The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany : The Past Imperfect [1 ed.] 9781443816519, 9781443897495

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The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany: The Past Imperfect By

Erwin J. Warkentin

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany: The Past Imperfect By Erwin J. Warkentin This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Erwin J. Warkentin All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9749-3 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9749-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Preface ......................................................................................................... x Abbreviations ........................................................................................... xiii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................. 6 The Problem Defining the German Problem ............................................................... 6 Disunity among the Allies ................................................................... 12 The Transformation to Information Control ........................................ 14 The Inner Workings of the German Psyche ......................................... 15 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 23 Organisation and Personnel Organisational Structure and Tasks ..................................................... 23 ICD Personnel ...................................................................................... 28 The Expatriates and the Brain-Factory ................................................ 33 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 41 The History The Sources.......................................................................................... 41 Overview.............................................................................................. 43 The Stuttgarter Zeitung: Measuring Success ....................................... 87 DANA ................................................................................................ 109 Publication Control ............................................................................ 114 Journals and Magazines ..................................................................... 115 Overt Magazines .......................................................................... 121 German Magazines....................................................................... 127 Book Publishing ................................................................................. 134 American Information Centers........................................................... 155 Film, Theatre, and Music Control ...................................................... 160 Music and Theatre ............................................................................. 171

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Music Control .................................................................................... 182 Radio.................................................................................................. 192 Intelligence ........................................................................................ 199 Our Problem in Germany ............................................................. 206 Lowering Standards...................................................................... 223 Rumour and Humour ......................................................................... 226 Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 234 The Mechanisms of Control Blacklists............................................................................................ 234 The Vetting Process ........................................................................... 246 Artur Brauner: A Case Study in Vetting ............................................ 260 Censorship and Control...................................................................... 273 Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 279 Conclusions Appendix A ............................................................................................. 287 Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War (Members List) Appendix B.............................................................................................. 289 Possible German Objections to the Allied Conduct of the War Appendix C.............................................................................................. 291 Important Overt Publications Appendix D ............................................................................................. 292 The Status of Information and Entertainment Services and of Licenses in the US Zone as of June 30, 1948. Appendix E .............................................................................................. 293 Circulation of German Newspapers in the US Zone (June 30, 1946) Appendix F .............................................................................................. 295 Important German Journal Publications to July 1947 to June 1948 Appendix G ............................................................................................. 296 ICD Pamphlet Publications and Circulation 1947-1948

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Appendix H ............................................................................................. 297 Book Translation Rights Acquisitions as of June 1948 that the ICD Considered most Important Appendix I ............................................................................................... 299 Representative Sampling of the Book Holding of the American Information Centers July 1947- June 1948 Appendix J ............................................................................................... 302 List of America Information Center Lecture Topics from January to March 1948 Appendix K ............................................................................................. 303 Activities in America Houses in Bavaria-June 1948 Appendix L .............................................................................................. 304 Documentary Film Production August 1947 to June 1948 Appendix M ............................................................................................. 306 Films in Production in Bavaria June 1948 Appendix N ............................................................................................. 307 Youth Performances Sponsored by ICD, Army Units, and the German Youth Activities Program Appendix O ............................................................................................. 308 Theater Performance Rights Held by the ICD June 1948 Appendix P .............................................................................................. 309 Royalties Generated by Performance Rights Held by the ICD Appendix Q ............................................................................................. 310 Number of Music Licensees by Sector June 1946 Appendix R.............................................................................................. 311 List of American Symphonic Works Performed in the US Sector to June 1946 Appendix S .............................................................................................. 312 1947-1948 Operatic Seasons of Bavarian State Opera and the State Theater Stuttgart

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Appendix T .............................................................................................. 314 Symphony Orchestras in the US Zone 1 July 1947 – 30 June 1948 Appendix U ............................................................................................. 315 Music of American Composers Presented in Germany June 1947 – July 1948 Appendix V ............................................................................................. 326 Radio Programming Preferences of Listeners in the US Zone Appendix W ............................................................................................ 327 Representative Broadcasts of Three Major Radio Stations January – March 1948 Appendix X ............................................................................................. 329 ICD Classification of Members of Nazi Organizations Appendix Y ............................................................................................. 333 Composition of ICD Oct. 1945, Dec. 1945, Apr. 1946, June 1946, Nov. 1946, and Mar. 1947 “White, Grey, Black Lists” according to age Appendix Z .............................................................................................. 335 Percentage of categorization of a given age group Appendix AA .......................................................................................... 337 Percentage of ICD applicant classification where the current city of residence is known Appendix AB ........................................................................................... 338 Categorization of ICD applicants according to media function Bibliography ............................................................................................ 340 Archival Records ............................................................................... 340 Published Documentation .................................................................. 342 Books and Articles ............................................................................. 343 Index ........................................................................................................ 348

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While my name may be on the front of this book, the reality is that it is a corporate work that has many different contributors. I would like to start by thanking the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding the research for this book through various grants and the Memorial University of Newfoundland for giving me the time to carry it out. While one needs funding and time to travel to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, the National Archives in London (Kew), the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz and the Berlin Document Center, the work would be considerably more difficult without the competence of the archivists who care for the material under their charge. They, immeasurably and without exception, helped move this project forward through their assistance in locating documents and suggesting new avenues of approaching the problem I had taken up. This project generated considerable data. The names and information associated with those listed in the American Information Control Division’s “Black, Grey, White Lists” had to be entered into a database for more thorough analysis. The 20,011 names that make up those lists are associated with a total of 227,152 data points. These were entered, checked, and rechecked by the following student research assistants: Amélie Aikman, Mira Okshevsky, David Vargas, Robyn Hannaford, Robyn Moffatt (Quinn), Amanda Molloy, James Parsons, Darcy Griffin, Lori Ramsay, Maria Mucahy, Holly Slade, Julie Skinner, and Theresa Powell. Special thanks to Tatiana Warkentin and John Hammell for reading and rereading the original typescript and questioning and/or correcting some rather tedious and fractured passages. Lastly, thank-you to Sylvia Warkentin for doing all of the above and sharing part of an administrative leave with the skeleton and inner-workings of this book.

PREFACE

In 1991, I was a young Ph.D. candidate working on research for my dissertation at the Wolfgang Borchert Archive at the University of Hamburg. As I was looking through the display of Borchert’s personal library, I came across a copy of Albrecht Haushofer’s Moabiter Sonette. This, in and of itself, would not have been unusual. Borchert was a poet, had served time in the old Moabit prison in Berlin, and avidly read and collected books. However, I was always drawn to bibliographic information. In this case, it indicated that the edition I held in my hands was published by Blanvalet (Berlin) in 1946. More to the point, it noted that it had been published under license of OMGUS and the Information Control Division. Being concerned with how this was going to be recorded in my bibliography, having a supervisor, who strictly enforced the MLA rules, I began asking the archivists and librarians what this was and what this represented. At the time, no one seemed to know. Even Holger Pausch, my supervisor simply peered at me over his reading glasses and said, “Well, you seem to have a mystery. Go solve it.” And so for the last 25 years I’ve been trying to solve that mystery. In all honesty, it did not remain a mystery for particularly long. However, it was the details that were time consuming. During this time, as the Wall in Berlin had just come down and the Germanys became Germany, the documents relevant to the period began being declassified. That is, scholars began having access to the material that held the answers to my questions. The approximately 33,000 cubic feet of OMGUS material has ensured that a fuller revelation of post-war publishing and information control in Germany could be had. However, it would take time as I and other researchers waded through and analyzed what was available on the topic. As work continued, it quickly became clear that all of the answers were not to be found at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), but that valuable insights into the question were also to be found at other locations, such as the former Public Records Office, now the National Archives, at Kew in England and the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Freiburg im Breisgau, and at the Berlin Document Center. Initial trawls

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through the holdings quickly revealed “History I (1945-June 1946)” and the “Black, Gray, White List for Information Control Purposes (November 1946).” All of these promised that there was still more to be found. Over the years of returning to the archives a fuller picture revealed itself to the point of having a reasonably clear view of how the media was reconstituted in post-war Germany by the Americans in their zones of control and how that would have affected the media that eventual took root and developed there. In 1945, the US occupation forces in Germany were tasked with curing what was called the “German malady.” They were asked to eradicate what was considered to be the fundamental flaw in the German character: militarism and the inclination to see themselves as a race superior to all others. This important task was handed over to the Information Control Division (ICD) of the Office of the Military Governor, US (OMGUS). The ICD determined that the appropriate management of this “illness” was to feed the Germans in their Zone a steady diet of American democracy through the creation of a new cultural elite that would in turn become the gatekeepers of Germany’s new media. This book is the first comprehensive overview of the activities of the ICD in Germany in the immediate post-war period. The ICD played a major role in the reconstruction of Germany’s media and its effects can still be felt today. This book is also the first to be based on the draft histories created by the Intelligence Branch of the ICD, which have never been published and are only available if one visits NARA and knows where to look. The publication of this book makes this vital information readily available for the first time and assists in more fully understanding how the US occupation changed Germany’s media and thus its cultural trajectory. The most unique aspect of this work is its attention to how the US occupation utilized psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists and other academics to vet potential candidates for media licenses in Germany. It also provides the first detailed historical overview of the activities and methods employed by the ICD and how they were able to get Germany’s media to comply with their wishes. The following narrative takes the reader through the various steps of the process of becoming a literary publisher, newspaperman, magazine editor, radio programmer, or filmmaker in Germany and what requisite personality characteristics an individual needed to successfully pass through the comprehensive screening process administered by the ICD. Furthermore, it reveals how the American Military Government in

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Preface

Germany used the establishment of new media empires in an attempt at the mass re-education of an entire nation along democratic lines. In addition, the appendices provide a wide-ranging overview of the cultural activities undertaken by the ICD in the US Zone of occupied Germany.

ABBREVIATIONS

BDC: CIC: COSSAC: CSDIC: DISCC: ETOUSA: EUCOM: ICD: ICS: ISCB: NSKOV: NSV: OKW: OMGUS: OSS: OWI: PWD: PWE: RKK: RIAS: SHAEF: UNRRA: USFET: VVN:

Berlin Document Center Counterintelligence Corps Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (British) District Information Services Control Command European Theater of Operations, United States of America United States European Command (March 15, 1947, to August 1, 1952) Information Control Division Information Control Services Information Services Control Branch (British) Nationalsozialistische Kriegsopferversorgung Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Office of the Military Governor, United States Office of Strategic Services Office of War Information Psychological Warfare Division Political Warfare Executive Reichskulturkammer Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor Supreme Headquarter Allied Expeditionary Force United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency United States Forces European Theater Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental tension in West Germany’s developing post-war information services was the American desire to create a revolution within the collective German “mind” and the Germans’ resisting this by wanting to express themselves freely on any and every topic without having to answer to a foreign authority. The Americans sought to “cure,” a term that will be clarified in the first chapter, the German people of the ideologies that had led them to Nazism. This was to be accomplished through active intervention, which involved everything from imprisoning German publishers whose material contravened OMGUS (Office of Military Governor U.S.) guidelines to the granting of confiscated media production facilities to those the Information Control Division (ICD) of OMGUS trusted to disseminate information they thought helpful in the re-education of the German people. While we may not believe that the application of Freudian principles in the governing of an occupied people would be especially useful today, this formed the basis of how the ICD dealt with those who were to become Germany’s media leaders. In fact, some British and American commentators went so far as to refer to the German mindset leading to the Second World War as a collective psychosis. The ICD leadership likened Germany’s media and cultural apparatus to a form of superego that could control the baser instincts of Germany’s id. The Germans, on the other hand, did not see things in quite so complex a manner, at least not those who hoped to operate Germany’s newspapers, radio stations, publishing houses, theatres, and concert halls. They appeared to believe that, since the National Socialists were now gone, they could continue operating as they had before the Nazis had come to power, that the National Socialist years in Germany were a blip in time, a historical anomaly best forgotten. These two positions are perhaps best summed up by the words of two individuals, who experienced the Second World War very differently, one an American war reporter and the other an actor and German soldier before May 8, 1945, and then a writer in the post-war period. Martha Gellhorn was a rare female journalist, who covered the war from its prelude, she reported for Collier’s magazine on the Spanish Civil War, to when the victorious Allies sat in judgment at Nuremberg. She had even stowed away on a landing craft as a stretcher bearer during the D-

2

Introduction

Day landing and became the only woman to file her stories from the beaches of Normandy, while her husband, Ernest Hemmingway, waited on one of the offshore vessels for the fighting to pass beyond the beaches.1 Gellhorn continued to follow and comment on developments in Germany until well after the formal establishment of the two Germanys. In a 1964 article written for the Atlantic Monthly, she remained critical of Germany’s mode of thinking, suggesting that it needed to change in a fundamental way, despite the best efforts of the American occupation: In my opinion, there is no New Germany, only another Germany. Germany needs a revolution which it has not had and shows no signs of having; not a bloody, old-fashioned revolution, with firing squads and prisons, ending in one more dictatorship, but an interior revolution of the mind, the conscience.2

She clearly indicates that she did not believe that the Germans, 19 years after their unconditional surrender, had changed their Weltanschauung sufficiently to be considered a trustworthy, democratic ally of the West. In her view, the mission of the ICD had been a failure. Some Germans, however, saw the problem quite differently. Wolfgang Borchert was one of the first big names in German post-war literature with the broadcast and then staging of his play Draußen vor der Tür. He was deeply affected by the activity of the British Information Services Division, which redacted and censored the radio version of the play, and then he came under the scrutiny of the American ICD, albeit indirectly at first since his radio drama was initially for broadcast in the British zone only. However, as its popularity quickly grew, the American occupation personnel ensured that his radio play was suitable for broadcast in the American sector. Moreover, American permission was eventually needed for him to travel to Switzerland for medical treatment due to his, by then, terminal illness. Borchert himself refers to the Allies collectively and does not single any of the occupiers out as being better or worse than the other. When

1

In 1999, a year after her death, the Martha Gellhorn Prize for war reporting was established. She is considered by many to be one of the greatest war correspondents of the 20th century. According to the trustees of the Martha Gellhorn Prize it “is awarded to a journalist whose work has penetrated the established version of events and told and unpalatable truth that exposes established propaganda or ‘official drivel’, as Martha called it.” 2 Martha Gellhorn, “Is there a New Germany?” The Atlantic Monthly February 213, 2 (February) 1964, p. 69.

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asked to comment in an interview with a Swiss newspaper on the freedom of the press in Germany, his observation was brief and to the point: So lange die Zigarettenstummel fremder Militärmächte auf der Straße liegen (damit will ich nichts gegen die Zigaretten gesagt haben) und so lange ich 16-seitige Fragebogen ausfüllen muß, um in einer Zeitschrift gedruckt zu werden, so lange ist es sinnlos, über Demokratie und persönliche Freiheit zu diskutieren.3

Borchert felt that real personal freedom did not exist for Germans, regardless of the occupation zone within which one happened to find oneself. His assessment suggested a control mechanism that was too stifling of open discussion and that Germans should not be infantilized by a process that was meant to create a mature media. Considering the contents of various Allied documents, both classified and public, Borchert was not too far from the truth when he made this comment. Did the necessary revolution of the mind ever take place? Was the American mission to cure the German psychosis after the Second World War an undertaking that failed? If one looks at the problem of it being fixed quickly, then one must answer in the negative. How could the German Weltanschauung, as will be outlined later, be changes in so short a time? As one reads through the volumes that were published in the two decades after the war, one is left with the distinct suspicion that little had changed in the German “mind” as a result of the post-war occupation. In book after book, article after article, the conclusion seems to be a negative one, with the post-war denazification and reconstruction process failing, and Germany being left as psychologically crippled as commentators, who will be discussed in subsequent chapters, suggest it had been in the centuries leading up to the National Socialists taking power. In the view of the early observers, Germany simply could not be brought up to the ideal standards set by its American occupiers and those charged with administering the prescribed cure. However, if one takes a longer view, one that accounts for a changing of the guard, then a much different picture emerges. The average age of those licensed by the ICD, according to the ICD “Black, Grey, White 3

Wolfgang Borchert in a 1947 interview in Basel quoted in Peter Rühmkorf’s Wolfgang Borchert p. 162. Author’s translation: As long as there are the cigarette butts of foreign powers lying in the streets (with this I don’t want to say anything bad about the cigarettes) and as long as I must fill out 16-page questionnaires, just to get a story published in a magazine, as long as that’s the case, it’s pointless to discuss democracy and personal freedom.

4

Introduction

List,”4 for positions involving editorial control of a media outlet was approximately 42-years with the median age being about 43. This would mean that it would take approximately 25 years for the majority of this initial group of licensees to retire, bringing the real time for change in the German media to the late 1960s or early 1970s. It is then, with the new generation of media people taking the reins of Germany’s radio and television broadcasters, newspapers, and publishing houses, that the residual effects of this experiment in social engineering would be felt. This book tenders a new starting point from which to approach the problem of how the media developed in the early years of America’s occupation of their zone of control in West Germany and their sector of Berlin. While every division within OMGUS was involved in the reorientation process in some way, it was the ICD’s task to deal directly with the collective German psyche, Germany’s superego, and “cure” what has often been referred to as the “German problem.” Until now scholars have most often relied on the testimony and judgment of those involved in applying “the cure.” Scholars like Harold Hurwitz, Saul Padover, and John Gimbel wrote extensively about the US Military Government’s efforts to reorient the German people. They were, however, not just academics coldly looking at the events of the period, but also employed by the US occupation forces to build a new, better, and less threatening Germany based on Anglo-American concepts of democracy and freedom and help Germany shed the accoutrements of hypernationalism that had led it down its destructive path. They were writing about a Germany that was still in the process of coming out of a fog of repressed memories of what the reality of the Third Reich was. In the late 1980s, the government archives in the United States and the United Kingdom began the process of declassifying documents related to the occupation of Germany. While the availability of American documents is rudimentary to a history of the ICD in Germany, the British sources also play a major role in understanding the period. Since the British and American forces worked closely together during the war, forming a single Psychological Warfare Division, and continued to exchange information even after they were separated into their own zones of occupation, the British sources often illuminate the activities of OMGUS and the ICD by 1) providing minutes to meetings between US and British Military Government officials that may be missing from the American archives, 2) the British and the Americans as a matter of course exchanged information 4

See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the purpose of the lists and how media personnel were vetted by the ICD.

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in regard to the banning of particular individuals and works in their sectors amongst other things, and 3) the British PWE, PWD, and ISCB officials would often have internal debates and discussions and would generate reports on American policies and studies regarding the activities and effectiveness of the American ICD. These British materials often illuminate the motives and practices of the American occupation. While there are still a few documents unavailable for scrutiny, researchers can now begin to formulate a comprehensive picture of the how the media was controlled in the immediate post-war period in the American zone of occupation. The sheer volume of material produced during the occupation by the various incarnations of what eventually became OMGUS has ensured that much of the material remains untouched and unanalysed. It is the goal of this book to present and examine some of the more significant documentary evidence produced during this early period. In doing so, it will provide an important context within which one can begin to understand how Germany’s media was changed by the US occupation and those termed “the Professors” by the Military Governors of the Zone in Germany.

CHAPTER ONE THE PROBLEM

Defining the German Problem More than 70 years ago the victorious Allies set themselves the task of curing the psychological/political malady of the Germans. The idea that Germany as a society was in some way “sick” had been advocated by many in the United States and Great Britain for years before Hitler was even in a position to dream of what a Germany under his control might look like. Though one might be tempted to consider this to be a phenomenon that grew out of the Second World War and the Holocaust, metaphors referring to Germany as being a problem or “sick” predate the First World War. The cure was to take the form of what Ralph Willett termed “the colonization of the German subconscious,”1 a subconscious that was determined by its media and those who controlled not only German information services but also its cultural and entertainment industries as well. Those who sought to cure Germany’s malady did so by diagnosing and then prescribing a cure that was based largely on Freudian psychoanalysis. One need only read the preliminary studies and one quickly comes to the conclusion that Germany was to be treated after its capitulation as if it were on a Freudian analyst’s couch. Studies by the leading advisors to what was to become the British and American Military Governments in post-war Germany, such as “A Report on Our Problem in Germany” in the American sector2 and “The Future of Germany,” which was based on the previously noted American study, in the British sector,3 point to Freudian theory as the basis to solving the “German Problem.” It is thus acceptable, even if these approaches are no longer current in trying to understand a 1

Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (New York: Routledge, 1989), 12. 2 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany” RG 260-390-42-16-5 Box 69. From here on referred to as “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 3 “The Future of Germany.” National Archives (Kew), FO 1049/72. From here on referred to as “The Future of Germany.”

The Problem

7

nation’s psyche, to understand and frame the American approach to dealing with Germany’s post-war media in this way. In the years leading up to the First World War, politicians and scholars in Great Britain made reference to the so-called “German Problem,” though not always articulated in psychological terms. The seeds of viewing the German Empire with suspicion were sown in Benjamin Disraeli’s February 9, 1871 speech to the British House of Commons, where he pointed out that the new Germany, with its new Emperor having been crowned on January 18, 1871, was Britain’s greatest threat: “The war represents the German revolution…a greater political event than the French Revolution of last century. The balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England.”4 In speaking out as he did, Disraeli voiced the sentiments of those in Britain who saw the newly unified Germany as a threat to Britain’s Empire and economic might. Later, after a meeting with Otto von Bismarck at the Berlin Congress of 1878, Disraeli did change his position towards Germany, and can largely be credited for the generally positive view most of the British had of Bismarck. However, the genie was out of the bottle and the view that Germany was a threat, and in some way inherently evil, lay latent in the British mind until it reached its fevered pitch in 1914. It was at this point that British thinking begins to allude to the “German Problem” as being philosophically or even psychologically based. Charles Sarolea, in The Anglo-German Problem, opines that the cause of German militarism and “perverted nationalism” lay in the Germans’ Nietzschean “will to power.”5 One of the most vociferous of those claiming that Germany, as a nation, suffered from a collective psychosis was Lord Robert Vansittart of Great Britain. Vansittart was Principal Private Secretary to Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin and Ramsay MacDonald from 1928 to 1930 and from 1930 to 1938 he was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, which saw him supervising Britain’s diplomatic service. In 1938, due to his opposition to the strategy of appeasing German demands, he was “promoted” to the post of Chief Diplomatic Advisor to His Majesty’s Government,” a post that was relatively meaningless and intended to nullify his opposition to government policy, though, in reality, it gave him greater freedom to criticize appeasement. Vansittart published a prodigious number of articles in newspapers on the topic of the “German Problem.” 4

Benjamin Disraeli, (Hansard) Parliamentary Debates, Ser. III, vol. cciv, February-March 1871, Speech of February 9, 1871, 81-82. 5 Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1913), 351.

Chapter One

8

He was, however, not alone in his antagonism. His American counterpart in describing Germany as psychologically diseased was Henry Morgenthau Jr. He was the American Secretary of the Treasury from January 1, 1934, until July 22, 1945, and advocated that Germany be turned into an agrarian society with little or no industry after World War II. It should be noted that Morgenthau’s image and name were used in the Nazi hate-film Der ewige Jude as a representative of the international conspiracy of Jewish bankers. For him, the war against Nazi Germany was a fairly personal issue, since he appears to have been specifically targeted by Goebbels‘ propaganda ministry as an enemy of National Socialism and thus Germany. Morgenthau‘s view of Germany, however, developed well in advance of World War II. Already towards the end of the World War I, in a October 19, 1918, editorial appearing in The New York Times, Morgenthau is said to have “expressed his belief that the mental attitude of the German people could be changed for the better, but that it would take a nervous shock in the form of a crushing military defeat to do it” and refers to the necessity of Germany’s mentality “[being] restored to a condition of health.”6 There have been other terms used to describe the so-called German malady. Saul Padover, writing after World War II, describes the German problem in slightly different terms. He designates the problem as “Germanism” or “Prussianism,” which he uses interchangeably.7 He goes on to equate Germanism or Prussianism with what he describes as Nazifascism indicating the following commonalities: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Hostility to democracy (shared power) Reliance on authoritarianism Respect for force and acceptance of military virtues Belief in German superiority, cultural or racial

Padover goes even further than this in suggesting that all Germans have these traits and that even the anti-Nazis subscribed to some or all of these Germanic virtues.8 It was the British propaganda of World War I, some of which was specifically targeted at the United States, that helped change American 6

“Morgenthau Would Chasten Germany,” The New York Times, October 19, 1918, 7. 7 Saul Padover, “The Failure of the Reeducation of Germany,” The Dilemma of Postwar Germany, Comp. Julia E. Johnsen (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1948), 180-192. 8 Saul Padover, “The Failure of the Reeducation of Germany,” 181.

The Problem

9

attitudes toward Germany and the German people. Between 1914 and 1918 the American press was flooded with British propaganda of the “Prussian Ogre,” the “Bloated Hun,” and the “Cadaver Conversion Factory.”9 Though the Americans realized after the war that they had been manipulated by British propaganda, for the most part, the image of the German being in some way a mentally defective monster remained as a latent memory. It was thus on this basis that the American efforts to deal with Germany after World War II were built. Of course, all of these stereotypes were then proven to be pale imitations of what the Nazis had undertaken in Germany. Though opinions regarding Germany’s psychological health were occasionally expressed throughout the period leading up to September 1939 and in the early part of the war, it is in 1943, when Germany’s defeat begins to appear imminent, that serious attention is focused on Germany and its “collective psychosis.” This is the case not only in the news media but also in books addressing the issue at that time. It was through these publications that the various schools of thought on how to “cure” Germany were trying to find the necessary leverage to convince the American elites of what ailed Germany and how to cure it. Over time, the way in which the German psyche was portrayed became extreme and the cures more sensational. It was during this period that Louis Nizer wrote What to do with Germany. Nizer was a renowned English-born American lawyer, who, in his youth, “won a Government citation for his patriotic speeches during Liberty Loan drives in World War I.”10 While he himself did not advocate the extreme “cure” that some did—he saw the occupation of Germany as being more like taking the German people into “protective custody.” 11 He also provided an outline of some of the approaches to Germany that had gained traction in the United States. He refers to these as medicines without a cure: extermination and sterilization, selective breeding, political dismemberment, and compulsory migration.12 It was not only the Americans and the British who saw the Germans as a psychologically afflicted nation. Gerhart Seger, a social democrat, who fled Germany after having been held at the Oranienburg concentration 9 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003), 179-180. 10 Eric Pace, “Obituary [Louis Nizer],” The New York Times, November 11, 1994, B7. 11 Louis Nizer, What to do with Germany (Chicago: Ziff Davis Publishing Company, 1944), 92. 12 Nizer, What to do with Germany, 3-11.

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Chapter One

camp in 1933,13 and Siegfried Marck,14 a social democratic journalist and academic born in Breslau, who fled Germany in 1933, added their opinions and solutions. They conclude that: Knowledge of the psychological structure of neurotic individuals helps us to understand the complications of a people’s spirit. The German mixture of contrasting neurotic complexes is explained by her history, which, unlike that of other nations, shows frequently alternating upward and downward trends. Periods of utter collapse interrupt those of highest power. The problem, To be or not to be? appears again and again in the course of her history with the accompanying alternative: Everything or Nothing. In individual psychology we would surmise that the neurotic person “arranges” these typical situations, but it is questionable whether such a definition is applicable to the relationship between the character and the destiny of a whole nation. We can rely on sober facts, however, when we contemplate the psychical effect of historical events upon the character of a people. Nietzsche once said that all Germans are born Hegelians, always in the making, never influenced by the happenings of today, but rather by those of the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow.15

While they did not suggest that the collective German psyche was terminally diseased, they could not have done so without impugning their own position; they suggest that the German approach to outsiders was neurotic. The foundational premise of those who believed that Germany as a society was in some way mentally ill, according to Walter Dorn, was that the “deep-seated German disease that had been more than a century in the process of incubation” needed to be cured and that all Germans had been so deeply infected with National Socialism that one could only consider all of them as guilty of having waged war against democracy.16 He concludes 13

In the United States Seger was an editor for a number of German newspapers and a much sought after speaker on the National Socialist regime. 14 Marck helped in the war effort in his capacity as an advisor and strongly influenced post-war policy in the United States toward Germany. He had a lengthy correspondence with Thomas Mann from 1939 to 1957. In a speech delivered to the annual congress of the Nazi Party on 13 September 1935, Goebbels mentions Marck as a member of the “General Congress of the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet of Germany” that met on the 16th of November 1918, with Marck representing the Army department. 15 Gerhard Seger and Siegfried Marck, Germany: To Be or Not to Be? New York: The Rand School Press, 1943), 15-16. 16 Cited in Walter Dorn, “The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany, 1944-45” Political Science Quarterly 72 (1957): 485.

The Problem

11

that Vansittart believed that the only cure could be a thorough Umbildung of the German psyche as the result of a lengthy occupation.17 There were, however, also those who took a more conciliatory approach to what was to be done with Germany after the war. For example, Harold Hurwitz outlines a middle ground, which nevertheless included many of the tough measures suggested by Vansittart and Morgenthau. Others, however, like Ralph Franklin Keeling, condemned any sort of hardline approach towards the German people. He simply saw “the Allied program to re-educate the Germans [as] a case of one deluded group trying to disillusion another.”18 Keeling represented what John Gimbel described as America’s eventual policy in Germany, which was to impose on Germany what was in America’s national interest, which was not necessarily the re-education or the democratization of Germany.19 In this case, the interest, at least by 1947, was America protecting itself against the Soviet Union, by ensuring that the expected future battle would be fought in the buffer region of middle Europe. The initial American approach, dubbed the Morgenthau Plan, would have seen Germany turned into an agrarian society, though this interpretation of Morgenthau’s intentions has recently been challenged.20 It was eventually decided, as Morgenthau lost influence in Washington and the American commanders on the ground in Germany began to agitate for a less drastic approach, that the re-education process became more surgical and targeted. Moreover, it was quickly realized that tensions between the Soviet Union and their erstwhile allies were escalating and that Germany needed to be more than an agrarian state to serve as an effective buffer between east and west. While this seems to have been a rather abrupt about-face in terms of the American policy in Germany, there was a considerable body of knowledge that had been accumulated during the war regarding a less overtly aggressive approach to reinventing Germany. Hoping to have found the solution to the “German Problem,” the United States, together 17 Cited in Dorn 485. In this case the term Umbildung is used in the English text and carries the sense of re-education and reshaping. 18 Ralph Franklin Keeling, Gruesome Harvest: The Costly Attempt to Exterminate the German People (Chicago: Institute of American Economics, 1947), 132. 19 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany. Politics and the Military 1945-1949. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), 321. 20 Michaela Hönicke, “‘Prevent World War III:’ An Historiographical Appraisal of Morgenthau’s Programme for Germany,” The Roosevelt Years: New Perspectives on American History, 1933-1945. Eds. Robert A. Garson and Stuart S. Kidd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 155-172.

12

Chapter One

with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, not only set about disarming Germany materially but psychologically. There was to be a complete laying bare of the German psyche, with the offending constituents being removed or rendered impotent. There were, however, some who spoke out against the American approach to curing Germany’s ills. They argued that there was nothing special about the German people and that the Germans posed no greater threat to peace than anyone else, especially now that they had lost their lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse line. This is the position held by Wolfgang Friedmann, who had been born in Germany and had studied law there and had indeed become a lawyer and a judge before fleeing the Nazi in 1934. Furthermore, he thought that the American approach was far too complex. In his words, it was “incapable of execution.”21 The overriding consideration for him was that the categorization of 70 million people into guilty and innocent was a sheer practical impossibility.22 Though Friedmann offered a thoroughly pragmatic approach to dealing with Germany, he did so from a psychological perspective. The main obstacle to a successful “cure” in his view was the “complete separation between the moral standards of a citizen in his private life and the moral standards of the same citizen as a member of the nation and his duty to the state.”23 From this, three important principles emerge from the practices of the ICD: there was a need to distinguish between active and nominal Nazis; there was a necessity to transfer the judgment to German antiNazis, who understood the German system; there needed to be a concession of justice to utility. In the case of this last point, that meant the temporary retention of certain officials who are indispensable to the running of the economy.24 The result of this was that certain confirmed Nazis would need to be kept in place until such time that they could be replaced.

Disunity among the Allies Though the Allies had, at least on paper, decided on a unified effort, it soon became apparent that their ideological differences, mistrust, and desire to assert their own will on postwar Europe ensured that they would 21

Wolfgang Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany (London: Stevens, 1947) 114. He was a professor at Columbia University from 1955 to 1972. 22 Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germny, 121. 23 Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany, 225. 24 Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany, 114.

The Problem

13

take separate paths in trying to establish a new Germany. The Soviet Union pursued a path that was not particularly subtle but was very quick in implementation and in many ways quite effective. This caused great concern among the British and American occupiers, who felt that they could easily lose the war for the German mind in 1945. France, on the other hand, had suffered the longest under German occupation and was more concerned with its own physical welfare. It proved to have little interest in curing Germany of its ills and concentrated on removing what wealth was left in Germany for its own benefit and paid little attention to capturing the German soul. So much so, in fact, that the French zone became known in postwar Allied circles as a haven for former Nazis and fellow travelers. As Theodor Eschenburg describes it, in the French zone, denazification was firmly subordinated to France’s dual policy of building up her power at the cost of Germany and seeking security from any future German threats. Only in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, this for a time gained a reputation as “the Eldorado of tolerance” for ex-Nazis, did the French, under American pressure, conduct a rigorous and effective denazification policy.25 All of this left the British and the Americans to pursue a loosely unified effort, which on the surface appeared to move in lock step; however, even under rudimentary examination, real differences in their approach are evident. The British took the tack of political warfare. If they managed to put the right gentlemen into places of appropriate authority, then the problem would solve itself. This was made clear in a letter from Major General Lethbridge, Head of the Intelligence Group of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element), on February 8, 1946 to C.E. Steel, a close personal friend of the General, of the Political Division in Berlin. Here they trade ideas about the establishment of the German Personnel Research Branch in Bad Oeynhausen.26 Lethbridge goes so far as to say that he sees the German concepts of democracy, though they may differ from those of the British, as completely valid and that the evaluation of applicants had little to do with what the individual might say and more to do with how it is said.27 The system being established by the British was to follow their own administrative system in which the elected officials 25 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung (1945-1949), Vol. 1. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 18. 26 FO 1049/535, National Archives, London. Lethbridge refers to Steel in the letter informally as “Kit” and signs off as “Tubby” and Steel reciprocates by addressing the General as “Tubby” in these communications. 27 Lethbridge, “Letter to C.E. Steel,” February 21, 1946, FO 1049/535, National Archives, Kew.

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Chapter One

were in some ways governed by, and captives of, their bureaucratic apparatus. The Americans, ironically, were to attempt Vansittart‘s more thorough Umbildung of Germany, which began on a psychological niveau and involved a high level of social engineering. Both the Americans and British relied to a great extent on civilians to operate their reorientation programs. This caused greater difficulty for the American occupation forces than for the British. The British were quite comfortable in having a mixture of civilians and military people working together in a command structure that tended to be a hybrid of military and civilian most of the time, with a civilian life of service following a stint in the military. This was a result of many of the individuals, whether civilian or military, having attended the same “public” schools and universities and simply knowing one another. This is clearly illustrated in the above-noted exchange between Lethbridge and Steel. The positive effect was that the British had a greater uniformity in the application of occupation policy. The Americans tended to keep the command structure formal and military, whether it involved civilians or not. That is, the officers running the programs were either career or long-term military men. They often did not understand what it was their so-called “professors” were trying to accomplish. In fact, they reflected the attitude of their Military Governor, Lucius Clay, who in his memoirs of his time spent as the American Military Governor in Germany, remarked, “We had much advice from those who profess to know the so-called German mind. If it did exist, we never found it; German minds seemed to us to be remarkably like those elsewhere.”28 As opposed to the British military occupation forces, in the American Military Government apparatus, there was a considerable disconnect between the practical, goal-oriented military officers in charge of enforcing regulations and the seemingly lax approach their civilian underlings exhibited. For this reason, one might at times note a certain dissonance between the ideal found in official policy and what was being done on the ground by individual officers charged with administering a program in a relatively remote part of Germany.

The Transformation to Information Control Approximately two months after the war ended in Europe the AngloAmerican Psychological Warfare Division and the British Political Warfare Executive were re-designated as Information Control Division in 28 Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1950), 281.

The Problem

15

the American sector and the Information Services Division in the British zone of control. Because the wartime units were not disbanded after the cessation of hostilities in Germany but were simply re-tasked into their peacetime role with the entirety of the staff becoming part of the Military Government, they carried their wartime approach to German re-education with them into the postwar phase. While the following study will concentrate on the American efforts, recourse will occasionally be taken to the British effort for illustrative purposes. The American Psychological Warfare Division was re-designated the Information Control Division on 13 July 1945. With this, the official effort to cure the German malady began in earnest. There was, however, one further complication. Saul Padover, who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Psychological Warfare Division from 1944 to 1945, notes that the Russians and Americans had an additional issue in dealing with the Germans that the British and the French did not, which had nothing to do with the policies and procedures implemented during the occupation, but was the result of a deeply ingrained German attitude towards the America and Russia/Soviet Union. He notes: As a rule, Germans regard the British and the French as more or less on the same Kultur level as them, and the Russians and the Americans as considerably below them. These opinions are deep-rooted and widespread and are not necessarily connected with the politics of Nazism; they are part of the national folklore of Germany. Consequently, they complicate the whole problem of re-education.29

This imbalance between how the Germans saw the Americans, as nonequals, might have led to considerable difficulties. The potential for German obstinacy was not realized, even though the average German continued to look down on what they considered to be an inferior American culture. The Germans at this point were thoroughly beaten and in no position to resist. They simply could not deny the victors anything for which they asked.

The Inner Workings of the German Psyche In a 1943 panel discussion for the Saturday Review of Literature, Horace Kallen observed, “The convalescence of the bled and broken world into a healthy new one will be determined largely by how its medicine-

29

Padover “The Failure of the Reeducation of Germany,” 180.

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Chapter One

men interpret the German national character.”30 What these comments emphasize is the trust that the American policymakers, or at least those who had some influence on the policymakers, had in the psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists that made up the various think tanks that provided the OWI,31 OSS,32 and the PWD with their analysis of the collective German psyche. It was individuals from these academic and medical disciplines, who would have a tremendous impact on how the initial policies towards Germany and the Germans were formulated. Though, as already indicated in the comments by Lucius Clay, some would rely on their own instincts and direct experience rather than the opinions of the “professors.” Throughout World War II the Americans made numerous attempts at understanding what made Germany and the Germans tick as a nation. The most important of these, “Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War,” was completed in 1944.33 Though it was initially classified as secret and only circulated among the upper echelons of those in charge of the Anglo-American war effort, it was later published under the same name. It attempted to render an understanding of what it called the “regularities in German national character” as well as offer “some specific applications of the regularities in German national character.” It also gave consideration to how controlled institutional change in a conquered Germany might be achieved and possible reactions of the American people to such an approach. The study was taken quite seriously, and echoes of its findings can be found in many of the directives issued from the various divisions of OMGUS. More significantly, the sentiments expressed in the final report reverberate in the field reports that were sent to their respective divisions. The “Future of Germany” formed the basis of not only how the American occupiers viewed and treated the Germans, but played a significant role in shaping the British reaction to the Germans as well. In February 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dicks, a psychiatrist who handled many important and delicate issues related to psychological warfare for the 30

Horace M. Kallen, “What Shall We do with Germany?” Saturday Review of Literature 26, May 29, 1943), 4. 31 Office of War Information. It was established on June 13, 1942 by executive order and served to coordinate information released regarding the war. This included news releases, radio broadcasts and movies among other things. 32 Office of Strategic Services. The approximate equivalent of the British Special Operations Executive and precursor to the CIA. 33 National Archives (Kew), FO 1049/72. From here on referred to as “The Future of Germany.”

The Problem

17

British wrote an analysis of the “Future of Germany” for the British War Office that was distributed to the appropriate divisions of the British Control Commission for Germany.34 A list of the attendees of the conference reads like a veritable who’s who of the American medical, psychiatric, and social sciences of the time.35 Of those listed as participants, some would take leading roles in the planning of Germany’s postwar convalescence. For example, Theodore Abel, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, had gone to Germany in 1934 and had collected almost 700 political biographies on Nazi party members. He then used these as a basis for his book Why Hitler Came into Power, which was published shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. Richard Brickner, an Assistant Professor of Clinical Neurology at Columbia University, who is still quoted in regard to research conducted during the war on the intellectual functions of the frontal lobe, also wrote a psychiatric study on Germany entitled Is Germany Curable? A further participant was Margaret Mead, who was then Associate Curator of Anthropology at the American Museum of Natural History and expert on primitive societies. Though she had no real practical experience with Germany, it was thought that her groundbreaking work in anthropological research and photography allowed her to study conditions in Germany from a distance and pass some of these techniques on to the conference. In all, there were 30 full members of the conference and another 30 consultants and guests. “Future of Germany” makes the usual claims of individual variation within a group and speaks of a German psyche as a whole rather than the psychology of individual Germans. One of its most telling findings is that of the dichotomy between the Catholics and Protestants in Germany. The report concluded that Catholicism represented a wider view of the world than Protestantism, which was more inward-looking and isolated. However, it does mitigate this somewhat by suggesting that the findings were not entirely conclusive and warranted further study. This led to Roman Catholic and Protestant Germans being treated differently by ICD officers, which is evident in some of the special reports discussed later in 34

Colonel Dicks was charged with the care of Rudolf Hess during a portion of his wartime captivity and also later wrote a lengthy article entitled “Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology” in which he publishes findings that resulted from the study of German prisoners of war in British custody. He had been instructed by the Directorate of Military Intelligence to undertake “any suitable studies which might help in the understanding of the enemies’ mind and intentions and in the conduct of psychological warfare.” (“The Future of Germany,” 111) 35 For a list of participants, see Appendix A.

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Chapter One

this book. It also made a distinction between northern and southern Germans. It came to the conclusion that the German problem lay in the militarism of the northern Germany, ignoring that the Nazi movement’s roots were in the south. However, there was an acknowledgment that such a finding was “too heavily male-typed to provide adequate interpretations for females.” Whatever its flaws might have been, it served as the fundamental way of looking at Germany for the ICD and most of the other American occupation establishments. The first regularity in the German character that the conference document points out is the preoccupation that Germans appeared to have with status. The example the study provides concludes that Germans, when they meet someone for the first time, are preoccupied with the task of discerning where this person ranks in relation to their own social status. It was suggested that if a person of authority spoke with an individual of lower status in a manner that was too familiar, that this would be disconcerting because it destroyed the hierarchy upon which the lower class individual’s own status depended. It was further pointed out that once the Allies had gained the status of military victor, that they do nothing to depreciate that status because it would, in turn, depreciate the status of the one who had acknowledged defeat. They suggest that forceful behavior, while considered bullying in an American context, would not necessarily be viewed as such by the Germans. This technique is evident in correspondence that the ICD undertook with Germans of all ranks. The report also clearly employs Freudian techniques in trying to understand the dynamics of a German family: [The German] can never rest secure in his father, because his father is not in control, but part of a status structure. The mother images are based on the role the mother plays vis-à-vis the father and vis-à-vis the child, within the house. When the father is away the mother is a loving companion, when the father enters, the mother betrays the child to the father, and the mother, as treated by the father, finally becomes a suffering mother in the child’s eyes, and so is reaccepted, again becoming a loving mother, etc. As defender of the suffering mother, the child is vis-à-vis the father, etc. Double and multiple identifications are offered to the child continuously.36

The report further concludes that the German is taught to move between the submissive role and the dominant role quite easily. Whether we consider this to be a good psychological analysis today is irrelevant; this is the information the ICD officers were given, and, at least initially, the 36

“The Future of Germany” 18. Emphasis in the original.

The Problem

19

Germans tended to bear out this prediction. In the reports from the DISCC offices, one often reads that the Germans had been acting according to the expected stereotype in a situation where the officer needed to assert his authority. The conference further warned that American military personnel was going to encounter two types of Germans: Type-A, who is Emotional Idealistic Active Romantic They may be constructive or destructive Anti-social Type-B, who is Orderly Hard-working Hierarchy-preoccupied Methodical Submissive Gregarious Materialistic

The Type-A’s, they concluded, were the result of an indulgent mother and the Type-B’s from an authoritarian father and a mother that preferred the father, which left the child to deal with abandonment issues. This method of analyzing the German character went even further in its conclusions. It suggested, “Nazism made possible more type-A behavior after adolescence than any previous regime.”37 Interestingly, many of the stereotypes listed are still associated with the Germans today, even if the psychological jargon has been abandoned. Individual ICD officers were charged with the responsibility of making certain that only those Germans with the positive aspects of the German character were employed in the nation’s cultural industry and those with a preponderance of, or even just one or two, negative traits were sidelined during the re-education and reconstruction of Germany. This was to be accomplished through rigorous psychological examinations of those who wished to take leading roles in Germany’s cultural life, with the criteria for approval being set remarkably high. In fact, the interrogations conducted by the ICD at Bad Orb reveal that German applicants who were thought to 37

“The Future of Germany” 20.

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Chapter One

have been dominated by a parent at some point in their life, and had not shown appropriate resistance to the “overbearing” parent, were turned down as potential publishers even though all of the other indicators were positive.38 The German attitude toward history was also identified as a significant and problematic aspect of the German character. The conference study concluded that the German did not “handle the past as a fixed and irrevocable sequence of events, but as a series of events, each one of which may recur in a timeless, symbolic structure, so that in a way, Germans may be fighting the Thirty Years War, Napoleon, and World Wars I and II and III all at once.”39 The report goes on to suggest that employing psychiatrists in the rewriting of German history textbooks would be helpful in terms of mitigating some of the paranoia that existed in how Germans taught history, which portrayed a Germany under constant threat. This, in the opinion of the report, led to a very weak development of a sense of guilt in the German people, which the authors apparently had not seen in the German people before, because their “views of Germany [were] so heavily colored by those who have rejected German culture or been rejected by it, and who have not been able to live within its definitions,”40 these people being the refugees who had escaped Nazi Germany before the war. The duality of the German character, as outlined above in the Type-A and Type-B personalities, needed to be treated or cured in the view of the conference report. Furthermore, these peculiar personality types were evident in the preponderance of the German people and that it was the fault of this duality in the German character that caused the repetitive outbreaks of German sadistic aggression against other people. The conference panel prescribed that the Germans needed to decrease the frustration of the A-types at critical points in their lives while at the same time strengthening the egos of the B-types so that their feeling of being attacked and the need for them to cling to status could be eliminated. The report further recommended that the occupation forces assist in developing a character that could be considered “genuinely inter-personal.”41 However, while the “Future of Germany” identifies these problems, it does not offer 38 Bad Orb, located approximately 50 kms east of Frankfurt am Main, was the American base where intensive, week-long, interviews were conducted with license applicants by intelligence officers, political interrogators, medical doctors and psychologists and psychiatrists. 39 “The Future of Germany” 21. 40 “The Future of Germany,” 21. 41 “The Future of Germany,” 22.

The Problem

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specific solutions. These are left to the individual practitioners to develop in the field. One of the conclusions of the conference, as noted above, was that the Germans have an underdeveloped sense of guilt. The Morgenthau group, and thus the original policy-makers for Germany’s occupation, took this aspect of the report seriously. Instilling a sense of collective guilt in the German people became a top priority of not only the ICD but a preoccupation of almost all of the separate divisions within OMGUS. Studies of the German psyche continued as part of the ICD’s activities. The denazification unit of the ICD undertook “special studies” of the nowdefeated Germans in an “[attempt] to build up a body of scientific information concerning the German mind.”42 This special project was undertaken by what were considered to be a prominent American psychiatrist, an important American psychologist, and two sociological anthropologists. Unfortunately, the document does not further identify those involved in the project. Their task was to analyze the German mind in relation to the effects of environment on political attitudes.43 The psychiatrist and psychologist devised a set of tests that they thought would reveal the “relative denazification of German youth, German women, ex-soldiers and so on,” while the anthropologists “made a detailed field study covering German community and home life.”44 In one of these studies, they asked German children to “write a composition on what they hoped for the political future of Germany.”45 Their conclusion was that Nazi ideals were still being taught in the homes. Unfortunately, more is not known about this project. The footnotes in History II indicate that this item was not to be used in the final documentation about the ICD because the supporting material for this project was already missing in 1946. It appears that the information was taken from an undated ICD report for visiting publishers, which also seems to have been lost. This is illustrative of the problem facing researchers who are trying to understand better how the ICD functioned and its motives. The evidence is either missing or was misfiled and then buried under approximately 33,000 cubic feet of archived material. The final attitude of the American occupiers in regard to the Germans under their charge was a natural evolution of the ideas that had been absorbed by those responsible for administering a defeated Germany and 42 “History of the ICD from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947,” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 70. From here on referred to as History II. 43 History II. 44 History II. Emphasis in the original. 45 History II.

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Chapter One

their experience as governors. It is best summed up in an article written by Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, who was Assistant chief of Staff of Army Intelligence for USFET, for The New York Times: To control these people we had to investigate the German mind, as complex an instrument as any modern mechanism of warfare: an instrument consisting, really, of two entirely separate elements which are merged only occasionally and then with disastrous effects. The first element is reason—methodical, cold, unimaginative and often exceedingly dull. The second is fanatical emotion—blind, overwhelming, without restraint and frequently unconscious. German reason designed beautiful machines and structures; German emotion designed Buchenwald.46

It was what they thought of as a deeply engrained schizophrenia that needed to be cured by moving the Germans as a collective away from the extremes of their personality to one that was ruled by moderate reactions to the other nations of the world, a nation that would respond in a measured way under the stress of national or international incidents. In the end, it was decided that the Umbildung of the German psyche in the American zone was to be accomplished through a very careful reconstruction of Germany’s media. To put it in Freudian terms, it was to be a substantial retuning of Germany’s “superego.” It was through the establishment of trusted publishers, journalists, editor, musicians, actors and filmmakers in positions of cultural influence that a new German society was to be built and Germany’s collective “id” was to be kept in check.47

46

Edwin L. Sibert, “The German Mind: Our Greatest Problem,” The New York Times, February 17, 1946, 7 47 While the terms “id and “superego” are not explicit in the studies generated by the various committees advising on and planning the occupation of Germany, their contextual appropriateness will become clearer in the following chapters of this book. Moreover, as one reads the academic books produced by the members of these committees, before, during, and after the war, it is difficult to imagine that these concepts did not form part of the foundation of their approach to re-educating the German people.

CHAPTER TWO ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Organizational Structure and Tasks The Information Control Division had three fundamental responsibilities. 1 It was to obtain agreement with the British, Soviet, and French military governors “for uniform or coordinated policies with respect to control of public information media in Germany.”2 The second part of its mission was “to determine and coordinate policy on the control and reconstitution of German information services in US controlled areas.”3 Finally, the ICD “was responsible for obtaining and reporting through the information control channels and for making available to the director of intelligence, information in five fields.”4 The areas on which the ICD was to report were: 1. German reaction and attitudes towards American military government and German civil government 2. German political activity, including purposes, programs and leaders, in the US zone and throughout Germany 3. Evidence of trends towards nationalism, militarism, Pan-Germanism and fascism 4. Separatist movements 5. Political effects of refugee movements.

The American zone of control encompassed Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg-Baden (now Baden-Württemberg), the Bremen enclave, and 1

“History. Information Control Division: Office for Military Government for Germany (U.S.),” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69. From here on referred to as History I. It indicates that a full discussion of the responsibilities of the ICD may be found in “OMGUS Organization Plan (9 Mar 46),” which has not yet been located the archival records. 2 History I. 3 History I. 4 History I.

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Chapter Two

the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Each of these had a full complement of offices that dealt with the various administrative concerns in their region. Additionally, there were Military Government installations that provided overall direction for the entire zone, with the nominal headquarters located in Berlin, but with actual operational control in and around Frankfurt am Main. Of particular interest is the manner in which the ICD related to the Military Governor in the American zone. While other divisions of the Military Government were subject to all of the bureaucratic structures that one might expect when one combines military with governmental functions, the ICD could circumvent this structure due to its policy development being independent of the standard chain of command. This gave the ICD and its personnel considerable latitude and freedom of operation. In essence, the ICD could determine its mandate without having to go through the regular chain of command, answering directly to the Military Governor. Until December 11, 1945, the ICD remained a Special Staff Division within USFET when its operation was transferred to OMGUS. Hurwitz reports that the ICD leadership managed to protect it from being fully integrated with the Military Government until February 28, 1946.5 Though it was eventually structurally assimilated by OMGUS, nothing changed in the way that the ICD operated on a daily basis. Despite this, the assimilation of the ICD into the larger Military Government structure represented a change of the ICD’s operational focus moving away from military security and marked the beginning of the implementation of longterm plans for how information services eventually would be turned over to the Germans. OMGUS was organised with Governors for each of the Länder under its control. The ICD units responsible for each of the Länder or enclaves were directly under the authority of the Land Governor, thus mimicking the structure of the entire American sector. However, the ICD units responsible for the Länder also answered directly to the Zone Governor, initially General Eisenhower and then Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, through the Director of the Office of Military Government for Germany Information Control Service, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure. This ensured the coordinated development of ICD policy, a situation that did not exist for any of the other divisions such as finance, legal, transport, or 5

Harold Hurwitz, U.S. Military Government in Germany: Press Reorientation (Karlsruhe: HICOG, 1950), 329. According to History I a full description of the organization of the ICD may be found in the “OMGUS Organization Plan (5 Dec 45),” which has not yet been located in the archival files.

Organization and Personnel

25

manpower. Indeed, this put considerable power into the hands of McClure, who had previously commanded the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. Of further significance is the fact that the ICD remained a military staff division despite the fact that it had numerous civilian members. While superficially this might not have made much of a difference in the day-today operations of the ICD, it did have the effect of maintaining military concerns as central to its functioning as well as operating in a hierarchical and authoritative fashion. This might not have been the case if it had been allowed to function in a quasi-civilian manner, as was the case with the British. The ICD itself was divided into two groups. One saw to the staff work, while the other oversaw the operations of the division. The staff group was divided into three units: Plans and Directives, Intelligence and Liaison, and Administration and Personnel. The work of this last group is self-explanatory. Every organisation needs a means of ensuring that it has the staff necessary to carry out its mission. The Plans and Directives group saw to the work of preparing overarching strategies and policies for the ICD and then ensured the appropriate instructions were sent out to the operational units. In addition, it coordinated its activities with other groups within OMGUS. The Intelligence and Liaison group was responsible for the gathering of information necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the ICD and to accomplish its core goal of reestablishing a thoroughly denazified German media in its zone. It also ensured that information was exchanged with other agencies within OMGUS and made sure that communication channels remained open with the other Allied Military Government organisations. Moreover, it played a vital part in the screening of individuals wishing to be involved in Germany’s cultural industries. The operating group was comprised of those units that had direct contact with the German populace and ensured that the plans and directives produced by the staff were carried out. It was compartmentalised into the four media groups under ICD control: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Press Publications Radio Film, theatre, and music

In addition, there was a fifth component called the Business Management Branch, which oversaw the financial and administrative aspects of the division.

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The Press Control Branch formulated policy regarding the operation of newspapers and news services in Germany. As the indigenous newspapers were reconstituted, the Press Control Branch not only provided guidance but also exercised control over individual newspaper organisations. While the term “guidance” is sufficiently vague to mean most anything that an ICD officer might say to a prospective news publisher, the term “control” is more precise. Both terms are used in the various documents produced by the Press Control Branch. Semantics aside, ICD officers had the power to shutter a newspaper if they so wished. Though it does not appear that this power was used capriciously, there are instances where individual publishers, or members of a publishing partnership, were banned from any association with the newspaper industry by Press Control officers. Even after German media companies had received initial approval from the ICD and even after they had been cleared through the denazification tribunals, they were still subject to scrutiny. The Publications Control Branch was quite different from Press Control Branch. While there was considerable pressure to begin producing newspapers in the Press Control Branch, there was no such pressure in the area of producing German books and magazines. Not only is this openly stated by OMGUS officials, but one can see book publishers very rarely appearing in the early Black, Grey, and White lists, while they make up a far larger proportion of licensees in the last Black, Grey, and White list. The Publications Control Branch, in the opinion of the ICD, dealt with a medium that was far more permanent and perhaps more dangerous than the Press Control Branch. A questionable news story might be forgotten the next day, while a literary work, produced in a seemingly nondisposable format, might have a longer lasting effect and might become relatively permanent over time. For this reason, considerable time and effort were spent on formulating policy regarding who could publish and what materials were appropriate for public consumption. This resulted in there being relatively little pressure being put on the Publications Control Branch to produce new content quickly. The Publications Control Branch also had the option of translating appropriate works from English before suitable German production was realised. It also undertook the greatest scrutiny of its applicants, because they were envisioned as having the longest lasting impact on how Germany’s “mind” was to develop for the foreseeable future. As with the previous two branches, the Radio Control Branch was responsible for the technical and editorial supervision. It was perhaps in the area of radio broadcasting that some of the most heated debates

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regarding who controlled the medium took place. Time and again, the two principal political parties in Germany, the SPD, and the CDU, took umbrage at the individuals chosen to run a particular radio service. While these discussions were part of the environment of the other media, the recognition that radio at the time was the most powerful way of reaching the average person, who would now be able to cast their vote freely, added a tremendous political urgency in the new Germany. Film, Theater, and Music fell under the governance of a single branch. This had as much to do with the fact that these areas were not considered as politically sensitive as the other three, as it did with them being related to one another and sharing the same facilities. An important aspect of this branch was the fact that it also controlled the importation of films from foreign countries; such as Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. One of the resulting challenges was access to hard currency with which they could obtain these foreign films. A further difficulty was deciding which films were appropriate for showing in Germany after the war. One particular film that was not allowed to be brought into Germany was Oliver Twist (1948), in which Sir Alec Guinness played Fagan. It was thought, given Germany’s recent history, that the German public was not ready for that type of portrayal of a Jew. It also led to some rather embarrassing questions being posed by civilian officers about whether the Allies had the right to stand in judgment over the anti-Semitism of the German people. A further film that was singled out personally by General McClure, as inappropriate for German audiences, was The Maltese Falcon, which he felt tended to confirm the propaganda produced by Goebbels during the war.6 Furthermore, any films that presented mob activity during the twenties and thirties received a blanket ban. While the explanation used by the ICD was that they did not want the United States portrayed in a poor light, the parallel between the violence of the American mobster and the Nazi street thugs may not have eluded them. It was in the final group, the Business Management Branch, where the finances of the ICD operations were administered. The entire process was run in a manner intended to generate income to support the functioning of the ICD since it did not receive a regular budget allocation to produce its material. Thus, the ICD had its own bank accounts containing money that did not come through the proper military channels and for which it did not have to account. These funds could be used at the discretion of the ICD to support the projects it thought worthwhile. They were thus able to pay for copyright permissions in much the same way that any other commercial 6

NARA RG 260 390/42/20/4 Box 266.

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publishing house, radio station, or newspaper might. Not only was the ICD an independent structure within OMGUS, but perhaps more importantly, it was also to a great extent financially independent. One of the greatest problems that the ICD faced was the requirement to perform functions that were hardly military in nature. The ICD needed to maintain a separate self-contained unit to carry out technical, operational responsibilities associated with restoring information services in Germany, which involved the repair of printing facilities and radio broadcasters. This unit was located at Bad Nauheim. It was comprised of technical and professional people in all fields of information services, who were both civilian and military and was the first unit to employ a great deal of native German expertise. DISCCs were located in each of the districts of the American zone of control. Each of these replicated the divisional structure. However, numerous specialist units, such as those that might focus on a particular type of music, were stationed in the ten largest cities in the American zone and the Bremen enclave.

ICD Personnel The commander of the ICD was General McClure.7 Born in Mattoon, Illinois, on March 4, 1897, he received his education at the Kentucky Military Institute. He served in the Philippine Constabulary between July 13, 1916, and August 9, 1917, and was then commissioned in the regular army as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. Promotions came quickly for the young officer. He was promoted to 1st Lieutenant on August 9, 1917, and to Captain (temporarily) on June 20th, 1918. On July 1, 1920, his promotion was made permanent. In the inter-war years, as one might expect, promotions came slowly, as was the case with most other officers. He was made a Major on August 1st, 1935 and then Lieutenant Colonel on August 9, 1940. A little more than a year later he was temporarily raised to the rank of Colonel on Dec. 24, 1941, and on March 15, 1942, to Brigadier General (temporary). McClure‘s first posting was at Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands, with the 31st Infantry, until November 1917, which had been formed in the Philippines on August 16, 1916. He then joined the 15th Infantry at Tientsin and Tongshaw, China. It was here that he had his first 7

The brief Curriculum Vitae of Robert McClure recorded here is based on one found in the archival files relating to the history of the ICD held at NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69.

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experience with Military/Civilian government since it was the task of the US military in China to disarm troops fleeing the White Russian forces. He later joined the 27th Infantry in Manila and saw service in Siberia during the Russian Revolution. Though this is not mentioned in any of the CVs available on McClure, the 27th Infantry was encamped in the vicinity of Vladivostok, Russia in 1918 and 1919. Later, he was transferred to a new regiment, the 19th Infantry, and was stationed to Camp Sherman, Ohio, in October 1920. During this tour, his regiment served on a special assignment at Borderland, West Virginia, in the latter part of 1920. He returned to Camp Sherman as an exchange officer in January 1921, and in the coming October joined the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. Here he enrolled in the infantry school in October 1924 and graduated the next June. One year later, he also graduated from the cavalry school, Fort Riley, Kansas. From July 1926 to September 1930 McClure served as an instructor at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He was graduated from the two-year course at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in June 1932, and was assigned as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Riverside Military Academy, Gainesville, Georgia. McClure entered the Army War College, Washington, D.C., in August 1935, and graduated in June 1936, remaining at the Army War College as executive officer. From July 16th, 1940, until August 2nd, 1941, he was personnel officer, G-1, of the Fourth Army, with headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. He was then assigned as military attaché in London, England on March 24, 1942, and in June 1942 he took on additional duties as military attaché to the governments in exile for Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Holland, Belgium, Norway and Yugoslavia. In September 1942, McClure was designated intelligence officer, G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Staff, as chief of the information and censorship section. He returned to the European theatre of operations in November 1943 and was assigned to COSSAC. In April 1944 he was moved to G-6 (psychological warfare), SHAEF. He was given additional duty as the director, Information Control Service, U.S. Group Control Counsel in Germany, in March 1945. Upon the disbandment of SHAEF, he was Director of Information Control, OMGUS. McClure‘s abilities were highly regarded by his peers. Bruce Lockhart, a former member of the British Political Warfare Executive, who could be

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acerbic in his postwar assessments of colleagues,8 was complimentary toward McClure’s abilities in running the PWD and singled out his ability to foster cooperation between the British and American forces.9 McClure was also recognised by the United States for his contribution to the fighting. For his service in Tunisia, where, by his own admission the fledgeling PWD was operating on a trial and error basis,10 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1943, with the following citation: For exceptionally meritorious distinguish services in a position of great responsibility. During the Tunisian Campaign, General McClure was charged with the formulation and direction public relations policy of the Allied Forces... conduct of propaganda and operation of censorship... he created a closely integrated American-British organization... developed and maintained harmonious relationships with press of the United Nations... largely responsible for effectiveness of the United Nations propaganda activities in territory of North Africa operations... in occupied territories and the combat zone...11

He was also later awarded the oak leaf cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal for his work in organising SHAEF’s PWD. McClure followed the orders he had received from Eisenhower in every detail. Eisenhower’s instructions were to “rigidly control” all aspects of Germany’s information services. McClure’s tight control of the ICD can be observed in the memos that emanated from his office, which often involved themselves in minute policy details, which will become apparent in later examples of how he directed the ICD’s operations. While he allowed for a great deal of operational freedom at the DISCC level, which sometimes has been interpreted as representing a lack of control of the ICD organisation, he expected policy to be adhered to closely. An interesting point in regard to McClure‘s directives concerning ICD policy is that it appears that he took little time in drafting his own policies. He gave this task to the civilian experts in his office. Almost every memo coming from his office refers to McClure in the third person, though they take care to note that he had approved the policy or memorandum. In this way, he was able to utilise his civilian experts, while at the same time 8

Lockhart was particularly critical of Sefton Delmar and engaged in a bitter war of words with this erstwhile colleague. 9 R. H. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning (London: Putnam, 1947), 295. 10 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare. Its Origins, 2nd Edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 12. 11 NARA, RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69.

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maintaining the authority of the Military Government in the ICD’s activities. Invoking this dual authority, civilian and military, was not as unusual as it might seem. As noted earlier, there was at times considerable friction within the ICD due to its strange mixture of professional military personnel and civilian experts. The military people often found the civilians, who at home were presidents of large corporations, university professors, or Hollywood celebrities, to be undisciplined. On the other hand, the civilian personnel found that the professional military people did not always share their enthusiasm for an obscure collection of compositions that should be published or recorded.12 The mixing of forms of authority in the memos, civilian expertise with the military authority, ensured that whether the recipient was a member of the military or a civilian expert, the message it carried would be respected. McClure was able to assemble a team that was truly distinguished in various aspects of the communications profession. William S. Paley served as a colonel with the PWD and the ICD in the capacity of Deputy Chief of the Information Control Division. Paley was also the President of the Columbia Broadcasting System from 1928 to 1946 and then served as chair of CBS from 1946 to 1983. Prior to this, his Deputy Chief had been Charles Douglas Jackson, who was Vice-President of Time-Life Inc. with whom McClure maintained a friendship long after the war had ended. Another officer in McClure‘s operation was Billy Wilder, who had returned to Germany, as a civilian with the rank of colonel, to serve under CBS president William Paley. During this time, Wilder wrote a 400-page manual to help reconstruct the German film industry. Upon his return to Hollywood, he directed the political satire A Foreign Affair (1948), which served as a commentary on the American occupation of Berlin. Its plot tells the story of a congressional committee’s visit to occupied Berlin to investigate G.I. morals. The idea for the film had already been percolating in Wilder’s mind while in Germany, which is attested to by the flurry of memos that were circulated referencing the initial proposal submitted by Wilder to the ICD regarding the film.13 In fact, McClure himself took an interest in the project and convened a meeting with the particular topic being the content of Wilder’s movie. Not all of the senior personnel had the high public profiles of Paley, Jackson, or Wilder. Many of them were simply educators who had studied 12

Edward Breitenkamp, The U.S. Information Control Division 1945-49 (Grand Forks, N.D.: 1953), 42. Breitenkamp notes that the military personnel took little interest in the day-to-day working of the ICD. 13 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 135.

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in Germany and had varying degrees of facility with the German language. Perhaps the most significant of these was Dr. Douglas Waples, who was a professor of social psychology at the University of Chicago and served as chief of the US sector in Berlin and was one of the few who were associated with the ICD throughout most of its existence. Among other things, he planned and helped execute the move of a significant number of prestigious publishing houses from Leipzig to Wiesbaden in May and June of 1945. This in itself ensured that the American zone would have a good starting point for its work in the re-education of the German people. One last individual worth making special note of was the head of the ICD’s Intelligence Branch, who might be informally called McClure‘s pitbull. As David Monod correctly points out, the Intelligence Branch saw its role more as “exterminating Nazism rather than promoting democracy” and that it was the job of the ICD to eradicate Germany’s cultural elite and to prepare a foundation for something new.14 Under Alfred Toombs, the Intelligence Branch was indeed ruthless to the point of some of Toombs’ subordinates questioning what they might have considered being the rather callous treatment of individuals who, on the surface, appeared to be victims of Nazi persecution. Here, at least, one might have expected a warmer reception given such credentials. This was not the case. Toombs was just as suspicious of apparent victims as he was of those who had a past to hide. Toombs may have had very personal and understandable reasons for his seemingly cold-hearted attitude towards any file, Fragebogen, or application that came across his desk, regardless of the applicant’s provenance. His subordinates were the first intelligence officers to enter Buchenwald Concentration camp after its liberation. This might explain a certain hardheartedness in his dealings with Nazi sympathisers coming under his scrutiny, but it does not entirely explain him having the same attitude towards what one might have classified at the time as “good Germans.” In fact, one might think he would be sympathetic to their cause considering he had been a witness to their suffering. On April 11, 1945, the main complex of the Buchenwald Concentration Camp was liberated by the American military. As part of the initial group entering the camp were intelligence officers under Toombs’ authority. On April 24, 1945, Egon W. Fleck (civilian) and 1st Lieutenant Edward A. Tenenbaum submitted a preliminary report on the

14

David Monod, Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, & the Americans, 1945-1953 (Chapel Hill: U North Carolina Press, 2005), 34.

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camp and the condition of its former prisoners to the 12th Army Group Headquarters with an introduction written by Toombs. There he writes: [The report] is NOT just another report on a concentration camp. It does not deal exclusively with the horror of life in Buchenwald, nor with the brutalities of the Nazi perverts. It is the story of wheels within wheels. It tells how the prisoners themselves organized a deadly terror within the Nazi terror. The report is obviously controversial. It has not been possible in so short a time to cross-check and weigh every detail. But independent investigation leads to the tentative conclusion that the basic story can be accepted. Later study and interrogation may result in modification of this picture–one-way or the other. But one thing is certain: There will have to be further investigation of the people of this and all concentration camps. Because the report makes it clear that in our search for decent, democratic elements which we can trust in Germany we cannot accept at face value ALL those people who were incarcerated for opposing the Nazi brand of fascism.15

Clearly, learning of how the concentration camp inmates themselves sometimes proved to be little better than the guards that confined them coloured Toombs’ attitude as Head of the ICD’s Intelligence Branch. He took nothing at face value and questioned the background and motives of even the most victimised of applicants. In doing so, he interpreted OMGUS directives literally and conservatively, with each candidate being presumed guilty.

The Expatriates and the Brain-Factory There was a further sub-grouping within the ICD. These were the refugees who had escaped Germany and found themselves in the employ of the PWD and then the ICD, those who had been prisoners of war deemed to be sufficiently anti-Nazi in their political leaning to be entrusted with vital re-education projects after the war. Billy Wilder could certainly be considered one of the former. The latter, however, for the most part, remained on the shadowy fringes, choosing not to stand in the limelight and not calling much attention to themselves. In November of 1944, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, received a proposal from a group headed by Professor Warren A. Seavey 15

Egon W. Fleck and Edward A. Tenenbaum, “Buchenwald: A Preliminary Report” to Headquarters 12th Army Group Publicity and Psychological Warfare, April 24, 1945. Papers of Richard Crossman. University of Warwick. 154/3/PW/1/9-17. Emphasis as in the original.

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of the Harvard Law School. In the proposal, Seavey suggested, “that German prisoners of war in the United States receive a fuller education on the ideals of democracy through a definite program.”16 Stimson, subsequent to receiving the proposal, sent two letters to the Harvard branch of the American Defense Organization of which Seavey was vice chairman. In these letters, Stimson outlines his reasons for rejecting the proposal. The primary motive he gives for his considering the Seavey proposal unworkable is that he, along with the War Department, felt that such a procedure “would be met with suspicion, hostility and resistance.”17 While Stimson concentrated on how such a program would garner results opposite of what the United States wanted to achieve, it appears more likely that he was reacting to the suggestion that the Seavey group wanted to have civilians conduct a survey in the prisoner of war camps in an effort to determine which of the prisoners “might be amenable to reeducation.”18 Finally, Stimson points out that the War Department had “for a long time been separating cooperative and non-cooperative prisoners,”19 indicating that the War Department was quite satisfied with what was already being done and, perhaps more significantly, that they were already engaged in planning a similar program that was at this point still classified. Regardless of Stimson‘s public rejection of the Seavey proposal, a plan that was in most respects identical to that suggested by Seavey was already underway. Evidence of this may be found in an article written for The New York Times by Dana Adams Schmidt in 1946.20 She interviewed former prisoners of war holding what were described as key posts in post-war Germany. Most reported that they had begun their re-education program in August of 1944, a full three months before Stimson rejected such a plan as unworkable. Of course, this should not be surprising, because, for a program like this to be effective, it is best to have it operate covertly. While most of those involved became minor functionaries and served in the German police service, some were in a position to have a much greater impact. Indeed, one might conclude that the “Special Prisoners” project had a significant impact on the overall development of Western Europe. For example, in the “Photographic Record: Former Special Prisoners Engaged in their Present Jobs as Civilians” one finds a picture of 16 Special to The New York Times, “Stimson Rejects Plan to Teach Nazi War Prisoners Democracy,” New York Times 30 November 1944: 5. 17 “Stimson Rejects Plan to Teach Nazi War Prisoners Democracy,” 5. 18 “Stimson Rejects Plan to Teach Nazi War Prisoners Democracy,” 5. 19 “Stimson Rejects Plan to Teach Nazi War Prisoners Democracy,” 5. 20 Dana Adams Schmidt, “German Captives Push Democracy.” New York Times June 9, 1944: 33.

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Dr. Walter Hallstein of the Universität Frankfurt am Main, who later became the first President of the European Commission.21 Though the records give only sparse information, and could not anticipate his future importance in the development of Europe, it is clear that Hallstein was considered one of their successes even at this early stage. While quite a few of the special prisoners took on leading editorial roles in Germany’s cultural industry, Alfred Andersch and Hans Richter took a special place within this group of “Special Prisoners” for two reasons. Andersch and Richter were the motivating force behind the Gruppe 47, which was a literary organisation in post-war Germany dedicated, at least initially, to encouraging young German authors. The second is their apparent falling out with the Military Government authorities. Both had been part not only of the prisoner of war newspaper Der Ruf but were also later part of the so-called “Rhode Island Project.” Once accepted into the “Rhode Island Project,” or, as it was referred to by some, “die Gehirn-Fabrik,”22 prisoners attended lectures given by a number of educators from leading American Universities. In fact, Peter Demetz notes that Andersch participated in the lectures enthusiastically.23 The hope was to establish a new intellectual elite in Germany. Some of the topics covered were: American Studies,24 American History and Political Science,25 and German History.26 This new elite, it was hoped, would owe their allegiance to the American democratic system. It was further anticipated that they would be able to impose these values on German cultural and political life after the war. The re-education process of a German POW began shortly after the soldier was captured. Following an initial questioning, it was determined to what degree the individual adhered to National Socialist doctrine. At 21

NARA RG 389 290/34/29/4 Box 1604. Volker Christian Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt. Über die Konstituierung der deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur in den amerikanischen Kriegsgefangenenlagern (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1971), 23. “Die Gehirn-Fabrik” was used in referring to Fort Getty. For a more thorough discussion on how the Gehirnfabrik operated, see Arthur L. Smith The War for the German Mind and Judith M. Gansberg Stalag USA. 23 Demetz, Peter. After the Fires. Recent Writing in the Germanies, Austria and Switzerland (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 8. 24 Taught by Howard M. Jones, Harvard University and President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 25 Taught by Thomas V. Smith, University of Chicago, he was also director of the program. 26 Taught by Arnold Wolfers and Fritz Mommsen both of Yale University and Henry Ehrmann of the Institute of World Affairs, New York. 22

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this point, the prisoners were separated into two distinct groups. One group consisted of those who were deemed anti-fascist. These were designated “White.” The other, much larger, group was comprised of general prisoners who did not display the requisite political attitudes. They were designated “Black.” In total, there were an estimated 375,000 German prisoners held in the United States.27 Of this, according to Wehdeking, approximately 15,000 were segregated as anti-Nazis and were housed in separate camps.28 The number suggested by Wehdeking is debatable since it is reported that approximately 26,000 German prisoners went through the re-education program according to news reports of the time.29 There was also a practical aspect to their education. Numerous specialists were brought to the camp from Washington D.C. to instruct the “students” in English. Moreover, American military personnel also gave lectures on administration and military government in preparation for the roles they might take in Germany upon their return.30 The prisoners who successfully completed the course of study began returning to Germany in October of 1945 and were expected to aid in the governance of occupied Germany.31 As mentioned above, two of the more notable figures to emerge from the Rhode Island Project were Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter. Together they were the ostensible editors, under the watchful eyes of Allied Information Control Officers, of the initial version of Der Ruf, the most extensively circulated of the POW newspapers. This journal, however, was to take on a second incarnation after the end of hostilities. Upon their return to Germany, Andersch and Richter obtained one of the first publishing licenses and continued Der Ruf as a literary journal. In it, they hoped to create a forum in which not only literary issues were discussed but the deeper philosophical problems facing post-war Germany. Publication continued until April of 1947 when the Military Government cancelled its license. In A History of West Germany, Dennis Bark and David Gress engage the question of why Der Ruf was closed down.32 They point out that the journal had reached a circulation of 100,000 in all three Western zones and 27

Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt, 3. Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt, 6. 29 Adams Schmidt, “German Captives Push Democracy.” 33. 30 Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt, 23. 31 “German Captives Trained Here,” New York Times (October 21, 1945), 5. 32 Dennis Bark and David Gress, A History of West Germany. From Shadow to Substance, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 163-164. 28

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that it was enormously enjoyed among returning war veterans. They, however, point to Richter as the main problem for the Americans, when they describe him as being above all an anti-American and that he “wrote in rosy terms of events and conditions in the Soviet zone.” They suggest that the raison d’être of the journal was advocacy of “socialist humanism” which was inspired by a rejection of the idea of collective guilt and a critical attitude to OMGUS and the whole notion of re-education and denazification in general. They suggest that the journal’s editors’ initial anti-Communism did subside in favour of a radical leftist stance of opposition to the social, political, and cultural order emerging under Allied tutelage in West Germany.33 This position, however, is not supported by the reasons the ICD gave in their correspondence for closing the journal down. Moreover, many other magazines and newspapers took an even stronger stand in regard to idolising the Soviet sector and were not shuttered. The reasons for this are debatable and unclear. Wehdeking reports that it was due to the nihilistic tone of the articles appearing in its pages.34 However, Ralf Schnell, in Die Literatur der Bundesrepublik Autoren, Geschichte, Literaturbetrieb, reports that Der Ruf was suspended due to its critical position towards Allied politics and the concept of collective guilt as sponsored by the western Allies.35 Rebecca Boehling, on the other hand, states, “Der Ruf’s editorials smeared the search of young intellectuals for their generation’s cultural and national identity. After pinpointing some of the mistakes of the older generation and rejecting a clear-cut choice between an American capitalist or Soviet communist ‘way,’ Andersch and Richter had their license revoked by the US military government in 1947.”36

Sometimes the explanation is simple but offers no support for the position taken. For example, Ralph Willett sees the withdrawal of the license for Der Ruf being due to its nihilism, with no further explanation.37 33

Bark and Gress, A History of West Germany. From Shadow to Substance, 163164. 34 Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt, 139. 35 Ralf Schnell, Die Literatur der Bundesrepublik. Autoren, Geschichte, Literaturbetrieb (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986), 82. 36 Rebecca Boehling, “US Cultural Policy and German Culture during the American Occupation,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990, Vol. I, Ed. Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 389. 37 Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 2-3.

