The History of South Vietnam The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967 9780367618896, 9781003108009

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The History of South Vietnam

This book provides an in- depth analysis of the political instability of South Vietnam between the two Republics and offers a valuable contribution to the study of the history of Vietnam as it focuses on a decisive period in the history of South Vietnam. A much-needed examination of the political environment of the Republic of Vietnam between 1963–1967, this book shows how South Vietnamese leadership failed to form a stable civilian government and to secure South Vietnam against the increasing threat by North Vietnam. Through a detailed assessment of political difficulties during the period, the book suggests that, to prevent the imminent loss of South Vietnam to the Communist forces, the United States government did not have any other option than to escalate the war by committing its combat ground forces in the South and beginning the sustained bombing in the North. Moreover, the book analyses the administration of General Khánh and Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát and includes a full account of the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. The achievements, the difficulties and the sudden death of the National High Council as well as the confrontation between the Buddhists and the Trần Văn Hương government are also explored. This book will be of interest to researchers and students of the contemporary history of Vietnam, the history of the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnam War and Southeast Asian history and politics. Vinh-The ­ Lam is Librarian Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. His previous book with Hãn Nguyên Nguyễn Nhã Vietnam, Territoriality and the South China Sea: Paracel and Spratly Islands is also published by Routledge (2019).

Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

The aim of this series is to publish original, high- quality work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Southeast Asia. The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam Between States and Markets Guanie Lim ASEAN and Power in International Relations ASEAN, the EU, and the Contestation of Human Rights Jamie D. Stacey The Army and Ideology in Indonesia From Dwifungsi to Bela Negara Muhamad Haripin, Adhi Priamarizki and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki The 2018 and 2019 Indonesian Elections Identity Politics and Regional Perspectives Edited by Leonard C Sebastian and Alexander R Arifianto Embodied Performativity in Southeast Asia Multidisciplinary Corporealities Edited by Stephanie Burridge The History of South Vietnam The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967 Vinh-The ­ Lam

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Contemporary-Southeast-Asia-Series/book-series/RCSEA ­ ­ ­ ­ ­

The History of South Vietnam The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967 ­

­ Vinh-The Lam

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Vinh-The Lam The right of Vinh-The Lam to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-61889-6 ­ ­ ­ (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10800-9 ­ ­ ­ (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of illustrations Foreword Acknowledgments List of abbreviations

vii ix xiii xv

1 Introduction

1

2 The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath

7

3 The January 30, 1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh

18

4 The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh

31

5 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964: a year of total chaos

38

6 High National Council

48

7 The Buddhists and Trần Văn Hương government

58

8 Phan Huy Quát government and the cabinet crisis of May/June 1965

64

9 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government: the War Cabinet

75

10 Moving toward the Second Republic Appendix A: Biographical sketches of the Republic of Vietnam personalities Appendix B: Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963

101

123 139

vi Contents

Appendix C: Temporary Charter No. 2 – February 7, 1964. Replacing Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963 Appendix D: Charter of the Republic of Vietnam – August 16, 1964 (Vũng Tàu Charter) Appendix E: Provisional Charter – October 20, 1964 Appendix F: Provisional Constitution – June 19, 1965 Bibliography Index

141 143 151 161 167 171

Illustrations

Figures 2.1

The MRC at a Press Conference chaired by LieutenantGeneral Dương Văn Minh   7.1 Trần Văn Hương cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on January 21, 1965 after the reshuffle of January 18, 1965 8.1 Phan Huy Quát cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on February 16, 1965 10.1 President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ at inauguration ceremony on October 31, 1967

8 58 64 117

Table 10.1

Election of CA – Distribution of Votes

104

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to introduce this book History of South Vietnam: The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967. The work is the first study to examine politics in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the years between the fall of the First Republic under President Ngô Đình Diệm and the founding of the Second Republic under the leadership of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. This was a chaotic period that witnessed severe political instability. On one hand were ambitious colonels and generals who schemed to seize power via coups. Some succeeded and others failed. On the other hand were various religious and other civil society groups who violently protested on the streets to demand political representation and accountability. In addition, several political parties and their regional factions, which lacked mass bases of their own, sought to position themselves between the military and the Buddhist movement. None turned out to be able to stay in power for long. Amidst that political turmoil, two external forces, the Communists and the Americans, further muddied the water. The former attempted, through escalating combat and terrorist activities, to aggravate the situation to pave the way for a takeover, while the latter sought to stabilize the situation for a possible expansion of the war with a larger role for US forces. A Communist agent, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, led a failed coup that might have resulted in a quick takeover of the South by Hanoi had it been successful. In contrast, the United States invested greatly in General Nguyen Khanh only to find out that he was inept and unreliable. Both examples suggest that external forces added to the chaos but did not achieve what they wanted. By 1965, after the departure of General Nguyen Khanh from the scene, the situation became more stable with a core group of generals, the socalled “Young Turks,” in control of government. Social unrest continued and reached a climax in 1966 when the government under General Nguyen Cao Ky confronted a popular revolt in central Vietnam led by Buddhist monks and supported by a military faction. Out of the crisis, in which the Ky government prevailed, was the move of the authorities to promulgate a new, liberal constitution and the democratic elections of a legislature and the president of the Second Republic in 1967.

x Foreword Despite all the turbulence, the period between the two Republics was a significant period in the history of South Vietnam and Vietnam in general. For South Vietnam, it was a time when massive social energies were released after having been held back for many years by the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. As political parties were legalized, civil society groups proliferated and the press thrived. It was a period when the basis of a modern liberal order was created even though that order was still unstable and would face significant challenges later on. For the history of Vietnam, this period can be likened to the 1945–1946 period when a similar level of intense social and political interaction took place. In both periods a great power vacuum suddenly appeared after years of political immobility. In 1945, the Communists were able to seize power and slowly extinguished their rivals in the North by the summer of 1946 before war began at the end of the year between them and the returning French. The period 1964–1967 also took place in the middle of a war but ended with a more positive outcome: social forces were able to make the military accept a liberal political system in which their participation was legitimate and institutionalized. The literature on the RVN that existed from 1955 to 1975 is extremely limited. For a long time, orthodox American historiography was influenced by propaganda from Hanoi and dismissed the Saigon regime as a mere creation of the United States in its strategy to contain communism in Asia. Lacking indigenous roots, America’s “South Vietnamese project” was considered doomed from the start. To most American diplomatic historians, there is no need to study the RVN since it can be assumed that the Americans called all the shots. Nevertheless, recent scholarship has showed that the United States was often held hostage by their South Vietnamese ally despite an asymmetry of power between them. Rather than being American puppets, Saigon elites had their own political visions and expended tremendous efforts to create a viable nation in the middle of a war not of their own choice. Rather than being mostly Communist sympathizers, South Vietnamese people held diverse political views and fought bravely to hold those in power accountable. The period of 1964–1967 arguably offers the best example of such dynamics in South Vietnamese politics. Furthermore, for all its problems, it is important to note that the turmoil in this period, or the ups and downs in politics in the RVN over its twodecade existence, was not something unique to South Vietnam, indicating something irredeemably wrong with its society or politics. After all, similar problems beset all South Vietnam’s noncommunist neighbors, including Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, in the first decade or two after colonial rule. All experienced personal dictatorship, military coups, regional rebellions, Communist insurgencies, and periods of extreme chaos.

Foreword  xi South Vietnam in 1964–1966 was similar to South Korea in 1960–1961 and 1979–1980, Indonesia in 1965–1966, Thailand in 1973–1976, the Philippines in 1986–1987, and Burma in 1960–1962 and 1989–1990. None except South Vietnam faced an attempt of direct conquest by another country, and all, including even Burma, have gradually grown out of such precarious existence. Some have achieved economic miracles, and all now have political systems that allow political competition if not liberal democracy. While I do not suggest that the RVN would become a liberal democracy like South Korea had it continued to exist, one should avoid the notion that it was predestined to fail. By helping us understand better the politics of South Vietnam during the critical period between the two republics, Mr. Vinh-The Lam makes a great contribution to scholarship on Vietnamese history. Tuong Vu University of Oregon Co-editor ­ of The Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1975: Vietnamese Perspectives on Nation-Building (2020)

Acknowledgments

This is a revised and updated version of the author’s self-published book Republic of Vietnam, 1963–1967: Years of Political Chaos (Hamilton, Ontario: Hoai Viet, 2010). Permission has been granted. All photos were originally published in the journal Chính Luận which ceased publication in April 1975. The photo of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ at inauguration ceremony was produced by Nha Kỹ Thuật, the Republic of Vietnam’s Military Intelligence Directorate, which ceased to exist on April 30, 1975. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

Abbreviations

AFC ARVN

Armed Forces Council Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, or Army of the Republic of Vietnam CA Constituent Assembly CEC Central Executive Committee CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINCPAC Commander-In-Chief, ­ ­ Pacific GVN Government of Vietnam HNC High National Council JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff MRC Military Revolutionary Council MRS Movement for the Renaissance of the South NIE National Intelligence Estimate NLC National Legislative Council NSAM National Security Action Memorandum OPLAN Operational Plan RVN Republic of Vietnam SAVA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate USG United States Government VBUC Vietnamese Buddhist United Church

1

Introduction

From November 1963, after the November 1 military coup that overthrew the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and ended the First Republic, to November 1967, after Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were inaugurated as the first President and Vice-President of the Second Republic, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, or South Vietnam) went through a time of political instability. The five civilian and military governments during this period of time, namely, the Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, Nguyễn Khánh, Trần Văn Hương, Phan Huy Quát and Nguyễn Cao Kỳ cabinets, have successively tried really hard to re- establish the legitimacy for the new regime as well as to achieve political stability for the country. From the military viewpoint, this period witnessed the fierce escalation of the Vietnam War. In Hà Nội, at its Ninth Plenum (December 1963), Vietnam Workers’ Party (Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam) passed the resolution to adopt First Secretary Lê Duẩn’s strategy for General Offensive – General Uprising, mandating “a major buildup of conventional military force in the Central Highlands and the area northwest of Saigon to bring the war to a speedy end.”1,2 North Vietnam, therefore, increased the infiltration of their troops to the South along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the level of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops to the South has gone from 35,000 in 1965 to 90,000 in 1967.3 The military situation in South Vietnam was so bad that the US Government decided to introduce combat troops to South Vietnam and to carry out sustained bombing of North Vietnam. At the end of 1963, there were only about 20,000 US military advisors in South Vietnam. By the end of 1967, the total US military force in South Vietnam was 486,000 men.4 The sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam, codenamed Operation Rolling Thunder, started on March 2, 1965 and lasted until October 31, 1968.5 According to the joint monthly report of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the month of January 1968, the total number of strike sorties carried out against North Vietnam of this month was 16,307.6 In addition to the US forces, there were also troops from the following Allied countries: South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. During this period of time, with military aids from the United States, the Armed Forces

2 Introduction of the Republic of Vietnam totaled 650,000 men,7 with their equipment greatly improved by modern American materiel. From the social-economic viewpoint, due to the presence of US and Allied military personnel, there was a tremendous impact on the daily life of the South Vietnamese people. Commodity prices went up with the galloping inflation and caused misery to people with steady incomes such as the civil servants and the soldiers. Social problems, such as prostitution and drugs, increased steadily in cities and rural areas surrounding US military bases. With the continuously increasing atrocities of the war, villages and rural communities became very much unsafe, and the peasants were forced to leave their villages for a safer life in cities. The number of displaced persons and refugees continued to increase and made urban life just more miserable. In summary, the period of 1963–1967 was a time when the RVN had to cope with all kinds of political, military, and socio- economic difficulties. This book looks only into the political situation. Occasionally, there are military and/or socio- economic details in the book and they are mentioned just to illustrate the political point being discussed. It is safe to say that during these four years of this historical period, all successive governments of the RVN took efforts, in their own way, to search for a sound legal basis for the authority and power they exercised. This was a primary political need because the legal basis that had existed for the previous eight or nine years, the Constitution promulgated on October 26, 1956, was suspended after the November 1, 1963 military coup. The Hôi Đồng Quân Nhân Cách Mạng (Military Revolutionary Council or MRC), headed by Lieutenant- General Dương Văn “Big” Minh, right after the November 1, 1963 coup, promulgated the Hiến Ước Tạm Thời số 1 (Temporary Charter No. 1) on November 4, 1963. Three months later, Lieutenant-General ­ Nguyễn Khánh carried out another coup on January 30, 1964, and replaced it with the Hiến Ước Lâm Thời số 2 (Temporary Charter No. 2) on February 7, 1964. By the summer of 1964, thinking that the time was right to grant himself the absolute power, General Khánh gave birth to the Hiến Chương Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Charter of the Republic of Vietnam, often referred to as Vũng Tàu Charter) on August 16. However, the Charter was strongly opposed by the students and the MRC had to rescind the Charter. After this setback, General Khánh had to share power with Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm and Dương Văn Minh in the newly created triumvirate called the Ban Lãnh Đạo Lâm Thời Quốc Gia và Quân Lực (Provisional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and the Armed Forces) with General Minh as Chairman. On September 8, General Minh signed the Resolution No. 7/BLĐQGQL to establish the Thượng Hội Đồng Quốc Gia (High National Council). After more than one month of hard work, the Council completed the Hiến Chương Lâm Thời (Provisional Charter) on October 20, which annulled the two Temporary Charters No. 1 and No. 2. On the basis of this Provisional Charter of October 20, 1964, the two civil governments of Trần Văn Hương (from November 4, 1964 to January 27,

Introduction  3 1965) and Phan Huy Quát (from February 16, 1965 to June 18, 1965) were installed. The cabinet crisis of the Phan Huy Quát government, beginning on May 25, 1965, led the civil administration to an impasse and resulted in the return of the power to the generals. The Great Council of the Armed Forces of the RVN promulgated the Ước Pháp (Provisional Constitution) of June 19, 1965, which annulled the Provisional Charter of October 20, 1964. This Provisional Constitution of June 19, 1965 was in effect until the promulgation of the new Constitution of April 1, 1967. All efforts to create a legal basis for the new regime after the November 1, 1963 military coup, as described earlier, did not achieve the desired goal. The main reason for this failure could be found in the wrong way in which they were carried out. The right way should have been in the opposite direction. All of these temporary and provisional charters and provisional constitution were, through all of these committees and councils, “handed down” to the people from individuals or institutions that were not elected by the people. They were produced to serve those individuals in power and not the people. They were not emanating from the representatives of the people and, thus, not reflecting the aspirations of the people. As a result, it was only natural that the people opposed all of these pieces of “legislation.” During this period of time, all successive governments have promised to organize elections for the Quốc Hội Lập Hiến (Constituent Assembly), which, in turn, would create the new constitution for the country. They all failed to keep that promise. It was only after the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966, and under heavy pressure from the US Government that the Thiệu-Kỳ military government decided to call elections for the ­ ­Constituent Assembly. The lack of a legal basis, as previously described, was not the only reason for the extreme political chaos in the RVN during that period of time. There were other factors that contributed to that extreme political chaos. The political parties of South Vietnam constituted the first factor. After the November 1, 1963 coup succeeded in the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, all political parties and their leaders had high expectations for their roles in the new government. General “Big” Minh made a big political mistake when he appointed Mr. Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, former Vice-President under the Ngô Đình Diệm administration, to form a cabinet filled mostly by technocrats, causing tremendous disappointments among the politicians. The creation of the Hội Đồng Nhân Sĩ (Council of Notables) also did not satisfy everyone. A number of Đại Việt leaders who were not chosen to sit in the Council were unhappy and participated in the coup led by Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm and Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964. When General Nguyễn Khánh formed his government, Đại Việt Party members held a number of important cabinet posts with Dr. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn, a Đại Việt leader from the Southern sect holding the position of Vice Prime Minister Responsible for Pacification. But not long after that, the Đại Việt Party became unhappy with General Khánh and plotted again to overthrow him,

4 Introduction but this time it failed and one of its leaders, Mr. Hà Thúc Ký, Minister of the Interior, was forced to resign from the cabinet. This kind of action by the Đại Việt Party was not unfamiliar with the political parties in South Vietnam. The main objective of all political parties was to topple the government, not to make contributions as loyal opposition parties to make the government work better because, in reality, no government in South Vietnam has ever tolerated a formal loyal opposition. The political parties, therefore, were always willing and ready to take part in any coup plot. In addition, one could not ignore the personalities, the narrow minds and visions, and the boundless ambitions of the party leaders. All of these factors caused them to continuously fight with each other. Many US classified documents used the word “bickering” with contempt to depict these fights. It was the real reason behind the cabinet crisis of the Phan Huy Quát administration that ultimately put an end to the civil government and hand the power back to the generals. The second factor contributing to the political chaos was the popular and religious forces that had participated in the struggle against the dictatorial Ngô Đình Diệm regime during the Buddhist Crisis of 1963. These forces demanded that the new government pay attention to their political views and aspirations. The most important groups among them were the students and the Buddhists. The students actively participated in all these chaotic events during this period. They organized countless political seminars, “nights without sleep,” “takes-to-the-street,” and demonstrations, and also bloody street confrontations and violence. They were the most idealistic and the most easily incitable crowds. For the Buddhists, to achieve the necessary strength, all regional and dogmatic sects grouped together under a unique organization called the Vietnamese Buddhist United Church (VBUC) and decided not to accept being discriminated and oppressed by the government again. In order to have influence with the government, the Buddhists wanted to have the final word in the formation of the cabinet’s membership and policies. If these demands were not met, the Buddhists immediately exerted their pressure by inciting their followers, mostly students, to take to the streets and demonstrate. In some cases, like the case of opposing the Vũng Tàu Charter, they could obtain their goals just with demonstrations. If these pressuring measures did not get them results, they would use the two stronger measures: selfstarvation and self-immolation. The most extreme measure of ordering their followers to bring Buddha’s altars to the streets was used only once when they were facing with the desperate situation in Huế and Đà Nẵng during the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in June 1966. The last factor causing the political chaos of this period was the military establishment. The military, traditionally, would be non-political and always under the control of the civil government. But in the RVN, at this point in time, after the military coup of November 1, 1963, the Armed Forces have

Introduction  5 become a political force, and, in fact, have created a series of governments for the country. General Khánh has actually said that “The Army is the father of the nation.”8 During a period of less than two years, the RVN has witnessed four military coups (on November 1, 1963, on January 30, 1964, on September 13, 1964, and on February 19, 1965) and two coup attempts (the coup attempt by the Đại Việt against General Khánh, and the coup attempt on the night of May 20, 1965 under the Phan Huy Quát government). On top of that, there was also the boundless ambition of the generals. And, of course, General Nguyen Khánh was the most ambitious. In order to gain the absolute power within the Armed Forces, he created, in a very short period of time, a whole group of young generals, to whom the US media later gave the collective nick name of “Young Turks.” This group of young generals, with General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as their coordinator and spokesman, gradually became the dominant force of the Armed Forces. They have saved General Khánh during the two military coups of September 13, 1964 and February 19, 1965. They wanted to retire all “old generals” (defined by the Young Turks as having more than 25 years of service) and when the High National Council refused to go along with this plan, they took the most drastic action of abolishing the Council and incarcerating a number of the Council members. This rebellious action by the young generals was unimaginable, unprecedented, and almost resulted in the cut off of US aid to the RVN. And finally, they did what even General Nguyễn Khánh could not have imagined: they voted him out of his position as Commander-In-Chief and forced him to leave Vietnam for good. During this period of the history of the RVN, obviously there were two opposing groups that were strong enough to dominate the political scene of South Vietnam. They were the Buddhists and the military establishment. A final showdown between the two of them was unavoidable. It happened during the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966 with the decisive victory for the military. This serious political crisis, however, resulted in a very positive way: the military agreed to call for elections of the Constituent Assembly that ultimately produced the new Constitution of 1967 and gave birth to the Second Republic, putting an end to the period of political chaos in South Vietnam. This book consists of ten chapters. This chapter presents a synthetic view of all events during this historical period. Chapter 2 gives an account of the political situation after the November 1, 1963 coup until the January 30, 1964 coup. Chapter 3 provides details of the January 30, 1964 coup: the reasons for the coup, the preparation of the coup, the coup itself, and the outcome of the coup. Chapters 4 and 5 recount in details the administration of General Khánh: the total political chaos and his various failing plots to hold on to power. Chapter 6 describes the achievements, the difficulties, and the sudden death of the High National Council; this chapter also gives a brief account of the confrontation between US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General Khánh and the Young Turks. Chapter 7 presents the confrontation

6 Introduction between the Buddhists and the Trần Văn Hương government; it concludes with the plot by General Khánh with the Buddhists to overthrow the Hương government. Chapter 8 provides insight into the administration of Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát with a focus on the cabinet crisis of May 1965, which resulted in the return of power to the military. Chapter 9 gives a full account of the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, focusing on the two most important events: the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966, and the cabinet crisis of October 1966. The last chapter, Chapter 10, retraces all events in the nation’s move toward the Second Republic: the elections of the Constituent Assembly, the drafting and promulgating of the new Constitution, and the presidential and senatorial/house elections.

Notes 1 Nguyễn Thị Liên-Hằng. ­ Hanoi’s war: an international history of the war for peace in Vietnam. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 65. 2 Vietnam. Lịch sử kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954–1975 ­ (History of the resistance war against the United States to save our country, 1954–1975). (Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Chính trị quốc gia, 2013) (Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House, 2013). Online documents available full-text at this URL: http://www. vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=28816.35;wap2 In vol. 9, p. 8/27: “Hội nghị lần thứ 9 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng, thông qua hai nghị quyết quan trọng: Về tình hình thế giới và nhiệm vụ quốc tế của Đảng ta và Ra sức phấn đấu, tiến lên giành những thắng lợi ở miền Nam.” (“The Ninth Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee passed 2 resolutions: 1) World situation and the international duty of our Party; 2) Escalating the resistance, advance, and scoring new victories in the South”) …. “nhưng đã đến lúc miền Bắc phải tăng cường chi viện cho miền Nam hơn nữa.” (… “but it is already time that the North has to give more aid and support to the South.”) 3 McNamara, Robert S. and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 244. 4 Đoàn Thêm. 1967: việc từng ngày (1967: Chronology); tựa của Lãng Nhân ( preface by Lãng Nhân). (Los Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 322. 5 Kutler, Stanley I., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), 477. 6 “An appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam through 31 January 1968,” Declassified Documents Reference System (from now on, referred to as DDRS), CIA and DIA joint monthly report for Jan-1968, declassified 22-Apr-1994, 16. 7 Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: a political, social and military history (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC- CLIO, 1998), 526. According to this Encyclopedia, in 1967, the ARVN forces totaled 643,000 men with the following breakdown: 303,000 Army, 16,000 Air Force, 16,000 Navy, 8,000 Marines Corps, 151,000 Regional Forces, and 149,000 Popular Forces. 8 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua: việc từng ngày, 1945– 1964 (The past twenty years after, 1945–1964: Chronology); tựa của Lãng Nhân (preface by Lãng Nhân). (Los Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 412.

2

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath

A successful coup On November 2, 1963, at 6:00 AM, the fighting, which had started in the early afternoon of the day before, stopped at Gia Long Palace. The colonial-style palace was the temporary residence for President Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother-advisor Ngô Đình Nhu’s family after his official residence, Độc Lập (Independence) Palace had been damaged by the bombing carried out by two dissident South Vietnamese Air Force pilots, Nguyễn Văn Cử and Phạm Phú Quốc on February 27, 1962. The garrison responsible for the protection of the Gia Long Palace surrendered to the attacking forces. But the President and his brother were not found inside the Gia Long Palace. At 6:45 AM, President Ngô Đình Diệm called General Trần Thiện Khiêm, ­ one of the coup leaders, and “told Khiêm his whereabouts at the church in Cholon and asked for transportation to pick them up because he felt insecure there.”1 The coup was successful. In Public Announcement No. 1, the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), directing the coup and headed by General Dương Văn (Big) Minh, proclaimed victory in the overthrowing of the dictatorial regime, promised to establish as soon as possible a Provisional Government and a Council of Notables to work on a new Constitution. In Public Announcement No. 2, the MRC affirmed that the Republic of Vietnam continued to fight against Communism as a member country of the Free World. It also confirmed that all civil rights, including freedoms of political activity, press, and religion, would be respected. All political parties were recognized and encouraged to participate in the nation’s politics. Saigon people poured into the streets, chanting slogans supporting the MRC, comforting and feeding the troops involved in the attack at Gia Long Palace, and fanning their anger against the Ngo’s regime in various ways. One group destroyed the Trưng Sisters Monument, sawed off the heads of the statues (believed to be molded on Madame Nhu’s face), and kicked them around the downtown area. Some other groups ransacked

8  The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath

Figure 2.1 The MRC at a Press Conference chaired by Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Minh.

offices of pro-Diem organizations and newspapers. Demonstrations to support the MRC were organized in every province. All political prisoners were released. Those detained by the Diem regime in Côn Đảo prison were brought back to Saigon in Vietnamese Navy ships. Many political exiles came back from Cambodia and France, among them was the group of military officers involving in the failed coup of November 11, 1960. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) stood firmly behind the MRC. The coup appeared to be a great success, not only in military terms but also in political terms. The MRC seemed to receive the overwhelming endorsement from the people for its overthrow of the Ngô regime. Expectations ran high in every corner of the country. The semi- official term for the coup, used by the media, was The November 1, 1963 Revolution. One big avenue in Sài Gòn, which used to be named after the late President’s brother Ngô Đình Khôi, was now renamed after the Revolution.

General Dương Văn (Big) Minh: the man and his action Physically, in comparison to other Vietnamese, Lieutenant- General Dương Văn Minh was a big person, with his height and body weight being well over the average. The US media people, therefore, have given him the nickname

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath  9 of “Big Minh” to distinguish him from Lieutenant- General Trần Văn Minh, who was smaller than him and with the nickname of “Little Minh,” since both of them were members of the MRC.2 At the time of the coup, General Minh was one of the most senior lieutenant-generals of the ARVN under the oldest brother of the whole ARVN, Full-General (four star) Lê Văn Tỵ, who later, on October 21, 1964, rose to the rank of General of the Army (five-star), the only one in the history of the ARVN. Although he was less senior than Lieutenant- General Trần Văn Đôn (less than two months: General Đôn got his promotion on December 9, 1956, and General Minh got his on February 1, 1957), General Minh had more respect and prestige within the ARVN because he had a lot more combat experience. Moreover, he was more well-liked by lowerranking officers for his gentle and unassuming personal character. That was why General Đôn had decided, by all means, to have him take part and lead the coup in spite of the fact that he did not have any command over the troops. After the successful coup, General Minh, as Chairman of the MRC, had to act as Chief of State, a position which required action and behavior completely opposite to his easy, unassuming character. Mr.  Rufus Philipps, Assistant Director of USOM (United States Operations Mission, predecessor of USAID (United States Agency for International Development) in Vietnam, after his meeting with General Minh on November 18, 1963, had the following observation: “The man has the necessary elements of a popular leader in his character but he will have to be pushed into assuming this role because he is essentially a humble man.”3 This “push” was partly realized in the meeting between the US delegation headed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara with the leaders of the MRC on December 20, 1963 at the General Staff Headquarters. Both McNamara and CIA Director John McCone suggested that General Minh should find opportunities to talk directly to the Vietnamese people, through speeches and/or visits, in order to instigate their hope and faith in the future.4 General Minh has made efforts to carry out that advice. He appeared several times in front of the public, making visits to the Buddhist organizational units, talking to the press at news conferences, coming and giving speech at the inauguration of the Council of Notables, etc. However, due to his modesty, his reluctance to make too many public appearances, and/or speeches, he has created a misunderstanding among the foreign press, especially the US media people, that he was a lazy person and shy of responsibility. They believed he only liked to go play tennis, to take care of his orchids, not to concentrate enough on his work, and thus, not to be well-informed of the political situation, resulting in his downfall by General Khánh’s coup. Nothing was farther from the truth about his personal character. We will look into this issue again in the next part of this chapter.

10  The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath

The Military Revolutionary Council action plan The Public Announcement No. 2 also revealed the membership of the MRC as follows5: Chairman ­ First Vice-Chairman ­ Second Vice-Chairman Secretary- General & Commissioner For External Affairs Commissioner for Military Affairs Commissioner for Economic Affairs Commissioner for Security Affairs Commissioner for Political Affairs Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner

Lt.-Gen. ­ Dương Văn Minh ­ Lt.-Gen. Trần Văn Đôn Lt.- Gen. Tôn Thất Đính Lt.- Gen. Lê Văn Kim Lt.-Gen. ­ Trần Thiện Khiêm ­ Lt.-Gen. Trần Văn Minh Lt.-Gen. Phạm Xuân Chiểu ­ Maj.-Gen. ­ Đỗ Mậu Lt.- Gen. Mai Hữu Xuân Lt.- Gen. Lê Văn Nghiêm Maj.-Gen. ­ Nguyễn Văn Thiệu Maj.-Gen. ­ Nguyễn Hữu Có

Lt.-General ­ Dương Văn Minh was apparently in control of the MRC. He made decisions regarding the composition of the new Provisional Government headed by his long-time friend Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, former Vice-President under the Ngô regime6: Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Minister of Defense Minister of Security Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Justice Minister of Education Minister of Rural Improvement Minister of Information Minister of Public Works Minister of Health Minister of Labour Minister of Youth Minister at the Prime Minister Office Junior Minister of Finance Junior Minister of Economy

Mr. Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ Lt.-General ­ Trần Văn Đôn Lt.- General Tôn Thất Đính Mr. Phạm Đăng Lâm Mr. Nguyễn Văn Mầu Prof. Phạm Hoàng Hộ Mr. Trần Lê Quang ­ Maj.-General Trần Tử Oai Mr. Trần Ngọc Oành Dr. Vương Quang Trường Mr. Nguyễn Lê Giang Mr. Nguyễn Hữu Phi Mr. Nguyễn Thành Cung Mr. Lưu Văn Tính Mr. Âu Trường Thanh

This new Provisional Government, announced on November 4, 1963, was a big disappointment within the political circle. Most cabinet members were professionals without political affiliation and governmental experience.7,8 General Minh was also responsible for policy matter. He had no illusions about the tremendous difficulties facing the government.9 His immediate plan was to remove incompetent and corrupted Diệm-appointed ­ province chiefs and replace them with capable and responsible civilian and/ or military personnel. He also planned to continue the Strategic Hamlet

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath  11 Program but with modifications and a new name for the Program. For longterm political issues, he gave Lt.- General Lê Văn Kim the task of liaising with political parties in order to establish a political advisory council. General Kim worked closely with Dr. Phan Huy Quát and Mr. Bùi Diễm, both members of the Northern Sect of the Đại Việt Party. The Constitution of 1956 under the Ngo regime was now suspended. The need for a new Constitution, therefore, was top priority for the new regime. After much consultation, the Council of Notables10 was created on December 19, 1963 with 60 members, “who represented the entire non- Communist political spectrum.”11 In addition to representatives of the Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Đài, and Hòa Hảo, 12 of the 18 members of the Caravelle Group12,13 were chosen to be members of this Council. On January 2, 1964, at the first meeting of the Council of Notables, General Minh outlined in broad terms the mandate for this advisory body, which was to advise the MRC regarding the “revision of the Constitution, the safeguarding of civil liberties, and the development of a legal and constructive opposition”14 On the surface, everything seemed to be on track: a successful coup against an unpopular repressive government, a new leader with strong popular support, a provisional government with an active program of democratization. In reality, things were not moving the way the MRC had wanted. The replacement of province chiefs caused some paralysis in the local administrative system. In some provinces, a succession of chiefs has been appointed since the coup. The Việt Cộng were quick to seize the opportunity and fill the vacuum. At the same time, the Strategic Hamlet Program, seen by most province chiefs as a pet program of the old regime, more specifically of Ngô Đình Nhu, and believed as an undesirable element in the eyes of the new leadership, was abandoned almost everywhere. It was reported that most strategic hamlets in Long An province were destroyed. It was very clear that what General Minh had in mind did not materialize at the provincial level. The honey moon between the MRC and the press came quickly to an end. The media began attacking the Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ Government. On December 9, General Minh held a press conference to reaffirm his confidence in Prime Minister Thơ and reminded the press of its responsibilities in a country at war. The next day, Prime Minister Thơ held another press conference to defend his activities under the Ngô regime, especially his role in the capture and execution of Ba Cụt, a prominent Hòa Hảo leader. Following General Mnh’s warning to the press was the suspension of three vernacular newspapers.15 In the December 9 press conference, General Minh also warned the press about its reporting on the issue of neutralization of South Vietnam. This sensitive issue began on November 20, 1963 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, officially requested the termination of US aid. Two days later, he suggested an international conference to recognize Cambodia’s neutrality. On December 18, Ambassador Trần Chánh Thành was sent by the South Vietnamese government to Phnom Penh on a good-will

12  The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath visit, with the objective to re- establish diplomatic relations with Cambodia, which had been frozen under the Ngô regime. The Cambodian government returned the favor, sending its good-will delegation to Sài Gòn on December 29. France under De Gaulle had been advocating for the neutralization of Indochina for a number of years. Right from the day of its creation, the Provisional Government of Premier Thơ, which included many Franceeducated ministers, was believed to be pro-France. All of these factors led to the rumor that the South Vietnamese new government was also looking into the possibility of neutralization of South Vietnam. Nothing was farther from the truth than that.16

The US reaction In the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson was now President after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. When he was still Vice-President, Johnson, after his trip throughout Southeast Asia in 1961, strongly advocated for US firmness and determination in helping the peoples in the area in their fight against Communism. On November 24, 1963, two days after his becoming President, with a small group of advisors, he had a meeting with Henry Cabot Lodge, US Ambassador in Vietnam, who was called back for consultation after the coup in Sài Gòn. After that meeting, Johnson signed a National Security Action Memorandum reaffirming American support for South Vietnam. Still feeling uncomfortable with his own policy, he decided to send Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. McNamara came to Sài Gòn on December 19. Together with CIA Director John McCone and Ambassador Lodge, McNamara had a meeting at the ARVN’s General Staff Headquarters with Prime Minister Thơ and the leading members of the MRC, Generals Minh, Đôn, and Kim.17 At the meeting, the US delegation and the MRC representatives exchanged ideas about the ways to deal with the war. Secretary McNamara was concerned with the fact that leading members of the MRC, specifically Genarals Đôn and Đính, were assuming too many responsibilities. General Minh promised to look into these issues. As a result of this meeting, Prime Minister Thơ had a Cabinet reshuffle on January 5, 1964.18 After the trip, openly to the press, McNamara praised the South Vietnamese Government for the progress that had been made. In his official report on the trip, although he was critical of the South Vietnamese leadership, he still concluded that: The physical resources—men, equipment and supplies—required to win the Vietnam War are all present, with minor exceptions. The plans to bring victory about are basically sound, subject to some refinement. The Vietnamese are willing to follow our advice, albeit belatedly in many cases, and the advice is good. These are essential factors in the formula for victory.19

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath  13 But in confidence to President Johnson, he painted a very dark picture of the situation in South Vietnam. He predicted that “current trends, unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralization at best or more likely to a Communist- controlled state.”20 Openly, based on McNamara’s official report, President Johnson sent an official letter to General Minh, promising full support in the war for the new South Vietnamese government.21 In secret, the US Government was worried and waited for a change of leadership in South Vietnam so that they could reverse the course of the Vietnam War. They did not have to wait for long. On January 30, 1964, a bloodless coup led by Lt.- General Nguyễn Khánh, Commander of I Corps, occurred in Saigon and removed the leading members of the MRC.

The revolution that never was The Revolution, professed by the MRC and expected by the South Vietnamese people, did not materialize. Several factors contributed to this political failure. First and foremost, the MRC, and more specifically the Chairman of the MRC, General Minh, did not have the political skills so much needed in such a transitional period from a totally dictatorial regime to an intentionally-to-be- democratic civil government. With the suppression of the Ngô family regime, an enormous political vacuum was opened and many ambitious personalities, including military and political leaders, wanted to fill it. The creation of the new political and administrative structure for South Vietnam was seen by these ambitious people as opportunities for them to obtain power and/or exercise influence in the new regime. For those people who were denied these opportunities, the MRC became their new political enemy that had to be removed. Many Đại Việt Party members were among this group of unhappy people. They decided to take side with General Nguyễn Khánh who was unhappy after he was ordered by the MRC to move from II Corps (Central Highlands) to I Corps (northernmost region of South Vietnam, just South of the DMZ). More important, even some members of the MRC, who were rewarded after the coup, felt that they deserved more and became unhappy and ready to switch camp. They were Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, and Nguyễn Hữu Có. General Nguyen Khánh, as Commander of I Corps without any command over troops in the capital area, could not have mounted the successful coup of January 30, 1964 without support from these generals. General Thiệu was Commanding Officer of the 5th Infantry Division headquartered in Biên Hòa, just North of Sài Gòn. General Khiêm was Commander of III Corps, which included the Capital Military District. General Có was Commander of IV Corps, which included the 7th Infantry Division. This Division, under General Lâm Văn Phát, was participating in the January 30, 1964 coup. Another factor that could not be ignored was the position of the US Government through its Ambassador in Saigon toward the MRC and the Provisional Government. As mentioned earlier, the US Government was worried

14  The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath about the French attempt to make a comeback into the scene through its policy of neutralization of South Vietnam. McNamara mentioned of this threat in his personal advice to President Johnson. Ambassador Lodge, of course, was not unaware of this hot issue. General Khánh capitalized on this fear and used the pretext of preventing the neutralization of South Vietnam as the main reason for his January 30, 1964 coup. These issues will be discussed in details in Chapter 3. The civilian government of Premier Thơ, with a mandate from the MRC to bring about a much- expected and much-needed Revolution, was thus struck by a sudden death. With it, South Vietnam lost a good opportunity to create a civil, democratic government that would have made a big difference in the war against the Communists. Moreover, with the take-over by General Khánh, the country entered a period of three years of total political chaos and military weakness that finally pushed the US Government into a deep and direct confrontation with the Communist forces in Vietnam.

Notes 1 Trần Văn Đôn. Our endless war: inside Vietnam (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 108. Less than an hour after that fateful telephone call, both Ngô brothers were killed. Most documents agree that the killer was Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung, who, as bodyguard of General Dương Văn Minh, was promoted to the rank of Major after the coup, and who was later dead (official document stating that he committed suicide) during his incarceration after the coup led by Lt.-General ­ Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964. The mystery remains who has given the order to kill the Ngô brothers. General Trần Văn Đôn, in his book, implied that it was General Minh who had given that order. General Minh never confirmed nor denied that allegation. Based on all the accounts of the military officers who were present in the convoy ordered by the Military Revolutionary Council to go pick up the Ngo brothers, it was more than likely that that order was given by General Minh. First of all, the convoy was placed under the command of General Mai Hữu Xuân, a close friend of general Minh. Second, Captain Nhung, as personal bodyguard of General Minh, should have remained at the General Staff compound to protect General Minh. There was absolutely no reason why Captain Nhung should have been a member of the convoy. Captain Nhung could not have dared to commit such a high crime without firm and direct order from his boss. Finally, it was not a secret that General Minh hated the Ngô brothers very much. 2 In the history of the ARVN there were two lieutenant-generals with the same name of Trần Văn Minh. The second and much younger Minh was Commander of the Air Force, replacing Major- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, from 1967 until 1975. At the time of the November 1, 1963 coup, the younger Minh was still a Major. After the coup, on November 4, 1963, he was promoted to Lieutenant- Colonel. 3 “Conversation between Vietnamese General Duong Van Minh and Rufus Philipps, Assistant Director of U.S. Operations Mission, topics covered: strategic hamlet program; pacification; lack of qualified Vietnamese civil or military personnel; political corruption,” DDRS, US State Dept. cable, dated 2-Dec1963, declassified 26-Apr-1984. ­ ­ 4 “Summary of 12/20/63 conversation between Ambassador Lodge, General Minh, General Don, General Kim, Prime Minister Tho, Secretary McNamara

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath  15 and McCone, regarding how to accelerate the war effort,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, dated 20-Dec-1963, declassified 14-Dec-1987. The cable includes the following ­ statement: Secretary McNamara then brought up the question of General Minh’s acting like a Chief of State and making some speeches to the people which would give them hope and faith in the future… Mr. McCone recalled that when Vice-President Johnson had become President, he had speedily obtained the support of the people by the speeches he had made in Congress and to the people and felt that much could be learned from his example. 5 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 368. 6 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 369. 7 “Situation report as of 11/5/63: announcement of new provisional government under Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho has helped ease tensions in aftermath of 11/1/63 coup and will presumably pave way for early recognition of new regime,” DDRS, CIA Cable, issued 5-Nov-1963, declassified 10-May-1995. Page 2 contains the following observation on Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ’s Cabinet: Big Minh and Tho were primarily responsible for selection of new cabinet. … New govt. … almost wholly southern (both Minh and Tho are southerners) … While many of new appointees are good technicians, there are few capable administrators among them. … Many of new ministers were long-standing friends of either Minh or Tho. 8 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff. In the jaws of history; foreword by Jane HamiltonMerritt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 106–107. Bùi Diễm wrote: When I asked Kim who the generals were thinking of for prime minister, he answered Nguyen Ngoc Tho, the man who for years had been Diem’s vice president. When I heard this I was startled. In an agitated voice I told Kim, ‘Listen, we have a wonderful opportunity here, a historic opportunity. But what we need is a clean slate. How can you possibly think of taking this guy back?’ ‘Well’, he answered, ‘it was a given as far as Big Minh was concerned. Tho would have to get the job. 9 “Conversation between Vietnamese General Duong Van Minh and Rufus Phillips, Assistant Director of U.S. Operations Mission, topics covered: strategic hamlet program; pacification; lack of qualified Vietnamese civil or military personnel; political corruption,” DDRS, State Dept. Cable, issued 2-Dec-1963, declassified 26-Apr-1984. Mr. Phillips concluded his report with the following comment: Nothing in General Minh’s personal manner that the writer could notice, has changed since he became the Chief of State. He is as unpretentious and candid as in the past. He obviously has no illusions about the difficulties ahead or that the main task of leadership falls on him. He is still the only top Vietnamese leader, known to the writer, who projects the personal warmth and sympathy required to stir popular enthusiasm in Vietnam. The man has the necessary elements of a popular leader in his character but he will have to be pushed into assuming this role because he is essentially a humble man. ­ 10 NGHỊ-ĐỊNH số 47-NĐ/CT (DECREE no. 47-NĐ/CT), dated 19-Dec-1963, nominating members of the Council of Notables, printed in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, Ninth Year, Number 8-3 (New Series), (Saturday 21-Dec-1963), 264–265. This Resolution was signed by Lieutenant- General

16  The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath

11 12

13

14 15 16

DƯƠNG VĂN MINH. The total number of members was 60, including 2 women and 58 men. Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 107. The Council of Notables’ membership was only 60, not “seventy” as mistakenly noted in Mr. Bùi Diễm’s book at p. 107. Mr. Bùi Diễm was a member of the Council. This Group met the international reporters at a news conference organized at the Caravelle Hotel in downtown Saigon on 26-Apr-1960 to announce the petition that had been submitted to President Ngô Đình Diệm in the morning at the Presidential Palace by Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu and Mr. Trần Văn Văn. The petition was to warn President Ngô Đình Diêm about the serious political, military, and socio- economic situation of the Republic of Vietnam. The Group consisted of 18 well-known South Vietnamese politicians: Trần Văn Văn, Phan Khắc Sửu, Trần Văn Hương, Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Huỳnh Kim Hữu, Phan Huy Quát, Trần Văn Lý, Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ, Trần Văn Đỗ, Lê Ngọc Chấn, Lê Quang Luật, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên, Phạm Hữu Chương, Trần Văn Tuyên, Tạ Chương Phùng, Trần Lê Chất, and Hồ Văn Vui. “Make up [of] Council of Notables,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, issued 28-Dec1963, declassified 21-May-1976. This cable lists the 12 Caravelle Group members as follows: Phan Khắc Sửu, Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Phan Huy Quát, Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ, Trần Văn Đỗ, Trần Văn Hương, Lê Quang Luật, Trần Văn Văn, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên, Phạm Hữu Chương, and Trần Văn Tuyên. “South Vietnamese situation report,” DDRS, CIA report, issued 4-Jan-1964, declassified 16-Sep-1996, ­ ­ 2. “Situation appraisal as of 14 December 1963,” DDRS, CIA report, issued 16Dec-1963, ­ ­ ­ declassified 15-Apr-1975. Gibbons, William Conrad. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: executive and legislative roles and relationships. Part II: 1961– 1964 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 212. Defense Secretary McNamara, in his report to President Johnson after his December 19–20, 1963 trip to Vietnam, said: Possible neutralization of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, and our attitude is somewhat suspect because of editorials by the New York Times and mention by Walter Lippmann and others. We reassured them as strongly as possible on this— and in somewhat more general terms on the neutralization of Cambodia…

17 “Summary of 12/20/63 conversation between Ambassador Lodge, General Minh, General Don, General Kim, Prime Minister Tho, Secretary McNamara and McCone regarding how to accelerate the war effort,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, issued 20-Dec-1963, ­ ­ declassified 14-Dec-1987. ­ ­ 18 The Thơ Cabinet reshuffle had the following changes: Lt- Gen. Tôn Thất Đính was relieved of his command of the III Corps, which went to Lt- Gen. Trần Thiện Khiêm; Lt- Gen. Trần Văn Đôn was appointed Commander-In- Chief of the Armed Forces; Maj- Gen. Đỗ Mậu replaced Maj- Gen. Trần Tử Oai as Minister of Information; Lt- Gen. Lê Văn Kim was appointed Chief of the Joint General Staff; and, Maj- Gen. Nguyễn Văn Quan was appointed Chief of Military Security Service. 19 “Report on the visit of the Secretary of Defense to South Vietnam, 12/19-12/20/63,” DDRS, Defense Dept. report, issued Dec-1963, declassified 30-Sep-1994. 20 McNamara, op. cit., 105. 21“Transmittal Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy, Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs, to the President. Dec. 30, 1963. 1 p. Encl: (1) (US assures Vietnam of continued support against Communism.) Draft Letter, Lyndon B. Johnson, Pres., to Gen. Duong Van Minh, Chairman, Military Revolutionary

The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath  17 Council, Republic of Vietnam,” DDRS, White House document, issued 30Dec-1963, declassified 2-Mar-1976. On p. 1, the letter contained the following paragraph: This New Year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam whatever American personnel and materiel are needed to assist you in achieving victory.

3

The January 30, 1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh

The military coup led by Lt.-General Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964, exactly three months after the November 1, 1963 coup that had overthrown the Diệm regime, was a big unexpected political event at that time. General Khánh presented the Coup as a pre-emptive strike to remove pro-French generals, who were allegedly plotting to impose neutralization of South Vietnam. Now, after more than 40 years, with secret US documents declassified, let’s try to understand the real motivation behind this important political event.

