The Hermeneutics of Translation: A Translator's Competence and the Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer 3631825927, 9783631825921

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The Hermeneutics of Translation

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS Edited by Piotr Stalmaszczyk

VOLUME 16

Advisory Board: Emma Borg (University of Reading) Manuel García-Carpintero (University of Barcelona) Hans-Johann Glock (University of Zurich) Paul Livingston (University of New Mexico) Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (University of Warsaw) Maciej Witek (University of Szczecin) Marián Zouhar (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava)

Beata Piecychna

The Hermeneutics of Translation A Translator’s Competence and the Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer Translated by Mikołaj Golubiewski, Jan Burzyński and Łukasz Dorociński

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Cover illustration: Courtesy of Benjamin Ben Chaim The publication of this monograph is financed from the grant received from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under the Regional Initiative of Excellence programme for the years 2019–2022, project number 009/RID/2018/19, the amount of funding 8 791 222,00 PLN. Original title: Rozumienie, dzieje, dialog. Kompetencje tłumacza w hermeneutyce filozoficznej Hansa-Georga Gadamera, 2nd ed., Białystok: Prymat. ISSN 2363-7242 ISBN 978-3-631-82592-1 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85113-5 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85675-8 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85676-5 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b18506 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2021 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

In any case, the hermeneutically enlightened consciousness seems to me to establish a higher truth in that it draws itself into its own reflection. Its truth, namely, is that of translation. It is higher because it allows the foreign to become one’s own, not by destroying it critically or reproducing it uncritically, but by explicating it within one’s own horizons with one’s own concepts and thus giving it new validity. Translation allows what is foreign and one’s own to merge in a new form by defending the point of view of the other even if it be opposed to one’s own view. H.-​G. Gadamer1

1 H.-​ G. Gadamer, “Semantics and Hermeneutics,” in: Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. D.E. Linge, Berkeley-​ London 1976, p. 94. In the original wording: “Seine Wahrheit nämlich ist die Wahrheit der Übersetzung. Deren Überlegenheit ist, daß sie ein Fremdes zum Eigenen werden läßt, indem sie es nicht einfach kritisch auflöst oder unkritisch reproduziert, sondern indem sie es mit ihren eigenen Begriffen in ihrem eigenen Horizont auslegt, neu zur Geltung bringt. Das Übersetzen läßt Fremdes und Eigenes in eine neue Gestalt zusammengehen, indem es den Wahrheitspunkt des anderen gegenüber sich selbst festhält” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Semantik und Hermeneutik, in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III. Idee und Sprache. Platon, Husserl, Heidegger, Tübingen 1972, p. 259).

To Andrzej

Table of Contents Foreword to the English Edition ����������������������������������������������������������������  13 Introduction ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  15 Chapter One: Gadamer’s Concept of Language ��������������������������������  45





1.1 How Did the Concept of “Language” Form in Western European Thought? according to Hans-​ Georg Gadamer ����������������������������������������������������������������  48 1.1.1. Gadamer’s Reflections on Language in the Light of Greek Philosophy �������������������������������������  49 1.1.2. Language and the Christian Idea of Incarnation  53 1.1.3. Language and the Conceptualization Process –​Gadamer’s Reflections on the Achievements of Nicholas of Cusa �����������������������  58 1.2. Language and Hermeneutical Ontology �����������������������  60 1.2.1. Gadamer’s References to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Findings ����������������������������������������������  60 1.2.2. Language in Relation to the World and the Individual’s Environment ��������������������������������������  64



1.3. Language in Relation to Understanding and Cognition ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  71



1.4. Gadamer’s Reflections on Language and the Translation Process ����������������������������������������������������������  79 1.4.1. Aspects of Language �����������������������������������������������  84 1.4.2. The Speculativeness of Language �������������������������  91 1.4.3. The Historicity of Language ����������������������������������  95



1.5. Semantics and Hermeneutics �����������������������������������������  96



1.6. Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������  100

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Table of Contents

Chapter Two: Translation as the Realization of a Circular Structure of Understanding �������������������������������������  103

2.1. Understanding, Interpretation, Application �����������  105



2.2. Structure and Elements of the Understanding Process –​The Hermeneutic Circle ���������������������������  109 2.2.1. Preunderstanding ����������������������������������������������  113 2.2.2. Fore-​knowledge �������������������������������������������������  120 2.2.3. Prejudice (Vorurteil) �����������������������������������������  122 2.2.4. Verification of Prejudices –​The Translator’s Self-​reflection and Self-criticism  126



2.3. Summary ����������������������������������������������������������������������  135

Chapter Three: Translation as a Concretization of Historically Effected Consciousness ��������������������  137

3.1. Translation as a Hermeneutical Experience –​ Introduction to the Notion of Historically Effected Consciousness ����������������������������������������������  137



3.2. Effective History ���������������������������������������������������������  141



3.3. Tradition ����������������������������������������������������������������������  147



3.4. The Horizon �����������������������������������������������������������������  152



3.5. Hermeneutical Consciousness ����������������������������������  154 3.5.1. Translation and Tradition ��������������������������������  156 3.5.2. The Translator and Temporal Distance ����������  162 3.5.3. The Translator and the Horizon ����������������������  165



3.6. Summary ����������������������������������������������������������������������  171

Chapter Four: Translation as a Hermeneutical Conversation  173

4.1. Reading and Translation ��������������������������������������������  175 4.1.1. Text ����������������������������������������������������������������������  178 4.1.2. The Translator and the Text �����������������������������  182

Table of Contents



11



4.2. The Dialectics of Question and Answer –​the Translator’s Dialog with the Text ������������������������������  193 4.2.1. The Essence of the Question ����������������������������  194 4.2.2. Reading in an Understanding Way �����������������  199



4.3. Application ������������������������������������������������������������������  203 4.3.1. Competences of the Legal Translator �������������  206



4.4. Gadamer’s Model of Knowledge �������������������������������  209 4.4.1. Bildung –​Who is an “Educated Translator”?  209 4.4.2. Phronesis, Sophia, Techne ��������������������������������  214



4.5. Summary ����������������������������������������������������������������������  216

Concluding Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  219 Coda: Hermeneutics of Translation, Where Are You Heading?  231

Hermeneutics of Translation Studies or Hermeneutics of Translation?  232



Hermeneutical Translation �������������������������������������������������������������������������  235 Hermeneutics of Translation Studies and the Hermeneutics of Translation �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  240

Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  247 Index of Names �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  261

Foreword to the English Edition The idea to write a monograph on a translator’s competences from a hermeneutical perspective came in 2011, while I was reading the third part of Hans-​Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method and preparing an article on the phenomenon of translation in the light of his philosophy of language. The approach to translation as an understanding and interpretation of the world, a particuliar reading of the surrounding reality –​a reading invariably set in history and culture –​seemed to me, on the one hand, completely obvious and by no means debatable, but on the other hand, specifically innovative, mainly due to the state of research on translation at the time Gadamer’s opus vitae –​Wahrheit und Methode was published. However, my original idea to discuss translator competences from a hermeneutical perspective –​or more precisely from the perspective of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which was barely on the horizon in 2011 –​crystallized in 2013, as a result of the extremely inspiring and edifying discussions I had with Radegundis Stolze during a symposium on translational hermeneutics held in Cologne. I am grateful to Radegundis Stolze for helping me outline and specify my research goals at that time and for repeatedly, in subsequent email correspondence, encouraging my continuation of the project along with patiently answering all my questions about the hermeneutics of translation, especially the manifestation of the hermeneutics of translation that has begun to become more evident since 2009, when Radegundis Stolze, Larisa Cercel, and John Stanley first began to reflect on how to use the hermeneutical paradigm in translation theory and practice. I would also like to express my special gratitude to Professor Ft. Andrzej Bronk. Although I have never had the opportunity to talk personally to him, I have often treated the reading of his monograph entitled Rozumienie, dzieje, język [Understanding, History, Language] as a specific dialog, thanks to which many issues concerning the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-​Georg Gadamer shed new light on the concept analyzed in this work. In this book, I would like to pay a modest tribute to Professor Ft. Bronk and express my sincere thanks and appreciation for his enormous contribution to the dissemination of knowledge about hermeneutics, in particular about Hans-​Georg Gadamer, among the Polish philosophical community. This monograph was originally published in 2018. A second, revised edition came out in 2019 (Białystok, Prymat Publishing House). This translation is based on the revised edition, although it contains some changes, both stylistic and substantive. The translation of my monograph is intended to popularize the

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Foreword to the English Edition

knowledge about translational hermeneutics, its strong philosophical foundation, and research perspectives in this area for the future. Moreover, its aim is to show the potential inherent in the hermeneutical approach to translation –​ in particular with regard to the interpretative possibilities that this paradigm creates in terms of exploring the specificity of concepts fundamental to the existence and further development of translation studies. One such concept is translator competence, a kind of binding link between the considerations contained in this publication. Although the contents of many subsections of this monograph may seem obvious to authors dealing with philosophical hermeneutics, translatologists and philosophers of translation will hopefully find much theoretical-​methodological inspiration, if not to explore the hermeneutics of translation itself, then to reflect on other possible philosophical research perspectives through which, we can –​and should –​look at the translation act.

Introduction Undoubtedly, one of the most important issues of contemporary translation studies is the concept of translator competence. Finding a comprehensive answer to the question of what determines the success of any translation process and what qualities, attitudes, motivations, and behaviors should characterize a competent translator is one of the most pressing issues, and at the same time one of the most important challenges facing contemporary translatology –​both linguistically and literary-​culturally. Translation competence and the translator’s competence as separate issues of translation studies have become of interest to scholars relatively recently. We may date the beginning of research in this area to the 1990s. In the literature on the subject, the terms translator’s competence or translation competence are contextualized in very different ways.2 However, a review of the available literature 2 I refer to the following works, which, in my opinion, concisely describe the state of research in this area: Pym, “Redefining Translation Competence in an Electronic Age. In Defence of a Minimalist Approach,” Meta: Translators’ Journal 2003, 48 (4), pp. 481–​ 497; Whyatt, Translation as a Human Skill. From Predisposition to Expertise, Poznań 2012; Orozco, Hurtado, Albir, “Measuring Translation Competence Acquisition,” Meta: Translators’ Journal 2002, 47 (3), pp. 375–​ 402; Dybiec-​ Gajer, Zmierzyć przekład? Z metodologii oceniania w dydaktyce przekładu pisemnego, Kraków 2013; Neubert, Competence in Language, in Languages, and in Translation, in:Developing Translation Competence, ed. Adab, Schäffner, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 2000, pp. 3–​ 18; Lörscher, “Bilingualism and Translation Competence: A Research Project and its First Results,” SYNAPS –​A Journal of Professional Communication 2012, 27 (3), pp. 3–​15; Developing Translation Competence, ed. Schäffner, Adab, Amsterdam 2000; Neubert, “Competence in Translation: A Complex Skill, How to Study and How to Teach It,” in: Translation Studies: an Interdiscipline, ed. Kaindl, Pöchhacker, Snell-​Hornby, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 1994; Toury, “Natural Translation and the Making of a Native Translator,” TEXTconTEXT 1986, 1, pp. 11–​29; Snell-​Hornby, “The Professional Translator of Tomorrow: Language Specialist or All-​ Round Expert?” in: Teaching Translation and Interpreting: Training, Talent, and Experience, ed. Loddegard, Dollerup, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 1992, pp. 9–​22; Presas, “Bilingual Competence and Translation Competence,” in: Developing Translation Competence, ed. Adab, Schäffner, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 2000, pp. 19–​31; H. Risku, Translatorische Kompetenz. Kognitive Grundlagen des Übersetzens als Expertentätigkeit, Tübingen 1998; Chesterman, “The Development of Translational Competence,” in: Chesterman, Memes of Translation: The Spread of Ideas in Translation Theory, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 1997, pp. 147–​168; Göpferich, “Towards a Model of Translation Competence and Its

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Introduction

on the subject clearly shows that these works lack references to the work of philosophers who made translation an important issue in their deliberations. After all, thinkers have used the category of translation to analyze philosophical notions or to justify their views touching upon very different spheres of human existence.3 It is noteworthy that, for a long time, scholars have mentioned the so-​called philosophy of translation. Interesting monographs or scientific articles dedicated to this sub-​discipline have been published,4 and there are also conferences whose primary goal is to exchange thoughts on the relationship between philosophy and translation, translation problems encountered by translators of philosophical works, and ways of translating important philosophical concepts,

Acquisition. The Longitudinal Study ‘TransComp,’ ” in: Behind the Mind: Methods, Models and Results in Translation Process Research, ed. Göpferich, Jakobsen, Mees, Copenhagen 2009, pp. 11–​37; PACTE, “Building a Translation Competence Model,” in: Triangulating Translation: Perspectives in Process Oriented Research, ed. Alves, Amsterdam-​Philadelphia 2003, pp. 43–​66; Harris, “The Importance of Natural Translation,” Working Papers on Bilingualism 1977, 12, pp. 96–​114; Kiraly, Pathways to Translation. Pedagogy and Process, Kent-​London 1995; D. C. Kiraly, A Social Constructivist Approach to Translator Education. Empowerment from Theory to Practice, Manchester-​Northampton 2000; Kompetencje tłumacza, eds. Piotrowska, Czesa, Gomol, Tyupa, Kraków 2012. Of course, these works do not exhaust the topic, but they are a very good starting point for further discussion on the concept of a translator’s competence. 3 Notably, philosophers have often acted as translators, translating and making the works of great thinkers available to representatives of a given culture. Thus, we see here a specific doubling and strengthening of the function performed by philosophy, which explains in a particuliar way the most burning issues concerning the functioning of man, at the same time doing so by translating and explaining a given thought or thought trends that can be distinguished in a given thematic circle. 4 See, for instance, Bobowska-​Nastarzewska, “Parakteksty tłumacza na podstawie własnego przekładu dzieła Plotyn albo prostota spojrzenia autorstwa współczesnego francuskiego filozofa Pierre’a Hadota,” Rocznik Przekładoznawczy 2012, 7, pp. 39–​50. Brzezicka, Problematyka przekładu filozoficznego, Warszawa 2018; Nerczuk, “O specyfice pracy tłumacza antycznej literatury filozoficznej,” Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne 2016, 14(49), pp. 13–19; Rosnerowa, Jedność filozofii i wielość języków: O filozoficznym przekładzie i jego funkcji poznawczej, Warszawa 1975; Translation and Philosophy, ed. L. Foran, Oxford-​Bern-​Berlin-​Bruxelles-​Frankfurt am Main-​New York-​Wien 2012;. The series of translator-​philosophical publications published by the Hungarian publishing house Zeta Books is also worth recommending: https://​www.zetabooks.com/​ books/​translation-​studies.html?limit=all (access February 14, 2019).

Introduction

17

as well as the implications of such translation choices for understanding certain philosophical systems. Hermeneutic thought –​though ignored by translatologists, pushed aside or treated with a rather incomprehensible, in my opinion, indulgence –​seems to be particularly “rich” and promising in this respect. Although no one denies heremeneticists’ place in the history of translation theory,5 scholars often simply do not discuss this approach. To the best of my knowledge, apart from Bukowski’s6 work (particularly innovative given the status of the hermeneutics of translation in Poland) on the hermeneutical competence of a translator and, given the status of the hermeneutics of translation in our country –​which is particularly innovative –​and the monograph by Radegundis Stolze,7 there is no comprehensive study of the translator’s competence in the light of the hermeneutics of translation. It is true that there are works devoted to the problem of translation in the view of Hans-​Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, or Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy, but so far no study on the issue of translator competence from a hermeneutical perspective has been published.8 Translators rarely make use of the rich body of works by authors such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, or Paepcke in their research, wrongly considering these arguments too complex, intricate, 5 Notably, excerpts of the works by authors whom we could regard as representatives of the hermeneutics of translation were included in the anthology entitled Współczesne teorie przekładu, eds. Bukowski, Heydel (Kraków 2009). To quote Bukowski: “The hermeneutics of translation, one of the oldest fields of translation research, is still well established, enjoying considerable interest. Contemporary researchers eagerly refer to it. They reach out to both the old theses of Friedrich Schleiermacher and the more recent speculations of George Steiner or Frtiz Paepcke, developing, modifying, and recontextualising them. No serious compendium of knowledge about contemporary translation theories nor academic lecturers in their courses overlook hermeneutical translation theory.” (Bukowski, “Dydaktyczne aspekty hermeneutycznej teorii przekładu,” in: Przekład –​teoria, terminy, terminologia, eds. Piotrowska, Dybiec-​Gajer, Kraków 2012, p. 17). 6 Bukowski, “Hermeneutyczne kompetencje tłumacza,” in: Kompetencje tłumacza, eds. Piotrowska, Czesak, Gomola and Tyupa, Kraków 2012, pp. 125–​139. 7 Stolze, Hermeneutische Übersetzungskompetenz: Grundlagen und Didaktik, Berlin 2015. 8 Likewise, we may say that there is no comprehensive study of the essence of the concept of translation, not only in the context of philosophical hermeneutics, but also –​and perhaps above all –​in the context of hermeneutical philosophy. If we consider how much importance hermeneuticists have attached to the category of translation, but also the extent to which they have philosophized the very act of translation, we can clearly notice the importance –​and purpose –​of writing a monograph which presents hermeneutical conceptualizations of translation.

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Introduction

or full of incomprehensible metaphors, and thus too complicated and abstract to be a significant point of reference in any discussion of concepts in translation theory.9 The main purpose of this monograph –​which is a shortened and revised version of my doctoral thesis –​is to analyze and reconstruct Gadamer’s views on understanding, history, dialog, and indirectly on language, and to find an answer to the question of the nature of a translator’s competence analyzed from the perspective of his hermeneutical philosophy. The following reasons led to pursuing this research problem: 1) the insignificant number of works concerning a translator’s competence embedded theoretically and methodologically within the framework of the hermeneutics of translation, 2) the natural relationship between philosophy (including hermeneutics) and translation, and 3) the unsatisfactory contemporary conceptualizations of the concept of translator competence, currently developed mainly on the basis of the so-​called cognitive approach to translation.10 Hermeneutics and translation have a lot in common. According to Palmer, “modern hermeneutics finds in translation and translation theory a great reservoir for exploring the ‘hermeneutical problem.’ … The phenomenon of translation is at the very heart of hermeneutics.”11 for it is man in his daily existence that faces a universal hermeneutical situation: in order to understand a text, one must interpret and express its meaning by making a kind of translation from one code into another. As Bronk rightly points out,12 hermeneutics –​as the art of hermeneuein –​boils down to “announcing, translating, and explaining” so as to transfer “certain meaningful content from another ‘world’ to one’s own.”13

9 Cf. Bukowski, “Hermeneutyczne kompetencje,” pp. 125–​126. It is worth underscoring that many tend to describe the discourse of hermeneutists precisely as hermetic. See also Januszkiewicz, W-​koło hermeneutyki literackiej, Warszawa 2007, pp. 11–​15. 10 Importantly, the literature on the subject –​see the titles listed in footnote 2 –​shows that scholars have dealt with translator competence and translation competence mainly for purely didactic and pragmatic reasons. Moreover, it seems that the trend is still visible. Cf. Bukowski, “Hermeneutyczne kompetencje.” The identification of the specific components that make up translation competence was probably meant to define and analyze the scope and type of training to which adepts of the art of translation were to be subjected. (Nowadays, scholars tend to choose the word “education” over “training.”). 11 Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Evanston 1969, p. 31. 12 Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, język. Filozoficzna hermeneutyka H.-​G. Gadamera, Lublin 1988, p. 24. 13 Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, język, p. 24.

Introduction

19

Moreover, both areas are linked by the “experience of alienation”14 of the subject in contact with either cultural artefacts or historical processes. The achievements of translational hermeneutics, which is a specific variety of so-​called particular hermeneutics, are quite rich. The very term “translational hermeneutics” has a relatively wide range of meanings and includes a collection of statements and works by translation theorists, translators, literary scholars, linguists, and philosophers of history. Most often these works are studies of the views of a given philosopher (e.g., Schleiermacher,15 Heidegger,16 Gadamer17 or Ricoeur18) on the act of translation. They may also touch upon the essence of meaning and sense or ethical-​ontological issues in the light of assumptions about translation.19 14 Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” in: The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of Later Writings, ed. Palmer, Evanston 2007. “Entfremdungserfahrungen” (Gadamer, “Die Universalität des hermeneutischen Problems,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 2. Hermeneutik II, Tübingen 1993, p. 219). 15 See Oliveira, “Revisitando os clássicos: Schleiermacher, numa ótica wittgensteiniana,” Revista Letras 2012, 85, pp. 163–​180; Robinson, Schleiermacher’s Icoses. Social Ecologies of the Different Methods of Translating, Bukarest 2013. 16 See Groth, Translating Heidegger, New York 2004. 17 See Yan, “On the Translator’s Subjectivity –​From the Perspective of Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,” Higher Education of Social Science 2012, 3 (2), pp. 21–​ 26; O’Keeffe, “Responding to the Sovereign Work: Gadamer and Mallarmé,” The Comparatist 2012, 36, pp. 107–​122; Marinescu, “Figures de la distanciation dans l’expérience dulangage chez Hans-​Georg Gadamer: la traduction et le texte,” Hermeneia 2012, 12, pp. 92–​106; Kasten, “Wor(l)ds at Play: Gadamer and the Dynamics of Literary Translation,” in: Hermeneutics and the Humanities –​Hermeneutik und Geisteswissenschaften. Dialogues with Hans-​Georg Gadamer –​Im Dialog Mit Hans-​ Georg Gadamer, ed. Kasten, Herman, Sneller, Leiden 2012, pp. 198–​216. 18 See Darwish, Paul Ricoeur. La problématique de la method et le déplacement herméneutique du texte à l’action et à la traduction. Vers une herméneutique du dialogue, Paris 2011; Grondin, Paul Ricoeur, Paris 2013; Davidson, “Linguistic Hospitality: The Task of Translation in Ricoeur and Levinas,”Analecta Hermeneutica 2012, pp. 1–​14; Davidson, “Ricoeur’s Later Thought: From Hermeneutics and Translation and Back Again,” Philosophy Today 2013, 57 (1), pp. 61–​71; Lee, Yun, “Ricoeur and Berman: An Encounter Between Hermeneutics and Translation Studies,” Philosophy Today 2012, 56 (1), pp. 16–​25; Shadd, “Chasing Ricoeur: In Pursuit of the Translational Paradigm,” New Voices in Translation Studies 2012, 8, pp. 158–​169; Canullo, “La traduction politique comme heritage et pari. La réflexion de Paul Ricoeur sur l’ethos européen,” Archivio di filosofia 2013, LXXXI, pp. 173–​186. 19 See Oliva, “La differenza linguistica tra etica e ontologia,” in: Ricoeur, Tradurre intraducible. Sulla traduzzione, Roma 2008, pp. 61–​124.