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One of the more recent monographs on the situation of non-ICD journals in Germany sheds little additional light on the situation. Clare Flanagan simply reiterates the already existing theories but does note that the cut in the number of copies allowed to be published by the authorities may well have been a warning to the editors of Der Ruf.38 In fact, she is correct in assuming this. On March 11, 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Kleitz sent a letter to Dr. Douglas Waples of the Publication Control Branch indicating the Andersch and Richter had been told that their circulation was being scaled back to 50,000 for what he called “irresponsible journalism.”39 Moreover, the ICD was going to reassess the situation in June. In any case, there was no further reassessment in June, because the magazine was shut down by the ICD in April. It was further noted that the reprimand was made personally and that no public announcement was to be issued. The abrupt closure of the Der Ruf can be traced to two articles that Andersch and Richter published. The two objectionable pieces are clearly marked in the ICD files with one being a letter to the editor entitled “Das patriotische Trinkwasser” by Gerd Klaass and the second an article entitled “Unmassgebliche Vorschläge zu einem umfassenden Austauschplan zwecks Rettung der Deutschen Kultur” by Walter M. Guggenheim.40 The first is critical of the Allied occupation in that it has created a situation that sees the Germans as second-class citizens in their own country. The second is critical of Allied policy in Germany and the shortages of items on the open market that must then be purchased on the black market. Either of these articles could have warranted imprisonment by a military tribunal. However, not wishing to cause too much of a stir in an already fragile situation, the ICD quietly ordered Der Ruf shutdown. There is merit in both Wehdeking’s assertion and the position put forward by Schnell since it is not one, but two articles that the ICD found objectionable. The ICD did want uplifting stories to appear, especially as the world teetered on the brink of the Cold War. Schnell’s claim is also true, in that one of the articles was indeed critical of the Allied occupiers.

38

Clare Flanagan, A Study of German Political-Cultural Periodicals from the Years of Allied Occupation, 1945-1949 (Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 152. 39 NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. 40 NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254.

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There is some evidence of the regard the Americans involved in the Gehirnfabrik had for Andersch. He had to go through a battery of examinations that tested and graded41 his knowledge of: 1. 2. 3. 4.

English…………………………………….B+ American History………………………….1 German History……………………………2 Military Government………………………1.5

It was further noted that Andersch had excellent knowledge of Munich (he had lived there for 23 years), Frankfurt am Main (2-year residence), and Hamburg (he had resided there for 5 years). Interestingly, it does not mention the fact that he had been interned in Dachau in 1933 for 6 months due to his activity with the Communists in southern Germany. In addition, it notes that he had a wife who was part Jewish with the statement that this precluded his membership in any Nazi organisation. In this case, it was used to his benefit. It is certainly a far cry from the “mongrel of Jewish descent” he refers to in other documentation of his time as a prisoner of war.42 Moreover, he does not mention that he had divorced her in 1943. However, he is bound to receive more sympathy from the Americans if they believe his story. He does note his membership in the DAF, which did not preclude him from receiving a “White” designation. It is also interesting to note that Andersch at this time already lists as “avocational experience of military significance” writer, novelist, and radio scriptwriter. The Andersch case mentioned above demonstrates that the American system of vetting candidates may not have been as tight as they would have liked to have believed. The comments made by the investigators responsible for deciding who would become part of the re-education of Germany were glowing. On the cover of the Andersch file the remark “good man” is found. It seems the Americans may have made a monumental error in sizing up Andersch, or there is more to the story than has been revealed so far by archival documents. There is the possibility that the Americans were “cooking” the official records in a way that 41

The languages were always assigned a standard letter grade. The other subjects were rated according to a 5-point scale: 1=Superior, 2=Excellent, 3=Very Satisfactory, 4=Satisfactory, 5=Unsatisfactory. The complete dossiers are available at NARA RG 389 290/34/29/4 Boxes 1449-1466. 42 W.G. Seebald, On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Modern Library, 2004), 120. It is noteworthy that the handwriting found in the documents uncovered by Seebald match that of the examinations Andersch wrote as a special prisoner of war in 1945.

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allowed them to use Andersch. The problem was that, though Andersch did not reveal his activities in the Communist Party to the Americans, it most likely came to light on his return to Germany. In order to avoid a possible embarrassment as the Cold War started, ties with Andersch were cut. There are many of these “Special Prisoners” documented in the American files. In fact, the above noted “Photographic Record. Former Special Prisoners Engaged in their Present Jobs as Civilians” depicts many of these products of the Gehirnfabrik at work in Germany after the end of the war. They range from anonymous POWs charged with the responsibility of building an ordinance depot in Griesheim near Frankfurt am Main to Dr. Walter Hallstein, who was appointed President of the Frankfurt University and was recognized as one of the leading “Europeans” in Germany’s political reconstruction and Hans Bott, who shortly after his return to Germany worked closely with the Minister of Culture and Education in Baden-Wuerttemberg and later made it into the political inner-circle of the Adenauer government. But of greater direct relevance to the current topic, were individuals like Ernst von Bressendorf, who was a Publication Advisor in the Publication Section of the ICD in Stuttgart. It is clear that the Americans had an extensive plan for how they were going to go about transforming Germany into a model democracy, even though it may have looked disorganised at times.

CHAPTER THREE THE HISTORY

The Sources Early historical studies dealing with Germany’s post-war period rarely cite the primary material used as the basis of their work. Recently published works that use this material, cover only specific aspects of the ICD’s activity, usually either the press or music and do not offer an overview of the ICD work. While these works provide considerable depth in regard to a narrowly defined area that they undertake to document, they do not provide much in the way of context in terms of how the various branches of the ICD functioned together. What follows may best be described as a harmonisation of the various unpublished draft histories produced by anonymous officers of the ICD with commentary based on the files created by its administrative apparatus. There were at least three early attempts by officers attached to the ICD to document the activities of the Division. These were written anonymously with the expressed purpose of synthesising the ICD’s activities on an annual basis. These reports created for OMGUS have until now remained unpublished, though occasionally cited. Relegated to the archives, they have only sparingly been used as references for studies on the various aspects of the ICD’s activities. The three unpublished histories used in this work have been designated as History I,1 History II,2 and History III.3 They provide not only a synthesis of the activities of the ICD and its various branches but demonstrate America’s shifting attitudes as Germany becomes ground zero for the initial phases of the Cold War. History I, a total of 151 typescript pages, provides the most comprehensive, though general, overview of not only the activities of the ICD but also the underlying motives of the organisation. While its official reporting began on the 8th of May 1945, it provides some background on 1

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69. December 1944 to June 30, 1946. NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 70. July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947. 3 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 70. July 1, 1947 to June 30, 1948. From here on referred to as History III. 2

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the origins of the unit as the Psychological Warfare Division prior to that date. In this initial report, it becomes clear that the ICD is engaging in Kunstpolitik. Regulation of the media and information dissemination in the American zone was designed to be an equally strict program of control and supervision. The difference between control and supervision is a topic that is taken up by Tania Long in a February 23, 1946, article written for the New York Times. Supervision, in her view, was the positive side of the work of the ICD. It entailed encouraging and directing the German efforts towards democracy and away from National Socialism and militarism. Control was the inverse of supervision. It required licensing, restricting, and on occasion punishing the fledgeling German media.4 She, however, emphasised that the ICD was to control the German media and not the non-German press. Overall, the tone of the document is idealistic and refers to the advancement of the cause of all of the Allied nations, 5 which was to change in the two subsequent unpublished histories. This would be entirely in keeping with the initial attitudes of those employed by the ICD. Again, in reports in newspapers in the United States, the idealism of some of the officers is noted. This, however, becomes a problem for the ICD later as the early personnel begins to be replaced in 1946. It was hoped that some of these initial recruits could be convinced to reenlist; however, frustrations with the lack of policy direction from Washington and a dearth of resources from the Army led many of these idealists to later, in the words of C. L. Sulzberger, “fling up their hands and quit,”6 an attitude that is evident as an undercurrent in some of the studies produced later by those who had been directly involved in the ICD’s work. History II appears to be less official in nature and runs a total of 75 typescript pages, though not all of the pages are filled. It is cursory in some areas of the ICD’s activities, and recapitulates much of what was already stated in History I, but it does fill in areas not covered in History I. Moreover, its purpose seems to be different from that of the initial history. It focuses on issues such as the gathering of intelligence, denazification, how the blacklists were compiled, and the study of the reactions the German people had toward the occupation and how the ICD might be 4

Tania Long, “Army Still Blocks News in Germany; German Civilian Workers Have Access to Material Denied to U.S. Journalists.” 5 History I. 6 C. L. Sulzberger, “US Psychology Fails in Germany,” The New York Times, March 6, 1946.

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more effective. While History I can be deemed to be idealistic in its expression of the activities of the ICD in Germany, History II concerns itself with the political realities of the time. Where History I appears more outward looking, History II describes the ICD on an operational level and how its various branches functioned as an organisation. While the Histories I and II describe much the same time frame, with History II repeating much of what was already stated in the previous report and adding a little new information that arose over the period of its reporting, History III is chronologically removed and deals with the situation in the American Zone of Control as it developed from July 1, 1947, to the end of June 1948. It ends approximately where the Berlin crisis begins, after which the focus of the western occupation was shifted from denazifying Germany to fighting the Cold War. History III provides insights into how the tensions began to mount between the United States and the Soviet Union. A comparison of the three histories yields evidence of trends in how the American occupation forces dealt with their former allies, primarily their relationship with the Soviet Union. However, it also illuminates aspects of how they worked in partnership with the British and French occupation forces. In the initial history, the emphasis is on ensuring that the Germans realise that they have been completely defeated and that there is a collective guilt that all Germans share. Moreover, Nazism is clearly targeted. However, in the second history, there are some changes that can easily be noted. There is still a sense that the ICD wants to ensure that the Germans realise that they have been completely defeated, but any language referring to collective guilt on the part of the Germans has disappeared. By the writing of the third history, there is what can best be described as a seismic shift in how the ICD deals with not only the Germans but also the Soviets. When references are made to Nazism, and these are indeed sparse in comparison to the first two histories, it is usually done in comparison with Communism.

Overview The ICD officially came into being on the 12th of May 1945 and operated as a parallel organisation to the PWD for two months. It consisted of a special staff division of ETOUSA, which was, in turn, redesignated two months later as USFET.7 It was only on the 13th of July 7

History I.

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Chapter Three

1945 that the Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Division ceased to operate. In the intervening two months, the personnel of the Psychological Warfare Division were reassigned to the ICD, which was in charge of operations, and the ICS, which was in charge of policy and planning. Though technically separate organisations, they were both under the overall control of General McClure. Since the Psychological Warfare Division had been a joint operation, the British personnel were transferred to the ISCB of the British Military Government in Germany. As 1945 came to a close, a significant change was in the air for the ICD. Until then, General McClure and his staff had operated independently of the Military Government structures in Germany, answering directly to the Military Governor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and finally General Joseph T. McNarney. It was under McNarney that on December 11, 1945, the ICD was no longer a separate staff division and its responsibilities were now transferred to OMGUS.8 Though this move was purely administrative, it did mark the beginning of the ICD operating in a governing rather than a security role. The opinion that the ICD had of the general German population dictated to a large degree how individual officers approached the job of reeducating Germany.9 In the ICD’s view, almost the whole population of Germany was incapable of reading “the facts” and then forming their own opinion. Much of this mindset can be ascribed to the studies, both military and civilian, that had flowed into what was then still the PWD. These consisted of documents such as “A Report on Germany after the War,” which was published in July of 1945, but had already been circulated as a secret document among those in the American and British forces, who were preparing to govern post-war Germany in late 1944.10 In the ICD’s view, the German population had become so accustomed to being told what to think that it was unnecessary to change its approach to something that required the average German to make too many choices on his or her own. It also required that not only the physical wreckage found in postwar Germany but the ideological wreckage as well, be cleared away. This was one of the underlying reasons for why they forced the cessation of all publishing in their zone. At the beginning of the second year of the occupation, the efforts of the ICD continued to focus on driving the point home that the German people 8

History I. History I. 10 A report had already been written by Lt. Col. Victor Dicks, who was one of the primary advisors to the British War Office concerning psychological warfare, before February 1, 1945. FO 1049/72. 9

The History

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have been completely defeated. However, differently from the first year, there was a recognition of the establishment of eventual freedom of expression in at least the American zone and the clear acknowledgement that they are not there yet.11 Another issue that the ICD needed to confront in their second year of operation was the issue of there not been one single written policy that governed their activities.12 Rather, they were guided by a disparate collection of memos and letters that had been exchanged by their various offices, with the occasional directive being given by General McClure or OMGUS. The most important document was still the Potsdam Agreement, which served as the final arbiter in questionable situations. In addition, the ICD was tasked with working together with the other occupation powers in order to reach a coordinated policy. Though the Americans did have a plan in place as early as November 1944, it was in effect only in their zone of control and did not represent a coordinated agreement on how to deal with media control in the other zones. In History II there is an explanatory note included regarding the state of primary documents relating to the basic policies of the ICD. It reported, “owing to an almost complete lack of documents relating to Information Control Policy, this section [the section in the manuscript dealing with policy formation] is intended merely as an outline in its present form.”13 This note reveals that 1) OMGUS and the ICD had not fully comprehended the enormity or scope of the task they had before them, i.e. trying to change completely the mode of thinking of an entire nation, 2) that the death of Roosevelt and the subsequent falling out of favour of the Morgenthau group in Washington created a policy vacuum at a critical time, and 3) the officers on the ground in Germany were often left to develop their own policies or deduce them from documents such as the Potsdam Agreement or the JCS 1067. All three of these factors led to at least the appearance of a lack of consistency or coordinated mode of operating in the field of information control in Germany by the Americans. This would then have been further exacerbated by the large number of “unsoldierly” civilian types, who were members of the ICD, and had their own ideas on how Germany should be reconstructed. In the absence of prepared policies, the ICD simply reached for that which was readily at hand. The basis for all subsequent information control policy was the Potsdam Agreement. What flowed from this were the two cornerstones of ICD activity: “The first was to inculcate the German people with a sense of their own war and atrocity guilt. The 11

History II. History II. 13 History II. 12

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second was to instil in the Germans the values of a democratic way of life, with the establishment of eventual freedom of expression.”14 Here one finds that there are actually three policy positions in operation. Two of them are overt: 1) the Germans as a nation were guilty of the events of the Second World War, and 2) the Germans needed to be provided with a democratic model through the information media. The third is covert. The Germans were a defeated nation with no right, at least initially, to freedom of expression. What is made clear from the outset is that the Germans in the American sector would not be able to express themselves as they wished, but would express themselves in ways consistent with what the American occupation thought appropriate. Accompanying these official policies were a number of underlying assumptions that guided the activities of the ICD in Germany. The details of how these assumptions were reached will be discussed further below and are perhaps best summarised by Harold Hurwitz, when he suggests that the four powers in control of post-war Germany, and charged with introducing democracy through their re-education programs, had the following negative views of the German mind: a) Germans preferred an authoritarian structure, b) Germans preferred a hierarchical caste society, c) the Germans tended to be disposed towards collectivism.15 This in turn, according to Hurwitz, predisposed the American reformers and re-educators to emphasise liberal and egalitarian aspects of their own tradition.16 The American takeover of German media services had been carefully planned, with initial strategies being developed as early as 1943. In all, there were to be three distinct phases to the ICD’s activities. The first phase was to see a complete shutdown of Germany’s media, which was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion as more and more of Germany came under Allied control with Military Government Law No. 191, issued under the authority of the Supreme Commander in January 1945. This law “was amended in June 1945 to include television broadcasts and the sale and distribution of publications and sound recordings.”17 The second phase of their plan would see the Allied Forces overtly operating “certain selected instruments of public information.” In doing so, they also had complete control of its content. 14

History II. Harold Hurwitz, “Comparing American Reform Efforts,” in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 19441952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 323. 16 Harold Hurwitz, “Comparing American Reform Efforts,” 323 – 324. 17 History I. The second decree became known as “Law No. 191 Amended (1).” 15

The History

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The third phase involved a gradual return of the media to German control through careful selection of licensees who had been chosen for their anti-Nazi, democratic-mindedness. Once all of the German information sources had been shut down, the Allies needed to fill the information void they had created. In order to fill this gap, the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) published “clearlylabelled overt weekly newspapers,” so as to “fulfil the immediate need for disseminating news and information in Germany and for transmitting Military Government instructions and regulations to the populace.”18 The same was done with German radio. The third phase was itself divided into three stages. At first, conditional licenses were to be issued, though one might argue that all of the licenses were conditional, because they could be, and were, revoked from those that did not follow the ICD regulations. As evidence of the how often and severely punishment was meted out to those unwilling to follow ICD regulation, one need only consult the archival material on ICD reports on licensee penalties.19 Moreover, the PWD, and subsequently the ICD, “retained the right of pre-publication scrutiny of all material published by such licensee.” The second stage involved post-publication scrutiny of publications, a practice that was employed most often, because of its pragmatism and the fact that there was a built-in penalty for not adhering strictly to the ICD’s guidelines. It ensured that almost all publishers did not venture near any of the grey areas or policy ambiguities. The order to pulp even a single edition would have, in most cases, led to financial ruin. The ICD, as noted by Ziemke, needed to avoid the stigma of book burning and issued strict orders against it. They deposited copies in American research libraries and pulped the rest.20 The final stage saw the removal of any restrictions and controls with complete control of the media being put into German hands. While the ICD had initially planned for prepublication scrutiny, as noted above, this seems never to have taken place according to reports and memos issued by the various offices operated by the ICD. In reality, due to its impracticality, the whole first phase was barely perceptible as it had initially been planned and the ICD moved straight to the second phase, which involved only post-publication scrutiny of already published material.21 18

History I. NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. 20 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946. (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975), 375. 21 History I. 19

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The most significant problem that ICD officers encountered was a shortage of suitable candidates. It was not necessarily the case that they could not find individuals who were suitably “clean,” but that the individuals they were left with lacked the necessary influence to start a media outlet and/or they had such low self-confidence that they were considered ill-suited to rebuilding Germany’s information and media services.22 From the outset, the granting of media licenses was reserved for “natural” persons. No corporations would receive a license from the ICD. This policy emphasised that individual Germans were to be held liable for what was printed, broadcast, or performed on stage.23 The ICD was thus permitted to impose meaningful penalties that went beyond financial fines and the dissolution of corporations. It also ensured that individuals who had stepped outside of the rules put in place by the ICD could not simply hide their misdeeds behind the impersonal façade of a corporation and then simply re-enter the German media under the cloak of another company. The penalties for breaking ICD regulations ranged “from warnings and reprimands for minor infractions, to fines, suspension of license or right to engage in the activity for periods ranging up to three months, revocation of license or permanent suspension, and when warranted, to criminal prosecution of the registrant.”24 Regardless of who they were, if they engaged in any sort of publishing or broadcasting without a license, they were prosecuted, if caught. This also held true of individuals the ICD held in particularly high regard, such as Kurt Port of Cotta-Verlag, who had his license revoked on July 2, 1946, for having published poems that had a militaristic tone.25 Even Kurt Schauer, the publisher of the Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel, was ordered by the ICD to fire his editor and also received a reprimand for having published material that was in violation of ICD instructions.26 There was one group that appeared to be a particularly difficult and thorny problem for the ICD. The biggest technical offenders were the churches. This left the ICD officers at loose ends since many of them must have realised the mimeographing of a church order of service may have

22

History I. History I. 24 History I. 25 NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. “Penalties for German Licensed Publishers in the US Zone and Berlin Sector.” 26 NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. “Penalties” memo October 23, 1946. 23

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fallen within the letter of the law, but that the laying of criminal charges in these cases was not necessarily a reflection of the spirit of the law.27 The ICD was unique in relation to the other organisations within OMGUS, in that it used requisitioned wealth or property not for the benefit of the occupation forces, i.e. in order to support the occupying troops directly, but used it to establish Germans in business. They did this in order to address the problem of many of the licensees not having enough capital to be self-supporting. So, the ICD ensured that this did not become a barrier to their successful launch of a publishing house, newspaper, or another form of media outlet.28 Not only were facilities included, but equipment, copyrights, contracts, and trade names as well. All of this was justified by the furtherance of the mission of the ICD.29 Within two weeks of the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the PWD began disseminating directives related to how it wanted to develop Germany’s new media. On May 22, 1945, the first directive was issued to its various branches in occupied Germany, which was the beginning of the so-called overt media. Radio broadcasts, newspapers, and whatever other means the US Military Government used to communicate with the German population operated under the PWD’s control. Eventually, American overt media would consist of five radio stations, situated in Bremen, Berlin, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich; one newspaper, Die Neue Zeitung (The New Newspaper), published in Munich with a zone-wide and inter-zonal circulation; three magazines, Heute (Today), Amerikanische Rundschau (American Review), Neue Auslese (New Selections), and the weekly newsreel Welt im Film (World in Film), which was produced jointly by US and British Military Governments. The intention was that these “outlets serve as the example or ‘spark’ for the large number of US licensed media, including DENA, the German news agency, with 50 German language newspapers, 380 periodicals and other information services operated entirely by Germans.”30 It also reminded the Germans that at any moment the Americans still had the capability to shut down any of the licensed information services and replace it with their own. A further way the ICD made its presence felt was through what was called “officially sponsored news stories and releases.” Though “the licensed services [were] under no obligation or pressure whatever from Military Government to utilize officially sponsored information, the 27

History I. History I. 29 History I. 30 History III. 28

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material [was] widely exploited on its merits.”31 One of those merits being that it was available free of charge and could thus improve the profit margins of the licensed media. The PWD‘s two goals were first, to create a passive acquiescence of the German people toward the occupation forces and second to stimulate food production in Germany. In addition to this, the PWD started to focus on the re-education process in Germany. To this end, two primary goals were enumerated: the inculcation of a sense of collective guilt among the German people and exposing the fatal consequences of Germany’s Nazi and militaristic leadership.32 As will be seen later, these goals were modified (January 1946) with the beginning of the Nuremberg process and then virtually eliminated in the prelude to the Cold War as the friction between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated. Six days later, on May 28, 1945, a second directive was issued in which the PWD retreated somewhat from its original hard-line.33 This highlights the confusion of policies that existed in the early days of the occupation. It also added to the hesitancy on the part of potential publishers in Germany to self-identify. Having become accustomed to official government sources telling them what to publish, many simply waited until they had some sense of where the occupation government wanted to go in terms of Germany’s new political structures. While this new directive stood firm on the issue of obtaining passive acquiescence from the German people, it also discussed waking the sense of duty among those with anti-Nazi sympathies and was aimed at possible strategies for encouraging these individuals to write once more. The directive was also not silent on the issue of war guilt, but with a subtle shift in how it was to be presented. Officers were to remain firm on the position that all Germans were guilty, but it now allowed for varying iterations of guilt. It was at this point that the PWD began pushing the concept of active versus passive guilt. Those who were considered to have been active criminals were to be punished, whereas the others could make up, or atone, for their crimes through hard work, restitution, and a change of heart. General Eisenhower later more fully established the criteria of atonement for this latter group of Germans in a speech given to the German people on August 6, 1945.34 On January 16, 1946, the ICD released its policy document formally called “Guidance Document #4” or less formally “The American Soldier 31

History III. History I. 33 History I. 34 History I. 32

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in Germany.” In addition, the ICD circulated a document that explained the reasoning for its position to a smaller circle within the higher echelons of OMGUS.35 While other scholars, such as Ziemke, have discussed “Guidance Document #4,” none have looked at the document that provides the rationale that lies behind it. The “rationale memo” is a frank discussion of why the American occupation needed to modify its position in regard to German war guilt. It goes to the fact that, initially, all Germans were considered to be guilty of having waged war against humanity. This was made clear in the documents establishing the ICD. However, eight months after Germany’s unconditional surrender the American occupation found it necessary to begin making distinctions between those who committed the crimes against humanity and those who simply held the same citizenship as those who committed the crimes. Though it is not explicitly stated, its production coincides with Eisenhower‘s speech on German war guilt. In all of this, the ICD recognised that this shift in thinking was going to be difficult because it required a nuanced understanding of Germans as individuals and not a collective. It also recognised the fact that there might actually be groups within Germany that had been pro-democratic during the Nazi regime and that they now constituted the primary hope for creating a peaceful Germany. Moreover, it was acknowledged that for individual American soldiers to either hate or love all things German did not necessarily constitute movement towards achieving the goals they set for the ICD, the elimination of Germany as a threat to peace in Europe. That is, the document does away with the black and white interpretation of Germans as a whole and moves into an area where the Germans are seen as various shades of grey, a concept that is taken as far as the classification of applicants for media licenses, a point that will be clarified later. The “rationale document” also argued that there were good grounds for differential treatment of Germans in order to achieve the goals of the occupation more quickly. The premises of the argument put forward took into consideration both the Potsdam Agreement and the Joint Chiefs of Staff document 1067. It also had to perform a delicate balancing act between the indictments of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg and the public statements made by both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The reasoning behind this new policy is as follows: One cannot condemn all Germans–invoking a racial theory in reverse–and expect a democratic Germany to spring up miraculously. The high assurance that Germany will not again become a menace to the security of 35

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69

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Chapter Three the United States and the world was to destroy the forces that can prevent its emergence in selecting and encouraging individuals and groups of true democratic aspirations and helping them to grow strong.36

In addition, there was the fear that the United States would in some way be obligating itself to occupy and thus run Germany for the foreseeable future if appropriate individuals were not found and supported in the early days of the occupation. There was the very real fear that the American presence in Germany would become permanent. Oddly enough, this did happen to some extent anyway, but it was the result of Cold War with the Soviet Union and not because the Germans had not abandoned their militaristic ways. Through all of this, there is also recognition that the process they were putting in place was not infallible and that there was always the prospect for error. With this in mind, the ICD decided the best course of action was to eliminate influences that might stand in the way of German individuals and groups that were dedicated to establishing Germany as a democracy. By doing so, they left little room for error by excising good tissue with the bad. That is, errors were unavoidable, so it was better to err by eliminating some potentially helpful licensees as long as all of those theoretically detrimental to their cause would be removed as well. The rationale for “The American Soldier in Germany” starts by quoting Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Robert H. Jackson, who was the chief American prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal. In doing so, it establishes as a guiding principle what was to become a defining statement of how the American occupiers understood Germany: We have no purpose to incriminate the whole German people. We know that the Nazi party was not put in power by a majority of the German vote… if the German population had willingly accepted the Nazi program, no storm troopers would have been needed in the early days of the Party, and there would have been no need for concentration camps or the Gestapo.37

Thus, it was decided that, though there were many shortcomings that could be pointed to within the German trade unions, churches, schools, and public service during the Nazi era, the occupation was going to have to work with the material at hand. They chose to believe the words of 36 37

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69.

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President Roosevelt when they quote him: “… and all people, without exception, their lives some instinct for truth, some attraction towards justice, and some passion for peace–buried as they may be in the German case under a brutal regime.”38 Having had eight months to decide what action to take, the ICD determined that their best chances lay with the trade unions and the youth of Germany. They concluded that for the democratic processes to take hold in Germany the trade union movement was an “inevitable accompaniment of the industrial system” and a vital part of any democracy.39 This was in line with Brigadier General McSherry’s opinion that the industrial workforce of Germany was a powerful force for democracy. 40 Moreover, it was one of the few groups in Germany that had acknowledged its role in Germany’s atrocities and admitted its war guilt. Though it is easy to understand how the ICD might want to target the youth of Germany, because of the long-term benefits that would be accrued, it also saw the youth of Germany as perhaps the most injured group they were dealing with. ICD officers understood that the young people in Germany during the Nazi regime had seen “no effort spared to distort their outlook by falsifying history, glorifying war and racial prejudice, inculcating intolerance and indifference to people as human beings and crushing all the finer instincts and potentialities which exist in every people.”41 It was further recognised that very few of Germany’s young people would have had any understanding of what American or British style democracy was like, or what it consisted of. Germany’s young people were also seen as a large, leaderless group that rejected the discredited Nazis and were now looking for some sort of movement to provide leadership. It is here that the common American soldier was to play a vital role. It was the curiosity that young Germans showed for the American way of life that would give these common soldiers a way of reorienting young people, not only in their attitude towards the United States but the world. Thus the American soldier was directed to take a sympathetic interest in Germany’s youth. Officers and ordinary GIs were encouraged to set up clubs for young people. These organisations were to be run by what was 38

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69. NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69. 40 Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry was the Manpower Division Director and had already been closely involved in writing policy and setting up the mechanisms of government in Sicily, France, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. 41 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69. 39

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called “the product[s] of democracy,” or, as McClure phrased it, “the ambassadors of democracy.”42 These ordinary soldiers were to inspire respect and confidence in Germany’s new generation. Moreover, these initiatives were calculated to “teach young Germans … that democracy is not something imposed by decree but something which springs from the individual desires of the people who make up a nation.”43 On the 28th of June 1945, a third directive was issued by the PWD.44 It indicated that the PWD was beginning to undertake what it called “reconnaissance,” which meant they were actively looking for potential licensees. In addition, the directive reveals that some were already beginning to emerge. This was an important step because the foundation of their policies was based on the notion that a German media would have a far greater effect on the occupied Germans than one that was overtly American, or, as restated later, the Germans could best be educated by other Germans.45 In addition, the directive restated that the inculcation of collective guilt in the minds of the German people was to be the initial primary goal of the new media’s message. Later in the directive, it begins to move away from broad general statements and begins to outline what the official policy was going to be in regard to how the PWD, and then the ICD, would communicate with the German people. The newly established German newspapers were to carry the message of Allied past, current, and future intentions in regard to recreating Germany. That is, they would not just tell the Germans of their intentions, but would explain them as well. While this appears to contradict earlier policies that directed the Allied troops not to engage in debate with the Germans about their occupation policies in Germany, it is not necessarily an inconsistency. The general directive of non-fraternization and not engaging in debate with Germans was aimed at the regular soldier on the ground. It was not directed at those in the ICD, who, presumably, were well versed in whatever arguments Germans might present them with in regard to the Allies not actually occupying the moral high ground. Already in February of 1944, before the D-Day invasion, the Allies were trying to anticipate questions that would be directed by the occupied Germans, with some of the questions anticipating in a surprisingly accurate manner Germany’s division.46 42

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69. NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5/6 Box 69. 44 History I. 45 History I. 46 See Appendix B for a full list of anticipated questions. 43

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These were questions to which the ordinary Allied soldier could not respond in an informed manner. Moreover, these questions would have caused difficulties within the ranks of the occupation forces. So, it was simply wiser to instruct soldiers not to engage in debate with Germans and not to fraternise with them. On the other hand, the ICD personnel tended to have a significantly higher level of education than the average Allied soldier in Germany. In addition, there was no real way of enforcing, or even requiring, non-fraternization between the ICD officers and the eventual licensees. They would at times be required to work together rather closely. The directive also justified the reasoning for the manner in which newspaper licensing was undertaken. Newspaper publication licenses were never issued to individuals, but rather to groups. Moreover, these groups would consist of individuals representing different political persuasions, which, at least initially, also involved Communists. The intention was to create an equilibrium of views within the directorship of each newspaper and to establish internal checks and balances. It also meant that an individual member of the group could have his license revoked without putting the publication of the newspaper in jeopardy. This proved to be handy when the Communists were systematically removed from the newspapers. There was, however, a further more nuanced, reason for implementing this model. In creating groups representing various different political viewpoints, they hoped to diffuse any resentment that might be directed towards an individual by the reading public based on their differing political or religious beliefs. In addition, individual newspapers could not be considered the official organ of any particular political or religious point of view. If difficulty still arose, then the Military Government acted to protect newspapers from political pressure groups.47 This proved to be difficult, especially in the area of radio broadcasting, a medium that all of the political parties sought to control. However, even with the careful attention given to creating a balanced environment within each of the newspapers, the political drift to the left and right was noted by the ICD by the end of June 1946. Three months passed before the issuing of a fourth directive on September 4, 1945. This edict addresses the issue of the Potsdam Agreement and its implementation within the scope of the ICD’s mandate.48 Article II-A of the Potsdam Agreement, which established the political principles by which Germany was to be governed, was 47 48

History I. History I.

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particularly important in formulating new policies because it went to the heart of what the ICD was supposed to be doing: 3.ii. To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. 3.iii. To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. 3.iv. To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. […] 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

Since the Potsdam agreement granted freedom of speech, press, and religion to the occupied Germans, the ICD now had to develop policies that brought the sometimes seemingly contradictory dictates of the agreement into some semblance of order. For example, German education was to be controlled in order to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines; however, this seemed to run counter to the freedom of speech and press that they were supposed to enjoy as well. While an argument could be made that certain freedoms could be curbed for reasons of security, there was no real guidance in terms of boundaries relating to political viewpoints that could or could not be expressed. In reality, just about anything could be presented as a security issue and thus suppressed. This was an issue that the Soviet authorities were able to take advantage of in their propaganda battle with the Americans. Hansjörg Gehring quotes an article written by Alexander Dymschiz of the Soviet Information Office (leader of the cultural division), in September of 1947 where he speaks out against the “totalitarian cultural politics in the West.” Dymschiz argues “On the one hand, Marxist literature is not offered (to be more accurate, it is forbidden) despite all the hypocritical talk about freedom of the press by

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the bi-zonal propaganda leaders. Yet every little run-of-the-mill existentialist booklet has a chance to be sponsored.”49 The policy that was eventually put in place allowed “all important groups” to have access to the media and that they were to be given the opportunity to express themselves on important matters. The problem with the policy as drafted was the use of vacuous terms such as “important groups” and “important matters.” This allowed the ICD to regulate who would have access to the media, because they determined which the “important groups” and “important matters” were. This effectively meant that very little needed to change in terms of how the ICD operated, while lip service was paid to the establishment of greater freedom for Germany’s media and its ability to represent a full spectrum of political views. The initial absolute control over the German media that blanketed everything that could appear in print, be heard on the airwaves, and presented on stage was eased over time, especially as the OMGUS moved towards holding elections in its zone. At first, as may have been surmised from initial PWD policies, this included a ban on producing political pamphlets and even posters that political parties might use. However, on November 2, 1945, the ICD relinquished some control over what political parties could print for their own use. From this point onward, German political parties could print posters and pamphlets without prior ICD consent, but the quantities they published were strictly controlled. Moreover, the news was strictly prohibited from appearing in pamphlets or on posters.50 Again, the ICD gave no guidance to the Germans in regard to what constituted news, which left the political parties erring on the side of caution rather than risk retribution from OMGUS. If the political parties wanted to publish books or magazines, they needed to designate a person to take responsibility for these publications. That individual then had to undergo a thorough vetting, just as required of other “non-political” publishers. This was completely in keeping with the ICD’s policy of individual responsibility. That is, they did not want to deal with a corporate entity, or in this case a political party, but wanted to be able to connect any given work with a particular individual they could hold responsible. This made control, and when necessary prosecution, more efficient and thorough. Moreover, it gave OMGUS the appearance of not interfering with Germany’s political development, nor gave the 49

Hansjörg Gehring, Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1953. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976. p. 88. This is taken from, OMGUS, Information Control Review. No. 57, 5f (ICD translation). 50 Gehring, Amerikanische Literaturpolitik, 88.

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impression that OMGUS had a political bias. It was, after all, the publisher who made the error and not the political party. As decreed by the Potsdam Agreement, a Four Power Directorate of the Allied Control Council had been organised. In theory, this was the body that coordinated the efforts of the ICD with its counterparts in the other three zones of control. By June 30, 1946, there had only been a measure of success in organising this group. Despite this, there was an informal group made up of the four directors that controlled the media in their respective zones. This group did manage to achieve some modicum of official recognition regarding the banning of Nazi material. This was most likely the case because it was an issue that was at the very top of the priority list of each of the occupying powers and was an issue about which there could be little disagreement. However, due to the disorganisation of the Four Power Directorate, this was not promulgated on a quadripartite level but had to be enacted unilaterally by each of the controlling powers.51 By the middle of 1946, the ICD had taken on a significant intelligence function in Germany.52 They were to report on: the general reactions and attitudes of the German people, German political committees, and whether there was any evidence of trends towards nationalism, militarism, panGermanism, fascism, separatist movements, and the political effect of refugee movements. While the ICD’s early intelligence gathering was more educational in nature, that is, they were trying to understand German culture as it existed in 1945, after June 1946 one is left with the distinct impression that an ideological battlefield was developing that had little to do with Nazism in Germany and was directed toward the Communist threat in the East. While the Western Allies all started with the same basic policy, that is the effort to defeat a common enemy as developed by the psychological warfare division; it begins to be shaped in different ways as the cultural sensitivities of the different nationalities of the occupying forces began to take effect.53 Up until December 11, 1945, the ICD operated independently. On this date, it was transferred officially to the control of the Military Government in the US Zone. This also marked the end of military security operations and marked the beginning of long-term planning for how Germany’s media was to be reconstructed.54

51

Gehring, Amerikanische Literaturpolitik, 88. History II. 53 History II. 54 History II. 52

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By the end of the second year of operation, the ICD viewed their task in a more positive light. That is, they were not so much trying to eliminate the wrong people in the German media; they were trying to select the right people.55 However, one of the great difficulties now faced by the ICD was a reported lowering of the standards for those who sought leadership positions in Germany’s new media. It should be noted that Colonel Gordon Textor, who eventually became the director of the ICD March 1947, was one of the most adamant opponents of the lowering of the standards. The tightrope that the ICD had to walk when it came to licensing individuals for the media was one of balancing the proven abilities of an individual, usually technical or financial, with a clean political background. Part of what may have been construed as a lowering of standards was the constant re-evaluation of the ICD’s blacklist. In many cases individuals who had been initially classified as black or grey (unacceptable) were reclassified as white. There were, however, a number of cases where individuals who had initially been considered white were re-categorised as black.56 A further difficulty that the ICD faced was the exchange of lists compiled by the various controlling powers in Germany. The list created by any one of the occupation governments was supposed to be binding on the other powers as well, but the ICD found that this was difficult to enforce and oversee. History II claims that the ICD in the American sector had not received blacklists from any of the other powers. This, however, is not true, since there are many lists to be found in the archives that were created in the British sector and some that had originated from the Soviet zone of control. There is very little evidence, however, of any such material coming from the French zone. This may well have been one of the reasons for OMGUS considering the French zone as a haven for former Nazis. An example of the tensions that resulted from the various occupation units not respecting one another’s blacklists can be found in the rather frank letters sent from the ICD to the French occupation government. On 12 September 1946, Edward T. Peeples, the executive officer of the ICD Intelligence Branch, wrote a memo to the French Occupation Chief of Information Section Political Division, Alfred Silbert, regarding the employment of blacklisted German personalities in the French zone of control.57 Apparently, a conversation had taken place between Silbert and a Mr. Kavon of the French Information Section, in which it was verbally 55

History II. For an explanation of how the classification system functioned, see chapter 4. 57 NARA, RG 260 5/265/1/6 56

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indicated to Kavon that blacklisted Germans were working in various media in the French Zone. Apparently, the French representative had asked for specifics, and the Intelligence Branch was now prepared to furnish evidence to support their assertion, specifically of individuals in the area around Constance. The list given did not claim to be exhaustive, but is instructive in terms of how much information the Americans had been able to gather on these individuals, who plied their trade outside of their jurisdiction. For example, the Americans had determined that Hans Hömberg had been an early member of the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur and former editor of the Völkische Beobachter, where he was in charge of the film supplement and the author of “crude anti-Semitic articles, which appeared regularly.” It was further noted that he was the editor of the Brennessel, which was owned by the NSDAP-Verlag. He was reported to have started a publishing firm named Bubikverlag in Constance. They had also received reports that he was the author of an adaptation of a French play, which was at that time waiting for his premier in the Tübingen theatre. Another individual the ICD had managed to track down was Gerhard Scherler, who was a dramaturge and theatre director. He was also a former advisor to Goebbels‘ Propaganda Ministry and had even been sent to Teplitz-Schönau in Czechoslovakia in order to introduce Nazi culture in the Sudetenland. The intelligence branch further claimed that it had information that he had been appointed a delegate to the general meeting of the Shakespeare Society in Bochum. Johannes Riemann was also reported to be working in the French zone. The Intelligence Branch informed the French that he was currently an actor at the Stadttheater in Constance and had been a Parteigenosse since 1933 and a so-called Amtswalter, political leader, in the Nazi party. He had in general been considered a fanatical Nazi, who was known to appear in public in an SA uniform. The ICD also wanted the French to remove Eugen Klöpfer and Lothar Muethel, who were listed together in the memo and were reported to have settled in Constance. At this point in time, they had simply been negotiating for an engagement. Klöpfer was an old Parteigenosse and first vice president of the Reichstheaterkammer and a Kultursenator. The ICD considered him to be among the most prominent of Nazi actors in the Third Reich. They also considered him culpable in the self-inflicted deaths of Joachim Gottschalk, an actor, and Herbert Selpin, a film director, who had been denounced to the Gestapo. It was also noted that he had been arrested and subsequently deported from Austria earlier in 1946. The Americans also indicate that, when he arrived in Constance on April 5,

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1946, a glowing article in celebration of his 60th birthday was published in the Süd-Kourier. Muethel had also been a Parteigenosse since 1933, a leading member of many Nazi theatrical commissions. It was stated that he had been recently removed from the Wiener Staatstheater, where he had been the general intendant. The Intelligence Branch also listed individuals residing in Tübingen. The first was Elizabeth Flickenschildt an actress and Parteigenosse since 1932 and an avowed Nazi. She had several months previous applied for a position with the ICD in Munich, during which she failed to disclose her party membership in the Fragebogen. She had learned that legal proceedings had been initiated against her for falsification of her questionnaire, after which she left for Tübingen. Once there, she apparently immediately took up her acting career again. It was also noted that she had taken part in the Tübingen Theatre Festival. In addition to Flickenschildt, the ICD also was investigating Theodor Loos, who had been and actor and a Parteigenosse since 1936 and a Kultursenator. Moreover, he was considered an avowed Nazi according to the report. He had played leading roles in many Nazi propaganda films, with Jud Süss and Entlassung being mentioned specifically. It was indicated that he was blacklisted by the ICD in Stuttgart, after which he moved to Tübingen, where he was allowed to be active in the theatre. In Baden-Baden, Artur Maria Rabenalt was listed and the fact that he had just been appointed as director of the Baden-Baden theatre was noted by the ICD as inappropriate for someone as involved with the Nazis as he had been. Though he was never a party member, the ICD considered him to be an arch-opportunist, who had willingly served the Nazi cause in the Third Reich. The ICD judged his military deferment to be an example of such opportunism because he accepted an offer to direct the propaganda film Achtung! Feind hört mit, where he had worked closely with the German Secret Service. For these reasons, he had been blacklisted by the Munich detachment of the ICD. In addition, he was given a second vetting at the ICD screening centre, where he was described to be: a liar, unreliable, and full of contradictory statements relating to his activities in the Third Reich. The screening centre had confirmed his black classification. Claus Clausen was an actor and director and was, at the time of the writing of this memo, active in Freiburg and Baden-Baden. The ICD considered him to be known for his extreme Nazi ideas. He had also been a party member since 1933. The ICD also looked for relationships between applicants, which sometimes was used to deny a license to an applicant. Such was the case with Franz Grothe, a composer, and Ilse Werner, a movie actress. They

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were listed together and were known to have performed recently in BadenBaden in an ensemble organised by the Theater der Prominenten von Film und Kabaret. Grothe had been a Parteigenosse since 1933 and apparently had close ties to the propaganda ministry. At the time of the writing of this memo, he was wanted in Bavaria for falsification of his Fragebogen. Werner had been refused employment in the American and British Zones. Shortly after sending the initial memo, a second memo was drafted and sent on September 16, 1946, by Peeples. This memo was addressed to Pierre Ponnell of the French radio section. Here a further two individuals were brought to the attention of French authorities. The Americans had listed Lothar Hartmann as grey unacceptable. Their reason for doing so was that he had worked as a radio reporter in a propaganda company since the start of the war. Later in 1942 he became the editor of the frontline correspondents’ reports and worked directly in the OKW. He left the military in 1943 and was immediately hired as a radio reporter by Radio Berlin. Following this, they simply note that he had been active in the field of Nazi propaganda. However, one ought to note that he was considered grey unacceptable and not black. Finally, it was possible to ban someone because they were someone’s girlfriend. Hildegard Leppert had been blacklisted by the ICD because she was the girlfriend of a man described as one of the most dangerous Nazis on Radio Frankfurt, though they fail to mention who this was. She had fled Frankfurt when the Allies arrived but returned later. In addition, she had been a Scharführerin of the JM (Jungmädelbund), which, according to Directive 24 of the Control Council, disqualified her from a job in the media. If the last point was enough to bar her, then why mention her liaison? Late in 1947, OMGUS strengthened its political information program in order to reinforce the expression of its objectives in Germany. Initially, its goal had been to teach the fundaments of democracy and destroy Nazi influences in Germany. However, an additional, perhaps even primary, goal was added. Using the media available, the ICD set about dealing with what it labelled “the menace of Communism.”58 As part of the effort to combat the Soviet threat and stabilise the economy in the American, British, and French zones, the western occupation forces introduced a currency reform in June of 1948. This proved, in part, to be the impetus of the so-called Wirtschaftswunder. The US licensed German press and US controlled radio system played a vital role in launching this new currency and thus in normalising West 58

History III.

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Germany’s economy. The reforms were first promulgated through official military government publications, which were then supported by the German information media, which explained the initiative to its German audience. It was one of the most prominent examples of how the new German media worked with the western occupation forces to achieve the goals of the Military Governors. Another was the reporting on the Berlin blockade, which was begun in June of 1948. This was a story that the ICD closely watched as is developed in the German press and appeared well satisfied with how the official, licensed and controlled German information media gave “Operation Vittles” broad coverage. The ICD supported this through official broadcasts, pamphlets, news reports and editorial comment in Die Neue Zeitung. In addition, feature articles and pictorial layouts were sponsored in Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau, and Neue Auslese. These consisted of information about OMGUS’s accomplishments in Berlin, with a special emphasis on democratic reforms, economic growth, and humanitarian activities from an American point of view. In doing so, they contrasted the American system, which was shown as free and enabling, with Communism, which was presented as stifling politically, economically, educationally, and culturally. The emphasis of the overt press was on the individual and his interaction with government. As a result, the “intrinsic values of democracy which protects the freedom, rights, and dignity of the individual above all else” was brought to the fore.59 When reviewing the Soviet sector, the individual was presented as “a pawn whose personal safety depends on his strict adherence in word and deed to the dictates of his political masters.”60 A point that was particularly stressed by the official media was OMGUS’s institution of “habeas corpus rights in the US sector of Berlin in order to place in even sharper view the numerous kidnappings of German citizens, engineered by agents from the East in that same sector.”61 Of a more general nature were the broadcasts categorised under the heading of “Freedom vs. Totalitarianism.” These were augmented by official pamphlets and news stories that commented on the official broadcasts.62 While the Soviets could not jam the airwaves, the pamphlets had difficulty making their way into the Soviet zone even though, under provisions of Allied Control Authority Directive No. 55, all Allied printed 59

History III. History III. 61 History III. 62 History III. 60

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matter could be distributed in all four zones, with German publications from the American zone being repeatedly commandeered. This made the circulation of the American publications in the Soviet zone nearly impossible, with very few actually making it to their subscribers in the east. At this point, OMGUS engaged in tit-for-tat and banned the import, sale, distribution and display of Soviet-sponsored publications in this American zone. The Soviet Military Authority was told that this would continue until American publications would once again be permitted in the Soviet zone as per Directive 55, which the four occupying powers had agreed to on 25 June 1947. Two weeks later the Deputy Military Governor of the Soviet Zone assured OMGUS “that no further interference with US Zone publications would occur in the Soviet controlled area, and the prohibition was lifted immediately thereafter.”63 On March 22, 1947, OMGUS ended the process of registering minor employees in the entertainment and information fields. This required a redefinition of what a minor employee was.64 This also made German managers responsible for employing politically acceptable personnel. The following were considered major employees, with any others not appearing on the list being considered minor employees: Press: Publishers, Chief Editors, Editorial Staff, Business Managers Publications: Publishers, Business Managers, Chief Editors, Editorial Staff of Magazines Film: Producers, Directors, Advisors), Business Managers

Scriptwriters,

Dramaturges

(Literary

Theatre: Intendants, Producers, Directors, Dramaturges Music: Record Manufacturers Radio: Intendants, Business Managers, Production Managers, Chief Engineers. Performers could also be included if their responsibilities were comparable to any of the above.65

63

History III. Directive from the Military Governor to the Directors of the US occupied Länder, March 22, 1947, RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. 65 RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. 64

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The loosening of licensing and registration requirements by the ICD marked the beginning of the transition to German control of the media in the US zone. One could, however, argue that this was a hollow gesture. On the one hand, the American occupation continued to monitor Germany’s media very carefully until at least 1952 with some level of veto power still being in the hands of the Americans until that point.

Newspapers On 14 July 1945, the overt or official press in US-occupied Germany became the responsibility of the ICD, and no attempt was made to hide the fact that the US Military Government was controlling the radio and newspapers in their zone. This was completely in keeping with the psychological, sociological and anthropological studies undertaken before the end of the war. Expert opinion, as discussed more fully in chapter one, held that the German mind understood only the direct approach, and a more nuanced approach would lead to the ICD officials needing to explain their actions. This was considered undesirable in that it gave the Germans an opportunity to argue the correctness of the actions being taken by the Military Government and thus undermined its authority. This was simply the carrying-forward of the Psychological Warfare Division’s policy in regard to dealing with the Germans they now governed. The official policy was that they were going to control German thought and expression in all media and make no excuses about it. This position was mitigated to some extent by the Potsdam Agreement, which exposes a fundamental contradiction of ICD policy regarding freedom of expression, which is far more nebulous in the Potsdam document. In the initial two months of its operation, the ICD was the only agency allowed to grant newspaper licenses to applicants recommended by the DISCC. This was, however, a temporary measure and the process was soon decentralised with licensing authority delegated to the commanders of the Military Districts on September 11, 1945.66 The ICD Director, nonetheless, reserved the right to select the cities in which newspapers were to be licensed. Within two months of Germany’s surrender, eight overt newspapers were being published by the ICD: Augsburger Anzeiger in Augsburg, Bayrischer Tag in Bamberg, Weser Bote in Bremen, Frankfurter Presse in Frankfurt, Süddeutsche Mitteilungen in Heidelberg, Hessische Post in 66

Letter, HQ, USFET, File AG of BIC-AGO, “Decentralization of Newspaper Licensing” (11 Sept 45).

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Kassel, Münchener Zeitung in Munich, and the Regensburger Post in Straubing. They had a combined circulation of 3,139,500 copies at their peak. Two further overt publications, the Allgemeine Zeitung in Berlin, published three times weekly, alternating with the British Der Berliner, and the Stuttgarter Stimme were added in August 1945. By late September 1945, only five official newspapers remained: Augsburg, Bamberg, Berlin, Munich and Straubing. ICD policy was that the overt newspapers cease publication when licensed German newspapers appeared in the areas they served. So it was that by mid-November the rest of the official newspapers ceased publication, with the exception of Die Neue Zeitung, which had been established in October 1945 as the official voice of the Military Government for the entire zone. Of the overt newspapers, the Allgemeine Zeitung in Berlin had the largest circulation at 600,000 copies. The Bayrischer Tag in Bamberg and the Münchener Zeitung in Munich were not far behind. Originally, ICD officers edited all of the overt newspapers from Bad Nauheim. As news copy was written and assembled there, it was delivered to the larger German cities under U.S. and British control, where printing and distribution took place. In the beginning, the newspapers were free, but this gradually changed to a paid system. The overt papers were only four or six pages and distributed on a weekly basis. At their high point, the combined overt press reached a paid circulation of almost eight million copies. The first experiment in publication control was undertaken in the first German city captured by the Western Allies.67 In the city of Aachen the PWD established Heinrich Hollands, who was a 68-year-old former composing room foreman, “who admittedly had no editorial experience” and whose only apparent qualification was that “[he had] retired soon after Hitler came to power,”68 as the first licensed publisher in what was not yet post-war Germany. According to Time magazine, He gave up his job as foreman of an Aachen newspaper composing room, and retired on a small pension rather than serve the Nazis. U.S. Psychological Warfare officers found him, when they went looking for a German to help them print a four-page weekly, the Aachner Nachrichten. Soon he was doing some of the editing; Army officers found it was easier

67

History I. “First German Paper Gets Operating Right,” The New York Times, June 28, 1945, 6. 68

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to make an editor out of the printer than to make non-Nazis out of the available German editors.69

With this experiment, the ICD did learn that they needed to separate news from opinion and editorial. Previously, German newspapers had mixed the two in a manner that interpreted the facts for the reader. The PWD and then the ICD wanted to model the new German media along the lines of that found in the United States, where opinion and editorial pages were clearly designated. In August 1945 there were 10 of these overt publications in the US zone.70 However, by September 1945 this number had dropped to five and by mid-November there was only one. The use of the term “overt” implies that there must have been such a thing as a “covert” newspaper. One might suggest that the use of this term is simply a slip of the tongue if it were to appear only once or twice in documents produced by the ICD. This, however, is not the case. The term “covert” is consistently used as a description of the newspapers not directly published by the ICD and the Military Government. Moreover, there does not appear to be any evidence that the ICD published newspapers that could truly be identified as covert. That is to say; they did not publish a newspaper and then try to hide the fact that they were in control of its news and editorial content. Rather, covert refers to a licensed newspaper run and owned by Germans, since no other newspapers were published in the American sector; they were either overt or German press. But, what is one to make of the term covert, if the terms “German” and “covert” are the only terms used in the ICD files and those files clearly indicate that “overt” is synonymous with “American”? Then one can come to the logical conclusion that “covert” would be the counterpart of “German.” If German newspapers were considered covert, then, the ICD must in some way have controlled the content of the news and the opinions expressed by the German editors. Content control of the German media was accomplished through a three-pronged approach. The first was the rather blunt instrument of rescinding the licenses of individuals involved in publishing newspapers, magazines, journals, books, and radio broadcasting, and/or criminally charging them under Military Government Law 191. Though this was done, it would not have ensured that the material they wanted published actually appeared and even then it would have undermined the “covert” nature of the news that appeared. It would, however, have had a chilling 69 70

“On His Own,” Time. July 9, 1945, 50. History I.

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effect on the other publishers and ensured future compliance. For the most desirable effect, the techniques employed would have needed to be more nuanced and appear detached from the day-to-day administration of any given media outlet. The ICD counted on the new licensees wanting to accumulate money and influence in post-war Germany, which ensured that those chosen to run Germany’s new media remained in line with rules established by the ICD. As Bark and Gress point out, once a publisher had a license from the ICD or its British equivalent, and once they had paper on which to print, newspapers, journals, and books were a seller’s market, even though newsprint was rationed,71 which was simply a restating of Ziemke’s earlier assessment of the situation.72 Elizabeth Janik suggests “American information officers did not engage in censorship.”73 This may be true, but only using the narrowest of definitions of what censorship might be. The ICD officers may not have gone through every word on every page that was published in their zone of control and then taken out that which offended the policies of the occupation forces. This is but one very blunt instrument that may be used when engaging in what may more broadly be defined as censorship. There is evidence that the Allies carefully studied the Nazi approach to “censorship” in the Reich. They then used what they had learned in the post-war as an effective means of controlling the German publishing industry. A secret document produced by the British CSDIC, based on interviews with the POWs Wolfgang Brandstetter, former manager of the Tauchnitz publishing firm in Leipzig, and Heinz Schroeder, son of the owner of a Berlin printing firm, provided vital insights into how censorship in Germany functioned. While the report is filled with many fascinating details, its most interesting feature is the description of censorship in Germany 1933-1939 as having a “Sword of Damocles” quality, in that there was no censorship of works of fiction, and that publishers were allowed to publish what they wished.74 It is only afterwards, that a publisher might be declared politically unreliable. This 71

Bark and Gress, A History of West Germany, 155. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 371. His source is History of Military Government in Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, vol. I, p. 1316. (History of Military Government in Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, 8 May 45-30 Jun 46, in OMGUS 410-1 /3. (2) Hist. Rpt., Eastern Military District, 15 Dec 45-14 Jan 46, in OMGUS 76-3/10) 73 Elizabeth Janik, “‘The Golden Hunger Years’: Music and Superpower Rivalry in Occupied Berlin,” German History 22 (2004): 87. 74 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140. 72

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would have led to financial ruin. This is effectively the same strategy employed by the ICD in the final phase of its licensing of German publishers. The effect was that publishers were very mindful of what they published, seldom considering works that they were not certain would pass muster with the ICD. Post-censorship was considered more desirable than pre-censorship by the Military Government in that it always allowed the ICD deniability should difficulties arise. Moreover, it was the most effective approach to conditioning German publishers into acting in ways that would assure long-term compliance with the policies of the ICD, even after it had been disbanded. Practices and approaches to issues would become policy in German publishing houses and then simply the usual way of doing business. These practices would take on inertia all their own, making them almost immovable in the foreseeable future. Choosing the “right” material to publish would be a reflex. Though it may not properly fit under the rubric of censorship, food was used as a means of keeping those in publishing, the news media, radio, and film in line with official ICD policy. People working in those industries were declared essential workers by the ICD. This meant that they received double rations and were allowed to eat in the military commissaries.75 The ICD even took steps to have German media personnel declared Military Government employees during the noon meal period so that they could partake in the noonday meal at the Military Government’s expense. This was not just for those who worked on the periphery of the ICD itself, but those who worked for private concerns and were simply licensees of the ICD. This ensured their compliance when it came to matters concerning what the ICD would like to see brought before the German people. It encouraged a self-censorship that was born out of self-interest because no one receiving double rations in addition to free meals was going to act in a way that would jeopardise this arrangement. It achieved a further goal. Since it was self-censorship, it was not necessary to engage in overt censorship that would tend to undermine the message they were trying to convey. The first license granted to a German newspaper publisher after the war was for the Frankfurter Rundschau, which was issued on August 1, 1945.76 General McClure personally presented the license to the seven

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NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. History I. The information on the licensees has been compiled from an intelligence report entitled “Licensed Personnel of the Frankfurter Rundschau” (October 23, 1945) NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. 76

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licensees; Emil Carlebach, Hans Etzkorn, Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Otto Grossmann, Wilhelm Knothe, Paul Rodemann, and Arno Rudert. Carlebach was a Communist of Jewish ancestry. He had survived continuous imprisonment since early 1934. In May of 1933, he was arrested for distributing illegal literature, but released after six weeks. He did not give up on his work and was rearrested and sentenced to threeyears imprisonment. Immediately thereafter he was sent to Dachau for 18 months and then transferred to Buchenwald, where he spent six and a half years until his liberation by the Allies. Carlebach was the least experienced of the group and had never been a part of the staff of a regular newspaper. However, he had started to write at the age of 16 and had contributed articles to the radically democratic Dortmunder General Anzeiger. In addition, the ICD considered it important that he had had experience preparing illegal pamphlets before his arrest in 1933. The reasons for his recommendation were that they hoped he would bring a more youthful perspective to the paper, since he was considerably younger than the other licensees and had not been an official member of any political party as far as the ICD could determine at the time, though they knew of his activities with what they called the “Youth League for Human Rights,” which was most likely the “Young Communist League of Germany.” Moreover, they considered the upbringing he had received from his father, which the ICD described as being along the lines of the old Frankfurter Zeitung, to have made him an ideal candidate as a publisher. The time Carlebach had spent as a concentration camp inmate had brought out his leadership potential as far as the ICD investigators were concerned, at least initially. They were also surprised at his physical and mental condition considering how long he had been a concentration camp inmate. This may have been his undoing in the end. In 1947, apparently without warning, his license was revoked by OMGUS. While it may have been related to his ties to the Communist party in the post-war period, it may also have been related to the fact that he had not been truthful on his Fragebogen. The ICD report indicates that he had not been a member of any political party, just active in the Youth League for Human Rights, it was not known at the time that he had joined the Young Communist League of Germany (Kommunistischen Jugendverband Deutschlands) in 1932. Moreover, Colonel Toombs, who had written the introduction to the controversial report on the activities of inmate groups in German concentration camps, was gaining greater influence in decisions regarding press licenses in US-occupied Germany.

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Hans Etzkorn had worked for the SPD publishing house Phoenix GmbH from 1924-1933. There he had been the editor of Volk und Zeit and the Sunday magazine section of Vorwärts and other newspapers. He was a specialist in creating and editing illustrated features. The ICD described Etzkorn as not being a party man, but rather a cultured person of broad socialist convictions. Though he was not involved in party politics at the time, they did see his socialist leanings coming through in his work in theatre, film, radio, and music. Etzkorn had not been allowed to work in the press since 1933 and had sold advertising in order to earn a living. He had been picked up by the Gestapo a number of times but had never been held. For this reason, they concluded that he had not really suffered under the Nazi regime. Even so, they saw him as an important addition to the group, because apparently they were well satisfied how he had expressed himself in regard to his understanding of democracy and the virtue of cooperation. Though he did not make a strong initial impression, longer acquaintance with him allowed the ICD to see his better qualities. What else was important was that he had a clean professional and political record. They also did not question his sincerity as a democrat, being convinced that he espoused these views due to conviction and not expedience. Another asset that he brought to the group was his background in cultural topics. The ICD already thought they had enough individuals who would stress political issues in the paper and needed someone who would ensure that the reporting in the paper was well rounded. Wilhelm Gerst was an active Catholic. He had been the chief editor of the Hildesheimische Zeitung from 1911. Already during the First World War he had opposed what the ICD called Prussian militarism, a point that worked in Gerst’s favour. At the time other Catholic newspapers had vigorously attacked him. Gerst‘s interests were broad, and he not only wrote books but organised film and theatre projects. In addition, he was interested in the international aspects of film and aided in the dubbing of non-German language films, with the ICD noting that some of them having even been Russian. In Gerst‘s case, the ICD was very interested in his earnings during the Nazi regime because this was one of the criteria they turned to in borderline cases. For this to turn up in his files indicates that they were not entirely sure of him at this early stage. It may also have been a case of the ICD simply getting as much information as possible so that they could defend his inclusion, should questions arise.

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In the three years immediately before the Nazis came to power, Gerst had earned 240,000 RM per year. In 1933, he had been offered a plum job in theatre by none other than Goebbels himself, which he turned down. Instead, he founded St. Georg Verlag, which published liberal Catholic books. In 1934 his income dropped to 100,000 RM and from there it precipitously fell to around 6000 RM per annum for the years 1935 to 1944. All of this proved to the ICD that Gerst had not worked with the Nazis. ICD investigators considered Gerst to be a progressive centrist, who had been active in Catholic youth work since before WWI. In addition, they considered it as positive that he had been a member of most Catholic anti-Nazi organisations. They also thought him to be a youthful and vigorous 57-year-old and an outstanding organiser with a wide knowledge base in cultural areas. Though he was a Catholic, the ICD noted that he worked well with other denominations and saw him as an ecumenical unifying factor in a country known for its religious schisms. The Nazis had always suspected him of working counter to their political outlook and the Gestapo eventually arrested him in October 1944. He had received an 18-month sentence when the American forces found him in a Darmstadt jail. At the end of October 1946, Gerst was removed as a licensee due to suspected association with the Nazi Party in 1933-1934, as revealed during a the Spruchkammer hearing. There was a flurry of memos exchanged by the various units within the ICD, with it becoming clear that there were not only some Germans, most of whom had been members of the Nazi Party, or some other very conservative group, but there were some American officials who wanted him removed as a licensee.77 The problem was that they could not really find fault with him, and the license was removed on the slimmest of pretexts; he had been forced to publish one or two books by Nazi authors in 1933 and in order to get out of the dilemma had sold his publishing house in December of 1933. What is clear is that, according to Kinard, they were concerned that they would not be able to defend their actions before General Clay, General McClure, or the court of public opinion. What was not mentioned was that there were some in the ICD, not identified in the memos, who had a problem with the way Gerst ran the physical plant of the paper, which had nothing to do with politics. 77

“Intelligence Report on Wilhelm Gerst” by Phillips Davison (October 1946), “Word Picture on Karl Wilhelm Gerst” by Robert Schmid (September 30, 1946), “Memo to Kinard on Gerst” by Eggleston (October 9, 1946), NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29.

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Apparently, he ran a very tight organisation and behaved in a very authoritarian manner towards his employees. Eggleston, however, suggested that Gerst did not behave any differently than any good managing editor at any newspaper would and even cites Hans Habe and Hans Wallenberg of the overt US paper as behaving in a similar fashion. In the end, Davison perhaps sums it up best by suggesting that Gerst had simply made too many personal enemies because he had behaved in an undiplomatic way. Otto Grossmann had little experience on the content side of newspaper production, having worked for a short time on the Arbeiterzeitung before 1933. However, he was an expert on photography and newspaper layout and had worked closely with democratic youth organisations. This is where the ICD thought he would make his contribution to the Rundschau. Grossmann had been a member of the worker’s youth movement since he was 14 years old and its President at 16. The ICD considered him to be an independent SPD and a member of the KPD in his youth. They did note that he had left the party in 1926 due to the internal party strife of the time. He did remain a supporter of unions and was imprisoned in 1934 for distributing the illegal anti-Nazi Brown Book. At 45, he was considered youthful and vigorous. After his time in prison, he worked for the Georg Stritt firm, which did engraving and printing. At the time of his licensing, he put this experience to good purpose and was involved in getting the printing plant in Frankfurt up and running. Though Grossmann wavered between supporting the SPD and KPD, he was leaning towards the KPD in the summer of 1945.78 In the end, he was one too many Communists for the paper and was eventually given his own license for the sports newspaper Neuer Sport. Knothe had been an active member of the SPD since 1906 and was imprisoned a number of times during the Nazi period in Germany. He had contributed to Berlin’s Vorwärts, the Kassler Volksblatt, the Offenbacher Abendblatt, the Frankfurter Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Nachrichten. He was responsible for the political management of the new paper. From 1934 to 1937 he had been in and out of various jails and in 1938 found himself working for various merchants in Frankfurt. He remained an active anti-Nazi and eventually was jailed again in August 1944, but escaped in September of the same year and hid in Frankfurt until the end of the war. The ICD recommended him, because of his solid antimilitarist, anti-Nazi beliefs and his internationalist worldview. 78 Eva-Juliane Welsch, “Die hessischen Lizenzträger und ihre Zeitungen” (Dissertation, Universität Dortmund, 2002) 77.

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Knothe resigned his license on March 1, 1946, in order to devote himself to politics. Paul Rodemann had worked for a number of social democratic newspapers prior to the beginning of WWI, beginning his career at the Hamburg-Harburg Volksblatt in 1911. He later became the political editor of the Freies Wort in Schwerin. In 1919 he was elected as a representative to the Weimar National Assembly. Due to his political engagement, he was arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned and then sent to a concentration camp. After his release, he remained under Gestapo observation and was forbidden to work as a journalist. Rudert was one of the Communists grant the license for the paper. He went along with what has been termed Zuckerbrot und Peitsche (carrot and stick) approach of the ICD and managed to retain his license. He was thrown out of the Communist Party for acquiescing to the wishes of the American occupation forces. Arno Rudert had been one of the members of the editorial staff on Frankfurt’s KPD Arbeiterzeitung from 1924 to 1933 and chief editor for the last six years. The ICD noted that he was the only chief editor in Frankfurt who was both available and politically acceptable. He had been one of the early organisers of the KPD in the Vogtland and had helped organise the party in Oelsnitz. He was arrested in February of 1933 and held for 2 weeks. Later that year he was almost beaten to death by some SS men. He had a further strike against himself in Nazi Germany in that he was married to a Jewish woman. Eventually, all of their family and friends would become victims of the Nazi regime. ICD investigators describe Rudert as quiet, presentable, intelligent, and filled with a desire to work with anyone wanting to get rid of the Nazis. He was another one of those found by the Americans in a Nazi work camp, this one being in Clausthal. However, he had not been sent there for the usual political reasons, though remaining with a non-Aryan wife could certainly be considered a political statement in Germany at that time. Though he had been left badly shaken by his experiences, the ICD noted that he appeared to be recovering quickly and demonstrating leadership and organisational qualities that the Rundschau needed. The Frankfurter Rundschau was authorised for twice-weekly publication (Wednesdays and Saturdays) and had an official circulation of 400,000. This size of print run allowed the Frankfurt paper to cover most of Hessen. For the first edition, the Military Government provided some of the copy. One of those articles announced that the appearance of the

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Frankfurter Rundschau “was a clear indication of the collective rehabilitation of the city of Frankfurt am Main.”79 The licensees of the Rundschau had to overcome many obstacles in order to get its first edition into the hands of its readers. Its first physical plant was the basement of the bomb-damaged building that had accommodated the Frankfurter Zeitung, whose contributors had read like a “who’s who” of German literature, philosophy, and the liberal left. The first edition was four pages in length with five columns of news to the page. Of interest is the fact that it immediately began covering international events. While it did carry a brief statement from the Military Government of Hessen, its lead story was on the British general elections and the Labour Party’s victory. In addition, it reported on the ratification of the United Nations charter by the U.S. Senate, with pictures of President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee on the front page. Soon after this, other newspapers in the U.S. Zone were licensed. The Rhein-Neckar Zeitung was licensed in Heidelberg on 5 September. Along with Theodor Heuss, who was a member of the Demokratische Volkspartei and then the Freie Demokratische Partei, Rudolf Agricola, a leader within the KPD in Württemberg-Baden, and Hermann Knorr, who was a member of the SPD and their top candidate in the November 1946 Land elections, were licensed. Considerable work must have been done prior to this since it appeared the next day with a print run of 200,000 copies. It had a broad circulation, being available in Darmstadt, Mannheim, Dieburg, Schwetzingen, Mosbach, and Hockenheim. The first issue demonstrated that it would, in the words of the ICD, “become a strong instrument for democracy in Germany.”80 On the front page Theodore Heuss “described the moral disintegration of the German press under the Nazis, and hailed the opportunity to restore the people’s faith in a free press.”81 It is also notable that many of those identified and licensed by the ICD went on to distinguished political careers. For example, one of the three initial licensees of the Rhein-Neckar Zeitung (RNZ), Theodor Heuss, became post-war Germany’s first President.82 He had been politically active and had worked as a newspaper editor in Weimar Germany. The first issue of the new newspaper made a point of speaking out about the disintegration of the free press under the Nazis. It is truly ironic that Heuss had voted for the enabling act of 1933, which gave Hitler his dictatorial

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History I. History I. 81 History I. 82 History I. 80

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powers.83 During the Nazi regime, Heuss continued to write for the few remaining liberal papers in Germany but was eventually blacklisted by the Propaganda Ministry. He did continue to write under a number of pseudonyms and was even published in the National Socialist weekly Das Reich. Becoming President of the Federal Republic of Germany meant that he had to divest himself of his interest in the newspaper, which allowed Hermann Knorr to gain control of the RNZ, an example of the compromises the ICD was willing to make in order to get German newspapers up and running. Nine days later the Marburger Presse, the third ICD licensed newspaper in Germany, began appearing on newsstands on a twice weekly basis. This was followed on September 16 with the licensing of the Stuttgarter Zeitung with an ambitious circulation of 400,000. The circulation numbers were not allocated in an arbitrary fashion. Rather, the ICD estimated that they would need one copy for each five residents in the area served by the newspaper. On September 15 the ICD did something unusual in that it licensed a single publisher, Hans Hackmack, to publish the Weser Kurier in Bremen twice weekly with a circulation of 125,000 copies. Hackmack had been a member of the SPD before the Nazi regime and had been imprisoned on and off from 1933-1945 for his anti-Nazi activities. In 1945 he was still a member of the Kampfgemeinschaft gegen den Faschismus (Anti-Fascist Action Group) but left when it became apparent that the Communists were taking over its leadership. The sole proprietorship did not last long, as Bernhard Peters, who was a Communist, joined him shortly after its inception. Peters was not to remain with the paper for very long, and it is not clear whether he was forced out. Felix von Eckhardt, who was not a member of a political party, but did support the CDU, replaced him. This was the first license to be issued outside the contiguous U.S. Zone. This was quickly followed on September 27 by the licensing of Der Tagesspiegel in Berlin, a daily paper that quickly became the object of attacks from the Soviet-controlled publications in the east. A further paper to begin publishing in September was the Hessische Nachrichten in Kassel. On September 26 five co-publishers were licensed: Wolfgang Bartels (SPD), Fritz Schmidt (KPD), August Heinrich Berning (unaffiliated), Gustav Römer (LDP [Liberaldemokratische Partei] leaning non-member) und Dr. Wolfgang Poeschl (CDU leaning non-member) to

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It is noted that Heuss spoke out against voting for the enabling act within his party caucus. In the end, he decided to maintain party discipline and voted for the Enabling Act.

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publish a newspaper on Wednesdays and Saturdays with an initial circulation of 220,000 copies. No sooner had the Hessische Nachrichten started publishing, when on October 1 the Wiesbadener Kurier was granted a license as well and was authorised to produce 90,000 copies. The original licensees were Georg Meyer (Centrist leaning) and Fritz Ulm (SPD leaning non-member). In this case, the ICD denied a license to Gustav Schellenberg, the former publisher of the Wiesbadener Tagblatt, whose family had owned the weekly paper since its inception in the 1840s. Not only that, but the ICD confiscated his printing plant and offices and turned them over to the new licensees. The Tagblatt was, however, not finished. When the licensing of newspapers was ended under Konrad Adenauer in 1949, Schellenberg restarted the paper, sharing offices and a printing plant with the Kurier. While the ICD was very active in licensing newspapers in Hessen, the process was a little slower in Bavaria. The first license granted in Bavaria was presented by Colonel B.B. McMahon, Commanding Officer of the 6870th DISCC, to August Schwingenstein (CSU), Edmund Goldschagg (SPD), and Franz Josef Schöningh (Bayerischer Bauernbund)84 authorising them to publish the Süddeutsche Zeitung in Munich as of October. Considering the area that was to be covered by the paper, it is not surprising that its circulation was set at 410,000 copies. The first edition of the paper is informative in that it gives a good impression of how OMGUS was able to project its power through the fledgeling German media. After a brief mission statement, in which the paper dedicates itself to being the voice of the people and not of a particular brand of politics, it announces the appointment of Wilhelm Högner to the task of forming a new government in Bavaria. In supporting stories, also carried on the front page, it describes Eisenhower as a man of action, who orders Patton replaced as Governor of Bavaria in order to bring political stability to the region. Also telling is a front-page story written by Goldschagg that emphasises that Germany has suffered a complete political collapse for the second time within the lifetime of a generation. October was a very busy month for the ICD in terms of licensing newspapers. On October 8 the Hochland Bote was licensed in GarmischPartenkirchen with a circulation of 20,000 and on October 11 the Nürnberger Nachrichten at 50,000 copies. The following day, two publishers were licensed to publish the Hof Frankenpost and on October 84

The ICD indicated him as having leaning toward the Bayerischer Bauernbund, but this party had been dissolved in 1933, with the leadership urging members to join the NSDAP. After the war, its former members gravitated towards the CSU.

