The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia 9780300166453

Citation preview

The Hour of Europe

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

This page intentionally left blank

The Hour of Europe Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia

Josip Glaurdic´

New Haven & London

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Published with assistance from the Louis Stern Memorial Fund. Copyright © 2011 by Josip Glaurdic´. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Yale University Press books may be purchased in quantity for educational, business, or promotional use. For information, please e-mail [email protected] (U.S. office) or [email protected] (U.K. office). Set in Electra type by IDS Infotech Ltd., Chandigarh, India. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Glaurdic´, Josip, 1979– The hour of Europe : Western powers and the breakup of Yugoslavia / Josip Glaurdic´. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-300-16629-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Yugoslavia—Politics and government—1980–1992. 2. Yugoslavia—History—1980–1992. 3. Yugoslavia— Foreign relations—1980–1992. 4. Cold War. 5. Europe, Western—Relations— Yugoslavia. 6. Yugoslavia—Relations—Europe, Western. 7. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Causes. 8. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995. 9. Europe, Western—Politics and government—1989– I. Title. DR1309.G55 2011 949.703—dc22 2011015194 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). 10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1

For Sandra

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Acknowledgments  ix List of Abbreviations  xi Map of SFR Yugoslavia  xiv 1  Introduction  1 2  Taming the Balkan Gorbachev, 1987–1989  11 3  Yugoslavia’s Cold War, 1988–1989  46 4  Challenges of Democracy, 1990  75 5  To the Brink and Back, October 1990–April 1991  119 6  Descent to Dissolution, March–June 1991  148 7  Summer of Violence and Divisions, June–September 1991  173 8  Diplomacy on the Edge, September–November 1991  215 9  The End and the Beginning, November 1991–April 1992  249 10  Conclusions  303 Notes  311 Index  407

vii

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

This page intentionally left blank

• Acknowledgments

This book was written in five great cities in five different countries. Leaving such a long trail behind, I have accrued a lot of debts. These few lines of acknowledgment will do little to express just how grateful I am to all who helped me along the way. Naturally, it goes without saying that all mistakes—and there are surely many—are solely my own. First and foremost, my sincerest thanks go to my dissertation advisors, David Cameron, Ivo Banac, and Jolyon Howorth. Without their patience, understanding, and faith in my abilities, this project would never have seen the light of day. In retrospect, my scholarly pursuits seem to me a sort of mix of their interests and academic personalities. This is not only a testament to how lucky I have been to have them as advisors, but also to how much respect and admiration I have for them as researchers, teachers, and mentors. Before they had an opportunity to influence what kind of a political scientist I would turn into, however, someone else made sure I became one in the first place. Without Kathleen Montgomery, who was my undergraduate advisor at Illinois Wesleyan University, I never would have found my calling. For that I owe her eternal gratitude. As for those five great cities in five different countries—they make for a long list of people and institutions to whom I owe my gratitude. In New Haven and the United States, I must thank Yale University’s Macmillan Center for International and Area Studies, its European Union Studies Program, the Fox International Fellowship, and the Open Society Institute for their support. My stay in Vienna at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen would have been impossible without the help of the Robert Bosch Stiftung. In Split, Croatia, I must thank the staffs of the libraries of the University of Split and its Department of Economics. In Cambridge I have been fortunate to experience the life of both a graduate student and a college fellow. Both of these experiences have

ix

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Acknowledgments been the absolute highlights of my academic career, and for that I will always be grateful to Sidney Sussex College and Clare College. Finally—as the song goes—“Ich hab’ mein Herz in Heidelberg verloren.” No formal institution to thank for that—just great fortune or destiny. This book would also have been impossible without the help of those whose political actions it tries to explain and who have graciously given me their time and their memories. I thank them all, whether they wished to stay anonymous or not. I must, however, especially thank Ambassadors Hans-Jörg Eiff, Sir Peter Hall, and Wilhelm Höynck for their candor and help. I also thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives at King’s College, London, for allowing me to use their Death of Yugoslavia television series archive and its extensive interviews with the main protagonists. Special thanks also go to the staff of the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and to Jennifer Budniak of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their assistance with the archives and my Freedom of Information Act requests. Finally, this book has also benefited from the comments of several people who read its various drafts: Matthias Kraft, Marko Attila Hoare, Branko Salaj, Brendan Simms, three anonymous reviewers, and my expert and efficient editors, Bill Frucht and Ann-Marie Imbornoni. Accounting for my more personal debts accrued over the years is much more difficult. I have benefited from the friendship and help of many, and I hope they will forgive me for mentioning here only some of them: Danilo, who not only provided me with unceasing support, but also made my days in New Haven less homesick; my comrades Melissa, Gahodery, Michael, Mary, and countless others, who tried to make me into a better member of the academic community and in the process made me a better man; Marko, whose passion for our field is a source of great inspiration; Igor and Marin, whose friendship over the years has meant the world to me; the Kraft family, who has always made me feel at home. All of this, of course, would have been in vain without the closest people in my life. My parents, who have sacrificed so much to get me where I am, gave me the foundation and safety of unconditional love and support. And my wife, Sandra, who is the one who stole my heart in Heidelberg, gave me the confidence to ask more of myself and out of life. She also gave and continues to give real meaning to everything that I do.

• Abbreviations

BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIA Central Intelligence Agency CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe CSO Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union of Bavaria) Demos Demokraticˇna opozicija Slovenije (Democratic Opposition of Slovenia) DS Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party, Serbia) EC European Community ECMM European Community’s Monitoring Mission ECU European Currency Unit, precursor to the euro EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EMU Economic and Monetary Union EPC European Political Cooperation EU European Union FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, Germany) G-7 Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) HSLS Hrvatski socijalno-liberalni savez (Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance)

xi

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

xii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Abbreviations HZ ICTY IMF JNA KGB

Hrvatska zajednica (Croatian Community) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Monetary Fund Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav People’s Army) Комитет государственной безопасности (Committee for State Security of the USSR) KNS Koalicija narodnog sporazuma (Coalition of National Accord, Croatia) KOS Kontraobavještajna služba (Counterintelligence Service of the JNA) MBO Muslimanska bošnjacˇka organizacija (Muslim Bosniak Organization) MUP Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova (Ministry of Internal Affairs) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate of the CIA NS Narodna stranka (People’s Party, Montenegro) OTP Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY PDP Partija za demokratski prosperitet (Party for Democratic Prosperity, Macedonia) Phare Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies RSK Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serb Krajina) SANU Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) SAO Srpska autonomna oblast (Serb Autonomous Region) SDA Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action, BiH) SDB Služba državne bezbednosti (State Security Service) SDS Srpska demokratska stranka (Serb Democratic Party) SFRJ Socijalisticˇka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) SK Savez komunista (League of Communists) SKBiH Savez komunista Bosne i Hercegovine (League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina) SKCG Savez komunista Crne Gore (League of Communists of Montenegro) SKJ Savez komunista Jugoslavije (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) SKH—SDP Savez komunista Hrvatske—Stranka demokratskih promjena (League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Changes)

Abbreviations SKM—PDP Sojuz na komunistite na Makedonija—Partija za demokratska preobrazba (League of Communists of Macedonia—Party for Democratic Change) SK—PJ Savez komunista—Pokret za Jugoslaviju (League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia) SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) SPM Socijalisticˇka partija na Makedonija (Socialist Party of Macedonia) SPO Srpski pokret obnove (Serb Renewal Movement) SPS Socijalisticˇka partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia) SRSJ Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije (Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia) SRSM Sojuz na reformskite sili na Makedonija (Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia) SZDL Socijalisticˇna zveza delovnega ljudstva (Socialist Alliance of Working People, Slovenia) TO Teritorijalna obrana (Territorial Defense) UJDI Udruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu (Alliance for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) UN United Nations UNPA United Nations Protected Area UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force VMRO— Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija—   DPMNE Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization— Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) WEU Western European Union ZKS Zveza komunistov Slovenije (League of Communists of Slovenia) ZKS—SDP Zveza komunistov Slovenije—Stranka demokraticˇne prenove (League of Communists of Slovenia—Party of Democratic Change) ZSMS—LS Zveza socijalisticˇne mladine Slovenije—Liberalna stranka (League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia—Liberal Party)

xiii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

SFR Yugoslavia

1

Introduction

“This is the hour of Europe—not the hour of the Americans. . . . If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.”1 Those were the words with which Jacques Poos, the chair of the EC Foreign Affairs Council and the foreign minister of Luxembourg, staked Europe’s claim to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis in the early summer of 1991. The South Slav federation had been in political and economic agony for years, with violence steadily escalating and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) repeatedly demonstrating its willingness to use force. The JNA had been brutally suppressing the Kosovo Albanians since the spring of 1989. It had been supporting the rebel Serbs of Croatia since the summer of 1990. It had rolled out its tanks to the streets of Belgrade to protect Serbia’s regime of Slobodan Miloševic´ from the opposition in the spring of 1991. That early summer, however, things were even more serious. Yugoslavia’s two northwestern republics—Slovenia and Croatia—declared independence, prompting JNA intervention in Slovenia. The clash of the Yugoslav army with the determined defenses of the nascent Slovenian forces brought real war to the borders of the European Community. And Europe needed to respond. With Yugoslavia’s descent into bloody mayhem over the course of that summer and fall, Poos’s words became easy fodder for the cynics who saw the EC’s failure to stop the violence as the definitive sign of its inability to grow into anything more than an economic club for Europe’s wealthy. That is, however, not how the invocation of “the hour of Europe” was initially perceived. Poos’s statement and similar statements of his EC colleagues were seen as a sign of new and better times for the European continent, which was developing a

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Introduction common sense of purpose after the divisions of the Cold War. Poos’s confidence that the Europeans could solve the Yugoslav problem was deeply rooted in the Cold War victory not just of the Western liberal ideas of democracy and market economics, but also of the vision of new European and international cooperation. If only the Yugoslavs were to listen to this promise of a better common European future, the thinking went, they were surely to come to their senses and to give up on war. Poos’s confident words were also seen as a sign of (Western) Europe’s growing independence from its protector and partner across the Atlantic. Europe’s hour was clearly being invoked in contrast to that of the United States. The Cold War had been won, and now it was time for Europe to carry its share of the security burden. And when it came to Yugoslavia, the United States had made it abundantly clear it was welcoming Europe’s leadership. Jacques Poos gave his fateful statement to the press on the eve of an EC mediation mission’s departure for Belgrade on 28 June 1991. Just a week earlier, US Secretary of State James Baker had also visited Belgrade. After a twelve-hour marathon of meetings with the principal Yugoslav actors, Baker left the Yugoslav capital intent on withdrawing America from the fray. “It was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power,” he later claimed.2 Or, as one more cynical observer of US policy at the time explained Baker’s decision, “Many, if not most, senior and sub-cabinet-level officials argued . . . that Europe would fail the test, and so would be painfully reminded of its continuing need for a strong American presence.”3 After all, Yugoslavia had already lost its Cold War significance for the United States. As Baker crassly told his associates upon leaving Belgrade, “We got no dog in this fight.”4 The leaders of the European Community, on the other hand, could not so easily wash their hands of the Yugoslav mess. Nor did they want to—at least not initially. During the previous year Saddam Hussein had managed to sow discord among them over how to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Now they were determined not to repeat their disagreements and mistakes from the buildup to the intervention of the US coalition in the Persian Gulf. Thus in many quarters of the European Community the explosion of the Yugoslav crisis was actually seen as a welcome test of whether the EC—soon to be transformed into the European Union (EU) by the Treaty of Maastricht—could grow into a unified force for positive and proactive foreign policy. To say that the EC/EU failed the Yugoslav test would be a dramatic understatement. Its failure was demonstrated not only by the humiliating inability of its diplomats and foreign policy makers to stop the wars which resulted with

Introduction tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, devastated economies, and torn families and communities or by their powerlessness to arrest the process which turned the former Yugoslav region from a front-runner of East European reforms and the best candidate for EC integration into a dark hole on the map of Europe whose troubles continue to destabilize the continent to this day. The failure of the EC/EU was also demonstrated by the actual manner in which its diplomats and foreign policy makers displayed their futility. With every new violent twist in the crisis, they appeared to be more concerned with outmaneuvering each other than with solving real issues on the ground. Their divisions and diplomatic gamesmanship were at times so explicit and so narrow-minded that their whole involvement seemed to belong to the nineteenth and not to the brink of the twenty-first century. Most important, many European (and American) leaders stared straight into the face of evil and failed to even call it by its proper name. Their failures in Yugoslavia were indeed so devastating and so profound that the transformation of the EC/EU into a unified actor capable of any common foreign policy was for years rightly considered to be impossible. The principal aim of this book is to describe and explain the influences of the Western powers—primarily Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—and the apparatuses of the European Community and the United Nations on the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, as well as to firmly situate the demise of the South Slav federation within the larger historical context of the end of the Cold War in Europe. Much too often the Yugoslav breakup and the West’s responses to it are seen as completely distinct from the developments which simultaneously took place elsewhere throughout the European continent. This book avoids making that mistake. It compares and contrasts the approaches of the Western powers to the disintegration of Yugoslavia with their contemporaneous policies related to the impact of the end of the Cold War on Eastern and Western Europe. It seeks to explain how strong differences within the Western alliance regarding the necessary policy responses to the events in Yugoslavia evolved and how the failures of the Western foreign policy makers to stop the violence challenged their efforts to build a more united Europe. The book also goes further back in history than most comparable works in order to identify the roots of the Western foreign policy makers’ perceptions of and responses to what was actually happening in the crisis-ridden federation. Instead of, as is often the case, concentrating on the crisis starting with the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia in the summer of 1991, this book sheds light on the West’s policies toward Yugoslavia starting with the mid-1980s—a period marked by the federation’s dramatic deterioration in economic conditions, a

3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Introduction dangerous construction of the Serb nationalist and irredentist program, and the unscrupulous ascent to power of the man who finally led the whole country to its violent end: Slobodan Miloševic´. Every account of the end of the Cold War is ultimately an account of America’s European policy, and the narrative presented here does not stray from that norm. Most works written about the West’s involvement in Yugoslavia, partly due to their concentration on the period after the summer of 1991, have focused solely on the peace efforts of the European Community. They have also dealt only in passing with the fact that the United States was for decades the principal architect of the West’s policy toward the Yugoslav federation. This book openly confronts the transfer of Western responsibility for Yugoslavia from the United States to the European Community. It does so with particular consideration for America’s overall policy toward East European transformations and toward its assured post–Cold War position as the sole international superpower. Before the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the date of 11 September was primarily associated with President George H. W. Bush’s 11 September 1990 announcement to the joint session of Congress that the time had come for a “new world order . . . freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace . . . where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle . . . [where] nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice . . . where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”5 The president’s famous invocation of the “new world order” may have been just a strategy of selling the war in the Persian Gulf to a divided Congress and the unconvinced public, but it did signify a shift in Washington’s conception of the post–Cold War international system.6 The question is: what happened—literally and figuratively—between 11 September 1990 and late June 1991? Why did President Bush’s administration choose to withdraw from Yugoslav affairs? And to which extent was its withdrawal from the region related to its overall policy toward Europe and the end of the Cold War? The involvement of Western powers in the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation has generated an extensive popular and academic literature which, in spite of some notable exceptions, continues to be dominated by several either inadequate or deeply flawed interpretations. The first of those interpretations, espoused by many former diplomats and foreign policy analysts, shies away from accentuating the roles of particular international actors and instead focuses on the supposed suddenness, intractability, and novelty of the Yugoslav problem. For the proponents of this approach, the response of the West was one of “unity in frustration,” not just because of the difficulties of what was happening on the

Introduction ground, but also because of the international community’s lack of tools to effectively respond to a crisis such as Yugoslavia’s. The warning signs of the coming storm supposedly slipped under the radar of the West, preoccupied with itself, with the transformation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and with the events in the Persian Gulf. Any early or preventive action in Yugoslavia would have required time and resources not available to the European and Western alliance, which was making its first steps toward a new conception of common security. It would also have required foresight and innovation, which were simply beyond the reach of overstretched diplomats and foreign policy makers. As one analyst put it, “Here was a paradigmatic illustration of Hegel’s adage that Minerva’s owl flies at dusk. We achieve wisdom only when it is too late for effective action.”7 The second prevalent interpretation of the West’s impact on the dissolution of Yugoslavia suggests that the warning signs of Yugoslavia’s impending disaster were understood by the Western foreign policy makers but that there was simply not enough political will for anything to be done about them. The primary interest of the West in Yugoslavia, once the troubled federation’s slide toward war began, was to limit the damage through a concerted diplomatic effort. Any non-diplomatic involvement deemed necessary to halt the carnage was seen as prohibitively expensive and risky. After decades of living with the constant threat of an all-European war and the need to militarily balance the Soviet bloc, the West in the early 1990s wanted to cash in on the “peace dividend.” Pursuing unclear or even unimportant goals in (the former) Yugoslavia would have jeopardized this goal. The West’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis was therefore a “triumph of the lack of will”—the “lack of will” being the absence of political resolve to back diplomacy with military force.8 The third dominant interpretation of the West’s involvement in Yugoslavia’s breakup—espoused by a number of former foreign policy makers and diplomats (particularly in France and Britain), popularized by several authors of highly recognized accounts of the war, and increasingly taken up by leftist critics of the West’s policies in Yugoslavia—sees some Western powers as more than just observers of the Yugoslav events. The proponents of this interpretation place great emphasis on the alleged efforts of the economic, political, and even religious elites of some Western states to destabilize Yugoslavia and encourage the leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia in their pursuits of independence. This interpretation in particular singles out the newly unified Germany, which was supposedly expanding the reach of its power to the Balkans and flexing its new foreign policy muscles by pushing for the international recognition of Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics. The West’s foreign policy making during the crisis was

5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Introduction thus most prominently marked by the unsuccessful struggle to restrain Germany’s destructive activism and—after the damage was done—to pick up the pieces in a series of misguided diplomatic and military interventions.9 This book presents a different argument. With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost all importance to the West as a bulwark against Soviet advances and as an example of socialism that was not sponsored by the Kremlin. The signals which the Yugoslav political protagonists began to receive from their Western counterparts, however, were not those of destabilization of the Yugoslav federation or encouragement for its various parts to pursue independence. On the contrary—the creators of Western policy were virtually unanimous in giving little or no support for the federation’s periphery. What they did do was repeatedly indicate their strong preference for Yugoslavia’s continued existence and their backing for the foundational pillars of the central government in Belgrade. No one with any influence on Western foreign policy wished to see Yugoslavia disintegrate. Furthermore, the Yugoslav crisis evolved over a long period of time, and its descent toward extreme violence was gradual, often openly preannounced, and thus widely anticipated. Nothing about its development was either sudden or novel. The collapse of empires and multinational states, the rise of nationalism, the questions of national minorities—these issues were not introduced into European politics only with the end of the Cold War. More important, just months prior to Yugoslavia’s definite explosion of violence in the summer of 1991, the West demonstrated its capability to stop and punish aggression—by clobbering Saddam Hussein not only over his invasion of Kuwait, but also over his terror against the Kurds in northern Iraq. As for the question of political will to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia, such will indeed was lacking in many important quarters of Western foreign policy making. The problem was that this lack of will was often coupled with the aforementioned support for Belgrade and, once real war began, with the willingness to accept the repercussions of such a policy on the ground. In addition, the onset of extreme violence in Yugoslavia marked the beginning of a West European diplomatic effort characterized not by a lack of will to back diplomacy with force, but by a clash of wills among the principal players over virtually every aspect of the West’s policy—military or diplomatic.10 During one period of that clash, Germany stood alone in its demands for Western action and the recognition of Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics, but not because it was expanding the reach of its power to the Balkans or flexing its foreign policy muscles after reunification. It stood alone because it correctly perceived what was happening in Yugoslavia and because its West European allies were less

Introduction concerned about the actual reasons for its alarm and assertiveness than about the fact that it was indeed the reunified Germany which was trying to steer the West toward some foreign policy action. The principal contention of this book is that—considering the brutality of the Yugoslav violence and its clear sources—our attention ought to be directed not at those who were urging the West to act, but at those who were stifling its involvement. The main subjects of our study ought to be those many Western foreign policy makers who not only continued to signal their support for Yugoslavia’s center over its periphery well into the war, but who also continuously tended to appease the strong and push the weak during various internationally sponsored peace negotiations. This book contends that the motivation of those numerous Western foreign policy makers—who predominantly came from Britain, France, and the United States—was simple: it was the pursuit of stability in the face of a great upheaval which had engulfed the whole continent. At a time when the Soviet bloc and the Soviet state were crumbling, the fear of greater turmoil overrode the distaste for the lack of Belgrade’s democratic credentials. Yugoslavia was simply not to become an example for the Soviet Union because the dissolution of the Soviet state was seen as a dangerous development with potentially nuclear consequences. Such thinking, however, had one crucial error. It mistook the political and military apparatus controlled by Slobodan Miloševic´ for a willing and able protector of Yugoslavia’s unity, when the motivation of the Serbian leader was in fact dramatically different: it was the creation of an enlarged Serbian state on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation. Yugoslavia’s international position during the Cold War was the product of political realism of both the West and the Soviet bloc. The policies of crucial Western players during the Yugoslav crisis were rooted in that very same political realism. And it was this political realism which had a decisive impact on the violent nature of Yugoslavia’s breakup.11 The empirical evidence this book uses to support such an interpretation of events is extensive. The intent was to create an account which will hopefully stand the test of time even after the archives in the West and in former Yugoslavia have been fully opened, if they ever are. Great use was made of the freedom of information acts in the United States and the United Kingdom. Hundreds of declassified documents from the period of 1987–1992 were acquired from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague was also an important source of primary documents. Particularly valuable were the witness testimonies at the trial of Slobodan Miloševic´, as well as more than two hundred intercepts of

7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Introduction telephone conversations within Miloševic´ ’s closest circle, captured by various intelligence services between May 1991 and May 1992 and also used as evidence in his trial. Firsthand accounts of more than eighty principal protagonists were additionally acquired from a collection of extensive interviews conducted for the Brook Lapping 1995 television series The Death of Yugoslavia, deposited at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in London. These firsthand accounts were supplemented by more than forty additional interviews with former diplomats and foreign policy makers from the West and former Yugoslavia which were conducted by the author. All of this was accompanied by a thorough analysis of primary documents—resolutions, declarations, transcripts of parliamentary debates—generated by various international political institutions; contemporaneous press reports from former Yugoslavia and the West; dozens of autobiographical accounts of the main protagonists; and, of course, all relevant secondary sources. Without a doubt, this book is empirically thus far the most complete account not only of the responses of the Western foreign policy makers to Yugoslavia’s breakup, but also of the impact they had on the decisions of the principal Yugoslav actors. The nature and complexity of the questions this book aims to answer basically determined how its evidence was to be exhibited. The story presented in the subsequent chapters is thus characterized by three important methodological choices: a clear focus on the actions of the political decision makers, a concurrent presentation of reconstructed historical events and their analysis, and a chronological interweaving of Yugoslav and international developments. The reasoning behind these three choices was rather straightforward, though perhaps not immediately obvious. Yugoslavia’s violent end was not inevitable. As weak and fragile as the South Slav union was, it took a series of concerted and deliberate actions by a set of ambitious and reckless political entrepreneurs to bring it to its knees. Without detracting from the larger systemic causes of Yugoslavia’s downfall, this book focuses exactly on the concerted and deliberate actions of those political decision makers. The choice to concurrently describe and analyze historical events, on the other hand, was made because only a complete account of all relevant events—and what follows is a rather comprehensive reconstruction—can allow us to claim credibility for our interpretations. Without understanding what happened, we cannot even begin to give any sensible explanation of why it happened. Finally, the decision for the chronological interweaving of Yugoslav and international developments was made because it allows us to directly compare and contrast concurrent events, policies, and strategies of the principal protagonists in Yugoslavia and the West. It also enables us to much more easily establish

Introduction proper paths of causality, the lack of which has been a source of struggle for a number of narratives of the events in Yugoslavia. No less important, a chronological approach enables us to most effectively present evidence drawn from diverse sources. Only in their proper context of the time line of events do, for example, the CIA reports or the intercepts of Miloševic´’s telephone conversations begin to make sense, let alone reveal their true significance. Although Yugoslavia dissolved two decades ago, the story of the international community’s response to its breakup remains relevant, not just for the people of the troubled federation’s successor states. NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force, which led to the withdrawal of Serbia’s troops from Kosovo, was a direct product of the West’s lessons about the Miloševic´ regime from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The analysis presented in this book exposes how the West’s interaction with the Serbian leader evolved over the first six years of his career in Yugoslavia’s high politics, and it could help us understand how foreign policy makers learn and adjust their policies. All Western powers undoubtedly made mistakes in the way they responded to the materialization of Miloševic´’s political program. But how often did they repeat their mistakes? And what lessons could they have drawn from the Yugoslav experience in light of their policies toward other crisis regions and the future of European integration? The story of Yugoslavia’s breakup also remains relevant because it sheds a revealing light on a momentous period in the history of Europe. The end of the Cold War was a time when all sources of stability which stemmed from the balance of power between the two blocs rapidly disappeared with dramatic consequences. Whereas Western Europe followed the withdrawal of the Soviet threat with an unprecedented—and in many ways unexpected—acceleration of integrative efforts, vital East European structures crumbled together with Moscow’s power.12 The dichotomy between integration and disintegration, so characteristic of Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is one of the most important aspects of the greater setting in which the events elucidated by this book took place.13 How did West European foreign policy makers, who worked so intensely on integrating (their half of) the continent, respond to the disintegrating processes in Yugoslavia? What kind of visions of Europe’s future did they have, and did these visions affect their approaches to the Yugoslav crisis? Could differences in the American, British, French, or German conceptions of Europe’s future help us explain the different interpretations of American, British, French, or German foreign policy makers of what was happening in Yugoslavia and what the West’s response to the Yugoslav crisis should be? Finally, what did failure in Yugoslavia mean for the unity of Europe and the unity of the Western

9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Introduction alliance? Yugoslavia’s breakup took place at a time when the foundations of Europe’s new political, economic, and security system were being set. This makes answering the above questions vital not only because it will improve our understanding of an important period in Europe’s history, but also because it will hopefully help us understand what the foundations of post–Cold War Europe really are.

2

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev, 1987–1989

Slobodan Miloševic´ took Serbia’s high politics by storm at a time when the whole Yugoslav federation was close to complete collapse. Yugoslavia’s economy was in free fall, its society in deep turmoil, and its political elites in bitter conflict over revisions of the federal constitution. For decades socialist Yugoslavia’s political competition had been defined by the process of steady differentiation between the elites of its nations and their six republics into a growing conflict over economic, national, and even ideological differences. By the mid-1980s, all bonds that used to keep that conflict under control were either gone or quickly disappearing. Tito passed away in May 1980. The League of Communists (SK) increasingly lost its firm grip on power and was internally split along republican lines. Socialism as a motivating and unifying idea of economic and social development was politically spent. And although political players from both blocs still strongly supported Yugoslavia’s unity, the real international factors of the federation’s cohesion—the external threats to its security from the East and the West—were now all but nonexistent. From the perspective of Yugoslavia’s post-Tito political development, Miloševic´’s rise to power and his campaign for control over the federation were a form of break with the past. In many ways, however, they also represented a continuation (albeit extreme) of Yugoslav political competition among the country’s national/republican elites. The only truly novel—and in the end explosively dangerous—aspect of Miloševic´’s ascent was the extent of his willingness to exploit the growing nationalism in his republic and among his people. Simply put, Miloševic´ wanted to use the wave of Serb nationalist discontent, centered on the status of Serbia’s autonomous province of Kosovo, to gain and consolidate power first within his republic and then the whole of Yugoslavia,

11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev which was ultimately to be reframed and recentralized. His calculations rested on two assumptions: (1) that his potential opponents in the country’s post-Tito leadership would be too weak and too divided to stop him; and (2) that his nationalist platform could be wrapped into reformist garb and pitched to the West as positive and necessary for Yugoslavia’s cohesiveness and capacity to change. It was an ambitious and cunning plan which found a receptive audience in important Western quarters still committed to the Cold War realist search for Yugoslavia’s “strong leader” after Tito’s death. And although Miloševic´’s campaign to take Tito’s place ultimately failed, it managed to destroy Tito’s greatest political achievements and set the Yugoslav federation on course toward breakup and war. SETTING THE STAGE: YUGOSLAVIA’S DECAY AFTER TITO’S DEATH

Few analyses of Yugoslavia’s disintegration fail to emphasize the significance of Tito’s death for the country’s descent toward ultimate breakup. Indeed, Yugoslavia’s post–World War II political and economic development—in fact, its very existence—was to such a great extent shaped by its charismatic leader of three and a half decades that his death is often seen as the death of all internal factors that kept the Yugoslav nations and their republics together. However, although Tito’s death did mark the end of an era, it did not mark the end of Yugoslavia’s brand of socialism or its rapid economic development or the concept of “brotherhood and unity,” which was the foundation of the Communists’ platform for the country’s inter-ethnic and inter-republican relations. By May 1980, all of these had already been long lost. What Yugoslavia, its ruling party, and its nations did lose with Tito’s death was a powerful arbitrator whose unquestionable authority was always the guarantee of eventual conflict resolution. Without him as the center of power around which everything revolved, Yugoslavia’s political system was virtually destined for deadlock. The country that Tito and the party had built had come a remarkably long way from the economically backward, nationally divided, and politically barely existing formation that it was during World War II, when they came to power. At the time of Tito’s death, however, that country was in a serious economic, political, and social crisis which created the conditions ripe for the explosion of Serb nationalism and the eventual rise of Slobodan Miloševic´. While Yugoslavia and the international community were preoccupied with the political consequences of Tito’s death, true economic disaster was looming. The borrowing and investment binge of the mid- and late 1970s—fueled by the

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev

13

availability of cheap international credit and the desire of the power holders to placate their constituencies after the 1971–1972 purges of “nationalists” and “liberals”—was having a tremendously detrimental effect on the country’s fiscal and monetary stability. By 1979, the Yugoslav trade deficit reached $7.2 billion, the budget deficit reached $3.7 billion, and foreign debt surpassed the $20 billion mark eighteen months later.1 Political leaders installed in the wake of the 1971–1972 purges had simply been using borrowed sources and increased consumption to buy popular legitimacy that they did not have. Pumping enormous and increasingly expensive investments into a highly bureaucratized and inefficient system, however, did not result in an expected economic boom but rather in a real “hangover.”2 In an environment in which there was practically no economic risk and in which decisions regarding investment and employment were still political, productivity stagnated or even declined. As a result, inflation spiraled out of control and reached 46 percent by 1981. (The development of the economic crisis can be seen in table 2.1.)3 The response of Yugoslavia’s political elites to the obvious crisis was slow and confused. The first two years after Tito’s death were wasted on adjusting to an apparent power vacuum. Partly because of obvious inefficiencies in the process of inter-republican “harmonization of positions” and partly because of the traditional inability of the ruling party to admit to or just recognize its mistakes, the crisis had not even been publicly acknowledged by 1982. That year, a commission led by Sergej Kraigher, the president of the Yugoslav federal presidency, began its work on analyzing the failures of Yugoslavia’s economic system. The Kraigher Commission’s critique of the federation’s economy was devastating. Excessive taxation and the long-standing practice of political meddling into the Table 2.1 Development of Yugoslavia’s Economic Crisis, 1974–1985 GDP per capita Gross foreign debt Gross investments per capita Personal consumption Real net income per worker Retail prices

Average Annual Change (in percent) 1974–1976 1977–1979 4.3 19.4 7.9 4.0 2.6 20.2

6.4 24.3 7.8 5.6 2.7 16.1

1980–1982

1983–1985

0.7 10.1 –7.8 –0.8 –4.8 35.1

–0.2 –0.7 –8.3 –1.6 –4.8 56.5

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku SFRJ: Statisticˇki godišnjak Jugoslavije 1991 (Belgrade, 1991), 101–102, 219, and Jugoslavija, 1918–1988 (Belgrade, 1989), 121, 147.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev economy were seen as the main culprits in the creation of an irrational economic system in which it was possible for some enterprises to have more annual net losses than was the value of their assets. The commission saw the economy as run by state/party functionaries and state-owned banks, turning producers into nothing more than the executors of political decisions. A fundamental change was necessary, but the commission provided very few prescriptions beyond a recommendation that “objective economic laws be respected.”4 It was a perfect example of the party’s struggles with indecisive, unimaginative, and risk-averse leadership after Tito’s death. The commission’s empty phrases, such as “the strengthening of the market,” “the organic inclusion of Yugoslav enterprises into the world economy,” and “the suppression of the party/state apparatus in the economy,” had little effect on what was actually happening. What did dramatically shake up Yugoslavia’s economic situation was the entry of the International Monetary Fund onto the scene. Through a series of negotiations for loan arrangements in the early 1980s, the IMF pushed the Yugoslav government to drastically cut all non-essential forms of spending, devalue the dinar, liberalize prices, and establish a system of real interest rates. The government and the SFRJ Assembly were forced to succumb because the only alternative was a complete default on loan payments and an end to all international credit, factors that would have brought the whole economy to a halt.5 Yugoslavia thus entered into a program of severe austerity measures that presented its people with the greatest economic challenge since Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin. By 1984, this program did get the budget and trade deficits under control. However, it failed on practically all other counts. Inflation continued to rise and reached 70 percent by the beginning of 1985. With a steep decline in pensions and wages, a significant increase in prices, and repeated devaluations of the dinar, the overall standard plummeted to the levels of the late 1960s. Since all non-essential imports were limited, everything from bread to gasoline was in short supply. And as unprofitable firms now began to either lay off workers or just shut down, unemployment rose to more than 16 percent in 1985. By the mid-1980s the economic crisis turned into a deep social crisis. With the black market and currency speculation thriving, the “socially” owned assets of economic enterprises being increasingly plundered, absenteeism from work rising, and bribery and corruption becoming rampant, Yugoslav society rapidly crumbled under economic pressures. The devastating economic crisis was, however, not the only factor leading to the decay of Yugoslav society in the early 1980s. On 2 April 1981, massive demonstrations of ethnic Albanians spread throughout the autonomous province of Kosovo. They initially began as protests of local students against the living

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev conditions in university housing but finally evolved into a movement with a broad platform of various grievances regarding the economic and political situation in their province. In the minds of Albanian protesters the only solution to Kosovo’s poverty and unemployment was a change in its official status: Kosovo needed to become a republic. By 3 April the whole province was put under martial law (the first time this had been done anywhere in Yugoslavia since 1945), and the federal army moved in with armored troops to establish order. In the violent conflicts that followed, hundreds of protesters were killed or wounded and thousands were arrested.6 The harsh response of the army and the police forces, however, failed to bring a lasting peace to the province. Although martial law was lifted two months after the outbreak of demonstrations, Kosovo remained in silent but forceful and constant protest throughout the years to come. The severity of the conflict in Kosovo and the demands of its Albanian population for a change in the province’s status profoundly unsettled Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s political scene. Although the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists resorted to traditional name calling by labeling the protests a “counterrevolutionary, irredentist, and nationalist attempt at creating an ethnically cleansed Albanian republic within Yugoslavia with a potential for secession and unification with Albania,” its official analysis of the causes of Albanian revolt was mostly sound. The main causes were identified as: (1) lingering nationalism, (2) the Kosovo leadership’s policy of dependence on federal funds for the underdeveloped, (3) demographic pressures on limited employment capacities, (4) autarchic economic and cultural policies, (5) strong bureaucratism instead of self-management, and (6) support for protests from Albania. As in the case of the Kraigher Commission, however, the Central Committee made no real suggestions for what should be done. Its sole proposals were (1) a greater economic integration of enterprises from Kosovo with the rest of the Yugoslav economy, and (2) support for the leadership of Serbia in redefining this republic’s constitutional relations with its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.7 This lack of efficient or meaningful response of the party leadership to the situation on the ground and the apparent green light to Serbia to publicly reintroduce the issue of constitutional reform (which had been buried by Tito himself in the aftermath of the promulgation of the 1974 federal constitution) opened a Pandora’s box that many had hoped would stay closed. As Kosovo became more Albanian through higher Albanian birthrates and the emigration of local Serbs and as Albanians continued to assert their political power, Serbia began to view the situation in the province as a test of its statehood.8 With the

15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev outbreak of Albanian protests, the fate of Kosovo and the Kosovo Serbs became an almost daily preoccupation of the press and the subject of increased activity of Belgrade’s intellectual elite, which began to closely collaborate with the community organizers of the Kosovo Serbs.9 Serbia’s public was united in believing that a change in the republic’s policy toward Kosovo was needed. The only question was how the political leadership would respond. The answer came only months after the protests. Serbia’s League of Communists jumped on the bandwagon and commenced an initiative for changes in both the constitutional status of the autonomous provinces and the political system of the Yugoslav federation. The critique of the constitutional status of the autonomous provinces and their relationship to the central Serbian government was harsh and relentless. The highest leadership of Serbia’s SK accused the provinces of “going beyond the 1974 constitution” and “closing off to Serbia,” all with the disastrous effects of “taking away Serbia’s character as a state” and “causing the disintegration of both Serbia and Yugoslavia.” The federation as a whole was increasingly labeled as ineffective and even nonexistent. Reforms of the political system toward greater decentralization and liberalization, which had culminated with the federal constitution of 1974, were seen as the cause of the economic crisis since they had “created polycentric etatism” in which the republics and provinces had established themselves as de facto independent states. In the eyes of Serbia’s Communist leadership, Yugoslavia had become a non-functioning confederation and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) nothing more than a union of eight distinct parties. A public initiative for change was now seen not only as necessary due to public pressure in Serbia and the experience of the Kosovo protests, but also as possible because of “the unity of the Serbian leadership” and the change in the “balance of power” with the death of Tito.10 Serbia’s intense and persistent public campaign for change, however, had failed resoundingly by 1985. The unprecedented mobilization of all political factors in Serbia proper and their daily pressure through the media with pleas and demands for a new Yugoslav contract on the basis of a “modern democratic federation” led only to the rest of Yugoslavia simply saying no. In spite of the purge of the League of Communists of Kosovo in 1981, the leaderships of both autonomous provinces managed to limit the extent of possible changes by defending their constitutional prerogatives under the 1974 constitution. The only achievement of Serbia’s Communist leadership vis-à-vis the provinces was an agreement to “alter political practices in the spirit of the 1974 constitution”—a Yugoslav code for no change whatsoever. The results of another inter-republican commission for the reform of the political system, publicized in the spring of 1985, were virtually

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev identical: no changes in the political system but “further development on the foundations of the 1974 constitution with minor changes to make the system more rational and efficient.”11 Serbia’s calls to recentralize the SKJ and to essentially return Yugoslavia to the political system that was in place before the constitutional reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted in adamant opposition from the rest of the federation. None of the republics or autonomous provinces wanted to relinquish their developed political authority and identity, especially not to Serbia’s public campaign, which challenged their well-established constitutional rights of sovereignty and autonomy.12 Simply put, the platform of Serbia’s Communist leadership for the “reintegration” of Yugoslavia was perceived as a revival of Belgrade’s traditional centralism and unitarism, and it was understandably rejected. The failure of Serbia’s Communists to successfully answer the open demands of their constituents had grave consequences for the perceived legitimacy of their power. The first half of the 1980s was a period of intense revisionist radicalization of the Serbian intellectual elite in which all basic tenets of Serbian participation in Yugoslavia were challenged. The most prominent and respected Serbian historians, philosophers, and writers began to publicly portray post– World War II Yugoslavia as a delusion and a mistake in which Serbia’s Communists were basically traitors who had delivered their nation to a community that was nothing but a spiritual, economic, and political loss for the Serbs. Nobody expressed these views better than the writer Dobrica C´osic´—the unofficial leader of the nationalist revival among the Serbian intellectual elite. Already in 1977, on the occasion of his induction into the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), C´osic´ had famously described Serbia’s alleged historical curse of winning the war and losing the peace: “What kind of people are we, what kind of a nation, that we die so easily for freedom and remain in our own victories without it? How is it possible that some among us, in our own home, have stolen from us what a much more powerful enemy could not take on the battlefield? How can a people so dignified, proud and courageous in war accept to be so humiliated and docile in peace?”13 With the fiasco of the attempted reforms of the federal political system initiated by Serbia’s Communist leadership, all remnants of real commitment to Yugoslavia among the Serbian intellectual elite were fundamentally challenged. A new and more assertive platform for change based on “true Serbian national interests” was seen as necessary, and the Serbian intellectual elite soon provided it with the infamous “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.” The memorandum, an unfinished draft of which was smuggled to the press in September 1986, was basically a collection of radical Serb grievances

17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev against the Yugoslav federation.14 Although it did not delve deeply into possible recommendations for change, the ramifications of its critique of Yugoslavia were abundantly clear. It perceived “the status of Serbia and the Serb nation” within Yugoslavia as economically and politically unequal. It claimed that the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo prevented the Serbs from “having their own state, as do all the other nations.” It labeled the situation in Kosovo as “genocide” waged against the Serbs by the Albanians and called the Serbs to mount a “resolute defense of their nation and their territory.” The memorandum extended its reach beyond Kosovo and Serbia by alleging that “except for the time under the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never been as jeopardized as they are today” because of discrimination and assimilation. The ones to blame for the whole Serb tragedy were, naturally, the most prominent leaders of post–World War II Yugoslavia—the Croat Tito and the Slovene Edvard Kardelj—who enabled their republics to “accomplish their nationalist agendas” of subordinating the Serbs.15 Although the memorandum did not provide anything truly novel in the development of the Serb nationalist platform of the early and mid-1980s, the fact that it was crafted by the most august body of Serbia’s intellectuals signified a tremendously high level of entrenchment of Serbia’s society and its intellectual elite in the nationalist discourse. With the memorandum, the movement to redefine Yugoslavia based on Serbian national interests now had its ideological and popular foundations. The last missing piece of the puzzle—a real political leader—came not even a year later in the form of Slobodan Miloševic´. MILOŠEVIC´ TAKES SERBIA

The proponents of Serb nationalist revival, bruised by the years of failure of Serbia’s Communists to force the desired recentralization of the federation, finally found their man in the spring of 1987. Very few aspects of Miloševic´’s political career up to that point suggested that he could become the political leader of the brewing nationalist movement. In many ways, he was a regular party technocrat who had come to high politics largely through connections and without any real backing from Serbia’s national or party base. What distinguished him from the swarms of other similar functionaries, however, were his uncharacteristically strong personal drive for power and an ability to correctly read the political situation in the country. “He [was] the first Yugoslav politician to realize that Tito was dead,” one of Miloševic´’s associates said of him.16 This realization of the power vacuum that was left after Tito’s death, together with the awareness that nationalism was the easiest and most profitable way to gain

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev political authority in a society deeply destabilized by a severe economic and political crisis, became the crux of Miloševic´’s political strategy. Between April and September 1987, he put this strategy into action to build the most powerful political machine post-Tito Yugoslavia had seen, to unscrupulously seize full control over Serbia’s political and media apparatuses, and to thus lay the foundations for all of his future campaigns. As 1987 began, Yugoslavia’s political and economic crisis reached a feverish pitch, threatening the country’s already severely damaged international standing and its fragile internal stability. With inflation spiraling beyond the control of the federal government’s administrative measures, workers engaged in the first statewide wave of strikes, which brought significant sectors of the economy to a halt. The perceived threat of the strikes to the political and economic system was such that the federal prime minister, Branko Mikulic´, publicly hinted at using the JNA to “protect the constitutional order.”17 The constitutional order was, however, under a greater and more real threat from the principal political players themselves as they continued to clash over the extent and direction of necessary changes in the federal constitution. In October 1986, the Constitutional Commission of the SFRJ Assembly created a group of experts and politicians to prepare specific proposals for the revision of the constitution on issues like property ownership, the single market, central planning, relations among the republics, and relations of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo with Serbia. Within months, this coordinating group brought forward proposals which sought to extend the reach of the federal center at the expense of the economic sovereignty of the republics, prompting yet another bitter clash among the republics.18 Yugoslavia’s external position was not a great deal better. Already in the early 1980s interpretations of Yugoslavia’s domestic stability and consequent international status were highly negative in both blocs. By March 1987, NATO’s analyses of the situation in Yugoslavia saw the country’s political and economic system in a state of acute crisis and bankruptcy “which can suddenly explode, and turn itself into ‘lebanonization’ or ‘super-balkanization.’ ”19 To make matters worse, the international financial community and Yugoslavia’s West European friends were hardly providing any relief or a clear alternative path for the country’s economic stabilization and easier association with the integrative processes in Europe. Even Yugoslavia’s timid attempts at greater cooperation with the European Community, its Eureka program of scientific cooperation, or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were met with brisk dismissal. Yugoslav diplomats were advised to “not even think about joining the [European] Community for a long number of years” and to refrain from applying for EFTA membership “since

19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev that is not possible and would not bring anything to Yugoslavia.”20 Yugoslavia’s relationship with the IMF was also hardly positive or constructive. The government of Branko Mikulic´ took a critical view of the IMF’s involvement in the fall of 1986, only to discover by early 1987 that without a standby arrangement with the IMF, Yugoslavia would be unable to secure structural adjustment loans from the World Bank or meet its own debt repayments.21 Although the crisis was permeating Yugoslav society in all republics, the situation was most unstable in Serbia. In addition to the aforementioned strikes that particularly hit the largest Serbian industrial enterprises, this republic was also stirred by the contentious process of constitutional reforms and the growing critique of the ruling system by the developing coalition of the republic’s leading intellectuals and the organizers of the Serb population in Kosovo. It is particularly significant that this coalition began to call for the protection of Serbian national interests not only through the curbing of the independent rights of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, but also through the protection of Serbs in other republics, through either provisions for their autonomy in these republics or even changes of inter-republican borders.22 It is important to understand that the foundations of this platform to redefine Yugoslavia were largely set before Miloševic´ commenced his power grab in Serbia. The ideological foundations were set by the Serbian intellectual elites, and the practical foundations were set by the protest organization of Serbs from Kosovo, which already in 1986 had initiated a series of high-profile demonstrations and meetings with the officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia.23 Until his meteoric rise to power began in the spring of 1987, the political career of Slobodan Miloševic´ had depended solely on the sponsorship of his longtime mentor and prominent Serbian politician, Ivan Stambolic´. Prior to Stambolic´’s installing him as president of the party organization of Belgrade in 1984, Miloševic´ had been a banker with one of the largest banks in Yugoslavia and for a time was its chief representative in New York. Stambolic´ perceived him to be “decisive and dynamic,” with experience of working in the West that could be useful in pushing for the reforms of Yugoslavia’s economic system— just the kind of man needed in the highest party echelons undergoing serious generational reorganization.24 After bringing Miloševic´ into politics, Stambolic´ single-handedly promoted him to the post of president of the Central Committee of Serbia’s League of Communists in January 1986, in spite of significant opposition from some prominent Serbian Communists and in spite of Miloševic´’s rigidly conservative measures as head of the SK in Belgrade. By April 1987 and his famous visit to Kosovo, which launched his drive for power, Miloševic´ was thus just one in a series of ambitious politicians whose few claims to fame

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev within Serbia included his campaign to protect the courses of Marxism in the schools and his curious silence during the wave of public critiques of the SANU memorandum.25 Ivan Stambolic´ gave Miloševic´ a task before going to Kosovo: stop the Serbs from the Priština suburb of Kosovo Polje from marching to Belgrade in protest against government inaction in the face of alleged discrimination at the hands of local Albanians. Miloševic´ initially did not relish this assignment. He came to Kosovo on 20 April 1987 and gave a bland speech of “brotherhood and unity” that the two thousand congregated Serbs had heard many times before. Pressed by Miroslav Šolevic´, the lead organizer of the Kosovo Serbs’ protests, however, Miloševic´ agreed to come back on 24 April to “engage in dialogue, not monologue,” as Šolevic´ demanded. During the following three days foundations were set for the organizational bond between Miloševic´ and the leaders of the Kosovo Serbs that would serve them well in the years to come. Šolevic´ and his comrades mobilized thousands of local Serbs to come see Miloševic´ and formed a group of a few hundred armed core supporters for a potential real fight with the local, largely Albanian, police.26 Miloševic´ also left very little to chance and enlisted the support of his good friend and deputy director of Television Belgrade, Dušan Mitevic´, to have the cameras ready to cover the event.27 As so many times before and after, Miloševic´’s wife, Mirjana Markovic´, was key in his political decision making. “The time had come to back the Kosovo Serbs,” she told him.28 Miloševic´ listened to his wife and to the call of power that could come from controlling the Kosovo issue. On the evening of his second visit, he walked into the crowd in commotion after its clash with the police and famously exclaimed, “Nobody has the right to beat you! Nobody has the right to beat the people!” He then walked back into the hall where his meeting with the local Serbs was taking place, patiently listened to their complaints for twelve hours, and finally promised them in an impassioned speech that “There is no Yugoslavia without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give up Kosovo!”29 With Television Belgrade airing his exclamation of “Nobody has the right to beat you!” over and over again in the days to come, Miloševic´’s campaign for power was officially launched. In the words of Miroslav Šolevic´, Miloševic´ came to Kosovo Polje “as the president of the Serbian Central Committee, and left as the leader of the Serb nation.”30 Upon Miloševic´’s return from Kosovo Polje, Stambolic´—who was at that time the president of Serbia’s presidency—noticed a great change in his attitude.31 Miloševic´ began to speak in nationalist and exclusivist terms, demanding quick solutions for the “fatherland under threat” in Kosovo. “Nationalists ran

21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev into his embrace,” as Stambolic´ put it, and Miloševic´ “knew that [nationalism] was politically very profitable.”32 It was a calculated and dangerous decision on Miloševic´’s part that signified an important break with recent political practice. Although all Yugoslav Communists used nationalism in their republics either as a tool for political mobilization or a bargaining chip in the federal institutions, they were charged with keeping such nationalism under control. Miloševic´’s new rhetoric was a clear break with the past. It signified he had no intention of limiting the outburst of Serb nationalism. During the summer that followed, Miloševic´ meticulously and calculatedly built his network in Serbia. He assembled a group of the most powerful people in Serbia’s media—from Television Belgrade to the Politika and Politika Ekspres daily newspapers—who ensured that he had a clear grip on the information flow in the republic and that all obstacles to his complete power takeover would be removed.33 By September, this media machine was in action. Stambolic´ and his associates were exposed to a ceaseless barrage of criticism for their failures to stop the “years of humiliation” in Kosovo and were in the end ousted at the infamous (and televised) Eighth Session of the Central Committee of Serbia’s League of Communists.34 By publicly and so ruthlessly getting rid of his former mentor and his cadre, Miloševic´ firmly took control of Serbia’s political elite and secured a strong public mandate for decisive policy in Serbia and Kosovo. A vigorous campaign of consolidation of power, famously named “the antibureaucratic revolution,” commenced. In Miloševic´’s own words from that time, “Those who cannot accept the tasks of the new policy [toward Kosovo] can get other, quieter and easier, jobs.”35 Within weeks virtually all media outlets (down to individual journalists) and the organizations of the political and economic system (down to low-level local party functionaries or enterprise managers) were cleansed of the opponents of Miloševic´’s line.36 It was a version of “differentiation” that was extreme even by traditional Communist standards. Miloševic´ demanded unquestionable loyalty, and by the end of 1987 he had it in Serbia proper. The rest of Yugoslavia, though troubled, remained conspicuously silent. Most officials from the other republics simply did not want to meddle in what they saw as Serbia’s internal affairs and, in any case, did not mourn Stambolic´’s downfall because of his previous attempts to change the federal constitution. Some of the highest party functionaries even publicly backed Miloševic´, mistaking his previously conservative stand for a genuine commitment to Tito’s political heritage and thinking of him as just a “controllable grey bureaucrat.”37 As one Serbian journal fittingly put it, Miloševic´ managed to convince the nationalists that he was only pretending to be a Communist and Communists that he

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev was only pretending to be a nationalist.38 His embrace of Serb nationalism was thus initially seen as just a weapon in an attempt to replace Stambolic´, and it remained virtually unchecked. Yugoslav Communists were, however, not the only ones who did not understand Miloševic´’s threat in this early period. The judgment of international players was even more gravely mistaken. Whereas Yugoslav Communists underestimated Miloševic´’s organizational capabilities and mistook him for one in a series of functionaries willing to “responsibly” exploit nationalism, significant segments of the international foreign policy-making community—in spite of solid intelligence about the true motives and dangers of Miloševic´’s strategy— even thought of him as a potential reformer and a force for positive change. American views of Miloševic´ during this period are particularly significant since Europe’s assessments apparently did not stray too far from Washington’s.39 The Central Intelligence Agency in its reports regarding Kosovo dated 28 April 1987 and 3 June 1987 expressed its belief in a connection among the Serb nationalist intellectuals, Serbia’s political leadership, and the Kosovo Serb organizers in fomenting the April demonstrations that brought Miloševic´ public prominence.40 The agency’s further lengthy Kosovo report of 20 August 1987 clearly identified Serbia’s leadership as the main instigator of tensions in Kosovo, which were being used as a pretext for reasserting full control over the province.41 The CIA report of 14 October 1987 saw the threat of ethnic violence growing due to continuing Kosovo Serb protests in which “speakers called for a return to the official repression of Albanians that occurred in the 1960s and for Serbs to take up arms” and due to prescriptions of Serbian officials for “purging and executing Albanian officials and colonizing the province with Serbs while expelling 400,000 ethnic Albanians to neighboring Albania.”42 The intelligence on the dangers of Miloševic´’s use of Kosovo was extensive, and the diplomats were also convinced that he had risen to power by exploiting Serb nationalism and the situation in the province.43 This awareness and the intelligence assessments, however, did not translate into a real perception of threat. On the contrary, according to a US diplomat stationed in Belgrade at the time, Miloševic´ was during this period “seen as a reform Communist, perhaps even a potential Balkan Gorbachev” by some of the most prominent people in the diplomatic community.44 The strongest proponents of such thinking were Jack Scanlan, the American ambassador in Belgrade, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the éminence grise of the State Department’s policy making on Yugoslavia and the future deputy secretary of state; both believed Miloševic´ was a reformer who could push the whole Yugoslav federation toward democracy.45 Their personal friendship with Miloševic´ extended well beyond the usual diplomatic practices,

23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev to such an extent that Miloševic´ at the time confided to a British journalist that “Larry Eagleburger had been in Belgrade and had gone to see him [for] four hours [and] had told Miloševic´ that, whichever way the [1988 US presidential] elections go, Republicans or Democrats, it will be all right for Serbia because he would get the job at State.”46 Arguably as a direct result of such perceptions in the highest US diplomatic circles, a lengthy State Department intelligence research report created in January 1988 for the National Security Council and the White House regarding future prospects for the Yugoslav federation largely dismissed the concerns that were identified by the CIA.47 The position of the United States’ West European allies was at the time very similar and hardly more cognizant of the threat from Miloševic´. The UK foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe, in a privately transmitted message to Belgrade from November 1987, for example, did say that he was “very, very concerned” with the situation in Kosovo and with the Yugoslav economic crisis, but he implied that the United Kingdom’s principal sources of concern were the “centrifugal tendencies in Slovenia and at times in Croatia,” which stemmed from their growing “Europeanization.” His message even expressed the preference of his government for Yugoslavia to be “a strong federation with a powerful central government,” thereby making it more than obvious which side he took in the raging Yugoslav constitutional debates.48 Such positions of high Western officials were in considerable contrast to the events on the ground and the intelligence available, which identified Miloševic´’s centralist camp as the greatest threat to Yugoslavia. An extensive CIA report from 1 August 1987, although stating that the Yugoslav federation would “remain fundamentally stable for the foreseeable future,” did not perceive the country’s “continued evolution as a foregone conclusion.” Rather this report asserted that Yugoslavia still could “revert to greater authoritarianism or collapse into instability,” primarily due to the threat from the centralist camp run by Serbia’s leadership, whose “hidden agenda” behind its “suspect commitment to marketoriented reform” was to “use recentralization to reestablish its dominance over a unified Yugoslavia.” The report also ominously claimed that “the centralists will fail in their efforts to make major changes in Yugoslavia’s political and economic systems in the near future unless they gain the pretext of more serious public unrest.”49 Only months later, Miloševic´ resorted to exactly that—serious public unrest organized and led by the Kosovo Serbs—in order to further his campaign for power and for Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s recentralization. Such analyses appear not to have had a great impact on thinking in the highest policy making circles. In spite of his dangerous use of Serb nationalism and the Kosovo issue and in spite of his impressive and ruthless campaign to

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev become the undisputed leader of Serbia’s political elite, Miloševic´ was still underestimated and misinterpreted both by his peers within Yugoslavia and by international circles. In the midst of a nationalist awakening and the Yugoslav economic crisis, Serbia was ripe for plucking, and Miloševic´ seized his opportunity. His goals—as well as the goals of those who created the ideological foundations for his campaign—were, however, set higher. Underestimated and misinterpreted by the people who could have kept his campaign in check, Miloševic´ was free to begin the drive for the big prize: power over a recentralized Yugoslav federation. EUROPEANIZING SLOVENIA AND THE JNA

With the economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia intensifying, some international circles began to exhibit a greater understanding of the gravity of the situation and were motivated to help. However, they proved to be too weak and too isolated in their concerns. At a meeting of the EC foreign ministers in early March 1988, the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, warned their colleagues that Yugoslavia was “close to economic collapse” and even possible political disintegration. Delors urged the EC countries to financially help Yugoslavia get out of its debt and balance-of-payments crisis. His campaign, however, fizzled after serious opposition from a number of governments.50 Apart from words of encouragement and calls for “greater internal cohesion,” Yugoslav officials received little more in the meetings with their Western counterparts.51 Skeptical about Yugoslavia’s prospects for reform, the EC’s goodwill extended no further than helping the Yugoslavs with some debt rescheduling and limited short-term credits and loans.52 The first half of 1988 thus brought little relief to a tense economic and political situation in Yugoslavia, with the only encouraging diversion being the March visit of Mikhail Gorbachev. During his five-day visit, Gorbachev effectively announced the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which postulated the Soviet Union had a right to intervene wherever socialist systems were being challenged.53 After decades of being considered the leading heretics of socialism, the Yugoslavs were now being commended by the Soviet leader for their different and independent path. Though the irony of such a statement, coming at a time when the “Yugoslav way” was so obviously failing, was not lost on anybody, Gorbachev’s visit was indeed a sign of a new era. Optimists saw it as a positive development that would free the liberal forces within Yugoslavia to act more forcefully, while pessimists saw it as an additional nail in the coffin of Yugoslav unity because one of the last factors of the country’s cohesion—the

25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev Soviet threat—was now also gone. Whatever the case may be, Gorbachev’s visit proved to be only a brief respite in the midst of a brewing crisis. That crisis soon spread beyond the borders of Serbia and Kosovo and pitted two diametrically opposite camps of Yugoslavia’s politics against each other: the rigid and dogmatic leadership of the JNA and the reformist leadership of Slovenia. The JNA’s status in the federal and party institutions was practically equal to that of the republics and autonomous provinces. Civilian oversight over the JNA while Tito was alive amounted to no more than his personal interaction with the military apparatus. After Tito’s death, many within and outside of Yugoslavia worried about what the army’s level of commitment to the country’s civilian institutions would be, especially vis-à-vis its collective commander in chief: the federal presidency. We now know those worries were not unfounded. The highest commanding echelons of the JNA during this period engaged in unconstitutional activities regarding the reorganization of the country’s defense forces. What’s more, they also seriously contemplated and planned a power takeover. Immediately after the 1981 riots in Kosovo, the JNA took over the weapons of the Kosovo Territorial Defense (TO) and virtually disbanded this force, claiming it was staffed by Albanian separatists. More important, the Kosovo riots (and a previously perceived threat of a Croatian national revival quashed by Tito in 1971) prompted the JNA to commence a thorough reorganization of the country’s defenses with the goal of severing the constitutional connection between the republics and autonomous provinces and their Territorial Defense forces.54 Using exaggerated assessments of external threats as a form of pressure in the political bodies, the army leadership in 1987 and 1988 managed to push through a plan of command structure recentralization that was basically unconstitutional, as well as a territorial restructuring of army forces that placed control of the greatest part of the country in the hands of the regional staff office in Belgrade.55 Since about 60 percent of the total officer corps in the army at this time was already Serb, this process of recentralization deeply troubled the political leaderships of the republics.56 In spite of disproportional representation of Serbs in the officer corps and their growing approval of the rhetoric and methods of the Serbian leadership under Miloševic´, the highest ranks of the JNA at this time were still not in Miloševic´’s camp. Led by Admiral Branko Mamula—a Croatian Serb of Communist and staunchly Yugoslav orientation who was the federal secretary for the people’s defense—the JNA leadership was disturbed by the developments in the country, including those in Serbia.57 As Mamula later acknowledged, “soon after Tito’s death it was clear [to the JNA leadership] that it had nothing to expect from the federal presidency,” which was constitutionally

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev supposed to be its supreme commander.58 Mamula’s cohorts in the JNA conducted extensive preparations for a power takeover throughout the second half of 1986 and the first half of 1987, and by the second half of 1987 they were convinced that a coup was indeed inevitable. They forcefully entered into the public debate over the Yugoslav crisis “in order to prepare public opinion for the JNA’s potential decisive action.”59 However, their increased political activity and hints of a military action were met with strong criticism in the party elite. The criticism was most severe in Slovenia. The fact that the JNA leadership clashed most forcefully with Slovenian public opinion and that republic’s government and party elite was no great surprise. Slovenia’s social development during this time was going in the direction of increased opening, liberalization, and democratization. With a basically free press and booming civil society, Slovenia was in 1987 deservedly considered by Newsweek to be the “sole island of freedom” in Eastern Europe.60 Its collision with a dogmatic institution such as the JNA, which clearly had different ideas regarding the direction of the country, was practically unavoidable. During late 1987 Mladina, the magazine of the Slovenian League of Socialist Youth, began a campaign for reforms in the military system regarding conscientious objections and the performance of military service in a civilian capacity. By mid-1988 this campaign had spiraled into a full-fledged conflict between Slovenia’s political establishment and the highest JNA leadership over republican sovereignty, the role of the army in society, the equality of the Slovene language, and the future path of Yugoslav socialism.61 Initially the military leadership was most bothered by the Slovenian Communists’ tolerance for the public activities of the nascent opposition. The campaign in Mladina and a series of “national program” essays published by the Slovenian intellectuals in the journal Nova revija prompted Branko Mamula to issue a private warning to the president of the Slovenian League of Communists, Milan Kucˇan, in December 1987: “Your radicals, together with the opposition, will topple you. That will be the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. And don’t expect that we would watch it quietly.”62 When in February 1988 the largest Slovenian newspaper, Delo, published highly critical reports regarding Mamula’s efforts to sell weapons to famine-stricken Ethiopia and when Mladina soon thereafter uncovered the use of JNA conscripts in building a seaside villa for the admiral, the army’s private warnings became public.63 Slovenian press attacks were labeled a form of “special war” and “counterrevolutionary activity,” with origins in the Slovenian political leadership. Slovenia was openly threatened with the arrests of those who wrote against the army and with the institution of a state of emergency in the republic.64 In the

27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev opinion of Milan Kucˇan, the army was trying to “kosovize” Slovenia.65 Miloševic´ now joined the fracas. His influential media machine waged a new campaign— this time against the Slovenian “separatists” and “counterrevolutionaries” and in defense of the army as the protector of legal order. Slovenia’s leadership was placed in an extremely delicate position. On the one hand, it faced a real threat from the army, which was now opportunistically seconded by Serbia and significant segments of the federal party leadership. On the other hand, it faced a defiant public opinion within Slovenia that refused to succumb to the army, party, or media pressure from Belgrade. The standoff heated up in April, when Slovenia’s intellectual opposition publicly rallied behind a proposal for a new Slovenian constitution which asserted the republic’s right to make decisions “about internal political relations and matters of defense” and which presented a platform for a looser Yugoslav confederation.66 Things finally boiled over on 13 May, when Mladina published an article under an ominous headline—“Night of the Long Knives”—alleging a JNA plan for the intervention and arrest of prominent people in Slovenia. Within weeks, the JNA had in custody the Mladina journalists Janez Janša and David Tasic´, their editor Franci Zavrl, and Ivan Borštner, a JNA sergeant who was suspected of having given Mladina a secret military document outlining instructions on how to prepare for martial law.67 Public outcry against the arrests was enormous, and the trial of the Mladina four proved to be a great blunder for the army. Immediately after the arrests, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights was formed to coordinate a hugely successful public campaign of protests and petitions. When the Ljubljana military court decided to hold its proceedings in camera and in Serbo-Croatian instead of Slovene, even Milan Kucˇan was compelled to publicly exclaim that “The Slovenes cannot accept a state which does not guarantee them the use of their mother tongue and their equality.”68 The JNA eventually got its convictions (the four’s sentences were between six months and four years, though served only partially and in minimum security facilities), but the results were otherwise devastating. The Slovenian public was homogenized, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights became an organized nucleus for the future opposition, the army’s already tarnished reputation was damaged even further, and the simmering clash between Slovenia and Serbia regarding the direction of Yugoslavia’s constitutional reforms was now open and forceful. The reasoning behind the JNA leadership’s decision to eschew a drastic military action during the standoff with Slovenia is a particularly interesting aspect of the whole story. The JNA opted against the coup in Slovenia even though it had at least the tacit approval of the West. According to Raif Dizdarevic´,

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev the president of the federal presidency during the later part of the clash, the Yugoslav State Security Service “acquired information from NATO that the West would ‘close their eyes’ if the army would commence an action to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia.”69 Admiral Mamula later concurred that he—as the army’s leading man—was ready to take the risk since there were no real international obstacles to a more forceful action by the JNA.70 This was Western Cold War realism par excellence. The JNA was seen as necessary to keep the country together. Even though it was a dogmatic institution with questionable domestic loyalties and no reformist potential, it was considered a useful tool for pacifying the troublesome “Europeanizing” Slovenes, whose liberalization was distancing them from the rest of the federation. The plan for more forceful action, however, had one crucial weakness: the army lacked the necessary domestic political backing. As General Veljko Kadijevic´ (Mamula’s successor as the federal secretary for the people’s defense) has argued, the army needed, but did not get, pan-Yugoslav political support.71 The federal party apparatus proved to be inefficient, weak, and unwilling to encourage military action against the Slovenes. The political power vacuum, felt already after the death of Tito, was ever more apparent. This is where Miloševic´ shrewdly stepped in. With a concerted antiSlovenian and pro-JNA campaign in the Serbian media under his control, Miloševic´ took advantage of the situation to set the foundations for his position as the army’s political protector and sponsor. The clash with the Slovenes still did not put the JNA openly in Miloševic´’s camp, even though a more swayable Veljko Kadijevic´ now took Mamula’s place. Nonetheless, starting with the Mladina affair, Miloševic´ was justifiably perceived by his opponents and the broader public as the army’s political favorite, which put him in a crucial position of strength. In Yugoslavia, there were ten focal points of political power: six republics, two provinces, the army, and the party. By the summer of 1988, Miloševic´ had two. He controlled the largest republic and enjoyed the support of an institution which had more than just military force at its disposal. The JNA was an independent unit of the federation whose arsenal apparently also included the backing of important international circles. With such a crucial addition to his side, Miloševic´ was emboldened to expand the reach of his campaign beyond Serbia proper in the second half of 1988. CATALYST OF CHANGE: RALLIES OF THE ANTI-BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION

Social developments in the first half of 1988 in Serbia were seemingly very similar to those in Slovenia. Serbia’s intellectual scene was vibrant and active in

29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev its reevaluation of the Serbian and Yugoslav political and economic system. As in Slovenia, different committees and groups of opposition intellectuals were formed in order to pressure the ruling system toward change and reform. For some of Serbia’s most prominent members of the intellectual elite, the atmosphere in Serbia in 1988 was indeterminate, with “both more nationalism and more freedom” and with no way to tell whether Serbia would go toward true democratic change or national exclusion and intolerance.72 The cause of this perceived relaxation of the state toward the expression of opinions of the intellectual elite, however, did not stem from the regime’s newly found taste for social liberalism but was rather much simpler. Serbia’s political leadership and the republic’s intellectual elite were now definitely on the same program. Miloševic´’s sympathies for the SANU, first expressed by the absence of his critique of the infamous memorandum, were now taking a more defined and concrete form. Not only was his press giving virtually unlimited access to the academy’s members, but the academy and the Serbian government also closely cooperated on two of the most important political issues of the time: the proposal for a new Serbian constitution and a campaign for the redefinition of the Yugoslav federation.73 The political program of the mainstream Serbian intellectual opposition was solidified in late 1987 and early 1988. Although the intellectual elite of Serbia embraced liberal calls for free elections and the surrendering of the party’s monopoly on power, the main thrust of its political action was directed at the nature of Yugoslav federalism and the position of the autonomous provinces within Serbia. The challenge that the intellectual elite presented to the constitutional system was a dangerous combination of contradictions. The 1974 federal constitution, which solidified the position of the republics as individual states, was claimed to be the main culprit for all of Yugoslavia’s troubles. And yet what was called for was the strengthening of the Socialist Republic of Serbia as a “true state.” The autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina were challenged. And yet appeals were made for the autonomous status of Serbs outside of Serbia. The “full national, spiritual and cultural integrity” of the Serb nation was demanded, but it was unclear how this was to be achieved—through the strengthening of the federal center or through the strengthening of the links of the Socialist Republic of Serbia with “parts of its people” in other republics.74 The platform of the Serbian intellectual elite was dangerous not only because it challenged the basic tenets of the existing constitutional equilibrium, but also because its principal demands—a strong federal center and a strong Serbian state—were logically mutually exclusive and thus understandably perceived in the rest of Yugoslavia as part of a larger demand for Serbian hegemony. This

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev platform became even more dangerous when it was embraced by Miloševic´, who vowed to alter Serbia’s “sad and absurd [constitutional] situation, which is legally impossible, politically reactionary, and morally unacceptable.”75 The constitutional reform proposals of Serbia’s leadership, which grew out of the intellectuals’ critiques of the spring of 1988, were formalized in June and July of that year. They called for the elimination of the autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina in virtually all major policy areas such as the administration of security services, territorial defense, economic planning, international relations, and language policy. It is interesting that real resistance to these proposals was basically nonexistent at the federal level. Any leeway that the leaderships of the autonomous provinces might have hoped for in their negotiations with Miloševic´ was severely circumscribed by the fact that the federal party and the army gave their stamp of approval to his platform of constitutional changes.76 With such support, the road to passing the constitutional amendments was practically clear, and passage could have been achieved through a legitimate political process. Conforming to the legitimate political process, however, was not Miloševic´’s primary goal. Constitutional reforms and Serbia’s “revival” as a “unified state” (and particularly a clash with the real and imagined enemies of that revival) were for Miloševic´ always only a means to a larger end: control over the whole Yugoslav federation. Serbia’s boss and his political apparatus thus artificially extended the process of constitutional reforms.77 More dangerous, they also sought to intensify their pressure on the rest of the country by throwing their republic into a whirlwind of public protests under a banner of whipped-up Serb nationalism. Although workers’ demonstrations and strikes were during 1988 a daily occurrence in Yugoslavia, the wave of rallies and protests that swept over Serbia during the summer of that year was a dramatically different development and the ultimate tool in Miloševic´’s campaign for power. While these so-called “rallies of truth” were to a large extent an expression of real popular discontent, there was nothing spontaneous about their organization and timing. They were in fact a product of cooperation between Serbia’s state and party institutions under Miloševic´’s control and his Kosovo Serb allies, now congregated in the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins.78 After the first rally, held on 9 July 1988 in Novi Sad against the “treacherous and separatist” leadership of Vojvodina, the strength and number of protests simply snowballed, with dozens of rallies attended by hundreds of thousands of protesters in virtually all major towns of Serbia. This was a wave of public dissatisfaction with the political system unseen anywhere in Europe at the time.79 The “folklore” in all the rallies was virtually uniform. Demonstrators carried Miloševic´’s portraits,

31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev sang popular songs in his honor, and compared him to Tito. They also chanted against the constitution and the leaders of the provinces and the other republics and publicly called for weapons. The purpose behind these rallies was clear to everybody. They were a show of Miloševic´’s force and a direct threat to all his potential opponents and the rest of Yugoslavia.80 The extent of Miloševic´’s open threat to the stability of Yugoslavia with the rally campaign was such that even the Western press started to write that his aggressive tactics might lead to the possible breakup of the country and even civil war.81 Somebody had to stand up to Miloševic´’s bullying, but those in positions of power did not dare to. The CIA report of 8 September 1988 predicted that “national leaders probably will take tough measures to restrict the Serb protesters and will avoid supporting Serbia’s more controversial constitutional proposals, a failure that may weaken Miloševic´ and lead to his eventual ouster.”82 This was, however, one of the CIA’s very few wrong assessments of Yugoslav politics from the period. The Yugoslavia of 1988 was no longer the tightly controlled country of Tito’s era. The federal leadership, as well as the leaderships of the other republics, was in fact ready to meet Miloševic´’s demands for the effective elimination of the autonomous provinces in the hope that his campaign would not spread beyond Serbia. The main levers of power—the party and the army—remained passive and at critical times acquiescent to Miloševic´’s demands. When the organizers of the “rallies of truth,” for example, wanted to expand their campaign to Jajce, the birthplace of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the heart of Bosnia (of which more in chapter 3), the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina stopped the announced rally, but they coupled that decision with strong support for the proposed changes to Serbia’s constitution. When the leaders of Vojvodina publicly and forcefully lashed out against Miloševic´ and the initial 9 July 1988 rally in Novi Sad, the federal party presidium scolded them for airing the party’s dirty laundry in public and for not having conducted “a broad discussion with all the demonstrators.”83 The federal party president, Stipe Šuvar—a Croat of clearly Yugoslav and dogmatic Communist orientation—though exclaiming that “the people did not self-organize in 1941 and they are not self-organizing today,” still openly supported Miloševic´’s constitutional reforms in Serbia and challenged the leaderships of Kosovo and Vojvodina.84 Finally, the army, though troubled by the spread of popular unrest, openly asserted that the “rallies of truth” as protests of Serbs and Montenegrins who were trying “to secure their rights within the system” could not be condemned.85 Some officials did issue warnings in the federal party and presidency meetings, and the provincial leaderships of Vojvodina and Kosovo did try to defend the rights of their regions. Nevertheless,

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev Miloševic´ did not face a real and open challenge from those who could have stopped him.86 As a result, he—rather unsurprisingly—decided to increase the stakes and to use the rallies to topple his opponents during that fall. The first target of Miloševic´’s attack was the easiest: the leadership of the autonomous province of Vojvodina in Novi Sad. On 5 October 1988 some seventy thousand protesters congregated in the city center, chanting Miloševic´’s name and demanding that the provincial party leadership resign. Cordoned off from the protesters by local police units but under a constant barrage of coins, rocks, and yogurt cartons (which led to the demonstration’s being named “the yogurt revolution”)—Vojvodina’s leaders desperately sought help from the federal party and the army and even pleaded with Miloševic´ to call off the rally. No help was forthcoming. Miloševic´ coolly told them to resign. The army refused to intervene since the Serbian leadership claimed it had to approve all uses of the JNA on its territory and it declined to do so.87 The federal leadership, probably frightened by the possibility of greater unrest and hoping that Miloševic´ could be appeased, backed his demands and insisted that Vojvodina’s functionaries quit.88 The affair had the air of the first “revolution” in Eastern Europe of the late 1980s. Unlike the revolutions that would sweep the rest of the region in the years to come, however, Vojvodina’s “yogurt revolution” brought to power just another set of Communists. Their only distinguishing feature was that they were acquiescent to the Serbian leader. Vojvodina did not satisfy Miloševic´’s appetite. Only a day after his opponents in Novi Sad were forced out of power on 6 October, a similar scenario was unleashed on Montenegro, with about twenty-five thousand protesters descending on the government buildings in Titograd.89 The implications of the exporting of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” beyond the borders of Serbia were now obvious to all. Both the Yugoslav and international press began to compare Miloševic´’s campaign of local putsches through rallies and marches to the campaigns of Mussolini and Hitler.90 A CIA report asserted that in case of success in overthrowing the Montenegrin leadership, Miloševic´ would turn to BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia and with coups in those republics “would produce a Serbian-led national regime dominated by Miloševic´.”91 The Yugoslav leadership finally seemed to begin to understand that its hopes of “Miloševic´ stopping at the moment when he reached control over Serbia” were futile.92 Apart from Montenegrin functionaries extending their lease on power for another three months with a strong police intervention against the protesters, party leaders continued to waver and hedge their bets in the face of Miloševic´’s threats. On 9 October, Raif Dizdarevic´ addressed television audiences across Yugoslavia with a vague critique of nationalism that failed to name any names

33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

34 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev and with an equally vague reference to possible emergency measures throughout the country.93 Two days later, Stipe Šuvar—although himself subjected to a vicious attack from the Serbian press and party—effectively helped Miloševic´ seal the fate of the leaders of Kosovo by waging a harsh critique of their “failure to do more to halt the counterrevolution” in their province.94 The only hint of the federal party leadership’s willingness to enter into a direct clash with Miloševic´ came at the highly anticipated and televised Seventeenth Session of the party’s Central Committee, which took place on 17 and 18 October 1988 and where one of Miloševic´’s allies on the party presidium was given a vote of no confidence.95 Even such a minor “victory” was enough to give hope that the train of Serb nationalism could be stopped in its tracks and offer a glimpse of what might be achieved with an even more resolute challenge to Miloševic´. Functionaries from other republics started to publicly portray the Seventeenth Session as a message “to the leader of Serbia that he needs to stay within the borders of Serbia.”96 A big Belgrade rally Miloševic´ had planned to have on 22 October was suddenly postponed, and the Serbian leader began to limit his public appearances. This was, however, only a temporary lull. A CIA report of 29 October 1988 maintained that “after lying low for awhile, [Miloševic´] is likely to regroup his supporters in Serbia and other regions to resume his efforts . . . [and] may return to provocative demonstrations to discredit opponents.”97 As the report predicted, Miloševic´ was soon back on the offense—this time with a new attack on the Kosovo leadership and the biggest protest rally in Yugoslavia’s history. “It is not time for sadness but for battle,” he told a massive crowd of 1.3 million congregated in Belgrade on 19 November. “We shall win, although today, as before, Serbia’s enemies from abroad are joining with the enemies from within the country,” he continued, striking a chord with Serbia’s sense of victimhood and making it clear that the Seventeenth Session was just a passing and minor setback.98 Miloševic´’s campaign of rallies and the events in Novi Sad and Titograd did nothing to bring about a true reassessment of policy in the Yugoslav political leadership or a stiffer opposition to his campaign. Moreover, they did not lead to a meaningful shift in the West’s perception of the Yugoslav situation. Some influential policy-making circles, like those in the departing Reagan administration, were still “torn between their appreciation of Mr. Miloševic´ as a catalyst forcing through sorely needed political and economic changes and their fear that the Serbian leader, by playing on nationalist passions, might create unbridgeable antagonisms in Yugoslavia’s other republics.”99 And Western ambassadors to Yugoslavia during an October meeting in Belgrade—troubled by the exploding nationalism which had turned Yugoslavia into “Europe’s weak point” and

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev which seemed to be leading to civil war—curiously once again placed their hopes in the Yugoslav People’s Army to “solve the country’s socio-political and economic crisis,” although it was already obvious to all (including the CIA) that the JNA was clearly biased in favor of Miloševic´.100 The campaign of the Serbian leader in the summer and fall of 1988 was not that of a “catalyst forcing through sorely needed political and economic changes,” but a dangerous operation which shattered the foundations of Yugoslavia’s national and political equilibrium. In his quest for political power and control of the whole federation, Miloševic´ had struck a bargain with nationalism stirred up in the Serbian intellectual elite and unleashed it onto Yugoslav society, which had already been destabilized by a severe socioeconomic crisis. The effects were poisonous, though for his short-term goals seemingly highly profitable. Out of Yugoslavia’s ten focal points of political power, by the end of 1988 Miloševic´ definitely controlled Serbia proper and Vojvodina, was on the verge of capturing Montenegro and Kosovo, and was strongly favored by the army and Macedonia.101 The most important aspect of the events during this period was that Miloševic´’s campaign faced no organized or determined opposition. Those in positions of power within Yugoslavia (including the leaders of Slovenia, who were the most critical of Miloševic´), although distressed, basically tried to appease Miloševic´ by giving in to his demands over Vojvodina, Kosovo, and the Serbian constitution. Those in positions of power outside of Yugoslavia not only chose to remain on the sidelines, but even showed sympathy and understanding for Miloševic´’s campaign. Some, like Miloševic´’s admirers in the American diplomatic community, saw his use of nationalist rallies as a potentially necessary—though admittedly dangerous—means for the achievement of economic reforms. Others, probably reminiscing about Tito’s reign, placed their hopes for stability in an institution as unrepentantly non-reformist and nationally biased as the JNA. Most important, no international actors offered any real support for the Yugoslav economy, which was still in dire straits. In fact, by the end of 1988, the European Community appeared to be mainly interested in getting official reassurances from Belgrade that Yugoslavia would not apply for full membership in this organization—a possibility to which the Slovenian and Croatian leaders had publicly alluded.102 Yugoslavia was left to deal on its own with the economic crisis and with the virus of Serb nationalism that was eating away at it from the inside. BATTLES FOR KOSOVO

The Serb nationalist revival of the 1980s revolved around the fate of the autonomous province of Kosovo. This region was perceived by the Serbs as the

35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev cradle of their republic’s statehood, now held captive by its Albanian majority. The long and simmering crisis in Kosovo finally boiled over in November 1988 as Serbia began its push for full control of the province. Under intense public attacks by the Serbian SK and Miloševic´, the highest provincial party leadership was forced to resign on 17 November.103 Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari, two of the most exposed Kosovo leaders who were driven out of their posts, could not resist Miloševic´’s assault without any real support from the federal party. They and their province were basically sold out in an attempt by the federal leadership to keep peace in the house. Virtually within hours of Vllasi’s and Jashari’s resignations, Kosovo Albanians took to the streets. Throughout the summer of the Serbian “rallies of truth,” they had largely kept to themselves, but now they refused to remain quiet. As Belgrade prepared for the aforementioned 19 November rally, which was to consolidate Miloševic´’s gains and help launch his newest campaigns, close to a hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians congregated in the province’s capital of Priština to express their support for the local leadership. Although the direct reasons for their protest were the resignations of Vllasi and Jashari, the real underlying cause of the protesters’ anxiety was Miloševic´’s threat to Kosovo’s autonomy strengthened by the 1974 constitution.104 They chanted for Tito, the SKJ, Albanian equality, and brotherhood and unity, but their appeals for the reinstatement of Vllasi and Jashari were denied even after five days of protests that swept the whole province. In fact, though the protests were largely peaceful and spontaneous, they sparked an even more intense anti-Albanian campaign by the Serbian press and authorities and became easy fodder for Miloševic´’s counterattack, which extended well beyond Kosovo.105 On the heels of his demand for the arrests of the “leaders of the counterrevolution [and the] terror and genocide against the Serbs” in Kosovo, Miloševic´ now went after Montenegro and the federal party.106 On 11 January 1989, after two days of continuous protests by tens of thousands of demonstrators, the Montenegrin leadership finally succumbed to the pro-Miloševic´ forces and resigned. Soon thereafter, Miloševic´’s proxies in the leadership of Vojvodina started a process of impeachment against Stipe Šuvar, accusing him of “forming an unprincipled coalition against Serbia . . . [and] sowing the seeds of discord between the Serbs on the one side and the Montenegrins and Macedonians on the other.”107 Šuvar’s past timidity toward Miloševic´ was apparently not enough to save him from the attacks of Miloševic´’s cronies. Though his impeachment was not adopted (largely on procedural grounds), Šuvar’s position was severely weakened in the process. Over the last four months of his term as the federal party president, he caused no serious problems for Miloševic´ or his campaign in Kosovo.

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev Within weeks, Miloševic´’s Kosovo campaign reached an explosive level. On 19 February 1989, more than a thousand miners in the Trepcˇa mines in Kosovo descended into the Stari Trg pit and began a hunger strike to protest the impending changes in Serbia’s constitution and the new Kosovo leadership of Miloševic´ loyalists. They indeed had much to protest. After the departure of Vllasi and Jashari, Miloševic´ installed the pliant Rahman Morina—Kosovo’s secretary for internal affairs who was in charge of police and security forces (a sure omen of things to come)—as the head of the provincial party. More important, the draft of Serbia’s new constitution which was soon to be ratified stripped Kosovo and Vojvodina of their autonomy in everything but name. Not only was control over policy areas such as security, territorial defense, economic planning, international relations, and language policy now to be solely in the hands of the Serbian government, but Kosovo and Vojvodina were also to be denied their veto power over any future constitutional changes in Serbia.108 The miners were clearly risking their lives by hunger striking thousands of feet under ground, but the Serbian leadership remained resolute. Morina and his associates refused to resign, and the constitutional amendments continued through the ratification process. On 22 February, the amendments were adopted by the constitutional commission of Serbia’s National Assembly, and two days later they were endorsed by the assembly’s three houses in a plenary session. The president of the National Assembly, Borisav Jovic´, perfectly summed up the prevailing sentiment in Belgrade in his address to the plenary session by stating that the 1974 Yugoslav constitution had stripped Serbia of its sovereignty but that the new constitutional amendments were now bringing Serbia “on the path to equality with the other republics.”109 As Jovic´ spoke to Serbia’s parliamentary representatives, the situation in Kosovo spun out of control, with the whole province joining the miners in protests and strikes. The demands of the protesters were simple: the resignations of Morina and his colleagues and no changes to the autonomy of Kosovo.110 After months of rising tensions, the Kosovo Albanians had finally entered a full-fledged showdown with Miloševic´, and the federal leadership was caught in the middle. Miloševic´ and Šuvar came to Kosovo on 24 February to try to calm the protesters, but their visit only made matters worse. Miloševic´ refused to talk to the miners and insisted on criticizing Albanian nationalism. Šuvar, probably traumatized by the harangues in the Serbian press to which he was still exposed, tried to get the miners to abandon their strike by making disingenuous claims that Serbia’s amendments did not challenge the autonomy of Kosovo and by faulting the “organized socialist forces of Kosovo” for their “lack of political work with the masses.”111 The following two days were critical as the miners’

37 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

38 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev strike continued and the Albanian protests only grew in numbers and intensity. There was a danger of serious tragedy since the miners were entering the second week of their hunger strike in a pit apparently filled with explosives. The end finally came on 27 February with the resignations of Morina and his associates and with the federal presidency’s enactment of “special measures”—a euphemism for a state of emergency—throughout Kosovo.112 The miners left the Stari Trg pit that evening with the satisfaction of at least the minor victory of Morina’s resignation (there was no mention of a repeal of the constitutional amendments). Within hours, however, they realized they had been tricked by Miloševic´. That evening Television Belgrade showed a recording of a public gathering in Ljubljana’s Cankarjev Dom concert hall, where Slovenian politicians spoke in support of the miners of Stari Trg. Speaker after speaker, including prominent leaders of the Slovenian League of Communists, expressed respect for the miners’ “just struggle” and alarm at the direction of the country.113 The results were explosive. By the following morning, about one million Belgraders were on the streets in front of the SFRJ Assembly. Although Miloševic´’s rally-making machine worked overtime that night, many of the protesters came on their own because they felt personally affronted by the Slovenes.114 With the masses on the streets shouting “We want weapons!,” “We’re going to Kosovo!,” “Arrest Vllasi!,” and “This is Serbia!,” the strongest trump card was once again in Miloševic´’s hands, and he played it skillfully.115 He refused to speak to the protesters, letting the crowd get more restless, while behind the scenes he pressured the federal leadership to reinstate Morina and arrest Vllasi (who was by now vilified in the Belgrade press as the chief clandestine organizer of the Kosovo strikes and protests). After a full day of intense arguments as the demonstrators still refused to leave, the federal leadership finally succumbed. It called for a reexamination of the resignations of Morina and his colleagues, which “were made under duress,” and for the “arrest and prosecution of the organizers of the Kosovo events.”116 Miloševic´ now triumphantly faced the crowds. In his famous response to the shouts directed against Vllasi, he exclaimed, “I can’t hear you well, but we will arrest those responsible including those who have used the workers! In the name of the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, I promise this!”117 He was true to that promise. Azem Vllasi and a number of other prominent Albanian leaders were incarcerated only a day later. Kosovo erupted once again, but Albanian protests were now answered with brutal repression by the police and army forces that were dispatched. On 23 March Kosovo’s Provincial Assembly endorsed Serbia’s constitutional changes and thereby de facto ended the province’s autonomy. The vote itself was a blatant public expression of

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev Miloševic´’s force and intimidation. Prior to the assembly session, Albanian representatives were individually interrogated by Serbia’s State Security Service. As the vote took place, police forces used truncheons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. The legislature itself was locked up by helmeted policemen armed with automatic rifles.118 Even Miloševic´’s right-hand man, Borisav Jovic´, later acknowledged that Albanian deputies were placed under “enormous pressure.”119 Only 10 of them in the end dared to vote against the amendments (out of a total of 190), and they were all soon expelled from the assembly, dismissed from their jobs, and threatened with criminal prosecution.120 In the coming days, the clashes between the Kosovo Albanian protesters and the police intensified. The official victim toll actually was double the one from the 1981 riots and in the end stood at twenty-four dead and more than two hundred injured.121 Serbia’s National Assembly nevertheless proceeded with ratification and promulgated the new constitution on 28 March 1989 in a lavish ceremony at Belgrade’s Sava Center congress hall which was also attended by prominent Western ambassadors. It was a significant symbolic act which the Serbian leadership understood as an indication of Western support for its policy in Kosovo. “The time can never and shall never return when decisions about Serbia are taken outside of Serbia,” Borisav Jovic´ exclaimed from the podium.122 It was a clear jab at the federation, and it was backed up by abundant evidence from the previous six months. Time and again the federal leadership had proved to be incapable of stopping Miloševic´, and time and again the Serbian leader had proved to be fully capable of pushing around the rest of the country. By the end of March 1989, Miloševic´ directly controlled four out of eight federal units—Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro—and enjoyed the tacit support of Macedonia and the army. In May he even got his man to be the new president of the federal party’s presidium. Šuvar’s term expired and he moved on to be Croatia’s representative on the country’s federal presidency, while the party was now (by the rule of annual rotation) in the hands of Miloševic´’s ally from Macedonia, Milan Pancˇevski. The stage was set for Miloševic´’s complete takeover of the federation, and he did not hide his intentions. “I would like to say to everyone in Serbia and outside, that Serbia will not—intoxicated by its victories—rest on its laurels,” he announced that May.123 Miloševic´’s dismantling of the Yugoslav constitutional equilibrium and the brutal subjugation of Kosovo failed to spark any concerted reaction in the international community, even though credible information of what was happening and how much was at stake was readily available both in the press and in intelligence reports.124 The reasons for the lack of reaction were twofold. First, Miloševic´ was in some highly influential international circles still mistakenly

39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev perceived as a reformer who was using nationalism in an effort to push the federation toward necessary restructuring. Second, the momentous changes which were beginning to unfold at that time in the Soviet bloc were affecting Western perceptions of Yugoslavia. With every new step Gorbachev took toward ending the Cold War divide, Yugoslavia’s position mattered less and less. Since the United States was still the front-runner of Western policy toward Eastern Europe, the example of its approach to Yugoslavia during this period is once again particularly instructive. Between March and June 1989, a number of resolutions were proposed in the US Congress which expressed grave concern “over the recent ominous developments in Yugoslavia and [the belief] that all steps should be taken to prevent bloodshed in that country.” Some of these resolutions requested that the United States end the most-favored-nation status for Yugoslavia or that it ban the imports of Yugoslav cars because of developments in Kosovo. Other resolutions appealed to “the President of the United States [to direct] the Department of State to convey to the appropriate representatives of [Yugoslavia] the support of the United States for the continuing internal autonomy of the province of Kosovo as provided for in the Yugoslav constitution of 1974.”125 None of these resolutions passed, largely because of the influence of the State Department and the White House. The reactions of the highest officials in these two institutions toward Yugoslavia were indeed starkly different from those of a growing number of congressmen and were in direct conflict with the available intelligence. A perfect example of the thinking in the administration of George H. W. Bush was Lawrence Eagleburger, the newly appointed deputy secretary of state and the man who had the greatest influence on the State Department’s and the White House’s Yugoslav policy. In his confirmation hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15–16 March 1989, Eagleburger offered some criticism of Slobodan Miloševic´ for having created “the worst situation with regard to the nationality question we have seen since the close of the war.” However, he did so only after stating that “there is no question in my mind that Miloševic´ is in terms of economics a Western market-oriented fellow . . . [who] is playing on and using Serbian nationalism, which has been contained for so many years, in part I think as an effort to force the central government to come to grips with some very tough economic problems.” In addition and in indirect reference to the Senate resolution asking the president and the State Department to convey to Yugoslavia the US support for Kosovo’s autonomy, Eagleburger asserted that “if I know anything about Yugoslavs it is when you come at them and tell them not to do something, that is precisely the time they will go ahead

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev and do it.”126 There was no need to read between the lines. Eagleburger implied that Miloševic´’s playing with fire was at least in part motivated by something positive and that the United States should not necessarily meddle.127 Eagleburger’s position corresponded perfectly to the more general views of the Bush administration toward Eastern Europe at the time. During the first several months of President Bush’s term, which began in January 1989, his administration almost completely detached itself from the region. If there was one word that characterized President Bush’s worldview, it was “stability.” His own and his administration’s early detachment from Eastern Europe stemmed not so much from the “beginners’ confusion” so common to presidential newcomers as from a genuine commitment “not to make things difficult for Gorbachev”—that is, to have any systemic change between the two blocs, if necessary in the first place, occur orderly and “prudently.” The president had a special appreciation not only for Gorbachev, but also for the leaders of the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech Communists, who were seen as a safer bet than the anti-system opposition.128 In spite of all the popular enthusiasm for a change in relations between the two blocs, it was this strong commitment to stability, the status quo, order, and balance that was the quintessence of realism of prominent members of the West’s political elites when dealing with the transformation of Eastern Europe. Naturally, such a commitment had a decisive impact on how they responded to particular events in this region—including Yugoslavia. The US ambassador in Moscow, Jack Matlock, for example, bitterly noted in March 1989, “Our marching orders are clear: ‘Don’t just do something, stand there!’ ” The administration indeed just “stood there,” even when Soviet troops violently suppressed Georgian protests in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. The president’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, told his aides that day, “We’ve got no dog in this fight. For everyone’s sake, the less said, the better.”129 It is interesting that this was not the last time a high Bush administration official would state the United States “had no dog” in an East European “fight.” Secretary of State James Baker would famously say the exact same thing two years later, on the eve of the wars in Slovenia and Croatia. The United States— due to the influence of some prominent congressmen—in the second half of 1989 and throughout 1990 did exert significant pressure on Yugoslavia regarding the situation in Kosovo. Judging by the initial reactions of March 1989, however, it is not difficult to imagine that the protests of the Kosovo Albanians were treated by the State Department and the administration very similarly to those of the Georgians. The “Balkan Gorbachev,” just like the real Gorbachev, was most likely seen as using force to maintain stability in the federation.

41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

42 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev The United States and the West as a whole did not in early 1989 choose to “overlook” only the issue of Kosovo. They made the neglect of the whole of Yugoslavia their official policy, and they ensured that the Yugoslavs understood that. Before coming to Yugoslavia in March 1989, the new US ambassador, Warren Zimmermann, was briefed by Lawrence Eagleburger about the message for Belgrade and for the capitals of the Yugoslav republics. In addition to a new emphasis on human rights and democracy and a continuing commitment to Yugoslav unity, the essence of Eagleburger’s instructions was “that Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed its former geopolitical significance as a balance between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact.”130 In the realist calculations of the West, Yugoslavia did not matter anymore. When President Bush visited Eastern Europe in July of that year, he did not make a stop in Belgrade, even though his visit was hoped for by the Yugoslavs and expected by the Western press.131 After Kosovo, there should have been no doubts about Miloševic´’s goals. Such a grave threat to Yugoslavia’s stability, coupled with a still catastrophic economic situation, apparently did not compel the West to revise its approach to the crisis-ridden federation. The coronation of Miloševic´ as the principal power holder in Yugoslavia took place exactly where his meteoric rise had begun in April 1987—in Kosovo Polje. The date of 28 June 1989 marked the six hundredth anniversary of the famed Battle of Kosovo, which was etched in Serb memory as the beginning of a tragic descent of their medieval kingdom in the face of advancing Ottoman forces. On that day, in front of the highest delegation of Yugoslav leaders and a crowd of more than one million Serb pilgrims from all over Yugoslavia, Miloševic´ outlined his interpretation of the past and his vision for the future: When socialist Yugoslavia was formed, the Serbian leadership in that new country remained divided, willing to compromise at the expense of its people. The concessions that many Serb functionaries made at the expense of their people would not have been accepted either historically or ethically by any nation in the world. Especially because Serbs throughout their history had never conquered or exploited others. Their national and historical being throughout history, the two world wars, as well as today, has been liberating. They have permanently struggled to liberate themselves, and when they had a chance, they helped others to liberate themselves. And the fact that they are in this region a large nation is not a Serb sin or shame. It is an advantage which they have never used against others. I also must say here on this great, legendary field of Kosovo that Serbs have never used that advantage of being a large nation even for themselves. Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality, they have even felt guilty about it in front of others

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev and themselves. It has been like that for decades, for years. We are here in Kosovo Polje to say—no more. . . . Six centuries later, today, we are again in battles and in front of battles. They are not armed battles, but even those cannot be excluded.132

Miloševic´’s project had made full circle. Two years earlier, he had started his metamorphosis from a Communist apparatchik into a Serb national leader right there in Kosovo Polje. Now he was back to celebrate his victories and to draw the obvious conclusions of his campaign for the whole of Yugoslavia to understand. Gone were the days when Serb leaders would sacrifice the interests of their nation—the largest in the South Slav union—for the benefit of Yugoslavia, he claimed. The Serbs would no longer feel guilty that they were “a large nation.” In fact, as Miloševic´ added, the size of the Serb nation was “an advantage” that his predecessors had not used sufficiently. The connection between the size of the Serb nation and the “battles” to which he alluded was not lost on anybody. It was an open threat to all his opponents, a call to arms to his compatriots, and an indisputable death certificate for Tito’s Yugoslavia. It was also the peak of his campaign for control over the whole federation. Until the summer of 1989 and his speech at Kosovo Polje, Miloševic´ had faced little more than fearful appeasement within Yugoslavia and disinterest coupled with tacit approval in international circles. The speech—together with the spread of his campaign toward Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia in the second half of 1989—marked a shift in Miloševic´’s fortunes. Though international responses to the situation remained virtually unchanged, the finally strong backlash from the rest of the country meant his hope of ruling over a reframed and recentralized Yugoslavia was finished.

• The ascent of Slobodan Miloševic´ to power grew out of a long conflict among Yugoslavia’s national Communist elites and occurred at a time when the federation’s political stability was extremely vulnerable. The ideological and practical foundations of Miloševic´’s program were laid not only by the resurgence of Serb nationalism, centered on the issue of Kosovo, but also by a string of Serbian grievances over the direction of Yugoslavia’s constitutional, political, and economic development. The evolution of Yugoslavia into a decentralized union of states during the last two decades of Tito’s rule had never truly been accepted in Serbia. The efforts of Serbia’s Communist leadership during the first half of the 1980s to recentralize the country, however, encountered stiff opposition

43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev from the rest of the federation. Other republics saw their rights to autonomy and sovereignty as products of long and hard-fought internal struggles and therefore as fixed and not subject to negotiation. The essence of Miloševic´’s platform was to forcefully change the balance of power which had hindered the efforts of his predecessors and to make Yugoslavia’s internal arrangement not even a subject of negotiation but a subject of Serbia’s diktat. In his drive for power Miloševic´ managed to successfully establish himself as the most important political player in the country. By June 1989, out of Yugoslavia’s ten focal points of political authority, he did not directly control or have the support of only three: Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a record of ruthlessly achieved success unparalleled in Yugoslavia’s brief post-Tito history. It was also a record of destruction of the foundational pillars of Yugoslavia’s sociopolitical system. Miloševic´’s campaign destroyed the country’s inter-republican and inter-ethnic relations, which were dependent on consensual decision making, and shattered its constitutional equilibrium, which was dependent on the real autonomies of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Most important, as a result of Miloševic´’s drive for power, growing segments of Yugoslav society—particularly in Slovenia and Kosovo but also in Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, and Macedonia—began to seriously question the very need to live in a union dominated by Serbia under Miloševic´. Direct responsibility for allowing the Serbian leader to come so far and destroy so much lay undoubtedly with Yugoslavia’s ruling political elite. The federal and republican leaderships had allowed Miloševic´ to bully and blackmail them and had only invited more of his abuse by trying to appease him regarding the status of the autonomous provinces and Serbia’s constitution. Indirect responsibility for the rise of Miloševic´, however, also lay with the West. Yugoslavia was severely destabilized by the economic crisis that was feeding the popular discontent so crucial for the success of Serbia’s nationalist revival. Yet the country’s Western allies refused to offer meaningful financial assistance which could have alleviated some of the problems and even harshly stifled Yugoslavia’s nascent hopes of growing cooperation and integration with the EC and EFTA. For four decades the West had supported Yugoslavia out of its own realist calculations that the federation’s independent path to socialism was an important challenge to the Soviets. Now, as the Cold War divide was crumbling and Yugoslavia did not need to play the role it had been playing, the West was abandoning it for the same realist reasons. From a crucial buffer zone between the two blocs, Yugoslavia had now been turned into a marginal member of Europe’s periphery. It was a critical mistake that only contributed to Miloševic´’s sense of having a free reign to push through his platform.

Taming the Balkan Gorbachev The West committed another critical mistake which more directly encouraged Miloševic´ in his campaign. In spite of formidable evidence to the contrary, it mistook the Serbian leader for a reformer of Gorbachev’s mold who was trying to strengthen the integrity of the federation. Miloševic´ was not leading the country toward necessary reforms, nor was he trying to preserve the unity of the federation by going after the “separatists” in Kosovo or Slovenia. In his effort to recentralize and reframe Yugoslavia based on the blueprints of the Serbian intellectual elite, he was actually destroying the federation. Important elements of the Western diplomatic and policy-making community, in spite of the availability of more than solid intelligence and analysis, failed to recognize this. That is why they failed to alter their policies, even after all the rallies and regional putsches and even after the brutal subjugation of Kosovo. That is also why they gave signals of approval for the increasing involvement, potentially even the intervention, of the JNA. What is worst, they continued to make such “realist” mistakes in the years to come—even after those “armed battles,” which Miloševic´ announced at Kosovo Polje, had spread throughout Yugoslavia.

45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

3

Yugoslavia’s Cold War, 1988–1989

After Miloševic´’s speech at the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the constellation of Yugoslavia’s political forces changed dramatically. The speech was not only the country’s defining event of that whole momentous year, but also a true turning point in the development of the crisis. It marked the celebration and consolidation of Miloševic´’s victories in his “anti-bureaucratic” battles and the launching of the next phase in his broader campaign for control over the whole Yugoslav federation. It also, however, marked the end of appeasement from the country’s political elites and the beginning of an assertive resistance to his platform for the redefinition of the federation. After the Battle of Kosovo speech, all that was left for Miloševic´ to do was to crush his opponents in the federation’s western half. His attempts to expand his power westward, however, led the whole ruling system toward complete collapse and destroyed any potential for a new consensus regarding the common future of all the Yugoslav nations. The second half of 1989 was, of course, a period of historically important events throughout Europe, and they had a decisive impact on Yugoslavia. The ruling regimes of the Soviet bloc collapsed like dominoes. In late August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki became Poland’s first non-Communist prime minister since World War II. On 9 November, the East German government opened the Berlin Wall. By the end of that month, the West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, announced a ten-point plan for the reunification of Germany. In December, Nicolae Ceaus˛escu was deposed and executed in Romania, and Václav Havel became the new president of Czechoslovakia. Suddenly, all of these events and all of these countries became much more important to the West than Yugoslavia. A running joke that was popular in Yugoslavia at the

46

Yugoslavia’s Cold War time—“If only we had said ‘yes’ to Stalin back in 1948, instead of resisting him, we would have been free today”1—reflected the Yugoslavs’ discontent both with the pace of reforms in their country and with the dwindling significance of their fate for the West. George Kennan, one of the greatest experts on Cold War politics and a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, warned in the late summer of 1989 that “with the Cold War ending, people think Yugoslavia isn’t in the position to do any damage. I think they’re wrong. There’s a fault line of instability running through the Balkans. I think events in Yugoslavia are going to turn violent and to confront the Western countries, especially the United States, with one of their biggest foreign policy problems of the next few years.”2 This and similar warnings from equally authoritative sources, however, resulted in no engaged and committed policy toward Yugoslavia. According to the then ambassador of the United Kingdom in Belgrade, Peter Hall, the only response of the Foreign Office to his alarming reports from the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 was that “they really would much prefer it not to be happening.”3 BORDERS OF SLAUGHTER

Miloševic´’s full plan for the reform of the Yugoslav political system and the redefinition of the federation became public in the summer of 1989. In April of that year, his supporters in the party’s Central Committee had scored a significant victory. They had pushed the federal SK to call its Fourteenth Congress earlier than scheduled. This move was significant because according to party statutes, the size of the delegations to the congress from each of the six republics was to be proportional to the size of party membership in the particular republic, and the most important decisions could be adopted by simple majority. Since the Serbian SK accounted for about 40 percent of all members of the party throughout Yugoslavia, Miloševic´ would have a tremendous advantage in the process of reforms that the Fourteenth Congress was supposed to initiate. By July 1989, his platform for those reforms was clearly expressed: both the party and the federation needed to be reorganized along the principle of “one member/citizen—one vote.” Although the Serbian leadership presented this proposal as essential for the democratization of the political system, the implications for a multinational state with a complex set of regional checks and balances like Yugoslavia were clear. Simply put, the Serbian proposal was an attempt to annul the long process of Yugoslavia’s constitutional development and decentralization. As Miloševic´ explained in his July 1989 interview with the Paris daily Le Monde, the root cause of Yugoslavia’s troubles was the political system

47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

48 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War established in the 1974 constitution; it enabled the “disintegration of the economy,” the rise of “separatist tendencies” in the republics, and systemic waste and inefficiency because everything was based on the decisions and negotiations of “bureaucrats” and not on market forces. His solution was, however, not a drive for full liberal democracy but for centralism, non-party pluralism, and an economy made more efficient by cuts in the bureaucratic structure of selfmanagement. In Miloševic´’s vision of Yugoslavia’s new economic and political system, it was primarily the country’s federalism that needed a radical overhaul through the process of redefinition of inter-republican and inter-national relations. Consensus decision making needed to be substituted by majoritarianism, except in the case of a limited set of issues like the “protection of the rights of the smallest nations.”4 With the interview in Le Monde, Miloševic´ pitched his platform to Western and Yugoslav audiences as a strong critique of the failures of Yugoslav selfmanagement and (con)federalism and an appeal for streamlined decision making, a deserved position of leadership for Serbia, and more democracy. Significant segments of the Western policy-making community and the press were convinced. As the Guardian of London editorialized that September, “under the neutered system of central government that Tito bequeathed, national policy, particularly economic policy, degenerated into an anarchic mess. That certainly argues for what the Yugoslavs call ‘recentralization.’ The attempt to confine Serbia within a kind of constitutional cage was equally unnatural. That, too, argues for the establishment of a national politics in which the Serbians will have their properly powerful voice. Thus far Miloševic´ is right, although his crudity and extremism endanger his purposes.”5 An increasing number of Yugoslavs perceived Miloševic´’s platform in a radically different light. They saw it as nothing more than a blueprint for Serbian domination in a centralized system where the levers of economic and political power would still rest in the hands of the state. By the summer of 1989, Miloševic´’s proposals enjoyed the open and unquestionable support of four federal units and the army.6 For Yugoslavia to be redefined based on Serbia’s blueprints, however, Miloševic´ needed much more. He needed the acquiescence of the two republics central to the very existence of any Yugoslavia: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). His plan was to get that acquiescence the same way his machine had delivered it in Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo—through an orchestrated and concerted pressure campaign using every means at his disposal: his allies in the Serbian intellectual elite, protest rallies, the powerful Belgrade press, and the Serbian State Security Service (SDB). In order to be pliant, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Yugoslavia’s Cold War had to be blackmailed with instability. And the best way to destabilize these two republics was through their indigenous Serb populations, which could be easily mobilized on the platform of already rampant Serb nationalism. Both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were highly vulnerable to Serbian attacks. They were led by essentially pro-Yugoslav party cadres who were widely perceived to be weak and unable to stand up to Miloševic´. Croatia was considered to be “the silent republic,” run by dogmatic party veterans installed by Tito after the failure of Croatia’s national/liberal revival in 1971. Their potential assertions of Croatia’s sovereign rights were open to attacks by Miloševic´’s camp as yet another reincarnation of Croatia’s “dormant separatism.” BosniaHerzegovina, on the other hand, had throughout 1988 and 1989 suffered from a serious party crisis. A number of its most powerful functionaries had been forced to resign in September 1987 after the Agrokomerc scandal, which had exposed the networks of political patronage in the BiH economy.7 Most important, both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were ethnically diverse, with significant Serb populations (about 12 percent in Croatia and 31 percent in BiH). The potential support of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs for Miloševic´ and their mobilization on national grounds was rightfully deemed to be dangerous for the stability of inter-ethnic relations in both of these republics. And that stability is exactly what Miloševic´’s camp began to actively attack in the fall of 1988. Serbia’s intellectual elite had already made open calls throughout 1987 and early 1988 for an increased role for Serbia in defending the position of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, who were allegedly subjected to a concerted strategy of discrimination and assimilation. The first real attempts to mobilize the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs came in the early fall of 1988, with the intensification of the crisis in Kosovo and the exporting of the “rallies of truth” beyond the borders of Serbia. Rally organizers tried to extend their campaign into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia by staging demonstrations in support of the Kosovo Serbs and the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in the small Bosnian town of Jajce and in Knin, the perceived center of the Croatian Serbs. The strong negative reaction of the local functionaries forced the organizers to cancel these rallies.8 However, five months later—at the peak of the Kosovo crisis—they could not be stopped.9 On 28 February 1989, about two thousand factory workers in Knin rallied against the Kosovo Albanian miners of Stari Trg and in support of Serbia’s leadership. In the following few weeks, similar protests were held in a number of predominantly Serb towns of Bosnian Krajina and eastern Herzegovina. These rallies never gathered the same momentum as in Serbia and Montenegro or reached the critical mass necessary to topple the Bosnian and Croatian leaderships. Nonetheless, they polarized the political scene, tore communities apart straight

49 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

50 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War along inter-ethnic lines, and even led to resignations of local leaders who did not support the “anti-bureaucratic revolution.”10 The leaderships of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly understood what Miloševic´’s strategy was, but they were still unable to find an effective response to it. A high functionary of the Croatian League of Communists, Celestin Sardelic´, in a January 1989 interview stated that “lately there have been attempts to prove the alleged inequality of Croatian Serbs and to accuse the Croatian SK of a policy of assimilation. Those who are suggesting this are not shying away from using lies, deceptions, and manipulations. It is clear what the goal of such attempts is.”11 The secretary of the Croatian SK, Dragutin Dimitrovic´, in March 1989 similarly asserted that “a policy of [national divisions] is being promoted in Croatia through the ‘happening of the people’ and the ‘exporting of the revolution,’ and it originates in Serbia.”12 After the Serbian leadership vehemently objected to Stipe Šuvar’s becoming Croatia’s representative on the federal presidency in May 1989,13 the Central Committee of the Croatian SK concluded that “never in the post-war period has the anti-Croatian dimension of Serb nationalism in Yugoslavia been so openly and destructively exposed. The most worrisome fact is that the media that promote such theses as ‘the genocidal nature of the Croats’ or ‘calculated assimilation’ or ‘the strategy of forgetting’ [of World War II crimes against the Serbs] are not susceptible to political critique.”14 The leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina was no less cognizant of the danger and its origins. In May 1989, one of the leaders of the Bosnian SK, Nijaz Durakovic´, suggested that “if the poisonous stew of nationalism is cooked in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the whole of Yugoslavia will eat it. The commotions of national identification, complaints, cheerleading passions, and euphoria have already begun.” Another Bosnian high functionary, Milan Uzelac, noted that “we have already been faced with pressures to even split our Central Committee [of the BiH SK] on a national basis.”15 In a 30 June 1989 meeting of the leaderships of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, the BiH delegation clearly asserted that there was a “propaganda war” being waged by Serbia which “labeled the Bosnian leadership as anti-Serb; . . . suggested there was a national split in the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina; . . . claimed the Serb-populated areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina were deliberately less developed than the Muslim or Croat areas; . . . [and] threatened there would be a Bosnian ‘happening of the people’ as in Vojvodina and Montenegro.” This “propaganda war,” according to the Bosnian leadership, was “organized and directed from above.”16 Apart from such public acknowledgments of what was happening and the initial forceful opposition to the protest rallies, however, neither the Croatian nor the Bosnian leadership organized a real counterattack against Serbia’s

Yugoslavia’s Cold War campaign. In fact, the Croatians and the Bosnians throughout 1988 and the first half of 1989 tried to calm the situation partly by playing a characteristically slow and defensive game in the legitimate party institutions and partly by giving in to some of Miloševic´’s demands. Celestin Sardelic´ perfectly summed up the “level-headed” strategy of his republic and of Bosnia-Herzegovina: “We must not fall into their trap and accept their logic. We must speak with the logic of reason and fact, and the problems that exist [to which the Serbian side is drawing attention] must be resolved.”17 Such a defensive (though arguably admirable) attitude, however, did not result in any respite in the Serbian campaign; the attacks continued and even intensified. The next big assault of Miloševic´’s machine came in the immediate aftermath of the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Under pressure from Serbia, Croatian authorities organized and financed an additional celebration of the anniversary in Knin on 8 and 9 July. By placing events under the umbrella of the institutions of the system, the authorities hoped to defuse the growing tension and organize a peaceful event. Such hopes proved to be naive. The celebration, held in front of about thirty thousand Serbs from the Knin region and from Serbia and Bosnia, quickly evolved into a nationalist rally. The crowd carried banners with slogans praising Miloševic´, pledging support for all future war efforts, and warning the Croatian government, “The army’s full of generals, and they’re all Serbs!” and— in reference to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 4 June 1989—“China gave you a message—it was also not betrayed by its army!”18 The official program had to be canceled because the stage was taken over by one of the local Serb anti-Communist leaders, Jovan Opacˇic´, who decried the “Croatian policy of assimilation of the Serbs” and demanded that “the Serb people liberate themselves of their illusions about Yugoslavia.” Opacˇic´’s speech was repeatedly interrupted with chants of “This is Serbia!,” “We won’t give up Kosovo!,” and “Slobo, you are freedom, come to us—we’re waiting for you!”19 The extent of such aggressive and irredentist rhetoric, accompanied by hundreds of Miloševic´ posters and the insignia of the Cˇetniks, World War II Serb nationalist collaborationists, among some of the protesters, stunned the Croatian public.20 It was an open challenge to Croatia’s sovereignty. The authorities were, under serious public pressure, now forced to respond. They arrested Opacˇic´ and some of his associates and indicted them for “obstructing a public event,” “inciting national hatred,” and “damaging the reputation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”21 These arrests, however, did little to pacify the situation. Clashes between Serbian tourists and Croatian locals erupted in a number of Dalmatian towns during that summer; an even larger rally of fifty thousand Serbs with similar themes and iconography was organized within a

51 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War month on Mount Romanija in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Belgrade’s attack campaign against the two republics became even more ferocious.22 In August 1989, an interview by Dobrica C´osic´ with the Rome daily Il Tempo created an uproar in Croatia. In addition to praising Miloševic´ as “young, brave, decisive, and intelligent” and bestowing him with the title of “the most popular Serb of our century,” C´osic´ outraged the Croatian public by suggesting that the “seven hundred thousand Serbs in Croatia have no rights” and that Croatia “is the pillar of Titoism because Marshal Tito was the greatest man in Croatia’s history. He gave them Istria, kicked you Italians out. He took Zadar.”23 The reactions in Croatia (and Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) were vigorous, but C´osic´ and his colleagues in Belgrade’s intellectual elite continued their barrage. Croatia was chastised for not changing the constitutional definition of its official language from “the Croatian literary language” into “the Croato-Serbian language.”24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, was heavily criticized for disallowing the formation of nationally based cultural institutions—a move that this republic’s leadership felt would lead to poisonous divisions within its multiethnic communities.25 The most troubling aspect of this campaign was the invocation of the images of World War II crimes against the Serbs. During one of many highly popular and publicized meetings of the Writers’ Association of Serbia regarding the fate of Croatian Serbs, C´osic´ asked “whether the fate of Serbs in Croatia was in war genocide and in socialist peace discrimination and assimilation. Do the Croats who consider themselves Communists and democrats look at the Serbian language and the Cyrillic script the same way the Ustaše [the Croatian World War II nationalist collaborationists] did?”26 Others went even further and suggested that “it cannot be excluded that the Croatian regime is pro-Ustaše” or that the Croatian Serbs were “the remnants of the slaughtered people.”27 The oftrepeated challenges to inter-republican borders were also amplified. For the writer and SANU vice-president Antonije Isakovic´ those borders “[did] not represent the real situation.”28 For the poet Milan Komnenic´, they had been “drawn with slaughtered Serbs.”29 And for the writer and future opposition leader Vuk Draškovic´, all the pits and graves of Serb victims of the Ustaša terror during World War II could no longer be in Croatia but would have to determine the western borders of Serbia.30 The problem that the Croatian and Bosnian publics saw in these attacks—in addition to their content—was the fact that they were officially condoned and supported by Serbia’s political establishment. The anti-Croatian and antiBosnian campaign was actually led by the Miloševic´-controlled Belgrade press with its characteristic zeal. All requests by Croatia’s and Bosnia’s officials to their

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Serbian counterparts for a critique of such inflammatory rhetoric were met with either silence or outright refusal. Miloševic´ himself asserted that “it would be wrong if our society rid itself of the influence of the writers and intellectuals who meet [at the Writers’ Association of Serbia]. Which sensible nation would be ashamed of its Academy of Sciences and Arts?”31 The Central Committee of the Serbian SK also declined to condemn the inflammatory rhetoric of Belgrade’s intellectual elite and even accused the Croatian leadership itself of being “blindly nationalistic” when “suggesting someone was attacking Croatia.” Miloš Laban, a deputy in Serbia’s National Assembly, even began a drive to “establish who the legal heir of the [World War II] Ustaša state is . . . so that the descendants of Serb genocide victims can demand just compensation. . . . I do not see why today’s Croatia would not take part in compensating the victims.”32 As the Central Committee of the Croatian SK declared, this was obviously Serbia’s official campaign, “with the goal of blocking and marginalizing Croatia in the process of redefining the Yugoslav community.”33 Miloševic´’s goal to destabilize his opponents was furthered not only by the protest rallies, the vilification campaign in the Belgrade press, and the public attacks led by the intellectual front-runners of Serb nationalism like Dobrica C´osic´. It was also advanced by the active assistance of the Serbian State Security Service. In October 1989, local newspapers broke the story that the Serbian SDB was illegally operating in the Bosnian region of Bratunac and Srebrenica (it is interesting that this is also the region that was one of the launching pads for Serbia’s military attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992). The SDBs of all the Yugoslav republics were supposed to cooperate with each other and the federal SDB, but they were never allowed to work independently on the territory of another republic. During 1989, the Serbian SDB was crossing into BosniaHerzegovina in order to gather intelligence for Miloševic´ and the Serbian leadership regarding the status and opinions of the local Bosnian Serb populations and their political representatives.34 According to the highest functionaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian SDB had even developed its own intelligence network within their republic. The Bosnian public and political leadership was outraged. It was a serious intrusion into the internal affairs of the republic and a direct challenge to its sovereignty. Serbia was asked to issue an explanation and apology. Miloševic´ arrogantly gave neither.35 The effects of Serbia’s aggressive campaign toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia by the end of 1989 were truly distressing: the League of Communists as one of the last federal guarantors of stability was in virtual collapse, and interethnic relations within the two republics were dramatically damaged. Miloševic´ attempted to use the ploy of Serb national mobilization within Croatia and

53 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

54 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Bosnia-Herzegovina as blackmail to destabilize the two republics and thereby “disqualify” them from the process of transformation of Yugoslavia. He was successful in only one respect, though one that would in 1991 and 1992 prove to be fatal for the survival of Yugoslavia: Bosnian and Croatian Serbs began to mobilize nationally and to actively join Miloševic´’s pan-Serb machine.36 Miloševic´ failed, however, in his larger goal: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina did not acquiesce. The Croats no longer lived in “the silent republic” but in an increasingly homogenized community in which the public and the ruling party—in spite of all its wavering—were more determined to stand up to Serbia. BosniaHerzegovina, though troublingly polarized and divided by the Serbian campaign, also showed it would not easily collapse into Miloševic´’s camp. Slovenia became even more defiant and actually escalated its opposition to the Serbian platform. Even the Macedonian leadership openly began to distance itself from Miloševic´ because of a series of his policy blunders directed at their republic.37 These new signs of resistance to Miloševic´ came in time only to effectively mark the end of the League of Communists as a federal organization. Although the SKJ officially disintegrated at the Fourteenth Congress in January 1990, its real death had come in the summer of 1989, at the peak of Serbia’s assault against the leaderships of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.38 Miloševic´’s campaign to weaken the opponents to his platform of redefinition of Yugoslavia was not directed against any anti-system or nationalist parties in the other republics since those were at the time (except to some extent in Slovenia) on the margins of public life.39 His attacks were directed against those who were still firmly in power: the republican organizations of the ruling League of Communists. By orchestrating a campaign that invoked the memories of World War II crimes to denigrate the essentially pro-Yugoslav Communist leaderships of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as “anti-Serb” and “pro-Ustaše,” the Serbian boss effectively ended all hope for compromise within the party. More important, by fiercely attacking these two republics, which were crucial for the continuing existence of any Yugoslavia, he also laid the foundations for the eventual disintegration of the country. SLOVENIA’S AMENDMENTS OF FEAR

Although Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be difficult nuts for Miloševic´ to crack, the greatest challenge to his program of controlling a centralized Yugoslavia came from Slovenia. Yugoslavia’s westernmost republic was an important and influential member of the federation in spite of its small size. It contributed about 16 percent of the country’s GDP and more than a third of

Yugoslavia’s Cold War its hard-currency exports. It was also considered the Yugoslav trailblazer of democratization and liberalization and the country’s strongest link to the West. With such assets and with virtually no Serb minority that Miloševic´’s camp could use as a tool of intimidation, Slovenia was best positioned to challenge the Serbian boss. The Slovenes viewed Miloševic´’s campaign as a direct affront to everything that their republic had earned through decades of Yugoslav devolution. Serbia’s centralist blueprints were seen as an attack on Slovenia’s separate identity and sovereignty within Yugoslavia, as well as on its economic independence. Miloševic´’s campaign of street protests, regional coups, and violent suppression of the Kosovo Albanians was furthermore perceived as a threat to Slovenia’s reform efforts and hopes for increased integration with the West. As Milan Kucˇan told US ambassador Warren Zimmermann in 1989, Miloševic´ “is a demagogue with a gangster attitude. He’s destroying everything good that Yugoslavia has stood for, especially the tolerant attitude that has made it possible for all of us to coexist. . . . We’re moving toward democracy, and Miloševic´ is moving away from it, toward a kind of ‘Serbo-slavia.’ . . . How are we going to get into the European Community or the Council of Europe with this Kosovo albatross around our neck? If we have to go through Belgrade to join Europe, we’ll never make it.”40 With Miloševic´’s camp holding in check virtually all federal institutions, the Slovenes organized their counteroffensive through the only channel still available to them—the constitution of their own republic. The amendments to Slovenia’s constitution that were debated during the summer of 1989 were significant and, for that period, truly revolutionary. They were a reflection of the process of democratization and liberalization which this republic was going through, as well as a foundation for the coming multi-party democracy. A series of amendments extended the rights of Slovenian citizens in areas such as freedom of assembly, prohibition of the death sentence and torture, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, the right to privacy, and—most significant— freedom for organized participation in politics, freedom of private ownership, and the abandonment of the leading role in society for the League of Communists.41 More important, the amendments were also a direct response to Miloševic´’s platform for the centralization of Yugoslavia. They asserted that the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was “the state of the sovereign Slovene nation and citizens of SR Slovenia,” which had the right to secede from the Yugoslav federation if it so decided. The amendments also insisted that the Slovenian parliament had to approve any declaration of a state of emergency within the republic; that the republic’s organs “must undertake measures to defend the republic’s position and

55 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War rights” if federal institutions infringe on Slovenia’s rights; that all federal agencies had to use the Slovene language on the territory of Slovenia; and that Slovenia would respect “the material capabilities of the republic and the requirements for its development” in fulfilling its financial obligations to the federation.42 Some of these amendments indeed posed a challenge to the country’s political system and were at best of questionable concordance with the federal constitution.43 However, the actual reason why Slovenia’s amendments prompted a crisis and a forceful response from Miloševic´’s camp was that they tried to strengthen the guiding principles of the 1974 federal constitution, which Miloševic´ had been working so ardently to demolish: decentralization, consensual decision making, and equality of all the republics. The Basic Principles of the 1974 federal constitution clearly stated that “the nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, . . . united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded . . . the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Article 1 further asserted that Yugoslavia was “a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their socialist republics.” And Article 3 declared that “the socialist republics are states founded on the sovereignty of the people.”44 Based on these elements of the federal constitution, the Slovenes argued that the passage of the aforementioned amendments to their republic’s constitution was nothing but an assertion of the unalienable and constitutionally guaranteed right of self-determination of the state of Slovenia, which was using the amendments to protect its position within the federation whose institutions were being hijacked by Miloševic´. As one Yugoslav constitutional expert suggested, Slovenia’s amendments were primarily “the amendments of fear”—fear of what Yugoslavia was developing into under Miloševic´’s pressure.45 The crisis that erupted at the time of the adoption of the amendments only confirmed to the Slovenes that they undeniably had much to fear. The Belgrade press intensified its well-rehearsed smear campaign, which labeled the Slovenes as “separatists” and “counterrevolutionaries.” Protest rallies were organized throughout Serbia and Montenegro with new calls for weapons and chants of “Arrest Kucˇan!,” “We want the army!,” and “Treason in Slovenia!”46 Miloševic´’s large voting bloc managed to put additional pressure on the Slovenes in the SKJ Central Committee, the federal government, and the federal presidency, with all three of these institutions asking the Slovenes to postpone the adoption of the amendments in order to keep peace in the house.47 Finally and most important, the Slovenes were—just as during the 1988 Mladina affair—threatened with JNA intervention, though this time directly by Miloševic´.