20

Introduction

Heidegger and his views on the translation act are among the subjects addressed in Emad’s work.20 Emad analyses Heidegger’s comments on translation that were shared during one of his seminars in 1951. Recalling Heidegger’s concept of so-​ called productive translation, and distinguishing between seinsgeschichtliche and historische Darstellung, Emad critically analyzes the English translations of Nietzsche’s works by the German thinker. Therefore, this work is all the more valuable because, in addition to valuable comments on Heidegger’s understanding of translation, there are also interesting references to the practical side of the translation act. In reference to Heidegger, it is also worth mentioning an interesting work by De Gennaro and Schalow,21 which shows the inseparable link between thinking and translation, or the groundbreaking work edited by Schalow,22 in which we may see a description of the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and the hermeneutical method used in translating the philosopher’s oeuvre for the first time. There are relatively many works devoted to Ricoeur’s philosophy of translation. Paganine has an interesting opinion on this subject,23 referring to Ricoeur’s work devoted to translation and other translation theorists who show that translation goes in circles of the “absurdity of possibility.” Some authors interestingly compare the views of philosophers or translation theorists, referring in their works to the hermeneutical approach to the translation act. One example is an article by Rao,24 who compares Berman’s translation theory with Levinas’s ethical philosophy, showing, contrary to their commonly shared statements, many differences between the assumptions of these authors’ theoretical-​philosophical systems. On the validity of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on hermeneutical philosophy and the hermeneutics of translation, we may read an article by Costache,25 who shows 20 See Emad, “Heidegger and the Question of Translation: A Closer Look,” Studia Phaenomenologica 2010, 10, pp. 293–​312. 21 See De Gennaro, F. Schalow, “Translation, Tradition, and the Other Onset of Thinking,” Heidegger Studies 2010, 26, pp. 97–​124. 22 See Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad, ed. Schalow, New Orleans 2011. 23 See Paganine, “A tradução ou o absurdo do possível: ‘On Translation’ de Paul Ricœur,” Scientia traductionis 2010, 7, pp. 93–​102. 24 See S. Rao, “Lesaltérités en conflit: l’éthique bermanienne de la traduction à l’épreuve de l’Étranger lévinassien,” TranscUlturAl 2008, 1, pp. 59–​67. 25 See Costache, “The Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Thought for Philosophical Hermeneutics. The Problem of Translation between the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations,” Journal for Communication and Culture 2011, 1 (1), pp. 44–​54.

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the Austrian philosopher’s understanding of the translation act as articulated in two works: Tractatus Logico-​Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Referring to George Steiner’s translation theory, Goodwin26 draws attention to ethical issues related to the translation act, stating that a translation per se always contains ethical inclinations, while Steiner’s most famous work is described as a “bridge” linking Levinas’s philosophical ethics with translation practice. In terms of the relationship between philosophy and translation, we should also remember Weissbrod, who has an interesting opinion on this subject.27 Weissbrod points out that although the research interests of both translation philosophers and translators overlap, the two fields are not the same. Weissbrod juxtaposes Ricouer’s concept of the third text with the idea of Toury’s “adequate translation” and bases her deliberations on three Hebrew translations by Kipling. Another important publication showing the relationship between philosophy and translation is the monograph The Ontology of Translation.28 Analyzing Hafiza’s English translations, Panahbar focuses on tracing the course of the translator’s understanding of the source text. Among other things, Panahbar considers the translation’s historical nature and the fusion of horizons. Moreover, this publication is valuable because Panahbar attempts to present a hermeneutical definition of translation, which he treats as a dialogical-​historical act of reconstructing and merging two worlds: the past and the present one. Furthermore, many researchers discuss the role of the translator in their reflections. One of them is Hemmat,29 who combines multiple theoretical approaches to the subject –​including Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s philosophy, Derrida’s deconstructionism, Wittgenstein’s language games, or Goffman’s sociological approach –​and shows that by researching the interpreter’s self-​reflexivity, it is possible to integrate two perspectives in translation studies: the philological and the hermeneutical. Other interesting texts include works by Canullo, who perceives the translation act as the experience of mediation in intercultural

26 See Goodwin, “Ethical Problems in Translation: Why We Might Need Steiner After All,” The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication 2010, 16 (1), pp. 19–​42. 27 See Weissbrod, “Philosophy of Translation Meets Translation Studies: Three Hebrew Translations of Kipling’s ‘If ’ in light of Paul Ricoeur’s ‘Third Text’ and Gideon Toury’s ‘Adequate Translation,’ ”Target 2009, 21 (1), pp. 58–​73. 28 See Panahbar, The Ontology of Translation. Ideas of Philosophical Hermeneutics in Translation, Saarbrücken 2012. 29 See Hemmat, “Contemporary Hermeneutics and the Role of the Self in Translation,”MonTi 2009, 1, pp. 157–​174.

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Introduction

dialog.30 We should also pay attention to the phenomenological aspects present in the translation act –​Stanley writes interestingly about this31 –​the hermeneutical accents present in Biblical translation,32 specialized translation33, or the translation of poetry or drama.34 Scholars often criticize the paradigm of the hermeneutics of translation, because of its alleged over-​embedding in the domain, usually laconically referred to as the subjectivity of the interpreter. Therefore, no wonder that there are works on this subject in the literature. One article by Cercel is of particular interest.35 Starting from the statement that a significant part of the criticism directed at the hermeneutics of translation comes down to problems related to the above mentioned subjectivity in translation, Cercel states that when questioning the scientific status of hermeneutics and undermining its theoretical and methodological potential, critics often fail to take into account that the most important element of the hermeneutical theory of translation was and still is the desire to articulate and outline the scientific and intersubjective foundations of the interpretation process. Cercel shows that the hermeneutics of translation is in fact a reflection of the subtle and extremely nuanced game between the subjective and the intersubjective and the subjective and the objective.

30 See Canullo, La traduzione coma esperienza di mediazione nel dialogo tra culture in: Soggettività, ontologia, linguaggio, ed. by Mora, Ruggiu, Venezia 2007, pp. 83–​102. 31 See Stanley, Translation –​Interpretation: A Phenomenological Analysis of Some Distinguishing Characteristics from the Vantage Point of Translational Hermeneutics in: Trans-​lationswissenschaftliches Kolloquium II. Beiträge zur Übersetzungs-​und Dolmetsschwissenschaft (Köln-​Germersheim), Hrsg. Ahrens, Hansen-​Schirra, Krein-​ Kühle, Schreiber, Wienen, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 29–​74. 32 See Dorn, Hermeneutik und Bibelübersetzung in: Theorie und Praxis del Dolmetschens und Übersetzens in fachlichen Kontexten, Hrsg. Baumann, Kalverkämper, Berlin 2013, pp. 483–​514. 33 See Stanley, “Concerning the Relevance of the Hermeneutical Approach to the Translation of Economic Reports” in: Kölner Konferenz zur Fachtextübersetzung, Hrsg. Krein-​Kühle, Wienen, Krüger, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 237–​252. 34 See Kharmandar, Karimnia, “The Fundamentals of Constructing a Hermeneutical Model for Poetry Translation,” Procedia. Social and Behavioral Sciences 2013, 70, pp. 580–​591; Maitland, “Performing Difference: Bodas de sangre and the Philosophical Hermeneutics of the Translated Stage,” Quaderns. Revista de Traducció 2012, 19, pp. 53–​67. 35 See Cercel, “Subjektiv und intersubjektiv in der hermeneutischen Übersetzungstheorie,” Meta. Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 2010, 2 (1), pp. 84–​104.

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Foreignness has a special place in the hermeneutics of translation. Among scholars who address this topic are Mezei36 and Bruneaud.37 One interesting article created in this field is “The Epistemological Dilemma of Translating Otherness.”38 King Lee focuses on examining the interpretation difficulties resulting from meeting with the Other in the translation process. From the point of view of translational hermeneutics, the issue of the translator’s presence and its mark in the translation is also important. Authors address this subject most often in the context of literary translation. Let us also refer to Parlog’s “Transforming Literature: The Hermeneutics of Translation”39 which focuses on showing the way the translator marks his presence in the translation of Hullabaloo in the Guava Orchard by Kiran Desai. Parlog tries to prove that the reception of a translation is always determined by the influence that the content, form, and style of the original text have on the translator. In the background of these works, an article by Panahbara and Dabaghi is particularly interesting.40 Referring to Gadamer and Ricoeur’s philosophy, the authors analyze the fundamental role of the translation act in intercultural understanding. Furthermore, we must emphasize the presence of works on interpreting from a hermeneutical approach. Although there are not many so far, they show that the we may find answers to many different questions related to interpreting –​ both consecutive and simultaneous –​from the hermeneutical perspective.41

36 See Mezei, “Foreign Translation: The Hermeneutics of Foreigness in Translation Theory,” Trans –​Revue de littérature générale et compare [online] 10, 2010 [access: May 6, 2019]. . 37 See Bruneaud, “Traduire ou (comment) faire entendre la voix de l’Autre,” International Review of Studies in Applied Modern Languages 2011, 4, pp. 85–​102. 38 See King Lee, “The Epistemological Dilemma of Translating Otherness,” Meta: Translator’s Journal 2011, 56 (4), pp. 878–​895. 39 See Parlog, “Transforming Literature. The Hermeneutics of Translation,” Professional Communication and Translation Studies 2011, 4 (1–​2), pp. 107–​116. 40 See Panahbar, Dabaghi, “Philosophical Hermeneutics: A Path to Intercultural Understanding Through Translation,”Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 2012, 3 (1), s. 453–​460. 41 See Leibbrand, Grundlagen einer hermeneutischen Dolmetschforschung, Berlin 2011; Leibbrand, “Verstehen in der Forschung zum Simultandolmetschen. Ein Modell –​ Hermeneutik als Forschungsparadigma?” in: Translationsforschung. Tagungsberichte der LICTRA –​IX. Leipzig International Conference on Translation & Interpretation Studies 19.-​21.5.2010, eds. Schmitt, Herold, Weiland, Frankfurt am Main 2011.

24

Introduction

A quite valuable title in the field of translational hermeneutics is the monograph Übersetzung und Hermeneutik. Traduction et herméneutique42 edited by Cercel, one of the most prominent representatives of the hermeneutical approach in translation, and published in a series by Zeta Books. This book includes first-​ published works by authors who are considered today to be leading representatives of the hermeneutics of translation, among others Radegundis Stolze, John W. Stanley, Domenico Jervolino, Bernd Stefanink, Alberto Gil. The book presents interdisciplinary considerations of the basic problems of translation and does not overlook applying the hermeneutical approach to the teaching of translation. Another important work in the field of translational hermeneutics is the monograph Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft: Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag.43 It was published on the 60th anniversary of Stolze’s birthday and focuses on the basic and obvious assumption that translation is a hermeneutic act in which the human factor plays a decisive role, along with all the cognitive and affective implications associated with this statement. Authors of the published articles are among others: Ladmiral, Chesterman, Robinson, Kohlmayer, Gil, Snell-​ Hornby, Bălăcescu, Stefanink, Oliva, and Pommer. The range of topics undertaken in the monograph is quite broad as it includes such aspects as: the interpreter (translator) as a kind of hermeneutical guide, translation didactics, the rhetoric of literary translation, audiovisual translation from a hermeneutical perspective, subjectivity in the hermeneutics of translation, the hermeneutical approach in legal translation. The publication not only summarizes achievements in the field of the hermeneutics of translation to date, but also sets out possible paths of development. The development of translational hermeneutics in historical terms is presented by Cercel in a landmark monograph Übersetzungshermeneutik. Historische und systematische Grundlegung.44 It is the first such reliable attempt to show this area of research in the context of emerging translation and other related disciplines. J. Kristeva, a French linguist, psychoanalyst, and philosopher, gave some interesting comments on translation in a hermeneutical context in Pour comprendre la traduction.45 Kristeva emphasizes the irremovable and, in a way, obvious 42 See Übersetzung und Hermeneutik. Traduction et herméneutique, Hrsg. Cercel, Bukarest 2009. 43 See Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft: Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag, Hrsg. Cercel, Stanley, Tübingen 2012. 44 See Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik. Historische und systematische Grundlegung, St. Ingbert 2013. 45 See Kristeva, Pour comprendre la traduction, Paris 2009.

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distance between the original and the translation. Without losing sight of objectivity and subjectivity, and thus without those aspects which intertwine and are always inherent in the translation act, Kristeva analyzes contemporary translation theories, drawing attention to the usefulness of the hermeneutical approach. Kristeva is the author of yet another work on the hermeneutics of translation: Perspectives herméneutiques de la traduction: du dialogue herméneutique à lhospitalité langagière.46 In that monograph, Kristeva discusses the relationship between hermeneutical dialog and linguistic hospitality, showing the specific conflict that this relationship entails. Kristeva emphasizes that translation, like any dialog, requires understanding of the message conveyed and, at the same time, coming to terms with the indispensable element of “foreignness.” According to Kristeva, the way of dealing with this dissonance lies in the good will of the translator, whose ethical duty is to accept the otherness present in every person. As far as the question of the didactics of translation in the light of hermeneutics is concerned, we should first mention work by Varne.47 Her article criticizes current theoretical methods of teaching translation. Varne analyzes in detail those didactic techniques in which the development of student autonomy is of value. Another interesting article in the didactic context is a work by Stefanink,48 who recalls the figure of Ionescu –​a didactic working at the University of Cluj-​ Napoca who has adopted the hermeneutical approach in his work with translation adepts. Of course, Stolze writes most extensively about the teaching of translation from a hermeneutical perspective.49 A very interesting work, described as pioneering in the context of hermeneutical philosophy, is a monograph by Di Cesare.50 Di Cesare exploits, among other things, assumptions present in the philosophical systems of Heidegger and Gadamer, and describes Auschwitz as the Tower of Babel of the twentieth

46 See Kristeva, Perspectives herméneutiques de la traduction: du dialogue herméneutique à l’hospitalité langagière, “Signes, Discours, Sociétés” [online] 3, 2009 [access: May 6, 2019]. . 47 See Varne, “From Hermeneutics to the Translation Classroom: a Social Constructivist Approach to Effective Learning,” The International Journal for Translation & Interpreting Research 2009, 1 (1), pp. 27–​43. 48 See Stefanink, “Un herméneute dans l’âme: Tudor Ionescu,” International Review of Studies in Applied Modern Languages 2011, 4, pp. 17–​26. 49 See for instsnce Stolze, The Translator’s Approach –​Introduction to Translational Hermeneutics. Theory and Examples from Practice, Berlin 2011. 50 See Di Cesare, Utopia of Understanding. Between Babel and Auschwitz, Albany 2012.

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Introduction

century. Di Cesare addresses the hermeneutics of language, but in the specific historical period after Auschwitz. Moreover, Di Cesare emphasizes that translation manifests itself mainly in two forms: speaking and understanding. Her statement that each of us is always in “linguistic exile,” even when we are speaking our mother tongue, is quite important and inspiring. To learn about audiovisual translation in the context of hermeneutics, we may refer to a work by Korycińska-​Wegner,51 who analyzes the screenplays of two movies. It is worth emphasizing that Korycińska-​Wegner is one of the few researchers dealing with the hermeneutical approach to translation in Poland. In this field, we should also mention Brzozowski, and especially his monograph Stanąć po stronie tłumacza,52 in which he looks at the phenomenon of translation from the perspective of translators’ achievements –​in contrast to the vast majority of translatologists who focus their attention on translation errors. Following Berman’s postulates, Brzozowski makes an interesting attempt to integrate the hermeneutical perspective with the approach postulated by the descriptivists. Bukowski –​mentioned at the beginning of the introduction –​is another representative of the hermeneutical approach to translation in Poland. He attempts to outline the didactic relevance of hermeneutics of translation in “Dydaktyczne aspekty hermeneutycznej teorii przekładu.”53 Bukowski presents the theoretical proposals of translational hermeneutists that may be used in translation pedagogy. His work is important from the point of view of the hermeneutics of translation, because he points out that, in translation didactics, one can successfully refer to the achievements of such authors as Stolze or Paepcke. Another work by Bukowski, entitled “Hermeneutyczne kompetencje tłumacza”54 is an extremely valuable contribution to the development of the hermeneutics of translation in Polish translatology. To some extent, his article is a precursor in terms of the research problem addressed in this monograph. He shows what the translator’s competence consists in and proves that in the work of the translational hermeneuticists the human factor invariably remains a specific 51 See Korycińska-​Wegner, “Filmübersetzen und Hermeneutik. Das Drehbuch als Übersetzungsvorlage am Beispiel von Sonnenallee und Good bye, Lenin!,” in: Ästhetik und Kulturwandel in der Übersetzung, Hrsg. M. Krysztofiak, Frankfurt 2008, pp. 271–​289. 52 See Brzozowski, Stanąć po stronie tłumacza. Zarys poetyki opisowej przekładu, Kraków 2011. 53 See Bukowski, “Dydaktyczne aspekty.” 54 See Bukowski, “Hermeneutyczne kompetencje tłumacza.”

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foundation. This is an innovative approach to the problem, to which scholars have not yet given much deeper reflection. Bukowski not only presents what “goals and values” a competent translator should follow but also explains how we should understand the understanding of a text, why it is so important in translation, and what links understanding with translation. After Brzozowski,55 we should remember that elements of the hermeneutic method are also present in many approaches specific to contemporary translation studies, e.g. in works by Barańczak or Ziomek.56 Wawrzyniak also emphasizes the importance of understanding the text in the translation process. He writes about the so-​called “hermeneutical aspect of translation,” and calls each translation an act of “producing an understanding of the text”: “The first task of the translator is to fully and truly understand the original text. The second fundamental task of the translator is to consolidate this understanding of the original in the recipient’s language.”57 Another important Polish work partially devoted to the hermeneutical approach to translation is Przekład literacki jako metafora autorstwa by Kozak.58 In chapter four, Kozak raises the question of the translator as a hermeneutical “I,” justifying that we may describe a translator’s experience with a text as “dialogical,” i.e. one in which the text plays the role of the Other. Kozak emphasizes that while reading a source text, the translator “puts on the Other’s mask,” which the target audience equates with the Other.59 Thus, translation becomes a hermeneutical act –​“the act of discovering oneself in the Other, and the Other in oneself.”60 The work is interesting mainly because Kozak reduces the translation act to a kind of hermeneutical experience. There are numerous references not only to the ontology of translation, but also to the essence of the text, language,

55 See Brzozowski, “Przekład a hermeneutyka,” in: Mała encyklopedia przekładoznawstwa, ed. Dąmbska-​Prokop, Częstochowa 1997, p. 170. 56 See Barańczak, “Poetycki model świata a problemy przekładu artystycznego,” in: Miejsca wspólne. Szkice o komunikacji literackiej i artystycznej, eds. Balcerzan, Wysłouch, Warszawa 1985, pp. 207–​226; Ziomek, “Przekład-​rozumienie-​interpretacja,” in: Zagadnienia literaturoznawczej interpretacji, eds. Sławiński and Święch, Wrocław 1979, pp. 43–​70 after: Brzozowski, “Przekład a hermeneutyka.” 57 Wawrzyniak, Praktyczne aspekty translacji literackiej na przykładzie języka niemieckiego i angielskiego, Warszawa 1990, pp. 131–​132. 58 See Kozak, Przekład literacki jako metafora. Między logos a lexis, Warszawa 2009. 59 I have included my comments on the correctness of such a metaphorization of translation in Chapter Four. 60 Kozak, Przekład literacki, p. 139.

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Introduction

sense, meaning, horizon, and dialog, all of which are characteristic of philosophical hermeneutics. Her words are worthy of reference: “To read and translate is to understand and express the Other through oneself.”61 Translation from the hermeneutic perspective is also an area of Tokarz’s interest.62 Focusing on artistic translation, she describes it as “a communicative and hermeneutic phenomenon,” justifying it as follows: Communication and understanding do not take place in isolation, but are possible through conversation. The conversation in which the translation participates, takes place in the same symbolic space of literature, using different natural languages. It serves the meeting of different cultures in the sphere of ideas, knowledge, value systems, worldviews, emotions, and aesthetic tastes. … This is why artistic translation should not aim to eliminate the differences between individuals and cultures, but to skillfully bring them out through the understanding between cultural, mental, psychological, axiological and worldview barriers which, inherent in each language, create the symbolic space of literature. The translation recipient receives the result of the conversation between the translator and the original from the point of view of the native culture in the process of understanding, deverbalization, and re-​expression.63

It is commendable that Kozak looks not only at the reception and criticism of translation, but also its aspects such as: the role of the translator in the translation process, the rhetoric of translation, cultural and historical conditions of the original and target text, linguistic categories in translation, intercultural dialog or the “fusion of horizons.” The way in which Tokarz defines translation itself is also very interesting, describing it as a metaphor of meeting: Translation determines the space-​time of the meeting, combining different temporal and spatial orders of two cultures and two personalities entangled in different biographical, emotional, historical, artistic, aesthetic, ethical, mental sequences, etc. … Translation should not only serve as a historical and cultural testimony, because its goal is intercultural understanding, its aim is to help get to know oneself, one’s own culture, and one’s individual possibilities linked to his or her participation in the world.64

When describing the specificity of the translation act in an artistic translation, she refers to the works of Steiner, Gadamer, and Ricoeur. Tokarz emphasizes that translation implies the aspect of agency and a specifically understood

6 1 Kozak, Przekład literacki, p. 146. 62 See Tokarz, Spotkania. Czasoprzestrzeń przekładu artystycznego, Katowice 2010. 63 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 121. 64 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 229.

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dynamism –​translation exists in a specific creative and dialogical space to which the author, the original, the translator, and the receiving culture belong.65 Apart from these works, we may conclude that in Poland there is little interest in the hermeneutic trend in translation studies. Brzozowski’s article “Czy istnieje w Polsce szkoła hermeneutyczna w przekładzie?” [Is There a Polish Hermeneutics School in Translation?] confirms this.66 The question was inspired by the publication in Poland of a translation of Steiner’s classic After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. It is worth recalling the words of Brzozowski, who commented on the event as well as the presence of hermeneutic reflection in Polish translation studies: It is perhaps surprising that the publication of this book has not received much attention from us. An additional surprise, at least for the writer of these words, were the numerous errors in its translation, often in places concerning the problems of translation and its relationship with hermeneutic thought, which could indicate that translators, contrary to expectations, are not particularly interested in this problem. So everything tends to the conclusion that there is, in fact, no hermeneutic school in translation in Poland. There are several centers of philosophical hermeneutics (Poznań, Lublin, Warsaw), and Katarzyna Rosner operates at the meeting point of philosophy and literary studies…, however, among the very numerous recent translation studies publications, I have not been able to find anything that would directly reveal such inspiration.67

We will not find hermeneutic inspiration in translation in either Polish philosophical periodicals or specialist journals devoted to translation studies. Among the international journals in which works on the hermeneutics of translation are published, the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Meta. Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy, Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual, Asymptote, Studia Phaenomenologica and Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik are all noteworthy. Moreover, we should mention the Zeta Books publishing house and the Zeta Series in Translation Studies, which includes publications devoted to the hermeneutic trend in translation studies. First of all, we can refer to such monographs as the aforementioned Übersetzung und Hermeneutik. Traduction et herméneutique edited by Cercel68 or Schleiermacher’s Icoses. Social Ecologies of

6 5 Tokarz, Spotkania, pp. 229–​260. 66 Brzozowski, “Czy istnieje w Polsce szkoła hermeneutyczna w przekładzie?,” Między Oryginałem a Przekładem 2004, IX, pp. 23–​38. 67 Brzozowski, “Czy istnieje w Polsce szkoła hermeneutyczna w przekładzie?,” pp. 23–​24. 68 See Übersetzung und Hermeneutik. Traduction et herméneutique.

