The history of Islamic political thought from the Prophet to the present [2 ed] 9780748639878, 074863987X, 9780748639861, 0748639861

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To Aileen, and Christopher

Contents

Analytical Table of Contents Abbreviations Map Time Chart Preface to the Second Revised and Expanded Edition

©Antony Black, 200I, 20I I First published 200I by Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh www.euppublishing.com

Introduction

Second edition 20I I Typeset in Trump Medieval by Koinonia, Bury, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 o 7486 3986 I (hardback) ISBN 978 o 7486 3987 8 (paperback)

vii xi xii xiv xvi I

Part I The Messenger and the Law c.622-Iooo r 2

3 4

5 6

The Mission of Muhammad The Idea of Monarchy under the Umayyads and 'Abbasids c.66r-8so The Formation of the Shari'a Shi'ism The Restoration of Persia c.8so-1050 Knowledge and Power: Philosophy without the Polis

9 18 32 40

so

57

Part II Religion and State Power (din wa dawla): The Sunni Doctrine The right of Antony Black to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act I988.

of the State c.900-1220

7 8 9 10 11

12

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1 1

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The Theory of the Caliphate State and Religion under the Saljuks Al-Ghazali: Mysticism and Politics The Ethics of Power: Advice-to-Kings (nasihat al-muluk) Ibn Rushd Sufism and Politics

81 91 97 Ill

118 132

vi THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT Part III

13 14 15 r6 I7 18 19

The Rape of Asia Mamluk Ideology and the Sultan-Caliph Nasir al-Din Tusi (120I-74): Social Philosophy and Status Groups Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328): Shari'a Governance (al-siyasa al-shar'iyya) The Delhi Sultanate and al-Barani: Statecraft and Morality Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406): The Science of Civilisation and the Governance of Islam The Decline of Classical Islamic Political Thought

Part IV

20 21 22 23 24

141 145 149 158 164 169 r86

Religious Ideology and Political Control in Early Modern States

A New World Order The State of the House of Osman (devlet-i al-i Osman) The Safavids India and the Mughals The Decline and Reform of the Ottoman Empire

Part V

25 26 27 28

The Shari'a and the Sword c.r22o-rsoo

195 199 223 240 256

Islam and the West

Modernism from the Ottoman Reforms to the Turkish Revolution Co11servatism and Modernism in Iran Islamism Islamism, Modernism and the Secular State

28 r 300 304 324

Conclusion

347

Glossary Bibliography Index of Names Index of Subjects

353 356 369 372

Analytical Table of Contents

Abbreviations Map ,. Time Chart Preface to the Second Revised and Expanded Edition Introduction

xi xii xiv xvi

I

Part I The Messenger and the Law c.622-Iooo

I The Mission of Muhammad Prophet and the tribe; a new kind of political society; the wars of succession 2 The Idea of Monarchy under the Umayyads and 'Abbasids c.66I-8so The patrimonial Caliphate; Iranian influences and Ibn Muqaffa'; Abu Yusuf; the Caliph al-Ma'mun; al-Jahiz; the failure of the Caliphate 3 The Formation of the Shari'a The 'ulama and the hadith; al-Shafi'i and the method of al-Sunna (Tradition); political implications 4~~

The Imami Shi'ites; a theory of leadership; the Isma'ilis; Fatimid political theory; the Nizaris and violent revolution s The Restoration of Persia c.8so-Ioso The dawla of the dynastic state; Firdausi on the ancient kings; Ibn Qutaiba and status groups 6 Knowledge and Power: Philosophy without the Polis Al-Farabi and the Brethren of Purity; methods of knowing; knowledge and Leadership (imama); the political community; the division of labour and social groups; Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

9

I8

32 ~

so

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viii THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