Reasons of the coup Internal division of the MRC From the appearance, the MRC seemed solidly unified behind Lt.-General Dương Văn Minh. In reality, it was divided internally right from the second day of the November 1, 1963 coup when both President Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother-advisor Ngô Đình Nhu were assassinated in the armored troop carrier M113 that had been sent by the MRC to bring them to the General Staff Headquarters. Lt.-General Trần Thiện Khiêm confessed on November 2, 1963 to Mr. Huỳnh Văn Lang, a close friend of his, that he could not stop other generals to kill the Ngô brothers and that he even feared for his own life.1 A few days later, it was Khiêm again who warned his friend that more would still come.2 General Khiêm was also unsatisfied because he was not nominated for any important position. He was, therefore, the real leader of the January 30, 1964 coup as revealed by General Nguyễn Chánh Thi in his memoirs.3 Maj.-General ­ Đỗ Mậu, Commissioner for Political Affairs of the MRC, in a meeting with a CIA agent on November 9, 1963, revealed that the MRC had already been divided into two camps, one pro-French and one pro-US.4 General Mậu also informed that he was worried by the fact that General Mai Hữu Xuân had placed several pro-French individuals in positions of chiefs of police in a number of districts in Saigon.5 In addition, General Mậu was probably unhappy with the fact that he was removed from the position of Director of Military Security; Maj.- General Nguyễn Văn Quan, a close friend of Lt.-General Dương Văn Minh, was nominated to replace him.6

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  19 For General Khánh, he was unhappy after he was moved from II Corps (Central Highlands) to I Corps (northernmost region of the Republic of Vietnam, right at south of the 17th parallel and the DMZ). But it was very clear that General Khánh, without direct command on any troops stationed in the capital region, could not have successfully carried out the coup if he did not have the support of Maj.- General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, commanding the 5th Infantry Division headquartered in Biên Hòa, adjacent to Saigon, and of Maj.-General Nguyễn Hữu Có, head of IV Corps, which included the 7th Infantry Division. This division, under the command of Maj.-General Lâm Văn Phát would participate in the January 30, 1964 coup. Conflict between the US Government and the MRC After the November 1, 1963 coup, although there was some tension between the MRC and General Paul Harkins, Head of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group, later renamed MACV = Military Assistance Command – Vietnam) because Harkins had been against the overthrow of President Ngô Đình Diệm, the relations between American officials, especially Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, with the MRC were very good. However, these good relations did not last very long. Right from the beginning of December 1963, there were reports that the MRC was not performing as expected.7 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in the meeting with Premier Nguyen Ngoc Thơ and the leading members of the MRC in December 1963, made suggestions and recommendations for changes in the ways the MRC generals were operating. Some of these recommendations were accepted and implemented by the generals. However, there were also other recommendations, much more important, were decisively rejected by the generals. Most important among the rejected recommendations were: (1) the recommendation to expand the US advisors down to the company and district levels; and, (2) the recommendation of bombing North Vietnam. For the first recommendation, General Minh reasoned that it would help the Viet Cong in their propaganda because South Vietnamese officials would look more like US lackeys.8,9 The recommendation for bombing North Vietnam was also rejected by General Minh; he cited the following reasons in his rejection: (1) The bombing would not have good results; on the contrary, it would cause casualties among the civilian population; (2) The bombing would make South Vietnam loose the good cause of the self-defense war.10 For Ambassador Lodge, he was not happy with General Minh’s refusal to have weekly meetings with him to discuss policy and daily activities.11 General Harkins, for his part, because of his antipathy toward the MRC, even actively made contributions to General Khánh’s plotting for his coup. He ordered Colonel Jasper Wilson, Senior Advisor for I Corps, to report to Ambassador Lodge on General Khánh’s plot. He even gave permission to Colonel Wilson to directly participate in the coup led by General Khánh.

20  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh Colonel Wilson, therefore, was present at the coup headquarters in the early morning of February 1, 1964.12,13 On top of all those issues, the Americans were also changing their Vietnam policy: They were preparing to escalate the war. Let’s review the US policy changes that happened between the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. Only four days after his inauguration on the plane carrying the casket containing the body of President John F. Kennedy, who had been assassinated in Dallas, on November 26, 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed NSAM 273 (NSAM = National Security Action Memorandum), reaffirming the US Government’s commitment to defend South Vietnam. Article 1 of NSAM 273 stated clearly: “It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist aggression.” Going even farther than Article 1, Article 7 showed US Government’s intention to escalate the war by bringing the war to the North: “Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity; and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as: A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam; …”14 To implement NSAM 273, the US Government made successive steps in its escalation of the war, more specifically the following: •

•

• • • •

December 19, 1963: CINCPAC (Commander-In- Chief, Pacific) revised OPLAN 34- 63, approved by the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) since September 9, 1963, changed its code name to OPLAN 34-A and submitted to President Johnson. According to this plan, commandos of the Republic of Vietnam, trained by the United States, would infiltrate the coastal areas of North Vietnam to carry out sabotage activities. December 19 and 20, 1963: Secretary of Defense McNamara went to Vietnam for a fact-finding mission; McNamara’s report was very pessimistic about the military situation in the Republic of Vietnam; he observed: “current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best or more likely to a Communist- Controlled state.”15 He made two recommendations: (1) To increase the number of advisors; and, (2) To increase intelligence activities. Both recommendations were approved by President Johnson. December 21, 1963: President Johnson nominated General Victor Krulak to head an interdepartmental committee to review OPLAN 34-A. January 2, 1964: The interdepartmental committee submitted its report to President Johnson, in which it approved the plan and recommended its implementation. January 16, 1964: President Johnson approved the interdepartmental committee’s recommendation. A few days later, President Johnson established the new Vietnam Coordinating Committee to be headed by William Sullivan to replace the Vietnam Task Force.16

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  21 The US Government’s determination to escalate the war in Vietnam was very clear now and it needed to have in South Vietnam a government ready and willing to implement its recommendations – or, more precisely, its demands. The MRC under General Dương Van Minh’s leadership and the Nguyen Ngoc Thơ Government were not good collaborators for its plan of war escalation. It needed and wanted a change of leadership in South Vietnam. Unsatisfaction of South Vietnamese politicians As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the MRC, after having consulted widely among various political groups, established the Hội Đồng Nhân Sĩ (Council of Notables) on December 19, 1963, with 60 members. Those politicians, who had not been invited by the MRC to sit in the Council, were unhappy with the new regime. Among these peoples, there were important Đại Việt Party members such as Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn (Southern faction) and Hà Thúc Ký (Central faction). Other politicians were not happy with General Minh’s selection of Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, former Vice-President under Ngô Đình Diệm regime, for the position of Prime Minister. Most of Hòa Hảo politicians have not forgotten Prime Minister Thơ’s role in the capturing and then executing of General Lê Quang Vinh (aka Ba Cụt), a famous Hòa Hảo militant. Several other politicians worried about the fact that the new government employed many individuals who had served under the Diệm regime. Neutralization of South Vietnam To this complicated and divisive political atmosphere, the issue of neutralization of South Vietnam, initiated and publicized by the French Government under De Gaulle, added another dimension. In fact, this pro-neutralization policy of De Gaulle was not a secret. The French President made his view clear to the newly elected John F. Kennedy when the latter visited Paris in the spring of 1961. Southeast Asia did not offer a good terrain for Western troops, De Gaulle told him, nor indeed for Western politics. The French experience in the region had made clear that military action could never achieve lasting success, and therefore the best solution was neutralization.17 On November 20, 1963, Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia requested that the US Government terminate its foreign aid to his country.18 Two days later, he suggested that the international community convene a new Geneva Conference to discuss the issue of neutralization of Indochina. Seizing this opportunity, President De Gaulle, in his press conference on January 31, 1964, announced his policy of neutralization of the whole

22  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh Indochina, including Vietnam. The US New York Times, in its issue of February 1, 1964, reported that: The President [De Gaulle] emphasized today, however, that to him neutrality appeared to be the only role for these states. Their acceptance of it, he said, should be guaranteed internationally, and this guarantee should exclude armed action between them as well as “foreign intervention.”19 The Thơ Government, which included a large number of France- educated ministers, was already considered as pro-French, and thus likely to incline toward French-supported neutralization. Within the MRC, generals Đôn, Kim, and Xuân, in particular Đôn since he had held French citizenship in the past, were all suspected to be pro-French and maybe pro-neutralization. The Saigon press published so many articles on neutralization of South Vietnam that General Minh had to convene a press conference on December 9, 1963 to warn the press on the issue. The US Government, of course, was not happy with the vision of neutralization of South Vietnam, which went into the opposite direction of its intention to escalate the war in Vietnam. General Khánh would use the pretext of preempting the neutralization movement for his coup.

Executing the coup General Khánh’s biographical sketch General Nguyễn Khánh hold a dominant role in the political stage of South Vietnam for more than a year, from January 30, 1964, when he successfully carried out his coup, to February 25, 1965, when he was forced to leave Vietnam. During this relatively short period of time, he was able to create a number of important political figures, who had been non- existent before his administration and who would continue to be key players in South Vietnamese political stage after his exit. We need to know about his life in order to understand his actions. General Khanh was born in November 1927 in the province of Trà Vinh (later renamed Vĩnh Bình) in the Mekong Delta. His father, Nguyễn Bửu, was a rich landowner. He attended high school in Cambodia (1938–1944). His adopted mother was Miss Phùng Há, a famous Vietnamese traditional opera actress. At 17, he joined the Viet Minh to fight against the Japanese. Not long after that, he left the Viet Minh to attend the military academy just established by the French in Đà Lạt and graduated as a Warrant Officer in 1947. He was later sent to France to receive special training in infantry and paratroop. Returning to Vietnam, he participated in various operations against the Viet Minh and was wounded twice during 1948–1954.

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  23 He rose quite rapidly within the Vietnamese National Armed Forces thanks to the special support of General Nguyễn Văn Hinh, who was then Chief of the General Staff. During the time General Hinh was fighting against the newly appointed Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm and created the secret party called The Eagle, Khanh was also a member of this party. But after General Hinh lost the fight with Prime Minister Diem and was forced to leave Vietnam, Nguyễn Khánh, already a Lieutenant- Colonel, changed camp to serve Diệm. He was awarded with the position of Head of the Province of Cần Thơ in the Mekong Delta in February 1955. In September 1955, he was designated Vice- Commander of the Hoàng Diệu Operation under Colonel Dương Văn Minh. When the Hoàng Diệu Operation was concluded victoriously, smashing the remaining forces of Bình Xuyên in Rừng Sát, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel and nominated Vice-Commander of the First Infantry Division. He was sent to the United States in 1957 to receive high staff training. Returning to Vietnam, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and nominated Commander of Military Region 5. In mid-September 1960 he was nominated Chief of Staff at the General Staff Headquarters.20 When the November 11, 1960 coup by the paratroopers occurred in Saigon, he helped prolong the negotiations so that Colonel Trần Thiện Khiêm had enough time to bring his 7th Infantry Division from the Mekong Delta to Saigon and saved the regime. After this event, Khanh was nominated Commander of II Corps (Central Highlands). During the November 1, 1963 coup, he also supported the MRC (but only at the last minute) and expected to be rewarded appropriately. The MRC, however, did not trust him and, although promoting him to the rank of 21 Lieutenant-General, ­ decided to move him from II Corps to I Corps to replace General Đỗ Cao Trí. He was very upset by this move and started to plot against the MRC. His principal collaborator would be General Trần Thiện Khiêm, Commander of the III Corps. Through this biographical sketch, we can see very clearly one thing about General Khanh: he was an opportunist, always acting for his own benefit. Therefore, he was always ready to switch camp. After he already seized power, this personal trait showed more clearly and it would eventually cause his downfall. US preparations for the coup As previously mentioned, right in the report of US Secretary of Defense McNamara dated December 21, 1963, submitted to President Johnson after his fact-finding mission to Vietnam on December 19 and 20, 1963, the US Government worry about the neutralization of South Vietnam was recorded. The US officials in Saigon, in particular within the intelligence (CIA team at the US Embassy in Sài Gòn) and military (MAAG with General Harkins at the top) circles, had exploited this political issue to deepen the

24  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh conflict between the US Government and the MRC, and, thus, gave Khánh the just cause for his coup. The MRC’s authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Trần Đình Lan to repatriate from France was reported in a CIA cable as follows: Col Tran Dinh Lan, most recent returned from Paris is alleged by Col who met him at airport to have been empowered, presumably by the French, to spend substantial sum (two billion piasters) to achieve neutralization of SVN. Lan reported by this source to have been brought back to SVN at requests Gens Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim.22 This was a direct accusation naming two generals who were leading members of the MRC. This cable also named another member of the MRC, General Mai Hữu Xuân, who was head of the police force. The Americans understood very clearly that for any military coup to succeed the plotters had to have the Commander of III Corps at their side. The reason was simple: III Corps included Sài Gòn and the surrounding areas. This III Corps, after the November 1, 1963 coup, was still under the command of General Tôn Thất Đính. The Americans had to find a way to remove General Đính from this position. General Harkins and the Department of Defense, therefore, continuously pressured on the fact that it was very difficult for General Đính to fulfill his two heavy responsibilities, Commander of the III Corps and Minister of Security. When the McNamara delegation met with Premier Thơ and the MRC in December 1963, this issue was brought back, resulting in the MRC’s decision to remove General Đính from the Command of the III Corps and monimate General Trần Thiện Khiêm to replace him in that position.23 When the coup was about to be carried out, another issue surfaced and needed to be resolved. On January 28, 1964, Major- General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Commander of the 5th Infantry Division, ordered LieutenantColonel Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, Acting Head of the Armored Command to bring all armored vehicles out of Sài Gòn to the headquarters of the 5th Infantry Division in Biên Hòa. Lt.- Colonel Nghĩa suspected immediately that General Thiệu was preparing for a coup to overthrow General Dương Văn Minh. He informed General Thiệu that he was loyal to General Minh and refused to carry out General Thiệu’s request, using the pretext that the armored vehicles were under repairing and temporarily inoperable. However, only one day after that, on January 29, 1964, Lt.- Colonel Nghĩa changed his position, carried out General Thiệu’s order, and on the following day, January 30, 1964, participated in General Khánh’s coup.24 What really happened on January 28, 1964, after Colonel Nghĩa had answered General Thiệu’s request that made Colonel Nghĩa change his position on the following day? In a cable to General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, his direct supervisor, immediately after the coup, General Harkins reported that two days before, January 28, 1964, around 3 PM, he was informed by Colonel

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  25 Wilson of the plan of the coup by General Khánh and he ordered Colonel Wilson to go see and report to Ambassador Lodge about the plot, and right after that, he went out for “a field trip.” One of the priorities for this “field trip” of General Harkins might have been to go see and persuade Colonel Nghia to change his position and join the coup plotters.25 For his part, having authorization from General Harkins, his direct supervisor, Colonel Wilson was present at the coup headquarters and reported to Ambassador Lodge the progress of the coup by the hours.26 General Khanh’s preparations for the coup Right from mid-December 1963, General Khánh had already discussed the coup plot with Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Deputy Commander of I Corps (Colonel Thi later rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General and hold the Command of I Corps). After initial discussion, he even sent Colonel Thi to Sài Gòn to learn more about the political situation. Meanwhile General Khánh himself also made several trips to Sài Gòn to establish connections with people who were unhappy with the MRC and talked them into joining him for the coup. The MRC was never aware of these moves, which General Thi happily mocked in his Memoirs.27 The CIA, on the contrary, was not unaware of the plot. General Thi again recounted his encounter with Lucien Conein in Huế.28 General Khanh was successful in his efforts and finally lined up the following individuals for his coup: • • • • • • • • • • • •

­ Lieutenant-General Trần Thiện Khiêm, Commander of III Corps Major-General ­ Nguyễn Hữu Có, Commander of IV Corps Major-General ­ Đỗ Mậu, Minister of Information Major-General ­ Dương Văn Đúc, Deputy Chief, General Staff, for Training ­ Major-General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Commander of 5th Infantry Division Major-General Lâm Văn Phát, Commander of 7th Infantry Division Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Deputy Commander of I Corps Colonel Cao Văn Viên, Commander of Airborne Brigade Colonel Huỳnh Văn Tồn, Chief of Province of Gia Dinh Colonel Nhan Minh Trang, Chief, Military Affairs, Prime Minister Office Lieutenant-Colonel ­ Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, Acting Commander, Armored Command Major Phạm Văn Liễu, Assistant to the Commander, 22nd Infantry Division29

On January 28, 1964, General Khánh informed Colonel Jasper Wilson, Senior Advisor of I Corps, his intention to mount a coup against the MRC. The

26  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh reason he gave for his action was: the pro-French and pro-neutralization generals of the MRC, headed by General Mai Hữu Xuân, would carry out a coup on January 31, 1964, and then would announce the neutralization of South Vietnam; in order to prevent that event from happening he would strike first by mounting a coup on January 30, 1964.30 On January 29, 1964, General Khanh and his I Corps staff took the 2 PM Air Vietnam flight from Đà Nẵng to Sài Gòn. Colonel Thi took a different flight in a military airplane of I Corps with Lieutenant-Colonel Trang Văn Chính, Commander of Regional and Civil Guards of I Corps, Captain Nguyễn Mộng Hùng and a unit of military police. Once in Saigon, Colonel Thi spent the afternoon, talking a number of Ranger and Marines units into the coup. At 5 PM, he met with General Khánh in the latter’s compound located within the General Staff Headquarters. Present at the meeting were generals Dương Văn Đức and Đỗ Mậu. Around 3 AM, January 30, 1964, one unit of troops moved from General Khánh’s compound and took control of the General Staff Headquarters without meeting any resistance. After having secured the General Staff Headquarters, the whole coup command, including General Khánh and Colonel Thi, moved to Camp Hoàng Hoa Thám, where the Airborne Brigade headquartered, and set up the new command post there. Colonel Cao Văn Viên, Commander of the Airborne Brigade, did not raise any objection. From this new command post, Colonel Thi monitored coup units, under the command of Colonel Dương Ngọc Lắm, which went to private houses of generals Đôn, Kim, Xuân, and Đính to put them under arrest. General Minh’s house was also surrounded by coup troops but thanks to the protection provided by Lieutenant- Colonel Dương Hiếu Nghĩa’s armored unit, General Minh was not humiliated by Colonel Lắm’s troops. Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ was also arrested but later released. At 6 AM, General Khánh moved his command post back to the General Staff Headquarters. Around 6:10 AM, General Trần Thiện Khiêm was present at the command post; not long after that, other generals, Nguyễn Hữu Có, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, and Đỗ Mậu, joined him there. Around 8 AM, General Dương Văn Minh was also brought to the General Staff Headquarters to meet with generals Khánh and Khiêm.31,32,33 The coup was completed successfully, without any fire shot and any bloodshed. The only casualty of the coup was Major Nguyễn Văn Nhung, the alleged assassin responsible for the death of President Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Nhu during the November 1, 1963 coup. He was arrested and incarcerated at Camp Hoàng Hoa Thám, and, according to the official news release from the Department of Defense, he committed suicide by hanging himself with his shoe laces.34 The lieutenant-generals Trần Văn Đôn, Lê Văn Kim, Mai Hữu Xuân, and Tôn Thất Đính were brought to Đà Nẵng and then moved to Đà Lạt and kept under house arrest there; Saigon press, therefore, later called them collectively “Đà Lạt generals.” Lieutenant-General ­ Dương Văn Minh was replaced by LieutenantGeneral Nguyễn Khánh in the position of Chairman of the new MRC but

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  27 continued to hold his position as Head of State. On February 8, 1964, General Khánh formed a new government with himself as Prime Minister35: With Nguyen Khanh government, South Vietnam entered a period of chaos unparalleled in the whole history of the Republic of Vietnam. For his part, Lieutenant- General (later promoted to the rank of Full General) Nguyễn Khánh was only to hold on to power for just over one year; he would be forced out of power by his young generals and had to leave the country on February 25, 1965. This will be discussed in details in Chapter 4. The “Đà Lạt generals” were ultimately set free after the special meeting of senior generals on May 28, 1964, in Đà Lạt because General Khánh could not find any proof to prove his accusation against them.36 For the Americans, especially the military and the Department of Defense, their goal was attained. The MRC now had new leadership, which they believed would cooperate more with them in their escalation of the war. They would not be disappointed. Only one week after the coup, General Khánh agreed to expand US military advisors to the district level.37 During Khánh administration, the United States continued its planning for escalation, culminating at the Gulf of Tonkin Event in August 1964 and leading to the beginning of bombing of North Vietnam and ground force build-up in South Vietnam in 1965. From a modest force of 23,300 advisors at the end of 1964, the US forces raised to 184,300 combat troops at the end of 1965.38

Notes 1 Huỳnh Văn Lang. Nhân chứng một chế độ: một chương hồi ký. Tập ba (Witness of a regime: memoirs. Vol. 3). (California: The Author, 2000), 259. “Tụi nó giết ông Cụ, tôi không làm sao ngăn cản được. Từ hôm qua, Minh toàn quyền quyết định tất cả, Đôn Kim Đính Đỗ Mậu … đồng lòng như vậy. Tụi nó còn muốn làm thịt tôi luôn nữa.” (They killed The Old Man, I could not stop them. Since yesterday, Minh made all decisions, Don, Kim, Dinh and Do Mau concurred with them. They even wanted to take me out too.) 2 Huỳnh Văn Lang, op. cit., 261. “Thôi, chuyện đã qua rồi, thương tiếc cũng không làm gì cho Ông Cụ, ông Nhu được nữa. Nhưng còn nữa, chưa hết đâu.” (Well, what’s done is done. Even if we have deep sorrow for The Old Man and Nhu, we could not do anything about it. But there will be more things to come, it is not over yet.) 3 Nguyễn Chánh Thi. Việt Nam: một trời tâm sự (Vietnam: from my heart). (Los Alamitos, CA: Anh Thư, 1987), 232. “Đến sáng ra, gặp lại các tay cầm đầu đảo chánh, tôi mới vở lẽ ra rằng vai chánh của âm mưu này không phải Nguyễn Khánh, mà vai chánh lại là Trần Thiện Khiêm, Tư Lệnh Quân Đòan III.” (In the morning, meeting again with the coup leaders, I was surprised to find out that Tran Thien Khiem, Commander of III Corps, not Nguyen Khanh, was in fact the principal plotter.) 4 “Summary of a meeting between U.S. intelligence officials and South Vietnamese General Do Mau,” DDRS, CIA document, dated 9-Nov-1963, declassified 24-Apr-1995, 3 p. On p. 1, we have this statement: He stated that the Council was beginning to divide between one group which was more oriented toward French techniques comprising General Duong Van Minh, General Le Van Kim, and General Mai Huu Xuan with some indications of a similar orientation by General Tran Van Don. On the other

28  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh side a group oriented along American lines comprised General Tran Thien Khiem, General Nguyen Van Thieu, General Nguyen Huu Co, General Pham Xuan Chieu, and himself. 5 “Summary of a meeting between U.S. intelligence officials and South Vietnamese General Do Mau,” op. cit. On p. 2, we have this statement: Mau expressed concern at the fact that General Mai Huu Xuan was moving pro-French individuals into the working levels of the police services to the extent that the pro-A mericans now hold only two of the eight police commissioner positions in Saigon. 6 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 375. 7 Gibbons, op. cit., 211. “… reports from Vietnam that the new junta was not performing as well as expected.” 8 Kahin, George McT. Intervention: how America became involved in Vietnam. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 189. The Minh leadership also opposed any greater American role in directing South Vietnamese army operations and refused to accept persistent proposals for increasing the number of U.S. military and civilian advisers, especially the introduction of the military down to the district and subsector levels. 9 Gibbons, op. cit., 229. General Minh argued that it would play into the hands of the VC and make the Vietnamese officials look like lackeys. There would be a colonial flavor to the whole pacification effort. Minh added that even in the worst and clumsiest days of the French they never went into the villages or districts. 10 Kahin, op. cit., 188. General Minh mentioned two reasons: (1) bombing North Vietnam would not produce good military results; on the contrary it would do more harm to innocent Vietnamese; (2) by such bombing we would lose the just cause because we had [thus far] held that we were fighting a defensive war and had ascribed the role of aggressor to the communists [accusing them] of sending troops to the South, committing crimes in the South, etc. If we bombed the North, we would bring war to the North and we would lose our legitimate cause. 11 Kahin, op. cit., 190. “He (Lodge) was also disappointed by Minh’s unwillingness to meet him regularly once a week to discuss governmental policy and actions.” 12 Kahin, op. cit., 199. Harkins, in a cable to Taylor sent just after the coup had been completed on January 30, reported that two days before, at about 3:00 P.M., Wilson had come to see him at the request of General Khanh to check on whether the United States would back a pre- emptive “counter- coup” against individuals who “planned to seize control and immediately announce a position of neutralization. Harkins states he ordered Wilson to go to Lodge and relate his story, and then, according to this cable, he himself decided to go on what he refers to as “a fieldtrip” … Harkins returned to Saigon on January 29, checked in with Lodge, and was told of Wilson’s latest meeting with Khanh. He states that at 2:15 A.M. on January 30, Lodge sent an aide to alert him that “H-hour” would be at 4:00 A.M., that Khanh would pick him up at 3:15 and that coup headquarters would be at the airborne brigade’s command post. 13 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 224. “Lẩn lộn trong những người bao quanh ông Khánh, tôi thấy có ông Cố Vấn Quân Đoàn … và nhiều người ngoại quốc khác,

1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh  29

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

mặc thường phục.” (Among the crowd surrounding Khanh, I noticed the Senior Advisor of I Corps … and many other foreigners in civilian clothes.) United States. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273, accessible online at this URL: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-lbj/nsam-273.htm. McNamara, op. cit., 105. “current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best or more likely to a Communist- controlled state.” Gibbons, op. cit., 211–213. Logevall, Fredrik. “De Gaulle, neutralization and American involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964,” ­ Pacific Historical Review, v. 61, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 69–102. The quotation was from p. 75. Cable no. 15564, dated 22-Nov-1963, from US Embassy in Phnom Penh to State Department: “… ACTING SECSTATE FORAFFAIRS PHURISSARA HANDED ME NOTE NOVEMBER 20 REQUESTING TERMINATION US AID.” “De Gaulle proposes China join a plan to neutralize Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,” The New York Times, (February 1, 1964): 1. Trần Ngọc Thống, Hồ Đắc Huân, Lê Đình Thụy. Lược sử Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Brief history of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam). (San Jose, CA: Hương Quê Publisher, 2011), 100. Phăm Văn Liễu. Trả ta sông núi: hồi ký. Tập II, 1963-1975 (Give me back my country: memoirs. Vol. II, 1963-175). (Houston, TX: Văn Hóa, 2003), 52–53. Sau cuộc đảo chinh 1-11-1963, ông Khánh không được thăng cấp Trung tướng, hay tham gia Hội Đồng Quân Nhân Cách Mạng. Ong Khánh bèn bay vào Sài Gòn năn nỉ Tướng Dương Văn Minh xin thêm một sao. Tướng Minh bất đắc dỉ phải phong ông Khánh lên Trung tướng. Hôm sau, ông Khánh đi mua cặp lon ba sao sáng bóng, mang tới tư dinh Thủ tướng Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ xin gắn lon mới. Theo Đại tá Nhan Minh Trang, Chánh võ phòng Thủ tướng Thơ, vì ông Thơ đang bận rộn, có việc phải đi gấp, nên chỉ gắn một cái lon ba sao lên ve áo ông Khánh ngay trên cầu thang tư dinh. Cái lon còn lại, ông Thơ nhờ Đại tá Trang gắn giúp = After the 1-11-1963 coup, Khanh was neither promoted to Lieutenant- General nor designated member of the MRC. He flew to Saigon, imploring General Minh to give him one more star. General Minh reluctantly had to promote him to Lieutenant- General. The next day, Khanh bought a new shining pair of three-stars, and went to the private house of Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho for his official promotion. According to Colonel Nhan Minh Trang, Chief of Military Affairs of Prime Minister Tho, being busy and rushing to a meeting, Prime Minister had time to pin only one set of three stars on one side of the collar of Khanh’s shirt right on the stairs of his house, and asked Colonel Trang to pin the other set.

22 “Report of conversation between Gen. Nguyen Khanh and senior MAAG adviser re imminent coup d’etat by pro-neutralists, pro-French generals led by Gen. Xuan; plan must be crushed,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 29-Jan-1964. ­ ­ 23 Kahin, op. cit., 195. Of greater importance, following persistent pressure by Harkins and the Defense Department, who argued that he could not effectively discharge concurrently the responsibilities of two major positions (minister of security and III Corps commander), General Ton That Dinh was on January 5 relieved of his command of the vital III Corps— embracing Saigon and the provinces around it. The officer that the U.S. military approved as his successor, Major General Tran Thien Khiem, played a pivotal role in the events that followed…

30  1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh The author, Kahin, has made a mistake here: Trần Thiện Khiêm had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant- General on November 2, 1963, right after the successful coup against the Ngô regime. 24 “Background of coup staged by General Nguyen Khanh,” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 30-Jan-1964. ­ ­ On 28 January 1964 General Thieu ordered Lieutenant Colonel Duong Huu [sic] Nghia, Acting Commander of the Armored Command, to move all available armored units in Saigon to 5th Infantry Division Headquarters in Bien Hoa. However, Nghia suspected that Thieu was plotting a coup against Major General Duong Van Minh and informed Thieu that the armored units could not move as ordered using the excuse that the vehicles were inoperable. Nghia also announced his support for General Minh. By 29 January, however, Nghia apparently had switched his support to Thieu who had operational control of both the Armored Command and the Marine Corps on that date. On 30 January Nghia supported the coup group led by Major General Nguyen Khanh. There is a minor misinformation in this CIA cable: General Dương Văn Minh was a Lieutenant- General, not a Major- General. 25 Kahin, op. cit., 199. 26 Kahin, op. cit., 199–200. 27 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit, 210. 28 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 209. 29 Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 57– 65. 30 “Report of conversation between Gen. Nguyen Khanh and senior MAAG adviser re imminent coup d’etat by pro-neutralists, pro-French generals led by Gen. Xuan; plan must be crushed,” op. cit. Maj Gen Nguyen Khanh on 28 Jan told Col Jasper Wilson, Senior MAAG Advisor for I Corps, that he had info indicating that another coup would be attempted possibly as early as Friday 31 Jan. Coup, which would be of palace variety involving little or no bloodshed, would be mounted by pro-French, pro-neutralist generals with Mai Huu Xuan playing leading role. Once coup successfully carried out, perpetrators would immediately call for neutralizating of SVN. Plotters in touch with Gen Nguyen Van Hinh. Khanh appeared deeply concerned, stating that if plot not immediately crushed, it stood fair chance of success.

31 32 33 34 35 36

Again, a minor misinformation in this CIA cable: Nguyễn Khánh was a Lieutenant- General, not a Major- General. Kahin, op. cit., 198–200. Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 218–227. Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 65–74. Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 382. Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 381. Trần Văn Đôn, op. cit., 127–128. General Khanh presided over the hearing and began a five-and-one-half hour series of questions, none of which were related to the accusation of neutralism that had been raised against us. … Khanh asked us, on behalf of the entire group, not to take vengeance on anyone when we once again began serving in the army. Then they all gathered around to congratulate us.

37 Gibbons, op. cit., 229. “… Khanh not only agreed to this latter suggestion (he accepted U.S. advisers in 13 districts in the delta)…” 38 McNamara, op. cit., 321.

4

The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh

As mentioned in Chapter 3, General Khánh was an opportunist. He was always ready to change position, switch camp, serving only his own interest. After he seized power, this character was exposed more clearly. This chapter focuses on circumstances and motivation of his actions in order to understand his downfall.

The political atmosphere After the Diệm regime was toppled, the roles and strength of the Buddhists were more and more enhanced. The Buddhist leaders had the determination not to let the situation of Buddhists being discriminated and oppressed under the First Republic happen again. In order to achieve this goal, the Buddhists needed a unified organization with clearly defined structure and officially recognized by the government. The secular and clergy leaders of both Mahayana (Northern) and Hinayana or Theravada (Southern) sects cooperated in organizing a unified church. They had solid support from the MRC. A national conference was held at Xá Lợi Pagoda in Sài Gòn on December 31, 1963, and the Charter of the VBUC was signed by all parties on January 4, 1964. Everything was moving very well for the Buddhists when the January 30, 1964 coup led by General Khánh took place, resulting in pro-Buddhist generals of the MRC being incarcerated. The Buddhists thus had good reasons in their suspicion that General Khánh would try to reestablish a pro-Cần Lao, pro-Catholic regime like the First Republic. They would exercise great pressure on Khánh government in their dealing with the alleged resurrection of the Cần Lao and the Catholics. General Khánh understood this issue very well and, therefore, despite the strong support he received from the Americans, saw the need to find support from other political groups in order to counterbalance the Buddhist pressure. First, he sought support from the Đại Việt Party, and then switch to the “Young Turks,” and finally, as no other option was available, he turned to the Buddhists for help.

Nguyễn Khánh and the Đại Việt Party The first action taken by General Khánh, after the success of his January 30, 1964 coup, was to alter the leadership of the MRC. He took over the Chairmanship of the MRC from General Dương Văn Minh and dissolved

32  The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh the existing Executive Committee of the MRC. He secured the support for his coup of several MRC members such as Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm (III Corps Commander), Đỗ Mậu (Minister of Information), Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (5th Infantry Division Commander) and Nguyễn Hữu Có (IV Corps Commander).1 Four leading members of the out-going MRC, LieutenantGenerals Trần Văn Đôn, Mai Hữu Xuân, Lê Văn Kim, and Tôn Thất Đính, were arrested, brought out of Saigon by air, and detained in Đà Nẵng, in a beach house near Mỹ Khê Base, owned by wealthy businessman Nguyễn Văn Bửu.2 The four generals were later brought to Đà Lạt, thus the nick name given them later by the media “Đà Lạt generals.” Prime Minister Thơ was also arrested but released later. On February 3, 1964, Thơ submitted the resignation of his Cabinet, which was accepted by General Khánh. Khánh was more cautious with General Big Minh because of Minh’s wide popularity among the people and the military. He offered Minh the chairmanship of the new government if Minh would discharge the four detained generals, which Minh refused to do.3 Khánh then considered a few other civilians for the position of Prime Minister such as Trần Văn Lý and Phan Khắc Sửu.4 Finally, the new MRC decided to offer Minh the figurehead title of Chief of State and to have Khánh assume the position of Prime Minister. After one-week consultation with various political personalities, and with encouragement from the US Government through Ambassador Lodge, on February 8, 1964, Khánh was successful in putting together a Cabinet with a fairly good representation of the South Vietnamese political spectrum as follows5: Prime-Minister ­ Deputy Prime-Minister, Pacification Deputy Prime-Minister, Economy and Finance Deputy Prime-Mnister, Cultural and Social Affairs Secretary of State Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of the Interior Minister of Civil Works Minister of National Education Minister of Defense Minister of Rural Transformation Minister of Health Minister of Labor Minister of Information Minister of Finance Minister of Economy Minister of Justice Minister of Social Services Minister at the Prime-Minister Office

Lt-General ­ Nguyễn Khánh Dr. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn (Đại Việt, Southern Faction) Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Oánh Major-General ­ Đỗ Mậu Dr. Lê Văn Hoạch (Cao Đài) Dr. Phan Huy Quát (Đại Việt, Northern Faction) Mr. Hà Thúc Ký (Đại Việt, Central Faction) Mr. Trần Ngọc Oành (Catholic) Dr. Bùi Tường Huân (Buddhist) Lt-General ­ Trần Thiện Khiêm Mr. Nguyễn Công Hầu (Hòa Hảo) Dr. Vương Quang Trường Mr. Đàm Sĩ Hiến (Unionist) Mr. Phạm Thái (Quốc Dân Đảng) Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Oánh Dr. Âu Trường Thanh Mr. Nguyễn Văn Mầu (Catholic) Dr. Trần Quang Thuận (Buddhist) Mr. Nghiêm Xuân Hồng (Duy Dân)

The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh  33 Despite the apparent effort to build a broad-based coalition government, the Cabinet formation clearly showed that General Khánh was under heavy influence of the Đại Việt Party. There were quite a few reasons for Khánh to rely on the Đại Việt Party. First, as a professional military, he did not have any political base, and, therefore, he had to rely on some political party for its organization and membership to carry out his political program. Second, his coup had removed the key figures of the MRC who were popular with their anti-Diệm position. He had to shake off the image of a pro-Diệm leader. The Đại Việt Party had been widely known as the anti-Diệm political party. Third, the Đại Việt leaders, like Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn and Hà Thúc Ký, had been very unhappy when they were not invited to join the Council of Notables created by the MRC after the November 1, 1963 coup. There were even some rumors that the January 30, 1964 coup was indeed organized from the beginning by the Đại Việt Party but Khánh managed to get the lion’s share. Dr. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn was upset that he did not get the PrimeMinister’s job. Khánh, therefore, had to calm down the Đại Việt Party by sharing power with it and by appointing Hoàn as Deputy Prime-Minister responsible for Pacification and Ký as Minister of the Interior. This political honeymoon did not last long. The Đại Việt Party, obviously, was not 100% happy with this arrangement. They wanted to have total control of the government, and, therefore, started planning another coup to get rid of Khánh.6 This ambitious program was beyond the party’s capabilities. In fact, the Đại Việt Party never had a nation-w ide organization; it “has never been more than a factional coalition of individual politicians holding vaguely similar political goals and banded together for mutual advantage. In least since 1955, in fact, there has been no centralized party structure.”7 Khanh discovered the plot and forced Ký to submit his resignation from the position of Minister of the Interior. General Đỗ Mậu, Deputy Prime-Minister for Cultural and Social Affairs, reported this event in his Memoirs.8 The other Đại Việt leaders, Dr. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn and Dr. Phan Huy Quát, agreed with Khánh’s decision to remove Ký from the government and continued to serve on the Cabinet. This reaction from these two leaders proved that the above-mentioned CIA’s evaluation of the Đại Việt Party was accurate.

Nguyễn Khánh and the Young Turks After this painful experience with the Đại Việt Party, General Khánh decided to look elsewhere for support for his government. During that period of time, there were two main groups that could have big influence on the political scene in South Vietnam: the Buddhists, which had strong popular support, and the Military, which were in control of the government. The Buddhists would not support Khánh because they could not trust him for two reasons: (1) he helped Diệm defeat the November 11, 1960 coup by the paratroopers; and, (2) he removed the “Đà Lạt Generals,” who were pro-Buddhist.

34  The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh Khánh decided to cultivate the support from within the Armed Forces, which would also minimize the danger for him being overthrown in a military coup. Within less than a year, he granted a series of promotions to the general officer-rank to several colonels; many of these officers even received two promotions within one year. These promotions were9: • •

• •

•

March 3, 1964: promotion to Major-General rank for Colonel Cao Văn Viên, Airborne Brigade Commander April 8, 1964: promotion to Brigadier-General rank (recently established by Khánh himself within the ARVN) for Colonel Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Air Force Commander, and promotion to One-star Rear Admiral Captain Chung Tấn Cang, Navy Commander May 29, 1964: promotion to Brigadier- General rank for colonels Nguyễn Chánh Thi (Deputy Commander of I Corps), Phạm Văn Đổng, Bùi Hữu Nhơn, Cao Hảo Hớn, and Ngô Dzu August 11, 1964: promotion to Brigadier-General rank for colonels Nguyễn Đức Thắng, Nguyễn Xuân Trang, Nguyễn Cao, Nguyễn Văn Kiểm, Đặng Văn Quang, Vĩnh Lộc, Lê Nguyên Khang (Marine Brigade Commander), and Hoàng Xuân Lãm October 21, 1964: promotion to Major-General rank for Brigadier-Generals Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Lê Nguyên Khang, Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Phạm Văn Đổng, Bùi Hữu Nhơn, and Chung Tấn Cang (to Two-star Rear-Admiral).

The media started calling these officers with the collective nick name Young Turks, with General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as their spokesman and moderator. Khánh’s scheme seemed to pay off when the Young Turks united and squelched the attempted coup to overthrow him by generals Dương Văn Đức and Lâm Văn Phát on September 13, 1964. However, it was also after this failed coup that Khánh’s control over the Young Turks started to erode. The Young Turks had witnessed Khánh’s weakness during several crises in the summer of 1964, especially the decision by Khánh in August to abolish the Vũng Tàu Charter under students’ pressure. Now they saw clearly the incompetence of Khánh during the September 13 coup. But they still did not want to overthrow Khanh right away. They wanted to use Khanh to achieve their “program” of removing all senior generals from active duty. They were calling for the removal not only of the generals implicated in the September 13 coup but also the Đà Lạt generals.10,11 When the High National Council, the recently created legislative body, refused to approve their proposal to retire all senior general officers, the Young Turks took dramatic action on December 20, 1964, by dissolving the Council, and putting in jail several members of the Council. Khánh had to go along with their decision.

Nguyen Khanh and the Buddhists The dissolution of the High National Council irritated the US Government, which had seen its creation as a positive step toward democratization and a

The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh  35 good civilian government. The US Ambassador, General Maxwell Taylor, had harsh, almost insulting, words with the Young Turks and Khánh on the subject. Khánh reacted by accusing the US Ambassador of intervening into internal affairs of South Vietnam and asked the US Government to recall its Ambassador. Only through the clever and delicate intervention by Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương was the tension between the two countries resolved. After this incident, Khánh knew that he could no longer rely on the Young Turks. He turned to the Buddhists for support. At that moment, the Buddhists have put in place a campaign to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Hương. Khánh decided to go along with this plan.12 He removed Prime Minister Hương on January 27, 1965, and asked Dr. Phan Huy Quát, a pro-Buddhist Đại Việt leader, to form a new government on February 16, 1965.

General Nguyễn Khánh forced to leave Vietnam Three days later, on February 19, 1965, another military coup was mounted by the pro-Catholic Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo,13 requesting that General Khánh be removed from power. The Young Turks, once again, united to suppress the coup. However, this time, at the meeting of the Armed Forces Council (AFC) in Biên Hòa on February 20, 1965,14 they also voted to remove General Khánh from his position of Commander-In-Chief and designate LieutenantGeneral Trần Văn Minh15 to replace him. General Khánh was appointed Ambassador-at-Large and left South Vietnam on February 25, 1965.16 The failure of General Nguyen Khanh was caused by several factors. First, he was basically a loner. He never was a member of any team. There was no one to come to his rescue at the end. Second, his personal ambition was so obvious that it even repulsed the Young Turks, who were indebted to him and should have supported him. Third, by alienating his real and only ally right from the beginning after the January 30, 1964 coup, the US Government and its ambassador, Khánh has in fact sealed his fate.

Notes 1 “Khanh coup: coup accomplished quickly and without bloodshed; Prime Minister Tho and generals detained or arrested; Thieu, Mau, Co and Tri have supported coup; explanation of Khanh’s political rationale re coup; Khanh to assume title, Chief of State; Gen. Minh will not be in new govt,” DDRS, cable from US Embassy in Saigon, issued 30-Jan-1964, declassified 20-Mar-1975. 2 “1. Khanh coup group considers selection of younger civilian as Prime Minister; 2. Four generals flown to Da Nang where they will be imprisoned [Khanh considering assuming control of govt. if no suitable civilian can be found],” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 30-Jan-1964, declassified date not given. The cable contained the following statement:“… Major Generals Ton That Dinh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, and Mai Huu Xuan were sent by air to Da Nang where they will be detained, probably at My Khe Base.” Another mistake in this CIA cable: all of these generals were actually Lieutenant- Generals.

36  The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh

­

­

­

­

­

­

The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh  37 his being a potential Communist agent. The cable, however, does not reach any clear conclusion regarding these doubts. After April 30, 1975, the Communists revealed that Thao indeed had been one of their agents. 14 “Armed Forces Council’s plans to remove General Nguyen Khanh as Commander in Chief and severely punish the leaders of the abortive coup,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1975, microfiche no. 48A, CIA cable, no. TDCS-314/02340-65, ­ ­ dated 21-Feb-1965, ­ ­ declassified 24-Dec-1975, ­ ­ 1 p.; Ky said that Khanh became aware that his days were numbered at the meeting at Bien Hoa on the afternoon of 20 February. Khanh was present at the beginning of the meeting when Brigadier General Nguyen Chanh Thi stated frankly and very bluntly that Khanh’s usefulness had come to an end. According to Ky, at this point, Khanh excused himself from the meeting with the offer, which he had made previously, that he would be willing to make any sacrifice for the good of the country, including relinquishing his post as Commander in Chief and leaving the country, if the AFC considered these steps necessary. This CIA cable has a minor misinformation: General Nguyễn Chánh Thi was already a Major- General, no longer a Brigadier- General on 20-February-1965. 15 General Trần Văn Minh was usually called “General Little Minh” by the US media to distinguish him from General Dương Văn “Big” Minh. Also, he should not be mistaken for another General Trần Văn Minh, who would become Commander of the South Vietnamese Air Force (replacing General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ) under the Second Republic (1967–1975). 16 Đoàn Thêm. 1965: việc từng ngày (1965: Chronology). (Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 38.

5

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 A year of total chaos

The Government of General Nguyễn Khánh was born after his own m ilitary coup of January 30, 1964, which he called “Chỉnh Lý,” i.e. “Rectification.” His Government, therefore, basically was a continuation of the political course set out by the November 1, 1963 coup. This fact brought in advantages as well as difficulties for the Nguyễn Khánh Government.