Yugoslavia’s Cold War The Mladina affair of 1988 had positioned Miloševic´ as the army’s main political protector. Now the Serbian boss wanted to capitalize on his influence and demanded from General Veljko Kadijevic´ that the army intervene in Slovenia in order to stop the adoption of the amendments.48 As Momir Bulatovic´, the head of the Montenegrin SK and Miloševic´’s close associate, later recollected, “President Miloševic´ and I insisted that the army should do that, to carry out a coup d’état in order to prevent the spontaneous reactions that were to come. . . . I thought that [Kadijevic´] would perhaps send paratroopers to block the Slovenian parliament.”49 According to Borisav Jovic´—then Serbia’s representative in the federal presidency and another close associate of Miloševic´— Kadijevic´ initially agreed to this plan.50 Fortunately for the Slovenes, he could not deliver. Fearing conflicts within the army’s ranks and a negative reaction throughout Yugoslavia, Kadijevic´ backed out at the last minute. With the main trump card out of Miloševic´’s hands, the Slovenes chose to stand their ground and passed the amendments as planned on 27 September. It was the first real and direct counteroffensive against Miloševic´’s campaign to establish power over a centralized Yugoslavia. The country now had a clearly formulated alternative to Serbia’s platform: a vigorous affirmation of decentralization, consensual decision making, and the individual rights of the republics. By standing up for its vision of Yugoslavia and refusing to be coerced into accepting Miloševic´’s program for the redefinition of the Yugoslav federation, Slovenia forced the Serbian leader to radically adjust his strategy. The choice that he made in response to the Slovenian amendments was indeed radical. Since Slovenia would not succumb to his pressure, Miloševic´ decided to cut it off from all decision making in the federal organs dominated by his bloc and to effectively push it out of Yugoslavia. Miloševic´’s allies in the federal party leadership, who were preparing the upcoming Fourteenth Congress of the SKJ, were given instructions to proceed with drafts of reforms without consideration of Slovenia’s positions. As Borisav Jovic´ advised the president of the federal party, Milan Pancˇevski, that October, “Act as if the Slovenes do not exist: prepare and adopt everything by majority vote, to the extent that we are certain that it is reasonable, and let them take whatever position they want. They can take it or leave it. We will do the same thing with the [new federal] constitution. We will draw up a constitution that suits Yugoslavia, and they can choose to stay in Yugoslavia or leave it.”51 Not even two months later, Slovenia was given a definite signal that it had no place in Miloševic´’s Yugoslavia. The organizers of the “rallies of truth” were put to work once again in order to bring to the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana about fifty thousand Serbs and Montenegrins who wanted to “ask the Slovene people

57 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War to exert pressure on its leadership, which permanently supports the separatist nationalism in Kosovo, has committed high treason, and wants to break up Yugoslavia.”52 When the Slovenians banned the rally, the Serbian leadership “invited all institutions and enterprises within the boundaries of Serbia to break off their links with Slovenia.”53 All Slovenian products were purged from Serbian shops, and Serbian companies severed joint ventures with their Slovenian partners. All economic, political, and even cultural exchange stopped. “Cold War,” screamed the front page of a leading newspaper, and rightly so.54 This was an unprecedented act which not only gave the Slovenians a clear signal they were no longer wanted in Miloševic´’s Yugoslavia, but also shattered the country’s common market and made a concerted federal push toward necessary economic reforms a virtual impossibility. The clash between the two visions of Yugoslavia’s future—the Serbian vision of a centralized country with majoritarian decision making and limited reforms and the Slovenian vision of a decentralized community of states with a drive toward democratic pluralism and increased integration with the West—played out during an important period of European history. The events which unfolded throughout Eastern Europe in late 1989—from Gorbachev’s official announcement of the end of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” in late October to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November—were popularly welcomed throughout Europe. However, they were in fact deeply distressing for Western leaders. Europe was seen as entering a period of uncertainty, which was a troublesome “improvement” on the Cold War. As Lawrence Eagleburger, the US deputy secretary of state, said that September, “For all its risks and uncertainties, the Cold War was characterized by a remarkably stable and predictable set of relationships among the great powers.”55 The changes that were rapidly unfolding provoked a sense of unease that was deeply pervasive at the highest levels of Western political decision making, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. For example, French president François Mitterrand, after meeting with Gorbachev in Kiev in early December, spoke to the press of the “centuries-old role played by Russia and France in preserving stability in Europe.”56 Four days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, in a speech in London’s Guildhall, reminded her guests from President Bush’s National Security Council that “We must remember that times of great change are times of great uncertainty and even danger.”57 And President Bush more famously exclaimed at the time of the Berlin Wall collapse, “I’m not going to dance on the wall.”58 This sense of unease with the process of East European reforms had a decisive impact on how the situation in Yugoslavia was perceived and how Western leaders responded to the clash between Miloševic´ and the Slovenians.

Yugoslavia’s Cold War The neglect that had characterized Western responses to the events in Yugoslavia earlier that year, particularly regarding Kosovo, persisted and was now perhaps even more pronounced. After all, one could easily argue that what was happening in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Romania was seen in the West as more important than the inter-republican conflicts within Yugoslavia. However, neglect was not the only defining trait of the Western response to Yugoslavia’s internal breakdown during late 1989. Throughout the clash between Miloševic´’s platform for the centralization of Yugoslavia and the Slovenian defense of devolution and the rights of the republics, prominent Western diplomats and policy makers expressed at least tacit support for the position of the Serbian leader. The West had always supported Yugoslavia’s integrity, but the public statements that were made at the peak of the clash between Serbia and Slovenia revealed a deeper preference for the direction of Yugoslavia’s reforms. In the virtually unanimous opinion of Western policy makers, Yugoslavia needed to centralize because centralization was seen as indispensable both for the success of its economic transformation and for the maintenance of regional stability. Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis on 27 October publicly stated that “Italy is for a strong and integrated Yugoslavia . . . and does not want any special political contacts with any of the Yugoslav republics, but will always advocate a unified Yugoslav approach.”59 French prime minister Michel Rocard in a 3 December interview with the Yugoslav press corps prior to a visit to Belgrade stated that he believed Yugoslavia “has gone too far in constitutional decentralization.”60 West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, during a 5 December visit of Janez Drnovšek, the president of the SFRJ presidency, to Bonn, expressed his “appreciation for Yugoslavia’s irreplaceable role in the stability of the region and the whole of Europe,” while German president Richard von Weizsäcker told the Yugoslav delegation that he wished for a “centralized” Yugoslavia.61 Abel Matutes, the member of the European Commission in charge of relations with Yugoslavia, in an interview with the Belgrade magazine NIN that same week also expressed the “concerns and fears” of the European Commission for Yugoslavia and its economic reforms because the country still needed macroeconomic and monetary centralization and “a reform of the political structure that went with it.”62 In other words, although Yugoslavia’s constitutional equilibrium, party consensus, inter-ethnic and inter-republican relations, and even its common market had all been shattered over the previous two years by Miloševic´’s push for increased centralization, Western policy makers were at the end of 1989 unanimously expressing their preference for a more centralized Yugoslavia.

59 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War This preference principally stemmed from the West’s perspective on what Yugoslavia needed in order to successfully reform its economic system, which was by the end of 1989 struggling under hyperinflation. The problem was that the public statements of European policy makers in favor of Yugoslavia’s centralization were coming at a time when they served as important encouragement to Miloševic´’s camp. An even greater problem was that these statements were accompanied, just as during the 1988 Mladina affair, by yet another round of Western secret signals of approval for the JNA’s intervention in Slovenia. According to Borisav Jovic´, who was vice-president of the federal presidency at the time, such signals were received during early December 1989. They suggested that “if Yugoslavia were to impose emergency measures in Slovenia, NATO would decide on no reaction by the West, because that [was] an internal matter for Yugoslavia.”63 In light of the growing national and policy biases of the JNA, this was a truly dangerous Western decision. These signals were hardly out of character for the Western powers during the last months of 1989. Toward the end of that December, as the crisis in Romania was turning violent with the downfall of Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, the US secretary of state, James Baker, publicly asserted he would not object “if the Warsaw Pact felt it necessary to intervene” in Romania. This statement prompted ridicule from Soviet foreign ministry officials, who joked with their American counterparts that “it seems that we [have] turned the Brezhnev Doctrine over to you!”64 The Soviets were much more appreciative of America’s support the following month, when their violent intervention in Azerbaijan led to no Western condemnation and to President Bush’s declaration that the situation would “not be made easier by a lot of pontificating from leaders in other countries.”65 During the turbulent days of the end of 1989, Western leaders were willing to condone even the use of force in order to secure some stability in Eastern Europe. Based on Jovic´’s testimony, such willingness to endorse the use of force apparently also extended to Yugoslavia. Although the JNA leadership did not muster enough strength to intervene in Slovenia, such responses were one more lesson in Western realism that surely had an impact on Yugoslavia’s principal political players. The position of the Western leaders, together with their pronounced preference for Yugoslavia’s increased centralization, could only have encouraged Miloševic´ in his clash with the Slovenians. The results of that clash were decisively negative. The conflict between the Slovenian leadership and Miloševic´’s camp was a conflict between two conceptions of Yugoslavia’s past and future development. Through their forceful resistance to Miloševic´’s campaign and their defiance of the threat of JNA intervention, the Slovenians thwarted

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Miloševic´’s plans to control a recentralized Yugoslav federation. Faced with Slovenia’s intransigence, the Serbian leader adjusted his goals drastically. Since the Slovenians could not be made pliant, they were to be isolated and in effect pushed out of the federation. By instituting an economic, political, and cultural boycott of Slovenia and cutting off its leadership from decision making in the federal structures under his influence, Miloševic´ officially added Yugoslavia’s common market to the list of casualties of his drive for power. For a country suffering under hyperinflation and in desperate need of a concerted push toward economic reforms, the decisions of the Serbian leader had a profoundly destabilizing effect. They brought Yugoslavia to the verge of internal collapse and disintegration. ILLUSIONS OF A LAST HOPE: THE ECONOMIC REFORMS OF ANTE MARKOVIC´

Two weeks after Miloševic´’s Serbia severed its relations with Slovenia and thereby fractured the federation’s common market, the Yugoslavs were dramatically and somewhat unexpectedly given hope that their country’s tumultuous crisis might still have a peaceful and reasonable solution. On 18 December 1989, the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic´, announced the beginning of his government’s program which aimed to end Yugoslavia’s hyperinflation and thoroughly overhaul its inefficient economic system. The “shock therapy” that Markovic´ announced that day was a daring plan which earned the prime minister plaudits in the international community and unprecedented popularity among Yugoslavs in all the republics. Over the following two years, the prime minister’s program and reformist rhetoric made him into the embodiment of what was considered the federation’s last pan-Yugoslav hope. Western plaudits and domestic popularity were, however, not enough. The prime minister’s plan was doomed to failure even before its principal measures were put in place. Markovic´ had actually been sworn in as the federal prime minister in March 1989, some nine months before his anti-inflation measures were put in place. Although this sixty-five-year-old engineer of Bosnian Croat origin had built impressive reformist credentials as the CEO of one of the largest companies in Yugoslavia, “Rade Koncˇar,” and as the prime minister and president of Croatia, he was in fact not the favorite for the position of the federal prime minister after the resignation of Branko Mikulic´ in December 1988.66 When Mikulic´ resigned in the midst of a steadily deteriorating economic situation and rampant inflation at the end of 1988 (see table 3.1), the favorite to take the post was actually Slobodan Miloševic´. Serbia’s boss enjoyed significant support in influential

61 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

62 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Table 3.1 Yugoslavia’s Principal Economic Indices, 1987–1989

Annual Change (in percent)



1987

1988

1989

GDP per capita Industrial product per capita Agricultural product per capita Gross investments Personal consumption Consumer prices

–1.1 0.8 –4.4 –5.2 0.3 119

–1.7 –0.7 –3.6 –5.8 –1.3 199

0.6 0.9 5.0 0.6 1.0 1256

Average, 1987–1989 –0.8 0.3 –1.1 –3.5 0.0 346

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku SFRJ, Statisticˇki godišnjak Jugoslavije 1991 (Belgrade, 1991), 101.

Western circles, in the army, and among some members of the federal presidency. Some Western policy makers and journalists considered Miloševic´’s possible ascent to the position of federal prime minister to be the fulfillment of their hopes that the Serbian leader would put into action his “Gorbachevian” skills and his supposed preference for market reforms. As the Guardian of London argued in January 1989, “The gravity of the economic crisis persuades the regional power brokers to put aside their animosities—ideological, personal and nationalistic—and give Slobo a go, as a strong figure of control authority. . . . Miloševic´’s ascendancy, it is thought, would also have the virtue of gaining superpower backing. The State Department, while not naming names, has voiced its preference for a strong central figure in Belgrade, while Gorbachev’s paramount concern is seen as fostering stability.”67 The JNA High Command and the federal secretary for the people’s defense Veljko Kadijevic´ also considered Miloševic´’s becoming Yugoslavia’s prime minister as the perfect solution to their problem of not having a strong federal leader to look up to.68 And for certain members of the federal presidency, Miloševic´’s potential shift to a position with largely economic duties which would divorce him from his nationalist constituencies implied that the Serbian revival might be tamed. Miloševic´, however, refused to take the bait. The powers of the federal prime minister were, after all, seriously limited, and the office would have been just a distraction from the campaign in Kosovo, which still had to reach its peak that winter. Real power in Yugoslavia rested with the republics, and Miloševic´ knew that. He declined suggestions to take the helm of the federal government and put forward Borisav Jovic´ as Serbia’s candidate. Although Jovic´ somewhat surprisingly lost out to Markovic´, whose political career was actually considered to be in decline, Miloševic´ got an

Yugoslavia’s Cold War important concession from the new federal prime minister.69 According to Markovic´’s testimony years later at Miloševic´’s trial in The Hague, the Serbian leader was the only regional functionary to make demands regarding the distribution of ministries in the new government. It is rather significant that Miloševic´ asked for—and was eventually given—the position of federal secretary for internal affairs for his close associate Petar Gracˇanin. In Markovic´’s view, by so adamantly pushing for that specific post in the federal government, Miloševic´ actually “wanted to put under his control the intelligence services at all levels” since the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs had significant access to intelligence from all republics and provinces.70 It was a farsighted decision which served the Serbian leader well in the years and wars to come. With Kadijevic´ as the federal secretary for the people’s defense and Gracˇanin as the federal secretary for internal affairs, Miloševic´ controlled two of the most important levers of coercive power in the country. After Yugoslavia’s long record of disappointing economic performance, Markovic´’s term in office commenced with limited optimism in the country and with even lower expectations or willingness to help from the West. The Financial Times in an editorial under the fittingly chosen headline of “Realism in Yugoslavia” perfectly summed up the mood in international financial circles: “Too often in the past [Yugoslavia’s] debt has been rescheduled and new credit granted on the basis of impressive reform programs which never developed beyond the stage of good intentions. There appears to be no compelling argument for giving Yugoslavia the benefit of the doubt yet again. Mr. Markovic´’s chances of outflanking the muddlers, the tribal chieftains, and the downright corrupt, might well be enhanced by a little judicious national belt-tightening.”71 The financial goodwill toward Yugoslavia, when Markovic´ took office, had already been spent. Throughout 1989, that “little judicious national belt-tightening” failed to help Markovic´ deal with “the tribal chieftains,” who were threatened by his government’s new course. Upon entering office, Markovic´ had proposed a series of measures to create a “new type of socialism,” which would be fundamentally based on market forces and not on agreements among political power holders, as was the case in the Yugoslav system of self-management. All limitations on private foreign currency holdings were revoked, imports were liberalized, customs duties lowered, the federal budget cut by about $2 billion, and wage policies left up to individual enterprises.72 These measures did result in some positive effects on the overall state of the economy during 1989, with the GDP, investments, and personal consumption all showing mild signs of recovery. However, inflation continued to rise, turning into full-fledged hyperinflation by September. In an economy with a “tightened belt,” strapped for real

63 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

64 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War cash, with formidable foreign debt obligations and at the same time with heavy pressure from the regional elites for monetary sustenance for their popular legitimacy, primary emissions got even more out of hand. The government called for putting the expanding money supply under control by slashing bloated regional budgets, cutting industrial and agricultural subventions, and better managing national bank advances to exporters trading with the clearing area (essentially the Soviet bloc and Third World countries). The cooperation of regional power holders was, however, difficult to obtain—nowhere more so than in the case of Slobodan Miloševic´ and the Serbian leadership. The essence of Serbia’s complaints was the prime minister’s refusal to attack the growing inflation directly by employing administrative measures and his insistence on striking at the core of public financing of the economy. The Serbian leadership felt its republic was negatively singled out by the federal government because Serbia’s large industrial complexes and its strong agricultural sector depended heavily on various forms of state subsidies and because Serbia was the only Yugoslav republic which had a significant trade surplus with the Soviet bloc.73 In the eyes of Serbian officials, Markovic´ and his government were just operationalizing what was in Serbia perceived as a decades-old assault on its economy in favor of the northwestern republics. As Borisav Jovic´ later recalled, the Serbian leadership’s assessments of Markovic´ were by November 1989 so negative that Miloševic´ wanted to oust the prime minister within six months because “he has subordinated everything to the flow of money from the underdeveloped to the developed” and because he was “neither for socialism nor for Yugoslavia.”74 As 1989 neared its end and the inflation rate continued to spiral out of control, Markovic´ began to realize he needed a different approach to tackling Yugoslavia’s economic crisis. Under the decisive influence of a young Harvard economist, Jeffrey Sachs, who had also worked with the new Solidarity government in Poland, he opted for a set of “shock therapy” solutions that aspired to do much more than just tame the rampant hyperinflation.75 According to Markovic´’s new program of reforms, which was announced at a session of the SFRJ Assembly on 18 December 1989, the national currency, the dinar, was to be denominated at the rate of 1:10,000, pegged for six months to the German mark at the rate of one mark to seven new dinars, and made fully convertible. Wages were also to remain frozen for the first six months of 1990, while the formation of most prices and the import of most goods were to be liberalized. In addition, the role of the national bank was to be dramatically altered. Its function as the primary lender to the federal budget and to certain sectors of the economy through an increase of the money supply was to be abandoned.

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Monetary policy was to be tightened and real criteria for the fiscal activities of the federal budget established. In other words, Markovic´’s goal was to provide a program that would not only lower inflation, but also bring order to the country’s finances and create a real system of economic responsibility at all levels of government. It was a daring plan that earned the prime minister lengthy applause from the SFRJ Assembly and words of encouragement from the international community. It was also a plan destined for failure from the first day of its implementation. The program’s potential for success was fatally circumscribed primarily because Markovic´’s government lacked two crucial assets: it did not get any real financial assistance from the West, and it failed to secure a domestic consensus for reforms because of Serbia’s strong opposition. The initial response to Markovic´’s announcement on 18 December said it all. Republican leaderships, enterprise managers, and the most influential media outlets in all parts of Yugoslavia responded to the government’s “shock therapy” with enthusiasm and hope—except in Serbia.76 Croatia’s parliament commended the prime minister for “proposing the most Yugoslav program since Tito’s times.”77 Slovenia’s leadership and official press sources, though noting the government’s “inability to resist the discreet charms of centralization,” also expressed their firm support for Markovic´. In his address to the Eleventh Congress of the Slovenian SK, Milan Kucˇan asserted that the “call of the federal prime minister deserves all support. Mutual conflicts need to be forgotten, and all energy needs to be invested in the success of the reforms.”78 Even the leaders of Montenegro chose to go against their political mentors in Serbia and supported the federal prime minister, prompting the Belgrade papers to derisively exclaim that “Montenegro sold out to Markovic´ for the $30 million he promised [its leaders] in direct aid.”79 The response from Serbia’s political elites, on the other hand, was dramatically different. According to Borisav Jovic´, two days before Markovic´’s announcement, Miloševic´ was adamant that the federal government’s program had to be rejected “because it is detrimental to Serbia . . . [and] if it passes now, it will remain for another four years.”80 Miloševic´’s associates and the Belgrade press under his control lambasted the prime minister after his speech before the SFRJ Assembly, claiming characteristically that the federal government was trying to “plunder Serbia’s economy” in favor of the more developed northwest and that those who were applauding Markovic´ were “with their applause flattering the policy of tearing down Yugoslavia and Serbia.”81 In the words of one high official in Serbia’s government, “We are in favor of tackling inflation, but we are against these measures that are proposed. . . . Very soon it will be shown

65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

66 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War that Markovic´’s path is not safe, just that until then Serbia will have to carry the greatest burden. That is something which was forced upon us and with which we cannot be at peace.”82 Miloševic´ was indeed not at peace with Markovic´’s proposals, and, in addition to public attacks on the federal prime minister, he worked behind the scenes to undermine the program’s principal measures. Two weeks after the launch of Markovic´’s plan, Miloševic´ notified his associates in the Serbian leadership that their republic would not observe the proposed wage freeze: “Quite simply, Serbia did not accept that law and will not obey it!”83 Such an open and public expression of obstinacy and nervousness from the Serbian boss signified his profound feeling of threat from Markovic´’s measures. As the influential weekly Danas perceptively noted, Serbia’s leadership reacted with direct hostility toward Markovic´’s program because its measures, if implemented, aimed to expose and eliminate the core of the economic apparatus supporting regional political power holders, a turn of events that would have been particularly dangerous for Miloševic´ and his camp.84 The prime minister hoped to establish clear fiscal records and accountability in order to curtail the capacity of the republican political elites to pay off their constituencies with inflationary wage increases—something upon which the Serbian leader so clearly depended. Miloševic´ had been in power in Serbia for more than two years when the federal prime minister announced his program of reforms, and the economic results of his rule over Yugoslavia’s largest republic were abysmal. For all his alleged “Gorbachevian” qualities, the Serbian leader actually had no economic program beyond blaming the federal government or the northwestern republics for Serbia’s economic ills. In direct contrast to the Miloševic´ enthusiasts in some Western press and policy circles, independent economic analysts noted at the time that “perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Miloševic´ phenomenon is its lack of a serious economic policy dimension.”85 As Danas also convincingly argued, “It has been two years that [Serbia’s] government has been firmly consolidated. . . . And Serbia is showing the greatest economic losses in the country and the smallest capital accumulation of all republics. Average wages are also among the most modest in the country in spite of an unprecedented ‘pumping up’ over the past several months.”86 Markovic´ thus presented a double threat to the Serbian boss. He aimed to strike at the financial foundations of the apparatus sustaining Miloševic´’s power and, more important, he was becoming a popular pan-Yugoslav alternative to Miloševic´’s nationalist campaign. In order to succeed against the resistance and sabotage of the Serbian boss, the prime minister needed more than just the enthusiasm of the rest of Yugoslavia. He needed genuine and concrete Western support. Although Markovic´ had

Yugoslavia’s Cold War built his optimism around Yugoslavia’s solidly filled currency reserves and its positive balance of trade, the fact remained that the federal government simply could not weather the storm of fundamental economic transformation without economic and political help from the West. The social costs and political pressure from regional leaders—particularly Miloševic´—had already been formidable during 1989 and only increased after the “shock therapy” measures were put in place at the beginning of 1990. Unfortunately for Markovic´, the federal government officials who worked diligently on securing outside support in a series of meetings with Western policy makers managed to obtain only general words of encouragement. How the prime minister and his program were treated in the United States during this period is possibly the best documented and in the end most important example for our understanding of the obstacles he faced regarding the perception of the Yugoslav crisis in the West. According to Warren Zimmermann, Markovic´ was clear that what he “wanted most of all was support from the West” and that this support needed to be not only political, but also financial. As the prime minister told the ambassador, “I’m playing a big game, and that requires big money. I think four billion dollars would be a good start to help a reform that’s going further than anything in Eastern Europe.”87 The US response was hardly positive. Markovic´ did get an official invitation to visit Washington in October 1989, as well as meetings with President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, other government officials, World Bank and IMF representatives, and various American businessmen, but these meetings had no real financial results. During his meeting with the US president, Markovic´ did not even get a chance to talk about anything other than his views on Gorbachev and the situation in the Soviet Union. In the words of Robert Hutchings, who was the director of European affairs at the National Security Council between 1989 and 1992, Markovic´’s visit “was like the sound of one hand clapping: he got a polite hearing and words of encouragement, but no tangible economic or political support.”88 Or, as Ambassador Zimmermann recalled, the prime minister was “certainly [shown] that Yugoslavia was not in the center of Washington’s universe.”89 Judging by the events in Eastern Europe during the last months of 1989 and by the West’s responses to them, the new “center of the universe” for US and European policy makers was farther north than Yugoslavia. East Germany erupted in mass protests that September, and its Communist leader, Erich Honecker, resigned only three days after Markovic´’s Washington visit. Within weeks, the Berlin Wall fell, and by the end of November West German chancellor Helmut Kohl had unveiled his plan for the reunification of Germany. Momentous changes were also taking place in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and

67 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

68 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Hungary. These countries were suddenly far more important to the West than the struggling Yugoslav federation, and their new status had clear implications for the financial assistance available to them. Although Yugoslavia’s economic crisis and the response of Markovic´’s government closely mirrored the situation in Poland, for example, Western responses to these two countries were radically different. Between October 1989 and January 1990, the Polish government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki secured more than $5 billion in emergency aid, export credits, loans, grants, and debt rescheduling from European governments, as well as significant additional funding from the IMF and the World Bank.90 Yugoslavia received nothing even remotely similar. As Hutchings recollected, the United States and the West, burned by their futile attempts to sustain the unsuccessful reforms of Markovic´’s predecessor, Branko Mikulic´, were now “wary of committing to another effort to support a Yugoslav leader who had yet to demonstrate his authority among the country’s disparate republics.”91 Or, as Ambassador Zimmermann succinctly put it, Markovic´ was not propped up because “Yugoslavia looked like a loser.”92 The most obvious problem with the West’s approach was that it was so dangerously illogical and negligent. Western policy makers publicly professed their admiration for the federal prime minister and his program but at the same time refused to assist him even with such relatively modest issues as Yugoslavia’s debt rollover. Hutchings convincingly (though with an eight-year delay) exposed the logical inconsistency and dangers of such a policy: if Markovic´ was deemed to be Yugoslavia’s last hope, then he should have been supported with all possible means. And if his platform was marginal for the country’s future development, then the West “should have concluded that Yugoslavia was already doomed and begun preparing for its dissolution.”93 Instead, Markovic´ and the whole of Yugoslavia were given mixed signals. They were being encouraged but at the same time were being provided with no real assistance. Such a position limited the prime minister’s maneuvering space and had a profound effect on his decision making and perception of the situation. Knowing that his political life depended on real outside support, Markovic´ not only publicly embellished his cooperation with Western policy makers, but also privately “harbored extravagant hopes that the West would somehow bail him out.”94 The Serbian leader, on the other hand, could have interpreted the unwillingness of the West to financially assist Markovic´ only as an encouraging sign that the West was still looking for that “Yugoslav leader who had yet to demonstrate his authority among the country’s disparate republics.” Markovic´’s plan was risky, and it is questionable whether it would have succeeded even under conditions much more favorable than those in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia’s Cold War Nevertheless, at the end of 1989, the federal prime minister was the only political actor who presented a pan-Yugoslav alternative to Miloševic´. Although Serbia’s boss basically held half the country in his hands and was a formidable obstacle to the success of Markovic´’s reform program, the federal government may have had a chance to isolate and neutralize him if it had been given real and firm backing from the West. That backing did not come when Markovic´ needed it the most: at the beginning of his reforms in December 1989 or throughout the critical period of 1990. In early spring of 1990, when the government’s program showed initial signs of success, the prime minister publicly bitterly noted that “we have done it all on our own. We even had to pay back $3.8 billion of our debt, and we did not get a single cent of help.”95 The financial assistance Markovic´ had hoped for was finally offered when the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, visited Belgrade in May 1991, but by then it was much too late. As 1989 drew to a close, the West missed a crucial opportunity for a clear, logical, and engaged policy. It publicly encouraged the federal prime minister and his efforts, but it gave him no real economic help. As a result, Markovic´ did not become the pan-Yugoslav catalyst for positive change that he may have been. Instead, he turned into no more than an illusion of hope for the Yugoslavs. Moreover, his initial success became only an excuse for Western inaction and the further neglect of Yugoslavia. FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE SKJ

At the beginning of 1990, few institutions in Yugoslavia still maintained at least some semblance of federal unity or commitment to the common goals of all the Yugoslav nations. The glue that had kept the federation together for nearly half a century since the carnage of World War II was quickly disintegrating. One of the most important components of that glue was the party—the Yugoslav League of Communists. The long-lasting internal conflicts among the republican elites were now finally and irreparably tearing it apart. For all the intensity of the clash between the Serb and Slovene Communists, the SKJ in fact had spiritually and ideologically died during the campaign of Miloševic´’s cohorts against the Croatian and Bosnian leaderships in 1988 and 1989. Socialist Yugoslavia as a whole and the party as its internal skeleton of support had decisively depended on the strength of the Serb-Croat concord and the resulting calm in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The campaign of the Serbian political and intellectual elite, which used the imagery of World War II crimes against the devoutly pro-Yugoslav Croatian and Bosnian Communists, ruined that concord

69 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

70 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War and effectively ended all hope for a renewed Yugoslav and SKJ consensus. The party’s Fourteenth Congress, scheduled to take place at Belgrade’s Sava Center between 20 and 22 January 1990, was therefore merely a swan song of the organization that had held a monopoly on political power in Yugoslavia. The sole reason why the country’s press and public still hoped for something positive to come out of that congress was the reform program of Ante Markovic´’s government. The federal prime minister’s “shock therapy” did not call for greater responsibility and competition just in the economic sphere. It made the same demands of the country’s political elites. To maintain a monopoly on political authority in a system which had begun to dissipate economic power to the private sector and in an international environment where the Communists had relinquished their posts in most of Eastern Europe was virtually impossible. The Fourteenth Congress was thus seen as the party’s last chance to somehow erase recent conflicts, to find within itself a new strength for a new era, and to catch the train of dramatic political liberalization and change. That strength was, however, simply not there. Based on the events of the prior two years and on the publicly announced policy positions of the republican Leagues of Communists in the run-up to the congress, the schism that finally and officially materialized during those tumultuous three days at the Sava Center was easily predictable. Throughout November and December 1989, all republican organizations of the SK had held their internal conventions and elections in preparation for the congress of the federal party organization. The differences in their positions were truly vast. On the one hand were the Slovenes and the Croats, who had already agreed to hold multi-party elections in their republics in the spring of 1990. They were coming to the Fourteenth Congress with a platform that was, in the words of Milan Kucˇan, “undoubtedly for Yugoslavia: a voluntary state of equal republics, free and equal nations, a democratic community of free citizens which measures its socialist content and existence by the criteria of a European quality of life . . . not a Yugoslavia as an extended Serbia to which—according to its wishes—others can be joined.”96 The Slovenes and the Croats wanted the Fourteenth Congress to abandon the party’s constitutionally guaranteed “leading role” in society, to give decisive support to Markovic´’s economic program, to condemn the Serbian boycott of Slovenia, and to affirm the basic principles of the 1974 constitution—especially sovereignty and the independent rights of the individual republics. The position of the Serbian leader and his camp, on the other hand, was dramatically different. The essence of Miloševic´’s platform for the Fourteenth Congress revolved around the redefinition of inter-republican and inter-national

Yugoslavia’s Cold War relations within the party and the federation and around preserving the greatest possible access to power for the Communists.97 In contrast to the Slovenes and the Croats, the Serbian camp believed the party had to initiate serious revisions of the 1974 constitution which would lead toward the recentralization of the country and the abandonment of consensus decision making. In Miloševic´’s view, Serbia and Yugoslavia also did not need a multi-party democracy but “non-party pluralism,” primarily because of the situation in Kosovo. If multiparty democracy was instituted, as Miloševic´ told Borisav Jovic´ that fall, then “an Albanian party would be formed in Serbia. There are nearly two million of them. No matter what they call this party of theirs, they would take over power in their local settings and we would lose Kosovo.”98 Differences between the bloc controlled by the Serbian leader and the delegations from the northwestern republics were basically irreconcilable and clearly pointing toward a major collision at the Fourteenth Congress. As predicted, the congress began raucously, with the delegates spending nearly half of the first day simply trying to agree on the agenda. The clash of ideas was immediately obvious, as was the inflexibility of the principal protagonists. The party’s president and Miloševic´’s ally, Milan Pancˇevski, in his introductory speech presented an outline of his camp’s position; it held that the League of Communists should support the political pluralism only of parties of socialist and Yugoslav orientation, which would operate within the existing ruling system. This prompted complaints from Slovenian and Croatian delegates, who dismissed Pancˇevski’s views as anachronistic and demanded that the party “immediately give up its constitutionally mandated vanguard role, sever its wild marriage with the state . . . [and] support the economic reforms of the federal government.”99 The responding barrage of Serbian deputies against the positions of the northwestern camp was relentless. As Miloševic´ himself exclaimed, “We in Serbia no longer have a complex from being the largest, so that we sit in a mouse hole and listen.”100 The Slovenian leadership was repeatedly accused of “supporting separatism, terrorism, and genocide in Kosovo” and of “destroying Yugoslavia while considering the opening toward Europe more important [than the unity of the country].”101 All Slovenian proposals for the reform of the party and society were rejected to enthusiastic applause by Miloševic´’s sizeable bloc. In addition to the substantive proposals for increased decentralization of the party, support for Yugoslavia’s closer association with the EC, condemnation of Serbia’s boycott of Slovenia, and acknowledgment of the constitutional right of disassociation, Miloševic´’s camp also defeated human rights proposals such as the ban on political trials and torture—simply because they came from the Slovenian delegation.102 The only hint of change that received the approval of

71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

72 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War all the delegations was the rejection of the party’s constitutionally guaranteed vanguard role in society. On the evening of the third day of the congress— 22 January 1990—when the final plenary session made it clear to the Slovenes that none of their proposals would be adopted, their delegation stood up at a sign from their leadership and walked out of the congress hall, followed by loud cheers of the delegates from Miloševic´’s camp. Serbia’s boss gave the Slovenes a clear message that the SKJ was no longer their party and the Slovenes agreed. The departure of their delegation was no real surprise for Miloševic´. The whole congress knew of the Slovenian plan to leave the Sava Center if their main proposals were rejected. The most important question was actually how the other delegations—especially the Croats and Bosnians—would react. As Miloševic´’s close associate Dušan Mitevic´ later recalled, the Serbian leader expected the Croatian Serbs within their republic’s delegation to force the president of the Croatian SK, Ivica Racˇan, to stay at the congress.103 And if the Croats stayed, so would the others. In an act that defined his whole political career and the future of the SKJ, Racˇan stood up to Miloševic´, called for an indefinite break in the proceedings, and took his delegation back to Zagreb.104 As a result, the Bosnian and Macedonian delegations decided to do the same— they rejected Miloševic´’s call for the congress to continue without the Slovenes and the Croats.105 Although Miloševic´ managed to reconvene the majority of the congressional deputies four months later to officially conclude the last plenary session and adopt the final statement of the congress, the Yugoslav League of Communists ended its life that late evening of 22 January 1990.106 Torn by the conflict between the Serbian leader and his northwestern opponents, the party which had ruled Yugoslavia for nearly half a century finally disintegrated. Though it was the Slovenes who left the Sava Center with all of their proposals defeated, the congress was actually a true failure for Miloševic´. In the words of Ivica Racˇan, “Miloševic´ wanted to turn the party into his political stick, with which he would regulate relations in a unitarist Yugoslavia . . . in which the hegemony of Serbian politics should be secured.”107 After the Fourteenth Congress, that “stick” was definitely broken. The Slovenian and Croatian Communists reformed their parties and lost the spring republican elections. A similar fate caught up with the Macedonian and Bosnian Leagues of Communists during the fall of 1990. The parties that came to power in those four republics— ironically thanks to Miloševic´’s campaign—proved to be much more resolute in their opposition to the Serbian leader. Ante Markovic´ famously asserted in the wake of the Fourteenth Congress that “Yugoslavia will continue to function, with or without the League of Communists.”108 The reality was, however, far better captured by the former president of the SFRJ presidency, Raif Dizdarevic´,

Yugoslavia’s Cold War who exclaimed that “Yugoslavia is collapsing. . . . It is entering a period of complete disorientation.”109 Or by Peter Hall, who reported his impressions from the congress to the Foreign Office: “From the diplomatic box, I felt like Rhett Butler watching the burning of Atlanta. The old order was dying fast.”110

• Miloševic´’s speech at the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo marked the apex of his drive for power. After that speech, Serbia’s boss finally faced direct resistance from the Communist elites—primarily in Slovenia, but also in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even Macedonia. This first strong resistance, however, came after he had already taken his campaign too far. In an attempt to blackmail Croatian and Bosnian leaderships with the national mobilization of their republics’ Serb populations, Miloševic´ destroyed the most important foundational elements of stability of the League of Communists and of Yugoslavia. He destroyed the concord between the country’s two largest nations—Serbs and Croats—and unsettled the fragile ties of ethnic cooperation within Yugoslavia’s central republic—Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although his clash with the Slovenes received the most attention, it was actually the campaign of Serbia’s political and intellectual elites against the essentially pro-Yugoslav leaderships of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which sealed the fate of the League of Communists and set the country on its course not only toward eventual dissolution, but also toward bloody war. To a large extent, this clash between Miloševic´ and his opponents in the Communist leaderships of the other republics went unnoticed in the West. The second half of 1989 was a tumultuous period in Europe’s history, and Western policy makers were more interested in the events in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was thus embroiled in the deepest possible internal crisis at a time when the attention of the West was firmly committed elsewhere. Although Western policy makers had a strong interest in the stability of the Yugoslav federation (just as they had a strong interest in the stability of the whole of Eastern Europe), the loss of Yugoslavia’s importance for relations between the West and the Soviet bloc meant that the United States and its European allies were not willing to invest any real financial or political resources to ensure that stability. The end of 1989 presented a solid opportunity for a clear and committed policy of the West toward the Yugoslav crisis. Miloševic´ proved himself to be no leader of “Gorbachevian” caliber but a party conservative with little willingness to engage in true political and economic reforms. His project of controlling the

73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

74 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Yugoslavia’s Cold War whole federation was defeated by the determined resistance of the Slovenes. Ante Markovic´ became Yugoslavia’s most popular politician, and his reform program gave at least some hope that the crisis could have a peaceful end. If Western policy makers believed Yugoslavia still had a shot with Markovic´ at its helm, then they should have given him all the support he needed. If they, on the other hand, believed that “Yugoslavia was a loser,” then they should have actively prepared for its dissolution. In the end, they chose neither. Their only contributions during this period were their verbal support for Markovic´’s reforms, their unanimous insistence that Yugoslavia would benefit from increased centralization, and their repeated signals of consent to the JNA’s potential intervention in Slovenia. None of these policies had a positive effect on Yugoslavia’s internal situation. The troubled federation thus found itself in a dead end. All its internal sources of stability had been dismantled as a result of Miloševic´’s drive for power, and the desperately needed assistance from the West was not forthcoming.

4

Challenges of Democracy, 1990

Yugoslavia had struggled with the inefficiencies of the single-party system for decades, and the collapse of the federal League of Communists marked the final destruction of all the pillars of its political and economic existence. Nevertheless, the timing of the advent of real pluralism and democracy to Yugoslavia was hardly seen as ideal in a number of important quarters both within the federation and the international community. For all their talk of democracy and freedom, crucial Western policy makers were actually deeply concerned about who might take the Communists’ place. Moreover, as noted in chapter 3, their attention was diverted by a series of historic events. From the difficult negotiations on the future of a unified Germany to the violent outbursts in the disintegrating Soviet Union to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the foreign policy apparatuses of the Western powers had their plates full during 1990. According to Percy Cradock, who served as the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the foreign policy advisor to the UK prime minister at the time, the impact of this rapid pace of events was profound: “Policy recommendations were made by overstretched advisers working at breakneck speed and digested by leaders under even greater stress. This meant a dependence on idées reçues, drafts on a dwindling intellectual capital amassed years before.”1 And according to the UK ambassador in Belgrade, Peter Hall, such dependence resulted in his government’s (and the governments of other Western powers) basing their Yugoslav policies on the idée reçue that the struggling federation had to remain united.2 The problem with this approach was that it was coupled with an open detachment from Yugoslavia and reckless disregard for what was happening on the ground. Throughout the truly historic year of Yugoslavia’s gradual shift from

75

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

76 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy communism to democracy, a series of events should have resulted in a Western reevaluation of the policy of giving only token support to Yugoslav unity. The CIA’s analyses from the fall of 1990, for example, presciently implied that unless something was done, Western democracies would “have to contend with prolonged instability in Yugoslavia, which will hamper efforts to forge a stable postCold War architecture in Europe.”3 According to Louis Sell—political counselor at the US embassy in Belgrade at the time—something could have and should have been done in 1990, without the need for military involvement but with a concerted diplomatic and financial effort from the United States and its European allies.4 However, that whole year brought no real change in the West’s policy, with consequences for Yugoslavia’s internal developments nothing short of tragic. As Budimir Loncˇar, the last Yugoslav secretary for foreign affairs, suggests, Miloševic´ “read the international community well. He judged correctly that the international community wished to maintain Yugoslavia as a factor which had for decades been useful and whose positions were sacrificed at the end of the Cold War.”5 Indeed, it was this correct reading of the West’s Realpolitik on Yugoslavia which enabled Miloševic´ to dramatically alter his political goals. Since he could no longer count on controlling the whole Yugoslav federation, he shifted to a program which was to bring so much destruction to the whole region in the new decade. He began to set the foundations for a Greater Serbian state, while presenting his campaign to the West as the protection of Yugoslavia. UNITY AND STABILITY: EUROPE AND YUGOSLAVIA AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE

As Europe entered the last decade of the twentieth century, the outlook for its political development into a continent no longer torn by deep ideological divides appeared to be positive. The remarkable and largely peaceful withdrawals of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe in the fall months of 1989 gave hope to those who wished to see Europe “whole and free.” The events were indeed historic and worthy of comparison with grand advances in Western democracy such as the French Revolution or the American Declaration of Independence. The US secretary of state, James Baker, remarked in December 1989 that “Between 1789 and 1989, between ‘we the people’ [in the Declaration of Independence] and ‘we are the people’ [which the people of Dresden and Leipzig chanted in street protests that fall] runs one of history’s deepest currents—between the America of ‘we the people’ and the Europe of ‘we are the people’ there can be no division.”6 As with all “revolutionary” developments, however, dangers were not in short supply. With 1989 coming to a

Challenges of Democracy close, threats of instability, serious divisions within the Western alliance, and reactionary relapses of the ruling elites in the disintegrating Soviet monolith began to dominate Europe’s political scene. No single point of political contention defined the dangers for Europe’s safe transformation better than the issue of German reunification. As noted in chapter 3, only two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl announced his ten-point plan for German reunification. The enthusiasm with which the chancellor and the general populations of both Germanys approached the issue of reunification was met with concern and even direct hostility in many European capitals. The European Council meetings held in Paris and Strasbourg that November and December were notably marked by the obvious resentment of Kohl’s European counterparts for his initiative, with only the Spanish and Irish prime ministers offering any real support.7 Italy, the Netherlands, and particularly the United Kingdom and France, led by Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand, expressed serious misgivings about the wisdom of a push for German unity. Thatcher’s opposition to the joining of the two Germanys was so vigorous that her foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, noted at the time he “was hearing at Number Ten about the parallel with the years 1904–14, when the British, French and Russians had joined in an entente to check German ambitions.”8 The French president drew similar inspiration from early twentieth-century history when he issued a warning to West German foreign minister Genscher about a possible reemergence of the pre–World War I system of balances in Europe and a revival of the Franco-Russian alliance against Germany.9 Although there were many reasons for French and British ambivalence about German unity, they all primarily had to do with one overarching issue: stability. The potential for the heart of a new and less divided Europe shifting to a united Germany—with a population of more than eighty million and with the strongest economy on the continent—was seen in France and Great Britain as a triple threat: a threat to their own positions of power, which were also challenged by American general support for the Germans; a threat to West European integration due to possible changes in Germany’s policy toward Eastern Europe; and a threat to the capability of a fragile reformist leadership in the Soviet Union to withstand reactionary pressures.10 As Thatcher explained in an interview to the Wall Street Journal on 26 January 1990, German unification had to “come at a rate which takes account of other obligations and which gives us time to work things out, otherwise that could destabilize everything. . . . The person to whom that would be most bitterly unfair is Mr. Gorbachev, without whom it could never have come about.”11

77 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

78 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy The seriousness of the rift caused by primarily Thatcher’s, but also Mitterrand’s, public hostility toward German reunification was apparently such that it led the chancellery and the foreign ministry in Bonn to believe that “we did not only have friends among our allies.”12 It is important to note that this strong and public disagreement among Western Europe’s three greatest powers over the issue of Germany’s future did not only burden their relations throughout 1990. It also damaged the coordination of their actions regarding the situation in Yugoslavia well after the process of reunification was completed in October of that year. With Europe’s powers engaged in such significant matters, it is little wonder that nothing changed in the West’s approach to Yugoslavia’s severe internal crisis as 1989 came to an end. By the time the Fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists dissolved on 22 January 1990, Yugoslavia was close to the point of no return on its road to disintegration. Its ruling political system was in a state of collapse, its principal national and ethnic cleavages were charged to the point of discussions about a potential civil war, its common market was broken up, and—most important—the potential for a new consensus regarding its continuing existence was simply demolished in the ruthless nationalist campaign of the Serbian leader. In spite of all these negative developments, however, the only Western priority in Yugoslavia was the maintenance of the federation’s unity. According to Ambassador Zimmermann, during a December 1989 Brussels meeting of US ambassadors called by the secretary of state to discuss European issues, “there was surprisingly little concern among the attending US ambassadors to European countries [about Yugoslavia]. . . . Most of the time at the meeting was understandably taken up by the more immediate issue of Germany’s reunification.”13 Thomas Patrick Melady, who was the US ambassador to the Holy See at the time and also present at that meeting, furthermore remembered that the principal message relayed to the ambassadors by Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger was “direct and clear: Yugoslavia’s unity had to be supported, otherwise it would fall apart and become a model for the disintegration of the Soviet Union.”14 Just as Germany’s unity was perceived in important Western quarters as a dangerous threat to the Soviets, so was Yugoslavia’s disunity. In President Bush’s words, publicly expressed that February after a Camp David summit with Chancellor Kohl, the new enemies facing the Western alliance were “unpredictability” and “instability.”15 The pursuit of predictability and stability through the support of Yugoslavia’s unity in order “not to make things difficult for Gorbachev” remained a staple of America’s (and the West’s) policy toward Yugoslavia until the end of the Soviet leader’s reign in

Challenges of Democracy 1991. At the beginning of 1990, this support was expressed both publicly and privately. Yugoslavia’s vice-president and Slobodan Miloševic´’s close associate Borisav Jovic´, in his diary entry from 5 February 1990 noted the US State Department’s message in response to a New York Times editorial about the situation in Yugoslavia. Titled “One Yugoslavia or Six?,” the editorial suggested that “unity is not automatically the top priority. Yugoslavia’s most compelling need now is for effective reforms to halt its slide toward ethnic conflict and economic ruin. Washington still has an interest in trying to preserve Yugoslav unity, but not at any cost. . . . Dissolving the federation might be less explosive than fierce ethnic friction or continued economic paralysis. The basic choices are for Yugoslavs to make. America’s preferences should be reform, stability and unity, in that order.”16 The message communicated to the Yugoslav representative in Washington by Raymond Seitz, the US assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, was that “the New York Times commentary was revolting and that it had nothing to do with the US position.”17 Indeed, in spite of all proclamations in favor of democratization and reform, the US (and European) preferences regarding Yugoslavia were exactly in the reverse order of those presented in the New York Times—they were unity and stability first, and only then reform. As noted above, this approach was coupled with pronounced Western detachment from Yugoslavia. Ambassador Zimmermann may have been publicly claiming during those winter months that “Yugoslavia is of first-rate importance for the United States,”18 but what mattered was the message that was being delivered privately to Yugoslav policy makers. And that was the message of Yugoslavia’s dwindling geopolitical significance and no real outside support for the country’s economic reforms. As Yugoslavia entered the new decade, this desire of Western policy makers to preserve the federation “on the cheap” led to a highly problematic and destabilizing outcome: a set of confusing signals to the country’s feuding camps. The full extent of the problems associated with the West’s approach was perfectly displayed during a February 1990 visit of Lawrence Eagleburger to Belgrade. During his previous visit to Yugoslavia in 1988, Eagleburger had given important words of support to Slobodan Miloševic´. Barely two years later, he was not only forced to admit his error of judgment about the Serbian president, but he also had to reluctantly deliver a statement of US policy to Yugoslavia’s disintegrating ruling elite, worried public, and budding political opposition groups.19 The Yugoslavs perceived Eagleburger’s mission as important, especially because February marked the beginning of real political campaigns for

79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

80 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy the first post–World War II democratic elections in two of their republics. The ruling Leagues of Communists of Slovenia and Croatia in the aftermath of the collapse of the Fourteenth Congress fulfilled their pledges for greater democratization by constitutionally abandoning the one-party system, legalizing various opposition groups within their republics, and scheduling democratic elections for April and May of that year. Those who had hoped that Eagleburger’s visit would bring direct encouragement for the democratic tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia or concrete financial assistance for Ante Markovic´ were, however, sorely disappointed. Eagleburger publicly did “welcome the advent of greater political pluralism, . . . repeat the support of the US government for the far-reaching reforms of the federal government, . . . [and] express concern for the breaches of human rights in Kosovo,” but his message to the representatives of Yugoslavia’s different political parties during their meeting at the US Embassy in Belgrade had different accents.20 After listening to the whole spectrum of policy positions of the representatives from all the Yugoslav republics, Eagleburger made two important comments: “human rights, freedom, and a market economy would be best advanced if Yugoslavia remained united,” and “the United States would not advocate the breakup of Yugoslavia, but—if it happened—would have no choice except to live with it.”21 These comments understandably left the Yugoslavs confused. On the one hand, they heard a clear statement of support for Yugoslav unity, and, on the other, an unclear and almost metaphysical announcement that the United States would be willing to “live with” any outcome. Coupled with the fact that “Eagleburger didn’t think it realistic to pour financial assistance into Markovic´’s economic reform” and publicly hinted as much in the Yugoslav press, anybody who followed the deputy secretary’s mission could only conclude that the Yugoslavs had been left to their own devices.22 As David Halberstam revealed in his insightful examination of how the lessons of Vietnam had influenced American foreign policy during the Bush and Clinton administrations, Eagleburger knew that the United States was removing itself from Yugoslavia even before he came to Belgrade that February: “The deal was done. The Bush administration had already made its decisions. So it did not matter which options appeared to be open, for in reality they were already closed.” Although the deputy secretary, provoked by what he had heard and seen in Yugoslavia, concluded “that it’s much worse than anyone thought. It’s going to be much bloodier than we thought,” the only thing he did after that visit was to try to throw the Yugoslav ball into Europe’s court.23 He appealed to the continent’s leaders to increase assistance for “Markovic´’s beleaguered efforts,” which the United States itself found too “unrealistic” to support.24

Challenges of Democracy Washington’s instruction cable to its representatives in European capitals, sent after Eagleburger’s visit, suggested that “a breakup was in the interest neither of the Yugoslav people nor of Europe’s security” and directed them “to urge the Europeans to avoid actions that could encourage secession” and to support Yugoslavia’s unity, democracy, and the federal government. The cable also directly addressed the issue of the upcoming April and May elections in Slovenia and Croatia and made it clear that the State Department saw them as more of a threat than an advancement of reforms and democratization. The cable’s message was that these elections “might bring to power those advocating confederation or even dissolution of Yugoslavia” and that, as a result, “unity was likely to suffer.” According to Zimmermann, these warnings were “greeted in Europe with a yawn,” with “the French and British governments particularly dismissive of American concern.”25 While the ambassador may have been right in claiming that some of that indifference came from the inability or unwillingness of the Europeans to see what was happening, some of it was surely the result of US reluctance to do anything concrete for the reinforcement of the troubled federation’s continued existence. Europe was at the turn of the decade still unwilling to take over America’s leading role in responding to the Yugoslav events. Embroiled in the deepest crisis of its existence, Yugoslavia was left only with declaratory statements of Western support for its unity. And the processes of democratization in its northwestern republics were met with deep Western apprehension. DEMOCRACY AS THE ANSWER: ELECTIONS IN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

Although the State Department did not find common ground with its European allies regarding the situation in Yugoslavia, its opinion on the potential perils of democratic elections in Slovenia and Croatia did match the opinion of significant players in the Yugoslav crisis: Slobodan Miloševic´ and the JNA. One of the greatest points of contention between Miloševic´ and his opponents in Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics at the Fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists was exactly the nature of Yugoslavia’s democratization and the future of its political system. In opposition to Slovenian and Croatian calls for multi-party elections, Miloševic´’s and the army’s plan called for the institution of socialist non-party pluralism. The Serbian leader’s and the JNA’s fear of democratic elections closely resembled that of the State Department. Elections were dangerous because in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo they could bring to power politicians whose demands for increased regional autonomy

81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

82 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy would far exceed those of the local Communist elites. In the end, those fears proved to be well founded. The campaigns and the electoral results in Slovenia and Croatia closely reflected the desire of these two republics’ electorates for a tougher answer to Serbia’s platform for the recentralization of Yugoslavia. Though Slovenia’s and Croatia’s drives toward pluralism began in 1988 and 1989 with the formation of various embryonic political groups and parties, the political landscape of these two republics began to resemble that of true democracies only after the collapse of the Fourteenth Congress. Until then, opposition groups which harbored any hopes of real political competition were to a large extent on the margins of political life with only limited access to the media. Admittedly, this marginalization was less pronounced in Slovenia, where the bulk of the opposition parties which had developed in the pluralist outburst of 1988 and 1989 had formed a broad coalition called the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demos) in October 1989 and managed to exert considerable public pressure on the party in power.26 The nature of this public pressure was, however, much different and less intense than that felt by the Communist governments of East Germany, Poland, or Czechoslovakia. As the head of Slovenia’s League of Communists (ZKS), Milan Kucˇan, correctly stated at his party’s republican congress in December 1989, the ZKS was “the only Communist party in power which [had] opted for multi-party pluralism and free elections without the pressure of demonstrations or the mass anger of its citizens.”27 The position of the League of Communists as the driving force behind democratization was even more pronounced in Croatia. The initiatives for the foundation of Croatia’s first opposition parties—the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance (HSLS)—were publicly presented in late February and early March 1989, but these and other opposition groups were basically out of the public limelight throughout that year and were not officially registered until 5 February 1990.28 At an informal lunch of Croatia’s Communist leadership on 31 December 1989, the leader of the HDZ, Franjo Tud‒man, was labeled “completely irrelevant based on his strength,” and the main danger for the ruling elite was identified not in Croatia’s nascent opposition parties but in the conservative wing of the SK itself.29 In other words, the push by Slovenian and Croatian ruling parties for multi-party democracy was not motivated by domestic opposition pressures but was at least in part based on the belief that the balance of political forces guaranteed the League of Communists a solid showing—if not outright victory—in the elections. With the actual scheduling of free elections in the aftermath of the Fourteenth Congress, however, that balance of political forces soon began to shift.

Challenges of Democracy Although Slovenia’s League of Communists could rightfully claim to have been a solid defender of Slovenia’s independent rights within Yugoslavia and the only true bulwark against Miloševic´’s push for power, the electoral campaign in this republic almost instantaneously put the ruling party on the defensive. In spite of its departure from the Fourteenth Congress and a change of name from the League of Communists of Slovenia to the League of Communists of Slovenia—Party of Democratic Reform (ZKS-SDP), this organization of such seasoned foes of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” as Milan Kucˇan and Ciril Ribicˇicˇ could still not shed the label of the decaying system. On two of the most important campaign issues, the ZKS-SDP had virtually the same position as the Demos coalition: both camps favored Slovenia’s closer association with Europe as well as the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign republics. The claims of top Demos officials that “Slovenia simply wants to join Europe and is not willing to wait for the rest of Yugoslavia to catch up with it” were matched by the ZKS-SDP campaign with the slogan of “Europe now!”30 The problem for the ZKS-SDP, however, was that it was still seen as an element of a political system which in the immediate aftermath of the Fourteenth Congress once again showed its ugly side in Kosovo. Just as the electoral campaign in Slovenia began to heat up in late January 1990, Kosovo exploded in protests with the resumption of the trial of Azem Vllasi, the Albanian leader imprisoned by the Serbian authorities in March 1989. Within days, the protests of local Albanians, organized in part by the newly formed Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, became violent and spun out of the control of the police forces. Chants for democracy and free elections were met by police batons, tear gas, water cannons, and even open fire. As the death toll climbed into the dozens and the press began to describe the situation as “on the verge of civil war” or “reminiscent of Romania,” the clash between Serbia and the two northwestern republics intensified. The Serbian leadership accused Slovenia and Croatia of aiding and abetting the Kosovo protesters.31 A meeting between Slobodan Miloševic´, Borisav Jovic´, and Janez Drnovšek, Slovenia’s representative in the federal presidency, on 31 January demonstrated the vastness of the gulf between them on the issue of Kosovo. While Miloševic´ and Jovic´ demanded federal approval of the use of JNA forces against the protesters and claimed that anything less would in Serbia be deemed an act of treason and a sign that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, Drnovšek warned that in the case of an increased use of force Slovenia “could adopt a decision on secession because it does not want to live in a state where reprisals are used against the people!”32 In the weeks that followed, Slovenia’s Communist leadership attempted to demonstrate to its electorate that it was severing links with a system defined by

83 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

84 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy the escalating rhetoric of the Serbian leadership and violence on the streets of Kosovo. The JNA forces were dispatched to Kosovo on 1 February 1990, and the Serbian president followed up with calls for the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanians engaged in protests and for a fresh Serb resettlement of the province. These events were answered by a series of significant decisions of the Slovenian leadership. On 4 February, the ZKS-SDP announced it was formally cutting all relations with the federal party. Two days later, the Slovenian police contingent officially withdrew from the federal forces dispatched to Kosovo. On 22 February—and in direct retaliation against Serbia’s economic blockade of Slovenia imposed three months earlier—the Slovenian government decided to withhold 15 percent of its contribution to the federal budget, the amount designated for Serbia’s underdeveloped areas. Finally, and most significant, on 8 March the Slovenian parliament adopted amendments to the republic’s constitution which dropped the adjective “socialist” from the republic’s formal name and from the names of all of its institutions. These acts, however, ultimately failed to impress the voters. The opposition’s call to combat “Serbia’s ‘balkanization’ of Slovenia” through a stronger push for the republic’s independence resonated better with an electorate tired of classical Yugoslav politics.33 No matter how hard the ZKS-SDP tried, it could not escape its association with the old system, which had been sustained by a rhetoric of threats and “external and internal enemies.” Such rhetoric no longer worked with the Slovenes. When General Veljko Kadijevic´ visited Slovenia on the eve of the election’s first round to issue a public warning that the army disapproved of the opposition’s electoral platform, the Slovenian voters took up the general’s challenge and effectively sealed the fate of the ZKS-SDP.34 As table 4.1 shows, in the elections held on 8 and 22 April, the Demos coalition soundly defeated the parties which had grown out of the socialist system— the League of Communists, the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS-LS), and the Socialist Alliance—by winning 54.8 percent of the votes and 126 out of 240 seats in the parliament’s three houses.35 With the old nomenklatura now out of the new republican government headed by the Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle, the only consolation for the party that had run Slovenia for four and a half decades was the victory of Milan Kucˇan in the election for the president of Slovenia’s presidency. Although Kucˇan beat the leader of the Demos coalition, Jože Pucˇnik, with 58.3 percent of the vote in the second round, the Communists could not even fully claim that victory. The new president renounced his party membership immediately upon election and thus made Slovenia the first Yugoslav republic where democracy had truly pushed the Communists out of power.

Challenges of Democracy

85

Table 4.1 Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia, 1990 Demos coalition League of Communists (ZKS-SDP) League of Socialist Youth of   Slovenia/Liberal Party (ZSMS-LS) Socialist Alliance of Working People (SZDL) Others Total

Percent of Votes

Number of Seats

Percent of Seats

54.8 17.3

126 38

52.5 15.8

14.5 5.4 8.0 100

38 16 22 240

15.8 6.7 9.2 100

Source: Niko Toš and Vlado Miheljak, Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997: Analyses, Documents and Data (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2002), 175; Jana Taškar, “Demosu dobra polovica,” Delo, 25 April 1990, 1.

The electoral competition in Croatia was in many ways starkly different. Whereas in Slovenia the issue of the future of the Yugoslav federation was to a large extent politicized by the violence in Kosovo, Croatia’s electoral campaign was more politicized by the direct Serbo-Croat clash. Miloševic´’s drive for the destabilization of Croatia and the timid response of the Croatian SK made the Croats more homogenized and determined to stand up to the Serbian leader. These justified sentiments of grievance caused by the vicious nationalist attacks of Serbia’s intellectual and political elite were, however, channeled not only into a reasoned defense of Croatia’s sovereign rights, but also into an ethnically exclusivist drive of Croatia’s new mass movement—the Croatian Democratic Union—led by Franjo Tud‒man. The electoral campaign in this republic became a comparatively much more polarized and tense affair than had been the case in Slovenia and ultimately contributed to Croatia’s future deep rift between its Croat majority and Serb minority. Tud‒man—a historian who was at the same time a former JNA general with exemplary World War II service in the Partisan movement and a former political prisoner who had served multiple sentences for his public challenges of the Yugoslav system—gave the Croatian electorate exactly what it craved: a firm and unwavering response to Miloševic´ that matched the Serb nationalist campaign point by point. The Serbian platform for greater centralization of Yugoslavia was answered by the HDZ’s firm endorsement of reforming the federation into a union of independent states with only loose confederal links in defense, the economy, and foreign affairs. The claims by Serbian intellectuals that Yugoslavia was a moral, spiritual, and economic loss for the Serbs were

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

86 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy matched by Tud‒man’s equal claims for the Croats.36 Serb allegations of discrimination against them and their assimilation in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina were answered by contrasting claims of the actual preferential treatment of Serbs in the government, police, and media.37 Finally, and most dangerously, the repeated challenges made by Serbian intellectuals and politicians regarding the borders and sovereign status of Bosnia-Herzegovina were mirrored in their Croatian equivalent: Tud‒man’s call for Croatia “in its historic and natural borders”—an implied claim on at least parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.38 It was exactly this policy toward Yugoslavia’s central republic that proved to be the Achilles’ heel for Tud‒man during the campaign (and the years to come), threatening his party’s otherwise sound and popular platform of Croatia’s political and economic transformation. With a series of conflicting and controversial statements about Bosnia-Herzegovina and about Croatia’s World War II past during interviews and rallies on the campaign trail, Tud‒man damaged his own and his party’s standing. His claims, for example, that the World War II Ustaša state “was not only a quisling formation and a fascist crime, but also an expression of the historical desires of the Croatian people for their own independent state” or that the borders between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were “the borders of an imperial conquest by an Asian force in Europe” did not only give plenty of fodder to Miloševic´’s press machine, which labeled the HDZ a reincarnation of the Ustaša movement.39 They also soured relations with the Bosnian Muslims and pushed the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs even further into the open arms of Serbia’s boss. It is important to note that Tud‒man’s demands for Croatia “in its historic and natural borders,” which were repeatedly invoked during the campaign, were always followed by a caveat that such a scenario would come into play only if Serbia’s own expansionist demands materialized. As the HDZ leader stated at his party’s First Congress on 24 February, “Those who blame us that with this demand we are provoking civil war forget that we have put it forward only after the plans for the creation of Greater Serbia have been presented to the world public.”40 Or, as he explained the following week at a campaign rally in Dalmatia, “The HDZ is not for the destruction of Yugoslavia’s [inter-republican] borders but is the only party which has stood up against the border changes demanded by those who want a Greater Serbia. . . . If others do not touch these borders, neither will the HDZ touch them.”41 In his campaign speeches, Tud‒man also defended Tito’s federalism from Serb attacks and expressed support for the economic reforms of Ante Markovic´. These statements, however, did not grab headlines.42 The damage had already been done, especially in Tud‒man’s relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina.43 He accepted to play Miloševic´’s game and thus set his future policy on a dangerous path.

Challenges of Democracy

87

In spite of such controversial statements, Tud‒man’s tit-for-tat with Miloševic´ was tremendously successful with Croatian voters. Nothing that the two other major electoral competitors—the leftist bloc around the ruling SKH-SDP and the centrist Coalition of National Accord (KNS)—did or promised could challenge Tud‒man’s strong anti-Miloševic´ appeal. The Communists publicly asserted their firm belief in the sovereignty of the individual republics; fielded a list of popular candidates full of entertainers, artists, and intellectuals; rejected the JNA pressures for the cancellation of elections; postponed Croatia’s payments into the federal fund for the underdeveloped; withdrew the Croatian contingent from the federal police forces in Kosovo; and even resorted to a last-minute 20 percent wage increase in contravention of a federal wage freeze instituted by Markovic´’s program of reforms.44 And it was all still to no avail. As table 4.2 demonstrates, in the elections held on 22 April and 6 May, the HDZ garnered the highest proportion of Croatia’s votes and clearly defeated its opponents. Though it was significantly shy of a majority of votes, Tud‒man’s party earned an overwhelming majority of seats in the three houses of the Croatian parliament (Sabor) because the Communists, in their mistaken preelection belief in victory, instituted French-style two-round majoritarian electoral rules.45 The leftist bloc came in at a relatively close second place, carried to some extent by the votes of Croatia’s Serbs, who largely endorsed it in place of the newly formed nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS).46 The destiny of the centrist Coalition of National Accord, which was disappointingly left with only 5.9 percent of parliamentary seats, testified to the high level of polarization of the electoral campaign. In many ways, Croatia’s and Slovenia’s elections were a referendum on these republics’ response to Miloševic´ and his drive for the recentralization of Table 4.2 Parliamentary Elections in Croatia, 1990 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) League of Communists and allies (SKH-SDP) Coalition of National Accord (KNS) Serb Democratic Party (SDS) Others Total

Percent of Votes

Number of Seats

Percent of Seats

41.9 35.0 15.3 1.6 6.2 100

205 107 21 5 18 356

57.6 30.1 5.9 1.4 5.1 100

Source: Ivan Šiber, ed., The 1990 and 1992/93 Sabor Elections in Croatia: Analyses, Documents and Data (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1997), 137.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

88 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy Yugoslavia. As the head of the SKH-SDP, Ivica Racˇan, assessed in a post-election interview, those who had voted for the HDZ “had voted, above all else, for a change in the way Croatia [was being] treated in Yugoslavia, especially lately. The essence here was a discontent with the ‘policy of silence’ and with our lukewarm response to the Greater Serbian and hegemonic claims.”47 Or, as one Western diplomat succinctly told the Washington Post, “If it weren’t for Miloševic´, Tud‒man could never have happened.”48 Ironically, the Serbian leader was indispensable in the materialization of his greatest fears about Croatia’s and Slovenia’s elections. Just as he had feared, both republics now had non-Communist leaderships whose demands for increased regional autonomy far exceeded those of their predecessors and closely mirrored the policy preferences of their electorates. Pre-election polls in Slovenia showed that 52 percent of Slovenes supported the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation, 28 percent supported Slovenia’s independence, and only 8 percent supported Yugoslavia’s remaining a federation.49 Similar pre-election polls in Croatia showed 51 percent of Croatia’s citizens supporting a confederation, 11 percent their republic’s independence, and 27 percent a federation.50 With such a popular mandate, it was no surprise that Ljubljana and Zagreb only days after the second round of Croatia’s elections jointly came out with a declaration of intent to reconstruct Yugoslavia as a confederation. “If other peoples of Yugoslavia also have such vital interests, which they would like to realize in a community of equal peoples and their republics,” Slovenia’s new president Milan Kucˇan stated on that occasion, “then it is realistic to expect that we agree on a new structure for common existence or, if that is not possible, disassociate peacefully.”51 Kucˇan’s call was, however, in vain. The Serbian leadership had no intention of negotiating Yugoslavia’s possible confederal status or allowing any peaceful disassociation. Miloševic´’s circle even prior to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s elections had opted for a radical response to the demands for decentralization from the northwestern republics. The Slovenes were simply to be pushed out of Yugoslavia, and the Croats were to be once again threatened with border changes at the expense of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Borisav Jovic´, he and Miloševic´ had already agreed on 21 March 1990 that “Yugoslavia can do without Slovenia. That will make it easier on us. We will also have an easier time with the Croats without them around.” On 26 March (about two weeks prior to the Slovenian and four weeks prior to the Croatian elections) at a meeting of the highest leadership of Serbia, the decision was made to commence preparations “to live without Yugoslavia” because “Serbia will not agree to a confederation.” The goal of Miloševic´ and his associates, as

Challenges of Democracy decided at that meeting, was “to establish a border within which there will be no warfare.”52 Three days later, the president of Serbia’s National Assembly, Zoran Sokolovic´, publicly threatened, “If some believe that a confederation is possible or even unavoidable, they cannot count on the present internal borders. In that case, all historical stakes and all aspirations would come into play.”53 Those in the West who were fearful of the democratic elections in Yugoslavia’s two northwestern republics because of their potential threat to the federation’s unity were, therefore, missing an important point. Yugoslavia’s conflicting political camps were headed for another major clash irrespective of the electoral results in Slovenia and Croatia since Miloševic´ and the Serbian leadership had prepared an escalation of radical measures even before the elections in these two republics had taken place. The electoral campaigns and their results made the operationalization of those radical measures easier. First, the polarization of the political campaign in Croatia and the nationalist platform of the HDZ pushed the Croatian Serbs even further into Miloševic´’s arms.54 Second, the positions of the Demos coalition and the HDZ expressed during the electoral campaign against the JNA’s commitment to communism and its pro-Serb bias helped entrench Miloševic´’s role as the army’s principal political sponsor.55 In the spring and summer months which followed, these two secondary “results” of Yugoslavia’s first democratic elections proved to be crucial. They helped enable Miloševic´’s next big move: the armed rebellion of the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina region. A NEW YUGOSLAV ORDER: SERB ETHNIC DEMOCRACY ON THE STREETS

The official answer of Miloševic´’s camp to the electoral results in Slovenia and Croatia came several days before the new governments of the two republics were sworn into office. On the occasion of his rotation from the position of vicepresident to the position of president of Yugoslavia’s presidency on 15 May, Borisav Jovic´ launched what the local press labeled a “verbal coup d’état” against the new leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia.56 In his inaugural speech Jovic´ implied that the democratic elections in the two northwestern republics were illegitimate because they brought to power forces which pushed for the abandonment of Yugoslavia’s socialist orientation and for the country’s decentralization through a strong assertion of republican rights and constitutional reforms. What gave Jovic´’s speech the spirit of a quasi-putsch was not his obvious policy differences with the Demos coalition and the HDZ but his clear

89 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy threat of “urgent measures” of the kind used in Kosovo: “Let’s hope that [the implementation of the ‘urgent measures’ in Kosovo] was a lesson which will ensure that in the future there are no anti-constitutional acts which endanger the rights and interests of others.”57 Within two days—before the electoral winners in Slovenia and Croatia even had a chance to publicly respond to the new federal president—Miloševic´’s apparatus demonstrated in practical terms what Jovic´’s threat meant. The Territorial Defense (TO) forces of the two northwestern republics were almost completely disarmed. As noted in chapter 2, the TO units were constituent parts of Yugoslavia’s defense mechanism, created as an answer to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The JNA leadership in 1988 managed to limit the command of the republics and autonomous provinces over their TO forces. Nevertheless, the vast stockpiles of light infantry and artillery weapons at the disposal of the regional TOs were still seen as a guarantee of the republics’ independent defenses. On 14 May—still in the period between the elections and the formation of new governments in the two northwestern republics—the JNA moved to empty the TO depots in Slovenia and Croatia.58 “Practically speaking, we have disarmed them,” Jovic´ noted on 17 May in his diary. “Formally, this was done by the head of the General Staff, but it was actually under our orders.”59 The significance and meaning of this decision was not lost on anybody, especially since in Croatia the TO depots were emptied only in areas with Croat majorities.60 Slovenia’s government managed to salvage some 15–30 percent of the weapons of its republic’s TO, which were in 1991 used in the brief armed conflict against the JNA.61 Its position, as well as the position of the Croatian government, in relation to Miloševic´’s camp was still unenviable. Both northwestern republics were now without even the thin blanket of security that the TO could give them and were virtually defenseless. One interesting aspect of this act of disarmament of Slovenia and Croatia was that it was a carbon copy of what had happened only weeks earlier in the Soviet Union. In mid-February of that year, at an informal meeting of Serbia’s highest leadership with General Kadijevic´, Miloševic´’s assertion that “There is going to be war, by God,” was answered by the general with a promise that “there will be the kind of war there must be, one where we do not allow them to beat us.” Though the general then proceeded to put the bulk of blame for the events in Yugoslavia on Gorbachev, who “sold out the idea of socialism and communism for a very cheap price, . . . broke up the Warsaw Pact, destabilized the USSR . . . [and] destroyed the balance of power in Europe,” the move to disarm the Slovenian and Croatian TO depots in order that the two republics “not [be] allowed to beat” the Serbian camp came straight out of Gorbachev’s

Challenges of Democracy playbook.62 Just days after the Lithuanian parliament had unanimously voted on 12 March 1990 to “reestablish” the independence of Lithuania, Gorbachev issued an ultimatum demanding that Vilnius renounce the independence declaration and an edict (his first as the new president of the Soviet Union!) that all Lithuanian citizens must give up their weapons for “temporary storage.”63 Although the Lithuanians did not have a force similar to the Slovenes’ and Croats’ TOs, the lesson from Gorbachev was apparently well learned by the Serbian and the JNA leadership. The ensuing standoff between Moscow and Vilnius throughout late March and the whole of April taught Miloševic´’s camp a few other useful lessons, especially regarding the potential responses of the West. The day after Gorbachev’s edict that the Lithuanians must give up their weapons, President Bush publicly stated that although the United States had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics, “there are certain realities in life—the Lithuanians are well aware of them—and they should talk . . . with the Soviet officials about these differences.” As Soviet paratroopers occupied the Communist Party building in Vilnius and Soviet tanks rolled through the streets of Lithuania’s capital, the main thought on President Bush’s mind was not how to stop Gorbachev’s military intervention but how not to become “a president who gives subject peoples the false impression that if they rebel, they are going to get help.” In the words of Bush’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, “Americans could do no more than wish the Balts well, since there was a ‘lot more at stake’ in terms of US national interests.”64 At the peak of the Moscow-Vilnius confrontation that April (and with Bush’s encouragement), French president Mitterrand and West German chancellor Kohl concurred with Scowcroft. They wrote to the Lithuanian president, Vytautas Landsbergis, and urged him to suspend the declaration of independence and bargain with Gorbachev.65 As Kohl bluntly told Lithuanian · “With [Gorbachev], we know where we prime minister Kazimira Prunskiene, stand; what comes afterward, we have no idea.”66 Since the Moscow-Vilnius confrontation was taking place in the weeks of the JNA’s planning for the disarmament of Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbian camp could have interpreted the signals from the West in only one possible way: similar activities by the (perceived) holders of central power in Yugoslavia would be internationally tolerated.67 The extent to which the events in Lithuania and the West’s response to them had an effect on Yugoslav affairs was assessed by Croatia’s new president, Franjo Tud‒man, in a New York Times editorial that June. “Belgrade has learned and implemented the lesson of Lithuania: rather than condemning democratization, the Communists argue that the price of democratization is higher than the West should be willing to pay. . . . It is the height of arrogance for the US to

91 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

92 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy dismiss Croatian democracy on the ground that regional stability is at stake when we Croatians are willing to put our lives at stake for our freedom and dignity.”68 The analysis in Tud‒man’s editorial was correct. Belgrade was obviously using Western fears of instability (demonstrated in the Lithuanian case) in order to push its agenda—an agenda that was indeed putting the lives of not only Croatians at stake. The disarmament of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s TO forces had a clear purpose. It was the groundwork for the imposition of a new solution to the Yugoslav crisis on the Slovenes and the Croats. More dangerous, it was also the groundwork for a bitter collision between Croatia’s two largest national groups. Knowing full well that Croatia’s loss of TO weapons meant little without political control, in the weeks following the elections that brought the HDZ to power, Miloševic´ established a strong and practical bond with the Serb Democratic Party leadership in the Croatian region of Krajina.69 Throughout the spring and early summer months of 1990, the most prominent leaders of this new pan-Serb coalition intensified their public challenges to Croatia’s frontiers. On 28 May, Borisav Jovic´ in a speech to the SFRJ Assembly asserted that in case any Yugoslav republic decided on secession (the allusion was clearly to Slovenia and even more so to Croatia), the borders of that republic would be up for renegotiation.70 Two weeks later, in his speech to Serbia’s National Assembly, Slobodan Miloševic´ declared that Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution was “an example of a constitutional swindle against the Serb people” and that “in the case that a federative Yugoslavia is not wanted [by the other Yugoslav republics], the issue of Serbia’s borders is an open political question.”71 One of the leaders of the SDS, Jovan Opacˇic´, soon thereafter outlined what this meant in practical terms. In case of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Opacˇic´ claimed, the Serbian state would extend “from [Croatia’s regions of] Lika and Kordun to [Serbia’s border with Bulgaria at] Pirot, and from [Serbia’s border with Hungary at] Subotica to [the Croatian town of] Dubrovnik.”72 Opacˇic´ may have been publicly more explicit than Miloševic´ and Jovic´ in articulating Serbia’s irredentist claims against Croatia (and BosniaHerzegovina), but his description of the new Serbian state was exactly along the lines of what his two more senior allies were privately expressing. In a 27 June conversation with General Kadijevic´, Borisav Jovic´ stated that his preference was “to forcibly expel [Slovenia and Croatia] from Yugoslavia by simply drawing borders and declaring that they have brought this upon themselves. . . . I would like to present to them a fait accompli.” The following day, Miloševic´ agreed with Jovic´ and explained his solution for the Croatian Serbs: “First, that the ‘amputation’ of Croatia be effected in such a way that the Lika, Banija, and Kordun municipalities . . . remain with us, whereby the people there

Challenges of Democracy later declare in a referendum whether they want to stay or go; and second, that the members of the Yugoslav presidency from Slovenia and Croatia be excluded from voting on this decision because they do not represent the part of Yugoslavia that is adopting it.” As Jovic´ concluded on the occasion, “Without Croatia and Slovenia, Yugoslavia will have around seventeen million inhabitants, and that is enough for European circumstances.”73 Six weeks later, during a joint vacation which ironically took place in Croatia near Dubrovnik, Miloševic´, Jovic´, and Kadijevic´ continued their plotting. First, they agreed they “definitely [had] to get rid of” Ante Markovic´, whom General Kadijevic´ labeled a “son of a bitch.” Second, they concurred that the Slovenian and Croatian calls for a Yugoslav confederation could be accepted, but only if Serbia’s borders were adjusted to include Montenegro and parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.74 Faced with such open hostility by a clearly superior adversary (or simply because the electoral campaign was over) Franjo Tud‒man significantly tempered his rhetoric in the immediate post-election period. Although the more hawkish members of his party, especially on the local level, did little to assuage the fears of Croatia’s Serbs for their safety and status, Tud‒man and his closest associates— most of whom were former members of Tito’s Partisans—actually tried hard to bridge the ethnic gap exacerbated during the electoral campaign.75 Before the formation of Croatia’s new government on 30 May, Tud‒man offered the leader of the SDS, Jovan Raškovic´, the positions of Croatia’s deputy prime minister and vice-president of the Croatian Sabor, but he was refused on both counts.76 In his inaugural speech, Tud‒man proclaimed that the most important task of the new Croatian government was “legal security for all Croatian citizens irrespective of their nationality, for peace and trust between them.”77 Peace and trust between the Croats and the Serbs was, however, in short supply. Inter-ethnic ties that had been damaged in Miloševic´’s drive for the destabilization of Croatia during 1989 and then further harmed by the HDZ’s nationalist campaign were now beyond repair. Tempted by Miloševic´’s strength and secretly guided by his emissaries, the leadership of the Krajina Serbs intensified its conflict with Croatia’s government and soon turned it into a fully armed rebellion.78 Already by 21 May 1990, the SDS had decided to create a regional alliance of six municipalities around the small railway town of Knin in northern Dalmatia, where the Serbs formed a majority.79 (For Croatia’s ethnic makeup, see figure 1.) On 27 June, this “Community of Municipalities” was officially proclaimed, prompting the accusation of the Croatian government that the SDS was attempting to create “a state within a state.”80 In the coming days, police stations in those municipalities, staffed largely by local Serbs, refused allegiance to the Croatian ministry of internal affairs and limited the control of

93 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy

Figure 1.  Ethnic composition of Croatia by municipality, 1991

the region for the republic’s authorities.81 Although all of these undertakings had the semblance of spontaneous acts of disobedience by the local Serbs, they were to a great extent instigated and managed by the high-ranking officials of the State Security Service (SDB) of Serbia, sent to the region by Miloševic´.82 These officials not only trained and equipped the leaders of the Krajina mutiny (like the Knin police inspector Milan Martic´, who soon became the military and political leader of the local Serbs), but they also made sure that there was no response to any attempts of the HDZ government to engage the SDS leadership in dialogue.83 This was an orchestrated campaign which had all the characteristics of Serbia’s crisis buildup in Kosovo during 1988 and 1989, and it was now precipitously dragging Croatia into actual armed conflict.84 Outside of

Challenges of Democracy Yugoslavia, however, virtually no one—in spite of all the evidence of impending disaster—seemed to notice. Although US diplomats in Belgrade had already by June begun to compare the situation in Croatia to that in Cyprus or Lebanon by wondering “where do we draw the Green Line?,” Ambassador Zimmermann’s greatest contribution to his lengthy conversation with Borisav Jovic´ that month was his assurance that the criticism of Serbia’s actions against Kosovo in the US Congress did not constitute official US policy.85 The approach of most US allies in Western Europe differed little. The Dutch ambassador in Belgrade, Albert Nooij, reported to The Hague on 23 July 1990 that “the continued existence of the (con)federation as a viable state seems to be hanging from a silk thread” and that “Serbian president Miloševic´ had emphasized that in the case [of the disintegration of Yugoslavia] the borders between the republics would have to be revised—by force if need be.” In place of sending suggestions for the discouragement of the Serbian boss, however, the ambassador’s superiors instead instructed him to give no possible support to Slovenia and Croatia!86 What is more important, when General Kadijevic´ sent his closest associates during the early summer of 1990 to the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom to get the responses of these three powers to the JNA’s plans for an armed intervention directed against the new leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia, these JNA emissaries also received no words of caution or discouragement.87 By the last week of July, the conflict between the Krajina Serbs and the Croatian government had begun to take mass proportions. The SDS responded to the amendments to Croatia’s constitution, implemented by the Croatian Sabor on 25 July, with a rival “Serb Sabor,” held that same day at a rally near Knin of about 120,000 Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. The Croatian Sabor’s amendments, among other things, reasserted the republic’s sovereignty, placed Croatia’s traditional coat of arms instead of the red star on the flag, removed the term “socialist” from all republican institutions, and limited the use of the Cyrillic script to areas with a Serb majority.88 These amendments were rejected by the “Serb Sabor” and answered with an assertion that the Serb nation had a right to decide “on its historic territories in presentday Croatia with whom it lives, under which regime it lives, and how it will create ties with the other nations in Yugoslavia.”89 Most important, the following week the “Serb National Council”—the executive body of the SDS leaders formed on the occasion of the mass “Serb Sabor”—called for a referendum of Croatia’s Serbs, to be held between 19 August and 2 September 1990, to decide on an official proclamation of Serb autonomy within Croatia.90 Outvoted and vastly outnumbered in Croatia’s first democratic elections, the leadership of the

95 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

96 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy Krajina Serbs now wanted a new electoral round in which the Serbs would be the only ones to vote. The response of the Croatian government revealed not only its obvious frustration with the events, but also its utter powerlessness to do anything to change them. President Tud‒man stated in front of the Croatian Sabor that “we are confronted with a scenario for the kosovization and destabilization of Croatia, with a goal of taking down the legitimate Croatian government,” but he could do no more than ask his colleagues and supporters to be “sensible and reasonable” in order not to provoke the other side.91 Two days before the Serb mass rally near Knin, Tud‒man spoke privately with Jovan Raškovic´ and offered to institute Serb cultural autonomy within Croatia. Raškovic´, however, avoided accepting Tud‒man’s offer by stating that things were already out of control because Serbs were “a crazy people, incredibly armed . . . like commandos.”92 Other similar efforts of Croatian officials, like those of the republic’s prime minister, Stipe Mesic´, to communicate with the local Serb leadership in the weeks after the “Serb Sabor” simply got no response.93 Instead of negotiating with Zagreb, the Krajina functionaries now had a firm sponsor in Belgrade, where they were given resources not only for the referendum and the institution of autonomy, but also for armed rebellion.94 On the eve of the Serb referendum, armed rebellion was finally on the streets of Krajina. Croatia’s authorities proclaimed the referendum illegal and attempted to regain control of the local police stations on 17 August but were met with stiff resistance by both the local Serb policemen and the JNA. The army’s MiGs forced three helicopters of Croatia’s ministry of internal affairs that were headed for Knin to abort their mission, and local stockpiles of weapons under the JNA’s control were given out to newly formed militia units loyal to the SDS leadership.95 These units, staffed to a significant extent by men brought to the region from Serbia by Miloševic´’s SDB, then blocked off all access to the area by forming road barricades from fallen rocks and tree logs, thus giving the Krajina mutiny its popular name of “the log revolution.”96 Newscasts throughout Europe were filled with footage of Western tourists leaving the Dalmatian coast in panic, giving the crisis an additional economic dimension that was hardly welcome for the reforms of the federal prime minister, Markovic´. Faced with a far better armed and supported enemy, the Croatian authorities did the only sensible thing: they withdrew. The referendum proceeded as scheduled and resulted in nearly 100 percent support for autonomy.97 Defended by the JNA and the new militias led by Knin police inspector Martic´, the Krajina region was now effectively off limits to Croatia’s authorities and remained so until 1995.

Challenges of Democracy The danger that the armed rebellion of the Krajina Serbs presented to Yugoslavia’s stability was soundly assessed by Western intelligence. In its report of 18 August, the CIA identified the risk of violence as high, particularly between the JNA and the Croatian police forces. It further asserted that such violence “could easily spill over into ethnically mixed Bosnia and other regions and ignite a wider conflict.”98 According to the CIA analysis, Croatia was on the verge of a civil conflict that threatened to engulf the rest of the country. Such assessments did not lead to any reappraisal of policy toward the crisis or toward Yugoslavia by the Western powers. As Borisav Jovic´ reported in his diary, the message that US State Department officials gave to Yugoslav representatives in the midst of the Krajina referendum was that the United States was for a unified and democratic Yugoslavia and that it would not support its breakup.99 The message from the European leaders was virtually identical. As the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, stated during a meeting with Yugoslavia’s federal presidency on 27 August, the EC wanted Yugoslavia to be “a strong federal state and had no interest whatsoever in a break-up of the country.”100 The world’s commitment to Yugoslavia’s integrity was understandable. However, the lack of at least some acknowledgment of the causes of the crisis in Croatia only strengthened Miloševic´’s hand. August 1990 was, of course, a dramatic month in international affairs, filled with events likely deemed in the West to be more important than Yugoslavia. It was not only the month of continuing negotiations on German unity, which culminated in the signing of a unification treaty by the two German states on 31 August, but also the month when the world’s attention dramatically shifted from the events in Europe to those in the Middle East. On 2 August, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, drawing severe condemnation from virtually all corners of the international community. The world was presented with the first real test of the post–Cold War era, and the months that followed were marked by serious debates within the Western alliance over how to respond to Iraqi aggression.101 Although Iraq managed to sow discord among the Western allies throughout the summer and fall of 1990, their initial response to the invasion of Kuwait was universally determined and strong, nowhere more so than in the United States.102 In contrast to his own and the State Department’s decision to leave Yugoslavia to cope alone with the virus of Serb nationalism and irredentism, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger provided a strong voice against Saddam Hussein’s aggression. At a Camp David meeting of the highest US officials on 4 August, Eagleburger insisted that tolerating the Iraqi invasion would set “all the wrong standards for the new world order.” It would tell other world dictators that in the absence of global bipolarity, “pipsqueaks like Saddam

97 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

98 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy Hussein [could] do more rather than less because they [weren’t] constrained by their Big Brother.”103 President Bush agreed and thus set in motion a lengthy and painstaking buildup toward international intervention, as well as a process of reevaluation of what this “new world order” to which Eagleburger had referred actually meant. In an address before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990, titled “Toward a New World Order,” Bush explained how he saw the post–Cold War world: “Out of these troubled times . . . a new world order can emerge; a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. . . . Today, that new world is struggling to be born . . . a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. . . . Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.”104 Though Bush’s speech may have been no more than a marketing ploy for a divided Congress or anxious allies, the vision expressed had the potential of capturing the hearts and minds of the international community. Invoked, however, only in this one particular case, when the “lion’s share of the world’s remaining oil reserves” was under threat of being “dominated by one so ruthless” as Saddam Hussein,105 the call for a “new world order” rang hollow, especially in a country that for years had been tormented by a “pipsqueak” like Miloševic´. Indeed, as President Bush outlined his vision of a new world in which “actual and potential despots” were confronted by the international community with determination and resolve, Yugoslavia’s and Croatia’s crisis reached a new and violent climax. In two September reports, the CIA asserted that “the federal Yugoslavia created by Tito is unraveling,” with a high likelihood of “ethnic strife [escalating] into communal conflict or even civil war.” In the opinion of the CIA analysts, all the elements of the federation’s security that had held it together for decades were now gone. The northwestern republics were turning toward European markets and integrations, and Serbia was turning toward “uncompromising nationalist policies” in Kosovo. The chances of Yugoslavia violently disappearing from the world scene were deemed to be high, with the likely scenario of a descent into war starting with the escalation of clashes between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs, followed by a spillover into ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had “much tinder for more serious trouble.” Most important for the grand visions of a “new world order,” the CIA reports asserted that Yugoslavia’s crisis threatened to turn the Balkans into “an area of major instability in the borderlands of Europe. [This] at a minimum . . . would

Challenges of Democracy hamper US and Western efforts to build a stable post–Cold War order in Europe.”106 In other words, Miloševic´’s push for a new Yugoslav order in the form of Serbia’s expansion at the expense of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was threatening President Bush’s platform for a new world order and European stability. Perhaps nothing demonstrated better how these two “new orders” were destined to clash than a meeting between the chief ideologue of Serb nationalism ´ ´, and the president of the SFRJ presidency, and irredentism, Dobrica Cosic Borisav Jovic´, which took place exactly on the same day as President Bush’s address to the Congress—11 September 1990. In his portrayal of Serbia’s national ´ ´ presented the same analysis of interests to a highly receptive Jovic´, Cosic Yugoslavia’s dissolving cohesion as the CIA: everything that had held the fed´ ´, however, did not call for a new system of eration together was now gone. Cosic “shared responsibility and justice . . . where the strong respect the rights of the weak,” as President Bush did. He instead called for the formation of a new and enlarged Serbian state: “from [the Dalmatian town of] Šibenik, through Lika, Bosnian Krajina, along the Sava, and to [the Bosnian town of] Bijeljina, everywhere where Serbs are in the majority.”107 It was a vision of a solution to the Yugoslav crisis that belonged to the nineteenth rather than to the brink of the twenty-first century. It was also a vision which guided the actions and policies of the Serbian leadership in the years to come. On 30 September, the “Serb National Council” proclaimed the institution of the “Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina,” comprising (unnamed) Croatian municipalities where the Serbs claimed they were in the majority. Just as predicted by the CIA, clashes erupted between Croatia’s special police units and the armed supporters of the autonomous region in the Croatian towns of Petrinja, Glina, and Dvor, with one policeman and one civilian wounded. Around Knin, the scene of the most dramatic August events, roads and railway lines were blockaded for all traffic to the cities on the Adriatic coast. Late on 2 October, two policemen were shot and wounded by Martic´’s militiamen manning one such roadblock near Knin. The following morning, Croat-owned shops in Knin were petrol-bombed. The government of Serbia, directly involved in the instigation of conflicts in Krajina, on 1 October also called on the federal authorities to intervene to “defend Serbs from repression in Croatia.” Leading representatives of Serbia’s political establishment escalated their rhetoric to the point of demands for “a declaration of war” against Croatia.108 However, not even this escalation—practically identical to the CIA’s predictions—led to any shift in Western policy. During this last outbreak of violence in Krajina, President Bush personally met with both Franjo Tud‒man

99 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy and Borisav Jovic´. The contrast between those two meetings revealed how the United States and the West viewed the crisis. On 25 September, during Tud‒man’s meeting with President Bush’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, Bush briefly entered Scowcroft’s office, exchanged a few words of greeting with Tud‒man, and left. Scowcroft, meanwhile, refused to engage in any talks regarding a possible Yugoslav confederation and merely “repeated coldly that his administration supported the unity of Yugoslavia at any cost, as well as that of the Soviet Union. On the request to put pressure on Belgrade not to use force and weapons, Scowcroft answered that they supported the government of Ante Markovic´ and the unity of Yugoslavia.”109 Tud‒man tried to present the meeting in a positive light in the press, but it was clear to everybody in Yugoslavia that Washington had given him the cold shoulder. The meeting between Bush and Jovic´ the following week in New York was dramatically different. At the very beginning, in addition to his usual assertions of support for Yugoslavia’s “unity, independence, and territorial integrity,” President Bush practically apologized for even shaking Tud‒man’s hand. Though he welcomed the democratic changes and elections in all the republics and referred to the issue of human rights violations in Kosovo, the principal element of Bush’s message was his question whether the United States should be “more vocal in expressing its position on behalf of the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.” Jovic´, naturally, used the opportunity to request that the United States make sure it qualified its expressions of support for democracy with statements of condemnation of secessionist demands in places like Kosovo and Slovenia. Bush concluded by “expressing his satisfaction with what he heard.”110 The Guardian of London rightly noted in October 1990 that “paradoxically, Western policy as currently practiced has the effect of bolstering the Serbian authoritarian leader, Slobodan Miloševic´, against more liberal elements, and at a time of mounting anti-Western frenzy in Serbia.”111 Indeed, the neglect of the causes of the crisis in Croatia and the blind public commitment to Yugoslav unity without virtually any reference to the destructiveness of Miloševic´’s policies or the JNA’s abuse of force could have only bolstered the Serbian camp. This Western approach to the situation in Croatia and Yugoslavia was partly rooted in the fact that the American and European policy makers did not wish to jeopardize the reform processes in the Soviet Union and that they were overstretched with the events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. This approach also, however, had roots in something much less justifiable. For all the talk of a “new world order” and the “respect of the strong for the rights of the weak,” when it came to Yugoslavia, the West was playing an “old world order” realist

Challenges of Democracy game of banking on the perceived holders of central power. Miloševic´ and his associates shrewdly understood the lessons of Lithuania and Western ambivalence about the events in Croatia and thus successfully set the foundations for a protracted military conflict whose goal was not the maintenance of Yugoslav unity but the formation of a new and enlarged Serbian state on the ruins of the already abandoned Yugoslav federation. ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY OR ETHNIC PARTITION?

The CIA’s perception of the threat that the Croatian crisis posed for the stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina was well founded. The security of Yugoslavia’s central republic always depended on the quality of relations between the two larger republics that enveloped it, and the relations between Croatia and Serbia in the summer months of 1990 reached a new and dangerous low. More important, the long Serb nationalist campaign which questioned the very existence and sovereign status of the BiH republic was now answered with a dangerous policy from Croatia. Franjo Tud‒man may have tempered his rhetoric after Croatia’s electoral campaign, but his public challenges regarding the national identity of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independent status added to the poisoning of the already severely damaged inter-ethnic relations within that fragile republic. To make matters even more serious, Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the midst of moving toward its first free elections, which were to define its own and Yugoslavia’s future. Bosnia’s problems during this period were compounded by its weakened and inexperienced Communist leadership, which continuously proved to be incapable of balancing different ethnic interests. Staffed largely by the new generation of Bosnian politicians in the aftermath of the Agrokomerc corruption scandal of 1987, the highest leadership of the SKBiH struggled to find its own path in the conflict which had broken up the federal party organization at the Fourteenth Congress. Though it even participated (under pressure from its disproportionally Bosnian Serb base) in Miloševic´’s attempt to resuscitate the federal party in May 1990, the leadership of the BiH League of Communists could hardly be labeled as dogmatist, non-reformist, or pro-Miloševic´.112 After all, it was the Serbian president’s campaign which had started the process of Bosnia’s destabilization during 1988 and 1989. The truly difficult task for the SKBiH leadership was how to balance the sympathies of the party’s membership and the republic’s mixed population with Yugoslavia’s three possible policy directions: the faster economic and political reforms as advocated by the federal

101 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

102 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy prime minister, the centralism and nationalism of the Serbian president, or the country’s decentralization and democratization as demanded by the northwestern republics. The problem was that the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had always looked to Belgrade and Zagreb for political guidance, but—in the environment of extremely heightened tensions—this habit of outside sponsorship only spelled disaster for Bosnia-Herzegovina and its ruling party. As Yugoslavia’s crisis intensified during the spring and summer months of 1990, the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina progressively lost the last elements of its grip on power and virtually all of the popular support it still enjoyed. On 12 June, the republic’s Constitutional Court ruled that the ban on ethnically defined political parties, which the SKBiH had instituted and vigorously defended, was unconstitutional. Ethnic parties, which by then had already managed to semi-illegally organize large segments of the population, were now free to publicly voice their rightist challenges to the ruling political elite. On 29 July, at a rally of one hundred thousand people on Mount Kozara in northern Bosnia, Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic´ also staked his claim to the BiH government by launching his own leftist party: the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (SRSJ).113 Hugely popular in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Markovic´ thought his allies would sweep into government in the republic and thus make him the ultimate power broker in the federation. In the coming months, however, his party only exhausted itself and the SKBiH in useless mutual attacks that split the left’s popular support and weakened its prospects of stemming the tide of nationalism. Making matters even worse for the SKBiH, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, which had erupted that August, struck Bosnia-Herzegovina’s large enterprises particularly hard. Burdened already by Markovic´’s shock therapy and the overvalued dinar, the loss of more than $1 billion in unpaid materials and services by both Iraq and Kuwait brought these companies to the brink of bankruptcy and left their workers looking for alternatives.114 When the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided on 7 August to call for multi-party elections, to be held on 18 November and 2 December, support for the ruling party was already in precipitous decline. The three nationalist parties of BosniaHerzegovina’s three constituent nations proved to be the ones that used that decline the best: the Croatian Democratic Union, the Serb Democratic Party, and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the BiH Muslims. The political organization of both Bosnian Croats and Serbs followed the pattern established during the electoral campaign in Croatia. The Croatian Democratic Union of Franjo Tud‒man, simultaneously with its organizational expansion throughout Croatia, took significant Croat-populated regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina by storm. During the early months of 1990, tens of thousands

Challenges of Democracy of BiH Croats—particularly in the region of western Herzegovina—joined Tud‒man’s party and its ambiguous platform for the protection of Croatian national interests in Yugoslavia’s central republic. As explained above, Tud‒man’s campaign statements, which called for Croatia “in its historic and natural borders,” compared Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to West and East Germany, and challenged the independent national identity of Bosnian Muslims, caused many to wonder what the HDZ’s policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina actually was. Though Tud‒man restrained his rhetoric after Croatia’s elections, the HDZ’s stance toward Bosnia-Herzegovina in the months leading up to the elections in this republic was still at best unclear. Was the HDZ in favor of BosniaHerzegovina’s sovereignty within a Yugoslav confederation, its independence, its subservient position in a personal union with Croatia, or its division among its three (or two) constituent nations? Careful observers of political affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period could have found evidence of support for all of these options within the strongest party of the republic’s Croat population. The principal source of confusion regarding the HDZ’s standpoint toward the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the fact that the party’s BiH organization was led by people like Stjepan Kljuic´, who, though loyal to Franjo Tud‒man and his leadership, did not share the Croatian president’s disdain for the complexities of Bosnian society or his enthusiasm for a possible deal with Miloševic´ at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tud‒man, in spite of solid advice from his more moderate associates, still held on to his controversial view of Yugoslavia’s central republic. Based on that view, Bosnia-Herzegovina was “an artificial colonial creation” and a source of regional instability whose potential for sparking conflict due to rival claims from Serbia and Croatia could be eliminated by its three-way or two-way (depending on the choice of the Bosnian Muslims) partition.115 This dangerous and ultimately erroneous perception of BosniaHerzegovina did not only lead to the HDZ’s mixed messages during the electoral campaign, where the calls of the party’s Bosnian leadership for “defending the frontiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina even at the price of civil war” were heard alongside separatist claims of its functionaries in western Herzegovina.116 Tud‒man’s lack of understanding of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also the seed of the future two-faced policy of the HDZ toward this republic and its defense against the ultimate Serbian aggression. The message of the Serb Democratic Party, on the other hand, did not suffer from any lack of clarity. Formed during the summer of 1990 as an offspring of ´ ´, the SDS the Croatian SDS and under the decisive guidance of Dobrica Cosic of Bosnia-Herzegovina saw this republic as a historically Serb land which under

103 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

104 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy no circumstances could be a sovereign state in case of Yugoslavia’s dissolution or transformation into a confederation. In the words of the new leader of the BiH SDS, Radovan Karadžic´, “The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina tie all their hopes to their homeland Serbia and will never allow themselves to be separated from Serbia by some sort of a state frontier. . . . The Serb people will find a way to be in the same—simple or complex—state as Serbia.”117 The position of the Bosnian SDS was that Yugoslavia either had to remain a federation or become more compact by shedding Slovenia and Croatia without its Serb-populated regions. Whereas the Bosnian HDZ at least had a strong wing within its leadership which worked for the preservation of the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDS had nothing of the sort. The vision that this party promoted to its electorate was basically of a Bosnia-Herzegovina as a constituent element in the de facto new Greater Serbian state.118 Faced with such policy preferences of the two parties representing BosniaHerzegovina’s two smaller constituent nations, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action had a difficult choice to make. In spite of the clear sympathies of its highest leadership for Yugoslavia’s transformation into a confederation, the SDA was forced to craft a carefully balanced policy of equidistance between the country’s two camps. Unlike the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not look to Belgrade or Zagreb for guidance since their republic was their only perceived homeland and their sole option for survival. And in order to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina together, the SDA had to keep both its Serbs and Croats onside. As the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegovic´, stated during the campaign, “The idea of a confederation is more to my taste, but it is not realistic today. It is not time for personal tastes and sympathies, and I am trying to be as realistic as possible. . . . We stand on the position of equal closeness and equal distance from the Serb and Croat centers.”119 Though this choice of equidistance between Yugoslavia’s two principal poles was viewed as frustrating and disingenuous by the Serbs and especially by the Croats, it was the key— together with a vigorous defense of the republic’s sovereignty—to the SDA’s success in becoming the central voice of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims. As much as they felt the threat from Belgrade more acutely than from Zagreb, the Muslims still believed that choosing sides would lead to the dissolution of their republic. In spite of attacks from the left and the right during the electoral campaign and in spite of a clear tilt of public opinion toward the nationalist parties (which was obvious in polls and in the sheer numbers of people who attended their rallies), the League of Communists was on the eve of the elections still convinced of getting the most seats.120 Its attempt to be all things to all people,

Challenges of Democracy

105

however, simply had to backfire in a tense multi-ethnic environment such as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s. On the one hand, even though the republic’s parliament, controlled by the SKBiH, proclaimed on 31 July that Bosnia-Herzegovina was “a democratic sovereign state of equal citizens—Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and members of other nations and nationalities which live in it”121—most Muslims and Croats still perceived the ruling party as too weak in defending Bosnian sovereignty from Serbian irredentist claims. On the other hand, even though the SKBiH leadership supported Miloševic´’s efforts to resurrect the SKJ organization after the collapsed Fourteenth Congress and was in favor of Yugoslavia’s remaining a federation, most Bosnian Serbs still thought the party had betrayed them by leaning toward the reformists in the northwestern republics. In other words, the electorate of all the national groups no longer trusted the apparatus of the ruling party to make momentous decisions and inter-ethnic compromises behind its closed doors. The voters of Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted clear accounts in inter-ethnic and inter-republican relations. Judging by the electoral results, presented in table 4.3, that is exactly what they got. After the elections of 18 November and 2 December, the new BiH parliament faithfully represented the republic’s national structure: 35.8 percent of the 240 seats went to the Muslim SDA, 30 percent to the Serb SDS, and 18.3 percent to the Croat HDZ. The two multinational parties of the left—the League of Communists and the Alliance of Reform Forces—exhausted by mutual attacks and their inability to form a joint bloc, were decimated at the polls and took only 8.3 percent and 5 percent of the seats respectively. The situation was

Table 4.3 Parliamentary Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990 Party of Democratic Action (SDA) Serb Democratic Party (SDS) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) League of Communists and allies (SKBiH-SDP) Alliance of Reform Forces (SRSJ) Others Total

Percent of Votes

Number of Seats

31.5 26.1 16.1 13.7 8.9 3.7 100

86 72 44 20 12 6 240

Percent of Seats 35.8 30.0 18.3 8.3 5.0 2.5 100

Source: Republicˇka izborna komisija SR BiH, “Izvještaji o rezultatima izbora poslanika u Vijec´e grad‒ana i Vijec´e opština Skupštine Socijalisticˇke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine,” Službeni list SR BiH, vol. 46, no. 42 (19 December 1990): 1242–1263.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

106 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy no different in the republic’s seven-member presidency, for which the BiH voters had to vote based on their nationality. The SDS won the two seats reserved for the Serbs, the HDZ took the two seats reserved for the Croats, and the SDA took the two seats reserved for the Muslims, as well as the one seat reserved for “others.” The head of the SKBiH, Nijaz Durakovic´, in the aftermath of the Croatian elections, claimed to have learned from the mistake of his Croatian counterparts in instituting majoritarian electoral rules.122 His party, however, put in place exactly the same majoritarian rules for the BiH Council of Municipalities, where it won only 4 out of 110 seats. It also chose ethnically based voting for the republic’s presidency, where it was shut out by the nationalist parties.123 With such abysmal results, it appears that the choice of electoral rules by Durakovic´’s SKBiH was even more mistaken than was the case with Racˇan’s SKH. Somewhat surprisingly, all three nationalist parties formed a post-election coalition and the new government. The Western press found this cooperation a “timely example to Yugoslavia’s feuding nations” and perhaps even a signal that Bosnia-Herzegovina could survive as a form of consociational democracy.124 Those who followed political affairs in Yugoslavia’s central republic more closely and took note of all the local inter-ethnic clashes during the electoral campaign were, however, far more concerned.125 The nationalist parties swept the Communists not only out of the republic’s parliament and presidency, but also out of nearly all municipal and local councils, making some BiH regions subject to their own exclusive rule. The SDS, just as in Croatia, even prior to the elections began to form volunteer units and created its own “Serb National Council”—a quasi-executive body ready to take over the duties of a parallel government in case the Serbs decided not to respect the republic’s institutions. The HDZ, though running on the platform of its Sarajevo leadership for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina in a Yugoslav confederation, was still internally torn by those who would have rather seen their republic divided. And the SDA, stuck between a rock and a hard place, was not ready to let Bosnia-Herzegovina fall without a fight. In the words of Alija Izetbegovic´, the Muslims were “ready to defend Bosnia with arms. . . . Bosnia will not agree to remain in a Greater Serbia and be a part of it. [If Slovenia and Croatia declare independence], we will also declare independence, the absolute independence of Bosnia.”126 The coalition that the three national parties formed after the elections was, therefore, just a temporary marriage of convenience. Unable to agree on anything other than the division of political offices, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ formed a government which soon fell into a vicious cycle of permanent deadlock bound for violent conflict over the republic’s ethnic partition.