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the Different Methods of Translating by Robinson.69 Also noteworthy, in 2012 a research center was established at Saarland University in Germany, focusing on issues related to the hermeneutics of translation and creativity in the translation process –​Hermeneutik und Kreativität, Forschungszentrum des Lehrstuhls für romanische Übersetzungs-​wissenschaft. Until 2018, prof. Alberto Gil managed the center.70 Certainly, there are critical remarks regarding the hermeneutics of translation itself and its scientific and cognitive potential. Authors who put them forward usually prefer an analytical, linguistic approach to the translation process. This criticism most often concerns, first, the irremovable flaws –​or even the lack –​of specific methodological assumptions that could be used to study the attitudes and goals of translators, and second, the discourse filled with incomprehensible metaphors characteristic of philosophical hermeneutics, which seems to be an inspiration and a specific foundation for hermeneutic thought in translation studies. As Cercel writes, such criticism was clearly visible at the beginning of the 1970s. According to Cercel, in those years, Paepcke –​Stolze’s teacher –​made a huge but still underestimated contribution to the development of translation studies. Paepcke could be regarded symbolically as the initiator of a polemic between the representatives of two approaches: the hermeneutic and the linguistic-​structuralist. At the time, he strongly emphasized the need to develop a theoretical-​methodological alternative to the linguistic paradigm of the so-​ called Leipzig school of translation studies.71 Since then, however, the development of translation studies has shown –​as Cercel rightly indicates72 –​that although undoubtedly in strong contrast, both fields can draw from each other and a dialog between them is possible. Therefore, at the current stage of development of translation research, it is important to reflect more deeply on the issue of the translator’s competence, but from a completely different perspective, i.e. one that allows for a holistic look at both the translation process and the translator involved in this process. So far, the hermeneutic dimension of the translation act has not been sufficiently considered, yet translation as a concept functions in hermeneutic philosophy: it is universal and fundamental, and is also subject to ontologization –​for a translator

6 9 See Robinson, Schleiermacher’s Icoses. 70 In 2019, it was moved to the University of Leipzig. 71 For more see. Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, pp. 99–​100. 72 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, p. 102.

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is an entity “entangled” both linguistically and historically, which influences the way of understanding the surrounding reality. In this approach, translation becomes a way of being in the world. From a philosophical perspective, when one takes into account the direction in which contemporary translation studies is heading, it is not only possible but even advisable to ponder the phenomenon of translation, especially the question of a translator’s competence.73 This leads us to an obvious association with the distinction present in the title of Gadamer’s opus vitae.74 Emphasizing the importance of tradition and history in cognition, Gadamer points to the importance of turning to philosophy in the search for the truths concerning the most fundamental concepts in human functioning; in other words, a turn toward dialog with “old thought.” This view undoubtedly contains the essence of so-​called philosophical consciousness, because “the task of hermeneutics is to develop critical consciousness.”75 The dialog with hermeneutical thought undertaken in this work is intended to help reach the very idea of translation, understood by hermeneuticists much more widely than linguists, literary scholars, or representatives of other disciplines of the humanities. As Cercel rightly emphasizes,76 we may reach the essence of translation, as a specific idea, only by turning to hermeneutical thinking. It seems that only on the basis of translation understood as “pure quality” –​a quality that is universal and constantly present in human cognition –​can we get to the bottom of other fundamental concepts, for example the translator’s competence. Numerous shortcomings in understanding and explaining the phenomenon of translation and concepts closely related to it from the linguistic, literary, or cognitive perspective –​translator competence is certainly such a concept –​result from ignoring the basic issue, which is “recognizing the existence of hermeneutic moments”77 in any kind of cognition and 73 In my opinion, the analysis of translation studies publications from the last few years (2013–2020) leaves no illusions that the cognitive dominates over this discipline. Most dominant is the strictly empirical research on various aspects of the translation process: decisions, strategies, techniques, and translation problems, the influence of the emotions or mental simulation on translation, etc. 74 According to Lawrence K. Schmidt, Gadamer originally planned to entitle his work Fundamentals of Philosophical Hermeneutics, but the publisher, believing that hermeneutics was a little known concept, decided to change the wording (Cf. Schmidt, Understanding Hermeneutics, Stocksfield 2006, p. 2). 75 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 57. 76 Cercel, “Hermeneutik des Übersetzens. Heidegger, Gadamer und die Translationswissenschaft,” Studia Phaenomenologica 2005, V, pp. 335–​353. 77 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 71.

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therefore also those “hermeneutic moments” that permeate every act of translation, whether a literary or specialized translation, and regardless of whether it is an inter-​or intralingual translation. Furthermore, hermeneutic reflection on the translator is also a way to defend humanistic thought in translation, which, if we look at the research context, has been largely reduced to purely pragmatic and cognitive-​affective categories in recent years. Of course, the value of research in the cognitive field of translation studies carried out using such advanced research methods and techniques as fMRI or EEG should not be denied in any way, but we may ask at this point a perverse question: what do we need the method for? If we don’t need it, do we know what truth is and where to look for it? In the Polish literature, the only point of reference may be an article by Bukowski, who drew attention to the significant absence of hermeneutic reflection among Polish and foreign authors dealing with translation issues. However, in the cited work, Bukowski focuses mainly on the already relatively well-​known views about translation of Hans-​ Georg Gadamer. Moreover, in my opinion, Bukowski put much more emphasis on the findings made by translation scholars respresenting the hermeneutic turn in translation studies than on philosophical studies per se. This remark should by no means be interpreted as an accusation directed at Bukowski. My opinion is only intended to further strengthen the sad diagnosis regarding the (un)presence of hermeneutic considerations on translation in Polish translation studies literature.78 This book consists of four chapters. In the first, I present the specificity of the concept of language in Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy and point to its connection with translation issues. When presenting aspects of language in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, I have linked them with the categories of understanding and history. This chapter is an important introduction to further considerations on the translation model as perceived by Gadamer. The next

78 I use the word “translation” on purpose, because –​following Katarzyna Lukas –​ I want to understand it as interpersonal communication understood very broadly and in many shades of metaphorism, i.e. as the transfer of ideas between cultural areas, sharing experience, ideas, etc. For moer see Lukas, Fremdheit –​Gedächtnis –​ Translation: Interpretationskategorien einer kulturorientierten Literaturwissenschaft, Berlin 2018). At the same time, we should note that Lukas’ proposal concerning the definition of translation is in a sense an echo of the views of not only Hans-​Georg Gadamer, but also George Steiner, (see Steiner, After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation, Oxford 1975), and Piotr Blumczyński (see Blumczyński, Ubiquitous Translation, New York & London 2016).

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three chapters of this work –​entirely devoted to his concept of translation –​illustrate respectively three conceptualizations of the translation act: 1) translation as the implementation of a circular structure of understanding; 2) translation as a concretization of historically effected consciousness; 3) translation as a hermeneutic conversation. These conceptualizations, pointing to both the substantive and procedural nature of translation, illustrate the way in which the act of translation functions in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Moreover, these three chapters provide an overview of the most important concepts of his hermeneutics, without which it is impossible to outline how the philosopher discussed the notion of translation in his works. Why did I decide to discuss a translator’s competences in the light of the main assumptions of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics? Hans-​Georg Gadamer is one of the greatest and most prolific philosophers of the twentieth century. He became famous for his opus magnum, Wahrheit und Methode, translated into thirteen languages, including English, French, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese. Gadamer made a lasting and extremely valuable contribution to contemporary philosophy. As Donatella Di Cesare aptly states, he not only participated in the most important philosophical changes of the last century, but also represented those changes and, thanks to his innate openness, contributed to making hermeneutics popular in Europe and North America.79 Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics enters ever new dimensions of meaning, exerting an overwhelming influence on the work of researchers not only in literary studies, but also in the philosophy of law, theology, psychology, sociology, musicology, cultural studies, art and, of course, translation studies. They continue to occupy a very important place in continental philosophy, becoming a koiné.80 Scholars usually regard Gadamer as a classic of hermeneutic thought in philosophy, although we should not forget that he was also a philologist, and considered himself a philologist –​though in a rather specific sense of the word.81 During 79 For more see Di Cesare, Gadamer. A Philosophical Portrait, trans. Keane, Bloomington 2007. 80 Di Cesare, Gadamer. A Philosophical Portrait, pp. 189–​194. 81 Interestingly, in one of his later texts “Die Aufgabe der Philosophie,” Gadamer states that he cannot describe himself as a philologist in the narrow sense, i.e. he is not specialized in philological sciences per se. However, his reverence for Logoi reflects with full strength his interest in the dialectic of questions and answers in the particular dialogical relationship between interpreter and text. In the same work, Gadamer repeatedly emphasizes his love for poetic texts and for the essence of “listening” to what they say to us. For the German thinker, contact with poetry means conducting a dialog, which is often reflected in his works, especially those in which Gadamer interprets

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his Marburg period, Gadamer collaborated with such outstanding philologists as Curtius, Jaeger, Friedlander, and Bultmann. His philological interests are reflected not only in numerous references to language, but above all to poetry, literature, text interpretation, and translation. Perhaps it is for this reason that Gadamer’s works inspire not only philosophers, but also literary and translation scholars. He combined his philosophical and philological competences in a special way, creating works with an extremely original meaning, which entered the canon of humanistic literature. Gadamer’s hermeneutics occupy a prominent place in books on the history of philosophy.82 Among the most important objects of his reflection are the categories of understanding and the fusion of two horizons: the horizon of the human being (interpreter) and the horizon of the text. As part of these considerations, Gadamer places translation at the center, which by undergoing a peculiar ontologization, illustrates how man functions linguistically in the world. Most of his reflections on this subject are contained in the third part of his outstanding, the works of his beloved poets. Moreover, poetry serves Gadamer to comment on the enormous difficulties involved in translating such texts. Cf. H.-​G. Gadamer, “Dichten und Deuten,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften II. Interpretationen, Tübingen 1967, p. 12. Importantly, poetry in Gadamer’s terms often shows the phenomenon of the hermeneutic problem even more strongly. A special feedback is clearly visible: the poetic text is the source of the hermeneutical problem for the reader. It consists in communing with foreigners (interpretation), but at the same time the creation of the poem makes it difficult for the poet to find the means of expression –​in the right amount –​to extract the poetic “I,” to translate thoughts into language in a way that is innovative and ahead of what is already articulated. Interestingly, in this approach, creating poetry somehow contradicts translation, because, according to Gadamer, when translating, we somehow replicate, because we always rely on well-​developed, well-​known linguistic structures. However, the Gadamer-​like ideal of a poet implies a significant novelty in relation to what is already known and familiar. The poet is supposed to “free the language from the compulsion of dead conventions” –​“(…die Befreiung der Sprache von Zwang unlebendiger Konventionen,” Gadamer, “Dichten und Deuten,” p. 235). According to Gadamer, to be a poet is to say something new with the use of innovative linguistic means in such a way as to merely highlight a problem. Thus, while poetry seems to be a detail heading toward the general, translation is the general heading toward a detail. Despite some differences, it seems that both poetry and translation are linked by the creator’s inclination toward a word that does not yet exist and therefore toward a temporal moving towards an undefined future. Cf. H-​G. Gadamer, “Über leere und erfüllte Zeit,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III. Idee und Sprache. Platon Husserl Heidegger, Tübingen 1972, p. 235. 82 Cf. Przyłębski, Gadamer, Warszawa 2006, p. 16.

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monumental work Warheit und Methode.83 This is the part that refers to the hermeneutical ontology of language.84 From Gadamer’s viewpoint, translation is a kind of hermeneutic experience, and as such it is subject to multiple aspects typical of a particular type of exchange of thoughts, namely hermeneutic conversation. It is worth recalling the words presenting his idea: So the whole point was to make the multilayered problem of translation a model of linguality of human behavior toward the world and to develop, based on the structures of translation, the general problem of how the alien becomes one’s own.85

It would be unfair not to mention at this point that in the text “Von Lehrenden und Lernenden” [literally: “Of teachers and students”], Gadamer, recalling the figure of Karl Jaspers, unequivocally supports not translations per se, but reading texts written in the source language: In this tremendous reader, whom Karl Jaspers was, the whole educational richness of our tradition was invigorated by his human richness. On the other hand, he was so much isolated from everything we were raised to be. If I were to define hermeneutics in a new way and say that hermeneutics means: “do not believe in any translation,” then I would have to call into question a large part of the sources of Karl Jaspers’ wisdom. The real task for hermeneutics here is to interpret –​so to speak –​the living word and breathe a new life into the word, which has been petrified in writing. But no translation is really alive, and only from living language does the awakening power grow, which is bestowed

83 Warheit und Methode is considered to be one of the most important works of twentieth-​ century German philosophy, being the starting point for Gadamer’s subsequent works, in which he clarified and explained in more detail many problematic and even controversial issues contained in his opus vitae. 84 H.-​G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1965, pp. 361–​465. Later citet as WuM. 85 “So lag es nahe, das vielschichtige Problem der Übersetzung zum Modell der Sprachlichkeit des menschlichen Weltverhaltens zu erheben und an den Strukturen von Übersetzung das allgemeine Problem zu entwickeln wie Fremdes zu eigen wird” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik. Metakritische Erörterungen zu Wahrheit und Methode,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 2. Hermeneutik II, Tübingen 1986, p. 232). Gadamer derives the idea that this translation should symbolize the way in which man functions linguistically in the world –​fully developed in the third part of Wahrheit und Methode –​from the specificity of the hermeneutic problem, which is alienation from ancient written sources of human cultural activity caused by temporal distance. At the same time, Gadamer is aware that the model he suggests is not able to reflect the complexity of the problem of human linguistic existence. (Gadamer, Rhetorik, p. 114).

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Introduction on us in the miracle of language, namely [the power] to experience the speaker’s actual intention beyond what is said.86

86 “In diesem ungeheuren Leser, der Karl Jaspers war, wurde der ganze Bildungsreichtum unserer Tradition in seinem menschlichen Reichtum lebendig. Andererseits war er durch eine ganze Welt von all dem getrennt, wozu wir erzogen worden waren. Wenn ich Hermeneutik auf eine neue Weise definieren darf und sage, Hermeneutik heiβt, an keine Übersetzung glauben, dann müsste ich Karl Jaspers einen groβen Teil der Quellen seiner Weisheit streitig machen. Dass Hermeneutik das lebendige Wort sozusagen auszulegen hat und das zur Schrift erstarrte Wort neu zum Leben zu erwecken hat, stellt hier die eigentliche Aufgabe dar. Keine Übersetzung ist aber wirklich lebendig, und nur aus lebendiger Sprache erwächst die Erweckungskraft, die uns im Wunder der Sprache verliehen ist, nämlich, über das Gessagte hinaus die eigentliche Intention des Sprechenden zu erfahren” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Von Lehrenden und Lernenden, in: Gessamelte Werke 10.Hermeneutik im Rückblick, Tübingen 1995, p. 333). Gadamer expresses a similar view about the impossibility of translating the source text according to its spirit in the text “Mensch und Sprache:” “Wir können uns das an einer Erfahrung verdeutlichen, die jeder von uns macht. Ich meine das Übersetzen und das Lesen von Übersetzungen aus fremden Sprachen. Was der Übersetzer vorfindet, ist sprachlicher Text, d. h. ein mündlich oder schriftlich Gesagtes, das er in die eigene Sprache übersetzen soll. Er ist gebunden an das, was da steht, und er kann doch nicht einfach das Gesagte aus dem fremden Sprachstoff in den eigenen Sprachstoff umformen, ohne daß er selber wieder zum Sagenden wird. Das aber heißt, er muß in sich den unendlichen Raum des Sagens gewinnen, der dem in der fremden Sprache Gesagten entspricht. Jedermann weiß, wie schwer das ist. Jedermann weiß, wie die Übersetzung das in der fremden Sprache Gesagte gleichsam flach fallen läßt. Es bildet sich in einer Fläche ab, so daß Wortsinn und Satzform der Übersetzung das Original nachzeichnen, aber die Übersetzung hat gleichsam keinen Raum. Ihr fehlt jene dritte Dimension, aus der sich das ursprünglich, d. h. im Original Gesagte, in seinem Sinnbereich aufbaute. Das ist eine unvermeidliche Sdiranke aller Übersetzungen. Keine kann das Original ersetzen. Aber wenn man meinen sollte, jene ins Flache projizierte Aussage des Originals müßte nun in der Übersetzung gleichsam leichter verständlich geworden sein, da vieles im Original anklingende Flintergründige, Zwischenzeilige nicht mit hinübergetragen werden konnte –​wenn man nun meinte, diese Reduktion auf einen einfältigen Sinn müsse das Verständnis erleichtern, so täuscht man sich. Keine Übersetzung ist so verständlich wie ihr Original. Es ist eben gerade der vieles einbeziehende Sinn des Gesagten –​und Sinn ist immer Richtungssinn –​, der nur in der Ursprünglichkeit des Sagens zur Sprache kommt und in allem Nachsagen und Nachsprechen entgleitet. Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers muß daher immer die sein, nicht das Gesagte abzubilden, sondern sich in Richtung des Gesagten, d. h. in seinen Sinn, einzustellen, um in die Richtung seines eigenen Sagens das zu Sagende zu übertragen” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Mensch und Sprache,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I. Philosophie. Hermeneutik, Tübingen 1967, p. 99).

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Why, then, despite such huge doubts about the credibility of translation, is it worth analyzing the issue of translator competence from the perspective of Hans-​Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics? Well, first, as he himself implicitly makes known above: a writing becomes a repeatedly postulated living speech when it becomes “revived.”87 Of course, we may understand this postulate in various ways, but the specific “revival” of the message may also result from the translation of a given text into another language,88 especially in a situation in which the translation determines a given social group’s understanding of a specific cultural artifact. It will not be prejudiced to say that the history of the development of philosophy is, in fact, the history of translation, because it is thanks to translations that huge numbers of readers interested in the work of a given thinker could explore his or her achievements. Second, as Gadamer emphasizes, hermeneutics by its very definition indicates its translational grounding, because it is interested in a specific “linguistic event, translating from one language to another.”89 Hence, translation is inherently hermeneutic, and hermeneutics implicitly indicates the translationalization of human existence. Third, analysis of the concept of translator competence from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics to some extent makes the Gadamerian dictum, that elements of hermeneutic theory invariably have their source in praxis, clear.90 Fourth and finally, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is in fact an anthropologizing hermeneutics oriented toward man and invariably oscillating around all that is human. An important place belongs to the hermeneutical experience connecting man and the world, i.e. the relationship between the understanding being –​the interpreter, and therefore also the translator –​and the understood being –​the world as a text. Referring not only to his obvious inspirations, i.e. Aristotle, Plato, Humboldt, Heidegger, and Hegel, Gadamer asks about the structure of understanding, and looks for answers to bothersome questions about cognition, pointing to the

8 7 H.-​G. Gadamer, “Von Lehrenden und Lernenden.” 88 I elaborate on living speech in the context of the translation act in the successive parts of this monography. 89 Cf. H.-​G. Gadamer, “Ästhetik und Hermeneutik,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften II, p. 4. 90 Cf. H.-​ G. Gadamer, “Hermeneutik als theoretische und praktische Aufgabe,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke. Hermeneutik II, Tübingen 1986, pp. 301–​318. Gadamer emphatically states in “Hermeneutik als theoretische und praktische Aufgabe,” that hermeneutics “is more than just a scientific method…. It also means a natural human capacity” (“So ist Hermeneutik mehr als nur eine Methode der Wissenschaften …. Sie meint vor allem eine natürliche Fahigkeit des Menschen”) (Gadamer, “Hermeneutik als theoretische und praktische Aufgabe,” p. 301).

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inability to objectivise. Gadamer invariably assumes that understanding is a universal and universalizing phenomenon –​after all, all human existence comes down to the search for understanding and agreement. Hence, as Lorenc rightly states, such hermeneutics is “the theory of actual experience of what thinking is.”91 Therefore, it is also a theory of what cognition is and assimilation of the alien. And finally, it is a model of what reading and understanding the world, and therefore translation, mean. An important aspect of Gadamer’s work remains the aspect of application –​ combining the general with the particular and interpreting it based on the situational and historical context. Gadamer’s philosophy is also a fundamentally practical philosophy. It focuses largely on human activity in the world. As, again, rightly stated by Lorenc: “It takes part in disputes conducted in the area of practice, tries to help overcome the obstacles of our understanding, cares about maintaining the dialog and increasing the circle of its participants.”92 Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy is also often called concrete philosophy. While writing Wahrheit und Methode, he argued that we should not understand his take on “understanding” in procedural and methodological categories. However, as Lorenc notes, “awakening hermeneutic consciousness allows for the development of premises for a specific practice.”93 One text states that understanding, being initially the natural predisposition of a human being, is transposed into a skill that requires the application of specific rules.94 In this sense, we may speak of the normative nature of Gadamer’s philosophy. By opening up to a dialog with what is different and foreign, hermeneutics prompts us to search for, challenge, and revise our own assessments and judgments, and consequently to adopt and accept certain norms and attitudes. This becomes particularly evident in his works written after the publication of Wahrheit und Methode.95 It is worth quoting Gadamer from “Ästhetik und Hermeneutik:” Since the time of the German Romantics, therefore, the task of hermeneutics has been defined as avoiding misunderstanding. With this definition, hermeneutics acquires a domain that in principle reaches as far as the expression of meaning as such. Expressions of meaning first of all take the form of linguistic manifestations. As the art of conveying what is said in a foreign language to the understanding of another person, hermeneutics

91 Lorenc, Hermeneutyczne koncepcje człowieka. W kręgu inspiracji heideggerowskich, Warszawa 2003, p. 125. 92 Lorenc, Hermeneutyczne koncepcje człowieka, p. 129. 93 Lorenc, Hermeneutyczne koncepcje człowieka, p. 133. 94 Gadamer, “Rhetorik,” p. 234. 95 Gadamer, “Rhetorik,” p. 234.

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is not without reason named after Hermes, the interpreter of the divine message to mankind. If we recall the origin of the term “hermeneutics,” it becomes clear that we are dealing here with a language event, with a translation from one language to another, and therefore with the relation of two languages. But insofar as we can only translate from one language to another if we have understood the meaning of what is said and construct it anew in the medium of the other language, such a language event presupposes understanding.96

This one statement contains the essence of Gadamer’s concept of translation. First, it evidences the primacy of the phenomenon of understanding necessary for any translation. Second, as he emphasizes, understanding takes on a linguistic character, becoming a meaningful statement, i.e. one that is to be understood by the target audience. This makes the essence of intersubjectivity apparent. Gadamer’s remarks and comments represent a broad spectrum of possible readings and original reflections on the translation process and the translator’s role. They inspire critical reflection on the essence of the phenomenon of translation and offer an answer to the question of the translator’s competences that are important from the point of view of modern translation studies. Finally, they encourage the creation of further hermeneutical theories and models, including those that have a direct impact on the contemporary didactics of written translation, a clear example of which is the scientific activity of Stolze. The analysis of such Gadamerian categories as understanding, history, and dialog reveals very interesting observations about the nature of translation: translator competence, knowledge, cultural aspects in translation, the text’s essence, meaning, the message’s sense, the way language exists, and the identity of not only a literary work but other written statements. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics –​especially the old but still important problems concerning the 96 Gadamer, “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” in: The Gadamer Reader, p. 127. “So ist seit der deutschen Romantik die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik dahin bestimmt, Mißverstand zu vermeiden. Damit hat sie einen Bereich, der grundsätzlich soweit reicht, wie überhaupt die Aussage von Sinn reicht. Aussage von Sinn sind zunächst alle sprachlichen Äußerungen. Als die Kunst, das in einer fremden Sprache Gesagte dem Verständnis eines anderen zu übermitteln, heißt die Hermeneutik nicht ohne Grund nach Hermes, dem Dolmetsch der göttlichen Botschaft an die Menschen. Wenn man sich an diesen Namensurprung des Begriffs Hermeneutik erinnert, wird unzweideutig klar, daß es sich hier um ein Sprachgeschechen handelt, um Übersetzung einer Sprache in eine andere, also um das Verhältnis von zwei Sprachen. Sofern man aber aus einer Sprache in die andere nur übertragen kann, wenn man den Sinn des Gesagten verstanden hat und ihn im Medium der anderen Sprache neu aufbaut, setzt solches Sprachgeschechen Verstehen voraus” Gadamer, “Ästhetik und Hermeneutik,” p. 4.