Advantages: strong support from the United States With the pretext of “rectification,” meaning just setting right the course, not changing the regime, the Nguyễn Khánh administration easily received immediate recognition and support from the US Government. In reality, as we have seen in Chapter 3, US officials in Saigon, specifically Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins, had been informed of Khánh’s coup a few days before it was carried out. They did not relay this information to the MRC and the Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ Government so that the Vietnamese Government could prevent the coup from happening. This fact showed very clearly that the United States had already decided to support the change of government in South Vietnam right from the beginning. Disappointed with the MRC’s performance under General Minh’s leadership, the United States wanted to find a new leader, who would be more easily persuaded to carry out its policies and objectives in Vietnam. The United States believed that General Khánh would be that leader,1 and, therefore, through Ambassador Lodge, strongly supported General Khánh.2 And exactly like what they had expected, General Khánh easily accepted the US recommendations that General Minh had categorically rejected. More specifically, he accepted, as a test, to introduce US advisors down to 13 districts in the Mekong Delta. In addition, he also asked Ambassador Lodge to suggest names of Vietnamese politicians whom he should approach for the positions of Prime Minister or cabinet members.3 One day before his Cabinet was sworn-in, General Khánh had invited Ambassador Lodge to come to see him so that he could inform the Ambassador about the membership of his Cabinet.4 This excellent relationship was behind the US Government’s decision to polish and prop up General Khanh. Before sending Secretary of Defense McNamara to Vietnam in March 1964, President Johnson instructed him to make clear

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 39 to everyone that the United States absolutely supported General Khanh.5 After his visit in South Vietnam during March 8–12, McNamara submitted his report to President Johnson on March 16. After the report was discussed at the National Security Council, President Johnson issued it as NSAM 288. NSAM 288 contained a statement that said “To make it clear that we fully support the Khánh government and are opposed to any further coups.”6 During that period of time, the US military, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was making preparations to escalate the war in Vietnam. To achieve these goals, they were in need of a stable and strong government in South Vietnam in order to strike North Vietnam. They thought they already had the “strong man” they needed in General Khánh. They would soon discover that they were wrong. The Khánh Government was neither stable nor strong.7,8

Difficulties: political instability and disunity From the appearance, the Khánh Government seemed to represent a fairly good political consensus through the participation of a wide variety of political parties of South Vietnam. It was not true. The political consensus was non- existent in South Vietnamese political activities. The Ngô Đình Diệm regime had the determination to achieve political consensus but committed a serious mistake in trying to achieve it by annihilating all political parties other than the regime-sponsored Cần Lao Party. The apparent political consensus of the Ngo regime was only a screen hiding the boiling political aspiration inside. When the screen was removed, this boiling political aspiration, together with personal ambition of political leaders, was pouring out like a tornado, creating uncontrollable upheavals. Another special characteristic of political activities in South Vietnam that made political consensus impossible was the very nature of political parties. All important political parties in South Vietnam were born during the French domination and, thus, had to operate under secrecy. The period of time when it was possible for them to operate openly was very short, less than a year, after the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was created on September 2, 1945. After that they were again forced to move back to secrecy because of the hostility and harassment by the Communist Party. During the whole period of the First Republic in South Vietnam, under Ngô Đình Diệm, they also had to operate in secrecy because of the suppression carried out by the Ngôs. Consequently, they did not have any experience working in the open as opposition parties. Their objective and operating methods remained the same as in the past. Their objective was to overthrow the incumbent government, not making contributions to improve it. They were always ready, therefore, to participate in military coups. And of course, their operating methods were still plotting in secret in order to seize power by force. Another characteristic of political activities in South Vietnam was the disuniting trend of political parties. This trend was partially rooted in the secret birth of political parties. It was also enhanced by regionalization of political parties. In a large majority of political parties, in particular the Đại

40 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 Việt Party, regional factions were totally independent. They were neither operating under a common manifest nor subjecting to a unified command. This disunity was denying the strength that they needed. Moreover, they did not trust each other, even within one party because of different factions, not to mention with other parties. Consequently, there had never been among political parties in South Vietnam a mutual trust that was needed to work for a common cause. Working together for a common cause was always temporary. On top of that, one could not ignore the self-serving complex of superiority of political party leaders that, in many cases, pushed them to the extreme, making them blinded to national interest, and seeing only the interest of their parties or their own interest. The Americans were fed up with this “bickering” among the South Vietnamese political parties. This political instability was aggravated by other political forces liberated by the military coup of November 1, 1963, from the oppression by the Diem government during the past nine years: the religious groups and other civilian groups. These groups required the government to pay attention to their needs and aspirations. The most important groups were the Buddhists and the youth-students, whose important contributions to the overthrow of the Diem regime could not be ignored. Finally, the last element that contributed to the political instability of South Vietnam was the Armed Forces. Traditionally, the Armed Forces were under the control of the government and should act as a government tool. However, during this period of time in South Vietnam, the Armed Forces were out of that political framework. The Armed Forces, represented by the generals, had stood up to overthrow the Diem regime and were no longer resigned to be passive facing political events. Through the two military coups in three months, they had seen very clearly that the government was created by the military. General Khánh even declared “The Military is the Father of the Nation.”9 The basic national discipline no longer existed. Within the Armed Forces the discipline became loose too. The generals, even high- and intermediate-ranking officers, provided they had command of units, and if unsatisfied, were ready to plot for coups. During the period of just over one year during General Khánh’s leadership, besides rumors of coups, there were two more coups. All of these factors have contributed to create a very serious political instability, which required a strong government with a leader having status, experience, and determination in order to remain in a steady course. General Khánh was no such leader. It was no surprise that, during the whole time of his administration, South Vietnam went through a period of total political chaos unprecedented in the whole history of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Buddhist factor Through the Buddhist crisis of 1963, the Buddhist leaders had learned that, in order to effectively protect their religion, they must have a unified organization. At that time, in terms of organization, Vietnamese Buddhism

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 41 comprised many separate regional churches. The most important church was the General Buddhist Association, created in 1951, including different elements of Mahayana Buddhism (or Northern Sect) from the North to the South of Vietnam. The General Association was present only nominally; in reality, it did not have a unified control structure. According to a CIA document,10 in 1962, the General Association comprised of 3,000 monks, 600 nuns, with approximately 3 million followers, among which there were 60,000–70,000 Buddhist Youth members. The General Association was headed by the Supreme Monk (Tăng Thống) Right Venerable (Thượng Tọa) Thích Tịnh Khiết, assisted by three Vice Supreme Monks (Phó Tăng Thống), who were Right Venerable Thích Tâm Châu, for the Northern Church (already moved from Hà Nội to Sài Gòn after 1954), Right Venerable Thích Thiện Minh, for the Central Church, located in Huế, and Right Venerable Thích Thiện Hoa, for the Southern Church, located in Sài Gòn. The secular branch of the General Association was the Association for Buddhist Studies of South Vietnam, headquartered at Xá Lợi Pagoda in Sài Gòn, and headed by Mr. Mai Thọ Truyền. All of these individuals had made important contributions to the negotiations with the Diệm government during the Buddhist crisis of 1963. Right Venerable Thích Trí Quang, of the Central Church, though not holding any official position within the General Association, did have great influence over Buddhist followers, especially the Buddhist youth and students. It was Thích Trí Quang who launched and led the Buddhist protest in Hue that triggered the Buddhist crisis of 1963. In SNIE 53- 65, dated February 4, 1965, (SNIE = Special National Intelligence Estimate), the CIA had the following statement on Thích Trí Quang: Among these leaders, Tri Quang is the most influential and politically skillful. He seems to have outmaneuvered all existing or potential rivals within the Buddhist movement and is not likely to be deposed from within the movement itself. … Tri Quang is vain and hyper-nationalistic; thus, he probably resents the extent of US involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Although he recognizes the present need for US support, he regards the US as incapable of understanding the political situation in South Vietnam and, over the long run, would like to see the US out of the country.11 For the Hinayana Buddhism (Southern Sect), there was the Original Church (or Theravada Church), headquartered at Kỳ Viên Pagoda in Saigon, with around 400,000 followers. Its principal leader was Venerable (Đại Đức) Thích Hộ Giác. In addition, there were a few smaller sects, such as the Cổ Sơn Môn (largely in the Mekong Delta) and the Du Tăng Khất Sĩ. After the military coup of November 1, 1963 was successful, the Buddhist clergy and secular leaders moved toward a unified Church. A big conference to unite Buddhist sects was held at the Xá Lợi Pagoda in Sài Gòn on December 31, 1963 and the Charter for the VBUC was signed by all parties on January 4, 1964 and later officially recognized by the government by Decree

42 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 No. 14/5 issued on March 14, 1964. According to this Charter, the VBUC comprised of two institutes: the Institute of Clergy Hierarchy (Viện Tăng Thống) and the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma (Viện Hóa Đạo). The Dharma Institute was the most important element of the VBUC, whose mandate was to provide leadership in the execution and control of all activities of the VBUC. Right Venerable Thích Tịnh Khiết was elected Supreme Monk to head the Clergy Institute. Right Venerable Thích Tâm Châu was elected Chairman of the Dharma Institute on January 12, 1964. Right Venerable Thích Trí Quang was elected Secretary-General of the Clergy Institute. By experience gained during the 1963 Buddhist crisis, the VBUC decided that it would never allow the situation of being discriminated and oppressed by the government occur again. To achieve this goal, the Buddhists wanted to be heard and to have influence in South Vietnam politics. From this determination, the VBUC, through its Dharma Institute, was actively involved more and more in political events in the Republic of Vietnam. Finally, the VBUC reached the point of wishing to have its voice in the cabinet membership selection as well as government policies. The struggle methods of the Buddhists included inciting followers to take to the streets and to demonstrate in order to exercise pressure on the government. In addition, they also carried out self-starvation and self-immolation. Finally, when completely desperate, such as in the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in June 1966, the Buddhists could use the extreme measure of bringing down the Buddha’s altars to the streets in order to stop the advance of the Vietnamese Marines in Đà Nẵng. Regarding the Khánh government, right from the beginning, the Buddhists had great doubts because the “Rectification” had removed and incarcerated pro-Buddhist generals of the MRC. Besides, the unclear death of Major Nguyễn Văn Nhung, the alleged assassin of the Ngô brothers, who was arrested immediately after the “Rectification,” as well as the reappointment of a number of pro-Diem province chiefs, caused the Buddhists to worry about the possible return of the Cần Lao Party. They immediately put pressure on General Khánh by denouncing that he intended to reestablish the anti-Buddhist policy of the Diệm regime. This forced Khánh to stop re-appointing pro-Diem officials, put more Diem-ministers under arrest, and close down a number of pro-Diem newspapers.12,13 These actions by Khánh helped the Buddhists see clearly Khanh’s weakness: he was easy to yield under pressure. The Buddhists continued to pressure General Khánh, forcing him to put on trial Ngô Đình Cẩn (younger brother of Ngô Đình Diệm, who used to hold power in Central Vietnam) and other Diệm officials, who, more or less, had been involved in the 1963 Buddhist crisis. General Khánh yielded again. He established the Revolutionary Tribunal (Tòa Án Cách Mạng) by Decree no. 4/64 issued on February 28, 1964. From March to June 1964, the Revolutionary Tribunal held a series of trials for Phan Quang Đông, Ngô Đình Cẩn, Đặng Sỷ, Nguyễn Văn Y and Dương Văn Hiếu, resulting in extremely severe sentences. Phan Quang Đông and Ngô Đình Cẩn were sentenced to death; the other defendants were receiving

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 43 life-time hard-labor sentences. Ngô Đình Cẩn, in spite of the US Embassy’s intervention, was executed at Chí Hòa Prison on May 9, 1964.14 Now, the Buddhists knew for sure that General Khánh would never dare resist any demand through pressure by them. They demanded that the government establish the Buddhist chaplain system within the Armed Forces and General Khánh assented by Decree no. 224/QP on July 1, 1964.15 Witnessing all these concessions by General Khánh, especially the harsh sentences by the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Catholics, in particular the former Cần Lao Party members, felt very much threatened. They began to react. Several demonstrations of Catholics took place in Huế and Sài Gòn, denouncing the “government’s persecution of Catholics.”16 At the same time, a series of violent incidents occurred in Central Vietnam with Buddhists as victims.17 Meanwhile, a group of intellectuals in Huế, led by Dr. Lê Khắc Quyến, with close relationship with the Buddhists in general, and with Right Venerable Thích Trí Quang in particular, published a magazine called “Lập Trường” (Position). The magazine criticized the government harshly. To confront the violence incited by the Catholics and the Cần Lao, the group established the Council of National Salvation in Huế. The Council sent delegates to other provinces in Central Vietnam to set up provincial National Salvation Committees, whose mandate was to search and arrest former Cần Lao Party members. Now nothing could stop the public confrontation between the Buddhists and the Catholics any more. During the whole summer of 1964, numerous violent confrontations, sometimes bloody, took place between the Buddhists and the Catholics in Saigon and in different areas of Central Vietnam as well.

Factor youth and students Besides the difficulties generated by religious groups, the Khánh government had also to face with the youth/student group. At the beginning, the students were only concerned with educational issues. However, they were subsequently falling under the influence of the Buddhist leaders and were concerned more and more with political issues. On July 20, 1964, the government organized a mass demonstration at Lam Sơn Square, denouncing both Colonialists and Communists for the division of the country. After the demonstration, the students moved to the French War Memorial on Duy Tân Street, dirtying the statues with paints. At night, they organized a “Đêm Không Ngũ” (Night Without Sleep) on the campus of the Đại Học Văn Khoa (Faculty of Letters, University of Saigon). The next morning, about 100 students mounted a demonstration in front of the French Embassy where they burned cars, and caused other damages. The next day, the Tổng Hội Sinh Viên Sài Gòn (General Association of Sài Gòn Students) held a news conference, suggesting severance of diplomatic relations with France and nationalization of properties of French nationals in Vietnam. Five days later, on July 26, 1964, the students returned to the French War Memorial

44 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 on Duy Tân Street and knocked down all statues.18 The Khánh government had to pledge compensation for the French but did not have any measures to warn or punish the students. The government even took advantage of the surging anti-Communist sentiment of the students after the July 20, 1964 celebration to call for “Bắc Tiến,” (Marching North).19 In early August, the US destroyer Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin and President Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnam in retaliation. The US Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the President to use whatever measures, including military forces, to counter any hostile situations in South East Asia. In order to meet the US needs for a strong base for the escalation of the war, General Khánh believed that the time has come for him to seize absolute power. As preparing steps, on August 7, 1964, he declared a national state of emergency and re- established press censorship. One week later, on August 16, 1964, the MRC met in Vũng Tàu and promulgated a new Charter and elected General Khánh as Chủ Tịch (Chairman, instead of Tổng Thống = President) of the Republic of Vietnam. According to the new Charter (called Vũng Tàu Charter, see the full-text of its English translation in Appendix D), the Chairman held the position of Chief of State with many special powers; the MRC would designate a National Assembly with 100 civilian members and 50 military members; the MRC would be the body with supreme power.20 The students reacted immediately. On August 19, 1964, they met at the office of the General Association of Sài Gòn Students on Duy Tân Street to discuss the Vũng Tàu Charter. After three days of intensive discussion, on August 22, 1964, they gathered in front of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) on Thống Nhứt Boulevard, next to the Botanical Garden, and submitted their petition against the Vũng Tàu Charter. The Minister at the PMO Nghiêm Xuân Hồng had to come out to meet with them. The students still refused to disperse. In the afternoon, Chairman Nguyễn Khánh had to come out to talk to them. Thee student representatives stated that the students could not accept the new Charter and raised three demands with the government: (1) The need for a new government with young and clean members; (2) The Generals to come back to their military duties; and (3) The extermination of the remnant Cần Lao Party members. On August 25, 1964, after the demonstration in front of the Bến Thành Central Market, marking the first anniversary of the sacrifice of Quách Thị Trang,21 the students once again gathered in front of the PMO to protest against the Vũng Tàu Charter and military dictatorship. The gathering grew in number by hours. Finally, Chairman Nguyễn Khánh had to come out again to meet with the students and promised to reconsider the Charter. The next day, the MRC convened an urgent meeting at the General Staff (GS) Headquarters and rescinded the Vũng Tàu Charter. It was also announced that the MRC continued its meeting to elect a new Chief of State, who would be responsible for the implementation of a democratic government system for the country. On August 27, 1964, the MRC created a new governing body called Ủy Ban Lãnh Đạo

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 45 Lâm Thời Quốc Gia và Quân Lực (Provisional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and the Armed Forces) comprised of generals Dương Văn Minh, Trần Thiện Khiêm, and Nguyễn Khánh. While the generals were still meeting inside, about 2,000 Catholics, armed with sticks, machetes, and hammers, gathered in front of the GS compound, and asked to meet with the MRC. The soldiers guarding the entrance refused to let them in. They forced their way in violently, hitting, chopping, injuring the soldiers. The latter had to fire on the crowd, resulting in 4 dead and 11 injured. Meanwhile, another group of Catholics crowded in front of the Radio Station; on their way by the Technical High School Nguyễn Trường Tộ, they had a confrontation with the students; the students of the Technical High School Cao Thắng got the news of that confrontation and came to rescue their fellow students. A big brawl occurred resulting in two students stabbed to death. Father Hồ Văn Vui and Right Venerable Thích Tuệ Đăng had to come and tried to reconciliate; finally, at 7 PM, the crowd broke up. During that evening, areas surrounding Catholic neighborhoods as well as the location of the Dharma Institute, youth on both sides took turn to mount guards all night. The Archbishop of Saigon and the Chairman of the Dharma Institute issued a joint communiqué, calling followers on both sides to stay calm and avoid further violence. The next day, August 28, 1964, students on both sides were again involved in another fight at Nguyễn Bá Tòng High School; the violence dragged on into the evening. Soldiers were dispatched to the scene to re- establish order but neither side listened to them. Finally, the soldiers had to fire on the crowd, resulting in 2 dead and 48 injured. The Ministry of National Education ordered all schools closed in the Sài Gòn – Gia Đinh area. Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Oánh was designated Acting Prime Minister, and ordered curfew for the whole Sài Gòn – Gia Đinh area.22

The Armed Forces factor On September 7, 1964, Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Minh was elected Chairman of the Provisional Committee. The next day, he signed the Resolution no. 7/BLDQGQL, establishing the High National Council with the following mandate: convening the National Assembly, drafting the new Constitution, creating the national executive body, and advising the Government and the Provisional Committee. On the same day, General Khánh rescinded the decree designating Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Oánh as Acting Prime Minister and came back to his job as Prime Minister. During the whole summer of 1964, witnessing these excessive concessions to the Buddhists by General Khánh, especially the easy rescind of the Vũng Tàu Charter, making the Armed Forces really lose face with the people, a number of generals began plotting against Khánh. First, four individuals resigned from the Cabinet: generals Trần Thiện Khiêm, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Lâm Văn Phát, and Colonel Trần Ngọc Huyến. On September 13, 1964, Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Đức, Commander of IV Corps,

46 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 and Major-General Lâm Văn Phát carried out a coup against General Khánh. Thanks to the objection and resistance by the “Young Turks,” General Khánh survived the coup. The two leaders of the coup were arrested, stripped of command, and prosecuted. However, the prestige of General Khánh vis-à-vis the young generals was much more reduced. After the Trần Văn Hương government was inaugurated on November 4, 1964, although General Khánh still held on to the position of Commander-In-Chief, the real power was already in the hands of the young generals. The attempted coup of February 19, 1965, by Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, who demanded, among other things, the ouster of General Khánh, was again suppressed by the young generals. The latters took this opportunity to get rid of General Khanh once and for all, forcing him to leave Vietnam. This elimination of General Nguyễn Khánh from the political sphere of South Vietnam did not end “the political malaise in Saigon. The civilian Cabinet left behind by Khanh had little authority and no energy.”23

Notes 1 Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing war: the lost chance for peace and the escalation of war in Vietnam. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 99. 2 Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a war: Vietnam, the United States, and the modern historical experience. (New York: New Press, 1994), 119. “Washington gave solid support to General Nguyen Khanh’s bloodless coup at the end of January 1964, allegedly to head- off pro-French neutralist officers ready to take power.” 3 Gibbons, William Conrad, op. cit., 229. “Khanh not only agreed to this latter suggestion (he accepted U.S. advisers in 13 districts in the delta), but went so far as to ask Lodge to recommend Vietnamese for the position of Prime Minister and for the Cabinet.” 4 “Assessment of Khanh’s selection of administrators for his new govt.,” DDRS, US Embassy cable no. 1510, 6 p., dated 7-Apr-1964, declassified 20-Mar-1975. “Called on General Khanh at his invitation … The purpose of inviting me was to tell me about the make– up of the new government.” 5 McNamara, op. cit., 112. “Bob, I want to see about a thousand pictures of you with General Khanh, smiling and waving your arms and showing the people out there that this country is behind Khanh all the way.” 6 Gibbons, op. cit., 240. “To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.” 7 Porter, Gareth, ed. Vietnam: the definitive documentation of human decisions. Vol. 2. (Stanfordville, NY: E.M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979), 241. Memo from Asst. Sec. of Defense William P. Bundy to President Johnson, dated 1-Mar-1964. The great weakness in the present situation is the extremely shaky position of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is probably the ablest man in the country, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain. 8 Kahin, op. cit., 208. Despite substantially increased US military and economic backing, Khanh was never able to establish anything like a viable political base; nor could he even maintain that little cohesion his regime had initially enjoyed. It grew progressively weaker—both internally and vis-a-vis the NLF.

Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964 47









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6

High National Council

After the emergency meeting of August 26, 1964, the MRC rescinded the Vũng Tàu Charter. The next day, The MRC created the Provisional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and the Armed Forces with generals Dương Văn Minh, Trần Thiện Khiêm, and Nguyễn Khánh. The Nguyễn Khánh government was given two months to convene the National Assembly. On September 7, 1964, General Minh was elected Chairman of the Provisional Committee, and the next day, the 17-member High National Council (HNC) was created with the following mandate: “convening the National Assembly, drafting a new constitution, implementing national governmental structure, and advising the Government and the Provisional Committee.”1

Political atmosphere On September 26, 1964, the HNC was officially inaugurated at Diên Hồng Conference Center. The next day, Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu was elected Chairman of the HNC. The Council decided to put on top priority the drafting of the new Charter from which all national governmental bodies would be created. All Council members worked very hard together in the most difficult political conditions of the Republic of Vietnam: a military coup (on September 13 by generals Dương Văn Đức and Lâm Văn Phát), a general strike (on September 21 in Saigon by the Federation of Labor Unions), demonstrations, violent confrontations (by the Council of National Salvation in Central Vietnam with the objective of searching and arresting former Cần Lao Party members), a revolt by the Montagnards (in Ban Mê Thuột, on September 20, by the Rhade ethnic elements of the Special Forces trained by the United States). The US Government worried very much, reflecting in a very pessimistic special CIA report: “the continuing deteriorating political situation, the poor chance of success of the new government to be formed by the end of October, and, regarding General Khanh, the decreasing support for him from the military.”2 For General Khánh, the creation of the Provisional Committee leading to the establishment of the HNC was a step backward he had to take in this

High National Council  49 extremely difficult situation. In addition to the above-mentioned difficulties, he had also been under great pressure from the generals after the face-losing repeal of the Vũng Tàu Charter in August. Right after the HNC was created, Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Đức and Major-General Lâm Văn Phát ­ mounted a coup against General Khanh (later, at a news conference, General Duc said that this was not a coup, just a “biểu dương lực lượng” (demonstration of forces), which failed because they could not win the support from the young generals. After this failed coup, the young generals had no doubt that General Khánh needed their support very badly, and, therefore, they exerted more pressure on him. On September 30, 1964, their representatives met with General Khánh in Vũng Tàu. Present at this meeting with General Khánh were: Brigadier-General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Commander of the Air Force; Rear-Admiral (One-star) Chung Tấn Cang, Commander of the Navy; Brigadier-General Lê Nguyên Khang, Commander of the Marines Brigade; Colonel Dư Quốc Đống, Commander of the Airborne Brigade. At this meeting, General Khánh promised that he would implement the following demands of the young generals: (1) Forcing General Trần Thiện Khiêm out of the country, using the cover as a roving ambassador visiting allied countries to thank them for their support in the war; (2) Retiring all Đà Lạt generals (generals Trần Văn Đôn, Lê Văn Kim, Tôn Thất Đính, Mai Hữu Xuân, and Nguyễn Văn Vỹ); (3) Putting on trials all officers involved in the September 13 coup; and (4) General Khánh, himself, would come back to the Armed Forces on October 27, 1964.3 After having made those promises, General Khánh took a further step in pleasing the young generals by granting them one more promotion. On October 21, 1964, the following five brigadier-generals were promoted to majorgenerals: Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Lê Nguyên Khang, Bùi Hữu Nhơn, Phạm Văn Đổng, and Nguyễn Chánh Thi. One-star Rear-Admiral Chung Tan Cang was also promoted to Two-star Rear Admiral.4 Among these six generals, general Lê Nguyên Khang had two promotions in less than three months: promotion to brigadier-general on August 11, 19645 and promotion to majorgeneral on October 21, 1964. After having pleased and bribed (with more promotions) the young generals, General Khánh thought about taking back the absolute power he had had before. For him, the first step was to get rid of the other two members of the Provisional Committee. The first member who had to go was General Trần Thiện Khiêm (exactly like what he had promised with the young generals in the Vũng Tàu meeting). On October 7, 1964, General Trần Thiện Khiêm left Vietnam to visit several allied countries. On October 24, 1964, he was appointed ambassador to the United States.6 Next would be General Minh’s turn. This was more difficult because of his good standing with the people and the Armed Forces. General Khánh had to wait for a more appropriate time, which finally came when the HNC had chosen the Chief of State and the Provisional Committee was disbanded after turning the power over to the Chief of State on October 26, 1964. On November 7, 1964,

50  High National Council Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Minh was appointed Overseas Special Rep­ resentative of the Chief of State.7 And on November 12, 1964, General Minh left Saigon to make his tour abroad.8

Provisional Charter Within that much chaotic political scene, the HNC succeeded in its drafting of the Provisional Charter, which was promulgated on October 20, 1964 (see the full-text of its English translation in Appendix E). According to the Charter, the legislative power would be held by the National Assembly; regarding the executive branch, there would be a Chief of State selected by the National Assembly; the Chief of State would pick a Prime Minister, who would have to be approved by the National Assembly. During the transitional period before the National Assembly would be elected in the next couple of months, the HNC would function as the legislative branch. Therefore, the HNC’s first responsibility now was to select the Chief of State. Several drives, with support from the US Embassy,9 occurred inside the HNC to select General Dương Văn Minh for this position. Although the ideal formula suggested by the US Embassy was only for a position of figurehead without any real power, it was not acceptable for General Khánh. Finally, the HNC settled with the selection of Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu as Chief of State on October 24, 1964. The US Embassy was not happy with this selection but had to accept it.10 And, of course, as suggested in the above-mentioned CIA report on the political situation in South Vietnam, the US Government, through its Embassy in Saigon, really hoped that this civilian government would succeed to improve the political situation of the Republic of Vietnam.

Establishment of civilian government The next step for the establishment of a civilian government now was for the Chief of State to select a Prime Minister. To fit to the time frame imposed on the government when the Provisional Committee was created, as well as to keep his promise with the young generals at his September 30, 1964 meeting with them in Vũng Tàu, General Khánh, on behalf of his Cabinet, submitted his resignation to Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on October 26, 1964. Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu consulted with various political groups and on October 30, decided to offer Mr. Trần Văn Hương, Mayor of Saigon, the position of Prime Minister. The next day, Prime Minister- designate Trần Văn Hương presented his government program to the HNC and received an almost unanimous vote from the HNC.11 On November 4, 1964, his Cabinet was sworn-in (for activities of the Hương government, see Chapter 7 for details). As previously mentioned, the US Government, represented by Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in Saigon, strongly supported the option for a civilian government in South Vietnam and really hoped that such a government

High National Council  51 would be able to improve the chaotic political situation that had been in existence for almost one year. However, the reality would not be as the Americans expected. Because in the program he presented to the HNC, Prime Minister Hương, among other things, recommended that order and national authority should be re- established, and religion should be separated from politics, his government was opposed immediately by the students and the Buddhists. This opposition only ceased when Prime Minister Hương was removed from power by the military on January 27, 1965.12

Difficulties facing the HNC After the selection of Phan Khắc Sửu as Chief of State, the HNC elected another member, Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, as its Acting Chairman. One day after Prime Minister Hương’s cabinet was sworn-in, Dr. Chữ resigned from his new position of Acting Chairman of the HNC, citing his disapproval of the formation of the Hương cabinet. He stated that the membership of the Huong cabinet did not reflect the aspiration of South Vietnamese political parties.13 This action by Dr. Chữ gave more ammunition to the opposition movement by the students and the Buddhists. While the situation was already difficult, the HNC also initiated another crisis by asking the Hương government to answer a series of questions. On November 13, 1964, Prime Minister Hương sent his answers to the HNC and declared: “The national authority should be re- established, the separation of religion and politics should be implemented, religion should be taken out of politics.”14 This statement by Prime Minister Huong was no less than “pouring gasoline onto the fire” and resulted in more negative reaction from the Buddhist opposition. Several violent demonstrations occurred. The government ordered police to quell them, with several hundreds of students and Buddhists arrested. The conflict between the Hương government and the Buddhists could no longer be resolved. Meanwhile, unsatisfied with Prime Minister Hương’s answers to its queries, the HNC decided to create a special committee to investigate the membership of the Hương cabinet. On November 18, 1964, Mr. Lê Văn Thu was elected Chairman of the HNC. On December 18, 1964, Prime Minister Huong sent a memo to the HNC objecting the creation of that investigative committee. The relationship between the Hương government and the HNC became strained.

Dissolution of the HNC With the conflict between the Hương government and the Buddhists reached an impasse, the generals held a meeting in Đà Lạt on December 4, 1964. A fter the meeting, they declared that they: “supported a strong, clean and patriotic government that would not yield under pressure; and prepared to create an Armed Forces Council.”15 This declaration showed clearly that the military

52  High National Council supported the Hương government in its struggle with the Buddhists. The generals intended to trade this support with the Hương government’s support for one long-standing objective in their action plan. This objective was to retire all old generals (old was defined as having over 25 years of service). Their pressure on General Khánh at their September 30 meeting in Vũng Tàu to get his promise to retire the Đà Lạt generals was part of this plan. On December 17, 1964, they came to present this request to Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu.16 Because of the legislative characteristic of this request, Chief of State Sửu submitted it to the HNC for consideration. On December 18, the HNC issued its resolution, rejecting the request that it termed as illegal.17 In the same day, the generals formed the Armed Forces Council (AFC). During the night of the December 19, six members of the HNC, together with a number of generals, politicians, and students, were arrested and incarcerated in different locations. These six HNC members were: Ngô Gia Hy, Trần Văn Văn, Nguyễn Văn Huyền, Mai Thọ Truyền, Nguyễn Văn Lực, and Lê Khắc Quyến.18 In the afternoon of December 20, 1964, the generals held a news conference, announcing their decision to dissolve the HNC, and their continued support of Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu and Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương.

Reactions of Chief of State and Prime Minister Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu was only notified by General Khánh and the young generals around 1 AM after they had already arrested and moved the HNC members to Pleiku and Kontum. The reaction by Chief of State Sửu, according to General Nguyễn Chánh Thi in his memoirs, was “sad and pensive,”19 and he accepted it as a “fait accompli.” Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương was notified by General Khánh and the young generals around 2 AM20 He was very upset by their action but still accepted to remain in his position and did not take any step to denounce this illegal action of the generals. US Ambassador Taylor had a meeting with Prime Minister Hương immediately in the morning. His recommendation to Prime Minister Hương was not to accept the generals’ decision to dissolve the HNC. His reasoning was that the acceptance of that decision would be seen by the whole world as a proof that the civilian government was just a puppet regime. He also pushed Prime Minister Hương to put pressure on the military by threatening to resign. He suggested to Hương a plan to resolve the crisis that included the following points: (1) The generals would rescind their resolution to dissolve the HNC; (2) The HNC would be re- established with a new membership that would be acceptable to the generals; (3) The generals would set free all arrested HNC members; and (4) The generals would issue a statement affirming their strong support for the Hương government.21 Prime Minister Hương discussed this plan with the generals but gained only one point of the plan: the generals agreed to

High National Council  53 set free the arrested HNC members and other individuals involved.22 In his negotiations with the generals, Prime Minister Hương never embarked on the issue of resignation or even threat of resignation. The reason for this lack of determination by Prime Minister Huong in his dealings with the generals was his belief that the main concern of his government was the confrontation with the opposition movement by the Buddhists and the students and in that confrontation, he was in need of the military support. He even took a further step in this thinking: on January 18, 1965, he reshuffled his cabinet and offered memberships to four generals. (See Chapter 7 for details). Thus, the two top individuals of the civilian government whose existence was created by the HNC had accepted to go along with the absolutely illegal dissolution of the HNC by the generals. They did not realize (or refused to realize) that their positions were now totally lacking of legal basis. Prime Minister Huong would soon pay a high price for his decision: on January 27, 1965, he would be removed from power by the AFC and put in house arrest in Vũng Tàu for a long time.

Reactions by the United States Unlike the totally passive reactions by the two top leaders of the South Vietnamese civilian government, the US Government, through its Ambassador, General Taylor, strongly opposed this illegal action by the generals. Ambassador Taylor’s reactions were not unfounded. The distant reason of Ambassador Taylor’s reactions was the US Government’s wish for a stable government (better if civilian) in South Vietnam. 1964, under the Khánh government, was a year of total political chaos. For the United States, 1964 was a year of preparation for the escalation of war in Vietnam. The United States needed a stable government in the South as a solid base for its planned attack in the North. In spite of an extremely strong support of the Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964, President Johnson still withheld his decision to escalate the war because 1964 was a year of presidential election. After his landslide victory against Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater (he won in 44/50 states, and got 486/538 of the electorate votes) in the November 3, 1964 presidential election, President Johnson began the implementation of the escalation of war by establishing the National Security Council’s Working Group on South Vietnam/South East Asia headed by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. This group’s mandate was to study and make recommendations for a new US policy on Vietnam. The group worked very hard during November 1964. Ambassador Taylor was recalled to Washington to participate in the November 27 minister-level meeting to discuss the new US policy recommended by the group. At the meeting of December 1, President Johnson approved the plan for the escalation of war in Vietnam, which basically included two phases: phase 1 for the bombing of North Vietnam only in retaliation; phase 2 for sustained bombing of North Vietnam.23 Ambassador

54  High National Council Taylor was instructed to inform the South Vietnamese government that the United States wished to see a stabilized political situation in the South so that the United States could implement the escalation of the war.24 The immediate reason of Ambassador Taylor’s reactions was his implementation of the instruction he received in Washington. Almost immediately after he came back to Saigon, Ambassador Taylor invited the young generals to have dinner with him at General Westmoreland’s house. General Westmoreland was head of MACV (Military Assistance Command – Vietnam). During the dinner, Ambassador Taylor told the young generals very clearly that it would be very difficult for the United States to continue its support for Vietnam if the chaotic political situation continued.25 The dissolution of the HNC by the young generals leading to a more chaotic political situation for South Vietnam was like a slap to Ambassador Taylor’s face. Enraged, he summoned the generals to his house to discuss the dissolution of the HNC in the morning of December 20, 1964. General Khanh refused to come and sent four generals to meet with Taylor: Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Nguyễn Chánh Thi, and Chung Tấn Cang. The Ambassador’s words and gesture at this meeting, of course, were not polite and hurt the young generals’ feelings very much.26,27,28,29 The next day, Ambassador Taylor came to see General Khánh in his office, trying to get from Khánh clarifications for the generals’ decision to dissolve the HNC. The exchange between the two of them was, of course, not smooth either. To please the young generals, General Khánh convened the AFC to discuss these nondiplomatic actions by Ambassador Taylor. It was unanimously decided to send a request to Chief of State Sửu and Prime Minister Hương demanding the expulsion of Ambassador Taylor.30 General Khánh also held a news conference denouncing Ambassador Taylor’s interventions into the internal affairs of South Vietnam. The relations between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam became strained. The US State Department declared that the expulsion of Ambassador Taylor would result in the cease of US aid to South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor also put a hold on items of US military aid already approved. Thanks to the clever negotiations by Prime Minister Hương, this diplomatic crisis was successfully resolved. On January 9, 1965, the Hương government and the AFC issued a joint- communique ending this political crisis. The next day, January 10, 1965, the 6 HNC members and 14 politicians and students incarcerated were set free in Kontum.31

Conclusion The HNC’s existence lasted just over three months, from September 8 to December 19, 1964. During this short period of time, and within very difficult conditions, the HNC succeeded in its drafting of the Provisional Charter, and, based on the Charter, in the implementation of a civilian government for South Vietnam. This was a high mark for the HNC. The sudden death of the HNC was an absolutely illegal action by the ambitious young generals,

High National Council  55 almost like a traitorous rebellion by them. The passivity of the two top civilian leaders, Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu and Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương, categorically accepting this illegal action, paved the way for the generals to go farther in their action plan with more serious consequences. The immediate consequence was the serious diplomatic crisis with the United States, which almost resulted in ceasing US aid. The next consequence was the removal of Prime Minister Hương from power on January 27, 1965, and putting him under house arrest in Vũng Tàu for a long time.

Notes 1 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 405. Membership of the High National Council included the 16 following individuals: Phan Khắc Sửu, Lê Văn Thu, Nguyễn Văn Huyền, Trần Đình Nam, Trần Văn Văn, Trần Văn Quế, Nguyễn Văn Lực, Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, Hồ Văn Nhựt, Mai Thọ Truyền, Ngô Gia Hy, Lê Khắc Quyến, Tôn Thất Hanh, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Đình Luyện, and Hồ Đắc Thắng. Đoàn Thêm’s book missed one member: Trần Quang Vinh. The correct total number of members was 17. 2 “SNIE 53-2-64: the situation in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 1Oct-1964, declassified 4-Nov-1975, 12 p. Since our estimate of September 8, 1964, the situation in South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate. … It is possible that the civilian government promised for the end of October could improve GVN esprit and effectiveness, but on the basis of present indications, this is unlikely. … Khanh’s authority, already weakened by the Buddhist-student crisis in August, has been further diminished, and the degree of his support within the military establishment is increasingly in question. 3 “Agreement between Nguyen Khanh and the “Young Turks” to join together to solve the political problems of the colony [sic],” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 1- Oct1964, declassified 24-Sep-1985, 5 p. 4 Đoàn Thêm, Hai m ươi n ăm qua, op. cit., 412. 5 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 400. 6 Đoàn Thêm, Hai m ươi n ăm qua, op. cit., 410, 413. 7 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 415. 8 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 416. 9 “Formation of provisional government discussed,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 20- Oct-1964, declassified 30-Nov-1984, 2 p. “Thus, we have made every effort to get the Council back to our preferred formula: Minh a ceremonial Head of State, Khanh the Commander-In- Chief and perhaps Minister of Defense and a civilian Prime Minister with strong executive powers.” 10 “Progress in moving toward a civilian government outlined,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 27- Oct-1964, declassified 30-Nov-1984, 3 p. We are not too happy over the choice of Suu who was slipped in ahead of Minh at the last minute by pressure on the High National Council by a delegation composed of Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai leaders. 11 “Political situation in South Vietnam: High National Council approval of the appointment and program of Premier- designate Huong,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 2-Nov-1964, declassified 8-Nov-1977, 4 p. “Huong reportedly was approved by a vote of 11 of the now 16- member Council, with one blank ballot and four members not present.”

56  High National Council













High National Council  57

7

The Buddhists and Trần Văn Hương government

Figure 7.1 Trần Văn Hương cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on January 21, 1965 after the reshuffle of January 18, 1965.

Formation of Trần Văn Hương government The Trần Văn Hương cabinet was installed on November 4, 1964, with the following membership:1 Prime Minister and Minister of Armed Forces First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Second Deputy Prime Minister and Governor of National Bank Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Trần Văn Hương Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Oánh Mr. Phạm Đăng Lâm

Trần Văn Hương government  59 Minister of Justice Minister of Information Minister of Economy Minister of Finance Minister of Rural Development Minister of Public Works Minister of Culture and Education Minister of Health Minister of Social Affairs Minister of Labor Minister at the Prime Minister Office

Mr. Lữ Văn Vi Mr. Lê Văn Tuấn Dr. Nguyễn Duy Xuân Mr. Lưu Văn Tính Mr. Ngô Ngọc Đối Mr. Lê Sĩ Ngạc Lawyer Phan Tấn Chức Dr. Trần Quang Diệu Mr. Đàm Sĩ Hiến Mr. Nguyễn Hữu Hùng Mr. Phạm Văn Toàn

A large majority of the ministers were specialists without any affiliation with political parties and without government experience; some of them were even totally not nationally well-known. The main reason for this characteristic of the cabinet was the difficulty that Prime Minister Hương was facing when he invited the notables and politicians to join his cabinet. Most of them refused to join the cabinet because they did not believe that this government could last long in front of too many difficult problems. At the last moment, two individuals, who had accepted to head two important ministries, withdrew under Buddhist pressure. The US Embassy had been informed that the Buddhists were not happy with the Trần Văn Hương government and were planning to sabotage it.2

The Buddhist opposition Formed in extremely difficult political conditions as presented in the previous chapters, the Trần Văn Hương government also had to face with an internal crisis suffered by the HNC. Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, Acting Chairman of the HNC, resigned with his objection to the formation of the Hương government, whose membership he believed did not reflect the aspiration of South Vietnamese political parties.3 The HNC sent a memo to Prime Minister Hương to ask for clarifications for a number of issues. These two events caused the opposition to the Hương government to explode. Saigon students met, discussed, and reached the conclusion that Prime Minister Hương had to make changes to his cabinet. The government reacted by ordering the Ministry of Information to issue a statement that the cabinet would neither resign nor change. The students met again and denounced the government to be composed of only too old specialists under the influence of the Tinh Thần group (Catholics). On November 13, 1964, Prime Minister Hương answered the questions sent to him by the HNC and declared that “Phải tái lập uy quyền quốc gia, tách rời chính trị khỏi tôn giáo, đưa tôn giáo ra khỏi chính trị (national authority should be re- established, politics and religion should be separated, religion should be taken out of politics).”4 This position by Prime Minister Hương should be correct theoretically but was a huge political mistake within the political conditions of South Vietnam at this point in time. The Buddhists, as presented in Chapter 5, had

60 Trần Văn Hương government become a very important political force, having broad base support within the population (through the students, which were the most enthusiastic, the most idealistic and also the most easily excited element), that the government could not ignore, not to mention Prime Minister’s Hương intention to eliminate them from the South Vietnamese political stage. The declaration by Prime Minister Hương, therefore, immediately brought the two following serious consequences: (1) The Buddhists now openly opposed the Hương government; (2) the HNC, under pressure from the Buddhists and the students, decided to create a special committee for its investigation of the Hương cabinet membership. The students then came to meet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu and asked for the dissolution of the Hương government. A group of politicians met with the students at the Chi Lăng swimming pool to criticize the government. On November 22, 1964, several big demonstrations occurred at many different locations in Saigon with banners criticizing the Hương government harshly. Anti-r iot police units were sent to break up these demonstrations with lachrymose grenades; several demonstrators were injured and a number of them were arrested. Two days later, Right-Venerable Thích Tâm Châu sent a memo to Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu, asking him to put an end to the crisis (i.e. dissolving the Hương government). Prime Minister Hương still held on to his position, declaring “no backing off, all measures taken to re- establish order.” At the same time, he also sent a memo to the HNC to object the council’s decision to investigate his cabinet membership. His action showed very clearly his character: he was a courageous politician, refusing to surrender under pressure, but lacking flexibility for compromise, a necessity in politics. The opposition movement against his government, therefore, spread more widely and caused more problems to him and his government. On December 13, 1964, rumors were circulating that the Supreme Monk, Right-Venerable Thích Tịnh Khiết, together with Right-Venerables Thích Tâm Châu and Thích Trí Quang had begun their 48-hour self-starvations. Two days later, Mr. Phan Tấn Chức resigned from his position as Minister of Culture and Education. Professor Nguyễn Văn Trường was chosen as his replacement. The confrontation between the Hương government and the opposition movement reached an impasse because neither side wanted to make concessions.

Reshuffle of the Hương cabinet After the dissolution of the HNC, as presented in Chapter 6, Prime Minister Hương realized the importance of the young generals within the AFC. He decided to reshuffle his cabinet with the participation of four generals. On January 18, 1965, his cabinet was installed with the following membership5: Prime Minister First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior

Mr. Trần Văn Hương Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên

Trần Văn Hương government  61 Second Deputy Prime Minister Third Deputy Prime Minister Minister of Armed Forces Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Justice Minister of Political Warfare Minister of Economy Minister of Finance Minister of Rural Development Minister of Public Works and Transportation Minister of Culture and Education Minister of Health Minister of Social Affairs Minister of Labor Minister of Youth and Sports Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office

Lt.-General ­ Nguyễn Văn Thiệu Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Oánh Lt.-General ­ Trần Văn Minh Mr. Phạm Đăng Lâm Mr. Lữ Văn Vi Maj.- General Linh Quang Viên Dr. Nguyễn Duy Xuân Mr. Huỳnh Văn Đạo Mr. Ngô Ngọc Đối Mr. Lê Sĩ Ngạc Prof. Nguyễn Văn Trường Dr. Trần Quang Diệu Mr. Đàm Sĩ Hiến Mr. Nguyễn Hữu Hùng Maj.-General ­ Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Mr. Phạm Văn Toàn

The inaugural ceremony in front of Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu, scheduled for January 19, 1965, was called off because the four generals did not come. Finally, on January 21, 1965, the new Hương cabinet was presented to Chief of State Sửu at the Gia Long Palace. The Buddhists continued to oppose the Hương government. The RightVenerable Thích Trí Quang now had a plan to overthrow the Huong government.6 An anti-government demonstration was organized in front of the Dharma Institute; police were sent to disperse it, the violent confrontation occurred, 6 policemen and 10 demonstrators were injured, 30 persons were arrested. The Right-Venerables Thích Tâm Châu, Thích Trí Quang, Thích Pháp Tri, Thích Thiện Hoa, and Thích Hộ Giác began their self-starvations. Several demonstrations, and self-starvations were carried out in different locations, in particular in Nha Trang where, on January 23, 1965, 300 female monks were involved in a mass self-starvation. On January 24, 1965, the AFC met without inviting General Khanh; it had two discussion sessions on the on-going political crisis and decided to continue to support the Hương government.7 Meanwhile, General Khánh had other thoughts. On the one hand, he realized that he could no longer have the support of the US Embassy after the incident with Ambassador Taylor. On the other hand, he also recognized that the young generals in the AFC were becoming stronger and more independent. Thus, for him, in order to hold on to power, he had no other options than seeking assistance from the Buddhists. He contacted Thích Trí Quang and planned to carry out his plot to overthrow the Hương government.8 On January 24, 1965, he convened the AFC. After three days of discussions, the AFC’s decisions were to designate General Khánh to solve the current political crisis; to convene immediately a Civilian-Military Council including 20 members representing the religious factions, the political spectrum, and the military; the future government to organize the elections for the National

62 Trần Văn Hương government Assembly… Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu to remain in position, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Oánh to be designated Acting Prime Minister.9 Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương was put under house arrest in Vũng Tàu. The Trần Văn Hương government ceased to exist. The Dharma Institute issued a communiqué calling all Buddhists to stop all anti-government activities, and all Buddhist leaders put an end to their self-starvations.

Conclusion The Trần Văn Hương government lasted only less than three months (from November 4, 1964 to January 27, 1965) in the most chaotic period of the Republic of Vietnam’s political stage. Although having good reputation with the general population, Prime Minister Hương did not have any political affiliation and, therefore, did not have support from any political parties. He faced with numerous difficulties in forming his cabinet. He also lacked the flexibility for political compromise, and especially he refused to yield under pressure. His government was victimized by General Khánh’s personal ambition within the struggle between the Buddhists and the military. General Khánh, with the support from the AFC comprising mostly of young generals promoted by him, as well as with the compromise with the Buddhists, succeeded in the overthrow of the Hương government. But this success was a Pyrrhic victory because, as presented in Chapter 4, less than a month later, and just one day after Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo’s failed coup attempt on February 19, 1965, the AFC removed General Khánh from his position of Commander-In-Chief. On February 25, 1965, he was forced to leave Vietnam and ended for good his short period of time in power in the Republic of Vietnam.