Challenges of Democracy YUGOSLAVIA TRANSFORMED: DEMOCRACY’S LAST WAVE

The democratic advances in Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics presented great problems for Slobodan Miloševic´ not only because they brought to power non-Communist governments much more willing to stand up to his campaign. Since the Serbian president throughout most of 1990 was stalling with moving his republic toward multi-party democracy, the elections in Slovenia and Croatia were also a testament to the Yugoslav and international community that there were fundamental differences among Yugoslavia’s republican regimes and that Miloševic´ had something to fear from democratic competition. The Serbian boss and his associates were indeed fearful of democratic competition, primarily because they were (rightly) convinced that a fair democratic election would remove them from power in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Although the attention of the Serbian leadership and the Serbian electorate throughout 1990 shifted westward to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the issue of Kosovo and the status of its Albanian population still defined and determined Serbia’s path toward multi-party democracy. The immediate aftermath of the Fourteenth Congress brought massive protests of Kosovo Albanians in favor of the institution of full democracy in the province and against the resumption of the Vllasi trial. The conflict that ensued on the streets of the province’s towns and villages, as well as in the Yugoslav federal institutions, exposed the depth of the gulf not only between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, but also between Serbia and Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics. While Serbia’s government functionaries competed that winter with their republic’s nascent opposition in discriminatory rhetoric against the Albanians, the Slovenes stiffened in their resolve not to live in a federation dominated by such verbal and actual violence.127 As discussed above, Miloševic´ and his ally in the federal presidency, Borisav Jovic´, managed to secure the federal approval of “special measures” and JNA intervention in Kosovo that January. The arrival of the army forces and the eventual acquittal of Azem Vllasi in late April brought a brief respite in the province’s turmoil, but Kosovo never truly ceased to simmer, and by late June it again blew up in a new round of clashes. In February and March 1989 Kosovo’s Provincial Assembly, staffed largely by the more pliant Albanian functionaries willing to collaborate with Miloševic´, agreed under severe duress to remove the principal vestiges of Kosovo’s autonomy. By the summer of 1990, pushed by the violence exerted against their compatriots, even those “good Albanians” decided to stand up to Miloševic´’s regime and proclaim Kosovo to be Yugoslavia’s seventh republic. Anticipating this

107 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

108 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy move, Serbian authorities locked up the Provincial Assembly on 26 June, transferred all remaining powers of Kosovo’s institutions to Serbia’s National Assembly, and called for a snap referendum in which Serbia’s voters were asked to approve the plan of the ruling party to promulgate a new constitution prior to the republic’s multi-party elections. This constitution was supposed to not only establish a democratic multi-party system, but also eliminate Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s remaining elements of autonomy, enable Serbia to oppose federal laws, declare Serbia responsible for the Serbs living outside its borders, and enable the president of Serbia to “command” combat forces in peace and war. Simply put, Serbia was being redefined as a de facto independent state whose president was to have vastly expanded powers.128 On 2 July, the constitutional conflict between Miloševic´’s government and the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians reached its peak. Finally undaunted by the scare tactics of the Serbian president, the majority of the deputies in the Provincial Assembly proclaimed on the steps of the assembly building that Kosovo was “an independent and equal unit within the Yugoslav federation with the same constitutional status as the other republics.”129 The Serbian voters, on the other hand, in the referendum which took place on 1 and 2 July, gave an overwhelming vote of approval for Miloševic´’s plan for the new constitution.130 To contribute additional drama to the Kosovo clash, on the very same day—2 July—the Slovenian parliament also passed a declaration proclaiming full sovereignty for the Slovenian republic and calling for the formulation of a new constitution which would, just like the proposed Serbian constitution, enable Slovenia to place its own laws above those of the federation, allow it to control national defense activities on its territory, and empower it to determine its own foreign policy. Though Miloševic´’s camp launched a public attack on the Slovenes for their sovereignty declaration, privately Slovenian officials were actually encouraged to leave Yugoslavia altogether.131 After all, Serbia’s and Slovenia’s plans for their own constitutions were virtually identical, and Serbia was much more interested in Kosovo than in the unity of the Yugoslav federation. During the summer months which followed, Kosovo was torn by violent protests, police interventions, banning of the local press and media, persecution of Albanian political activists, and contending constitutional claims by the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian government.132 In the words of a Western diplomat, the Serbs had decided “that they are going to do whatever they have to in Kosovo, and the rest of the world can go to hell. They say publicly that they will pay any price. If that includes world condemnation and breakup of the Yugoslav federation, they say, so be it.”133 Or, as the headline of the Yugoslav weekly Danas exclaimed above its story of the Kosovo unrest that September, “Yugoslavia Is No More.”134

Challenges of Democracy Just as during the Kosovo protests and Serbia’s constitutional changes in the spring of 1989, the events during the summer of 1990 attracted great attention in the international community, especially in the US Congress. In fact, one could easily draw parallels between the heated congressional debates about the situation in Kosovo and the debates in Yugoslavia’s own federal presidency or assembly. Throughout that summer, a vocal group of senators, led by Senate minority leader Robert Dole, tried to push the White House into taking a more forceful stance against the Miloševic´ regime. They wrote to Ambassador Zimmermann, asking him to express their concern to Belgrade; they attempted to pass congressional resolutions condemning the discrimination of Kosovo Albanians; they wrote editorials in the press; and—unlike in 1989—they even went to Yugoslavia and Kosovo to witness for themselves what was happening on the ground. “What we have here is another situation like Lithuania—a Communist government is threatening to use every means at its disposal to prevent people from exercising their basic right to self-government. That is wrong. And we should condemn it in the strongest terms,” stated Senator Alfonse D’Amato on the floor of the Senate in reference to Serbia’s lockdown of the Kosovo Provincial Assembly.135 Senator Dole’s report from an August visit of a congressional delegation to Yugoslavia and Kosovo was even harsher. With the Serbian authorities exposing their violent methods against the Kosovars in full force during the visit of the US delegation to Priština and even detaining and expelling a delegation of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, the senator concluded that “there is serious question whether Yugoslavia, as a country, will long exist. . . . The Serbian government is running a police state with the acquiescence of the federal government of Yugoslavia. The United States cannot sit this out on the sidelines; we have a moral obligation to take a strong stand in defense of the individual rights of Albanians and all of the people of Yugoslavia.”136 The appraisal of the situation in Kosovo and Yugoslavia by the US senators was in line with the press reports and, more important, with intelligence assessments of the federation’s prospects for the future. The findings of the CIA’s August and September reports about the situation in Croatia, which were discussed above, were in October combined with analyses of the situation in the whole federation into a remarkable National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) called “Yugoslavia Transformed.” According to this NIE, Yugoslavia was to cease to function as a federal state within one year and dissolve within two. “No all-Yugoslav political movement has emerged to fill the void left by the collapse of the Titoist vision of a Yugoslav state, and none will.” This assessment included federal prime minister Markovic´, whose reform achievements were seen as “mostly illusory.” All alternatives to dissolution, particularly the confederal plan

109 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

110 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy of Slovenia and Croatia, were to be defeated because of Serbia’s opposition due to its fear of losing influence. In fact, Serbia’s maneuvering space was so limited that it could “ ‘save’ the unity of the Serbian folk only at risk of civil war.” Such a conflict was seen as particularly likely in Kosovo, where there were signs of a developing “protracted armed uprising of Albanians.” Civil war was seen as less likely to develop in the form of open inter-republic warfare, but it was still deemed dangerously possible. “The most plausible scenario for inter-republic violence,” according to the CIA, was “one in which Serbia, assisted by disaffected Serbian minorities in the other republics, moves to reincorporate disputed territory into a greater Serbia, with [text illegible] and bloody shifts of population. The temptation to engage in such adventures will grow during the period of this Estimate.”137 The CIA’s view of the international side of the crisis was no less perceptive and interesting. Most important, the agency deemed that there was little the United States and its European allies could do to preserve Yugoslav unity but that their actions would nevertheless be seen as significant by the feuding sides. All statements of the Western diplomats would be used by Yugoslavia’s different camps to support their conflicting causes. Statements in favor of Yugoslav unity would likely be used both by Serbia and by the federal leaders, while statements in favor of human rights and self-determination would likely be used by the Slovenes, Croats, and Kosovars. According to the CIA, the European powers were deemed to be basically useless for the management of the crisis. They “will pay lip service to the idea of Yugoslav integrity while quietly accepting the dissolution of the federation. West European governments share Washington’s hope that Yugoslavia’s transformation will be peaceable, but they will not provide much financial support.” Finally, and what is equally important, the Soviet Union was seen as a non-factor. “Its geographic separation, its retreat from hegemony in Eastern Europe and its domestic preoccupation with centrifugal tendencies similar to those in Yugoslavia, will make it a spectator, not a participant in Yugoslav events.”138 The government of the United States (and the governments of its European allies, since intelligence was pooled) was given the best and most reliable information regarding the situation in Yugoslavia.139 The predictive power of the NIE in the months to come proved to be truly impressive. The only real miscalculations were the predictions of an imminent protracted armed uprising of the Kosovo Albanians and of Yugoslavia’s falling apart in two years instead of one. On virtually all other counts, the NIE was astoundingly prophetic. However, this important document, which carried the seal of approval of the director of the CIA and used the best available intelligence and analysis, had no effect on

Challenges of Democracy US and Western policy toward Yugoslavia and Kosovo. According to Marten van Heuven, the head of the team of analysts who wrote the NIE, “nobody was glad to get this predictive assessment” and, worse, it was actually “ignored.”140 Probably due to such disregard for the NIE’s warnings in the highest ranks of the US government (particularly in the State Department), the document’s main findings were leaked to the New York Times in late November, when they did cause a stir but still had no policy impact.141 Some analysts suggest that the reason for the disregard of the NIE was President Bush’s and Secretary Baker’s reliance on Lawrence Eagleburger’s “well-tested relationship with Miloševic´” instead of the CIA reports.142 Such thinking certainly fits in with the US president’s general mistrust of the agency and its director, William H. Webster; the mistrust even resulted with Bush disregarding CIA reports predicting Iraq’s imminent invasion of Kuwait because his high-level Middle East contacts claimed that Saddam Hussein was only bluffing.143 Ambassador Warren Zimmermann and the director of European affairs at the National Security Council, Robert Hutchings, on the other hand, explained the lack of impact of the NIE by blaming the document’s “bald assertion that nothing could be done” and the “smug finality with which [its judgments] were rendered.”144 This explanation, provided by two important players on the US foreign policy team, speaks volumes about the thinking in the Bush administration, particularly because the NIE did not suggest “nothing could be done”—it suggested little could be done to preserve the Yugoslav federation. Since Western powers at the time were of the opinion that the maintenance of unity was the only thing worthwhile doing in Yugoslavia, that was exactly the problem with the NIE, which rendered the whole document “ignorable.” It was simply telling the US and Western policy makers what they did not want to hear. The approach of the State Department and the White House—and thus of the West in general—toward Yugoslavia basically remained unchanged during the last months of 1990, regardless of the NIE’s warnings and the desire of important members of the US Congress for a significant shift in policy. Just as in the spring of 1989, when a number of resolutions regarding the situation in Kosovo were defeated in Congress at the urging of the State Department and the White House, the same happened in October 1990. Even a relatively toothless and balanced resolution which “condemn[ed] the use of force in Kosovo by any party” and basically asked all sides to refrain from violent acts failed to pass muster because of the direct influence of the State Department. According to a State Department letter to the Senate president pro tempore, Robert C. Byrd, “any action [by the US Congress is deemed to be] more likely to have a negative rather

111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy than a positive impact both on human rights situations in Kosovo and the prospect for freedom and prosperity throughout Yugoslavia.”145 Pleas of otherwise influential senators from President Bush’s own party for the United States to condemn Miloševic´’s policies in Kosovo and “not sit this out on the sidelines” were not only left unfulfilled, but were in fact actively opposed by the State Department and the administration. Kosovo and Yugoslavia were one of the first tests of the “new world order” invoked by President Bush that September, and the standardbearers of Western international policy were failing that test resoundingly. Throughout the crucial months of the run-up to Serbia’s first post-Communist election, Slobodan Miloševic´, therefore, did not face any real dangers of international condemnation for his policies. On the contrary, he was free to conduct his violent policy in Kosovo and toward the rest of Yugoslavia. This freedom contributed to his ability to create a winning electoral strategy and enabled him to acquire a democratic stamp of approval from the Serbian electorate. One of the most troubling consequences of Miloševic´’s long nationalist campaign was the dramatic radicalization of Serbia’s political life. The republic’s nascent opposition parties did not even attempt to challenge the Serbian president’s platform from a more tolerant and cosmopolitan standpoint. The ruling League of Communists, which transformed itself into the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in July 1990, was the principal flag bearer of Miloševic´’s policies and the proven apparatus of Serb nationalism. The main opposition parties which formed throughout 1990 did not contest the record of the SPS by providing alternatives for a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. If anything, they proposed even more radical programs that would antagonize just about every non-Serb nation in the federation. Vuk Draškovic´, the leader of the largest opposition party—the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO)—publicly claimed the following: (1) half a million Albanians should be expelled from Kosovo; (2) the Slovenes and the Croats had to pay reparations to Serbia in case Yugoslavia became a confederation or dissolved; (3) the borders of the referendum of the Krajina Serbs were the new borders of Serbia; (4) a new Serbian state should include Macedonia and most of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and (5) any coalition between the Muslim and Croat parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be considered a “declaration of war on the whole of Serbdom.”146 Even the Democratic Party (DS)—which was supposed to represent the urban and well-educated population and provide a liberal alternative to the nationalist socialism of Miloševic´ and the open Cˇetnik ideology of Draškovic´—also backed the formation of Greater Serbia in its electoral program.147 This attempt of Serbia’s opposition parties to match or even surpass the nationalist rhetoric and ideology of Miloševic´ was ultimately a resounding

Challenges of Democracy failure. The resources available to the SPS and its leader in the electoral campaign were practically limitless. The SPS had at its disposal the loyalty of the state apparatus and control over the material assets still overwhelmingly in the hands of the government. The power to set electoral and campaign rules, as well as to increase industrial wages and agricultural subsidies, basically rested in the hands of the SPS leadership and was put to good use. In addition to these administrative and economic resources, the ruling party could also count on an even stronger source of power: the media. After yet another round of purges in the local television news staff in the spring of 1990, a British diplomat remarked to the Times of London that Miloševic´ had turned the Serbian press into “a shameful propaganda machine worthy of Goebbels.”148 During the electoral campaign, this propaganda machine worked tirelessly for the ruling party’s cause, making the obstacles to the opposition’s ascent to power virtually insurmountable.149 The key to the opposition’s inability to reach the voters, however, did not lie only in the media blockade and the capacity of the ruling party to materially reward its constituents. Much of Miloševic´’s success with the Serbian electorate had to do with his extremely well-crafted and powerful campaign, which accentuated his proven record of fighting for the Serb national cause and tapped into the fears of the general population regarding the maintenance of economic security and peace. As much as Miloševic´ in the early years of his rule had claimed he was a reformer (and was perceived as such by the West), his economic platform for the elections on 9 and 23 December was status quo. The masterful slogan of the SPS—“With us there is no uncertainty”—perfectly captured the message that both the job layoffs announced by Markovic´’s reform program and the real casualties invoked by the extremist rhetoric of the likes of Vuk Draškovic´ would not be tolerated under Miloševic´’s administration.150 Ironically, the man who had contributed the most to Yugoslavia’s being on the brink of war was now successfully portraying himself—as he so often did throughout the 1990s—as the man of ethnic reconciliation. With the practically open public endorsements by the JNA chief of staff Veljko Kadijevic´ and his generals, as well as the principal ideologue of the Serb nationalist movement, ´ ´, and his apprentices in the SDS organizations of Croatia and Dobrica Cosic Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miloševic´ became at the same time the protector saint of Serbdom, Yugoslavia, economic stability, and—most important—peace.151 It was a combination that struck a chord with the Serbian voters and propelled Miloševic´ and the SPS to convincing electoral victory. As table 4.4 demonstrates, the SPS—unlike the Croatian and Bosnian successor parties of the old SK—used majoritarian electoral rules to its great

113 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

114 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy Table 4.4 Parliamentary Elections in Serbia, 1990 Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Serb Renewal Movement (SPO) Democratic Party (DS) Democratic Community of   Vojvodina Hungarians Others Total

Percent of Votes

Number of Seats

Percent of Seats

48.1 16.5 7.8

194 19 7

77.6 7.6 2.8

2.7 24.9 100

8 22 250

3.2 8.8 100

Source: Vladimir Goati, ed., Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990–1996 (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1998), 195, 198.

advantage. With 48.1 percent of the total vote, the ruling party secured more than three-quarters of all seats in Serbia’s National Assembly and thus gave its leader a free hand in virtually all matters of policy making. Miloševic´ himself also won the presidential election in the first round with 65.3 percent of the vote, leaving his chief opponent, Vuk Draškovic´, far behind at 16.4 percent. In the end, Miloševic´ and his associates made sure that their fears of democratic elections did not materialize. They maintained a firm grip on Kosovo by not allowing Albanian parties to register, a decision that prompted a broad Kosovar boycott of the elections. In addition, they secured electoral results throughout the republic by blatant vote rigging.152 For all the irregularities and unfairness of the campaign, the size of Miloševic´’s victory signified that his policies and his party had the democratic seal of approval from Serbia’s electorate. By voting for the continuity of the economic policies of non-reform and the constitutional policies vis-à-vis the provinces, it had also voted for the continuity of Miloševic´’s unwillingness to engage the rest of Yugoslavia in real negotiations on the future of the federation. As extremist as Vuk Draškovic´’s rhetoric was, his platform at least also included a promise to hold talks with the leaders of the other Yugoslav nations because they would, in Draškovic´’s words, “have to live together peacefully as neighbors” regardless of Yugoslavia’s future.153 Miloševic´’s resounding victory, however, shattered the hopes of those who wanted to see a change in the balance of political forces within Yugoslavia. As the CIA presciently forecast in the immediate aftermath of Serbia’s elections, “Fears [were] certain to rise among Croatians and Slovenes that [Miloševic´] may ally himself with the Serbdominated federal army to move against them.”154

Challenges of Democracy

115

The division of Yugoslavia’s feuding camps confirmed by Miloševic´’s victory was furthermore compounded by the electoral results in Macedonia and Montenegro, which also held their first free elections that November and December. As table 4.5 demonstrates, the Macedonian elections, held between 11 November and 23 December, produced a hung parliament, with the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) garnering the highest number of seats. During the campaign all Macedonian political parties, including the reformed Communists in the League of Communists of Macedonia–Party for Democratic Change (SKM-PDP), adopted platforms defending republican sovereignty, a stance which confirmed the shift of their republic toward the position of Slovenia and Croatia. The non-partisan government of experts and the new president, Kiro Gligorov, made this shift more apparent in the months to come, carefully balancing the demands of the Macedonian electorate with the republic’s destabilizing surroundings. Montenegro, on the other hand, remained firmly in Miloševic´’s camp. In the elections which took place on the same dates as in Serbia, the ruling League of Communists (SKCG) won two-thirds of the assembly seats, with the rest going to Ante Markovic´’s Reformists, the Democratic Coalition of Muslim and Albanian parties, and the People’s Party (NS), which espoused an even more pro-Serb platform than the SKCG. (See table 4.6.) The leader of the SKCG and one of Miloševic´’s strongest allies, Momir Bulatovic´, also won the runoff election for president of the republic. The last wave of democracy to sweep over Yugoslavia thus entrenched the federation’s principal conflicting parties and brought no respite in their Table 4.5 Parliamentary Elections in Macedonia, 1990 VMRO-DPMNE League of Communists (SKM-PDP) Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) League of Reformist Forces of Macedonia (SRSM) Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM) Others Total

Percent of Number of Votes Seats 21.0 24.3 16.0 17.9 7.3 13.5 100

38 31 22 17 5 7 120

Source: Blagoja Nineski, Izborite, mediumite i partite vo Makedonija 1990–2000 (Skopje, Macedonia: NIP “Studentski zbor,” 2001), 188.

Percent of Seats 31.7 25.8 18.3 14.2 4.2 5.8 100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

116 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy Table 4.6 Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro, 1990 League of Communists (SKCG) League of Reformist Forces (SRSJ za CG) People’s Party (NS) Democratic Coalition Others Total

Percent of Votes

Number of Seats

Percent of Seats

58.3 14.1 13.3 10.5 3.8 100

83 17 13 12 — 125

66.4 13.6 10.4 9.6 — 100

Source: Vladimir Goati, ed., Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990–1996 (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1998), 195, 198.

ongoing clash. Miloševic´ held on to power in Serbia, Montenegro, and—most important—Kosovo. His heavy-handed approach to the Kosovo Albanians, in spite of protests from important international quarters, brought no real condemnation or a significant shift of policy from the West and at the same time left the Serbian leader with a handsome reward. The province which defined Serbia’s path to democracy had finally been pacified and would largely remain so until the second half of the 1990s. The federation’s northwestern republics, and especially Slovenia, now had even less reason to extend their stay in the dysfunctional union. Though the vastness of the gulf between Yugoslavia’s conflicting camps widened dramatically and the dynamics of that growing animosity were perceptively noted and analyzed by the CIA, Western policy remained unchanged. Kosovo, Serbia, and the whole of Yugoslavia provided the Western powers with a textbook test of President Bush’s “new world order.” In a deeply misguided attempt to support Yugoslav unity, however, that test was resoundingly failed. In the end, the only thing that was supported was Miloševic´’s free hand in conducting policy in Kosovo and toward the rest of Yugoslavia.

• The year 1990 marked a new beginning not only for Yugoslavia’s democracy, but also for the prospects of bridging the gap between Europe’s East and West. During that year, voters in all the Yugoslav republics put their political elites to the test—as did the voters in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the newly unified Germany. The power of the electorates throughout Eastern Europe to choose their political representatives in more or less democratic

Challenges of Democracy elections ushered in a new epoch for the continent and implied that the ideological differences that had kept it divided for more than four decades had come to a true end. Indeed, that November the governments of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—which included nearly all the European states, as well as Canada, the United States, and the USSR—met in Paris to sign the “Charter for a New Europe” and to formally bury the Cold War by commencing “a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.” According to the charter, “Europe whole and free [was] calling for a new beginning,” and this new beginning was to be marked by a “steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our states.”155 In many ways, this document—which aimed to set the foundations of the new CSCE as a pan-European organization in charge of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation—echoed President Bush’s “new world order” speech from September of that year. Just like that speech, however, the charter had little positive effect on the events in Yugoslavia. After all, it was, ironically, signed in Yugoslavia’s name by Borisav Jovic´ in the midst of Serbia’s electoral campaign, where all access to the media for the opposition was blocked and where the Kosovo Albanians were de facto disenfranchised.156 The year 1990 was, therefore, also a year of missed opportunities for the West to steer Yugoslavia away from deeper internal conflict. A number of developments on the ground warranted greater attention and involvement by the Western powers. If nothing else, the Belgrade-instigated armed rebellion of the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina region and Miloševic´’s final and violent subjugation of the Kosovo province should have warranted at least an acknowledgment of the true sources of such dangerous actions. Intelligence reports coming from Yugoslavia were certainly pointing toward a need for a shift of Western perspective. Based on the CIA’s remarkably perceptive assessments, Yugoslavia was on an irreversible path toward dissolution, with dangerously high chances for an explosive outcome, most likely in the form of Miloševic´’s attempt to change republican borders by using the Serb populations in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina. Nothing of substance, however, changed in the West’s approach to Yugoslavia, with the only attempt of a shift in policy coming from the US State Department, which unsuccessfully tried to transfer the balance of international involvement in the crisis to the Europeans. Yugoslavia’s democratic transformation thus resulted only in the further radicalization of political positions and the entrenchment of already existing fault lines. With the Slovenes and the Croats answering the Serb nationalist

117 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

118 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Challenges of Democracy campaign with new non-Communist governments much less willing to buckle down under Serbia’s pressure, Miloševic´ turned his plan for control over the whole federation into a program for the creation of a Greater Serbian state. Logically reading the signals of the Western powers regarding the potential dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Serbia’s president claimed the mantle of protector of the Yugoslav federation. In reality, however, he pushed the Slovenes to go their own way and placed a significant portion of Croatia’s territory in the Serb-populated region of Krajina under his control. Together with the ethnic polarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which occurred due to pressures from the Serb and the responding Croat nationalist campaigns, this meant that the contours of the future armed conflicts had already taken shape. With the advent of 1991, Yugoslavia steadily descended into war. And the policy of the West remained recklessly and stubbornly unchanged.

5

To the Brink and Back, October 1990–April 1991

Though the contours of the coming armed conflicts in Yugoslavia took shape over the course of 1990, most Western actors—and some optimists within the struggling federation—continued to believe that the different parts of the disintegrating South Slav state could still coalesce around some unifying program. As discussed in chapter 4, the CIA’s prescient National Intelligence Estimate of October 1990 asserted that “no all-Yugoslav political movement has emerged to fill the void left by the collapse of the Titoist vision of a Yugoslav state, and none will.”1 Such analyses, however, had no effect on Western policy. Against all odds and against better judgment, Western diplomats and foreign policy makers continued to cling to their policy of strong (but only verbal) support for Yugoslavia’s unity and the hope that the Yugoslavs might somehow still stay together. The events of the first few months of 1991 also proved such irrational hopes to be tragically misplaced. However, the approach of the West remained unchanged. The reforms of the federal government of Ante Markovic´, whose early successes were touted by his Western admirers, had collapsed by the beginning of 1991. Yet the West’s verbal support for the federal government remained in place. Another supposedly pan-Yugoslav institution with enthusiasts in the West—the Yugoslav People’s Army—also demonstrated its disastrous failings. The former UK ambassador in Belgrade, Peter Hall, claims that “certainly many people [in the West] would have been vastly relieved if the JNA had proved to be prepared to actually step in for a federal Yugoslavia.”2 The actions of the army leadership in the first months of 1991, however, demonstrated that its commitment to a federal Yugoslavia was at best suspect and its partnership with the Serbian president truly troubling. Through two attempted coups—one against the northwestern republics in January 1991 and one in favor of Miloševic´ in his struggle with the Serbian opposition that March—the JNA’s High 119

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

120 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back Command revealed its true colors. The impact on Western policy was, however, still minimal. In fact, the bulk of Western pressure and criticism during this period was reserved for the northwestern republics because of their “separatism”—even after they had clearly demonstrated their commitment to a common Yugoslav future by proposing the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation. For the leaders of the West—faced by the US coalition’s intervention in the Persian Gulf and Moscow’s escalation of drastic measures against the Baltic republics— the political stability of the international system in early 1991 hung in the balance, and all threats to its stability were to be strongly discouraged. The problem was, however, that crucial Western players wrongly believed that the Yugoslav sources of instability lay in the country’s northwest and not in its capital. As a result, the West missed crucial opportunities to make a positive impact on the crisis, which was rapidly spinning out of control. More important, it encouraged exactly those forces which should not have been encouraged. FINAL FAILURES OF “YUGOSLAV” OPTIONS

The dismantling of Yugoslavia’s political system and the country’s descent toward perilous conflicts during 1990 were coupled with a dramatic spiral of economic decay which only exacerbated the simmering crisis. As discussed above, during the first days of the new decade, the federal prime minister commenced his bold program of shock therapy and thus gave hope to all who wished to see Yugoslavia weather its storms. The convertibility of the national currency, extensive liberalization of prices, six-month wage freeze, tightening of the budget, and strict controls of the money supply—all staples of Markovic´’s stabilization program—actually did bring some encouraging results in the first months after their inception. Rampant hyperinflation plummeted, exports and currency reserves rose sharply, and new small enterprises sprang up across the country as a sign of popular confidence in the economic reforms. Indeed, as one survey from the spring of 1990 revealed, an overwhelming majority of Yugoslavs across republican borders believed that the reforms of the federal government were the real solution for the country’s crisis.3 Putting a program of shock therapy into action in a command economy, however, was an extremely risky undertaking. In a country with dire internal divisions and little external support such as Yugoslavia, it was nearly impossible. Markovic´’s program was therefore doomed to fail, as it did in the second half of 1990. The insurmountable problem for the prime minister was the fact that Yugoslavia’s internal clashes and his own inability to wield effective control over

To the Brink and Back the economy were mutually reinforced with the unwillingness of the West to offer him real financial support. For all their publicly pronounced enthusiasm for the reforms undertaken in Eastern Europe, Western leaders were actually ambivalent about “throwing money” at the problem.4 Throughout 1990 Markovic´ was given verbal encouragement but denied real financial backing on account of the federation’s instability and Serbia’s human rights abuses in Kosovo.5 It was the height of Western hypocrisy: in order for Markovic´ to get the financial backing presumably necessary to defuse the economic tensions in the country and thus deflate the nationalist bubble, he somehow first had to reign in the main instigator of the problems—Miloševic´. This catch-22 meant that the ability of the prime minister to get international support for his program was held hostage by the developments directed by the Serbian president. Miloševic´ understood this imbalance of power very well and drew great confidence from it. After he initiated Serbia’s economic boycott of Slovenia, for example, he advised the US ambassador that “if it comes to secession, Serbia is a lot bigger than Slovenia. In fact, we’re bigger than a lot of European countries. The United States should look to where its interests lie.”6 All of this presented huge problems for the federal prime minister and his reforms, particularly because other republican governments responded to Serbia’s measures and to general instability by withholding contributions to the federal budget. By the end of November 1990, contributions to the federal budget from the republics were nearly 70 percent smaller than expected, with only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia exhibiting any measure of compliance with the demands of the federal government. Throughout the second half of 1990, Yugoslavia’s economic system rapidly deteriorated toward a state of collapse and a virtual free-for-all.7 (The country’s principal economic indices are shown in table 5.1.) Although there is disagreement in the literature over whether Markovic´’s reforms failed in their principal goals because of their own poor design, obstruction from the republics, or lack of sufficient Western financial assistance, there is little disagreement on the reforms’ real and rather dismal figures. The government’s two principal achievements—the lowering of the inflation rate and the expansion of the foreign reserves—were simply too little compared to other negative indicators.8 Over the course of 1990, manufacturing production fell by more than 10 percent, while the number of unemployed rose by the same figure. The liberalization of trade led to a massive $4.6 billion trade deficit.9 Though exports rose slightly, much of that increase could have been attributed to “distress exporting” by firms willing to sell abroad even at a loss. By the end of the year inflation also spun out of control since the government had failed to

121 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

122 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back Table 5.1 Yugoslavia’s Principal Economic Indices, 1990 GDP Agriculture Industry Services Imports Exports Gross domestic investments Real incomes Consumer prices

Annual Change (in percent) –7.6 –7.5 –10.3 –3.8 19.6 1.7 –10.4 –21.9 587.6

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku SFRJ, Statisticˇ ki godišnjak Jugoslavije 1991 (Belgrade, 1991), 101; World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 1991 (Washington, DC, 1991), 589; United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1991–1992 (Geneva, 1992), 94, 291.

control wages and public spending.10 With the political and economic downturn leading to a popular loss of confidence in the government and in the convertibility of the dinar, foreign reserves after August began a precipitous decline as well. What is worst, as noted in the aforementioned CIA National Intelligence Estimate from that October, the government managed to produce no real structural changes necessary for a market economy. Banks still gave out loans based on political patronage and held more than $10 billion in fictitious assets, while large enterprises continued to avoid bankruptcy because of their political connections.11 When the government devalued the dinar by 22 percent with the first day of 1991, the only surprise was that the devaluation was not even greater. The response of Yugoslavia’s principal political camps to the country’s economic decline was their further entrenchment in the debate on the future of the federation. Miloševic´ claimed to be pushing for increased centralization, the northwestern republics demanded that Yugoslavia be reformed as a confederation, while the others were caught somewhere in between. As discussed in chapter 4, the new governments of Slovenia and Croatia had already announced in May 1990 that they planned to form a joint front in favor of a Yugoslav confederation. Pushed further by the events in Krajina, the deterioration of the economy, and international unwillingness to assist Markovic´, the two northwestern republics unveiled their proposal for a new Yugoslav confederal

To the Brink and Back agreement in early October 1990.12 Though it was prefaced as only a starting point for negotiations, with multiple proposed alternatives, the impetus behind the document was clear. Yugoslavia was to become a confederation of sovereign states similar to the European Community. Just like the EC, the proposed Yugoslav union of states was to have a confederal court modeled on the European Court of Justice, an executive council modeled on the European Commission, a confederal assembly modeled on the European Parliament, and a council of ministers modeled on the EC Council. The confederation was also to offer its member states the benefits of a common market, a customs union, and the possibility of a monetary union. What, however, resulted in a particularly harsh reaction from Miloševic´’s camp was the fact that Slovenia’s and Croatia’s proposal provided for the member states—the Yugoslav republics—to become internationally recognized subjects endowed with full sovereignty. In contrast to their relations in the decaying Yugoslav federation, they were only to coordinate their separate defense and foreign policies and were to be given the right to eventually independently join the European Community. In other words, Yugoslavia—as it was known until that point—was basically to be dissolved and only then reformed on what the Slovenes and the Croats thought were healthy grounds for a future politics of “clean accounts.” While the strong negative reaction of the Serbian bloc could have been easily foreseen considering its past policy preferences, the disinterest and even hostility with which the confederal proposal was greeted by Western officials did surprise many. The EC and the United States were at the time almost blindly committed to maintaining Yugoslav unity in its current form. The US State Department during the early fall of 1990 sent out another round of cables to its allies in Western Europe to urge them to do more to preserve the Yugoslav federation.13 The ministers of foreign affairs of the EC countries at a meeting in Rome on 28 October 1990 duly responded by expressing their “wish that the present process of democratic evolution in Yugoslavia will succeed in the framework of a development of respect for human rights and the preservation of unity and the territorial integrity of that country.”14 Though this statement may seem to have been somewhat bland and purposeless, it was its omission of the principle of self-determination that was meant to send a clear message to the different Yugoslav parties. As the Italian foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis, explained to the press, “The Yugoslavia which wishes to dissolve will have great difficulties with economic and political integration with Europe, especially Western Europe. . . . The principle of self-determination is important, but it must be related to other principles, of which the principle of inviolability of borders is the most important.”15 Or as other EC diplomats told the Yugoslav

123 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

124 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back journalists, “You must have one voice for the whole country. . . . At this moment, the Swiss confederation would also not be accepted [into the EC], although it satisfies all other conditions, because we cannot afford to get a member state . . . which has to consult its cantons for every important decision.”16 Although both the Europeans and the Americans arrived at this position relatively easily, it was not without its international detractors. An Associated Press journalist pointedly responded to De Michelis’s statement with an assertion that “You always say Yugoslavs must decide by themselves, but in fact you keep pushing them to remain the way they are.”17 In its editorial that same month, the Economist—in addition to emphasizing that the West needed to get more involved and presciently imploring diplomats to make sure that Yugoslavia’s internal borders were not tampered with—also noted that “it is not the outside world’s business to hold Yugoslavia together, any more than it is its business to hold the Soviet Union together. More than marriage guidance, these countries may need divorce counseling.”18 Some Western diplomats in Belgrade also asked their governments to support the confederal project, but their advice was not heeded. According to a former high official in the British Embassy in Belgrade, Ambassador Peter Hall’s reporting to the Foreign Office “was very much, and increasingly so, to the effect that [the federation was] a dead duck. You’re not going to have that. He urged London to authorize him to press as hard as he could for a very loose confederation. Something more on the lines of a ‘united states’ in that there would be a tremendous amount of power to the individual parts. . . . But he never, frankly, had any encouragement from London on that.”19 Such a position of the British government during October and November 1990 may have been understandable considering the turmoil surrounding the resignations of Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe on 1 November and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on 22 November, but other Western powers shared the British disregard and disapproval of the plan for a Yugoslav confederation. In fact, the only real glimmer of disagreement in the highest ranks of foreign policy makers at the time was the assertion of the German foreign ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), stemming from the barely completed process of German reunification on 3 October 1990, that “if the choice between stability and unity of Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and democracy and human rights, on the other, became inevitable, priority would have to be given to the latter.”20 However, even this view—voiced behind closed doors at lower-level EC meetings and clearly brushed aside by officials of other EC member states—was coupled with a strong public message by the German foreign minister to his Yugoslav counterpart that Germany “has a fundamental interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia,” which it intends to support by

To the Brink and Back making “the Yugoslav republics realize that separatist tendencies are damaging to the whole and very costly.”21 This Western approach was clearly aimed at discouraging not Miloševic´ but those who opposed him. Such a strategy of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and the looming real conflict only continued to yield devastating results. Three particular events in the last days of 1990 demonstrated that the principal Yugoslav nations—Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs—had virtually given up on life in a common state. On 21 December, the Croatian Sabor promulgated a new constitution reasserting the republic’s sovereignty. Two days later, Slovenia held a successful referendum on its eventual independence. And on 27 and 28 December, the Serbian government illegally appropriated 18.2 billion dinars (worth more than 2.6 billion German marks) from the federation’s primary emission in order to pay for the public handouts used to win the elections earlier that month and in order to prepare for the upcoming war. The principal motivation of the Slovenes in organizing the referendum on the potential independence of their republic was a demonstration to the rest of Yugoslavia and the international community that their intentions were serious and that they would not be bullied by Miloševic´’s constant refusal to engage in negotiations on the proposed confederation. Slovenia’s leadership held out some hope that things might change with Miloševic´’s possible defeat in the December elections, but after his victory by a large margin, such hopes were replaced by the determination to force Serbia’s camp to negotiate. The referendum asked for the popular stamp of approval of a plan to push the rest of the country into completing negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future within six months. In case of the negotiations’ failure, Slovenia was to opt for a separate path.22 Unsurprisingly, this proposal carried easily, with the “yes” vote reaching 88 percent on a turnout of about 85 percent. In the end, however, the referendum did not lead to real negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future. Since the months to come brought no change in Serbia’s policies, the Slovenian vote only set the time of the federation’s dissolution for the end of June 1991. The position of the Croats was much more delicate. On the one hand, they were confronted with a de facto occupation of a significant portion of their territory, whose Serb inhabitants—guided and armed by Miloševic´ and protected by the JNA—threatened to officially secede from Croatia in case it proclaimed independence. On the other hand, the Croats also had to deal with the Slovenes, who—in the opinion of the Croatian leadership—were moving too fast toward possible separation. Franjo Tud‒man and his advisors rightly estimated that if the Slovenes managed to leave the Yugoslav federation on their own, Croatia would be in a much more difficult position. In Tud‒man’s words to Davorin

125 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

126 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back Rudolf, a member of his government and future foreign minister, the Croats had to “hold onto Kucˇan by his coattails because if he [ran] off, Croatia [would] be doomed.”23 The Croatian president also correctly perceived the international community’s lack of support for the Slovenes. Tud‒man was apparently swayed by the opinion of influential Western politicians who, like De Michelis, urged him to “hold back Slovenia since the EC prefers Yugoslavia because its disintegration would spark the fires of conflict throughout the Balkans and would also potentially stimulate the disintegration of the USSR.”24 However, since his hopes of slowing down Slovene moves toward the referendum did not materialize, Tud‒man knew he needed to keep pace with his northwestern neighbors. The promulgation of the new Croatian constitution on 21 December 1990 served exactly that purpose. It was Croatia’s signal that it was keeping pace with the Slovenes without going quite as far. The constitution itself brought nothing new to the Yugoslav scene as it basically reiterated the principal assertions of republican sovereignty, right to independence, and control over foreign and domestic policy, points that were already in Slovenia’s and Serbia’s new constitutions promulgated over the course of 1990. In his address to the Sabor on the occasion of the constitution’s promulgation, Tud‒man explicitly declared that Croatia was taking a different and slower path than Slovenia. Croatia was not asserting republican independence or calling for a popular referendum because “such a decision would deepen the lack of understanding and resistance in some other republics, as well as among a significant portion of the Serbs in Croatia and the JNA. . . . [Furthermore,] the decisive actors of European and world politics do not accept the program of destruction of Yugoslavia and the change of borders in Europe.”25 All caveats aside, however, the constitution was still a sign that Croatia was adopting measures that were—just as in the case of Slovenia and Serbia— further detaching it from the federation.26 The third event which finally sealed the federation’s fate—and truly brought something new to the political scene—was the illegal appropriation of the federation’s primary emission by the Serbian government. On 27 and 28 December, Serbia’s National Assembly and Vojvodina’s Provincial Assembly approved in secret sessions a plan by the Serbian government to appropriate 18.2 billion dinars from the federation’s primary emissions in order to refinance the republic’s banks, distribute agricultural subsidies, and fund back payments of pensions.27 Simply put, Serbia was covering its losses by using the central bank to print federal money. As the prime minister of Serbia, Stanko Radmilovic´, explained to Borisav Jovic´ once the story leaked to the press, this money covered public handouts given during the electoral campaign, without which Miloševic´’s

To the Brink and Back party “certainly would have lost the elections, because more than half of the republic would not have received wages and pensions. Ante [Markovic´] was surprised and flabbergasted that we were not ‘bankrupt,’ but we outwitted him.”28 The 18.2 billion dinars that the Serbian government thus appropriated amounted to one-half of the planned primary emission for the whole of Yugoslavia in 1991. It was an unprecedented attack on the monetary stability of the federation and the last nail in the coffin of the federal government’s struggling reform program. Markovic´—who later publicly labeled Serbia’s sabotage as a “gangster act” of “daylight robbery”—did not even find out about it until 4 January.29 That fact alone demonstrated who truly controlled the country’s economic system. Those three events—Slovenia’s referendum, Croatia’s constitution, and Serbia’s financial sabotage—indicated that 1991 was to be the year of Yugoslavia’s final dissolution. The reports of Western ambassadors in Belgrade to their governments were at the time virtually unanimously pessimistic, not only about the prospects for Yugoslavia’s dissolution, but also about the prospects for real violence.30 Some West European governments, which during the late summer of 1990 had responded to US cables about Yugoslavia with little or no urgency, by January 1991 actually believed that the federation was beyond saving.31 Nevertheless, there was little change in the West’s rhetoric and policies. During the second half of 1989, Western powers had unanimously insisted Yugoslavia would benefit from increased centralization. In the early fall of 1990, they had rejected the confederal proposal of Slovenia and Croatia. By the beginning of 1991, they were at best urging the maintenance of the constitutional status quo while reserving the bulk of their derision for the “separatists.” Italy’s foreign minister De Michelis, who was ending his six-month presidency of the EC Council in December 1990, in his interview with the Belgrade daily Borba that was published on the first day of the new year, provided the most complete picture of the dominant European position regarding the Yugoslav crisis at the time. He claimed to see equal dangers in the actions of the “separatists” in the northwest and the “hegemonists” in Serbia. However, his only real and rather chilling warning was aimed at the former: “If in some republics pressures for separation and dissolution become dominant, those republics will not be able to survive without the establishment of political relations with Europe. And until then, they will risk being crushed because of their wrong decisions.”32 It was a thinly veiled threat against the Slovenes and the Croats that in case they moved toward independence, they would be left at the mercy of those within the federation who had the power to “crush.” According to the CIA’s last 1990 report on Yugoslavia, the only real force capable of

127 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

128 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back “crushing” individual republican leaderships—the JNA—was indeed going to determine the path of the country’s imminent dissolution. “A largely peaceful and prolonged dissolution is possible if the military remains on the sidelines,” the CIA report claimed.33 With the first days of 1991, however, it became clear the JNA had no intention of either remaining on the sidelines or suddenly becoming impartial. MIMICKING THE SOVIETS: ABORTED JNA COUP NO. 1

The political and ideological positions of the Yugoslav army were clear to all Yugoslavs. The JNA’s leadership demonstrated throughout 1990 not only that it had struggled with the democratization of society and political life, but that it also had chosen sides in the country’s growing inter-ethnic and inter-republican feuds. The ideologically rigid position at the Fourteenth Congress of the SKJ, the intervention in Kosovo, the attempt to postpone Slovenia’s and Croatia’s elections, the disarmament of the Territorial Defenses of these two republics, the open taking of sides with the rebel Krajina Serbs, and the endorsement of Serbia’s president prior to his reelection—all contributed to the public perception of the army’s generals as pro-Miloševic´ reactionaries willing to go to great lengths to preserve their position in the country’s political system. During the last weeks of 1990, that perception was further confirmed since the JNA’s highest leadership began preparations to use the ultimate tool in its arsenal—a military coup—to rid the country of “self-styled messiahs and political adventurers” in the country’s northwest.34 Although the army’s highest leadership had considered extreme measures such as a coup d’état throughout the second half of the 1980s, many signs during the last months of 1990 suggested that the JNA was finally laying the domestic and international foundations necessary to take the ultimate leap. One of the strongest signals of the army’s increasing political activity came in November 1990. With the situation in the country deteriorating and the forces of the old system having lost or set to lose the elections in all republics except for Serbia and Montenegro, the army’s highest active and retired officers entered the political fray on 19 November by launching their own party: the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ). According to Branko Mamula, the former federal secretary for the people’s defense, and Miloševic´’s wife, Mirjana Markovic´, who along with Mamula was one of the more prominent leaders of the SK-PJ, this party had indeed been created as a domestic political foundation for the army’s prospective power takeover.35 Any attempt at a coup, if it was to have a chance of success, needed a group of qualified

To the Brink and Back officials to take over the positions of those overthrown, and the SK-PJ had been created to provide an organizational structure for exactly such people. In addition to domestic political preparations, the JNA’s leadership also intensified its signals on the international front. As discussed above, General Kadijevic´ in the early summer of 1990 had sent his closest associates to the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom to get the responses of these three powers to the JNA’s plans for an armed intervention directed against the new leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia.36 A similar approach was taken again in November 1990, shortly after the formation of the SK-PJ. Just two days after the inaugural congress of the SK-PJ, Admiral Mamula gave a lecture at London’s Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies and had a roundtable discussion with British officials from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense during which he told his audience that the JNA was strongly opposed to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s confederal proposal and that it was ready to intervene.37 Based on the CIA reports from the period, the army leadership was indeed prepared to act and was only searching for a pretext and opportunity for its intervention.38 As 1990 drew to a close, both the pretext and the opportunity began to align perfectly: the army was in possession of evidence that Slovenia and Croatia were replenishing their confiscated Territorial Defense stockpiles from abroad, and the West was preoccupied with the US coalition’s intervention in the Persian Gulf. The arming of Slovenia and Croatia on the international market was hardly a surprise for any close followers of Yugoslav affairs. Croatia was in a particularly unenviable security position. With its Territorial Defense completely disarmed and a significant portion of its territory out of the reach of its police forces, it was practically indefensible and thus highly susceptible to blackmail from Belgrade and the Krajina Serbs. The republic’s new minister of defense, Martin Špegelj, during October 1990 (notably six weeks after the “log revolution”) began to organize the importing of mostly light weapons for Croatia’s security forces.39 Since the market was flooded with cheap weapons offered by cash-strapped East European governments, Špegelj had little difficulty acquiring what he deemed necessary and importing it into Croatia through Hungary.40 During Communist times, such an act would likely have been a routine matter since the republics legally had the right to import weapons and equipment for their police and Territorial Defense units. In the Yugoslavia of 1990, however, Špegelj did the best he could to conduct his transactions secretly while the JNA’s Counterintelligence Service (KOS) followed and recorded his every move. This game of cat and mouse continued for the following two and a half months. The JNA High Command thought it was not yet time for action. Things

129 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

130 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back changed as the world’s attention began to shift toward the Persian Gulf and the impending intervention of the US coalition in January 1991. The preoccupation of the Western alliance with its internal divisions over how to respond to Saddam Hussein provided the JNA leadership with the ideal opportunity to intervene. The initial reaction of the West to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait had been resolute and unified. The virtually instantaneous adoption of a variety of punitive measures against the regime of Saddam Hussein had led to optimism among those who wished to build deeper foreign, defense, and security policy cooperation in the EC. However, the lengthy construction of the coalition against Iraq during the summer and fall of that year melted all of this optimism away. The greatest problem for the Western powers was not that they disagreed on the extent of potential international intervention or the best policy toward the intransigent Iraqi leader. It was that they all had different perceptions of what the post–Cold War world should look like and which institutions should take primacy in ensuring the new order. The issue was thus not only that, for example, the Italian coalition government was embarrassingly divided on how to deal with Saddam or that the strong negative reaction of Germany’s public opinion precluded any real participation of the Bundeswehr in the military campaign or that France maintained secret direct contacts with the Iraqi dictator throughout the crisis.41 The more important issue—and the real source of disagreements—was the depth of the gap among the European powers on the role of the EC, NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU) in coordinating security policies and conducting military operations. One school of thought was represented by Italy, Germany, and some other West European countries, which to varying degrees supported a “quantum leap forward” in the development of common foreign and security policy mechanisms of the EC. On the opposite side was the United Kingdom, which was against anything that could undermine NATO, consensus decision making in the EC, and its own “special relationship” with the United States. And a completely different line of thinking was taken by France, which sought to maintain its independent security policy while strengthening the WEU as a European security arm unconstrained by the United States. In fact, no two EC countries took the same position on either the West’s response to the crisis in the Gulf or these greater issues of Europe’s security and its international institutions.42 The lesson for the JNA generals toward the end of 1990 was therefore not only that the Western alliance was preoccupied with how to punish Iraq, but also that it was deeply divided on the future of its own security mechanisms and, as a result, was severely limited in mounting a strong and united response to a potential army action within Yugoslavia.43 And in case

To the Brink and Back there were any doubts in the JNA High Command regarding the capability of the West to stop or punish a Yugoslav military coup, they were dispelled in mid-January 1991 during another round of Soviet interventions in the Baltic republics. The lessons of the West’s weak response to the spring 1990 Soviet intervention in Lithuania and Latvia were well learned and used by the JNA during its disarmament of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s Territorial Defenses. In early January 1991, Soviet president Gorbachev—who was increasingly allying himself with conservative elements in his government and military—further escalated the clash with the Baltic republics.44 Just three days before the US coalition’s aerial bombing campaign against Iraq began on 16 January, Soviet paratroopers attempted to round up Lithuanian draft dodgers, seize some of the buildings of the Lithuanian ministry of internal affairs, and occupy the main television tower in Vilnius, the republic’s capital. Their intervention was met with stern protests from the Lithuanian public, and these turned bloody. In an episode reminiscent of the Chinese massacre on Tiananmen Square, an assault by Soviet tanks left fifteen Lithuanians dead and hundreds wounded. Gorbachev was clearly using the West’s preoccupation with the Gulf to settle scores with the stubborn Baltics. As Condoleezza Rice, the director of Soviet and East European affairs in the National Security Council, remarked upon hearing of the events in Vilnius, Gorbachev’s intervention looked terribly similar to Khrushchev’s move against Hungary in 1956, when Khrushchev had perceived the West to be absorbed with the Suez crisis.45 Compared to Moscow’s clash with the Baltic republics in the spring of 1990, Western policy makers were this time only marginally less understanding of the Soviet use of force. Western capitals did issue statements urging an end to the violence and warning Gorbachev of a possible suspension of aid. Nevertheless, their restraint in publicly criticizing the Soviet president was obvious. Some of them, like Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti, even assured the Kremlin that its actions were acceptable since the existence of the Soviet Union should not have been challenged by aroused “emotions” in response to the tanks on the streets.46 The US president was also determined to secure a “working relationship” with Gorbachev in the hope of maintaining the Soviet leader’s cooperation on Iraq. In fact, the only reason Secretary of State James Baker put any pressure on his Soviet counterpart, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, to show tangible signs of abandoning force (after Soviet troops had committed even more atrocities, this time in the Latvian capital of Riga on 20 January) was because of pressure from the US Congress.47 Bush’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, was simply of the opinion that “the instability of the USSR would be a threat to

131 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

132 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back us. [And] to peck away at the legitimacy of the regime in power would not be to promote stability.” Or, as Scowcroft often more colorfully remarked to his colleagues, the very word “republic” sent shivers up his spine.48 The generals of the Yugoslav People’s Army were thus presented with a perfect opportunity to act. They had collected enough intelligence about the arms imports to build a publicly damning case against the Slovenes and the Croats and to thereby have a direct cover for intervention. And the Western powers proved to be preoccupied with Iraq and unwilling to craft any concerted negative response to the intervention of the Soviet forces in the Baltics. With the increasing assertiveness of the JNA, January 1991 brought Yugoslavia to the very edge of full-scale armed conflict. What played out during that month was a tense game of brinksmanship which fully exposed the goals of all players and even reshuffled their long-standing alliances. The drama began at a session of the federal presidency on 9 January 1991 at which the Slovenes and the Croats were presented with the army’s ultimatum. They were to turn over all of their imported weapons to the JNA and demobilize their newly formed and expanded security units within ten days. The following day, the JNA leadership increased the battle readiness of its troops in Croatia to the highest level and attempted to arrest the republic’s minister of defense. Further demonstrating that its threats were serious, the army then organized a series of troop maneuvers and public shows of force.49 The Croats and the Slovenes responded by signing mutual defense pacts on 20 and 22 January which specified their joint response in case of the JNA’s intervention.50 If the military was to opt for an overthrow of the leaderships of these two republics, the two governments were set to retaliate by withdrawing their citizens from the army’s officer and recruit corps, cutting off supplies for the army’s barracks on their territories, and organizing a real armed defense against the JNA troops.51 Their political response to the intervention was to include an immediate proclamation of independence, a cessation of all contributions to the federal budget, and an appeal to the United Nations for protection.52 The pact between the Slovenes and the Croats was a crucial event and a sign that Yugoslavia was nearing real war. It, however, failed to curb the threat from Belgrade because the Serbian president backed the army’s offensive with a series of significant moves. With the assistance of the army’s Counterintelligence Service, Miloševic´ first withdrew the leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´, to Belgrade to further clear the path for the JNA intervention by protecting the SDS man from Croatia’s possible retaliation.53 In one of his characteristic tactical maneuvers, he then secured his flank in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The JNA’s plans hinged on

To the Brink and Back Yugoslavia’s central republic not siding with the Croats and the Slovenes in the coming showdown. Miloševic´’s strategy of throwing competitors into spirals of internal squabbles in order to keep them weakened had been well tested since his rise to power. On this occasion, he used the meeting of Serbia’s and BosniaHerzegovina’s leaderships on 22 January to dispute Bosnia’s sovereignty and to offer its leaders ethnic partition.54 This gave the fragile coalition of BiH ethnic parties plenty to quarrel over. General Kadijevic´ then tried to lure Ante Markovic´ with an offer of becoming Yugoslavia’s sole president in exchange for support for the coups in the northwestern republics.55 Once these efforts failed, Miloševic´ delivered his best and strongest move. He effectively broke up the alliance between Croatia and Slovenia by cutting a deal with the Slovene leadership at a meeting in Belgrade on 24 January. According to this new pact, Serbia formally agreed to let Slovenia go its own way, while Slovenia expressed its understanding for “the interest of the Serb people to live in one state” and concurred “that a future Yugoslav agreement must respect this interest.”56 The deal sent shockwaves throughout the country, particularly in Croatia. Miloševic´ had already decided in late 1989 that there was no place for the Slovenes in his Yugoslavia. Throughout 1990, he and his allies pushed Yugoslavia’s northernmost republic toward leaving the union. Now, faced with the possibility of an armed intervention, the Slovenian leadership finally agreed.57 Croatia was thus put in an extraordinarily difficult position, left without any real support from outside or within Yugoslavia. The alleged infractions of Slovenia regarding arms imports conspicuously disappeared from the statements of the JNA generals, who now reserved all their attention for the Croats. While the Slovenes managed to get themselves off the hook, the sense of isolation in the Croatian leadership grew. The sentiment in the Croatian Sabor was such that the deputies pleaded with President Tud‒man not to go to the scheduled showdown with the army at the federal presidency session of 25 January, for fear that he may be arrested or even assassinated. By the time Tud‒man left for Belgrade on that day, it was clear that the JNA had commenced its action plan for the assault on Croatia’s government. On the morning of 25 January, lowerand middle-level officials from the Croatian ministries of internal affairs and defense who had been involved in the arms procurement were arrested by the military police. Slovene and Croat recruits serving in the JNA barracks in Slovenia and Croatia were also suddenly withdrawn to other republics. Most significant, the Federal Secretariat for the People’s Defense on that day issued a manifesto which was read to all officers throughout the country to rally them to the impending intervention. “The Soviets have started to regain their nerve and to realize that the path which they had chosen does not lead to a successful

133 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

134 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back reform but to disaster. . . . These days, they are taking decisive measures to arrest separatist tendencies in individual parts of the country,” the JNA manifesto asserted, making clear where the army’s High Command was finding its inspiration.58 The meeting of the federal presidency, the members of the Federal Secretariat for the People’s Defense, and Croatia’s leadership, which took place on the afternoon and evening of 25 January, was, therefore, understandably seen by the Croats as little more than an opportunity for the presidency to rubberstamp the army’s decision to intervene. The generals indeed did everything to get the support of the members of the presidency for their plan. That evening they produced one of the most defining moments of the whole Yugoslav crisis. They used the news programs of Television Belgrade and Television Sarajevo to present to the public a patched up assortment of clandestinely acquired audio and visual recordings of Martin Špegelj speaking with his associates about Croatia’s arming efforts and its hostile tactics toward the JNA.59 The generals hoped this cunning piece of political propaganda would persuade the presidency to give the army a free hand to act against Croatia. In a last-ditch effort to avert the worst, however, the Croats accepted most of the terms of the JNA blackmail and thus defused the generals’ plan for a takeover. In return for the army’s lowering of combat readiness, Croatia’s reservist troops were to demobilize and the officials involved in the arms procurement—including Špegelj— were to be arrested and put on trial. Yugoslavia came back from the brink, with the local newspapers optimistically announcing that “civil war has been averted.”60 The calm which followed the showdown between the Croats and the JNA was short-lived. The consequences of the clash on the federation’s political future were, however, long-lasting. According to Borisav Jovic´, Miloševic´ was disappointed that the Croats had avoided a head-on collision with the army because he had hoped the army’s intervention would have ultimately led to the amputation of Croatia without the parts held by the Krajina Serbs.61 Though the Serbian boss may have been disappointed by the decision of the JNA generals to accept Croatia’s mini-capitulation, the averted coup of 25 January did bring him significant benefits. Croatia and Slovenia continued to cooperate on certain issues throughout the months to come, but their relationship became increasingly marked by distrust, apprehension, and suspicion. Croatia’s defense efforts were also irreparably set back because Tud‒man—who understood the effects of the Serbo-Slovene pact and wanted to avoid further isolation—ceased Croatia’s arms procurement until real war began in earnest in the summer of 1991.62 Martin Špegelj had to go into hiding in order to avoid arrest by the JNA’s

To the Brink and Back military police. Finally, the Croatian leadership’s public standing was hard hit, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the army’s media campaign found a receptive audience. In other words, while the attempted coup may have failed to provide Miloševic´ with the blowout punch against his chief rivals, it managed to seriously weaken them in the critical period of the run-up to war. The consequences of the January crisis for the way Yugoslavia’s situation was internationally perceived and the way international actors responded to it were, on the other hand, not as significant, even though a number of new developments should have resulted in a real change of course. Most obviously, the Yugoslav army’s dangerous mimicking of the Soviets clearly exposed it as a mechanism of force led by dogmatists and reactionaries unwilling to accept democratic change.63 Furthermore, the increasing willingness of the JNA to use its military power brought Yugoslavia closer to a bloody conflict. As the CIA report of 23 January correctly concluded, the army’s insistence on stamping its authority on the northwest republics was leading the federation into a civil war bound to deteriorate into a lengthy, violent, and highly lethal stalemate which would inevitably become the greatest challenge to date for the European institutions.64 Finally, while the West may have shied away from overtly criticizing Gorbachev for the interventions in the Baltic republics because he was perceived as trying to save the unity of the Soviet state, a similar parallel could not have been drawn with Yugoslavia. Federal prime minister Ante Markovic´—the closest formal equivalent to the Soviet president—had no control over the army and was completely excluded from its planning. The real political backer of the JNA was Slobodan Miloševic´, and he had no counterpart in the USSR. He was no Gorbachev, and he was certainly no Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia and one of the strongest opponents of the Soviet military interventions in the Baltics. The JNA’s pan-Yugoslav character was by January 1991 almost completely gone, and the army’s formidable force was no more than a tool in the hands of the Serbian president, whose goal was not the preservation of Yugoslavia. If there were any doubts regarding Miloševic´’s goals in the West, they should have been dispelled when, at a luncheon meeting with the Western ambassadors in Belgrade on 16 January 1991, Miloševic´ himself openly and confidently announced Serbia’s plans for a new Serb state on the ruins of Yugoslavia. He asserted that he was ready to let Slovenia go and that Macedonia was still under discussion but that the Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were to be included in the new state. His warning to the ambassadors was explicit and clearly implied the use of the army: “If this is not attainable peacefully, one forces Serbia to use the tools of power which we possess but they [the other republics] do not.”65

135 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

136 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back To be fair, such blatant saber rattling did result in a strong initial response from the US government, which through Ambassador Zimmermann on 17 January conveyed to Borisav Jovic´ that it deplored the use or threat of force, was opposed to attempts to change Yugoslavia’s internal borders in any way other than peaceably, and was convinced that those who used force would be internationally isolated.66 On 25 January, the British minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Douglas Hogg, added Britain’s voice against the threatened coup when he summoned the Yugoslav ambassador in London and expressed his government’s interest in the crisis and its strong opposition to the use of force against the northwestern republics.67 However, although these two interventions by the US and UK governments surely contributed to the shaking of the confidence of the JNA leadership, they were not harbingers of a real and lasting shift in Western policy but exceptions to the long-established rule clearly confirmed in the days after the averted coup. On 24 January, President Tud‒man wrote to President Bush, urging him to warn Belgrade against the use of force since Ambassador Zimmermann’s efforts of the previous week had obviously had little impact. “Yugoslavia is not the Soviet Union; Serbia is not Russia; and the Yugoslavian army is not the Soviet army,” Tud‒man remarked in his letter.68 The only response Croatia’s president received, however, was that of Senator Robert Dole, who once again pleaded on the Senate floor “that the United States not sit quietly on the sidelines.”69 On 25 January, the EC Twelve decided against presenting a collective demarche to Yugoslavia against the military action and dismissed the reports of JNA activities as “alarmist.”70 The following week, the EC ambassadors in Belgrade, likely still under the influence of their meeting with Miloševic´ two weeks earlier, decided to advise their superiors to no longer stress the Community’s insistence on Yugoslavia’s integrity. However, on 4 February, at a meeting of the political directors of the foreign ministries of EC states, this crucial recommendation was rejected.71 The Western powers continued to demonstrate that their public support for Yugoslavia’s unity remained sacrosanct. German chancellor Kohl showed at least some acknowledgment of the events when on 13 February in a letter to Ante Markovic´ he coupled his strong endorsement of the EC position on Yugoslav unity with an expression of his “grave concern” for the situation in Yugoslavia and his support for peaceful political dialogue, respect of human and minority rights, and abstention from the use of force.72 French president Mitterrand, on the other hand, at the same time instructed his government officials and diplomats not to communicate with the leaders of Yugoslavia’s republics but only with the federal authorities.73 The European Commission strongly rejected signals for a peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia into a

To the Brink and Back confederation of sovereign states with claims that the EC “found the creation of new states on the territory of Yugoslavia unacceptable” and that it needed Yugoslavia to act as a single actor in international affairs.74 Officials of the US State Department in multiple February 1991 meetings with their European counterparts continued to push for Europe’s even stronger and more proactive endorsement of Yugoslav unity.75 Finally, when a UK delegation led by Douglas Hogg visited Yugoslavia between 25 and 28 February and was once again explicitly told by Slobodan Miloševic´ of his intention to change Croatia’s borders in case that republic sought independence, the UK officials found the Serbian president’s platform “reasonable.”76 As a result of the averted JNA coup against the Croats, some Western diplomats and policy makers behind the scenes may have begun to consider that a serious shift in international policy toward Yugoslavia was necessary.77 In spite of some modest signs of a change of approach, however, the main thrust of Western policy at this time remained the preservation of Yugoslavia—even if this flew in the face of events on the ground and even if it misguidedly served to encourage exactly those who wished to ethnically partition the country. In the words of a Dutch diplomat, “That one had to try to keep [Yugoslavia] together for as long as possible was a kind of dogma for the [EC foreign] ministers.”78 Or, as Slovenia’s foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel, more vividly remarked that February, “At moments it seems that the international community would most like to close its eyes and continue to dream [of] a unified Yugoslav state, which it sees as a guarantee of peace in this region.”79 ´ : ABORTED JNA COUP NO. 2 PROPPING UP MILOŠEVIC While the Serbian president was occupied by his machinations with the Yugoslav army and the country’s northwest during the first weeks of 1991, his grip on power in Serbia severely weakened. The illegal intrusion into the federation’s primary emission may have bought the social peace needed to win the December 1990 elections, but it was insufficient to sustain Serbia’s cash-strapped government and its losing economic enterprises much beyond them. Already in late January 1991, two thousand Serbian metal workers had gone on strike because of unpaid wages, under the slogan of “We voted for you, and you deceived us.” The following month, thirteen thousand workers in Belgrade’s industrial suburb of Rakovica (Miloševic´’s stronghold during the “anti-bureaucratic revolution”) struck as well.80 With such clear signs of the system’s economic decay, the opposition parties now sensed an opening. Led by the charismatic head of the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO), Vuk Draškovic´, they waged a campaign of protests

137 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

138 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back in the republic’s capital which brought Miloševic´’s regime to the brink of collapse and forced the hand of the JNA High Command to once again expose its true colors. The dramatic events which unfolded during the early days of that March in the squares and streets of Belgrade were as much the result of Miloševic´’s intransigence and unwillingness to engage in the democratic process as they were the product of a newly found assertiveness and confidence of the Serbian opposition. The call of the opposition parties for a protest rally on 9 March against the regime’s manipulation of Television Belgrade and the Politika press was answered by tens of thousands of Belgraders who wanted to see change. Based on firsthand accounts, this initial rally, which started all the trouble, would likely have ended peacefully and with few consequences for the Serbian president had it not been answered with a disproportionate use of force by his police.81 Miloševic´ had expanded his power in 1988 and 1989 through a poisonous campaign of nationalist rallies which were considered to be “happenings of the people” and “rallies of truth.” Now, when the opposition resorted to a similar mechanism of popular organization, Serbia’s government and the loyal press labeled the 9 March rally an act of “hooliganism” and “national treason.” The events of that day exposed Miloševic´ for what he truly was: a powerhungry tyrant who did not hesitate to use physical force against either his opponents or his own people. The opposition protesters advanced toward Belgrade’s Republic Square, chanting “Slobo—Stalin! Slobo—Saddam! Red bandits!” The essence of their complaints was not necessarily the content of Miloševic´’s policy but its form.82 They were mostly in favor of nationalism, but they also wanted democracy and freedom of the press—exactly the things Miloševic´ was unwilling to concede. According to Borisav Jovic´, the rally of 9 March was seen by the Serbian leadership as a “repetition of what had happened in Romania” when Nicolae Ceaus¸escu had been violently deposed just two and a half months earlier.83 The calls of Vuk Draškovic´ to tear down “Television Bastille” simply sounded too similar to the calls of Romania’s protesters, and Miloševic´ chose to answer them with measures similar to Ceaus¸escu’s. Water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and truncheons wreaked havoc among the protesters, who responded with clubs, fists, rocks, and Serbian flags. Belgrade’s center was torn apart by the most serious violence it had seen since World War II, leaving one protester and one policeman dead and dozens injured. The protesters fought bravely, but by the evening they were defeated and pushed away from the main government institutions and the television building. Vuk Draškovic´ and several hundred demonstrators were arrested, and the only truly independent media outlets—Radio B92 and Studio B—were shut

To the Brink and Back down. With the streets cleared and the opposition beaten, JNA tanks left the barracks for the city center at the urging of Miloševic´ and Jovic´ in a show of force and intimidation.84 Belgrade went to sleep that night defeated and shocked by the army’s occupation. It was one thing to watch the tanks on television as they rolled through Kosovo’s towns and villages but something quite different to see them muddy the center of Belgrade. The following day the real challenge for Miloševic´ began. Several hundred students broke through the police cordons blockading Republic Square and set up camp by the square’s fountain. With such popular labels as “the future of Serbia” and “our children,” the students were almost exempt from police brutality and posed a delicate public relations problem for the regime. They demanded the immediate release of Vuk Draškovic´ and the imprisoned activists, the resignations of the heads of Television Belgrade, the resignation of the minister of internal affairs, an emergency session of Serbia’s National Assembly, and the freedom to broadcast for Studio B and Radio B92.85 Throughout that night and the following day, their numbers swelled to the thousands, with the police helplessly looking on. Gradually ordinary Belgraders and, more important, some of the most prominent intellectuals, who symbolically withdrew their support for Miloševic´, joined the students for this Woodstock-like demonstration. The regime tried to respond by staging a counter-rally at the confluence of the Sava and Danube Rivers, but the low numbers and even lower enthusiasm of the bussed-in elderly supporters exposed the effort as a sound failure. In March 1989, students had helped stage the rally which Miloševic´ used to pressure the federal institutions into deserting the Kosovo Albanians and allowing the arrest of Azem Vllasi. Now the students were abandoning him, as were the nationalist intellectuals who had provided the ideological grounding for his campaign. Something had to be done, or his regime would fall like a house of cards. Miloševic´ resorted to his tried and tested strategy. He staged a series of diversions outside of Serbia to draw the attention of the public and his opponents away from the streets of Belgrade. On 12 March, Borisav Jovic´ used public television to call for a special session of the federal presidency “under the recommendation of the federal secretary for the people’s defense” to discuss the situation in the country. He ominously announced that “the public will in due course be acquainted with the decisions of the High Command.”86 Rumors of an impending coup d’état spread like wildfire throughout the country, and they were not unfounded. Borisav Jovic´, together with General Kadijevic´ and the High Command, did plan to turn power over to the JNA.

139 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

140 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back Members of the presidency were taken in army buses out of the presidency’s regular building to an emergency meeting place in Topcˇider. There they were subjected to Jovic´’s and Kadijevic´’s tirades against the threat of “all possible enemies of socialism and a united Yugoslavia” and implored to vote for the institution of a federal state of emergency which would give the army broad powers.87 The army leadership felt it needed some semblance of a legal cover for action and counted on pressuring the members of the presidency—particularly Bogic´ Bogic´evic´, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s representative and ethnic Serb—into acquiescence. However, it failed. Bogic´evic´ refused to vote, and Jovic´ was left with only four insufficient votes—his own, Nenad Buc´in’s of Montenegro, Jugoslav Kostic´’s of Vojvodina, and the vote of the frightened and at the time ill Kosovo Albanian Riza Sapunxhiu.88 Due to his failure to win domestic political backing for a military action, General Kadijevic´ flew that night to Moscow (with Jovic´’s blessing) in order to seek international sponsorship. According to Jovic´’s and Kadijevic´’s later accounts, the goal was to get the protection of the Soviet minister of defense, Marshal Dmitry Yazov, and the armed forces under his command in the case of Western intervention against a JNA coup which was undertaken without the approval of the federal presidency.89 Yazov told Kadijevic´ the Soviet intelligence services were convinced that the West did not plan to intervene in Yugoslavia under any circumstances. He also, however, could not offer direct support, claiming that the conditions for a Soviet backing of the JNA would improve once Gorbachev was removed, a step that was supposedly to come soon.90 The JNA and the Serbian camp closely followed the events in the Soviet Union and learned from the interactions of the crumbling Soviet state with the West. Though Yazov was this time unable to give firm support to their cause, his mixed and noncommittal message was apparently still enough for Kadijevic´ and the High Command to decide to go ahead with the coup, regardless of the decision on the state of emergency that the federal presidency was supposed to debate again on 14 and 15 March. As Kadijevic´ told Jovic´ and Miloševic´ upon his return from Moscow, the coup was to go ahead as planned, and it was to entail deposing the government and the presidency, not allowing the SFRJ Assembly to convene, removing from power all republican and provincial leaderships which did not support the military action, and establishing a six-month deadline for an agreement on the future of the country. Jovic´ and Miloševic´ concurred, with Jovic´ promising he would help justify the intervention by resigning from his post of president of the presidency if the presidency as a whole failed to approve the state of emergency.91

To the Brink and Back The following two days went according to this plan. The presidency failed to approve the state of emergency—this time with five “no” votes from the representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and even Kosovo. Jovic´ then immediately announced his resignation on television, claiming he could no longer work with the “prevailing forces in the federal presidency, which do not care for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the country; which support the unconstitutional and non-democratic disintegration of the country; and which want to tie the hands of the Yugoslav People’s Army.”92 His resignation was followed by the resignations of the representatives of Montenegro and Vojvodina. Miloševic´ in the meantime placated the protesting students by releasing Draškovic´ and some of the arrested demonstrators and having the editors of Television Belgrade and the minister of internal affairs resign (only to be replaced by equally hard-core members of his regime).93 And on 16 March—the day after Jovic´’s resignation—Serbia’s president delivered his coup de grâce and laid all his cards on the table. In a televised address Miloševic´ announced that Serbia had ceased to respect the decisions of the federal presidency, which had supposedly been hijacked by the “anti-Serb coalition.” He also announced that he was sacking the representative of Kosovo in the federal presidency, who had dared to vote against his line, and that he was mobilizing reservist forces and forming additional militia units to answer alleged attempts to provoke incidents in Kosovo and Sandžak. “Yugoslavia has entered the final stage of its agony,” he exclaimed, and Serbia was basically jumping ship.94 All observers, within and outside of Yugoslavia, were shocked. This was “the most secessionist act that’s been taken” in Yugoslavia, claimed one Western diplomat in the New York Times.95 “Miloševic´ couldn’t get the presidency to do his bidding, so he took an axe to it,” claimed another Western diplomat in the Guardian.96 The Western press was basically unanimous that Serbia’s boss had “punctured two myths he was fond of fostering: . . . that it was he and his Serbian Socialist Party that sought to maintain the existence of Yugoslavia, while his rivals outside Serbia were intent on breaking up the union . . . [and that] he represented all of Yugoslavia’s nine million Serbs.”97 Serbia’s opposition leaders were also convinced that Miloševic´’s public address was tantamount to Serbia’s secession from Yugoslavia.98 Indeed, Miloševic´ and Jovic´ were opening the door for the army’s intervention—not in an effort to preserve the Yugoslav federation but in an effort to preserve their grip on power and their position in the push to create a new Serbian state with enlarged borders. The clearest and fullest confirmation of this position came from Miloševic´ himself in an address to about two hundred mayors and local officials of Serbia’s

141 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

142 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back municipalities who were summoned to Belgrade in the immediate aftermath of his televised statement. We have to ensure unity in Serbia if we—as the largest and most populous republic—wish to dictate events. This concerns the questions of borders, therefore fundamental questions of the state. And borders, as you know, are always dictated by the strong, never the weak. . . . Yesterday I ordered the mobilization of the reserve police units [and] the formation of new police forces, and the government has been given the task of creating units which will make us safe and capable of defending the interests of our republic and, by God, the interests of the Serb nation outside of Serbia. I have talked to our people in Knin, in Bosnia. . . . The pressures are enormous. . . . We will under no circumstances back away from our formula—a referendum of the nation through which it will fulfill its right to self-determination. That is the only formula which can be accepted. The other is force. . . . And if we need to fight, by God, we shall fight. I hope they will not be so crazy as to fight us. Because if we do not know how to work and do business, at least we shall know how to fight well.99

Miloševic´ and Jovic´ thus fulfilled their end of the bargain with Kadijevic´ and the army. They stepped aside, withdrew their support for the federal institutions, and claimed to have created a power vacuum necessary for the army to step in. Miloševic´ also mobilized the full power apparatus of his party and republic. All that was necessary was for the army to activate its plan for a takeover. In that crucial moment, however, General Kadijevic´ and the JNA aborted their plot. Based on later accounts by Borisav Jovic´ and General Kadijevic´ of the army’s decision making during those dramatic days, the High Command finally concluded on 17 March that its planned coup was bound to fail because it would homogenize the Croats and the Slovenes, turn other Yugoslav nations against the Serbs, potentially disillusion the Serbs from Serbia, strengthen the Serbian opposition, and lead to the full economic and political isolation of Yugoslavia.100 While this analysis was probably on the mark, the question remains of what changed between 13 and 17 March to shift General Kadijevic´’s willingness to take the responsibility of directing a military takeover. Both Jovic´ and Miloševic´ were seriously disappointed and angry with the decision.101 Some of Kadijevic´’s main associates, like his predecessor, Branko Mamula, and his eventual successor, General Života Panic´, were critical of his reluctance to go ahead with the coup because they were convinced both the West and the Soviets would have accepted it.102 Whatever the case may be, Kadijevic´’s cowardice or the High Command’s new analysis of the situation made the JNA step back from the

To the Brink and Back brink and thus inadvertently exposed the intentions of Miloševic´ and the Serbian leadership. The Serbian president could draw comfort from only one aspect of this humiliating episode. The JNA High Command increasingly began to realize that any attempt of a pan-Yugoslav action was doomed to failure, so it was forced to rely on Serbia, Miloševic´, and his platform for a new state. In the words of General Kadijevic´, the JNA’s new agenda in the aftermath of the aborted March coup was “the protection and defense of the Serb nation outside of Serbia and the consolidation of the JNA into the borders of a new Yugoslavia.”103 On all other counts, Miloševic´’s and Jovic´’s stunts with resignations and their regime’s violent response to opposition protests were serious failures. Miloševic´ had to orchestrate Serbia’s National Assembly’s rejection of Jovic´’s resignation in order to awkwardly return his closest associate to the presidency. He was also forced to organize an unprecedented and lengthy public meeting with Belgrade’s students in order to patch up his relationship with both the students and Serbia’s nationalist intellectuals.104 The economic situation in Serbia also continued to deteriorate. In mid-April more than seven hundred thousand of Serbia’s workers walked out on strike for unpaid wages, forcing Miloševic´’s government— which feared a repeat of the March unrest—to fulfill the workers’ demands within one day.105 According to a very revealing Borba poll, the popularity of Serbia’s ruling party had melted away to such an extent since its victory the previous December that had the elections been held in late March, the SPS would have been soundly defeated by the united opposition.106 The March events and their immediate aftermath, however, did not only result in challenges for Slobodan Miloševic´. They also provided a series of opportunities for other Yugoslavs and the West. A New York Times editorial of 15 March perceptively noted that the events on the streets of Belgrade and the erosion of Miloševic´’s popular support opened “the possibility of genuine dialogue among Yugoslavia’s republics, leading either to looser confederation, or negotiated separation. Either would be an outcome Americans can endorse.”107 The tanks on the streets of Belgrade were more shocking than the tanks on the streets of Kosovo not only for the Serbs, but also for Western diplomats. At a meeting of EC officials in the immediate aftermath of the 9 March violence, for example, German representatives tried to initiate a joint action from the Community by drafting a declaration condemning the violence and asserting the need for “the creation of a new Yugoslavia.”108 Though this proposal was at the time shelved, it signified a shift in some quarters of the EC which—at least behind closed doors and at lower levels of policy making—began to see the crisis with different eyes.

143 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

144 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back A perfect testament of this shift was also a long debate on the situation in Yugoslavia held on 13 and 14 March in the European Parliament.109 Particular criticism was reserved for the Serbian leadership, its policy in Kosovo, and the JNA’s use of force during the Belgrade protests. Though the parliament reiterated Europe’s interest in the unity and integrity of Yugoslavia, it did so by asserting that this unity and integrity could be maintained only if they were built on the free will and equality of all republics, with their borders intact.110 This was a significant message clearly intended for the Serbian leadership. Diplomats participating in the EC’s Eastern Europe working group also showed signs of a shift in perspective. Their debate of 19 and 20 March on whether to establish contacts with the republican leaders in Yugoslavia resulted in a proposal to increase communications with all Yugoslav parties only in order to convince them to stay together, but it also demonstrated that diplomats from a number of EC countries were beginning to understand that a completely new approach to the issue was necessary.111 The principal reason why a completely new approach was not crafted at this point lay in the fact that the US State Department and the White House took the lead in pushing for a stronger assertion of the old policy of status quo.112 When the political directors of the foreign ministries of the EC troika states (consisting of the current, former, and upcoming holders of the EC presidency)—Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands—visited Washington on 21 March, they were scolded by the State Department for not doing enough to prop up the Yugoslav federation. Though the European delegation expressed its ambivalence about doing that since it felt that the “proponents of unity as a rule were not the greatest proponents of democracy and market reform,” the message of the State Department had an important effect.113 On 26 March, the foreign ministers of the EC states formalized their long-standing policy stance toward Yugoslavia and its republics by adopting a declaration that “a united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself harmoniously in the new Europe.”114 Two days later, President Bush in his letter to Prime Minister Markovic´ also accentuated the idea that Yugoslavia’s integrity was a necessary condition for its greater cooperation with Europe and the West, and he asserted that the United States would “neither support nor reward those who wished to tear Yugoslavia apart.”115 Though the letter expressed America’s denunciation of any use of military force, its lack of mention of the actions of the Serbian leadership and of what had happened earlier that month led many in Yugoslavia to interpret President Bush’s message as directed toward the northwestern republics. In the days which followed, such statements and communications with the Yugoslav parties only intensified. On 4 April, the EC troika delegation of Gianni

To the Brink and Back De Michelis, Jacques Poos, and Hans van den Broek, together with EC Commission member Abel Matutes, visited Belgrade. Their message was also primarily directed toward the northwestern republics and consisted of three principal elements: (1) only a democratic and united Yugoslavia could hope for membership in the EC; (2) the EC could not even imagine having relations with six separate Yugoslav entities; and (3) Yugoslavia’s dissolution would not solve its political, economic, social, or other problems.116 The head of the EC delegation, Jacques Poos, went so far as to tell Borisav Jovic´ not only that “the European Community will not support the breakup of Yugoslavia,” but also that it would not even “accept separate negotiations with individual parts of it, if that does come about.” Judging by Jovic´’s entry in his diary, Poos’s statement on this occasion left him encouraged.117 In fact, Jovic´ was apparently so encouraged that on the following day he held a meeting with Miloševic´, Kadijevic´, and the JNA chief of staff, General Blagoje Adžic´, in which they “crossed the Rubicon” and decided that “we are no longer seeking any decisions from anyone, we are taking all necessary actions to protect the Serb nation, we will inform the presidency of any events, and anyone who does not like it can go home.”118 The climax of this approach of the EC and the United States came in midApril. At an EC Council summit held in Luxembourg on 9 April, the presidents and prime ministers of the Community states issued a repeat of the troika message from its recent visit to Belgrade. The Yugoslavs were once again told that “If it does not maintain its unity and territorial integrity, Yugoslavia cannot count on faster integration with Europe,” with Jacques Poos adding that “any other attitude could jeopardize internal frontiers in Europe.”119 On 12 April, the same message was repeated by President Bush; the president of the EC Council and prime minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Santer; and the president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, during a Washington meeting regarding post–Gulf War events in northern Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s violence against the Kurds. “Our primary preoccupation is with keeping the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,” asserted Santer at the press conference after the meeting, with Delors adding that the EC could consider giving associate status to Yugoslavia but only if it stayed united.120 Changes in Western policy toward Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the March crisis and another aborted military coup were, therefore, very limited. Western policy makers did express their profound disagreement with the use of force, which may have had an effect on the JNA High Command. EC officials also started to mention the possibility of Yugoslavia’s greater integration with the Community and the West. There were, furthermore, indications that diplomats behind closed doors had begun to see a confederation—something they had

145 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

146 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

To the Brink and Back rejected just months earlier—as the best solution to Yugoslavia’s problems.121 On the other hand, all principal elements of the West’s policy toward Yugoslavia and its republics remained unchanged. The main thrust of the involvement by the EC and the United States was still directed at the northwestern republics. They were the ones who felt the brunt of pressure from the West, even though they had nothing to do with the events in Belgrade or with the JNA plans for a coup. Borisav Jovic´’s account of the meeting he had with the EC troika delegation on 4 April and of that meeting’s consequences on the Serbian leadership’s decision making provides a great insight into the effects of Western policy at the time. The March events exposed Slobodan Miloševic´ as the greatest separatist in Yugoslavia, but Western policy makers failed to acknowledge that, particularly in their interactions with Yugoslav interlocutors. By pushing so hard for the protection of Yugoslavia’s unity and integrity, by making unity a condition for further European integration, and by refusing to even engage the leaders of the northwestern republics, the EC officials provided crucial cover for the Serbian president and his camp at a time when they needed it most.

• Any semblance of hope that some “Yugoslav” option would gather enough strength to stop the disintegration of the country should have been put to rest in the first months of 1991. Yugoslavia’s economy had collapsed, and the federal prime minister had turned into a figurehead whose only achievements were sporadic statements of support from Western governments and diplomats. The JNA—another federal institution with international admirers—also clearly showed it could offer no solutions for the crisis. Its High Command was staffed by conservatives and reactionaries who closely collaborated with Miloševic´ and the Serbian leadership in order to preserve not the federation as a state but their own positions of power. Finally, the only proposal which offered the possibility of maintaining some level of Yugoslav unity—Slovenia’s and Croatia’s proposal for a Yugoslav confederation—was buried before it was even discussed, to a large extent because of open hostility from the West. Opportunities for a shift in Western policy during this period presented themselves practically daily, and the need for a new approach became clearer with every new twist in Yugoslavia’s tragic plot. Crucial Yugoslav events were not only correctly assessed by the Western press, intelligence, and lower-level diplomats, but were even announced to Western governments by Yugoslavia’s most important players. The plan for the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian

To the Brink and Back state on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation, which was during 1990 mentioned in the West perhaps only in intelligence reports (though it was a common subject of discussion throughout Yugoslavia), was now openly disclosed by Miloševic´ to the European ambassadors in Belgrade. The army’s highest leadership also announced its preparations for a military intervention to the international actors. Nothing that happened in Yugoslavia in the first months of 1991 was a great surprise, and yet it resulted in little change in Western policy. What is more, the continuing commitment of Western governments to Yugoslavia’s federal unity and their criticism of Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics helped the Serbian president weather the challenge of Belgrade’s March protests and maintain the façade of the protector of Yugoslavia’s federalism. The West’s unwillingness to reassess its approach toward Yugoslavia certainly had a great deal to do with the sheer “eventfulness” of the first months of 1991. The US coalition’s intervention in the Persian Gulf began in mid-January and was completed by a successful ground invasion in late February. That winter also saw the further deterioration of Moscow’s control over the crumbling Soviet state and new violence in the Baltic republics. More than filling the plates of Western foreign policy makers, however, these events made them increasingly wary of change. In his post-Iraq speech at Maxwell Air Force Base on 13 April 1991, President Bush claimed that the “new world order” did not imply “forfeiting our interests, it really describes a responsibility imposed by our success. . . . What makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free.”122 At that particular time and as far as the Yugoslav federation was concerned, President Bush’s statement could not have been more misplaced or more false. The United States was indeed forfeiting its interests and shedding all responsibility in Yugoslavia, contributing to the West’s involvement not as the proponent of the idea “that all people everywhere must be free” but as the ultimate guarantor of stability and the status quo. The Europeans—some of them troubled—largely agreed with this approach.

147 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

6

Descent to Dissolution, March–June 1991

The final failures of the federal government and the JNA to assert themselves as possible pan-Yugoslav solutions to the crisis did not result in any major retooling of the West’s approach to Yugoslavia. Throughout the spring of 1991—the last spring of its existence—the Yugoslav federation descended further toward disintegration and violence. Belgrade’s March protests shook the foundations of Miloševic´’s grip on power. They also led the Serbian president toward escalating the conflict between his Krajina proxies and the Croatian authorities in an attempt to divert and unify the Serbian electorate. For all intents and purposes, real war began in Croatia that early spring. The West’s response to the precipitous deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia could probably best be described as “more assertive persistence.” Western diplomats belatedly started to give signals of appreciation for the proposal for a Yugoslav confederation and showed their readiness to finally offer tangible financial aid, but their real efforts were still centered on persuading the Yugoslavs to stay together. One after another, the heavyweights of Western foreign policy making—including the president of the EC Council, Jacques Santer; the president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors; and the US secretary of state, James Baker—came to Belgrade to impress on the Yugoslavs that their unity was of paramount importance for the stability of Europe. One after another, they all left Belgrade, often incredulous at the “irrationality” of their Yugoslav interlocutors, never realizing the irrationality of their own approach. Whereas during 1990 the insistence of the West on the preservation of the Yugoslav state could have been understood as a knee-jerk reaction or an idée reçue used by overstretched diplomats and foreign policy makers, the same could not be said of Western efforts during the last weeks of the Yugoslav federation for two reasons. First, the dogged commitment of the West to the 148

Descent to Dissolution federation’s unity had already been shown to be dramatically counterproductive. Second, the newest explosion of violence during the spring of 1991 had led to a substantial shift of perspective among important Western political actors, who began to push for a different policy and offered reasonable alternative solutions for greater Western involvement. This chapter deals with such shifts of perspective in two significant Western political institutions—the US Congress and the German Bundestag—but similar dynamics could have been observed throughout the West. The contention that Western foreign policy makers pushed for the preservation of the Yugoslav state out of their inability to conceive of a different policy, therefore, cannot be made. The roots of Western policy in the late spring of 1991 were instead grounded in realist conceptions of what constituted a greater threat to regional, European, and international stability. And the problem lay in the fact that a greater threat was seen in Slovenia’s and Croatia’s pursuits of independent paths than in the violent policies of the apparatus under Slobodan Miloševic´ which had led the two northwestern republics to go their separate way in the first place. Unsurprisingly, this crucial Western mistake not only failed to stop the northwestern republics from declaring independence, but also encouraged the Serbian president and his allies to pursue war. SPIRAL OF ESCALATION

Throughout the second half of 1990, Slobodan Miloševic´ and his regime directed the Croatian Serb extremists in building a proto-state structure in the Krajina region. According to the testimony of the leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´, at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´, starting in late 1990 virtually the whole operational structure of the budding Krajina mini-state (especially its police and later military units) was directly—most often in cash—funded by Serbia under the personal orders of President Miloševic´.1 And according to the ICTY testimony of the JNA general in charge of the KOS, Aleksandar Vasiljevic´, the assistance of Serbia’s government extended beyond financing and included weapons and military know-how from people who later rose to notoriety for their crimes, like the infamous Željko Ražnatovic´-Arkan.2 During 1990, such activities were used by the Serbian president both as a means of pressure against the Croats and as a building block for the projected border adjustments and the creation of a new Greater Serbian state.3 With Miloševic´’s grip on power beginning to falter during the first months of 1991, Krajina also began to serve as a distraction for the Serbian electorate and the opposition. After a relative lull in the clashes between the Krajina Serbs and the Croatian authorities during that winter, the month of March brought not only the Belgrade

149 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

150 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution protests against Miloševic´, but also the beginning of a new escalation of violence in Croatia. On 2 March, Croatian special forces collided with Serb paramilitaries, who took over the local police station in the small Slavonian town of Pakrac. Although there were no casualties, Borisav Jovic´ ordered JNA troops to intervene, and the Belgrade media under Miloševic´’s control used the incident to whip up antiCroatian sentiment.4 On 16 March—the day of Miloševic´’s televised speech, in which he claimed to sever Serbia’s relations with the federal institutions—the Krajina Serbs also announced they were seceding from Croatia, which prompted the Washington Post to note that the Serbian president was trying to provoke the Croats into an intervention in order to distract Serbia’s public from the events in Belgrade. According to diplomatic sources consulted by the Post, “Serbia has distributed weapons and money to the Serbs in Knin, and . . . they are under Miloševic´’s control.”5 Those weapons, money, and control—initially invested as a means of blackmailing the Croats and building the structure of a new state— were now being used to pay dividends in Belgrade. The opposition’s March protests may have presented Miloševic´ with the greatest challenge of his rule, but they also accelerated his choice to plummet the country into war by instigating the clash between the Krajina Serbs and the Croats. In this environment of heightened tensions and open provocations, one of the most controversial episodes of Yugoslavia’s dissolution took place. Slobodan Miloševic´ and Franjo Tud‒man met head to head in Tito’s former hunting estates of Karad‒ord‒evo in Vojvodina and Tikveš in Croatia. These meetings, which took place on 25 March and 15 April, surprised the Yugoslav public and immediately led to conspiracy theories regarding the subject of the two presidents’ conversations. The presidents of all six of Yugoslavia’s republics engaged in a series of summits between 28 March and 6 June, but none of these gatherings caught the attention of the Yugoslav public in the same way as the two meetings between Miloševic´ and Tud‒man.6 Serbia’s and Croatia’s presidents were seen as the two biggest rivals on the federation’s political scene, and their negotiations—no less the locations of the negotiations in places of such historical symbolism—puzzled the Yugoslav public.7 Were the meetings part of Tud‒man’s plan to save Miloševic´ after the Belgrade protests because the two leaders needed each other to perpetuate their regimes? Or were they the product of Tud‒man’s thinking that he could get the best deal out of a weakened Miloševic´? Did the two presidents plan to trade the fates of the Krajina Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians? Did they agree to push Ante Markovic´ out of office? Finally and most important, did Tud‒man and Miloševic´ agree to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Descent to Dissolution The primary impetus for these meetings most likely came from the Croatian side, more precisely from the Croatian representative on the federal presidency, Stipe Mesic´.8 The Croats had already been eager to negotiate with Miloševic´ in 1990 because they wanted to defuse the crisis in Krajina, but Miloševic´ had repeatedly refused.9 The sudden willingness of the Serbian boss to engage Tud‒man directly in late March probably had something to do with his weakened position in Belgrade. These meetings, which brought Miloševic´ and Tud‒man together for two lengthy conversations uninterrupted and unattended by anyone else—in contrast to how they were later described—were not secret. They were covered by the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug and extensively discussed by the local press.10 The conversations that the two presidents held during their walks in the forests of Karad‒ord‒evo and Tikveš were, naturally, not transcribed, but the official press releases offered some clues as to what was discussed.11 These press releases suggested that Markovic´’s fate was on the table and that Miloševic´ and Tud‒man tried to “eliminate the options endangering the interests of the whole of the Serb and Croat nations and seek permanent solutions while acknowledging the historical interests of their nations.”12 A formulation mentioning “the interests of the whole of the Serb and Croat nations” made many wonder whether the two presidents had tried to settle their scores at the expense of the republic where large segments of the Serb and Croat nations lived: Bosnia-Herzegovina. After all, both Miloševic´ and Tud‒man gave plenty of reasons to the observing public to suspect they would consider such a deal. Ever since the Croatian electoral campaign and his problematic statements regarding Yugoslavia’s central republic, Tud‒man’s stance toward Bosnia-Herzegovina was seen as questionable at best. Though he tried to secure the support of Bosnian Muslims and their leader, Alija Izetbegovic´, by publicly endorsing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s sovereignty, Tud‒man never managed to shake off his image as a man who struggled with the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its equality with Croatia.13 Miloševic´’s infractions against Bosnia-Herzegovina were, on the other hand, much more egregious and dangerous. As noted above, in the run-up to the aborted January 1991 coup against Croatia, Miloševic´ had publicly disputed BosniaHerzegovina’s sovereignty and threatened its leaders with ethnic partition.14 Throughout February, the clash over Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status and sovereignty between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, on the one hand, and Miloševic´’s proxies in the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) on the other, further intensified. In contrast to the Muslims and the Croats, who wanted to pass a parliamentary declaration reaffirming the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDS and its leader, Radovan Karadžic´, argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s sovereignty could be

151 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

152 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution recognized only if it remained within Yugoslavia, and—more dangerously—that without Yugoslavia there could not even be a Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 This conflict had reached such bitter proportions by the end of February that Karadžic´’s and Izetbegovic´’s sparring on the floor of the republican assembly basically marked the end of any coherent joint policy by the ruling ethnic parties. Karadžic´ announced that the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina had withdrawn their support from the republic’s government and instead had empowered Slobodan Miloševic´ to negotiate in their name on the future of Yugoslavia.16 Alija Izetbegovic´’s response was a staunch defense of his republic’s sovereignty in which he claimed he would be willing to sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina but would not be willing to sacrifice a sovereign BosniaHerzegovina for peace.17 Karadžic´’s retort at a mass rally in Banja Luka—a clear description of the policy of the SDS and its protector in Belgrade—was that “as the chances for Yugoslavia fall, the chances for Greater Serbia rise.”18 With such a run-up to the meetings in Karad‒ord‒evo and Tikveš, it is no wonder that the Yugoslav public suspected Miloševic´ and Tud‒man had cut a deal for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though we will probably never find out exactly what the two presidents talked about, some firsthand accounts of highly positioned officials in Tud‒man’s circle suggest that the fate of Yugoslavia’s central republic was indeed the main subject of negotiations. According to Stipe Mesic´, Tud‒man was very content with the negotiations in Karad‒ord‒evo because Miloševic´ supposedly offered him even more than the borders of the pre–World War II Croatian Banovina; these included significant portions of BiH and, naturally, all of Croatian Krajina.19 The account of Croatia’s vice-president, Dušan Bilandžic´, is somewhat different, though no less damning for both Tud‒man and Miloševic´. Bilandžic´ was one of four members of the expert group Tud‒man created in the aftermath of the Karad‒ord‒evo meeting for the purpose of negotiating with Miloševic´’s group of experts. The two groups apparently held a series of meetings in April 1991 on the subject of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is crucial, however, that they failed to reach any agreement because of the maximalist demands of the Serbian side. In contrast to Mesic´’s account, Bilandžic´ claims that Miloševic´’s experts were adamant not only that Serbia should get a vast portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also that Croatia cede its eastern province of Baranja and the whole of Krajina.20 No matter what the Serbian demands were, these and a number of other firsthand accounts strongly suggest Miloševic´ and Tud‒man did discuss the carving-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina.21 Tud‒man himself in press interviews at the time hardly concealed his ambiguity regarding the border alterations.22 His argument in favor of negotiating with Miloševic´ rather than resorting to violence was

Descent to Dissolution sound, especially since the rhetoric of the Serbian opposition was even worse than that of the Serbian president.23 However, his willingness to accept Miloševic´’s challenge to the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a tragic mistake which had serious repercussions, even though no deal on this republic’s partition was reached at the time. It is unclear how the two presidents even came to the subject of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Was it all Miloševic´’s trick to lower Tud‒man’s defenses and lure him into a morally equivalent position of aggressor? Was it a product of Tud‒man’s well-documented enthusiasm for the idea of partition or simply his tactic to bait Miloševic´ with a part of BiH in order to keep him from going after Croatia? Whatever the case may be, by agreeing to negotiate at the expense of Yugoslavia’s central republic, Tud‒man gave credence to Miloševic´’s claim that the federation’s internal borders meant little. He thus weakened Croatia’s international position and further damaged its relations with the Bosnian Muslims. By agreeing to even participate in a tête-à-tête arrangement with the Serbian president, Tud‒man also sent a public message that Yugoslavia’s problems revolved around the Serbo-Croat clash. He thus undermined the broader negotiations among the presidents of all six republics which were taking place during the same period and alienated other Yugoslav players who could have helped strengthen his position. Finally—and most tragic—by placing trust in the supposed genuine intentions of Miloševic´ to negotiate in good faith, Tud‒man also disastrously misjudged the events on the ground, particularly since the Serbian president continued to prove by brute force that he had no intention of giving anything away. The first new sign of Miloševic´’s true intentions came not even a week after the meeting in Karad‒ord‒evo. On the morning of Easter Sunday, 31 March, Croatia’s police forces clashed with Krajina paramilitaries at Plitvice National Park in Lika. The scenario was similar to the aforementioned events in Pakrac. Armed militiamen under the command of Milan Martic´ took control of the park, denying Croatian authorities the right to set up a local police station. Special units of the Croatian police then intervened to evict Martic´’s paramilitaries. One Croatian policeman and one local Serb paramilitary were killed. Today they are considered the first casualties of Yugoslavia’s wars. Their deaths sent shockwaves throughout the country. The rebel authorities of Krajina and another newly formed Serb Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem responded to the events by confirming their secession from Croatia and proclaiming themselves to be an integral part of Serbia.24 Just as in Pakrac, JNA tanks came out as a quasi-interposition force but quickly proved their true allegiance by pushing out the Croatian police units from the national park and mobilizing

153 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

154 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution forces for a broad front of armor around Krajina in order to prevent similar actions by the Croatian ministry of internal affairs.25 To which extent Miloševic´ himself was involved in guiding the escalation among Krajina, the JNA, and the Croats is uncertain, though the Western press was convinced he was the mastermind of the whole affair.26 The fact, however, remains that Martic´’s men were directly armed by Serbia and that Serbia’s National Assembly—although refusing to recognize Krajina’s proclamation of accession to Serbia—openly endorsed the position of the rebel Krajina Serbs for their secession from Croatia.27 The effects of these events on the already tense inter-ethnic relations in Croatia were devastating. Sporadic clashes between the police and the paramilitaries erupted throughout the rural areas, new barricades were erected on a daily basis, and extremists on both sides became more vocal and gained popular support. Since the Krajina region was now effectively sealed off by the JNA armor, attention shifted to the more ethnically diverse northeastern regions of Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. Their proximity to Serbia made them particularly vulnerable to intrusions by the Serbian radicals, whose rallies and violent actions were duly answered by Croatian extremists, many of whom were members and leaders of the local HDZ organizations.28 Such a tense situation with daily provocations and conflicts was bound to explode violently. And explode it did on 2 May in the village of Borovo Selo near Vukovar. On that day, local paramilitaries from this stronghold of Serb rebellion in Slavonia, assisted by the forces of the Serb Radical Party from Serbia and armed by Serbia’s ministry of internal affairs, ambushed a contingent of Croatian policemen, killing twelve and wounding twenty.29 The cruel and cold-blooded nature of the carnage—pictures of apparently mutilated bodies of the policemen were published in the media— overshadowed all previous clashes and dramatically radicalized Croatian public opinion. The Croats now demanded their republic’s independence and a forceful response to the Serb paramilitaries and Miloševic´’s regime. Though the Croatian president appealed to the citizens of his republic for peace and restraint in responding to the events of Borovo Selo, the situation quickly slipped out of his hands.30 Local feuds and provocations turned into armed clashes and spread like wildfire, not only through the ethnic mix of villages in eastern Slavonia, but also in urban areas.31 Croatian Serbs outside of the Krajina region were particularly hard hit as they became exposed to discrimination at their workplaces and to mistreatment at the hands of the local police authorities.32 In the republic’s second largest city of Split, mass demonstrations in front of the headquarters of the JNA’s naval district on 6 May took a violent turn and led to the death of a Macedonian conscript.33 The federal secretary for the people’s defense, Veljko Kadijevic´, in response proclaimed that “Yugoslav

Descent to Dissolution society has already entered a civil war” and ordered the mobilization of reservist forces and their deployment to Croatia. Army columns rolled westward from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, at times clashing with the local Croat population.34 War engulfed Croatia, further exposing the naivety of the Croatian president’s attempt to hold Slobodan Miloševic´ to some deal. Miloševic´’s unwillingness to cede anything to the Croats became even more obvious on 15 May—the day of the scheduled rotation of the federal presidency’s leadership. On that day Croatia’s Stipe Mesic´ was supposed to take over the duties of the president of the SFRJ presidency from Serbia’s Borisav Jovic´ in a procedure set in motion after the death of Tito in 1980. Never before had anyone challenged the established order of rotation, and never before had any republic’s right been challenged to independently appoint its representative to this federal body. In March of that year, even Slobodan Miloševic´ had defended the independent right of his republic to fill the position of federal president after Borisav Jovic´’s resignation.35 Two months later, he changed his mind, and with the help of his four votes in the presidency (Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro) he blocked Mesic´’s promotion. It was a move which federal prime minister Ante Markovic´ called “political suicide” and Slovenian president Milan Kucˇan labeled a “camouflaged coup d’état.”36 By this action, Yugoslavia was decapitated and left without a head of state. Moreover, the Croats were now also given the clearest message yet that their elected leaders could not be the leaders of Miloševic´’s state. Four days after the voting farce in the federal presidency, the citizens of Croatia agreed with Miloševic´ that life in a common state was at its end. In a referendum on the republic’s independence and its position in the negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future, they overwhelmingly voted for Croatia to be a “sovereign and independent state . . . [which] can enter into a confederation of sovereign states with other republics.” The violence in Pakrac, Plitvice, Borovo Selo, and countless other towns and villages; the decision of the Krajina Serbs to secede from Croatia and join Serbia; and Miloševic´’s latest blatant circumvention of the constitution during the non-election of Mesic´—all of these finally spelled the end of patience for Croatia’s voters.37 More than 94 percent of them—on a turnout of 83 percent— voted for sovereignty and independence. Although their referendum only repeated what the Slovenes had already decided in December 1990, the vote of the second largest Yugoslav republic effectively meant the federal Yugoslavia was dead. CHANGING VIEWS IN THE WEST

The dramatic events in Yugoslavia during this period shot to the front pages of the Western press and had a profound effect on how the crisis was perceived

155 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

156 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution in some important quarters of the international community. In the immediate aftermath of the carnage in Borovo Selo, major newspapers throughout Western Europe and the United States echoed Croatia’s and Slovenia’s disappointment with the policies of the West toward Yugoslavia. The Independent of London expressed its distaste for Europe looking “on the creation of several new states in the Balkans with unabashed horror, and maybe even sighing with relief if the army takes power and quashes [Slovenia’s and Croatia’s] separatist ambitions”— a position which had thus far been “good news for Serbia’s rulers and the generals.” The paper’s conclusion was perhaps cynical but justified: “The club of Europe seems to prefer the members it knows, however badly behaved, to the unknown newcomers frantically beating on the door.”38 The Economist also perceptively noted that “some western governments would find it tempting to go along with” intervention by the hard-liners in the army, “deploring tanks in the streets but privately preferring the ‘tidiness’ of a single Yugoslavia to the uncertainties of a break-up.” The journal issued a sound warning that such temptations should be resisted because Yugoslavia could not be held together by force and because an endorsement of a military intervention by the JNA “would set a bad precedent for the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union.” In the opinion of both the Economist and the New York Times, instead of giving mixed signals to the hard-liners, the West needed to issue a clear threat of economic sanctions to those who used force. It also had to step in with an offer of mediating negotiations toward a loose confederation or complete separation. As the Economist noted, “Yugoslavia is post-Cold-War Europe’s first big test for solving old-fashioned disputes in a new-fashioned, peaceful way. It cannot afford to flunk it.”39 Yugoslavia indeed was a big test, and the events of the spring of 1991 did lead to some changes in the way Western governments responded to the federation’s crisis. One of the more notable shifts occurred in the United States, where congressional pressure finally resulted in some reassessment of the situation and public acknowledgment by the State Department and the Bush administration of the principal problem in Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the high-profile visit by the congressional delegation to Yugoslavia and Kosovo in August 1990, important members of Congress from President Bush’s own party, like senators Robert Dole, Alfonse D’Amato, and Donald Nickles, voiced their outrage over Serbia’s policies and demanded that the United States not remain on the sidelines. Though their efforts at passing direct congressional resolutions about the situation in Kosovo and Yugoslavia were at the time fruitless because of the opposition of the White House and the State Department, in November 1990 the senators did manage to “sneak in” a significant amendment—later known

Descent to Dissolution as the Nickles Amendment—to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for the 1991 fiscal year. This amendment required the United States to end all forms of economic assistance to Yugoslavia—including support at the IMF and the World Bank—if it was determined that “a pattern of systematic gross violations of human rights” was still occurring in the crisis-torn federation at the end of that period. As those six months were, by coincidence, set to expire exactly in the middle of the newest wave of troubles in the spring of 1991, the Senate again sprung to action. On 18 April, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution steering official US policy in a new direction. The resolution called on Miloševic´ to “cease all repressive policies against the Albanian population of Kosovo” and on Jovic´ and the JNA to “refrain from the use of coercive tactics and force against the democratically elected” non-Communist governments of the republics. More important, the resolution also sent a clear message to the US president and the State Department that the “United States policy toward Yugoslavia should be based on support for democracy and human rights”; that the president should act swiftly to economically punish Yugoslavia in case of a military crackdown; and—significantly—that the Yugoslav and Serbian governments did not meet the criteria of respect for human rights necessary for the suspension of the Nickles Amendment.40 It was one thing for the White House and the State Department to face dissent by several, even if prominent, members of Congress. It was quite another when that dissent was expressed by a unanimous voice vote of the whole Senate. The highest officials in the administration and the State Department were, however, hardly receptive to the Senate’s intrusion into foreign policy making. In addition to the customary unwillingness to relinquish control over an area largely under the purview of the White House, they were also reluctant to follow the Senate’s lead because of their long-standing policy toward Yugoslavia and because of the possible effects of a change in policy on the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev’s weakening grip on power. A week after the Senate resolution, the CIA submitted to the White House its assessment of the situation in Moscow; it found the Soviet president facing the threat of a coup by his more traditionalist associates like the minister of defense, Dmitry Yazov; the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov; and the minister of internal affairs, Boris Pugo.41 And on 9 May, the CIA added its evaluation of the Soviet view of Yugoslavia and Western involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. That evaluation suggested that “the Soviets see Yugoslavia as the USSR in microcosm” and that they are loath to accept greater foreign involvement in the crisis out of fear of this setting “a dangerous precedent, undoubtedly one that could be applied to

157 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

158 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution the USSR in a similar situation.”42 Since President Bush still maintained his commitment to Gorbachev in spite of the Soviet leader’s growing weakness and troubling reactionary leanings, it is not difficult to see why the Senate’s resolution on Yugoslavia was not welcomed by the White House and the administration.43 It called for a new policy which could potentially weaken the Soviet president in the eyes of his reactionary associates/adversaries. The official reaction of the State Department to the Senate resolution was, thus, at first as low-profile as possible. Secretary of State James Baker, who had the discretionary power to act on the resolution’s main provision of triggering the Nickles Amendment, simply chose “non-response.” That did automatically set in motion the withdrawal of US aid to Yugoslavia but without any public acknowledgment, which the senators thought was necessary in order to send a message to Miloševic´ and the JNA. In fact, since the US aid to Yugoslavia was at the time so small anyway, no one in the federation even noticed that the Nickles Amendment had been activated on 5 May until a lengthy article on the topic was published two weeks later in the New York Times.44 Only then—when the affair captured headlines in the Yugoslav press and prompted federal prime minister Ante Markovic´ to call President Bush and ask for an explanation—did the State Department finally publicly respond through an extended statement of policy toward Yugoslavia on 24 May.45 Although this statement tried to have things both ways—to placate the Senate and at the same time continue the State Department’s policy—it marked an important shift in the US approach to the crisis. The statement for the first time placed democracy ahead of unity on the list of America’s principles guiding its policy in Yugoslavia. It expressed US acceptance of any resolution of the crisis—in federal, confederal, or other form—that was achieved through peaceful means. The statement also stressed the administration’s firm belief in the inviolability of Yugoslavia’s external and internal borders. Most important, the statement singled out the Serbian leadership as the main culprit in the blockade of the federal presidency and the abuse of human rights. However, the statement did not go all the way. It reinstated US aid to Yugoslavia, a move that prompted Ambassador Zimmermann—who was particularly eager to placate the Serbian public—to bluntly declare at a press conference in Belgrade that the Nickles Amendment was “dead.”46 The reason why aid had been reinstated lay in the fact that the Bush administration was reluctant to withdraw support from Ante Markovic´, no matter how hopeless his prospects were. For a perfect example of such blind commitment to the federal prime minister, one needs only to look at Ambassador Zimmermann’s account in his cable to Washington on 20 May 1991—a model

Descent to Dissolution of sound assessment of Miloševic´’s goals and the general balance of power within Yugoslavia, as well as a model of disastrously misguided and uninventive policy analysis and prescription. Though he correctly believed that Miloševic´ “now wanted to destroy the country in the interest of a Greater Serbia” and that Markovic´’s prospects for success were at best slim, Zimmermann urged Washington’s continued support of the federal prime minister against all reasonable odds.47 The Senate resolution had at least forced the State Department to publicly truly acknowledge what was happening on the ground. However, the Bush administration—extending its failing strategy of support for Gorbachev to its treatment of Markovic´—still did not snap out of its spiral of ineffective policy and did not connect that acknowledgment of reality with a new, stronger, and more proactive approach. The spring 1991 events in Yugoslavia also had a significant impact on the perception of the crisis throughout Western Europe. This shift was nowhere more obvious than in the newly reunified Germany. Of all the members of the European Community, Germany had the strongest and most developed economic and political ties with Yugoslavia. It was Yugoslavia’s largest trading partner, home to nearly half a million guest workers from all regions of the federation, and an unofficial sponsor of Yugoslavia’s efforts to deepen its relations with the European Community.48 In the words of Yugoslavia’s last secretary for foreign affairs Budimir Loncˇar, Germany “was very interested in seeing that the Yugoslav crisis does not develop into violent conflict. Anticipating the changes in the East, it was interested in Yugoslavia maintaining its leading role, as a frontrunner of better and easier transitions to democracy. That is why Germany supported Yugoslavia energetically.”49 Indeed, until the spring of 1991, German support of Yugoslavia’s integrity and unity differed from the similar views of Germany’s allies only in the level of understanding of the threat posed by Miloševic´ and the army. According to intelligence reports available to the Serbian and Yugoslav leaderships in February 1991, German foreign policy makers were incredulous that “the nations in Yugoslavia really think that they would be better off on their own than in a community, which is Europe’s destiny.” The reports furthermore claimed that Germany’s foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was personally interested in the peaceful maintenance of Yugoslavia’s unity because he believed its disintegration would (1) create an area of instability in Europe; (2) confirm that the introduction of democracy and a market economy in Eastern Europe leads to national confrontations; (3) create possibly authoritarian successor states which would still be in conflict with one another; and (4) impoverish the local population, especially if there was war.50 What is more, Germany’s

159 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

160 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution foreign policy community also wished to secure Yugoslavia’s unity because of its interest in maintaining the unity of the Soviet state during the process of German reunification. Germany fully regained its sovereignty only on 15 March 1991 with the “Two plus Four” treaty coming into force, and Moscow ratified the last reunification-related treaty on Soviet troop withdrawal on 2 April.51 That is why, according to German diplomat Gerhard Almer, who was at the time working on Yugoslav affairs in the Auswärtiges Amt, “Everything that was happening in Yugoslavia was viewed through Soviet glasses. [Genscher’s] idea was, ‘Well, Yugoslavia disintegrating is a bad example for Soviet disintegration, and this was bad for us since we needed a Soviet Union capable of action because we needed to get a deal with them on our unity.’ This was widely accepted in the ministry.”52 As the violence in Yugoslavia escalated during the spring of 1991, however, this broad consensus among German foreign policy makers began to face serious domestic challenges. German diplomacy already advocated a proactive approach by the West toward Yugoslavia and a clearer acknowledgment of the destructive role of the JNA and the Serbian camp, but this proactive approach had always been used to support Yugoslavia’s integrity.53 In the aftermath of the Belgrade protests, with the continuing brutal subjugation of Kosovo and the violence in Pakrac, Plitvice, and Borovo Selo, this policy was met with stiff criticism from the German press, public, and members of the Bundestag. Though the arguments presented in papers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or Die Welt barely differed from the arguments presented during the same period in the New York Times, the Economist, or the Independent, they carried special weight in Germany because they forcefully and emotionally related Yugoslavia’s fate to Germany’s recent experience of self-determination through reunification and even more so to its experience of Nazism and aggressive expansionism.54 With every new episode of violence and push for border changes in Belgrade and with every new assertion of the right to self-determination in Ljubljana and Zagreb, the German media only sharpened their critique of the West’s (and Bonn’s) policy toward the Yugoslav federation. The events in Borovo Selo in particular proved to be a watershed. German diplomats behind closed doors unsuccessfully urged the EC to issue a strong response to the incident with a draft declaration which argued that the foundations for a real solution of the crisis were “democracy, right of self-determination, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, as well as the rule of law.”55 The German diplomats still had to face harsh domestic criticism, which had now spread from the media to the Bundestag, and particularly to the opposition Social Democrats. Though much has been made in the literature of the

Descent to Dissolution eventual support of Kohl’s Christian Democrats or Genscher’s Liberals for the self-determination of Slovenia and Croatia, it was actually the opposition SPD which was the first to make a concerted push for a real policy shift in the German parliament. The day after the Borovo Selo clash, the foreign policy spokesman of the Social Democrats, Karsten Voigt, harshly criticized the Brussels policy of tying Yugoslavia’s possible EC association with the perpetuation of the federation’s unity because “such a position of the EC could be understood as encouragement by those who would wish to force Yugoslavia to stay together even at the price of the use of force and the oppression of nations, as is the case in Kosovo.”56 This critique was one of the main elements of the SPD’s lengthy policy statement of 23 May, written by the party’s leading foreign policy expert, Norbert Gansel, who had just returned from a visit to Yugoslavia. Gansel’s report found the Community’s pursuit of Yugoslav unity misplaced, particularly since the very “idea of a ‘democratic, united Yugoslavia’ was a fiction to begin with.” Instead, he urged the EC, CSCE, and United Nations to proactively assist the Yugoslav nations and republics in developing new forms of mutual cooperation “based on voluntariness, equality and common interests.” He also “proposed that the CSCE demand that the intra-Yugoslav borders should only be changed by consent . . . [and] that the United Nations gives security guarantees to those republics willing to forego the creation of separate armies.”57 These proposals gained additional weight and importance five days later, when they earned the official approval of the SPD congress in Bremen and words of support from former chancellor Willy Brandt.58 Such uncharacteristic foreign policy assertiveness by the Social Democrats had an impact on other parties, particularly the ruling CDU/CSU, which was more responsive to the opposition’s public pressures than its junior partner, the FDP. According to a former foreign ministry official, the outcome of these pressures was a push by Helmut Kohl’s chancellery on Foreign Minister Genscher to craft a new policy.59 Prominent members of the chancellor’s party began to demand a real turnaround in the approach to the crisis. This turnaround was to entail active pressure from the EC on Serbia, as well as Germany’s support for the most comprehensive and forward-looking plan for Western involvement available at the time—the plan of Austria’s foreign minister, Alois Mock, who wanted the EC to offer its good offices to the conflicting Yugoslav parties as a negotiations facilitator and the WEU to make available a number of preventative peacekeeping troops.60 Although these pressures from the Bundestag and the chancellery did not manage to alter the position of the German foreign minister at the time (his opinion on what threatened the stability of Eastern

161 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

162 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution Europe remained the same as the opinions of most of his Western counterparts), they did signal a deep underlying reservoir of discontent with Europe’s policy toward Yugoslavia and the potential for a future significant shift of Germany’s position.61 While the events on the ground may have convinced the parliamentary majorities in Germany and the United States (and a number of other states like Austria, Hungary, and Denmark) that a shift in policy toward Yugoslavia was necessary, the highest levels of Western foreign policy making remained tenaciously committed to their long-standing approach. At a meeting of the EC Council on 13 May, the foreign ministers of all the EC states agreed to the proposal of their British colleague Douglas Hurd not only to continue with the established policy, but also to amplify it by dispatching the president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, and the president of the EC Council, Jacques Santer, to give that message to Belgrade.62 As one EC diplomat stated on that occasion, “We want to see stability, we want faster progress to democracy and we want the continued unity of Yugoslavia.”63 In other words, very little changed in the way the EC approached the problem. The only indication of a shift came in signals that a transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation could now be accepted. Those signals, however, came six months too late. When Slovenia and Croatia had proposed the confederal solution in the fall of 1990, they had been openly discouraged and criticized by the West. By mid-May 1991, when blood in the clash between the Serbs and the Croats had already been spilled, the confederal proposal was dead. Western signals of possible support for a Yugoslav confederation were at that point meaningless, especially since there were few public indications that the West’s policy had truly changed. Prominent EC officials, like Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis, still gave strong negative messages to the Slovenes and Croats (as well as the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians) or—like French prime minister Edith Cresson—insisted that “Yugoslavia cannot be part of Europe unless she remains united.”64 More important, significant Western players, such as Britain’s Conservative government of John Major, refused to accept that the European Community had a role in the enforcement of a possible Yugoslav deal and offered ambiguous and dangerous public assessments of the appropriate role for the JNA. Prominent opposition parliamentarians, such as the deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats, Russell Johnston, at the time suspected that the Foreign Office was willing to condone the JNA’s intervention “in order for the problem to go away.”65 The explosion of violence in Yugoslavia thus resulted in hints of real change in the Western outlook only in the legislatures of the United States

Descent to Dissolution and Germany. The true centers of Western foreign policy, however, kept their course and pushed for the practically unaltered approach, against all odds of such an approach doing anything but supporting exactly the wrong people in Yugoslavia: the JNA and the Serbian camp. PREVENTING THE INEVITABLE: THE WEST AND YUGOSLAVIA’S LAST DAYS

The aftermath of the non-election of Stipe Mesic´ and Croatia’s decisive vote for independence left Yugoslavia in a state of quickly advancing decay. The federation’s “expiration date” was more or less set for the end of June by the referendum in Slovenia and the public statements of the Slovenian leadership. The Slovenian vote of December 1990 had established a six-month deadline for the completion of the negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia and had signaled Slovenia was determined to go its separate way in case of the negotiations’ failure. During late May and early June 1991, Yugoslavia was for all intents and purposes a headless state teetering toward its certain end. Its presidency was blockaded with the four members under Miloševic´’s control staunchly defending their position that Mesic´ would not become the country’s president on their watch. All federal institutions except the army ceased to wield effective control over most matters of public policy. The presidents of the six republics still engaged in talks on the future of the Yugoslav community but only to confirm that their differences were irreconcilable.66 Most important, those who truly held power were quickly preparing for dissolution and war. On one end of the Yugoslav clash were the Slovenes and the Croats, who were determined not to let their June deadline slip by. The Slovenes were particularly adamant in their preparations for independence because, after all, their January 1991 deal with Miloševic´ guaranteed them there would be no real opposition from Serbia to their departure. As Slovenian foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel later put it, “We were afraid only of Markovic´, not of Miloševic´.”67 The series of meetings between the Slovenes and the Croats at the time demonstrated the dramatically different conditions under which the two republics were approaching their declarations of independence. The Slovenes were selfassured and prepared, and their decisions were final and far-reaching. They printed new passports, announced the imminent creation of their own currency, and publicized their plans to take over Yugoslavia’s border posts toward Italy, Austria, and Hungary and establish new ones on their border with Croatia. For the Croats, on the other hand, the declaration of independence was just a step in the ongoing negotiations on the future of Yugoslav space, an act imbued

163 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

164 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution with patriotic sentiment but not implying a definitive severance of relations with the Yugoslav federation.68 The Croats were torn by their need not to fall back behind the Slovenes and by the fact that a significant portion of their territory was under the control of the Serb rebels and the JNA, which had plans for an even broader attack on their republic.69 Croatia’s leadership thus had to tread much more carefully on its path to independence—by balancing shows of strength, like the formation of the Croatian National Guard that May, with conciliatory statements of a continuing commitment to negotiations.70 The camp around the Serbian president did not have to tread as carefully in its preparations for Yugoslavia’s end. Gone were the days after the March 1991 Belgrade protests when Miloševic´ may have felt weakened enough to entertain thoughts of satisfying his appetite with a divided Bosnia-Herzegovina. In midJune he again met twice with Franjo Tud‒man, though this time with the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic´, present.71 In Miloševic´’s view on these occasions, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not to be divided but to remain in a joint state with Serbia, Montenegro, and the Krajina Serbs—in what would perhaps be a mini-Yugoslavia in name but a Greater Serbia in essence. The key to Yugoslavia’s dissolution thus lay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the actions of the Serbian president in and toward this republic offered perfect clues as to what was coming. Since the Serbs accounted for only 31 percent of the population in Yugoslavia’s central republic, the success of Miloševic´’s plans depended heavily on the acquiescence of the Bosnian Muslim leadership, represented by Izetbegovic´. From some of the most interesting evidence to surface during the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´—the intercepts of Miloševic´’s telephone conversations with the members of his inner circle—we can easily reconstruct the strategy of the Serbian president vis-à-vis Izetbegovic´ and the Bosnian Muslims at this time.72 Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Muslim population and leadership were to be coerced and blackmailed into siding with Miloševic´ by a strong show of force with the help of the JNA and the Serb Democratic Party under Radovan Karadžic´. The SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina had already caused a political crisis in May 1991 by creating Serb regional associations similar to the SAO Krajina in Croatia.73 The Bosnian Serbs began to copy their ethnic brethren in Croatia in both political decisions and military matters. Krajina’s armed militias under the command of Milan Martic´ conducted a number of incursions into the Serbpopulated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina during May and June and even performed armed exercises at the invitation of the local Bosnian SDS organizations.74 More important, as revealed by the aforementioned telephone intercepts, the

Descent to Dissolution SDS leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina at this time established a clientelist relationship with both the JNA formations and Miloševic´’s state apparatus in Serbia. Miloševic´ used the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May and June 1991 to mobilize troops for the JNA, create a network for the disbursement of supplies and weapons from Serbia’s authorities under his command to the Bosnian Serbs, and build a governing structure of the projected new Serb state.75 As he exclaimed to Radovan Karadžic´ in his invitation for a joint meeting with the ´ ´, on 11 chief ideologue of Serb nationalism and irredentism, Dobrica Cosic June, “We shall build a nation!”76 The stage was, thus, set for Yugoslavia’s inevitable end. All signs of the impending violent clashes were in plain view. The Slovenes, emboldened by their deal with Miloševic´, prepared for independence with conviction and determination. The Croats, as cautious as they may have tried to be, simply could not afford to fall behind their northwestern neighbors. And the Serbian camp expanded its preparations for the building of a new state, especially in what was to be the heart of any possible Greater Serbia: Yugoslavia’s central and ethnically most diverse and vulnerable republic. In spite of all the available evidence that the federation was not only about to expire, but also to blow up in a vicious conflict over territory, the European Community and the United States still refused to acknowledge the facts and adjust their policy. On 29 May, Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors came to Belgrade to reiterate the Community’s long-standing commitment to being more Yugoslavist than the Yugoslavs themselves. Six weeks earlier, they had visited President Bush in Washington and asserted that their primary preoccupation was with keeping the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Now they repeated the same thing in Belgrade, as if that policy had not already proved to be hopeless and as if nothing had happened during those six weeks. In their meetings with the presidents of the republics, members of the federal government, and members of the federal presidency, Santer and Delors expressed their support for an integral Yugoslavia and offered economic assistance for the federal government in the amount of $4–5 billion.77 Yugoslavia, however, had to satisfy four conditions: (1) a single market, currency, and central bank; (2) a single army; (3) a single joint foreign policy; and (4) a common system for the protection of human and minority rights.78 In other words, Santer and Delors wanted Yugoslavia to maintain some form of a constitutional status quo (Delors noted at the time that “the European Community has never encouraged those forces in Yugoslavia that aspire to separation”), even though their interlocutors painted a clear picture of the intractability of the problem. As Borisav Jovic´ bluntly stated in his conversation with the EC duo, “Yugoslavia

165 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

166 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution cannot be broken up [along republican borders] by ‘peaceful means’ because it is impossible to determine the real ethnic borders between the nations, especially since Croatia does not accept any change in borders.”79 The Yugoslav crisis was already about the “building of nations” and the changing of borders on the ruins of the federation, which made the EC proposal so out of touch with reality. The reaction of the Yugoslav players to this incursion of the Community was decisively negative. According to the federal secretary for foreign affairs, Budimir Loncˇar, only the president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov and to some extent Alija Izetbegovic´ accepted the EC offer, while the presidents of all other republics rejected it.80 The West’s insistence on Yugoslavia’s unity was finally—but some eighteen months too late—backed up by a promise of substantial financial aid, so the sole result of the visit was the federal prime minister’s rekindled hope for his already failed reform program. Even that glimmer of hope for Markovic´ lasted less than a week. The financial offer of Santer and Delors was taken back just five days after their visit, when the EC foreign ministers at a meeting in Dresden decided they would not finance a country which did not respect human and minority rights and whose leaders did not engage in dialogue but were pulling the state apart.81 All of this only entrenched the positions of Yugoslavia’s conflicting camps. Miloševic´ and the army could find consolation and encouragement in the fact that the West was fully committed to Yugoslav integrity. And the Slovenes and the Croats could only conclude that even staying in Yugoslavia would be no guarantee of Western aid since the EC offer was so easily revocable and was tied to issues which Miloševic´ and Serbia would not fulfill. The Serbian president could thus continue to publicly claim to be the protector of Yugoslavia’s unity and centralization while at the same time building his Greater Serbian program. And the Slovenian and Croatian leaderships had no choice but to continue on their path toward the scheduled declarations of independence, even though virtually no one in the West at the time offered them any real refuge.82 As Gianni De Michelis warned Milan Kucˇan, in the case of its declaration of independence, Slovenia would “find itself in limbo.”83 Though the EC ministers withdrew the offer of financial assistance for Markovic´’s government, their verbal commitment to Yugoslavia’s unity and integrity remained unchallenged, and their pressure on the Slovenes and the Croats only intensified throughout June. After the Santer-Delors visit, this pressure was also applied through the only organization which transcended Europe’s old iron curtain divisions and connected the continent with both the United States and the Soviet Union: the Conference for Security and Cooperation in

Descent to Dissolution Europe (CSCE). The first meeting of the CSCE Council on 19 and 20 June in Berlin was supposed to mark the beginning of the practical construction of a new European security architecture built on the pillars of the Paris Charter from November 1990. This security architecture was to draw its strength from cooperation founded on a common endorsement of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, economic transformation, arms control, and peaceful joint settlement of disputes.84 More important, the new European security architecture was also to be built on the greatest possible protection of stability, perpetuated through the maintenance of the status quo in European frontiers. The construction of a new Europe was not to get derailed by crises like Yugoslavia’s, and this determination was made abundantly clear by the CSCE Council. In addition to agreeing on a number of practical extensions of the CSCE organizational mechanisms, the foreign ministers of thirty-five member states also agreed on a “Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia,” which reaffirmed their commitment to “the democratic development, unity and territorial integrity” of the Yugoslav federation and merely expressed “friendly concern” with the events which were tearing it apart.85 The mildness of the language in the statement was in stark contrast to what was actually happening on the ground. Part of this discrepancy likely had to do with the intervention of Budimir Loncˇar, a strong Markovic´ ally, who in his statement to the Council stressed that “the integrity of the country needs to be preserved, because this is the necessary condition of democratic development, the same way democracy is the imperative of unity.”86 Part of it also had to do with the fact that the decision making in the CSCE was based on consensus, and to reach unanimous agreement in a large organization with such a diverse membership was obviously difficult. The greatest reason why the CSCE opted for “a limp statement which came down too hard on the side of unity” lay, however, in the motivation of the statement’s primary creator, German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.87 At the same time as the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council was taking place, the German Bundestag convened in Bonn to urge a different and more proactive EC approach toward Kosovo and the general Yugoslav crisis. The Bundestag’s two resolutions—one on the situation in Kosovo and the other on the Yugoslav crisis—endorsed Europe’s interest in maintaining Yugoslavia’s unity but on a transformed and free basis. The resolutions asked that the EC offer associate status to Yugoslavia so transformed and that the Community actively participate in confidence building and negotiations between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. As one of the resolutions emphasized, “The unity of Yugoslavia can be founded only on the basis of free self-determination . . . [and] the European Community should help with words and deeds in the

167 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

168 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution reconciliation of the nations of Yugoslavia on that basis.”88 Although the two resolutions enjoyed the support of all parties except the East German Party of Democratic Socialism, Genscher pushed for the wording of the CSCE resolution which did not even mention self-determination but stressed the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He simply felt that the federation’s disintegration would jeopardize Europe’s benefits from the end of the Cold War. As Wilhelm Höynck, the German ambassador to the CSCE and Genscher’s coauthor of the Berlin statement, described his and the foreign minister’s mood at the time, “After the Paris Charter and this broad future we saw in front of ourselves, we thought: ‘For heaven’s sake, let’s not go to these Balkan crises and spoil the future by having right in the beginning such a situation. For heaven’s sake, keep Yugoslavia together and give them some more freedom, but keep the country together; otherwise we would be in big problems.’ ”89 Genscher overrode the nearly unanimous stance of the Bundestag because he felt that issues of much greater importance were at stake and because he still—together with practically all of his Western counterparts—failed to understand what was really tearing Yugoslavia apart and threatening its and Europe’s stability. Another foreign minister who overrode the stance of his legislature for the same reasons was the US secretary of state, James Baker. Immediately after the CSCE Council in Berlin, Baker departed for Belgrade for a series of meetings with the presidents of all six Yugoslav republics, representatives of the Kosovo Albanians, and federal prime minister Markovic´. According to the accounts of Warren Zimmermann and Robert Hutchings, who alternated as note takers during Baker’s twelve-hour meeting marathon, the secretary of state tried to play as much hardball as he could with all the players.90 He was apparently harsh in his critique of Miloševic´ and the latter’s blockade of the federal presidency. Though he conceded that preventing Slovenia’s takeover of border posts by the use of the JNA might be logical, he also warned Markovic´ not to cast his lot with the JNA because such a move would be used by Miloševic´ and would make the West unable to continue its policy of support for Yugoslavia’s unity. “If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose democracy,” he told Markovic´.91 He also made clear to the Slovenes and the Croats that their declarations of independence would not be recognized by the United States and that they would be held responsible if violence broke out. Finally, Baker reiterated US support for the positions presented in the CSCE statement from Berlin. None of his statements, however, had any effect on any of the protagonists. Miloševic´ remained defiant and combative, and Kucˇan and Tud‒man claimed they could not back away from the imminent declarations of independence.

