The History of the Formation of Early Chinese Buddhism: A Study on Discourse Characteristics 1666944815, 9781666944815

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The History of the Formation of Early Chinese Buddhism

The History of the Formation of Early Chinese Buddhism A Study on Discourse Characteristics By In-sub Hur Translated and Edited by Ronald Dziwenka and Alexander Choi

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2024 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hur, In-Sub, -2023, author. | Dziwenka, Ronald, translator. | Choi, Alexander, translator. Title: The history of the formation of early Chinese Buddhism : a study on discourse characteristics / by Insub Hur ; translated by Ronald Dziwenka and Alexander Choi. Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Translated from Korean. | Summary: “This book analyzes the process of the sinicization of Buddhism. It provides a comprehensive investigation on how the perceived similarities between Buddhism and Daoism originated and how traditional Daoist terminologies were applied”—Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2023036514 (print) | LCCN 2023036515 (ebook) | ISBN 9781666944815 (cloth) | ISBN 9781666944822 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Buddhism—China—History. Classification: LCC BQ626 .H8713 2023 (print) | LCC BQ626 (ebook) | DDC 294.30951—dc23/eng/20230823 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023036514 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023036515 ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Foreword: History of the Formation of Early Chinese Buddhism In-Sub Hur 1 The Origins and the Characteristics of Buddhist and Daoist Thoughts

vii

1

2 Religious Characteristics of Central Asians and Buddhism in the Kushan Era

37

3 The Characteristics of Wei-Jin Era Buddhism

63

4 Examples of the Continuous Influences of Early Chinese Buddhist Discourses Translators’ Notes

175 195

Bibliography203 Index213 About the Author

221

About the Translators

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v

Foreword History of the Formation of Early Chinese Buddhism In-Sub Hur

The initial occurring phenomenon in the process of a religion leaving its place of origin and being spread to and assimilated into a different culture seems to show similar forms, regardless of the religion. From a positive perspective, this change is referred to as indigenization, but when we look at this change from a negative perspective, it is referred to as a transformational distortion of religious theory. Considering the historical fact that, in many cases, religions entering an area collide with the traditional thought forms and religions of the area of penetration in their process of indigenization, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the indigenization process of Buddhism in China was rather unconstrained. This book starts with the question of how the process of sinicization of Buddhism in China seemed to be so straightforward. Even though the nonexclusivity of Buddhism was a main cause of its smooth sinicization, in addition to this I will investigate the process of discourse formation in early Chinese Buddhism from the perspective that the Chinese attempts to actively accept Buddhism accelerated its sinicization. In the process of sinicization of Buddhism, the studies on the initial stage of Chinese Buddhism that we need to pay attention to have not been as prolific as those in other areas of Buddhist studies. The reason may lie above all in the fact that the intellectual tensions of the Chinese regarding the heterogeneity between Chinese traditional thinking and Buddhism was not sustained historically due to the smooth sinicization of Buddhism in China. To point out another practical reason for this besides the historical background, I may say that the attempt is not easy because there is a limited amount of materials on early Chinese Buddhism and the work to analyze and evaluate them requires extensive knowledge in various areas related to this time period. vii

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The reason I became interested in understanding the process of the sinicization of Buddhism arose from a vague feeling that the Buddhist scriptures translated into Korean that I started to read in the Buddhist study group at Yonsei University seemed to be quite different from the commentaries written by Chinese monks. My early attempt to understand this was through my winter 1985 master’s thesis on “The influence of Daoistic thinking in Buddhism.” Looking back now, I see it was a clumsy attempt of raw courage. At that time, the person who encouraged me to do something that I could not have done on my own was my gifted teacher, Dr. Taidong Han. Without his teaching on the differences between Buddhist and Taoist thought forms, I would not have been able to even begin studying this subject. In 1990, I started the graduate school doctoral program at the University of Hawaii after completing the doctorate program at Yonsei University in Korea. I left for Hawaii with the expectation that I would be able to understand the transformation of Buddhism in China more clearly when I understood the traditions of Southeast Asian Buddhism. This is how I started my relationship with Dr. David J. Kalupahana, my doctoral dissertation advisor. He taught me clearly the unique position of the Buddhist “dependent arising theory” in the intellectual history of mankind. He is well known as a scholar who asserted the status of Buddhism in the intellectual history of thought forms as fundamentally empirical or pragmatic, from the comparative philosophical standpoint. But, more accurately, he should be considered as a scholar who uncovered the meanings and limitations of various Buddhist disciplines, as well as Eastern and Western philosophies, from the perspective of early Buddhism. In the University of Hawaii’s strong academic tradition in comparative philosophy, I completed my dissertation in 1997 entitled “An Analysis of the Different Way of Thinking of Indian Yogacara and Chinese Fa-hsiang School,” comparing the thought forms of Vasubandhu, Xuanzang, and Kuiji. While writing this dissertation, I keenly felt that this was merely a preliminary step in my understanding of the process of the sinicization of Buddhism. The scope of study required for a deeper understanding seemed to be endless, and my academic capability felt lacking. After returning to Korea, I began to envision the outline of this book by writing essays on Wei-Jin Buddhism, thinking that analyzing commentaries by Chinese monks of early Buddhism would be the first step to make up for the shortcomings of my dissertation. The problem was that while studying Buddhism of the Wei-Jin era, I realized that it is impossible to analyze the discourses of Chinese Buddhism without a proper understanding of Central Asian Buddhism. Since I did not have much prior knowledge in this field, I studied it with a beginner’s mind. I felt that this lack of knowledge was an

Foreword

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obstacle like an ocean, which was different from the huge mountains that I had felt while writing my dissertation. While I was studying Central Asian Buddhism, I realized, despite my short-sightedness, that research was being conducted only in very limited areas. I started to write related essays while meeting and exchanging ideas with young scholars interested in this field. Thanks to this, even with my limited ability, I was able to draw a rudimentary view of the transmission of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and China. Even though this subject had attracted my interest for a long time, I felt greatly dissatisfied by publishing this book due to my low academic level and lack of diligence. Through the karma of this publication, I look forward to obtaining feedback from scholars to comment on and point out the shortcomings of my research on the discourses in the process of the early indigenization of Chinese Buddhism. I would like to extend my gratitude to my family and friends who supported and encouraged me to walk this path up to now. In-Sub Hur, Namaste Winter of 2017

Chapter 1

The Origins and the Characteristics of Buddhist and Daoist Thoughts

Even though there are many books that describe the sinicization process that includes the penetration and assimilation of Buddhism in China, a few of them offer an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of how such heterogeneous Buddhist thought forms were consolidated and how Buddhism became one of the major thought forms, along with Confucianism and Taoism. While most books on Chinese Buddhism are similar to each other in their formats and descriptive methods, with minor differences, and some are similar in their simplicity or extent of detail, it is safe to say that their descriptions of the trends of Chinese Buddhism are organized chronologically. The reason why the descriptions of the trends of Chinese Buddhism are so straightforward and formulaic is due to the inability to clearly analyze the framework of the theoretical transformation of Buddhism in the process of the sinicization of Buddhism. We can analyze the meaningful inner structures that the various theories of Chinese Buddhism pursued after it was imported into China only after thoroughly investigating the research and various debates, specifically regarding what types of Buddhism were introduced, when they were imported, how the Chinese reacted to them, what kinds of new debates were established, what the meanings of those debates were, how the origin of the theories arose, and what aspects of human thinking were actively expressed in relation to human thought in general. In light of these issues, the studies have not yet been performed systematically or broadly. The Buddhist Conquest of China by Erich Zurcher is a seminal work that describes the formative period of early Chinese Buddhism in detail. Zurcher provides very important information which allows us to grasp the level of understanding of Chinese Buddhism at that time. However, even in this book, it is hard to find a detailed theoretical analysis on what kind of ideological convergence occurred in the early stages of the encounter between Buddhism 1

2

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and traditional Chinese thought forms. More specifically, we cannot find, in most books on Chinese Buddhist history including Zurcher’s work, an elaborate theoretical analysis on issues such as why Buddhism converged with Daoistic ways of thinking. In fact, for a long time, the convergence of these two groups has been considered an expected and natural occurrence. It seems that there has been no attempt to analyze the causes in more depth. That being stated, there are more complicated elements that intervened in the process of penetration and assimilation, which cannot be simply explained away by holding that the convergence of the two groups was possible merely because Buddhism and Daoism were philosophies pursuing transcendent values. In order to explain this, it is necessary to have an approach that is different from the existing description method of Buddhist history. It must start with a discussion of the general human thought process, which influenced the thought processes of the two groups, in order to answer the question of how the Buddhist and the Daoist ways of thinking, which were inevitably very different due to region, ethnicity, and culture, met and converged. Let’s investigate the origins of Buddhism and Daoism with this awareness of the problems.

HETEROGENEITY BETWEEN INDIAN AND CHINESE MYTHOLOGICAL THINKING Searching for the causes of the heterogeneities in the ways of thinking between different cultures classified as independent cultural units, or dissimilar ways of thinking in the East and the West, may not produce satisfactory results, especially if we focus only on one research field. In particular, from a comparative philosophy point of view, when we discuss the dissimilarities and the internal connections of the ways of thinking, presenting only one possible approach is bound to have its own limitations. Nonetheless, an acceptable approach could be to search for the meaning of the dissimilarities by focusing only on the structure of the ways of thinking while acknowledging the limitations of this approach. Therefore, I intend to initiate the discussion by acknowledging that numerous problems may arise that could not be included in the established structure; this could be due to the general, inherent limit of the structural approach or to the insufficiency of the established structure. Through this attempt, I will try to overcome the ambiguity in the writings which found the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism in the relationship with Daoism, even though Buddhism had encounters with other traditional Chinese thought forms. The reason why I say the explanations of these writings are ambiguous is because it is very difficult to determine whether the

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understanding of those Chinese monks is Daoistic or Buddhistic, as they criticized a Daoistic interpretation of Geyi Buddhism (格義) and tried to explain the essence of Buddhism through an amalgam of both a Buddhistic and a Daoistic worldview. This phenomenon of matching Buddhist and Daoist concepts has appeared repeatedly in the history of Buddhism since this Geyi Buddhism era. This phenomenon arose because the early Chinese Buddhist intellectuals engaged in the Chinese Buddhist discourses without a deep analytical understanding of the differences between and the similarities of Buddhism and Daoism. This is the reason why I will emphasize the necessity to understand the unique characteristics of the early Chinese Buddhist discourses. Actually, it is hard to find serious discussions regarding the similarities of and differences between Daoistic and Buddhistic ways of thinking among contemporary scholars of Chinese Buddhism. Even though the fact is that this topic interests modern researchers and yet is not well understood, it demonstrates the complexities involved,1 and such a phenomenon reminds us how difficult comparative philosophy is. The difficulty of applying comparative philosophy appears not only in research on comparative philosophies of the East and the West but also in comparing different schools with heterogeneous worldviews even in the same culture. Especially, in China, where there is a strong tradition of syncretism, some scholars assert that the heterogeneous and somewhat competing worldviews of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism are similar by asserting the premise of the monism of the Way (Dao). It is common to see scholars avoid addressing the notable heterogeneity, and this is more severe in the case of Daoism and Buddhism. Let’s examine a specific case of ambiguity by taking examples of explanations of scholars on the so-called “syncretism” of Daoism and Buddhism. This happened during the period of formation of Chinese Buddhism, based on the matching of meanings with the Daoist worldview (Geyi Buddhism and its sublation), when Buddhism was accepted with relative theoretical awareness. Kimura Kiyotaka thinks that although Daoan (道安) had a critical view of Geyi Buddhism, Daoan’s opinion was not to break away from Geyi Buddhism, but rather he determines that Daoan sublated Geyi Buddhist thought into what would become a Chinese Buddhist way. Furthermore, Kiyotaka confirms that Daoan adopted the concept of “original nothingness” (本無) from Daoism to easily explain Buddhism’s “emptiness” (空). In addition, he determines that Daoan described the true ultimate world that was expounded independently by Buddhism, and Daoism was wonderfully expressed by the unifying concept of “original nothingness.”2 This evaluation tacitly acknowledges the acceptance of unproven premises as self-evident facts. In effect, Kiyotaka considers that the ultimate goals of Daoism and those of Buddhism could be naturally combined. However, in order to assert that a syncretism

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of these two is possible, a discussion should be preceded by what parts the Chinese considered to be similar, and how, and on what similarities made the syncretism possible in reality. But we cannot find a debate with this kind of acceptance in Kameda Sigeo’s History of Chinese Buddhism either. Kameda Sigeo merely mentions that Wei-Jin era scholars accepted the concept of “emptiness” of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtra and Vimalakīrti Sūtra as similar to the “nothingness” of Laozi and Zhuangzi. But he omitted an expansive analysis on why they had such an idea.3 The evaluation of Daoan4 is even more succinct, as there is only a brief mention that, in the beginning, Daoan supported a Daoistic understanding of Buddhism but later became a critic of Geyi Buddhism by saying that a Buddhist text must be understood in a Buddhist way. Such a simplistic and naïve explanation may have been generated due to the lack of a thorough discussion on the fundamental issues of similarities and differences, rather than due to this book’s simplistic structure as a history of Buddhism.5 In order to be able to understand the issue of the syncretism of Daoism and Buddhism in Chinese Buddhism in more depth, it is necessary to deal with the similarities and heterogeneities of Indian and Chinese mythological thinking that existed before they began seriously developing their philosophical thinking. This is because the similarities and differences in the philosophizing of Buddhism and Lao-Zhuang Daoism can become clearer when we identify the differences in the mythological ways of thinking of their cultures, which were the causes of the heterogeneities. When we are able to examine the differences in this way, the differences in the worldviews that Buddhism and Daoism were seeking will become clearer. Mythological Thinking as an Intermediate Step between Mythical Thinking and Logical Thinking I would like to analyze the general characteristics of mythological thinking and reveal that the heterogeneities in Indian and Chinese ways of thinking greatly influenced the developments of the philosophical thinking in both countries. The reason is to demonstrate that the worldviews of Buddhism and Daoism are related to the dynamic worldviews that the mythological worldviews of India and China possessed, respectively. First of all, I want to set up a structure in three stages—mythical thinking, mythological thinking, and philosophical thinking—as a historical realization of the human development of subconscious ways of thinking, in order to explain the continuity of mythological and philosophical ways of thinking while avoiding the generally discussed view of these two in conflict. In other words, mythological thinking was a type of thinking prior to the logical behavior of describing mythological events. It was the way of thinking in the

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period in which abstract and logical thinking were more actively involved, compared to primitive mythical thinking. And yet it is clearly distinguished from philosophical thinking in the sense that the abstract and logical thinking type had not yet become the main trend. It does not mean, of course, the way of thinking of an imaginary era, but the way of thinking of an era when there were mythological discourses that could be analyzed. In other words, the specificity of this way of thinking can be confirmed by analyzing Vedic literature and oral myths that are alleged to have greatly influenced the preVedic people’s ways of thinking in India and by analyzing the oral myths and the structure of oracle bone scripts of the Shang Dynasty era in China. In fact, the perspective that considers mythological thinking and philosophical thinking as opposing is contrary to the concrete historical facts, from the point of view of the transformation of humanity’s way of thinking. For example, considering the general evaluation6 that Vedic literature was concurrently mythological and philosophical (or logical) naturally validates the necessity of applying the above mentioned three stages. And even though there have not been many discussions on the coexistence of philosophical thinking and mythological thinking, and few studies7 on the motives of philosophical thinking in mythological thinking, it validates the necessary premise8 that heterogeneous mythological thinking (as an intermediate stage between primitive mythical thinking and early philosophical thinking) gave rise to heterogeneous philosophical thinking. The structural characteristics of these modes of thought show a mixture of thinking based on the dichotomous category and thinking utilizing the trichotomous category. In other words, we have to focus on the fact that logical and abstract thinking constituting the main mode of philosophical thinking directs us to the understanding of dualistic and static worldviews such as subjectivity and objectivity, essence and phenomenon, and transcendental and secular.9 And it should be noted that the sense of mutual penetration that originated from the dynamics of the situation presupposed in an understanding of the primitive, mythical, and undivided world was being conveyed through the expression method of the trichotomous understanding of the world during the stage of mythological thinking in which rudimentary logical and abstract thinking began to function. The characteristics of the modes of thought in this era will become more clear when we compare the mythological forms of thinking of India and China in the following way. Mythological Thinking in India In the case of India, it is necessary to divide the mythology into the Vedic tradition and the pre-Vedic tradition.10 One of the specific ways to distinguish the characteristics of these two traditions would be to compare the Vedic texts

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with oral folk myths. More specifically, I will develop the discussion by comparing the relationship between the gods and humans described in the myths of the two traditions, and contrast the heterogeneous sensibilities regarding attributes of the gods to describe the characteristics of these two. The Characteristics of Vedic Traditional Mythology The main analysis of the Vedic tradition would be an analysis of Vedic texts. Here we are going to specifically focus on how the early Indo-Aryans understood the relationship between gods and humans, centering around the Rg Veda. There is no disagreement with the view that the Vedas had a polytheistic worldview. However, we should not overlook this collection of text’s repeated emphasis on the description of the Supreme God or Absolute God who surpasses all other deities. The characteristics of such Vedic texts may be summarized below. First, in the Vedas, the Absolute God defines all beings in a spacial sense, or is understood as being itself.11 Second, such an Absolute God reveals itself as the cause and the Perfector of the movement that leads all the creatures anew, beyond the range that can be inferred in the temporal sense.12 Third, in a similar way, such an Absolute God must be expressed as the highest god in the hierarchy because it is the Supreme Being.13 Fourth, he must be the Executor of the law of creation and the movement of the universe.14 Chandra insists that such a tendency—being overwhelmed by the absoluteness of God and the effort to understand Him—even came to define the concrete lifestyle of the Aryans who maintained the ancient Vedic tradition. The feeling of dualistic separation between God’s world and the human world shown in the Vedic tradition appears to have been sped up by the stiffening of awe in the absoluteness of God.15 Although it can be said that God has a relationship with the sentient beings of the world by claiming unequivocally that the God intervenes in any form of existence of all beings in the world, we have to recognize that there is an underlying premise of an untraversable qualitative difference of transcendence and secularity between God’s world and the human world. It is undeniable that the understanding described above of God in the mythology of the Vedic tradition initiated the activation of a dualistic understanding of the world, which is abstract thinking or logical reasoning. However, this does not mean that philosophical thinking replaced mythical thinking and became their dominant mode of interpreting the world. Rather, as Georges Dumezil points out, a dualistic understanding of the world and a trichotomous understanding of the world coexisted in the ancient Indian way of thinking.16 In other words, this is the stage at which even though logical thinking began to function actively, mythological thinking, that included primitive mythical thinking and that constituted the main structure of the

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understanding of the world, was still functioning. In the same context, the two masterpieces of J. Gonda—The Dual Deities in the Religion of Veda and Triads in the Veda—express the actual characteristics of the mythological way of thinking of the Vedic tradition, in which the dualistic way of thinking and trichotomous way of thinking coexisted, as shown in the titles. If we compare this Vedic tradition with the characteristics of pre-Vedic or Chinese mythology, to be discussed later, the tendency of their dualistic understanding of the world as mentioned above appears relatively prominent. Therefore, by scrutinizing the characteristics of the orally transmitted mythical folk tales, which were under the influence of the Vedic tradition but had a different type of mythological worldview, I would like to point out that in the Indian mythological thinking tradition there were two parts: Vedic and pre-Vedic. The Characteristics of Pre-Vedic Mythology It appears as yet to be impossible to fully reconstruct the original forms of the traditional mythologies of the pre-Vedic era because the deciphering of the hieroglyphics, which were discovered in the ruins of the Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa sites, started only in 1969. We assume the hieroglyphics display the pre-Vedic language. Despite this limitation, in addition to deciphering the characters, comparative mythologists and folklore scholars have identified and discussed aspects of the orally transmitted mythologies of pre-Vedic culture and analyzed attributes of the heterogenous and exclusive gods appearing in Vedic literature. Due to their effort, many aspects of pre-Vedic culture are being discussed in considerable detail.17 In analyzing the pre-Vedic mythological traditions, it is especially important to analyze the characteristics of oral myths. William Crooke’s Religion and Folklore of Northern India, a collection of oral myths from Northern India, provides very interesting materials to compare. Here is a quote from a report on the understanding of the God, Indra, of the peoples of Northern India. In these areas, the Vedic rain-god is Indra, who enters into the fray with Vritra, “the obstructer,” the demon of drought, or with Ahi, the demon who disperses the rain clouds, is understood in this way. Though he has now lost much of his dignity and the Tulasidas people call him “a vile wretch,” he still retains his popularity among Buddhists. The Koch and Rajbansis of Bengal identify their godling, Hudum Deo, with him, and he appears in androgynous form, represented by two figures, male and female, made of cow-dung. When a drought escalates hardship, women offer to him milk curds, fried rice, and molasses, and they dance around him all night, perform many obscene rituals, and stimulate Indra in the hope of compelling him to send rain.18

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This report depicts that the Vedic God Indra loses his authority and is transformed into a local godling. We can see how much his authority is weakened by comparing the description of Indra as praised in the Rg Veda. He who reveals himself as the Supreme God, full of spirit, far surpasses the other gods in wisdom: Before whose majesty and mighty manhood, the beings in this and the other world tremble: He, O men, is Indra.19 (Rv. II. 12.1)

We cannot simply interpret the weakening of the authority of the gods established in this comparison as a declining of the influence of the gods. Rather, in this phenomenon, we can see the undivided sentiment of primitive mysticism; that the power of the divine world is in harmony with the secular lives of humans, and that is strongly reflected in Indian oral mythology. In this sense, the sentiments expressed in the Central Indian mythology collected and recorded by Verrier Elwin, especially the lack of systematicity in the myth of creation, may be interpreted as a similar expression of such a sentiment.20 The gods or mystical beings appearing in the oral myths of creation in Central India are impulsive and irrational beings. Although the Vedic gods are also described as mystical beings in the Vedas and Upanishads, pre-Vedic gods possess different characteristics from those Vedic gods who exhibit consistent characteristics in the well-structured stories. If we consider this aspect as indicative of the lack of logical development of these types of stories, we might overlook an important function of primitive myths; the undivided sentiment that mythological thinking possesses. Actually, this tells us that the Central Indians had a more flexible way of thinking than the people who inherited the Vedic traditions, in terms of the relationship between gods and humans and affinity to the dynamics of nature. Perhaps the main characters of their mythical stories were neither gods nor humans, but might have been the dynamic powers themselves. Therefore, the capriciousness of the gods—that clay tiger icons are easily transformed into deadly, living tigers, as depicted in the oral myth of Bhuia province21—is nothing strange in the world where all beings are alive and active, and their powers interpenetrate. We need to pay attention to the arguments of scholars such as Deshmukh and Eliade, who insist that these sentiments form the axis of an anti-Vedic way of thinking; in other words, the pre-Aryan worldview, which was alienated from the center of the Vedic tradition, is actively reflected in the antiVedic way of thinking.22 In the same context, it would be very meaningful to analyze how Buddhism, which belongs to the anti-Vedic trend, embraced and organized these sentiments. Before discussing this further, I will examine the development of Chinese mythological thinking and how the trichotomous

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way of thinking worked in the Chinese way of thinking, by organizing the Chinese characteristics of mythological thinking more clearly as well as demonstrating that a similar structure exists in Buddhism. The Mythological Way of Thinking in China Let’s look at the generally discussed characteristics of Chinese myths before we compare the Chinese mythological way of thinking with that of India. First, the pursuit of the Absolute God depicted in the Vedic tradition appears very vaguely in Chinese mythology. This phenomenon makes it possible to infer that the gods appearing in the pre-Vedic era myths would be similar to the gods appearing in Chinese myths, in terms of their characteristics. Second, for the Chinese, not the Absolute God but their ancestral gods, presumed to be related by blood, play an important role. We will examine why their mythological way of thinking has these characteristics, by analyzing the ancient Chinese worldview documented in the oracle bone script as well as through a content analysis of a few of their important myths. The Chinese Way of Thinking in the Shang Dynasty Period Seen through the Composition of the Oracle Bone Script The oracle bone script, which is the foundation of Chinese characters as hieroglyphs, can be a relevant type of artifact to study and assess the Chinese way of thinking, in the sense that we can see how they described the world by simplifying and organizing it. While the process of understanding this script is ongoing, the views on the meanings of each character are diverse and inconclusive. It is not at all easy to fully grasp their ways of thinking merely through the research on oracle bone script, as it is true that there is always the potential for misinterpretation. Therefore, through a macroscopic approach methodology, we are going to examine the structure of the characters rather than their individual meanings, the method of expansion of the concept from simple to complex characters, and the conceptual relationships among characters.23 Sima Kunio organized the basic characters of the oracle bones into 840 sections in his oracle bone script dictionary (殷墟卜辭綜類).24 His organization helps us to confirm that one of the important facts is that most characters have 3 as the highest number in the formation of a character, except for a few exceptions. Specifically, a radical in a unitary pictogram, for example, the radicals representing hand ( ) and foot ( ), is composed of only three strokes. The fact that this is not a coincidence is explicitly revealed in the way they displayed their flags. The fact that the number of decorations on a flagpole or that of the directions of movement of a flag does not exceed 3

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means that the maximum number qualitatively felt is 3 (diagram of examples: ). We may understand the flow of a river or the expression of raindrops in the same context (diagram of examples: ). These examples do not seem to be exceptions, as in the case of radicals being constituents of compound characters. As seen in the pictogram for drumming ( ), and the radical considered as the origin of a group ( ), that the maximum number of people is 3 supports this assumption. The principle of character composition of 3 is repeatedly confirmed, without exception, in the description of shapes such as tree ), grain ( ), and the skein of a cocoon ). Their intrinsic sensitivity, directing the principle of formation of characters into 3, as repeatedly confirmed, repeats without failure in the relational formation of the characters. For example, the fact that there were three characters, each describing a person’s position in society (status, hierarchy) such as ( ), indicates that this principle was being applied even in the concept of their relationships. And also, we find trichotomous elements in the perception of space, as seen in the descriptive system of high, middle, low ( ). I think that the concept of three cosmic elements (三才: 天地人, heaven, earth, humans) that developed later on is not unrelated to this. We may consider that, as Sarah Allen points out, in the records and artifacts of the Yin (Shang) Dynasty, the impressively expressed trichotomous understanding of space25 by the people of that era, in addition to the concept of the four directions based on dichotomy, should be seen as meaning that this way of thinking existed. Of course, the regularity of these two kinds of understanding methods corroborates the idea that the dichotomous and abstract ways of understanding the world had reached a considerable level. Their elaborate calendar and the classification of their deceased ancestors’ status based on the ten celestial stems shown in the records of ancestral worship support this assertion.26 It has been understood that the meaning of the trichotomous way of describing the world, which is often found in the mythological worldview, is as a phenomenon that appeared when the primitive mythical way of thinking and the logical way of thinking coexisted. In other words, this style of expression appeared when dynamic powers penetrated into each other, and the continuity is expressed conceptually. I would like to confirm that, through the understanding of the characteristics of Chinese myths covered in the following section, the ancient Chinese view of gods and nature depended more on this sense of interpenetration and continuity. In other words, the fact that the Chinese expressing a more peripheral affinity toward the gods, rather than the absolute awe based on the dualistic sense of separation as in the Vedic tradition, could be understood to mean that the continuous development of the trichotomous understanding of the world, as previously analyzed, cannot be perceived as separate.

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The Characteristics of Chinese Mythology Even in Chinese myths, a god as the foundation of the natural world, or as the creator god such as Pangu (盤古, Pan’Ku), is mentioned. Although many scholars suppose that Pangu is not predominantly a Chinese god,27 it cannot be denied that the myths associated with him are products of the ancient Chinese way of thinking in the sense that the depiction of Pangu has Chinese embellishments, as seen below. Pangu is described by Xu Zheng in the Yi-wen lei-chü: The sky and the earth were at first one blurred entity like an egg. Pangu was born into it. The separation of the sky and the earth took eighteen thousand years—the yang which was light and pure arose to become the sky, and the yin which was heavy and murky sank to form the earth. Between them was Pangu, who went through nine changes every day; his wisdom greater than that of the sky and his ability greater than that of the earth. Every day the sky rose ten feet higher, the earth became ten feet thicker, and Pangu grew ten feet taller. Another eighteen thousand years passed, and here was an extremely high sky, an extremely thick earth, and an extremely tall Pangu. Then came the Three Emperors. So, these numbers came into existence and evolved like this. The number begins with one, becomes established at three, is completed at five, prospers at seven, and ends at nine. So, the sky is ninety thousand li from the earth.28

Although a lot of the ideas that appear in this myth were formed not based on early mythical concepts but on abstract concepts developed later on, they do not portray Pangu, a god, as an absolute object of worship. On this point, Pangu comes close to the concept of a demigod and is understood as a complete amalgam of three elements; god along with Heaven (天) and Earth (地).The Chinese characteristics of the god Pangu are more distinct in the Wuyunli nianji (五運曆年紀), which describes the death of this god and the birth of the universe and human beings. In this myth, all human beings came into existence by being transformed from parasites attached to the body of Pangu, not as demigods.29 This way of thinking (about humans’ emergence) is far from that of the Vedic tradition, which asserts the origin of humanity as being related to divinity—that humanity’s superiority was transmitted by God as they were created from the essence of God. Furthermore, the understanding that the utilization of naturally occurring things by human beings or the acquisition of culture are not accomplished through man’s confrontation and struggle with God or obtained by the simple death of God but are all derived from the benefit of God, shows another aspect of the affinity with God. Mankind’s affinity with God is not confined to “good gods” or ancestral gods. The attitude of the Chinese toward the god Chiyou, as explained in Ren Fang’s (任昉) Tales of Strange Events (述異記), aptly represents the nontranscendental type of understanding of a divine being.

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People in the village of Taiyuan never offered ox heads as sacrifices to the God Chiyou. In Jizhou there is a place called Chiyouchuan, which was the battlefield of Zhulu. During the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han, the God Chiyou appeared once in the daytime with a snake’s head and a turtle’s legs, and then a pestilence spread. Because of this, the people there built a temple for him.30

Their understanding of gods by those who built shrines even for evil gods appears to be quite pragmatic. This attitude can be understood as an extension of the attitude toward good gods and ancestral gods, who were thought to be responsive to humans who sincerely ask for their support. In other words, the Chinese attitude toward all types of gods reflects the Chinese view that there are both good gods and evil gods, and their theological position that gods are among humans, and intervene in and react to human affairs. This view is quite dissimilar to the Vedic tradition that ultimately attempts to suppress or eradicate evil gods. In this context, it may be understood that the Chinese did not take evil gods as seriously, as they did not feel absolutely overwhelmed by the Great God, which is different from the views of those of the Vedic tradition. This kind of perceptivity, along with the trichotomous understanding of the world discovered in the analysis of oracle bone scripts, became important evidence to support the assumption that the ancient Chinese had a way of mythological thinking that was different from that of the Vedic tradition. To summarize, in their two ways of understanding the world, both of which consisted of their mythological way of thinking, they were more familiar with viewing the world as a continuity of interpenetrating dynamic forces than a world made up of beings that were separated conceptually. In the case of China, this way of understanding the world was actively asserted and justified philosophically by the Daoists. This part will be dealt with again in the discussion about the way the Daoists understood the term “chaos” and in the analysis of the major relevant chapters of the Daodejing. Now, let’s examine how Buddhism from the perspective of the anti-Vedic tradition in India can be discussed in relation to the pre-Aryan worldview. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE BUDDHIST WORLDVIEW There are two reasons why I consider the worldview of Vasubandhu, which is the theoretical pinnacle of Mahayana Buddhism, as the syncretic model of the Buddhistic worldview. First, the worldview of Vasubandhu actively expresses, through an epistemological analysis methodology, the theory of dependent arising, which is the essence of early Indian Buddhism’s worldview. Second, this kind of worldview was transplanted and actively

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perpetuated in China. In other words, while Middle Way Buddhism led by Nagarjuna inherited the critical perspective of early Buddhism against the Vedic tradition, the Consciousness-Only School of Buddhism of Vasubandhu developed a very unique expression of the dependent arising theory of early Buddhism, which provided the basis of the critique. It developed in a new way, and after that it established in a form, the Chinese Dharma-characteristic School (法相宗), that was a combination of the Chinese Daoist and NeoDaoist worldviews while maintaining the fundamental basis of the dependent arising worldview, with little modification. The Originality of the Buddhist Worldview: Critique of the Metaphysical Worldview and Confirmation of the Vitality of the Empirical World Most of the misunderstandings concerning Buddhism arose from misinterpretations of anātman, the opposite of ātman, which is the central concept in the Upanishads. Those who attempted to understand this concept, represented as no-self, expressed an affirming attitude and an attempt to absorb the negative, limiting conceptualization of no-self into a positive and more all-encompassing conceptualization, through the unification with the great self, or the discovery of the original self which transcends the phenomenal self. However, to regard this approach as merely a limitation of expression is a very big trap. Even if the original intention of the person who expressed this didn’t mean to, if the expression resulted in the return to the Upanishadic worldview that early Buddhism originally tried to critique, then we cannot regard this as a simple problem of expression. From the point of view of this issue, the changes in the understanding of Buddhism in the West analyzed by Andrew P. Tuck implies a lot.31 And, according to the various interests and philosophical trends on the appearance of Buddhism in the western world, these changes could, in a sense, be a part of the history of the misunderstandings about Buddhism. In other words, the previously mentioned problem of expression is not simply a matter of mere limitation of expression, but likely the product of misunderstanding. The scholar who addressed this issue most actively recently is David J. Kalupahana.32 He meticulously criticized similar interpretations by metaphysical scholars such as Murti, who have tried to view Buddhism as a continuation of the Vedic and Upanishadic traditions or traditional Indian philosophies. However, by trying to view Buddhism as an extension of these views, he criticizes the understanding that overlooks the originality of Buddhism as a reaction against traditional Indian philosophy prior to Buddhism. I sympathize with those raising these issues, but would like to stress the originality of the Buddhist worldview while critiquing the metaphysical

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understanding of the world and rediscovering the dynamic world. In order to do this, I will first summarize that the negation theory of Buddhism is a total negation of the ontological and metaphysical worldviews of the Vedic and Upanishadic traditions. Second, I will demonstrate that Vasubandhu reapplied the trichotomous conceptualization that had been used consistently in the Buddhist tradition to describe this dynamism of the empirical world, through my analysis of Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses on the Vijñapti-mātra Treatise as an example expressing the Buddhist worldview of “dependent arising,” which is the basis of the Buddhist method of critique, that is, double negation.

NEGATION OF METAPHYSICAL THINKING: THE BUDDHIST LOGIC OF DOUBLE NEGATION Upanishadic Metaphysics Viewed from the Developmental Standpoint of Dualistic Modes of Thought If we look at the Buddhist negation theory simply in its mode of expression, it is actually not much different from that in the Upanishads. Because of this, based on the proposition that words cannot express the nature of the absolute world or the world of truth, there are many cases in which distinctions between Buddhism and the Upanishads are ignored, or that they are considered not much different from each other. This misunderstanding may be resolved by pointing out the limits of reflexive thinking inherent in the negation theory of the Upanishads compared to the negation theory of Buddhism. One may notice that the negation theory applied in the analysis of consciousness in the Manduka Upanishad is definitely more sophisticated than the negation theory appearing in the Vedas. Let us examine the explanation of the fourth and deepest level achieved in the pursuit of the purity of consciousness. The fourth state of the soul is that of pure self consciousness, where there is no knowledge of internal objects nor of external ones, nor of the two together; where the soul is not a mass of intelligence, transcending as it does both consciousness and subconsciousness; where it is invisible, incommunicable, incomprehensible, indefinable; where it is beyond thought and beyond the possibility of any indication, being virtually the quintessence of self-intuition, in which all the five kinds of sensation are finally resolved; when it is tranquil and full of auspiciousness and without a second; it is then to be called ātman.33

This is the part explaining the ultimate pure state of the soul (or internalized divinity) that is connected by Vaishvanara, Taijasa, and Prajñā states as an internal development of the divinity (Brahman). This is considered as the process of

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emphasizing the mystery of the divinity of pure soul through the simultaneous negation of various dichotomous categories. But what needs to be pointed out here is that due to the attempt to understand the divinity conceptually through the negation method, the vital contents of the dynamic divinity, which were rather abundant in the Vedic era, were excluded. We cannot overlook the fact that intrinsic transcendentality of the mythical being is emphasized more than the dynamic participation of all beings and the secret relationship in terms of mysticism. In other words, while the mysterious feeling concerning god was commonplace in the Vedic era, we can point out that even though it was internalized then, the experience of it became more of an extraordinary event. There is no doubt that the elaborate negation theory they used and the breaking down of the process of consciousness analysis into more parts were related to the development of their dualistic thinking system. Therefore, we may refer to the outcome of this development as an exaggerated process of the transcendental world, in which the ordinary mysticism of the transcendental world was being removed due to the development of a dualistic thinking system. The final result of this process was that the purpose of the negation theory resided in the absolutization of the mental substance, the so-called “ātman,” rather than the deepening of the critique of perception. The negation process that they demonstrated merely emphasized that this substance is not grasped by the ordinary mode of thinking, which is based on dualism. And it does not demonstrate that they were aware that they were engaging in another level of dualistic separation. Above all, the Buddhist perspective was clearly aware of this point, and it opened up a different and unique new dimension in the critique of consciousness. Newly Interpreted Conceptualization of Double Negation Introduced by Buddhism: Consistency from Early Buddhism to the Madhyamaka-Śāstra One of the common misunderstandings occurring in the process of reading Buddhist texts seems to be overlooking the historical referents that the concepts in the texts presuppose. Let me quote the 55th verse of the Sutta-nipata. Norman presents his opinion indirectly by translating it thusly: “Gone beyond the contortions of wrong view, we arrived at the fixed course, having gained the way.”34 Norman interprets “niyama” as “fixed course” and thus leaves room for misunderstanding the purpose of Buddhism. If the text had intended to express a more robust meaning, it should have used the more appropriate term, “niyati.” “Niyama” is closer to what Buddha had originally intended to use—to translate “niyama” as “the ordinary way”—which would have helped Norman to lessen the possibility of an absolutist or substantialistic interpretation of this concept.

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This kind of problem is not unique to Norman. For example, let’s suppose that we are reading the next phrase from the same text, and let’s think of an easily associative interpretation. Having abandoned the pleasant and the unpleasant, not grasping, not dependent upon anything, completely released from the fetters, he would wander properly in the world.35

Meanings such as “leaving the mundane world” or “seeking for a way to transcend” would probably initially come to mind. But upon reconsidering this in the historical context, we may read into it as follows: “Doubt what the Upanishad philosophers believed to be concerning pleasing or suffering, and do not be obsessed with being preoccupied with what they believe to be eternal.” Then, the meaning reveals itself in a more concretely clear way. From this context, we may be able to comprehend that the negation theory of early Buddhism is the expression of negation of the worldview of the philosophers of that time who insisted on a metaphysically forged and idealized reality as reality. This point of view also appears in their constant vigilance against the view that the world they pursue, and the explanation of the practice in order to understand the world, is reduced to a metaphysical conceptualization framework. In Majjhima-nikāya (Collection of Middle-length Discourses), they established the state of “nirodha-samāpatti” (cessation of feeling and perception, 想受滅) in order to guard against making the state of “neither associative thought nor non-associative thought” (非想 非非想) as the epitome of Buddhism.36 Concerning this explanation, the Samyukta Agama (Connected Discourses) asserts that this is not the case, by rejecting the evaluation of the heretics that “this (‘nirodha-samāpatti’) is the ultimate pursuit of Buddhism.”37 This shows how keenly they were aware of, and how vigilantly they were reacting to, not returning to the method of understanding the world based on the structure of the former understanding of the world, specifically, the metaphysical structure of understanding the world. It appears that Nagarjuna was especially adept at employing negation theory. This was probably due to the sophisticated methodology of applying the negation theory that he developed while critiquing schools such as Sarvâstivāda, which had been disseminating the metaphysical interpretation of Buddhism. The following passage from The Investigations of Formations (觀行品) in the Madhyamaka-śāstra, which is replete with negation theories like this, shows very dramatically what Nagarjuna’s intention was. Buddha propagated the law of emptiness in order to dismiss these views. Nevertheless, if there is someone who holds their view that emptiness exists, this is a person that even the Buddha cannot educate.38

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To explain this in the contemporary context, if someone misunderstands what Buddha said concerning “emptiness” in order to caution those who consider the realist and absolutist world as the actual world, which was created by conceptual manipulation, Buddha himself cannot do anything for them. The basis of the reason for Nagarjuna’s confident assertion relies on his understanding that the world is based on the dependent arising theory of the original dynamic worldview of early Buddhism. In other words, Nagarjuna expressed, through his negation theory, that we must restore the dynamic, empirical world instead of relying on the static world described through abstract concepts. Therefore, he asserted the following: Anything happening without dependent arising is not clear. (Specifically, it can not be experienced by us concretely.) For this reason, things that are not empty are not clearly experienced.39

Finally, what Nagarjuna wanted to say is that we would have to have a direct view of the concrete, living world dependently arising. It is a warning that the depictions or formulations crafted through the metaphysical viewpoint are impossible to discuss and that any discussion would result in empty conclusions. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DESCRIPTION STYLE OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF DEPENDENT ARISING Previously, it was pointed out that Nagarjuna’s basis for critiquing the metaphysical perception of the world is the dependent arising worldview. On the other hand, this dependent arising theory had already been summarized and expressed as the “12-link chain of causation” (十二支緣起說) in early Buddhism. What we have to pay attention to here is that the expression “12link chain of causation” is described from “ignorance” (無明) to “old age and death” (老死) linearly, and that because of this, it can be understood simplistically as a theory of cause and effect. In order to avoid this kind of simplistic understanding, there had historically been a number of supplementary explanation methods. Nevertheless, we have to see that there was a limitation in depicting the world dynamically and in three dimensions merely through the “12-link chain of causation.” Of course, early Buddhism did not explain the dependent arising theory only through the simplistic description of the “12-link chain of causation.” We can identify a consistent structure that was used, from early Buddhism to the “Nikāya Buddhism school” and the Consciousness Only school. This is a structural method to discuss the world, and stream of consciousness, not through dualism, but

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through the trichotomous structure containing interdependent and interpenetrating characteristics. This type of structure shows similarities with the aforementioned mythological thinking style. It also means that even though these two thinking methods do not share the exact same sensitivity regarding the world’s dynamic situation, they have similar aspects in some areas. This point is revealed more clearly in Daoism, which will be discussed later. At this point, let’s scrutinize and explicate the trichotomous state of affairs in early Buddhism.

ONE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE DESCRIPTION METHOD OF DEPENDENT ARISING IN EARLY BUDDHISM In the Dīgha Nikāya (Collection of Long Discourses), one of the earliest sutras, we can find the following explanation of the dependent arising theory through a three-categorical structure; nāma (body), rūpa (mind), and viññāṇa (consciousness). “Ānanda, do not say that! This dependent origination is profound and is revealed subtly . . . Thus, Ānanda, mind-and-body conditions consciousness, and consciousness conditions mind-and-body. In the same way, we know that, mind-and-body conditions contact (觸).”40 The first thing to point out here is that in early Buddhism, mind and body (nāma-rūpa) were not set up as independent objects. This is one of the clues that reveal the characteristics of the dependent arising theory of early Buddhism. This expresses an intention to understand this structure not merely through simple spatial analysis. The following text from the Saṃyukta Nikāya, on negating the “four original causes (四原因),” dramatically demonstrates the worldview of early Buddhism. What now, friend Sariputta, old age-and death, is it wrought in one and same person, in a different person, in one who is both same and different, or in one who is neither the same nor a different person—is it (a state) that arises by chance? Not any one of these, friend Kotthita, is (the case with) old age-anddeath; but old age-and death is conditioned by birth.41

It is a warning that we will lose sight of reality if we try to analyze reality based on dualistic categories such as internal cause, external cause, internal and external cause, and no cause. The reason why he mentions birth, in the 12-link chain of causation as the basis of the last cause of aging and death, is that we should understand the birth and death of an object through the

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concrete dynamism of the concrete world. This dynamism is expressed as follows: When that exists, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that does not exist, this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases.42

This kind of early Buddhistic worldview is found through the discussion of “the Sarvâstivāda school” in the Nikāya Buddhism era, which insists on the concept of “even though people have no self, phenomena do exist” (人無我法有). In the Vijñānakāya, the arising of consciousness is explained as follows: Monks! Because of the arising of certain conditions, consciousness is established that distinguishes these states from those states. If consciousness arises because of eye and material shapes, it is known as visual consciousness; if consciousness arises because of ear and sound, it is known as auditory consciousness: . . . Therefore, it cannot be said that consciousness can exist by itself without depending upon the existence of reality; it must be said that the existence of a consciousness without any dependency does not match the doctrine.43

In this passage, we can see that the way of expressing the dependent arising theory at the time of early Buddhism was maintained even though it was explained incompletely, through the trichotomous structure which established that consciousness depends on the concrete real entities—a subjective perceiving organism and a consciousness that is dependent on an objective perceived material—and this matches the premise of “even though people have no self, phenomena do exist (人無我法有).” We can also see that this form of expression was established in a generalized form by looking at the descriptive methodology of the “18 dhātu” (elements of cognition) in the Abhidharmakośa. The group of six consciousnesses is described in the Dhātukāya as follows: What is Eye-consciousness? That which is eye-consciousness born of eye and material existence; eye being support and the material existence being a condition; that which is experience with regard to eye, its consciousness and material existence. This is Eye-consciousness. What is Ear-consciousness, Olfactory consciousness, Gustary consciousness, Body-consciousness and mind-consciousness?44

Repetition of the trichotomous method of structuring the discussion means that they knew the static understanding of the world or an understanding of the world through the dualistic category associated with it. For example, subjectivity and objectivity, or mind and matter, could not describe the dynamic

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and dependently arising world very well. This should be understood as meaning that they knew this either through the traditional forms of discussion in Buddhism or through their own awareness. THE PROJECTIVE TRICHOTOMOUS WAY OF THINKING OF THE TRIṂŚIKĀ It has been well-documented that Vasubhandu was at one time a theoretician of Sarvâstivāda. By this, we may infer that he might have been quite familiar with the trichotomous discussion methodology previously analyzed. Also, considering that he left the Sarvâstivāda School and adopted the Mahayana Buddhist perspective that the individual self and all phenomena are all empty (我法俱空), it is reasonable to assume that he might have understood the metaphysical problems of objective realism. Therefore, let’s for now put aside a discussion on the process by which the Consciousness-Only school theory transformed historically into a form of metaphysical idealism, as in the “womb of Tathāgata” theory, and why a number of modern scholars understand this as the case. Instead, let’s delve into the philosophical meaning of the Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only (The Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā), with the premise that Vasubandhu would have been careful to avoid a metaphysical interpretation of the development of his discourse. Therefore, let’s try to analyze the Thirty Verses, with the premise that Vasubandhu could have tried to include the understanding of the dynamic Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā world, which is the basis of the anti-metaphysical tradition, in his discussion of the trichotomous structure that he was familiar with. Vasubandhu clearly expressed his anti-metaphysical point of view, which is that the Consciousness-Only view does not indicate any substance, in his Twenty Verses on Consciousness Only (The Vimśatikā-vijñaptimātratā), and in detail in his own commentary in the “Treatise of Consciousness-Only” (唯識論) text translated by Prajñāruci (般若流支). The Buddha said that consciousness is the only means to make them understand that there is no substance in the Dharma and the self. But there is no consciousness to cling to.45

Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider ālaya-vijñāna (“storehouse consciousness”) in Thirty Verses on the Vijñapti-mātra Treatise (Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only; The Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā) as a nondualistic, a priori, functional framework to explain the phenomenon rather than to understand it as the original basis of the world. The first and the second verses of the Thirty Verses express that the storehouse consciousness was

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not envisioned as an intrinsic, foundational consciousness or something transcendental beyond the empirical world; rather, it seems to refer to the internal experience of something perpetually existing, and which functions prior to and after an individual’s conceptual understanding of the world. Whatever, indeed, is the variety of ideas of self and elements that prevails, it occurs in the transformation of consciousness. Such transformation is threefold, (namely,) the resultant, what is called mentation, as well as the concept of object. Here in, the consciousness called alaya, with all its seeds, is resultant.46

Here, attention needs to be paid to the fact that Vasubandhu describes the ālaya-vijñāna (“storehouse consciousness”) as an empirical status that matures and transforms in the stream of consciousness. We should consider this consciousness as ripening and transforming before the division between subject and object occurs, and also as a conceptual object in the sense that it was conceptualized as having three separate parts. What is important is that Vasubandhu does not establish another nonempirical dimension that would be a by-product of another dichotomy beyond subjectivity and objectivity in the same way as the dichotomy between subject and object. Here, the stream of consciousness is the most primordial experience, and the concepts of subject and object are the by-products of secondary reflection. However, being the by-products of reflection does not mean they are imaginary. This is also a by-product of one of the functions of our conceptualizing consciousness, such as contemplation (思量). Furthermore, it is clear that these conceptualizations—the thought of a situation that occupies space,47 and a thought that fruition is a temporal situation that includes the disappearance of the incident antecedent to the consequent incident48—do not exist outside of interdependence or the continuous dependent arising theory. Here, the empirical situation called ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is described concretely as the continuity of a certain primordial and undivided experience prior to conceptualization. In other words, what Vasubandhu means by consciousness when he says, “It rises from the transformation of consciousness”49 and “It transforms like a powerful and constantly flowing torrent,”50 can be understood as him describing one of the aspects of consciousness of the aforementioned mythological way of thinking in which the subject and the object are not separate. The experience of dynamism of a primordial undivided situation, in which internal and external powers flow together, could be an indirect and secondary experience in terms of the way of understanding the conceptual situation. If we compare the relationships of the following three categories with the analysis of consciousness in Yogacara, we can refer to this structure as the

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projective trichotomous (or trichotomous) way of thinking: Ālāyavijñāna— storehouse consciousness—is the totality of primordial experiences (a syncretism of understanding between undivided continuity and categorical conceptual situations); indication of the role of “manas” (consciousness) which generates the experience of division between the conceptual situation innate in the undivided continuity (vipaka); the cognition of objects in the external realm by the senses (vidya-vijñapti) that draws the objectifying experience (of self and the elements) as the result of the function of the manas. We can call this structure a projective trichotomous (投影三範疇) way of thinking. This is Vasubadhu’s unique way of thinking that distinguishes itself from other ways of thinking, such as a way that tries to explain the world through dualistic or abstract categories, or that tries to set up a trichotomous relationship that includes consciousness, which is hypothesized to be based on two substantialistic objective categories. In other words, the basic structure of Vasubhandu’s way of understanding the world is that contemplation (manas), which simultaneously includes the flow of the primitive consciousness and the function of conceptual division, establishes the selfprojective subjective situation and the other-projective objective situation. Vasubaduhu clarified the inseparability of the primordial situation of the flow of consciousness and contemplation by saying that “since consciousness called contemplation arises depending on this flow of consciousness, thoughts are its nature.”51 Vasubandhu’s way of thinking can be ascertained as the synthesis of two worlds without contradiction: the world conceptually understood, and the world of undivided continuity between subject and object understood by the experience of the flow of primordial consciousness. Here, not only the way of understanding dualistic and conceptualized situations but also a sensitivity to the mythological, undivided dynamism, can be fully explained as our concrete experiences. This means that Vasubandhu had a clear understanding of the two main streams of our understanding of things: the source of the origination of dualistic and trichotomous structures.

UNIQUENESS OF THE DAOISTIC WORLDVIEW Previously, we described the characteristics of the Chinese ways of mythological thinking. And we also pointed out that Daoists actively supported these ways of thinking and main concepts, and used them in their philosophical assertions. In this section, in particular, how the concept of chaos was understood in Daoism and how it was projected in the way of describing the Dao in the Daodejing, will be observed.

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Understanding the Mythical Undividedness: The Active Acceptance of Chaos and the Insistence of a Nondualistic Way of Thinking Girardot explores the distinctiveness of Daoism, unique among Chinese philosophies, for its insights into the rather hidden and unseen primordial way of life beyond the commonsense understanding of the world which cannot be expressed through everyday language.52 The concept that he focuses on the most when he explains this primacy is, precisely, chaos (混沌). Inspired by the fact that the Daoists like to explain the Dao through this concept, he insists that the world the Daoists are seeking is not an orderly arranged world, but a nonstandard, primordial, and dynamic world. In fact, the world of Dao that the Daoists describe is quite far from the rational, ordered world arranged by humans or gods. The fact that Daoists actively refer to traditional mythological figures and the concepts corresponding to them means that their world view has a certain affinity with the mythological way of thinking. Girardot explains the examples, such as the coarseness of God as “chaos” appearing in Chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi and the “chaos” as the primordial manifestation of the universe mentioned in Chapter 25 of the Daodejing, as the understanding of “the world prior to the emergence of the dualistic world.”53 As above, the premise that “chaos” was the initial cause of the logically inferred world, and that “chaos” specifically was the mystical force that created the world concretely, is a good example of the Daoists’ affinity with the mythological way of thinking. The characters “profound (玄) or subtle (玄妙)” used to describe “chaos” are concepts used to indicate drawing a thread endlessly from a tangled mass, or referring to the subtlety of its mode of existence. Therefore, the thought that the Dao is tangled and subtle, yet produces all creatures endlessly, would have been an impossibility without an affinity for the sentiment of mythological undividedness. It is understandable that the two characteristics of the Dao, that are the foundation of the logically inferred world and yet make it hard to describe concretely due to its undivided mode of existence, made it difficult for the Daoists to clearly define the contents of the Dao. So here lies insight into the limits of dualistic language which is incapable of expressing such concepts. In other words, the use of mythological analogies and illogical or controversial statements in Daoist literature can be considered as attempts to bridge the gap between everyday language and the concrete world. Graham insists that Zhuangzi tries to explain “the one” as something that neither belongs to the ordinarily used categories of “one” or “many” while being aware of the limitations of dualistic language in a paragraph in the “Discussion of the Equality of Things” chapter.54 This could be seen as a

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proper indication of the worldview of Daoists, who insist on a nondualistic way of thinking. Let’s analyze how the abovementioned discussions developed into an actual structural framework to explain objects from a realist’s point of view, rather than as an introspection of the epistemological approach as in the West or in India; specifically, how the sense of mythological undividedness and the meticulous reflection on the dualistic way of thinking are expressed in the Daodejing, especially in the structure of repeated discussions when they explain the concept of Dao. The Circulative Trichotomous Way of Thinking of Daoism Viewed through the Description Style of Three Different Conceptualizations of the Dao We can investigate the Daoist way of thinking in the three following forms by adapting one of the formerly mentioned characteristics of Daoism to understand the Daodejing, which is the affirmation of undivided mystical existence expressed in the acceptance of the concept of mythological chaos, and applying the relational concept of essence-function (體用) methodology of the Dao and phenomena. They are as follows: First, the Daoist understanding of concrete phenomena as the functioning of the Dao, especially the phenomena understood through dualism, will be examined. Second, the essence of the Dao, understood as the undivided and primordial form of existence, and especially the method of describing enigmatic feelings through controversial statements by breaking them down into two parts, will be analyzed: (i) the explanation method of the primordial as “One,” (ii) and especially the established relationship which is contradictory to the dichotomous phenomena. Third, the depth of reflexive thinking regarding the understanding of the dynamic world through the characteristics of deconstructive linguistic expressions will be explained. The Daodejing reveals an active understanding of the dualism of the phenomenal world. In it, two premises are working concurrently: first, it accepts the phenominalizing of dualism as the self-expression of the undivided Dao, and second, it manages the limitations of the mundane duality of human understanding of the world within limits. The phenomenal world as the function of the Dao may be understood through a situational way of understanding which reflects our mundane dualistic way of thinking. Laozi accepts this kind of mundane nature naturally, as shown: Hence some things lead and some follow; Some breathe gently and some breathe hard; Some are strong and some are weak;

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Some destroy and some are destroyed; Therefore the sage avoids excess, extravagance, and arrogance.55

The acceptance of dichotomous phenomena may be understood as the first stage, if we understand this level of their reflexive understanding of the world. This means taking a passive attitude in following one’s environment or respecting the exclusively of each individual’s situation which appears to be dualistic. In other words, the passage quoted above aligns with the theoretical basis of the “Each one for himself” philosophy of Yang Chu, as pointed out by Fung Yulan. However, if we move to the stage of explaining the relationship between the two, or in other words, one step closer to the stage of reflexive thinking, the form of the discussion is completely overturned. The repeatedly emphasized interdependence of any dualistic situation is expressed in the Laozi as below: Thus Something and Nothing produce each other; The difficult and the easy complement each other; The long and the short off-set each other; The high and the low incline towards each other; Note and sound harmonize with each other; Before and after follow each other.56

Regarding the ways of thinking such as synchronicity of dichotomous events, mutual coexistence, or complementariness, it is true that the interpretation of the dialectic understanding of the world is applied in a very appealing way regarding these. But, even though we cannot deny the fact that similarities are found in the sense that dialectic is one of the ways to ascertain the dynamic aspects of things, this kind of comparison may result in diminishing the more diverse and reflexive connotations in the Daoist understanding of the world. Specifically, when Daoists explain the interdependence of a dualistic situation through the essence-function concept, there are a lot of cases in which the diversity of explanation methods cannot be interpreted only through the dialectic method. Of course, we also cannot say that they never reveal a linear understanding at all. In the Daodejing, we frequently encounter the traces of understanding of the essence of the Dao as the basis of unchangeability and of the undividable, absolute world. However, we can find more complicated parts to consider if we look at them from a more expansive, reflexive point of view. When the Daoists explain that the nondifferentiable and primordial Dao has the power to divide itself into two ontologically, and then explain the function of the Dao epistemologically, namely its relationship with phenomena in order to emphasize the indivisibility of the essence of the Dao, the

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following arguments may arise. That is, even though concrete phenomena occur discriminately due to the human dualistic way of thinking, it may be the case that even this is a part of the indifferentiable nature of the Dao. These two types of explanations result in what has to be accepted as the contradictory definitions of the essence of the Dao in our usual logical thinking to understand the world: the definition of the essence of the Dao as undivided and, at the same time, as the foundation of dualistic phenomena. In other words, how can we understand and express this undifferentiated Dao with our language that must depend on a dualistic way of thinking? There remains the issue of how we can explain the relationship between the Dao understood as indifferentiable and the Dao that we must understand as indifferentiable even though it is already differentiated. In the end, efforts to respond to these questions must have been what brought out the Daoists’ numerous, subtle, and esoteric expressions. If I give a name to this category of expressions— expressions that may seem contradictory at first glance—in a consistently and systematically interpretable structure, then I would refer to it as a Circulative Trichotomous Way of Thinking. First, the Daodejing expresses the Dao as the primordial “One” that conceals all the creatures and situations analogically, as below: The spirit of the valley never dies. This is called the mysterious female. The gateway of the mysterious female Is called the root of heaven and earth. Dimly visible, it seems as if it were there, Yet use will never drain it.57 The myriad creatures all rise together And I watch their return.58

In fact, this simplistic expression of the Dao may fall into a metaphysical understanding of the essence of the Dao, or a mythical, substantialistic understanding of the essence of the Dao. Human beings may be tempted to adopt this general way of thinking that tries to depict the world more clearly; with an ideological understanding of the world through a dualistic conceptual structure. However, the many paradoxical statements expressed in the Daodejing tell us that the Daoists did not settle into a simple, dualistic way of thinking. Therefore, second, we should understand that these paradoxical expressions are manifestations of Daoism’s “way of thinking of a nondualistic affirmation of paradox.” A strong affirmation of these paradoxical situations in the Daodejing is expressed below.