Notes 1 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 414. 2 “General Taylor reports on 3 noteworthy events,” DDRS, cable from Ambassador Taylor to State Dept., dated 4-Nov-1964, declassified 30-Nov-1984, 3 p.; …as of yesterday afternoon, he thought that he had completed his slate only to have two key members defect at the last minute, apparently because of Buddhist pressures. We had been hearing for the last few days that the Buddhist leaders were grumbling about Huong and might try to sabotage his government. 3 “Nguyen Xuan Chu, President of Vietnamese High Council, resigns over formation of cabinet,” DDRS, cable from US Embassy in Saigon to State Dept., dated 5-Nov-1964, ­ ­ declassified 28-Aug-1979, ­ ­ 2 p. He mentions having stressed importance and necessity of participation of political parties in formation of government to Suu on November 3. Now having seen composition of cabinet Chu contends that it will not rpt not be

Trần Văn Hương government  63 able to rally people’s confidence because it does not rpt not attach enough importance to political parties. 4 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 850. 5 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 17. 6 “Thich Tri Quang’s campaign to bring down the Tran Van Huong government,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 21-Jan-1965, declassified 12-Dec-1975; … Quang thinks that Chief of State Phan Khac Suu should name a new High National Council (HNC) which could dissolve the Huong government. Then Suu, with the support of the HNC and of the Buddhists could name a new Premier. Quang claims to have discussed this plan with Suu. He claims his plan has the backing of Buddhist students in Hue, of I Corps Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi and of Air Vice Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky. Quang said the Buddhists will continue their fight against Huong through the hunger strike of ranking Buddhist priests which started on 20 January. 7 “Deliberations of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces Council 1/24/65 resulting in military decision to back Tran Van Huong temporarily with the proviso that Huong must restore government stability,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 24-Jan1965, declassified 1984; A parallel proposal to remove Huong was made, since Huong is the target of the opposition to the government. The question was then raised as to who should replace Huong - a civilian or a military man. Generals Vinh Loc, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky spoke up for a military Prime Minister. Two officers were asked to take the job. Thieu, of the two, declined on grounds that he was Catholic and therefore unacceptable to the Buddhists. The second nominee, Nguyen Chanh Thi, at first said he was willing. Dong then asked Thi if Thi could form a civilian government. Thi said no, but he believed he could form one with military men. Dong argued that this was not feasible since there were not enough qualified military men available. It was at this point that Dong proposed that the AFC continue to support Huong… 8 “Alleged plotting of Nguyen Khanh with the Buddhists in order to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 8-Jan-1965, ­ ­ declassified 27-Sep-1976; ­ ­ Khanh then said that following the overthrow of the Huong government, the country would be without government for a while; during that period Khanh’s men would create disorders and the Buddhist Institute would also prepare lists of people who would be arrested including those opposed to Khanh, those opposed to the Buddhist Institute, and those who were pro-Americans. ­ 9 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 22.

8

Phan Huy Quát government and the cabinet crisis of May/ June 1965

Figure 8.1 Phan Huy Quát cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on February 16, 1965.

Formation of Phan Huy Quát government After the Trần Văn Hương government was dissolved on January 27, 1965, quite a few political maneuvers occurred1 with the final result being the formation of the Phan Huy Quát government on February 16, 1965, with the following membership2: Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces

Dr. Phan Huy Quát Lt.-General ­ Nguyễn Văn Thiệu

Phan Huy Quát government  65 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister Responsible for Planning Secretary of State Secretary of State and temporarily responsible for Ministry of Education Minister of Information and Psychological Warfare Minister of Open Arms Program Minister of Economy Minister of Finance Minister of Agriculture Minister of Transportation and Public Works Minister of Social Affairs Minister of Health Minister of Labor Minister of Youth Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office Deputy Minister of the Interior Deputy Minister of Transportation and Public Works

Dr. Trần Văn Đỗ Lawyer Trần Văn Tuyên Dr. Lê Văn Hoạch Dr. Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ Maj- General Linh Quang Viên Mr. Trần Văn Ân Prof. Nguyễn Văn Vinh Prof. Trần Văn Kiện Eng. Nguyễn Ngọc Tố Eng. Ngô Trọng Anh Prof. Trần Quang Thuận Dr. Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên Mr. Nguyễn Văn Hoàng Lt.- Colonel Dr. Nguyễn Tấn Hồng Mr. Bùi Diễm Mr. Nguyễn Văn Tương Eng. Bùi Hữu Tuấn

Dr. Quát was considered as successful in the formation of his cabinet because he “invited representatives from nearly all of South Vietnam’s feuding political, religious, and military factions into his cabinet.”3 However, since his government was born out of pressure from the Buddhists, it was meant to be unstable. Major- General Lê Nguyên Khang, Commander of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, an important member of the AFC, made known his impression after the meeting between the AFC and Dr. Quát on February 14, 1965, and it was reported in a CIA cable on February 15 as follows: Khang felt that Quát had selected good men for his cabinet, but felt that the Quát government might run into opposition from the Southerners since most of the important posts had gone to men from the North and Center. Khang expected the Quát government to last at least three months, but said that it would eventually be toppled.4 The instability of the Quát government was clearly shown right in its first week. The military coup led by Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo (Catholic) happened on February 19, 1965, only three days after the formation of this government. Although this coup attempt was unsuccessful (and resulting in the ousted of General Khánh by the young generals as discussed in Chapter 4), it really revealed the precariousness of the Quát government. One week after that, Minister of Labor Nguyễn Văn Hoàng resigned from the cabinet on February 25, 1965.5

66  Phan Huy Quát government

Establishment of the National Legislative Council One day after the Phan Huy Quát government was installed in front of Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu, the AFC established the National Legislative Council (NLC) with the following membership6: Lawyer Nguyễn Huy Chiểu Dr. Phạm Hữu Chương Lt.-General ­ Phạm Xuân Chiểu Rear-Admiral Chung Tấn Cang Major Đỗ Đăng Công Prof. Cao Hữu Đính Prof. Nguyễn Lương Hưng Dr. Phạm Văn Hạt Prof. Bùi Hữu Tuấn Mr. Trình Quốc Khánh Colonel Đoàn Chí Khoang Prof. Phan Khoang Mr. Nguyễn Long, a.k.a. Thành Nam Colonel Bùi Văn Mạnh Mr. Huỳnh Văn Nhiệm Major Nguyễn Phúc Quế Lawyer Nguyễn Lâm Sanh Mr. Nguyễn Văn Thanh Mr. Nguyễn Trân Mr. Trần Quang Vinh The NLC was created to replace the HNC that was dissolved on December 20, 1964, with the mandate to discuss and propose future political institutions for the Republic of Vietnam. The NLC elected Lt.-General Phạm Xuân Chiểu as its Chairman. Looking at its membership, one could tell that the NLC did not have the political weight of its predecessor. That was why it would not be able to resolve the cabinet crisis of the Quát government in the near future.

US Marines landing in Đà Nẵng In the morning of March 8, 1965, two US Marines battalions, totaling about 1,500 soldiers, landed in Đà Nẵng, Central Vietnam. This event was very important because this was the first time that US combat troops were introduced into the Republic of Vietnam. The US–Vietnam joint communiqué announced that the responsibilities of the two Marines battalions were for the security of the Đà Nẵng airbase. Author Bùi Diễm, Minister of Prime Minister’s Office at that time, reported, in his memoirs In the jaws of history (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), that although there

Phan Huy Quát government  67 had been some general discussions regarding the introduction of US combat ground forces into South Vietnam, this event was still a big surprise for Prime Minister Quát. Recently declassified US documents have shown that this event was anything but surprise.7,8,9

Dissolution of the Armed Forces Council Right from the first day of his government, one of Prime Minister Quát’s foremost concerns was to deal with the military establishment. He was not unaware of their political ambition and he considered them a threat to his government. Having served previously as Minister of Defense in the Nguyễn Phan Long government (from January 22, 1950 to May 6, 1950), he had experience as well as skills to deal with the generals. Like other political leaders of that period, he had seen the damaging impact of the successive military coups during the past two years and the more and more dominant role of the AFC. During the time they were dealing with Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo’s coup of February 19, 1965, and especially after they ousted General Nguyễn Khánh, the power and influence of the young generals, in particular MajorGeneral Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps, were increasing day by day. Lieutenant- General Trần Văn Minh, newly appointed CommanderIn-Chief to replace the ousted General Nguyễn Khánh, complained a lot about abusing statements and actions committed by General Thi during the time he was self-proclaimed Commander of the Forces for the Liberation of the Capital City, dealing with Colonel Thảo’s coup. General Minh suggested that the American Ambassador instruct the American senior advisors to talk the South Vietnamese generals into accepting the dissolution of the AFC. General Minh believed that the majority of the South Vietnamese generals would agree to do that. He also believed that if appropriate prearrangements were made he would be able, as Commander-In-Chief, to call a special meeting of the AFC to discuss this issue.10 Based on this suggestion from General Minh, both Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Alexis Johnson were actively sounding out the South Vietnamese generals on the issue. From early May 1965, Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát and Minister at the Prime Minister Office Bùi Diễm met, discussed, and persuaded the generals to accept to dissolve the AFC.11 On May 6, 1965, a ceremony was organized at the Prime Minister’s Office to mark the dissolution of the AFC.12

Coup attempt of May 20, 1965 On May 21, 1965, the Prime Minister’s Office announced that the security agency had arrested about 40 peoples the previous night for their involvement in a coup attempt. According to a CIA document, OCI No. 0621/65, reporting on the situation in South Vietnam for the week from May ­ 20–26, 1965,13 details of this coup attempt were not clear. According to the

68  Phan Huy Quát government government’s announcement, the leader of this coup plot was again Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo and the objective of the coup was to assassinate Prime Minister Quát and a number of individuals in the Armed Forces. On May 23, 1965, a new government announcement informed that Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát met with the generals to review the general situation after the coup attempt of 20 May 1965; a resolution was passed to perform some cleanup of the civil and military ranks in order to strengthen the base for the national fight.14 The announcement also put an emphasis on the involvement of Communist elements in the coup attempt but did not provide any concrete evidence. According to the CIA document, it appeared that this emphasis was aimed at reassuring the Catholics that the arrests following the coup attempt were not directed at them.

The cabinet crisis Direct cause of the crisis On May 25, 1965, Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat reshuffled his cabinet and recommended the following changes: • • • • •

Mr. Trần Văn Thoàn replacing Mr. Nguyễn Hòa Hiệp as Minister of the Interior Mr. Nguyễn Trung Trinh replacing Mr. Nguyễn Văn Vinh as Minister of Economy Mr. Đinh Trịnh Chính as Minister of Information Mr. Lâm Văn Trí as Minister of Land Reform Mr. Trần Thanh Hiệp as Minister of Labor

At the ceremony for the installation of the new cabinet members before the NLC, Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu refused to sign the decree nominating Mr. Trần Văn Thoàn as Minister of the Interior and Mr Nguyển Trung Trinh as Minister of Economy because the incumbent ministers had not resigned.15 Indirect causes of the crisis From the political events that happened before the cabinet crisis, one could tell that the reason cited by Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu for his decision was only a pretext. In reality, the Phan Huy Quát government did not receive the full and complete support from the various political groups, especially the Catholics and the Southerners. Everyone knew that the Quát government was brought into existence by the pressure from the Buddhists. Both recent

Phan Huy Quát government  69 military coups were led by Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, a Catholic. Minister of Economy Nguyễn Văn Vinh, dismissed by Prime Minister Quát, was also a Catholic. Prime Minister Quat himself was a Buddhist from the North and most important ministries of his cabinet were given to individuals from the North and Central Vietnam. This made the Southerners unhappy and Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu was a Southerner. The post- coup military and political personnel re-appointments created more suspicions about the Quát government’s intentions. On a personal level, Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu was not happy with the stillborn Nguyển Lưu Viên cabinet, which he had supported, as well as the disrespect that Prime Minister Quát had shown toward the office of Chief of State. He had been notified of the changes in the cabinet by Prime Minister Quát only 15 minutes before the installation ceremony.16 A top secret document of the US State Department revealed that Prime Minister Quát had been able to persuade Minister Nguyễn Văn Vinh to sign his letter of resignation but he was then persuaded by Chief of State Sửu to back down.17 Reactions of the Quát government The first reaction of the Quát government was to ask Chief of State Sửu to reconsider his decision, citing some clauses in the Provisional Charter promulgated on October 20, 1964, which laid the foundation for the current government structure of the Republic of Vietnam. Prime Minister Quát and Minister Bùi Diễm believed that the key clauses in Articles 11, 32, and 33 of the Provisional Charter implicitly gave the Prime Minister the power to nominate replacements for positions in the cabinet.18 As Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu refused to reconsider his decision, the government decided to seek interpretation of the Provisional Charter from the NLC. The majority of the NLC members and its Chairman, Lt.-General Phạm Xuân Chiểu agreed with the position taken by the government. On May 27, 1965, the NLC held a press conference and General Chiểu stated that making changes of cabinet was within the authority of the Prime Minister. He also revealed that the HNC, the NLC’s predecessor, also held a similar position. He recounted a press conference in October 1964 presided over by Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu, Chairman of the HNC at that time. At that press conference, Mr Sửu himself had stated that, since the Prime Minister had the authority to nominate or dismiss ministers, ministers should be appointed or dismissed upon proposals from the Prime Minister.19 Although supporting the Quát government in principle, General Chiểu and the NLC still lent itself to a compromise reached between Chief of State Sửu and Prime Minister Quát, rather than a binding resolution from the NLC. This was a clear proof of the NLC’s weakness. It does not have enough determination to carry out its responsibilities. For Chief of State Sửu, he said that his statement at a press conference should not be considered as having binding legal force.

70  Phan Huy Quát government External pressures from political groups In the late afternoon of May 27, 1965, a delegation from the Catholic Great Unity Forces led by Fathers Hoàng Quỳnh and Mai Ngọc Khuê came to Gia Long Palace to seek an audience with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu. After the meeting with the Chief of State, they went to submit to the NLC a petition asking for the dismissal of the Quát government, citing several reasons.20 On May 28, 1965, both Mr. Nguyễn Hòa Hiệp and Mr. Nguyễn Văn Vinh decided not to resign with the reason that they had to wait for Deputy Prime Minister Trần Văn Tuyên – at that time on a diplomatic mission in Africa – to come back so that they could discuss the issue within the Quốc Dân Đảng Party. On May 31, 1965, a delegation from the General Association of Sài Gòn Students submitted a petition to Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu, in which they stated that they would not accept cabinet members who used to hold foreign citizenship (referring to Mr. Nguyễn Trung Trinh, Minister- designate for Economy). In early June 1965, several other religious and political delegations continued to submit petitions to the Chief of State. Most petitions were against the Quát government; only a few of them supported the Quát government. Many demonstrations were held by the Catholics and the students in front of Gia Long Palace, the Chief of State’s residence, calling for a resolution of the cabinet crisis and a stabilization of the political situation. Result of the cabinet crisis On June 9, 1965, Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát held a press conference, giving explanations of the cabinet crisis, presenting the government fruitless efforts to solve the crisis, and informing that he already asked the generals to act as intermediaries in the conflict resolution. Two days later, June 11, 1965, the generals met all day at the Prime Minister’s Office with individuals from the two parties, seeking a resolution for this cabinet crisis. Mr. Bùi Diễm recounted in his memoirs as follows: The impasse was ended at a marathon meeting held on June 11 in the prime minister’s office. Everybody was squeezed into one room: forty or fifty generals, Quát and his backers, Sửu and his. Quát made a last, token attempt to appoint the two new ministers, but the generals insisted that the deadlock be broken then and there. They would not, they said, stand by while the government remained paralyzed. Quát knew that this was coming, and in the middle of the shouting he announced that he would voluntarily step down and dissolve the government. This he did, pulling Sửu down with him and clearing the stage for the generals to come in with their own regime. In short order two military committees

Phan Huy Quát government  71 were up and running: the National Leadership Committee with General Nguyen Van Thieu as chairman and chief of state, and the Central Executive Committee with Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky as chairman and prime minister. It was a bitter way to end South Vietnam’s final experiment in civilian government.21 On June 14, 1965, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam created two committees: (1) the National Leadership Committee with LieutenantGeneral Nguyễn Văn Thiệu as Chairman, assuming the function of Chief of State; and (2) the Central Executive Committee with Major- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as Chairman, assuming the function of Prime Minister. On June 16, 1965, the Central Executive Committee, or Nguyễn Cao Kỳ government, or the War Cabinet, was officially introduced, marking the beginning of direct military government, which lasted more than two years until the Second Republic was formed in November 1967.

Conclusion The cabinet crisis of the Phan Huy Quát government was caused by a very minor legalistic point but led to very serious consequences. First, it put an end to a promising period of civil government under the most competent Prime Minister with strong background and experience in government affairs and with a cabinet representing all religious, political, and military groups of South Vietnam. Second, it gave the power back to the military establishment, paving the way for the American escalation of the Vietnam War.

Notes 1 Lâm Vĩnh Thế. “Một nội các chết non của V.N.C.H.” (A stillborn government of the Republic of Vietnam), in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Republic of Vietnam). (Hamilton: Hoài Việt, 2008), 118–129. During this period of political maneuvering, Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Deputy Prime Minister under the recently dissolved Trần Văn Hương government, was invited by the AFC to form a new government. This was never materialized because Dr. Viên refused to offer Major- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi the position of Minister of the Interior as required by the Buddhists. 2 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 33–34. 3 Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: a history. (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 385. 4 “General Le Nguyen Khang’s review of the meeting of AFC executive session on 14 February and the discussion of Phan Huy Quat’s cabinet,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1975, microfiche 46B, CIA cable, no. TDCS314/02012- 65, dated 15-Feb-1965, declassified 8-Dec-1975, 6 p. 5 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 38. 6 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 34–35. 7 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 131. Bùi Diễm wrote:

72  Phan Huy Quát government Early on the morning of March 8 I received a phone call from Dr. Quat, asking me in a strained voice to come to his house immediately, something urgent had come up. When I arrived, I found Melvin Manfull already there. The American diplomat looked all business, but Quat was obviously nervous. Without asking me to sit down, Quat said the marines were at that moment coming ashore at Danang to take up defensive positions around the base. Manfull and I were to write a joint communiqué announcing the landing. “Be as brief as possible.” Quat told me. “Just describe the facts and affirm our concurrence.” The news itself was not an overwhelming surprise, because in the back of my mind I knew that Westmoreland would soon be pushing for something like this. But the abruptness of the thing and the lack of preparation for it were upsetting, to say the least. 8 Lâm Vĩnh Thế. “Thủy quân lục chiến Hoa Kỳ đổ bộ vào Đà Nẵng ngày 8 tháng 3 năm 1965,” (US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965), in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Republic of Vietnam), op. cit., 153–176. In this paper, the author found that, in reality, the government of South Vietnam was fully informed of the imminent US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965. US Embassy in Saigon sent to the State Department Cable no. 2798, dated 1Mar-1965, telling in detail the meeting between Ambassador Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Johnson with Prime Minister Quat about the coming landing in Danang of the two US Marines battalions. Another Cable, no. 2810, dated 2Mar-1965, also from Ambassador Taylor to the State Department, gave account of the meeting of General Westmoreland with Generals Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces, and General Trần Văn Minh, Commander-i n-Chief of the Armed Forces, and of General Westmoreland’s intention to go to Danang the next day to inform General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps, about the landing of the two US Marines battalions. 9 Lâm Vĩnh Thế, “Tìm hiểu thêm về việc Thủy Quân Lục Chiến Hoa Kỳ đổ bộ vào Đà Nẵng ngày 8-3-1965,” (Further research study on US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965), online article accessible full-text in Website Nam Kỳ Lục Tỉnh (Six Provinces of Cochinchina) at this URL: https://sites.google.com/ site/namkyluctinhorg/tac-gia-tac-pham/i-j-k-l-m/lam-vinh-the/tim-hieu-them­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ve-viec-thuy-quan-luc-chien-hoa-ky-do-bo-vao-dha-nang-ngay-8-3-1965. ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ This research study included photos published in Life Magazine showing Vietnamese school girls, with garlands of flowers, on the beach to welcome the Marines. In another photo, Major- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps, was standing by Brigadier- General Frederick J. Karch, Commander of the US Marines brigade. 10 “General Tran Van Minh’s concern over General Nguyen Chanh Thi’s uncoordinated actions taken in name of AFC,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1975, microfiche no. 48D, CIA cable, No. TDCS DB-315/00654-65, dated 23-Feb-1965, ­ ­ declassified 24-Dec-1975, ­ ­ 3 p. … Thi has issued notices and taken actions during the past several days in the name of the AFC even though for the past two days there have been no meetings of the AFC. Minh said he should be heir to the post of Chairman of the AFC, but Thi has declared that he will handle the talks and responsibilities of Chairman on a unofficial basis and for an undetermined period. … Minh said that Thi is preparing a list of military personnel changes which Thi insists will be implemented. It is not known exactly what these changes will be. The changes would bring strong Thi supporters into command positions. …

Phan Huy Quát government  73 Minh recommended … the US Ambassador should advise senior military advisers to counsel AFC members that the AFC should be dissolved. Minh is certain that the majority of the generals are in accord with this step, but they need the support and encouragement of US personnel. Minh is confident that if the proper groundwork can be laid, he could ask for an AFC meeting in his capacity as Commander in Chief for the purpose of discussing the dissolution… 11 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 145. 12 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 78. 13 “The situation in South Vietnam: 20 May – 26 May 1965,” DDRS, CIA weekly report, OCI No. 621/65, 17 p. On pp. 1–2, Details surrounding the coup attempt, reportedly nipped in the bud by police arrests on 20 May of some 40 persons in the Saigon area, are still obscure. The coup ringleader, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao— already under a death sentence for organizing the abortive coup of 19 February—has again eluded capture, suggesting that he may have well-placed protectors…. A government communique, issued on 23 May following a meeting between Quat and senior military officers, described the coup attempt as a Communist plot to exploit discontented elements. No evidence was cited, but government sources have stated privately that a Communist was picked up in the raids…. Some aspects of the government’s account of the coup plot are questionable, and it is probable that the Viet Cong role, in particular, is being stressed in order to reassure the suspicious Vietnamese Catholic community that the arrests are not directed at them. 14 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 84. 15 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 85. 16 “PM Quat’s presentation of the new cabinet ministers was accompanied by backstage maneuvering centering around Chief of State Phan Khac Suu,” DDRS, cable no. 3884, from Saigon US Embassy to State Dept., dated 25-May-1965, declassified 14-June-1979, 2 p. On p. 1, “According Secstate at Presidency Bui Diem, Quat saw Suu privately for fifteen minutes before Quat appeared before NLC. At that time, Suu did not rpt not mention his reservations to Quat.” 17 “Prime Minister Quat informs Alex Johnson, General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor of reaction of pressure groups to presentation of Quat’s new cabinet,” DDRS, cable no. 3981, from Saigon US Embassy to State Dept., dated 28-May-1965, declassified 24-Feb-1987, 3 p. On p. 2: “Quat will try again to persuade ministers Vinh and Hiep to submit their resignations. Vinh at one time was agreeable to doing so but was dissuaded by Suu.” 18 “PM Quat’s presentation…” DDRS, cable no. 3884, op. cit. On pp.1–2: Explicit ref to matter occur in Article 11 key clauses of which state (informal translation from French text): “President of govt (i.e. PriMin) proposes to Chief of State nomination of vice presidents, ministers, and secretaries of state.“ “Chief of State puts an end to function of president of govt and of members of govt in case where their offer of resignation is accepted by National Congress or in cases envisioned in Article 32 and 33 below.” On p. 2, “Applicable portion of Article 32 reads as follows: “National Congress can, by majority of two thirds of its total membership, vote motion of censure against one or of several ministers or secretaries of state. Minister or secretary having been made object of motion of censure is considered “ipso facto” as having resigned.” Article 33 refers to right of PriMin to pose questions of confidence.

74  Phan Huy Quát government

9

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government The War Cabinet

After the meeting of June 11, 1965, at the Prime Minister Office, a Joint Proclamation by the Chief of State, the Chairman of the NLC and the Prime Minister was issued with the following [translated into English] text1: After having considered the more and more urgent situation of the country; after having considered and determined that: the national structures and institutions are no longer appropriate for the current situation; after having consulted with all the generals of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam at the Prime Minister Office on June 11, 1965, we, the Chief of State of the Republic of Vietnam, the National Legislative Council, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, unanimously decided to solemnly return to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam the responsibility and the leadership that the Armed Forces Council had delegated to us according to the Resolution no. 8 of May 5, 1965, Proclamation no. 7 of May 5, 1965, Resolution no. 5 of February 16, 1965, Resolution no. 6 of February 17, 1965, and Resolution no. 4 of February 16, 1965. We appeal the whole nation, regardless of social classes, of regional differences, of political affiliations, and of religious faith, to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam in their leadership for the whole Armed Forces and the whole Nation according to the spirit of the Revolution of November 1, 1963. Created in Saigon on June 11, 1965 Phan Khắc Sửu, Chief of State, Republic of Vietnam Phan Huy Quát, Prime Minister, Government of Republic of Vietnam Phạm Xuân Chiểu, Chairman, National Legislative Council Three days later, June 14, 1965, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (from now on, referred to in acronym as ARVN), proclaimed Resolution no. 3 with the following [translated into English] text2: •

After having studied the Joint Proclamation by the Chief of State, the Chairman of the NLC and the Prime Minister of June 11, 1965, in which the responsibility and the leadership for the whole nation was solemnly returned to the ARVN.

76 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government •

Based on the proceedings of the Grand Convention of all the generals of the ARVN on June 12, 1965.

The Generals of the ARVN, and all Commanders of all Military Corps and Units unanimously decided: RESOLUTION ARTICLE 1. – To create a steering committee called “NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE” ARTICLE 2. – Membership of the above-mentioned committee includes: One Chairman, One Secretary-General, One Commissioner Responsible for the Executive Branch, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, all Corps Commanders, and the Commander of the Capital Special Region. ARTICLE 3. – The “NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE,” on behalf of the ARVN, directs all national activities. ARTICLE 4. – Have absolute confidence and designate: A

Chairman of the “NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE”: Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ­ B Secretary-General: ­ Lieutenant-General Phạm Xuân Chiểu ­ C Commissioner Responsible for the Executive Branch: Major-General ­ Nguyễn Cao Kỳ D The remaining commissioners are the Generals holding the positions mentioned in ARTICLE 2. ARTICLE 5. – The “NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE” has the duty to establish all national institutions and structures and to create a War Cabinet. SAIGON, the 14th of June 1965 All Generals and Commanders of Military Corps and Units.

Creation of the War Cabinet On June 19, 1965, the Central Executive Committee (from now on, referred to in acronym as CEC) was presented to the National Leadership Committee (from now on referred to as the Directorate) with the following membership3: • • • •

Chairman: Major- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ General Commissioner for Foreign Relations: Dr. Trần Văn Đỗ General Commissioner for Justice: Lawyer Lữ Văn Vi General Commissioner for War and Commissioner for Defense: MajorGeneral Nguyễn Hữu Có (later promoted to Lieutenant-General on November 1, 1965)

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 77 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

General Commissioner for Economy and Finance: Eng. Trương Thái Tôn General Commissioner for Cultural and Social Affairs and Commissioner for Education: Dr. Trần Ngọc Ninh Commissioner for the Interior: Judge Trần Minh Tiết Commissioner for Psychological Warfare: Lawyer Đinh Trình Chính Commissioner for Rural Construction: Mr. Nguyễn Tất Ứng Commissioner for Youth: Lieutenant- Colonel Dr. Nguyễn Tấn Hồng Commissioner for Finance: Prof. Trần Văn Kiện Commissioner for Agriculture: Eng. Lâm Văn Trí Commissioner for Transportation and Public Works: Eng. Ngô Trọng Anh Commissioner for Health: Dr. Nguyễn Bá Khả Commissioner for Labor: Mr. Nguyễn Xuân Phong Commissioner for Social Affairs: Lawyer Trần Ngọc Liểng Deputy Commissioner for the Interior: Prof. Nguyễn Văn Tương Deputy Commissioner for Transportation and Public Works: Eng. Bùi Hữu Tuấn

The Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government presented a 26-point action plan that includes actions in the four following directions4: • • • •

Five actions in War and Politics Ten actions in Economy and Finance Seven actions in Social, Educational, and Cultural Affairs Four actions in Foreign Affairs

The objectives of this 26-point program are: to achieve 3 urgent goals: Reorganizing the governing mechanism so that it is appropriate for the time of war; Strengthening the homefront; and, Keeping control of all battlefronts. These three urgent duties need to be achieved in order to create favorable conditions for the long-term duty of social reform.5 In the inaugurating ceremony, the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government made all possible efforts to create the image of a revolutionary government, totally different from the previous ones. From the appellation of “Commissioner” for cabinet members to the fact that all commissioners wore short-sleeve shirts without neck ties, as well as the speech read at the ceremony being called “Report on Situation and Duties,” all were intentionally orchestrated to create that image. In addition to the image of a revolutionary government, the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government also wanted to be seen by the people as a government in war time, i.e. a War Cabinet. In the 26-point program of the government, there were clearly many points concerning the improvement of the conduct of the war, both on the homefront and the battlefront.

78 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government We have to recognize that, compared to previous governments, the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government, with its Report on Situation and Duties, had an accurate and courageous view of the grave situation of the country and from this has put in a comprehensive action plan to cope with that situation. The important thing was that whether this government had the determination and the ability to carry out such a program. Before looking into how this government implemented its program, let us take a look at the person who directed this War Cabinet.

Biographical sketch of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Major-General ­ Nguyễn Cao Kỳ was born on October 8, 1930, in Sơn Tây, North Vietnam.6 He was drafted and attended the officer-training school in Nam Định in 1951. Graduated as a second-lieutenant, he commanded a platoon of the Vietnamese 2nd Battalion in the region of Hải Dương and Hưng Yên.7 In 1953 he was transferred to the newly created Vietnamese Air Force and was sent to attend the pilot school in Marrakech, Morocco, in North Africa, a French colony. He was promoted to first-lieutenant on February 1, 1954. After his training in Marrakech, he returned to Vietnam at the end of 1954 and was promoted to the rank of temporary captain on June 20, 1955, and regular captain in November 1955. In February 1957 he rose to the rank of Major and was assigned the command of the 1st Transport Squadron. In 1958, he was sent to the United States to attend the Command and Staff Officers training course at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. After the November 1, 1963 coup, the MRC made him Acting Commander of the Air Force on December 16, 1963, and then Commander on August 12, 1964. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General on April 8, 1964, and MajorGeneral on October 21, 1964. Together with other young generals, a majority of them being commanders of services and major units of the ARVN, General Kỳ began to participate in political activities as the spokesperson of what the US media called “Young Turks.”8 As a member of the “Young Turks,” General Ky has helped General Khánh survive two coups: the first one, called “Demonstration of Forces,” by two generals Dương Văn Đức and Lâm Văn Phát on September 13, 1964, and the second one by colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo on February 19, 1965. Also, together with the “Young Turks,” General Kỳ participated in the dissolution of the HNC on December 20, 1964. After that he joined the government for the first time as Minister of Youth and Sports when Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương reshuffled his cabinet on January 18, 1965. Finally, again together with the “Young Turks,” he was involved in the ousted of General Khánh from the political scene and forced him out of Vietnam on February 25, 1965. After the Phan Huy Quát Government resigned and gave the power back to the ARVN, at the Grand Convention of the ARVN, and after a number of generals refused to form government (among them was General Nguyễn

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 79 Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps), he was unanimously proposed by other generals and accepted to serve as prime minister. Although different from most generals in being incorrupted, General Ky was a direct, outspoken, dynamic, daring and action-oriented person. When he became Chairman of the CEC, nobody thought that his government would last more than the previous ones, i.e. not more than three or four months. The US Embassy also had negative thoughts about his governing capability.9 Everyone was wrong, the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government lasted more than two and a half years, until the Second Republic was born in November 1967 after the inauguration of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ.

Early failures of the War Cabinet The War Cabinet had remarkable efforts to implement the 26-point program. And, naturally, like its predecessors, it also had important achievements in more than two years of existence10 as well as unavoidable failures at the beginning. After being inaugurated on June 21, 1965, the first action of the War Cabinet was to set up a sandbag firing place right in the middle of Saigon, in front of Bến Thành Central Market. The first prisoner to be executed at this firing place was a Viet Cong special agent who had been red-handedly caught carrying 10 kg of TNT with the intention to blow up the American officers’ club on Võ Tánh Street, in Gia Định.11 The Viet Cong retaliated immediately. Two days later, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) announced on Radio Hà Nội that they had executed by firing an American prisoner caught by them during the Battle of Bình Giả, Sergeant Harold George Bennett.12 The next day, June 25, 1965, Việt Cộng sappers blew up the floating restaurant Mỹ Cảnh on Bạch Đằng waterfront in Saigon, killing 44 persons (27 Vietnamese, 13 Americans, 2 Frenchmen, 1 Swiss and 1 Filipino), and injuring 81 persons (62 Vietnamese, 16 Americans, 1 Swiss, and 2 Germans).13 Although the US Embassy in Saigon continued to support these actions by the government, the War Cabinet could not go on using the sandbag firing place to punish the terrorists, and this kind of action was gradually forgotten. The firing place was also used to punish the bad market speculators and the first one to be executed was a Chinese businessman named Tạ Vinh, but, again, this kind of punishment was also gradually forgotten among the populace of Saigon. The sandbag firing place itself was left abandoned, disintegrated gradually by rain and wind. On June 24, 1965, General Ky held a press conference to make known publicly his Cabinet’s 26-point program. At the conference, he announced that he would shut down all 36 newspapers published in Sài Gòn and would review the press statute. This announcement upset the Saigon press corps. The next day, most papers boycotted by not printing the news about the press conference.14 On June 27, 1965, the Ministry of Information had to

80 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government withdraw the decision to shut down all newspapers. And on July 3, 1965, 23 of the 36 Saigon newspapers were receiving permits to republish.15 On June 25, 1965, the War Cabinet created the Ùy Ban Bài Trừ Gian Thương (Committee Against Bad Merchants) and the Tổng Đoàn Thanh Niên Trừ Gian (General League of Youth Against Bad Merchants) to fight against market speculators and bribery.16 The League was solemnly inaugurated with 500 members on July 10, 1965, in Chợ Lớn. But only after a short while, several cadres of the League were prosecuted for a variety of criminal offenses, including receiving bribes; the bad merchants were not defeated.17

Political stabilization As seen in previous chapters, all civil governments before the War Cabinet did not last more than four months. The main reason for this was the political instability caused by several successive coups and coup attempts, by constant demonstrations of religious and student organizations, and also by the bickering among politicians and their political parties. General Ky and his associates knew quite well this situation and therefore they have decided that the top goal among the “three urgent goals” of their-26-point program was “Reorganizing the governing mechanism so that it is appropriate for the time of war.” With his youth appearance, his openness and direct approach, as well as his “dare to say and dare to act,” General Ky was able to mobilize a group of young specialists with technical competence and high motivation led by Như Phong Lê Văn Tiến. It was them who made positive contributions to the drafting of the 26-point program of the War Cabinet. In addition to the retaining of a number of good ministers of the Phan Huy Quát government (a total of 6: Trần Văn Đỗ, Nguyễn Tấn Hồng, Trần Văn Kiện, Ngô Trọng Anh, Nguyễn Văn Tương and Bùi Hữu Tuấn), General Kỳ has made an effort to invite into his cabinet a number of new people, who had refused to serve in previous governments.18 Learning from the experience of Phan Huy Quát government, General Kỳ (a Northerner) has invited several Southerners and has basically achieved a good North-South balance for his cabinet.19 With the temporary “neutrality” from the Buddhists, i.e. no open support or opposition toward his government (Ky was a Buddhist), and that meant that there would be no demonstrations, no chaos, no disturbances like under the Trần Văn Hương and Phan Huy Quát governments, General Kỳ now had only one group to worry about and that was the Armed Forces. General Kỳ understood really well that the power he had now was from the ARVN represented by the Directorate. Therefore, he always sought support from the Directorate in all his important decisions. Taking a further step in that direction, he convened the Armed Forces Congress with 1686 delegates from all corps and units on September 11, 1965, to seek the absolute consensus within the ARVN for the political action plan proposed by

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 81 20,21

the War Cabinet. The 19th of June was declared “Armed Forces Day” and to be celebrated every year. To improve the daily life of all soldiers, the CEC decided to give a good salary raise to all Regular, Regional, and Civil Guards units.22 With all these actions, General Kỳ gradually gained an almost absolute support from the military. However, in order to prevent all coup attempts, he put all his men into important security positions. One of his strong supporters, Major-General Lê Nguyên Khang (later promoted to Lieutenant-General), Commander of the Marines Corps, was appointed Commander of the Capital Special District.23 And, most importantly, Colonel Nguyễn Ngọc Loan (later promoted to Brigadier-General and then Major-General), Deputy Commander of the Air Force, General Ky’s right hand man, was given the top jobs of three security services: Military Security Services, National Police, and Central Intelligence Organization. Throughout the history of the Republic of Vietnam, Colonel Loan’s case was unique when one person held all these three security jobs at the same time. The Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government, in a very special situation as just described, gradually achieved the political stability for the Republic of Vietnam (from now on, referred to in acronym as RVN), putting an end to the chaos under Nguyễn Khánh’s administration. This does not mean that the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government had never to face with difficult political situations throughout that period of more than two years. In reality, General Kỳ had to reshuffle his War Cabinet four times during this two-year period: • • • •

the first time on October 1, 1965 the second time on February 21, 1966 the third time on July 13, 1966 the fourth time on November 18, 1966

And the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government has also gone through quite a few political storms which appeared to seriously threaten its existence, among which the two most important events were the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam after the removal of Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Chánh Tri from his command of I Corps (from April to June 1966) and the Cabinet Crisis of October 1966 after the illegal arrest of the Director of Cabinet of the Ministry of Health by General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan.

Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in 1966 On March 11, 1966, the General Assembly of Generals and the Directorate met for five hours at the General Staff Headquarters and decided to terminate Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Chánh Thi’s command of I Corps and granted him a sick leave to be treated for sinusitis in the United States.24 Two days later, March 13, the General Assembly of Generals together with all local commanders met at the General Staff Headquarters and voted,

82 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government with 32 yes and 4 blank, to approve the removal of Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi from the command of I Corps. Major-General Nguyễn Văn Chuân, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, was appointed to replace General Thi as Commander of I Corps.25 This removal of General Thi from his command of I Corps set off the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1966. Central Vietnam, since the Buddhist Crisis of 1963, under the dominant influence of Buddhists led by Right Venerable (from now on, referred to in acronym as RV) Thích Trí Quang, has become the constant source of anti-government political movements, especially after 1965. This antigovernment tendency had the following reasons: (1) All successive governments since the overthrow of Ngô Đình Diệm regime have promised to convene National Assembly to draft a new constitution and all have failed to do so; (2) These governments, more or less, have re-employed former Cần Lao Party members of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, which the Buddhists could not accept; and, (3) The War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ has actively supported the rapid introduction of US combat troops into South Vietnam, the expansion of the war to North Vietnam, making the war more destructive and putting South Vietnamese people’s life upside down. The Buddhists’ political motto could change with time, but, in general, it was always revolving around the two following topics: (1) Requesting government to call for election of the Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution; and (2) Fighting against the militarist government. General Nguyễn Chánh Thi was a very special figure among the generals and played a very important role in this period of time in the history of the RVN. When he was still a colonel, Commander of the Airborne Brigade, he led the coup of November 11, 1960, to overthrow the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. The coup failed and he had to live in exile in Cambodia for the next three years. When the November 1, 1963 coup succeeded, he repatriated, regained his rank, and was appointed Deputy Commander of I Corps under Lieutenant-General ­ Nguyễn Khánh. He participated in the coup of January 30, 1964, organized by General Khánh. After that, on February 7, 1964, he was given the command of the 1st Infantry Division. He was promoted to Brigadier-General on May 29, 1964, and then Major-General on October 21, 1964, and appointed Commander of I Corps on November 8, 1964. He became one of the most important members of the “Young Turks.” As a member of this group of young generals, he participated in the fight against the coup mounted by generals Dương Văn Đức and Lâm Văn Phát on September 13, 1964, and the one by Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo on February 19, 1965, as well as the ousted of General Nguyễn Khánh from power and forcing him to leave Vietnam on February 25, 1965. After that, he became one of the most powerful generals of the ARVN. After the Phan Huy Quát Government resigned and returned the power back to the ARVN, he was proposed by other generals to serve as Prime Minister but he turned down the offer and recommended General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ.26

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 83 In his position as Commander of I Corps and Representative of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in Central Vietnam, General Thi has had some disagreements with the central government in Saigon. In addition, with the rapid build-up of US combat forces in South Vietnam, he could not avoid having problems with US officials in his function as a corps commander. His refusal to attend the Honolulu Conference in early February 1966 made his relationship with the Americans even worse.27 On top of that, the fact that he has gained a very strong support from the Buddhists and the people of Central Vietnam made other generals nervous about his power and influence. Besides, with his hot temper, his outspokenness against other people’s wrongdoing, especially against corrupted generals (and these are the majority), he was gradually isolated within the assembly of generals. Not only had he been isolated among the generals, General Thi also provided more arguments to the people against him to use in their efforts to eliminate him from power. His first mistake was his refusal to attend the Honolulu Conference in early February 1966. This conference was the first summit between US President Lyndon B. Johnson with the top delegation of the GVN headed by Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Chairman of the Directorate and Major- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Chairman of the CEC. For the United States, it marked the official and public declaration of its commitment in the Vietnam War efforts. For the GVN, it was an excellent opportunity to present the objectives and policy of the War Cabinet to the US public as well as to the whole world; the most important part of the GVN’s presentation was its commitment to holding elections, drafting a new constitution and moving to a democratically elected government.28 This refusal to go to Honolulu was another evidence to prove that General Thi was not sharing the same position with the Directorate and the CEC, or, in other words, against the central government in Saigon. Next event was the visit of I Corps by General Kỳ in early March 1966. In the reception organized for the Kỳ delegation, General Thi let his people publicly criticize the central government and thus insulting General Kỳ severely.29 This was the last drop that overwhelmed the glass. General Kỳ decided to eliminate General Thi from the power. Although personally he was a hot-temper individual, who did not think long before acting, this time General Kỳ planned for the elimination of General Thi very carefully.30 First, on March 9, he had a meeting with principal members (all generals) of the Directorate and got their agreement on this planned action against General Thi. Immediately after this meeting, he met with US Ambassador Lodge, presented the difficulties that General Thi had created for his government, and informed the ambassador of the decision of the generals at the previous meeting. He added that he just could not carry out his responsibilities if General Thi was not removed. Ambassador Lodge advised him to move carefully and established adequate documentation before moving against General Thi.31

84 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government The Directorate also acted very carefully in this affair. General Thi was invited to come to Saigon for a special and restricted meeting with only generals Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Cao Văn Viên (Chief of General Staff of the ARVN), and Nguyễn Hữu Có (Commissioner for Defense). The generals tried hard to persuade General Thi to resign from his command of I Corps and leave Vietnam for the United States for a while for medical reason, but Thi categorically refused to do so. The generals had no options but putting Thi on “house arrest” at his residence in Sài Gòn and convened the General Assembly of Generals on the next day, on March 10, to consider Thi’s case. After hearing generals Kỳ and Có’s presentation of Thi’s wrongdoing (mostly, his unsubordination toward the central government), all generals voted for the removal of Thi from his command of I Corps; only Brigadier-General Dư Quốc Đống, Commander of the Airborne Brigade, ­ gave a blank vote.32 One week after the removal of General Thi from command of I Corps, several anti-government demonstrations and strikes incited by the Buddhists occurred in Huế and Đà Nẵng. The radio station in Huế was occupied by the struggle movement. The RV Thích Trí Quang’s call for civil servants, soldiers, and students to participate in the fight against the militarist government of Thiệu-Kỳ ­ was broadcasted on a daily basis. The League of Ready-To-Die Students was organized and they occupied the headquarters of National Police of the Thừa Thiên Province and of the City of Huế. They broke in the weapon depots at these two locations, seized all weapons and armed their members.33 Brigadier- General Phan Xuân Nhuận, recently appointed Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (replacing Major- General Nguyễn Văn Chuân appointed Commander of I Corps to replace General Thi) stationed in Huế, took side with the Buddhists in their fight against the central government of Saigon. A great number of soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division also participated in the struggle movement and started the military training for the students. Many Regional and Civil Guard Forces units also abandoned their posts and went back to the cities of Huế and Đà Nẵng to join the anti-government movement. Dr. Nguyễn Văn Mẫn, Mayor ­ of Đà Nẵng, and Colonel Đàm Quang Yêu, Commander of Quảng-Đà Special District (short for Quảng Nam – Đà Nẵng) also publicly supported the struggle movement. The struggle movement spread to other provinces and cities of Central Vietnam, such as Nha Trang, Ban Mê Thuột, and Đà Lạt. Even in Sài Gòn there were anti-government demonstrations. In fact, the movement against the central government in Saigon has become the serious political crisis after the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government was installed. The Directorate gave permission to General Thi to go back to Central Vietnam in mid-March to explain the whole affair to the people of I Corps as well as to let people know that he himself accepted the Directorate’s decision. This intervention did not ease the struggle movement because, in reality, the movement’s objective was no longer the demand for the re-assignment of General Thi to the command of I Corps; the movement’s objective was