Descent to Dissolution The reasons for the failure of Baker’s mission were simple: it came too late, it carried no carrot, and—most dangerous—the stick it carried for the northwestern republics was much bigger than the one it carried for Serbia. Since early 1990, Baker’s State Department had tried to pass the balance of international involvement with Yugoslavia to the Europeans. A single one-day visit after the crisis had already spun out of control was hardly a real effort to arrest the federation’s further descent into violence and chaos. During his meetings with the Yugoslavs, Baker did voice his support for Yugoslavia’s transformation into a confederation, but this support—just as in the case of similar statements from some European quarters—came hopelessly late.92 Back when the confederal proposal had become public in the fall of 1990 and needed real support from the United States, it did not get it. And unlike Santer and Delors, who at least brought to Belgrade a (fleeting) promise of financial aid, Baker propped up his newly found taste for a Yugoslav confederation only with negative rhetoric which was much more harshly directed at Slovenia and Croatia than at Miloševic´ and the JNA. Indeed, the main thrust of Baker’s approach was to lay the bulk of the pressure on the “secessionist” northwesterners. They were the ones who were told privately and, more important, publicly that their declarations of independence would not under any circumstances be recognized by the United States and its West European allies.93 The Serbian president was only privately told that if he persisted with his expansionary efforts, his republic would be made an international pariah. This warning also came too late. As Ambassador Zimmermann notes, Miloševic´ was already prepared to accept such a temporary punishment in order to achieve the permanent goal of a new Serbian state.94 Furthermore, Baker’s emphasis on Yugoslavia’s unity, his public equidistance between the positions of the northwestern republics and Serbia, and his concession to Markovic´ that preventing Slovenia’s takeover of border posts by the use of the JNA might be logical—all had decisively harmful effects. They gave a troubling signal to Markovic´ and the JNA and portrayed Miloševic´ as just one in a series of problematic personalities. As Robert Hutchings recollects, lower levels of the US administration at the time of Baker’s visit recommended that NATO take the lead under the CSCE to proactively support Western diplomatic efforts in Yugoslavia. Such recommendations were, however, overruled by senior members of the administration and were publicly renounced by the US military. General John Galvin, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, in a 2 June interview with Miloševic´’s mouthpiece Politika, openly stated that “NATO [would] not intervene in Yugoslavia” because it was “not within NATO’s defense zone.”95 Although

169 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

170 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution Baker expressed interest in reaching a peaceful solution without the use of force, such a public position of the US military, coupled with Baker’s overall performance and his focus on Slovenia and Croatia, led many within and outside of Yugoslavia to speculate on whether the United States had given an implicit green light for the intervention of the Yugoslav army. As Hutchings cogently put it, “By warning equally against unilateral declarations of independence and the use of force to hold the federation together, we seemed to be sanctioning the latter if the Slovenes and the Croats resorted to the former.”96 Or, as explained by Percy Cradock, who was the foreign policy advisor to the British prime minister at the time, “A vote for Yugoslav unity at that stage amounted to approval for the attempts of the Yugoslav army to crush the secessionist movement by force.”97 To which extent Baker’s visit directly encouraged the JNA, Markovic´, or Miloševic´ to contemplate applying force still remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Baker’s direct exposure to the intractability of the crisis resulted in the US administration’s definitely washing its hands of the Yugoslav chaos. Channeling Brent Scowcroft’s statement during the intervention of the Soviet army in Georgia in April 1989, the secretary of state notoriously remarked upon leaving Belgrade, “We got no dog in this fight.”98 The foreign ministers of the EC states—though probably sharing Baker’s sentiments—could not walk away from the crisis as easily as the US secretary of state. In a last ditch effort to avert Yugoslavia’s dissolution, they preemptively decided on 23 June not to recognize Slovenia’s and Croatia’s announced declarations of independence and to freeze all contacts with the two republics’ leaders.99 The following day the EC Commission signed a five-year loan of 807 million ECUs with the Yugoslav government.100 Markovic´ also publicly added his voice against the plans of the northwestern republics. He made impassioned pleas in front of the legislatures in Ljubljana and Zagreb not to give up on the common state, vowing he would use “all legal means” to stop them.101 Those pleas, buttressed by his claims of finally being offered great international aid, were, however, brusquely rejected.102 In the words of Slovenia’s president, Milan Kucˇan, “At the time when Yugoslavia and Markovic´’s government needed Western support the most, that support was withheld on account of Kosovo.”103 Yugoslavia’s fate had already been sealed, and neither Markovic´’s enthusiasm nor the gravely belated initiative of his supporters in the West could save it. On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves sovereign and independent states.104 Even though the two republics announced their willingness to start negotiations on the creation of a Yugoslav union of independent states, Yugoslavia was no more. The Slovenes and the Croats were aware of the

Descent to Dissolution odds stacked against them, but they still embarked into the unknown. The hope of their leaderships was that the declarations of independence would finally jolt the West into dealing with reality. Until the very moment of the passing of the declarations, Slovenia and Croatia were on the receiving end of the stick of Western realism. Now they hoped their official assertions of independence would turn things around. As the president of the Croatian Sabor, Žarko Domljan, explained at the time, “We know that the great powers are opposed to an independent Croatia and Slovenia. But they are pragmatic. They will eventually recognize us.”105 These hopes that the crafters of Western foreign policy would swiftly change their minds were, however, mistaken. It would take much more than these declarations for the West to finally recognize the independence of the two republics. Only after six months of heavy fighting, thousands of dead and wounded, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and serious rifts in the Western alliance would Croatia and Slovenia be recognized as members of the international community of states.

• Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence marked not only the end of the Yugoslav federation, but also the end of the West’s virtually unanimous policy toward the crisis. The balance sheet of that common approach, which placed the bulk of pressure on the weaker sides in the Yugoslav conflict and was blindly steadfast in its support for the continued existence of the struggling federation, was decisively negative. As Lawrence Freedman observed in his perceptive editorial in the Independent on the occasion of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence, “By stressing national unity above all else the international community is making civil war more likely. . . . Divorce is messy and unpleasant. But it is preferable to domestic violence.”106 Western foreign policy makers disagreed with this advice. In their realist—though mistaken— calculations, keeping the Yugoslav nations in a “bad marriage” was much more preferable than having them publicly negotiate the terms of separation and thus give an example to other “unhappy spouses” that independence was possible. The nearly dogmatic commitment of the West to Yugoslav unity and its insistence on pressing and punishing the Slovenes and the Croats instead of facing up to the true source of the crisis had disastrous effects. Western foreign policy makers obviously craved stability. The problem lay in their mistaken belief that only a united Yugoslavia could guarantee that stability. Since their diplomatic efforts consisted of repeatedly making this stance on unity and stability clear to the feuding sides, the events which unfolded in the dissolved Yugoslavia at the

171 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

172 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Descent to Dissolution hands of those who had access to the instruments of force were hardly surprising. As Milivoje Maksic´, Serbia’s highest-ranked official in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, so revealingly explained in the run-up to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence, “The advantage would not be given a priori [by the European states] to the smallest side in [the Yugoslav] war or to the side that was the most successful in presenting itself as a victim of the aggression of others. The advantage would rather be given to those forces which were able to offer the broadest formula most acceptable to all—a formula of a future Yugoslavia that could live and survive as a coherent state unit.”107 Indeed, the race “to offer the broadest formula most acceptable to all” was on. The West’s Realpolitik was not only unsuccessful in arresting Yugoslavia’s dissolution, but also had a direct impact on the violent events after Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence. First, it pushed Markovic´ (who was goaded by the assertions of Western diplomats that he was the one offering the broadest and most acceptable formula of a Yugoslav future) to initiate the brief armed conflict in Slovenia together with the remaining Yugoslavists in the JNA’s High Command. Second—and far more important—the West’s policy encouraged Miloševic´ to continue his expansionist campaign against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by cloaking the construction of a Greater Serbia in the robes of defending a mini-Yugoslavia.

7

Summer of Violence and Divisions, June–September 1991

The consequences of Western policy toward Yugoslavia turned catastrophic within days of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence. Encouraged by the West’s stubborn stance toward Yugoslav unity, Ante Markovic´ and the Yugoslavist wing of the JNA’s High Command struck a deal to try and salvage the frontiers of the six-republic federation. Whereas until then armed conflict had been reserved for the “irrational inter-ethnic tensions” between the Croats and the Serbs, real war now came to Yugoslavia’s westernmost republic of Slovenia. The foreign policy makers of the European Community and the United States, however, did not easily or quickly learn the lessons of their mistakes. Their answers to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence were so negative, and their responses to the armed intervention of the JNA so mixed, that some in the Western press rightfully noted “The Cold War is ended, but the old rules and reflexes persist.”1 The continuing insistence of the leaders of the West on the status quo and their reluctance to draw the obvious conclusions from the events on the ground did indeed reek of Cold War geopolitics. As George Soros perceptively suggested in an editorial in London’s Independent in July 1991, this kind of “geopolitics is the wrong doctrine for dealing with the situation. It is played like chess and creates a desire to keep the pieces intact. . . . [It] prides itself on being realistic; as a result, its bias goes unnoticed. . . . Geopolitics fosters a reactionary attitude to revolutionary change. In situations where such change is desirable it often leads to the wrong policy decisions.”2 The problem with the West’s response to the escalating Yugoslav crisis was, however, not only that its foreign ministries and diplomacies seemed to be playing the game of realist geopolitics vis-à-vis the different Yugoslav parties, but also that they were starting to play it with each other.

173

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

174 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions The explosion of violence in Yugoslavia was the first real test of the post– Cold War Europe and the ultimate moment of truth for its political leaders. The Bush administration had preemptively washed its hands of the coming chaos and clearly signaled its withdrawal from the region. The ball was in Europe’s court, and it was up to its leaders to answer some crucial questions. How would they find balance between self-determination and the integrity of multinational states? How would they respond to violence? What would all of this mean for Europe’s near-term political future? Although finding answers to these questions was never going to be easy, the extent of the failure of West European leaders to shed their old impulses and come up with some semblance of a common and effective policy was nothing short of astonishing. Throughout the summer months of 1991, they were paralyzed not only by the sheer magnitude of the violence on the ground, but also by their own divisions about the direction of Europe, its process of political integration, and their own roles in it. ACHIEVING STABILITY: SEVERING SLOVENIA

Though the EC foreign ministers on the eve of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s declarations of independence made it clear they were not going to recognize the two republics and would even suspend all visits of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s representatives to the EC capitals, the harsh reactions of the West to the acts of the two northwestern republics took many within and outside of Yugoslavia aback. Virtually none of the official reactions even mentioned the context in which the two republics had opted for an independent path, and nearly all of them saw the declarations as “threats to the stability and well-being of the peoples of Yugoslavia.”3 The Bush administration repeated James Baker’s proclamation from his trip to Belgrade that the United States “will neither encourage nor reward secession” and added that Croatia and Slovenia were to continue to be treated only as constituent elements of the Yugoslav federation.4 The French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, announced that Slovenia’s and Croatia’s decisions “could cause an explosion of Yugoslavia” and expressed his hope that “the Yugoslav nations will find a new solution for joint life.”5 The British Foreign Office also announced that “We and our western partners have a clear preference for the continuation of a single Yugoslav political entity.”6 The only message which offered a different tone (though very similar content) was the one of the German government; under the influence of the Bundestag resolution of 19 June, it urged the Yugoslav parties to quickly make progress in their negotiations and reforms and stressed that the Slovenian and Croatian

Summer of Violence and Divisions decisions were not final.7 Indeed, as the Belgian foreign minister, Mark Eyskens, later remembered of those days, the initial knee-jerk attitude of most of his colleagues “was to try to maintain one country” and to be “absolutely opposed to the independence” proclamations of Slovenia and Croatia.8 The West’s policy toward the Yugoslav nations and their disintegrating federation had been largely unchanged throughout all the upheavals of the late 1980s and the first eighteen months of the new decade. Considering such a record, it was practically inconceivable that Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations would change anything. Western policy makers were still primarily concerned with stability and saw the continuing existence of Yugoslavia not only as a regional guarantor of that stability, but also as a particularly important parallel to what was happening farther east. In the words of a State Department official to a group of US senators at the time, “Today, it is not so much holding the line against the Warsaw Pact as achieving stability. We are interested in Europe. We are interested in [the Balkans]. We would like to achieve stability there and a break-up of the Yugoslav federation would be a serious setback.” Or, in the words of another State Department official who tried to dampen congressional action in favor of Slovenia and Croatia, “Don’t make a big deal about them. The Serbs are trying to hold the country together. . . . Don’t break up [Yugoslavia] because [people in] the Soviet Union will use it as a model.” And the consequences of the Soviet Union breaking up could be “nuclear.”9 While the idea of the applicability of the Yugoslav example to what was happening on the periphery of the Soviet Union may have made sense at the time, it was not the only reason for the unwillingness of most Western diplomats to even entertain the possibility of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence. The nearly dogmatic refusal of the major players in Western foreign policy making to acknowledge that Yugoslavia had reached its expiration date was also rooted in their almost neocolonial misunderstanding of the region based on quasihistorical arguments. Yugoslavia was seen as necessary because it was perceived as an umbrella protecting not only its nations, but also the rest of Europe from new Balkan troubles. Without the overarching structure of a Yugoslav state in which the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Albanians, and all the others would internally deal with their quarrels and thus not bother the rest of Europe, Yugoslav space would supposedly deteriorate into a region of permanent instability. For all the blame later assigned by the French and British diplomats and policy makers to the German foreign policy apparatus for supporting the northwestern republics (allegedly for historical reasons), the most egregious misinterpretations of history clouded sound policy judgment exactly in the foreign policy communities of London and Paris.10

175 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

176 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, for example, attempted to justify his government’s policy of supporting Yugoslavia’s continued existence by erroneously claiming that “Yugoslavia was invented in 1919 to solve a problem of different peoples living in the same part of the Balkans with a long history of peoples fighting each other.” In his view, expressed in an interview with BBC1 on 30 June, the Yugoslav nations were deemed to be simply unable to live together if the republics became recognized states because in that case “you would have to move thousands and thousands of people and that doesn’t happen peacefully and easily.” In Hurd’s opinion, the separation of Yugoslav nations along republican borders would lead to primitive instincts “asserting themselves,” including the instinct “to drive people of a different tribe out of your village.” Hurd’s image of feuding Balkan tribes without the protective shell of a Yugoslav state was frightening: “a chaos, fighting, a number of small statelets all bankrupt, all relying on the West in one way or another, trying to involve other countries in their fighting.”11 The possibility of Yugoslav republics coexisting peacefully in the European system of states was simply seen as nonexistent. If the explosions of Yugoslav nationalisms, and particularly the virulent and expansionist Serb nationalism, seemed as if they belonged to an era long gone, then so did the responses of some of the most prominent Western foreign policy makers. The problem with such interpretations of events and the resulting strategies for dealing with the crisis, however, did not lie only in the fact that their proponents accepted the logic and language of Miloševic´’s machine, which used historical imagery to create the semblance of “ancient hatreds,” which denied the republics their constitutional status of states and saw them merely as administrative units malleable by thrusts of nationalist force. The greater problem lay in the implicit acceptance of all methods used (or simply labeled as being used) in the preservation of Yugoslavia’s existence. Chapter 6 has already discussed the extent to which the performance of James Baker during his Belgrade visit was perceived within and outside Yugoslavia as encouraging for those who wished to use the JNA forces. Unequivocal Western rejections of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence; public interpretations of the crisis similar to that of Douglas Hurd; and statements such as that of Mr. Hurd’s under-secretary, Mark LennoxBoyd, who suggested in the House of Commons “that the Yugoslav federal army might have, under the constitution, a role in restoring order if there were widespread civil unrest”12—all of these had as dangerous an effect as the Belgrade visit of Secretary Baker. Such statements invalidated Western proclamations of commitment to the non-use of force in Yugoslavia and directly contributed to the onset of what soon became known as the first of the federation’s wars of dissolution: the ten-day clash between the Yugoslav army and Slovenia.13

Summer of Violence and Divisions The intervention of the JNA in Slovenia in the aftermath of this republic’s declaration of independence was seen as a surprise both in and outside of Yugoslavia. The army’s High Command was widely perceived as being in the pocket of the Serbian president, who was publicly opposed to keeping Slovenia in Yugoslavia either peacefully or by force. His deal with the Slovenes from January 1991, in which he promised they could go their separate way in exchange for their support for the Serbs to all live in one state, was still valid and convincing enough for some important actors within and outside Yugoslavia. The CIA report of 18 June, for example, noted that “the JNA appears resigned to Slovenia’s secession . . . and there are indications that the military is preparing to withdraw forces from the republic. The army, however, is unlikely to tolerate Croatia’s secession.”14 Croatian president Franjo Tud‒man was of a similar opinion. On the eve of his republic’s and Slovenia’s declarations of independence, he rejected intelligence information coming from the remaining Croatian officers in the JNA that the army was preparing an intervention in Slovenia.15 He correctly read the signals coming from the Serbian leadership, but what both he and the CIA failed to recognize was that the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic´, and the Yugoslavist remnants in the JNA High Command were beginning to collaborate. In a speech to the Slovenian parliament prior to its declaration of independence, Markovic´ threatened to use “all legal means” to stop this republic from enforcing its separation from Yugoslavia. The cooperation of the federal prime minister with the army which led to the violence in Slovenia was still somewhat of a shock, especially for his domestic admirers. Buoyed by continuing signals of support from the West, both Markovic´ and the JNA High Command were convinced that their joint action could halt the dissolution of the federation.16 After all, the West had already twice signaled it would condone a JNA intervention in Slovenia: in 1988 and 1989. Mutually distrusted and disliked for the greater part of their joint tenure in government, Markovic´ and General Veljko Kadijevic´ thus became partners in a desperate and deeply misguided campaign to resuscitate the Yugoslav carcass. On 26 June, Markovic´ gave out an order to the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Federal Secretariat for the People’s Defense to cooperate in reestablishing federal authority over Slovenia’s customs and border posts, which the Slovenes had zealously taken over after their proclamation of independence.17 The army, citing this order as a pretext for action even though its supreme commander was supposed to be the federal presidency and not the government, then commenced an operation which soon spiraled out of control. Armored columns left their barracks throughout Slovenia and western Croatia and took for Slovenia’s airports and borders with Austria, Italy, and

177 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

178 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions Hungary. The army’s leading strategists were convinced that such a clear, even if limited, show of force would be enough to cow any concerted resistance.18 Although Slovenia’s small but well-organized Territorial Defense forces put up a fight, the JNA’s clear advantage in armor and air resulted in the mission being nearly completed within forty-eight hours. This, however, only marked the beginning of real troubles for the army’s High Command. The generals had hoped for a quick and decisive victory which would isolate the Slovenes within Yugoslavia and convince the West that the army held things under control. Despite the relatively swift capture of border posts, the operation rapidly collapsed. Apart from Slovenian resistance, the army’s biggest domestic problem actually came from an unexpected source: Serbia. Slovenia’s leadership called on Croatia for active assistance, but the Croats gave little more than information on troop movements and moral support—partly out of fear of provoking the army themselves and partly out of resentment of the deal the Slovenes had struck with Miloševic´.19 The Serbian president, on the other hand, had already made it clear on 27 June in a meeting with General Kadijevic´ that the army did not have his political support for the action. In Miloševic´’s words, “Why should [the army] defend Slovenia’s borders? That is temporary. We must defend that which will be permanent.”20 With Markovic´ also quickly washing his hands of the army’s excessive use of force, the generals were left without any political backing and open to Slovenia’s physical and psychological counterattack.21 The very fact that the tiny Alpine republic put up a resistance and actually inflicted some casualties on the JNA troops in their initial assault served as a debilitating shock for those who ran the army operation. As a CIA analysis later found, the generals simply had no plan to sustain armed and political operations beyond the first day.22 Their forces, manned by conscripts of all nationalities, found the strain of combating the motivated Slovenes on their home territory unbearable and in many instances simply crumbled and deserted. Instead of a “rally ’round the flag” effect that the generals had hoped would occur at least throughout Yugoslavia’s southeastern republics, families of Serbian conscripts began to protest in front of the army’s Belgrade headquarters to stop the action and bring their sons home. Slovenia’s propaganda machine hit the army even harder than its motivated Territorial Defense forces. With every new hour of defying the army’s action, Slovenian shares on the market of international opinion rose, and the army’s plummeted. The onset of the action was greeted by an ambiguity in international circles perhaps best represented by the statement of the White House press secretary, who claimed that the United States supported the efforts of

Summer of Violence and Divisions Prime Minister Markovic´ “to preserve the unity of his country.”23 This statement initially led to such a high level of confidence in the JNA’s military intelligence service that the generals apparently believed the West “[would] tolerate everything if we succeed.”24 However, since Slovenia managed to portray itself to the Western press and public as a democratic victim of a totalitarian Communist force, by the second day of the operation it became clear the JNA had lost the tacit support of some Western policy-making circles. More important, it also became clear the Yugoslav crisis was no longer just an internal affair but a process that would be actively influenced by the West. As fate or chance would have it, the explosion of violence in Slovenia coincided with an important meeting of the EC Council in Luxembourg which began on 28 June. Confronted by the news of the downturn in the JNA intervention and the high level of commitment of Slovenia’s resistance, the European leaders were simply forced to craft some sort of a shared response. The desire to form a common front in dealing with the newest twist in the Yugoslav crisis was certainly there. European governments were at the time not only determined to avoid a repeat of their discord during the Persian Gulf crisis, but also involved in real negotiations on deepening and formalizing the EC’s common approach to foreign and security policy. The European Community was supposed to grow into much more than an economic organization of Western Europe and was—in the minds of many European diplomats and foreign policy makers—to become a united bloc distinct from the “guiding hand” of the United States. The final eruption of the Yugoslav crisis with the clear intervention of the JNA troops was seen as the perfect initial test of the Community’s growing resolve. The problem, which had already become obvious at the council’s meeting in Luxembourg, however, was that the EC’s major powers approached the Yugoslav problem from dramatically different standpoints. On the one end were the French, who viewed the possible dissolution of Yugoslavia’s center with disdain, perhaps because of their own “Bonapartist” and state-centric prejudices and even more so because of how they saw the future of Europe.25 The changes that the continent was going through—particularly due to potential destabilization resulting from East European demands for the widening of European integration—were in Paris seen as deeply troubling and dangerous. Not even two weeks prior to the aforementioned EC Council’s Luxembourg meeting, French president François Mitterrand had publicly clashed with Czechoslovakia’s president, Václav Havel, over Eastern Europe’s prospects for increased integration with the continent’s western half, with Mitterrand asserting that East Europeans could at best hope to wait for “decades

179 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

180 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions and decades” to be an equal part of the EC club.26 The French president and his country’s foreign policy establishment observed the changes in the continent’s east with apprehension—primarily because of how they perceived those changes affecting the position of the newly unified Germany in Europe. The fear of “l’Europe des tribus,” as Roland Dumas later put it, was at the time felt not only because of the negative effects of national fragmentation on Europe’s interethnic stability, but also because of its possibly tempting Germany to abandon the process of West European integration in place of some new Drang nach Osten.27 The reaction of the French government to the violent developments in Slovenia was, therefore, probably the most guarded of all Western reactions, to a large extent because challenges to Yugoslavia’s central authority were also seen as challenges to the French-patented European security system in which Germany was tied into West European integrations. On the other hand, Germany’s foreign policy apparatus was during these initial days of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s proclaimed independence split and under serious strain over developing a new policy direction. The highest policy makers in the Auswärtiges Amt, and in particular foreign minister Genscher, were intent on maintaining a common course with the rest of the European Community and the United States and had not yet abandoned their pronounced commitment to (a reformed) Yugoslav unity. The developments on the ground, however, placed this approach under intense public and political scrutiny from various quarters—the press, the Bundestag, and even the government itself. Germany’s interest, expertise, understanding, and active involvement in the reform processes throughout Eastern Europe—including Yugoslavia—were unmatched by any other West European power.28 Such a central position in the interactions between the continent’s two halves, coupled with the tremendously significant experience of applying the principle of selfdetermination in the process of Germany’s reunification, led to an initial reaction to the developments in Slovenia that was much more outspoken than was the case in France. Germany’s principal concerns in Yugoslavia were centered on stopping the JNA intervention and reviving negotiations among the republics on new forms of Yugoslav cooperation. The forgiving stance that Germany expressed regarding Slovenia’s and Croatia’s moves toward independence, and consequently its clear expression of disapproval for the JNA’s use of force, therefore, were rooted both in Germany’s correct understanding of what was happening on the ground and in its own recent experience of reunification and its position toward Eastern Europe in general. The remaining EC governments placed themselves somewhere between France and Germany on the territorial integrity vs. self-determination continuum,

Summer of Violence and Divisions though with important distinctions which made their common decision making even more complicated. The Danes were, for example, supportive of the Slovenes and the Croats, just as they were supportive of the Baltic republics in their quest to leave the Soviet Union. The Spanish were ambivalent because of possible implications of Yugoslav disintegration for their own problems with the Basques and the Catalans. The Benelux countries, together with the EC Commission, were primarily interested in furthering foreign policy cooperation within the EC and maintaining a common front, though their positions were hardly identical. Most important, the British shared some of the French fears regarding possible shifts in Germany’s commitments but were at the same time—unlike the French—also worried about the withdrawal of the United States from Europe. As Douglas Hurd later remembered, his government’s interest in the developments in Yugoslavia extended only insofar as there was an absence of “quiet” in the region: “We had no strategic interest in the Balkans, no commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet should return.”29 Since this quiet was seen as disturbed primarily by Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics, the British government’s criticism of the JNA was certainly less pronounced than it was in Germany. In the words of the Dutch foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, “The French position, in a certain sense backed up by the UK, was that in fact Belgrade had all the rights to secure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.”30 With such a variety of initial positions and commitments, it is little wonder that the meeting of the EC Council in Luxembourg on 28 June resulted in confusion and discord. The argument of German chancellor Kohl about the need to respect the principle of self-determination was duly answered by President Mitterrand’s assertion that the principle of the integrity of states held sway in international relations.31 Though the heated and tense debate which ensued apparently reminded many of the pre–World War I clashes among West European diplomats, it actually seems to have been just a continuation of the bitter exchanges accompanying the process of German reunification during 1989 and 1990. Then, just as in June 1991, the principles of self-determination and the integrity of states were pitted against each other and defended forcefully by the same players, though with one crucial difference: the United States was now unavailable to break the tie. The absence of the United States from Western involvement in Yugoslavia after the onset of the JNA intervention determined the nature of the EC debates on how to deal with the crisis and its effects on Europe’s future. James Baker’s decision to definitely disengage his administration from Yugoslav affairs came after his unsuccessful Belgrade visit that June. David Halberstam perfectly summed up the secretary’s sentiment after that unfortunate visit: “Baker left

181 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

182 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions Yugoslavia angry and frustrated, feeling, his close aides believed, that these Balkan leaders had no earthly sense of what was good for them. Why waste rational words on irrational people? Why waste your breath? What happened there, he seemed to think, was what they deserved, and we should wash our hands of the whole thing.”32 As the Washington Post reported on the eve of the JNA intervention in Slovenia, this sentiment undeniably permeated the thinking in the highest echelons of the State Department. In the words of one senior official, spoken in frustration over the Yugoslavs’ refusal to resuscitate the already dead idea of a confederation, “At this point, no one in Yugoslavia is listening. It may be that they will have to shed blood first. Then, if it gets bad enough, they might be more willing to step back and listen to reason.”33 Such extreme frustration and acceptance of possible greater violence in Yugoslavia were, however, not the only reasons why the Bush administration chose to disengage from the dissolving federation. The more important reason actually had to do with the US policy toward the future of EC integration. The United States was more than willing to leave the Yugoslav crisis to the Europeans because it wanted them to prove they were capable of dealing with security challenges on their own or—even better—to prove they were incapable of doing so. According to Secretary Baker, the Bush administration was at the time embroiled in a serious rift with some West Europeans (most notably the French) over the relationship between NATO and the EC’s defense arm, the WEU—a rift centered on the assertion of those West Europeans that Europe needed a defense identity separate and independent of the United States in the post–Cold War world. As Baker later remembered, “The result was an undercurrent in Washington, often felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia was as good a first test as any.”34 Or as Brendan Simms has argued, quoting the testimony of a note taker present at State Department meetings at the time, “James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger both felt that the ‘European bluff should be called.’ Indeed, they had a two-way bet on the outcome. If the Europeans succeeded it would simplify an agenda already dominated by Iraq and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; if they failed, it would bring the Europeans down a peg. ‘They will screw it up,’ Eagleburger argued, ‘and this will teach them a lesson’ and ‘teach them to burden-share.’ ”35 Whatever the motivation of the Bush administration for disengaging from Yugoslavia, the Europeans jumped at the opportunity to prove their newly discovered assertiveness in international relations. In spite of serious disagreements at the EC Council meeting in Luxembourg on 28 June, the eagerness to act immediately, forcefully, and in unison resulted in the first concrete international

Summer of Violence and Divisions involvement in the Yugoslav crisis since the JNA intervention: the sending of the EC troika of foreign ministers from Luxembourg (Poos), Italy (De Michelis), and the Netherlands (van den Broek) to Yugoslavia to mediate among the conflicting parties. Though there were hardly any reasons for optimism regarding the ministers’ mission to the Balkans—after all, due to their own disagreements at the council meeting, they had chosen to “decide on the plane” what to tell the Yugoslavs—the public outpouring of self-confidence by the EC officials was remarkable.36 Italian foreign minister De Michelis labeled the troika the EC’s “diplomatic Rapid Reaction Force.” The president of the European Council and the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Santer, claimed that the sending of the troika was basically “a common foreign and security policy even before . . . [it] had found its way into the future treaty on the Union.” And the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, uttered the fateful statement which haunted him throughout the rest of his political career: “This is the hour of Europe—not the hour of the Americans. . . . If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.”37 Upon arrival in Yugoslavia, the troika simply repeated the performance from its visit to Belgrade in early April: it proceeded to apply virtually all of its pressure on the Slovenes and the Croats. The leaderships of the two northwestern republics were bluntly told they had to reverse their decisions, and the Slovenes had to return all control over customs and border posts to the federal authorities and the JNA.38 The continuing commitment to Yugoslavia’s integrity by most EC officials in spite of all the events on the ground (the JNA commenced a broad campaign of tactical air strikes throughout Slovenia on 28 June)39 was not reserved only for negotiations behind closed doors, but was also clearly demonstrated in their public statements. Jacques Santer explained to the press that “we have to try all means to save the federation at this moment,” with British prime minister John Major concurring and adding that “the great prize is to hold the federation together.”40 It is not surprising that the EC trio’s visit to Belgrade and Zagreb was a sound failure in spite of the ministers’ triumphalism upon returning to Luxembourg. The troika borrowed its peace proposals from the person whose short-sightedness had led to the JNA intervention in the first place: the disgraced federal prime minister Ante Markovic´. It demanded the following: (1) that the Slovenes and the Croats freeze the implementation of their declarations of independence for three months; (2) that the Serbian bloc withdraw its opposition to the election of Stipe Mesic´ and thus unblock the federal presidency; and (3) that all parties observe a cease-fire.41 Within hours of their return to the ongoing EC Council

183 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

184 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions meeting, it became clear that little had been achieved. Miloševic´’s bloc on the presidency continued its declarative opposition to Mesic´, and the Slovenes and the JNA were still engaged in heavy fighting. The reaction of the EC ministers to such a clear collapse of their initial peacemaking effort was more of the same: a swift and ineffective response without adjustment in either rhetoric or actual policy content.42 Poos, van den Broek, and De Michelis once again showed up in Belgrade on the evening of 30 June for a session of the federal presidency which was supposed to lead to the election of Stipe Mesic´ as its president and thus, rather optimistically, to the reestablishment of civilian control over the JNA. The European trio were, however, unaware of two important new developments, which turned their newest peacemaking effort into one of the more grotesque episodes of the whole crisis. First, although the Serbian president had folded under troika pressure to allow the election of Mesic´, he instructed his bloc in the presidency to stall in order to wheedle as much as possible from the EC officials.43 Second, the Serbian leadership had now even formally announced it was for Slovenia’s departure. At a session of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order held the day before the arrival of the EC troika, Borisav Jovic´ clearly expressed his own and Serbia’s determination that Slovenia could go.44 The dramatic session of the federal presidency with the EC officials, which took place in the night hours between 30 June and 1 July, was just a brazen piece of political theater organized by Miloševic´’s right-hand man. In front of the EC trio Jovic´ feigned his continuing opposition to Mesic´ and a deep commitment to a federal and united Yugoslavia. He did so in the hope of extracting a strong statement from the Community officials in favor of exactly that which the Serbian leadership did not support but was using as a cover for its machinations—Yugoslav integrity. The Europeans easily and willingly obliged, exposing themselves as more Yugoslavist than any of their Yugoslav interlocutors and thereby providing encouragement for Miloševic´ and his associates in pursuit of their strategy. As Jacques Poos stated at the joint meeting with the Yugoslav presidency, “We have more hope in the future of your country, in the unity, the territorial integrity, than [the members of the presidency] who stated their opinions a moment ago.” Or as Hans van den Broek moments later added, “The crisis in Yugoslavia jeopardizes not only the people of this country, but Europe as a whole. . . . We appeal to you, as our partners, to retain this one united Europe, and one and united Yugoslavia.”45 After giving the Serbian bloc what it demanded—a strong public statement in favor of Yugoslav integrity—the EC ministers were able to leave Belgrade that night with the “victory” of having Mesic´ proclaimed the president of Yugoslavia’s presidency and

Summer of Violence and Divisions with the false sense that their emotional appeals for a “united Europe” and a “united Yugoslavia” had found fertile ground among the Yugoslav leaders. The next morning, however, the continuing violence in Slovenia made it clear that Mesic´’s election and the troika’s visit had changed virtually nothing. The diplomatic visit to Yugoslavia which arguably did much more to change the way the crisis was dealt with internationally took place on the day that the troika left Belgrade. It was the visit of German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. Genscher formally came to Belgrade in the capacity of acting chairman of the CSCE Council of Ministers in an effort to examine the situation firsthand. He also wished to ascertain the responses of the Yugoslav parties to a possible CSCE observer mission and mission of good offices, which had been discussed earlier that day at a meeting of the CSCE’s Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Center in Prague.46 Genscher’s motivation for becoming personally involved extended beyond his formal position derived from Germany’s chairmanship of the CSCE. According to the testimonies of a number of German diplomats working directly with the foreign minister at the time, the reason why Genscher decided to come to Yugoslavia had much to do with the unprecedented pressure he was put under domestically for his and the EC’s policy toward the dissolving federation. Just two days prior to Genscher’s visit, Norbert Gansel and Karsten Voigt, leading foreign policy experts of the SPD, had come to Ljubljana to demand stronger EC pressure on Belgrade and a permanent Community presence in Slovenia. Their party leader, Björn Engholm, had gone even further and had urged the government to consider the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.47 The fact that the Social Democrats, who had a long history of excellent relations with Yugoslavia and even ideological attachment to the Yugoslav system of self-management, had come out so strongly on the side of the Slovenes and the Croats was a shock for Genscher and his administration.48 What is more, the SPD was hardly alone. Germany’s whole political spectrum was in agreement that the foreign minister’s and the European Community’s approach to Yugoslavia had failed miserably and needed a drastic overhaul. In fact, just prior to departing for Yugoslavia, Genscher had to face the Bundestag’s Foreign Relations Committee, where he was subjected to a barrage from members of all parties—including his own—criticizing his and the EC’s policy toward Yugoslavia.49 Faced with such strong and unanimous parliamentary disapproval, the foreign minister had to do something to shift the status quo of Western policy. His visit to Yugoslavia only pushed him further toward orchestrating a major change of approach. Genscher’s visit began on the afternoon of 1 July in Belgrade, where he met with the officials of the federal government and, more significantly, the Serbian

185 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

186 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions president. Based on testimonies of German diplomats present at those meetings, the visit “proved to be a psychological disaster for the German-Yugoslav relationship, and it probably dissipated whatever goodwill [Genscher] may still have felt for the central authorities in Belgrade.”50 Miloševic´, who ordinarily charmed Western diplomats, this time opted for a tough and uncooperative approach toward the German foreign minister. He was “rough, not at all sensitive to the arguments. He didn’t want to give any really positive input. He wanted to have it his way.”51 More important, the federal government proved to be unable and the JNA unwilling to halt the military operations in Slovenia in order to allow Genscher to go to Ljubljana for his scheduled meeting with the Slovenian leadership. In the end, the German foreign minister met with the Slovenes across the border in Austria, but the experience of Serbia’s and the JNA’s intransigence marked a complete transformation in his opinion of what Germany’s and the West’s policy ought to be.52 What had begun earlier that day in the Foreign Relations Committee with the drastic reduction of his maneuvering space by parliamentary pressure ended that evening with his own conviction that the Bundestag was right.53 In the words of a German diplomat working on Yugoslav affairs at the time, Genscher’s visit “marked his Saul/Paul transformation. He had defended and had been really convinced of his position on the inviolability of frontiers . . . [but after the visit] he realized that this was no longer fruitful for the future. He understood that something was changing there and that there was a new original situation.”54 With the criticism at home only increasing upon his return to Bonn as the situation in Yugoslavia showed no signs of quieting down, Genscher sprang into action to become one of the leading voices of change in international policy. His conviction that a shift of approach was needed and his desire to demonstrate personal assertiveness to the German public brought about an important new development in the international diplomatic response to Yugoslavia—the baptism by fire of the CSCE. Though the never-before-tested conflict-prevention mechanism of the CSCE had days earlier been invoked by Austria (for which the Austrians were initially resented by the EC officials) in response to the violence occurring on its borders,55 it was indeed the German foreign minister who became the driving force behind the introduction of the CSCE to the mix of international responses to the Yugoslav crisis. Genscher’s reasoning for raising the profile of the CSCE certainly made sense. Germany held the CSCE chairmanship at the time, giving him an opportunity to step into the limelight and prove to his Bundestag detractors that he was doing something. It also gave him an opportunity to sidestep the Dutch presidency of the EC under Hans van den Broek (the Netherlands had taken

Summer of Violence and Divisions over the presidency from Luxembourg on 1 July), with whom he had tense relations stemming from van den Broek’s lack of enthusiasm for German reunification. Getting the CSCE into the picture also had greater strategic potential. It meant that the United States, through its membership in the CSCE, may still have been persuaded to reconsider its decision of abandoning Yugoslavia— something that the German foreign policy community hoped to achieve. Finally and most important, Genscher believed that the CSCE would enable him to help guide the international community toward a more effective and rational policy.56 The CSCE, however, almost immediately proved to be ill equipped for the task. Its Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) met on 3 and 4 July in Prague to discuss the worsening developments in Yugoslavia, but its actions were stifled by the lack of any enforcement mechanisms and by the fact that decisions could be reached only by the consensus of all member states. The Prague meeting did result in a statement which admonished the use of force in strong terms and formally offered a mission of good offices.57 However, the statement went nowhere nearly as far as Genscher had hoped and ultimately proved to be toothless. The Yugoslav diplomatic service, run by the Markovic´ government, which wanted to hold on to whatever international and domestic influence it could, was hardly cooperative and made the negotiations at the CSO difficult. It was enthusiastically supported by Soviet diplomats, who did not want to set a precedent for international intervention in the impending dissolution of their own federation. Most interesting, the Yugoslavs and the Soviets were supported by the divisions within the EC bloc. According to the head of the CSO, Wilhelm Höynck, these discussions dragged on and were fruitless exactly because “the EC countries couldn’t come to terms” in their “sometimes very emotional” arguments.58 The CSCE thus became little more than a sounding board for different lines of thought within the divided EC. And without committed unanimity among the EC Twelve, which formed the core of the CSCE, this organization could create no forward-looking conflict-management policy because it was easy for those who did not want to see greater international assertiveness—like the Soviets—to resist. The CSCE reappeared from time to time throughout the Yugoslav crisis and eventually proved useful in helping the EC organize international monitoring of the conditions on the ground. However, its performance at the onset of real violence in Yugoslavia hardly fulfilled the goals of the German foreign minister or the hopes inscribed in its own foundational document, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In many ways, the CSCE—as envisioned in the Charter of Paris—became the first international “casualty” of the Yugoslav wars.

187 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

188 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions This initial CSCE episode, however, did serve an important purpose. It not only highlighted the differences in the international perceptions of the Yugoslav crisis, but it also exposed the growing disconnect between Western foreign policy makers and their own domestic audiences. A number of authors tracing international responses to the dissolution of Yugoslavia have emphasized the vigorous negative reaction of the German political apparatus to the JNA intervention in Slovenia. Some have even called it “recognition fever,” which supposedly spread through Germany’s political elite suddenly after Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence.59 Indeed, the reaction of German politicians from virtually all political parties (and not only from the right, as many have mistakenly claimed) was strong and unanimous in its demand for a change in Western insistence on Yugoslavia’s unity.60 This pressure that the German parliament, press, and the public at large exerted on their country’s foreign policy administration under Genscher was, however, hardly unique. Virtually all Western governments—except perhaps (and only initially) the French socialist government and its foreign minister, Roland Dumas—faced similar challenges and critiques domestically. Germany’s strategic position toward Europe’s east, its recent experience of self-determination in reunification, and its geographic proximity to Yugoslavia made the issue so important that the result was a united and strong pressure which the Auswärtiges Amt found impossible to resist. Other Western foreign ministries may have been more successful in insulating themselves from domestic demands for a shift in policy, but the critique to which they were subjected during the days of the JNA intervention in Slovenia was virtually the same. This critique was crucial in altering the perception of the crisis by the Western foreign policy makers and thus bringing a diplomatic end to the Slovenian conflict. The UK government’s ambiguous stance toward the JNA’s intervention was hardly met with parliamentary and press approval. Representatives of all parties in the House of Commons during the last days of June and the first days of July bombarded the Foreign Office and government officials with questions about the wisdom of their policy. Rather predictably, representatives of the Scottish National Party wondered, “Would not it have been better to issue a clear clarion call saying that we shall respect the ballot box, not the threat of the bullet?” and demanded “some honesty for the record” from the foreign secretary.61 The spokesman on foreign affairs and Europe of the Liberal Democrats, Russell Johnston, went even further and asked for the foreign secretary’s promise that he would push for the recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence in the EC.62 The Labour MP, Ken Livingstone, also expressed his distaste with the government policy by pointedly asking Mark Lennox-Boyd on 27 June, “Why is

Summer of Violence and Divisions the Government propping up a bankrupt concept created by great power politics at the end of the First World War?”63 Days later, after another bout of violence in Yugoslavia, Livingstone blamed the “unsympathetic response of Western governments to Slovenia’s declaration” for potentially encouraging “the Yugoslav military to think that they could proceed without resistance from the West” and demanded “firm and total sanctions” in case of a new offensive by the JNA.64 Even some members of the Conservative Party expressed their uneasiness with the government’s direction by asking the foreign secretary to reconsider his policy and even suggesting that he should quote to the “civil and military authorities in Belgrade” the words of the great nineteenth-century fighter for Irish home rule, Charles Stewart Parnell.65 These critiques were mirrored in editorials of virtually all the important British broadsheets. The Conservativeleaning Times argued that “the European Community cannot remake Yugoslavia, as the British and their allies once made it.” The Labour-leaning Guardian claimed that “to assert a unity which cannot be maintained is to send the wrong signal to Belgrade—and above all to the Yugoslav army.” And the Liberal-leaning Independent added that “if Europe means anything as a concept, the civil war in Yugoslavia must be stopped” and concluded that the EC foreign ministers must recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia that very week.66 Similar responses also could have been found in other European legislatures and the US Congress. Prominent US congressmen looked on the State Department’s disengagement from Yugoslavia and its ambiguous stance toward the JNA intervention with disbelief. Republican senator Alfonse D’Amato stated on the Senate floor on 28 June that it was the US policy “which has only motivated the Serbian leadership toward further violence” and that it was “time the United States firmly stood up to the terroristic rule of Slobodan Miloševic´” and firmly allied itself “with the forces of democracy and human rights.”67 Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Claiborne Pell (D-RI) went even further and publicly called on “American authorities to express clearer support for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia” because “it is not enough to say that the US support[s] ‘any solution’ which the people of Yugoslavia choose,” as the State Department was publicly claiming at the time, but rather “that America is on the side of those fighting for democracy and market economy, and against Communist terror. . . . The United States need not support unity at any price.”68 Such opinions were perfectly captured by several Senate resolutions adopted unanimously at the time. Resolution 153, adopted on 11 July, for example, actually went as far as to support the self-determination of all six

189 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

190 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions Yugoslav republics and the two autonomous provinces and to urge the State Department and the Bush administration “to ensure that concerns regarding the restoration of political stability in Yugoslavia will not preclude the chief objective of promoting and securing democracy and self-determination.”69 Simply put, the disapproval of the dominant Western approach toward Yugoslavia was substantial in the legislatures, newspapers, and public opinion across most Western countries, not just Germany.70 And though the foreign policy apparatuses of these countries were on this issue perhaps more insulated from domestic challenges than was the case in Germany, the disapproval and the resulting pressures actually did lead to a change of policy by the end of that first week of July.71 Western diplomats and foreign policy makers began to publicly accept the possibility that the Yugoslav federation may have reached the end of its life. The Bush administration behind closed doors remained fully committed to still supporting a unified Yugoslav state.72 However, pressured by the Congress and the events on the ground, it had to publicly concede that it would accept Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence “if it is achieved peacefully.”73 This shift of approach, no matter how nonsensical it may have seemed considering the JNA tanks on the streets, may have actually helped alter the calculations of the clashing parties and bring a diplomatic conclusion to the Slovenian conflict. Hints of the new Western approach toward Yugoslavia materialized at a meeting of the EC foreign ministers in The Hague on 5 July. After yet another session of emotional and divisive debates, the ministers finally agreed on a series of measures which signaled their shift in thinking. They suspended the EC’s financial aid to Yugoslavia—worth nearly $1 billion—instituted an arms embargo, acknowledged that “a new situation has arisen,” threatened to reconsider “their position in the event of any further breach of the cease-fire,” and decided to again send the troika to Yugoslavia to broker an agreement.74 The more robust tone of the ministers’ statement seemed to work. Two days later, an agreement was signed at Tito’s summer estate on the Croatian islands of Brioni. Its main provisions were basically a collection of what had already been agreed upon but not executed: (1) a three-month moratorium on the implementation of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s declarations of independence; (2) a cease-fire accompanied by the return of the JNA to the barracks and the demobilization of the Slovenian TO; (3) the reestablishment of the border situation prior to 25 June; (4) a call to all Yugoslav parties to begin negotiations on their common future by 1 August; and, most important, (5) the foundation of a limited monitoring mission under the auspices of the CSCE to be deployed in Slovenia “and possibly also Croatia.”75

Summer of Violence and Divisions Unlike the previous agreements negotiated by the EC ministers, the so-called Brioni Accord actually marked the end of the Slovenian conflict. The reason for that was simple: by suggesting they were ready to accept the end of the Yugoslav federation, Western governments clearly gave a signal to the Yugoslavists in the JNA’s High Command that their hopes of maintaining a united state of six republics were misplaced. They were the ones who, together with federal prime minister Markovic´, had initiated the intervention in Slovenia, and now they were forced to accept their defeat. That defeat, however, did not stem from the provisions of the new agreement, which, if anything, were far harsher on the Slovenians, but from the change of position of the JNA vis-à-vis the Serbian leadership due to the withdrawal of tacit Western acceptance of the army’s intervention. Western governments now seemed to be consenting to (only) Slovenia’s independence.76 And while this was great news for the Slovenes, it was even better news for Miloševic´, who immediately made good use of the situation. In the days after the signing of the Brioni Accord, Miloševic´’s right-hand man in the federal presidency, Borisav Jovic´, orchestrated a deal with the Slovenian representative, Janez Drnovšek, to completely withdraw the JNA troops from Slovenia and not leave them in the barracks as the Brioni Accord mandated.77 Over the strenuous protests of the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic´, and Ante Markovic´, this new coalition in the federal presidency voted on 18 July to abandon Slovenia, just as the Serbian president had argued all along. Drnovšek later explained why he had suddenly decided to cease his boycott of the federal presidency for one crucial day: “Naturally I would have to be there in Belgrade, since the Serbs could guarantee four votes, and with my fifth vote we would have the necessary majority in the presidency. I agreed now to come. So at last the great game on Brioni, which nobody at the time fully understood, was over.”78 The intent of Jovic´ and the Serbian bloc was clear. The JNA troops were to relocate to Bosnia and Serbia, from where they would be used in battles Miloševic´ and his regime wanted them to fight. As a CIA report of 19 July argued, the decision amounted to a “de facto recognition of Slovenian independence” and an isolation of Croatia.79 With the campaign of violence exploding throughout Croatia during those summer days and the JNA piling on massive armored forces into and around this republic and openly using them to assist the Krajina Serbs, it was obvious to all that the real war was just beginning.80 The consequences of the Slovenian episode, both within and outside of Yugoslavia, were dramatic. Slovenia with minimum sacrifices basically became an independent state.81 The JNA, marred by desertions and the final failure of its generals to push for the preservation of the whole of Yugoslavia, became

191 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

192 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions even more Serb-dominated.82 Its High Command now decisively switched to the program of the Serbian president and never again strayed from it so dramatically.83 Most important, Croatia was left virtually alone at the mercy of the JNA and the Serb rebel attacks. Though Slovenia was never a reliable ally, the very fact that it was in a similar position had relieved Croatia of some pressure. That relief was now gone. Tud‒man’s decision not to assist the Slovenes militarily was controversial and not without serious opponents within his cabinet.84 The Croatian president believed the JNA action in Slovenia could not succeed because it lacked Serbia’s support, and he suspected that the High Command had plans to overthrow the Croatian government in case of its overt involvement on the side of the Slovenes. Judging by the developments on the ground and the later account of General Kadijevic´, Tud‒man’s assessments were correct.85 His unwillingness to engage the army in open combat, however, meant that for the remainder of that summer Croatia suffered great losses from an aggression its forces frustratingly could not directly respond to. The international consequences of the Slovenian conflict were arguably even more dramatic. The CSCE proved to be unable to deal with the first crisis it faced after the end of the Cold War, and the EC steadily lost its credibility with every new broken cease-fire. The JNA’s intervention exposed all the perils of international policy which had been predicated on Yugoslavia’s unity. Western journalists and parliamentarians who argued that this policy had been instrumental in encouraging the Yugoslav army and Prime Minister Markovic´ to launch their botched campaign were correct. Without the West’s tacit acceptance of the use of force and without its harsh reaction to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence, it is highly unlikely that the JNA and Markovic´ would have opted for an intervention in Slovenia. Western foreign policy makers were not locked into their policy choices, even though their persistent repetition of failed prescriptions may have suggested otherwise. Different options were available and had real support in the legislatures and public opinion throughout the West. A genuine reassessment of the situation and a shift of approach, however, occurred in the foreign policy apparatus of only one major Western power—Germany. EUROPEANS DO NOT BEHAVE LIKE THAT: ABANDONING CROATIA

A CIA report of 25 June 1991 argued that “Serbian strongman Miloševic´ remains committed to his goal of incorporating all Serb-occupied territory into Serbia” and that the communal violence resulting from his campaign in Croatia and

Summer of Violence and Divisions Bosnia-Herzegovina would “even under the best of circumstances . . . probably produce casualties in the hundreds. If republic paramilitary and federal army forces are drawn in, the scale of fighting could expand dramatically.”86 With Slovenia out of the way and the hopes of some army generals for a united Yugoslavia shattered, the Serbian president and his apparatus of power soon fulfilled the predictions from the CIA scenario. Croatia was subjected to an open attack for its territory on a scale unseen in Slovenia. In the aftermath of the 1990 “log revolution,” the president of Serbia had established virtually complete control over the political, economic, and military affairs in Krajina through the actions of his republic’s State Security Service (SDB). Serbia’s SDB armed and trained Krajina’s forces and—more important—exerted direct influence on the decision making of the highest Krajina leadership.87 During the second half of 1990 and the first half of 1991 it was actively assisted by various JNA units and commanders in the field, as well as by individual members of the High Command. As the army cadre became even more Serb-dominated after the failure of the campaign in Slovenia, this collaboration between the SDB and the JNA reached a systemic and highly explosive level. According to Borisav Jovic´, the JNA’s fiasco in Slovenia made General Kadijevic´ much more pliant. Two days before the Brioni Accord was even signed and the Slovenian conflict thus de facto finished, Kadijevic´ agreed to Miloševic´’s and Jovic´’s instructions that the army should amass its main forces along the lines of the perceived new Serbian state on Croatia’s territory.88 As the general later recollected, the new real goals of the High Command were the military consolidation of the local Serbs and the preparation of the JNA for a full-scale war with Croatia—all under the guise of the army’s officially proclaimed mission of “preventing inter-ethnic conflicts.”89 Though some army commanders of local units did try to act as an interpositional force between the Croats and the Serbs, this was more of an exception than the rule. Starting in mid-July, the JNA became for all intents and purposes the most powerful tool in the arsenal of the Serbian president.90 A series of intercepted communications between Miloševic´ and his associates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from this period, used as evidence during his trial at the ICTY, clearly demonstrates this development. In an intercept of 8 July that received much attention in September 1991, when it was made public by Ante Markovic´ (who had apparently gotten it from the Bosnian SDB), Miloševic´ instructed Karadžic´ that “it is of strategic importance for the future ‘Ram’ [‘Frame’ in Serbian] . . . that the Banja Luka Corps be able and mobile. . . . Call [the JNA commander of the Banja Luka corps] General Uzelac in one hour with a reference to the agreement at the highest

193 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

194 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions place. . . . All the people you supply . . . he will arm. We will bring helicopters and everything.” Markovic´’s interpretation of the intercept at the time was more than prescient: “Let it be known that it clearly follows that . . . Slobodan Miloševic´ is giving orders to Karadžic´ to make contact with Uzelac in order to, according to an agreement with the top military commanders, hand over army weapons to the Territorial Defense of Bosnian Krajina. This forms a part of the Plan ‘Ram,’ which allegedly refers to the plan for a Greater Serbia.”91 Or as the Serbian president explained to the leader of the Bosnian Serbs some two and a half weeks later in reference to the ongoing JNA operations in eastern Slavonia, “The whole thing is that a serious operation needs to be conducted, as we talked about it . . . like a surgical operation,” to which Karadžic´ responded, “I explained to my associates that none of this is being done spontaneously—you and I discussed it in September of last year.”92 With the cover of the JNA’s massive force, the Serbian war machine began a series of offensives against the Croats in the second half of July. As the political leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´, revealed during his testimony at Miloševic´’s ICTY trial, these offensives were largely directed at ethnically mixed areas in order to expel the Croat population and claim the territory for the new Serbian state. The attacks on local Croats and their towns and villages routinely followed a uniform scenario. As Babic´ described, assaults would commence as provocations of the local Krajina police and volunteer units, which were controlled by the Serbian SDB, with the JNA soon joining in with artillery and armor under the cover of stopping the “inter-ethnic conflict” under way. Croatia’s troops and the local Croat population were then simply pushed out by the overwhelming force of the army, and their property was looted and torched.93 The purpose of this campaign of terror, which was leaving hundreds of dead and wounded throughout eastern Slavonia, Banija, Lika, and northern Dalmatia, was confidently publicly announced by the Serbian leaders and thus obvious to all. The military leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Martic´, for example, had no qualms about admitting to the EC negotiators that the Serbian forces would respect a cease-fire only if the Croats ceded the cities of Karlovac, Osijek, Petrinja, and Vukovar.94 And Radovan Karadžic´ bluntly explained to the Guardian that the fighting could stop only if the Croats accepted defeat.95 By the end of July, the Croats really were on the brink of defeat. Their poorly armed units were getting a drubbing on the field from the coalition of the Krajina Serbs, the JNA, and Serbia’s own volunteer and security service units. With the JNA forces still stationed throughout the whole republic, the Croatian leadership faced a difficult choice of how to wage a successful defense. Tud‒man and his nearest circle opted for a strategy of avoiding open conflict with the JNA in

Summer of Violence and Divisions the hope of getting Western support and sowing doubts and discord throughout the army’s units and officer corps. Considering Croatia’s disadvantage in weapons and resources, that strategy appears to have been sensible. At the time, however, it was widely unpopular. The HDZ’s hawks demanded a full mobilization of Croatian troops and a more forceful response with a clear pronouncement of the JNA as the aggressor army. Their discontent with the poor organization of the defenses and with Tud‒man’s policies—particularly his January decision to halt arms imports and his July offer of autonomy to the Krajina Serbs96—was so strong that they were actually prepared to overthrow the government through a no confidence vote at the parliamentary session of 1 August 1991.97 In a critical move which saved his presidency and defined the future developments on the battlefield, Tud‒man managed to block his party’s hawks by turning to the opposition and forming a coalition government of national unity. This meant that Croatia’s strategy of trying to avoid open conflict and push for Western support remained intact. Unfortunately for the Croats, however, Western support was not forthcoming. European foreign policy makers remained deeply divided over their approach to the crisis, and their disagreements left Croatia at the mercy of Miloševic´’s onslaught. Though much has been made in the literature of the supposed differences in the interpretation of the Yugoslav crisis among the Western powers, the purpose and nature of the Serbian campaign against Croatia was actually correctly analyzed and understood in the various quarters of the Western foreign policy making community. By the end of July, Western diplomats were clear on what the goals and strategy of the Serbian president and his war machine were. The Americans followed all movements of the JNA troops and understood what their purpose was.98 The French sent two diplomatic fact-finding missions to Yugoslavia, with both reaching the same conclusion: a Yugoslav state was no longer possible because of Serbia’s campaign.99 The analyses of the German Auswärtiges Amt were similarly gloomy. In its view, Miloševic´ was avoiding the internationalization of the crisis and was simply buying time for his war aims in Croatia and later inevitably in Bosnia-Herzegovina.100 Even members of the EC troika behind closed doors defined Serbia’s campaign as a war of annexation of Croatian territory.101 However, in spite of the abundance of evidence on the aims of the Serbian president—or exactly because of it—the initial response of most Western foreign policy makers to the July explosion of violence in Croatia could have only been described as the washing of hands. During a mid-July summit in London, the G-7 countries (likely under the decisive influence of the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed they could do nothing to prevent the violence in Croatia and hid behind the statement

195 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

196 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions that “it is for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide their future.”102 Some of the reasoning behind that position was based—as Russell Johnston remembered of his interaction with John Major’s government—on the belief that the combatants “would simply fight themselves out.”103 Some of it, in the cases of France and the United Kingdom, was based on the more or less open sympathy for Serbia and its cause. As Hans van den Broek claims, foreign policy makers from these two countries did not believe only that “Belgrade had every right to secure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,” but also that it had the right to bring the Serbs of Krajina and eastern Slavonia under its protective wing and away from Croatia’s nationalist government.104 Some of the reasoning behind the West’s washing of hands from Croatia and Yugoslavia was also based on the general policy toward the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s grip on power had been dramatically weakened, and the danger of a violent clash between the USSR’s periphery and the hard-liners in its central government was real. The West was thus trying to keep a low profile on an issue—the dissolution of Yugoslavia—that could have resulted in a precedent for the Soviets. As one US official told the New York Times, “The Soviet Union can stay together or it can fall apart, but what we want to do is stay clean so we don’t get blamed whichever way it goes. . . . We’re going to sit on that fence until we get splinters.”105 Whatever the reasoning behind the West’s unwillingness to meaningfully respond to the war in Croatia, the developments on the ground and the resulting public pressure made further disengagement impossible. With the Serbian campaign expanding and leading to hundreds of casualties and tens of thousands of refugees, the Western press exposed the international policy toward Croatia and Yugoslavia to the harshest possible criticism. The response of the German press has been widely noted in the literature, but similar examples from the United Kingdom are particularly instructive, especially in light of the Foreign Office’s clear preference for no Western involvement in Yugoslavia. Most of London’s broadsheets by the beginning of August heavily criticized the policy of the British government and the EC. The Times argued that the JNA was now simply an arm of the Serbian state, which was seeking expansion, and that the West was just waiting to see the outcome of the ensuing war. One of its editorials implored the EC to stop the Serbs and make it clear that Slovenia was not a special case, “but that Croatia too will have its claims for recognition considered in due course.” Other papers agreed. The Guardian also found the JNA’s assistance crucial for Serbia’s campaign and demanded the sharpest possible European response to Miloševic´ and the generals, while the Independent repeated its support for the recognition of Croatia and added a call for Europe’s armed peacekeeping intervention.106

Summer of Violence and Divisions Faced with such strong domestic pressures and with the steady stream of appalling news from Croatia, the EC foreign policy makers were once again forced to craft some sort of a response. The problem, however, lay in the fact that most of them based their reactions to the explosion of violence not on what was happening on the ground, but on their policy preferences in the ongoing negotiations on the future of the European Community. This tendency to connect the policy toward Yugoslavia with the policy toward European integration was particularly pronounced in France and the United Kingdom. It stifled any effective unified approach to the war in Croatia and rendered the EC toothless. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the debates on the EC’s possible military involvement in Yugoslavia, whether through the Western European Union or an expansion of the monitoring mission established by the Brioni Accord. The role of the long dormant WEU in the security architecture of post–Cold War Europe had already been a subject of vigorous debates in 1990 with the preparations of the Western alliance against Iraq. In spite of strong support for an expansion of the WEU’s responsibilities by a number of countries— particularly France—this organization had been sidelined to the minor role of enforcing the naval embargo against Iraq.107 As the war in Croatia expanded throughout July 1991, France once again put the WEU on the table. At a meeting of the EC Council on 25 July, Roland Dumas not only proposed the formation of an “interpositional” force under the auspices of the WEU, but also “let it be known that [France] wanted the WEU to become ‘the full-blown defense arm of the EC.’ ”108 In the days which followed, the French proposal garnered some support within the Community—most notably from Germany, which backed any sign of international action on Yugoslavia—but it could not overcome intense opposition from the United Kingdom and others. The hope of French foreign policy makers was to settle the debate on the development of the EC’s defense arm which was ongoing at the time by making the WEU the principal instrument of the Community’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. The problem with their insistence on strengthening the WEU through an action in Yugoslavia was, however, the fact that it was an attempt at institution-building which was not based on what was necessary for the management of the crisis.109 Though the French military did begin to plan for a possible intervention in Yugoslavia that July, the feasibility of conducting such an operation through the WEU was highly questionable.110 As Jonathan Eyal cynically but rightfully noted, the WEU consisted “of a few filing cabinets in London.”111 Getting a WEU-coordinated European intervention off the ground would have thus taken a great effort and much scarcely available time—a fact also recognized by the JNA High Command.112 What is more problematic, the French

197 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

198 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions proposal did not suggest that the WEU forces were to be sent to Yugoslavia as any form of deterrent against the escalation of the Serbian aggression, but rather as a means of making Croatia “more reasonable” and willing to stay in a common Yugoslav state.113 The discussion on the role of the WEU intensified once again that September and did have some results, but during late July and early August it served as no more than empty posturing and a distraction easily brushed away by the country which was at the same time the greatest supporter of NATO and the greatest opponent of the intervention in Yugoslavia: the United Kingdom.114 While the proposal for the creation of an “interpositional” force under the WEU may have been understood as “gesture politics” with little prospect of making a difference for the situation on the battlefield, the extension of the EC’s monitoring mission (ECMM) should have been a wholly different matter. Established by the Brioni Accord, which formally brought an end to the Slovenian conflict, the ECMM was supposed to monitor the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the JNA units to their barracks in Slovenia “and possibly also Croatia.” The problem was, however, that the monitors—famously called “icecream men” by the locals for their white uniforms—refused to extend their operations to Croatia without a clearer mandate, better equipment, and more staff.115 The EC thus had no official means of observing the situation on the ground and thereby influencing the calculations of the combatants. Considering the obvious utility of the ECMM and the opening that the Brioni Accord had provided for the mission’s easy expansion to Croatia, the Community had a clear opportunity to simply extend the ECMM’s reach into Croatia and thus make a strong and unified statement that could have made a difference on the battle operations. Instead, the EC member states not only exposed their differences, but even surrendered the decision on the monitoring mission’s operations in Croatia to the very man who wanted no witnesses: Slobodan Miloševic´. At an EC Council meeting of 29 July, the German and French foreign ministers managed to persuade their counterparts to quadruple the number of monitors and to give the ECMM a clear mandate for operations in Croatia, though with an important caveat—that the monitoring mission’s expansion gets direct approval not only from the Yugoslav and Croatian authorities, but also from Miloševic´.116 While this formulation (which was, judging by the press reports, put in place at the behest of the United Kingdom) was probably motivated by the desire that the monitors have all possible assurances for their personal security, the message it sent to the Serbian president was deeply troubling. When the EC needed to openly name the culprit for the explosion of violence, Miloševic´ was off the hook because of his claims of Serbia’s non-involvement in

Summer of Violence and Divisions the aggression and because of the Community’s desire to remain impartial. But when the EC needed to put in action a decision that would have some repercussions for the situation on the battlefield, he was de facto given veto power as the president of one of the parties in the conflict. It is not surprising that Miloševic´ used that veto power and exposed the EC for the powerless and internally divided club that it was. During long negotiations with the EC troika in Belgrade on 4 August, after both Croatia and the federal authorities had accepted the expanded dispatch of the monitoring mission, the Serbian president simply held firm. The monitors were not to observe the situation on the battlefields of Croatia, where his forces clearly had an upper hand, because that would have constituted “interference in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs.” The EC foreign ministers—after surrendering the decision over Yugoslavia’s sovereignty to the president of one of its republics— could do nothing but conclude they had failed. They even refused to publicly declare it was Miloševic´’s intransigence which had led to their failure and instead placed the blame on the vague “lack of political will” among Yugoslavia’s political leaders.117 Two days later, at an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) called by Germany to discuss ways of responding to Serbia’s blatant show of force, the ministers only showed their own disagreements.118 While the German foreign minister called for increased political pressure on Miloševic´ through economic sanctions and a consideration of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, others—led by the United Kingdom— wished to give up all together. Their joint decision and statements reflected this lowest-common-denominator defeatism because they simply threw the ball into the CSCE’s court (as if the organization of thirty-five member states, including the USSR and Yugoslavia, could somehow be more effective) and asked the EC Commission to just study possible economic measures.119 Germany’s proposal to put the prospect of the republics’ recognition on the table in order to make it clear to Miloševic´ that his push for border changes by force could not stand was dismissed for being too inflammatory. As one British official argued with little logic and much patronizing condescension, “If we recognized Croatia, the Serbs would make an all-out push tonight. . . . You cannot negotiate anything without the Yugoslavs who are determined to kill each other. We have somehow to persuade them that Europeans do not behave like that.”120 The combined powerlessness of the EC countries suited Miloševic´ well and fit perfectly into his plans. In a revealing telephone conversation intercepted on the day after the EPC’s ministerial meeting, Miloševic´ shared a laugh with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžic´, over what a Sky News journalist

199 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions had told him before his interview earlier that morning: “He said, ‘Mr. President, you are the most important media personality in the world now . . . because you brought the whole of the EC to despair.’ ”121 The Serbian boss found this comment amusing not only because it furthered his sense of importance, but exactly because it confirmed that his strategy of “bringing the whole of the EC to despair” by exposing its internal differences was working. As he remarked to Karadžic´, “[Tud‒man] is hoping for one thing—internationalization . . . which he can achieve only with German help, as in 1941. . . . And [the Germans] have shown too quickly and too nervously what they want . . . which has put Europe on alert.” Karadžic´ agreed with his superior: “Kohl is now coming out more openly with his appetites, which leads to suspicion in Russia, France, and England. It is good they are coming apart.”122 Europe’s divisions and resulting powerlessness were important because they were enabling the Serbian war machine to present the international community with a fait accompli. As Karadžic´ and Miloševic´ agreed, the whole point was to use their upper hand in brute military force to set the new borders in Croatia “as soon as possible [so that] if Europe is rushing to end things—there, please, end them.” Or, as Miloševic´ most succinctly explained his strategy: “We are strong. And since we are strong, we can establish peace.”123 This being not any peace, but peace on his terms. The Serbian camp at this time was indeed strong and reaped great benefits from that strength. Undeterred by feeble EC attempts at crisis management and by the poorly armed Croatian units, the coalition of the local Serbs, the JNA, and the forces from Serbia expanded its campaign in mid-August. On 12 August, a new Serb Autonomous Region was proclaimed in western Slavonia and was immediately “protected” by an offensive of armored JNA troops from Banja Luka in Bosnia-Herzegovina.124 On 19 August the JNA artillery units commenced operations which soon evolved into the most infamous episode of the whole Croatian war: the bombardment and siege of Vukovar.125 Towns and villages throughout Croatia—from its border with Serbia on the Danube through the plains of eastern and western Slavonia to the rocky hills of Krajina—faced attacks that the local Croatian troops struggled to repel. Serbia’s strength did not only bring benefits to Miloševic´ on the battlefield, but it also enabled him to set the agenda in negotiations which were taking place behind the scenes within the dissolving Yugoslavia. By demonstrating the full extent of the force under his command in Croatia and successfully keeping the EC out of the picture, Miloševic´ began to be seen—by both his opponents and his allies—as the ultimate power broker without whose agreement nothing was possible. Two episodes from the period give a perfect glimpse into how this dynamic worked and how it was used by the Serbian president.

Summer of Violence and Divisions On 14 August, a high delegation of the Slovene leadership called on ´ ´, in Belgrade to discuss a new secret SerboMiloševic´’s mentor, Dobrica Cosic ´ ´ and through him Miloševic´ Slovene deal. The Slovenes sought out Cosic because Slovenia was internationally still struggling to formally divorce its case from Croatia’s and because they believed the Serbian president was the one who could help them. They struck an agreement that looked like an extension of the earlier Serbo-Slovene deal from that January. In addition to supporting the solution of the crisis “based on the self-determination of peoples,” the Slovenes agreed to stay out of the Serbo-Croat clash; to support the creation of a federation among Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and to reject international or federal mediation in Slovenia’s relations with Serbia—all in return for Serbia’s greater support for their independence.126 From Miloševic´’s standpoint, this was a brilliant arrangement. Croatia’s maneuvering space was even more circumscribed, Serbia practically did not have to give up anything, and—what was best—the deal simply fell into his lap because Slovenia had correctly interpreted his position of power. Whereas the Slovenes merely helped Miloševic´ to further isolate the Croats, one other far more crucial Yugoslav constituency nearly enabled him to strike a decisive coup de grâce against Zagreb: the Bosnian Muslims. The position of the most numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia’s central republic was of crucial importance for both Miloševic´’s and Tud‒man’s plans. With only 31 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population being Serb, Miloševic´ desperately needed to keep the Muslims onside if he was to fulfill his plans for westward expansion into Croatia. In mid-July 1991, those Muslims—just like the Slovenes—secretly and on their own approached Miloševic´ in search of a deal. The reason behind the sudden willingness of the Muslim leaders to enter into a pact with the Serbian president was simple: they had found out what Miloševic´’s machine had in store for them. In early July, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s State Security Service had come into possession of the recordings of conversations among Miloševic´, Karadžic´, and their associates in the JNA, as well as of the army’s plans directed specifically against the Bosnian Muslims.127 Confronted with such shocking threats to their very existence and unable to rely on the Croats because of their own weaknesses and Tud‒man’s ambivalence about the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims decided to strike a deal with Belgrade.128 Afraid of associating himself publicly and directly with such an undertaking, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic´, chose to conduct secret negotiations with the Serbs through the leadership of the smaller Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO), which had splintered from the ruling SDA. The MBO’s leaders, Adil Zulfikarpašic´ and Muhamed Filipovic´, to Izetbegovic´’s

201 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

202 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions surprise, quickly found common ground with Karadžic´ and Miloševic´. By the last week of July, their negotiations had reached the final stage, and an agreement only awaited Izetbegovic´’s signature. Bosnia-Herzegovina was to preserve the status it had enjoyed in Yugoslavia by remaining in a common state with at least Serbia and Montenegro.129 In a dramatic turn of events, however, the SDA withdrew its support just as Zulfikarpašic´ and the leaders of the SDS were announcing the deal on Television Sarajevo. Zulfikarpašic´ later blamed Izetbegovic´’s withdrawal on the extremist wing of the SDA, which was supposedly wary of the MBO’s rising popularity as a result of the brokered agreement. While this may have partly been the case, the real reason behind the withdrawal was probably the fact that Izetbegovic´ still wanted his republic to keep a balance between the Serbs and the Croats and that he did not see Miloševic´’s offer as genuine. Judging by the intercepts of conversations between Miloševic´ and Karadžic´ at the time—which may have been available to Izetbegovic´—the Serbian president’s offer was indeed disingenuous, and he had no intention of respecting it. He in fact wanted to split the Bosnian Muslims and believed the assent of the Bosnian Serb leadership was the only thing necessary to keep BiH in a common state with Serbia and Montenegro.130 Moreover, his and Karadžic´’s goals for the Bosnian Muslims had already taken a sinister turn early that summer. According to Milan Babic´’s ICTY account of his meeting with Miloševic´ and Karadžic´ in Belgrade in July 1991, “Karadžic´ said . . . that he held Alija Izetbegovic´ in his little pocket, that he could settle accounts with him at any time, but the time was not ripe for it so that the Serbs should not be blamed for things, that it would be better to wait for Izetbegovic´ to first make the wrong political move and that is when accounts would be settled, and Muslims would be expelled or crammed into the river valleys and he would link up all Serb territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”131 Though publicly snubbed by Izetbegovic´ and the SDA, Zulfikarpašic´ and Filipovic´ entered into a deal with Miloševic´. On 12 August they joined the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro and the president of the BiH Assembly, Momcˇilo Krajišnik (from the ranks of the SDS), to sign the proposal for a new constitution for those republics wishing to stay in a common state and the “historic agreement” between the Serb and Muslim communities of BosniaHerzegovina.132 Their accord, however, only marked the end of Miloševic´’s prospects of getting the Bosnian Muslims into his camp. The BiH public correctly saw the deal as just an attempt to split the Muslims and to attach BosniaHerzegovina to Serbia’s project of expansion with the help of the Bosnian Serbs and the SDS. And Alija Izetbegovic´ announced Bosnia-Herzegovina was soon to organize a referendum on its future as an independent state.133

Summer of Violence and Divisions The two episodes of secret negotiations between Miloševic´ and his proxies with the Slovenes and the Muslims, together with the expansion of the Serbian military campaign against Croatia, perfectly illustrate the state of affairs in the disintegrating Yugoslavia in mid-August. As a result of clear aggression going unchecked by the EC and the West, Miloševic´ was on the brink of complete victory.134 His power enabled him to push the Croats on the battlefield. It also brought the Slovenes and the Bosnian Muslims to his doorstep. At a critical moment, however, power also blinded him into a false feeling of superiority and invincibility. When his project of creating a new state “only” needed the assent of the Bosnian Muslims, he balked at offering them a genuine deal. Though mid-August did not mark the peak of the reach of Miloševic´’s forces on the Croatian battlefields, it did mark the point when he had the best chance of securing his mission. Because soon something happened that changed the approach of the international community and irrevocably immersed the EC into the negotiations on the future of the Yugoslav space and into the war itself. On 19 August commenced the unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. SHEDDING THE SOVIET BALLAST: FORMATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

As the Yugoslav crisis plummeted into violence during the first weeks of that summer, the Soviet Union teetered on the verge of systemic collapse. Forced to surround himself with conservatives in order to shore up his dwindling support, Gorbachev quickly lost control not only over the Soviet republics, which were clamoring for independence, but also over Moscow and the central government. During that whole spring, the Western press and intelligence speculated about the possibility that the Soviet leader might be overthrown by those who saw his reforms as the cause of the impending dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was thus forced to carefully balance his troubled reform agenda with the strong domestic elite pressures for the preservation of the Soviet state. This is why his own and his government’s response to the first six weeks of real violence in Slovenia and Croatia were markedly more forceful than expected in light of their otherwise anemic diplomatic activity and vulnerable international position at the time. As discussed above, Soviet diplomats had backed the federal government of Prime Minister Markovic´ in its support of the JNA intervention in Slovenia and in its efforts to limit international involvement in the crisis through the CSCE.135 Gorbachev himself publicly used the example of what was happening in

203 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

204 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions Yugoslavia to warn both domestic and international audiences of a possible similar scenario in the USSR.136 The violence which beset Slovenia and Croatia was used to dissuade the leaders of the Soviet republics from their goals for independence and to persuade the West to financially support Gorbachev’s program and stay out of Moscow’s disputes with the union’s periphery. While this message failed to result in any meaningful change in the calculations and actions of the leaders of the Soviet republics, it did resonate with Washington and important members of the EC. The West may have been reluctant to pour money into Gorbachev’s failing reforms, but it proved to be willing to limit its involvement in Yugoslavia and give little or no encouragement to the Soviet republics pushing for independence.137 As President Bush stated in front of the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev on 1 August 1991, “Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”138 Bush’s and the West’s only verbal support of Gorbachev did little to spare the Soviet leader from reactionary attacks. On the morning of 19 August—the eve of the signing of the New Union Treaty, which was to reconstitute the USSR as a confederal Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics—those reactionary attacks culminated in an attempted coup d’état.139 The infamous “Gang of Eight,” led by Soviet vice-president Gennady Yanayev, placed Gorbachev under house arrest at his dacha in Crimea, declared a state of emergency, and brought army tanks to the streets of Moscow. Within hours, they were publicly and forcefully confronted by Boris Yeltsin, who called for a general strike, urged the army not to take part in the coup, and demanded that Gorbachev address the people. Muscovites responded to Yeltsin’s plea and soon joined him in protest in front of the Russian parliament building. The footage of Yeltsin addressing the crowd while standing on top of a tank dominated the world’s newscasts that night as Moscow braced for a bloody resolution of the standoff between the Russian president and the putschists. Western reactions to the attempted takeover by the Kremlin hard-liners were unanimously negative, though in some quarters overly guarded.140 Gorbachev had long been the West’s preferred choice for steering the Soviet Union toward democracy and had been backed in spite of all his weaknesses, failures, and reactionary relapses. The attempted coup was seen not only as a threat to Europe’s stability, but also as a challenge to the West’s long-standing policy toward the Soviets. One European ruling party, however, did welcome the coup: Miloševic´’s Socialist Party of Serbia. In contrast to the leaderships of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which all spoke out in no uncertain

Summer of Violence and Divisions terms against Moscow’s conservative turn, Serbian officials either remained silent or praised the timing of the putschists.141 As Mihajlo Markovic´, the vicepresident of the SPS, explained, the coup was a welcome development for Serbia because “it could have happened that the USSR would have—after the signing of the treaty establishing a union of sovereign republics—put pressure on Serbia to also accept a confederation. . . . With this change, such a possibility is removed, so these events suit us.” Or as he more succinctly put it, “The coup attempt was bad for democracy but good for Serbia.”142 How good the coup was for Serbia immediately became apparent on the battlefield. When General Kadijevic´ had visited his Soviet counterpart, Dmitry Yazov, earlier that March to ask for Soviet support for a JNA coup, Yazov could not commit but promised this would change after Gorbachev was deposed. Now that Gorbachev was under house arrest, Kadijevic´ and Miloševic´ felt confident that they could capitalize on the possible change in the Kremlin. The offensive started by the coalition of Serbian forces earlier that August in the wake of the EC’s failure to expand the monitoring mission to Croatia was now intensified. The armored forces of the JNA, together with Serbia’s Territorial Defense units and the Serbian volunteers led by the infamous Željko Ražnatovic´Arkan, had by 23 August occupied the whole of Croatian Baranja, nearly encircled Osijek and Vukovar, and started a campaign of artillery attacks throughout eastern Slavonia. In the Krajina region, Milan Martic´’s men joined up with the local JNA troops of then colonel Ratko Mladic´ to destroy the Croatian village of Kijevo and to expand their offensive throughout northern and central Dalmatia.143 As Martic´ once again boasted on 19 August, “We have artillery, aviation, and the army which is with us—there is no hiding. . . . Soon we shall establish control over Petrinja, Karlovac, Zadar . . . because it is in our and the army’s common interest to have a large harbor.”144 To the disappointment of the Serbian camp, however, the Moscow coup collapsed within three days. The conspirators’ mistake of not eliminating Yeltsin on time cost them dearly. The Soviet army, faced with the mass of protesters who had answered Yeltsin’s call and taken to the streets, refused to storm the Russian parliament and effectively sealed the fate of the putschists, who were arrested upon Gorbachev’s return to Moscow. The consequences of the coup’s failure were truly historic. Gorbachev resigned from his position as the generalsecretary of the Communist Party and thus signaled the coming end of the organization which had run the country for more than seven decades. Within a week, most of the Soviet republics had declared independence, and the West recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.145 On 2 September, Gorbachev proposed the reconstitution of the common state in

205 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

206 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions the form of a confederation in which “Republics would be offered a Soviet Union à la carte. Each could join a political union by signing a union treaty, but would be free to decide later on full or associate membership.”146 Within days, the Congress of People’s Deputies adopted this proposal and recognized the independence of the three Baltic states. The Soviet Union de facto ceased to exist, though it continued to stumble to its de jure death until December. The consequences of the coup’s failure for the Yugoslav crisis were also significant. Most important, with the obvious and more or less peaceful dissolution of the Soviet state, Western diplomats no longer had to continuously weigh the repercussions of their policy toward Yugoslavia on the situation in the USSR.147 Throughout July and early August, their approach to the Yugoslav crisis was under the Kremlin’s scrutiny, but the attempted coup quickly exposed the fact that Moscow’s pressures regarding Yugoslavia had originated in the same conservative circles which had tried to remove Gorbachev from power.148 With the coup’s breakdown, this pressure was now gone. As the Times of London noted in a long editorial on 26 August, “There is no longer need for the West to worry, after last week, that a break-up of the [Yugoslav] federation would exacerbate Mr. Gorbachev’s difficulties in controlling his own centrifugal forces. The priority is to stop the killing. This can be done only if all sides are forced, with all the pressure that the world can muster, to see that the old model has failed and that independent states are now emerging in Yugoslavia, just as they are in the Soviet Union.”149 Though the EC’s foreign ministers did not yet agree with the assertion that independent states were definitely emerging in Yugoslavia, they did agree that the removal of the Soviet Union from the international scene opened up the possibility for the EC’s renewed assertiveness. At the Brussels meeting of the EPC on 27 August—the very same meeting at which the independence of the Baltic states was recognized—the foreign ministers gave a clear signal to Miloševic´ and the JNA that the Community was back in business. Alarmed by the intensified aggression against Croatia and sobered by Serbia’s approval of the Moscow coup, the ministers adopted their strongest statement yet on the Yugoslav crisis. They expressed their determination never to recognize changes of frontiers brought about by violence and never to accept a policy of fait accompli. They finally explicitly named the JNA and the Serbian side (though only as “elements of the Yugoslav People’s Army” and the “Serbian irregulars”) as the principal culprits for the violence and demanded their agreement to the expansion of the ECMM to Croatia. Most significant, the foreign ministers endorsed a plan for an EC-sponsored peace conference and arbitration commission which would organize negotiations among all the republics and the

Summer of Violence and Divisions federal institutions. The Yugoslav parties were given no choice. Those who refused to agree to this plan by 1 September would be simply left out of negotiations.150 The ministers’ new tough approach at the EPC was actually the product of a concerted Franco-German push. While the two countries still disagreed on the preferred outcome of the crisis, they shared the opinion that the EC needed to be more proactive. Earlier that month, the French stunt with the WEU— though receiving Germany’s tacit support—had been easily defeated by the non-interventionist bloc led by the United Kingdom. This time the opponents of increased EC assertiveness had no counterargument. The Soviets were out of the way. The situation on the battlefield was worsening. The peace conference and the ECMM were efforts of markedly less risk than the WEU intervention. And, most important, the principal points of the EC Council statement were the result of a pre-negotiated Franco-German compromise which was backed in full force by the two countries. An international peace conference had been strongly urged by Germany for weeks. And an arbitration commission which would help decide constitutional counterclaims by the Yugoslav parties was a French proposal. In the spirit of classic Franco-German cooperation, which both countries were eager to revive, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Roland Dumas connected those two ideas and thus ushered in a new period of Europe’s management of the Yugoslav crisis.151 The Serbian camp had hoped the Moscow coup would convince the Western foreign policy makers to remain uninvolved or at least divert their attention long enough for the resolution of the crisis on the battlefield. The coup’s quick collapse and the resulting breakdown of the Soviet state, however, actually expedited and intensified Europe’s involvement. The finally assertive statement of the EC ministers on 27 August did not lead to a decline in violence on the Croatian battlefields or a reversal of the Serbian aggression. After all, the EC’s record of involvement in the crisis up to that point had given the Serbian president and his camp no indication that the Community would stand by its words. His campaign for border changes by force continued to intensify in the last days of August. Eastern Slavonia was hit by an even stronger attack of the JNA, backed up by Serbia’s own TO forces and volunteer units.152 The city of Vukovar—soon to become the symbol of Croatia’s resistance—was subjected to such heavy bombardments that the president of the SFRJ presidency, Stipe Mesic´, had already dubbed it “our Stalingrad.”153 The goals of this campaign were clear and were hardly concealed by the Serbian officials. As the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, Vladislav Jovanovic´, stated in a televised interview at the peak of this new offensive, “The present internal borders are administrative borders and not national frontiers. These borders

207 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

208 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions were drawn after the Second World War by the then ruling Communists in an arbitrary fashion. . . . If a republic such as Croatia decides to become an independent state, then this opens the question of these borders, above all between Croatia and Serbia.”154 The continuation of violence, however, this time brought a new wave of international condemnation and pressure on Serbia to accept the expansion of the ECMM to Croatia and the formation of a peace conference. On 29 August, the US State Department joined the EC foreign ministers in singling out the JNA and Serbia as the principal culprits for the explosion of violence and asserting that violent changes of borders would never be accepted.155 That same day, Miloševic´ was summoned to Paris to meet with President Mitterrand, who pressured him to accept the EC plan.156 The governments and legislatures of a number of European states passed resolutions condemning the actions of the Yugoslav army and Serbia and even threatening possible recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Newspapers across the continent welcomed the EC’s tough approach and demanded even more pressure on the Serbian president.157 This pressure finally bore some fruit on 1 September—the deadline set by the EC foreign ministers. When the EC troika, led by Hans van den Broek, came to Belgrade that evening to get Miloševic´’s signature on the expansion of the monitoring mission and the formation of the peace conference, they still had to face his delaying tactics and attempts to get concessions. This time, however, they held firm. Van den Broek simply told Borisav Jovic´ that he “did not come here to negotiate” with him and made it clear that internationally administered talks on Yugoslavia’s future would proceed with or without Serbia and that all possible measures of international pressure would be brought against those who continued to stonewall.158 And Miloševic´ buckled. He signed a comprehensive cease-fire agreement and the memorandum extending the ECMM.159 Two days later, the EC foreign ministers established the Conference on Yugoslavia (to be chaired by former British foreign secretary Lord Carrington) and the arbitration commission (to be chaired by the president of the French Constitutional Council, Robert Badinter) to help settle the constitutional arguments of the conflicting sides.160 Though Miloševic´’s acceptance of the EC plan exposed his susceptibility to concerted Western pressure, the Serbian president did not automatically abandon his campaign or cease testing Europe’s resolve. The attacks on Croatian towns and villages continued unabated in the first days of September. Eastern and western Slavonia faced armor and artillery attacks of such intensity that the Western press once again proclaimed Croatia to be on the brink of military defeat.161 The strategy of the attacks spearheaded by the JNA troops coming

Summer of Violence and Divisions from within Croatia, as well as from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was to split the republic into four parts and disable the communications and supply routes of the already overstretched Croatian defenders. The plan made sense not only militarily, but also politically. A further push of the front lines against the Croats would have either strengthened Miloševic´’s hand in the negotiations at the conference or—even better—it would have delayed the implementation of the EC plan because of a lack of a functioning cease-fire. In spite of clear lessons from the troika’s success of 1 September, some EC foreign ministers nearly allowed the Serbian president to once again get off the hook. The unity that the EC Twelve had expressed in crafting their tough statement of 27 August and pushing for the agreement of 1 September was now gone. The continuation of the aggression against Croatia after the signing of the cease-fire split the EC on two important questions: whether to put the recognition of the republics on the table and whether to proceed with the conference. One end of the spectrum was represented by the British and the Dutch foreign ministries, which considered the new explosion of violence as evidence that the Community should again retreat because there was simply no peace to keep. On the other end were German officials who, faced with Serbia’s and the JNA’s blatant disregard for the provisions of the cease-fire and with the resulting criticism of European policy in the Bundestag, deemed it necessary to reintroduce the threat of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and to push for the commencement of negotiations in The Hague.162 This time the Germans managed to prevail. Their plea for the consideration of recognition gained the endorsement of only a few other EC states, but their insistence on going forward with the conference succeeded in winning French support and overcoming the opposition of the British and the Dutch, who argued for a postponement.163 The disagreement within the EC on the commencement of the conference was only one of the reasons why this formidable effort at crisis management and mediation had been set on the wrong course from its very beginning. Most obviously, Lord Carrington had few tools at his disposal. While his access to the Community’s and the West’s financial sources (to be used as carrots for the combatants) was limited, his ability to threaten the Yugoslav parties with any meaningful force was literally nonexistent.164 With peace absent from the battlefields of Croatia and aggression for its territory progressing unabated, it was highly unrealistic to expect a conference endowed with few carrots and no sticks to result in a “solution acceptable to all,” as the EC officially demanded.165 In many ways, the EC foreign ministers also underestimated their task at hand and the level of commitment and resources it would take to bring the conference to a successful end. The Dutch foreign minister, for example, told Lord

209 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

210 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions Carrington that he expected the conference to complete its work within two months.166 Even more problematic, the EC foreign ministers underestimated the depth of their own differences, which set the conference to sail into uncharted waters with an unclear destination. While Germany viewed the conference as a vehicle for an orderly and peaceful disassociation of the Yugoslav federation and the establishment of a system of minority and human rights throughout its to-beindependent republics, France and Britain saw the conference as a vehicle for the preservation of at least some semblance of a common Yugoslav state on the largest possible territory. As Lord Carrington later remembered, the idea of his mission—as conveyed to him at the beginning of the conference—“was to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia.”167 Or as President Mitterrand mused at a press conference on 11 September 1991, “I have in mind Bismarck’s answer to the question of why after he beat Austria-Hungary in 1866 at Sadowa he did not divide this monarchy, as was the case later in 1918. Bismarck’s answer was: ‘AustriaHungary knows how to deal with the South Slavs. We [the Germans] do not.’ He therefore did not want to change the equilibrium in the region.”168 Such thinking and the resulting profound disagreements among the principal EC allies debilitated the work of the conference because they took away exactly what Lord Carrington needed—a rational goal and the Community’s united front—to deal with the intense disputes among the Yugoslav parties. How intense those disputes were became immediately apparent at the conference’s opening session on 7 September. Hans van den Broek tried to impress on everyone just how out of place violent pursuits of border changes were in Europe on the brink of the twenty-first century: “Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the European Community, taught us that we should not fight over national borders but that we should make them irrelevant through more intensive economic and political cooperation, so that in the end we can remove them completely.”169 The leaders of the Yugoslav republics who spoke after him, however, proved just how out of place the invocation of Jean Monnet was at a conference dealing with their conflicts. The presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia at least maintained some level of constructive civility. Alija Izetbegovic´ called for the expansion of the ECMM to his republic and spoke in favor of a Yugoslav confederation of independent states, while noting that this position did not have the support of the Bosnian SDS. Kiro Gligorov joined in Izetbegovic´’s endorsement of a confederal arrangement and pleaded with the EC to also commence a process of association with both the republics and the Yugoslav whole. Milan Kucˇan’s aloof contribution demonstrated the extent to which Slovenia no longer felt a part of the Yugoslav mess. The Slovenian president was determined his republic was going to become

Summer of Violence and Divisions independent after the expiration of the three-month moratorium imposed by the Brioni Accord. The proceedings, however, turned rancorous with a harsh exchange between Franjo Tud‒man and Slobodan Miloševic´. Tud‒man—pressured by the continuing violence to which his republic was subjected—asserted that a “dirty, undeclared war . . . organized by Serbia with the help of the JNA and a small part of the Serbian minority” was being fought against Croatia. He demanded Croatia’s speedy international recognition “so that the international mechanisms of protection against aggression could be applied to Croatia as a subject of international law.” Miloševic´’s response was even more combative. He invoked the crimes of the Ustaše in World War II as the cause of the the Krajina Serbs’ “self-organization and defense from the dangers of a repeated genocide.” He again cloaked his platform in the garb of protection of Yugoslavia by claiming that he was simply fighting for the rights of those who wished to remain in a common state “which still exists in the present borders as the only internationally recognized subject.” Though posing as a Yugoslavist, however, he did not conceal his main goal: he clearly asserted that the borders of the republics needed to be changed.170 The commencement of the conference therefore gave little hope to all observers of Yugoslavia’s violent collapse. The very foundation of the conference as a forum for orderly negotiations on the future of the Yugoslav space was, of course, a diplomatic achievement of sorts. This did not, however, mask the fact that the two principal underlying problems in the interaction between the international and the Yugoslav players were left unresolved. First, the conference’s meager endowment of tools of reward and coercion could not offset the dissonance in the goals of the EC states regarding the outcome of the crisis. All principal EC powers continued to play their own independent diplomatic games, which in the end proved much more important than the conference’s feeble apparatus. Second, neither the conference nor the EC foreign ministries found a way to keep Slobodan Miloševic´ and his camp accountable. The Serbian president pitched his campaign at the conference’s opening session as a defense of Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington—as well as some in the highest levels of the EC’s foreign policy making—took his argument at face value. The real goals of the aggression Miloševic´ orchestrated, however, had nothing to do with preserving the only state that could have reasonably been called a Yugoslavia—the (con)federation of the six republics. As the Serbian president told Radovan Karadžic´ in a conversation on the eve of the conference’s opening session, his goal was “Yugoslavia with three republics [Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina] plus the Serbs in Croatia.”171 Or as Mihajlo Markovic´ more openly explained to the Serbian electorate why Miloševic´ invoked “Yugoslavia”

211 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

212 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions when he clearly meant “Greater Serbia,” “The primary Serb national interest is for the Republic of Serbia to lead the defense of the Serb nation in Croatia in such a way that it is not accused by the world to be participating in an aggression against the Republic of Croatia. . . . It is in our interest at this point of the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis to insist on Yugoslavia (without Slovenia and Croatia) and not ‘Greater Serbia.’ . . . The new state border in Croatia must go along the demarcation line of the Serb and the Croat nations. The JNA needs to take that border.”172

• Some observers of international policy during the summer of 1991 perceptively noted that the Western efforts regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia resembled traditional Japanese theater, Kabuki—“the observance of good form without the substance, indeed, the use of form precisely in order to deflect the pressures for substantive involvement.”173 Judging by the record of Western diplomatic futility at the time, it would not be difficult to agree with such criticism. EC diplomats and foreign policy makers showed genuine enthusiasm and willingness to find substantive solutions only at the very outbreak of violence following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, and American diplomats and foreign policy makers did not show any enthusiasm for action even then. Once their preferred solution—of the clearly Yugoslavist kind—had burned in the flames of real war which engulfed the two republics, this enthusiasm was gone. The driving force for the EC’s involvement became real domestic pressures—in the legislatures, the press, and public opinion—which time and again prevented the Community’s foreign policy makers from washing their hands of the whole mess. To say that the European diplomatic effort in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1991 appeared only to observe good form without substance would, of course, be too simplistic. More important, it would conceal the real clashes between the principal EC powers over the substance of their common approach to what was happening on the ground. To some extent, those clashes were caused by different preferences regarding the outcome of the crisis, which were in turn rooted in various historical biases and preconceptions. The pro-Serbian and pro-centralist leanings in France and the United Kingdom, as well as the proSlovenian and pro-Croatian leanings in Germany, certainly reminded many of World War I and World War II politics. As much as they made good newspaper headlines and as much as they truly did influence the thinking in some foreign policy circles, those different leanings were not nearly as important as the real differences in the perceptions of what should be the future of the European continent as a whole.

Summer of Violence and Divisions Germany’s internal consensus on the direction of the EC’s policy toward the crisis was rooted both in its recent experience of self-determination and reunification and in the clearly correct interpretation of what was happening on the ground in the dissolving Yugoslavia. This conviction and the resulting assertiveness, however, distressed some of Germany’s EC partners, particularly France and the United Kingdom. In addition to being inherently troubled by the process of Germany’s reunification, French foreign policy makers also looked on a united Germany with distrust because of its position toward Eastern Europe. The principal French strategy for a post–Cold War European order revolved around a deepening of West European integration and only a gradual adjustment in the East European status quo—both of these steps directed toward further binding Germany to France. French foreign policy makers were afraid of the process of European integration being “hijacked” and used to further the German vision of deeper East-West rapprochement through a series of applications of the principle of self-determination, which would inevitably result in a shift of Europe’s center of gravity from Paris to Berlin.174 Probably no one captured the essence of this fear better than French foreign minister Roland Dumas, who on 5 July 1991 publicly asserted that “It is not the role of the EC to promote the independence of peoples.”175 Unlike France, which worried about where European integration was going and about the effects this would have on the relations between the continent’s east and west, Britain had qualms about European integration going anywhere, especially in the fields of foreign and security policy. British foreign policy makers certainly shared their views of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as their historical biases toward the region, with their French counterparts.176 However, while the French were eager to see the EC rise to the global stage by actively managing the Yugoslav crisis (toward at least some semblance of a common state), the British did not want Yugoslavia to become a precedent that would lead to the deepening of the EC’s foreign and security policy integration. The consequence of such profound divisions among the main EC powers was a diplomatic game which was only partially guided by what was happening on the ground and thus understandably seemed to only “observe the good form” of crisis management. The Serbian president and his camp proved to be more than capable of reaping the benefits of such a game. The results of the EC efforts during that summer of violence were indeed nearly fully in accordance with Miloševic´’s goals. Slovenia was out of the picture. Croatia was rapidly losing territory with no real possibility of international intervention or recognition. And the mechanisms of the Community’s involvement were weak and ineffective. The brief period of assertiveness and unity in the immediate aftermath of

213 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

214 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Summer of Violence and Divisions the failed Soviet coup—though exposing the vulnerabilities of the Serbian president and his susceptibility to pressure—resulted in little more than the formation of the Conference on Yugoslavia. And as war and violence continued to spread throughout that autumn, deep divisions among the three largest EC powers did not only stifle their endeavors to halt the crisis, but they also put into question the progress of the transformation of the EC.