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These two are the same, but diverge in name as they issue forth. Being the same they are called mysteries.59

This subtlety is far from the dualistic separability of things that are clearly grasped on a daily basis; for example, clearly distinguishing being from nonbeing. This is directly related to the mystical sensibility derived from the positive acceptance of the abovementioned term, “chaos (混沌).” They express the sense of this subtlety, as below. Its upper part is not dazzling; Its lower part is not obscure. It spreads out without end, it cannot be named And returns to that which is without objective things. This is called the shape that has no shape, The Image that is without an object. This is called something ecstatic.60

The active acceptance of any situation as being not dazzling in its upper part, not obscure in its lower part, and having shape without shape, which are definitely considered to be paradoxical in daily life, is considered to be the basis of the affirmative sensitivity of “chaos.” And the sense of ceaseless vitality of the chaotic situation may introduce the term “indistinct” (恍惚). The idea of the Dao embracing all paradoxes becomes the basis of making us accept the paradoxical statements naturally—the description of the essence of the Dao through dualistic language based on dualistic thinking. Therefore, here, a different synthesis or an establishment of a new sublated situation, as dialectics assumes, is not required. Since such an assumption is somewhat of a call for the use of dualistic or conceptual thinking, which demands distinctiveness and unity, it could be a redundancy for the Daoists, who want to face the dynamic, concrete, and actual situation of reality and move away from static ways of thinking by such conceptual structures. This strong affirmation of paradox offers the basis from which to read, in a new way, the relations of the aforementioned trichotomous categories—the undivided Dao which is the primordial One, and the dichotomous phenomena. In other words, it is a way to connect the relationship of these three categories by applying the idea that the primordial Dao is, on the one hand, a conceptualized setup to explain that it is different from the dualistic phenomena; however, this setup is also a reflection of the dualistic judgment of the situation. And on the other hand, even though the primordial Dao could be the conceptualized Dao or a dualistic situation appearing in our daily life, it

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is not the transcendental Dao or a self-independent situation. This is how the trichotomous categories are related. If we read the corresponding concepts in each of these three categories from the two opposing methods of associating and circulating, namely the “Circulative Trichotomous Way of Thinking,” the Daoist texts can be read more easily. In other words, it means a method that requires applying both of the following points duplicately: Even if this is a phrase to explain the mystery of the essence of the Dao one-sidedly, it presupposes an awareness of the contradictory revelation of the dualistic situation and, furthermore, even if it is a simple explanation emphasizing the revelation of the dualistic situation of each side, it presupposes the dynamic vitality of the essence of the Dao understood as chaos. The basis of the assertion to read Daoist texts in this way is rooted in the judgment that they are applying the relationship of dichotomous and trichotomous concepts very reflexively in their literature. This points out that Daoists were very sensitive about not only the expressions of mystery, continuity, and dynamism through the use of paradoxical language but also that their language might be ceaselessly engulfed in the tendency toward dualism conceptually which would ultimately make them risk the danger of returning to the rigid framework of the conceptual understanding of the world. This also means that they did not express the situation merely from the perspective of mystical undivided feelings, but that they developed their unique form of discourse after introspecting proactively on their conceptual way of thinking. The first chapter of the Daodejing could be a representative example of their use of writing—limiting the conceptual language and deconstructing it. The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao; the Name that can be named is not the eternal Name.61

Even though a usual way of giving a commentary is by focusing on the term “constant Dao” (常道), as many scholars have done, if we read this phrase on the basis of the aforementioned circulative trichotomous way of thinking, we have no need to adhere to what the concepts such as constant Dao, Dao, or constant name are. Rather, we would need to pay more attention to the deep insights in the interpretation of the Dao by Taidong Han, who says that we need to focus on Laozi’s intention when he explains the concept of Dao by putting it in the same structure (可 and 非) with the explanation of the concept of name (名), which is relative to the Dao.62 This might be more persuasive if we consider the intention of Laozi, who conveyed two exclusive terms through the same structure; passively keeping in mind the dissolution of dualistic language, and actively transmitting the meaning of the dynamic world which cannot be grasped by clinging to the dualistic language structure.

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In the end, Laozi’s explanation of the primordial Dao, the explanation of the dualistic phenomenal world, or the explanation of these two, can be interpreted as an effort to change the understanding of the world from a conceptualized and fossilized one to one that is full of vitality. The Daoist explanation of the world, namely the circulative trichotomous way of thinking, should be considered as the early Daoists’ purpose of the discussions, represented by Laozi and Zhuangzi. Their goal was not seeking the transcendental Dao, but rather a confirmation of the sensibility of the concrete world full of vitality yet easy to lose, as well as a clear understanding of the characteristics and the limits of our conceptual thinking.

CHAPTER SUMMARY: THE MYTHOLOGICAL WAY OF THINKING, THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN DAOISM AND BUDDHISM The differences and similarities of both traditions, which maintain the sensibility of the primordial, undivided vitality shown in the mythological way of thinking, can be summarized as follows. First, in the case of Buddhism, the process of overcoming the dualistic tendency of thinking of the Vedic and Upanishadic traditions through epistemological reflection and of clarifying the understanding of the dynamic world were confirmed. Second, in the case of Daoism, it is confirmed that they adapted their ancient traditional mythology smoothly to their philosophical system. The commonality of these two ways of thinking can be found in their similar trichotomous thought structure. It is clear that numerous expressions appearing in Buddhist texts, which rejected the grasping of situations based on a dualistic way of thinking, must have attracted the attention of the Chinese regardless of the texts’ purposes or contents. The difference between these two is that Buddhism developed a relationship of the projective trichotomous category from early Buddhism to Vasubandhu by understanding the world through internal introspection with a strong epistemological approach. On the other hand, Lao-Zhuang thought developed the discussion of the circulative trichotomous category relationship, focusing on interpenetration and the dynamism of a situation from a realist perspective. In fact, we should view their methodologies not for their differences but for their similarities, in that both are seeing the dynamism of the actual situation correctly and also that they both are thoroughly avoiding the dilemmas of Western metaphysical substantialism. However, in fact, as Buddhism in China developed historically as a stepping stone from early Daoism, it cannot be said that its history is one of effortless understanding. The reason is because Daoism, which played an important role in the Chinese understanding of Buddhism, did not continue

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with an elaboration of the aforementioned circular trichotomous categorical understanding. Rather, if I were to describe Daoism at that time, I would say it shows a simplification of thought and, in an extreme way, regression. The application of metaphysical Daoism as an active tool to understand Buddhism in China, which pursued the Daoistic thought of simple returning, as in the returning to the state of being of “the chaotic One,” and an even more simplistic, negative-passive, and sedentary returning, is represented by Wangbi in Wei-Jin Daoism. The fact that he was of the Wei-Jin Lao-Zhuang school of Daoists carries a very important meaning in the understanding of the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism. Thus, analyzing the differences between early Daoism and Wei-Jin Daoism is very important in order to understand the Daoist influence on Chinese Buddhism. This section will be discussed again in chapter 3: “The Characteristics of Wei-Jin Buddhism.” Another aspect to consider is the historical and philosophical characteristics of various, imported religious schools of Buddhism from India. For example, as we can see from the assertion “There is no self but elements (人無我法有)” of Sarvâstivāda, it cannot be said that they were rigorously using the aforementioned original discussion methods of Buddhism properly, even though they were from established schools in the Indian tradition. When we analyze the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism, we are required to clarify factually the historic nature of the school and monks belonging to it as the objects of analysis. Especially, since an understanding of the characteristics of Central Asian Buddhism, which influenced Chinese Buddhism directly, is the inevitable task, this part will be dealt with first. NOTES 1. I have tried to find writings giving clearer answers to these questions through Philosophers’ Index from 1969 until 2010, but they were not easy to find. Even considering the short term that the structure of discourses on Eastern ideas has changed due to the influence of Western philosophy, it reveals that this issue is a difficult topic to deal with. In Yijie Tang, “The Significance of Comparative Philosophy and Comparative Religion: A View from the Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China,” Chinese Studies in Philosophy 4, no. 18 (1987): 3–63, there is an attempt at this, but it is very brief. 2. Shigeo Kamata, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy. Translated into Korean by Hwi Ok Jang (Seoul, Jang Seun Publishing Company, 1997), 31–31. English translation provided by Ron Dziwenka and Alexander Choi. 3. Kamata, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, 45. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 4. Kamata, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, 65. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

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5. The absence of a theoretical distinction between Buddhism and Daoism is also seen in Erich Zürcher’s book, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), which deals with the early stage of the main transmission of Buddhism in China. 6. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore, eds. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 1989), Foreword, xviii. 7. Such arguments can be found in the introduction of Francis Macdonald Cornfold’s From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (Princeton University Press, 1991), 41–43 and for a recent study in the same vein, Lawrence J. Hatab’s Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths (Chicago: Open Court, 1990), 197. 8. Similar reasoning may be found in Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Culture (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005) and Mircea Eliade’s A History of Religious Ideas (University of Chicago Press, 1981). Similar discussions are being made; the former discusses the continuity of culture, and the latter the establishment of the specificity and identity of each cultural group from the Stone Age. 9. The content of the philosophical thinking discussed here is based on the second stage of the model of thought development stages—mythological, ontological, and functional thinking—by C. A. van Peursen (refer to his book, Cornelis Anthonie van Peursen, The Strategy of Culture. Translated into Korean by Young Hwan Oh (Seoul: Bupmoonsa, 1980), 33). The analysis of modes of thinking in this book was greatly aided by Peursen’s method of analysis. However, I tried to establish a more detailed three-dimensional composition to describe the part where the explanation of the explanatory method of Peursen’s dichotomous structure is not clear; that is, the characteristics of mythological thinking as a next step in mythical thinking that is premised in this book. This composition focuses on the point that the trichotomous category appears frequently in mythological stories or mythological thinking. With this as a clue, a new approach may be attempted. 10. P. R. Deshmukh, Indus Civilization, Rigveda, and Hindu Culture (Nagpur: Saroj Prakashan, 1982). Deshmukh shows in this book that pre-Aryan gods have completely different characters from the Aryan Gods. He analyzes the names and attributes of the gods appearing in Vedic literature and later Hindu literature and explains how the pre-Aryan gods were revived in Indian culture later on. I refer to M. Ramchandran and R. Madhivanan’s The Spring of the Indus Civilization (Prasanna Pathippagam, 1991) regarding pre-Aryan culture and ethnic characteristics. A. N. Chandra’s The Rig Vedic Culture and the Indus Civilization (Princeton: Princeton University Library, 1980) and S. R. Rao’s Dawn and Devolution of the Indus Civilization (Aditya Prakashan, 1991) are notable recent studies on Vedic and pre-Vedic ethnic issues that differ from Deshmukh’s opinion—theory of similar or multiraces. A similar opinion is supported by Robert H. Dyson Jr.’s “Paradigm Change in Study of the Indus Civilization,” in Harappan Civilization: A Recent Perspective, ed. Gregory L. Possehl (New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishers, 1993), which is a report of the analysis of archeological excavation. 11. Examples in this category, in the Rg Veda text in Arthur A. Macdonell, Hymns from the Rigveda (New Delhi: Y.M.C.A Publishing House, 1966), are “He alone is

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sustaining the cosmos fanning, aspiring and inspiring as if by His Two wings” (Rg Veda, X. 81.3.) and “Thousand-headed was the Pursa, thousand-eyed, thousandfooted. embraced the earth on all sides, and stood beyond the breadth of ten fingers” (Rg Veda, X. 90.1). Also in the same text, the Rig Veda, X. 90, 13–14. 12. The following contents will be applicable to this: Rg Veda, VI. 27. 3, “O bounteous Lord, we know not the extent of your vast magnitude, also we know not the limit of your advance; no one has yet discerned the bounds of your power which reveals fresh forms every moment,” in Macdonell, Hymns from the Rigveda. 13. Rg Veda, X. 121. 1, 3~8, “He in His might surveyed the floods containing productive force and generating worship. He is the God of gods, and none beside Him. To that Lord alone, may we offer our adoration,” in Macdonell, Hymns from the Rigveda. 14. The following expression corresponds to this: Rg Veda, X. “From fervour kindled to its height Eternal Law and Truth were born: Thence was the night produced, and thence the billowy flood of sea arose. From that same billowy flood of sea the year was afterwards produced, Ordainer of the days nights, Lord over all who close the eye. Dhatar, the great creator, then formed in due order, sun and moon. He formed in order heaven and earth, the regions of the air, and light,” in Macdonell, Hymns from the Rigveda. 15. Chandra, The Rig Vedic Culture and The Indus Civilization, 63. The same opinion may be found in Ramakant A. Sinari’s “The Realm of Transcendental Reality,” in The Structure of Indian Thought, Ramakant A. Sinari (Springfield: C. C. Thomas, 1970), Ch. 5. 16. See Georges Dumezil’s Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representations of Sovereignty. Translated by Derek Coltman (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 179, “I leave historians of philosophy to evaluate these coincidences, and to decide whether they are mere chance or whether the two dualistic philosophies developed in part from the early myth of bipartite cosmic sovereignty. . . . Similarly, it is also probable that the triads of ‘qualities’ that played so large a role in Indian speculations are not wholly different in kind from the early theory of the threefold division of social and cosmic functions. Nor, indeed, is there anything exceptional in a myth that gives rise to a philosophy.” 17. Deshmukh’s Indus Civilization, Rigveda, and Hindu Culture cited above could be one of the research achievements. 18. William Crooke, Religion & Folklore of Northern India (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1925), 69–70. 19. Macdonell, Hymns from the Rigveda, 43–47. 20. Verrier Elwin, Myths of Middle India (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 7 & 27–50. In this book, he introduces 33 more similar oral myths from Central India. 21. Elwin, Myths of Middle India. 22. Please refer to the following books for more details: Deshmukh’s Indus Civilization, 359–360; Mircea Eliade’s Shamanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 407–421. Eliade discusses how pre-Aryan shamanism penetrated the Indian way of thinking.

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23. This kind of approach relies on the unpublished scripts written in 1987–1988, and 1987 graduate school lecture notes by Professor Taidong Han. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 24. See Kunio Sima, Oracle Bone Script Dictionary (殷墟←辭綜類) (Tokyo: Daian, 1967). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. David N. Keightley points out this book and Hyo Jung Lee’s The Compilation and Interpretation of Oracle Bone Characters as the fundamental books for the research of oracle bone scripts. David N. Keightley, Sources of Shang History: The Oracle-Bone Inscriptions of Bronze Age China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 62. Chang Ping-Chuan evaluates his book as the first dictionary organizing the oracle bone script. See Ping-ch’uan Chang (Bingquan Zhang), “A Brief Description of the Fu Hao Oracle Bone Inscriptions,” in Studies of Shang Archeology: Selected Papers from the International Conference on Shang Civilization, ed. K. C. Chang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 121–140. 25. Sarah Allen, The Shape of the Turtle: Myth, Art, and Cosmos in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 100. She cites Eliade’s point of view and mentions the coexistence of dichotomous and trichotomous understanding of the spacial by the Chinese. 26. K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (Yale University Press, 1982), 165–188 & 202–203; David Keightley, Sources of Shang History, 185, Table 1; Allen, The Shape of the Turtle, Ch. V, 114–120. 27. Anne Birrell, Chinese Mythology: An Introduction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 30–31. 28. For the quotes of these Chinese mythical stories, I referred to 100 Chinese Myths and Fantasies, selected, and translated by Ding Wangdao (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1988), 3. 29. Ding, 100 Chinese Myths and Fantasies, 4, “神之諸蟲, 因風所感, 化爲黎甿.” 30. Ding, 100 Chinese Myths and Fantasies, 21. 31. Andrew P. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 32. David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 33. This translation is based on the English translation of Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1931). 34. Ananda, The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipata). Translated by K. R. Norman (London: Pali Text Society edition, 1992), 6. 35. Ananda, The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipata), 363. 36. The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-nikaya) Volume I: The First Fifty Discourses (Mulapannasa). Translated into English by I. B. Horner (London: Pali Text Society, 1976), 455–456. You may understand that these concepts are referring to the stage of the in-depth reading of the flow of inner consciousness more deeply, and it is not to find any ultimate reality within, if you make this inference in relation to the anti-metaphysical and anti-substantialistic understanding of the world by Buddhism.

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37. “Samyukta Agama 17” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 6 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 485. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 38. “大聖說空法, 爲離諸見故. 若復見有空, 諸佛所不化.” Nāgārjuna. “Madhyamaka-śāstra (The Investigation of Formations)” Ch. 13. Zhonglun (中論; Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 39. D. J. Kalupahana, Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 13. A complete discussion of the Chinese translation of this portion will be done after a framework to understand the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism is made. 40. This is a translation of the translation by Maurice Walsh, Thus Have I Heard: The Long Discourse of the Buddha (Dīgha Nikāya) (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1987), 223. 41. Rhys Davids, trans. The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Samutta-nikaya), II. (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2004), 113. 42. Horner, The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikaya). Translated by I. B. Horner (London: PTS, 1987), I. 262–264. Horner translated this passage, “If this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises, . . . If this is not, that does not come to be; from the stopping of this, that is stopped.” This translation was revised and translated into Korean, and I followed the translation of D. J. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna, 14. Imasmiṃsati idaṃ hoti, imassa upāpādā idaṃ uppajjati. Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirjjhati. 43. Daishozo (大正藏). “Vijnanakaya (Theory of Consciousness Body; 識身足論; Shishenzu lun).” T 1538.26.529c2.1. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 44. Vasumitra (筏蘇蜜多羅). “Dhātukāya (界身足論),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka I. 8, 1–2 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 45. Daishozo (大正藏), “Theory of Consciousness; 唯識論),” 31, 67a. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 46. Triṃśikā (唯識三十頌), 1–2. See D. J. Kalupahana, The Principle of Buddhist Psychology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 192–194. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 47. Triṃśikā, 18. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 48. Triṃśikā, 19. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 49. Triṃśikā, 1. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 50. Triṃśikā, 3. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 51. Triṃśikā, 5. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

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52. N. J. Girardot, Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (huntun) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 2. 53. Girardot, Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (huntun), 50. 54. Girardot, Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (hun-tun) Zhuangzi: The Equality of Things (莊子, 齊物論), 51~55, “旣已爲一矣, 且得有言乎, 旣謂之一矣, 且得 無言乎, 一與言爲二, 二與一爲三. 自此以往, 巧歷不能得, 而況其凡乎. 故 自無適有, 以至于三, 而況自有適無乎. 無適焉, 因是已.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 55. D. C. Lau, trans. Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (London: Penguin Books, 1963), Chapter 29. 56. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 2. 57. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 6. 58. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 16. 59. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 1. 60. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 14. 61. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, Chapter 1, Kim Chung-yeol interprets this as, “The Tao that can be spoken of is not the constant way; The name that can be named is not the constant name.” And, he explains that “constant name” refers to “constant Dao,” but it is difficult to say if Laozi gave a positive connotation to “constant name,” not “constant way,” given the intention of this text to give negative connotation to “that which can be spoken of” and “that which can be named.” Rather, the purpose of my work is to consider that the “a method to depict the moon by drawing the clouds” (烘雲托月法) itself, as pointed out earlier by Kim Chung-yeol, was the purpose of this passage. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 62. Taidong Han, “A Study of ‘Daw Der Jing’: Structural Analysis of Laotze’s Thought Form,” Dongbanghakji 6 (2003): 48–49. I am indebted in my understanding and explanation of Daoism to the structure of Daoist thought that my teacher, Taidong Han, explained. I am applying this method and transforming it as an important criterion to analyze various examples for the traditional discussion methods of Eastern philosophy and the discussion of comparative philosophy. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout.

Chapter 2

Religious Characteristics of Central Asians and Buddhism in the Kushan Era

Even though discussions as to what forms of Buddhism were first introduced into China and how the Chinese understood them are of utmost importance, it is hard to find detailed research on these. In fact, the reasons for the absence of elaborate discussions of the characteristics of early Chinese Buddhism have been properly pointed out in various areas by scholars like Erich Zurcher. Among them, one of the most notable reasons is that the understanding of Sanskrit by Chinese intellectuals at the end of the fourth century was very limited, incomplete, and it began very slowly.1 This kind of critique essentially explains succinctly why the Chinese understanding of Buddhism inevitably appeared in a distorted form in early Chinese Buddhism, in addition to the historical background in which the Buddhist doctrines were transmitted very unsystematically. The Hongming Ji could be classified as an important corpus of texts to offer a glimpse into this way of understanding early Chinese Buddhism.2 As previously mentioned, questions arose spontaneously about the origins of the many Buddhist doctrines which deeply impressed the Chinese mind, such as which regions they came from and what kinds of contents of Buddhism originated in those regions. These doctrines were brought into China unsystematically, and they became the main themes of discussion. For example, the theory of the indestructibility of the soul, which is similar to the theory of the immortality of the soul, are both mentioned as main contents in the Hongming Ji. However, they would have been difficult for the Chinese intellectuals, who were familiar with the theory of qi (qilun), to assert. It is a very convincing and accepted historical theory that the people who initially introduced Buddhism to China were the monks and the Central Asian traders on the Silk Road. But the problem is that once the rich contents of the facts that seem to be evident historically are examined, we find ourselves 37

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faced with a frustrating array of obstacles. Of course, there is no big obstacle in the chronological sequence of the huge flow of history of this region. However, if we delve into more detail, we may find that historical records of this area are quite insufficient, and that many historical facts that appear to be definitely evident are supported by mere assumptions. Researchers of this region point out the following common reasons regarding the indeterminate history of this region: Internally, the complex history of Central Asia experienced repeated cycles of unity and dissolution involving the settlers of the oases and the steppe nomads, whose origins are uncertain based on the various assumptions that appeared at different time periods. Externally, the Greek and Persian powers in this region conquered the region’s politics, cultures, and religions, and, especially in terms of religion, the Islamization of Central Asia abolished and replaced the traditions of the previous eras, so it is not an exaggeration to say that the religious traditions were severed. For these reasons, most of the descriptions of the currently known history of Buddhism in this region for the time being seem to be nothing more than what is described in The History of Buddhism by Etienne Lamotte, perhaps until a lot of new, evidentiary materials are discovered and added. The reason why I see the situation as such is because the contents of the research by scholars like Charles Willemen, who are actively conducting the research on the development of Sarvâstivāda in northwestern area of India and in China, do not seem to have advanced much beyond the extent of the research by Lamotte. Of course, I believe there will be more progress in professional research in this field. In fact, it is notable that scholars like Jin Il Chung are trying to rectify the existing point of view on Buddhism in the Central Asian region through the analysis and restoration of the Buddhist texts discovered in eastern Turkestan.3 But even if all the research results were collected, the characteristics of Buddhism that developed in this region would not be completely revealed without disputes. It would be possible to have more understanding of the transmission of Buddhism in China in this era than we do now, when we focus on the interest in Buddhism, the discussion topics, and the way of understanding of Buddhism by the Chinese intellectuals of the time while considering the abovementioned limitations, and, contrarily, when we trace back an outline of understanding of Buddhism by Central Asians, who we assume influenced the Chinese way of understanding. And, following this analysis, the issue that we need to deal with is to examine the religious background in the Central Asian region prior to the introduction of Buddhism into China; specifically, the roots of the religious sensibility of the peoples of this region. Of course, as mentioned earlier, while these works are filled with direct and indirect analyses and assumptions dependent on incomplete materials and theories, these

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could nonetheless give us meaningful clues to understand why the Buddhism of these peoples and the Chinese had these characteristics.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF BUDDHISM IN THE OLD STANDARD TRANSLATION ERA Looking at the discussion on when Buddhism was introduced in China, we will find that not only the mythical origin of it but also historical records cannot be corroborated. Also, no scholar has come to a definitive conclusion that can be agreed on. Despite this situation, we can apply the theory of Jung Suil from his book, Silkroadology, in which he insists on two stages in terms of the interactions among religions; namely “early transmission and official transmission.”4 He asserts that the time of the first introduction of Buddhism, namely the period of early transmission, should have occurred before the official transmission era, which was during the reign of Emperor Ming of the Later Han (58–75 AD). Even though this official transmission era has been proven to be propaganda forged by the Buddhists of a later era,5 it is accepted as factual that, during the first century, Buddhism was widely transmitted to the extent that it was believed by the royal family, considering the historical fact that King Ling of the Chu state adopted Buddhism in the middle of the first century AD. Zurcher estimates that by synthesizing the Chinese materials such as folk tales, historical records, and Buddhist texts, Buddhism gradually settled in China from the beginning of the first century BC to the end of second century AD.6 This work focuses on Chinese Buddhism from the first century BC to the early fifth century AD, a period prior to the large-scale old standard translation projects started by Kumarajiva. The reason for focusing on this is because it is thought that the foundations of various Buddhist debates that would influence Chinese Buddhist society later on were formed during this time. For example, the theory of the imperishability of the soul brought up at this time might have influenced in some ways the discussions on topics such as “Buddha Nature” and “Dharmakāya” (Buddha-bodies) in Chinese Buddhism later on. And the function of salvation that general Buddhist layman expected from Buddhism as a religion when it was introduced might have made the Chinese monks adopt various methodologies to describe the salvation theory so as not to contradict their own understanding of Buddhism. Accordingly, the deep analysis on the phenomena appearing in Chinese Buddhism at this time was indispensable to understanding the characteristics of the development of theories of Chinese Buddhism. Even though it is very important to understand the phenomena of Chinese Buddhism of this time, it is almost impossible to reproduce this era due to

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the lack of the quantity and credibility of the records. However, if we analyze some historical records that reveal the popular religious characteristics of the Buddhists at that time and the debate themes on Buddhist doctrines among the Chinese appearing in the Hongming Ji, it should be possible to trace the characteristics of Buddhism in Central Asia, which is assumed to be the area of origin of these phenomena.

POPULAR RELIGIOUS CHARACTERISTICS, AND FAITH IN MAITREYA AND AMITĀBHA, IN EARLY CHINESE BUDDHISM Generally in the description of the history of Chinese Buddhism, the popular religious characteristics of early Chinese Buddhism are mainly emphasized in terms of the aspect of syncretism with the traditional Chinese religions praying for good fortune in this life, and the aspect of Daoist thought forms syncretizing with theories of Buddhism. We cannot deny the obvious presence of these phenomena in early Chinese Buddhism. Additional phenomena worth mentioning are the religious sanctification of the existence of the Buddha as well as salvational beings such as Maitreya and Amitābha. Of course, there are writings regarding these phenomena in the history of Chinese Buddhism, but it is hard to find an in-depth discussion on the origin of them. Even though there is no single definition of the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism, according to the religious characteristics of the Chinese during the Shang Dynasty7 it must be noted that the overwhelming, great Deity had the character of mythical, ancestor gods related by blood. It might be difficult to imagine a popular religion, either in the East or the West, which lacks these specific characteristics; a primitive conceptualization of salvation as a result of the transformation of the people’s participation with and the intervention of an overwhelming, external and divine power. But we cannot ignore the fact that the Maitreya and Amitābha faiths of Buddhism as a foreign religion are quite different movements that show a texture that is clearly different from that of the traditional Chinese religious sentiments. Of course, it might be possible to attempt to explain this problem as an internal transformation of the religious sentiments of the Chinese based on a transformation in the way of thinking about humanity in general or a change in the socioeconomic conditions of the Chinese.8 Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility that the way of thinking about how to understand the Buddha as a being with universal absoluteness, such as Maitreya and Amitābha existing in infinite time and space, had the potential to project the traditional way of understanding the great Deity of the Chinese in a new format that included the concept of an absolute, transcendental being.

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The Chinese understanding of Buddha appearing in the Hongming Ji does not deviate greatly from the description framework of the conventional depictions of traditional Chinese mythical beings. And it is true that even in the era of early Chinese Buddhism, the sinicization of the concept of the Buddha was already taking place. Nevertheless, the following various historical facts demonstrate that a new concept of Buddhistic salvation had been planted in the minds of the Chinese: the translation and distribution of the six scriptures related to Maitreya9; twelve separate translations within the next 843 years of Sutra of Immeasurable Life (無量壽經) by An Shigao to the translation of Great Vehicle Sutra of the Adornment of Immeasurable Life (大乘無量壽莊嚴經) by Faxian (法賢)10; the translation of Banshou Sanmei Jing (般舟三昧經) by Lokakṣema (179 CE); several translations of the Pure Land Sutra (淨土經) were done, such as the Longer Amitābha Sutra (大阿彌陀經) by Zhi Qian (between 178 CE and 189 CE); during the reign of Emperor Wu of the Western Jin (265–274 CE), Que Gongze (闕公則) was recorded in the public transmission record as the first Pure Land believer; Huiyuan (慧遠), as the leader of the Buddha Mindfulness Society of Lu Mountain, performed the Maitreya worshiping ceremony with his 123 laymen believers11; Daoan (道安) was a fervent believer in the Maitreya sect and his students participated in Maitreya worship under his influence.12 These records allow us to infer that the idea of a ruler who transcends time and space of this finite world, specifically the concept of an absolute being, was planted and consolidated in full force among the Chinese from the early translation era onward. The reason why we have to pay attention to these facts is because of the likelihood that the concept of Maitreya and the concept of Amitābha as being close to the concept of an Absolute Deity were consolidated and expanded in the northwestern Indian Gandhara and Kashmir regions influenced by Zoroastrianism.13 Characteristics of Chinese Intellectuals’ Interests in Buddhism in the Hongming Ji It is necessary to research the origin of the concept of the external absolute being like this in early Chinese Buddhism, as well as the origin of the concept of imperishability of the internal soul, which appears to have been prominent in early Chinese Buddhism. The latter phenomenon appearing in the Hongming Ji was the most central theme in the various debates of the early Chinese intellectuals and the monks. The problem is that it must not have been easy to try to logically establish and explain an imperishable internal being, considering the worldview of Chinese intellectuals who might have felt it difficult to escape from the traditional Chinese theory of qi.

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In his book The Buddhist Conquest of China, Erich Zurcher defines the characteristics of early Chinese Buddhism as gentry Buddhism and points out the phenomenon of the intellectuals’ understanding of Buddhism by way of debates as intellectual games during the time of Neo-Daoism (Xuanxue 玄學). Of course, later on, Zurcher expresses changes in his views in his later works. In fact, these kinds of point of view adjustments are natural considering the complexity of the phenomenon of propagating a religion. Even though the gentry as the main participants in debates was a small group of intellectuals, it is assumed that the knowledge of Buddhism among most of the gentry, apart from the professional Buddhist text translators, was not much more specialized than the Buddhist information impressed upon the laymen at that time. In other words, although they were in the position to acquire and possess specialized Buddhist knowledge, their depth of understanding of Buddhism seemed not to surpass that of the general public. The reason for this judgment is the crudeness of the level of their arguments to refute the critiques of Buddhism of that era by its critics. Considering the distribution of foreign monks during the old translation period, the theories of Sarvâstivāda, or the theories of the Sautrântika school, as a part of secondary branches of the Hīnayāna tradition, must have been transmitted from northwestern India into China through Central Asia.14 However, the problem lies in the fact that the Chinese intellectuals did not fully digest this kind of information and internalize it. Due to the complicated origins inherent in the Sarvâstivāda and Sautrântika theories, among the information transmitted to the Chinese that were remarkably repeated in the Indian tradition,15 the only parts that would have caught the attention of the early Chinese Buddhists would have been the main topics of debates on Buddhism. These kinds of opinions are not simple assumptions but they have some basis in historical fact. And they can be confirmed if we consider the intellectual circumstances that Daoan encountered and if we examine the contents of the debates of intellectuals in the fourth and fifth centuries AD in the Hongming Ji.16 In the background of Daoan, a representative of the Wei-Jin era who insisted on five losses of source texts and three difficulties in translation in his effort to compile the list of scriptures, lies the reality of the low level of understanding of Buddhist knowledge in the Buddhist society at that time and his effort to overcome it. Kamata Shigeo summarizes the situation of that time, based on the Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka that has Daoan’s biography, as follows: Even though considerable years have passed since the scriptures were translated in the early Chinese Buddhism era, there were errors in the translations and the profound teachings of the texts were not grasped, and the meanings were not fully understood. Therefore, when they were teaching with the old translations

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of texts, they adopted only the main ideas of the texts or just recited them. Specifically, they only recited them aloud because they could not understand the exact meaning of the texts.17

This situation led to a stage where Daoan himself, who is considered to be the first critic of Geyi Buddhism, tolerated his disciple Huiyuan’s attempts to make Buddhist doctrines understood and with the contents of the Zhuangzi judged to be interpreted in the same way, and also utilized non-Buddhist texts instead of excluding them.18 As shown earlier in the level of understanding of Sanskrit, Zurcher did not seem to estimate Daoan’s level of understanding of Buddhism highly. Due to this, it is possible to assume that the Chinese Buddhist monks in the Neo-Daoist era misunderstood Buddhism from the NeoDaoist perspective instead of understanding it from the Buddhist perspective. The preface to the Sutra of the Path of Stages of Cultivation (道地經), as quoted below, may be an example of how the early Chinese Buddhist monks tried to fill the gap in their lack of understanding of Buddhism. The ground of the Buddha’s Path is the mysterious hall of the arhats (a true worthy ones) and the hidden abode of the Daoist immortals. It is difficult to attack the castle of non-origin and it is difficult to scale the wall of doing non-doing. As the subtle gate is closed, few can get a glimpse inside. . . . The image is allinclusive, yet tranquil. It seems to faintly linger as if it exists. But few may argue against it because it is tranquil and quiescent. It is splendidly infinite, yet does not progress, so no one can measure it even though he pursues it.19

As seen above, in this early Chinese Buddhism era, when the Daoist influence was surely absolute, it is impossible to imagine that they did not know about the original theory of no-self (anātman) of Buddhism, but were also advocating the theory of imperishability of the soul without hesitation in the debates while advocating Buddhism’s position. The reasons for these issues need to be investigated. Zongbing, a disciple of Huiyuan, carried on the perspective of Huiyuan and wrote the Treatise Clarifying Buddhism (明佛論), which advocates the theory of imperishability of the soul. What is interesting here is that he was using the traditional Chinese theory of qi in the argument of imperishability of the soul, but they do not seem to logically fit together. The quote “Now, so called once-yin and once-yang is called the Dao. . . . What cannot be measured by yin and yang is called numinous (神靈)” means that the ultimate nothingness is the Dao, and that, since in this Dao yin and yang are mixed, it is called once-yin and once-yang. When one proceeds from the Dao to the numinous, one will always be outside of yin and yang. So, this is simply saying that one cannot investigate with yin and yang because yin and yang can not be measured. This is what Yan Junping (嚴君平) meant when he says that

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one begetting two is divine. If the above two verses do not illuminate the soul, how can we illuminate it? However, the soul of sentient beings is ultimately the same, but they transform and flow to become a crude or subtle consciousness according to dependent arising, but the soul fundamentally does not perish.20

Zongbing simultaneously expressed both the Daoist perspective based on the traditional Chinese views of the theory of qi and a Neo-Daoist perspective which emphasized the attainment of nothingness. However, he sets up the existence of soul, as a manifestation of the attainment of the Dao of nothingness, as distinguished from yin–yang, in order to emphasize the existence of an individual, imperishable soul. This seems to be the result of a logic derived from the theory of the wheel of life that was circulated as the center of the Buddhist theory at that time and due to the necessity of establishing the subject of rebirth. Furthermore, it seems that Zongbing believed he could confirm the superiority of Buddhist doctrine if he could conclude that the soul was imperishable. This viewpoint offered the basis to boldly present a crude spiritual dualism not fitting the Chinese tradition. The body is not the spirit. Also, the spirit is not the body. They are combined to function together. Therefore, this is a combination, not a coincidence. When one is alive, they are combined to function; when one dies, the body remains and the spirit leaves. On what basis can you say this? . . . When one sleeps, the spirit is in harmony with other things. Therefore, the spirit of Zhuangzi stays in the butterfly; the spirit and the body are separated. When he is awake, his body is active; he is definitely himself. This is the combining of body and spirit.21

As stated, this theory of imperishability of the soul, stated here as spirit, had been asserted by his teacher, Huiyuan, in both his Preface to Sutra on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations translated on Mount Lu ((廬山出修行方便禪經 統序), and also in his Inscription of Buddha’s Reflection (佛影銘). In addition to him, scholars like Mou Rong (牟融) also insisted on the same theory. The objection to this argument is expressed by the traditional theory of qi, as mentioned earlier, in that the spirit-body is the phenomenon of the one fundamental qi that is separating, combining, assembling, and dispersing (離合聚散). If so, when the body is exhausted, where does the spirit adhere to so as to be imperishable? If imperishable, the spirit depends on itself and does not depend on the body. Since it does not depend on the body, how can it exist with the body, and how is it possible not to be separated from the body? Therefore, if the body and the spirit cannot be separated, then one can see that the foundation of life is the same.22

If this dualistic assertion of the separation of spirit and body was expressed strongly by the advocates of Buddhism in the milieu of thought of Chinese intellectuals who maintained a dominant and traditional monistic theory of

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qi, it would be more persuasive to find the cause of this phenomenon outside the tradition. Of course, even though similar concepts of a terrestrial spirit and celestial spirit (魂魄) already existed that are different from the body in traditional Chinese thought, they are classifications of mental qi phenomena showing different shapes according to the characteristic of condensation of qi, that is, levels of purity, but they cannot be independent substances beyond the structure of the theory of qi. Although a combination of a loosely understood soul and loosely understood concepts of a terrestrial spirit and celestial spirit could occur in reality at the popular level, it was difficult for the Chinese intellectuals to accept the concept of an imperishable soul, as they did have the ability to logically analyze and criticize the argument of imperishability of the soul acclaimed by Zheng Daozi (鄭道子), as confirmed in the above example. In order to find the origin of this problem, we will ultimately have to research which kinds of doctrines of which forms of Buddhism influenced the Chinese Buddhists to perpetuate this kind of argument at the beginning of the transmission of Buddhism into China. Looking at this issue in relation to the concept of imperishability of the soul, the theories of Sarvâstivāda and Sautrântika in the Kashmir and Gandhara regions attract the most attention. This is because of the fact that the problem of the reality of the pudgala (translated as bǔtèqiéluó (補特伽羅)) was the main debate issue of Sarvâstivāda and Sautrântika.23 The Characteristics of Northwestern Indian Buddhism Kalupahana points out very well how the original character of Abhidhamma could have been distorted as he comments on how different Kathāvatthu and the later generations of absolutist and essentialist treatises were.24 However, such a distortion may have arisen due not only to internal causes of theoretical compositions, such as the substantialization of conceptual being, but also to external stimuli. The external stimuli not only from the powers of Greece and Persia but also due to the control of the Yuezhi, who were the herdsmen of the northern steppe region, caused the distortion of Buddhist theories in the northwestern Indian Gandhara region. We may be able to confirm that such a phenomenon occurred dramatically when we look into the history of how this distorted Buddhism was expanded and reproduced. UNDERSTANDING THE REGION RULED BY THE KUSHAN EMPIRE Here, discussing the Central Asian region in relation to the transmission of Buddhism is problematic because of the diversity of the concept of region. Therefore, I think it would be best to refer to this area as the Kushan Empire

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region. The reason is because the chronological position or the area of rule of the Kushan Empire is very close to the temporal and geographical regions of the Central Asian Buddhism that we are discussing and that influenced China.25 Although it should also be noted that this region was dominated by the Indo-Parthian Kingdom prior to the rule of the Kushan Empire, when we trace back the ethnic characteristics of peoples of this region over time, we must also take into consideration that Persians, Greeks, and Shaka tribes ruled at different times. This region, in the oases as well as in the pastoral grasslands and mountain steppes, had been ruled by Iranian (Aryan) nomads such as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Yuezhi, and Shakas until the Turkish tribes immigrated there in the ninth to tenth centuries.26 Nonetheless, considering the fact that all of them were nomadic Iranian peoples, to progress this discussion it would not be appropriate to list all the cultural characteristics of those who ruled this region in detail. Therefore, I will point out only the relevant aspects associated with Buddhism among the characteristics of the past cultures that were integrated and absorbed under the reign of the Kushan Empire.27 That empire played the most influential role in influencing the transmission of Buddhism into China by completely absorbing the cultures of the former ruling powers. Commercial Prosperity and the Changes in the Form of Buddhism in the Kushan Empire Even if we study the history of this region before the Kushan Empire, to late 2000 BC when the Aryans began to establish city states, our understanding of this region is based on the historical records that start from the sixth century BC. In the sixth century, Achaemenid Persia ruled Bactria, Sogdia, Chorasmia, and Merv, and in the latter half of the fourth century, Alexander the Great conquered Bactria, Sogdia, and Khwarezmid regions. After that, the Greek-Bactria Kingdom ruled Bactria and Sogdiana in Central Asia from 250 BC to 125 BC. Then, the Indo-Greek kingdom was established in 180 BC due to the expansion into the Northern Gandhara region by Greek Bactrians, and it lasted until 10 AD. It is understood that the major tribe that established the Kushan Empire was the Yuezhi. It is understood that they were defeated by the Huns in 162 BC and moved to this area. In 120 BC, they occupied the Bactria Region, and in 12 BC, they expanded into northern India to establish the Kushan Empire. However, as the ruling class of the Kushan Empire was made up of the Yuezhi nomads, the management of the empire was accomplished by the absorption and application of the institutions, cultures, and religions of the ruling tribes.28 Specifically, in terms of the political system of rule, they maintained the preexisting “satrap” system, which is the ruling family appointing a governor to rule in local areas used by the Persian Empire.

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This situation shows that the tradition of establishing states in this region, by combining the military power of the steppe nomads with the intellect of the oases settlers, was similar to the state formation process on a larger scale. This historical condition indicates a state with a loose ideology that naturally recognizes cultural diversity. This is the background of how the Kushan Empire became a central and flexible international trade hub connecting the countries from the Mediterranean region to China, which made possible the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling class through prosperity and successful commerce.29 The commercial success of the Kushan Empire was the key reason why the northwestern region of India became the center of Buddhism, and the cosmopolitanism of the Kushan Empire was the reason why the Kushan Empire became the center of Buddhist missionary propagation. But the problem is that external growth like this has two different sides. On the one hand, the accumulation of financial resources made by institutionalized Buddhist temples that may have become secularized due to connections with traders became the vehicle for the regional expansion and propagation of Buddhism. However, this also distorted the religious characteristics, and even the religious goals, of Buddhism. It is also a well-known fact that even in India, the urban merchants accounted for a major portion of the sponsors of Buddhism. This tradition of commercialization continued to develop and expand, in conjunction with the development and expansion of the Kushan Empire. As they expanded and developed, Buddhist temples not only served as lodging as well as supply and distribution centers on the commercial trade routes, Buddhist groups also became importers of expensive goods.30 In association with the aforementioned external elements of change, the element that accelerated change was that the religious character of this region had originally been different from that of Buddhism. Etienne Lamotte points out the non-Buddhistic activities of the Buddhists in the northwestern region as below: Faith in the sovereign and exclusive virtue of action exempted the Buddhist from believing in gods. Therefore it is not surprising that the Buddhists of the North-West, Greeks, Scythians, Parthians, and Yueh chih showed a less disinterested piety and that we see them formulating, on their dedicatory inscriptions, “intentions” which dangerously resemble petitionary prayers.31

Even though Lamotte acknowledges the influence of Greek theology in this region, he does not see it as crucially influential enough to have changed the theological view of the Central Asians or Indians.32 However, it appears he considered that the abovementioned phenomena arose due to the influence of the secular prayer tradition, based on the Greek concept of humanistic gods,

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on the residents of the region. But it would be difficult to simply accept this influence as solely caused by the Greeks or as a manifestation of the religious sensibility of the nomads, as it must be acknowledged that these kinds of ceremonies of praying for good fortune at the folk level were also already being enacted in the Buddhist traditions of mainland India. And, in terms of doctrinal changes to accept these, it is difficult to see this as merely an expression of the religious nature of the Greeks or nomads.33 Of course, there had to be more profound causes for this phenomenon to occur. In recent studies looking into these in-depth causes, the Zoroastrian tradition is more actively referenced.34 As mentioned earlier, the emergence of the concept of Mahayana’s Bodhisattva is due to Iranian religious influences. In general, as the basis for this claim, tangible cultural elements such as Zoroastrian relics found in the Surkh Kotal sanctuary of Bactria are mentioned, and this is due to the inevitable limitation of the scarcity of Buddhist texts and records related to this region, and the discontinuity of the Buddhist tradition. The problem is that simply emphasizing the salvific elements from the concept of an Absolute God and traces of related rituals is, to a large extent, inadequate to reveal the full picture of the development of Buddhism in the Kushan Empire era. This is because the explanation of the compilation of the Treatise of the Great Commentary on the Abhidharma, which is the sum of Abhidharma teachings of Sarvâstivāda through the external support of King Kanishka, may have resulted in the error of ignoring the revelations of the inner religious desires of human beings; that is, the human will to overcome the limits of mundane desire. There are reasons why we must deal with this topic delicately and in detail. When we ask how the Buddhist monks, who were aware of the fading of the original Buddhistic ideals due to the rise of popular Buddhism in the northwestern Indian region would have reacted, we can see that the problem is not that simple. From this point of view, we may think of Kushan Empire Buddhism as having different characteristics from the simple description of the characteristics of Kushan Empire Buddhism of Xinru Liu’s socioeconomic history perspective mentioned above. That is, the issue of the characteristics of Central Asian Buddhism needs to be approached more broadly, from the possible combining of the pure religious characteristics of Zoroastrianism with those of Buddhism to the issue of combining the secularizing characteristics of both religions. Therefore, in the following section, I will first summarize the origin and characteristics of Zoroastrianism, which will allow us a glimpse into the roots of the religious sensibilities of Central Asians. Then, based on this, I will analyze the religious phenomena that were occurring in relation to Buddhism during the Kushan Empire era, and confirm that these phenomena were

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transmitted to China and were the causes of the formation of the discourses in early Chinese Buddhism, as described above. Characteristics of Zoroastrianism as the Source of Religious Ideas of Central Asians in the Kushan Empire Region The concept of deity in Zoroastrianism, which is believed to have influenced Buddhism in the Kushan Empire era, requires a very delicate approach. That is because it has more meaning than just the fact that, in northwestern India, the appearance of the concepts of Maitreya and Amitābha carried with it the powerful function of salvation, which is related to Zoroastrian theology. In other words, the phenomenon of the appearance of Maitreya and Amitābha as a Buddhistic application of the popular religious Zoroastrian theology could have been the starting point to an important question of how the characteristics of Zoroastrian theology impacted the Buddhist intellectuals of the Kushan Empire era. It would be worth looking into the changes in Buddhist doctrines or, on the other hand, the strengthening of certain Buddhist doctrines as a reaction to that. In addition, this approach could highlight the necessity of investigating the pure theological meanings of Zoroastrian theology that is assumed to be projected in the gigantic Buddhist statues. The production of gigantic Buddhist statues in the Kushan Empire such as the Bamiyan Buddhas which did not appear in India and Buddhism’s expansion to China were due to certain actions beyond the realization of mundane human religious desire, from the perspective of socioeconomic conditions. Any attempt to resolve these questions should probably begin with an understanding of the origin and characteristics of Zoroastrianism, which contains indigenous religious characteristics. Ultimately, this issue returns us to questions such as what were the religious concepts of the Aryans as the common origin of Iranian and Indian cultures and what were the shamanistic religious concepts of the steppe and mountain nomads? The Origin and Religious Sentiments of the People Who Established Zoroastrianism It is believed that Zoroaster, the founder of Zoroastrianism, or Zarathustra in the ancient Persian Avestan language, was born and active in Eastern Iran or Central Asia before approximately 1400 BC.35 In general, a religion having a founder means that the religion becomes a rational and advanced one beyond the form of a primitive religion based on primitive mythological sensibility. However, no advanced religion is newly created. Rather, the contents of religion are always arranged logically, based on the traditional, mythical level of religiosity of the region where the new religion originated. In this context, an

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understanding of Zoroastrianism must start from looking into what kind of religious sensibilities the people who had given birth to Zoroastrianism had. The issue that never fails to be mentioned in a discussion about the characteristics of Zoroastrianism is the question of the origin of the Aryans. To summarize the results of the discussions, Zoroastrianism is referred to as the religion of Iran and is the religion with the same origin as Brahmanism of India.36 That is, the reason why researchers of this field use terms like preZoroastrianism or pre-Zoroastrian Indo-Iranian deities is because it is based on this perspective.37 Of course, it is probably intended to refer to the preAryan religion before its development into these advanced religions, based on the Vedas and Avesta. This perspective is widely accepted in both archaeologically and linguistically similar contexts, and the linguistic evidence in particular strongly supports this homogeneous ethnic origin theory.38 The fact that they were of the same ethnicity means that their religiosity was based on that of the nomads. Of course, from the point of view that there is no human culture that has not gone through its own nomadic era, the mythological sensibilities of the nomads were reflected in all the advanced religions. While this would not be a characteristic unique to them, the regional peculiarity of Central Asia makes this characteristic stand out. It is necessary to have the following historical perspectives in order to infer how this peculiarity was achieved. In other words, the Aryans can be divided into two groups: one that stayed in the steppes, and the other that settled in Iran and India and then mixed with the indigenous peoples and established a highly advanced settlement culture. And we can assume that the settlers from these two regions transmitted their cultures to the steppe nomads, and then the transmitted cultures transformed again by being combined with the primitive nature of the indigenous peoples of the steppes. It would be helpful and important to determine how the traits of these nomads worked within the characteristics of the religions of Central Asia. This perspective is derived from the judgment that the various settlers’ cultures imported into Central Asia did not, from an historical point of view, impose an overwhelming and profound influence consistently enough to replace the religious sensibilities of the nomads, based on their mythological way of thinking. Zoroastrianism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism must have been accepted and propagated as nonindigenous advanced religions, and with their elaborate and structured ritual ceremonies must have appeared to be more superior to those of the nomads. So it is highly likely that their understanding of those religions through their original and indigenous religious sensibilities must have been great.39 Moreover, if the contents of those advanced religions shared similarities with their indigenous religions, the phenomenon of assimilation would have been easily achieved.40

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Therefore, the reasons why Zoroastrianism thrived in the ruling area of the Kushan Empire should be understood by approaching it in two ways, as follows: First, since during the Achaemenian Persian era (550–330 BC), the seminaries for training clerics, called Mobed, had been established in various areas, and we can assume that a well-structured theology of Zoroastrianism by the empowered clerics was organized and wide spread. Second, nonetheless, considering the fact that even in the Sasanian Persian era, as the number of people who were literate was very limited, it should be assumed that the primitive religious characteristics of Zoroastrianism were imprinted on the religious rituals of the people. This situation demands that the Zoroastrian influences on the other religions need to be considered concerning the duality of its content, the theological aspects of advanced religions, and the praying for good fortune by the masses. The Characteristics and Influences of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism in the Kushan Era A very interesting scene is described in The Last Caravan on the Silk Road, written by Turkish artist Arif Aşçɪ, who is a western art history professor and a photographer. Here is the part describing the religious nature of the people as his exploration team was passing through a mountain village in Kyrgyzstan. There were no mosques in the villages we passed through. Even though they call themselves Muslims, they still preserved the shamanistic traditions that their ancestors had believed in. According to Shamanism, their souls stay with them forever even after the people pass away. Even the mountains, streams, trees, and lifeless rocks have souls. Shamans catch and sacrifice animals as a sign of respect and offering to the souls, and to connect with the souls.41

Kyrgyzstan is a place where various religions such as Nestorianism, Islam, Russian Orthodox Christianity as well as Buddhism passed through. The religious dispositions of these peoples, as described by Arif Aşçɪ, lead us to ask what their actual religions were. Although it is an isolated mountainous area, if the people’s religious sentiments are like this in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, what would the religious sensibilities of Central Asian peoples have looked like during the Kushan Empire era, which is what we are dealing with here? In order to respond to these questions, the first thing that must be done is to clarify the characteristics of Zoroastrianism as an advanced religion. Zoroastrianism clearly contrasted with religions before it, which had been based on primitive mythological thinking. Based on the aforementioned changes in human thought forms, it can be said that advanced religions appeared when

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the religious experiences derived from mythological thinking were explained with more organized and structured logical thinking. However, concerning the doctrines of Zoroastrianism, the human reaction to the absolute power surrounding them, that is, the phenomenon when we try to explain the existence of the mythological and colossal Deity based on the undivided sentiment and the experience of it by the logical thinking based on the absolute and dualistic concepts is revealed very clearly. Zoroastrians believe in the one and only deity, Ahura Mazdā. This being, referred to as the compound word of Ahura, meaning Deity (Lord), and Mazdā, meaning wisdom, stands out as a very rational deity. The fact that early Zoroastrians steadfastly refused to ingest haoma, a hallucinogenic beverage,42 is a symbolic act that demonstrates the process by which mythological sensibility was limited by logical thinking, which means an escape from undifferentiated ecstasy, one of the effects of hallucinations. Of course, it would not be possible to have a religion deprived of mythological sensibilities, but this act demonstrates the process of establishing human independence by overcoming the collapse of the self into overwhelming Existence by way of mythological thinking, and finally establishing a religion of rationality. Zoroastrian dualism also shows a theological perspective that reflects the duality of logical thinking, the concept of transcendentality due to this duality, and the duality of good and evil. In this perspective, the abstract concept of a unique and absolute Deity is applied, which transcends the miscellaneous deities. And Spenta Mainyu, the concept of a spiritual being, is established as the concrete manifestation of Deity which may produce the Good. On the other hand, Angra Mainyu as the evil spirit is established as its dualistic counterpart. What is interesting is the position of human beings in this dichotomously established worldview. Even though Spenta Maiyu is guaranteed to acquire the final victory as the absolute spirit of Deity, Angra Mainyu is set up and understood as a gigantic force of evil acting against Spenta Mainyu in actuality. Therefore, based on this worldview, Zoroastrianism emphasizes the power of human agency to choose good or evil; that is, good and evil are the options of choice of man’s will.43 This structure becomes the foundation of Zoroastrian’s Ethical Dualism, thus emphasizing the subjectivity of man, but, on the other hand, it is the background from which its eschatology and soteriology are formed. This means that, ultimately, evil is punished, and those doing good (good thoughts, good words, and good deeds) are saved and are led to a new world where they will never again fall into evil (“the new and endless age of the Separation [wizarashen]”44) The revelation of faith of an external power requesting the divine being of Saoshyant, the Savior, to guide them is a natural conclusion, as a manifestation of man’s primitive religious sentiment.