Part II Religion and State Power (din wa dawla): The Sunni Doctrine of the State c.9oo-r22o 7 The Theory of the Caliphate 8I Sunni political theology; the Leadership (imama) or Caliphate (khilafa); al-Mawardi on the Caliphate and political power 9I 8 State and Religion under the Saljuks Nizam al-Mulk and the Saljuk regime; Saljuk political theory; the middle way 9 Al-Ghazali: Mysticism and Politics 97 Religious knowledge ('ilm) and politics; the spiritual and the worldly; the middle way; religion and politics; the origin and justification of the state; Caliph and Sultan; religious governance; conclusion Io The Ethics of Power: Advice-to-Kings (nasihat al-muluk) III The religio-politicallegacy of the Saljuks; the Advice genre: 'The Sea of Precious Virtue'; justice and the circle of power; 'The Wisdom of Royal Glory' and Turkish political culture II Ibn Rushd II8 Religion and politics in Spain; philosophy in Spain; Ibn Rushd (Averroes): philosophy and religious knowledge; Ibn Rushd's political writings; the origin and justification of the state; contemporary observations; Fakhr al-Din Razi in Khwarazm and the circle of power I2 Sufism and Politics 132 Kai Kawus and Najm al-din Razi on the dignity of work; an attempt to restore the Caliph as political leader Part III The Shari'a and the Sword c.12io-rsoo 13 The Rape of Asia I4I The Mongol invasions; a revival of Irano-Islamic political culture; the Black Death and Timur I4 Mamluk Ideology and the Sultan-Caliph I45 Integration of religion and polity; the Sultan-Caliph; Ibn Jama'a and the justification of power based on force IS Nasir al-Din Tusi (120I-74): Social Philosophy and Status Groups I49 Revival of Imami Shi'ism: the authority of the mujtahid (wellqualified jurist); Nasir al-din Tusi: a synthesis of Jurisprudence, Aristotle and Iranian lore; humanity; political society; political associations; status groups r6 Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328): Shari'a Governance (al-siyasa al-shar'iyya) 158 Religion requires state power; the ruler's responsibilities I7 The Delhi Sultanate and al-Barani: Statecraft and Morality I64 Muslims and Hindus; al-Barani (c.r28s-c.1357); secular law 18 Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406): The Science of Civilisation and the Governance of Islam 169 Methodology; human civilisation and its driving forces; power and the state; political economy and the duties of government; •

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

ix

Islamic and non-Islamic forms of authority; the political situation of Muslims at present; Ibn Khaldun's political ethics; epistemology; Ibn Khaldun as a social scientist 19 The Decline of Classical Islamic Political Thought 186 Failed states; cultural stagnation; Dawani on status groups; Khunji on the Shari' a and governance Part IV Religious Ideology and Political Control in Early Modern States 20 A New World Order 21 The State of the House of Osman (devlet-i al-i Osman) Political culture and the organisation of public life; religion and state (din ve devlet); the patrhnonial sultan; sultanic ideology; religious leadership; self-management and diversity; Shari'a and kanun (state law); political theory; 'the order of the world' and classes 22 The Safavids Sacred and patrimonial monarchy; ideological controversy; al-Karaki (c.I466-1534) and the religio-political authority of the Mujtahid; monarchy versus clergy; the Majlisi revolution and the clerical ascent to power; tribalism and political decline 23 India and the Mughals Akbar (I.I556-I6os), the enlightening monarch; religious toleration; a spiritual emperor; orthodox Sunni political thought; Wali Allah of Delhi (1703-62) on human nature and civilisation 24 The Decline and Reform of the Ottoman Empire The decline and reform school; Mustafa 'Ali (I54I-I6oo); al-Aqhisari on status groups; why is the state in decline? What should be done?; the use of history and of Ibn Khaldun; advocates of stricter religious observance; the beginnings of Westernisation