8

Diplomacy on the Edge, September–November 1991

The creation of the Conference on Yugoslavia as a forum for organized negotiations offered hope that some arrangement for peace among the Yugoslav parties might be achieved and that the public differences among the EC countries regarding the management of the crisis might settle down. Over the course of the autumn of 1991, such hopes proved to be illusory. War operations of the Serb coalition intensified on all Croatian battlefields, expanded into BosniaHerzegovina, and continued to shock the international community with their brutality and scant regard for human life or for the cultural heritage of places like Dubrovnik, Zadar, Šibenik, or Vukovar. The European Community, in spite of some signs of growing unity in frustration with the crisis, remained deeply divided and no closer to any substantive or effective policy. And the Carrington conference, pressured by the events on the ground and the divisions among its creators, simply collapsed as a means of achieving any useful end. The essence of the rifts which had marred the EC’s decision making throughout that summer remained virtually unchanged as the war stretched into autumn. Germany’s internal consensus on a policy toward the crisis only strengthened with the escalation of the Serb aggression. On the other hand, the commitment of France and Britain to use the Carrington conference in order to salvage as much as possible of Yugoslavia’s common structure still guided their policies. The French and British positions were also united on the question of how selective and strong the EC pressure on the various Yugoslav parties—particularly Serbia—ought to be. No matter how obvious the activities of the war machine under his direct control, Miloševic´ was able to count on France and Britain to dilute the decisions and declarations of the EC. The only real, albeit important, difference in the positions of these two states toward the

215

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

216 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge Yugoslav crisis still had to do with potential European military intervention. Whereas for France the crisis was an opportunity for the expansion of the WEU’s and the EC’s military capability, for Britain it was a threat to its own long-standing strategy focused on limiting Europe’s independent security capacity.1 The results of Europe’s diplomatic efforts by mid-November were thus unsurprisingly abysmal. Miloševic´’s obstinacy at the negotiating table, the continuing aggression of his coalition on Croatia, and its preparations for an even greater war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ultimately went unchecked and unpunished. All that the EC had to show for its efforts during this period was a series of relatively tough declarations undermined by the individual statements and actions of some of its members. The Community’s divisions—so obvious and so debilitating during that summer—not only persisted, but even intensified. One insider of the Carrington conference later labeled the whole Western effort during this period as “diplomacy on the edge,” which just about captures the essence of the whole story.2 This chapter demonstrates how Western diplomats and foreign policy makers struggled to find common ground, how they as a result repeatedly failed to have a positive impact on the escalating war, and—most tragically—how their diplomacy in the end teetered on the edge of reason. QUATORZE ENCORE UNE FOIS: DEFENDING CROATIA

The offensive of the coalition of local Serb rebels, volunteer and Territorial Defense units from Serbia, and the Yugoslav army against Croatia continued on virtually all fronts as soon as the opening session of the Conference on Yugoslavia ended. On 12 September, the Knin corps managed to effectively sever Croatia in two at the critical bridge of Maslenica, near Zadar, and to push the Croats out of a large swath of the Dalmatian hinterland. The whole Dalmatian coast was either occupied or isolated from the rest of the country and at the same time swamped with fresh JNA units sent in from Montenegro to keep the region under control.3 The situation was so dramatic that Western diplomats and officials doubted that Croatia could defend itself for longer than two weeks.4 Indeed, the Serbian president had every reason to be confident that his political and military plans were on the verge of success. As he remarked to Radovan Karadžic´ in one of their characteristic telephone conversations on 10 September, “Please—no respite for anyone! We are now going, and if they want to fight— we’re here. . . . And they can go fuck themselves! Whoever wants to fight— we’re here and we’re stronger!”5

Diplomacy on the Edge Several days later, however, Miloševic´’s confidence suffered a significant blow. With its poorly equipped and stretched defense forces pressed to their limits, Croatia finally resorted to measures long advocated by its former minister of defense, Martin Špegelj. On 14 September, Croatian policemen and guardsmen surrounded the JNA installations situated deep within the territory controlled by the Croatian government and demanded their surrender. If they were to have any hope of arresting the Serb advance, Croatia’s troops desperately needed to get their hands on the sizeable JNA arms depots still spread throughout the republic. President Tud‒man had long resisted that strategy out of a fear of antagonizing the West and exposing Croatian cities to the army’s retribution attacks. In mid-September, pushed to the brink by the ongoing offensive and the West’s inability and unwillingness to act, Tud‒man changed his mind. It was a decision which marked a turning point in the war and saved Croatia from complete defeat.6 The immediate consequences of the blockade of the JNA barracks, bases, and arms depots were dramatic. The army retaliated with a vengeance by launching disproportionate attacks on Croatian towns and villages. Already on 14 September, the army and Serb volunteer units launched a massive attack on Vukovar which left about eighty civilians dead and two thousand homeless.7 The following day, the Yugoslav Navy instituted a full blockade of Croatian ports and, together with the Yugoslav Air Force, opened fire on Croatia’s strategic positions along the coast. The escalation of violence prompted the EC to attempt to broker yet another cease-fire. On 17 September, Lord Carrington managed to get Tud‒man’s, Miloševic´’s, and Kadijevic´’s signatures on a ceasefire after negotiations in Tito’s villa in the Montenegrin resort of Igalo, but what the three men signed was an inoperable agreement full of empty phrases which immediately proved to be worth less than the paper it was written on.8 That very same day, the Knin corps pushed its attacks toward Šibenik and Drniš in Dalmatia, the army troops intensified their attacks on Osijek and the rest of eastern Slavonia, and the Croatian troops had to surrender Petrinja just south of Zagreb to the Serb forces.9 Though the JNA High Command had been without the civilian oversight of the federal institutions for a long time, its escalation of both operations and rhetoric now reached a new level of insolence. On 19 September, it sent a long column of armored units from Belgrade to the battlefields of eastern Slavonia.10 It also piled onto Herzegovina about eighty thousand reserve troops recruited in Serbia and Montenegro in preparation for a massive attack on the Dalmatian coast.11 The federal prime minister, Ante Markovic´, attempted to fire Kadijevic´ from his post as the federal secretary for the people’s defense, but the general

217 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

218 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge got his orders elsewhere. As he asserted on 21 September in a statement to Television Belgrade, “Yugoslavia is no longer what it was. The presidency has been shattered. It is headed by one of the chief proponents of the establishment of a fascist government in Croatia, a proven enemy of Yugoslavia [Stipe Mesic´]. The [SFRJ] Assembly has fallen apart while the government’s leader [Ante Markovic´] is blatantly trying to blame others for his failings, which have fundamentally contributed to, indeed made possible, the chaos and disintegration of the country. . . . The army is therefore taking certain decisions into its own hands.”12 The success of this new offensive initiated by the JNA High Command hinged on two factors, both of which ultimately spelled the end of the army’s hopes for a complete defeat of Croatia. Military bases under siege deep in Croatian territory had to withstand Croat pressures to surrender, and the army units in the east of Yugoslavia had to mobilize enough troops to mount successful attacks on a number of crucial fronts. The army’s efforts failed decisively on both counts. Mobilization succeeded only in Montenegro and among certain segments of the Serb population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Belgrade, on the other hand, the success of the draft was an abysmal 15 percent. Mutinies, desertions, and insubordination were rampant throughout all JNA units, especially those on the battlefields of Slavonia.13 Miloševic´’s insistence on publicly wrapping his pursuit of Greater Serbia into the garb of the protection of Yugoslavia may have scored points for him internationally, but it left his troops confused and unwilling to fight for what was perceived to be an unattainable and worthless goal.14 Mobilization was in fact so problematic that the Serbian president had to personally call his proxies in Bosnia-Herzegovina to motivate units to go to particular battlefields in Croatia.15 Even more damaging to the High Command’s agenda than the mobilization failures was the ability of the Croats to force crucial JNA bases to surrender. One after another, significant weapons depots fell into the hands of Croatian troops desperate for equipment. Delnice, Đakovo, Gospic´, Plocˇe, Varaždin, Virovitica, and a number of other Croatian towns which housed large JNA compounds were in relatively quick succession cleared of the ticking bombs of army units stationed in their midst. In some instances these sieges led to significant casualties, but the overall process was resolved to Croatia’s great advantage. According to General Anton Tus, who was on 21 September appointed by President Tud‒man to be the chief of staff of the newly created Croatian Army, Croatia managed to capture nearly 200 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers and other infantry vehicles, about 400 artillery pieces, 180,000 rifles and automatic weapons, 18 ships of various types, and substantial quantities of

Diplomacy on the Edge ammunition and explosives.16 Though none of this was even comparable to what the Yugoslav People’s Army still held under its control, it was certainly of decisive importance in thwarting the JNA’s plans, particularly in western Slavonia and just south of Zagreb in Kordun.17 Although the fighting in Croatia intensified throughout October with the Serb coalition’s push to capture more territory even in undoubtedly Croat areas such as southern Dalmatia around Dubrovnik, Croatia’s decision to directly take on the army actually saved it from complete defeat and had disastrous effects on the JNA’s morale and the interaction between the High Command and Miloševic´.18 However, it also placed the already tense relations among the Western powers under additional strain. The divisions among the EC countries on the subject of Croatia’s war conduct were publicly obvious just days after Tud‒man’s decision to institute a blockade of the JNA barracks and arms depots. Already on 14 September, Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek in a meeting with his Croatian counterpart, Zvonimir Šeparovic´, “accused Croatia of deliberately escalating the war and jeopardizing the conference that had just started in The Hague.” He also made sure to belittle the first strong statement of the EC from 28 August and point out to Šeparovic´ that “despite the tough-sounding declaration, Croatia should not pin its hopes on a European military intervention which was ‘out of the question.’ ”19 That very same day, the German and Italian foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gianni De Michelis, met in Venice for a bilateral conference of both countries’ ambassadors in southeastern Europe. Their approach to the developments in Croatia was starkly different from van den Broek’s. In addition to the usual assortment of policy standpoints—such as the rejection of the modification of borders by force, support for Lord Carrington’s efforts, and a demand for a comprehensive set of minority protection measures throughout the Yugoslav space—the two foreign ministers also called for a full retreat of the JNA from Croatia and the expansion of the ECMM to BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia. Most significant, Genscher and De Michelis asserted that if the negotiations in The Hague failed due to the continuing aggression of the Serb coalition, the time would come for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.20 The clash which ensued between Genscher and van den Broek signaled not only the level of personal animosity that some of the highest EC foreign policy makers had for each other, but also the depth of the chasm among their differing approaches to dealing with the crisis. On 16 September, the Dutch foreign ministry in its function of running the presidency of the EC sent out an unprecedented telegram to all EC member states which sharply attacked the Venice meeting as a departure from common European policy and an encouragement

219 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

220 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge to Croatia to disengage from the conference. Germany responded by inviting the Dutch ambassador in Bonn to the Auswärtiges Amt, where he was told that the propensity of the Netherlands to equally allocate blame between the Serbs and the Croats for the events on the ground, as well as its open unease about Germany’s increased assertiveness, was a burden on the relations between the two countries.21 Indeed, relations between Germany and the Netherlands—as well as among other EC states—were burdened by their differing perceptions of what was the best way to deal with the violence on the ground. Whereas Germany in particular—but also Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and others—believed that pressure ought to be placed clearly on the aggressors in Serbia and the JNA, a diametrically opposite school of thought, which was particularly strong in the United Kingdom but also in France and at times in the Netherlands, held that the bulk of Western pressure should be exerted on the weaker side because such an approach held the most promise for a quick wrap-up of hostilities. As the Times of London perfectly captured the essence of this policy approach, “Of [the Yugoslav] players, only the Croats are susceptible to EC pressure. They are the weakest on the battlefield, they want Western recognition and aid, and an ‘internationalization’ of the conflict to protect them from further onslaught.”22 Such a fundamental difference in the preferred strategy for the EC’s and the West’s diplomatic efforts led to increased tensions within the Community, nearly complete policy-making paralysis, and a set of deeply flawed signals to the Yugoslav parties, particularly those in Miloševic´’s camp. Renewed negotiations among the EC foreign ministers regarding a possible WEU intervention in Yugoslavia were a perfect case in point. Whereas in July and August it was France which had come out strongly in favor of a WEU interpositional force, on 16 September it was actually the Netherlands which made public a proposal for a WEU intervention. The very fact that it was the Netherlands—one of the staunchest supporters of NATO, whose foreign minister just days earlier had told the Croats that a European intervention was “out of the question”—which put the WEU back on the table was a sufficient sign that nothing was going to come of it. Indeed, the very motivation of Hans van den Broek for the reintroduction of the WEU was a testament to the level to which some European diplomats were conducting their policy toward the crisis with scant regard for what was actually happening on the ground. Van den Broek and his administration actually raised the issue of the WEU in order to “call [Genscher’s] bluff”! The Germans had been urging a European intervention but were at the same time reluctant about their own participation because of Germany’s constitutional restrictions on international deployment of

Diplomacy on the Edge its armed forces. By bringing up the WEU, van den Broek essentially hoped to put the Germans on the spot and thus silence their critiques.23 His plan, however, backfired. The Germans, though still hesitant about placing their troops in a region with strong historical sensitivities such as the Balkans, pledged to at least provide equipment and transportation for the WEU force and voiced their support for the Dutch plan. The French were equally enthusiastic; considering their long-standing commitment to expanding the WEU, their stance could have easily been predicted. Even the United States, whose military establishment openly and strongly expressed its distaste for any US intervention in the region, signaled it would not oppose a WEU involvement. In fact, all the WEU member states at the very least suggested they could be convinced to participate in an intervention.24 That is, all the WEU member states save one: the United Kingdom. The extraordinary ministerial meeting of the EPC held on 19 September to discuss the possibility of a WEU intervention in Croatia unfolded in a way unanticipated by the Dutch foreign minister, who had initiated it. Instead of isolating the Germans, the possibility of sending a WEU force actually isolated the British, who—if anything—actually shared Dutch opinions on the primacy of NATO in European security. UK foreign secretary Douglas Hurd fought tooth and nail at this meeting to dampen any enthusiasm his colleagues may have felt for a joint European intervention in Yugoslavia.25 Though his public explanation for the UK refusal to support the WEU force largely revolved around Britain’s reluctance to get involved in anything remotely similar to what it had to deal with in Northern Ireland, the more important underlying reason behind Hurd’s willingness to stand alone against the rest of Europe on this issue actually lay in his government’s policy toward the future of the EC and its independence in foreign policy and security matters.26 The WEU was simply not to become the defense arm of an increasingly assertive European Community. Without British consent, the foreign ministers could do no more than agree to ask the WEU to study the possibilities for intervention, which would fit into four broader possible scenarios: (1) logistic support for the members of the monitoring mission (2,000–3,000 personnel); (2) escort and protection of the ECMM by an armed military force of 5,000–6,000 soldiers; (3) a lightly armed peacekeeping force of 7,500–10,000 soldiers; and (4) a full-scale peacekeeping operation of 20,000–30,000 personnel.27 Though these scenarios signaled the extent and detail to which the foreign ministers had considered the issue, the fact that it was all to be simply reserved for further study clearly meant that the proposal was in fact dead. If there was any doubt on this matter, the British

221 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

222 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge foreign secretary did everything possible to dispel it. He successfully insisted that the official communiqué from the meeting not only clearly asserted that “it is [the ministers’] understanding that no military intervention is contemplated,” but also that it gave actual veto power over any possible European intervention in the future to every Yugoslav party—including Miloševic´.28 The Serbian president and his camp knew perfectly well how to score goals to such obvious assists. Immediately after the EPC meeting, Serbia’s foreign minister, Vladislav Jovanovic´, rejected any possibility of his republic’s assent to European peacekeepers by referring to them as “invasion forces,” and the JNA—as mentioned above—sent a long column of armored units from Belgrade to the battlefields of eastern Slavonia.29 The fact that the British were singled out within the EC in their opposition to a possible WEU intervention did not, however, mean that the rest of the Community was united or that it had a common goal for Europe’s policy toward the crisis. On the contrary, important and profound divisions still existed, particularly between France and Germany, whose foreign policy makers strongly disagreed on the issue of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Though they publicly slowly began to concede that Croatia and especially Slovenia would attain their independence, France’s highest officials still clung to the idea of maintaining Yugoslavia in some form and to the greatest possible extent. More troubling, they continued to perceive Germany’s actions and policy input through the lenses of their own quasi-historical fears about Germany’s interests in the region and throughout Eastern Europe. As President Mitterrand was at liberty to remark to Douglas Hurd in late September, “Mais vous comprenez Monsieur le Ministre, c’est quatorze encore une fois,” thus implying that it was—as in 1914—up to Britain and France to hold back the Germans.30 Franco-German differences and conflicts notwithstanding, it was still Britain that exerted the most problematic influence on the EC’s management of the crisis at this time. Douglas Hurd was the one who had insisted on asking for Miloševic´’s approval to send the ECMM to Croatia in August, and it had critically delayed the mission by a month. Now he demanded the same for the WEU intervention, thus not only killing the proposal, but also making it clear to the Serbian leader that he did not have to fear a Western intervention in the conceivable future. Hurd’s decision making may have been partly grounded in Britain’s historical pro-Serb bias or even more so in the classically realist and conservative tendency to bank on the stronger side in a regional conflict such as Yugoslavia’s, but its sources were also deeply rooted in his country’s and his party’s Euro-skepticism. As the Liberal Democrat MP David Alton so perceptively noted on the pages of the Times the following week, “We in Britain have

Diplomacy on the Edge the right to ask why our government opposed the gathering European consensus for intervention without offering any credible alternative. Could it be that Foreign Office mandarins regard united European military action in Croatia as a stalking horse for greater convergence on European defense and foreign policy? If so, must democracy in Croatia be sacrificed for British reluctance to share sovereignty in wider European co-operation?”31 Such was indeed the reasoning behind Hurd’s staunch opposition to the WEU initiative. More important and problematical, it was also the reasoning behind the hardly credible policy alternatives coming out of the Foreign Office at the time.32 One such policy alternative, which eventually proved to be the defining trait of the West’s inglorious involvement in the Yugoslav wars, was implemented just days after the failure of the WEU initiative. It was the UN-mandated arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia. The inability of the European Community to mount a WEU intervention prompted an immediate response at the UN headquarters in New York. Australia, Austria, Canada, and Hungary on 19 September—the same day that the EC foreign ministers failed to come to an agreement on the WEU involvement—requested that the Security Council discuss the Yugoslav crisis.33 Their idea was to use the precedent of Security Council Resolution 688 (which in April 1991 had allowed the international community to defend the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War) and to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to pave the way for an international intervention in Yugoslavia with a UN mandate. Such thinking and the desire to involve the Security Council actually had strong support not only in the antiMiloševic´ bloc in Yugoslavia, but also in France and Germany, which after the failure with the WEU insisted that the crisis was ripe for the highest body of the United Nations.34 The idea of rallying the Security Council to support an international intervention was, however, very soon stripped of its momentum and transformed into something much different. Getting the backing of the Security Council for an involvement in what were still technically the internal matters of a recognized member of the United Nations was, of course, an undertaking laden with obstacles. A coalition of staunch “defenders of sovereignty” (such as China, India, and various other Asian, African, and Latin American states), who were always cautious in their interpretations of the interaction between Chapter VII and state sovereignty, was remarkably strong in the Security Council. Yugoslavia’s great reputation as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement certainly made their task of resisting international intervention easier. What, however, also made their task easier was the fact that they were in this case seconded by a permanent member of the Security Council

223 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

224 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge whose role had been crucial in the passing of the aforementioned Resolution 688 and in its application in Iraq: the United Kingdom. Fearing a UN endorsement of the European plans for intervention, Douglas Hurd cooled Canada’s enthusiasm for a UN-sanctioned intervention during a visit to Ottawa on 20 September.35 More important, his diplomats at the United Nations made sure that any reference to the dispatch of an international peacekeeping force was removed from the French draft of the resolution floating in the Security Council at the time.36 The resolution that the Security Council actually adopted at its meeting on 25 September—Resolution 713—hardly fulfilled the hopes of the countries which urged the highest UN body to get involved.37 In addition to expressing support for the EC’s and the CSCE’s efforts, as well as for the Conference on Yugoslavia, the resolution most notably established a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia” and called upon “all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict.”38 While these provisions may seem to have constituted little more than the international community’s standard response to a crisis such as Yugoslavia’s, the story of the adoption of Resolution 713 was remarkable in a number of important ways. First, the institution of an arms embargo on all sides in the Yugoslav conflict was a remarkable policy choice in and of itself. The EC had instituted a Yugoslav arms embargo of its own in the midst of the Slovenian clash in early July, but the dynamics of the larger war were dramatically different by the end of September. The embargo was known to have little impact on the well-stocked JNA and the Serbian bloc, which held under its control most of Yugoslavia’s arms industries, and to have a highly debilitating effect on the poorly armed Croatian forces.39 Even with their successes in confiscating weapons from the surrounded army bases, the Croats were no match for the JNA’s vastly superior armored ground troops, the navy, and the air force. It was thus little wonder that the JNA generals actually welcomed the embargo and openly admitted to the Western press they were to be its principal beneficiaries.40 While this had a profound effect on the battlefields of Croatia, it was to have even more devastating effects on the dynamics of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which exploded into full force in the spring of 1992. The insistence of some influential members of the international community—especially the United Kingdom—to maintain the embargo between 1992 and 1995 in spite of dramatic disparities in armaments between the Bosnian Serbs and the forces of the Bosnian government probably marked the lowest point in the international involvement throughout all of Yugoslavia’s crises.41

Diplomacy on the Edge The second, and perhaps less obvious, aspect of the Security Council’s decision making that was remarkable was the extent to which the main thrust of Resolution 713 did not correspond to the motivation of those who had initiated the discussions on the subject in the first place. Though the Security Council had expressed its support for the efforts of the EC and the CSCE and had ended the resolution with a decision to itself “remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved,” the resolution’s principal impetus was actually a profound message of non-involvement largely directed at the states which were the most perceptive in their analyses of the crisis and the most vocal in their demand for international action.42 As the UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, later recounted in his memoirs, the penultimate operative clause of Resolution 713, which called upon “all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension,” was in fact aimed at those who were at the time calling for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.43 It was most notably directed against German foreign policy makers but also against their colleagues from a host of other European states, the European Parliament, the US Congress, and the overwhelming public opinion throughout most of Europe.44 The action of the Security Council—originally initiated as a means of demonstrating international resolve to the JNA and the Serbian bloc—could thus hardly have been considered discouraging by those whose aggression continued unabated. Finally, a third aspect of the Security Council decision making that was particularly remarkable was the role played by the United States. The State Department’s and the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the international efforts of conflict mediation and crisis management in Yugoslavia that June did not meet with approval in the Congress. On 11 September—the anniversary of President Bush’s “new world order” speech—the Senate unanimously passed a resolution asking the State Department to intensify its diplomatic efforts and urging the administration to base its policy toward the Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces on the same principles it had used toward the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic republics.45 Congressional dissatisfaction with the White House policy toward Yugoslavia was in mid-September at such an extraordinarily high level that virtually every aspect of the administration’s and the West’s approach to the crisis was subjected to harsh critique.46 This strong and well-informed congressional pressure put the performance of the secretary of state, James Baker, at the Security Council meeting under special light. Considering his own and the State Department’s detachment from Yugoslavia, Baker—to the great surprise of his counterparts in the Security

225 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

226 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge Council—actually delivered a message in accord with what the Congress had demanded.47 He clearly identified the JNA and Serbia as the principal culprits for the explosion of violence whose goal was “to create a ‘small Yugoslavia’ or a ‘greater Serbia,’ which would exclude Slovenia and a rump Croatia.” He also prophetically and perceptively noted that “There can be no mistaking that the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina also hangs in the balance.”48 Indeed, the forcefulness of Baker’s condemnation of Miloševic´’s camp gave hope to many in Yugoslavia that America was reentering the fray and adding muscle to Western policy. In the end, however, Baker’s speech proved to be—as David Hannay, the British permanent representative to the United Nations, later put it—just a “flash in the pan.”49 Those who were looking for real clues regarding America’s policy toward Yugoslavia actually should not have been paying much attention to Baker’s speech at the Security Council but should rather have tuned in to President Bush’s address at the UN General Assembly. There the president provided an update of his vision of the “new world order” originally presented a year earlier in the buildup to the intervention against Iraq. Gone was the Wilsonian poetry of “a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.” Though the updated “new world order” still revolved around a commitment to human rights, respect for the rule of law, and an emphasis on international negotiations, it was now firmly defined as the “order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty.” President Bush may have been trying to reassure those in the General Assembly who were wary of America’s assertiveness in the aftermath of the defeat of Saddam Hussein, but his message—as noted in a Washington Post editorial— could also have been taken “by such improbable unitary states as Yugoslavia to mean that they will not be asked to let their restive peoples go free.”50 In other words, in spite of Secretary Baker’s forceful speech, America’s signals to the Yugoslavs remained basically unchanged. And the involvement of the Security Council and the United Nations did little to alter the dynamics of the war. GREATER SERBIA MARCHES ON: CARRINGTON’S FAILURE NO. 1

The institution of the arms embargo and its message to the warring sides in the Yugoslav conflict had little effect on the events on the battlefield. If anything, the intensity of the Serb offensive actually increased, pitting the forces of the newly formed Croatian Army against their enemies in a series of fierce battles which were to determine whether Croatia would even survive as a

Diplomacy on the Edge viable state with a functioning government. Two of those battles—the most important of the whole Croatian war—in fact escalated just days after Security Council Resolution 713 was voted on. They were the battles for Vukovar, in eastern Slavonia, and Dubrovnik, in southern Dalmatia. Vukovar—a baroque town of some fifty thousand ethnically diverse inhabitants and Croatia’s largest port on the Danube—was strongly coveted by the Serb forces.51 Its nearby villages had been dangerously radicalized over the course of the previous year and were the sites of some of the bloodiest early clashes. The coalition of local Serbs, JNA armored and artillery units, and volunteer and TO forces from Serbia by the end of September had successfully established control over substantial areas north and south of Vukovar. The city itself, however, remained in the hands of a highly motivated force of some two thousand Croatian national guardsmen and policemen, whose only connection to the rest of Croatia was a thin strip of villages along the road to the nearby town of Vinkovci. On 1 October, the JNA troops, reinforced by a fresh supply of mobilized reservists and volunteers from Serbia (now numbering a staggering total of thirty-six thousand men) and run by the newly installed commander of the army’s first district, General Života Panic´, managed to sever that fragile connection of Vukovar to the rest of Croatia and thus condemned the city to a slow and painful death.52 The logical decision for the JNA commanders after the encirclement of Vukovar would have been to simply blockade the city and continue their march westward with the mechanized armored units, which were much superior to anything the Croats could throw at them. Instead, however, Panic´ and his associates took the Vukovar bait in a mistaken belief that its defenders could not hold out for much longer.53 The first days of October thus saw the beginning of a vicious campaign which shocked the world and fully exposed the methods and goals of the Greater Serbian military and political program. The encircled Croatian units and the thousands of civilians who remained huddled in the city’s basements were subjected to constant artillery bombardments, which in the following six weeks pulverized more than 90 percent of Vukovar’s buildings, and to frequent JNA tank assaults backed up by the volunteer forces run and organized by people like Željko Ražnatovic´-Arkan and Vojislav Šešelj. A peculiar stalemate developed in which the JNA and its allies tried to wear out the city’s defenders, whose determination only grew because they knew they were doomed.54 This battle, which took its final shape in the first days of October, became a symbol of Croatia’s struggle and the ultimate test of the army’s and Serbia’s resolve and ability to win the war. Whereas the JNA could claim to have some basis for its campaign in eastern Slavonia in the supposed protection of the region’s sizeable Serb population

227 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

228 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge and its proximity to Serbia, it could hardly use the same explanation for its actions in southern Dalmatia and its assault on the city of Dubrovnik. The whole narrow southern strip of Dalmatia around Dubrovnik was overwhelmingly populated by Croats and was supposed to be immune to Serb claims to territory.55 And yet the JNA, together with the Territorial Defense forces from Montenegro, Serbia, and Serb-populated eastern Herzegovina, at the end of September launched a massive operation for the occupation of Dubrovnik and its broader surroundings. As already mentioned above, during the last two weeks of that month, the army amassed thousands of troops in eastern Herzegovina in preparation for an all-out attack on the Dalmatian coast. On 1 October, those troops crossed the Croatian border and flooded the basically undefended towns and villages in Dubrovnik’s vicinity, while also destroying the Croat-populated villages in eastern Herzegovina and thus committing what are considered to be the first major acts of aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina.56 They were joined by the Montenegrin Territorial Defense forces, which attacked the Dubrovnik region from the east and subjected the affluent tourist villages and small towns to the south of the city to violence and plunder.57 Since the population of Dubrovnik and southern Dalmatia was overwhelmingly ethnically Croat, what were the actual motivations of the JNA and the Serb/Montenegrin coalition for their operations in the area? According to General Kadijevic´’s later account, the JNA and TO troops from eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro were supposed to merely blockade Dubrovnik as part of a larger plan for the full military defeat of Croatia, to be followed by the JNA’s retreat to Serb ethnic areas.58 Some in the army High Command also justified the operation by claiming the need to secure the valuable Yugoslav navy bases in Montenegro’s Bay of Kotor from possible Croatian attack.59 These explanations, however, do not stand up to scrutiny for two reasons. First, the Croats had left the Dubrovnik region basically undefended. As retreating civilians from the nearby towns and villages swelled the city’s population to about seventy thousand, the number of their defenders barely reached five hundred. These poorly armed, though motivated, soldiers were hardly capable of mounting any offensive operations against the JNA in Montenegro or elsewhere, and the region they were defending had little military strategic importance. Second, the viciousness and magnitude of the army’s attack on the Dubrovnik region implied a purpose much different from a simple military maneuver or blockade. As one report of the ECMM from Dubrovnik at the time asserted, the army was conducting—just as in Slavonia—“a deliberate scorched earth policy” whose goal was the purge of the local Croat population.60 The initiation of the army’s offensive around Dubrovnik was indeed part of a larger plan. However, judging by the

Diplomacy on the Edge string of political decisions and military movements of the Serb coalition from the period, as well as by the evidence which has become available in the Miloševic´ trial, that larger plan was not just a military maneuver. It was a plan to secure the borders of a new and enlarged Serb state. In spite of its sizeable Croat majority, Dubrovnik was to have a special place in that new pan-Serb state.61 As the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžic´, in an almost surreal 7 October 1991 telephone conversation with his party’s local strongman from eastern Herzegovina stated, “Dubrovnik needs to be saved for Yugoslavia. Let it be a republic. . . . Some citizens should be found there to decide on that when they are liberated.”62 Or as he later that week also mused to Gojko Đogo (a Serbian poet and famous 1980s dissident of a political ´ ´), Dubrovnik “has to be put under military stock similar to that of Dobrica Cosic command and that’s it. . . . Dubrovnik was never Croatian!” Đogo responded that the territory around Dubrovnik needed to be ethnically cleansed: “Burn everything and good bye! . . . Up north of Dubrovnik River kill everybody!”63 Judging by the diary of Borisav Jovic´ and other intercepted communications within Miloševic´’s closest circle, the border of the new state seems to have been set at the Croatian port of Plocˇe and Neretva River, some one hundred kilometers north of Dubrovnik.64 Considering that such a large swath of southern Dalmatia could not have been occupied and eventually annexed without the coerced complicity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fact that Radovan Karadžic´ was intimately involved in the process was hardly a surprise. Indeed, throughout the second half of September, Karadžic´ and his party worked hard to set the foundations for the coercion of Bosnia-Herzegovina into complicity with the plans of the Serb coalition. Throughout the spring of that year, municipal authorities controlled by the SDS created regional organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina similar to the regional organizations which had preceded the formation of the Serb Autonomous Regions (SAOs) in Croatia. In mid-September, those BiH regional organizations—just as their counterparts from Croatia—also announced they were to have a purely Serb ethnic character. SAO Herzegovina, with its headquarters in Trebinje, was formed on 12 September; SAO Bosnian Krajina (Banja Luka), on 16 September; SAO Romanija (Sarajevo), on 17 September; and SAO Northeastern Bosnia (Bijeljina), on 19 September.65 These illegal para-state formations (which were later to become the building blocks for the formation of Republika Srpska) were a clear signal that the SDS was erecting a political structure for a power takeover over a significant portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was necessary in order to bridge the gap between Serbia and the conquered areas of Croatia.66 Greater Serbia was getting “filled in” and growing into the

229 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

230 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge shape determined for it by its ideologues and political sponsors. And if there was any doubt that this was taking place, it was surely dispelled on 3 October, when the four members of the Yugoslav federal presidency from the Serbian bloc announced that they were taking decisions solely on the basis of their four votes and that they were assuming the powers of the SFRJ Assembly due to “the immediate danger of war.” As the nominal president of the SFRJ presidency, Stipe Mesic´, asserted, and the Western diplomats agreed, the decision of the so-called “rump presidency” was a blatant coup d’état.67 In the midst of this dramatic escalation of violence and the expansion of the Serb offensive, the EC turned its attention from the discussions on the possibility of a WEU intervention to the efforts of Lord Carrington and the Conference on Yugoslavia.68 On 4 October, it appeared that this effort had finally managed to result in a breakthrough. A meeting of van den Broek, Carrington, Tud‒man, Miloševic´, and Kadijevic´ in The Hague seemed to produce an agreement for a solution of the crisis based on four principles: (1) the formation of a loose association or alliance of independent and sovereign republics; (2) the protection of human and minority rights with a possibility for certain regions to get “special status”; (3) no unilateral changes of borders; and (4) a perspective of diplomatic recognition at the end of the negotiating process.69 The agreement was hailed in the Western press as a significant step toward peace because it seemed that van den Broek and Carrington had managed to get both Tud‒man and Miloševic´ to back off from their uncompromising positions. Tud‒man agreed to form some common structure with other Yugoslav republics, even though the three-month moratorium on Croatia’s (and Slovenia’s) declaration of independence (established by the Brioni Accord) was expiring on 8 October. And Miloševic´ seemed to accept the possibility of Croatia’s independence and international recognition in exchange for extensive and internationally guaranteed protections for the Croatian Serbs, even though it was everything that the military machine under his control was fighting against. The problem with this deal, which actually set the future course of the conference and soon directly led to dramatic disagreements among the EC states on the issue of recognition of the Yugoslav republics, was that it was interpreted differently by the parties which agreed to it. The Western press, the Croats, and—most important—van den Broek, Carrington, and the European foreign policy makers and diplomats took the deal to mean that Serbia was accepting the independence not only of Croatia, but of all Yugoslav republics, in exchange for extensive rights for the Croatian Serbs and the creation of some form of a “special status” for them within the newly independent Croatian state.70 The conviction that Miloševic´ had made such an important concession was

Diplomacy on the Edge apparently such that even the otherwise reluctant Douglas Hurd and Roland Dumas now publicly accepted the inevitability of the republics’ independence and the end of Yugoslavia.71 Miloševic´ and his associates, however, did not share that view and understood the agreement as a guarantee that the “special status” for the Croatian Serbs would not leave them within Croatia but would rather ensure that they would remain in a common state with Serbia.72 If nothing else, the continuing violence should have made it clear to the Europeans that the Serbian president had no intention of altering his principal goals. Just minutes after the agreement was announced on 4 October, the Yugoslav Air Force conducted a series of raids to destroy Croatia’s communications infrastructure. Vukovar and Zadar suffered under another wave of strong attacks, and the naval blockade of Dalmatia continued.73 That very same day, the so-called “rump presidency” announced another round of mobilizations of reservist troops for the JNA units starved of manpower, and the announcement was answered the following day by Tud‒man’s decision to order general mobilization in Croatia. The offensive of the Serb coalition actually intensified to such a level that the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic´, issued a dramatic call to the citizens of his republic not to respond to the JNA’s mobilization efforts and declared his republic’s neutrality in the conflict.74 The culmination came on 7 October, when the Yugoslav Air Force conducted an unprecedented attack on the presidential palace in Zagreb which nearly killed Tud‒man, Stipe Mesic´, and Ante Markovic´, who were meeting there at the time.75 Unsurprisingly, the following day both Croatia and Slovenia confirmed their decisions from 25 June and once again declared their independence. Although there was little cause for optimism or for belief that the agreement of 4 October represented a true step toward peace, Hans van den Broek decided to use it as a springboard for a new diplomatic offensive. His sense of urgency stemmed from a broad perception throughout European foreign policy circles that the Dutch EC presidency until that point had been a failure. In addition to serious divisions within the Community over Yugoslavia, which van den Broek did much to exacerbate, negotiations over a draft treaty for the European political union which were taking place at the time were no less divisive or problematic. The extensive and ambitious Dutch draft treaty—a controversial blend of federalist proposals for a political and economic union and pro-NATO defense arrangements which was presented to the member states on 24 September— garnered support only from the Belgians. This meant that wrapping up negotiations by the end of the Dutch presidency in December was rather improbable.76 Van den Broek therefore needed a significant diplomatic victory in Yugoslavia and was determined to use the 4 October deal to get it.

231 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

232 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge At an informal meeting of the EC foreign ministers in the Dutch castle of Haarzuilens on 5 and 6 October, van den Broek insisted that the Community’s increased pressure was needed to ensure that the 4 October agreement was put into action.77 The foreign ministers agreed and issued a strong statement which not only applauded the agreement and endorsed its principles, but also asserted that those who did not respect the cease-fire would face Europe’s economic sanctions and personal accountability under international law.78 On 8 and 9 October, van den Broek continued his offensive and in a series of telephone conversations with his counterparts throughout the West tried to get their agreement to institute a two-month deadline for both the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and the signing of an overall settlement which would be followed by international recognition for those republics wishing it.79 His motivation was simple—the institution of a time limit on the conference negotiations was the only way to put pressure on the Serbs, who were obviously the party most interested in stalling and continuing with the land grab, and the completion of the conference’s mission was also to coincide with the end of the Dutch presidency, which could, as a result, be considered a success. After long negotiations with Tud‒man, Miloševic´, and Kadijevic´ on 10 October, van den Broek—rather improbably—seemed to manage to get the agreement of Croatia, Serbia, and the JNA to the institution of this two-month deadline. Miloševic´ himself admitted as much to the Western press and somewhat cynically conceded that the deadline was “a realistic footing on the condition [that] all parties in Yugoslavia fully agree to the settlement of the crisis.”80 In response, Henry Wynaendts, Carrington’s deputy at the conference and the special envoy of the Dutch presidency to Yugoslavia, that very same day distributed a memorandum to the conference staff confirming the established timetable: “I therefore think that we should have at the latest within two months an agreement. . . . That would also be the point in time to have a concluding and solemn session of The Hague conference. That would also be the latest occasion for the Twelve to take a decision on the recognition of the independence of those republics that have expressed through a democratic process their will to be independent.” And if there was any doubt on the firmness of the twomonth deadline, van den Broek surely dispelled it the following week, when he confirmed in an interview with the Austrian daily Die Presse that in two months at the latest “there must be a political settlement and the JNA must have been completely withdrawn from Croatia. . . . If this does not happen, the time will have come for the EC to decide on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.”81 This agreement on the two-month deadline, however, suffered from even more serious flaws than the agreement of 4 October on the basic principles for

Diplomacy on the Edge a solution of the crisis. Just as after that earlier deal, it soon became clear that Serbia and the JNA were interpreting the deadline arrangement differently from van den Broek.82 On 11 October, the Serbian leadership announced that the withdrawal of the JNA from the occupied territories in Krajina and Slavonia was out of the question.83 Serbia simply did not see these areas as parts of Croatia and thus also did not see them as parts of the deal. In the words of Mihajlo Markovic´, the vice-president of Miloševic´’s SPS, “The JNA will not withdraw from Croatia in its present-day borders. The Yugoslav Army will withdraw to the new border between Serbia and Croatia, and a peaceful solution to the crisis can be discussed after that.”84 This “misinterpretation” of the agreement was, however, not the biggest problem for the Dutch foreign minister. The more important issue was the fact that the two-month deadline was also differently interpreted by his colleagues in the West. When van den Broek called his British and French counterparts, Douglas Hurd and Roland Dumas, on 8 and 9 October, he obtained their consent to the institution of the deadline only by agreeing that recognition would be “granted in the framework of a general settlement”; such consent basically meant that he had obtained no consent at all.85 The whole purpose of the deadline and the threat of recognition for the republics was to induce Serbia to finally negotiate in good faith and halt the aggression because the achievement of a “general settlement” had been impossible due to Miloševic´’s obstruction, stalling, and unwillingness to engage with the proposals from the EC and the other republics. By making recognition conditional on the achievement of a general settlement, Hurd and Dumas basically rendered the deadline meaningless because they gave the Serbian president an easy out: as long as he made sure there was no general settlement, the other republics would not be recognized. The problem was compounded by the fact that the understanding of van den Broek’s deadline and his threat of recognition was diametrically different in Germany. German foreign minister Genscher, who had been advocating a tougher approach toward Serbia and the clear threat of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, understood van den Broek’s two-month deadline for what it really was: a firm promise that the Community would definitely decide on the issue of recognition no later than two months after the agreement van den Broek reached with Tud‒man, Miloševic´, and Kadijevic´—that is, no later than 10 December.86 Unlike their French and British colleagues, Genscher and the Auswärtiges Amt diplomats took this deadline seriously and had real expectations for the Community’s policy toward the crisis at the end of it. As the following chapter will demonstrate, such a fundamental difference in the perception of the deadline and the threat of recognition for the Yugoslav republics in

233 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

234 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge December 1991 had dramatic consequences for the relations among the EC states and their foreign policy makers. The initial results of van den Broek’s diplomatic activity were, however, positive. Undeterred by the continuing violence on the ground and buoyed by van den Broek’s uncertain progress, Lord Carrington sped up the work of the conference toward the creation of a draft of the general settlement, “Arrangements for General Settlement.” On 14 October, he instructed the heads of the conference’s three working groups (on economic relations, human rights and minorities, and institutions) to complete their portions of the draft within forty-eight hours and scheduled the conference’s plenary session for 18 October.87 Encouraged by his own interaction with Miloševic´ on 4 October and by other signals that the Serbian president could be persuaded to support an agreement embodying the principles consented to on that day, Carrington believed in the success of the draft formulated by his colleagues to such an extent that he claimed he was prepared to return his mandate to the EC in case of anyone’s rejection of the draft’s provisions.88 His conviction was, in fact, so strong that he chose to give the opening of the plenary session on 18 October to Miloševic´ in the belief that the Serbian president’s acceptance would set a positive tone for the others.89 It was a sad illusion and a miscalculation of dramatic proportions. The draft “Arrangements” discussed and voted on at the conference’s 18 October plenary session were in many ways a reiteration of similar confederal proposals made by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia over the previous year. They provided for the creation of a loose association of republics which were free to have their sovereignty, independence, and international personality if they so wished. Different national minorities within the republics, and particularly the Croatian Serbs, were to be guaranteed extensive individual and national rights and provided with protections of a broadly defined “special status” in the form of territorial autonomy.90 All other issues were left to the choice of the republics. Their collaboration in different policy areas would vary, depending on their individual interests. It was a proposal for “Yugoslavia à la carte,” as Lord Carrington—who basically took the idea from Gorbachev—later put it.91 To Carrington’s great surprise, Miloševic´ found this to be not enough and opened the conference’s plenary session with a clear rejection of the proposal. In his long rebuttal of the Carrington draft, the Serbian president did little to conceal the principal goals of his war campaign and the resulting problems he had with the proposed “Arrangements.” The draft was unacceptable because it “abolished Yugoslavia,” recognized the inter-republican borders as sacrosanct, and paved the way for comprehensive minority protections across the whole

Diplomacy on the Edge Yugoslav space.92 It thus struck not only at the core of Miloševic´’s plan for a new and enlarged Serbian state that would be the sole heir of the old Yugoslavia of six republics, but also at the principal “achievement” of his term in power: the subjugation of Kosovo.93 Although Carrington himself did nothing to bring the Kosovo Albanians to the conference table and inexcusably treated the question of Kosovo’s autonomy as Serbia’s internal matter, the draft “Arrangements” produced by his subordinates from the working groups actually opened the possibility for the reinstatement of Kosovo’s autonomous status.94 Unsurprisingly, after his speech Miloševic´ simply walked out of the conference hall together with his delegation.95 While Miloševic´’s rejection of the Carrington draft was no surprise (except to Carrington), the answers of the other five presidents were. All five of them accepted the proposed “Arrangements.” Kucˇan and Tud‒man voted yes even though Slovenia and Croatia had confirmed their independence just ten days earlier. Most surprising, Momir Bulatovic´ joined them, even though his Montenegro had been no more than a pliant sidekick to Miloševic´’s Serbia. The reason for Bulatovic´’s “stab in the back” was simple: he had been offered direct financial assistance from Italian foreign minister De Michelis and had apparently been given guarantees by Tud‒man that Croatia would cede to Montenegro its southernmost Cape Oštro, which extended into the Bay of Kotor.96 Ultimately, however, Bulatovic´’s insubordination meant little. Without Miloševic´’s agreement, the conference was back at square one. Carrington did not give his mandate back to the EC, as he claimed he would, but kept the conference running toward a new plan. Bulatovic´ returned to Montenegro only to be badgered by Miloševic´ into withdrawing his consent to Carrington’s draft.97 Most important, the offensive of the Serb coalition against Croatia showed no signs of a slowdown.98 In fact, the only real difference in Miloševic´’s approach was that he hired the London advertising firm of Saatchi and Saatchi—famous for its 1979 campaign for the Conservative Party—to improve Serbia’s image in the West.99 GREATER SERBIA MARCHES ON: CARRINGTON’S FAILURE NO. 2

Most Western diplomats understood Miloševic´’s rejection of the Carrington draft on 18 October for what it truly was: a signal “that Serbia alone among the Yugoslav republics was the one that wished the war to continue.”100 Indeed, the war showed few signs of a slowdown. The JNA’s armored units, backed up by volunteer and Territorial Defense forces from Serbia, occupied a large area just south of Vukovar in mid-October and purged it of its non-Serb population. A particularly

235 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

236 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge striking example was Croatia’s easternmost town of Ilok, which surrendered to the army without much resistance. Ilok’s non-Serb inhabitants were summarily expelled by the JNA under ECMM supervision, and the few who tried to stay behind were killed, forcibly driven out, or sent to prison camps in Serbia.101 The Serb coalition’s strategy was clear and applied uniformly from eastern Slavonia to southern Dalmatia: occupied territories were to be ethnically cleansed under threat of physical destruction and mayhem often perpetrated by the shock volunteer units unleashed on the local civilians by the army commanders.102 This strategy and the continuing bombardments of a number of Croatian cities during the month of October often also led to reprisals by Croat troops against Serb civilians which made life for the Serbs remaining on the territory controlled by the Croatian government extraordinarily difficult. The most infamous episode of violence perpetrated against Serb civilians took place in the town of Gospic´, which was under constant attack by the joint Krajina and JNA forces. Throughout the second half of October, Croatian units stationed in the town rounded up dozens of influential Serb civilians from the area and killed them.103 Although these local vendettas sullied Croatia’s defense efforts and contributed to the poisoning of the already ruined inter-ethnic relations, there was no doubt among the neutral observers on the ground which side was really furthering the war through its disproportionate use of force and its expanding offensives.104 As the battles in Croatia continued to escalate, so did the situation in the “belly” of the war: Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aforementioned creation of the Serb Autonomous Regions throughout this republic in mid-September served a double purpose. It served to blackmail the Bosnian Muslims into complicity with Serbia’s war efforts, and it served as a foundation for the capture of the largest possible piece of BiH in case of Muslim insubordination. While Alija Izetbegovic´ had tried to play a conciliatory role throughout the early stages of the all-out war in Slovenia and Croatia, by early October it was increasingly obvious he was standing up to the blackmail of Miloševic´ and his proxies from the SDS. Izetbegovic´’s declaration of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s neutrality in the war and his call to the citizens of his republic not to answer the JNA’s mobilization on 6 October had already led to a strong negative response from Radovan Karadžic´ and his party.105 The following week the BiH president raised the stakes and even more clearly demonstrated that the Muslims were to be no accomplices in the Greater Serbian campaign. Together with the Croatian HDZ he initiated a debate in the BiH Assembly regarding the memorandum affirming Bosnia-Herzegovina’s sovereignty and the republic’s platform for the negotiations at The Hague conference which would insist that Bosnia could stay in a common South Slav state only if both Serbia and Croatia were also in it.106

Diplomacy on the Edge Izetbegovic´’s proposals were hardly revolutionary or novel in the history of BiH politics since World War II. Bosnia-Herzegovina was defined by the Yugoslav constitution as a state, just like all the other republics. Its sovereignty had been confirmed by a firm declaration of its Communist-run republican assembly as recently as July 1990, just prior to the multi-party elections. Faced with threats to its equality and very existence from Serbia and with hints of its possible division from Croatia, it was obvious that Yugoslavia’s central republic needed a government which would stand up for its unique and independent status. It was also obvious that those from within BiH who were working against it needed to be exposed. Izetbegovic´’s proposals for a memorandum of affirmation of Bosnia’s sovereignty and a platform of its possible participation in some form of a Yugoslav state were directed at exactly those two goals: they were to be the signals of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s resilience and independence, and they were a means of exposing those who were working against their republic from within. The four-day debate in the BiH assembly on Izetbegovic´’s two proposals certainly managed to expose those who were working against their republic’s status and position vis-à-vis its neighbors. The BiH president managed to secure the support of practically all major parties in the assembly (the Croatian HDZ, the former Communists, the remnants of the reformists of Ante Markovic´) except for one: the SDS of Radovan Karadžic´. Karadžic´ and his party during the assembly’s proceedings did everything possible—stalling, pleading, threatening war, and in the end staging a walkout—in order to stop Izetbegovic´. They failed. Karadžic´ accused Izetbegovic´ from the assembly floor of taking BosniaHerzegovina “down the same highway which had taken Croatia to hell” and ominously warned him that “the hell of war would be even more severe in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Muslim people could perhaps disappear in it.”107 The BiH president, though shocked by Karadžic´’s threats, calmly replied that “The words of Mr. Karadžic´ illustrate in the best way why we perhaps will not stay in a rump Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavia that Mr. Karadžic´ wants—nobody else wants. . . . I solemnly declare that the Muslim nation will not attack anyone. But I also solemnly declare that it will energetically defend itself. Therefore it cannot disappear.”108 In spite of the SDS walkout, the remaining deputies approved the two documents on the night between 14 and 15 October and thus gave a clear signal to Miloševic´ that he would not be able to swallow the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina into his new state without a fight. The affirmation of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s sovereignty and the decision to remain in a Yugoslav state only if it also included both Croatia and Serbia were truly a turning point for this republic’s status in Miloševic´’s schemes and

237 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

238 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge machinations. Until those decisions by Izetbegovic´ and his party, the Serbian leader and his proxies in the SDS had hoped the Bosnian Muslims might succumb to his blackmail and—even if grudgingly—accept the position of accomplices in the construction of a new Greater Serbian/rump Yugoslav state. Izetbegovic´’s insubordination stunned them and forced them to adjust their plans. The intercepts of telephone conversations within Miloševic´’s closest circle are once again particularly instructive in this respect. On 13 October, in the midst of the parliamentary debate on Izetbegovic´’s proposals, Karadžic´ explained to one of his associates (who was reporting on the collaboration among the SDS, the army, and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs in preparations for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina) just what he meant by his threat to Izetbegovic´: “In two-three days Sarajevo will disappear, and there’ll be five hundred thousand dead. In a month, there will be no more Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”109 Karadžic´’s frustration surfaced even more openly in his exchange with Miloševic´ eleven days later: “We will establish full authority over Serb territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina! [Izetbegovic´] will not be able to exercise power there! He will not have control over 65 percent of his territory! That is our goal!” the SDS leader stormed. Miloševic´, on the other hand, was partly skeptical and partly dumbfounded that the Muslims would actually dare stand up to him and to the military power under his control. Miloševic´: “I don’t believe that they dare to fight. I don’t believe that.” Karadžic´: “If they knew they would be humiliated, they would fight!” Miloševic´: “But they know very well they cannot win that.”110 Although the Serbian president’s vague hopes of holding onto the whole of BiH did persist for some time after this conversation with Karadžic´, the BiH Assembly’s affirmation of sovereignty marked the beginning of a profound shift of strategy in the Serbian camp toward the goal that Karadžic´ had so bluntly outlined in his fit of rage at Izetbegovic´’s defiance—65 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 24 October, the Serb deputies who had walked out of the BiH Assembly on Karadžic´’s orders ten days earlier now created their own separate “Assembly of the Serb Nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” The new assembly revealed its agenda at its first session when it called for a referendum of only BiH Serbs for 9 and 10 November on whether they wished to “remain in a common state of Yugoslavia together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem, and others who so declare.”111 It was yet another exercise in a peculiar brand of Serb ethnic democracy that was supposed to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina hostage through the decisions of less than a third of its population. It was also a signal that Yugoslavia’s central republic was heading for a bloody war. And what is worst, few in the international diplomatic community actually understood this.112

Diplomacy on the Edge The continuation of the war in Croatia and the threat of its real expansion into Bosnia-Herzegovina did not halt the negotiating process at the Conference on Yugoslavia. After Serbia’s first rejection of his “Arrangements for General Settlement,” Lord Carrington instructed the heads of the conference’s three working groups to continue their efforts toward finding an overall solution. The six presidents of the Yugoslav republics were invited once again to The Hague one week after their previous dramatic meeting. Carrington hoped that Europe’s negative reactions to Miloševic´’s first rejection of 18 October, coupled with a new sweetener—the offer of Croatia’s not having any military presence in Krajina—could sway the Serbian president to change his mind.113 That hope proved to be misplaced. Miloševic´ still simply restated his objections to the conference’s draft and further demonstrated his power by forcing Montenegro’s president, Momir Bulatovic´, to now, reluctantly, support him as well.114 The essence of Miloševic´’s restated opposition to the newest Carrington offer was the same as one week earlier: the proposal still denied the fruition of his plan for a new and enlarged Serbian state that would be the sole heir to the old Yugoslavia of six republics. As the leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´, later recollected during his testimony at the Miloševic´ trial, on 23 October 1991—just two days before the Serbian president once again objected to the Carrington draft—the highest officials of Serbia and Montenegro held a joint meeting with the representatives of the SAOs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as with prominent members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and decided that their interests would be best served by defending the position that Yugoslavia had to remain in existence.115 Even if Miloševic´ had personally wished to accept the Carrington draft, he would not have been able to because of strong domestic pressures. All principal Serbian parties and politicians— including the leaders of the Democratic Party like Dragoljub Mic´unovic´ and Vojislav Koštunica—were adamantly opposed to the direction of The Hague conference and were determined to insist on Serbia’s rejection of the Carrington draft.116 Miloševic´’s continuing opposition to the plan under discussion in The Hague—in spite of an important concession on Carrington’s part—soon resulted in a renewed diplomatic offensive from the EC. In preparation for the conference’s plenary session of 25 October, Hans van den Broek had already directed Henry Wynaendts to warn Serbia that it faced selective sanctions and the continuation of the conference without its participation if it persisted in its opposition to the Carrington draft.117 At the meeting of the EC foreign ministers in Brussels on 28 October, van den Broek put that threat into action. At his

239 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

240 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge insistence and with the strong support of his German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (and in spite of resistance by Roland Dumas), the foreign ministers agreed to probably the strongest declaration yet on the situation in Yugoslavia. They noted Serbia’s continuing opposition to the Carrington draft, the continuing JNA bombardment of Dubrovnik, and “the coup d’état by four members of the federal presidency and their announcement of a plan aimed at the establishment of a Greater Serbia.”118 In response, they demanded that Serbia change its position by the next plenary session of the conference on 5 November, and they issued a series of threats in case of its continuing obstinacy. Most notably, if Serbia continued to oppose the Carrington draft, the EC pledged (1) to proceed with the conference only with the cooperative republics “in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it,” (2) to institute “restrictive measures” against Serbia, and (3) to ask the Security Council “to urgently address the question of further measures under Chapter VII” of the UN Charter.119 However, even though the EC ministers’ declaration was a strong signal that Serbia’s stalling and continuing aggression would have real consequences, Miloševic´ could still have taken solace in the obvious public disagreements of the Community’s foreign ministers regarding the direction of their joint diplomacy. Those EC diplomats and foreign policy makers (from the EC Commission, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and other EC states) who were in favor of the tough approach set by the 28 October declaration did everything to publicly bolster the declaration’s pledges. The vicepresident of the EC Commission, Abel Matutes, affirmed that the EC was able to immediately suspend the EC trade agreement with Yugoslavia, take additional punitive measures against the non-cooperating republics, and grant trade and aid favors to cooperating republics even before their formal recognition. Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis also confirmed that the EC aimed to wind up the conference by mid-December with a treaty that would recognize the independence of all the republics that wanted it. Dutch officials concurred that the conference could not be stalled for much longer: “There is a certain limit to our patience. This can’t go on forever.”120 On the other hand, there were those who muddied the message and blunted the EC’s approach toward the Serbian president. During his joint press conference with Mikhail Gorbachev on 31 October, François Mitterrand relativized the inter-republican borders in Yugoslavia as “internal administrative borders [which] cannot (automatically, anyway) be considered as borders under international law.” He also presented a challenge to those who were asking for a clear path toward recognition of the Yugoslav republics.121 Douglas Hurd joined

Diplomacy on the Edge in the following day, after the Queen’s Speech in the Parliament, by strongly rejecting not only all suggestions of a number of MPs for a faster approach to the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, but also the possibility of any Western military involvement in Croatia. Rather cynically, the British foreign secretary questioned whether even the institution of a no-fly zone against the continuing attacks of the Yugoslav Air Force on Vukovar and Dubrovnik would be “meaningful.” In Hurd’s view, Miloševic´ was being “somewhat obdurate,” but the foreign secretary did not provide any policy proposals on how to make the Serbian president more flexible.122 Finally and perhaps most significant, the Greek foreign minister, Antonis Samaras, during a visit to Belgrade on 3 November, affirmed his country’s strong opposition to Yugoslavia’s dissolution and hinted at a Greek veto of the EC sanctions against Serbia on account of possible damage to Greece’s trade with the rest of Europe.123 Such a cacophony of messages gave Miloševic´ plenty of reasons to feel comfortable in his position and relieved him of pressures to alter his approach despite the harsh formal declaration of the EC foreign ministers of 28 October. Miloševic´’s proxies in the leadership of the Croatian Serbs, in their negotiations with the conference diplomats, thus continued not only to insist that the “special status” of their SAOs meant they would be outside of Croatia, but also “claimed considerably more territory than the municipalities with an absolute Serb majority.”124 Serbia and Montenegro also submitted amendments to the Carrington draft which basically altered the fundamental principles underlying the conference by asking for the formation of a “common state of equal republics and Yugoslav nations, which, based on the right of self-determination, wish to stay in a common state.”125 And the JNA further escalated its offensive on all fronts throughout Croatia. On 3 November, its armored units penetrated Vukovar’s defenses and came to within a few hundred yards of the city center, forcing the exhausted and abandoned Croatian defenders into two more weeks of hand-to-hand combat.126 The Yugoslav Air Force carried out a series of rather “meaningful” sorties against targets in Vukovar, Varaždin, Kutina, Otocˇac, Sisak, Zadar, and Šibenik. And in Dubrovnik, the JNA troops mortared the local hotels filled with refugees from the region and sniped into the historic city behind its old walls.127 With such a run-up to the conference’s plenary session of 5 November, it was illusory to expect any positive outcome. The EC foreign ministers did meet once again on 4 November and formally confirmed their pledges of 28 October. In case of Serbia’s rejection of the Carrington draft, the republics supporting it would continue their negotiations at the conference and would be financially rewarded through “positive measures,” while Serbia would be exposed to the

241 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

242 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge Community’s comprehensive sanctions, which would annul all the benefits Yugoslavia had earned through its long ties with the EC.128 Faced with Miloševic´’s continuing obstruction of the peace process and the dramatic expansion of the aggression on Croatia, the EC foreign ministers seemed to be finally signaling they were adopting a tough approach long advocated by Genscher. Judging by their contrasting individual statements and positions, however, that signal was hardly genuine and, in any case, came too late. Carrington once again made a series of important concessions to Miloševic´, and Miloševic´ once again, together with Bulatovic´, rejected Carrington’s draft treaty. Carrington’s hope this time was to lure Miloševic´ into accepting the conference’s principal provisions with an offer which removed Serbia’s obligation to reinstate Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s autonomy and allowed for the formation of a common state for those republics, though not nations, wishing it.129 This was a problematically generous offer by Carrington, particularly because it came exactly at a time when Serbia was once again escalating repression over its own minorities. Just days earlier, the Kosovo Albanians and the Muslims from the region of Sandžak had organized referendums for increased autonomy from Serbia. The efforts of both groups were proclaimed illegal by the Serbian government and suppressed by a concerted police action.130 In spite of Carrington’s offer of a basically free hand in dealing with such challenges and in spite of an affirmation of Serbia’s and Montenegro’s choice to create a common and more integrated state—Miloševic´ remained defiant. Considering the circumstances, his repeated rejection was rather unsurprising. First, as Carrington later recollected, “It all came down, as usual, to the fact . . . that Greater Serbia was the thing that was important, and that if he agreed to Chapter I as it then was [which would have enabled Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be independent in the present borders], then this would not be possible for him.”131 Second, with every new rejection of the Carrington draft, Miloševic´ just kept getting a better deal from the conference chairman.132 In spite of tough formal declarations by the EC foreign ministers, he simply had little reason to believe he would get properly punished. And he was soon proven to be right. The EC’s threats of 28 October and 4 November were seemingly clear and offered little room for compromise. With Miloševic´’s continued rejection of the Carrington draft, the Community was now presented with an obvious opening to put its words into action. Genscher, having championed a tougher approach toward Miloševic´, which was vindicated by the events on the ground, certainly expected the EC not to back away from its promises. On 6 November in a speech before the Bundestag and in a radio interview, he stressed that his main goal was to keep the Community faithful to its decisions. In his view, there were

Diplomacy on the Edge two options for the conference: either it was to continue with the cooperative republics, as pledged in the EC statements of 28 October and 4 November, or Lord Carrington was to declare it useless, in which case the republics wishing independence would have to be recognized. Additionally, Genscher emphasized, Serbia had to be exposed to comprehensive economic sanctions (again, as pledged in the EC foreign ministers’ declarations), which in his opinion should include an oil embargo and a freeze of international assets and financial transactions, to be brought about in cooperation with the Security Council. In contrast, the positive measures for the cooperating republics in Genscher’s view ought to include an EC offer of treaties of association with the perspective of future accession to the Community—this likely was the first attempt by a major EC foreign policy maker to use the prospect of accession to the Community as an anchor of stability in the Balkans.133 Though his policy proposals corresponded perfectly to the latest decisions of the EC, the German foreign minister was in for a rude awakening. On 7 and 8 November, the heads of governments and foreign ministers of NATO countries met in Rome for a summit to discuss the future of the Western alliance. With the threat of a massive Soviet attack disappearing, the organization that had provided a security umbrella for Western Europe for more than four decades now needed a new raison d’être, not only for the presence of American troops in Europe, but for its very existence. The ideas of the organization’s principal members certainly differed on a variety of important issues: from the eastward expansion of the organization, which was greeted with ambivalence in France, to proposals for the creation of a specifically European defense force under the WEU, which was publicly greeted with frustration by the US president.134 Considering the apparent consensus in the EC, expressed through its statements of 28 October and 4 November, the situation in Yugoslavia and the West’s response to Serbia’s intransigence were not expected to be the subjects of heated debate and disagreement at the Rome summit. However, the balance and consensus seemingly achieved in the Community were now lost in this new forum. The reason was simple: the US State Department and the Bush administration had briefly reentered the scene. Genscher’s and Kohl’s attempts to move the Community toward its pledged actions hit a wall of stiff US opposition, and this shift in turn encouraged the EC countries ambivalent about the Community’s course set by the statements of 28 October and 4 November. James Baker exerted strong pressure on his German counterpart not to steer the Community away from what he misperceived as a “non-recognition consensus” in the EC.135 Baker’s and the State Department’s stance was perhaps best summed up by Lawrence Eagleburger in an interview

243 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

244 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge with the Belgrade weekly Vreme that week: “I do not intend to name a culprit, but I dare say that it seems to me, personally, that all the parties involved should have realized by now that they are all to blame.”136 Such relativism—a far cry from Baker’s strong statement, given under congressional pressure at the Security Council some six weeks earlier—was in Rome also backed up by a new crucial player in the international diplomatic effort in Yugoslavia: Cyrus Vance. Vance had been the US secretary of state under President Carter between 1977 and 1980 (he had actually selected Eagleburger to be the US ambassador in Belgrade during the same period) and was in early October 1991 appointed by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to be his special envoy to Yugoslavia.137 He visited the region between 11 and 18 October and, as many international diplomats before him who did not have to continuously deal with Miloševic´, left Belgrade convinced that the Serbian president was someone who could be negotiated with in good faith. He believed that “singling out Serbia for blame and punishment [was] unjustified and counterproductive in terms of an overall settlement” and intervened with the EC states to back away from their threats even after Miloševic´’s repeated rejections of the Carrington draft.138 Due to such double American pressure, which was eagerly seconded by the British and the French, the EC and NATO declarations issued on 8 November unsurprisingly represented a significant retreat from the path already established by the Community’s diplomatic effort. Both declarations expressed concern over the continuing bloodshed and the dramatic situation in Dubrovnik, as well as over the fact that Carrington’s proposals had not been supported by all parties. The EC declaration, however, fulfilled few of the Community’s pledges given in expectation of exactly those developments which were seen as the cause of concern. It implemented sanctions which included the termination of the trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia, the imposition of limits on Yugoslav textile imports, the removal of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the Generalized System of Preferences and the formal suspension of benefits under the Phare program on Yugoslavia. The EC also invited the Security Council to tighten the arms embargo and to work on implementing the oil embargo. The cooperating parties were not named, nor did they get anything more than a promise of compensatory measures some time in the future. Equally, Serbia was not named, nor did it get any specific punitive measures.139 There was no freezing of international assets or international financial transactions, through which the JNA continued to fund its efforts; no immediate economic or oil embargo (Greek officials again publicly pledged to veto any imposition of the oil embargo); and no expulsion of Yugoslavia from any international organizations.140 The measures which were implemented were piecemeal and in reality virtually

Diplomacy on the Edge meaningless, not to mention that they were applied to all the republics equally, a measure that constituted a clear break of the Community’s pledges from 28 October and 4 November.141 Another, and much more important, way in which the EC declaration of 8 November broke the Community’s recent pledge was in the manner it treated the potential continuation of the Carrington conference and the possibility of recognition of individual Yugoslav republics. The declaration asserted “that the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement that includes adequate guarantees for the protection of human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups.”142 In their statement of 28 October, the EC foreign ministers had suggested that in case of Serbia’s continuing rejection of the Carrington draft, the Conference on Yugoslavia “will proceed with the cooperative republics to obtain a political solution, in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith.”143 Serbia did not negotiate in good faith but refused the draft principles, coerced others who accepted them (Montenegro), continued its military aggression against Croatia, and prepared for war against BosniaHerzegovina. The new EC declaration, which made the recognition of republics conditional on the achievement of an overall settlement, thus enabled Miloševic´ to simply continue his campaign: “to conquer while feigning to negotiate.”144 What was worst, he did not even need to feign to negotiate, as Lord Carrington actually suspended the conference instead of continuing it with the cooperative republics. Without the forum of the conference, how were these cooperative republics then to reach an “overall settlement” which was to enable them to get the recognition they so desperately craved? Neither the EC nor the NATO declaration provided any answer. The achievements of this brief, but highly influential, return of the State Department and the White House to the diplomatic scene were once again in stark contrast to the prevailing opinions in the US Congress. In mid-October, Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) introduced Resolution 1793, which would have imposed a trade embargo on Serbia and prohibited US assistance to it until the Serbian government had ceased its aggression and agreed that Serbia would remain within the present borders.145 On 28 October—the same day as the EC’s tough statement warning Serbia—the Senate agreed by consensus to a resolution submitted by Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Al Gore (D-TN) asking President Bush to work in the Security Council toward sending a peacekeeping force which would help maintain a cease-fire.146 Gore, in one of his many passionate speeches on the subject, implored a dramatic change

245 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

246 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge of course by the Bush administration which would include finally giving up on hopes for a continuation of a Yugoslav entity and excessively relying on the EC to handle the conflict: “Yugoslavia was created in response to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. It was valued by us as a barrier to Soviet aggression. It no longer reflects the concept of self-determination, but rather the reappearance of imperialism in all its arrogance. It no longer serves any geostrategic purpose for us. On the contrary, it is now the breeding ground for troubles that will plague the United States of America for another generation, unless we take measures now to deal with the situation.”147 Several days later, Senator Gore took his argument further, and together with Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) submitted a resolution which urged the president to recognize Croatia and Slovenia and establish a comprehensive economic embargo on Serbia in case of continuing Serb aggression.148 And on 7 November—the day the NATO Rome summit commenced—the Senate agreed to refer to its Committee on Foreign Relations a resolution urging the president to recognize not only Slovenia and Croatia, but also Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo.149 Unlike in late September, when the Senate had managed to put significant enough pressure on the Bush administration for the secretary of state to deliver a strong—if ultimately ineffectual—speech at the Security Council, this time the situation was rather different. The administration and the State Department obstinately withstood all congressional pressures for a change of policy and— what is particularly remarkable—made sure the Yugoslavs understood that. According to Borisav Jovic´, in a mid-October Washington meeting between the Yugoslav ambassador (who was apparently loyal to the “rump presidency”) and Lawrence Eagleburger, the latter had acknowledged that the US government was aware of Miloševic´’s plans and efforts to forge a Greater Serbia but also asserted it had no intention of punishing the Serbian leader with anything other than economic sanctions, which would be put into effect only once the Greater Serbian state actually materialized. Eagleburger also assured the ambassador that the United States had no intention of assisting Slovenia or Croatia in any possible way and that the president, his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, and the secretary of state were committed to resisting all congressional pressures for a change of policy. America was comfortable letting Europe take the lead for two reasons, Eagleburger added. First, it was becoming increasingly isolationist after the end of the Cold War. Second, it held not only Serbia, but also Croatia and Slovenia, in low regard and did not see a pan-Yugoslav figure in which it could put any faith.150 Or, as Jovic´ observed in a report he received around the same time regarding NATO and US goals, the United States had two interests in Yugoslavia: (1) containment of the

Diplomacy on the Edge crisis, and (2) the preservation of the largest and most unified possible Yugoslav state.151 Such signals from the US government, as well as its influence over the decisions at the Rome summit, had dramatically negative effects. They directly encouraged the Serbian leader, who built his confidence on America’s continuing interest in some form of a Yugoslavia and its open distaste for the Slovenes and the Croats. More important, Bush’s and Baker’s positions and influence at the Rome summit also took the European Community off of its seemingly established diplomatic path vis-à-vis the Yugoslav republics. This not only encouraged the Serbian leader, who received no punishment for his actions, but it also sowed tremendous discord among the EC states. After long and arduous negotiations as the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate, they had reached some semblance of a formal agreement for a tough diplomatic approach, and now all of that progress was reversed. Germany, which took the bulk of US pressure in Rome and which had worked hard to shift the EC toward greater involvement and a more robust line, interpreted the suspension of the Carrington conference and the EC and NATO declarations of 8 November as signals to intensify its own diplomacy toward the individual Yugoslav republics. Most notably, it decided to assist the republics in preparing legislation guaranteeing minority rights, which would enable them to claim international recognition.152 German foreign policy makers also still believed in the two-month deadline initiated by van den Broek, which had projected the end of the whole negotiating process for mid-December. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and France—at best ambivalent about the Community’s hard line against Serbia—were now encouraged by America’s input in Rome. They understood the newest EC statement as a break with the Community’s previous line and as a perfect instrument for the future restraint of Germany. As brief and seemingly limited an effort as the United States had made in Rome, it had actually succeeded in dramatically damaging the EC’s progress toward both unity and a sensible policy. In spite of dramatic events on the ground in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina over the previous two months, the Serbian president was off the hook, and the European Community was once again torn apart.

• The military advances of the Serb coalition in Croatia and its preparations for a larger war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not unstoppable. NATO Supreme Commander General John Galvin did make contingency plans for an intervention against the JNA around Dubrovnik, but no one asked him to put them into

247 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

248 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Diplomacy on the Edge action.153 As French general Jean Cot, who served as the commander of the UN forces in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between July 1993 and March 1994, later recalled, “Along with many others, I am convinced that the Serbs could have been stopped in October 1991 with three ships, three dozen planes and about three thousand men deployed in Dubrovnik and Vukovar to emphasize the unequivocal determination of the European Community.”154 The problem was, however, that the EC was not unequivocally determined to stand up to Serb aggression either militarily or diplomatically. As a result, the Greater Serbian machine marched on. Vukovar continued its heroic struggle toward certain collapse. Dubrovnik and many other Croatian cities found no respite from continuing attacks. And Bosnia-Herzegovina precipitously stumbled into bloody war. There is perhaps no better evidence of the disastrous effects of the West’s return to relativism after the failure of the Carrington conference than the transcript of ´ ´, held an intercepted conversation between Radovan Karadžic´ and Dobrica Cosic just three days after the Rome summit. “You are bringing one historical process to ´ ´ told Karadžic´. “The unification of the South Slavs collapsed hisan end,” Cosic torically, but the unification of the Serbs did not. It is now being historically finalized or will fail. . . . This tactic of yours, your strategy; I don’t know what would ´ ´ have happened if you had not done what you did.”155 The praise that Cosic bestowed upon Karadžic´’s “tactic” and “strategy” on this occasion came in the midst of the Bosnian Serb referendum on whether to remain in a common state with Serbia and Montenegro and just weeks after the Serb walkout from the ´ ´ and Karadžic´ were upbeat about assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.156 Both Cosic the prospects for success of the “unification of the Serbs” and about developments after the collapse of the Carrington conference. Karadžic´: “[Izetbegovic´] pinned his hopes on The Hague. He returned from The Hague shattered, because The Hague is not strong enough to impose anything. We won’t accept anything.” ´ ´: “Yes, yes, we’re changing positions for the better.”157 Cosic Indeed, after the two-month experience with the Conference on Yugoslavia, where Miloševic´ did not “accept anything,” the Serb coalition was in a good position. It was on the verge of achieving its military goals, and it had avoided any real punitive measures. The international recognition of its opponents not only again appeared distant, but was now formally put in the hands of the Serbian president, who paradoxically seemed to have “earned” it by his repeated rejections of the EC’s peace plans. What is more, the Community’s failures were also soon to enable Miloševic´ to shift the focus of international mediation away from Europe and its troublesome Germans and toward another international organization he could much more easily manipulate: the United Nations.

9

The End and the Beginning, November 1991–April 1992

Although the failure of the Conference on Yugoslavia led many to believe that the end of the crisis was distant, Carrington’s withdrawal did have the potential to open a path to real solutions. In the weeks after the conference’s collapse, the JNA’s war operations around Vukovar and Dubrovnik escalated to a shocking level. Their brutality convinced the bulk of the international community that the only path to a resolution of the crisis lay in the recognition of the Yugoslav republics as independent states. However, the final implementation of that conviction in mid-December 1991 resulted in an unprecedented diplomatic collision, leaving the Western alliance once again deeply torn. Although all the evidence on the ground for months had clearly suggested Yugoslavia was at its violent end, major international players still refused to pull the plug on the failed federation and continued to cling to the idea of maintaining some semblance of a common Yugoslav framework. That was the essence of the divisions among the Western powers at the very beginning of the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, and it was the essence of their divisions at its very end. At the onset of the new year—claimed by EC foreign policy makers to be the birth year of a united continent—the results of this diplomatic clash were profoundly negative. Germany managed to successfully steer the EC toward recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and thus helped bring peace to Croatia. However, the backlash in the Community—and especially in Britain and France—against Germany’s efforts was so strong that its arguments on the crucial question of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not heard. Instead, the EC negotiators stubbornly reverted to the tried, tested, and repeatedly failed realist

249

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

250 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning strategy of pressuring the weak and appeasing the strong. Rather than doing at least something to stop the impending attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina, they withheld this republic’s recognition and used the prospect of aggression to force its government into accepting a de facto ethnic partition. Quite predictably, this approach only encouraged a vicious grab for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s land which quickly degenerated into extreme ethnic cleansing and genocide. Not even this, however, altered the West’s approach. After the violence—directed primarily against the Bosnian Muslims—reached monstrous proportions during the spring of 1992, the only answer the EC negotiators gave to the besieged Bosnian government pleading for help was, “Capitulate.” Such a response to the worst campaign of war crimes in Europe since World War II marked a fitting culmination of the West’s cynical Realpolitik toward Yugoslavia’s breakup. It also marked a tragic beginning of the West’s inglorious policy, which led BosniaHerzegovina through death and destruction in the coming years. PYRRHIC VICTORIES: THE ROAD TO RECOGNITION

It is difficult to see how exactly the suspension of the Conference on Yugoslavia was supposed to apply any pressure on those whose lack of cooperation had actually led to its repeated failures. If anything, the absence of a forum for negotiations that were meant to lead to the international recognition of the republics exerted more pressure on those who were the objects of Serb aggression rather than on the intransigent Serbian president.1 With his forces extending their territorial reach in Croatia and with his political and military proxies successfully setting up the groundwork for the coming conquest of BosniaHerzegovina, Slobodan Miloševic´ actually had no use for the conference and now did not even have to pretend to negotiate in good faith. In the days after NATO’s Rome summit, at which Lord Carrington announced the suspension of the conference, the situation on virtually all battlefields dramatically deteriorated as the Serbian land grab continued. In the words of General Kadijevic´’s deputy, Marko Negovanovic´, directed at the Serbian public troubled by the length and the bloodiness of the war, “No matter what, we who wish to live in Yugoslavia will get only that which we are ready to win and defend by the sword. Everyone needs to understand that. What our soldiers get and keep will be defensible politically.”2 The situation in Croatia was most severe around Vukovar and Dubrovnik. After having Vukovar completely encircled for more than five weeks, the army and the volunteer paramilitary units under its command began a large Slavonian offensive and a final assault on the city in mid-November.3 Dubrovnik’s plight

The End and the Beginning was also beginning to take contours similar to Vukovar’s as the JNA and the TO forces from Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina tightened their grip on the surrounded city with continuous bombardments from land, sea, and air.4 As the local SDS strongman, Božidar Vucˇurevic´, described the progress of the battle to his party chairman, Radovan Karadžic´, “Now we need to pass it, and then to slowly squeeze Dubrovnik and cleanse further. Let it be a hostage city—it is perhaps even better that we did not enter it.”5 Or, as the Guardian of London lamented in its editorial that week, “In the history of bombardments from the air this may soon rank with the savagery of Guernica and the wantonness of Vietnam. Yet somehow it is still regarded as deeply regrettable but sadly unstoppable. Last night Mr. Major was still protesting that it was ‘extremely difficult to see what . . . could be done.’ Where are the ringing words to stop the guns? What is this moral numbness which in essence continues to regard Yugoslavia as a Balkan cockpit in which the plumed contestants must fight it to the death?”6 The outrage of the Guardian’s editors at the seeming aimlessness of the international diplomatic effort at the time of Vukovar’s and Dubrovnik’s greatest peril was understandable. However, John Major’s claim of being unable “to see what could be done” did not quite capture the essence of where Britain and the rest of Europe stood on what was to be done about the crisis after the suspension of the Carrington conference. The issue was not that no one could see what to do but that—once again—Europe was deeply torn on two diametrically opposite courses of action. On the one end of the spectrum was Germany, which took the suspension of the conference as a pretext to intensify its own diplomacy. Since Lord Carrington had failed to fulfill the EC’s promise of continuing the conference only with the cooperating parties, Germany decided to use its influence to ensure that the cooperating parties unilaterally satisfied the terms of the Carrington plan which Serbia had rejected. Most notably, this meant that German experts in constitutional and international law were sent to assist the Croatian government in drafting extensive legal protections for Croatian Serbs which were to include the establishment of regional self-rule.7 German foreign policy makers still saw the controversial deadline of 10 December for the completion of negotiations on the future of Yugoslav space as valid, and they had every intention of soon thereafter following through with their promise of the recognition of individual republics. In this they were not only supported but actually strongly pressured by the Bundestag, which on 15 November unanimously adopted a resolution singling out the Serbian leadership as “chiefly responsible” for the violence and urging the German government to continue its efforts to create conditions for the recognition of those Yugoslav republics wishing it.8

251 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

252 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning The other end of the spectrum was represented by those who still shied away from international recognition of the republics and even believed that Western efforts should be directed at finding a deal acceptable to Miloševic´. The Serbian president and his associates certainly had given enough fodder to this camp through an ingenious diplomatic offensive of their own in the immediate aftermath of the NATO summit in Rome. Although Miloševic´ had repeatedly rejected the stationing of UN troops anywhere in Yugoslavia throughout that summer, the Rome summit changed his mind. At a session of the rump federal presidency on 9 November, his right-hand man, Borisav Jovic´, devised a plan to call for the positioning of the UN peacekeepers along the front line in Croatia. The call was then promptly submitted to the UN Security Council through the Romanian representative because the rump presidency had no faith in Yugoslavia’s UN representative, who was a Croat.9 The UN administration had refused to even acknowledge previous calls for peacekeepers that had come from Croatia and even from the still legitimate president of the SFRJ presidency, Stipe Mesic´, but now it sprung into action.10 As Borisav Jovic´ noted in his diary entry of 15 November, “The operation was a success. The Security Council has initiated talks on the idea of sending ‘blue helmets’ to Krajina and Croatia, although they are avoiding any mention of our request. They too have found a ‘Solomonic’ solution. Formally, this was ‘requested’ by Great Britain and France. As a ‘cover.’ They do not want to mention our ‘truncated’ presidency.”11 The reasons why Miloševic´ wanted to increase UN involvement at that particular point were rather obvious. First, although his forces were still winning in Croatia, the mobilization failure in Serbia meant that they were increasingly stretched by the motivated Croats. The army High Command felt it was reaching the maximum of its projected territorial conquests and saw the deployment of the UN troops as a means of securing what it had achieved on the battlefield. Secondly, threats from Germany and the other EC member states to recognize the independence of Croatia opened up the possibility that the JNA could face a clearer legal challenge to its presence in Croatia because it would be considered an occupying army in an internationally recognized state.12 Finally, although Serbia had managed to avoid real and selectively applied international sanctions in Rome, Miloševic´ felt he desperately needed to shift the balance of international involvement away from the EC and onto the United Nations. The governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom were already ambivalent about applying selective pressure on Serbia. They would be even more ambivalent when put in the UN Security Council together with China and the crumbling Soviet Union and when faced with the UN administration and the scores of non-aligned countries who could

The End and the Beginning still buy Miloševic´’s story that Serbia and the JNA were simply trying to protect Yugoslavia’s continued existence. As Miloševic´ remarked to Karadžic´ that December, “It is difficult for us to accept [coming back to Carrington’s negotiations] because now we have this parallel line: the UN.” To which Karadžic´ responded, “Yes, yes. There everything should be made more difficult for Europe and also directed to that other route. Because our standing there is better for sure.”13 Getting the forces of the United Nations to freeze the conditions on the ground and thus secure Miloševic´’s territorial winnings Cyprus-style was, however, far from a foregone conclusion. The UN secretary general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar; his special envoy to Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance; and the UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding, were all opposed to a peacekeeping mission, both on account of there being no peace to keep and on account of the UN administration and budget being stretched to the limit with the ongoing operations and planned missions in El Salvador and Cambodia.14 Nevertheless, Miloševic´’s request resonated with those whose opinion in the United Nations actually mattered: the French and the British governments, which held permanent seats on the Security Council. The enthusiasm of these two states for an increased profile of the United Nations lagged marginally behind Miloševic´’s, not only because of their dislike of German pressures, but also because of their common opinion that in the aftermath of the failure of the Carrington conference, Western efforts should not be directed at punishing Miloševic´ but at finding a solution which could satisfy him. The proposal for the stationing of the UN troops—which traditionally have a tendency to freeze conflicts and front lines—could thus have not come at a better time because it offered a possibility of maintaining the appearance of international legitimacy while at the same time giving Miloševic´ what he wanted: de facto changes in Croatia’s borders. Initial hints of this newly found taste for possible changes to Croatia’s borders among British and French foreign policy makers were subtle. On 6 November—the day after Miloševic´’s last “no” to Carrington and the day of heavy attacks by the JNA artillery and the Yugoslav Air Force on Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and other Croatian cities—Douglas Hurd’s right-hand man, Douglas Hogg, explained to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons why exactly his government was opposed to the international recognition of Croatia: “If the parties wanted to make adjustments to frontiers, by your prior recognition you actually have an obstacle in the way of that.”15 French president François Mitterrand also freely questioned Yugoslavia’s inter-republican borders in his communications with the press at the time. As he explained

253 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

254 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning to journalists after a meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 15 November, during which the two leaders had agreed to leave the issue of recognition ad acta until the completion of the negotiations on the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht on 9 and 10 December, “Recognition—under which conditions? Frontiers, minority protections, acceptance of international agreements on security. . . . At this time the two greatest problems in Yugoslavia in our eyes are the frontiers . . . and the destiny and protection of minorities. . . . I do not speak of Slovenia, where the population is homogenous. But that is not the case in Croatia.”16 The full extent and practical meaning of what Mitterrand and Hogg were alluding to, however, soon became much clearer in the press reports of Lord Carrington’s newest efforts. On 12 November, the EC foreign ministers noted that both Croatia and the rump presidency had asked for peacekeeping forces and therefore instructed Lord Carrington “to leave for Yugoslavia without delay in order to explore whether an agreement on such deployment can indeed be reached.”17 Carrington did leave for Belgrade without delay and—according to British, American, and Serbian press sources—discussed a deal with Miloševic´ under which the occupied areas in Krajina and Slavonia would be demilitarized and protected by the UN troops for a number of years, while their local populations would eventually have the opportunity to decide in a referendum whether to stay in Croatia or to join Serbia.18 While the source of the leaks that resulted in these reports was unknown, they were deemed to be credible enough to lead German foreign minister Genscher to publicly ask Hans van den Broek, the president of the EC Council of Ministers (and nominally Lord Carrington’s superior) for an explanation.19 Genscher’s concern was understandable. The Community had a long-established policy of not recognizing changes of borders by force, and now some seemed to be considering extracting de facto border changes from Croatia, which was still under fierce attacks by the Serbian forces. Within several days, however, something happened which made any effort directed at pressuring Croatia into ceding territory indefensible. The city of Vukovar finally fell into Serb hands. For nearly three months, Vukovar’s defenders had resisted the vicious onslaught of the JNA troops and the Serb paramilitaries. They had not only blunted the army’s attack on the rest of Slavonia, but also exposed the nature of Serbian war aims and tactics for the whole world to see. The scenes of a picturesque central European town on the Danube being pulverized by the JNA artillery, with its inhabitants huddled in basements, were essential in turning international public opinion against Serbia and the JNA. On 18 November, television newscasts throughout Europe were overwhelmed with footage that

The End and the Beginning surpassed in sheer madness and brutality anything that had been aired over the previous three months. Coordinated attacks of the JNA’s elite armored forces and the shock paramilitary infantry units from Serbia, after two weeks of handto-hand combat, had finally broken the resistance of the exhausted defenders and taken control of the city. Vukovar’s streets filled with columns of ashen figures of civilians who climbed up from their basements to witness the complete destruction of their city into rubble littered with corpses of people and animals. Serb volunteers were let loose to plunder the little that could still be plundered and to kill any defenders who may have tried to hide among the civilians.20 The army separated the men from the women, children, and the elderly and sent most of them to prison camps in Serbia. Some 260 people— both civilians and former defenders taken primarily from the Vukovar hospital—had, however, no such luck. On 20 November, the JNA and Serb paramilitary units took them to the hangars of the agricultural complex Ovcˇara, just south of Vukovar, and summarily executed them.21 The plight of Vukovar’s defenders—some fifteen hundred of them perished during and in the immediate aftermath of the siege22—led to a very public and bitter clash between their commanders and the Croatian government. Mile Dedakovic´-Jastreb, the head of Vukovar’s defenses who managed to break out of the city, charged President Tud‒man with having failed to provide Vukovar with weapons and additional manpower in an alleged attempt to sacrifice the city in order to draw international support.23 Dedakovic´’s accusations, however, did not fully capture the drama that played out during the last days of Vukovar’s stand. The Croatian troops did attempt a breakthrough from the direction of Vinkovci on 12 November but were halted both by the superior armored forces of the JNA and by President Tud‒man, who apparently received calls from Lord Carrington and Hans van den Broek blaming Croatia for the escalation of violence in eastern Slavonia.24 Faced with such pressures, all that Tud‒man’s administration could do was to concentrate on diplomatic efforts to evacuate the city and save the lives of its defenders. The Croats managed to get Cyrus Vance to visit Vukovar on 19 November after his meeting with Miloševic´ in Belgrade the previous day, but that visit failed to amount to much. Vance and his associates did see the destruction of the city firsthand, but they were physically prevented by the JNA from going to the Vukovar hospital and saving its staff and patients from the impending tragedy.25 The immediate effects of the fall of Vukovar on the Croatian front lines in eastern Slavonia were devastating. Vukovar was the symbol of Croatia’s resistance, and the scenes of its destruction by the JNA and the Serb paramilitaries depressed the embattled Croats and knocked the wind out of their defenses.

255 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

256 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning Cyrus Vance managed to get Miloševic´, Kadijevic´, and Tud‒man to agree to yet another cease-fire in Geneva on 23 November, but the deal did little more than enable the army to move its heavy equipment out of the Croatian territory controlled by the Zagreb government into the SAOs of Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina.26 Miloševic´’s mouthpiece, Politika, urged the JNA to move swiftly beyond Vukovar in order to crush the Croats before they had a chance to recover, and the army duly responded.27 Its guns, long used to pummel the city on the Danube, were now turned toward Osijek and Vinkovci. A string of villages just south of Osijek fell to the JNA’s advancing armored units, opening Croatia’s fourth largest city to broad artillery attacks from three sides. Civilians poured out of Osijek westward in the expectation that their homes would inevitably be surrounded, but the army—itself fatigued by the grueling battle of Vukovar—decided to dig in and bomb the city into submission.28 Although the Serb coalition celebrated the “liberation” of Vukovar as a great coup for its forces and for the achievement of its goals in the territorial conquest of Croatia, the international effects of the events in eastern Slavonia soon confirmed Vukovar’s fall to be no more than a Pyrrhic victory for its “liberators.” Within hours of the scenes from Vukovar’s destroyed streets pouring into the homes of West Europeans, the mood in the highest ranks of the EC’s foreign policy making shifted dramatically. According to reports from the Dutch presidency, the majority of the EC member states now supported the principle of recognition of those republics wishing it without waiting for the achievement of the overall settlement. As the Dutch memorandum to the foreign ministries of the other EC member states cogently put it, “If the Twelve should take the view that the prospect of recognition of the independence of republics can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement which involves all six republics, they are powerless against one republic blocking the process meant to achieve an overall settlement while in the meantime conquering territory.”29 The task for the Dutch presidency and the EC as a whole, as the directorgeneral for political affairs of the Dutch foreign ministry, Peter van Walsum, expressed to his boss, Hans van den Broek, was to “apply so much pressure [on Serbia] through a selective and discriminating policy that it will sooner or later be prepared to compromise. . . . I realize that it will not be easy to convince all partners, but ‘even-handedness’ can only lead us to having to miserably accept the Serbian conquests and their corresponding new borders in the course of 1992.”30 Such a shift in international sentiment also allowed German foreign policy makers to once again seize the initiative and steer the Community toward their preferred policy of recognition. On 22 November, they hosted the president of

The End and the Beginning Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic´, in Bonn. The fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina was widely seen as the main impediment to the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, so Genscher and the rest of the Auswärtiges Amt wished to hear firsthand how Izetbegovic´ felt about it. Izetbegovic´’s public statements in the Bosnian and international media and to individual diplomats were contradictory and cautious, so his visit to Bonn was seen as necessary to finally clear up the matter. Western diplomats in Belgrade—including Germany’s own ambassador, Hans-Jörg Eiff, who opposed his foreign minister’s and chancellor’s enthusiasm for recognition—urged Izetbegovic´ to use the occasion to advise Genscher against recognition.31 Once sitting opposite the German foreign minister, however, Izetbegovic´ refused to do so.32 Instead of warning Genscher against recognition in general or against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in particular, Izetbegovic´ warned that a large majority of the citizens of his republic were against Bosnia-Herzegovina being left behind in a common state with the Serbian bloc. The BiH president still hoped that some form of a loose association among the republics could be salvaged, but his main problem was not the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; his problem was the recognition of only Slovenia and Croatia. As his foreign minister, Haris Silajdžic´, later remembered, “Izetbegovic´ could not have said what Ambassador [Eiff] wanted him to say because that would have been against the interests of the citizens of BosniaHerzegovina. It would have meant we would stay in a Greater Serbia which was being created politically and militarily.”33 With that hurdle surmounted, Germany’s foreign policy apparatus continued with its diplomatic initiative toward international recognition. On 25 November, Croatia’s foreign minister, Zvonimir Šeparovic´, was also received in Bonn and promised that Germany still viewed the 10 December deadline seriously, especially if Croatia implemented a new law on the rights of minorities.34 Two days later, Genscher and Kohl addressed the Bundestag and confirmed that Germany was ready to recognize before Christmas those republics which unilaterally fulfilled the Carrington conditions for a comprehensive political settlement. Kohl denied any wish on Germany’s part to act on its own but confirmed his readiness to proceed even without a complete EC consensus. Genscher, on the other hand, warned against any changes of borders among the Yugoslav republics and made it clear that he fully understood what Serbia was trying to do through the deployment of UN troops along the front lines in Croatia.35 Kohl felt comfortable stating his policy so openly, partly because the previous day he had reached an agreement with five other Christian-Democrat government leaders from the EC member states—Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and

257 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

258 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning the Netherlands—that recognition should take place before Christmas.36 The movement toward recognition thus steadily gained momentum. On the same day as the meeting of the Christian-Democrat leaders, the Vatican’s secretary of state, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, convened the ambassadors of the CSCE states accredited to the Holy See and conveyed to them the Vatican’s support for a coordinated and conditioned international recognition of the Yugoslav republics within one month.37 Considering the Holy See’s usually guarded approach to foreign relations, this was a significant intervention which may have had an effect on some European governments. On 28 November Germany and Italy jointly announced they would recognize Croatia and Slovenia before the end of the year and expressed confidence that other EC member states would follow suit.38 On 2 December, the EC foreign ministers finally withdrew the sanctions established at the Rome summit for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia and thereby arguably de facto recognized the republics as international subjects.39 The following day, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark followed Germany’s and Italy’s lead and publicly announced they were also to recognize Slovenia and Croatia by the end of the year.40 Naturally, the mood swing toward recognition in the aftermath of the Vukovar tragedy was not clear-cut, and the voices of opposition—especially in the United Kingdom and France—could still be heard. President Mitterrand in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published on 29 November still clung to his prejudices by claiming that “Croatia belonged to the Nazi bloc, not Serbia.”41 Three days later in Le Monde, he once again raised the issue of settling the frontiers prior to any recognition.42 Douglas Hurd also, in a somewhat unprecedented editorial he wrote solely on the subject of Yugoslavia for the Times on 3 December, publicly expressed his misgivings about the wisdom of recognition.43 Unfortunately for Hurd, however, his editorial was accompanied by press accounts of a leaked ECMM report which outlined in detail the tactics of destruction of the Serb coalition and labeled the JNA “a cowardly army, fighting for no recognizable principle, but largely instinctively for its own status and survival.” The report also put pressure on the Community by suggesting the West could easily deal with the JNA’s military capabilities: “There is good reason to believe that selective show and use of force—to intimidate and hit the JNA in places where it hurts—can cow its bluster and bluff.”44 With the leaked report dominating the press coverage and with Croatia on 4 December passing a far-reaching constitutional law on human and minority rights as recommended by Germany, the general direction of EC policy toward recognition seemed clear and secured.45 Indeed, on 5 December sources in the British government were already forced to admit to the press that the imminent

The End and the Beginning recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was “unstoppable” and that the best Britain could still do was to possibly delay the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the Community’s member states and the republics.46 Since the principal EC players had agreed to delay making a definite decision on Yugoslavia until after the summit on the Treaty on European Union, which was to be held in Maastricht on 9 and 10 December, the maneuvering space for the opponents of recognition of the Yugoslav republics became nearly nonexistent. Many signs during the first week of December pointed toward the imminent recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. On 6 December, the JNA—as if to prove the verity of the ECMM report and thus seal the determination of the majority of the EC member states to recognize Croatia—intensified its coordinated attacks on Osijek and Dubrovnik to a level until then unseen. Shells rained on Dubrovnik’s Old Town, hitting its cathedral, churches, monasteries, and main square and killing thirteen people while wounding another sixty.47 The attack on Osijek was no less deadly. Within twenty-four hours of the JNA’s artillery attack, which pummeled the capital of Slavonia in spite of its being visited by a delegation of the French government led by Bernard Kouchner, fourteen people lost their lives and another seventy-seven were wounded.48 At the same time as the JNA was ensuring that the world saw it for a collection of brutal thugs with scant regard for cultural heritage or the lives of civilians, farther east the last vestiges of the Soviet Union were being peacefully dismantled. On 7 December, Boris Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevitch, met near Brest. The following day they declared that the USSR was to be dissolved and supplanted with the Commonwealth of Independent States.49 The announcement was significant not only because it drew a stark contrast between Moscow and Belgrade, but also because it helped assuage the remaining fears throughout Europe regarding possible consequences of the recognition of Yugoslavia’s dissolution for the Soviet case.50 During the first week of December, Yugoslavia’s fate appeared to be sealed not only politically, but also legally. The arbitration commission led by Robert Badinter had not been used by Lord Carrington throughout September and October. On 20 November, however, Carrington finally—and, interestingly, at Miloševic´’s request—submitted three questions to the commission for adjudication. Two of the questions were Serbia’s and dealt with (1) whether the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had a right to self-determination and (2) whether the borders between Croatia and Serbia, and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, could be considered as frontiers in terms of international law. The arbitration commission gave its responses to those two questions on 11 January, of

259 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

260 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning which more below. The remaining question—to which the commission gave a response rather quickly—was Carrington’s own, and it asked the Badinter Commission whether the situation in Yugoslavia was a case of secession by some republics (as argued by Serbia and Montenegro) or a state dissolution (as argued by all the others). The significance of the posed question cannot be overstated. It struck at the core of Miloševic´’s claim that his forces were merely defending Yugoslavia and of the EC’s diplomatic effort up to that point. In its Opinion No. 1—which was submitted to Lord Carrington on 29 November but which he inexplicably did not publicize until 7 December51— the Badinter Commission ruled against Serbia and determined that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution. As the commission argued, four out of six republics had expressed in some form their desire to be independent; federal institutions no longer met the criteria of participation and representativeness; and the recourse to force had led to an armed inter-republican conflict which had resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and considerable physical destruction.52 In retrospect and considering the situation on the ground as well as Yugoslavia’s own constitutional arrangement, the question posed to the commission appears to have had a clear answer. In fact, however, the commission’s opinion was a terrible surprise for Miloševic´ and for many in the international community.53 The head of the conference’s working group on minorities and human rights, Geert Ahrens, later remembered the Badinter opinion as surprising because “[Badinter] was a close associate of Mitterrand [and he] took a diametrically opposite view from [the French president].”54 The French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, certainly shared the surprise and saw the commission’s opinion as “a good argument for the Germans because they could say, ‘Well, this is the Badinter Commission, and he is French.’ ”55 And Lord Carrington, when later asked of Badinter’s input, could hardly conceal his distaste: “What—that Frenchman? He was not very helpful.”56 With the Badinter Commission removing the last legal obstacle to the recognition of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the only political hurdle remaining on the path of the Yugoslav republics toward independence was the Maastricht summit, where the Treaty on European Union was to be negotiated. Van den Broek’s deadline of 10 December for the completion of negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia had not been accidentally chosen. The principal EC players—primarily France and Germany—had implicitly agreed to hold off making a decision on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics until the completion of the Maastricht Treaty on 9 and 10 December. As the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, later remembered, a good portion of his time and effort that fall had been dedicated to trying “to pacify the relations

The End and the Beginning between Germany and France,” which had been poisoned by their disagreements over Yugoslavia. This changed only once the two countries consented— partly due to Delors’s advice—to postpone their decision making on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics until the week after Maastricht. Compared to the process of building an “ever closer union” with a common currency, more powers for its institutions, and greater cooperation in domestic and foreign policies, the Balkan war simply seemed as “not a very important crisis,” and the EC leaders thus agreed not to let it ruin the Maastricht negotiations.57 Indeed, the Maastricht show came and went without much mention of Yugoslavia. The EC turned into the European Union of “three pillars”: the European Community, in which EU institutions would have a great role in policy making; the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Justice and Home Affairs, in which decisions would be made intergovernmentally by consensus. All negotiators gave and took and had something to show for their efforts at home.58 The British prime minister most notably ensured that the EU—just as the EC had done—was going to make its foreign and security policy decisions by consensus and that the United Kingdom would not be a party to the new agreement on social policy. The French president, on the other hand, could market the whole treaty to his constituents as a clear step toward the building of a deeper union with an even more intricate web of connections that would tie down the unified Germany. More specifically, he could point to the creation of a clear timeline for the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the establishment of a common currency which would finally supplement the dominant German mark by the end of the century. “A great power is being born,” he jubilantly said after the completion of the negotiations, “one at least as strong commercially, industrially and financially as the United States and Japan.”59 The German chancellor, in spite of his concessions to Britain on the agreement on social policy and in spite of the German mark’s expiration date not sitting well with the German press, could draw comfort from at least some progress in the building of what he had always wanted: a federally structured Europe whose union was as much political as it was economic. The EC leaders had thus fulfilled their mission: they had managed to set the course for European integration in the post–Cold War world without getting derailed by Yugoslavia. Their blueprint for a European Union was an imperfect product of a variety of interests and negotiating positions, but it still gave hope to many that Europe was entering an era of cooperation and unity. Those who observed the Community’s involvement in Yugoslavia could also hope that its efforts would get a new and more united momentum, not only because the Maastricht negotiations were completed, but also because of what they meant.

261 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

262 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning Yugoslavia’s republics—except for Serbia and Montenegro—certainly believed they were now near the finish line in their race to recognition. All the signals of Europe’s finally united (though in the case of some states—grudging) stand in favor of recognition were certainly there. Yet, somehow, the weeks after Maastricht saw the unraveling of a dispiriting display of diplomatic gamesmanship which not only placed all the achievements of Maastricht in doubt, but also set the new EU on a path to more dramatic failures in Yugoslavia. “ALLEINGANG”: PEACE FOR CROATIA

Although the Yugoslav crisis did not derail the Maastricht negotiations or even have much effect on the EC member states’ decision making vis-à-vis the CFSP (the Community’s ineffectiveness in the Balkans was used as evidence both that the CFSP needed to be strengthened through majority voting and that the CFSP would never work),60 the EC foreign ministers did make one crucial decision on Yugoslavia on the margins of the Maastricht summit. The French delegation floated a proposal for the establishment of a set of conditions—to be crafted jointly by France and Germany—which all potentially independent Soviet and Yugoslav republics would have to satisfy in order to earn the recognition of the EC member states.61 The proposal had the air of an attempt at a compromise which would not only allow both the pro-recognition and the anti-recognition blocs within the EC to save face, but would also give the Community’s policy toward the continent’s East a semblance of strategy, unity, and calculated intent. Considering how much the Yugoslav crisis had damaged the public’s perception of the EC’s ability to conduct any reasonable or united foreign policy, the French proposal, at face value, certainly made sense. Other delegations at Maastricht approved it in principle, and the Quai d’Orsay’s political director, Alain Dejammet, and director for Europe, Jacques Blot, joined the Auswärtiges Amt’s political director, Jürgen Chrobog, to draft the list of conditions for recognition, which would be presented to the Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on 16 December.62 The implicit agreement of the EC foreign ministers to this Franco-German compromise formula was apparently so firm that Hans van den Broek, still the holder of the EC presidency, on 12 December sent a telegram to his counterparts proposing that at their meeting of 16 December, they all “should consider to proceed with a policy of conditional recognition. This would imply granting recognition only to republics that have accepted EC proposals.”63 In spite of what appeared to be a developing EC consensus on the implementation of conditional recognition which was to be officially adopted

The End and the Beginning at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 16 December, German foreign policy makers could certainly not rest on their laurels in expectation of a fulfillment of their preferred policy. There were two reasons for this. First, the French motivations behind the proposal for the creation of conditions for recognition were not only centered on finding a face-saving compromise for all. There were clear enough indications that at least part of the French intent was actually directed at creating a framework which would allow for further delays in recognition. Some press reports certainly viewed the proposal as a French attempt “to block German demands for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia without publicly confronting Bonn.”64 Second, the US State Department and the White House had once again—just as before NATO’s Rome summit in November— reentered the diplomatic scene. Already in the run-up to the Maastricht summit, the Bush administration had made it clear it did not approve of the newly developing consensus in the EC regarding recognition. On 5 December, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler suggested that her superiors did not agree with Germany’s argument in favor of recognition.65 The next day the United States instituted economic sanctions on the whole of Yugoslavia, even though the EC earlier that week had limited its economic sanctions to only Serbia and Montenegro.66 What is more, Secretary Baker after Maastricht instructed the US ambassadors in all EC capitals to urge their hosts not to proceed with recognition.67 As in November, Baker’s newest effort was again undertaken in spite of strong opposition from the US Congress. Instead of imposing sanctions on the whole of Yugoslavia and working behind the scenes to stave off recognition, members of Congress—as summarized by Senator John Kerry (D-MA)—wanted President Bush to (1) personally speak out on the issue instead of relegating it to “second or third tier officials at the State Department,” (2) recognize that Yugoslavia is finished and that its republics are independent states, (3) bring the issue in front of the UN Security Council in order to institute global sanctions on Serbia and organize a peacekeeping force, and (4) work actively with the EC to help find a permanent solution.68 Baker did not stop at issuing public statements and instructing his ambassadors to pressure the Europeans. Under the direct influence of the State Department, the question of recognition was now taken to Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. On 10 December, Pérez de Cuéllar wrote a letter nominally addressed to Hans van den Broek (as the holder of the EC presidency) but in fact directed at Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In his letter, the secretary-general referred to the “strong fears” expressed to him by Cyrus Vance regarding the possible recognition of the Yugoslav republics before the achievement of an overall

263 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

264 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning settlement at Lord Carrington’s Conference on Yugoslavia.69 The message was clear: the EC was urged to go back to the position adopted under American pressure at the NATO summit in Rome. In fact, Pérez de Cuéllar even quoted directly from the EC ministerial declaration issued in Rome and referred to it as the “correct” position. The essence of Pérez de Cuéllar’s apprehension was centered on Vance’s assertion that the “leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were among the many political and military figures who last week underscored . . . their own strong fears in this regard. More than one of [Vance’s] high-level interlocutors described the possibly explosive consequences of such a development as being a ‘potential time bomb.’ ”70 Vance and Pérez de Cuéllar were, however, not really precise in their suggestion that the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia had strong fears regarding recognition. The fact was that neither the Bosnians nor the Macedonians were afraid of recognition—they were afraid of not being recognized themselves and being left at the mercy of Miloševic´. Izetbegovic´’s input on the subject of recognition at his meeting with Genscher in November has already been discussed above. His interaction on this subject with the diplomats from the Conference on Yugoslavia was basically the same. According to Ambassador Henry Wynaendts, Izetbegovic´ never asked the EC not to recognize Croatia and Slovenia.71 As for the Macedonians, in the absence of transcripts of meetings between Macedonian officials and Cyrus Vance, a letter from Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov to Hans van den Broek dated 12 December will have to do as a close approximation. In this letter, Gligorov enumerated all the acts of the Macedonian government and legislature which he believed qualified his republic to be recognized just as Slovenia and Croatia, and he warned against leaving Macedonia’s recognition for the future because he deemed such a delay to be potentially dangerous for the region.72 The fact of the matter was that the only people in Yugoslavia who did suggest to Vance that recognition would have “possibly explosive consequences” were his interlocutors in Serbia and the JNA. The intercept of a 5 January conversation between Radovan Karadžic´ and Serbian foreign minister Vladislav Jovanovic´ is particularly instructive in this respect. Karadžic´ recounted what he had told Vance would happen in case of recognition: “Large movements of the masses, the homogenization of territory, shifts of population from region to region, and—of course—uncontrolled shooting. [Vance] asked, ‘Who will start the shooting?’ Nobody knows . . . somebody from the lower classes.” Jovanovic´ concurred: “What you told them—we told them. I told them directly—a call for recognition is a call for misadventure and war.” Jovanovic´ also admitted that instilling fear among Western diplomats was Serbia’s main strategy for dissuading

The End and the Beginning them from recognizing the other republics: “It seems that the only thing that could instill fear in them is a lack of control over the situation that could arise. . . . That is the only thing that could keep them from doing it.”73 The problem was, however, not only that Vance believed what Jovanovic´, Karadžic´, Miloševic´, Kadijevic´, and the likes were telling him, but also that he overvalued their opinions because he harbored irrational and dangerous hopes regarding the whole peace process.74 According to Marrack Goulding, who accompanied Vance during his missions in Yugoslavia, Vance protested against recognition because he believed “there was still hope of keeping the model of a federal Yugoslavia and negotiating the peace between the federal authorities in Belgrade and these Croatian insurgents. He still thought of them as insurgents.”75 Recognition was thus a problem because Vance still clung to the idea that he could—against all odds—salvage the Yugoslav federation. This irrational and dangerous pursuit of the “Holy Grail” of the preservation of Yugoslavia was the exact same reason why Lord Carrington also joined Vance in the push against recognition at this time. Carrington later often claimed that his primary concern was for the fates of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and that he believed recognition would “torpedo” his efforts at the conference.76 Few things could be further from the truth. How was something in mid-December supposed to “torpedo” his conference when it had already been sunk by Miloševic´—first in October and then decisively in November?77 What is more, during that fall Carrington had been alerted by one of the highest ranked diplomats at the conference, Ambassador Geert Ahrens, regarding Serb preparations for a war of massive proportions for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory and had been urged that the conference take up the issue. However, he did next to nothing and in fact considered Krajina—and not Bosnia-Herzegovina—the key to the solution of the crisis well into 1992.78 The essence of Carrington’s agreement with Vance on the issue of recognition, as he explained in his interview with the author, actually lay in the fact that if individual republics were to be recognized, it would be “in nobody’s interest to go on with a loose federation.”79 Carrington and Vance simply did not wish to alienate Miloševic´, whom they saw as crucial for the preservation of some semblance of a common Yugoslav state.80 In the words of Ambassador Ahrens, “Carrington seemed to believe that he needed the recognition issue in order to make pressure on Croats or Slovenes. There was always a certain tendency of pressuring the weaker party because the stronger party didn’t budge.”81 As Carrington elucidated in another of his interviews, “The point was that Serbia, being infinitely the biggest of the republics, was clearly the most important, and unless you somehow managed to keep Serbia onside, there wasn’t very much chance of getting an agreement.” Or, as he more

265 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

266 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning colorfully remarked, the Yugoslavs were “all impossible people . . . all as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs.”82 The only difference of opinion between Vance and Carrington was regarding which one of them was more able to coddle Miloševic´ into stopping his march westward. As Ambassador Wynaendts remembered, “Vance said to Carrington, ‘You don’t know how to deal with Miloševic´; I know much better.’ It reminded me of Roosevelt saying to Churchill, ‘I know how to speak to Uncle Joe; let me do it.’ ”83 While Carrington’s, Vance’s, and the US State Department’s efforts to use the United Nations to halt the EC’s drive to recognition may have been expected, Pérez de Cuéllar was also pressured by someone else to write his letter to van den Broek. As the British permanent representative to the UN, David Hannay, later admitted, it was he and the French permanent representative, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, who—at the urging of their foreign ministers— went to the UN secretary-general and also pushed him to write to the president of the EC Council.84 More significant, the two diplomats also—together with the US permanent representative to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering— at the same time floated a Security Council resolution which, among other things, “strongly urged all states and parties to refrain from any political action which might contribute to increasing tension, to inhibiting the establishment of an effective cease-fire and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia which would permit all the peoples in Yugoslavia to decide upon and to construct their future in peace.”85 The resolution’s target was clear, and the press understood what it all meant. It was an attempt to deter Germany from leading the EC toward recognition—the “political action which might contribute to increasing tension.”86 It was also an unprecedented diplomatic maneuver which not only put in question the deal on conditional recognition agreed to in Maastricht, but also made a mockery of the whole spirit of European unity, so strongly invoked at the conclusion of the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty. In the end, the French, British, and American plan with the United Nations failed. Genscher publicly and privately made it clear he would stand his ground. He wrote to Pérez de Cuéllar, warning him that his statements and their publication “were apt to encourage those elements in Yugoslavia which all along have vehemently been resisting the successful conclusion of the peace process.”87 He announced in press interviews that he was determined to press ahead with recognition and that he expected broad backing from the rest of the EC, insisting that non-recognition of the republics’ independence had not only failed to defuse the war, but had actually made the situation more dangerous. Finally, he personally staged a “counteroffensive on the phone,” directed at the

The End and the Beginning British and the French to get them to back off from their initiative with the Security Council resolution.88 Back off they did. Due to Genscher’s pressure, France and Britain watered down the resolution, fearing a great rift in the Community at the EC Council meeting on 16 December. As Roland Dumas remarked in his note of 14 December to President Mitterrand after Genscher’s clear stand, “For the Twelve, and especially for France and Germany, to split over the Balkans seems to me to be much more dangerous than the risk of hastening the conflagration in former Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia to split up is tragic; for the Community to do so would be catastrophic.”89 The effects of the Franco-British stunt at the United Nations on the eve of 16 December were highly negative. Genscher was walking into the EPC ministerial meeting, scheduled for that day, on the heels of a series of his own and his government’s public statements which had clearly announced that Germany would recognize Slovenia and Croatia at a session of Chancellor Kohl’s cabinet on 19 December “whether any, all, or none of the European states join us.”90 In an attempt to break the German foreign minister’s resolve, the British and the French managed only to damage his trust in them and to get him to publicly limit his policy options in order to make his stand.91 Douglas Hurd and Roland Dumas, on the other hand, were walking into the EPC meeting with a clear preference for further delay, but also with an understanding that their diplomatic battle was nearly lost.92 And the rest of the EC foreign ministers, all of different persuasions and opinions on the subject, were deeply distressed by the build-up to the meeting. Whereas just days before Maastricht a majority of them had been in favor of recognition and at Maastricht they had all tacitly agreed to creating a list of conditions for recognition, now the involvement of the United States and the UN secretary-general had succeeded in challenging their resolve.93 The Brussels meeting—probably the most talked about and written about episode of Europe’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis—quickly unfolded into discord. Lord Carrington, Roland Dumas, Douglas Hurd, and Hans van den Broek all argued—with varying degrees of conviction—for further delay.94 Their arguments, however, were centered not only on the issue of what recognition would mean for the Conference on Yugoslavia or for the fates of BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia, as they publicly claimed. They also argued for the prospect of still keeping some semblance of Yugoslavia. As Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens remembers, “The argument was that it was not desperate and that we should make the last try. That you never know in politics, that things can change, that we should once more try to convince all the parties [into] an adapted, looser confederation. . . . They wanted absolutely to maintain

267 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

268 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning the façade of an existing Yugoslavia.”95 The response of the strongest proponents of recognition—Genscher, De Michelis, Eyskens, and Ellemann-Jensen of Denmark—was that the time for delays had ended with the expiration of van den Broek’s two-month deadline and that it was instead time to accept reality, a fact that had been clearly elucidated by the Badinter Commission.96 Since the other camp kept returning to the EC decision in Rome to hold off recognition until a general settlement had been reached, Genscher had to remind everyone of what actually had happened on the battlefields after their 8 November meeting in the Italian capital: “Look at Rome, since you are talking so much about Rome. At Rome we gave the reprieve to Serbs and what did they do in the meantime? They finished with Vukovar, massacred who knows how many people, bombarded Dubrovnik. . . . Are we going to continue like that?”97 Although this argument convinced some, it seems that what actually carried the day were Genscher’s reminders “that his country had accommodated others at Maastricht and that the German government could not renege on its public commitment to a recognition before Christmas.”98 These reminders certainly worked with Douglas Hurd, who got the approval of his prime minister to agree to a deal with Genscher, at least partly on account of Germany’s “calling in her Maastricht debts.”99 The deal was, however, an awkward attempt at a compromise which did more to confuse than clarify the situation. The ministers agreed on two declarations. The first declaration outlined the list of conditions all Yugoslav and Soviet republics would have to satisfy in order to gain recognition. These included respect for the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Final Act, the rights of minorities, the inviolability of frontiers, and the acceptance of all commitments related to disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. The second declaration invited all Yugoslav republics to announce by 23 December whether they wished to be recognized as independent states, whether they accepted the aforementioned conditions, whether they accepted the treaty provisions of the Conference on Yugoslavia (especially those in Chapter II on human and minority rights), and whether they supported the efforts of the United Nations and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia. After 23 December the applications of the republics were to be submitted to the Badinter Commission “for advice,” and the EC member states agreed to implement their decisions to recognize all the republics which satisfied the conditions on 15 January.100 The Greek foreign minister, Antonis Samaras, also convinced his counterparts to include in the declaration a passage clearly aimed at Macedonia which required it to pledge constitutionally and politically that it had no territorial claims on a neighboring EC state in order to gain recognition.101

The End and the Beginning The principal reason why the EC declaration on the recognition of Yugoslav republics resulted in confusion lay in the fact that its main thrust appeared to be the pursuit of a common EC policy, whereas its language opened the path to the individual states to interpret policy as they saw fit. The role of the Badinter Commission in the evaluation of applications for recognition of the Yugoslav republics was to be merely advisory, and 15 January 1992 was not to be the date when the EC member states were going to announce whether they were recognizing or not recognizing particular republics but the date when they would implement their decisions—the definition of “implementation” being as unclear as the definitions of “acceptance,” “support,” and “respect” referred to in the declaration.102 This basically meant that the act of recognition of the Yugoslav republics was turned into a month-long process which paved the way for the governments of individual European states to start signaling their intent just days after the EC meeting. On 19 December, a number of European governments issued statements with similar, though slightly varied, messages for the Yugoslav republics. The government of Iceland declared it was recognizing Slovenia and Croatia but was withholding the establishment of diplomatic relations until after 15 January. The Swedish and Austrian governments declared they were recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, but they stipulated that recognition would not take effect until 15 January. The governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary announced they would simultaneously recognize Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January. The Italian government announced it would “on 15 January start implementing the formal recognition of the Yugoslav republics which by 23 December have asked it and have pledged to satisfy certain criteria. Among them are, without a doubt, Slovenia and Croatia.”103 And the German government, most notably, announced it was recognizing “those Yugoslav republics that declare by December 23, 1991, that they wish to be recognized as independent states and that they will meet the requirements set forth in the December 16 declaration on Yugoslavia of the European Community’s foreign ministers. Immediately after December 23 the minister of foreign affairs will begin discussions regarding the preparation of entering into diplomatic relations as of January 1992 with those republics that fulfill the above-mentioned requirements for recognition.”104 Four days later, as the deadline for the application for recognition expired on 23 December, Germany went one step further. It announced that out of the four republics which had submitted their applications for recognition—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia—it was recognizing two: Slovenia and Croatia. It also, however, stipulated that it was holding off on the implementation of its decision through the establishment of diplomatic relations until 15 January.

269 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

270 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning It would be an understatement to say that much has been made of Germany’s decisions of 19 and 23 December, and of Genscher’s efforts at the meeting of 16 December, in the press and the academic literature. One particularly influential line of argument has been that Germany “cheated” on the agreement of 16 December and “unilaterally” recognized Slovenia and Croatia with its decisions of 19 and 23 December in a dangerous and unprecedented Alleingang.105 Aside from the fact that all acts of recognition are inherently “unilateral” as they can only be issued by the governments of individual states, proponents of this line of argument miss the mark on a number of fronts. First, and most obviously, Germany was not alone either in its decisions of 19 and 23 December or in its efforts at the EC meeting of 16 December. As noted above, other European governments issued similar statements on 19 December, and other EC foreign ministers supported the efforts of Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the EC Council. Second, the declarations of the German government of 19 and 23 December satisfied the EC declaration of 16 December. The input of the Badinter Commission, for example, was meant to be simply advisory, and the German government was convinced Slovenia and Croatia had fulfilled the conditions for recognition because it had sent its own constitutional expert to make sure that was the case.106 Whether the German government’s decisions satisfied the spirit of the EC declaration of 16 December is another question, but in light of Franco-British actions in the run-up to the EC meeting and in light of the nature of the negotiating process which had led to the declaration, to consider the EC foreign ministers’ decision of 16 December as imbued with any spirit of European unity or diplomatic fair play seems to be rather naive. Finally, Germany’s position was clearly announced prior to the meeting of 16 December, at the meeting of 16 December, and in contacts with the press immediately after the meeting of 16 December.107 There was no ambiguity as to what the German government was going to do on 19 December, nor was there any surprise once it had done it. For perfect evidence, one needs only to look at the coverage of the events in the British press. Germany’s position was heavily criticized in the reports subsequent to the meeting of 16 December, whereas its decisions of 19 and 23 December received barely any coverage and were in fact labeled as the “honoring of a repeated pledge.”108 If there was no surprise, how could there have been “cheating”? Criticisms of Germany’s efforts were indeed very harsh, especially in countries which had done the most to halt the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. It is interesting that even the newspapers which at various points throughout the summer and fall of 1991 had argued in favor of recognition—like the New York Times and London’s Independent and Times—now balked at the possibility that

The End and the Beginning recognition would actually materialize.109 The New York Times provided probably the most muted of criticisms, arguing for a “de-recognition” of Yugoslavia, as well as for a delay in recognition of the individual republics until they “demonstrate a willingness to end ethnic strife.”110 This, obviously, implied that there should be a symmetry of both blame and punishment among the republics, a condition that was not only mistaken as a description of what was happening on the ground, but also illogical as a policy prescription meant to induce compliance from the principal players. The Times of London, on the other hand, argued that “recognition is the last step, not the first,” as if those who were seeking recognition were presenting obstacles to peace, as if diplomacy and means of Western pressure would be exhausted once recognition was given, and as if Europe had not already tried for six months to bring peace to the region.111 Perhaps the most revealing of criticisms came from the Guardian, which provided a brutally realist and cynical argument against recognition. Croatia was not to be recognized because its government did not control all of its territory and because “we cannot honestly tell what these great swathes of territory will look like after three years or even within three months.” The message was that the Balkan nations should be left to their own devices to fight over territory, while the West should stay out and simply contain the crisis. “When history is in such a state of flux, it would be wiser not to second-guess the future,” the editorial concluded.112 Much of the criticism, however, had little to do with the possible consequences of Europe’s policy on Yugoslavia but concentrated rather on the changing role of Germany in European affairs. The Guardian complained that British diplomats “should have been red-faced” after coming back from Brussels where they were forced to “fall into line behind Bonn” after they were given “a ride on a [German] bulldozer.”113 For the Times, Germany was “hijacking” EC policy and “steamrollering” the other eleven EC member states.114 As another Times commentator noted—after criticizing Germany for pushing the EC to recognize the republics within their borders and supposedly “eliminat[ing] a useful bargaining chip in negotiating peace”—“The lesson that is immediately clear is that a unified Germany, anxious to establish its international role as a sovereign power and unnervingly sure of the rightness of its thinking, is an unpredictable giant in our midst.”115 Or as President Mitterrand even more revealingly suggested, “The days of the ‘good Germans’ are almost over and . . . the world must brace itself for the worst.”116 Considering such bitter, though predictable, criticisms from some of its most important EC partners, why did Germany push for recognition at the EC meeting of 16 December, why did it on 19 December suggest it would recognize all republics which had satisfied the EC conditions for recognition, and why

271 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

272 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning did it on 23 December actually extend its recognition to Slovenia and Croatia? Some have suggested that the German government’s internal political considerations were the decisive factor. The Social Democrats, for example, continued pressuring the government to pursue the policy of recognition and thus limited its maneuvering space well into December.117 What is more, at the same time as the EC meeting was taking place on 16 December, the ruling Christian Democrats held their first all-German congress in Dresden, where a new political platform calling for a more assertive foreign policy was being discussed. Chancellor Kohl certainly made good use of the EC decision on conditional recognition—“a great success for Germany’s foreign policy,” as he labeled it— at his party’s congress, especially since the CDU’s rank and file and the German public needed to be placated after the Maastricht negotiations.118 His concessions on the agreement on social policy and the Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht resulted in Germans beginning to question “why anyone would wish to give more authority over foreign policy to a European Community that was strong enough to undercut German sovereignty, but too weak to coerce the political and ethnic factions in Yugoslavia.”119 An arguably even more convincing case is made by those who have suggested that Germany’s decisions in mid-December were guided by its foreign policy makers’ deep feelings of mistrust and disappointment with their EC partners. Germany had cooperated and played along with the rest of the Community throughout that summer and fall but had been outmaneuvered each time the EC was supposed to adopt a tougher stance toward Serbia. Instead of continuing the Conference on Yugoslavia with the cooperating parties and instituting selective sanctions on Serbia after Miloševic´’s final rejection of the Carrington plan on 5 November, the Community—partly under American pressure—had instead returned to the policy of evenhandedness at the NATO summit in Rome. Instead of respecting the two-month deadline for the completion of negotiations on the future of Yugoslav space, which expired on 10 December, some in the Community were now talking of an indefinite delay in recognition. And instead of respecting the deal on conditional recognition agreed to on the margins of the Maastricht summit, France and the United Kingdom at the very same time had gone to the United Nations to try to “rein in” Germany. Though the decisions of the German government of 19 and 23 December were preannounced, they actually served an additional purpose: they were an insurance policy that the opponents of Germany’s line would not stall with recognition yet again beyond 15 January.120 All of these possible explanations for Germany’s efforts and actions in mid-December, however, miss one crucial point: German foreign policy makers

The End and the Beginning simply believed they were right—right about their interpretations of what was happening on the ground and right about their policy prescriptions.121 As a position paper of the Auswärtiges Amt from March 1993 explained, Germany believed that the Yugoslav war was not a civil war but a war of conquest by Serbia. Because of that, the international community had two choices: either to militarily contain Serbia or to internationalize the conflict “by political means through formal recognition of the threatened republics in order to thwart any hopes Belgrade might have of faits accomplis achieved through the use of force being tolerated.”122 This principle extended not only to Croatia—as the critics of Germany often suggest—but also to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC decision of 16 December and Germany’s decision of 19 December extended to all Yugoslav republics exactly because Genscher took to heart the plea of Alija Izetbegovic´ “not to recognize Slovenia and Croatia only” and thus did not want to leave the Bosnians behind.123 As the German ambassador in Belgrade, Hans-Jörg Eiff— hardly a proponent of recognition—later conceded, Genscher took the warnings on Bosnia-Herzegovina seriously and believed “the recognition of Croatia without the solution of the Bosnian problem would lead to a bloodbath to the extent nobody could imagine.”124 After formally recognizing Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December—and thus fulfilling the public pledge to extend recognition to those two republics by Christmas—German foreign policy makers wanted to do the same with Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible.125 They were simply convinced not only of their interpretation of Miloševic´’s regime and its war aims, but also of the need for Europe and the West to strongly and proactively engage with the region. Chancellor Kohl’s response to the critics of recognition from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom at the CDU’s Dresden congress is perhaps most revealing in this respect: “We won’t let ourselves be lectured by others who have hardly raised a finger to support the reform process in Eastern Europe.”126 The consequences of Germany’s assertiveness on the issue of recognition were profound. In Yugoslavia, the foundations of Miloševic´’s plan finally began to crumble. One needs only to look at a series of intercepted communications between the Serbian president and his associates to fully understand the sense of disbelief and alarm that gripped the Serbian leadership, especially regarding the possibility that Bosnia-Herzegovina might be recognized.127 In the Western diplomatic world, on the other hand, Germany began to pay a high price. The intensity of criticism to which it was subjected immediately after the meeting of 16 December did not decrease but arguably became even more malicious.128 British MPs complained of “the strength of Germany [being] once again not very different from what it was at the beginning of 1938” and of “German

273 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

274 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning influence . . . spreading to all the countries that were once under the Prussian empire and under the Hapsburg empire.”129 Years later, both those who were and those who were not involved in the events blamed Germany not only for what subsequently transpired in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but even for the whole dissolution of Yugoslavia in the first place.130 As a result, after December, Germany was shoved aside on practically all matters related to Europe’s policy in the Balkans. Some of this had to do with a self-imposed introspection and withdrawal on the part of the German foreign policy makers and diplomats, who were stunned by the level of criticism to which they were subjected.131 Some of it, on the other hand, had to do with German diplomats literally being cut out of the negotiating process, as was the case with Lord Carrington’s demotion of Ambassador Ahrens at the Conference on Yugoslavia in early 1992.132 It is difficult to say what the root cause of this resentment toward Germany was and whether it actually had anything to do with the Yugoslav crisis. Perhaps for those of the more realist inclination, as one European official said to the Daily Telegraph, this had nothing to do with the recognition of Yugoslavia’s dissolution but with “the recognition of Germany as a Superpower.”133 And for the others, who were of a more liberal and Europeanist conviction, this had to do with the fact that Germany seemed to be willing to challenge the EC’s unity in order to pursue what it saw as an effective and just policy. As another European official later lamented, “We could not have solved the Yugoslav crisis, but at least we could and should have stayed together . . . united in unsuccessful policy . . . in failure, but nonetheless united.”134 The EC’s decisions on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics took place during a critical period of the international diplomatic endeavor to stop the violence. Carrington’s conference had, for all intents and purposes, already failed, and the work of Cyrus Vance and the United Nations was near failure as well. After getting Miloševic´’s, Tud‒man’s, and Kadijevic´’s signatures on a cease-fire deal in Geneva on 23 November, Vance had little to show for his efforts. In an attempt to find a middle ground between Serbia’s wish to have the “blue helmets” stationed along the front line and Croatia’s wish to have them along Croatia’s legal frontiers, Vance—together with Marrack Goulding—devised a plan for the stationing of the UN troops throughout the municipalities significantly populated by Serbs in an “ink-blot” fashion. These municipalities—to be known as UN Protected Areas (UNPAs)—were to be completely demilitarized. The JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia were also to be relocated outside of the republic. The only armed presence throughout the UNPAs were to be the ten thousand UN peacekeepers and the local police forces, which were to be created from local residents in proportions reflecting the national composition of

The End and the Beginning the population prior to the war.135 The problem was that by the second week of December this plan was nowhere near implementation. Vance did get Croatia to accept the plan and to fulfill its commitment to release the last of the JNA’s blockaded garrisons.136 The violence, however, continued—especially around Osijek and Dubrovnik. What is more, the Krajina Serbs began to act independently of Miloševic´ and openly rejected the UN plan. In his report of 11 December, the UN secretary-general had no choice but to conclude—at Vance’s suggestion— that the conditions for any deployment of UN peacekeepers had not been met. Starting with the third week of December, a serious and very public rift between Miloševic´ and the Krajina leadership (primarily Krajina’s president, Milan Babic´) intensified. SAO Krajina “upgraded” its status on 19 December 1991 by proclaiming itself to be the “Republic of Serb Krajina” (RSK) and asking the international community for recognition.137 While Miloševic´ at least implicitly supported that move, his irritation with Krajina’s continuing rejection of the Vance plan for the deployment of the UN peacekeepers was palpable both publicly and privately.138 Miloševic´’s problem was not only that the impending recognition of Croatia was going to make it more difficult for the JNA to still be stationed on its territory, but also that he wanted to demonstrate to the international community that the United Nations was a better alternative than the EC in negotiations. There was no confusion either on his part or on the part of his associates in Belgrade and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the question of how they planned to use the UN deployment in Krajina. They had not given up on Krajina, but Croatia’s recognition made it necessary to find a different method of permanently tearing Krajina’s territory away from Zagreb. As the vice-president of Miloševic´’s SPS, Mihajlo Markovic´, stated in Politika on 29 December, “If the UN peacekeepers come to the territory of the Republic of Krajina, it will be temporarily under international protectorate, outside of the borders of Croatia and Yugoslavia. Its subsequent joining with Yugoslavia through democratic means would only be a matter of time.”139 Or as Radovan Karadžic´ more openly explained to one of his associates in Banja Luka on 27 December, “Milan Babic´ thinks that it is enough that we hold the territory and that Tud‒man will then sign the secession of one-third of Croatia. . . . That could only happen if he was compelled [to do so] by the United Nations, and that could take at least five years. . . . If we accept [the Vance plan], Tud‒man is finished. Because then he has to reject it, and then the guilt is on him and on Germany. . . . We received reliable information from the British and the French that this is being worked on, that Tud‒man’s only hope is that the Serbs say no.”140 By the last days of 1991, however, Miloševic´’s pressure had failed to bear fruit, and Cyrus Vance was no closer to success in organizing a peacekeeping

275 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

276 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning operation. At a meeting in New York on Christmas Eve among the incoming UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali; his outgoing predecessor, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar; and Cyrus Vance, Boutros-Ghali expressed his wish “to disengage from Yugoslavia as soon as possible; there was no law that obliged the UN to assume responsibility for every problem in the world; Yugoslavia was a European problem; let the Europeans deal with it.”141 He faced no disagreement from the others. Little changed at a meeting between Vance and his assistants two days later, where Vance merely announced a trip to Yugoslavia for “one last try” to see what could be done.142 Pérez de Cuéllar once again, in his last statement on Yugoslavia to the Security Council on 27 December, had no choice but to conclude that the conditions for any deployment of UN peacekeepers had not been met.143 Vance’s “one last try,” however, this time did have results. Miloševic´, sensing that his plan of getting the “blue helmets” to do his bidding was slipping away, upped the ante. On 2 January, delegations of the JNA and the Croatian ministry of defense met with Vance in Sarajevo and signed an accord which reiterated and extended the failed Geneva cease-fire of 23 November.144 Any hope Krajina leaders may have had for the continuation of territorial expansion were brought to a halt. In their meetings with Vance, both Miloševic´ and Kadijevic´ insisted on the materialization of his concept for a peacekeeping operation and pledged that the Krajina Serbs would be brought into line.145 Indeed, after Milan Babic´ demanded the stationing of the UN forces along the front line and rejected the demilitarization of Krajina on 4 and again on 6 January, Miloševic´ resorted to an unprecedented move not only to discipline the Krajina leadership, but also to demonstrate his cooperation to Vance. On 8 January, he wrote an open letter to Babic´ demanding that he either relent or face withdrawal of support from “the citizens of Krajina.”146 The decision on the sending of a peacekeeping mission was not completely made until mid-February (of which more below), but Miloševic´’s intervention in early January made it clear that its final implementation would not be in question. While it is admittedly difficult to judge whether Miloševic´’s commitment to the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation and his pressure on Babic´ were decisively influenced by the EC’s and Germany’s decisions on the recognition of Croatia, it is even more difficult to imagine the Serbian president halting his war machine and resorting to the United Nations if there had been no EC pressure and no prospect of recognition.147 Some of his principal associates, like Montenegro’s representative on the rump federal presidency, Branko Kostic´, or General Života Panic´, who was soon to be rewarded for his command over the Vukovar operations with the post of chief of the army’s general staff, later openly admitted that recognition had an

The End and the Beginning important effect on Serbia’s and the army’s decision making regarding the United Nations.148 By bringing in the United Nations, Miloševic´ could secure his winnings in Croatia in spite of its recognition, revamp his image in the West—as he would so often do in the coming years—into one of indispensable peacemaker, and concentrate on the real prize: Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is exactly the position and role of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the whole story of the creation of the UN peacekeeping force that is perhaps the most instructive in elucidating Miloševic´’s motivations, as well as the dynamics of his relationship with the UN negotiators. The discussions on the sending of peacekeeping troops to Yugoslavia were at this time not limited only to Croatia. The leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina repeatedly throughout that fall appealed to the United Nations for a peacekeeping operation in their republic which would defuse tensions and prevent the worst from happening. Alija Izetbegovic´ on 12 November called for the immediate deployment of UN troops, and the following week his government presented Vance’s assistant, Herbert Okun, with a detailed plan for a force of 2,000–3,000 UN peacekeepers to be positioned on BosniaHerzegovina’s critical border crossings and airports.149 The call was repeated directly to Vance in late December and was this time actually backed by a similar request from the EC foreign ministers.150 Nothing, however, came of it. The main reasons why the United Nations refused to do anything on BosniaHerzegovina at this time and thus missed a glorious opportunity to prevent a brutal war lay in the misjudgment of Cyrus Vance and the general unwillingness of high-ranking UN officials to expand their involvement in Yugoslavia in any way. After Izetbegovic´ presented to Vance his plan for a limited UN deployment along Bosnia’s borders with Croatia and Serbia, Miloševic´ and his proxies in BiH unsurprisingly rejected it.151 UN troops would have foiled their ongoing preparations for aggression. The problem was that Vance and his assistants did nothing to pressure the Serbs to change their position. Instead of realizing that Miloševic´ needed him to put the “blue helmets” into Krajina, Vance mistakenly believed that it was he who needed the Serbian president to get the Krajina peacekeeping operation off the ground.152 As for the unwillingness of the high UN officials to do anything in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the stunning level of cynicism with which they demonstrated it at the time, the explanation of high UN official Shashi Tharoor, given to the BiH leaders in late December 1991 regarding why their republic could not get the UN troops, is probably the most instructive. “First war should happen,” Tharoor explained. “It should be a terrible war in order to attract the attention of the international community. Then a cease-fire should occur, and then we send in the troops.”153 Within months, Tharoor’s conditions were fulfilled.

