‬Education in the den of the Militias”. . . the First Special Report that Monitors Houthi Violations of Education in Sanaa (January–April 2018)],” May 1, 2018, https://yemen-shabab.com/hot%20files/34965. 48 Almasdar Online, 2019. “‫الحوثيون يفرضون دليالً إذاعيا ً يحول المدارس إلى محاضن طائفية ومعسكرات تجنيد‬ [The Houthis Are Imposing a Radio Guide That Turns Schools into Sectarian Incubators and Recruitment Camps],” October 20, 2019, https://almasdaronline.com/ articles/172985. 49 The Riyadh, 2019. “‫ التحالف العربي دعم الشرعية وأحبط االنقالب‬:»‫وكيل وزارة حقوق اإلنسان باليمن لـ «الرياض‬ [Undersecretary of the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen to “Al-Riyadh”: The Arab Coalition Supported Legitimacy and Thwarted the Coup],” August 8, 2019, https:// www.alriyadh.com/1770507. 50 Ansarollah, 2019. “‫ عملية تحصين واكتساب العلم والمعرفة من مصادرها‬..‫المراكز الصيفية الصحيحة‬ [The Correct Summer Centers . . . the Process of Fortifying and Acquiring Knowledge from Its Sources],” July 6, 2019, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/263724. 51 Huthis’ spending on Summer centers. 52 B. Chernitsky, 2019. “Huthi Schools, Summer Camps, and Children’s Magazine Instill Hatred of U.S., Israel, and Jews, Glorify Martyrdom and Jihad,” Middle East Media Research Institute. August 8, 2019, https://www.memri.org/reports/Huthi-schoolssummer-camps-and-childrens-magazine-instill-hatred-us-israel-and-jews-glorify.

134

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

53 The image of the cover of the children magazine Jihad issue number 7 can be found at this link: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/img/MY/1/108436.jpg. 54 The image of the cover of Jihad children magazine issue number 24 can be found at this link: http://alforgan.net/nacimg/nac/1082. 55 Irfaa Sawtak, 2020. “‫[ الحوثيون يصبغون المناهج الدراسية بصبغة طائفية‬The Huthis Dye The School Curriculum with a Sectarian Tint],” February 25, 2020, https://www. irfaasawtak.com/world/2020/02/25/‫طائفية‬-‫بصبغة‬-‫الدراسية‬-‫المناهج‬-‫يصبغون‬-‫الحوثيون‬ 56 Saleh, Salah. 2019. “. . . ‫ تعديالً طائفيا ً على المناهج‬234‫ كتب منعدمة و‬.‫[ العبث الحوثي‬AlHuthi’s Tampering . . . Non-existent Books and 234 Sectarian Amendments to the Curricula],” Al Bayan. October 19, 2019, https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/ arabs/2019-10-19-1.3678093. 57 Dr. Mokhtar Almshwshy, telephone interview with the author. 58 Yemen Monitor, 2017. “‫ تجريف للتعليم واعتراف بتحريف المناهج ومستقبل أطفال اليمن مجهول‬..‫جماعة الحوثي‬ [The Houthi Group . . . Razing Education and Recognition of Distorting Curricula, and the Future of Yemeni Children is Unknown],” October 15, 2017, https://www. yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/20921. 59 Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 2017. “‫ معركة مع الجميع‬. . .‫[ تعديل الحوثيين مناهج التعليم في اليمن‬The Houthis Amendment of the Educational Curricula in Yemen . . . a Battle with Everyone],” July 23, 2017, http://shorturl.at/mGIS2. 60 Mosnad, 2017. “‫ كيف حول الحوثيين اسم (صالح) إلى (حسين‬.‫[؟ )عبث بالمنهج التعليمي‬Tampered with with the Educational Curriculum.. How Did the Huthis Convert the Name (Saleh) to (Hussein)?],” March 13, 2017, https://www.mosnad.com/news/21141. 61 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 first grade Islamic studies, p. 24. 62 Ibid., 40. 63 Ibid., 116. 64 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 5th grade Social Studies, p. 8. 65 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 Islamic Studies 4th grade, p. 10. 66 Ibid., 12. 67 Ibid., 85. 68 Edward Fox, 2018. “Yemen’s War Reaches Into Public-University Classrooms— Al-Fanar Media,” Al-Fanar Media, June 13, 2018, https://www.al-fanarmedia. org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-university-classrooms/. 69 Muthanna, Abdulghani, and Guoyuan Sang. “Brain Drain in Higher Education: Critical Voices on Teacher Education in Yemen,” London Review of Education 16, no. 2 (2018): 296–307. 70 Ibid. 71 Edward Fox, 2018. “Yemen’s War Reaches Into Public-University Classrooms— Al-Fanar Media,” Al-Fanar Media, June 13, 2018, https://www.al-fanarmedia. org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-university-classrooms/. 72 Al-Fanar Media quoted Dr. Walid Mahdi, an associate professor at the University of Oklahoma “aside from the alleged administrative abuses regarding faculty hires, it is clear that the culture of fear produced through the Huthis’ strict rule would naturally lead many faculty [members] to self-sensor the content of their courses.” https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-universityclassrooms/. 73 Erem News, 2017. “‫ إستراتيجية حوثية جديدة لغزو عقول الشباب‬..‫[ من السالح إلى الجامعات‬From Arms to Universities . . . a New Houthi Strategy to Conquer the Minds of Young People],” January 5, 2017, https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/ gcc/673578.

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135

Bibliography Aden College. A Short History of Education in Aden 1839–1967. Aden College. Retrieved December 22, 2020. http://adencollege.info/html/body_education.html Akhbar Alyoum. “‫[ الحوثيون يستكملون حوثنة التعليم إدارة ومعلما ً ومناهج‬The Houthis Complete the Huthization Education Administration, Teachers and Curricula].” September 9, 2018. https://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=104082 Alaqbi, A. “‫ حوثنة الوظائف في المحويت وتعيينات ساللية وإقصاء للمخالفين )تفاصيل‬..‫[ باألرقام واألسماء‬In Numbers and Names . . . Huthi Jobs in Mahwit, Dynastic Appointments, and Exclusion of Violators (Details)].” Iqleem Tehama, July 18, 2019. http://mtehama.com/?p=58076 Aldroubi, Mina. “Yemen’s Huthi Rebels Force Children Out of School with Fees.” The National News. September 25, 2019. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/ yemen-s-Huthi-rebels-force-children-out-of-school-with-fees-1.915156 Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. “‫ معركة مع الجميع‬. . . ‫[ تعديل الحوثيين مناهج التعليم في اليمن‬The Houthis Amendment of the Educational Curricula in Yemen . . . a Battle with Everyone].” July 23, 2017. http://shorturl.at/mGIS2 Al Arabiya English. “Sanaa University Launches Weekly Lectures to ‘Analyze’ Huthi Leader Speeches.” February 6, 2019. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/ features/2019/02/06/Sanaa-University-launches-weekly-lectures-to-analyze-Huthileader-speeches Al Huthi, Hussein. “‫[ اإلسالم وثقافة اإلتباع‬Islam and the Culture of Following].” September 2, 2002. https://www.huda.live/node/45 Al Huthi, Hussein. “‫[ دروس من وحي عاشوراء‬Lessons from the Inspiration of Ashura].” March 23, 2002. https://www.huda.live/node/73 Al Huthi, Hussein. “‫[ الدرس الثاني في مديح القرآن‬The Second Lesson in Praise of the Quran].” May 29, 2003. https://www.huda.live/node/77 Al Huthi, Hussein. “‫هـ‬1440 ‫[ للمشاركين في إقامة المراكز الصيفية‬For the Participants in the Establishment of the Summer Centers 1440 A.H.].” March 7, 2019. https://www.huda. live/node/320 Al Huthi, Hussein. “‫م‬2019-8-4 ‫هـ‬1440 ‫[ ذكرى إختتام المراكز الصيفية‬The Occasion of the Conclusion of the Summer Centers 1440 AH 4-8-2019 AD 2019-08-04].” April 8, 2019. https://www.huda.live/node/321 Al Mashhad Al Arabiya. “‫ درس الحوثي الوحيد الذي تلقنه لطالبها في المدارس‬.‫[ هيا بنا نقتل‬Let’s Kill . . . the Only Huthi Lesson Taught to Its Students in Schools].” April 1, 2019. https:// almashhadalaraby.com/news/81382# Almasdar Online. “‫الحوثيون يفرضون دليالً إذاعيا ً يحول المدارس إلى محاضن طائفية ومعسكرات تجنيد‬ [The Houthis Are Imposing a Radio Guide That Turns Schools into Sectarian Incubators and Recruitment Camps].” October 20, 2019. https://almasdaronline.com/ articles/172985 Ansarollah. “‫ عملية تحصين واكتساب العلم والمعرفة من مصادرها‬..‫[ الصحيحة مراكز الصيفية‬The Correct Summer Centers . . . the Process of Fortifying and Acquiring Knowledge from Its Sources].” July 6, 2019. https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/263724 Al Rashad Press. “‫ هذا ما عملته في صنعاء‬، ‫[ حوثنة التعليم من أبرز إنجازات المليشيا‬Huthisation of Education Is One of the Militia’s Most Prominent Achievements. This Is What It Did in Sanaa].” September 7, 2018. https://alrshadpress.net/%D8%AD%D9%8 8%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84 %D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9% 84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A/

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Alsafwani, Sadiq Mohmad. “‫تأسيس البعثات الطالبية اليمنية في مصر في ثالثينيات القرن العشرين‬ [The Establishment of Yemeni Student Missions in Egypt in the 1930s].” Arabian Humanities. Revue internationale d’archéologie et de sciences sociales sur la péninsule Arabique/International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula. Chroniques Yéménites, no. 12. Asharq Al-Awsat. “‫ وضغوط على آالف الموظفين الحكوميين لاللتحاق بها‬. . . ‫دورات التعبئة الحوثية تستنزف الموارد‬ [The Huthi Mobilization Courses are Draining Resources . . . and Pressures on Thousands of Government Employees to Join Them].” July 12, 2020. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2384311/-‫الحوثیة‬-‫التعبئة‬-‫دورات‬ ‫لاللتحاق‬-‫الحكومیین‬-‫الموظفین‬-‫آالف‬-‫على‬-‫وضغوط‬-‫الموارد‬-‫تستنزف‬ Al-Tamimi, Nabil. “Huthis Profit from Back-to-School Campaign.” Al-Mashareq. September 6, 2019. https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/ features/2019/09/06/feature–01 Ardemagni, Eleonora. “From Insurgents to Hybrid Security Actors? Deconstructing Yemen’s Huthi Movement.” ISPI Analysis, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Analiz 315 (2017): 15. Bawabaty. “‫[ مليشيا الحوثي تستبدل أسماء عددا من المدارس الحكومية في صنعاء بأسماء طائفية‬Huthi Militia Changes the Names of Public Schools in Sanaa with Sectarian Names].” April 5, 2020. https://sahafaa.net/show6808799.html Boucek, Christopher. “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ war_in_saada.pdf Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Chernitsky, B. “Huthi Schools, Summer Camps, and Children’s Magazine Instill Hatred of U.S., Israel, and Jews, Glorify Martyrdom and Jihad.” Middle East Media Research Institute. August 8, 2019. https://www.memri.org/reports/Huthi-schools-summercamps-and-childrens-magazine-instill-hatred-us-israel-and-jews-glorify. Clausen, Maria-Louise. “Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1744217 Crater. “‫[ مخاطر استهداف الحوثيين للمناهج التعليمية الرسمية‬The Risks of Targeting the Official Educational Curriculum by the Huthis].” July 7, 2019. https://www.cratar.net/ archives/45405 ­Edroos, Faisal. “Huthis Offer Saudi Princes Political Asylum in Yemen.” Al Jazeera, November 7, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/Huthis-offer-saudiprinces-political-asylum-yemen171107171600790.html Educational Department of Ansarallah. “‫الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هللا‬.” http://www.altarbawy.net/ Educational Department of Ansarallah. “‫ بقيادة مسؤول الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هللا هادي عمار‬:‫الجوف‬ ‫[ وفد تربوي يزور المحافظة‬Al-Jawf: An Educational Delegation Is Led by the Head of the Educational Department of Ansar Allah, Hadi Ammar, Who Visits the Governorate].” March 21, 2020. http://www.altarbawy.net/2020/03/21/25624/ Erem News. “‫ استراتيجية حوثية جديدة لغزو عقول الشباب‬..‫[ من السالح إلى الجامعات‬From Arms to Universities . . . a New Houthi Strategy to Conquer the Minds of Young People].” January 5, 2017. https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/gcc/673578 Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan. “Huthis Ramp Up Their Ideological Crusade in Yemen.” Inside Arabia. September 16, 2020. https://insidearabia.com/Huthis-ramp-up-ideologicalcrusade-in-yemen/ Fox, Edward. “Yemen’s War Reaches into Public-University Classrooms.” Al-Fanar Media, June 13, 2018. https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-intopublic-university-classrooms/

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Glenn, Cameron. “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?.” Wilson Center, April 29, 2015. https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-Huthis Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. “Education Under Attack 2018— Yemen.” May 11, 2018. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be942f926.html (accessed January 20, 2021). Gulf News. “Al Huthi Militia Bombs Two Schools in Yemen.” https://gulfnews.com/world/ gulf/yemen/al-Huthi-militia-bombs-two-schools-in-yemen-1.2247924 Haidar, A., Muthanna, A., and Almahfali, M. “The Interaction of War Impacts on Education in Yemen: Experiences of Teachers and Administrators [Unpublished manuscript].” Civil Wars Journal, 2021. High Social Committee of Yemen. “‫[ الرؤية الوطنية لبناء الدولة اليمنية الحديثة‬The National Vision: To Build the Modern Yemeni State].” March 26, 2019. http://yemenvision.gov.ye/ upload/Yemen%20Vision%20-%20ar.pdf Irfaa Sawtak. “‫[ الحوثيون يصبغون المناهج الدراسية بصبغة طائفية‬The Huthis Dye the School Curriculum with a Sectarian Tint].” February 25, 2020. https://www.irfaasawtak.com/ world/2020/02/25/‫طائفية‬-‫بصبغة‬-‫الدراسية‬-‫المناهج‬-‫يصبغون‬-‫الحوثيون‬ Johnston, Trevor, Matthew Lane, Abigail Casey, Heather Williams, Ashley Rhoades, James Sladden, Nathan Vest, Jordan Reimer, and Ryan Haberman. “Could the Huthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Huthi Movement.” (2020) https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2551 Juneau, Thomas. “No, Yemen’s Huthis Actually Aren’t Iranian Puppets.” Washington Post. May 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/ contrary-to-popular-belief-Huthis-arent-iranian-proxies/ Knights, Michael. “The Huthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture.” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8 (2018): 15–23. Lux, Abdullah. “Yemen’s Last Zaydī Imām: The Shabāb Al-Muʾmin, the Malāzim, and ‘ḥizb Allāh’ in the Thought of Ḥusayn Badr Al-Dīn Al-Ḥūthī.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434. https://doi.org/10.1080/17550910903106084 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. “Hezbiollah’s ‘Education Mobilization:’ An Institution Engaged in the Indoctrination of Shiite Students in Lebanon’s State and Private Educational Systems, in Preparation for Their Joining Hezbollah upon Graduation.” (2019). https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/ uploads/2019/07/E_144_19.pdf ­Mosnad. “‫ كيف حول الحوثيين اسم )صالح (إلى )حسين(؟‬.‫[ عبث بالمنهج التعليمي‬Tampered with the Educational Curriculum . . . How Did the Huthis Convert the Name (Saleh) to (Hussein)?].” March 13, 2017. https://www.mosnad.com/news/21141 Abdulghani Muthanna and Guoyuan Sang. “Brain Drain in Higher Education: Critical Voices on Teacher Education in Yemen.” London Review of Education 16, no. 2 (2018): 296–307. Orkaby, Asher Aviad. “The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1968.” Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/ handle/1/12269828/Orkaby_gsas.harvard_0084L_11420.pdf?sequence=4 Porter, Hannah. “‘Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant’: Understanding the Logic and Symbolism of Yemen’s Huthi Movement.” PhD diss., MA thesis, University of Chicago, Division of Humanities, US, 2018. Sahafah “‫ الدائرة التربوية تكرم المنتخب الوطني لناشئي كرة القدم‬24 [The Educational Department Honors the National Junior Football Team . . . Sports News].” September 30, 2017. https://sahafah24.com/article/1128848. Saleh, Salah. “. . . ‫ تعديالً طائفيا ً على المناهج‬234‫ كتب منعدمة و‬.‫[ العبث الحوثي‬Al-Huthi’s Tampering . . . Non-existent Books and 234 Sectarian Amendments to the Curricula].” Al Bayan, October 19, 2019. https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-19-1.3678093

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Saleh, Tasneem. “‫ أبريل‬-‫ أول تقرير خاص يرصد انتهاكات الحوثي للتعليم بصنعاء( يناير‬.”‫التعليم في عرين الميليشيات‬ 2018) [‘Education in the den of the Militias’. . . the First Special Report that Monitors Huthi Violations of Education in Sanaa (January–April 2018].” Yemen Shabab, May 1, 2018. https://yemen-shabab.com/hot%20files/34965 Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. “Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon.” Rand Corporation, 2010. The Riyadh. “‫« التحالف العربي دعم الشرعية وأحبط االنقالب‬:‫وكيل وزارة حقوق اإلنسان باليمن لـ »الرياض‬ [Undersecretary of the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen to ‘Al-Riyadh’: The Arab Coalition Supported Legitimacy and Thwarted the Coup].” August 8, 2019. https://www. alriyadh.com/1770507 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Yemen.” (2018). Washington Institute. “How Yemen’s Deteriorating Education Sector May Prolong the Conflict.” October 25, 2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/ How-Yemens-Deteriorating-Education-Sector-May-Prolong-the-Conflict World Bank. “Republic of Yemen Education Status Report: Challenges and Opportunities.” Washington, DC, 2010. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/18516 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. “Yemen: Constitutional Declaration by the Huthis, February 2015.” https://al-bab.com/ yemen-constitutional-declaration-Huthis-february–2015. “Yemen—Educational System-Overview.” StateUniversity.com, https://education. stateuniversity.com/pages/1687/Yemen-EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html (accessed March 27, 2021). Yemen Monitor. “‫ تجريف للتعليم واعتراف بتحريف المناهج ومستقبل أطفال اليمن مجهول‬..‫جماعة الحوثي‬ [The Houthi Group . . . Razing Education and Recognition of Distorting Curricula, and the Future of Yemeni Children Is Unknown].” October 15, 2017. https://www. yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/20921 Yemen Shabab. “‫ أول تقرير خاص يرصد انتهاكات الحوثي للتعليم بصنعاء‬..‫التعليم في عرين الميليشيات‬ )2018 ‫ أبريل‬-‫‘[ (يناير‬Education in the den of the Militias’. . . the First Special Report that Monitors Houthi Violations of Education in Sanaa (January–April 2018)]. May 1, 2018. https://yemen-shabab.com/hot%20files/34965 Yemen Shabab. “(‫ مدرسة بأشخاص مواليين لها (اسما‬36 ‫ مليشيا الحوثي تغير مدراء‬:‫[ صنعاء‬Sanaa: Al-Huthi Militia Changes the Principals of 36 Schools with People Loyal to Them (Names)].” September 8, 2018. https://yemen-shabab.com/locales/38963 Yemen Shabab. “‫[ تغيير مدراء المدارس في صنعاء يثير مخاوف اليمنيين‬Changing School Principals in Sanaa Raises Yemeni Fears].” Yemen Shabab, September 11, 2018. https://yemenshabab. net/news/39077 Yemen Today. “ ‫[ تعميم البقاء تغيير واستبدال مدراء مكاتب التربية والمدارس حصرا على يحيى الحوثي‬A Circular to Keep the Change and Replacement of Directors of Education Offices and Schools Exclusively on Yahya Al-Houthi]. October 10, 2019. https://www.yementdy.tv/ news2651.html

­7 P R O PAG A N DA , C R E AT I V I T Y, A N D D I P L OM AC Y: T H E H U T H I S’ A DA P T I V E A P P R OAC H T O M E D IA A N D P U B L IC M E S S AG I N G Hannah Porter

Introduction When the Covid-19 pandemic reached northern Yemen in April 2020, local officials and medical professionals were ill-equipped to respond effectively.1 Masks, hospital beds, and ventilators were scarce and social distancing guidelines all but impossible to enforce. As the coronavirus quietly spread unchecked through some of Yemen’s most populous cities, the Sanaa-based Huthi government was unable— and perhaps unwilling—to provide necessary relief. One branch of the Huthis, however, was well situated to address the pandemic and seize on the fear and uncertainty that accompanied the disease: the group’s media apparatus identified the Covid-19 information vacuum early on as an opportunity to promote politically expedient conspiracy theories and scapegoat rivals. Huthi officials went on air to accuse the Saudi-led coalition of spreading the virus in Yemen, and artists working for Huthi production teams released poems and cartoons echoing these claims.2 Huthi-affiliated social media channels accused the United States of using the coronavirus as a form of biological warfare and warned citizens not to come in contact with foreign aid that might be deliberately contaminated.3 With the knowledge that an effective and medically sound response to Covid-19 was out of their reach, Huthi leadership did its best to downplay the pandemic by issuing a series of evasive statements and optimistic but baseless claims. In May, the head of the Huthi-run Health Ministry, Taha al-Mutawakkel, asserted that Yemen was making progress in developing a cure for Covid-19.4 At the same time, officials declined to release any data on the number of infections with the justification that this would only incite panic, and instead emphasized the high rate of recovery from the coronavirus. By late summer 2020, when reliable information on the pandemic’s origins and means of preventing infection became more widely available for Yemenis and the global population, the Huthis’ media apparatus had largely moved away from this topic and refocused its efforts on messaging campaigns related to military developments and the blockade.

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

The Huthis’ response to the pandemic is emblematic of their broader approach to media and public messaging, which consists of two key strategies: the promotion of real and fake news stories that align with their political agenda, and the obfuscation of those that contradict it. For years, the Huthis have invested in media productions as a means of advancing the movement’s immediate and longterm goals, including attracting followers and fighters, signaling to their allies and enemies, promoting their narratives about domestic and international events, and performing legitimacy. To help them achieve these aims, Huthi media productions weave together themes of national pride and self-reliance, armed resistance, divine legitimacy, praise of martyrs, and a wealth of Yemeni cultural and social themes. What characterizes Huthi media is not simply biased news coverage and propaganda but a continuously expanding network of entertainment programs, social media pages, and artistic and poetic productions.5 The Huthis sometimes refer to these messaging efforts as a form of “soft war” (harb na’imah) or “psychological war” (ḥarb nafsiyya), which they consider to be both a key component of their political and military efforts and a weapon that is regularly deployed against them by their enemies—primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their supporters.6 A 2017 op-ed penned by pro-Huthi analyst Zayd Baouh emphasizes the importance of the media and its role in “psychological warfare.”7 A three-part documentary aired by the Huthi flagship network AlMasirah outlines how the United States uses media and disinformation to undermine Arab and Islamic societies.8 The Huthis understand that populations living under their control in northern Yemen are hardly insulated from outside perspectives, which are readily available via social media, messaging platforms, and international satellite channels. This reality creates a kind of competition for the Huthis that pushes them to be on the cutting edge of creative media productions and technical expertise. Just like the “hard war” that Huthi soldiers are engaged in, soft war through media demands investment, constant maneuvering, and offensive and defensive strategies to respond to similar efforts made by their enemies. A robust media mechanism that can adapt and respond to events is essential to Huthi survival. Content disseminated across their platforms helps them shape public discourse, reinforce their own national vision, and allows them to communicate with outsiders. Contemporary analysis often incorrectly portrays the Huthis’ primary goal as the reanimation of Yemen’s Zaydi imamate, which collapsed in the 1960s.9 But the group is, in fact, a distinctly modern movement, and their approach to public messaging and media is a prime example of this.

Evolution of the Huthi Media Landscape The history of the Huthi movement—and indeed the dynamics of the ongoing conflict—is inextricably linked to the group’s relationship with media. In the early days of the Believing Youth10 in the 1990s, the movement quickly learned that it would need to curate an appealing public image while reacting to adverse

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messaging from elements it sought to oppose—primarily Salafis proselytizing and promoting anti-Zaydi messages in Saada.11 The Believing Youth countered these campaigns by distributing Zaydi educational materials, books, and cassette tapes.12 Beyond Zaydi religious teachings, the group embraced a variety of social issues and activities that enhanced their message’s appeal and supported their efforts to promote social cohesion and boost their popularity.13 In the early 2000s, in-person lectures delivered by Hussein al-Huthi pushed the group in a new direction and laid the foundation for many of the core beliefs of the Huthi movement that we know today. These lectures focused on Islamic teachings, self-improvement, personal responsibility, and increased awareness surrounding the current state of Muslims worldwide, especially in relation to the United States and Israel. In his first lecture, al-Huthi touched on the insidious role played by the global media in subjugating Muslim countries and promoting Western dominance.14 Hussein al-Huthi delivered these lessons in lecture halls, mosques, and private homes.15 Seated in front of a camcorder and an audience of a few hundred followers, he spoke authoritatively and at length without a script. “What is to be done?” he would ask his followers, alluding to outside threats posed to Yemenis and Muslims, occasionally taking brief pauses to scan the room for emphasis. These lectures, as simple as they were in production quality, proved to be immensely influential in shaping Huthi doctrine and contemporary media and messaging. Hussein al-Huthi’s assassination at the onset of the six Saada Wars (2004– 10) by Ali Abdullah Saleh’s security forces helped canonize his messages. Many of the arguments made by al-Huthi, including his views on the regional role of the United States and its relationship with Gulf monarchies, were seen to be reinforced during the Saada Wars and the current conflict. In both instances, the United States was portrayed as the puppet master of the Huthis’ enemies and to be instigating conflict in an attempt to guide Yemen’s domestic affairs. Much of current Huthi propaganda efforts paint the United States as Yemen’s greatest adversary, retroactively strengthening al-Huthi’s worldview. Israel, considered by the Huthis to be an appendage of the United States, is a frequent target of much of Huthi propaganda since the early 2000s. The Huthis’ notorious slogan, “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam,” was said to be first uttered by Hussein al-Huthi upon seeing  footage of twelve-year-old Palestinian Muhammad al-Durra being shot and killed by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Second Intifada in 2000.16 The slogan, or sarkha, is now ubiquitous in cities under Huthi control, posted on walls and billboards, and chanted by troops on the frontlines. It has become a lasting symbol of the movement despite, or perhaps because of, its controversial and blatantly anti-Semitic nature. The sarkha was an attack not only on the United States and Israel but also on Saleh’s regime, who the Huthis accused of being a puppet for the West. The slogan was cited by Saleh throughout the Saada Wars as evidence that the United States should assist him in his conflict with the Huthis.17 As years of war in the 2000s dragged on, the Huthis updated their messaging strategies to focus on battlefield gains and counter enemy propaganda. They

142

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

launched the outlets Saada Online and Al-Menbar, which have since ceased publication.18 Saleh’s regime was likewise preoccupied with guiding the media narrative on the conflict, both by disseminating pro-government propaganda against the Huthis and by stifling coverage of events in Saada.19 Saleh banned journalists from reporting from conflict zones and cut lines of communication in an effort to control the narratives surfacing from the war.20 These experiences likely helped inform similar Huthi media tactics that we see today, including the crackdown on independent journalism and their tactic of periodically cutting off telecommunications systems near battlefronts.21 Years before their rise to power, the Huthis excelled at media productions and outpaced even the central government in this regard.22 In 2012, the Huthis established their official media outlet, Al-Masirah, in southern Beirut with technical assistance from Hezbollah’s Al-Manar.23 Al-Masirah’s Lebanese and Yemeni presenters began covering national and regional news stories, and some of the earliest programs on the channel focused on religious, cultural, and social topics, including a show titled Al-Qināʿ (The Mask), which provided critical analysis of foreign films, and another program still on air called Al-Haql (The Field), which features drone footage of Yemen’s agricultural lands and includes interviews with farmers discussing their daily struggles and successes. Even as the Huthis became increasingly adept at media production, they were relegated to the margins of Yemeni and regional news outlets, unable to guide narratives on national events and instead reacting to them. This impediment was reversed when the Huthis seized Sanaa in 2014 and one of their first acts was to reshape local media. Huthi forces took control of newsrooms belonging to the same outlets that disseminated anti-Huthi propaganda under the Saleh regime, and wiped online archives that included anti-Huthi news coverage. They shuttered outlets that they believed to be disposable and co-opted others that could help build authority and legitimacy, including Al-Thawra newspaper, the state news agency SABA, and local radio stations.24 The Huthis indicated early on that dissenting voices would not be tolerated.25 Since 2014, journalists in northern Yemen have faced the threat of imprisonment or death sentences handed down by Huthi courts and are often charged with “aiding the Saudi aggression.”26 The capture of state institutions and news outlets offered obvious benefits to the Huthis, not least of which was a newfound power in Yemen’s capital that gave them the breathing room and resources to build a proactive media apparatus made up of traditional news outlets, social media pages, and artistic productions. Years of experience in creating propaganda and diverse messaging helped the Huthis assemble an advanced media mechanism poised to react to events and generate narratives. By the time the Saudi-led coalition announced Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, Sanaa-based authorities were prepared to respond—both militarily and rhetorically. The operation led by Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Sunni states, and backed by the United States and the United Kingdom, immediately provided the Huthis with a wealth of propaganda that drew on their founder’s early condemnations of Western powers and their role in guiding and manipulating Gulf monarchies.