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Introduction

understanding or interpretation of texts taken up by him –​makes it possible to look at contemporary problems related to the concept of translator competence from a different perspective. For as Wawrzyniak emphasizes, we may define each translation as “generating understanding of the text,”97 and –​which we should add –​even leading to such “understanding.” Thus, Wawrzyniak confirms the legitimacy of conducting research on the translation process from the hermeneutic perspective.98 It is worth noting that Gadamer –​most likely inspired by Heidegger and Hegel –​includes subjective and subjectivized factors in his considerations, enriching traditional reflections on language –​including reflections on translation –​with the factor of human action. Therefore, we may regard examining a translator’s competence from the perspective of hermeneutic philosophy as fully justified. Gadamer’s views on translation are arranged in his works in an unsystematic and uncontrolled way. It is difficult to find unambiguous conclusions in them, the more so as the language he uses is characterized by a certain uncontrollable nature. However, we should consider his way of thinking about translation as accurate. Gadamer explains the nature of understanding, interpreting, and creating a text, i.e. all the aspects that characterize the work of any competent translator, regardless of his or her specialization. The translator’s competences, conceived from the perspective of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, form a shape of concentric circles, the centers of which are respectively understanding, history, and dialog. Of course, language remains a special type of medium through which the translation process is carried out. For language is the means through which there is agreement on a given matter, while in Gadamer’s hermeneutics translation constitutes a specific model of understanding and agreement. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss his views on translation without linking such a discussion with the interpretation of the concept of language in hermeneutic optics.99 The translator’s main task –​one might even say most important mission –​is to enable understanding between all parties involved in the communication process. The translator acts here as a special intermediary. He or she is both recipient and sender, but not directly as is the case in the author-​reader relationship.100 9 7 Wawrzyniak, Praktyczne aspekty translacji literackiej, p. 131. 98 Wawrzyniak, Praktyczne aspekty translacji literackiej, p. 132. 99 Hence the first chapter of this monograph deals with the linguistic nature of human experience. 100 Cf. Grucza, “Zagadnienia translatoryki,” in: Glottodydaktyka a translatoryka, ed. Grucza, Warszawa 1981, pp. 9–​29; Grucza, “Wyodrębnianie się, stan aktualny i

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The main research method in this monograph is reconstructing the concept of translation in the light of this philosophical investigation of language, understanding, history, and dialogicality, thus isolating the translator’s hermeneutic (more precisely, Gadamerian) competences on that basis. His works are so rich in references to translation that this interpretation is justified in the context of the issue discussed here. Though this perspective seems to be accurate, it is, of course, only one of the possible interpretations that can be used to recreate Gadamer’s theoretical and philosophical system.101 Each chapter begins with a reference to main concepts of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy. On their basis I carry out more detailed analyses of their relevance in relation to the translation act and the translator’s competences related to it. The discussions are ordered so as to reflect the specificity of the translation act itself. Thus, they consistently move from issues of a general nature to more detailed aspects, and finally, following the example of the figure of the hermeneutic circle, they express a specific summary. Chapter One presents the general scheme of understanding to which a text’s interpreters are subject. To describe it, I use Gadamer’s geometry of the hermeneutic circle. Since understanding always appears at a specific moment in history in the context of a specific tradition, Chapter Two is devoted to the concept of effective historical awareness that determines the course of the translation process. The last chapter takes a slightly more detailed look at the translation act and the activities undertaken during it. Consequently, it deals with translation as the translator’s hermeneutic conversation with the text, that is to say, as a process of in-​depth interpretation. When reconstructing, analyzing, and interpreting Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory, I mainly use his most famous work, Wahrheit und Methode, especially the second and third parts, the 4-​volume Kleine Schriften, the 10-​volume edition of Gesammelte Werke, especially volumes 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10, and the English translations of these titles. Selected quotations are given in the main part of the work on the basis of the English translations, but for a better understanding of his perspektywy świata translacji oraz translatoryki,” Lingua Legis 1998, 6, pp. 2–​12; Kielar, Zarys translatoryki, Warszawa 2003, p. 8. 101 This statement is in a way consistent with the “mission” of hermeneutics, which is to enter into a dialog not only with different views and authors, but also with itself. In this regard, I admit in this work the possibility that when I write about the competences of a translator from the perspective of Gadamer’s thought, I start a specific “hermeneutic conversation,” which is to deal with issues that are not directly mentioned in his works. Thus, the interpretation of Gadamer’s views in the light of the research problem outlined itself takes on a hermeneutic character.

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views, I present the original German version in the footnotes. In this work I analyze Gadamer’s works in accordance with his postulates. First of all, my main goal is to capture the full meaning of the texts, taking into consideration what they have to say to the reader. I enter into a kind of “dialog” with them –​a hermeneutical conversation –​and I focus primarily on the aspect of translation. Of course, I do not lose sight of the tradition from which he “emerged.” But I must emphasize that in this monograph, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics serve only as a specific frame in the light of which –​hence the expression contained in the title of this work –​I situate my own reflections on translator competences. Therefore, this is not a book about Gadamer, but about a translator’s competences, which can be derived from Gadamer’s philosophy. For this reason, I refer to his views only to the extent that they are required to distinguish the elements that make up the translator’s hermeneutic competences. Emphasizing these aspects, which too many translation scholars push to the margins, may inspire other researchers to adopt a hermeneutic reflection on translation. This is very important, especially in Poland, where study of the hermeneutics of translation is marginalized and its cognitive potential underestimated. Probably the first person to point this out was Brzozowski in a work with a telling title: “Czy istnieje w Polce szkoła hermeneutyczna w przekładzie?”[Is There a Polish Hermeneutics School of Translation?]. According to Brzozowski, although several scientific centers in our country actively concentrate their activities around hermeneutics –​including Lublin, Warsaw, and Poznań –​in recent years, Polish works in translation studies have not shown their authors are inclined in any way toward a hermeneutic approach.102 This might come as a surprise, because –​as Bronk rightly emphasizes –​what the hermeneuticists proclaim “does not contradict the most demanding ethos of science.”103 According to Gadamer, in order to fully reach the essence of a given phenomenon, it is not enough just to consider its ontological “immersion,” because we should enrich such reflection by placing the concept in a philosophical and hermeneutical context. As Bronk aptly states, just as we should not look for the problem of the truth of a work of art in “pure aesthetic awareness” but rather in the “broad framework of the humanities,”104 so we should not analyze the problem of translation only within the framework of translation studies, but rather in the humanities, and above all, in order to meet Gadamer’s postulate of

1 02 Brzozowski, “Czy istnieje w Polsce szkoła hermeneutyczna w przekładzie?,” pp. 23–​24. 103 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 64. 104 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 69.

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getting to the bottom of things, within philosophy. Finally, hermeneutic reflection on translation may help reach the “core” of a specific translation study problem. For example: it is a truism to say that in order to translate a text, the translator must understand and interpret it. The literature on the subject clearly lacks extensive research on what, in fact, understanding and interpretation in the context of the translation process is. Hence the need to take into consideration a strictly hermeneutic perspective, i.e. to analyze the historical and linguistic conditions to which the translator is subject. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provides such an overview of the state of affairs. By making a kind of self-​critique and reflection on its own methodology, Gadamer’s hermeneutics aims at asking questions about the deepest essence of things: “Hermeneutic experience in fact poses a problem of philosophy for us: to disclose the ontological implications involved in the ‘technical’ concept of science and to bring about theoretical recognition of hermeneutic experience.”105 In other words, we can explain certain points only on a philosophical basis. It is equally important that, contrary to popular belief, science per se and hermeneutics are by no means mutually exclusive: Hermeneutics also has relevance to theory of science in that hermeneutic reflection discloses conditions of truth in the sciences that do not derive from the logic of scientific discovery but are prior to it. This is especially, though not exclusively, true in the so-​called Geisteswissenschaften, whose English equivalent, “moral sciences,” already indicates that these sciences make their object into something that necessarily belongs to the knower himself.106

The following keywords are included in the titles of three chapters of this work: understanding, history, and conversation. The mutual relation of these concepts and their meanings form the basis for understanding that constitutes a translator’s hermeneutic competence. In the light of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, understanding performs the function of a specifically understood translation. On the other hand, history is closely related to understanding and dialog, i.e. hermeneutic conversation, constituting a fundamental condition for human existence and functioning in a linguistically conditioned world. Let the words of Dybel become an inspiration for further reading:

1 05 Gadamer, “Afterword,” in: Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 561. 106 Gadamer, “Afterword,” in: Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 556.

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Introduction A confrontation with the hermeneutic approach works “invigorating,” because it breaks it out of dogmatic stiffness. Moreover, it allows the researcher to pose a completely different type of questions about the “subject” of research and the results obtained, to look at them from a completely different, somewhat broader and more comprehensive perspective, and encourages self-​reflection on the “truth” of his or her own knowledge.107

107 Dybel, Granice rozumienia i interpretacji. O hermeneutyce Hansa-​Georga Gadamera, Kraków 2004, pp. 27–​28.

Chapter One: Gadamer’s Concept of Language Researchers describe Gadamer’s philosophy of language as “hermeneutic” and categorize it as a “continental, transcendental”108 philosophy that is part of “fundamental research tradition.”109 Moreover, Bronk perceives his philosophy as “Romantic” and “humanistic.”110 At this point, it is necessary to ask a question: what is the hermeneutic philosophy of language? Bronk gives an extremely apt description of it when stating that in the hermeneutical approach, language performs multiple functions of a holistic nature: its analysis takes into consideration both the linguistic and non-​linguistic context.111 Language understood as

108 As Andrzej Bronk points out, Gadamer’s references to Cassirer or Lohmann reveal his transcendental interests. See Andrzej Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, język: filozoficzna hermeneutyka H.–​G. Gadamera, p. 293. 109 See Lee Braver, “Hermeneutics and Language Philosophy” in: The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, eds. by J. Malpas, H.-​H. Gander, Oxon-​New York 2015, pp. 634–​643. 110 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 278–​279. Bronk states that Gadamer’s philosophy of language displays qualities of a “mythical-​magical” approach, and the very act of using language equals “creating” the world. Language, thought, and the world are closely connected. 111 “With some simplification,” Bronk distinguishes and accepts “the existence of two main attitudes to language in the history of European thought,” called conventionally in Rozumienie, dzieje, język “romantic,” or in other words “humanistic,” and “positivist,” or “scientistic.” The first is the so-​called “mythical-​magical” approach to language, which represents the “expression of power over things.” In this concept, language allows one to “create the world.” Moreover, such an approach underlines the inextricable link between language, thought, and the world. The natural language with its polysemiotic nature and plasticity, takes precedence over formal artificial languages and scientific language. It also appreciates the so-​called “language of paradox, the language of nature, flowers, or silence.” Historicism and the historical moment remain a characteristic feature. According to Bronk, Vico, Nicholas of Cousins, Novalis, Bergson, Heidegger and Gadamer all represent this tradition. The second concept of language, i.e. the one called positivist or analytical, considers language as a “tool of cognition.” In this approach, scholars place great value on formal artificial languages and scientific language. A characteristic feature of this concept is “ahistorism” or even “antihistorism.” Some representatives of this approach are: Raymond Lullus, Descartes, Leibniz, and proponents of modern neopositivist and analytical philosophy. See Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 279–​292.

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a specific medium is where understanding occurs. The focus is on the language’s relationship with cognition and the world.112 By a peculiar synthesis of language’s hermeneutical dimension, Aleksandra Pawliszyn stresses the importance of living speech as an important basis for the discussed phenomenon to occur. Pawliszyn states that the subjective content conveyed by a speaker to a great extent shapes the sense of their utterance. This subjective state of a person who utters certain words has a significant impact on the understanding of the content. Moreover, correct decoding of the message becomes possible only after taking into account the “subjective state” of the speaker. In this case, the relationship of language with the world and with the other person plays a crucial role.113 To sum up, the hermeneutical philosophy of language is primarily based on a holistic analysis of language, namely its relationship with human existence, the world, and other people. Nothing is said here once and for all: the meaning of a statement emerges only in a concrete situation, in the context of other words or expressions, because only then is it possible to understand. After all, Gadamer’s philosophy of language is –​to recall the words of Baran –​“the identity of the opposing elements … of the world and language.”114 As Bronk rightly points out, it is important whether Gadamer’s views on language may be treated as part of his own philosophy of language or whether they make up his particular theory of a holistic nature.115 Certainly, the foci of his interest were not “modern language concepts,” such as analytical philosophy 112 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 291–​294. For Bronk, the opposition to hermeneutical philosophy is an analytical philosophy in which language is inevitably instrumentalized and in which philosophers lean toward the ideal of objectifying cognition. In analytical philosophy, scholars treat language in terms of autonomization and separation from the components of culture in its broadest sense. As mentioned above, pragmatism remains its most important aspect. The particular moment in history or historicism does not play an important role in this case. On the other hand, in the hermeneutical philosophy –​as underlined –​scholars approach language holistically. This means that formal or instrumentalistic considerations are not as important as “the text’s view” (or what is contained in the text), tradition, the meaning of a given statement embedded in a given moment in history, and cognitive aspects. 113 Pawliszyn, Skryte podstawy rozumienia. Hermeneutyka a psychoanaliza, Gdańsk 1993, pp. 29–​30. 114 Baran, “Spekulacja hermeneutyczna,” in: Gadamer, Prawda i metoda, Kraków 1993, p. 14. The text is the translator’s introduction to the Polish translation of Gadamer’s Truth and Method. 115 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 293.

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or structural linguistics. Since he often referred to authors like Cassirer and Lohmann, we may conclude that Gadamer once leaned toward transcendentalism in his reflections.116 Moreover, he did not intend to create a comprehensive or systematic theory of language. This may be related to his education, as he thought of himself more as a philosopher than a philologist. In his work, the linguistic aspect is simply an element in the broader context of philosophical reflection. In this case, language becomes a philosophically considered phenomenon, transforming into a universal medium in which understanding takes place and an entity reveals itself and can thereby exist. Nevertheless, we should not reduce Gadamer’s views to “the psychology or sociology of language or to linguistics.”117 Although he did not create a separate, exhaustive theory of language, he developed an interesting concept closely related to other concepts crucial for his hermeneutical philosophy, especially his views on translation. Gadamer created his concept of language in the 1960s. As Jean Grondin rightly emphasizes, this theme belonged to the philosophical terra incognita at that time.118 At the time when Gadamer proposed his hermeneutical approach to language, it was truly unique and innovative. It is noteworthy, as Grondin emphasizes, that in the 1950s almost no one in Germany showed much interest in Wittgenstein. No one practiced analytical philosophy, considering it incomprehensible or only related to the activities of the Vienna Circle. Neither Husserl nor even Sartre engaged in language peregrinations.119 Gadamer included most of his considerations on language in Wahrheit und Methode120 and in subsequent works: Kleine Shriften and Gesammelte Werke. The thoughts presented in these works and in their translations serve as the basis for the analysis and interpretation of Gadamer’s concept of language in this chapter.

1 16 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 293. 117 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 293. 118 Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. K. Plant, Montreal-​Kingston 1999, p. 124. 119 J. Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. K. Plant, Montreal-​Kingston 1999, p. 124. 120 As Przyłębski rightly emphasizes, the last part of Warheit und Methode, devoted to the ontologization of language, is “a kind of culmination of the work,” it is the crowning of the previous considerations. The last part of Wahrheit reveals Gadamer’s intention, who wishes to demonstrate that hermeneutics should not be identified “with one of the philosophical sub-​disciplines,” but as the philosophy that is the outset of everything (Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 51).

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1.1 How Did the Concept of “Language” Form in Western European Thought? according to Hans-​Georg Gadamer It is worth starting with Gadamer’s famous words:121 “Being that can be understood is language.” In this sense, language is everything that can be understood. Such a perspective implies the universality of hermeneutics.122 In his work, language takes the form of art or history and everything that exists.123 It is a universal being: The hermeneutical phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its own relation to beings as interpretation. Thus, we speak not only of a language of art but also of a language of nature—​in short, of any language that things have.124

Quite frequently, Gadamer refers to language as word, but not in the sense of lexical units. Not only does a word mean a given thing, but it is also characterized by occasionality and always appears in a specific context, which at the same time indicates its fluidity.125 In this context, it is worth recalling Sołtysiak, who states that language in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy functions in several meanings. In a narrow sense, it is the language used by man, founded on the basis of a word, and in a broader sense, it constitutes human communication, which includes not only articulation but also gestures. Furthermore, Sołtysiak distinguishes an even wider meaning of language and defines it as a conversation

121 Hans-​Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Continuum: 2004, p. 470. “Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache” (WuM, p. 450). 122 Of course, we should not understand it in a way that our whole environment is a language, but that our relationship with the world is verbalized, and that language embraces everything that the human mind is able to understand. 123 WuM, p. 452. 124 Gadamer, Truth, p. 470. “Das hermeneutische Phänomen wirft hier gleichsam seine eigene Universalität auf die Seinsverfassung des Verstandenen zurück, indem es dieselbe in einem universellen Sinne als Sprache bestimmt und seinen eigenen Bezug auf das Seiende als Interpretation. So reden wir ja nicht nur von einer Sprache der Kunst, sondern auch von einer Sprache der Natur, ja überhaupt von einer Sprache, die die Dinge führen”(WuM, p. 450). 125 See more on Gadamer’s take on occasionality in the context of a work of art in: WuM, pp. 136–​143.

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that men can have with representatives of flora and fauna and even with works of art.126 All in all, in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy language is not subject to analyses of a typically linguistic or logical nature. In fact, if we assume a holistic character, it constitutes the certain set of senses or meanings expressed in a message’s content. Of course, specific traces of language may be found in ordered collections of knowledge, literary works, or other forms of notation, but language is truly realized only in living speech. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to purely linguistic aspects.127 The focus here is primarily on issues related to the linguistic aspects of understanding and the relationship between language, man, and the world, to be discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, Gadamer extensively reflects on the history of language research, especially from a philosophical perspective. These reflections are important as they make it possible to specify and understand how the philosopher defined language and its nature.

1.1.1. Gadamer’s Reflections on Language in the Light of Greek Philosophy In the part concerning the development of the term “language” in the history of Western European thought, Gadamer devotes a great deal of attention to Greek philosophy. Referring to Aristotle’s thought, he recalls the distinction between the functioning of man and animal. According to Aristotle, animals have significantly limited communication skills whereas man has been given logos, thanks to which people can additionally decide what is right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable. Gadamer sees great value in this view and emphasizes that it would be difficult to find it in the works of other philosophers.128 Only man was given logos129 –​therefore, only man is able to think and speak, and thus, unlike animals, relate his actions to many temporal planes: past, present, and future. Moreover, man can share thoughts with other people and express the specifically

126 M. Sołtysiak, “Uniwersalność i granice języka według H.-​ G. Gadamera” in: Hermeneutyczne dziedzictwo filozofii, eds. H. Mikołajczyk, M. Oziębłowski, M. Rembierz, Kraków 2006, p. 76. 127 See Gadamer, “Die Unfähigkeit zum Gespräch” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften IV, pp. 109–​117. 128 Gadamer, “Mensch und Sprache” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, pp. 93–​94. 129 Gadamer’s logos stands for “language” or “speech.”

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perceived intersubjectivity. As Gadamer contends, all this may be summarized in the following conclusion: man lives and uses speech.130 Aristotle’s thoughts on the process of speech assimilation –​or more precisely, on the acquisition of concepts of a general nature –​were another inspiration for Gadamer. While assigning great value to memory, he emphasizes that thanks to it man knows the world and organizes the reality in which he or she lives. Memory allows the consolidation and organization of experience, consequently, shaping a general knowledge about the world. We may say that memory binds human experience together, enabling people to communicate with each other, understand each other’s experiences and thoughts, reach conclusions, and make arrangements. Memory allows man to participate spiritually and intellectually in a certain community, and thus enables the intersubjectivization of the subject. The process is exactly the same as the process of language acquisition.131 Gadamer refers to specific works by ancient philosophers. Most frequently, he mentions the famous Platonic dialog, Cratylus, in which there is such a diversity of purely linguistic problems that subsequent deliberations on these subjects conducted by other Greek philosophers may only be regarded as secondary to the original Platonic thought.132 As he points out,133 Socrates’ conversation with Cratylus reveals the essence of a word: whether it remains only a formal reflection –​ a sign –​of something, or perhaps creates a specific image itself. Gadamer observes that since the Cratylus dialog, the concept of image has been replaced by that of the sign. This conclusion is present in any subsequent discussion of the topic. In relation to a thing, the word takes on a secondary character, while thinking seems to have nothing in common with the existence of words, considering them only the signs by which an object, idea, or thing becomes visible. Therefore, the word is understood as a certain instrument for the transmission of information. Gadamer rightly emphasizes that at this stage of development in Greek philosophy, we are dealing with the ideal of characteristica universalis,134 as clearly illustrated by the views later typical of Enlightenment philosophy and the ways so-​called ideal languages function, as in the case of Leibniz135, or 1 30 131 132 133 134 135

Gadamer, “Mensch,” p. 93. Gadamer, “Mensch,” p. 96. WuM, p. 383. WuM, pp. 385–​391. WuM, p. 391. Gadamer describes Leibniz’s ideal of linguistics as the “language” of reason (analysis notionum). He assigns to it two goals: the development of so-​called true concepts and the representation of the whole of being based on the model of divine reason. At the

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scientific and technical terminology, invariably characterized by artificiality and fragmentation. After all, what is a term? A technical term is always somewhat artificial insofar as either the word itself is artificially formed or—​as is more frequent—​a word already in use has the variety and breadth of its meanings excised and is assigned only one particular conceptual meaning.136

A term is a word, but one that is extremely precisely defined, framed in a rigid, methodical framework, detailed in meaning, semantically separated from neighbouring lexical units. Gadamer underlines that it is not possible to “speak terminologically” or to speak using terms, which leads to the clear conclusion that while terms may fall within the framework of a broadly understood word, the word itself is a superior unit to the term. Following this track, we may state that while the word bears signs of primacy, a term always indicates a kind of secondariness in various acts of communication. Although we may use terms in colloquial or spoken language, when we do so we must strongly emphasize that they have a specific linguistic function.137 This view is much in line with what modern linguists and translators say about terms.138 Essentially, this criticism of the ancient Greeks’ achievements and of Enlightenment ideals aiming to create an artificial language oscillates around his strongly articulated disagreement with putting language in an instrumentalistic, objective framework. Importantly, Gadamer’s hermeneutics of language, emphasizing the essence of the relation between language and the whole being, is the exact opposite of the attitude that considers language to be an object. He comes to the right conclusion, stating that the perception of language as a strongly

same time, Gadamer emphasizes that Leibniz’s ideal is no more than a system of signs to mark things. Therefore, we should not understand words merely as a sign per se, because in a way that is impossible to comprehend, they are linked to the “reflected.” As Gadamer notes, Plato held similar views on the nature of the word and nowadays we may see the idea of the word as a “reflection” in contemporary linguistic concepts of the onomatopoeia phenomenon. (WuM, pp. 393–​394). 136 Gadamer, Truth, p. 415. “Ein Terminus ist immer etwas Künstliches, sofern entweder das Wort aus der Fülle und Breite seiner Bedeutungsbezüge herausgesgeschnitten und auf einen bestimmten Begriffssinn festgelegt wird” (WuM, p. 392). 137 See Gadamer, “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie” in: Kleine Schriften III, p. 243. 138 In Słownik terminologii przedmiotowej [Dictionary of Technical Terminology], we may read that the term is “a language sign (a word or a word combination) that is part of a technical vocabulary and contrasts with the words and word combinations of a general language.” See Języki specjalistyczne. Słownik terminologii przedmiotowej, ed. J. Lukszyn, Warsaw 2005, p. 131.