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 85 now to demand the government to draft a new Constitution, hold elections, and establish a civilian government to replace the Thiệu-Kỳ militarist gov­ ernment. By the end of March 1966, the central government in Saigon did not have any more control of Huế and Đà Nẵng. At the same time, during the demonstrations in Huế, Đà Nẵng, and even in Saigon, banners with antiAmerican slogans began to appear. Under pressure from the Americans, who urged the GVN to put an end to this situation of anarchy and anti-Americanism, on April 4, with air transport means provided by the US military, General Kỳ moved two Vietnamese Marines battalions armed with tanks to the airbase of Đà Nẵng. Going with Kỳ were Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Hữu Có, Commissioner for Defense, Lieutenant-General Cao Văn Viên, Chief of General Staff, and Colonel Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, Chief of Military Security Services. General Nguyen Van Chuan, who had replaced Thi as Commander of South Vietnamese Forces in I Corps, was opposed to using troops against the dissidents, however, and blocked exits to Danang from the air base to prevent the marines from moving toward the city. At the same time, the commander of the 1st ARVN Division stationed in Hue, General Phan Xuan Nhuan, together with other officers from the division, announced his support for the Struggle Movement and vowed to resist efforts by the government to use force against Huế.34 Facing this serious confrontation, which could lead to big bloody fighting between units of the ARVN, generals Kỳ and Viên decided to go back to Saigon; General Có stayed in Đà Nẵng to negotiate with the dissidents. General Kỳ realized that a political solution, not just using forces, was needed to solve the crisis. The US Government, through Ambassador Lodge, has made positive contributions to the negotiation process between ­ the Thiệu-Kỳ administration and the Buddhists. Ambassador Lodge, because of his special relationship with RV Thích Trí Quang formed during the Buddhist Crisis of 1963, met with the latter several time during this period of time and reported the Buddhist demands to the GVN through General Kỳ. On April 5, after he came back to Saigon from Đà Nẵng, General Ky had a meeting at his own home with a Buddhist delegation led by RV Thích Tâm Châu (RV Thích Trí Quang was still in Huế and did not attend the meeting). The principal demand of the Buddhists was that the government must hold elections for the Constituent Assembly within six months. General Kỳ met with generals Thiệu and Viên on the next day and all of them agreed to that demand of the Buddhists. After this meeting, General Kỳ sent a letter to RV Thích Tâm Châu informing him that the government agreed with the Buddhist demand. But on the next day, April 7, General Kỳ received a letter from RV Thích Tâm Châu demanding that the government must carry out the following four actions: (1) No punishment for the civil servants and soldiers who had supported the struggle movement;

86 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government (2) Release all people who had been arrested; (3) Withdraw all forces that had been deployed to Đà Nẵng; and (4) Convene the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible. General Ky was very angry; he believed that these demands showed that, in reality, the Buddhists only wanted to overthrow his government. He decided to bring two more Marines battalions to Đà Nẵng and asked the Americans for transportation means to do that. This time the Americans refused to help. General Kỳ had to use airplanes of his Air Force to transport these two Marines battalions to Đà Nẵng; the command staff had to take a Caravelle flight by Air Vietnam. When he got news about this operation, General Có, still in Da Nang negotiating with the dissidents, phoned General Thiệu directly and asked Thieu to order the withdrawal of these forces. General Thiệu, himself against using forces, agreed with General Có’s request and issued that order that he himself signed on the draft cable sent to Đà Nẵng.35 On April 12, the Directorate convened the National Political Congress at Diên Hồng Convention Center (when the Congress was opened there were only 92 delegates – out of 170 invited – ; in the last day, the number of delegates rose to 115); Dr. Phan Quang Đán was elected to chair the Congress. The next day, General Kỳ sent a letter to RV Thích Tâm Châu informing that the government had agreed to implement all four requests by the Buddhists. On April 14, General Thiệu came to preside over the closing ceremony of the Congress and read the Decree-Law 14/66 announcing the decision of the government to hold elections for the Constituent Assembly in three to five months.36 Generals Thiệu and Kỳ also “agreed to take certain actions stipulated by the Congress, among which were that the military government would resign as soon as elections for the Assembly were held.”37 The Buddhist Dharma Institute in Saigon issued a communiqué calling Buddhists to cease all demonstrations because the government had satisfied all Buddhist demands. However, the dissidents in Đà Nẵng and Huế continued their demonstrations and asked the government to resign so that a civilian government could organize elections. This demand confirmed the doubt within the intelligence community for some time that the struggle movement in Central Vietnam had been infiltrated, if not controlled, by the Communists. On April 19, RV Thích Trí Quang had to issue a statement calling for a suspension of the struggle in Huế and Đà Nẵng, waiting for the government to keep its promises.38 While the situation was still precarious, Lieutenant- General Tôn Thất Đính, recently appointed Commander of I Corps to replace Major- General Nguyễn Văn Chuân, declared that he supported the struggle movement against the central government in Saigon. This declaration gave more reasons to the struggle movement to continue its fight. The demonstrations by local struggle movement units, sometimes reaching the point of anarchy, continued throughout Central Vietnam. In Quảng Nam, on April 17, the movement unit arrested the province chief Nguyễn Hữu Chì and the district chief of Hòa Vang District, accusing them of being pro-government.39 In Đà Lạt, on April 23, a demonstration turned

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 87 violent; many soldiers were beaten up, and even the captain, chief of the local military station, was arrested.40 Facing this serious political crisis of the GVN reflecting the deep disunity among various factions in South Vietnam that could lead to a civil war, the US Government (from now on, referred to as USG) realized that there was a need for them to revise its policy in Vietnam. At the meeting of April 9, the senior advisors of President Johnson (secretaries of state and defense, national security advisor, director of CIA, and the chair of JCS) decided to charge the following individuals to prepare the following reports: (1) Mr. George Carver, senior CIA analyst – later becoming Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, or SAVA – to write a report for Option A, for the status quo; (2) Mr. Leonard Unger, assistant to Mr. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, to write the report for Option B- O, keep the status quo but seeking negotiations with optimistic view (the letter O for Optimistic); (3) Mr. John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, to write the report for Option B-P, status quo plus negotiations but with pessimistic view (the letter P for Pessimistic); and (4) Mr. George Ball, Assistant Secretary of State, to write the report for Option C, withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. All these four reports had to be based on the assumption that the United States continued to support the GVN only if all South Vietnamese factions united and acted effectively. A Working Group was established under the chairmanship of Mr. George Ball to discuss the merits of these reports. After two weeks of discussions, the four reports were recomposed by Mr. William Bundy into one report titled “Basic Choices in Vietnam” and presented for discussion at the meeting of April 25, between President Johnson and his senior advisors. Three options were assessed: Option A: To continue roughly along the present lines, in the hope that the setback is temporary. Option B: To continue roughly along the present lines, perhaps with a decrease in the rate of entry of US troops, but moving more actively to stimulate contact between the Saigon government and elements in the Viet Cong. Such contact could either begin with a public call for negotiations by the GVN or with covert tentative feelers. After the rough outlines of the VC position had been determined, the US would then decide on whether to press the GVN to continue negotiations or to support the GVN in its reluctance to accept difficult terms. Option C: To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent and non- Communist South Vietnam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted. This would mean setting the stage where, at the proper moment, steps can be taken that would probably lead to a disengagement and withdrawal.41 This report was presented with a cover letter by State Secretary Dean Rusk, in which Rusk recommended Option A. President Johnson agreed with

88 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government Rusk’s recommendation.42 In early May, Ambassador Lodge was called back to Washington for consultation. On May 2, Leonard Unger prepared a memorandum listing the issues that needed to be discussed between William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State and Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor with Ambassador Lodge. Regarding the issue of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the memo said that President Johnson wanted that Ambassador Lodge make clear to the GVN leaders that they would have to follow through with this commitment, otherwise the US support for the Republic of Vietnam would be affected seriously. Regarding the issue of the present GVN (i.e. Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government), the best approach would be for the government to resign and relinquish the power to the Constituent Assembly after it was elected. The Assembly would then have the right to give a confidence vote for the present government and keep it in power, or to choose a new one.43 This position was completely compatible with what the present government had agreed to carry out when the National Political Congress was ended in mid-April 1966. On April 22, the CEC, in order to implement the Decree-Law 14/66 announced by General Thiệu when he came to preside over the closing ceremony of the National Political Congress, convened a committee of 48 individuals with a mandate to draft the legislation for the elections of the Constituent Assembly.44 Two days later, this committee recommended the establishment of a council for the drafting of the constitution, and the monitoring of the coming elections.45 While everything was going quite well, on May 6, during the inauguration of the new airbase in Bình Thủy (Cần Thơ), General Kỳ announced that his government would stay on for another year until all new government structures have been elected based on the new constitution.46,47 The USG, without being consulted in advance, was surprised by this announcement; they were not happy but decided to keep a “non-intervention” attitude in this event.48 Immediately after General Kỳ’s announcement, the Buddhists and the struggle Movement in Central Vietnam called for demonstrations, accusing the government of breaking its promises. Unlike previous reactions, this time both General Kỳ and the Directorate decided not to make concessions any more. On May 15, General Thiệu, Chairman of the Directorate, announced that he had ordered that troops to be sent to Đà Nẵng to re-establish order.49 Once more, General Kỳ himself went to Đà Nẵng with Colonel Nguyễn Ngọc Loan (recently appointed Head of National Police to replace Colonel Phạm Văn Liễu on April 22) to oversee the operation to retake Đà Nẵng with five Marines battalions. Thanks to the surprise factor, the Marines battalions were able to quickly occupy the I Corps Headquarters, the radio station, and the Phổ Đà pagoda, where the struggle movement had its command post.50 By the evening, government forces had total control of Đà Nẵng and the 8 PM to 5 AM curfew was declared and enforced.51 The RV Thích Trí Quang sent a cable to President Johnson asking for US intervention. The State Department answered with

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 89 a cable informing him that the USG was very concerned about the situation in Đà Nẵng and promised that the USG would try its best to persuade opposite sides to solve the differences peacefully and avoid bloodshed.52 Lieutenant- General Tôn Thất Đính, Commander of I Corps, protested against the use of forces by the central government and was replaced by Major-General ­ Huỳnh Văn Cao, former Commander of IV Corps and a former Cần Lao Party member. His appointment by the central government as Commander of I Corps, a region under strong Buddhist influence, was like pouring gasoline into a fire. The Buddhist struggle movement erupted in total anger and bitterness. The bloodshed was no longer avoidable. On May 17, when General Cao came to Huế from Đà Nẵng, he was met with a huge demonstration organized by the struggle movement. With great difficulty, General Cao escaped the crowd and ran into the Tây Lộc heliport within the Citadel. When the helicopter, provided by the US military to transport him back to Đà Nẵng, took off, one junior officer of the 1st Infantry Division, First-Lieutenant Nguyễn Đại Thức, from within the crowd, draw his handgun and shot him. Luckily, General Cao was not hit. The gunman from the helicopter fired back and killed Lieutenant Thức at the spot.53 A few days later, the struggle movement created a brigade including all dissident Buddhist soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division and called it Nguyễn Đại Thức Brigade. After the shooting incident, General Cao sought refuge within the headquarters of the US 3rd Marines under LieutenantGeneral Lewis Walt and resigned from his command of I Corps. On May 20, Major- General Trần Thanh Phong was appointed to replace him. On the same day, a bloody confrontation occurred between the Marines and the struggle movement at the Tỉnh Hội pagoda, causing heavy casualties on both sides. On May 23, after the dissidents surrendered at the Tỉnh Hội pagoda, thousands of guns were confiscated and 30 decomposed bodies were found.54 The two leaders of the struggle movement in Đà Nẵng, Dr. Nguyễn Văn Mẫn, Mayor of Đà Nẵng, and Colonel Đàm Quang Yêu, Commander of the Quảng-Đà Special District, were arrested and sent away to Sài Gòn. Hundreds of dissident officers and soldiers lay down their arms and surrendered to the central government forces. The government granted amnesty to all of them. The RV Thích Trí Quang once again appealed the USG for intervention,55 ­ regime, but this time, demanding the end of US assistance for the Thiệu-Kỳ the USG ignored his call and did not answer him directly. However, in a cable from the State Department to the US Embassy in Saigon, Ambassador Lodge (just came back from the United States) was instructed to inform General Kỳ the following points: (1) The USG was very concerned about the situation in South Vietnam; (2) The USG recommended that the GVN sought a compromise with the dissidents to end the demonstrations and bloody confrontations and to make every effort in holding elections for the Constituent Assembly; (3) General Kỳ should have a meeting with General Thi and the other dissident generals (Đính, Nhuận) to get a compromise.56

90 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government On May 31, a six-member Buddhist delegation from the Dharma Institute led by the RV Thích Tâm Châu met with six members of the Directorate at Gia Long Palace. On the next day, the Directorate announced that it would enlarge its members by inviting ten civilians, and it would also establish a Civilian-Military Council to advise the CEC.57 The hardliners within the struggle movement, under the influence of the RV Thích Trí Quang, immediately attacked the moderate position of the RV Thích Tâm Châu. This was the first sign of the disunity within the Buddhist movement, which later led to the split of the Buddhists into two camps: the Ấn Quang faction (led by the RV Thích Trí Quang) and the Việt Nam Quốc Tự faction (led by the RV Thích Tâm Châu). A number of Buddhists were incited by these hardliners to self-immolate to put pressure on the government: June 3, junior nun Bảo Luân in Sài Gòn; June 4, a 15-year-old student monk in Quảng Trị; June 17, female Buddhist Đỗ Thị Ngọc at the Dharma Institute; June 18, female Buddhist Đào Thị Tuyết also at the Dharma Institute. However, these selfimmolations did not have any effect on the hard policy of the government toward the struggle movement in Central Vietnam. In the meantime, Brigadier- General Phan Xuân Nhuận, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, reversed his position, rejoined the government forces, and withdrew his command post from Huế on May 30. On May 31, Major-General Hoàng Xuân Lãm, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, was appointed Commander of I Corps to replace Major- General Trần Thanh Phong. After having gained total control of Đà Nẵng, the government forces began to move to Huế. On June 5, 3,000 government troops with tanks arrived in Huế. On June 7, three battalions of Marines and Airborne were helicoptered to Phú Bài airport and occupied positions about 8 km from Huế. Huế was now opened and undefended. In order to stop the government forces, from June 6, the RV Thích Trí Quang ordered the Buddhists to bring all Buddha’s altars in homes and pagodas to the streets. This order was carried out to the extreme by the League of Ready-To-Die Buddhist Students. They went house-to-house and forced people to comply with the order. As a result of this extreme order from the RV Thích Trí Quang, all streets in every district of Huế as well as all roads leading to Huế were barricaded with thousands and thousands of Buddha’s altars.58 On June 8, the RV Thích Trí Quang decided to go on an indefinite hunger strike. Since soldiers from the government forces refused to touch the Buddha’s altars, Colonel Nguyễn Ngọc Loan had to use the Special Brigade 222 of Anti-riot Police, airlifted to Huế from Sài Gòn, to dispose of the altars from the streets of Huế. Brigadier-General Phan Xuân Nhuận surrendered to the government forces command post and was sent by air to Sài Gòn, waiting to be tried by the High Disciplinary Council of the ARVN. Colonel Ngô Quang Trưởng was appointed to replace him as Commander of the 1st Infantry Division. On June 20, Lieutenant-General Nguyển Chánh Thi was arrested at his own home in Huế and sent to Sài Gòn, also waiting to be tried by the High Disciplinary Council of the ARVN. On June 21, the RV Thích

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 91 Trí Quang was also sent by government forces to Sài Gòn, with the pretext of helping him to recuperate from his hunger strike. He would be placed under guard at Dr. Nguyễn Duy Tài’s medical clinic on Duy Tân Street in Sài Gòn. In the following days, more than 1,000 soldiers of all ranks, who had joined the struggle movement, presented themselves to the government forces command post; a number of them were transported by air to be detained at the Military Security Services; others were sent to Phú Quốc detention center. For the dissident civilians, more than 2,000 were temporarily put in jail for investigation; later a number of them were released; others were tried under disorderly conduct clause of the Criminal Code.59 A number of leaders of the struggle movement, mostly teachers and students, were contacted by the NFL agents; they were helped to escape from Huế and joined the NFL (local people referred to this as “nhảy núi = jump to the mountain”); those individuals would come back to Huế with the NFL during the 1968 Tet Offensive. In early July 1966, the High Disciplinary Council of the ARVN met two days (the 8th and 9th of July) to consider the cases of the generals involved in the Civil Revolt of Central Vietnam. These generals were: LieutenantGeneral Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Lieutenant-General Tôn Thất Đính, MajorGeneral Huỳnh Văn Cao, Major-General Nguyễn Văn Chuân, and Brigadier-General Phan Xuân Nhuận. At the end of the second day, the following verdict was pronounced to all of the five generals being tried: 60 days of serious confinement and dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces. Brigadier-General Phan Xuân Nhuận was also demoted to the rank of Colonel.60 Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi was ordered to leave Vietnam. He and his two sons left Vietnam for the United States on July 31.61 The Civil Revolt of Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966 was ended with two important consequences: (1) The end of the political predominance of the Buddhists in South Vietnam since after the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime; and (2) The beginning of the period leading to the establishment of the Second Republic.

The cabinet crisis of October 1966 On October 3, 1966, Brigadier-General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, a Northerner, Head of National Police, right-hand man of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, arrested Dr. Nguyễn Tấn Lộc, Director of Cabinet of the Ministry of Health, a Southerner (Commissioner of Health was Dr. Nguyễn Bá Khả, a Northerner, who allegedly instigated the arrest; at the time of the arrest, Dr. Khả was abroad on a government mission), accusing him of “North-South discrimination,” an offense not listed in the Criminal Code.62,63 This abuse of power by General Loan ignited a serious cabinet crisis of Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government during the two months of October and November of 1966. After his success in conducting the military operation to suppress the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in June, effectively protecting the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government, and promoted to the rank of Brigadier- General, General

92 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government Loan held the top jobs of three security services in South Vietnam: Military Security Services (since February 1965), Central Intelligence Organization (since February 7, 1966), and National Police (since April 22, 1966) and became the most trusted lieutenant for General Kỳ. When this abuse of power happened, the commissioners (ministers) of southern origin were very upset by the following reasons: (1) The arrest was made for a non- existent criminal offense; (2) Director of Cabinet was a political appointee and No. 2 within a ministry directly under the minister; and (3) Most importantly, this was a politically motivated arrest, the individual arrested being a political appointee holding the most important position in a ministry, only less important than the minister, yet the Prime Minister was not informed at all.64 All of these factors led the southern commissioners to reach the conclusion that this action was not only illegal but also an intolerable abuse of power by the person at the head of the national police. If not properly handled, it could lead to the establishment of a deplorable “police state” that would be unpopular and would do a lot of damage to the government’s effort to build a democratic regime and would be prone to the anti-government propaganda by the Communists. All southern commissioners agreed to demand that General Kỳ remove General Loan from his functions, otherwise they would all resign from the cabinet. When he was aware of this illegal arrest, General Kỳ ordered General Loan to release Dr. Lộc immediately; he also reprimanded General Loan for this action, but he decided to keep Loan in his functions. A few days later, back to Vietnam after his trip, Dr. Nguyễn Bá Khả resigned from his portfolio and General Kỳ appointed a southerner, Dr. Trần Lữ Y, to replace him as Commissioner of Health. Having witnessed General Kỳ’s good will to resolve the issue, the southern commissioners were quite satisfied and ready to let the incident pass. But on October 6, the daily newspaper, Công Chúng, the official organ of the Ministry of Information (at this time the Commissioner of Information was Major- General Nguyễn Bảo Trị, a northerner) but financed by General Loan, printed a diatribe that blasted the six southern commissioners. At the same time, Deputy Chairman of the CEC, Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên, one of the six southern commissioners, was receiving anonymous threatening phone calls; Youth Commissioner Võ Long Triều also reported receiving direct threats from General Loan.65 In spite of General Kỳ’s quick response to the incident by ordering the closure of that newspaper, the whole affair flared up again, and this time, all six southern commissioners submitted their resignations together in one letter of resignation to General Kỳ. They were: Deputy Chairman of the CEC (i.e. Deputy Prime Minister) Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Commissioner (i.e. Minister) of Education Nguyễn Văn Trường, Commissioner of Transport Trương Văn Thuấn, Commissioner of Social Affairs Trần Ngọc Liểng, Commissioner of Labor Nguyen Hữu Hùng, and Commissioner of Youth Võ Long Triều. After his official trip to the United States, General Commissioner of Economy and Finance Âu Trường Thanh joined the other six and submitted his

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 93 resignation. General Kỳ accepted Mr. Âu Trường Thanh’s resignation right away, but for the other six he tried really hard to have them withdraw their resignations. Because it was very close to the opening day of the Manila Conference,66 the six resigning ministers agreed to stay on until after the Conference. After the Manila Conference, General Kỳ met with the six resigning ministers, on a one-to-one basis, and persuaded them to stay in the cabinet. The Directorate, under suggestion by one of its civilian member, Mr. Trần Văn Ân, invited the six resigning ministers to a “Understanding Banquet.” After this banquet, four of the six resigning ministers, Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Trương Văn Thuấn, Trần Ngọc Liểng, and Nguyễn Hữu Hùng, agreed to withdraw their resignations and continued to serve in the cabinet. Only two of them, Education Minister Nguyễn Văn Trường and Youth Minister Võ Long Triều, were determined to resign. On November 11, General Kỳ had no other choice but accepting their resignations.67 The Cabinet Crisis of Nguyen Cao Ky government ended. This cabinet crisis showed very clearly that there were under- currents of North-South division as well as civilian-military antagonism in the politics of South Vietnam. However, started as having the potential to bring down the Nguyen Cao Ky government, this cabinet crisis was resolved relatively easily, without creating any serious disruption, probably for the two following reasons: (1) The genuine good will of General Kỳ to resolve the situation as well as the political skills that General Kỳ has gained after more than one stormy year in power; thanks to these qualities, he was successful in persuading four of the six resigning ministers to stay on; (2) The six southern ministers, especially Education Minister Nguyễn Văn Trường and Youth Minister Võ Long Triều, did not have broad-based and strong political support to exercise enough pressure on General Kỳ; in addition, their main demand, removal of General Loan from power, was absolutely unacceptable to General Kỳ. Probably from this painful experience, the southerners felt the need to have some political mechanism in place to back up their fight for southern interest in the future. That was the main reason for their future creation of two southern-oriented institutions: the Hội Liên Trường (Old Southern Schools Association) and the Phong Trào Phục Hưng Miền Nam (Movement for the Renaissance of the South, or MRS).

Notes 1 “Tuyên Cáo của Quốc Trưởng, Chủ Tịch Hội Đồng Quốc Gia Lập Pháp và Thủ Tướng Chánh Phủ V.N.C.H.” (Proclamation by the Head of State, the Chairman of the National Legislative Council and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam) Chính Luận (Sunday / Monday 13, 14-Jun-1965): 1. 2 “Quyết Định số 3 của Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa” (Resolution no. 3 of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam), Chính Luận (Wednesday, 16-Jun1965): 1. 3 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 100–101.

94 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government

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Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 95 this recommendation, citing as reason the fact that he did not like politics; he wrote: Như quý vị đã thừa biết, tính tôi rất bộc trực và thẳng thắn, tôi chưa bao giờ nghĩ rằng tôi phải làm chính trị. Thiên hạ từ xưa đến nay cứ thường bảo làm chính trị thì phải thủ đọan, và tôi thấy thủ đọan ở họ, tiếc thay lại đồng nghĩa với xảo trá, gian manh. Tôi vốn lại không biết thủ đọan, lấi rất khinh bỉ thủ đọan từ lúc còn thiếu thời. Tôi xin cám ơn tất cả anh em đã đặt lòng tin vào tôi, tiếc thay tôi không thể nào chấp nhận được, và xin nhường cho ngưới khác. (As you all know, I am an outspoken and direct person, I never thought that I would be in politics. People have always said that in order to do politics you must be tricky, and, unfortunately, for them, tricky means deceitful and cunning. Personally, I don’t play tricks, and since my boyhood I despise tricks. I thank all of you who have placed your trust in me, but, unfortunately, I cannot accept your nomination, and I want to cede this honor for someone else.) In reality, the refusal by General Thi had been indeed calculated like the following statement in the memoirs of Colonel Phạm Văn Liễu, a close associate of General Thi: Ông Thi vì thời gian quá gấp gáp, về chính sách, đường lối và nhân sự không chuẩn bị kịp, chưa tiện nắm chức Chủ tịch UBHPTƯ. Trong vài buổi họp giới hạn, anh Như Phong khuyên ông Thi không ứng cử hầu có thời gian chuẩn bị kỹ càng hơn. Tôi cũng tán thành. Ông Thi suôi theo. Đây là một ước tính rất sai lạc. (Because of the short notice, Mr. Thi could not be fully prepared in terms of policy and personnel, therefore he was not in a good position to accept the job of Chairman of the CEC. In quite a few restricted meetings, brother Như Phong advised that Mr. Thi should not stand for election, but rather wait to have more time for careful preparations. I agreed. Mr. Thi followed our advice. This was a very wrong calculation.) (Pham Van Lieu, op. cit., 301) General Thi himself wrote the following statement in his memoirs: “Tôi còn nhớ rất rõ, sau khi tôi nói vừa chấm dứt thi được nghĩ mấy phút giải lao, tự nhiên Nguyễn Văn Thiệu đi ngang, ghé tai tôi nói nhỏ: “Để cho thằng Kỳ làm đi.” (I still remember, immediately after my speech we had a few minutes break, Nguyen Van Thieu walked past me, he stopped and whispered to me: Let Ky do it). (Nguyen Chanh Thi, op. cit., 312). General Ky also knew clearly all the difficulties when he accepted to be Chairman of the CEC; he wrote in his early memoirs as follows: “Of course everyone who refused the job knew perfectly well that we were going through an extremely difficult phase in which the chances of failing loomed larger than any slim hopes of success.” (Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. Twenty years and twenty days. (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 67). 27 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 335. Một hôm anh trùm CIA tên là Rib Robinson đến gặp tôi ở văn phòng. Anh ta than phiền rằng CIA được báo cáo là tôi đã hiểu sai lầm về vai trò của Hoa Kỳ ở Việt Nam. Anh ta nói thẳng những “ghi nhận” của Hoa Kỳ về tôi: - Tinh thần “chống Mỹ” mỗi ngày mỗi rõ rệt; - Cụ thể là phản đối Hội nghị Honolulu; Khuyến khich dân chúng miền Trung không hợp tác với chính phủ trung ương Saigon; - Nhiều lần không tuân lệnh Saigon một cách bướng bỉnh.

96 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government (One day, the CIA boss named Rib Robinson came to see me in my office. He complained that the CIA had been reported that I misunderstood the US role in Vietnam. Straightforward, he told me the following “observations” about me by the Americans: - Anti-American spirit more and more clearly seen; - Specifically, objection to the Honolulu Conference; -Encouraging the people of Central Vietnam not to cooperate with the central government in Saigon; - Many times stubbornly refusing to take orders from Saigon.) 28 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 162. The author writes about the drafting of the Declaration of Honolulu as follows: For the Vietnamese side the most demanding commitment was ‘to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, to take it to the Vietnamese people for discussion, modification, to seek its ratification by secret ballot and finally to create, on the basis of elections a representative government.’ 29 This event was recorded in the memoirs by both General Thi and General Kỳ. In his memoirs Buddha’s child, General Kỳ wrote: I went to Hue with General Huu Co, the minister of defense, for a routine and previously scheduled visit. It began with a meeting at the Hue city hall with top I Corps military and civil officials. Throughout the country, on every such previous occasion, the corps commander personally conducted the briefing. This time, however, Thi gave this task to the deputy governor. Most of what this civilian said was critical of the Saigon government—my government. It caught me by surprise. As I sat listening, I began to wonder how is it that this third-rank civilian dare to challenge me? Why does the rat come to play with the tiger? Something is wrong. (p. 197) In his memoirs, General Thi recounted: Ngày 2 tháng 3 năm 1966, Cao Kỳ ra Huế tiếp xúc với thân hào nhân sĩ và các đoàn thể nhân dân tại Tòa Đại Biểu Chánh Phủ. Một nhân sĩ của Huế, ông Hồng Dũ Châu được mời đứng ra phát biểu. Ông nói: “Chính phủ của dân nghèo ra đời tại Saigon đã 8 tháng nay. Suốt thời gian ấy chưa thấy làm được gì cho dân nhờ, chỉ thấy nay lệnh này mai lệnh khác trái ngược nhau, khiến chúng tôi bối rối, không biết lệnh nào đúng mà thi hành. Gạo cơm tiếp tế cứ bị thiếu hụt mãi, hỏi thì trung ương Saigon cứ bảo “chờ lệnh.” Dân đói, lại bị bảo lụt đói thêm, thử hỏi sẽ phải “chờ đến bao giờ”? Đến bây giờ, có mặt ông Thủ tướng của cái “Chính phủ của dân nghèo” ở đây, tôi xin thưa thật với ông rằng ông thật xứng đáng, bởi vì sau 8 tháng ông cầm quyền, dân đã nghèo lại nghèo thêm, có lẽ không thể nghèo hơn được nữa! Nguyễn Cao Kỳ không nén nổi tức giận, quên cả cương vị Thủ tướng của mình, xông ra ngắt lời ông Hồng Dũ Châu, sừng sộ như sắp đi đánh lộn ở một tiệm nhảy đầm nào đó: - Ông là cái thớ gì mà dám nói với một vị Thủ tướng Chánh phủ như thế? Đồ vô phép! Câm mồm! … Nguyễn Cao Kỳ về lại Saigon, có lẽ mang mối hận không nguôi vì bị người dân miền Trung cho một bài học đích đáng. Vì thế y quyết định triệt hạ tôi từ sau chuyến đi Huế ấy. (On March 2, 1966, Cao Kỳ paid a visit to Huế and had a meeting with important people and organizations at the Government’ Representative Office. A notable of Huế, Mr. Hồng Dũ Châu, was asked to say a few words. He said: “The Government for the Poor People” was born 8 months ago in Saigon. During that time, nothing was done for the people, only this order that order was received, and these orders contradicted themselves, we were confused, did not know what order to follow. The rice and food supply have

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 97 always been inadequate, when we asked, the only answer we got from the central government was to wait. The people were hungry, the storms and floods made their lives more miserable, we asked ourselves we had to wait until when. Now, the Prime Minister of that “Government for the Poor People” is here present, I’d like to tell you that you really deserve that title, because after 8 months since you took power, the poor people are now poorer, probably can’t be poorer. Nguyễn Cao Kỳ was so angry that he forgot his position as a Prime Minister and jumped out to cut off Mr. Hồng Dũ Châu’s speech, behaving like getting ready for a brawl in a dancing club, and shouted: Who the hell are you so that you dare talk like that to a Prime Minister? Insolent! Shut up! … He went back to Saigon, probably with an unforgettable rancor. Therefore, he decided to eliminate me after that trip to Hue.) (p. 335) It is hard for us to believe 100% what General Thi wrote but we can say for certain that the true historical fact was that General Ky was losing face a lot at that meeting. 30 In his memoir Buddha’s Child, General Kỳ wrote about the removal of General Thi as follows: I turned back to Co and said, “As soon as we are airborne, use the aircraft radio and send a cable to Thi, relieving him of his command.” Co, stunned, asked: “What did you say?” I repeated myself, and a few minutes later he sent the cable. (p. 198) This is not true, as we can see in the next note no. 31. 31 Gibbons, William Conrad. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: executive and legislative roles and relationships. Part IV: July 1965 – January 1968. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 268–269. On March 9, Ambassador Lodge received a telephone call from Ky’s office asking him to come immediately to a meeting with the Premier. … Ky asked Lodge for advice about removing Thi, saying that at a meeting earlier that day other members of the junta had favored removal. He added that he could not continue as Premier unless this was done. Lodge replied that, as U.S. Ambassador, he could not comment, but speaking unofficially and as a friend he thought Ky should plan his moves carefully and should document his case against Thi before acting. 32 Phạm Bá Hoa, Đôi dòng ghi nhớ: hồi ký chính trị, 1963-1975 ­ (A few lines in remembrance: political memoirs, 1963-1975). 4th ed. (Houston, TX: Ngày Nay, 2007), 192–203. The recount of this story by this author is believable because, at that time, as a Lieutenant- Colonel, he was chief aide of Lt.- General Cao Văn Viên, Chief of the General Staff of the ARVN. He was ordered by General Viên to provide logistics for that fateful meeting at the General Staff Headquarters when General Thi was voted out of the command of I Corps. 33 Liên Thành. Biến động Miền Trung: những bí mật chưa tiết lộ: giai đoạn 1966 – 1968 – 1972 (The Civil revolt in Central Vietnam: secrets never revealed: period of 1966 – 1968 – 1972). (Westminster, CA: Tổng Hội Biệt Động Quân QLVNCH (General Association of Rangers Corps of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam), 2008), 24. 34 Gibbons, Part IV, op. cit., 281–282. 35 Phạm Bá Hoa, op. cit., 212. 36 Đoàn Thêm, 1966: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 66– 67.

98 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government











Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government 99 … We are aware of your concern over the recent events in Danang. The efforts and influence of the U.S. Government will be used to persuade all elements and groups in South Vietnam to find a resolution to their difficulties and to establish the unity required if South Vietnam is to maintain its freedom and independence. 53 Liên Thành, op. cit., 28. 54 Đoàn Thêm, 1966: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 93. 55 Gibbons, Part IV, op. cit., 321: On May 21, after clashes between government troops and dissidents in Danang, and an attack on a pagoda in which monks and nuns were killed, wounded or arrested, Tri Quang gave the American consulate in Hue a message for President Johnson requesting the end of U.S. assistance to Ky and Thieu and a ban on the use against the Buddhists of tanks and aircraft given to South Vietnam to fight the Communists. 56 Gibbons, Part IV, op. cit., 322: … “[T]here is no acceptable course,” the cable said, “except for GVN leadership and dissidents to find some compromise modus vivendi which will stop fighting and demonstrations and permit all efforts to be turned to fighting VC, preparing for elections and bringing inflation under control. … Further, Lodge should stress the need for Ky to meet with Thi, as well as other dissident generals (Nhuan and Dinh), to seek a modus vivendi. 57 58 59 60 61 62

Đoàn Thêm, 1966: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 101, 103. Liên Thành, op. cit., 51. Liên Thành, op. cit., 56. Phạm Bá Hoa, op. cit., 229. Đoàn Thêm, 1966: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 146. “Situation report in South Vietnam covering period 10/10-10/16/66,” DDRS, CIA weekly report, dated 17- Oct-1966, declassified 04-Mar-1994, 22 p. On p. 5: “The controversy, basically rooted in north-south animosities and sharpened by civilianmilitary differences, stemmed specifically from the temporary arrest of a southern Health Ministry official on 3 October by police director Loan, a northerner.” 63 Võ Long Triều. Hồi ký Võ Long Triều (Memoirs of Võ Long Triều), online document, available full-text at this RFUL: http://www.vietnamvanhien. org/hoikyvolongtrieu.html. In the Section “Mọi chuyện đổ vở vì Tướng Loan” (Everything lost because of General Loan). The author, Minister of Youth and Sports, reported that he was informed by Mr. Nguyễn Văn Trường, Minister of Education as follows: Tướng Nguyễn Ngọc Loan bắt ông BS Nguyễn Tấn Lộc, Đổng Lý Văn Phòng Bộ Y Tế về tội “chia rẽ Nam Bắc.” Đổng Lý Văn Phòng là nhân vật số 2 trong bộ mà ông Loan bắt giữ với tội danh kỳ lạ như vậy mà không hề thông báo cho chính phủ. (General Loan arrested Dr. Nguyễn Tấn Lộc, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Health for “North-South discrimination”. The Chief of Staff is no. 2 of a ministry and Mr. Loan arrested for such a strange crime without notifying the Government.)

64 Võ Long Triều, ibid. This is what Mr. Triều wrote about the telephone conversation between him and General Kỳ that showed that General Kỳ had never been told by General Loan of the arrest of Dr. Lộc: Tôi nghe nói Tướng Loan bắt giam BS Lộc, Đổng Lý Văn Phòng Bộ Y Tế về tội chia rẽ Nam Bắc, có phải do lệnh của anh không? … Làm gì có chuyện đó. Toa lúc nào cũng vấn đề … vấn đề… Moa bảo đãm không có việc đó đâu. Để

100 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government moa gọi thằng Loan xem, năm phút sau moa sẽ gọi lại. Chưa đầy năm phút ông Kỳ gọi lại. Có bắt, nhưng moa đã bảo nó thả ngay ông Lộc rồi. (I heard that General Loan arrested Dr. Lộc, Director of Cabinet of the Health Ministry for South-North discrimination, was that by your order? … That never happened. You always had issues … issues. … I can guarantee you that that never happened. Let me phone Loan, I’ll call you back in five minutes. After not even five minutes Ky called back. Yes, it happened, but I have already ordered Loan to release Dr. Lộc right away.) 65 “Indications that the cabinet crisis may be intensifying discussed,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 18- Oct-1966, declassified 01-Mar-1994, 4 p. On p. 2: Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Nguyen Luu Vien, one of the six resigning ministers, is constantly receiving threatening telephone calls. Minister of Youth Vo Long Trieu, another of the six, said that General Loan informed him that he (Loan) has a thousand and one means of getting rid of Vien and all those connected with him. 66 This was the Summit Conference of the seven allied countries in the Vietnam War: RVN, United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, held in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, on October 24 and 25, 1966. The RVN delegation was led by Lt.- General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Chairman of the Directorate, and Maj- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Chairman of the CEC. 67 “Situation in South Vietnam covering the period 11/7-11/13/66,” DDRS, CIA weekly report, dated 14-Nov-1966, declassified 16-Dec-1993, 20 p. On p. 8: On 11 November, Premier Ky announced to the 79-member government advisory body, the Peoples Army Council, that the resignations of Youth Minister Trieu and Education Minister Truong had been accepted, but only after he had made a determined effort to have them stay on. No replacements for these men were named by Ky. The resignation of Economy Minister Thanh had been accepted previously. In view of this announcement, it appears that the four other dissidents within the cabinet, including Deputy Premier Vien will probably remain.

10 Moving toward the Second Republic

The Civil Revolt of Central Vietnam in 1966, although creating a serious political storm that almost led to a fratricidal civil war between military and civilian forces of the RVN, in fact concluded with a very positive impact on the RVN politics: the generals in power, through their two committees, the Directorate and the CEC, finally knew that they could no longer keep going on with their militarist regime, and the only solution would be to hold elections for the Constituent Assembly (from now on referred to as CA), draft a new constitution and establish a democratically elected government.

Elections of the Constituent Assembly 1966 One week after Lieutenant- General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Chairman of the Directorate, came to preside over the closing ceremony of the National Political Congress on April 14, 1966 and signed the Decree-L aw no. 14/66 allowing for the elections of the CA, on April 22, the CEC convened a committee of 48 individuals to start drafting the election law.1 Mr. Trần Văn Ân, a famous and respected southern politician was elected Chairman of this committee. The committee had been working for almost one month when the Directorate decided to take military action in Đà Nẵng (May 16, 1966); Prof. Trần Quang Thuận (one of the Buddhist representatives on the committee) withdrew from the committee in protest of this action. Mr. Ân sent a letter to Prof. Thuận asking him to reconsider his decision but did not receive any response. Another member of the committee, Provincial Councilor of Thừa Thiên, Mr. Nguyễn Khoa Phạm, also resigned.2 In spite of this setback, the committee continued its hard work and finished its job. The project law was submitted to the Directorate on June 5.3 After two weeks of discussions and exchanges of ideas between the Directorate and the committee, the revised project law was approved by the Directorate and promulgated on June 19 as two separate decrees: Decree-Law no. 021/66 and Decree-L aw no. 022/66.4

102  Moving toward the Second Republic The Decree-Law 021/66 was consisted of three chapters with a total of 24 articles distributed as follows: • • •

Chapter I: Status of the Representatives of the CA; articles 2–7 Chapter II: Administration of the CA; articles 8–15 Chapter III: Constitution drafting procedure; articles 16–24

Thus, in addition to setting out the special status for Representatives of the CA, this Decree-Law provided general guidelines for the structure and administration of the CA as well as the procedure to be followed by the CA and the Directorate in the drafting and approval of the Constitution. The term of the CA would be automatically ended after the promulgation of the Constitution (Article 21). The Directorate would have the duty to establish all national institutions required by the Constitution within three to six months after the promulgation of the Constitution (Article 22). The Decree-Law 022/66 was consisted of seven chapters with a total of 52 articles distributed as follows: • • • • • • •

Chapter I: Election Day, Electoral Districts, and Number of Representatives; articles 2–3 Chapter II: Voters; articles 4– 8 Chapter III: Candidates; articles 9–17 Chapter IV: Electoral Campaign; articles 18–27 Chapter V: Balloting; articles 28–36 Chapter VI: Tallying Votes and Declaration of Voting Results; articles 37–46 ­ Chapter VII: Appeals; articles 47–52

According to this Decree-Law, the CA would be elected by general popular votes; each representative would represent roughly 50,000 voters. In the whole country there would be 52 electoral districts, which would elect 108 representatives (among these 108, 4 would be reserved for the Khmer populations of the four Mekong-delta provinces: Ba Xuyên, Châu Đốc, Kiên Giang, and Vĩnh Bình); the Montagnards, the Chàms and the Northern Montagnards Refugees would choose, in accordance with their traditions and customs, a total of nine representatives; thus the real total members of the CA would be 117). Among the 43 provinces of the RVN, the 20 small-size provinces would be entitled to one representative each; the 13 medium-size provinces entitled to two each; and the ten large-size provinces entitled to three or more each (e.g., Gia Định, the province surrounding Saigon, would have two electoral districts and would be entitled to ten representatives). For the six recognized municipalities, each one would elect one representative, except Đà Nẵng would be entitled to two. The capital city of Saigon would have three electoral districts and would elect 16 representatives.

Moving toward the Second Republic  103 To be qualified, the candidates had to meet all of the following requirements: • • • • • •

Be a Vietnamese citizen by birth, or a naturalized Vietnamese for at least five years, or a re-naturalized Vietnamese for at least three years Be 25 years old as of election day Be entitled to all citizen’s rights Have legal residence in any place within the territory of Vietnam without interruption for at least one year before election day Be in good standing with military service Be excluded from cases of ineligibility listed in Article 105

This Article 10 listed several cases of non- eligibility among which the two following ones were most important: • •

Civil servants, military persons, and government officials at any level who had been suspended, removed, fired or forced to resign following disciplinary measures Persons who had directly or indirectly worked for the Communists; and neutralists who were sympathized with the Communists or whose activities had been beneficial for the Communists6

These measures clearly aimed at excluding the ‘tainted” former associates of Ngô Đình Diệm regime, as well as more recent political dissidents (for example, those involved in the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam). Article 11 subsequently asserted that governmental and military officials, and their spouses, were forbidden to run for elections at electoral districts where they were serving or had been serving during the previous six months. In addition, would-be candidate had to post a surety of VN $10,000 (this sum of money would be reimbursed if the candidate garnered more than 5% of the total vote in his electoral district). For electoral modalities, in electoral districts where only one representative would be elected, the candidates would run as individuals; the winner would be who got the highest total vote. In electoral districts where multiple representatives would be elected, the candidates would run in slate; voters would vote for the entire slate rather than for the individual candidate. A voting quota was defined by dividing the total number of actual voters by the number of representatives allotted to the district. The number of seats gained by each slate would be determined by diving the total votes garnered by that slate by the quota; the more quotas it got the more seats it would gain. If there were still unfilled seats, then they would by allotted to the slate that had garnered the next highest vote. Slates that had not garnered more than 5% of the total votes in the district would not be elected.7

104  Moving toward the Second Republic This rather unusual procedure was required in order to avoid the situation where a well-organized organization could sweep all the seats allotted to a district. The lawmakers also believed that it could also encourage political and religious groups in forming alliances and eliminating a multiplicity of small parties which could otherwise run individual candidates. The Decree-Law no. 022/66 also designated September 11 as Election Day and July 11 and 14 as deadlines for the registration of individual candidates and slates, respectively. After the lists of candidates were reviewed and approved by local Electoral Councils, the tally was as follows: • •

Slates: 212 slates with a total of 401 candidates (383 men and 18 women) Individual candidates: 164 distributed as follows: 130 (Vietnamese + Khmer), 28 Montagnards, two Chams, and four Northern Montagnard Refugees.8

In general, in electoral districts of Sài Gòn and the Gia Định Province, most candidates were city and provincial councilors, teachers, businessmen, and professionals; there were only a few military persons. The slates did not clearly reflect the relationships with the traditional political and religious groups. Among the 212 slates for the whole country, there were only one slate by the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng, one by the Hòa Hảo, and one by a coalition of Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài.9 Throughout the whole electoral campaign period, and even on the Election Day, the Communist forces first used their propaganda machinery to entice the population to boycott the elections and then used their Armed Forces to intimidate, assassinate, and sabotage the elections. However, thanks to the extraordinary efforts by the War Cabinet under pressure from the US Government, and with the security and military situation being much improved by the significant growth of the ARVN as well as the presence of more than 200,000 US and Allied combat troops, the elections for the CA have achieved great results as shown in the following table: Table 10.1 Election of CA – Distribution of Votes

Country Capital I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps Minorities

Total Voters

Actual Voters

Percentage

5,289,652 1,308,413 821,859 915,146 671,220 1,573,014 2,901

4,274,812 905,632 717,292 785,859 557,604 1,308,425 2,840

80.8 69.0 87.2 86.9 83.0 83.1 97.8

Source: Quốc Hội Lập Hiến: 11–9 –1966: mở đầu chu kỳ vàng son trong lịch sử Việt Nam (The National Assembly: 11-Sep-1966: opening the golden cycle of Vietnam). (Saigon: Nha Chương Trình Tài Liệu (Directorate for Programs and Documents), Tổng Bộ Thông Tin Chiêu Hồi (General Ministry of Information and Open Arms Program), 1966), 54. (Figures for Minorities are for their Electoral College; Minorities = Northern Montagnard Refugees).