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In addition to this logically sophisticated dualism, Zoroastrianism also maintained the religious characteristics of the nomads, from their fundamental doctrines to their ritual ceremonies. Amesha Spenta, described as a class of fundamental doctrinal beings, is revealed as the inner attributes of Ahura Mazdā, which are differentiated into six beings (Asha Vahishta, Vohu Manah, Spenta Ārmaiti, Khshathra, Haurvatāt, and Ameretāt). This structure of these beings is known to have originated from pre-Zoroastrian deities.45 Their unique funerary rituals and their implications are good examples that show how the religiosity of the nomads was being maintained. According to the doctrines of Zoroastrianism, death is not in the realm of Ahura Mazdā. It is a result of the destructive behavior of Ahirman, the god of evil. So there are a lot of taboos in dealing with a corpse. The process of a sky burial in Zoroastrianism expresses a long-standing convention as a representation of this kind of idea. Zoroastrians pray for three days and three nights while enshrining the cleansed and sanitized corpse in a specially secluded space to prevent evil from desecrating it, before putting it on the dakhma, known as the tower of silence, for the vultures. This is due to the belief that the soul of the deceased lingers near the corpse for three days. The bones that remain after the vultures eat the flesh are collected and kept in a jar.46 As seen above, it is not unreasonable to assume that the following deeprooted shamanistic spirit of the nomadic peoples was taught to and greatly influenced the residents when Buddhism entered the Kushan Empire region: the concept of Ahura Mazdā as the absolute Deity in Zoroastrianism; the concept of confrontation between good and evil; the concept of Saoshyant as the savior protecting man from the evil in the world; and the concepts of following eschatological soteriology theory and a new ideological world; that is, the advent of a utopian world free of death and suffering.47 Therefore, if we trace back the Buddhism in this region, specifically the characteristics of Kushan Empire Buddhism, while keeping these characteristics in mind, we can elucidate the following points: First, the building of the colossal Buddhist statues in the Kushan Empire can be seen as an expression of maintaining their traditions and their concept of the absolute Deity through Buddhist statues at a place and time in which Buddhism was the dominant religion, and supported by their success in international commercial trade. Therefore, the construction of colossal Buddhist statues in China can be considered as an extension of Kushan Empire Buddhist tradition, and so there is a strong possibility that a similarly understood concept of an absolute Deity was imported into China through the building of these colossal Buddhist statues. Second, it is not unreasonable to say that the concept of Saoshyant as Savior may have strongly influenced the establishment of the concepts of

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Maitreya and Amitābha. The concept of Mithra, which originated as a spiritual being in the pre-Zoroastrian era, was revived and replaced with the concept of a Savior at the end of the world in the latter days of Zoroastrianism at its height, as a being that controls and eliminates evil and which is similar to Saoshyant as well as having attributes similar to those of Ahura Mazdā.48 This is the opinion in the same context in which this concept was transformed into Maitreya Buddha in the Kushan Empire era.49 In the same context, diverse perspectives explain the faith in Amitābha. A number of scholars point out the connection with the deities of Iran and Egypt and, furthermore, the concept of God and Heaven in the Judaic tradition. Therefore, it would not be too unreasonable to extend the inference that the concept of the Zoroastrian Deity, which greatly influenced the concept of deities of those religions, also influenced the concept of the Buddha as an absolute Deity in the Kushan Empire. Finally, it would not be wrong to say that this concept of a Savior became the root of the ideology of the Pure Land School (淨土宗) and the longing for the Pure Land of the Western Region (西方淨土). Third, it is highly likely that the pre-Zoroastrian concept of soul, which became the root of Zoroastrianism, was influenced by Buddhist theory. In fact, the concept of ātman in the Vedic Upanishad tradition was expressed as a conceptualization of the religious sensibility of a mysterious, imperishable, and innate soul. And the concept of spiritual beings such as Spenta Mainyu and Amesha Spenta of Zoroastrianism may be considered as a theological conceptualization of the crude shamanistic idea of soul that the Central Asian steppe people already had. As previously mentioned, historically, the fiercer debates on pudgala took place in the Sarvâstivāda and Sautrântika schools in the northwestern region of India.50 This might have been due to the fact that the shamanistic concept of soul, which seemed to have been maintained more vividly in the Central Asian region, stimulated the process of the debates by the Buddhist scholars. Therefore, Sautrântika’s superior pudgala can be seen as a Buddhistic transformation of the Central Asian religious tradition. That is to say, it is difficult to interpret this assertion of the Sautrântika school, the influence of which like that of the Dharmagupta school did not spread south of northwest India, as an isolated outcome of the theoretical discussion process that was unrelated to the religious tendencies of the indigenous peoples in the Kushan Empire era. So the idea that the Zoroastrian concept of the imperishability of the soul penetrating Buddhism cannot be ignored. Therefore, the imperishability theory that appeared distinctively in early Chinese Buddhism may be considered as a Chinese development of the Sautrântika school theory. Fourth, the possibility of a critical response by the Buddhist monks during the Kushan Empire era to the projection of the Zoroastrian absolute deity concept onto Buddhism or the penetration into Buddhism of the tendency to

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substantiate the Zoroastrian soul concept has to be considered. In other words, there is a strong possibility that a superficial understanding of Sarvâstivāda is related to this problem. As previously mentioned, those of the Sarvâstivāda school talked about a mundane pudgala, but the Sautrântikas talked about the superior pudgala. There are two sides to these two assertions. Sarvâstivāda’s theory, insisting on a mundane pudgala, strongly maintains a very naïve materialistic elementalist theory. It is worth noting the reason why this theory had maintained its influence for a long time, even though it has the premise of a non-Buddhistic, substantialistic theory. It must have been very effective for a critique of the religions to contain theistic or mental substantialism because their theory had a strong simplicity and clarity that appealed to the masses. Perhaps, because the positive tendency toward the existence of substantialistic soul penetrated Kushan era Buddhism and was persuasive to the masses, the logic of Sarvâstivāda theories must have been used to critique these popular tendencies, regardless of whether they were right or wrong. There is a strong possibility that the laity’s impression of Sarvâstivāda’s theories became established as such, regardless of whether this was the true theoretical goal or intention of Sarvâstivādans. It is believed that this impression, and thus the theories of Sarvâstivāda as they were understood, greatly influenced early Chinese Buddhism. This topic will be dealt with separately in chapter 3, section 5.

NOTES 1. Eric Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), 321 note 1. “The 1st Chinese who is known to have mastered Sanskrit is the late fourth century translator Chu Fo-nien (cf. p. 202); before that time, some Chinese monks and laymen like Nieh Tao-chien, Nieh Ch’eng-yuan (cf. p. 68) and Po Yuan (p. 76) appear to have acquired some linguistic training as assistants of foreign translators. On the other hand, some foreign missionaries were well versed in Chinese (K’ang Seng-hui, Chih Ch’ien, Dharmaraksa, Kumarajiva). However, the most prominent Chinese masters and exegetes of this period (people like Chih Tun, Tao-an, Chu Fa-t’ai, Hui-yuan) ignored Sanskrit altogether.” See van Gulik, Siddham, An Essay on the History of Sanskrit Studies in China and Japan, 12–14. 2. In Sub Hur, “A Study on the Characteristics of Neo-Daoists in the Wei-Jin Era,” Journal of East and West Comparative Literature 25 (2012). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 3. Jin Il Chung, “Vinaya Elements in Agama Texts as a Criterion of the School Affiliation: Taking the Six Vivadamulas as an Example,” Indian Philosophy 34 (2012): 165–203. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout.

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4. Soo Il Jung, Silkroadology (Pajoo: Changbi, 2007), 378–379. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 5. Kamata, translated into Korean by Whee Ok Jang, The History of Chinese Buddhism, 123–136. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 6. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 43. The estimate of the period of the early transmission era in Kamata Shigeo’s analysis in The History of Chinese Buddhism matches Erich Zürcher’s opinion. Other related scholars’ opinions do not deviate far from his. 7. In-Sub Hur, “The Comparison between the Methodology of Buddhism and Daoism for Understanding the Characteristics of Chinese Buddhism, Focusing on the Projective Trichotomous Way of Thinking of Vasubandhu and the Circulative Trichotomous Way of Thinking of the Daoists,” Eastern Philosophy 8 (1997). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 8. See Noritada Kubo (窪德忠), Junzo Nishi (西順藏) and 13 others. The History of Chinese Religion. Translated into Korean by Jung Eul Cho, 50–57. In this book, Obuchi Niji explains a series of processes that provide the basis for the growth of Buddhism due to changes in the religious environment following the politicoeconomic transformation in China. He mentions (the phenomenon of) the collapse of townships (li, 理) a community group based on locality, as well as of religious rituals for common deities; in other words, the local religious leaders that the townships depended on. He also explains that in this chaotic situation in which the ties of region and kinship could not realistically provide strong protection, there was a change in the religious sensibility of the Chinese by discussing the phenomenon in which individuals naturally pursued a type of religion that provided salvation and mental stability on a personal level. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 9. 沮渠京聲 譯, 佛說觀彌勒菩薩上生兜率天經; 羅什 譯, 彌勒下生經; 義淨 譯, 彌勒成佛經; 竺法護 譯, 觀彌勒菩薩下生經; 羅什 譯, 彌勒 下生成佛經; 失譯, 彌勒來時經. See Kubo, Nishi and 13 others, The History of Chinese Religion. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 10. Tae Won Lee, “Chinese Early Maitreya Faith,” Studies on Maitreya 3 (2000): 112–113. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 11. Huijiao 慧皎, “Gaoseng zhuan (高僧傳; Biographies of Eminent Monks; 釋慧遠),” K 1074, T 2059. 6. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 12. Kamata, The History of Chinese Buddhism, 409–410. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 13. Sung Doo Ahn, “The Background and Process of Mahayana Text Composition,” Buddhism Review 11–12 (2002). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. Sung Doo Ahn mentions Iranian religion as exerting an external influence on the origin of Mahayana Buddhism and the appearance of the Mahayana Bodhisattva idea. He admits that this argument follows the view of Basham. And, as an internal background of Buddhism, he points out the

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appearance of the ideas of “Buddha of the Future” and “Heavenly Bodhisattva” based on the bodhisattva ideology in Stories of the Buddha’s Previous Lives. Also, from an institutional perspective, he considers Harakawa’s research as valid, which asserts that the origin of Mahayana started from the worship of relics and stupas, despite various critiques (critiques by scholars such as Chopin and Harrison). However, Sung Doo Ahn, by synthesizing their opinions, asserts that the origin of Mahayana should be viewed as a result of compound elements consisting of not a unilinear factor but mutilinear factors. I judge Sung Doo Ahn’s opinion to be reasonable in that it matches the general process of historical fact formation. However, what I would like to pay more attention to in the theory of the influence of Iranian religions among Basham’s views that Ahn Sung-doo followed is Basham’s claim that they influenced not only Buddhism but also the entirety of Indian religions. (A. L. Basham, “The Evolution of the Concept of the Bodhisattva,” in The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism, ed. Leslie S. Kawamura (Calgary: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 37. “It appears to have been part of wide spread reaction, evident also in Hinduism at the time, against belief in the rigid operation of karma. We have no evidence of rejection of karma and transmigration altogether, but the Bhagavad Gīta contains passages which teach that grace of Kṛṣṇa cancel the effect of past sins, so that through faith even śūdras on death can go straight to God.”) Basham’s view is quite plausible in the historical context. However, as the concept of the Bodhisattva in Stories of the Buddha’s previous lives is mentioned as the Buddhist background of the origin of Mahayana, I think the possibility to include the original Indian, that is, pre-Aryan primitive, religious salvation faith as the internal Indian background, or the possibility of Indian revival and expansion of the proto-Aryan religious sensibility which could be the common origin of Iranian and Indo-Aryan religious cultures, could be topics that need to be studied in a more complex network of relationships going forward, from the perspective of the shift from the mythological way of thinking to the logical way of thinking. 14. Etinne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era. Translated into French by Sara Webb-Boin under the supervision of Jean Dantinne (Paris: Peters Pub & Booksellers, 1988), 538–544. The fact that the Dharmagupta School, whose influence was limited in the northwestern region of India, played a crucial role in spreading Chinese precepts collection and is an important clue showing that the knowledge of the early Chinese Buddhists had a close relationship with the doctrines of the Buddhist sects in the northwestern region of India. In other words, it is a fact that strongly supports the inference that Buddhist doctrines in the northwestern region of India played a crucial role in early Chinese Buddhism. This fact also makes it possible to infer that the Sautrântika School, which was very active in the northwestern region of India, would have significantly influenced the Chinese understanding of Buddhism. 15. Robert Kritzer, “General Introductions,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26, no. 2 (2008): 202. Roberts Kritzer agrees with the opinion of Cox that considers the Sautrântika School as a series of various opinions derived from the Sarvâstivāda Sschool, rather than an independent school such as Sarvâstivāda.

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16. The approximate birth and death times of the contemporary intellectuals are as follows: Daoan (道安, 312–384), Huiyuan (慧遠, 334–417(6?)), Zhi Daolin(支道林, 314–366), Mou Rong (牟融 Middle of 5c), Zongbing (宗炳, 375–443), He Chengtian (何承天, 370–447), Sun Chuo (孫綽, 300–380), Luo Junzhang (羅含, later 4c), Daoheng (346–417), Huan Xuan (桓玄, 369–404), Wang Mi (王謎, 360–407), Xi Chiao (郗中書), Hongming Ji, 336–377. 17. Kamata, The History of Chinese Buddhism, 412–413; it is an analysis of the contents of 出三藏記集 vol. 15, 道安法 師傳. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 18. Kamata, The History of Chinese Buddhism, 167. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 19. Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 外 vol. 10, 288. “夫道地者, 應眞之玄堂, 升仙之奧室也. 無本之城, 杳然難陵矣. 無爲之牆, 邈然難踰矣. 微門妙闥, 少闚其庭者也. … 其爲像也, 含弘靜泊, 緜緜若存, 寂寥無言, 辯之者幾矣. 怳惚無行, 求矣漭乎其難測.” (道安, 出三藏記集, 道地經序第一) English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 20. Sengyou (僧祐), “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集) T 2102.52.1–97. Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 44–45, “今稱一陰一陽, 謂陰 陽不測之謂神者, 蓋謂至無爲道. 陰陽兩渾, 故曰一陰一陽也. 自道而降便入 精神, 常有於陰陽之表,非二儀所究, 故曰陰陽不測耳. 君平之說一生二, 謂神 明是也, 若此二句, 皆以無明則以何明精神乎? 然群生之神, 其極雖齊而隨緣 遷流, 成麤妙之識, 而與本不滅矣.” (宗炳, 弘明集 第二卷, 明佛論). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 21. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 280–281, “形非卽神也, 神非卽形也. 是合而爲用者也, 而合 非卽矣. 生則合而爲用, 死則形留而神逝也. 何以言之? … 斯其寐也, 魂交 故, 神遊於胡蝶, 卽形與神分也. 其覺也, 形開遽遽然周也, 卽形與神合也.” (曹思文, 難范中書神滅論, 弘明集. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 22. Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated by Kye Hwan Jang, 137, “此形盡矣, 神將安附, 而謂之不滅哉. 茍能不滅, 則自乖 其靈? 不資形矣, 旣不資形, 何理與形爲生, 終不相違. 不能相違, 則生本是 同, 斷可知矣.” (鄭道子, 神不滅論, 弘明集 第五卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 23. Refer to the book written by Sang Hwan Shin, Thoughts of Nagarjuna (Seoul: Doseochoolpan, 2011), 194–219 regarding the historical debates on Pudgala. English translation is provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. What is notable among the debates considered is that as the theories of Sautrântika in relation to the topic of my writing is the content of the Treatise of the Wheel of the Different Divisions of the Tenets by Vasumitra, a treatise master in Kashmir circa first to second centuries AD, who conveys that Sautrântika claimed the superior existence

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of Pudgala. In addition, it is also worth noting that Sautrântika treatises such as Treatise of the Saṃmitīya School were translated between 350 and 431 AD Etienne Lamotte’s quote below is a passage confirming the general understanding of the theory of Sautrântika: “One Sautrântika category went so far as to admit the existence of a subtle thought (sūkaṣmacitta), the fruit of maturation endowed with all the seeds (sarvabījaka) of the phenomenal world.” History of Indian Buddhism, 608. This will help us to infer what kind of influence the theory of Sautrântika had on the early Chinese Buddhists concerning the understanding of Buddhism. 24. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 144–152. 25. The Kushan Empire is considered to have expanded its territory and ruled the areas from the eastern regions such as Bactria, Sogdia, and Pargana, all neighboring Parthia, which are mentioned in Chinese history books and Buddhism-related literature, to the western region of the northwest and west of the Tarim Basin of the Xinjiang area of China, which is assumed to be their place of origin, and from the Gandhara region of northwestern India to Mathura of Middle India and the Gangetic Plain of Eastern India, from the first to the third centuries AD. Also, there is a view that retrospectively situates the origin of the Kushan Empire in the first century BC that is also persuasive. And, this is the time and region of the arrival of the monks of the old translation era of early Chinese Buddhism that this book is investigating. Soo Il Jung summarizes the characteristics of the monks emigrating to China as follows: “As seen above, at the beginning of the immigration of the Buddhist monks to the east for about 600 years from Han Dynasty to Wei-Jin era, a majority of the immigrant monks were from the western countries (Central Asian), such as Yuezhi, Parthia, and Samarkand (康國). The number of monks from India was relatively low. In the meantime, around the fifth century, when Buddhism was beginning to decline in Central Asia, the opposite phenomenon occurred. . . . We can divide the translation process of 600 years into three stages. The first stage was from the Han Dynasty to the Three Kingdoms era, when the emigrant monks played major roles, and An Shigao and Lokakṣema were the representative translators. The second stage was during the Wei-Jin era, when both Chinese and emigrant monks participated in the translations, and the representative translators were Kumarajiva from India, and Zhendi (眞諦, Paramârtha (499–569), Huaseng (華僧) and Faxian from China. The third phase is during the Sui and Tang dynasties, when Chinese monks Xuanzang and Yijing played major roles.” See Soo Il Jung, Silkroadology (Pajoo: Changbi, 2007), 467. 26. Eiji Mano et al., Central Asia for Cultured Persons (Seoul: Chaekgwahamke, 2009), 37–38. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 27. The complexity of the culture of the Kushan Empire is dramatically confirmed in the complexity of the various deities reflected in their coins. Jonas Harmatta, “Conclusion,” in History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Volume 2: The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations, 700 BC to AD 250, ed. Janos Harmatta (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1994), 491, “The pantheon on the Kushan coins, with gods of pre-Zoroastrian, Zoroastrian, Greek, Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Indian origin, clearly reflects the syncretic character of Kushan culture.”

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28. It is true that there are strong objections to the theory that the ruling class of the Kushan Empire was Indo-Scythians. However, Otani Nako strongly supports the Indo-Scythian theory based on the study of a Rabatak inscription found in 1993 and criticizes the prejudice with which western scholars cling to the Indo-Scythian emigration to the West. Otani Nakao, Dayuezhi: In Search of the Mysterious Peoples of Central Asia. Translated into Korean by Hyehong Min (Seoul: Ifield, 2008), 95–112. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 29. Nakao, Dayuezhi: In Search of the Mysterious Peoples of Central Asia, 220; Xinru Liu, The Silk Road in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 48–49. 30. See Mano, Central Asia for Cultured People, 222–223. Refer to Liu, The Silk Road in World History, 52–58, regarding details relating to the commercialization of the Buddhist sects and their secular corruption. English translation is provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 31. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 431. 32. Lamotte, The Silk Road in World History, 426–427. 33. I think that even though there could be a difference in the religious sensibilities between the nomads and Greeks, similar reactions could be drawn from the perspective of the primitive religious tendency to pray for good fortune. Please refer to the following for the characteristics of praying for good fortune in the Buddhist tradition: Hajime et al., The World of the Buddha, 438–440. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 34. Mano, Central Asia for Cultured People, 219 and 221. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 35. Heung Tae Yoo, Persian Religions (Pajoo: Sallim Publishing Co., 2010), 12. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. See also Peter Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith (Thornhill: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 18–25. 36. Yang Sup Shin, “Advancement to the East of Persian Culture and the Roles of the Sogdians—Focusing on Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism,” Study of Middle East 27, no. 1 (2008): 13. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. He explains this problem as follows: “Zoroastrianism is not only one of the earliest religions of revelation, it is also one of the most important religions in the history of religions. Zoroastrianism is also linked to the Vedic religion of ancient India and to much earlier indigenous Indo-Aryan beliefs.” 37. Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 28. Along with these terms with religious connotations, he considers ethnicity in the sense of geographical disposition and regards the proto-Indo-Aryans in the Indus Valley and the Iranians in Iran as ethnic groups of the same origin. He mentions linguistically that they are people of the same origin through the term “proto-Indo-European,” as it is the origin of the Latin and Greek, and Sanskrit and Avestan, languages. 38. Studies comparing and contrasting the terminologies of the Avestan language and Sanskrit of the Vedas are too numerous to mention. Of course, various philosophical and religious discussion topics are derived from them. Representative examples of similar language comparisons are “zaotar and hotr,” Yasna and “Yajña,”

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and “Mithra and Mitra.” For a more detailed discussion on this, refer to Subhash Kak, “Vedic Elements in the Ancient Iranian Religion of Zarathustra,” The Adyar Library Bulletin 67 (2003): 47–63. 39. This is a judgment based on the opinion that there is a strong possibility that both the Sakas and Kushans preserved the theology of the pre-Zoroastrian era. “Essentially the Sakas and Kushans who invaded Graeco-Bactria may have had similar ideas and cults to the population of Sogdiana and Bactria in pre-Zoroastrian times.” See Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era, 316. 40. Conversely, I think this perspective explains the reason why Greek religions did not penetrate into them deeply, as indicated by Lamotte’s quote above. 41. Aşçɪ Arif, The Last Caravan on the Silk Road. Translated into Korean by Moon Ho Kim (Seoul: Ilbit, 2008), 216. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 42. Yoo, Persian Religions, 16–17. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 43. Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 62. The following Yasna passage he quotes points out these aspects directly, “And through, O Mazda, has been implanted in this (our) choice to benefit (us) but deceit (has been implanted) in false teaching in order to har (people). Therefore I request the shelter of good though, and I banish all the deceitful from (our) fellowship.” (Y.49:3). 44. Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 75. 45. Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 28–29. 46. Yoo, Persian Religions, 25–27. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. Refer to Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 114–117 for a detailed analysis regarding the religious significance of the death and funerary rites. It is also reported that this type of ceremony was performed by the Zoroastrians in China. Shin, “Advancement to the East of Persian Culture and the Roles of the Sogdians—Focusing on Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism,” 16–17. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 47. The typical shamanistic concept of spirit is based on the study of Siberian Shamanism and developed through the discussions of the similarities and the differences with Siberian Shamanism. A report on Shamanism in the contemporary Pergana region in Central Asia shows that the belief in the Shaman spirit has been passed down as a deep and long tradition in Central Asia. See Vladimir Basilov, “Traces of Perversion in Central Asian Shamanism,” in Shamanism in Siberia, eds. V. Diószegi and M. Hoppal (trans into Korean by Khil Sung Choi), 289–297. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 48. Clark, Zoroastrianism: An Introduction to an Ancient Faith, 46–48. 49. Hajime and two others, The World of Buddha, 478. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 50. It is difficult to deny that Sarvâstivāda was very influential in the northwest region of India, considering the following two opinions: the first opinion is that of Nakamura Hajime (Hajime and two others, The World of Buddha, 276–277. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka). They insist that the

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transmission route of Sarvâstivāda, which is said to have started in King Asoka’s time, expanded from Magada to Mathura, and in the Kashmir and Gandhara regions of northwestern India, and that this northwestern transmission influenced China. The second opinion is that of Sasaki Sizka (Sasaki Sizka, The Transformation of Indian Buddhism. Translated into Korean by Ja Rang Lee (Seoul: DongKook University Press, 2007), 258–273. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka). He mentions that Sarvâstivāda was isolated in the Kashmir region due to the conflict between King Asoka and Sarvâstivāda, prior to that school accepting the perspective of disrupting saṅgha protocol.

Chapter 3

The Characteristics of Wei-Jin Era Buddhism

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE WAYS OF THINKING IN THE WEI-JIN ERA The discussion of the characteristics of Chinese philosophies based on the method of distinguishing between Aesthetic Order and Logical Order by David Hall and Roger T. Ames has attracted attention as a new perspective in comparing East and West ways of thinking. They define the characteristics of the Eastern philosophical tradition as “Aesthetic,” which shows concrete, anti-substantialistic and aesthetic ways of thinking, in contrast to the Western philosophical tradition, which is based on abstract, metaphysical, and logical ways of thinking.1 Their assertion was an effort to recover the original form of East-Asian philosophy which had been, as they insist, interpreted and distorted by the Western philosophical point of view. There is no denying that their discussion contributed somewhat to the understanding of East-Asian philosophy from an Eastern philosophical perspective. Although I cannot evaluate this pseudointerpretation of Eastern philosophy to the extreme extent that Edward W. Said does, I cannot dispel the point that their perspective is still not coming from outside of the framework of the Western intellectual tradition. The reason is because they are describing the concept of “aesthetic order” found in the Chinese philosophical tradition as something that contrasts dramatically with their own philosophical tradition, and thus they consider the Eastern and Western philosophies as thoroughly heterogeneous. Furthermore, when we see that their ways of thinking are directly compared with the introspection of the traditional philosophies by the contemporary philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and John Rawls, it is difficult to deny that their philosophical interests cannot but be seen as westernized. In a sense, this makes me wonder if Hall and Ames failed to describe the East as 63

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it is, having been overwhelmed by the established objective of their analysis (discovery of Aesthetic Order), or if they only saw what they wanted to see. The problem is that the search for the peculiarity of Eastern thought in this way can bring about just as much of a distortion as the distortion of Eastern understanding by a one-sided interpretation based on a simple Western perspective in the past. The comparison of extreme heterogeneities between the Western and Eastern ways of thinking may lead to a conclusion that is contrary to the fact that they share a common basis in their ways of thinking; in other words, a commonly approved identity of biological cognitive structures, and specifically that mutual discourse and understanding are possible and appear as a concrete and ongoing fact in our lives. This may be an application of the perspective found in Monadology by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz. The pursuit of an ideology of perfect mutual understanding may often evoke certainty to the conclusion that opposites are eternal and mutual understanding is impossible. It appears that Hall and Ames may be making similar mistakes in their comparison of Eastern and Western philosophies. As they insist, the point that Asians did not set up an abstract world beyond this world in order to understand the concrete world may be another newly created myth. The assertion that the establishment of existence based on abstract and conceptual thinking as an already historically formed human habitual way of thinking that cannot be arbitrarily avoided and that these are not found in the thinking traditions of the East is too extreme.2 Even though they affirm the accolades of connecting the characteristics of the traditions of thought found in China as being in direct alignment with the anti-metaphysics trends of contemporary Western philosophies, it can be said that this is as unhealthy as the claim of exclusive superiority of Western thought forms that does not see the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese or Eastern philosophies in a balanced way. In connection with this, Dong Hwan Park’s interpretation of Eastern thought forms through the logic of reflexive seeking3 shows a very different dimension from theirs. It is not simply a discussion on the idiosyncrasies of Eastern philosophies. It might be more appropriate to say that it is a work that confirms his insight regarding the fundamental dimensions of human consciousness in the traditions of the East. This is because it is difficult to say if the ways of thinking that Dong Hwan Park confirms are coherently carried out either in the Analects of Confucius or in the Daodejing. In other words, it is because in his work we are able to encounter various statements which can be interpreted as simple mystical ways of thinking or mythological ways of thinking or, moreover, substantialist ways of thinking, which is opposite to his reflexive attitude in the logic of reflexive seeking. From this point of view, although his theory may be found among the traditions of Eastern thought forms, the philosophers of those traditions did not apply the theory

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actively with clear awareness to formulate a consistent logical structure. In this regard, it would be all right to say that the logic of reflexive seeking of Dong Hwan Park is his own creation. It is natural that a lot of emerging scholars in Korea’s Eastern philosophy society are paying attention to this logic of reflexive seeking, as they have not been able to craft noteworthy reference points for discussions. In fact, as Korean academia has lacked sufficient reflection on the ideological basis of contemporary Eastern philosophies or methodologies of study and their goals, in the past these scholars have instead paid attention to the views of contemporary Taiwanese Confucian scholars, and, from 1970 to 1980, they paid attention to the discussions in mainland China. Nowadays, they seem to go along with the Western scholars, such as Hall and Ames previously mentioned. In that respect, it is not an unreasonable expectation that the logic of reflexive seeking, which presents a new dimension that has broken away from the simple, existing interpretation of Eastern philosophies, will aid in the development of a discussion of Eastern philosophies that could mark a new starting point. However, I am concerned that the anticipation of the restoration of the true identity and spirit of the Eastern philosophical traditions by this logic of reflexive seeking has shown errors in the application of this theory even in the discussions of distantly related philosophical trends. This concern includes the idea that the thoughts of Fung Yulan and Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), who are criticized for interpreting the Chinese history of philosophy from the perspective of Western philosophy, should be partially reinstated in a completely different sense. In future discussions, I will try to explain why there are theories among the philosophical theories in Chinese history of philosophy that can be explained in a very plausible manner through a Western metaphysical point of view, and why in the thought forms of Wangbi, as well as in the understanding of Buddhism by Xuanzang and Ji, there is the tendency to establish a substantialistic or metaphysical worldview that is similar to that of the West.

THE PHENOMENON OF THE DECLINE OF “THE LOGIC OF REFLEXIVE SEEKING” When we read the Daodejing or the Zhuangzi, which is the basis for defining the philosophical character of pre-Qin Dynasty Daoism, there are statements that are difficult to see as being based on the logic of reflexive seeking. We may find many statements in Daoist texts that are searching for, relying on or returning to the mystical world. Obsession with the concept of the Dao, and the emphasis on the concept of nothingness, may in return have overwhelmed the unique form of understanding of the world of Daoists who utilized such concepts, thus invalidating their motives for discussion. It appears to me that

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Dong Hwan Park is sensitive to this reductionist tendency of returning to the substantialistic Dao of Daoism and holds the philosophy of the Analects in high regard, as it develops discussion based on every day, ordinary, and concrete situations. However, while examples of less reflexive statements which are not thorough in the reflexive seeking way of thinking simplify those statements that contain the reflexive seeking way of thinking, we can also see that active critique of these examples does appear in the Daoist tradition in reality. In the Jei Lao chapter (解老篇) of The Han Feizi (韓非子), the Daoists who simplify what they pursue are referred to as “those with no Dao technique (無術者),” and are criticized as below: The reason for valuing becoming “empty” by doing nothing and not thinking of anything indicates that there is no restriction in its meaning. Those who do not possess that technique consider emptiness as non-doing and non-working. Those who consider non-doing and non-working as emptiness never forget that the meaning of them is emptiness. This means that there is a restriction by considering them as emptiness. Emptiness means not being restricted. If there is restriction when something is considered to be empty, then it is not emptiness. The non-doing of those who attain emptiness does not take non-doing as the eternal way (常道). If non-doing is not taken as the eternal way, emptiness will be attained, as well as virtue (德). When virtue is accomplished, it is called the accomplishment of virtue (德盛). This is what Laozi meant by saying, “the Upper Virtue is really non-doing, and doesn’t even consider it as non-doing.”

It is not an exaggeration for the scholars of Legalism to proudly consider themselves to be direct descendants of Laozi by looking at the insight of those Legalists who were cautious to not return to simple nondoing through directly looking at the paradoxical statement of “non-doing but not nondoing (無爲而無不爲).” It is not unreasonable to say that their insight was the discovery of an open and unknown world, which resulted in the logic of reflexive seeking and was based on the overwhelming understanding of others who consistently encountered endless contradictions due to the limitations of their acquired knowledge. Although the Legalists had excellent insight into the contradictory limits of human thinking, they might have considered themselves to be outside of the contradictory situation due to the arrogance of their intellectual superiority, or they might have determined that their future would lead to an inevitable catastrophic end. Their mindset and political actions established them as immoral political strategists, historically, and thus subject to criticism. The meaning of the philosophical characteristics of Wangbi becomes more clear when it is understood in relation to the philosophical trend of Confucianism of the Han Dynasty and Tang Dynasty; especially the Han Dynasty, when a new syncretic energy arose after the time of the arrogance and destruction

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of this early Legalism had passed. Modern-era scholars like Angus Graham identify the attempts to establish a simple, grand theory through the theories of yin–yang and five elements, as well as the theory of “change (易),” as the “intellectual deterioration” of the spirit of the time, as the trend of Han Dynasty Confucianism was to pursue a simple grand theory that contrasted with the various experimental pre-Qin era thought forms.4 This trend is far from the logic of reflexive seeking, which conditions “what is already known” with “what is not yet known” found in the pre-Qin Dynasty philosophies. Their attempt at theoretical synthesis was established so as to deductively unify and simplify various theories of the past. Although the yin–yang and five elements theories that they mainly adopted are relational theories emphasizing interconnectedness, their spirit already showed an attempt to subordinate various situations into one grand theory; in other words, it could be said that it was an attempt to subordinate concrete situations into abstract categories deductively. The reason why Graham defines this as intellectual regression seems to be because he sees in the philosophers of that time the absence of a subtle intellect to overlook the concreteness and diversity of situations, and this was their shortcoming. This is comparable to the Legalists’ assertion, prior to the Han Dynasty, for ideological unification in order to maintain the practical and idealized political objective of a unified empire. However, early Legalists, unlike Han Dynasty Confucians, were delicately aware of the causes of rampant contradictory assertions based on different understandings of the world. We can assume how subtly Han Feizi understood the contradictory situation, by taking note of contradictory chapters written in his book regarding the relationship between distrust and confrontation; that is, in the Discourse on the Difficulties of Persuasion chapter (說難篇), written from the subjects’ point of view, and the Discourse on Expressing Doubts chapter (說疑篇), written from the ruler’s point of view. On the other hand, the theoretical unification directive of the Han Dynasty Confucianists can be said to be very crude and naïve. In other words, it is difficult to see in them a subtle awareness of the contradictions, as Han Feizi shows. Going one step further from this naïve and simplistic theory of unification, a thought trend pursuing deductive absolute reduction based on the static Dao may be confirmed more clearly from Wangbi’s philosophy, as follows. Wangbi’s Neo-Daoist Thought of Taking Nothingness as the Basis If we look at Wangbi’s theory as a continuation of an attempt to fit the world into a simple and grand theory, we may understand what his philosophical ambition was. The dialogue between Wangbi and Peihui (裴徽) described

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in the Annals of the Three Kingdoms (三國志) shows the extension of the philosophy Wangbi was pursuing. The sage (Confucius) embodied wu (無), and since “wu” cannot be taught, he therefore did not discuss it. Laozi, however, remained on at the state of “being” (you 有); thus he constantly addressed the inadequacies of the world of being.5

The above quote is a statement showing the intention of Wangbi, who wanted to construct a worldview that transcends the common sense distinction between Confucianism and Daoism by expanding and applying the hidden intention of Confucius in the discussion of being and nonbeing by Laozi. This assertion demonstrates Wangbi’s ambition to construct a theoretical, synthetic structure larger than the theoretical synthesis of the Confucianists of the Han Dynasty. Alan Chan describes that Wangbi was trying to pursue the world of oneness that all the associated structures were based on, as he was dissatisfied with the interpretation of the Yijing based on the Han Dynasty era yin–yang and five elements theories of simple interrelatedness. Instead of concentrating on what the numbers stand for, Wangbi is concerned with unveiling the deeper significance of the “One,” which seems to stand apart from the other numbers. The “One,” as we have seen, is described as the “Great Ultimate of Change” (I-chih t’ai-chi, 易之太極). Although it is not used and is not a number, the “One” makes possible and completes the process of change. Moreover, according to Wangbi, “One” is also related to “non-being” (無 wu).6

Wangbi’s tendency to abstract and simplify the concept of oneness or nothingness can be understood by comparing the Daodejing with his Commentary on it. Wangbi’s understanding of the concept of the Dao appears as a very passive form, quite different from the paradoxical dynamism of the world that the Daodejing tried to ultimately show. Among the successive paradoxical expressions of dualistically opposing categories described in the last two parts of chapter 22 of the Daodejing, Wangbi’s Commentary shows very well how he understands the concept of the Dao or oneness. [Daodejing]:  To have little is to possess. To have plenty is to be perplexed. [Wangbi’s Commentary]:  The Dao of Tzu-jan is like a tree. The more it grows (to have plenty), the more distant it is from the roots; the less it grows (to have little), the less distant it is from the roots. If one always increases, then one becomes removed from the true essence. Therefore, it is said to be perplexed. If there is little, one reaches one’s roots. Therefore, it is said to possess.7

Wangbi understands the contradictory expressions appearing in the Daodejing as a simplified, passive pursuit of the foundation from a reductionist

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perspective. The vitality of the dynamic situation cannot be found in Wangbi’s concept of the Dao understood as the roots of a tree. The following understanding of the concept of oneness decisively reveals Wangbi’s way of understanding the world. [Daodejing]:  Therefore, the sage embraces the One And becomes the model of the world. [Wangbi’s Commentary]: The One means the ultimate of the little. A model implies something to follow.

Thus, in Wangbi’s Commentary, no tension can be found in the description of the limit of the Dao or in the consciousness of the Sage who embodies the Dao, as is frequently found in the Daodejing. In other words, the tension arising from the co-existence of passivity and positivity as well as affirmation and negation, disappears, and we can see that Wangbi’s reductionistic thought, which simplifies the concept of the Dao by seeing only the passive and negative categories, is highlighted. This tendency is confirmed again in his choice of language, specifically when he emphasized adding the static utmost of things and true meaning to the concepts of emptiness (虛) and stillness (靜). [Daodejing]: Arrive at the ultimate of emptiness and promote maintaining stillness. [Wangbi’s Commentary]:  Arriving at emptiness means realizing the ultimate of things. Keeping the static state means keeping the true essence of things.

The simplicity of his understanding of the concept of the Dao can be seen in his explanation indicating the division of “essence” and “phenomenon” in his commentary of the first verse of chapter 1 of the Daodejing. [Daodejing]:  The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao; the Name that can be named is not the eternal Name. [Wangbi’s Commentary]:  The Tao that can be told of and the name that can be named point to a particular affair and construct a form but not their eternal aspect. Therefore, they cannot be told of or named.

The division between the world of expressible phenomena; that is, things which have concrete form, and the indistinguishable world of formlessness and nonexistence, is not much different from the dualistic thinking of the West’s essence and phenomena. In this method of explanation, it is not possible to gain insights concerning the expressions, which are seen in the text of the Daodejing, that trigger tension, such as the analogies of the limited

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consciousness expressing the world through words, the meaning of the negation of that world, and the limited insights of the human ways of thinking which could only be expressed in such a way. Therefore, it can be said that the reason why Wangbi considered the paradoxical thought forms and behaviors of the Sage in the Daodejing as simple and mystical is because he could not feel such tensions. Wangbi copied and described the following verse from the Daodejing, which describes the behavior of the Sage, “Resides in doing without doing and spreads doctrines without words. (處無爲之事, 行不言 之敎).”8 In a similar way, “Resides in doing without doing and spreads doctrines without words (居無爲 之事,行不言之敎),” and Wangbi understood this to mean that there is no concrete form in a Sage’s behavior. He treats this as something mystical so that people living in the phenomenal world cannot grasp it.9 Although the Commentary attempts to explain the politics of nondoing, considering that the original purpose of the Commentary was to enrich the understanding of the readers, this can only be seen as an explanation that lacks a thorough understanding of what the paradoxical statements in the Daodejing intend to mean. In fact, the very proposition of “Therefore the Sage manages affairs without action, and spreads doctrines without words (處 無爲之事, 行不言之敎).” Wangbi’s Commentary reveals a simple dichotomous method that makes it hard to say whether or not he correctly understood the characteristics of this proposition. He comments on it as “Nature herself suffices; he who acts artificially will meet with defeat. Wisdom itself is complete; he who acts artificially is false (自然以足, 爲則敗也. 智慧自備, 爲則 僞也).” And he divides it clearly in a dichotomous way into naturalness and artificiality, and a declaration of the completeness of a priori wisdom, and the negative evaluation of an posteriori artificiality. Thus, in Wangbi’s Discourse on Valuing Emptiness (貴無論), “taking nothingness as the essence (以無爲本)” can be understood as the prototype of dualistic reductionism seen in the tradition of Chinese philosophy. The fact that Wangbi’s naïve understanding of Laozi became the fundamental perspective of Daoism going forward means that the development of metaphysical thinking in China had taken its place as the major way of thinking rather than the exception. This kind of reductionism was not an exception in Chinese Buddhism. Even in the understanding of “Consciousness Only” of Xuanzang and Ji during the Tang Dynasty, who are understood as having maintained the purest form of Indian Buddhism, the reductionist, substantialistic thinking is found in the same context as Wangbi’s. Since the Buddha considered his worldview as going against the traditional trend, and didn’t expect it to be easily understood by the people, the decline in thinking of reflexive seeking visible in the pre-Qin era might rather be understood as a way of thinking that could not easily be brought to the surface of conscious understanding of the majority of the everyday Chinese.

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Characteristics of the Understanding of Buddhism by the Neo-Daoists in the Wei-Jin Era It is common sense historically, and no one doubts that Daoist philosophy played a mediating role in the Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of Indian Buddhism. But if we ask again why it had to be the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi, we will find that there has not been any systematic process of discussion or precise analysis of this question. The philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi were very good tools for the Chinese intellectuals to understand Indian Buddhism. But as we can see in the reflexive understanding of Buddhism by the Chinese themselves, that is, the critical view of Geyi (格義佛敎) Buddhism’s tradition that started with people like Daoan, it is obvious that they knew clearly and early on that there were distinct differences that distinguished these two traditions. So then, have the limits of a Daoistic understanding of Buddhism that Chinese intellectuals were aware of from the early period of Chinese Buddhism been truly clarified and overcome in the process of the development of the Chinese history of thought or in the history of Buddhism? In fact, there are too many issues that would need to be reexamined in order to adequately answer this question.10 With these issues in mind, examining the process of adopting Buddhism by revisiting the discussions among the monks or by the scholars, especially layman scholars of the Wei-Jin and the Northern and Southern Dynasties era when Neo-Daoism was in vogue, will confirm that addressing these problems is not unreasonable. Especially, the reason why it is important to discern and understand the apologetic points of view of the laymen scholars at that time is because, through that, we can observe an extremely clear view of general Chinese Buddhism at that time rather than the theoretical understanding of Buddhism found in the discourses of the eminent monks in the Wei-Jin era. The Hongming Ji (弘明集) by Sengyou (僧祐), which is a collection of apologetic discussions of early Chinese Buddhism, provides a wealth of materials on the topics covered in this book. Compared to the mature treatises and commentaries by the Buddhist monks of later times, the level of understanding of Buddhism appearing in the Hongming Ji is not that elaborate, as explained earlier. Of course, the reason why their knowledge of Buddhism was incomplete is due to the historical limitations of that time, as they lived before or during the start of large-scale translations by those like Kumarajiva. However, in the sense that their incomplete understanding of Buddhism reveals more clearly the Chinese characteristics in the interpretation of Buddhism, it may be said to be a very appropriate object of analysis.11 The reason why it is important to find out the consistent logic innate in the Chinese way of understanding of Buddhism more clearly, as seen in these

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materials, is because this analysis may provide important clues to help us try to situate the areas of discussion where the true intention is ambiguous, based on the sinicized Buddhist concepts appearing in the treatises and commentaries of later Chinese monks. With this interest in mind, the analyses of the ways of explaining the debates on imperishability of the soul, the way of understanding the theory of rebirth, the understanding of the concept of emptiness, and about nirvana, all of which were formed in the Wei-Jin era, provide remarkably interesting phenomena. In particular, while analyzing their understanding of various concepts of Buddhism, it is noteworthy that a lot of areas in the development of the discussions between the traditionalists who wanted to criticize Buddhism and the apologetics who supported Buddhism are based on the same logic. This could be said to be evidence that points out the difficulty of excluding the traditional worldview that was dominating the contemporary Chinese ways of thinking even during the era of theoretical establishment of Chinese Buddhism. This shows Chinese ways of thinking, especially the persistent vitality of the Daoist worldview. Let’s examine the intervention of Chinese ways of thinking into the understanding of Buddhism, in the following order: First, let’s look at Buddhism before the time of Kumarajiva that the Chinese intellectuals seemed to be relatively familiar with, specifically the characteristics of Buddhism introduced before the Eastern Jin Dynasty era, as well as the understanding of the contemporary religious views by the Chinese who were also the principle agents of the acceptance of Buddhism in China. The clarification of these two factors will offer a clue as to why the discussions, such as on the imperishability of the soul which is far from the main theories of Buddhism, were vigorously developed in Chinese Buddhism. Second, let’s look at the definitions of the characteristics of Neo-Daoism, which depicted the typical worldview of the Chinese intellectuals in the WeiJin era in their earnest attempts at a theoretical understanding of Buddhism. The scholars of the Neo-Daoist era are estimated to have developed a more in-depth abstract thinking than those of the pre-Qin Dynasty Daoists representing the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Therefore, they were better at setting up concepts of being derived from their abstract thinking, and actively performed in the discussions on the concept of being. What we want to focus on are the problems resulting from this. An understanding of the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism that excludes the research on the philosophical characteristics of Neo-Daoism might be impossible. That is, the difference between pre-Qin Daoism and Neo-Daoism, and a study of the positive and negative aspects of Neo-Daoistic thinking from the perspective of a general human way of thinking, will be an indispensable task in the development of this book.

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Third, let’s look at understanding the above two historical developmental processes as well as set up the objects that this book will analyze. Here, we will deal with the characteristics of the discussions on imperishability of the soul, the way of understanding the wheel of life appearing as cause-and-effect theory, and their way of explaining the concepts of emptiness and nirvana, as mentioned above.

BUDDHISM INTRODUCED TO CHINA BEFORE THE EASTERN JIN ERA AND THE CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION OF THE CHINESE In order to understand the characteristics of Wei-Jin era Chinese Buddhism, the priority would be to observe what kind of schools of Buddhism were active in the regions of Gandhara, Kashmir, and Xinjiang, which were located along the route of transmission, during the 300–400 years that Buddhism was introduced into China following the end of the Later Han Dynasty. The most noteworthy factor to pay attention to concerning the introduction of Buddhism into China is that Theravāda Nikāya Buddhism was the main form of Buddhism in this region during the third and fourth centuries. The commonly held view is that Nikāya Buddhism originated from the division between Sthaviravāda and Mahāsāṃghika due to the debates regarding the ten views on practices and five matters on arhatship, and there is no strong objection to this view. However, the problem is that it is impossible to reconstruct an accurate picture of the emergence of various schools, and their spread and demise, due to the absence of accurate and relevant information. Although there seems to have been 18 to 24 schools, according to Lamotte, this was a later classification based on similar historical information. Therefore, it is hard to reconstruct historical actuality based on this information. Among the various classifications of Nikāya Buddhism that Lamotte introduced, the list we need to focus on for this book is the theory of five subdivisions of the five catalogs. Specifically, the fact that the Dharmaguptaka, the influence of which was limited to the northwestern region of India, played a crucial role in disseminating the “Precepts Collection” (Vinaya; 律藏) in China is a good clue that shows the characteristics of Buddhist knowledge in early Chinese Buddhism.12 This fact firmly supports the assumption that the Buddhist theoretical framework of the northwestern Indian region must have played a crucial role in early Chinese Buddhism. Since it is an indisputable fact that the Buddhist monks of the various schools coexisted with each other without conflict throughout all of India,13 the Buddhist environment of its northwestern region would have been similar to this. Nonetheless, in terms of the distribution of the influence of the

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Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna schools and considering the historical fact that Mahāyāna schools were clearly subordinate before the fifth and sixth centuries AD, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Buddhist theories introduced into China before the Eastern Jin era would have been influenced more by Hīnayāna schools, like Sarvâstivāda. Actually we can see that this assumption cannot be much off the mark if we examine the characteristics of Buddhism of the Xinjiang area; that is, the western region, the route through which Buddhism was imported. It is generally accepted that in the areas such as Kashgar, Kucha, and Khotan, through which we assume Buddhism was imported in the first and second centuries BC, either Sarvâstivāda theories from Kashmir or those of Sautrântika in Gandhara would have been transmitted. But the conjecture is that only after the latter part of the third century AD in Kucha were Prajñā texts and the Lotus Sutra, and in Khotan the texts of Prajñā and the Huayan School, circulated.14 With the continued political turmoil after the Later Han Dynasty, it is assumed that information about Buddhism was transmitted from the western region to China in a fragmentary way. Furthermore, the criteria distinguishing Hīnayāna from Mahāyāna might have been unclear. Therefore, the Wei-Jin era Chinese intellectuals’ knowledge of Buddhism, especially before the large-scale translation projects by Kumarajiva, must have been unsystematic because they were dependent on the texts and commentaries introduced in various ways. This fact indicates that we have to consider that early Chinese Buddhism developed in quite different circumstances than the Chinese Buddhism centered on Mahāyāna that would be developed later on. Conversely, the main discussion topics of the Hongming Ji express what the most conspicuous Buddhist theories were to them in this historical situation. According to the contents of the Hongming Ji, it appears that they accepted the most impressive Buddhist theories such as an epistemological and psychological mind-centered discussion system, the theory of no-self (anātman) based on Sarvâstivāda’s elementalist understanding of the world, and karma and the wheel of life as the popular religious elements. Among the Neo-Daoist understanding of Buddhism of the Wei-Jin era, the reason for the mixed appearance of the dualistic understanding of the identity of the individual self, meaning the understanding of the substantialistic mind and that of Sarvâstivāda’s elementalist theory of no-self, may have been due to the environment of incomplete understanding and the fragmentary transmission of Buddhist information. What we have to focus on are the contents of Buddhist information mentioned above, which is what the Chinese encountered during this time, as well as why the Chinese became so interested in such kinds of Buddhism. One of the most persuasive explanations for why the Chinese accepted Central Asian Buddhism is the assertion that there were aspects of Buddhism that responded

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to the internal, religious demands of the Chinese. Obuchi Ninji describes in The History of Chinese Religions a series of processes through which the soil for Buddhism to grow in had been prepared by the changes in the religious environment according to the political and economic changes of China. These can be summarized as below.15 In ancient Chinese society, the emergence of ironware and the use of currency generated the emergence of the large estate owners and accelerated the collapse of local village life centered on independent farmers. This change originated in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States era and was passed on through the unified empires of the Qin and the Han. At the end of the Han Dynasty, the power of landowning families with huge estates surpassed that of the aristocrats and the imperial family, and finally ended in struggles for supremacy. This change in the political order brought on a collapse of li (理), local villages based on territorial lineages, in addition to a collapse of the religious ceremonies for the deities that the village lineage organizations shared and relied on. This change in the religious environment brought about the appearance of village deities and village graveyards, which trended toward strong individualistic deities. Finally, in a chaotic society in which territorial relationships and blood ties could no longer provide adequate protections, individuals would naturally pursue religions that offered personal salvation or spiritual stability on a personal level. Namely, the Way of Great Peace (太平道) and the Way of the Five Pecks of Grain school of religious Daoism (五斗米道) that began at the end of second century AD, that is, near the end of the Later Han Dynasty, are nonterritorial and nonblood-related, popular religious organizations that arose in that era’s political context. During this time, it would have been natural for the Chinese to be keenly interested in Buddhism, with its strongly persuasive theory of individual salvation. Assuming as mentioned above the religious environment that the Chinese of the Wei-Jin era accepted Buddhism and the contents of the information of Buddhism, what we have to focus on are the specific perspectives that were concretely operative in the acceptance of Buddhism. Historically speaking, there are no scholars who will argue against the view that it was Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism. Neo-Daoism was the main academic trend of the era when Buddhism began to be seen in light of Chinese traditional thought, and it can be said to be a process of justifying the political and ethical aspects of Confucian ideology in terms of responding to current political needs. However, it is very difficult to deny that the theory adopted to justify Confucian ideology was Daoistic. The development of Neo-Daoism that was a response to these practical demands appears superficially to be a mixture of opposing trends of thought, such as the concepts of extreme being (有) and extreme nonbeing (無) that were simultaneously advocated as the fundamental concepts for the

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development of Neo-Daoism’s own thought. Of course, although it is undeniable that Wangbi’s concept of “original nothingness (本無)” was surely more actively applied in the development of Chinese Buddhistic theories, if we instead focus on discussing the expansion of the understanding of the world through the establishment of abstract existence, such as the world of being or nonbeing, this would help to explain the character of the early Chinese Buddhist theories later. In order to more accurately analyze the Neo-Daoistic influence in the development of Chinese Buddhism, the duplicity inherent in the Daoistic tradition derived from the intervention of Neo-Daoistic thinking must be understood above all. In order to clearly analyze the influence of Neo-Daoism in the development of Chinese Buddhist philosophy, the duplicity of the Daoist thought tradition derived from the intervention of Neo-Daoist thinking might need to be understood first. This is because in the history of Chinese Buddhism, in which almost-impossible situations for a thorough understanding of Indian Buddhism were repeated,16 the difficult to explain parts of Chinese Buddhist theories were often too closely related to the duplicity of this Daoistic thought tradition. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will examine the differences between pre-Qin Daoism and Neo-Daoism within the Daoist tradition, which is the cause of this duplicity. THE WAYS OF THINKING OF PRE-QIN DAOISM, NEO-DAOISM, AND BUDDHISM Whether it be the East or the West, evaluating the development and the regression of any ideological trend has to be done, with the premise that the understanding of the preconditions for evaluation will constantly be limited. I pointed out earlier that, through Wangbi’s explanation of “taking nothingness as the source,” Neo-Daoists did not actively reproduce the important philosophical insights of the pre-Qin Daoists. Now let’s go a step further in our attempt to understand this by more actively comparing Neo-Daoism with preQin Daoism. Let’s recall Angus Graham’s opinion that there appears to have been an intellectual regression of the Chinese philosophy that had a tendency to lack elaborate integration of theories, especially after the unified Qin-Han era. So let’s try to understand the characteristics of Neo-Daoism in consideration of the increasing trend toward actualization of the abstract world or the tendency toward a simple reduction to such a world, even though it is not the same as the metaphysical world construction in the Western sense. The biggest problem revealed in Neo-Daoism is that it could not preserve the limitations of the ways of thinking based on simple dualism and could

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not keep the meaning of the tense confrontations of the inevitable paradoxes which pre-Qin Daoists repeatedly emphasized and explained. Although the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are not texts in which the thoughts of Laozi and Zhuangzi are expressed systematically, they contain rich statements comprised of philosophical insights which can be reconstructed based on the depth of reflexive thinking. Among the philosophical insights referred to as the core of the pre-Qin era ways of thinking,17 what I want to emphasize here is the insight regarding the interdependence of dualistic language categories in order to explain the phenomena that appeared based on their high sensitivity to the continuity of events. For example, in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, statements emphasizing nothingness (無) appear frequently. But we need to be attentive to the fact that these statements were not simply locating the world of “original nothingness” defined negatively and passively by Wangbi, but that there are repeated statements that are cautious of this simple locating. The following passage, introduced in the Daoist circular trichotomous way of thinking in chapter 2, is one of the typical statements characterizing the pre-Qin era Daoists’ philosophical insights. Thus, being and non-being arise dependent on each other; difficulty and ease complete each other; long and short appear together; high and low incline toward each other; music and sound harmonize with each other; front and back follow each other.18

The Laozi’s insight into the dependence on these contradictory dualistic concepts can be comprehended when it is preceded by an understanding of the essence of the Dao as an undivided continuity that is established based on concrete experience in continuously changing situations. That is, the insight of the Laozi is an expression of the idea that the limitation of conceptual thinking; that is, our way of thinking that grasps phenomena as separated and fixed forms as well as the true meanings of dualistic concepts derived from them, can be comprehended when we understand the undivided essence of the Dao. Chae-Woo Lim regards the characteristics of Wangbi’s thought of the Wei-Jin era as follows: “Laozi and Zhuangzi hold the circulative worldview of being and non-being, while Wangbi has a singular worldview that absolutizes the ultimate state of existence as non-being” (復卦 注: 寂然至無 是 其本矣).19 This makes his view different from that of Laozi and Zhuangzi. He also insists that this difference is hard to explain without taking into consideration the influence of Buddhism. The argument of Chae-Woo Lim is definitely a step forward in the sense that it specifies the causal relationship more concretely, rather than holding the point of view of considering Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism as an unprecedented development of the potential for Chinese abstract thinking, as insisted in A History of Chinese Philosophy by Fung,

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Yulan. However, considering that the early Chinese intellectuals acquired incomplete information of Buddhism or an understanding that was close to misunderstanding, as mentioned previously, in order to make Chae-Woo Lim’s argument more robust, a more precise content analysis on what kind of Buddhism, and what contents, influenced Neo-Daoism must be added. Even though different opinions by several scholars regarding the characteristics of Wei-Jin Daoism have been raised, what they commonly agree on is that the contemporary intellectuals vigorously have attempted to explain the world based on the logic of simple reduction. However, a discussion of the simple reduction methodology expressed in Neo-Daoism, especially in that of Wangbi, may be criticized because it makes it difficult to capture the importance of the meanings that affirmation-of-a-paradox expressions carry, which are what the pre-Qin Daoists repeatedly used to explain the ultimate Dao. The establishment of the affirmation-of-a-paradoxical essence of the Dao by the pre-Qin Daoists and their resultant understanding of man and the world contain very important characteristics of Chinese philosophy, which includes a perception of the limitations of logical thinking and the acceptance of mythological thinking as sources of the sensibility to the undivided continuity. But Wangbi’s Commentary on the Daodejing does not seem to wholly replicate such characteristics. Specifically, as I mentioned earlier, such comments as “The One means the ultimate of the little. A model implies something to follow”20 may show that the dynamism Lim, of the undivided essence of the Dao expressed as the affirmation-of-a-paradoxical “One” in pre-Qin Daoism is significantly weakened. Of course, even though the sense of mystery of the essence of the Dao traditionally established as a mysterious thing is maintained, if its reason is to define it as a form of existence in a very passive and negative way such as the ultimate of the little, then the perception of the dynamism of the world of the Dao supported by the affirmation-of-the-paradoxical expressions may be almost impossible. The reason why concepts frequently used in the Commentary by Wangbi, such as void and stillness, show a different intention than the pre-Qin use of the concepts to emphasize their opposites (of the back versus the front), is because his concept of original nothingness is an extension of the idea of the extreme of the little. Wangbi’s discourse like this on “valuing nothingness (貴無論)” played a decisive role in converting the concepts of prajñā (般若) and emptiness (空) into the concept of emptiness, with its passive and negative connotations.21 The diffusion of the understanding of the concept of emptiness in this way in Chinese Buddhism was a factor that further weakened the dynamism of the concept of the Dao of the pre-Qin Daoists. This phenomenon that is addressed further by scholars such as Fung, Yulan, and Lim, Chaewoo,

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fortified and expanded the development of abstract thinking and the negative aspects of the establishment of a simple reductive worldview. As this phenomenon is an expression of the negative aspect of abstract, conceptual, and logical thinking, this same critique may be applied in the same context as the critique of Western Platonic metaphysics. In other words, this indicates that abstract thinking prevailed over concrete phenomena, and that this is a sign that philosophical thinking in the Western sense was beginning to stand out in the history of Chinese philosophy.22 In the sense that these changes resulted in distorting and diminishing the dynamic and continuous grasp of the world, which is a specific form of concrete human experience, the NeoDaoists’ ways of thinking provided the cause to miss many of the philosophical insights of the pre-Qin Daoists’ understanding of the dynamic world. The problem is that this Neo-Daoism decisively influenced the Chinese historically when they began to understand Buddhism theoretically. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, an analysis of the statements of the early Chinese Buddhist apologetics near and at the time of Wangbi, those who played a prominent role in the formation of Chinese Buddhist theory, can more clearly reveal the influence of Neo-Daoistic ways of thinking. Therefore, in the next section, we will analyze the issues mentioned above, specifically their understanding of the imperishability of the soul, discussions of the retribution theory of causes and conditions, the Chinese conceptualization of no-self (anātman) or the concept of emptiness, and the status of nirvana, by comprehensively considering the issues discussed earlier; those are the unsystematic Buddhist knowledge of early Chinese Buddhism, the change in the religious environment emphasizing the individual self, and the characteristics of the ways of thinking of pre-Qin Daoism and Neo-Daoism. Analyses of the Methods of Understanding the Various Buddhist Concepts of the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoists The Theory of Qi (氣論) Characteristics of the Argument on the Imperishability of the Soul The question of why the theory of the imperishability of the soul came up in Chinese Buddhism23 may seem like a question about a strange aberrant phenomenon, considering that Buddhism is a theory based on the theory of no-self (anātman). However, even in the Indian tradition, looking at the example of Sarvâstivāda which attempted a substantialistic understanding of the world based on an elemental substance, albeit different from the substance as a personal subject, and in light of Sautrântika which postulated the subject of reincarnation such as pudgalā, there could not be a case in which this phenomenon could not have happened.