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autonomous component unconnected with existence makes us slowly forget what language really is: Language and thinking about things are so bound together that it is an abstraction to conceive of the system of truths as a pregiven system of possibilities of being for which the signifying subject selects corresponding signs. A word is not a sign that one selects, nor is it a sign that one or gives to another; it is not an existent thing that one picks up and gives an ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible through it. This is mistaken on both counts. Rather, the ideality of the meaning lies in the word itself. It is meaningful already.139

To Gadamer,140 the above considerations do not mean that the word should take on a primary character in relation to being. This is because within the framework of that being, we search for the right words to express the experience of existence to the fullest. The word has such a strong connection to a given thing that neither the word nor the being ultimately decide what character they take on separately, since they seem to exist only in relation to each other. However, as he repeatedly points out, the Greek philosophers did not link the word with the thing that language describes, nor did they link speech and thought. Instead, they sought to deal with onoma in a holistic way, focusing mainly on the perfection which, as they underlined, is typical of language. Thus, he considers criticism of the legitimacy and purposefulness of the names that can be read about in Cratylus as the first important step in the development of a modern theory of language, defined as a system of signs bearing the signs of perfection, which inevitably leads to covering language. However, his reflections refer to a period in history which brought out in a special way the essence of language, namely the idea of incarnation typical of Christianity.141

139 Gadamer, Truth, p. 417. “Die Sprachlichkeit liegt dem Denken der Sachen so völlig ein, daß es eine Abstraktion ist, wenn man das System der Wahrheiten als ein vorgegebenes System von Seinsmöglichkeiten denkt, dem Zeichen zuzuordnen wären, die ein nach diesen Zeichen greifendes Subjekt verwendet. Das sprachliche Wort ist kein Zeichen, zu dem man greift, es ist aber auch kein Zeichen, das man macht oder einem anderen gibt, kein seiendes Ding, das man aufnimmt und mit der Idealität des Bedeutens belädt, um dadurch anderes Seiendes sichtbar zu machen. Das ist nach beiden Seiten falsch. Vielmehr liegt die Idealität der Bedeutung im Worte selbst. Es ist immer schon Bedeutung” (WuM, p. 394). 140 WuM, pp. 393–​395. 141 WuM, pp. 393–​395.

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1.1.2. Language and the Christian Idea of Incarnation Gadamer says that the Christian idea of incarnation saved the essence of language from oblivion. Moreover, he suggests that the idea of incarnation may serve as a key to comprehending his theory of understanding,142 pointing out that Christianity stresses the transformation of God into man. However, that transformation comes with a price –​the crucifixion of the Son of God. This is already very close to an explanation of the proper doctrine of the Holy Trinity.143 According to Gadamer, the idea of incarnation in Christian thought has much in common with the nature of the word, because the explanation of the Holy Trinity is based on the links between thought and speech. As he stresses, this issue is present in medieval Christian thought, in scholastics, and in Augustinism. At this point, some separation of Christian thought from ancient Greek thought occurs. Since the word became flesh, the world around us is filled with spirituality. Thanks to this transformation, language has been subjected to deeper philosophical reflection.144 In fact, in Christian thought, contrary to the views of the ancient Greeks, the word “is happening,” and thus, as Thomas Aquinas claims: verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum.145 The articulation (vox) Verbum dei is also of great value when it comes to Christian thought and faith in revelation.146 Verbum dei finds its full dimension in language. The existence of language is a kind of miracle, for the world was 142 In Wahrheit und Methode, Gadamer devoted much space to the Augustinian concept of the “inner word” (verbum interius), using it to explain the relationship between language and understanding. See in more detail J. Arthos, The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, Notre Dame 2009. Arthos attempts a detailed exegesis of this concept, stating that by means of this metaphor –​as it actually is a metaphor –​we are able to gain an in-​depth understanding of what constitutes language and the relationship between it and man, the world and understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy. In such a case, Gadamer’s concept of the “inner word” has a direct impact on the specificity of translation: for we may consider translation to be a certain cognitive process common to all people who often, wanting to express something, experience difficulties in expressing their own thoughts. At this point, this “word,” which is sometimes difficult to articulate, brings to mind the Other present in every human being, see more extensively P. Sznajder, “Logos wyłaniający się z rozmowy. Inny a prawda w dialogu w filozofii Hansa-​Georga Gadamera,” Estetyka i Krytyka 2012, 25(2), pp. 183–​199). 143 WuM, pp. 395–​396. 144 WuM, pp. 395–​396. 145 WuM, p. 396. 146 WuM, p. 396.

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created by the Word of God. Sometimes, the Word of God places itself on a par with the transformation of God into man. But as Gadamer rightly points out, it is not about the transformation or objectification of the inner word. It is all about a mystery: the mystery of the unity of the Father, the Son, the Spirit, and the Word:147 The greater miracle of language lies not in the fact that the Word becomes flesh and emerges in external being, but that that which emerges and externalizes itself in utterance is always already a word. That the Word is with God from all eternity is the victorious doctrine of the church in its defense against subordinationism, and it situates the problem of language, too, entirely within inner thought.148

St. Augustine is critical of the outer word per se. He denies the value of sensory data and perception and states that a real word is completely independent of the senses. For it is the inner word that indicates and reveals the image of God. (In scholastics, the essence of the word actually has a lot to do with revelation or unveiling.) As Gadamer points out, the case is similar to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, where it is no longer so much about the very moment and fact of Christ’s birth and His life on Earth, but rather about the nature of His relationship with God, about how much they constitute unity.149 On the other hand, in theology, the existence of Christ may be expressed in the phenomenon verbum intellectus,150 the “word of the intellect.” Therefore, the relationship between speech and thought corresponds to the mystery and nature of the Trinity. In a way, the inner word is equated here with thinking –​this integrity brings to mind the relationship of God with the Son of God.151 1 47 WuM, pp. 396–​398. 148 Gadamer, Truth, p. 419. “Das größere Wunder der Sprache liegt nicht darin, daß das Wort Fleisch wird und im äußeren Sein heraustritt, sondern daß das, was so heraustritt und sich in der Äußerung äußert, immer schon Wort ist. Daß das Wort bei Gott ist, und zwar von Ewigkeit her, das ist die in der Abwehr des Subordinationismus siegreiche Lehre der Kirche, die auch das Problem der Sprache ganz in das Innere des Denkens einkehren läßt” (WuM, p. 397). 149 WuM, pp. 397–​398. 150 WuM, pp. 397–​398. 151 WuM, p. 398. At this point, we observe a turn in Gadamer’s deliberations as he asks a number of questions about what an inner word is and whether it exists at all, since it is not subject to “physical sound articulation.” Is it not the case that, as a result of the integrity of thinking and language, man must think in a given language in order to be able to communicate with it at all? According to Gadamer, even situations with dominating silence take on a linguistic character. Therefore, he proposes that we should seek the answer to this important question not in theology but in the “text’s

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Against this background, Gadamer refers to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, who seems to reject the integrity of the logos and verbum.152 The existence of a word that does not undergo articulation is characterized by processability and a tendency to change. However, importantly, we should not identify the inner word with elements of vernacular languages. For what one wishes to express with the inner word does not depend on the “form” in which a thought is articulated. It is also not about the phenomenon of realization. Thinking will always mean “inner speech.”153 In St. Thomas’s philosophy, the word is the “keystone” of cognition, and therefore, in a sense it shapes a specific perception of reality. This has nothing to do with the process of change. As Gadamer states: Thus, we can see how the creation of the word came to be viewed as a true image of the Trinity. It is a true generatio, a true birth, even though, of course, there is no receptive part to go with a generating one. It is precisely the intellectual nature of the generation of the word, however, that is of decisive importance for its function as a theological model. The process of the divine persons and the process of thought really have something in common.154

Demonstrating this similarity, he reflects on the differences between man’s word and the Word of God, since the mystery of the Trinity is in fact unknowable. After all, the human mind is far from being perfect, which is how it differs from the Divine. The reference here is to Aquinas,155 who gives three differences between the human word and the Word of God. First of all, the human word always refers to the multiple possibilities of expressing reality, it is the building block of an utterance, and is subject to change. Therefore, a word is brought to life by thinking (or in thinking), but once it finally comes into existence, the process of creation comes to an end. In such a situation, we may say that a given thing

view” and in the nature of the so-​called inner word. As he states, the thought typical of scholastics is of little help in this case, since an understanding of the word in scholastic terms forces us to turn again to the logos. 152 WuM, p. 399. 153 WuM, p. 398. 154 Gadamer, Truth, p. 423. “So läßt es sich verstehen, daß die Erzeugung des Wortes als ein echtes Abbild der Trinität verstanden wurde. Es handelt sich um wirkliche generatio, um wirkliche Geburt, wenngleich es hier natürlich keinen empfangenden Teil neben einem zeugenden gibt. Gerade dieser intellektuale Charakter der Erzeugung des Wortes ist jedoch für seine theologische Moellfunktion entscheidend. Es gibt wirklich etwas Gemeinsames zwischen dem Prozeß der göttlichen Personen und dem Prozeß des Denkens” (WuM, p. 401). 155 See WuM, pp. 400–​404.

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“becomes present” or manifests itself in a particular word. Aquinas compares this situation to the phenomenon of a mirror: the word “reflects” the object in an almost perfect way. Second, the human word, unlike the Word of God, is imperfect: the expressive abilities of the “human word” have clear limitations. However, the reason for this situation is the characteristic imperfection of the human spirit, because the word, at least in theory, is meant to translate into the “medium of articulation” what the human spirit wishes to express. Furthermore, there is only one Word of God –​and in this unity, and at the same time, in this integrity, which is unprecedented anywhere, lies the Word’s uniqueness. On the other hand, human words are multiple and this multiplicity fully reveals how large the mind’s cognitive limitations are. There is also a third difference between the human word and the Word of God. Namely, God makes a word a kind of medium that lets Him express His nature and substance. Simultaneously, every thought that man calls to existence and every word that comes with that thought reflects only the situation in which man finds himself at a given moment of articulation. In fact, man is only able to glance at reality, but he certainly cannot grasp it in a holistic way –​as God does.156 In his reflections, Gadamer gives great value to verbum theology.157 It is primarily about different interpretative optics. In this sense, the created word is understood as the mind’s product, and yet it has a lot of spirit. The inner word, leading to the inseparability and integrity of thinking and speaking, effaces the possibility of creating a word automatically and without deep reflection on the process itself. Thus the formation of such a word is not accompanied by “reflection,” because it indexically indicates what is being said by means of it or, as Bronk points out, “the creation of words does not happen through reflective acts.”158 The word is closely linked to the “view of the articulation process,” the thing to which it refers. Consequently, a word enables the creation of a specific “vision” of the world in the human mind. It reveals the veil of cognition and, to some extent, triggers the process of reaching concrete conclusions about reality. Moreover, the dynamics of the relationship between the unity and multiplicity of words is also of importance here. We should keep these characteristics in mind both in the case of the human word and in the case of the Word of God: The difference between the unity of the divine Word and the multiplicity of human words does not exhaust the matter. Rather, unity and multiplicity are fundamentally in

1 56 WuM, pp. 401–​402. 157 WuM, pp. 403–​404. 158 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 298.

How Did the Concept of “Language” Form in Western European Thought? 57 dialectical relationship to each other. The dialectic of this relationship conditions the whole nature of the word. Even the divine Word is not entirely free of the idea of multiplicity. It is true that the divine Word is one unique word that came into the world in the form of the Redeemer; but insofar as it remains an event—​and this is the case, despite the rejection of subordinationism, as we have seen—​there is an essential connection between the unity of the divine Word and its appearance in the church. The proclamation of salvation, the content of the Christian gospel, is itself an event that takes place in sacrament and preaching, and yet it expresses only what took place in Christ’s redemptive act. Hence it is one word that is proclaimed ever anew in preaching. Its character as gospel, then, already points to the multiplicity of its proclamation. The meaning of the word cannot be detached from the event of proclamation.159

Thus, the meaning of a word is of a procedural nature. To illustrate this idea, Gadamer gives the interesting example of curses –​they always occur in a specific situational context. We do not understand a curse as an abstract sense of a given statement, but as the very process of expressing the curse. In order to truly gain understanding of the curse, a person must be “immersed” in a given situation and, above all, understand it. The human word, which is an event conceptualized by means of speech, functions similarly.160 So far, however, these considerations have not exhausted the problem of language. It is necessary to look at conceptualization, which is the aspect that makes language meaningful.

159 Gadaner, Truth, p. 426. “Vielmehr haben Einheit und Vielheit ein von Grund auf dialektisches Verhältnis. Die Dialektik dieses Verhältnisses beherrscht das ganze Wesen des Wortes. Auch vom göttlichen Wort ist der Begriff der Vielheit nicht ganz fernzuhalten. Das göttliche Wort ist zwar wirklich nur ein einziges Wort, das in der Gestalt des Erlösers in die Welt gekommen ist, aber sofern es doch Geschehen bleibt –​ und das ist trotz aller Ablehnung der Subordination, wie wir sahen, der Fall –​, so besteht damit eine wesenhafte Beziehung zwischen der Einheit des göttlichen Wortes und seiner Erscheinung in der Kirche. Die Verkündigung des Heils, der Inhalt der christlichen Botschaft, ist selbst ein eigenes Geschehen in Sakrament und Predigt und bringt doch nur das zur Aussage, was in der Erlösungstat Christi geschehen ist. Insofern ist es ein einziges Wort, von dem doch immer wieder in der Predigt gekündet wird. Offenbar liegt in seinem Charakter als Botschaft bereits der Verweis auf die Vielfalt seiner Verkündigung. Der Sinn des Wortes ist vom Geschehen der Verkündigung nicht ablösbar” (WuM, pp. 403–​404). 160 WuM, p. 404.

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1.1.3. Language and the Conceptualization Process –​Gadamer’s Reflections on the Achievements of Nicholas of Cusa As Gadamer states in the section dedicated to the conceptualization process: “When the Greek idea of logic is penetrated by Christian theology, something new is born: the medium of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event achieves its full truth.”161 Therefore, it was Christian theology that laid the foundations for an anthropology that binds the human spirit to God’s infinity. This combination is where we may find the fullest dimension of the hermeneutical experience.162 Emphasizing the conditions of conceptualization to which language is invariably subjected, Gadamer underlines that the meaning of words is intrinsically linked to a particular environment and situational context, or to the concretization (realization) of a communication act. Thanks to that it is possible to speak about the semantic multidimensionality of lexical units. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider that it is context which determines the meaning of a given statement. A word is created in a new form that best reflects the specific circumstances of a given situation. Thanks to the constant process of conceptualization, the language “lives” and goes through successive stages of development and new manifestations.163 Referring to a novum in the theological findings of the Middle Ages,164 Gadamer emphasizes the processuality of the word: a relatively innovative aspect in relation to Platonic dialectics. In Plato’s view, logos finds its place within the aforementioned dialectic, with an absence of interpretation. Thus, for Gadamer, the problem of language could only arise when a new, previously absent element was added to the relationship between Aristotle’s philosophy and Christian thought, namely, the community of the creation moment (Schöpferischen). This is the essence of the position taken by Nicholas of Cusa.165 As Gadamer states,166 uttering individual words in order to refer to certain things may be considered a natural primitive conceptualization, but it is different 161 Gadamer, Truth, p. 427. “In der Mitte der Durchdringung der christlichen Theologie durch den griechischen Gedanken der Logik keimt vielmehr etwas Neues auf: Die Mitte der Sprache, in der sich das Mittlertum des Inkarnationsgeschehens erst zu seiner vollen Wahrheit bringt” (WuM, p. 405). 162 WuM, p. 405. 163 WuM, p. 405. 164 WuM, p. 411. 165 See more on it in: WuM, p. 411. 166 WuM, p. 412.

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from scientific conceptualization. The conceptualization corresponds to the current human need and the characteristics of a given communication act. It is no exaggeration to say that it is the circumstances of place and time that largely determine what words a person uses in a given situation. In this sense, the general meaning of a word is often determined by the so-​called additive qualities.167 Gadamer wonders why this issue was ignored in the so-​called Latin Middle Ages. He explains it by first pointing to the dominant Latin used by scholars at the time and, second, to the influence of Greek teachings about logos. The change in the perception of natural language used in everyday communication was not really noticed until the Renaissance, when Latin had ceased to dominate and national languages gained primacy.168 Furthermore, he explains the problem of language in the Renaissance by the fact that the Greek-​Christian legacy was still placed on a pedestal at that time, as is visible in the views of Nicholas of Cusa.169 In Nicholas’s work we may see the essence of diversity and the creative potential of national languages; at the same time we may avoid an instrumentalistic perception of language.170 The expressions characteristic of each language correspond to some extent to a specific communication situation, with each word being accurate –​though not always. Each word is accurate as long as it “aptly” defines a given situation in which the word appears, but it is not always possible to express a given thing with it. It all boils down not only to the semantic multidimensionality of the word, but also to the diversity of conceptualization, i.e. the different perceptions of the world revealed linguistically171 or the different ways of seeing the same universe. As Bronk rightly states,172 Nicholas of Cusa saw the “compatibility of all languages” in the so-​called verbum naturale. Therefore, it is necessary to realize that human language is characterized by far reaching imperfection and finiteness. Gadamer sees great inspiration in Nicholas’ views, because in his philosophy we may find acceptance for many ways of looking at the world. This is why language can never be described as a perfect creation. Of course, human cognition is inextricably linked to language, but language itself is undeniably

1 67 WuM, p. 412. 168 WuM, pp. 412–​413. 169 WuM, pp. 412–​413. 170 WuM, p. 413. 171 WuM, pp. 412–​414. 172 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 299–​300.

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intertwined with reality, which is perceived differently depending on the historical, social, and cultural perspective important for Gadamer’s philosophical system.173 Notably, Mensch und Sprache clearly states that only Enlightenment thinkers took the issue of language seriously. At that time, philosophers stopped referring to the Bible and started seeking answers about the nature of language in man. This moment is of great historical importance when it comes to the perception of language, bringing us to Gadamer’s reflections on the philosophy of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who saw that the anthropocentricity of language is in fact the linguality of anthropocentrism.

1.2. Language and Hermeneutical Ontology 1.2.1. Gadamer’s References to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Findings Gadamer sees Humboldt as the founder of the modern philosophy of language. He includes Humboldt among those philosophers who emphasized the special role of language in its anthropocentric dimension,174 but he also immediately underlines175 that in order to properly assess him, one must be wary of the exaggerations characteristic of Humboldt’s contrastive analyses. Humboldt emphasized the close relationship between individuality and general nature: “Together with the feeling of individuality, a sense of atotality is given as well, and so the study of the individuality of linguistic phenomena is itself intended as a means of insight into the whole of human language.”176 According to Gadamer, Humboldt states in his reflections that languages are the result of a specific spiritual force that man operates. For where there is language, there is also a natural power that is realized in language. Perhaps this is where we should look for the unity of language with the human individual who uses it. Humboldt, who promotes the idea of perceiving language as a special image of the world, not only in single individuals but also in local communities and nations, turns to the aforementioned spiritual power that enables the differentiation of languages.

1 73 WuM, p. 300. 174 Gadamer, “Mensch und Sprache,” p. 94. 175 WuM, p. 415. 176 Gadamer, Truth, p. 437. “Mit dem Gefühle der Individualität ist ihm immer das Ahnen einer Totalität gegeben, und so ist die Vertiefung in die Individualität der sprachlichen Erscheinungen seler ls ein Weg zur Einsicht in das Ganze der menschlichen Sprachverfassung gemeint” (WuM, pp. 415–​416).

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Humboldt treats this spiritual power –​or spiritual strength –​as an inherent feature of language. Hence the differences in the perception of the world by representatives of different communities. According to Gadamer, Humboldt thus leans toward the principles of Enlightenment thought, for during this period all manifestations of individualism were interpreted in terms of truth and perfection. Furthermore, linguistic diversity fits in perfectly with Leibniz’s monads.177 Gadamer highly values Humboldt’s achievements.178 Although the power of language is enormous and immeasurable, man has a prominent place in this relationship, for we create language and language creates us. In this vision of language, the freedom to use linguistic means is significantly limited. Each language has within it a pre-​established structure of what has already been said in the past. This view seems to have had great influence on Gadamer’s understanding of tradition. Man cannot completely free himself from this understanding of language, which is passed on to him in the process of education and upbringing. Any changes in the use of language happen on the basis of those forms we come across at birth. Language cannot escape the past179: “In language conceived as form, Humboldt was still able to perceive the historical life of the mind. To base the phenomenon of language on the concept of a linguistic faculty gives the concept of inner form a special legitimacy justified by the historical vicissitudes of the life of language.”180 This had significant implications for Gadamer’s concept of language, in which the historical aspect plays an important role. Gadamer refers to Humboldt’s concept of language also in light of his own reflections on the hermeneutical experience. Humboldt’s views on language, accordingly, are only an abstraction, which in hermeneutical ontology should be looked at from a completely different perspective: “Verbal form and traditionary

1 77 Gadamer, Truth, p. 437. 178 At the same time, we should emphasize that despite the great merits of Humboldt’s philosophy, Gadamer states that even in this case Aristotle’s thought is second to none. Although Humboldt’s research allows us to look at the phenomenon of language from a completely different perspective and emphasizes the significance of man, an important limitation in Humboldt’s philosophy was the reduction of language to a cognitive ability man is born with. (Gadamer, Mensch, pp. 94–​95). 179 WuM, p. 417. 180 Gadamer, Truth, p. 438. “Die Begründung des Phänomens der Sprache auf den Begriff der sprachlichen Kraft gibt dem Begriff der inneren Form eine eigene Legitimation, die der geschichtlichen Bewegtheit des Sprachlebens gerecht wird” (WuM p. 417).