Moving toward the Second Republic  105

Drafting the Constitution of 1967 The CA was solemnly inaugurated on Tuesday, September 27, with the presence of all members of the Directorate, the CEC, the Civilian-Military Council, the Armed Forces Council and the diplomatic corps. In the afternoon of Thursday, September 29, the CA held its first meeting and established the Credentials and the Rules Committees as well as a flood-relief sub- committee. The present deputies also decided to call for the first plenary session of the CA on the next day, Friday September 30. After one week of hard work, at the session of October 5, the Credentials Committee reported that it had vetted 94 (out of the total of 117) deputies. It should be noted that the Catholic deputies have been elected to a number of important positions within these first committees of the CA. They have gained six of the 15 seats of the Rules Committee and three of the six executive seats of this Committee. “Southern Catholic deputy Nguyễn Văn Hội, who was later elected committee chairman, received 70 votes out of 110 voting for the rules committee membership.”10 In the week of October 17–24, the number of vetted deputies has been brought to 111, with only six cases pending verdict by the tribunals. The CA completed its Rules, and the procedure for the establishment of Blocs and put in place four standing committees: • • • •

Constitution Drafting Committee Information and Press Committee Budget and Finance Committee People’s Aspiration Committee

On October 26, the CA elected its Office with the following membership11: Speaker: Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu First Deputy Speaker: Mr. Lê Quang Liêm Second Deputy Speaker: Mr. Nguyễn Văn Đính Secretary-General: Mr. Trương Tiến Đạt First Deputy Secretary-General: Mr. Nguyễn Hữu Lương Second Deputy Secretary-General: Mr. Nguyen Hữu Trung Third Deputy Secretary-General: Mr. Thạch Sung Treasurer: Mr. Mai Văn Thiệp Treasurer: Mr. Trần Văn Phiên After the election of its Office, the CA adjourned for several days so that the Blocs had enough time to form. On October 31, four Blocs were formed. The largest of four established blocs is the Peoples Bloc, with 44 delegates mostly native to north and central Vietnam and significant participation by Dai Viet Party, military, and Catholic members… The 16-member Democratic Bloc, which is almost entirely Catholic… Among the remaining assembly delegates, the Alliance Bloc, has 25 members, and is primarily southern-based with a core of Hoa Hao supporters. The final

106  Moving toward the Second Republic group, the Movement for the Renaissance of the South [MRS], has 12 or 13 members, and is a more militant group of southern regionalists.12 On November 8, the CA had a heated debate on the Article no. 20 of the Decree-Law 021/66, which regulated the organization of the CA. According to this Article, the CA would need a two-thirds majority to reject changes made by the Chairman of the Directorate to the draft constitution.13 Recognizing that this majority was almost impossible to reach, the CA unanimously resolved to create a special task force of 12 deputies with a mandate to amend the Decree-Law 021/66 and submit the amendments to the Directorate for approval.14 Immediately after that, the CA begun discussing basic characteristics of the constitution. The Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, however, requested the CA to postpone this discussion for two weeks so that the Committee would have enough time to prepare and submit a working document containing the basic guiding principles of the draft constitution, making the CA discussion easier. This request was accepted by the CA. The Office of the Secretary-General provided the Constitution Drafting Committee with copies of constitutions of several countries in the world for its consultation in the drafting of the constitution for South Vietnam. The Chairman of the Committee, Deputy Đinh Thành Châu, believed that the Committee would be able to finish the draft of basic principles of the constitution for discussion at the CA’s plenary session on November 28.15 In the meantime, the special task force, on November 18, finished off the list of amendments of the Decree-Law 021/66, of which the amendment of Article 20 was the most important and transferred the list to the Directorate for consideration. On November 26, two days before the anticipated date, the CA held a plenary session to begin the discussion of the basic principles for the drafting of the constitution submitted by the Constitution Drafting Committee16: • • • •

Executive branch: a presidential regime with a strong president Legislative branch: a bicameral assembly; upper house with 30–35 members; lower house with each member representing 25,000–30,000 voters Judiciary branch: totally independent, with a nine-member supreme court Inspectorate: equal to the other three branches, with nine Inspectors having the power to monitor and investigate activities of the other three branches

The discussion of these principles for the drafting of the constitution was interrupted for a short while when one of the prominent members of the CA, Mr. Trần Văn Văn, was assassinated on December 7.17 Mr. Trần Văn Văn, an important member of the anti-government MRS Block, had been always highly critical of the militarist government of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. The CA created a committee, headed by Representative Lý Quí Chung, to investigate the assassination. The committee was later disbanded under

Moving toward the Second Republic  107 pressure from the National Police under General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan. Many people, including Mr. Trần Văn Văn’s family, believed the assassination was carried out by the government following General Loan’s orders. Only very recently, in 2015, a live TV show in Hà Nội revealed, for the first time, that the assassination was carried out by the communists.18 The CA resumed its discussion of these principles after Deputy Trần Văn Văn’s funeral. A majority of deputies expressed their concern over the possibility of a powerful president that could lead to a dictatorship similar to the First Republic under President Ngô Đình Diệm. To offset this possibility the CA agreed to create a position of prime minister, who would be designated by the president but could be subject to the legislature’s questioning and vote of non-confidence. The CA also decided that local government officials including provincial chiefs would be elected by the people. These discussions by the CA caused uneasiness within the military government and they decided to intervene. First of all, they had to respond to the CA’s request for amendments of the Decree-Law 021/66, of which the most important was the amendment of Article no. 20 aimed at curbing the Directorate’s powerful veto. The Directorate met, discussed, and rejected the CA’s request.19 It then sought ways to influence the CA’s activities through the Blocs. General Kỳ had several meetings with deputies to build good relations with them, especially the chairmen of committees. All of these efforts resulted in the reorganization of the Blocs. On December 13, the Democratic Bloc and the Alliance Bloc merged together and became the new Democratic Alliance Bloc. This new Democratic Alliance Bloc also attracted four new deputies and became the largest bloc with 45 members. It was a pro-government bloc and strongly supportive of General Kỳ.20 During the sessions at the end of 1966, the CA passed resolutions on the remaining basic principles for the draft constitution: a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, one or several advisory councils for economic and social matters, and the election of government officials of the 44 provinces and the six autonomous municipalities.21 In January 1967, the CA began to discuss the last basic principle for the constitution dealing with the transitional period after the promulgation of the constitution and before the inauguration of the first president. The CA decided to grant itself an extension so that it could work on the presidential and legislature election laws. With all basic principles of the constitution agreed upon, on January 19, the CA met in plenary session to begin final discussion and voting on each article of the draft constitution. A few days before there had been several meetings between the Directorate and representatives of the CA to discuss those articles in the draft constitution that the Directorate would like to make changes.22 The representatives of the CA tended to accept these changes; they anticipated that it would be very hard to veto these changes since the Directorate had already rejected the amendment of Article 20 of the Decree-Law 021/66. The CA had two sessions everyday and quickly

108  Moving toward the Second Republic passed the first two chapters of the draft constitution: Chapter I, Basic Articles; and, Chapter II, Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens. After that, the CA adjourned for the Tet Holiday from February 8 to 13, 1967. After Tet, the CA resumed their work on February 14 with discussion of Chapter III, Legislative Branch. This Chapter contained articles that the Directorate had wanted to modify. Thanks to the previous meetings between the Directorate and delegates from the CA in mid-January, after two days of heated debate, the whole Chapter III with all modifications proposed by the Directorate was passed on February 16.23 The most important modification in this Chapter was the transfer of authority during emergency period from the legislative branch to the executive branch. In the following week, the CA passed quite quickly Chapter IV, Executive Branch. The only article of this Chapter that caused some heated debate was the one on the age requirement for candidates for the presidency. The southern deputies of the Bloc for the Movement for the Renaissance of the South, still unhappy and unforgetful with the handling of the Cabinet Crisis in October 1966 by General Kỳ, suggested 40 as the minimum age requirement, aiming at eliminating Kỳ as a potential candidate (at that time General Kỳ was 37 and General Thiệu was 43), but finally the CA voted in favor of 35 as minimum age requirement.24 The remaining chapters of the draft constitution on the Judiciary Branch, the Special Institutions, Political Parties and Opposition, Amendments, and Transitional Articles were passed by the CA in the first two weeks of March 1967. The whole text of the draft constitution was completed in mid-March. On March 16, the Directorate sent to the Office of the CA a memo listing the following remarks25: • • • • • • • • • •

There was a lack of balance in the draft constitution The Legislative Branch was given more power than the Executive Branch The workers’ participation in factory management could not be a constitutional right The Legislative rights to question and recommend dismissal of cabinet would lead to a parliamentary regime The appointment of provincial chiefs should be part of Executive rights The Supreme Court should be nominated by the judiciary electoral college The Inspectorate should not be a super-agency The disbanding of political parties should be part of Executive rights The Transitional Period should be cut down to from three to six months The CA should not become the Legislative Assembly and stay on for 18 months

This time the CA decided to ignore these remarks and resolved to keep the completed draft constitution intact. This confrontational situation might lead to a delay of the promulgation of the constitution. The timing was also

Moving toward the Second Republic  109 really bad for General Kỳ, who would be going to Guam for the next US– South Vietnam Summit Conference to be held on March 20. He desperately needed to show US President Johnson the finished constitution as a proof that the RVN had finally reached political stability and on the way to form a democratically elected government. For these political reasons, General Kỳ decided to unilaterally (i.e. without participation of the other members of the Directorate) met with representatives of the CA to seek some compromise in order to break through the impasse. He was able to reach this compromise. On the one hand, the CA accepted to keep the Directorate and the CEC until after the presidential election. On the other hand, General Ky accepted all requests by the CA, including the election of provincial chiefs (but with an additional article mentioning that the president could appoint provincial chiefs in the first term) as well as the legislative right to vote for non- confidence of the cabinet.26 After having obtained these concessions from General Kỳ, the CA passed the final vote for the draft constitution on March 18 and transferred it immediately to the Directorate for approval. On the next day, March 19, the Directorate and the CEC accepted in principle the draft constitution submitted by the CA.27 On March 24, Speaker Phan Khắc Sửu came to the Độc Lập Palace to officially submit the final constitution text now already approved by both the CA and the Directorate. On March 27, the Armed Forces Great Council also approved the constitution, reluctantly though. According to the Chính Luận daily newspaper, at the first round of voting, the majority of generals voted against the constitution. Generals Thiệu and Kỳ had to persuade them to reconsider for the sake of “the needs for democracy development and political stability.” At the second round of voting, the result was “35 votes for, 8 against, and 2 blank.”28 The final communiqué from the Armed Forces Great Council also made the following announcements: (1) the Constitution would be promulgated on April 1, 1967; (2) the election dates for President/ Senate, and Lower House would be September 1, 1967, and October 1, 1967, respectively; (3) both the Directorate and the CEC would continue to hold power until the inauguration of the president- elect. The Constitution promulgated on April 1, 1967, consisted of nine chapters with a total of 117 articles distributed as follows29: • • • • • • • • •

Chapter I: Basic Articles, Articles 1–5 Chapter II: Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens, Articles 6–29 Chapter III: Legislative Branch, Articles 30–50 Chapter IV: Executive Branch, Articles 51–75 Chapter V: Judiciary Branch, Articles 76– 84 Chapter VI: Special Institutions, Articles 85–98 Chapter VII: Political Parties and Opposition, Articles 99–102 Chapter VIII: Ameding The Constitution, Articles 103–107 Chapter IX: Transitional Articles, Articles 108–117

110  Moving toward the Second Republic According to this new Constitution, the RVN would have a presidential regime with a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary system. The President and Vice-President, on the same ticket, would be elected for a term of four years and could be re- elected only once (Article 52, Paragraph 2). The president would appoint the Prime Minister, and following recommendations by the Prime Minister, would appoint members of the cabinet (Article 58, Paragraph 1). The President would be the CommanderIn-Chief of the ARVN (Article 60), and Chairman of the National Security Council (Article 69, Paragraph 2). The Vice-President would be Chairman of the three advisory councils: Council for Cultural and Educational Affairs, Council for Economic and Social Affairs, and Council for Ethnic Minorities (Article 66, Paragraph 1). The Legislature would consist of two chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House would have from 100 to 200 Representatives elected individually, serving a term of four years with possibility to be reelected (Article 31, Paragraphs 1 and 2). The Senate would have from 30 to 60 Senators elected by tickets, serving a term of six years (with half of them to be re-elected every three years), and with possibility to be re-elected (Article 33, Paragraphs 1 and 2). The Legislature would exercise the following powers: pass the laws, ratify treaties, declare war, make peace, and control the government (Article 30, Paragraphs 1–5). After passage at the Legislature, all bills would be transferred to the President in three working days; the time for the President to sign the bills would be 15 working days; in case of emergency determined by the Legislature, this time could be reduced to seven working days; if the President did not sign the bills within these time frames, the bills would automatically become laws and would be promulgated by the Chairman of the Senate (Article 44). During this time frame, the President could send the bills back to the Legislature, and, with written reasons, request the Legislature to work again on one or more articles in the bills; in this case, the Legislative would have a plenary joint-session to discuss these requests from the President, and, with an absolute majority, could veto these requests; the bills would automatically become laws and would be sent again to the President for promulgation (Article 45). The Legislature, with a two-third vote, would have the power to make recommendations to replace part of whole of the cabinet (Article 42, Paragraph 1). The House would have to vote on the national budget before November 30 of each year; the Senate before December 31 (Article 46, Paragraphs 3 and 4). The Judiciary power would be independent and vested in the Supreme Court (Article 76, Paragraph 1). The Supreme Court would have from 9 to 15 Supreme Court Judges selected by the Legislature and appointed by the President from a list of 30 candidates elected by the Judge Corps, the Prosecutors Corps, and the Lawyers Corps (Article 70, Paragraph 1); Supreme Court Judges would serve a term of six years (Article 80, Paragraph 3). The Inspectorate was one of the Special Institutions listed in Chapter VI. The Inspectorate would have the power to: (1) Inspect, control, and

Moving toward the Second Republic  111 investigate government officials and other private co- defendants for bribery, speculation, and abuse of power or activities detrimental to the national interest; (2) Audit the accounting of governmental agencies and corporations; (3) Take an inventory of properties of government officials including the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Representatives, Senators, and Chief Justice; (4) For the Chief Inspector and the Inspectors, the inventory of their properties would be carried out by the Supreme Court (Article 88). The Inspectorate would have from 9 to 18 Inspectors, one-third designated by the Legislature, one-third by the President, and one-third by the Supreme Court; the Inspectors would have the special power and guarantee to carry out their duties (Article 90). The President, or more than half of the members of the Legislature would be able to propose amendments to the Constitution (Article 103, Paragraph 1). The resolution for these amendments would require a vote of two-thirds of the Legislature (Article 105). During the transitional period, the CA’s term would be extended so that it could carry out the following functions: (1) To prepare and vote on the laws for the elections of the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, the laws to organize the Supreme Court and the Inspectorate, and the laws for political parties and the press; (2) To rectify treaties (Article 109). The CA’s new term would automatically end when the first-term Legislature was convened (Article 110). Also, during this transitional period, the Directorate and the CEC would continue to exercise the executive power until the inauguration of the first-term President and Vice-President (Article 111).

Presidential and senatorial elections of September 1967 After the Constitution was solemnly promulgated on April 1, 1967, at the Độc Lập Palace, the CA resumed its work. “Phan Khắc Sửu was reelected chairman of the Constituent Assembly on 14 April, pulling a wide majority in contrast to his narrow margin last fall.”30 The CA also elected the Presidential Election Law Drafting Committee, with Deputy Đinh Xuân Quảng (Democratic Bloc) as Chairman and Deputy Nguyễn Văn Sâm (MRS Bloc) 31 as Vice-Chairman. ­ This Committee completed the draft in two weeks and “The Constituent Assembly on 29 April began debate of the draft of the presidential election law…”32 The article in the draft that caused a lot of debate was the one that required presidential candidates to be introduced by at least 30 elected representatives (National Assembly deputies or provincial / city councilors); this article also stated clearly that these elected representatives could introduce only one ticket.33 The draft also set the election day for the presidential race at September 3. The CA completed the draft on May 16 and sent it off to the Directorate for approval. On May 26, the Directorate sent it back to the CA, requesting that the CA removed the article requiring the introduction of presidential candidates by at least 30 elected representatives; in addition, the Directorate also suggested that the senatorial

112  Moving toward the Second Republic election date be set at the same day of the presidential election.34,35 On June 2, the CA voted to keep the article requiring the introduction of presidential candidates by 30 elected representatives. On June 6, the CA put the draft senatorial election law through final vote and still kept December 17 as the election day.36 The Directorate again requested the CA to change the senatorial election day, and this time the CA concurred and set the senatorial election day on the same day with the presidential election.37 The lower house election law was also passed by the CA and subsequently approved by the Directorate on August 7. On June 30, deadline for the presidential and senatorial elections, the tally was: 18 presidential tickets and 66 senatorial tickets.38 For the lower chamber election, on October 1, the tally was: 1,240 candidates competing for 137 seats in 53 electoral districts.39 In the presidential race, the most surprising event was the formation of the Thiệu–Kỳ ­ ticket. The rivalry between these two generals was not unknown within the South Vietnamese political community. They did not like each other, partly because of differences in personal characters, but mostly because of access to power. After two years in his position as Chairman of the CEC (or Prime Minister), General Kỳ in fact acquired a lot more power than General Thiệu. He was successful in building a personal network of supporters among the military and governmental machinery, especially after he had eliminated General Nguyễn Chánh Thi and crushed the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam. Using the pretext of anti- corruption, he also removed General Đặng Văn Quang, a close associate of General Thiệu, from the IV Corps. Using the same reason, he also eliminated General Nguyễn Hữu Có while the latter was on an official trip to Taiwan. He also placed his loyal friends in commanding military, security and administrative positions. His right-hand man, General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, held all three security positions: Director of the Military Security Services, Director-General of National Police, and Head of the Central Intelligence Organization. General Lê Nguyên Khang, his personal friend and supporter, was also given three important commanding positions: Commandant of the Marines Corps, Commander of the Capital Special District, and Commander of the III Corps (surrounding Saigon). During the Cabinet Crisis of October 1966, thanks to his goodwill and political skills, he was able to persuade four of the six resigning ministers to stay on. He also worked hard to gain the support of the Southern religious sects Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo. He also signed the DecreeLaw No. 62-SL/GD, which created the University of Cần Thơ for the Mekong Delta, gaining strong approval from Southerners. In brief, at this point in time, after two years in power, General Kỳ was in a much better position to run for president than General Thiệu. He officially announced his candidacy on May 12 at a news conference in Đà Lạt.40 One week later, on May 19, General Thiệu also announced his candidacy.41 The fact that both generals decided to run for president really worried the military circle. First, this would lead to disunity among the Armed Forces; second, this disunity could lead to the victory of a civilian ticket, something the military absolutely did

Moving toward the Second Republic  113 42

not want to happen. Because a large majority of the generals were now on General Kỳ’s side, General Thiệu was under heavy and continuous pressure to withdraw his candidacy but he consistently refused to do so. Finally, General Nguyễn Đức Thắng, very well-known for his outspoken style, was sent by Kỳ’s camp to talk directly to Thiệu into quitting the race. Thắng did not succeed.43 On May 25, in his meeting with Mr. Bùi Diễm, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States who had been called back to Saigon by the government for consultation, General Thiệu again repeated his determination to stay in the race.44 The US Government was also supporting General Kỳ’s candidacy and wanted to find ways to pressure Thiệu to get out.45 Now it became very clear to everyone that General Thiệu would never withdraw his candidacy. General Kỳ proceeded with his plan, inviting Mr. Nguyễn Văn Lộc, a Southern lawyer, to join him in his bid for the presidency. General Thiệu formed his own ticket with Mr. Trình Quốc Khánh, a Hòa Hảo leader. Facing this serious division among the military, which could lead to the victory of a civilian candidate, and at the same time, the deadline for candidacy application – July 1 – was approaching, General Cao Văn Viên, Chief of the General Staff (probably after having consulted the commanders of the four Corps) decided to convene the Armed Forces Great Council on June 28 in order to break this impasse. After two days of closed meetings, both Thiệu and Kỳ agreed to stand for election in the same presidential ticket. Of course, once he had agreed to run together with General Thiệu, General Kỳ had to accept the vice-president position on the ticket because of the military hierarchy: Thiệu was a lieutenant-general (3-star general), and Kỳ a major-general (2-star-general); Thieu was also older.46,47 This was a big concession (if not a sacrifice) from General Kỳ under tremendous pressure by all generals present at the meeting. As a face-saving measure for General Kỳ, the senior generals decided to create a secret top military committee responsible for all policy and personnel matters for the GVN after the election and with General Kỳ as Chairman.48 This secret pact was a serious violation of the new Constitution; both Thiệu and Kỳ, therefore, dared not publicly reveal its existence.49 After a while, no one talked about it anymore. Of course, the person who gained the most from this affair was General Thiệu. In addition to the forceful coup on Thiệu–Kỳ ­ ticket, the generals had to cope with the possibility of General Dương Văn Minh running for president too. General Cao Văn Viên was sent to Bangkok to persuade General Minh not to run but General Minh did not agree. On June 28, they passed a resolution that General Minh should not come back to Việt Nam to run for president.50 General Minh, however, did not reconsider and proceeded as planned. His running mate was Trần Ngọc Liểng, former Commissioner of Social Affairs in General Kỳ’s War Cabinet. On July 6, General Viên together with the commanders of the four Corps sent a letter to the CA objecting the acceptance of General Minh’s ticket.51 Finally, General Minh’s ticket was eliminated by the CA’s special committee responsible for vetting candidates’ applications.

114  Moving toward the Second Republic On July 19, the CA posted the list of officially accepted presidential candidates. Seven tickets were eliminated and there were now 11 presidential tickets, one military ticket (Thiệu–Kỳ) ­ and ten civilian tickets. Among the ten civilian tickets, only three had some potentials and could cause some difficulties to the military ticket: the Trần Văn Hương–Mai ­ Thọ Truyền ticket, the Phan Khắc Sừu–Phan Quang Đán ticket, and the Hà Thúc Ký–Nguyễn Văn Định ticket. The Ký–Định ­ ticket was the weakest among these three civilian tickets for the following reasons: (1) The candidates were not nationally well-k nown; Mr. Hà Thúc Ký was a leader of the Đại Việt Party, Central faction and was Minister of the Interior for a short while in General Nguyen Khánh cabinet; but Mr. Nguyễn Văn Định was almost totally unknown to the people; (2) Their political base was only in Central Vietnam; the Đại Việt Party did not have a centralized national structure; (3) The votes they might gather would be very limited, from Đại Việt Party members, and only of the Central faction. Next in strength was the Sửu–Đán ticket. Both candidates were nationalist politicians with impressive political activities not only during the French domination but also under the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. They were wellknown by the people, especially Mr. Sửu. Even after the Ngô Đình Diệm regime was overthrown, they continued to be very politically active: Mr Sửu was Chief of State during the Trần Văn Hương and Phan Huy Quát administrations; he was the Speaker of the CA (that created the new Constitution); Mr. Đán was a well-respected Deputy of the CA. Their problem lied with the fact that they were not running as candidates of any political party; their political base, therefore, would be quite limited. Mr. Sửu was a Deputy of Electoral District 1 of Sài Gòn; Mr. Đán was representing one of the two electoral districts of the Province of Gia Định (he had been Chairman of the Gia Định Provincial Council). The political strength of this ticket would be within the Sài Gòn– Gia Định area. The Hương–Truyền ticket was the strongest among the civilian ones. Its ­ strength came first of all from the excellent reputation of the two candidates. Mr. Hương was well-known since the time he had been Mayor of Sài Gòn under Ngô Đình Diệm regime, and more recently as Prime Minister. He was well respected by Southerners as an incorrupted and decent politician. Mr. Truyền was the President of the Association for Buddhist Studies of South Vietnam and made significant contributions to the Buddhist struggle against the Ngô Đình Diệm regime during the Buddhist Crisis of 1963. This was the unique ticket with both candidates being Southerners. It was strongly supported by the MRS created by Mr. Võ Long Triều, former Commissioner of Youth of General Ky’s War Cabinet. Ironically, the strength of this ticket was also its weakness. The election of the CA of 1966 had shown the limitation of the strength of the Southerners’ votes: the Northern refugees and the Catholics had succeeded in electing more candidates. Within the CA, the Movement for the Renaissance of the South Bloc was the smallest bloc

Moving toward the Second Republic  115 and almost always defeated in any important votes during the drafting of the Constitution and the drafting of the presidential election law as well. Besides, of course, this ticket would not be attractive to voters from Central Vietnam where most Buddhists under RV Thích Trí Quang’s influence still vividly remembered their struggle against Trần Văn Hương government at the end of 1964. In addition, the Hương–Truyền ­ ticket would not be able to count on voters west of the Mekong River where the majority of them were Hòa Hảo followers. One should also take into consideration the fact that the Hương– Truyền campaign was not as well-organized as one might have thought. It had adequate representation in III and IV Corps, only partly in I Corps and none in II Corps. There was some friction between members of the MRS and the Lực Lượng Bảo Vệ Tự Do (Freedom Protection Forces), another political group supporting the Hương–Truyền ­ ticket. This friction led to the creation of the Âu Trường Thanh–Vũ ­ Văn Huyền ticket. Although, at the end, the Thanh–Huyền ­ ticket was eliminated by the CA, the antagonism between these two groups has somehow weakened the Hương–Truyền ­ ticket.52 In ­ brief, the Hương–Truyền ticket, although with two Southerners having good reputation and deep respect, still hardly found support on a national basis. While the civilian votes could be divided among these three tickets (not to mention the fact that the seven remaining civilian tickets would cut deeper ­ into the civilian vote pool), the Thiệu–Kỳ ticket was the unique military ticket, after the CA had eliminated the Minh–Liểng ticket. The number of potential military votes was very significant since, at this point in time, the number of the ARVN troops, including the Regional and Civil Guard forces, has reached the proximity of one million. Generals Thiệu and Kỳ were still holding power with a regional and local administrative system totally headed by military officers; all municipal and provincial chiefs were ­ appointed by the central government in Saigon, i.e. Thiệu–Kỳ government. A number of these provincial chiefs, although probably not under any pressure from Saigon, could, on their own initiatives, engage in various schemes ­ ticket for many different personal reasons. to gather votes for the Thiệu–Kỳ Finally, since they were still the incumbents, Generals Thiệu and Kỳ had by far more means, including financial, than the civilian candidates to carry out their campaign programs. Within such conditions, the victory of the ­ ticket was almost something guaranteed. Thiệu–Kỳ Like with the CA election the year before, the Communists used all means to sabotage the presidential and senatorial elections: attacks on isolated military posts and police stations, shelling mortars into the cities, kidnapping hamlet/village officials. “The number of significant incidents of Communist violence is now at least three or four times normal and well above last year’s ­ pre-election level.”53 The big difference in the Communists’ sabotage strategy this time was that alongside with the violent attacks just mentioned they also incited people in those areas partially controlled by them to vote for the Trương Đình Dzu–Trần Văn Chiêu ticket, which advocated “peace at all cost.” This effort would bring surprising results to the presidential election.

116  Moving toward the Second Republic During more than one month of campaigning, although there were some regretful incidents that led to some government-protesting news conferences by the civilian tickets, in general the presidential and senatorial elections went quite well, without any serious violations of the election laws. On September 5, the CA posted the following temporary results of the presidential election: • •

The Thiệu–Kỳ ­ ticket elected with 1,649,561 votes The Dzu– Chiêu ticket came second with 817,120 votes

The result for the Dzu– Chiêu ticket was the biggest surprise of the presidential election since all polls had predicted that either the Hương–Truyền ­ ticket or Sửu–Đán ticket would come second. Another surprise was that the Thiệu–Kỳ ticket got only 34.8% of the votes, far below the level predicted ­ (1,649,561 out of 4,735,404 votes cast = 34.8%).54 The majority of the 22 American and 93 international observers agreed that the election showed many signs of being a free one.55 This observation was correct for the situation in Sài Gòn and its surrounding areas. The strong evidence could be found in the fact the Thiệu–Kỳ ­ ticket trailed the other civilian tickets in a number of electoral districts in Sài Gòn.56 Even the Thiệu–Kỳ ­ national vote percentage could be considered as a sign of this relatively clean election. However, in those provinces far away from Sài Gòn, there were several violations that led to the news conference organized by the 8 losing civilian tickets on September 7 in front of the National Assembly building where they accused the government of cheat and fraud.57 In the following days, a number of losing senatorial tickets also submitted to the CA petitions protesting against violations of the election law in tallying and controlling votes. Saigon students also met at their association office on Duy Tân Street and declared that they would not accept the election results because of fraud. On September 18, the CA posted the following temporary results of the senatorial election58: • • • • • •

Trần Văn Đôn slate: 980,474 votes Nguyễn Văn Huyền slate: 631,616 votes Nguyễn Gia Hiến slate: 600,720 votes Huỳnh Văn Cao slate: 569,975 votes Trần Văn Lắm slate: 553,720 votes Nguyễn Ngọc Kỷ slate: 553,632 votes

On September 19, the Democratic Front, composed of five losing presidential tickets and seven losing senatorial slates, sent a letter to the CA requesting annulment of the election results and organizing a new election.59 In the following days, students in Huế, Saigon, and Cần Thơ organized seminars, discussing the election results and raising the same demand. On September 30,

Moving toward the Second Republic  117 the Special Committee of the CA responsible for vetting the election results, which had been discussing the issue since the day before, confirmed that there were serious violations of the election law and voted to recommend to the CA to annul the results of the September 3 election.60 In spite of this recommendation, the CA, at its plenary session of October 2, with the presence of 107 deputies, voted to accept the results of the September 3 presidential election, with 58 yes, 43 no, 1 blank, and 4 spoiled votes.61 This resolution by the CA had already been predicted by the US State Department on a memo dated September 29, based on a report by the US Embassy in Saigon.62

Establishing the Second Republic On October 22, the election of the lower chamber went also well, with 73% of the registered voters casting their votes.63 With this election done, all basic political institutions for the Second Republic required by the new Constitution of 1967 have been in place. President-elect Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and VicePresident-elect ­ Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were inaugurated on October 31. The CEC resigned. Mr Nguyễn Văn Lộc, former running mate of General Ky before the creation of the Thiệu–Kỳ ­ ticket, was appointed Prime Minister. On November 9, the Nguyễn Văn Lộc cabinet was sworn-in at the Independence Palace with the following membership64:

Figure 10.1 President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ at inauguration ceremony on October 31, 1967.

118  Moving toward the Second Republic Prime Minister Junior Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office Junior Minister, Assistant to the Prime Minister Responsible for Relations with the National Assembly Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of National Defense Minister of the Interior Minister of Justice Minister of Economy Deputy Minister of Commerce Deputy Minister of Industries Minister of Finance Minister of Education Deputy Minister of Culture Deputy Minister of University and Technological Affairs Deputy Minister of Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education Deputy Minister of School and Youth Affairs Minister of Rural Construction Minister of Open Arms Program Minister of Public Works Minister of Communication and Transport Minister of Veteran Affairs Minister of Rural Reform and Agriculture Minister of Health Minister of Refugee Affairs Minister of Ethnic Affairs Minister of Labor

Lawyer Nguyễn Văn Lộc Mr. Đoàn Bá Cang Prof. Nguyễn Văn Tương Dr. Trần Văn Đỗ Mr. Phạm Đăng Lâm Lt.-General ­ Nguyễn Văn Vỹ Lt.- General Linh Quang Viên Mr. Huỳnh Đức Bửu Eng. Trương Thái Tôn Mr. Nguyễn Chánh Lý Mr. Võ Văn Nhung Mr. Lưu Văn Tính Dr. Tăng Kim Đông Dr. Bùi Xuân Bào Mr. Trần Lưu Cung Prof. Lê Trọng Vinh Mr. Hồ Thới Sang ­ Lt.-General Nguyễn Bảo Trị Mr. Nguyễn Xuân Phong Mr. Bửu Đôn Mr. Lương Thế Siêu Lt.- Col. Dr. Nguyễn Tấn Hồng Eng. Tôn Thất Trình Dr. Trần Lữ Y Mr. Nguyễn Phúc Quế Mr. Paul Nur Dr. Phó Bá Long

The Nguyễn Văn Lộc government officially put an end to the politically chaotic period of 1963–1967 after the military coup overthrowing the First Republic and ushered in the new era of civilian government of the Second Republic established by the Constitution of 1967.

Notes 1 Đoàn Thêm, 1966: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 72. 2 “U.S. Ambassador William Porter reports on actions taken by the South Vietnamese Election Law Drafting Committee,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, dated 18-May-1966, declassified 24-Sep-1993, 2 p. On p. 1: Chairman Tran Van An opened May 18 session by congratulating members on their May 17 display of unity, referred to withdrawal of Tran Quang Thuan and read letter which he sent to Thuan requesting he reconsider decision pull out of committee. Thua Thien Provincial Councilor Nguyen Khoa Pham immediately announced he also withdrawing from committee.

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122  Moving toward the Second Republic 46 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 148. 47 Lâm Vĩnh Thế, “Phiên họp định mệnh của Thiếu Tướng Nguyễn Cao Kỳ” (The fateful meeting of Major-General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ) in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Republic of Vietnam), op. cit., 207–227. 48 Lâm Vĩnh Thế, “Mật ước giữa các tướng lãnh cao cấp của Việt Nam Cộng Hàa” (The secret pact between the high-ranking generals of the Republic of Vietnam), in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Republic of Vietnam), op. cit., 228–251. 49 “Cable from Ambassador Bunker to Secretary Rusk summarizing his view of the election relative to charges against the GVN and the Thieu-Ky ticket,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to Secretary Rusk, dated 12-Aug-1967, declassified 02-Nov-1994, 6 p. On p. 4: Rumors that the Armed Forces had formed a Council that would “run the government” no matter who is elected. The formation of any such Council and such intent of the Armed Forces have been categorically denied by Thieu and Ky. 50 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 146. 51 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 153. 52 “Composition and internal problems of Tran Van Huong’s campaign organization,” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 03-Aug-1967, declassified 20-Sep-1979, 5 p. On p. 3: “The MRS covers IV Corps quite well and III Corps fairly well but practically none of II Corps and only part of I Corps.” On p. 4: “For their part, MRS members are angered with the FPF because of the latter’s former efforts to persuade MRS members to support the candidacy of Thanh.” MRS = Movement for the Renaissance of the South (Phong Trào Phục Hưng Miền Nam); FPF = Freedom Protection Forces (Lực Lượng Bảo Vệ Tự Do); Thanh = Âu Trường Thanh. 53 “South Vietnam’s election situation report no. 1 (9/2/67),” DDRS, CIA report, dated 02-Sep-1967, declassified 14-Aug-1995, p. 1. 54 “Ambassador Bunker’s 9/6/67 weekly telegram,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy’s weekly cable to the White House, dated 06-Sep-1967, declassified 28-Nov-1983, 15 p. On p. 5: “The Thieu – Ky victory in the elections was decisive though their percentage of the vote was 34.8 percent according to revised figures released by the National Assembly Sept. 5.” 55 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 197. 56 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 196. 57 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 199. 58 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 209. 59 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 211. There was a typo in the book, “27” was printed instead of “7” for the number of losing senatorial slates. 60 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 219. 61 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 222. 62 “South Vietnamese political situation report includes…,” DDRS, State Dept. memo, dated 27-Sep-1967, declassified 24-Mar-1995, 2 p. On p. 1: “Regardless of the action by this committee, the Embassy believes the full Assembly will validate the elections.” 63 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 239. 64 Đoàn Thêm, 1967: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 254–255.

Appendix A

Biographical sketches of the Republic of Vietnam personalities

Bùi Diễm: born in 1923 in Hà Nam Province, North Vietnam, joined the Đại Việt Party since 1944. Under the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he was the publisher of the English-language daily newspaper The Saigon Post. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, overthrowing the Ngô regime, he became a member of the Council of Notables. When Dr. Phan Huy Quát formed his cabinet on February 16, 1965, Bùi Diễm was given the portfolio of Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office. He was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs within the Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s War Cabinet. President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu appointed him Ambassador to the United States (1967–1972). From 1972 to 1975, he was Ambassador-At-Large. He was the author (with David Chanoff) of In the Jaws of History, first published by Houghton Mifflin in 1987, and re-published by Indiana University Press in 1999. The Vietnamese-language version of the book, Gọng Kìm Lịch Sử, was later published by Phạm Quang Khai Publishing House in 2000. After 1975, he has been living in the United States. Cao Văn Viên: at this point in time, he was a Lieutenant-General (threestar general), Commander of the III Corps, and later moved up to the rank of General (four-star general) and served as the Chief of the General Staff until the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975. Born on December 11, 1921, in Vientiane, Laos, he joined the French Army, graduated from the officer school in Vũng Tàu as a Second-Lieutenant and was one of the first airborne officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). After the paratroopers’ failed coup of November 11, 1960, he was appointed Commander of the Airborne Brigade. During the November 1, 1963 coup overthrowing Ngô Đình Diệm, he refused to participate and was relieved of his Command, but, later, was reinstated. After the January 30, 1964 coup by Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Khánh, he continued to command the Airborne Brigade. He was promoted to Major-General by General Nguyễn Khánh on March 3, 1964, after being wounded during the Quyết Thắng operation in Kiến Phong Province. He was appointed Commander of the III Corps on October 11, 1964, and became Chief of the General Staff on October 1, 1965, position he held until the end of the war. After April 30, 1975, he lived in the United States and authored the three books on the Vietnam

124  Appendix A War published by the US Army Center of Military History in the Indochina Monographs Series: (1) Reflections on the Vietnam War, published in 1980, co-authored with Lieutenant- General Đồng Văn Khuyên, his former Deputy at the General Staff; (2) Leadership, published in 1981; and (3) The Final collapse published in 1982. He died on January 22, 2008 in Falls Church, Virginia, US at the age of 87. Chung Tấn Cang: born on July 22, 1926, in Gia Định Province, he graduated from the civil maritime school in 1947 and worked in the maritime trade until 1952. He was mobilized and finished his training as a naval officer in 1952. He was the first South Vietnamese naval officer to be promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral (one-star) by General Nguyễn Khánh on April 8, 1964, and, six months later, was promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral (two-star) on October 21, 1964. After the Phan Huy Quát government was established, the Armed Forces Council (AFC) created the National Legislative Council (NLC) with a membership of 20. Admiral Chung Tấn Cang was one of these 20 appointed members of the NLC. He was promoted to ViceAdmiral (three-star) in 1966 and appointed Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. Vice-Admiral Chung Tấn Cang was commanding the South Vietnamese fleet to move out of the country in the evening of April 29, 1975. He lived in Los Angeles, Southern California, United States until he died on January 24, 2007 at the age of 81. Dương Văn Đức: born in 1925 in Thủ Đức, Province of Gia Định, ­attended the Đà Lạt Inter-Arms Officer Training School, and graduated as a Warrant Officer in July 1947. He was promoted to Second-Lieutenant in 1948, and First-Lieutenant in 1949 successively. After 1954, he joined the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and moved up through the rank quite rapidly, and was made a Major-General in 1956, the youngest general of the whole Army. He was given command of the IV Corps and promoted to Lieutenant-General in mid-1964. After the failed coup against General Nguyễn Khánh, he was court-martialed and released from the Army at the end of 1964. A few years after that he became mentally ill. After 1975, still he was incarcerated in reeducation camp until 1987. He passed away in Saigon in 2000 at the age of 75. Dương Văn “Big” Minh: born on February 19, 1916 in Mỹ Tho, joined the French Army in 1939, attended the Thủ Dầu Một Officer Training School and graduated as a Warrant Officer in 1940. He was promoted to SecondLieutenant in 1946, and First-Lieutenant in 1948. On September 17, 1949, he was transferred to the newly created Army of the State of Vietnam and was promoted to Captain in 1950, and Major in 1951. He then attended the Command and Staff College in Paris, France. He became a full Colonel on May 5, 1955 and was made a Major-General (two-star general) on November 1, 1955, after he conducted successfully the Hoàng Diệu Operation, which crushed the resistance of the Bình Xuyên in Rừng Sát. In 1956, again, after his victory against the Hòa Hảo in the Nguyễn Huệ Operation, he got his third star for Lieutenant-General rank on December 8. When President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu resigned on April 21, 1975, Vice-President Trần Văn

Appendix A  125 Hương, following provision in the 1967 Constitution, became President. The Communists refused to talk to the new President. The bi- cameral National Assembly, at the special plenary session of April 27, 1975, passed a resolution to instruct President Trần Văn Hương to transfer full power to General Dương Văn Minh so that the later could start to negotiate with the Communists. With a certain victory within their grasp, the Communists refused to negotiate and asked for an unconditional surrender of the Republic of Vietnam. General Dương Văn Minh had to surrender at 12:00 noon of April 30, 1975, at the Independence Palace, officially ending the Vietnam War. He was allowed to emigrate to France in October 1981. He moved and lived in Pasadena, California, US in 1988 until he passed away on August 9, 2001, at the age of 86. Lâm Văn Phát: A Major-General, former Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the IV Corps, he joined Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Khanh in the January 30, 1964 coup, and was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, replacing Mr. Hà Thúc Ký, a Đai Việt Party member on April 4, 1964. With other generals in the cabinet, he resigned this position on September 9, 1964. Three days later, on September 12, 1964, he joined Lieutenant-General Dương Văn Đức, former Commander of the IV Corps in his coup against General Nguyễn Khánh. Without the support from other generals, the coup failed. General Phát was court-martialed and forced out of the army. Lê Văn Kim: born in 1910 in Bình Định Province, Central Vietnam, joined the French Army, and graduated from the Artillery School in Poitiers with the rank of Warrant Officer in 1940. He received a series of promotions during the 1950s: Captain in 1950, Major in 1951, Lieutenant- Colonel in 1952, Colonel in 1955, and Major- General in 1956. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General and became a member of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). He was removed from the RMC together with other Lieutenant- Generals Trần Văn Đôn, Mai Hữu Xuân, and Tôn Thất Đính and put under house arrest in Đà Lạt (Đà Lạt Generals). He retired from the Army in 1965. After 1975, he was incarcerated in re- education labor camps until 1982. After his release from the camp, he was allowed to go to France in the family reunion program. He passed away on March 23, 1987, at the age of 76. Lê Văn Nghiêm: born in 1912 in Huế, he joined the French Army in 1935 as a Sergeant. Later he graduated from a special officer training as a Warrant Officer. Together with the French, he fought against the Germans during World War II in Europe. After the war he was promoted to First-Lieutenant and came back to Vietnam. In 1950 he was promoted to Captain. When the Vietnamese National Army was created in 1952, he was promoted to Major and given command of the 30th Vietnamese Infantry Battalion recently formed in Quảng Trị Province. The following year, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and given command of the 21st Mobile Brigade in Central Vietnam. The 21st Mobile Brigade was upgraded and became the 21st Infantry Division in 1955 in Huế, he was promoted to Colonel and became

126  Appendix A the first Commander of this Division. He became Major-General at the end of 1955 and Acting Commander of the Second Military Region. At the beginning of 1956, he left the Second Military Region and assumed the position of Commander of the Thủ Đức Infantry Officer School until May 1961 when he was appointed Commander of the III Corps. On February 7, 1962, he left the III Corps and held the position of Commander of the I Corps. During the Buddhist Crisis of 1963, he was relieved of his command of the I Corps on August 1. He participated in the military coup against the Ngô regime. After the successful coup, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General, became a member of the RMC and Commander of the Special Forces. After the military coup by Lt.- General Nguyễn Khánh, he was appointed Commander of the War College. He retired from the Armed Forces on May 1, 1965. He stayed in Vietnam after April 30, 1975, and passed away on January 27, 1988, at the age of 76. Mai Hữu Xuân: born in 1917 in Quảng Bình, Central Vietnam, was employed in the security services during the French regime. In 1953, he was made a full colonel and served as Head of the Military Security Services. He was promoted to Major- General in 1955 and appointed Chief of the Trương Tấn Bửu Operation, headquartered in Biên Hòa to pacify the eastern part of South Vietnam. In 1958, he was appointed Commander of the Quang Trung Infantry Training Center. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, as a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), he was promoted to Lieutenant-General, and appointed Mayor of Saigon. After the coup by General Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964, together with the “Đà Lạt Generals” Trần Văn Đôn, Lê Văn Kim, and Tôn Thất Đính, he was removed from the MRC. In March 1965, he retired from the Army. After 1975, he lived in Washington, D.C. He has passed away in the United States. (date unknown). Nguyễn Cao Kỳ: Throughout his first term (1967–1971), President Thiệu tried hard and succeeded in exercising and consolidating his presidential power. All Kỳ’s men were sacked. At presidential re- election in 1971, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ was dumped by Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, who chose Trần Văn Hương as his running-mate. Kỳ, who was still a Major- General, could not even returned to command the Air Force because Thiệu had already promoted Trần Văn Minh, the incumbent, to Lieutenant- General. At first Kỳ was barred from running for president but later, together with General Dương Văn “Big” Minh, he decided to boycott the election, which ended up with Thiệu winning this one-man show. From 1971 to the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, Kỳ was running his plantation in Khánh Dương, Nha Trang in southern Central Vietnam. After 1975, Nguyễn Cao Kỳ lived in the United States and engaged in a number of business activities but did not succeed. In 2004, Kỳ returned to Vietnam for the first time, calling overseas Vietnamese to forget the past and work together with their fellow countrymen to develop the country. He was harshly criticized by overseas Vietnamese for that action considered as a high crime of treason. He passed away in Malaysia on

Appendix A  127 July 22, 2011, at the age of 81. He has authored two books: (1) Twenty years and twenty days, published by Stein and Day in 1976; and (2) Buddha’s child: my fight to save Vietnam, co-authored by Marvin J. Wolf, and published by St. Matin’s Press in 2002. Nguyễn Chánh Thi: born on February 23, 1923 in Thừa Thiên Province, he joined the French army in 1941 at 17. He graduated from the Officer Training School in Cap Saint-Jacques (Vũng Tàu) in 1941 with the rank of SecondLieutenant and was assigned to the First Airborne Battalion. With the airborne troops he has seen action in several battles against the Viet Minh in North Vienam. After the 1954 Geneva Accords, he became Commander of the 5th Vietnamese Airborne Battalion. He became a Major in August 1955 and participated in the Hoàng Diệu Operation against the Bình Xuyên in Rừng Sát under the Command of Colonel Dương Văn Minh. After the success of the Hoàng Diệu Operation he was promoted to Lieutenant- Colonel. He was then sent to the United States to attend Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Coming back to Vietnam, he was nominated Commander of the Airborne Brigade and promoted to Full Colonel. After the failed coup of November 11, 1960, against the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he was in exile in Cambodia for three years. When the Ngô regime was toppled by the November 1, 1963 coup, he came back to Vietnam and appointed Deputy Commander of I Corps under Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Khánh. After having supported General Khánh in his January 1, 1964 coup, he was rewarded with a series of big promotions: • • • •

February 2, 1964: Commander of the 1st Infantry Division May 29, 1964: Brigadier-General October 21, 1964: Major-General November 4: Commander of I Corps

After being forced out of Vietnam at the end of July 1966, General Nguyễn Chánh Thi lived in the United States. He tried to come back to Vietnam in February 1972 and did not succeed. In 1987, he published his political memoirs entitled Việt Nam: một trời tâm sự (Vietnam: straight from my heart). He passed away on June 23, 2007, at the age of 84. Nguyễn Hữu Có: born in February 1925 in Định Tường, he graduated top of the 1st class of the Huế Military School on June 1, 1949, as a SecondLieutenant. During the First Republic, he moved quite rapidly through the rank and became a full colonel on October 26, 1959. As Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, he participated in the November 1, 1963 coup overthrowing the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. After the successful coup, he became a member of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRS), was promoted to Major-General and given the Command of the IV Corps. He was General Commissioner for War and Commissioner for Defense in General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s War Cabinet. He was later elevated to the position of Deputy Chairman of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and on November 1,