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Footage of civilians killed and maimed by Saudi airstrikes and interviews with mothers whose emaciated children starve as a result of a coalition-enforced blockade continue to serve as powerful messages for pro-Huthi media. Such content not only highlights the destruction wrought by years of war but also boosts the group’s portrayal of themselves as humble defenders of the homeland and the sole resistance to some of the world’s most well-equipped militaries.27

The Importance of Diverse Content Huthi media productions continue to expand and adapt to the current conflict. The group and its backers invest heavily in TV channels, including Al-Masirah (established in 2012), Al-Sahat (established in 2013), Al-Hawya, and Al-Lahza (both established in 2017). These outlets broadcast local and international news reports as well as documentary films exposing American misdeeds in Yemen and interviews with former soldiers.28 Beyond coverage of the conflict, each channel airs entertainment programs including Ramadan series, children’s shows, and talk shows discussing women’s issues or matters of Islamic jurisprudence.29 Other forms of traditional media, including newspapers and magazines, are employed by the Huthis to a lesser extent. Major radio stations operating in governorates under their control promote Huthi messaging through poetry and radio dramas.30 By the late 2000s, the Huthis had embraced social media as a means of reaching diverse audiences worldwide. They now utilize, to varying degrees, all major platforms, including Telegram, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Soundcloud, and TikTok, with each platform offering its own set of benefits and drawbacks.31 Facebook, for example, is the most popular platform in Yemen, but the company is increasingly cracking down on unauthorized or violent content, which results in the suspension of some Huthi-affiliated accounts. At the other end of the spectrum is Telegram—a favorite of the Huthis (likely because of its lack of oversight) but also a platform that is not especially popular among Yemeni audiences. These social media pages facilitate the rapid dissemination of all forms of content. In the space of an hour, a single Houthi Telegram channel might share an infographic illustrating the success of their latest missile attack on Saudi oil facilities and selections of battlefield footage overlaid with speeches from AbdulMalik al-Huthi.32 Pictures of recently martyred soldiers are shared alongside news alerts and cartoons, but one of the most common pieces of content on these platforms comes in the form of poetry. Poems and songs are released almost every day on Huthi platforms, often with the aim of promoting excitement about the movement, encouraging followers to take up arms, and extolling the virtues of Huthi leaders. These poems come in different forms, with the most popular among the Huthis being zawāmil (sing. zāmil). These are commonly described as war poems, but many zawāmil discuss specific social issues or Yemeni communities. To address the issue of food shortages

144

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

and the blockade, the Huthis have produced a number of zawāmil performances focused on agriculture and sustainability.33 Other poems aim to praise and win the support of certain tribes or populations.34 A few characteristics of zawāmil make them uniquely suitable for Huthi propaganda efforts.35 The act of composing and reciting poetry is valued across Yemen as a means of conducting diplomacy and resolving disputes.36 An eloquent poem has the potential to persuade, and the Huthis (as well as many other political movements) use this art form to promote their own image and agenda.37 zawāmil are catchy and their messages stick with audiences for days if not months, or longer. The ease with which zawāmil are memorized also gives them an advantage: once they are committed to memory or become part of an oral tradition, they can never be blocked or censored, unlike articles or videos.38 In areas with low literacy rates, the spoken word can potentially reach a larger audience. Poems are also uniquely scalable and can be released as simple MP3s, shared through word of mouth, or filmed and auto-tuned depending on the capabilities of the producing entity and the needs of the audience. The same Huthi zamil, for example, can often be found in text form, on Soundcloud, and as an elaborate, highly produced performance resembling a music video.39 A cadre of dozens of poets, musicians, and producers from not only Yemen but also Iraq, Palestine, Iran, and Syria collaborate to create powerful propaganda videos and recitations that are at once culturally relevant and visually striking.40 The Huthis themselves make no secret of the importance of poetry in their “soft war” efforts. One article from Al-Masirah opens by saying that “the zamil is a leader on the front lines of all battles for Yemen’s salvation, throughout history and until today.”41 The Huthis believe that poetry has a psychological impact on the enemy, and the same article analyzing zawāmil explains that “most wars are waged not only to defeat the enemy, but to entirely break the will of resistance or defiance, and it is well-known that psychological victories are the most impactful.” The depth and breadth of Huthi media productions points to the fact that the group relies on their outlets and platforms for more than just recruitment or popular support. Messages communicated through their media repertoire are designed to create specific, coordinated narratives on events and actors that are deployed at certain times across mediums. When Huthi leadership grew especially frustrated with the role of the UN and its Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in 2020, media channels under their control and their officials released concurrent statements, cartoons, and poems attacking the UN’s work in Yemen and accused the body of promoting American and Saudi interests.42 Investments in diverse media allow the group to craft narratives about themselves for specific audiences. One zamil released in 2020 praised the role of the muhammashīn (a marginalized community in Yemen whose members are typically dark-skinned) in fighting against coalition forces, and paid tribute to muhammashīn martyred in the war.43 The poem was released in conjunction with a speech by Abdul-Malik al-Huthi on the same topic, as well as criticisms in major Huthi outlets of the response by police forces in the United States to Black Lives Matter protests.44 The coordinated campaign was apparently intended to highlight

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racial inclusivity in Huthi-controlled territory and contrast it with the injustices faced by African Americans in the United States. Huthi messaging also extends beyond that which is produced by the group’s own media. Fan accounts supporting the movement are numerous, and regional and international outlets—especially Hezbollah-leaning channels like Al-Mayadeen and Al-Manar, Iran’s Al-Alam, and Russia’s RT Arabic45—regularly provide platforms for Huthi leaders and representatives to argue their cause and launch accusations against their enemies. News stories that are reported by Russian, Iranian, and Lebanese outlets are often picked up by Huthi outlets, and vice versa. News platforms are frequently used to threaten and intimidate enemies by highlighting the Huthis’ advanced military capabilities and instances when Huthi missiles and armed drones have penetrated Saudi or Emirati defenses. Their messaging campaigns sometimes put their opponents on the defensive by requiring them to counter Huthi narratives and push back against torrents of propaganda or disinformation, including false or exaggerated claims about Huthi victories on the frontlines, or fake news stories about the conduct of international organizations or foreign militaries in Yemen.46 It is worth noting, however, that Huthi-affiliated outlets often report accurately on local and international news. The majority of stories that one encounters on Huthi platforms, especially in major outlets like Al-Masirah, are factual, but are selected and framed to reflect a specific worldview—one that emphasizes the failure or corruption of entities that oppose them and highlights their own successes or virtues, or those of their allies.

Adaptability and Diplomacy in Huthi Media But cross-border messaging campaigns cannot be neatly divided between those that praise allies and those that threaten enemies. On a number of occasions throughout the past two decades, the Huthis have made a point of making diplomatic overtures via popular media. One of the well-known early examples was in 2004, when Hussein al-Huthi penned a letter to Ali Abdullah Saleh, lamenting the president’s “displeasure” with him and proposing a kind of partnership. “I do not work against you,” he wrote. “I appreciate you and what you do tremendously, but what I do is my solemn national duty against the enemy of Islam and the community . . . America and Israel.”47 This letter not only allowed al-Huthi to present himself as a peacemaker but also helped reassert that the movement’s primary enemies are the United States and Israel, and not Yemen’s government. Similar messages have been communicated since the beginning of the Saudiled coalition’s intervention in Yemen, where Huthi leadership and media channels signal to Riyadh that they are looking to improve relations and end the conflict. The Huthis have consistently highlighted that the primary bad actors in Yemen are the United States and Israel, not Saudi Arabia, which is merely a puppet to Western powers. This depiction of the Saudi-American-Zionist aggression in Yemen, as the Huthis often label it, leaves the door open for future negotiations, with the understanding that the Huthis’ animosity toward Saudi Arabia lies in

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

its dependence on the United States, and not with the Kingdom itself.48 In 2017, following the purge by Mohammed bin Salman of major figures in the royal family, the Huthis said that they were “ready to offer sanctuary to any member of the Al Saud family or any Saudi national that wants to flee oppression and persecution.”49 In December 2020, when an oil tanker in Jeddah port came under attack, Mohammed Ali al-Huthi said that the group would consider providing protection to Saudi ports, considering “the apparent failure of America and Britain [in doing so].”50 Whether these overtures are sincere or not, they indicate that the Huthis use public messaging to enhance their legitimacy and communicate with allies and rivals.51 In their ongoing effort to assert legitimacy, the Huthis employ state symbols and rhetoric in their public messages.52 Like other rebel movements worldwide, the Huthis have created a set of “parallel hierarchies” to attempt to destroy the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government and secure the establishment of a rival regime.53 For the purposes of media analysis, these parallel hierarchies may include the cooptation of official state outlets under Huthi control, the publication and promotion of national visions and economic plans, and speeches delivered by Huthi officials wearing uniforms, badges, or other trappings of state and military power.54 Some expressions of legitimacy in Huthi messaging demonstrate a dual public image—that of a recognized authority and a supposed grassroots social justice movement. The group’s media paints them as competent and legitimate political leaders while harkening back to their humble origins in Saada and the guiding vision of their founder, Hussein al-Huthi. While the Huthis certainly project an air of authority and legitimacy, their rhetoric frequently highlights their perceived role as an underdog in Yemen’s ongoing war. It is clear from their media productions that the conflict itself—and the images and messages that accompany it—helps sustain Huthi media productions and their propaganda machine. Another notable linkage between Huthi messaging and statecraft is the role that individual journalists and media personalities continue to play in Huthi diplomacy. In 2019, the former head of Al-Masirah network, Ibrahim al-Dailami, was appointed as the Sanaa government’s ambassador to Iran.55 In November 2020, the journalist Abdullah Sabri was named as their latest ambassador to Syria.56

Remaining Dominant in the Modern Media Landscape In territories under their control, the Huthis ensure that their messages are the dominant ones by cracking down on opposition media within their grasp and competing with outlets over which they have no control. Despite their efforts to suppress independent media in northern Yemen, modern technology ensures that the Huthis’ grip is not absolute, since all platforms and sources of information cannot be blocked or censored. Internet proxies, though sometimes difficult to use in Yemen due to poor connectivity, allow some access to restricted websites,

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while platforms like WhatsApp and Signal can be used even with a weak internet connection. Alternative and sometimes adversarial narratives emanating from these outside networks create competition for the Huthis and compel them to adapt and refine their media strategies. One strategy employed by the Huthis is the circulation of various forms of disinformation to promote their own narratives. Examples of disinformation range from falsified videos released by high-level Huthi leadership to intentionally misleading claims and obfuscation of important news stories. Huthi disinformation is not always disseminated by the group’s leaders or official media outlets, but it is frequently shared by supporting media personalities and Telegram channels. Where each disinformation campaign originates is unclear, but many demonstrate a degree of coordination between outlets and leadership. Although the group relies on disinformation as a propaganda tool, the majority of their output, especially on the most prominent Huthi channels, cannot be classified as “fake news.” Outlets instead choose to report on stories that reinforce their key narratives while omitting unfavorable news events, nuanced coverage, or contextual analysis. For example, Huthi outlets and media personalities closely tracked and shared developments related to the 2020 US elections and the siege on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and while the events they described did indeed take place, Huthi media spun the stories to reflect the weakness of Western democracy and the illegitimacy of American elections.57 An equally important component of the Huthis’ media strategy is the sheer volume and diversity of content that the group produces on a daily basis, which may help ensure that target audiences in Yemen’s north need not look elsewhere for any form of media. The group seems to believe that providing audiences with content beyond news reporting or official statements is an effective means of competition in the media industry. New poems, infographics, radio dramas, and speeches are circulated across platforms and channels so that their narratives inevitably become the dominant ones in the territories they control. This strategy works in concert with the spread of disinformation, as studies evaluating the so-called illusory truth effect found that people tend to believe the pieces of information that they hear most frequently, regardless of their veracity.58 Even the most media-savvy and skeptical Yemenis are frequently exposed to Huthi narratives, and likely to accept at least some of them as fact. Many Huthi outlets boast an unapologetic Yemeni identity that gives them a distinct advantage among local audiences. Most entertainment programs are delivered in northern Yemeni dialects and many interviewers on channels like Al-Hawya and Al-Eman don traditional outfits.59 Every facet of Huthi media is imbued with Yemeni architectural and environmental motifs, and cultural and historical references surface in most of their poetry. Huthi media prides itself on being distinctly Yemeni by refusing to acquiesce to Western norms or attire.60 This local character may give them an advantage among Yemeni audiences, who would not be able to find similar programming within the more popular regional outlets like Al Arabiya or Al Jazeera.

148

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Even with their multifaceted strategy of disinformation, obfuscation, inundation, and Yemeni-specific themes, the Huthis must contend with the pressure that comes from the population under their control knowing that freedom of speech and unfettered press coverage is largely absent. Possibly in an attempt to account for this, and to give the appearance of permittivity, pro-Huthi outlets like AlHawya are increasingly airing dissenting voices on their shows, within limits. One example of this was seen in December 2020 when Al-Hawya aired an interview with Yemeni journalist “Muḥaḍarat aṣ-ṣrkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn lis-sayyid Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-juzʾ al-Awwal”, in Sanaa, in which she condemned the Huthi coup of 2014 and defended her use of the term “Huthi” rather than “Ansar Allah.”61 AlMasirah’s agricultural program, Al-Haql, also allows a space for farmers to vent their frustrations with local officials and their lack of support. Popular Sanaa-based YouTuber Mustafa al-Momari frequently and harshly criticizes Huthi leadership. In May 2021, he was arrested by Huthi authorities but quickly released following a request from Mohammed Ali al-Huthi and has since continued to produce videos.62 This degree of strategic flexibility, no matter how superficial, might indicate that the Huthis are adapting to an ever-changing media environment and responding to challenges that have accompanied their rise to power. Still, censorship remains an essential tool that the Huthis utilize to maintain control over local narratives. This tool is also used against the Huthis, as the group’s most prominent media personalities find themselves subjected to restrictions on their social media accounts, which are often suspended or blocked for suspicious or violent content.63 To evade these restrictions, users will create substitute accounts to which they quickly redirect their followers.64 This leads to a cycle of duplication, detection, and suspension for many of these accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.65 This is a distinct disadvantage for Huthi affiliates because of the popularity of these platforms. Other voices in Yemen’s conflict—including the government of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council, and even independent journalists—grapple with some of the same challenges presented by the modern media landscape. Regardless of affiliation, those who want to amplify their messages and attract followers must navigate barriers posed by Yemen’s oversaturated and highly politicized media environment. Often their strategies are informed by, and directly mimic, those of their rivals. As the dominant political entity in Yemen’s north, the Huthis inform and react to the messaging strategies of their adversaries. What remains to be seen is how the Huthis will adapt their rhetoric and public image to future stages of Yemen’s conflict and, eventually, peacetime. If the group hopes to remain relevant in the long term, they will need to find new ways of engaging domestic and international audiences and competing with rivals. Depending on the trajectory of the movement and the conflict itself, this may mean abandoning some of the more extreme elements of their messaging, such as the sarkha, or doubling down on provocative and divisive rhetoric in order to appease hardliners or foreign backers. Other political parties, independent journalists, and even average citizens will be forced to contend with the media practices and public

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messaging strategies that the Huthis have put in place in recent years. Regardless of the outcome for the Huthis, the movement has likely enacted changes to Yemen’s media environment that will remain for years to come.

Notes 1 IOM Yemen: COVID-19 Response Update, April 19–May 2, 2020, https://reliefweb. int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-covid-19-response-update-19-april-02-may-2020 2 “Interview with Mohamed al Houthi.” BBC Arabic. June 14, 2020, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=ic_V8BcQbHc (accessed March 26, 2021). 3 “Houthi: Corona Is an American Invention.” Al-Alam. March 24, 2020, https:// www.alalamtv.net/news/4815296/‫أمريكية‬-‫صناعة‬-‫كورونا‬-‫( الحوثي‬accessed March 28, 2021); Raiman al-Hamdani and Robert Wilson. “Yemen’s Response to Covid-19: Part I.” Political Settlements Research Programme. August 24, 2020, https://www. politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/27/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-i/ (accessed March 28, 2021). 4 “Coronavirus Vaccine ‘Will Come from Yemen’, Houthi Health Minister Claims.” AlAraby, May 31, 2020, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/31/yemenshouthis-claim-they-are-developing-a-coronavirus-vaccine (accessed March 28, 2021). 5 For the purposes of this chapter, “Houthi media” will include the outlets, channels, and social media pages that are either operated by Houthi-owned entities or those that are operated by the Houthis’ allies and prominent supporters. 6 “Soft War: Part I,” YouTube, August 11, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Z0tY_wP3-cs&list=WL&index=43&t=18s. 7 Zayd Baouh, “The Role of the Media in Countering Psychological Warfare,” Ansarollah, March 19, 2017, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/82906. 8 “Women and Soft War,” Telegram channel, established December 24, 2020. Accessed March 26, 2021, https://t.me/joinchat/Twrq838Wg7ZtDGri. 9 Nadwa al-Dawsari, “The Houthis’ Endgame in Yemen”, Al Jazeera, December 21, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/12/21/the-houthis-endgame-inyemen/. 10 The Believing Youth was a social movement that sought to strengthen Zaydi identity through religious training and youth activities. It arose in Sa'ada in the 1990s as a result of domestic and political events. 11 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, A History of the Houthi Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 37, 117, 135. 12 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen the Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 90–100. 13 Brandt 116. 14 “Muḥaḍarat aṣ-ṣrkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn lis-sayyid Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-juzʾ alAwwal,” Thaqafaqurania, YouTube, published January 20, 2014, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=U-SgKYLcEYs&t=456s. 15 Salmoni 115. 16 Brandt 133. 17 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Yemen’s Double Game,” Foreign Policy. December 7, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/07/yemens-double-game-2/ (accessed March 28, 2021).

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18 Brandt 5. 19 Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment, Middle East Program, Number 110, April 2010. 3, 5. 20 Robert F. Worth, “In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain,” The New York Times. October 24, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/ middleeast/25yemen.html (accessed March 28, 2021). 21 Casey Coombs, “In the Battles for Al-Jawf and Marib, Houthis Weaponizes Sana’a-based Telecom Companies,” Al-Masdar Online. April 29, 2020, https://almasdaronline.net/national/716 (accessed March 28, 2021). 22 “As a nonstate entity, the Huthi organism has been able to astutely utilize both timetested and cutting-edge mechanisms and modes of ideological dissemination in a much more effective and quickly evolving manner than the GoY [Government of Yemen] itself.” Salmoni 217. 23 Johnny Fakhry, “ʾʿlām al-al-Ḥūthī fī Ḥiṣn Ḥizbu-allāh Daʿm wa- Tadrīb” [“Houthi Media in the Lap of Hezbollah . . . Support and Training from Beirut”], Al-Arabiya. June 10, 2020, https://www.alarabiya.net/araband-world/yemen/2019/06/10/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7 %D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA. 24 Afrah Nasser, “The Yemen War, Media, and Propaganda,” Atlantic Council. May 3, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-yemen-war-media-andpropaganda/. 25 Raiman Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner. “Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans Can Promote Peace in Yemen,” ECFR. October 14, 2020, https://ecfr.eu/publication/ talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/ (accessed March 28, 2021). 26 “Who Are the Four Yemeni Journalists under Houthi Death Sentence?” Reporters Without Borders (RSF). May 14, 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/who-are-four-yemenijournalists-under-houthi-death-sentence (accessed March 28, 2021). It is worth noting that although a number of journalists have been sentenced to death by Houthi special courts, these sentences have not yet resulted in executions taking place. 27 Despite the Saudis’ access to advanced military capabilities, the Houthis attempt to show that the righteousness of their cause always wins out in the end. One example of these symbols is Abdul-Malik al-Huthi’s lighter, which he spoke of in a 2017 speech to illustrate how the Huthis will defeat the world’s greatest armies with the simplest and cheapest of tools. Lighters often show up in Huthi propaganda videos, accompanying footage of burned Saudi tanks. See: “Mā Huwwa Sir al-Wallāʿa Al-Lattī Rafaʿhā Zaʿīm Ḥarakat ʾAnṣār Allāh fī Wajh al-Suʿūdiyya” [“What Is the Secret of the Lighter that the Leader of Ansar Allah Movement Raised in the Face of Saudi Arabia?”] Al-Alam, February 11, 2017, https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1923623/-‫زعيم‬-‫رفعها‬-‫الوالعة‬-‫سر‬-‫ماهو‬ ‫السعودية‬-‫وجه‬-‫في‬-‫هللا‬-‫أنصار‬-‫حركة‬-‫( التي‬accessed March 28, 2021). 28 “Al-Ḥarb ʿAlā As-silāḥ,” Al-ʾIʿlām al-Ḥarbī al-ʿAskrī, YouTube, March 19, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-o8GAd8Z9mI (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Ḥakāyāt Ḥarb,” Al-Masirah, https://www.almasirah.net/category/175/102/%D8% AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8 (accessed March 28, 2021).

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29 “Thāʾrāt.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah.net/category/154/102/‫( ثائرات‬accessed March 28, 2021). and “Masāʾl Fiqhiyya,” Al-Masirah, https://www.almasirah.net/ category/140/102/‫فقهية‬-‫( مسائل‬accessed March 28, 2021). 30 Sanaa Radio, http://www.sanaaradio.net/Default.aspx (accessed March 28, 2021). 31 Many pro-Huthi accounts on YouTube and Telegram have tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of followers. Some of the most popular pages are those that post Huthi poetry, including Fatā Saʿda al-Thāʾr, which has 289,000 followers on YouTube. See: Fata Sa’adah al-Tha’ir, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/channel/ UCz6PEKTwix_KGjicjH3ih-g (accessed March 28, 2021). 32 Al-Masirah Satellite Channel, Telegram, https://t.me/almasirah2 (accessed March 28, 2021). 33 “Frontlines of Self-Reliance,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube, October 31, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzQF8JMt3uM&t=1s (accessed March 28, 2021). 34 “New Issa al-Layth Zamil for the Tribes of Haraz,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube. June 16, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZsHaUtAHKY (accessed March 28, 2021). 35 Hassan Al-Mortatha, “The Yemeni Zamil from a Local Weapon to an Intercontinental Weapon,” Al-Masirah. March 20, 2021, https://www.almasirah.net/post/148043/ 36 Steven Charles Caton, Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). 37 Elisabeth Kendall and E. Stein, “Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad,” Twenty-First Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (London: IB Tauris, 2015), 247–69. 38 “Elisabeth Kendall: Jihadi Poetry in Yemen,” Babel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 24, 2020, https://www.csis.org/podcasts/babeltranslating-middle-east/elisabeth-kendall-jihadi-poetry-yemen (accessed March 28, 2021). 39 Houthi Telegram channels often publish the same zamil videos in three different qualities: low, medium, and high. This allows even those with weak internet connections to view the performances. 40 “Khandaq Waḥīd,” Zawaml, YouTube, October 9, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pIIIUNWTSrE (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Qawm Qamāsa” Wiḥdat alʾIntāj al-Fannī- al-ʾIʿlām al-H̱arbī al-ʿAskkarī, YouTube, November 11, 2020, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QFOxCDynbk (accessed March 28, 2021). 41 Al-Masirah, Al-Mortatha, al-Zāmil al-Yamanī min Silāḥ Maḥlī ilā Silāḥ ʿĀbir li-l-Qārāt, https://www.almasirah.net/post/148043/‫للقارات‬-‫عابر‬-‫سالح‬-‫إلى‬-‫محلي‬-‫سالح‬-‫من‬-‫اليمني‬-‫الزامل‬ 42 “The UN is an Official Partner in the Aggression and Blockade in Yemen,” Al-Sahat Reports, YouTube, July 9, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9DW5Hi2IVI (accessed March 28, 2021) and “The One Who Controls the Nations,” Artistic Productions Unit—Yemen War Media, YouTube, July 18, 2020, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=6JMv1atJHyg (accessed March 28, 2021). 43 “Aḥfād Bilāl,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube, July 1, 2020, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=ckbFaEjRaAo&t=18s (accessed March 28, 2021). 44 Al-Masirah Satellite Channel, Telegram, June 14, 2020, https://t.me/almasirah2/54934 (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Leader of the Revolution: I Call on the Official Authorities to Launch a Long-term National Program to Take Care of Bilal’s Descendants,” Al-Majlis Al-Zaydi Al-Islami, June 18, 2020, http://www.zaidiah.com/ news/8074 (accessed March 28, 2021).