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23 Karl Esser was licensed to publish the Mittelbayerische Zeitung in Regensburg, following the example of the Bremen paper, only in this case no additional licensees were added. This is particularly odd, considering the paper had an initial circulation of 200,000. This may simply be an example of the ICD having difficulty finding suitable candidates and thus having to ignore their own internal policies. This thesis may be difficult to support since it is hard to believe that of the 93 applicants for the license in Regensburg he was the only suitable candidate. A more reasonable explanation might be that Esser was a bit of a rarity in that he was a member of the SPD and had survived numerous imprisonments, even spending time in Dachau. Most likely, Esser gave a very good impression to the ICD in terms of his commitment to democracy; the only way they would have accepted him as a sole publisher. Esser did not disappoint them. In the very first edition, the lead story presented the crimes committed by the Nazis to its readership. An additional story on the front page discussed the second defeat of Germany’s “military-caste,” an article that fully supported the ICD’s emphasis on eradicating militarism in Germany. On October 30, three further licenses were issued. The licensees for the Schwäbische Donau Zeitung in Ulm at 90,000 copies were Kurt Fried, Johannes Weißer und Paul Thielemann. Fried had been a member of the Deutsche Demokratische Partei before the Nazis came to power. Due to his Jewish ancestry on his father’s side, he was forbidden to publish, yet released two books in 1937 under his wife’s name (Elsie Gotmann).85 He was eventually arrested and made to work in the German war industry in the Harz as a slave-labourer, from which he was liberated by American forces in 1945. Weißer had been Party Secretary of the SPD in Ulm before 1933. Also licensed on October 30 was the Schwäbische Landeszeitung in Augsburg at 100,000 copies. Curt Frenzel and Johann Wilhelm Naumann were the initial licensees. Frenzel had been the editor of the Volksstimme in Chemnitz until 1933. This paper supported the SPD and in that year Frenzel was banned from working in the press. He was also under Gestapo surveillance for ten years thereafter. Right after the war, Frenzel worked as an editor for the overt Regensburger Post, where he developed the connections and trust required to be granted a license. Eventually, he turned his back on the SPD and became an ardent supporter of the CSU. Naumann was a devoted Catholic. The relationship with Frenzel seems to have been strained and eventually 85

Deutsche Briefe der Liebe und Freundschaft and Briefe und Gedichte.

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Naumann was licensed to publish a paper of his own in 1948 that was aimed at a Catholic readership. However, this happened only after a great deal of agitation on his part, and the support of the Catholic Church. The Fuldaer Volkszeitung at 35,000 copies was one of the smallest newspapers licensed by the ICD. It is perhaps understandable that it only had a single publisher, although, as noted above, this was highly unusual. Heinrich Kierzek was the ICD’s choice. He had worked for a Centrist newspaper, Echo der Wahrheit, in Aachen until it was forced to close in 1933. After this, he worked in private industry until his arrest by the Nazis in 1940. He then spent the remainder of the war as a political prisoner. This paper is also an example of one of the few licensed newspapers that is no longer in operation, having shut down in 1974. In the latter part of November, the licensing of newspapers continued as the ICD started to fill in the gaps in smaller cities. After the Darmstädter Echo on November 17, the Main Echo in Aschaffenburg and the Main Post in Würzburg were licensed on November 24. This now meant that all of the main cities in the US occupation zone were served by German newspapers. This also signalled the end of the overt papers, with the exception of Die Neue Zeitung. Die Neue Zeitung was established in October 1945 covering the entire US occupation zone and was intended as the official voice of OMGUS. It was published twice a week, and its mission was “to bring the American point of view to German readers and to serve as an example of the best in American journalism for the new German press.”86 Die Neue Zeitung was founded by Major Hans Habe, an ICD officer. Habe was an Austrian Jew, who had studied in Heidelberg for a short time. He had returned to Austria as a result of the growing anti-Semitism in Germany. In Austria, he had the distinction of being the youngest newspaper editor at the age of 20. After Austria’s annexation, he fled to France and joined the Foreign Legion, but was captured in the 1940 invasion. He managed to escape and made his way to the United States. After taking American citizenship in 1941, Habe was drafted into the Army in 1942 and underwent psychological warfare training. He participated in the invasion of North Africa, where he would have worked closely with McClure, and in the Italian campaign. He was then sent back to the United States as a psychological warfare instructor. In 1944, as the United States was beginning to plan Germany’s occupation, he was selected to return to Germany based on his proven previous experience as a newspaper editor. 86

History I.

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Habe was replaced by Major Hans Wallenberg in March of 1946. It seems that Habe and his superiors differed on the editorial direction the newspaper was taking. Wallenberg had been on the staff of the Vossische Zeitung and a member of the Ullstein Verlag in Berlin until 1933. He left Germany in 1937 for Czechoslovakia. Eventually, in 1938 Wallenberg left Prague and emigrated to the United States, where he became a citizen and began his service in the US Army in 1942. He came to Die Neue Zeitung in Munich from the Allgemeine Zeitung, which had been established as an overt newspaper in Berlin. Die Neue Zeitung was a product of the US Army’s Twelfth Army Group’s Psychological Warfare Division, which had set the plans in place for its establishment. While the other overt papers had always been intended as short-term measures, Die Neue Zeitung was seen as a longterm presence in Germany. General Eisenhower made its aims and policies clear through a lead article printed in its first edition of October 18, 1945: First: As distinguished from those German newspapers which are now published by German publishers and which represent the beginning of a free press in Germany, Die Neue Zeitung will be an official organ of the American authorities. Its circulation will not be restricted to any given area; rather, it will be circulated throughout the U.S. occupied zone, thus linking all sections. Second: Die Neue Zeitung, as an American newspaper published in The German language, will set an example for the new German press through the objectivity of its reporting, through unconditional devotion to truth in its articles, and through high journalistic standards. Third: Through its emphasis on the affairs of the world, Die Neue Zeitung will widen the view of the German reader by giving him facts which were suppressed in Germany during the twelve years of National Socialistic rule. Fourth: Die Neue Zeitung will be a factor in demonstrating to the German people the necessity of the tasks which lie ahead of them. These tasks include self-help, the elimination of Nazism and militarism from the German mind, and the active de-Nazification of the German government and business.87

The first issues had a circulation of 500,000 copies and their reception by German readers was deemed to be “enthusiastic” by many of their

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dealers, who had waiting lists of people wanting copies.88 By the end of 1945, the circulation of Die Neue Zeitung had reached 1,300,000 copies,89 and in January 1946, an additional 200,000 copies were added to supply Berlin.90 Die Neue Zeitung‘s circulation reached its peak in February 1946 at 1,600,000 copies.91 However, the scarcity of newsprint also affected Die Neue Zeitung, and its circulation was capped at 1,500,000 copies. The popularity of the paper is underlined by the fact that editions were regularly sold out within a day of publication. Moreover, news-dealers suggested that they could sell twice as many papers without effort. Die Neue Zeitung was distributed through 54 dealers located in the larger cities of the U.S. Zone, Berlin, and Bremen. At 20 Pfennig a copy, it contributed approximately 2,000,000 RM per month gross to the ICD coffers. Together with the overt magazines: Die Amerikanische Rundschau, Heute, and Neue Auslese, Die Neue Zeitung was published by the Publishing Operations Branch of ICD and printed in Munich, with the paper’s chief editor also acting as head of the ICD’s Publishing Operations Branch. At first, Die Neue Zeitung was permitted to accept international news from the Allied Press Service, the British Broadcasting Company, and Office of War Information (OWI) and from no other sources such as the Associated Press, the United Press, or the International News Service.92 Die Neue Zeitung did not just rely on news services for its stories, as the Publishing Operations Branch had a network of special correspondents in centres of Military Government activity for the purpose of ensuring proper coverage for its overt publications.93 This arrangement continued even after the formation of DANA, the German news agency. This is not to say that Die Neue Zeitung did not monitor other news gathering sservices such as: The Associated Press, United Press, Reuters, Radio Moscow, Tass, as well as other organisations. They did so in order to properly counter or support news that Germans received through unofficial channels. Die Neue Zeitung did not have any foreign 88 OMGUS, ICD Functional Annex to Governor, No. 4 (20 Nov 45), Press, p. 3. 89 OMGUS, ICD Functional Annex to Governor, No. 6 (20 Jan 46), Press, p. 2 90 OMGUS, ICD Functional Annex to Governor, No. 7 (20 Feb 46), Press, p. 3. 91 OMGUS, ICD Functional Annex to Governor, No. 8 (20 Mar 45), Press, p. 4. 92 History I. 93 History I.

the Monthly Report of the Military the Monthly Report of the Military the Monthly Report of the Military the Monthly Report of the Military

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correspondents, but it did carry articles by writers in the United States and Great Britain. Die Neue Zeitung carried no advertising. This meant that no company or individual could in any indirect way claim that OMGUS in any way sanctioned them, the service, or product they provided. At the same time, it gave the partial impression of not competing with ICD-licensed German newspapers, though there would still have been a certain level of market pressure at the newsstand. Since the paper did not have to worry about running an advertising department, story layout was simplified and it could concentrate on delivering the news it felt was important for the reeducation of the German people. It also did not have to concern itself with being popular and thus delivering on its pages what the advertisers felt comfortable with. The only master they served was OMGUS. This was in keeping with the direction Eisenhower gave the newspaper: While popularity with the German readers is desirable, it is not the chief test whether Die Neue Zeitung is carrying out its mission. As the official newspaper of the American Government in Germany and as spokesman for the American point of view on German and world affairs, it may be desirable and necessary at times to risk unpopularity.94

Despite Eisenhower‘s support for the paper, sometimes reporting that which the readers did not want to be confronted with, Die Neue Zeitung paid close attention to public opinion surveys emanating from the ICD’s Intelligence Branch. A survey conducted in January 1946 indicated that about 50% of those surveyed read Die Neue Zeitung. Additionally, it was discovered that “copies were passed from person to person, a single copy often being read by as many as five readers.”95 Beyond the simple numbers of Germans being reached by this paper, it was also noted that Germans considered there to be a qualitative difference between the overt and the licensed German papers, with the German papers coming off second best. By the end of June 1946, things had begun to change. The readership of Die Neue Zeitung began to drop off due to the increasing number of licensed German newspapers. This did not mean that Die Neue Zeitung was no longer read; it had just become people’s second choice. Die Neue Zeitung continued to be the most popular choice, once “the desire for local news had been met by the local newspaper.”96 94

OMGUS, Weekly Information Bulletin, NO. 66 (4 Nov 46) History I. 96 History I. 95

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Three more newspapers were licensed before the end of 1945. This brought the total to 23 newspapers with a combined circulation of over 3,000,000 copies.97 The papers added in December were all in Bavaria. The Donau Kurier in Ingolstadt was licensed on December 11 with a circulation of 45,000. The first licensee was Joseph Lackas, who was a nominal CSU supporter. An interesting figure in this is Wilhelm Reissmüller, who, immediately after the Adenauer government in 1949 lifted the licensing requirements, became a partner of Lackas. In 1935, Reissmüller led the takeover of the conservative-catholic Ingolstädter Zeitung as part of the Gleichschaltung of the German press under the Nazis. The paper was then merged with the Donaubote, which was owned by his father-in-law, Ludwig Liebl. Though Reissmüller was never a member of the Nazi Party, he had been a candidate for membership. In addition, as a soldier in the Wehrmacht, he had received the Iron Cross second and first class. All of this hardly made it possible for him to work in the press during the initial period of occupation. Der Allgäuer in Kempten was licensed on the 13th of December to Caspar Rathgeb. His was an unusual situation in that it appears that he had been given the task of organising the publication of the paper in September with licensing coming later. Though he was initially a lone licensee, Hans Falk was brought in from Bonn as a partner. What this demonstrates is that the ICD did at times take a very active role in ensuring they had the right Germans as licensees. Falk had already been a business editor in newspapers in Hannover, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Berlin until the Nazis took power. After this he worked as an insurance consultant until he secretly left for Austria in 1943, only returning to Germany after the capitulation. On December 18, the Fränkische Presse in Bayreuth was licensed to Julius Steeger and Walter Fischer, with a circulation of 60,000 copies. Steeger had been a member of the Landesrat for the SPD. He had some difficulties with the Nazi regime and spent a month in Dachau in 1944. In the next six months, only 12 newspapers were given licenses, with the bulk of them being issued in January. These were most often smaller papers like the Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung, the Giessener Freie Presse, the Fränkischer Tag in Bamberg, the Neue Presse in Coburg, and the Isar Post in Landshut. The Wetzlar paper had an initial circulation of 20,000 copies. It had a history that went back to 1872 when Ferdinand Schnitzler founded it as the Wetzlarer Kreisblatt. The ICD issued the license to Johann Eifinger, a 97

Figure does not include Die Neue Zeitung.

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Social Democrat, and Josef Hülsch, with the first issue appearing on January 1, 1946. Hülsch was to remain with the paper until 1950. The Schnitzler family was still in the area, but none of them had been found politically suitable to operate the paper. The paper had operated into the last year of the war without having any difficulty with the Nazi regime. However, in 1952 the family managed to take over the new paper. The Giessener Freie Presse was licensed to Adolf Weller and Julius Hahn, with the first edition appearing on January 8, 1946. Weller had been a member of the SPD since 1919 and had worked as an advertising agent for the Gießener Anzeiger, which had been founded in 1750 under the name Giessener Wochenblatt. Until he took over the paper, Weller had been the manager of the OMGUS’s administrative centre in Giessen. Once again, the ICD promoted from within. One could almost see the press license as being issued to someone they had grown to trust and perhaps as a reward for Weller’s work with the occupation forces. Of particular interest with this newspaper is the fact that Julius Hahn, the second licensee, was also a member of the SPD. This indicates a shift away from the initial policy of having a politically balanced directorate for the licensed press. Hahn had been a film and theatre script writer before the Nazis came to power. Because he had actively opposed the Nazis, he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1933 and spent 6 weeks in jail. Again in 1942, he was arrested and brought to a labour camp in Silesia, where the advancing Soviet army eventually liberated him. The two divided the task of running the paper along their administrative strengths; with Weller seeing to the physical production of the paper while Hahn took on the editorial duties. The Fränkischer Tag in Bamberg, with a circulation of 60,000 copies, the Neue Presse in Coburg at 45,000 copies, and the Isar Post in Landshut with an allotment of 50,000 copies, were additional Bavarian newspapers licensed in January. These were followed on the 5th of February by the Passauer Neue Presse, which was permitted an initial circulation of 60,000. In their rush to license further smaller newspapers, ICD officers in Bavaria seemed to become less discriminating in who was granted a publishing permit. For example, Hans Kapfinger, the licensee of the Passauer Neue Presse, had been recognised as a victim of the Nazi regime, because of his arrest by the Nazis in 1933. However, even a rudimentary background check should have raised questions in the minds of the ICD interrogators. Kapfinger had worked as chief editor of the Straubinger Tageblatt until 1933 and was known for his strong views in support of political Catholicism, having written his dissertation on the topic at the university

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in Munich. Though he had been arrested in 1933, which was the basis of his claim as a victim of Nazi oppression, he was released shortly thereafter. More than this, he almost immediately started working for various publishing houses and continued to do so until the end of the war. In fact, the last paper he worked for, as interim chief editor, before Germany’s surrender was the Nazi newspaper Deutsche Werbung, a fact that, as reported in Der Spiegel in 1962, he spent considerable effort trying to camouflage.98 All of this should have made Kapfinger persona non grata in Germany’s post-war media. However, in their desire to hand over control of the press to the Germans, he slipped through. On the other hand, if one is prone to conspiracy theories, one might even see the ICD officers in Passau as being sympathetic to this man who was later characterised as a “Kommunistenjäger.”99 Two licenses were issued in March for newspapers in WürttembergBaden. The Badische Neueste Nachrichten in Karlsruhe was allowed a print run of 100,000 and Die Heilbronner Stimme was permitted a circulation of 35,000. Wilhelm Baur and Walter Schwerdtfeger were the licensees when the first edition of the Badische Neueste Nachrichten appeared on March 4, 1946. Baur had been a member of the Centrist Party and was a journalist for the Badischer Beobachter until the Nazis took power. After this, he worked in the office of the Badenia Bausparkasse. When he was awarded the press license, he was a supporter of the CDU, which was the offspring of the earlier Zentrum Partei. Schwerdtfeger, on the other hand, is reported to have been a supporter of the SPD, who did not support stubborn partisan politics. Prior to 1936, he had been a journalist for ten years. In that year he was arrested by the Nazis and sentenced to life imprisonment. He had been incarcerated for about nine years when he was freed by the French forces in April of 1945.100 Schwerdtfeger left the paper in 1950. The ICD’s licensing policy changed in April 1946. Since the occupation zone was now deemed to have sufficient coverage of print news services, they began the task of opening competing newspapers in the larger centres. This meant that for the first time since 1933 individuals would have unfettered access to competing viewpoints in the media. The first city to enjoy this new found freedom was Frankfurt am Main. Frankfurter Neue Presse, with an initial circulation of 150,000 copies, 98

Der Spezi,” Der Spiegel, March 14, 1962, 26-34. Der Spezi.” Trans. Communist hunter. 100 Kathleen Nawyn “‘Striking at the Roots of German Militarism’: Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied WürttembergBaden, 1945-1949” (Ph.D. Diss. Chapel Hill, 2008), 327. 99

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began publishing twice weekly in competition with the Frankfurter Rundschau. The new policy called for licensing second newspapers in all cities with populations of 100,000 or more. However, Frankfurt was the only city to have two such newspapers by the end of June 1946. Hugo Stenzel and August Berning, both supporters of the CDU, were the original licensees for this new paper. Initially, Bruno Stümpke, an SPD supporter, was to have been a licensee as well, but during the vetting process, it was discovered that he had been a Kapo (trustee) in the concentration camp where he had been imprisoned.101 Knowing how Alfred Toombs, the Head of Intelligence, felt about such individuals, it is not at all surprising that he was denied a license. The paper was, however, to have further difficulties when Berning’s license was nullified after he had apparently libelled and offended one of the ICD officers by suggesting he was an anarchist and certainly not a good American.102 Apparently, it had been made clear to Berning by one of the ICD press officers that they were not going to tolerate two Catholic licensees at the same paper for long and that he was simply a placeholder until someone more suitable could be found. Interestingly, Berning, after leaving the paper, received a monthly stipend from the paper in the amount of 1000 DM for ten years following.103 While the Frankfurter Neue Presse was the most pressing of the projects at the time, a few other newspapers were licensed in some of the smaller cities. The Fränkische Landeszeitung in Ansbach began publishing on 24 April with a circulation of 60,000 copies, and two further Bavarian newspapers were added in May. This brought the first phase of the licensing program to an end at 35, with the exception of second newspapers in Munich and Stuttgart. The Südost Kurier in Bad Reichenhall was licensed on 10 May and Der Neue Tag in Weiden received its license on 31 May, with publication set to begin in June. Throughout this time, the ICD considered all of the papers they had licensed to be potential dailies. However, the newsprint supply remained a constant problem. All of the papers, with the exclusion of Der Tagesspiegel in Berlin, had to sometimes make due with not reaching their allocated circulation. That Der Tagesspiegel was exempt from these issues was a matter of the increasing political tension between the US and the Soviets. Berlin had now become the focus of a paper war between the two erstwhile allies.

101

Nawyn “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” 290. Nawyn “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” 297. 103 Nawyn “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” 298. 102

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The roster of licensed newspapers in the U.S.-occupied areas of Germany on 30 June 1946 showed 19 newspapers in Bavaria, 9 in Greater Hesse, 5 in Württemberg-Baden, and 1 each in Bremen and Berlin.104 While the ICD was willing to make compromises in the initial licensing of newspapers, they carefully watched how the editorial policy of the papers developed, how they were received by the reading public, and the difficulties the papers encountered as they established themselves as the arbiters of Germany’s new OMGUS determined political agenda.

The Stuttgarter Zeitung: Measuring Success From December 1945 to mid-January 1946 the Stuttgarter Zeitung was the subject of an intense investigation by the ICD. They wanted to determine whether the paper was meeting the needs of the community and whether a second newspaper was warranted in Stuttgart. In order to better understand the situation in Stuttgart, ICD investigators interrogated the editors of the Stuttgarter Zeitung and other political and community leaders. 105 Joseph Eberle, one of the three licensed publishers of the paper, was informally associated with the SPD. That is, he was not a member of the party at the time, but leant politically to the left and his closest friends and associates were not only members of the party but in leadership positions. From 1927 to 1933, when the Nazis removed him, he works in an editorial capacity with the Süddeutschen Rundfunk. Eberle had a second strike against him in Nazi Germany as he was married to a Jewish woman, Else Lemberger. He had been questioned by the Gestapo on a number of occasions and had spent a month and a half in the Heuberg concentration camp. He continued to publish under the pseudonym Sebastian Blau, but eventually this was denied him as well. Eberle was also granted the license for the Stuttgarter Zeitung together with Karl Ackermann and Henry Bernhard on the 17th of September 1945. Eberle was also very much a reliable and known quantity to the Americans. From May 1, 1936, until its closing in July of 1942, Eberle worked in the American consulate in Stuttgart, so it is no wonder that he was one of the first newspaper licensees.

104

For a complete listing, see Appendix E. In this text the terms interviewed and interrogated are used interchangeably, though in the Intelligence Summary “interrogated” is used most often to describe the how the ICD obtained its information from German subjects.

105

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Karl Ackermann, who was informally associated with the KPD, was the second of the Stuttgarter Zeitung licensees. From what one can gather from the ICD report, he had a strong personality and was very much the leader of the initial three licensees. Early in the Nazi regime he was implicated as a traitor, due to his involvement with a resistance group in Württemberg, and was put on trial. He spent time in Dachau concentration camp, from which he managed to escape to Switzerland. Here he worked as an academic researcher in Zurich before his return to Germany after the war. The final member of the initial group of three was Henry Bernhard. He was a member of the DVP (Democratic People’s Party) and had been the private secretary to Gustav Stresemann from 1923 to 1929 and was administrative director of the Foreign Ministry. After this, he wrote for a number of politically unaligned newspapers, which he had to give up in 1933. From 1933 to 1938 he owned a newspaper clipping service, after which he worked in Mercedes Benz’s public relations department until 1945. A fourth individual was often unofficially included in this group. Helmut Cron had initially applied for a license but had been turned down due to his peripheral involvement with the Nazis. Even so, he is still credited today with having been part of the team that helped build the Stuttgarter Zeitung. He had been the chief editor of the Mannheimer Tagesblatt from 1928 until 1934 when the National Socialists forced him out. After this, he worked as an editor for a number of trade papers until he was forced to give this work up as well, due to being considered politically suspect. In 1939 he became the business editor of the Stuttgarter neues Tagblatt, which from 1943 onward was considered synonymous with the Stuttgarter NS-Kurier, a capacity in which he served until 1945. It was for this reason that the ICD refused to license him as a publisher. From 1949 to 1953 he was the Chairman of the Deutschen Journalisten-Verbandes (German Journalist’s Association). He left the Stuttgarter Zeitung in 1949 to become the Chief Editor of the Wirtschaftszeitung. The licensed publisher of this paper was Curt E. Schwab, whose brother had emigrated to the United States in 1933 and returned to Germany as an occupation officer in the US Army. In addition, the leaders of the four main political parties in Württemberg-Baden were interviewed. The Chairman of the DVP, Wolfgang Haußmann, was a lawyer and, together with Arnulf Klett, founded the resistance cell Rettet Stuttgart (Save Stuttgart) during the Nazi years in Germany. For a brief time from 1945-1946, Haußmann served as Stuttgart’s Deputy Mayor.

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A further individual interrogated was Josef Andre, who was Minister of Economics and leader of the CSU (Christian Social Union). He was a Catholic and had been a leader in the Zentrum Party before the Nazis disbanded it. He had been imprisoned after the July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life. He was Economics Minister for Württemberg-Baden from September 1945 to May 1946, when he was forced out of office by OMGUS. Fritz Ulrich was the Chairman of the SPD in Württemberg-Baden. He had apprenticed as a printer/typesetter during which time he came in contact with the SPD. He eventually became chief editor of the NeckarEcho in Heilbronn. He was arrested by the Nazis in March 1933 and spent 8 months in various prisons and concentration camps. When he applied for a publishing license after the war, he was turned down by the ICD because they did not wish to have any newspapers tied directly to any of the political parties. However, OMGUS officials had other things in mind for him and, as of September 22, 1945, he was made the Minister of the Interior of Württemberg-Baden. Albert Buchmann was the Chairman of the KPD in WürttembergBaden. In 1919, Buchmann had joined the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany and in 1921 joined the KPD. He had been arrested in 1933 and was found guilty of treason in 1936. He spent virtually the entire 12-years of the Nazi period in Germany in either prison or a concentration camp. He eventually emigrated to the German Democratic Republic in 1952. Government officials were also asked their opinions. They were important because they worked very closely with the occupation forces on a daily basis. Reinhold Maier, the Minister President and leader of the Democratic Party was asked to comment on the newspaper situation. Maier was a Protestant and had been a member of the DDP (Deutsche Demokratische Partei) in Weimar Germany and had been the Economic Minister of Württemberg from 1930 to 1933. He was also the founder of the DVP in 1945 and had been designated Ministerprasident of Württemberg-Baden by OMGUS. Arnulf Klett, the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart, was a lawyer and then Mayor of Stuttgart from 1945 to 1974 and had initially been sworn in by the French forces 14 days before the end of the war in Europe. Klett, of Protestant background, had not been affiliated with any political party during the Nazi years but had been a tireless defender of those persecuted by the Nazis. Already in 1933, he had been sent to Heuberg concentration camp for four weeks due to his work with those being pursued by the Nazis. Even after this, he remained a staunch opponent of the regime.

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Considering the strong position of the church in helping to shape public opinion, the ICD also questioned their leaders. Franz Joseph Fischer, the Bishop of Rottenburg, and Reverend Seidenmeyer of the Catholic Church were questioned; as well as the protestant Bishop Theophil Wurm. While the two Catholics were politically unaligned, they did espouse conservative political positions. Wurm, on the other hand, had been a member of the Christian Social Party before World War I and had a seat in the Württemberg State Parliament until 1920. During the Nazi regime, he was twice arrested because of his stance in regard to church policy, especially the Barmen Declaration, and aligned himself with the breakaway Confessing Church. His complaints against the Nazi euthanasia program resulted in him being forbidden to speak in public, or to have his writing published. In 1945 he was made Chairman of the council of the reconstituted Evangelical Church in Germany and was a signatory of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt. Generally, while it was thought that the Stuttgarter Zeitung was sound in reporting and commenting on the news and had satisfied those interrogated, there were some criticisms concerning the newspaper’s philosophy. Overall, there was general agreement that the journalistic quality of the paper was good.106 Conservative leaders pointed out during their interviews that there was an imbalance among the licensed publishers of the paper with two leftist licensees and only one rightist, who also took on considerable editorial responsibilities. Adding Anton Frey, a journalist proposed by the Christian Social Union, to the editorial staff, corrected this to an extent. In addition, Helmut Cron, an unaffiliated conservative, edited the financial page of the paper. On the left, they added two additional editors. Willi Bohn had solid anti-Nazi credentials and had already been an antiwar activist in 1916 when he distributed flyers against the war in his hometown of Gotha. Later, he joined the Independent Social Democratic Party and then the KPD. He was eventually arrested by the Gestapo in 1935. The other leftwing editor was Fritz Eberhard, who ostensibly represented the worker’s viewpoint. Eberhard’s name at birth was Helmut von Rauschenplat. He took on the pseudonym Fritz Eberhard in 1933 after a warrant for his arrest was issued for his activities against the Nazis in Germany as a member of the SPD. In 1937 he managed to escape to Great Britain. There he was affiliated with the British Political Warfare Executive and also published articles and worked with the Sender der 106

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946, NARA, College Park, RG 260 390/41/10/1 Box 454.

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europäischen Revolution (initially associated with the BBC), which broadcast to German-occupied Europe. He was brought back to Germany in April 1945 by the OSS. Though he worked for the Stuttgarter Zeitung, his primary responsibility was ensuring the democratic reestablishment of radio broadcasting in southern Germany. Ackermann worked hard to establish some manner of inter-party harmony and was not opposed to the addition of a conservative licensee to the paper. However, according to the interrogation report, he noted, “The trouble is that the conservatives cannot find an experienced newspaper man who would satisfy the requirements of M[ilitary] G[overnment].” After analysing the ICD activities surrounding the Stuttgarter Zeitung, this was simply a statement of fact. The greatest scrutiny was reserved for Ackermann, because he was considered the most dynamic of the three licensees and that “he could perhaps exert his influence in orienting the paper toward his own philosophy.” 107 In his interview, however, he expressed a “desire to avoid the danger of having the newspaper branded as Communist,” because he thought that would compromise the “effectiveness of the paper in converting its readers to a democratic point of view.” 108 As a result, the ICD found, in the words of Ackermann himself, that “many readers conditioned by Nazi ideology and the German nationalist tradition are unpleasantly shocked by the democratic philosophy of the newspaper and try to solace themselves by calling the paper Communist.” 109 Ackermann further believed that all political persuasions should be allowed to express themselves freely to the public in the newspaper. He brushed aside dissatisfaction among Stuttgart’s leaders with the paper as being the result of the publishers not having enough space available and that, under the circumstances, this was unavoidable. He provided an example to the interrogators of how difficult a job editing the paper was with the then controversial November 5, 1945, edition. In this issue, several articles on the Communist Party and about life in the Soviet Zone appeared together. The result was “that critics objected to what they considered a Communist bias.” 110 Bernhard, the rightist co-publisher of the paper, echoed conservative criticism when he complained to his interviewers “that he could easily be out-voted by the two other licensees, both of whom are leftists.” 111 107

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 109 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 110 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 111 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 108

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Even so, Bernhard did agree that the news was not distorted in the paper, despite his perception that the news was being slanted in favour of the Soviets. He also bemoaned the fact that too much reporting on Nazi criminality appeared in the paper, and this was detrimental to reporting on the German economy, which he considered of utmost importance. In addition, Bernhard also felt that it was necessary to exercise greater discrimination in talking about members of the Nazi Party and not to portray the entire membership as a single homogeneous group. Eberle, the SPD sympathiser on the licensee board, was in charge of the reporting on cultural affairs. He presented a third view to the ICD investigators. He expressed concern that Ackermann could not follow an independent policy for the newspaper due to his close involvement with the Communists. Conversely, Eberle found Bernhard only to be interested in lending his support to the then Minister-President Maier and accused the right wing parties in the strongest terms of wishing a return to a totalitarian regime. He also suggested that Bernhard was disposed to “deal[ing] too gently with the Nazis” and that it was articles on culture that could realise re-education as envisioned by the Americans and not by writing yet another political editorial. His opinion was that the sole focus of the newspaper should be denazification and reconstruction. It was for this reason that he was not in favour of giving much space to religious affairs since, in his opinion, the religious leadership in Germany represented a regression into a Germany that resembled what led to the Nazis coming to power. The unofficial fourth member of the group, Cron, who was treated by the ICD interrogators on the same level as the licensed publishers, took a very different approach in his interview. In Cron’s view, the other three had insufficient business and journalistic qualifications to be responsible for the publication of the newspaper and argued: “he should be taking a larger part in managing the paper.” 112 Other than this, he reiterated the accusation that Ackermann had a clear KPD bias, which was not surprising considering his own political background. Having gathered the testimony of the publishers of the Stuttgarter Zeitung, the ICD moved on to Württemberg-Baden’s most influential political leaders. Haußmann, for instance, found it objectionable that the newspaper to did not support Minister-President Maier “in his effort to accomplish the transition to democracy as rapidly as possible.” 113 He further stated to the investigators—and demonstrated how out of touch the 112 113

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946.

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German political leadership was with the political realities of American politics—that “Surely the press in the United States would not attack an existing administration” and complained that Maier’s speeches often were not granted due importance in comparison with articles favourable to the left.114 Haußmann stated that the Stuttgarter Zeitung should provide unreserved support for Maier, his ministers, and to all of their projects, which revealed the type of authoritarian attitudes the ICD was trying to combat. Andre’s interview focused more on what he called the need for positive Christianity in the newspaper. This may, or may not, have been related to the official Nazi policy in regard to the churches in Germany. This is not clarified in the report. Considering Eberle‘s comments noted above, one can see that there were some fundamental differences in what the opinion leaders in Stuttgart saw as the necessary ingredients for a successful democracy in Germany. Andre may well have been correct when he expressed that he “sensed a certain hostility to religion in general.” However, he also showed impatience with, and resentment towards, the strictly ideological approach of the left wing members of the paper, who were drawing sharp lines between workers and employers. Andre may have seen this as creating class divisions when, in his view, Germans needed unity of effort and purpose. While there might have been differences reported between left-wing and right-wing parties, dissension between the left-wing parties picked up where it left off at the dissolution of the Weimar Republic by the National Socialists. Ulrich, the Chairman of the SPD, declared to the ICD interviewers that his party was not being represented satisfactorily in the paper. He felt that the “poetic Eberle was no balance to the dynamic Ackermann.” 115 This, he surmised, led to an overemphasis on the reporting of stories about the SPD-KPD union. In his opinion, this misrepresented the relationship between the two parties. This demonstrates that the accusation of reporting bias came not just from the rightists, but from the more moderate leftists as well. The leadership of the SPD feared being marginalised, since it appeared that the KPD had a powerful ally in the Soviet-controlled east. However, Ulrich did moderate his position and reported it as a “certain pro-Communist slant exhibited in the choice of the news items.” 116 Buchmann found fault with the Stuttgarter Zeitung too but suggested that it was not necessarily the shortcomings of the editorial staff that lay at 114

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 116 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 115

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its foundation. Rather, he felt that it “could not fulfil its mission of reflecting the mood, wishes and outlook of the people, because it did not appear often enough or in sufficient quantity.” 117 He also made concrete suggestions for ways that the paper could more effectively reflect its readership by being “more hospitable to correspondence from its readers” and that this “should aim at real democratization and reconstruction, expressed by the suggestions and opinions of those most directly involved in this effort–the workers, the intellectuals, the peasants, but certainly not the politicians.” 118 In part, his recommendations were based on enlisting the common person in an effort to rebuild Germany’s economy by being allowed to publically criticise the operation of industries. These were rather tame proposals compared with his submission “that the effectiveness of the newspaper would be increased if it were allowed to criticize the American authorities and to suggest ways of improvement” and that “such criticisms might bear on the denazification program, people being permitted to present instances where the program was being carried out too mechanically.” 119 This last item receives no comment in the ICD report, but would have certainly been a non-starter for the OMGUS, since it had clearly stated in its policies for Germany’s media that criticism of the US administration in Germany was not permitted. Government officials, like Reinhold Maier, also had criticisms of the paper that largely confirmed what the others were already saying. Though Maier was mostly complimentary towards the newspaper, he did have reservations about what he perceived as a tendency towards “a Communist approach” and also focused on the November 5, 1945, issue of the paper. 120 He did, however, note what he called “a marked improvement in this direction.” 121 He also reiterated Haußmann’s complaint regarding the newspaper not supporting the government, but qualified this position by suggesting “that such difficulties were being overcome.” 122 Maier might have been alluding to two instances where Ackermann made special efforts to avoid party conflicts by suppressing stories that would have been embarrassing to the fledgeling government. One instance involved the accusation by the Württemberg trade unions that Maier was orchestrating an attack on labour unions in the Land. Instead of going to print with the story, Ackermann informed Maier of the protest. What 117

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 119 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 120 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 121 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 122 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 118

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happened then was that Maier conferred with Buchmann, the head of the KPD in the Land, which led to Buchmann intervening with the unions on his behalf. In this case, the resolution put forward by the workers was not published in the paper. The second example might have been even more dangerous for the government. Ackermann had uncovered that Ministry of Economics under Andre had, without prior authorization, distributed food within the Ministry. Considering Germany’s situation in that first winter after the war, this could very easily have led to considerable unrest. However, in order to keep the fragile peace, Ackermann refrained from exploiting the story in the paper. So, while there may have been criticism about the paper not supporting the government, there is evidence that it did not actively work to undermine the government, though it had the means and opportunity to do so. Klett, Stuttgart’s Oberbürgermeister, declared the Stuttgarter Zeitung to be the best licensed paper in the American Zone in his interview. He was also the strongest advocate for appointing Cron as an additional licensee for the paper, though he did understand, given Cron’s Nazis ties, that this would be impossible. Klett’s reasons for his support of Cron were that Klett saw him as a possible counterbalance to Ackermann‘s “aggressive personality,” which presumably would bring greater balance to the paper’s reporting. Klett, however, did not consider Ackermann to be editorialising for the Communists, though he suggested that Ackermann was selecting positive news items supporting the KPD. Klett saw the problem as more one of the paper needing to reflect the political realities of the time. He argued that “since the Communists were only a minority, Ackermann’s taking as much space for the Communist Party as was given was manifestly unfair.” 123 The most revealing attacks on the Stuttgarter Zeitung came from the church leaders. The Catholics, Bishop Fischer and Reverend Seidenmeyer, were strongly anti-Communist in their statements about the paper but did praise its journalistic standards. They both challenged the need for a Communist licensee on the board, suggesting that it was doubtful that Ackermann was committed to creating a democratic Germany. Though their main dissatisfaction was with any Communist being involved in an editorial position on a paper, they also complained about “the absence of articles on youth, and the omission of news on the situation in the Eastern (Polish and Russian) areas since, in their opinion, the forced migrations of Germans in those areas were causing hardships equal to any atrocities

123

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946.

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committed by the Germans.” 124 From the report on the interrogations, it is clear that they were unwilling to embrace a changing Germany that was part and parcel of having surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. It also underlines the suspicions that the ICD had about how reactionary the Church was and that it appeared to be a bastion of anti-democratic activists. The Protestant church leader, Theophil Wurm, was less harsh in his criticism. He complained to the interrogators that articles he had sent to the paper had not been published. His assumption was that the left-leaning members of the editorial board had rejected these. Wurm suggested as well that the paper include a more critical stance in regard to present conditions in Germany. With this, he specifically singled out the issue of denazification. What the ICD interrogators were trying to determine through all of this was whether Stuttgart needed, or was ready for, a second newspaper. The majority, all but one of the journalists and most of the political and religious leaders, did not think that is was a good idea. Ackermann was of the opinion that readers would jump to the conclusion that this new paper was created to express rightist views “and would infer, therefore, that the Stuttgarter Zeitung was indeed a Communist organ,” a notion that he strenuously defended against. 125 Konrad Witwer, a State Councillor for the Land and close friend of Maier, supported this view and added that a second paper would damage the prestige and influence of the Stuttgarter Zeitung. In addition, he thought that many readers switch to the other paper because they did not accept the Stuttgarter Zeitung’s support of the American’s emphasis on “responsibility for the war, the approval of the denazification policy and the advocacy of complete cooperation with the occupying forces.” 126 The one dissenting voice amongst the journalists was Cron. He favoured the introduction of a second newspaper. The interviewers surmise that this was the case because “he anticipated being its editor.” 127 Cron believed that a paper published by him “would make sharp inroads into the circulation of the Stuttgarter Zeitung because of his greater experience and because he would recognise the differences among different kinds of Nazis.” 128 Klett, not surprisingly, supported a second paper edited by Cron. Haußmann was also in agreement with the idea of a 124

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 126 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 127 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 128 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 125

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second paper, “provided it exhibited rightist policies,” not unforeseen given his political views. 129 Somewhat isolated among the right-wing politicians was Andre, who “deplored the possibility of the establishment of an additional paper, which he believed would be considered reactionary and would fail to attract people from the lower economic strata.” 130 Buchmann supported this view and “suggested that most of the present paper’s deficiencies could be overcome by publishing it daily and giving each political group more opportunity for expression.” 131 Maier offered the most even-handed approach in his opposition to a second newspaper. He felt that a second, right-wing, paper would be counterproductive and would work against what he considered vital for Germany’s budding democracy, “a rapprochement between the SPD and the conservative parties.” 132 He was of the opinion that “a second paper would […] drive the Social Democrats to the more extreme left.” 133 However strong the opposition to a second newspaper in Stuttgart may have been, those expressing opposition to a second paper were in favour of establishing individual party newspapers, a suggestion that the ICD was strictly opposed to in its policies. Buchmann, however, was afraid that the establishment of party newspapers would create internal strife in the Communist Party and probably lead to greater friction within the Party as it would publically air its dissensions amongst its rank and file members. His solution was simple, increase the circulation of the Stuttgarter Zeitung, which some argued was already safely in Communist hands. In its conclusion, the “Intelligence Summary” found that, for the most part, criticism of the Stuttgarter Zeitung “was restrained and that many of the critics recognised the extreme handicaps under which a semi-weekly licensed paper is forced to operate.” 134 They also determined that the tempered nature of the criticism directed at the paper in its current state “[wa]s an indication, perhaps, that the newspaper [wa]s satisfying the needs of the community.” Despite the fact that licensing of newspapers in the American zone of control was almost completed, it was never, at least initially, the intention of the ICD to completely exit the production of overt newspapers. As it did phase out its overt newspapers, it retained Die Neue Zeitung, under its full

129

“Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 131 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 132 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 133 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 134 “Information Control: Intelligence Summary,” January 26, 1946. 130

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control.135 The intention was, as indicated by the policies and aims established by Eisenhower, 1) to retain at least one official Military Government voice in the print media, 2) provide an example of how newspapers were to objectively and truthfully report the news, 3) widen the Germans’ view in regard to things they had not been exposed to during the Nazi regime. Edward Breitenkamp, a former ICD officer, in his brief outline of how the ICD functioned, noted a fourth possible reason for maintaining Die Neue Zeitung has a functioning newspaper. It was to remain in place in order to demonstrate to the Germans that their newspapers could be shut down at a moment’s notice and that the ICD could become the sole provider of news for the German people.136 In other words, the newspaper could be shut down in a particular city, and additional editions of Die Neue Zeitung could be produced and distributed to fill the void left by the newspaper that had been shut down. In order for German newspapers to remain in good standing with the occupation forces, they had a few hard and fast rules that they needed to follow. The official policy regarding what German newspapers could not publish were: 1. there were to be no national socialist ideas contained in any of the stories 2. so-called “Völkisch” ideas which related to racism or race hatred were forbidden 3. fascist or antidemocratic ideas were forbidden 4. pan-German or opinions of an imperialist nature, which were considered militarist, were also forbidden 5. no criticism of the Military Government’s policies or personnel were to be tolerated.137

While there were violations of the above-noted ICD policies, most came in the form of not separating news from opinion and for the most part were considered to be minor infractions of the rules. At the same time, the ICD did not leave their new publishers to work in isolation. On October 20, 1945, the ICD organised the first general meeting of the 45 licensed publishers and editors of the Western Military District, representing eleven newspapers, at a conference in Marburg. This was the first step in re-establishing an association of publishers and editors 135

Die Neue Zeitung was published in Munich from October 17, 1945 until January 30, 1955 and included in its banner the phrase “Eine amerikanische Zeitung für die deutsche Bevölkerung.” 136 Breitenkamp, The U.S. Information Control Division 1945-49, 39. 137 History I.

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as existed before 1933. The ICD considered this development of great significance; because it was the first time in 12 years that German newspapermen had been able to talk freely with one another about “their mutual problems and policies.”138 The second day of the conference was devoted to the development of DANA and the training of new journalists. For this, representatives from the Eastern Military District joined the group. Press Control officers were also in attendance, but only as observers and providing advice when requested. After this conference, a further one was organised for the publishers from Bavaria. On November 17, 1945, they met at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Two days later, the Bavarian Publishers Association was proposed, and its constitution and by-laws were approved by OMGUS on December 5. It took a little longer for the newspaper association to get underway in Hessen and Württemberg-Baden. The association for Hessen was approved on May 9 at Fulda, after meeting on April 7. Publishers in Württemberg-Baden had already received approval on May 6 at Stuttgart. After a brief transition period, the three publishers’ groups began “dealing with a number of matters which formerly had been referred to Military Government” at the end of June. Though the associations were ostensibly independent bodies, ICD officers were invited to participate. With these independent bodies in place for the first time since 1933, the German press became more and more able to deal with problems on their own without political or governmental interference. Although by mid-1947 OMGUS no longer directly controlled newspapers, as had been the case early in the occupation, it continued to screen carefully and rescreen licensees and post-publication scrutiny of newspapers was the rule. Even after two years of a seemingly good working relationship with the licensed press, the ICD reminded US licensed publishers August 1947, “that they would be held fully responsible for the contents of their newspapers.”139 Indeed this seemed to work as Ralph Willett suggests that German writers and artists in the US zone did pull their punches for fear of having their licenses or registrations revoked.140 This was not just an idle threat. In that same month, the ICD revoked the licenses of four leading newspapermen.141 One licensee each from the Frankfurter Neue Presse and the Frankfurter Rundschau and two licensees of the Bremerhaven Nordsee Zeitung were dismissed when 138

History I. History III. 140 Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 4. 141 History III. 139

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evidence turned up during the rescreening process “that their actions and policies were in conflict with the principles of a democratic press.”142 In addition, Karl Vetter of Der Mannheimer Morgen was asked to tender his resignation in January 1948 because of his close association with the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. This was not the only way in which licensees could run afoul of the authorities. There would also be instances in which one of the occupying powers might take offence at something appearing in a newspaper in one of the other zones and ask that the situation be addressed. Another way of dealing with the situation would be to ban the newspaper from appearing in one’s zone, as was the case with the French. French military government authorities suspended the distribution of the Rhein-Neckar Zeitung for three months, accusing the paper of having attacked French occupation policy. In this particular case, the ban was put in place without prior notice to OMGUS, a situation that apparently did not sit well with the ICD. In order to avoid a repeat of what must have been an embarrassing situation for OMGUS, since it made it appear as though they had sanctioned the views expressed in the paper, the French authorities were asked to bring future violations by US licensed newspapers to the attention of OMGUS before action was taken. In addition to the problems that newspapers might encounter with the ICD officers, they also were confronted at times with a German bureaucracy that had an agenda of its own and tried to control what the papers reported. Such was the case with the new licensees of the Nordsee Zeitung when they took over from the previous licensees. The Mayor of Bremerhaven ordered city officials not to grant interviews or to give statements directly to the press. He went even further and established a Central Press Bureau, which was to censor all official news releases. The paper found an innovative way of challenging the censorship decree when it began replacing the official municipal releases with recipes for housewives. They were not alone in taking action. The Weser Kurier of Bremen, in a show of journalistic solidarity, supported the actions of the Bremerhaven paper. It was not long before the censorship order was withdrawn. As the newspaper media and the publishing houses in Germany gained more and more freedom from oversight and OMGUS turned more power over to local German authorities, an issue surfaced that could have undone everything the ICD had worked to establish in Germany. The problem was that the new publishers had little or no capital of their own to work with, 142

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other than the license and a clean political record. At the beginning of the occupation, the ICD had provided licensees with the facilities to print their newspapers and books, but this arrangement could have been nullified by a new German government that might turn the property back over to the original owners and the old guard could then have effectively shut down the new papers and restarted their own publications. For this reason, OMGUS issued a regulation in September 1947, which provided security of property tenure for the US licensed newspaper publishers in Germany. This regulation stipulated that, if the owner of a newspaper printing plant was unwilling to execute a new lease voluntarily with a licensed publisher, OMGUS would require that a five-year mandatory lease be extended. Moreover, if the publisher could not make new arrangements for a printing facility during the term of the first lease, it would be extended for an additional three years, essentially giving the newspaper a secure printing facility until 1955. As well, it ensured that the original owner, who had been deemed unsuitable in the new media established by the ICD, could not re-enter the newspaper industry until 10 years after the end of the war and would have to compete with solidly established media outlets. While this arrangement might appear draconian, it did provide for the payment of a fair rental to the owner of the printing plant. It also made accommodation for an annual review of the lease with the possibility of the terms being modified due to changing economic and financial conditions. The ICD went even further to ensure the financial security of the newly established newspapers. In February 1948, the ICD began dispersing the more than 48,000,000 RM it had collected as the 20% fee on gross receipts of US licensed newspapers. While the fund’s primary purpose had been to provide a reserve fund in cases of financial exigency in the first few years, these funds had seldom been necessary to aid the licensed press. The first step in finally utilising this fund was the establishment of Wirtschaftliche Genossenschaft der Presse with a grant of 25,000,000 RM from the ICD’s bank account. This new organisation was to be administered by a German Board of Supervisors, who were in turn supervised by military government authorities. The purpose was to provide loans to newspaper publishers and news agencies licensed in the US occupied area and ensure that they could procure new facilities and equipment. The rest of the fund, some 23,000,000 RM, was divided among the existing newspaper publishers. With this sudden influx of cash, the papers were able to make improvements very quickly to their physical plants, purchase equipment, and build up the supplies needed to publish their papers. This last point

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was particularly important given the chronic issue of paper shortages since it allowed newspapers to expand from semi-weekly papers to dailies. There were, however, some problems associated with this fund that were out of the control of the ICD. Perhaps the most significant of these was the currency reform of June 21, 1948. By this date, the fund had increased to about 36,000,000 RM, but this was now reduced to approximately 3,600,000 DM. While one could argue that the fund was now capitalised with a currency that had real value, the psychological impact of the now much smaller number was significant and soon the fund had been exhausted in the form of loans to its members. While assistance did come from money made available through the Marshall Plan, this new money was also available to the approximately 650 new papers that were started between June and September of 1949 as a result of the of the lifting of licensing requirements in June. In the third year of the occupation, German newspapers began extending their reach and were reporting far more on: world political and economic developments, American foreign policy, the European recovery program, several of the conferences held in London, the world food crisis, the political crisis in Czechoslovakia in February, and the April elections in Italy. These stories were an important proving ground for the German papers, and the ICD watched their reporting and commentary carefully. Of special importance was not so much what the papers reported or their political take on the stories, but rather whether the papers were adhering to the ICD policy of clearly differentiating between reporting on the news story itself and editorial comment. The ICD also carefully monitored newspaper reporting on Allied conference decisions on Germany. These received full coverage in the papers, especially when the new industrial plans for the US and British zones were announced in August 1947. The papers carried the full text of the decisions with explanations following on the editorial pages and not mixed in with the text of the news story, as had been the practice prior to the occupation. A further meaningful step for journalism was taken in November 1947. In London, a conference of Foreign Ministers was held and for the first time, German journalists were to cover the story and not simply pick up whatever came across the wire service. OMGUS managed to secure the cooperation of the British Foreign Office, and two German journalists were authorised to cover the story for the licensed press and radio in the US zone. Erik Reger, one of the licensed publishers and editor in chief of Der Tagesspiegel in Berlin and Hilda Brockhoff, the assistant foreign editor of DENA, where the first representatives of the US licensed press permitted to cover an assignment outside of Germany. Together, the two

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managed to file an average of 1000 words daily to DENA. Reger also broadcast a number of reports direct from London through the facilities of RIAS in Berlin. This gave the Germans, for the first time in many years, firsthand reports on the discussions important to their future without them first being filtered through foreign sources. Reger’s excursion into the outside journalistic world was not to end there. The German papers had closely followed the progress of the European Recovery Program (ERP), and the German population had been kept up to date on all of its various developments. So, during final congressional discussions of the program in March of 1948, Reger was given special permission to travel to the United States and report on the final hearing. Twice a week he sent commentaries to Berlin by radio, with these being rebroadcast by the five US controlled radio stations and printed in the US licensed papers. The German press devoted considerable space to covering the Foreign Assistance Act and highlighted the subsequent Paris conference of the participating nations. German editorial writers hailed Germany’s inclusion in the program as a sign that the German people were truly on the road to rehabilitation in the eyes of the rest of the world. The ICD not only used the newspapers in the US zone to deliver its message to the German people but also used them to gauge the mood and anxiety of the Germans, especially over the tension in Berlin leading to the blockade. They not only read the editorial pages of the German press but paid close attention to reader letters to the editors. Die Neue Zeitung also took an active role in disseminating the US political program during this time. One of the most significant was John Gilbert Winant’s A Letter from Grosvenor Square, which is a retelling of the war as seen through the eyes of the American ambassador to Great Britain during the war years. It was intended to bring home to the Germans, in a rather gentle way, the struggle of Great Britain to survive. Winston Churchill’s memoirs were also serialised in the paper and were a means of showing the determination of the British during even the darkest period of the Blitz. The means of reaching out to the German people was not just through political memoires. The paper showed a surprising breadth of field in what it included in its pages and did not confine itself to American or British writers. The cultural pages of Die Neue Zeitung included reprints of works by Irving Stone, Andre Gide, José Ortega y Gasset, Louis Bromfield, William Saroyan, Thomas Mann, Carl Zuckmayer, Stefan Zweig, JeanPaul Sartre, and Somerset Maugham.

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During the third year of its publication, Die Neue Zeitung increased its circulation from 1,200,000 copies to 1,905,000 copies. Part of the reason for this was more fully to penetrate the readership in the Soviet zone. This, however, was not the only area that it thought vulnerable. The Ruhr, which contained a considerable left-wing element that was sympathetic to the Soviets, also received extra papers. In this way, the paper was used to stabilise support for the Americans in the western part of Germany because the Americans saw the Ruhr as being crucial to the revitalization of western Germany. With the Die Neue Zeitung, one can see the special effort that the Americans made in shoring up their support in Berlin through the special Berlin supplement that was printed in semi-weekly editions of 400,500 copies. The ICD also took some of its final steps in completing the task of licensing newspapers in its zone during the period July 1947 to June 1948. To this end, a further five newspapers were licensed, bringing the total to 51. The Nordsee Zeitung had been founded 1866 (North Sea Newspaper), but the publisher of the paper during the Nazi period, Kurt Ditzen, had taken out a membership in the Nazi party in 1938 and was disqualified as a publisher. The license was instead issued to Bruno Stöwsand and Walter Gong. Stöwsand had spent 4 years in various concentration camps from 1935 to 1939 due to his opposition to the Nazis. After the war, he worked as an editor for DENA until he was granted a license as a newspaper publisher. The paper was published three times a week in Bremerhaven and had a circulation of 50,000. Though the paper was licensed on 18 July 1947, its first issue did not appear until October 27 due to what was simply termed “internal personnel problems.” In 1948, Ditzen was cleared by the denazification tribunal and took over in 1949 as publisher, with Stöwsand remaining as chief editor and in an executive position. Johann Brandenburg and Felix Richter were authorised to publish the Süddeutsche Allgemeine in Pforzheim on July 29, 1947. Brandenburg, a lawyer by trade, was a Catholic supporter of the FDP. His ownership of the paper, however, was short-lived, since he had to give it up when he became mayor of Pforzheim in 1948. Richter, who was a supporter of the SPD, but not a member of the party, served as the editor of the paper. The Süddeutsche Allgemeine had a modest circulation of 39,000. The paper underwent a number of name changes since its inception and indeed, like some of the other papers could call upon a longer tradition of having been published under various names prior to 1945. As with the Nordsee Zeitung, there was a former publisher of the newspaper, Jakob Esslinger, waiting in the wings to take over, once the ICD restrictions were lifted.

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Though there was no indication that Esslinger had been complicit in delivering Nazi propaganda and had even been shut down by the Nazis in 1943, ostensibly due to paper shortages, he was not allowed to operate the paper when the ICD decided to reopen it. So it was that on December 1, 1949, Richter left the paper and allowed Esslinger to step in as publisher of the paper. On August 28, 1947, the Niederbayerische Nachrichten began publishing under the license granted to Albert König, who was a supporter of the SPD, and Hans Wetzel, a supporter of the CSU. Initially, they had no plant in which to publish the paper, but the ICD quickly stepped in and forced Georg Huber of the Huber’schen Verlag to sign a printing contract with König and Wetzel. The paper was published in Straubing twice weekly with a circulation of 50,000. The Straubing paper is another good example of what happened after ICD licensing of newspapers was ended. In this case, it was, however, not a matter of the old publisher, who may have been tainted by a connection with the Nazi, but another existing licensee that created a problem for the paper. Though Huber was “just” the printer of the newspaper, it seems that he took a far greater leadership role in running the paper than might have been evident from the license issued by the ICD. It was he who would eventually lock horns with Hans Kapfinger, who already held a license for the newspaper in Passau, but was looking to expand into the Straubing area. Kapfinger had even reached an agreement with König and Wetzel to take over the paper on June 3, 1949. This, however, caused the printers to go on strike, and they refused to print the paper. This, in turn, caused the printing for the Straubing paper to be transferred to the Passau plant. At the same time, Huber was preparing to publish a new paper called the Straubinger Tagblatt, which was at that time still unsellable due to the licensing requirements still being in force. Huber went so far as to print a test run on August 12. One might guess that Huber had insider information about what was going to happen because ten days later licensing was ended in the US zone.143 The Werra Rundschau, published in Eschwege, Hessen on a weekly basis, had a circulation of 20,000. Peter Kluthe, who, according to the ICD was affiliated with the Liberal Democrats (LDP), was authorised to publish the paper in January 1948. This paper seemed to run without any of the dramatic episodes experienced by some of the other papers, and Kluthe appeared to work well with his two editors, Max Klier and Alfred Nagel, as well as the rest of the team that he had assembled. 143

Historisches Lexikon Bayerns Online.

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According to the ICD reports, the Schwäbische Post was licensed on February 25, 1948, to Karl Eduard Conrads, who was the political editor of the paper and not affiliated with any party, and Johannes Binkowski, who acted as the publisher and was a member of the CDU.144 It seems that shortly after the paper’s founding, Konrad Theiss replaced Conrads as Binkowski’s co-licensee. The paper was published in Aalen (Württemberg-Baden) at a rate of two issues per week and a circulation of 33,000 per issue. Binkowski held a doctorate in theology and had published a book about religious education for adults in 1940. The contents of this book, however, caused the Nazis to issue a ban on his writing, though he does not appear to have been arrested. Instead, he was drafted into the army and subsequently became a prisoner of war with the Americans. The last newspaper to be licensed in Hessen was the Waldecker Kurier on June 9, 1948. It was published in Korbach twice a week and had a circulation 17,000. Ludwig Steinkohl, a member of the CDU, acted both as editor and publisher of the paper. The Waldecker Kurier is an unusual newspaper in that it only published until May 31, 1950. Almost all of the other papers had become so well established that their market position had become unassailable by any of the other papers that were started after the licensing requirement had been done away with. In the case of the Waldecker Kurier, the problem may have been the so-called Dietz Affair, in which it was virtually the only Hessian newspaper that took the side of Fritz Dietz, who was eventually found guilty of misusing his power as minister in charge of food distribution to his benefit. Steinkohl upheld the principle of not declaring Dietz guilty before he had been found so, while the other papers doggedly went after him. In this case, Dietz was found guilty and was sentenced to two 90-day prison terms. While Steinkohl may or may not have taken a principled stand, it cost him credibility in the eyes of his readers. Another reason could well have been the fact that Steinkohl envisioned the paper as a truly local paper, published for those who call Waldeck home. The problem was that at least 33% of his readers, or those residing in Waldeck, were now from elsewhere and thus the attraction for local news being at the forefront was not a particularly strong selling feature. The newspapers in the US zone, though working on their own, also undertook projects that saw them cooperating with one another and treating the newspaper as being more than a news reporting device and as 144

“The German Press in the US Occupied Area 1945-1948,” Special Report of the Military Governor November 1948. Online.

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an organ for a greater sense of unity as well. In the spring of 1947 the Verband Bayerischer Zeitungsverleger (Bavarian Newspaper Publishers Association), enlisted the support of OMGUS and other agencies to put on an international press exhibit. This show outlined the early history and development of newspapers not only in Germany but worldwide. As could be expected, special emphasis was given to how German newspapers had developed under the occupation. The exhibit ran from 5 May to 15 June 1948 and was the first such event in US-occupied Germany. The first day saw about 10,000 people attending the opening ceremonies. What followed was quite remarkable and during the six weeks of the exhibit, more than 220,000 visitors attended. Some of the displays tried to recreate a sense of history and tradition for the newspaper industry in Germany. In the German section of the exhibit, the history of German newspapers from 1848 to 1933 was chronicled. A further display, “The Press in Chains,” demonstrated the conditions encountered by the press during the Nazi regime. This was then contrasted with the presentation of the German press in the post-war period, with samples of newspapers from all of the occupation zones. They also did not shy away from the mission the ICD had given the German press. They were quite forward in stating that the press was there to aid in re-educating and reorienting the German people. Moreover, their task was to expose and remove any signs of Nazism and militarism. This was emphasised through a display including many recent editorials that attacked these ideas. DENA was also present and Die Neue Zeitung, the official OMGUS newspaper also presented their stories. The Americans had a section of the exhibition devoted to presenting a complete history of the press in the United States. It stressed the importance of the public service function of the American newspaper. The demonstration material was, for the most part, on loan from American newspapers, universities, and libraries. They even made special arrangements to show the motion picture Call Northside 777, which had been released February 1, 1948, starring Jimmy Stewart. The film dealt with the role of the press as a check on the power of the government and its officials. In the film, Jimmy Stewart plays a reporter who grudgingly takes an assignment to report on a woman who placed an ad in the paper to help catch the murderer of a police officer in 1933. The woman’s son was found guilty of the murder, but she was convinced that he was innocent. As the reporter digs into the story, he begins to believe in the young man’s innocence as well. The further he investigates, the greater the resistance he encounters.

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In addition to the feature-length film, other short films were also shown. The most significant of these was the case of the German-born John Peter Zenger and his fight for freedom of the press in colonial America. Zenger owned the first independent newspaper in New York and was famous for running satirical pieces aimed at the Governor of the colony. He was finally brought to trial and in 1735 was acquitted of seditious libel, though what he had been printing fit the legal description of libel at the time. This film was clearly aimed at drawing a connection between the United States, Germany, and freedom of the press. Further films, such as The New York Times, were more instructional in nature and showed the methods and techniques of American journalism. Other countries participating in the exhibition included Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Austria. Perhaps the most significant was the display of newspapers published during the war by resistance groups in occupied countries. The exhibition also featured its own newspaper, the Tageszeitung, which was the brainchild of the ICD officer Ernst Langendorf. This newspaper was written, typeset, and printed in full view of all of the visitors to the exhibit. In the view of the ICD, the Tageszeitung combined the best features of American and German journalism and presented up to the minute news in a popular way. Each day, 70,000 copies were printed and then distributed throughout the US zone. The copies kept for sale at the exhibition sold out almost as soon as they came available. The paper proved to be so popular that it was continued for another three months as Die Abendzeitung (The Evening Newspaper), with a daily circulation of 25,000 copies under a licence granted to Werner Friedmann, who was already one of the licensees of Die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Friedmann was half-Jewish on his father’s side and, despite this, had been drafted into the Wehrmacht. Prior to the Nazis taking power, he had worked as a journalist for the Süddeutsche Sonntagspost. Upon being released from incarceration in a British prisoner of war camp, he was employed by the Die Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1945 and made one of the four licensees in 1946. Initially, the Die Abendzeitung was to be published on a non-profit basis, being sponsored by the Bavarian newspaper publishers’ association and used as a training ground for young journalists. The newspaper, however, went on to be successful and, though it still fulfilled its role as a place for young writers to cut their teeth, very quickly became independent and turned a profit. The exhibition was more than just a showcase for the newspapers. Attached to it was a three-day International Press Convention. This was an opportunity for more than 50 journalists from the United States, Great

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Britain, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria, and about 200 representatives of German newspapers in the four occupation areas to discuss the techniques and trends of modern journalism. While the Bavarian Exhibition was the largest and most obvious of the efforts on the part of the ICD to promote their vision of what Germany’s newspapers should look like, there were many other smaller events that helped point the German newspapermen towards the American model of how the press relates to its environment. For example, German correspondents were encouraged to attend three-week intensive journalism courses conducted by the American military’s Stars and Stripes newspaper, which was headquarters in Pfungstadt just south of Darmstadt. The ICD also encouraged a strong working relationship between Swiss newspapers and the licensed papers in Germany. Such was the case when the Swiss agency Kosmospress was licensed to sell its services directly to US licensed newspapers in December 1945. A further initiative undertaken by the Swiss, and permitted by the ICD, was the visit of Bavarian newspaper representatives to Switzerland, which was sponsored by the Swiss Newspaper Publishers Association in March 1946. There were also visits from newspapermen from further afield. At the Coburg newspapermen’s conference, there were high-ranking American newspaper publishers in attendance for the first time since the end of the war. Eugene Meyer, publisher of the Washington Post and who was shortly to become the first President of the World Bank, and Geoffrey Parsons, editor of the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune encouraged and admonished the German publishers on the responsibilities and duties of a free, democratic press.

DANA DANA (Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichtenagentur) was the news agency established by the ICD, which later was renamed DENA (Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur) after its amalgamation with the corresponding agency in the British sector, was viewed as a journalism school. The average age of those working for DANA was only 26 ½ years and the German press agency employed in total 180 employees. 145 Of these, 130 were German. It was also the main conduit and choke point into the German newspapers in the US zone for world events. Since the ICD closely controlled it, they could regulate the information used to form German opinion of world events in their zone and, to some extent, in the other three. 145

History I.

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Despite being free and having worked out most of its difficulties by June 30, 1946, DANA was still under direct press control supervision and subjected to pre-broadcast scrutiny.146 In reality, DANA was not so much a world-newsgathering agency as a channel for The New York Times and Herald Tribune into the American occupation zone. Moreover, as long as the ICD operated DANA, the US press services agreed not to enter into agreements with individual German newspapers.147 Agreements such as this ensured that the ICD had a relatively easy means of overseeing international news stories that were disseminated to the German press. The initial plan was to turn DANA over to German control as quickly as possible. This, however, proved to be more difficult than expected. By October 20, 1945, a new board had been put in place for DANA and by November 10 a three-member executive had been chosen to plan its organisation and draft a charter. Since many of the laws giving absolute control of the content of news in Germany to Goebbels‘ Propaganda Ministry had not been nullified, there were some legal difficulties in accepting information from foreign sources in Germany. While it did cause problems, it could also work to the benefit of the ICD, since it could cloak itself in the legitimacy of working from within existing German laws. The most serious problem, however, was one that had its roots in the United States. The “Trading with the Enemy Act” had been brought into force in 1917, and it prevented American individuals and corporations from doing business with countries that had been designated as enemies. Germany continued to be on that list until 1949. This meant that DANA under German control could not, without special permission, deal with American news sources directly, because US law would have considered the American newspapers to be doing business with the enemy. Thus the ICD served as an important intermediary for news from US sources to Germany. DANA, as an agency of OMGUS, did not have to worry about the restrictions resulting from the American law. On June 29, 1945, two lieutenants and four enlisted men were stationed to Bad Nauheim. Seven OWI civilians accompanied them. Their task was to create a German news service. The news service was to provide international news to both overt and licensed newspapers in Germany. Bad Nauheim was selected because the existing facility, though damaged, had been built as a communications centre for the Propaganda Ministry after the repeated bombing of Berlin made it difficult to maintain 146 147

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communications from there. It also had a surviving communications infrastructure that did not need to be rebuilt, such as working teletype circuits. Moreover, the main offices of the American overt newspapers were already there, as well as the 12th Army Group’s press and radio facilities. It simply made sense to consolidate these operations in one place to facilitate easy communications between units that needed to coordinate their work. As might be expected “service to newspapers was slow and incomplete at first, hampered as the news agency was by insufficient personnel, transportation and communications” with part of the problem being the slow translation of news stories from English to German.148 However, by the middle of August 1945, both a German and English desk had been established, with translated stories being couriered to the German newspapers. Moreover, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, and Wiesbaden now had working press bureaus and correspondents. While all of this was going on, the news service was also looking for new German staff and training them. This fledgeling operation had specific criteria that potential employees had to meet. The preference was not to employ veteran journalists who, even if they had not been members of the NSDAP, were suspected of having compromised their political principles in order to obtain or retain a job. What they were looking for were “young people with a family or personal background of anti-Nazi activity.”149 The preference, in other words, was not for experience, but a willingness to learn news techniques, economics, history, and any subject that might be helpful in a journalistic career. The Allied Press Service in London was discontinued on September 6, 1945, with the disbanding of SHAEF. Until then, this was the conduit for world news reaching Germany. This left only the US Press Service in Luxembourg as a clearinghouse for the media in Germany. It was also at this time that the name DANA was adopted for the German news service, and it became fully operational. It initially used a radio teleprinter (Hellschreiber) captured from the Germans by the 12th Armoured Division near Stuttgart. Ironically, this transmitter had been used by the Germans to jam Radio Luxembourg after the Allied Forces had begun using the station to broadcast into Germany after its capture. The new procedure for getting news stories into and out of USoccupied Germany was now simple and completely in American hands. 148 149

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“A file of world news in German was received by DANA from Luxembourg by teletype, and in turn DANA’s English file was sent to Luxembourg for transmission to the OWI news bureau in New York.”150 This state was short-lived. On November 11, 1945, the US Army turned Radio Luxembourg over to the Duchy of Luxembourg and made Bad Nauheim and DANA the centre of news operations. DANA did not use its own staff writers in order to create its news files exclusively. It also had stories flowing in “from the various licensed newspapers and operating radio stations.”151 As new newspapers were licensed, “the DISCC representative with that newspaper was instructed to make firm arrangements with whatever communications existed in the area for filing news copy back to Bad Nauheim.”152 The ICD also established a photo section in Frankfurt, which provided for the exchange of images to be used in newspapers. German staff photographers provided the images from inside Germany for the most part, but additional photos were made available by the US Signal Corps. If images from outside of Germany were required, these were obtained from services in New York, London, and Paris, with pictures from the OWI and PWD archives filling in as needed. As noted above, DANA employed approximately 130 Germans and another 50 Americans by the end of 1945. This allowed them to provide their 34 media clients with approximately 15,000 words of world and domestic news on a daily basis. Additionally, about four features were provided every day, and it processed 2,000 over photo prints and approximately 50 negatives each week. OMGUS, through the ICD, gave DANA a clear mission, and that was to write news that was “accurate, concise, swift and non-partisan factual report with the principal facts clearly stated at the outset in ‘lead’ style.”153 This was quite different from what had been found in German papers in the past; even before the Nazis came to power. Traditionally, German newspapers had always been a mix of news and commentary, with the boundaries between the two ill-defined at best. However, with stories written by DANA, the newspapers could not simply rewrite the story as they wished. They had to be printed as written. Though “the expression of opinion on news events was left exclusively to the editors of individual newspapers,” it helped create a clear division between news and

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commentary, because the commentary would have to appear in a separate article. In January 1946 the Military Districts were dissolved in the US zone. It was at this time that DANA passed “from the 6840th Theater Information Services Control Command (TISCC) to the Information Control Division of OMG Greater Hesse.”154 At this time the DANA press control staff also began preparing DANA for the hand over to German control. The turning over of DANA to the Germans was not without its own problems, such as dealing with the American “Trading with the Enemy Act” as noted above. By June 30, 1946, the majority of the legal issues had been resolved and the US licensed publishers, as a collective, were prepared to take over responsibility for DANA. A charter for this new entity was submitted to OMGUS for final approval, and communications were now being handled by Deutsche Post rather than the US Signal Corps. Symbolic of the handover was the replacement of the American signal equipment with German equipment. At this point, “less than 15% of DANA’s communications were being handled through Army channels.”155 In spite of this, DANA remained “under [the] direct supervision of U.S. Press Control officers and was still subjected to pre-transmission scrutiny.”156 While it may have looked as though DANA had a bright future, this was because it had had a monopoly. In the June 1946, DANA began operating under a system in which other news sources could begin competing for the German market and American supervision was reduced to one liaison officer. The US Treasury Department began issuing special licences “to individuals and firms selling news [who] could now offer their services direct to licensed newspaper publishers in Germany,”157 with the first stories coming directly from Associated Press to German newspapers on June 29, 1946. While it was competition and might have been a threat, DANA did have “agreements with the International News Service and the British Reuters for their world news files.”158 Perhaps more important than that, DANA “had a professional and technical staff of some 320 Germans providing DANA’s 35 newspaper clients, five radio stations and Die Neue Zeitung with more than 22,000 words of news daily, supplemented by 20 features and nearly 10,000 photo prints weekly.”159 154

History I. History I. 156 History I. 157 History I. 158 History I. 159 History I. 155

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While one might assume that the employees of DENA test their new autonomy, a German working for DENA had some powerful incentives to remain true to the vision that had been provided by the Americans. In the early part of January 1946, DENA employees began receiving relief shipments from the American Newspaper Guild. These were a welcome relief from the rationing that was necessary for that first winter after the war. These included CARE packages, clothing, office supplies, toiletries, among other items that were very hard to obtain, if you were a German. The Guild Reporter, a publication of the American Newspaper Guild, organised the collection of money and the shipment of these packages. This was not a one-time event, and the campaign continued for some time afterwards on a monthly basis. Once the packages arrived in Germany, they were distributed by DENA officials on the basis of need.

Publication Control Though both Publication Control and Press Control were branches of the ICD, they operated independently and on different conceptual levels. The ICD’s view, based on research done during the war, divided print media into three distinct functions based on the perceived longevity of their effect on the reading public. Newspapers, magazines and journals, and books were to fulfil different roles in re-educating the German people. Newspapers were seen to have a short-term effect and were replaced in German households, during the initial phases of the occupation, twice per week and then later on an almost daily basis. This gave the news they contained a relatively short shelf life. Newspapers were perhaps useful in planting ideas in the collective consciousness of the German people, but not in growing and nurturing those ideas. Journals and magazines tended to remain with the reader for a month or more. They would, for the most part, have a medium-term effect on a reader and his or her mode of thinking and thus the ideological principles that were to shape Germany’s new Weltanschauung. The articles could be longer and provided greater intellectual sustenance and challenge for the reading public. The Publications Branch could, therefore, start working on longer fact-based narratives and literary short stories that presented the reader with more complex ideas, which would, in turn, be reflected in a new vision for Germany’s future in the world. The printed form that had the longest-term effect, according to the ICD, was the book. The ICD viewed the book’s part in Germany’s reeducation as most important, because “it was considered that books exerted a greater influence in Germany than in the United States, and did

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more to mould public opinion than newspapers and periodicals.”160 Moreover, [t]he Germans were always avid readers and books had long played an important part in German life among all classes. Extensive private libraries were owned by many middle-class families, and few German homes were without their shelves of books. Normally, Germany published more books, both titles and number of copies, than the United States.161

The ICD’s research indicated that before 1939 “the average number of different titles published annually in Germany was 17,000, as against an average of about 9,000 in the United States with twice the German population.”162 This fact simply underlined the importance of the book in Germany. The ICD surmised that the Germans, having a strong reading culture, could be most easily reached through the printed word in book form.