277 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

278 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning Progress on the UN front in Croatia and the announcements of a number of European states that they were going to implement their decisions on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics on 15 January did not remove the drama and discord from the EC’s meeting on that crucial day. Most of the friction among the EC foreign ministers stemmed from the advice they had solicited from the Badinter Commission and its disparity from their political goals. On 11 January, the commission came out with a string of six opinions. Opinion Nos. 2 and 3 were its answers to the two questions posed by Serbia regarding the right of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to self-determination and the possible international status of inter-republican frontiers. Opinion Nos. 4 through 7 were the commission’s evaluations of the applications for recognition by the four republics whose governments had expressed their wish to be recognized: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. These six opinions have been a great source of controversy from the moment they became public.154 The commission’s Opinion Nos. 2 and 3 legally tore down the scaffolding for the creation of a Greater Serbia. Opinion No. 2 concluded that the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs had the right to choose their nationality and were “entitled to all the rights accorded to minorities and ethnic groups under international law and under the provisions of the draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991” but that they did not have the right of selfdetermination in terms of a right to secession from their home republics. Opinion No. 3 similarly concluded that the borders between Serbia and Croatia, as well as between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were indeed to be seen as “frontiers in terms of public international law” and that they could only be changed peacefully through agreement freely arrived at.155 Miloševic´’s principal claims finally saw their legal defeat. Of the remaining four opinions, only Opinion No. 7 on the international recognition of Slovenia did not cause any controversy.156 The commission ruled that Slovenia did satisfy the tests in the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” and in the “Declaration on Yugoslavia,” which were adopted by the EC Council on 16 December. In its Opinion No. 6, the commission also ruled that Macedonia satisfied the tests for recognition by the EC member states and that its renouncement of any territorial claims and its commitment to refrain from hostile propaganda against any other state—as requested by Greece—were satisfactory. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s application for EC recognition, on the other hand, was deemed to be deficient. In its Opinion No. 4, the Badinter Commission did not rule that BosniaHerzegovina had failed to satisfy the tests established by the EC guidelines but

The End and the Beginning actually suggested that—in light of the clear opposition of the Bosnian Serbs to the BiH presidency’s and government’s decisions on independence—it was not possible to establish the will of the citizens of this republic. The commission also suggested it could review its decision “if appropriate guarantees were provided by the republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of all the citizens of [Bosnia-Herzegovina] without distinction, carried out under international supervision.” Finally, in its Opinion No. 5 on Croatia’s application for EC recognition, the commission expressed a reservation regarding whether this republic had satisfied the tests established by the Community’s guidelines and declaration on Yugoslavia. The Badinter Commission established that Croatia had met all the conditions for its recognition by the EC member states except for one: its Constitutional Law of 4 December on human rights and the rights of minorities did “not fully incorporate all the provisions of the draft Convention of 4 November 1991, notably those contained in Chapter II Article 2(c), under the heading ‘Special status.’ ” The principal problem with Croatia’s Constitutional Law, as the Badinter Commission and Lord Carrington explained in their communication with the Croatian president in mid-December, was that it did not provide for the demilitarization of the areas with the special status, that it established the position of a “government representative” who was to have broad powers of oversight over the areas with the special status, and that it mainly provided for the organization of the special status along municipal instead of regional lines.157 The arbitration commission’s reservation has subsequently been wrongly interpreted by a number of diplomats, journalists, and academics as a firm decision against Croatia’s recognition on account of its “human rights violations” of the local Serbs.158 The arbitration commission itself tried to dispel this misperception in its comment of 4 July 1992 regarding Croatia’s Constitutional Law; it reiterated not only that in January 1992 it had found Croatia’s application for recognition satisfactory except for the one reservation, but also that the provisions of the draft convention of 4 November were themselves unclear on the definition of local autonomy and that Croatia’s Constitutional Law did satisfy “the requirements of general international law regarding the protection of minorities.”159 When the EC foreign ministers met in Brussels on 15 January in order to discuss their decisions on the issue of recognition of the four republics, they were presented with a series of legal documents which put them in a delicate position. Yugoslavia’s future had already been sealed by the arbitration commission’s Opinion No. 1, and Miloševic´’s claims had been defeated by its Opinions Nos. 2 and 3. After 16 December, the resolve of most EC states to recognize the Yugoslav

279 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

280 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning republics had been further strengthened by a number of other factors. The string of decisions and public commitments of various European states—most notably Germany—had limited everyone’s options. The Soviet Union had officially ceased to exist with the advent of the new year, and Mikhail Gorbachev had left the international scene together with the state over which he had presided. What is more, on 7 January a JNA MiG had shot down a helicopter of the ECMM in Croatia, killing five EC monitors. The federal secretary for the people’s defense, General Veljko Kadijevic´, apologized for the incident and paid for it with his resignation, but the public perception of the JNA in the West was only solidified.160 Though there was no doubt that Yugoslavia was finally finished, the opinions of the Badinter Commission presented the EC foreign ministers with a critical policy question: which of the four republics were they going to recognize? In one of the most controversial decisions of their involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, the foreign ministers opted for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and postponed their recognition of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina until “important matters” had been addressed.161 Apart from the recognition of Slovenia, which was widely seen in the press and diplomatic circles as a foregone conclusion, the Community’s decisions on the remaining three republics were almost instantaneously labeled as deeply flawed. The decision to recognize Croatia was—largely due to the one reservation of the Badinter Commission—in particular seen as merely a nod to Germany because of its recognition of Croatia of 23 December. Speculation was compounded by the fact that a number of EC member states—most notably France and the United Kingdom—postponed establishing full diplomatic relations with Croatia until it altered its Constitutional Law on minorities to fully comply with the Carrington draft convention of 4 November.162 The fact of the matter was, however, that the foreign ministers on 15 January had not only the opinion of the Badinter Commission (which was supposed to have just an “advisory” purpose anyway), but also a letter from President Tud‒man dated 13 January affirming Croatia’s acceptance of the provisions of the Carrington plan regarding “special status” areas. This letter had come too late to be considered by the commission, but Badinter did submit it without comment to the Portuguese EC presidency prior to the meeting of 15 January.163 Since the EC declaration of 16 December on the conditions for recognition of the Yugoslav republics stated that the republics had “to state whether they accept the provisions” of the draft convention, rather than have the provisions implemented, Tud‒man’s written commitment of acceptance did satisfy the EC request.164 The decision to recognize Croatia was thus considered by the EC foreign ministers themselves to be far less controversial than subsequently suggested in the press

The End and the Beginning and academic literature and was largely based on the opinion of the Badinter Commission, or at least on the fact that the commission’s objection to Croatia’s application was qualified. As Douglas Hurd later recollected, the United Kingdom was actually prepared to withhold Croatia’s recognition, “if Badinter had come in all guns blazing: ‘the situation is such that you should not recognize.’ But that did not happen.”165 The Community’s decision on Macedonia, on the other hand, did not have even the slightest grounding in the opinion of the Badinter Commission. The commission ruled that Macedonia had satisfied all conditions for recognition by the EC states, but the eleven foreign ministers who agreed with that position in the end succumbed to the diplomatic offensive of the Greek prime minister, Constantine Mitsotakis. Although Greece argued that its opposition was simply a response to the issue of Macedonia’s name, which the Greeks found to be a signal of this republic’s claim to their territory and heritage, the actions of the Greek diplomats told a much more problematic story. Mitsotakis had actually launched his diplomatic offensive against Macedonia at a meeting with Miloševic´ in Belgrade on 14 January and hosted the Serbian president in Athens two days later. On both occasions he had expressed support for Miloševic´’s claim that Yugoslavia would simply continue with the four unrecognized republics.166 What is even more alarming, we now know that such close coordination of policies and positions between Greece and Serbia had begun much earlier than January 1992, extended for years to come, and involved deeply troubling plans and actions to destabilize Macedonia politically, economically, and even militarily.167 Greece’s unprincipled policy toward Macedonia (which from February 1992 already included an embargo on the movement of goods), its long collaboration and support of Miloševic´’s regime throughout the 1990s, and the EC’s and later the EU’s toleration of such actions were undeniably some of the most scandalous episodes in the story of Western diplomatic efforts in former Yugoslavia. Unlike their decisions on Croatia and Macedonia, the decision of the EC foreign ministers not to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina did not receive as much public scrutiny at the time, primarily due to the Badinter Commission’s suggestion of a referendum. It was, however, the decision with the most detrimental long-term consequences, all of which were clearly foreseeable. This decision to postpone the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was, however, not easily arrived at. Germany tried to convince its partners to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, but scarred by the harsh criticisms of his decision making on Slovenia and Croatia, Genscher chose not to insist on the issue.168 Instead of using the same logic that appeared to have worked in steering the Serbian camp toward peace in Croatia,

281 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

282 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning the foreign ministers instead opted for yet another round of more gradual and piecemeal diplomatic efforts geared toward placating Serbia over BiH. It was a disastrous miscalculation, which left the initiative clearly with Miloševic´ and his proxies in the Bosnian SDS. Indeed, judging by the intercepted communications from the period, the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the one thing that Miloševic´ and his closest circle feared the most and the one international act that could have derailed their plans with this republic. The prospect of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recognition was throughout the first two weeks of January the subject of a series of conversations between Radovan Karadžic´ and the head of Serbia’s State Security Service, Jovica Stanišic´. Karadžic´’s fear of the recognition of BosniaHerzegovina and his anger at what he perceived to be Miloševic´’s lack of preparedness for that possibility were palpable. “Nothing is the way it was estimated,” he fumed to Stanišic´ on 5 January. “I’m afraid there is a very dramatic lack of a realistic estimate,” he added on 12 January. To the great relief of the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, clearly expressed in Karadžic´’s conversation with Miloševic´ on 15 January, Miloševic´’s calculation that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be recognized was proven correct.169 Their schemes could continue. The EC had missed a great chance to preempt a war that would soon make the war in Croatia pale in comparison. Of all the mistakes the European Community had made regarding the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, this one was probably the most tragic. The formal recognition of Croatia, on the other hand, expedited the creation of the UN mission to this republic. The Krajina leadership under Milan Babic´ still resisted the main provisions of the Vance plan, but all of that changed during the last days of January and the first days of February, when Miloševic´’s strong political offensive against Babic´ finally bore fruit. In his assault on Babic´’s standing in Krajina, the Serbian president was crucially assisted by the chief UN negotiators. On 28 January, Marrack Goulding visited Zagreb and told President Tud‒man that he had promised Miloševic´, among other things, that the UN operation would not change the status quo of Krajina’s governing structures and that the UNPAs would not be under the jurisdiction of Croatia.170 This was more than just a clarification of what had been agreed to earlier by the UN negotiators with both Miloševic´ and Tud‒man; it was a stretched interpretation of Vance’s original concept, introduced solely to help Miloševic´ convince the Krajina leadership. What is even more problematic, it was accompanied by behind-the-scenes claims of the UN negotiators to the Serbs that the Vance plan’s references to Krajina’s being “in Croatia” were merely geographical and not political.171 As one of Miloševic´’s key assistants, Mihalj Kertes, summed up

The End and the Beginning to Radovan Karadžic´ the gist of the meeting between the Serbian leadership and the UN delegation, “Today what I heard from the mouth of this Englishman is super. . . . He’s super, that’s all there is to it. . . . The main thing is that Croatia will never again be sovereign over those areas.”172 Such doublespeak by the UN officials definitely helped Miloševic´ sell the Vance plan to the Krajina Serbs. However, it was also a recipe for future disaster as the Serbs and Croats were bound to interpret political reality and the UN mission in diametrically opposite ways. Tud‒man was, naturally, surprised by Goulding’s new interpretation of the Vance plan and initially rejected it. His opposition was, nevertheless, shortlived. At Vance’s urging, Genscher called the Croatian president and succeeded in persuading him to unconditionally accept the plan.173 The path to Milan Babic´’s acceptance of the UN mission was, however, not so easy. Between 31 January and 2 February, Babic´ and his chief associates from the government of Krajina were subjected to pressure from the whole Miloševic´ apparatus at a non-stop two-day meeting in Belgrade. Functionaries from the federal rump presidency, the Bosnian SDS, the leadership of Serbia, the leadership of Montenegro, and the top brass from the JNA High Command tried to cajole Krajina’s political leadership into agreement.174 They managed to get the leaders of the Croatian Serbs from eastern and western Slavonia on their side, but Babic´ remained stubborn. He left the meeting and went back to Knin without agreeing to anything. However, his most trusted associates, who stayed in Belgrade, betrayed him. They succumbed to Miloševic´’s pressure, accepted the Vance plan, and organized a separate Krajina assembly, which, after several weeks of a power struggle with Babic´’s faction, chose a new Krajina government and relieved Babic´ of his duties.175 The spirit of the purges of the “anti-bureaucratic” revolution lived on, and Miloševic´’s power over Krajina remained unchallenged. On 21 February 1992, Security Council Resolution 743 established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was to be stationed in four sectors in Croatia (North, South, East, and West) covering the municipalities and parts of municipalities where the Serbs constituted either a majority or a significant minority. (See figure 2.) The force of nearly fifteen thousand soldiers and civilian personnel was to provide protection for the local Serb population while overseeing the full demilitarization of the four sectors, the return of refugees, and the establishment of local police forces whose composition was to closely follow the 1991 census. Although its arrival did mark the end of major hostilities throughout Croatia, UNPROFOR very soon proved to be a failure in virtually all aspects of its mission.

283 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

284 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning

Figure 2.  UN Protected Areas and frontlines in Croatia, early 1992

The JNA officially left Krajina, but the bulk of its staff and weaponry was turned into the new “Military of Serb Krajina,” which was endowed with significant artillery, armor, and aerial capabilities. Some JNA weapons were also simply painted over and given to the infamous Krajina Militia run by Milan Martic´.176 All operations of the Krajina armed forces, as well as the functioning of the entire Krajina civilian apparatus, were financed directly by Serbia.177 No attempt was made to create a police force whose national composition matched the prewar census, partly because no real attempt was made to return more than one hundred thousand non-Serbs who had been purged from the occupied territories. In fact, the ethnic cleansing of the “Republic of Serb Krajina” continued unabated well after the arrival of the UN troops. Moreover, the UN troops

The End and the Beginning actually used the continuing intimidation, violence, and lawlessness as an excuse to at times forcibly stop the efforts of the expelled civilians to return to their homes.178 Particular bones of contention were also the so-called “pink zones”—areas in Sectors North and South which were controlled by the Serb troops but were not supposed to be part of the UNPAs. Though the Vance plan implied that Croatia’s authority would be returned to these zones, Serb forces refused to comply and in June 1992 actually got the United Nations’ agreement to make the “pink zones” part of the UNPA regime.179 As the UN secretary-general finally recognized in his 16 March 1994 report to the Security Council, “The Serb side has taken advantage of the presence of UNPROFOR in its efforts to freeze the status quo, under UNPROFOR ‘protection,’ while establishing a selfproclaimed ‘State’ of the ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’ in UNPROFOR’s area of responsibility.”180 The UN mission, therefore, may have helped bring about a tenuous peace to Croatia’s front lines, but it also helped entrench the division of Croatia. All of this was, unsurprisingly, a source of great frustration for the Croats, and it culminated in the UNPROFOR’s final failure: the failure to protect the local population from vengeful acts following Croatia’s military defeat of Krajina in 1995. CREATING ETHNIC REALITIES: WAR FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The fragile cease-fire and the arrival of the UN forces to an internationally recognized Croatia did not mean that the worst was over for the now already former Yugoslavia. All observers of the federation’s dissolution understood that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the “grand prize” of the whole process. The Serbs saw it as the center of their project for the creation of a Greater Serbian state; the Croats were divided and saw it either as the subject of their predatory claims or as an indivisible barrier to Serb advances; the Muslims saw it as the conditio sine qua non of their survival; and the international negotiators saw it as the ultimate test of their ability to secure peace in former Yugoslavia. Throughout the winter of 1991–1992, Bosnia’s steady slide toward war—particularly due to the extensive preparations for aggression by the Bosnian Serbs and their sponsors in Belgrade—appeared to be unstoppable. It was not. The EC’s decision to postpone Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recognition left this republic in a tense state of limbo. Since Lord Carrington and the Conference on Yugoslavia had failed to initiate true negotiations among the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, Bosnia’s three principal national groups only stiffened in their resolve to pursue mutually irreconcilable policies. Their sole real interactions

285 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

286 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning during this period were a series of secret bilateral meetings. These meetings, however, merely increased public mistrust and suspicion, and—rather than alleviating pressures—actually brought Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to war. The principal reason why Bosnia-Herzegovina plummeted toward war was the strategy of the Bosnian Serb leadership, which was directed from Belgrade. It is impossible to wage war without the necessary structure and weapons, and the Bosnian Serbs by early 1992 had built and acquired both. The documents of the Bosnian SDS used in trials against its officials at the ICTY clearly demonstrate the extent and nature of this party’s plan for an apartheid-like power takeover in a series of municipalities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.181 Documents confiscated from the JNA headquarters in Sarajevo in May 1992 furthermore demonstrate that the Yugoslav army had already equipped the volunteer units organized by the SDS with tens of thousands of firearms by the early spring of 1991.182 As the situation in Croatia escalated, this collaboration deepened. Virtually all armored and artillery units which the JNA withdrew from Croatia throughout that autumn ended up in Bosnia-Herzegovina and were positioned in strategic locations ready for imminent action.183 These forces transformed Bosnia-Herzegovina not only into a launching pad for further incursions into Croatia, but also into the prime target of intimidation directed against the local Muslim and Croat populations and their leaderships. In September and October 1991, these JNA forces acted in concert with Serb volunteer and paramilitary units to wreak havoc throughout the republic, especially in the heavily Muslim-populated areas in central and eastern Bosnia.184 Perhaps the best evidence of their intent was the fact that in September 1991 they had already dug trenches and prepared artillery units on the hills around Sarajevo.185 With the recognition of Croatia becoming a near certainty and the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina a distinct possibility, coordination between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb leadership in their preparations for war intensified even further. According to Borisav Jovic´, in early December 1991 Slobodan Miloševic´ decided to instruct the JNA to shift its personnel based on their geographic origin so that the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular would be stationed only in that republic. The goal was to “create the possibility for the Serb leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina to assume command over the Serb part of the JNA.”186 By Christmas, this JNA shift was nearly completed, as was the creation of a detailed structure for a full power takeover in all municipalities the BiH SDS could keep under control.187 In this project the SDS was crucially assisted by the State Security Service of Serbia, which throughout December increased its interactions with Radovan Karadžic´ and his closest associates on both political and military matters. With such support, on 9 January 1992 the

The End and the Beginning Bosnian Serbs felt comfortable enough to upgrade the status of their SAOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina into the “Republic of Serb Bosnia-Herzegovina,” which declared itself to be an independent and integral federal unit of Yugoslavia.188 The aim of the Bosnian Serbs was clearly out in the open. Since their intimidation of the whole republic—and particularly the Bosnian Muslims—had failed with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s request for recognition, they wanted to reserve the largest possible piece of BiH land for the new “smaller Yugoslavia.” The position of the Bosnian Croats, on the other hand, was not nearly as cohesive as that of the Bosnian Serbs. The Croats were uniformly disillusioned with the (in)actions of the Muslim leadership over the course of the war in Croatia and disappointed with the general lack of preparation for the coming war in BosniaHerzegovina. The SDA leadership, and Alija Izetbegovic´ in particular, seemed to the Bosnian Croats to be too naive and too conciliatory toward the Serb side and the JNA. But whereas some of the BiH Croats had little understanding of the difficult position in which the Bosnian Muslims found themselves and advocated the abandonment of any Muslim-Croat alliance (and of the Bosnian state in general), others continued to believe that Izetbegovic´ and his party would gradually give up their illusions of being able to tame the JNA or the SDS leadership. The Bosnian Croats were essentially split into two camps which saw the future Croat policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina in two diametrically opposite ways. On one end were those led by the president of the BiH HDZ, Stjepan Kljuic´, who believed that the only salvation for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina— and especially those in the mixed areas of Posavina and central Bosnia—lay in an alliance with the Bosnian Muslims and the pursuit and defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an indivisible state of three equal constituent nations. They drew the bulk of their support exactly from areas where Croats were the most vulnerable and did not constitute a majority, and—most important—they had the backing of the Catholic Church. Their opponents, however, had a much more important sponsor. Franjo Tud‒man’s low regard for BosniaHerzegovina and his taste for its division were well known publicly and in political and diplomatic circles.189 Although his negotiations with Miloševic´ on the issue of division in the spring of 1991 had not led to a deal and although the Serbian side proved itself to be dishonest and uncompromisingly brutal in its expansionism, Tud‒man’s school of thought had strong followers among some BiH Croats—especially from areas of western Herzegovina with an overwhelming Croat majority. The goal of this wing of the BiH HDZ, led by Mate Boban, was to basically mimic the policy of the SDS in an attempt to eventually break off the largest possible piece of Bosnia-Herzegovina and annex it to Croatia.190

287 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

288 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning There is probably no better evidence of the depth of the chasm between these two camps of the BiH Croats than a transcript of their meeting with President Tud‒man and his associates in Zagreb on 27 December 1991.191 Earlier that year, in November, as the Serb siege of Vukovar reached its final stage and the attacks on Dubrovnik intensified, the HDZ faction led by Boban had created the “Croatian Communities” (HZs) of Herzeg-Bosnia and Posavina as an answer to the Serb preparations for war in Bosnia and as a structure which was supposed to help the Croats in gaining the largest possible part of BiH in case of the republic’s dissolution.192 These “Croatian Communities”—a rather straightforward parallel to the “Serb Autonomous Regions”—were created and run independently of the official BiH HDZ leadership (though almost certainly with Tud‒man’s blessing), and they made the clash between the party’s two factions very public and highly contentious.193 Tud‒man called a meeting in Zagreb to unify the Bosnian HDZ around his platform and to reestablish his clear line of control over the party’s policy actions. The meeting, however, achieved nothing of the sort. Tud‒man expressed his doubts about the prudence of pushing for the unity and sovereignty of BosniaHerzegovina on account of the overwhelming presence of the JNA and its obvious war preparations, as well as what he saw to be the problematic policy of the Muslim leadership. His preference was for a clear demarcation between the Bosnian Serbs and Croats and for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts—a Croat part to be annexed to Croatia, a Serb part to be annexed to Serbia, and a small, predominantly Muslim, part in central Bosnia to act as some sort of a buffer zone between the two enlarged states. However, he received support only from Boban and his cronies. Stjepan Kljuic´ remained defiant, as did a number of other highly positioned BiH HDZ functionaries, including the Bosnian minister of defense, Jerko Doko. Even Tud‒man’s own close associates from the Croatian HDZ clearly voiced their opposition to his schemes. Their argument was that all discussions on the division of BosniaHerzegovina were simply a ploy by the Bosnian Serbs to bait the Croats into abandoning their efforts for an alliance with the Muslims and their common pursuit of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Stjepan Kljuic´ convincingly concluded, the SDS leaders were interested only “in a division of BosniaHerzegovina where the army is the ultimate arbiter.”194 Since Tud‒man did not manage to reestablish control over the whole BiH HDZ, the position of the Croats throughout that early winter remained deeply divided. The Boban wing continued strengthening its HZs and in early February managed to oust Kljuic´ from the post of president of the HDZ of BosniaHerzegovina.195 Tud‒man even hosted Nikola Koljevic´, a high SDS functionary,

The End and the Beginning on 8 January in Zagreb for secret talks on the division of Bosnia.196 Similar communications between the SDS and the Boban wing of the HDZ continued throughout January and February.197 Kljuic´, however, kept his position in the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, together with a significant segment of Bosnian Croat leaders, remained loyal to Sarajevo and to the pursuit of a sovereign and independent BiH.198 The work of these Bosnian Croats proved to be crucial in ensuring that Bosnia-Herzegovina took clear steps toward independence, sovereignty, and international recognition. Without any cooperation with the Croats, it is doubtful whether Alija Izetbegovic´ and the leadership of the Bosnian Muslims would have even dared to stand up to Miloševic´. On 25 January 1992, the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina—that is, members of the assembly from the SDA, HDZ, the Reformists, and former Communists— voted to withdraw all representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Yugoslav federal institutions and officially called for a referendum on the republic’s independence to be held on 29 February and 1 March.199 President Izetbegovic´ during his speech to the assembly perfectly captured his own and his republic’s position: “We cannot go back, we have nowhere to go. We can only go forward.”200 A common South Slav state was finished, and to remain in a state dominated by Miloševic´’s Serbia would have been suicidal. As Ejup Ganic´, another SDA member of the Bosnian presidency, explained to Ambassador Zimmermann, “We’ve had plenty of time to see how Miloševic´ deals with minorities in Serbia: the Hungarians, the Muslims, and the Albanians. We’d be crazy to make ourselves vulnerable to that kind of oppression.”201 Alija Izetbegovic´ and the Muslim leadership did continue to harbor foolish and naive hopes regarding the JNA, and these hindered Sarajevo’s preparations for war.202 Nevertheless, their commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence and pursuit of international recognition only strengthened—in spite of the EC’s negative response of 15 January and in spite of their difficult position vis-à-vis Bosnia’s predatory neighbors. Lord Carrington finally focused his efforts on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-February. On 13 and 14 February, a delegation of the Portuguese EC presidency, led by the seasoned diplomat José Cutileiro and backed by one of Carrington’s assistants, Henry Darwin, met in Sarajevo with the political leaders of all major parties to get a sense of their different positions.203 One week later, on 21 and 22 February, the EC negotiators reconvened the BiH leaders— this time only those from the three largest national parties—for another round of talks in Lisbon, where they were presented with Cutileiro’s first draft of the principles for a new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The observers of the affair probably could have predicted what kind of a draft the EC

289 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

290 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning negotiators were going to propose by a statement of the EC foreign ministers passed at the urging of France on 17 February. In addition to the expected platitudes about their support for the UN mission and the negotiations at the Conference on Yugoslavia, the ministers noted “with satisfaction the constructive attitude of Serbia” and hinted they were considering withdrawing the EC sanctions, all in spite of the more than obvious Serb preparations for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.204 The provisions of the Cutileiro draft presented in Lisbon to the BiH leaders, as shockingly correspondent to the SDS platform as they were, thus should not have been a big surprise. The draft basically proposed a (con)federalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent (and not necessarily contiguous) ethnically defined states which were to have broad political, economic, and administrative responsibilities and de facto veto powers over foreign affairs, military matters, education, and relations with religious communities.205 The draft also proposed that the territory of these three constituent states was to be determined based on the censuses of 1971, 1981, and 1991. As the starting point for territorial negotiations, it suggested the ethnic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the 1991 census, where the three nations would control those municipalities in which they constituted at least a plurality of the population.206 (See figure 3.) Considering that the SDS had been making proposals for the ethnic “cantonization” of BosniaHerzegovina since 1990 and that it had practically achieved this with its SAOs and its “Republic of Serb Bosnia-Herzegovina,” it was no wonder that Radovan Karadžic´ was, according to Ambassador Zimmermann, “ecstatic over developments in Lisbon,” just as it was no wonder that Alija Izetbegovic´ was “astonished by the EC proposal for the creation of ethnically based regions.”207 The damage that the Cutileiro plan did to Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be overstated. By accepting the ethnic principle for the reorganization of the republic, Cutileiro in essence recognized the platforms of the SDS and the Boban wing of the HDZ and opened a Pandora’s box of ethnic division that still mars Bosnia to this very day. Cutileiro’s intent was obviously to appease the Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsor into not implementing their massive war machinery. However, instead of lowering tensions and giving the three parties an impetus to continue negotiating, the plan actually gave them “a charter for ethnic cleansing.”208 As Radovan Karadžic´ excitedly told Sarajevo journalists upon coming back from Lisbon, the Cutileiro plan was “a great leap forward because it accepted reality.”209 What the Portuguese diplomat had failed to realize was that by sanctioning “ethnic reality,” he was in fact inducing the parties—and especially the Bosnian Serbs, who had the military backing of Serbia and the JNA—to create new ethnic realities on the ground. As Radovan Karadžic´

The End and the Beginning

Figure 3.  Ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by municipality, 1991

explained at a meeting with his party’s organizers, “Believe me—now in Europe they don’t take law into consideration. They take facts and analogies. . . . Well, when the facts are such-and-such, then we will create facts. . . . And the facts will be that Izetbegovic´ won’t be able to assert control over 70 percent of the territory.”210 Tragically, all subsequent Western plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina simply built on Cutileiro’s ideas and continued making the very same mistakes. If the EC negotiators were not immediately aware of the error they had made, they should have been within days. The opposition parties, most notably the former Communists, forcefully rejected the ethnic principle of division as ahistoric and especially counter to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s tradition within Tito’s Yugoslavia. Radovan Karadžic´, on the other hand, succinctly made it clear that

291 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

292 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning he viewed the Lisbon plan as evidence that “there will be three BiHs: Serb, Croat, and Muslim.”211 In his opinion, each of those three Bosnia-Herzegovinas would have its own army, currency, and government. And the Serb BosniaHerzegovina would have to be given 66 percent of the whole republic and 33 percent of Sarajevo.212 On 26 February, at the request of the SDS, Karadžic´ and Koljevic´ met with a delegation of the Croatian government in Graz, Austria, to get the Croats’ support for their interpretation of Cutileiro’s plan and to lure the Croats away from voting for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence in the referendum three days later. They offered territorial exchanges and suggested that the Bosnian Croats should create their own state within Bosnia-Herzegovina just as the Bosnian Serbs had done—something that the Croatian delegation rejected at the time but did eventually implement by “upgrading” HZ HerzegBosnia into the “Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia” in August 1993.213 Unsurprisingly, at the third meeting of the BiH leaders with Cutileiro’s team in Sarajevo two days later, the main subject of conversation was the map. The SDS insisted on loosening Cutileiro’s reliance on the ethnic character of whole municipalities. The reason for that was very simple—under Cutileiro’s plan, Serbs were to get not 66 percent but only 43.8 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory.214 Karadžic´’s last-ditch attempts to shake the Croats’ commitment to vote for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina failed resoundingly at the referendum of 29 February and 1 March. In spite of broad intimidation by the SDS machinery— especially against fellow Bosnian Serbs, who were told to boycott the referendum, and against Muslims and Croats in areas with a Serb majority—nearly two million citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (some 63.4 percent of the electorate) turned out to vote. Almost all of them (99.7 percent) voted for independence. The Serbs largely stayed at home, but the Muslims and the Croats came out in droves to support their republic’s claim to independence and its application for EC recognition. Within hours of the closing of the polling stations, however, the referendum was overshadowed by an explosion of violence. On the afternoon of 1 March, the father of the bridegroom at a Serb Orthodox wedding in the center of Sarajevo was killed by a Muslim who was trying to steal his Serb flag.215 Karadžic´ used the incident to order his men to erect barricades throughout the city in “a lightning action.”216 By that evening, all entrances to Sarajevo had been blocked off by masked Serb paramilitaries in what appeared to be a pre-planned and highly coordinated action. The Muslims soon responded with barricades of their own in the center of town. Sporadic skirmishes erupted throughout the city and within twenty-four hours took three lives. By the following day, similar developments had occurred in other cities. In Doboj a motorist was killed by the men guarding a Serb barricade. And in Banja Luka, armed Serb units used

The End and the Beginning the situation to seize control over the local television station. With Sarajevo firmly in the grip of its militias, the SDS came out with a list of demands: the nullification of the referendum, the reorganization of the republic’s ministry of internal affairs, and the division of the state-owned media along ethnic lines. In an attempt to defuse tensions, the Bosnian government promised to fulfill the latter two demands but refused to relent on the issue of the referendum, whose results were publicized on 3 March. Its two concessions did seem to give results as the barricades were gradually withdrawn, though not before several more people throughout the republic—especially around the town of Bosanski Brod, which was even subjected to a night of mortar fire—lost their lives.217 Bosnia-Herzegovina thus officially fulfilled the additional requirement of the Badinter Commission for recognition by the EC states, and its government immediately issued a plea for the Community to fulfill its promise.218 Apart from its appeals for calm, however, the EC remained silent. Hans-Dietrich Genscher called on his colleagues on 5 March to move toward recognition, but the ministers did not heed his call.219 Their decision to continue withholding recognition was just another in a string of mistakes the EC made in recognizing the Yugoslav republics. The ministers’ motivations appear to have been primarily based on a desire not to disturb Cutileiro’s negotiations and Vance’s efforts in bringing the UN mission to Croatia (which finally became operational between mid-March and April). The signal they were sending, however, was that they were willing to cave into Serb demands after a violent demonstration of force. On 7 and 8 March, the three BiH sides met again with Cutileiro in Brussels, but the new session failed to bring a result. The SDA and the HDZ accepted the draft as the basis for continuing negotiations, but Karadžic´ reserved his opinion, mainly on account of the map and the level of power allocated to the central government.220 On 10 March, the EC foreign ministers and the US secretary of state also met in Brussels to discuss further steps on recognition. The only novelty in their joint declaration was an announcement that they would coordinate their approaches to the recognition of the remaining republics.221 The bland declaration concealed a strong US push for the recognition of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. According to Secretary Baker, by the end of February, the State Department had completely changed its view of recognition and now saw it “as a way to reinforce stability.”222 It was a remarkable policy shift which had at least partly come about as the result of strong and concerted congressional pressure.223 However, not even Baker’s intervention was enough to convince the EC ministers—especially Antonis Samaras—of the need to move more speedily.

293 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

294 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning The following day the “Assembly of the Republic of Serb Bosnia-Herzegovina,” controlled by the SDS, unanimously rejected the Cutileiro plan. The Serb representatives agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina could only either stay in a union with Serbia and Montenegro or become a confederation of three separate states. They also put forward a map which finally clarified what the Bosnian Serbs were after—they wanted nearly two-thirds of BiH territory, and they wanted to leave the Muslims and the Croats with a disjointed strip of land stretching through the center of the republic, with a series of ethnically split cities and with isolated, ghetto-like enclaves.224 This was a clear blueprint of the Serb war effort, which was to materialize within months. Although the other two sides and the Europeans did not accept the SDS map, Cutileiro did make certain concessions which were implemented in the newest version of his draft and presented once again to the three parties at their extended negotiations between 16 and 18 March in Sarajevo. The new proposal now clearly asserted that the three constituent units would be “based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic, and other criteria.” It also allowed the constituent units to “establish and maintain relations and links with the other republics and with organizations in them”—a clear concession to the SDS demands.225 Finally, it provided for the holding of another referendum, this time on constitutional changes and the territorial definition of the constituent units. The most notable aspect of the latest round of negotiations, however, was not the changed draft but the negotiating approach of Cutileiro and Carrington. Karadžic´ and Boban had relatively quickly signaled they could put their signatures on the draft, but President Izetbegovic´ resisted. He had been disappointed with the EC approach from the very beginning and saw it as just a stepping stone to his republic’s ultimate division. The newest draft only confirmed that the EC was committed to placating Bosnia’s predatory neighbors and their proxies with ethnic partition. The president’s resistance to Cutileiro’s pressure, however, was not a real political option. The Portuguese diplomat suggested that the acceptance of the draft by the Muslims was a precondition for the EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence.226 And Carrington bluntly told Izetbegovic´ that he stood no chance against the military might of the Serbs. As Carrington later explained, “I thought that it was very much in President Izetbegovic´’s interest to settle on the basis of the Cutileiro plan because it was clear to me that the overwhelming military superiority at that time at any rate was with the Serbs, and they were obviously being helped. . . . I mean President Miloševic´ may have denied it, but they were obviously being helped in a big way by [Serbia].”227 The Community’s negotiators thus took their inclination to pressure the weaker parties into acceptance of unfavorable deals to a new level.

The End and the Beginning Instead of doing at least something to dissuade the Serbs from using force, Cutileiro and Carrington simply took the military capacity of the Serbs as a fact and used it to bludgeon the BiH president into accepting a de facto ethnic partition of his country. Izetbegovic´ eventually succumbed to Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s pressure, but the signatures he and the leaders of the SDS and the HDZ put on the newest proposal for the constitutional restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina were worth less than the paper they were written on. Although Cutileiro and Carrington years later still blamed Izetbegovic´ for allegedly being the only one to renege on the deal of 18 March 1992 (supposedly on the advice of the United States), the fact was that all three sides had no intention of respecting the deal’s provisions and made that abundantly clear just days after their Sarajevo meeting.228 Izetbegovic´ did on 25 March announce he had been pressured by the EC into signing the agreement and called on all BiH citizens to reject the ethnic division of their republic.229 However, the Croats and the Serbs also rejected the agreement. Under intensive pressure from the Catholic Church and HDZ members who were not from western Herzegovina, the Croats not only rejected the Cutileiro map, but also put in question the whole principle of the internal restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines.230 The SDS functionaries, on the other hand, made it clear they viewed the Cutileiro plan as “a good starting point for confederalization of Bosnia and annexation of the Serb lands to Yugoslavia”—hardly the letter or the spirit of the agreement.231 Their “Serb Assembly” also promulgated the constitution of the “Republic of Serb BosniaHerzegovina” and declared it was to join “the all-Serbian state of Yugoslavia.”232 Whether Izetbegovic´ made his decision under the influence of the Americans remains unclear.233 The CIA’s analysis of the Cutileiro agreement was certainly negative. Its National Intelligence Daily report of 19 March asserted that the deal “may prevent clashes in the near term, but ethnic groups left outside their respective units almost certainly will resort to violence eventually. . . . Moreover, ethnic fighting is likely in regions where no ethnic group is in the majority, such as Mostar and Bosanski Brod, as the three groups maneuver to take advantage of the planned border changes.”234 Whatever the case may be, the bottom line was that Izetbegovic´—just like the leaders of the Bosnian Croats and Serbs—reneged on the Cutileiro deal because his constituents and his party’s rank and file wanted him to. Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s effort was thus a waste of time because it purported to reconcile the irreconcilable and in the process left everyone dissatisfied and uncommitted.235 More important, it only expedited the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina by those who wanted its ethnic partition.

295 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

296 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning Bosnia-Herzegovina’s slide to war during the month of March was obvious to all who spent even just a day in any of its ethnically mixed areas. The certainty of war manifested itself not only through the sporadic bursts of violence which took lives on a practically daily basis, but also through the clear preparations of the massive JNA machinery for extensive war operations. As the leaders of the three Bosnian nations negotiated with Cutileiro and Carrington, the JNA held all of Bosnia’s main cities at gunpoint. It withdrew its artillery units from their urban bases and placed them in strategic positions in the field: in the trenches on the hills around Sarajevo, in attack formations around Bosanski Brod, on all access routes to Mostar. With the clear collapse of the Cutileiro negotiations, this slide to war dramatically and brutally accelerated. During the last week of March, severe fighting erupted in the Posavina region around Bosanski Brod and Derventa.236 This region was a crucial route for communications of the Serb-controlled areas in Croatia and Bosnian Krajina with Serbia, so the fierce fighting between the JNA and the Serb paramilitaries, on the one side, and the Croat and Muslim paramilitaries, on the other, was hardly surprising. Nothing that the small towns of Posavina went through, however, could quite compare to what befell the ethnically mixed town of Bijeljina, just fifteen kilometers from the border with Serbia. On 31 March, local Serb paramilitaries, backed up by the special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) of Serbia commanded by Željko Ražnatovic´-Arkan, started their operations for a full takeover of the town and its ethnic cleansing. Within two days, their reign of terror left dozens of the town’s Muslims dead and thousands as refugees. Nothing changed even when the JNA moved into town on 3 April. In fact, the killings and torture continued, to the shock of the Sarajevo government and the Bosnian public, which seemed to have quickly forgotten what role the army had played just months earlier in Croatia.237 By 4 April, the contours of the Serb war effort were obvious. Important transportation and communication centers populated by non-Serbs throughout the republic were either under attack or on the verge of attack by the combined forces of the already created “Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serb Bosnia-Herzegovina,” the JNA, and the special shock units of the MUP of Serbia.238 The inhabitants of Kupres, Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Bijeljina, Goražde, and Mostar had already experienced the wrath of the Serb war machine, and within several days the same fate engulfed a string of towns in eastern Bosnia like Zvornik, Višegrad, and Focˇa, as well as the capital, Sarajevo.239 The strategy was one of “shock and awe,” under which the Bosnian Muslims and their leadership were to quickly surrender when confronted with the vast resources of the JNA and the wanton brutality of the Serb special units.240 That

The End and the Beginning early April, the numbers were certainly on the Serb side: compared to some 15,000–16,000 Croat troops, mainly stationed in Herzegovina, and the small local Muslim units, numbering perhaps 3,500 in total, the Serbs and the JNA had more than 100,000 well-armed men.241 On 4 April, President Izetbegovic´ tried to remedy that imbalance and called for a mobilization of the republic’s Territorial Defense forces to “enable people to defend themselves . . . from future Bijeljinas.”242 His call was, however, meaningless. The Bosnian TO had been disarmed by the JNA in 1990 (just like the TOs of Croatia and Slovenia), and its command structure was in any case staffed by Serbs loyal to the JNA and the SDS.243 The day after Izetbegovic´’s mobilization call perfectly demonstrated just how powerless his government and the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina were against the aggression. That night, the artillery units positioned around Sarajevo began a rain of fire which plagued the city for the following three and a half years, and the Serb paramilitary forces took the city’s airport and the main police station.244 The people of Sarajevo responded by gathering for a large antiwar rally and marched to the parliament building in some irrational belief that their message of peace could change the minds of those who had already set the war machine in motion. The marchers were met with sniper fire by members of the SDS stationed in their party’s headquarters in the Holiday Inn Hotel; it killed six people and wounded several more.245 It was a telling testament to what Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina were facing. Contrary to a number of accounts in the literature, the recognition of BosniaHerzegovina was not the spark which set Bosnia alight. The recognition was in fact a response of the West to the violence which had already fully engulfed this republic. On 6 April—six months after the JNA’s first acts of aggression against the Croat villages in Herzegovina, five weeks after the first victims and barricades in Sarajevo, two weeks after the artillery attacks which damaged Bosanski Brod to such an extent that the local press compared it to Vukovar, one week after the ethnic cleansing of the Bijeljina Muslims commenced, and one day after the shelling and the siege of Sarajevo began—the EC foreign ministers issued a declaration recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina.246 The following day, the United States followed and also recognized Slovenia and Croatia. Incredibly, however, the EC foreign ministers accompanied their recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a decision to stop the sanctions on Serbia. In spite of everything that Slobodan Miloševic´ and his government were doing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in spite of the more than obvious involvement of the JNA troops and special units clearly under Belgrade’s command, the European Community freed Miloševic´ from the pressure of economic sanctions.247

297 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

298 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning With such signals from the West, it is no wonder that the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina only intensified after its recognition. Whereas the recognition of Croatia had managed to change Miloševic´’s calculations because of Zagreb’s growing ability to defend its territory, the recognition of BiH meant little, partly because its government was powerless and partly because Bosnia was so central and indispensable to any plan for the creation of an all-Serb union. As Miloševic´ remarked to Karadžic´, the recognition of BosniaHerzegovina was akin to the Roman emperor Caligula declaring his horse to be a senator.248 On 8 April, the joint forces of the Serbian MUP under Arkan’s command, volunteer units of the Serb Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj, and the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, supported by the JNA units from Bosnia and Serbia (which included artillery fire from Serbia’s side of the Drina River), attacked and quickly defeated the poorly armed Muslims in a string of small towns and villages in eastern Bosnia.249 The scenario from Bijeljina was repeated in Zvornik, Višegrad, and Focˇa. Bodies of hundreds of men, women, and children littered the streets of the conquered towns while Serb soldiers plundered and searched for the remaining defenders.250 Thousands of Muslims left their homes either as refugees or as prisoners destined for Serb concentration camps. Either way, they were never to come back. A similar fate was reserved for the Muslim and Croat communities of Bosnian Krajina in towns like Prijedor and Banja Luka. They were subjected to intimidation, discrimination, and by early May to murder, mass rape, deportation, and imprisonment in some of the most notorious concentration camps of the Bosnian war.251 The citizens of Sarajevo, on the other hand, were subjected to constant shelling and sniper attacks, apparently in an effort of the SDS and the JNA to induce the Bosnian Muslim leadership to surrender.252 Just as in Croatia, all of this was taking place with the full awareness and knowledge of the Western foreign policy makers. On 14 April, US deputy secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger had already been given a confidential memo from a staff analyst describing the “clear pattern of use of force, intimidation and provocation to violence aimed at forcibly partitioning [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and effecting large forced transfers of population. . . . The clear intent of Serbian use of force is to displace non-Serbs from mixed areas (including areas where Serbs are a minority) to consolidate Bosnian Serb claims to some 60 percent of Bosnian territory . . . in a manner which would create a ‘Serbian Bosnia.’ ”253 In response, the State Department sent its deputy assistant secretary, Ralph Johnson, to speak to both Miloševic´ and the Bosnian leadership. Johnson did tell Miloševic´ the United States knew what he and his SDS proxies were doing but also delivered only a threat of “working towards Serbia’s political and economic

The End and the Beginning isolation”—a risk Miloševic´ was obviously willing to take since Johnson ruled out any international military involvement.254 By the following month, US intelligence agencies had submitted reports to high officials in the State Department on the extent of “Serbian atrocities— death camps, torture, and gang rape,” about which those officials did nothing substantive; they only reluctantly admitted the existence of the Serb concentration camps once the press eventually broke the story about them that August.255 The Western press certainly made sure from the very beginning that light was shed on the sinister nature of the carnage which was taking place in Bosnia. Already on 15 April the New York Times pleaded with the White House and the rest of the Western world to “stop the butcher of the Balkans.” The Guardian blamed the “EC talks for carving up of Bosnia into separate ethnic zones, however well intended” and helping “to mask Serbian plans for separation” and clearly stated that the problem was in “Belgrade, not Sarajevo.” The Times of London called “the Serbian offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . nothing less than the invasion of an independent country” and demanded an international “de-recognition” of Yugoslavia.256 Television newscasts and front pages of newspapers across the world were splattered with the images of what clearly amounted to ethnic cleansing and genocide in the heart of Europe.257 All had been premeditated, pre-planned, pre-announced, and widely known. None of this, however, seemed to really matter. The Bosnian government every month repeatedly called for a preventative sending of UN troops, starting with November 1991. Once the violence began to get out of control, it repeated its pleas on 27 March, 3 April, 10 April, and after that on a weekly basis.258 It was repeatedly refused by the UN administrators and negotiators. First the problem was that there was no fighting, then the problem was that the Serbs did not want a UN force or that the UN lacked the resources, until finally the problem was that there was too much fighting.259 What is more, high UN administrators actively worked on changing the public perception of the events on the ground in efforts that far surpassed the usual UN practice of projecting impartiality. Marrack Goulding’s both public and private interventions during this period epitomized the approach of his whole organization. In addition to repeatedly advising the secretary-general against a UN intervention throughout that winter and spring, in early May Goulding declared publicly that “all sides are equally responsible” for the conflict, urged Belgrade to keep the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a “stabilizing factor,” chastised President Izetbegovic´ for suggesting the damage to Sarajevo’s cultural sites was significant when in Goulding’s opinion it was nowhere near to what had been done to Beirut, and seemed to have nothing but scorn for the

299 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

300 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning non-permanent members of the Security Council who were pushing the UN to do something.260 The approach of influential Western negotiators and foreign policy makers was hardly different. In May Lord Carrington and his assistants came to Sarajevo to continue negotiations among the three sides, but their effort basically amounted to an attempt to persuade President Izetbegovic´ to capitulate. According to Izetbegovic´, Carrington “asked me, ‘What would you do?’ I told him we would fight back. . . . Carrington paused, looked into my eyes and said, ‘How do you think you will fight back? Do you know what you are talking about, Mr. Izetbegovic´? Do you know what weaponry they have?’ I told him we didn’t have any choice. If we capitulate, we will either be captured or killed. . . . He told me, ‘You, Mr. Izetbegovic´, are not aware who you are dealing with. They have several thousand tanks, several hundred military planes, between two and four thousand artillery weapons, stocks of ammunition and weapons; are you aware of it? How do you think you can resist?’ ”261 That was it—this exchange between Carrington and Izetbegovic´ perfectly captured the essence of the West’s approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Years of appeasement and encouragement of the Serbian leader—and thus of the project over which he presided—had finally culminated in the perverse response of Western foreign policy makers and international institutions to the hell unfolding in Bosnia.

• With the advent of that fateful year in Europe’s history—1992—a new era in the history of the South Slavs also dawned. Yugoslavia ceased to exist, and in its place new states were recognized by the international community. Just as they had presided over the creation of Yugoslavia more than seven decades earlier, Europe’s principal powers—including the greatest European power of all, the United States—now presided over the collapse of the failed federation. Unlike their distant predecessors, however, Western foreign policy makers did not approach their task with much imagination or openness to change. As Douglas Hurd later reminisced about that period, “George Bush had famously said he didn’t do the vision thing. . . . [Bush and James Baker] weren’t visionaries, and nor were we.”262 Indeed, faced with Yugoslavia’s obvious failures, which degenerated into war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide, Western leaders clung to old ideas and concepts and tried hard to maintain any semblance of the status quo. The sole reason why Yugoslavia was ultimately relegated to the scrapheap of history, where it belonged, was the unprecedented effort of those

The End and the Beginning in the West who not only recognized that the apparatus of the Yugoslav state had been hijacked and abused by the Greater Serbian program, but also believed that the new Europe could not stand for it. The problem was, however, that they were led by Germany. The unique position of the newly united Germany in European affairs placed its efforts in the Yugoslav crisis under an unfair magnifying glass. Its success in steering the European Community toward the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in the aftermath of Serbia’s violent subjugation of Vukovar and the JNA’s reckless attacks on Dubrovnik did result in a solution for the Croatian war. It also, however, led to the de facto expulsion of German diplomats and foreign policy makers from Europe’s continuing efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For years to come, Germany was to be blamed not only for the botched process of recognition of the Yugoslav republics, but even for the war itself. If there was blame to be allocated to anyone in the West—and the analysis presented here certainly shows that there was—it should have been allocated elsewhere, particularly regarding the onset of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, the European Community’s diplomatic efforts in the run-up to the war in former Yugoslavia’s central republic marked the climax of its strategy of appeasing the strong and pressuring the weak. Faced with the obvious escalation of preparations for war by the Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsors, the EC diplomats did nothing to halt the aggression before it happened. Instead, they withheld the international recognition of BosniaHerzegovina and used the Serb military threats to bludgeon the BiH government and the Bosnian Muslims—as well as all the others who did not support the SDS or the western Herzegovina wing of the HDZ—to accept a deal for the de facto ethnic partition of their country. What is worst, the EC diplomats did nothing to change their approach once the Serb military threats materialized in the form of ethnic cleansing and genocide throughout the summer of 1992. Carrington continued to insist that “Peace will not come to Bosnia until there is a de facto partition.” Mitterrand called the Bosnian Serb offensives “unfortunate initiatives.” The British minister for foreign affairs, Douglas Hogg, told the Bosnian government, “There is no cavalry over the hill. There is no international force coming to stop this.”263 And his superior, Douglas Hurd, argued against the repeal of the arms embargo on Bosnia by saying that the West should not be creating a “level killing field.” The obvious implication was that an uneven killing field was more preferable.264 The saddest aspect of the West’s approach to the onset of war and genocide in Bosnia was the fact that it was relatively easily preventable. In addition to providing their superiors and the foreign policy makers with clear evidence of

301 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

302 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

The End and the Beginning the concentration camps and the mass killings, which presaged in numbers and brutality what was to happen in Srebrenica three years later, Western intelligence analysts also provided clear evidence that the largest bulk of Serb armor and artillery stationed around Bosnian cities was so vulnerable to aerial attack that 95 percent of it could have been taken out in one single day.265 Instead, however, Western foreign policy makers—particularly in the Mitterrand administration in Paris, the Bush administration in Washington, and the Major administration in London—actively worked to limit their involvement and publicly recast the conflict as an unfortunate but intractable civil war. As Senator (and soon-to-be Vice-President) Al Gore in May 1992 asserted on the Senate floor, “Our government continued to base its policy on the incredible fiction that the victim was as much to blame as the perpetrator, and that a moral symmetry existed such that the appropriate response was to turn our backs on both.”266 Or, as the then foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Haris Silajdžic´ observed, the international community behaved “as if this was a natural catastrophe” instead of responding to a “catastrophe caused by people who use force in order to achieve their political aims.”267

10

Conclusions

Today, years after the Yugoslav wars have ended, it is still difficult for many in the West and in former Yugoslavia to understand how it was possible for such horrors to take place in the center of Europe on the eve of the twenty-first century. How could all those “Balkan thugs” even dare to so brazenly and repeatedly defy the Western powers and the United Nations? This book suggests that the answer to that question is simple: they had every reason to believe they would profit from it. Many aspects of Western policy from the mid-1980s until the beginning of the Bosnian war could have only convinced the leaders of the Serbian expansionist program not only that their crimes would go unpunished, but also that some important Western foreign policy makers would have an astonishing level of tolerance and even regard for those with the power to engage in brutal displays of physical force. From the very beginning of Miloševic´’s ascent to the very end of Yugoslavia’s existence and the collapse of Bosnia-Herzegovina into bloody mayhem, the predominant signals of the crucial exponents of Western policy were those of approval, lenience, and understanding for the powerful. As this book has clearly shown, those signals were not built on ignorance or faulty intelligence. The dynamics and the driving forces of Yugoslavia’s steady descent to war were self-evident to anyone paying attention, often openly pre-announced, and—most important—accurately analyzed by those whose task it was to analyze them. Of course, nothing regarding the five years of the West’s policy examined here was, historically speaking, truly novel. When they felt their immediate interests were not at stake, world powers often stayed out of regional “quarrels” or even openly condoned the exploits of those perceived to be stronger. Europe’s modern history is replete with similar examples which offer us a sobering

303

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

304 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Conclusions perspective on the West’s policies during the Yugoslav crisis. The tolerance of Benjamin Disraeli’s Conservative government for the brutal Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian uprising in 1876, for example, arguably had the same source as the tolerance of prominent Western foreign policy makers for the JNA interventions in Slovenia and Croatia: the maintenance of a regional status quo.1 Italy’s occupation of Abyssinia in 1935 also faced little international condemnation or opposition. Britain deemed its interests in the region to be insufficient to justify any meaningful response. Instead of recognizing Italy’s threat to the international security system, Western powers argued that Abyssinia never should have been admitted to the League of Nations in the first place. Parallels to Serbia’s aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina are obvious.2 The Spanish Civil War offers another compelling comparison. Upon the launch of Franco’s rebellion in July 1936, France and Britain instituted an arms embargo on all sides, arguing that their decision contributed to the pacification of the crisis. The facts that Hitler and Mussolini supplied Franco with massive amounts of advanced weaponry and that the republican side was led by the legitimate Spanish government whereas the nationalists were a rebel army seemed to matter little. Parallels to the institution and maintenance of the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of their right to self-defense are again inescapable.3 One other example from the 1930s also lends itself to an easy, though admittedly more controversial, comparison. France and Britain’s 1938 appeasement of Hitler over Sudetenland certainly reminded many of similar efforts to placate Miloševic´ and push the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward a de facto ethnic partition of their country.4 As Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister and a great critic of Britain’s policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reportedly told Douglas Hurd during the Bosnian war, “Douglas, Douglas, you would make Neville Chamberlain look like a warmonger.”5 The list of such examples could go on and on. The fact that the story of the West’s involvement in the dissolution of Yugoslavia has a number of historical parallels, however, does not detract from its importance. Decisions of the Western foreign policy makers may appear to have come out of an era thought to be long gone, but that is exactly what made them into such important subjects of study. With the end of the Cold War, things were simply supposed to be different. Europe was not only supposed to be whole and free, but also to act in unison on more than just economic matters. With the successful experience of the Persian Gulf intervention, the United Nations was supposed to no longer be a paralyzed guardian of international collective security, and the United States was supposed to lead the world toward a new order in which aggression would not be tolerated. Great powers

Conclusions were supposed to be willing to take on medium powers in order to protect small powers.6 The contention of this book is, however, that it was exactly the end of the Cold War which led to things being no different from what they had been decades before. President Bush’s talk of the “new world order” was just that: talk. His administration may have used the rhetoric of Wilson’s and Carter’s administrations, but it thought and acted like Nixon’s.7 The tectonic shifts in the international system did not make the Western leaders embrace an opportunity to mold the world into something better or more just. The crumbling of the Soviet bloc actually made them tremble with concern for the stability of the European and global security system. The end of the Cold War may have been hailed as a victory of freedom and democracy, but what was in fact desperately craved was stability. This in practice meant that any perceived changes to the status quo were automatically greeted with a knee-jerk negative reaction, especially if they were related to the very existence of states. In the “realist” calculation of the Western policy makers, any challenge to the continuing existence of states like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union was accelerating uncertainty at a time when, more than anything else, the world needed certainty.8 The resulting Western consensus on the need to preserve the Yugoslav federation remained stable until the outbreak of real hostilities. Once the images of tanks on the streets, refugee columns, and artillery and aviation attacks on civilian targets poured onto television newscasts, this consensus was gone. Whereas the Western publics were now nearly unanimous on the need for a diametrically opposite approach of their governments toward Yugoslavia, a real shift of perspective took place in the foreign policy apparatus of only one major Western power: Germany. The reasons for this were complex and varied, but this book suggests that the principal difference between Germany and the other Western powers regarding how to respond to the Yugoslav crisis was rooted in their different conceptions of Europe’s near future. The primary interest of the United States, which remained remarkably firm throughout the second half of 1991, was the stability of the Soviet state and Mikhail Gorbachev’s position. Transitions to democracy and market capitalism in Eastern Europe were welcome but only inasmuch as they did not challenge the continuing reach of Moscow’s power over the Soviet republics. The dissolution of the USSR was deemed to have a high potential for violence with possible nuclear consequences. Slovenia and Croatia were not to become the examples for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or—once those broke away from the Soviet state—for Georgia or the Ukraine. French conceptions of Europe’s near future, on the other hand, unavoidably revolved around the position of

305 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

306 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Conclusions Germany in European affairs. French foreign policy makers were deeply troubled by the pace of Germany’s reunification and viewed Germany’s active participation in and enthusiasm for East European transitions with great concern. Their primary interest was a deepening of West European integration, which was mainly motivated by an effort to further bind Germany.9 The end of the Cold War also had a dramatic effect on the position of Britain in European affairs. As William Wallace has argued, “In the Cold War international order, Britain was the pivot of ‘the West,’ the essential partner of the United States in providing security guarantees to a beleaguered Western Europe. In the world which is emerging, its position looks more like that of England under Henry VIII: a kingdom on the edge of a European system, attempting both to play a part in continental politics and to assert its independence of continental constraints.”10 The primary interest of the British foreign policy makers was thus the maintenance of America’s role in European politics and security. The British did not share French enthusiasm for the extension of West European integration into security matters but did share French concerns with the pace of Germany’s reunification. Their reasons for these concerns were, however, different. The British feared that the position of “pivot of the West” and essential European partner of the United States was now going to belong to the united Germany.11 Whereas France and Britain were the net losers of the end of the Cold War, Germany was the most obvious beneficiary of the shift in Europe’s status quo. This was the case not only because of its reunification, but also because of a fundamental change in its geopolitical position. From a Cold War front line, Germany turned into the center of a European continent united in democracy and a free market economy. Its knowledge of Eastern Europe—including Yugoslavia—was unparalleled throughout the Western alliance, as was its interest in the region’s political and economic transformation. Its position, of course, did not mean that German foreign policy makers were interested in the breakup of East European structures of stability. On the contrary, they strongly supported Mikhail Gorbachev—partly out of their own need for a stable Soviet Union in order to complete the process of reunification—and they strongly supported the continuing existence of Yugoslavia.12 Once real violence began, however, Germany’s commitment to the Yugoslav federation’s continuing integrity changed. This book suggests that the change in Germany’s view was rooted in the challenge that the Serbian aggression presented to the principled ideas of German foreign policy makers—ideas which helped shift the focus away from Germany’s real interests in favor of Yugoslavia’s preservation.13 Indeed, the

Conclusions nature and the aims of the Serbian aggression galvanized some of the most deeply ingrained principled ideas within the German foreign policy community: the idea of peaceful self-determination (which had been the basis for Germany’s reunification), the idea of strong anti-expansionism and antiirredentism (which stemmed from Germany’s own World War II traumas), and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions (which was the foundation of Germany’s post–World War II foreign policy).14 It was Miloševic´’s challenge to these three principled ideas which shifted the spotlight of German foreign policy makers away from their material interests in the continuing existence of Yugoslavia—and if any country had real material interests in the perpetuation of the Yugoslav federation, it was Germany—to the moral interests of self-determination for Yugoslavia’s republics and Europe’s strong resistance to Serbia’s expansionism.15 The resulting profound division within the Western alliance led to the advancement of problematic historical comparisons, which were exploited by Miloševic´’s media machinery and much too easily perpetuated by highly positioned Western policy makers and diplomats. Germany’s support for Yugoslavia’s northwestern republics was, particularly in France and Britain, viewed with distrust because it was allegedly grounded in the old regional alliances from the two world wars. French and British foreign policy makers took up these allegations with real enthusiasm and used them both publicly and privately to further the claim that the West now had to fear the rise of a “Gaullist Germany.” Such arguments, coupled with equally prejudicial arguments about the different Yugoslav sides, gave the West’s diplomatic effort a particularly unpalatable image.16 They were, nevertheless, simply a façade for a much more problematic dynamic in the West’s involvement in the crisis. Faced with Germany’s clear policy shift, France and Britain began to adjust their preferences regarding Yugoslavia not based on what was happening on the ground, but based on their preferences regarding Europe and Germany’s role in it. French and British foreign policy makers sparred over a possible WEU intervention not only on account of how effective this intervention could be in halting the conflict, but also on account of what it would mean for the future of the WEU in relation to NATO and the EC. Britain, furthermore, insisted on giving Miloševic´ de facto veto power over all expansions of the West’s diplomatic and military effort not because it wished to secure the approval of all the parties on the ground, but because it actually wanted Miloševic´ to use that veto to stop the West from doing more. Since the Yugoslav crisis presented no real challenge to its own interests, Britain wanted to make sure that the crisis would not be used by others to expand their own or the EC’s standing in foreign and security

307 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

308 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Conclusions policy. Finally and most obviously, Britain and France opposed the recognition of the Yugoslav republics not only because they questioned the recognition’s effects on the dynamics of war, but also because they did not wish to turn the diplomatic initiative over to Germany.17 The result was a diplomatic and foreign policy effort marked with distrust, disunity, and tragic failures. “The hour of Europe” tarnished the image of the EC/EU for many years to come. What do these observations tell us about the foundations of post–Cold War Europe? Was the West’s policy merely influenced by those new foundations being deeply rooted in a “lack of will” to back diplomacy with force? This argument certainly does have its logical appeal. The analysis presented here implies, however, that the lessons of the dissolution of Yugoslavia are far more complex and far more troubling than the suggestion that the West’s inability to stop the violence was caused by its newly found taste for the post–Cold War “peace dividend.” First, it is impossible to speak of the West’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis without accounting for a serious clash of wills among the prominent players in the Western alliance. Second, this clash of wills was not only centered on the question of military intervention, but was also the defining trait of Western debates on practically all initiatives—military or diplomatic. And third, the “lack of will” argument implicitly suggests that the West was little more than a troubled observer of what was happening in Yugoslavia when, in fact, it was an active participant with direct and indirect influence on the decisions of the Yugoslav protagonists. This book instead contends that the significance of the whole story lies in the fact that the dissolution of Yugoslavia exposed an underlying current of political realism in the West’s conception of European affairs. The West’s nearly desperate pursuit of stability through the support of Yugoslavia’s unity was mistaken and unrealistic—but it was grounded in political realism. Its signals of assent to the JNA’s intervention in Slovenia were political realism. Its continuous tendency to appease the strong and push the weak during negotiations was political realism. Finally, its unwillingness to intervene militarily against a clear regional bully was also political realism. This commitment to “realist” ideas in dealing with the dissolution of Yugoslavia was strongest in London, though Washington and Paris (and Bonn until the explosion of violence) did not lag too far behind.18 The same men who preached the liberal gospel of European integration, international cooperation, and a “new world order” in which no aggression would be allowed to stand, behind closed doors argued that “only a strong Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans.”19 Some may say that such arguments and actions were brought to the surface exactly because this was about the Balkans—Europe’s heart of darkness, which

Conclusions seems to bring out the worst in Europeans, generation after generation. There is perhaps some truth in that, but only inasmuch as West Europeans continue to demonstrate their deep misunderstanding of the region, generation after generation. This book, rather, proposes that the West’s Realpolitik came to the fore not because this was about the Balkans, but because it was about uncertainty. The end of the Cold War meant that America and the West were losing more than their enemy—they were losing “the sextant by which [their] ship [had] been guided since 1945.”20 And, as Peter Katzenstein has argued, “In such situations of uncertainty, actors fall back on the world view they have acquired over time—that is, a mixture of causal and principled beliefs about how the world works, and how one should behave in it.”21 This is not to say that the Yugoslav crisis exposed the foundations of the Western view of Europe, or even just of the Balkans, to be essentially and enduringly realist. Some Western policy makers throughout the five years examined in this book—and throughout the Bosnian war and beyond—did exhibit a stunningly low capacity to learn and change their “realist” policies. Eventually, however, they did begin to change, and they continue to do so. As one European diplomat put it, “We have progressed mainly through failure. It is through demonstrable and rather shameful failures that we get the energy to do something slightly better the next time.”22 This book has focused on those failures in order to illuminate how difficult, contentious, and ultimately unsuccessful the struggle has been to shake off the underlying “realist” impulses at the end of the Cold War. More important, it has devoted its attention to the failures of Western policy in order to demonstrate the tragic consequences of practicing Realpolitik without concern for the most fundamental historical lesson of political realism: “Whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community.”23 Europe allowed itself to be taken hostage by its most ruthless member because crucial Western foreign policy makers had not learned this lesson. They mistakenly believed that “quiet would return” to Yugoslavia not because of their own resolve and willingness to back diplomacy with force, but because of the power of the man and his political and military machine who were already holding Yugoslavia hostage.

309 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

This page intentionally left blank

Notes

chapter 1. introduction 1. Quoted in Alan Riding, “Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europeans Send High-Level Team,” New York Times, 29 June 1991, 4, and Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), 45. 2. James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), 636–637. 3. John Newhouse, “The Diplomatic Round: Dodging the Problem,” New Yorker, 24 August 1992, 61. 4. Quoted in Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 312. 5. “Toward a New World Order,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 3, 17 September 1990, 91–92. 6. For the best accounts of decision making on international affairs in President Bush’s administration, see Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), and Hutchings, American Diplomacy. For useful discussions of the “new world order,” see Joseph S. Nye, “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (1992): 83–96, and Lawrence Freedman, “Order and Disorder in the New World,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1 (1992): 20–37. 7. Richard Ullman, “The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold War,” in The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, ed. Richard Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 14–15. For a characteristic diplomatic view centered on the intractability of the problem and Europe’s “unity in frustration,” see Douglas Hurd, The Search for Peace: A Century of Peace Diplomacy (London: Little, Brown, 1997), 100. 8. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). As Gow argues, though largely

311

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

312 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 6–7 about the West and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “If there was an overall policy failure, its central feature was the absence of armed force as a bottom line. The reason for that absence was a lack of the ‘political will’ to act forcefully in a transitional situation that appeared to be both laced with risk and not absolutely indispensable” (306). The “lack of will” view has also been popular with former international diplomats and mediators who were involved in the crisis, like the former UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Michael Rose. Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harvill, 1998), 3. 9. This interpretation has been particularly popular with Serbian analysts. For indicative examples, see Radmila Nakarada, ed., Evropa i raspad Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1995); Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 135–140; and Aleksa Djilas, “Germany’s Policy toward the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies, ed. Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 151–167. Similar analyses permeate the works of Misha Glenny and Susan L. Woodward, who have written some of the most well-known accounts of the war and the West’s involvement in it. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1996), 191; Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), ch. 6. Also see Susan L. Woodward, “Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1985–1991,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 140–142. For the most advanced in the string of strongly worded leftist critiques of the West’s involvement, see David N. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009). The title of one of Gibbs’s chapters is indicative of his argument: “Germany Drops a Match.” 10. Carole Hodge and Mladen Grbin, A Test for Europe: Confidence-Building in Former Yugoslavia (Glasgow: Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1996), 47. 11. Similar arguments have already been made by a number of informed observers. Prominent examples include the following: Almond, Europe’s Backyard War; Christopher Cviic, An Awful Warning: The War in Ex-Yugoslavia (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1994); Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present (London: Routledge, 2006); Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999); Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding ‘Vietnam’ and Blundering into ‘Abyssinia,’ ” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 8, no. 1 (1994): 189–219; Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, “German Foreign Policy toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991–1999,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 48, no. 1 (2001): 48–64; Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin Books, 2002).

Notes to Pages 9–15 12. Some at the time saw Europe’s path toward integration as hardly secured. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56. 13. On the dichotomy between integration and fragmentation, see John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2 (1991): 102–122.

chapter 2. taming the balkan gorbachev, 1987–1989 1. Dušan Bilandžic´, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 1980–1985 (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), 49. 2. Yugoslavia’s foreign debt continued increasing despite the tripling of loan interest rates between 1977 and 1981—from about 5.5 percent to 16.8 percent. During that period, Yugoslav foreign debt more than doubled, from $9.5 billion to $20.8 billion. Dušan Bilandžic´, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 716. 3. Although indicative, official figures likely dramatically underestimate the extent of the crisis. For an excellent critique of Yugoslavia’s official accounting practices, see Michael Palairet, “The Inter-Regional Struggle for Resources and the Fall of Yugoslavia,” in State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration, ed. Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic´-Soso (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 223–224. 4. For a discussion of the Kraigher Commission, see Bilandžic´, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 53–65. 5. After reaching agreement with the IMF in July 1983, Yugoslavia received a $4.6 billion relief loan package. Ibid., 106. The US undersecretary of state for political affairs and former ambassador to Yugoslavia, Lawrence Eagleburger, played an important role during this period. He assembled a private consortium called The Friends of Yugoslavia, which assisted in refinancing Yugoslavia’s debt. John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 319–320. 6. The official toll was 12 dead and 150 wounded, though unofficial estimates went as high as 300 dead. Within a year, 140 people were sentenced to a total of 999 years in prison, with most of them receiving harsh sentences for the alleged organization of “counterrevolutionary” and irredentist paramilitary formations. Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980–92 (London: Verso, 1993), 7, 16. 7. Bilandžic´, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 70–78. 8. The proportion of Serbs and Albanians was relatively stable between 1931 and 1961, with the Serbs making up about 23–27 percent of the population and Albanians 60–67 percent. As the Serb birthrate plummeted and the Albanian birthrate remained stable in the following two decades and as a significant number of Serbs emigrated from the province, the balance significantly shifted in Albanian favor. In 1981, the Serbs made up only 13.3 percent of the population in Kosovo and the Albanians 77.5 percent. Although the causes of Serb emigration from Kosovo varied and most often included economic reasons, independent studies established that the local Serbs experienced ethnic discrimination which in many cases accelerated their decision to leave the

313 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

314 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 16–20 province. Jasna Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 117–121. 9. Although much has rightfully been made of the influence of the Belgrade political and intellectual elite in fostering the organization of Kosovo Serbs throughout the 1980s, initial organizing efforts were independent of influences from Serbia proper. Nebojša Vladisavljevic´, “Grassroots Groups, Miloševic´ or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 2004): 781–796. 10. Bilandžic´, Jugoslavija poslije Tita, 84–85. 11. This and the preceding quotes from ibid., 90, 166–167, 172. 12. For Bosnia-Herzegovina’s resistance to the plans of Serbia’s SK, see Raif Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: Svjedocˇenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2000), 88–91. 13. Quoted in Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 92. 14. For the memorandum’s complete text, see Kosta Mihailovic´ and Vasilije Krestic´, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1995), 95–140. The memorandum was written by a committee of SANU members formed in June 1985 and was not directly sponsored by Serbia’s Communist leadership, though its impact on that leadership and on Serbia was obvious. Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 177–188. 15. Mihailovic´ and Krestic´, Memorandum, 107, 128, 133, 139. 16. Quoted in Jackson Diehl, “Ambitious Yugoslav Tries to Fill Void Left by Tito,” Washington Post, 9 October 1988, A1. 17. “Yugoslavia: Shall We Gdansk?” Economist, 28 March 1987, US edition, 53. 18. Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 218–221. 19. Raif Dizdarevic´, former Yugoslav secretary for foreign affairs (1984–1988) and president of the SFRJ presidency (1988–1989), quotes the 1984 intelligence reports from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which saw Yugoslavia in a deep crisis. Both camps perceived the country to be so weakened by its internal divisions and economic problems that its international prestige was seen as a thing of the past. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 123–124, 167. 20. Quotes are from the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Claude Cheysson, the former French foreign minister (1981–1984) and European Commissioner in charge of Mediterranean policy and North-South relations (1985–1988). Quoted in ibid., 169–170. For a solid presentation of Yugoslavia’s relations with Europe during this period, see Zachary T. Irwin, “Yugoslavia’s Relations with European States,” in Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubiša Adamovich (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 349–392. 21. David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (London: Routledge, 1990), 158–159. 22. The idea of autonomy for the Serbs outside of Serbia (particularly for the Serbs of Croatia) had been present in Serbian intellectual circles ever since World War II and was especially prominent in the early 1970s. It reemerged again in the mid-1980s, with

Notes to Pages 20–22 the increased public activity of the SANU and the Writers’ Association of Serbia. The issue of border adjustments became public during the debate on a possible confederal restructuring of Yugoslavia. Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 201. 23. Vladisavljevic´, “Grassroots Groups,” 786. For the connection between the intellectual elite and the Kosovo Serb protesters and for the toleration and at least tacit support of Serb officials, see ibid., 785–789. Also see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 35. 24. Ivan Stambolic´, Put u bespuc´e: Odgovori Ivana Stambolic´a na pitanja Slobodana Inic´a (Belgrade: Radio B-92, 1995), 137. 25. For one of the best accounts of Miloševic´’s political strategy during this time, see Adam LeBor, Milosevic: A Biography (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 63–74. For Miloševic´’s lack of response to the SANU memorandum, see Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 44–47. And for a telling account of Miloševic´’s courting of the party’s conservative old guard, see Stambolic´, Put u bespuc´e, 147–150. 26. For solid accounts of Miloševic´’s two visits to Kosovo Polje, see Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 37–39, and especially LeBor, Milosevic, 78–83. For the preparations of Šolevic´ and his companions for a clash with the police, see Miroslav Šolevic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, July 1994–July 1995, 3/71, 7. 27. The former leader of Kosovo’s SK and great foe of Slobodan Miloševic´, Azem Vllasi, claims Miloševic´ also sent one of his personal secretaries to help prepare and coordinate things with Šolevic´. Azem Vllasi, BL-DY interview transcript, 10 October 1994, 3/83, 1. 28. Quoted in LeBor, Milosevic, 79. 29. For the transcript of Miloševic´’s speech in Kosovo Polje that evening and night, see Slobodan Miloševic´, Godine raspleta (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989), 140–146. 30. Miroslav Šolevic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 11. 31. According to Stambolic´, this was his second major disagreement with Miloševic´. The first one was regarding the SANU memorandum. Ivan Stambolic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/73, 8. 32. Quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 40. 33. Miloševic´’s group of media faithfuls included the Radio and Television Belgrade director Ratomir Vico; his deputy, Dušan Mitevic´; Politika editor Živorad Minovic´; Politika Ekspres editor Slobodan Jovanovic´; and an expanding list of others who were willing to serve. This group, with the assistance of Miloševic´’s wife, Mirjana Markovic´, who wrote editorials under pseudonyms, was crucial in securing Miloševic´’s takeover. Kemal Kurspahic, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 36–39. 34. For media manipulations leading to Miloševic´’s victory over Stambolic´ at the Eighth Session, see Dušan Mitevic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 29 September 1994, 3/55, 11. Also see Kurspahic, Prime Time Crime, 39–40. Stambolic´ was not ousted from his post until December 1987, but without the support of the party he was no more than a

315 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

316 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 22–23 lame-duck president. For a fascinating account of his interaction with Miloševic´ and his cronies after the Eighth Session, see Stambolic´, Put u bespuc´e, 251–262. 35. This quote is from Miloševic´’s speech at the Sixth Session of the Central Committee of the Serbian SK in July 1987. Miloševic´, Godine raspleta, 160. Miloševic´ commenced his purges in the party structure in Serbia even before the Eighth Session, though in a less open way because of the still present influence of Stambolic´. 36. For the media purges, see Misha Glenny, “TV Editor Dismissed in Yugoslavian Purge,” Guardian, 26 November 1987. Also see Kurspahic, Prime Time Crime, 40–41. For Miloševic´’s general campaign of purges, see “Yugoslavia: Sloba’s Serbs,” Economist, 9 January 1988, UK edition, 39. The official party statement publicized at the end of the Eighth Session presciently exclaimed, “Only those who are ready and capable to materialize the decisiveness and the mood of the public can hold responsible and managing functions”; in Miloševic´, Godine raspleta, 179 (emphasis in original). 37. The quote is from Stipe Šuvar, Croatia’s representative in the presidium of the federal SK. Quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 47. For Šuvar’s acknowledgment of his grave mistake, see Predrag Tašic´, Kako je ubijena druga Jugoslavija (Skopje, Macedonia: Al, 1994), 111. 38. Miloš Vasic´, Roksanda Nincˇic´, and Tanja Topic´, “A Tired Serbia,” Vreme News Digest, no. 52, 21 September 1992. 39. According to Louis Sell—political counselor at the US Embassy in Belgrade in 1987–1991—there was not much disagreement between the US and European assessments. Interview with the author, 13 February 2007. 40. CIA: “Controversial Party Plenum Opens,” 28 April 1987, FOIA F-1995–00364, and “Ethnic Tensions in Kosovo Province,” 3 June 1987, FOIA F-1995–00364. 41. CIA, “Ethnic Tensions Still High in Kosovo,” 20 August 1987, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1–4. The report claimed that “the security scene is most immediately threatened by the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins who, aided by nationalist-oriented Belgrade intellectuals, have developed the organized protest into a fine art.” In contrast to the claims coming from Belgrade at the time, the report found “no solid evidence that Tirana is instigating Albanian separatism in Kosovo by providing arms, funds, or any training.” 42. CIA, “Threats of Ethnic Violence Growing,” 14 October 1987, FOIA F-1995–00364. 43. Jackson Diehl, “New Serbian Leader Accused of Adding to Ethnic Tension,” Washington Post, 20 November 1987, A21. The assessment of the UK ambassador in Belgrade, Andrew Wood, in his report to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was also clear: Miloševic´ had exploited Serb nationalism to oust Stambolic´ in a reactionary coup which “proved a brutal reminder of the power of demagogy and party discipline in determined hands.” “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1987,” 25 January 1988, FCO document DD1988/171, FOIA 0020–10. 44. Quoted in LeBor, Milosevic, 67. 45. Louis Sell, interview with the author, 13 February 2007. Scanlan served as ambassador to Yugoslavia (1985–1989) and as deputy chief of mission in Belgrade under Eagleburger (1979–1981). His troubling relationship with Miloševic´ and his regime persisted even after he left the diplomatic service. Eagleburger had served in Yugoslavia on two occasions—as second secretary (1962–1965) and as ambassador (1977–1981). During

Notes to Pages 24–26 this particular period, he was the president of Kissinger Associates (1984–1989), though he was still present and influential in the diplomatic community. In the administration of George H. W. Bush he served as deputy secretary of state (1989–1992) and secretary of state (1992–1993). Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 41. 46. Dessa Trevisan, the Times of London Balkan correspondent, quoted in LeBor, Milosevic, 110. Trevisan also tells the story of a Belgrade reception on 29 November 1987—only two months after the Eighth Session—during which US ambassador Scanlan embraced and kissed Miloševic´, saying “they were old friends and so was Larry Eagleburger.” Ibid., 109–110. 47. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Federation—Intelligence Research Report No. 145,” 22 January 1988, Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group, 2007), 4–5. 48. As reported in the memoirs of the former federal secretary for the people’s defense and the JNA chief of staff, Admiral Branko Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 146–147. 49. CIA, “Prospects for Stability and Economic Recovery—An Intelligence Assessment,” 1 August 1987, FOIA F-1995–00364, 2–4, 10. 50. John Palmer, “Yugoslavia ‘Close to Disintegration’: EEC Ministers Get Warning on Belgrade’s Predicament,” Guardian, 7 March 1988; David Buchan, “Brussels Urges Yugoslav Loan,” Financial Times, 15 April 1988, I-2. 51. The meeting of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and a member of the Yugoslav federal presidency, Veselin Đuranovic´, on 23 March 1988 is probably a perfect example. Thatcher’s words of encouragement to Đuranovic´ were as follows: “What is it with you? Lift your chin up! You have been through worse challenges. You are talented, capable, and brave. Do not let yourself fall into depression. Strengthen the leadership and the cohesion in your country.” Quoted in Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 427. When it came to real assistance to Yugoslavia, as in the form of the European Commission’s proposal for an interest rate subsidy, the British government, together with others, blocked such plans. Buchan, “Brussels Urges Yugoslav Loan,” I-2. 52. Dyker, Yugoslavia, 167. 53. For the most comprehensive account of Gorbachev’s visit, see Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 179–183. For East European perceptions of Gorbachev’s Belgrade statements as the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see “The Gorbachev Doctrine,” Economist, 26 March 1988, UK edition, 43. 54. TO units were constituent parts of Yugoslavia’s defense mechanism, created as a response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in accordance with the doctrine of “general people’s war” developed in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. They were constitutionally the responsibility of the republics and provinces and were run as military reserves and a foundation for possible future partisan warfare in case of external attack. Marko Attila Hoare, How Bosnia Armed (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 18–19. For a confirmation of the army’s goal of detaching the TO from the republics and provinces, see Mamula, Sluc´aj Jugoslavija, 61. Veljko Kadijevic´,

317 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

318 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 26–29 Mamula’s successor as the federal secretary for the people’s defense (1988–1992), admits to the same in Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 78. Dizdarevic´ claims that Mamula and Kadijevic´ admitted to him in person that the reorganization of the JNA regional coverage was fundamentally politically motivated. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 400–401. 55. General Martin Špegelj, commander of the Croatian TO units in the early 1980s and commander of the JNA’s fifth district who later became minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia and a general in the Croatian Army, in his memoirs convincingly challenges the constitutionality of the JNA reorganization plan of 1987–1988. Martin Špegelj with Ivo Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 88–93. 56. For the national composition of the JNA’s officer corps, see James Gow, “Deconstructing Yugoslavia,” Survival, vol. 33, no. 4 (1991): 302. 57. Mamula claims to have consulted the republican leaderships of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to start a campaign against Miloševic´’s overthrow of Stambolic´, only to be told that nobody had the desire to meddle in Serbia’s internal problems. Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 115, 118. Stipe Šuvar, the president of the federal party’s presidium in 1988–1989, expressed serious doubts about the sincerity of Mamula’s claims in “Ne klepec´em Mamulama!” Feral Tribune, 28 June 2000. 58. Demonstrating the politicization of the JNA and its steadfast ideological commitment to the party, Mamula claims that the JNA leadership gave up on the SK much later than it gave up on the federal presidency. Mamula, Slucˇaj Jugoslavija, 89. 59. Ibid., 88, 101–104. The CIA at the time found that Yugoslavia “does not face this danger [of a military coup]. Nevertheless, there are enough indicators to make this prospect plausible at some later date should conditions seriously deteriorate.” CIA, “Testing the Chances of a Military Coup,” 15 January 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1. 60. As quoted in Bilandžic´, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 759. 61. For solid accounts of the JNA clash with the Slovenian leadership, see James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 78–83, and Meier, Yugoslavia, 60–71. 62. Branko Mamula, BL-DY interview transcript, 12 October 1994, 3/49, 16. 63. Meier, Yugoslavia, 62. 64. Ibid., 62–64. Mamula admits that the goal of the JNA was “a threat to Slovenia that they cannot treat us that way.” Branko Mamula, BL-DY interview transcript, 17. 65. Milan Kucˇan, BL-DY interview transcript, 17 November 1994, 3/45, 5. 66. Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 204–205. 67. Janez Janša, at this time a Mladina specialist on JNA affairs and later Slovenia’s minister of defense, has suggested that Slovenia’s leadership actually cooperated with the JNA, particularly regarding his arrest in May 1988. Janez Janša, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/33, 5. See also Janša’s marginally less accusatory account in Janez Janša, Pomaci (Zagreb: Mladinska knjiga, 1993), 10–11. 68. Quoted in Meier, Yugoslavia, 68. 69. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 423. 70. Mamula, Slucˇaj Jugoslavija, 150. Talks of a military takeover made it into the Western press as well. “Yugoslavia: Press 1, Army 0,” Economist, 4 June 1988, UK edition, 5. The

Notes to Pages 29–31 CIA saw the odds of a military intervention in Slovenia at this time as “about even” and growing “if Belgrade concludes that regional leaders have lost control.” CIA, “Growing Unrest,” 25 June 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1. By its next report two weeks later, the CIA viewed the prospects of a unilateral military intervention as “not likely any time soon.” CIA, “Growing Military Concern over Unrest,” 9 July 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364. 71. Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada, 102. 72. Quote from Vesna Pešic´, a prominent Serbian liberal and anti-nationalist intellectual, in Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 214. 73. Olivera Milosavljevic´, “The Abuse of the Authority of Science,” in The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis, ed. Nebojša Popov (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 284–285. 74. The Serbian intellectual elite was hardly a unified body. Nevertheless, practically all of its main representatives participated in the creation of a concrete platform regarding social, economic, and political reforms. In March 1988, “virtually the whole of Serbia’s intellectual opposition” endorsed the platform, entitled “Contributions to the Public Debate about the Constitution.” Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 202–203. 75. Miloševic´, Godine raspleta, 251. 76. At a session of Serbia’s National Assembly discussing the drafted constitutional amendments, “Major-General Milisav Djordjevic [of the JNA], addressing the assembly in full military uniform, said he wanted a single Serbia stretching from the northern borders of Vojvodina to the southern borders of Kosovo, not an ‘invalid Serbia’ within its present borders without the provinces.” Barney Petrovic, “Serbian Assembly Drafts Framework to Strip Provinces of Autonomy,” Guardian, 27 July 1988. The federal party organization also repeatedly endorsed Serbia’s constitutional reforms. See the reproduced statements of the president of the party presidium in Stipe Šuvar, Nezavršeni mandat (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 1:38–45. 77. Federal officials, like the president of the SFRJ presidency, Raif Dizdarevic´, publicly asked Miloševic´ to complete the process of constitutional changes because he had received the stamp of approval from the principal bodies. Tašic´, Kako je ubijena, 168. 78. The collaboration of Serbia’s state services and the organizers of the rallies was widely cited in the local press at the time. Local bodies of Serbia’s SK were most often the official sponsors and organizers of the rallies, and the Central Committee of Serbia’s ruling party and Miloševic´ publicly supported them. For the connection of the protests with Serbia’s State Security Service, particularly regarding the protests in Vojvodina, see Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 59. For an account which minimizes the role of Miloševic´’s state apparatus and stresses the leading role of the Kosovo activists, see Nebojša Vladisavljevic´, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševic´, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 79. According to Sabrina Ramet, between 9 July and 4 September 1988 eleven rallies were organized with up to 160,000 protesters at a time, and by the spring of 1989 almost one hundred rallies had taken place, with a cumulative total of about five million people. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 231. Slavoljub Đukic´ cites the official (inflated but nevertheless indicative) figures, which put the number of protesters in Niš at 300,000, Leskovac at 200,000, Kragujevac at 200,000, Vranje at 150,000, and so on.

319 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

320 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 32–33 Slavoljub Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme: Politicˇ ka biografija Slobodana Miloševic´a (Belgrade: Filip Višnjic´, 1994), 104. 80. The assortment of songs and chants at the “rallies of truth” was sizeable. In addition to those which praised socialism, Serbia’s ruling party, the JNA, and Yugoslavia, or those which were against the constitutional system and bureaucracy, there were many which were seen as deeply troubling outside of Serbia. There were chants against the leaders of the autonomous provinces—“Down with Vojvodina separatists!” or “We will kill Azem [Vllasi]!” There were also warmongering chants of “We want weapons!” and songs like “Who says, who lies that Serbia is small? It isn’t small—it’s been at war three times! It will go to war again, if there is luck.” Finally, there were chants of praise for Miloševic´, which crowned him as the new Tito. Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 104–116. 81. Edward Steen, “Yugoslavia Threatens to Break Up as Tito’s Ghost Fades,” Independent, 19 September 1988, 8; “Dreams and Nightmares of Greater Serbia,” Economist, 17 September 1988, UK edition, 57; Jackson Diehl, “Protesters Oust Leaders of Yugoslavian Province,” Washington Post, 7 October 1988, A25. 82. CIA, “Contentious Weeks Ahead,” 8 September 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364. 83. Public statement of the SKJ presidium of 30 July 1988, quoted in Meier, Yugoslavia, 74. 84. Šuvar, Nezavršeni mandat, 1:36–45. For Šuvar’s vigorous critiques of the Kosovo leadership, see ibid., 25–32, 46–63. 85. Meier, Yugoslavia, 77–78. 86. Dizdarevic´ provides accounts of a series of closed-door meetings in the federal leadership where Miloševic´’s tactics were criticized by representatives of other republics. None of these meetings and criticisms had any effect on Miloševic´. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 193–214. 87. For the best account of the Novi Sad protests, see Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 107–110. It is intriguing that the federal leadership knew of the plan to wage the protests the day before they started and apparently did nothing to stop them. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 214. 88. Dizdarevic´ recalls the closed-door protestations of the federal functionaries against Miloševic´’s tactics, but the fact remains that the federal leadership did nothing to help Vojvodina. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 214–219. What is more, one of the leaders of Vojvodina’s SK, Boško Krunic´, contends that it was Dizdarevic´ himself who insisted that the leadership of Vojvodina resign. LeBor, Milosevic, 105. 89. Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 114–116. Also see Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 220–224. As with the Novi Sad protests, the federal leadership knew of the preparations for the protests in Titograd the day before. Ibid., 219. 90. For a comparison of Miloševic´’s tactics with those of Mussolini and Hitler, see “Yugoslavia: Mussovic,” Economist, 8 October 1988, UK edition, 66. Also see Jackson Diehl, “Ambitious Yugoslav Tries to Fill Void Left by Tito,” Washington Post, 9 October 1988, A1; “Yugo Minus Slavia,” Economist, 15 October 1988, UK edition, 16. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post published editorials warning the West of the nationalist troubles started by Miloševic´. “Aboil in the Balkans,” New York Times, 11 October 1988, A30, and “Back in the Balkans,” Washington Post, 12 October 1988, A18.

Notes to Pages 33–37 91. CIA, “European Brief,” 8 October 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364. 92. Henry Kamm, “In Yugoslavia, a Charge of ‘Stalinist!’ ” New York Times, 15 October 1988, 4. 93. Dizdarevic´ also demanded that the “economic” amendments to the federal constitution being discussed at the time be passed as soon as possible. Meier, Yugoslavia, 79. 94. Šuvar, Nezavršeni mandat, 1:46–63. 95. Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 110–112. 96. Statement of the Slovenian president, Janez Stanovnik, at the World Affairs Council in Washington, DC; quoted in “Visoka cena herojskog poteza,” Borba, 14 November 1988, 4. 97. CIA, “Milosevic Lying Low,” 29 October 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364. 98. Miloševic´, Godine raspleta, 274–277. 99. David Binder, “US Aides Express Concern over Yugoslav Crisis,” New York Times, 12 October 1988, Section A, 7; emphasis added. 100. Account of the October 1988 Belgrade meeting of the ambassadors of Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany in Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 148. Also see CIA, “JMC Meeting amidst Political Turmoil,” 11 October 1988, FOIA F-1995–00364, 2. 101. Macedonians at the time worked closely with Miloševic´ because of their shared animosity toward the Albanian minority. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Miloševic´ (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 31. Macedonia followed in the footsteps of Serbia’s antiAlbanian campaign and removed any mention of Albanian and Turkish minorities from its constitution in June 1989. Magaš, Destruction of Yugoslavia, 224. Macedonia’s relationship with Serbia soured in late 1989 due to a series of blunders by Miloševic´, of which more in chapter 3. 102. “Belgrade Denies Plan to Join 12,” Guardian, 21 December 1988. 103. For an excellent account of the events in Kosovo during this period, see Darko Hudelist, Kosovo: Bitka bez iluzija (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1989), 267–287. 104. Ibid., 269–270. 105. Although opinions differ on whether these protests were spontaneous or actively organized, contemporary press reports and later accounts by the main protagonists imply that at least the highest leadership of Vllasi and Jashari had nothing to do with them. Sell, Slobodan Milosevic, 82; Hudelist, Kosovo, 275–281; “Ovako nešto nismo ocˇekivali,” Borba, 19–20 November 1988, 6. 106. Misha Glenny, “Serbian Leader Demands Imprisonment of Albanian Insurgents,” Guardian, 22 November 1988. 107. The impeachment campaign culminated at the Twentieth Session of the party’s Central Committee on 30 and 31 January 1989. Šuvar, Nezavršeni mandat, 1:208–212. 108. Meier, Yugoslavia, 85–86. For the final version of the constitutional amendments that were ratified in February and March 1989, see Ustav Socijalisticˇ ke Republike Srbije sa ustavnim amandmanima (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1989), 15–92. 109. Meier, Yugoslavia, 86.

321 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

322 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 37–39 110. Magaš, Destruction of Yugoslavia, 180–186. 111. Šuvar, Nezavršeni mandat, 1:232–246. Šuvar’s inability (or unwillingness) to confront the realities of the situation was nothing short of astonishing. 112. The term “special measures” (which was unknown in Yugoslav constitutional terminology) was used solely for the purpose of public relations with the West. The federal presidency contemplated imposing “special measures” throughout Serbia in order to stop potential new rallies and protests but opted only for Kosovo under strong pressure from the Serbian leadership. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 358, 371–373. 113. The Slovenian assembly was attended by the whole political elite of the republic. Milan Kucˇan stated that “Yugoslavia is being defended in the Trepcˇa mine. We protest against fanning the psychosis of the state-of-emergency. We are warning that a quiet coup is taking place before our eyes which is changing the face of Yugoslavia.” Quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 65–66. Kucˇan later recalled his motivation for organizing the assembly: “We feared that after Kosovo, we would be next.” Quoted in LeBor, Milosevic, 116. 114. For claims of involvement by high Serbian SK functionaries and company bosses in the organization of the Belgrade rally, see Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 376, and Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 120. 115. Miloševic´ later told Dušan Mitevic´, who became the director of Television Belgrade in late 1988 and who chose to air the footage of the Cankarjev Dom events on Television Belgrade, that “This single thing that you did is quite enough to cover your entire term.” Dušan Mitevic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 22–23. 116. Dizdarevic´ tried to calm the crowds that afternoon, but his conciliatory speech made no impact and only angered the rest of Yugoslavia because of its substance and tone of appeasement. Dizdarevic´, Od smrti Tita, 379–383. Morina and other “loyal Albanians” were soon thereafter reinstated. Also see CIA, “Milosevic Exploits Mass Demonstration,” 1 March 1989, FOIA F-1995–00364. 117. Quoted in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 68. 118. “Yugoslavia: Intifada in the Balkans,” Economist, 1 April 1989, UK edition, 54; Meier, Yugoslavia, 92–93. 119. Borisav Jovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/35, 20. 120. Sell, Slobodan Milosevic, 87. 121. The official victim toll was 22 protesters and 2 policemen dead and 222 injured. Independent estimates were much higher. Ibid., 87–88. 122. Quoted in Meier, Yugoslavia, 93–94. 123. Ibid., 95. 124. The United States had solid intelligence even on the validity of various claims of discrimination and harassment made by the Serbian government and the Kosovo Serbs. A detailed CIA analysis from February 1989 exposed the Serbian claims of alleged Albanian terror as “largely unfounded” and asserted that “Serbian officials and media are advancing these claims at least in part to discredit Kosovo Albanian leaders and justify stronger Serbian influence in the province. By contrast, Kosovo Albanians are largely justified in claiming that provincial authorities, under strong Serbian and federal pressure, are abridging the basic rights of Albanians.” CIA,

Notes to Pages 40–47 “Yugoslavia’s Serb-Albanian Dispute: Who Is Violating Whose Human Rights?” 21 February 1989, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1. 125. US Senate, “Senate Concurrent Resolution 20—Relating to the Condition of Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 135, no. 26, 9 March 1989, S2520. Also see US Senate, “Senate Concurrent Resolution 43—Concerning Human Rights Violations in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 135, no. 78, 13 June 1989, S6548. 126. US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Nomination of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, One Hundred First Congress,” Hrg. 101–178, 15–16 March 1989, 35–36. During his examination, Eagleburger denied he was a “close friend” of Miloševic´ and instead claimed he just “knew him.” For the extent of Eagleburger’s business connections with Yugoslav companies, some of which had serious legal problems in the United States, see ibid., 84. 127. The last US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, mentions Eagleburger’s hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee in his memoirs. However, he cites only Eagleburger’s critique of Miloševic´ and fails to mention the rest of his statement. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers— America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 8. 128. According to Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, who wrote the most in-depth account of the Bush administration’s actions during this period, the president “was in no hurry to see Jaruzelski swept aside in favor of Walesa. He told his aides that a sudden collapse of the Communist regime might be ‘more than the market can bear.’ ” Moreover, “in [Bush’s] lexicon, solid, proven, and reliable were adjectives of high praise. Names like Walesa and Yeltsin did not find their way into Bush’s Rolodex as easily as Jaruzelski or Gorbachev.” Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 86–87. 129. Quoted in ibid., 35, 51. 130. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 7–8. 131. Ian Traynor, “US President to Visit E. Europe,” Guardian, 6 May 1989. 132. “Sloga je zalog svih uspeha,” Borba, 29 June 1989, 1.

chapter 3. yugoslavia’s cold war, 1988–1989 1. “Yugoslavia: Falling to Pieces?” Economist, 20 January 1990, UK edition, 62. 2. Quoted in Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 31. 3. Sir Peter Hall, interview with the author, 22 May 2005. Hall’s disappointment with his government’s lack of attention regarding Yugoslavia continued into 1991. For his complaints concerning the absence of high-profile UK visits to Yugoslavia, see “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1990,” 23 January 1991, FCO document, FOIA 0020–10.

323 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

324 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 48–51 4. Jacques Amalric, “Un entretien avec le président de la Serbie: En Yougoslavie, le système économique et politique ‘fait tout à l’envers,’ ” Le Monde, 12 July 1989, 1, 6–7. 5. “Comment: Slovenian Jeopardy,” Guardian, 28 September 1989. 6. For the army’s position, see “Uzroci krize nisu u revoluciji i njenim tekovinama,” Borba, 13 July 1989, 10. Macedonia began to slowly slip out of Miloševic´’s grip. 7. Agrokomerc was an agricultural concern in western Bosnia whose CEO, Fikret Abdic´, used his political connections to secure lucrative loans from Yugoslav banks using fraudulent promissory notes. The practice was common throughout Yugoslavia, but Agrokomerc pushed the limits. For a concise presentation of the scandal, see Neven Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 56–61. 8. For the reaction of the BiH leadership, see a series of articles in the Sarajevo daily Oslobod‒enje, 1–5 September 1988. For the failure of the Knin rally, see Predrag Tašic´, Kako je ubijena druga Jugoslavija (Skopje, Macedonia: Al, 1994), 135. 9. The lead organizer of the “rallies of truth,” Miroslav Šolevic´, announced the expansion of the campaign into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in a December 1988 interview with the Croatian weekly Start. Croatia’s authorities censored the magazine (which held off on publishing the interview until March 1989), but its contents still became public knowledge. It is reproduced in Darko Hudelist, Kosovo: Bitka bez iluzija (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1989), 309–330. 10. Tašic´, Kako je ubijena, 157, 173. Also see Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 112. 11. Jelena Lovric´ and Mladen Malocˇa, “Intervju: Celestin Sardelic´,” Danas, 31 January 1989, 12. 12. Quoted in “Glavom i rukama protiv kampanja i fraza,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 12 March 1989, 6. 13. This was not the last time that Serbia objected to a Croatian representative on the federal presidency. In the summer of 1990, it opposed Šuvar’s replacement, Stipe Mesic´, and in May 1991 it blocked Mesic´’s ascent to the position of president of the presidency. For Serbia’s opposition to Šuvar, see Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 8. 14. Davor Maric´, “Plimom demokracije do—oseke nacionalizma,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May 1989, 1. The Central Committee of the Croatian SK was referring to a series of articles in the Serbian press which claimed that Croats were “innately genocidal,” that the Serbs in Croatia were exposed to “calculated assimilation,” and that the World War II crimes of the Croats against the Serbs were “strategically forgotten” after the war. 15. Both quotes in Željko Vukovic´, “Izmed‒u sloge i epidemije,” Borba, 13 May 1989, 1, 6. 16. “Zajedno smo moc´ni—razjedinjeni bez šanse,” Borba, 20 July 1989, 4–5. The “happening of the people” was at the time a popularly used term for the protest rallies. 17. Lovric´ and Malocˇa, “Intervju: Celestin Sardelic´,” 12. The secretary of the Croatian SK, Dragutin Dimitrovic´, also stated that he wanted the year 1989 to be devoted to “the Croatian defense against attacks.” “Glavom i rukama protiv kampanja i fraza,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 12 March 1989, 7. 18. Ivica Mlivoncˇic´, “ ‘Pravoslavna’ Dalmacija po Jovi Opacˇic´u,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 16 July 1989, 14.

Notes to Pages 51–53 19. Ibid., 14. For the best coverage of the Knin events, see the Split daily Slobodna Dalmacija between 10 and 23 July 1989. 20. The Cˇetnik symbols were particularly prominent among the protesters from Serbia. For the reaction of the local Serb Communists, see Tašic´, Kako je ubijena, 180. 21. “Optužnice protiv Opacˇic´a i Andric´a,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 21 July 1989, 5. 22. “Tko, što, kada,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 6 August 1989, 11; “Serbs Defy Ban to Rally in Support of Milosevic,” Financial Times, 14 August 1989, 2. 23. C´osic´’s interview was published in Il Tempo on 27 July 1989 but reached the Yugoslav public in August. It is reproduced in Georgio Torchia, “Tabu titoizma paralizira Jugoslaviju,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 8 September 1989, 19. Note that the number of Serbs in Croatia was officially 531,502 in 1981 and 581,663 in 1991—not 700,000, as C´osic´ claimed. 24. The constitutional definition of the official language in Croatia was “the Croatian literary language—the standard form of the people’s language used by the Croats and Serbs in Croatia, which is called Croatian or Serbian.” After a lengthy debate throughout 1988 and the first half of 1989, it was decided in June 1989 that such a formulation should remain in spite of various other proposals. This prompted a series of critiques in Serbian intellectual circles, which claimed that “the Croatian literary language” was being forced upon the Croatian Serbs. “Bez amandmana 41,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 22 June 1989, 4. 25. The BiH leadership was throughout 1989 under constant pressure from Belgrade’s intellectual elite and Serbia’s SK to allow the formation of Serb national cultural institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It strongly opposed those requests by claiming that separate national institutions for the three main nations within Bosnia would lead only to divisions and increased tensions. See the interview with the president of the Bosnian SK, Nijaz Durakovic´, in Jelena Lovric´, “Bitka za Bosnu,” Danas, 25 July 1989, 14–17. 26. Quoted in Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing–Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 48. 27. In the words of the poets Gojko Đogo and Matija Bec´kovic´, as reported in Mladen Malocˇa, “Meki trbuh Hrvatske,” Danas, 19 September 1989, 11. 28. Quoted in ibid. 29. Quoted in Jasna Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 236. 30. Darko Hudelist, “Jugoslavija u sjeni noža,” Start, 16 September 1989, 51–57. 31. From Miloševic´’s statement to the Priština daily Rilindja. As reproduced in “Uvek na strani ugroženih,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 December 1989, 12. 32. Quoted in Malocˇa, “Meki trbuh Hrvatske,” 11, and Viktor Ivancˇic´, “Hrvatski dug za ustaški zlocˇin!?” Slobodna Dalmacija, 19 November 1989, 18. Laban was that fall installed as the president of the Council of Associated Labor of Serbia’s National Assembly. 33. “Destabiliziranje Hrvatske,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 9 September 1989, 2. 34. For concise accounts of the affair, see Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 115–117, and Tašic´, Kako je ubijena, 203–205. For the best press coverage of the scandal, see a series of articles in Oslobod‒enje and the Zagreb daily Vjesnik, 14–28 October. Also see Vlastimir Mijovic´, “Strogo kontrolirana Republika,” Danas, 24 October 1989, 15–16. 35. Miloševic´ waited five weeks to respond to the official letter from Obrad Piljak, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s presidency, demanding an explanation. In his

325 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

326 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 54–56 response, he simply stated that he had passed the letter on “to the relevant services” and concluded by stating he was “firmly convinced that the times when truth could be kept hidden were gone.” Tašic´, Kako je ubijena, 204. For Piljak’s allegations, see “Ne izmišljamo špijune,” Vjesnik, 26 October 1989, 6. 36. This was also the case with Serb political functionaries in the two republics. Several prominent Serb members of the leaderships of Croatia and BiH directly opposed Miloševic´, while others—particularly in BiH—showed signs of support for his platform. Vlastimir Mijovic´, “Rasplet sa zadrškom,” Danas, 31 October 1989, 12–13; Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 117–118. 37. Macedonia’s leaders in a 17 July 1989 meeting with their Serbian counterparts criticized Miloševic´ for the following: Serbia’s lack of recognition of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church; Miloševic´’s claim in his Battle of Kosovo anniversary speech that “the Serbs . . . had never conquered or exploited others,” a claim that disregarded the Serbian treatment of the Macedonians in the interwar period; and his support for Serbs who had settled in Kosovo and Macedonia after World War I, had been driven out and refused to return after World War II, and now wanted to go back. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 111. Also see “Što je Lazaroski rekao Miloševic´u,” Vjesnik, 22 October 1989, 8. 38. One needs only to look at the proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Session of the SKJ Central Committee, 30 July–1 August 1989. The bitterness of the clash among the entrenched camps was beyond anything that had until then been seen in SKJ history. See the coverage in Borba and Slobodna Dalmacija. 39. Opposition parties that did not share a commitment to the ruling system or a common South Slav state began to form throughout 1989 but gained noticeable influence only in early 1990. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which won the Croatian elections in April and May 1990, had been secretly formed by a few dozen initial members in the barracks of a local soccer club on 17 June 1989—days before Miloševic´ delivered his speech to about one million supporters at the anniversary celebration of the Battle of Kosovo. 40. Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 31. 41. For a different view, see Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 33–46. 42. Both Serbia and the JNA vigorously contested the state of emergency amendment, claiming it challenged the unity of Yugoslav defenses, even though the approval for the state of emergency in Kosovo was sought from Serbia’s National Assembly and even though the JNA did not intervene in Vojvodina during the “yogurt revolution” exactly because the Serbian leadership refused to give its approval. 43. Though finding that the republics indeed had the right to secede, the federal Constitutional Court in February 1990 determined that significant portions of the new Slovenian constitution were in conflict with the federal constitution. Hayden, Blueprints, 42–46. 44. Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslovenski pregled, 1989), 9, 27 (emphases added). According to the constitution, people

Notes to Pages 56–59 exercised their sovereign rights primarily in the republics and in the federation only “when in the common interest it is so specified by the present constitution.” Ibid., 10. 45. Davor Maric´ and Dino Mikulandra, “Ustav Slovenije: Zbogom državnom socijalizmu,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 October 1989, 13. 46. Marcus Tanner, “Outrage in Serbia over Slovene Vote on Secession,” Independent, 29 September 1989. 47. For the most comprehensive coverage of SKJ Central Committee decision making, see Borba, 27–29 September. 48. For the nature of Miloševic´’s close personal relationship with Kadijevic´, solidified during joint family vacations near Dubrovnik, see Branko Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 158, and Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 45. 49. Momir Bulatovic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, 10 October 1994, 6. Bulatovic´ also publicly repeated his threats of a military intervention at a meeting of the SKJ Central Committee on 26 September and the following day at a Titograd rally against the Slovenian amendments. “ ‘Nož u srce Jugoslavije,’ ” Slobodna Dalmacija, 28 September 1989, 10. 50. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 54–55. 51. Ibid., 60. 52. Josip Vrhovec, “Istina iza ‘Mitinga istine,’ ” Vjesnik, 10 December 1989, 7. In addition to this demand, the rally organizers claimed they wanted “to check if the Slovene people share the opinions of their leadership because, if they do, both the Slovene people and their leadership can take the first train out of Yugoslavia.” The choice of the date for the “rally of truth” in Ljubljana—1 December 1989—was also no accident. It was the anniversary of the 1918 formation of the Yugoslav kingdom and was seen by the rally organizers as “the date of victory.” It is interesting that 29 November—the anniversary of the 1943 formation of Tito’s Yugoslavia—was not chosen. 53. Marcus Tanner, “Divided Yugoslavia Likely as Serbia Acts against Slovenia,” Independent, 30 November 1989, 10. 54. “Hladni rat,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 December 1989, 1. 55. Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 106. 56. Quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, “French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe,” in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 130. 57. Quoted in Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 67. 58. Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 135. 59. Quoted in Miodrag Paskucˇi, “Želimo jaku i integrisanu Jugoslaviju,” Oslobod‒enje, 28 October 1989, 1. 60. Quoted in Aleksandar Đukanovic´, “Treba vam malo više politicˇke konkurencije,” Borba, 4 December 1989, 9.

327 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

328 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 59–65 61. Quoted in Nenad Ivankovic´, “Podrške našim reformama,” Vjesnik, 6 December 1989, 1. 62. Quoted in “Mi smo zabrinuti za Jugoslaviju,” NIN, 10 December 1989, 36. 63. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 81. 64. Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 170–171. Baker made his statement on NBC’s Meet the Press on 24 December 1989. The Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, found Baker’s views “stupid.” 65. From Bush’s statement to Newsweek immediately after the January 1990 protests in Azerbaijan, where more than a hundred demonstrators were killed by Soviet forces. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 176. 66. Markovic´’s predecessor resigned on 30 December 1988 but remained in a caretaker position until Markovic´ assumed office on 16 March 1989. 67. Ian Traynor, “A Skipper to Bridge the Gap—Could Milosevic Steer Yugoslavia to Safety?” Guardian, 3 January 1989. The article furthermore argued that “The quid pro quo would be a pledge from Milosevic assuaging the others’ fears of Serbian hegemony, while restoring Serbia to what it sees as its rightful place, by virtue of its size, as the most powerful of the six republics.” 68. Kadijevic´ openly urged Miloševic´ to take the position on his own behalf and supposedly on behalf of the president of the SFRJ presidency, Raif Dizdarevic´. Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 106. 69. Drago Buvacˇ, 1990—Slom hiperinflacije ili Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba, 1990), 40–42. 70. According to Markovic´, he was at least a month late with announcing his cabinet because of Miloševic´’s demand that “at any cost he should have the post” of federal secretary for internal affairs. Ante Markovic´, testimony at the trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 23 October 2003, 28001–28003. 71. “Realism in Yugoslavia,” Financial Times, 22 March 1989, section 1, 20. 72. Buvacˇ, 1990, 43. 73. Between 1978 and 1988 Serbia had a surplus in its trade with the Soviet Union of $3.13 billion, while the rest of Yugoslavia had a deficit of $46 million. The problem was that the companies whose trade resulted in these surpluses could get automatic advances which were financed through primary emissions of the Yugoslav National Bank. According to local economists, such primary emissions were at fault for one-third of Yugoslavia’s inflation rate. Ibid., 44, 65. 74. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 68–69. As if to return the favor from early 1989, when Kadijevic´ wanted Miloševic´ to take the position of federal prime minister, now Miloševic´ wanted Kadijevic´ to take Markovic´’s place with the assistance of Serbia’s eminent economist Oskar Kovacˇ. 75. For a solid assessment of Sachs’s activities in Yugoslavia at the time, see Dušan Sekulic´, “Lutajuc´i vitez s Harvarda,” Borba, 11 November 1989, 2; Vladimir Gligorov, “Lekovi za inflaciju,” Borba, 22 November 1989, 7. 76. For a representative collection of reactions, see the interviews with enterprise managers, political experts, and the coverage of the Yugoslav press in Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 December 1989, 15, 20.

Notes to Pages 65–71 77. Olga Ramljak, “Markovic´evo okupljanje Jugoslavije,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 December 1989, 3. 78. “Opredjeljenje bez sumnji: Jugoslavija,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 December 1989, 5; “Diskretni šarm centralizacije,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 December 1989, 19. 79. Dušan Sekulic´, “Uvrijed‒eni i usamljeni,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 24 December 1989, 4. 80. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 82. 81. Dušan Sekulic´: “Hlad‒enje vruc´e glave,” Danas, 2 January 1990, 16, and “Zašto se Markovic´u ne smije pljeskati,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 11 February 1990, 9. 82. Quoted in Velizar Zecˇevic´, “Zašto je Srbija protiv,” NIN, 24 December 1989, 10. 83. Quoted in Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 86. For Markovic´’s recollection of such measures of the Serbian leadership, see Ante Markovic´, TSM-ICTY, 23 October 2003, 28005. 84. Sekulic´, “Hlad‒enje vruc´e glave,” 16. 85. David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (London: Routledge, 1990), 182. 86. Sekulic´, “Hlad‒enje vruc´e glave,” 16. 87. Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 46. 88. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 304. 89. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 47. 90. Stephan Haggard and Andrew Moravcsik, “The Political Economy of Financial Assistance to Eastern Europe, 1989–1991,” in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 275–277. 91. Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 305. 92. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 51. 93. Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 305. 94. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 50. Markovic´ desperately tried to spin his visit to the United States into a success in front of the Yugoslav media and his political opponents. “Veliki zaokret,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 16 October 1989, 3. 95. Quoted in “ ‘Ulovljen,’ pa dobrovoljno ‘priveden,’ ” Borba, 12 March 1990, 3. 96. “Opredjeljenje bez sumnji: Jugoslavija,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 December 1989, 5. 97. The decision of the Croats and the Slovenes to hold multi-party elections was seen as a direct threat to Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s stability and was publicly condemned by Serbian officials. Barney Petrovic, “Yugoslav Party Seeking a Route to Democracy: Serbia May Stand in the Way of an Agreement at National Congress,” Guardian, 16 December 1989. Unlike the Croats and the Slovenes, who decided to hold real multi-party elections in the spring of 1990, Miloševic´ held the elections for the post of president of Serbia’s presidency in November 1989, running against other candidates chosen by the Serbian SK. He won 82 percent of the vote, but when the votes cast for all candidates were added up, the total interestingly came to 104 percent. “Yugoslavia: Falling to Pieces?” Economist, 20 January 1990, UK edition, 62.