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45 Qatari and Turkish outlets, such as Al Jazeera and TRT often host Huthi spokesmen. CNN Arabic and other channels have also featured interviews with some leaders, including Mohammed Ali al-Huthi. “With Mohammed Ali al-Houthi,” CNN Arabic, YouTube, March 13, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cSxCzj7MLRM (accessed March 28, 2021). 46 For a few examples of fake news in Huthi-affiliated media, see “The Truth of USAID’s Military Activities in Yemen,” Yemen Press Agency, July 8, 2020, http:// www.ypagency.net/274581 (accessed March 28, 2021) and “See Pictures of Sana’a Forces Raising the National Flag above Marib Dam,” Yemen Press Agency, March 7, 2021, http://www.ypagency.net/344480 (accessed March 28, 2021). 47 Published in Yemen Times, June 28, 2004 and quoted in Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 155. 48 Hannah Porter, “What an End to Yemen’s Conflict Will Mean for the Houthis,” LobeLog, September 4, 2019, https://lobelog.com/what-an-end-to-yemens-conflictwill-mean-for-the-houthis/ (accessed March 28, 2021). 49 Faisal Edroos, “Houthis Offer Saudi Princes Political Asylum in Yemen,” Al-Jazeera, November 7, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/7/houthis-offer-saudiprinces-political-asylum-in-yemen (accessed March 28, 2021). 50 Mohammed Ali al-Huthi, Twitter post, December 14, 2020, https://twitter.com/Moh_ Alhouthi/status/1338598031470579714?s=20. 51 One pro-Huthi entertainment channel on YouTube with almost 700,000 followers released a short fictional clip of two Huthi soldiers risking their lives to provide Saudi soldiers with food and water. Messages like these are an attempt to depict the inherent morality of Huthi troops while also asserting that peace can exist between the two sides. “A Yemeni Surprises His Saudi Opponent with Food,” Abu Ali Channel, YouTube, May 10, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whv_aGtr6SE (accessed March 28, 2021). 52 “Rebels often seek to bolster their authority by borrowing ruling practices developed by the nation-state, most directly by setting up governments that mimic the form and practices of the national governments they seek to replace.” Mampilly, Zachariah, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 82, 89. 53 Eqbal Ahmad, “Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency,” Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 241–62. Quoted in Mampilly in Rebel Rulers, 2015. 13. 54 After their arrival in Sanaa, Huthi forces seized or shuttered most news outlets in the capital, including Al-Thawra newspaper and Yemen TV, among many others. For some of these outlets, Hadi’s government has set up mirror sites, effectively creating multiple news entities under the same name that represent opposing sides. See Huthi-run SABA Net (https://www.saba.ye/ar) and the Hadi government-operated site (https://www.sabanew.net/). For political visions, see “Text of the Document Presented by ‘Ansar Allah’ for a Comprehensive Solution to the War in Yemen,” AlAlam, April 8, 2020, https://bit.ly/3ie6JTf. 55 “Ibrahim al-Dailami, ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to Iran,” Al-Ahed News, August 17, 2019, https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=9836&cid=123 (accessed March 28, 2021).

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56 “Republican Decision to Appoint Abdullah Sabry as Yemen’s Ambassador to Syria.” SABA News Agency, Sanaa. November 11, 2020, https://www.saba.ye/ar/ news3115773.htm. 57 “‘Demagoguery’ of Trump Reveals the Shame of Fake American Democracy . . .!” Al-Masirah, January 9, 2021, http://www.almasirahnews.com/59846/ (accessed March 28, 2021). 58 Lisa K. Fazio, et al. “Knowledge Does Not Protect against Illusory Truth,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144, no. 5 (2015): 993–1002. 59 “Nine-thirty,” Al-Hawya, YouTube, March 28, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=jNu2GTSmtLc (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Be Aware,” Kun Wāʿiyyan Al-Eman, http://www.alemantv.net/VideoGalleary/5/ً ‫واعيا‬20%‫كن‬20%‫( برنامج‬accessed March 28, 2021). 60 Abdul-Malik al-Huthi spoke about the West’s attempts to impose their clothing styles on Yemenis in a speech on the anniversary of Hussein al-Huthi’s death. “Text of the Leader of the Revolution’s Speech on the Anniversary of the Martyr Leader,” Saba Net, March 10, 2021, https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3132041.htm (accessed March 28, 2021). 61 “Special interview with Yemeni media figure Mona Safwan,” Al-Hawya Channel, YouTube, December 24, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR6dA4RH0-I. Another example of dissent being make public is the Huthi-run channels that air parliamentary sessions, where members criticize the Sanaa government’s policies. See al-Barlamānī ʿAbdu Bashar Yafḍaḥu Jamāʿat al-Ḥūthī fī Mudākhaltihi Khilāl Jalsat Majlis an-Nuwwāb bi-Ṣanʿāʾ [“Parliamentarian Abdo Bashir Shames the Houthi Group in His Comments during the House of Representatives Session in Sana’a”], Al-Yemen Al-Jumhuri, YouTube, July 28, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=2rmEp8yFFJc (accessed March 28, 2021). 62 Shāhidū Limādhā Tamma Iḥtijāzī fi-l Maḥkama wa Kayfa Kharajtu wa Kayfa kān al-Taḥqīq maʿī Muṣṭafā al-Mūmrī [“See Why I Was Detained and How I Was Released”], Mustafa al-Momari, YouTube. May 31, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=NlCdrLBMI94 63 Following the US government’s short-lived designation of the Huthis as a foreign terrorist organization, many social media pages associated with the group were blocked or suspended, including on YouTube and Facebook. Throughout the conflict, Huthi accounts on Facebook have been blocked. 64 Dhaifula Shami, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/DhaifulahShami (accessed March 28, 2021). 65 Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abdelsalam warns his followers in his pinned tweet to not fall for fake duplicate accounts, explaining that this page is his “certified account.” Huthi members usually cannot get their accounts certified by Twitter, which leaves them vulnerable to copycats. See Muhammad Abdelsalam, Twitter post, March 31, 2018, https://twitter.com/abdusalamsalah/status/979953011651956737?s=20 (accessed March 28, 2021).

Bibliography “Aḥfād Bilāl.” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube, July 1, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ckbFaEjRaAo&t=18s (accessed March 28, 2021).

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

“Al-Ḥarb ʿAlā As-silāḥ” Al-ʾIʿlām al-Ḥarbī al-ʿAskrī, YouTube, March 19, 2021. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=-o8GAd8Z9mI (accessed March 28, 2021). “Ḥakāyāt Ḥarb.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah.net/category/175/102/‫حرب‬-‫حكاية‬. (accessed March 28, 2021). “Be Aware.” Kun Wāʿiyyan Al-Eman. http://www.alemantv.net/VideoGalleary/5/20%‫برنامج‬ ً ‫واعيا‬20%‫( كن‬accessed March 28, 2021). “Coronavirus Vaccine ‘Will Come from Yemen’, Houthi Health Minister Claims.” AlAraby, May 31, 2020. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/31/yemenshouthis-claim-they-are-developing-a-coronavirus-vaccine (accessed March 28, 2021). “’Demagoguery’ of Trump Reveals the Shame of Fake American Democracy..!” Al-Masirah, January 9, 2021. http://www.almasirahnews.com/59846/ (accessed March 28, 2021). “Elisabeth Kendall: Jihadi Poetry in Yemen.” Babel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 24, 2020. https://www.csis.org/podcasts/babel-translating-middle-east/ elisabeth-kendall-jihadi-poetry-yemen (accessed March 28, 2021). “Frontlines of Self-Reliance. ”zawāmil wa Anasheed. YouTube. October 31, 2020. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzQF8JMt3uM&t=1s (March 28, 2021). “Houthi: Corona is an American Invention.” al-al-Ḥūthī: Kūrūnā Ṣināʿa ʾAmrīkiyya, AlAlam. March 24, 2020. https://www.alalamtv.net/news/4815296/‫أمريكية‬-‫صناعة‬-‫كورونا‬-‫;الحوثي‬ (accessed March 28, 2021). “Ibrahim al-Dailami, Ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to Iran.” Al-Ahed News, August 17, 2019. https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=9836&cid=123 (accessed March 28, 2021). “Interview with Mohamed al Houthi.” BBC Arabic. June 14, 2020. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=ic_V8BcQbHc (accessed March 26, 2021). “IOM Yemen: COVID-19 Response Update.” April 19–May 02, 2020, May 11, 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-covid-19-response-update-19-april-02may–2020 “Khandaq Waḥīd.” Zawaml, YouTube, October 9, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pIIIUNWTSrE (accessed March 28, 2021). “Leader of the Revolution: I Call on the Official Authorities to Launch a Long-term National Program to Take Care of Bilal’s Descendants.” Qāʾd al-Thawra: ʾAdʿū al-Jihāt al-Rasmiyya li-ʾIṭlāq Barnāmaj Waṭanī Ṭawīl al-ʾAmad li-l-ʿināya bi-Aḥfād Bilāl, AlMajlis Al-Zaydi Al-Islami. June 18, 2020. http://www.zaidiah.com/news/8074 (accessed March 28, 2021). “Main News Bulletin on Sunday 14/06/20.” Al-Masirah Satellite Channel on Telegram. June 14, 2020. https://t.me/almasirah2/54934 (accessed March 28, 2020). “Muhadarat as-sarkha fi wajh al-mustakbireen lis-sayid Husayn Badraddin al-Huthi al-juz’ al-awal.” Thaqafaqurania, YouTube, published January 20, 2014. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=U-SgKYLcEYs&t=456s “New Issa al-Layth Zamil for the Tribes of Haraz.” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube. June 16, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZsHaUtAHKY (accessed March 28, 2021) “Nine-thirty.” Al-Hawya, YouTube, March 28, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=jNu2GTSmtLc (accessed March 28, 2021). “The One Who Controls the Nations.” Artistic Productions Unit—Yemen War Media, YouTube, July 18, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JMv1atJHyg (accessed March 28, 2021). “Parliamentarian Abdo Bashir Shames the Houthi Group in His Comments during the House of Representatives Session in Sana’a.” Al-Yemen Al-Jumhuri, YouTube, July 28, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rmEp8yFFJc (accessed March 28, 2021).

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“Qawm Qamāsa.” Wiḥdat al-ʾIntāj al-Fannī- al-ʾIʿlām al-H̱arbī al-ʿAskkarī. YouTube. November 11, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QFOxCDynbk (accessed March 28, 2021). “Republican Decision to Appoint Abdullah Sabry as Yemen’s Ambassador to Syria.” SABA News Agency, Sana’a. November 11, 2020. https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3115773.htm. Shāhid bil-Ṣuwar Quwwāt Ṣanʿāʾ Tarfaʿ al-ʿAlam al-Waṭanī ʿAlā Sad Maʾrib, “See pictures of Sana’a Forces Raising the National Flag above Marib Dam.” Wakālat alṢaḥāfa al-Yamaniyya, “Yemen Press Agency”, March 7, 2021. http://www.ypagency. net/344480 (accessed March 28, 2021). al-Ḥarb al-Nāʿima: al-juzʾ al-ʾAwwal, “Soft War: Part I.” YouTube, August 11, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0tY_wP3-cs&list=WL&index=43&t=18s “Special Interview with Yemeni Media Figure Mona Safwan.” Al-Hawya Channel, YouTube, December 24, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR6dA4RH0–I. Naṣ al-Wathīqa al-Lattī Qaddamathā ʾAnṣāru Allāh li-l-Ḥal al-Shāmil li-Waqf al-Ḥarb fi-l-Yaman, “Text of the Document Presented by ‘Ansar Allah’ for a Comprehensive Solution to the War in Yemen.” Al-Alam, April 8, 2020. https://www.alalamtv.net/ news/4850731/‫اليمن‬-‫في‬-‫الحرب‬-‫لوقف‬-‫الشامل‬-‫للحل‬-‫هللا‬-‫انصار‬-‫قدمتها‬-‫التي‬-‫الوثيقة‬-‫نص‬ “Text of the Leader of the Revolution’s Speech on the Anniversary of the Martyr Leader.” Saba Net, March 10, 2021. https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3132041.htm (accessed March 28, 2021). “Thāʾrāt.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah.net/category/154/‫تارئاث‬/102 (accessed March 28, 2021). “The Truth of USAID’s Military Activities in Yemen.” Yemen Press Agency, July 8, 2020. http://www.ypagency.net/274581 (accessed March 28, 2021). “What Is the Secret of the Lighter that the Leader of Ansar Allah Movement Raised in the Face of Saudi Arabia?.” Al-Alam, February 11, 2017. https://www.alalamtv.net/ news/1923623/‫السعودية‬-‫وجه‬-‫في‬-‫هللا‬-‫أنصار‬-‫حركة‬-‫زعيم‬-‫رفعها‬-‫التي‬-‫الوالعة‬-‫سر‬-‫( ماهو‬accessed March 28, 2021). “Who Are the Four Yemeni Journalists under Houthi Death Sentence?.” Reporters Without Borders (RSF). May 14, 2020. https://rsf.org/en/news/who-are-four-yemenijournalists-under-houthi-death-sentence (accessed March 28, 2021). “With Mohammed Ali al-Houthi.” CNN Arabic, YouTube, March 13, 2021. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=cSxCzj7MLRM (accessed March 28, 2021). al-Marʾa w-l-Ḥarb al-Nāʿima, “Women and Soft War.” Telegram channel, established December 24, 2020. https://t.me/joinchat/Twrq838Wg7ZtDGri (accessed March 26, 2021). “A Yemeni Surprises His Saudi Opponent with Food.” Yamanī Yufājiʾ Khuṣūmahu al-Suʿdiyyīn bi-Ṭaʿām ʾIfṭār, Qanāt Abū ʿAly, YouTube, May 10, 2020. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=whv_aGtr6SE (accessed March 28, 2021). ­Abdelsalam, Muhammad, Twitter post, March 31, 2018. https://twitter.com/ abdusalamsalah/status/979953011651956737?s=20 (accessed March 28, 2021). Ahmad, Eqbal. “Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency.” In Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California iPress, 1982), 241–62. Quoted in Mampilly in Rebel Rulers, 2015. ­Al-Dawsari, Nadwa. “The Houthis’ Endgame in Yemen.” Al Jazeera. December 21, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/12/21/the-houthis-endgame-in-yemen/ (accessed March 28, 2021). Al-Momari, Mostafa. “See Why I Was Detained and How I Was Released.’’ YouTube. May 31, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlCdrLBMI94

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The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Al-Mortatha, Hassan. “The Yemeni Zamil from a Local Weapon to an Intercontinental Weapon.” Al-Masirah. March 20, 2021. https://www.almasirah.net/post/148043/ AlSahat Reports, “al-ʾUmmam al-Muttaḥida Sharīk Rasmī fi-l ʿUdwān w-l-Ḥiṣār ʿAlā al-Yaman”, YouTube, July 9, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9DW5Hi2IVI (accessed March 28, 2021). Boucek, Christopher. “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge.” Carnegie Endowment, Middle East Program, Number 110, April 2010. Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen, a History of the Houthi Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Caton, Steven Charles. Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). Coombs, Casey. “In the Battles for Al-Jawf and Marib, Houthis Weaponizes Sana’a-based Telecom Companies.” Al-Masdar Online. April 29, 2020. https://al-masdaronline.net/ national/716 (accessed March 28, 2021). Edroos, Faisal. “Houthis Offer Saudi Princes Political Asylum in Yemen.” Al-Jazeera. November 7, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/7/houthis-offer-saudiprinces-political-asylum-in-yemen (accessed March 28, 2021). Fakhry, Johnny. “Saudi Arabia’s Delegate: The Yemeni Government Decided to Allow Ships to Dock in Hodeidah as a Goodwill Gesture.” Al-Arabiya. January 10, 2020. https://bit.ly/3izEReU Fata Sa’adah al-Tha’ir, YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCz6PEKTwix_ KGjicjH3ih-g Fazio, Lisa K., et al. “Knowledge Does Not Protect against Illusory Truth.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.” 144, no. 5 2015: 993–1002. Al-Hamdani, Raiman and Helen Lackner. “Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans Can Promote Peace in Yemen.” ECFR. October 14, 2020. https://ecfr.eu/publication/ talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/ (accessed March 28, 2021. ). Al-Hamdani, Raiman and Robert Wilson. “Yemen’s Response to Covid-19: Part I.” Political Settlements Research Programme. August 24, 2020. https://www. politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/27/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-i/ (accessed March 28, 2021). Al-Huthi, Mohammed Ali, Twitter post, December 14, 2020. https://twitter.com/Moh_ Alhouthi/status/1338598031470579714?s=20 (accessed March 28, 2021). Kendall, Elisabeth, and E. Stein. “Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad.” Twenty-first Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 247–69. Knickmeyer, Ellen. “Yemen’s Double Game.” Foreign Policy. December 7, 2010. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/07/yemens-double-game–2/ Mampilly, Zachariah. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). Masāʾl Fiqhiyya, Al-Masirah, And “Masa’il Fiqhyah.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah. net/category/140/102/‫فقهية‬-‫( مسائل‬accessed March 28, 2021). Nasser, Afrah. “The Yemen War, Media, and Propaganda.” Atlantic Council. May 03, 2017. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-yemen-war-media-andpropaganda/ Porter, Hannah. “What an End to Yemen’s Conflict Will Mean for the Houthis.” LobeLog. September 4, 2019. https://lobelog.com/what-an-end-to-yemens-conflict-will-meanfor-the-houthis/ (accessed March 28, 2021).

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Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen the Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: R and, 2010). Sanaa Radio. http://www.sanaaradio.net/Default.aspx (accessed March 28, 2021). Shami, Dhaifullah. Twitter account. https://twitter.com/DhaifulahShami (accessed March 28, 2021). Wedeen, Lisa. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Worth, Robert F. “In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain.” The New York Times. October 24, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/middleeast/25yemen. html (March 28, 2021).

158

­8 T H E H U T H I Z A M I L : F O L K L I T E R AT U R E O R P R O PAG A N DA ? Emily J. Sumner

1. I said “in the name of God” at the gates of Najran We tear out the enemy’s forts from their roots 2. The victory is like the sun, clear to see: I imagined its lightning shining in Nahuqa 3. We’ve tasted their crimes in shapes and colors And today what we’ve tasted they must taste 4. Oh, whoever wants greatness moves now Over the Saudi, oh men, over him! 5. We continue our mission to Salman’s palace And whoever has a right takes his rights! 6. I swear I won’t be humiliated by America Everyone’s desire is stirred to plunge into battle! 7. If they gather Pharaoh, Qarun and Haman In our sea their sins must drive them 8. If with arms march the humans and jinn [We are] confident in the victory of God, completely confident 9. And the battle has witnesses and proof And nothing holds back the power of the Most Merciful 10. Ring the bell, oh every marksman and swordsman! And this victory we passionately desire—its lightning gleams 11. Oh God! This oppressor tyrannized aggressively Guide our aim, we shut them upi

i

1. ‫سميت باسم هللا على أبواب نجران‬ ‫نقلع حصون المعتدي من عروقه‬ 2. ‫والنصر مثل الشمس واضح لال عيان‬ ‫خيلت براقه لمع في نهوقة‬ 3. ‫ذقنا جرايمهم على أشكال وألوان‬ ‫واليوم ما ذقناه الزم يذوقه‬

160

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Introduction The poem above is a Huthi zamil (plural, zawāmil).1 The zamil is a genre of oral poetry embedded in Yemen’s social fabric.2 As occasional poems that emerged from tribal areas, they give shape to events of communal importance, from the joy of weddings to the upheaval of war. Zawāmil proliferate in Yemen’s transitional moments,3 and the current civil war is no exception. In the areas under Huthi control, zawāmil particular to their cause are omnipresent. They blare at military checkpoints, official political events, and workplaces; they are chanted among children at play and enjoyed in private homes. They can also be found at local cultural circles that the Huthis have set up in neighborhoods. As one interlocutor told me, “Yemenis live on zawāmil.”4 Furthermore, on social media, Huthi zawāmil spread rapidly. Reactions on sites such as YouTube demonstrate they are appreciated in Yemen and beyond. Elsewhere, I analyze how a Yemeni family experiences the Huthi zamil and the practices with which they perceive the poems to be enmeshed.5 In this chapter, I turn to the continuities and tensions that erupt when considering the zamil as folk literature with potent historical precedence, on the one hand, and a media tool of the Huthis, on the other. First, I review scholars’ definitions of the genre and its social role—not because I believe scholars enjoy ultimate authority in how to define the zamil (they do not)—but because these definitions offer a background upon which to draw comparisons between poems that carry the name zamil. Then, I contrast two Huthi poems with another pair composed in the early to mid-twentieth century, as the imamate was crumbling. In so doing, I identify sites of tension in the genre; hypothesize how and why the Huthis find them useful; and call for future research. Consistent with many zawāmil that have come before it and continue to be composed today, the Huthi zawāmil are composed in dialect; rely on shared 4. ‫يامن يريد العز يتحرك اآلن‬ ‫فوق السعودي يا الرجاجيل فوقه‬ 5. ‫نواصل المشوار لقصرسلمان‬ ‫وكل من له حق ياخذ حقوقه‬ 6. ‫أقسم قسم ما أنا لألمريكي مهتان‬ ‫كلن لخوض المعركة هز شوقه‬ 7. ‫لو يجمعوا فرعون قارون هامان‬ ‫في بحرنا الزم ذنوبه تسوقه‬ 8. ‫لو بالمدرع يزحف اإلنس والجان‬ ‫واثق بنصر هللا كامل وثوقه‬ 9. ‫والمعركة فيها شواهد وبرهان‬ ‫وقوة الرحمن ما شي يعوقه‬ 10. ‫دق الجرس يا كل رامي وطعان‬ ‫والنصر ذي نهواه الحت بروقه‬ 11. ‫يا هللا ذا الظالم طغى ظلم عدوان‬ ‫سدد مرامينا نسدد حلوقه‬

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161

lexicon and imagery; draw upon tribal, religious, and nationalist discourses; and constitute groups and their positions on social issues. In contrast to the folk zamil, Huthi zawāmil contain more verses, feature electronic instrumentation, and integrate melodies from other genres of poetry. Furthermore, the poems I analyze here suggest that the Huthis shift the crux of the poetry’s message to hinge upon religious ideology. Taken together, these changes signal that the Huthi zawāmil do not function as a dialogic form of public discourse among local groups; the Huthis do not aim to contribute to public discourse but to dictate it. By entrenching their religious ideology within language typical of the zamil and disseminating their poems far and wide, the Huthis create a finely tuned media and recruitment tool.

The Zamil: Origin, Classification(s), Definition(s) Scholars agree that zawāmil are historically rich, communal, chanted poems associated with tribes.6 One manner in which Yemenis occasionally illustrate the historical potency and social power of the genre is through an origin story. In the tale, Yemeni tribesmen cower from Roman warriors in a cave. While in hiding, they hear the chanting of poetry, and then see clouds of dust, indications of jinn waging war. The poetry compels the tribesmen to emerge and resume their fight. Yemenis have composed and performed zawāmil ever since.7 Regardless of the truth of this story, it positions the zamil as a centuries-old practice. Yemeni literary scholars categorize the zamil as one of Yemen’s folk arts (funūn shaʿbiyya) or a folk literature (ʾAdab Shaʿbī), thereby associating it with the common man.8 AlBaradduni concludes that the zamil is a product of “the details of life” (ʾItqān alḤaya) and the “intuition of the ordinary person” (badihat al-Insān al-ʿĀdī).9 This may be a romanticization of the zamil, as most Yemenis do not consider themselves tribal,10 and many did not grow up with the zamil in their communities. However, the perception that the zamil connects with the average Yemeni is worth noting, as the Huthis appear to be aware of that view. This, perhaps, contributes to their decision to invest in the form as a backbone to their media campaign. When scholars discuss the zamil, several recurring characteristics surface. Zawāmil are performed in groups and include a rhymed poem chanted to a melody. They also engage with a specific social issue.11 The relationship between the zamil and the group is a defining one, both in terms of the group’s performance and their connection to the subject matter. One Yemeni scholar notes the two essential characteristics of the zamil are “a group of chanters and the expression of the group, not the individual” (jamāʿat al-ʾInshād wa-l-taʿbīr ‘an al-kull lā ‘an alfard).12 The syntactic root of the zamil is consistent with this observation. It carries the meaning of a clamor of voices in one derivation (azamil) and a troop in another (zumla). During the performance, chanters often march toward their audience; the bar‘a, a tribal dance, is also sometimes featured.13 For example, in 2019 a dance troop performed the bar‘a for a large crowd to the zamil, “Maghāzī al-Layl” (night raids) in Sanaa, as part of the events on the National Day of Steadfastness, meant to

162

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

commemorate four years of withstanding the Gulf coalition’s air campaign against the Huthis.14 Zawāmil are not only performed for war; they are also performed at other significant events, such as weddings, political rallies, tribal conferences, and religious festivals.15 Unsurprisingly, it is common for the poems’ discourse to reference tribal values and customary law, thereby participating in the cultural context from which it came.16

The Zamil as Performance The zamil does not merely express perspectives; the genre creates and maintains groups along with their positions. To discuss the zamil’s social role is to consider the performance of identities as well as their position in public discourse. Zawāmil, along with other forms of poetry, were indispensable to the creation of Yemeni national identity, particularly because of their prevalence on the radio and circulation via audio cassettes.17 Some nationalists of the 1950s attribute their initial conceptualization of Yemen as a nation (waṭan) to zawāmil they heard performed by the imam’s poets in their villages as young boys.18 ‘ʿAly ʿAbdallah Ṣāliḥ’s regime capitalized on the zamil to construct tribal and national identity.19 This is not only true for Yemen. Zawāmil were performed at key moments, such as national day, to celebrate Sultan Qaboos’ reign in Oman and are now being composed in honor of his successor.20 Strategic use of a cultural practice for the production of a specific identity or ideology, such as nationalism, is well known in the Middle East and elsewhere, known as invented traditions.21 The work of the Huthi zamil should be understood in relation to other invented traditions and cultural practices, not as operating by an entirely separate logic. The link between the zamil and identity formation is consistent with Caton’s case study of the zamil among tribesmen in the Yemeni highlands, in which he theorizes the poems as persuasive rhetoric.22 His argument rests upon language’s ability to index specific identities (in this case, the honorable tribesman) in mutually understood social worlds. In his study, the zamil provides a medium for debate and negotiation between two conflicting tribes. The parties build their perspectives through the poems, create their own honorable identities, and situate them in the social context in such a way that makes it possible to imagine a solution. The more aesthetically pleasing the poem and the more adeptly the language indexes and situates identities, the more persuasive the zamil. As is often the case with Huthi zawāmil, zawāmil motivate warriors and instill fear in adversaries when used as weapons of “psychological war that precedes physical war” (ḥarb nafsiyya tasbiq al-ḥarb al-fi‘liyya).23 The relationship between the zamil as performance and waging war is quite evident. Zawāmil provide morale for fighters prior to battle, a form of ḥamāsa (excitement) poetry. The symbols of the Huthi media campaign and the lyrics to their zawāmil provide evidence for its role in waging war. For example, the YouTube channel Zawāmil wa-anashid

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163

features a gun with notes emerging from its snout.24 Furthermore, consider verse three of the popular zamil “Armies of God in Ma’rib”: Allah is great! Its echo blazes inside [of them]. My rifle in the conflict performs its songs.25ii In the second hemistich of the zamil above, the rifle is likened to a musical instrument, hence it “performs its songs,” thereby constructing an analogy between the art of the zamil and that of war. The verse opens with invocations of “God is great,” resounding within the self, just as the zamil’s chants echo through the air, activating the emotions of those who hear it. Similarly, another zamil that appears later in this chapter declares, “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale,” invoking the very effect the zamil aims to realize.