128  Appendix A 1965, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General. In 1967, while on an official visit to Taiwan, he was relieved of his position within the CEC and later forced out of the Armed Forces. On April 28, 1975, he was recalled back to the army as Assistant to the Minister of Defense and Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff. After the Communist takeover on April 30, 1975, he was put in re- education camp in North Vietnam until September 14, 1987. He passed away in Saigon on July 3, 2012, at the age of 87. Nguyễn Khánh: After being forced out of Vietnam by the “Young Turks” on February 25, 1965, as Ambassador-at-Large, he has lived in France from 1966 to 1977. In 1977, he emigrated to the United States and began working for various US corporations. Beginning in 1993, he started lecturing at different civil and military universities about the Vietnam War and about the future of Vietnam. In January 2005, truthful to his nature as an ambitious opportunist, he was talked into accepting the position of Chief of State of the bogus Government of Free Vietnam, an anti-Communist organization in Little Saigon, Westminster, Southern California, US. He died on January 11, 2013, at the age of 86. Nguyễn Lưu Viên: a medical doctor by training, Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên was born on November 21, 1919 in Trà Vinh Province of the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam. In 1945, while studying medicine at Hanoi University, he joined the Resistance to fight against the French. After a few years, he discovered the real face of the Communists and decided to leave the maquis, returning to Hanoi to finished his medical study. During the administration of President Ngô Đình Diệm, he held the position of Head of the General Commission for Refugees. Toward the end of the Ngô Đình Diệm government, he was a member of the Caravelle group. During the period of the Second Republic, he was holding many cabinet posts, including Deputy Prime-Minister and Minister of Education. After the Paris Accords was signed, as Deputy Prime-Minister of the Trần Thiện Khiêm government, he was appointed by President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, on March 6, 1973, Head of the South Vietnamese Delegation for negotiations with the Communist PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam) in La Celle Saint Cloud, Paris, France. After 1975, he lived in the United States. He passed away in Springfield, Virginia, US, on September 17, 2017, at the age of 98. Nguyễn Ngọc Loan: born on December 11, 1930, in Huế, Central Vietnam, Nguyễn Ngọc Loan was drafted and graduated as a Second-Lieutenant from the first class of 1951 of the Thủ Đức Infantry Officer School. He joined the recently created Vietnamese Air Force at the end of 1952. In January 1953, he was sent to Salon- de-Provence, the famous French Air Force Training School, for fighter pilot training. For the next ten years, he moved up through several commanding positions within the Air Force. In 1965, as a Colonel, he held the position of Deputy Commander of the Air Force under Brigadier-General (and later Major-General) Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. After General Kỳ became Prime Minister, he was his right-hand man: holding at the

Appendix A  129 same time three important security positions: (1) Director- General of the National Police; (2) Director of Military Security Services; and, (3) Head of the Central Intelligence Organization. With important contributions in the suppression of the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the Summer of 1966, he was promoted to Brigadier- General. On February 2, 1968, during the Tet Offensive (Phase I), he executed a Việt Cộng sapper caught red-handed with the murder of the whole family of a National Police officer. The execution scene was caught by Eddie Adams, an AP (Associated Press) reporter. ­Brigadier-General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan was badly wounded on May 5, 1968, (Tet Offensive Phase II) and was promoted to Major-General. He spent the last years of the Second Republic in a desk job at the Department of Defense. After 1975, he lived in Burke, Virginia, US, and passed away on July 14, 1998, at the age of 68. Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ: born on May 26, 1908, in a rich landowner family in Long Xuyên Province, South Vietnam. During the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he had been Vietnamese Ambassador in Japan, Chief of Cần Thơ Province, and Minister of Economy before he became Vice-President. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, overthrowing the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he was appointed Prime Minister by General Dương Văn Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). His government lasted only three months and was replaced by General Nguyễn Khánh government after the bloodless coup of January 30, 1964. He passed away in Sài Gòn in 1976 at the age of 68. Nguyễn Văn Lộc: born on August 24, 1922, in Vĩnh Long Province, he was a supporter of the resistance and actively contributed as a writer under the pseudonym of Sơn Khanh during the Resistance War against the French. He then went to France and studied law and graduated from University of Montpellier in 1954. After his graduation, he came back to Vietnam and practiced law in Saigon. He was an ardent follower of Cao Đàism and later became a high-ranking member of the hierarchical clergy of this Southern religion. During the time of the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam, in May 1966, he was invited to be a member of the committee drafting the decreelaw for the election of the Constituent Assembly. In fact, he was elected by fellow members to be vice- chairman of the committee. In the 1967 presidential election, in order to woo Cao Đài followers and southerners, General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ chose Nguyễn Văn Lộc to be his running-mate. But then he had to cancel his ticket with Nguyễn Văn Lộc and stood for election with General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu under the pressure of other senior generals of the Armed Forces. After the election, under Kỳ’s pressure, Thiệu had to offer the prime-ministership to Nguyễn Văn Lộc. Prime Minister Nguyễn Văn Lộc’s cabinet was inaugurated on November 9, 1967, lasted more than half a year and was finally replaced by Trần Văn Hương government on May 25, 1968. During the 1970s, Nguyễn Văn Lộc was involved in higher education, first as a Professor at the Hòa Hảo University in An Giang and then as Rector of Cao Đài University in Tây Ninh. After 1975, Nguyễn Văn Lộc tried

130  Appendix A many times to escape from Vietnam and finally succeeded in 1983. He lived in France until his death in 1992 at the age of 70. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu: born on April 5, 1923, in the village of Tri Thủy, district of Thanh Hải, province of Ninh Thuận, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu attended the first class of the military officer training school in Huế and graduated as a Second-Lieutenant on September 25, 1949. Under the First Republic, in March 1955, as a Lieutenant- Colonel, he was appointed Commander of the Đà Lạt Inter-Arms Military Academy. In July 1957, he attended the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US. In February 1959, he was sent to Okinawa, Japan, to attend the Combat Intelligence Training Course. Upon his return to Vietnam, he was appointed Chief of Staff for Operations at the General Staff Headquarters, and on October 26, 1959, he was promoted to the rank of full colonel. He was sent to the United States the second time for Air Defense Training Course at Fort Bliss, Texas. On December 20, 1962, he was appointed Commander of the 5th Infantry Division stationed in Biên Hòa (just outside of Saigon). He joined the group of senior generals who planned the November 1, 1963 military coup to overthrow Ngô Đình Diệm. After the successful coup, he was promoted to major-general (two-star general) and became a member of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). In spite of this big promotion, Thiệu, however, was unhappy being still Commander of the 5th Infantry Division, not elevated to a more important position. That was why he decided to join Lt.- General Nguyễn Khánh in the latter’s January 30, 1964 coup, which, in fact, helped him get more power. He was appointed Secretary-General of the new MRC under General Khánh, then appointed Commander of the IV Corps (in September 1964), and finally promoted to the rank of Lieutenant- General (three-star general) on January 1, 1965. After the collapse of the civilian Phan Huy Quát government in June 1965, and with the power given back to the military, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was selected to be Chairman of the National Leadership Committee (usually referred to as the Directorate), assuming the function of Chief of State. For the next two years (1965–1967), however, he was outplayed by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, who, assuming the function of Prime Minister, controlled every aspect of the governmental machinery. Before the 1967 presidential election, uneasy with the prospect of losing the power back to the civilian because of the intensive rivalry between Thiệu and Kỳ, the military forced them to stand for election in one single ticket with Thiệu running for president and Kỳ for vicepresident. After their successful election, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, as President and Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces, eliminated one-by-one all Kỳ’s lieutenants and gradually regained control of the power. In 1971, in his re- election, Thiệu dumped Kỳ from his ticket and chose former Prime Minister Trần Văn Hương as his running mate. After the Paris Accords was signed in January 1973, with all US forces withdrawn, and the US military aid deeply cut, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam could not stop the

Appendix A  131 advance of the Communist forces. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu resigned on April 21, 1975, and left Vietnam for Taiwan on the 25th. After a short time in Taiwan, he emigrated to the United Kingdom and lived there until 1985 when he came to settle in Boston, Massachusetts, US. He passed away in Boston on September 29, 2001, at the age of 78. Nguyễn Văn Trường: Professor Nguyễn Văn Trường was born in 1930 in Vĩnh Long Province. After his secondary education in Phan Thanh Giản Secondary School in Cần Thơ and Collège Le Myre de Vilers in Mỹ Tho, he went to France for higher education at the Université de Toulouse, and obtained his master’s degree in Mathematics. Coming back to Vietnam, Professor Nguyễn Văn Trường started his teaching career at the University of Huế. After the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm government, he was appointed Head of the Directorate- General of the Elementary-SecondaryPopular Education of the Ministry of National Education. When Mr. Trần Văn Hương became Prime Minister (for the first time, from November 4, 1964, to January 27, 1965), Professor Nguyễn Văn Trường was appointed Minister of Education on December 15, 1964 replacing Lawyer Phan Tấn Chức. He served as Minister of Education the second time within the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. Together with Mr. Võ Long Triều, Minister of Youth, he resigned from the War Cabinet on November 11, 1966, in protest of General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan’s abuse of power. He came back to his teaching career at the Faculty of Pedagogy, University of Saigon until the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam on April 30, 1975. Leaving Vietnam in the 1980s, he came to settle in Houston, Texas, US. He passed away in Houston on January 3, 2018, at the age of 88. Phạm Ngọc Thảo: He was born on February 14, 1922, in Saigon from a rich land-owner family having French citizenship. When the French tried to make a comeback in Cochinchina, Thảo joined the Viet Minh to fight against them. After the Geneva Accord was signed in July 1954, he stayed in the South and joined the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and moved up to the rank of full colonel. After the Ngô Đình Diệm regime was overthrown in November 1963, he was involved in a few failed military coups, and finally got himself killed on July 17, 1965. After 1975, the Vietnamese Communist government revealed that Thảo had been one of their agents. Phạm Xuân Chiểu: born in November 1920 in Ninh Bình Province, North Vietnam, Phạm Xuân Chiểu, during the Resistance War against the French, attended the 4th Class of the Infantry School in Lào Kay (1946), with some in-service training at the renowned Chinese Whampoa Military Academy. He joined the Army of the State of Vietnam (Quân Đội Quốc Gia Việt Nam) with the rank of Captain. In 1952, he attended the Ecole d’Etat Major de Paris in France. Returning to Vietnam, he was promoted to Major and appointed Commander of the 18th Infantry Battalion in 1954. In 1955, he became a Lieutenant-Colonel and was appointed Chief of Staff of the First Military Region under the command of Colonel Trần Văn Minh (later Lieutenant- General with the nick name of Little Minh of the ARVN).

132  Appendix A In 1956 he received another promotion to Full Colonel and became DirectorGeneral of the National Police. The following year, on February 17, 1957, he became a Major- General, and on August 15, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the ARVN. At the end of September 1960, he was given command of the War College. In 1963, he joined other senior generals in their plot to overthrow President Ngô Đình Diệm. After the successful coup on November 1, 1963, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General and became a member of the MRC. After the January 30, 1964 coup by General Nguyễn Khánh, he was appointed Chairman of the National Legislative Council. When the military recaptured the power in June 1966, he was selected to serve as SecretaryGeneral of the National Leadership Committee under General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. After April 30, 1975, he lived in Rockville, Maryland, US. He passed away in Gaithersburg, Maryland on August 7, 2018 at the age of 98. Phan Huy Quát: born on June 12, 1908 in Hà Tĩnh Province, Central Vietnam, Phan Huy Quát attended Lycée Pellerin in Huế and studied medicine at Hanoi University. He was a high-ranking member of the Đại Việt (Great Viet) Party, Central Vietnam Faction, and was a member of the Caravelle Group. He has held many different cabinet portfolios of the Vietnamese government: • • • •

Minister of National Education in Bảo Đại government (from July 1, 1949 to January 22, 1950) Minister of Defense in Nguyễn Phan Long government (January 22, 1950 to May 6, 1950) Minister Responsible for Democratization in Bửu Lộc government (from January 11, 1954 to July 7, 1954) Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nguyễn Khánh government (from February 8, 1964 to November 4, 1964)

He was Prime Minister for a short period of time, from February 16, 1965, to June 12, 1965. After the Communist take-over in April 1975, he failed in his attempt to escape from Vietnam and was put in jail. He died in jail on April 27, 1979, at the age of 71. Phan Khắc Sửu: born on January 9, 1905 in Vĩnh Long Province, South Vietnam, Phan Khắc Sửu studied in France and graduated as an Agricultural Engineer. After his graduation, he went back to Vietnam and, while working as a civil servant in the Cochinchina administration, started to engage in anti-French revolutionary movement. In the early 1940s he was arrested, tried, and sentenced to eight years of hard-labor work and sent to the famous prison on Poulo- Condor. After the March 9, 1945 coup by the Japanese, he was released and came back to the mainland. During the Resistance War against the French, he refused to work both for the French and for Việt Minh. When ex-Emperor Bảo Đại came back to power in 1949, he accepted to serve in his cabinet as Minister of Agriculture, Social Affairs and Labour. Later, in 1954, he also served in Ngô Đình Diệm’s first

Appendix A  133 cabinet as Minister of Agriculture for a short time and then resigned, as a Cao Daist, in protest of Diêm’s policy against the Southern religious sects. He then joined his friends to oppose Ngô Đình Diệm regime resulting in the submission in 1960 of the Petition, which was later called Caravelle Manifest by the press. After the successful coup of November 1, 1963, he was a member of the Council of Notables, created by General Dương Văn “Big” Minh, to draft a new constitution for South Vietnam. The Council’s work on the new constitution was just half-way when General Nguyễn Khanh’s coup of January 30, 1964, happened. General Khánh installed himself as Prime Minister and let the country stumble to an unprecedented period of political chaos. Abandoned by all his allies, General Khanh had to share power with General Dương Văn Minh again, who seized the opportunity to create the High National Council, which ultimately elected Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu as Chief of State. Mr. Sửu then invited Mr. Trần Văn Hương, one of his former fellows of the Caravelle Group, to form the first civilian government, which, unfortunately, did not live long. The second civilian government under Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát also shared the same fate and the power came back to the military in June 1965 with the War Cabinet under General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. After the serious Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam during the Summer of 1966, the military was forced to call for election of the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Sửu ran for election and won a seat in the Assembly. At the first plenary session of the Assembly he was elected as Speaker on October 26, 1966. The new Constitution was promulgated on April 1, 1967, ushering in the Second Republic. At the first presidential election in September 1967, Mr Sửu stood for election in a ticket with Dr. Phan Quang Đán and lost to the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu–Nguyễn Cao Kỳ ticket. Mr. Phan Khắc ­ Sửu was still active in the opposition to the Thiêu–Kỳ government when he passed away on May 24, 1970, at the age of 65. Thích Trí Quang: He was born on December 21, 1923, in Quảng Bình Province and his real name was Phạm Quang. He joined the Buddhist clergy in Central Vietnam at the very early age and moved up the rank to become a Venerable. He was among the top leaders of the Buddhist Movement during the 1963 Buddhist crisis, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. After the creation of the Vietnamese Buddhist United Church, officially recognized by the government by Decree No. 14/5 issued on March 14, 1964, with two governing bodies, the Institute of Clergy Hierarchy, and the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma, Venerble Thích Trí Quang was elected Secretary-General of the Institute of Clergy Hierarchy. In this role, Thích Trí Quang soon exercised a very great influence on the Buddhist Movement, especially the Buddhist youth and students, who were one of the main factors that created the political chaos under General Nguyễn Khánh administration. After General Nguyễn Khánh was ousted and after the military had seized the power with General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ’s War Cabinet, Thích trí Quang continued to control and direct the Buddhist opposition movement, which led to the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in

134  Appendix A the Summer of 1966. After the Revolt was crushed by the military, Thích Trí Quang’s political influence waned and was finally eliminated. His autobiography, Trí Quang tự truyện, was published in Ho Chi Minh City in 2011. He passed away in Huế, Vietnam, on November 8, 2019, at the age of 96. Tôn Thất Đính: born on November 20, 1926, in Đà Lạt, graduated from the First Class of the Huế Military School on June 1, 1949, as a SecondLieutenant. He moved up the rank quite fast: First-Lieutenant in 1952, Captain in 1953, Major at end of 1953, Lieutenant- Colonel in 1954, and Colonel in 1955. On November 1, 1955, he was given command of the Field Division no. 2, precursor of the 2nd Infantry Division. In August 1958, he was promoted to Major- General and appointed Commander of the II Corps (Central Highlands). In December 1962, he was appointed Commander of the III Corps. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General and became a member of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). When General Nguyễn Khánh mounted the January 30, 1964 coup, he was removed from the MRC together with other “Đà Lạt Generals.” After the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in 1966, he was court-martialed and forced out of the Armed Forces. At the first senatorial election of the Second Republic in September 1967, he was elected Senator in the slate headed by ex-general Trần Văn Đôn. His autobiography 20 Năm Binh Nghiệp (Twenty-year military career) was published by Tuần báo Chánh Đạo (Chánh Đạo weekly periodical) in San Jose, California in 1998. After 1975, he lived in the United States, and passed away on November 21, 2013, at the age of 87. Trần Thiện Khiêm: born in December 1925 in Saigon, Trần Thiện Khiêm attended the Đà Lạt Inter-Arms Military School in 1946 and graduated in 1947 with the rank of Warrant Officer. He moved up the military officer rank quite quickly and by 1957 he was already a Full Colonel. He was made Commander of the 21st Infantry Division on February 2, 1960, and it was he who brought this Division to Saigon from the Mekong Delta to crush the military coup of November 11, 1960 and save the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. He was promoted to Major- General on December 6, 1962, and nominated Chief of the Inter-Arms General Staff. After the successful military coup of November 1, 1963, overthrowing the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he was promoted to Lieutenant- General and became a member of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC). On January 30, 1964, he cooperated with ­ Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Khánh in a new coup and became the First Vice-Chairman of the new MRC. Although he was promoted to General (four-star) on August 11, 1964, his relationship with General Nguyễn Khánh deteriorated and he was forced to leave Vietnam as Ambassador to the United States (1964–1965), and then Ambassador to Taiwan (1965–1968). He stayed in Taiwan until May 1968 when he came back to Vietnam to serve as Minister of the Interior in the Trần Văn Hương cabinet. On September 1, 1969, he replaced Mr Trần Văn Hương as Prime Minister and kept this position until April 5, 1975. He left Vietnam for Taiwan together with President

Appendix A  135 Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. He has been living in the United States since after April 30, 1975. Trần Văn Đỗ: born on November 15, 1903, in Hà Nam Province, Mr. Trần Văn Đỗ studied medicine and graduated from University of Paris, France. He was the State of Vietnam’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Geneva Conference in 1954, which ended with the division of Vietnam into two countries, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). One year later, in 1955, he resigned from Ngô Đình Diệm government to protest its policy against Southern religious sects. He was one of the 18 personalities who signed the Caravelle Manifest. When Dr. Phan Huy Quát formed his cabinet, Dr. Trần Văn Đỗ was nominated Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (February to June 1965). He was retained by General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ in his War Cabinet as General Commissioner for Foreign Relations (1965–1967). After 1975, he lived in France and passed away on December 20, 1990, at the age of 87. Trần Văn Đôn: General Trần Văn Đôn was born on August 19, 1917, in Bordeaux when his father, from a wealthy Vietnamese family having French citizenship, was studying medicine in France. He came back to Vietnam when his father graduated and returned to Vietnam to practice medicine in Saigon. When he finished his secondary education at Lycée Chasseloup Laubat, his family sent him back to France to attend university. He was mobilized when World War II broke out and was taken as a prisoner of war after the Battle of the Loire River. After the French surrender to the Germans, he was released from the POW camp, returned to Vietnam, and served in the French Army. In 1942, he graduated from the Officer Training School of Tông in Sơn Tây Province with the rank of Warrant Officer. He moved through the rank quite rapidly: • • • • • • • • • •

First Lieutenant: 1946 Captain: 1949 Major: January 1, 1952 Lieutenant-Colonel: July 1, 1952 Colonel: June 1, 1953 Major-General: April 30, 1955 Lieutenant-General: February 2, 1957 Commander of the 1st Corps: October 15, 1957 Commander of the Army: December 8, 1962 Acting Chief of General Staff: August 20, 1963

As one of the principal plotters of the November 1, 1963 military coup overthrowing the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, he became the second-in-command of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) headed by Lieutenant- General Dương Văn “Big” Minh. He was then ousted from the MRC by LieutenantGeneral Nguyễn Khánh after the January 1, 1964 coup, and was finally

136  Appendix A forced out of the army on May 24, 1965. At the senatorial election of September 3, 1967, the ten-men slate he was headed was getting the most votes and he became a Senator. For the next three years, he was Chairman of the Senate Defense Committee. He was Defense Minister of the Nguyễn Bá Cẩn Cabinet, the last government of the Republic of Vietnam. After April 30, 1975, he lived in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, US. He was the author of Our endless war: inside Vietnam published by Presidio Press in 1978. He passed away in 1998 at the age of 81. Trần Văn Hương: He was born in 1904 in the Province of Vĩnh Long in the Mekong Delta. After his graduation from the Cao Đẳng Sư Phạm Đông Dương (Indochinese Teachers’ College) in Hanoi, he came back to the South and taught Vietnamese language at the Collège Le Myre de Vilers in Mỹ Tho. After World War II, in August 1945, when the French tried to re-establish their control of Nam Bộ (Cochinchina, or South Vietnam), Trần Văn Hương joined the resistance movement of the Southern Vietnamese people and was nominated Chủ Tịch Ủy Ban Hành-Kháng Tỉnh Tây Ninh (Chairman of the Administrative-Resistance Committee of the Province of Tây Ninh). He soon realized that the resistance movement was in fact under the control and direction of the Communists. He left the resistance movement and came back to Saigon but did not co-operate with the French and the Bảo Đại government. When Ngô Đình Diệm established his first administration in South Vietnam in July 1954, Trần Văn Hương was nominated Mayor of Saigon on October 27, 1954. After almost six months, on April 7, 1955, he resigned from that position in protest of Diêm’s hard-handed policy on Southern religious sects. With the Diệm government having become a dictatorship, Hương together with other political dissidents, on April 26, 1960, submitted a petition to President Ngô Đình Diệm, suggesting changes that the government should take. They all then appeared at a press conference held at the Caravelle Hotel in downtown Saigon. The group, therefore, was called The Caravelle Group by the media. After the Ngô Đình Diệm government was overthrown by the November 1, 1963, South Vietnam was falling into a period of three years of total political chaos. Trần Văn Hương was Prime Minister from November 4, 1964, to January 27, 1965. Under the Second Republic, founded by the 1967 Constitution, Trần Văn Hương was Prime Minister one more time, from May 25, 1968, to October 31, 1969. During his second term, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu had Trần Văn Hương as his Vice-President. When Thiệu resigned on April 21, 1975, Trần Văn Hương became President. Under great pressure from the Communists, and with approval from the National Assembly, Trần Văn Hương transferred the power to General Dương Văn “Big” Minh on April 28, 1975. He declined the US. Ambassador’s invitation to be evacuated in the afternoon of April 29, 1975. He passed away in Saigon (renamed Hồ Chí Minh City) on January 27, 1982, at the age of 78. He has authored two poetry anthologies: Lao trung lãnh vận (Cold poems from the prison), and Bó hoa cuối mùa (A bouquet of flowers at season’s end), published in Saigon around 1965.

Appendix A  137 Trần Văn Tuyên: He was born on September 1, 1913, in the Province of Tuyên Quang, North Vietnam, and joined the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) at young age. He graduated from University of Hanoi’s Faculty of Law in 1943. His political career began in 1945 when he was appointed Assistant to Foreign Minister Nguyễn Tường Tam in the Hồ Chí Minh government. He joined the Bảo Đại government in July 1949 as Minister of Information. In 1954, he was a member of the nationalist delegation at the Geneva Conference. During the Ngô Đình Diệm government, he was in the opposition and was a member of the Caravelle Group. He became Deputy Prime Minister under Phan Huy Quát Government in 1965. During the Second Republic he was a member of the Legislative Assembly. After April 30, 1975, he was arrested by the Communist government and put in a re- education camp in Hà Tây Province. He passed away in the camp in October 1976 at the age of 63. Trần Văn Văn: He was born on January 2, 1908, in a wealthy landowner family of the Province of Long Xuyên, South Vietnam. After secondary school, he was sent to France to continue his study at HEC (Hautes Études Commerciales). His political career began in 1945 when he was appointed Director of Cabinet (Chief of Staff) for Mr. Hồ Tá Khanh, Minister of Economics of the Trần Trọng Kim government. In 1949 he served as Minister of National Economy and Planning under the Bảo Đại government for a short time. During the Ngô Đình Diệm government he was in the opposition and a member of the Caravelle Group. After the Ngô Đình Diệm was overthrown and before the beginning of the Second Republic, he was an active member of the two legislative councils: Council of Notables and High National Council. Under the Second Republic he was an elected member of the Constituent Assembly and frequently criticized the military government of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. His assassination on December 7, 1966, by the Communist terrorists put an end to his promising political career. Võ Long Triều: born in 1934 in Bến Tre Province, he studied in France from 1951 to 1961 and graduated as an Agricultural Engineer. He served as Minister of Youth in the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. After his resignation from the War Cabinet, he worked for several years as a reporter. In 1971, he ran for election and became a Representative of the Legislative Assembly. When the Communists took over the South, he was put in reeducation camp for 11 years. After his release from the camp he was allowed to emigrate to France. He finally settled down in Fresno, California, US, where he passed away on September 2, 2016, at the age of 82. His autobiography, Hồi ký Võ Long Triều, had been published weekly for a few years in the online Vietnamese-language newspaper Người Việt in Little Saigon.

Appendix B

Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963

(Author’s translation of the original document in Vietnamese, printed in the November 9, 1963 issue of the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, p. 4)

Military Revolutionary Council Considering that the revolution against the dictatorial regime was completed with the tradition of sacrifice and service to the Nation of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to bring back to the people freedom and democracy; Considering that the Constitution promulgated on October 26, 1956, was suspended because it contained several articles that need to be revised; Considering that while waiting for the revision of the Constitution, government agencies and the administrative organization in the country need to be regulated by a Temporary Charter.

Declares Article 1. – Vietnam is still a Republic. Article 2. – While waiting for the revision of the Constitution, the Executive and Legislative Powers reside with the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 3. – The Power of the Chief of State is vested with the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 4. – The Executive Power is delegated to a Provisional Government headed by a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government is designated by the Military Revolutionary Council. Members of the Provisional Government are designated by the Prime Minister with the agreement of the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 5. – The Legislative Power is delegated to the Provisional Government with the exception for the provision of the national budget and the establishment of taxation laws and issues relating to the national security. Article 6. – The existing laws and regulations continue to be in effect with the exception for those articles that are contradictory with the spirit of the Revolution of November 1, 1963.

140  Appendix B This Temporary Charter is in effect on the day of being declared. Saigon, November 4, 1963 Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council Lieutenant-General ­ Dương Văn Minh

Appendix C

Temporary Charter No. 2 – February 7, 1964. Replacing Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963

(Author’s translation of the original document in Vietnamese, printed in the February 17, 1964 issue of the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 478–479) ­

Military Revolutionary Council Based on the declaration of January 30, 1964, of the Military Revolutionary Council; Based on the Temporary Charter No. 1 of November 4, 1963; Considering the present political condition that requires an appropriate sharing of responsibilities in order to improve efficiency of the national administration.

Declares Article 1. – The above-mentioned Temporary Charter No. 1 of November 4, 1963 is amended as follows: Article 2. – The Power of the Chief of State will be executed by the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council or delegated to an individual designated by the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 3. – All pre- existing articles that are contradictory with this Temporary Charter are abolished. Saigon, February 7, 1964 Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council Lieutenant-General ­ Nguyễn Khánh

Appendix D

Charter of the Republic of Vietnam – August 16, 1964 (Vũng Tàu Charter)

(Author’s translation of the original document in Vietnamese, printed in the August 19, 1964 issue of the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, p. 3044/1-3044/8) ­

Preliminary • •

Loyal to the supreme interest of the Fatherland and to the highly sacred revolutionary spirit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam; Believing in the heroic and unyielding tradition of the People, in the enduring and eternal existence of the Nation, and in the splendid future of our Country.

Revolutionary Army Council •

•

• • •

Knowing that in this extremely dangerous period, caused by the international emergency situation and the cruel imperialist policy of the Communists, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam must directly take responsibility before History to guide the Nation to the final victory; Knowing that we must discard all seeds of disunity sown by the traitors serving colonial and neutralist causes in order to group all anticommunist nationalist forces and to mobilize the whole nation so that we can soon achieve our goal of building a peaceful, free, democratic, unified, and prosperous country; Knowing that each Vietnamese citizen, disregard of origin, religion, residing in cities or in the country side, must accept sacrifice in order to safeguard our Fatherland in danger; Knowing that the ideal of freedom, the full human development, as well as the independence and prosperity of the country could only be achieved in a democracy; Knowing that facing the emergency situation caused by the internal unrest and the risk of foreign invasion, basic personal freedoms as well as democratic institutions could not be achieved in full and immediately but rather slowly and in parallel with the economic development;

144  Appendix D •

Knowing that the national sovereignty belongs to the people so that the duty for national leadership of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam should be terminated immediately when the conditions permit and be handed back to representatives of the people.

The Military Revolutionary Council, representing all Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, After discussion and unanimous agreement, Promulgates the following Charter:

Charter First chapter Basic articles Article 1. – Vietnam is a Republic; its territory is not divisible. Article 2. – The national sovereignty belongs to the people. Article 3. – The division of responsibilities between the Government, the Legislature and the Judiciary is a guarantee for democracy. Article 4. – Citizens of Vietnam, disregard of origin, are born equal. The Government recognizes and guarantees basic personal freedoms. Article 5. – The Republic of Vietnam accepts principles of internal laws that are not contradictory with its sovereignty, contributes to the building and protection of international peace and security, keeps and develops the cooperation with other countries on the basis of freedom and equality.

Second chapter Rights and duties of citizens Article 6. – Basic democratic freedoms are recognized and guaranteed. Article 7. – No one can be arrested, incarcerated, imprisoned illegally. Article 8. – No one can be tortured or submitted to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatments. Article 9. – Private life, human dignity and reputation as well as family and residence of citizens must be respected. Article 10. – Citizens must work and have the right to be employed. Article 11. – Citizens have the freedom of thoughts, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of exercising and preaching religion. Article 12. – Within the limits of laws, citizens have the right of having meetings and organizing associations. Article 13. – Citizens have the rights of voting, and standing for elections, according to the laws. Article 14. – The right to own personal properties is recognized and guaranteed. The government encourages and supports the efforts to enrich the citizenry.

Appendix D  145 For public or social benefits, private properties can be appropriated with compensation. Article 15. – The right to have unions and the right of labor strike are recognized and must be executed according to the laws. Article 16. – In workplaces of government and of fields relating to national defense and security, or relating to public utilities, the right of labor strike is not recognized. However, the benefits of employees and workers in these fields must be guaranteed in the same way with their equivalents in other fields. Article 17. – These democratic freedoms and rights can only be limited for national security reasons. Article 18. – All citizens have the duty to protect the Fatherland, the integrity of its territory and the republic regime. All citizens have the duty to contribute to the public expenses according to their capacities.

Third chapter Military Revolutionary Council Article 19. – The Military Revolutionary Council representing the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam is the supreme agency with the duty to lead the nation in this historic period. Article 20. – The Military Revolutionary Council elects the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam. Based on the recommendation by the Chairman, the Military Revolutionary Council designates the Vice- Chairman. Based on the recommendation by the Chairman, the Military Revolutionary Council accepts the resignation or terminates the duty of the Vice-Chairman. ­ Article 21. – The Military Revolutionary Council designates the Speaker, one or several Deputy Speakers as well as members of the Provisional National Assembly, according to the procedures mentioned in Article 40. The Military Revolutionary Council accepts the resignation or terminates the duty of these individuals. Article 22. – The Military Revolutionary Council designates the President of the High Judiciary Council. Article 23. – The Special Tribunal, including a number of members elected by the Military Revolutionary Council, will prosecute the Chairman and the Vice- Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam, the Speaker of the Provisional National Assembly, in case these individuals commit high treason or high offenses. The organization and administration of the Special Tribunal as well as the procedures to prosecute before the Special Tribunal will be determined later.

146  Appendix D

Fourth chapter Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam Article 24. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam is elected by the Military Revolutionary Council and is responsible to the Military Revolutionary Council and the people. Article 25. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam is assisted by the Vice-Chairman, the Ministers, and the Deputy Ministers. Article 26. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam nominates the Ministers, the Deputy Ministers, with the agreement of the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 27. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam accepts the resignation or terminates the duty of the Ministers, the Deputy Ministers, with the agreement of the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 28. – The duty of the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam is terminated if his resignation is accepted by the Military Revolutionary Council or if there is a decision by the Military Revolutionary Council. Article 29. – In case the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam is deceased or incapable to fulfill his duty, and before the Military Revolutionary Council elects a new Chairman, the Vice- Chairman automatically replaces the Chairman. Article 30. – The Government Council, or Cabinet, presided over by the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam, is composed of the ViceChairman, the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers. Article 31. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam is the supreme commander-in- chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Article 32. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam nominates, according to the current laws: • ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and special envoys with rank of ambassadors or plenipotentiaries • judicial and administrative judges • generals and colonels executing functions of generals Article 33. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam nominates highranking government officials according to the current laws. Article 34. – Based on the request of or the agreement by the Military Revolutionary Council, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam declares war or signs peace treaties. Article 35. –Based on the request of or the agreement by the Military Revolutionary Council, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam declares the state of emergency, the state of curfew or the state of war. In these circumstances, a number of laws and regulations can be suspended. An official document will determine the conditions for the declaration and the effect of these states. Article 36. – With the approval by the Military Revolutionary Council, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam ratifies international treaties.

Appendix D  147 Article 37. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam signs credentials for ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and special envoys with the ranks of ambassadors or plenipotentiaries, and accepts credentials presented to him by ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, or special envoys with the rank of ambassadors or plenipotentiaries from foreign countries in Vietnam. Article 38. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam has the right to pardon, reduce, change or suspend sentences. The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam grants medals of all kinds. Article 39. – In case the national independence, the integrity of territory are seriously and immediately threatened as well as the administration of basic structure of the Republic Regime or the execution of international commitments are heavily obstructed, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam will enact all resolutions, all appropriate measures, after consultation with the Speaker of the Provisional National Assembly and with the agreement by the Military Revolutionary Council. The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam will inform the whole nation. The decree-laws will be notified to the Provisional National Assembly.

Fifth chapter Provisional National Assembly Article 40. – W hile waiting for the elected National Assembly, a Provisional National Assembly is now established with 150 members: a

100 civilian members: • A number of members are designated by the Military Revolutionary Council among members of province, municipality or capital city councils, based on recommendations from these councils; each council designating one member. • The remaining members are designated by the Military Revolutionary Council among personalities inside or outside of the political organizations.

b

50 members representing the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam designated by the Military Revolutionary Council.

Article 41. – The Provisional National Assembly passes laws. The Provisional National Assembly can pass recommendations on basic national policies. These recommendations are not binding. The Provisional National Assembly discusses draft laws suggested by the Government, or bills or draft recommendations suggested by at least 20 members. Article 42. – Within five full days after being passed by the Provisional National Assembly, laws will be sent to the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam. The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam will seek advice from the judiciary committee mentioned at Article 57 on these laws as well as on other draft laws.

148  Appendix D The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam enacts these laws within 45 full days after reception. In cases of emergency, and requested by the Provisional National Assembly, this period of promulgation will be 15 full days. Article 43. – Within this period of promulgation, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam can ask the Provisional National Assembly to reconsider one or several articles of the laws. When reconsidering, if the Provisional National Assembly refuses to make the changes requested by the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional National Assembly must pass the laws with a majority of ¾ of all its members. Article 44. – The national budget draft must be sent to the office of the Provisional National Assembly before October 1 and must be passed before December 31. Article 45. – Members who suggest new expenditure must also suggest corresponding new revenue. Article 46. – In case of emergency, war, revolt, economic, or financial crisis, the Provisional National Assembly can delegate to the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam the power of signing the decree-laws within the scope and the time frame of the delegation. The decree-laws must be sent to the Provisional National Assembly immediately after being signed. In the regular session after the period of delegation, if the Provisional National Assembly does not reject, the decree-laws will automatically become laws. Article 47. – Between the sessions of the Provisional National Assembly, in case of emergency, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam can sign decree-laws. These decree-laws must be sent to the Provisional National Assembly immediately after being signed. In the next regular session, if the Provisional National Assembly does not reject, these decree-laws will automatically become laws. Article 48. – It is forbidden to prosecute, track down, arrest, or sentence a member for his statements or votes in the Provisional National Assembly or at the committees of the Provisional National Assembly. Except the case of being caught on the crime scene, no member can be prosecuted, tracked down, arrested, or tried throughout the sessions of the Provisional National Assembly, including the time he goes to the meetings or the time he comes home after meetings. Article 49. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam can send messages to the Provisional National Assembly or speak at the Provisional National Assembly. Ministers, Deputy Ministers can have meetings with the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, and the chairmen of the committees of the Provisional National Assembly. With the approval of the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam, the Speaker of the Provisional National Assembly can invite Ministers, Deputy Ministers to explain the draft laws in front of the committees.

Appendix D  149 Article 50. – Every year, the Provisional National Assembly conducts two regular sessions. One session begins on the first Monday of April and does not last more than two months. One session begins on the first Monday of October and does not last more than three months. Article 51. – Between the regular sessions, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam can convene the Provisional National Assembly for special sessions. In this case, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam sets the agenda. Article 52. – The Provisional National Assembly holds open sessions. For special reasons, the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam or the office of the Provisional National Assembly may suggest closed- door sessions. Article 53. – Reports of discussions will be published in the Official Journal, except when the Provisional National Assembly holds closed-door sessions.

Sixth chapter The Judiciary Article 54. – Judges judge according to their conscience, with objectivity and respect of the laws. Article 55. – To guarantee the independence of trial judges, the transfer, punishment, and discipline of judges are decided by the High Council of Judges. The Military Revolutionary Council designates the President of the High Council of Judges. The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam nominates and promotes trial judges, based on recommendations by the High Council of Judges. Article 56. – An Act will determine membership, organization and administration of the High Council of Judges, following this principle: the President of the High Council of Judges is nominated by the Revolutionary Army Council, members are elected by trial judges of all ranks.

Seventh chapter Professional agencies Article 57. – The legal committee has the duty to give advice on laws, draft laws, decree-laws, and decrees received from the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam. An official document will determine membership, organization and administration of the legal committee. Article 58. – The Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam can establish other professional agencies with the duties to present initiatives, to give advices, and to prepare plans and projects for issues suggested by the Government.

150  Appendix D

Eighth chapter Final articles Article 59. – While waiting for the elections of province, municipality, and capital city councils, the Military Revolutionary Council will designate members of the Provisional National Assembly, selected from regional representatives recommended by province heads, municipality heads and the mayor of the capital city. The term of these members will be automatically terminated when there are members designated according to the procedures mentioned in Article 40. Article 60. – A provisional High Council of Judges with four members is designated by the Military Revolutionary Council. This High Council of Judges will draw up a list of trial judges and make appointment recommendations to the Chairman of the Republic of Vietnam, based on Article 55 of this Charter. The duty of this provisional High Council of Judges is terminated when the real High Council of Judges is legally established. Article 61. – These above-mentioned national institutions will be established and will begin their operations at the latest one month after the proclamation of this Charter. Article 62. – The Temporary Charter No. 1 of November 4, 1963, and the Temporary Charter No. 2 of February 7, 1964, are abolished. All current laws and regulations are still in effect except for those that are contradictory with this Charter. This Charter is in effect from the day it is promulgated. Saigon, August 16, 1964 Military Revolutionary Council

Appendix E

Provisional Charter – October 20, 1964

(Author’s translation of the original document in Vietnamese, printed in the October 21, 1964 issue of the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 3878/2–3878/7) ­

Preliminary On November 1, 1963, the Army courageously stood up to overthrow a family-oriented oligarchic dictatorial regime. That was a marvelous exploit that the nation still remembers and is grateful. However, after temporarily holding power for a while, the Army, through proclamation and appeal, has rightly observed that, in order to efficiently serve the nation and correctly meet the aspiration of the people, it needs to return to its military duty and gradually hand the power back to a civilian government. The High National Council was created to draft and promulgate a Provisional Charter, with the objective to organize the national political structure in the transitional period, and to gradually complete the transfer of power from the military government to the civilian government. Drafted during a period of war and chaos, within a short time frame to put a quick end to the risks of a government without a legal basis, this Charter, in spite of its provisional status, still includes elements of a democratic regime: • • •

Separation of powers Respect of basic freedoms Social equality

Besides, the Charter also aims at building a stable government and solving rapidly and smoothly potential political crises. However, in front of urgent demands of the current situation, some limitations are inevitable to guarantee the supreme interest of the Fatherland as well as to return and maintain public security.

152  Appendix E To give the power to the High National Council while waiting for the National Assembly to be convened is a temporary solution, realistic and necessary, to respond to the difficulties that our Nation has to cope with, and at the same time to have the transfer of power achieved within the deadline declared by the incumbent government.

Provisional Charter First chapter Basic articles Article 1. – Vietnam is a Republic; its territory is indivisible. Article 2. – The sovereignty belongs to the people and will be executed by elected representatives of the people. Currently, due to the special situation of the country, a National Assembly will be convened according to the procedures determined in a law that will be enacted after this Charter. Article 3. – The Republic of Vietnam accepts the principles of international laws that are not contradictory with its sovereignty and with its antiCommunist, anti-Neutralist politics.

Second chapter Rights and duties of citizens Article 4. – A ll Vietnamese citizens are equal before the laws, disregard of sex, origin and religion. Article 5. – The basic freedoms recognized by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, such as the freedom of thoughts, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of religion, the freedom of practicing and preaching religion, the freedom of meetings, the freedom of organizing associations, the freedom of moving, are guaranteed within the legal framework, with the condition of respecting the rights of others, and not causing any harm to the national defense and the public order and security. The freedom of speech should not be abused to falsely accuse, to defame, to violate good morals and customs, public order, or to conduct propaganda for the Communists and Neutralists. Article 6. – The freedom to organize unions and the freedom of labor strike are recognized, but must be exercised within the legal framework, not causing any harm to national defense, and public order and security. Civil servants as well as employees and workers in fields relating to national defense, public security, public utilities such as electricity, water, transportation, do not have the freedom of labor strike. Laws and regulations will determine special status aiming at the protection of the legitimate interests of these civil servants, employees and workers.

Appendix E  153 Article 7. – No one can be arrested, incarcerated, imprisoned illegally. All kinds of torture are forbidden. Private life, family, and dignity of individuals must be respected. Article 8. – The Government of Vietnam recognizes and guarantees the rights to own private properties, and has a policy to enrich the citizenry and to realize social equality. For public utilities, Government can appropriate private properties, but that must be done according to the laws with appropriate compensation. Article 9. – All citizens have the duty to respect national discipline, to protect the Fatherland by fulfilling military service and contributing to the public expenses based on their capacities.

Third chapter Chief of State Article 10. – The Chief of State will be selected based on the procedure determined by the National Assembly. Article 11. – The Chief of State selects the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister presents his action plan to the National Assembly. The Chief of State will appoint the Prime Minister, if the National Assembly approves. The Prime Minister designates the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers and Deputy Ministers for the Chief of State’s appointment. The Chief of State terminates the duty of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, if his resignation is accepted by the National Assembly or in cases envisioned in the following Articles 32 and 33. In the case the National Assembly does not approve successively two (2) Prime Ministers selected by the Chief of State to replace the resigning Prime Minister, the National Assembly has the duty to present a list of three (3) individuals for the Chief of State’s selection. Article 12. – The Chief of State, based on the Government’s recommendations, appoints at the Council of Ministers: • Diplomatic envoys of all ranks • Presidents of universities • Mayor of the Capital City The Chief of State appoints and promotes, at the Council of Ministers, trial judges, based on the recommendations by the High Council of Judges. The Chief of State appoints and promotes generals, and colonels promoted to generals, based on the recommendations of the CommanderIn-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, after consultation with the Prime Minister.

154  Appendix E Article 13. – The Chief of State will be the supreme leader of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The Chief of State appoints the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, after consultation with the Prime Minister. Article 14. – The Chief of State grants medals and exercises the right to pardon. Article 15. – The Chief of State should always be notified by the Government of all international negotiations, and, with the approval of the National Assembly, signs and ratifies international conventions and treaties. Based on the recommendations by the National Security Council and with the approval of the National Assembly, the Chief of State declares war, armistice, and signs peace treaties. The Chief of State accepts credentials and represents the Nation in international relations. Article 16. – Based on the recommendations by the National Security Council and with the approval of the National Assembly, the Chief of State declares the state of emergency, the state of martial laws, or the state of war, which has the effect of suspending the application of a number of laws on one part or on the whole territory of Vietnam. In the above-mentioned states, and when the independence, the integrity of territory of the country are seriously threatened, the National Assembly, after consultation with the National Security Council, can pass a law delegating to the Government, for a period of time and for a specific scope, the power to promulgate decree-laws signed by the Chief of State at the Council of Ministers in order to apply necessary emergency measures. All decree-laws will be notified to the National Assembly after being signed. Thirty (30) days after the end of the period determined in the delegating law, the decree-laws that the National Assembly does not reject will automatically become laws. Article 17. – If the national budget is not yet passed by the National Assembly at the deadline, the Chief of State, following suggestion from the Government, can sign a decree-law permitting the execution of one quarter (1/4) of the budget for the three (3) coming months; this execution can be repeated until the national budget is passed by the National Assembly. Article 18. – The Chief of State presides over the Council of Ministers. All official documents signed by the Chief of State, except the one to appoint the Prime Minister, must be countersigned by the Prime Ministers and the corresponding Ministers. Article 19. – The Chief of State promulgates laws according to the procedure determined in the Fifth Chapter.

Appendix E  155 Article 20. – In the case the Chief of State is deceased or incapable of discharging his duty, the Speaker of the National Assembly will replace him, with the condition there will be a new Chief of State within sixty (60) days. The Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly will replace the Speaker to head the Assembly. Article 21. – The Chief of State is only held responsible in the case of high treason and will be tried by the Special Tribunal.

Fourth chapter Government Article 22. – The Prime Minister presides over the Government Council, determines and implements national policies. The Prime Minister is responsible for the application of laws and regulations with the right to sign decrees. In the case the National Assembly has passed the delegating law, as envisioned in Article 16, the Prime Minister has the duty to prepare draft laws. The Prime Minister employs the Armed Forces and the national defense organization, based on decisions by the National Security Council. The Prime Minister appoints officials of all ranks, civilian and military, except for positions mentioned in Articles 11, 12, and 13. The Prime Minister can delegate part of this power to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers. Article 23. – All official documents signed by the Prime Minister must be countersigned by the corresponding Ministers. Article 24. – The Prime Minister and the Ministers, before the National Assembly, are responsible, as a group, for the general politics of the Government, and responsible individually for the activities by their functions. The procedures for reprimand recommendation and the issue of confidence will be determined in the Fifth Chapter. Article 25. – The Prime Minister has the power to propose draft laws and to prepare the national budget.