195 199

22 3

240

2 56

Part V Islam and the West 25 Modernism from the Ottoman Reforms to the Turkish Revolution 281 The Ottoman Tanzimat (reform) (1839-71); parliamentary liberalism and Islamic values: the Young Ottomans; Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi; Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: rationalism, republicanism and the religio-political revival of Islam; the Turkish revolution 26 Conservatism and Modernism in Iran 300 27 Islamism 304 The Muslim Brethren, al-Maududi, Sayyid Qutb; Khomeini and the Iranian revolution of I979; the Constitution of 1979 28 Islamism, Modernism and the Secular State 324 Constitutional theory; religion and politics; hermeneutics; the secular state; economic justice; international relations Conclusion

347

S1~ Ottoman political ideas, insofar as they were expressed at all, were expressed largely by this group. Their cultural background and position in government made them open to the Persianate Advice-to-Kings lore; they tended to promote adoption of European ideas, espcially in technical fields. Their ideas

202

THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

were grounded in their administrative experience; Ottoman political thought was markedly pragmatic. There were thus two 'parallel and separate systems of provincial administration', that of the military governors representing 'the Sultan's executive authority', and 'a legal-administrative one manned by graduates of the Religious Colleges', who represented 'the Sultan's (religious) legal authority'. 3 Much of the business of government and social control was conducted at the local level by the iimera (lit. 'Commanders': sing. emir): the governor-generals (beylerbeyi) of Rumelia and Anatolia, and under them the district-governors (san~akbeyi). These were appointed by the Sultan. Most were timar-holding knights, but some were slave-soldiers or senior 'ulama. They comprised a military elite: they had a separate law code (kanun-i sipayihan) and were under the special jurisdiction of two Chief Religious Judges (kadiaskers), another Ottoman innovation. Their households became centres of local power. The timar (Persian for iqta': 'fief') was the key instrument of government and fiscal policy. This was assigned by the Sultan to cavalrymen (sipahi: 'Knights'). They were landowners in the sense that they were entitled to the taxes on the land; but the Sultan and the cultivators (re'aya: common people) 'retained rights over the land'. 4 The knight was traditionally responsible for local law and order; the Sultan's law-codes (sing. kanun) stipulated his duties to the cultivators and their rights. 'Fiefs' were not supposed to be hereditary: the timar could theoretically be reassigned at any time by the Sultan; the fiefholder was thus formally less independent than his European equivalent. This was the Ottoman version of the military-agricultural complex. A parallel religious structure was headed by the Seykiilislam, an office which had precedents in earlier regimes but was considerably upgraded by the Ottomans. He was appointed, and could be dismissed, by the Sultan. The Seykiilislam's rulings on religious law (fetvas) were binding. Under him came the chief Judges, then the kadis (Religious Judges) of major cities: these were religious Experts (muftis), and they too could issue fetvas on points of law. Then came district kadis. All these were, to begin with, appointed by the Sultan on the recommendation of the grand vizier. Minor Judges were appointed by the chief Judges. The kadis were 'the backbone of the Ottoman administration'. The position of the Seykiilislam was strengthened in the mid-sixteenth century when he acquired power to appoint the chief Judges and other senior kadis; this effectively gave him 'control over the entire organisation of the ulama'. 5 This gave the religious body greater independence; and it was a further step towards Islamicisation of the polity. The 'ulama were more free than other subjects from government action. Indeed, apart from the Sultan, they were the only self-authorising element in the polity. They were immune from execution or confiscation of property; unlike others, they could pass their landed wealth on to their children. Leading families came to monopolise the higher religious positions; the senior 'ulama were very much part of the ruling group. Religion provided the strongest bond between government and subjects, between the ruling classes ('askeri) and the common people (re'aya) - that is, between those who lived off tax revenue and those who paid taxes. Symbiosis