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Debating the imperishability of the soul in China is rather a thoroughly understandable phenomenon from the perspective that it is not an outcome of intense debates by those in the inner circles of Buddhist schools. As demonstrated earlier, the fact that the time in which the debating began was when individualistic and private motives, thus not those of any group, were elevated in terms of the eruption of Chinese religious desires, and this would be an important clue in the explanation of the causes of these phenomena. That is, in the case in which the interest in the eternal life of the private and individual self combined with the abstract thinking developed vigorously in the Wei-Jin era, the occurrence of concepts such as mind, and substance indicating human internal essence, would not have needed such a difficult process. There is a strong possibility that this environment might have provoked a hasty expectation by the Buddhist apologetics favoring Buddhism during the phase of an incomplete importation of Buddhism, which had an epistemological or psychological discussion system centered in the mind and a theory that could explain the substance of the mind. In fact, Neo-Daoistic Buddhists in the Wei-Jin era interpreted the concept of mind, which was a central concept in the development of Buddhist theory, as a mysterious spirit in comparison with their traditional concept of tangible shape and intangible spirit, and simply located it. As well, they defined the concept of mind as the imperishable soul, which is the foundation of the eternal existence of the individual self, in order to highlight the superiority of Buddhist theory which exhibited elaborate arguments centered on the debates about the mind and to satisfy the religious desires of the contemporary masses praying for their personal security. When we investigate the processes by which their arguments emerged and were asserted, we will be able to see that the above assumptions do have more concreteness rather than being simple assumptions. Let’s now observe verses of Zongbing’s “Treatise Clarifying Buddhism (明佛論)” quoted in chapter 2, which show the difficulty in conceptualizing an imperishable, substantialistic soul in the framework of the discussion of the traditional “qilun” debates. “Now, what becomes once yin and once yang is called the Dao . . . What cannot be measured is called numinous.” The phrase above means that ultimate nothingness is called the Dao, and that since the Yin and Yang are mixed in the Dao, it is referred to as once Yin and once Yang. If something advances from the Dao to the Numinous, it always deviates from Yin and Yang. So, it cannot be explored through Yin and Yang. That is why it cannot be measured by Yin and Yang. What Yan Junping explained in “the one begets the two is the spiritual numinosity” is this. If these two phrases do not illuminate the mind, what can illuminate the soul? But, the souls of the people are ultimately the same. They change according to their dependent arising, flow and form a crude or subtle consciousness, but basically do not perish.24

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The above verse calls attention to and emphasizes the existence of the imperishable individual soul, and the intention evidently seems to be to preserve the superiority of Buddhist doctrines. This kind of logic is ultimately connected to the mundane mind–body dualism, which does not fit in with the Chinese tradition. The logic of those like Cao Siwen, who asserts the independence of the soul by quoting the Zhuangzi as discussed earlier, is in fact extremely crude and vulgar, and thus is not persuasive. Nonetheless, a discussion like this that argues for the existence of soul as an inner substance within the individual self must have been effective in promoting the mind-centered Buddhist doctrines to the uninformed masses. Of course, at a level quite different from the above, we can also see detailed examples of meticulously developing the theory of the soul or imperishability of the mind in combination with the traditional theory of qi and the theory of Buddhist enlightenment. It is also said, “If delusion (无明) is transformed, it becomes illumination (明).” If we study the meaning of this text, we can grasp its reasoning. It is because the mind is the foundation of functioning, and as the foundation is one, the functioning multiplies. Multiplied functioning may naturally rise and fall, but the unique nature of the foundation never changes. The one foundation is spiritual numinosity (神明). Thinking of delusion, it does not indicate the Great Emptiness. As earth and stone do not have emotions, how can we call this delusion? Therefore, although the functioning of perception and consideration is clear, the body is not free from delusion. Since the confused perception and consideration are not wise, they are deluded. Therefore, the body enveloped in delusion has life and death. Life and death are the differences of its functioning, and this is a case in which the operation of the mind of the deluded does not change. Perhaps by looking at the differences of functioning, they would say that suddenly, the mind disappears along with the boundary of the object. . . . The fact that the mind is the foundation never changes. Since the foundation of the functioning is not cut off, the principle of enlightenment is obvious. Since it transforms and reverses according to the situation, it ultimately reveals life and death.25

The discussion of the root (根本) and the branch（枝末) was a typical topic of discourse in Neo-Daoism. Wangbi’s viewpoint applies here, as it considers transforming and functioning as the world of being, which is the branch, and understanding the unchanging and obscure original nothingness, which is the root. In addition, even though this method of defining the one root as the deluded and spiritually numinous is different from the intention of the pre-Qin Daoists, who pursued the affirmation-of-a-paradoxical essence of the Dao, this shows that they followed tradition in the external technique of expression. However, the imperishability of soul argument would have

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been a rationale hard to accept for the scholars who advocated the traditional worldview based on the “theory of qi.” In life there must be death, and when the body disappears the spirit scatters. It is just like all creatures alternatively regenerating in spring and declining in autumn, and the four seasons also alternatively coming and going. How can a man be reborn with a new body?26

The counterarguments by people like Zheng Daozi and He Chengtian of the Wei, like the examples in chapter 2, are based on the deeply rooted Chinese way of thinking. Due to this, the task for the advocates of Chinese Buddhism to overcome these must assuredly have been challenging. The theory of imperishability is against the theory of anātman of Buddhism as well as the traditional Chinese theory of qi. It would have been impossible for the advocates of Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era to establish a theory of imperishability on their own that would have been complete enough to be impossible to refute, as the theories they put forth did not seem to exclude the theory of qi. As well, the incomplete argument of imperishability in early Chinese Buddhism finally ended up making more complex problems by associating with the concept of Buddha Nature later on.27 The Understanding of the Theory of Karmic Retribution According to the Chinese Buddhist Concept of Dependent Arising Understood as Simple Causality It would be impossible to expect that the Indian Buddhism concept of dependent arising to have been understood thoroughly during the early stage of Chinese Buddhism. Of course, even within the tradition of Indian Buddhism, the theory of dependent arising applied the logic of simple causality at the level of popular religious discourse. Nonetheless, in the texts and commentaries that concisely define the theory of dependent arising, diverse argumentative methods are expressed in order to avoid the establishment of simply located incidents or elements presupposed by simple sequential cause and effect.28 The Neo-Daoists’ discussions appearing in the Hongming Ji, which has limitations as an apologetic text of early Chinese Buddhism, are expressed at the level of an individual soul accumulating and resolving karma according to the simple law of cause and effect in the flux of past, present, and future. However, we must keep in mind that the dependent arising theory of Buddhism is not based on simple, one-sided cause and effect. Furthermore, as their own traditional theory of qi and Daoistic worldview are far from the worldview that presupposes the concept of soul as simple substance and the

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elementalist simple theory of cause and effect, the simplicity of the argument will be more clear when we look at their discussions. Since the Heavenly Dao is extremely fair, and all lives want to live, how can one abuse others and not avoid retribution? Now, the good and evil of six hundred thousand people are all different, but in the sense that they all harm others, they are not different. Since good and evil are different from each other, what they enjoy in life may be different. But since the fact that they harm others is the same, they are killed on the same day. . . . King Bimbisara received retribution by killing a white rabbit, and the Sakya clan was destroyed by the killing of a yellow fish (dace); this shows the power of retribution. Since retributive justice is profound, it is far-reaching, so hard to see, and unavoidable. . . . If you see that one’s present fortune is made up of past deeds, it is evident that present deeds will surely affect future lives.29

Zongbing explains the precept of abstaining from taking life in the above passage, in relation to karma and dependent arising. While he emphasizes that the present is the unavoidable result of past karma, he could not clearly explain the past causes of the results appearing in the present. This is a way of explaining dependent arising on the premise of simple cause and effect that is close to strong determinism, and this is a typical form of the popular Chinese theory of cause and effect. Of course, Huiyuan displayed a more accomplished and meticulous theory of cause and effect based on dependent arising, in his Discourse on the Three Retributions, by using the terms “present retribution,” “retribution in the next birth,” and “subsequent retributions,” and the inherent logic in the text is not much different from that in the above examples. In the mundane world, there are people who encounter disasters even though they have accumulated good deeds; on the other hand, there are people who have committed bad deeds but to whom good things happen. The present retribution has not yet borne fruit to them, but the retribution of past lives has slowly started to appear. Therefore, the suspicions that occur from here, that righteous and good people encounter disasters while the wicked and crooked are rather blessed . . . that is because the unseen logic of retribution invisible to the eye was determined long ago, and destiny unknowingly continues to revolve secretly. Therefore, the energy of fortune and misfortune transform with each other during the incarnations within the Six Destinies, and the retribution of the karma of good and evil are mixed and interact together.30

Even though Huiyuan was a monk representing the Wei-Jin era, as was Daoan, his understanding of karma and reincarnation could not avoid the naivety expressed above. Considering the fact that his way of thinking did not significantly deviate from the structure of Neo-Daoistic thought,31 the

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contemporary Neo-Daoist layman’s understanding of the theory of dependent arising as simple cause and effect, and popular religious understanding of the theory of dependent arising such as retribution theory, could perhaps be understood as a natural trend. An Ontological Understanding of the Concept of Emptiness (空) The theory of no-self (無我) was established to critique the concept of ātman in the Vedic Upanishad tradition. It is a theory to point out that the substantialistic self of the Vedic tradition was established through the misunderstanding that a conceptual existence that is not concretely experienced is real. The theory of emptiness in Buddhism was developed from the theory of no-self, which is the basic premise of early Buddhism. In its connotation, it is no different from the theory of no-self. It is safe to say that the concept of emptiness was designed to elucidate the idea that all beings referred to by conceptual designations do not maintain an underlying substantiality that matches these conceptualizations. Therefore, the ontological understanding of emptiness and attempts to objectify emptiness would eventually become the subject of critique as an argument in itself which is against the intention to elucidate the concept of emptiness. The following verse from Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way is a harsh critique of those who attempted these endeavors. The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.32

However, the problem is that the understanding of the concept of no-self or emptiness at the early stage of Chinese Buddhism often appears to be in harmony with the forms of understanding of the ontological concept of the Dao in the Daoist tradition pursuing nothingness. Among the writings that thoughtlessly equate emptiness with nothingness with little consideration, the simplest form appears in the Hongming Ji, as in the paragraph below: I have studied Buddhism from an early age and have savored the teachings of Daoism. I think that the Emptiness (空) that Buddhism shows reverence for and the Nothingness (無) that Daoism values have the same fundamental meaning.33

The description of the ultimate Buddhist world is literally described in a Daoist way, as it depends on the pre-Qin Daoist and the Neo-Daoist ways of

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understanding. Instances of the example below are so frequent that it is difficult to count them all. Since Indian tradition values simplicity, they teach frugality. A beautiful figure whose hair hangs loosely and whose clothing are untailored conveys the cultivation of the mind by hiding inner feelings, opening its functioning and yearning for the vastness of time. This means, by assumption, that the Dao extends to infinity. . . . In general, the ultimate of the Dao is neither splendid nor naive, neither bound nor differentiated, and neither near nor far. Whoever it encounters, it does not discriminate by taking sides or making groups. It does not blame or praise others. It flows smoothly and is quiet. Therefore, it temporarily borrows a name called nothingness (無). All things in the “mysterious objective realm” (妙境) are like this. How can we say that they are different?34

The Daoist writing style of linking together opposing concepts such as splendor and naivety, immediate and differentiated, and close and far, into an affirmation-of-the-paradox way to explain the world of the Dao is replicated in the above paragraph. Furthermore, we can frequently find that even the writings that try to find differences between Daoism and Buddhism establish the static and passive stages as the ultimate. The statement below, which argues that Buddhism and Laozi must be returned to a point at which there is no need to distinguish them, where they no longer need to be differentiated, is a representative example of this. Through its interaction with the world, Buddha Nature validates emptiness, but it unfolds its meaning from outside of being (有) in terms of Laozi’s nothingness (虚无) as nothingness. However, one should think more deeply about the fact that both statements are consistent. Laozi is inferior to Buddhism in terms of forgetting being (有)，as it only mentions non-agitation of the mind, wandering, brushing away the afflictions of the mind, and the elevation of the body as the highest value. But in terms of losing one’s mindfulness, Buddhism cannot replace Laozi. When one’s psychic realm is secure and is harmonized with tranquility, if one sits quietly and focuses one’s mind, one’s psychic power reaches everywhere and it makes the functioning of the mind empty. When one reaches this stage, one is not going to distinguish between Buddhism and Laozi.35

In the same context, the world that they ultimately consider is often described as a world of original nothingness (本無) that expresses the NeoDaoists’ reductionist ultimate, rather than the dynamic, affirmation-of-theparadox world of the pre-Qin Daoists. Therefore, the concept of emptiness in Buddhism is defined as possessing the characteristics of the Neo-Daoists, as below:

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The four impermanences are: first, impermanence; second, suffering; third, emptiness; and fourth, non-body. As a child differs from an adult in terms of their body, and hills and valleys change their places, this is called impermanence. . . . As all creatures return to nothingness, this is called emptiness.36

This kind of understanding of the concept of emptiness is applied as well in the practical image of the bodhisattva, as below. Therefore, the profound practice of the bodhisattva penetrates both ignorance and enlightenment as one, and understands that all creatures are in darkness (冥). Wherever it resides, it understands the profound truth. By knowing that all things appearing before our eyes are originally empty, it understands them as originally identical, and that the four physical forms (四色) are intrinsically intangible, and thus abandons everything according to the original truth (本諦).37

The expressions appearing to be the copies of phrases in Daoist texts, such as “penetrating delusion and enlightenment as one,” “all creatures are always in harmony,” and “original identity” are rather Daoistic and are hard to read purely as Buddhistic. Strictly speaking, they dominantly express the underlying Neo-Daoist worldview. THE CHINESE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NIRVANA (涅槃) Even in the understanding of the concept of Nirvana, which could be the ultimate purpose of Buddhism as a religion, the Neo-Daoist influence is decisive. By integrating yourself with the profound meditation (禪諦) on impermanence by renouncing the world of being and abiding in the world of nothingness, you can enter the Nirvana of the great Arhats (羅漢). By not avoiding doing (有为) and not being bound to contemplating emptiness (空觀), you will be one with the Truth. And, since there is no attachment and no dependence, there is no seed that needs to be planted. Since no seed needs to be planted, there is no retribution to be received. Then, you may enter the realm of mysterious no-mind without being trapped. This is the Nirvana of the Buddha.38

In the world’s dualistic division of being (有) and nonbeing (无), the passage including the phrase, “residing in the world of nothingness, you may enter the Nirvana of the arhat” may be considered the first stage of the argument that you must not fall into the dualism of being and nonbeing. This can be interpreted as accommodating to the double negation logic that Buddhism pursues. But the following argument of “by not avoiding doing (有为) and not being bound to contemplating emptiness, you will be one with the Truth”

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positions “doing” and “contemplating emptiness” next to each other, and simultaneously affirms and negates each other inversely by pursuing the paradoxical unification with the Truth. Only by considering this paradoxical unity of becoming, as a projection of the traditional Daoist worldview, does the context follow naturally. Therefore, the interpretation of the stage of no seed and no retribution, as an expression of ascribing positive value to static and passive behaviors following the Neo-Daoist way of thinking, would be a natural way of reading it. In other words, there are repeated expressions that make it difficult to avoid the suspicion that they are concepts of Nirvana that are transformed by the Neo-Daoist understanding, rather than those of Buddhism’s original meaning. In the same context, the Daoist perspective of establishing a reductionistic foundation and attributing all phenomena to it appears below: Minister Ji said, “If spiritual intelligence is exhausted, how can it be called spiritual? . . . that means it is neither imperishable nor severable. If the transformation is like that of grass or a tree, how can it be called subtle? Since it is not severable, it ultimately reaches Nirvana (妙极). If your mind relies on this state, every reason will be evident. If all reasons are evident, how can all deeds not be accomplished?39

The eternity of the substantialistic mind interpreted as spirit through the concepts of body and spirit (形神) was now becoming the premise for attaining the ultimate state of Buddhism. The establishment of the eternal mind substance and Nirvana, which is described as the ultimate of static and passive reductionism, may have been understood by the intellectuals of the Wei-Jin era at a time when the Neo-Daoists prevailed and exposed these as limitations in the understanding of Buddhist concepts. Furthermore, the reason why we must closely examine, in the cases in which these kinds of expressions were repeated even in the texts written after the Wei-Jin era, whether they were closer to the true meaning of Buddhism or whether they reflected the understanding of concepts of Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era, is because Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era became the deep-rooted template for the understanding of Buddhism in China. Even though there would be certain variations in their traditional worldview, that is, the Daoist worldview, it is difficult to deny that this worldview was the fundamental thought form of the Chinese, which would continue to operate, consciously and subconsciously. The Neo-Daoist Way of Thinking appearing in the Thoughts of Zhi Dun, Daoan, and Hui Yuan The influence of Daoism in the sinicization of Buddhism is obvious to any scholar with basic knowledge of Chinese philosophy, and they can point out

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a few phrases as Daoistic when he or she encounters any learned Chinese monk’s commentary. Nevertheless, when we study the appraisals of and analyses on the Wei-Jin era Buddhist scholar-monks who tried to overcome Geyi Buddhism and understand Buddhist texts primarily through original Buddhist logic, it is difficult to make an accurate assessment as to whether or not the Chinese Buddhist scholar-monks at the time had a clear understanding of the differences between Buddhism and Daoism. This outcome may have been the result of an inaccurate assessment by today’s scholars of the history of Chinese Buddhism, who also have a superficial and unclear understanding of the differences between these two trends. First, let’s take a look at how today’s Japanese Buddhist scholar Kimura Kiyotaka explains Daoan’s understanding of Buddhism. He defines Daoan as a critic of Geyi Buddhism. At the same time, he explains the position of Daoan in the history of Buddhism ambiguously and, in a certain sense, very paradoxically. According to the biography of his disciple, Sengxian (僧先), Daoan himself said, “There are many inadequate points in the Geyi (格義) of the predecessors.” This means that Daoan clearly had a critical view concerning traditional Geyi Buddhism. However, this does not mean that he abandoned the foundation of Geyi Buddhist thought or the concepts applied in it. On the contrary, he is seen as having made its foundational thought more concrete, and to have used the same concepts to elevate their meaning in the “Chinese Buddhist way.”40

The key point of the above description would be that Daoan must have used the same concepts to overcome Geyi Buddhism, but he interpreted their meanings in the ways of Chinese Buddhism; in other words, in ways different from those of Indian Buddhism. What we must emphasize here is the meaning of the word, “Chinese.” Kimura Kiyotaka understands the meaning of “Chinese” as “Daoist.” And he quotes a part of the introduction to the Daodijing (道地经) as below, and insists that “the ultimate world that Buddhism and Chinese traditional Daoist hermit philosophy acclaimed separately is described wonderfully and synthetically by the independent thinker and Buddhist monk named Daoan.”41 The ground of the path (道地) is a mysterious hall (玄堂) conforming to the truth, and a hidden abode (奧室) in which to become a hermit. The realm of nothingness is too far to cross over, and the wall of non-doing is blocked too high to climb over. Since the words of the Dharma are subtle, there are few who sneak through the door and peek inside. . . . The image is infinitely pure and without end, and as it is clear and beautiful, there are no words. Those who try to differentiate it are dangerous. It can only be sought when there is non-doing in ecstasy. . . . When a sage sees a flower, he knows it will bear fruit, and so he thinks that by seeing a phenomenon he can reach the foundation.  .  .  . He

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transmits by preaching the hubless wheel and illuminates the truth by exalting cessation and observation. Outstanding scholars bring back the mind to the valley of the spirit according to the Dao. How envious it is!42

However, in this quote, it is not easy to find the core of how Daoan sinicized Buddhism. Actually, if we eliminate the following characters such as “words of the Dharma (法文)” and the phrases such as “illuminating the truth by exalting cessation and observation” from the quote, and conceal the name of Daoan, I greatly doubt that many scholars who read this passage for the first time could confidently say that the above passage is related to Buddhism. This kind of problem arises because we assume that everyone already knows the meaning of the words “Chinese” and “Chinese Buddhism” when they use them. In other words, to overcome the ambiguity, the shared level of understanding of the connotations of these terms must advance from the level of a simple and emotional agreement to a more objective and perceptible level of understanding. To accomplish this, the discourse on the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism should follow these steps. First, when we say “Chinese,” we have to lead a more discriminating discussion so that the meaning of the word is clearer. Second, we have to focus on how the words functioned when their characteristics transformed Buddhist doctrines in a Chinese way. Third, as a result, we have to be able to assess whether or not the original philosophical and religious pursuit of Buddhism has been maintained or distorted. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era was the Buddhism of the era which determined the characteristics that we acknowledge when we refer to Chinese Buddhism. The arguments mentioned in chapter 1, “The origin and the characteristics of the ways of thinking in Buddhism and Daoist philosophy,” and chapter 3, “Wangbi’s thoughts on valuing nothingness as the essence” were preliminary pieces on these characteristics through a more objective and structured discussion. Therefore, the following analyses of the writings of Zhidun, Daoan, and Huiyuan will be the work of summing up the necessary parts of these previous chapters and explicating clearer meanings of the statements.

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE-QIN DAOISM AND NEO-DAOISM The traditional Chinese thought form that played a decisive role in the Chinese understanding of Indian Buddhism is Daoist philosophy. However, the problem is that it was Wei-Jin era Daoism, rather than pre-Qin Daoism, that contributed to the formation of the theoretical structure of Chinese Buddhism more directly. And, this is partially due to the historical fact that even though translated texts

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by An Shigao and Lokakṣema were already extant, full-scale translation works started in the Wei-Jin era. Although it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that Neo-Daoism came to be established based on Daoist thinking and methods of discussion, we cannot ignore the fact that the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism are considerably different from those of pre-Qin Daoism. Of course, this difference in the characteristics is not enough to define pre-Qin Daoism and Neo-Daoism as completely different ways of thinking. Even though NeoDaoism carries such different philosophical tendencies that it has to be referred to as Neo-Daoism, we cannot consider that Neo-Daoism is located outside of the Daoist understanding of the world or the Daoist discourse tradition which defined Daoism as Daoism among the pre-Qin philosophies. Therefore, it is natural that Buddhist monks were using, in their commentaries, Neo-Daoist expressions as well as linguistic expressions similar to those in pre-Qin Daoism. In fact, it is impossible to define Neo-Daoism in a unitary way. From the legendary and romantic “Bamboo Grove sect (竹林派)” with figures such as Ji Kang (嵇康) and Ruan Ji (阮籍) to the “Illumination Teaching sect (明教派)” represented by Wangbi and Guoxiang (郭象), and even in the ideas of Zhidun and Daoan in the Wei-Jin era who we are dealing with here, they are all included in the category of Neo-Daoism.43 Therefore, NeoDaoism’s characteristics must have been quite varied. Nevertheless, the reason for attempting such a definition is because a common, general way of thinking among the Wei-Jin era philosophers has been found. For example, even though Wangbi asserted the “theory of valuing nothingness (貴無論)” and Pei Wei (裵頠) asserted the totally opposite “theory of valuing being (崇有论),” it is worth noting that these two had a particular reductionist way of thinking. In this context, in this chapter, I am going to analyze Wangbi’s worldview as the important standard of Neo-Daoist thought. I am emphasizing again that, as already pointed out, in terms of the influence on Chinese Buddhism by Neo-Daoism and pre-Qin Daoism, later NeoDaoism could not actively continue to reproduce the philosophical insights that the pre-Qin Daoists had expressed. Now, by analyzing the statements of Zhidun, Daoan and Huiyuan, let’s confirm that the absence of their important philosophical insights in Neo-Daoism was continued and reproduced in the understanding of Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era. Analyses of Zhidun’s, Daoan’s, and Huiyuan’s Understanding of Buddhism The Overall Chinese Understanding of Indian Buddhism at the Beginning of the Wei-Jin Era One more thing to consider before analyzing the understanding of Buddhism by the Chinese monks is the characteristics of the Buddhism introduced

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into China when they were active. This consideration leads us to focus on the contents of the translations by Anshigao (安世高) and Lokaksema (支婁迦讖) who were active in the middle of the second century AD during the Later Han Dynasty. According to Daoan’s Catalogue, Anshigao translated 35 classic sutras in 41 volumes, and the majority of the texts belong to the Theravāda School of the Lesser Vehicle. These texts systematically explain the interpretations of the Dharma according to the names and numbers. The Chinese must have been very impressed by such an analytical understanding of existence. In addition, the Theravāda concept of mindful breathing that he introduced matches the Daoist cultivation techniques and concepts of “rejuvenative breathing (吐古納新),” and greatly influenced the popular dissemination of Buddhism. At this time in India, King Kanishka of the Kushan Empire supported the Sarvâstivāda School of the Lesser Vehicle. And we must not overlook the fact that the theory of Sarvâstivāda was transmitted into China through the western Yuezhi region, which was under the influence of the Kushan Empire. It is highly likely that the Sarvâstivāda methodological analysis of existence contributed to the Chinese perceiving Buddhism not as an epistemological thought system but as an ontological-centered one. Lokaksema was from Yuezhi and introduced early Mahāyāna prajñāpāramitā sutras to China by translating them into Chinese. The foundation of his thought is the “empty nature of the dependent arising of prajñā (緣起性空),” which refutes the substantialistic intrinsic nature theory of Sarvâstivāda with the concept of “the emptiness of self-nature (自性空).” But his level of “the emptiness of prajñā” thought did not appear to be enough to satisfy the intellectual needs of the contemporary Chinese intellectuals. A century later, Zhu Shixing (朱士行) went to the Western Region to collect Buddhist texts, and translated 90 chapters of the colophon of the Pañca​viṃśa​ti-sā​hasri​kā-Pr​ajñāp​ārami​tā-sū​tra (放光般若經). Zhu Fahu (竺法護) also translated multiple prajñāpāramitā texts, including Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (光讚般若經). These facts tell us that even until the middle of the third century, Chinese Buddhism was still at the stage of importing Indian Buddhism. In addition, as the translation of the texts depended greatly on the versions of the texts from the Western Region, it was almost impossible to translate the texts without being familiar with the Western languages fluently.44 The fact that the Chinese were dependent on the Buddhism of the Western Region reveals that they were limited in accepting Indian Buddhism as Indian Buddhism. In this situation, it was inevitable that the Chinese would establish an ideological system they were familiar with, Geyi Buddhism, through which they were able to interpret imported Buddhism. Since the time period during which sufficient information about the texts was available in order for

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translators to be able to overcome the limitations of the Geyi Buddhism system is generally considered to be after the time of Kumarajiva’s translations, it can be said that Daoan’s attempts to overcome Geyi Buddhism, which had occurred a little prior to that era chronologically, is considered to have started with that limitation. However, even though Daoan recognized the problems of Geyi Buddhism and tried to overcome them, the reason why it was difficult to do so is because it was not simply a problem of chronology. From the point of view of philosophical thought in general, this problem arose because Daoism and Buddhism have innate causes that inevitably lead to misunderstandings and misreadings. In other words, the reason why the fundamental differences could not be grasped even if sufficient information had been given is because there were overlapping common areas of problematic philosophical issues in both schools. However, the problem became even more complicated when there was a lack of recognition of the fact that there was a similarity of expressions with completely different connotations because their philosophical and religious goals were so different. In fact, the philosophical and religious differences in the goals of these two schools of thought are profoundly related to the heterogeneity of India’s and China’s traditions of thought.45 Accordingly, I am going to attempt to summarize the topic mentioned in chapter 1, with the purpose of extracting Neo Daoism’s elements and analyzing the similarities and differences in their discussions of early Chinese Buddhism influenced by Daoism.

The Causes and Conditions of the Mixed Concepts of Buddhism and Daoism Chapter 1 looks into the similarities that Buddhism and Daoism pursued through an analysis of the similarities in their inherited mythological thought traditions. Specifically, early Buddhism was opposed to the Vedic tradition, and it was connected to the context of the indigenous peoples of India prior to the Vedic era in their understanding of the world revealed in their mythological thinking. From this, we were able to confirm that the continuity and dynamism of the worldview, as shown in the mythological world prior to the Vedic era, were remarkably like that of the ancient Chinese that Chinese Daoism had been rooted in, in terms of their sensibility. Thus, it was confirmed that there had been a worldview that Buddhism and Daoism may have shared, which was the trichotomous categories functioning in both thought systems. However, since Buddhism and Daoism had been formed through quite different historical conditions, their philosophical goals, and the worlds they ultimately intended to pursue, came to be established differently, as discussed below.

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THE COMMONALITIES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITS OF DUALISTIC OR CONCEPTUAL THINKING, AND THE DIFFERENT METHODS USED TO OVERCOME THEM How to interpret the philosophical meaning of Buddhism in the history of Indian thought may be considered somewhat of a new philosophical subject that has emerged recently.46 Even though it is true that the nationalistic viewpoint since World War II of investigating the origin of Indian culture through the pre-Vedic tradition rather than the Vedic tradition has been widely spread, the fact that Buddhism originated from the anti-Vedic tradition has not been strongly emphasized. Even though the works of experts in Indology to seek the roots of Indian cultures based on the historical facts from the pre-Aryan culture before the migration of the Indo-European Aryan conquerors have seen progress to some extent, the interpretations of their ideological traditions are not free from the Vedic tradition-centered Western interpretation system. For this reason, they do not have a nuanced appreciation that Buddhism was at the pinnacle of the anti-Vedic tradition, and instead they have a strong tendency to treat Buddhism lightly as one of the nontraditional thought forms which were perceived to be extensions of the Upanishadic tradition. In fact, since early Buddhism was consistently understood to have originated from the theory of anātman (無我), which is a thorough negation of the Upanishadic tradition of Brahman and ātman, it resulted in a lot of difficulties by considering Buddhism as a simple transformation of the Upanishadic tradition. Furthermore, if we deliberate on the idea that Buddhism is based on the dependent arising theory, which could not accept the theory of substantialism such as the thought of ātman, then the characteristics of Buddhism opposing the Vedic tradition become more evident. Of course, there are various reasons why these characteristics were not emphasized. The primary reason could have been the Vedic-ization of Buddhist theory, and the more current reason may be due to the fact that the revival of Buddhism in the history of Indian thought has been largely dependent on the interpretation of Buddhism according to their metaphysical and substantialistic worldviews, along with the Western interest in Buddhism. Attention needs to be paid to the fact that the theory of anātman, which is the foundation of both prajñā (般若) and emptiness (空) thought, was established by adhering to the anti-Vedic, nonsubstantialistic way of thinking. In other words, let’s confirm that, from a chronological perspective, Buddhism is a philosophy that originated in the critique of nonsubstantiality of the concept of ātman, which is the product of dualistic, conceptual, and abstract thinking. And, lest we forget, the Buddhist theory of negation is repeated countless times in Prajñā texts, which is a tool by which to express such thoughts.

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This perspective of Buddhism, criticizing the limitation that the dualistic thinking of the Vedic Upanishadic tradition had, actually aligns with the critical perspective stated above explaining pre-Qin Daoists’ aversion to the attempt to explain the world as one of the isolated dualistic categories. Furthermore, concerning the pursuit of nondualistic thinking, they both undeniably have similarities. Actually, these kinds of similarities appear as structural similarities between the double negation statements in Prajñā texts and the negation statements of Daoists. Thus, this provided the Chinese the opportunity to assimilate Buddhism easily. However, as examined earlier, in the case of the pre-Qin Daoists, the problem is that the real motive of the negation of the dualistic world was to affirm the undivided world and that the quest to assert this kind of world would function more strongly. Of course, the philosophical insights of the pre-Qin Daoists, as previously presented, show the possibility that the epistemological insight that had strongly persisted in the tradition of Buddhism may have also been accepted in the Daoist tradition. Nevertheless, in the historical development of Daoist thinking, in which Chinese substantialism was prominent, it is difficult to deny that the premise of the affirmation-of-the-paradoxical essence of the Dao and its pursuit were the central topics. The concept of fundamental nothingness that appears in Wangbi’s philosophy, defined as the negative and passive essence of the Dao, is a case of the transformation of Chinese substantialism. The analyses of the commentaries of Chinese monks in chapter 4 will help us to confirm that this way of understanding the world by the pre-Qin Daoists and Neo-Daoists strongly permeated into Chinese Buddhism as well. Aspects of the Daositic Understanding of the Dependent Arising Theory Daoistic realism, which exhibits the important characteristics of the Chinese way of thinking, actively intervened in the understanding of the theory of dependent arising of Buddhism. Especially, to understand the nature of the Chinese dependent arising theory during the Wei-Jin era, we have to pay attention to the fact that even though the dependent arising theory of early Buddhism was a proactive way of explaining the phenomena, it is a theory that included an epistemological reflection that very severely criticized the abstract and nonempirical premises of transcendental existence that the Vedic Upanishad tradition held. In other words, the dependent arising theory of Buddhism is a theory presenting a thoroughly empirical, actual world by criticizing the Vedic tradition which confuses the conceptual world with the tangible, actual world. Due to this tradition, the Indian ConsciousnessOnly school was able to reconfigure the theory of dependent arising from

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epistemological and psychological points of view, if we want to describe this through contemporary terminology. By describing the functioning mechanism of deep perception before the conceptual understanding of the world in the lineage of Indian meditation tradition, the Thirty Verses on ConsciousnessOnly by Vasubandhu reveals that the phenomenal world that we ordinarily experience is the work of dependent arising. This shows that dependent arising theory is a theory based on epistemological insight.47 On the contrary, the Chinese way of understanding the world has always had a strong realistic tendency, as mentioned above. Of course, it is unnecessary to reiterate that this realistic tendency mainly came from the pre-Qin Daoist worldview. Furthermore, in the case of the early Wei-Jin era that we are dealing with here, considering the fact that the majority of the texts of An Shiago’s 35 classic sutras in 41 volumes in Daoan’s Catalog mentioned earlier belong to the texts of the Theravāda School of the Lesser Vehicle, the Theravāda Sarvāstivādin analyses of the theory of existence might have greatly influenced the Chinese. However, it is also possible to infer that the epistemological character of the dependent arising theory of Buddhism was not highlighted. Actually, the Chinese understanding of the dependent arising theory appears to have been at a very rudimentary level and, accordingly, it is natural that the interpretation was quite simply constituted. Furthermore, the Buddhist theory of anātman, emphasizing the impermanence of individual existence through the perspective of dependent arising theory, mingled with the concept of original nothingness, which is the explanatory concept of the shapeless and imageless Dao of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism in addition to the perspective of the negation of the dualistic and isolated existence of pre-Qin Daoism. There is a strong possibility that this anātman theory might have been interpreted in a more Chinese way. We might be able to find a point of convergence of these two views, from the perspective that the Chinese Daoist worldview grasped a dynamic view of the world. However, there was a divergence between the Chinese understanding of the dependent arising theory and the dependent arising theory that early Buddhism wanted to convey as mutual cause and effect and mutual interconnectedness. Strictly speaking, the undivided world of the foundational Daoistic world is nothing but a special state that exists in our experiential world from the perspective of dependent arising theory. Thus, to establish the undivided world as something foundational became a premise that Buddhism found hard to accept, based on its original purpose. However, it was frequently the case that Wei-Jin era Buddhism, and Chinese Buddhism going forward, misunderstood that the description of the mystery of the world applied to emphasize the uniqueness and complexity of the dependent arising theory by early Buddhism and the later Buddhist schools was similar to the description of the mystery of the undivided essence of the Dao. Assuming the former is similar to the latter

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caused confusion. These characteristics of Chinese Buddhism are confirmed through the analyses in the following section. Analyses of the Commentaries of Zhidun, Daoan, and Huiyuan Analysis of Zhidun’s Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā (大小品對比要抄序) Zhidun (314–366), also called as Zhi Daolin (支道林), is a representative Buddhist Neo-Daoist scholar, who is often mentioned in Wordly Stories and New Tales (世說新語). However, most of his 13 works, including his Essay on Free and Easy Wandering (逍遙遊論), have been lost. His remaining complete work is limited to the Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions (of the Prajñāpāramitā), which is included in the Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集) by Sengyou. Zhidun is a Daoistic Buddhist interpreter who could be classified as a representative of Geyi Buddhism, the school propounding identification with material form (卽色宗). From the first chapter of the Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions (of the Prajñāpāramitā), his unrestrained interpretation of the Daoist style unfolds as follows: Prajñā-pāramitā is the great source of all mysteries. It is the profound foundation of all wisdom. It is what the marvelous kings rely on. It is the functioning of the Tathāgata’s meritorious illumination. Its stage (經) is the ultimate of nothingness, empty and vast, and clear without boundary. Nothing resides there.48

His understanding of Prajñā is far from the original meaning of wisdom in Buddhism. Even if it is read by paraphrasing it as “the completion of wisdom” or “true insight (實相般若),” the style of description and the idea that it elicits is close to the understanding of the concepts of mysterious foundation of the Dao that Daoists pursued or that of the negative and passive Dao of the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoists such as Wangbi, which is read as the “ultimate of nothingness.” This Neo-Daoist way of thinking appears more distinctly in the following excerpts: For this reason, it is necessary to equate the teachings of three liberations (三解脫) with the mysterious and subtle principles. All creatures are considered to be equal in their emptiness. By revealing that all Buddhas originally exist, and by stating thoughtfully that all creatures do not originally exist, one can ascend the steps of the ten abodes (十住) and progress to the shortcut path of the Unborn (無生).

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For what? It is because it can function by depending on reaching ultimate nothingness. How can that nothingness become nothingness on its own? Nothingness cannot become nothingness by itself; nor can principle become principle by itself. Since principle cannot become principle by itself, principle is not principle; since nothingness cannot become nothingness by itself, nothingness is not nothingness.49

In the later part of the quote above, the affirmation of reaching ultimate nothingness and the emphasis on the incompleteness of nothingness or principle are typical ways of thinking of Neo-Daoists. That is, it is because incompleteness of the phenomenal world as a dualistic concept, and another thought of a dualistic structure that exists beyond it as original nothingness and not as dualistic nothingness, were reproduced. Furthermore, it is highly likely that the negation of a dualistic category here was interpreted to assume the affirmation-of-the-paradoxical essence of the Dao or the intangibility of original nothingness, rather than with the intention to prevent nothingness, or the concept of it, from being substantialized. The passages below make his judgment more convincing: For what? Ultimate Principle is like a dark valley returning to Namelessness (無名). Namelessness and Beginninglessness are the essence of the Dao. Definitively affirming or denying are what the Sage refrains from. . . . This is not the same as making what makes nothingness disappear, and forgetting what becomes being; If one forgets what becomes being, what makes the existing object exist disappears; If one forgets what becomes nothingness, one forgets even what made the object become nothingness. Because nothingness is forgotten, it exists mysteriously; Because it exists mysteriously, nothingness is exhausted. If nothingness is exhausted, subtlety is forgotten; Forgetting subtlety is being without thought (無心). Thereafter, these two traces depending on each other disappear; Non-being and being are exhausted subtly.50

This quote may be understood as a model of Chinese Buddhism’s development of the critique of the concept of absolute nothingness derived from the nihilistic understanding of no-self that arose as a reaction to the systematic critique of the substantialistic worldview that conceptual thinking was prone to making. However, in terms of content, it shows that even the affirmationof-the-paradoxical premise of the profound essence of the Dao by the pre-Qin Daoists, prior to being and nonbeing in the context of Neo-Daoism, was being transformed into the understanding of absolute nothingness, which is original nothingness. This kind of understanding may have led to an emphasis on the concept of immutability that metaphysical thinking emphasizes in general. This way of thinking is decisively expressed by Zhidun in his understanding of the Sage.

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Thus, principle is not transformed; nor does the transformation become principle. The teaching is not the essence (体), nor does the essence itself become the teaching. Therefore, none of the thousands and ten thousands of transformations can not be outside of principle. How can the spirit be something that moves? Since the spirit does not move, the transforming function in response is inexhaustible. Inexhaustible transformation does not belong to the Sage; it depends on the sentient beings (物). The sentient beings transform; the Sage does not transform; The Sage, from the beginning, has never transformed.51

His view of human beings is far from the unifying and continuous, mutually interpenetrating Ultimate Dao that the pre-Qin Daoists depicted as well as the ideal of early Buddhism that spread the theory of dependent arising based on dynamic and concrete world experiences. This is a typical example that reflects the influence of the Neo-Daoists on Zhidun, who projected immutability rather than change, the static world rather than the dynamic world, and the negative and passive world of original nothingness (本無) and ultimate emptiness (至虛) rather than the world of undivided fullness. Analysis of Daoan’s Preface to the Commentary on the Combined Texts As mentioned earlier, Daoan (道安, 312–385) is a figure who tried to overcome Geyi Buddhism. Daoan’s works are known to encompass more than sixty pieces, but only about twenty are extant. Among these, the sources by which to examine his thought are the prefaces he wrote to the texts. Therefore, it is not easy to analyze the influence of Daoism and Neo-Daoism in his writings, which are limited in resources, and furthermore, his intention involved overcoming Geyi Buddhism, unlike Zhidun. Nevertheless, it is difficult to affirmatively judge whether he had successfully surmounted Geyi Buddhism. The reason is because he leaves strong traces of Daoistic and NeoDaoistic understandings of Buddhism behind in his many statements among the short prefaces, such as his Preface to the Daodijing (道地經序). The Preface to Commentary on the Combined Texts of the Guangzan jing and Fàngguāng jīng (合放光光讚隨略解序) is his preface of the two texts, as he himself revealed. The Guangzan jing is a partial translation of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra. The Fàngguāng jīng is an abbreviation of the Pañca​viṃśa​ti-sā​hasri​kā-pr​ajñāp​ārami​tā-sū​tra. The Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra is the central work of these texts. Through this work, Daoan reveals his understanding of prajñā-pāramitā; that is “ultimate correct true enlightenment (無上正眞道; Anuttarā-Samyak-Saṃbodhi).” Prajñā-pāramitā is the foundation of ultimate correct true enlightenment. Being correct means equal, and also means entering the stage of non-duality (不二).

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Being “equal (等)” has three meanings: Dharma body, Thusness (如), and Ultimate Reality (眞際).52

Such an explanation of prajñā-pāramitā does not seem to be unreasonable. However, continuing the explanation of “Ultimate Reality (眞際)” has the sense of getting closer to a Daoistic usage of language. Ultimate Reality (眞際) means there is nothing to attach to. It is still, unmoving, profound, tranquil, and ordered. It does not do anything; it does not do nondoing. Even though all laws have activity, this law is profoundly silent (淵默). Therefore, nonattachment is called the truth (眞) of this law.53

When he explains Ultimate Reality in the quote “It does not do anything; it does not do non-doing,” it appears that he is applying the typical double negation logic of prajñā sutras. However, soon after, interpreting the confronting of all laws by transformable creatures as “doing,” which carries negative value, and Ultimate Reality as “non-doing,” which carries affirmative value as similar to the word profoundly silent (淵默), could be said to show the influence of Neo-Daoism. He was not free from the influence of Daoism, and this is shown at the end of the preface, when he explains the wisdom of the Dharma (法慧) as “the way that can be spoken of (可道之道),” and True Wisdom (真慧) as the Constant Dao (常道). All things, from the five aggregates to omniscience (薩云若: Sarvajña,一切智), are the wisdom of the Dharma (法慧) that bodhisattvas show in their coming and going, which is the Dao that can be explained in words (可道之道). All things, from monistic thusness (一相) to featurelessness (無相), are the True Wisdom (眞慧) that bodhisattvas express in their coming and going, which also reveals the Constant Dao (常道) that forever never changes.54

The dualistic division between the limited world that can be expressed with words and the absolute world that cannot be expressed with words was developed into “the way that can be spoken of (可道之道),” and the Constant Dao (常道), the Wisdom of the Dharma (法慧), and True Wisdom (真慧). Of course, even though at the end of the preface he discusses the interdependency of Conventional Truth (俗諦) and Ultimate Truth (眞諦) as if these two are not-two (不二), it seems highly likely that the background of his statement is based on the Daoistic “sense of undividedness” rather than a Buddhist concept. Analyses of A General Preface to Sutra on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations translated on Mount Lu (廬山出修行方便禪 經統序) and Preface to a Collection of Extracts from (the Translation of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) (大智論抄序) by Huiyuan Huiyuan (慧远, 334–416 AD) renounced secular life to become a disciple of Daoan in 355 AD and separated from his teacher in 377 AD due to a war, so

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we can see that he was under his tutelage for over twenty years. His Treatise on Buddha Nature (法性論) might be the best way to know his philosophy, but it has been lost. However, even though its entire contents have not been transmitted, the text has been quoted in several related writings, and so the main ideas have been conveyed. Even though Huiyan was a disciple of Daoan who is considered to have inherited the prajñā tradition, and while he exchanged ideas through his scholastic relationship with Kumarajiva, who was well-informed in prajñā and Middle Way Buddhism, the peculiarity of Huiyan’s philosophy is that he adheres to the concept of a substantialistic Buddha Nature, which is close to the theory of intrinsic nature of all phenomena of the Sarvâstivāda School. Generally speaking, it is known that Huiyuan’s adherence to the concept of Buddha Nature was mostly influenced by the Tridharmaka śāstra (三法度論), written by Vātsīputrīya Bhadryaniya (犢子系賢冑部) and who asserted the concept of superior self. Huiyan’s philosophy supported the contemporary Buddhist community, whose strong philosophical claim of the imperishability of the soul was prominent. The contents of his thought are in the Discourse on When the Body Dissipates, the Soul is Not Extinguished chapter (形盡神不滅論) in Monks Should Not Pay Homage to Kings ( 沙門不敬王者論), which is included in volume 5 of the Hongming Ji (弘明集). A philosophy such as his can in no way be thought of as separate from that of Neo-Daoism in the Wei-Jin era. The stage at which meditation and wisdom were in accordance in the following quote in (A General) Preface to Sutra on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations on Mt. Lu reminds us that he is a figure of the Neo-Daoist era. Its subtlety directs all movements with Ultimate Oneness (至一) without possessing anything. In the place where shape is not yet formed, it certainly makes the Great Image (大象) empty, but it is not that nothing exists. “Although there is no-thought and non-doing, there is not non-doing.”55

If one reads the above quote in isolation, it is probably more easily understood as a Daoist rather than a Buddhist passage. Especially, the expression “although there is no-thought and non-doing, there is not non-doing (无思无 为而为无为),” in the latter part of the passage is a typical Daoist affirmationof-the-paradox statement. This is the crucial part which makes the impression that the above quote is a Daoistic passage. And by paying closer attention to the beginning of the passage, one may notice that the content is almost the same as the description of the affirmation-of-the-paradox state of the essence of the Dao (道体). His philosophical influence from Neo-Daoism appears in a part of his Preface to the Great Wisdom Treatise where he explains the purpose of the Middle Way (中論) of Vasubandhu.

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Allow me to be brief. The way of life and death shows signs at the stage of no beginning, and change takes place depending on fortune and misfortune (倚伏). Everything is born from not-yet-existent (未有) and disappears from already-existent (既有). Taken to the extreme, since being and non-being alternate via the same law, we know that they correspondingly cannot be the source. Also, since coming into life and extinguishing occur due to the same transformability, we may now know that there is no subject, as the Void reflects.56

The Middle Way of Vasubandhu mainly focuses on sophisticatedly criticizing the substantialism inside and outside of Buddhism by adopting the concept of “emptiness” (空) based on the anātman theory of early Buddhism. However, Huiyuan adopts reductionist concepts, such as the state prior to being and non-being, and change as the source and basis of life and death, in his understanding of Middle Way. The result was not being able to revive the intention of the nonsubstantialistic world understanding of early Buddhism and the Prajñā lineage’s contemplation of emptiness. This kind of interpretation of Middle Way by Huiyuan is difficult to understand if one excludes the then-contemporary Daoistic characteristics as summarized above. This influence is reiterated in his understanding of “the emptiness of self-nature (自性空),” a key concept in Middle Way. How does one know how this is? It is because the nature without self-nature is called Dharma Nature (法性). Dharma Nature does not have self-nature, as it is formed by dependent arising. What is formed by dependent arising does not have intrinsic attributes. Therefore, even if being, it is non-being, and even if it is non-being, it is not separate from being. It is like fire transmitted elsewhere but is not extinguished.57

If we only look at the above passage, it seems that there is no big problem in his understanding of self-nature. However, the following supplementary explanation shows that the world he is imagining in his mind is rather closer to the Daoist world. Then, there is no alternate destiny (異趣) in Dharma (法), and it is completely empty at the beginning and at the end. All are, in the end, equally pure, so that being and non-being return to each other in turn. Therefore, the mind of one who strolls in the midst of the Dharma can not depend on consideration, as there is no object for his wisdom to encounter. Even without extinguishing characteristics, the mind is tranquil; even without establishing cultivation, the mind is free. Without having encountered this highly mysterious stage of mastery, how can one know the subtlety of the emptiness of emptiness? Utmost Ultimate! One cannot know any further.58

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It is difficult to see how the above passage could have been derived from the Middle Way text itself written by Vasubhandu. In particular, the explanation of Dharma at the beginning of the passage can be understood without much difficulty as having been based on typical ontology, and furthermore, on Daoist realism. Moreover, in the part where he describes that the idealistic image of the sage is that he is not at the stage of understanding the world, rather that he is at the stage of being in harmony with subject and object, confirms that Huiyuan is also engulfed in by the Daoist worldview. The Neo-Daoistic Transformation of the Concepts of Prajñā and Emptiness in the Zhaolun (肇論) Shigeo Kamata regards the time period of the life of Sengzhao to be between 378 and 414 AD, according to historical records of ancient texts as well as all studies of them, even though they record him as being active from 385 to 415 AD in the “Sengzhao Chapter” of Biographies of Eminent Monks (高僧傳).59 This period is classified historically as the Eastern Jin period of the Wei-Jin Southern and Northern dynasties era. Sengzhao was the head disciple of Kumarajiva, a monk from the West, who accomplished great achievements in his large-scale translation projects. He inherited Kumarajiva’s Buddhism and contributed tremendously to the sinicization of it. The history of Chinese Buddhism records that Sengzhao is a person who overcame the previous heretical doctrines through his study of the new doctrines of Nagarjuna and Āryadeva, under the tutelage of Kumarajiva, and who then reestablished the concepts of prajñā and emptiness. Now, let’s confirm whether Sengzhao, who was in this position, was able to truly prevail over the strange, extreme, and heretical doctrines regarding the concept of emptiness, through his Zhaolun (肇論). In order to properly understand the connotations of Sengzhao’s Buddhist concepts, we must review the philosophical status of his teacher, Kumarajiva. David J. Kalupahana compared the English translation from the Chinese translation of Middle Way by Kumarajiva with the Sanskrit version and made the interesting comment that Kumarajiva had revived the intention of the works of Nagarjuna, who had followed the empirical perspective of early Buddhism. I think this understanding of Kumarajiva is noteworthy, though I cannot completely agree with the viewpoint of Kalupahana that the reason why Buddhism flourished in China is simply because of the pragmatic tradition of Confucianism, considering the other aspect of Confucianism, which is rigid moralism, and recruited metaphysical ontology to support it. However, his view is somewhat persuasive, as nontranscendental and nonsubstantialistic ways of thinking of Buddhism appeared in a similar way in both Confucianism and in pre-Qin Daoism.60

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As Kalupahana argues, if Kumarajiva was faithful to the Middle Way tradition, while Candrakirti adhered to the transcendentalism shown in the Vedantic tradition,61 then the argument of Kumarajiva’s student, Sengzhao, must be different from the many contemporary Middle Way scholars who are still under the influence of Candrakirti. Is Sengzhao in fact a successor to the tradition of Nagarjuna continued by Kumarajiva? My answer to this question is “No.”62 The reasons are as follows: First, it is much more likely that Sengzhao was more sinicized, in terms of his understanding of the concepts of Buddhism, than Kumarajiva, who was born in Kucha in the Western region. Second, it is difficult to verify whether Kumarajiva understood Nagarjuna properly. Hence, it is difficult to clearly ascertain the relationship between Kumarajiva’s and Sengzhao’s understanding of Middle Way. Nonetheless, what cannot be denied is the fact that Sengzhao was a person who devoted himself to explaining all the concepts of the Middle Way, such as prajñā and emptiness, and so was considered the Nagarjuna of China. Therefore, as examined above, I think that the question of how (much) the trend of Daoistic or Neo-Daoistic understanding of Buddhism appearing in the Wei-Jin era influenced the Zhaolun (肇論) must first be answered, regardless of the existing diversity of evaluation methods in the understanding of emptiness by Kumarajiva and Sengzhao. The problem is that in order to fairly and adequately evaluate the understanding of the concept of emptiness by Sengzhao, a set of criteria must be presented in advance regarding the understanding of the concept of emptiness. Therefore, in the next section of this chapter, I would like to discuss what could be an appropriate way to adequately understand the concept of emptiness. General Issues in the Understanding of the Concept of Emptiness Examining how Sengzhao understood the concept of emptiness, the key concept of the Middle Way, is a very meaningful task in terms of revealing the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism. However, no matter whether the description regarding the characteristics is right or wrong, in order to be recognized for its objectivity, the right way to proceed, in my opinion, would be to first clarify how this text defines the concept of emptiness. In general, when Buddhist scholars explain the concept of anātman of early Buddhism that criticized the traditional Vedic Upanishad concept of ātman, it seems that they give a guarded explanation without expressing a more antagonistic attitude toward the language that they are using in their explanation. However, I see a kind of anti-linguistic attitude by the scholars, which is not so clearly evident when they explain anātman, yet is frequently evident in their process of explaining the concept of emptiness. Of course,

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while it is true that the simple, nihilistic understanding of emptiness as Nothing or Nothingness shown at the beginning of the West’s understanding of it is rarely written about anymore, and that the understanding of emptiness is getting closer to the original intention of early Buddhism to some extent, the anti-language attitude surprisingly still strangely persists. To state the questions above more directly, they might be as follows: “Was Buddha’s attitude toward language anti-linguistic?,” and “Is the understanding of emptiness possible only beyond our language, or is it transcendental to mundane human perception?” Of course, the answer is “No!”63 Now let’s ask and answer the above questions on the understanding of emptiness through some examples and try to find the true connotations of the concept of emptiness in a question and answer format. ‘I’ and the objective, external things of the world appear to us as independent, self-sufficient entities, but upon closer examination this appearance proves to be predicated upon a tacit, preconscious failure to engage with the deeply contextual nature of their presence. As the analysis proceeds, Candrakīrti points out the paradoxical nature of causes and conditions which are themselves only the products of other such causes and conditions. In the case of the reflection, a collocation of real causes and conditions results in an illusory, unreal effect, but the illusory appearance of the world is vastly more profound, for here both cause and effect are artificial constructs, devoid of intrinsic, self-contained being.64

The above quote is Huntington’s interpretation of a passage by Candrakīrti in his Madhyaymakāvatārakārikā.65 Here, Huntington explains that Candrakīrti understands phenomena as imaginary illusions and false falsehoods and concludes that their nonreality is due to the fact that the causes and effects are devoid of intrinsic essence. It cannot but be pointed out that, paradoxically, this conclusion results in the reassertion of the Upanishadic point of view that a being with intrinsic nature is true, and a being without intrinsic nature is false. Also, by following this logic, the status of the dependent arising theory of the Buddha, which is the central doctrine of Buddhism established by the observation of phenomena, will be shaken. To avoid this result, Huntington develops his argument that the philosophical aim of the Mādhyamika authors does not rest on carrying out its assertion, but only on rectifying the incorrect point of view of substantialism. Thus, he says the following: The arguments presented in these texts are a series of corrective devices; there is no attempt to connect words to reality or to suggest that they somehow reach beyond themselves for their justification. This non referential use of language allows the Mādhyamika authors to avoid the problems inherent in holding and defending a particular philosophical view, for when their aim is accomplished

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and the problem of reifying thought disappears, the content and the form of the propositions are entirely inconsequential.66

As above, he describes the Mādhyamika authors as philosophers who were reluctant to express their own philosophical perspectives through language, or felt that they should not do so. That the Mādhyamika authors, who had inherited the worldview and philosophy of the Buddha, held such a view is a problem. In other words, since the Mādhyamika authors were not nescient, we must assume that they had established a certain worldview different from that of the people whose opinions needed to be corrected, in order to rectify the opinions that they deemed to be incorrect. This worldview could not have been other than the dependent arising worldview that the Buddha had revealed when he had overcome the Upanishadic tradition. Huntington was also cognizant of the Buddha’s worldview which did not view reality negatively. Because of this reason, he intended to resolve this issue in the following way: “Emptiness” is a conventional designation (prajñapti), an ordinary word used, like all words, to accomplish a specific purpose registered in the intention of the speaker. In accordance with what the text says, it is perhaps best understood as a way of being, a way of existing, knowing, and acting with complete freedom from clinging and antipathy. In the direct (non inferential) realization of emptiness, the claims of the part or individual are immediately experienced as harmonious with the claims of the whole world of sentient and insentient being. The direct realization of emptiness, what I call the “actualization” of emptiness, is the source of the bodhisattva’s universal compassion.67