Fifth chapter Legislative power Article 26. – The legislative power belongs to the National Assembly. It is forbidden to prosecute, track down, arrest or sentence a member of the National Assembly for his statements or votes in the Assembly.

156  Appendix E Except the case of being caught on the crime scene, no member can be prosecuted, tracked down, arrested or tried throughout the sessions of the Provisional National Assembly. The prosecution and incarceration of a member will be ceased upon request by the National Assembly. The National Assembly, with a majority of three- quarters (3/4) of all its members, can pass a resolution to suspend the immunity from prosecution of a member. While carrying out the legislative power at the National Assembly, civil servant and military members must take long-term leaves of absence, except for the professors of universities and technical colleges. Members and their spouses are not allowed to participate in bidding or signing supply contracts with government agencies. Article 27. – The National Assembly passes laws. The National Assembly passes recommendations for the Government when necessary. Article 28. – The Government proposes draft laws; members of the National Assembly have the right to submit bills. Forty- eight hours after the National Assembly’s passage, laws will be sent to the Chief of State for promulgation in a period of fifteen (15) full days after reception. During this period of fifteen (15) full days, the Chief of State can request the National Assembly to reconsider one or several articles in the laws. When doing that, if the National Assembly does not agree to make changes suggested by the Chief of State, the National Assembly will pass the returned laws with a majority of two-thirds (2/3) of its total members. After the period envisioned for the promulgation, if the Chief of State neither promulgates nor returns the laws to the National Assembly for reconsideration, the laws will automatically be in effect and will be promulgated by the Speaker of the National Assembly. Article 29. – In the case the National Assembly declares emergency state, the period for promulgation will be reduced to one (1) full day. Article 30. – The National Assembly passes the national budget proposed by the Government. The draft budget must be sent to the National Assembly at least three (3) months before the planned day of execution. The National Assembly has the power to propose new expenses, but at the same time has to propose new corresponding revenues. If by the day the budget must be executed and the National Assembly still has not yet passed the budget, the Chief of State will sign a decreelaw permitting the execution of one- quarter (1/4) of the budget for the coming three (3) months, as mentioned earlier.

Appendix E  157 Article 31. – The National Assembly has the power to request that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers come to give a presentation of an issue that has been notified in advance by official memo at least one week, and in case of emergency, at least three (3) days. On the contrary, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers have the power to come before the National Assembly to explain a specific issue. The Government has the power to come before the National Assembly with assistants. Ministers, Deputy Ministers have the power to come or can be invited to come to the committees in order to give presentations or to consult on an issue, with the above-mentioned conditions. Article 32. – The National Assembly, with a majority of two-thirds (2/3) of its total members, has the power to pass a resolution to reprimand one or several Ministers, and Deputy Ministers. The reprimanded Minister or Deputy Minister will be automatically considered as resigning. With the same above-mentioned majority, the National Assembly also has the power to pass a resolution to reprimand the Prime Minister, with all members of the Government. However, together with the reprimanding resolution, the National Assembly must propose, with the agreement of the Chief of State, a new Prime Minster. The reprimanded Prime Minister is automatically considered as resigning, together will all members of the Government. The Chief of State will appoint the new Prime Minister proposed by the National Assembly. During the time the new Government is not yet installed, the new Government must continue in acting capacity. Article 33. – The Prime Minister, after discussion at the Council of Ministers, has the power to ask the National Assembly to vote for confidence. If the National Assembly, with a majority of two-thirds (2/3) of its total members, votes for no confidence, the Government will be automatically considered as resigning; the National Assembly will then pass a resolution to propose a new Prime Minister to replace, with the agreement of the Chief of State. Article 34. – The resolution for reprimand or the vote for no confidence visà-vis the Prime Minister can be performed only after forty-eight (48) hours of discussion. Article 35. – If within a period of twelve (12) months there are two (2) government crises caused by the application of above-mentioned Articles 32 and 33, the National Assembly can be dissolved by the Chief of State, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, and after consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly; however, the Chief of State must convene the new National Assembly within thirty (30) days. The new National Assembly cannot be dissolved within one (1) year.

158  Appendix E

Sixth chapter Judiciary power Article 36. – Trial judges judge and sentence according to their conscience, with objectivity, and in the respect of laws and the national interest. Prosecuting judges, under the control of the Ministry of Justice, administer and follow the application of laws in the spirit of respecting the social morals and the public security. Article 37. – To guarantee the independence of trial judges, their transfer, punishment and discipline will be decided by the High Council of Judges. The Chief of State appoints and promotes trial judges, based on the recommendations by the High Council of Judges. Article 38. – Ac Act will determine the organization, administration and power of the High Council of Judges. Article 39. – The trial of the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the National High Council, and the Speaker of the National Assembly committing high treason or high offenses, is under the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, of which the organization, administration and the procedures for prosecution will be determined in an Act.

Seventh chapter Council of Economic and Social Affairs Article 40. – A Council of Economic and Social Affairs will be established with the following duties: • Giving advices on draft laws, projects, plans sent by the Government or the National Assembly, if necessary • Presenting initiatives, and preparing plans for issues within the mandate of the Council of Economic and Social Affairs to submit for consideration to the National Assembly Besides, the National Assembly and the Government must consult with the Council of Economic and Social Affairs on all plans, draft laws and bills dealing with economic and social issues.

Eighth chapter National Security Council Article 41. – A National Security Council will be established with the following duties: • Recommending to declare war, armistice or to sign peace treaty • Recommending to declare state of war • Recommending to declare state of emergency or state of martial laws on a part of on the whole territory of the country

Appendix E  159 • Examining and approving national defense policy • Advising and assisting the Government in plans relating to national security Article 42. – The National Security Council includes: • • • •

Chief of State, Chairman Prime Minister, Vice- Chairman Minister of Armed Forces, Member Commander-In-Chief of Armed Forces of Republic of Vietnam, Member

Article 43. – An Act will determine the organization and administration of the National Security Council.

Ninth chapter Articles for transition Article 44. – During the transitional period, until the National Assembly is in place, the High National Council, established by Decision no. 7, dated September 8, 1964, of the Provisional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and the Armed Forces, assumes the powers entrusted to the National Assembly in this Charter. Article 45. – After the National Assembly is convened, The High National Council will become an institution equivalent to the Senate in a bicameral legislature. An Act will determine the duties and the powers of this institution. Article 46. – Until the Constitution is promulgated, the national political institutions established by the High National Council according to Article 44, will continue to operate according to articles of this Charter.

Tenth chapter Final articles Article 47. – The Chief of State, the Prime Minister or more than half (1/2) of members of the National Assembly can propose changes to the Charter. Proposals for changes must include reasons and are submitted to the Office of the National Assembly. Proposals for changes are only accepted if three- quarters (3/4) of all members of the National Assembly are in favor, and will be promulgated as a law. Article 48. – The Temporary Charter No. 1 of November 4, 1963, the Temporary Charter No. 2 of February 7, 1964, and the Charter of August 16, 1964, are abolished. All currently existing laws and regulations continue to be in effect, except for articles that are contradictory with this Charter.

160  Appendix E Article 49. – This Charter is in effect from the day it is passed until there is a new Constitution. Passed in Saigon, October 20, 1964 High National Council Signed by: • • • • •

Chairman ­ Vice-Chairman Secretary-General ­ Deputy Secretary-General ­ Members

Phan Khắc Sửu Nguyễn Xuân Chữ Trần Văn Văn Nguyễn Văn Lực Nguyễn Văn Huyền Ngô Gia Hy Nguyễn Đình Luyện Hồ Văn Nhựt Trần Văn Quế Lê Khắc Quyến Lương Trọng Tường Lê Văn Thu Mai Thọ Truyền Trần Quang Vinh

Absent: • Vice-Chairman ­ • Members

Trần Đình Nam (sickness) Tôn Thất Hanh (official travel abroad) Hồ Đắc Thăng (sickness)

Appendix F

Provisional Constitution – June 19, 1965

(Author’s translation of the original document in Vietnamese, printed in the July 3, 1965 issue of the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 2663–2666) ­

Preliminary In this dangerous situation, for the survival of the People, and for the honor of the Fatherland, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam has courageously assumed responsibility before the Nation and History. To accomplish this mission, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam will not follow demagogy as direction but take the security of the people as the basis of its policy. The Vietnamese people, through countless sacrifices, always aspire for a prosperous fatherland in peace and freedom. The duty of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam is to realize that cherished aspiration at all cost. To reach that goal, everyone must unify will and action, spend all efforts for the frontline, push back and destroy the Communist invaders. To reach that goal, in the rear the situation must be stabilized so that we can gradually build a solid basis on which a tradition of democracy and freedom will find favorable conditions to blossom in revolution and in fighting. Based on the painful experience of the past, the following Provisional Constitution determines the basic national organizational structure aiming at achieving the above-mentioned objectives.

First chapter General principles Article 1. – Vietnam is a Republic; its territory is unified and indivisible. Article 2. – While waiting for a genuine Constitution, the national sovereignty, provisionally, is held by the Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

162  Appendix F Article 3. – The Republic of Vietnam accepts and respects the principles of international laws, with the condition that these principles are not contradictory with the national sovereignty and with the present struggle of the Nation.

Second chapter Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam Article 4. – The Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam is composed of: • All Generals in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam • Commanders of all Services and Branches • Commanders of Tactical Regions and Commander of the Capital City Special Region • Commanders of Divisions Article 5. – The Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam is administered by a By-Laws that will be determined later. Article 6. – According to the By-Laws, The Great Council establishes a National Leadership Committee that is composed of: • • • •

One Chairman One Secretary-General ­ One Commissioner responsible for the Executive Power Seven other Commissioners: Commissioner for Defense within the Executive, Chief of General Staff, four Commanders of Tactical Regions and the Commander of the Capital City Special Region

Third chapter National Leadership Committee Article 7. – The National Leadership Committee is delegated to hold sovereignty and direct all national activities. The National Leadership Committee is accountable before the Great Council of the Republic of Vietnam for all its decisions. Article 8. – The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee assumes the representation of the Republic of Vietnam in the country and abroad. The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee appoints, at the Council of Executive Commissioners, by decrees and based on recommendations by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee: • Diplomatic envoys of all ranks • Presidents of universities • Mayor of the Capital City The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee appoints and promotes, at the Council of Executive Commissioners, trial judges

Appendix F  163 based on the recommendations of the High Council of Judges. Following decisions of the National Leadership Committee, the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee appoints and promotes Generals and Colonels promoting to Generals, based on the recommendations by the Commissioner for Defense. The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee appoints, based on the recommendations by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, General Commissioners, Commissioners, and Deputy Commissioners. The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, based on the decisions of the National Security Council, declares the state of emergency, the state of martial laws, or the state of war. The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, based on the decisions of the Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, declares war, armistice, and signs peace and international treaties. The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee promulgates legislative documents and enforcement formulae for the sentences by the judicial and administrative tribunals. Article 9. – The Chairman of the National Leadership Committee grants medals and exercises the power of pardon. Article 10. – In the case the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee is deceased or incapable of discharging his duty, the SecretaryGeneral of the National Leadership Committee will replace him with the condition that the Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam designates a new Chairman within ten (10) days. Article 11. – The Secretary- General of the National Leadership Committee has the following duties: • Studying and planning general national policies • With the consent of the National Leadership Committee, preparing and proposing legislative documents to implement national policies • Convening regular or irregular meetings of the National Leadership Committee Article 12. – The Secretary-General has the duty to organize the Office of the National Leadership Committee and, if necessary, to establish technical committees to assist in duties listed in Article 11. Article 13. – The Commissioner responsible for the Executive Power assumes the position of Chairman of the Central Executive Committee to implement policies determined by the National Leadership Committee. The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee can submit draft laws for the National Leadership Committee to study and promulgate. Article 14. – The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee has the full power to: • Organize the executive branch structure • Select and replace government officials

164  Appendix F However, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee must have the approval of the National Leadership Committee for decisions relating to structures from the provincial or General Directorate levels upwards and relating to positions from the Deputy Commissioners upwards. Article 15. – The National Leadership Committee designates among the Commissioners of the National Leadership Committee one person to replace the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee in the case this Commissioner is deceased or incapable of discharging his duty with the condition that the Great Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam designates a new Commissioner responsible for the Executive Power within ten (10) days.

Fourth chapter National Security Council Article 16. – The National Security Council is composed of: • • • • •

Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, Chairman Secretary-General of the National Leadership Committee, Member Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Member Commissioner for Defense, Member Chief of the General Staff, Member

Article 17. – The National Security Council has the following general duty: • To propose appropriate measures to safeguard the national security • To propose the declaration of the state of emergency, the state of martial laws or the state of war on one part or on the whole territory of the country Article 18. – An Act will determine the administration and additional duties of the National Security Council.

Fifth chapter Council of Economic and Social Affairs Article 19. – A council of Economic and Social Affairs will be established with the duty: • To present initiatives, to prepare plans for economic and social issues to submit to the National Leadership Committee • To give advices on projects, plans relating to economic and social issues prepared by the National Leadership Committee Article 20. – An Act will determine the organization and administration of the Council of Economic and Social Affairs.

Appendix F  165

Sixth chapter High Council of Judges Article 21. – A High Council of Judges will be established with the objective to guarantee the independence of trial judges. The High Council of Judges decides and proposes to the National Leadership Committee ideas relating to the appointment, transfer, punishment, discipline, promotion, and removal of trial judges. Article 22. – An Act will determine the organization and administration of the High Council of Judges.

Seventh chapter Final articles Article 23. – Half (1/2) of members of the Great Council of the Armed Forces or half (1/2) of Commissioners in the National Leadership Committee can propose changes to this Provisional Constitution. Article 24. – Proposals for changes must give the reasons and are accepted only if two-thirds (2/3) of members of the Great Council of the Armed Forces are in favor. Article 25. – This Provisional Constitution is in effect from the date of promulgation until there is a genuine Constitution. The Temporary Charter No. 1 of November 4, 1963, The Temporary Charter No. 2 of February 7, 1964, The Charter of August 16, 1964, The Provisional Charter of October 20, 1964, together with all official documents or laws and regulations that are contradictory with this Provisional Constitution are abolished.

Bibliography

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Bibliography  169 Porter, Gareth, ed. 1979. Vietnam: the definitive documentation of human decisions. Stanfordville, NY: E.M. Coleman Enterprises. Trần Ngọc Thống, Hồ Đắc Huân, and Lê Đình Thụy. 2011. Lược sử Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Brief history of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam). San Jose, CA: Hương Quê. Trần Văn Đôn. 1978. Our endless war: inside Vietnam. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press. Tucker, Spencer C., ed. 1998. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: a political, social, and military history. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. United States. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273, accessible online at this URL: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-lbj/nsam-273.htm. Vietnam. 2013. Lịch sử kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước, 1954–1975 (History of the resistance war against the United States to save our country, 1954–1975). Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House. Vietnam (Republic). 1966. Bầu cử Quốc-Hội Lập-Hiến: Sắc-luật số 021/66 và 022/66 ngày 19-6-1966 (Elections for the Constituent Assembly: Decree-Laws no. 021/66 and 022/66 of June 19, 1966). Saigon: Phủ Đặc Ủy Hành Chánh (Special Commission for Public Administration). Vietnam (Republic). 1966. Quốc-Hội Lập-Hiến: 11–9–1966: mở đầu chu kỳ vàng son trong lịch sử Việt Nam (Constituent Assembly: September 11, 1966: opening a golden cycle in the history of Vietnam). Saigon: Nha Chương Trình Tài Liệu, Tổng Bộ Thông Tin và Chiêu Hồi (Directorate of Programs and Documents, General Ministry of Information and Open Arms). Vietnam (Republic). 1967. Hiến-Pháp Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa: ban hành ngày 1–4–1967 (The Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam: promulgated on April 1, 1967). Saigon: Nhựt báo Bình Minh (Bình Minh Dailynews). Vietnam (Republic). 1967. Thành tích hoạt động của Nội Các Chiến Tranh: từ 19-61965 đến 19-6-1967 (Achievements of the War Cabinet: from 19-6-1965 to 19-61967). Saigon: Bộ Thông Tin và Chiêu Hồi (Ministry of Information and Open Arms). Võ Long Triều. 2011. Hồi ký Võ Long Triều (Memoirs of Võ Long Triều). Available online at this URL: http://www.vietnamvanhien.org/hoikyvolongtrieu.html.

Index

AFC 35, 51–4, 61–2, 65–7; dissolution of 67 Africa 70 Airborne Brigade 21, 66, 68 Alliance Bloc (in CA) 105 anti-American slogans 85 Armed Forces Congress 80 Armed Forces Council see AFC Armed Forces Day 81 Armed Forces Great Council see ARVN-Grand Convention of Generals Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam see ARVN Armored Command 20–21 Army of the Republic of Vietnam see ARVN ARVN 4–5, 8–9, 26, 30, 32, 40, 75–6, 80, 110; Grand Convention of Generals 76, 78, 109, 113; High Disciplinary Council 90–1; total number of troops 6 Association for Buddhist Studies of South Vietnam 31, 91, 114 Australia 1 Ấn Quang faction see Buddhists–internal division Âu Trường Thanh 10, 32, 92 Âu Trường Thanh–Vũ Văn Huyền presidential ticket 115 Ba Cụt 11, 21 Ba Xuyên Province 102 Bạch Đằng waterfront 79 Ball, George 87 Ban Lãnh Đạo Lâm Thời Quốc Gia và Quân Lực see Provisional Committeefor the Leadership of the Nation and Armed Forces Ban Mê Thuột 38, 84 Bangkok 90

Bảo Luân 90 Basic Choices in Vietnam report 87 Battle of Bình Giả 79 Bắc Tiến see Marching North Bennett, Harold George 79 Bến Thành Central Market 44, 79 Bienhoa see Biên Hòa Biên Hòa 13, 19, 27, 35 Bình Thủy (Cần Thơ Province) airbase 88 Bình Xuyên 23 Bombing of North Vietnam 15, 33, 43 Buddha’s altars to the streets 90 Buddhist Crisis of 1963 4, 31, 40–41, 82, 114 Buddhists 11, 31, 33, 35, 40–3, 53, 65, 83, 91, 115; establishment of Chaplain System in Armed Forces 43; internal division (Ấn Quang faction–Việt Nam Quốc Tự faction) 90; involvement in Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam 84–90; opposition to Trần Văn Hương government 46–49, 53; pressure on Nguyễn Khánh government 42; struggle methods 42; violent confrontations with Catholics 43, 45 Bùi Diễm 11, 65–7, 69–70, 113; biosketch 123 Bùi Hữu Nhơn 34, 49 Bùi Hữu Tuấn 65–6, 77, 80 Bùi Tường Huân 32 Bùi Xuân Bào 118 Bùi Văn Mạnh 66 Bundy, William 53, 87–8 Bửu Đôn 118 CA 3, 5, 85–6, 88, 101–17; Communist sabotage of election 104; drafting of constitution 105–11; election of 104; election of Office 105; election day 104; election law 102; establishing

172 Index committees 105; formation of blocs 105–7; inauguration 105; membership 102; number of candidates 104; qualifications of candidates 103; results of election 104; vetting elected candidates 105 Cambodia 8, 10–12, 21–2, 82 Cabinet Crisis of May/June 1965 5, 68–71 Cabinet Crisis of October 1966 91–3, 108, 112 Camp Hoàng Hoa Thám 26 Cantho Province see Cần Thơ Province Cao Đài 11, 24, 104, 112 Cao Hảo Hớn 34 Cao Hữu Đính 66 Cao Thắng Technical High School 45 Cao Văn Viên 21, 25–6, 34, 84–5, 113; biosketch 123–4 Capital Military District 12, 65, 89 Caravelle Group 11 Carver, George 87 Catholics 11, 31, 43, 45, 68; Tinh Thần group 59; violent confrontations with Buddhists 43; 45 Cần Lao Party members 31, 39, 43–4, 48, 82, 89 Cần Thơ Province 18, 23, 112, 116 CEC 71, 76, 79, 83, 90, 92, 101, 105, 109, 112, 117 Central Executive Committee see CEC Central Highlands 1, 19 Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) see CIA Central Intelligence Organization (Vietnam) 81, 92 Central Vietnam 42–3, 48, 66, 81–4, 114–15 Cham ethnic group 102, 104 Charter of the Republic of Vietnam (16 August 1964) see Vũng Tàu Charter Châu Đốc Province 102 Chí Hòa prison 43 Chínhluận daily newspaper 109 Cholon see Chợ Lớn Chợ Lớn 6, 80 Chung Tấn Cang 34, 49, 54, 66; biosketch 124 CIA 1, 9, 12, 18, 41, 65, 67; Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs see SAVA CINCPAC 20

Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam 3–6, 81–91, 101, 103, 112 Civilian-Military Council 90, 105 Commander-In-Chief Pacific see CINCPAC Committee Against Bad Merchants 64 Conein, Lucien 25 Constituent Assembly see CA Constitution of 1967 3, 5; age requirement for candidates for presidency 108; amendments to 111; basic principles of 106; contents of 109–11; drafting of 105–11; rationale for prime minister position 107 Council for Cultural and Educational Affairs 110 Council for Economic and Social Affairs 110 Council for Ethnic Minorities 110 Council of National Salvation 43, 48 Council of Notables 3, 7, 9, 11, 15–16, 21, 33; mandate 11; membership 16 Cổ Sơn Môn (Buddhist sect) 41 Côn Đảo prison 8 Công Chúng newspaper 92 Criminal Code 91 Dalat see Đà Lạt Danang see Đà Nẵng De Gaulle, Charles 12, 21–22 Decree-Law No. 021/66 101; Article no. 20 106–7; contents of 102 Decree-Law No. 022/66 101; contents of 102 Decree-Law No. 14/66 86, 88, 101 Decree-Law No. 62-SL/GD 90 Defense Intelligence Agency see DIA Demilitarized Zone see DMZ Democratic Alliance Bloc (in CA) 107 Democratic Bloc (in CA) 105, 111 Democratic Republic of Vietnam 29 Dharma Institute see Institute for the Execution of the Dharma DIA 1 Directorate 71, 76, 80, 83–4, 86, 88, 90, 93, 101–2, 105–7, 109, 111; approval of 1967 Constitution 109; creation of 76; enlargement with civilian members 90; membership 76; proposed changes to the draft 1967 Constitution 85–86 Diên Hồng Conference Center 48, 86 DMZ 13, 19 Du Tăng Khất Sĩ (Buddhist sect) 41 Duy Dân Party 25

Index  173 Dư Quốc Đống 38, 49, 84 Dương Hiếu Nghĩa 24–6 Dương Ngọc Lắm 26 Dương Văn Đức 21, 25–6, 34, 45, 48–9, 78; biosketch 124 Dương Văn Hiếu 42 Dương Văn Minh 2–3, 7–17, 18, 20–3, 31–2, 38, 45, 48–50, 113; biosketch 124–5 Đà Lạt 26–7, 32, 51–2, 84, 86, 112 Đà Lạt generals 22, 26–7, 32–4, 49 Đà Nẵng 4, 21–22, 24, 26, 32, 42, 66, 84–6, 88–9, 101 Đại Học Cần Thơ see University of Cần Thơ Đại Học Văn Khoa see Faculty of Letters, University of Sài Gòn Đại Việt Party 3–5, 11, 13, 21, 31, 33, 35, 39–40, 105, 114; plot against Nguyễn Khánh 33 Đàm Quang Yêu 84, 89 Đàm Sĩ Hiến 32, 58, 61 Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam see Vietnam Workers’ Party Đào Thị Ngọc 90 Đặng Sỹ 42 Đặng Văn Quang 34, 112 Đinh Thành Châu 106 Đinh Trịnh Chính 68, 77 Đinh Xuân Quảng 111 Đoàn Bá Cang 95, 118 Đoàn Chí Khoang 66 Đỗ Cao Trí 23 Đỗ Đăng Công 66 Đỗ Mậu 10, 18, 21–6, 32–3 Đỗ Thị Tuyết 90 Độc Lập Palace 7, 109 Faculty of Letters, University of Sài Gòn 43 Federation of Labor Union 48 5th Infantry Division 13, 19, 20–1, 24–5, 32 I Corps 13, 19–21, 23, 25–6, 67, 79, 81–4, 88–90, 115 1st Infantry Division 23, 82, 84, 90 Forces for the Liberation of the Capital City 67 IV Corps 13, 19, 25, 32, 45, 89, 115 France 8, 12 Freedom Protection Forces 115 French Embassy in Saigon 43 French War Memorial on Duy Tân street (Sài Gòn) 43

General Assembly of Generals 81, 84 General Association of Sài Gòn Students 43–4, 70 General Buddhist Association 41 General League of Youth Against Bad Merchants 64 General Staff Headquarters 44–5, 81 Gia Định Province 21, 79, 102, 104 Gia Long Palace 7, 61, 70, 90 Giáo Hội Phật Giáo Việt Nam Thống Nhất see VBUC Goldwater, Barry 53 Great Unity Forces 70 Guam Summit Conference 109 Gulf of Tonkin event 44 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 44, 53 Hà Nội 1, 41 Hà Thúc Ký 4, 21, 32–3 Hà ThúcKý–Nguyễn Văn Định presidential ticket 114 Hải Dương Province 78 Hanoi see Hà Nội Harkins, Paul 19–20, 23–5, 38 Hiến Chương Lâm Thời see Provisional Charter of 20 October 1964 Hiến Chương Việt Nam Cộng Hòa see Vũng Tàu Charter Hiến Chương Vũng Tàu see Vũng Tàu Charter Hiến Ước Tạm Thờisố 1 see Temporary Charter No. 1 Hiến Ước Lâm Thờisố 2 see Temporary Charter No. 2 High National Council see HNC Hinayana Buddhists 31, 41 Ho Chi Minh trail see Hồ Chí Minh trail Hòa Hảo 11, 21, 104–5, 112, 115 Hòa Vang District (Quảng Nam Province) 86 Hoàng Diệu Operation 23 Hoàng Hoa Thám Camp 21–22 Hoàng Quỳnh 70 Hoàng Xuân Lãm 34, 90 Honolulu Conference 83 House of Representatives 110; elections of 117 Hồ Chí Minh trail 1 Hồ Thới Sang 118 Hồ Văn Vui 45 Hội Đồng Nhân Sĩ see Council of Notables Hội Đồng Quân Đội Cách Mạng see MRC

174 Index Hội Đồng Quân Nhân Cách Mạng see MRC Hội Liên Trường see Old Southern Schools Association HNC 2, 5, 27, 34, 45, 48–55, 66, 69; creation of 48; difficulties of 51; dissolution of 52–4, 78; mandate 48; membership 55 Hue see Huế Huế 4, 41, 43, 84–5, 89–90, 116; the Citadel 89 Huỳnh Đức Bửu 118 Huỳnh Văn Cao 89, 91 Huỳnh Văn Cao senatorial slate 116; vote count 116 Huỳnh Văn Đạo 61 Huỳnh Văn Lang 18 Huỳnh Văn Nhiệm 66 Huỳnh Văn Tồn 25 Hưng Yên Province 78 inauguration of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ 117 Independence Palace see Độc Lập Palace infiltration of North Vietnamese troops 1 Inspectorate, The 110–11 Institute for the Execution of the Dharma 42, 86, 90 Institute of Clergy Hierarchy 42 JCS 20, 39 Johnson, Alexis 67 Johnson, Lyndon B. 12–14, 20, 23, 38–9, 44, 53, 83, 87–8 Joint Chiefs of Staff see JCS Joint Proclamation by the Chief of State, the Chairman of the NLC and the Prime Minister 75 “Jump to the mountain” movement 1966 91 Kennedy, John F. 11, 15, 17 Khmer ethnic group 102, 104 Kiên Giang Province 102 Kontum 52, 54 Krulak, Victor 20 Kỳ Viên Pagoda 41 Lam Sơn square 43 Lâm Văn Phát 13, 19, 21, 25, 34, 45–6, 48–9, 78; biosketch 125 Lâm Văn Trí 68, 77 Lập Trường magazine 43

League of Ready-To-Die Students 84, 90 Lê Duẩn 1 Lê Khắc Quyến 43, 52 Lê Nguyên Khang 34, 49, 65, 81, 112 Lê Quang Liêm 105 Lê Quang Vinh see Ba Cụt Lê Sĩ Ngạc 58, 61 Lê Trọng Vinh 118 Lê Văn Hoạch 32, 65 Lê Văn Kim 8, 10–12, 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 32, 49; biosketch 125 Lê Văn Nghiêm 10; biosketch 125–6 Lê Văn Thu 51 Lê Văn Tiến 80 Lê Văn Tuấn 58 Lê Văn Tỵ 7 Linh Quang Viên 61, 65, 118 Lodge, Henry Cabot 12, 19, 20, 25, 38, 83, 88 Long An Province 11 lower chamber see House of Representatives Lữ Văn Vi 58, 61, 77 Lực Lượng Bảo Vệ Tự Do see Freedom Protection Forces Lương Thế Siêu 118 Lưu Văn Tính 58, 118 Lý Quí Chung 106 McNaughton, John T. 87 MAAG 19, 23 MACV 19, 54 Madame Nhu 7 Maddox (U.S. destroyer) 44 Mahayana Buddhists 31, 41 Mai Hữu Xuân 10, 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 32, 49; biosketch 126 Mai Ngọc Khuê 70 Mai Thọ Truyền 31, 41, 52, 114–15 Mai Văn Thiệp 105 Manila Conference 93 Marakech (Morocco) 78 Marching North 43 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, US 78 McCone, John 9, 12 McNamara, Robert S. 9, 12–14, 19–20, 23–4, 38–9 Mekong Delta 18, 28, 90 Mekong River 92 Military Assistance Advisory Group see MAAG Military Assistance Command–Vietnam see MACV

Index  175 military coups 3–6, 29–30, 54, 67; coup attempt of May 20, 1965 67–8; coup of February 19, 1965 4, 27, 35, 46, 62, 65, 67, 79, 82; coup of January 30, 1964 2, 5, 18–27, 38, 82; coup of May 20, 1965 4; coup of November 1, 1963 1–5, 7–8, 26, 38, 40, 82; coup of November 11, 1960 23, 33, 82; coup of September 13, 1964 4, 34, 45–6, 48–9, 78, 82 Military Revolutionary Council see MRC Military Security Services 81, 92 Montagnard ethic group 102, 104 Montagnard ethnic group revolt see Rhade ethnic group revolt Movement for the Renaissance of the South see MRS MRC 2, 7–10–11, 13–14, 18–23, 25, 31–3, 38, 44, 48; membership 10 MRS 93, 106, 108, 114 MRS Bloc (in CA) 106, 108, 111, 114 Mỹ Cảnh Floating Restaurant 79 Mỹ Khê Base 32 Nam Định Province 62 National Assembly 39 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam see NFL National Leadership Committee see Directorate National Legislative Council see NLC National Police 81, 92 National Political Congress 86, 88, 101 National Security Action Memorandum 273 see NSAM 273 National Security Council (Vietnam) 110 National Security Council’s Working Group on South Vietnam / South East Asia see NSC Working Groupon South Vietnam neutralization of Indochina 12 neutralization of South Vietnam 11, 12, 21–3, 26 New Zealand 1 NFL 63, 75, 79, 91 Nghiêm Xuân Hồng 32, 44 Ngô Dzu 34 Ngô Đình Cẩn 42–3 Ngô Đình Diệm 1, 3–4, 7, 18–19, 23, 26, 39–40, 82, 91, 103, 107, 114 Ngô Đình Nhu 7, 11, 18, 26 Ngô Gia Hy 52

NgôNgọcĐối 58, 61 Ngô Ngọc Tố 52 Ngô Quang Trưởng 90 Ngô Trọng Anh 52, 61, 65, 77, 80 Nguyễn Bá Khả 61, 75–7, 91–2 Nguyễn Bá Tòng High School 45 Nguyễn Bảo Trị 118 Nguyễn Bửu 22 Nguyễn Cao 34 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ 1, 3, 5–6, 34, 49, 54, 61, 71, 76, 108–9; biosketch 78, 126–7 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ government 6, 77–93; Cabinet Crisis of October 1966 91–3; Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam 81–91; creation of Committee Against Bad Merchants 80; creation of General League of Youth Against Bad Merchants 80; inaugurating ceremony 77; membership 76–7, 80; political stabilization 80–1; program of activities 77–9, 83; reshuffle of 81; shut down of SàiGòn newspapers 79 NguyễnChánhLý 118 Nguyễn Chánh Thi 18, 20–21, 25–6, 34, 49, 52, 54, 67, 79, 81–4, 90–1, 112; biosketch 127 Nguyễn Công Hầu 32 Nguyễn Duy Tàimedical clinic 91 Nguyễn Duy Xuân 58, 61 Nguyễn Đại Thức 89 Nguyễn Đại Thức Brigade 89 Nguyễn Đức Thắng 34, 113 Nguyễn Gia Hiến senatorial slate 115; vote count 116 Nguyễn Hòa Hiệp 68, 70 Nguyễn Huy Chiểu 66 Nguyễn Hữu Chì 86 Nguyễn Hữu Có 10, 13, 25–6; 32, 76, 84–6, 112; biosketch 127–8 Nguyễn Hữu Hùng 58, 61, 92–3 Nguyễn Hữu Lương 105 Nguyễn Hữu Phi 10 Nguyễn Hữu Trung 105 Nguyễn Khánh 2–6, 8, 13–50, 54, 61, 65, 67, 78, 82; biosketch 22–3, 128 NguyễnKhánh government 5, 24, 38–46; membership 32 Nguyễn Khoa Phạm 101 Nguyễn Lâm Sanh 66 Nguyễn Lê Giang 10 Nguyễn Long 66 Nguyễn Lưu Viên 58, 60, 69, 92–3; biosketch 128 Nguyễn Lương Hưng 66 Nguyễn Mộng Hùng 21

176 Index Nguyễn NgọcKỷ senatorial slate 116; vote count 116 Nguyễn Ngọc Loan 81, 85, 88, 90–2, 107, 112; biosketch 128–9 Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ 1, 3, 10–12, 19, 21–2, 24, 26, 32; biosketch 129 Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ government 3, 10–14, 19, 21–22, 38; membership 10; reshuffle 12; resignation 32 Nguyễn Ngọc Tố 65 Nguyễn Phan Long 67 Nguyễn Phúc Quế 66, 118 Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên 52, 65 Nguyễn Tấn Hồng 52, 61, 65, 77, 80, 118 Nguyễn Tấn Lộc 75–76, 91 Nguyễn Tất Ứng 61, 77 Nguyễn Thành Cung 10 Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ 52, 65 Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn 3, 21, 32–3 Nguyễn Trân 66 Nguyễn Trung Trinh 68, 70 Nguyễn Trường Tộ Technical High School 45 Nguyễn Văn Bửu 32 Nguyễn Văn Chuân 82, 84–6, 91 Nguyễn Văn Cử 7 Nguyễn Văn Đính 105 Nguyễn Văn Hiếu 32 Nguyễn Văn Hinh 23 Nguyễn Văn Hoàng 52–53, 65 Nguyễn Văn Hội 105 Nguyễn Văn Huyền 52 Nguyễn Văn Huyền senatorial slate 116; vote count 116 Nguyễn Văn Kiểm 34 Nguyễn Văn Lộc 113, 117; biosketch 129–30 Nguyễn Văn Lộc government 117–18; membership 118 Nguyễn Văn Lực 52 Nguyễn Văn Mẫn 84, 89 NguyễnVănMầu 10, 32 Nguyễn Văn Nhung 26, 42 Nguyễn Văn Quan 18 Nguyễn Văn Sâm 111 Nguyễn Văn Thanh 66 Nguyễn Văn Thiệu 1, 10, 13, 15, 20–6, 32, 45, 54, 61, 64, 71, 76, 79, 83–6, 88, 101, 109; biosketch 130–1 Nguyễn Văn Thiệu–Nguyễn Cao Kỳ presidential ticket 112–16; pressure from the ARVN Grand Convention of Generals 113; strength of 115; vote count 116

Nguyễn Văn Thiệu–Nguyễn Cao Kỳ rivalry 112–13 Nguyễn Văn Trường 60–1, 92–3; biosketch 131 Nguyễn Văn Tương 52, 61, 65, 77, 80, 118 Nguyễn Văn Vinh 65, 68–70 Nguyễn Văn Vỹ 38, 49 Nguyễn Văn Y 42 Nguyễn Xuân Chữ 51, 59 Nguyễn Xuân Oánh 24–25, 32, 45, 58, 61–2 Nguyễn Xuân Phong 61, 77, 118 Nguyễn Xuân Trang 34 Nha Trang 49, 84 Nhan Minh Trang 25 Như Phong Lê Văn Tiến see Lê Văn Tiến NLC 66, 68–70; membership 66 North Vietnamese troop infiltration 1 Northern Montagnard Refugees group 102, 104 NSAM 273 20 NSAM 288 39 NSC Working Group on South Vietnam 43 Old Southern Schools Association 93 Operation Plan 34-A see OPLAN 34-A Operation Rolling Thunder 1 OPLAN 34-A 20 Paris 17, 19 Paul Nur 118 Phạm Đăng Lâm 10, 58, 61, 118 Phạm Hoàng Hộ 10 Phạm Hữu Chương 66 Phạm Ngọc Thảo 27, 35, 46, 62, 65, 67–9, 78; biosketch 131 Phạm Phú Quốc 7 Phạm Thái 32 Phạm Văn Đổng 34, 49 Phạm Văn Hạt 66 Phạm Văn Liễu 25, 88 Phạm Văn Toàn 58, 61 Phạm Xuân Chiểu 10, 66, 69, 75–6; biosketch 131–2 Phan Huy Quát 1, 3, 5, 11, 24–25, 27, 32–3, 35, 75; biosketch 132 Phan Huy Quát government 1, 3, 64–71; membership 64–65 Phan Khắc Sửu 32, 48, 50–2, 54–5, 60–2, 66, 68–71, 75, 105, 109, 111; biosketch 132–3

Index  177 Phan Khắc Sửu–Phan Quang Đán presidential ticket 114 Phan Khoang 66 Phan Quang Đán 86 Phan Quang Đông 42 Phan Tấn Chức 58, 60 Phan Xuân Nhuận 84–5, 90–1 Philippines, The 1 Philipps, Rufus 9 Phnom Penh 11 Phó Bá Long 118 Phongtrào “nhảynúi” 1966 see “jump to the mountain” movement 1966 Phong Trào Phục Hưng Miền Nam see MRS Phổ Đà Pagoda 88 Phú Bài airport 90 Phú Quốc detention center 91 Phùng Há 22 Pleiku 52 political parties of South Vietnam 3, 39–40 political situation of South Vietnam 11–12, 16, 23–27, 29–33, 38, 43, 55, 69 presidential election of 1967 111–17; Communist sabotage 115; demand to annul results of 116; drafting of election law 111–12; election day 112; number of tickets 112; requirements for candidates 108, 111–12; results of 116; vote by CA to accept results of election 117 Presidential Election Law Drafting Committee (CA) 111 Provisional Charter of 20 October 1964 2, 39, 44, 50, 69; contents of 151–60 Provisional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and Armed Forces 2, 45, 48 Provisional Constitution of 19 June 1965 3; contents of 161–5 Quách Thị Trang 44 Quảng-Đà Special District 84, 89 Quảng Nam Province 86 Quốc Dân Đảng Party 70, 104 Quốc Hội Lập Hiến see CA Radio Hà Nội 79 Radio Hanoi see Radio Hà Nội Rhade ethnic group revolt 48 Revolutionary Tribunal 42–3 role of U.S. advisors 15, 22, 28 Rostow, Walt 88

Rusk, Dean 87 Rừng Sát 23 Sài Gòn 7, 12, 19–21, 25–6, 41, 43, 79, 89, 102, 116 Sài Gòn–Gia Định area 114 Saigon see Sài Gòn sandbag firing place 79 SAVA 87 II Corps 13, 19, 23, 115 2nd Infantry Division 90 secret pact between senior ARVN generals 113 senatorial elections of 1967 112–6; election day 112; election law 112; number of tickets 112; results of 116 7th Infantry Division 13, 19, 21, 25 Sihanouk, Norodom 11, 21 SNIE 53–65 41 South Korea 1 Sơn Tây Province 78 Special Brigade 222 of Anti-Riot Police 90 Special National Intelligence Estimate 53–65 see SNIE 53–65 Strategic Hamlet Program 10–11 Sullivan, William 20 Tạ Vinh 79 Taiwan 89 Taylor, Maxwell 5, 20, 24, 35, 50, 52–4, 61, 67 Tăng Kim Đông 118 Tây Lộc heliport 89 Technical High School Cao Thắng 34 Technical High School Nguyễn TrườngTộ 34 Temporary Charter No. 1 2; contents of 139–40 Temporary Charter No. 2 2; contents of 141 Tết Offensive 75 Thạch Sung 105 Thailand 1 Thành Nam see Nguyễn Long Theravada Church 41 Thích Hộ Giác 41, 61 Thích Pháp Tri 49, 61 Thích Tâm Châu 41–2, 60–1, 85–6, 90 Thích Thiện Hoa 41, 61 Thích Thiện Minh 41 Thích TịnhK hiết 41–2, 60 Thích Trí Quang 41–2, 60–1, 82, 85, 88–90, 115; biosketch 133–4 Thích Tuệ Đăng 45

178 Index III Corps 13, 19–20, 23–5; 32, 115 Thừa Thiên Province 84, 101 Thượng Hội Đồng Quốc Gia see HNC Tỉnh Hội Pagoda 89 Tòa Án Cách Mạng see Revolutionary Tribunal Tôn Thất Đính 10, 24, 26, 32, 49, 86, 89, 91; biosketch 134 Tôn Thất Trình 118 Tổng Đoàn Thanh NiênTrừ Gian see General League of Youth Against Bad Merchants Tổng Hội Sinh Viên Sài Gòn see General Association of Sài Gòn Students Trà Vinh Province 22, 102 Trang Văn Chính 26 Trần Chánh Thành 11 Trần Đình Lan 24 Trần Lê Quang 9 Trần Lử Y 92, 118 Trần Lưu Cung 118 Trần Minh Tiết 61, 77 Trần Ngọc Huyến 45 Trần Ngọc Liểng 61, 92–3, 113 Trần Ngọc Ninh 61, 77 Trần Ngọc Oành 10, 32 Trần Quang Diệu 58, 61 Trần Quang Thuận 32, 65, 101 Trần Quang Vinh 66 Trần Thanh Hiệp 68 Trần Thanh Phong 89–90 Trần Thiện Khiêm 2–3, 7, 10, 13, 18–20, 23–6, 32, 45, 48–9; biosketch 134–5 Trần Tử Oai 10 Trần Văn Ân 65, 101 Trần Văn Đỗ 52, 61, 65, 77, 80, 118; biosketch 135 Trần Văn Đôn 7–10, 12, 22, 24, 32, 49; biosketch 135–6 Trần Văn Đôn senatorial slate 116; vote count 116 Trần Văn Hương 1, 27, 35, 50–5, 58–62; biosketch 136 Trần Văn Hương government 2, 6, 58–62, 115; membership 58–9; national authority program 59–60; Buddhist and student opposition to 59–62; reshuffle of 60–1, 78 Trần Văn Hương–Mai Thọ Truyền presidential ticket 114–15 Trần Văn Kiện 65, 77, 80 Trần Văn Lắm senatorial slate 116; vote count 116

Trần Văn Lý 32 Trần Văn Minh 9–10, 35, 61, 67 Trần Văn Phiên 105 Trần Văn Thoàn 68 Trần Văn Tuyên 65, 70; biosketch 137 Trần Văn Văn 52, 106–7; biosketch 137 Trình Quốc Khánh 66, 113 Trưng Sisters Monument 7 Trương Đình Dzu–Trần Văn Chiêu presidential ticket 115; Communist support of 115; vote count 116 Trương Thái Tôn 61, 118 Trương Tiến Đạt 105 Trương Văn Thuấn 92–3 22nd Infantry Division 21, 25 Unger, Leonard 87–8 United Stated Agency for International Development see USAID United States Operations Mission see USOM University of Cần Thơ 90, 112 U.S. 3rd Marines 89 U.S. Agency for International Development see USAID U.S. Central Intelligence Agency see CIA U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency see DIA U.S. combat troops in South Vietnam 1, 54, 66–67, 81 U.S. decision on escalation of war 53–4 U.S. Marines landing in Đà Nẵng 66 U.S. military forces in South Vietnam 1, 22 U.S. Operations Mission see USOM U.S. Presidential Election (1964) 53 U.S. Vietnam policy 20–1, 53–4, 83; review of 87–8 USAID 9 USOM 9 Ùy Ban BàiTrừ Gian Thương see Committee Against Bad Merchants Ước Pháp (16 June 1965) see Provisional Constitution of 19 June 1965 VBUC 4, 31, 41–2; Ấn Quang faction 74; Charter of 23, 31; Việt Nam Quốc Tự faction 74 Việt Minh 18 Vietnam Coordinating Committee 16 Vietnam Task Force 16 Vietnam War 1 Vietnam Workers’ Party 1

Index  179 Vietnamese Buddhist United Church see VBUC Vietnamese Communist Party 29 Vietnamese Marines during Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam 85, 88, 90 Viện Hóa Đạo see Institute for the Execution of the Dharma Viện Tăng Thống see Institute of Clergy Hierarchy Việt Cộng 11 Việt Nam Quốc Tư faction see Buddhists–internal division Vĩnh Bình Province see Trà Vinh Province Vĩnh Lộc 34 Võ Long Triều 76–77, 91–3, 114; biosketch 137 Võ Văn Nhung 118 Vũng Tàu 34, 44, 49, 53, 55, 62 Vũng Tàu Charter 2, 4, 26, 34, 44; contents of 143–50; rescind of 34, 44–5, 49 Vương Quang Trường 10, 32

Walt, Lewis 89 War Cabinet see Nguyễn Cao Kỳ government War Cabinet’s 26-point program see Nguyễn Cao Kỳ government’s program of activities Westmoreland, William C. 54 Wilson, Jasper 19, 20–21, 25 Xá Lợi Pagoda 31, 41 Young Turks 5, 31, 33–5, 46, 78, 82 youth and students 4, 40, 43, 45; closing of all schools in Sài Gòn–Gia Định area 45; demonstrations 43–5; fighting against Vũng Tàu Charter 44; involvement in Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam 84, 90; “Night Without Sleep” 43; opposition to Trần Văn Hương government 47; rejection of 1967 presidential election results 93–94