Journals and Magazines The ICD considered books to have a far greater influence on the German mind than either newspapers or periodicals. Earl Ziemke had already pointed this out in his study of the US occupation of Germany, though he equivocates this position by suggesting that it only made it seem that way to the ICD.163 As noted earlier, newspapers and periodicals were meant to be disposable and had a limited shelf life, not only in the shops but in the home as well. A book, on the other hand, tended to be kept and circulated over a longer period of time and thus would have a greater opportunity to have a lasting impact. A book was sometimes reread, annotated, and studied by the reader, thus engaging thought processes over a longer period of time. For this reason, the ICD devoted special attention to books that were to be published in the area occupied by the Americans. In the American zone that meant the ICD had approximately 500 publishers under its control. Of these, about 250 produced what could be classified as informational and inspirational books, magazines, and pamphlets. These were the publishers of greatest interest to Military Government because they would be vital to the process of German re-education. Again they found a similar problem 160

History I. History I. 162 History I. 163 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, 374. 161

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to that which faced newspaper publishing. Politically untainted publishers were very hard to come by as a result of the 12-year Nazi regime.164 The ICD was aware of differences that existed between the four occupation zones.165 They were, for example, cognizant of the fact that they, at least theoretically, emphasised political purity above all else when licensing publishers, though this was not always the case in practice. This stood in contrast with the Soviet approach, which stressed the ability to produce materials and did not appear to care about the political purity of an individual publisher, as long as the censors passed the material produced now. The British approach was pragmatic and tended to be a balance between the American and Soviet strategies. Though the British did place some weight on the potential publisher’s political record, they also considered the ability actually to produce material as important. In regard to the French occupation zone, the ICD’s view was wholly negative. The general belief held by the ICD was that the French were more interested in taking care of their own physical needs and placed little or no emphasis on controlling the activities of the various media in their zone. Later this was to have the effect of the French zone being seen as a haven for suspect personalities, who had been blacklisted, or were in danger of being blacklisted, in the other occupation zones. This is mentioned in many internal and external memos emanating from the various ICD sections and is on occasion bluntly indicated in letters to the French military governors as will be discussed in greater detail later. The emphasis on production allowed the Soviets to get the publishing industry very quickly off the ground in their zone. However, they were plagued by the time it took for a manuscript to be passed by the censors. This was to prove a persistent problem in the Soviet zone. Though the publishing industry was slow to launch in the American zone, by October 1945 only 10 of the 950 applications received by the ICD for publishing licenses had been approved in the US zone, their publishers showed a greater level of self-reliance. This led to the production accelerating sharply once the licensed publishers had been established. The number of licenses granted in subsequent six months, which averaged approximately 34 licenses per month with a peak of 47 being reached in the month of March 1946. By this time a total of 215 publishers had been licensed in the US zone. The following three months saw only a very modest increase in licenses granted, with only a little over nine licenses issued per month for 164 165

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a total of 28 additional licenses.166 This was as a result of an order to slow down the licensing process, which had been issued as a result of the acute paper shortage in Germany at that time. The ICD policy of post-publication censorship created a far more reliable group of publishers because they were held responsible, financially and criminally, for the production of acceptable material. The ICD, after all, could have an entire run of books pulped as a result of them being found unacceptable. This might mean not only a reprimand, or some other penalty, but also a considerable financial loss that might put the viability of a publishing house in jeopardy. This resulted in far fewer time consuming and potentially embarrassing criminal prosecution being necessary. So, instead of the Military Government being seen as following heavy-handed National Socialist practices, they simply caused an offending publisher to go bankrupt. Another link in the delivery of books to the German reading public was the network of book dealers. They were also required to register, not be licensed, with the ICD. By the middle of August 1945 approximately 1200 were registered and by the last week of September 1945 over 3000 book dealers had been granted permission to carry on business in the US zone.167 This ensured that the ICD had an overview of the complete paper media delivery system and were relatively certain that no undesirable books were being offered for sale. Since working as a bookseller in postwar Germany offered one of the few opportunities to make a good living, due to the high demand for reading material, it would have been rare for a bookseller to jeopardise his or her financial well-being in order to make a few extra Reichsmark. Moreover, they would have been permitted to carry on business based on their political reliability as well and thus would have been at relatively low risk of disregarding ICD regulations. This having been said, there were occasional sweeps undertaken by the ICD, which ensured that those involved in distributing books were aware that the Military Government was watching and prepared to take action as part of an overall intensified denazification effort. As a result, over a hundred book dealers in the Frankfurt area alone lost their registration status for political reasons. One of the causes for this spate of deregistrations was the process used to approve their applications in the first place. Since there were so many book dealer applications to process, the general procedure was to grant permission and then do a more thorough review of the applications later. 166 167

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The ICD also operated three overt periodicals: Die amerikanische Rundschau (devoted to describing the American way of life), Neue Auslese (its format was similar to Reader’s Digest), and Heute (which had a format similar to Life or Look with an emphasis on pictorial representations).168 These journals were not included in the press section of the ICD’s mandate but as part of the publications unit. This was due to the magazine format not reporting on the news, though it did offer comments on current events. The first periodical published in the US Zone was Die amerikanische Rundschau in August of 1945. It was closely followed by the debut of Heute on September 14. In choosing these two magazine formats, the ICD was providing the German populous with what it was looking for, though evidence to support this came later from the Surveys Section. In the retrospective research, it was determined that more than 50% of women in western Germany indicated that they were looking for an illustrated magazine, with over 32% of men and women combined noting a preference for a general interest magazine. Both of these journals made their initial appearance in Berlin before being distributed in other German cities. This is significant since the production plants were located in Munich. It demonstrates that the ICD had already at this early date identified Berlin as being the ideological battleground between East and West and that OMGUS recognised the significance of convincing the Germans that their approach to organising a society was the pattern that should be adopted by the Germans as a whole. Initially, the Germans were disappointed by the emphasis these early journals placed on war themes, in particular, the initial issues of Heute. Considering that the Germans were living in the midst of the destruction caused by the war, it is not surprising that they did not think much of looking at further images in a magazine, especially if that magazine was meant to appeal to women. However, it is also not surprising that the initial efforts made by the ICD to produce a magazine would focus on war themes. The guiding principles of the ICD dictated that they combat militarism within German society. What better way to do this than to show the German people the results of their militarism? The ICD did react to the feedback they were receiving from their readership and was not long before they began to modify what appeared in their magazines. While some may interpret this as the American occupation forces backing away from one of their core principles, it appears that they quickly realised that a blatantly aggressive and confrontational approach 168

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was not working. It might have worked if all of the Allies had shared the same political and ideological principles, but, in post-war Germany, the unity that had been hoped for in the planning stages simply did not exist once the reality of governing Germany began to highlight the differences that existed between the four powers. Moreover, the Germans realised that they could play the Allies off against one another. Instead of re-educating the Germans within an environment that provided few other options for the learner, the ICD found itself in an environment in which it was competing with the Soviet occupation information services for the support of the German people. This led to a situation in which the ICD had to be far subtler in how it presented German war guilt and atrocities on the one hand and the attractions of the American way of life on the other. They needed to be able to present propaganda that not only attracted Germans to their side but also caused the Germans to reject the Soviet system. There were a number of journals that received special attention from the ICD.169 One of these appeared early in the American occupation and was entitled Die Wandlung. It was initially licensed to Dolf Sternberger, a political scientist, and Lambert Schneider, who was one of the publishers that the American forces evacuated from Leipzig into what was to become US occupation zone. It also had the distinction of being the first literary magazine to be published in the US Zone. If one considers the composition of its editorial board; Karl Jaspers, Werner Krauss, Alfred Weber, and the authors who published in it; Hannah Arendt, T. S. Eliot, Marie-Luise Kaschnitz, Dolf Sternberger, Wilhelm E. Süskind, Gerhard Storz, Alfred Weber, and Viktor von Weizsäcker, one can quickly see that it was intended to be one of the elite journals in Germany. More than that, it was to serve as one of the hothouses for developing writers in post-war Germany and provided a radically different view of the world to what had been presented to the German people during the National Socialist era. In its pages, one can also note the development of the first elements of Das Wörterbuch des Unmenschen published in 1957, which made Sternberger, Süsskind, and Storz well-known with academic circles. A further important journal that appeared in this initial phase was Horizont, which was aimed at German youth. The journal was licensed in September of 1945 with its first edition of 50,000 copies appearing in Berlin on December 9 of the same year. With the goal of gradually inculcating young Germans with new ideas, it began by redefining old ideas. To this end, the magazine included a section entitled “Heros without 169

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Weapons,” which deemphasised the militarist traditions of the German past by suggesting that there was a new kind of hero that young people could look up to. One of these new heroes could very well have been the magazine’s assistant editor Eduard Grosse, who, at the age of 18, was writing about his experiences in a concentration camp. In fall of 1944, he had been arrested for distributing subversive flyers. No less a figure than Heinrich Himmler declared Grosse, who was 16 at the time, to be an adult and to be treated as such by the Nazi judicial system. Grosse, together with a friend Ralf Dahrendorf, was initially sentenced to death, but both were set free by the end of January 1945 as a result of Grosse’s father being able to bribe the right officials. Grosse wrote tirelessly, promoting democracy among the youth of Germany and worked closely with American Military Government officials as a translator and researcher during the initial occupation. Sie, a journal that targeted at women, appeared for the first time in December of 1945. Its purpose was to aid German women as they dealt with family life in a country that now lay in ruins.170 Interestingly, the first edition dealt with the returning German soldier. Obviously, one of the major concerns that German women had was the fate of their husbands or sons. While it addressed such issues as assisting their men with the transition into civilian life, it had a further purpose. It created hope. In all of the uncertainty of whether their men were alive or dead, the hope created by preparing to receive them, should they return, served to pacify the female population and also establish a home life that was more in keeping with the American ideal. The Frankfurter Hefte, which appeared for the first time in April of 1946, also was a project that made special note of the ICD.171 The original licensees for the journal were Eugen Kogon, who had survived Buchenwald concentration camp and was nominated by the British for King’s Medal for Courage in 1945, and Walter Dirks, a theologian and left-wing catholic journalist. The Frankfurter Hefte was one of the most left-wing offerings in the US Zone and represented the ICD’s attempt to present a relatively wide assortment of political opinions in their zone and beyond. While Dirks was not an active opponent of the National Socialists, having continued to work as a music critic and occasional editor of the Feuilleton section of the Frankfurter Zeitung until 1943, though he was forbidden to write after that, his co-licensee, Kogon had established 170 171

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himself as an opponent of the Nazis. Having spent six years in Buchenwald, he was exactly the kind of individual the ICD would consider to be reliable.172 The first edition of the Frankfurter Hefte certainly provided the ICD with what it wanted to read in the new German media. Amongst the articles written by Germans, one finds debates regarding whether Frankfurt am Main should become the new capital of Germany and a short essay regarding the post-Thirty-Years-War literature of Grimmelshausen and poetry by Paul Gerhardt. The editors were also very careful in including pieces written by American authors. Two in particular stand out a portrait of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in which Roosevelt’s legacy is compared with that of Hitler, by Richard A. Gaumont and John L. Brown’s essay on poets of the resistance in German-occupied Europe. By June 30, 1946, there were 128 different magazines and journals licensed by the ICD. The largest groups of journals were categorised as religious, at 47, or professional and occupational, at 42.173 A further 13 were classified as literary and musically oriented. Nine journals had the German youth as their target market, and seven were categorised as political. The smallest categories were those directed toward women (5) and those considered to be illustrated (4) which followed the pattern of Look and Life. While there may not have been many publishers in this last group, they also had the biggest press runs and were the costliest to produce.

Overt Magazines As noted, the number of acceptable German publishers was small. This caused significant production problems at the beginning, because “many of those licensed during the first few months were both inexperienced and slow to produce periodicals of good quality and effectiveness.”174 The ICD 172

In the last few months of the war, Kogon managed to distinguish himself by saving the lives of a number of Allied prisoners of war held at Buchenwald, where he worked as a private secretary to Sturmbannführer Ding-Schuler. He was even nominated by Squadron Leader F. Yeo-Thomas, one of the individuals he was instrumental in saving, for the King’s Medal for Courage. The nomination was turned down after considerable investigation, because it was doubtful that such an award could be made to an Austrian (the official documents identify Kogon as Viennese, though he had been born in Munich). National Archives [London] HS 8/401. 173 History I. 174 History I.

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did work to fill the vacuum created by the immediate suspension of all German publishing activities and the start of new production. Four overt publications were produced under Anglo-American sponsorship: Die Amerikanische Rundschau, Ausblick (Published by the British for prisoners of war in the United Kingdom), Neue Auslese (a British/American publication), and Heute. The first to appear was Die Amerikanische Rundschau (American Review), which presented the American way of life to the Germans. On August 20, 1945, its first issue was available in Berlin’s bookstores. One hundred and fifty thousand copies were printed, with 100,000 distributed in the US occupation zone. The rest were exchanged for an equal number of the Ausblick magazine. The Rundschau was a general magazine that covered a broad spectrum of topics by American authors only. Its initial issue carried contributions by Archibald MacLeish, Stephen Vincent Benet, and Joseph Wood Krutch, among others. The ICD closely monitored the reception of the magazine and determined that “German readers of high intellectual levels praised the Rundschau and welcomed it as the first uncoloured presentation of trends in American cultural life they had been permitted to read in more than a decade.”175 The second issue appeared in October 1945. It carried the article “Thomas Paine: Scientist-Religionist” by Ralph C. Roper,176 a story by William Saroyan, and Arthur M. Schlesinger Senior’s “The American Character.” Of particular significance is the inclusion of an essay by Wendall Wilkie the German-American political leader Carl Schurz, who, among other accomplishments, had been the first German-born American elected to the US Senate. Willkie’s grandfather had participated in the 1848 revolt in Germany together with Schurz. Clearly, the ICD was trying to demonstrate to the German people that Germans could indeed easily embrace American democracy and that the early embers of democracy in Germany had been a breeding ground for some of those who had made important contributions to the development of the United States and its democratic system. Overall, the Rundschau was sober in tone and aimed at Germany’s intellectual elite. The material for the first two issues had been prepared by the OWI in New York and transmitted to the ICD in Germany. The third issue, however, was different, in that, though the material was still produced by the OWI in New York, it was now translated in Germany. 175 176

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Ausblick, on the other hand, contained shorter topical articles than the Rundschau and was less serious in tone. It also contained cartoons and humorous pieces. However, it was only to have three issues before it was merged with Neue Auslese. The Neue Auslese followed the Reader’s Digest format. Its appeal was broader than that of the Rundschau and was not confined to publishing only American authors, with French, British, and Russian works also appearing on its pages. The initial issue appeared in October 1945 and included works by George Bernard Shaw, Robert H. Jackson, John Lardner, and Paul Valery. Drawings by Käthe Kollwitz were also included, showing the Germans that some of their own were also highly regarded by the British and the Americans. The second issue of the Neue Auslese appeared in November with reprinted articles from Harper’s, Saturday Evening Post, New Statesman, Nation, and La France Libre. British Prime Minister Attlee, Dennis William Brogan (a professor of Political Science at Cambridge), and John Boynton Priestley (a British novelist) were among the featured contributors. Neue Auslese was prepared in London by a joint Anglo-American editorial board, with the American board members being part of the OWI‘s London staff. Following the first issue, the ICD ensured that the material was brought to its Bad Homburg headquarters for discussion and policy clearance prior to its publication. By the beginning of 1946, the American edition was being printed by the Publishing Operations Branch in Munich and the British edition was printed in Hamburg. The fourth overt periodical, Heute, followed the format of the American LIFE or LOOK illustrated magazines. It unabashedly presented America to the German people in its articles and pictures. Heute was a product of the Publications Division of OWI and its first editor Robert Hatch, who had been the publisher of two other OWI’s magazines, Voie and Kijk, and had produced various propaganda pamphlets for the PWD. Hatch was succeeded in May 1946 by Heinz Norden. He had been a Major in the US Army and brought his experience as a staff member of The Saturday Review of Literature with him to this new job.177 The first issue was produced in the summer of 1945 in London. Its appearance in Germany was, however, delayed due to distribution problems in Germany. It was not until mid-September that it finally appeared. On September 14, 1945, its first edition was made available in Berlin. It was an immediate hit with the Germans, and its initial supply was sold out within the first hour of its having gone on sale. Its initial 177

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circulation was 50,000 copies a month. At 72 pages it was a substantial publication and cost one RM. In March 1946, it was switched to a semimonthly publication with its page count cut in half. However, the paper shortage eventually saw the page count cut back to 28 by the end of 1946. In the first two editions of Heute, there was a broad range of topics to be found: The concentration camps The labour movement German destruction in Holland US lend-lease The role of British women in the war The Yalta Conference The end of the war The Potsdam Conference The United Nations meeting in San Francisco Penicillin The threat of hunger in Europe The Atomic Bomb The opera Peter Grimes by Benjamin Britten. More than just the articles printed in its pages, the illustrations also carried an important message to the German people. The images included: President Roosevelt shaking hands with British Prime Minister Churchill aboard the Prince of Wales where the Atlantic Charter was drawn up in August 1941, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1943, fighting in Stalingrad, and pictures of the war with Japan in the Pacific. These all emphasised the solidarity of the Allies and in part explained why things were not going to get much better in Germany, at least materially, in the short term. As with everything else, the ICD monitored the reception of Heute carefully through surveys. They noted that “more than half its German readers were disappointed by the stressing of war themes, while many objected to the fact that most of the material was already familiar through the newsreel and the press.”178 The readers, however, praised its “excellent format, attractive appearance, and modern make-up.” The ICD interpreted the appeal of Heute to be its look rather than its content. The ICD learned well. The third edition in December 1945, was less sombre and austere in tone. Part of this may also have had to do with the 178

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fact that the staff of Heute had moved from London to their new headquarters in Bad Nauheim. Meanwhile, the printing of the third and subsequent issues was done in Munich. Topics covered were: The meeting of International Congress of Trade Unions The 1945 Salzburg Music Festival The new Labour Government of Great Britain. Circulation figures for all of the overt periodicals were not set by demand, but rather the availability of paper. They could always have sold far more magazines than they could produce. By the end of June 1946, the ICD reported that Heute had a circulation of 400,000 copies per issue; Neue Auslese a circulation of 260,000 copies, and Die Amerikanische Rundschau had a circulation of 150,000 copies. The magazines were also largely self-sustaining; with only the US staff members’ salaries being covered by the US military. This is also significant in light of the fact that none of the overt publications carried advertising. One final irony was that all of the printing (except for the first few editions of Heute) was being done in the former printing plant of Der Völkische Beobachter. In the third year of the occupation, OMGUS continued the publication of its three official periodicals. Heute now had a circulation of 500,000 and was distributed throughout Germany and Austria. It also persisted in dividing its content almost evenly between US, German, and international subjects. The American material was still prepared by the New York office and focused on presenting America to the German reader. The illustrated articles included the following titles: “Life in Iowa” “A Country Store in Maine” “A Description of Key West, Florida” “German Exchange Students in America” “Life of a Pennsylvania Coal Miner” “Life of a Maine Farm Boy” “The American Frontier” “The Structure of the United Nations Organization in New York” “Elections in America” “American Musicians Visit Germany” “Television in the US” Topics that were produced locally between July 1947 and June 1948 covered:

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The Munich press exhibition Activities of German police against border smuggling The establishment of student life at Heidelberg University Progress made in rebuilding Germany’s transportation system, Rehabilitation of German prisoners of war returning from Soviet Russia The effects of power shortage on German life The fight against the polio epidemic in Berlin Backyard gardening The persistent housing shortages. The April edition saw the beginning of a new series that featured German entrepreneurs entitled “Men with Ideas,” which demonstrated how individual Germans had begun to establish small enterprises that appeared to do well. It was intended to show that there were some “gogetters,” who refused to give in to what the ICD called “post-war lethargy and confusion.”179 Heute also began to expand its international stories. Though it still included articles on Great Britain, like the one on the activities of Scotland Yard, it included stories on the creation of the new state of Israel, a description of tourist attractions, historical background, and recent industrial and cultural progress in Mexico, an essay on Korea, life in occupied Japan, the development of the European Recovery Program, and a photo story entitled “Europe’s Dream Street” showing life on Bahnhofstrasse, Zurich. In addition to non-fiction, Heute continued to include fiction as part of its offerings. These included short stories and abridged novels such as: Robert Fontaine’s “Little Green Apples,” Whit Burnett’s “Sherrel,” E.B. White’s “Stuart Little,” Robert Nathan’s “The Bishop’s Wife,” Erskine Caldwell’s “The New Cabin,” and Kenneth Horan’s “Papa went to Congress.” The Neue Auslese continued to have a monthly circulation of about 260,000. By this time, its purpose had evolved to provide “the German population [with] a selection of outstanding foreign articles and fiction of high literary and reorientation value.”180 In the third year of the ICD’s operations, issues of Neue Auslese included reprints of:

179 180

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“Reuters, the Growing and Functioning of a News Agency” “Almost” (an account of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler) “Einstein in America” “Trade Unions in Japan” “What Is Going on in Great Britain” “Modern American Literature” “Benelux” (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg Economic Union) “Atomic Energy in Peace Economy” “The Objective of 1948” “The Turkish Straits and the Big Powers” “World History” “The Marshall Plan and the Change in Europe” “The Office of the President of the United States” Its fiction section included the works of John Masefield, Phyllis Bottome, Willa Gather, Paul Tabori, A.E. Coppard, George Gegniot, William March, Dorothy Baker, Stephan Spender, and Albert Schweitzer. Unlike the other two overt magazines, the circulation of which had either increased or remained stable, the circulation of the Amerikanische Rundschau dropped by 30,000 to 120,000. It continued to presents a selection of essays, short stories, and poetry designed to appeal mainly to the serious reader. From July 1947 to June 1948, essays such as: “Morals and Politics” by Sidney Hook, “Atomic Energy and Economics” by Sam H. Schurr, “The Battle of the Ardennes” by Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Future of Socialism” by A. N. Schlesinger, Jr., and “Remarks on the Policy of the Soviet Union,” could be found on its pages. As for fiction and poetry, it featured the works of John Bell Clayton, Paul Bowels, Robinson Jeffers, T.S. Eliot, Mark Van Doren and Theodore Spencer.

German Magazines Bark and Gress have already noted that the cultural renaissance of 1945-1948 was based not merely on radio, newspapers, and weeklies, but on more than 200 literary and political journals. These publications were the great beneficiaries of the cash surplus of 1945-8; by the same token, most of them disappeared when the currency reform made discretionary spending of cultural goods a luxury for most people. They also benefited

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from the fact that few books were published and distributed in Germany between mid-1944 in 1947.181 As noted above, the first ICD licensed German periodical was the literary magazine, Die Wandlung. The licensees, Dolf Sternberger and Lambert Schneider, had an editorial board that consisted of Dr. Karl Jaspers, a renowned philosopher; Dr. Werner Krauss, professor of Romance languages and literature at the University of Marburg, and Dr. Alfred Weber of the University of Heidelberg. On October 23, 1945, there was a special ceremony held in Heidelberg where the license was formally turned over to Sternberger and Schneider. The magazine appeared for the first time on December 1, 1945, with an approved circulation of 20,000 copies. In addition to the complete text of the Potsdam Agreement, it included: an account of a trip through post-war Germany, an article denouncing Nazi racial theories, two poems by T.S. Eliot in German translation, and the first in a series of articles explaining Nazi corruptions of the German language, which eventually was to be published as Aus dem Wörterbuch des Unmenschen. By December 1945, 20 German licensees were publishing 22 magazines in the American occupation zone. Of these, 15 of were religious publications, three were youth magazines, two were for women, and two were for general readers. The ICD made a special effort to find competent publishers of magazines for women’s and young people since these had been identified as important to the future democratic development of Germany. In addition, it encouraged illustrated magazines and what they termed “thought” magazines, which were journals that were more philosophical in nature. This was in keeping with their notion of creating an intellectual elite. Two periodicals licensed in the US Sector of Berlin in late 1945 were considered of special interest to the publications program: Sie, which had originally been licensed as Die Frau, was an illustrated magazine for women, and Horizont, a magazine for youth. Sie first appeared in December 1945. In tabloid format and its front page dealt with the readjustment of the returning veterans, an issue that caused considerable difficulties as families were reunited. The inside pages, however, also carried an article on the Nuremberg trial sandwiched between notes on clothes and infant care. In the same month, on December 9, 1945, Horizont‘s first issue appeared. Its message was clear. It aimed “to re-orient German youth by 181

Bark and Gress, A History of West Germany, 160; referencing Hermann Glaser Kulturgeschichte der BRD, Vol. 1, pp 281-288.

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the gradual inculcation of new ideas.”182 Its contents included a short story by Mark Twain, articles on astronomy and chemistry, poems and quotations taken from German literary classics. There was also what the ICD considered a special article. Eduard Grosse, the 18-year old assistant editor, recounted his experiences in a concentration camp. In addition to this, a section entitled “Heroes without Weapons” suggested that German youth could substitute the old military heroes for these new heroes, who could accomplish their goals in the face of Nazi terror. These were not the only important periodicals to appear in the US zone by the end of 1945. Der Bogen, published in Wiesbaden, concentrated on art; Frauenwelt, a Nuremberg women’s magazine; and additional two youth magazines, Jung Wort and Der Start, both published by Hartmuth Fuchs in Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, were considered by the ICD to be important contributions to the developing German magazine industry. The first half of 1946 saw a significant increase in the number of licensees in the magazine industry, with a comparable increase in the number of German magazines rolling off the presses. Eleven new journals were added in January 1946 alone, bringing the total number of periodicals to 33. The satirical magazine Ulenspiegel, which was published in the US Sector of Berlin, was of special interest. Herbert Sandberg, a well-known German artist and cartoonist and a long-time inmate of Buchenwald concentration camp, and Günther Weisenborn, who had been imprisoned in Luckau until the end of the war, were licensed to publish Ulenspiegel. Initially, it was supported by the ICD, though its paper supply was cut back at times for “ideological reasons.”183 Eventually, the ICD describes the situation as one in which the license was “relinquished,”184 that is, it was not revoked, but turned in by the licensees. Considering that there was already political pressure being exerted on the magazine through the paper supply, it is not unreasonable to assume that the ICD was not unhappy that the magazine ceased publication in July of 1948. Over time, an internal rift had developed between Weisenborn and Sandberg. This caused one of the licensees to look for greener pastures, which was more easily done in the Berlin sector than the other zones. Sandberg, who owned the rights to the name, received permission in the Soviet zone to continue publishing the journal without Weisenborn in July 1948, in the Soviet sector of Berlin. This, most likely, did not please the 182

History I. History II. 184 Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam. The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60 (London: Routledge, 2003) 295. 183

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ICD. The case of the Ulenspiegel highlighted another significant aspect of the ICD licensing process that might be described as the dark underside of how things got done in occupied Germany. Emil Carlebach, who was the US licensee of the Frankfurter Rundschau, introduced Sandberg to the ICD in July 1945. The two had both been inmates in Buchenwald and had developed their friendship there. Interestingly, Sandberg did not accept the license without first consulting with Johannes Becher, who was “the principal Communist cultural operative in Berlin.”185 In addition to the appearance of Ulenspiegel in January 1946, other notable journals began appearing that did not share its tumultuous history, nor its controversial topics. Das Neue Wort (The New Word), a nonpartisan all-party magazine began appearing in Stuttgart. Partisan journals published for Germany’s political parties also started publication with Volk und Zeit (Nation and Time), a Social Democrat organ published at Karlsruhe. Attention was also given to more pressing issues, as with the publication of Klinik und Praxis (Clinic and Practice), a medical journal published in Munich. Sixteen new periodicals appeared in February, bringing the total to 47 in the US Zone, the Bremen enclave, and the US Sector of Berlin. It also represented a convergence of media in Germany with the publication of Radiowelt (Radio World) in Munich and Radio Spiegel (Radio Mirror) in Stuttgart. Though these two journals were ostensibly German operations, they “were designed to stimulate interest in the U.S.-operated German radio.”186 German cultural life was also not ignored. Der Standpunkt (Point of View) was published in Stuttgart as a monthly with a circulation of 50,000. It provided articles on music, the fine arts, and the theatre. Along these same lines, the Stuttgarter Rundschau (Stuttgart Review) appeared in the same month. With the publication of two cultural journals, Stuttgart was beginning to show itself to be an important cultural centre in the US occupied zone. Das Junge Herz (The Young Heart) was a further magazine aimed at Germany’s youth. It appeared twice-monthly and was published in Munich with a circulation of 25,000. The smaller niche markets were also not ignored. In fact, they were important in making certain that post-war Germany managed to sustain itself. Die Landtechnik (Farm Methods) was a journal with a circulation of just 3,000 but had a significant impact on Germany’s ability to feed itself

185

Cora Sol Goldstein, “The Ulenspiegel and Anti-American Discourse in the American Sector of Berlin,” German Politics and Society 23 (2005): 13. 186 History I.

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in the coming years. It was a semi-monthly farm journal published in Pfaffenhofen (Bavaria). Fourteen new periodicals appeared in March. The ICD considered the most outstanding of these new publications to be Der Pinquin (The Penguin) edited by the famous children’s writer Erich Kästner. This new magazine appeared twice per month with a circulation of 50,000 copies. The very high circulation of the magazine can be seen as covert support for Kästner’s endeavour since it was the ICD that decided where the paper would be allocated, which meant they could virtually kill any publication by simply not allocating paper to it. Der Pinquin editions were always of the highest quality and featured many of the best post-war German authors, with one such example being Wolfgang Borchert. During March, further magazines appearing included Neues Abendland (New Occident), a monthly magazine that concentrated on politics, economics and culture with a circulation of 15,000, and Der Regenbogen (The Rainbow), a semi-monthly woman’s magazine from Munich with a circulation of 25,000 copies. By the end of March 1946, 60 periodicals were being published in the US Zone. Of these: 20 were religious, 17 were professional or occupational, 8 were cultural, 6 were for youth, 3 for women, 3 were political journals, and 3 were what the ICD described as of the glossy illustrated type. April 1946 was an important month for journal publications in the US zone. It was then that the Frankfurter Hefte (Frankfurt Notebooks), a magazine on culture and world and domestic politics published in Frankfurt for the first time. The original licensees were Eugen Kogon, Walter Dirks, Clemens Münster, and Walter Maria Guggenheimer. By the end of June 1946, the total number of journals and magazines had risen to 128. This total was divided among seven categories as follows: Religious, 47; Professional or Occupational, 42; Literary and Miscellaneous, 13; Youth, 9; Political, 7; Women, 5; and Illustrated, 4.187 Magazine production accelerated from July 1946 to the end of June 1947, and another 170 journals were added, making it the most active during the period when licensing of publications was required in the US zone. In the following year, the addition of newly licensed journals began to slow. By the end of June 1948 periodicals published in the US occupied area total 381, an increase of 83 during the preceding year.188 187

Information Control, Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 12 (20 Jul 46), Publications, p. 4. 188 For a list of the journals the ICD considered the most significant to appear for the first time from July 1947 to June 1948 see Appendix F.

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While many of the journals noted above were important in helping to rebuild Germany materially, the ICD singled out certain journals for special mention and comment. Schulfunk (School of the Air) was a periodical that appeared in Bavaria for the first time in September 1947. It had a monthly circulation of 30,000 copies and was distributed to all elementary and high schools in Bavaria. Its purpose was to reinforce and supplement Radio Munich’s educational broadcasts. The magazine provided a schedule of the broadcasts and print material that accompanied the broadcasts for the weekly radio school programs. In addition, it contained articles on these subjects that went beyond just the material covered. It was here that there was the greatest opportunity to steer the content in directions sympathetic to the ICD’s cause. A further educational magazine targeted at young people started in this year was Tatsachen (Facts). It was published on a weekly basis in Berlin. Its purpose was to explain current events to school-aged children. While Horizont was not a new publication in the ICD’s third year of operation, it continued to get considerable attention from its officials. In July of 1947, it was decided to try and expand its influence beyond Berlin. In that month it issued a special edition for what the British and American military governments called Bizonia after an agreement that saw the two areas begin to work more closely together. The magazine was popular with young German readers, and the Military Government allowed its distribution in the US and British Zones bringing the total circulation to 150,000. The ICD went even further and permitted a German staff to be set up in Munich to prepare a four-page supplement for Horizont, which was included in the Bizonia edition. The ICD also began to encourage greater convergence between the various media in US-occupied Germany. Early in 1948, the Radio Almanach, published in Frankfurt, started reprinting what the ICD considered “outstanding broadcasts originating in Germany or relayed from foreign stations.” This allowed the radio listener to read a transcript of speeches and commentary that had been broadcast. The ICD was of the opinion that this was an “important augmentation of the informational and reorientational services undertaken by the radio stations.”189 While this was emanating from Frankfurt, the Munich publishers were also becoming involved in the ICD efforts to combat the Soviet threat. The semi-monthly Echo der Woche became a weekly on the strength of having serialised Victor Kravchenko’s I Chose Freedom. Kravchenko had defected to the United States in 1944 and outlined his reasons for abandoning the Stalinist 189

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approach to Communism, which, in his view, made policy paramount regardless of the lives it destroyed in the process. It is unclear whether the ICD had assisted in negotiations with the Swiss holder of the translation rights to the book, but Thomas-Verlag of Zurich granted the serial rights to the German translation without charge. As noted earlier, OMGUS had established a unit responsible for clearing American magazine articles for reprint in US licensed German periodicals in January 1946. By 1947, it was working at capacity to provide licensed publications with as many articles as possible. These had a special attraction for the German magazines because they cost very little for them to include in their publishing programs and the German publishers accepted about half of everything that was made available to them.

Articles received from Reorientation Branch, Department of the Army Published in German periodicals Accepted for future publication

July 1947 to June 1948 806

Total to Date 1676

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248

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574

Beyond this official channel, a number of American periodicals offered blanket reprint rights to German publishers. By September 1947, 87 American magazines had agreed to permit all their articles, at no cost, to appear in German-language periodicals in the US zone. By June 30, 1948, this number had increased to 108, with Time being one of the last to do so. This was not done completely out of altruistic motives. As the US publishers watched the emerging German market, they realised that, while they might not earn any money on the articles picked up by the German publishers at that moment, it certainly allowed them to develop relationships with the German publishers that might become lucrative in the future. Moreover, it provided them with name recognition in the German marketplace at little or no cost to them. Beyond this, it also made them appear to be fully engaged contributors in the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Newspapers, magazines, journals, and books were not the only publications dealt with by the ICD. Pamphlets were also an important part of the publishing program. In the fall of 1947, OMGUS began issuing a series of official pamphlets dealing mainly with the foreign policy of the United States and other countries and how they related to Germany. This

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was part of their overall political information program. While the pamphlets may have officially been recognised as informational bulletins, the titles make it clear that they were propaganda pieces aimed at engaging the German public sympathy against Communism.190

Book Publishing In most critical discussions, scholars approach the problems of German post-war literature with a view to distilling the “truth” contained in what appears on the published page of a work of fiction. They are clearly concerned with the content or meaning of the literary text and not how it got there and to what purpose. Few, if any, pay much attention to the question of how the respective piece of literature got into print or what effect the mechanisms of the publishing industry have had on the final product. In most of the historical and critical accounts of that period, the published work is simply accepted as a product of the author alone. The role of the publisher, who makes the literature available, or their political masters, who encourage or curtail the publication of certain ideas, are seldom studied. Such an assumption holds that the post-war German author was free to express and publish thoughts that were of his or her own choosing. However, the response to the question of freedom of expression given by Borchert already quoted in the introduction, suggests that the authors of the period realised they were not free to write. Literary analysis also presumes that authors control a nation’s literary corpus and ignores the fact that the publisher, as well as the author, is trying to earn a living through the production of materials they hope readers will pay for, in this case, market mechanisms and cultural policies of the occupation forces are ignored. When one consults the standard histories of German post-war literature, one could safely conclude that it was once more allowed to flourish with little or no political impediment. That is to say, with the end of the Nazi regime, German authors were once again allowed to produce literature, which did not pander to a narrow political purpose. Simultaneous to the regeneration of literary production a theoretical debate ensued, which wrestled with how literature not only dealt with the events and guilt of the previous tyranny but also how the individual author could appropriately deal with the linguistic legacy left by the Nazi regime. Again, this debate is presented as internal by scholars, that is, German authors and critics debated problems unique to German language and 190

For a list of pamphlet titles, see Appendix G.

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literature. However, recently these assumptions have been questioned with more evidence coming to light that literary production, under the guise of free expression, was a vital part of Anglo-American re-education efforts. What has been largely neglected by scholars are the ideologies and mechanisms which lay behind the exterior of literary production. Many literary histories deal with the individual author or the literary collective and what is presented to the reader in its final form. What is not investigated is how one work rather than another is seen as worthy of publication and circulation. The lives of authors are often subject to the strictest scrutiny while the motives, ideologies, and necessities of those responsible for making the finished product available to the reading public goes unexamined. In the case of German post-war literature, an understanding of the publishing milieu is important, because the Military Government and publishers determined the direction literature was to take, while the authors wrote works which fell within the parameters set by the publishers, who were carefully scrutinised by the Publications Control Branch of the ICD. One of the few scholarly works to examine Allied manipulation of post-war literature in Germany is Volker Wedeking’s Der Nullpunkt. Über die Konstituierung der deutschen Nachkriegsliterature in den amerikanischen Kriegsgefangenenlagern. Wehdeking outlines how the American military, through its POW camps, took an active role in shaping the literature that was to appear in Germany after the war. He presents a great deal of historical data, which leads to the conclusion that American re-education was more than a secondary consideration, as is often insinuated, and that preparations for the management of German cultural life after the war was well coordinated. However, Wehdeking does little in the way of analysing what affects the American endeavour had on German literature. What he certainly accomplishes though is to uncover that the solution to the problem of post-war literature in Germany is not to be found in only the exegesis of the texts made available through publication. When discussing Allied censorship in post-war Germany, critics most often take on an apologetic tone, recognising the fundamental contradiction between the goal of democratisation and the means used to reach that goal. Dieter Breuer points out that the situation of the author and his work changed little with the advent of the Befreiung (liberation). He concludes that literature was to remain an administrative means to an end, even if it was in the service of a noble cause.191 In addition, he opines that with the 191

Dieter Breuer, Geschichte der literarischen Zensur in Deutschland (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1982), 239.

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beginning of the Cold War in 1947, the various Allied Military Governments were able to shift the thematic direction of German post-war literature away from the original purpose of re-education and focus it on either anti-communism in the west or anti-capitalism in the east. Although Breuer’s analysis of post-war censorship on a whole remains objective—he limits himself to a factual account of the policies and mechanisms used by the Military Governments—he demonstrates an ideological bias when describing censorship in the Soviet zone of occupation as opposed to the western zone. Whereas, the goals of the western allies are described as ehrenhaft (honourable), he uses the term Gleichschaltung in conjunction with the activities of the Soviet occupation.192 In doing so, Breuer equates Soviet censorship with the welldocumented activities of the Nazi regime while portraying the censorship of the western Allies as merely a regrettable error. Breuer’s view is symptomatic of how the cultural policies of the western Allies are portrayed by critics and discloses a reluctance to investigate the implication of those policies. Breuer’s findings stand in contrast to those reached by Volker Wehdeking and Günter Blamberger. They declared that the 8th of May 1945 marked the first time in German history, where Germans could write openly and in an engaged manner without fear of being put to death.193 This statement, however, does not entirely ring true. As noted earlier, the Military Governors in the western zones had the authority, at least initially, to execute those who published unlicensed material. Additionally, the term he uses, engagiert, is vague. According to Allied policies, publishers were forbidden from distributing works that were critical of any one of the occupying powers. Such a strategy would have limited the topics an author could discuss to the political, social, and cultural situation of the Nazi era, of which he or she would have to take a negative view, or extoll the virtues of the Allied political system and cultural values. In either case, the author served the purposes of Allied re-education. Ralf Schnell, in his history of post-war West German literature, touches on the subject of Allied literary policies. Though he recognises that the American Military Government made an attempt at managing German culture, he concludes that not only diehard Nazis, hangers-on, and stubborn conservatives rejected the American concepts of freedom, but also the intellectuals of the new generation.194 To an extent he is correct; 192

Breuer, Geschichte der literarischen Zensur in Deutschland, 241. Volker Wehdeking and Günter Blamberger, Erzählliteratur der frühen Nachkriegszeit (1945-1952) (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1990), 201. 194 Schnell, Die Literatur der Bundesrepublik, 82. 193

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however, it was not so much a rejection of American principles as a change in what those principles were. Schnell assumes that the reeducation process was aimed directly at the individual author and neglects to consider the influence exercised by the publisher on the author, with the publisher under the firm control of the ICD. The second aspect of the reshaping of German post-war literature was the practical application of the policies developed before the end of the war. This period runs from mid-1945 to early 1947. It was in this two-year time span that the Allied Military Government most overtly managed and directed the German publishing industry. Additionally, the Military Government actively distributed materials, which it deemed suitable for the democratisation and re-education of the German populous. Mid-1947 marked the beginning of the final stage of the Allied involvement in the German literary scene. By this time the Allied cultural control structures were in place, which secured the continuation of the reeducation process. The ICD had ensured that only acceptable and what they considered reputable publishers were in operation. This, however, is not to say they did not continue to exercise a powerful indirect influence on what appeared in print after this point. They allowed the appearance of a seemingly independent publishing industry, which they controlled through the allocation of paper and printer’s ink, rather than issuing a publication prohibition. The Second World War may be described as the first modern war. Although some might argue that this is not the case, because the First World War, the Franco-Prussian War, or even the American Civil War exhibited modern traits, because industrial production and technology was a major player, it is in the Second World War that was fought on the basis of discordant political ideologies. As Walther Dorn surmises, “It [the Second World War] no longer transpired exclusively under the balance-ofpower system as a war between sovereign states that could be resolved by the normal treaty-making devices that had become traditional in the nineteenth century.”195 He opines that the crucial question was, “how National Socialism was to be expunged as an active force from the political and economic life of post-war Germany?”196 In coming to such a conclusion, Dorn highlights the high degree to which economics, politics, and re-education were related in the Allied approach to post-war Germany. Accepting such a correlation, one must regard Allied policy holistically rather than as 195 196

Dorn, “The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany,” 482-3. Dorn, “The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany,” 483.

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strictly economic or political. They were specifically designed to operate in concert towards the goal of German democratisation and re-education. It is on this basis that one ought to approach the following strategies, which were incorporated into official American policy. Though the proposals appeared to address only economic, political, or legal issues, they formed the ideological background that dictated the themes dealt with by the post-war authors. The first of the three suggested approaches were dubbed “the out-law theory of National Socialism.”197 This plan was limited in scope and based itself on individual responsibility. It advocated the bringing to justice of all Nazis, with the degree of complicity being a factor in how they were dealt with. This policy influenced the London Charter, which resulted in the subsequent war crimes trials at Nuremberg. The second view of how to deal with the Third Reich was based on the neo-Marxist school of thought.198 As can be expected, they understood the rise of Nazism as a product of social tensions created by the capitalist society in Germany.199 They insisted that, by imposing an economic democracy (i.e. a radical redistribution of wealth) on post-war Germany, a social revolution should take place. As is plainly evident, they most strongly advocated a socialist approach to governing Germany, which also required a reorientation of how the individual related to traditional economic power structures. This approach may be seen at work in the large number of post-war publishers of a Marxist background, who were issued publishing licenses. The Germans were to be taught to question their traditions, and the pre-existing social structures were to be demolished. Such an underlying ideology is evident in many of the literary works that appeared shortly after the war, where the policies and tradition of the previous generations were questioned. This questioning of the wisdom of past generations is most evident in two of Wolfgang Borchert‘s manifestos, “Generation ohne Abschied” and “Das ist unser Manifest,”

197

An expression of this position may be found in a memorandum of January 22, 1945, addressed to the President of the United States from the U.S. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, Attorney General, Francis Biddle, and Secretary of State, Edward Stetinius. (Report of Robert H. Jackson to the International Conference on Military Trials [Washington, 1949]: 3ff. 198 Dorn indicates that the leading proponents of this approach were Franz Neumann, Gunther Reimann, Harold Laski, and Max Lerner. 199 Dorn, “The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany,” 484.

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where he indicts German cultural values for the suffering of the survivors of the war.200 A third position was to have the greatest influence on the policy makers in Washington and may be seen as the precursor to the Morgenthau Plan. The two foundational premises of his approach have already been noted earlier and encompass the belief that the “deep-seated German disease that had been more than a century in the process of incubation”201 needed to be cured and that all Germans had been so deeply infected with National Socialism that one could only consider all of them as guilty of having waged war against democracy. Although it cannot be argued that any of the above doctrines was fully realised in what was to become official occupation policy, all three played a part and thus affected the way in which the German people were expected to view themselves individually and collectively after the war. The interplay of these sometimes disparate ideological positions has in part led to the confusion expressed in post-war literature. The publishers and writers, without question, wanted to please their occupiers; however, they were unsure of exactly what it was that the Allies wanted. It also left authors not knowing where to place the blame for the Nazi nightmare, which comes across clearly in a great deal of the fiction written in Germany immediately after the war. An example of this confusion of ideologies is found in Wolfgang Borchert‘s Draußen vor der Tür.202 In the play, Beckmann, a soldier returning from Siberia, calls on various persons who are stereotypical caricatures of a German army officer, a Cabaret Director, and even of God. In each case, Beckmann lays the blame for some of the events of the Second World War at their feet. However, in each case they are unwilling to accept responsibility. In the end, Beckmann recognises his own guilt, but at the same time, the reader is left with the uneasy feeling that there is a greater collective guilt, which does 200

Wolfgang Borchert, “Generation ohne Abschied” and “Das ist unser Manifest,” in Das Gesamtwerk (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1949), 59-61 and 308-315. 201 Dorn, “The Debate over American Occupation Policy in Germany,” 485. The genesis of this position in regard to Germany may be found well before the National Socialist regime took power. In the years leading up to the First World War politicians and scholars in Britain made reference to the so-called “German problem.” Even in that early period they allude to being ideologically based. Charles Sarolea, in The Anglo-German Problem (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1913), 351, opines that the cause of German militarism and “perverted nationalism” lay in their Nietzschian “will to power.” 202 The play appeared just after Bizonia was established on January 1, 1947. Because his play was broadcast in both zones, he had to satisfy the requirements of both the British and the Americans.

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not reside within any one individual. Borchert does not provide a solution to the conflict of where blame is to be placed, not even God accepts it, and thus reflects Allied policy, which was becoming unclear on who was to be held responsible for the activities of the Nazi regime. Until May of 1945 most of how Germany was going to be treated can be considered abstract theory; however, after that date, the American Military Government, had to turn theory into practical application. It quickly found that it had to take the middle ground between high political/ideological platitudes and down to earth practicalities to govern a defeated nation. Another facet that is often considered in studies on Allied re-education in Germany is the impact of translations of American literature in the postwar period. This variant of the Americanization of German literature can only be considered a limited success, because few American authors; such as Carl Sandberg and Ernest Hemingway, were willing to give up the German translation rights.203 As of February 1946, only 34 American titles were available to the German publishing industry for translation.204 While an interesting aspect of post-war publications in Germany, American literature was already widely available in pre-war Germany and one only need consider the popularity of a work like Gone With the Wind in NaziGermany to understand that the post-war addition of a few title was not going to make a significant difference. What was more significant was the manner in which the Military Government approached the indigenous publishing industry, because this would most directly affect course postwar literature would take. Restarting the German book publishing industry was no easy task. The ICD quickly realised that many different aspects of producing a newly published work needed to come together in an environment that had had its physical and mental capacity to do so thoroughly disrupted. “New writers had to be found, manuscripts written,” and above all “the product read carefully by the licensed publisher to see that it did not violate military government directives.”205 The licensed publishers were, in this case, being given an opportunity to become quite wealthy and powerful within the new Germany, and this meant they were going to be especially careful with the “product” that they produced.

203

Albert Norman, Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture (New York: Vantage Press, 1951), 49. 204 Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, “German Publishing Begins to Revive,” Publishers Weekly, March 16, 1946, 1618. 205 History I.

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The first license was issued on July 13, 1945, to representatives of four religious denominations in the Munich area, authorising them to publish catechisms, hymnbooks and other religious literature.206 The second license, and the first in Württemberg-Baden was granted to Hermann Meister of Heidelberg, who had begun his publishing career at the age of 19 in 1909 together with Herbert Grossberger. While this first endeavour, Pendel-Verlag, produced only one work, Meister’s second publishing business, Saturn-Verlag, was more successful and has been considered one of the leading proponents of literary expressionism in Germany.207 During the Nazi-era, Meister confined himself to publishing an eclectic program, with his love of rugby taking the lead in his interests. In 1938, Grossberger left Germany, due to his Jewish ancestry, and settled in Palestine. This left Meister to run the publishing house until it too was closed by the Nazis in 1943. His post-war publications under the new name of Verlag Hermann Meister, produced works that were unremarkable in their literary value, like Das weisse Herz (1946) and Die Rückkehr: Erzählung (1946) but were intended to provide new hope for Germany. The first eight books and eight pamphlets released by the newly licensed German publishers appeared in October of 1945.208 Initially, because of the severe paper shortages, editions were limited to a maximum of 5000 copies, unless special permission was obtained for larger press runs. Such permission was granted for works that were of particular interest to the ICD’s re-education program. For example, the attempt of anti-Nazi authors to clarify recent German history for German readers, Der Reichstagsbrand (The Reichstag Fire), a factual exposé of Nazi crimes, was published in an edition of some 200,000 copies. In November a further 24 books and pamphlets were produced, which was followed by a considerable jump for the month of December of 51 new titles with a further 38 new titles released in January 1946. The ICD kept a careful account of the types of books that were being produced. The largest number of books fell into the category of literature and the humanities with a total of 38 being published by the end of January 1946. This rubric was followed closely by the social sciences at 22 with books “concerning the current problems in Germany” at 18. Youth and children’s books and language books accounted for 15 and 11 books respectively. While religious literature made up a large portion of the 206

Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 1 (20 Aug 45), “Publications,” p. 5. 207 Roland Krischke, “Ein Meister seines Fachs,” Börsenblatt 87 (November 1999): 16-20. 208 History I.

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journal titles being published, they only accounted for 11 titles in the books and pamphlets market, the same number as those in the category of informational calendars. Under the category of miscellaneous only three books can be found. Of significance as well is the considerable jump in publications between March of 1946, when there were 255 new pamphlets and books in circulation, and the end of June when there were 729 new pamphlets and books released. This meant that in the months of April, May, and June a total of 474 new publications appeared, an average of 158 per month. Compared with the previous nine months,209 where the average production amounted to approximately 28 publications per month. The situation had improved significantly. The emphasis on educational topics fell into those areas that would assist in the rebuilding of Germany, and it is not surprising that many of these focused on agriculture. Politics and American democratic structures were also a significant part of the publishing program encouraged by the ICD. For example, one of the first translations to be published in Germany after the end of the war was Margaret Mead‘s And Keep Your Powder Dry, which detailed the American way of life from an anthropological perspective. Central to this work was the controversial premise that culture was the primary motivator for the formation of an individual’s character, a conclusion that fit perfectly into the position taken by the ICD. Since Mead had been a significant member of the committee of academics that produced a report on how German society was to be restructured after the war, it might not seem unusual that she made the rights to her book available to the ICD, which in turn handed it over to a German publisher. The rights were given to Kurt Desch, who had received the first publishing license in Bavaria from the ICD and “taken over” the Zinnen Verlag in Munich. It is also reported that Desch never suffered under the same paper shortages that the other publishers did, a situation that could only have come from a strong working relationship between him and the ICD.210 The ICD did invite the opinions of their licensees in regard to what was needed in the German book market. What the ICD heard was that German publishers felt there should be more emphasis on reading material for the worker. It was their impression that the average worker was not being reached effectively. In essence, they were saying that the initial efforts at restarting the German publishing industry had targeted .

209

The first licenses were only issued in June of 1945. Reinhard Wittmann, Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels (München: C.H. Beck, 1991), 366.

210

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Germany’s elite and had ignored the common person. That is, they wanted to shape the opinions of those who would, in turn, shape the opinions of the working classes. This could be seen as a cost-effective way of reorienting Germany’s social foundations, but did not maximise the profits of the publishers. For the publishers to maximise their profits, they needed to expand the base of their readers. This was a significant point for another reason. The ICD understood that the book-buying market was different in Germany and recognised this fact in their 1946 report: Military Government regarded the field of publications as a highly important means of reeducating Germany. Generally, it was considered that books exerted a greater influence in Germany than in the United States, and did more to mold public opinion than newspapers and periodicals. The Germans were always avid readers and books had long played an important part in German life among all classes. Extensive private libraries were owned by many middle-class families, and few German homes were without their shelves of books. Normally, Germany published more books, both titles and number of copies, than the United States.211

However, the ICD did not fully appreciate how different. It seems that the German publishers instinctively understood that for a democracy to work, it is not only the elites, but it is also the common working person who has a say in how the country is to be governed. For democracy to take hold, it was necessary to create a well-informed and educated lower class as a balance to the power of the elite. While one might argue that it was simply a matter of making as much profit as possible that motivated the German publishers, one must also bear in mind that the licensed publishers in Germany held their positions based to a greater degree on their political idealism. German authors who were published during this early period tended to concentrate on Germany’s current problems.212 For example, special note is made of Gertrud Bäumer’s Der neue Weg der deutschen Frau, who had already been a significant member of the German feminist movement, politician, and author in the Weimar era, and Hugo Hassinger’s Der alte und der Neue Weg, Betrachtungen eines Volkserziehers. These titles all pointed to a new path for Germany and fit perfectly into the ICD’s publishing plans. Further books that the ICD highlighted as very 211

Before the war, the average number of different titles published annually in Germany was 17,000, as against an average of about 9,000 in the United States with twice the German population. 212 History I.

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significant to their mission during the initial year of the occupation were: Gustav Radbruch’s Der Geist des Englishen Rechts (The Spirit of English Law), he had served as the Justice Minister during the Weimar period, and this book eventually went through 5 editions and was still read in German Law Faculties until well into the 1960s; Fuehrer und Verfuehrte (The Leader and the Misled) by Hans Windisch, which analyzed German social politics; Zur Genesung des Deutschen Wesens (The Rebirth of the German Spirit) by Karl Barth, Protestant clergyman, and Die Idee der Universität (The Idea of the University) by Karl Jaspers. Also by the end of June 1946, translation and publication rights for some 40 selected American titles had been sold to licensed German publishers. One of the titles, The American Character by Dennis Brogan, sold 10,000 copies within three weeks of its appearance in German translation. The books of this period did not focus on just political matters, but fictional literature also took an important place in the publishing programs. The classical authors and their works were seen as having a didactic purpose. So, it is with this in mind that the early post-war publications of literary giants such as Goethe, Uhland, Moericke, and Eichendorf were made available. The publishers thus concentrated on reproductions of works that might be considered safe, rather than invest a great deal of time and effort in authors that were as yet politically untried.213 The topics chosen for publication in the first year after the cessation of hostilities are interesting in that they appear to be the opposite of the topics covered in the journals. The main topics of the new releases indicate that, with 271 publications, religion was the area in which most publications appeared. However, this may be a misleading figure, because it appears that all manner of publication the churches would normally produce; such as hymnbooks, catechisms, and church calendars were included in this number. In second place, with 147 new publications, were fiction, poetry, and drama. 44 new publications for children and youth also appeared during this period, which does not include textbooks and teaching materials. Tightly grouped together were philosophy and literary criticism at 34, textbooks at 32, and reference books and dictionaries at 31. Notable, but not unusual, given the political situation in Germany, is the fact that the ICD had a separate category entitled “National Socialism and other problems,” which included 29 separate titles. In some respects, one can actually consider the categories of religion and literature to be very similar nature, at least from the perspective of the 213

Even here one might consider the comments made by the Cabaret Director to Beckmann in Wolfgang Borchert’s Draußen vor der Tür.

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ICD. These types of books were seen as providing a new moral compass for the German people and served as a place where the intellectual elite of post-war Germany might try to convince, and in turn be convinced, of new ways of conceiving of a new German society. The ICD also knew that the Germans had a long tradition of a publisher’s association that had regulated the publishing industry in Germany for over 100 years prior to 1933. Thus, one of the first steps taken by the ICD was to re-establish a means of communication for those involved in the publishing industry.214 This was accomplished through the reestablishment of the Börsenverein of the German book trade and, perhaps more importantly, the publication of the Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel. A significant problem that faced the ICD was the fact that both the association and its publication had been headquartered in Leipzig, which was scheduled to be handed over to the Soviet forces. Initially, Leipzig had come under the control of the American forces. The US forces held the city from the 17th of April until their withdrawal on July 2, 1945. In the meantime, the ICD had received permission to transfer as much of the German book trade from Leipzig to Wiesbaden. This gave them approximately 2 1/2 months to organise the move to the sector they were scheduled to hold. The ICD did eventually manage to identify some reliable book publishers who had been responsible for the greater part of Germany’s exports. They were able to determine that at least some members of the Börsenblatt had attempted to maintain the traditions of the pre-Nazi era. In their opinion, Dr. Georg Kurt Schauer was the right man for the job, and he subsequently became the first post-war editor of the publication. On August 5, 1945,215 Schauer received one of the first four publication licenses issued by the ICD. The influence of the Börsenblatt should not be underestimated. At least initially, the Börsenblatt carefully followed the guidelines and requests of the ICD. In its first post-war edition, it published all of the military government regulations for the book trade in the US zone and thus became the de facto authority as to what could and could not be published. In addition, it regularly released lists of licensed publishers and authorised book dealers, in order that its members could easily remain within the regulations set down by the military government in the distribution of their 214

History I. History I states that it was July 1945. However, the Neue Deutsche Biographie, created by the Historical Commission of the Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften provides the date of August 5, 1945. 215

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material. The Börsenblatt, according to the ICD, was considered an integrative force in Germany’s new publishing industry and one that could have a powerful liberalising effect on German publishing. A further problem faced by the ICD in organising the book trade in their zone was the fact that the military government laws did not allow for trade organisations above the Land level.216 This meant that there would always be a certain level of fragmentation between the book trades in the various Länder. In an effort to better understand literary needs of the German people, the ICD began to interview licensed publishers in regard to what they thought the most worthwhile works for the Germans would be.217 The response to these interviews was that the book should espouse humanitarian ideals selected from classical works, primarily Goethe and Schiller.218 In addition, it was noted that they needed books that dealt with current problems in Germany. Bookselling and publishing had a highly sophisticated organisational structure in Germany long before the Nazis came to power. Leipzig, as noted above, had been the centre of the German book trade, with Stuttgart being a secondary centre for south-western Germany. Berlin was a third publishing centre, due to it being the governmental centre with many educational institutions. The ICD also noted that there was a major difference between the German and American publishing industry. In the US general publishers were the rule, while they were an exception in Germany, with “most German publishers specialized in definite fields, such as fiction, art, politics, philosophy and religion, history, science and the humanities, law and economics, medicine, and children’s books.”219 In addition to books being made available for purchase, Germany also had approximately 2,650 lending libraries, about 21,000 people’s libraries (Volksbücherein) and about 18,000 factory libraries. There were as well many scholarly and scientific reference libraries. This presented the ICD with a conundrum. It was reasonable to assume that all of these outlets, whether bookstore or library, had objectionable material on their shelves. Initially, the turning in of banned material was done on a voluntary basis. Not that turning in proscribed material was optional, but owners of bookstores were expected to purge their shelves on their own. This appeared to have been insufficient as OMGUS carried out a number of raids during a six-week period from the middle of February to 216

History I. History II. 218 History II. 219 History I. 217

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the end of March 1946 in an effort “to cleanse bookstores and lending libraries of these books.”220 While they thought that most Germans would have erred on the side of removing more, rather than fewer, of their material from their stock, this may have been an overly optimistic appraisal of the situation. The ICD found that about one-third of the bookstores or libraries investigated had at least one unacceptable book on sale or available for loan.221 Those who had been found to be in contravention of OMGUS regulations immediately had their registration certificates revoked. There were also more than a few cases in which the property was seized by the Property Control Division and handed over to reliable Germans who would then purge the holdings of these outlets. The Nazis, though they could have changed the publishing mechanisms in Germany, had left them largely unchanged since “both State and Party apparently found it a convenient and smooth-functioning organization.”222 This being said, they had removed individuals found to be “objectionable to the National Socialist regime on political and racial grounds.” The publishing industry’s organisational infrastructure was robust enough to absorb this massive change in personnel. This left the ICD with the same problem faced in other areas of the media, licensable Germans as publishers and those who needed to register as printers, book dealers, publications distributors, and operators of lending libraries were very hard to come by. The ICD estimated that approximately 500 publishers had been located in what was now their occupation zone under normal circumstances. Here it is not entirely clear what is meant by “normal circumstances.” One could assume that this referred to the time before the Nazis took power in Germany. They further judged that 50% of these published “trade organs, telephone directories, railroad guides, calendars, and other items for which the immediate post-war need was far below normal.”223 The rest published material that met the need of the “general reader for informational and inspirational books, magazines and pamphlets, and the demands of others for scientific, professional and educational publications, including textbooks.”224 Moreover, the ICD predicted that the “demand for publications of the general type was far above normal because of the

220

History III. History III. 222 History I. 223 History I. 224 History I. 221

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enormous losses which public and private book collections had suffered during the war.”225 The number of qualified German publishers with clear political records was exceedingly small at the beginning of the occupation. Other factors arising from the bomb-damage and war-destruction of printing plants and equipment and to existing stocks of books and printing paper greatly complicated the task of re-establishing the publishing industry in Germany. The most serious difficulty was the shortage of book paper. The primary mission of the Publications Control Branch, according to Military Government Regulations, included “control of the management, production, contents, and distribution of all books, pamphlets, magazines, and periodicals, and the control of the activities or operation of all commercial lending libraries” in their occupation zone.226 Its primary tasks were “to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as publishers, to prevent the circulation of objectionable literature, and to control and guide the reconstitution of the German publishing industry.”227 Individual ICD officers in the Publications Control Branch had six major responsibilities: (1) Preparation and execution of policies governing German periodicals and book publishing activities (2) Control of the constitution of German book trades and publishing agencies (3) Policy and supervisory functions incident to the publishing of magazines by U.S. Military Government for German readers (4) Policy and guidance functions involved in the translation and publication in Germany of books and magazine articles by U.S. authors, and in the commercial distribution in Germany of approved U.S. magazines, in either English or German language (5) Guidance of German publishers in the production of books and magazines considered effective in the democratic re-education of Germany (6) Stimulating German publishers to produce items considered essential to Military Government. 228

225

History I. MGR, Title 21, C-2 (27 May 46), 21-400 227 MGR, Title 21, C-2 (27 May 46), 21-401. 228 “Basic Information on Publications Control Branch,” prepared by Chief of Publications Control Branch for Director of ODIC (21 Nov 46). 226

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As noted earlier, the policies governing the licensing of publishers in the US, British and Soviet Zones often diverged significantly. The ICD described the difference in their most basic terms: US procedure emphasised the selection of politically pure, democraticminded Germans upon whom responsibility could be placed for producing publications that would meet the approval of Military Government. The British placed about equal stress on the applicant’s political record and his ability to produce desirable publications; while the Soviets stressed production only, and permitted almost any type of applicant to publish if his publications passed the censor before being released to the public.229

The three different policies presented their own advantages and challenges. Initially, the Soviets were ahead in production, but they faced the problem of constant inspection and censorship. Production was slow to begin in the US zone, but once it started “the U.S. policy proved increasingly justified by the greater self-reliance and initiative shown by the German licensees.”230 The British, which was a hybrid of the two, managed to mitigate the production problems of the US zone, without having constantly to oversee the content as in the Soviet system. While they held this middle position, it seems they were never able to produce enough reading material and had to fill in their shortfalls with material from the US sector. At the same time, they had, for the time being, the latent problem of undesirable content and people sneaking into the publishing industry in their zone. Though the ICD seemed to get off to a quick start, licensing slowed down and by October 1945 only 10 licenses had been granted to German publishers in the US areas of occupation. This did not mean that there were an insufficient number of applications. The Eastern Military District had about 300 applications in various stages of the vetting process, with another approximately 450 in the Western Military District. In the US Sector of Berlin, there were almost 200 additional applications. In all, there were about 950 potential publishers. The stringent application of denazification policies, however, kept the number of acceptable applicants to a minimum. Of greater importance to the ICD was getting the distribution network in place. The registration of book dealers started soon after the occupation began, with many having opened by July 1945. The Western Military District had registered about 1200 bookstores by mid-August. Berlin, 229 230

History I. History I.

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being smaller geographically, had nearly completed the registration process by this time. Due to logistical difficulties, priority was placed on making certain that lending libraries were available to the reading public since they ensured that books had a broader circulation than those that were purchased privately. It was estimated that lending libraries outnumbered bookshops three to two. Another difficulty brought on by the initial dearth of paper was the shortage of application forms for potential licensees. This was particularly acute in the Eastern Military District, resulting in a general slowdown in the registration process there. By the end of September 1945, the number of registered book dealers in the US zone and US sector of Berlin had increased to over 3000. Though they now had a sufficient distribution network in place, they had very few books and journals to sell. Once the shelves had been cleared of objectionable literature, not much was left, and the production of new material was slow to begin. As the ICD began to understand its mandate and the people they were dealing with, it became apparent that it needed to intensify the denazification program. September 1945 saw the withdrawal many already granted registrations. This second vetting of registrants was so thorough that in Frankfurt alone more than 100 registrants had their permits as book dealers revoked for what was termed political reasons. In October 1945 the licensing process began to accelerate, with licensing authority being delegated to the DISCCs.231 In this month 25 licenses were issued, bringing the total to 35. The US authorities took pride in this and even bragged that their total licensees were higher than what the British reported for their zone. In addition, the ICD judged their registration of book dealers to be nearing completion at 4,000 registrants. In the next month, the licensing of publishers continued to quicken with the addition of another 34 permits bringing the total to 69. It was during November that “a small but promising stream of magazines and books now began to come from the German presses.”232 Moreover, the registration of printers, book dealers, and distributors reached a total of 4,483. As the year closed out, the ICD seemed to have hit its stride and the total number of licensees in the US zone, Berlin, and Bremen reached 91. In the first 3 months of 1946, licensing and registration accelerated once more. January saw the addition of 41 book and magazine publishers, and by the end of February, the total was 168. The ICD had finally begun 231

History I references Letter, HQ, USFET, File AG 014.1 BIC-AGO, subject: Decentralization of Newspaper Licensing (11 Sep 45); however, this letter has not yet been located. 232 History I.

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to clear its backlog of applicants and could now boast that “[s]ome 227 publications, including 47 periodicals, had been published and approximately 250 additional books and pamphlets were in type awaiting paper stock on which they could be printed.”233 However, these logistical problems were to slow their progress. In March 1946, the shortage of paper suitable for publishing books “caused Information Control to limit the licensing of publishers to certain categories.”234 This was a convenient problem; they could use the paper shortage as an excuse for more overt censorship. It was during this time that “the field units were instructed to recommend only publishers who planned to concentrate on primary educational subjects such as current German problems, science and religion, and in particular those applicants who would consider the needs of women, youth, workers and intellectual groups.”235 The shortage of paper, however, did not stop them from issuing further licenses, which was seen as a temporary problem. Thus, in March 1946, a further 47 licenses were approved. By the end of June 1946, the ICD had “issued 243 publishing licenses, and 7,827 registrations had been acted upon or were pending.”236 Production of books and magazines was also beginning to reach relatively satisfactory levels. By June 30, 1946, some 729 books and pamphlets had been published. In addition to this, 128 periodicals were being printed.237 It was also important for the ICD to work together with other branches of OMGUS. For this reason, it is significant to note that in June 1946, labour unions in the US occupation zone were permitted “to publish pamphlets and trade journals without being licensed.”238 However, this did not mean that the unions could provide news other than that which pertained to the union’s activities. This was “similar to the publishing permits automatically granted to recognised political parties and to religious organizations.”239 Though these organisations were given significant autonomy, the paper shortage, limited the size, circulation and frequency of issue limited the themes that appeared on their pages.

233

History I. History I. 235 History I. 236 History I. 237 Information Control, Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 12 (20 Jul 46), Publications, p. 4. 238 History I references Letter, File AG-ODIC 461. (PuB), subject: Trade Union Journals (29 May 46); however, it has not yet been located. 239 History I. 234

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Between July 1, 1947, and June 30, 1948, the ICD licensed 73 German publishers. This left the number of licensed publishers in the US zone at 385. 240 The rate of production for books and pamphlets was starting to accelerate, with 3246 books and pamphlets titles being released. This was almost as much as the 3805 produced in the previous two years combined.241 Due to the paper shortage that affected all print media, the average book edition produced in the US zone was limited to 10,000 copies. If a book was popular, the ICD could authorise further printings. This restriction applied only to “ordinary” books that did not offend OMGUS regulation but did not really catch the attention of the ICD as being particularly useful as agents of democratic change. There were, however, a few titles that the ICD wanted to promote because they were thought to be politically important. These were not only given unusually large allocations of paper but were also priced at one Mark or less, which encouraged sales to a populous that was starving for anything to read. Some of the titles that the ICD thought particularly important were: Revolt of the Masses by José Ortega y Gasset, 50,000 copies. The Great Tyrant and the Trial by Werner Bergengruen, 75,000 copies. The SS State by Eugen Kogon, 100,000 copies. Tales from Abroad collected stories, 100,000 copies. Of Human Freedom Jacques Barzun, 100,000 copies. Red Horse Hill by Stephen W. Meader, 100,000 copies. Illusion and Reality by Erich Kordt, 25,000 copies. Forbidden and Burned, edited by Richard Drews and Alfred Kantorowicz, 60,000 copies Arithmetic Book for Bavarian Elementary Schools, five parts, 170,000 copies each

In restarting the German publishing industry in its zone, the ICD needed to worry about more than just who was allowed in and the physical infrastructure. They also needed to concern themselves with economic factors that they had little or no control over. For example, it was presumed that the currency reform of June 1948 would increase the demand for low-priced books. Due to the paper shortage, this problem was difficult to address by the ICD, since the one sure way of bringing prices down was to increase the number of copies a publisher was permitted to 240

In the manuscript one finds the number 13 rather than 73. It is clear that this is most likely a typographical error. 241 7053 books and pamphlets had been produced under the ICD’s auspices between the end of the war and June 30, 1948.

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print of any one book. Failing this, they predicted that the result would be a decrease in the sales of books due to the shorter supply of the new money. This would, in turn, undermine their re-education mission. This problem, though there were still occasional paper shortages after the currency reform, did not materialise. The Germans remained a culture of readers despite the decrease in the money supply. In fact, this beginning to the so-called economic miracle had quite the opposite effect. The ICD also continued in its efforts to foster better trade relations between publishers in the US zone and those in other countries. One such example took place in October 1947 when hundreds of copies of Bavarian published German-language books and magazines were displayed in the Swiss Booksellers Association headquarters in Olten, Switzerland. This gave the Swiss publishers, and public to a lesser extent, an opportunity to see what was being published in one area of Germany. Exporting new German books was not limited to the German-speaking part of Switzerland. In February 1948, a Frankfurt publisher and the representatives of several Dutch publishers signed a contract that facilitated the exchange of books. Though the value of the contract was modest at about $23,000, it did demonstrate the fact that Germany was once again opening its door to the rest of the world. The problem was that any contracts that German publishers entered into with foreign companies needed to be approved by the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA). Though many German publishers had contracts in hand by the end of June 1948, they were almost all held up somewhere within the JEIA bureaucracy. This also meant that German publishers, on their own, could not purchase foreign book rights in other German speaking countries without the assistance of the ICD, which had in many cases already purchased the German rights. The effect of all this was that the US, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, had an effective stranglehold on what was available to German publishers from the outside world. For some time, as already mentioned earlier, translation rights for certain US books had been made available to German publishers. Those that were not covered by the ICD’s agreement with US publishers could not be purchased until approval from JEIA had been received. As of the 30th of June 1948, the rights to publish 288 translated works in all of Germany had been sold. Most of these had been sold to US licensed publishers, with 13 being sold in the British zone and a further two in the Soviet sector.

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Of the 288 sold, the ICD had a list of recently acquired titles they considered to be the most significant.242 The titles highlighted by the ICD are an excellent cross-section of the types of books they thought would help turn Germany into the nation they imagined it should be. It contains a number of titles intended to have the Germans to do some serious soul searching. Titles such as Middletown, Middletown in Transition, and Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization encouraged the Germans to take a close look at not only their nation but at their communities, in order to identify areas that would make them more conducive to an American style democracy. Books like: Daniel Boone and Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, celebrated great individuals in American history, who could provide examples of how the individual is to serve the society into which he is born. This was not just reserved for those born in the United States as attested by A Prince in Their Midst, which told the story of Achille Murat, the former Prince of Naples and nephew of Napoleon I, who made a prosperous life for himself in the United States after escaping Europe. There were also books that told the stories of men of the cloth as in Men Who Have Walked with God and John Henry Newman, who was a leading religious figure, theologian, and convert from Anglicanism to Catholicism in Great Britain in the 19th century. These works emphasised the importance of religious organisations and their leadership in changing the attitudes of a nation. Among the various academic books were also those that made an argument for reform in the German educational system. The most interesting of these important publications are perhaps Journey for Margaret, On Second Thought, and You Can’t Go Home Again. Journey for Margaret takes place between the beginning of the Blitz in London and America’s entry into the war after Pearl Harbour. It tells the story of a newspaper columnist and his wife as they endure the bombing of London. In the course of the attacks, his wife is injured and loses the baby she had been carrying. The injuries are so severe that her surgeon performs a hysterectomy. After her return to the United States, her husband becomes acquainted with and eventually adopts two British children. The story emphasises the human cost of war and downplays the material loss of buildings and possessions. The novel fits well into the framework for Germany’s re-education on two levels. On the one hand, it was to inspire feelings of guilt towards the innocents caught in the war. The second 242

H.

For a list of which the ICD considered the most significant titles, see Appendix

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concept that it was supposed to plant in the minds of the German readers was the idea that material things can be replaced and that, even though they may have lost their own children, they could find joy and completeness in caring for the many that survived and had lost their parents. James Gray’s On Second Thought was a collection of essays and reviews written for the St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch in Minnesota. It is a useful and engaging introduction to the contemporary writers of the United States, with a few British authors added to the mix. For German readers to actually become interested in literature from the Englishspeaking world, beyond the classic authors of the British literary tradition and American pop literature writers, they would have to first of all know who they were. You Can’t Go Home Again by Thomas Wolfe also did not appear on the list of the ICD’s most significant works simply by accident. The plot of the story involves an author who has just had his first taste of success with a novel about his hometown. While he might think he was returning to a place that was familiar to him, he discovers that the inhabitants of his home treat him as a pariah, because they believe he has stripped them a little too bare before the world outside. Embittered by this reception, he travels to a Europe that was already living under the shadow of Hitler in Germany. Finally, he returns to the United States ready to rediscover the country that he loves. With this novel, the ICD is really setting the stage for a new Germany and those who were now returning to it. The authors who had lived in exile, especially ones like Thomas Mann, had been excoriated by the Nazi regime, and it was not certain what sort of reaction these returning cultural icons could expect to receive from the German people.

American Information Centres One of the more overlooked parts of the ICD’s activities is the function of the Information Centres they ran. The head of the operation was Dr. W.C. Headrick. His staff was never more than five American employees and between 75-80 German employees. These centres were put in place to provide Germans with a record of American life and provided Germans with American literature.243 In addition, they afforded access to American innovations in education and politics. In other words, they were to present American culture to the German people. 243

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There was another, more important, function served by the information centres. Intelligence gathering was important and allowed the ICD to monitor not only the attitudes of Germans but also what sorts of things interested them. This intelligence function provided the ICD with the information necessary to begin fine-tuning their operation and keep their finger on the pulse of the German reading public. A key part of this part of this initiative was the so-called American Libraries of Information. These were similar to those the US State Department had established around the world. In this case, they were placed in key cities of the US zone. These centres had already been planned by the PWD as the war was winding down. Lists of desirable books had been generated, and orders for this reading list were placed through the US Information Service in Paris and subsequently forwarded to the OWI. The libraries thus created were intended to meet the following needs: a. To acquaint the German people, especially German writers, editors, publishers, radio personnel, artists, scientists, teachers and other professionals, with the published record of American life and intellectual development; b. To enable these persons to acquire the best U.S. current literature, carefully selected and well-balanced, especially in the fields of politics, psychology, anthropology, social organization, economics, natural sciences, education, and art, emphasizing in particular information of the sorts denied the Germans by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry through its control of publications; c. To bring to the attention of German educators and political leaders the textbooks, methods and educational psychology developed in the United States; d. To present a full view of American culture to all interested German readers by liberal use of U.S. magazines and photographs; e. To provide Military Government officials with information needed in their work.244

All of the Information Centres had a large library room and several further reference or smaller reading rooms. In the reading rooms, the German visitor found collections of American texts, non-fiction and general reference works on a wide variety of subjects, which included: history, natural science, art, literature, medicine, social science and agriculture. In addition, they were supplied with catalogued reference pamphlets and reprints of feature articles from American periodicals. One 244

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of the initial challenges was that most of the material was available only in English. The first task of the ICD was to provide German translations of American reading material. In some cases, the German versions of these books, pamphlets, and journals were obtained through publishers in Sweden and Switzerland. The original planning called for the establishment of eight of these centres during the initial year of the occupation. The first of the planned eight libraries opened at Bad Homburg, fittingly, on July 4, 1945. While the centre was a success, it became apparent that libraries like these should be located in large population centres so that publishers, writers, and other professionals could more easily access them. This lesson having been learned, in September of the same year the Bad Homburg library was moved to Frankfurt, where it was known as the American library. After a year of operation, the centre’s holdings had risen to about 3,000 books. It also received about 100 American periodicals and 10 US, British, and Swiss newspapers on a regular basis. The Frankfurt library served another purpose in that it became the distribution centre for quantity shipments arriving in the American zone. The libraries provided a wide range of reading materials for their clients. The ICD, in listing a representative sampling of the holdings of all of its centres for July 1947 to June 1948, featured works of fiction, which were thought to assist in the in the democratisation of the German people.245 In November 1945, the second library opened in Berlin. The Army Special Services Division facilitated the quick opening of this library with the release of about 500 books. By June 30, 1946, the Berlin centre had nearly 3,000 volumes on hand and was receiving 151 American journals and 10 US, British, and Swiss newspapers on a regular basis. The third library was opened in Munich before the end of 1945. The ICD commandeered the reading room of the University of Munich Medical School. The Munich centre was unique in that it also housed a section devoted to Nazi literature, which was for the exclusive use of US officials. By June 30, 1946, the Munich library also contained the requisite 3,000 volumes. There was less of an emphasis on periodicals, though, with only about 30 American periodicals, and 9 US, British, and Swiss newspapers being available. In addition, it was also the Bavarian distribution centre. The ICD tried to open a centre in Stuttgart in 1945, but no suitable space was available due to the severe bomb damage in the city. Eventually 245

For a complete listing of these works, see Appendix I.

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appropriate space was found, and the library opened in January 1946. This was soon followed in February by a centre in Marburg. Further centres were opened in Erlangen and Regensburg in March and April respectively. This brought the number of centres in Bavaria to three and the total for the entire US zone to seven. The last centre to be established in the first year of the ICD’s operation was in Heidelberg in June 1946. In this case, the opening was attended by faculty from the University of Heidelberg and other academic and professional representatives. These eight centres were large-scale libraries. The ICD augmented these with smaller reference rooms elsewhere. These were to provide a wider distribution of US magazines and newspapers to German readers. In the first year, rooms of this type were opened in Augsburg and Nuremberg. The ICD monitored the use of the rooms carefully and surveyed the reading habits of its users. The Neue Zuericher Zeitung, Stars and Stripes, the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune were the most read newspapers. As for the magazines, Life was the most popular, followed in order by Readers’ Digest, Popular Mechanics, Harper’s, Time, Fortune, Popular Science, Saturday Evening Post and Economist. Of the users, students and professionals comprised more than 75 percent of the centres’ users. The Information Centres did not just provide Germans with reading material. They also organised public lecture and group discussions dealing with a variety of topics geared to aiding in the democratisation of Germany.246 The ICD established further “America Houses” in Frankfurt and Berlin, and the opening of the Wiesbaden installation brought the number centres to 22 at the close of June 1948. Additionally, a branch centre called “The American Library,” was set up in Hamburg (British Zone) in conjunction with the US Consulate. In this way, the American occupation started to broaden its influence over Bizonia. On August 18, 1947, OMGUS authorised an “Exhibitions Program.” This was a new reorientation tactic. The program was to demonstrate to the German people that the outside world had progressed without them through a graphic presentation of the American way of life. The first show opened in Berlin on December 22 and was an exhibit on the Tennessee Valley Authority. This project was viewed as a model for how the now devastated Germany might cooperatively redevelop its infrastructure. Eventually, copies of the TVA exhibition were sent to Stuttgart, Bremen, 246

For a list of included lecture topics from January to March 1948, see Appendix J.