Here, he renounces a conceptual and logical approach to the concrete world, and insists on grasping the concrete world as being empty, by intuition or a direct realization method. The statement that a true understanding of actuality is realization of actuality through direct entry into it instead of inference is, in fact, a statement that a negative value is required in the understanding of the conceptual world, while a positive value is required in the understanding of the nonconceptual world. As such, the argument for a noninferential understanding of emptiness finally relinquishes the understanding of emptiness to the realm of the mystical and extraordinary. The problem is that the realization of emptiness in this way only becomes possible when we possess the capability to transcend our everyday thinking. When one enters into this state, we can say that the world of emptiness is not the Upanishadic substantialistic world but is a state in which one loses their persuasive power to claim that the world of emptiness is a nontranscendental world. Do we have to say that the world of emptiness appears to be ordinary when we possess a special ability such as a nondiscriminative and direct perception of

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the world, even though the world of emptiness appears to be extraordinary through the lens of discriminative perception, in other words, phenomenally? One of the main reasons why such arguments appear so poorly developed is probably because of his radical understanding of language. The problem lies in the fact that while he is saying that he intends to avoid extreme views regarding the world and man, he does not adopt a neutral position regarding the relationship between language and the world. In light of the prevailing view that the spirit of early Buddhist started as a critique of Vedic Upanishadic substantialism and transcendentalism, it is hard to think that the Buddha had such a one-sided negative view of man’s ordinary thinking capacity. Unfortunately, however, such a use of language, emphasizing the differentiation between the nonreality of phenomena and the reality of the world of emptiness, is repeated not only in Huntington’s case, as mentioned, but also by so many other scholars that it is the generally accepted view. In the following example, we can see the same structural problem: As in the critique of the argument above, the phrase “something is empty” is not a declaration that damages Buddhism by tearing down the “Four Truths (四聖諦)” and the “Three Treasures (三寶).” It means that our extreme thinking functioning dualistically may not allow us to reach the Middle Way, because all things dependently arise, and yet each is referred to (by its temporary pseudonym) as a dependently arisen phenomenon.68

As in the previous passage, there is a consistent framework in the way of explaining emptiness in these works. The concept of emptiness is set up affirmatively, but real understanding of it is beyond our thinking capability. Accordingly, the world that we know is illusionary, and so as it is fictitious, it surely cannot be the empty world in an actual sense. Is this so? Let’s ask again! First, does our discriminative thinking, functioning dualistically, always result in extreme ways of thinking? Second, if we do conceptually grasp the world to be dependently arisen, and thus understand the meaning of no-self (anātman) and live by it, can the debaters argue that we are lingering in a different world from the true world of emptiness that they established, because our understanding is still conceptual? Difficult issues like these that arise from the extreme dichotomy in the relationship between language and the world ultimately lead to the following differentiation in terms of the general theories of Buddhism. The former teaching is “the true teaching that sees without discrimination,” and the latter teaching is “the teaching done to suit the discriminative thinking of ordinary people.” The teaching of Ultimate Truth deconstructs all of our discriminative thinking. However, the teaching of Conventional Truth is a systematic teaching based on discriminative thinking.69

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The teaching of no-self, which denies the existence of a self, is Ultimate Truth; the teaching of rebirth and retribution, which establishes the existence of a self, is Conventional Truth.70

Here, we need to reexamine the connotations of discriminative thinking. Due to these arguments that consider dualistic, conceptual, and linguistic thinking as an inferior level of thinking, the Buddha’s teachings that should actually have equal value are split into superior and inferior levels. Is the theory of noself truly a superior teaching, and the theories of rebirth and retribution inferior teachings? In the second quote above, if we understand the former self as the substantialistic self and the latter self as the nonsubstantialistic, empirical self or a self-based on the dependent arising theory, then no superiority and inferiority in the teachings will arise. Perhaps if we interpret the meaning of “escaping from differentiation” as simply “not being immersed in the metaphysical and substantialistic worldview due to the erroneous extension of conceptual thinking,” such a value distinction would not occur. Let’s readdress the question again. According to the argument of the writer of the quotes above, we end up with a strange conclusion that no teaching of the Buddha can be a true teaching if it is expressed in words. Is that acceptable? Is the language that asks for the deconstruction of differentiation not a conceptual language but a mystical incantation? The author above seems to try to avoid this as follows: Even the teachings of the Buddha may commit logical errors when they are expressed in language. With this understanding, when we use the teachings of the Buddha as instruments to elevate our “mind-nature (心性),” the teachings of the Buddha exhibit their true value. In other words, it means that one must not only absolutely have faith in, study, and practice the Buddha’s teachings expressed in discriminative language, but also one must thoroughly realize that it is impossible to avoid the intrinsic contradictions because they are expressed by language. Here, the former is the practice of Conventional Truth and the latter is the perspective of Ultimate Truth. As such, uniting together Ultimate Truth that deconstructs all differentiations with Conventional Truth that fabricates the Buddhistic world through differentiations is the model of the right practice of Buddhism.71

Logical fallacy or contradiction is a negative result that occurs when one infers a conceptually constructed world and believes it as an unchanging reality, with language, which is a simple concept, by fixing it as an unchanging structure. It is not a problem of conceptual thinking or language itself. In this context, if even the Ultimate Truth of the Buddha’s teachings is misunderstood, the initial meaning can be reversed. And, if the Conventional Truth that the author of the quote intended to present as inferior is understood through a nonsubstantialistic view of language, it would be no different from the superior law of Ultimate Truth. To summarize, all of the Buddha’s teachings, no matter which ones, are expressions of Ultimate Truth. They were given

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according to certain situations and to certain people and, even though not absolutely perfect (considering the relationship between the speaker and the listener according to the law of dependent arising), they must not be evaluated as inferior or superior. In other words, the Buddha’s teachings can make the issues mentioned more confusing or more clear, depending on the capacity of the listener. The right view of practice would be to examine, understand, and practice his teachings according to the context. Kalupahana explains that the reason why these problems arise is because the scholars inadvertently interpret Buddhist theories according to the use of substantialistic or metaphysical language, instead of understanding Buddhist theories according to the Buddhist language usage based on the dependent arising theory. Thus, he tried to resolve this problem by introducing two ways of using language. According to him, they are the “Language of Existence” and the “Language of Becoming.”72 The language of becoming, which he asserts as a unique use of language by Buddhism, was constructed when the Buddha thoroughly understood the human ability to conceptualize. In other words, the Buddha was only attempting to completely avoid the negative aspects of conceptualizing by human beings, meaning the rigidity of conceptualization and abstract substantialism, and so was not taking issue with conceptualizing itself. The Buddha’s very flexible position on conceptualizing is based on the correct understanding that concepts are merely mediators between sensory experiences and theories. Of course, such an understanding of language is based on the dependent arising worldview of the Buddha. In this context, one of the notable linguistic understandings of the Buddha that Kalupahana emphasizes is the negation of “non-conceptual knowledge.”73 This is an extension of the aforementioned idea of Buddhism as extreme empiricism. Knowledge is already a product of our thinking, and nonconceptual knowledge cannot exist in our experience. In other words, the Buddha clearly differentiated his dependent arising, empirical philosophy from the existing metaphysical philosophy (to attempt to simply situate the conceptual being within the dimension of experience), by understanding the separation between flexible experience and knowledge that tends to be fixed. In this way, the concept of “nonconceptual knowledge” finally becomes a product of substantialistic or metaphysical thinking. As was previously pointed out above that Buddhism encompasses all human experiences comprehensively and in a balanced way, we should not ignore the fact that the use of concepts is not something that we can choose randomly in the understanding of the world essential to human beings, but it is a functional ability already given and experienced. In other words, we may experience a nonconceptual world, but if it remains only as nonconceptual, it can only be said that this is a very abnormal state. It is undeniable that this type of experience is indispensable to explain the meanings of our current human experiences

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and behaviors. However, if one defines such a state as an essential situation and insists on the complete return to only such a state, this argument becomes a return to the essentialism that Buddhism attempts to reject. The arguments for grasping the state of emptiness in a nonconceptual way, for a mystical comprehension of the concept of emptiness such as direct entering into emptiness, and for a sharp division between Ultimate Truth and Conventional Truth, would not be the direction of the theories that the Buddha or Nagarjuna truly pursued. It is less convincing to assert that the Buddha would have established a noncognitive world only in the relationship between the language and the world, while rejecting the understanding of the transcendental and substantialistic world. Here is the reason why it is necessary to maintain a Middle Way perspective, and avoid extremes, even with regard to the human phenomenon of language. Analysis of the Ways of Understanding the Concepts of Prajñā and Emptiness in the Zhaolun (肇論) Now, on the basis of the preceding preliminary work, let’s analyze a few main concepts and complex statements that Sengzhao describes according to the following interests: First, we are going to compare the similarities between the stages of the pre-Qin Daoists’ understanding of the world, as analyzed above, with the Daoistic statements used in his explanation of Buddhist concepts. Second, in case of any reductionist statement, we are going to investigate whether it has room for a pre-Qin Daoist interpretation or is a simple Wei-Jin Daoist reduction. Third, in terms of his explanation of Buddhist concepts, we are going to investigate if his explanation of concepts is consistent with their original meaning. Fourth, in the case of a transformation of meaning, we are going to investigate what kind of synthesis may have occurred when a Daoist or a Neo-Daoist way of thinking was added to the original or miscommunicated meaning.

THE CONCEPT OF PRAJÑĀ IN THE ESSAY ON PRAJÑĀ WITHOUT KNOWING (般若無知論) The wisdom of the Sage, prajñā, that Senzhao describes, is something mystical and is described in a comparatively similar way as the emphasis on the subtlety of the Dao, as presented above. However, the wisdom of the Sage is so subtle and profound that it is difficult to comprehend its depth and imperceptible mystery (隱微). The wisdom of the Sage is shapeless, nameless. It is not something we can acquire through language or imagery.74

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Since the above passage is insufficient to confirm if the Daoist-style words such as “subtle and profound (幽微)” and “imperceptible mystery (深隱)” as well as the so-called “negative attitude” toward the discriminative phenomenon and language were used simply to criticize the substantialist worldview, or whether these statements were consciously made to return to the fundamental Daoist world that is mystical and undivided, we will attempt to confirm these through the following discussion. The following sentences are a form of commentary on the Pañca​viṃśa​ti-sā​hasri​kā-pr​ajñāp​ārami​tā-sū​ tra (放光般若經) and the Wisdom Scripture of Practicing Enlightenment (道行般若經). These sentences are describing the function and the form of the existence of prajñā in an affirmation-of-the-paradox way. These two sutras are speaking about the contemplative action of prajñā wisdom. But, what is the reason for saying that it has neither appearance nor knowledge? Isn’t that because the knowledge of prajñā is truly illuminating without discriminative knowledge? Why is it that what the wisdom of prajñā knows is not known? That is because the mind of the Sage is without knowledge; thus, it is the reason there is nothing to be ignorant of. This is the knowledge without knowledge, and is called “all-knowing (一切知).” Therefore, shouldn’t we believe that this is what the sutra indicates by saying that the mind of the Sage neither knows anything, nor has anything that he does not know.75

We must pay attention to the “affirmation-of-the-paradox” statements that are repeated in the above quote to describe the appearance of prajñā. As we have seen before, this is almost the same type of expression appearing in the conceptual explanation style of pre-Qin Daoists on the Dao. Of course, it is true that similar types of “affirmation-of-the-paradox” expressions appear in prajñā texts. However, the correct understanding would be to treat them as expressions to guard against substantializing dualistic concepts, or to emphasize that substance does not exist from the perspective of no-self or emptiness, rather than to demonstrate a certain mystical stage, like the Daoists were doing. In the following quote, Sengzhao describes prajñā very passively by utilizing the Chinese logic of “essence-function (體用).” It would be difficult to say that the “affirmation-of-the-paradox” expressions used here depend solely on prajñā, or Middle Way logic. This, the wisdom of prajñā, has a mirror that can illuminate all the way to the furthest extent of the Ultimate, but knows nothing. It has the marvelous function to move all creatures, and respond to and unite with them, but it does not take them into account. Because it does not take them into account, and because it has the marvelous function, it can stand alone detached from the mundane world. Because the wisdom of prajñā does not have knowledge, it can mysteriously illuminate all things from the outside.76

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In the discussion above, we can see that the Chinese logic of essencefunction naturally intervenes. That is, in place of the wisdom of prajñā, he assigns the dualistic character of essence (體) as the center of phenomena, and function (用) as the emergence of the phenomena, simultaneously. If we take the “nonduality of essence-function (體用不二)” from the point of view of general logic, it could be said to be based on “affirmation-of-the-paradox” logic. Of course, such an understanding of the world is based on the Daoist worldview and is a typical form of Chinese realism. But again, it should be noted that the wisdom of prajñā is described very passively (in the sense of immobility) and negatively (in the sense of ignorance). The nature of Senzhao’s worldview becomes more clear in the explanation of the concept of prajñā that, despite its marvelous unifying function, it is ultimately outside of the mundane world. The dualistic thinking that situates prajñā in a different world from the concrete world, and the simple reductionism that nevertheless takes it as the foundation of this world, proves that Sengzhao was not outside of the passive, negative, and reductionist tendencies of the metaphysical worldview of the Wei-Jin era. In the end, his worldview brings the conclusion of his Prajñā Without Knowing to end with a typical Daoist discussion format, as in the following: In response to the question, function is at once tranquility; tranquility is at once function. Function and tranquility are one body. They come from the same source, but have different names. There is no way that tranquility without function becomes the master of function. Therefore, the darker the wisdom of prajñā is, the brighter its illumination becomes. How can one say that brightness and darkness, and movement and stillness, are different from each other?77

The Concept of Being in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things (物不遷論) It can be said that it is a reasonable point of view when scholars point out that Senzhao’s method of understanding the world in his Treatise on the Immutability of Things (物不遷論) is similar to the worldview of Sarvâstivāda,78 as he reiterates his logic in which he separates and situates objects temporarily in space and time while isolating them atomically. Let take an example of his typical atomization of objects, as in the following: I sought objects from the past, but they were not non-existent in the past; I sought an object from the past in the present, but it is not yet extant. As an object from the past is not in the present, it is evident that an object from the past does not come to the present. I know this because as an object in the past was not non-existent, the object does not move. Looking again at the present like this, an object of the present goes and no longer exists. This means that because an

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object in the past only inherently existed in the past; it didn’t arrive to the past from the present, and that because an object in the present only exists in the present, it does not arrive at the present from the past.79

From this perspective, all things in the world come into being instantaneously, and they are displayed independently in isolation in their own time without any change at all.80 Thus, in this way of thinking, cause and effect are divided separately and are independent of each other. It is because the effect cannot co-exist with the cause, and that the effect arises due to the cause. Since the effect arises due to the cause, the cause does not disappear in the past. Since the effect cannot co-exist with the cause, the (past) cause does not come to the present. Since things neither disappear nor come to the present, the law that things do not change is clear. How can one be deluded by the going and the staying, and hesitate in between movement and stillness?81

If we separate and isolate time and space, and situate cause and effect, the cause and the effect become independent incidents without having any connection to each other. And Sengzaho used these kinds of results as the basis for denying that phenomena appear to move. Due to this, even if heaven and earth are turned upside down, it cannot be said that they are not tranquil. And, even if a flood overflows up to the sky, it cannot be said that it is moving. When responding to these kinds of things, if you accord with the wisdom of prajñā, you will immediately understand that the logic of the “things do not shift theory” is not far away.82

However, it is interesting to note that Sengzhao understood that the Daoist “affirmation-of-the-paradox” statement was an expression to keep in mind about the unchanging ultimate world. Therefore, what people say stays and does not move, I say moves; what I say stays and does not move, people say moves. Thus, even though moving and staying are different, ultimately the two are one. Therefore, as is written in the text, the correct word seems to be its opposite. That is why it is said, who should believe this?83

Considered in this way, it is not unreasonable to say that the statements by Sengzhao, at the beginning of the Things Do Not Move Treatise, show that he considers movement and stillness as one,84 and though he was influenced by the negative, passive reductionism shown in the Neo-Daoist worldview, he understood the immovable world as the ultimate world and described it by adopting the Wei-Jin Daoists’ “affirmation-of-the-paradox” form of expression.

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The Concept of Emptiness in Discussion of the Emptiness of the Unreal (不眞空論) In Sengzhao’s Zhaolun, the chapter that most clearly shows how the Chinese way of thinking intervened in the Buddhist understanding of the world is Discussion of the Emptiness of the Unreal (不眞空論). He used the concept of “unreal (不眞)” to assert that the literal meanings of the words “emptiness (空)” and “nothingness (無)” are, in a general sense, not the “emptiness (空)” that he truly intended to keep as “real (實).” Actually, in the sense that the transmission of the meaning of emptiness is not that easy to convey, it is understandable that he added various explanations regarding the concept of emptiness. The problem is that the Madhyamakans, who continued the tradition of early Buddhism, established the concept of emptiness in order to explain the anti-substantialistic, dependently arising world. And the issue is that their concept of emptiness, that Sengzhao took, to describe the mystical foundation of the existence of the world is similar to the Daoist concept of the essence of Dao (道體) from the perspective of realism. The first paragraph in the Discussion of the Emptiness of the Unreal (不眞空論) begins like this: That which is ultimately empty, with neither life nor death, is the place where prajñā gathers by reflecting all things subtly, like a mysterious mirror, and the place that is the foundation of all things. If one does not have thorough mastery of the wisdom of the Sage, how can one engage marvelously at the intersection of being and non-being?85

This way of thinking did not necessarily begin with Sengzhao, but rather than the aspect of “how to see,” which is what the wisdom of prajñā originally pursues, the interest was in the world as seen through prajñā or “what is” to depict the aspects of prajñā itself. However, it would be difficult to say that the reason why the ontological interest in Sengzhao’s writings, such as the relationship between the subject and the object of prajñā, was more overwhelming was not associated with the ontological interests traditionally held by the Chinese. Furthermore, in terms of his writing style, due to the intervention of Chinese realism, the Daoist logic expressing the unification of subject and object, rather than the double negation shown in the prajñā texts or the treatise and commentaries of the Middle Way, makes the initial portion of the Zhaolun overwhelming. The following description of the Sage by Sengzhao clearly displays this trend: Therefore, the Sage abides in the True Mind and obeys the principles of all things uniformly, so there is no obstruction and no place that cannot be permeated. Since he sees through a unified vital force and contemplates the change of all things, he encounters all things in harmony. Since he has no obstruction, and

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there is no place that he cannot permeate, he commingles with other things to become pure. Since he follows principle and encounters everything in harmony, he becomes one with all he encounters without discrimination.86

The world of emptiness, understood by Sengzhao as the ultimate form of the world, is revealed through the ontology of a Daoist articulation in the following passage: In the same way, even though all the myriad things are different from each other, they cannot be essentially different in nature. Since they are not different in nature, we can know that what is manifest is not their true form. Since all forms are not true forms, even though they are forms, they cannot be forms. Thus, all things and I are of the same foundation. Negation and affirmation are just a single vital energy source. This stage is quietly secluded and discrete. It is not a place where the ordinary people’s dangerous delusions may reach their fullest extent.87

With this explanation, we may find that the argument that we should return to the Undivided One Origin that is prior to the human grasping of discriminative phenomena is more pronounced than the negation of the understanding of all substantialistic phenomena emphasized in the prajñā texts or commentaries on the Middle Way. This way of thinking ultimately results in a point of view that the current, discriminative, and conceptual thinking may not be able to comprehend the secret reality. As pointed out earlier, such a viewpoint obviously demands the concepts of a transcendental world or being. The following concluding statements from Discussion of Emptiness of the Unreal (不眞空論) demonstrate that this tendency is seen in Sengzhao. Therefore, the Sage rides all the changes of the phenomena, and yet does not transform himself; even strolling through the deluded world of all living beings, he is always the master of the wisdom of prajñā. He forthrightly enters the emptiness of all things, but he does not empty all things, because they are already empty.88

While Sengzhao understood the Sage as one who responds to phenomenal change, the Sage does not himself change. And he ends his explanation at the level of passively affirming the objective world by grasping the emptiness of things passively (虛) rather than revealing the dynamic world of dependent arising. The reason for ending his explanation at this level might be because the metaphysical and transcendental tendencies held by the Neo-Daoists’ worldview at the time of Sengzhao overwhelmed the pre-Qin Daoist philosophical insights appearing in works such as the Zhaolun, and prevented them from proliferating. In general, the evaluation of Sengzhao in the history of Buddhism defines him as a person who correctly understood the Buddhist philosophy of the

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contemplation of emptiness by Nagarjuna, and he is called the Nagarjuna of China. Such an assessment seems to have already been made during his lifetime. It is said that his teacher, Kumarajiva, had said that the first Chinese person who understood emptiness was Sengzhao, in Biographies of Famous Monks (名僧傳). However, in light of the analysis in the previous section, I cannot help but question whether the past and present assessment regarding Sengzhao is valid. Not only does the way he understood existence, close to that of Sarvâstivāda as shown in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things (物不遷論), make us doubt the level of his understanding of the philosophy of the Middle Way, but also his affirmation-of-the-paradox expressions and realistic descriptions in Discussion of the Unreal Emptiness (不眞空論) make us question why Kumarajiva would have said that Sengzaho’s understanding of the concept of emptiness was the best in China. When we talk about the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism, we can often see that the above phenomenon is a subtle combination of Daoism and Buddhism. However, it is hard to consider these two philosophies as things that could be combined so easily. The reason is because the images of the worlds that they idealize and pursue are not the same. Daoism believes that difficult issues in life are finally resolved when all beings incorporate the ideal of an undivided essence of the Dao, and ultimately take on that form. However, Buddhism cannot accept the argument of returning to the mystical essence of the Dao. The reason is because, in Buddhism, whether a microscopic entity as ātman, or a gigantic entity as Brahman, if I may apply the same logic, or the mystical essence of the Dao, if it is not operating in our concrete experience or is seen as a meaningless, abstract being, they are merely products of delusion. As I pointed out earlier, when we look at Buddhism and Daoism from the point of view of their origins, we cannot deny that what they both possessed in common was the philosophical insight to see the world as a dynamic continuum. Therefore, the view that Buddhist theories were developed based on the syncretism of Buddhism and Daoism, as mentioned in the history of Chinese Buddhism, must be reconsidered. SARVĀSTIVĀDIN DISCUSSIONS APPEARING IN THE ZHAOLUN AND THE TREATISE ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF THINGS (物不遷論) In chapter 2, I analyzed the influence of Chinese thinking, especially Daoist thinking, appearing in the Zhaolun. The theme of this chapter is to analyze, historically and through the literature, the possibility that the Central Asian Sarvâstivāda School influenced early Chinese Buddhism and left its mark on the Zaolun of Sengzhao. And if the assumption is valid, I will address the

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issue of how to define the true characteristics of the Zaolun, written by Sengzho, as a successor to Middle Way thinking. Of course, I am not insisting that the Treatise on the Immutability of Things (物不遷論) in the Zhaolun was entirely influenced only by Sarvâstivāda. However, I am going to reveal that the discussion method of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things is similar to that of Sarvâstivāda and look into the various reasons for why these methods came about, from a number of viewpoints. The necessity for this multifaceted approach is because it is very difficult to objectively confirm the historical development of the early phase of the transmission of Indian or Central Asian Buddhism into China due to the absolute lack of historical sources, as stated earlier. That is, the reality of the current lack of sources leaves us with no choice but to supplement our understanding of various inferences by looking at the similarities in the discussion methods in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things and the Sarvâstivāda School. In consideration of these limited conditions, the problem of the Sarvâstivāda discussion method appearing in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things will be dealt with in the following way. First, I am going to macroscopically approach the kind of influence Sarvâstivāda had on the Chinese Buddhist community before Sengzhao’s era, by summarizing the relevant historical contexts and investigating what kinds of Abhidharma texts had been translated before and during Sengzhao’s era. Second, I will examine, with a microscopic approach, the philosophical meaning of the discussions by analyzing the statements in the Abhidharma texts translated before and during Sengzhao’s era that share a similar discussion format with those in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. Third, I will diagnose the characteristics of the ontology of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, which had an overwhelming influence during Sengzhao’s era, and the possibility of its direct and indirect influence on the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. Fourth, I will summarize the philosophical goals of the Middle Way translated by Kumarajiva in relation to those of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things, which is assumed to have directly influenced the discussions in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. Fifth, based on the above points, I will examine the problems of Sengzhao’s understanding of the Middle Way by analyzing the statements in his Treatise on the Immutability of Things. Circumstances Surrounding the Importation of Sarvâstivāda Theories into China and the Translation of Texts Prior to Sengzhao It is necessary to have a general understanding of the formation process of the Chinese Buddhist community before Sengzhao, as this might have influenced

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Sengzhao directly or indirectly, in order to examine the Buddhist philosophical characteristics of the Zhaolun and Treatise on the Immutability of Things. In summary, to maintain the key points of the discussion, I will describe the overall view of the early Buddhist community by focusing on the fact that the level of understanding of Buddhism held by the Chinese monks even until the time Sengzhao lived was not very high, by paying attention to the fact that the Theravāda School held a superior position in Central Asia where Theravāda and Mahāyāna coexisted peacefully. I will describe a broad outline of early Chinese Buddhism, and, based on this, I will adopt a method to predict the characteristics of Sengzhao’s understanding of Buddhism, in order to understand the formation process of this phenomenon. First of all, in order to estimate how much influence Theravāda Nikāya Buddhism had on Chinese Buddhism, we must pay attention to the characteristics of Buddhism in the Central Asian and Xinjiang regions at that time. As we can see from the historical fact of Buddhism’s transmission into China by monks from the so-called “Central Asian region,” the areas that continuously provided Buddhism related information to the Chinese Buddhists until the Eastern Jin era were Gandhara, Kashmir, and Xinjiang, which were where Buddhism was exported to China for 300–400 years after the end of the Later Han Dynasty. And it is known that Theravāda Buddhism had a relatively superior status in this region in the third to fourth century AD period. This historical situation allowed the Sarvâstivāda School in Kashmir and the Sautrântika School in Gandhara to be the dominant schools to spread to Kashgar, Kucha, and Hotan of the Xinjiang region, where Buddhism had already been transmitted in the first and second centuries BC. On the other hand, it was not until the latter half part of the third century AD that the Mahayana theories gained in strength, through the circulation of Prajñā and Lotus Sect texts to Kucha, and Prajñā and Huayan School texts to Hotan.89 In terms of the explanation of the characteristics of Buddhist schools in the areas where Buddhism was first introduced, the introduction of precepts collections of the Dharmagupta School to China, as indicated by Lamotte, is a very important historical fact that should draw our attention. Among the classified catalogs of various schools of Nikāya Buddhism that Lamotte presents in his History of Indian Buddhism, what is closely related to the themes in this book are the “five catalogs of the 5 schools” that are generally accepted in the early transmission of Buddhism into China. Lamotte points out that the Dharmagupta School, the influence of which was limited to the northwestern region of India, played a crucial role in the spread of precepts collections into China.90 This is a solid clue showing the characteristics of the early Chinese Buddhists’ knowledge of the types of Buddhism in the northwestern Indian region.

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In addition to the views of Lamotte, Charles Wilemen asserts that the Theravāda Dharmagupta School was derived from the Sarvâstivāda School in the first century AD and laid the foundation of Mahayana Buddhism in the Bactria and Gandhara regions, which would emerge in the second and third centuries AD, and it broadened its influence in the Hotan and Nulan areas in Xinjiang along the southern route of the Silk Road. This is an important noteworthy fact that helps us to gauge the process of transmission to China of the theories of Central Asian Theravāda Nikāya Buddhism, especially Sarvâstivāda, during that time.91 In addition, he emphasizes that the establishment and evolution of prajñā texts, along with the establishment and evolution of Sarvâstivāda texts, originated in the same region; that is northwestern India in the first century BC. This is a very significant passage in association with the relatively early period of prajñā text translations92 by Lokaksema, a Yuezhi native. Due to this historical background, a lot of Abhidharma texts written in northwestern India prior to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya by Vasubandhu were translated by An Shigao and others, starting in the middle of the second century AD in China. An Shigao from Parthia, where Theravāda Sarvâstivāda was more influential, is well-known for translating and distributing not only the meditative contemplation related texts of Sarvâstivāda but also the Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra (阿毘曇五法行經), and Collection of 98 Abhidharma Texts (阿毘曇九十八結經) of Sarvâstivāda. The Treatise on the Taste of the Nectar of the Abhidharma (阿毘曇甘露味論), translated during the Former Wei era (曹魏, 240–254 AD) by an unknown translator, is considered as the representative translation circulated after An Shiago. We cannot definitely exclude the possibility that Sengzhao read these materials, but what is more likely is for him to have read the Abhidharma literature translated and distributed during his time. They include 14 volumes of the Vibhāṣā-śāstra translated in 383 AD by Saṃghabhadra, the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthānaśāstra (阿毘曇八犍度論) translated by Saṃghadeva (僧伽提婆) and Zhu Fonian (竺佛念) in 383 AD, and the Abhidharmasāra (阿毘曇心論) translated by Saṃghadeva and Huiyuan in 391 AD. Considering the historical context and the translated Abhidharma literature mentioned above, it is highly likely that Sengzhao was exposed to the theories of Sarvâstivāda. The question is at what level did he understand these theories? As examined above, the information on Buddhism transmitted from the West during the era of political turmoil after the Han Dynasty is assumed to have been unsystematic, and there might not have been clarity in the understanding of the differences between Theravāda and Mahāyāna. In fact, before the grand scale translation projects by Kumarajiva during the Wei-Jin era, the Chinese intellectuals must have had an unsystematic understanding of Buddhism due to their dependence on texts and commentaries transmitted along

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various routes. This means that we must always consider that early Chinese Buddhism had developed in a quite different situation than later Chinese Buddhism, the development of which focused on Mahāyāna. Furthermore, due to the nature of Nikāya Buddhism such as Sarvâstivāda and Sautrântika having had complicated origins of their own, there is a strong probability that, among the contents in the traditions that were remarkable and repeatedly asserted, only the parts that made an impression on the early Chinese intellectuals would have been the central topics in the discussions of Chinese Buddhism. Eric Zurcher explains the historical background regarding the level of knowledge of Buddhism in the Wei-Jin era in his book, The Buddhist Conquest of China, through the term “gentry Buddhism.” Through the establishment of this term, he analyzed in detail the fact that the class that could learn the Buddhist theories at the early stages of importation was the gentry class, those who were able to maintain stable wealth and status, and a small group of middle-low class intellectuals. But even the Buddhist knowledge that this small group of gentry and intellectuals had was at a very low level and was distorted.93 Observations like these by Zurcher might have some differences in degree, but it is a very common phenomenon that inevitably occurs in the process of importing any foreign and heterogeneous ideas as well as the transmission of Buddhism into China. Although Sengzhao, a scholar in the Wei-Jin era, was perceived as a head disciple of Kumarajiva and possessed great skill, considering the fact in historical records that he died in his thirties and the level of understanding of Buddhism by the Han era Chinese monks at that time was not that high,94 as mentioned earlier, it would be difficult to say that his understanding of Sarvâstivāda also might not have advanced more than the general understanding of the very basic development of the discussion of Sarvâstivāda or the level of the public’s understanding of Sarvâstivāda. This judgment can be persuasive in terms of how the discussion about Sarvâstivāda was developed and accepted very simply without much concern and permeates the Zhaolun and Treatise on the Immutability of Things, to be analyzed shortly. The first thing to do in order to demonstrate the pervasiveness of this view would be to analyze Sarvâstivāda literature, as I pointed out above, and there is a high probability that Sengzhao might have encountered it. Textual Analyses of Exemplary Statements Associated with the Treatise On The Immutability Of Things [Wubuquianlun] in Sarvâstivāda Literature Translated at the End of the Fourth Century AD Abhidharma texts are very complex Buddhist texts that still provoke much controversy.95 Kalupahana attempts to untangle the complexities by

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separating the Abidharma texts themselves from the commentaries on them. That is, he keeps the point of view of splitting the Abhidharma texts that were written in a style of forming relationships in various classifications, which are physical and psychological components of human experiences in the sermons of the Buddha, from the commentaries in which the commentators imposed their own metaphysical interpretations of Abhidharma.96 This point of view is persuasive in light of the bibliographical development process of Abhidharma literature and the history of the arguments by the scholars.97 It is difficult to presume that Sengzhao had a complete understanding of the development of the Abhidharma literature and the issues of the philosophical debates raised by the commentators, considering the context of the Chinese Buddhist society at his time.98 It is reasonable to assume that the beginning of the understanding of these arguments would have been possible after the translation of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya by Xuanzang. Accordingly, we must assume that Sengzhao’s understanding of Abhidharma literature translated before or during his time would have been very naive. Of course, these premises do not mean that he would not have logically understood the discussion methods and the consequential conclusions in the Sarvâstivāda texts. In fact, even though the isolated and instantaneous (instant, 刹那) being defined in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things of Sengzhao is a being difficult to accept easily in the traditional Chinese worldview, we must accept the possibility that Sengzhao somewhat understood the Sarvâstivāda’s discussion method of establishing such a being while he was reading their literature, and thus adopted relevant statements in his Treatise on the Immutability of Things. If we want to see those statements, which might have had a high possibility of adoption among the Sarvâstivāda commentaries translated at his time, we may refer to the following examples. Can the mind of two instances become the cause (因) of each other by transformation? The answer is “No.” That is because for any person, two instances of mind occurring at the same time in the past and in the future cannot exist, and the mind of the future cannot become the cause of the mind of the past. Can the mind of two instances become the condition (緣) of each other by transformation? The answer is “Yes.” For example, thinking that the future does not exist arouses the mind of the first erroneous view, and then at the next moment provokes the arising in the mind of the second erroneous view. Also, thinking that the future does exist arouses the mind of right view, and that is the same as arising in the mind the second right view at the very next moment. In addition, it is the same as arising the mind, and then at the next moment arising a second mind by thinking that the Dao of the future does not exist. Also, it is the same as arising the mind, and then at the next moment arising a second mind by thinking that the Dao of the future does exist.

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Or, the transforming minds of two people who know each other’s mind become the conditions for each other. How come one cannot raise two minds, of before and after, at the same time? To answer this, I say it is because there is no second causality. Since the minds of all living beings arise and extinguish in an instant, it is the same as a man that cannot grasp the Void. The mind that arises earlier does not stay at the place; so how can the subsequent arisen mind remember the previous mind?99

The above passage is a part of Second Miscellaneous Translations on the Knowledge/Wisdom of Aggregates (雜犍度智跋渠第二) of the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra, one of the early Abhidharma texts translated by Saṅghadeva and Zhu Fonian in 383 AD. In this text, the author, Kātyāyanīputra (迦多衍尼子), shows a typical Sarvāstivādin way of thinking that develops the discussion by dividing the functioning of the mind into infinite divisions of instances. From the perspective of the general attributes of man’s conceptual thinking, the concept of “instance (刹那)” is analogous to the definition of a “point” in Euclidean geometry, which is defined as a “location” without “magnitude” and understood as a paradoxical situation. It has a dualistic connotation and can be interpreted phenomenologically as existent or nonexistent. In this context, the reason why Sarvâstivādans are considered and understood as realists is because they developed arguments that tacitly recognize instantaneous existences; that is, infinitesimally small beings. Therefore, it is a foregone conclusion that Sautrântika, on the other hand, critiqued Sarvâstivāda from the point of view of considering instances as nothingness.100 Accordingly, it could be considered that in order to express their phenomenon-affirmative realist trend, they made practice (行) superior to impermanence (無常) in order to explain the power dynamic between practice and impermanence, as in the section on “textual classification by physical form (色跋渠)” of the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra. Which is stronger, practice or impermanence? My answer is this; the power of practice is strong, and the power of impermanence is not. Practice may annihilate the past, present and future practices, but impermanence dissipates only the present practices. However, some people insist that the power of impermanence is strong and that of practice is not, because practices are also impermanent. But, according to the opinion of Sarvâstivāda (to my mind), the power of practice is strong, and that of impermanence is not. Practice may annihilate the past, present and future practices, but impermanence dissipates only the present practices.101

In addition to the abovementioned commentaries, the Abhidharmasāra translated by Saṃghadeva and Huiyuan in 391 AD is a commentary worthy

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of notice. This commentary is known as the work of Dharmaśreṣṭhin of Bactria in the third to fourth centuries AD. We can see relatively easily that the discussions on the intrinsic nature of dharmas are well organized, as seen in the following portion of the commentary. Considering the period of Sengzhao’s life and the time of translation of this text in China, I think that the probability that Sengzhao came across and easily understood such a discussion on intrinsic nature is high. I distinguished the characteristics of phenomena in this way. Then, what embraces dharmas; intrinsic nature or the natures of other things? The answer is intrinsic nature. Why? The answer is that all dharmas remain in their own nature by abandoning the natures of others. Therefore, all dharmas are subsumed into their intrinsic nature. The statement that “all dharmas abandon the nature of others” means that the eye abandons the ear. As such, that all dharmas are lost is not to say they are not subsumed. Therefore, they are not embraced by the natures of others. The statement that “each remains in its own nature” means that the eye remains in the nature of the eye. As such, all dharmas are subsumed by intrinsic nature.102

In fact, when one seeks to find the concept of being that maintains its own identity in actual phenomena, and when its idealistic form as a simple one rather than a compound one becomes more logically clear, then one’s attempt to establish the phenomena as a set of infinitely divided beings that are no longer divisible would inevitably become stronger. Of course, there must have been various attempts to avoid the resulting paradoxical situations. That is, the four different explanatory systems of Dharmatrāta, Ghosaka, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva, who were the later Sarvāstivādin commentators regarding the practical forms of existence of momentary and infinitesimally small beings, may be considered as the products of efforts to solve this problem.103 As pointed out earlier, the work required to find the origins of Sengzhao’s discussion method in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things may need inferences to take into account diverse historical circumstances. In addition, even though it is evident that Sarvâstivāda must have influenced the historical formation of Chinese Buddhism, the problem is that the way of thinking shown in Sarvâstivāda’s commentaries is not a phenomenon unique only to them. This fact makes us reflect back on the many ideological influences that Sengzaho might have had. Another origin worth pointing out as a background for establishing Sengzhao’s discussion of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things can be found in the internal change in Chinese philosophy, which is Neo-Daoism, a main ideological trend of the Wei-Jin era. Neo-Daoism, as a transformation from

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pre-Qin Daoism, had elements that could be evidence of metaphysical thinking similar to that in Western philosophy and that was starting to operate more actively even in China, considering the generality of the human way of conceptual and abstract thinking, even though it is not the same as the Western metaphysical way of thinking. Especially, the flourishing debate at the time, on being and nonbeing as the foundational essence or origin of the world, must have had a significant influence on Sengzhao’s way of understanding the world of objects. Accordingly, chapter 4 investigates how being and nonbeing became established in Wei-Jin Daoism regarding the explanation of the foundation of the existence of the objective world and assesses how it could be related to the way an isolated being, depicted in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things, was established. Philosophical Characteristics of the Debates on Being and Nonbeing in the Wei-Jin Era Like most assessments of philosophical trends of later times, the characteristics of Wei-Jin era assessments may be divided into positive or negative, depending on their perspectives. I totally agree with the insight of Graham that Chinese philosophy showed a kind of an intellectual regression amid the tendency toward unsophisticated theory integration after the period of unified empires of the Qin and Han.104 In the same context, I think Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism is also not free from this critique either. Apart from whether we agree with such a simplistic critical evaluation or not, it is true that it is hard to estimate the extent of research on Neo-Daoism as an academic discipline, especially since it had a decisive influence on the various trends of the three schools—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism—going forward. Therefore, in this section, the focus of the discussion among the various topics on NeoDaoism will be on the being and nonbeing of Wangbi (226–249 AD) and Guoxiang (郭象, 252–312 AD), an investigation of their philosophical meanings, and the possibility of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things being related to these. As pointed out earlier, even though the sprouting of simple reductionist thought that the Neo-Daoists were showing had already begun with the attempt to integrate the various thought forms by Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) of the Han Dynasty, let’s postpone the discussion on that to a later time in order to maintain the focus of this discussion. Let’s begin our discussion of Wangbi’s Neo-Daoism, in which he establishes his philosophical system by focusing on the concept of nothingness in the discussion of being and nonbeing of the Wei-Jin era, by summarizing this section of chapter 3: “Taking Nothingness as the Basis (以無爲本).”

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The way of nature is like a tree. As it grows taller, it gets far from its root; the less it grows, the more it will acquire the essence and maintain it. So, the more it grows, the further it is from the essence; this is called delusion. And, the less it grows, the closer it is to the essence; this is called acquisition.105

We can see from this that Wangbi promoted establishing a certain foundation, and actively trying to return to it, even though it was not a being that possesses a strict definition, like an independent, transcendental substance as in the West. As emphasized earlier, what we must focus on among Wangbi’s statements is that he shows the passive and negative points of view of returning to the essence of the root instead of to the branches, and to the small instead of the large. This helps us to predict how Wangbi’s abstract conceptualization was going to proceed in his establishment of the concept of essence. The negative and passive aspects of his understanding of essence are more clearly revealed in another statement explaining such an essence. The One is the ultimate of the small. Form means the same as the functioning of the norm.106

In his understanding of the concept of One (一), a way of thinking of the ultimate of the small was activated. It may be deduced as the concept of “infinitesimally small (極微)” in the Western world or in the Indian tradition. In his understanding of the concept of One, the dynamism of the Undivided Essence described as an affirmation-of-the-paradox of oneness of the Primordial Chaos (混沌之一) in pre-Qin Daoism was significantly weakened. Although it appears that the mysteriousness of the essence was maintained, it cannot be denied that it was explained by way of a passive and negative definition of being as “infinitesimally small.”107 It can be understood that the establishment of the concept of “original nothingness (本無)” was an active sign that heralded the beginning of Chinese metaphysics. Wangbi’s theory of “valuing nothingness (貴無論),” which embraced “taking nothingness as the basis (以無爲本),” is understood as a prototype of dualistic reductionism appearing in Chinese philosophy. Wangbi was unaware of the fact that the concept of original nothingness (本無) in Daoism, however it is modified, was bound to become a product of simple dualistic thinking. This way of understanding of Laozi by Wangbi became one of the most important points of view in the understanding of Daoism going forward. It also means that the development of metaphysical thinking had taken its position not as an exceptional case but as a main way of thinking in China.108 It is a well-known fact that there was a theory of “valuing being (貴無論)” in Wei-Jin era philosophy that was contrary to Wangbi’s, who valued the

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concept of original nothingness. In fact, this kind of confrontation is natural in terms of the general aspect of human thought. The theory of valuing being by Peiwei (裴頠), that opposed the theory of original nothingness of Wangbi, is a theory of realism (實有論) based on pro-Confucian values. And because the purpose of the discussion laid in advocating the Confucian system and values, it took for granted the current context and showed more interest in the ontological inquiry of innate principles of them, rather than an intense epistemological analysis of being and nonbeing.109 His basic point of argument for the theory of valuing being is developed as follows: Finally, I revealed the meaning of valuing nothingness, and I reestablished the “theory of devaluing being” (賤有論). If you devalue being, you will neglect the social system. If you neglect the social system, you will discard the conventional social system. If you discard the conventional social system, you will neglect what you must keep; If you neglect what you must keep, you will definitely lose propriety (禮). Thus, if the system of propriety (禮制) does not exist, politics cannot be conducted.110

In the passage above, the typical practical viewpoint of Confucianism is revealed simplistically. Jung Keun Won explains this kind of interpretation of the world, which is opposed to the theory of valuing nothingness of Wangbi and He Yan, as a conflict of the viewpoints, between that which considers the source of the essence of the universe as nothingness (無) and that which considers the source of the essence of the universe as a unified manifestation of being (有), not as absolute nothingness.111 His analysis may be seen as a good summary of the common but biased aspects of both philosophical trends that were trying to explain the world based on only one side of the dualistic extremes of being and nonbeing. While Pei Wei’s Theory of Valuing Being is a critique, from the Confucian perspective of realism, on the philosophy based on nothingness, Guoxiang’s realist perspective, which is also called “theory of individual transformation (獨化論)” and “theory of proper attributes (適性說),” is interpreted as having its roots in the Daoist worldview. The uniqueness of his realist perspective is presented in his commentary of the Zhuangzi. It is a very peculiar viewpoint that deserves to be associated with the way of defining being in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. First of all, let’s adopt a passage as an example from his commentary of Zhuangzi’s Free and Easy Wandering chapter (逍遙遊) that is known to twist Zhuangzi’s original intention, which best demonstrates the characteristics of Guoxiang’s theory of proper attributes. Mastering one’s own Original Nature is realization (至: arriving at the realm); fulfilling one’s Original Nature is the Ultimate (極: ultimate realm). Previously,

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I talked about the differences in the wings of two insects. Therefore, the places they reach are different; some go round and round in heaven and the earth, while some reach their aspiration in a birch or elm tree. They are satisfied according to their bodies without knowing why. Now, as for speaking about distinguishing the big and the small, since each has its Original Nature, they cannot reach the place even by standing on their tiptoes, even if they want to. And, as each is comfortable with its Original Nature, they do not for any reason grieve about their differences. Therefore, I am mentioning it again.112

The general view is that the Free and Easy Wandering chapter of the Zhuangzi explains the reason why one must pursue the level of a great mind that a small mind cannot reach. However, Guoxiang’s commentary on the passage above on the Free and Easy Wandering chapter nullifies the relative differences with the argument of “Therefore, even though they are different in terms of being small or large, they are equal in terms of wandering (故小大 雖殊, 逍遙一也).” The coherent logic shown in Guoxiang’s commentary on the Free and Easy Wandering chapter is an argument that says that, despite their differences, we must accept all beings as they are. This argument may be understood as an exhortation to accept an axiological evaluation, and to not discuss the superiority or inferiority in the original nature of things. However, given certain conditions, the possibility of being understood by being transformed into a discussion about the immutability of original nature, that is, an ontological discussion, is always open. This transformation can be found in Guoxiang’s “theory of individual transformation (獨化論),” based on the concept of “self-nature (自性).” This is a theory that posits a world in which independent, self-natured individuals transform and develop according to their original natures, and yet harmonize without mutual interference.113 Even though sensitivity to the dynamic world of change of Laozi and Zhuangzi seem to be reflected in the content development of the theory of individual transformation, the question is whether his theory of individual transformation could avoid problems that Leibinz’s Monadology had, that triggered difficult philosophical issues by establishing a substantial being indicated by the concept of an isolated individual. In fact, this way of explaining the world by presupposing the independence of individuals appeared frequently in pre-Qin Daoism. The duck’s legs are short, but to stretch them out would worry him; the crane’s legs are long, but to cut them down would make him sad. What is long by nature needs no cutting off; what is short by nature needs no stretching. That would be no way to get rid of worry.114

It is a phrase from the “Webbed Toes” (駢拇) story (Outer Chapters— Webbed Toes, 外篇 駢拇) in the Zhuangzi. It expresses the self-completeness of all beings. This thought also appears in the Daodejing.

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Hence some things lead and some follow; some breathe gently and some breathe hard; some are strong and some are weak; some destroy and some are destroyed. Therefore, the Sage avoids excess, extravagance, and arrogance.115

These phrases are statements acknowledging the exclusive identity of the individual objects appearing or being perceived dualistically, and they are frequently quoted for their explanations of Daoist naturalism. However, if the ways of understanding the world by Laozi and Zhuangzi had remained at this level, the insights of Daoists would not have garnered so much attention in the history of philosophy. The strong point of Daoist philosophy may be found in its presenting of a solution to how to overcome the collisions and development of the contradictions of these opposing beings, based on epistemological reflection. Accordingly, commentaries and similar phrases found in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, which would become the background for Guoxiang’s theory of individual transformation, reveal the first step in the Daoist understanding of the world, and can be seen as merely a preliminary example for resolving the more complex problems that would arise later. In this sense, Guoxiang’s understanding of Zhuangzi is at the beginning level in terms of the depth of epistemological reflection of pre-Qin Daoists, and it makes me question whether he reduced Zhuangzi’s philosophical intention. Of course, there could be an additional discussion on whether the true intention of the theory of individual transformation was that simple or not. However, it would not be easy to avoid the comments that the theory of individual transformation is limited in terms of reflecting on the phenomena of conflicts concerning opposing situations. As mentioned earlier, the viewpoint that the phenomenon of intellectual regression shown in Han Dynasty philosophy that was repeated in the Wei-Jin era would have been advocated more firmly if the simplicity of this theory of individual transformation had been understood and accepted. That is, we may find a negative aspect of a more fortified Chinese metaphysical understanding of the world in Guoxiang’s individual transformation theory. Such a development of logic quite likely contributed to generalizing the way of thinking that isolated concrete beings. Considering the position of Guoxiang in Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, this way of thinking was naturally spread among the contemporary intellectuals, and this may have reduced the reluctance to accept the concept of an exclusive, discriminative being. In other words, Guoxiang’s theory of individual transformation may have contributed to the generalization of a way of thinking that would replace the static understanding of a being as an immutable entity; that is, a conceptually defined being, with eternal and actual existence, by ignoring the dynamic transformation of all beings. The reason why Guoxiang could become a conservative advocate of Confucian orthodoxy, even though he was fundamentally a Daoist philosopher, might be because he firmly maintained this logic.116

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As can be seen from the above, the opposing trends that included the concepts of extreme being and extreme nothingness, which were supported as the fundamental concepts of the development of their thinking, were very strong in the Wei-Jin era. Of course, in the development of Chinese Buddhist theory, I cannot deny that Wangbi’s concept of original nothingness was more actively involved. However, if we focus our discussion on the expansion of the understanding of the world centering on the concepts of abstract being such as being or nothingness, we should not exclude the possibility as well that Guoxiang’s theory of individual transformation was one of the internal Chinese traditions of thought that directly or indirectly influenced the way of defining the isolated being in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things of the Zhaolun. Understanding the Philosophical Goals of the Madhyamaka-Śāstra in Relation to the Treatise on the Immutability of Things Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka-śāstra is a problematic text that has provoked various historical debates in the large field of Buddhist theories called Mahāyāna Middle Way Philosophy. These debates now occurring in the modern study of Buddhism are making systematic connections to the discussions of Western philosophies and have been continuously expanded and reproduced. They are also provoking awareness of the problems of comparative philosophy.117 While I was writing an essay on the reasons for discrepancies in the understanding of the Madhyamaka-śāstra by various contemporary scholars,118 I was able to confirm that the discrepancies may have originated from insufficient understanding of Buddhism’s theory of dependent arising and the consequential intervention of non-Buddhist perspectives. Since the purpose of this book is not dealing with all the issues of the understanding of the Madhyamaka-śāstra, I would like to proceed with the discussion focusing on the topics of Examination of Conditions (觀因緣品), Examination of the Moved and the Un-Moved (觀去來品), and Examination of Harmony (觀因果品). Of course, even if we limit the subject matter in this way, the most fundamental questions in understanding the Madhyamakaśāstra and what Nagarjuna intended to say through the Madhyamaka-śāstra cannot be avoided. In fact, in some ways, depending on how one answers such questions is crucial in determining whether he or she can comprehend the text correctly or not. Kalupahana’s critique of the existing comprehension of the Madhyamaka-śāstra and his call to read the Madhyamaka-śāstra based on Buddhism’s theory of dependent arising provides very important implications to these questions. Kalupahana insists that the philosophical perspective of Nagarjuna is a thorough restoration of the dependent arising perspective

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of early Buddhism; that is, the Madhyamaka-śāstra is simply criticizing the assertions of the substantialistic perspective, such as Sarvâstivāda, from its perspective. In this context, Kalupahana puts the brake on the misunderstanding, as if the concepts of coming and going, movement, causality, and transformation were denied in the Madhyamaka-śāstra. That is, what is denied is not phenomena such as these, but the substantialistic understanding of these concepts.119 The items that must be mentioned when Kalupahana explains the theory of dependent arising as the center in the understanding of the Madhyamakaśāstra are characteristics of the human experience. He emphasizes that human experience cannot avoid being limited, and, accordingly, that the theory of dependent arising is based on the experiences in given situations that are grasped by limited human experience; that is, the experiences of situations described in grammatical participles such as “has been” (bhūta), “has remained” (thita), “made” (kata), “dispositionally conditioned” (saṅkhata), and “dependently arisen” (paṭiccasamuppanna).120 In this context, Kalupahana strongly invokes that the words and concepts constituting our experiences must be understood as having limitations, due to having dependently arisen in such a way.121 Kalupahana’s insight in applying the dependent arising theory onto the human experience and language is a very important element in the comprehension of the Madhyamaka-śāstra. This is because the crossroads distinguishing correct from mistaken understandings of the Madhyamaka-śāstra depends on whether the insights into the language and concepts are coherently preserved or dulled. The reason why Kalupahana expresses his extreme aversion to Candrakirti’s (月稱) negative perspective on language is because his perspective on language is not based on the understanding of dependent arising. For this reason, Kalupahana is more friendly with Bhāvaviveka’s (淸辨) view that opposes Candrakirti’s. So it would be necessary to examine if Bhāvaviveka’s Svātantrika (Middle Way Autonomy School) method of argument is either more thorough or contradictory, in terms of its perspective concerning the dependent arising theory on the concepts and language, compared to the representative opposing viewpoint on the commentary of the Madhyamaka-śāstra of Candrakirti’s Prâsaṅgika (Middle Way Consequence School).122 Analysis of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things: Tracing the Origin and Inner Meanings of the Methods of Defining Isolated Being In this section, I would like to analyze the characteristics of the important passages in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. These analyses are based

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on an analysis of the Sarvâstivāda literature which possibly influenced the description of this treatise at the beginning of the era of transmission of Buddhism in China, an analysis of the method of understanding the metaphysical being of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism which was the dominant thought at Sengzhao’s time, and a summary of the philosophical direction of the Madhyamakaśāstra that is considered to have directly influenced Sengzhao. Perhaps the most striking way of defining being in Sengzhao’s Treatise on the Immutability of Things would be in the passages that seem to be copies of some passages from Examination of Conditions, Examination of the Moved and the Not-Moved and Examination of Harmony.123 Accordingly, first, I will find the similar passages to these in the Madhyamaka-śāstra and read the original philosophical intention by applying Kalupahana’s perspective. And by analyzing how Sengzhao explains the considered passages in his Treatise on the Immutability of Things that seem to be copies of passages in the Madhyamaka-śāstra, I will examine how his way of interpreting the Madhyamaka-śāstra emerged. Finally, I will examine how this way of interpretation and the understanding of being in Neo-Daoism can be related. And then, second, I will look for passages that seem to copy the way of defining being in the commentaries of Sarvâstivāda texts, among the various ways of defining being in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things. And then, I will determine if Sengzhao’s understanding of the passages is a mere repetition of the logic of Sarvâstivāda or an addition of different elements to it. In the Treatise on the Immutability of Things, the only passage that he begins his discussion with by directly referring to the Madhyamaka-śāstra translated by Kumarajiva is as follows: “The existent mover observes the direction, and tries to know where it goes, (but) he cannot reach the destination (觀方知彼去，去者不至 方).” If we look for the passages related to this portion of the text, it would be the last verse, 25. It is unique because only passage 25 mentions the place to go. Passage 25 is translated as follows: “Therefore, neither motion, nor the mover, nor the place to go to exist.”124

When we follow the discussion, as if the motion and the mover who performs the motion exist separately, then the motion, the mover, and the place to go to are set apart from each other, and so they lose their place in concrete experiences. Kalupahana reads this conclusion as a critical warning against the substantialization of a conceptual situation. If one rereads the entire Examination of the Moved and the Not-Moved text in this context, one can gradually understand that the Middle Way of Nagarjuna is not a book with a consistent story of complexity and technical concepts that was difficult for the masses to keep up with. Seen in this way, one may come to understand that the philosophical assertions of what Examination of the Moved and the

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Not-Moved of the Middle Way ultimately tries to convey is that one should not follow analytical logic of such philosophical perspectives of Sarvâstivāda without reflection, in terms of the understanding of the phenomena of “going and coming (去來).” That is, if one follows their logic as it is, one will find that being that could be a category of explanations or concepts of various categories of forms, flows into extreme isolation. Accordingly, dynamic phenomena are infinitely divided and positioned into isolated states of situations. It is understood by being replaced with an assemblage of various static events. The Middle Way may be understood as a warning against coming to strange conclusions that are derived from segregating concrete human experiences. Sengzhao summarizes passages such as the previously quoted one by saying, “The existent mover observes the direction, and tries to know where it goes, but he cannot reach the destination (觀方知彼去, 去者不至 方).” And, he explains this as “Since it is from motion that tranquility is acquired, it is evident that all beings do not move.”125 Sengzhao defines the true character of the other side (裏面) of the experience of motion as tranquility (靜). This shows that Wangbi’s (226–249 AD) worldview, which greatly influenced Buddhist discourses during the Wei-Jin era, also extended to Sengzhao. As analyzed earlier, Wangbi’s understanding of the essence of the universe is expressed as nothingness (無) or original nothingness (本無), and appears to be passive and static. It would be difficult to consider that this assertion of tranquility by Sengzhao was formed outside of the ideological atmosphere of the Wei-Jin era. In addition to this, Sengzhao developed his argument to explain the cause of this tranquility, that there is “neither coming nor going (不來不去)” by individual objective objects perceived by way of temporal disposition. Sengzhao insisted that the reason is because the logic of others is different from his. That is, even though the average person and he himself assume the same thing when they say “a thing from the past does not arrive in the present ( 以昔物不至今),” the average person assumes that the referred objects presupposed to be identical moves and transforms itself due to the difference between the past and present. However, he considers them as two different things (二物), because the past thing and the present thing are different.126 And he asserts that with a little reflection, anyone can accept this understanding of the situation. So there is no movement.127 Sengzhao’s argument as such may be seen to be influenced by Sarvâstivāda’s perspective that views any situation as infinitely divided and in isolation. As we saw in the analysis of passages quoted from the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthānaśāstra, where the perception of the world based on such a logic is developed and deepened, it is inevitable to conclude the perception of the world as forms “being born at every moment (刹那生)” and forms “being annihilated at every moment (刹那滅).” This perception of his appears as a passage insisting on the complete separation between the past situation and the present situation.