329 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

330 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 71–77 98. Quoted in Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 61. 99. “Raspada li se socijalizam?” Borba, 22 January 1990, 4. 100. “Nismo više u mišjoj rupi,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 22 January 1990, 4. 101. “Svi u Jugoslaviji zajedno tonemo,” Borba, 22 January 1990, 3. 102. The Serbian delegation was particularly chagrined by the proposal that the SKJ should endorse Yugoslavia’s path toward greater cooperation with the EC. Borisav Jovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/35, 20. See also the discussion in Meier, Yugoslavia, 138–139. 103. Dušan Mitevic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 29 September 1994, 3/55, 24. 104. After the Slovenes left, Racˇan withdrew with his delegation to a smaller conference room at the Sava Center to take a roll call of the delegates’ positions. Virtually all of them were in favor of leaving the congress, including the vast majority of the Croatian Serbs. Ivica Racˇan, BL-DY interview transcript, 26 October 1994, 3/63, 13. 105. The delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina actually had the mandate of its own republican congress (held in mid-December 1989) to leave the Fourteenth Congress in case of Slovene departure. For the best account of the collapse of the federal party congress, see “Noc´ ocˇekivanog razlaza,” Borba, 24 January 1990, 3. 106. The congress reconvened in Belgrade for three and a half hours on 26 May 1990 to adopt the final statement. In addition to the delegates from Miloševic´’s bloc (Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and the JNA), the majority of Bosnian delegates and some Croatian Serb delegates were present. “Ima li nade za politicˇki razum,” NIN, 3 June 1990, 15. 107. Ivica Racˇan, BL-DY interview transcript, 5. 108. “Noc´ ocˇekivanog razlaza,” Borba, 24 January 1990, 3. 109. “Pauza, a ne prekid,” Borba, 24 January 1990, 3. 110. “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1990,” 23 January 1991, FCO document, FOIA 0020–10.

chapter 4. challenges of democracy, 1990 1. Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: J. Murray, 1997), 35. 2. Sir Peter Hall, interview with the author, 22 May 2005. 3. CIA, “End of a Nation-Building Experiment,” 21 September 1990, FOIA F-1995– 00364, 1. 4. Louis Sell, interview with the author, 13 February 2007. 5. Budimir Loncˇar, interview with the author, 12 May 2006. 6. Quoted in Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992), 412. 7. Kohl noted that the atmosphere at the Strasbourg summit was the most hostile he had ever encountered in such a forum. Helmut Kohl with Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Propyläen, 1996), 195–197. 8. Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 383. 9. Douglas Webber, ed., New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy since Unification (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 2.

Notes to Pages 77–79 10. Some commentators at the time noted Britain’s particularly negative reaction to President Bush’s labeling of West Germany as a “partner in leadership” in the spring of 1989. West Germany was increasingly seen as a key actor in the process of democratization and reform of Europe’s east, whereas Britain’s more fringe geopolitical position and its own policy choices were causing it to be left out. Coker, “Britain and the New World Order,” 411. 11. Thatcher furthermore noted that “European leaders—such as West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—should put this longer view of Europe’s needs before their more narrow, nationalistic goals.” In Robert Keatley et al., “Thatcher Sees East European Progress as More Urgent than Germans’ Unity,” Wall Street Journal, 26 January 1990, A12. 12. Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), 63. As one author noted, France and the United Kingdom at the “Two Plus Four” negotiations (the two Germanys plus France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR) “ ‘behaved like little citadels of privilege,’ frightened that a united Germany would threaten their perceived prominence in Europe and their privileged position at the UN Security Council that they had enjoyed since 1945.” Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 115. For a comprehensive view of the politics of German reunification, see Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). For a different view of Mitterrand’s standpoint, see Frédéric Bozo, “Mitterrand’s France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal,” Cold War History, vol. 7, no. 4 (2007). 13. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers— America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 41–42. 14. Thomas Patrick Melady, Veleposlanikova pricˇ a: Sjedinjene Americˇ ke Države i Vatikan u svjetskoj politici (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1997), 154. 15. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 192. 16. “One Yugoslavia or Six?” New York Times, 31 January 1990, A26. London’s Independent had published a similar editorial a week earlier, noting that “Not the least of the reasons for welcoming the melting of Soviet power in Eastern Europe is that, if the Balkans insist on being Balkanised, there is no reason for outsiders to stop them.” “Letting the Balkans Balkanise,” Independent, 24 January 1990, 20. 17. Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 105. 18. Quoted in “Jugoslavija za nas ima prvostepeni znacˇaj,” Borba, 14 February 1990, 9; “Naš grijeh ‘Jugoslavenstvo,’ ” Slobodna Dalmacija, 21 March 1990, 3. 19. In Eagleburger’s words to Zimmermann just before a meeting with Miloševic´ during the February 1990 visit, “I thought he was a liberal; he talked so convincingly about westernizing Yugoslavia’s economy. I just must have been wrong.” Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 59.

331 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

332 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 80–84 20. Mirko Klarin, “Nikada se nismo opredeljivali u vašim unutrašnjim sukobima,” Borba, 3 March 1990, 5. 21. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 62. 22. Ibid., 64. For Eagleburger’s stance about America’s and the West’s limited roles in East European and Yugoslav reforms, see his interview with Borba in Klarin, “Nikada se nismo,” 5. 23. David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 26, 29. 24. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 64. 25. Ibid., 64–65. Zimmermann endorses the State Department cable by suggesting that “these prophetic thoughts highlighted the paradox of the Yugoslav elections of 1990— in bringing democracy to birth, they helped strangle it in its cradle.” 26. Demos included the Slovene Democratic Alliance, Social Democratic Alliance of Slovenia, Slovene Christian Democrats, Slovene Farmers’ Alliance, Slovene Craftsmen’s Party, and the Greens of Slovenia. It was created in October 1989 but publicly presented its joint program on 4 December. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 141–142. 27. Quoted in “Opredjeljenje bez sumnji: Jugoslavija,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 December 1989, 5. 28. The first political group to be formed outside of official circles in Croatia was the Alliance for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), founded on 2 February 1989. The first groups with programmatic orientations in true opposition to the ruling party were the HDZ and the HSLS. For the best account of early developments in the Croatian party system, see Darko Hudelist, Banket u Hrvatskoj: Prilozi povijesti hrvatskog višestranacˇ ja 1989–1990 (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1991). 29. Dejan Jovic´, Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije, 1974–1990 (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 52. 30. For a succinct analysis of Slovenia’s electoral campaign, see Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 89–91. 31. For a solid and comprehensive coverage of events in Kosovo, see the articles in London’s Times and Independent, 25 January–5 February 1990. For Serbia’s accusations against Slovenia and Croatia, see Dessa Trevisan, “Yugoslav Government Seeks End to Kosovo Bloodshed,” Times, 30 January 1990. 32. Quoted in B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 100. 33. See the interview with the leader of the Demos coalition, Jože Pucˇnik, in Richard Bassett, “Slovenes Set to Cast off Serbian Reins,” Times, 7 April 1990. The term “independence,” under which Demos ran its campaign, did not imply Slovenia’s secession at the time but its increased self-rule within a Yugoslav confederation. Meier, Yugoslavia, 143. 34. For the tense campaign relations between the ZKS-SDP and the JNA, see Jelena Lovric´, “U cˇemu griješi armija?” Slobodna Dalmacija, 10 April 1990, 13, and Cohen, Broken Bonds, 92. For the official JNA document instructing its officers and staff to vote for the Communists in Slovenia and Croatia, “in spite of their programmatic failings,” see “Obavijest 5 vojne oblasti podred‒enim jedinicama o smjernicama SSNO kako se starješine i grad‒anska lica u OS SFRJ moraju ponašati na predstojec´im

Notes to Pages 84–87 izborima, 6 April 1991,” in Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990–1995: Dokumenti, ed. Mate Rupic´ (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2007), 1:16–18. 35. It is interesting that the ZKS-SDP (17.3 percent) and ZSMS-LS (14.5 percent) individually still received the two largest vote totals, with the members of the Demos coalition receiving the following: Christian Democrats (12.9 percent), Slovene Farmers’ Alliance (12.5 percent), Slovene Democratic Alliance (9.9 percent), the Greens of Slovenia (8.9 percent), the Social Democratic Alliance of Slovenia (7.3 percent), and the Slovene Craftsmen’s Party (3.5 percent). Cohen, Broken Bonds, 92. 36. At the First Congress of the HDZ, held in Zagreb on 24 and 25 February 1990, Tud‒man stated that the formation of the Yugoslav federation had cost the Croatian people dearly and repeated the motto of Stjepan Radic´, the inter-war leader of the Croatian Peasant Party: “My rifle on my shoulder and my wallet in my pocket.” Sanja Modric´, “Hrvatska pre svega,” Borba, 26 February 1990, 3. 37. “Look at who the editors of radio, television, and newspapers are,” Tud‒man stated during the campaign. “We cannot agree to there being 40 percent Serbs in the government of Croatia and 61 percent in the trade union administration when 11 percent of the total population is Serb. Nor can we agree to there being six and a half Serbs among the seven chief editors on television (because one of them is half Croatian and half Serb).” Cohen, Broken Bonds, 97. 38. For Tud‒man’s call for Croatia “in its historic and natural borders” during his speech at the HDZ’s First Congress, see Modric´, “Hrvatska pre svega,” 3. 39. Tud‒man was also of the opinion that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina formed a “natural, economic, and geopolitical unit” similar to that of West and East Germany; that the Bosnian Muslims were simply Croats; and that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina should decide their fate through a referendum. See his interview between the two election rounds in Mladen Pleše and Zoran Daskalovic´, “Zašto pobjed‒ujemo i što HDZ namjerava,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 29 April 1990. For a perceptive analysis of Tud‒man’s attitude and policies toward BiH throughout the early 1990s, see Attila Hoare, “The Croatian Project to Partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990–1994,” East European Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1 (1997). 40. Quoted in Modric´, “Hrvatska pre svega,” 3. 41. “Obmanuta javnost,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 5 March 1990, 3. See also Tud‒man’s ˇ ulic´, “Jamcˇim, revanšizma nec´e biti,” Danas, 1 May 1990, 14. interview in Marinko C Tud‒man personally repeated a variation of this view to Ambassador Zimmermann during their first meeting: “If there’s pressure from the Serbs in Bosnia, we will defend our interests. If there isn’t, it’s fine with us if Bosnia remains an independent republic.” Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 74. 42. Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing– Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 58–59. 43. For negative reactions to Tud‒man’s statements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see “Tud‒man otvara vrata fašizmu” and “Udar na BiH,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 28 February 1990, 5. 44. For the SKH-SDP assertion of the sovereignty of the republics as states, see Seada Vranic´ and Miro Krmpotic´, “Mi mislimo sasvim ozbiljno,” Borba, 12 March 1990, 3.

333 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

334 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 87–89 For their rejection of the JNA’s public and private pressures, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 89. Also see Meier, Yugoslavia, 139. And for the 20 percent wage increase, see Olga Ramljak, “Plac´e više za 20 posto,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 4 April 1990, 3. 45. Candidates ran in single-member districts and qualified for the second round if they received more than 7 percent of the vote and if no candidate won the majority of votes in the first round. Realizing the mistake of instituting the two-round system after the election, Ivica Racˇan vowed to work in the Sabor on making “a new and more adequate electoral law, based on the apparent weaknesses of the current one.” Jasna Babic´, “Iskoristit c´emo sve šanse,” Danas, 1 May 1990, 11. 46. According to an extensive pre-election poll, 23 percent of Serb voters supported the SDS, while the rest mostly supported the various parties of the leftist bloc. The supporters of the SKH-SDP were 52 percent Croat, 28 percent Serb, 17 percent Yugoslav, and 3 percent other, compared to the HDZ’s supporters, who were 98 percent Croat. Ivan Šiber, “Nacionalna, vrijednosna i ideologijska uvjetovanost stranacˇkog izbora,” in Hrvatska u izborima ’90, ed. Ivan Grdešic´ et al. (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1991), 99–100. 47. In Mladen Pleše and Zoran Daskalovic´, “Zašto smo iznenad‒eni rezultatima izbora,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 29 April 1990. 48. Quoted in Blaine Harden, “Croatian President-Elect Plans ‘Sovereign State’: Nationalists Seek a Redefined Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, 30 April 1990, A13. 49. Meier, Yugoslavia, 143. 50. Among the HDZ voters, those numbers were even more pronounced: 59 percent supported a confederation, 30 percent supported Croatia’s independence, and only 5 percent supported a federation. Nenad Zakošek, “Polarizacijske strukture, obrasci politicˇkih uvjerenja i hrvatski izbori 1990,” in Grdešic´ et al., Hrvatska u izborima ’90, 175. 51. Meier, Yugoslavia, 147. The declaration of intent was made public on 10 May 1990. 52. Jovic´ also noted that he and Miloševic´ were “a little afraid of Croatia—that [the Croats] will drop out of society and disrupt everything. Presumably the Croats are aware that such an attempt would bring about unsolvable problems for them and perhaps even armed conflict.” B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 124–125, 131. 53. Quoted in “Konfederacija nije država,” Oslobod‒enje, 30 March 1990, 4. According to Borisav Jovic´, the Serbian president around this time met with a series of SANU members who expressed their support for his policies and advised him that “Yugoslavia [had] outlived its purpose.” Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 125, 130–131. For public statements by Dobrica C´osic´ and SANU vice-president Antonije Isakovic´ on Yugoslavia’s uselessness, Serbia’s support for Slovenia’s departure, and the need to change interrepublican borders, see Sonja Biserko, ed., Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006), 1:178, 184–185. 54. The tendency of the HDZ to turn away even moderate Croatian Serbs by its nationalist rhetoric was acknowledged by one of its former leaders, Stipe Mesic´, who placed the blame on the HDZ’s radical wing. Stipe Mesic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, July 1994–July 1995, 3/53, 1.

Notes to Pages 89–91 55. The JNA generals were particularly affronted by the criticisms of Demos and the HDZ regarding the army’s internal organization. In early March 1990, Demos came out with a proposal for Slovene citizens to serve in the JNA only on Slovenian territory and asserted that Slovenia could organize its own armed forces more cheaply than the JNA. Janez Janša, Pomaci: Nastajanje i obrana slovenske države 1988–1992 (Zagreb: Mladinska knjiga, 1993), 30–31. This proposal was followed by Tud‒man’s calls for the reorganization of the JNA into a NATO-like structure of integral republican armed contingents. Meier, Yugoslavia, 147. 56. Davor Maric´, “Verbalni državni udar,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 19 May 1990, 14. 57. For a summary of Jovic´’s speech, see “Nec´emo dozvoliti raspad zemlje!” Slobodna Dalmacija, 16 May 1990, 3. 58. The new government of Slovenia took oath on 17 May and the Croatian government on 30 May. For the official JNA order for the confiscation of TO weapons, see “Zapovijed nacˇelnika Generalštaba OS SFRJ komandama vojnih oblasti za oduzimanje naoružanja TO i nacˇin cˇuvanja istoga, 14 May 1991,” in Rupic´, Dokumenti, 1:19–20. 59. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 146. Also see Janez Drnovšek, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/21, 1–2. 60. The confiscation of TO weapons and their removal to JNA depots was also conducted in BiH, with virtually full success. For the selective disarmament of only Croat areas, see Martin Špegelj, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/72, 1. General Kadijevic´ implies the same policy of selective disarmament for both Croatia and BiH in Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 94. 61. According to the official JNA report, the operation had a nearly 100 percent success rate in Croatia and 85 percent in Slovenia. “Izvješc´e Komande 5 vojne oblasti Generalštabu OS SFRJ o realizaciji zapovijedi o oduzimanju naoružanja i streljiva TO u SR Hrvatskoj i SR Sloveniji, 5 June 1991,” in Rupic´, Dokumenti, 1:32–33. Janez Janša claims the Slovenes managed to salvage about 30 percent of their weapons. Janša, Pomaci, 39–40. 62. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 108. 63. Gorbachev became the first (and last) president of the Soviet Union on 15 March. He delivered his ultimatum to the Lithuanians on 16 March and issued his edict on Lithuanian weapons on 21 March. His edict was a direct response to the attempts of the Lithuanian government to form a “territorial defense system” of volunteers similar to the one already present in the Yugoslav republics. Francis X. Clines, “Gorbachev Tells the Lithuanians to Turn in Arms,” New York Times, 22 March 1990, A1. Also see Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 195–199. 64. Quotes from Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 199–201. 65. Sarah Lambert and David Usborne, “Lithuania Must Talk, Say Kohl and Mitterrand,” Independent, 27 April 1990, 1. 66. Quoted in Sarotte, 1989, 158. 67. According to Borisav Jovic´, preparations for the disarmament of the Slovenian and Croatian TOs took place that April. See Kadijevic´’s report to Jovic´ on 26 April (the very day of Mitterrand’s and Kohl’s plea to Landsbergis) in Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 139–143.

335 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

336 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 92–93 68. Tud‒man also contended that “There are those, however, even in America, who fear any measure of Croatian democracy. This surge of national identity and authority will, some say, lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia, to civil war, or both. These fears are misplaced. Freedom and self-determination do not threaten stability; repression and tyranny do. To reject Croatia’s transition to a democracy on the pretext of preserving regional stability only delays the inevitable—and heightens the risk of regional chaos and violence at some date in the future.” Franjo Tud‒man, “All We Croatians Want Is Democracy,” New York Times, 30 June 1990, 23. 69. The term “Krajina” (borderland) as used at the time was somewhat of a misnomer, roughly coinciding with the areas of the Austrian Military Frontier, which had been used as a buffer zone against the Ottomans. As understood by the local Serb leadership, it encompassed northern Dalmatia, eastern Lika, Kordun, Banija, and western Slavonia—areas of Croatia with significant Serb populations. Eleven municipalities of that region which had a Serb majority were, however, home to only 26 percent of all Croatian Serbs. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 128–129. 70. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 149–150. 71. From Miloševic´’s speech of 12 June 1990, as reproduced in Slobodan Miloševic´, Od Gazimestana do Ševeningena: Šta je sve govorio Slobodan Miloševic´ (Belgrade: Harprom, 2001), 26. Also see Ian Traynor, “Yugoslav Unity Faces New Threat as Leaders Clash,” Guardian, 26 June 1990. 72. Opacˇic´ made this claim on 28 June 1990—the 601st anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. ˇ ulic´, “Pohod udruženih voždova,” Danas, 10 July 1990, 13. Marinko C 73. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 159–161. 74. Ibid., 176–177. 75. Although Tud‒man was accused by the Serbian media of “ustashoid” policies, a great number of his closest associates—like Josip Manolic´, Josip Boljkovac, Janko Bobetko, and others—shared his Partisan and Communist past. Meier, Yugoslavia, 144. 76. Raškovic´ admitted as much in an interview with the Belgrade weekly NIN in Milorad Vucˇelic´, “Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti,” NIN, 20 May 1990, 18. Raškovic´ also admitted that Tud‒man had “played the card of Serbophobia, but only until he won the elections.” It is interesting that he additionally noted that there was significant agreement between the SDS and the HDZ in their goals toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ibid., 20. 77. Tud‒man also renounced all forms of revanchism and declared that his government wanted to build a political system “in which the rule of the majority means the protection of the minority.” “Promišljeni koraci,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 31 May 1990, 6. 78. The HDZ’s relatively moderate post-election leadership failed to control local Croatian extremism and discrimination against the Serbs. However, it would be mistaken to say that such acts of intolerance were the primary cause of intensification of the SerboCroat clash. The HDZ’s victory notwithstanding, the root cause of the growing mutiny of the Krajina Serbs was the direct influence of the Serbian president and what his nationalist drive promised to deliver. As Raškovic´ stated, even before the HDZ took power, “All Croatian parties, including the SKH and the Coalition of National Accord, [were] ‘croatocentric,’ ” and the position of the Croatian Serbs and the SDS “would have been the same no matter who won.” In Vucˇelic´, “Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti,” 17.

Notes to Pages 93–95 79. Though the majority of Croatia’s Serbs voted for the SKH-SDP, the SDS did have some local electoral success in the Serb-populated area around Knin. Its extremist stance toward the new government and its successful scare tactics against the local leaderships of other Serb-populated towns like Obrovac, Korenica, Vrginmost, and Vojnic´, which were won by the SKH-SDP, soon after the elections made it the strongest party in Croatia’s municipalities with a Serb majority. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 66. 80. The official proclamation of the “Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika” is reproduced in Davor Paukovic´, ed., Uspon i pad “Republike Srpske Krajine” (Zagreb: Centar za politološka istraživanja, 2005), 68–69. The Krajina Serbs during the war years of 1991–1995 considered the formation of the Community of Municipalities “the embryo of the future state of Krajina.” Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 66. 81. Perica Juric´, BL-DY interview transcript, 24 October 1994, 3/36, 1–3. Juric´ was Croatia’s deputy minister of internal affairs at the time. 82. Revealing evidence regarding the role of the Serbian SDB in the Knin area during this period was provided at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ by his close former associates, particularly the leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´. He identified the presence of a high-ranking SDB official and one of Miloševic´’s most important accomplices, Jovica Stanišic´ (in 2003 himself indicted for war crimes), as crucial during the early developments of the crisis in the Knin region. Milan Babic´, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 18 November 2002, 12918–12920, 12930–12933. Babic´ was backed up by Slobodan Lazarevic´, a former agent of the JNA Counterintelligence Service (KOS), in Slobodan Lazarevic´, TSM-ICTY, 29 October 2002, 12351. 83. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 18 November 2002, 12933–12936. 84. For perceptive parallels between the “scripts” used in Kosovo and Krajina, see the editorial of the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Azem Vllasi, in “Vec´ vid‒eno,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 August 1990, 1. According to Vllasi, “This scenario has caused a tragedy in Kosovo. For now, it is being repeated in Croatia as a farce.” 85. Description of the mood among US diplomats provided by Louis Sell—the embassy’s political counselor in 1987–1991—in an interview with the author, 13 February 2007. For a lengthy account of Borisav Jovic´’s 19 June 1990 meeting with Zimmermann, see Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 155–159. 86. After meeting with Serbia’s and Croatia’s leading politicians, Nooij also concluded that the relations between these two republics “had deteriorated to the extent that there was in fact no longer a basis for a continued common existence.” Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 71–72. 87. The JNA’s highest officers decided at the end of April 1990 to send their emissaries to Paris, London, and Moscow to provide the leaderships of the three powers with the army’s “assessment of the situation and to point out the measures we will undertake if necessary.” For an account of the reports from these meetings, delivered in early July 1990, see Branko Mamula, Slucˇaj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 182. 88. The amendment that the Krajina Serbs found particularly troubling was the return of the traditional Croatian coat of arms to the flag. The argument against the amend-

337 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

338 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 95–96 ment was that the coat of arms had been used by the World War II Ustaša state, even though the checkered pattern had also been the centerpiece of Croatia’s Communist coat of arms, as well as a part of the coat of arms of the interwar Serb-dominated Yugoslav kingdom. Other constitutional changes were mainly concerned with the republic’s public administration. For a list of all twelve amendments, see “Odluka o proglašenju Amandmana LXIV do LXXV na Ustav Socijalisticˇke Republike Hrvatske,” Narodne Novine, no. 31, 28 July 1990. 89. The “Serb Sabor” in its declaration also asserted that “it is nations that secede, not states” and threatened the Croatian government that in case Yugoslavia became a confederation, the Croatian Serbs would demand political autonomy. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 72–75. 90. Two aspects of the referendum were particularly notable: the extent of autonomy was unknown and yet to be determined, and the voting body was limited only to Serbs either resident in Croatia, born on the territory of Croatia, or with Croatian citizenship but living outside of Croatia. More than forty-five thousand Croats living in the area of the projected autonomy had no right to vote. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 134. 91. “Scenarij za tenkove,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 26 July 1990, 3. 92. The conversation between Tud‒man, his advisor Slaven Letica, and Jovan Raškovic´ took place on 23 July in an effort by Tud‒man and Letica to stop the organization of the “Serb Sabor.” After the mass rally was held regardless of Tud‒man’s offer of cultural autonomy for the Croatian Serbs, the transcript of the meeting was published in ˇ ija je Hrvatska?” Danas, 31 July 1990, 12–15. The publication had the effect of mar“C ginalizing Raškovic´ within the SDS and his substitution with more radical officials like Milan Babic´. 93. Mesic´, who was Croatia’s prime minister between May and August 1990 and after that Croatia’s representative on the federal presidency, made efforts to engage the Krajina SDS leadership in dialogue that summer. He claims that municipal SDS leaders were willing to speak to him until the head of the SDS, Milan Babic´, returned from a meeting with Miloševic´ in Belgrade. After that, virtually all contact was impossible. Stipe Mesic´, TSM-ICTY, 1 October 2002, 10522–10523. The Croatian government also earned a positive appraisal of its efforts to bridge the gap with the Krajina Serbs from the US Consulate in Zagreb, which described its endeavors in an August 1990 cable as “sound and judicious.” Patrick Glynn, “Yugoblunder,” New Republic, 24 February 1992, 17. 94. The leadership of the Krajina SDS met with Borisav Jovic´, Petar Gracˇanin (the federal secretary for internal affairs), and Serbia’s high officials on 13 August 1990 in Belgrade. According to Milan Martic´, the demand of the Krajina delegation was for armed intervention either through weapons deliveries or the involvement of the JNA. As Martic´ claims, promises to that end were made by Jovic´ which were “later partly kept.” Milan Martic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 14 October 1994, 3/51, 5. 95. For accounts of the distribution of weapons from the Knin police station and the JNA’s Knin Corps, see Milan Martic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 4–6; Martin Špegelj, BL-DY interview transcript, 1; and Martin Špegelj with Ivo Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 127.

Notes to Pages 96–101 96. Slobodan Lazarevic´, TSM-ICTY, 29 October 2002, 12371–12372. In Lazarevic´’s opinion, 75–80 percent of the people on the barricades were not from the region but from “Belgrade or elsewhere.” 97. According to official numbers, out of 756,781 people who voted, 756,549, or 99.96 percent, were for Serb autonomy. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 86. 98. CIA, “Civil Conflict Likely in Croatia,” 18 August 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1. 99. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 180–181. 100. Quoted in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 89. 101. For the debate within the EC, see Trevor Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–1992,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (1992), 236–248. 102. The initial reaction of the EC countries was also resolute. Within days of the Iraqi occupation, the Community instituted an embargo on oil imports from both Iraq and Kuwait; called for and supported UN sanctions; froze Iraqi assets and military sales; and suspended military, scientific, and technical cooperation with the regime of Saddam Hussein. The president of the EC Council, Italian foreign minister Gianni De Michelis, was so elated by the joint European response that he insisted the EC states had reacted to the Gulf crisis “effectively and with clarity of intentions and decisions.” He further declared that the intensity of the EC’s collaboration had been “a real start on building political union in Europe” and suggested that even defense and security questions could be built into deeper foreign policy collaboration by the EC states. Quoted in ibid., 245. 103. Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 249. 104. “Toward a New World Order,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 3, 17 September 1990, 91–92. 105. Ibid., 92. 106. CIA: “End of the Federal Experiment,” 15 September 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1, and “End of a Nation-Building Experiment,” 21 September 1990, FOIA F-1995– 00364, 1, 7–8. 107. Quoted in B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 191–194. 108. Ian Traynor, “Yugoslav Leaders Confront ‘Unprecedented’ Crisis,” Guardian, 3 October 1990; Dessa Trevisan, “Serb Autonomy Move in Croatia Increases Danger of Ethnic War,” Times, 2 October 1990. 109. See the firsthand account of the meetings in Slaven Letica, “The West Side Story of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrovic´ (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 182–185. As Letica recollects, “All in all, our hopes that George Bush’s administration would support the new democracies and nations (in the former Yugoslavia) were completely buried.” 110. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 197–201. 111. Ian Traynor, “West’s Balkan View Brings Dismay,” Guardian, 26 October 1990. 112. The membership of the SKBiH in the spring of 1990 was as follows: 38 percent Serb, 21.9 percent Muslim, 17.9 percent Yugoslav, and 10.2 percent Croat. Compared with the national structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1991 census, where 43.5 percent

339 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

340 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 102–104 of the population identified itself as Muslim, 31.2 percent as Serb, 17.4 percent as Croat, and 5.5 percent as Yugoslav, the problem of unbalanced ethnic representation in the SKBiH was obvious. Coupled with the fact that the highest party leadership was—unlike the membership—representative of the general population, this presented tremendous problems for the party. Simply put, the SKBiH’s disproportionally Serb membership pressured its largely Muslim leadership for a greater tilt toward the policies of Slobodan Miloševic´. Neven Andjelic, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 130–131. 113. Markovic´ announced the formation of his party on 26 May—too late for Slovenia’s and Croatia’s elections but in time for the elections in the other republics. His intention to compete in those four elections and his launch of the BiH campaign on Mount Kozara—the site of great World War II losses for the local Serbs—drew harsh criticism from the Belgrade press, which claimed Markovic´’s goal was to split the Serbian vote. Barney Petrovic, “Belgrade Aghast at New Party Plan,” Guardian, 28 May 1990. 114. “Da li c´e BiH izgubiti milijardu dolara?” Oslobod‒enje, 18 August 1990, 4. 115. Tud‒man’s conviction of the correctness of his views was, in fact, such that he had no qualms about sharing them even with international diplomats and visitors. On one occasion in the fall of 1990 he tried to convince the incredulous Bundestag representative of the CDU, Friedrich Vogel, that “there was a geopolitical line through Yugoslavia, with one part dominated by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the other part dominated by the Roman Catholic Church” and that the best solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina was its partition between Serbia and Croatia with a Muslim enclave acting as a buffer in the middle. Friedrich Vogel, correspondence with the author, 6 August 2005. 116. The assertion of the HDZ BiH leadership that “the Croats will defend the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the price of civil war” was made at the founding congress of the party in Sarajevo. “Po mjeri hrvatskog identiteta,” Oslobod‒enje, 19 August 1990, 3. For an example of irredentist claims during a rally in Western Herzegovina, see “Hercegovinu preselili u južnu Hrvatsku,” Oslobod‒enje, 12 August 1990, 2. 117. Quoted in Milorad Vucˇelic´, “Srbi izvan bosanskog lonca,” NIN, 9 November 1990, 13. 118. For a particularly instructive glimpse into the policy that guided the activities of the SDS, see the speech by Dobrica C´osic´ at an SDS meeting held in Belgrade that November in Dobrica C´osic´, “Pozdrav,” NIN, 9 November 1990, 14–15. In C´osic´’s words, “This moment is historic: the liberating and democratic unity of the Serb nation in its aim for the creation of a new state and new social order is being materialized.” C´osic´ tellingly referred to the Bosnian Serbs as “yesterday’s rayah [lower class in the Ottoman Empire] of Tito’s viziers”—a thinly veiled attack on both the Bosnian Muslims and the Communists. For Karadžic´’s open call for a Greater Serbian state, see Chuck Sudetic, “Evolution in Europe: Ethnic Rivalries Push Yugoslavia to Edge,” New York Times, 14 October 1990, section 1, 14. 119. Quoted in Sead Numanovic´, “Koalicija za opstanak Bosne,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 5 August 1990, 4.

Notes to Pages 104–108 120. For the slide of public opinion toward nationalist parties over the course of the campaign, see Suad Arnautovic´, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini: Analiza izbornog procesa (Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996), 56–57. For the election day conviction of the SKBiH that it would take at least a third of the parliamentary seats, see Jim Fish, “Fraud Charges Mark Bosnian Elections,” Guardian, 19 November 1990. 121. “Proglašeni amandmani na Ustav SRBiH,” Oslobod‒enje, 1 August 1990, 1; emphasis added. 122. “Tud‒e nec´emo, Bosnu ne damo!” Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 May 1990, 11. 123. The 110 deputies in the BiH Council of Municipalities were elected in two-round elections held in single-member districts—municipalities—irrespective of their extremely varying sizes. The 130 deputies in the Council of Citizens were elected in seven multi-member districts from party lists under proportional representation rules. And the 7 members of the republic’s presidency were elected from four ethnically based electoral lists. Arnautovic´, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini, 20–22. 124. Jim Fish, “Overwhelming Victory in Sight for Bosnia’s Nationalists,” Guardian, 20 November 1990. 125. For a partial list of BiH inter-ethnic campaign clashes, see Andjelic, BosniaHerzegovina, 173–178. 126. Excerpts from Izetbegovic´’s campaign speech on 15 September 1990 at a rally in Velika Kladuša, where he also added that “Our ideal is a republic of citizens. Not an Islamic republic, but also not a socialist republic. . . . We are all worried about Bosnia, but there are only three options open to it: Bosnia in a federal Yugoslavia— acceptable option; Bosnia in a confederal Yugoslavia—also an acceptable option; and finally an independent and free Bosnia.” Alija Izetbegovic´, Tajna zvana Bosna: Govori, intervjui, pisma, 1989–1993 (Sarajevo: SDA, 2004), 48–49. 127. In February 1990, Miloševic´ called for a “mobilization for Kosovo,” entailing a mass Serb “settlement” in the province. His party demanded the repatriation of “illegal immigrants” from Albania and the stripping of Yugoslav citizenship from those who had participated in the protests. The solution for the Kosovo crisis by the publicly best-known opposition leader, Vuk Draškovic´, was to expel half a million Kosovo Albanians. Marcus Tanner, “Greater Serbia Finds Its Rasputin,” Independent, 25 February 1990, 13. 128. Serbia’s leading constitutional specialists referred to its new constitution as not a “constitution of a federal unit, but the constitution of an independent state.” Cohen, Broken Bonds, 126. Miloševic´ at the time claimed “the draft of this constitution was prepared with another option in mind [in addition to Yugoslavia’s remaining a federation]—Serbia as an independent state.” Miloševic´, Od Gazimestana do Ševeningena, 25. 129. Out of the assembly’s 180 deputies, 130 were Albanian. Of those, 114 voted for the declaration of independent status. Andrei Gustincic, “Sovereignty Votes Shake Yugoslavia,” Independent, 3 July 1990, 8. 130. On a 78 percent turnout and with virtually all Kosovo Albanians boycotting the referendum, Miloševic´ received a 97 percent approval for the promulgation of the constitution prior to the multi-party elections. Cohen, Broken Bonds, 123.

341 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

342 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 108–111 131. Borisav Jovic´ on 23 July 1990 openly encouraged high delegates of the Slovenian government to have their republic leave Yugoslavia, but they “did not believe him.” Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 172. The Slovenian prime minister, Lojze Peterle, exposed Jovic´’s offer in an interview with the weekly Danas: “The federal presidency came to Ljubljana with a draft of the law which was to deal with [secession]. We clearly stated that for Slovenia’s sake such a law [was] unnecessary since our first wish [was] not secession but a Yugoslav confederation. The offered draft was unacceptable since it made secession conditional on the approval of single municipalities. . . . Mr. Jovic´ assured us that this draft [did] not affect Slovenia, since it [was] nationally homogenous, but [was] applicable for the other republics. Such an explanation did not satisfy us. . . . Sometimes it seems to us that certain political forces are trying to make Slovenia secede because in that case they could more easily fulfill their political aspirations.” In Zoran Medved, “Nismo kvislinška vlada,” Danas, 7 August 1990, 14. 132. The Kosovo Assembly was re-formed by 111 of its Albanian, Turkish, and Muslim deputies at a secret session on 7 September 1990 in the town of Kacˇanik. On 13 September, this assembly proclaimed a “constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.” Serbia’s National Assembly declared this proclamation null and void and officially promulgated the new constitution of Serbia on 28 September. 133. Quoted in Blaine Harden, “Serbia Said to Arrest, Expel Rights Investigators,” Washington Post, 6 September 1990, section 1, A20. 134. Ines Sabalic´, “Jugoslavije više nema,” Danas, 11 September 1990, 7–10. 135. D’Amato added that “I fear that a situation, much like that which recently occurred in Romania, is about to happen. The Serbian authorities must be told that the US will react swiftly and harshly to any such action.” US Senate, “Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 136, no. 85, 28 June 1990, S9165. 136. For Senator Dole’s report on the delegation’s visit to Yugoslavia, see US Senate, “Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 136, no. 117, 20 September 1990, S13488. For the detention and expulsion of the Helsinki delegation, see Harden, “Serbia Said to Arrest,” A20. 137. CIA, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1 October 1990, FOIA F-1995–00796, 4–18. Upon declassification, the CIA estimated the publication date as 1 October 1990. Based on the information presented in this NIE, the actual publication most likely took place in mid-October 1990. 138. Ibid., 19–21. 139. For a confirmation of intelligence pooling, see the account in Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 41. Such pooling was confirmed to the author in a number of interviews with British and American diplomats. 140. Quoted in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 71. 141. David Binder, “Evolution in Europe: Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon,” New York Times, 28 November 1990, A7. Though the question of who leaked the NIE’s findings to the New York Times remains open, press reports from the time were nearly unanimous that it was the CIA itself. Davor Glavaš, “Promašaj ili najava kraja,” Danas, 11 December 1990, 14–16.

Notes to Pages 111–113 142. Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), 44. 143. Bush was an avid consumer of intelligence reports, but his distaste for Webster seems to have been more important. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 505, 513, 518. 144. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 84, and Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 306. Hutchings blames the NIE for being “so unrelievedly deterministic that it suggested no possible avenue for American policy that might avert or at least contain the violence attending Yugoslavia’s seemingly inevitable disintegration.” In other words, one of President Bush’s chief foreign policy advisors blamed the CIA not for providing solid intelligence but for not doing what his own job was: coming up with policy options. 145. US House of Representatives, “Regarding Albanian Minorities in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 136, no. 145, 22 October 1990, H11472. Also see US House of Representatives, “Regarding Albanian Minorities in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 136, no. 146, 23 October 1990, H11871. Senator Dole also identified State Department pressure in Bob Dole, “Don’t Turn Yugoslavia into Europe’s Lebanon,” New York Times, 3 December 1990, A18. 146. Draškovic´ had evolved from being an SK member in the 1960s to a hard-line nationalist writer and dissident in the 1980s. He formed the SPO in March 1990 as a strongly antiˇ etnik Communist opposition party clearly rooted in the ideology of the World War II C movement. For his “plan” for the Kosovo Albanians, see Tanner, “Greater Serbia Finds Its Rasputin,” 13. His statements on Slovenia’s and Croatia’s war reparations, Serbia’s new borders, and the Bosnian Muslims are reproduced in Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 179, 191–192. See also Audrey Helfant Budding, “Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1961–1991” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1998), 399. 147. The DS was formed by a group of Belgrade intellectuals and dissidents like Vojislav ˇ avoški in February 1990. According to Koštunica, Dragoljub Mic´unovic´, and Kosta C the DS program, if other Yugoslav republics left the federation, “the national policy of the Serbian state would, exactly as other national states, aim toward the incorporation of all territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs into one state.” Jasna Dragovic´Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 249. 148. Quoted in Richard Bassett and Dessa Trevisan, “Serbs Tighten Grip on Media,” Times, 13 April 1990. 149. For the influence of the state-owned television stations on the campaign, see Slobodan Antonic´, “Promene stranacˇkog raspoloženja grad‒ana Srbije, 1990–1993,” in Srbija izmed‒u populizma i demokratije: Politicˇki procesi u Srbiji 1990–1993, ed. Slobodan Antonic´, Milan Jovanovic´, and Darko Marinkovic´ (Belgrade: Institut za politicˇke studije, 1993), 10. 150. Miloševic´ did not appear much in public during the campaign, but when he did, his message of being the agent of stability and peace was clear. See his speech at a

343 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

344 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 113–121 campaign rally in Niš in Miloševic´, Od Gazimestana do Ševeningena, 38–40. In contrast to the “anti-bureaucratic” revolution, when most of the popular slogans had to do with demands for weapons, one of the more popular slogans during the electoral campaign was “Slobo, Serb—don’t let people die!” Slavoljub Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme: Politicˇka biografija Slobodana Miloševic´ a (Belgrade: Filip Višnjic´, 1994), 161. 151. For the army’s support, see Kadijevic´’s pre-election interview in Miroslav Lazanski, “Jugoslavija nec´e biti Libanon,” Danas, 4 December 1990, 10–12. For C´osic´’s support, see Dragovic´-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation,” 240–241. For the endorsement by the leader of the Croatian SDS, Jovan Raškovic´, see Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 192–193. Raškovic´ claimed the SDS found Miloševic´ to be its “spiritual, moral, and—most surely—biological protector.” 152. Dessa Trevisan and Richard Bassett, “Opposition Alleges Serbia Poll Fraud,” Times, 10 December 1990. The CIA also asserted that the SPS was the only successor party of the old SK to engage in efforts to rig the elections. CIA, “Bitterly Divided Serbia Faces Elections (Deleted),” 6 December 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364, 4. 153. Quoted in Blaine Harden, “Elections Today May Determine Yugoslavia’s Fate; Two Top Candidates in Serbia Focus on Virulent Nationalism,” Washington Post, 9 December 1990, A29. 154. CIA, “Serbia Stays Communist,” 11 December 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364. 155. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” 19–21 November 1990, 3–6. 156. According to Robert Hutchings, the United States tried to raise the issue of the situation in Yugoslavia during the Paris summit but was strongly rebutted by the French, who accused the Americans of “overdramatization” and warned that any attempt to raise the issue in Paris would be considered a “summit-breaker.” Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 307.

chapter 5. to the brink and back, october 1990–april 1991 1. CIA, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1 October 1990, FOIA F-1995–00796, 7. 2. Sir Peter Hall, interview with the author, 22 May 2005. 3. Markovic´’s reforms were supported by 66 percent of Yugoslavs and opposed by 7 percent, with 27 percent uncertain. The level of support varied greatly among the different regions: from 32 percent in Slovenia and 46 percent in Kosovo to more than 70 percent in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia. Štefica Bahtijarevic´ and Goran Milas, “Reakcija javnosti na mjere i politiku SIV-a,” in Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici, ed. Ljiljana Bac´evic´ et al. (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje, 1991), 65. 4. For two telling episodes exposing the difficulties faced by European Commission president Jacques Delors in his quest to increase Western aid to Eastern Europe (including Yugoslavia), see John Palmer, “EC Urged to Step Up Aid to East,” Guardian, 20 January 1990, and Michael Binyon, “More Aid Offered to East Europe,” Times, 5 July 1990.

Notes to Pages 121–124 5. In June 1990, Yugoslavia was excluded from the Phare program of assistance due to the lack of democratic elections in the whole country and the violence in Kosovo—both issues out of the purview of the federal government and directly dependent on Miloševic´. It is interesting that upon the announcement of this decision, in interviews with Yugoslav journalists European diplomats did not criticize the Serbian leader but rather the “separatist forces.” Dušan Sekulic´, “Evropa nikad?” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 24 June 1990, 14. 6. Quoted in Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 57. 7. Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 249. 8. By the spring of 1990, the inflation rate had fallen to less than 1 percent on a monthly level. Foreign reserves reached their peak of more than $10 billion that August. Janez Prasnikar and Zivko Pregl, “Economic Development in Yugoslavia in 1990 and Prospects for the Future,” American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2 (1991): 193. 9. Egon Žižmond, “The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy,” Soviet Studies, vol. 44, no. 1 (1992): 109. 10. Wages rose at an average monthly rate of 5.5 percent. Prasnikar and Pregl, “Economic Development,” 193. 11. CIA, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1 October 1990, FOIA F-1995–00796, 15–16. 12. For the full text of the proposal, see Vladimir Đuro Degan, Hrvatska država u med‒unarodnoj zajednici: Razvitak njezine med‒unarodnopravne osobnosti tijekom povijesti (Zagreb: Globus, 2002). For an extensive and different view of the proposal from that presented here, see Dejan Jovic´, “The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal: A Tactical Move or an Ultimate Solution?” in Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic´Soso, eds., State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), 249–280. 13. Robert Hutchings (the director of European affairs at the National Security Council) presents these cables as calls to America’s European allies to get involved in order to avert catastrophe. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 307. Borisav Jovic´, who obtained access to the US communications with the Europeans through an unnamed “US source,” on the other hand, claims that the US message was the need to “show active interest in preserving Yugoslav unity . . . [since] the time [had] come for all true friends of Yugoslavia to take an active role in surmounting Yugoslavia’s problems instead of watching and waiting.” Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 207–208. 14. Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 89. 15. Quoted in Dražen Vukov-Colic´, “Neka odlucˇe sami,” Danas, 23 October 1990, 55. Italy held the presidency of the EC Council at the time. 16. Quoted in Sekulic´, “Evropa nikad?” 14. 17. Quoted in Vukov-Colic´, “Neka odlucˇe sami,” 54.

345 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

346 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 124–126 18. The editorial also noted that “The mediators are liable to make the mistake of concluding that their aim must be to keep Yugoslavia together. Yugoslavia might still hold together as a loose confederation, as proposed by Slovenia and Croatia, its two westernmost and most western-minded republics. If so, fine. But if the more authoritarian Serbia rejects the idea, no amount of foreign mediation will keep the country in one piece.” “Bust-up in the Balkans,” Economist, 13 October 1990, 17. 19. Interview with the author, 28 May 2005. 20. This was the argument of the political director of the German foreign ministry at a meeting of political directors held on 14 and 15 November 1990 in response to a request of the EC foreign ministers “for advice on how the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia could best be supported.” The German argument was apparently “brushed aside and the political committee concluded that the political imperative, formulated by the foreign ministers, of supporting Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity must have priority.” Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 90. 21. From Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s meeting with Budimir Loncˇar, the Yugoslav secretary for foreign affairs, in Bonn on 6 December 1990, as reported in Nenad Ivankovic´, Bonn: Druga hrvatska fronta (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993), 13. 22. For the motivation of Slovenia’s leadership behind the referendum, see Jim Fish, “Huge Slovenian Vote for Independence: Polls Could Decide Whether Yugoslavia Disintegrates,” Guardian, 24 December 1990. 23. Davorin Rudolf, interview with the author, 8 May 2006. 24. Dušan Bilandžic´, Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005 (Zagreb: Prometej, 2006), 363. According to Bilandžic´—Croatia’s vice-president at the time—De Michelis made his plea to Tud‒man on 2 December 1990. Bilandžic´ himself urged the Slovenes to slow down and “wait for” Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to join their camp in the summer of 1990, but without success (357, 364). 25. From Tud‒man’s address to the Sabor in “Ustav—oda slobodi i demokraciji,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 December 1990, 3. 26. Croatia’s constitution was heavily protested by the Krajina Serbs, who claimed that the document demoted their status. This claim is somewhat of a stretch, though the timing and nature of the constitutional change was obviously politically problematic. Under Croatia’s 1974 constitution, this republic was defined as “the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serb nation in Croatia, and the state of the nationalities which live in it.” The December 1990 constitution asserted that “the Republic of Croatia is being founded as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others; who are guaranteed equality with the citizens of Croatian nationality, as well as the fulfillment of national rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and the countries of the free world.” The constitution also guaranteed the “freedom of expression of national belonging, freedom of use of [one’s] native language and alphabet, and cultural autonomy.” For a useful discussion, see Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing–Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 87–90.

Notes to Pages 126–129 27. Of the 18.2 billion dinars, 5 billion were earmarked for pensions, 8 billion for the refinancing of the banks, and the rest for agricultural subsidies. Josip Šmidt, “Srbija ‘štampa’ novac,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 8 January 1991, 3. Miloševic´ also used Serbia’s state-owned banks to distribute financially unsound loans to state-owned enterprises for payments of wages. For the statistics of this breach of the country’s financial regulations, see “Pronevjera s državnim pecˇatom,” Oslobod‒enje, 9 January 1991, 3. 28. Quoted in B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 241. There are also indications that Miloševic´ transferred some of Serbia’s money to bank accounts in Cyprus, from where it was used to fund his future war efforts. See the 1996 testimony of Borka Vucˇic´, one of Miloševic´’s closest associates and the head of the Nicosia branch of Beogradska Banka, in Carole Hodge and Mladen Grbin, A Test for Europe: Confidence-Building in Former Yugoslavia (Glasgow: Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1996), 19. 29. For Markovic´ ’s account, see his interview in Gordan Malic´, “Moja istina o smrti Jugoslavije (5): Pljacˇka Narodne banke,” Danas (Belgrade), 19 November 2003. Also see Ante Markovic´, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 23 October 2003, 28012–28014. 30. The Dutch ambassador in Belgrade, Jan Fietelaars, came to his post in October 1990 with optimism. However, he claims, “By the end of December 1990/early January 1991, I had come round and said: ‘Something very nasty is going to happen here.’ And it was in that sense that we began to report” to The Hague. Quoted in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 74. 31. Robert Hutchings particularly singles out French responses to US cables as irresponsibly dismissive in the fall of 1990 and fatalistic in January 1991. Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 308. 32. Quoted in Mirko Klarin, “Sudbina Jugoslavije još nije zapecˇac´ena,” Borba, 1 January 1991, 11. 33. CIA, “Dissolution Accelerating,” 28 December 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1. 34. From General Kadijevic´’s interview in Miroslav Lazanski, “Jugoslavija nec´e biti Libanon,” Danas, 4 December 1990, 11. 35. Branko Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 190; Mirjana Markovic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, July 1994–July 1995, 3/50, 26. 36. Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 182. 37. Anthony Robinson, “Yugoslav Armed Forces ‘Ready to Intervene,’ ” Financial Times, 24 November 1990, 2. Mamula claims that the visit exceeded his expectations since “a great degree of understanding and respect was expressed for [his] arguments in favor of the maintenance of Yugoslavia.” Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 182–183. For the response by Croatia’s minister of defense, Martin Špegelj, see Jelena Lovric´ and Mladen Malocˇa, “Olako izrecˇene prijetnje,” Danas, 11 December 1990, 8. 38. CIA: “Army Ponders Its Role,” 1 November 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364, and “Army Intervention Rumblings Growing,” 29 November 1990, FOIA F-1995–00364.

347 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

348 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 129–133 39. Martin Špegelj with Ivo Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 131–135. JNA officials later admitted that Croatia had begun to arm independently only in October 1990. Andrija Rašeta, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/64, 7. General Rašeta was then the deputy commander of the fifth army district, encompassing Slovenia and most of Croatia. 40. Croatia also had requested “technical assistance for police improvements” from the US Embassy but was turned down by Ambassador Zimmermann. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 95. 41. Trevor Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–1992,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (1992): 237–242. 42. Ibid., 243. 43. For a highly revealing analysis of the JNA’s lessons from Iraq based on the contemporaneous writings of the army strategists, see James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst 2003), 104–113. 44. For Eduard Shevardnadze’s impassioned rejection of Gorbachev’s conservative turn, see Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 293–295. 45. Ibid., 304–307. 46. Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), 46. 47. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 315. For Baker’s 26 January meeting with Bessmertnykh and the impact of congressional resolutions supporting the Baltics, see ibid., 322. 48. Quoted in Ibid., 346–347. 49. Špegelj with Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika, 174–176. 50. The army’s ten-day deadline, set to expire on 19 January, was in the meantime extended, with the final “reckoning” to take place at the federal presidency session of 25 January. 51. Špegelj with Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika, 148–149. For expectations of the impending coup ˇ ekajuc´i in Croatia and the preparations of Croatia’s leadership, see Srd‒an Španovic´, “C rat,” Danas, 29 January 1991, 13–15. 52. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 164. 53. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 20 November 2003, 13095–13101. 54. Đ. Kozar, “Srbija uslovljava bh. suverenost,” Oslobod‒enje, 24 January 1991, 3; Stjepan Kljuic´, TSM-ICTY, 15 July 2003, 24401–24402. 55. Miloševic´ had already tried to lure Markovic´ with the post of sole Yugoslav president in the early fall of 1990. In January 1991, General Kadijevic´ repeated the offer in exchange for support in arresting Milan Kucˇan and Franjo Tud‒man. To a question from Markovic´ about arresting Miloševic´ as well, Kadijevic´ apparently “jumped up and said, ‘Miloševic´ is the only one fighting for Yugoslavia, and who would back this up if it wasn’t for him?’ ” Ante Markovic´, TSM-ICTY, 23 October 2003, 28062–28063. 56. Dragan Bisenic´, “Trojna veza, dvojni sukob,” Borba, 26–27 January 1991, 3. Slovenia’s president, Milan Kucˇan, even left it to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to negotiate

Notes to Pages 133–135 directly with Serbia on how to ensure that “the Serb people live in one state.” Z. Odic´, “Nepromjenjivost granica, promjenjivost stavova,” Oslobod‒enje, 25 January 1991, 4. Janez Drnovšek later admitted that Miloševic´ and Kadijevic´ had pushed for the deal throughout January 1991. Janez Drnovšek, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/21, 6–7. For Milan Kucˇan’s admission of a “community of interests” between Serbia and Slovenia, see Adam LeBor, Milosevic: A Biography (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 135. For a sympathetic view of Kucˇan’s decision making, see Meier, Yugoslavia, 163. 57. For an insightful review of the gradual rapprochement between Slovenia and Serbia during this period, see Zoran Daskalovic´, “Sumnjivi saveznik,” Danas, 8 January 1991, 14–15. 58. The manifesto—officially called the “Report Concerning the Actual Situation in the World and Yugoslavia and the Immediate Tasks of the Yugoslav People’s Army”—also declared that Yugoslavia could never be a confederation because “confederations were not states.” It also urged the troops to ensure a high level of combat readiness because “those whose heads will roll” may resort to desperate acts. In addition to a number of other paranoid assertions regarding the state of international affairs, the manifesto finally urged the officer corps to ensure that the SK-PJ “becomes the main political force in the Yugoslav space and the bastion of all left-oriented parties.” In Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup 1980–1992 (London: Verso, 1993), 270–274. 59. For a partial transcript of the recordings, see “TV-emisija koja je uzbudila Jugoslaviju,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 January 1991, 20–21. The footage was acquired by the KOS, which had spied on Špegelj and his associates. A significant portion was clearly a montage with questionable validity. For Špegelj’s account of the episode, see Špegelj with Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika, 177–180. For the account of the JNA officer in charge of crafting the film, see Ljubodrag Stojadinovic´, Film koji je zapalio Jugoslaviju (Belgrade: Art Studio “Crno na belo,” 1995). Stojadinovic´ had little respect for the JNA leadership, which had commissioned him to patch up the film from its materials: “The army leadership did not wish to save the state but [rather] the army’s place in it, even if the state disintegrated. Nor did it wish to save the army but its [own] place in it, even if the army disintegrated.” Ibid., 125. 60. F. Memic´, “Izbjegnut grad‒anski rat,” Oslobod‒enje, 27 January 1991, 1. 61. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 254, 257; Borisav Jovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/35, 52. The British ambassador in his report to the FCO that week also noted that Tud‒man “has shown some skill (little appreciated in Serbia) in controlling the more hawkish elements of his [HDZ].” “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1990,” 23 January 1991, FCO document, FOIA 0020–10. 62. Franjo Tud‒man, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/79, 14. According to Špegelj, Tud‒man also refused all his defense plans, arguing that the very existence of any defense plan could be used as a pretext for a JNA intervention. Špegelj with Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika, 198. 63. Roger Boyes, “Army Poised to Use Force against Croats and Slovenes,” Times, 23 January 1991.

349 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

350 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 135–137 64. CIA, “Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War,” 23 January 1991, FOIA F-1995– 00364, 1–2. The report presciently predicted that the coming Yugoslav war was bound to “quickly become a ‘European’ problem requiring a political settlement—perhaps negotiated under international auspices.” This “could become the first real test of the effectiveness of CSCE institutions.” The CIA was “[in] doubt, however, that CSCE would prove itself up to the task.” Ibid., 11. 65. Based on the report of the Dutch ambassador in Belgrade, Jan Fietelaars, in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 74. The German ambassador in Belgrade, Hans-Jörg Eiff (in whose house this meeting took place), confirmed his colleague’s report. Hans-Jörg Eiff, interview with the author, 8 June 2005. 66. For an account of the meeting and the aide-mémoire submitted by Zimmermann, see B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 248–253. Zimmermann claims he submitted the same message to Franjo Tud‒man. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 99–100. 67. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 184, column 366, 25 January 1991. 68. “President Tudjman to POTUS,” 24 January 1991, Yugoslavia—General Hutchings 1991: Yugoslavia [5 of 6], CF01412, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 69. US Senate, “Crisis in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 16, 24 January 1991, S1155–1156. 70. “EC Review of Situation in Yugoslavia,” 28 January 1991, Yugoslavia—General Hutchings 1991: Yugoslavia [6 of 6], CF01412, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 71. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 90. 72. Ivankovic´, Bonn, 22. 73. Božidar Gagro, interview with the author, 3 June 2005. Gagro was Yugoslavia’s ambassador to France at the time. 74. B. Boškov, “Evropa hoc´e Jugoslaviju,” Oslobod‒enje, 17 February 1991, 3. 75. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 83, 94. The US principal deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, James Dobbins, was on a tour of EC capitals to drum up greater European action for the preservation of Yugoslavia and the prevention of a greater crisis. 76. Michael Tait, interview with the author, 16 May 2005. Tait was a member of the UK delegation and assistant under-secretary of state with responsibility for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In Tait’s words, “Miloševic´ was saying if the Croats want to be on their own, as far as we the Serbs are concerned, it’s fine—let them do it. But let them not take areas which are basically Serb areas. Don’t make the mistake of just converting the so-called republican boundaries into international frontiers because that would not reflect the demography.” Upon stating that Miloševic´’s position was found to be “reasonable,” Tait was asked whether he or the rest of the UK delegation thought such a policy should be extended to Kosovo or whether they had considered what its consequences would be for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tait’s response: “That is a different issue. We were just dealing with Croatia at that point. We were not dealing with anything else.” 77. For reservations in various European quarters, see Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 83, 90, 94.

Notes to Pages 137–141 78. Quote of Peter van Walsum, the Dutch director-general for political affairs in the foreign ministry, in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 80. 79. Quoted in Davor Glavaš, “Prizivanje nove Jalte,” Danas, 12 February 1991, 8. 80. Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present (London: Routledge, 2006), 7. 81. Slavoljub Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme: Politicˇka biografija Slobodana Miloševic´a (Belgrade: Filip Višnjic´, 1994), 168–177; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 119–124. 82. Slavko C´uruvija—one of Belgrade’s most prominent independent journalists, assassinated in 1999 likely on Miloševic´’s orders—at the time perceptively noted that Miloševic´’s regime was characterized by ethnocentrism, unitarism, and bonapartism and that the protesters were complaining solely about the last of these. Slavko C´uruvija, “Od Kosova Polja do Terazija,” Borba, 12 March 1991, 2. 83. Borisav Jovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 54. 84. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 120–121. 85. For the best coverage of the events and the demands of the students, see Borba, 12 March 1991, 1–13. 86. Jovic´’s public call for the meeting was unprecedented and was seen as a form of pressure on the rest of the presidency. “Paralisan rad Predsedništva,” Borba, 13 March 1991, 1. 87. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 124–126. 88. Croatia’s representative, Stipe Mesic´, and Macedonia’s, Vasil Tupurkovski, voted against, while Slovenia’s representative, Janez Drnovšek, refused to attend the meeting. For Bogic´evic´’s perceptive assessment of Jovic´’s plan, see Bogic´ Bogic´evic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/7, 5–8. See also his interview in Fadil Ademovic´, JNA: Beznad‒e zla (intervjui) (Sarajevo: Med‒unarodni centar za mir, 1997), 30–43. 89. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 295; Borisav Jovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 62; Veljko Kadijevic´, “Protivudar—kako se raspala Jugoslavija (6): Tajna poseta Moskvi,” Vecˇernje novosti, 19 October 2007. Kadijevic´ claims he tried to meet with Gorbachev as well but was refused. 90. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 127. Also see Bogic´evic´’s account in Ademovic´, JNA, 32. 91. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 296. 92. For a complete transcript of Jovic´’s public address and resignation, see “Nec´u da budem saucˇesnik u raspadu zemlje,” Borba, 17 March 1991, 2. 93. Miloševic´’s key associates, Dušan Mitevic´ (the director of Television Belgrade) and Radmilo Bogdanovic´ (the minister of internal affairs), were among those forced to resign. They were, however, simply relocated to other positions. More important, they were replaced by equally staunch followers of Miloševic´—for example, Zoran Sokolovic´ as the minister of internal affairs. Đukic´, Izmed‒u slave i anateme, 174–177. 94. For a full transcript of Miloševic´’s address, see “Srbija ne priznaje ni jednu odluku Predsedništva SFRJ,” Borba, 17 March 1991, 6. 95. Quoted in David Binder, “Leader of Serbia Defies Yugoslavia on Federal Rule,” New York Times, 17 March 1991, 1.

351 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

352 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 141–144 96. Quoted in Ian Traynor and Barney Petrovic, “Serbia Mobilises Army as Yugoslavia Goes to Brink: Miloševic´ Has ‘Taken an Axe’ to the Authority of the Eight-Man Presidency,” Guardian, 18 March 1991. 97. Ian Traynor, “The Game Is Up for a Strongman Now Revealed as the Real Separatist: Serbia’s President Is Paying Dearly for His Fit of Pique,” Guardian, 18 March 1991. 98. I. Radovanovic´, “Vanredno stanje u pedeset nastavaka,” Borba, 18 March 1991, 3. Also see Hodge and Grbin, A Test for Europe, 21. 99. “Izvodi iz stenografskih beležaka sa sastanka predsednika Republike Slobodana Miloševic´a i potpredsednika Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije sa predsednicima skupština opština Republike Srbije, održanog 16. marta 1991.,” Vreme, 15 April 1991, 62–66. 100. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 306–310. For Kadijevic´’s excuses for abandoning the coup, see Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 115. The High Command’s analyses may have been partly influenced by Ambassador Zimmermann’s televised interview on 13 March, when he stated that the United States would cut off aid in case of a military intervention. Blaine Harden, “Yugoslav Army Wavers on Civil Role,” Washington Post, 15 March 1991, A33. 101. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 310. 102. Branko Mamula, BL-DY interview transcript, 12 October 1994, 3/49, 26–27; Života Panic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 4 October 1994, 3/59, 6. 103. Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada, 114. 104. For fascinating excerpts from the three-hour meeting between the students and Miloševic´, see Olga Nikolic´, “Nisam vam se ulagivao,” and “Dovedite nam demokratiju,” Borba, 20 March 1991, 4–5. In addition to reflecting on the March protests, Miloševic´ also asked the students to support his quest for border changes, claiming that the “anti-Serb coalition wishes to keep the areas which are within the administrative borders of the existing republics but which never were, nor ever will be, state frontiers.” 105. “Ne odustajemo do ispunjenja zahteva,” Borba, 17 April 1991, 4–5; “Udovoljeno radnicima,” Borba, 18 April 1991, 4–5. 106. “Stariji uz vlast, mlad‒i uz opoziciju,” Borba, 1 April 1991, 14–19. 107. “Hope in the Streets of Belgrade,” New York Times, 15 March 1991, A32. 108. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 91. 109. Momo Pudar, “Jugoslavija evropska briga,” Oslobod‒enje, 14 March 1991, 1, 9. 110. Momo Pudar, “Evropa za ocˇuvanje Jugoslavije,” Oslobod‒enje, 15 March 1991, 1, 8. 111. The issue of what kind of contacts to establish with republican leaders in Yugoslavia extended also to the EC’s policy vis-à-vis the USSR. This particular meeting of the working group ended in confusion because the diplomats had trouble reconciling the events on the ground with their adherence to dealing only with the central government. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 92. 112. The prevailing opinion in the Senate was dramatically different. For Senator Dole’s demand for a “clear message” to the JNA regarding America’s “swift, decisive, and punitive” action in response to the institution of a state of emergency, see US Senate, “Yugoslavia in Crisis,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 48, 20 March 1991, S3698.

Notes to Pages 144–149 113. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 83–84. 114. This declaration was delivered to the Yugoslavs “in close concert with the USA” by a delegation of ambassadors from the EC troika states. Ibid., 95. 115. For a full transcript of the letter published in the Yugoslav press, see “Buš hrabri Markovic´a,” Oslobod‒enje, 29 March 1991, 1. The Soviets also publicly expressed strong support for the unity of Yugoslavia and clear opposition to any internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis. James Headley, Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin (London: Hurst 2008), 68. 116. See the interview with Gianni De Michelis in “Jugoslavija test za Evropu,” Borba, 5 April 1991, 1, 12. De Michelis made his message to Slovenia and Croatia even clearer by stating that “If someone in the north believes there is a shortcut of secession so that they can join Europe faster if they secede—they have to be clear that such a shortcut does not exist.” 117. Quoted in B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 314–317. 118. Ibid., 317. 119. “Granice se ne mogu mijenjati,” Oslobod‒enje, 10 April 1991, 1, and Geoffrey Edwards, “European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: An Interim Assessment,” in Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community, ed. Reinhardt Rummel (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992), 168. The Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, also joined in by stating during his visit to Belgrade on 8 April that the USSR was for the integrity of Yugoslavia because it was a factor of stability in Europe and that Yugoslavia’s problems were an internal matter not to be internationalized. See his interview in “Integritet Jugoslavije—pretpostavka evropske stabilnosti,” Borba, 9 April 1991. 120. Quoted in Ivica Mišic´, “Za jedinstvenu Jugoslaviju,” Oslobod‒enje, 13 April 1991, 1. 121. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 94. 122. Quoted in Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992), 410.

chapter 6. descent to dissolution, march–june 1991 1. Milan Babic´, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 20 November 2003, 12955–12974. 2. Aleksandar Vasiljevic´, TSM-ICTY, 5 February 2003, 15772, 15789. During the 1970s and 1980s, Željko Ražnatovic´-Arkan was a career criminal and agent of the Yugoslav Secret Service operating throughout Western Europe. In 1990, he founded the Serb Volunteer Guard, a paramilitary formation created with the assistance of the Serbian Security Service and operating under the auspices of the Yugoslav Army in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. He was assassinated in Belgrade in January 2000. 3. Miloševic´’s public statements on the necessity of border changes intensified in the early days of 1991. Chuck Sudetic, “Serb Chief Warns of Land Demands,” New York Times, 11 January 1991, A5; “Srbi u istoj državi,” Oslobod‒enje, 2 February 1991, 3.

353 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

354 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 150–152 4. For an excellent account of the episode, see Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing–Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 114–115. Also see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 134–135. Miloševic´’s Socialist Party organized rallies in Serbia against the “genocidal Ustaša regime in Croatia” and its intervention in Pakrac. S. Zecˇevic´ and V. Marjanovic´, “Klicanje Srbiji i—oružju,” Borba, 4 March 1991, 3. 5. Quoted in Blaine Harden, “Republic Rejects Yugoslav Authority: Serbia Shuns Presidency, Mobilizes Forces,” Washington Post, 17 March 1991, A29. 6. Six summits were held, one in each of the six republics: 28 March in Split, 4 April in Belgrade, 11 April in Brdo kod Kranja in Slovenia, 18 April in Ohrid in Macedonia, 29 April in Cetinje in Montenegro, and 6 June in Stojcˇevac near Sarajevo. These summits, however, resulted in virtually no progress. 7. Karad‒ord‒evo was the site in early December 1971 of the infamous Twenty-first Session of the SKJ presidium, which marked the beginning of a campaign of Communist purges in Croatia. These purges led to the first imprisonment of Franjo Tud‒man, who was accused by Tito’s regime of Croatian nationalism. Tud‒man was again convicted in 1981 for giving interviews critical of the regime to the Western press. 8. Stipe Mesic´, “The Road to War,” in The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991– 1995, ed. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanic´ (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 11–12. Mesic´ claims a meeting was at first supposed to take place with him, Jovic´, Tud‒man, and Miloševic´ but that later Tud‒man and Miloševic´ decided to meet by themselves. 9. According to Borisav Jovic´, Tud‒man had asked to meet with Miloševic´ in August and October 1990 due to Serbia’s instigation of the Krajina rebellion, but Miloševic´ refused on both occasions. Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 182–183, 202. 10. For a critical account of the treatment of the two meetings in later academic and popular literature, see Ivo Lucˇic´, “Karad‒ord‒evo: Politicˇki mit ili dogovor?” Cˇasopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 35, no. 1, 7–36. For an example of the extensive coverage in the local press, see the series of articles immediately after the Karad‒ord‒evo meeting in “Susret Miloševic´-Tud‒man,” Borba, 27 March 1991, 1–6. 11. The memoirs of Tud‒man’s advisor Hrvoje Šarinic´, who accompanied the Croatian president to the negotiations, do not reveal much about the conversations, but they provide a photographic testimony of the setting. Hrvoje Šarinic´, Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševic´ em: Izmed‒u rata i diplomacije, 1993–1995 (1998) (Zagreb: Globus International, 1999). 12. I. Lucˇic´, “Karad‒ord‒evo,” 8–9, 13–14. 13. For Tud‒man’s support of BiH sovereignty, see “BiH i Hrvatska predlažu prolongiranje roka,” Oslobod‒enje, 22 January 1991, 1. 14. Đ. Kozar, “Srbija uslovljava bh. suverenost,” Oslobod‒enje, 24 January 1991, 3; Maristela Lucˇic´ and Radivoj Cveticˇanin, “Jugoslavije ima pregovaracˇa nema,” Borba, 8 February 1991, 5; Stjepan Kljuic´, TSM-ICTY, 15 July 2003, 24401–24402. 15. R. Preradovic´, “Bez Jugoslavije nema ni BiH,” Oslobod‒enje, 11 February 1991, 3; E. Habul, “Bosna je suverena u okviru Jugoslavije,” Oslobod‒enje, 20 February 1991, 3. 16. “Polemika Izetbegovic´-Karadžic´,” Oslobod‒enje, 28 February 1991, 1.

Notes to Pages 152–154 17. “BiH je stalo da spasi Jugoslaviju,” Oslobod‒enje, 1 March 1991, 4. 18. Quoted in M. Maric´, “Ne damo Jugoslaviju,” Borba, 4 March 1991, 3. 19. Mesic´, “Road to War,” 12. Croatian Banovina was the fruit of a 1939 agreement between the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Macˇek, and the Yugoslav prime minister, Dragiša Cvetkovic´. It added significant portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Croat lands which had entered into Yugoslavia from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. According to Mesic´, Tud‒man claimed Miloševic´ had offered him those borders plus the region of western Bosnia around the towns of Bihac´ and Cazin. 20. Bilandžic´ remembers three meetings of the expert groups: on 10, 13, and 20 April 1991 in Tikveš, Belgrade, and Zagreb respectively. Unlike Mesic´, he claims the Serbian side refused outright to consider the Banovina borders as a starting point for negotiations. Two members of the Croatian expert group resigned after the third meeting because of the Serbian demands, so no deal was reached at this point. Dušan Bilandžic´, Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005 (Zagreb: Prometej, 2006), 372–377. 21. For a telling account of Macedonia’s president, Kiro Gligorov, on this subject, see Mihailo Nicˇota, “Albanski gerilci dovode u pitanje teritorijalnu cjelovitost Makedonije,” Vjesnik, 10 June 1991. 22. See his interview in Josip Jovic´, “Karte su otkrite do kraja,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 5 May 1991, 4–5. 23. Even the leader of the Democratic Party in Serbia, Zoran Đind‒ic´, claimed that republican borders were valid only in the case of Yugoslavia’s remaining united. Otherwise they were to be adjusted in favor of Serbia’s westward expansion. Jelena Kosanovic´, “Republicˇke granice nisu državne,” Oslobod‒enje, 12 May 1991, 5. 24. The Serb Autonomous Region (SAO) of Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem was officially created on 26 February 1991, even though the Serbs did not form a majority in a single municipality in that region. On 31 March this SAO proclaimed its accession to Serbia, while the SAO of Krajina did the same on 1 April. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 102. 25. Davor Marijan, “Jugoslavenska narodna armija u agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku 1990– ˇ asopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 33, no. 2 (2001), 298–299. For the 1992 godine,” C official JNA order establishing the armored and air force protection of Krajina, see “Zapovijed 9. korpusa OS SFRJ za obranu Knina, Benkovca i Obrovca, 5. april 1991.,” in Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990–1995: Dokumenti, ed. Mate Rupic´ (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2007), 1:108–114. 26. Marcus Tanner, “Army Moves to Halt Clashes in Croatia,” Independent, 1 April 1991, 1. 27. See the discussion of the declaration of Serbia’s National Assembly from its emergency session of 2 April in Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 103. 28. Davor Marijan, Bitka za Vukovar (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2004), 46–49; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 140–141. 29. Marijan, Bitka za Vukovar, 50–53. The leader of the Serb Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj, admitted that his forces participated in the killings and that Serbia’s ministry of internal affairs supplied the weapons. Vojislav Šešelj, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia, deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, March 1995, 6–12. For a fascinating

355 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

356 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 154–157 interview with the Borovo Selo paramilitaries, see Ines Sabalic´, “Oni su profesionalci,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 12 May 1991, 15–16. 30. For Tud‒man’s televised 2:10 a.m. plea for calm and the rejection of “dilettante calls and provocations which do not take into account the situation in Yugoslavia and the world and which do not take into account the fact that certain actions can lead to unwanted casualties,” see “Nec´emo trpjeti!” Slobodna Dalmacija, 4 May 1991, 2. 31. Marcus Tanner, “Hatred Rages out of Control in Croatia,” Independent, 6 May 1991, 10. 32. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 130–131. 33. The demonstrations of more than forty thousand protesters in Split were organized by the local labor unions against the blockade of the Croatian village of Kijevo (near Knin) by the JNA and Martic´’s paramilitaries. “Uzavreli Split,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 7 May 1991, 3. 34. M. Šakota and Dž. Kolukcˇija, “Tenkovi tutnje Mostarom,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 8 May 1991, 7; Ian Traynor and Michael Simmons, “Army on Combat Alert as Yugoslavian Talks Falter,” Guardian, 8 May 1991. 35. For a detailed account of the whole affair, see Stipe Mesic´, The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 19–41. 36. Borisav Jovic´, as the outgoing president of the presidency, for the first time in Yugoslavia’s post-Tito history called for a vote on the incoming president. Together with the representatives of Vojvodina and Kosovo, he voted against Mesic´, while Montenegro’s president, Momir Bulatovic´, refused to vote because Montenegro’s representative had previously not been approved by the SFRJ Assembly. The remaining four representatives (of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) all voted for Mesic´. For the best coverage, see the issues of Borba for 16–18 May 1991. 37. On 12 May, the Krajina Serbs in another referendum overwhelmingly approved the proposal to “annex Krajina to the Republic of Serbia and for Krajina to remain in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, and the others who wish to maintain Yugoslavia.” Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 101–102. 38. The article added that Serbia and the generals “in Kosovo already have proof that the West is ready to tolerate almost any amount of government brutality if it will keep the lid on Yugoslavia, and stop the country from fragmenting.” Marcus Tanner, “Club of Europe Shuns Bullied Slav Republics,” Independent, 9 May 1991, 12. 39. “Yugo This Way, Yugo That Way,” Economist, 11 May 1991, 13; “Yugoslavia Loses Its Head,” New York Times, 16 May 1991, A22. 40. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 106—Relative to Democracy and Human Rights in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 57, 18 April 1991, S4785. 41. Titled “The Soviet Cauldron,” the report also implied that the United States needed to shore up Russia’s president, Boris Yeltsin, because he stood the best chance of deterring the “putschists.” This advice fell on deaf ears in the National Security Council (NSC). Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 360.

Notes to Pages 158–160 42. The report also stated that the Soviets “prefer a nonviolent solution that preserves Yugoslav unity, but may support a crackdown that promises to avert civil war.” CIA, “National Intelligence Daily,” 9 May 1991, FOIA F-1992–01432, 19. 43. For Bush’s continued backing of Gorbachev, see Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 379–380. 44. David Binder, “U.S., Citing Human Rights, Halts Economic Aid to Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 19 May 1991, 10. 45. “US Policy towards Yugoslavia,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, no. 22, 3 June 1991. 46. Zimmermann also proclaimed that any questions regarding Western armed intervention in Yugoslavia were “unfounded and totally ridiculous.” Quoted in Gordana Logar, “Protiv svakog separatizma,” Borba, 28 May 1991, 3. Zimmermann was apparently hostile to the Nickles Amendment to such an extent that he phoned individual senators in an attempt to stop it, prompting Senator Dole to ask, “Why doesn’t that ambassador stop calling senators and do what he’s being paid for?” Quoted in Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 131. 47. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 125. 48. West Germany accounted for 17.1 percent of Yugoslavia’s trade in 1990, ahead of the USSR at 15.5 percent and Italy at 14.8 percent. Far behind were France with 5.3 percent, the United States with 4.6 percent, and the United Kingdom with 2.3 percent. According to official Yugoslav census numbers from 1981, West Germany was also home to 451,607 Yugoslav guest workers and members of their families. Though a majority of those likely were Croats, a substantial number were Yugoslavs of other nationalities, especially Serbs. SFRJ, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Statisticˇki godišnjak Jugoslavije 1991 (Belgrade, 1991), 134. 49. Budimir Loncˇar, interview with the author, 12 May 2006. 50. Borisav Jovic´ entered his accounts of the intelligence reports into his diary on 11 and 18 February 1991. He claims he did not believe either of the reports’ main findings. B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 269, 272–273. 51. Eckart Arnold, “German Foreign Policy and Unification,” International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), 454. 52. Gerhard Almer, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. Almer was the Desk Officer for Yugoslavia and Albania in 1989–1991 and worked in the Southeast European Department in 1991–1992. Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek confirmed Almer’s assertions. He recounted his conversation with Genscher and the Danish foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, during which the German foreign minister urged Denmark to be cautious in pushing for the independence of the Baltic states because that had the potential of giving a bad example to the rest of the Soviet Union, as well as Yugoslavia. Hans van den Broek, interview with the author, 24 May 2005. 53. For Genscher’s discouragement of the Slovenes in March 1991, see Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 6.

357 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

358 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 160–162 54. For a characteristic argument against Western appeasement of Miloševic´ in late March 1991, see the editorial by Johann Georg Reißmüller, “Ein Staat des Unheils,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 March 1991, 1. As the editorial asserted, “Now come the Western politicians and warn in equal measure both the Serbs and those tormented and threatened by them to give up violence. That is almost the same as if someone in March 1939 had demanded non-violence equally from both the remnants of Czechoslovakia and Germany.” 55. The German draft declaration was rejected, and Yugoslavia’s unity was on this occasion once again advocated by the EC. Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 92. 56. Quoted in “Buduc´nost Jugoslavije—stvar njezinih naroda,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 4 May 1991, 10. Prominent members of other parties also criticized Western policy. The first to openly state support for Slovenia’s and Croatia’s right to selfdetermination in the Bundestag was, however, the head of the SPD, Hans-Jochen Vogel, on 13 March 1991. Nenad Ivankovic´, Bonn: Druga hrvatska fronta (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993), 105. 57. In his report, Gansel did not spare the northwestern republics from criticism and suggested that the Croatian government had to offer local Serbs political as well as cultural autonomy in order to earn its republic’s international recognition of independence. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 7. 58. Feto Ramovic´, “Senzacionalan preokret prema Jugoslaviji,” Oslobod‒enje, 29 May 1991, 11. 59. Gerhard Almer, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. 60. “Evropske trupe u Jugoslaviji?” Slobodna Dalmacija, 13 May 1991, 13. 61. According to Gerhard Almer, “There was some pressure from public opinion, which was reflected in the opinion of the chancellery, but with Genscher always saying ‘No!’ He was saying that this [shift in policy] was dangerous for our interests, dangerous for the stability of Eastern Europe, the stability of the Soviet Union.” Interview with the author, 2 June 2005. For Genscher’s indirect confirmation of this thinking, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 491. 62. In addition to rejecting Mock’s proposal, the EC foreign ministers also rejected the proposal of the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumière, for a mediation group consisting of experts from her organization. Christopher Cviic, An Awful Warning: The War in Ex-Yugoslavia (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1994), 13–14. 63. Quoted in John Palmer, “EC to Press for Unity in Belgrade,” Guardian, 14 May 1991. 64. Miodrag Paskucˇi, “Zapad za Gorbacˇova i Markovic´a,” Oslobod‒enje, 24 April 1991, 1; Mirko Klarin, “Avet Jugoslavije kruži Evropom,” Borba, 20 May 1991, 18. Cresson quoted in Pia Christina Wood, “France and the Post Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia,” European Security, vol. 3, no. 1 (1994): 131. 65. See the exchange between Johnston and the minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Douglas Hogg, in UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,”

Notes to Pages 163–165 Hansard, vol. 191, column 919, 22 May 1991. Johnston (from 1997 Lord Russell-Johnston) later claimed his sense of the government’s stance was that its officials would prefer the JNA to stage a quick intervention. Interview with the author, 10 June 2005. 66. As noted above, the last meeting of all six republican presidents took place on 6 June near Sarajevo. There was some enthusiasm in the press about the joint proposal of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it soon became clear that the other four republics were unwilling to compromise. As Borisav Jovic´ noted in his diary, the Bosnian-Macedonian proposal was considered by the Serbian leadership to be “stupid and inoperative.” B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 338. 67. Dimitrij Rupel, interview with the author, 26 September 2006. 68. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 176–177. 69. According to the Croatian minister of defense, Martin Špegelj, Croatia’s authorities learned of the JNA plan for the full-scale attack (operationalized later that summer) already in March 1991. Martin Špegelj, “The First Phase, 1990–1992: the JNA prepares for aggression and Croatia for defence,” in Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanic´ (eds.), The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 29. 70. The Croatian National Guard was formed on 5 May 1991 and gained public prominence with a parade in Zagreb on 28 May 1991. Its formation was directed both at the Serbs and at the increasingly pessimistic and apathetic Croats. Tud‒man was anxious to limit the scope of the ZNG, which the JNA labeled an illegal republican army. For the story of its formation, see Martin Špegelj with Ivo Žanic´, Sjec´anja vojnika (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 213–215. 71. The three presidents met in Split on 12 June and in Belgrade on 19 June. 72. It is unclear which intelligence service originally tapped the phones of Miloševic´ and his associates. It is, however, clear that the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) acquired this intelligence from the British and American governments, but only after the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia. Credible press sources have suggested that the intercepts were, if not created by the Western intelligence services, then at least contemporaneously available to them. All recordings and transcripts of the intercepts were made public by the OTP in the summer of 2004. They were accessed at http://www.domovina.net/tribunal/page_006.php and analyzed in their original Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian version concurrently with the recordings. For a more detailed analysis, see Josip Glaurdic, “Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Miloševic´ Telephone Intercepts 1991–1992,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 23, no. 1 (2009). 73. For the formation of a regional organization in Bosnian Krajina—the area around Banja Luka—made up of only Serb-majority municipalities, see D. Stanišic´, “Repriza vec´ vid‒enog,” Oslobod‒enje, 9 May 1991, 1. 74. “Upad protiv ustava,” Borba, 10 June 1991, 1. 75. For the use of the SDS to mobilize soldiers for the JNA, see Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Radislav Vukic´/Slobodan Boškovic´, 29 May 1991, B6525, 2. For Serbia’s supplies to the SDS through Mihalj Kertes and the head of the Serbian SDB, Jovica Stanišic´, see Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Mihalj Kertes, 24 June 1991, B6570-B6567,

359 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

360 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 165–168 2. Kertes had Miloševic´’s greatest trust since the 1988 “yogurt revolution” in Vojvodina, when he helped Miloševic´ overthrow the local leadership. 76. It is interesting that Miloševic´’s statement was part of his refusal of Karadžic´’s request to bring along the leader of the Croatian Serbs, Milan Babic´, to the meeting. Miloševic´ saw Babic´ as “a fool unfit for serious conversations” whom he would not allow to jeopardize the “building of a nation.” Intercept, Slobodan Miloševic´/Radovan Karadžic´, 11 June 1991, B6549, 2. 77. The exact figure of offered aid is not clear. Press reports spoke of $4 billion, as did some participants in the meeting. M. Karalic´, “EZ nudi 4 milijarde dolara pomoc´i,” Oslobod‒enje, 31 May 1991, 1. Also see Mesic´, Demise of Yugoslavia, 46. According to Budimir Loncˇar, the figure was $5 billion. Interview with the author, 12 May 2006. Jacques Delors claims he did not offer any specific figure. Jacques Delors, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. 78. Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), 13. 79. Delors and Jovic´ quoted in B. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 332–336. Delors also added, “From the very outset we have advocated the preservation of unity, both in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. . . . Certainly you [Mr. Jovic´] will recall our cautious position, even amid public pressure, with regard to the Baltic republics. All of that is our general position.” 80. Budimir Loncˇar, interview with the author, 12 May 2006. Miloševic´’s reaction was particularly bitter and aggressive. Barney Petrovic, “Serbia Spurns Delors Plan for Yugoslavia,” Guardian, 31 May 1991. ˇ etiri uslova Jugoslaviji,” Oslobod‒enje, 5 June 1991, 1. The EC ministers officially 81. “C gave four new conditions to the Yugoslavs: (1) unity of the country and respect for the federal constitution; (2) respect for human and minority rights; (3) dialogue; and (4) respect for the economic reform program. 82. Contrary to claims popular in some press and academic literature, the northwestern republics did not have real support from any meaningful quarters in the international community—not even the Vatican. For Tud‒man’s disappointing visit with Pope John Paul II in May 1991, see the account of Croatia’s foreign minister, Davorin Rudolf, who accompanied Tud‒man to Rome, in Davorin Rudolf, Rat koji nismo htjeli: Hrvatska 1991 (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1999), 223. 83. Quoted in Mirko Klarin, “Bracˇna ponuda iz Evrope,” Borba, 17 June 1991, 14–19. De Michelis asked the Slovenes to be patient by pointing to the example of the Germans, “who had waited 45 years for the right conditions for reunification.” 84. CSCE, “First Meeting of the Council,” available at http://www.osce.org/documents/ mcs/1991/06/ 4138_en.pdf. 85. CSCE, “First Meeting of the Council—Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia,” 19–20 June 1991. 86. For Loncˇar’s statement, see Ivankovic´, Bonn, 169–171. 87. Quote from Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 309. 88. For the full text of the two Bundestag resolutions, see Ivankovic´, Bonn, 173–178.

Notes to Pages 168–171 89. Höynck claims he and Genscher wrote the statement and then simply presented it during a ministers’ lunch, where it was approved by acclamation. Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. For Genscher’s account, see Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 491. 90. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 133–137; Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 309–312. Baker is much less forthcoming in James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), 478–483. 91. Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 137. 92. For Baker’s full public statement, see “US Concerns about the Future of Yugoslavia,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, no. 26, 1 July 1991. 93. Marcus Tanner, “Defiant Slovenia Plans Its Rebirth as Sovereign State,” Independent, 24 June 1991, 10. 94. In Zimmermann’s words, “Unfortunately, Miloševic´ and the generals who backed him had lived by force, and they understood it. What they read between the lines of the Baker visit was that the United States had no intention of stopping them by force. It might isolate them and make them pariahs, but that, they concluded, was an acceptable risk.” Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 137. 95. Quoted in Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 308. 96. Ibid., 310. 97. Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: J. Murray, 1997), 186. 98. Quoted in Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 312. 99. For a critique of this decision, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 11. 100. Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2000), 196. 101. Blaine Harden, “Yugoslav Prime Minister Warns Secessionist Republics,” Washington Post, 25 June 1991, A15. See also a series of articles in Borba on 25 June 1991. 102. The claim that he was finally going to be financially supported by the West was an important part of Markovic´’s plea to the Slovenes and the Croats. As he stated during his meeting with the Slovene leadership, “We have been offered the kind of aid that we could not have expected several months or a year ago. . . . Last April, I went to the EC. We were in good shape. I told them: ‘You have to give us aid, or else there will be a period of crisis in this country.’ They said: ‘No—you’re doing colossally well. You don’t need any aid. You should give aid to others.’ They did not understand. Now they understand.” “Evropa nec´e izdvojenu Sloveniju,” Borba, 19 June 1991, 16. 103. “Duhovno i fizicˇko nasilje vec´ postoji,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 June 1991, 5. 104. Croatia also passed the “Declaration on the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia,” which guaranteed the Croatian Serbs cultural autonomy, self-rule, and other civil rights. 105. Quoted in Ian Traynor, “Slovenia and Croatia on Brink of Independence,” Guardian, 24 June 1991. 106. Lawrence Freedman, “When Hindering a Divorce Hastens Domestic Violence,” Independent, 26 June 1991, 21.

361 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

362 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 172–177 107. Milivoje Maksic´, U raskoraku sa svetom (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2000). Maksic´ was Yugoslavia’s deputy secretary for foreign affairs under Budimir Loncˇar. He became the acting secretary for foreign affairs after Loncˇar’s resignation on 12 December 1991 and served in that position until 15 July 1992.

chapter 7. summer of violence and divisions, june–september 1991 1. Peter Jenkins, “Two Principles in Conflict,” Independent, 4 July 1991, 25. 2. George Soros, “The Centre Cannot Hold,” Independent, 15 July 1991, 19. 3. As stated by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in David Binder, “Europeans Warn on Yugoslav Split,” New York Times, 26 June 1991, A7. 4. John M. Goshko, “U.S. Opposes Using Force to Keep Yugoslavia United; Republics Warned on Dangers of a Breakup,” Washington Post, 27 June 1991, A36. 5. Quoted in Momo Pudar, “Nema priznanja za ‘mini-države,’ ” Oslobod‒enje, 27 June 1991, 8. 6. Statement by the under-secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, Mark Lennox-Boyd, in UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 193, column 1138, 27 June 1991. 7. Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 12–13. 8. Mark Eyskens, interview with the author, 7 June 2005. 9. Quoted in Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), 45. 10. For a representative example of the British school of thought, see Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 449. Hurd suggests that “an underlying German sympathy for Croatia went back to the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and less reputably to the help which ruthless Croat nationalists had given to the Axis in the Second World War.” Mitterrand’s view was hardly better. He suggested that “Germany considers itself as the legitimate heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and has thus associated itself with the old Austrian grudge against the Serbs.” Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand: À l’Élysée (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 625. 11. Quoted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 234–235. 12. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 193, column 1138, 27 June 1991. 13. For a cogent critique of Western reactions to the declarations of the two northwestern republics, see “The Road to War,” Economist, 6 July 1991, 45. According to the Economist, “The main effect of these warnings was not to deter Slovenia and Croatia, but to encourage some of Yugoslavia’s generals in the belief that the West would not object—and might even reward them—if they moved to keep Yugoslavia in one piece.” 14. CIA, “The Yugoslav People’s Army in the Current Crisis,” 18 June 1991, FOIA F-1995–00364, 3. 15. Dušan Bilandžic´, Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005 (Zagreb: Prometej, 2006), 380–381.

Notes to Pages 177–181 16. For a telling account of the meeting between the highest Serbian leadership with Generals Kadijevic´ and Adžic´ that demonstrated this conviction, see Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 340. See also Života Panic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, 4 October 1994, 3/59, 12. General Panic´ claims that there would have been some international reaction to a strong JNA action, but in the end it would have been accepted because Yugoslavia was deemed a necessary “factor of stability in the Balkans.” 17. For the full text of the order, see “Armija skida rampe,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 June 1991, 2. 18. For an excellent discussion of the army’s “superiority syndrome,” stemming from its flawed analyses of the Gulf War, see James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst, 2003), 102–104. 19. See the account of Milan Kucˇan in Adam LeBor, Milosevic: A Biography (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 167. For Tud‒man’s correct assessment of the nature of the Slovenian conflict, see Franjo Tud‒man, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/79, 5. 20. Quoted in Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 343–344. According to Jovic´, in his conversation with Kadijevic´, Miloševic´ persisted “in mentioning only Slovenia, perhaps for tactical reasons toward the military, which is intoxicated with the unity of a Yugoslavia that no longer exists, but for us it is clear that that also relates to a Croatia without Serb territory in it.” 21. “Markovic´: SIV ne snosi odgovornost,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 29 June 1991, 7. 22. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995 (Washington, DC: CIA, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), 1:62. 23. Quoted in David Binder, “U.S. Voices Regret on Yugoslav Crisis,” New York Times, 27 June 1991, A10. 24. From the account of the High Command meeting at the height of the Slovene conflict in Branko Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 214–215. 25. This idea is further developed in James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 159. 26. For a useful concise discussion of the French view of Eastern Europe at the time, see Philip Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 48–49. For the Mitterrand-Havel clash on a French proposal for a European “confederation”—a de facto waiting room for East Europeans—see Ronald Tiersky, “France in the New Europe,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (1992): 135. 27. According to Dumas, the fear of the European continent regressing “into the Middle Ages” was one of the most important reasons why France supported Yugoslavia’s unity even well after the war broke out. Roland Dumas, interview with the author, 4 June 2005. 28. For a comparison of German and French approaches to Eastern Europe at this time, see Gordon, France, Germany, 48–49. 29. Douglas Hurd, interview with the author, 11 May 2005.

363 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

364 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 181–184 3 0. Hans van den Broek, interview with the author, 24 May 2005. 31. See the account of Dutch foreign minister van den Broek in Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 93. Also see Roland Dumas, Le fil et la pelote: Mémoires (Paris: Omnibus, 1997), 353, and William Drozdiak, “West Europeans Send Envoys, Debate Yugoslav Crisis,” Washington Post, 29 June 1991, A18. 32. David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 46. 33. Quoted in John M. Goshko, “U.S., Allies Plan Meeting on Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, 28 June 1991, A31. 34. James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), 636–637. 35. Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 50. 36. Joseph Weyland, interview with the author, 30 June 2005. Weyland was at the time the permanent representative of Luxembourg to the EC and later chairman of the committee on political union at the inter-governmental conference on the Treaty of Maastricht. He was present at this council meeting. 37. Quoted in Alan Riding, “Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europeans Send High-Level Team,” New York Times, 29 June 1991, 4. See also J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 49; Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 198; Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 32. 38. Dimitrij Rupel, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/68, 1. 39. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:62. 40. Quoted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 32–33. 41. J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 51. 42. For an excellent critique of the troika’s approach, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 159. Silber and Little perceptively note that the three ministers “came—in the phrase of many a subsequent mediator—to ‘bang heads together,’ as though the conflict was caused by no more than some ill-defined, but frequently alluded to, Balkan temperament, a South Slavic predisposition—either cultural or genetic—toward fratricide.” 43. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 346–347. 44. Ibid., 344–345. An intercept of a telephone conversation Miloševic´ had with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžic´, on 1 July is revealing in this respect. In the conversation, Miloševic´ tells Karadžic´ that the time had come “to change things radically” and that the Slovenes and the Croats should be allowed to leave Yugoslavia, but only “along the border that suits us.” Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 1 July 1991, B6580-B6577, 2–3. 45. See the transcript of the meeting published in Stipe Mesic´, The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 97, 100. Poos was also adamant in refuting claims that Croatia and Slovenia were already independent: “But those republics are not recognized! No country in the world has recognized them. How can they be independent then?” Ibid., 98.

Notes to Pages 185–188 46. The Conflict Prevention Center was formally established by the Charter of Paris in November 1990 as a body which would assist the CSCE Council in reducing the risk of conflict by helping implement various confidence- and security-building measures. Its Consultative Committee was composed of representatives of all participating states, and it could hold meetings at the request of even just one state in response to unusual military activities. The CSCE mechanism for emergency response was set in June 1991 at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Berlin. 47. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 15. 48. Hans-Jörg Eiff, interview with the author, 8 June 2005. Eiff was Germany’s ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time. 49. Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. For a less dramatic account of the pressure Genscher faced in the Foreign Relations Committee, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 15. 50. Ibid., 16. 51. Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. Höynck accompanied Genscher to Yugoslavia and was present at all of his meetings. 52. Dimitrij Rupel, BL-DY interview transcript, 3–4. 53. According to Höynck, “Genscher knew that as a foreign minister, even a strong one with the support of the chancellor that he had, he could not go against, not the majority, but the unanimity of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Bundestag.” Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. 54. Gerhard Almer, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. 55. Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), 28. 56. In this analysis I rely primarily on Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. 57. The CSO was established by the Charter of Paris and was given a role in the CSCE mechanism for emergency response in June 1991 at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Berlin. Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 86, no. 3 (1992): 573. 58. Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 28 June 2005. Höynck remembered that discussions at the CSO were emotional because of the questions the diplomats felt they needed to grapple with: “What would happen to the Balkans? What impact would the outcome have on the rest of Europe? What would the precedent for other fragile structures in Europe be?” The British press claimed that the Yugoslav diplomats at the CSCE were supported by the USSR, Romania, and France. Martin Kettle, “Europe: The West Sees the Light,” Guardian, 5 July 1991. 59. For a characteristic view, see Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,” World Politics, vol. 48, no. 4 (1996): 494. 60. The general secretary of the ruling CDU, Volker Rühe, publicly joined the voices from the German left in asking that his country begin an EC action for the recognition

365 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

366 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 188–190 of Slovenia and Croatia. Stephen Kinzer, “Kohl Threatens to End German Aid to Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 2 July 1991, A8. 61. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 194, columns 28, 333–334, 1–3 July 1991. 62. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 194, column 330, 3 July 1991. Johnston compared the JNA intervention in Slovenia to “the same old-style, brutal Communist repression that we saw in Budapest, Prague and Berlin.” 63. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 193, column 1140, 27 June 1991. 64. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 194, column 332, 3 July 1991. The foreign secretary remained defiant and claimed that Livingstone was “moving ahead a bit fast in his [demand for sanctions]. If the whole of Yugoslavia were to fall into the hands of, shall we say, colonels, that would create a different situation in which the hon. Gentleman’s point would have to be considered.” 65. UK House of Commons, “Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 194, column 331–332, 3 July 1991. The quote from Parnell that was under discussion was “No man has a right to fix the boundary of the march of a nation”—an unhappy choice considering “the march” of the Serb nation for new boundaries but in this case obviously intended as a warning to Belgrade about the futility of its military operations. 66. “Yugoslavia Breaks,” Times, 3 July 1991; “Leading Article: Saving Yugoslavia from Itself,” Guardian, 1 July 1991; “Leading Article: Europe’s Duty to Intervene,” Independent, 4 July 1991, 1. The Independent asked the governments of the WEU states to be ready to intervene militarily, whereas the Guardian added that “Yesterday the foreign secretary Douglas Hurd expressed his ‘impatience’ with those who argue that Yugoslavia is an artificial creation and must therefore be allowed to break up. But the argument does not so much depend on past history as on present reality.” 67. US Senate, “Crisis in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 102, 28 June 1991, S9107. 68. Quoted in Mesic´, Demise of Yugoslavia, 121. 69. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 153—Expressing Support for Democratization in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 106, 11 July 1991, S9899. 70. For a useful cross-section of European opinion, see Kettle, “Europe,” 5 July 1991. For the barrage of criticism to which the Italian foreign minister (De Michelis) was subjected in his own parliament, see Silvije Tomaševic´, “Što c´e im nezavisnost poslije smrti?” Slobodna Dalmacija, 5 July 1991, 8. 71. The continuation of violence between the JNA and the Slovenian TO forces also played an important role. The TO proved successful in regaining border posts and forcing JNA barracks to surrender by cutting off their supplies. This provoked a strong response of the JNA High Command, which commenced another offensive—this time to extricate its surrounded troops—on 2 July. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:65–67. 72. For an account of a 2 July 1991 meeting of James Baker and the national security adviser (Scowcroft) with Dutch foreign minister van den Broek and his political director, Pieter van Walsum, see Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 104. According to van Walsum, “There was a complete absence of vision and commitment. There

Notes to Pages 190–193 was no willingness to talk about any option other than the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.” 73. John M. Goshko, “U.S. Shifts Emphasis away from Preserving Yugoslav Unity,” Washington Post, 3 July 1991, A25. For a similar public statement from the Foreign Office, see Sarah Helm et al., “West Leans towards Republics’ Point of View,” Independent, 3 July 1991, 8. 74. Statement reproduced in Snežana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 310–311. 75. Accord reproduced in ibid., 311–315. The monitoring mission was within days completely subsumed under the EC rather than the CSCE. 76. Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 30. 77. For Drnovšek’s account of the deal he had already cut with Jovic´ on Brioni, see Janez Drnovšek, Escape from Hell: The Truth of a President (Ljubljana: Delo, 1996), 267–275. 78. Ibid., 275. Drnovšek came to Belgrade on 18 July to add his necessary vote. 79. CIA, “National Intelligence Daily,” 19 July 1991, FOIA F-1992–01432, 4. Slovenia’s foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel, noted the same and added a jab at the Croatian leadership by saying that “Croatia has missed its historical opportunity.” Steve Crawshaw and Edward Lucas, “Slovenia Prospers while War Looms for Federation,” Independent, 20 July 1991, 10. 80. On the morning of 3 July, an armored column of about 150 vehicles of all types left Belgrade, cheered on by the city residents. The units were supposedly to go to Slovenia but never made it farther than the Serbo-Croatian border on the Danube. They remained there and were soon used against Croatian forces, most notoriously in the siege of Vukovar. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:67. 81. The final death toll of the Slovenian clash was eight killed on the Slovenian side and forty-four on the JNA’s. Ibid., 68. JNA general Adžic´ remarked on 5 July that “the losses were negligible—a death toll comparable to a collision of two buses.” “Udarit c´emo silom u potrebnom opsegu,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 9 July 1991, 4. 82. The ethnic composition of the army’s officer corps in the spring of 1991 was highly unbalanced. Though the Serbs and Montenegrins accounted for only 38.6 percent of Yugoslavia’s population, they made up 66.2 percent of JNA officers. After mass desertions of conscripts and officers of other nationalities during the Slovenian conflict, that imbalance was even more pronounced. James Gow, “Deconstructing Yugoslavia,” Survival, vol. 33, no. 4 (1991): 302. 83. For a confirmation of this shift in the High Command, see Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 215–216, and Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 360. 84. Croatia’s minister of defense, Martin Špegelj, strenuously opposed Tud‒man on this issue. For his account of their argument on 26 June, see Martin Špegelj, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/72, 33–34. 85. Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 129. 86. CIA, “Prospects for Violence (Deleted),” 25 June 1991, FOIA F-1995–00364, 1–3. 87. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:94.

367 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

368 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 193–196 88. Those lines were Karlovac-Plitvice in the west, Baranja-Osijek-Vinkovci-Sava in the east, and the Neretva River in the south of Croatia. Miloševic´ and Jovic´ also instructed the general to purge the army of its Croat and Slovene cadre. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 349. 89. Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada, 127. 90. The leader of the Krajina Serbs, Milan Babic´, confirmed that Miloševic´ in their private meeting in mid-July 1991 asserted he had the power to deploy JNA troops to particular areas. Milan Babic´, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 19 November 2002, 13056–13058. 91. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 8 July 1991, B6587-B6527-B6523, 2–3; and “The Statement of Ante Markovic´,” Vreme News Digest Agency, 30 September 1991, nos. 1–2; http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/. Markovic´’s revelation caused a media sensation that September, but it resulted in virtually no policy changes by any of the actors, including the international community. 92. During this conversation Miloševic´ also mocked a Western ambassador who had tried to confront him about Serbia’s troops and weapons supplies in Croatia: “I told him ‘Serbs always had weapons. We’re that kind of people. . . . Rocket launchers? Well, those are weapons too.’ . . . As if I’m going to tell him I sent all of that. He can’t be serious.” Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 26 July 1991, B6588, 1–2. 93. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 19 November 2002, 13064–13066. 94. Tim Judah, “Serbs Revel in Prospect of Victory over Croats,” Times, 5 August 1991. 95. Ian Traynor and Noll Scott, “Yugoslav Peace Plan Collapses: Serbs Say Killing Could End ‘If One Side Is Defeated,’ ” Guardian, 5 August 1991. 96. Ian Traynor, “Croatia to Offer Serbs Autonomy,” Guardian, 26 July 1991. The offer included civil and human rights, cultural autonomy, local self-government where Serbs were in the majority, and proportional participation in local and state bodies. ˇ ulic´, “Tud‒manovo biti ili ne biti,” Danas, 6 August 1991, 11–12. See also the 97. Marinko C coverage in Slobodna Dalmacija, 2 August 1991, 2–10. 98. The newly instated president of the SFRJ presidency, Stipe Mesic´, received a letter on 12 July from Ambassador Zimmermann which confirmed the US knowledge of the JNA’s troop movements and goals. Mesic´, Demise of Yugoslavia, 145. 99. Božidar Gagro, interview with the author, 3 June 2005. In July and early August, Gagro briefed the French missions of Jean-François Deniau and Jacques Blot which were sent to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana to ascertain the prospects for the creation of a new Yugoslav union. The conclusions were on both occasions clear: Yugoslavia was dead. 100. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 31. 101. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 499. 102. Marc Fisher, “Slovenia Nears Independence as Croatia Faces Civil War; G-7 Leaders Said to See Croats Destined for War,” Washington Post, 20 July 1991, A1. 103. Lord Russell-Johnston, interview with the author, 10 June 2005. 104. Hans van den Broek, interview with the author, 24 May 2005. French politicians openly spoke of their sympathy for the Serbs. For Mitterrand’s comments on the subject in early August, see Dumas, Le fil et la pelote, 354. Pia Christina Wood suggests

Notes to Pages 196–199 that the French were sympathetic toward Miloševic´ in the belief they would thus be able to exert greater influence over him—a strategy similar to their approach to Saddam Hussein prior to the Gulf War. Pia Christina Wood, “France and the Post Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia,” European Security, vol. 3, no. 1 (1994): 132. Other authors suggest that the French and British sympathies for the Serbs were rooted in their desire that the Serbs win and that they win fast. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 271. 105. Quoted in Andrew Rosenthal, “U.S. Wondering if Interests Lie in a United or Divided U.S.S.R.,” New York Times, 28 July 1991, 1. 106. “Balkan Answers,” Times, 29 July 1991; “Sharp Message to the Serbs,” Guardian, 3 August 1991; “Ending the Croatian Ordeal,” Independent, 2 August 1991, 20. 107. Trevor Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–1992,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (1992): 242–245. 108. Quoted in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 110–111. 109. For similar views, see Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 174–175; Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 32–33; and Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, 12. 110. French planning was directed by General Philippe Morillon, the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia in 1992–1993. Philippe Morillon, Croire et oser (Paris: B. Grasset, 1993), 11. 111. Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 32–33. 112. See the discussion of the analyses published in the army’s journal Vojno delo in James Gow, “One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2. no. 23 (1993): 5–6. 113. Mark Eyskens, interview with the author, 7 June 2005; J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 162. 114. The United Kingdom was on this issue strongly seconded by the Netherlands, which at the time held the presidency of the EC. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 110. 115. Charles Richards and John Eisenhammer, “EC Will Not Monitor Croatia Fighting,” Independent, 19 July 1991, 10. The ECMM at the time had only fifty monitors. 116. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 28. The former secretary-general of the WEU, Willem van Eekelen, claims that the Dutch EC presidency pushed for the ECMM not to be managed by the WEU because it did not want to increase the WEU’s role in the negotiations on the EC’s common foreign and security policy. Willem F. van Eekelen, Debating European Security, 1948–1998 (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 1998), 143. 117. Jacques Poos did claim that the “responsibility lies with those who want to redraw the internal frontiers of Yugoslavia,” but he refused to state this was Serbia. Marcus Tanner and Adrian Bridge, “Yugoslavia ‘Heading for Tragedy,’ ” Independent, 5 August 1991, 1. The article also claimed that “abandoned by the EC to face a possible military onslaught from Serbia, Mr. Tud‒man’s political demise appears inevitable.”

369 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

370 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 199–202 118. Introduced in 1970, the EPC was the synonym for EC foreign policy coordination until it was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty. 119. The official statement from the ministerial meeting reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 327–328. 120. Quoted in Tom Walker, “EC’s Search for Peace Reaches End of the Road,” Times, 7 August 1991. 121. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 7 August 1991, B6630, 1. Details of the SKY News interview—one of very few Miloševic´ gave at the time—can be found in Blaine Harden, “Croatia Rejects Talks on Borders,” Washington Post, 9 August 1991, A26. Miloševic´ asserted that Croatia could leave Yugoslavia but only without Krajina. 122. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 7 August 1991, C2521, 10. For similar strategizing by the Serbian and the JNA leadership in mid-July, see Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 364–365. 123. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 7 August 1991, C2521, 6–11. 124. Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing– Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 121; Davor Marijan, “Jugoslavenska narodna armija u agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku 1990–1992 godine,” Cˇasopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 33, no. 2 (2001): 305. 125. J. Gow, “One Year of War,” 6. After a week of sporadic shelling, the siege and permanent artillery attacks began on 26 August. 126. C´osic´ was visited by the Slovenian foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel, and the president of parliament, France Bucˇar. A follow-up with Miloševic´ was to take place on 19 August. For C´osic´’s account of the meeting, see his feuilleton “Pišcˇevi zapisi (1981–1991),” Vecˇernje novosti, 25–26 April 2002. Rupel tried to peddle something similar to the Serbo-Slovene agreement in a meeting with the Germans in Bonn on 20 August, to the consternation and surprise of his Croatian counterpart, Zvonimir Šeparovic´. According to Rupel’s proposal, Yugoslavia’s four southeastern republics would remain in a federation with which Croatia would have confederal ties and Slovenia possibly only CSCE-like ties as an independent state. Nenad Ivankovic´, Bonn: Druga hrvatska fronta (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993), 71–73. 127. See the accounts of Muhamed Filipovic´ and Adil Zulfikarpašic´, two Bosnian Muslim leaders who were close to Alija Izetbegovic´, in Muhamed Filipovic´, Bio sam Alijin diplomata (Bihac´, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Delta, 2000), 1:82–83, and Adil Zulfikarpašic´ et al., Okovana Bosna: Razgovor (Zurich: Bošnjacˇki institut, 1995), 99–100. 128. For an account of the Muslims’ decision making, especially in light of their relations with Tud‒man and the Croats, see Zulfikarpašic´ et al., Okovana Bosna, 100–102, and Filipovic´, Bio sam, 88–90. For Tud‒man’s continuing enthusiasm for a deal which would entail a three-way division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Tim Judah and Anne McElvoy, “Belgrade Ready for Border Sacrifices to Preserve Unity,” Times, 13 July 1991. 129. Details of the deal in Zulfikarpašic´ et al., Okovana Bosna, 107–109. Izetbegovic´ was offered the post of president of this new state.

Notes to Pages 202–205 130. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 29 July 1991, B6625, 1–2; Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 7 August 1991, B6630, 3. 131. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 19 November 2002, 13055. 132. For Zulfikarpašic´’s and Filipovic´’s reasoning behind the deal, see Muhamed Filipovic´, “Srbi se ne mogu pobijediti,” Danas, 13 August 1991, 29. Their principal argument was that the Serbs were so well armed and prepared for war that they could not be beaten. 133. Marcus Tanner, “Bosnia Calls for Vote to Resist Serbs,” Independent, 15 August 1991, 9. Though Izetbegovic´ was aware of the JNA’s preparations for war in his republic, he could do little more than “hope that the people see this is not the way. We believe our patience will pay off and that it will buy us time.” From an 16 August 1991 interview, reproduced in Alija Izetbegovic´, Tajna zvana Bosna: Govori, intervjui, pisma, 1989–1993 (Sarajevo: SDA, 2004), 152. 134. For a similar view, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 36. 135. See the account of Markovic´’s meeting in the Kremlin on 2 August in Blaine Harden, “80 Croatian Police Reported Slain,” Washington Post, 3 August 1991, A15. 136. Robert Seely, “Gorbachev Raises Spectre of a Soviet Yugoslavia,” Times, 6 July 1991; Francis X. Clines, “Kremlin to Look for Investments at London Summit,” New York Times, 10 July 1991, A1. 137. See the account of the mid-July London meeting of the G-7 countries, where they not only asserted nothing could be done to prevent the violence in Croatia, but also decided to give no financial aid to a struggling Gorbachev, in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 407. 138. Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 414. Bush’s speech—issued the day after his meeting with Gorbachev, where the Soviet president warned of the Yugoslav scenario playing out in the USSR—angered the Ukrainians and found little support in the United States. The New York Times called the speech “Chicken Kiev.” 139. The New Union Treaty was negotiated by nine out of fifteen republics. Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova had already opted for independence. Ukraine later also abandoned the treaty, which was to endow the new state with a common president, army, and foreign policy. 140. For President Mitterrand’s initial public reaction, which assumed the success of the coup and failed to fully condemn it, see Tiersky, “France in the New Europe,” 135–136. 141. Blaine Harden, “Breakaway Republics See ‘Lesson,’ ” Washington Post, 22 August 1991, A16; Marc Champion, “The Soviet Coup: A Grim ‘We Told You So’ to West,” Independent, 21 August 1991, 4; Blaine Harden, “3 Yugoslav Republics Fear Crackdown,” Washington Post, 20 August 1991, A8. 142. Quoted in Krešo Špeletic´, “Pucˇ kao poticaj,” Danas, 27 August 1991, 41; Ian Traynor, “Milosevic Leads Serbia into Wilderness of Paranoia,” Guardian, 28 August 1991. 143. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 171–172. 144. Quoted in Sonja Biserko, ed., Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006), 1:232.

371 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

372 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 205–208 145. British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd was quick to point out that the recognition of the Baltic states did “not carry any other implication for how we handle the other republics of the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Yugoslavia.” Quoted in George Brock, “Europe Recognizes Three Breakaway Baltic States,” Times, 28 August 1991. 146. Jonathan Steele, “Goodbye to the Soviet Union: Deputies Stunned by Plan for a la Carte USSR,” Guardian, 3 September 1991. 147. For the encouragement Genscher drew from the coup’s failure, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 40. 148. Ian Traynor, “The Soviet Coup: Gorbachev/The Years of Discontent,” Guardian, 20 August 1991. Also see James Headley, Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin (London: Hurst, 2008), 67. 149. The editorial added that “force can no longer hold Yugoslavia together. Britain and its Community partners must be ready to recognize the fragments of federation, starting with Slovenia.” “Recognising the Inevitable,” Times, 26 August 1991. 150. Statement reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 333–334. 151. For different accounts of the meeting, see Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 501, and Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 115–119. 152. Marcus Tanner, “Yugoslav Army Blitz on Croatia,” Independent, 27 August 1991, 10. 153. In Olga Ramljak, “Vukovar—naš Staljingrad,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 30 August 1991, 5. 154. Quoted in John Tagliabue, “Serbia Promises Reply to Truce Plan,” New York Times, 31 August 1991, 3. 155. “Call for a Cease-fire in Yugoslavia,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, no. 35, 2 September 1991. 156. The day before meeting with Miloševic´, Mitterrand also met with Tud‒man. The Croatian president readily accepted the EC’s measures, while Miloševic´ promised only to “further study” the proposals. Ian Traynor, “Serbian Leader Refuses to Endorse EC Truce Plan,” Guardian, 30 August 1991. 157. For characteristic views in the French and Italian press, see “Dernière chance,” Le Monde, 29 August 1991, 1, and Livio Caputo, “La secession c’è, riconosciamola,” Corriere della Sera, 28 August 1991, 1, 9. For assertive statements from the usually reserved Swiss government and parliament, see Miroslav Copicˇ, “Prekoracˇene sve granice,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 30 August 1991, 18. 158. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 382. Also see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 43. 159. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 334–342. The documents were signed after midnight, so they are sometimes referred to as the agreements of 2 September. 160. Carrington was chosen by Hans van den Broek in part because of his experience of chairing the Lancaster House Conference, which led to the end of the civil war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The Badinter Commission was supposed to consist of five members—three appointed by the EC and two by Yugoslavia. Since the Yugoslav parties could not agree on their two representatives, the commission in the end consisted of the presidents of the constitutional courts/councils of five European states: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium. Steve Terrett, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual Study of PeaceMaking Efforts in the Post–Cold War World (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 120–125.

Notes to Pages 208–213 161. For the best coverage of the renewed vigor of the JNA’s and Serbia’s campaign, see the coverage in the Independent, 4–6 September 1991. 162. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher responded to the Bundestag pressures with strong statements. Addressing the JNA, Genscher stated, “With every shot by your cannons and tanks, the hour of recognition moves closer. We shall not be able to look on further.” Quoted in Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 45. See also David Gow, “Kohl Ready to Recognize Rebel Republics,” Guardian, 5 September 1991. 163. John Palmer, “EC Split on Start of Yugoslavia Talks,” Guardian, 6 September 1991. Germany’s plea for the consideration of recognition was supported by Belgium, Denmark, and Italy. 164. For a critique of the mandate Carrington was given, see Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia, 38–39. And for an excellent analysis of how this affected the conference and the situation on the battlefield, see “Show Serbia Some Muscle,” Independent, 10 September 1991, 18. 165. Carole Hodge and Mladen Grbin persuasively challenge the very concept of organizing a peace conference where the aggressors and the victims were to sit at the same table and where their negotiations to find a “solution acceptable to all parties” were to be “impartially” managed by the West. Carole Hodge and Mladen Grbin, A Test for Europe: Confidence-Building in Former Yugoslavia (Glasgow: Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1996), 33. 166. Lord Carrington, BL-DY interview transcript, 4 January 1995, 3/11, 4. 167. Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 168. “La conférence de presse du président de la République,” Le Monde, 13 September 1991, 2. 169. Quoted in Sonja Biserko and Seška Stanojlovic´, Poslednja šansa Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002), 39. 170. For the opening statements of the presidents of all six republics, see ibid., 47–61. Miloševic´ and Momir Bulatovic´ repeated the favorite claim of the Serb bloc that Yugoslavia’s internal borders were only administrative and were thus open to change. Izetbegovic´ suggested that instead of border changes, a broad system of minority and human rights would have to be implemented. His vision of a confederation implied that its functions would pertain only to a “reasonable and necessary minimum” in human rights, foreign relations, defense, and economic cooperation. The day after the opening session of the conference, Gligorov’s platform of an independent Macedonia which had the right to join a Yugoslav confederation received overwhelming support in the Macedonian referendum: 95 percent on a 72 percent turnout. 171. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 6 September 1991, B6672, 3. 172. From Markovic´’s 30–31 August 1991 interview with Politika, as quoted in Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 234–235. 173. Lukic and Lynch, Europe from the Balkans, 245–246. 174. For similar analyses, see George Brock and Ian Murray, “Balkan Turmoil Brings France’s Fears to Surface,” Times, 10 July 1991, and William Drozdiak, “Conflicts over Yugoslav Crisis Surface in Europe,” Washington Post, 5 July 1991, A15. 175. Quoted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 237.

373 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

374 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 213–217 176. British representatives at the Council of Europe explained Britain’s policy to their German colleagues by asserting that Yugoslavia was “our baby”—the creation of British and French diplomacy after World War I. Friedrich Vogel, personal correspondence with the author, 6 August 2005.

chapter 8. diplomacy on the edge, september–november 1991 1. In fact, the very essence of British opposition to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was, according to John Major in early September 1991, the wish to avoid encouraging “Croatian hopes that Europe would be willing to intervene militarily.” Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 161. 2. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007). Ahrens was a German diplomat who served as the head of the working group on minorities and human rights at the Conference on Yugoslavia. 3. John Tagliabue: “Serbs Cut Off Croatian Capital from South Coast,” New York Times, 13 September 1991, A6, and “Serbian Rebels Harden Control of Croatia Coast,” New York Times, 14 September 1991, 3. 4. Austria’s vice-chancellor, Erhard Busek, on 4 September expressed such doubts to his Croatian counterpart, Mate Granic´. Mate Granic´, Vanjski poslovi: Iza kulisa politike (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), 25. 5. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 10 September 1991, C2352-B8409, 3. 6. For a similar analysis, see CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995 (Washington, DC: CIA, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), 1:95–96. 7. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 176. 8. Full text of the cease-fire agreement reproduced in Snežana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 344–345. For a cogent critique of the agreement, see James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 54. 9. Marcus Tanner, “Battles Rage in Croatia,” Independent, 19 September 1991, 9. 10. Elite armored units sent on this occasion from Belgrade were apparently so well equipped that the Yugoslavists in the JNA High Command believed them to be more than capable of avoiding the battlefields around Osijek and Vukovar, storming to Zagreb, and overthrowing the Croatian government. Branko Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija (Podgorica, Montenegro: CID, 2000), 231. 11. BiH officials accused the JNA of “provoking civil war” in the republic by sending undisciplined and nationalistic reservists into communities with already tense inter-ethnic relations. Marcus Tanner, “Defeats Force Army Truce,” Independent, 23 September 1991, 1.