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Munich, and Frankfurt. Further exhibitions followed and included topics such as “The European Recovery Program,” “American Industrial Design,” “US Labor Relations,” and “The US Farmer and His Land.” One of the quickest ways for the American Information Centres to overcome the language barrier was to offer photographic displays to its visitors, hopefully encouraging those who were hesitant to attend due to their lack of English language abilities to come in and look at the pictures. It also allowed the America Houses to spend less time on translating displays. Representative titles of these displays included: “Distinguished Living Americans,” “Higher Education in the US,” “Public Health,” and “Civil Rights.” The information centres also permitted individual branches to establish unique services for their clientele. For example, the centre in Stuttgart opened a press archive. It very soon proved to be one of the most popular and effective services of the information installations. It serviced an average of 25 requests a day from Radio Stuttgart, two newspapers, two press services, six periodicals, two book publishers, political parties, and public information officers. The America Houses’ lecture-discussion programs became a more and more important tool in delivering adult education by the end of June 1948. A turnout of 250 to 400 people was a normal occurrence. The size of the audience was often limited by the centre’s seating capacity. During June of 1948, the ICD took a bold step in that it allowed contrary voices from America to present their positions to German audiences. The so-called dissenters, who were lecturers at Midwestern American universities, lectured and led discussions on a variety of topics. These included “Racial and Ethnic Relations in America,” “News from the North” (Scandinavia), “Religious Aspects in America,” and “Biology.” While the information centres were able to reach those living in the larger cities, there was still a majority of the population that did not have easy access to these centres. For this reason, the ICD moved to establish supplementary centres in smaller towns of the US zone. This finally brought the rural population within the reach of their democratisation program. By the end of June 1948, 38 reading rooms were in operation in the US occupation zone, including the Bremen Enclave and their sector of Berlin. This, however, was not the full coverage envisioned by the ICD. As a result, the Heidelberg centre equipped an “America House” on wheels in order to reach even further into the countryside and establish an American presence even in the smallest of hamlets. The mobile Centre contained a small library as well as a graphic exhibition and the necessary equipment to show motion pictures.

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June 1948 saw all of the ICD’s information centres in full operation, and a picture begins to emerge in regard to how well its outreach programs are penetrating their target. At the end of the third year, the ICD provided statistics on the level of activities at its Bavarian branches which were encouraging. 247 A great deal of effort had gone into establishing their centre in Munich, but it seems that the per-capita users of the centre lagged well behind that of the other branches in almost all of the categories after correcting for the relative population of the cities in which they are located. While the centre in Nuremberg seems to be one of the best used, the statistics do not differentiate the nationality of the users. This would be significant because of the very high number of Allied personnel involved in the Nuremberg trials. On the other hand, the very high usage rates in the small city of Erlangen suggests that the information centre was doing a very good job of attracting Germans to its facility.

Film, Theatre, and Music Control The ICD was aware that film, theatre, and music had been a used extensively by the Nazis to create an ideological environment conducive to their goals.248 The ICD felt that this had been the most important tool used by Joseph Goebbels and the Ministry of Propaganda, especially the military documentaries they had produced. This appears to be contrary to current opinion, which tends to focus on the entertainment films or historical dramas. The first area on which the ICD focused was creating a complete inventory of the facilities available to them. It was important for them to know which resources they had at hand in order to begin using these media to their own benefit. A second priority of the ICD was the production of Welt im Film, which initially had been produced in London and was moved to the Bavaria in July of 1945, with the 18th edition being the first to be produced in Germany. Welt im Film was a weekly news digest that, at least initially, reinforced the idea of Germany’s complete defeat249 and emphasised the magnitude of Germany’s war crimes.250 Later, one could argue along with Brigitte Hahn that the newsreels could be seen as aimed at creating an alliance between Germany and the 247

For statistics on Information Centre usage in Bavaria, see Appendix K. History I. 249 Welt im Film #2. 250 Welt im Film #5, #6, and #18 among others. 248

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Americans,251 but this is only the case as the tensions between the Soviets and the Americans moved toward the Berlin blockade of 1948. In order to accomplish this, the ICD also began screening prospective film production licensees, with the initial vetting being based on the technical and artistic qualifications. If these needs were satisfied in the minds of the ICD, the applicants would then be sent to Bad Orb, an American installation run by the intelligence branch of the Army, to determine if the applicants were politically and psychologically suitable for the task at hand. The ICD also immediately sent out field officers to begin the task of repairing the film studios in both Munich and Berlin. The ICD requisitioned both the Tempelhof and Geiselgasteig facility as well as the Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht. Despite the early efforts to repair and use whatever facilities were available, filmmaking was slow to get off the ground in US-controlled Germany.252 What was missing was someone the ICD could trust and was familiar with the German film industry to take over the operation of the ICD’s mandate. The problem was that it required someone with a great deal of technical skill, who could very likely earn a very good living making films in Hollywood. In November of 1945, the ICD contacted Eric Pommer,253 a well-known German film producer who was then an American citizen. He agreed to return to Germany to help restart film operations in June of 1946 but did not arrive until July 4. No German films, other than newsreels, had been produced up until this time, and it was anticipated that the first productions would begin in early 1947. In the meantime, six film producers had been approved by the ICD, but no license had yet been issued by the end of June 1946. Newsreels were given top priority for processing and printing.254 General McClure considered the newsreels so important that when the Interim International Information Service in Washington wanted to reduce it to one reel, he stepped in and vigorously argued that the newsreel was the primary means of getting the American point of view across to the Germans. McClure considered it the “right form for obtaining maximum psychological effectiveness.” He was not alone in this since the Political Information Division of the British Foreign Office held the same position. 251

Brigitte Hahn, “Dokumentarfilm im Dienste der Umerziehung. Amerikanische Filmpolitik 1945-1953,” in Heiner Roß (ed). Lernen Sie diskutieren! Re-Education durch Film (Berlin: Cinegraph, 2005), 19-32. 252 History I. 253 Pommer had produced such films as: Das Kabinet des Dr. Caligari (1920), Dr. Mabuse (1922), Die Nibelungen, Siegfried (1924), and Metropolis (1927). 254 History I.

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Newsreels had fairly strict guidelines in regard to content. Fifty percent of each newsreel was to be devoted to German domestic news, with another 25% set aside for Anglo-American reports. The remaining 25% was devoted to world news.255 The newsreels not only served the purpose of bringing across the Anglo-American view of the world to the Germans but in Austria as well, since there was a second, somewhat revised, edition of the same newsreels produced for distribution there. In June of 1946, a meeting was called by OMGUS to establish an agreement between the Civil Affairs Division of the War Office (WARCAD) and the British Control Office, which was to determine the policies and objectives of future newsreels.256 The agreement was that “Welt im Film [was] to contribute to the enlightenment of Germans and Austrians by presenting news in pictures from throughout the world including the four zones of occupation in Germany, and from Austria.” Moreover, it was to present “the Allied purpose, standards and ways of life” and was to show efforts at reconstruction. Significantly, the agreement also notes that the focus should be on reconstruction and restoration undertaken by the local population. They did not necessarily want to concentrate on efforts that had been initiated by the occupation forces but wanted to emphasise what individuals were doing for themselves. In other words, they did not want to create the expectation within the occupied population that the AngloAmerican occupation forces were going to reconstruct Germany and Austria for them. This approach would have had another effect in that it presented the Anglo-American occupation forces as not necessarily reconstructing Germany and Austria in their own image. The impression would have been one of Germans and Austrians rebuilding their countries as they thought best. This, of course, would serve to mask everything else that was going on in the background in terms of the political and ideological guidance being provided through the various Military Government divisions, in particular, the Information Control Division. In May of 1946 WARCAD created a list of 120 reels they wanted to produce as documentaries. This list was divided into films that were to be produced in the United States and the films that were to be produced in Germany. The subject list of films to be produced in America covered a wide variety of topics, everything from American dance to life on a small farm in America, to how to conduct town meetings. The German list was

255 256

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just as wide-ranging but focused for the most part on practical matters. The list included topics such as the: “The Future” “Justice” “Reparations” “The D.P. Problem” “The Law” “De-Nazification” “The Zonal System” “Freedom of the Press” “Freedom of Speech” “Freedom of Religion” “Education in Democracy” “The Schools” “Labor” “Industry” “Agriculture” “The Mines” “Rebuilding the Railroads, Bridges, Roads, Canals” “Reforestation” “Commerce” “Public Utilities” “Housing” “Public Health” “Science and Research” “Painting and Sculpture” “Music and the Theater” “Film and Radio”257

A further problem that confronted the film division of the ICD was the actual physical space in which these films were to be shown.258 It was estimated that 80% of the movie houses in Germany were controlled or owned by Nazi party members or adherents. This made them unacceptable to the ICD. The only step that the ICD could take at this point was the requisitioning of the necessary property under the property control regulations. Once this was accomplished, a custodian acceptable to the ICD was appointed, and an ICD registrant was installed to manage the movie theatre. On June 30, 1945, the ICD opened the first 16 cinemas in its occupation zone. Initially, they only showed carefully screened documentaries. 257 258

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However, by the end of December 1945, with 345 cinemas reopened, the first few German-language feature films approved by the Military Government of were being screened.259 This only happened after a careful selection process that followed strict standards set down by General McClure. The films that the German audiences were to see needed to satisfy one of two fundamental criteria. The first of these was the establishment of German war guilt and the second was to demonstrate the value of democracy. One of the major problems that plagued the ICD’s efforts was the shortage of suitable films. By July 1946 there were only 15 German feature films in distribution, all of which had been produced prior to the occupation. A further eight German-produced documentaries were in circulation, in addition to 30 juvenile short subject films. Moreover, there were 48 US produced films that had been listed in 1944 as appropriate viewing for German audiences (in reality only 33 of these films were available by the end of June 1946). All of these film titles consisted of approximately 6 copies each. This meant that German movie houses only had about 288 actual films available for showing, which needed to be circulated among the 668 movie houses opened in the US zone of control. It meant that the German audiences did not get much variety, nor were they able to watch films on a regular basis. Because of this acute shortage of film titles, further German films were released to keep cinemas operating. As an interim solution, the ICD policy required German movie theatres to show American films for at least two weeks prior to showing a German film. Moreover, a movie theatre that was being reopened could not do so with a German film. This ensured that the German population was exposed to American films that contained the message the ICD wanted to impress upon the German population before they were allowed to watch a film that was nothing more than pure entertainment.260 In addition to the above policy, the ICD also looked outside of its occupation zone for help in order to supplement the films they already had in circulation. One of the solutions was to organise a film exchange between the four occupying powers.261 This was done under the auspices of the quadripartite agreement and done on a rental basis. The rental of a complete program cost 50% of the gross receipts after taxes had been 259

By July 1946 there were 15 German feature films in distribution, all of which had been produced prior to the occupation. A further eight German produced documentary films were in circulation in addition to 30 juvenile short subject films. 260 History I. 261 History I.

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deducted.262 The monies earned through the scheme were then deposited with the finance branch of the occupation zone, which would then meet on a regular basis to balance the earnings generated by these films in the various zones. The money accrued in these accounts was then put at the disposal of the ICD. There is no indication of what these finances were used for; however, one can assume that they were used for the daily operation of the ICD’s film section, the acquisition of the rights to show new films, and, in some cases, most likely to pay for the importation of films from Switzerland, which was a third way of providing a greater diversity of films. Under an arrangement with Praesens Film of Switzerland, the ICD imported the films The Last Chance (1945) and Marie-Louise (1944). The Last Chance, released in Germany on April 11, 1946, went on to win the Grand Prize as well as the International Peace Award at the Cannes Film Festival in October of 1946. The film deals with a British and an American soldier who escape from a Nazi prison train. They then find themselves leading a multinational group for the Italian underground. Marie-Louise went on to win an Oscar on March 7, 1946, Academy Awards for best writing, original screenplay. It tells the story of a young French girl, who is evacuated from her home in Rouen, France to Switzerland as a result of the war in Europe. Both of these films bring home the consequences on a very personal level of a war Germany foisted on the rest of Europe. Both also emphasise the isolation of Germany within the world community. In this case, the ICD used the proceeds to help concentration camp victims. The reaction of German audiences was not always favourable, especially towards the war films produced in the United States. There was, however, a specific purpose that the ICD had in mind when they brought them to Germany. It was felt that this type of film would be of some psychological benefit in that they were meant to show the machinery that had beaten the Wehrmacht. The ICD considered them especially important while the US was still at war with Japan. These films, for the most part, were later withdrawn; at least the films that dealt purely with war subjects. It is interesting to note that there was a fundamental, but perhaps necessary, contradiction in bringing these films to the German public. While the ICD was trying to eradicate German militarism, it also emphasised American military strength. By March 1946, 11 further carefully selected films were in circulation: feature films included:

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166 Here Comes Mr. Jordan Shadow of a Doubt Seven Sweethearts The Gold Rush It Started with Eve You Were Never Lovelier Young Tom Edison Pride and Prejudice, It Happened Tomorrow

The documentaries consisted of: A Child Went Forth Attack (Battle of New Britain) Cowboy Pipeline Democracy in Action The Town Autobiography of a Jeep Building of Boys Steel Town City Harvest, Toscanini

The ICD’s personnel continued to work hard and by June 30, 1946, a further 139 German films had been screened and censored by the ICD.263 While books used as sources for screenplays or screenplays written by Nazi party members or proven supporters of the Nazi party and “scenario writers, directors, or star performers under prosecution by Allied occupation authorities” were forbidden, other artistic and technical workers were allowed to continue to work. However, their credits for the films were removed. The situation was similar to that of ancient Egypt. If a Pharaoh’s name and image were removed, it would be as if they never existed. As with other arms of the ICD, the progress of the film program was carefully monitored and surveyed by the ICD’s Intelligence Branch. In August of 1945 in Erlangen, the first of many surveys related to film in the US sector was made. The survey sought to capture the reaction of German civilians to the short film program made available to the German movie theatres. For the most part, there seemed to be overwhelming support for the films among the German populous, with the majority considering the program not to be propaganda, but unbiased, factual information. Most of 263

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the moviegoers in the survey expressed a desire for new feature films and not for the old German films. Surprisingly, they showed a keen interest in educational films that depicted new and liberal ways of fostering democracy. However, one has to question the validity of a survey taken so near the capitulation of Germany to the Allies and the possibility that the Germans were simply telling the American surveyors what they thought they wanted to hear. The surveys also questioned Germans about the animated cartoons on the program. These had drawn the applause of the younger members of the audience, but a negative reaction from the older viewer, who preferred the film about the then modern American nursery school. Two further documentaries, one on a somewhat idealised view of life in a Midwestern American town and another depicting a pastoral version of the harvest in England, were received indifferently by the audience. A further zone-wide survey was done in March of 1946, which tried to assess the reception of the documentary Die Todesmühlen (Mills of Death). This was a film about concentration camp atrocities. Attendance at this film was considered to be normal in Greater Hesse, WürttembergBaden and Bremen. However, in Bavaria, where the film was shown in February, attendance was well above normal. In Berlin it was different. There the attendance dropped to 26% of theatre capacity. Audience reaction indicated that the audience was convinced of the existence of concentration camps, though they indicated to the surveyors that they did not accept personal responsibility for them. In early 1948 OMGUS began “democratising” the German film industry. It started the process by transferring the distribution rights for certain motion pictures to previously licensed distributors. Initially, there had been eight German distributors and two foreign companies. This number was increased to 15 in total by the middle of the year. While this applied to commercial films, the Department of the Army documentaries, the weekly newsreel, Welt im Film, and other official OMGUS films, continued to be under the control of OMGUS and were not handed over to the Germans for distribution. Circulation of films was thus made a matter of direct negotiations between the movie theatres and film distributors. Having relinquished control to some extent of what was going to be presented in Germany’s movie houses, at least those within Bizonia, the ICD began having concerns that there might be a return to the older monopolistic film distribution practices of the Nazi period. To this end, the ICD, through OMGUS, was able to put in place safeguards designed to prevent a revival of film monopolies in Germany. These regulations forbad so-called block

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booking and price cutting in the film distribution chain. It also required that all films be shown to exhibitors before the sale could be completed. Moreover, “tie-in” rentals were banned, which was the practice of providing the exhibition rights for one film based on the acceptance of another film. This ensured that all films were accepted by theatres on their own merits. The problem with these laws was that they could be considered unenforceable. At least the verbal agreements reached by the parties involved would have been very difficult to prosecute. Initially, the ICD found the owners of German movie theatres hesitant to take advantage of their new opportunity and responsibility. Selecting films in a competitive market was not something they were accustomed to during the Nazi era or the occupation to this point, so it is not surprising that they were reluctant and lacked the confidence necessary to show what they wanted to show in their theatres. These first steps in turning the film industry over to German control were set in motion in March of 1948 through the promulgation of order No. 1 under Military Government Law No. 56. This order defined the three main divisions of the motion picture industry, as production, distribution, and exhibition. What was significant was not so much the categorization of the various fields within the industry, but the requirement that any one person or organisation in Germany could operate in only one of the three outlined functions. The order did make provision for production companies distributing their own films. In addition to creating the three categories of how one might be involved in Germany’s motion picture industry, the ICD also established a comprehensive set of operating procedures for the German cinema. These were aimed at ensuring the German films would continue to contribute to the re-education and economic rehabilitation of the German people. OMGUS placed an embargo on exporting films that had been produced before May 8, 1945. It allowed only post-war films to be sold to foreign markets that contained a definite democratic message. Moreover, the proceeds of these exports were then to be used to pay for critically needed imports. This ensured that the German film industry made at least some films that followed the principles dictated by the ICD and that not all of the films could simply be escapist in nature. As a result of this law, one cannot say the German film industry was a true reflection of the German people or what they wanted to see on the screen. Rather, it was out of necessity made to remember the past and emphasise the American concept of democracy. The new policy also opened Germany to films from other countries, which meant the German industry was no longer protected from outside

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competition. While this would allow films of “democratic” value into the German market, it also permitted films that might reinforce the negative stereotypes the ICD had fought against early in the occupation, such as when it did not allow Oliver Twist to be shown in German theatres, due to the portrayal of Fagan. Even though the ICD appeared to be turning control over to the Germans, it still was able to inject its point of view into an evening at the movies. The ICD supplied every film performance in US occupation zone with a documentary film and an issue of the newsreel Welt im Film, in order to continue to instruct the German people in the fundamentals of democracy and to add to their knowledge of developments in democratic countries. Thus, as the owner of a theatre, if one were to show a film of one’s own choosing, one would still be required show that which the ICD wanted the Germans to see, which was especially important in the case of the newsreels. After operating Welt im Film for two and a half years, the ICD expanded the scope of its production. In August 1947, OMGUS established a documentary film unit. Its mandate was straightforward. It was “to produce documentaries, and to accelerate the pace and increase the efficiency of German documentary film production.”264 The first film it released was entitled “Hunger.” The film’s purpose was to assist OMGUS’s campaign to educate Germans on the scope of the food shortage in Germany. In total, there were 15 documentary films completed and another 24 in production between August 1947 and the end of June 1948. Not all of these were the work of the Documentary Film Unit, with some being produced by licensed German production companies.265 While the ICD made an effort to support the production of documentaries, feature films were not being neglected. Germans, operating under ICD licenses, had from July 1947 to June 1948 begun production of 15 full-length feature films. Of these, the Munich-based production companies, Neue Deutsche Filmgesellschaft and IFO-Film GmbH, completed, respectively, Zwischen Gestern und Morgen (Between Yesterday and Tomorrow) and Lang ist der Weg (Long Is the Way). In Berlin, “… und über uns der Himmel” (… And above Us the Heavens) was completed by Objektivfilm and Die sieben Schweinchen (The Seven Little Pigs) was released by Nova-Film. The first films are an interesting collection that plays to the policies of the ICD. Zwischen Gestern und Morgen depicts a collection of Germans 264 265

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returning to a war-ravaged hotel in post-war Munich that had played an important part in their lives. The actors in the film are the old guard from the Nazi era, whose careers were in the same shambles that the set found itself in. The only truly new face is Hildegard Knef, who started her career in 1944, but whose films had not been released until after Germany’s surrender in 1945. While Zwischen Gestern und Morgen focuses on the consequences for Germans and their complicity in the war, Lang ist der Weg was the first film to depict the Holocaust from the Jewish perspective. Written by Israel Becker, it showed the fortunes of a Jewish family from the years in prewar Warsaw, through Auschwitz, to their new life in a DP camp in Germany. This confronted the German audiences with the consequences of war as an ongoing, still not completely played out drama, rather than something that ended with the fall of the Nazi regime. A film that contrasted “die schöne alte Welt”266 of pre-war Berlin intercut with scenes of Berlin’s post-war rubble, … und über uns der Himmel depicted the underworld of the black market in Berlin and the struggle to break with what appears to be easy riches. Die sieben Schweinchen was the original name of a film that was eventually released as Der große Manderin. This film was intended to deal with the black market in Berlin, but with the monetary reforms, this became a less current topic than initially envisioned and delayed the release of the film to 1949. The emphasis of the film was the shifting struggle between men and women in an empire of a thousand years ago that resembles post-war Germany. The women are unhappy with the corrupt men that have run the country and are urged to start their own party, which eventually wins the majority. In addition to the US licensed films, British licensees worked in the US licensed Munich studios. Film ohne Titel (Film without Title) was a unique experiment in filmmaking that asked the question whether it was possible to make a film after the war and in some ways anticipating Adorno’s famous dictum regarding the barbarity of writing poetry after Auschwitz. The film is about making a film about a simple topic, a love story. The film crew shoots the film in a number of different genres, from expressionist to melodrama and remain unsatisfied with the results. The conclusion is that the film they are most satisfied with is the film about the attempt to make the film. That is to say, one can never tell the story, but only ever try to tell the story. Der Herr vom anderen Stern (A Man from Another Star) is a light comedy starring Heinz Rühmann. The film is about an alien being, in the 266

Spoken by Lotte Koch in the film as the scene fades from images around Potsdamer Platz lying in ruins to old stock footage of prewar Berlin streets filled with people and cars.

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form of a dot of light, who investigates the earth in the form of a mannequin he had copied. It is a vehicle for investigating the idiosyncrasies of humans and their foibles. While the above films had already been completed, there were quite a few films in production. Two Berlin cinema companies, Stella Film and Objektivfilm, had, respectively, Vor uns liegt das Leben (Life Lies before Us) and Der Ruf (The Call) in production at the end of June 1948. At the same time, in US licensed Bavarian studios, seven feature-length films were in various stages of production.267 Along with the German films being produced, the US zone was inundated with American films. Between July 1947 and June 1948 synchronising studios had processed 34 American feature-length films with German language sound. French films were also being dubbed, and the Munich and Berlin studios had synchronised German sound with 11 French feature films. As with other areas under its control, the ICD was concerned about their message reaching German young people. During the third year of the occupation, there were 7579 special film performances for German youth. During these performances, there was a total attendance of 2,327,918 persons.268 Over the three years since the beginning of the occupation, German cinemas continued to reopen as the needed repairs were made to the buildings that housed them. From the 16 cinema houses that initially open in the US zone on July 30, 1945, the number had risen to 1273 at the end of June 1948.

Music and Theatre Theatre and Music Control had the same task as all of the other branches. What set it apart was the wide variety of artistic endeavours and entertainment it was expected to oversee. These included “the publication and distribution of music, the recording and distribution of mechanical reproductions, and control of all theatrical activities such as plays, operettas, musical comedies, plays with incidental music, variety, cabaret, ballet, dance recitals, fairs, circuses, carnivals, concerts, operas, recitals and public music of any kind, and any other ‘live’ entertainment employing actors (or musicians).”269 267

For a complete list, see Appendix M. Further details, see Appendix N. 269 History III. 268

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The ICD noted, when they quoted Schiller, that “[T]he theatre in Germany was not considered purely an entertainment medium, but rather a ‘moral institution.’”270 They understood this in conjunction with the fact that very few theatres in Germany were privately owned. This meant that they were under the direct control of the municipality, Land, or the state itself. Moreover, they reasoned that this made it easy for the Nazis to take over the theatre. Conversely, it was felt that the same would be the case in the post-war era because the theatre people were accustomed to taking orders. Though this was the overall impression, the ICD also recognised that very few Nazis had become successful writers for the stage. The ICD also recognised that there was a strong relationship between theatre and music, which resulted in them treating it as a single entity. This did make sense in that very often the same facilities, out of necessity, were used for both, or in some cases, like opera, they represented a melding of the two. By the time the war was over, most of the physical facilities had been destroyed, since theatres tended to be in the centre of town with the heaviest concentration of bombing being focused there. Additionally, in the last eight months before the end of the war, the Nazis had decreed that all theatre should be closed, and most of the members of the ensembles had scattered throughout Germany. The ICD also noted that, because of the isolation of German musicians from the rest of the world of music during the Nazi era, and the order given by the Nazis that music was to be written that enhanced the Nazi cause, there were few musicians left or ready to carry out what the ICD felt their main function was to be, to produce “something creative and of free expression.”271 As with other areas of responsibility, the initial function of the ICD was to find suitable people, so that the theatres could once more be opened.272 There was one further obstacle, which was the entertainment of the occupying troops as a Military Government priority. In the case of entertainment for the troops, a wider variety of entertainers were used, since none of the restrictions on the political pedigree of an actor or musician were applied, as was the case of entertainment for the German general public, though there were equally strict rules against this practice. For example, the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion employed the Nuremberg Opera Company, which included many Nazis, for their variety shows.

270

History I. History I. 272 History I. 271

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Furthermore, there were the cases of Walter Morse-Rummel, a pianist, and Guila Bustabo, a violinist, who had been banned from the stage in post-war Germany. Both performers, though they were American citizens, had remained in Germany during the war under Nazi protection.273 In fact, Morse-Rummel had accepted German citizenship in August of 1944. While Morse-Rummel had never become a member of the Nazi party, ICD investigations revealed that remaining in Germany had financially enriched him. Apparently, his annual income was listed as somewhere between $80,000 and $100,000. This put him well beyond the lower limit the denazification process had set for revealing a person of interest. The case of Guila Bustabo was more difficult since she had remained an American citizen. She was beyond the scope of a denazification process because she was not a German and her brother made a number of attempts at having her repatriated to her home in Wisconsin. Archival documentation indicates that little priority was given to her, due to the fact that she had remained in Germany of her own volition. On November 21, 1946, a letter was written by Maj. Edward Peeples to her brother, Jack Bustabo, of Chicago Illinois, who had written a letter to the Military Government in Germany in regard to her blacklisted status. 274 In the letter, Peeples outlines the reasons for this categorization. Over time it has been suggested that it was her mother’s decision to remain in Germany during the war that led to the young violinist’s situation. Moreover, it has been argued that she suffered from a bipolar ailment, which was exacerbated by her mother’s domineering personality. The ICD did not take any of this into consideration and gave very specific reasons for its decision. In general, the reason for her classification was that she had “collaborated with, and made [her] talent available to the Nazis.” According to the policies in place at the time this meant immediate removal from any role in German cultural activities. It was also noted that an investigation of Bustabo was triggered by a concert she gave in Germany in the fall of 1945. The results of the investigation were as follows: she had not obeyed instructions from the American Consulate in Frankfurt to return to the United States, a full month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor she had appeared with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra as a soloist, that she had given concerts in Germany and other occupied countries by special permission from the propaganda ministry, that she had performed on the radio in Paris during the war, and finally it was related that she had had “many influential friends among Nazi 273

“Two US Musicians Barred in Germany,” The New York Times, December 15, 1945, Amusement Section, p. 23. 274 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136.

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officials as well as German military personnel who regularly exploited her talent for the German propaganda machine and that she was considered as politically reliable by the Nazi security office.”275 The ICD was also aware that they had a limited effect on individual musicians and actors.276 Many who had been refused licenses, or suspected that they would be refused a license, simply went to US special services officers and received permission to perform before American soldiers. The ICD did eventually reach an accommodation with special services and a ban on blacklisted or unlicensed entertainers was promulgated on September 1, 1945. This being the case in the US zone, these entertainers simply moved on to the French, British, or Soviet sectors. However, for many, the Soviet zone was simply not an option for either ideological reasons or simply out of fear. Within a short time, it also became clear that the British and the Americans were working very closely on this matter and were exchanging the names of those who had been blacklisted in their sectors. This left the French zone as the only refuge since they did not appear to make any effort to check an individual’s political background. Among both the US occupiers and the general German population, the French zone became known as a Nazi haven. This point is substantiated by Edward Breitenkamp,277 a former ICD officer, and in the numerous memos exchanged between the zonal commanders and their adjutants regarding the issue. With many of the performers blacklisted, one would expect that there would be a severe shortage in the US zone. However, with the destruction of many of Germany’s theatres, there was really no place for them to perform in any case. This meant that the ICD could be somewhat selective in whom it licensed or registered as a performer. It is quite clear that ICD officers had a great deal of difficulty not succumbing to some of the temptations that would have made their job easier. While the ICD claimed to have a hard line on whether an individual had been a Nazi or personally benefited from the Nazis at the highest administrative levels, the lower ranks found themselves having to overcome the urge to forgive or ignore questionable behaviour because of someone’s superior talent.278 Requests for exceptions were constantly being brought to their offices such as the case of Wilhelm Fürtwängler.

275

Edward Peeples, Letter to Jack Bustabo, November 21, 1946, NARA RG 260 5/265-1/16. 276 History I. 277 Breitenkamp, The U.S. Information Control Division 1945-49, 60. 278 Breitenkamp, The U.S. Information Control Division 1945-49, 52-53.

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There were a few things that all four occupying powers could agree on; however, the case of Wilhelm Fürtwängler, the famous conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, was not one of them. He had been blacklisted by the Americans for holding office during the Nazi regime but was actively courted by the Soviets.279 Inspite of this, there were moments where they seem to coalesce and agree on whom they did not want to have as part of the emerging entertainment scene in Germany. While many were added to the various military government blacklists, few were actually singled out for special attention. One of these was Norbert Schultze, who had composed Bombs over England as well as Lili Marlene. His name was specifically added to the October 1945 blacklist by a quadripartite subcommittee agreement in Berlin. One thing that the ICD could count on was musicians and theatre people being quite willing to inform on one another about their political background and failings. This could often mean the difference between just being another member of the string section, or a bit player on stage, and taking over the first chair in the orchestra or receiving the lead parts in a theatrical production. It was a matter of these performers finding a way of moving up through the ranks by ensuring that those above them were removed from the scene. One of the most common infractions that the ICD was able to charge performers with was a falsification of information on the Fragebogen they all had filled out prior to being licensed or registered. The ICD estimated that between 3% and 4% of the registered performers had provided false information. Usually, this was in connection with membership in a Nazi organisation. Investigative priority was given to those who had been informed on. Those caught having made fraudulent statements were charged before the military government courts and prosecuted. This led not only to them being banned from the stage but also often resulted in significant financial penalties or time spent in prison. In addition, because theatre licensees were held personally responsible for what went on in the theatre, it served as a reminder to them that no Nazi or militarist was to be connected with any of their productions.280 Added to this was another layer of bureaucracy, which applicants needed to clear before they could be licensed or registered. This was the so-called Prüfungsausschuss, which carried out preliminary examinations and vetted potential licensees and registrants and then made recommendations to the field ICD units.281 Clearly, field units were not bound by these 279

Berliner Zeitung 26.2.1946 and 12.3.1946. History I. 281 History I. 280

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recommendations, but for the most part followed them. There may have been some initial difficulty in how these examination boards interpreted Allied regulations, because it is noted that “by the end of March 1946 that most of [the Prüfungsausschuss] recommendations were being made in conformance with military government regulations.”282 But then again, it had only begun operating at the beginning of March, so it would seem that those selected for these examination boards very quickly understood what the ICD wanted. It was some time before the theatres were opened for stage plays. The problem was that no new acceptable plays had been produced and none of the plays produced in either the United States or Britain since 1932 had been translated into German.283 It would clearly take some time before new material would be available. Thus, the ICD and the German theatregoing public would have to satisfy itself with carefully screened works had been produced prior to the Nazis taking power. On September 5, 1945, the first theatre production was staged in Frankfurt. Toni Impekoven, the licensed theatre director for the Frankfurt area, presented a comedy, Ingeborg, by Curt Goetz. Impekoven had been a well-known opponent of the National Socialists, with his plays being banned in Germany immediately upon the Nazis coming to power. In fact, Impekoven’s wife, Frieda, had been implicated a number of times for having hidden Jews in their Frankfurt home.284 As for the comedy, Ingeborg, it had been written in 1920 and premiered on October 8, 1921, and was the first play presented at the Theater am Kurfürstendam in Berlin. Ingeborg, in fact, was quite popular in the US zone. It was used to reopen the theatre season in Ulm and performed in many smaller towns in the vicinity of Kassel. This was not always without its problems. For example, the Mayor of Frankenberg attempted to prevent its performance in his town. He argued, along with a number of other citizens, “that the play was immoral” and should be banned.285 The ICD would have none of this and saw that the performances went ahead. In fact, it became one of the staples of early post-war theatre productions in Germany and was also the first theatre piece performed in Ulm, where Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew followed it. Ingeborg was not the only work to cause difficulties for the ICD. The Catholic youth movement in Karlsruhe demonstrated against the premiere 282

History I (my emphasis). History I. 284 Meir Wagner, The Righteous of Switzerland: Heroes of the Holocaust (Jersey City: KTAV Publishing House, 2000), 17-19. 285 History I. 283

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performance of Bertolt Brecht’s Dreigroschenoper. Once again the charge brought against the play was that it was immoral. In this case, the police had to be called in to prevent a riot.286 Already in July 1945 the number of theatres offering German plays increased steadily throughout the US zone and in Berlin and continued to do so until October when approximately 50 theatrical programs were scheduled. These ranged from light musical comedy to classical opera and from variety shows to Macbeth. Especially in Berlin there was a rapid rebirth of the theatre. During the first year after the end of the war, the Hebbel Theater became an especially important theatre performance venue and what the ICD called “a landmark in the theatrical world.”287 Even though Berlin theatres suffered many difficulties due to the curtailment of electricity and the existence of a dual currency, Berlin theatres succeeded in remaining open. The Berlin freie Volksbühne was established in November 1947 under the sponsorship of the US, British, and French military governments. It had an initial membership of 12,000 persons, which increased to approximately 42,000 members by the beginning of July 1948. Initially, there was to be a single Volksbühne that was to serve the working classes with affordable tickets in all four sectors of Berlin. However, this was not to be. Alfred Lindemann, one of the leading members of the theatre, had an ideological falling out with Siegfried Nestriepke, who was also in a leading position with the newly re-established theatre. Lindemann eventually decided to take the offer of a license for the Volksbühne in the Soviet sector. In any case, the ICD reported that “the Soviet action was taken while negotiations were in progress with the other powers.”288 Theatre was not confined to the larger centres and many smaller towns revived their own. As a result, a total of 241 theatre licenses had been granted by the end of June 1946 and by June 1948 the ICD had issued a total of 539 theatre licences. The initial productions of plays in the US sector tended to focus on the classics. For example, the Staatstheater in Kassel started with Goethe‘s Iphigenia auf Tauris and Wiesbaden’s Deutsches Theater opened on November 18, 1945, with Goethe’s Die Geschwister, a one-act play with a cast of four from 1776. Not only was Goethe popular, but a number of Shakespeare’s plays were performed as well. In Stuttgart, one of the early productions of As You like It was staged and Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew was its second production. 286

History I. History III. 288 History III. 287

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There was a wide variety of plays on offer as Germany’s theatre came to life once more. In the Giessen Stadttheater, Artur Schnitzler’s Liebelei was performed on the 25th of November, and Stuttgart opened with Orpheus and Euridice. In Wiesbaden, the Der Lügenpeter [Pinnochio] by Toni Impekhoven was performed on the 24th of December and Menagerie, a group of three one-act plays, followed on the December 31. In Heidelberg, Moliere’s 1668 comedy L’Avare received its first performance on 17th of December. Also in the pre-Christmas period, Kassel’s Staattheater premiered Rotköpfchen on December 6, following this with Heinrich von Kleist’s Der zerbrochne Krug. The premiere of Ferenc Molnar’s 1926 Spiel im Schloss, which had been a huge hit worldwide in the late 1920s, was performed in Wiesbaden on December 8. Stuttgart’s premieres early in December 1945 included Emil Herrmann’s Das Gotteskind, a Christmas play, and several French comedies. By early December, Munich was already well on its way to recovery and the ICD reported that it had taken on an almost “metropolitan atmosphere.” By this time, Munich’s opera had already performed Puccini’s La Bohème and Eugen d’Albert’s Tiefland. The Volkstheater in Munich was also attracting considerable audiences. The Münchner Theater was using a gymnasium for its performances and had a repertoire of three plays by this time, with the Bürgertheater running five plays. The ICD also made certain that American plays appeared on the German stage. Through the Office of War Information (OWI) and the American Dramatists Guild, the ICD requested that the German rights for the following plays be secured for staging in Germany: Our Town, Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Yellow Jack, The Time of Your Life, The Patriots, The Voice of the Turtle, I Remember Mama, and Dear Life. They then set about satisfying the conditions under which the plays could be made available to German producers. Financially, they needed to create blocked accounts into which the royalties could be paid in marks. These monies would then be held in the name of the Dramatists Guild in an account for the individual authors. Securing German rights from the authors was difficult enough, The ICD then needed to have them translated and printed. The Dramatists Guild was of the opinion that it would be a time-consuming undertaking, and indeed it was. The PWD/ICD had begun work on this in March 1945; however, by late September 1945 they still had no authority to show American plays in Germany. The problem was that performance rights for these plays had been granted to German nationals prior to 1933. If the rights holder was still alive, these contracts were considered to be in force. Moreover, the holders of the rights might have been blacklisted and could thus not stage the play,

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while at the same time being unwilling to sell the rights to someone else. So, the play could not be staged. Though the ICD could simply hand over the physical printing plants to desirable publishers, it was more complicated in this case, since the American individuals and copyright law was now in effect which was something the ICD had no control over. The fear was that the German performance rights holders could simply wait out the occupation and move ahead with their own program once the ICD was no longer an issue. Even though common sense seemed to suggest that “since no plays by American authors had been staged in Germany since 1933 […] all rights on American plays had lapsed”, a new contract needed to be established with the Dramatists Guild. Until that happened, it was “not possible to secure American plays for production in the U.S. zone.” Nevertheless, a list of American plays was eventually cleared for production in Germany. These first ten plays were: Thunder Rock (Robert Ardrey 1939), Our Town (Thornton Wilder 1938), Yellow Jack (Sydney Howard and Paul de Kruif 1934), Awake and Sing (Clifford Odets 1935), Abe Lincoln in Illinois (Robert E. Sherwood 1938), Three Men on a Horse (George Abbott and John Cecil Holm 1935), Ethan Frome (a dramatization of Edith Wharton 1911 novel), Knickerbocker Holiday (Kurt Weill and Maxwell Anderson 1938), Uncle Harry (Thomas Job 1942), and On Borrowed Time (Paul Osborne 1938). Soon after, on 13 June 1946, the first American stage comedy in Germany premiered, Three Men on a Horse, in the Deutsches Theater in Berlin with Axel Ivers, who had translated the script and played a leading role in the production, directed. The play proved to be a great success in Germany and eventually a German film adaption was produced in 1959 by the Berliner Union-Film Studio in Tempelhof, Berlin. Seven other American plays with German translations were performed in the spring of 1946: Thunder Rock was performed in Bad Kissingen, Berlin, Bremen, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Giessen, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Kempten, Krumbach, Memmingen, Munich, Regensburg, Stuttgart, Süßen, and Ulm. Three Men on a Horse was performed in Berlin and Wiesbaden. Awake and Sing appeared in Berlin, Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Stuttgart. On Borrowed Time was produced in Berlin, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden. The Time of Your Life by William Saroyan appeared in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Stuttgart. Our Town was performed in Augsburg, Berlin, Bremen, Esslingen, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Hersfeld, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Munich, Nuremberg, Offenbach, Regensburg, Schwetzingen, Stuttgart, Ulm, and Wiesbaden.

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Skin of Our Teeth by Thornton Wilder was presented in Berlin, Darmstadt, Munich, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden.

While these plays had already appeared on stage in Germany, another 20 plays were either awaiting production or still in the translation/printing phase. Eugene O’Neill’s Ah, Wilderness (O Wildnis) had been translated and was available in printed form for the German theatres, along with My Heart’s in the Highland (William Saroyan 1939), Adding Machine (Elmer Rice 1923), Uncle Harry, The Barretts of Wimpolestreet (Rudolf Besier 1930), Morning’s at Seven (Paul Osborn 1939), Men in White (Sydney Kingsley 1933), and Angel Street (Patrick Hamilton 1941). A further twelve American plays were in the process of being translated: Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Biography (Samuel Behrman 1932), Ethan Frome, Embezzled Heaven (Ladislaus Bush-Fekete and Mary Fay 1944), End of Summer (Samuel Behrman 1936), Family Portrait (Lenore Coffee and Willian Joyce Cowen 1939), Mourning Becomes Electra (Eugene O’Neill 1931), No Time for Comedy (Samuel Behrman 1940), One Sunday Afternoon (James Hagan 1933), The Patriots (Sydney Kingsley 1943), Reunion in Vienna (Robert Sherwood 1931), and Why Marry (Jessie Lynch Williams 1917). As with everything else related to the ICD’s activities, the Intelligence Branch had its Surveys Unit investigate German reactions to American plays. The 1947 survey, noted what the ICD termed “a growing capacity for judgment on the part of the German audiences, critics, and theatre personnel.”289 What is precisely meant by this is unclear, but given other comments made by the ICD on this question, it was probably intended to convey the conclusion that the Germans seemed to like the American plays that had been performed. The surveys expressed the frequent surprise shown by the Germans at the high literary quality of American plays and that this disclosed that the Germans, according to the ICD, were generally unaware of US cultural achievements. American plays became more and more popular. During May 1948, Three Men on a Horse was performed for the 250th time at the Schlosspark Theater in the US sector of Berlin. Almost simultaneously, The Voice of the Turtle was performed for the 200th time in Berlin. As these two plays were being celebrated for their success, additional plays such as The Time of Your Life, by William Saroyan and S. N. Behrman’s No Time for Comedy, were being premiered held in Berlin. The Time of Your Life was immediately successful. The ICD reported that some German critics were saying that it was “the finest American play brought 289

History III.

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to Germany up to the present time.”290 Another successful opening was Eugene O’Neill’s Mourning Becomes Electra in Leipzig. It was well received by the public in what was then the Soviet zone, despite being labelled “reactionary” in the official newspapers of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The ICD continually tested the quadripartite agreements that allowed material produced for the various occupation information services branches to have some of their works produced in the other sectors. For example, the Staatstheater at Dresden was given permission to perform Our Town, which was the first performance of an American play in the Soviet zone. This was followed by further scheduled engagements in the Soviet zone and by June 1946 Halle, Eisenach, Magdeburg, and Leipzig had all arranged for performances of American plays. Moreover, an arrangement was also worked out by the ICD in the Bremen Enclave with the British 8th ICU (Information Control Unit) for the performance of American plays by German licensed theatres in Hamburg. In this case, applications were made by the theatres through the British Information Control Units, and scripts were to be furnished by Information Control Branch, Bremen. There was also a plan for the same arrangement with the 30th ICU (Hanover). American works were banned for a second time in the Soviet sector in April 1948, when Leipzig’s municipal authorities prohibited performances of Three Men on a Horse. At the time, no reason was given for forbidding the play, which had been extremely popular with German audiences in all four zones. However, one can assume that it was part of the increasing tensions as the Allies moved toward the Berlin Crisis. By June of 1948, the performance rights for 44 American plays had been negotiated. This allowed the ICD to sign a total of 413 contracts for the future production of these US theatrical works.291 The performances of these American plays were also quite lucrative. By the middle of 1948, the ICD had collected a total of 1,082,655.58 RM from performances of 31 American plays.292 The money collected was used towards obtaining further performance rights to American theatre pieces. However, this being said, there is no current record of how the money was eventually dispersed.

290

History III. For a list of these plays, see Appendix O. 292 For an accounting of the funds generated by these plays for the ICD, see Appendix P. 291

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Music Control Initially, instructions issued by the ICD in reference to music in postwar Germany were relatively simple and straightforward. All military marches and those used by the National Socialists were banned. In addition, all songs used or associated with the Wehrmacht were proscribed. Other musical forms proved to be more difficult to deal with.293 For example, Siegfried’s “Funeral March” from Twilight of the Gods was not banned. They reasoned that if it were to be banned because of its association with the National Socialists, then similar arguments could be made for the “slow movements of Beethoven‘s Third and Seventh Symphonies.”294 While the ICD considered Richard Strauss‘s Ein Heldenleben, a response to Nietzschean philosophy, to have dangerous tendencies, it was felt that Schubert’s An Schwager Kronos, with original lyrics by Goethe, was even more dangerous. Since it was felt that these pieces could not be banned outright, they needed at the very least to be controlled in certain instances. In the case of Hitler’s birthday, pieces such as Beethoven’s Eroica and Ein Heldenleben were not to be played. The ICD had determined that their overtones of the individual asserting his will on the world would be counter-productive to their goals. Though they found most of this to be fairly innocuous, they wished to err on the side of safety and keep a relatively tight rein on any musical associations that might exist with the Nazi party. Not only German music was watched carefully, but even music composed by individuals of other nationalities were restricted, because of the possibility of what the ICD called musical sabotage. Two such pieces were Chopin‘s Revolutionary Étude and Finlandia by Sibelius.295 The fear was that either of these pieces might stir revolutionary tendencies in the German audiences and potentially cause an anti-communist backlash. Another approach was to prohibit the dedication of an entire evening of music to a single composer such Strauss or Wagner. Rather than take a direct approach and restrict the music that was allowed, the ICD intended to crowd out the unacceptable music. For example, they simply could say that they were now allowing music to be presented that had been banned during the Nazi era like that of Mendelssohn, Hindemith, Meyerbeer and Offenbach. This way they could present lesser-known German music and bring in music that had been composed in America during the Nazi period.

293

History I. History I. 295 History I. 294

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The instructions that music licensees received were the same as in other areas under the control of the ICD. There were, however, two additions made in regard to music. They specifically mentioned that music was not to incite racism or race hatred.296 This point was absent from the instructions given in other areas of the new German media. Moreover, music was not to incite disorder. In some ways, this was recognition that music in some ways was different from all of the other forms of media. Music had an emotional element attached that was absent in the other mediums. It was an area of communications that seemed to go beyond normal cognitive processing and what one might understand as rational thought. The ICD annual report for June 1946 indicates that before a concert could go forward a list of all compositions; alternative compositions which might be played, and the names of the composer and author of each composition needed to be provided to the ICD’s district office “not less than 72 hours before the day of the performance, licensees should deliver to the DISCC from which their license was obtained a true copy of every program they intended to present.” The program had to give the date or dates of all performances, and indicate “whether it was in conjunction with a celebration of any particular occasion, historical or otherwise.” Licensees needed to enumerate all of the major participants in the program. The licensee also needed to provide a signed sworn statement “that no one participating in the performance had been an active Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer.”297 Musicians were also placed into the five categories used by the ICD to indicate who could and could not perform on the German stage. Thacker claims that of the approximately 10,000 musicians working in film, theatre, and music only four musicians were listed as “White A”.298 While the ICD may have been strict in the case of musicians, the “Black, Grey, and White Lists” of “White, Grey, Blacklists” indicate that of 5625 musicians listed, 301 had been given the “White A” designation, with a further 1618 being designated as “White B.”299 Music, like the theatre, had two categories of individuals that the ICD dealt with.300 The smaller group (69 in total as of June 1946) were the music publishers, orchestras, Opera companies, producers of musical 296

History I. History I. 298 Toby Thacker, The End of the Third Reich. Defeat, Denazification, and Nuremberg. January 1944 - November 1946 (Stroud: Tempus, 2006) 52. 299 For a more comprehensive accounting, see Appendix Y. 300 History I. 297

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performances, and phonograph recording manufacturers. These needed to be licensed and were subject to a far stricter vetting process. Musicians, vocalists, and instrumentalists (7,933 in total as of June 1946)301 only needed to be registered and underwent a less stringent vetting. The reasoning was that the first group controlled what was presented and thus controlled the political and ideological content of the performances. The second group was simply seen as tradespeople who lent their services to the first group.302 Musical entertainment was restored in Germany fairly quickly. For example, the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra gave its first concert on July 8, 1945. Albert Kehm, the licensee in charge of the Staatstheater in Stuttgart, opened on this date as well with a chamber music recital, with over 1500 audience members in attendance in a hall that was too small to accommodate all who wanted to attend.303 On July 29 Frankfurt heard its first concert in the performance hall of the radio station in memory of the victims of the concentration camps, with Wiesbaden’s first concert taking place on the same day. Mannheim opened with a light operatic concert and Haydn’s The Creation and Heidelberg followed in August. Bavaria’s cultural activities recovered quickly and by mid-September traditional musical groups were reappearing. Munich was able to maintain two orchestras: the Munich Philharmonic and the Bavarian State Opera Orchestra. The Brunnenhof concerts were again being given, but due to bomb damage had been moved to the Grottenhof. In addition, orchestras had already begun giving concerts in Ingolstadt, Wurzburg, Nuremberg, and Augsburg, with another being formed in Bayreuth. None of these orchestras ventured into the realm of modern music and remained with their repertoire of classical pieces. It is not that they might not have liked to have attempted some of the newer symphonic music; the problem was that a program of newer pieces had been attempted in Munich, and it had been a failure with only three hundred people attending. One could compare this with a series of concerts given in Bad Nauheim by the Oberhessische Symphony Orchestra to a capacity audience, which started on the 16th of September where compositions by Beethoven and Tchaikovsky were featured. Opera had always taken a significant position in Germany’s cultural life, and opera companies were quickly revived after the end of the war 301

Weekly Report of the Theater and Film Section, ODIC, for period 27 June - 3 July 1946. 302 For a chart comparing licenses granted vs. registrations, see Appendix Q. 303 OMGUS, Information Control (Cumulative Review), functional annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 13 (20 Aug 46), p. 11.

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with licenses being granted to Munich, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Fuerth, Coburg, Wiesbaden, Kassel, Stuttgart, Mannheim and Heidelberg in the U.S. zone. A further six licenses were granted between January 1 and the end of June 1946 to Regensburg, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, Ulm, Gmuend and Schwetzingen. Often a great deal of ingenuity was required to provide the needed space for concerts. For example, the exchange floor of the Frankfurt Börsensaal was converted into an opera house, and five operatic works were presented with little in the way of technical equipment. In addition, in early in December, Fidelio opened a Beethoven festival at that location. Tosca was performed for the first time on the 29th of September and Mozart’s Marriage of Figaro was premiered in Mannheim on the 21st of October. The same could be said of the orchestra in Heidelberg, where a large hall in the University was made available on a full-time basis for performances for German audiences. This was to make up for the requisitioning of the Stadthalle by the 7th Army, with Hänsel und Gretel by Humperdinck being the first opera performed there. Sometimes there was also some luck involved, in re-establishing Germany’s operas as when a large cache of costumes belonging to the Berlin State Opera Company was found in a salt mine south of Kassel near Heimboldshausen. Needless to say, the costumes were confiscated and distributed to opera companies in the four zones of occupation. Concerts and operas, however, were not just operating in the larger cities, but the smaller cities also participated in the revival of Germany’s cultural life. In Wiesbaden, Madame Butterfly premiered on the 9th of November in a hall made available to the company and in Bad Homburg, Paul Brehm, operating under a provisional license, personally financed a concert series with a symphony orchestra. The premiere of operetta Wiener Blut, by Johann Strauss Jr., was given on November 11th and met with the largest audience response to that time. This should not have been surprising since the operetta had already been popular in the Nazi era and a film adaptation had been produced by Deutsche Forst-Filmproduktion in Vienna in 1942. By the end of June 1946, 17 cities in the U.S. zone had opera companies. During this time 445 performances of 30 different operas were staged in Bavaria, 300 performances of 27 operas in Greater Hesse, 190 performances of 12 operas in the Bremen Enclave, and 449 performances of 23 operas in Württemberg-Baden. Since there was no opera in the U.S. sector of Berlin, the Staatsoper, located in the Soviet sector, and the

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Stadische Oper in the British sector, were used to satisfy the needs of Berliners. While the Music Control Section of the ICD could not control the activities of Liedergesangsvereine and Liedertafeln (choral societies), because they sang presumably for their own enjoyment, they did encourage them. They had a long history in German musical life and became a part of the ICD’s efforts to reorient Germany’s youth. Though most of the performances were of German or European pieces, the ICD began to introduce American classical music in early 1946. Some of the first performances were of Hanson’s Third Symphony and Piston‘s Suite from The Incredible Flutist. Samuel Barber‘s Adagio was played in Germany for the first time in Berlin. Some of the pieces became quite popular, for example, Barber’s Adagio went on to become the most performed piece in the US zone. As was the case in the theatre, the ICD had difficulty procuring the basics necessary in order to introduce American symphonic music to Germany. Even the sheet music needed for orchestras interested in newer music was in short supply, due to the bombing of German cities and the Nazi banning of the works of many composers. As was the case with the theatre, the ICD asked the OWI to assist with the importing of music into the U.S. Zone. The most difficult issue was the protection of copyrights of American compositions. For this reason, the ICD worked quickly to revive the German Performance Rights Society (STAGMA). Contemporary American music, which had not been available to the Germans since 1933, was introduced to German audiences in late 1945. The first American compositions to be made available were Quincy Porter’s Music for Strings, Virgil Thomson’s suite, The Plow that Broke the Plains and Douglas Moore’s Village Music. Howard Hanson’s Third Symphony, presented in Wiesbaden, Walter Piston‘s suite from The Incredible Flutist in Heidelberg and Mannheim, and Samuel Barber‘s Adagio, and Charles Ives’ chamber music played in Berlin were some of the first American compositions to be heard in Germany after the war. By the end of June 1946, there had been 71 performances of 33 musical works of U.S. composers.304 Additionally, more than 100 further American works had been made available for performance in Germany. In April 1946, the ICD office in Munich also arranged for the transport of the Berlin Philharmonic’s music library from its wartime storage facility in Bayreuth back to Berlin.

304

For a listing of these works, see Appendix R.

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Shortly after the war ended in Europe, the British Military Government received an application from several individuals involved in the German Performance Rights Society (STAGMA).305 This was not unusual since the offices of STAGMA had been located in what became the British zone. They were quickly given permission to start operating once more. However, STAGMA’s files were only partially available, since the bulk of them had been evacuated from Berlin to what was occupied Polish territory. In December 1945, a custodian was appointed for STAGMA in the U.S. Zone and the task of arranging performance fees began. This also ensured the protection of additional U.S. and Allied music not brought directly to Germany through the ICD. A further step needed to be taken to ensure the payment of royalties to artists from the Allied nations. The ICD recommended Hans Aldenhoff, a German lawyer, as custodian for U.S. interests in STAGMA. The French followed by appointing him to oversee their interests in March 1946 and shortly after by the British. STAGMA‘s influence and work, however, was not limited to the western sector, at least not initially. By April 1946, STAGMA had the permission of the Deutsche Zentralverwaltung (German Central Government) in the Soviet Zone to collect performance fees in Sachsen, Thüringen, Mecklenburg, Vorpommern and Brandenburg. Thus by June 30, 1946, STAGMA was collecting performances fees in all four zones. There was, however, a problem in that there was no quadripartite agreement on how the artists were to be paid. So, the money simply accumulated in the STAGMA accounts. Another important organisation that was still in the organisational stages by the end of June 1946 was the Inter-Allied Music Lending Library in Berlin. German personnel had been chosen as librarians, and the arrangement for their salaries had been made through the Magistrat of Berlin. The primary purpose of the Library was to introduce Germany to the most representative works of Allied composers. Moreover, they wanted to encourage German composers with what they considered to be the best traditions of Germany’s musical culture. In terms of new material being produced, the ICD did not necessarily encourage this nor concern itself very much with it. It had a clear notion of

305

In 1947 STAGMA (Staatlich genehmigten Gesellschaft zur Verwertung musikalischer Aufführungsrechte) underwent a name change to GEMA (Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte). Erich Schulze, who was the already active with STAGMA in the 1930s, assisted in restarting STAGMA’s work and was later charge with the responsibility of creating the GEMA, which he led until 1989.

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what it wanted to have performed and preferred to concentrate on the technical aspects of providing facilities for performances.306 By 30 June 1946, approximately 600 British, 200 Soviet, 100 French and 100 American music works had arrived in Berlin for the library. In addition, the ICD prepared a mimeographed catalogue of all American works. While the library was to be open to all Allied personnel, only Germans could borrow music. Under the library plan, rental fees for American musical works performed in Germany were to be collected by the Inter-Allied Music Lending Library. The fees were then to be turned over to the Information Control fiscal officer, who credited them to blocked-mark accounts for the copyright owners. In terms of the sheer number of licenses and registrations that needed to be processed, the Music Branch had the most daunting task. The ICD also found that it needed to overcome the urge to “forgive” artists for their past and thus settle for a lower standard because political affiliations during the Nazi era were a more important consideration than the technical ability of a musician.307 In order to assist in this task, the first Prüfungsausschuss (denazification committee) in the American zone was established in Stuttgart in March of 1946 in order to examine performers.308 Though these boards appeared to be autonomous, they worked within OMGUS guidelines and were watched over by the ICD. These committees were to consider individual artists on the basis of whether they had lent themselves to propaganda purposes during the Nazi era.309 One of the fundamental questions that they were to ask during their deliberations was “did they glorify Nazi Kultur.” Any ban imposed by the committees was often tempered by practical considerations, at least initially. The first case looked at in depth by the ICD was that of the wellknown pianist, Walter Gieseking. ICD investigations concluded that he had served not only as an artist but also as a propagandist. His concerts at home and in occupied countries had been planned and arranged by the Propaganda Ministry, to exhibit the accomplishments of the glorified Nazi Kultur. Though there were instances in his life under the Nazis that spoke against the findings of the ICD, he was never able to overcome the fact that he had been personally raised to the rank of professor by none other than Hitler himself. 306

History I. History II. 308 History II. 309 History II. 307

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The thorough study made in the Gieseking case served as a model for the investigation of other musicians. These showed that the Reich Music Chamber, an offshoot of the Propaganda Ministry, had co-opted musicians from even the most obscure of villages in Germany in support of Nazi propaganda. This finding resulted in the artists, “who had allowed their talents to be used by the Nazis for propaganda purposes” to be considered on par “with writers and publishers who have sold out to Hitler.”310 They were banned, at least initially, from working in Germany’s entertainment industry, at least until Germany could be sufficiently rebuilt along democratic lines that they posed no threat of taking Germany back into its authoritarian past. This standard was also applied to the world-renowned conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, Wilhelm Furtwängler. The so-called “Black, Grey, Whites Lists” were initially intended to keep suspect individuals out of the information services, but particularly the entertainment media.311 The ICD judged that entertainment conveyed a far more nuanced and thus more powerful message, which could not easily be countered with conventional direct modes of communications. In their view, entertainment inculcated a much deeper value in terms of creating democratic individuals; one that created a mode of thinking and decisionmaking that was autonomic rather than overtly cognitive. In the third year of the occupation, OMGUS “intensified its effort to free the German people from the cultural restrictions imposed by the Nazi regime.”312 It attempted to nurture a spirit of independence among German artists while discouraging the Länder from taking control of cultural affairs, as had been the case in the past. To this end, the ICD expanded its efforts to introduce music from outside of Germany to the Germans. The ICD announced in April 1948 that it would promote and finance the appearance of a series of American artists, who were to perform for German audiences.313 While this may have been when the official announcement came, these activities had already been underway for some time. On September 28, 1947, Yehudi Menuhin, who had already been entertaining American troops and had played for the liberated prisoners at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in April 1945, performed with the Berlin Philharmonic under the baton of Wilhelm Furtwängler. This performance marked the end of the official controversy surrounding the famous conductor but started an ongoing controversy for Menuhin. Moreover, financing for the program did not come from OMGUS coffers 310

History III. History II. 312 History III. 313 History III. 311

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but was supplied by private donations channelled through the American Music Centre, which had been established as a non-profit organisation in 1940. There was also a panel of experts, made up of Howard Hanson, Douglas Moore, Olga Samaroff, William Schumann, Carleton Sprague Smith, Harold Spivacke, Charles M. Spofford, Davidson Taylor, Charles Triller, and Harrison Kerr, who selected artists for the tour.314 The first performer sent was Patricia Traverse, a well-known 20-yearold violin soloist. As part of her tour, she performed with the Berlin and the Frankfurt Philharmonic orchestras, among others. The music she would perform was American, with Roger Sessions’ Concerto for Violin and Orchestra and Charles Ives’ Second Violin Sonata being the most prominent. Other performers included in this program were the folksinger Tom Scott and the harpsichordist Ralph Kirkpatrick has well as Helen Traubel, Rise Stevens, Leonard Warren, and Todd Duncan. Travers’ concert appearances were popular with the German audiences, and she performed to crowded halls in all of the major cities in the US, British, and French zones. The ICD reported that the German critics in the audiences appeared surprised at her musical abilities. These same critics had initially “been extremely sceptical before hearing the young American play.” In addition to the official program, OMGUS permitted other American artists to appear. These included Hans Kindler of the National Symphony Orchestra of Washington, DC conducting the Radio Stuttgart Orchestra and Leonard Bernstein leading the Bavarian State Orchestra. While the ICD did not comment on Kindler’s performances, it does make note of Bernstein’s. The Munich audiences so appreciated the music that he received a series of ovations from not only the general audience but the music critics as well. In order to support the live performances, the US Information Centres began stocking more and more recordings by American performers and of American compositions. The centres in Bavaria also organised music discussion programs, which eventually spread to almost all of the 22 Information Centres in the US zone. Though the centres did not carry exclusively American music, they did emphasise the American composers in their holdings, providing access to the best of the modern American composers. The ICD used various approaches to introduce American music to German audiences. These included live concerts, radio broadcasts, and Information Centre recordings. From July 1947 to June 1948, the ICD 314

“Musicians to Tour U.S. German Zone,” New York Times, April 14, 1948, 29.

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credited itself with introducing no fewer than twelve American composers to the German ears for the first time: Virgil Thomson Daniel Mason Walter Piston Aaron Copland Samuel Barber Roy Harris

Frederic Jacobi William Schuman Douglas Moore Quincy Porter Howard Hanson David Stanley Smith

Opera and ballet also played a significant part in the musical program overseen by the ICD. According to the ICD, the 1947-1948 seasons of Bavarian State Opera and the State Theatre Stuttgart were typical for their entire zone.315 Along with the fairly representative selection of operas and ballets, one selection stands out above the rest. Of particular interest on these lists is Beethoven‘s Fidelio, which can be found in almost every season program and was encouraged by the ICD. In fact, it was used to mark the 100th anniversary of the German revolution of 1848 on March 18 in Frankfurt am Main. It was the underlying message of yearning for freedom that made it popular with the ICD and thus the German opera companies as well. For the ICD, the European premiere of Samuel Barber‘s Second Symphony was one of the more important musical events of the 1947-1948 season in Berlin. Performed by the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of a US military government officer, it introduced the German audience to the most abstract forms of American symphonic music, which the ICD hoped would attract German audiences due to its complexity and emotional content. While the ICD was proud of its coup, it was not aware of Barber’s own loathing of the original version. Part of this loathing may have had to do with the fact that when he composed the original version, as a member of the US Army, he had agreed to sign over the royalties for the piece to the Army in perpetuity.316 Though no sources indicate such, it may not have been a matter of the ICD introducing what it thought was the best example of modern American composition, but the easiest and cheapest to hand. The ICD did not only promote the performance of American music but also assisted in the formation of orchestras. This was the case with the 315

For a listing of operatic performances given, see Appendix S. Barbara Heyman, Samuel Barber: The Composer and his Music, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 216–218. 316

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Württemberg Youth Symphony Orchestra formed in Stuttgart. Knowing the ICD’s focus on influencing the younger generation of Germans, this is not surprising. An added bonus was the featured performance of Kent Kennan’s Night Soliloquy at the orchestra’s premier performance. By June 30, 1948, there were 18 symphony orchestras in the US zone and another 12 opera houses.317 These orchestras all took on programs that were heavily seeded with American compositions. In total, there were 450 performances of American compositions from July 1947 to June 1948. This was comprised of 53 different composers. While this may appear to be a rather large number, five composers’ works made up 53% of the performances. These were: Walter Piston (70), Samuel Barber (57), Aaron Copland (55), Wilhelm Schuman (32), and Quincy Porter (25). Of the 109 different pieces performed, works by Copland (11), Piston (9), and Barber (7) made up 25% of the total works presented. Within the list of works performed, one can also determine some favourites among the orchestras. Far and away, Barber’s Adagio for Strings was the most liked with a total of 23 performances by 14 different orchestras. It seems that the violins reaching up, but not being able to grasp one’s heart’s desire, resonated with the German people as they sat in their ruined and cold concert venues.318

Radio The National Socialists used radio extensively in Germany to control public opinion. The Allies recognised early on that it would be imperative to control the radio airwaves in Germany in order to control the population.319 This effort began as early as September 1944, when the PWD took over radio Luxembourg, which then became a centre for Anglo-American broadcasts into Germany.320 This ended in November 1945 when sufficient radio resources were restored within the US zone of control. On July 14, 1945, SHAEF was dissolved and re-designated US Forces, European Theatre (USFET), which in turn had its name changed to EUCOM (US Forces, European Command) on 15 March 1947. From SHAEF the ICD inherited three radio stations in Germany, in addition to Radio Luxembourg. Radio Munich had been opened on May 12, 1945, 317

For a list of all established orchestras and opera houses, see Appendix T. For a list of all performances of American symphonic compositions, see Appendix U. 319 History I. 320 History I. 318

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Radio Frankfurt on June 2, and Radio Stuttgart on 3 June.321 While at first, the German stations depended on Radio Luxembourg for most of their programming, on November 11, 1945, Radio Luxembourg was returned to the Duchy of Luxembourg, ending this arrangement. At this time Radio Frankfurt became the primary originating studio for the Süddeutsche Rundfunk network in US-occupied Germany. In the third year of operation, three further stations were added: one at Nuremberg, synchronised with Radio Munich; another at Bremen to provide Military Government with radio service for the Enclave; and the Drahtfunk (“Wired Wireless”) in the US sector of Berlin.322 The three major studios—Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt—began as a fully military operation; only a few acceptable, qualified German personnel were included. This was to serve as the training ground for German personnel who would eventually take over the broadcasters as the Americans relinquished control. This was supplemented by the Network Control Office, which supervised, guided, and coordinated how the ICD policy was implemented at the stations. The control officers at the stations censored, or as the ICD worded it, “provided the initial examination all scripts before broadcasts.” Post-broadcast, the Network Control Office scrutinised and directed broadcasts that went out over the network. The ICD’s Radio Content Analysis unit also sampled them on a random basis. The monitoring of broadcasts did not end with those originating in Germany, but also included German language broadcasts beamed to Germany from outside the US zone.323 The mission of the radio section of the ICD was similar to that of the others. However, rather than having to deal with personnel problems, as the other sections did, the initial problem for the ICD in the area of radio broadcasting was really technical in nature.324 Most of the radio stations in Germany had been bombed, and it was now the task of the ICD to get the stations back up and running.325 Some locations were brought online relatively quickly.326 For example, the American forces began entering Munich on April 29, 1945, and had for all intents and purposes secured the city by May 1. The Americans began their first test broadcasts on May 10, with regular broadcasts beginning on May 12. By June 12 there were 10 ½ hours of broadcast daily and by 321

History III. History III. 323 History III. 324 History I. 325 History I. 326 History I. 322

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August 1945 Radio Munich was broadcasting about 40 hours a week of its own programming. Though competent and politically clean personnel were very hard to come by, the US military could move very quickly if it felt a need to.327 This was the case with two individuals, Joseph Eberle and Alfred Braun, in conjunction with Radio Stuttgart. Alfred Braun had also been a significant personality in Radio prior to 1933 and had initially suffered persecution under the Nazis, but eventually became an opportunist, who collaborated with Veit Harlan on films such as Jud Süss, Opfergang, Die goldene Stadt, and Kolberg. Eberle initially worked with the radio station, but soon became one of the licensees of the Stuttgarter Zeitung. Until July 8, 1945, the French had controlled Stuttgart, but it fell under the control of US military government thereafter. Almost immediately these two individuals were employed to work under information control supervision. Alfred Braun’s selection as one of the announcers of Radio Stuttgart is interesting and might even have raised a few eyebrows. In some respects, he had exactly the pedigree for which the Americans were looking. He had been one of the pioneers of radio in Germany during the Weimar era and thus was well known outside of Germany as well. While he is regarded, for the most part, today as a confirmed antifascist and anti-Nazi, there are some curious dark spots in his record that the ICD was most likely aware of, since he had been designated as “grey acceptable” in the March 1947 ICD Black, White, Grey List. The mission of the radio unit of the ICD was the same as with other media. Local programs and schedules were subject to review, scrutiny, and concurrence by the ICD.328 As with the other media, finding appropriate personnel was a problem because once again anyone with any Nazi affiliations was supposed to be banned from working in radio. However, as seen in the case of Alfred Braun, this may not always have been in force. A bright spot for the ICD was the relative docility of the personnel available, because of the high degree of control the Nazis had exercised in the area of radio broadcasting; thus, radio personnel would have been accustomed to the high degree of scrutiny and supervision undertaken by control officers.329 The ICD, as the Nazi Propaganda Ministry did, had specific requirements for radio broadcasts, in particular when it came to reporting on the Nuremberg Trials. The ICD wanted to ensure that material emanating from these proceedings was presented as commentary that 327

History I. History I. 329 History I. 328

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advanced military government policies in a positive way.330 However, as one moved away from the topics relating to the war-crimes trial, the charters for the radio stations were drawn up in a way that allowed for a wide spectrum of political opinion. To this end, many of the broadcasts took the form of roundtable discussions, which were also encouraged by the ICD. The ICD wanted to take the German listener through the process of weighing the pros and cons of the various political positions presented. They did not want radio to focus on promoting a specific political point of view, but to reflect the various views that were struggling for the attention of the German public. Radio was not to be as it was during the Nazi period, where only one opinion was available to the listener. Despite chronic human resource shortages experienced by the ICD initiatives, the radio division managed to have 600 German personnel working for them by mid-December 1945.331 Compliance of this rather large German staff was accomplished through what one might term food politics. The ICD managed to have the radio division workers classified as essential. This meant that they received double rations. In other words, if they were to lose their job with the ICD licensed broadcaster, their daily calorie intake would be cut in half. This was an indirect means of ensuring loyalty and reliability among the staff at work for the radio division. Radio controlled by the ICD ensured that the military government’s message was brought home to the German people.332 One of the ways that they ensured that there would indeed be listeners for their messages was by dedicating a little more than half of the programming to music. By the end of the first year of occupation, 52% of the broadcast time was devoted to music with 21% being set aside for news and public affairs programming. The remaining 27% was set aside for programming dedicated to women, youth, and children, as well as literary, dramatic and educational programs. There were also utilitarian programs, such as “Englisch macht Spass,” which was designed to facilitate easier communication between the occupiers and the occupied. On special occasions, they would have features such as the one celebrating the Jewish New Year, though programming of this type was done carefully in order not to create too much unrest in the German audience. The US military government also turned down requests by Jewish groups for special programming or publications during certain religious holidays. The music that was also broadcast had subtle political overtones. The initial ICD report made special note of broadcasting Beethoven‘s opera 330

History I. History I. 332 History I. 331

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Fidelio.333 It was considered to be as important as announcements regarding the licensing of Die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Fidelio was seen as a political statement regarding the individual’s struggle against tyrants. It also fit well into what the Americans saw as their role in Germany in that they were called from their distant land to free the prisoner from his dungeon and be brought into the light once more. On the other end of the musical spectrum was the top 10 program of American music “The Ten of the Week.” It was a half-hour broadcast of popular music similar to the “Hit Parade” in which German listeners cast ballots for their favourites. Those who had participated in the voting received a copy of the lyrics to the ten songs chosen for that week. The balloting was conducted by mail and listenership increased steadily, with many Germans considering it a good means of developing a taste for American popular music. From the American perspective, it was seen as a means of offsetting the anti-jazz propaganda campaign in Nazi Germany. At best, listener reaction to this type of music was mixed. The ICD compiled a list of things that the German audiences objected to. At the top of the list were swing music, the large number of foreign language broadcasts, the fact that news programs concerning Germany were too short, and the fact that there was too much international news.334 The ICD used this feedback to adjust their programming, and it was reported that Radio Munich showed an increase in listenership as a result of an increase and German music replacing American music. The listeners also requested that more “light music” be included in the programming. However, this aspect of programming was not changed, and the ICD retained its emphasis on classical music. Initially, the Voice of America, the overt radio broadcaster in US occupied Germany, was poorly received. While sports commentaries were enjoyed and the young people liked the jazz music, there were complaints about the Polish language broadcasts. Overall, the Germans preferred folk music, light music such as waltzes, operettas and dance music, with only 2% of the audience preferring jazz.335 Another aspect of the radio broadcasts that the German listeners did not care for were those originating from the Nuremberg Trials. This may simply have been a matter of the German audiences not wanting to come to grips with what had happened in Germany during the Nazi regime 333

History I. History I. 335 See Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, eds. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970) and appendices for greater details. 334

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because it is noted that when the popularity of these programs went down, German scepticism and suspicion in regard to these proceedings also went down.336 During the first year of ICD control, substantial progress was made in German radio broadcasts in the US zone. Radio Frankfurt, for example, started with 63 broadcast hours per week and managed to increase that to 116 hours by July 1946. Radio Stuttgart went from 28 to 116 weekly broadcast hours. Radio Munich began with only 12 hours a week and was airing 100 hours of broadcast at the end of June 1946. The five US radio stations controlled by the ICD337 developed a system in which major news developments were presented in regular newscasts and then supplemented by press reviews, commentaries, roundtable discussions, and speeches by military government and German authorities. In this way, by having the different media supporting one another’s reporting, they assured the believability of the information being provided. In addition to the regular broadcasting that was decided on locally, there were official Military Government broadcasts that were designed to counter propaganda emanating from the Soviet sector. These were used to assure the German people of America’s commitment to Germany. These programs included talks by OMGUS officers, US Congressmen in Germany on inspection tours, and visiting Americans from governmental, ecclesiastical, and educational fields.338 Further broadcasts emanated from the Military Governments of the Länder. These did not engage Soviet propaganda and confined themselves to providing background information on Military Government decisions and regulations as well as those regarding the German governmental agencies. While providing information was important and the primary role of the five US stations in Germany, musical broadcasts made up the majority of the broadcasts. It was here that the ICD could begin introducing Germans to modern American composers, in addition to the typical classical music the Germans would have expected. Among other features supplied by the radio outlets were broadcasts of special Christmas programs. These consisted of Christmas greetings from the Military Governor to the people of Germany. Special coverage was also provided “of the several thousand holiday parties held for German children by American occupation personnel.”339 This last broadcast represented the opposite sentiment of the 336

For a list of programming preferences broken down by sex, see Appendix V. Radio Frankfurt, Munich, Stuttgart, Bremen and RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) in Berlin. 338 History III. 339 History III. 337

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initial occupation policies, which outlawed fraternisation between US military personnel and the occupied Germans. It was calculated to break down the barriers between the occupation forces and present the Germans and Americans as being in the same boat facing down the menace from the east. Though there was a significant centralization of broadcasting, there was some room for the individual stations developing their own programming. Some of this programming consisted of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) and the British Broadcasting Company developing joint programs such as: special youth programs featured by Radio Bremen, the “Radio School of the Air” broadcast by Stuttgart and Frankfurt, and the programs discussing the civil service and education reform from Radio Munich.340 In late 1947 OMGUS instructed the Executive Director of the German Administrative Department of Post and Telecommunications that all Deutsche Post transmitters and studios were to be turned over to their respective Land governments. In addition, Deutsche Post, though excluded from broadcasting, “was authorized to collect radio receiver fees, provide required telecommunications services, and maintain an interference elimination system.”341 Of perhaps greater significance was the decision to turn over authority for enacting legislation for the establishment of independent German radio organisations that would take over the operation of Radio Munich, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt. This marked the end of the ICD’s direct involvement in radio broadcasting in Germany, though they would still watch its further development with great interest. In the fall of 1947, OMGUS started to open their occupation zone to the rest of the world. Until then, travel to and from Germany had been severely restricted. On October 7, 1947, OMGUS policy began permitting “the interchange of cultural, educational, and informational materials and personnel between the US occupied Areas of Germany and other countries.”342 One of the first of these “cultural exchanges” was with the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation and involved the exchange of programs and radio correspondents. More importantly, the agreement allowed the German staffs of US controlled stations to be instructed by the directors of the Swiss stations. It was also the first opportunity that the new German broadcasters would have to cover special events outside of Germany. The German broadcasters moved quickly to re-establish cultural and informational ties with the rest of the world. This was initiated by six 340

For a list of representative broadcast titles, see Appendix W. History III. 342 History III. 341

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German broadcasters travelling to the United States for a six-month study of American and British radio sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. The itinerary for the students was very full. They started two months of “special research” at Columbia University, which was followed by practical experience at several New York radio stations. This was followed by a tour of the United States and Canada. They then re-crossed the Atlantic for six weeks of study with the BBC in London. In order to ensure a multiplicative effect, four of the broadcasters were staff members of the US controlled stations, with the other two coming from British and French Zone stations.