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If you look for an object of the past in the past, there was not a time that it did not exist in the past. If you look for an object of the past in the present, there is not a time that it exists in the present. Since it does not exist in the present, it is clear that the object did not come. Since there was never a time that it did not exist in the past, we may know that it did not go. Again, conversely, even if we look for it in the present, the present also does not go to the past. This means that because an object of the past stays in the past by itself, it did not go to the past from the present, and that an object from the present stays in the present by itself, as it did not arrive in the present from the past.128

It may be inferred that an insufficient understanding of the verses of the Examination of Conditions and Examination of Harmony of the Middle Way might have played a role in Sengzhao’s perception. Among the several verses in the Examination of the Moved, the eighth verse reminds us that understanding the relationship between cause and effect is not that simple. And it seems quite possible that this verse influenced Sengzhao’s perspective on causality. It is impossible to say whether there is already a result in advance in a condition or not. If a result has not yet existed, for what does it become a condition? If it existed before, what would be the use of a condition?129

This passage in the Middle Way must be interpreted as a critical warning statement by Nagarjuna that the concept of condition cannot be established if a certain existence is presupposed as an existence with an exclusive original nature, as in Sarvâstivāda. That is, this passage points out that we cannot grasp the practical phenomenon of causality by contemplating that causality presupposes isolated situations. Conversely, it must be interpreted as pointing out that the practical phenomenon of causality may be seen properly when we see the situation as the precedents and the subsequent incidents sustaining an interdependent relationship and manifesting themselves simultaneously and separately; that is, when we understand the causal relationship from the dependent arising perspective. Seen in this way, it may be interpreted that the development of the discussion in the Examination of Harmony chapter of the Middle Way shows unreasonable conclusions in various cases that arose in discussions addressing the cause and effect by isolating them. The fifth and sixth verses of the Examination of Harmony stand out, as they develop the discussion by showing the technique of arriving at an absurdity by conceptually isolating and establishing and then subdividing concrete phenomena, and finally reisolating the subdivisions. The discussion is developed by dividing two attributes of a cause, into the effect and the extinction of the cause.

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If a cause were a cause to an effect, and if it produced a cause and then ceased to exist, then such a cause would have two substances; the giving and the extinguishing. If the cause were to extinguish without playing a role as a cause to an effect, then the case would be that the cause extinguishes but the result occurs. This is an effect without a cause.130

What level of understanding did Sengzhao have regarding these verses of the Examination of Conditions and Examination of Harmony that he had a strong probability of having read? It would be common sense to judge Sengzhao’s understanding as not that high, considering the evaluations of the level of understanding of the Wei-Jin Chinese Buddhist monks by Kamata Shiego and Eric Zurcher. Another reason for making such an assessment is because Guoxiang’s theory of individual transformation, which had a huge influence on the understanding of the realistic object in the Wei-Jin era, as mentioned earlier, could not reach the level of reflexive insight of the pre-Qin Daoists, when compared to the worldview of the pre-Qin Daoists. There is a strong possibility that Sengzhao might have encountered and read the commentaries of the Sarvâstivāda tradition, but it does not seem that he expressed any special opinion beyond the capacity of ontological or epistemological insight that was dominant in the Chinese thought tradition at that time. It does not seem that he critically understood the complicated issues of the debates on the commentaries of the later scholars. Due to such a limitation at the time of Sengzhao, his method of determining existence that was repeated a number of times in the Treatise on the Immutability of Things faithfully follows the Sarvâstivāda method of presupposing a very simple isolated existence, as in the following. What on earth is the reason why you want to move it after saying past and present? Therefore, even if you say it is going, it is definitely not going. It is because the past and the present always exist, and do not move.131

These statements are the result of a perspective that evokes a separation between the past and the present due to the conviction that there is a sharp division between the past and the present without any connection between them. Such a perspective excludes the vivid human experiences that perceive the world as being continuously added to and changing in a qualitative way, and thereby produces a worldview that cannot include the totality of human experience. Now, from the standpoint of summarizing the above analysis, let’s compare side by side the understandings of causality in the Treatise on Immutability of Things, the passages from the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra,

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and the fifth and sixth verses of the Examination of Harmony of Nagarjuna. If so, we can easily grasp that the logical development of the Treatise on Immutability of Things of Sengzhao is not a critical statement that understands the philosophical goal of the Middle Way of Nagarjuna, but rather is close to the way of simply following a discussion that presupposes the isolated substance of the Sarvāstivādins. An effect is not endowed with a cause; due to a cause, there is an effect. Since due to a cause there is an effect, the cause does not disappear in the past. The effect is not endowed with a cause, so the cause does not come to the present. Since neither disappears nor comes, it is clear that nothing moves.132

As we have examined, Sengzhao does not seem to accommodate the philosophical goals of the Middle Way completely, in his Treatise on Immutability of Things, to develop the discussion. His method of defining existence is repeating the generally understood philosophical perspective of Sarvâstivāda. Moreover, we may find an additional interpretation influenced by Wangbi’s static aspect of original nothingness, based on passive reductionism, among the discussions of the essence of the universe during the Wei-Jin era. And the explanation of the world as Sarvâstivāda’s static set of isolated individuals, as expressed in the Treatise on Immutability of Things, is structurally similar to the worldview of the theory of proper attributes and the theory of individual transformation of Guoxiang that depicts the self-production and the self-transformation of isolated individuals. Because of this, we should consider the strong possibility that Guoxiang’s worldview played a huge role in reducing Shengzhao’s resistance to accepting the logic of Sarvâstivāda. The Tendency for Substantialistic Thinking in the Dharma Body Theory during the Wei-Jin Era It was previously pointed out that the appearance of a philosophical assertion such as “imperishability of the soul” held by Chinese Buddhists and the emergence of religious phenomena such as the creation of gigantic statues of the Buddha were not natural from the perspective of Chinese traditions. On the other hand, I must admit that the reason why such phenomena actually appeared in China is because, as a product of conceptual abstract thinking, the Chinese way of thinking held the possibility of accommodating Central Asian Buddhist concepts. That is, it should be noted that there was a sinicized metaphysics, similar to that in the West, that embodied a metaphysical or substantialistic understanding of the world as a product of conceptual and abstract thinking, namely Neo-Daoism; a sinicized outcome of substantialistic thinking in the Wei-Jin era that was operating as the basis of this phenomena.

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The development of the Theory of Dharma Bodies (法身論), and the Theory of Buddha Nature (佛性論), must be understood as having applied this same perspective. Only by doing so can the characteristics of the various religious and philosophical discussions that arose in China be properly understood. The Theory of Dharma Bodies is, of course, a Chinese variation of Central Asian Buddhist theory. Accordingly, I would like to discuss the characteristics of Central Asian Buddhism in the following order. First, I will examine the cause of the transformation of Buddhism, which was the pinnacle of the lineage of anti-Brahmin thought, from the primitive Zoroastrianism tradition in Central Asia that was the prototype of Brahmin thought. More specifically, I will analyze how Zoroastrian theology, which is the background of these phenomena, was reflected in the Theory of Dharma Bodies in early Chinese Buddhism, while also focusing on the construction of gigantic Buddha statues and the transmission of these traditions into China. Second, by examining how the concepts of anātman and the theory of dependent arising are understood and misunderstood amidst this transformation, in association with the reflective introspection of modern Western philosophy on the positive and negative aspects of conceptual, abstract thinking in comparison to the history of reflective reasoning in Buddhism, I would like to explain the point that such discussions of metaphysical and substantialistic fallacies are found in the perspective of Dharma Bodies of early Chinese Buddhism by focusing on the sinicized perspective of Dharma Bodies by Huiyuan.

PENETRATION OF THE CONCEPT OF A SUBSTANTIALISTIC SOUL (神) INTO BUDDHISM The cause of the phenomenon of the intervention of substantialistic thinking appearing in early Chinese Buddhism may be found in the following two areas that had already appeared in the developmental process of Indian Buddhism. The first was the penetration of the concept of an Absolute Deity in Buddhism, which was the focus of an active critique of Buddhism from a religious point of view. The second aspect was the phenomenon of the penetration into Buddhism of the negative aspects of conceptual and abstract thinking, as the tendency toward the absolutization of Buddhist theory and principles that appeared in the process of the sophistication of the theories of anātman and dependent arising. Among these two, particularly the first phenomenon, the deification of the Buddha in the northwestern region of India, specifically in the Gandhara region which borders Central Asia, played the most prominent role. This topic was dealt in detail in chapter 2, Religious

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Characteristics of Central Asians and Buddhism in the Kushan Era. I will briefly summarize the contents here to aid understanding. Buddhism and Zoroastrianism during the Kushan Empire Era In the history of Indian Buddhism, the period in which the phenomenon of the Buddha as an Absolute Deity emerging in earnest may have been when Buddhism began to be transmitted into the northwestern region of India. Although the phenomenon of the deification of the Buddha appeared in the central areas of Indian Buddhism even before the transmission, as a result of the reflecting of religious tendencies at a primitive level, the starting point of the dominant phenomenon of projecting the elements of an Absolute Deity onto the understanding of the Buddha was the penetration of religious characteristics of the Central Asian region into Buddhism. The influence of the religious thinking of Central Asia on that of India becomes clear when we look at the historical event of Aryan tribes migrating into India from a macroscopic point of view. The Aryans in Central Asia spread not only into the northwestern part of India but also to Iran; that is, Middle Asia. We must pay attention to the fact that Zoroastrianism, which had transformed from a primitive religion to an advanced religion, then repenetrated into Central Asia from Iran. In this historical context, Buddhism also must have encountered Zoroastrianism, as another one of the religions penetrating into the northwestern region of India. That is, it means that we have to keep in mind, and to understand the characteristics of Central Asian Buddhism properly, that Zoroastrianism, which was rooted in their primitive religions, strongly dominated the religious sensitivities of the Central Asian peoples. On the other hand, we must also pay attention to the fact that the Absolute Beings appearing in Vedic literature, a collection of the religious ideas of the Aryan people who migrated to India, reflected in a similar way the religious characteristics of the Aryan people’s Zoroastrianism, which greatly influenced the establishment of the concept of a monotheistic Deity in Central Asia. This must be taken into consideration while trying to see what happened when Buddhism, which had been established as a critique of the Vedic tradition, went to Central Asia, which is believed to be the area of origin of Vedic thought. The following is a summary of the religious and ideological characteristics of the Kushan Empire region, focusing only on the necessary parts in relation to Kushan Buddhism. First, we must pay attention to the fact that the geographical and temporal domain of Central Asian Buddhism in the Kushan Empire had the greatest direct influence on the formation of early Chinese Buddhism. Second, we must take into account that various peoples such as Persians, Greeks, Sakas, and others had ruled this region prior to the Kushan Empire,

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and at the same time pay attention to the fact that the major groups of peoples such as Scythians, Sauromatians,Yuezhi, Sakas, and others who resided throughout this area that includes not only oases but also the mountainous steppes, were Iranian nomadic peoples; that is Aryans, before the major migration of Turks in the ninth and tenth centuries AD. Third, the rulers of the Kushan Empire were nomads who managed the empire by flexibly absorbing the cultures and religions of the previous ruling peoples. In particular, their method of political rule followed the Persian Empire satrap system; that is, assigning governors to the regions. This flexibility made it possible to not only accommodate diverse cultures but also to engage in versatile trading with those in the vast region from the Mediterranean Sea to China. Their resulting commercial success helped Buddhist temples connected to the traders accumulate fortunes, thus laying the foundation for the Kushan Empire to be the center of the propagation of Buddhism. Fourth, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the concept of Maitreya Buddha and Amitābha Buddha possessing the strong power of salvation emerging in northwestern Buddhism is related to Zoroastrian theology. In other words, it is highly likely that Zoroastrian theology influenced the emergence of beings such as Maitreya Buddha and Amitābha Buddha as the objects of popular Buddhist faith. This could mean that it is more a reality than a probability when we infer the possibility of the transformation of Buddhism when it went to the region where Zoroastrianism had originated. In a similar context, we can assert that Iranian religion that was influenced by Zoroastrianism influenced Mahayana Buddist thought. The above contents help us understand why the phenomenon of building gigantic statues like the Bamiyan Buddhas occurred, as that had not appeared in main regions of Indian Buddhism but occurred first in the Kushan Empire region, and how that phenomenon was transmitted to China. In particular, it cannot be denied that the construction of the gigantic statues was an expression of the secular and religious desires of the peoples in the region. Therefore, the understanding of Zoroastrian theology in the Kushan Empire projected in the gigantic Buddhas became an indispensable project to comprehend how the Buddhist theories came to be transformed in the Central Asian region. The Mechanism of Human Consciousness in the Establishment of the Concept of God It is necessary to examine what form of conceptualizing mankind used to establish the concept of God, in order to understand Zoroastrian theology from a more general perspective. This would be a matter of examining through not only what processes were included in the concept of God in Zoroastrianism

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but also how the diverse concepts of deity were established, and furthermore, how these have intervened concretely in our human ways of understanding of the world and what kind of consequences they have produced. Recent rapid progress in neuropsychology, science of the brain and cognition structure research, provides opportunities to contemplate reflectively on the meaning of philosophical debates related to the existing concepts of God. In particular, the progress in these areas has been playing a role in pointing out the problems of the discussions regarding the incorrect yet established philosophical assertions to prove the existence of God, and making the religious and philosophical insights into the newly established concepts of God more persuasive. Michael Shermer, in his masterpiece The Believing Brain, explains how the concept of God was established according to the operational principle of the concept of “agenticity” as follows: As large-brained hominids with a developed cortex and a “theory of mind”— the capacity to be aware of such mental states as desires and intentions in both ourselves and others—we practice what I call agenticity: the tendency to infuse patterns with meaning, intention, and agency. That is, we often impart the patterns we find with agency and intention, and believe that these intentional agents control the world, sometimes invisibly from the top down, instead of bottom-up causal laws and randomness that makes up much of our world.133

His explanation above seems to have assimilated the research outcomes of diverse scholars such as Daniel Dennett, Bruce M. Hood, Michael A Persinger, and others. He explains the theory of mind, which is the basis for the operation of human “agenticity,” with some sample explanations from neuropsychology. He says that this phenomenon is a product of a human strategy to survive and a result of evolution. In a review of the research on what brain scans have revealed about the location of such mind reading, Glasgow University neuroscientists Helen Gallagher and Christopher Frith concluded that there are three areas consistently activated whenever ToM is needed-located in different areas of cortex: the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci, and the temporal poles bilaterally. The first two brain structures are involved in processing explicit behavioral information, such as the perception of intentional behavior on the part of other organisms: “that predator intends to eat me.” All three of these structures are necessary for ToM, and Gllagher and Frith go so far as to posit that the anterior paracingulate cortex (located just behind your forehead) is the seat of the theory of mind mechanism.134

He defines the manifestations of the special incidental subsidiary properties that such a function brings, which become the core aspects of his assertion;

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that is, the universality of an a priori operation of belief in the human judgment of circumstances,135 and these are the abilities to imitate, predict, and empathize. He introduces an experiment on how the brain functions (by Sameer Sheth, Sam Harris, and Mark Cohen, Different Areas of the Brain Respond to Belief, Disbelief and Uncertainty) on the mechanism of the mind based on these abilities and explains the trend of the function of the brain as follows: This research supports what I call Spinoza’s conjecture: belief comes quickly and naturally, skepticism is slow and unnatural and most people have a low tolerance for ambiguity. This scientific principle that a claim is untrue unless proven otherwise runs counter to our natural tendency to accept as true that which we can comprehend quickly.136

In this context, if I simplify the establishment of the process of the human concept of God through Shermer’s explanation of the science of the brain, the sequence would be as follows: the operation of a theory of the mind, the operation of “agenticity,” the intervention of “agenticity” and the operation of the belief mechanism regarding certain individual events, the operation of the “agenticity” mechanism and belief mechanism overall on a universal situation, and the establishment of the concept of God as an Absolute Being on the operation of the belief mechanism. His way of explaining the human establishment of the concept of God and belief focuses on criticizing the blindness of unscientific belief about fictitious objects, including God, and so, it appears difficult to offer a counter-critique of it scientifically. However, if we shift the focus of the discussion a little and consider the operation mechanism of the brain as a product of human evolutionary strategy, as he asserts, to examine its duplicity in a balanced way, then another type of discussion may be established. Shermer also seems to be aware of this issue. In the epilogue, he states the following: An emotional leap of faith beyond reason is often required just to get through the day, let alone make the big decisions in life. . . . Nature has gifted us with a double—edged sword that cuts for and against. On the edge, our brains are the most complex and sophisticated information-processing machines in the universe, capable of understanding not only the universe itself but also the process of understanding. On the other edge, by the very same process of forming beliefs about the universe and ourselves, we are also more capable than any other species of self-deception and illusion, of fooling ourselves even while we are trying to avoid being fooled by nature.137

However, the task he was thinking of was not only carried out by performing analyses similar to his, based on the progresses of brain science,138 but

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was also being worked on by many philosophers with diverse perspectives. For example, contemporary philosophers like Whitehead and Van Peursen as well as modern Buddhist philosophers like Kalupahana have dealt with the issues raised by Shermer from their perspectives on excessive and superfluous intervention of human conceptual thinking. Furthermore, it can be said that this kind of problem of human thinking was already reflected in the general view of human beings and worldview of Buddhism, based on the fact that, the Buddhist theory of consciousness (唯識) was pointed out through observation of the deep stream of human consciousness.139 Reflecting on the Classic Concept of God and the Meaning of Establishing a New Concept of God At the basis of the operation of the “agenticity” mechanism of human brain function and the ability to imitate, estimate, and empathize, the human cognitive ability to respond to unpredictable situations as predictable situations, by simply ordering and corresponding them, seems to be engaged. Shermer also pointed out that this is a greatly evolved special human cognitive ability. In the existing traditional fields of philosophy, this is dealt with as an issue of the human conceptualization and abstraction ability to replace “changing concrete situations” with “unchanging conceptual situations,” and their duplicity. Whitehead argues that the crucial problem in existing philosophy is not abstract thinking itself, but in the distortion of the understanding of the world arising from the attempt to contain all human experiences within the narrow frame of abstract thinking. He points out that this distortion is an issue arising from the inability to find a way to logically explain the human experience of temporality and explains that this situation is a distortion of reality derived from the limitation of Western language usage. For example, single words, each with its dictionary meaning, and single sentences, each bounded by full stops, suggest the possibility of complete abstraction from any environment. Thus, the problem of philosophy is apt to be conceived as the understanding of the interconnections of things, each understandable, apart from reference to anything else.140 Too much attention has been directed to the mere datum and the mere issue. The essence of existence lies in the transition from datum to issue.141

Reflecting on the interpretation of the world by simple located facts, that can be said to be spatial interpretations of temporal events, as expressed in Process and Reality, is the process and reality that most systematically describes his understanding of the world among all his works. Whitehead uses a trichotomous structure to emphasize the temporality and dynamism of

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events, and the concepts that he uses must be reread in a new way with the understanding of connotations that the new categorical structure indicates; not through the existing, simple located connotations.142 In his philosophy of process, God is not a simple located abstract being. To borrow Shermer’s expression, it is not the object of unchanging and blind belief that makes the agenticity universalized to the extreme. Chang Okh Moon demands a new reading of Whitehead’s concept of God, explaining it as follows: Ultimately, God in His primitive nature is a treasure trove of pure possibilities arranged in order. And, in the sense that God is the treasure trove of possibilities, God becomes the source of newness and order. Owing to the particular value system primitively established by God, a new order becomes possible (PR 46–48), and because of the new order, new actual beings and new actual worlds become possible (RM 90–91).143

This is a new way of defining the concept of a Dynamic God, which is “God as process” and quite different from the existing traditional way that the concept of an Absolute God was established. Here, God is not the already completed God presupposed to be an absolute and perfected entity, but the God of an open system that creatively bestows new order in the changing world that we live in. In this sense, God is not a controlling power with an unchanging definite form, but the process itself that is continuously creating new definite forms, and a ceaselessly changing open order that can only be grasped by a delicate and vigilant consciousness. Such a definition of the concept of God is newly extended, from the God that had been understood traditionally to be static and abstract, on the premise of experiencing the living and dynamic world. This expansion of meaning makes the concept of God function in concrete phenomena, as it could not find its proper place in the concrete phenomenal world due to its past, narrowly defined meaning. Van Peursen analyzes the meaning of the concept of God appearing in human cultures in a different way. Of course, his conclusion asks for a change in perspective from a closed God to an open God in terms of the understanding of the concept of God. The schema of his way of understanding the world consists of the three categories of mythological thinking, ontological thinking, and functional thinking, with magical thinking, substantialistic thinking, and operational thinking as their negative counterparts. What we have to pay attention to in his scheme in relation to this book is the functioning of mythological thinking and ontological thinking. That is, according to his view, the concept of God could have originated from the human experience of the overwhelming power surrounding them, as shown in mythological thinking. Van Peursen points out that at the mythological

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thinking stage, the individual has not yet established an independent selfconsciousness and is engulfed by an overwhelming force. He points out that the individual thus reveals an image of grasping the situation by mixing the undivided subject with the undivided object. In fact, in the sense that this is a basic form of religious experience, it may be said that this form of consciousness is running through us now. However, only in the stage of ontological thinking, that is, when the division between subject and object becomes more clear, the so-called “stage” when logical thinking is sophisticated, does this kind of religious sensibility transform into the religious sensibility of ontological form. Van Peusen describes this as follows: The habit of reflecting upon Being manifests itself in a multiplicity of religious ideas and philosophical speculations.  .  .  . At all events ‘salvation’ involves a growing insight into true reality as the absolute—sometimes lying beyond every opposition, like that of subject and object, being and not-being—which implies detachment from all that is relative, changing, transient. This then leads to very explicit ontological systems, in which the processes of knowing and reasoning are analyzed with great care. . . . A whole range of categories of thinking and of being, with the most subtle logical ramifications, functions in the context of one saving insight: that all is one within the Absolute.144

This is a process by which the ontological form of religious sensibility is established by not collapsing into mythological sensibility against the overwhelming power engulfing me, but by keeping distance from it by objectifying the power and logically explaining it. But eventually, the concept of the Absolute Being transcendent of the subject and object as a logical inference is established, and this replaces the mystical power. The issue is that in this process, when the contemplating subject intends to confine the contemplated object in the area of its explanation by isolating it, substantialistic thinking, which is the negative aspect of ontological thinking, comes into play. Accordingly, the substance that Van Peursen refers to as substantialistic thinking means either that it belongs to a certain category that includes the total and individual or universal and particular, or the existence that results in immutability and isolation by being understood as having self-contained attributes. This phenomenon can be read in Shermer’s polarization of agenticity in the same context, even though they are different ways of explaining. And it can also be found in the world understood as a set of phenomena that are identified in a simply located and distorted form, which Whitehead criticizes. Van Peursen points out that when the substantialistic thinking is operating overwhelmingly, the transcendental God who must continuously transcend the subject may contradictorily lose its meaning in concrete reality. Whereas if one takes subjective experiences, direct apprehensions of the surrounding world and the like as one’s point of departure, the whole physical

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world becomes something unreal. Again, nature and the supernatural are substantialized to such an extent that the relation between them is destroyed. Men advance certain “values,” that is, timeless norms, which must be taken as a guide in matters ethical, political and aesthetic. They also speak of ‘God’ as the supreme Substance out of whom the unending programme of the world process logically flows (consequi) and unrolls itself in time. No sooner is the supernatural thoroughly systematized, rationally demonstrated and brought within the rules of reason in this way than it.145

These modern philosophers’ attempt to change the concept of God conversely confirm what problems the existing concept of God has had. In fact, we must consider that magical thinking, the negative aspect of mythological thinking, and substantialistic thinking, the negative aspect of ontological thinking, as pointed out by Van Peursen, still continue to operate in the form of present progressive thinking that has not yet been overcome. Therefore, from his point of view, our existing way of understanding the concept of a substantialistic God that provokes conflicts by constricting and distorting the contents of our actual experiences is merely something to be overcome. Van Peursen tries to resolve this by presenting a frame of thinking called functional thinking. Here, the dynamic relationship between the categories of subject and object becomes the main concern, rather than the categories of subject and object themselves. He pays attention to the nonfixedness and the relationship of interdependency of the subject and the object when they are grasped in reality and explains that when we observe how the two are related to each other, then eventually the meaning of all actual beings (including conceptual objects) will be properly understood. Therefore, for him, the concept of God as understood from the perspective of functional thinking is explained as follows: At the very beginning of this chapter the point was made that in and by itself the question of the supernatural is meaningless and could only be handled properly when set within the question of the natural. This implies, not that the divine is eliminated but that the God-question be raised in a functional context: how can the term “God” be given a concrete setting in the routine relationship which the person and the community adopt vis-à-vis their history. There is no longer any place either for theism or for atheism in the traditional sense, because both the affirmation and the denial of God’s existence were here rooted in a predetermined interpretation of the term “God”. . . . The functional approach to the question of God requires openness: the key words to our existence can only become charged with meaning as we proceed.146

The understanding of the concept of God by such open-minded philosophers as Whitehead and Van Peursen may be said to conversely reveal the issues of the closed nature of the traditional way of understanding the concept

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of God based on the substantialistic point of view. As mentioned earlier, their understandings of the concept of God provide expansive insights into human experiences beyond the critique of the traditional concept of God based on brain science by people like Shermer. It is not an exaggeration to say that understanding the world through anti-substantialistic insight is common sense in the Buddhist tradition. This is revealed broadly and profoundly in Buddhism’s discourses. David J. Kalupahana is one of the contemporary Buddhist philosophers who explain this kind of insight coherently. Kalupahana’s Way of Understanding Regarding the Penetration of Substantialistic Thinking into Buddhism Kalupahana’s understanding of Buddhism is the understanding through the confrontation between substantialism and anti-substantialism, as he himself mentions in his various works. That is, in the context of the general history of Indian philosophy, he explains the characteristics of Buddhism through the confrontation between the substantialistic understanding of the world of the Vedantic tradition and anti-substantialistic understanding of the world of Buddhism. In the context of the history of Buddhism, he highlights the confrontation between the Buddhist tradition faithful to anti-substantialism and the Buddhist tradition that distorted the intention of the Buddha by leaving room for a substantialistic interpretation that broke away from its own tradition. According to this, he examines thoroughly how the anti-substantialisticistic perspective of early Buddhism was revived in the traditions of the Middle Way and Consciousness-Only schools. What we want to focus on in this work, in association with the Dharma Body theory, is the passages in which he explains that even these revivals are again misled by the substantialists’ perspective. Kalupahana emphasizes that the dependent arising theory is a theory based on the limited situation grasped by conditioned human experiences; that is, experiences of the situations expressed in participle forms such as “has been” (bhuta) or “has remained” (thita), “made” (kata), “dispositionally conditioned” (sankahta), or “dependently arisen” (paṭiccasamuppanna).147 Accordingly, it is Kalupahana’s coherent perspective that we must not forget that the words and the concepts constituting our experiences are dependently originated.148 He asserts that he cannot help seeing that even the commentators of the Middle Way as well as Sarvāstivādins and Sautrântikans are engulfed by the negative aspect of the understanding of the conceptualized world of the theory of self-nature; that is, substantialism.149 In other words, Kalupahana reminds us that the dependent arising theory of Buddhism already delicately contains the effort to avoid the fallacies that can be derived by chance when we express the experiences of continuity and dynamism in conceptual language; that is absolutization and the metaphysicalization of principles.

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However, the penetration of the substantialistic way of thinking, as Kalupahana points out, may be seen to have been occurring continuously and widely in the history of Buddhism. Even though a substantialistic way of thinking has been constantly corrected in the tradition of Buddhism by the original anti-substantialisticistic insight in Buddhism, such as anātman and dependent arising, it is true that not only in lay Buddhism but also in the realm of theoretical Buddhism that they have mutually influenced each other, and so the substantialistic discourse has been raised and amplified. The most noteworthy aspects that we need to pay attention to when Kalupahana explains these phenomena are the description of the contents of awakening and the attributes of the enlightened Buddha. In the dependent arising worldview, in which the Buddha insists on criticizing the Vedic tradition, it does not tolerate absolute knowledge of the objective world. Therefore, the dependent arising world that the Buddha explained neither perfectly nor faultlessly describes the whole world in its entirety, but we must understand that he was describing an image of the world that appears to and is understood by us from the perspective of admitting the limitations of human perception and experience. It is not a problem of knowledge of the world but a problem of the attitude through which we see the world. Therefore, the right knowledge of the world according to the Buddhist perspective is based on constant results appearing through the accumulation of such a perspective. In this sense, the arguments surrounding the Buddha’s omniscience may be seen to appear when one understands the Buddha’s abilities as being exaggerated to the religiously absolute level, beyond expressing reverence for the firmness of the dependent arising worldview, and the resultant coherence of his explanation of the world and of his behaviors. Kalupahana is aware of these facts, and points out the following: Yet some of his contemporaries soon began to speculate about the nature and scope of the Buddha’s knowledge, sometimes attributing to him absolute “omniscience” (sabbannuta) comparable to that claimed by his senior contemporary, Vardhamana Mahavira.150

From the perspective of scholars such as Van Peursen, this concept of omniscience could be a manifestation of the substantialistic tendency of human thinking to absolutize the Buddha’s cognitive ability. This tendency could naturally be applied to the discussion of objects themselves. For example, this is the case when one admires the completeness of the world that is revealed wholly from the perspective of omniscience. In other words, the admiration of the world that is seen to be completely penetrated by emptiness, or revealed wholly in a dependently arisen format, may continue to lead to the discussion of the completeness of the world itself. That is, while the “nature

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of the essence is great emptiness (大空性)” and the principle of dependent arising were already given as unchanging world principles to which the Buddha had correctly awakened, the ordinary people misunderstand. That is, it is the evolution of the argument about the completeness of the empty objective world itself, and of the claim of the completeness of the world from the principle of dependent arising without any error. This has a high possibility of being ultimately finally developed into a discussion form based on the dichotomy of subject and object and of the completeness of the object and the incompleteness of man. The Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra (楞伽經) expresses this as follows: This is the nature as it is (dharmata) of all things, which belongs only in the realm of Mind, and it is not comprehended by the ignorant as they are confused by every form of imagination.151

It is Kalupahana’s point of view that such expressions are not controlled by the reflective insights of the original tradition of Buddhism, but that they frequently appear to be engulfed in an incomplete dichotomous structure; that is, a simple form of discussion in the history of Buddhist theories about a complete object and incomplete subject, a complete perceiving subject and an incomplete perceiving subject. In order to see what kind of phenomena appear when Buddhism is transmitted to places where the substantialistic worldview is strongly maintained in a state where reflective insight does not function properly, or a strong substantialistic belief system is strong enough to produce an enduring concept of an Absolute Deity, the Buddhism in the Kushan Empire would be a good example to affirm the substantialistic thought of mankind. The Characteristics of the Zoroastrian Concept of God and the Meaning of the Colossal Buddha Statues The pantheon of gods on Kushan coins, with gods of pre-Zoroastrian, Zoroastrian, Greek, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Indian origin, clearly reflects the syncretic character of the Kushan Empire.152 Lamotte points out that the religious practices of the peoples of this region who believed in various gods were very secular.153 This should not be a big issue because the religious practices of lay people are mostly praying for prosperity, regardless of their location, with some degree of differences. Lamotte insists that the faith in deities by the Buddhists in this region was low, which hardly makes them an appropriate case by which to evaluate daily Buddhist activities of lay Buddhists who should be atheistic. Actually, it should be noted that lay Buddhists who should have been atheistic made colossal statues of Buddhas and worshiped the Buddha as a divine being. In fact, explaining this phenomenon

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only through the extent of the secular desires of the people in this region cannot be appropriate. We need to consider that a deeper cause for the occurrence of such a phenomenon was at work. This deeper cause actively mentioned in recent studies is the tradition of Zoroastrianism. Since I already explained in detail about the concept of God in Zoroastrianism as an advanced religion which had strong influence in the region where Buddhism was transmitted, as well as the general religious sensitivity of the nomads who are presumed to have maintained the tradition of PreZoroastrianism in chapter 2: “Religious characteristics of Central Asians and the Buddhism of Kushan Empire,” I will summarize the related contents concerning the understanding of Buddhism while keeping in mind what kind of phenomena were occurring while these two aspects were syncretizing and being projected onto their understanding of Buddhism. First, Zoroastrianism, as an advanced religion, worships Ahura Mazda as the one and only God. This being is referred to by a combination of the words, Ahura (Lord), and Mazda (Wisdom), which emphasizes that it is a very rational God. This implies that a theology, based on a rational form of religion that overcame the engulfing of the subject into the overwhelming being that appeared at the stage of mythological thinking to establish human subjectivity, was already generally widespread during the Kushan Empire era. The fact that, from the time of the Achaemenid Persian Empire (550–330 BC), a theological seminary called Mobed had already been established in many places and Zoroastrian theological theories were well organized and widely spread supports this inference. Second, Zoroastrianism drew the masses with its powerful, popular religious soteriology. Zoroastrianism preserved the theological viewpoint in which the duality of logical thinking, the resulting concept of transcendentality, and the dichotomy of good and evil are all reflected. Based on this, it produced the concept of the one and only God or Absolute God beyond all the miscellaneous gods. We can see that this logic combined with the mythological sensibility of the nomadic tradition and established a spiritual being called Spenta Mainyu, who had the ability to create good as a concrete manifestation of God, as well as Angra Mainyu, as its dualistically opposing evil spirit. This establishment became the basis of Zoroastrianism’s Ethical Dualism that emphasized human subjectivity on the one hand and a background that conceived their eschatology and soteriology on the other hand. That is, the manifestation of the faith in an external power that ultimately punishes all evil, saves those who do good (good thinking, good words, good behavior, among others), and asks the godly being, Savior Saoshyant, to lead them into the new world that would never again fall into the evil, is an expression of the primitive religious disposition that the nomads of this region possessed.

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Third, the creation of their exaggerated, colossal Buddha statues can be understood as the projection of the concept of Absolute God of Ahura Mazda of Zoroastrianism, and the faith in an external power shown in Savior Saoshyant, into Buddhism. It is generally understood that the concept of a Savior, such as Saoshyant, greatly influenced the establishment of the concepts of Maitreya (彌勒) and Amitābha (阿彌陀). That perspective is based on the research that suggests that Mithra, who was worshiped as a spiritual being in the pre-Zoroastrian era, was replaced as one of the manifestations of Ahura Mazda, a being similar to Saoshyant who prevents and destroys evil; that is, a Savior for the end of the world that was restored and reappeared during the later period of Zoroastrianism. Thus, it is argued that such a phenomenon may have been the major factor in the birth of the concept of Maitreya Buddha during the Kushan Empire era. These facts indicate that, during the Kushan Empire era, a Central Asian traditional concept of God was strongly involved in the understanding of the Buddha. Thus, their way of thinking may be considered to be the foundation that, as Van Peursen points out, set the way of thinking of a substantialistic absolute God, which was the negative side of ontological thinking and was very strongly developed during that time. The substantialistic Dharma Body theory appeared when such a substantialistic thinking innate in the religious faith of the Buddha was applied to the theoretical side of Buddhism. To paraphrase Kalupahana’s expression of this in order to explain it, the substantialistic Dharma Body theory appears when the expression of the world fully understood by dependent arising theory or the coherent maintenance of the perspective of dependent arising theory are overinterpreted as the manifestation of the absolute world or the establishment of the existence of the omniscient Buddha by metaphysical substantialism. In the next section, I would like to focus the analysis on Huiyuan’s (334– 416 AD) statements regarding “Dharma Body” concept seen in the Essay on the System of Mahāyāna (大乘大義章) chapter as one of the typical discussions of early Chinese Buddhism, which is different from the “Dharma Body” concept in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra of Nagarjuna. The focus of the analysis will be on the leap in logic that was oblivious of the point that the dependent arising theory was a theory that presupposed the human epistemological and empirical limits (i.e., nonabsolute and transformable) and on the nondependent arising description of the world that was caused by an excess of conceptual thinking or abstract thinking. Therefore, I will try to analyze the meanings of the variety of explanations of the Dharma Body theory appearing in early Chinese Buddhism into three categories: first, religiously, the explanation of Dharma Bodies as the pantheistic Buddhas appears to be influenced by the concept of the Absolute God of Zoroastrianism that had originated in Central Asia; second, theoretically, the

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“rational deity” explanation of the Dharma Body theory based on the revelation of the complete, dependently arisen world as the embodiment of emptiness; that is the principle of dependent arising, and a way of understanding imposed by substantialistic thinking, such as the explanation of the Dharma Bodies referring to the completeness of the understanding of objects by the Buddha who fully and without doubt understood emptiness and the world embodied by the theory of dependent arising; and third, an explanation of the Chinese qilun-based Daoistic world by paradoxically embracing the chaotic unity as the Dharma Body. The Sinitic Transformation of Dharma Body Theory in Early Chinese Buddhism As mentioned earlier, what is essential when examining the characteristics of the Dharma Body theory in Chinese Buddhism is the consciousness of faith in Maitreya and Amitābha that was spread widely among the early Chinese Buddhists. It has been confirmed in the translations of relevant texts and in the historical literary records on the attempts by venerable monks to form religious groups that faith in Maitreya and Amitābha was not merely a means to an end of popular religious necessity, but it also greatly influenced the understanding of the contemporary venerable monks of the time.154 Perhaps the most appropriate way to understand what the contents of the Maitreya-Amitābha faith of the early Chinese Buddhists were would be to analyze the description of the Amitābha Buddha appearing in the Three Principal Texts of the Pure Land Tradition (淨土三部 經). The reason is because the Three Principal Texts of the Pure Land Tradition, which led the discourse, was established around the beginning of AD in northwest India prior to the sophisticated Dharma Body Theory of the later time which consists of more abstract concepts than Dharma Body Theory, and that the Amitābha Buddha (阿彌陀佛) described in there is presented as an Absolute Being of Immeasurable Life (無量壽) and as Limitless (無邊). Amitābha Buddha is also referred to as twelve Buddhas of Light.155 In fact, all these names are referents that contain infinite space and time, pure goodness in value, and epistemological transcendence in meaning, and are surely implied to describe the Absolute God. The following phrase from The Sutra of Visualizing the Buddha of Immeasurable Life (佛說觀無量壽佛經) describes the True Dharma Body and shows how the concept of twelve Buddhas of Light was derived. The Buddha said to Ānanda and Vaidehī. “When such a thought is conceived, then you must see the marvelous characteristics of the Buddha’s Body and the light of the Bodies of the Buddha of Immeasurable Life. Ānanda! You must

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know this. The Bodies of the Buddha of Immeasurable Life are the same as the color of ten million billion particles of gold from the river running through the groves of the Heavenly jambu trees; the height of the Buddha is incalculably (six hundred billion nayuta (72 power of 10)), immeasurably (the number of grains of sand in the Ganges), and infinitely (a distance that an ox can plow a day) tall; the curl between his eyebrows faces to the right, just like the fivepeaked Mount Sumeru; the eyes of the Buddha are as clear as the blue and white color of the water of the four great seas. . . . In the round radiance there are ten billions of incalculable (six hundred billion nayuta (72 power of 10), immeasurable (the number of grains of sand of the Ganges) transformation-body Buddhas; in which there are several infinite transformation-body bodhisattvas. . . . Each light illuminates the ten directions of the world; they embrace, and do not discard, the chanting laymen.156

The concept of God at the stage of mythological thinking that originated from the sensibility of an overwhelming power is described with greater sophistication with the addition of the logical concept of numbers. According to an expression by Van Peursen, the overwhelming power appearing in the mythological concept of God is expressed by the ontological concept of God. According to Kalupahana’s expression, it shows a typical process of transmission of the substantialistic and unchanging concept of Deity of the Brahman tradition into Buddhism. In early Chinese Buddhism, the understanding of the Buddha as an object of religious faith was commonly described as Earthly Body (生身) or Material Body (色身), which were considered to possess the above attributes. This supports the inference that the description of the Buddha as an Absolute Deity appearing in texts such as the Three Principal Texts of the Pure Land Tradition (淨土三部經), which are considered to be products of Central Asian Buddhism, greatly influenced early Chinese Buddhism. The following presentation of the issues raised by Huiyuan in Topics on the Great Meaning of the Mahāyāna (大乘大義章) reveals the level of Chinese understanding of Dharma Body at that time. When the Buddha as the Dharma Body sermonizes a sutra to the Bodhisattvas, the Dharma Bodhisattvas may see it immediately. If this is the case, the Dharma Body has four great elements and five sensory faculties. Then, why is it different from the Material Body, and why is it called Dharma Body? According to the sutra, the Dharma Body neither goes nor comes, neither originates nor extinguishes; so, it is said to have the same form as Nirvana. If so, how can we see it and sermonize on the sutra?157

It seems to me that such a realist understanding of Dharma Body and the presentation of issues by Huiyuan are due to the fact that the Sarvāstivādin

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realism and the Daoist realism based on the Chinese theory of qi overwhelmed him. He explains the world based on the Chinese qilun in his Discourse on Why Monks Should Not Pay Homage to Kings (沙門不敬王者論): he establishes the two types of condensation of qi (氣凝聚) as tangible (有形) and intangible (無形). He develops his theory that the tangible includes physical things (事物) that are conditioned by time and space as the condensation of coarse energy (凝聚) such as residual energy (殘氣), while the intangible includes soul and spirit (魂神), a true energy that is not conditioned by time and space, and something that is spiritual and the ultimate (極致) of pure energy (淸純氣). What on earth is spirit (神)? It is the essence (精) that reaches the ultimate and becomes marvelous. Since it is the ultimate of essence (精), it cannot be described by the hexagrams (卦象) of the Book of Changes (易). Therefore, the Sage calls it subtle. Even an extraordinarily intelligent one cannot determine its form or investigate thoroughly its profound meaning.158 Because everyone from a laymen to a śrāvaka (direct disciple of the Buddha) prior to becoming the final body of the wheel of life by acquiring the fruit of arhat discipline originates from defilements, it is the result of the transformation of afflicted karma (結業). Everyone, from the bodhisattva who receives the pure body of a distinctive level of enlightenment (possessing the tolerance of nonarising Dharmas (無生法忍)) to the succeeding bodhisattva (補處菩薩) who attains correct awakening under the bodhi-tree, is born from the residual energy of defilements, and is the result of the transformation of residual energy of defilements (餘垢) through original practice (本習). And, after the defilements are extinguished, there is no reason to receive a body.159

Such an understanding of Buddhist concepts by Huiyuan based on Chinese qilun raises the question about the claim that there was a decisive change in Huiyuan’s understanding of Buddhism after his academic exchange with Kumarajiva.160 For me, even though it is possible that Huiyuan may have changed his perspective of Buddhism from Theravāda to Mahayana, his understanding of Dharma Body does not seem to be completely outside of the framework of the discussion of Chinese traditional qilun. In other words, Huiyuan’s understanding of Dharma Body based on the essence-function theory (體用論) was far from the nonsubstantialistic and anti-metaphysical understanding of the world originally held by Buddhism’s dependent arising theory or anātman theory. It is not difficult to see this thought in the description of the omnipresence of Dharma Body theory in his well-known later work, Inscription on Buddha’s Shadow (佛影 銘).

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How vast the Great Image is! Its reason is so subtle that it doesn’t even have a name. It is realized marvelously and enters into all creatures by transformation It drops its shadow, and even loses its form. Its layered brilliance emerges from the abyss, and its light remains in emptiness. Since it is not ignorant even in the five darkness, it is rather bright even in darkness. Like a cicada shedding its skin, it wipes itself holy. Even though 100 spirits pay respect to it, and it responds differently to each of the places, its traces are obscure and invisible.161

This depiction of the transcendental Dharma Body is describing the image of the transcendent Buddha filling both time and space. This is the epitome of the Chinese understanding of the substantialistic Buddha as a colossal Deity, as this quote intends to point out. Yet, another fact that is discovered in Huiyuan’s understanding of Dharma Body is that he is actively reflecting on the paradoxical embracing of the chaotic unity of the world of Daoism. This penetration of Daoist or Neo-Daoist thought is a universal phenomenon persistent among the general theories of Chinese Buddhism. The influence of Chinese thought regarding his Dharma Body theory can be confirmed by the fact that it appears repeatedly in his later works. Its mystery is that all movements are collectively operated by the Ultimate One, but it does not possess anything. Even though it definitely empties the Great Image in the places where form has not yet appeared, it does not mean that nothing exists. Though there is neither contemplating nor acting, there is no non-doing.162

Actually, concepts like “Ultimate One (至一)” are far from being considered as main concepts of Buddhism. The reason why this kind of concept is used in Buddhism cannot be fully explained completely if we exclude the traditional Daoist worldview. That is, the sense of an original source of existence, described as chaos, ultimate oneness, essence of Dao, among others, cannot be explained separately from the undivided sensibility of the deeply rooted mythological thinking of the Chinese. It is difficult to differentiate the following expression by Huiyuan, on the state of Buddhism, from Daoist texts. And so, there is certainly no difference in the types of tendencies of the Dharma. Its beginning and its end are empty and are equally pure in the end. Being and

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non-being alternatively return to each other. Therefore, the mind of one who is wandering in the middle of these can not rely on contemplation. Since one’s wisdom does not have an object to encounter, even if the characteristics are not extinguished, one’s mind is calm and relaxed without practicing meditation. If one does not encounter this marvelous stage of mastery, how could one know the subtlety of emptiness? Surpassing the ultimate of the Ultimate; I cannot know more than this.163

The problem here is that the meaning of the quasi-Buddhist attainment of this state is described by a projection of the Daoist description of that state, with expressions such as interdependent being and non-being, and affirmation-of-a-paradox. In this sense, it is questionable whether, right before the above quote, the concepts that Huiyuan uses, such as anātman, dependent arising, and Dharma Nature of the nature without self-nature, are based on a complete understanding of the prajñā texts and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra by Nagarjuna. The reason why I am questioning this is because many intellectuals of that time besides Huiyuan also used a mixture of Daoist concepts, especially Neo-Daoist concepts, in the discourse on Buddhism, without careful consideration.164 I assert that the reason for the conflated usage of the Daoist ultimate stage with the Buddhist Buddha’s stage is because the expressions in the scriptures and treatises where the world of dependent arising theory and anātman theory are completely embodied, and that emphasize the absoluteness of the perceiver, were easily accepted through syncretization with their own traditional worldviews. The Medicinal Herb Chapter (藥草品) of the Lotus Sutra (正法華經) translated by Dharmarakṣa (竺法護) depicts omniscience and omnipotence as follows: Wonderful! Those are admired as facts! As you said, the merits and deeds of the Buddha are the same as those of the previous analogy. There have been so many wonders that they can not be counted in infinite time. Because the sage responds to each and every countable one of them, the wisdom of the Buddha is limitless; it neither resides in the thoughts on the Dharma nor in the ground of the Buddha Path, and its source cannot be exhausted. The Buddha enters into relationships with all sentient beings and observes their minds, discerns all things with methods of perfection, and decides on expedient and wise things to make them come to fruition. He advises and raises all things to guide them to the other shore. He manifests universal wisdom, leading to the entry into all kinds of marvels and wisdoms.165

It is highly likely that these descriptions of the Buddha in the ultimate stage in the Lotus Sutra led Huiyuan, an early Chinese Buddhist, to understand the Buddha as a Daoist Sage who had reached the stage of ultimate

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Dao, according to his Chinese way of thinking. That is, he might have been trying to divide Chinese qilun into tangible qi and intangible qi; to allocate the intangible to spirit (魂神) and to understand the spirit as a mysterious agent of the intangible aspect, such as the essence in the essence-function (體用) concept or as the concept of principle, li (理). In this sense, Huiyuan’s request to Kumarajiva to explain Dharma Body from the perspective of the Material Body and Transformation Body in Essay on the System of Mahayana might be seen as him wanting to confirm through Kumarajiva that the Dharma Body in his mind must ultimately be intangible. Even though this way of understanding is neither Western nor Vedic substantialism, as Kalupahana points out, it could have been the activation of the tendency toward metaphysical reductionist thought that was being maximized in NeoDaoism. The following passage from the Lotus Sutra suggests that it was highly likely that the reductionism of Neo-Daoism concerning the “theory of fundamental nothingness (本無論)” was being projected onto early Chinese Buddhism. In the same way, one must understand this analogy. If one does not thoroughly understand fundamental nothingness while existing within the 5 destinies of rebirth and death, this is called being deluded. This delusion arouses action; action, perception; perception, name and form (名色); name and form, the six bases of the senses. . . . Birth arouses aging, disease and death (老病死) as well as sadness, hatred and suffering (憂惱苦患). Unwholesome activities accumulate, and this is called ignorance of the truth (盲冥). . . . In other words, it reveals the teachings of the three vehicles and helps to arouse the mind of a Bodhisattva to reach non-retrogression. There are no more rebirths to pursue, which helps in arriving at Buddhahood. In this analogy, it is like acquiring the clear vision to become an Immortal. . . . However, when one faces the extinction of mental activity, the Buddha stays in front of him and manifests the intention of a Bodhisattva by teaching the essence of the Dharma. With this, there is no residing in either life or death, nor is there cessation of mental activity. It understands the emptiness of the three realms, so that everything in the ten directions is like an illusion, a dream, a mirage, and an echo from deep in a mountain valley. It has nothing; expects nothing; neither takes nor discards; and is neither dark nor bright. So, finally, one truly witnesses, and there is nothing that one cannot master. One sees everything without seeing and comprehends each and every sign of all beings.166

Bearing in mind that the change might have occurred while the text was being translated into Chinese by sinitic terminology, I think that the dualism shown in the Lotus Sutra between the immutable real world that the Awakened One sees and the illusionary phenomenal world that an ignorant person sees might have played a part in strengthening the substantialistic perspective

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of the essence of Dharma (法體) as an unchanging substance on the part of the early Chinese Buddhists. However, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra that the dialogue between Huiyuan and Kumarajiva relied on shows a completely different understanding of the Dharma Body from Huiyuan’s understanding, as above. The Buddha talked to a Buddhist nun. “It was not you who began paying homage to me initially, but Subhūti. That is because Subhūti observed that all things are empty. This means that he observed the Dharma Body and acquired the true offering. This is the most important of all offerings, because merely paying homage to a living body does not constitute such an offering.” For this reason, it is said “Subhūti always observes the samādhi of emptiness and this corresponds to the emptiness of prajñāpāramitā.” Thus, the Buddha ordered Subhūti to sermonize on prajñāpāramitā.”167 Observing the Body of the Buddha as it is “means that all Buddha’s bodies are like illusions and something transformed; it doesn’t belong to the five skandhas, twelve sense fields or eighteen compositional elements of cognition; it is seen as long, short or various colors according to the karma that the sentient being has committed in previous lives.” Here, the Buddha himself says, “the one who sees the Dharma Body sees the Buddha.” Dharma Body is the emptiness of the unobtainable Dharma; the emptiness of the unobtainable Dharma arises from the side of causes (因) and conditions (緣), and the Dharma does not have self-nature.168

Thus, it must be noted that Nagarjuna decisively points out that the Dharma Body is not a simple ontological object, but an metaphor for the state of the Buddha’s awakening to reality in his Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (大智度論). Such passages that show constant vigilance against reducing to naive realism, such as depicting empty objects as existing according to the dependent arising theory and the contents depicting the perceiver who understands it, that is, the state of perception of the Buddha, demonstrate that an epistemological awareness was at work, and was based on the anti-substantialistic anātman and dependent arising theories of the early Buddhism that had made the tradition of prajñā and this kind of tradition. Despite Kumarajiva’s response to Huiyuan’s questions, it does not seem like Huiyuan had proper insight into the fact that the realization of the world of emptiness based on Buddhist epistemological insight was symbolized by the concept of Dharma Body. Rather, when we understand that, as pointed out earlier, the substantialistic understanding of the Buddha of Central Asian Buddhism had been concluded as a sinitically transformed understanding of the substantialistic Dharma Body by the Neo-Daoist thought that was the thought tradition of Huiyuan, the true meaning of his various statements may be understood.