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content cannot be separated in the hermeneutic experience.”181 Thus, even if each language is treated separately as a reflection of a certain worldview, we should not close ourselves within this methodology to specific, single, historically and geographically determined languages, but rather open ourselves to the content spoken in each of them. Accepting the unity of language and all that we express through it makes the problem discussed here appear in a completely different light. Gadamer, denying the primacy of form, recalls Humboldt’s example concerning the learning of a foreign language, stating that what Humboldt considers to be a limitation is, in fact, one way to realize the hermeneutical experience: It is not learning a foreign language as such but its use, whether in conversation with its speakers or in the study of its literature, that gives one a new standpoint “on one’s previous worldview.” However thoroughly one may adopt a foreign frame of mind, one still does not forget one’s worldview and language-​view. Rather, the other world we encounter is not only foreign but is also related to us. It has not only its own truth in itself but also its own truth for us.182

Paraphrasing this, it is not the learning of individual words or grammatical structures that makes a person a foreign language user. This label rather comes down to the way in which the words and sentence structures are used and how, through them, a person learns a different image of the world, which of course includes the person’s place in the cultural system of a given language area. In the course of his deliberations, Gadamer speaks about man’s attitude toward literature written in a foreign language.183 The world experienced through the prism of such a literary message cannot lead only to the acquisition of new knowledge. When entering the literary world revealed in the medium of a foreign language, the reader, unlike a philologist, does not only focus on language per se. In order to understand the content, the reader “penetrates” the world

181 Gadamer, Truth, p. 417. “Sprachliche Form und überlieferter Inhalt lassen sich in der hermeneutischen Erfahrung nich trennen”(WuM, p. 417). 182 Gadamer, Truth, p. 439. “Nicht die Erlernung einer fremden Sprache als solche, sondern ihr Gebrauch, sei es im lebendigen Umgang mit dem fremden Menschen, sei es im Studium der fremden Literatur, ist es, was einen neuen Standpunkt »in der bisherigen Weltansicht« vermittelt. Auch wenn man sich noch so sehr in eine fremde Geistesart versetzt, vergißt man nicht darüber seine eigene Welt-​, ja seine eigene Sprachansicht. Vielmehr ist die andere Welt, die uns da entgegentritt, nicht nur eine fremde, sondern eine beziehungsvoll andere. Sie hat nicht nur ihre eigene Wahrheit in sich, sondern auch eine eigene Wahrheit für uns”(WuM, p. 418). 183 WuM, p. 418.

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depicted in a book.184 Likewise, a person cannot understand a message when the subject is unfamiliar to him or her, which is usually the case when reading something for the first time.185 In this sense, as Gadamer emphasizes, learning a foreign language helps to broaden one’s cognitive horizons, gain additional knowledge and extend it in a given area, and ultimately to open oneself to other ways of seeing the same world. These issues, as will be shown, have important implications for Gadamer’s vision of translation. So what, then, is the hermeneutical experience? Well, it seems to be a situation of opening oneself to the content expressed in language. Importantly, understanding invariably boils down to the detailing –​the positioning –​of the understood content against the background of one’s own interpretative insights, including one’s own image of language.186 In other words, understanding –​to be discussed in more detail later –​is assimilating what the text is about. Therefore, it is not language that is subject to understanding; it is only the medium in which understanding occurs. For language always hides a certain content behind it, and it is this content that is subject to the process of understanding. Gadamer sees great value in Humboldt’s idea of a linguistic worldview for the development of hermeneutical issues.187 The essence of Humboldt’s language comes down to linguistic energeia, the linguistic process of life. We may also consider Humboldt’s reflections as an anthropologization of language, since he saw language as human from its very beginnings. But what does the statement that languages are images of the world mean? Let us look at Gadamer’s interpretation: language occupies a primary position, autonomous of the linguistic community to which it belongs. On the other hand, members of that community establish themselves in a given relationship to the world and thus adopt concrete behaviors and convictions about the surrounding reality. Therefore, this growing into a linguistically rooted community means at the same time assimilating certain patterns for perceiving the world. In its original form, the human nature of language means nothing less than that human functioning is linguistically conditioned.188 Language enables man to live in the world, but on the other hand, the existence of the world implies the existence of language. The relationship is mutual and equal. Although language as a being is independent, it exists insofar 184 This conclusion brings to mind contemporary literary studies conducted in a cognitive spirit. 185 WuM, p. 418. 186 WuM, p. 418. 187 WuM, p. 419. 188 WuM, p. 419.

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as it makes it possible to look into a given image of the world and understand it, and the world exists insofar as it is described and expressed in language. As Bronk aptly points out, Humboldt’s views are a starting point for “developing the thesis that the world is given to individuals only in language.”189 From this, we move on to the way Gadamer understands the relationship between language and the world.

1.2.2. Language in Relation to the World and the Individual’s Environment Starting his reflections on the relationship between language and the world, Gadamer utters these famous words: “Welt haben.”190 What do they mean? Language is a place where “world presents itself; a place, where man can meet a given being, it is also a place, where one can refer to the world.”191 However, for this to be possible, one must first of all distance oneself from what is happening in this world –​for it conditions possession of both the world and language.192 Gadamer distinguishes between two concepts: Welt (world) and Umwelt (environment or surroundings).193 He devotes much attention to this distinction, hence it is worth recalling its main points. For Gadamer, Umwelt is the so-​called milieu. Moreover, he emphasizes that this concept was originally used only to refer to the environment in which man lived and was strongly connected with. Furthermore, he underlines the sociological dimension of this concept, explaining that in a broader sense, the Umwelt may equally well refer to any living being. In such a case, the Umwelt would be defined as the set of conditions to which an entity is subject. This is important, because it reveals a clear difference between humans and other living creatures. For, unlike other beings, man in a way “possesses the world,” to some extent controls it, can (to some extent) take possession of it, and has reference to it. In a sense, these other beings are placed in this world but are not as closely connected to it as people are. Bronk is right to note that this leads us to “identification of language with the world.”194 Thus, where there is language, there is the world and vice versa: where there is

1 89 Cf. Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 300. 190 WuM, p. 419. 191 Compare with K. Gurczyńska-​Sady, W. Sady, Wielcy filozofowie współczesności, Kęty 2012, p. 80. 192 WuM, p. 419. 193 WuM, pp. 419–​420. 194 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 334.

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the world, there is language. Man has the power to create his own environment, while animals function in the world unintentionally, without having any influence on it.195 In this respect, Gadamer distinguishes one more difference between humans and animals. Man, unlike other living beings, is free when referring to his environment –​free when he speaks a language and when he refers to that language. But what does this freedom mean? As he states, it means that man not only frees himself from certain obligations that functioning in the world imposes on people, but also from the names of certain objects or things, given after all by people.196 In other words, man has the freedom to create his own linguistically established world. Unlike animals, man is not “supinely” or involuntarily placed in this world, but can evaluate, carry out evaluation activities, call “in his own way” what he sees and experiences: he can understand and interpret this world. In this sense, the expressions ‘to have a language’ and ‘to have a world’ merge.197 For the world exists only insofar as it is mediated by language, and thus insofar as language acts as a mediator. Thus, we may speak of the existence of a language only if it constitutes a specific medium in which that world can appear, and thus in which the world can be understood at all.198 As a special negotiator in the relationship between man and the world, language also indicates that only those things that can be expressed linguistically exist. According to Gadamer, it is natural that there are so many different languages in the world. Since the individual is freed both from the world and from language, this means that he or she is free to use the latter; for if a person has freedom in the causative, interpretative construction of the world, he or she gains freedom in relation to the linguistic means used: “Man’s freedom in relation to the environment is the reason for his free capacity for speech and also for the historical multiplicity of human speech in relation to the one world.”199 Individuals can 195 In Mind and World, J. McDowell also speaks about this topic in an interesting way. McDowell believes that animals, not having the ability to conceptualize the environment in which they live, cannot therefore in any way position themselves in the world although they are able to react to what is happening around them. Thus, in spite of this responsiveness, animals –​unlike humans –​exist in the environment (surrounding) and not in the world per se. See J. McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge 1994, pp. 116–​117. 196 WuM, pp. 419–​420. 197 WuM, pp. 419–​420. 198 WuM, p. 324. 199 Gadamer, Truth, p. 441. “Mit der Umweltfreiheit des Menschen ist seine freie Sprachfähigkeit überhaupt gegeben und damit der Grund für die geschichtliche

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always free themselves from their environment and thus express their linguistic competence in a variety of ways. In the light of this, how should we understand Gadamer’s expression: Erhebung über die Umwelt?200 In different words it means Erhebung zur Welt, therefore going out to the world, opening up to it. For man, this means opening up to new possibilities, to a new point of view, to understanding both oneself and others –​even the Other in ourselves. Moreover, it is also to take a different position toward a given environment, to see it from a different perspective, and to keep a loose distance from it. It is noteworthy that going beyond one’s surroundings invariably has a linguistic character: “For language is a human possibility that is free and variable in its use.”201 Once again, this statement shows the apparent autonomy of language understood as being from a world constituted on a linguistic basis. At this point, Gadamer touches upon the important issue of the variability and instability of language. This means that language exhibits a feature of variability in itself, thus it is not only about the diversity of languages, but also about the nature of language, i.e. the same thing may be expressed in a given language in different ways. This is important in the case of translation, to be discussed later. It is also true even in exceptional situations, as Gadamer describes them; for example in the case of deaf people, whose language replaces speech produced by certain sounds and phonemes.202 We should not forget that in the language process, the states of things are equally unstable, because single words often illustrate changes in the priorities and values that guide people. Referring to M. Scheler’s essay,203 Gadamer gives an example of the word “virtue” (Tugend), which nowadays clearly has an ironic element to it. Therefore, words often symbolize changes in the mentality of society; they exemplify how language images form values. The same is true of poetry, where we often have to try to verify what is actually happening in the reality around us. As he goes on to state, this is possible because language must be understood as a factor that shapes the relationship between man and the world.204 Neither the world nor language is an object of their “activity:” they are Mannigfaltigkeit, mit der sich das menschliche Sprechen zu der einen Welt verhält” (WuM, p. 420). 200 WuM, p. 421. 201 Gadamer, Truth, p. 442. “Denn Sprache ist eine in ihrem Gebrauch freie und variable Möglichkeit des Menschen”(WuM, p. 421). 202 WuM, p. 421. 203 WuM, p. 425. 204 WuM, p. 425.

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factors that can only coexist together. So it is appropriate to recognize that the use of language both shapes and presents our reference to the world, though at the same time the environment in which we find ourselves in a given situation profoundly influences how we articulate this world. Everything in the world is “immersed” in language. In this sense, we may also identify language with a kind of game as one of the main elements or motives of ontological explication. The game is not in the consciousness of the person playing, instead it draws the player in. Which means that the game controls the participant.205 The same applies to language. At this point it is worth highlighting Gadamer’s references to Wittgenstein’s language games. Language is also a media game, involving players in its scope of activity. People who talk to each other “play a given language,” which may in a way exist thanks to this game.206 As with any game, a conversation is characterized by a kind of lightness, randomness, freedom, creative potential –​new words appear, old words may disappear, various meanings and senses are also visible.207 In Gadamer’s philosophy, we cannot understand a game like language in terms of concrete, purposeful action, because the game dominates over the players: This suggests a general characteristic of the nature of play that is reflected in playing: all playing is a being-​played. The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the game masters the players. Even in the case of games in which one tries to perform tasks that one has set oneself, there is a risk that they will not “work,” “succeed,” or “succeed again,” which is the attraction of the game. Whoever “tries” is in fact the one who is tried. The real subject of the game (this is shown in precisely those experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the player but instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself.208

2 05 WuM, p. 104. 206 Notably, Gadamer recognizes conversation as a perfect example of language becoming reality. A language exists as long as it serves the realization of an agreement, and therefore only in conversation. It is in fact the conversation that allows the language to reveal its existence. 207 See Gadamer, Zur Problematik des Selbstverständnisses in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, pp. 70–​81. 208 Gadamer, Truth, p. 106. “Es läßt sich von da aus ein allgemeiner Zug angeben, wie sich das Wesen des Spieles im spielenden Verhalten reflektiert: alles Spielen ist ein Gespielt-​ werden. Der Reiz des Spieles, die Faszination, die es ausübt, besteht eben darin, daß das Spiel über den Spielenden Herr wird. Auch wenn es sich um Spiele handelt, in denen man selbstgestellte Aufgaben zu erfüllen sucht, ist es das Risiko, ob es‚ geht, ob es‚ gelingt und ob es‚ wider gelingt, was den Reiz des Spieles ausübt. Wer so versucht, ist in Wahrheit der Versuchte. Das eigentliche Subjekt des Spieles (das machen gerade

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The game concept is proposed as a leitmotif of conversation. The game is a kind of stir, which is essentially the overriding element in this case: In a sense, the “I” of the player is lost in this stir. The game has a certain primacy over its participants and draws them into its own rhythm. The same is true in a conversation. Moreover, the game and conversation are similar in many ways: Those who cannot do that we call men who are unable to play. Now I contend that the basic constitution of the game, to be filled with its spirit –​the spirit of bouyancy, freedom and the joy of success –​and to fulfill him who is playing, is structurally related to the constitution of the dialogue in which language is a reality. When one enters into dialogue with another person and then is carried along further by the dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person, holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative. Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in the dialogue and elicits statement and counterstatement and in the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue has succeeded, one is subsequently fulfilled by it, as we say. The play of statement and counterstatement is played further in the inner dialogue of the soul with itself, as Plato so beautifully called thought.209

At this point, he again refers to the specific translation of the contact with reality into dialectically colored human thinking. The game –​like a conversation, and therefore a certain specific way of reaching understanding/​agreement –​is the foundation of human existence. Man plays by interacting with the world and entering into its metaphorical reading. Furthermore, man is always immersed in this game. As it seems, we always play the game through contact with what may be read in one way or another. The world, the text, and the interlocutor invite us

solche Erfahrungen evident, in denen es nur einen einzelnen Spielenden gibt) ist nicht der Spieler, sondern das Spiel selbst. Das Spiel ist es, was den Spieler im Banne hält, was ihn ins Spiel verstrickt, im Spiele hält” (WuM, pp. 101–​102). 209 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” p. 66. “Solche Leute, die das nicht können, nennen wir Menschen, die nicht spielen können. Nun meine ich: die Grundverfassung des Spiels, mit seinem Geist –​dem der Leichtigkeit, der Freiheit, des Glücks des Gelingens –​erfüllt zu sein und den Spielenden zu erfüllen, ist strukturverwandt mit der Verfassung des Gesprächs, in dem Sprache wirklich ist. Wie man miteinander ins Gespräch kommt und nun von dem Gespräch gleichsam weitergetragen wird, darin ist nicht mehr der sich zurückbehaltende oder sich öffnende Wille des Einzelnen bestimmend, sondern das Gesetz der Sache, um die es im Gespräch geht, und die Rede und Gegenrede hervorlockt und am Ende aufeinander einspielt. So ist man dort, wo ein Gespräch gelungen ist, nachher von ihm, wie wir sagen, erfüllt. Das Spiel von Rede und Gegenrede spielt weiter fort im inneren Gespräch der Seele mit sich selber, wie Plato so schön das Denken genannt hat” (G.-​H. Gadamer, Mensch und Sprache, pp. 98–​99).

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to play the game. In a conversation –​just like in a game –​what is not objectified and therefore, what is possible in many versions, is transformed into what is objectified and therefore, what is revealed, produced.210 These words about the dialectics of interpretation indirectly confirm this statement: “the word that interpretatively fits the meaning of the text expresses the whole of this meaning –​ i.e., allows an infinity of meaning to be represented within it in a finite.”211 According to Gadamer, regardless of tradition, history, and cultural conditions, the world is always constituted and determined linguistically. Language is an all-​ embracing interpretation of the world, which cannot be replaced by anything else. For people, the world is always a universe that has already been linguistically interpreted and which will be subject to continuous, endless interpretation. Coming into the world and learning to function in it, man gets a concrete reality, shaped by means of language. In this sense, it is necessary to understand his statement about man’s original openness to the world and the fact that, even while learning our mother tongue we are already stuck in it before we utter our first word.212 In this respect, the linguistic world of a particular individual plays a crucial role. Gadamer writes that it embraces everything a person can reach out to, confirming, at least to some extent, the existence of linguistic relativism, because he clearly states that it is obvious that people who have been brought up in a particular linguistic-​cultural tradition perceive the surrounding reality from a different perspective than those who grew up in another environment. Despite these differences, however, the world always remains human and therefore structured and linguistically determined. This means that each such world is open to different points of view,213 to a different vision of reality, although these different visions are also linguistically constituted. Therefore, these worlds are not hermetic but accessible to people from other cultures and traditions. But what does ‘Welt an sich’ mean in the light of these

210 I owe this thought to Oziębłowski’s text “Granica czy most? O funkcjach rozumienia w hermeneutyce H.-​G. Gadamera,” Diametros 2006, 10, pp. 65–​77. 211 Gadamer, Truth, p. 461. “Weil das Wort, das den Sinn des Textes auslegend trifft, gas Ganze dieses Sinnes zur Sprache bringt, also eine Unendlichkeit des Sinnes in sich zur endlichen Darstellung kommen läβt” (WuM, p. 441). 212 Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte, p. 239. 213 At the same time, we should emphasize after Przyłębski that Gadamer is not inclined in his philosophy to linguistic relativism in the sense that the he does not equate the “multiplicity of languages” with the “multiplicity of worlds” but rather with the “multiplicity of linguistically conditioned references to one world” (Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 56).

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considerations? We must understand it such that thanks to positive changes in our experience of the world, the “image” of the world expands. This happens regardless of the language spoken by the community since language is universal in Gadamer’s view. It is not about the fact that next to these images of the world we can place another world, superior and existing objectively; hence, it does not seem to be about the distinction between subjective worlds and one objective world.214 In Gadamer’s vision of language, we will not find a division into the so-​called real world and the metaphysically and epistemologically idealistic worlds corresponding to different perceptions. His point is that since the world is linguistically structured, there is a unique opportunity to include in one’s own image of the world a “part” of another image –​a fragment of the reality in which the conversation partner functions. In other words, there is an opportunity to intersubjectively “scan” the situation in which the other person remains, and thus, to simultaneously enter another world. This new world determined by language enables people to shape their experiences. As Gadamer accurately states –​emphasizing the linguistic nature of human functioning –​language does not “reflect” how shaped and structured the being in its entirety is. Instead, it is our human experience that is shaped according to linguistic concretization.215 Gurczyńska-​Sady and Sady rightly emphasize that the world is multifaceted, which matches the nature of language characterized by a “multi-​perspective” character.216 To a large extent, such an interpretation of language resembles Wierzbicka’s view that there is one reality, which “deflects in different ways” in different languages.217 Gadamer summarizes his reflections: “We have, then, a confirmation of what we stated above, namely that in language the world itself presents itself.”218 Experiencing the world in terms of language encompasses the whole of being, including even what eludes cognition. This does not lead to objectification of the world through language and in language, because it is the horizon of language that encompasses with its scope the subject of cognition.219

2 14 WuM, pp. 423–​424. 215 WuM, p. 433. 216 Gurczyńska-​Sady, Sady, Wielcy filozofowie, p. 81. 217 Wierzbicka, O języku –​dla wszystkich, Warszawa 1965, p. 179. 218 Gadamer, Truth, p. 446. “So bestätigt sich im ganzen, was wir oben feststellten: in der Sprache stellt sich die Welt selbst dar” (WuM, p. 426). 219 WuM, p. 426.

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1.3. Language in Relation to Understanding and Cognition Gadamer opposes perceiving language from the point of view of Greek ontology –​taking into account both the eleatic concept of being and the Greek thought and philosophy of Plato –​and considers it unreasonable to look at it only from the perspective of speaking or, in other words, uttering. He writes that we may speak of language as being only in the context of conversation or, more precisely, in the realization of an understanding (Verständigung), in the sense of coming to an understanding, an agreement with someone. In a way, understanding becomes identified with conversation, and thus, as discussed above, with the game. However, he also warns that we cannot reduce understanding to a deliberate action, because it needs no tools to be realized.220 Understanding is a life process specific to the language community.221 In this sense, it is no different from the understanding realized by other living beings. Gadamer considers the language man uses to be a unique process –​especially since linguistic understanding results in the opening of a “world” that “binds” beings communicating with each other.222 Language communities use the language of conversation: it is in conversation –​not in the semantic-​syntactic rules –​that language finds its fullest dimension.223 Conversation, then, is a paradigmatic model of language, or more precisely: a model of language use.224 In accord with Gadamer’s views, artificial systems of communication –​e.g. the language of mathematical symbols –​cannot be called languages, since these systems do not form a linguistic community. Using such a language, apparently, does not require the human factor.225 Unlike artificial, “mechanical” systems, or creations, the existence of a linguistic community means that it requires constant communication among its representatives. Understanding, thus, is a sine qua non of human existence: The object of understanding is not the verbal means of understanding as such but rather the world that presents itself to us in common life and that embraces everything about which understanding can be reached. Agreeing about a language is not the paradigmatic

2 20 WuM, pp. 421–​22. 221 WuM, p. 422. 222 WuM, p. 422. 223 On rules of language and their practical aspects in communication see Davidson, Truth, Language, and History, Oxford 2005, pp. 107–​152. 224 More on this see Urbaniak, Hermeneutyka a kierunki myśli, p. 127. 225 Moreover, the idea of an artificial, pure language always requires the use of natural language –​the one that is used on a daily basis. See Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte, p. 239.