The Zamil in Yemen’s History Because zawāmil express public opinion, they are often integrated into Arabic and English narrations of Yemen’s history and politics.26 Zawāmil offer insights into how groups experienced pivotal events, and bear upon the present. For example, in 2020 the Huthis launched a fresh offensive against the tribes of al-Bayda’, and amid his analysis of the developing situation, one analyst notes that zawāmil “immortalized” the Zaydi imam’s attacks on the Sunni tribes of al-Bayda’ in the early and midnineteenth century, implying the zawāmil preserve animosity and impact how the tribes perceive the Huthis.27 The zawāmil’s citation in historical, political, and literary texts is indicative of their role in transmitting history; in the words of Diane Taylor, the zamil is part of the Yemeni repertoire that makes its way into the archive.28 If written poetry belongs in the archive and oral poetry belongs in the repertoire, the zamil is a prime example of how the oral and written are co-implicated. ii

1. ‫استنفري يا جيوش هللا في مأرب‬ ‫وقت النقا حان ويل المعتدي ويله‬ 2. ‫جنود ربي حماة الدار تتأهب‬ ‫والجن واإلنس واالمالك تصغي له‬ 3. ‫هللا أكبر صداها في الحشا يلهب‬ ‫وبندقي في الخصم يدي مواويله‬ 4. ‫­صنعاء بعيدة قولو له الرياض أقرب‬ ‫يا بندقي ال هنت سامرني الليلة‬ 5. ‫القوم شبت نكفها للقاء ترغب‬ ً ‫كال حزم عدته وأسرج على خيله‬ 6. ‫قولو لسلمان ماله مننا مهرب‬ ‫حتى ولو في بطون األرض نأتي له‬ ‫هذا اليمن من تجاهلنا فقد جرب‬ ‫المعتدي يالغبي يبشر بتنكيله‬

164

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

­Zawāmil from the Archive: Lexicon and Imagery Zawāmil composed by both republicans and royalists in the 1960s continue to resonate within Yemeni discourse today. Below is a zamil exchange from the civil war following the 1962 revolution. The poems are from a series that circulated widely and are quoted in several texts on Yemen, in Arabic and English, with slight discrepancies from source to source.29 The initial zamil expresses the view of those from the tribes of Khawlan who supported the royalists, attributed to either Shaykh Nājī bin ʿAly al-Ghadīr or Nasir Ahmad al-Faqih: Tiyal Peak announced and every mountain in Yemen answered: We won’t become Republicans ever, even if we vanish from the Earth, Even if yesterday comes after today or the sun sets in the South [Aden] And the Earth blazes fire and the rain clouds rain bullets.iii And here is the response attributed to either al-Shaykh Salih Bin Naji al-Ruwayshan or Ahmad Muhammad al-Qiri: We said please excuse us [we] track and pursue those who are fickle With Migs and Ilyushins, with helicopters, especially black ones. The battle of rifles and MIs won’t strike planes. Oh Naji, tell al-Hasan and al-Badr, silver has become copper.iv The zawāmil above are not unusual in their form, lexicon, and imagery. As expected with poetic sparring, they carry the same meter and rhyme. This creates a dialogic structure; in other words, a process of mutual meaningmaking occurs. My interpretation is generally consistent with those of other scholars, with some variance in translation and subsequent reading that may be due to relying on different Arabic sources. In my translation of the first line, the mountain itself announces, and the other peaks respond, capturing nature’s personification. The mountains are a metaphor for the speaker’s tribe and the other tribes of Yemen (the word shāmikh carries the double meaning of a proud, notable person and a mountain). Tiyal Peak is a mountain in northern Yemen where the tribes of Khawlan live. Mountains are often addressed in the first line, a worn-in metaphor for the tribesman.30 The second hemistich of the first ّ ِ ‫َحي ِد‬ 1. ‫الطيال أعلن وجاوب كل شامِ خ في اليمن‬ ‫ما با نجمهر قط لو نفنى من الدنيا خالص‬ 2. ‫لو يعقب أمس اليوم واال الشمس تغرب من عدن‬ ‫واألرض تشعل نار وأمزان السماء تمطر رصاص‬ iv 1. ‫قُلنا اسمحوا عفوا ً قَفا ما قد تليون والتون‬ ‫بالميج واليوشن مع بو مروحة والسود خاص‬ 2. ‫ما يقرع الطيار حرب الشرف وال ميم ون‬ ‫قُـل للحسن والبدر يا ناجي قد الفضة نحاس‬ iii

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165

verse names the group’s position: in opposition to republicans. The initial poem is “a logic built entirely out of paradoxes.”31 Depictions of nature illustrate the impossibility of embracing republicanism.32 Zawāmil often depend upon similar analogies between nature and society.33 In this case, nature participates in the war itself. Notice that in the second verse clouds rain bullets and the earth burns. No matter how violent the earth may seem, or how out of the ordinary (such as the sun setting from the  south), Yemen will never be a republic. The imagery effectively communicates the steadfastness and bravery of the royalists who refuse to succumb. The first hemistich of the response begins playfully, even cheekily: “please excuse us.” The syntactic field associated with the Arabic term “fickle” in the same hemistich carries the meaning of changing color. Hence, the tribesmen from the previous poem are the exact opposite of what they claim—not steadfast, but as variable as shifting hues. In the next two lines, the royalists are chased by large weapons that dwarf their own outdated, futile guns.34 Finally, in the last hemistich, the poet tells the composer of the first poem to return to the imam, al-Badr, and al-Hasan (al-Badr’s uncle) to inform them that silver has become brass. This is in itself clever, as it returns us to “fickle” by connoting changing color. There are multiple interpretations for the last line.35 One scholar suggests support for the Hamid al-Din dynasty is akin to owning a single silver; its value has been reduced to that of copper because of the royal family’s greed and corruption.36 Another reads the line as meaning Hamid al-Din’s allies are not sincere but merely bought.37 An additional interpretation is that while it seemed previously impossible for Yemenis to form a republic, circumstances have changed. Similarly, while we may think silver can never become copper, it in fact already has.38 This exchange provides a model for historical zawāmil. They are short and clever; personify nature and make special mention of Yemeni land, especially mountains; mention weaponry; and glorify a certain masculinity, one associated with the honor of a tribesman and his steadfastness and bravery. These zawāmil also offer two opposing perspectives in a moment of tumult in Yemen’s history, in conversation with one another. Now, let us turn to the Huthi zamil.

The Huthi Zamil In the following, I draw attention to the shared lexicon, language register, and imagery between the Huthi zamil and its predecessors. I then observe a number of differences before focusing on a select few to hypothesize the zamil’s utility for the Huthis. By this I am not suggesting that the Huthis do not also use traditional folk zawāmil, nor that communities have stopped composing their own zawāmil, but that concurrently, the Huthis have also invested themselves in proliferating a divergent mass-media form that shares the same name. Among the key differences between the traditional and Huthi zamil are the longerlength and monologic structure alongside an increased emphasis on religious

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rhetoric signaling a Huthi ideology. Based on these observations, the Huthis aim to dictate public discourse instead of contributing to it, to constitute followers out of their listeners and inspire Yemenis to take up arms for them. Instead of dialogic, mutual meaning-making, the Huthis attempt to saturate the public sphere with their narrative. Examples The zawāmil I take up below are performed by ʿIssā al-Layth, the most popular zamil performer for the Huthis and regularly featured on their media network.39 Many of his zawāmil enjoy hundreds of thousands, even millions, of views on YouTube and many comments.40 Zawāmil are shared on multiple social media outlets, including Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram. The tweets, chats, comments, and number of views reveal the zawāmil are vastly popular, with commenters claiming they come from all over the Arab world. Some comments simply contain greetings, while others, among other things, praise the quwwa (strength)41 of the zamil, and call for God to bring the Huthis victory.42 First, I turn to the zamil “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale”:43 1. “God is Great!” raises the morale. God is Great! Repeat, oh squadrons! 2. We mobilized for the Lord of the Heavens. Squadrons of the Leader [assembled] for plunging to their deaths! 3. When the sky rains smart bombs, And the earth shatters in shards, 4. Fire blazing from every galaxy, And the army surrounds me from every corner— 5. God witnesses us at all times. We attack making them swallow death’s chalices 6. There’s no way we would submit. There’s no way, there’s no way! 7. We sold ourselves to the Creator with honest intentions.v v

1. ‫هللا أكبر ترفع المعنويات‬ ‫هللا أكبر رددي يا سرايا‬ 2. ‫حنا تجندنا لرب السماوات‬ ‫كتايب القائد لخوض المنايا‬ 3. ‫لو السماء تمطر قنابل ذكيات‬ ‫ شظايا‬..‫واألرض تتفجر شظايا‬ 4. ‫والنار تشعل من جميع المجرات‬ ‫والزحف حولي من جميع الزوايا‬ 5. ‫يشهد علينا هللا في كل األوقات‬ ‫نغزي نجرعهم كؤوس المنايا‬ ‫هيهات منا الذل هيهات هيهات‬ ‫بعنا من الخالق بصدق النوايا‬

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167

This poem shares some of the folk zamil’s common features, such as an opening line which hails the audience, constituting a subject and demanding a response. Hence, the second hemistich orders the group: “Repeat, oh squadrons!” The remaining verses describe the squadrons’ actions. Like most zawāmil, the poem is in dialect. The poem is short for a Huthi zamil, but on the longer side for the genre as a whole. Like many zawāmil, the poem references weapons—in this case, smart bombs in verse three. In terms of imagery, nature is intimately involved in the war being waged. Finally, the poem emphasizes the steadfastness of the army in the face of violence and calamity. Despite the cosmos (every galaxy in verse four) and the earth breaking apart from the raining “smart bombs,” the army never backs down, as noted in verse six. Courage in war is implied in the actions of the soldiers, a common theme in zawāmil. Not only does this poem fit into the zamil tradition but it actually bears striking similarities to the zamil “Tiyal Peak announced and every mountain in Yemen answered”; at the very least this indicates that there are certain conventions that Huthi zawāmil share with their predecessors. Verses three, four, and the first hemistich of verse six create similar subjects, brave and steadfast fighters who will never back down, and use the same imagery to do so. For example, both use the verb tushʿil for blazes and the verb tumṭir (rains) to portray weapons falling from the sky and Creation aflame. Nature turns against the subjects, but the fighters remain defiant in the face of it. Furthermore, both poems express loyalty to ahl albayt, the family of the Prophet. The earlier zamil implies support for the imamate, while “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale” declares allegiance to the sayyid ʿAbdul Malik al-Ḥūthī (“the leader” in verse two). However, there are differences between the poems. The dialect, melody, and instrumentation in the Huthi zamil resemble another form of oral poetry, the Gulf ’s shayla. One indication of this is that the dialect is not distinctly Yemeni as opposed to that of the Gulf.44 In addition to the language, Huthis have integrated melodies from the shayla into their zawāmil, diverging from the traditional melodies associated with specific regions and tribes of Yemen.45 Furthermore, folk zawāmil are not typically performed with musical instruments, with the exception of the drum, and are not considered songs (ʾaghānī) but chants.46 However, in the zamil above, there is electronic instrumentation. The use of technology to manipulate the voice and add sound effects is similar to what is sometimes found in both the shaylat and religious anashid; for both genres, many listeners and composers claim the production is not music, despite the musical quality.47

Monologic Discourse The Huthi zamil is also longer than the folk zamil. Zawāmil are usually short, often only two verses, and not usually more than eight.48 Shorter length is in keeping with the poems’ social function: a conversation between two sides about a communal issue. Like most conversations, zawāmil are often improvised. They are also performed by a large group. Hence, it is logical for the poem to be short

168

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

in order to facilitate turn-taking, improvisation, and live performance. Of course, recordings and social media do not require improvisation and offer opportunities to record more than once for accuracy and quality of performance. However, the length of Huthi zawāmil suggests that the social function differs from that of the traditional zamil; the zamil is not a conversation but rather monologic discourse to create Huthi supporters. Yemen’s decentralized recording industry historically facilitated public dialogue on audiocassettes; this polyvocality contributed to multiple conceptualisms of solidarity beyond state-driven nationalism.49 Bid‘ wa-jawāb (call-and-response) poetry, such as zawāmil, created discursive spaces for public exchanges of opinion.50 In contrast, one dimension of the Huthi zamil is that, at the very least on social media, it is not a conduit for sustained poetic dialogue. While responses to Huthi zawāmil on social media in the tradition of call-and-response are not absent, they are not the norm; when there are responses, the message of the poems reflects a polarization of views.51 The Huthis commission poets to write zawāmil and a single performer records them, after which they are spread widely on social media. Instead of one community engaging with another in an exchange of views, the Huthi zawāmil are composed, produced, and disseminated from a nexus of power. The Huthis built a resilient media that strategically embeds Huthi ideology within a form that is held dear in Yemen, considered “the expression of the people directly,” to return to al-Baradduni. In the Huthi zamil above, al-Layth is the single performer, but his voice is manipulated on the recording to mimic a group. Even though the zamil is meant to express the opinions of a group, the Huthi zawāmil use technology to create the illusion of group performance. The poetic voice calls upon fighters to take heart and remain steadfast in their commitment to fighting for God. The Huthis present their ideology as truth, and the zamil is one method to spread that truth to the populace through a cultural form that, deceivingly in this case, is known for lively debate.

Religious Discourse This brings me to a striking characteristic of a large body of the Huthi zawāmil: religious discourse that increasingly signals Huthi ideology. While the zamil emerged from tribes and prioritizes vocabulary indexing honor, many Huthi zawāmil, the one above among them, frame acts of violence for their cause as synonymous with religious duty. The Huthi zawāmil do not abandon tribal vocabulary nor do they ignore honor, but honor is at the service of piety. Piety, in turn, entails taking up arms for God, which often corresponds with fighting for Huthi leadership. Notice that despite both “Tiyal Peak announced and every mountain in Yemen answered” and “‘God is great!’ raises the morale” advocate for the continued rule of the Prophet’s family, the latter explicitly ties religious duty to the fighter’s mobilization and bravery in battle. While verses three and four capture the violence the fighters face, the surrounding verses frame the fighters’ bravery and steadfastness as animated by faithfulness to God. Furthermore, verse

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two equates “mobilizing” for God with dying for al-qāʾd (leader), who is most certainly ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi. By bringing attention to the religious discourse in Huthi zawāmil, I am not suggesting that piety did not surface in zawāmil previously. Consider the following poetic exchange, in which royalists accuse the republicans of abandoning their religion to Egypt (who was supporting the republicans at the time), and emphasize their loyalty to al-Badr, the last imam of Yemen:52 1. My mighty peace to you from an army that hasn’t become Republican, That doesn’t want Egypt’s apostasy or religion. 2. Our imam is al-Badr as long as rain falls from the sky, “Allah is Great!” upon all his enemies.vi The republicans responded: 1. Egypt didn’t say “apostatize,” she said “liberate!” You didn’t understand the speech’s correct meaning. 2. It is the will of destiny and fate for al-Badr to disappear. By God, those you’re waiting for have already gone.vii The Huthi zawāmil are not charting a completely new trajectory but expanding upon a discourse that already exists, and at certain junctures becomes pronounced. It is not a question of whether or not piety appears in zawāmil but shifts in emphasis and degree that occur in relation to other tribal values, especially honor, in specific socio-historical moments. In contrast to the civil war in the 1960s, after the establishment of the republic, the imamate was usually framed in terms of darkness and backwardness, while the republic stood for development and modernity.53 Writing several decades after the September 26 Revolution, Caton argues that the zamil constructs an honorable person, not necessarily a pious one. The distinction between honor and piety, and the emphasis on one or the other in performative constructions of the self, depends upon context and the social work a given performance aims to do. In keeping with his conclusion, during the years leading up to the 1994 civil war, when the zawāmil enjoyed a resurgence and featured prominently in the tribal conferences, Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel note that “an Islamist zamil is so far a contradiction in terms.”54 1. ‫جيش ما جمهر‬ ِ ‫يا سالمي َجبَ ْر مِ ْن‬ ‫ما يبى َمص َْر ال ُك ْفر ْه والدِينِه‬ ُ ‫در ما دام السماء تُم‬ 2. ‫طر‬ ِ َ‫إمامنا الب‬ ‫وأكبر هللا على منهم معادينه‬ vii 1. ‫اتحرر‬ ‫َمصْر ما قالت اكفُر قالت‬ َّ ‫ما فهمت الحكا ويش انت من عينه‬ 2. ‫القضا والقدر شاء البدر يتزفَّر‬ ‫وهللا انه سرح ياذي مراعينه‬ vi

170

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

Tribes, while valuing Islam, have a rhetoric of their own.55 Dresch and Haykel were discussing a very different Islamic group (Islah), but the implication holds: the zamil was perceived by many tribesmen at the time as a genre specific to them which privileged tribal discourse, thereby prioritizing honor without disregarding piety. It was not primarily a vehicle for religious ideology, which is precisely how the Huthis now use it. Religious discourse is central to Huthi zawāmil. In fact, they contain explicit phrases that signal their ideology. The use of certain terms such as ʾaʿlām, the way of guidance, and explicit references to Huthi leadership are common in zawāmil as the years of the conflict lengthen and the Huthis reinforce their hold over parts of Yemen. I now turn to another zamil as an example of how the Huthi religious ideology intertwines with tribal and nationalist discourse to interpellate the Huthi fighter. The following poem, performed by al-Layth, was published on social media in May 2020:56 1. Tribes of al-Mahwit oh soldiers of Islam, They plant their noble deeds and harvest their fresh dates. 2. I bear witness that they are Yemen’s armor and [safety] belt, And if they [the tribes] boast in their lineage, they are the origin of Arabs.  3. Men who walk in the way of guidance, behind al-ʾaʿlām, Allah gave the tribes of Mahwit the honor of supporting His religion  4. And the tribes of Milhan and al-Rujum and Shibam came, The earth shakes with the strength of their clamor.  5. And the tribes of al-Khabt in the face of the enemy are a mighty sword, they burn the armies of the enemy with their flame.  6. And from al-Tawila is a people far be it from them to accept tyranny,  If they want glory they will get it.  7. And the tribes of Hufash, if the battle erupts and death hovers Throw at the heads of the enemies their shooting stars.  8. And every honorable person from the tribes of Bani Sa‘d, if they rise up,  Oh woe, woe to whoever ignores their wrath. 9. After the son of Badr al-Din, in obedience and with bravery, walk  Soldiers of the Path and declaration of war is in their holster 10. Their constitution is al-Qurān, their law and order They take the reason for dignity and sacrifice for the sake of it  11. Their history has risen for al-naqāʾ, The best and brightest of the country.viii

viii

1. ‫قبائل المحويت يا جند اإلسالم‬ َ ‫تزرع مكارمها وتحصد ُر‬ ‫طبها‬ 2. ‫وأنا أشهد أنهم لليمن درع وحزام‬ ‫وأصل العرب ال اتفاخرت في نسبها‬ 3. ‫رجال ت َمضي بالهدى خلف األعالم‬  ‫هللا بتأييده لدينه وهبها‬ ْ

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171

Before providing a brief analysis of the zamil, I touch upon two genealogies that come to bear upon this poem. Real or imagined, they remain pertinent to Zaydi Islam (from which the Huthis emerge) and Yemeni tribes: the Adnanis and Qahtanis. The Adnanis are from northern Arabia, while the Qahtanis hail from the south.57 The sada, as descendants of the Prophet, belong to the Adnanis. The sada’s time in Yemen began in the ninth century when the first Zaydi imam was invited to Sa‘da to act as a mediator between the tribes.58 Beginning in the 1950s and especially after the revolution, public discourse drew from these two genealogies to position the sada as intruders, even colonizers, who were not truly Yemenis.59 In this view, an authentic Yemeni is Qahtani. Despite the ambivalent relationship between Qahtanis and sada, vom Bruck claims tribesmen and sada value kinship and bloodlines.60 Particularly for the northern areas of Yemen, she draws a connection between Zaydi theology and tribal concepts of authority and morality. For both, “the idiom of knowledge and pre-eminent heredity”61 played an essential role in determining who was fit to rule, within the Zaydi imamate and tribal leadership; embodying the moral potential that your heritage bestows upon you is paramount. In Zaydi Islam, the imam can err; furthermore, legitimate leadership, while from within ahl al-bayt, is not necessarily passed from father to son. Instead, being a descendant of the Prophet means to share Muhammad’s ṣulb or substance.62 This substance is a potentiality that must be developed by the individual as he seeks knowledge (‘ilm). To return to the poem: the first hemistich hails the subjects as both tribesmen and soldiers of Islam, signaling the tribal and religious discourses that animate the entire poem. The second hemistich of the verse names the actions that index both identities: noble deeds.63 In the second verse, the poem lauds the tribes of alMahwit as “the origin of the Arabs,” a reference to the tribes of Qahtan. To boast of their lineage is to boast of their moral standing and valor as well as to activate 4. ‫وان اقبَلت ملحان والرجم وشبام‬  ‫تزلزل الدنيا بقوة لَ َجبها‬ 5. ‫صمصام‬ ِ ‫سيف‬ َ ‫وال َخبْت في وجه ال ِعدَى‬  ‫تحرق ُحشُود ال ُمعتدِي مِ ن لهبها‬  ِ 6. ‫ومن الطويلة قوم هيهات ت َنضام‬  ‫ال ش َّم َرت للعز تلحق طلبها‬ 7. ‫و ُحفاش ال ثار الوغى والفنا حام‬ ‫ترمي على روس االعادي شهبها‬ 8. ‫وكل نَشمي من بني سعد ال قام‬ ‫يا ويل ويله من تجاهل غضبها‬ 9. ‫بعد ابن بدر الدين تسليم وإقدام‬ ‫جند المسيرة والنَقا في جعبها‬ 10. ‫دستورها القرآن مشروع ونظام‬ ‫تاخذ وتعطي للكرامة سببها‬ 11. ‫على النقا والعز تاريخها قام‬  ‫من صفوة أخيار البالد ونخبها‬

172

The Huthi Movement in Yemen

a sense of unity among the tribesmen. It reinforces their indigeneity to Yemen and therefore authenticity. Activating Yemeni nationalism and tribal genealogy in a single line, the poem positions the tribesmen as warriors of glorious heritage, united against those who would threaten Yemen. Verses four to eight name specific tribes in al-Mahwit, such as Milham, Khabt, and al-Tawila. The language in these verses is reminiscent of an apocalyptic judgment, with the tribes burning the enemy with “flames,” and “shooting stars” while “the earth shakes.” This imagery and set of metaphors are not out of place for the zamil genre: nature and weapons intermingle, with galaxies, jinn, rain, and mountains all taking part in war. In this case, nature wages war alongside the tribesmen; God’s creation brings judgment upon those who abuse power. Hence, in verse six the alTawila tribes do not “accept tyranny,” a reference to those who go beyond the limits that God has set. The poet is galvanizing the tribes by way of flattery, boasting of the tribesmen’s honorable deeds and praising their prowess in war. Verse three and verse ten justify the tribesmen fighting for the Huthis on the basis of genealogy and religious knowledge, thereby capitalizing on the affinity between Zaydism and tribalism to maximize the poem’s persuasive power. The tribesmen are those who walk “in the way of Guidance behind al-ʾaʿlām.” “The way of guidance” is a common phrase used by the Huthis. The term means notable figures, but for the Huthis, it is linked to the leadership of ahl al-bayt, and ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi in particular. The term for knowledge, ‘ilm, shares a lexical root with ‘alam. Although the term does not necessitate a religious affiliation or leadership, in the context of this poem the term connotes both. In conjunction with “the way of guidance,” al-ʾaʿlām serve as signposts for the tribesmen as they seek God’s path; they are the rightful religious leaders by virtue of their genealogy (that of the Prophet), religious knowledge, and embodiment of values such as piety, humility, generosity, and courage.64 The second hemistich of verse three makes honor subject to piety—to follow the path of the Quran behind the Prophet’s family is itself an honorable deed, an honor granted by God Himself. Then, verse ten specifies who of the Prophet’s family is leading them: the son of Badr al-Din al-Huthi (‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi). In case it was not clear that “the path of guidance” refers to Huthi ideology specifically, verse nine references almasira, short here for al-masīra al-Qurʾāniyya, a term for the Huthi movement, specifically embodying the teachings of Husayn al-Huthi and adhering to the Quran through direct action; it is also the name of the Huthis’ official media outlet. Obedience and bravery animate the soldiers, framing submission to Huthi leadership as a glorious deed. In short, these verses attempt to reconcile Huthi ideology with tribal ethos by interpellating honorable fighters of glorious heritage who recognize the role of the Prophet’s family in leading them; the call to action is justified in general terms to the tribes of Mahwit in the first three verses, and then calls upon specific tribes and names Huthi leadership in verses four through nine. Finally, verses nine and eleven contain a single word that carries two distinct meanings: al-naqāʾ. Generally, the word means purity. In tribal code, however, the term means a state of warfare in which killing the enemy is not shameful.65 Both meanings carry weight in these verses: in verse nine, al-naqāʾ is in the tribesmen’s

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173

holster as they submit to Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, referring to the purity they embody by following the righteous path. Verse eleven closes the poem by praising the tribesmen as those making history for “war (naqa) and glory,” signaling the second meaning. In short, fighting for the Huthis is a pure act, justifiable under tribal law, and a glorious deed. This zamil works to persuade the tribesmen that rallying behind the Huthis is akin to pledging allegiance to God and is inextricably linked to their identities as honorable tribesmen, pious Muslims, and Yemeni citizens.

Conclusion My interlocutors describe the Huthi zawāmil as quite persuasive and part of a larger campaign to recruit Yemenis to the Huthi cause. Beyond Yemen, regional audiences enjoy the zawāmil, as is clear from the viral zawāmil on social media. The Huthi zamil deserves further attention from a variety of analytical angles, some of which I engage in here and others that surface tangentially and require further study, such as elucidating the Huthi zamil’s relationship to the Gulf shayla and religious anashid.66 This chapter investigates the Huthi zamil in relationship to the genre broadly understood; it details the primary discourses, imagery, and lexicon on which the poetry relies, and then observes the genre’s transformation into a media tool for the Huthis. As the Huthis have tightened their grip on northern Yemen, their ideology has made its way into the poems, first by shifting the focus to more greatly emphasize piety, and now by explicitly invoking Huthi leadership as the rightful leaders. The Huthis do not break from folk zawāmil completely; they rely on historically used lexicon and imagery. This, of course, only serves to reinforce Huthi legitimacy and position the Huthi zamil as distinctly Yemeni. The Huthis take a dynamic cultural form that continues to play an important role in Yemeni life, transforming into a cog in their expansive media campaign, a strategic rendering of a well-loved folk art.