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NOTES 1. Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: New York), 131–138, State University of New York Press, 1987. 2. I have discussed this issue directly with Professor Ames. In response to my objection, he also showed a reserved attitude in the application of his theory to only the pre-Qin philosophies and leaves the later philosophies to a future time. 3. See Dong-Hwan Park, Anti Homo Erectus. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka, 63–100, 2017. 4. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 314, 1989. 5. Chan, Two Visions of the Way: A Study of the Wangbi and the Ho-shang Kung Commentaries on the Lao-tzu, 28. This translation is a requote of the section of the Annals of the Three Kingdoms text cited by Chan, Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1991. 6. Chan, Two Visions of the Way, 31–32. Translators chose the transliteration of Wangbi instead of Wang Pi, to be consistent. 7. Special note from the translators: Commentary on the Lao Tzu by Wang Pi. Translated by Ariane Rump and Wing-tsit Chan (University of Hawaii Press), 68. 8. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi, 7 (Daodejing, Ch. 2), University of Hawaii Press. 9. “居無爲之事, 行不言之敎, 不以形入物. 故功成事遂而百姓不知其所以然 也.” Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi, Chapter 17. 10. References are In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Development of Metaphysical thought Forms in Chinese Philosophy—Focusing on the Discussions among Wangbi, Xuanzang, and Ji,” Eastern Philosophy 20 (2003) (English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout), and In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Concepts of Prajñā and Emptiness in the Zhaolun,” Study of Buddhism 11 (2005): 257–293. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 11. This is in the same context as my attempt to research Chinese characteristics from the noncanonical texts (僞疑經). See In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy in Non-canonical Texts Edited in China through the Baozanglun,” Eastern Philosophy 27 (July 2007): 261–283. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. Refer to Jin-Moo Kim, “How Can We See the Chinese Publication of Non-Canonical Texts?,” Buddhism Critics 11 (2002) regarding a detailed discussion on the process of noncanonical texts publications in response to the needs of the general Chinese public. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 12. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era, 536–544. 13. Joo-hyung Lee, Dong-shin Nam, Tae-seung Lee, Hee-jeong Kang, Kyungmi Joo, Hye-young Kim, Young-jong Lee, and Jung-min Ha, East Asian Buddhist Pilgrims and Buddhist Remains in India—Exploration of Indian Buddhist Art and Cultural Exchanges in the 4th–8th Centuries (Social Review, 2009), 87–96. English

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translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout; Hajime and two others, The World of the Buddha, 351. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 14. Jiyeon Han, “A Study on the Buddhist Development in the Western Region and its Transmission” (PhD diss., DongKook University), 2007, 74–77, 117–119, and 186– 189. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 15. Noritada Kubo, Obuchi Ninji, Junzo Nishi, et al., The History of Chinese Religions. Translated into Korean by Seungeul Cho (Pajoo: Hanwool, 2002), 50–57. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 16. Erich Zurcher even asserts that one of the reasons for the success of Chinese Buddhism is due to the fact that the sinitic transformation was accepted and applied strongly while the construction of an historical environment to unify and strongly assert its identity was very vague. See Erik Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (3rd ed.). Translated into Korean by Yeon-shik Choi, Preface XXXVII. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 17. In-sub Hur, “Comparison of Philosophical Methodology between Buddhism and Daoism to Understand the Characteristics of Chinese Buddhism: Mainly on the Differences between Visubandhu’s Trichotomous Projective Category thought Form and Laozi’s Circular Trichometic Category Thought Form,” Eastern Philosophy 8 (1997). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 18. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi (Daodejing Chapter 2), “故有無相生, 難易相成, 長短相較, 高下相傾, 音聲相和, 前後相隨.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 19. Chae-Woo Lim, “Critique on the Misunderstanding of Wangbi’s Neo-Daoism,” Study on Daoist Culture 14 (1996): 237–270. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 20. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi (Daodejing Chapter 22), “一, 少之極也, 式猶則之也.”on “是以聖人抱一爲天下式.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 21. Tang Yongtung mentions in detail that the tradition of passive negative interpretation of the concept of the Dao, which led to Wangbi’s valuing nothingness being associated with the Daoistic concept of original nothingness, was already being used to express the attributes of thusness (眞如) that has the character of anātman in the translation of texts during the Han Dynasty, and that this became an important characteristic in the Chinese way of understanding Buddhism. Such an opinion is generally accepted in most narratives on the history of Chinese Buddhism. See Yongtung Tang, The History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Liang-Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties (漢魏兩晉南北朝佛敎史) (Wuhan University Press, 2008), 103–104. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 22. Hur, “A Study on the Development of Metaphysical thought Forms in Chinese Philosophy—focusing on the Discussions among Wangbi, Xuanzang, and Ji.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 23. Yeon-Jae Kim, “A Study on the Buddhism and Philosophy of Arts of Zhong Bing” (Master’s thesis Seoul National University) 1991 (English translation provided

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by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout) and Kim Young Bo, “A Study on the Debates on the Imperishability Theory in the Six Dynasty Era” (MA thesis Dongkook University), 1998 (English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout). They explain this and the Buddhistic transformation of traditional Chinese thought concerning “spirit.” 24. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 44–45. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 25. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 265–266, “又言: 若無明轉則變成明. 案此經意, 理如可求, 何者 夫心爲用本? 本一而用殊, 殊用自有興廢, 一本之性不移. 一本者卽無明神明也. 尋無明之稱非太虛之目, 土石無情豈無明之謂. 故知識慮應明, 體不免惑, 惑慮 不知故曰無明, 而無明體上有生有滅. 生滅是 其異用,無明心義不改. 將恐見其用 異 便謂心隨境滅. . . . 而心爲其本 未曾異矣. 以其用本不斷故, 成佛之理皎然, 隨 境遷謝, 故生死可盡明矣” (大梁皇帝立神明成佛義記, 弘明集 第九卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 26. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 103, “至於生, 必有死, 形弊神散, 猶春榮秋落, 四時代換, 奚有 於更受形哉?” (何承天, 達性論, 弘明集 第四卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 27. Early Chinese Buddhism’s understanding of the Buddha as a religious figure; that is, the substantialistic view of Dharma and the concept of Dharma as an attribute, elicited various philosophical discussions that developed later in Chinese Buddhism. Ultimately, this issue must be connected to the issues of divine immortality, as mentioned here, in order to more clearly understand the implications of the Chinese monks’ statements regarding Dharma and Dharma-body (法身). For more on Dharma-body, see Yujin Ha, “The Development of Dharma-Body Thought in Early Chinese Buddhism,” Proceedings of the 49th National Buddhist Academic Conference (Spring 2009): 63–78. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 28. In-Sub Hur, “A Comparative Study on the Similarity between ‘the Categorical Scheme’ in Whitehead’s Process and Reality and the Structure of the Epistemology (Trimsaka) of Vasubhandu,” Journal of Comparative Literature of the East and the West 21 (2009): 173–199. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 29. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 62–65, “天道至公, 所希者命, 寧當許其虐命, 而抑其冥應哉! 今六 十萬人雖當美惡殊品, 至於忍咀群生, 恐不異也. 美惡殊矣, 故其生之所享固可實 殊, 害生同矣, 故受害之日固亦可同. . . . . 蓱沙見報於白兔, 釋氏受滅於黃魚, 以 示報應之勢. 皆其窈窕精深, 迂而不昧矣. . . . 旣見福成於往行, 則今行無負於後

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身明矣.” (宗炳, 明佛論, 弘明集 第二卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 30. “Hongming Ji (弘明集),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (出三藏記集). Translated into Korean by Kye-Hwan Jang (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 168–169, “世或有積善而殃集, 或有凶邪而致慶, 此皆現業未就, 而前行始應. 故曰貞祥遇禍, 妖孽見福, 疑似之嫌於是乎在. . . . 倚伏之勢定於在 昔, 冥符告命潛相迴換, 故令禍福之氣, 交謝於六道, 善惡之報, 殊錯而兩行.” (慧 遠, 三報論, 弘明集 第五卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 31. In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Neo-Daoistic Way of Thinking Intervening in the Process of the Establishment of Wei-Jin Era Buddhism, Centering around Zhidun, Daoan and Huiyuan’s thought Forms,” Eastern Philosophy 21 (2004). 32. David Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way). Translated into Korean by In Sung Park (Hapcheon: Jangkyunggak, 1994), Chapter 13. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. “大聖說空法, 爲離諸見故. 若復見有空, 諸佛所不化.” 33. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 216, “僕夙漸法化, 晩味道風, 常以崇空貴無宗趣一也.” (朱廣之, 疑夷夏論諮顧 道士, 弘明集 第七卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 34. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 210–211, “夷俗重素故, 教以極質, 髡落徽容, 衣裳不裁. 閑情開照, 期神曠劫. 以 長其心, 推而遠之也. . . . 夫道之極者, 非華非素, 不卽不殊, 無近無遠. 誰捨誰居, 不偏不黨, 勿毀勿譽, 圓通寂寞, 假字曰無. 妙境如此, 何所異哉!” (朱昭之, 難顧 道士夷夏論, 弘明集 第七卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 35. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 194, “法性雖以卽色圖空, 虛無誠乃有外張義. 然環會其所中, 足下當加以半思 也. 至夫遊無蕩思, 心塵自拂, 思以無蕩, 一擧形上. 是雖忘有老如騫. 然而有忘 不代老, 當其神地悠悠, 精和坐廢, 寂然以湛. 其神遂通以沖其用, 登其此地, 吾 不見家之與老氏涉其此意.” (張融, 張融門律, 弘明集 第六卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 36. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 429, “四非常, 一曰無常, 二曰苦、三曰空、四曰非身. 少長殊形, 陵谷易處, 謂之 無常 .  .  . 一切萬有, 終歸於無, 謂之爲空.” (郗中書, 奉法要, 弘明集 第十三卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 37. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 433, “是以開士深行統以一貫, 達萬像之常冥. 乘所寓而玄, 領知來理之先空, 恒 得之於同致, 悟四色之無映. 順本際而偕廢.” (郗中書, 奉法要, 弘明集 第十三卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 38. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 432, “種非常禪. 皆諦背有著無, 則得羅漢泥洹. 不忌有爲不係空觀, 遇理而冥, 無執無 寄, 爲無所種. 旣無所種, 故不受報. 廓然玄廢, 則佛之泥洹.” (郗中書, 奉法要, 弘明 集 第十三卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

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39. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna. Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise of the Middle Way), 265, “臣績曰, 神而有盡寧謂神乎. … 此卽不滅斷之義也. 若化同草木則豈精乎. 以其不斷故終歸妙極, 憑心此地則觸理皆明, 明於衆理何行不成.” (大梁皇帝立 神明成佛義記, 弘明集 第九卷). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 40. Kiyotaka, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, 30–31. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 41. Kiyotaka, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 42. Kiyotaka, History of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, 32. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 43. Lu Zheng, Lecture on the Study of Chinese Buddhism. Translated into Korean by Kakso (Seoul: Minjoksa, 1992), 60–63. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. We must not overlook the fact that full scale of translations of texts began at around the time of Wangbi and He Yan (何晏). Scholars such as Lu Cheng (呂澂) used this historical fact as the basis to assert that Wangbi was influenced by Buddhism. 44. Zheng, Lecture on the Study of Chinese Buddhism, 66. 45. Hur, “A Comparison between the Methodology of Buddhism and Daoism for the Understanding of the Characteristics of Chinese Buddhism-centering around the Projective Trichotomous Way of Thinking of Vasubandhu and the Circulative Trichotomous Way of thinking of the Daoists.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 46. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna. In his book, Tuck raised a serious question about the existing understanding of Buddhism. He considers that the reason for the various definitions of Buddhism according to the Western scholars’ individual interests is because they do not see Buddhism in terms of an internal worldview of Buddhism. 47. In-Sub Hur, “An Influence of the Heterogeneous Pre-Vedic and Vedic Mythological Ways of Thinking on the Establishment of a Theory of Buddhism as a Anti-Vedic Way of Thinking,” A Study on Religion 15. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 48. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka. Translated into Korean by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 217, “夫般若波羅蜜者, 衆妙之淵府, 群智之玄宗, 神王之所由, 如来之照㓛. 其為經也, 至无空豁, 廓然無物者也.” Koryo Tripitaka, 31, 348. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 49. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 217, “是故夷三脫於重玄, 齊万物於空同, 明諸佛之始, 盡群霊 之夲无, 登十住之妙階, 趣無生之徑路. 何者耶, 賴其至无故能為用. 夫无也者, 豈 能无哉. 无不能自无, 理亦不能為理, 理不能為理, 則理非理矣. 无不能自无, 則無

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非无矣.” Koryo Tripitaka, 31, 348. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 50. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 218, “何則至理冥壑歸乎无名. 无名无始道之體也. 无可不可者 聖之愼也. … 莫若无其所以无, 忘其所以存. 忘其所以存則, 无存於所存, 遺其所 以无則, 忘无於所无. 忘无故妙存, 妙存故盡无. 盡无則忘玄, 忘玄故无心. 然後二 迹无寄, 无有冥盡.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 348. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 51. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 219, “故理非乎變, 變非乎理, 教非乎體, 體非乎教. 故千變万化 莫非理外. 何神動哉. 以之不動故, 應變无窮, 无窮之變, 非聖在物. 物變非聖, 聖 未始於變.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 349. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 52. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 7, 180–181, Preface to the Commentary on the Combined Texts ( 合方光光讚略解序), “般若波羅蜜者, 無上正眞道之根也. 正者等也. 不二入也. 等 道有三義焉, 法身也, 如也, 眞際也.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 338. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 53. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 181, “眞際者, 無所著也. 泊然不動, 湛尒玄齊, 無為也, 無不 為也. 万法有為, 而此法淵黙, 故曰無所有者, 是法之眞也.” (Koryo Tripitaka 31, 338). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 54. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (出三藏記 集) 8, Preface to a Synoptic Extract to the Larger and Smaller Versions of the Prajñāpāramitā,” 181–182, “諸五隂至薩云若則, 是菩薩来徃所現法慧, 可道之道 也. 諸一相无相則, 是菩薩来徃所現眞慧, 明乎常道也.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 338. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 55. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集), Compilation of Sutras on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations Emerging from Mount Lu (廬山出修行方便禪經統序),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8. Translated by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001) (廬山出修行方便禪經統序), 268, “其妙物也, 運羣動以至壹而不有, 廓大象 於未形而不無, 無思无為而無不為.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 364. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 56. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka 10, Preface to the Great Wisdom Treatise,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka. Translated into Korean by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001) (大智論抄序), 318, “請略而言, 生塗兆於無始之境, 變化搆於倚伏之場, 咸生於 未有, 而有滅於旣有. 而無推而盡之, 則知有無廽謝於一法, 相待而非原, 生滅兩 行於一化, 映空而無主.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 379. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

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57. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 319, “何 以知其然. 無性之性謂之法性. 法性無性因縁以之生. 生縁無自相, 雖有而常無, 常無非絶有. 猶火傳而不息.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 379. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 58. Translated by Sang Joon Park and two others, Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka, “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka,” 319, “夫然則法無異趣, 始末淪虛, 畢竟同爭, 有無交歸矣. 故逰其樊者, 心不待慮, 智無所縁, 不滅相而寂, 不修定而閑. 不神遇以斯通, 焉識空空之為玄. 斯其至也斯其極也. 過此以徃莫之 㦯知.” Koryo Tripitaka 31, 379. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 59. Kamata, translated by Hui Ok Chang, History of Chinese Buddhism 2, 301–304. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 60. Kalupahana, Nagarjuna—The Philosophy of the Middle Way, 8. 61. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuity and Discontinuity, 8. 62. K. Venkata Ramana also points out that the understanding of the Middle Way of Sengzhao is incomplete. However, Ramanan’s evaluation of Sengzhao doesn’t seem to be the result of a thorough grasp of the entirety of Sengzaho’s thoughts. This is because the examples he cites to clarify Sengzhao’s understanding of the concepts of Nirvana or prajñā appear to me to be the statements made under the influence of Daoism. See Krishniah Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna’s Philosophy: As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra (Motilal Banarsidass Publications, 1987), 323–324. 63. Refer to David J. Kalupahana, The Buddha’s Philosophy of Language (Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha Printers; First Edition, 1999) regarding his lucid interpretation of the empirical perspective of the Buddha’s view on language. I am deeply influenced by his concise writing to clarify my view on the Buddha’s perspective on language. However, I emphasized in my 1996 doctoral dissertation that the Buddhist tradition tries to understand all human experiences, including mythological thinking and philosophical thinking from before to after the usage of language, in order to include all the experiences accumulated throughout the entirety of human evolution, up to today. In other words, I made a point that Buddhism does not negatively exclude the understanding of the world through human conceptual thinking and the experience of the world constituted by language; rather it offers a balanced perspective on the verbal and nonverbal experiences. To summarize my opinion, the expressions that appear to be nonverbally or anti-linguistically antagonistic are for the purpose of criticizing the substantialistic thinking that appears to be immersed in conceptual thinking, not to criticize language itself or the conceptual thinking itself based on discrimination. 64. C. W. Huntington Jr. and Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika (Motilal Banarsidass, 2007), 56–57. 65. Candrakīrti, Madhyaymakāvatārakārikā, 6, in Huntington Jr. and Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika, 38. 66. Huntington Jr. and Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika, 57.

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67. Huntington Jr. and Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika, 59. 68. Sung Chul Kim, Middle Way: Liberation from Logic, Liberation by Logic (Seoul: Kyungseowon, 2005), 203. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. Even though the author characterizes this book as an introduction to the Middle Way, it is an extraordinary work that affirms his academic accomplishment in the sense that no other work in this field explains the form of discussion that is consistent with that in the Middle Way as clearly and distinctly. However, the only thing I could not agree with is his acceptance of the nonconceptual understanding of emptiness, because I have a different opinion on this. 69. Kim, Middle Way: Liberation from Logic, Liberation by Logic, 196. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 70. Kim, Middle Way: Liberation from Logic, Liberation by Logic, 197. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 71. Kim, Middle Way: Liberation from Logic, Liberation by Logic, 199. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 72. Kalupahana, The Buddha’s Philosophy of Language, Preface. 73. Kalupahana, The Buddha’s Philosophy of Language, 41–47. 74. Taisho (大正藏) Vol. 45, 肇論, 般若無知論, 153, a21–22, “然則聖智幽 微. 深隱難測. 無相無名. 乃非言象之所得.” I edited the corresponding part of the Korean translation after referring to the Jay-ryoung Shim, History of Chinese Philosophy (Seoul: Philosophy and Reality, 1998) and the Zhaolun (Joron). Translated into Korean by Chan Woo Song (Seoul: Koryowon, 1989). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 75. Taisho (大正藏), 153, a25–29, “此辨智照之用. 而曰無相無知者何耶. 果有 無相之知. 不知之照明矣. 何者. 夫有所知. 則有所不知. 以聖心無知. 故無所不知. 不知之知. 乃曰一切知. 故經云. 聖心無所知. 無所不知. 信矣.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 76. Taisho (大正藏), 153, b3–5, “然則智有窮幽之鑒. 而無知焉. 神有應會之 用. 而無慮焉. 神無慮. 故能獨王於世表. 智無知. 故能玄照於事外.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 77. Taisho (大正藏), 154, c16–19, “答曰. 用即寂. 寂即用. 用寂體一. 同出而異 名. 更無無用之寂. 而主於用也. 是以智彌昧. 照逾明. 神彌靜. 應逾動. 豈 曰明昧 動靜之異哉.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 78. Ramanan, Nagarjuna’s Philosophy, 324. 79. Taisho (大正藏) vol. 45, 肇論, 物不遷論, p 151 b1–5, “物不來. 於向未 甞無. 故知物不去. 覆而求今. 今亦不往. 是謂昔物自在昔. 不從今以至昔. 今物 自在今. 不從昔以至今.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 80. Taisho (大正藏), 151, c16–17, “事各性住於一世. 有何物而可去來.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 81. Taisho (大正藏), 151, c23–26, “何者. 果不俱因. 因因而果. 因因而果. 因不 昔滅. 果不俱因. 因不來今. 不滅不來. 則不遷之致明矣. 復何惑於去留. 踟蹰於動 靜之間哉.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

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82. Taisho (大正藏), 151, c26–28, “然則乾坤倒覆. 無謂不靜. 洪流滔天. 無謂 其 動. 苟能契神於即物. 斯不遠而可知矣.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 83. Taisho (大正藏), 151, c10–12, “是以人之所謂住. 我則言其去. 人之所謂 去. 我則言其住. 然則去住雖殊. 其致一也. 故經云. 正言似反. 誰當信者.” The quote in the last phrase is a quote from the Lalitavistara [普曜經] and it is ‘正言似 反’, and is understood as having the same meaning as ‘正言若反’ in Chapter 78 in the Daodejing. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 84. Taisho (大正藏), 151, a9–15, “夫生死交謝. 寒暑迭遷. 有物流動. 人之常 情. 余則謂之不然. 何者. 放光云. 法無去來. 無動轉者. 尋夫不動之作. 豈釋動 以求靜. 必求靜於諸動. 必求靜於諸動. 故雖動而常靜. 不釋動以求靜. 故雖靜 而不離動. 然則動靜未始異. 而惑者不同. 緣使真言滯於競辯. 宗途屈於好異. 所 以靜躁之極. 未易言也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 85. Taisho (大正藏) vol.45, 肇論, 不眞空論, p 152 a2–4, “夫至虛無生者. 蓋 是般若玄鑑之妙趣. 有物之宗極者也. 自非聖明特達. 何 能契神於有無之間哉.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 86. Taisho (大正藏), 152, a7~9, “是以聖人乘真心而理順. 則無滯而不通. 審 一氣 以觀化. 故所遇而順適. 無滯而不通. 故能混雜致湻. 所遇而順適. 故則觸物 而一.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 87. Taisho (大正藏), 152, a10~13, “如此則萬象雖殊. 而不能自異. 不能自 異. 故 知象非眞象. 象非眞象故. 則雖象而非象. 然則物我同根. 是非一氣. 潛微 幽 隱. 殆非群情之所盡.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 88. Taisho (大正藏), 153, a1~2, “是以聖人乘千化而不變. 履萬惑而常通者. 以其 即萬物之自虛. 不假虛而虛物也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 89. Han, “A Study of the Development and Exchanges of Buddhism in the Western Region,” 74–77, 117–119, and 186–189. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 90. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 212–223. 91. Charles Willemen, “Sarvâstivāda Development in northwestern India and in China,” Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 2 (2001): 164–165. Charles Willemen who succeeded Lamotte’s Buddhism studies legacy tradition in Belgium, clears up the point that the Abhidharmasāra (阿毘曇心), which is early Adhidharma literature from the first century BC, was written by Dharmaśrī in Bactra, which is the Adhidharma text in early first century BC, and reveals that the Treatise on the Eight Aggregates was written by Kātyāyana in Gandhara. He explains in this thesis that the commentaries on Sarvâstivāda being transmitted into China and translated into Chinese was a natural phenomenon historically. 92. Lokaksema of the Yuezhi translated the Wisdom Scripture of Practicing Enlightenment, Śūraṃgama-sūtra, 般舟三昧經, and Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūhasū tra, during the eras of Guanghe (光和; 168–189) and Zhongping (中平; 184–189) of Emperor Ling of the Later Han Dynasty. Willemen, “Sarvâstivāda Development in Northwestern India and in China.” 93. Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest of China, 1–9.

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94. Kamata, translated by Hwi Ok, Jang, History of Chinese Buddhism, 412–413, Kamata summarizes the situation of the time as follows based on the Biography of Daoan in “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集), Biography of Daoan,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001). “Even though a long time has passed since the Buddhist texts were translated in the early era of Chinese Buddhism, there are some errors in the previous translations, so the profound teachings of the texts were not grasped and the meanings were not sufficiently understood. Therefore, when the old translations were lectured on, only the main topics of the texts were adopted or read. That is, because they could not understand the precise meaning of the texts exactly, they just read them out loud.” I also have summarized the situation and the level of understanding of Buddhism by the Chinese monks during the Wei-Jin era in the following essays. In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Religious Situation and Characteristics of Buddhism in Central Asia before and after the Kushan Empire Era to Understand the Characteristics of Early Chinese Buddhism,” Buddhism Study 32 (2012); In-sub Hur, “A Study on the Characteristics of Neo-Daoists in the Wei Jin Era,” Journal of Comparative Literature between East and West 25 (2012). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 95. In the case of Sarvâstivāda, even though this writing emphasizes the elementalist logic of Sarvâstivāda, there can be an immediate objection not to treat Sarvâstivādans only as elementalists. Such an objection may be justified by only a few passages of the saṃskāra chapter of the Abhidharmasāra, a representative work of this thesis. “All laws cannot arise by themselves. Why? The nature of all dharmas is inferior and has no power .  .  . If a law can not arise by itself, how can it arise? The answer is this; all laws finally occur due to the power of various conditions.” “Abhidharmasāra (阿毘曇心論),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 1. Translated into Korean by Changseob Lee and Jaechun Kim (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 216. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. The reason for the cause of the occurrence of such problems may be summarized and inferred as two parts. First, it is due to the nature of the arguments themselves that offers a strong possibility of elementalist interpretations; and second, even though there may be room for debate later on, an elementalist tendency is strengthened by the interpretations of the treatise masters and the history of the public, who were influenced by Sarvâstivāda, to vaguely define it. 96. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 144–152. 97. Jung Il Hwang, “A Study on the Theory of the Three Times by Sarvâstivāda” (PhD diss., Dongkook University, 2004). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 98. When referring to the nature of these controversial histories, it should be noted that there were probably only a few scholars who participated in the debate with a sufficient understanding of the core topics of this debate. Therefore, even if the relevant information on the controversies was given to the Chinese monks through the discussions, the number of monks who were able to fully understand and apply it into the discourse structure of Chinese Buddhism had to have been very limited.

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99. “Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (Second Miscellaneous Translations on the Wisdom of Aggregates),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 1. Translated into Korean by Ohmin Kwon (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 1, 22–23, “ 頗有二心, 展轉相因乎. 答曰無也. 此非一人, 若前未來, 俱生二心, 非未來心, 與 前心因. 頗有二心, 展轉相緣乎. 答曰有, 若一思惟無當來生心, 彼當念時便生二 心. 若思惟有當來生心, 彼當念時便生二心. 若念無當來道生心, 彼當念時便生 二心. 若念有當來道生心, 彼當念時便生二心. 若二有知他人心, 展轉心作緣. 以 何等故, 一人前後二心不俱生? 答曰 無有第二次第緣. 衆生一一心轉, 如人不可 得空也. 前心不住後心, 云何憶本所作.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 100. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 603–604, “Not satisfied with confining the dharma to the present alone, the Sautrântikas reduced its duration to zero.” 101. “Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (Second Miscellaneous Translations on the Wisdom of Aggregates),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 1. Translated into Korean by Ohmin Kwon (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 60, “行力 强, 無常力强. 答曰, 行力强, 非無常. 行者, 過去、未來、現在 行滅, 無常者, 現 在行散. 或作是說, 無常力强非行, 行亦無常. 如我意行力 强, 非無常. 行者, 過去, 未來, 現在行滅. 無常者, 現在行散也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 102. “Abhidharmasāra (阿毘曇心論),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 1. Translated into Korean by Changseob Lee and Jaechun Kim (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 215–216, “問, 如是分別 法相已. 云何攝法, 爲自性, 爲 他性. 答, 自性. 問何故. 答, 諸法離他性 各自住己性. 故說一切法 自性定所攝. 諸 法離他性 者, 謂眼離耳. 如是一切法, 不應說若離者是攝. 以故非他性所攝. 各自 住己 性者, 眼自住眼性. 如是一切法. 應當說若住者是攝. 故說一切法 自性之所 攝.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 103. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 602–603. 104. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 314, Graham diagnosed the trend of the Confucianism of the Han Dynasty era that searched for a simple, unified worldview in contrast to the various experimental thought forms of the pre-Qin era; that is, that expressing the world with very rough and simple theoretical structure that relied on five elements and yin–yang theories as “intellectual deterioration.” 105. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi, Daode Jing, Ch. 22, translated from Wangbi’s commentary on “Less will lead to gain, more will lead to confusion.” “少則得, 多則惑”, “自然之道, 亦猶樹也. 轉多轉遠其根, 轉少轉得 其本. 多則遠其眞, 故曰惑也. 少則得其本, 故曰得也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 106. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao-tzu by Wang Pi, Daode Jing. Translated from Wangbi’s commentary on “是以聖人抱一爲天下式,” “一, 少之極也, 式 猶則之也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 107. Chan, Two Visions of the Way: A Study of the Wangbi and the Hoshang Kung Commentaries on the Lao-tzu, 31–32. 108. A more detailed discussion on this can be found in in-Sub Hur, “A study on the development of the metaphysical way of thinking in China focusing on the discussion of Wangbi (王弼), Xuanzang (玄奘), and Ji (基).”

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109. Even though it contains a form of theory of realism with the purpose to support Confucian values, its philosophical and historical meanings cannot be ignored. Jung Keun Won has developed a discussion that the theory played a role of linking the theory of valuing nothingness of Wangbi with He Yan and Guoxiang’s theory of lone transformation. Refer to Jung Keun Won, “Pei Wei’s Chongyoulun, What is the Problem?,” Research on Daoist Culture 25 (1994): 72. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. Refer also to Hak Mok Kim, “Chongyoulun of Pei Wei,” in Wei-Jin Daoism, ed. Se Keun Chung (Seoul: Yemun Seowon, 2001), 125–130 regarding the philosophical goals of the Chongyoulun. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 110. 裴頠, 崇有論, “遂闡貴無之議, 而建賤有之論. 賤有則必外形, 外形則 必 遣制. 遣制則必忽防, 忽防則忘禮. 禮制不存, 則無以爲政矣.” Won, “Pei Wei’s Chongyoulun, What is the problem?” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 111. Won, “Arguments of Being and Non-being in Wei-Jin Philosophy: Focusing on the Relationship between the Essence of the Universe and the Phenomena of the Objects,” 176 and 179. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 112. Tang Yijie, Guo Xiang and Wei-Jin Metaphysics, “Zhuangzi, Free and Easy Wandering” chapter (逍遙遊), commentary by Guoxiang, “各以得性為至,自盡為 極也。向言二蟲殊翼, 故所至不同, 或翱翔天池, 或畢志榆枋, 直各稱體而足, 不 知所以然也. 今言小大之辯, 各有自然之素, 既非跂慕之所及, 亦各安其天性, 不 悲所以異, 故再出之.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 113. Yijie, Guo Xiang and Wei-Jin Metaphysics, 276. In the second section of Chapter 14, Tang Yijie explains the theory of lone transformation as follows: “Socalled lone transformation is that all beings originate and transform independently and self-sufficiently. This object originates and transforms independently and selfsufficiently just like this, while that object transforms and originates independently and self-sufficiently just like that. All beings are this way due to their original natures. They are not decided to be so by an external creator or ‘the nothingness as original essence’. The foundation of the existence and activity of all beings is the original nature innate in them. Original nature not only arises naturally, but also is not dependent on anything (無待). Due to this, in principle, the existence or activity of any thing does not need any external condition. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.” 114. Yijie, Guo Xiang and Wei-Jin Metaphysics, “Zhuangzi, Webbed Toes Chapter (騈拇),” “是故鳧脛雖短, 續之則憂. 鶴脛雖長, 斷之則悲. 故性長非所斷, 性 短非所續, 無所去憂也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 115. Daodejing, Chapter 29, “夫物, 或行或隨, 或噓或吹, 或强或羸, 或載或隳, 是以聖人去甚, 去奢, 去泰.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 116. Sekeun Chung considers it problematic to classify Guoxiang as Daoist because of his way of thinking in which a Confucian perspective is expressed. However, I would like to consider Guoxiang as a perpetuator of a low-level revival of

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Daoistic thinking. Se Keun Chung, “Institution and Nature: What is Neo-Daoism?” in Wei-Jin Daoism, ed. Se Keun Chung (Seoul: Yemun Seowon, 2001), 40–45. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 117. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna. 118. Insub Hur, “A Study on the Issues of Contemporary Interpretations of the Concept of Nothingness,” Eastern Philosophy 34 (2010). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. In this work, I attempted to critically address the various origins of the understanding of Madhyamaka-śāstra and the ways to treat the issues. That is, based on Kalupahana’s understanding of epistemology and the language based on the dependent arising theory of Buddhism, as well as my perspective of the Buddhism that urges a balanced understanding of two aspects of human experiences, namely the experience of a continuous and dynamic world and the experience of a separate and static world, I analyzed the trends of all schools of contemporary Buddhist studies that Andrew P. Tuck classified. And, I have diagnosed that non-Buddhist thinking that has lost the sense of balance, or a distortion in the Buddhist community, have been repeating not only in the past but also in the present. 119. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 161–163. 120. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 44. 121. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 61. 122. It is true that there are mixed opinions on the evaluation of Candrakirti among contemporary scholars of Buddhism. There is the opinion that it is necessary to give more time for evaluation because of the exclusive value of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti, which provides a unique Sanskrit text of Madhyamaka-śāstra, and the fact that studies on this text are currently being performed by many scholars. Refer to the translator’s views in Nagarjuna by David Kalupahana, translated by In Sung Park. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. Refer also to Shin, Thoughts of Nagarjuna, 149. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. Shin points out that, in the Madhyamaka-śāstra, Nagarjuna does not mention the opinions expressed by Candrakirti and Bhāviveka. 123. The reason why I believe strongly that Kumarajiva influenced Sengzhao in the description of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things is because he wrote the Treatise on the Immutability of Things in 411 AD, which was two years after when Kumarajiva translated and published his Madhyamaka-śāstra and Treatise of the Twelve Aspects in 409 AD. Considering that Prajñā Without Knowing and Discussion of the unreal as empty were published in 404 AD and 412 AD, respectively, and that Jongbenyi and Nirvana has no name are or have the possibility of being apocryphal scriptures, there is a high possibility that Treatise on the Immutability of Things and Discussion of the unreal as empty were composed in direct relationship with the discussion of the Madhyamaka-śāstra. Refer to Guijie Liu, Research on Seng-Zhao Thought – The Negotiation between Wei-Jin Metaphysics and Buddhist Thought (Taipei: Wenshizhe Publishing, 1985), 8–12. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout.

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124. “Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 101. Translated into Korean by Sung Chul Kim (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 75–76, “是故去去者 所去處皆無.” I used the text and translation by Sung Chul Kim as a reference. However, I revised it partially as necessary. Therefore, any incomplete part is entirely my responsibility. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 125. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things),” in Daishokyo 151, a22, “斯皆即動而求靜，以知物不遷，明矣.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 126. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things),” in Daishokyo 151, a22–26. This is my interpretation of the following quote: “夫人之 所謂動者，以昔物不至今，故曰動而 非靜. 我之所謂靜者, 亦以昔物不至今, 故 曰靜而非動. 動而非靜, 以其不來, 靜而非動, 以其不去.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 127. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things),” 151 and 27–28, “傷夫人情之惑也久矣. 目對真而莫覺.” In this passage, Sengzhao shows that he is convinced that his opinion is the irrefutable truth. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 128. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things),” 51, b1–5, “求向物於向, 於向未甞無; 責向物於今, 於今未 甞有. 於今未嘗有, 以明 物不來; 於向未甞無, 故知物不去. 覆而求今, 今亦 不往. 是謂昔物自在昔, 不從 今以至昔; 今物自在今, 不從昔以至今.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 129. Middle Way. Translated into Korean by Sung Chul Kim, 41, “果先於緣中, 有無俱不可. 先無爲誰緣, 先 有何用緣.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 130. Middle Way. Translated into Korean by Sung Chul Kim, 330–331, “若因與果 因, 作因已而滅, 是因有二體, 一與一則 滅. 若因不與果 作因已而滅, 因滅而果生, 是果則無因.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 131. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things),” 151, c5–6, “既曰古今, 而欲遷之者, 何也, 是以言往不必往, 古今常存, 以其不動.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 132. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on Immutability of Things),” 151, c23–25, “果不俱因, 因因而果. 因因而果, 因不昔滅, 果不俱因，因不來今. 不滅 不來, 則不遷之致明矣.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 133. Michael Shermer, The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths (New York: Henry and Holt Company, 2012), 87. 134. Shermer, The Believing Brain, 131. 135. Shermer, The Believing Brain, 131. 136. Shermer, The Believing Brain, 135. 137. Shermer, The Believing Brain, 343–344. 138. “The assertion of the extended-self challenges such a self-view, and suggests that the category of the concept of self needs to be approached in a different manner. . . . In this sense, our selves can not be internal somethings trapped in our bodies

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or brains. . . . As a result, the human self takes on a hybrid synthesis of a biological brain and body, intellectual tools, and technology.” Sang Gyu Shin, “Boundary between Extended Mind and Self,” Philosophy Papers 31 (November 2012): 80–81. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 139. Hur, “A Comparative Study on the Similarity between ‘the Categorical Scheme’ in Whitehead’s Process and Reality and the Structure of the Epistemology (Trimsaka) of Vasubhandu,” 173–199. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 140. Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 66. 141. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 96. 142. Hur, “A Comparative Study on the Similarity between ‘the Categorical Scheme’ in Whitehead’s Process and Reality and the Structure of the Epistemology (Trimsaka) of Vasubhandu.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 143. Chang Okh Moon, Understanding of Process Philosophy of Whitehead (Seoul: Tongnamu, 2002), 102. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. PR stands for A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free Press, 1978); RM stands for Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927). 144. van Peursen, The Strategy of Culture. Translated into Korean by Young Hwan Oh, 52. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 145. van Peursen, The Strategy of Culture, 74. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 146. van Peursen, The Strategy of Culture, 100–101. 147. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 44. 148. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 61. 149. Kalupahana, Nagarjuna, 28. 150. Kalupahana, Nagarjuna, 122. 151. David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 183. 152. Janos Harmatta, “Conclusion,” in History of Civilization of Central Asia, 2nd ed. by Janos Harmata, 491 (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1996). “The pantheon on the Kushan coins, with gods of pre-Zoroastrian, Zoroastrian,Greek, Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Indian origin, clearly reflects the syncretic character of Kushan culture.” 153. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, 431. 154. The six texts related to Maitreya, namely the Sutra on the Contemplation of the Bodhisattva Maitreyaʼs Ascent to Rebirth in Tuṣita Heaven (佛說觀彌勒菩薩上 生兜率天經), Sutra that Expounds Maitreya Buddha and His Enlightenment (彌勒 成佛經), Sutra on the Meditative Insight and Descent of Maitreya Bodhisattva (觀 彌勒菩薩下生經), Sutra that Expounds the Descent of Maitreya Buddha and His Enlightenment (彌勒下生成佛經), Sutra on the Era of the Coming of Maitreya (彌

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勒來時經), and the Six Maitreya Sutras (彌勒六部經), show that the early Chinese Buddhists were very interested in the Maitreya faith. In addition, it should be noted that twelve different translations were made in 843 years from An Shigao’s Sutra of Immeasurable Life (無量壽經), the Great Vehicle Sutra of the Adornment of Immeasurable Life (大乘無量壽莊嚴經) of Faxian (法顯), Lokakṣema’s Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sūtra (般舟三昧經) in 179 AD, and Zhi Qian’s (支謙) Great Amitābha Sutra (大 阿彌陀經) between 178 and 189 AD. These show the extent of the deep faith in Maitreya by the Chinese. Considering the case of Jue, Gongze (闕公則) who is recorded as the first Pure Land believer at the beginning of the reign of the Western Jin (西晉) era of Emperor Wu (武帝; 265–274 AD), and the fact that Huiyuan, the head of Mt. Lu Temple, along with 123 lay believers became believers of Amitābha, and that he performed the ritual ceremony, and that Daoan also became a sincere believer in Maitreya and that his followers also believed in Maitreya under his leadership, goes beyond merely meeting the religious needs of those in the area, showing the significance of the impact that famous Chinese monks had on the masses. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 155. Twelve Buddhas of light are immeasurable 無量光佛, boundless 無邊光佛, irresistible 無礙光佛, incomparable 無對光佛, yama (or flaming) 燄王光佛, pure 淸 淨光佛, joy 歡喜光佛, wise 智慧光佛, uninterrupted 不斷光佛, difficult to conceive 難思光佛, ineffable 無稱光佛, and surpassing the sun and moon 超日月光佛. Even though there are twelve names, they must be considered as the synonyms of Amitābha Buddha. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 156. Sunei Tusboi, A Study on Three Principal Texts of the Pure Land Tradition (Seoul: Hongbupwon, 1988), 451–452; “Sutra on the Visualization of the Buddha Amitāyus,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 11 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 1, 180, “佛告阿難及韋提希: 此想成已, 次當更觀無量壽佛身相 光明. 阿難, 當知無量壽佛身, 如百千萬億夜摩天閻浮檀金色, 佛身高六十萬億那 由他, 恒 河沙由旬, 眉閒白毫, 右旋宛轉, 如五須彌山, 佛眼淸淨, 如四大海水, 淸 白 分明, . . . 彼佛圓光,如百億三千大千世界, 於圓光中, 有百萬億那由他恒河沙 化佛, . . . 一一光明, 遍照十方世界, 念佛衆生, 攝取不捨, 其光相好及與化 佛, 不 可具說. 但當憶想, 令心明見.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 157. “Great Import of Kumarajiva,” in Daishokyo (大藏教) 45 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 122, c6–10, “佛於法身中為菩薩說, 法身菩 薩乃能見之. 如此則有四大五根. 若然者, 與 色身復何差別, 而云法身耶. 經云, 法身無去無來, 無有起滅, 泥洹同像, 云 何可見, 而復講說乎.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 158. “Hongming Ji, Discourse on why Monks Should Not Pay Homage to Kings,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 278 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 153 “夫神者何耶? 精極而爲靈者也. 精極則非卦象之所圖, 故 聖人以妙物 而爲言. 雖有上智猶不能定其體狀.” Koryo Tripitaka, vol. 33, 189. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 159. Sengzhao (僧肇), “Zhaolun (肇論, Treatise on the Immutability of Things), 151, c5–6, “從凡夫人, 至聲聞得無著果, 最後邊身, 皆從煩惱生, 結業所化也. 從 得法忍菩薩, 受清淨身, 上至補處大士, 坐樹王下取正覺者, 皆從煩惱殘氣生, 本

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習餘垢之所化也. 自斯以後, 生理都絕.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 160. Mi Kyung Yoon, “A Study on the View of Dharma Body by Kumarajiva” (PhD diss., DongKook University, 2012), 65. In her dissertation, Mi Kyung Yoon shows outstanding research results by classifying the works of Huiyan chronologically and meticulously analyzing how his view of Dharma Body changed after he contacted Kumarajiva. She explains that Huiyuan accomplished his thorough understanding of Dharma Body through the concept of empty nature (性空) which surpassed the understanding of Dharma Body by the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoists’ concept of original nothingness (本無). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 161. “Guang Hongming Ji (壙弘明集), Inscription on Buddha’s Shadow (佛影 銘),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 279 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 460, “廓矣大象, 理玄無名, 體神入化, 落影離形. 迴暉層巖, 凝映虛亭, 在陰 不昧, 處暗逾明. 婉步蟬蛻, 朝宗百靈, 應不同方迹絕而冥.” (Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大藏經) vol. 33, 435. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 162. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集), Compilation of Sutras on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations Emerging from Mount Lu (廬山出修行方便禪經統序),” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8. Translated by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 268쪽, “其妙物也, 運羣動以至壹而不有, 廓大象於未形而不無, 無思无為 而無不為.” Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大藏經), 31, 364. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 163. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001) 대지론 초서 서(大智論抄 序), 319, “夫然則法無異趣, 始末淪虛, 畢竟同爭, 有無交歸矣. 故逰其 樊者, 心不待慮, 智無所縁, 不滅相而寂, 不修定而閑. 不神遇以斯通, 焉識 空空之為玄. 斯其至也斯其極也. 過此以徃莫之㦯知.” Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大 藏 經), 31, 379. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 164. In-Sub Hur, “A Study on the Characteristics of the Understanding of Buddhism by the Neo-Daoists in the Wei-Jin Era.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 165. “Lotus Sutra,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 131 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 156, “善哉! 所歎如實. 審如所言, 如來之德如向所喩, 復倍無數不可思誼, 無能計量劫之姟底. 一一計數大聖所應, 如來之慧無能限者, 不有法想道地處所, 莫能盡原. 世尊普入一切諸誼, 察于世間見衆庶心, 所度無 極一切分別, 皆使決了㩲慧之事, 勸立一切度於彼岸, 皆現普智入諸通慧.” Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大藏經) 9, 827. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 166. “Lotus Sutra,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 131 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 172–173, “如是當解 此喩. 人在生死五道陰蓋, 不了 本無則名曰癡. 從癡致行, 從行致識, 從識致 名色, 從名, 色致六入, . . . 從生致老 病死憂惱苦患. 罪應集會,故謂盲冥.  .  .  . 便見三乘, 發菩薩心至不退轉, 無所從 生, 徑得至佛. 猶如有目得爲神仙. . . . 臨欲滅度, 佛在前住, 誨以要法, 發菩薩意. 不在生死不住滅度, 解三界空, 十方一切如化, 如幻, 如夢, 野馬, 深山之響. 悉無

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所有無所希望, 無取無捨, 無冥、無明. 爾乃深睹無所不達, 見無所見, 見知一切 黎 庶萌兆.” Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大藏經), 9, 831. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 167. “Lotus Sutra,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 131 (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 156, “善哉! 所歎如 實. 審如所言, 如來之德如向所喩, 復倍無數不可思誼, 無能計量劫之姟底. 一一計數大聖所應, 如來之慧無能限者, 不有法想道地處所, 莫能盡原. 世尊 普入一切諸誼, 察于世間見衆庶心, 所度無 極一切分別, 皆使決了㩲慧之事, 勸立一切度於彼岸, 皆現普智入諸通慧.” Koryo Tripitaka (高麗大藏經) 9, 827. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 168. “Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 101. Translated into Korean by Sung Chul Kim (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 1771, “如實觀佛身者, 觀諸佛身如幻如化, 非五衆十二入十八界所攝, 若長 若短若干種色, 隨衆生先 世業因緣所見. 此中佛自說, 見法身者是爲見佛. 法身者 不可得法空, 不可得 法空者, 諸因緣邊生, 法無有自性.” Koryo Tripitaka. vol. 14, 1001. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

Chapter 4

Examples of the Continuous Influences of Early Chinese Buddhist Discourses

SYNCRETIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BUDDHISM AND DAOISM IN THE APOCRYPHAL TEXT, TREASURE STORE TREATISE (寶藏論) The existence of apocryphal texts (僞疑經) in the tradition of Chinese Buddhism makes us contemplate on fundamental issues that have been repeatedly raised not only in Buddhism but also in religions and philosophies in general. An awareness of this problem is approached by even a slight advancement in understanding of apocryphal texts. It starts with the question of whether the original texts or books can be free from reasons that state that apocryphal texts are dubious and unreliable sources; that is, from the criteria that define apocryphal texts as apocrypha. The fact that the Buddha’s original voice had only been orally transmitted and started being written down at the time of the Third Council, 200 years after the Buddha had entered final Nirvana, inevitably makes them vulnerable to the question whether the existing Buddhist texts are the original voice of the Buddha or not. In other words, this inevitably became the historical background of the never-ending argument concerning apocryphal texts. In fact, arguments regarding apocryphal texts are not unique to Buddhism. In the case of Christianity, even though the time span of the activity of Jesus was very short, the critical arguments concerning whether the New Testament, which is the record of his disciples, conveys the original voice of Jesus, are being discussed even today and continue to attract public attention. Furthermore, it would be nearly impossible to restore his original voice from the Buddhist texts, as they are the records of the Buddha who sermonized on various subjects for the extended period of over 45 years. Rudolf Bultman (1884–1976), whether he succeeded or not, is a person who attempted 175

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such a seemingly impossible task. Even though the evaluation of his work on “demythologization” (entmythologisierung) through his so-called “form critique,” which purifies the additional remarks of later thinkers that intervened in the establishment of the New Testament, has not been viewed favorably, the influence of his methodology in the fields of religion and philosophy cannot be ignored. Bultman confesses that through this kind of work, his understanding of Jesus is confined to that of the early church. He arrives at a skeptical conclusion that about 30 passages found in the Bible are assumed to be original words of Jesus Christ, as a result of demythologization.1 Even within the Buddhist tradition, awareness of this kind of problem seems to have been acute since the early days of Buddhism. While the motive of the First Council was to preserve the original voice of the Buddha, it can be said that the motives of the Second and Third Councils, in addition to this, were the processes of arguing for the application of the Buddha’s teachings to reality, and of establishing Buddhist texts with hermeneutical awareness of issues such as translating works or removing the added comments of the later scholars or anti-Buddhist heretical theories. The issue of how to interpret the Buddha’s sermons must have been naturally connected to the evaluation of the texts that were composed by the Buddhist schools. Thus, the texts that contained opposing views must have inevitably been entangled in the arguments, as apocryphal texts. Considering the influential theory that even at the First Council there must have been differences in opinion among the disciples who lived during the time of the Buddha,2 the history of the compilation of Buddhist texts that were edited, expanded on, and circulated for a long time in history, with these aforementioned issues, would lead us to a strange conclusion that there is a history of hiding the true story of original texts, if the previous awareness of the problem is strictly applied and extended. One can only imagine what kind of confusion must have occurred when Indian Buddhist texts compiled through this kind of complex process were imported into China and translated regardless of their chronological order of composition. In the sense that the tradition of doctrinal classification system (教相判釋) of Chinese Buddhism was ultimately an attempt to sort out the Buddhist theories that were tangled like skeins of thread, it can be said that it was Buddhist hermeneutics from the Chinese perspective corresponding to the awareness of the issues of Indian Buddhism which tried to restore the Buddha’s initial intentions. Nevertheless, it is assumed that China was able to provide relatively simple standards regarding the authenticity of the texts, even with this complex history. That might be because of its position as a country importing Buddhism. Even though we discussed the hierarchical order of the texts according to the doctrinal classification system as the understanding of Buddhism matured in China, Sanskrit texts imported from the Western regions or initially from

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India were compiled and translated and have been listed in the canonical catalogs. The first catalog that Daoan created in 374 AD is known as the Comprehensive Catalog of Scriptures (綜理衆經目錄), but does not currently exist. It is Sengyou’s (僧祐) Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (出三藏記集) that succeeded and improved on Daoan’s catalog. The interesting sections of this text in relation to this topic are the records of apocryphal texts by Daoan, as well as An Expanded Version of Master Daoan’s Catalog of Spurious Sutras (新集安公疑經錄) and A Newly Compiled Catalog of Sutras of Doubtful Authenticity and Spurious Translations (新 集疑經僞撰雜錄) that reveal the apocrypha that Daoan discovered. In these two catalogs, Daoan reveals and introduces 26 sections and 30 volumes, while Sengyou points out 20 sections and 26 volumes. Especially, in the writing of Sengyou, the criteria and a classification system are provided for the apocryphal texts. Among them, the following judgments of the apocryphal texts below are worth noting. In the case of listening to the Dharma (法) and the rules of discipline (律), one must judge their falsity (虛) and truthfulness (實) through all the sutras. If they violate the Dharma, they are not the words of the Buddha.3 In general, the essence (體) that the original texts are aiming at is harmonious permeation (融然), so it is profound and grand. But the spurious phrases are inferior in their expressions and meanings, and the good and the bad as well as the right and the wrong are all mixed, so there is nowhere to escape. Now, to differentiate what is suspicious, commentaries are in the records, and the recent, absurdly written ones are marked at the end.4

The above criteria and evaluation of differentiation seem so natural that it would be hard to object to them. However, looking back at the history of the composing of texts as above, problems that cannot be easily overlooked arise. The determination of a text as apocryphal through the Dharma, as mentioned by Sengyou, is not such a simple matter when seen from the perspective of Buddhism’s history of theoretical conflicts between the numerous sects originating from differences in understanding of Buddhism. Of course, there would not be many people who would disagree with the Sutra of the Four Guardian Gods (四天王經) and Sutra on the Divination of the Effect of Good and Evil Actions (占察善惡業報經), which are based on the very Chinese faith in good fortune, or numerous other texts composed for political or social reasons,5 being classified as apocrypha. However, in the process of Chinese Buddhism sect formation, sophisticated apocryphal texts6 composed in order to reinforce their perspectives by borrowing the authority of the Buddha’s words are unreasonable and make Sengyou’s above criteria ambiguous, in the sense that they do not deviate from Buddhism’s Dharma with the deployment

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of exaggerated logic. In other words, the method to differentiate the original texts from the apocryphal on the basis of whether the contents accord with the Buddha Dharma can only make the boundary of defining the apocryphal texts narrower. Actually, the fact that texts like The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (大乘起信論) and the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra (金剛三昧經) that are classified as Chinese compositions and that had greater influences than the original texts in East Asian Buddhist societies indicate how the study of apocryphal texts should proceed in the field of philosophy. It means that it is more fundamentally necessary to advance the development of our interest in analyzing the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that apocryphal texts possess, even though the study of Chinese-composed apocryphal texts focusing on the existing philological investigation or historical approach concerning the motives for composing apocryphal texts is meaningful. In this context, I would like to analyze the Treasure Store Treatise (寶藏論) composed by borrowing Sengzhao’s name.7 The reason is because, in general, apocryphal texts reveal the imposition of the Chinese way of thinking more clearly because they were described in a way of thinking that was more familiar to the people of the region, rather than the serious commentaries that Chinese Buddhist monks faithfully composed according to the Buddhist tradition in the process of its establishment. Through an analysis of the Treasure Store Treatise, we will confirm that an understanding of Buddhism similar to the way of thinking appearing in the previous analysis on commentaries was replicated. As pointed out earlier, one may easily assume that the Chinese composing apocryphal texts developed their writings by accommodating Buddhist concepts within their traditional ways of thinking or in familiar sentence structures, since their purpose had to be to direct the contents in a way that the Chinese could easily accept. The first passage of the Treasure Store Treatise exactly meets our expectations. “If emptiness can be called empty, it is not emptiness; If form can be called form, it is not true form.”8 Anyone can see at a glance that this is a transformation of the first verse in the Daode Jing: “The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao; the Name that can be named is not the eternal Name (道可道, 非常道, 名可名, 非常名).” Of course, one may interpret this verse without any reference to the Daode Jing, or thoroughly in relation to the perspective emphasizing the dynamic worldview that Buddhism and Daoism share. However, the problem is that if one proceeds to explain the Buddhist terms by relying excessively on the Daoist ways of expression, it would put the cart before the horse and would increase the likelihood of Buddhism collapsing into a Daoist worldview. The Treasure Store Treatise’s expressions copying those of the Daode

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Jing now advance one step further and reveal a linear Daoist realism based on popular understanding, as in the following: True form is shapeless; true emptiness is nameless. Nameless is the father of name; formless is the mother of form. This is the source of all the myriad things, and the Great Ancestor of Heaven and Earth. It stretches above to all mysterious phenomena; It reaches below to the courts of darkness (冥庭). Original qi is contained in the Great Mysterious phenomenon; The Great Mysterious Phenomenon is hidden in the shapeless. It becomes the Marvelous to perceive all objects. There is spirit in the Marvelous; there is mysterious function in the spirit. It transforms by non-doing, and each is endowed with self-nature.9

The beginning of this passage seems to copy a passage in the Daode jing: “Nameless is the beginning of Heaven and earth; Having a name is the mother of all the myriad things (無名天地之始, 有名萬物之母).” However, while the Daode Jing describes an accurate understanding of the affirmation-of-aparadox situation, such as in the following phrase, “these two come from the same source, but have different names (此兩者, 同出而異名),” the Treasure Store Treatise attempts a simple reduction and mythical absolute reduction of individual objects by intervening with simple dualisms such as tangible and intangible and name and nameless, as well as with qilun, which is the foundation of Chinese realism. Moreover, the fact that such dualistic reductionism is based on the static and passive perspective of “original substance (本體觀)” that Wangbi expressed among Wei-Jin era thought forms leads to a revelation of the world transitioning from simple stillness to movement and a negative evaluation of the world revealed as such. This Subtle Essence includes the functioning of things, and it gradually reveals forms and names. Even though forms are revealed, their qualities are not yet attained. Their names arise, but they are not yet namable. The form of each is already foretold, but the roaming qi obscures their clarity, and so it is tranquil, empty, spacious, and vast. It starts to be divided and differentiated; there are rulers above and subjects below.  .  .  . Because everyone holds their positions, propriety arises and is practiced. There are things called virtues and things called evil; good people are valued and evil ones are taken lightly. Thus, right and wrong arise and contend. The wise resolve disputes while the ignorant are bound by them. Troubled form is stretched above, and there is no tranquil pleasure below. The Dao of nature is being lost.10

The above quote is typical of those written with a negative view of the differentiation from undivided states to divided states, and from realistic division to value-added division. Such a typical worldview is clearly revealed in Wangbi’s commentary on Chapter 22 of the Daode jing passage: “To have little is to possess; To have plenty is to be perplexed (少則得, 多則惑).” If we

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choose to accept that the Daode jing values “little (少)” and belittles “plenty (多)” by looking at the above quoted passage of the Daode jing, we might not be able to read between the lines of the Daode jing. This is a passage that demonstrates the Daoist worldview that the Daoists wanted to convey to us, which is reversing the commonly accepted notion of value concepts. However, as we have seen before, Wangbi comments on the phrase as follows, and demands us to approach “little” as “ultimate littleness.” The Dao of Nature is like a tree. The more it grows, the more distant it is from the roots; the less it grows, the less distant it is from the roots. If one always increases, then one becomes removed from the true essence. Therefore it is said to be perplexed. If there is little, one reaches one’s roots. Therefore it is said to possess.11

Wangbi’s term, “original nothingness (本無),” is a concept applied with the ultimate destination of such ultimate littleness in mind. It is highly likely that the author of the Treasure Store Treatise developed his writing according to this way of thinking. Of course, not all the writings in the Treasure Store Treatise are necessarily consistent with the perspective of Wangbi’s NeoDaoism. Sometimes we can find an instance of applying the double negation theory of Buddhism properly to explain the undivided world; that is, the world of undivided (未區分) Supreme Oneness (太一), which was developed to elucidate the theory of anātman in the prajñā texts system. In general, everything has its own companion; only the Dao exists alone. There is nothing else outside of it; there is nothing inside to embrace. It includes Supreme Oneness without inside or outside (無內無外); It extends to the eight courts (八冥) and includes all things equally. Its mode of being is neither inside nor outside; neither small nor large; neither one nor others; neither bright nor obscure.12

Here, what we need to reflect on more carefully is whether or not it is all right to apply the double negation theory of Buddhism to the description of the undivided essence of the Dao. In case of Laozi and Zhuangzi, they actively utilized double negation in order to guard against fixating and isolating any situation. However, the repeated use of the double negation theory to establish the anātman theory, in order to describe the mysterious essence of the Dao, resulted in a fortification of the Daoistic worldview that Buddhism could not at all agree on, as this is contrary to the original intention of the compilation of apocrypha to promote Buddhism. The following example is a representative passage that demonstrates such a result. Can the ascetic figure described here be considered as a Buddhist monk?

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In general, an ascetic renounces worldly desires and seeks enlightenment. He tries to abandon the Small Vehicle and proceeds toward the Great Functioning (大用), but there is no such thing as this in the Wondrous Principle (妙理). To say that the essence (體) departs from the boundary means that he has neither worldly desires to renounce nor the Small Vehicle to abandon; to say that the essence is subtle means that there is no enlightenment to seek nor any Great Functioning to proceed to. Why is that? It is because there is no corresponding Dharma at all. For this reason, the sage neither renounces falsity (妄) nor ceases to attain the truth (眞). The sage enacts a myriad of functions, but does so naturally.13

Even though the literary elegance invoking the form of prajñā texts to describe an ascetic’s state is impeccable, it is doubtful indeed that this describes the original state of Buddhism. In particular, it would be more appropriate to consider the last part, “its functioning occurs naturally (萬用而自然矣),” as a Daoist state familiar to the Chinese rather than a Buddhist state, as it is an expression ripe with the Neo-Daoist or Daoist way of thinking, as shown in previous arguments. The Treasure Store Treatise is a complex commentary that encompasses a wide range of applications, from the explanation of Buddhist concepts utilizing very simple and popular understandings of Daoism to the application of sophisticated phrases based on the similarities of both ideologies and mixed together which made it difficult to discern the differences. But as we can see from the previous analyses, the free expression form that the apocryphal text shows is that the writer of this treatise is himself a Chinese who was deeply entrenched in the Daoist way of thinking. In the contemporary study of Buddhism, it can be said that the serious study of apocryphal texts began with the excavation of the Dunhuang materials. As a result, Studies on Apocryphal Sūtras (疑經硏究) by Makita Dairyo, and The History of the Formation of Buddhist Texts (佛敎經典成立史) by Motski Singo were produced. But it is true that these studies suggest that the bibliographical approach is stronger than a historical analysis of thought. It seems that so-called “apocryphal texts” have not yet become the objects of intensive study, as the concept has a pejorative connotation. However, if we want to focus on how Buddhism became indigenized in various regions through apocryphal texts, determining the status that each apocryphal text might have as an object of study would be very different. As analyzed previously, apocryphal texts reveal Chinese thought more explicitly than the commentaries by Chinese monks. Nonetheless, while it is difficult to give an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not the commentaries by Chinese monks are a product of such syncretism, studying the apocryphal

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texts written in China will help greatly in determining the meanings of the ambiguous phrases appearing in the various commentaries by Chinese monks.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMENTARIES ON “THUS I HAVE HEARD (如是我聞)” BY HUINENG (慧能) AND YEFU (冶父) APPEARING IN THE COMMENTARIES OF FIVE MASTERS (五家解) OF THE DIAMOND SUTRA (金剛經) As mentioned previously, even though the process of sinicization of Buddhism is a topic of great interest not only to Buddhist scholars but also to historians and scholars of various fields, it is not easy to come across articles dealing with this systematically. The reason may be because one has to overcome not just one but two obstacles, neither of which is easy, in order to deal with this topic in more depth. The first one is the language barrier. It is necessary to be fluent in Chinese as well as Sanskrit and Pali. Moreover, even if one is fluent in those languages, one may not be able to effortlessly grasp the differences between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism. To overcome this, one has to satisfy the more fundamental requirement of the second condition, which is that it is necessary to establish comparative philosophical points of view to differentiate the heterogeneous natures of Indian and Chinese thought traditions from each other. For this reason, most of the writings on this subject are limited to pointing out superficial similarities and differences based on the fact that Lao-Zhuang Daoist concepts were adopted in the translations of Sanskrit texts. The problem with these writings is that it is not easy to find sophisticated arguments responding to the following questions: Why did the Chinese at that time adopt Lao-Zhuang Daoist thought in the translations of the original texts? In other words, why did they consider Buddhism and Lao-Zhuang Daoism as similar to each other? Are the similarities genuine similarities? Even though they are fundamentally different, and as it is difficult to find a discussion about their differences, did the Chinese and East Asians misunderstand them? The reason for analyzing the commentaries on “Thus have I heard (如是我聞)” by Huineng and Yefu is to overcome such limitations. The fact that many core terms of Indian Buddhism were translated through Daoist terminologies illustrates that from the beginning of the importation of Buddhism into China the Daoistization of Buddhism was enacted consciously and, at times, unconsciously. We can confirm that Chinese monks, from the earliest period in the history of Chinese Buddhism, were very much aware of this Daoistization of Buddhism, as can be seen in the examples of monks like Daoan who attempted to overcome Geyi Buddhism. The evaluations

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by modern scholars of the attempts to overcome the Daoistization of Buddhism by Chinese monks reveal very ambiguous dualistic aspects. That is, while they have a negative perspective on the success of these attempts on the one hand, they reveal an ambiguous perspective in their evaluation of the unavoidable process of the addition of a Daoist flavor to Chinese Buddhism in the development of Buddhist thought on the other hand. Specifically, the latter point of view could be just a vague expression of Sinocentrism if it does not adequately address discussions on the following issues: concrete theoretical analyses on specific points of Daoism that supplement certain weak points of Buddhism as a result of the syncretism with specific aspects of Daoism, and the emergence of a superior form of thought which could not have been seen in their original forms of thought. Of course, it would be difficult to deny such a positive evaluation completely through only the analyses on the commentaries of “Thus have I heard (如是我聞)” by Huineng and Yefu. However, it can provide an opportunity for a more active discussion on the issues previously raised, by pointing out the basic fallacies of their arguments and their causes, even if in a limited scope. The Original Meaning of “Evam Mayā Śrutam” In his translation of the Diamond Sutra,14 Edward Conze translates “evam mayā śrutam” as “thus have I heard.” This is the same as the translation by the Pali Text Society translators. Looking at the fact that Robert Thurman adopts this translation in his book The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti,15 “Thus have I heard” seems to be accepted as the standard translation in the West. However, Kalupahana raises a philosophical issue derived from this kind of translation and asserts the necessity of new translation.16 He considers the passive voice that frequently appears in Sanskrit and Pali texts as an important phenomenon containing the philosophical intention of the Buddha, and translates it as “Thus has been heard by me.” That is, he tries to maintain the intention of the Buddha by translating “evam” as “thus,” “mayā” as “by me,” and “śrutam” as “has been heard.” Kalupahana interprets the philosophical connotation of the intentional use of the passive voice as the rejection of the metaphysical substantialism of Upanishadic philosophy, and adopts the term, “mayā” expressed in the passive voice as a device employed to avoid the substantialistic concept of ātman. Thus, he insists that there is no reason to change the phrases of Sanskrit and Pali texts written in the passive voice into the active voice. Furthermore, he points out that the existing translations into the active voice are evidence of the active intervention of the western academic metaphysical worldview, rather than it being a simple issue of translation. In this context, he suggests translating the existing texts in a format that maintains the passive voice as much as possible.