Intelligence As noted earlier, the ICD also served a significant intelligence function within the greater structure of OMGUS. Primarily, the ICD reported on the psychological state of the civilians within the US zone of control. When they were still the Psychological Warfare Division, they fulfilled this task in relation to German prisoners of war as well.343 In February of 1946, the ICD was given the further task of collecting political intelligence. This new mission encompassed the investigation of German applications for licensing or registration for employment in the media. The intelligence branch passed this information on to not only the various branches of the ICD but to the OMGUS Intelligence Division as well. Though the ICD’s Intelligence Branch may have concentrated on gathering information on Germans wanting to work within the various branches of the media, it was also responsible for monitoring the German reception of all aspects of military government and policy. Finally, it also gathered political intelligence, which […] was defined as obtaining and reporting information on German reactions and attitudes towards US military government and German civil government; German political activity in the US zone and throughout Germany, including purposes, programs, and leaders; evidences of trends towards nationalism, militarism, pan-Germanism, or fascism; separatist movements; and political effects of refugee movements.344

The ICD intelligence unit also determined what were to be priority intelligence targets.345 It also advised the ICD leadership as to which 343

History I. History I. 345 History I. 344

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targets to exploit and how to do so. Out of necessity, it served as a consolidation point for information gathered by various other intelligence units. In addition to all of this, it scrutinised what was being produced by the media in Germany with a special emphasis on the German press. The ICD intelligence branch was not only concerned with compliance but also tried to provide insights into the German attitudes.346 In doing so, it measured the responses of German politicians to the Military Government’s actions. In the initial haste to get the German media working again, the ICD correctly assumed that some undesirables would slip through the initial vetting process. This is evinced in a memorandum of May 4, 1946, from Alfred Toombs (ICD Intelligence Chief) to General McClure. There Toombs indicates that the Intelligence Branch has noticed that a number of the licensed publishing houses are being operated by people that the Intelligence Branch had no information on. He further notes that they might be either stockholders or even former owners of these concerns. In the memo, he is very careful not to mention the name of one of the companies that he is referring to, but he does say that it was moved from Leipzig.347 It was through a censorship intercept that he had learned that the principal stockholder had been requested to return to the Soviet zone on business. This caused concern for Toombs because he was already worried that many of the licensees were “merely decorative fronts for other people.”348 Toombs did, however, mention a second case and this time he mentioned Brockhaus Verlag specifically. The two older brothers, who had run the publishing house prior to the end of the war, had been blacklisted by the ICD, but the 26-year-old son of one of the brothers had been licensed to run the firm. He pointed out that the son had very limited experience as a publisher and that it should be obvious that he was merely a front for the original owners. He also indicates that the Intelligence Branch was looking into this further. Toombs broadened the net he was attempting to cast over the existing German publishers by demanding that the publications branch furnish the names, Fragebogen, and a brief CV of all of the major stockholders in licensed firms. He also wanted information on all of the former owners or 346

History I. Initially, the US forces had occupied a considerable part of what was to become the Soviet sector. Included in this was the city of Leipzig. In the brief time that they occupied the city, they identified important publishers and moved them back to the western sector and resettled them in and around Frankfurt am Main. 348 NARA RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. 347

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controllers of these firms, who would be in a position to influence those running the publishing house at that moment. Toombs, who, if nothing else, was thorough, then argued that all licensed publishers be required to submit names of everyone working in an editorial capacity in addition to all of those in policymaking, supervisory, or executive positions.349 The intelligence branch now combed through the applications from licensees a second time. Through this process, it was discovered that numerous applicants had lied on their Fragebogen. These infractions were then brought to the attention of the ICD district units, who then rectified the situation. Usually, this meant a withdrawal of the license, but could also include fines and even prison sentences. By going through the second, more thorough, process, ICD intelligence ensured that no German was employed against the recommendation of the Public Safety Branch of OMGUS or the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps). From this point onward the ICD concentrated on selecting suitable candidates for licensing, and the Personal History Questionnaire (Fragebogen) was more carefully scrutinised at the initial vetting. In addition to this, the Bad Orb screening centre was established in October of 1945. As a result of all of this work, applicants’ names were placed on one of five lists as follows; a. If his/her political record was clean, his/her name was placed on “White” list (A), and he/she was considered eligible for a leading position in any of the information fields for which he/she was professionally qualified. b. If investigation disclosed that he/she was a member of minor affiliated Nazi Party organizations, but had not collaborated actively with the Nazis, his/her name was placed on “White” list (B), which qualified him/her for certain types of leading positions, but in a probationary status. c. If he/she was considered a less desirable person, his/her name was placed on “Grey” list (C, acceptable), which qualified him/her for employment with German information services, but not in policy-making, executive, or creative positions. d. If he/she was a Nazi Party member who held only nominal membership, his/her name was placed on the “Grey” list (C, unacceptable), which restricted him/her to employment at ordinary labour. e. If he/she had held high office in the Party, or in any of its affiliated organizations, or had shown himself/herself to be an active Nazi, his/her

349

Letter to McClure from Toombs,” May 29, 1946, NARA RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145.

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It was also the task of the intelligence officers to ensure that other branches within the ICD did not grant licenses too expeditiously. They were well aware of the constant tug-of-war that took place when one had an applicant with strong experience but a questionable political record. This vigilance sometimes led to the ICD coming under sharp criticism for not using the best people available. It seems that the ICD preferred to use those with limited experience provided their political records were clean. This had the further benefit of employing malleable individuals, who would be more open to bending to the will of the ICD staff. One of the persistent problems faced by the ICD was the rotation of staff out of the division. In the closing weeks of 1945, this became so acute that the Bad Orb screening centre was closed. It was replaced for a time by travelling teams, which would try to undertake the same work done at the previously fixed and relatively controlled environment offered by the former Stalag IX-B facility. Soon it was realised that a fixed establishment was preferable to the travelling units. For this reason, in the spring of 1946, a screening centre was re-established at Bad Homburg and continued to operate past the end of June 1946. As part of this reopening of the screening centre, Dr. David Levy, the Director of the American screening centre, visited the British equivalent at Bad Oeynhausen.350 The British organisation was known as the German Personnel Research Branch and was under the control of the Intelligence Group of the Control Commission for Germany British Element under the command of Wing Commander O.A. Oeser. The report indicates that the organisation consisted of a President of the Board, a psychiatrist, an administrative officer, two testing officers, four psychological assistants, eight secretaries, and 15 enlisted men, in all, 32 staff members. This was far more than the Americans had allocated to their endeavour. Levy was of the opinions that “the primary requirement for winning the peace [was] an understanding of the psychology of the German people. The modification of the psychology is the main task of military

350

Maj. Bertram Schaffner and Thomas Frank visited the British equivalent to the ICD screening centre between the 12th and 15th of May 1946 and submitted a report on 16 May 1946 to the Chief of the ICD Intelligence Section Alfred Toombs. RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145

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government.”351 It seems, however, that Levy’s methodology and approach were considered questionable even at that time. Martin Grotjahn, writing a review of Levy’s book, Father Land. A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family, for the Psychoanalytic Quarterly in 1949, was appalled at the application and misuse of Freud’s techniques by Levy.352 As already mentioned, the ICD’s Intelligence Branch was also responsible for keeping a finger on the pulse of what the average German was thinking. Like its predecessor, PWD/SHAEF, it was directed to investigate and report the state of mind and opinions of the German population on all questions of interest to the Military Government. Its early approaches relied on what were called impressionistic methods, which could not be considered scientific, but relied on the ability of those involved to interpret deeper meaning from what an interviewee might have meant when engaged in a casual conversation related to another matter. Principal grievances and attitudes were collected and studied by a small force of interrogators; surveys were made to determine what percentage of the population was being reached by MG newspapers and radio broadcasts, and to see whether the desired results were being obtained by these media. As German-operated information services resumed, the reaction of the population to these was also tested, as well as their reactions to, and knowledge of, principal Military Government pronouncements and actions. Inquiries along the latter lines frequently uncovered areas of ignorance, which were then corrected by suitable broadcasts and news releases. The first signs of political activity were also monitored closely, and the response of the German population to new political programs and leaders was constantly checked. In October 1945, scientific sampling surveys of the entire U.S. Zone were inaugurated. Conducted by the Surveys Unit, these assessments were made weekly on the same basis as scientific polls conducted in the United States. Originally a sample of 400 interviews was used, but this was expanded steadily to permit more detailed and reliable probing of public opinion. U.S. ICD personnel handled the compilation of results, while German civilians, carefully supervised by American ICD intelligence officers, did field interrogations.

351

Levy M. Levy, “Introduction,” in Bertram Schaffner, “Forward,” Father Land. A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), xi-xii. 352 Martin Grotjahn, “Review of Father Land. A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly 18 (1949): 253.

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By the end of January 1946, a balanced picture of public opinion and political trends in all areas under U.S. control was being obtained on the basis of approximately 1,000 interviews a week, in 70 representative urban and rural localities.353 Persons to be interrogated were selected on a scientific sample basis, in order to give a true picture of the opinions of all socio-economic, political, religious, sex, and age groups. It is interesting to note that tests indicated that answers to any given question obtained by uniformed U.S. interrogators did not vary significantly from the answers obtained by German interrogators. Interviews usually took place in the home of the person being questioned and normally lasted from 30 minutes to an hour. All results were channelled to the Surveys Unit Headquarters at Bad Homburg where they were tabulated, evaluated by a staff of public opinion specialists, and made available to interested agencies in consolidated form.354 Other intelligence investigators, organised separately into a Special Intelligence Unit, supplemented these public opinion studies by frequent interrogations of political leaders, professional men, church dignitaries, and other opinion leaders. These investigators, whose reports also were centrally evaluated and disseminated, attended public meetings, read the local press, collected rumours, noted any graffiti that might suddenly appear, and generally maintained familiarity with the localities in which they worked. Weekly opinion surveys made it possible for Military Government to follow trends and attitudes on important problems. In order to demonstrate changes in attitudes, the same question was often used by the interviewers in successive surveys. The value of this type of questioning was shown when a strong majority of the German public continued to indicate that the Nazis on trial at Nuremberg were receiving a fair trial and that news accounts of the proceedings were complete and trustworthy. Other socalled “trend” questions were periodically asked to note any changes in the public’s attitude toward the occupation, National Socialism, democracy, politics, relations among the Allies, and Germany’s economic future.

353

OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone (Information Control) No. 7 (20 Feb 46): 12. 354 The results of these surveys would later be published by Richard and Anna Merritt in 1970. It seems that the Merritts were able to piece together the results of the survey through a number of individuals directly involved in the collection and assessment of the surveys, who may have been allowed to keep their research data.

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By 30 June 1946, the number of persons interviewed for each survey was increased to 3,000.355 Surveys could no longer be made on a weekly basis because of the larger sample, coupled with a serious reduction in the amount of transportation available to interrogators. Topics covered by the ICD included nearly every question of major interest to Military Government, and sounded out the Germans on their major concerns, their political party preferences, attitudes toward reconstruction, opinions on the denazification programs, reactions to the Nuremberg trials, reactions to the film Mills of Death, opinions about price trends, radio listening habits, the “black market” and its effects, and the destruction of war industries.356 Some of the major findings of these investigations showed: a. Major Concerns: Missing relatives and the scarcity of food were of equal concern to the Germans until the food cut of 1 April 1946 when the proportion of people worrying about food approximately doubled. In general, material well-being was consistently of more immediate concern to the populace than anything else. b. Denazification: This was approved by about half the adults polled; the German public wanted the occupying Power to retain ultimate responsibility for impartial handling of the program, leaving operation and individual decisions to Germans. c. The Nuremberg Trials: These were thought to be conducted in an orderly manner. Most Germans felt that all the accused would be found guilty, and generally agreed that they were guilty and deserved punishment. d. Concentration Camps: Most Germans in the U.S. Zone who had seen the atrocity film Mills of Death were convinced of its veracity; a small minority considered it propaganda. e. Fear of Rising Prices: Most Germans thought that with proper measures price rises could be controlled f. Radio Listening Habits: Germans on the whole were found to approve the US controlled radio, and were particularly interested in programs which explained the American democratic system. g. The Black Market: Most Germans felt that the occupation authorities were doing all in their power to curb the black market.

355

OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, Information Control (Cumulative Report), No. 13 (20 Aug 46), 12. For a full presentation of the surveys, see Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. The original survey tabulations and commentary may be found at NARA RG 260 390/41/10/1 Boxes 456-458. 356 OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 13, 12.

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Chapter Three h. Destruction of War Industries: Most Germans disapproved of the Level of Industry Law and failed to understand that one of its chief intents was to destroy Germany’s war potential. i. War Guilt: In general, most Germans did not accept the proposition that the German nation at large was guilty of the war and the crimes committed under Nazi leadership, and felt that neither they nor their friends were personally responsible for such matters. They were inclined to blame their former leaders, particularly those now dead. j. Nazism: The majority of Germans believed that the underlying idea of Nazism was good, but badly implemented.

The most disturbing, but perhaps not surprising, findings were that Germans to a large degree still considered Nazism to be generally good, but that it was badly put into practice.357 While some of the populace held opinions generally similar to those prevalent in democratic nations, the majority was still infected with ideas resulting from 12 years of Nazi indoctrination and German militaristic tradition. By the middle of 1946, the ICD had a number of sociologists and psychologists working on the problem of re-educating the German people.358 They concluded that, though Nazism had been eliminated from “public” education, National Socialist ideology was still being taught in the homes.

Our Problem in Germany In July 1946, a document entitled “A Report on Our Problem in Germany” was generated by the Intelligence Branch of the ICD, which contained not only a summary of intelligence gathered over the past year but an analysis of how the ICD could move forward with its stated mission.359 The first part of the report deals with topics such as the German relationship towards Nazism and what are called its pathological features. Furthermore, it discusses what they surmised was the imprint that Nazism had been left on German society. The second section deals with specific German cultural institutions. These include: the German home, school, church, political life, and finally Germany’s information media, past and present. 357

History II. History II. 359 The report consists of sections entitled: German Culture, Channels of German Culture, The Present State of the German Mind, The Present Situation, Opportunities and Tasks, and Recommendations. 358

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In reporting on the German “mind,” the first issue they looked at was the attitude the Germans had towards the occupation authorities. They also address the problem of what they called “the clear conscience,” which was the manner in which the German people collectively shifted responsibility up the “chain of command” in order to retain a clear conscience in regard the Nazi atrocities. The document also reported on Germany’s political attitudes at the time. Here it is interesting to note how the ICD categorised Germany’s society. Initially, they looked at what they called the average German and then they subdivided German society into various demographic segments that helped them more effectively target their propaganda efforts. The two groups of particular interest to the ICD were German women and German youth. The report singles out these two groups as being those with which the American occupation forces needed to make some sort of headway, because of their importance in terms of changing the attitude of German society in the future. A further group isolated by the report was labelled “the atypical element,” which represented those individuals that were not easily categorised. “A Report on Our Problem in Germany” makes it clear that a significant staff of specialists had already been at work in Germany for more than a year, which had been assembled by the ICD’s Intelligence Branch “and included trained interrogators, psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and public opinion analysts.”360 Upon closer analysis of the report, its context, and participants, this group’s work was clearly a continuation of the studies that had already been undertaken before the end of the war and was tasked in part with determining the accuracy of the findings of “Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War.” The self-defined goal of this study was “to find out as much as they could about the factors that led Germany to participate [in] two world wars.” Furthermore, they recognised that “the political, economic, geographical, and social tensions which built up and [led] to war were so interconnected that it was nearly impossible to point out any factor that is solely responsible.” In other words, they took a holistic approach to their analysis of the German “mind” and how it might be predisposed to destabilising Europe and bringing its various nations into armed conflict. While one may not necessarily agree with the premises from which they started their research, it does provide significant context for understanding the actions taken by the ICD after July 1946. 360

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany,” NARA RG 260-390-42-16-5 Box 69.

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The conclusions of this report were based in part on reports filed by ICD interrogators. In addition, Dr. David Rodnick361 and his wife, Elizabeth, carried out anthropological studies. As a couple, they spent 6 months living in Hessen studying the people that lived there and their institutions. Their research was augmented by that of Dr. William Lipkind,362 who undertook the same work in Bavaria under contract to the War Department. Dr. David Levy and Maj. Bertram Schaffner, who would be central to the ICD’s vetting of German publishers during the initial years of the occupation, generated the psychiatric aspect of the report. In addition, Maj. Donald McGranahan363 produced the psychological aspects of the study with Dr. Frederick L. Williams364 leading the public opinion research. It should be noted that his research into how “public” and “private” might be differentiated during interviews can be discerned throughout the report.365 Another fundamental question that the Intelligence Branch sought to answer was whether there was something “definitely different about the German people, which has led them to aggressive war, to dictatorship, and to institutionalised crime? Or were they merely a people like any other, but who had been victimised first by a Kaiser then by a Hitler?”366 They had already “discarded as nonsense the possibility that such desires flow from the blood or belong to any race.”367 For this reason, they concentrated on the cultural apparatus of Germany that they understood as having led to two world wars. A priori the committee responsible for the report accepted the notion that German culture “creates the atmosphere for and gives impetus to

361

Rodnick would go on to publish his findings in greater detail in Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist’s Account in 1948. 362 Lipkind had graduated from Columbia University and taught anthropology at New York University and children’s literature at Hunter College. After the war he went on to become a successful author of children’s books, winning a Caldecott Medal in 1951 for Finders Keepers. 363 McGranahan was only 29 years old at this point and went on to work in the Bureau of Social Affairs of the UN in the 1950s and 1960s. He went on to found the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). 364 Williams was a member of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University and specialized in the area of using interviewer rapport as a means of differentiating between the private and public opinions of interviewees. 365 Williams and McGranahan are noted as two of the primary sources of data in the book by Merritt and Merritt. 366 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 367 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.”

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aggression.”368 They did not believe that any rearrangement of economics, politics, or geography would necessarily have an effect on the fundamental menace that Germany was to world peace. It was the underlying culture, which included literature, theatre, music, and art that needed to change before Germany could once more be considered a normal member of the family of nations. In order to accomplish this, the committee needed to define what German culture was. Here they came to the conclusion that the German way of life was created in the home, schools, the world of business, and on the sports fields. Moreover, they surmised that culture was based on what they called folkways, mores, and accepted standards of good and evil as shaping the behaviour and character of each individual German in a consistent way. They noted that the one significant difference between the German and American cultures was that Germans taught their citizens that political order was the most desirable state within a nation, while the Americans advocated for political freedom as the central tenet of nationhood. This they considered being at the heart of why Germany would continue to be a menace to world peace, if not remedied. Even more than a year after the end of the Second World War in Europe, these researchers considered Germany to have the potential to threaten world peace by pitting the occupying countries against one another. However, they were not sure whether German political leaders were engaging in this behaviour consciously or subconsciously. The study concluded that “the National Socialist movement adhered closely to the ideals established by German culture and attracted followers because of this.”369 The report determined that the reason the National Socialists came to power was because they simply used the methods most Germans understood and that the Nazis simply played to the pre-existing beliefs held by most Germans. The report went on to compare Germany with America, France, and Russia in terms of how each of these countries had undergone some form of revolution that cast aside all of the old reactionary ideas of the past. Germany, on the other hand, had not gone through such a process. Conspicuously absent from this list was Great Britain. The report cloaked the notion of revolution in the language of it bringing new ideals or ideas to their respective countries, while Germany’s lack of a successful rebellion, left it mired firmly in antiquated modes of thinking. The committee also rejected the idea of the Nazi takeover of 368 369

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” Emphasis in the original. “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.”

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Germany as being any sort of revolution, but that it represented a retrenchment of the traditional ways of doing things. Nazism, in other words, “merely crystallised and intensified the prejudices and neuroses which had been developed in the German people through several generations.”370 The committee presented the fundamental message of the Nazis as being: aggression, the superiority of the German race, anti-Semitism, brutality towards supposed inferiors, the virtues of manliness, and industry and order. They concluded that the German leadership had advocated these ideals both politically and culturally for generations and that these ideals had been accepted to a greater or lesser degree by the German people as core values of what it meant to be a German. For this reason, the report concluded that National Socialism was not simply “a phenomenon, which can be forgotten, now that it is gone,” but that it was something that needed to be rooted out of the German line of thinking and acting. Not only did the Nazi leadership and their laws need to be done away with, but also culturally this entire mindset needed to be turned on its head. The report went beyond simply suggesting that German culture was bad. It noted that a bad culture did not necessarily need to “represent an international menace.” However, it concluded that the bad aspects of German culture did indeed represent a danger to the world. The report included a caveat. While they use the term “German” or “Germans”, they did not intend this to “describe all Germans,” though they suggest, “that deviations are greatly in the minority.”371 To a large extent, the report is filled with what one might today consider biassed clichés and prejudices regarding how the Americans viewed the average German. However, it also lists qualities with which the Germans thought themselves imbued, such as: that the Germans had the cleverest workers, the greatest inventors, the most important musicians and poets, and were the most important contributors to world culture. The committee concluded that the Germans, as a whole, looked upon other nationalities with contempt and suspicion; moreover, that all of their neighbours were inferior and were not to be trusted. The report states “the Germans believe that the French have always hated them; that the Poles have designs against them; that the Russians envied them their superior position; and that the British feared them as a rival.”372 This was then one of the central issues that the ICD dealt with in the reestablishment of Germany’s media services. The ICD needed to make certain that the 370

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” Emphasis in the original. 372 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 371

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German idea that all of its neighbour nations were inferior and hostile did not make its way into the collective thought process. In other words, the traditional position taken by Germans vis-à-vis the siege mentality that had existed since at least the 30-Years-War was not a position that was to be tolerated within the context of debating how Germany was to be reconstructed. They were simply not going to allow Germany’s new leadership and public opinion makers to incite the German people to war against their “hostile” neighbours. A further difficulty that the ICD faced, according to the report, was “the German system of internal organisation.” This made the carrying out of an aggressive war possible, which in turn made “real democracy an impossibility.”373 Fundamental to all of this was the problem of the Germans preferring an orderly society to personal freedom. In the committee’s view, the Germans were uncritical of their superiors. This led the committee to conclude that Germany as a whole was organised along the lines of a single massive army, with each individual being situated within a specific rank both socially and economically. Accordingly, this, they thought, led to a society within which each individual was willing to acknowledge those of a higher rank while expecting deference from those of a lower echelon. This meant that German society had an identifiable chain of command, which, during the Nazi years, found Hitler at its pinnacle. This particular principle is emphasised in both the 1944 conference report and a report written by Lt. Col. Dicks on the future of Germany. Both make a considerable effort to portray the German as bowing and scraping to his superiors, while at the same time shouting at his inferiors. This type of portrayal is clearly carried forward in this 1946 report and demonstrates the consistent approach to the German problem taken by those charged with the responsibility of determining how occupied Germany’s culture was to be restructured. The report describes culture as a way of life that is “handed down by parents to their children, by the elders to the youngsters, by the mighty to the weak.”374 It goes on to suggest that this power structure in Germany, with very few men at the top, was able to establish cultural institutions in order to exert influence and dominance over German society. It was also surmised that, in particular in the years of 1848, 1870, and in 1933, it was Germany’s liberal elements that exited the country, with those who did not leave reconciling themselves to conformity with the ideals of German culture. In other words, even the liberals remaining in Germany could not 373 374

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.”

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necessarily be trusted. While the home, school, and church were important aspects of how Germany’s culture was formed, the report placed considerable emphasis on the information media, which they defined very broadly, in the formation of the German psyche. The report suggested that the most important obstacles to the restructuring of the German “mind” were: 1. The most powerful newspapers in Germany were controlled by those who followed traditional lines of German thinking. 2. Germans were taught to view only their own writers and philosophers as important. 3. The state controlled most of the theatres directly through the Ministry of Culture, which emphasised German productions. 4. Cultural production had been subsidised by the state and thus not dictated by the tastes the ordinary German, but by the bureaucrats who oversaw what was presented to its audience and who had an interest in maintaining the status quo.375

These would then be the specific areas that the ICD would need to target, even if it meant utilising the suspected German predisposition to accepting orders from above, of which the ICD was critical. Since this was already something that the German people were apparently accustomed to, it represented the easiest way to administer Germany’s needed cure. The one enigma that the report points to, but does not really have a solution for, is what was already identified in 1944 as “the German dual personality.” This “commonly noted phenomena” was described as the dichotomy that existed between what a German might publically say in support of the cultural norms and his own thoughts and feelings in regard to a given topic, which he kept to himself. These were all things that he was not able to express “in the home, in school, in business life, in church, in art nor in politics.”376 It was these two solitudes that the ICD tried to reconcile. That is that the ordinary German should reach the point where those things reserved previously for only his private world could now be expressed openly without fear of the cultural mechanisms put in place by German political and cultural elites. The ICD also wanted to ensure that democracy became “a way of life– not merely a political creed” in German society.377 They wanted to make it understood that the right to vote was not the “end-all and be-all of

375

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 377 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 376

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democracy, but merely one of its mechanics.”378 In other words, simply because the right to vote was going to be established, it did not mean that one necessarily had an established democracy in Germany. In this respect, the committee felt the German’s had a long way to go because they were not just fighting the 12-years of the Nazi Reich, which they considered simply an intensification of an already evil culture, but centuries of cultural practice that was deeply ingrained in the entirety of Germany’s habits and practices. It boiled down to the simple fact that, while it was likely that the average German was happy that the terror of the Nazi era had come to an end, the ICD did not necessarily believe that the Germans were willing or able to embrace freedom or democracy. It seemed that the ICD thought it was quickly losing its window of opportunity to force the Germans into accepting greater freedoms, because the committee noted that the emerging German leadership was already beginning to formulate “excuses for having lost the war, beyond blaming everything on the Nazis.”379 While the American occupation was emphasising the concept of Germany’s collective guilt, they also saw that the Germans were making efforts to play on the guilt feelings of the occupiers, at least on those of the Americans. The report states that German politicians and other community leaders would often make the accusation that, if the Americans did not provide more food, better shelter, or ensure that the Ruhr remained a part of Germany, then they should not be surprised when the Germans rebelled. Effectively, this placed the blame on the Allied occupiers for Germany’s misfortunes after the war. More subtly, the German media in the American zone began drawing comparisons between the conditions in the various zones, always suggesting that things were better elsewhere. This was something that the ICD simply could not tolerate, and one often finds that this was given as the reason for the revocation of a press or publication license, fine, or even being sentenced to prison at hard labour.380 The Intelligence Branch committee also pointed out that according to their research no more than 10% of the German population in the American zone held pro-democratic opinions. This was opposed to approximately 30% of Germans who held anti-democratic views. Among these understandings were such things as: the inability of Germans to 378

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 380 Examples of this may be found in the OMGUS-ICD files at NARA RG 260390-42-20-3 Box 254. These infractions were usually categorised as “Offense to the U.S.A.,” “Violation of Military Government Regulations,” or “Political Reasons.” 379

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allow common people to make political decisions; ordinary people should not be allowed to discuss or criticize decisions made by government officials, and that pending legislation should not be discussed by individuals without the proper educational background or experience to make a meaningful contribution to the discussion. It was in this area that the ICD had the most work to do, that is, to create an environment in which meaningful political discourse and debate could take place outside of the elite circles of lawmakers and judges. Also important to the work of the ICD were the differences this research project found in the attitudes held by men and women as a group. It found that German women tended to be more conservative and willing to accept authority than men. It suggested the German women were “motivated by a desire to preserve their status in society.”381 Moreover, because they had been kept politically ignorant, they were, as a group, unable to analyse political statements made by politicians as filtered through the media. For this reason, the committee concluded that women were in a very weak position in regard their responsibilities within a democratic society. The ICD’s Intelligence Branch also had ascertained that German women, in general, tended to be more anti-democratic than their husbands. Moreover, opinion surveys suggested that it was the women who were looking for a new Führer. However, because the ICD inferred that women would be the initial “democratic” instructors of Germany’s children, it was imperative that they learn and pass on the appropriate democratic values. In order for women to fulfil this role, they needed instruction. This was why the ICD placed such great emphasis on the creation of special women’s magazines, for which they maintained significant control for a longer period than other publications. It was also for these key magazines and journals that the ICD took extra care in choosing their licensed publishers and editors. All of this effort was made in order that not another stunted generation grew up in Germany in reference to the democratic principles the American occupiers wanted to take root on German soil. The same surveys discovered that it was the younger people in Germany who held the most undemocratic values. This was not surprising because they had been the targets of the Nazi educational system for a period of 12 years. For them, it had been a time without choices. The report, however, does indicate that there was some success in reeducating the youth. It did find that German young people, for the most part, believed that “concentration camps were undesirable, that the 381

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.”

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Gestapo was not admirable, that party leaders were venal, and that the Nazis had brought on the war.”382 It was also found that what Germany’s young people did know about democracy had a distinct Nazi ring to it, though they appeared willing to explore it. It was from this survey that the ICD discovered that among the young people of Germany there was a movement to develop the principle of “good fascism.”383 In this new form of fascism, young Germans saw a society that was well ordered and without political parties squabbling amongst themselves. It also made room for benevolent dictators and a nation that could work together for its own glory. So, in the end, what the ICD was left with were middle-aged men who “knew something of democracy before Hitler,” because this is where the highest percentage of acceptance of democratic concepts was to be found.384 The intelligence surveys revealed further trends in the US occupation zone that would shape the way in which the ICD would approach its work. The surveys discovered that those holding antidemocratic ideas could be broken down into socioeconomic classes, age groups, and religious affiliations. It was not surprising that the upper and upper middle classes in Germany held the highest number of people holding anti-democratic ideas. These tended to be “businessmen, higher civil servants, and professional people.”385 In opposition to this, the highest number of democratically minded people were found to come from the working classes, who had no great stake in preserving the status quo. One of the more surprising findings coming out of the surveys for the writers of the report was that most German university professors did not support, or favour, a more democratic society and had distinct sympathies for the traditional authoritarian structures supported by the Nazi regime. In retrospect it is easily explained by the purges of the Germany’s universities in the 1930’s, the extent of which the Allied occupiers were not yet fully aware. Individuals such as Julius Ebbinghaus of Marburg, who was made Rector Magnificus by the US military government, and Karl Jaspers of Heidelberg could be considered famous exceptions. Ironically, OMGUS used the same authoritarian system to recreate Germany’s cultural leadership in the likeness it preferred. The most important question broached by the research group was the question of what makes someone an anti-Nazi. Levy focused on this aspect of post-war Germany’s reconstruction. He analysed the files of 21 anti382

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 384 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 385 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 383

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Nazis in order to determine common influences in their lives. Levy found that all had come from homes where the father had not been particularly authoritarian. Here the report tried to explain this finding by suggesting that “perhaps he was an unusual German, perhaps he had died or been too crippled to inflict punishment.”386 It also reported that there was a tendency towards anti-authoritarianism if the parents came from different religious or national backgrounds. Moreover, if the individual had travelled to other countries or had knowledge of foreign literature, there was a very good chance that they would be democratically inclined. The report also suggested that it would be able to identify the type of person most likely to have democratic leanings. For example, “if all men between the ages of 40-45, whose mothers were non-German, whose fathers were skilled labourers and had been killed in the last war, who live in large cities, who had spent at least a year abroad and had read widely of foreign literature, who were Protestants and Social Democrats, were taken, a very high percentage of democratic thinkers would be found.”387 At the same time, the committee also suggested that it would be possible to identify specific groups where very high percentages of anti-democrats might be found. This group tended to be aged 20-25, “the fathers were well-paid civil servants, the parents both Catholic Germans, living in a small town and never travelling nor reading.”388 Though the report does not go so far as to suggest that this should be how the licensee selection process worked, the committee saw this as representing how “extraneous influences on the basic political thinking of individuals” functioned.389 In July 1946, the situation, as seen by the ICD, was that the war “had brought about profound changes in German home and family life.”390 While many of the German fathers were dead, crippled, or POWs, it did not mean that German society was simply going to change on its own, it still needed help. The Rodnicks and Lipkind pointed out that the German school system still functioned along traditional lines, with the teachers operating as tyrants within the classroom. Moreover, no change in the political discourse had taken place at Germany’s universities, and they continued to influence Germans towards nationalism and “concepts related to Nazism.”391 The typical University student still came from the upper and upper-middle classes, where Nazism still found it strongest supporters 386

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 388 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 389 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 390 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 391 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 387

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in post-war Germany. As of July 1946, with the political parties reviving in Germany, the report found that they did not really bring a “breath of fresh air into German life.”392 Political allegiances were taken up again from the period prior to the Nazis taking power. Even here they did not really find a difference between the left and right wings of German political life. It is also clear that the ICD Intelligence Branch was unhappy with the developing German political situation. It was reported that 60% of the Germans in the American zone supported the parties of the right, with the balance supporting the left wing. It identified the Christian Socialist/Christian Democratic groups as the most powerful political organisations on the right wing. Their analysis of the situation indicates that these two parties, in their view, “include the most anti-democratic elements.”393 The committee reported that among its members were former Nazis, nationalists, and conservative church people. In addition, they attracted a large proportion of women and individuals from the middle and upper classes, which the committee had already concluded would have political views that would not necessarily coincide with those they wished to foster in the new Germany. On the other hand, it appears that the ICD was willing to support the Social Democrats emanating from the working and lower middle classes, where there was a far higher potential for support for democracy. They, however, also had misgivings about the German left, which they thought had abandoned their traditional ideals and spouted the same nationalistic rhetoric found on the right wing. It started with something as fundamental as the organisation of the Social Democratic Party, which they considered to be quite undemocratic. Oddly enough, this same analysis found that the Communist Party came “close[st] to the thinking of the occupying powers on many issues than the other” parties.394 They also noted a strong nationalist streak in the speeches made by leaders of the Communist Party, with the party as a whole being judged “authoritarian in the extreme” with “many of its actions and methods having been reminiscent of the Nazis.”395 The ICD, and ultimately OMGUS, thus had to decide whether it was going to go into battle against either a nationalistic mindset, or one that was authoritarian in its structure. From a strict pragmatic view, it was most likely easier to combat an authoritarian approach, because it was easier to 392

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 394 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 395 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 393

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identify and organisational structures could have been put in place to mitigate its chain of command. In addition, an authoritarian predisposition could have been used by OMGUS, because it was the ultimate authority in their zone. Conversely, the academics that made up the special committee did not appear to have an aversion to left-wing politics. Nationalism was not as easily defined and identified and would have been more difficult to root out. However, political considerations were the final arbiter and eventually, with the increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, OMGUS decided that concern for authoritarian structures within Germany’s media would be set on the backburner, while every effort was made to eliminate nationalistic attitudes from Germany’s information services. A further concern was the church and its leadership role in German political and cultural matters. According to the report, “The German church, particularly the Catholic Church, emerged from the war, and the Nazi regime, in a strong position.”396 Even though it was thought that “the Catholic Church in Bavaria actually insulated citizens against the extreme Nazi teachings,”397 there was concern that the Church was taking on a role that was too political. The greatest concern was the Church’s desire to preserve Germany’s traditional culture. As may be seen early in the report, this was something that the ICD was trying to eliminate. Moreover, the clergy often violated OMGUS regulations. This was especially true in the area publications, where licensing was required to print even orders of service. In the case of the Church, the ICD was not so much concerned with National Socialist ideas as it was with “German nationalistic thinking” and further concern was caused when the church opposed the entire denazification process in Germany.398 Though they did recognise the Catholic Church’s role in opposing some of the most extreme manifestations of Nazism, it was still considered to be “a dangerous, reactionary influence on German culture and its activities are a stumbling block in the way of democracy.”399 The main focus of the report was, of course, Germany’s new media, with each of the items discussed providing intelligence with regard to how information services might be used to improve the re-education of Germans in the US zone. Here, the ICD felt certain they had completely dismantled all of the information services that had been established by the Nazis. Upon restarting Germany’s media, they were also certain that it was 396

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 398 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 399 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 397

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“almost without exception under new management.”400 They were particularly proud of the screening centre established at Bad Orb and considered this to be the ICD’s apex. This was the one place where they were sure they were able to sideline the traditional German power structures. One of the weak points that the committee did isolate was the German theatre, which remained to a large degree under state control due to the subsidies required to continue operations. It was argued that the ICD tried to license individuals, whose characters were strong enough to resist pressures from a state bureaucracy that tended to be traditional and undemocratic. When the files of those licensed to take leadership positions in the theatre are scrutinised, it does indeed show evidence of the ICD’s Theater and Music Branch exercising extra caution when giving their approval to applicants. As for the future of Germany, the July 1946 report emphasised the fact that education towards democracy needed to be undertaken by Germans with the support of the occupation forces and was not to be seen as originating from the US occupation forces. The committee report was also clear when it stated that OMGUS should not “haggle with [the Germans] on the subject of democracy.”401 The solution to the problem, as far as the ICD was concerned, was very simple. They just needed to select the right people for the job. The issue was that they considered the Germans “utterly incapable of selecting these new leaders.”402 The ICD had to “select from the Democratic 10% of the German people the leaders for all activities.”403 Not only that, but they needed to mitigate the effects of the 30% that did not believe in democracy through a ruthless process of elimination. This was to be done by “exact, scientific means.”404 However, it was recognised that this was something that was going to take no less than two generations to establish itself. The Intelligence Branch report presented a number of recommendations on how OMGUS should move forward. An analysis of OMGUS activities indicates that only some of these recommendations were acted upon. One of the most interesting was the establishment of a committee that would analyse all activities of OMGUS in relation to their educational value in Germany. The committee further proposed that “a small group of highly trained sociologists, anthropologists, and psychiatrists continue studies 400

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 402 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 403 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 404 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 401

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already in progress.”405 In other words, the group that wrote the initial report would form the core of this new standing committee. It also made the rather bold suggestion that this committee “should have [the] power to prevent actions harmful to the cause of education and to initiate actions considered useful.”406 In other words, it would have what amounted to a veto in regard to decisions made by the Military Governor. Needless to say, this was never acted upon by OMGUS. As noted, some of the suggestions were put into effect. While reform of the German home through the introduction of books teaching child psychology that downplayed the “the ideal of the tyrannical father” was certainly something that the Publications Branch promoted, it also advocated the broadening of the availability of nursery schools in order to mitigate the influence of the family on a child’s early life. A further suggestion was that a less disciplined attitude in the home should be fostered through fiction, movies, and other branches of the media. One of the most significant recommendations involved the reform of women’s position in German society, which was to be accomplished through having women participate more fully in business and government. It also recommended that greater efforts be made to teach women about politics in a democratic society. In addition to this, the military government was supposed to promote conditions that allowed women to spend more time “away from the drudgery of the home.”407 Within the context of the German educational system, German teachers were to be retrained using American models in order to break down “the authoritarian educational system.”408 It also recommended the creation of new textbooks, which would replace those that emphasised the nationalistic aspects of German culture. Along with this, they recommended that student self-government be promoted and that tuition fees be abolished for those coming from the lower classes. The reform of German youth organisations, however, was going to be a particularly difficult task, since the National Socialists had made such extensive use of an organised youth movement to support its political structures. The goal of these new groups was not to create an environment in which Germany would be reconstructed as a first-class power, either militarily or economically, but to find its place within a well-ordered democratic world system. What was emphasised in the area of working with Germany’s youth was that German “elders”, unless they were 405

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 407 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 408 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 406

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specifically trained to work with the youth, were to be kept out of these organisations.409 Reform of German political parties was to be accomplished by banning its “present chauvinistic leaders.”410 It was hoped that this would lead to the establishment of political parties that were more responsive to their constituents. Political parties were also to be encouraged to broaden their political platforms in order to have an appeal to a more diverse group of people. This was intended to create an environment in which fewer political parties would exist, with broader appeal. This would mean that there would be a greater diversity of opinions within each political party. It was hoped that this would then lead to a more vigorous debate within the parties themselves. The overlap in party platforms, it was hoped, would lead to more efforts at consensus building and thus more stable governments in what was a country that rarely ever was governed by a party that held an absolute majority in its parliament. The German church and how to transform it into an agent of democratic change proved to be a thorny issue for the writers of the report. While they expressed aversion to “interfering with religious life” they also suggested that the present influence that the church had on German life in general should not be allowed to continue. It recommended that the political activities of churchmen be banned and that the church itself be thoroughly denazified. None of this was considered to be interference with freedom of religion. They simply wanted to create a tangible division between church and state. In all of this there appeared to be some contradictions in that they did want to co-opt “Liberal churchmen” in the re-education of reactionary clergy away from German nationalism and authoritarianism.411 The restructuring of cultural life involved keeping “in power the international democratic minded publishers and editors so far selected.” It is noteworthy that the word “power” is used here in conjunction with publishers and editors. It seems to underline the notion that the ICD was quite conscious of the influential structure they were creating in Germany. The report also recommended a greater diversity of reading material by placing less emphasis on German cultural achievements and underlining the fact that the Germans were simply contributors to a greater “world cultural tradition.” In all of this foreign literature, plays, and music were to be brought in and either performed or published in Germany. Moreover, every effort was to be made to ensure that the emerging German state was 409

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 411 “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 410

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not able to retreat back to the old cultural status quo, which would have negated everything that the ICD was trying to accomplish in its Germany. In all of this, there was recognition that OMGUS propaganda could only support a course of action already undertaken. The committee realised that the information media alone could not change Germany’s mode of thinking, but that it could only support steps already taken. In order to accomplish this, the following recommendations were made. All publishers and licensed editors were to be rescreened using the ICD screening centre in Bad Orb, so as “to eliminate those propagating traditional German nationalist, authoritarian thinking.”412 This was not to be considered punishment, but as a prophylactic measure to ensure that Germany’s future media would follow democratic principles in the future. All state controls for German theatre and music were to be removed and the traditional Germanic concept of “Kultur” was to be deemphasised. The German market was to be flooded with foreign books, especially those that emphasised political ideas, with the specific purpose to combat the notion that only German writers and philosophers introduced new political concepts. The War Department in Washington was to be asked who provide books and films that supported the reform of the German home and which stressed “the obligation of women to participate in business and political life.”413 As the ICD entered its second year of operation, the Intelligence Branch of the Office of the Director of Information Control, as it was later termed, was divided into two sections; the Reports and Analysis Section (RAS) and the Denazification Section (DS). The RAS monitored German public opinion, attitudes, and political trends, while the DS was responsible for eliminating Nazis, nationalists, and militarists from the German media. As the situation developed, the Intelligence Branch needed to deal with three pressing problems: “a shortage of personnel, difficulties in denazification in the information services, and the problem of exchange of information between the four occupying powers.” 414 The lack of ICD personnel was chronic and hampered its ability to carry out the mission they had been tasked with. This was a result of key individuals having been withdrawn from the Germany, which left the ICD relying more and more on indigenous personnel. Occasionally employing native personnel worked in their favour, as with the collection of survey data, because they could often gather covert information, such as 412

“A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” 414 USGCC ICS Report “Information Control in Germany” (25 Sept 45). 413

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monitoring conversation in restaurants, buses and the black market. On the other hand, employing Germans could lead to the reliability of the collected data being compromised, as in the case of surveys not being random samplings or seeded with information the German interrogators thought the ICD wanted to hear.

Lowering Standards The pressure on the Intelligence Branch to lower standards so that information services could be turned over to the Germans complicated the denazification of the media. Toombs was steadfast in his opposition to any questionable individuals being allowed into policy decision-making roles. However, due to the lack of personnel, he could not necessarily provide the evidence or arguments to support his hard-line. He would have liked far more detail on applicants, but this was not within the bounds of reality, relative to the investigators he had under his command. As a result, he had to depend on Germans informing on one another and concentrate on prominent figures within Germany’s cultural community like Furtwängler, Gründgens, and the Jünger brothers. The Reports and Analysis Section’s primary responsibility was reporting on German political trends.415 The section employed experienced interrogators who followed developments in German politics and provided weekly reports. The interrogators reported on the four main political groups in Germany, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party. They also attempted “to measure the reactions of German politicians to the actions of the Military Government.”416 An example of this is the interrogation of Dr. Walter Kolb417 on May 29, 1946, by Gertraud Schulz, a member of a CIC (Counter-Intelligence

415

MG Monthly Report, No 13 (20 Aug 46). History II. 417 NARA RG 260 42/16/7 Box 136. The interviewee was simply identified as Dr. Kolb. However, references in the interview indicate that this was most likely Walter Kolb, who eventually became the Mayor of Düsseldorf and then Frankfurt am Main. While Kolb was a self-described religious socialist and eventually joined the SPD, the interview notes made by Gertraud Schulz, a 22-year old member of the CIC and stationed at the ICD Survey Branch in Bayreuth, indicate that Kolb was a member of the LDP (Liberal demokratische Partei) which eventually became the FDP in West Germany. 416

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Corps) unit, which was working on behalf of the ICD Survey Branch in Bayreuth.418 Schulz had been seconded to the ICD from the CIC and had all of the appearances of being a regular German employee of the ICD. When looking at the personnel lists of the various units, employees are always listed by name, address, date of employment, age, and salary. This is the case for the three other German employees of the Bayreuth Survey unit: Willi Frensch, Josef Kellner, and Pauline Keyl. However, in the case of Gertraud Schulz, the address is given as “CIC” followed by her telephone number, which was a number associated with the ICD office in Bayreuth. Additionally, the others had salaries attached to their file, while Schulz’s is simply indicated with a “-”. Schulz begins by having Kolb relate a recent event in Bayreuth (March 13, 1946), in which he attended a Communist Party rally as a curious observer. During this meeting, Kolb was involved in a verbal altercation when he interrupted name-calling directed at former officers of the Wehrmacht by announcing he was leaving. When he left the meeting, he reported that most of those present left with him. This caused the Communists to level a charge of disrupting their meeting against him. The next morning, there were “strips of paper pasted over his name on the posters announcing his talk at an LDP rally. The strips of paper read: “Kriegsverbrecher Nazischwein Pg Kolb,” (War criminal Nazi pig Party member Kolb) and “Nazi Kolb der Mörder” (Nazi Kolb the murderer). Schulz then delved into Kolb‘s political attitudes. She discovered that Kolb had become a member of the LDP because of the stand the party took in regard to how former soldiers should be treated. Kolb himself had been conscripted into the Wehrmacht after several run-ins with the Gestapo, due to his defence, as a lawyer, of several opponents of the Nazis. He elaborated on his position, saying that it was the unemployment of the soldiers after the First World War that caused veterans to be susceptible to the Nazi’s message and radicalism. He indicated that the LDP was made up of men who knew what it meant to struggle for economic survival, due to the leadership being made up of “independent craftsmen, officials, and professional men.” Kolb also stated that they were dedicated to winning the youth of Germany to their cause only by means of public meetings and placards. He also believed that the leadership of the LDP was reasonable in its expectations in terms of Germany’s recovery. He held that the masses had unreasonable

418

“Dr. Kolb Interview.”

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expectations and that their attitudes would need to be moulded by an extended period of training and enlightenment. Schulz also probed Kolb about his attitude towards a merger of the LDP and SPD. To this, he indicated that, given the latest platform put forward by Kurt Schumacher, it was not at all impossible. He stated that their purpose was “to unite the German people and [that] such a proposal would be a means to that end.” He was also asked about who the greatest political opponent was, to which he answered that it was those who did not belong to a political party and did not express their political convictions due to cowardice or indifference. On the question of collective guilt, he said that the LDP did not deny this. He, however, added, “Every nation is more or less lead and deceived by the few who are their leaders.” He further appended that the majority of the masses lacked political understanding and judgment. When asked about the denazification process, he responded by saying that it would promote healthy attitudes, but that the Germans themselves should administer them uniformly. He was of the opinion that the occupiers lacked an understanding of the German mentality, which had just come out of 12 years of Nazi rule. He also criticised the application of the denazification process in that the Military Government detachments interpreted them differently due to their intricacy. He also was of the opinion that the Military Government should find a way of prosecuting those who had been refused membership in the Nazi party because of their connections to the Free Masons or could not prove they were pure Aryans. He saw these as sometimes being no less ardent supporters of the Nazis as those who were members. This he saw as a gross injustice. The final part of the interrogation revolved around his attitude towards what a peace settlement might look like. As for the terms of the peace, he suggested that the humiliation of an entire nation creates the most fertile ground for “war-mindedness.” This would then be compounded by the poor economic conditions in Germany, which would most likely last for some time yet. He felt that reparations and reconciliation, not robbery and hatred should be the motivating factors. This would liberate humanity from militarism and pave the way for a United States of Europe. In the end, it would lead to a United Nations of the world. There was another group of Americans and Germans employed by the ICD, who were organised into what was designated as Special Intelligence Units. These individuals augmented the public opinion studies by frequently interrogating political leaders, professional men, church dignitaries, and other opinion leaders. An example of this can be found in the report written about the Stuttgarter Zeitung in a previous chapter.

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These special investigators often were individuals recruited from American universities to carry out a specific study. They would attend public meetings, read the local newspapers, and generally become familiar with the areas in which they lived, feeding any information they might hear in passing into the Intelligence Branch analysis machinery.

Rumour and Humour A further section of the Special Intelligence Unit was comprised of Germans reporting on what the average German was talking while waiting for the tram, sitting in a restaurant, or making a purchase at one of the black markets. Here the “reporters” would collect snippets of conversations, with these being categorised as “rumors, opinions, or jokes.” The ICD would then use these pieces of information to shape their news releases in a way that would appeal to the average German. The types of information collected by the reporters covered the gamut of what might be heard on the streets. Moreover, these would have been the unguarded moments of ordinary Germans who were expressing their feelings to a confidant and not a representative of one of the occupiers. The reporters were identified in ICD reports by their sex, name, and identification number.419 On July 20, 1948, the cadre of reporters in Berlin consisted of: Herr Ernst Blume (302) Herr Fechner (305) Herr Johannes Goesch (307) Herr Wilhelm Gregor (309) Herr Heinrich Kirschte (312) Frau Ursula Krämer (313) Frau König I (314) Herr E.-Günther Riemscheider (320) Herr Rueckmann (321) Herr Schlamm (322) Herr Heinrich Wilcke (323) 419

Frau Rosemarie Sand (325) Herr Richard Armstroff (326) Frau König II (328)420 Herr Eghard von Liebermann (337) Frl. Edit Rocholl (338) Frl. Schlicht (339) Frl. Alin Assmus (340) Frl. Anne Majer (341) Herr Auster (375) Frau Dr. Kloss (378)

The first names of some of the reporters were obtained by cross-referencing this list with a Christmas letter (dated December 30, 1948) sent to the personnel of the ICD Berlin office thanking them for the Christmas gifts they had received. RG 260 42-16-7 Box 136. 420 There were two women with the surname on the list of interrogators for the ICD. One went by the name Berta, but it is not clear which one. On their reports, the interrogators would add an “I” or “II” to indicate which of the two had submitted the report.

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The main task of these Special Intelligence units was to keep track of a set list of items that Germans would procure at one of many black market meeting points in Germany, with the primary focus being Berlin. While they worked in the American, British, and French sectors of Berlin, their primary surveillance target was the Russian sector. Because the reporters could blend into the mass of people moving around Berlin’s various black markets without raising suspicion, one can safely assume that the information they were bringing back to the ICD was reliable. Significantly, the information was not gleaned from direct conversations, but through conversations that were overheard. In addition, the reliability of the reporters was constantly being checked by the Data Analysis Branch and cross-referenced with the results submitted by the other reporters. These rumours were some of the most significant sources of intelligence and feedback for the ICD. For example, in the semi-monthly report of February 16-29, 1948 they learned that the following rumours were circulating in the Soviet occupation zone: 1. Russian officers stationed in Potsdam were supposed to have told Germans that they can count on war breaking out in April of 1948. 2. Upper-middle-class citizens are supposed to have moved their residence from the Russian sector to the American or British sector because they believed that war between the Soviets and the Western Allies would break out soon. 3. Members of the Russian occupation forces now resident in Germany, who are scheduled to be rotated back to Russia, were hesitating to leave Germany because they do not what to live under primitive conditions again. 4. In relation to the recent arrest of the Reichsfrauenführerin ScholzKlink, it is assumed that Hitler and Bormann were still alive and living in Argentina.421

These rumours were then coupled with the following opinions overheard in Berlin, which provide a common theme of concern over war between the Russians and the Americans: 1. The publication of the documents related to the negotiations between Molotov and Ribbentrop are seen as proof that the tensions between the US and Russia can no longer be settled through peaceful means. 2. The victory of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and the further demands made on Finland by Russia add to the impression that the danger of war is increasing.

421

RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145.

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Chapter Three 3. The apparent passivity of the US towards Russia and the further gains of Communism in Europe are giving rise to the fear that all of Europe will come under Russian influence. 4. The insufficient provision of food and clothing is driving Germans into the arms of Communism. Only quick assistance from the US will be able to prevent this. 5. There is still the possibility that the western powers, especially the US, can prevent further advances by the Russians through quick action. At this time the Russian are not strong enough to involve themselves in a war. They are bluffing and are not clear as to whether they have anything that can be used against atomic weapons.422

The gallows humour of the Berliners again reinforces the fear of war in 1948: 1. The Americans want to give 20 of their 60 atomic bombs to the British and French. On learning about this, the Russians ask why they have not been given any. They answer they receive is, “You’ll get all of them.” 2. The residents of the French Sector say that they are all O. d. F.” “What do you mean?” they are asked. The response, “Opfer der Franzosen.” (Victim of the French). 3. A Berliner asks his friend: “On which side would you fight, when there is war between the US and Russia?” The friend replies, “On the Russian side, naturally.” “Why that,” he is asked. To which he responds: I’d rather end up in an American PW camp than a Russian one.” 423

The ICD reporters even went so far as to take note of graffiti that was beginning to appear. They were not so much interested in the one-off graffiti, but slogans that might surface in many different places, such as one from December 31, 1947, that began appearing in the Schöneberg and Zehlendorf areas of Berlin, in particular around the subway entrances: Lieber satt und Nazischwein Als Demokrat und hungrig sein!”424 Another related piece of graffiti, or poem as it is referred to in the reports, read:

422

RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. 424 RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. Translation: Better to be full and a Nazi swine, than a democrat and hungry! 423

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Wer nur von Karten erwirbt – der stirbt, Wer sein Leben liebt – der schiebt.425

The ICD was also well aware that the Germans were fond of using acronyms and initialisms, and they used their informants to track these as well. For example, they noted in a December 31, 1947, report that students and intellectuals in Berlin were using BBC to indicate “Black Business Corporation” in reference to the black market. They also found that these were confined to specific sectors where they would have special meaning. For example, in the Russian sector, SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/Socialist Unity Party of Germany) meant So ein Durcheinander (such a mess). 426 Related to this was a joke circulating in the Soviet sector of Berlin reported on November 30, 1947: “The expression “Occupied” is not to be used on toilet doors in Germany any longer, because this expression is exclusively reserved for the use by Allied “Occupying” Authorities. The new German word appearing on the doors of toilets denoting that they are occupied will be “SED” (Socialist Union Party) meaning “Sitzt einer Drauf” (somebody’s sitting on it).” 427 Politics and the threat of war between the former allies was not the only topic of conversation. Germans were beginning to pick up on contradictions in the official policies of OMGUS, in particular, the apparent discrepancy between the anti-militarist position in the re-education policies for the Germans and the activities of the Allies themselves, which demonstrated a militaristic attitude that would not have been tolerated of the Germans. The following conversation was overheard between two workers in a Berlin street café and noted in an ICD report of August 15, 1947: A: Have you seen the British Tattoo? B: Not yet. A: Well, it is quite interesting to see how the British are trying to teach us democracy and peace and then go ahead and put on a very militaristic show. B: I agree with you. They are so much against militarism in Germany, and they themselves are as militaristic as the Nazis were.

425

RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. Translation: Who only buys on the strength of his ration-cards – dies, Who loves his life has to be in black market vice. 426 RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. 427 RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145.

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Chapter Three A: And then look at the prices they charge to see such a militaristic spectacle. 10, 15, and 20 Marks! B: Yes, it is really a disgrace. 428

Though the conversations between Berliners, the opinions they held, and the jokes they told were helpful in tuning American propaganda into the German psyche, the one topic the ICD watched the closest, if one determines this by the sheer volume of these topics being mentioned in reports, was the relationship between the Russians and the Germans. This was especially the case as the ICD became less interested in re-educating the Germans as democrats and more in having them as allies in the case of war with the Russians. Information collected through these covert channels was fed directly to the Neue Zeitung, the overt American newspaper, which had an independent Berlin edition started in early 1947 and existed in order to deny Berlin to the Soviets ideologically. One of the more disquieting rumours to come out of the Soviet sector of Berlin was that Germans were being rearmed to fight against the Russians, which appeared in the ICD monthly report of April 1948: “In Hannover sollen freiwillige deutsche Verbände aufgestellt und mit britischen Uniformen und Waffen ausgerüstet werden. Auch ehemalige SS-Leute sollen einberufen worden sein,”429 and in the same report,“Die Amerikaner sollen in ihrer Zone Deutsche zum Militärdienst anwerben. Bevorzugt werden Berufssoldaten. Ehemalige SS-Verbände sollen bereits zum Einsatz bereitstehen.”430 Rumours such as these provided the ICD, and ultimately OMGUS, with a picture, no matter how distorted it was by those passing it on, of what the Germans were feeling. One of the more significant items related to rumours dealing with the possibility of war between the United States and the USSR is conspicuous by its absence. Nowhere do any of the rumours suggest that the Germans might join the Russians as allies against the western forces, except in the humour that was circulating in Berlin where it is used as a comedic device. While the Survey Branch and their German reporters had determined that the Germans would not be coming to the aid of the Russian, they also 428

RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. Translation: It is rumored that they are forming units of German volunteers outfitted with British uniforms and weapons in Hanover. Even former SS personnel are supposed to have enlisted. 430 Translation: It is believed that the Americans are recruiting Germans for military service. Career soldiers are preferred. Former SS units are standing ready for deployment. 429

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noted that the average Berliner considered Germany, though it lay in ruins, to be superior to Russia. Examples of this may once again be found in jokes included in the April 16-30, 1948, semi-monthly report on “Rumors, Opinions, and Jokes” overheard in the Soviet sector of Berlin: Eine Nonne will schwarz über die Grenze. Sie wird von den Russen aufgehalten und trotz vieler Bitten zur Kommandantur gebracht. Der Kommandant hat zum Schluss aber doch ein Einsehen und bedeutet ihr zu gehen. Voller Dankbarkeit wendet sich die Nonne beim hinausgehen nochmals dem Kommandanten zu und sagt: „Ich will auch für Sie beten, damit Sie ins Paradies kommen.” Der russische Kommandant antwortet ihr darauf aufgeregt: „Nix Paradies, nix Paradies, ich will in Deutschland bleiben.” 431

The German view expressed in this joke is that the Russians’ desire to be in Germany has nothing to do with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, but the desire of the average Russian to escape his homeland. Not just the Stalinist regime, but the entire Russian society, simply because life in bombed out Berlin is better than in everyday Russia. The German view of the superiority of German Kultur is emphasised in the next joke, which again stresses the superiority of the German way of life: Ein Russe und ein Deutscher unterhalten sich. Russe: Ihr spricht bloß immer vom „Essen”. Deutscher: Worüber sprecht Ihr denn in Russland? Russe: Von unserer „Kultur”. Deutscher: Jeder spricht in seinem Lande von dem, was er nicht hat.432

431

RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. Translation: A nun tries to cross the border illegally. She is stopped by the Russians and despite her pleading is brought to the Commandant’s office. In the end the Commandant is reasonable and tells her to be on her way. Full of gratitude the nun turns to him as she is leaving and says: “I also will pray for you, so that you enter paradise.” The Russian Commandant answers her agitatedly: “No paradise, no Paradise, I want to stay in Germany.” 432 RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. Emphasis is placed on the word Kultur in the original making it a reference to the German concept of “high culture.” Translation: A Russian and a German are having a conversation: Russian: All you people talk about is food. German: Well, what do you talk about in Russia? Russian: About our culture. German: I suppose everyone speaks of that which they don’t have.

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Of grave concern to the United States, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent France, was the second Volkskongress held in March 1948. At this meeting, which had some representation from the western sectors, it was decided, along with a rejection of the Marshall Plan and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, that a referendum would be held between May 23 and June 13, 1948, calling for the unification of Germany. The referendum was the topic that was most heavily reported on by the Special Intelligence Units in Berlin so that the ICD would know how to counter this initiative instigated by the Soviet Military Government. Report after report came in describing how those living in the Soviet sector, and some living in the West, were coerced into supporting the unification of Germany under the SED-led Congress. During this period Blume, Majer, and especially Rocholl and König (II) submitted numerous handwritten reports in regard to what they had heard about the referendum.433 They all seemed to point to coercive tactics being used to convince individuals that it was in their best interest to sign in favour of the referendum’s German unification question. It was these reports that allowed the ICD to fight back through news stories in the overt paper and news releases to the licensed German press. It is made clear that this was happening, based on an opinion expressed by one of the reporters, König II. There was a problem with the American propaganda about the Volkskongress, in her opinion. In her report of May 31, 1948, she writes: “Wie ich schon häufig hörte und auch zum Ausdruck brachte, ist man der Meinung, dass das Niveau der amerikanischen Propaganda zu hoch liegt und besonders jetzt, bei der wichtigen Angelegenheit betreffs des Volkskongresses volkstümlicher gehalten werden müsste.”434 In this one sentence, König II identified the problem of the ICD’s propaganda efforts. It was written for the political and intellectual elite in Germany and not the average person. König II, perhaps the most active of the German interrogators working in Berlin for the ICD, based her opinion on not just the formal interviews she conducted, but the conversations she overheard on her way to and from these interviews. König also underlines how the Soviets and the Americans differed in their approach to the media in Germany. The Russian approach was one in which the workers were to be mobilised by the press in order to support 433

RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. Translation: As I have often heard and expressed, the opinion is held, that the intellectual level of American propaganda is too high, especially now at this opportune time of the “People’s Congress” it should be simpler.

434

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those they put in power. The American approach was to create an environment in which the media educated those in power to serve the people.

CHAPTER FOUR THE MECHANISMS OF CONTROL

Blacklists The “Black, White, Grey Lists” were used by the ICD as a guide for control officers to determine quickly the suitability of an individual for licensing. In this way, ICD officers in different American field offices could coordinate their efforts and be reasonably sure that individual applicants could not simply “shop around” if they were initially turned down for a license. The Americans also shared their lists with the other occupying powers under the understanding that the blacklisting of an individual in the American zone would be honoured in the other zones, and vice versa. While the three “Histories” produced by the ICD’s historical branch insist that the first blacklist was published in October [1945], there is at least one attempt to create a comprehensive list, of which 50 were circulated under a “SECRET” designation on November 18, 1944, with 1857 individuals listed. The preface, signed by McClure, indicates that the list should not circulate below the Army Headquarters level and that under no circumstances should it be taken into any area where it might fall into German hands. It explains that this might put the Germans on their guard and make the job of arresting those on the list more difficult. Though its cover indicates that this is a “Black List” and that anyone on the list should be apprehended and turned over to the proper authorities immediately, its preface mitigates this by stating that some of those listed might actually be anti-Nazis and that the inclusion of those not clearly Nazis does not mean that they are dangerous.1 The October 1945 “Black, White, Grey List” has a handwritten emendation on its cover indicating that it is “List 2.” There is indeed an ICD “List 1.” On August 10, 1945, the ICD issued its “White List,” which was supplemented by a second “Grey and Black List” issued separately

1

“Records of the Information Control Division, Central File of the Executive Office,” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136.

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but on the same day. However, with only 40 “White,” 14 “Grey,” and 19 “Black” entries, it is in no way as wide-ranging as those that followed.2 Breitenkamp, himself a former ICD officer, in his early study of the effect of information control on German authors and publishers, notes that the ICD used various lists to determine the suitability of an individual to fulfil a role in the cultural machinery of post-war Germany. However, the existence of these lists seemed to be controversial. Breitenkamp notes that these lists were not for general distribution and that he had not seen one in his time with the ICD, though the four occupying powers did exchange lists on a somewhat regular basis. The ICD approached the task of cataloguing and classifying performers, publisher and filmmakers, to mention but a few of the categories, with thoroughness. Evidence of their attention to detail may be found in the “White, Grey, and Black List for Information Control Purposes” dated November 1, 1946.3 The classification criteria were set out on December 21, 1945, by Robert C. Martindale, who was acting Chief of the Intelligence section of the ICD and a civilian serving with the Military Government. The new criteria superseded those put in place December 1, 1945, which in turn replaced a policy that was announced on October 1, 1945. It appears that there was an extremely fluid situation regarding who might be licensed. However, it seems that the December 1945 guideline was the final authoritative iteration. This does not mean that there may not have been a certain amount of “fudging” going on in the creation of these lists. History II indicates that “[t]he task of denazification was complicated by the pressure on the Intelligence Branch to lower standards so that information services could be turned over to the Germans.”4 Further evidence of this may be found in the hiring of Germans to run the radio services in the American Zone of Control. Allegations were made that the Americans favoured those who had a right-wing slant, with the implication that they were Nazi sympathisers, 2

“Records of the Information Control Division, ICD Press Branch Black List November 18, 1944.” NARA RG 260 390/42/19/1 Box 189. 3 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 69 and Box 70. It should be nated that the title of the list varied slightly from edition to edition. The author has been able to identify six lists that amended the previous versions and two primary lists dated October and December 1945. The last was issued in March of 1947. In total there are 20,012 entries with approximately 14000 non-duplicate individuals on those lists. All had applied for either licensing or registration in the post-war German media in the US zone. The complete searchable database is accessible at www.erwinlist.com. 4 History II.

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in the appointments to the leading positions within the German Radio media.5 In some respects, this was a red herring used by supporters of the SPD to try to establish themselves in crucial media roles that were to help shape Germany’s future political direction. By November 1946 there were still some ICD district offices using the older standards. This is apparent from the explicit manner in which the change from the older six category system needed to be noted. The ICD had pared the number of possible classification from six to five. Instead of being classified A, B, C, D, E, or F, applicants were categorised as either White, Grey, or Black, with White and Grey being further subdivided.6 Those classified as being “White” were sorted into A’s and B’s. A’s had an impeccable record, which warranted licensing in the fields of press, publishing, and major theatrical or musical enterprises. They were considered suitable for leading positions. The individual had to be determined as not having been a collaborator with the Nazis nor a beneficiary of Nazism. Yet, having been a member of one of the following organisations did not preclude a White-A designation: x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

5

Reichsbund der deutschen Beamten NS Rechtswahrerbund NSV KDF Reichsrundfunkkammer NSKOV Reichspresskammer Deutsche Studentenschaft DAF Reichsschriftumskammer Reichskammer der bildenden Künste Reichstheaterkammer Deutsche Jägerschaft Reichsfilmkammer Reichsluftschutzbund Reichsmusikkammer Reichsbund deutscher Familie Deutsches Rotes Kreuz NS Reichsbund für Leibesübungen

The Americans were not the only ones to suffer through such allegations. The British experienced similar difficulties with NDR in Hamburg. 6 While “F” is noted as a classification, in practice the lowest category assigned appears to have been “E,” which was equated with the later “Black” designation.

The Mechanisms of Control x x x x x

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Reichsarbeitsdienst (if compulsory; if vocational, then Grey C not acceptable) NS Bund deutscher Technik Deutsches Frauenwerk NS Lehrerbund Reichsdozentenschaft

However, rank in these organisations indicated party membership and only allowed a grade of Grey acceptable or lower. White-B’s were suitable for licensing or employment in leading positions of all media except in the fields of press, publications, or film production. This initial differentiation shows which of the areas the ICD considered the most politically sensitive of cultural activities. This classification indicated that the applicant had not been a member of the NSDAP or affiliates, except for the above-listed and the following additional organisations: x x x x x x x x x x x x x

HJ and BdM Deutsche Akademie München (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable) Rank in KDF Deutsches Auslandsinstitut (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable) Deutsche Glaubensbewegung (Note: Membership in any principal suborganization: Grey C acceptable of better) Deutscher Fichte-Bund (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable) NS Altherrnbund Ibero-Amerikanisches Institute (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable) Deutsche Christen-Bewegung NS Frauenschaft (before 1936; after 1936; Grey C acceptable) Reichskolonialbund Amerika-Institut (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable) VDA (if abroad before 1939, Grey C not acceptable. If any rank was held, then the classification was Grey acceptable or lower) Ost-Europa Institut (before 1934; after 1934; Grey C acceptable

The candidate could also have shown no evidence of collaboration with the Nazis or benefits under Nazism. Additionally, they were also considered suitable for a probationary White-A classification. The second classification was “Grey”, which was also divided into two subgroups. Those deemed “Grey Acceptable” were suitable for employment, but not in a policy-making position or an executive or

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creative capacity. They were not suitable for licensing and were to be replaced by “Whites” at the first opportunity. They tended to be NSDAP party members or members of one of the following organisations: x x x x x x x x x x

NSDFB Deutsche Akademie München (after 1934) Deutsche Frauenschaft (after 1936) Deutsches Auslandsinstitut (after 1934) Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut (after 1934) Deutscher Fichte-Bund (after 1934) Amerika-Institut (after 1934) NS Reichskriegerbund Ost-Europa Institut (after 1934) Kyffhäuserbund

If they held a rank in one of these organisations, they received a designation of Grey Unacceptable. If they had been a member of one of the following organisations, the applicant would need to explain the circumstances of their having become members to the ICD: x x x x x x x

NSDAP NSFK Opferring Deutscher Gemeindetag (Membership implies NSDAP membership) NSDStB Institut fuer deutsche Ostarbeit NSKK Alldeutscher Verband

A rank in one of the above organisations warranted a Black classification. There could also be no evidence of Nazi or nationalistic convictions. This is also where the small, non-party, opportunists were usually placed, the so-called Mitläufer (fellow-travellers). Those considered Grey Unacceptable were not suitable for employment other than in ordinary labour as defined under Military Government Law No. 8. Those having belonged to the following organisations automatically found themselves in this category: x x x x

Reichsarbeitsdienst (vocational) NS Reichsbund deutscher Schwestern VDA (if abroad before 1939) NS Ärztebund

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A final classification was “Black.” These individuals were judged to be unsuitable for any form of employment in any information or cultural medium. Members of the following organisations were automatically classified as Black: x x x x x x x x x x x x

Waffen-SS (unless drafted after 1943) SA NSDoB Kameradschaft USA Staatsakademiefuer Rassen- und Gesundheitspflege Werberat der deutschen Wirtschaft Weltdienst Reichsring für Propaganda Verband Zwischenstaatlicherverbände Allgemeine SS Sicherheitsdienst der SS Institut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage

The individual could also not have held an office or rank in the Nazi Party, its subordinate organisations, or organisations furthering militarism. In addition, the following conditions also disqualified an individual from activities regulated by the ICD: x x x x x x

An Officer of the Wehrmacht, unless a specific exception is made by Information Control An Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer of the Waffen-SS A marked beneficiary under the Nazis A participant in Nazi crimes, persecutions or racial discriminations One whom evidence shows to have been a believer in Nazi, racial, or militaristic creeds One who voluntarily gave substantial moral or material support to the NSDAP, its officials or leaders

On February 11, 1946, Alfred Toombs, Head of Intelligence for the ICD, released a document relating to the treatment of NSDAP members and their suitability for involvement in the cultural industries of post-war Germany.7 There was a suggestion that May 1, 1937, be considered a cutoff. That is, those who had joined the party after that date be disqualified from holding a publications license. He saw no room for members of the NSDAP in the new German media. Eva-Juliane Welsch 7

NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 25.

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notes, perhaps optimistically, that he managed to ensure that only those who actively opposed the National Socialists in Germany were granted the privilege of holding a license as a publisher.8 Though there is conclusive evidence that more than a few slipped through, Toombs was ever-vigilant in ensuring that tight control was exercised over publishers and was always concerned that they were getting out of control as in directive he issued in May of 1946.9 These concerns appear to have led General McClure to issue a lengthy document to all intelligence personnel on May 7, 1946, in which he provided greater guidance regarding the nuances of applicant classification to facilitate the work of field interrogators and give a “uniform basis for their classification recommendations.”10 If an individual had been a nominal member of the NSDAP, they could still be classified as grey unacceptable. However, if they had been an active Parteigenosse, or had been a member of four other organisations associated with the NSDAP, they were to be classified black immediately. Even if they had only attained Anwärter (candidate) status, they were to be treated as if they had been full members. For the Allgemeine SS rank-andfile, there was an immediate black designation. For those who had been designated as fördernde Mitglieder der SS (sustaining members of the SS) it was decided that they could be designated as grey acceptable. McClure, however, did allow for rare exceptions in the case of those who made large financial contributions to the SS (1000 RM or more), because these may have been made as the result of blackmail. It was advised that these cases should be carefully investigated and, if blackmail was indicated, it should be considered to have been a donation under duress. In situations such as this, it was possible to issue a white designation, if the candidate’s political record was otherwise clean. In the case of the Waffen SS, those with memberships before 1943 were to be designated black, while those with memberships after 1943 were to be considered grey acceptable or grey unacceptable depending on their political record. If they had been members of SS Standarte Kurt Eggers, they were SS war correspondents, and they were immediately designated as black. All members of the SA were designated black except those who had been thrown out or had resigned before June 30, 1934. These could be designated grey acceptable, or, if they had an otherwise good record, could be considered white. Further to this, the SA-Wehr- or SA-Sportabzeichnung were seen as meaningless, if not connected to the 8

Welsch, “Die hessischen Lizenzträger und ihre Zeitungen,” 35. NARA RG 260 390/42/15-16/21. 10 NARA RG 260 390/42/15-16/21 9

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NSKK (National Socialist Motoring Corps), NSFK (National Socialist Flying Corps), NSDStB (National Socialist German Students’ Association), or NSDDoB, (National Socialist Association of German Docents) and did not disqualify an individual from receiving a white designation. It was also noted that any rank in one of the major NSDAP organisations immediately meant an individual was designated in black. In the lesser organisations, the lower ranks could sometimes be qualified as grey acceptable or grey unacceptable on a case-by-case basis. However, an officer’s rank was always to be considered black.11 The “White, Grey, and Black List for Information Control Purposes” supplemental inventories dated: April 1, 1946; June 1, 1946; August 1, 1946; November 1, 1946; and March 1, 1947, had a total of 16100 entries of all classifications. Neither the very old nor the very young could escape classification by the ICD. The oldest to appear on the list is an 86-year-old book dealer from Immenstadt by the name of Max Wengenmayr, who was “Grey Unacceptable.” The youngest to appear on the list is Alfred Gruber, a musician, from Neureichenau, who, at the age of 11 years, was classified as “Grey Acceptable.” Gruber was by no means an anomaly, with 215 other individuals under the age of 18 appearing on the list.12 The statistics of the ICD’s “White, Grey, Black List” show some significant trends. The Military Government in their zone declared 1919 a benchmark year in terms of their occupation policy. It was the cut-off year for those they would consider as culpable for Germany’s crimes. Age, however, did not exclude individuals from the ICD vetting process, with 37 individuals under the age of 22 years being designated Black. Most of those under 22 years received a WB or GA classification (81.8%). At the age of 22, the banning of individuals from Germany’s cultural machinery began in earnest. The youngest individual to be given a Black designation by the ICD was Johannes Bollmann of Nuremberg, who, at the age of 15, was a newspaper employee. There is no indication of what he did to warrant the classification. It might have been nothing more than having lied on his Fragebogen, which was considered a serious transgression. Beyond what one might consider anomalies and curiosities in the vetting process, age and the city of application were significant factors regarding one’s categorization. For example, applicants in Berlin, Heidelberg and Munich were far more likely to be classified Black; 11 For a complete list of designated NSDAP classifications with commentary, see Appendix X. 12 For the data regarding applicant ages listed in the October 1945, December 1945, April 1946, June 1946, August 1946, November1946, and March 1947 “White, Grey, Black Lists”, see Appendix Y.

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whereas, in Bremen or Heidelberg one had a much better chance to be classified WA. The older one was, the greater the chance of receiving a WA designation. While the differences are not great, there is a steady increase in the percentage of WA designations given to older applicants until the age of 70 at which point they drop very rapidly. While the two youngest groups could not easily receive a WA designation, they are the largest group, per capita, in the WB category at 44.1%. This discounts the 80+ age group, which has a total of 24 applicants in its cohort. The WB designation allowed the ICD to provide closer supervision of those representing a new generation of opinion-makers. This, in turn, allowed the ICD to have a greater impact on the future of Germany’s media without it looking too obvious.13 The largest number of applicants fall into the WB classification at 33.0%, which permitted them to do most things in their profession; however, they were not authorised to make policy decisions. The smallest number, but only by 1.0%, is found in the category that allowed the greatest freedom and required the highest level of trust on the part of the ICD. Only 12.3% of the applicants were given a classification of WA. About equal were those who were classified as GU at 13.3% with a somewhat larger group classified as GA at 20.2%. Those classified as Black made up 21.2% of the applicants appearing in the “White, Grey, Black Lists” of 1945 to 1947.14 The largest single group on the list is musicians, and they do skew the statistics. Of the 5625 musicians (37.1% of the total list) only 5.4% were granted a White-A designation.15 The overall average is 11.2%. The large group of musicians keeps the total percentage of WA designations artificially low. With musicians removed the portion of WA applicants becomes 14.4%. Musicians usually found themselves at the other end of the spectrum with 19.6% being classified as Black. However, they are not the largest group classified as such and are surpassed by virtually every other job group other than performers in variety shows. With an overall average of Black designations at 13.9% (11.2% with musicians removed), the musicians vary significantly from the norm. 13

For details on the age group breakdown according to classification see Appendix Z. For details on the effect of application city vs. classification see Appendix AA. 14 In a list comparing age with classification, 18,151 of the 20011 entries allow the determination of individual classification of the individual. That number drops to 15172 in the list comparing classification with profession. 15 Musician in this case refers to actual musicians playing in an orchestra, band, ensemble, or solo and those in positions of leadership such as conductors, directors, and composers.