Notes 1 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil: Samayt bi-smi-llah ʿalā ʾAbwāb Najrān,” YouTube video, 3:46, posted by “Zawamil Ansar Allah,” December 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lVkLbzSQGK8. Translation my own. 2 Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir al-Harithi, al-Zāmil fi-l-ḥarb wa-l-munāsābāt (Sanaa: alJumhūriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-Siyāḥa, 2004), 61. 3 Marieke Brandt, e-mail to the author, September 16, 2020. 4 Sanaa resident, phone conversation with author, March 2019; Emily J. Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil,” Arabia Felix Center for Studies, April 29, 2021, https://arabiafelixstudies.com/experiencing-the-huthi-zamil. 5 Ibid. 6 ʿAbdallah al-Baradūnī, Funūn al-ʾAdab al-Shaʿbī fi-l-Yaman (Bayrūt: Tanfīdh Dār al-Bārūdī, 1998); Steven Charles Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon” Poetry as

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Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat; Flagg Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen (Cambridge, MA: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 2007), 101; Ahmad Muhammad al-Shami, Qissat al-ʾAdab fi-l-Yaman (Sanaa: Maktabat al-ʾIrshād, 2007). 7 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 136–7. 8 Al-Shami, Qissat al-adab, 161–3; al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 147–9; Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil.” 9 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 149. 10 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 198. 11 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb, 123–9; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 130. 12 ʿAbdal ʿAzzīz Al-Maqāliḥ, “al-Taqdīm,” in al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, ed. al-Harithi, Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir (Sanaa: al-Jumhuriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizarat al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha, 2004), 11. 13 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 130. 14 Firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda, “Raqṣat Barʿ min firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda fī maydān al-sabʿīn bi-l-ʿāṣṣima”’, ” YouTube video, 7:09, filmed on March 26, 2019, posted by “Maktabat alYaman li-l-Marʾiyyat,” March 27, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yen0aakyYQ. 15 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 8. 16 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb, 44–54. 17 Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 44; Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 24–9. 18 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 44–5. 19 Najwa Adra, “Dance and Glance: Visualizing Tribal Identity in Highland Yemen,” Visual Anthropology (Journal) 11, no. 1–2 (1998): 55–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/089 49468.1998.9966746. 20 For examples of zawamil in Oman, see Quwwāt al-Firāq, Mahrajān al-ʿīd al-Waṭanī al-ʾArbaʿīn al-Majīd 29-11- 2010 Salṭanat ʿUmān “Opening of Oman’s 40th National Day Festival,” YouTube video, 2:00:36, filmed on November 29, 2010, by OmanTV, posted by “Nibrās ʿUmān-Marʾiyyāt ʿUmān,” https://youtu.be/gUaU3-Whoc0; Ahmad Diqal, “Zāmil Dhifārī li-l-Shāʿir Aḥmad Dagal ʾIhdāʾ ilā al-Sulṭān Haytham bin Tāriq āl-Saʿīd al-Muʿaẓẓam Ḥafiẓahu Allāh,” YouTube video, 3:19, posted by Said Alawaid for Heritage, September 4, 2020, https://youtu.be/mbXbwnzKy9w. 21 E J Hobsbawm (Eric J) and T. O. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); for discussions surrounding the Arabian Peninsula and invented traditions, see Adra, “Dance and Glance”; Karen Exell and Trinidad Rico, “‘There Is No Heritage in Qatar’: Orientalism, Colonialism and Other Problematic Histories,” World Archaeology 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 670–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/00438243.2013.852069; Sulayman Khalaf, “Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates,” Ethnology 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–61, https://doi.org/10.2307/3774109. 22 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 155–79. 23 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 142. 24 “Zawamil wa-anashid,” YouTube channel, published April 17, 2016, https://youtube. com/Zawamel.

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25 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Ṣanʿāʾ Baʿīda Qūlū Lahu al-Riyāḍ ʾAqrab,” YouTube video, 5:36, posted by “Sana’a boy fata San’a’ al-tha’ir,” December 31, 2015, https://youtu. be/3tRFJdzQwZw. Translation mine. 26 For examples of zawāmil referenced within texts, see Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 95, 135–6; Zayd Muṭīʿ Dammāj, Al-Rahīna (Bayrūt: Dār al-ʾAdāb, 1984), 19, 152; Maged al-Madhaji, “Al-Bayda Governorate: Too Strategic to Be Forgotten,” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, June 4, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/ analysis/10137 27 al-Madhaji, “Al-Bayda Governorate.” 28 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 29 Caton and al-Harithi analyze this poetic exchange: Caton, Peaks of Yemen I Summon. 150–3; al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-al-munasabat, 292–3; See also Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 95; Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 46–7. 30 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 142–3. 31 Ibid., 151. 32 Ibid.; al-Harithi, 292–3. 33 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 145–6, 151. 34 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 150–3; al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-almunasabat, 292–3. 35 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 152. 36 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-al-munasabat, 292–3. 37 Al-Harithi, A History of Modern Yemen, 95. 38 phone conversation with author, January 9, 2021. 39 See his YouTube page, where he enjoys 366,000 subscribers at the time of writing. ‘Issa al-Layth, “‘ʿIssā al-Layth—Issa Allaith,” YouTube channel, published May 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/c/IssaAllaith/featured (accessed March 27, 2021). 40 Ibid. 41 Husayn al-Faqih (@ntw8C26eerXuzX4), “quwa al-quwa,” Twitter, March 9, 2021, 12:51pm, https://twitter.com/ntw8C26eerXuzX4/status/1369360086469128193?s=20. 42 Ibid. Examples of comments on a zamil video: (Mohamed Aziz Amazighi), “May God protect you oh heroes of beloved Yemen, greetings from the heart of Tunis the Green”; comment on Issa Allaith, “Zamil: the decisive path, Issa al-Laith, words by Abd al-Rahman al-Khatib,” https://youtu.be/oZq2e3AWvWI; (Mohamad Faroukh), “Our warmest greetings to Yemen from Syria glory to Happy Yemen,” February, 2021, ibid.; (Lemine Moosa), “My greetings to you from Libya,” February, 2021, ibid.; (Leader Sino), “May God bring you victory, my greetings to the brave Houthis from Iraq,” February, 2021, ibid.; (Hussaini Al-Hawa), “May God preserve you and make you victorious, our Yemeni brothers, your Iraqi brother,” February 2021, ibid. Translations mine. 43 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Yamanī Allāhu ʾAkbar Tarfaʿu al-Maʿnawiyyāt” YouTube video, 3:33, posted by “Ibrahim al-Maghrabi zawamil Yemeniyya,” November 4, 2015, https://youtu.be/3TTLDR3mnQA. 44 Mohammed al-Mahfali, written communication to the author, January 27, 2021. 45 Ibid. 46 Adra, “Dance and Glance,” 76; Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 105. 47 Nelly Lahoud, “A Cappella Songs (Anashid) in Jihadi Culture,” in Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists, ed. Thomas Hegghammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 42–62, https://doi. org/10.1017/9781139086141.003

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48 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 101; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 127. 49 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 389, 104, 403, 428–9. 50 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 27; Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 46. 51 Emily Sumner, “The Righteousness of the Houthi Zamil” (Working paper, Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2018). 52 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 177. Translation mine. 53 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 144. 54 Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, “Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 4 (1995): 418. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800062486 55 Dresch and Haykel, “Stereotypes and Political Styles,” 418. 56 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Qabāʾl al-Maḥwīṭ,” YouTube video, posted by “Isa al-Layth— Issa Allaith,” May 30, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhQZLIjLD_M. Translation mine. 57 Wedeen, Peripheral Vision, 171; Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition, Contemporary Anthropology of Religion (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 10. 58 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen, 36–7. 59 Ibid., 53–6. 60 Ibid., 203. 61 Ibid. 62 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen, 103–4; cited in Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi zamil.” 63 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 448; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 29–49; 112. 64 Abdullah Hamidaddin, e-mail to the author, March 14, 2021. 65 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 46. 66 Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil.”

Bibliography Adra, Najwa. “Dance and Glance: Visualizing Tribal Identity in Highland Yemen.” Visual Anthropology (Journal) 11, no. 1–2 (1998): 55–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/08949468. 1998.9966746 al-Baradūnī, ʿAbdallah. Funūn al-ʾAdab al-Shaʿbī fi-l-Yaman (Bayrūt: Tanfīdh Dār alBārūdī, 1998). Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Caton, Steven Charles. “Peaks of Yemen I Summon”: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Caton, Steven Charles. “‘Salām Tahīyah’: Greetings from the Highlands of Yemen.” American Ethnologist 13, no. 2 (1986): 290–308. Dammaj, Zayd Muti‘. al-Rahina (Beirut: Dār al-Adab, 1984). Diqal, Ahmad. “Dhofari Zamil for Sultan Haytham bin Tariq al-Sa’id.” YouTube video, 3: 19. Posted September 4, 2020. https://youtu.be/mbXbwnzKy9w Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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Dresch, Paul and Bernard Haykel. “Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 4 (1995): 405–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800062486 E J Hobsbawm (Eric J), and T. O. Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Exell, Karen and Trinidad Rico. “‘There Is No Heritage in Qatar’: Orientalism, Colonialism and Other Problematic Histories.” World Archaeology 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 670–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/00438243.2013.852069 Firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda. “Raqṣat Barʿ min firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda fī maydān al-sabʿīn bi-lʿāṣṣima’.” Filmed on March 26, 2019. YouTube video, 7: 09. Posted March 27, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yen0aaky-YQ al-Harithi, Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir. al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat (Sanaa: alJumhuriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizarat al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha, 2004). “‘Isa al-Layth—Issa Allaith.” YouTube channel. Published May 25, 2017. https://www. youtube.com/c/IssaAllaith/featured (accessed March 27, 2021). Khalaf, Sulayman. “National Dress and the Construction of Emirati Cultural Identity.” https://www.academia.edu/1415931/National_dress_and_the_construction_of_ Emirati_cultural_identity (accessed March 28, 2021). Sulayman Khalaf. “Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates.” Ethnology 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–61. https://doi. org/10.2307/3774109 Lahoud, Nelly. “A Cappella Songs (Anashid) in Jihadi Culture.” In Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists, ed. Thomas Hegghammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 42–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139086141.003 al-Layth, ‘Isa. “Zāmil Qabāʾl al-Maḥwīṭ.” YouTube video, 2: 41. Posted May 30, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhQZLIjLD_M. al-Layth, ‘Isa. “Zamil Samayt bi-smi-llah ‘ala abwab Najran.” YouTube video, 3: 46. Posted December 2, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVkLbzSQGK8. al-Layth, ‘Isa. “Zāmil Yamanī Allāhu ʾAkbar Tarfaʿu al-Maʿnawiyyāt.” YouTube video, 3: 33. Posted November 4, 2015. https://youtu.be/3TTLDR3mnQA. ­al-Layth, ‘Isa. “Zamil Sanaa ba‘ida qulu lahu al-Riyadh aqrab.” YouTube video, 5: 36. Posted December 31, 2015. https://youtu.be/3tRFJdzQwZw. al-Madhaji, Maged. “Al-Bayda Governorate: Too Strategic to Be Forgotten.” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, June 4, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/10137 al-Maqalih, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. “al-Taqdim.” In al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, ed. alHarithi, Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir (Sanaa: al-Jumhuriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizarat al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha, 2004), 8–15. Miller, Flagg. The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen (Cambridge, MA: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 2007). Quwat al-Firaq. “Opening of Oman’s 40th National Day Festival.” Filmed on November 29, 2010. YouTube video, 2:00:36. https://youtu.be/gUaU3-Whoc0. al-Shami, Ahmad Muhammad. Qissat Al-Adab Fi al-Yaman (Sanaa: Maktabat al-Irshad, 2007). Sumner, Emily J. “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil.” Arabia Felix Center for Studies, April 29, 2021. https://arabiafelixstudies.com/experiencing-the-huthi-zamil Sumner, Emily J. “The Righteousness of the Houthi Zamil.” Working paper, Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2018.

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Taylor, Diana. The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). vom Bruck, Gabriele. Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition. Contemporary Anthropology of Religion (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Wedeen, Lisa. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). Zawāmil wa-Anashid. YouTube channel. https://youtube.com/Zawamel. Published April 17, 2016.

­Section III RE-ENGINEERING THE STATE

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­9 “S TAT E” A N D C O E R C I V E P OW E R I N Y E M E N : T H E H U T H I S A N D T H E T R I BA L - SE C TA R IA N F I E L D Anthony Chimente

Introduction Neo-patrimoinalism largely characterizes how the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh managed the machinery of the state and solidified power in North Yemen and subsequently the Republic of Yemen for nearly thirty-four years. President Saleh accomplished this by establishing robust and overlapping patron-client networks within this system to cull opponents and secure the subservience of important social, political, economic, tribal, and military elites. More significantly, the very nature of the system meant that no single entity could accumulate power sufficient to pose a threat to the regime. The distribution of patronage and patrimonial affiliations allowed the president to cohere much of society around a central authority and maintain the subservience of the officer corps, and as head patron, President Saleh was able to capture the monopoly over the coercive instruments of violence. This environment produced a patrimonial army, whereby the distribution of patronage linked the institution’s survival to the president. In this regard, the neopatrimonial system established by President Saleh arguably constituted a Weberian state construct; “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, 4). However, following 2011 and the collapse of the regime, the nature of state power and civil-military relations in Yemen fragmented, whereby power dissipated away from the central authority and settled around sub-state actors. The collapse of the neo-patrimonial state and dissolution of coercive power gave birth to a nascent political field in Yemen. As a result, the new realities of this political field demonstrate the “state is not always ontologically distinct from non-state actors” and the conflict taking hold in Yemen “is better understood as a struggle over who controls the state, rather than as a conflict between the state and a non-state actor” (Claussen 2018, 561). Indeed, numerous non-state actors are now vying to control the economic landscape and assert dominance over the monopolies of violence across Yemen. The “state” remains fractured into three main competing

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political-military entities claiming legitimacy: the internationally recognized government relocated in Aden, the “quasi-state” of the Huthi insurgents based in the capital Sana´a, and the self-proclaimed and secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Aden and the immediate surroundings. In the eastern part of Yemen, local authorities remain formally under the internationally recognized government (as seen in the Mahra governorate). Indeed, the political and military fragmentation of Yemen is also recognized by the Yemeni populace, with half the population affirming no single actor holds the political dispensation nor a monopoly of violence according to a survey by the Yemeni Polling Center (Transfeld 2019, npn). In particular, the Huthi rebellion and its ability to capture the dispensation of power across much of the country emerged from the decline in state capacities and dissolution of coercive power away from the center and into the periphery. To be sure, the institutional erosion of the Weberian state necessitates the subcommunalization of violence and unfolds the dispensation of power around substate actors. A new structure of “civil”-military relations is therefore emerging in fragmented states across the region to include Yemen. Accordingly, this chapter will evaluate the nature of civil-military relations in future Huthi-controlled areas by applying the conceptual approach of the tribal-sectarian field—a novel framework to understand the dispensation of power when the Weberian state construct has collapsed and non-state actors are now the focal point of power. A brief discussion of the conceptual approach will be conducted, followed by an application of the three frames—tribalism and communalism, patrimonial economy, and external actors—to understand the predominance of the Huthi movement and to theoretically situate the nature of civil-military relations in Huthi-dominated territories. It is unlikely that the previous centralization of political power will be tenable in post-conflict Yemen, and equally unlikely that the monopolies of violence will be centralized under the central authority as experienced under the rule of President Saleh. The chapter will conclude by reviewing the likely nature of “civil”-military relations in Huthi-governed areas based on the application of the conceptual approach and proceed to highlight that, for historical and theoretical reasons, a coherent, national military subservient to the state will fail to emerge in Yemen over the medium term, even following the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, a fragmented monopoly of violence is likely to persist where multiple non-state actors continually strive to build and expand coercive power to centralize control.

Conceptual Approach While this chapter focuses on civil-military relations, the conceptual approach of the tribal-sectarian field is a novel way to conceptualize the “state” or “civil” component in the military nexus across the Middle East given the fragmentation of the central authority and sub-communalization of violence. In this vein, the dispensation of power is settling in the hands of non-state actors, as evidenced in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. To be sure, the ongoing crisis in Yemen epitomizes

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the dissipation of power dissipating away from the Weberian state construct and around armed, non-state actors. The sub-communalization of the monopoly of violence and dissipation of power away from the central authority underscores the collapse of the Weberian state construct as a given referent object of analysis in the study of civil-military relations in fragmented states such as Yemen. This actuality necessitates the need for a new conceptual approach to understand this nascent environment of civil-military relations whereby non-state actors are increasingly emerging as the purveyors of force while equally accumulating the political power necessary to challenge the feeble position of the central authority. Consequently, this section will introduce the conceptual framework of the tribalsectarian field by discussing key theoretical assumptions, while also highlighting how the framework will assist in elucidating the nature of civil-military relations in Huthi-controlled areas specifically and across Yemen more generally. Conceptually, the nature of warfare within the tribal-sectarian field is characterized as a battlefield of “varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors” (Kaldor 1990, 2). Within this milieu of “new wars,” “ethnic, religious, or tribal” considerations are the motivation for societal segments vying in war (ibid.). In line with Susser, Kaldor argues the saliency of sub-state identities results from “the erosion of more inclusive (often state-based) political ideologies like socialism or post-colonial nationalism” (ibid.). The “state,” in accordance with the “new” contours of the battlefield, illustrates a devolution of state capabilities, institutional strength, and cohesion at the hands of sub-state actors and solidarities. The conceptual approach of the tribal-sectarian field is underpinned by and developed from the works of Uzi Rabi: The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Saʻid Bin Taymur, Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, and Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. Based on his examination of the development of the Omani state, Rabi determined that “[t]he state should not be seen as an independent political actor but rather as a ‘political field,’ i.e., an arena in which diverse actors compete for influence and resources. Political landscapes in this context should not be seen in a fully-fledged ‘Weberian’ manner, dominated by a rational bureaucratic model” (Rabi 2006, 3). Rabi noted that the “state” within this political field ebbs and flows between “weakness and strength, and between losing or acquiring state attributes, or ‘stateness’” (ibid.). As such, the ability of the central authority to exercise a monopoly of violence is unequivocally a fundamental attribute of “stateness” and a measure of state capacity. Similarly, Migdal demonstrates how the state is conceptualized as “a mélange of social organizations,” with ethnic sectarian, cultural, and state-based institutions denoting these societal clusters (Migdal 1988, 14), and “the state is one organization among many” (ibid., 28). The focal point of Migdal’s model is the ever-present rivalry between the “state” and social organizations for social control and the dispensation of power. In this political field, innumerable societal actors compete for resources and power in a political environment, whereby “the state is one organization among many” (Migdal 1988, 28). Accordingly, the state and actors within the polity shouldn’t necessarily be held a priori; that is to say, there is

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a constant interplay among the forces whereby “[s]tates may help mould, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded” (Migdal et al. 1994, 2). Charles Tilly holds that the use of force and monopolies of violence are inextricably linked to the notion of legitimacy and the process of state formation. Tilly interprets legitimacy as “the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority” (Tilly 1985, 171). Tilly argues that warmaking, state-making, protection, and extraction are on a continuum leading to statehood, with all four components mutually reinforcing and contingent “on the state’s tendency to monopolise the concentrated means of coercion” (Tilly 1985, 181). All four aspects are mutually reinforcing and depend “on the state’s tendency to monopolise the concentrated means of coercion” (ibid.). Thus, the preservation of force and the consistent monopoly of violence establish and prolong legitimacy. This understanding will allow the chapter to demonstrate the inherent connection between state legitimacy and the monopolies of violence. Invariably, a state’s failure to control the organized means of violence indicates a regression along the continuum of state formation. Within the tribal-sectarian nexus, the sub-communalization of violence away from the central authority and armed forces captures the process of state degradation. More broadly, the incorporation of Tilly’s work with the tribal-sectarian nexus points to the crisis of legitimacy now faced in fragmented states that stem from the inability of weak central authorities to fully control the monopolies of violence. The three frames of the conceptual approach are communalism, patrimonial economy, and external actors which assist in providing an understanding of state cohesion and in determining the dispensation of power. Overall, the chapter will examine the role and impact of the three conceptual frames on the dispensation of power and civil-military relations in territories under Huthi control. Thus, the model will highlight where the “Weberian” construct of the state has fragmented, and tribal identity, confessional loyalty, external actors and patrimonial economy might come to determine the role that coercive actors could presently play, and illuminate the factors informing the dispensation of power within the “state.”

Tribes Across the Middle East, tribal forces can have a direct impact on military cohesion and the nature of power in the tribal-sectarian nexus. In this regard, military disintegration and the decline of the central authority provide the space for armed, non-state actors and sub-state solidarities to gain power. The rising prominence of these actors and associated loyalties “call into the question the political authority of states and their continuing monopoly on legitimate violence” (Berzins and Cullen 2003, 11). Indeed, this problem becomes pronounced within fragmented states, where the sub-communalization of violence has often eclipsed state-sanctioned monopolies of violence.

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In certain cases, tribal fidelity serves as a stronger sense of deferential respect and consciousness which supplants and surpasses that of national identity of the territorial state. In this regard, while the tribe as a social organization is waning, Tibi argues that “the tribe as a referent for social identity and loyalty has persisted” (Tibi 128, 1990). Furthermore, the steadfast nature of tribal identity and fidelity proved problematic as a competing form of identity against the state, and as such, tribal affiliations and loyalty can erode the cohesiveness of the state (Kostiner 2008, 22–3). However, tribes are not fundamentally opposed to the central authority, nor are they organizationally structured in a hierarchical manner. As such, “[t]ribal leaders, or Shaykhs, do not have unconditional authority over their tribes or their members,” and consequently, a “Shaykh’s legitimacy and authority depend on his ability to provide for his constituents” (al-Dawsari 2018, 19). Because the term “tribe” has been used to characterize a number of social organizations or groups, a precise “all-encompassing definition is virtually impossible to produce” (Khoury and Kostiner 1990, 15). However, tribal solidarity and the ability of the tribe to act as a unified organization are two aspects this chapter will incorporate into the model of the tribal-sectarian field. The notion of kinship, in conjunction with the cohesive power of solidarity, results in the tribe best understood as a polity. Indeed, as Tibi argues, “the tribe as a referent for social identity and loyalty has persisted” despite the advent of the modern “state” and state-orchestrated forms of allegiances (Tibi 128, 1990).

Patrimonial Economy The patrimonial economy approach within the framework is “concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society. It focuses on the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and on the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (Collinson 2003, 10). Pointedly, the frame examines the level of corruption, criminality, and patronage that underpins the modes and means of exchange between elites and militia, or armed, non-state actors. Based on this understanding, patronage, or the distribution of material incentives in exchange for loyalty is a focal aspect in understanding the patrimonial economy of the subcommunalization of violence. In this regard, patrimonial economy is utilized to illustrate how the “state” organizes and distributes the nation’s wealth, along with how this wealth can also be manipulated by non-state actors to secure loyalties and fortify their own power. In such environments, “[t]he system as a whole is held together by the oath of loyalty, or by kinship ties (often symbolic and fictitious) rather than by a hierarchy of administrative grades and functions” (Clapham 1985, 48). In this system, a specific relationship of mutual exchange can be described as either patronage, clientelism, or patron-clientelism (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 151–2). During times of state coherence, this system entails the regime “distributing jobs and money in exchange for loyalty from its citizens” (Bank and Schlumberger 2004, 51). Consequently, loyalty and political acquiescence in this

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environment are established through the distribution of resources or through acts of corruption and criminality. Warlordism is an integral component of the sub-communalization of violence and the dissolution of state power. In such an environment, warlords are one of the myriad non-state actors (Kaldor 2013, 2). The nature of warlordism is characterized by a leader who both exercises considerable economic and military strength and can mobilize manpower for combat. This is important because the theoretical approach holds the “state” to be on an equal playing field relative to other societal actors, and Warlords in this sense exercise “civil” power and command large militia that often eclipse the militia of the “state.” This leader will also have a great amount of autonomy relative to the central authority (Freeman 2015, 179). Warlords can often be former regime elites, who utilize their wealth and networks of patronage to maintain armed militia in the wake of state fragmentation. Consequently, patronage is useful when discerning patterns of solidarity. The model holds the advent of warlordism to be more pronounced following the elite fragmentation of a patrimonial state, or one in which patrimonialism and patron-client relations heavily influence the nature of power and authority. Part of this has to do with how the regime and the army fragmented in Yemen, and the role of patronage and according nature of loyalties in this process. Under these circumstances, the political authority and military power of the state dissolve into the periphery and around sub-groups of former regime elites.

Role of External Actors External actors can impact military cohesion and the fragmentation of state power based on the feeble nature of loyalties and cohesion in the “tribal-sectarian” field. External actors are positioned to influence and impact military cohesion and the dispensation of power in several ways. In this regard, the research will examine the role and impact of the foreign actors in altering the overall civil-military relationship and enabling the Huthi rebellion to remain fixtures within the Yemeni political and military landscape. Primarily, external actors impact the civil-military relationship by implementing policies of direct military intervention, alongside the process of political development and distribution of rents and resources. Moreover, foreign powers can directly impact tribal solidarity in ways which have positively or adversely impacted the basis of civil-military relations in Yemen. In this regard, external powers can introduce societal realignment, or a shift in the structures of power, by fundamentally altering the centers of power and those who access the levers of power.