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Gadamer’s Concept of Language case but rather a special case –​agreeing about an instrument, a system of signs that does not have its being in dialogue but serves rather to convey information.226

Moreover, Gadamer opposes the idea that the process of using language is conscious. After all, he emphasizes, language “hides” behind what is explicably being said.227 The language “disappears” behind the articulated content, becomes invisible, and is by no means a tool by which consciousness would communicate with the surrounding world. Thus, thought comes to the fore and behind it we can only see the existence of a language that is a manifestation of our understanding of the world. This idea determines the specificity of hermeneutics and the way hermeneuticists approach language.228 Gadamer is quite critical of the instrumentalistic understanding of language229 and emphasizes its holistic imaging as a specific whole (or “subject”),230 which does not always serve the purpose of typically scientific cognition. We will gain very little if we perceive language only in its formal categories.231 Accordingly, language exists only in conversation and ceases to function outside it. Language shapes human consciousness and influences our world view. In a way, we are “immersed” in language –​ it determines our essence. So talking about it in purely formal terms is unjustified in hermeneutical philosophy. At this point, it is worthwhile to refer to the language of poetry, philosophy, or art, repeatedly cited by Gadamer, and thus address the issues that remain “covered” by language. In this matter, he also sees the meaning of hermeneutics, which, unlike linguistics, reveals the implicit: those elements that are not explicitly given.232 When emphasizing the hermeneutics-​specific link between 226 Gadamer, Truth, p. 444. “Es ist die Welt, die sich uns im gemeinsamen Leben darstellt, die alles umschließt, worüber Verständigung erzielt wird, und nicht etwa sind die sprachlichen Mittel für sich selbst Gegenstand derselben. Verständigung über eine Sprache ist nicht der eigentliche Fall einer Verständigung, sondern der Sonderfall einer Vereinbarung über ein Instrument, ein Zeichensystem, das nicht im Gespräch sein Sein hat, sondern als Mittel zu Informationszwecken dient” (WuM, p. 423). 227 WuM, p. 382. 228 WuM, p. 366. 229 WuM., pp. 380–​81. 230 Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, p. 305. 231 WuM, p. 382. 232 See Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik.” At this point, we should mention that Gadamer is aware of the fact that objective research on language is justified, but it is not enough to fully capture the language problem. Therefore, he does not deny the sense and essence of linguistics and the methodology of linguistic research, but stresses the urgent need to complement them with a reflection on language from

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the linguistic form and content transmitted by language, he underlines the essence of the hermeneutical phenomenon and questions contemporary linguistic theories.233 In his philosophy, language functions in a much more complex way. Bronk points out that Gadamer, opposing a subjective and instrumentalistic approach to language, criticizes primarily “semiotic and logical” concepts that reduce language and its function to a tool of cognition and a set of formal signs.234 Gadamer refers to the issue as follows: Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it has done its service. That is not the same as when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their use let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over against the world and, as it wore, grasp after a tool of understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own. We grow up, and we become acquainted with men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn to speak. Learning to speak does not mean learning to use a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts us.235

a hermeneutical perspective. Moreover, the third part of Wahrheit und Methode, devoted to the hermeneutical ontology of language, states emphatically, by criticizing the scope and potential of the sciences of language: “Nor does comparative linguistics, which studies the structure of languages, have any nonlinguistic point of view from which we could know the in-​itself quality of what exists and for which the various forms of the linguistic experience of the world could be reconstructed, as a schematized selection, from what exists in itself—​in a way analogous to animal habitats, the principles of whose structure we study” (Gadamer, Truth, p. 449.) “Ebensowenig kennt aber auch die vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft, die die Sprachen in ihrem Bau studiert, einen sprachfreien Standort, von dem aus das Ansich des Seienden erkennbar wäre und für den die verschiedenen Formen sprachlicher Welterfahrung als schematisierende Auswahl aus dem Ansichseienden rekonstruierbar würden –​ analog den Lebenswelten der Tiere, die man nach ihren Bauprinzipien erforscht. Vielmehr liegt in jeder Sprache ein unmittelbarer Bezug auf die Unendlichkeit des Seienden” (WuM, p. 429). 233 WuM, p. 381. 234 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 305. 235 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” pp. 62–​63. “Die Sprache ist überhaupt kein Instrument, kein Werkzeug. Denn zum Wesen des Werkzeuges gehört, daß wir seinen Gebrauch beherrschen, und das heißt, es zur Hand nehmen und aus der Hand legen, wenn es seinen Dienst getan hat. Das ist nicht dasselbe, wie wenn wir die bereitliegenden Worte einer Sprache in den Mund nehmen und mit ihrem Gebrauchtsein zurücksinken

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This notes an extremely important aspect of language acquisition. He does not agree that –​as is sometimes done –​we should treat the first word spoken by a child as “the ‘original’ language of creation.”236 He repeatedly draws attention to the fact that a person settles into a language just as into the surrounding world. This brings to mind Heidegger’s statement that speech not only hides a being, but is also a place where every human being can seek refuge.237 Acknowledging Aristotle, Gadamer states that it is extremely difficult for us to understand how it is possible to acquire language. Man is not able to capture this phenomenon in a temporal way. He emphasizes that the acquisition of language is similar to the accumulation of general knowledge, which expands thanks to memory and experience.238 As Przyłębski interestingly puts it, for man, language acquisition is “preontology –​the first structuring of the surrounding world which is to be further enriched, for example by learning foreign languages.”239 Thought and cognition are secondary to what constitutes the linguistic world.240 We may understand it in such a way that while learning to speak, we not only become “familiar” with the world, but we also learn the world. According to Gadamer,241 the awareness does not prove that language exists, although it certainly determines its presence. However, it cannot be said that language is a “building block” of an individual’s awareness. This issue is explained by stating that man is not aware of speaking. The consciousness of using language appears only in exceptional cases when, for example, a given word seems incomprehensible or

lassen in den allgemeinen Wortvorrat, über den wir verfügen. Eine solche Analogie ist deshalb falsch, weil wir uns niemals als Bewußtsein der Welt gegenüber finden und in einem gleichsam sprachlosen Zustand nach dem Werkzeug der Verständigung greifen. Wir sind vielmehr in allem Wissen von uns selbst und allem Wissen von der Welt immer schon von der Sprache umgriffen, die unsere eigene ist. Wir wachsen auf, wir lernen die Welt kennen, wir lernen die Menschen kennen und am Ende uns selbst, indem wir sprechen lernen. Sprechen lernen heißt nicht: zur Bezeichnung der uns vertrauten und bekannten Welt in den Gebrauch eines schon vorhandenen Werkzeuges eingeführt werden, sondern es heißt, die Vertrautheit und Erkenntnis der Welt selbst, und wie sie uns begegnet, erwerben” (Gadamer, Mensch, pp. 95–​96). 236 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” p. 63. (Gadamer, Mensch, p. 96). 237 M. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in: Basic Writings: Nine Key Essays, plus the Introduction to Being and Time, trans. David Farrell Krell (London, Routledge; 1978), p. 208. 238 Gadamer, Mensch, p. 96. 239 Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 53. 240 See WuM, pp. 375–​381. 241 Gadamer, Mensch, p. 97.

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when it makes us laugh.242 However, in such situations, language is not fulfilling its proper, hermeneutical functions, because its purely formal features have come to the fore.243 Gadamer underlines the inseparable link between thinking and language and gives primacy to the universality revealed in the process of learning the world. In other words, this inseparable relationship is a close relationship of understanding and interpretation,244 to be discussed in the last chapter of this work. He is interested not so much in how to articulate our experiences using “a particular language, but how much, in the multitude of ways of speaking, the unity of thinking and speaking that enables the understanding of both the written text and the oral message reveals.”245 Language, then, is the “nucleus of the system,” though it may seem that language means do not often reflect human cognitive capabilities. The inability to find a word to describe a given phenomenon is an almost universal situation, affecting each of us and related to the “duality of the word”246 inherent in language. However, this does not imply any restrictions in the sphere of intellect. Gadamer emphasizes that language is de facto the language of the intellect, because it seems to define and co-​create man’s cognitive potential. In other words, language is what we are able to perceive and comprehend, for as we exist, we read what the being says to us.247 Even if linguistic expression has its limitations, it is active only in the realm of conventional means used to articulate thoughts on a given topic, the so-​called schematic, commonplace ways of talking about something. But human reason is able to deal with this issue effectively.248 Therefore, he confirms the link between understanding and language. Whenever man strives to articulate his thoughts as accurately as possible, language reveals its unlimited possibilities.249

242 We may assume that this might also refer to the situation of translating a text into another language. 243 Gadamer, Mensch, p. 97. 244 WuM, pp. 378–​79. 245 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 318. 246 See P. Sznajder, “Logos wyłaniający się z rozmowy. Inny a prawda w dialogu w filozofii Hansa-​Georga Gadamera,” Estetyka i Krytyka 2012, 25(2), p. 186. 247 H.-​G. Gadamer, J. Grondin, Dialogischer Ruckblick auf das Gesammelte Werkund dessen Wirkungsgeschichte in: H.-​G. Gadamer, J. Grondin, Gadamer Lesebuch, Tübingen 1997, p. 286. 248 WuM, pp. 378–​79. 249 WuM, pp. 378–​79.

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Gadamer’s Concept of Language While we live wholly within a language, the fact that we do so does not constitute linguistic relativism because there is absolutely no captivity within a language –​not even within our native language. We all experience this when we learn a foreign language, especially on journeys insofar as we master the foreign language to some extent. To master the foreign language means precisely that when we engage in speaking it in the foreign land, we do not constantly consult inwardly our own world and its vocabulary. The better we know the language, the less such a side glance at our native language is perceptible, and only because we never know foreign languages well enough do we always have something of this feeling. But it is nevertheless already speaking, even if perhaps a stammering speaking, for stammering is the obstruction of a desire to speak and is thus opened into the infinite realm of possible expression. Any language in which we live is infinite m this sense, and it is completely mistaken to infer that reason is fragmented because there are various languages. Just the opposite is the case. Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of our being, which is evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite dialogue is opened in the direction of the truth that we are.250

It is not, therefore, the specific language that determines the will to communicate, but the content that the interlocutor wants to communicate, even if, as Gadamer stresses, there are infinite possibilities for expression. This infinitude takes on an interesting form in his philosophy: it does not just refer to the possibility of articulating the essence of things in many ways in one’s mother tongue, but enables the interlocutor to use other languages, known as foreign languages.

250 Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” trans. D. E. Linge, in: Contemporary Hermeneutics, ed. J. Bleicher, London 1980, p. 139. “Aber obwohl man ganz in einer Sprache lebt, ist das kein Relativismus, weil es durchaus kein Gebanntsein in eine Sprache gibt –​auch nicht in die eigene Muttersprache. Das erfahren wir alle, wenn wir fremde Sprachen lernen, und besonders auf Reisen, sofern wir die fremde Sprache einigermaβen beherrschen, und eben das heiβt, daβ wir nicht immerfort mit dem Blick auf unsere Welt und ihr Vokabular innerlich sozusagen nachschlagen, wenn wir uns in dem fremden Lande sprechend bewegen. Je besser wir die Sprache können, desto weniger ist solch ein Seitenblick auf die Muttersprache fühlbar, und nur weil wir fremde Sprachen nie genug können, fühlen wir etwas davon immer. Aber es ist gleichwohl bereits ein Sprechen, wenn auch vielleicht ein stammelndes, das wie alles echte Stammeln das Gestautsein eines Sagen-​Wollens und daher ins Unendliche der Aussprachemöglichkeit geöffnet ist. In dem Sinne ist jede Sprache, in der wir leben, unendlich, und es ist ganz verkehrt, zu schlieβen, weil es die verschiedenartigen Sprachen gibt, gibt es eine in sich zerklüftete Vernunft. Das Gegenteil ist wahr. Gerade auf dem Wege über die Endlichkeit, die Partikularität unseres Seins, die auch an der Verschidenheit der Sprachen sichtbar wird, öffnet sich das unendliche Gespräch in Richtung auf die Wahrheit, das wir sind” (Gadamer, “Die Universalität,” p. 230).

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This conclusion can inspire optimism, as it encourages the search for solutions in our pluralistic world clearly symbolized by the wobbly Tower of Babel. Of course, the question remains: to what extent is an object cognisable to an interpreter? Notably, in Text und Interpretation, Gadamer clarifies the meaning of his famous statement “Being that can be understood is language.” He explains that existence eludes full understanding,251 that it is not the given object that is subject to the process of understanding but the content of that object transmitted through language. Thus, we may conclude that in his hermeneutical philosophy, the linguistic form has everything that one wants to understand and that one can understand.252 As Przyłębski states, this does not mean that “the only thing people try to understand is a specific language, but rather that in the process of understanding, the reality around people becomes meaningful for them and becomes the meaning, i.e. language.”253 Gadamer emphasizes that language is a medium in which understanding is carried out and all the issues touching upon strictly linguistic expressions are closely related to problems of understanding.254 Since everything that exists is subject to understanding, we may conclude that language is what exists (what is), but moreover, language helps us understand anything. Following this track, we may say that men do not pay attention to the

251 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” in: Text und Interpretation, Hrsg. Philippe Forget, München 1984, p. 29. 252 In Hermeneutyczny zwrot filozofii, Przyłębski argues that Gadamer’s famous claim: “Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist sprache” should be translated as: “byt, który można rozumieć, jest językiem” (Being that can be understood is language). Thus, he departs from the Polish translation by Baran: “Bytem, który może być rozumiany, jest język” (Language is a being that can be understood). Przyłębski justifies his decision with the argument that Baran’s translation may lead to the erroneous conclusion that a “ready-​made” language is subject to understanding as a kind of entity. The point is that everything that can be understood has a linguistic nature and is predetermined by language. It is worth mentioning, after Przyłębski, that Gadamer’s pupil and friend, Fritz Paepcke, the “founding father” of modern hermeneutical theory in translation, used the term Werden, not Sein. Therefore, the translation of Gadamer’s claim in question would have been: “byt, który może zostać rozumiany, staje się językiem” (Being that can be understood becomes a language). See Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, pp. 175–​176). It is worth referring to Gadamer himself, who, in his conversation with Grondin, specified that, in saying these words, he did not mean that everything is language, but that everything we understand may be defined as language. Cf. H.-​G. Gadamer, J. Grondin, Dialogischer Ruckblick, p. 286). 253 Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 60. 254 WuM, p. 366.

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incomprehensible;255 men do not pay attention to what eludes linguistic form. As Urbaniak rightly says, in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, verbality is the center of a specific interdependence between the “understanding subject and the understood world,”256 which expresses a kind of unification of the understood and the entity willing to understand.257 In this sense, as further emphasized by Urbaniak, Gadamer opposes the representatives of structuralism, since language in a hermeneutical sense remains a “dynamic and infinite process of living discourse.”258 Finally, it is worth quoting Gadamer’s important metaphor which he employs to describe the universality of language: Rather, everything that is, is reflected in the mirror of language. It is in this mirror, and only there, that we encounter something that we do not encounter anywhere else because it is what we are (not just what we mean and know about ourselves). In the end, language is not a mirror at all; nor is what we perceive in it a reflection of our and all being, but it is rather the interpretation and expression of what is happening with us, both in terms of real dependencies of work and domination and in terms of everything else that composes our world. Language is not an ultimately found anonymous subject of all social-​historical processes and actions, one which would offer itself together with all its activities and objectivations to our observing gaze, but it is a game [Spiel] in which we all participate. No one takes precedence of the rest. The game is already and always “on” and everyone has to make a move.259

2 55 Pawliszyn, Skryte, p. 25. 256 Urbaniak, Hermeneutyka a kierunki, p. 124. 257 I owe this thought to the reading of M. Oziębłowski, Granica czy most? 258 Urbaniak, Hermeneutyka a kierunki, p. 124. 259 “Im Spiegel der Sprache reflektiert sich vielmehr alles, was ist. In ihm und nur in ihm tritt uns entgegen, was uns nirgends begegnet, weil wir es selber sind (nicht bloß das, was wir meinen und von uns wissen). Am Ende ist die Sprache gar kein Spiegel, und was wir in ihr gewahren, keine Widerspiegelung unseres und allen Seins, aondern die Auslegung und Auslebung dessen, was es mit uns ist, in den realen Abhängigkeiten von Arbeit und Herrschaft so gut wie in allem anderen, das unsere Welt ausmacht. Sprache ist nicht das endlich gefundene anonyme Subjekt aller gesellschaftlich-​ geschichtlichen Prozesse und Handlungen, das sich und das Ganze seiner Tätigkeiten, Objektivationen unserem betrachtenden Blick darböte, sondern sie ist das Spiel, in dem wir alle mitspielen. Keiner vor allen anderen. Jeder ist ‘dran’ und immerfort am Zuge” (Gadamer, “Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik,” pp. 242ff).

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1.4. Gadamer’s Reflections on Language and the Translation Process Gadamer’s views on the translation process are part of his philosophy of language and are also very closely related to it; furthermore, the translation process itself belongs to the language act. His thoughts on translation often result from his in-​depth reflection on the essence of language, as a kind of space in which translation can become reality. Moreover, in the case of the translation act, it is not possible to separate things from the language; there is true translation only when a translator captures linguistically the thing shown to him or her by the source text.260 In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, a translation cannot exist without language, because in a way the latter gives the act of translation an ontological meaning. Furthermore, all understanding –​inseparable from the process of translating texts –​can be realized only in the medium of language. Problems arising from the articulation of meaning in a given language are invariably connected with the problems of understanding a text:261 The essential relation between language and understanding is seen primarily in the fact that the essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language, so that the preferred object of interpretation is a verbal one.262

Thanks to the language transfer, a meeting such as translation can take place. Another event that can occur is conceptualization of the diversity inherent in the culture in which the source text was created. In Wahrheit und Methode, language is a kind of “guide” that makes it possible to understand Gadamer’s hermeneutical ontology.263 We may also say that language symbolizes here a “window” to the hermeneutical world of translation –​which is just how it functions in his hermeneutics. The “nucleus” of his hermeneutical theory is the basis of contemporary hermeneutics of translation.264 Therefore, in a book about translation and

2 60 WuM, p. 364. 261 WuM, pp. 366–​367. 262 Gadamer, Truth, p. 391. “Der Wesensbezug zwischen Sprachlichkeit und Verstehen zeigt sich zunächst in der Weise, daß es das Wesen der Überlieferung ist, im Medium der Sprache zu existieren, so daß der bevorzugte Gegenstand der Auslegung sprachlicher Natur ist” (WuM, p. 367). 263 L. K. Schmidt, “Language in a Hermeneutic Ontology,” in: Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, ed. by L. K. Schmidt, Lanham-​Boulder-​New York-​Oxford 2000, p. 1. 264 See R. Stolze, “The Translator’s Approach.”

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especially about translator competences, it seems necessary to show the translation act from the perspective of the linguistic interpretation of the world. There is no doubt that the translation process requires the translator to deal with at least two distinct languages on many levels. D. J. Schmidt rightly points out265 that translation tools are of little use if the translator does not understand both languages, which in this case we should understand as acquaintance with living speech. When translating, the translator somehow turns to the language, opening up to it and its specific properties, which involves “listening carefully to the specific sound of the language.”266 Schmidt, thus, sees the role of language in translation from a hermeneutical perspective: Languages are the bearers of history and of memory. In what we say language carries into the present a residue of the past and how words have been understood and heard. Language also carries its own peculiar history in itself. It does this in the roots of words and in the way words come into being. Words arise out of other words and in response to the effort to say something. In short, no word is insulated from either its own or its culture’s past. This means of course that languages are never innocent, but always mementoes of a culture and of a history that has been spoken and written… One sees then how the translator must confront the largest dimensions of language and in this confrontation we are reminded of the full scope of language. A simple word can carry a large and long history. This means that to attend to language, to bring it forward –​the first task of hermeneutic theory –​is to wake up to the profound and inescapable force of history in language. A further consequence of this is that one realizes that different languages can belong to different histories and so historical frictions, as well as historical connections, enter into every translation. Here the great expanse that opens up with language becomes evident.267

From this perspective, language in the translation process is, in a way, the “main actor” of the whole project, making it possible to achieve understanding/​ agreement. For the translator, one of the main aims of the translation is to place the meaning he or she understands in a specific situational context. At the same time, Gadamer warns against distorting the sense. The translator’s task is to preserve that sense and convey what the source message is about, but –​because this sense is to be understood in a different “linguistic space” –​the translator has to express the message in a completely different way, putting the same thing in a different language dimension.268 265 D. J. Schmidt, “Text and Translation” in: The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. by J. Malpas, H.-​H. Gander, Oxon-​New York 2015, p. 349. 266 Schmidt, “Text and Translation,” p. 349. 267 Schmidt, “Text and Translation,” p. 349. 268 WuM, p. 362.

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As Schmidt aptly observes, the effort a translator makes to translate a text from a foreign language into his mother tongue must necessarily boil down to an in-​depth reflection on the nature of the language, also in a contrastive perspective.269 In this peculiar confrontation between two languages, the translator should understand what language is, what possibilities it offers, and what its limitations are. A single word may refer to the historical-​cultural content built into it, which is why it is so important for the translator to take into account the history of the language, how it is “embedded” in history,270 and its speculation and occasionality. Words have no stable meaning, as their use is born out of a changing situational context. In the process of translation, “language comes out of hiding, revealing the extent of its existence”: this is what hermeneutical theory seeks to do, namely, to show that language in fact “hides behind the horizon of speaking and reading.” Each translation is a meeting with the language and its relation to history –​with how it opens the translator to effective history, and with how it closes him or her to it. Therefore, it makes us aware that language is in fact a network of connections between the contemporary and the past.271 The translation process does not involve the translator “pulling out” specific language resources as if from a set of specific elements, because the language is alive –​the concretization of the translator’s historical consciousness.272 Gadamer does not approach language in terms of the conventionally conceived linguistic competence usually mentioned by modern translation scholars. Rather, the knowledge of both languages –​in the case of translation –​is something absolutely natural and necessary, a prerequisite for hermeneutical conversation. It seems Gadamer does not consider it appropriate to discuss this issue in detail. Whoever wants to translate has to know both languages in which he or she is translating –​there is no doubt about that. He stresses that the understanding of a language does not yet mean real, factual, authentic understanding; understanding a language is a more process-​oriented phenomenon, a “factor in action” or even a means to an end. In fact, to understand a language is to understand the Other, both within me and in front of me during the conversation. The hermeneutical problem concerns not the correct knowledge of a given language, but agreement on a given matter which the medium of language enables.273 We

2 69 270 271 272 273

Schmidt, “Text and Translation,” p. 349. Schmidt, “Text and Translation,” p. 349. Schmidt, “Text and Translation,” p. 351. WuM, p. 367. WuM, p. 362.

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should note the novelty of such statements in the context of translation theory of the time, when the so-​called linguistic approach to the process of translation dominated and researchers focused primarily on purely linguistic analyses, rather than the text per se. Although Gadamer does not specify what knowledge of the language means, analysis of his deliberations allows us to conclude that the translator’s task is to translate the text back into living speech. This phrase –​and the phrase “living language” –​appears quite often in his works. So how should we understand it in the context of the translation process, and especially in the light of the concept of translator competence? First of all, it seems that a living language is the translator’s use of those stylistic, rhetorical, and lexical means that help reduce the impression of the target audience that they are dealing with an artificial creation which sounds unnatural in the target language. As Gadamer emphasizes, no text will reach the recipient if the language used by the translator does not “reach” him; if, as it seems, this language does not prove familiar to the reader. Therefore, the translator’s task is to find the right language, or more precisely, the right linguistic means to reach the potential addressee. Otherwise, the translation becomes dead. One might say it turns into an ineffective creation meaning nothing to the reader, telling nothing.274 The text should speak to the reader, evoke images and thoughts, open him up to multiple readings of the same content, be heard by him, establish a specific relationship with him –​it must always be received by someone. At the same time, this transposition of a text written in living speech indicates the situational nature of the contexts of language use –​in other words, it indicates that it is not only language that is infinite, but also that the interpreter, through the use of living speech, can transcend himself and thus be able to transcend a text. For we may say that living speech infinitely reveals what it is always embedded, stimulating multiple readings –​the infinity of living speech leads to an infinity of meaning and an infinity of interpretation.275 This conclusion is related to the second dimension of the concept. Living speech also means the process of getting lost, the slow disappearance of language in the translation process and the transformation of particular linguistic means into the generality of the thing being communicated. Of course, this task becomes 2 74 WuM, p. 375. 275 I owe this conclusion to A. M. Olson’s Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophyof Karl Jaspers, The Hague-​Boston-​London 1979, p. 174. Referring to the phenomenon of living speech, Olson uses an interesting play on words: he claims that it is in living speech that we observe “the unfolding of the enfolding.”

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quite difficult because, when translating, the translator goes beyond the linguistic sphere, and at the same time, paradoxically, stays on its surface. Gadamer refers several times to situations when, due to the lack of this living language, a translated text is simply impossible to read. Therefore, indirectly, he points out that the translator must have some specific linguistic competence in order to be sensitive to the linguistic nuances or harmonic tones of the language,276 and emphasizes that linguistic issues should be the least important in the process of reaching understanding.277 At this point, more and more often we are dealing with translations that make it difficult to understand the message: The famous formula by Benedetto Croce says: traduttore –​tradittore. Every translation is like a betrayal. How could it not be evident for such a polyglot as the great Italian aesthetician –​or for someone like me, a hermeneutist, who has learned all his life to pay attention to the overtones and undertones of languages. Over the years one becomes more and more sensitive to partial and fragmentary approximations of the truly living language that we witness in translations. They prove hard to endure and even harder to understand.278

The aspect pointed out above is very interesting. It concerns the low quality of translations, making clear that today’s translators increasingly lack any deep reflection on the nature and essence of language, on its fundamental feature, i.e. on its liveliness, which at the same time stands for its compatibility with the historical patterns, conventions, and norms in force at a given time, referring equally to vocabulary, stylistics, and grammar. One more fragment from Gadamer’s work is useful here, where he complains about the shape that some translations take:

2 76 See Gadamer, Lesen ist wie, p. 279. 277 Gadamer emphasizes that only unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement on a given matter should lead to a linguistic analysis and to the restoration of the literal sound of the text. However, it should be an exceptional situation, motivated by specific communication conditions. Gadamer, Text, p. 37). 278 “Ein berühmtes Wort von Benedetto Croce sagt: »Traduttore-​traditore. « Jede Übersetzung ist wie ein Verrat, Wie sollte das der Mann nicht wissen, der so polyglott war, wie der bedeutende italienische Ästhetiker –​oder wie jeder Hermeneutiker, der sein Leben lang auf die Nebentöne, die Ober-​und Untertöne von Sprachen zu achten gelernt hat. Oder wie jemand, der auf ein langes Leben zurückblickt. Man wird mit den Jahren immer empfindlicher gegen die Viertels-​und Halbannäherungen an wirklich lebendige Sprache, die als Übersetzungen begegnen. Man findet sie immer schwerer zu ertragen und obendrein immer schwerer zu verstehen” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Lesen ist wie…, p. 279).