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Of greater interest are what the ICD considered to be the most sensitive media professions. Writers, editors, journalists made up 10.8% of applicants listed who could be identified by profession and classification.16 Once the large number of musicians are factored out, the percentage of writers on the lists jumps to 17.1%. They have normal designation rates in the other classifications. There is one professional group that stands out in terms of the number granted a WA designation. Publishers had 32.1% of their applicants given a WA designation, which is significantly higher than any of the others. Oddly, in the case of publishers, their classification forms a reverse bell when graphed. Most other professions have most applicants falling in the WB-GA-GU range. With publishers, this is the opposite and most fall on either end of the spectrum. This indicates that the ICD wanted to ensure there was absolutely no ambiguity in the publishing industry. One was either in or out. The vetting process for publishers, as will be described in some detail later, was substantially different and more strenuous than for any other group. This in itself would have resulted in some self-removal or self-selection, because they knew that the ICD was combing through the files of this group especially carefully. Blacklists, or lists of proscribed individuals, were a common occurrence in all of the zones of control and did not follow a set pattern regarding how the information was presented. The “White, Grey, and Black List for Information Control Purposes” dated August 1, 1946, is the most comprehensive. In addition to the name, profession, and categorisation of an applicant, it gives the year, and place of birth, as well as the current address and occasionally the telephone number of the applicants. Some of the early lists, especially the original November 1944 list, provides reasons for the inclusion of an individual. Other lists, while not as thorough in locating and identifying the applicant, did sometimes provide the reason for a license having been rejected and the organisations, or people, to which the applicant was in some way related.17 Though the lists for the most part dealt with applicants for licensing, it was clearly not always the case. For example, Peter Raabe, a German composer and conductor who had superseded Richard Strauss as President of the Reichsmusikkammer had died in Weimar on April 12, 1945, was included on the October 1945 list. Most likely his name had been carried forward from the November 1944 list where his name does appear. It is removed from subsequent lists. However, it is indicative of the state of the

16

For a complete listing of professions versus classification, see Appendix AB. For a complete database including all of the text found on the lists see www.erwinslist.com.

17

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ICD in the early days of the occupation. With the fourth list of April 1946, one sees a notable improvement in the lists being produced by the ICD. Despite indications to the contrary from some former ICD officers, the lists current in the various sectors were exchanged on a regular basis with the understanding that lists established in one sector would be honoured in all sectors. This, however, may have been more workable in theory than actual practice. That is to say, the lists may have officially been exchanged, but may not have been passed on to the DISCC level or enforced once it did arrive there. For example, Breitenkamp, a former ICD officer, indicates that he had heard rumours of such lists existing, but that he had never actually seen one. While the lists emanating from the Soviets seemed to have had little effect on the blacklists in the western sectors and the French showed little interest in the cultural issues, there was considerable cooperation between the British and the Americans. This may be seen in the number of British lists appearing the American archived files and vice versa.18 The blacklisting of publishers went further afield than only those located in Germany. The “vetting” included Swedish and Swiss publishers as well, though the authorities were not able to enforce their procedures on these individuals and entities, they could stop materials produced by those foreign sources from entering their zone. A February 1945 PWD (Psychological Warfare Division) document intended as preparation for post-war control procedures in occupied Germany provides insight into how far the Americans were willing to go.19 They used the 1941 members list of the Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler zu Leipzig as the basis for their list of publishers to be investigated. Publishers such as BrausRiggenbach (formerly Henning Oppermann) were blacklisted though they were located in Switzerland. Braus-Riggenbach was accused of being “strictly pro-Nazi” with the owner having close ties the former editor of the Swiss Nazi paper Neue Basler Zeitung. A further publisher, Francke A.G. of Berne, was found to have “dispatched German propaganda periodicals to the United States” and was thus also blacklisted. Some of the firms had reached arrangements with the PWD, like Hug & Co. of Winterthur and Zurich. The owners, Adolf Hug Senior and Junior, signed an undertaking with the Allies “submitting to Allied control of their exports and neutral imports.”20

18

An example from October 15, 1947 is found in NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. 19 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140. 20 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140.

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While the ICD could censor the production of books produced in postwar Germany, it also had to keep a close watch over material that survived the war. To control the trade of the surviving stocks of books the ICD regularly read and vetted communications between publishers and their dealers. An example of this is an intercepted invoice from the C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung sent to Das Bücherkabinett located at 14/16 Königstrasse in Hamburg. The censorship form indicates that the invoice was sent on the 7th of November 1945 and was postmarked on the 8th of November. The intercepted document was examined on the 17th of November and was found to contain billings for four works by Walter Flex: 21 Demetrius22, Frauenrevoire23, Wallenstein24, and a final item simply named Novels. The censor noted that “according to the second edition of the Neue Zeitung books by Walter Flex have been banned.”25 Unfortunately, the records do not indicate what the result of the investigation was. Most likely it concluded the same way as that of the Klostermann publishing house, which was found guilty of having produced works by Ernst Jünger, an author who was banned. In this case, Klostermann Verlag was subsequently stripped of its license to publish.26 Also, a warning was sent out to publishers of the dangers of releasing material of which the ICD did not approve. There are a few items that call attention to themselves in the process of determining the designation of individuals applying to the ICD for a license. The first is the meticulous nature of the ICD oversight of the publishing industry. The second point is that the ICD covered every avenue in trying to ensure that the German publishing industry complied with their list of proscribed authors. Finally, the overt newspaper Neue Zeitung was used to disseminate to the German publishing industry, as well as ordinary people, which specific authors were banned in post-war Germany. It was, after all, the mandate of the Neue Zeitung to communicate the wishes of the Military Governments to the German people.

21

Born 1887, died 1917. His works were used by the National Socialists to indoctrinate the youth with nationalist ideals. 22 Initially published in 1910. 23 This title must have been copied in error, since it does not appear that Flex published a book with this title. 24 Initially published under the name Wallensteins Antlitz. Gesichte und Geschichten aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg in 1916. 25 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140. 26 NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29.

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The Vetting Process Some scholars have concluded that the Americans were slow to react to the ideological void in post-war Germany. They note that the Soviets were much quicker off the mark because they knew what they wanted to accomplish: the integration of Germany into their sphere of influence and the establishment of a Soviet-style government. Moreover, they had a large cadre of trusted Germans, who had escaped to the Soviet Union for political reasons, who now became their willing collaborators. The Soviet occupiers did not seem to be bothered too much by an individual’s past political affinities but rather were more interested in what that person might be willing to do for them now. One need only look at their courting of the famous conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, Wilhelm Furtwängler, to recognise that they did not struggle with the same matters of political purity that the Americans did. The British, on the other hand, were pragmatic in their approach and were willing to make deals, if not with the Devil then certainly with some of his henchmen, just to keep Germany functioning. They saw this as necessary so as not to draw too much energy away from rebuilding their devastated country. Finally, as noted earlier, the French, according to American sources, were too busy trying to exact reparations from their zone to pay too much attention to the cultural aspects of their occupation of Germany. Those in charge of the vetting process in the American Zone continued to try and improve their processes over time. To this end, Major Bertram Schaffner and Thomas Frank visited their British counterparts from May 14-15, 1946, and submitted a report on May 16 to the Chief of the Intelligence Section, Alfred Toombs.27 There is also evidence that the Americans consciously modelled their program at Bad Orb on the one established by the British occupation. The British organisation was known as the German Personnel Research Branch (GPRB) and was under the control of the Intelligence Group of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element). It was located at Bad Oeynhausen and was under the overall command of Wing Commander O.A. Oeser. The report indicates that the organisation consisted of a president of the board, a psychiatrist, an administrative officer, two testing officers, four psychological assistants, eight secretaries, and 15 enlisted men, in all, 32 personnel. It is often indicated that the ICD’s complement was much larger than that of the British 27

NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29.

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organisation, as in Toby Thacker’s assertion that the ICD had 1700 officers at its disposal,28 while a British Military Government report suggests that the British Personnel Research Branch only had 16 officers working for it.29 However, at least in the case of the vetting process, the American organisation complained that the British employed far more people than the Americans. This may well be related to how the statistics were compiled and one should trust the assessment of Schaffner and Frank in this particular case. The report indicates that the British assessment centre investigated 12 candidates per week, who all arrived on Monday afternoon and would then leave on the following Friday morning. Friday afternoons were reserved for staff meetings to discuss results of individual tests and to make decisions on each interviewee, with reports being written by the President and the psychiatrist on Saturday. In comparing the two vetting sections, it is noteworthy that the British unit processed fewer individuals than the Americans on a weekly basis and also spent more time with each applicant. Schaffner and Franks carefully outline how each of the applicants is processed. It starts with all of the candidates being welcomed with a speech on Monday afternoon delivered by the President. In this talk, the aims of the centre were explained, and the staff is introduced to the candidates. Following this, the candidates were then asked to fill out a highly detailed 19-page questionnaire, which dealt with their political background and the political activities of their parents and their nearest relatives. On Tuesday morning, each candidate was asked to provide a five-minute oral resume of his background and professional life. This was done with everyone, including all of the staff, present. Following these initial introductions, parts one, two, and three of the written intelligence test were administered. The first part was called “matrix,” which was a nonverbal test that used visual pattern completion problems. The second part dealt with reasoning. It was used to test the higher intelligence ranges in deduction, synthesis, and analysis. The third part was a written word association test. Following this, a fourth test was administered, which was an oral word association test. This was often replaced with the Thematic Apperception Test in the case of younger candidates. The fifth and final test of the morning was a self-description by the candidate, first as his best friend would perceive him, and then as a strong critic would see him. After Tuesday’s lunch, the candidates were divided into two groups. 28 29

Thacker, The End of the Third Reich, 31. National Archives, Kew, FO/898/401.

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The first group began with individual studies; these included a political interview and a psychiatric interview of about one and half hours each. It is also noted that the President and the psychiatrist interviewed approximately four candidates each on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. The second group had its individual studies in the latter half of the period. While the first group was being individually studied, the second group went ahead with further group tests. The first of these was a group discussion over a 90-minute period. The groups were asked to spend approximately 30 minutes discussing each of three topics: personal happiness, the relationship of family and state, and Germany’s contribution to European reconstruction. After this, each of the candidates was asked to give an impromptu talk or “lecturette” without any preparation. These talks would last five minutes and were on special assignments, for example “a school superintendent addresses his teachers on corporal punishment, a chief of police addresses policemen on black market activities.”30 What followed was a sociological questionnaire. This questionnaire attempted to elicit as much information as possible about a candidate’s fundamental political trends and social outlook. They then conducted a “miniature interrogation,” in which one of the candidates would interview another for approximately 20 minutes in the presence of the staff, to obtain information about the candidate’s personal interests, special hobbies, and recreational activities. The purpose of this interview was to evaluate a candidate’s ability to conduct an interview. However, it also provided valuable information about the one being interviewed. All of this was then followed by the so-called “protest test.” Here, the individuals were asked to imagine themselves in a difficult situation and to defend their position in the face of stern, unsympathetic criticism and frustrating behaviour on the part of the examiners. This was followed by a “group-planning test.” One of the groups is asked to formulate a solution to a problem in county administration based upon letters, statistics, and a map of the county concerned. The next test was a team negotiation test, in which one of the groups was asked to represent a local German government committee and the other to represent the British military government detachment. They were to work out a solution to a problem, which was presented in the form of legal briefs. Following all of this, the entire group undertook a mutual evaluation. The candidates were asked to rate one another regarding leadership qualities, reliability, and friendship worthiness. After all of this, the candidates received a concluding talk and were encouraged to ask 30

NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29.

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questions or make suggestions. The candidates left the centre at 10 o’clock on Friday morning. Finally, a board meeting was held. During the board meeting, each of the candidates was discussed, and final recommendations were decided upon. The report notes that there were some similarities between the ICD screening centre and the procedures used at Assessment Ctr., #1, the official name of the facility visited by the Americans. The aims of the two groups and the standards employed were identical. It also indicates that the political/sociological, and psychological/psychiatric division of how the candidates were studied was also the same. Moreover, there was a general correspondence in how intelligence tests were administered. Also, the sociological questionnaire resembled the “incomplete sentences” test of the ICD screening centre and the “mutual evaluation test” was essentially the same as the ICD’s “sociometric” test. There were, however, differences between how the British and the Americans operated their screening centres. In the case of the British assessment centre, it offered its services to all of the divisions of the Military Government and the Control Commission. It was noted that many of the assessment centre’s candidates came from government agencies, such as the Reichspost and the Reichsbahn. From this, one can conclude that less emphasis was placed on selecting publishers. It was also noted that the assessment centre seems to be adequately staffed. This point emphasised the dissatisfaction on the part of Schaffner with the staffing of the ICD screening centre. The report also notes that the British assessment centre placed relatively less emphasis on the political suitability of the candidate and more on the psychological fitness of the candidate. Moreover, the British centre relied on a larger number of procedures, administered by a larger staff and took into consideration the conclusions and appraisals of at least six different observers in coming to its final assessment. This, Schaffner and Frank concluded, led to a greater objectivity in reaching its appraisals. They also noted a high degree of organisation and specialisation of functions within the assessment centre. They saw this as lending greater formality to the process of vetting candidates, as opposed to the increased flexibility of the ICD screening centre. They saw this as creating a process to which a larger number of assistants could be trained, and an adequate number of replacements could be insured for departing staff members. It was also noted that, due to its larger staff, the assessment centre could also engage in research and follow-up projects. Notably, the assessment centre also employed what were called “lay analysts” rather than psychiatrists with medical training. The use of “lay” personnel ensured that a larger

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staff was available to the centre. The report also included two samples of the reports written by the President regarding unidentified candidates, though one might also conclude that the reports were simply examples of what the British Assessment Centre considered to be ideal candidates. One of the candidates was classified as white and the other as black. It is also noteworthy that the British also used a five-point scale, but did not necessarily associated colour with their assessments, except an individual candidate’s testing related to psychological authoritarianism. In the case of the acceptable candidate, he and his parents had joined the SPD in 1929 and had been staunch supporters of the party. The applicant had served initially as a youth leader and then from 1933 to 1936 an editor of an illegal newspaper in Hanover. He and his parents had been arrested in 1936, and he was sentenced to 10-years imprisonment, of which he had served eight years and eight months. Of the more than eight years in prison, four and a half were spent in solitary confinement. As far as his personality is concerned, he was considered highly intelligent with a high ethical and moral standard, but also not inflexible in his thinking. He was described as having a broad range of interests and was considered to be humanitarian in his thinking. Where they did find fault was in his emotional state, which was not surprising considering his imprisonment. The applicant was judged to being prone to slight hysteria and showed occasional irritability, sharpness, and obstinacy towards others. Though he had, in their opinion, only average leadership skills, he was recommended: “as unconditionally suitable for employment at any level, and as a man who can make a most valuable contribution to the democratic reconstruction of Germany.” In this particular case, one should note that most likely the US vetting process would not have been as enthusiastic. Even though he had a remarkable record and appropriate experience, his time in prison, especially the time spent in solitary confinement would have allowed him a “White B” categorization at best. Very often, the Americans rejected individuals with this sort of background, because they felt that they were unpredictable regarding their dealings with others, a trait that this person apparently clearly exhibited. If they were granted a license, it would suggest that they either be watched closely, or paired with another applicant, who might mitigate the original applicant’s emotional shortcomings. The second example was of an applicant who was clearly unacceptable. He had been an Obertruppenführer in the Stahlhelm from 1932-1935. When the Stahlhelm became part of the SA, he accepted the rank of

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Rottenführer but left in 1938. Moreover, he joined the NSdAP in 1936 and claimed to have been a convinced Nazi until 1938, when “he claims to have become more critical.” Even so, he remained a trusted member until the end of the war. As far as the personality of this applicant was concerned, the British assessors found him to be rather jolly and perky. However, below the façade, the investigators found what they thought was a rigid reactionary, who was contemptuous of the feelings of others and that he was a “complete menace.” They also found him to be an opportunist at heart. The assessment was as brief as it was blunt: “This man is highly dangerous and should not be employed at any level or in any circumstances.” The report written by Schaffner and Frank outlines the GPRB at work and does not go into the guiding philosophy that lay behind its establishment and operation. There is little indication that they suspected that the GPRB’s establishment was based, in part, on the assessment made by Dicks of the work that Schaffner had done as part of the Conference on Germany after the War.31 The Americans could be considered the idealists amongst the Allies. One is left with the impression that they wanted to get it right. OMGUS was committed to a careful screening out of undesirables from the publishing industry and tried to apply “scientific” principles to their practices, as will be demonstrated in the following pages. It was a practice that continued until May of 1949.32 In general, the task of examining Germans was carried out by local ICD units. At this stage, candidates for media related positions in the US zone were required to fill out personal history questionnaires, the Fragebogen. This was followed by supplementary interrogations of the candidate and his or her present and past associates. Some interviews usually termed “vetting,” were also undertaken by the denazification staff of the ICD. According to the ICD’s history, editors and executives received special attention. After a candidate had been investigated within the context of his or her community, it was compared with the records of the Nazi Party members in Berlin, as well against the files of the RKK held by the Berlin Document Center. All those who had worked in any of the media industries in Nazis Germany were required to belong to one branch of this organisation and had been collected by SS-Brigadeführer Hans Hinkel 31

Henry V. Dicks, “Foreign Office, Future of Germany” and “Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War,” National Archives, London, FO 1049/72. 32 Wehdeking and Blamberger, Erzählliteratur der frühen Nachkriegszeit, 28.

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who, at the end of the war, was the Reichsfilmintendant (National Film Superintendent). These files held detailed dossiers on the careers of many of the RKK’s members. Cross-referencing these files in conjunction with the statements given on the Fragebogen allowed the ICD to determine the truthfulness of the candidate and determine whether the Nazis had regarded an applicant, who may have denied affiliation with the Nazi Party, as a loyal party member. While practices may have varied somewhat, Felix Reichmann provided a slightly more detailed outline of the basics of the procedure in The Publisher’s Weekly in November of 1946: The applicant had to file three Military Government questionnaires and three detailed business and personal questionnaires with Publications Control. After a thorough and comprehensive interview by an official of Publications Control the applicant had to submit a publishing program for one year worked out in specific titles. Then the whole file was transmitted to Intelligence Branch, which again interviewed the applicant and his references. If both branches agreed that the applicant was eligible for a publisher’s license a recommendation to this effect was submitted to the Commanding Officer of the Information Control Division. If Berlin Headquarters concurred with the opinion of the Land, a license was issued.33

It should be noted that membership in one of the branches of the Reichskulturkammer did not mean that an individual could not be given a “White A” designation. What they were looking for was the fundamental honesty of the person they were considering. A close relationship was maintained between the Denazification Section, the Public Safety Branch, and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). It was a consistent policy of the ICD to grant no licenses without prior clearance with these two agencies. In no case was any German to be employed in an ICD-sponsored enterprise against the recommendation of either Public Safety or CIC. When the study of a candidate’s record was completed, a decision was reached as to his eligibility for employment and his name was placed on one of the following lists: a. If his political record was clean, his name was placed on “White” list (A), and he was considered eligible for a leading position in any of the information fields for which he was professionally qualified. 33 F. Reichmann, “The First Year of American Publications Control in Germany” Publisher's Weekly, November 16, 1946, 2811.

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b. If investigation disclosed that he was a member of minor affiliated Nazi Party organizations, but had not collaborated actively with the Nazis, his name was placed on “White” list (B), which qualified him for certain types of leading positions, but in a probationary status. c. If he was considered a less desirable person, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, acceptable), which qualified him for employment with German information services, but not in policy-making, executive, or creative positions. d. If he was a Nazi Party member who held only nominal membership, his name was placed on “Grey” list (C, unacceptable), which restricted him to employment at ordinary labor. e. If he had held high office in the Party, or in any of its affiliated organizations, or had shown himself an active Nazi, his name was placed on the “Black” list (D), which prevented him from being employed in any capacity.34

High standards of personnel selection were maintained by ICD despite differences of opinion, some within ICD itself. Media sections, eager to carry out their mission of restoring German information services, sometimes supported the candidacy of a key person in their field who possessed desired professional qualifications, but whose political record was subject to criticism. Seldom, however, did the Intelligence Section temper its judgment with expediency, and as a result of this strong policy, information services were sometimes criticised for not using the ablest Germans available. It was not until the ICD Screening Center was established at Bad Orb in October 1945,35 that it became possible to select with certainty the most desirable individuals for key positions within German information media. The Screening Center, utilising the services of a psychiatrist, a political interrogator, and a psychologist,36 subjected German applicants to comprehensive political and psychological examinations which went far beyond the standard Fragebogen or questionnaire type of denazification scrutiny. Judgment was made not only of the candidate’s political reliability but also of his basic personality profile insofar as it helped evaluate his democratic potential. His stay at the Screening Center normally lasted three days during which time he was subjected to six types of examination. On completion of the tests, members of the staff compared their findings and made recommendations as to the employability of the 34

History I. The first group of candidates for licenses was studied 6 November 1945. 36 The Screening Center was directed by Dr. David M. Levy, a member of the faculty at Columbia University and of the staff of New York's Psychiatric Institute. 35

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applicant. In some instances, persons acceptable for their political reliability were rejected because of undesirable character traits. In the closing weeks of 1945, redeployment of U.S. Army personnel so drastically reduced the servicing staff that the Screening Center was abandoned as a fixed institution, and the staff specialists were therefore organised into travelling teams to conduct denazification examinations on a modified scale in the U.S. zone, using Munich as a headquarters. The Screening Center was re-established at Bad Homburg in the Spring of 1946 and continued to operate through 30 June 1946. Passing the stringent test of character and receiving a license from the proper authorities did not mean that scrutiny did not continue. Each publisher was required to police himself regarding what was published under the following guidelines set by the Military Government, which forbade the following topics: 1. Criticism of the Allied Government and interference with the Military Government. 2. Racial or Religious discriminations. 3. Propagation of militaristic ideas including Pan-Germanism and German Imperialism. 4. National-socialistic or related völkisch ideas. 5. Fascist or anti-democratic ideas. In Reichmann’s description one finds the innocuous line “the whole file was transmitted to Intelligence Branch which again interviewed the applicant and his references.”37 However, the intelligence interviews were more than simple consultations. In fact, the intelligence interviews spoken of took three days, or even a week, to complete and involved the potential licensees being isolated at one of the camps set aside for the vetting Germans for ICD purposes. As noted above, the ICD installation was located at Bad Orb. The first potential licensees went through the Bad Orb facility on November 6, 1945. Archival documents indicate that the ICD continually tried to improve their ability to identify those who were and were not suitable for licensed functions under the Military Government. In an evaluation of the ICD Screening Center written some time after February

37 F. Reichmann, “The First Year of American Publications Control in Germany,” 2811.

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17, 1946, recommendations are taken from both officers running the program and potential licensees.38 Some of the responses received from the candidates might be considered overly obsequious. One of those interviewed simply identified as Dr. S. stated that he had a high regard for the knowledgeable staff and “could have stayed there three weeks, rather than just three days.”39 Dr. S. also made further comment regarding the IQ tests administered during the interview process, suggesting that vocational item be included to ensure that those licensed were technically able to produce that which the ICD expected of them. Suspicion is cast on his motives for wanting to stay longer by a later interviewee, an entertainer identified as G., who pointed out that he appreciated the food and accommodations, which were better than the average German experienced in everyday life.40 Initially, the interview caused tremendous anxiety among many of the candidates. Boehling points out that for many the first contact people usually had with the ICD was when they were being licensed or censored.41 A Mr. P. was an early candidate that went through the facility when the candidates were not told the purpose of the excursion they were asked to take. They “were merely asked to take a trip of three days duration.”42 He commented on the clever way in which he was being questioned. The interrogators would, for example, engage him in a discussion about philosophy. He noted that he was impressed with the way in which the conversation was led in such a way that the interrogators could feel out his attitudes about society and human relations. The approach was friendly. Mr. G, who had been questioned by a Dr. Levy and a Mr. Bernard, did not at all feel that he was before an examining committee, but that the approach likened that of a conversation between friends. While this was the general trend, Mr. P. reports that as he was preparing to leave, he was questioned a final time along the “old police 38 “Evaluation of the ICD Screening Center,” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70. 39 “Evaluation of the ICD Screening Center,” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70. 40 “Evaluation of the ICD Screening Center,” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70. 41 Boehling, “US Cultural Policy and German Culture during the American Occupation,” 392-393. It should be noted that both Andersch and Richter had been groomed by the prisoner of war training program in the United States for positions in Germany’s post-war media. 42 “Evaluation of the ICD Screening Center.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70.

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lines.” The report indicated that this was indeed the case and was used as a demonstration using two of the applicants to determine how reliable the results of the previous three days of interrogation had been. The reports generated by the vetting process also reveal how some of the officers in the ICD felt about how the whole denazification process was functioning. A First Lieutenant Paul E. Moeller, who was an intelligence officer attached to the Military Government in Bavaria, felt that “mental nazidom must rate on par – at least – with proved Party membership.”43 He went on to say that the ICD’s vetting process was able to add this layer to the official denazification process, should the Military Government issue that directive. Clearly, the ICD felt that their process held their applicants to a higher standard. While at Bad Orb, candidates were subjected to an impressive array of psychological tests. These tests often determined whether an individual received a license or not. At some time around February 1946 a report entitled “Contribution of Psychiatric and Psychological Study to the ICD Screening Center” was written.44 At this point, fewer than 50 candidates had been processed. The 25 case studies presented amounted to a little more than 50% of the total number of applicants processed until then. The goals of the psychiatric and psychological tests were specific: 1. Determination of mental status. This was considered a deciding factor in six of the 25 case studies. It was thought more important than the political reliability of a candidate. 2. Determination of personality structure. This was intended to keep those characters out of the media who were authoritarian, militaristic, domineering, brutal, or intriguers etc. The concern was that such characters would perpetuate a psychology that was sympathetic to power politics and aggressive wars. It was intended to favour those who had broad sympathies, tolerated criticism and were generally “democratic” in the sense of respecting their fellow men. It was noted that the reason some of the candidates had been classified as “White” was due to questions related to the fitness of their personality. This was the case in 8 of the 25 case studies. 3. Determination of Nazi and anti-Nazi status. The ICD was aware that some of the candidates would attempt to simulate anti-Nazi attitudes. The problem was that the ICD often had no concrete evidence. They determined that they could learn a great deal from individuals relative to their childhood history and personality by employing special attitude tests. These tests often decided the issue or

43 44

“Evaluation of the ICD Screening Center.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70.

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confirmed or challenged assumptions made as a result of political analysis of the applicants. All of the individuals in the case studies were seen as examples of this. 4. Determination of special capacities or incapacities. In certain candidates special qualifications of leadership, originality, or what was simply called “superior endowment” were brought to the attention of the referring agents. Such candidates were marked as especially useful. Of course, the lack of these capacities or inadequate intelligence was likewise determined. Of the 25 case studies seven were seen as example of this being significant. 5. Evidence. The psychiatric studies were also to assist in determining the reliability of statements made by the candidates. Seven of the 25 individuals represented in the study were there to determine the voracity of the applicant’s previous statements.45

Of the 25 case studies, the professions break down as follows: eight publishers, five theatre directors, five radio engineers, five film directors or producers, and two actors or entertainers. The abstracts of the case studies reveal some interesting findings. For example, one of the publishers had some doubtful points on his political record and appeared to collaborate with the Nazis to maintain ownership of his publishing company. He, however, gave a favourable impression overall, even though the psychological assessment was said to have revealed a very passive personality that was never able to withstand any requirement of a despotic father.46 Despite his inward antagonism to authority, he could not be relied upon to resist any pressure. This served to confirm that he had made concessions to the Party and had collaborated. His application was rejected on both political and personal grounds. Another publisher was recommended for a license even though it appeared that he had exploited “the Jewish situation through ownership of a Jewish movie studio.” The political portion of the interrogation revealed that no exploitation had occurred, which was confirmed by the psychiatric study. In fact, it was discovered that he would make an ideal candidate for the ICD. The questionable ethics were simply overlooked in this case. A questionable past was not always held against an individual as will be seen later. A further publisher was in a somewhat unique situation. He was found to be an ardent anti-Nazi. He had been severely beaten by the SA in 1933, and it was found that he still suffered from disturbances of his equilibrium 45

NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70. Adapted from “Contribution of Psychiatric and Psychological Study to the I.C.D. Screening Center.” 46 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5-6 Box 70.

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and confusion in thinking as a result.47 The recommendation was that the license be granted but that he be given special guidance in his work. The inability to work with others was deemed a liability for a further publisher. While he had engaged in some questionable activities in the past, this alone was not sufficient to deny him a license. However, the ICD did not wish to encourage “one-man shows” too often. The psychiatric diagnosis of individual applicants was also often decisive in that it was used to explain the actions of some who appeared to have an otherwise clear record. This was the case with an applicant who had initially served as the Chief Engineer of a radio station. The problem was that he had taken out a membership in the SA, though he had apparently taken no active role in the organisation and had received no special advantage from the Nazi Party. He was, however, able to prove that he had rendered assistance to a resistance group. The psychiatric report found strong anxiety states in the individual. It concluded that he took out membership in the SA due to having been in a panicky phase and then later tried to undo the damage. Politically, he was recognised as “Black”, but with the caveat that it was only in a “technical” sense. He was refused the license as Chief Engineer but was recommended for a technical assistant’s job. This was a task that could be performed by someone classified as “Grey Acceptable” and not “Black”. It is apparent that the ICD was somewhat pragmatic in its approach to licensing and it may be the case that the tightness of the process is questionable, despite the officially strong stance taken by the Head of Intelligence, Toombs. Once the candidates passed through Bad Orb and were granted licenses, it was not the end of the examination. Scrutiny of the licensees continued for some time after. In some of the cases, it was noted that they should be watched or “helped” once licensed. “Helped” was often used in a euphemistic manner to indicate that a candidate could not be fully trusted, but might prove helpful to the cause. A statement such as this does not necessarily mean that it was actively watched on a continual basis, but, in at least one of the cases, it was more than an idle threat. There was significant doubt about the reliability of an applicant, who wanted to produce films in Germany. He had lived and prospered in Italy and France for seven years and then returned to Germany. He had worked as a “cutter” (film editor) and was not considered to have had any influence on the final product coming out of the UFA studios. He had passed the political portion of the examination. However, the psychiatric 47 The reference may be to Arno Rudert of the Frankfurter Rundschau, though he is not mentioned by name in the report.

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portion of the exam revealed that he was “rather unstable, immature, and not to be trusted in a leading position.” He was thus recommended for an assistant’s job. At the end of the abstract, a parenthetical note is included which states, “Conclusion verified by later observation,” an indication that he had been kept under close observation upon taking up his position.48 Documents reveal that actual practice may, in some instances, have been more rigorous than described in the histories. ICD documentation clearly states that although an individual may have been cleared and officially denazified by the Spruchkammer, the ICD could still deny the applicant’s clearance to work in any area under its control.49 On the other hand, in some instances, the ICD seemed to go to considerable lengths in justifying the inclusion of a candidate they might consider particularly useful. There were other motivations for including or excluding candidates from the ranks of licensed publishers. Some of this had to do with the positive rather than negative goals of the ICD. Negative goals would be those that involved keeping publishers out who might attack Military Government policies or publish militaristic materials. Positive goals would involve the publication of works that would support the “democratic” and anti-Nazi education of the German people. Thus there was a large grey area of material that might be considered harmless enough, but of no particular help in moving the political goals of the ICD forward. The tolerance given to these potential publishers came to an end with the shortage of paper. A November 16, 1945, report written by Heinz Berggruen and R.B. Redlich on nine potential licensees who had submitted insufficient publishing plans explains that of these nine, three did not provide a list of titles and were rejected immediately. 50 A further five were found to have programs that had little more than titles of very limited value. Of the nine only one was found to have a particularly ambitious publishing plan. Heinrich Ledig of Stuttgart proposed to revive the wellknown Rowohlt Verlag. However, even with this application, it was thought that “no particular effort has been made to search for books and other materials that will fit the present needs.” In the end, Ledig managed 48

“Contribution of Psychiatric and Psychological Study to the I.C.D. Screening Center.” 49 NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. 50 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140. Heinz Berggruen had emigrated to the United States from Wilmersdorf in 1936. He was a friend of Picasso and a renowned art collector. In 1944 he returned to Europe as an American Soldier. He was initially stationed in Berlin and then was transferred to Munich. Shortly thereafter he was one of the founding employees of UNESCO.

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to get the enterprise off the ground. In total, the Ledig application included 29 titles. Some of the samples provided in the report include: x x x x x x x

“Poems” by Erich Kaestner Translations of Thomas Wolfe‘s novels Frederic Prokosch’s51 novels A new Political Novel by Oskar Marie Fontana,52 A History of Astronomy A History of Plagues and Epidemics A Biography of Heinrich Mann.

In the end perhaps, the final deciding factor was the usefulness of the works an individual wanted to publish. That is if they did not demonstrate that they would help inculcate the ideas of collective guilt, denazification, or demilitarisation they were not high priorities.

Artur Brauner: A Case Study in Vetting When working with the archival files of the ICD, there is often a paucity of material that deals in detail with individuals who were investigated. Most often there are very cursory mentions of individuals and actions taken to either punish or reward them. On occasion, one of the officers might provide a précis of the reasons for having come to the decision that is noted in the file. Rarely, however, does one come across an entire report on an investigation that was undertaken of an applicant and rarer still if the individual has become someone of note in the years after the war. Usually, a negative report on the part of the ICD would have made it very difficult for the individual to get a start in Germany’s new media. However, it was thought that by the time the ICD no longer could keep someone out of the information services, the others would have become so well established that it would have been tough for the less desirable candidates to break into the business. There is, however, at least one file that has survived, which provides an insight into how the ICD and the CIC

51

An American author who had spent considerable time in Germany and Austria in his youth. Many of his novels were indeed translated into German between 1946 and 1954. 52 He went on to become a theatre critic, but did not enjoy much success as a writer. He also edited a work entitled Heldenkampfe der Kaiserschützen1914-1918 : nach berichten von Mitkämpfern bearbeitet im Ministerium für Landesverteidigung.

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carried out an investigation and what they were looking for in an individual. Artur Brauner was a Polish Jew, who survived the Holocaust and went on to produce over 300 films after the war. Most of these films were strictly for the entertainment of the movie-going public and found little critical success. Among these are titles like Girls Behind Bars (1948), Sex Olympics (1972), The Rise and Fall of the Pinups and the Real, Hot Guy (1982).53 However, in amongst these money-makers, though the last film noted made no money, he also produced films that won awards and critical accolades, such as Hitlerjunge Salomon (Oscar for best foreign language film) and Il giardino dei Finzi Contini (Oscar for best foreign language film and a Golden Bear).54 In all, he has produced 21 films dealing with the Holocaust, with the first of these, Morituri, being made in 1948. As an aspiring film producer in post-war Germany Artur (Atze) Brauner had to complete the mandatory forms to get permission to make films. As a result, the CIC was asked to confirm details provided by Brauner, and they went to work checking the veracity of his statements and provided the ICD, now officially the ISD (Information Services Division) with their findings.55 On the basis of this report, the ISB determined that Brauner was ineligible for a film production license in the US zone, even though, according to Brauner’s autobiography, Eric Pommer, who was working for the ISB’s film branch in Berlin, had indicated to him that he would immediately receive a license.56 If this conversation had indeed taken place, it would not have been too presumptuous of Brauner to assume that the license was as good as in his hand, considering that Pommer has been described by some as having virtually dictatorial powers when it came to the film industry in the American sector.57 There was a further complication in all of this; the French Military Government had already issued Brauner a license in 1946. According to ICD correspondence, 53

Original German titles: Mädchen hinter Gittern, Gelobt sei was hard macht, and Pinups und ein heißer Typ. 54 Original titles: Europa Europa and Il giardino dei Finzi Contini . 55 NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136, Dossier on Artur Brauner License Application. December 22 1948. (From here on referred to as “Brauner Dossier”). Images of the dossier are available at http://www.erwinslist.com. 56 Artur, Brauner, Mich gibt’s nur einmal: Rückblende eines Lebens (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978), 65. 57 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater. Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945-1948, Trans. Kelly Barry, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 143.

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though they could not force the French to rescind this license, is very clear that they would have liked to have seen Brauner’s license withdrawn. On March 14, 1949, Arthur L. Mayer, Head of the Motion Picture Branch of the ISD in Munich, wrote a letter to the Chief of the French Information Service Division, Cinema Section, M. Brown de Colstoun. It contained the report on Brauner by the Chief of Motion Picture Branch in Munich and tried to exert subtle pressure on the French to have them rescind Brauner’s existing license: On the basis of this report, Brauner has been found ineligible to receive a film production license in the U.S. Zone. In view of the fact that Brauner has held a French Military Government license since 1946, this Branch will not request that this license be withdrawn, but is leaving a decision on that question entirely to your judgement.58

Though superficially the note appears innocuous enough, but for a few of the facts that surround it. The US ICD/ISD was in the habit of pointing out to the other occupying powers Germans within the media services that should be removed from their current positions. Secondly, the cover letter shows no indication that the report was forwarded at the request of the French, making this an unsolicited note. Why write a letter of this nature, if one did not hope to accomplish something by it? The question that is left open to some extent is why the ISD did not want Brauner in Germany’s film industry. Clearly, since he was Jewish, the ISD could not accuse Brauner of being a Nazi or having National Socialist tendencies and thus deny him a license. What seemed to trouble the ISD was his relationship with the Russians and how he had managed to acquire the capital necessary to start a film company. While the money itself was a positive factor in favour of Brauner being granted a license, since so many other companies had failed as a result of the lack of capitalization, the source of his money was an ongoing concern. Though his references indicated that he appeared to be opposed to Communism, or at the very worst was someone who was apolitical, the ISD continued to be ill at ease with Brauner’s ability to move into and out of the Eastern zone without much difficulty. This was of particular concern since he was able to do this even during the Berlin blockade from June 24, 1948, to May 12, 1949. Moreover, it was a bit of a curiosity that Brauner was fluent in English (Dossier indicates “perfect”) despite the fact that he had 58 “Report on Artur Brauner to M. Brown de Colstoun,” March 14 1949, NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. From here on referred to as “Report.”

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no regular contact in the years prior to English speaker and his Russian was noted as “imperfect” even though he had lived in Russia since at least 1941. During the investigation, CIC interrogators questioned not only the three official references whose names appeared in his Fragebogen but 16 other individuals with whom Brauner had done business or was connected to in some way in Berlin. These witnesses gave information that was much more useful than that which the official references could provide. These additional interviewees consisted of: x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

x

Günter Regenberg Wolf Brauner (brother of Artur Brauner) Gerhard Grindel Karl Boese Gaston Briese Mrs. Briese (wife of Gaston Briese) Siegmar Schneider Hilde Körber Kandziorra (Head of Tempelhof Studio) Mr. Feldes (Member UFA‘s Board of Trustees) Hedwig Boran Heinz Herlitz Ernst Lipelt Franz Vogel Theodor Baensch (Head Film, Public Education Section, Berlin Senate) Mr. Winston (ISB staff, British MG, Berlin)59

According to the ISD files, Artur Brauner, Josef Einstein, and Günter Regenberg founded CCC on 16 September 1946. The capital brought into the firm amounted to 21,000 RM. Each of the partners held one-third of the company. Einstein, Brauner’s brother-in-law, handed his part of the company over to Brauner on November 27, 1946, and left the company. Brauner now held a majority interest in the film company. On the same day, Brauner increased the capitalization of the company to 100,000 RM, giving him an almost 90 percent interest in the company. As a result, there was an even greater imbalance between the two owners of the company. CCC’s ownership remained this way until April 25, 1947, when Regenberg transferred his share of the company to Brauner. At this point, the film production company was completely in Brauner’s hands. 59

Brauner Dossier 8-16

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Additionally, Brauner increased the capitalization of the company to 500,000 RM. The ISD, in their investigation, was focused on Brauner‘s apparent easy access to cash, and it became a repeated topic in their interrogation of those who did business with him. Other details about Brauner‘s application bothered the Americans. There seemed to be contradictions in the facts that he presented in his Fragebogen. It was not at all clear to them what he did during the war. This was particularly the case when they compared his questionnaire with statements he had given to the various other agencies in Berlin. The statements that they seemed to have the greatest concern with were: 1) Initially, Brauner had claimed that he had spent the war years in Fergana, Uzbekistan and had been repatriated directly to Poland from there. 2) He claimed that he had indeed stayed with the family in Fergana, but fled from there in 1943, because he was afraid of being drafted into the Soviet Army. 3) A further story that he had given was that he had spent the war hidden in the Polish forests as a member of the resistance. 4) Finally, he had claimed that he had been an inmate at Buchenwald with the prisoner number 89137.60

The one thing that the investigators were clear on, though they had very carefully followed up on Brauner‘s statements, was that it was virtually impossible to develop a clear picture of his life before August 1946. This uncertainty led the CIC investigators employed by the ISD to look for other sources that might give them a clearer picture of Brauner‘s activities before 1946. After an investigation of the files of the VVN,61 the CIC uncovered the identification card number 20001, which contained Brauner’s information.62 To the VVN he had made a fuller (though suspect) statement regarding his life before arriving in Berlin. There he clearly states: 1) That from 1939 until 1944 he had lived in Lodz (not until 1939 as claimed in his Fragebogen) 2) That he was captured in Lodz by the Germans and was taken directly to Buchenwald 60

Brauner Dossier 19 Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, trans. Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime. 62 Brauner Dossier 7. 61

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3) He was given the inmate number 89137 4) In 1944 he was a member of a slave labor group in the area of Rackow and was liberated by the Russians there63

The CIC went even further in its investigations. They not only compared Brauner‘s statements to the ISD and the VVN but also correlated these with the responses he had given on his UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) declaration. For example, in the UNRRA statement, there is no mention at all of any time spent in Buchenwald, which certainly would have been to his benefit. Naturally, the contradictory stories given by Brauner would have appeared highly suspect to ISD officers. They thus decided to follow up their investigation with the Soviet sector police, which indicated that Brauner was living in a UNRRA camp and not the address he had given the ICD on Ilsensteinweg in Berlin-Zehlendorf. Further contradictions in his story continued to emerge as various related items were looked at more carefully. The report indicates that Brauner is supposed to have said that he had fled from the Russians and that he lived in fear of persecution by the Soviets. This appeared to contradict other parts of the story once again: 1) Brauner had received permission to make his first film, Morituri, from the Russians. This meant that he had some very close contacts with the Russians and that they seem to trust him to make films that the Soviet system and the Russian occupation would see in a positive light. It seemed clear, at least to the investigators, that Brauner and the wishes of the Soviet military administration were marching in lockstep. 2) Brauner was also registered with the representatives of the Polish government in Berlin and had been issued a Polish passport. This placed him beyond the reach of the three Western occupation forces. He could move between the various sectors of Berlin without much problem. What they found even more disquieting was the fact that the Polish Embassy hesitated to give the ISD any information about Brauner. 3) Brauner did not just have an ordinary Polish passport, but a special passport that was issued in the four languages used in Berlin at the time. With this passport, Brauner could cross any of the internal zonal borders without difficulty. This meant that he was one of the few people in Berlin who could, despite the blockade, move freely 63

There are five different towns within 40 km. of Lodz named Rakow. It may be that there is a spelling error in the ICD report. I was not uncommon for the spelling in ICD documents to contain “ck” where clearly only a “k” should have been used.

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266 between the four zones.

All of these points would have made the ISD suspicious of Brauner‘s motives and for whom he was working. The ISD had its spies in the Soviet sector that moved freely between the zones. It was only natural to assume that the Soviets also had spies operating in the western sectors. One can only conclude that the CIC and the ISD thought that Brauner might be one of these operatives. When one takes the various stories that surfaced about Brauner as a result of the ISD/CIC investigation and entered into his dossier, especially the statement given by his brother, Wolf, a clearer picture emerges of Artur Brauner’s life between 1939 in 1946. From September to December 1939, Brauner had been an inmate of a Russian work camp close to Brody and not in a German labour camp. He escaped from the camp, but stayed in Poland and worked for a timber company in the Soviet sector of Poland until June 1941. After the invasion of Russia by the Germans, he travelled with his family first to Tashkent, where they did not receive a residency permit, and then to Fergana where they were allowed to remain. Until December 1941, Brauner worked in the timber industry and then became the manager of a warehouse for alcohol and foodstuffs. His father and brother were drafted into a Soviet labour brigade in either June or July of 1942. Artur was spared due to a lame arm. In December of 1942, Brauner managed to free his father and brother from the labour brigade. Eventually, Brauner was drafted into the Soviet Army, despite his infirmity. On March 14, 1945, Brauner was told to report to Gorozakovo for service but travelled to Moscow instead. While in Moscow, he apparently received a letter from the “Polish Patriots” asking him to go to Lemberg and then Lodz. Thus, on May 22, 1945, Brauner once again appears in Lodz with his family. Brauner continues to move about Eastern Europe and eventually has his family sent to him in Stettin at the end of May 1945. His stay in Stettin seems to have been a prosperous one. According to the ISD report, he opened a warehouse for textiles, shoes, and groceries in Stettin. It did not take very long for him to open further warehouses in Poelitz, Odermünde, and the second one in Stettin. Having spent a little over a year there, the family suddenly appeared in Berlin in September 1946. According to witnesses, the family seemed to be well-to-do as a result of having sold their family jewels and their business in Stettin, which altogether had the value of approximately 3.2 million RM. In all, Brauner had managed to do this with an income of 24.000 Rubles in 1940, 18.000 Rubles in 1942, and 20.400 Rubles in 1944, according to his financial statement. This, again, would have raised the eyebrows of those

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investigating him. What probably bothered the ISD the most, was Brauner‘s ability to disregard almost all of the military laws that had been enacted by the US Military Government in a particularly unscrupulous manner, provided there was profit to made. They listed some his infractions; even when he crossed the interzonal borders illegally to attend a wedding in Heidenheim, almost 600 km from Berlin, after initially having been stopped at the frontier for not having the appropriate documentation to do so or a driving permit. The CIC also found evidence of Brauner‘s involvement in Berlin’s burgeoning black-market; not just as a buyer of everyday necessities, but as a major supplier of cigarettes. In the report, it was noted that previously Brauner had been arrested by the military police with a thousand cartons of cigarettes. At the time the value of these goods would have been approximately 700,000 RM. The goods had been confiscated, and he absorbed the loss. It could very well have been that it was not the family jewels that were affording the Brauners a better-than-average lifestyle and the money to finance filmmaking, but his activities in Berlin’s ubiquitous black-markets. According to Brauner‘s statement to the ISD, he also did not live in a refugee camp, but on Ilsensteinweg, Berlin-Zehlendorf. This is where he became acquainted with this future business partner Günter Regenberg, who in turn introduced him the film milieu of Berlin. Even if Regenberg might have thought that Brauner had cheated him in the past, it appears that he had positive things to say about him when the CIC came knocking on his door asking for an interview. Even though Brauner had not received all of the necessary documents for the operation of his production company, this was a small detail that was not going to hold him back. He was not satisfied with only taking on the role of providing the necessary finances to make a film. According to the report, they understood that he also actively participated in the production of the movie. It appears that Brauner was already prepared to begin making his first film in the US sector at the beginning of 1947. This was the film entitled Herzkönig, with Helmut Weiss as director. The problem was, of course, that Brauner was not allowed to make a film in the US sector. This was a small detail for him, as he simply leased a license from two French licensees by the name of Vogel and Lipelt. As a result of having obtained a license, he was able to gain access to the film studio at Tempelhof, which was operated by the Americans. In the end, after the production had been completed, the film was given a French presentation permit. The

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French even offered it for showing in the other sectors as part of an exchange program to gain access to films made in the British and American sectors. The British and Americans refused it. This is often given as the reason for the movie not being a financial success. However, what may have been overlooked is the fact that it was not a very good film, even by the standards of the time. There were also other irregularities in the production of this film. It was, in essence, a French licensed production that had been shot in the American sector under a special permit issued by the American ISD. The winter of 1946 to 1947 had been particularly cold, and it was Regenberg‘s job to keep the facility heated. Brauner accused him of having embezzled money from the production. Regenberg’s defence was that he needed the money to procure petrol and coal from the black-market, for which he naturally did not have a bill or receipt. As a result of this misunderstanding, the two eventually parted company. For the American authorities, according to the report, this was the end of a very promising partnership. What the ISD overlooked were Regenberg’s significant Nazi connections. As noted earlier, when Brauner submitted his Fragebogen to the ICD, he was required to provide three references. These were a Mr. H. Neumann, a Mr. Bauminger, and a Mr. M. Kleinmann. Neumann had known Brauner since 1945 and was the owner of a Jewish restaurant and was a member Jewish congregation in Berlin. Brauner had often been a customer of his, and this had resulted in their acquaintanceship. Neumann indicated that Brauner was a decent and helpful person and that he appeared to have a good education. Moreover, he said that Brauner was an excellent director and a smart businessman. He also said that Brauner had told him that he had even helped as a bricklayer at the reconstruction of the studio so that it might be completed as quickly as possible. Neumann was of the opinion that Brauner was able to overcome any task put before him and that the priority of his filmmaking was its artistic integrity. However, what was of greater interest to the investigators was Brauner’s political attitudes. According to Neumann, Brauner supported the parties from the west that wanted to fight for justice within a democratic framework. The second reference, Bauminger, a furrier, had also become acquainted with Brauner when he was a customer in 1946. Bauminger claimed only to know Brauner superficially. Even so, he felt he was in a position to say that Brauner was a decent and well thought of person and an excellent and adept film producer. The third and final reference, Kleinmann, appeared to have no

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profession and was described as living off of his private funds without needing to work. He had known Brauner the longest of the three since he had also been in the lumber business in Poland. He reported that Brauner appeared to be a talented young man, who had very quickly made himself familiar with every aspect of filmmaking. He also indicated that Brauner was very ambitious. As one might imagine, the three references provided by Brauner were unsatisfactory in the eyes of the ISD and thus further inquiries were made among Brauner’s acquaintances. Gerhard Grindel64 was the political editor and publisher of the journal Sie and had assisted Brauner in writing the outline of Morituri together with the Polish resistance leader Zygismund Szarf Kazimierski. Grindel described Brauner as an honest person and suggested that he had been swindled during the filming of Herzkönig as well as Morituri. He also offered insights into Brauner’s coworkers. For example, Grindel said that Josef von Báky was concerned with how people were treating Brauner. Grindel attacked Walter Tost, who acted as a consultant on the film Morituri for a short time. He also mentioned that it had struck him odd that Brauner appeared to have access to considerable amounts of capital, which was always brought in the form of jewels. Brauner‘s brother, Wolf, was also interrogated.65 The questions the CIC put to him had very little to do with current events and revolved around Brauner’s time in Russia. Wolf Brauner testified that he and his brother had been in Fergana from 1941 to the beginning of 1943. After this, Wolf and his father had been conscripted into a labour brigade, which Artur did not have to join. Wolf Brauner and his father worked for half a year in the Kaganowitsch Factory, where Locomotives were built. He also stated that Artur had come to the factory in Lublinow, freed them from their work, and took them back to Fergana. Though Wolf denied that his brother had ever been a member of the Russian army and that the Soviet administration always appeared to be looking for him, to the ISD it must have been strange that someone of Brauner‘s background would have had enough influence the Russia of 1943 to be able to free his family from forced labour. It is also noteworthy that the report indicates that Wolf Brauner worked as a jeweller at this time. The investigators might have seen this as the conduit of Artur Brauner’s funds. Not all of those questioned had a positive opinion of Brauner. Karl Boese,66 who was the licensed owner of Tova-Film GmbH in the British 64

Brauner Dossier 12. Brauner Dossier 11-12. 66 Brauner Dossier 12-13. 65

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sector, became acquainted with Brauner in 1946. Brauner wanted Boese to lend his support to the production of Morituri since he was already a wellknown film producer. Brauner, apparently, had put considerable pressure on Boese, who eventually relented and signed a contract with Brauner. The reason that Boese did not want to be involved with the film was that it had been a long time since he had done anything other than comedy, though earlier he had been involved in Der Golem, wie er in die Welt kam. Boese may also have been uncomfortable with some of the people with whom Brauner chose to work. Support for this may be found in the report, when Boese claims to have warned Brauner about working with Walter Tost, due to his political questionability. Signing the contract with Brauner would have negative repercussions for Boese. He had also formed a film production company and had begun producing a film without Brauner’s financing. Later, Brauner tried to claim the profit of the film based on the old contract. In the report, it also states that Boese had wanted to take the entire thing to court, but it seems the entire matter was eventually settled quietly. Despite his personal animosity towards Brauner, Boese still appeared to indicate that Brauner was decent. This view is supported by the fact that Boese went on to make other films with Brauner later on in the early 50s. Boese further noted that, like every beginning filmmaker, Brauner wasted considerable amounts of money. As with all of the others that were interrogated by the CIC investigators, Boese was also asked about the source of Brauner‘s money. On this topic, he was in agreement with the others, that the capital had been accumulated through the sale of lumber and the family jewellery. Boese gave the CIC investigators a further lead. They were told to speak with Gaston Briese, who had produced a film for Boese, Beate, and he should be able to provide further information on Brauner‘s background. The investigators did a follow-up on this lead and had a conversation with both Briese and his wife. Briese testified that Brauner used robber baron methods in conducting his business and that Brauner had few scruples when it came to money.67 For this reason, Briese did not think it was anything unusual that Brauner would work with “the Nazi Walter Tost.” Apparently, when Briese asked Brauner about how he could deal with someone like Tost, Brauner’s response was that he could easily take Tost as a brother. Briese also pointed out that Brauner’s production manager and partner, Regenberg, had been a member of the Nazi party, who had not yet been gone through 67

Brauner Dossier 13.

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the denazification process when the film was being made. In response to the film Herzkönig itself, Briese noted that the movie had been forbidden in the British and American sectors due to its poor quality. He further stated that it was because Brauner had money that he did not have to concern himself very much with the fact that the film did not appear in theatres right away. Brauner, according to Briese, only had to wait and eventually the film would be approved for screening. As with the other interviewees, the question eventually came up about the source of Brauner‘s money. The response that Briese gave was enigmatic. He suggested that they go on ask Zygismund Szarf Kazimierski, who was currently living in Frankfurt. According to Briese, Kazimierski would be able to provide them with precise information regarding Brauner’s financial sources. Briese continued in the interview by indicating that “Szarf” had been a leader of the Polish resistance under the codename “Dreadnought” and had given Brauner the basic ideas for Morituri‘s rescue of eight American bomber crew members. Next, CIC interrogators questioned Briese‘s wife, who happened to be Jewish.68 She was Brauner‘s most vociferous opponent and had a very low opinion of him. In the report, it indicates that she was of the view that Jews like Brauner only served to give anti-Semitism the upper hand and that one should not wonder about people who are anti-Semitic when they have to deal with businessmen such as Brauner. She warned the interrogators that, if they wanted to support anti-Semitism, they should simply allow people like Brauner into power. She also said that Brauner often spoke glowingly of the Russians, though she mitigated that statement by saying that Brauner also often said that one had to fear one’s own shadow when dealing with the Russians. However, when the interviewers pressed her, she said that she was utterly convinced that Brauner had been with the Russian army during the war because she had seen a photo of him in the uniform of a Russian captain. At the beginning of his filmmaking career, Brauner had a colleague by the name of Dr. Heinz Herlitz,69 who provided the CIC with a considerable wealth of information about Brauner. In the report, it is noted that Herlitz was the son of Carl Herlitz and oddly, as a “half-Jew,” had worked in the legal department of UFA throughout the war. He confirmed that Brauner had given up his office in the American sector as the result of a direct order given by the Military Government. Herlitz further noted that the order that came from the Military Government was completely in order 68 69

Brauner Dossier 13-14. Brauner Dossier 5, 15.

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and followed the law to a fault. Also, Brauner had immediately shut down the business’s telephone connection; however, he immediately applied for a private phone line, which allowed him to continue doing business as usual. Herlitz also commented on the making of the film Morituri, which had been done under a Russian license, but had been shot at the film production studio in the American sector. It struck him that the Berlin ISD was rather half-hearted in its efforts to shut them down because their threats were never followed up on. The CIC did not limit their investigations to Brauner alone. Because of the close ties that Herlitz had with Brauner, Herlitz was also carefully scrutinised. It appears they wanted to know how someone who was half Jewish could survive the war in Berlin working in UFA‘s legal department. Not only would that, but his membership in the DAF from 1937 to 1945 also have struck them as unusual. The CIC had already assumed that, because of his being half Jewish, Herlitz had not been a member of the NSDAP, which indeed was the case. Even this obvious detail was followed up on at the Berlin Document Centre. What was of greater interest for the ICD was whether Herlitz had profited from the Nazis in some way. As Julian Bach pointed out in 1946: To answer questions concerned with ‘incomes and assets’ provided a valuable clue to the Nazi-identification where no party membership can be proved. A man in the civil service position, who confidently fills in ‘no’ under the membership column, may well be suspected of Nazi tie-ups if his salary since 1933 jumped considerably.70

The investigators noted that his Fragebogen indicated that he had earned 9500 RM in 1944. Though this was higher than the average income of 1200 RM, it was not unusual considering the type of work he did. This was important to the CIC because it made them more comfortable trusting the statements that he had given them. The ISD report clearly puts Brauner‘s character into question. While they were assured that he would be able to deliver films that they wanted to show and would support their political goals, they simply did not know that they could trust him. Lurking in the backs of their minds might have been the disturbing thought that he was a Soviet agent working to undermine the American efforts to introduce their democratic ideals into German society. 70 Julian Bach, America's Germany. An Account of the Occupation (New York: Random House, 1946) 177.

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The investigation into Brauner‘s application serves another purpose for the reader of today. It shows exactly how difficult it was to make films in a Berlin that was divided and had been bombed to rubble. In the end, it appears that the French simply ignored the American request to void Brauner’s license. It may also have simply been a case in which the changing political landscape of Germany in 1948 to 1949 made their request a moot point as the various controls over the media were handed over to German authorities. It is also notable that, even though Morituri had been made under a Soviet license, it was never given permission to be shown in the Russian zone. According to the report, Brauner had been asked to make some “political” changes to the film to receive a screening permit from the Russians. He, however, refused to make the changes, because he felt that it was his money that was at risk. In the end, he had no difficulty getting screening permissions in the American or British zones, though nothing is said about the film having a “screening permit” in the French sector. It may not have been so much a matter of political principle on the part of Brauner in this particular case. Being the businessman that he was, he simply looked at the number of moviegoers in the various zones and did the math. Remaining with a film that was acceptable in the AngloAmerican zones was going to be more profitable than one that could only be shown in the Soviet sector.

Censorship and Control Censorship is a strange thing that takes place in almost all nations regardless of whether constitutions or parliamentary bodies are in place to protect against it. One can only speak of degrees of freedom and not the black and white world many would like to impose on the political discourse surrounding censorship. Ironically, the ICD in Germany recognised this when they categorised individuals as black, grey, or white and then further subdivided the grey and white rubrics into degrees of “whiteness” or “greyness.” There is even evidence that some of the more idealistic ICD officers wondered whether what they were doing was in accord with the ideals that brought them to Germany.71

71

Questioning the policy when they were in service could have been equated with insubordination. It might well explain why a blind eye was turned to certain transgressions on the part of the German licensees. It is after the war, when these individuals began to write on their experiences that one gets the impression that some are still trying to justify what they were a part of. See Breitenkamp.

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The ICD went through distinct phases in how it approached censorship in Germany. Initially, there was a period during which nothing other than OMGUS sanctioned documents could be produced. This banning of nonOMGUS material was supported by Law 191, which had been agreed to by the four Allied Powers. It effectively took control of Germany’s entire cultural industry: The printing, production, publication, distribution, sale and commercial lending of all newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, posters, printed music and other printed or otherwise mechanically reproduced publications, of sound recordings and motion picture films; and the activities or operation of all news and photographic services and agencies, of radio broadcasting and television stations and systems, of wired radio systems; and the activities or operation of all theatres, cinemas, opera houses, film studios, film laboratories, film exchanges, fairs, circuses, carnival houses and other places of theatrical or musical entertainment and the production or presentation of motion pictures, plays, concerts, operas, and performances using actors or musicians are prohibited.72

While Robert Shandley limits his commentary to the German film industry, his sentiment can be applied more broadly when he suggests that almost six months before the end of the war the Allies had already blacked out the means by which the Nazis had created a German community.73 The fact that the initial version of Law 191 allowed the Allies to impose capital punishment on those who did not act in accordance with the law would have made certain of maximum, though not necessarily total, compliance. On May 12, 1945, an amendment was passed that allowed for the licensing of the media and in November 1945 capital punishment was replaced with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The goal from the very beginning was for censorship to remain as covert as possible. For this reason, the ICD relied far more on coercion than the outright exercise of power. However, there is evidence that the ICD took overt action from 1945 to 1947. After 1946, the incidents of

72 Control of Publications, Radio Broadcasting, News Services, Films, Theaters, and Music: SHAEF Military Government Law NO. 191, Amended (1),” in Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents, United States Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, Publication #3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9, March 1950. 73 Robert R. Shandley, Rubble Films. German Cinema in the Shadow of the Third Reich (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 10.

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overt censorship and sanction became rarer, and the control exercised more refined, though not necessarily less effective. Publishers, booksellers, libraries, radio services and film studios were subject ICD investigation, and their licenses or registrations were very much held at the pleasure of the individuals who controlled the local ICD outposts. There was a subtle difference in the way that booksellers and libraries were controlled. The distribution points were registered rather than licensed. This meant that they did not need to meet initially the strict criteria set for those who produced the material. They operated under the assumption that they could prove that they were willing to comply with what was considered acceptable for the German people. The producers, on the other hand, had to prove before the fact that they were going to remain within the stated regulations and needed to demonstrate that they had not been tainted by involvement with the NSDAP. A further consideration was that there were so many more distributors than producers. This made the decision to concentrate on the producers a matter of practicality and led to what appears to be a rather uneven application of the regulations that blanketed the U.S. zone. ICD reports and memoranda provide examples of how thorough the ICD was in its oversight of the German cultural industry. A November 25, 1946, report on violations and penalties for Bavaria, Greater Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden74 indicates that those caught violating ICD rule could face everything from a warning to imprisonment at hard labour.75 Unfortunately, the document does not provide a chronological context with which to work other than the date on which it was created. Some of the associated documents from the various outposts note the start date for their reporting was July 1945. The statistics contained in the associated documents do not support this as a start date because of the sheer number of violations listed in the individual reports. Although one may not be able to provide a specific time frame for the report, other than the end date, of greater interest perhaps are the types of violations that were actionable with penalties and how they are spread out over the three Länder being reported. This last item may point to specific emphases of the officers in control in a given area. For example, in Bavaria, there are 23 cases of objectionable books having been lent out by libraries, with no such violations reported in either Greater Hesse or Württemberg-Baden. On the other hand, Greater Hesse reported far more violations that could be categorised as political in nature. This would 74

This is the designation used during the initial occupation as opposed to the current Baden-Württemberg. 75 RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254.

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include everything from applicants falsifying their past political affiliations on the Fragebogen to a category simply and aptly entitled “political reason.” For a more detailed picture of how the German cultural industry was monitored and sanctioned, the “outpost” reports and correspondence between the various levels of the ICD provide the necessary details. A complete catalogue of what may be found in these files is far too large a task for the present work, so a few representative examples will have to suffice. On May 6, 1947, the ICD Publications Branch reported penalties meted out to various publishers in the US Zone. What is significant about this report is that it lists not only who was penalised, but why they were sanctioned. The Amatheo Verlag of Schliersee, approximately 50 km south of Munich, had its license revoked on April 18, 1946. The stated reason was: “Disagreement between the members of the firm,” “Unauthorized publication: ‘Hints to the Tobacco farmers,’” and “The publishing program was very poor and not one book of the program has been produced.”76 Even the famous Cotta-Verlag was not immune from the ICD. The licensed post-war custodian of the publishing house, Dr. Kurt Port, had his license revoked by the ICD on July 2, 1946, for “try[ing] to evade MG regulations” by “publish[ing] poems having [a] militaristic character.”77 The Leo Lehnen Verlag, which later published some rather significant titles in the 1950s, had its license revoked on November 7, 1946, for Lehnen’s activities with the NSDAP in 1938 and 1939. It was found that he “did not fill out his Fragebogen entirely honestly.”78 While Lehnen had been dishonest in completing his Fragebogen, Gustav Askani of QuellVerlag, which later became an influential publisher of materials for the Evangelical Church in Germany, was found guilty of perhaps a more serious infraction. Askani was found to have tried “to evade MG regulations by writing a letter to a Mr. Ilgenstein advising him to falsify his Fragebogen to get the permission to publish his book ‘Freudige Menschen.’” Wilhelm Ilgenstein did eventually publish Du bist meines Gottes Gab with Quell-Verlag in 1951, among other titles with other publishers, but, for the time being, Askani’s license to publish was revoked in September of 1946. The final example taken from this document is that of Hans Klassen of Kassel-Wilhelmshöhe, who operated the Neu-Sommerfelder Jugend Verlag. This appears to have been a publishing house specialising in the 76

NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. 78 NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. 77

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works for the youth of the Sommerfelder Mennonite Church in Germany. The transgression, in this case, was “making incorrect statements about the backgrounds of his authors,” so on June 5, 1947, his license was revoked.79 The list of penalties reveals something else as well. At about this time Alfred Toombs indicated that it appeared that it was the religious publishers who usually did not abide by ICD regulations. The above list does suggest that Toombs may have been right in his assessment. For the most part, offences against the ICD regulations, specifically Laws 8 and 191, were dealt with through the revocations of licenses and the closure of business premises. Some simply received reprimands. There was, however, a more severe aspect to the penalties handed down to Germans who did not abide by the rules. A document produced by the Office of the Military Government U.S. Berlin District on November 22, 1946, demonstrates how severe some of these punishments could be. For example, Horst Grunsch, who operated a department store at Hasenheide 16 in the Neuköln district, had his license suspended for four weeks on August 28, 1946, as a result of what was called “illicit trade in sheet music.” Most likely the music was of a militaristic nature. On the other hand, on May 21, 1946, Dr Herbert Schmidt-Lamberg of Schöneberg received one-year imprisonment for publishing without a license. The ICD branch overseeing activities in Greater Hesse, administered by Lt. Col. Anthony Kleitz, seems to have been concerned with the number of licenses that may have been revoked in its district. In a report written on November 5, 1946, a handwritten note appears on the bottom of the cover page indicating that no licenses had been revoked. In fact, when one looks at the cover page for the Berlin area report, it also contains a reference to no revocations having taken place. It seems that there was considerable concern regarding this type of action being undertaken. Though no explanation exists for these notes, it appears that the ICD felt it necessary to be able to say that they were not in the business of closing down publishers. Despite being able to say that they did not revoke licenses, some of their other actions would most certainly have ensured compliance on the part of publishers. In Darmstadt outpost, Walter Messner of Bensheim was found guilty by the ICD of having “offended [the] USA” and was sentenced to 6 months in jail.80 Though their penalties were less severe, both Kurt Schauer of the Börsenblatt des deutschen Buchhandels and 79 80

NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254. NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254.

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Vittorio Klostermann, both early and trusted licensees of the ICD, received official reprimands. In the case of Schauer, the publication of the Börsenblatt was temporarily halted for having been in violation of ICD instructions. Klostermann, who had published a work by an unacceptable author, Georg Friedrich Jünger’s Die Perfektion der Technik, escape with only a reprimand. In Bavaria, the penalties seemed to be more severe than elsewhere in the American zone. The October 23, 1946, report from the Military Government ICD Branch Chief in Bavaria,81 Laurence Dalcher, reports that August Küper of Rothenburg o. d. Tauber was found guilty on December 11, 1945, of having printed an unauthorised calendar with advertising, for which he received a 10,000 mark fine in addition to 6 months at hard labour. Even the unauthorised mimeographing of reading material could lead to difficulties. Conrad Willecke of Munich was sentenced on December 19, 1945, to 1-year of prison at Stadelheim for the copying and sale of concentration camp literature.

81

NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254.

CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS

OMGUS, and thus the men and women of the ICD, found themselves in a conundrum on May 8, 1945. They were to democratise Germany, but, as Willett notes, they were confronted by the paradox of an open democratic society forcing its political values on others.1 To some degree, the Allies had already attempted this once after the First World War, but with little enthusiasm and, many would argue, no success. This time was going to be different. They were not simply going to aid in the change of government, but rather they were going to cure the Germans of militarism and racism, or as Saul Padover suggests, their essential “german-ness.”2 They were going to steer the Germans away from what they termed “Germanism” or “Prussianism.” According to Padover, these could be equated with “Nazi-fascism” and consisted of the following traits: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Hostility to democracy (shared power) Reliance on authoritarianism Respect for forests Acceptance of military virtues Belief in German cultural or racial superiority

Padover thought that even the anti-Nazis subscribe to some or all of these. His opinion is that these traits were an essential component of all Germans, had been common German characteristics for generations, and would not easily be eradicated.3 In the secondary literature, it is sometimes intimated that the attempt to reform the German media, and thus the German way of viewing the world, after the war was a failure. This conclusion is usually based on the fact that a few pre-1945 newspaper, magazine, or book publishers; broadcasters; authors; or journalists slipped through the legal and administrative barrier 1

Willett 1. Saul Kussiel Padover, Experiment in Germany; The Story of an American Intelligence Officer (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946), 180-192. 3 Padover 181. 2

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erected by the ICD. Indeed, there were some who reestablished themselves in publishing, radio, or news services after the war. However, what is often overlooked are the successes that attract little or no attention, because they are for the most part “un-newsworthy.” Der Tagesspiegel, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, among many others, were established during the time of ICD control and have served Germany’s democracy well. In addition, publishers like Lambert Schneider, who published Karl Jasper’s Die Schuldfrage in 1946 and then Tagebuch der Anna Frank in 1950, Michael Beckstein, whose publishing house produced significant volumes that dealt with how the Nazis came to power in 1933, and Friederich Michael, who established a West German branch of Insel Verlag in Wiesbaden, could not have done so without significant support from the ICD. In this way, one should conclude that the successes of the ICD, though not as well-known, far outnumber the failures. Germany’s media showed itself to be quite conservative after its control was handed over to the Germans under Adenauer in 1949. It has thus been argued that it did not become the bastion of socialist antiNazism that had been desired by some involved with the ICD. In this connection, there was even a theory as expressed by Gehring that there were some among the ICD, who tended more towards communism as a model for the new Germany.4 If this notion is correct, the fact that the post-war German media did not embrace the left-wing socialist or Marxist attitudes of many of the non-military/civilian officials in charge of the ICD’s administration was reason enough to declare the entire project a failure. However, when one looks at Germany’s media landscape today, one finds a diverse topography of political leanings that are capable of challenging those in power, no matter their ideological bent. It would be hardly supportive of a healthy democracy if every media outlet shared the same political beliefs. Moreover, the literary publishing in Germany, whose foundation is what was established by the ICD, is vigorous and tolerant of experimentation. Not only that, the literary publishers are not afraid to engage current political issues through their publishing programs. Again, one must conclude that in the long term, the ICD project was a success. Others, like Boehling, make the claim that the ICD’s program was a failure, but for other reasons. She suggests that the ICD had little influence over German cultural and non-political life beyond its mass media focus.5 The problem with this theory is that it holds that mass media has no 4

Gehring, Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1953, 89. Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany, 389.

5

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281

influence over the deeper ideology of a nation. While the effect may not have been immediate, there has been a long-term change in how the Germans view themselves as part of Europe and the world. In fact, the program worked so well that, as Fritz Stern stated, “The conflicts in the world in German politics were real -- and rife with irony. The American insistence on German demilitarisation worked so well that some Germans became critics of American militarism.”6 Moreover, the ICD’s program established the major players in today’s German media, with appreciable echoes of the re-education program still being read and heard in today’s German media. Judging the results of the ICD’s efforts solely by these criteria is, however, wrong because it was never the goal of the ICD to create a Germany that was free of all opportunists or of those who might have thought that Nazism was not inherently bad, just badly put into practice. It was also never an objective given to the ICD that US-occupied Germany should reconstruct itself along socialist or Marxist lines. Such may have been the dream of some of the intellectuals and academics working within the machinery of OMGUS and the ICD, but it is not a criterion that one should use to judge the success of the re-education efforts of the ICD. The stated objectives of the ICD, as noted earlier, were to inculcate a sense of collective guilt among the German people, to impress upon the German people that they had been utterly defeated, and to expose the fatal consequences of Germany’s Nazi and militaristic leadership. These are the benchmarks by which one must measure the success or failure of the ICD’s program. The ultimate goal was to create media that was free of government manipulation and a media that would hold those with political power accountable for their action without fear of retribution. In this, the ICD was certainly successful. More than 70 years since the end of the war the German media has shown itself to be independent of governmental control. In fact, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which has a centrist-left orientation, in Bavaria is often referred to as being the only real opposition to the conservation CSU that has governed Bavaria almost continuously since the end of the war. Two further considerations are the timeframe by which one judges the Umbildung of an entire nation and the thoroughness of its collective ideological re-orientation. In terms of the time needed for a nation to change its mode of thinking, one must agree with the opinion of “A Report on Our Problem in Germany,” which clearly states that the timeline for 6

Fritz Stern, Five Germany’s I have Known (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 182.

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solving the problem would span generations and would not occur spontaneously in the few months immediately following Germany’s surrender. One must also consider the words of Brigadier General Edwin Sibert, who was the Assistant Chief of Staff of Army Intelligence, regarding whom they were trying to re-educate. In “The German Mind: Our Greatest Problem” written for the New York Times and published on February 17, 1946, he indicates that his preferred approach to Germany was based on Ortega y Gasset‘s notion of the selection of an “intellectual aristocracy.” This was very similar to the British approach noted earlier. While there is no proof that Gasset was required reading within the ranks of the ICD, there is enough evidence to suggest that the ICD was not aiming to educate each and every German in their zone, but rather to create the conditions for a continuing process of re-education. This route was to ensure that, as Sibert put it, a small number of men very carefully screened, whom the Americans would back to the hilt, would ensure that Germany stayed on a course that supported the American objectives in Europe. The notion that the American occupiers had no plan regarding how to deal with Germany’s occupation is also a blind alley. The Americans most definitely had an idea of how they wanted to move forward. They had set some definite, if difficult to achieve goals. The greater problem may have been that they had too many plans that worked at cross-purposes. Initially, the Morgenthau Plan was the doctrine that was to guide the US occupation. However, with the death of President Roosevelt, it quickly lost favour in Washington. In the absence of any other concrete set of guidelines its principles were implemented in the beginning but were then superseded by JCS 1067 and the Potsdam agreement. The PWD had drawn up plans for how it wanted to proceed in Germany, and these effectively became the plan for the ICD. The difficulty was that they did not always agree with the principle of the JCS 1067 or the Potsdam Agreement. The separate divisions, branches, and even local units of the US Military Government, were left with the task of interpreting the original plan in light of the new policies dictated by the agreements made by the leadership of the Allied nations. Thus, it was not a matter of the ICD not having a workable plan, but the fact that there were too many different plans in operation from various governmental levels. What happened, in the end, was that the individual officer in the field had considerable latitude in the everyday functioning of the area offices. This issue was remedied by the middle of 1946, and the ICD began to reinvestigate licenses that had been granted under considerable pressure to make something happen. The fact of the matter was that

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considering the enormity of the task and the short timeframe the ICD was given; one must agree with Wolfgang Friedmann, who felt that the American approach was far too complex. 7 Moreover, considering the above factors it is not surprising the ICD officers looked for expedient solutions to the tasks they had been given and that, as Thacker suggests: “Put bluntly, if the Allies had actually dismissed all ex-Nazis from all positions of responsibility and influence in Germany after 1945, they would have had all essential services there desperately depleted.”8 The retention of some of some opportunists led to situations like that described by Brewster S. Chamberlin on the meeting between Hans Tost, who had been active in filmmaking during the Nazi era, Henry C. Alter, an official of the ICD, and Wolff von Gordon, who had worked with Terra Films until 1945. It is reported that Alter clearly stated that the Germans are not expected to be “päpstlicher als der Papst.”9 While this may have been the case early on, the ICD tightened up its vetting process considerably by the beginning of 1946. A further issue that added to the difficulty that the ICD had in implementing its program was the change in the role of first the PWD and then the ICD, whose staff was, for the most part, that of the former PWD. Clifford Kirkpatrick had already identified this problem in a 1946 article. There he states that it was a handicap to understanding the other’s point of view while waging war. That is, when one is fighting, one must be convinced of one’s position. Otherwise, doubt will creep in, to the detriment of achieving one’s goal of winning the war. On the other hand, once the war is over and one is trying to achieve a lasting peace, one needs to understand the other side’s point of view.10 It was here that the ICD ran into some difficulty. In the initial phase of the occupation, the Americans continued to operate in a manner that was consistent with being at war. It took a while for them to transition into a mode that allowed them to listen to the Germans. By December 1945, the ICD was beginning to operate on a peacetime footing and showed considerable interest in listening to the Germans and how they thought their various media should evolve in the future.