The Rebels and Tribes At various times, tribes played an important role in shaping the modern history of Yemen and the nature of civil-military relations, although this trend is more pronounced in the north and middle of Yemen as opposed to the south. More

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broadly, the tribes in the north have played an important role within Yemen, spanning military offices, political leaders, social elite, and businessmen, while tribal governance, legal traditions, and conflict mediation are returning to being more prominent in the wake of state collapse and the fragmentation of violence (al-Dawsari 2012, 3–4). Yemen observer Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani describes the pronounced role that the tribes have increasingly come to play across the armed forces: “[i]n Yemen we don’t really have a military as an institution, we have tribal factions in uniform, many of whom can be bought over to the other side” (Finn 2011, npn). The tribal army reflected the tribal-sectarian nexus and nature of the state. Furthermore, the tribes have both supported and countered the military and political ambitions of the Huthi movement. Furthermore, much of the relations “between tribes and state institutions in the Arab world are expressed, mainly, through relationships of patronage and clientism between influential tribal Shaykhs and political elites” (Fattah 2011, npn). This patron-client relationship manifests because of the significant role tribes perform in the political, social, and military order within Yemen, with patron-client relations with the tribes prominent during the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Accordingly, tribal support determines the longevity of power and the ability of the central authority or other organizations to achieve a monopoly of violence in Yemen. To be sure, Yemeni Colonel Abdul Basit Al-Baher affirmed that “[t]he tribes have played a great role in supporting the national army. The tribes reinforced the army with fighters, logistics and intelligence, and hosted army troops” (al-Batati 2020, npn). Moreover, the vast majority of fighters on the front-line are tribesmen. Pointedly, this section will demonstrate how Huthi officials sought to establish “tribal and military loyalties through a combination of financial inducements, fear, and personal relationship building” (Longley Alley 2018, 3), in an effort to cement their hold on the monopolies of violence in strongholds across Northern Yemen. Similar to other state and non-state coercive centers in Yemen, the tribes are a main artery of manpower for the Huthi military apparatus. Tribal recruitment into military formations and acceptance of the political order are fundamentally important when understanding the nature of civil-military relations and the dispensation of power in Yemen. Indeed, tribal support and/or resistance to the Huthi rebellion remain a determining factor in the movement’s ability to control large swathes of territory. Huthi military commanders and officials require tribal loyalty to win and retain power, while tribal support historically determined longevity of the country’s political rulers. Huthi personnel continue to demonstrate an acute understanding of the tribal balance within Yemen and appreciate the importance of working by, with, and through the tribes to expand political power and consolidate coercive power. Brandt (2014) succinctly depicts this reality when commenting on Huthi relations with the tribes: The Huthi rebellion works through carefully developed plans and brilliant moves on the chessboard. They rely on alliances, both secret and openly visible. The Huthi strategy is based on a precise knowledge of the local tribes and on widespread social presence in their areas; they set up a tight network of checkpoints and patrol

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in the hamlets in operations that local sources describe as Huthi operations to feel the tribe’s pulse. Accordingly, the initial military success that enabled the Huthi insurgents to capture Sa’ana on September 21, 2014, emanated from Huthi relations with Ali Abdullah Saleh and access into his vast network of patronage and tribal connections. In this vein, Huthi expansion from its northern stronghold of Sa’ada across territories within Yemen was based on its ability to exploit “the alliance with former President Saleh to access the tribal, military, and political networks associated with his family and his political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC).”1 Huthi and Saleh forces amalgamated into a formidable force during the early stages of the internecine conflict, with a substantial portion of Huthi officers and Hashid soldiers rallied from tribes loyal to the former Yemeni strongman. However, tensions between the Huthis and the tribes in the North have worsened since Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed on December 3, 2017. The former Yemeni president represented the most powerful tribal wing of the alliance between the Huthis and the tribes. The death of Saleh generated tensions between the Huthi rebels and tribes. For example, while tribal leadership is integral in the mobilization of fighters for the Huthi rebels, the motivation in doing so varies based on the circumstances. In the north, where Huthis have established a system akin to a totalitarian police state, recruited tribal fighters are used to help the Huthis solidify their power (alDawsari 2020b, npn). Further, in the North, the Huthis have historically “‘pushed to disrupt the traditional tribal political system “by appointing supervisors from the Bani Hashim class to tribe-related positions of authority inside and outside the government’” (Dashela 2020, npn). To be sure, the Huthis have developed a new and powerful relationship with the tribes that enables them to establish a modicum of political power and capture the monopolies of violence over the areas in which they control. Moreover, the Huthi leadership seeks to systematically recalibrate the nature of tribal dynamics in an effort to weaken the political, social, and military power of tribes. According to Amnesty International, Huthi officials impose recruiting quotas in the areas it controls and harshly disciplines tribes who fail to supply the demanded manpower. In this regard, “a mixture of indoctrination, machismo, material sustenance, punishment and threats have kept the Huthi movement well-supplied with new fighters across nearly a dozen major battlefields in Yemen for over three years of war” (Knights 2018, npn). Notably, this approach to tribal relations is distinctly similar to the tactics deployed by the Islamic State in Iraq in Anbar and other provinces. Huthi takeover of territory causes the decline in power of local elites. For example, the Huthi leadership elevates “fourth-class” tribal Shaykhs into positions of power to establish parallel tribal structures such as the “tribal cohesion councils,” which are located in each Huthi territory under control. The tribal cohesion councils are staffed by Huthi-appointed tribal leaders and play an important role in the recruitment of tribal kin into the ranks of the Huthi forces.2 Under this arrangement, Huthi officials prop up loyalist tribal figures with patronage and diminish the influence of uncooperative tribal leaders who fail to comply (al-Dawsari 2020b, npn).

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Broadly, Huthi consolidation of political and military power is focused on expanding the influence of the Hashemite tribes in the north who proved instrumental during the Sa’ada Wars, in conjunction with the mutaḥawwithīn Huthi loyalists outside of Sa’ada who are in effect Huthizied, yet joined the movement for pragmatic as opposed to ideological reasons.3 Indeed, one evident reconfiguration of power is the placement of loyal Hashemite tribesmen into positions of power within the security apparatus, based on the Huthi strategy of co-option and control in relation to the tribes. In Ibb, for example, Huthi officials installed Hashemite loyalists into the positions of governorate security director and first deputy governor.4 A similar trend is noticeable in the governorates of Sanaa, Amran, al-Mahwit, Dhamar, and western Marib. The structuring of the Huthi security sector is focused on replacing local security and military officials with Huthi loyalists from Sa’ada and Hajjah to establish loyalty using patrimony and tribal kinship. This particular form of subverting the security and military institutions to a group or individual is similar to the practice of President Saleh placing tribesmen from his village of Sanhan into prominent positions within the military. Indeed, this method of securing the institutional fidelity of the military remains underpinned by patrimonial considerations. Moreover, Huthi officials are gradually removing prominent tribal leaders who had close relations to President Saleh or are supportive of the Islah political party. In terms of security, “the central pattern of security governance organized by the Huthis has managed to undermine and divide the local tribal structure, leaving the tribes with insufficient space to exercise some form of autonomy” (Nagi et al. 2020, npn). As a whole, Yemeni tribes inherently desire to preserve their social, economic, security, and political standing to remain a cohesive organization. This mentality of preserving the security of the tribe largely characterizes how the tribes interact with the state and other entities within Yemen. Importantly, Huthi-tribal relations are reminiscent of the co-option and patronclient relations under President Saleh, in that Huthi officials absorb tribal centers into high-level positions in the structures of the “state” as a form of patronage. This is evident with regard to Shaykh Muhammad Hussein al-Maqdashi, whom the Huthis appointed as governor of Dhamar Governorate, Shaykh Abd al-Wahid Salah, whom the Huthis elevated to governor of the Ibb Governorate, and Shaykh Faris al-Habbari, who was put in charge of the Raymah Governorate. In turn, the elevated Shaykhs promote lower Shaykhs, sons, and tribal kin to other roles within the government, thereby bonding the tribe to the benevolence of the Huthi organization similar to the nature of patron-client relations under President Saleh. Conversely, and similar to the experiences of the Islamic State in Iraq, tribal cohesion has stymied the Huthi takeover of certain territory. While the Huthi rebels managed to quell the tribes situated in the north, the organization failed to achieve military victory in Al Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf precisely because the tribes proved more cohesive and able to act as a unit (al-Dawsari 2020a, npn). As of now, the Huthi machinery has managed to garner influence over tribes in territory under their control by directly appointing new leadership to prominent northern tribal confederations to include the Hashid, Bakil, Lahum, Khawlan, and Raymah.

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This type of relationship enables the Huthi movement to nominally secure tribal subservience and easily recruit military-aged males to fight against the Coalition Forces. At the same time, the nature of influence and relationship witnessed with the northern tribes is oftentimes repressive depending on whether the tribe acquiesces to Huthi demands. As noted, Huthi relations with the tribes center on co-option and exclusionary tactics, which have resulted in tribal resistance to Huthi rule in governorates such as Ibb or Hajjah. Therefore, the Huthi leadership has failed to generate a sustainable loyalty among these tribesmen who are coerced into the fighting against the Coalition Forces. Conversely, the same tactics of co-opting loyal tribesmen and excluding uncooperative Shaykhs has been instrumental concerning the Huthi consolidation of power in Western Marib, Sanaa, Dhamar, al-Mahwit, and Amran. Importantly, “the loyalty of the tribes is not a given, and Huthi methods of tribal control may ultimately backfire, leaving the Huthi movement friendless in a hostile environment” (Dashela 2020, npn). Ostensibly, this assessment of how the Huthi movement interacts with the tribes is important given the historical role and impact of the Yemeni tribes on the civil-military relationship. Moving forward, it remains to be seen as to whether the organization is able to solidify tribal support in the north and thereby monopolize violence or lose tribal support and witness the mobilization of tribal fighters similar to the Anbar Awakening.

Patrimonial Economy Yemen has largely been the antithesis of Western-idealized notion of the “state” construct because much of the economic interactions remain beholden by patrimonial rule, patron-client relations, and endemic corruption. The collapse of the neo-patrimonial system necessitates a competition between non-state actors over the resources and modes of economic exchange within the political field. This new environment is characterized by the formation of informal economic networks, such as the pervasive “war economy” flourishing across Yemen, whereby corruption and criminality are utilized as methods of enrichment and state capture. Indeed, the Yemen war economy necessitated and reinforced practices of corruption to finance political and military ambitions across all parties involved. All parties involved in the civil war strive to gain political dominance and establish a monopoly of violence to achieve legitimacy. Securing access to illicit streams of income, avenues of corruption, for example, provide the various factions with the ability to form patron-client relationships in a patrimonial economy. To be sure, the pervasive networks of patronage defining the war economy transcend “the conflict, seamlessly crossing [front-lines] and regional borders, with perceived adversaries cooperating for the sake of maximizing profits” (Sana´a Center for Strategic Studies 2018, 26). Based on this understanding, patronage, or the distribution of material incentives in exchange for loyalty is a focal aspect in understanding the patrimonial economy of the sub-communalization of violence. The Huthis have asserted dominance over the informal and formal modes of

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economic exchanges under their control through the import, distribution, and sale of fuel, while the Huthi rebels diverted money away from the Central Bank of Yemen to finance military operations, pay the salaries of soldiers, and procure weaponry (Sana´a Center for Strategic Studies 2020, npn). Furthermore, Huthi officials collected income based on the organization’s relationship with Saleh and access to the networks of patronage he erected during his tenure as President. For example, Saleh loyalists afforded the Huthis access to lucrative black-market opportunities in the trades of narcotics, weapons, and other nefarious activities, who relied upon these important streams of illicit income to finance military and political objectives. Huthi influence also permeated into the Yemeni Economic Corporation (YECO)—a historically important institution connecting the military with the economic and financial segments of the Yemeni state and transforming it into an epicenter of patronage under the Presidency of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. YECO, under the Ministry of Defense, has been subject to rampant corruption in Huthicontrolled governorates. Further, Huthi officials commandeered transportation and logistical assets nominally under ownership of the YECO to fund military campaigns and engage in combat. Importantly, Huthi leaders are known to extend assets of the YECO to influential Yemenis in return for loyalty as a patron-client relationship. While the nature of “state capture” described above is one aspect of the patronclient relationship in Huthi territories, the Huthi rebels also work to distribute financial incentives to tribal leaders in an effort to recruit additional fighters. For example, local sources stated that Huthi military officials reportedly “pay 50 million riyals to any clan leader who can enlist 50 fighters to their ranks. The reward is doubled if the chief manages to recruit more individuals” (Nasser 2021, npn). Similarly, sources confirmed that Huthi leadership instructs local supervisors and military officials to recruit manpower and support, by “coaxing the tribes to joint insurgent ranks by offering them cash incentives, weapons and positions” within the Huthi government.5 This practice of distributing patronage in return for loyalty is longstanding in Yemen and characterized the neo-patrimonial rule of President Saleh. Consequently, Huthi officials are largely replicating the structure and nature of patron-client relations with the tribes experienced under President Saleh. This is particularly evident in the realm of distributing patronage to tribal chiefs in exchange for political and military support. Huthi commanders have replicated this patrimonial system, whereby access to resources and the dispersion of patronage in return for loyalty is an integral component of the tribal-sectarian field and thereby the dispensation of power.

External Actors The collapse of the Weberian state construct provides an opening which enables foreign powers to directly fund, train, and so on. To be sure, KSA, the UAE, the USA, and Iran are all actively vying to manipulate and empower local actors

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to achieve discursive objectives on the ground. To be sure, the role of external actors is perhaps the most influential in exacerbating the conflict and the subcommunalization of violence in Yemen (Transfeld 2019, npn). The UAE, KSA, and the IRI are the most pronounced foreign powers involved in the internecine conflict and hold the most responsibility for fundamentally exaggerating the dispensation of power and nature of civil-military relations across the fragmented state. However, the IRI is the most likely external actor to influence the nature of civil-military relations in Huthi-controlled areas in the future. The absence of state coherence and strong Weberian state construct with the monopoly of violence enables external actors to directly impact the internal power dynamics within Yemen and thereby manipulate the nature of civil-military relations through the empowerment of armed, non-state actors. Consequently, the dissipation of power away from the central authority and sub-communalization of violence allow external actors to directly work by, with, and through armed, nonstate actors to achieve foreign policy and geopolitical objectives. Indeed, Yemeni analyst Abdulghani Al-Iryani highlighted the profound role of external actors when noting that “Huthi successes should be primarily attributed to the incompetence, corruption, and pettiness of its Yemeni enemies, the duplicity and scheming of their regional allies, and the indifference of the international community” (al-Iryani 2020, npn). Operation Red Dawn positioned the Huthi rebels into the role as defender of the nation against the external aggression of Saudi Arabia and resulted in Riyadh equating “to the Huthis what Israel has long been to Hezbollah” (ibid.). The lack of Coalition strategic thinking and the inability to develop a coherent military campaign further weaken relations with Yemeni tribesmen, fail to generate a fighting spirit among the tribes, and precipitously support toward the Huthi militants. For example, a tribal leader in Marib stated that “the coalition wants us to fight without planning or sufficient support” (al-Dawsari 2020a, npn). The Saudi-led coalition and action of its partners enabled the Huthis to gain undue power and influence. The KSA legitimized Huthi rebels fighting. Furthermore, the lack of success of Riyadh and absence of any overall strategic vision to reach a political settlement ultimately “ended up facilitating the Huthis’ assertion of military dominance in the north, a process that was largely completed by 2017, shortly before the Huthis murdered the former president” (al-Iryani 2020, npn). Moreover, as the former head of the Moral Guidance Department in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense Major General Mohsin Khosroof explained, “we don’t know who is the decision-maker anymore. The Yemeni army has become paralyzed. No unified leadership. The command-and-control concept is absent. There are different heads with different allegiances inside the Yemeni army” (alDawsari 2020b, npn). Thus, opposed to helping the tribes, coalition incompetence is pushing the tribesmen into the wings of the Huthi military apparatus (ibid.). Ultimately today, the Huthi following encapsulates a spectrum of groups—an unruly quasi-coalition spanning religious, geographic, and political spaces and hierarchies allied in their opposition to the Saudi-led intervention (al-Hamdani 2019, npn). Accordingly, KSA provides a flag for Huthi followers to rally around.

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On the other hand, Iranian support toward the Huthi rebellion is more attuned around sewing the seeds of chaos as opposed to representing any larger or coherent foreign policy strategy. Iran is involved and this is well documented even before the revolution. From 2004 to 2010, Iran’s role increased in Yemen remarkably by supporting the Huthis in their military conflict with the Yemeni government. By 2012, the United States began to observe Iranian weapons shipments going to the Huthis, alongside members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operating within Sa’ada during the same period, while Iranian support has measurably increased since 2015. Around this time, Iran began to apply its model that worked for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shi’a militia in Iraq. This focused on the provision of weapons to the Huthi fighters and training them to conduct unconventional warfare. IRGCQF personnel have been deployed to Yemen in order to coordinate these activities, advise on military matters, and facilitate the movement of Hezbollah fighters into Yemen to help train Huthi insurgents. Furthermore, a significant number of Huthi fighters were “invited” to travel to Iran to receive religious education and military training.6 Iranian cooperation with the Huthi rebels increased following the removal of Saleh from power and ensuing disorder. In fragmented states—Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—state weakness and lack of cohesive institutions facilitate Iranian influence over domestic political and military dynamics. The military support Iran has provided to the Huthis since at least 2011 has largely been limited to training and mostly channeled through Lebanese Hezbollah. According to Hezbollah sources, hundreds of Lebanese and Iranian advisors have provided training to Huthi fighters in Yemen. It is not clear, however, whether and how this training translates into military strength on the ground (Transfeld 2017, npn). Importantly, while “the Iranian role in Yemen is not absolute,” it is severely limited in terms of replicating a situation similar to Hezbollah or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq because of “the internal conditions in Yemen, while others are related to Iran’s own capabilities.” The Iranians are not in a position to establish a Hezbollah-like entity in Yemen for a number of reasons. The political landscape in Yemen is not a confessional system similar to Lebanon but also Iran lacks the financial means to establish a durable and loyal patronage network in Yemen.7 However, at the same time, Iran is gradually establishing relations with the Huthi rebels that will potentially alter the nature of coercive power in the north. In October 2020, Iranian “diplomat” and IRGC-QF officer Hassan Eyrlou entered Sa’ana as Tehran’s first ambassador to the Huthi government since 2015. The placement of such a high-ranking IRGC officer signified Tehran’s confidence in prolonged Huthi military control of the north, while also suggesting how Tehran will seek to bolster support for the Huthi rebels. These steps will enable Iran to further develop the Huthi militia under the command and control of IRGC. Indeed Eyrlou, according to the US State Department, is “an IRGC member tied to Lebanese Hezbollah, into Yemen under the guise of ‘ambassador’ to the Huthi militia” (al-Batati 2020, npn).

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Iranian ambassadors posted to Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus are all career IRGC and often IRGC-QF officers who work by, with, and through local proxies to advance the regional policy goals of Iran. Therefore, the implication of Iranian involvement in domestic Yemeni politics is concerning given the success of Iran in nurturing non-state actors into formidable economic, political, and military forces. It stands to reason that the Huthi rebels will enjoy similar power following the conclusion of any peace settlement, given the organizations domination of the north, aside from Marib. Therefore, Iranian support toward the Huthi movement in the aftermath of a peace agreement will witness the organization gradually grow into a formidable force displaying similar characteristics and attributes to Lebanese Hezbollah or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. Accordingly, Iranian involvement in conjunction with the failed operations conducted by the Coalition Forces to defeat the Huthis has only served to increase the influence and power of non-state actors; this is particularly evident for example with regard to the STC and affiliated Security Belt Forces as well as the Huthi rebellion.

Conclusion The sub-communalization of violence and dissipation of power away from the central authority since the Arab Spring have fundamentally altered the nature of the state and coercive power in Yemen. What has manifested is an environment of “of mini-states at varying degrees of war with one another and beset by a complex range of internal politics and conflicts, than a single state engaged in a binary conflict” (Salisbury 2017, 2). This new reality of warfare and power fundamentally alters the nature of civil-military relations in Yemen, considering the collapse of the Weberian state construct, and the sub-communalization of violence. Accordingly, this chapter sought to understand the nature of civilmilitary relations and the dispensation of power in Yemen generally, and the Huthi rebellion specifically. In doing so, this chapter applied the conceptual approach of tribal-sectarian field by evaluating how the three frames—sub-state solidarities, patrimonial economy, and external actors—impact the dispensation power and the civil-military nexus. To recall, the nature of warfare within the tribal-sectarian nexus that coincides with state formation is characterized as a battlefield containing “varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors” (Kaldor 2013, 2). In Yemen, armies and militias are drawn from “ethnic, religious or tribal” communities (ibid.). The tribal-sectarian nexus in this regard illustrates a devolution of state capabilities, institutional strength, and cohesion at the hands of sub-state actors and solidarities. Particularly, this chapter demonstrated how coercive power in Yemen is dissipating around armed, non-state actors with a focus on Huthi insurgents based in the capital Sa’ana, although others are important to acknowledge to include the secessionist Southern Transitional Council in Aden, and the forces that are nominally controlled by the internationally recognized government of

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Yemen. In all instances, the operational forces are not appendages of a Weberian state and are largely formed around tribal, religious, or political loyalties. More broadly, the incorporation of Tilly’s work with the tribal-sectarian nexus points to the crisis of legitimacy now faced in fragmented states that stems from the inability of weak central authorities to fully control the monopolies of violence. Non-state actors attempting to establish a “state” will make war to neutralize foreign rivals, eliminate internal rivals to consolidate power, protect clients with the territory, and, lastly, develop the means to conduct all three activities (Tilly 1985, 181). While the Huthi rebels are currently engaging in the process of state formation within the tribal-sectarian field, all four activities described by Tilly require the movement “to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion” (ibid.). In this regard, the Huthi rebels are going along this continuum of state-building. Moreover, the rise of the Huthi rebellion reflects the erosion of “state” legitimacy and weakness of the central authority in Yemen, while the sub-communalization of violence has led to the emergence of the tribal-sectarian field. In this case, the Huthi rebels exercise considerable military and political power relative to the central authority—the internationally recognized government. Accordingly, an application of the conceptual approach based on the above theoretical underpinnings demonstrates how tribal identity, confessional loyalty, patrimonial economy, and external actors might come to determine the role and nature of civil-military relations in areas under Huthi control, while also illuminating how the above frames inform the dispensation of power within the “state.” In the north, the tribes continue to exert considerable influence in the political, security, and social realms, and the Huthis are acutely aware of this fact. Huthi officials rely on a mix of patronage, co-option, patrimonialism, and repression to maintain the acquiescence of the tribal Shaykhs residing in areas under their control. In certain instances, Huthi military commanders pay Shaykhs for providing fighters, while other tribes are elevated to important security or military roles in exchange for loyalty. At the center of these actions are the concerted efforts by the Huthi rebellion to ensure the Hashemites effectively capture the “state” similar to President Saleh’s centralization of power around his Sanhan tribe following the decline in peak oil. The deterioration of state cohesion and fragmentation of the Weberian state construct in Yemen expose the contours of power, and underlying networks of patronage are vulnerable to external actors. For example, Ginny Hill argues that “Yemen’s donors established their own patronage structure, competing with indigenous patronage structures in a contentious political environment where no paymaster had overall control” (Hill 2017, 261). This same phenomenon remains poignant in Yemen, where external powers continue to manipulate internal power dynamics by controlling networks of patronage. For example, the UAE provided patronage to the security and political structures of the south, while KSA finances the internationally recognized government. At the same time, Iran has gradually increased the distribution of patronage to the Huthi movement and recently appointed an IRGC-QF officer as ambassador to the Huthis. In these instances, foreign states manipulate the dispensation of power and alter the civil-military

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relationship by empowering non-state actors. While Iranian support has thus far remained limited, an exerted effort to bolster the Huthi military and political structures following a cessation of hostilities could potentially mirror the role and impact of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, or Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Notes­ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_ analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf https://abaadstudies.org/news-59852.html https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_ analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:FHXP49VfuRwJ:https:// www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/118592+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=it https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1356766/houthis-try-cash-positions-luretribal-chiefs-recruitment Researcher’s Interview with Colonel (Ret.) Randy Rosin. May 25, 2017. Researcher’s Interview with Yemeni diplomat.

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Clapham, Christopher. Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Claussen, Maria-Louise. “Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 29, no. 3 (2018): 560–78. Collinson, Sarah. Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action (London: Humanitarian Policy Group: Overseas Development Institute, 2003). Dashela, Adel. “Coercing Compliance: The Houthis and the Tribes of Northern Yemen.” Washington Institute for Near East Politics (2020). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/coercing-compliance-houthis-and-tribes-northern-yemen Fattah, Khaled. “A Political History of Civil-Military Relations in Yemen.” Alternative Politics, Special Issue 1 (2010): pp. 25–47, http://alternatifpolitika.com/site/dosyalar/ arsiv/Kasim2010-OzelSayi/2.khaled-fattah-a-political-history-of-civil-military.pdf Fattah, Khaled. “Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Shaykhs.” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 79–85. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.14754967.2011.00499.x ­Finn, Tom. “In Yemen, Saleh’s Military Forces Showing Signs of Strain.” Christian Science Monitor (2011). http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0523/In-YemenSaleh-s-military-forces-showing-signs-of-strain Hill, Ginny. Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017). Kaldor, Mary. “In Defence of New Wars.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–16. https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ sta.at/. (accessed January 19, 2016). Kaldor, Mary. New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: University Press, 1990). Khoury, Philip S. and Kostiner, Joseph. Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Oakland: University of California Press, 1990). Knights, Michael. “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture.” Combating Terrorism Center, (2018). West Point. https://ctc.usma.edu/houthi-warmachine-guerrilla-war-state-capture/ Kostiner, Joseph. “Solidarity in the Arab State-A Historical Perspective.” In Challenges to the Cohesion of the Arab State, ed. Susser, A. (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Centre, 2008), 21–40. Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1944). Lemarchand, Rene and Legg, Keith. “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis.” Comparative Politics 4, no. 2 (1972): 149–78. https://www.jstor. org/stable/421508 Longley Alley, April. “Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh Alliance and the Future of Yemen’s War.” Project On Middle East Political Science (2018). https://pomeps.org/collapse-ofthe-houthi-saleh-alliance-and-the-future-of-yemens-war Nasser, Mohammed. “Houthis Capitalize on Tribal Conflicts, Poverty for Recruitment.” Asharq al-awsat (2021). https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2776101/houthiscapitalize-tribal-conflicts-poverty-recruitment?amp Rabi, Uzi. The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Saʻid Bin Taymur, 1932–1970 (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2006). Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order.” Chatham House (2017). https:// www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order.

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­10 H U T H I V I SIO N S O F T H E STAT E : A H U T H I R E P U B L IC W I T H A N U N O F F IC IA L I M A M Charles Schmitz

This chapter assesses Huthi understanding of a future state. Contrary to widespread perception, the Huthi appear not to strive toward re-establishment of the Zaydi imamate but to imposition of a revolutionary model of republican government guided from the outside by the leader of a revolutionary movement. The model has similarities to the Iranian government but lacks the formal role for religious leaders. This chapter tries to make sense of Huthi thinking behind such an odd combination of republican ideals and adherence to Zaydi tenets. The chapter makes no claim about the viability or credibility of Huthi visions of governance but only traces Huthi thinking on the topic. The Huthi movement is a political movement rooted in religion. The Huthi claim a heritage in early Hadawi Zaydism that adheres to the idea of the imamate, a just state ruled by descendants of the Prophet, and reject later developments in Yemeni Zaydism that backed away from the requirement that the ruler be from the family of the Prophet (al-Huthi 2012; King 2012). The Huthi are firmly in power in northern Yemen, and they have been working to rebuild the state and society in accordance with their worldview. But no imam has appeared. Instead, Abd al-Malik al-Huthi is called a revolutionary leader and guided notable (Almasdaronline 2020). Reading the National Vision document, Huthi ideology in the Malāzim, and the Peace and National Inclusion agreement, and examining Huthi behavior during the interim government period as well as its wartime political institutions, it seems clear that the Huthi adheres to both the idea of the republican state and some form of the Zaydi principle that the Ahl al-Bayt are models or leaders of the Muslim community. While these appear contradictory, that is, republican equality and Ahl al-Bayt’s preference, the Huthi seem to straddle the fence between the two by pretending that the Huthi organization represents the will of the people separate from and outside of state institutions. The Huthi argue that they are guardians of the people’s will but not necessarily at the head of the state. Huthi wartime political institutions do have Huthi leaders, but significantly no one has declared themselves imam and the head of state has not been of Sāda stock since Mohammed al-Huthi relinquished power to the Supreme Political Council in the

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summer of 2016. The real Huthi leader, Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, has no official role in the state, yet he addresses the nation on national holidays as if he were the head of state. The Huthi appear to understand the relationship between the Huthi movement and the state in a manner not unlike the National Front and the Yemeni Socialist Party during the days of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen—the party makes decisions that the state implements.