Notes to Pages 218–221 12. Quoted in Anton Tus, “The War in Slovenia and Croatia up to the Sarajevo Ceasefire,” in The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995, ed. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanic´ (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 48; Tanner, “Defeats Force Army Truce,” 1. 13. In one telling episode, a disgruntled soldier abducted an armored personnel carrier from his unit on the Slavonian front, drove it back to Belgrade, and parked it in front of the SFRJ Assembly. Ofelija Backovic´, Miloš Vasic´, and Aleksandar Vasovic´, “Who Wants to Be a Soldier? The Call-Up Crisis—an Analytical Overview of Media Reports,” in Magaš and Žanic´, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995, 334–336. 14. This issue was the subject of a tense meeting between Kadijevic´, Miloševic´, and Borisav Jovic´ on 28 September. Kadijevic´ demanded that the army officially become the army of Serbia and Montenegro, but his demand was rejected on political grounds because it would have been imprudent internationally. Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 388–389. 15. In the days of mid-September, Miloševic´ often discussed mobilization issues with Radovan Karadžic´. For his insistence that more troops be mobilized in Bosnian Krajina and sent to the crucial battlefield around Slunj in Croatia, see Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 22 September 1991, B6737, 1. 16. Tus, “War in Slovenia and Croatia,” 52. 17. The capture of the Varaždin barracks and arms depot in particular proved to be crucial in the defense of western Slavonia. Davor Marijan, “Jugoslavenska narodna armija u agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku 1990–1992 godine,” Cˇasopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 33, no. 2 (2001): 311–312. 18. See in particular the discussion between Miloševic´ and Karadžic´ in Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 19 September 1991, B6724, 1. Miloševic´ was palpably depressed about Croatia’s successes and feared the JNA was lying to him about the conditions in the barracks under siege. Karadžic´’s suggestion was to overthrow Kadijevic´, which Miloševic´ seems to have seriously considered and perhaps even attempted through the more non-Yugoslavist cadre in the High Command in late September. For such speculations, see Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 228. 19. Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 119–120. 20. Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 52. 21. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 120. 22. Roger Boyes, “Dilemma Confronts Carrington as EC Shifts towards Peace Force,” Times, 17 September 1991. 23. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 120–121. Van den Broek also believed that even if the WEU intervention was approved, NATO forces would eventually have to be drawn in, and such a step would additionally demonstrate to the French the extent to which NATO was still indispensable. 24. Alan Riding, “Capital of Croatia under Attack as Yugoslav Accord Breaking Down,” New York Times, 18 September 1991, A7; Hella Pick, “Britain Acts to Deter Armed Intervention,” Guardian, 16 September 1991; John Palmer et al., “EC to Back Use of NATO Troops in Yugoslavia,” Guardian, 17 September 1991.

375 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

376 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 221–224 25. Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present (London: Routledge, 2006), 11; Trevor Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–1992,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (1992): 250–251. 26. For the fear of repeating the Northern Ireland experience, see David Fairhall, “Britain Fears Disaster If Troops Are Put in without a Ceasefire in Place,” Guardian, 18 September 1991. 27. Geoffrey Edwards, “European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: An Interim Assessment,” in Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community, ed. Reinhardt Rummel (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992), 176. 28. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 347–348; John Palmer, “Hurd Warns EC on Yugoslav Force,” Guardian, 20 September 1991. 29. Croatia immediately accepted a possible WEU intervention. Alan Riding, “Europeans Retreat on a Peace Force for Croatia,” New York Times, 20 September 1991, A6. 30. Quoted in Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 448. Hurd also noted that Roland Dumas tried to convince him it was “all a continuation of World War II.” In Hurd’s opinion, the French just wanted “a big European army in Yugoslavia and an Anglo-French protectorate.” 31. David Alton, “Call to Intervene in Yugoslavia,” Times, 23 September 1991. 32. One curious policy alternative proposed by the Foreign Office was an isolation of the Markovic´ government, as if his cabinet had any influence on the events in the country or any leverage on the army. Palmer, “Hurd Warns EC on Yugoslav Force.” 33. See the letters dated 19 and 20 September from the permanent representatives of these four countries to the UN secretary-general, in UN documents S/23047, S/23052, S/23053, and S/23057. 34. For Croatia’s support, see Stipe Mesic´, The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 225, and Tony Barber, “Defeated Croats to Appeal for UN Intervention,” Independent, 14 September 1991, 8. For German and French views, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 503–504; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 54; and Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup, 23. 35. James Bone, “Security Council Split on Options for Action,” Times, 21 September 1991. 36. James Bone and Christopher Walker, “UN Imposes Arms Embargo on All Sides in Yugoslavia,” Times, 26 September 1991. Compare the French and the British resolution drafts of 22 September 1991 in “European Security Council Initiative,” Yugoslavia: EC [3 of 3], and “UK Revised Draft UNSC Res on Yugoslavia,” Yugoslavia: UN, CF01476, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. The UK draft eliminated all French references not only to the “emergency force,” but also to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 37. To add drama and gravitas to the adoption of the resolution, the Security Council meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of the member states, who were in New York for the opening session of the UN General Assembly. 38. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 349–350.

Notes to Pages 224–226 39. Tony Barber, “EC Sanctions Unlikely to Affect Serbs,” Independent, 21 September 1991, 8. 40. Alan Cowell, “Yugoslavs Said to Agree to Halt Spread of Fighting,” New York Times, 27 September 1991, A6. 41. Diego Arria, Venezuela’s permanent representative to the United Nations and a strong critic of the West’s policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, recalled during his testimony at the Miloševic´ trial that the smaller states had supported the institution of the arms embargo in 1991 because they were unaware of its effects: “It was innocently believing that this would put all the parties in a similar condition.” Diego Arria, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 10 February 2004, 31720. 42. British permanent representative to the United Nations David Hannay later remembered that “the arms embargo was not looked at purely on the basis of which of the parties in Yugoslavia did it favor, but rather what the international community could do to make clear from the outset that it would not allow that its members get drawn in. So, it’s part of a very long-running theme of non-involvement, which was absolutely crucial.” Lord Hannay, interview with the author, 16 May 2005. 43. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 477. 44. In the September 1991 Eurobarometer survey, citizens of EC states were asked to weigh in on the question of self-determination and democracy versus Yugoslavia’s integrity. Democracy and self-determination won by 68 percent to 19 percent across the EC, with only the Greeks supporting Yugoslavia’s integrity by 39 percent to 36 percent. It is interesting that the Germans were ranked only tenth in the level of their support for self-determination in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s integrity also handily lost in the same survey among all the Central and East Europeans, apart from the Romanians. Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community, no. 36 (1991): 39–41, A41. 45. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 176—Relative to the Violence in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 11 September 1991, S12800. 46. For the most eloquent representation of the prevailing sentiment in the Senate, see the 19 September speech by the junior senator from Tennessee (and future vicepresident), Al Gore, in US Senate, “Peace in Europe,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 19 September 1991, S13247. Gore not only labeled the US hands-off policy as shortsighted, but he also outlined point by point all the punitive measures that should have been imposed on Serbia and Slobodan Miloševic´. These included backing the ECMM with a “European contingent of elite shock forces lent by NATO governments but under the nominal authority of the Western European Union.” 47. According to David Hannay, the British permanent representative to the United Nations, “We were all expecting a bland statement” from Baker. Lord Hannay, interview with the author, 16 May 2005. 48. Baker’s speech and the whole Security Council provisional record from this meeting (S/PV.3009) are reproduced in Daniel L. Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds. The “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law: General Issues, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), part 1, 62–73.

377 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

378 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 226–228 4 9. Lord Hannay, interview with the author, 16 May 2005. 50. Charles Krauthammer, “First, Democracy: The Element Bush Missed,” Washington Post, 27 September 1991, A29. For a similar criticism which contrasted US policies toward Iraq and Yugoslavia, see Peter Jenkins, “European Key to a New World,” Independent, 25 September 1991, 19. 51. According to the official 1991 census, of Vukovar’s 44,639 citizens, 21,065 (47.2 percent) were Croats, 14,425 (32.3 percent) were Serbs, and 9,149 (20.5 percent) were others. Numbers were similar for the whole Vukovar municipality, whose inhabitants were 43.8 percent Croats, 37.4 percent Serbs, and 18.8 percent others. 52. Serbia carried out partial mobilization for the JNA reserves on 28 September. For a succinct account of the battle of Vukovar, see CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:99–102. For a more extensive view, see Davor Marijan, Bitka za Vukovar (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2004). And for the account of the leader of the Croatian defenses, see Mile Dedakovic´-Jastreb, Alenka Mirkovic´-Nad‒, and Davor Runtic´, Bitka za Vukovar (Vinkovci, Croatia: Vinkovacˇke jeseni, 1997). 53. See the discussion of Croatia’s strategy in the account of the chief of staff of the Croatian Army in Tus, “War in Slovenia and Croatia,” 56–57. 54. Croatia’s inability to assist Vukovar by breaking the siege or supplying additional weapons and manpower later led to bitter accusations by the surviving defenders of the city. The commander of the city’s defenses, Mile Dedakovic´-Jastreb, has been particularly critical of Zagreb’s inability, ineptness, or unwillingness to help him. Mile Dedakovic´Jastreb, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, July 1994–July 1995, 3/16, 12. 55. According to the 1991 census, of Dubrovnik’s 49,728 citizens, 77.5 percent were Croats and 8.7 percent were Serbs. In the whole Dubrovnik municipality, 82.4 percent of the inhabitants were Croats and 6.7 percent Serbs. 56. For the visit of Ejup Ganic´, a member of the Bosnian presidency, to the village of Ravno immediately after its destruction in October 1991, see Ejup Ganic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/24, 4–5. Ganic´ remembered how—upon seeing the destruction and the JNA troops greeting him with the traditional Serb three-finger salute—he asked the military commander in charge whether the army was Yugoslav or Serb. The commander responded, “It’s up to you to decide what it is.” 57. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:103–105. 58. Veljko Kadijevic´, Moje vid‒enje raspada: Vojska bez države (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 135. 59. Mamula, Slucˇ aj Jugoslavija, 232–233. 60. Colm Mangan, TSM-ICTY, 27 February 2003, 16984–16985. Lieutenant General Colm Mangan was a member of the ECMM. For a similar analysis, see James Gow, “One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2. no. 23 (1993): 7. Serbia’s government cynically joined the campaign on 5 October by issuing a call to the inhabitants of Dubrovnik to “save the city” by leaving it. Ivan Bilic´, “Kronologija raspada SFRJ i stvaranje Republike Hrvatske do 15 sijecˇnja 1992,” National Security and the Future, vol. 6, no. 1–2 (2005): 146.

Notes to Pages 229–231 61. For a telling analysis of Serb and Montenegrin goals for Dubrovnik told through the account of the founding meeting of the Serb Democratic Party for Dubrovnik in March 1991, see Jakša Raguž, “Osnivacˇki skup SDS-a za Dubrovnik—Otvorena najava agresije na dubrovacˇko podrucˇje,” Cˇasopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 35, no. 1 (2003): 37–77. 62. Intercept, Jovan Tintor/Radovan Karadžic´/Božidar Vucˇurevic´, 7 October 1991, C3621, 5. 63. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Gojko Đogo, 12 October 1991, C2373, 10–13. 64. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Branko Kostic´, 26 November 1991, B6916, 1–2. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 349. 65. These four SAOs were joined on 5 November by SAO Northern Bosnia, with headquarters in Doboj. See the excellent discussion of this process in Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 34–35. For the report of the proclamation of the autonomous region of Bosnian Krajina, see R. Preradovic´, “Najava referenduma,” Oslobod‒enje, 18 September 1991, 5. The SDS functionaries openly stated on the occasion that Bosnian Krajina was to be a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina only as long as Bosnia-Herzegovina was a part of a joint state with Serbia and Montenegro. 66. The Bosnian public and leadership were fully aware of what the proclamation of the SAOs meant. See Zoran Odic´, “Ustavna okupacija BiH,” Oslobod‒enje, 2 October 1991, 2. For a useful discussion of the legality of the SAOs, see Kasim I. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do daytonskog sporazuma (1991–1995) (Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, 1997), 55–59. 67. Blaine Harden, “Naval Blockade of Croatia Is Reimposed; Surrender of Dubrovnik Demanded; Serbia Moves to Seize Powers of Yugoslav Legislature,” Washington Post, 4 October 1991, A20. See also the statement of the EC ministers of 5 October condemning the seizure of power by the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 351. It is interesting that in the expectation of Serbia’s takeover, Ambassador Zimmermann still wanted the United States to encourage Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the rump presidency “both for their moderating influence and for keeping them involved in Yugoslavia.” See his cable to Washington in “Yugoslavia: US Response to Possible Serbian Takeover of Federal Institutions,” Yugoslavia: Republics [2 of 2], CF01476, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 68. The WEU ministers, together with their non-WEU and NATO counterparts, once again met on 30 September to discuss the different options for an intervention. They decided to basically table the discussion by only agreeing to have the WEU at the disposal of the Community and Lord Carrington as the coordinator of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Carrington never requested anything from the WEU. Edwards, “European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis,” 176–177. 69. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 47. 70. For Carrington’s conviction, see Lord Carrington, BL-DY interview transcript, 4 January 1995, 3/11, 4. For van den Broek’s, see Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 124–125. 71. Marc Champion et al., “Croats Vote to Secede as Latest Ceasefire Is Signed,” Independent, 9 October 1991, 1; George Brock, “Yugoslavia No Longer Exists, Says France,” Times, 10 October 1991.

379 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

380 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 231–233 72. The clarification of the Serbian government’s understanding of the “special status,” sent to the conference later that month by the Serbian minister of foreign affairs, Vladislav Jovanovic´, clearly asserted that “SAO Krajina and SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem are free territories within Yugoslavia.” Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 127. This was also confirmed by the leader of the Krajina Serbs in Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 21 November 2002, 13201–13202. 73. Blaine Harden, “Yugoslav Sides Accept Peace Pact,” Washington Post, 5 October 1991, A1; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 176. 74. Izetbegovic´’s statement reproduced in Alija Izetbegovic´, Tajna zvana Bosna: Govori, intervjui, pisma, 1989–1993 (Sarajevo: Stranka demokratske akcije, 2004), 161–162. Izetbegovic´ famously exclaimed, “This is not our war,” which was later used against him by the Croats. Considering his position and the military might of the JNA in BiH, this was probably the best Izetbegovic´ could do. In the words of the BiH deputy prime minister, Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, “Put yourself in the position of a president of a state completely covered by the JNA. We’re here talking to the army generals who despise us and refer to us as “balije.” What would you do? Could you say, ‘We will stand by Croatia?’ With all of the army that you have here, full of Serbs.” Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006. 75. Blaine Harden, “Yugoslav Jets Attack Palace in Zagreb,” Washington Post, 8 October 1991, A12; Mesic´, Demise of Yugoslavia, 362–363; Franjo Tud‒man, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/79, 26–28. 76. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 123–124. The greatest opposition to the Dutch proposal came from the United Kingdom, which opposed the Dutch plans for majority voting on foreign and security issues and the expansion of the European Parliament’s powers. David Usborne, “Consternation over Dutch Plans for the EC,” Independent, 25 September 1991, 9. 77. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 125. 78. The statement also singled out the JNA for its “disproportional and indiscriminate use of force” and called on the UN secretary-general to consider sending his own special envoy to Yugoslavia. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 351–352. The principles of the 4 October deal were also endorsed by the CSCE at a meeting of its committee of senior officials on 10 October in Prague. Arie Bloed, ed., The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents 1972–1993 (London: Kluwer Academic, 1993), 910–913. 79. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 125. The actual deadline was to be one month, with the possibility for an additional one-month prolongation. 80. John Palmer and Ian Traynor, “Federal Army Agrees to Pull out of Croatia,” Guardian, 11 October 1991. 81. Wynaendts and van den Broek quotes from Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 126. 82. Particularly instructive in this respect is the exchange of letters among van den Broek, Kadijevic´, and the president of the “rump presidency,” Branko Kostic´, in “EC/ Yugoslavia: Van den Broek Exchange,” 15 October 1991, Yugoslavia: EC [2 of 3], CF01476, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 83. Ian Traynor, “Federal Army Rejects Call for Pull-Out,” Guardian, 12 October 1991.

Notes to Pages 233–235 84. From Markovic´’s interview with Borba on 10 October, as reproduced in Sonja Biserko, ed., Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006), 1:240. 85. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 125. 86. For Genscher’s understanding of the deadline, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/25, 6; Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 509. And for confirmation this was taken seriously in the Auswärtiges Amt, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 65, and Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup, 126. 87. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 95. As a form of “respite” from the conference, Miloševic´ and Tud‒man participated in negotiations mediated by Gorbachev in the Kremlin on 15 October. These negotiations resulted in nothing more than yet another bland statement of a cease-fire that was broken as soon as it was announced. For an interesting account of this episode by Croatia’s deputy prime minister, who was present at the negotiations, see Zdravko Tomac, Iza zatvorenih vrata (Zagreb: Organizator, 1992), 313–326. 88. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, interview with the author, 1 July 2005. 89. Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 15–16. Carrington actually feared that Croatia—not Serbia—would refuse the plan. Nikola Samardžic´, TSM-ICTY, 2 October 2002, 11223. Samardžic´ was the foreign minister of Montenegro at the time. 90. “Special status” included the right to have and show national emblems; the right to a second nationality; the institution of a special legislative body, administrative structure, police force, judiciary; and provisions for international monitoring. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 359. 91. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 191. 92. See the transcript of Miloševic´’s speech in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 363–365. 93. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 193–194. See also Vladislav Jovanovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/34, 5. Jovanovic´ explains that Miloševic´ wished the minority protections to be internationally mandated and guaranteed through “special statuses” only “within the republics that had seceded or had the intention to secede.” 94. Years later, Carrington still insisted that the Kosovo Albanians did not need to have a seat at the conference because “Kosovo was part of Serbia—legally and internationally part of Serbia so that was rather different.” Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 95. It is interesting that Miloševic´ also demanded that the Badinter Commission get involved and—just as Douglas Hurd and Roland Dumas—insisted that a general settlement be a precondition for any republic’s recognition. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 363–364. 96. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 193–194; Nikola Samardžic´, TSM-ICTY, 2 October 2002, 11226. For an interesting account of Bulatovic´’s decision making, see Branko Kostic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 8 October 1994, 3/42, 16–18. 97. Miloševic´ apparently told Ambassador Wynaendts in the men’s room after the plenary session that Bulatovic´’s days as the president of Montenegro were numbered. Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005.

381 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

382 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 235–238 98. Another wave of the offensive actually started on the eve of the conference’s plenary session. “Yugoslavia Army Begins Offensive,” New York Times, 18 October 1991, A8. 99. “Selling of Serbia,” Times, 18 October 1991. 100. Herbert Okun, TSM-ICTY, 26 February 2003, 16898. Okun was an American diplomat who acted as deputy to Cyrus Vance, the special envoy of the UN secretarygeneral to Yugoslavia. 101. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 119–120. 102. Two weeks after the cleansing of Ilok, the JNA also offered the besieged defenders and inhabitants of Dubrovnik a chance to leave the city in order to physically spare it. They refused. Ed Vulliamy, “Victims of War in Croatia Lose Homes but Not Spirit,” Guardian, 28 October 1991. According to the UN secretary-general’s report of 25 October, the total number of refugees and internally displaced persons at the time exceeded 350,000. Bethlehem and Weller, “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law, 458. 103. In March 2003, members and commanders of the units which had committed the crimes—including Major General Mirko Norac—were convicted in a Croatian court to between ten and fifteen years in prison. Their indictment listed fifty victims. “Trial Against Mirko Norac,” Balkan, 2 June 2004, 6. 104. See the 24 October 1991 ECMM report in “EC Monitors’ 10/24 Update on Yugoslav Situation,” Yugoslavia: EC [3 of 3], CF01476, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. Also instructive is an interview with the head of the ECMM, Dirk Jan van Houten, in ˇ elnici gube kontrolu,” Danas, 15 October 1991, 40–41. Van Dražen Vukov-Colic´, “C Houten named the JNA as the “conqueror” which was “fanning the flames of war with ceaseless offensives” and was “particularly guilty of breaking all rules.” 105. Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 239. 106. As BiH foreign minister Haris Silajdžic´ explained at the time, “We want to be connected to Serbia and Croatia, at an equal distance, but if that is not possible then we shall seek another solution.” Quoted in Tim Judah and Anne McElvoy, “Bosnia Sovereignty Vote Widens Rift,” Times, 16 October 1991. 107. Quoted in Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 240. 108. Izetbegovic´’s speech reproduced in Izetbegovic´, Tajna zvana Bosna, 163–165. See also a detailed account of the proceedings in Miljenko Jergovic´, “Muslimani c´e nestati s lica zemlje,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 17 October 1991, 11. Izetbegovic´’s reaction to Karadžic´’s statement was telling: “At that moment I had the feeling that the door to hell, the gate to hell, was opened and that we were all touched by the flames from the inferno.” Alija Izetbegovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/32, 10. 109. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Momcˇilo Mandic´, 13 October 1991, B6823, 2–3. Mandic´ reported on a meeting of the JNA, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and the SDS at the army base in Han Pijesak in eastern Bosnia. 110. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 24 October 1991, B6846, 5–6. The BiH leadership was apparently aware of Karadžic´’s communications with Miloševic´ and the JNA. See a fascinating account in Ejup Ganic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 11.

Notes to Pages 238–242 111. S. Rakocˇevic´-Novakovic´ and E. Habul, “Konstituisana Skupština srpskog naroda BiH,” Oslobod‒enje, 25 October 1991, 3; Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 61. 112. Lord Carrington was a perfect example of this lack of understanding. That October, he was presented with an analysis of the Bosnian Serb institutional preparations for war by Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, the head of the conference’s working group on human rights and minorities. However, Carrington—as well as others involved in the Western diplomatic effort—did not want to listen. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, interview with the author, 1 July 2005. 113. Paul L. Montgomery, “Serb Rejects Plan Posed by Europe,” New York Times, 26 October 1991, 5. 114. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 68–69. 115. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 21 November 2002, 13200–13201. 116. See Mic´unovic´’s and Koštunica’s statements to the Belgrade daily Politika, as reproduced in Sonja Biserko and Seška Stanojlovic´, Poslednja šansa Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002), 173. 117. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 127–128. 118. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 368–369. A day earlier, the EC foreign ministers had also agreed on a “Declaration on Dubrovnik,” which denounced the JNA attacks on the city as disproportional to any actions by the Croats and labeled the JNA demand for the Croats’ surrender as “an illegal act clearly aimed at the seizure of an indisputably Croatian city.” Chuck Sudetic, “European Community Faults Serbian Forces on Truce,” New York Times, 28 October 1991, A5. 119. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 369. 120. Quoted in Sarah Lambert and Leonard Doyle, “EC Tells Serbs to Stop War or Face Sanctions,” Independent, 29 October 1991, 1. See also John Palmer, “EC Gives Serbia One Week to Accept Outline Peace Deal,” Guardian, 29 October 1991; Tim Judah, “Yugoslav President Defies Siege,” Times, 1 November 1991. 121. Frederick Todd Wilson, “Choosing to Pursue Foreign and Security Policy through International Organizations: France in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Yugoslavia” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1997), 261–262. 122. UK House of Commons, “Orders of the Day,” Hansard, vol. 198, column 120–124, 1 November 1991. For a convincing argument that Hurd’s characterization of Miloševic´ on this occasion “implicitly acquitted” the Serbian president, see Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 17. 123. Marc Champion et al., “Serbs Defy EC and Step Up War,” Independent, 5 November 1991, 1. 124. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 131. 125. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 26–27. Emphasis added. 126. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 178. 127. Marcus Tanner and David Usborne, “All-out Attack on Croatia as EC Deadline Nears,” Independent, 4 November 1991, 1. 128. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 69–70; John Palmer, “EC Agrees on Sanctions against ‘Obstructive’ Yugoslav Republics,” Guardian, 5 November 1991.

383 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

384 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 242–245 129. Compare the draft of 1 November in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 370–378, with the draft of 4 November in B. G. Ramcharan, ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 13–23. Point 6 of chapter 2 on human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups, which dealt with Kosovo and Vojvodina, was simply deleted in the new draft. 130. A. D. Horne, “Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia Reportedly Vote for Sovereignty,” Washington Post, 26 October 1991, A17. Kosovo Albanians voted to proclaim Kosovo a separate republic within Yugoslavia, while the Sandžak Muslims voted for autonomy within Serbia. 131. Lord Carrington, BL-DY interview transcript, 10–11. 132. This was also recognized by the German foreign minister. Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 510. 133. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 70–71. 134. See the account of the first day of the summit in “NATO Seeks a New Role,” Independent, 8 November 1991, 20. The US president responded with irritation to Franco-German proposals centered on the WEU: “If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.” 135. James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), 638; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 71. 136. Cvijeto Job, “Lawrence Eagleburger on Yugoslavia,” Vreme News Digest Agency, 11 November 1991. 137. Pérez de Cuéllar officially appointed Vance on 8 October in response to the request of the EC foreign ministers in their statement of 6 October from Haarzuilens and in accordance with Security Council Resolution 713. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 480. 138. Ibid., 484–485. 139. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 378–381. 140. “Athens Warns of Veto,” Independent, 8 November 1991, 11. 141. The Belgrade media certainly saw the declaration of 8 November as a victory for Serbia and recognized that the economic sanctions actually implemented were nowhere near to what had been proposed by the EC Commission or discussed by the EC foreign ministers in the days leading up to the Rome summit. Šime Vucˇkovic´, ˇ etvrta verzija,” NIN, 8 November 1991, 46–47. “C 142. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 380. Emphasis added. 143. Ibid., 369. 144. For a well-argued critique of the declaration of 8 November and of Carrington’s decision to suspend the conference, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 72–74. 145. US Senate, “The War in Croatia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 25 October 1991, S15244. State Department officials strongly opposed this resolution by arguing that it would not “advance the goal of achieving a peaceful, negotiated settlement in

Notes to Pages 245–248 Yugoslavia” because it would deny the president flexibility in responding to a “complicated and fluid” crisis. They also continued to advance the relativist argument that “the world community cannot stop the Yugoslavs from killing one another so long as they are determined to do so.” See the 17 October 1991 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Ralph Johnson (principal deputy assistant secretary for European and Canadian affairs) in “US Efforts to Promote a Peaceful Settlement in Yugoslavia,” US Department of State Dispatch, vol. 2, no. 42, 21 October 1991. 146. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 210: Relative to Violence in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 28 October 1991, S15299. 147. US Senate, “War in the Republic of Croatia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 25 October 1991, S15235. 148. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 213: Relative to United States Policy toward Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 25 October 1991, S15809. Gore justified his and Pell’s proposal by referring to the EC declaration of 28 October, which threatened taking the matter to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “which, as Iraq has reason to know, has teeth.” His proposition of recognition was an attempt to “convert the issue to an international, rather than an internal, dispute” in order to make international involvement under UN mandate easier. He was also convinced that the EC was “now prepared to recognize Croatia if the November 7 [sic] deadline is not met by the Republic of Serbia. There is no guarantee of this, but the logic of the situation points straight at that outcome.” 149. US Senate, “Senate Resolution 216: Relative to Recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and Macedonia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 7 November 1991, S16283. 150. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 395–397. 151. Ibid., 398–399. 152. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 74–75. 153. Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers— America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 158. According to Zimmermann, instead of getting punished for their actions, “the Serbs learned a different lesson [from the Dubrovnik episode]—that there was no Western resolve, and that they could push about as far as their power could take them.” 154. Quoted in Carole Hodge and Mladen Grbin, A Test for Europe: Confidence-Building in Former Yugoslavia (Glasgow: Institute of Russian and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1996), 51. 155. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Dobrica C´osic´, 11 November, 1991, C2352-B6770-B6767, English transcript, 2. 156. The results of the Bosnian Serb referendum—announced one day after the conversation between Karadžic´ and C´osic´—were overwhelmingly in favor of BosniaHerzegovina’s staying in what would remain of Yugoslavia. The official referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence (largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs) took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992. On that occasion the mostly Bosnian Muslim and Croat voters overwhelmingly endorsed Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence.

385 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

386 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 248–252 157. Karadžic´ and C´osic´ also mocked Germany and its foreign minister for making such “incredible mistakes” that Karadžic´ suggested it was “as if [Genscher] is working for us.” Their conversation about Central Europe was also particularly interesting. C´osic´: “Central Europe has nothing original now.” Karadžic´: “Nor can it create a myth.” C´osic´: “It has nothing but Catholicism.” Karadžic´: “Nothing, nothing. It’s a grumpy sort of Catholicism, always complaining and grumbling. I think there’s nothing sadder than a Slav people who are Catholics.” Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/ Dobrica C´osic´, 11 November, 1991, C2352-B6770-B6767, English transcript, 6–9.

chapter 9. the end and the beginning, november 1991–april 1992 1. Croatia’s president wrote to Carrington just three days after the suspension of the conference, asking that it reconvene as soon as possible. He reconfirmed that Croatia accepted all provisions of Carrington’s plan. “Totalni rat protiv Hrvatske,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 12 November 1991, 5. 2. Quoted in Luka Micˇeta, “Topola se brani u Gospic´u,” NIN, 15 November 1991, 13. 3. Marcus Tanner, “Yugoslav Army Starts New Offensive,” Independent, 15 November 1991, 12. 4. For a telling account of life in Dubrovnik under siege, see the week-long diary of a New York Times journalist in David Binder, “Dubrovnik Diary: Shelling, Sniper Fire, Chaos, and for a Few, Escape by Sea,” New York Times, 16 November 1991, 4. 5. Vucˇurevic´, the ranking SDS functionary in Trebinje in eastern Herzegovina, had the same plan for the town of Cavtat, just south of Dubrovnik: “Surround it, grab it by the throat, and let it breathe through a straw.” Karadžic´ recounted his talks with the Bosnian Muslims and asserted they all needed to be told that in case they stood up to the Serbs, “Sarajevo and a few other Bosnian cities would be destroyed. . . . In three to five days they would be destroyed.” Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Božidar Vucˇurevic´, 14 November 1991, C2827, 2–3. 6. “A Faraway Tragedy, Blankly Observed,” Guardian, 13 November 1991. 7. Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 74–75. 8. Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 75–76. 9. Borisav Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1996), 408–409. Romania held a seat in the Security Council at the time. 10. Mesic´ and Tud‒man had been calling for UN troops to be stationed along the Croatian border from the very beginning of real war that summer. For Mesic´’s account of his unanswered letters to UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in early October 1991, see Stipe Mesic´, testimony at the ICTY trial of Slobodan Miloševic´ [hereafter TSM-ICTY], 1 October 2002, 10582–10605. 11. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 411.

Notes to Pages 252–256 12. Branko Kostic´, interview transcript, Brook Lapping documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia [hereafter BL-DY], deposited at Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, 8 October 1994, 3/42, 25. Kostic´ was Montenegro’s representative on the rump presidency and its acting president. 13. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Slobodan Miloševic´, 4 December 1991, B6925, 2. 14. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 487; Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 294. 15. Quoted in Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin Press, 2001), 19. 16. Mitterrand also remarked that “Over the centuries, our histories have been different, as have—one must say it here—our friendships in Yugoslavia.” Quoted in Nenad Ivankovic´, Bonn: Druga hrvatska fronta (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993), 116–120. For a different view of the meeting and of what Mitterrand wanted, see Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 76. 17. Snežana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 382. 18. David Usborne et al., “UN Troops May Go to Yugoslavia,” Independent, 13 November 1991, 1; Nora Beloff, “Hope and History in Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, 19 November 1991, A21; Stevan Nikšic´, “Dilema pod plavim šlemom,” NIN, 15 November 1991, 46–48; Roksanda Nincˇic´, “Blue Helmets in Yugoslavia,” Vreme News Digest Agency, no. 8, 18 November 1991. 19. Ian Murray et al., “Bonn Pushes for Accord Details,” Times, 16 November 1991. 20. For a solid account of the events in Vukovar at the time of its fall, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 178–182. 21. The mass killing at Ovcˇara was the subject of several trials in Serbia and at the ICTY— most notably the Mrkšic´/Šljivancˇanin/Radic´ trial and the trial against the leader of the Serb Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj. 22. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995 (Washington, DC: CIA, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), 1:101. The CIA analysts put the total number of civilian and military deaths on the Croatian side in Vukovar at 4,000–5,000 persons. 23. Marc Champion, “Croat Commander Denounces Vukovar ‘Sell-out’ by Zagreb,” Independent, 16 November 1991, 10. 24. This charge is made by Mate Granic´, Croatia’s then deputy prime minister and later minister of foreign affairs, in Mate Granic´, Vanjski poslovi: Iza kulisa politike (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), 38. For an account of the attempted Croatian Army breakthrough, see Anton Tus, “The War in Slovenia and Croatia up to the Sarajevo Ceasefire,” in The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995, ed. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanic´ (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 59–60. 25. See the account of Vance’s assistant, who had accompanied him to Vukovar, in Herbert Okun, TSM-ICTY, 26 February 2003, 16914–16922. When Vance and Okun later told Miloševic´ about what they saw, he told them that “the world would understand the destruction.” 26. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 412–413.

387 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

388 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 256–258 2 7. Ian Traynor, “Yugoslav Troops Keep Up Attack,” Guardian, 23 November 1991. 28. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 185–186. Concurrently with its occupation of eastern Slavonia and Baranja, Serbia’s government began a program of settling Serbs into the homes of the expelled Croats. Ian Traynor, “Belgrade Puts Blueprint for New Ethnic Map of Balkans into Action,” Guardian, 25 November 1991. 29. Quoted in Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 130–131. 30. Ibid., 129. 31. Hans-Jörg Eiff, interview with the author, 8 June 2005. Also see Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 176. 32. Hans-Jörg Eiff, interview with the author, 8 June 2005. Haris Silajdžic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 77. See also the later account of Ambassador Zimmermann in Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 124. Some authors, quoting primarily Lord Carrington, mistakenly claim that Izetbegovic´ urged Genscher not to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 63; Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 163. 33. Haris Silajdžic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006. 34. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 77. Genscher also publicly reconfirmed his observance of the 10 December deadline. James Bone and Dessa Trevisan, “U.K. Backtracks on Yugoslav Embargo,” Times, 26 November 1991. 35. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 78–79; Ivankovic´, Bonn, 131–132. 36. The meeting of the six government leaders was held under the aegis of the European People’s Party in preparation for the Maastricht Treaty. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 131–132. 37. Thomas Patrick Melady, Veleposlanikova pricˇa: Sjedinjene Americˇke Države i Vatikan u svjetskoj politici (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1997), 159–160; Jean-Louis Tauran, “The Holy See and World Peace: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” The World Today, vol. 50, no. 7 (1994): 127. Melady was the US ambassador to the Holy See and was present at the meeting, and Tauran was Sodano’s assistant and the Vatican’s secretary for relations with states. 38. Adrian Bridge and Sarah Helm, “U.K. Ready to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia,” Independent, 29 November 1991, 1. 39. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 425. 40. Ian Traynor, “Croatia and Slovenia Put Case to Bonn,” Guardian, 4 December 1991. 41. For an excellent response to Mitterrand’s misleading and—considering his own murky World War II past—cynical claim, see Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), xii–xiii. 42. Pia Christina Wood, “France and the Post Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia,” European Security, vol. 3, no. 1 (1994): 135. Wood suggests that the issue of frontiers was actually at the root of Mitterrand’s disagreement with Germany: “Unlike the German government, which believed that internal borders should be recognized automatically

Notes to Pages 258–261 as international borders, Mitterrand questioned if borders drawn by Tito would remain viable for the independent republics.” 43. Douglas Hurd, “Averting a Balkan Tragedy,” Times, 3 December 1991. 44. Quoted in Chuck Sudetic, “Observers Blame Serb-Led Army for Escalating War in Croatia,” New York Times, 3 December 1991, A8. To compound Hurd’s embarrassment, the report was apparently written by the British member of the ECMM. For a more detailed list of the report’s principal findings, see Tony Barber, “Serbs ‘Bomb Hospitals and Schools,’ ” Independent, 3 December 1991, 1. 45. The “Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia” was drafted with the help of Christian Tomuschat, a German jurist and chair of public law at the University of Bonn who was sent to Zagreb by the German government. See Genscher’s account of the episode in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 515. 46. Hella Pick, “Early Recognition ‘Is Unstoppable,’ ” Guardian, 5 December 1991. 47. “Gori Stari Grad,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 7 December 1991, 3. 48. Drago Hedl, “Osijek—linija fronte,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 7 December 1991, 8; Chris Stephen, “Shells Rain on Dubrovnik,” Guardian, 7 December 1991. 49. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 450. 50. Gorbachev, though aware that his term in power was nearing its end, remained combative and warned that the dissolution of the Soviet Union could make Yugoslavia’s war seem like a “simple joke.” He was indirectly backed by US secretary of state James Baker. Peter Pringle and Susan Viets, “Soviet Union Declared Dead,” Independent, 9 December 1991, 1. 51. Steve Terrett, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual Study of Peace-Making Efforts in the Post–Cold War World (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 153. 52. The full text of Carrington’s question, together with the commission’s response, is reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 415–417. 53. For Miloševic´’s surprise, see Radovan Karadžic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994– July 1995, 3/38, 3–4. Confirmed by Ambassador Henry Wynaendts in his interview with the author, 1 June 2005. 54. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, interview with the author, 1 July 2005. 55. Roland Dumas, interview with the author, 4 June 2005. 56. Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 57. Jacques Delors, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. 58. For a succinct presentation of each EC member state’s pre-Maastricht negotiations goals, see “Where the Twelve Community Leaders Stand,” Times, 9 December 1991. Also see Alan Riding, “The European Summit: West Europeans Gather to Seek a Tighter Union,” New York Times, 9 December 1991, A1. 59. Quoted in Alan Riding, “The European Summit: Europe at Crossroads,” New York Times, 12 December 1991, A1.

389 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

390 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 262–265 6 0. Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13. 61. It is unclear whether the initiative originated at the Élysée or at the Quai d’Orsay. It is, however, clear that it had the seal of approval of both Mitterrand and Dumas. Ibid., 221; Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 124. 62. Confirmed in Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 83, and Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 513. Genscher claims he “discussed every word of the draft” of the list over the phone with Chrobog. 63. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 133. 64. Annika Savill, “Maastricht Summit: Insider File—France’s ‘Grande Idee’ for Europe,” Independent, 10 December 1991, 8. 65. Anna Tomforde, “Washington and Bonn Clash over German Plan to Recognize Breakaway Yugoslav Republics,” Guardian, 6 December 1991. 66. David Binder, “U.S. Suspends Trade Benefits to All 6 Republics,” New York Times, 7 December 1991, 7. In response, the Croatian president remarked that “Taken objectively, [the US act] equals support for the aggression against Croatia.” Quoted in Stephen Kinzer, “Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics,” New York Times, 8 December 1991, 18. 67. James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), 639. 68. US Senate, “The Crisis in Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 26 November 1991, S18158. The outrage at America’s lack of initiative after Vukovar was palpable in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. According to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos (D-CA), “The neoisolationists have so intimidated this administration that it cannot now make an honest claim to the leadership of the civilized world or to the cause of human rights. Surely we can walk and chew gum at the same time. Surely we can address the long neglected domestic agenda without abdicating our international responsibilities.” US House of Representatives, “Slaughter at Vukovar,” Congressional Record, vol. 137, 21 November 1991, H10729. 69. Daniel L. Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., The “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), part 1, 481. 70. Ibid., 481. 71. Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005. 72. “Priznati i Makedoniju,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 14 December 1991, 17. 73. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Vladislav Jovanovic´, 5 January 1992, B7010, 5–6. 74. Some of Vance’s position may have had to do with Vance’s character or worldview. In the opinion of his rival from the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Vance was weak when he had to confront “the thugs of this world.” Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), 231. Or, as Marrack Goulding later remembered, it could have had to do with the fact that Miloševic´ took advantage of Vance’s being a novice in Yugoslav affairs. Sir Marrack Goulding, interview with the author, 23 May 2005. 75. Sir Marrack Goulding, interview with the author, 23 May 2005. 76. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 199–200.

Notes to Pages 265–267 77. For a much more eloquent and detailed refutation of Carrington’s argument, see Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 108–110. 78. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 69, 202–203. 79. Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 80. Confirmed by Ambassador Wynaendts in Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 127. 81. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, interview with the author, 1 July 2005. 82. Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 12, 17. 83. Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005. 84. Lord Hannay, interview with the author, 16 May 2005. This initiative also had the strong backing of the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement. “RE: Situation in Yugoslavia,” 17 December 1991, Yugoslavia: Recognition, CF01476, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 85. See the operative clause 7 of the final text of Resolution 724, passed on 15 December 1991; reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 429–431. The word “political” was eventually removed at the request of France once Genscher made it clear he would not waver. James Bone and Ian Murray, “Bonn Threat Clouds UN Peace Mission,” Times, 16 December 1991. 86. Paul Lewis, “U.N. Yields to Plans by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics,” New York Times, 16 December 1991, A1. Michael Libal puts the bulk of blame for the resolution’s anti-recognition bend on the United States. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 82. 87. Pérez de Cuéllar then responded to Genscher directly, once again quoting the EC statement from the Rome summit of 8 November. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 492–494. 88. David Gow, “Bonn Shows Way on Yugoslavia,” Guardian, 13 December 1991; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 82. 89. Quoted in Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, 222. 90. John Tagliabue, “Moving Defiantly on Yugoslavia, Bonn Threatens Rift with Allies,” New York Times, 15 December 1991, 1; Adrian Bridge et al., “Germany Faces Row with EC on Yugoslavia,” Independent, 16 December 1991, 10. 91. For Genscher’s sense of betrayal by his EC partners at the United Nations, see Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,” World Politics, vol. 48, no. 4 (1996): 515. 92. Lord Hurd, interview with the author, 11 May 2005. 93. For a perfect example, see the account of Dutch decision making and van den Broek’s change of heart on the eve of the 16 December meeting in Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 134. 94. All of them subsequently blamed each other for not speaking up against recognition more forcefully or even at all. Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 450; Hans van den Broek, interview with the author, 24 May 2005. Lord Carrington and Ambassador Wynaendts even suggest that Douglas Hurd was not present at the

391 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

392 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 268–270 meeting but that he had instead sent his deputy, Douglas Hogg. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 199; Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005; Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005. There is, however, no support for this claim in the press accounts of this meeting or in the accounts of the other participants. 95. Mark Eyskens, interview with the author, 7 June 2005. 96. See, e.g., Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 514. The argument of Mark Eyskens was that recognition was necessary in order to internationalize the conflict and thus “enable the international community to intervene as soon as possible.” This was also, however, used by some as an argument against recognition, exactly because of their wariness to intervene. Mark Eyskens, interview with the author, 7 June 2005. 97. Recounted by Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005. Wynaendts was also present at this meeting. 98. Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 135. 99. Hurd, Memoirs, 450–451. Much has been made of this subsequently in the British Parliament, press, and some academic literature, with suggestions that Germany at Maastricht conceded to the United Kingdom an opt-out of the new agreement on social policy in return for British support on recognition. UK House of Commons, “Orders of the Day,” Hansard, vol. 201, column 491, 19 December 1991; “Yugoslavia: Wreckognition,” Economist, 18 January 1992, 48. All those involved, however, strenuously denied that Yugoslavia had been discussed at all at Maastricht, aside from a tacit agreement for the French and the Germans to create a list of conditions for recognition. For a perfect example, see John Roy Major, John Major: The Autobiography (London: Harper Collins, 1999), 533–534. 100. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 431–432. 101. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 24. 102. For a useful discussion, see ibid., 24–25. 103. Silvije Tomaševic´, “Bonn, Stockholm, Rim: Priznanje Hrvatske,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 December 1991, 13. The government of Austria had actually already made its announcement on 17 December. Ian Murray, “Kohl to Recognize Yugoslav States in the New Year,” Times, 18 December 1991; Marcus Tanner, “Serb Fury over EC Diplomacy,” Independent, 20 December 1991, 12; 104. Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 516. 105. See, in particular, Beverly Crawford, “German Foreign Policy and European Political Cooperation: The Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia,” German Politics and Society, vol. 13, no. 2 (1995): 1–34, and Crawford, “Explaining Defection,” 482–521. 106. On this, see Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 515, and Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 39. German foreign policy makers were not the only ones who thought Slovenia and Croatia would satisfy the conditions for recognition. Lord Carrington thought the same. Blaine Harden, “EC’s Yugoslav Move Spurs Serbian Rage,” Washington Post, 18 December 1991, A25. 107. William Drozdiak, “EC Envoys Agree on Recognition of Croatia, Slovenia Next Month,” Washington Post, 17 December 1991, A15. For the clarity of Germany’s

Notes to Pages 270–273 position at this meeting, see Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 515, and Hurd, Memoirs, 450. Hurd states that Kohl instructed Genscher not to accept that recognition be conditional on the decision of the Badinter Commission. 108. Anna Tomforde, “Germany Keeps Its Promise to Croatia,” Guardian, 20 December 1991. 109. The Independent offered two diametrically opposing views of recognition in its editorials. For a harsh critique, see Peter Jenkins, “Dangerous Consequences of a Bad Night’s Work,” Independent, 18 December 1991, 17. And for a rebuttal, see “An Unduly Negative Reaction,” Independent, 19 December 1991, 20. 110. “De-Recognize Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 18 December 1991, A28. 111. “Reckless Recognition,” Times, 17 December 1991. 112. “Recognizing Realities,” Guardian, 17 December 1991. 113. “Falling Into Line Behind Bonn,” Guardian, 18 December 1991; Hella Pick, “A Ride on a Bulldozer,” Guardian, 18 December 1991. 114. George Brock, “Kohl Hijacks Brussels Policy,” Times, 18 December 1991. 115. Anne McElvoy, “Blundering in the Balkans,” Times, 19 December 1991. 116. Quoted in Hella Pick, “A Master Germany Wants to Lose,” Guardian, 10 January 1992, 19. 117. Crawford, “German Foreign Policy,” 18. 118. Ibid., 19. 119. Wolfgang Krieger, “Toward a Gaullist Germany? Some Lessons from the Yugoslav Crisis,” World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (1994): 30. 120. Crawford, “Explaining Defection,” 487. Crawford, though factually inaccurate on a number of issues in her article, does base this claim on an interview with Genscher. 121. It is particularly interesting that when asked of Germany’s motivations for its policy, none of the author’s interviewees from the United Kingdom or France gave the Germans even the benefit of the doubt. For some of them it was all about domestic politics, for some simply about Kohl’s or Genscher’s personal character, while for others it was all about pressure from the Catholic Church. 122. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 28. The very fact that the Auswärtiges Amt had to write a position paper in 1993 explaining its actions from 1991 is a testament to the kind of persistent criticism German foreign policy makers were subjected to. 123. Confirmed in Gianni De Michelis, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/15, 14–15. 124. Hans-Jörg Eiff, interview with the author, 8 June 2005. This view is contradicted by Ambassador Ahrens, who claims that Germany’s recognition policy was “concentrated on Slovenia and Croatia and contained no recipes for BiH.” Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 202. 125. Gerhard Almer, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. 126. Quoted in David Gow, “Germans Assert Leadership Role: Kohl Shows His Diplomatic Muscle Over Yugoslavia,” Guardian, 18 December 1991. 127. Intercept, Slobodan Miloševic´/Radovan Karadžic´, 17 December 1991, B6955, 1–2; Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Branko Kostic´, 17 December 1991, B6954, 1–6.

393 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

394 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 273–276 128. For an excellent overview, see Daniele Conversi, German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Seattle: Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1998). 129. UK House of Commons, “Supplementary Estimates 1991–1992: Class II, Vote 2: Yugoslavia,” Hansard, vol. 205, column 470, 5 March 1992. 130. Roland Dumas in late 1993 blamed the acceleration of the crisis on Germany and the Vatican. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 325. Clinton’s first secretary of state, Warren Christopher, was also convinced of Germany’s blame. Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, “German Foreign Policy toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991–1999,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 48, no. 1 (2001): 49. 131. Gerhard Almer, interview with the author, 2 June 2005. Wilhelm Höynck, interview with the author, 18 June 2005. Former high official in the Auswärtiges Amt, interview with the author, June 2005. 132. Ahrens was demoted from his position as the head of the working group on human rights and minorities expressly because of Germany’s role in the EC’s recognition policy. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 70–71; Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, interview with the author, 1 July 2005. 133. Ben Tonra, The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish, and Irish Policy in the European Union (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), 232. 134. Former high official in the European Commission, interview with the author, June 2005. 135. See the details of the plan in Bethlehem and Weller, “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law, 478–480. 136. Chris Stephen and Ian Traynor, “Croats Soften Stance on Territory,” Guardian, 26 November 1991; Tony Barber, “Hopes Recede for Rapid UN Action,” Independent, 6 December 1991, 9. 137. Nikica Baric´, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990–1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing– Tehnicˇka knjiga, 2005), 146. The Krajina leadership was also backed up by local JNA commanders, most notably General Ratko Mladic´. See the account of his rejection of a UN mission in “Yugoslav Update,” 26 December 1991, Yugoslavia [2 of 6], CF01401, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 138. Serbia threatened to recognize Krajina, and Miloševic´’s associates on the rump federal presidency developed plans to create “a new, smaller Yugoslavia” out of Serbia, Montenegro, Krajina, and the Serb areas in BiH. “Serbia Strikes Back,” New York Times, 19 December 1991, A8, and “Serb-Led Presidency Drafts Plan for New and Smaller Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 27 December 1991, A10. 139. Quoted in Sonja Biserko, ed., Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006), 1:254. 140. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Vojislav Kuprešanin, 27 December 1991, B6974, 4. 141. Quoted in Goulding, Peacemonger, 306. 142. Sir Marrack Goulding, interview with the author, 23 May 2005. 143. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 491. 144. The accord is reproduced in Bethlehem and Weller, “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law, 486.

Notes to Pages 276–278 145. For the account of Vance’s meetings with all the parties, see ibid., 482–483. 146. Miloševic´ also added that “The fact that Serbia gives multifaceted and unselfish support to Krajina does not mean that you have the right to decide about the lives of its citizens.” Quoted in Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 151–152. 147. For a similar argument, see J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 62. Lord Carrington himself at Chatham House in March 1992 argued that recognition had directly led to the drop in violence. “Lord Carrington on Yugoslavia,” 12 March 1992, Yugoslavia: February 1992 [1 of 2], CF01401, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 148. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 111. Lord Carrington also on 9 January publicly stated that Miloševic´’s newly conciliatory tone could be traced to the Community’s decision on recognition. Paul L. Montgomery, “Talks on Yugoslavia Resume with New Cooperative Tone,” New York Times, 10 January 1992, A2. 149. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 131. Izetbegovic´ around the same time also asked Lord Carrington that a greater effort of the EC be concentrated on BosniaHerzegovina and that it include a “mission of good will to be headed by a high official.” His request was not fulfilled. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 202. 150. “Bosnia Appeals to U.N.,” New York Times, 24 December 1991, A3; Ian Traynor and John Palmer, “Key Yugoslav Republic Seeks EC Recognition: Community Wants UN Peacekeepers in ‘Explosive’ Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Guardian, 21 December 1991. 151. The Bosnian Croats supported Izetbegovic´’s plan and joined him in calling for UN troops. See the discussion in Goulding, Peacemonger, 299–304. 152. According to Ambassador Wynaendts, “Vance did not want to antagonize Miloševic´— he thought he needed him to settle the issue in Croatia.” Henry Wynaendts, interview with the author, 1 June 2005. 153. In Ejup Ganic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/24, 3. Confirmed in author’s interviews with high-ranking officials in both the United Nations and the BiH government. For Tharoor’s denial of the episode, see Shashi Tharoor, BL-DY interview transcript, 30 April 1995, 3/77, 1–2. Tharoor claims that the preventative deployment of the UN troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina was not possible because it was neither an internationally recognized independent state nor a member of the United Nations. Considering that the case was the same for Croatia—and that, in fact, the UN secretary-general and his special envoy did everything possible to prevent Croatia from becoming an internationally recognized independent state—this explanation does not stand up to scrutiny. 154. The arbitration commission issued three more opinions on 4 July 1992. They dealt with the completion of the process of dissolution, the settlement of problems of state succession, and the claim of the Serbo-Montenegrin state to be the sole legal heir to the SFRJ. They are reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 634–639. 155. Opinion Nos. 2 and 3, together with the positions of the Serb bloc as expressed through the statements of the rump federal presidency, are reproduced in ibid., 474–485. For excerpts from the aide-mémoire of the Croatian government issued to the commission regarding these two questions, see “Bivšu Jugoslaviju stvorile— republike,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 22 December 1991, 8.

395 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

396 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 278–281 156. Opinion Nos. 4 through 7 are reproduced in Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 486–500. 157. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 130, and Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990–1997 (Zagreb: Globus, 2000), 142–143. Nobilo was Tud‒man’s advisor. 158. Beverly Crawford wrongly claims that the arbitration commission’s findings suggested “Serbs in Croatia were subject to human rights violations.” Crawford, “German Foreign Policy,” 11. Misha Glenny goes even further and suggests that the Badinter Commission ruled that Croatia’s application failed on two counts: lack of control over its territory and failure to provide “sufficient guarantees for the protection of its minorities, most notably the urban Serbs who still lived in territory under Croatian control.” Glenny, Fall of Yugoslavia, 164. 159. “Comments on the Republic of Croatia’s Constitutional Law of 4 December 1991, as last amended on 8 May 1992,” 4 July 1992; reprinted in International Legal Materials, vol. 31 (1992): 1505–1507. Indeed, the 4 November provisions of the draft convention did not even delineate the areas that were going to be covered by “special status.” Chapter II Article 2(c) stated that “These areas are listed in Annex A,” but “Annex A” simply did not exist. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 97. 160. Marcus Tanner et al., “Peace Monitors Killed,” Independent, 8 January 1991, 1. 161. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 501. 162. Stephen Kinzer, “Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup,” New York Times, 16 January 1992, A10. France waited until 24 April 1992 to establish full diplomatic relations with Croatia, and the United Kingdom waited until 24 June of the same year. 163. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 86. Portugal took over the EC presidency on 1 January from the Netherlands. 164. Later that year, in May, the Croatian Sabor voted to change the Constitutional Law on human rights and the rights of minorities and established two coherent regions made of municipalities with a Serb majority, which were endowed with a “special status.” Ahrens and other conference negotiators worked with Croatian authorities on making the changes to the Constitutional Law. Although the revised law still did not provide for the demilitarization of the “special status” regions, Ahrens believed that “Minorities in other countries with similar problems could only dream of such a law (implementation is not the subject here).” Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 138–139. 165. Lord Hurd, interview with the author, 11 May 2005. 166. Tim Judah et al., “UN Peacekeepers Arrive to Start Mission in Croatia,” Times, 15 January 1992; Tim Judah and Anne McElvoy, “Greece Gives Its Backing to Belgrade’s Defiance,” Times, 17 January 1992. 167. For an excellent account of the connections between Greek politicians and the Miloševic´ regime regarding a common policy against Macedonia, see Takis Michas, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 42–56. 168. John Palmer, “EC Set to Recognize Yugoslav Republics,” Guardian, 11 January 1992, 7. Confirmed by Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006,

Notes to Pages 282–286 and Haris Silajdžic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006. In contrast to Germany’s enthusiasm for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Silajdžic´ recounted the stance of President Mitterrand in Paris when the BiH leaders visited. The French president dismissed their request for recognition by saying that “not every village can be a state.” The UK ambassador in Belgrade, Peter Hall, at the time still held that, optimistically, Serbia could show “enough flexibility to forge a loose association of the four southern republics.” “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1991,” 24 January 1992, FCO document, FOIA 0020–10. 169. Intercept, Jovica Stanišic´/Radovan Karadžic´, 5 January 1992, B6508-B7005, 2; Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Jovica Stanišic´, 12 January 1992, B9112, 3. Stanišic´ was in general agreement with Karadžic´; Intercept, Slobodan Miloševic´/Radovan Karadžic´, 15 January 1992, B7022, 1–4. 170. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, 249–251. Confirmed in the secretary-general’s report to the Security Council of 4 February 1992 (UN Doc. S/23513), in Bethlehem and Weller, “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law, 490. 171. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 134. 172. Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Mihalj Kertes/Franko Simatovic´, 28 January 1992, C4119, 2. 173. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, 251; Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 518. Due to his statements to the media, in which he expressed doubts regarding the UN mission, Tud‒man had to directly reconfirm his unconditional acceptance of the Vance plan in a letter exchange with Cyrus Vance between 6 and 10 February. See the account of the exchange in the secretary-general’s report to the Security Council of 15 February 1992 (UN Doc. S/23592), in Bethlehem and Weller, “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law, 493, 496. 174. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 202–204. 175. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 154–162. 176. For a particularly telling account, see Slobodan Lazarevic´, TSM-ICTY, 29 October 2002, 12330. 177. Milan Babic´, TSM-ICTY, 21 November 2002, 13233; Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 162–163. 178. Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present (London: Routledge, 2006), 27–28. 179. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 89–90; Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, 135. In the Sector North “pink zones,” Serbs constituted a 74 percent prewar majority, but in the Sector South “pink zones,” they were only a 36 percent minority. Baric´, Srpska pobuna, 178–179. 180. Quoted in Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 112. 181. James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst, 2003), 121–129. 182. Jovan Divjak, “The First Phase, 1992–1993: Struggle for Survival and Genesis of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Magaš and Žanic´, The War in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina 1991–1995, 154. 183. Ibid., 155. According to Divjak, the strength of this force by the spring of 1992 was 90,000–100,000 well-armed men, 750–800 tanks, about 1,000 armored personnel

397 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

398 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 286–289 carriers and other armored vehicles, more than 4,000 mortars and artillery pieces, up to 100 airplanes, and about 50 helicopters. 184. Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing” (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 44; Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 122. Cyrus Vance had already been notified of this in November 1991 by Ante Markovic´. Herbert Okun, TSM-ICTY, 26 February 2003, 16903. 185. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 123. Confirmed by Vlatko Kraljevic´, interview with the author, 15 May 2006, and in Stjepan Kljuic´, TSM-ICTY, 15 July 2003, 24410. 186. Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 420. 187. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 126–127. For a fascinating transcript of Radovan Karadžic´ giving directions to his party’s organizers on how to take control over the local enterprises, radio stations, banks, and political institutions in order to build a de facto apartheid, see Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 260–264. 188. Kasim I. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do daytonskog sporazuma (1991–1995) (Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, 1997), 64. 189. Tud‒man was at times recklessly unguarded when speaking with some of his international interlocutors about the possible division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 181–183. His interaction with the Croatian press was equally candid. See his New Year’s interview with the Croatian press corps in Olga Ramljak, “Priznanje se više ne može sprijecˇiti,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 31 December 1991, 3. 190. Boban pursued this policy without regard for the majority of BiH Croats, who would not be covered by the possible territorial expansion of Croatia at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When one of his colleagues asked what would happen to those Croats who were to be left unprotected by his schemes, Boban’s answer was characteristically crude: “They can go fuck themselves!” Former high official of the BiH HDZ, interview with the author, June 2006. 191. The transcript was made public by Tud‒man’s successor, Stipe Mesic´, after his victory in 2000. It is reproduced in Predrag Lucic´, ed., Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne (Split, Croatia: Kultura i rasvjeta, 2005), 75–128. Its validity was confirmed to the author in interviews with former high officials of the BiH HDZ in June 2006. 192. HZ Posavina was formed on 12 November on the territory of eight municipalities, while HZ Herzeg-Bosnia was formed on 18 November—the day Vukovar fell—and claimed the territory of thirty municipalities in western Herzegovina and central Bosnia. These two HZs were joined by HZ Central Bosnia, which was created on 27 January 1992 on the territory of four municipalities. Out of these forty-two municipalities, the Croats were in the majority in only fourteen and in the plurality in another six. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 65–66. 193. The leaders of the HZs in December 1991 even formally voted to withdraw their support from Stjepan Kljuic´. Lucic´, Stenogrami, 82. 194. Ibid., 85–89, 127. 195. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 69. 196. The transcript of this meeting is reproduced in Lucic´, Stenogrami, 129–154. The contents were also leaked to the press. Fahrudin Radoncˇic´, “Dani odluke,” Danas, 21 January 1992, 33–35.

Notes to Pages 289–292 197. For one account of these negotiations, see Intercept, Slobodan Miloševic´/Radovan Karadžic´, 10 February 1992, B7073, 1–2. 198. For Tud‒man’s continuing pressures on Kljuic´, see Stjepan Kljuic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 2 October 1994, 3/39, 10. Kljuic´ resisted and stayed in Sarajevo throughout the war. 199. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 72–73. 200. Alija Izetbegovic´, Tajna zvana Bosna: Govori, intervjui, pisma, 1989–1993 (Sarajevo: Stranka demokratske akcije, 2004), 187–190. 201. Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 177. 202. For a perfect example of this naivety, see the account of James Baker’s meeting with BiH foreign minister Haris Silajdžic´ in mid-March 1992 in “Baker mtg w/Bosnian FM in Brussels,” 14 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia March 1992, CF01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. Silajdžic´ told Baker that the JNA “was behaving” and staying “out of politics.” For good critiques of the Muslim leadership on this issue, see James Gow, “One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2. no. 23 (1993): 8, and Divjak, “First Phase, 1992–1993,” 157. 203. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 84–85. 204. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 514–515. See also Libal, Limits of Persuasion, 90. 205. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 517–519. The draft left the terminology of the constituent units basically undetermined but did refer to them repeatedly as “states,” which was also how they were represented in the local media. “BiH: Država triju država,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 February 1992, 12. 206. The draft also stated that “small adjustments” to this principle which could be “clearly justified” were possible, and it suggested that the arbitration commission would be called in to adjudicate in case of disputes. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 519. 207. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 189–190. Zimmermann saw them both on 25 February. For the long-held preference of the SDS for ethnic “cantonization,” see J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 81. 208. For an excellent critique and a convincing comparison with 1938 and Czechoslovakia, see J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 81–83. 209. Quoted in Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 87. 210. Quoted in Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 263. 211. Quoted in Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 87–88. 212. From Karadžic´’s interview to the Viennese Kurier, as reproduced in “Kantonizacija BiH jedini izlaz iz krize,” Oslobod‒enje, 28 February 1992, 1. 213. See the account of Josip Manolic´, the head of Croatia’s delegation, in Ines Sabalic´, “Partija pokera s Karadžic´em u Grazu,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 5 March 1992, 8–9. Also see Radovan Karadžic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 4–5. 214. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 88–89. Croats were to get 12.5 percent, and the Muslims, 43.7 percent. According to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 1991 census, Serbs constituted 31.2 percent of the republic’s population; 43.5 percent were Muslim, 17.4 percent Croat, 5.5 percent Yugoslav, and 2.4 percent other.

399 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

400 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 292–295 215. For a solid and unbiased account of the events, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, February 29–March 1, 1992” (Washington, DC), 19–20. 216. Karadžic´’s order was captured in the Intercept, Radovan Karadžic´/Rajko Dukic´, 1 March 1992, B9117, 1–2. 217. One casualty was a participant in a candlelit Sarajevo peace march who was shot by a barricade guard. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Referendum on Independence,” 20. 218. Chuck Sudetic, “Rebel Serbs Disrupt Travel into Yugoslav Republic,” New York Times, 3 March 1992, A9. The EC’s promise had been clear. On 23 January, the Portuguese EC presidency announced the Community was willing to recognize BiH if the independence vote won the referendum. John Palmer and Jonathan Rugman, “EC Is Prepared to Recognize Bosnia,” Guardian, 24 January 1992, 10. 219. Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 275. 220. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 90. 221. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 520. 222. Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 639–642. For the same view, see Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 191–192. Neither Baker nor Zimmermann acknowledges the fact that their logic for defending the push for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina—as a deterrent against aggression—was exactly the same as the German logic three months earlier. 223. On 23 January, a group of thirty senators sponsored a resolution calling for the immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For the resolution and the debate, which was highly critical of the State Department and the White House, see US Senate, “Senate Resolution 246—Relative to Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia,” Congressional Record, vol. 138, 23 January 1992, S292. 224. For this and other maps from the BiH war, see Mladen Klemencˇic´, Territorial Proposals for the Settlement of the War in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Durham, UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1994), 38. 225. B. G. Ramcharan, ed. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 24–27. 226. Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006. Mahmutc´ehajic´ was present at this meeting. 227. Lord Carrington, BL-DY interview transcript, 4 January 1995, 3/11, 17. 228. For Cutileiro’s view, see Esad Hecimovic, “Back to the Future,” Bosnia Report, no. 23–25, June–October 2001. Lord Carrington expressed the same view in his interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 229. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:135. 230. Attila Hoare, “The Croatian Project to Partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990–1994,” East European Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1 (1997): 130; Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 92; “Zamijeniti delegaciju HDZ,” Oslobod‒enje, 27 March 1992, 2. 231. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 130. 232. “Bosnia Close to War as EC Plan Falters,” Independent, 28 March 1992, 15.

Notes to Pages 295–298 233. According to some accounts, Ambassador Zimmermann told Izetbegovic´ to renege on the deal. For Zimmermann’s and Izetbegovic´’s denials of such an interpretation of events, which had been popularized by a 1993 New York Times article, see Hecimovic, “Back to the Future.” Lord Carrington claims Cutileiro saw a telegram from the US State Department telling Izetbegovic´ he should not accept because the deal implied “recognition of territorial gain by force.” Lord Carrington, interview with the author, 18 May 2005. 234. CIA, “National Intelligence Daily,” 19 March 1992, FOIA F-1992–01432, 7. 235. Cutileiro met with the three sides once again on 30 and 31 March in Brussels, but their different interpretations of the agreement meant that little progress could be made. Further meetings were also scheduled for 10 and 29 April and during May, but in light of the aggression on BiH, they lost all meaning. Begic´, Bosna i Hercegovina, 92–93. 236. V. Mrkic´, “Ko c´e zaustaviti rat?” Oslobod‒enje, 26 March 1992, 3; “Smrt, razaranja, pljacˇke,” Oslobod‒enje, 28 March 1992, 1. 237. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:135. 238. For the formation of the “Serb MUP” in BiH, see Šefko Hodžic´, “Prvoaprilska zbilja,” Oslobod‒enje, 1 April 1992, 1, 5. 239. Tim Judah and Dessa Trevisan, “Serb Assaults Push Bosnia to Edge of War,” Times, 4 April 1992. For the best coverage of the events during these days, consult the Sarajevo daily Oslobod‒enje. 240. The JNA and the Bosnian Serb leaders apparently expected the war to last no longer than several weeks. Norman Cigar, “Serb War Effort and Termination of the War,” in Magaš and Žanic´, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995, 216–217. 241. J. Gow, “One Year of War,” 9. 242. A. Šarac, “Mobilisati TO, miliciju i civilnu zaštitu,” Oslobod‒enje, 5 April 1992, 1. 243. Divjak, “First Phase, 1992–1993,” 158. 244. Ibid., 157. 245. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:152–154; Tom Gjelten, Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper under Siege (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 19–24. 246. Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, 521. Under Greek pressure, the decision on Macedonia was once again postponed. 247. The United States decided to remove its sanctions on Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, and Macedonia but kept them for Serbia and Montenegro. Ibid., 522. 248. Radovan Karadžic´, BL-DY interview transcript, 3. 249. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds, 1:137–139. A series of intercepted communications confirm the involvement of the forces of the MUP of Serbia. Josip Glaurdic, “Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Miloševic´ Telephone Intercepts, 1991–1992,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 23, no. 1 (2009): 96–97. 250. For a detailed account of the crimes committed around Zvornik, see Hannes Tretter et al., “ ‘Ethnic Cleansing Operations’ in the Northeast-Bosnian City of Zvornik from April through June 1992,” Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights Report. For Vojislav Šešelj’s admission that Slobodan Miloševic´ personally asked him to send his volunteer units to eastern Bosnia in the spring of 1992 and that the MUP of Serbia

401 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

402 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 298–301 organized and ran the whole operation, see Vojislav Šešelj, BL-DY interview transcript, March 1995, 3/69, 23–27. 251. For a detailed account of the crimes committed in a series of locations throughout Bosnian Krajina and elsewhere in BiH during that spring, see Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina—A Helsinki Watch Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). 252. For Karadžic´’s 15 April 1992 explanation of why Sarajevo was shelled and besieged, see Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, 290–291. 253. Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 264. 254. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 196–200. 255. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 316; Power, “Problem from Hell,” 269–274. 256. “Stop the Butcher of the Balkans,” New York Times, 15 April 1992, A26; “Bosnia Needs Help—Now,” Guardian, 13 April 1992, 20; “The New Pariah,” Times, 23 April 1992. 257. The Helsinki Watch in its August 1992 report on the war crimes committed in BosniaHerzegovina during that spring called on “the Security Council of the United Nations to exercise its authority under the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to intervene in Bosnia-Hercegovina to prevent and suppress genocide.” Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in BosniaHercegovina, 1. 258. Chuck Sudetic, “Bosnia Asking U.N. for Peace Forces,” New York Times, 28 March 1992, 4; Marcus Tanner, “Bosnia Appeals to UN as Dozens Die in Clashes,” Independent, 4 April 1992, 13; Caplan, Europe and the Recognition, 132. 259. The UN administrators had the backing of the United States and Cyrus Vance, who shared their belief that the events in former Yugoslavia were “a European affair.” Vance even tried to persuade the British and the French to send WEU instead of UN forces to BiH. “Perm Three Recommend UN Emissary to Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 10 April 1992, and “Vance Tells Perm 3,” 14 April 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia April 1992 [4 of 5], CF01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 260. Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 31; Jovic´, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 449–450; Goulding, Peacemonger, 310–313. 261. Alija Izetbegovic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/32, 3–4. Confirmed by Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, interview with the author, 27 April 2006. Mahmutc´ehajic´ was present during this exchange. 262. Quoted in Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4. 263. Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 20, 30; Patrice Canivez, “France’s Yugoslav Policy: Contribution to a Collective Failure,” in International Perspectives on the Balkans, ed. Jacques Rupnik (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2003), 124. 264. Perceptively noted in Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, 321. The arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina was simply extended from the arms embargo on Yugoslavia in

Notes to Pages 302–306 clear contravention of BiH’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. For a useful discussion of the legality of the arms embargo, see Marc Weller, “Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 56, nos. 1–2 (1996): 87–89. 265. For the story of the US intelligence satellite picking up images of the mass killing of about three thousand mostly Muslim men from the Brcˇko region in May 1992, see Charles Lane and Tom Shanker, “Bosnia: What the CIA Didn’t Tell Us,” New York Review of Books, vol. 43, no. 8 (1996): 10–15. And for an account of an early summer 1992 meeting between the NSA and CIA analysts and the one sole State Department official who bothered to come and listen to what they had to say, see Ed Vulliamy, “Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement,” International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1 (1998): 79. 266. US Senate, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Congressional Record, vol. 138, 13 May 1992, S6545. 267. Haris Silajdžic´, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994–July 1995, 3/70, 11.

chapter 10. conclusions 1. Brendan Simms, “Bosnia: The Lessons of History?” in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrovic´ (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 69–72. Disraeli was motivated by the desire to prop up crumbling Ottoman influence in the Balkans in the face of Russia’s advances. 2. Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding ‘Vietnam’ and Blundering into ‘Abyssinia,’ ” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 8, no. 1 (1994): 191–193. 3. Ibid., 190–191; Simms, “Bosnia: The Lessons of History?,” 73. 4. Simms, “Bosnia: The Lessons of History?,” 74–76; James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 83. 5. Quoted in Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 50. 6. Lawrence Freedman, “Why the West Failed,” Foreign Policy, no. 97 (1994–1995): 54. 7. Joseph S. Nye, “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (1992): 84. 8. For the contemporaneous discussion of the dangers of the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world for Europe, see Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s Security: A Great Confusion,” International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1 (1991): 131–132. 9. Ronald Tiersky, “France in the New Europe,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (1992): 131. 10. William Wallace, “British Foreign Policy after the Cold War,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992): 424. 11. Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s,” International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992): 411.

403 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

404 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Notes to Pages 306–309 12. According to Yugoslavia’s last secretary for foreign affairs, Budimir Loncˇar, Germany was the most knowledgeable and the most committed international actor throughout the Yugoslav crisis. Its support for Yugoslavia’s peaceful transition to democracy, which would be coupled by the maintenance of unity, was unparalleled. Budimir Loncˇar, interview with the author, 12 May 2006. 13. For a useful discussion of the interaction between principled ideas and material interests in foreign policy, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 16–17. 14. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have argued that “Germany had become reflexively institutionalist: its institutional ties were viewed as intrinsic to the Germans’ views of themselves.” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe,” in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 10. 15. Germany was not only Yugoslavia’s principal creditor and trading partner, but was also the country that was bound to bear the largest brunt of any refugee outflow from Yugoslavia due to its sizeable immigrant population from the region. 16. For a useful discussion, see Wolfgang Krieger, “Toward a Gaullist Germany? Some Lessons from the Yugoslav Crisis,” World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (1994): 26–38. For historical musings of the most important figures in British and French policy making regarding Yugoslavia—Douglas Hurd and François Mitterrand—see Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 447–449; Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heineman, 1994), xii–xiii; and Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 153–154. 17. For a comparison among the inputs of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in Europe’s diplomatic effort in the Balkans which convincingly demonstrates that “In reality, Bonn has been a team player, while London and Paris obstructed the peace process,” see Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, “German Foreign Policy toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991–1999,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 48, no. 1 (2001): 48–64. 18. Former British foreign policy makers have openly admitted as much. Percy Cradock suggests that “British policy over Yugoslavia was piecemeal, tentative, unheroic, perhaps inglorious, but it was realistic.” Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: J. Murray, 1997), 190. For a similar argument, see Douglas Hurd, The Search for Peace: A Century of Peace Diplomacy (London: Little, Brown, 1997), 98. For critiques of British policy centered on the same argument, see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 6–12, and Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 174–182. 19. As quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 12. 20. Charles William Maynes, “America without the Cold War,” Foreign Policy, no. 77 (1990): 5.

Notes to Page 309 21. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Coping With Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan,” in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 267. 22. Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, interview with the author, 7 June 2005. 23. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), 1.

405 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

This page intentionally left blank

Index

Adži´c, Blagoje, 145, 367n81 Ahrens, Geert, 260, 265, 274, 374n2, 383n112, 393n124, 394n132, 396n164 Almer, Gerhard, 160, 357n52, 358n61 Arkan (Željko Ražnatovi´c), 149, 205, 227, 296, 298, 353n2 arms embargo, 190, 223–224, 226, 244, 301, 304, 377nn41–42, 402n264 Austria, 162, 186, 223, 258, 269, 392n103 Auswärtiges Amt, 78, 124, 180, 188, 195, 220, 233, 257, 273, 346n20, 393n122 Babi´c, Milan, 132, 149, 194, 202, 239, 275–276, 282–283, 337n82, 338nn92–93, 360n76, 368n90 Badinter, Robert, 208, 260, 280–281 Badinter Commission, 208, 259–260, 268–270, 278–281, 293, 372n160, 381n95, 393n107, 395n154, 396n158 Baker, James, 41, 60, 67, 76, 111, 131, 158, 182, 225–226, 300, 389n50, 399n202; Belgrade visit of, 2, 148, 168–170, 174, 176, 361n94; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 169, 243–244, 247, 263, 293, 400n222; withdrawal from Yugoslavia, 2, 169–170, 181–182 Baltic republics: lessons for Miloševi´c regime, 91, 131–132; recognition of

independence, 205–206, 372n145; Soviet interventions in, 91, 131, 147, 335n63; Western policies toward, 91, 131–132, 135, 181, 225, 305, 357n52, 360n79 Belgium, 220, 231, 240, 257, 258, 373n163 Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr, 131, 353n119 Bilandži´c, Dušan, 152, 346n24, 355n20 Boban, Mate, 287–289, 290, 294, 398n190 Bosnia-Herzegovina: 1990 elections in, 102–106, 341n123; “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and, 32–33, 49–52, 324n9; CIA assessments of, 98, 295, 403n265; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 236, 278, 285, 290; division of, 103, 133, 152–153, 164, 287–288, 290, 292, 340n115, 354n8, 355nn19–20, 370n128, 398n189, 398n191; EC and, 289–297; Germany and, 257, 273, 281; JNA and, 164, 201, 236, 289, 335n60, 374n11, 378n56, 399n202, 401n240; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 48–49, 133, 151, 201, 237, 325n35; recognition of, 246, 257–258, 264–265, 268–269, 273, 278–282, 293, 297–298, 400n218; referendum on independence, 202, 289, 292–293; sovereignty of, 105–106, 236–237, 379n65; Tud‒man, Franjo and, 86, 101, 103, 151, 333n39,

407

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

408 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index Bosnia-Herzegovina (continued) 340n115, 370n128, 398n189; UN and, 277, 299, 395n151, 395n153, 402n259; US and, 401n233, 403n265; war in, 296–302, 401n250 Brezhnev Doctrine, 25, 58, 60 Brioni Accord, 190–193, 197–198 Bulatovi´c, Momir, 57, 115, 235, 239, 242, 327n49, 356n36, 373n170, 381n97 Bundestag: criticism of Western policy, 160–161, 180, 209, 358n56; pressure on Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 161, 168, 185–188, 365n53, 373n162; resolutions on Yugoslavia, 167, 174, 251 Bush, George H. W., 67, 98, 111, 247, 343n143; Congress (US) and, 245, 263; Eastern Europe and, 42, 58, 323n128; Gorbachev, Mikhail and, 41, 131, 158, 204; new world order, 4, 98–99, 112, 116, 147, 226, 305; Soviet Union and, 60, 91, 204, 371n138; support of Yugoslav unity, 100, 144–145; Tud‒man, Franjo and, 99–100, 136; Western Europe and, 331n10, 384n134; worldview of, 41, 78, 300 Bush administration, 41, 182, 243, 263, 302, 305; Congress (US) and, 112, 156, 157, 190, 225, 246, 390n68; Markovi´c, Ante and, 158–159; support of Yugoslav unity, 100, 158, 174, 190, 339n109; withdrawal from Yugoslavia, 4, 80, 169–170, 174, 181–182 Carrington, Peter Lord, 208–210, 217, 219, 230, 234–235, 239, 243–245, 249–257, 265, 274, 372n160, 379n68, 381n94, 386n1; Badinter Commission and, 259–260; BiH and, 265, 285, 289, 294–296, 300–301, 383n112, 395n149, 401n233; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 211, 234–235, 239, 242, 254, 265–266; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 265–267, 279, 391n94, 392n106, 395n147 Ceaus¸escu, Nicolae, 46, 60, 138 CFSP, 261–262, 370n118

Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), 161, 272, 273, 365n60 Chrobog, Jürgen, 262, 390n62 CIA: assessments of BiH, 98, 295, 403n265; assessments of Croatia, 97–98, 387n22; assessments of JNA, 35, 97, 114, 127–129, 135, 177, 191, 318n59, 319n70; assessments of Kosovo, 23, 98, 110, 316n41, 322n124; assessments of Miloševi´c, Slobodan, 24, 32–34, 114, 117, 192; assessments of Serbia, 98, 110, 114, 344n152; assessments of Soviet Union, 110, 157–158, 356n41, 357n42; assessments of Yugoslavia, 24, 76, 98, 117, 350n64; NIE “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 109–111, 122, 342n137, 342n141, 343n144; White House and, 24, 111, 157 Conference on Yugoslavia, 216, 230, 234–235, 239–245, 253, 272, 274, 380n72, 396n164; BiH and, 210, 236, 278, 285, 290; Croatia and, 211, 230–232, 235, 278; formation of, 207–211, 219, 373n165, 373n170; Kosovo and, 235, 242, 381n94, 384n129; Krajina and, 239, 254, 265, 380n72, 381n90; Macedonia and, 210, 265; Montenegro and, 235, 239–242, 245, 260; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 264–268; Serbia and, 211, 230–235, 239–242, 245, 260, 278; Slovenia and, 210, 235; suspension of, 245–251, 386n1; two-month deadline, 232–233, 240, 247, 251, 268, 272, 380n79; Vojvodina and, 242, 384n129 Congress (US): confirmation hearing of Eagleburger, Lawrence, 40, 323n126; criticism of US policy, 189, 225, 245, 246, 263, 302, 377n46, 390n68; Nickles Amendment, 157–158, 357n46; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 189, 225, 246, 293, 385n148, 400n223; resolutions on Yugoslavia, 40, 109, 156–159, 189, 225, 245; State Department and, 95, 111, 156–158, 175, 190, 226, 244, 246, 352n112, 385n145

Index C´osi´c, Dobrica, 17, 52–53, 99, 103, 113, 165, 201, 229, 248, 325n23, 334n53, 340n118, 370n126, 386n157 Counterintelligence Service of the JNA (KOS), 129, 132, 149, 337n82, 349n59 Cradock, Percy, 75, 170, 404n18 Croatia: 1990 elections in, 81–89, 333n36, 334nn45–46; “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and, 49–51, 324n9; arming of, 129–134, 195; CIA assessments of, 97–98, 387; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 211, 230–232, 235, 278; constitution of, 52, 95, 125–126, 258, 279–280, 325n24, 337n88, 346n26, 396n164; declaration of independence, 170–171, 174–175, 190, 231; Germany and, 251, 257; JNA and, 132–134, 348n39, 359n69, 374n10, 382n102; Krajina and, 150, 155, 195, 368n96, 396n164; recognition of, 169–170, 219, 225, 230, 241, 243, 246, 254, 257–258, 262–273, 278–282, 396nn158– 159; Slovenia and, 126, 132–133, 177, 192; UN and, 274–276, 282–285; US and, 136, 348n40; war in, 148, 154–155, 193–200, 205–209, 216–219, 226–231, 235–236, 241, 250–251, 254–256, 259, 375nn14–18, 382n102 CSCE, 161, 169, 188, 192, 199, 203, 258, 350n64; Berlin meeting of, 167–168, 361n89, 365n46, 365n57; CSO, 187, 365nn57–58, 380n78; Genscher, Hans-Dietrich and, 167–168, 185–187, 361n89; monitoring mission, 187, 190, 367n75; Paris Charter, 117, 365n46 Cutileiro, José, 289–296, 401n233, 401n235 D’Amato, Alfonse, 109, 156, 189, 245, 342n135 Dedakovi´c-Jastreb, Mile, 255, 378n54 Delors, Jacques, 25, 69, 145, 148, 162, 165–166, 169, 260–261, 360nn77–79 De Michelis, Gianni, 339n102; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 219, 235, 240; discouragement of Slovenia and

Croatia, 127, 145, 162, 166, 346n24, 353n116, 360n83; EC troika, 183–184; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 219, 268; support of Yugoslav unity, 59, 123–126 Democratic Party, Serbia (DS), 112, 114, 343n147 Demos, 82–85, 89, 332n26, 333n35, 335n55 Denmark, 162, 181, 220, 240, 258, 357n52, 373n163 Dizdarevi´c, Raif, 28, 33, 72, 314n19, 318n54, 319n77, 320n88, 321n93, 322n116, 328n68 Dole, Robert, 109, 136, 156, 357n46 Draškovi´c, Vuk, 52, 112–114, 137–141, 341n127, 343n146 Drnovšek, Janez, 59, 83, 191, 349n56, 351n88, 367n78 Dubrovnik, 378; in Serbian plans, 92, 228–229, 251, 378n60, 379n61, 386n5; siege of, 228, 241, 250, 253, 259, 275, 288, 382n102; Western responses to, 240–241, 244, 247–251, 268, 301, 383n118, 385n153 Dumas, Roland, 188, 213, 381n95; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 207, 233, 240; Germany and, 180, 267, 394n130; military intervention in Yugoslavia and, 197, 376n30; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 231, 260, 267, 390n61; support of Yugoslav unity, 174, 363n27 Durakovi´c, Nijaz, 50, 106 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 58, 182, 243–246, 298, 313n5, 316n45; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 23–24, 40–41, 79, 111, 246, 317n46, 323n126, 331n19; new world order, 97–98; support of Yugoslav unity, 78–81; withdrawal from Yugoslavia, 42, 80, 246 EC: BiH and, 289–297; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 206, 208–209; divisions over Yugoslavia, 219–222, 230–233, 240, 247, 251, 267–268, 278; Gulf War and, 130, 339n102; JNA and, 136, 206, 208, 220, 228, 232, 240, 244, 258, 280, 380n78, 383n118; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and,

409 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

410 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index EC (continued) 198–200, 206, 208, 213, 216, 220, 222, 240, 242, 245, 252, 272, 297; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 232–233, 240, 245, 249, 256, 262, 264–270, 276–282, 297, 400n218; relations with Yugoslavia, 19–20, 25; statements on Yugoslavia, 190, 206, 239–245, 353n114, 360n81, 380n78, 383n118; support of Yugoslav unity, 59, 97, 123, 136–137, 145, 162, 165–166, 170, 174, 183–184, 358n55; troika, 144–146, 183–184, 190, 195, 199, 208, 364n42; US and, 2, 182, 243 EC Commission, 59, 136, 170, 181, 199, 240, 260, 317n51, 384n141 EC Council, 77, 145, 162, 179, 181–183, 190, 197–198, 207, 254, 262–263, 266–267, 270, 278 EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM), 190, 198–199, 205–210, 219–222, 228, 236, 258–259, 280, 367n75, 369n116, 377n46, 382n104, 389n44 EFTA, 19, 44 Eiff, Hans-Jörg, 257, 273, 350n65, 365n48 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe, 268, 357n52 European Parliament, 144, 225, 380n76 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 199, 206–207, 221–222, 267, 370n118 Eyskens, Mark, 175, 267–268, 392n96 Fietelaars, Jan, 347n30, 350n65 Filipovi´c, Muhamed, 201–202, 371n132 Foreign Office (UK), 47, 73, 124, 129, 162, 174, 188, 196, 223, 376n32 France: Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 215, 233; Eastern Europe and, 179–180, 213, 306; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 215, 253, 369n104; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 222, 233, 254, 258, 262, 266–267, 280, 308, 391n85, 396n162; relations with Germany, 77, 180, 207, 213, 222, 261, 262, 267, 306–307, 331n12; Serbia and, 196, 252, 368n104; support of Yugoslav unity, 136, 162, 174,

181, 365n58; UN and, 223, 252–253, 266–267; WEU and, 130, 197, 216, 220, 221, 307, 375n23 G-7, 195, 371n137 Gagro, Božidar, 350n73, 368n99 Galvin, John, 169, 247 Gani´c, Ejup, 289, 378n56 Gansel, Norbert, 161, 185, 358n57 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 25, 77, 268, 283, 314n20, 357n52, 372n147, 384n132, 386n157; BiH and, 273, 281, 293; Bundestag and, 161, 185, 188, 365n53, 373n162; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 207, 219, 233, 240, 254, 381n86, 388n34; CSCE and, 168, 185–187, 361n89; Izetbegovi´c, Alija and, 257, 264, 273, 388n32; pressure on Serbia, 242–243, 257; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 219, 243, 257, 263, 266–270, 390n62, 391n85, 391n87, 393n107; support of Yugoslav unity, 159–160, 167–168, 180, 358n61; van den Broek, Hans and, 186–187, 219–220 Germany: BiH and, 257, 273, 281; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 207, 209–210, 233, 243, 247, 251, 254; criticisms of, 5–6, 175, 188, 270–274, 301, 307, 312n9, 362n10, 393nn121–122, 394n130; Croatia and, 251, 257, 389n45; early warnings on Yugoslavia, 124, 143, 159–161; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 222, 233, 247, 251, 256–258, 262–263, 266–273, 276, 393n124; relations with France, 207, 222, 261, 262, 267; relations with the Netherlands, 219–220; relations with Yugoslavia, 159, 357n48, 404n12, 404n15; reunification of, 77–78, 97, 160, 331n12; roots of policy toward Yugoslavia, 188, 213, 272–273, 306–307; support of Yugoslav unity, 59, 124, 136, 159–160, 167–168, 180, 358n61; Treaty of Maastricht and, 261, 392n99; UN and,

Index 161, 223, 225, 263–267; WEU and, 130, 197, 220–221 Gligorov, Kiro, 115, 166, 210, 264 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 40, 58, 67, 77–78, 90, 196, 234, 240, 280, 305–306, 389n50; Baltic republics and, 91, 131, 135, 335n63; Bush, George H. W. and, 41, 131, 158, 204; coup against, 140, 157, 203–206; Yugoslavia and, 25–26, 62, 203, 381n87 Gore, Al, 245, 246, 302, 377n46, 385n148 Goulding, Marrack, 253, 265, 274, 282–283, 299, 390n74 Gracˇanin, Petar, 63, 338n94 Greater Serbia, 86, 88–89, 92–93, 99, 112, 146, 149, 239, 278, 295, 301, 340n118, 343n147, 355n23, 394n138; BiH and, 106, 165, 194, 229, 236, 238, 257, 285, 295; Karadži´c, Radovan and, 104, 152, 248; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 76, 117, 159, 164, 166, 172, 211–212, 218; Western perceptions of, 159, 226, 240, 242, 246 Greece, 241, 244, 257, 278, 281, 401n246 Gulf War, 4, 97–98, 102, 130, 147 Hall, Peter, 47, 73, 75, 119, 124, 323n3, 349n61, 397n168 Hannay, David, 226, 266, 377n42, 377n47 Havel, Václav, 46, 179 HDZ (BiH): 1990 elections and, 102–106, 340n116; BiH sovereignty and, 236–237, 289; Cutileiro negotiations and, 290–295, 301; division of BiH and, 287–289 HDZ (Croatia): 1990 elections and, 85–88, 326n39, 333n36, 334n46; BiH and, 103, 288, 336n76; Croatian Serbs and, 89–94, 154, 334n54, 336n78; formation of, 82, 332; JNA and, 89, 195, 335n55 Hogg, Douglas, 136–137, 253–254, 301, 392n94 Howe, Geoffrey, 24, 124 Höynck, Wilhelm, 168, 187, 361n89, 365n53, 365n58

Hungary, 59, 68, 73, 129, 162, 223, 269 Hurd, Douglas, 77, 222, 233, 300–301, 304, 366n66, 381n95, 383n122; military intervention in Yugoslavia and, 221, 224, 241, 376n30; quasi-historicism of, 176, 362n10; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 231, 240, 258, 267–268, 281, 372n145, 391n94, 393n107; support of Yugoslav unity, 162, 176, 181; WEU and, 221–223 Hussein, Saddam, 2, 6, 97, 98, 111, 130, 145, 226 Hutchings, Robert, 67–68, 111, 168–170, 343n144, 344n156, 345n13, 347n31 IMF, 14, 20, 67–68, 157, 313n5 Italy, 59, 77, 130, 220, 240, 257, 258, 269, 357n48, 373n163 Izetbegovi´c, Alija, 104, 151, 164, 166, 201, 277, 287, 297, 299, 370n129; BiH referendum and, 202, 289; BiH sovereignty and, 106, 152, 237, 238, 341n126; Bonn visit of, 257, 388n32; Carrington, Peter Lord and, 294, 295, 300, 395n149; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 248, 373n170; Cutileiro negotiations and, 290–295, 401n233; JNA and, 289, 371n133, 380n74; Karadži´c, Radovan and, 152, 202, 237–238, 382n108; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 164, 202, 236; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 257, 264, 273; war in Croatia and, 231, 236, 380n74 Janša, Janez, 28, 318n67, 335n61 Jashari, Kaqusha, 36–37, 321n105 JNA: 1990 elections and, 81, 84, 87, 89, 113, 332n34, 335n55; “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and, 32–33; arming of BiH Serbs, 165, 193–194, 201, 238, 286, 382n109; BiH and, 164, 201, 236, 289, 335n60, 374n11, 378n56, 399n202; CIA assessments of, 35, 97, 114, 127–129, 135, 177, 191, 318n59, 319n70; coup threats of,

411 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

412 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index JNA (continued) 19, 27–29, 56–57, 95, 128–134, 139–143, 318n58, 348n50, 349nn58–59; Croatia and, 126, 132, 133, 134, 348n39, 359n70; disarmament of Slovenia and Croatia, 90–91, 131, 335n61; EC and, 136, 206, 208, 220, 228, 232, 240, 244, 258, 280, 380n78, 383n118; Izetbegovi´c, Alija and, 289, 371n133, 380n74; Kosovo and, 15, 26, 38, 83–84, 107; Krajina and, 96, 154, 191, 193, 205, 283–284, 338n94, 394n137; Markovi´c, Ante and, 135, 177–178; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 26, 29, 35, 56–57, 62, 89–90, 119, 128, 134–135, 139, 142, 145, 178, 191, 193, 219, 286, 368n90, 375n18; restructuring of, 26, 90, 318nn54–55; Serbianization of, 26, 191, 367n82, 368n88; Slovenia and, 26–28, 56–57, 132–133, 318n64, 318n67, 326n42; Soviet Union and, 140, 205; Tud‒man, Franjo and, 85, 177, 192, 217, 288; UK and, 119, 129, 136, 162, 176, 181, 188–189, 359n65; UN and, 252, 274, 277, 299; US and, 136, 157–158, 168–170, 179, 189, 195, 208, 226, 352n100, 352n112; war in BiH and, 296–298, 401n240; war in Croatia and, 150–155, 164, 192–195, 198, 200, 205–209, 212, 216–219, 224, 227–228, 231, 235–236, 241, 249–256, 259, 276, 359n69, 374n10, 375n14, 382n102, 382n104; war in Slovenia and, 172–173, 177–178, 183–186, 190–191, 366n71, 367n81; Western perceptions of, 137, 144, 156, 178, 196, 304; Western signals to, 29, 60, 95, 129, 191–192, 308, 337n87 Johnson, Ralph, 298–299, 385n145 Johnston, Russell, 162, 188, 196, 359n65, 366n62 Jovanovi´c, Vladislav, 207, 222, 264, 265, 380n72, 381n93 Jovi´c, Borisav, 117, 150, 208, 252, 286, 334n52, 357n50, 375n14; 14th SKJ Congress and, 57, 71; Belgrade protests and, 138–139; border changes and, 92,

93, 99, 165, 193, 229, 363n20, 368n88; disarmament of Slovenia and Croatia and, 89–90; JNA coup attempts and, 134, 139–143, 351n86; Kosovo and, 37, 39, 83, 107; Markovi´c, Ante and, 62–65, 126; Mesi´c, Stipe and, 155, 184, 356n36; preparations for war and, 145, 191, 193, 338n94; Slovenia and, 57, 83, 88, 184, 191, 342n131; US and, 79, 95, 97, 100, 136, 157, 246, 345n13 Kadijevi´c, Veljko, 145, 265, 276, 317n54; JNA coup attempts and, 139–143, 352n100; Markovi´c, Ante and, 93, 133, 177, 217, 218, 348n55; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 62–63, 93, 113, 178, 193, 327n48, 328n68, 328n74, 375n18; preparations for war and, 90, 95, 129; Slovenia and, 29, 57, 84, 92, 349n56; war in Croatia and, 154, 192, 217, 228, 230–233, 250, 256, 280, 375n14; Yazov, Dmitry and, 140, 205, 351n89 Karadži´c, Radovan, 151, 164, 202, 229, 237, 238, 265, 292, 298, 386n157, 386n5; arming of BiH Serbs and, 193–194, 201; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 248, 253; creation of Serb structures in BiH and, 238, 248, 286, 398n187; Cutileiro negotiations and, 290–294; Greater Serbia and, 104, 152, 248; Izetbegovi´c, Alija and, 152, 202, 237–238, 382n108; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 152, 165, 194, 199–202, 238, 282, 360n76; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 264, 282, 397n169; war in Croatia and, 194, 200, 216, 229, 236, 251, 275, 283, 375n15, 375n18 Kljui´c, Stjepan, 103, 287, 288–289, 399n198 Kohl, Helmut, 59, 78, 91, 136, 161, 200; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 181, 243, 254, 257, 267, 272–273, 373n162, 393n107; reunification of Germany and, 46, 67, 77, 330n7 Koljevi´c, Nikola, 288, 292

Index Kosovo, 313n8, 384n130; Albanian protests of 1981, 14–15, 26, 313n6; Albanian protests of 1989, 37–39, 322n112, 322n121; autonomy of, 18–20, 30–32, 36–37, 107–108; CIA assessments of, 23, 98, 110, 316n41, 322n124; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 235, 242, 381n94, 384n129; JNA and, 15, 26, 38, 83–84, 107; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 21, 34–38, 42–43, 71, 83, 107–108, 114, 116, 141, 341n127; Slovenia and, 38, 55, 83, 322n113; US and, 40–42, 80, 95, 100, 109–112, 156–157, 246; Western perceptions of, 24, 121, 144, 161, 167, 345n5; Yugoslav Communists and, 34, 37 Kraigher, Sergej, 13, 15 Krajina, 112, 122, 129, 151, 196, 336n69, 336n78, 337n80, 337n88, 338n89, 346n26, 355n24; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 239, 254, 265, 380n72, 381n90; Croatia and, 93–96, 99, 150, 155, 195, 368n96; JNA and, 96, 154, 191, 193, 205, 283–284, 338n94, 394n137; “log revolution,” 96–97, 339n96; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 92, 118, 132, 134, 148–154, 211, 275–276, 282–283, 337n82, 338n93, 370n121; referendums, 95–96, 338n90, 339n97, 356n37; Serbia’s support for, 94, 149, 150, 154, 193, 337n82, 338n94, 394n138, 395n146; UNPROFOR plan and, 252, 275–277, 282–285, 394n137; war in Croatia and, 153, 194, 200, 205, 233, 236 Kucˇan, Milan, 55–56, 70, 88, 126, 155, 166, 168, 322n113, 349n56; 1990 elections and, 82–84; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 235; JNA and, 27–28; Markovi´c, Ante and, 65, 170 League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ), 128–129, 349n58 League of Communists of BiH, 50, 72, 101–106, 237, 289, 291, 325n25, 330n105, 339n112

League of Communists of Croatia, 50, 53, 72, 80–88, 106, 324n14, 334n46, 336n78, 337n79 League of Communists of Serbia, 16–22, 36, 43, 47, 53, 112, 314n14, 316n36, 319n78, 325n25, 329n97, 330n102 League of Communists of Slovenia, 27, 38, 55, 65, 80–85, 333n35 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 11, 15–17, 36, 53–56, 69, 75, 318n58, 319n76, 326n38, 354n7; 14th Congress of, 47, 57, 70–73, 81, 105, 330n102 League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia— Liberal Party (ZSMS-LS), 84–85, 333n35 Lennox-Boyd, Mark, 176, 188, 362n6, 366n64 Loncˇar, Budimir, 76, 159, 166–167, 360n77, 404n12 Macedonia, 373n170; 1990 elections in, 115; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 265; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 54, 135, 281, 321n101, 324n6, 326n37; recognition of, 246, 258, 264–269, 278–281, 293, 401n246 Mahmut´cehaji´c, Rusmir, 380n74, 400n226, 402n261 Major, John, 162, 183, 196, 251, 302, 374n1 Maksi´c, Milivoje, 172, 362n107 Mamula, Branko, 26–29, 128–129, 142, 318n54, 318nn57–58, 318n64, 347n37 Markovi´c, Ante, 109, 136, 155, 167, 172, 183, 187, 203, 237, 344n3; 14th SKJ Congress and, 70, 72; 1990 elections and, 102, 115, 340n113; economic reforms of, 61–66, 70, 87, 96, 102, 113, 119–121, 127, 345n8; election for prime minister, 61–63, 328n66; JNA and, 135, 177–178; Kadijevi´c, Veljko and, 93, 133, 177, 217–218, 348n55; Kucˇan, Milan and, 65, 170; lack of Western support for, 66–69, 74, 80, 121–122, 166, 170, 361n102;

413 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

414 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index Markovi´c, Ante, (continued) Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 62–69, 121, 127, 150–151, 328n70, 347n27, 348n55; Slovenia and, 163, 169–170, 177, 361n102; Tud‒man, Franjo and, 86, 150–151, 231; US and, 67–68, 80, 100, 144, 158–159, 168–170, 179, 329n94; war in BiH and, 193–194, 368n91, 398n184; war in Slovenia and, 173, 177–178, 191–192 Markovi´c, Mihajlo, 205, 211, 233, 275 Markovi´c, Mirjana, 21, 128, 315n33 Marti´c, Milan, 94, 96, 99, 153–154, 164, 194, 205, 284, 338n94 Matutes, Abel, 59, 145, 240 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 46, 68 Melady, Thomas Patrick, 78, 388n37 Mesi´c, Stipe, 191, 207, 218, 230–231, 368n98; Croatian Serbs and, 96, 338n93; division of BiH and, 151–152, 354n8, 355n19, 398n191; election for president of SFRJ presidency, 155, 163, 183–185, 356n36; UN and, 252, 386n10 Mikuli´c, Branko, 19–20, 61, 68, 328n66 Miloševi´c, Slobodan: 14th SKJ Congress and, 70–72; 1990 elections and, 81, 107, 112–114, 329n97, 343n150; “antibureaucratic revolution” and, 22, 31–33, 46, 316n35, 319n78, 320n80; arming of BiH Serbs and, 165, 193–194, 201, 294; Belgrade protests and, 137–141, 148, 351n93, 352n104; border changes and, 89, 92–93, 95, 135–137, 141–142, 147, 211, 229, 350n76, 352n104, 364n44, 368n88, 370n121; BiH and, 48–49, 53–54, 101, 133, 151, 201, 237–238, 277, 282, 289, 298, 325n35; CIA assessments of, 24, 32–34, 114, 117, 192; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 208, 211, 230–235, 239, 242, 248, 250, 253–254, 259–260, 278, 372n156, 373n170, 381nn93–97; Congress (US) and, 109, 112, 157–158, 189, 377n46; constitutional changes in Serbia and, 31–32, 36, 108, 319n77, 341n128; C´osi´c, Dobrica and, 52,

165, 201; Croatia and, 48–54, 85, 334n52; Croatian Serbs and, 89, 92–96, 149, 344n151, 360n76; division of BiH and, 150–153, 164, 354n8, 355n19; Eagleburger, Lawrence and, 23–24, 40–41, 79, 111, 246, 317n46, 323n126, 331n19; EC and, 198–200, 206, 208, 213, 216, 220, 222, 240, 242, 245, 252, 272, 297; France and, 215, 253, 369n104; Germany and, 186, 195, 242, 273, 307, 358n54; Greater Serbia and, 76, 117, 159, 164, 166, 172, 211–212, 218; Izetbegovi´c, Alija and, 164, 202, 236; JNA and, 26, 29, 35, 56–57, 62, 89, 90, 119, 128, 132–135, 139, 140–143, 145, 178, 191, 193, 219, 286, 368n90, 375n18; Kadijevi´c, Veljko and, 62–63, 93, 113, 178, 193, 327n48, 328n68, 328n74, 375n18; Karadži´c, Radovan and, 152, 165, 194, 199–202, 238, 282, 360n76; Kosovo and, 21, 34–39, 42–43, 71, 83, 107–108, 114, 116, 141, 341n127; Krajina and, 92, 118, 132, 134, 148–154, 211, 275–276, 282–283, 337n82, 338n93, 370n121, 395n146; Macedonia and, 54, 135, 281, 321n101, 324n6, 326n37; Markovi´c, Ante and, 62–69, 121, 127, 150–151, 328n70, 347n27, 348n55; perceptions of Western policy, 76, 101, 121, 166, 200; recentralization of Yugoslavia and, 12, 47–48, 54, 57, 59, 61, 73, 122; SANU and, 18, 21, 30, 53, 334n53; SDS (BiH) and, 113, 165; Serbian media and, 21–22, 113, 138, 315n33, 322n115; Serbian nationalism and, 11, 21–22, 35; Slovenia and, 55–58, 83, 88, 108, 133, 135, 163, 201, 349n56, 370n126; Stamboli´c, Ivan and, 20–23, 315n31; telephone intercepts of, 8, 164–165, 193–194, 199–202, 216, 229, 238, 273, 282, 359n72, 364n44, 382n110; Tud‒man, Franjo and, 87–88, 150–155, 211, 354n9, 381n87; UK and, 215, 222, 241, 253, 307, 350n76; UN and, 248, 252, 253, 275–277, 282–283; US and, 34–35, 116, 159, 168–170, 226, 298–299, 361n94; Vance, Cyrus and, 244,

Index 255, 265–266, 276–277, 390n74, 395n152; war in Croatia and, 194–195, 200, 216–218, 229–233, 256, 368n92, 375nn14– 15, 387n25; war in Slovenia and, 178, 191, 363n20; Western perceptions of, 7, 9, 23–24, 39–40, 45, 48, 59–62, 66, 117, 135, 141, 143, 149, 196, 316n43, 328n67, 361n94; Yugoslav Communists and, 22–25, 32–39, 43–47, 50–51, 54, 56, 69–73, 101, 105, 320n86, 320n88, 326n36 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), Croatia, 93, 96, 154 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), Serbia, 154, 296, 298, 355n29, 401nn249–250 Mitevi´c, Dušan, 21, 72, 315n33, 322n115, 351n93 Mitterrand, François, 179, 208, 260, 301, 302, 372n156; Germany and, 77–78, 267, 271; quasi-historicism of, 77, 210, 222, 258, 362n10, 368n104, 387n16; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 390n61, 397n168; Soviet Union and, 58, 91, 371n140; support of border changes, 240, 253–254, 388n42; support of Yugoslav unity, 136, 181 Mladi´c, Ratko, 205, 394n137 Mladina, 27–29, 56–57, 60 Montenegro: 1990 elections in, 115; “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and, 33, 36, 56; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 235, 239–242, 245, 260; war in Croatia and, 216–218, 228, 251 Morina, Rahman, 37, 38, 322n116 NATO, 42; analyses of Yugoslavia, 19, 246, 314n19; intervention in Yugoslavia and, 169, 247, 375n23, 377n46, 379n68; Rome summit of, 243–247, 250, 252, 263–264, 272; Slovenia and, 29, 60; WEU and, 130, 182, 198, 220–221, 231, 307 Netherlands: Conference on Yugoslavia and, 209, 240; EC presidency of, 186, 231–232, 256; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 256, 258; relations with

Germany, 77, 219–221; WEU and, 220–221, 369nn114–115 Nooij, Albert, 95, 337n86 Okun, Herbert, 277, 382n100, 387n25 Opacˇi´c, Jovan, 51, 92 Pancˇevski, Milan, 39, 57, 71 Pani´c, Života, 142, 227, 276, 363n16 Parliament of the United Kingdom, 176, 188–189, 241, 253, 392n99 Pell, Claiborne, 189, 246, 385n148 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 225, 244, 253, 263–266, 276, 384n137, 386n10, 391n87 Peterle, Lojze, 84, 342n131 Poos, Jacques, 1–2, 97, 145, 183, 184, 364n45, 369n117 Racˇan, Ivica, 72, 88, 106, 330n104, 334n45 Raškovi´c, Jovan, 93, 96, 336n76, 336n78, 338n92, 344n151 Realpolitik/political realism, 7, 12, 29, 41–45, 60, 76, 100, 149, 171–173, 222, 249–250, 305, 308–309, 404n18 Romania, 46, 59, 60, 138, 365n58 Rudolf, Davorin, 126, 360n82 Rupel, Dimitrij, 137, 163, 367n79, 370n126 Samaras, Antonis, 241, 268, 293 Santer, Jacques, 145, 148, 162, 165–166, 169, 183 Scanlan, Jack, 23, 316n45, 317n46 Scowcroft, Brent, 41, 91, 100, 131–132, 170, 246, 366n72 SDA, 102–106, 201–202, 287, 289, 293 SDS (BiH), 113, 210, 251, 282–283, 340n118; 1990 elections and, 102–106; BiH Muslims and, 202, 236, 238; BiH sovereignty and, 151, 237, 379n65; Cutileiro negotiations and, 290–295, 301; division of BiH and, 287–289; preparations for war, 165, 229, 238, 286, 382n109; SAOs in BiH, 164, 229, 379n65; war in BiH and, 293, 297–298

415 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

416 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index SDS (Croatia), 93–96, 103, 113, 336n76, 336n78, 338n92–94, 379n61; 1990 elections and, 87, 334n46, 337n79; formation of SAO Krajina, 93, 95 Sell, Louis, 76, 316n39 Šeparovi´c, Zvonimir, 219, 257, 370n126 Serbia: 1990 elections in, 112–114, 127; “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and, 22, 31–33, 56, 319n79; appropriation of federal funds, 125–126; CIA assessments of, 98, 110, 114, 344n152; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 211, 230–235, 239–242, 245, 260, 278; constitution of, 15–16, 30–32, 37–39, 108, 319nn76–77, 341n128, 341n130; Slovenia and, 58, 70, 71, 108, 133, 163, 184, 191, 201, 342n131, 349n56, 363n20, 370n126; support for Krajina, 99, 149, 150, 154, 231, 337n82, 338n94, 394n138, 395n146 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), 17, 21, 30, 52–53, 239, 314n14, 315n22, 315n31, 334n53 Serb Renewal Movement (SPO), 112, 114, 137, 343n146 Šešelj, Vojislav, 227, 298, 355n29, 401n250 Silajdži´c, Haris, 257, 302, 382n106, 397n168, 399n202 Slovenia: 1990 elections in, 81–84, 89; “antibureaucratic revolution” and, 57–58, 327n52; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 235; constitution of, 28, 55–57, 84, 108, 326n42; Croatia and, 126, 132–133, 177, 192, 367n84; declaration of independence, 170–171, 174–175, 190, 231; JNA and, 27–28, 56–57, 132, 318n64, 318n67; Kosovo and, 38, 55, 83–84, 322n113; recognition of, 169–170, 219, 225, 243, 246, 254, 257–258, 262–273, 278, 281; Serbia and, 55–58, 70–71, 108, 133, 135, 163, 184, 191, 201, 342n131, 349n56, 363n20, 370n126; war in, 177–178, 183–186, 190–191, 366n71, 367n81 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 161, 185, 358n56

Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), 112–114, 141, 143, 204–205, 233, 275, 354n4 Sokolovi´c, Zoran, 89, 351n93 Šolevi´c, Miroslav, 21, 315n27, 324n9 Soviet Union, 73, 129, 252, 278; Baltic republics and, 90, 91, 131, 147, 335n63, 372n145; Bush, George H. W. and, 91, 204; CIA assessments of, 110, 157–158, 356n41, 357n42; dissolution of, 203–207, 259, 280; JNA and, 95, 140, 205; relations with US, 41, 60, 91, 100, 131–132, 157–158, 175, 196, 225, 305, 371n138; relations with Yugoslavia, 25–26, 328n73, 357n48; reunification of Germany and, 77, 160, 306, 331n12; support of Yugoslav unity, 187, 203, 353n115, 353n119, 365n58; Western comparisons to Yugoslavia, 7, 78, 126, 135–136, 156, 160, 175, 196, 206, 259, 305, 358n61, 389n50 Špegelj, Martin, 129, 134, 217, 318n55, 349n59, 349n62, 359n69, 367n84 Stamboli´c, Ivan, 20–23, 315n31, 315n34 Staniši´c, Jovica, 282, 337n82, 359n75, 397n169 State Department, 24, 41, 243; Congress (US) and, 40, 111–112, 156–159, 189–190, 225, 245–246, 263, 384n145, 400n223; criticism of Serbia, 208, 298; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 263, 266, 293; support of Yugoslav unity, 62, 79, 81, 97, 111, 123, 137, 144, 175, 182, 332n25, 350n75; war in BiH and, 299, 401n233, 403n265; withdrawal from Yugoslavia, 117, 169 State Security Service (SDB): of BiH, 193, 201; of Serbia, 39, 282, 319n78, 353n2; of Serbia in BiH, 53, 286, 359n75; of Serbia in Croatia, 48, 94, 96, 193–194, 337n82 Šuvar, Stipe, 32–39, 50, 316n37, 318n57, 322n111 Territorial Defense (TO): disarmed in Slovenia and Croatia, 90–92, 131, 335n60, 335n67; origins of, 90, 317n54;

Index war in BiH and, 194, 297; war in Croatia and, 205, 207, 216, 227–228, 235, 251; war in Slovenia and, 178, 190, 366n71 Tharoor, Shashi, 277, 395n153 Thatcher, Margaret, 58, 77, 78, 124, 304, 317n51, 331n11 Tito (Josip Broz), 11–18, 26, 49, 52, 86 Treaty of Maastricht, 2, 254, 259–263, 266–268, 272, 364n36, 370n118, 388n36, 392n99 Tud‒man, Franjo, 168, 280, 354n7, 360n82, 386n10; 1990 elections and, 82–87, 333n36, 335n55; BiH and, 86, 101–103, 151–153, 201, 287, 288, 333n39, 333n41; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 211, 235, 372n156, 386n1; Croatian Serbs and, 93, 96, 333n37, 336nn76–77, 338n92, 349n61; division of BiH and, 150–153, 164, 287–288, 340n115, 354n8, 355n19, 370n128, 398n189; JNA and, 85, 133–134, 177, 192, 217, 288, 349n62; Markovi´c, Ante and, 86, 150–151, 231; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 87–88, 150–155, 211, 354n9, 381n87; Slovenia and, 125–126, 177, 192, 367n84; UNPROFOR plan and, 275, 282–283, 397n173; US and, 91–92, 99–100, 136, 336n68, 390n66; war in Croatia and, 194–195, 200, 217–219, 230–233, 255–256, 356n30, 359n70 United Kingdom: Conference on Yugoslavia and, 209–210, 215, 233; JNA and, 95, 129, 136, 162, 176, 181, 188, 359n65; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 137, 215, 222, 241, 253, 307, 350n76; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 233, 253, 258–259, 266–268, 280–281, 308, 374n1, 396n162; relations with Germany, 77, 213, 306–307, 331n10, 331n12; relations with US, 306; relations with Yugoslavia, 317n51, 323n3, 357n48, 374n176; Serbia and, 196, 252; support of Yugoslav unity, 24, 75, 124, 162, 174, 181, 183; Treaty of Maastricht and, 261,

380n76, 392n99; UN and, 224, 252–253, 266–267; WEU and, 130, 197–198, 221–222, 307, 369n114 United Nations, 274, 304; arms embargo, 223–224; BiH and, 277, 299, 395n151, 395n153, 402n259; calls for intervention of, 132, 161, 223–224, 240, 252–254, 263, 299, 300, 385n148, 386n10, 395n151, 402n257; Croatia and, 275–276, 282–285; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 248, 252–253, 257, 275–277, 283; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 225, 266–268; Security Council, 223–227, 240, 243–246, 252–253, 263, 266–267, 276, 283, 285, 300, 376n37 United States: BiH and, 401n233, 403n265; Croatia and, 136, 348n40; EC and, 2, 182, 243; JNA and, 136, 157–158, 168–170, 179, 189, 195, 208, 226, 352n100, 352n112; Kosovo and, 40–42, 80, 95, 100, 109–112, 156–157, 246; Markovi´c, Ante and, 67–68, 80, 100, 144, 158–159, 168–170, 179, 329n94; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 34–35, 116, 159, 168–170, 226, 298–299, 361n94; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 169, 243–244, 247, 263, 266, 293; relations with Soviet Union, 41, 60, 91, 100, 131–132, 157–158, 175, 196, 225, 305, 371n138; relations with Yugoslavia, 345n13, 357n48; support of Yugoslav unity, 78–81, 97, 100, 111, 123, 137, 144–145, 158, 174–175, 190, 339n109; withdrawal from Yugoslavia, 2, 4, 42, 80, 117, 169, 170, 174, 181, 182, 246 Vance, Cyrus, 244, 253, 256, 276, 293, 382n100, 384n137, 390n74; BiH and, 277, 398n184, 402n259; Kadijevi´c, Veljko and, 265, 276; Miloševi´c, Slobodan and, 244, 255, 265–266, 276–277, 390n74, 395n152; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 263–266; UNPROFOR plan and, 274–276, 282–285; Vukovar visit of, 255, 387n25

417 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 39R

418 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 38 39R

Index van den Broek, Hans, 145, 181, 184, 196, 219, 231, 239, 255–256, 357n52; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 210, 230–234, 247, 254, 260, 372n160; EC troika, 183–184, 208; Genscher, Hans-Dietrich and, 186–187, 219–220; recognition of Yugoslav republics and, 262–268, 366n72; WEU and, 220–221, 375n23 Vatican, 78, 258, 360n82, 388n37, 394n130 Vllasi, Azem, 36, 37, 38, 83, 107, 139, 315n27, 321n105, 337n84 Voigt, Karsten, 161, 185 Vojvodina: autonomy of, 15, 18–20, 30–32, 37, 108, 319n76; Conference on Yugoslavia and, 242, 384n129; “yogurt revolution,” 31–33, 319n78, 320nn87–88, 326n42 Vukovar, 378n51; fall of, 254–256, 378n54, 387nn21–22, 387n25; siege of, 200, 205, 207, 217, 227, 231, 235, 241, 250, 253, 288, 367n80, 374n10; Western responses to, 241, 248–251, 258, 268, 301, 390n68 Webster, William H., 111, 343n143 WEU, 130, 161, 182, 197–198, 207, 216, 220–223, 230, 243, 307, 366n66, 369n116, 375n23, 376n29, 379n68, 384n134, 402n259 Wynaendts, Henry, 232, 239, 264, 266, 381n97, 391n94 Yazov, Dmitry, 140, 157, 205 Yeltsin, Boris, 135, 204, 205, 259, 356n41 Yugoslavia: CIA assessments of, 24, 76, 98, 109–111, 117, 122, 343n144, 350n64; confederal plans for, 28, 83, 85, 88–89,

93, 100, 104, 109–110, 122–124, 137, 145–146, 148, 162, 169, 210, 234; constitution (1974) of, 11, 15–17, 19, 22, 30, 36–37, 40, 48, 56, 70–71, 92, 321n93, 326nn43–44; economic crisis, 12–14, 19, 25, 61–68, 120–122, 313n2, 313n5, 328n73; NATO and, 19, 169, 246, 247, 314n19, 379n68; relations with EC, 19–20, 25, 345n5; relations with Soviet Union, 25–26, 328n73, 357n48; relations with UK, 317n51, 323n3; support of unity from EC, 59, 97, 123, 136–137, 145, 162, 165–166, 170, 174, 183–184, 358n55; support of unity from France, 136, 162, 174, 181, 363n27; support of unity from Germany, 59, 124, 136, 159–160, 167–168, 180, 358n61; support of unity from Italy, 59, 123–124, 126; support of unity from Soviet Union, 187, 203, 353n115, 353n119, 365n58; support of unity from UK, 24, 75, 124, 162, 174, 181, 183; support of unity from US, 78–81, 97, 100, 111, 123, 137, 144–145, 158, 174–175, 190, 339n109; US withdrawal from, 2, 4, 42, 80, 117, 169, 170, 174, 181–182, 246; Western comparisons to Soviet Union, 7, 78, 126, 135–136, 156, 160, 175, 196, 206, 259, 305, 358n61, 389n50 Zimmermann, Warren, 42, 55, 78–79, 81, 111, 136, 168, 169, 323n127, 332n25, 348n40, 361n94, 379n67, 385n153; BiH and, 289–290, 400n222, 401n223; Congress (US) and, 95, 109, 158, 357n46; JNA and, 352n100, 368n98; Markovi´c, Ante and, 67–68, 158–159 Zulfikarpaši´c, Adil, 201–202, 371n132