7

Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany, 114. Thacker, The End of the Third Reich, 153. 9 Brewster Chamberlin, Kultur auf Trümmern. Berliner Berichte der amerikanischen Information Control Section Juli–Dezember 1945 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1979), 39. (Author’s translation: “More pope-like than the Pope”). 10 Clifford Kirkpatrick, “Sociological Principles and Occupied Germany,” American Sociological Review 11 (1946): 70. 8

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The allegation that the ICD did not go particularly deep and did not attempt to reach the mental Nazi has also been suggested. Such a conclusion is usually based on situations where former Nazis were found to be operating media organisations after the handover of full control of the media in 1949 to the Germans. While some did slip through on occasion, the majority of individuals operating outlets were politically clean, and the number of politically problematic individuals is insignificant when considering the bigger picture. The enforcing of the doctrine of collective guilt, which was a cornerstone of the re-education program, presented a significant and insurmountable problem for the ICD in the administration of postwar Germany. They knew this would be a problem, and it was one of the reasons that the occupation authorities did not wish to engage the Germans in a debate. It represented a fundamental dichotomy in theory and practice. It was also a question for which both the American PWD and the British Political Warfare Executive had spent at least two years preparing justifications. In some ways, it was the easiest solution to the problem, because as Friedmann suggests: “The categorization of 70 million people into guilty and innocent is a sheer practical impossibility.”11 On the other hand, if all Germans were equally guilty, then they were indeed placing the culprits in control of the country’s media. It is, for this reason, that OMGUS while keeping the doctrine in place officially, started to distinguish between varieties of guilt. In the end, it may simply have been, as Clara Menck suggests that the collective guilt campaign failed because the link was not successfully made between the average German and what went on in the camps. 12 The final straw was the rift that opened between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans needed the German media to stop playing the two sides of the developing Cold War off of one another. They, in other words, needed a more conservative press to sway public opinion in their favour, especially in Berlin and the Ruhr. The easiest solution was to take away all of the licenses from the individuals whose politics strayed too far to the left. This included all of the Communists and many of those involved with the SPD. From then on the media very quickly moved to the right, but not because the German media was expressing some peculiar German attribute, but a very predictable result of actions taken by OMGUS to manufacture a West Germany that would 11

Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany, 121. Clara Menck, “The Problem of Reorientation,” in The Struggle of Democracy in Germany, eds. Gabriel Abraham Almond & Eugene Newton Anderson (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 306-307. 12

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become a staunch conservative ally of the United States. What the US did not count on was how effective their campaign against militarism in Germany would eventually be. In fact, in the spirit of Fritz Stern, it was so successful that Germany resisted and eventually refused the American call to go to war in Iraq, a final irony in the war for the German mind.

APPENDICES

The following appendices have all been taken from the original documents held at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland. The only changes made are the rare spelling errors in the original documents that have been corrected and have been normalised to American English standards.

APPENDIX A Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War (Members List) The following organizations were officially represented at the conference: The American Association on Mental Deficiency American Branch of the International League Against Epilepsy American Neurological Association American Orthopsychiatric Association American Psychiatric Association American Society for Research in Psychosomatic Problems The National Committee for Mental Hygiene.1 Individual members of the conference were: Theodore Abel, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University. Franz Alexander, M.D., Director, The Institute of Psychoanalysis, Chicago. Alvan L. Barach, M.D., Associate Professor of Clinical Medicine, Columbia University. Lauretta Bender, M.D., Senior Psychiatrist, in Charge of the Children’s Ward of Bellevue Hospital, New York. Sidney Biddle, M.D., Philadelphia. Carl Binger, M.D., Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, Cornell Medical College. Richard M. Brickner, M.D., Assistant Professor of Clinical Neurology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University. Lyman Bryson, Professor of Education, Columbia University. D. Ewen Cameron, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, McGill University. Frank S. Churchill, M.D., Former Physician of Juvenile Court, Chicago and

1

It is noteworthy that The National Committee for Mental Hygiene advocated strongly for eugenics programs and called for “Legislation denying the privilege of parenthood to the manifestly unfit” (Hand Book of the Mental Hygiene Movement and Exhibit [1913] 17).

288

Appendix A

Former President of the American Paediatric Society. Richard Crutchfield, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Swathmore College. Lawrence K. Frank, Chairman, Joint Committee on Post-War Planning. Frank Fremont-Smith, M.D., New York. Thomas M. French, M.D., Associate Director of the Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago. M.R. Harrowe-Erickson, Research Associate, Department of Neuro-psychiatry, University of Wisconsin. Ives Hendrick, M.D., Boston. Edward J. Humphreys, M.D., Director of Research and Training in Mental Deficiency, Michigan State Hospital Commission. Marion E. Kenworthy, M.D., Director, Department of Mental Hygiene and Professor of Psychiatry, New York School of Social Work. Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D., Sub-committee on Psychiatry, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. Bertram Lewin. M.D., New York. Lawson G. Lowrey, M.D., Editor, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. Marion McBee, Executive Secretary, New York City Committee on Mental Hygiene. Margaret Mead, Associate Curator of Anthropology, American Museum of Natural History. Adolf Meyer, M.D., Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry, John Hopkins University. John A.P. Millet, M.D., Chairman, Emergency Committee of Neuro-Psychiatric Societies of New York City. Gardner Murphy, Professor of Psychology, College of the City of New York. Harry A. Overstreet, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, College of the City of New York. Talcott Parsons, Professor of Sociology, Harvard University. Tracy J. Putnam, M.D., Professor of Neurology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University. George Stevenson, M.D., Medical Director, The National Committee for Mental Hygiene.

APPENDIX B Possible German Objections to the Allied Conduct of the War I. Britain and Germany, 1933-1939 1. Why didn’t you give Germany a free hand in the East? 2. Why did you refuse to cooperate with Germany? 3. Why did you start the World War by declaring war on Germany? 4. Why did you refuse to return Germany’s colonies? 5. Isn’t it a pity that the Jews landed us in a war against each other? II. The Conduct of the War 6. Why do you blame German ruthlessness when you have won your own Empire by the same kind of methods? 7. Why did the British concentrate on an unsoldierly air war against women and children? 8. Did you smash German industry in order to remove a competitor? 9. Why didn’t you join up with the Germans in a crusade against Russia in 1941? Can’t you see that Russia is the menace of the future and that the Germans were just forestalling a vast attack? 10. Can’t you see that we were betrayed by our allies? 11. Can’t you see that we had to fight on the fear of annihilation? III. Britain’s Post-War Policy to Europe and to Germany 12. Haven’t you in fact lost the war by losing your Empire to the Americans and your influence in Europe to the Russians? 13. Why did the Western Powers allow Russia to occupy part of Germany? 14. Why do you continue to treat the Germans as enemies instead of making peace with them? 15. Why do you blame the German people for the war when they were the unwilling instruments and victims of Nazi tyranny? Why didn’t you crush the Nazis between 1933 and 1939 instead of blaming them? 16. Why are some Germans who are obviously innocent of war aims being made to suffer? 17. Why do the British and Americans keep trying to thrust Democracy down the Germans throats? What is good for them may not be good for us.

290

Appendix B 18. You said you would save the Germans from starvation, unemployment and economic misery? Why are rations still short, and jobs so hard to get?1

1

“Letter from Wilson to Birch,” February 2, 1944, Public Records Office, London, FO 898/480. Wilson and Birch had worked together and had just completed the initial drafts of “A Pocket Guide to Germany.” This was to become the standard field manual for the Allied soldiers and was intended to guide their dealings with Germans.

APPENDIX C Important Overt Publications (1946) “Freedom vs. Totalitarianism Broadcasts and Pamphlets” The most salient topics of the broadcasts according to the ICD were: Elections in a Free Democracy Trade Unions in a Free Democracy Non-political Organizations in a Democracy Duties of an American Editor The Western Union Germany’s Import Program The pamphlets included: “Hinter dem eisernen Vorhang” (Behind the Iron Curtain) “Marshall stellt klar” (Marshall Makes it Clear), a reproduction of the Secretary of State’s Chicago speech before his departure from the London conference late in 1947 “Offen gesagt” (Speaking Frankly) by former Secretary of State Byrnes “Machtraub in Ungarn” (How the Russians Grabbed My Government) by Ferenc Nagy former Hungarian Premier “Mit vereinten Kräften – Europa plant, Amerika hilft” (With United Strength -Europe Plans, America Helps) “Aspekte der gegenwärtigen amerikanischen Aussenpolitik” (Aspects of the Present American Foreign Policy) “Lasst auch endlich Taten sehen! – Der Meinungsaustausch zwischen Washington und Moskau” (Let Us Also See Deeds at Last -- the Exchange of Opinions between Washington and Moscow) “Gewerkschaftler und Kommunisten” (Trade Unionists and Communists) “Arbeiter oder Ausgebeutete?” (Workers or Exploited?) “Gewerkschaften und Sozialpolitik in Sowjet-Russland” (Trade Unions and Social Politics in Soviet Russia)

APPENDIX D The Status of Information and Entertainment Services and of Licenses in the US Zone as of June 30, 1948. NUMBER OF INFORMATION AND ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES IN OPERATION Newspapers Radio Stations US Information Centers Film Theaters Legitimate Theaters and Opera Houses

Bavaria

Hesse

WürttembergBaden

Bremen

Berlin Sector

Total

22 1 7

13 1 7

12 1 5

2 1 1

2 1 2

51 5 22

582 41

377 20

226 23

47 8

70 8

1302 100

NUMBER OF INFORMATION AND ENTERTAINMENT LICENSES ISSUED IN THE US OCCUPIED AREAS OF GERMANY AS OF 30 JUNE 1948 Publishers Film Producers Theater Activities1 Music Activities 2

1 2

Bavaria

Hesse

WürttembergBaden

Bremen

Berlin Sector

Total

114 11 278

81 3 67

141 2 101

9 0 20

40 17 14

385 33 480

95

29

36

10

13

183

Legitimate Theaters, Variety Shows, Circuses, and Cabarets Orchestras, Opera Companies, Concert Agencies, Producers

APPENDIX E Circulation of German Newspapers in the US Zone (June 30, 1946)1 City BAVARIA 1. Ansbach 2. Aschaffenburg 3. Augsburg 4. Bad Reichenhall 5. Bamberg 6. Bayreuth 7. Coburg 8. Garmisch-Partenkirchen 9. Hof 10. Ingolstadt 11. Kempten 12. Landshut 13. Munich 14. Nuremberg 15. Passau 16. Regensburg 17. Rosenheim 18. Weiden 19. Würzburg

Name of Newspaper

Licensed

Circulation

Fränkische Landeszeitung Main Echo Schwäbische Landeszeitung Südost Kurier Fränkischer Tag Fränkische Presse Neue Presse Hochland Bote Frankenpost Donau Kurier Der Allgäuer Isar Post Süddeutsche Zeitung Nürnberger Nachrichten Passauer Neue Presse Mittelbayerische Zeitung Oberbayerisches Volksblatt Der Neue Tag Main Post

24 Apr 46 24 Nov 45 30 Oct 45 10 May 45 08 Jan 45 18 Dec 45 25 Jan 46 08 Oct 45 12 Oct 45 11 Dec 45 13 Dec 45 15 Jan 46 06 Oct 45 11 Oct 45 05 Feb 46 23 Oct 45 26 Oct 45 31 May 46 24 Nov 45

60,000 60,000 199,700 55,000 75,000 73,500 65,700 42,900 106,000 45,000 65,000 70,900 410,000 165,000 90,000 200,000 40,100 60,000 103,100

GREATER HESSE: 1. Darmstadt 2. Frankfurt 3. Frankfurt 4. Fulda 5. Giessen 6. Kassel 7. Marburg 8. Wetzlar 9. Wiesbaden

Darmstädter Echo Frankfurter Neue Presse Frankfurter Rundschau Fuldaer Volkszeitung Giessener Freie Presse Hessische Nachrichten Marburger Presse Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung Wiesbadener Kurier

17 Nov 45 15 Apr 46 31 Jul 45 30 Oct 45 02 Jan 46 26 Sep 45 15 Sep 45 02 Jan 46 01 Oct 45

70,400 150,000 250,000 46,700 20,000 199,300 40,000 22,500 92,500

WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN: 1. Heidelberg 2. Heilbronn 3. Karlsruhe

Rhein-Neckar Zeitung Heilbronner Stimme Badische Neueste Nachrichten

05 Sep 45 28 Mar 46 01 Mar 46

169,300 38,600 92,000

4. Stuttgart 5. Ulm

Stuttgarter Zeitung Schwäbische Donau Zeitung

17 Sep 45 10 Nov 45

319,000 76,100

1

History I.

294 ENCLAVES: 1. Berlin 2. Bremen 35 [Newspapers]

Appendix E

Der Tagesspiegel Weser Kurier

27 Sep 45 15 Sep 45

450,000 153,000 4,177,200

APPENDIX F Important German Journal Publications to July 1947 to June 1948 Title

Details and Circulation

Erziehungskunst (Educational Practice)

bimonthly, Stuttgart, 5000

Die Pädagogische Provinz (The Teacher’s Job) Zeitschrift für Hygene und Infektions-Krankheiten (Journal of Hygiene and Infectious Diseases), Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten Vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie (Archive for Psychiatry and Nervous Disease) Bayerisches Ärzteblatt (Bavarian Physician)

monthly, Frankfurt, 5000 irregularly, Heidelberg.

Langenbecks Archiv für klinische Chirurgie vereinigt mit deutsche Zeitschrift für Chirurgie (Langenbeck’s Archives for Clinical Surgery Combined with German Surgical Journal) Angewandte Chemie (Practical Chemistry) Chemische Berichte (Chemical Reports) Zeitschrift für analytische Chemie (Analytical Chemistry) Physikalische Berichte (Physical Abstracts) Zeitschrift Der Deutschen Geologischen Gesellschaft (Journal of the German Geological Society) Neue juristische Wochenschrift (New Juridical Weekly) Studium Generale (General Science) Jugendruf (Call of Youth) Radio Illustrierte (Illustrated Radio Magazine) Deutsche Rundschau (German Review) Die neue Stadt (The New City) Zeitschrift für Versicherungswissenschaft und Versicherungspraxis (Science and Practice of Insurance) Brandschutz (Fire Protection) Nachrichtendient des deutschen Vereins für offentliche und private Fürsorge (Bulletin on Community Welfare) Bayerische Rundschau (Bavarian Review)

irregularly, Heidelberg, 1200

monthly, published in Munich, 8000 irregularly, published in Heidelberg, 1200

monthly, Heidelberg monthly, Heidelberg irregularly, Heidelberg, 1650 monthly, Wiesbaden, 5000 irregularly, Stuttgart, 1250 monthly, Munich, 10,000 monthly, Heidelberg, 6000 monthly, Berlin, 25,000 weekly, Bremen monthly, Berlin. monthly, Frankfurt, 15,000 monthly, Schliersee, 5000

monthly, Stuttgart. Edition 10,000 monthly, Munich, 1700

semimonthly, Munich, 50,000

APPENDIX G ICD Pamphlet Publications and Circulation 1947-1948 Title “Behind the Iron Curtain” by N.Y. Herald Tribune correspondents “Marshall Makes It Clear” by Secretary of State George C. Marshall “Speaking Frankly” by former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes “How the Russians Seized my Government” by Ferencz Nagy, former Premier of Hungary “Aspects of Current American Foreign Policy” (a US Government publication) “Forced Labor in Soviet Russia” (excerpts), by David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky “Nazi-Soviet Relations 19341941” Department of State. Limited German edition. “Smith-Molotov Exchange” “Trade Unions and Social Policy in Soviet Russia” a Military Government publication “Social Democracy and Communism” by Kautsky (published by US licensed publishers) “How to Beat the Communists” by Walter Reuther and David Dubinsky “With United Strength” (a pamphlet on the Marshall plan, including 20,000 copies for Austria)

Date Issued December 1947

Size of Edition 200,000

December 1947

500,000

December 1947

January 1948

250,000 (1st Edition) 100,000 (2nd Edition) 200,000 (3rd Edition) 68,000

February 1948 March 1948

10,000 (1st Edition) 50,000 (2nd Edition)

March 1948

110,000 (1st Edition) 120,000 (2nd Edition)

April 1948

1500

May 1948 June 1948

200,000 100,000

June 1948

25,000

June 1948

200,000

May 1948

240,000

APPENDIX H Book Translation Rights Acquisitions as of June 1948 that the ICD Considered most Important Title Daniel Boone (1939) Teacher in America (1945) Woman as a Force in History (1946) Economic Basis of Politics (1922) America in Midpassage (1939) Patterns of Culture (1934) Managerial Revolution (1941) The Growth of the Law (1924) Men Who Have Walked with God (1945) On Understanding Science (1947) Science in Childhood Education (1944) French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation (1947) American Political and Social History (1943) Plowman’s Folly (1943) Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1916) On Second Thought (1946) A Prince in Their Midst (1946) Economic Policy and Full Employment (1947) What Man Can Make of Man (1942) Preface to Philosophy (1946) Higher Learning in America (1936) Hawk of Hawk Clan (1941) Peace of Mind (1946) Middletown (1929) Middletown in Transition (1937) Selected Stories Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (1945) Invincible Louisa (1933) Systematic Politics (1945) John Henry Newman (1946) The Condition of Man (1944)

Author John Bakeless Jacques Barzun Mary R. Beard Charles A. Beard Charles and Mary Beard Ruth Benedict James Burnham Benjamin N. Cardozo Sheldon Cheney James Bryant Conant Gerald Spellman Craig Henry Ehrmann Harold Underwood Faulkner Edward Faulkner Felix Frankfurter James Gray A. J. Hanna A. H. Hansen William E. Hocking William E. Hocking Robert M. Hutchins Margaret Johansen Joshua L. Liebman Helen M. and Robert S. Synd Helen M. and Robert S. Synd Thomas Mann Elton Mayo Cornelia Meigs Charles E. Merriam John Moody Lewis Mumford

298

Appendix H

City Development (1945) One World in the Making (1945) Great Teachers (1946) Industrial Microbiology (1940) The Daring Young Man on the Flying Trapeze (1934) Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937) The Well-Tempered Listener (1940) The Newspaper, Its Making and Its Meaning (1945) Liberal Education (1943) Journey for Margaret (1941) You Can’t Go Home Again (1940)

Lewis Mumford Ralph Barton Perry Houston E. Petersen Prescott and Dunn William Saroyan A. Pitirim Sorokin Deems Taylor Edited by the New York Times Mark Van Doren William Lindsay White Thomas Wolfe

APPENDIX I Representative Sampling of the Book Holding of the American Information Centers July 1947- June 1948 Title Run with the Hare Tomorrow Will Sing It’s a Woman’s World National Velvet A Tale from Bali Still Time to Die The Hymnal, Army and Navy Young’ un The Decameron Tragedy in Blue Pleasant Valley What Became of Anna Bolton Jane Eyre Prester John A Marriage The Way of All Flesh For Men Only The Postman Always Rings Twice Genesee Fever Try and Stop Me Mystery Omnibus The Paradoxes of Mr. Pond And Then There Were None A Far Country Richard Carvel Blithe Spirit The Last Adam The Green Years Burnaby Rudge A Child’s History of England The Personal History of David Copperfield Great Expectations Little Dorrit Martin Chuzzlewit Nicolas Nickleby The Old Curiosity Shop A New Pronouncing Dictionary of the Spanish and English Language

Author Kieran Abbey Elliot Arnold Mary Louise Aswell Enid Bagnold Vicki Baum Jack Belden Ivan L. Bennett Herbert Best Giovanni Boccaccio Marion Bramhall Louis Bromfield Louis Bromfield Charlotte Brontë John Buchan Pearl S. Buck Samuel Butler James M. Cain James M. Cain Carl Carmer Bennett Cerf Raymond Chandler G. K. Chesterton Agatha Christie Winston Churchill Winston Churchill Noel Coward James Gould Cozzens A. J. Cronin Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Charles Dickens Mariano de la Cadena Velazquez

300 Title The Heart of Jade The Pine Ridge Feud Dictators of the Baton Murder at a Police Station Young Lonigan Freedom Road The American Joseph Andrews The Golden Rooms Journey in the Dark Twenty Best Film Plays Voyage of the Golden Hind The Bedside Esquire A Sheltered Life Norma Ashe The Facts of Life Delilah Wife to Mr. Milton World Words The Troubled Midnight England Mystery Omnibus Take Them Up Tenderly Drift from Two Shores Lie down in Darkness The Sun Also Rises Farewell to Arms The Gentle Grafter The Trimmed Lamp Reads of Destiny The Voice of the City Whirligigs Hostages I Never Left Home Time Must Have a Stop Daisy Kenyon The Walsh Girls The Voice of Bugle Ann Poems I Remember Anna and the King of Siam Weekend at the Waldorf Galli-Curci’s Life of Song None but the Lonely Heart Back Where I Came from Potterism

Appendix I Author Salvador de Madariaga Harriet Catherine Evans David Ewen Jefferson Farjeon James T. Farrell Howard Fast Howard Fast Henry Fielding Vardis Fisher Martin Flavin John Gassner Edmund Gilligan Arnold Gingrich Ellen Glasgow Susan Glaspell Paul Goodman Marous Goodrich Robert Graves W. Cabell Greet John Gunther John M. Hall Daschiell Hammett Margaret Case Harriman Bret Harte H. R. Hayes Ernest Hemingway Ernest Hemingway O. Henry O. Henry O. Henry O. Henry O. Henry Stefan Heym Bob Hope Aldous Huxley Elizabeth Janeway Elizabeth Janeway MacKinlay Kantor John Kieran Margaret Landon Charles Lee C. E. Le Massena Richard Llewellyn A. J. Liebling Rose Macauley

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Title Mr. England, The Life Story of Winston Churchill How to Design and Install Plumbing The Razor’s Edge McSorley’s Wonderful Saloon Kitty Foyle Morley’s Variety (a selection) The Story of San Michele Pal Joey Crazy like a Fox Blackout in Gretley Masterpieces of the World’s Literature, Ancient and Modern The River Mystery Bold Robin Hood and His Outlaw Band Rabble in Arms Runyan à la Carte The Damon Runyon Omnibus Tales of Detection Gaudy Night Plowman of the Moon

Author Paul Manning and Hilton Bronner A. J. Matthias W. Somerset Maugham Joseph Mitchell Christopher Morley Christopher Morley Axel Munthe John O’Hara S. J. Perelman J. B. Priestley Harry Thurston Peck Arthur J. Rees Louis Rhead Kenneth Roberts Damon Runyon Damon Runyon Dorothy L. Sayers Dorothy L. Sayers Robert Service

301

APPENDIX J List of America Information Center Lecture Topics from January to March 1948 “Modern American Plays” “Agriculture in America” “England Today” “Farm Life in California” “The London Conference” “Public Opinion in a Democracy” “The Springfield Plan” “What Is Public Opinion Research” “American Farm Life” “The Oil Industry in America” “Christmas in America” “History of Jazz” “American Family Life” “The Expellee Problem” “Abraham Lincoln” “American Paintings” “Modern Art” “Democratic World Government” “Music Life in America” “American Literature” “American Influence in Europe” “Some Aspects of Modern Education” “American Journalism” “United Nations Organization” “Background of Russian Policy” “European Recovery Program” “The Negro in America” “Banks in America” “Civil Liberty in Times of Crisis” “Basic Problems of World Peace” “Trends in German History” “Democracy in the United States” “Democracy in France” “The World Food Crisis” “What Can Be Done for a Better Understanding between the Americans and Germans?” “Fundamental Rights and the Right of Freedom in the American Constitution” “The Influence of Public Opinion and Government” “Can Germany Really Build a Democratic Government of, by, and for the People?” “Economic Failure of the Totalitarian States” “American and British Conceptions of Government” “Influence of the Frontier on American Democracy” “The U.S. Constitution and the Development of American Economy” “Presidential Elections in the United States” “Is a United States of Europe Possible?” “America’s Contribution to the Idea of Continental World Unity”

APPENDIX K Activities in America Houses in Bavaria-June 1948 Location of Centers Population (estimated)

Augsburg

Bamberg

185000

75000

47500

801500

340000

114500

70000

1633500

9690

2975

6893

7943

7015

3950

5718

44184

Reader attendance in center:

Erlangen Munich

Nuremberg Regensburg Würzburg

Total

Number of lectures, discussions (reorientation) etc. 7

2

2

2

45

9

2

69

50

18

4

10

161

3

2

248

English-language:

3636

2488

706

723

3119

219

62

10953

German language:

344

344

145

150

3458

873

115

5343

21

1

1

1

2

1

1

28

422

125

58

55

263

48

80

1051

Number of books in circulation:

1996

861

169

2000

2590

3427

1466

12509

Attendance and branch reading rooms:

3190

3140

6818

7068

10737

2200

4566

37693

12000

German: English:

Attendance at reorientation programs

Number of music programs:

Attendance at music program:

Total inventories 7572

7508

8642

7420

12000

11511

66653

projectors:

1

1

1

1

2

1

7

playbacks:

2

1

1

1

1

6

Filmstrip machines:

1

1

1

1

4

books:

records: Books on shelves:

281

70

206

200

250

290

280

1586

5576

6647

8437

10000

4830

8573

10045

54108

APPENDIX L Documentary Film Production August 1947 to June 1948 Completed: Released Hunger* Reaction Positive It’s up to You* Achtung Mücken* Red Cross Awaiting Release Nuremberg* Nuremberg*

Subject World Food Problem Venereal Disease Germany 1919 -- 1948 Malaria Problem Bavarian activities

Producer DFU/Kurt Schmid Film Kurt Schmid Film DFU/Kiepenheuer DFU Leckebusch

Nazi history English-language version Amputations

DFU DFU Berger-Schmalfilm

Fairytale film Fairytale film

Schongerfilm Schongerfilm

Fairytale film Fairytale film Fairytale film Artificial limbs

Schongerfilm Schongerfilm Schongerfilm Leckebusch

Marshall Plan Special Assignment Races of Mankind Press Freedom Progress and Optimism Militarism

DFU DFU Kultur Film Institut Concordia Brandes Renaissance

Wille zum Leben (16 mm) Frau Holle Das verzauberte Tüchlein Ein Fass voll Spass Schneemann Pimpinella Prosthetics Final Production Stages: Me and Mr. Marshall* Reparations* Black, White, Yellow Between the Lines Druck aus Tempelhof Marschieren -marschieren Psychology (series) In Production: Mooreland Home Six Technical Films

Study of emotions

Film-Form

Reclaimed land (Medical)

Munich Rhapsody Fear Uncared For You and Traffic Goethe Homegarden Spatzenfest

Munich today Psychiatry Psychiatry Accident prevention Life and works Food production Animated cartoon

Hochlandfilm Institut für wissenschaftliche Filme Pfeiffer Attila Film Attila Film Messer Örtel Film Pfeiffer Quidom Film

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany JEIA* Export -- Import Transport* Railroad analysis Town Speaks* Town meetings Law New Court System Dorf im Aufbau Cooperative Village Refugees German “DP’s” Der Wald German forests Berlin lebt Berlin today Die Frau German women today *Produced by the Documentary Film Unit

DFU DFU DFU Kiepenheuer Schwabenfilm Schonger Hochlandfilm Renaissance Schubert

305

APPENDIX M Films in Production in Bavaria June 1948 In Camera Stage Der Apfel is ab (The Apple Has Gone)

Camera Filmgesellschaft

Das verlorene Gesicht (The Lost Face)

Neue Deutsche Filmgesellschaft

Die kupferne Hochzeit (The Copper Wedding)

Comedia Film

In Pre-Camera Stage “Pawlin” (Temporary Title)

Witt-Film

Die andere Seite (The Other Side) (Temporary Title)

Bavaria-Film

Die Nachtwache (The Night-Guard)

Neue Deutsche Filmgesellschaft

Hallo, Fräulein

Camera Film

APPENDIX N Youth Performances Sponsored by ICD, Army Units, and the German Youth Activities Program July 1947 August 1947 September 1947 October 1947 November 1947 December 1947 January 1948 February 1948 March 1948 April 1948 May 1948 June 1948 Total

Number of Showings 753 762 650 611 660 658 653 587 555 633 490 567 7579

Total Attendance 229,072 216,739 183,431 167,512 191,336 208,376 206,747 184,990 185,021 202,141 165,220 187,333 2,327,918

APPENDIX O Theater Performance Rights Held by the ICD June 1948 Abe Lincoln in Illinois Ah Wilderness Another Language Awake and Sing Biography Boy Meets Girl Claudia End of Summer Ethan Frome Embezzled Heaven Family Portrait First Legion Glass Menagerie I Remember Mama Knickerbocker’s Holiday Life with Father Mary of Scotland Men in White Morning’s at Seven Mourning Becomes Electra My Heart’s in the Highlands Monsignor’s Great Hour

Mice and Men No Time for Comedy On Borrowed Time One Sunday Afternoon Our Town Pursuit of Happiness Saturday’s Children Susan and God The Adding Machine The Barrets of Wimpole Street The Skin of Our Teeth The Time of your Life Three Men on a Horse Thunder Rock The Patriots The Happy Journey Uncle Harry Voice of the Turtle Vinegar Tree Watch on the Rhine Why Marry Yes, My Darling Daughter

APPENDIX P Royalties Generated by Performance Rights Held by the ICD Play Voice of the Turtle Three Men on a Horse Biography The Skin of Our Teeth Thunder Rock Our Town On Borrowed Time First Legion Mourning Becomes Electra Yes, My Darling Daughter Uncle Harry The Adding Machine Men in White Monsignor’s Great Hour Claudia Saturday’s Children I Remember Mama Family Portrait Life with Father The Barretts of Wimpole Street Ah Wilderness Awake and Sing My Heart’s in the Highlands Mary of Scotland Boy Meets Girl Vinegar Tree Ethan Frome The Patriots Watch on the Rhine Pursuit of Happiness Why Marry?

Author John van Druten John Cecil Holm & George Abbott S .N. Behrmann Thornton Wilder Robert Ardrey Thornton Wilder Paul Osborn Emmet Lavery Eugene O’Neill Mark Reed Thomas Job Elmer Rice Sidney Kingsley Emmet Lavery Rose Franken Maxwell Anderson John van Druten Lenore Coffee & William Joyce Cowen Howard Lindsay & Russell Crouse Rudolf Besier Eugene O’Neill Clifford Odets William Saroyan Maxwell Anderson Bella and Sam Spewak Paul Osborn Owen and Donald Davis Sidney Kingsley Lillian Hellman Lawrence Langer & Armina Marshall Langer Jesse Lynch Williams

Royalty (RM) 221,608.95 145,237.89 130,930.82 107,580.81 90,521.13 70,139.08 54,730.63 43,064.57 27,879.61 26,895.30 20,597.50 17,837.23 12,294.90 12,244.49 11,461.80 11,016.25 11,001.86 10,082.80 9925.29 9762.25 6447.91 5962.65 5147.42 5107.63 5009.80 2869.47 2388.11 1408.66 1408.66 961.85 907.00 1,082,655.58

APPENDIX Q Number of Music Licensees by Sector June 1946 Music Licenses Music Registrations Area Bavaria

43

3,404

Berlin (U.S. Sector)

5

903

Bremen Enclave

1

361

Greater Hesse

8

1,918

Württemberg-Baden

12

1,347

69

7,933

Totals

--

APPENDIX R List of American Symphonic Works Performed in the US Sector to June 1946 Adagio Capricorn Concerto Essay Essay No. 2 School for Scandal Overture Symphony No. 2 Violin Concerto Clarinet Sonata Schelomo Rhapsody Holiday Overture Appalachian Spring Outdoor Overture Symphony Violin Sonata Quintet Symphony No. 3 Trio Adagio Violin Sonata Concertino String Quartet No. 1 The Incredible Flutist Suite Symphony No. 2 Trio No. 1 Violin Sonata String Quartet No. 4 Ukrainian Suite American Festival Overture String quartet No. 2 Symphony for Strings Symphony No. 3

Samuel Barber

Leonard Bernstein Ernest Bloch Elliot Carter Aaron Copland David Diamond Howard Hanson R. Harris Charles Ives

Walter Piston

Quincy Porter

William Schuman

String Quartet

Roger Sessions

Symphony No. 2

Randall Thompson

APPENDIX S 1947-1948 Operatic Seasons of Bavarian State Opera and the State Theater Stuttgart Bavarian State Opera Abraska Bajazzo Ballet Daphnis and Chloe Barber of Seville Carmen Die Bernauerin Die schweigsaume Frau Dreispitz Eugen Onegin Feuervogel – Ballet Fidelio Freischütz Gianni Schicca Hänsel und Gretel Katja Kabanova La Boheme Macht des Schicksals Madame Butterfly Marriage of Figaro Mathis der Maler Othello Tales of Hoffmann The Bartered Bride The Magic Flute Tiefland Tosca Tristan und Isolde

Werner Egk Leoncavallo Ravel Rossini Bizet Orff d’Albert De Falla Tchaikovsky Stravinsky Beethoven Weber Puccini Humperdinck Janacek Puccini Verdi Puccini Mozart Hindemith Verdi Offenbach Smetana Mozart d’Albert Puccini Wagner

State Theater Stuttgart Aida Barber of Seville Cosi fan Tutte Die Bernauerin Die schöne Helena Don Pasquale Ein kurzes Leben Fidelio Hänsel und Gretel La Boheme

Verdi Rossini Mozart Orff Offenbach Donizetti De Falla Beethoven Humperdinck Puccini

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Madame Butterfly Mathis der Maler Meistersinger Nacht in Venedig Orpheus und Euridyke Pelleas und Melisande Rigoletto Salome The Bartered Bride

Puccini Hindemith Wagner J. Strauss Gluck Debussy Verdi Strauss Smetana

313

APPENDIX T Symphony Orchestras in the US Zone 1 July 1947 – 30 June 1948 Bavaria Stadttheater, Augsburg Symphony Orchestra, Bamberg Symphony Orchestra, Bayreuth Stadttheater, Coburg Philharmonic Orchestra, Munich Bayerische Staatsoper Orchestra, Munich Kammerorchestra, Munich Stadttheater, Nuremberg Stadttheater, Regensburg Stadt. Orchestra, Würzburg Württemberg – Baden Stadttheater, Heidelberg Stadttheater, Karlsruhe Stadttheater, Mannheim Stadttheater, Stuttgart Location of Opera Houses in the US Zone Bavaria City Theater, Augsburg City Theater, Coburg Bavarian State Opera, Munich City Theater, Nuremberg City Theater, Regensburg Hesse City Theater, Frankfurt City Theater, Wiesbaden

Hesse Stadttheater, Frankfurt Stadttheater, Wiesbaden

Bremen Stadttheater, Bremen

Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra

Württemberg – Baden City Theater, Heidelberg City Theater, Karlsruhe City Theater, Mannheim City Theater, Stuttgart Bremen City Theater, Bremen

APPENDIX U Music of American Composers Presented in Germany June 1947 – July 1948 Composer

Title

Place

Number of Performances 3

Anthiel, George

Decateur at Algiers

Berlin

Barber, Samuel

Adagio for Strings

Berlin Frankfurt am Main Bremen Heidelberg Dresden Leipzig Halle Marburg Chemnitz Freiburg im Breisgau Schwetzingen Stuttgart Wiesbaden Würzburg

8 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1

Violin Concerto

Berlin Bremen Leipzig Stuttgart

2 2 1 1

Essay Opus 12

Berlin Frankfurt am Main Heidelberg Munich Radio Munich Stuttgart Würzburg

5 1 1 1 1 4 1

Essay Opus 17

Berlin Munich Radio Stuttgart Würzburg

3 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

Appendix U

316 Composer

Title

Place

The School for Scandal

Heidelberg

Number of Performances 1

Mannheim

1

Symphony No. 1

Berlin Munich Radio Munich

1 1 1

Dever Beach String Quartet and Solo

Munich

1

Berlin

2

Bailey, Parker

Sonata for Flute and Piano

Weimar

1

Berezewsky, W.

Violin Concerto Opus 28

Stuttgart

2

Bergama, W.

String Quartet

Munich Stuttgart

1 1

Bernstein, L.

Clarinet Sonata

Baden – Baden Stuttgart Ulm Weimar

1 1 1 1

Bitter, John

String Quartet

Berlin Leipzig Marburg

10 1 1

Blitzstein, Marc

Songs

Heidelberg

1

Bloch, Ernest

Piano Quintet

Coburg Munich Berlin Stuttgart

2 1 1 1

“Schelomo” For Cello and Orchestra

Berlin

1

Munich Karlsruhe Stuttgart

1 1 1

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

317

Composer

Title

Place

Bowles, P.

Songs

Heidelberg

Number of Performances 1

Carter, Eliot

Pastoral for Viola and Piano

Berlin

2

Holiday Overture

Berlin Frankfurt am Main Leipzig Bremen

2 3 1 1

Chanler, Theodore

Night Epitaphs

Stuttgart

1

Citkowitz, P.

Songs

Heidelberg

1

Copland, Aaron

Violin Sonata

Berlin Dresden Munich Würzburg Stuttgart

6 1 1 1 3

Vitebsk

Berlin Frankfurt am Main Hamburg

4 2 1

Quiet City

Berlin

2

Songs

Heidelberg

1

Appalachian Spring

Augsburg

4

Berlin Heidelberg Radio Munich Schwetzingen Brandenburg

3 1 1 1 1

Billy the Kid

Frankfurt am Main

3

Four Dance Episodes from “Rodeo”

Berlin

1

Brandenburg

1

Appendix U

318 Composer

Crestion, P.

Title

Place

Music for the Theater

Berlin

Number of Performances 3

Radio Frankfurt Hannover Munich

1 1 1

Outdoor Overture

Berlin Heidelberg Mannheim Munich Radio Munich Schwetzingen Stuttgart Bremen

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Prairie Night and Celebration Dance

NWDR Berlin

1

NWDR Hamburg

1

El Salon Mexico

Berlin

1

Suite for Violin and Piano Symphony Opus 20

Berlin

5

Stuttgart

2

Karlsruhe Wiesbaden

2 1

De Lamarter, Eric

The Betrothal

Berlin

2

Dello Joio, N.

On Stage

Karlsruhe

1

Diamond, D.

Sonata for Cello and Piano

Frankfurt am Main

1

Quintet

Berlin Dresden Munich

1 1 1

Rounds Piano Trio

Berlin Bremen Bremen

1 2 2

Ricercare

Berlin

2

Donovan, R.

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Composer

Title

Place Heidelberg

Number of Performances 1

Foot, A.

Night Piece for Flute and Orchestra

Hamburg

1

Griffes, Charles

The Pleasure Dome of Kabul Khan

Berlin

4

Munich Wiesbaden

1 1

The White Peacock

Heidelberg

1

Grand Canyon Suite

Berlin

4

Mississippi Suite

Berlin

2

Piano Sonata

Berlin Wiesbaden

2 1

Piano Trio

Stuttgart

1

Piano Quintet

Berlin Heidelberg Stuttgart

2 1 1

Sextet

Berlin

2

When Johnny Comes Marching Home

Stuttgart

1

Square Set

Berlin

2

Bremen

2

Grofé, Ferde

Harris, Roy

Haufreucht, Herbert

319

Heilner, I.

Songs

Heidelberg

1

Hill, E. B.

Sextet

Berlin

1

Ives, Charles

Violin Sonata

Berlin

5

Appendix U

320 Composer

Radio Munich Stuttgart Würzburg

Number of Performances 1 2 1

String Quartet

Heidelberg Heidenheim Karlsruhe Kassel Stuttgart Wiesbaden

1 1 1 1 1 1

String Quintet

Frankfurt am Main Radio Frankfurt Munich

1 1 1

Trio (1940)

Berlin

1

Suite for Flute and Piano

Berlin

1

Weimar Lübeck

1 1

Symphony No. 1

Berlin Frankfurt am Main Leipzig Stuttgart

2 2 1 1

Kubik, Gail

Sonatina for Violin and Piano

Stuttgart

1

Loeffler, Charles

Trio

Hamburg Munich Frankfurt am Main

1 1 1

Mac Dowell, Edward

Indian Suite

Marburg

1

Nuremberg Greifswald

1 1

Heidelberg

1

Karlsruhe Kassel Stuttgart

1 1 1

Jacobi

Kerr, Harrison

Mason, Daniel G.

Title

String Quartet Opus 19

Place

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Composer

Title

Place

321

Ulm

Number of Performances 1

Sextet

Berlin

1

McBride, Robert

Strawberry Jam

Berlin Karlsruhe Mannheim Stuttgart Radio Stuttgart

3 1 2 2 1

Menetti, GianCarlo

The Old Maid and the Thief

Mannheim

1

Weimar Gera Bremen Wiesbaden Nuremberg Dresden

1 1 1 1 1 1

Moore, Douglas

String Quartet

Munich

1

Morris, Harold

Piano Trio

Marburg

1

Nabokoff, N.

Serenata fesive

Berlin

5

Phillips, Burrill

Concerto for Flute and Orchestra

Halle

1

Marburg

1

Violin Sonata

Bad Nauheim Frankfurt am Main Radio Frankfurt Karlsruhe Munich Berlin

1 1 1 1 1 2

Piano Trio

Berlin Bremen Frankfurt am Main Heidelberg Mannheim Munich Würzburg

2 2 1 1 1 2 1

Piston, Walter

Appendix U

322 Composer

Title

Place

String Quartet No. 1

Baden-Baden

Number of Performances 1

Berlin Coburg Heidenheim Konstanz Stuttgart Ulm Wiesbaden Marburg Frankfurt am Main

4 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1

Quintet

Berlin Munich Stuttgart Dresden Hamburg

1 1 1 1 1

Nonett

Stuttgart

1

The Incredible Flutist

Berlin

4

Frankfurt am Main Radio Frankfurt Heidelberg Kassel Mannheim Baden-Baden

1 1 1 1 1 1

Sinfonietta

Berlin

2

Symphony No. 2

Heidelberg

1

Munich Radio Munich Nuremberg

1 1 2

Berlin

4

Donaueschingen Frankfurt am Main

1 2

Concertino for Piano and Orchestra

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Composer

Porter, Quincy

Title

Radio Frankfurt Munich Stuttgart Leipzig

Number of Performances 2 2 2 2

Violin Sonata

Berlin

1

String Quartet No. 3

Karlsruhe

1

Mannheim Munich Stuttgart Berlin

1 1 2 2

Baden-Baden

1

Berlin Coburg Heidelberg Karlsruhe Konstanz Stuttgart Radio Stuttgart Ulm

5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1

Munich

1

Wiesbaden

1

Music for Strings

Berlin

1

String Quartet No. 2

Munich

1

Ulm

1

Berlin

1

Frankfurt Heidelberg Munich Schwetzingen

2 1 2 1

Bad Nauheim Berlin

1 2

String Quartet No. 4

Schuman, William

Symphony for Strings

Festival Overture

Place

323

Appendix U

324 Composer

Title

Place Bremen Frankfurt am Main Heidelberg Munich Baden-Baden Leibzig Dresden Nuremberg

Number of Performances 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

Symphony No. 3

Frankfurt am Main Radio Frankfurt Mannheim Munich Radio Munich Stuttgart

2 1 2 2 1 1

Serly, Tibor

Violin Concerto

Berlin

2

Session, Roger

Songs

Heidelberg

1

String Quartet A Minor

Heidelberg

1

Mannheim Munich

1 1

Sheppeard, Arthur

Triptych for High Voice and String Quartet

Kassel

1

Smith, David

Violin Sonata Opus 43

Heidelberg

1

String Quartet No. 6

Karlsruhe

1

Stuttgart

1

Flute Sonata

Heidelberg

1

Carillin

Berlin

1

Violin Sonata

Berlin

3

Quintet

Berlin

1

Sowerby, Leo

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Composer

325

Title

Place

From the Northland (Orchestra)

Berlin

Number of Performances 2

Taylor, Deems

Casanova Ballet

Berlin Bremen

3 2

Thompson, Randall

Trio

Heidelberg

1

Stuttgart

2

Symphony No. 2

Frankfurt am Main Radio Frankfurt Nuremberg Wiesbaden

2 1 1 1

String Quartet No. 2

Bremen

2

Songs

Heidelberg

1

The Plow

Frankfurt am Main

3

Turner, Godfrey

Piano Sonata

Karlsruhe

1

Van Victor, David

Quintet

Berlin Dresden

1 1

Songs

Stuttgart

1

String Quartet N. 3

Munich

1

Stuttgart

1

Tomson, Virgil

Wagenaar, Bernard

APPENDIX V Radio Programming Preferences of Listeners in the US Zone Program Format1

TOTAL

MEN

WOMEN

Musical programs (all types)

65%

61%

69%

News programs In general

48 (25)

54 (30)

35 (21)

Speeches, discussion Political commentary

(8) (7)

(11) (9)

(6) (5)

Official information News re Prisoners of War Dramatic programs or plays

(3) (1) 7

(3) (0) 9

(1) (2) 9

Variety Shows Religious Programs

3 3

3 2

2 3

Other “Don’t know”

7 5

6 3

7 6

1

Please note that the totals will add up to more than 100%, because often more than one preference was indicated by those surveyed.

APPENDIX W Representative Broadcasts of Three Major Radio Stations January-March 1948 Radio Munich (Bavaria): “Communal Self-Administration” “School Reform in Bavaria” “The Right of the Individual in the Bavarian Constitution” “Publishing of Books and Magazines in Bavaria” “Modern Civil Service” Radio Stuttgart (Württemberg-Baden): “Prison Management in Württemberg-Baden” “The Food Situation” “Fight against Tuberculosis” “School Reform” “Problems of Health Today” “Foreign Aid in Württemberg-Baden” Radio Frankfurt (Hesse): “Trade, Industry, Export and Import of Hesse” “Roundtable Discussion of School Reform in Hesse” “Information on Communism” “Public Health” “Duties and Rights of a Democratic Citizen” “Freedom of the Press in Practice” Radio Munich (Bavaria): “Communal Self-Administration” “School Reform in Bavaria” “The Right of the Individual in the Bavarian Constitution” “Publishing of Books and Magazines in Bavaria” “Modern Civil Service” Radio Stuttgart (Württemberg-Baden): “Prison Management in Württemberg-Baden” “The Food Situation” “Fight against Tuberculosis” “School Reform”

328

Appendix W

“Problems of Health Today” “Foreign Aid in Württemberg-Baden” Radio Frankfurt (Hesse): “Trade, Industry, Export and Import of Hesse” “Roundtable Discussion of School Reform in Hesse” “Information on Communism” “Public Health” “Duties and Rights of a Democratic Citizen” “Freedom of the Press in Practice”

APPENDIX X ICD Classification of Members of Nazi Organizations Reiterkorps: Membership in this group was considered unimportant unless it was combined with membership in another “important” affiliated organization such as the SA-Reiterkorps or the SS-Reiterkorps. Both of these required membership in either the SA or the SS. Hitler Jugend (incl. Bund deutsche Mädchen): Each applicant was to be studied carefully by the ICD. However, it was indicated that a rank above Kameradschaftsführer meant that the applicant was unsuitable for positions in the press, film production, and radio. NSDStB and ANST: As with some of the other groups that involved young people in National Socialist Germany, applicants with this sort of background needed to be studied individually. So, there was no blanket categorization. There is, however, an indication that they were to be categorized as grey acceptable. What they consider to be decisive factors were the University attended by the individual and whether or not that particular university enforced membership in this group. They noted that some universities had enforced membership for a short period of time and some not at all. NSDDoB: These were generally considered to be grey unacceptable other than if they had a combined affiliation with another major National Socialist organization. Then they were considered black. NS Altherrenbund: The ICD considered membership in this group to be meaningless. NSF (NS Frauenschaft): If an individual had been a member prior to 1936, it was considered meaningless. However, if they had obtained their membership after 1936 they were to be considered grey unacceptable. If they held any sort of rank, regardless of when they joined, they were categorized as black. DF (Deutsche Frauenwerk): Membership in this group was considered meaningless unless the individual had obtained a rank within the organization, then they were considered grey acceptable. NSKK: If the individual had been a member of this group from 1931 to 1934, they were considered grey unacceptable. However, after 1934, they were considered to be grey acceptable, unless they had formerly belonged to the Motor SA. NSFK (NS Fliegerkorps): Members of this group were to be considered grey acceptable, except for those who joined in 1937 because they were members of an SA or SS flying unit.

330

Appendix X

NS Reichsbund Deutscher Schwestern (Incl. NS-Schwesternschaft): Members of this organization were for the most part grey acceptable with those holding rank being designated as grey unacceptable. NS Ärtztebund: If an individual held a full membership, they were considered grey unacceptable, as opposed to those who were simply candidates, who were categorized grey acceptable. RDB (Reichsbund deutschen Beamten): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. DAF (incl. KdF) This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSV: This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSKOV (NS Kriegs Opfer Versorgung): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSBDT (NS Bund Deutscher Technik): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSLB (NS Lehrer Bund): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSRB (NS Rechtswahrer Bund): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. RDB (Reichsbund deutsche Familie): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSRL (NS Reichsbund für Leibesübung): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable.

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

331

DSt (Deutsche Studentenschaft): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. NSRK (NS Reichskriegerbund): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. DG (Deutscher Gemeindetag): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. Reichsdozentenschaft: This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. Reichskulturkammer (RSK, RPK, RTK, R_K, RK der bildende Künste, RFK): This organization was considered meaningless in terms of categorizing an individual for ICD purposes unless they held rank, which meant they would be categorized as grey unacceptable. Amerika Institut: Membership in this organization was considered meaningless if it was taken up before 1934, after that, applicants were considered grey acceptable. Deutsche Akademie München: Membership in this organization was considered meaningless if it was taken up before 1934, after that applicants were considered grey acceptable. DAI (Deutsches Auslandsinstitut): Membership in this organization was considered meaningless if it was taken up before 1934, after that, applicants were considered grey acceptable. Deutsche Christenbewegung and Deutsche Glaubensbewegung: With this sort of organization the ICD officers had to be a little bit more careful. If the applicant had been a member of any pagan organization, they would be considered grey unacceptable. If the Fragebogen indicated that the applicant was “Gottesgläubig,” then a careful investigation had to be undertaken to determine whether this meant the applicant was without religion (gottlos), in which case it was meaningless, or whether it meant that he adhered to any pagan organizations. Deutsche Fichte Bund: Membership before 1934 was meaningless, after which the applicant was considered to be grey acceptable. Deutsche Jägerschaft: Meaningless, unless the applicant held rank, then they were considered grey acceptable

332

Appendix X

DRK (Deutsches rote Kreuz): Membership was meaningless in terms of ICD consideration for licensing, unless the applicant held “higher rank.” Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut: Membership before 1934 was meaningless, after which the applicant was considered to be grey acceptable. Institut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage: Members of this organization were always classified as black. Kameradschaft USA: Members of this organization were always classified as black. Osteuropa Institut: Membership in this organization before 1934 was meaningless in regard to ICD classification. After that they were considered grey acceptable. Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit: Members were considered grey unacceptable regardless of when they took their membership. RAD (Reichsarbeitdienst): Was considered meaningless unless rank was held, or it was their vocation. They were then classified as grey acceptable. RKB (Reichskolonialbund): This was considered meaningless unless the individual held rank, which gained them the classification of grey acceptable. RLB (Reichsluftschutzbund): Only nominal membership of this group was designated as meaningless. If they held any rank before 1939 they were classified as grey unacceptable. If they obtained rank after that, they were classified as grey acceptable. Staatsakademie für Rassen und Gesundheitspflege: Classified as black VDA (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland): If they had lived abroad prior to 1939, they were considered grey unacceptable. If any rank was held, they were classified as black. Werberat der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Classified as grey unacceptable) Weltdienst (Black)

APPENDIX Y Composition of ICD Oct. 1945, Dec. 1945, Apr. 1946, June 1946, Nov. 1946, and Mar. 1947 “White, Grey, Black Lists” according to age. The total number of applicants where an age could be determined is 15563. Age distribution of German applicants for ICD licensing of those listed with an age or date of birth (Corrected to 1945). Age 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Number 1 3 6 15 27 64 100 135 162 211 230 237 244 300 352 267 240 212 239 340 302 332 356 390 390 429 462 451 430 475 417 509

Age 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Number 479 445 475 500 365 339 321 319 312 283 301 272 265 406 230 211 194 195 183 152 168 246 118 82 56 49 39 36 60 40 14 17

Appendix Y

334

Age 75 76 77 78 79 80

Number 15 7 5 11 5 6

Age 81 82 83 84 85 86

Number 7 3 3 0 0 1

13.80%

17.30%

18.20%

15.80%

4.20%

166

387

592

479

229

32

1

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71-80

80+

1898

6.60%

10.00%

12

11-20

Total

WA%

2.30%

WA

Age Group

Percentage of categorization of a given age group

5097

12

72

377

826

1231

1325

979

275

WB

WB%

50.00%

35.50%

30.00%

29.80%

31.80%

34.30%

38.70%

5.40%

GA

3125

2

18

181

401

686

799

862

176

GA%

8.30%

8.90%

14.40%

14.50%

17.70%

20.70%

34.10%

33.50%

2055

3

19

159

340

672

543

280

39

GU

GU%

12.50%

9.40%

12.70%

12.30%

17.40%

14.00%

11.10%

7.40%

B 23 242 814 1100 722 309 62 6 3278

B% 4.40% 9.60% 21.00% 33.60% 26.10% 24.60% 30.50% 25.00%

Total 525 2529 3868 4281 2768 1255 203 24 15453

Total% 3.40% 16.40% 25.00% 27.70% 17.90% 8.10% 1.30% 0.20%

APPENDIX Z

336

Append dix Z

APPENDIX AA Percentage of ICD applicant classification (17769 total of all applicants with a known city of residence) where the current city of residence is known. Not all percentages add up to exactly 100% due to rounding errors.

Percentage of Classification by City WA WB Berlin 14.3 28.3 Bremen 24.6 17.4 Frankfurt a/M 17.3 22.3 Heidelberg 22.4 19.7 Munich 13.4 28.3 Straubing 1.8 40.7 Stuttgart 14.2 31.2 Wurzburg 5 33.9 Zone Wide Pct. 11.8% 30.5%

GA 11.8 18.8 24.5 11.8 11.8 27.4 13.9 11.6 19.1%

GU 7.2 15.9 12.9 9.2 7.2 13.3 13.3 21.5 13.2%

B 38.3 23.2 23 36.8 38.3 16.8 27.7 28.1 25.4%

APPENDIX AB Film Production

Misc

Misc

5 54 209 89 65 112 534 534

0.9% 10.1% 39.1% 16.7% 12.2% 21.0% 3.5% 5.6%

1 12 103 70 64 178 428

0.2% 2.8% 24.1% 16.4% 15.0% 41.6% 2.8%

25 289 1515 1479 967 922 5197

0.5% 5.6% 29.2% 28.5% 18.6% 17.7% 34.3%

Production

Film Production

0.3% 5.6% 19.4% 12.5% 8.9% 53.3% 2.4% 3.8%

Production

Disseminati on

1 20 70 45 32 192 360 360

Newspaper Production

Disseminati on

0.1% 7.4% 38.1% 18.1% 14.3% 22.0% 5.5% 8.8%

Newspaper Production

Actors

1 62 320 152 120 185 840 840

Musician

Actors

0.5% 6.5% 30.5% 22.7% 13.9% 26.0% 7.0% 11.1%

Musician

Blank WA WB GA GU Black Total Total

5 69 324 241 148 276 1063 1063

Music Leadership

Category

Blank WA WB GA GU Black Total Total Music Removed

Music Leadership

Category

Categorization of ICD applicants according to media function.

13 274 292 177 134 499 1389 1389

1.2% 19.7% 21.0% 12.7% 9.6% 35.9% 9.2% 14.5%

0 20 41 16 24 87 188 188

0.0% 10.6% 21.8% 8.5% 12.8% 46.3% 1.2% 2.0%

0.2% 4.3% 56.5% 23.7% 6.8% 8.5% 3.5% 5.6%

2 19 197 50 17 34 319 319

0.6% 6.0% 61.8% 15.7% 5.3% 10.7% 2.1% 3.3%

8 223 420 263 179 541 1634 1634

0.5% 13.6% 25.7% 16.1% 11.0% 33.1% 10.8% 17.1%

72 1702 4286 2961 2102 4049 15172 9547

0.5% 11.2% 28.2% 19.5% 13.9% 26.7%

Propaganda

Propaganda

Radio Production

1 23 300 126 36 45 531 531

2 0.81% 2 0.81% 4 1.62% 6 2.43% 10 4.05% 223 90.28% 247 1.6% 247 2.6%

Music Removed Total

Radio Production

0.0% 18.8% 15.3% 19.3% 15.1% 31.5% 2.8% 4.5%

339

Music Removed Total

Radio Leadership

0 80 65 82 64 134 425 425

Total

Radio Leadership

1.8% 5.5% 20.0% 9.1% 9.1% 54.5% 0.4% 0.6%

Total

Publisher

1 3 11 5 5 30 55 55

Writer

Publisher

0.3% 32.1% 24.0% 9.0% 13.2% 21.5% 11.3% 18.0%

Writer

Propaganda

5 550 411 154 227 368 1715 1715

Variety Production

Propaganda

0.8% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4% 4.0% 90.3% 1.6% 2.6%

Variety Production

Blank WA WB GA GU Black Total Total

2 2 4 6 10 223 247 247

Variety Performer

Category

Blank WA WB GA GU Black Total Total

Variety Performer

Category

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

46 1401 2668 1412 1071 2949 9547

0.5% 14.7% 27.9% 14.8% 11.2% 30.9%

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Records National Archives and Records Administration (College Park) Fleck, Egon W. and Edward A. Tenenbaum. “Buchenwald: A Preliminary Report” to Headquarters 12th Army Group Publicity and Psychological Warfare, April 24, 1945. Papers of Richard Crossman. University of Warwick. 154/3/PW/1/9-17. “Inter-Allied Music Library.” Weekly Information Bulletin. Magazine of U.S. Military Government 105 (Aug. 11, 1945): 11-2. “Photographic Record. Former Special Prisoners Engaged in their Present Jobs as Civilians.” NARA RG 389 290/34/29/4 Box 1604. “Records of the Army Staff.” NARA RG 319 270/10/6/7 Box 3780. Contains Black, Grey, Whites Lists for April 1, 1946 and June 1, 1946 “Records of the Information Control Division, Central File of the Executive Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 135. “Records of the High Commissioner for Germany.” RG 466 250/71/31/2 Box 14. Contains Black, Grey List March 1, 1947. “Records of the Information Control Division, Central File of the Executive Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 136. “Records of the Information Control Division, ICD Press Branch Black List November 18, 1944.” NARA RG 260 390/42/19/1 Box 189. “Records of the Information Control Division, Moscow Liberations.” NARA RG 260 390/42/15-16/21. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the Executive Office, Activities of the Information Control Division.” NARA RG 260/390/41/10/1 Box 454. Contains “Information Control: Intelligence Summary.” “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ICD Divisional Headquarters.” NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 25. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ICD Divisional Headquarters, Personnel: German and Foreign.” NARA RG 260 390/42/15/2 Box 29. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ICD Executive Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/7 Box 140.

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

341

“Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ISD Reports and Historical Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69. Contains Black, Grey, White List November 1946 and ICD History I and “A Report on Our Problem in Germany.” “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ISD Reports and Historical Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Box 69. Contains Black, Grey, White List November 1946 and ICD History I. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the ISD Reports and Historical Office.” NARA RG 260 390/42/16/5 Boxes 70. Contains ICD History II and III. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the Motion Picture Branch.” NARA RG 260 390/42/20/4 Box 266 “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the Opinions Survey Branch.” NARA RG 260 390/42/18/1 Box 145. “Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Special Prisoners.” NARA RG 389 290/34/29/4 Boxes 1449-1446. “Records of the Information Control Division, Records of the Publications Branch.” NARA RG 260 390/42/20/3 Box 254 “Records of the Information Control Division, Records Relating to Public Opinions.” NARA RG 260 390/41/10/1 Boxes 456-458. Weekly Information Bulletin, NO. 66 (4 Nov 46). NARA RG 549 Box 3383. Weekly Information Bulletin, Number 71 (December 1946). NARA RG 549 Box 3383.

National Archives (London) Dicks, Henry V. “Foreign Office, Future of Germany” and “Future of Germany. Report of a Conference on Germany after the War.” National Archives, London, FO 1049/72. “Foreign Office, German Personnel in Research Branch.” FO 1049/535. “Foreign Office, Future of Germany.” FO 1049/72. “Foreign Office, Policy of German Information Services for Germany: Cooperation between P.I.D. (Extension of Charter for this Purpose) and Control Commission for Germany: Correspondence and Reports re: Progress of Policy.” FO/898/401. “Records of the Special Operations Executive, Citations for Foreign Nationals.” HS 8/401.

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Other Archival Documents “The German Press in the US Occupied Area 1945-1948,” Special Report of the Military Governor November 1948. Online.

Published Documentation Governmental and Military Publications Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Ser. III, vol. cciv, February-March 1871. Speech of February 9, 1871, pp. 81-82. Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 4 (20 Nov 45), Press, p. 3. Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 6 (20 Jan 46), Press, p. 2 Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 7 (20 Feb 46), Press, p. 3. Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 8 (20 Mar 45), Press, p. 4. Information Control Functional Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 1 (20 Aug 45), “Publications,” p. 5. Information Control, functional annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor. No. 12 (20 Jul 46), Publications, p. 4. OMGUS. Monthly Report of the Military Governor. Information Control (Cumulative Report). No. 13 (20 Aug 46), Public Opinion Surveys. OMGUS. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone (Information Control). No. 7 (20 Feb 46) “Weekly Report of the Theater and Film Section,” ODIC, for period 27 June - 3 July 1946.

Newpaper Articles Adams Schmidt, Dana. “German Captives Push Democracy.” The New York Times. June 9, 1944, 33. “Der Spezi.” Der Spiegel. 14.03.1962: 26-34. “First German Paper Gets Operating Right.” The New York Times. June 28, 1945, 6. Gellhorn, Martha. “Is there a New Germany?” The Atlantic Monthly February, February, 1964: 69 - 76. “German Captives Trained Here.” The New York Times (October 21, 1945), 5.

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany

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Long, Tania. “Army Still Blocks News in Germany; German Civilian Workers Have Access to Material Denied to U.S. Journalists,” The New York Times, February 23, 1946. “Morgenthau Would Chasten Germany.” The New York Times. October 19, 1918. “On His Own,” Time, July 9, 1945. p. 50. Pace, Eric. “Obituary [Louis Nizer].” New York Times. November 11, 1994. Sibert, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. “The German Mind: Our Greatest Problem.” New York Times Magazine, Feb. 17, 1946: 7ff. Sulzberger, C. L. “US Psychology Fails in Germany,” The New York Times, March 6, 1946. “Stimson Rejects Plan to Teach Nazi War Prisoners Democracy.” New York Times, November 30, 1944: 5. “Two US Musicians Barred in Germany.” The New York Times. December 15, 1945. Amusement Section, p. 23.

Books and Articles Almond, Gabriel Abraham. “The German Resistance Movement.” Current History 10 (1946): 409-19 and 519-27. —, ed. The Struggle for Democracy in Germany. University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1949. Almond, Gabriel Abraham & Eugene Newton Anderson, eds. The Struggle of Democracy in Germany. New York: Russell & Russell, 1965. Bach, Julian Sebastian. America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation. New York: Random House, 1946. Bark, Dennis & David Gress. A History of West Germany. 2 vols. From Shadow to Substance. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. Boehling, Rebecca. A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945-1949. Monographs in German History; v.2. Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1996. —. “US Cultural Policy and German Culture during the American Occupation.” In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990, Vol. I, edited by Detlef Junker, 388-393. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Borchert, Wolfgang. Das Gesamtwerk. Rowohlt: Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1949.

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INDEX

Ackermann, Karl, 87-88, 91-96 Adagio for Strings, 192, 315 Adenauer, Konrad, 40, 280 Allgemeine Zeitung, 66, 80, 280 Allied Press Service, 81, 111 Amatheo Verlag, 276 Amerikanische Rundschau, 49, 63, 81, 122, 125, 127 Andersch, Alfred, 35-39, 255 Augsburger Anzeiger, 65 Ausblick, 122-123 Bad Oeynhausen, 13, 202, 246 Bad Orb, 19-20, 161, 201-202, 219, 222, 246, 253-254, 256, 258 Badische Neueste Nachrichten, 85, 293 Barber, Samuel, 186, 191-192, 311312, 315 Bayrischer Tag, 65-66 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 182, 184185, 191, 195, 312 Berlin Blockade, 63, 103, 161, 262, 265 Berlin freie Volksbühne, 177 Bizonia, 132, 158, 167 Boese, Karl, 263, 269-270 Bombs over England, 175 Borchert, Wolfgang, 2-3, 131, 134, 138-139, 144 Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel, 48, 141, 145, 277 Brauner, Artur (Atzi), 260-273 Breitenkamp, Edward, 31, 98, 174, 235, 244, 273 Brickner, Richard M., 17, 282 Briese, Gaston, 263, 270-271 Brockhaus Verlag, 200 Bustabo, Guila, 173-174 Call Northside 777, 107

Carlebach, Emil, 70, 130 CDU, 27, 76, 85-86, 106 censorship, 29-30, 68-69, 100, 117, 135-136, 149, 200, 245, 273-274 Chopin, Frédéric, 182 Clay, Lucius, 14, 16, 24, 72 collective guilt, 21, 37, 43, 50, 54, 139, 213, 225, 260, 281, 284 Communism, 37, 40, 43, 58, 62-63, 70, 74, 76, 91-93, 94-97, 130, 133-134, 136, 182, 217, 223224, 227-228, 262, 280, 296, 327-328 Copland, Aaron, 191-192, 311, 317 Cotta-Verlag, 48, 276 Cron, Helmut, 88, 90, 92, 95-96 CSU, 77-78, 83, 89, 105, 281 Darmstädter Echo, 79, 293 Das Junge Herz, 130 Das Neue Wort, 130 DENA (DANA), 49, 81, 99, 102, 104, 107, 109-114 Der Allgäuer, 83, 293 Der Berliner, 66 Der Bogen, 129 Der ewige Jude, 8 Der große Manderin (Die sieben Schweinchen), 170 Der Herr vom anderen Stern, 170 Der Lügenpeter (Pinnochio), 178 Der Mannheimer Morgen, 100 Der Neue Tag, 86, 293 Der Pinquin, 131 Der Ruf (publication), 35-38 Der Ruf (film), 171 Der Standpunkt, 130 Der Start, 129 Der Tagesspiegel, 76, 86, 102, 280, 293

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Der Völkische Beobachter, 125 Der zerbrochne Krug, 178 Dicks, Henry, 16-17, 44, 211, 251 Die Abendzeitung, 108 Die amerikanische Rundschau, 118 Die Heilbronner Stimme, 85 Die Landtechnik, 130 Die Neue Zeitung, 49, 63, 66, 79-83, 97, 98, 103-104, 107, 113 Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, 108, 196 Die Todesmühlen (Mills of Death), 167, 205 Die Wandlung, 119, 128 Dirks, Walter, 120, 131 documentary films, 5, 164, 167, 169 Donau Kurier, 83, 293 Dortmunder General Anzeiger, 70 Dreigroschenoper, 177 Eberle, Joseph, 87, 92-93, 194 Echo der Wahrheit, 79 Eichendorf, Joseph Freiherr von, 144 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 24, 30, 44, 50, 51, 77, 80, 82, 98 Etzkorn, Hans, 70, 71 European Recovery Program, 103, 126, 159, 302 Fidelio, 185, 191, 196, 312 Film ohne Titel, 170 Fragebogen (Personal History Questionnaire), 3, 32, 61, 62, 70, 175, 200, 201, 241, 251-253, 263, 264, 268, 272, 276, 331 France, 7, 12-13, 15, 23, 43, 53, 5960, 62, 79, 85, 89, 100, 108-109, 116, 123, 165, 171, 174, 177178, 187-188, 190, 194, 199, 209-210, 227-228, 232, 244, 246, 258, 261-262, 267-268, 273, 288, 297, 302 Frankfurter Hefte, 120-121, 131 Frankfurter Neue Presse, 85-86, 99, 293 Frankfurter Presse, 65 Frankfurter Rundschau, 69, 74, 86, 99, 130, 258, 293

349

Frankfurter Zeitung, 70, 73, 75, 120 Fränkische Landeszeitung, 86, 293 Fränkische Presse, 83, 293 Fränkischer Tag, 83-84, 293 Frauenwelt, 129 Freie Demokratische Partei, 75 Fuehrer und Verfuehrte, 144 Fuldaer Volkszeitung, 79, 293 Fürtwängler, Wilhelm, 174-175 Future of Germany (Conference Report), 6, 16-20, 207, 251, 287 Gehirnfabrik, 35-36, 39-40 German mind, the, 13-14, 21-22, 35, 46, 65, 80, 115, 206, 282, 285 German Problem, 6-7, 11, 139 Germanism, 8, 23, 58, 199, 254, 279 Gerst, Wilhelm Karl, 70-72 Gide, Andre, 103 Giessener Freie Presse, 83-84, 293 Gleichschaltung, 83, 136 Goebbels, Joseph, 8, 10, 27, 60, 72, 110, 160 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 144, 146, 177, 182, 304 Grosse, Eduard, 120, 129 Grossmann, Otto, 70, 73 Guggenheimer, Walter Maria, 131 Habe, Hans, 73, 79, 80 Hackmack, Hans, 76 Hänsel und Gretel, 185, 312 Heinrich Hollands, 66 Herlitz, Heinz, 263, 271-272 Herzkönig, 267, 269, 271 Hessische Nachrichten, 76-77, 293 Hessische Post, 65 Heuss, Theodor, 75-76 Heute, 49, 63, 81, 118, 122-126 Hindemith, Paul, 182, 312-313 Hinkel, Hans, 251 Hochland Bote, 77, 293 Hof Frankenpost, 77 Horizont, 119, 128, 132 Huber, Georg, 105 Hurwitz, Harold, 4, 11, 24, 46 Impekoven, Toni, 176 Isar Post, 83, 84, 293

350 Jackson, Robert H., 31, 52, 123, 138 Jaspers, Karl, 119, 128, 144, 215 jazz, 196, 302 Jud Süss, 61, 194 Jung Wort, 129 Kästner, Erich, 131 Kazimierski, Zygismund Szarf, 269, 271 Klett, Arnulf, 88-89, 95-96 Klinik und Praxis, 130 Klostermann Verlag, 245 Knothe, Wilhelm, 70, 73-74 Kogon, Eugen, 120-121, 131, 152 Kolb, Walter, 223-225 Kosmospress, 109 KPD, 73-76, 88-90, 92-93, 95 Kunstpolitik, 42 La Bohème, 178 La France Libre, 123 Lang ist der Weg, 169-170 Law No. 191, 46 LDP, 76, 105, 223-225 Levy, David, 202-203, 208, 215, 253, 255 Lili Marlene, 175 Macbeth, 177 Madame Butterfly, 185, 312, 313 Main Echo, 79, 293 Maltese Falcon, 27 Mann, Thomas, 10, 103, 155, 297 Marburger Presse, 76, 293 Marriage of Figaro, 185, 312 Maugham, William Somerset, 103, 301 McClure, Robert A., 24, 27-32, 4445, 54, 69, 72, 79, 161, 164, 200201, 234, 240 Mead, Margaret, 17, 142, 288 Mendelssohn, Felix, 182 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 182 militarism, 7, 18, 23, 42, 58, 71, 78, 80, 85-86, 107, 118, 139, 165, 199, 225, 229, 239, 279, 281, 285, 304 Mittelbayerische Zeitung, 78, 293 Moericke, Eduard, 144

Index Morgenthau, Henry Jr., 8, 11, 21, 45, 139, 282 Morituri, 261, 265, 269-271, 273 Morse-Rummel, Walter, 173 Mourning Becomes Electra, 180181, 308-309 Münchener Zeitung, 66 Münster, Clemens, 131 Neue Auslese, 49, 63, 81, 118, 122123, 125-126 Neue Basler Zeitung, 244 Neue Presse, 83-84 New Statesman, 123 New York Herald Tribune, 109-110, 158, 296 New York Times, The, 8-9, 22, 34, 36, 42, 66, 108, 110, 158, 173, 190, 282, 298 newsreel, 49, 124, 160-162, 167, 169 Niederbayerische Nachrichten, 105 Nizer, Louis, 9 Nordsee Zeitung, 99, 100, 104 Nürnberger Nachrichten, 77, 293 Offenbach, Jacques, 179, 182, 312 Office of War Information, 16, 81, 110, 112, 122-123, 156, 178, 186 Oliver Twist, 27, 169 Ortega y Gasset, José, 103, 152, 282 Our Town, 178-179, 181, 308-309 overt censorship, 69, 151, 275 Padover, Saul, 4, 8, 15, 279 Paley, William S., 31 paper shortage, 102, 105, 117, 124, 141-142, 151-152 Passauer Neue Presse, 84, 293 Peeples, Edward T., 59, 62, 173-174 Pendel-Verlag, 141 Piston, Walter, 186, 191-192, 311, 321 Political Warfare Executive, 5, 14, 29, 90, 284 Pommer, Erich, 161, 261 Port, Kurt, 48, 276 Potsdam Agreement, 45, 51, 55-56, 58, 65, 124, 128, 227, 282

The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-War Germany Prüfungsausschuss, 175, 188 Prussianism, 8, 279 Psychological Warfare Division, 4, 14-16, 25, 30-31, 33, 42-44, 47, 49-50, 54, 57, 65-67, 80, 112, 123, 156, 178, 192, 199, 203, 244, 282-284 Radio Spiegel, 130 Radiowelt, 130 Regenberg, Günter, 263, 267-268, 270 Regensburger Post, 66, 78 Reuters, 81, 113, 127 Rhein-Neckar Zeitung, 75, 100, 293 RIAS (Radio in the American Sector), 103, 197-198 Richter, Hans, 35-38, 104, 255 Rodemann, Paul, 70, 74 Rowohlt Verlag, 139, 259 Rudert, Arno, 70, 74, 258 Rühmann, Heinz, 170 Saroyan, William, 103, 122, 179180, 298, 309 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 103 Saturday Evening Post, 123, 158 Saturn-Verlag, 141 Schaffner, Bertram, 202-203, 208, 246-247, 249, 251 Schiller, Friedrich von, 146, 172 Schneider, Lambert, 119, 128, 280 Schulfunk, 132 Schultze, Norbert, 175 Schumacher, Kurt, 225 Schwäbische Donau Zeitung, 78, 293 Schwäbische Landeszeitung, 78, 293 Schwäbische Post, 106 Sie (Die Frau), 120, 128, 161, 231, 269, 305 Soviet Union, 11-13, 15, 29, 43, 50, 52, 63, 86, 92, 104, 116, 126, 127, 133, 149, 161, 175, 209, 218, 227-228, 230-232, 244, 246, 263, 265-266, 269, 284, 289, 291, 296

351

SPD, 27, 71, 73, 75-78, 83-87, 8990, 92-93, 97, 104-105, 216-217, 223, 225, 236, 250, 284 Special Services Division, 157 Spruchkammer, 72, 259 STAGMA, 186, 187 Stars and Stripes, 109, 158 Sternberger, Dolf, 119, 128 Stimson Henry L., 33, 34, 138 Straubinger Tagblatt, 105 Strauss, Richard, 182, 185, 243, 313 Stuttgarter Rundschau, 130 Stuttgarter Stimme, 66 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 76, 87-88, 9093, 95-97, 194, 225, 293 Süddeutsche Allgemeine, 104 Süddeutsche Mitteilungen, 65 Süddeutsche Rundfunk, 193 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 77, 108, 280281, 293 Süd-Kourier, 61 Südost Kurier, 86, 293 Switzerland, 2, 27, 35, 88, 108-109, 153, 157, 165, 176, 244 Tagebuch der Anna Frank, 280 Tageszeitung, 108 Taming of the Shrew, 176-177 Tatsachen, 132 Textor, Gordon E., 59 The American Soldier in Germany, 51-52 The Saturday Review of Literature, 123 The Voice of the Turtle, 178, 180 Three Men on a Horse, 179-181, 308-309 Thunder Rock, 179, 308-309 Tiefland, 178, 312 Toombs, Alfred, 32-33, 70, 86, 200202, 223, 239-240, 246, 256, 277 Tost, Walter, 269-270, 283 translation, 3, 57, 111, 128, 133, 140, 144, 148, 153, 180, 228232, 283, 297 UFA, 258, 263, 271-272 Uhland, Ludwig, 144

352 Ulenspiegel, 129-130 Ullstein Verlag, 80 UNRRA, 265 Vansittart, Robert, 7, 11, 14 Verband Bayerischer Zeitungsverleger, 107 vetting, 4, 39, 57, 61, 86, 149-150, 161, 175, 184, 200-201, 208, 241, 243-247, 249-251, 254, 256, 260, 283 Volk und Zeit, 71, 130 Völkische Beobachter, 60 Vor uns liegt das Leben, 171 VVN, 264-265 Wagner, Richard, 176, 182, 312, 313 Waldecker Kurier, 106 Waples, Douglas, 32, 38 WARCAD, 162

Index Welt im Film, 49, 160, 162, 167, 169 Werra Rundschau, 105 Weser Bote, 65 Weser Kurier, 76, 100, 293 Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung, 83, 293 Wiesbadener Kurier, 77, 293 Wilder, Billy, 31, 33, 179-180, 309 Wirtschaftliche Genossenschaft der Presse, 101 Wolfe, Thomas, 46, 155, 260, 298 World War I, 6-9, 11, 16, 71, 90, 137, 139, 224, 279 Wurm, Theophil, 90, 96 Zinnen Verlag, 142 Zuckmayer, Carl, 103 Zweig, Stefan, 103 Zwischen Gestern und Morgen, 169