­Contradictory Huthi Ideas The movement seems to propose both a religious leader with secular authority, a Zaydi imam, and a secular state based upon the republican ideal dominant in Yemen over the last half century. Though the Huthi leadership repeatedly disavows any intention to reestablish the Zaydi imamate that ruled northern Yemen before the republican coup in 1962 and no one has declared themselves imam as would be expected following Zaydi tradition, the lectures by Husayn and Abd al-Malik al-Huthi reaffirm the Zaydi arguments for a religious leader with secular power. And the reality of Huthi power is that a small circle of people close to the Huthi leader control decision making, a reality born of years of military struggle against difficult odds. Huthi policies are clearly designed to root the Huthi version of political Zaydism in society through revising educational programs (see Lashual, in this volume), public holidays and events, and mandatory educational programs for state employees. The Huthi relentlessly attacked their perceived enemies the Islah Party and the Salafis, destroying mosques and schools and imprisoning leaders. At the same time, the movement produced a blueprint for a future state in 2019 called the “National Vision” that builds upon the republican experience of the last fifty years. It calls for equal citizenship, elections, political competition, political parties, and limited government. The National Vision claims to implement more effectively the goals of the republican state: economic development, social justice, rule of law, political freedom, education, etc. The Huthi movement’s interim government in Sanaa is also secular in style, drawing as much as possible on continuities with the republican past—the use of Parliament, a prime minister and ministers, an attempt to hold Parliamentary elections, and a ruling council whose leader is not Ṣāda. Opponents of the Huthi argue that Huthi allegiance to the republican ideal is simply deceit or a temporary tactic. The Huthi only pretend to adhere to republican ideals of government because the republican government is popular in Yemen and the imamate, associated with Zaydism and often with the Sāda, the descendants of the Prophet through Hassan and Husayn, is hated. The Huthi retain republican government to gain legitimacy and deflect the charge that they aim to restore the hated Zaydi imamate from prior to the republican coup in 1962. There is plenty of evidence to support Huthi disingenuousness. The Huthi claim to defend religious freedom, yet they repress religious currents they oppose. The military agreement with President Hadi that ended the fighting in Amran in the summer of 2014 the Huthi violated before the ink was dry on the paper. When the Huthi entered

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Sanaa in September 2014 and signed the Peace and National Inclusion agreement ostensibly to reform the interim government, they effectively overthrew the very government they facilitated by installing “supervisors” to control all government agencies. It was a slow coup, Huthi style, a call to reform the government that ended with Huthi control of government through the back door. The Huthi demanded upon their entrance into Sanaa that the government revoke its decision to withdraw subsidies to domestic petroleum products that was the source of popular discontent on the street. Upon taking power, however, the Huthi forgot their demand because domestic petroleum supplies became a source of revenue for the movement, so instead of subsidizing the public, they raised prices to gain revenue. Finally, though the Huthi retain as much as possible the institutions of the Republic of Yemen, creating only the Supreme Revolutionary Council and then the Supreme Political Council to replace the presidency temporarily, in fact the country is run by a small group of people associated with Abd al-Malik al-Huthi from the beginning. Mahdi Mushat, president of the High Political Council and ostensibly head of state, is significantly not a member of the Sāda signaling Huthi adherence to republican ideals, but he is a close childhood friend of Abd al-Malik, suggesting the Huthi want the appearance of republican government without the content—deceit. The Huthi National Vision is nothing more than ink on paper, as they say in Yemen. However, since the Huthi are secure in their role as the de facto government in Sanaa, why have they not re-established the imamate? The Huthi have no need for deception, they are the de facto power. The Huthi have spent considerable energy normalizing their rule in the areas under their control, looking ahead to a postwar era when people will hold the Huthi responsible for their everyday conditions. This suggests that while the National Vision document may well be only ink on paper for those who expect equality, rule of law, peaceful political transfer of power, etc., the ink the Huthi did produce might tell us something important about Huthi selfperception. The Huthi may in fact adhere to their version of a republic not only out of political expediency but also because of their own perceptions of government and self-understanding. A Zaydi republic is not unprecedented. The 1980s and 1990s saw many alternate visions of government proposed by Zaydi scholars that remain within the realm of traditional Zaydi precepts but that support republican government and reject the restriction of leadership to Ahl al-Bayt, some form of Zaydi republicanism (Ghulays 1997; King 2012). The Huthi vision of the state may be a new proposal of government that retains the requirement of a Sāda leader in a novel, non-institutionalized form, as a model of behavior rather than a formal role in government. The Huthi are guided by religion, by Zaydi ideas, but their relationship to traditional Zaydi scholarship is ambiguous. Huthi ideology is politically revolutionary. It argues that religion should transform people’s lives in this world. Muslims are weak and poor because their reading of the Quran fails to inspire them to transform their conditions in this world. A new engagement with the Quran, a “Quranic March” (al-Masīra al-Qurʾāniyya), is required to inspire people to change, to improve their conditions, resolve their problems. Following

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this logic, the Huthi National Vision is an improved republic that builds upon the republican experience over the last fifty years rather than overthrows it. The Huthi movement sees itself as a revolutionary movement, overcoming corruption and improving people’s lives. The republican National Vision is an improved form of republican government. That the National Vision does not include the restriction of leadership to the Sāda, as required in Zaydi principle, may stem from the Huthi innovation of an informal deference to Ṣāda leadership, an imam-like figure, in noninstitutionalized form. The Huthi leader Abd al-Malik is the real source of power, but not in a formal position of government. He is the guided notable that everyone is religiously obliged to follow in religious and secular affairs, but he does not occupy a formal position in government. The principle that there is a religious political authority is interpreted as a model, an example to be emulated, rather than a claim to official state leadership. The Huthi relationship with Iran also may lend legitimacy to republican government within Huthi circles. Huthi are inspired by Khomeini and Iran, as we will see below. Retention of republican government could follow from the example of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Huthi National Vision does not include the formal institutionalization of religious guidance that the Iranian Wilāyat al-Faqīh represents. The Huthi proposal is a republic without formal role for Zaydi religious authority. The Huthi seem to propose a model more akin to the Yemeni Socialist Party’s (YSP) relationship to the state in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen: the state implements party decisions (Ismael 1986, 53). In both cases, the YSP and the Huthi are the will of the people, and the state should naturally follow the movement because it is the people’s will. On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the Huthi entrance into Sanaa, Abd al-Malik outlined his vision of the relationship between the Huthi revolutionary state and religion: We reaffirm the continuance of our liberatory revolutionary project through which we strive to achieve the legitimate and rightful hopes of our dear people in the complete liberation of our country, total independence in its decision making, in order to build a state on the basis of justice and legitimacy in harmony with its identity in religious faith and focusing on national inclusion and preventing oppression in all its forms whether individual, racial, class, or regional. (A. al-Huthi 2020, emphasis added)

The Political Revolutionary Husayn al-Huthi Husayn al-Huthi’s ideas are primarily political but constructed in religious terms. His view of the world is very simple. Muslims are in a difficult situation; they are poor and weak. Jews and Christians of the Quran, Israel and the United States today, are the cause of Muslim poverty and weakness; in this the Quran is clear, says Husayn: Christians and Jews are enemies of Islam. “The holy Quran

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affirms that they [the Jews and the Christians] are the historical enemies of the Muslim people from that time and perhaps until the last days of the world and it gave us much guidance on how to confront them” (al-Huthi, H. 2002e). In the contemporary world, the Muslims are losing the battle. Jews and Christians have divided Muslims, exploited Muslim resources, and dominated Muslim culture such that Muslims willingly subjugate themselves to Jewish and Christian designs. Husayn sees urbanization as a Jewish conspiracy because it caused Muslims to lose their bonds to one another in city life (ʿAwaḍah 2019a, 60); he sees education in Yemen as an American plot, and the American war on terror is simply an America excuse to occupy Muslim lands (102). But the cause of Muslim weakness is not only the conspiracies of the Jews and Christians: Muslims are weak because they have lost the spirit of Islam, he argues. To regain the spirit of Islam, Husayn argues for a Quranic culture to invigorate Muslims, to empower Muslims to be able to take their rightful place in the world, stand up to American and Israeli conspiracies, and expel Jewish and Christian influence from Muslim lands. His is a Quranic politics of the Middle East that locates evil in American and Israeli dominance and good in Muslim ability to resist and overcome American and Israeli dominance. His Quranic project is a radical return to a direct reading of the Quran as the source of religious knowledge, eschewing the corpuses of traditional Muslim scholarship and the religious divisions they embody. “None of Shawāfiya say that they are only Shāfiʿī, none of the Ḥanābila say they are only Ḥanbalī. We want to examine, we want to return everyone as Muslims to the Holy Quran and that is what will guide us” (al-Huthi, H. n.d.). I do not want to anger him, I don’t want to make him mad from the perspective that I am one school of Islam and he is from another, not like that. We will resolve the issue by realizing that we are all Muslims. That is one of our problems, that I attack another because he is Sunni and I am Zaydi. (al-Huthi, H. n.d.)

His Quranic project appears pan-Islamic, and indeed he strives to lead the entire Muslim world (but as we will see below, his return to the Quran has a distinctly sectarian bent). Husayn’s real focus, though, is not so much on a pan-Islamic reading of the Quran but a political reading that produces a project of Muslim unity in opposition to the United States and Israel. It is political animation that Husayn wants. He criticizes those who study religion but whose study does not lead them to change the world, as he sees it, to fight in the name of God against the Christians and Jews. Religion is dead unless it animates political activity in opposition to the conspiracies that bring evil to the Muslim world. In the end we find that we spend our days with books, and they are all misleading from the first to the last such as the book Origins of Jurisprudence (ʾUṣūl alFiqh). It is behind all the delusions we are in, behind the passivity of Zaydism,

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behind the battering of Zaydism, behind that diminished spirit of Zaydism, which is completely contrary to that of the ancestors of the Ahl al-Bayt and their faction. These that we stay up late studying their lessons and carrying into the mosque and which distance us from the reality of the mosque, and suddenly we reap onto ourselves, reap onto our mosques from these books that we saw ourselves worshiping God in reading them, suddenly they are what ruin our mosques, and we do not have that spirit of the mosque of the Prophet, and we lost the spirit of the Ahl al-Bayt and its faction. (al-Huthi, H. 2002d)

His focus on political animation explains his puzzling stance toward Iran. Husayn admires Iran because of its obstinate opposition to American and Israeli dominance of the Middle East. “Imam Khomeini is a person that is known for his seriousness in confronting all Islam’s enemies, in confronting American calling it the Great Satan and considering it behind all the humiliation and insult that afflicts Muslims” (al-Huthi, H. 2001). But Husayn mocks Iranian Twelver doctrine and warns the youth against Iranians pushing Jaʿfrī ideas. He makes fun of core concepts of Jaʿfrī Shiʿim such as the hidden imam, the khums, and the mutaʿa, temporary marriage. He alleges that Khomeini does not follow Twelver doctrine. “We do not pay attention to their [Twelver] doctrine because, as I’ve said before, if their doctrine influenced me, I would find their doctrine is not them, that their doctrine imposes upon them that they be not as they are. Wilayat al-Fiqh is not in their doctrine nor is [political] movement or Islamic government” (al-Daghshī 2010, 80; see also al-Huthi, H. 2003). Husayn admires Khomeini precisely because he stirs people out of their quietism, a quietism that Husayn considers a central tenet of Twelver doctrine. Khomeini’s Islamic government and political activism are innovations beyond the confines of Twelver doctrine, he seems to imply; precisely what he admires about Khomeini is his politics. [The name] Imam Husayn was repeated many times on Ashura and other times amongst the Jaʿfrī Shiʿa and they cried and beat themselves, but it is all was emotional. Imam Khomeini was able to make it effective, revive Ashura. That name [Hussayn] was repeated hundreds of years in a purely emotional atmosphere, not connected to jihad, not connected to taking a stance, not connected to lifting the spirits of the Muslim community, to taking a stance against the enemies of the Muslim community and the enemies of religion, until someone came that could revive it in the souls of the people. (al-Huthi, H. 2002c; see also Haidar 2014)

Husayn is similarly skeptical of the view of traditional Zaydi scholarship. He argued that traditional arts of religious scholarship were the very thing that brought Zaydis to the miserable situation they live today (al-ʾAḥmadī 253). He would say, “I sense from my reading of the Quran and through my understanding of reality,

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and I could be wrong in many things, that Zaydism is living its worst period of humiliation, worse than that which struck the people of Israel” (al-ʾAḥmadī 253). The reason for this deterioration according to Husayn is that the traditional approach to religion is deadening: “Aren’t we trying now to rid ourselves of the sciences that we read, arts we want to get rid of completely, throw them against the wall, that which is called theology, foundations of religion, that specializes in knowing God and that does not take us to knowledge of God, but stops us from knowing God” (al-Huthi, H. n.d.). Husayn’s critique of traditional Zaydi scholarship might suggest that his Quranic culture is pan-Islamic and does not adhere to any established school of Islamic thought. Not so, however. Husayn argues that though he is not making a sectarian argument, a clear reading of the Quran establishes the truth of Zaydism. First that Ali bin abi Talib was the successor to the Prophet and that there is a political authority appointed by the Prophet to whom Muslims owe allegiance, and then that the Prophet’s family have been selected by God to carry the tradition of the Prophet. When we recall the occasion of the announcement of the authority of Ali (peace be upon him), we declare that religion, according to our understanding, our view, and our doctrine, that it is religion and a state, that the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family), did not leave this life until he announced to his people who would succeed him. (al-Huthi, H. 2002a)

Ali (and by extension, his family) was selected to lead the Muslim community in this world, in political affairs. Husayn mentions many times that the goal of jihad currently is to establish an Islamic state. He admires Imam al-Hadi and Imam Khomeini for doing so. And while criticizing bin Laden, Husayn affirms that only the family of the Prophet can save the Muslim community. One day ʾUssāma appeared, and we saw many people who thought that he would be the one to save the Muslim community. But we said, no, it will not ever be achieved by him. The Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) said: I leave to you that if to which you adhere, you will not go astray ever, God’ book and my family. So, liberation from the delusion that we live in will not be except by the family of the Prophet who are the companions (quranāʾ) of the Qurʾān. (al-Huthi, H. 2002)

While Husayn may argue he is not sectarian and wants all Muslims to unite in a return to the Quran, his Islam is Zaydi. ­ e noticeable thing in the history of the Muslim community is that all those Th that ruled the Muslims beginning from Abū Bakr, those that rule the Muslims except the ʾImam ʿAli (peace be upon him) and except the Ahl al-Bayt are outside

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the requirements of faith, they are the ones that lost the faith of the Muslim community, while we find that in the hands of the Ahl al-Bayt like ʾImām ʿAlī and those after him from the Ahl al-Bayt, they are the ones that educate the Muslim community with an education that lifts them to the level of complete faith. (al-Huthi, H. n.d.) These days do we hear anyone calling the Muslim community to return to the Qurʾān? To return to the Qurʾān and not to the interpreters from the Sunni, to know the Qurʾān in the way of the companions of the Qurʾān [a reference to Shīʾa] and the heirs of the Qurʾān, and not to Tabari and Ibn Kathir and other interpreters that give documents to the Jews saying that the land that God promised you is the Levant and not Palestine. The Levant includes Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine! (al-Huthi, H. 2001)

However, Husayn’s Zaydism is political, just as his Islam is. Husayn argues Zaydism today is lost and the descendants of the Prophet, Ahl al-Bayt, are ineffective. ʾImām al-Hādī went to Yemen by himself and created an Islamic state in Yemen, and his blessings remain today, and many others like him went to the Maghreb and to Iran and to other places in the world. Just one of them [Ahl al-Bayt] would reform a whole community, but now thousands have almost melted, almost become nothing, they forgot their honor, they forgot the great responsibility on their shoulders, even in this dangerous situation that we see and live, we find a lack of the spirit of the previous Ahl al-Bayt, gone from amongst this large number of Ahl al-Bayt. (al-Huthi, H. 2002)

Husayn’s political Zaydism will save the Muslim world, not the traditional corpus of Zaydi thought. Ahl al-Bayt must be most vigilant to mark the guided path and that their culture is a Qurʾānic culture far from any foreign errors, because they strive to guide others, and because if their culture is corrupted they won’t be able to receive God’s guidance for them, it will reflect the influence of their false, errant culture that is foreign to them, it will be reflected in the form of passivity, inattention, shortcoming, and neglect as happens with us now. Isn’t someone from the Ahl al-Bayt going to move the Muslim community? They are tens of scholars of the Ahl al-Bayt that do nothing, just sit quietly. Isn’t that clear? Tens of scholars of Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen sit quietly, where did that come from? The rules of jurisprudence (ʾUsūl al-Fiqh) and of theology (ʿIlm al-Kalām), rules they’ve leaned upon to make them sit quietly. (al-Huthi, H. 2002)

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This is articulated clearly in a document of principles signed by Abd al-Malik in 2012: The criticisms of the scholars are not directed against the scholars of Ahl al-Bayt of God’s Prophet and their faction and not their scholarship but against those that do not see the necessity of jihad for the oppressed and that do not require enjoining the good and ending evil but that are quiet and obey those that are not to be allowed to be obeyed. (al-Huthi 2012)

In Husayn al-Huthi’s view, there are particular people, the guided notables (alʾAʿlām al-Hudā), that are guided by God. They are primarily Zaydi but not only Zaydi who animate a political project and fight Islam’s enemies as defined by the Huthi. Husayn mentioned as guided notables in his reading of ʿAshūrāʾ “Ali, Zayd, Husayn, Hassan, and their likes” (al-Huthi, H. 2002f). But the guided notables also included Khomeini who is outside Zaydi circles and outside his own doctrine’s circles, as Husayn sees it. The criterion of being guided is a political one; the guided ones animate people to join the movement to fight Islam’s enemies, that is, Israel and the United States, according to the Huthi. In the end, Husayn al-Huthi’s message is political. The criterion for determining those “guided” by the Qurʾān today is an agreement with the political analysis of the Huthi that Christians and Jews are eternal enemies of Islam, that today the United States and Israel are the source of Muslims’ problems, and that jihad defined as military struggle against these enemies is the highest duty of Muslims today. The Huthi relationship with traditional Zaydism is ambiguous. The Huthi include Zaydis only in as much as Zaydis support their political program. The diversity of views that characterizes any school of thought is absent in Huthi Zaydism and the traditional style of argument among the Zaydi scholars is also absent (see Haykel, this volume). The style of even a traditional scholar such as Badr al-Din al-Huthi, father of Husayn and Abd al-Malik, is quite different from the style of his sons. Badr al-Din’s books remain with longstanding traditions in Zaydi and Muslim scholarship and are not political treatise like his sons (Badr al-Din al-Huthi 2016). The Huthi break with the traditional scholarly community and styles leaves room for innovation in styles of government. Husayn reaffirms many times the necessity of an Islamic state, that religion and the state are not separate, but his main message is a revolutionary one. The Quranic path is one that animates, stimulates, invigorates, and motivates Muslims for political action in this world to better the lives of Muslims and fight against God’s enemies which are Huthi enemies—a political project. Such revolutionary fervor might well accord with a republican state such as outlined in the National Vision, so long as the people are guided, somehow, by Ahl al-Bayt, but perhaps through a revolutionary movement rather than the head of state.

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The Emergence of a Modern Insurgency The Huthi movement of Husayn al-Huthi is not the Huthi movement today. In the early 2000s, Husayn al-Huthi politicized what had been a Zaydi cultural revival movement, but it was his brother, Abd al-Malik, who built an effective political military organization to fight an insurgency against Saleh’s government (al-Daghashī 2010, 10). The conflict originated in the reverberations of Husayn’s famous slogan that remains the slogan of the organization today. In the context of the American war on terror and the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, Husayn launched, in a famous talk in January 2002 entitled “Scream in the Face of the Arrogant,” the call “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Long Live Islam” (al-Huthi, H. 2002b). The Saleh regime feared the Huthi slogan would cause (further) tensions with Washington over terrorism policy and that it would be used against the regime itself (al-Daghashī 2010, 108). The regime’s heavy-handed security response in effect consolidated Huthi leadership over an insurgency born less of Zaydi revivalism than self-defense and hatred of the Saleh regime’s military. The victory of the Huthi insurgency guaranteed the organization a significant place in Yemen’s future, but also transformed what had been a religious cultural movement into a political military organization. Huthi success resulted from political and military manipulation of cleavages within Yemeni society in the north rather that popular appeal of its political vision or doctrinal positions (Brandt 2017, 133; al-Daghashī 2013, 31). By the end of the six wars between 2004 and 2010, the Huthi established themselves as the de facto power in Saada. The military strategy of the Huthi organization during the interim period 2012–2014 focused on expanding its control over the north, expelling its enemies in Islah and the Salafis (al-Daghashī 2013, 56), and moving its sphere of control southward toward Sanaa. The Huthi military strategy included an alliance with former enemy Ali Abdallah Saleh, who saw in the Huthi a chance to exact revenge upon those that turned on him in 2011, particularly the Islah Party and Ali Muhsin. The Huthi alliance with Saleh was a tactical, strategic alliance to further political military goals. The Huthi organization at this point behaves as a political/ military organization within a larger context, making strategic alliances that have no religious or doctrinal content, merely political. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Agreement allowed the Huthi to participate in peaceful political activities within Yemeni institutions (though the NDC was an ad hoc arrangement). When the peaceful demonstrations against the Saleh regime erupted in early 2011, the Huthi organization participated actively, making political alliances with other Yemeni groups opposed to Saleh. The Huthi, and much of Yemen, saw the Huthi movement as another victim of Saleh’s regime (without realizing, obviously, that Saleh would ally with the Huthi). And when the GCC agreement created the National Dialogue, the Huthi movement was an active participant. One of the nine issues on the table of the National Dialogue was the trouble in Saada. In the National Dialogue, the Huthi acted as part, and only a part, of a larger community of Yemenis formulating a common foundation for a future state. And the Huthi fell squarely behind the republican ideals of

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the National Dialogue. Along with the majority, the Huthi representatives voted against the proposed clause (existing in the current constitution) that Islam was the state religion and that Islamic law was the sole source of legislation (though this may have been simply a tactical vote against the interests of Islah Party). The first recommendation of the NDC committee on Saada was to guarantee religious freedom, the right to chant slogans, and to guarantee the neutrality of the state in religious affairs (Republic of Yemen 2014). Participation of the Huthi in the NDC showed that the Huthi had interest in formal political participation and that there were liberal thinkers among the Huthi leadership. The Huthi organization was thinking about political ideology and institutions, but the NDC was preparing for a new constitution and elections that never took place, and the Huthi did not propose their own model of government in the conference since they were not in a position to do so. The transformation of Husayn al-Huthi’s movement into a military insurgency over 2004–10, under Abd al-Malik from 2005, transformed the Huthi movement from an educational movement to a military organization. As a military organization, its interests are in survival first, whether through military tactics and alliances or political ones, such as Huthi participation in the Arab Spring uprising and the National Dialogue Conference following it. Following the Huthi entrance into Sanaa in September 2014, the movement shifts again from a regional power to de facto state power. The transformation is clear in Abd al-Malik’s rhetoric that is more strategic, addressing the Yemeni people, whereas Husayn al-Huthi addresses broader concerns of Muslims in general or Zaydis in Yemen (see al-Mahfali in this volume). Under Abd al-Malik, the Huthi begin to imagine the Huthi movement’s relationship with a future Yemeni state.

­The Peace and National Inclusion Document and the National Vision: Huthi Dominance within Republican Institutions The Huthi movement’s political behavior during its coup in Sanaa and later in its proposed political blueprint both indicate that the Huthi want to continue the legacy of the republic, not overthrow it. In September 2014 when Huthi militia overran Sanaa, the Huthi did not overthrow the government. Instead, the Huthi suggested reforms of the current interim government, and the rest of Yemen’s political leaders agreed along with the UN. The thrust of the Huthi reforms was to make government more representative and more responsible (and under control of the Huthi). Abd al-Malik spoke shortly before the entrance of Huthi forces into Sanaa saying, “We are not in a political reality that embodies the will of the Yemeni people, a reality that addresses the worries of the people, their concerns and pain, no!” (al-ʿAwāḍa 299). “The state must adapt to the people and not be in one valley while the people are in another, it should embody the will of the people, its choices, and its directions” (p.  303, italics added). It becomes clear later that the Huthi claim to determine the will of the people, and the fulfillment of the will of the people means Huthi power, not an effective democratic state.

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In the Peace and National Inclusion document signed by the UN’s Jamal Benomar and Abd Rabo Hadi after the Huthi overran Sanaa, the Huthi suggested instituting a presidential advisor from each of the Southern Movement and the Huthi movement since these were left out of the GCC brokered interim government that was divided between Saleh’s GPC and the opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Party (JMP). And the ministers of the new government were to be chosen based on competencies and not politics. The later measure was widely popular since the government instead of governing and addressing the immediate concerns of the country the ministers were positioning themselves and their parties for the post-interim government. A new government was chosen, one not dominated by the Huthi, that was indeed much more competent than the previous government. It was a technocratic rather than political government and was in fact well positioned to address many of the pressing economic and security issues facing the country. The Huthi call for wider participation was also widely welcomed because the parties that sat in the National Dialogue Conference represented a much wider swath of Yemeni society than the interim government that was restricted to Saleh’s GPC and the formal coalition of opposition parties, the JMP. The Huthi-inspired Agreement for Peace and National Inclusion was rooted firmly in the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, reiterates a commitment to equal citizenship, and focuses on building an effective state. Double employment and “ghost” employees were to be eliminated; taxation was to be applied to all, but especially large owners; and tax revenues were to go to the appropriate state agencies. State employees were to be identified with secure IDs. Markets were to be freed for private competition from state monopolies. Pricing of basic commodities was to alleviate some of the economic pinch people were feeling, and the government’s social welfare programs were given special emphasis (Yaman Saʿīd). It was a well-designed populist position that was carefully tailored to the political moment. Significantly, the military amendment of the document calls for all militias to disband, all heavy weaponry to be returned to the state, and for the military to gain control over all Yemeni territory, under UN supervision. (This clause is repeated in UNSC resolution 2216.) The Huthi seemed not to fear the Yemeni military because they see themselves as the state. The Huthi supported the state’s monopoly over the means of coercion, the heavy weaponry of the state, because they controlled the state, not as political commanders of the state but as the personnel of the state, though Huthi control of the state was not consolidated at this point and there were still significant divisions within the military. The new government formed by the Peace and National Participation Agreement lasted only a short while. The Huthi interpreted the agreement to say that Huthi supervisors would enter the halls of government to prevent fraud and oversee the work of the government, but Huthi intervention became intolerable and the government resigned. Huthi behavior during the Peace and National Inclusion period suggests that the Huthi want an effective, modern, republican government that the rest of Yemen accepts, but a government that the Huthi control from

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within. In effect, the Huthi are the state, and in time, the Huthi supervisors did indeed become the state functionaries (see Rogers, this volume). The Huthi did not want to put themselves into official positions of the government, there were no Huthi appointees in the Peace and National Participation government (except for the advisor to the president), but the Huthi effectively melted into the government bureaucracy and became the state apparatus. And Huthi militias slowly became the military, though it took time because Ali Abdallah Saleh retained significant influence, especially in the military. Meanwhile, Huthi militias and Huthified Yemeni military units rushed to secure as much territory as possible. The Huthi seem to say that the Huthi are the people, they will ensure that government follows the will of the people, but the government is the same republican government that the people of Yemen put into place in 1962. The resignation of the government in January 2015 forced the Huthi to take leadership of the state directly, not by restoring the imamate but by continuing, as much as possible, the republican government. The Huthi first created the Supreme Revolutionary Council headed by Abd al-Malik’s cousin, Mohammad al-Huthi, that itself immediately called for the replacement of parliament with a new interim national council made up of 551 members who would choose a presidential council that would lead the government over a two-year period. The interim government’s mission was the same as Hadi’s interim government: complete the rewriting of the constitution according to the outcomes of the National Dialogue, hold a referendum on the new constitutions, then hold elections for a new government under the new constitution (al-Jazeera 2015). However, political considerations led the Huthi to reverse their decision to dissolve parliament. Parliament in Sanaa was dominated by allies of Ali Abdallah Saleh, whose support the Huthi clearly valued. Thus, in the summer of 2016, a new Supreme Political Council was created whose members were “chosen” by parliament. Council members were sworn into their positions before parliament. The council was divided between Saleh supporters and Huthi supporters; the president of the council was to rotate between Saleh supporters and Huthi supporters. In practice, the Huthi retained the position of head of the council (and government), perhaps reflecting the real balance of power between the two erstwhile allies. The Huthi were clearly concerned about political legitimacy: their consistent demand in international negotiations is recognition as the de facto government in Sanaa, and their charades in Parliament were designed to legitimize their new institutions within the republican context (Sanaa Center 2019). Although Mohammad al-Huthi, a cousin of Abd al-Malik and a sayyid, led the Supreme Revolutionary Council from February 2015 until the creation of the Supreme Political Council in summer of 2016, the Huthi leaders of the Supreme Political Council, the Huthi heads of state, were not Sāda. The presidents of the council, Saleh al-Samad and Mahdi al-Mushat, were not Hashemite, Sāda. Though Husayn and Abd al-Malik emphasize Yawm al-Ghadīr, the Hadith of Wilāya, and the Hadith of the Thaqalayn, and though the Sāda are an important constituency of the Huthi movement, the head of government, Mahdi al-Mushat, and the prime minister, Abd al-Aziz bin Haptour, are not Sāda, not Hashemite.