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Whether his proposal is persuasive or not may be put aside for later. What we should focus on concerning the phrase, translated in Chinese as “Rushi women (如是我聞),” is that it does not include any terms with especially significant Buddhist philosophical meaning. Simply, this verse is a formal introductory phrase to convey the sermons of the Buddha. However, Huineng and Yefu made commentaries on each of the translated words into Chinese characters by allocating significant philosophical connotations to them. The cause of these complicated commentaries seems to have started with the translations of the two Sanskrit terms, “evam” and “tathā,” which have different etymologies, identically as “Thus (如).” And furthermore, the problem becomes more complicated when “Thus” stands out through the ontological terms such as “tathāgata” and “tathātva” and, in addition to this, is commented on through the adoption of the Daoist worldview. Huineng’s Commentary on “Thus Have I Heard (如是我聞)” Huineng added a commentary on the “Thus have I heard (如是我聞)” phrase in the Diamond Sutra simply as follows: “Ru” (如) means “to indicate”; “Shi” (是) means “constant”. When Ānanda said to himself, “I have heard the Dharma like this from the Buddha”, this reveals that it is not his own theory. And, the self (我) is nature (性); just as nature is also the self. It is the movement of inside and outside. Because one can hear everything thanks to this nature, it is called “I hear” (我聞).17

In the above commentary, there is no doubt that Huineng was aware of the general meaning of this phrase. However, it cannot be denied that his interpretation that emphasizes the self with nature, and his way of thinking that embraces all the movements of the world centering in nature, reveal NeoDaoist reductionism. Here, however, when one adds to and elaborates on the character of the self, there is an inherent danger of it being developed into an essentialist or reductionist self-concept that considers the self as the center of the world. In other words, in the above commentary, we can feel that the expression goes beyond the sense of unity between simple nature and oneself, as shown in the pre-Qin Daoist worldview, and was developed into types of discussions that appear as abstract and rigid interpretations; that is, close to the Neo-Daoist understanding of the world. Following Yefu’s more poetic commentary below on the same phrase would be an effective example that reconfirms the influence of Daoist thinking, as pointed out above. Yefu’s Commentary on “Thus (如是)” Yefu comments on “thus (如是)” as follows:

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When the “old man of the Dao” (Nanquan, 南泉) talks about Thusness, it has changed a lot from what it was a long time ago. Tell me again! Where does the direction of change go? Hey! It cannot be acquired if one wanders aimlessly. In the end, what can be done? Even though one talks about a fire, the mouth is not burned.18

Yefu seems to have tried to express in his commentary the ever-changing dynamism of nature. Even though he confuses the meaning of “evam” with “tathā,” he does not seem to understand “tathā” substantialistically here. However, it does not seem to be clear that such anti-substantialism originated with the original teachings of the Buddha. Yefu’s perspective is closer to the Daoist ontology rather than the anātman theory of the Buddha, who criticized the Upanishadic metaphysical concept of ātman. In general, it is accepted that both Daoism and Buddhism clearly recognized the limits of human conceptual thinking. However, their differences in methods of understanding are clear. While Daoism emphasizes the unification of subject and object in order to overcome human epistemological limits in the understanding of the objects, Buddhism emphasizes that the suffering of all sentient beings may be reduced and overcome by analyzing the suffering generated through not understanding the world correctly based on the awareness of the human epistemological condition or limits on conceptual thinking, and through the correct understanding of this process. In this context, that is, if we look at Buddhism based on Buddhism’s insights into the human limits of perception or the limitations of conceptual thinking, the repeated use of double negation of the Diamond Sutra could be understood as a critique on the fallacy of grasping the concrete world in which dynamic changes are occurring being perceived as a conceptual static world. Through this critique, the Buddha emphasized to his disciples that it is a fictitious delusion to understand the concrete world as a static substance, whether it is permanent or temporary. For the Buddha, claiming everything as eternal originates from mere human ignorance that misrepresents a static concept as reality, and clinging to it. In other words, the suffering of human beings begins with the belief or the wish that something that cannot exist is real, whether internal or external. Speaking epistemologically, such a problem derives from the inability to differentiate the concrete from the conceptual, and the dynamic from the static. It appears to be clear that the pre-Qin Daoists were distinguishing the dynamic concrete world from the static conceptual world in an attempt to overcome the incomplete understanding of the world due to the limits of human perception. That is, even though it was not the Buddhists’ religious way of understanding of the world within the tradition of Indian thought forms, it is possible to suppose that the pre-Qin Daoists had insights that were similar to

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the Buddha’s understanding of the world, as mentioned previously. However, we cannot overlook the fact that it was the Neo-Daoism of the Wei-Jin era that directly influenced the formation of Chinese Buddhist theories, which metaphysically transformed pre-Qin Daoism, as repeatedly pointed out previously. The basis of the assumption that the traditional Daoist idealism seeking for an undivided oneness of subject and object as well as their metaphysical understanding of the transcendental concept of the Dao exerting a constant influence on the Chinese understanding of Buddhism lies in the developmental process of the Chinese history of thought, just like the transformation from pre-Qin Daoism to Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism. In other words, this book intended to distinguish the differences between Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism by focusing on the historical fact of the transformation of Daoist thought forms. We confirm that our above assumption is not unreasonable when we see that Yefu applied the very Chinese logic of “nondualism (不二門)” in his commentary on the concept of “shi (是),” as follows: This is this. Water is not separate from the waves, as the waves are water. When there is not even the slightest breeze on the water and it becomes like a mirror with no stain, then it reflects all things of heaven and earth clearly. Look and see!19

At the beginning of this commentary, Yefu interprets that the character “shi (是),” which does not have significant meaning, indicates the simplistic unity of the original world by emphasizing the essential oneness of “water” and “waves.” However, the nondualistic metaphor of “water” and ‘waves’ results in a weakening of the meaning of the dynamic world of the supposed mystical unity of subject and object that the pre-Qin Daoists pursued, by distinguishing the changing world (when the wind blows) from the unchanging world (when the wind doesn’t blow) in the latter part, to give positive value to the latter. This kind of perspective is in line with the idea of the absolute world of the Dao that was actively introduced by Neo-Daoist scholars such as Wangbi, and the passivity of the static world of the Dao that they grasped. Such an influence of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoist thinking becomes clearer in his commentary on the phrase “I have heard (我聞).” Yefu’s Commentary on “I Have Heard (我聞)” Yefu independently derives a mystical self-concept from “mayā,” expressed in the passive voice and gives positive meaning to it. Me, with my pure and naked body washed in water, can not comprehend myself. If I, myself, try to recognize and acquire these clearly, it makes two. When they

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do not move as much as a thin hair, they can be united in their true nature. Get this! The sound of wisdom in the true self, like the wind making that special sound blowing through pine trees harmoniously, exists of itself.20

The way of explaining the self in this commentary is far from the tradition of Buddhist anātman ideology that rejects the ātman, the concept of self asserted in the Upanishadic tradition. Moreover, the thought of unifying with original nature is closer to the Daoists’ assertion. If one replaces the character “I (我)” with the character “Dao (道)” and then reads the commentary above, one may find that Yefu’s commentary is not very different from, specifically, the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoistic explanation of the world of the Dao. This could be a good example to show that his way of thinking is influenced by the Neo-Daoist worldview. In other words, the passive and static concept of self-found in Yefu’s expressions, such as “when they do not move as much as a thin hair,” can be said to be a way of thinking that is similar to the conceptualization of the Dao as static and absolute nothingness, as seen in Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism. Even though the poetic expression emphasizing naturalness expressed in the latter part of the commentary alleviates much of the rigidity of Neo-Daoism’s reductionism, this kind of understanding is in fact basically far from the understanding of the world of the dynamic Dao as Chaos (混沌), as shown in pre-Qin Daoism. His following commentary on the character “to listen (聞)” is a metaphor, the content of which is also far from the ultimate goal of what the pre-Qin Daoists tried to say; an understanding of the world comprehended paradoxically and the urge to overcome their phenomenological limitations. Listening (聞). It avoids following other things (sound and form 聲色). Monkeys are howling in the hills, and cranes are crying in the forest. The wind is blowing patches of clouds, and turbulent water is creating long rapids. On a late autumn frost-fallen night, the best is to be enlightened by the cold cry of a wild goose.21

The first phrase seems to be a metaphor for the autonomy and independence of the mind that does not chase after the outside world. The succeeding phrases show the point of view of accepting all things (物物) in nature as they are through the descriptive method of contemplating nature. This is one of the general ways that the pre-Qin Daoists explain nature. However, this stage of understanding nature cannot play the role of a prescription that must be presented in order to overcome the conflicts and struggles among things that inevitably occur. In other words, the understanding of nature at this stage is far from the method of proactively accepting conflicts and contradictions that inevitably arise in the dynamic world revealed by the pre-Qin Daoists.

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The concept of nature, frequently emphasized in Buddhism, elicits the meaning of guarding against the general human fallacy of mistaking conceptual substances for real things. Affirmatively speaking, it means the direct seeing of concrete situations that are dependently arising. On the other hand, the naturalness of Daoism emphasizes the characteristics of “the transformation of things (物化)” to conform to changes of nature, which is the opposite of “human artificiality (人僞).” Furthermore, in the case of Neo-Daoism which directly influenced the development of Chinese Buddhist theory, the emphasis on the “reduction to the basis of the transformation of nature” cannot be underestimated. In fact, this reductionist thinking is far from the pre-Qin Daoists’ way of thinking, who maintained insight into the dynamism of paradox. Such reductionist thinking becomes clearer in Yefu’s grand commentary on the phrase “Once (一時),” which has no serious philosophical intention, followed by the phrase “Thus have I heard (如是我聞).” The Concept of “Oneness (一)” Understood as Original Oneness Yefu understood the “One (一)” of “once (一時)” as an ontological adjective, and commented as follows: One! Each one follows another. One is one. It divides into two and then brings about three, following this process. One has to contemplate on the stage before the division of “heavenly and earthly” (乾坤) and “chaos” (混沌) throughout one’s entire life.22

Yefu does not seem to at all be concerned with what the Sanskrit word “eka,” corresponding to “One (一)” here, originally means, nor what kind of function it has in Chinese. This is not really a matter of whether or not the word in the original text was simply misunderstood, but rather more fundamental issues are involved. His interest is focused on the one undivided, mysterious fundamental world prior to the division of Yin and Yang. His interest in and obsession with such oneness cannot be explained without considering the Daoistic, especially Neo-Daoists, influence in the way of understanding the world. Such an ontological interest in the fundamental world could be evaluated as an absurd interest, in light of the initial philosophical motive of Buddhism that negated the metaphysical ontology and substantialism of the Vedic and Upanishadic traditions. The reason why we must thoroughly distinguish Chinese Buddhism from Indian Buddhism is because of the frequent occurrence of examples in which the fundamental direction of Buddhism is expressed differently even though they equally claim theirs as the same Buddhism.

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REMAINING ISSUES The characteristics of early Chinese Buddhism cannot be explained simply with an analysis such as this alone. In the process of the indigenization of Indian Buddhism in China, numerous heterogeneous elements had to be involved, and these elements made Chinese Buddhism into unique forms that were different from those in Indian Buddhism. So it would be easy to succumb to a very dangerous fallacy of simplification by defining it through only a few elements. In this context, it might be a reckless and impossible task to seek a Chinese Buddhism based on universal characteristics that everyone can agree on. However, the task of looking for general characteristics in a loose sense cannot be considered as meaningless, even if it is not a universality that can be applicable to all sects of Chinese Buddhism. As mentioned earlier, I cannot deny that each of the evaluations on their own is the outcome of an effort to identify the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism; whether it be a positive one, that Chinese Buddhism was a subtle and creative syncretism of Indian and Chinese ways of thinking, or a negative one, that it was a product of misunderstandings that was thoroughly and systematically repackaged. Even though more elaborate analyses and research studies are required, I think that there is a possibility that the Buddha’s anti-metaphysical method of understanding the world, based on epistemological reflections, could have been correctly grasped by the insights of the pre-Qin Daoists derived from their ontological interests. As explained above, we can discover commonalities shared by the dynamic worldview of the dependent arising theory of Buddhism and the world of the Dao expressed as Chaos by pre-Qin Daoists, in the sense that it is a revival of the reminiscence of the undivided world that had been the main way of understanding the world during the era of mythological thinking prior to the era of philosophical thinking. From this perspective, it could be said that Chinese Buddhism had sufficient theoretical potential to be understood as an example of the creative syncretism of Indian and Chinese traditions of thought. How these commonalities have been exhibited in the history of Chinese Buddhism must begin with the work of examining how the discussions that overcame the limitations of Neo-Daoist thinking finally appeared in the history of Chinese Buddhism. In addition, the fields of research that need to be carried out more rigorously in order for this work to be more successful are investigating the causes of how pre-Qin Daoism transformed into metaphysical Neo-Daoism and identifying the exact characteristics of Indian Buddhist theories during each era in which they were imported into China and how they interacted with the mixing of different thought elements besides Buddhism. With the premise that this kind of work has already been done, I speculate that a true encounter between Daoism and Buddhism could be found in the

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thought forms of a few genius Chan masters (禪僧) among the Chinese sects of Chan Buddhism. And I expect that research in this area could contribute tremendously to the understanding of the characteristics of Korean Buddhism, which considers the Diamond Sutra as its foundational sutra and has been faithfully carrying on the Linji Chan (臨濟禪) tradition.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The focus of this book is to reveal the fact that, among the traditional Chinese ways of thinking, Daoist thought forms intervened very deeply in the interpretation of Buddhism. Some may suggest that I have put forth an overly negative view of the Chinese understanding of Buddhism. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that such problems that appeared in the Chinese understanding of Buddhism were not phenomena limited only to the Chinese. Of course, because China had kept its unique worldview firmly as the center of East Asian culture for a long period of time, it is undeniable that it would have been difficult to completely understand the Buddhist worldview, as one of the Aryan Indian worldviews, as it was, in such a short period of time. The problem is that even the past Buddhist traditions of India and Central Asia had had similar problems of their own, though different from those in China, and this phenomenon is occurring even in the ways that modern scholars understand Buddhism. I would like to emphasize that because my initial interest was the sinicization process of Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism became my subject of analysis, but I do not have any particular prejudice against Chinese Buddhism. As can be seen in my discussions throughout this book, my paramount interest lies only in revealing what kinds of horizons Buddhism opened to the understanding of human beings and the world. A while ago, Professor Chung-ying Cheng (成中英), a Chinese philosophy scholar, asked me this question, “Is it your opinion that the Chinese did not understand Buddhism?” I answered that in the era of Chinese Chan Buddhism, there could possibly have been a syncretism of philosophical insights of early Buddhism and Daoism. Even though I could not confirm that because my research did not extend to the era of Chan Buddhism, it is my view that, in light of the epistemological insights that Daoism had, the Chinese intellectuals must have come relatively closer to the teachings presented by early Buddhism than those of any other region or time. Dr. Kalupahana had a very unique perspective of not considering the history of Buddhism as a history of development in which the horizon of understanding of Buddhism has been continuously expanding, but rather of a circular history of regression and restoration of early Buddhism’s way of understanding of the world. I agree with this perspective and, at the same

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time, have tried to include the view that Buddhism’s understanding of the world is the product of a complete understanding of humanity in general, in which all three representative types of ways of thinking that have appeared in the transformation of the human ways of thinking have had no choice but to function together. I have attempted to present in this work what Buddhism has contributed to the history of the human intellect. I think that it can be pointed out that my way of understanding Buddhism is far from the traditional way of understanding Buddhism, as it would be a huge, overly abstract discussion. However, I think that this kind of approach could be a new frame of reference to apply when one tries to compare Buddhism with other philosophies or religions. I think that only through this kind of approach can Buddhism be placed in its rightful position in the history of thought forms and persuade people of different viewpoints to see Buddhism’s preeminent status.

NOTES 1. Taidong Han, History of Christianity (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2003), 133. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 2. Shoko (渡辺照宏) Watanabe, Translated into Korean by Moo Deuk Kim, Theory of the Establishment of Texts (Seoul: Kyungseowon, 1983), 26. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 3. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8. Translated into Korean by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 137. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 4. “Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka,” in Hangul (Korean) Tripitaka 8. Translated into Korean by Sang Joon Park and two others (Seoul: Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, 2001), 137. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 5. Jinmoo Kim, “How Can We Interpret the Creation of Apocryphal Texts in Chinese Buddhism?” 66. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 6. Dongshin Nam, “Investigation on the Establishment of Middle Shilla Dynasty Buddhism,” Korean Culture 21 (June 1998): 114. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 7. Yu-Lan Fung, Resource Book of Chinese Philosophy. Translated into Korean by In Jae Jung (Seoul: Hungsung Publishing Co. 1992), 141. 印順, 印順法師佛學著作集 券 3, 華雨集, 189–190. English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 8. Sengzhao (僧肇), Treasure Store Treatise (寶藏論; Baozang lun, 廣照空有品第一), T 1857.45.143b–150a, 1, “空可空非真. 色可色非真色.”

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(廣照空有品第一). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka throughout. 9. Sengzhao (僧肇), Treasure Store Treatise (寶藏論), “真色無形, 真空無名. 無名名之父, 無色色之母, 為萬物之根源, 作天地之太祖. 上施玄象, 下列庭. 元氣含於大象, 大象隱於無形, 為識物之靈. 靈中有神, 神中有身, 無為變化, 各稟乎自然.” (廣照空有品第一). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 10. Sengzhao (僧肇), Treasure Store Treatise (寶藏論), “微有事用, 漸有形名. 形興未質, 名起未名. 形各既兆, 遊氣亂清, 寂兮寥兮, 寬兮廓兮. 分兮別兮, 上則有君, 下則有臣. … 各守其位, 禮義興行, 有善可稱, 有惡可名, 善人所重, 惡人所輕. 於是即是非而競生, 其智有解, 其愚有縛. 上施煩形, 下無寂樂, 失自然之志.” (廣照空有品第一). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 11. Rump and Chan, Commentary on the Lao Tzu by Wangbi, Daode Jing, Adapted from Chapter 22, “自然之道, 亦猶樹也. 轉多轉遠其根, 轉少轉得其本. 多則遠其眞, 故曰惑也. 少則得其本, 故曰得也.” English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 12. Sengzhao (僧肇), Treasure Store Treatise, 4, “夫萬物有侶, 唯道獨存. 其外無他, 其內無復.無內無外, 包含太一, 該羅八冥, 周備萬物, 其狀也非內非外, 非小非大, 非一非異, 非明非昧, .  .  .” (廣照空有品第一). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 13. Sengzhao (僧肇), Treasure Store Treatise, 7, “夫修道者, 莫不斷煩, 惱求菩提, 棄小乘窺大用, 然妙理之中, 都無此事. 體離者, 本無煩惱可斷, 無小乘可棄. 體微者, 無菩提可求, 無大用可窺. 何以故. 無一法可相應故. 是以聖人, 不斷妄, 不證真, 可謂萬用而自然矣.” (離微體淨品第二). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 14. Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972). 15. Robert A. F. Thurman, The Holy Teachings of Vimalakirti (New York: Penn. State University Press, 1981). 16. David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, Introduction: xiv. 17. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim (Seoul: Hyunamsa, 1984), 23, “如者指義, 是者定詞, 阿難 自稱如是之法, 我從佛聞, 明不自說也. 故言 如是我聞. 又 我者性也, 性卽 我也, 內外動作, 皆由於性, 一切盡聞故, 稱我聞也.” (Appendix, 16). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 18. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim, 24, “如是 古人道 喚作如如 早是變了也 且道 變向甚麽處去 咄 不得亂走 畢竟作麽生 道火 不曾燒却口.” (Appendix, 17). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 19. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim,

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25, “是是 水不離波 波是水 鏡水塵 風不到時 應現無瑕照天 地 看看.” (Appendix, 18). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 20. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim, 25–26, “我 淨裸裸赤洒洒 沒可把. 我我 認得分明成兩箇不動纖豪合本然 知音 自有松風和.” (Appendix, 18). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 21. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim, 26, “聞 切忌隨他去. 猿啼嶺上 鶴唳林間 斷雲風捲 水激長湍 最好晩秋霜午夜 一聲新鴈 覺天寒.” (Appendix, 18–19). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka. 22. Newly Translated Commentaries of Five Masters (五家解) of the Diamond Sutra (金剛經) (新譯 金剛經五家解). Translated into Korean by Woon Hak Kim, 27, “一 相隨來也. 一一 破二成三 從此出 乾坤混沌未分前以是一生參學畢.” (Appendix, 19). English translation provided by Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka.

Translators’ Notes

I was pleasantly surprised when Dr. In-Sub Hur spent some time with me on his visit to the United States with his colleague Dr. Song in the winter of 2019. The following April he called and confided in me that he had lung cancer, and he asked me not to share this news with any of our mutual friends, so as not to distress them. We called each other often in 2020, and learning how serious his disease was, I started to think about how I could help him stay positive during his battle against cancer. I suggested translating his book into English so that more people could know about his lifelong research. He liked the idea. Dr. Hur had published A History of Early Chinese Buddhism in Korean in 2017. In June 2020, I reached out to my long-time friend Ron Dziwenka, a native English speaker who holds a doctorate in Buddhist philosophy and spent 12 years studying in Korea, to collaborate on this project. With Dr. Hur’s and Dr. Dziwenka’s participation, the three of us began our collaborative work. Dr. Hur and I first met each other in 1980, during our second year of undergraduate studies in the Philosophy Department at Yonsei University. He had just returned to school after his military service. I particularly remember his interest in Buddhism, specifically the works of Dr. Van Peursen and Dr. Tai-Dong Han. After graduation, we did not see each other again for many years, but in 2000, he made several visits to the University of California at Berkeley as the Head of the Academic Research Division for the Korean Tripitaka Research Center, so our relationship deepened, and he became my good family friend. Dr. Hur, Dr. Dziwenka, and I worked together as a team for just over two years, during which I spent one to two hours a day on the initial translation from Korean to English. Once I had a substantial part of the initial translation ready, Dr. Dziwenka and I spent two to four hours a week going over 195

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my translation and his separate reading of the text, to discuss and suggest specific rephrasings. Dr. Hur and I met online weekly to discuss the questions and issues regarding the text and our translation. Of course, each one of us had to spend quite a lot of time preparing for the meetings. After two cycles of reviews and revisions of the entire book, Dr. Hur approved our translation. This collaboration was a fascinating and inspiring experience. Even though I had appreciated his brilliance and compassion in our college days, encountering his rich life experiences and continued growth as a philosopher made these past two years of working together an exhilarating experience. His philosophy studies had infused his zest for life as he continuously sought genuine answers to his insightful questions. Due to our regular discussions and close collaboration, we were able to comb through each sentence of his manuscript and clarify the meaning, ensuring that our English translation faithfully expressed his ideas in the original text. However, the style of the final translation differs a little from the original. Dr. Hur’s original work followed the writing style of German philosophy, written in very long sentences which are difficult to maintain with English grammar. Dr. Dziwenka and I could have misinterpreted Dr. Hur’s ideas without his dedicated guidance. As a result, in the English translation, we agreed to make the sentence structure simpler, more direct and clearer. Dr. Hur mentioned more than once that the English version is better than the Korean one. We could only have done this with his close collaboration. Dr. Hur’s book is the culmination of his life-long research exploring how the amalgam between Buddhism and Daoism occurred so smoothly. He approaches this question from the universal human way of thinking conventionally applied in both cultures regardless of their regional, ethnic, and cultural differences. He also points out that the similarities shared by these two thought forms are trichotomous ways of thinking. He mentions that the difference between them is that Buddhism developed a projective trichotomous way of thinking through the method of introspection, while Daoism developed a circulative trichotomous way of thinking focusing on understanding the interpenetration and dynamism of any situation from a realist perspective. He searches for answers in primary source materials and scholarly works on the topics. While working with him, I witnessed his sincere and genuine attitude as a scholar-researcher. We talked a lot about his impending death while he was suffering from the disease. He told me several times that he had lived his life without regrets. We revisited a lot about our past as well. He told me that the human life of birth, aging, sickness, and death is suffering, as Buddha says. But thinking of life with only birth, aging and sickness, but without death, would be painful. Death is a blessing, even if it is something sad that we all must face as human

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beings. I was always impressed by how he managed to maintain his equanimity without falling into the daily turbulence of joy and sadness. As soon as the translation work was complete, Dr. Dziwenka and I began looking for a publisher. Even though Dr. Hur suffered deeply from the disease, he continued to be actively engaged in the publisher search process. He even offered to contact the writer and translator of a book whose publisher was interested in our book. While we were confident that a reputable publisher would be interested in our translation, we wish that Dr. Hur had been able to see it happen. I am glad to see the publication of this book come to fruition. As my dear friend Dr. Hur said and wished, I hope this book provides a fresh perspective for those whose interests are not only in early Chinese Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism, pre-Chin Daoism, and Neo Daoism, but also in East Asian cultures in general. Alexander Choi In order to include some recent scholarship that is relevant to the themes of Dr. Hur’s work but that was made public after the publication of his original text, rather than adding it into our translation of his original text we decided to present this scholarship in this note. David Hinton addresses an era somewhat later than the Wei-Jin era and focuses on the emergence and ascension of the Chan schools in the third to fifth centuries. He asserts that just as in the early penetration of Buddhism in China it was understood through the Daoist lens, in the latter stage of the sinicization of Buddhism, the Chan texts show that Chan was greatly affected by Daoist thought as well as the practical, earthy, and empirical-based view of the Chinese. Early Chan practitioners and thinkers, like early Chinese Buddhists, also negotiated the mutual assimilation and accommodation of Buddhist to Daoist ideas by trying to understand Sanskrit concepts through Chinese characters from the Daoist lexicon, thus adding new connotations to these Daoist concepts while struggling to distance them from their preBuddhist meanings. Another researcher, April Hughes, focuses on the period of “mature sinicization” of Buddhism and thus is later than the era focused on in this book. She addresses how rulers in medieval China, Empress Wu Zhao 武曌 (624– 705) as one example, drew on the Buddhist concept of worldly saviors and Wheel-Turning Kings and associated themselves with Chinese and Buddhist symbols that were correlated with imperial power—especially worldly saviors—as one source of multiple claims to legitimate their claims to the throne. This is an extension of the Central Asian religion tradition and Zoroastrianinfluenced adoption of the colossal Buddhist statues in China. Sovereigns

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incorporated these figures into their imperial system and depicted themselves both as monarchs and as buddhas or bodhisattvas, thus as both political rulers and religious teachers, in uncertain times of apocalyptic chaos. One of the key texts Hughes discusses to support this is the Scripture Expounded for the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra on Attesting Illumination (Puxian pusa shuo zhengming jing 普賢菩薩説證明經, T. no. 2879), a very recently discovered apocryphal text dating to the sixth century CE. Hughes agrees with Zurcher (1981) that “apocalyptic texts represent an amalgamation of Buddhist and Chinese understandings. They have components of both Indic and Central Asian Buddhist systems .  .  . (and) that the Buddhist tradition had several intrinsic notions related to apocalypticism” (Hughes, 21). Thus, the rulers appropriated the idea of the need for the saving power of bodhisattvas by incorporating themselves as savior bodhisattvas (Hughes, 26–43). Eric Greene draws from hagiography, ritual manuals, material culture, and various rarely studied meditation manuals translated from Indic sources into Chinese or composed in China in the early medieval era. He addresses how the early Chinese Buddhists approached Buddhist meditation primarily as a way of gaining access to the enigmatic visionary experiences, to interpret them and the nature of the authority they had already ascribed to them. In chapter 1, Greene points out that the earliest Buddhist texts translated into Chinese in the second century by An Shigao (安世高; fl. 148–68) and his translation teams coined much of the relevant vocabulary, as did Daoan (道安; 312–385), going forward. These vocabulary terms would be applied in the coming Wei-Jin era. Greene also points out that early meditation masters like Daoan and Sengrui (僧叡; 352–421/439) felt that proper instructions for Buddhist meditation required Western masters to convey them directly, and in the fifth century, with the arrival of Indian and Central Asian meditation missionaries such as Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadara, Dharmapriya, and Dharmamitra chan practice began to establish itself in China as something that these Chinese Buddhists could accomplish (Greene, 28). So, by the fifth century, Buddhists in China could gain status, authority, and patronage through their claimed or imputed mastery of meditation (Greene, 55). Relevant to our work here is how Greene accounts for the social dimensions of early Buddhist meditation, by applying anthropologist Webb Keane’s idea of “semiotic ideology,” which “points to the forms, practices, and spaces in which the people who use signs think and argue with each other about how those signs work” (Greene, 15). These forms, practices, and spaces are “semiotic” in their communicative functions of signifying Buddhist spiritual attainments. Chan visions within their social contexts functioned communicatively as “semiotic forms,” or semiotic markers, as symbols or indexes (Greene, 63). In fact, Kumārajīva declared that spontaneous visions were “signs” of meditative attainments (Greene, 85).

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Jun Tang contextualizes specific issues relevant to Buddhist translation in the premodern Chinese context (i.e., orality, inclusiveness, power, teamwork, conflict, sinicization, censorship, canonization, and early monk-translators’ diverse textual strategies) from a macroscopic perspective, thus representing monk-translators’ translation activities, their association with power, and their role in the making of Chinese Buddhism. Relevant to our book is the role of translation in the acculturation of Buddhism in what we must see as quite a heterogenous premodern Chinese cultural history. Tang points out that 120 identifiable non-Chinese Buddhist monks or lay Buddhists “from different Buddhist sects” (Berkwitz, Schober, & Brown, 2) coming from ancient empires or kingdoms such as Ceylon, Funan, India, Kapisa, Khotan, Kucha, Parthia, Sogdiana, and Yuezhi between the 140s and the 1080s, participated in the translation of Buddhist manuscripts, and they constituted about 60% of the total number of recognized Buddhist translators (including Dharmarakṣa, Kumārajīva, Buddhayas, Dharmakṣema, and Vajrabodhi) in premodern China. texts. These monk-translators painstakingly borrowed Chinese concepts or terms to render Buddhist ones. The “immensely broad range of ” Buddhist texts “trickled into China” in disregard of “chronological or ideological sequence” conveyed “varying, or even contradictory, messages,” which often “possessed layers of cultural accretion added outside of India” (Zhiru, 95). Specifically relevant to this book is the fact that the sixth-century Gao Seng Zhuan (Biographies of Eminent Monks) attributed the term geyi to two Chinese monks, Zhu Faya and Kang Falang, and that Tang asserts that early translators deliberately changed some segments of Buddhist texts that conflicted with prevailing Chinese ideologies. More importantly, Jan Nattier (Nattier, 18) asserts that early translators also developed diverse styles for diverse audiences; for the Chinese literati, for the immigrants of various nationalities, and for the masses of uneducated, and monolingual, Chinese. A recent edited work by Silk and Zacchetti offers a number of perspectives based on the study of earlier phases of Chinese Buddhist history and addresses issues concerning the early sinicization of Buddhism such as dereification of words, relativizing the limits of language, the structure of indirect communication, and use of paradox, tautology, and poetic language. In particular, Stefano Zacchetti, in his “Blind Spots and One-Way Tracks in the Chinese Buddhist Historiography” chapter, adds to Funayama Toru’s view that the history of Chinese Buddhism had both a significant continuity, and sometimes a remarkable discontinuity, with Indian Buddhism by positing that from the very early period, Chinese Buddhists “were actively reflecting on (and hence creating) their own history.” Some of the views expressed in [their] fragmentary “historiographical statements” proved extremely influential, directly or indirectly, in modern scholarly views of particular issues and periods” (Zacchetti, 293). What is relevant to this book’s thesis is

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Zacchetti’s assertion that an “historiographical statement” is used to explain “a certain fact by placing it in a specific historical and cultural context . . . it uses a specific cultural and historical datum as an explanation for something that was happening” (Zacchetti, 295). Zacchetti sees this as mature form of historical thinking, as it offers a paradigm to understand, or misunderstand, early (Wei-Jin era) Chinese Buddhism; thus his discussion of “blind spots.” His example of the importance of this, taking his example of Daoan, is not whether Daoan’s view is right or wrong, but that it influenced the understanding of Buddhism going forward in the premodern era as well as of modern scholars, especially Zurcher’s, view of this era of Chinese Buddhist history. He states that “the picture of Eastern Jin Buddhism may have been painted overwhelmingly with the color of this xuanxue—Prajñāpāramitā connection, resulting somehow in a monochrome portrait of that religious and intellectual landscape” (Zacchetti, 295). Another example of a “blind spot” that directed the narrative structure of our understanding of history is the acceptance by scholars of the Gaoseng zhuan as the most important source (despite other possible texts) of early Chinese Buddhist historiography. Zacchetti asserts that it is fair to “question the historiographical supposition that takes the existence of biographies for granted,” and so we should consider other alternatives in situating and understanding early Chinese Buddhist historiography. Ron Dziwenka Since the initial publication of this book, there have been researchers who have recently addressed this. See a summary of the recent scholarship on this issue in the “Translators’ Notes” section at the end of this book. NOTES 1. David Hinton, China Root: Taoism, Ch’an and Original Zen (Boulder: Shambala Publications, 2020). 2. April D. Hughes, Worldly Saviors and Imperial Authority in Medieval Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2021). 3. Eric Greene, Chan Before Chan: Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience in Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2021). 4. Jun Tang, “Translation and Buddhism in Premodern China: A Contextualized Overview,” Translation Journal, no. 2 (April 2017). trans​​latio​​njour​​nal​.n​​et​/Ap​​ril​-2​​ 017​/t​​ransl​​ation​​-and-​​buddh​​ism​-i​​n​-pre​​moder​​n​-chi​​na​-a-​​conte​​x​tual​​ized-​​overv​​iew​.h​​tml 5. S. C. Berkwitz, J. Schober, and C. Brown, “Introduction,” in Buddhist Manuscript Cultures: Knowledge, Ritual, and Art, ed. S. C. Berkwitz, J. Schober and Claudia Brown (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 1–15.

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6. S. Zhiru, “Scriptural Authority: A Buddhist Perspective,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 30 (2010): 85–105. 7. Jan Nattier, A Guide to the Earliest Chinese Translations: Texts from the Eastern Han and Three Kingdoms Periods (Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, 2008). 8. Jonathan A. Silk and Stefano Zacchetti, eds. Chinese Buddhism and the Scholarship of Erik Zürcher (Boston: Brill, 2023). 9. Stefano Zacchetti, “Blind Spots and One-Way Tracks in the Chinese Buddhist Historiography,” in Chinese Buddhism and the Scholarship of Erik Zürcher, eds. Jonathan A. Silk and Stefano Zacchetti (Boston: Brill, 2023), 290–303.

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Index

12-link chain of causation (paṭiccasamuppāda; 十二支緣起說), 17 abhidharma; 48, 116, 118–121, 131, 133, 166, 203 Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (Commentary on the Establishment of Knowledge of Buddhist Scholasticism; 阿毘曇八犍度論), 121, 133, 166 Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of the Abhidharma; 阿毗達磨俱舍), 19, 118, 120 Abhidharma literature, 118, 120 Abhidharmasāra (Heart of the Abhidharma; 阿毘曇心論), 118, 121, 164, 165, 168 Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra (Scripture on the Five Dharmas of the Abhidharma; 阿毘曇五法行經), 118 Absolute God, 6, 9, 48, 141, 147–49 affirmation-of-a-paradox, 78, 81, 153 agenticity, 138–42 Ahura Mazdā, 52–54, 147, 148 all-knowing (一切知), 110 although there is no-thought and non-doing, there is not non-doing (无思无为而为无为), 100

Amesha Spenta, 53, 54 Amitâbha Buddha (阿彌陀佛), 137, 149, 171 Amitâbha Sutra (大阿彌陀經), 41, 171 anātman (無我), 13, 43, 74, 79, 82, 93, 95, 101, 103, 106, 135, 145, 151, 153, 155, 157, 180, 185, 189 Andrew P. Tuck, 13, 33, 168 Angra Mainyu, 52, 147 Annals of the Three Kingdoms (三國志), 68, 156 anti-Vedic, 8, 12, 93, 160 apocryphal texts (僞疑經), 175–78, 181, 191 ātman, 13–15, 54, 84, 93, 103, 115, 183, 185, 187 The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (大乘起信論), 178 being (有) & non-being (无), 77, 101, 113, 153, 167 Biographies of Eminent Monks (高僧傳), 56, 102, 199 Brahman, 14, 93, 115, 150 Brahmanism, 50 Brahmin, 135 branch (枝末), 81 Buddhist theory of consciousness (唯識), 140 213

214

Index

Candrakīrti (月稱), 103, 104, 162, 168 celestial spirit (魂魄), 45 cessation of feeling and perception (nirodha-samāpatti; 想受滅), 16 Chandra, A. N., 31 chaos (混沌), 12, 22–24, 27, 28, 35, 124, 152, 187–89, 198 Chinese Dharma-Characteristic School, 13 circulative trichotomous way of thinking (循環 三範疇的 思惟方式), 24, 26, 28, 29, 56, 160, 196 Collection of Middle-length Discourses (Majjhima Nikāya), 16 Commentaries of Five Masters of the Diamond Sutra (五家解金剛經), 182, 192, 193 Compilation of Notes on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka (catalog compiled cira, 515 by Sengyou 출삼장기집 (出三藏記集)), 42, 96, 160–161, 172, 177, 191 Compilation of the 98 Texts of the Abhidharma (阿毘曇九十八結經), 48, 116, 118–121, 131, 133, 166, 203 Comprehensive Catalog of Scriptures (綜理衆經目錄), 177 consciousness (唯識), 14, 15, 17–22, 34, 44, 64, 69, 70, 80, 94, 95, 133, 137, 140–42, 144, 149 Consciousness-Only School of Buddhism, 13 the Constant Dao (常道), 99 Conventional Truth (俗諦), 99, 106, 107, 109 Dao (道), 3, 22–29, 35, 43, 44, 65–69, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83–85, 89, 94–100, 109, 110, 113, 115, 120, 152, 154, 157, 178–80, 185–87, 189 Daoan (道安), 3, 4, 41–43, 58, 71, 83, 87–90, 92, 96, 98, 100, 159, 165, 171, 177, 182, 198, 200 Daodejing (道德經), 12, 22–26, 28, 64, 65, 68–70, 77, 78, 126, 127, 156, 157, 164

David J. Kalupahana, 8, 13, 33, 102, 144, 162, 170, 192 delusion (无明), 81, 86, 115, 124, 154, 185 demigod, 11 dependent arising (緣起), 8, 13, 14, 17–19, 21, 44, 80, 82–84, 91, 93–95, 98, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 114, 128, 129, 132, 135, 144–46, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 168, 189 Dharma (法慧), 13, 20, 88, 89, 91, 99, 101, 102, 134, 135, 144, 148–55, 158, 166, 172, 177, 178, 181, 184 Dharma Body Theory (法身論), 134, 144, 148–49, 151–52 Dharmagupta School (法藏部), 54, 57, 117, 118 Dharmakāya (Buddha-bodies), 39 Diamond Sutra (金剛經), 182–85, 190, 192, 193 Dīgha Nikāya (Collection of Long Discourses), 18, 34 Discourse on Expressing Doubts (說疑篇), 67 Discourse on the Difficulties of Persuasion (說難篇), 67 Discourse on Valuing Emptiness (Wangbi) (貴無論), 70 Discourse on When the Body Dissipates, the Soul is Not Extinguished (形盡神不滅論), 100 Discourse on Why Monks Should Not Pay Homage to Kings (沙門不敬王者論), 151, 171 Discussion of the Unreal as Empty (不眞空論), 168 doctrinal classification system (教相判釋), 176 doctrine that the individual self and (all) phenomena are all empty (我法俱空), 20 double negation (negation of metaphysical thinking)14, 15, 86, 94, 99, 113, 180, 185

Index

dualism, 15, 17, 24, 28, 44, 52, 53, 76, 81, 86 dualistic way of thinking, 7, 24, 26, 29 early transmission 초전 (初傳), 39, 56, 117 emptiness (空), 3, 4, 16, 17, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 84–87, 91, 93, 96, 98, 101–6, 109, 110, 113–15, 145, 146, 149, 152–56, 162, 163, 178, 179 emptiness of (individual) self-nature (自性空), 91, 101 emptiness of self-nature (自性空), 91, 101 empty nature of the dependent arising of prajñā (緣起性空), 91 Erich Zürcher, 1, 2, 31, 37, 39, 42, 55, 56, 119, 133, 157, 164, 198, 201 Essay on Free and Easy Wandering (逍遙遊論), 96 Essay on the System of Mahāyāna (大乘義章), 148 Essay on Wisdom Without Knowing (般若無知論), 109–11 essence-function theory (體用論), 111 Etienne Lamotte, 38, 47, 57, 60, 61, 73, 117, 118, 146, 156, 164, 166, 170 even though people have no self, phenomena do exist (人無我法有), 19 Examination of Conditions (觀因緣品), 128, 130, 132, 133 Examination of Harmony (觀因果品), 128, 130, 132–34 Examination of the Moved and the Un-Moved (觀去來品), 128 An Expanded Version of Master Daoan’s Catalog of Spurious Sutras (新集安公疑經錄), 177 Faxian (法賢), 41, 59 Faxian (法顯), 171 forms being annihilated at every moment (刹那滅), 131 forms being born at every moment (刹那生), 131 four original causes (四原因), 18 four physical forms (四色), 86 fundamental nothingness (本無), 94, 154

215

Georges Dumezil, 6, 32 Geyi Buddhism (格義), 3, 4, 43, 88, 91, 92, 96, 98, 182 Girardot, 23, 35 Gonda, J., 7 Great self (大我), 13 Great Ultimate of change (易之太極), 68 Great Vehicle Sutra of the Adornment of Immeasurable Life (大乘無量壽莊嚴經), 41, 171 The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipa; 尼波多), 33 Guoxiang (郭象), 90, 123, 127, 134, 167 The Han Feizi (韓非子), 66 The history of the formation of Buddhist texts (佛敎經典成立史), 181 Hongming Ji (弘明集), 37, 40–42, 58, 71, 74, 82, 84, 100, 158–159, 171, 172 Huineng (慧能), 182–84 Huiyuan (慧遠), 41, 43–44, 58, 83, 89–90, 96, 99, 101–2, 118, 121, 135, 150–53, 155, 171–72 human artificiality (人僞), 188 illumination (明), 81, 90, 96, 111, 198 imperceptible mystery (隱微), 109–10 Indra, 7–8 infinitesimally small (極微), 121–22, 124 Inscription of Buddha’s Reflection (佛影銘), 44 instance (刹那), 121, 180 its functioning occurs naturally (萬用而自然矣), 181 karma (業), 9, 57, 74, 82–83, 151, 155 Kathāvatthu (論事), 45 Kātyāyanīputra (迦多衍尼子), 121 Kimura Kiyotaka, 3, 88 Kumarajiva (鳩摩羅什), 39, 55, 59, 71–72, 74, 100, 102–3, 115–16, 118– 19, 130, 151, 154–55, 168, 171–72, 198–99 Kushan Empire, 45–49, 51, 53–54, 59–60, 91, 136–37, 146–48, 165

216

Index

language of existence (Kalupahana), 108 Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra (楞伽經), 146 The Last Caravan on the Silk Road, 51, 61 Lesser Vehicle (Theravādins), 91, 95 the logic of reflexive seeking, 64–67 Lokakṣema (支樓迦讖), 41, 59, 90–91, 118, 164 Longer Amitābha Sutra (大阿彌陀經), 41 Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise on the Middle Way), 15–16, 34, 128–30, 159, 168 Mādhyamika authors, 104–105 Mahāyāna, 12, 20, 56–57, 74, 91, 117–19, 128, 137, 148, 150–51, 154, 178 Maitreya Buddha (彌勒佛), 40–41, 49, 54, 56, 137, 148–49, 170–71 manas (思量), 22 Mandukya Upaniṣad, 14 metaphysicalization, 144 Middle Way Buddhism, 13, 100 mind-nature (心性), 107 Mithra, 54, 61, 148 Monks Should Not Pay Homage to Kings (沙門不敬王者論), 100, 151, 171 Murti, 13 mythical thinking, 4–6, 13, 31 mythological thinking, 2, 4–9, 12, 18, 22, 31, 51–52, 78, 92, 141, 143, 147, 150, 152, 162, 189 Nāgārjuna (龍樹), 13, 16–17, 33–34, 58, 102–3, 109, 115, 128, 130, 132, 134, 148, 153, 155, 159–60, 162, 168, 170 nature of the essence is great emptiness (大空性), 146 neither coming nor going (不來不去), 131

A Newly Compiled Catalog of Sutras of Doubtful Authenticity and Spurious Translations (貞元新定釋教目録), 177 Nirvāṇa (涅槃), 72–73, 79, 86–87, 150, 162, 168, 175 non-conceptual knowledge, 108 non-doing but not non-doing (無爲而無不爲), 66 non-duality (不二), 98 non-duality of essence-function (體用不二), 111 non-substantialistic (non-substantialism), 73, 101–102, 107, 151 Norman, 15–16, 33 no-self (無我), 13, 43, 74, 79, 84, 97, 106–7, 110 nothingness (無), 3–4, 43–44, 65, 67– 68, 70, 76–78, 80–81, 84–86, 88–90, 94–98, 104, 113, 121, 123–25, 128, 131, 134, 154, 157, 167–68, 172, 180, 187 old standard translation (舊譯), 39 oracle bone script, 5, 9, 12, 37 original nothingness (Wangbi) (本無), 3, 76–78, 81, 85, 95, 97–98, 124–25, 128, 131, 134, 157, 172, 180 original self (本來我), 13 original truth (本諦), 86 Pañca​viṃśa​ti-sā​hasri​kā-pr​ajñāp​ārami​ tā-sū​tra (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines; 放光般若經), 98 Pangu (盤古), 11 polytheistic worldview (多神敎), 39 prajñā (般若), 4, 14, 20, 74, 78, 91, 93–94, 96, 98–103, 105, 109–14, 117–18, 149, 153, 155–56, 160–62, 168–69, 173, 180–81, 200 Prajñā-pāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom; 般若波羅蜜), 98–99 Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sūtra (Banshou Sanmei Jing; 般舟三昧經), 171

Index

Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sūtra (Pratyutpannabuddha Saṃmukhāvasthita Samādhi Sūtra; Sūtra on the Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present; 般舟三昧經), 171 pre-Aryan, 8, 12, 31–32, 57, 93 Preface to Commentary on the Combined Texts of the Guangzan jing and Fangguang jing (合放光光讚隨略解序), 98 Preface to Sutra on the Cultivation of Expedient Meditations translated on Mount Lu (廬山出修行方便禪經 統序), 44, 99 Preface to the Daodijing (道地經序), 98 pre-Vedic, 5, 7–9, 31, 93, 160 Primordial Chaos (混沌之一), 124 profoundly silent (淵默), 99 projective trichotomous way of thinking (投影三範疇), 20, 56, 160, 196 public transmission record (公傳), 41 pudgala (補特伽羅), 45, 54–55, 58–59, 79 Pure Land Sutra (淨土經), 41 Qilun (氣論), 37, 80, 149, 151, 154, 179, see also theory of qi (氣論) Que Gongze (闕公則), 41 retribution (報應), 79, 82–84, 86–87, 107 Rg Veda, 6, 8, 31–32 root (根本), 26, 28, 38, 48, 53–54, 68– 69, 81–82, 87, 92–93, 124–25, 136, 143, 152, 180, 200 Saṃyuktâgama-sūtra (Connected Discourses; 雜阿含經), 16 Saṅghadeva (僧伽提婆), 121 Saoshyant, 52–54, 147–48 Sarvāstivāda (說一切有部), 16, 19–20, 30, 38, 42, 45, 48, 54–55, 57, 61–62, 74, 79, 91, 100, 111, 115–22, 129– 34, 164–65

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Sautrāntika (經量部), 42, 45, 54–55, 57–59, 74, 79, 117, 119, 121, 144 School [propounding] identity with material form (卽色宗), 96 Second Miscellaneous Translations on the Knowledge/Wisdom of Aggregates (雜犍度智跋渠第二), 121 Sengzhao (僧肇), 102–3, 109–20, 122–23, 130–34, 162, 168–69, 171, 178, 191–92 sentient beings (物), 6, 44, 98, 153, 185 An Shigao (安世高), 41, 59, 90, 118, 171, 198 Spenta Mainyu, 52, 54, 147 spiritual numinosity (神明), 80–81 state of neither associative thought nor non-associative thought (非想非非想), 16 storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna; 阿頼耶識), 20–22 Studies on Apocryphal Sūtras (疑經硏究), 181 substantialism, 29, 55, 93–94, 101, 104, 106, 108, 144, 148, 154, 183, 185, 188 substantialistic, 15, 22, 26, 34, 55, 63, 65–66, 70, 74, 79–80, 84, 87, 91, 93, 97, 100–102, 105, 107–9, 113–14, 129, 134–35, 141–46, 148–52, 154– 55, 158, 162, 183, 185 subtle and profound (幽微), 109–10 Sutra of Immeasurable Life (無量壽經), 41, 171 Sutra of the Four Guardian Gods (四天王經), 177 Sutra of the Path of Stages of Cultivation (道地經), 43 Sutra on the Divination of the Effect of Good and Evil Actions (占察善惡業報經), 177 taking nothingness as the essence (以無爲本), 70 Tales of Strange Events (述異記), 11

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Index

theory of fundamental nothingness (本無論), 154 theory of individual transformation (Guoxiang (郭象) (獨化論)), 125– 28, 133–34 theory of proper attributes (適性說), 125, 134 theory of qi (氣論), see Qilun (氣論) theory of rebirth (輪回說), 72 theory of the imperishability of the soul (神滅)·신불멸(神不滅), 39, 79 theory of the Middle Way (中論), see Madhyamaka-śāstra (Treatise on the Middle Way) theory of valuing being (崇有论), 90, 125 theory of valuing nothingness (貴無論), 90, 125, 167 Theravāda Nikāya Buddhism, 73, 117–18 a thing from the past does not arrive in the present (以昔物不至今), 131 Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only by Vasubandhu (Triṃśikāvijñaptimātratā; 唯識三十頌), 20, 95 those with no Dao technique (無術者), 66 three difficulties in translation (三不易), 42 Thus I have heard (如是我聞; evam mayā śrutam), 182 Thusness (如), 99, 157, 185 the transformation of things (物化), 188 Treasure Store Treatise (寶藏論), 175, 178–81, 191–92 Treatise Clarifying Buddhism (Zongbing 宗炳) (明佛論), 43, 80 Treatise on Buddha Nature (佛性論), 100 Treatise on Buddha Nature (法性論), 100 Treatise on the Immutability of Things (物不遷論), 111, 115–17, 119–20, 122–23, 125, 128–30, 133, 168–69, 171

Treatise on the Taste of the Nectar of the Abhidharma (阿毘曇甘露味論), 118 True insight (實相般若), 96 True Wisdom (真慧), 99 ultimate correct true enlightenment (無上正眞道), 98 ultimate emptiness (至虛), 98 Ultimate Reality (眞際), 33, 99 Ultimate Truth (眞諦), 99, 106–7, 109 undivided (未區分) Supreme Oneness (太一), 180 undivided continuity (vipāka: 異熟), 22, 77–78 unreal (不眞), 104, 113–15, 143, 168 Upaniṣad, 8, 13–14, 16, 33, 54, 84, 94, 103 Vajrasamādhi-sūtra (金剛三昧經), 178 valuing being (貴無論), 90, 124–25 valuing nothingness (貴無論), 78, 89– 90, 124, 125, 157, 167 Vasubandhu (世親), 8, 12–14, 20–22, 29, 56, 95, 100–101, 118, 160 Vedas, 6, 8, 14, 50, 60 Vedic, 5–15, 29, 31–32, 54, 60, 84, 92–94, 103, 106, 136, 145, 154, 160, 188 Verrier Elwin, 8, 32 Wangbi (王弼), 30, 65–70, 76–79, 81, 89–90, 94, 96, 123–25, 128, 131, 134, 156–57, 160, 166–67, 179–80, 186, 192 the way that can be spoken of (可道之道), 99 Wei-Jin Daoism (Neo-Daoism; 魏晉玄學), 30, 42, 71–72, 75–79, 81, 89–90, 95, 97–100, 116, 122–23, 127, 130, 134, 154, 157, 167–68, 180, 186–89, 197 William Crooke, 32 Wisdom of the Dharma (法慧), 99

Index

Wisdom Scripture of Practicing Enlightenment (道行般若經), 110, 164 Wordly Stories and New Tales (世說新語), 96 words cannot express the nature of the abso­lute world or the world of truth (言表不能性), 14 Wuyunli nianji (Chronicle of the Five Cycles of Time; 五運曆年紀), 11 Yefu (冶父), 182–86, 188

219

Yuezhi (Yueh-chih), 45–46, 59, 91, 118, 137, 164, 199 Zhaolun (肇論), 102–3, 109, 113–17, 119, 120, 128, 156, 163, 169, 171 Zheng Daozi (鄭道子), 82 Zhi Daolin (支道林), 58, 96 Zhi Dun (支遁), 87 Zhi Qian (支謙), 41, 171 Zoroastrianism, 41, 48–54, 60–61, 135–37, 147–48

About the Author

In-Sub Hur studied at Yonsei University in the ROK, where he earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees in the Department of Philosophy. After completing his PhD coursework, he earned his doctorate at the University of Hawaii under Dr. David J. Kalupahana, focusing on the unique position of the Buddhist “dependent arising theory” in the intellectual history of mankind and being introduced to what would be his lifelong work of comparing Indian, Central Asian, and early Chinese Buddhism in terms of the structure of human thought. As a visiting scholar, In-Sub Hur also taught at a number of prestigious institutions throughout his career, including Yonsei University, Kyonghee University, Jingak University, and Episcopalian University. He published numerous works in international journals of philosophy and Buddhism as well as theology and comparative thought. He served as Head of the Academic Research Division for the Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana (RITK) where he assisted in the completion and launching of the digitized Koryo Tripitaka (CD-ROM Version of Tripitaka Koreana 2000), served as the Technical Coordinator of EBTI (Electronic Buddhist Text Initiative), and organized a number of international conferences. He was also Special Section Chief and Seminar Coordinator for the Bibeak Institute for Buddhist Studies, and a longtime Researcher for the Research Institute of Philosophical Ideas at Seoul National University and The Research Institute of Toegyehak. Throughout his career as a scholar-researcher and a professor of philosophy at Duksung Women’s University, In-Sub Hur published essays on Wei-Jin Buddhism by analyzing commentaries by Chinese monks and realized he needed a deeper understanding of Central Asian Buddhism. By collaborating with scholars in this field and publishing journal articles on the topic, he came to envision the theme of this book.

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About the Author

In-Sub Hur was battling cancer while he was collaborating with Alexander Choi and Ron Dziwenka on this translation project and knew that publishing companies had offered contracts to publish this translated work. However, he succumbed to the disease in January 2023 before we could complete the publication process. We dedicate this book to In-Sub Hur to honor him and his lifelong contributions to the field.

About the Translators

RON DZIWENKA Ron Dziwenka has published several papers on martial arts and East Asian philosophy, and has presented his research at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Scientific Congress as well as at international conferences in the Republic of China (Taiwan), People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Thailand, France, Poland, Mexico, Canada, and the United States. He began his study of Korean during his 12 years at Yonsei University in the ROK, where he earned his first MA in Korean studies. He also spent a year at the Mandarin Training Center in National Taiwan Normal University. He is a reviewer for Revista de Artes Marciales Asiáticas Journal, a reviewer for Ido Movement for Culture Journal of Martial Arts Anthropology, and an active member of the Association for Asian Studies, American Philosophical Society, and Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts. He is a cofounder and the president of the education nonprofit company, International Academic Center for Taekwondo, that just published its first book, Martial Meditation: Philosophy and the Essence of the Martial Arts (2022). He is currently an adjunct faculty member in the History Department at Salisbury University and Editorial Assistant for the Journal of Adolescent and Adult Literacy. ALEXANDER CHOI Alexander Choi earned a BA in philosophy at Yonsei University in the Republic of Korea and attended the graduate programs in philosophy at Yonsei as well as at Universitaire de Paris X in France. He has translated and 223

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edited books on topics such as Daoist meditation practices and martial arts history expressed in postage stamps. He served as president of the Yonsei University Alumni Association of Northern California. He is a Grandmaster of Taekwondo and has been the owner-operator of two Taekwondo schools in California for over twenty-five years, educating thousands of students. He is also cofounder, former vice president, and special advisor of American Taekwondo United, and in those capacities guided the organization in national and international Taekwondo competitions, symposia, and forums. As well, in addition to serving on the board of directors of the Seoul-San Francisco Sister City Committee and overseeing various international and local events for the past six years, he is also a respected and experienced entrepreneurial community leader. He established the Yonsei Sarang Foundation, a nonprofit organization raising funds for student scholarships, and over the years his martial art schools have raised more than $120,000 for the UCSF Children’s Hospital.