THE STATE OF THE HOUSE OF OSMAN

203

between government and religion did not take place only among the ruling and propertied classes. The Ottoman state made allies of folk-Islam and the Sufi orders. This showed once again the multi-faceted strength of Islam as a religion of social control, as well as the skill of the Ottomans. Sufism had been the highway for ordinary people from Christianity to Islam. The Sufis' religious missions permeated rural and urban society and the army. The janissaries were devotees of the Bektashi order. The first Ottomans were invested with the sword of the gazi by a Sufi dervish. Sufi orders which preached against wealth and property and supported resistance to the Ottomans were suppressed. Orders devoted to mystical and humanitarian pursuits were generously patronised and took their place in the people's affections. The government and its adherents became patrons of dervish lodges, whose heads had to be approved by the Seykulislam. Sufi orders quickly became part of the social cement, providing a welcome dose of political quietism. Sufism enhanced social deference through its example of hierarchical order and unquestioning obedience to the master. It formed an integral part of social and spiritual life at the court, in the army, and among urban workers and the peasants. The mystical approach appealed to both learned and uneducated. Thus, 'relative harmony was achieved through toleration of three parallel religious strands: official Sunni legalism, the Sufi tekke (hospice) cult, and the folk cult' (Trimingham 1971: 69). This gave great strength to Ottoman political society. The keystone of this interlocking of state and religion was the kadi (Religious Judge). They were religious magistrates, but they administered both the Shari' a and the 'secular' kanun, and they also supervised 'the execution of the Sultan's administrative and financial decrees' (Inal«;ik 1973: rr8). This extension of the kadi's role into non-religious spheres was 'the main innovation of Ottoman public law' (Heyd 1973: 216). In applying the Shari'a itself, they had little discretion, since 'the entire body of law was perfectly known to the litigants; there were no secrets and no surprises'. The execution of judges' decisions was, as before, separate from the process of adjudication, with military governors enforcing court decisions. Recent research indicates that kadis' decisions did in fact have to be 'heeded by governors and police officials' (Gerber 1994: 177, 181). The Ottomans underwrote the Shari'a order of society by ensuring that kadis' decisions were acted upon. This close integration of the 'ulama into the government brought benefits to both. It gave the 'ulama power and wealth. It gave the regime a ready-made legal and administrative framework with roots deeply embedded in popular belief, and it was the bedrock of the dynasty's legitimacy in the eyes of its Muslim subjects. THE PATRIMONIAL SULTAN

The Sultan was the keystone of the whole Ottoman system. He held it together in his dual functions as religious and military leader, and he was also the focus of tribal, religious and patrimonial sentiment. The same had been true of other

204 THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT Islamic regimes, but the way in which the Ottoman polity developed made the role and person of the Sultan especially critical. The Ottoman state began, like most pre-modern states in the Islamic world, as a clan dynasty; and, to the end, allegiance was focused on the family of Osman. 6 Like other regimes in Islamdom, it rested on its reputation for promoting religion, especially in this case through Holy War.? One indication of early Ottoman sentiment comes from the poet Ahmedi (d.r412), who dedicated a version of the Alexander epic, which he called 'a book of Holy War', to Bayezid I (r.r 389-1402). Having praised 'the justice of the Mongol Sultans', Ahmedi asserted that the Ottomans are 'both Muslims and just rulers'. Those who call the Ottomans upstarts should remember that 'he who comes later, and remains, is better than his predecessors' (in Fleischer 1986: 290). But in the case of the Ottomans, the patrimonial factor came to the fore and for a while, during its greatest days c.I44o-rs8o, was arguably the most important element. The dynastic regime of the House of Osman became a 'patrimonial' state, in the sense that monarchical authority was seen as the bastion of justice and agricultural wealth, and that power was the personal possession of the ruling Sultan. The Sultan's authority rested on the widespread conviction that 'the only way to realise [justice] was ... by means of an omnipotent ruler independent from all external influences, deciding and acting in absolute freedom, responsible only before God for his actions'. 8 In this process, clan and tribal features gave way to the personal will of the Sultan. 'No longer was the state thought of as the joint property and inheritance of the dynasty. The padi~ah (emperor) was seen ... as the bearer of an absolute and abstract authority ... state and ruler [were] equated.' In foreign relations, military organisation, strategy and other affairs of state, 'every decision was expressed formally as deriving directly from the person of the Sultan' (Inal