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The symbolism appears intentional and significant: the Huthi do not require the head of state, the top secular authority, to be Sāda, as the Zaydi tradition of the imamate would require.

National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State Following Ali Abdallah Saleh’s poorly calculated rebellion in December 2017, the Huthi leadership appeared concerned that Saleh’s supporters may desert the Huthi after his demise. The important military commander and the former president’s nephew Tareq Saleh fled to Aden with many of the former Republican Guard members he commanded. In this context, Huthi president Samad initiated the creation of a new national vision designed in part, judging by the timing, to shore up support from the ranks of those Saleh supporters whose vision of Yemen is republican and secular but also against the background of growing Huthi confidence in their military capabilities (though the document insists it is not a “political strategy but a national demand and property of all future Yemeni generations” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 17)). Samad’s initiative was completed only in 2019 after Samad was killed in a Saudi air raid, but the slogan of “a hand protects, and a hand builds” captures the Huthi desire to shift some of the focus from military defense to consolidation of domestic political gains. In the document, the Huthi are thinking ahead to a postwar Yemen, and the document might be taken as an opening gambit in a domestic political settlement with those fighting on the Hadi side. Huthi president al-Mushat wrote, “the initiation of the state building project was as a basis of interaction for all those sincere among the Yemeni people and political forces to build a modern Yemeni state” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 12). “Hoping to strengthen the legitimacy of our agenda and hoping to unite the hands of Yemenis, we call on all political forces to a national reconciliation” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 14). The desire for the document to serve as an opening to a political solution is clear: “There are political issues the Vision does not determine their final form because they are related to the outcome of the reconciliation and political settlement” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 18). The first period of the timeline for implementation of the National Vision is a two-year period, 2019–20, that is titled “Reconciliation and Forgiveness,” referencing the initial period of national political reconciliation that the document calls for (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 25). In the National Vision document is a list of impediments to achieving the goals of the document that read as a comprehensive list of the ills of Ali Abdallah Saleh’s regime over the last three decades. Significantly, Husayn al-Huthi’s analysis of the weaknesses of Islam and Zaydism is absent. There is nothing about passive Muslims and the subjugation of Islam and Muslims to Israeli and American conspiracies. The significant challenges are the weakness of supervision mechanisms for the state’s bureaucracy and their subjugation to political agendas, loyalty to individuals rather than the national state, and lack of social justice and equality of opportunity

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(Supreme Political Committee 2019, 26). Islam is included in the document, but the National Vision’s roots are in the National Dialogue Conference and the experience of the half century of republican rule, not the Quran or Husayn’s Malazim. In the general principles of the National Vision, at the top of the list are the “principles of Islam and the precepts of Sharia are the foundation of the National Vision to build a modern Yemeni state” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 20), but Islam plays almost no role elsewhere in the document. Among the other six basic principles are the “republican system and adhering to the constitution and laws,” “peaceful transfer of power through free and transparent elections that are the working embodiment of democracy,” and “achieving social justice and equal citizenship” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 20). These principles do not align easily with Hashemite dominance or a traditional Zaydi imamate. The National Vision claims roots and sources in Yemeni experience over the last fifty years. The sources for the document are the Yemeni Constitution, the agreedupon outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, the basic laws and legislation, the sectoral strategic plans of the previous government, the International Program for Sustainable Development (2016–30), successful international experiences, suggestions and views of the government institutions, and the visions of political parties (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 21). By claiming roots in republican Yemen and its existing political parties, the Huthi movement argues that it introduces nothing significantly new but reforms what exists. The Huthi National Vision proposes a reformed Yemeni republic, not a return to the imamate. The National Vision document is the Huthi organization’s most significant proposal for a post-settlement government, and it, along with Huthi retention of parliament, shows that the Huthi want to claim at least the mantle of the Yemeni republicanism despite their actions that belie a lack of adherence to the substance of the ideals of Yemeni republican government.

Conclusion The Huthi movement began as a religious and political renaissance movement among Zaydi youth and scholars that blossomed after the political liberalization of Yemeni unification in 1990. After 2000, Husayn al-Huthi took the rhetoric of renaissance and refashioned it into a politically revolutionary Islam outlined in the Malazim. He defined the world in terms of the struggle between Muslims and Christians and Jews, expressed today as the United States and Israel. Husayn’s renaissance is a political one—a re-reading of religion to say that religion should support political resistance against non-Muslim involvement in Muslim world affairs, specifically expel the United States and Israel from the Middle East. Husayn is not interested in reviving traditional religious scholarship; his is not a renaissance of religious tradition but of political action. He attacks scholars who disagree with him, who do not share his reading of politics. Husayn does not say much about a state except to say that Islam and the state are inseparable.

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Abd al-Malik oversees the transformation of the Huthi movement from an educational, inspirational movement into a military organization that fights a long, difficult insurgency and finally into a power that becomes the de facto government in Sanaa. Abd al-Malik’s language is more concrete, strategic, and focused on the Yemeni people, nation, and state. Huthi participation under Abd al-Malik in the National Dialogue Conference, its Peace and National Inclusion document after its entrance into Sanaa, and the National Vision Document of 2019 all point toward a desire to stay within the tradition of the Yemeni Republic, in appearance at least. The Huthi also desire to remain within the framework of Zaydism. Abd alMalik cites traditional sources of Zaydi religious interpretation that support a religious authority in this world. The Huthi seem to reconcile Zaydi authority with republican authority through a non-institutionalized form of leadership. Abd alMalik is clearly the leader of the Huthi, yet he does not have an official role in government. Abd al-Malik addresses the nation on national and religious holidays as the head of state would, but he is not the head of state. The relationship between Abd al-Malik and the Huthi government is similar to the relationship between the party and state in socialist governments such as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Ansar Allah is the Yemeni Socialist Party, the source of power outside of state institutions. The problem for the Huthi is that Abd al-Malik’s power outside state institutions destroys the integrity of state institutions. If state institutions are directed by an authority that lies outside the framework of the state, a revolutionary leader, then the state has no integrity and people cannot trust the political process the institutions represent. Sovereignty lies with Abd al-Malik rather than the republic. While the Huthi may see themselves implementing the rule of law, and in many ways Huthi bureaucracy is effective, the Huthi supervision of the government and Huthi behavior during the war show that while it claims republican legitimacy, its actions demonstrate that they want to be the arbitrators of republican law rather than subject to it. Such an arrangement is unacceptable to political foes of the Huthi and does not portend well for a long-term settlement in Yemen.

Bibliography Albloshi, Hamad. “Ideological Roots of the Ḥūthī Movement in Yemen.” Journal of Arabian Studies 6, no. 2 (2016): 143–62. al-Ahmadi, Adel. The Blossom and the Stone: The Shia Rebellion in Yemen (Sanaa: Nashwan al-Himyari Center for Studies and Publication, n.d.). Almahfali, Mohammed and Root, James (2020). “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence Houthi Rule in Northern Yemen.” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. February 13, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050 Awada, Yahya Qasem Abo. The Quranic Path in Yemen: Part One (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿārif al-Ḥikmiyya, 2018). Awada, Yahya Qasem Abo. The Mar Sayyrd Hbssayn al-Drn al- (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿārif alḤikmiyya, 2019a).

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Awada, Yahya Qasem Abo. The Quranic Path in Yemen: Part Three (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿārif al-Ḥikmiyya, 2019b). Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). al-daghshi, Ahmed Muhammad. The Huthi: A Complete Methodological Study (Doha: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2010). al-daghashi, Ahmed Muhammad. The Huthi: Their Military, Political, and Educational Futurbte (Doha: The Forum for Arab and International Relations, 2013). Ghulays, Ashwāq Aḥmad Mahd. Renewing the Idea of the Imamate in Zaydism in Yemen (Cairo: Maktaba Matbouli, 1997). Haider, Najam. Shi’i Islam: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). al-Huthi, Abdul-Malik. “Wathīqa al-Fikriyya wa-l-Thaqāfiyya.” February 13, 2012. al-Huthi, Abdul-Malik. Al-Wilayyat Fī Yawm al-Ghadīr (Beirut: Dār al-Moda, 2018). al-Huthi, Abdul-Malik. Kalimat al-Sayyid ʿAbd-ulmalik Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī fi-l-Dhikrā al-Sādisa li-Thawrat al-Ḥādī wa-l-ʿIshrīn min Sibtambir 2020-1442H “Speech of Sayyid Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi on the Sixth Anniversary of the 21 of September Revolution.” September 22, 2020. https://www.huda.live/node/435 al-Huthi, Badr al-Din. The Golden Chain in Response to Wahhabiirsm (2016), prepared by Abdallah bin Hamoud Al-ʿizi, Majlis al-Zaydi Al-islami. al-Huthi, Hussein. (n.d.). “al-Wiḥda al-ʾImāniyya.” https://www.huda.live/node/49 al-Huthi, Hussein. “Yawm al-Quds al-ʿĀlamī.” December 2001. https://www.huda.live/node/75 al-Huthi, Hussein. “Masʾuliyyat Ahl al-Bayt.” December 21, 2002. https://www.huda.live/ node/60 al-Huthi, Hussein. “Ḥadith al-Wilāyat.” December 21, 2002a. https://www.huda.live/node/50 al-Huthi, Hussein. “A-ṣarkha fī Wajh al-Mustakbirīn.” January 17, 2002b. https://www. huda.live/node/71 al-Huthi, Hussein. “al-Dars al-Thālith ʿAshar.” February 5, 2002c. https://www.huda.live/ node/90 al-Huthi, Hussein. “Mʿarifat Allah al-Dars al-Khamis ʿAshar.” February 8, 2002d. https:// www.huda.live/node/91 al-Huthi, Hussein. “al-ʾIrhāb wa al-ʾIslām.” March 8, 2002e. https://www.huda.live/ node/44 March 2002 ­al-Huthi, Hussein. “Durūs min Waḥī ʿAshūrāʾ.” March 23, 2002f. https://www.huda.live/ node/73 al-Huthi, Hussein. “Sūrat al-ʾAʿrāf.” November 2003. https://www.huda.live/node/15 Ismael, Tareq and Ismael, Jacqueline. PDR Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). Al-Jazeera. al-ʾIʿlān al-Dustūrī li-l-Ḥūthī “Constirrttbtronal Declatatron iy the Hbthr.” AlJazeerta March 4, 2015. https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2015/3/ ‫للحوثيين‬-‫الدستوري‬-‫اإلعالن‬ King, James R. “Zaydī Revival in a Hostile Republic: Competing Identities, Loyalties and Visions of State in Republican Yemen.” Arabica 59 (2012): 404–45. Al-Majlis A-Siyāsī al-ʾAʿlā. The National Vision for Buibrlding the Modern Yemeni State (Sanaa: the Yemeni Republic, 2019). Al-Masdar Online. “al-Ghash al-Kāmin fī al-ʾIktifāʾ bi-Taʿrīf al-Ḥūthiyyīn bi-Dalālat ʿIlāqatihim bi-ʾIrān.” Almasdaronline, July 6, 2020. https://almasdaronline.com/ articles/197398 Republic of Yemen. Results of the National Dialog Conference (Sanaa: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014) https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/‫الوطني‬-‫الحوار‬-‫مخرجات‬-‫وثيقة‬/

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Sabanet “The Republican Palace in Sanaa Witnessed the Ceremony Turning over Power between the Supreme Revolutionary Council and the Supreme Political Council. (2016).” https://www.saba.ye/ar/news436973.htm (August 15, 2016). Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. “The Game of Parliaments.” Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. April 2019, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/7357 Yemen Saeed. “al-Yaman al-Saʿīd Yanshuru al-Naṣ al-Kāmil li-Itifāq al-Silm wa-l-Sharāka al-Waṭaniyya wa-ʾAsmāʾ al-Muwwaqiʿīn ʿAlyhā Publishes the Complete Text of the Peace and National Inclusion Agreement.” Yemen Saeed, November 22, 2014. https:// yemen-saeed.com/news19426.html

­11 B E C OM I N G T H E STAT E : HOW A N S A R A L L A H T O O K OV E R A N D A DA P T E D F O R M A L I N ST I T U T IO N S AT T H E L O C A L L EV E L Joshua Rogers

Introduction Past wars in Yemen have driven local, everyday changes that left enduring legacies for the shape of the state.1 There is every reason to believe that this is happening again. Drawing on the move toward the “micro-level” in thinking about the effects of conflict (Justino et al. 2013), on work on state formation, and on the political economy of conflict (Wennmann 2019), this chapter investigates how war and Huthi policy have combined to reconfigure the Yemeni state2 by focusing on changes to the local authorities and practices of administration. Pursuing political economy concerns, the chapter focuses in particular on who controls formal and informal institutions at the local level, on changes to how local and central institutions are financed, and on how these local institutions provide or fail to provide services and otherwise enact state functions. In keeping with this volume’s focus on the Huthi Movement,3 the chapter focuses on the changes in the areas of Yemen under de facto control of the authorities in Sana‘a. It is based on a review of the published literature, unpublished reports, and a series of interviews conducted with experts on the ground and internationally. Due to the extreme sensitivity of data collection in the areas under the control of the Huthi Movement at present, no identifying information for interviewees could be provided and information gathered from interviews is not attributed where this would have allowed inferences about the identity of the interviewee. Since the end of 2014, the Huthi Movement has wrested control of local institutions in a multi-phase takeover, replacing former formal and informal networks of control and patronage with its own. Alongside changes to who controls formal institutions at the local level, Ansar Allah has also overseen moves toward ever greater centralization, central oversight, and control, especially over taxation and spending—local institutions now have far less autonomy from ministries in Sana‘a. At the same time, and in a context of collapsing salaries

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and earnings, falling remittances, inflation, fuel shortages, a blockade on the Huthi-controlled areas, airstrikes, and shelling, local budgets have been slashed and salary payments suspended, prompting a de facto transfer of responsibilities for local services to international aid organizations. Increased centralization of revenues and decision-making about local security and strategic resources has made the state more visible and intrusive on the local level, while services remain uneven at best. Even as the Huthi Movement has taken control of local institutions and sought to increase their ability to tax the population and collect revenue, war, Huthi policy, and international aid have combined to hollow out the existing local authority structures and to shift historical patterns of central-local relations toward levels of centralization unprecedented in Yemen’s republican history.4 These changes matter, not only for how they are reshaping the current lived reality of the state in Yemen but because they are likely to cast a long shadow. The system remains in flux, but as patterns become more established, they will become facts on the ground that constrain options for the post-war period.

A Multi-phase Takeover The GPC-centered formal institutions and networks of patronage that defined local governance across Yemen between unification and the current war no longer exist. In their place, the Huthi Movement and new networks of loyalty centered on Abd al-Malik al-Huthi and his closest confidants now define local governance in much of the former Yemen Arab Republic. This takeover at the level of local governance occurred in three distinct but overlapping phases.5 The first was a period of GPC-Ansar Allah partnership, during which the wide deployment of supervisors created a presence for the Huthi Movement in local institutions, while supervisors’ roles remained limited. The second phase, from the beginning of 2018 until approximately mid-2019, witnessed an expansion of supervisors’ remit that brought them increasingly into direct conflict with governors and other local officials. Most recently, a third phase is apparent, as Ansar Allah increasingly formally appoints supporters as governors and district directors. This amounts to a re-formalization of the de facto operations of the local authority system, accompanied by attempts to increase central oversight and control and, less systematically, to improve services and the functioning of formal institutions. GPC-Ansar Allah Partnership 2014–17 After the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) of September 2014—and in cooperation with the GPC and especially former President Saleh— Ansar Allah began placing “supervisors” (mushrifīn) in the governor’s office, the executive offices, and in the district administrations of governorates under control of the Huthi-Saleh alliance. As their forces advanced in the course of 2015, the

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supervisor system expanded to most of the territory that the Huthi Movement continues to hold now. Generally, the governors in these governorates were GPC members—even where pro-Hadi governors were ousted—while supervisors were from Ansar Allah. Most of the top-level “general supervisors” shared direct family or close biographical links to the al-Huthi family (Nevola 2019). Similarly, at the district level, the secretary general of the district tended to be from the GPC, while the district supervisor was from Ansar Allah. District supervisors were drawn from a broader pool of long-term Huthi loyalists than the general supervisors. Generally from Sa‘dah or Hajjah governorates, they tended to have been part of the Huthi movement during the (six) Sa‘da wars (Nagi et al. 2020). At this point, Ansar Allah relied upon the support of the GPC to establish an accepted presence in local institutions in areas where they previously had no power base. Reflecting this partnership, the general supervisor and governor had a clear division of responsibilities: the governor was responsible for questions of service delivery and local administration, while matters relating to the war effort—from recruitment, gas and petrol, military deployments, to checkpoints—fell under the responsibility of the supervisor.6 The role of supervisors at lower levels of the hierarchy was less clearly delineated, but during this initial period, most did not directly affect the functioning of the local administration, but rather observed and shadowed officials. Most local decision-making initially did not change as a result of the supervisors, although it was disrupted by the war and especially by the loss of central revenues and salary payments. Ansar Allah Takeover 2018–19 Following the killing of Ali Abdallah Saleh in December 2017, the power dynamics in the GPC-Ansar Allah relationship at the center shifted dramatically (Longley Alley 2018; Nevola and Shiban 2019), but this filtered through to the local level more gradually. The break with Saleh did not constitute a full dissolution of the partnership between GPC and Ansar Allah. The Huthi movement needed to keep institutions functioning and local constituencies on the side. This meant, at least initially, keeping in place the expertise of senior officials, many of whom were members of Saleh’s party, and maintaining access to its networks of tribal leaders and local notables. Yet, over time, supervisors began to assert themselves more forcefully at all levels. Thanks to their relationships to the apex of the Huthi hierarchy, supervisors held the ultimate trump card in contests with local rivals: influence on the allocation of resources from Sana‘a and on the deployment of the Huthi Movement’s military machine. Increasingly, they also wielded direct influence locally and came to be able to withhold official seals, control budgets and revenues, frustrate the work of figures opposed to their influence, and advance the careers of those who supported their agenda. Supervisors came “to possess real authority at the neighborhood, district and governorate levels” (Transfeld et al.

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2020, 10) across much of the areas under the control of the de facto authorities. Secretary generals, governors, and office directors who sought to overrule supervisors’ decisions found themselves sidelined and increasingly replaced by former subordinates more willing to accept the new rules of the game, or by the supervisors themselves. An example may help to illustrate how this gradual shift played out. In Dhamar, then president of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, Saleh Al-Sammad, appointed Muhammad Al-Maqdashi as governor in December 2017. A long-time GPC member and tribal shaykh with an alleged role in the killing of a Huthi leader, Al-Maqdashi was hardly an obvious choice for Ansar Allah. His appointment highlights the extent to which the movement at this point was seeking to repair its fractured alliance with the GPC and its concern for local demands and sensitivities. However, by June 2019, a series of increasingly public disagreements with the governorate supervisor, Fadil Al-Mashriqi, culminated in Al-Maqdashi’s resignation. In his resignation letter (posted on Facebook, subsequently deleted), he complained that he had become “utterly unable to perform his duties,” blaming an unnamed “lobby” seeking to control governorate officials. He was replaced by an acting governor and then, in July 2020, by Muhammad al-Bukhayti, a longtime Ansar Allah activist, formalizing Ansar Allah’s dominant position in local decision-making.7 Some weeks after his resignation, Al-Maqdashi was appointed deputy minister for Social Affairs and Labor in Sana‘a, highlighting the extent to which patronage remains a tool for Ansar Allah to repair frayed alliances. At the same time, wresting control of local institutions has often been highly coercive. A recent study on Ibb, which also notes that Ansar Allah co-opted local notables by offering them high-ranking military positions, focuses primarily on the ways in which Ansar Allah punished perceived opponents and blacklisted those in the governorate who refused to cooperate, stripping them of their ability to use their connections in government to get things done or access state resources—a central source of their local influence (Transfeld et  al. 2020, 13). In the course of its multi-phase local takeover, Ansar Allah has successfully sidelined many formerly influential figures at the apex of local tribes, in the local administration, and in the security forces. Localization and formalization 2019–? Most recently, there appears to be a move underway toward greater formalization, localization, and professionalization in the Huthi Movement’s control of local governance. Ansar Allah is increasingly formally appointing its members, and new governors have re-assumed some of the powers previously seized by supervisors. Newly appointed officials, be they supervisors, deputy governors, or secretary generals, are increasingly likely to be from the governorates in which they serve, especially at the district level, and to have the formal prerequisites for a civil service career. Since about early 2019, some of the original cadre of supervisors from the movement’s heartlands of Sa‘dah, Hajjah, and Amran has gradually been recalled

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after loyal local officials were identified. Many of these new officials are new recruits to the Huthi Movement, often young, educated figures from within the local public administration itself.8 This change has primarily taken place below the level of the “general supervisor” for the governorate and outside the security sector—where supervisors continue to be very carefully selected (ACAPS 2020; Nevola 2019). Across governorates in the areas under the control of the de facto authorities, new  district secretary generals and new deputy governors are being appointed, ensuring that key portfolios like services, finance, and administration are now formally in the hands of Ansar Allah. Most new appointees are Ansar Allah members, are from the governorates in which they serve, and hold the formal qualifications for their posts. In a related development, the “old guard” of supervisors has been brought into the formal state structure in a number of governorates. In Raymah and Sana‘a, for instance, the former general supervisors have been appointed as governors (ACAPS  2020, 6), formalizing their role and restoring formal responsibilities and lines of reporting. Overall, as the Huthi Movement establishes local organizational structures and gains confidence in the political loyalty of the formal administrative apparatus, the parallel system of supervisors appears to be retreating from day-to-day administration and responsibilities that were blurred for a time, are now clearer. At the same time, in most governorates, the majority of former (GPC)9 district secretary generals and deputy governors remain in place—and there is no apparent rush to replace them. This suggests that the ongoing changes aim to formalize Huthi influence in key positions, reduce open power struggles, and ensure that Ansar Allah can set the terms of its tacit alliance with technocrats and local elites—not to wholly replace all (senior) officials. This continuity in less politically sensitive posts and the continuity implied by former GPC members and civil servants without party affiliations joining Ansar Allah helps inflect the charge that Ansar Allah is packing the civil service with its supporters and replacing technocrats with inexperienced loyalists. This may be based on too wide a generalization from the experience of the central government in Sana‘a, where clientelist hiring has been widespread. Anecdotal evidence from other governorates and districts appears to confirm recent attempts to quantify changes in Hajjah, which found rates of personnel turnover in the district and governorate offices since 2015 to be in line with normal fluctuations (UNDP 2019b). That is, recent changes have not involved the large-scale removal of previous staff or mass hiring on clientelist grounds but rather the systematic positioning of allies in key decision-making and oversight roles and a concerted attempt to recruit existing officials into Ansar Allah and to fast-track their careers.10 Even this more limited change in personnel requires a significant cadre of new supporters. This plethora of “new Huthis” is the result of a systematic effort at recruitment, training, and organizing in the governorates that has resulted in local branches of Ansar Allah and the recruitment of local officials and notables, predominantly claiming sayyid descent, to the movement (Interview 6, Interview 7). These local branches engage in political mobilizing, charity, spreading the movement’s teachings, and organizing cultural events (Interview 11).

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In the governorates, local officials increasingly perceive Ansar Allah membership as a normal and accepted option to help fast-track a civil service career, and former GPC members and civil servants without party affiliation have become members of Ansar Allah (Interview 1). Ansar Allah now appears to be a national-level network that is increasingly eclipsing, though not wholly replacing, the former ruling party, the GPC, in terms of its local branches and membership, its presence in key institutions, its ability to dispense patronage, and its ability to observe and police the actions of officials and ordinary Yemenis throughout the areas under its control. Whether this organization—which has been very explicit that it does not see itself as a political party—would also be a powerful electoral machine remains to be seen. A word on intra-Huthi bargaining and conflict: the movement is not monolithic, and conflicts, especially between the old guard and more recent recruits—coinciding outside the Huthi’s heartlands of Sa‘dah, and perhaps Hajjah and Amran, with divisions between outsiders and natives of the governorates— are not uncommon. ACAPS has traced how in 2018 and 2019, moves to bring Huthi supervisors from Sa‘dah into Ibb’s and Hodeidah’s security sectors sparked infighting between local supporters of the movement and the old guard brought in at their expense (ACAPS 2020). Other recent research suggests that such conflicts increased further in 2020, sparked by disputes over land, control of checkpoints, and over taxation (Carboni 2021). Divisions of region, class, and education often coincide with those between an old guard that fought with the movement during the Sa‘dah wars and new recruits within the civil service or from local sayyid families. These divisions are amply on display in the everyday bureaucratic politics of local governance.

Centralization and Taxation There has been a marked increase in taxation and other revenue collection at the local level, coupled with increasing central control over how these revenues are spent. After a brief period of relative local autonomy in 2017 and 2018, local authorities have grown more dependent on central allocations, lost control over their budgets, and become more dependent on central connections, approvals, and priorities. Throughout 2017, local efforts to raise more funds were ad hoc and driven by necessity. When the internationally recognized government of Yemen stopped central salary payments and other funding to the Huthi-controlled areas in late 2016, governorates sought ways to make up the shortfall. Making up for this funding was always going to be a tall order, given that most governorates received well over 90  percent of their annual budget from central allocations and were trying to raise funds under conditions of war and economic collapse. Although local authorities appear to have redoubled their efforts to collect the revenues they were in theory due, and paying off collectors or paying only token fees and taxes has become much harder (Interview 3), fixed permit fees, utility taxes, and zakat

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did not amount to a viable revenue base in most governorates (al-Awlaqi and alMadhaji 2018, 5). For example, Hajjah reported a decrease of more than 75 percent in local district revenues between 2015 and 2018, with local revenues in the governorate per capita in 2018 in the range of hundreds of YR per capita per year (