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Gadamer’s Concept of Language For the despair of translation lies in the fact that the unity of viewpoint that a sentence possesses in its own language does not permit its being arranged in the corresponding order of sentence parts in the target language. To do so produces the dreadful sentences we often find in translated books: letters without spirit [Buchstaben ohne]. What is missing that necessarily constitutes the very nature of language is that there is a word being offered by the other person, a word that calls forth other words, so to speak, that themselves hold open the continuation of the speaking.279

Here, Gadamer clearly draws attention to the incompetence of translators whose lack of translation skills or uncareful treatment of the task they face leads to products of very poor quality. The texts are translated mechanically, without creative finesse, without awareness of the critical location of a given message. Living language and living speech are absent in such texts. Moreover, there is no fluidity or dynamism –​features that characterize the language itself. A competent translator has language skills that enable selection and combination of lexical and stylistic means in such a way that the target text “reaches” its recipients without causing difficulties in understanding the message, so that the source language “does not attract attention.” Although the language of translation is by nature already “alienated” from the original language and is rarely as precise or adequate –​after all, languages do not reflect anything in the mirror; the differences between them do not allow for a full rendering of all the harmonic tones mentioned by Gadamer –​we may speak of the certain linguistic awareness that every competent translator should display. We can assume that certain pillars reflected in some aspects of language support this awareness.

1.4.1. Aspects of Language Gadamer distinguishes three aspects of language. First of all, it is self-​forgetting. Living speech functions as if beyond the self-​awareness of one’s own grammar, specific language structures, etc. As Gadamer writes:

279 Gadamer, “Language and Understanding,” in Gadamer Reader, p. 106. “Denn darin liegt das ganze Elend des Übersetzens, daß die Einheit der Meinung, die ein Satz hat, sich durch die bloße Zuordnung von Satzgliedern zu den entsprechenden Satzgliedern der anderen Sprache nicht treffen läßt und daß so diese gräßlichen Gebilde zustande kommen, die uns im allgemeinen in übersetzten Büchern zugemutet werden –​ Buchstaben ohne Geist. Was dort fehlt und allein Sprache ausmacht, ist, daß ein Wort das andere gibt, ein jedes Wort von dem anderen Worte sozusagten herbeigerufen wird und seinerseits selber den Fortgang des Redens weiter offen hält” (Gadamer, “Sprache und Verstehen,” in: Gadamer, Gessamelte Werke 2, p. 197).

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Hence one of the peculiar perversions of the natural that is necessary for modern education is that we teach grammar and syntax in our own native language instead of in a dead language like Latin. A really gigantic achievement of abstraction is required of everyone who will bring the grammar of his native language to explicit consciousness.280

Somehow, in the process of speaking, the language is lost –​it “hides” behind what has been said or expressively articulated in the conversation. “Language is language when it is a pure actus exercitus; that is, when it is absorbed into making what is said visible, and has itself disappeared, as it were.”281 To illustrate this situation in more detail, Gadamer recalls the case of learning a foreign language and the nature of sentences illustrating certain grammatical phenomena included in standard textbooks. While these constructions often turned out to be completely meaningless and abstract, there has been a certain improvement in more recent books. Nowadays, authors of textbooks try to smuggle additional cultural knowledge into the sentences, which creates a certain side effect: instead of concentrating on a given structure, the student directs more attention to the cultural information provided.282 The second interesting case of a language that self-​forgets in a given communicative act is a private situation from Gadamer’s life: It was at the time when my daughter learned how to write. She was doing her homework and asked me: “How do you spell ‘strawberry’? After my reply, she noticed thoughtfully: “It’s so funny. When I hear it that way, I no longer understand the word. It is only when I forget this that I can be inside the word again.283

280 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” in: Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. D. E. Linge, University of California Press 1977, p. 64. Daher gehört es zu den eigentümlichen Perversionen des Natürlichen, daß die moderne Schule genötigt ist, Grammatik und Syntax, statt an einer toten Sprache wie dem Latein, an der eigenen Muttersprache beizubringen. Eine wahrhaft riesige Abstraktionsleistung, die von jedem verlangt wird, der die Grammatik der Sprache, die er als seine Muttersprache beherrscht, zu ausdrücklichen Bewußtsein bringen soll” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Mensch, p. 97). 281 Gadamer, “The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,” p. 126 “Die Sprache ist Sprache dann, wenn sie reiner actus exercitus ist, d. h. wenn sie im Sichtbarmachen des Gesagten aufgeht und selber gleichsam verschwunden ist” (H.-​ G. Gadamer, Die philosophischen Grundlagen, p. 146). At this point, we should consider the relationship between Gadamer’s considerations and the concept of speech acts –​this issue certainly deserves to be studied in depth. 282 Gadamer, Mensch, p. 97. 283 “Ich habe einmal an meiner kleinen Tochter folgende Beobachtung gemacht: als sie schreiben lernte, fragte sie eines Tages bei den Schularbeiten: »Wie schreibt man Erdbeeren?« Es wurde ihr gesagt, und sie meinte nachdenklich: »Komisch, wenn ich

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This means that the more the language becomes a living speech, the lower the awareness of the applied grammatical structures and lexical units. As we may conclude, language exists only when it communicates something, when it creates a common world of human life –​one that encompasses all possible elements of tradition and historical heritage. For Gadamer, “The real being of language is that into which we are taken up when we hear it –​what is said.”284 This means that the text interpreter does not turn to the word as a fully autonomous and separable unit. In this sense, the word is not a specific tool of expression, but its first principle. This corresponds to the special relationship between language and translator. The translator –​aware of the essence of language understood in this way –​applies a holistic approach and turns to living speech. Let us once again recall what distinguishes this phenomenon. First of all, living speech is a language in action, born in a specific communicative situation, completely “at the mercy” of the interlocutors. It is a “fitted” language, constantly “adapting” to the situation. Second, in the context of translation, living speech is the language the translator should use freely, creating a target text that will resonate with the world known to the recipient of the translation. In an ideal situation, as Gadamer often says, the interpreter should not play the main role but disappear into the message. An authentically formulated translation, which may be described as living speech, makes the target audience focus not on single linguistic elements of the translation but on the sense emerging from the content being read. Of course, one exception could be for example a discussion about lyrical poetry. A translation characterized by living speech means that it is always “directed at some ‘you.’ ”285 It brings the source text to life, captivates the reader, and covers up the language, which becomes forgotten and blurred in the process of reading.286 Since living speech presupposes the presence of a listener, das so höre, verstehe ich das Wort überhaupt nicht mehr. Erst wenn ich es wieder vergessen habe, bin ich in dem Worte drin.« Drinsein im Worte, das ist in der Tat die Weise, wie wir reden” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte als…, p. 244). 284 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” p. 65. “Das eigentliche Sein der Sprache ist das, worin wir aufgehen, wenn wir sie hören, das Gesagte”(Gadamer, Mensch, p. 98). 2 85 Cf. P. Sznajder, Logos wyłaniający się z rozmowy, p. 185. 286 This is not the first time that we may discover a number of contradictions in Gadamer’s philosophy. If we understand only what is language, then we should conclude that in a translational context, living speech produces language and thus enables understanding. Therefore, we may describe what the target audience understands as language, and in such a perspective living speech would be the sine qua non of the situation of reaching an agreement between the translator and the reader of the translation.

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translation invariably means translating to “you.” At the same time, assuming the presence of a “you” implies the inalienable dialog of the translation process. Of course, the understanding that the reader achieves by participating in the reading of the target text occurs through language, but this does not constitute the decisive factor. Language is merely a bridge –​although as a bridge it also points to a borderline aspect287 –​connecting the author of the initial text with the target audience. It is a bridge that enables understanding and agreement. The translator’s goal is not for the reader to understand the language but rather the message coded in the language. This means that language becomes the intermediary between the partners of a hermeneutical conversation. An ideal translation is the living speech of the original “filtered” by the translator and directed at an assumed recipient. Furthermore, the disappearance of language in translation is connected with the aspect of interpreting a linguistic text which –​if it is authentic –​must “disappear.” Entering into a kind of Wittgensteinian language game, the translator has to play it in such a way as to make all traces of interpretative effort disappear. For during the game, all the translation activities annul each other. A second characteristic of language closely related to the first is the issue of its subjectivity. Gadamer states that in this case, the subject is not the so-​called “I.” To speak means always to address a particular person. Bakhtin states the issue accurately: Understanding itself enters the dialogue system as a dialogue factor and in a way changes the total meaning of the system. … Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth), whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses. It is the “second party.”288

For this reason, it is of great importance that the message be understandable and legible. In a way, saying always means clarifying and making sense. Hence, what follows is not only a pragmatic adaptation of the statement to the addressee’s situation, but also a clear way of expressing oneself. This idea is closely related to Gadamer’s metaphysics of beauty and light, from the last section of the third part of Wahrheit und Methode, devoted to the universal phenomenon of hermeneutics: “like everything meaningful, the beautiful is einleuchtend (‘clearly

2 87 See Oziębłowski, Granica. 288 M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis,” in: Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. V. W. McGee, ed. C. Emerson and M. Holquist, Austin 2010, p. 77.

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evident,’ ‘shining in’)”289. Einleuchtend, however, does not mean the certainty of the judgment, but rather specific suggestions that seem most appropriate under given circumstances: “The idea is always that what is evident has not been proved and is not absolutely certain, but it asserts itself by reason of its own merit within the realm of the possible and probable.”290 If the given suggestions or arguments are evident, it means that something points to them –​that there is a factor that makes us formulate a given thing precisely the way we do.291 Comparing the specificity of brightness to beauty, Gadamer remarks an element of “surprise”, not in the sense of the unexpected, but rather in relation to broadening perspectives, to the possibility of “shedding light” on an area subject to interpretation and understanding –​like a lonely light beam that lets us learn and understand more.292 This phenomenon takes place at a particular moment, so we may refer to it as a specific event when interpreters “comprehend” the situation in which they find themselves: when in the face of the infinite word, they have to decide on one concrete solution; when they have to face their own human finiteness. We may also transfer this statement to the process of creating a written message, when the clarity of the statement indicates its ability to broaden the recipient’s horizon, i.e. the ability to create access to an in-​depth interpretation of a given fragment and direct the reader to the message’s meaning. The utterance is invariably meant to serve something. To Gadamer, using a language that is difficult to understand, and not motivating the utterance, means the same as not talking at all: “The word should be the right word. That, however, does not mean simply that. It represents the intended object for me, but rather, that it places it before the eyes of the other person to whom I speak.”293 This statement reveals the essence of his concept of language, namely, that language realizes its fullness in conversation: whether the one we conduct with ourselves or the one we conduct with another person. An incomprehensible language leads to a lack of any communication, to a lack of speaking and therefore to the lack

289 Gadamer, Truth, p. 479. “Wir sprachen davon, daβ das Schöne wie alles Sinnvolle einleuchtend’ist” (WuM, p. 460). 290 Gadamer, Truth, p. 479. “Es wird dabei immer mitgedacht, daβ das Einleuchtende nicht bewiesen und nicht schlechthin gewiβ ist, sondern sich innerhalb des Möglichen und Vermutlichen als ein Vorzügliches zur Geltung bringt” (WuM, p. 460). 291 Gadamer, Truth, p. 479. 292 Gadamer, Truth, p. 479. 293 Gadamer, “Man and Language,” p. 66. “Das Wort will das treffende Wort sein, das aber heißt nicht nur, daß es die gemeinte Sache mir selbst vorstellet, sondern daß es sie dem anderen, zu dem ich spreche, vor Augen stellt”(H.-​G. Gadamer, Mensch, p. 98).

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of a living speech.294 According to Przyłębski, language described in such a way cannot be “approached from the modern perspective of subjectivity,” because language –​worth emphasizing once again –​belongs to the “We” sphere. The realness of language is the “realness of pneuma –​the spirit connecting the people talking,” who try to reach agreement/​understanding “by agreeing on a common language in the medium that is not given.”295 The third aspect of language is its universal character.296 According to Gadamer, everything in the world is subject to articulation, because language is all-​embracing –​man is always in it –​i.e. in the language. Moreover, man is not able to look at the world outside of language.297 It influences the way we think about the world and how we perceive it. It also implies that every conversation is in fact a never-​ending hermeneutical phenomenon. From a purely physical point of view, though, a conversation cannot last forever. Nevertheless, paradoxically, it can never end or be interrupted, because it can always start again, from a different point of view, in a different situational context, and so on. Hence, Gadamer asks, when does a statement become understandable –​when does it make sense? The answer is that the sense appears when the unspoken –​the linguistically covered element –​is understood along with what has been said, i.e. was at the forefront. A properly motivated question makes it possible to obtain an answer. If we want to understand something, we need to know where the question comes from, what its motivation is.298 Gadamer concludes that therefore, a conversation is full only in a particularly understood exchange of questions and answers.299 This constitutes the truth about language, about its essence.300 How should we 294 However, we should note that Gadamer opposed not only to the individualization of language, but also its conventionalization. As Gadamer claims, a person who cannot escape the “chains” of linguistic conventions loses control over the language and, as a result, becomes silent (See Gadamer, Semantik, p. 253). 295 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot filozofii, p. 176. 296 Noteworthy, Gadamer’s universality of language is closely connected with the universality of understanding itself. 297 See Sołtysiak, “Uniwersalność i granice języka według H.-​ G. Gadamera,” in: Hermeneutyczne dziedzictwo filozofii, eds. H. Mikołajczyk, M. Oziębłowski, M. Rembierz, Kraków 2006, pp. 75–​92. 298 Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte, p. 242. 299 Gadamer, Mensch, p. 99. 300 Cf. M. Urbaniak, Hermeneutyka a kierunki myśli współczesnej. Rozumienie kultury w filozoficznej hermeneutyce, filozofii przyrody i (post)strukturalizmie, Kraków 2014, p. 162.

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understand this in the context of the translation process? Well, translated words contain not only meaning, but also everything that is different –​everything that constitutes the expression and strength of the translator’s living speech. Gadamer rightly emphasizes that, in a way, every act of speaking and every statement invites us to participate in them, to continue them. Thus, translation is also infinite: the same text may always be translated in a different way, using different linguistic means, while still focusing on the message’s meaning: “It is just an infinite process to succeed in rebuilding the feeling and content of the foreign speaker into the feeling and content of one’s own language. It is a never completed self-​conversation of the translator with himself.”301 We may conclude that this conversation is the most powerful essence of the true interpretation that man makes in his encounter with the world. At the same time, the universality of language indicates the enormous difficulties that every person experiences when striving to “put it into words.” In order to express what we think about, we must first enter a hermeneutic conversation with our own “I” –​with the Other who is within me, with that inner word that wants to “come to the surface” and be articulated. Gadamer clearly expresses his scepticism about this by stating that, “in fact, we will never be able to say that which we wish to express.”302 This observation is intrinsically linked to his statement that we will never really know and understand ourselves. Language is also referred to as a universal creation because it cannot be separated from two other hermeneutical issues: understanding and interpretation. It seems that language, in order for it to be language at all, must be at the same time the element that is understood and the one that is to be interpreted. As Gadamer writes: Understanding and interpretation are related to verbal tradition in a specific way. But at the same time they transcend this relationship not only because all the creations of human culture, including the nonverbal ones, can be understood in this way, but more

301 Gadamer, “Boundaries of Language” (qtd. after Language and Linguistically in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, Oxford 2000, p. 17). “Es ist eben ein unendlicher Prozeß, die Umbildung des Sprachgefühls und des Sprachinhalts des fremden Sprachers in das Sprachgefühl und die Sprachinhalte der eigenen Sprache zu leisten. Es ist ein nie ganz vollendbares Selbstgespräch des Übersetzers mit sich selbst” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Grenzen der…, p. 360). 302 “Dass wir nie das ganz sagen können, was wir sagen möchten” (Gadamer, “Europa und Oikoumene,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 10, p. 274.

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fundamentally because everything that is intelligible must be accessible to understanding and to interpretation. What is true of understanding is just as true of language.303

1.4.2. The Speculativeness of Language According to Gadamer, language expresses the verbalization of the world. Therefore, it is unlikely to provide men with an invariable articulation of their experience. It seems that, in this way, we reach the full meaning. Importantly, the constitution of what this voice gains always remains itself; that is to say, expressing a thought in “other words” does not mean that something completely different –​or a being of a different provenance –​has been born.304 To be even clearer, we may say that language makes it possible to “manifest” the things it articulates. However, the existence of the articulated thing is more stable than the existence of language. But since language cannot exclude a being, and existence/​a being cannot exclude language, they must function only in a specific cooperative. This is why, as hermeneutic philosophers often emphasize, any being that can be understood has a speculative character.305 The speculative nature of speaking lies in a being’s expression through words, or more precisely, in enabling the being to verbalize its existence. We may apply this statement to all kinds of speech. In fact, speaking is as much about what is spoken directly as it is about what is unspoken in its infinity,306 and language is

303 Gadamer, Truth, p. 405. “Verstehen und Interpretieren sind in spezifischer Weise der sprachlichen Überlieferung zugeordnet. Aber sie überschreiten zugleich diese Zuordnung nicht nur, sofern alle, auch die nichtsprachlichen Kulturschöpfungen der Menschheit so verstanden werden wollen, sondern noch weit grundsätzlicher, da alles Verständliche überhaupt dem Verstehen und der Interpretation zugänglich sein muß. Vom Verstehen gilt eben dasselbe wie für die Sprache” (WuM, p. 382). We may also find confirmation of the three-​way language interpretation-​interpretation relationship in the final pages of Wahrheit und Methode, dedicated to language and experiencing the world: “Just as things, those units of our experience of the world that are constituted by their suitability and their significance, are brought into language, so the tradition that has come down to us is again brought to speak in our understanding and interpretation” Gadamer, Truth, p. 452. “Wie die Dinge, diese durch Eignung und Bedeutung konstituierten Einheiten unserer Welterfahrung, zu Worte kommen, so wird auch die Überlieferung, die auf uns kommt, erneut zur Sprache gebracht, indem wir sie verstehen und auslegen” (WuM, p. 432). 304 WuM, p. 450. 305 Cf. Sołtysiak, Rozumienie i tradycja, p. 95. 306 WuM, p. 444.

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the means of connecting consciousness with the existing.307 Speech invariably reflects more than it expresses in an explicative way.308 Speculativeness reveals itself both in everyday language and in poetry. Recalling the great nineteenth-​ century novelists, Gadamer states that they not only deal with fundamental philosophical issues in a manner characteristic of their time, but they spiritually “inherit” the philosophy of the word characteristic of its perception in Western metaphysics.309 Przyłębski correctly notes that Gadamer sees speculativeness in the “relationship between the inner word (‘inner-​speech’) and the outer word” (i.e. “in a specific, historically established language”).310 So should we explain inner speech as an idiosyncratic interpretation of the world that constitutes the interpreter’s operating framework? By the same token, should we explain outer speech as the embodiment of an interpretation coined by larger linguistic communities; an embodiment characterized by a certain universality, though at the same time within the preserved boundaries of the historical experience? It seems that we really should do so, because from Gadamer’s perspective, we get to know the world only in language –​the question remains whether it is an individual language or, as some might say, a shared one. Access to the world always belongs to those who interpret it –​and it seems that it is of no significance how they do so. Therefore, we must agree with Bronk who states that “the study of the speculative unity of language … is an expression of Gadamer’s realistic attitude … because it is impossible to say that a world which has not been linguistically understood and described in fact exists.”311 This makes all the differences between what is real and what is speculative disappear; between what is meaningful and what is meaningless. In Gadamer’s case, only “another utterance –​the linguistic context” may be the decisive factor in determining the meaningfulness of a statement.”312 As Weinsheimer rightly points out, this fact also indicates that in Gadamer’s philosophy, language is divided into what it actually is and what it means. The meaning of a word does not equal its existence, therefore it does not equal it as a being. But it does not equal the existence of a word without its proper 307 See more on it in Gadamer, “Die Natur der Sache und die Sprache der Dinge,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, pp. 59–​69. 308 Cf. J. C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics. A Reading of Truth and Method, New Haven-​London 1985, p. 253. 309 See H.-​G. Gadamer, “Über die Ursprünglichkeit der Philosophie,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, p. 30. 310 Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 57. 311 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 319–​320. 312 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 319–​320.

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meaning, thus the word is intrinsically and comprehensively connected with meaning. Where there is no meaning, there is also no word. Hence, language does not exist in itself, but only in connection with what it communicates:313 I am aiming at the implicit unity that belongs to both the word and the concept: from the perspective of the relationship I am discussing, there are no words and it is not even evident that there are languages in the sense that today’s language research assumes. Every language that is spoken is only there as the word that is said to someone qua the unity of speech that establishes communication between people and builds solidarity. The unity of the word therefore precedes all diversity of words or languages. It contains an implicit infinity of what is even worth putting into words.314

Gadamer, here, clearly refers to the history of concepts as a philosophy, but these considerations perfectly reflect the tasks a translator faces. Accordingly, the translator should treat the text’s meaning as a unity that constitutes the perspective of both the author and the creator of the translation. For this reason, the speculative nature of language is reflected in translations, since it is only in a specific context that the carriers of meaning are established. They correct, systematize, and order each other; and words –​in their ambiguity –​strive to indicate meaning in an autonomous way.315 The meaning of words take shape very slowly. The process by which the translator strives for unity of meaning in a given sentence is also slow. Infinity is not just characterized by the conversation the translator has with the text: words also have this feature. Their meaning is not determined only by the context in which they exist. For words never free themselves from their ambiguity –​even when context makes the sense seem unambiguous. Thus, we cannot speak of the ideal meaning of a word, because words lack clarity and their range of meanings is characterized by instability, dynamism, and flexibility. Precisely these characteristics indicate a high degree of risk connected with the use of language, because it is only in a given statement, in building a linguistic

3 13 Cf. J. C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics., p. 255. 314 “Ich ziele damit auf die implizite Einheit, die sowohl dem Wort wie auch dem Begriff zukommt: Für dieses Verhältnis gibt es keine Wörter, ja, es gibt vielleicht auch nicht so selbstverständlich, wie das die heutige sprachtheoretische Forschung annimmt, Sprachen. Jede Sprache, die gesprochen wird, ist immer nur da als das Wort, das jemandem gesagt wird, als die Einheit von Rede, die zwischen Menschen Kommunikation stiftet, Solidarität aufbaut. Die Einheit des Wortes also liegt aller Vielfalt der Wörter oder der Sprachen voraus. Sie enthält eine implizite Unendlichkeit dessen, was es überhaupt in Worte zu fassen lohnt” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte als…, p. 240). 315 See Gadamer, “Text,” pp. 48–​49.

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context, that the carriers of meaning become visible and are subject to further revisions and corrections. Ricoeur too takes this issue into account, pointing to the essence of the polysemy: Two words on the word: each of our words has more than one meaning, as we see in the dictionaries. We call that polysemy. The meaning is thus defined each time through usage, which basically consists in screening the part of the word’s meaning which suits the rest of the sentence and with it contributes to the unity of meaning expressed and offered for exchange. It is the context each time which, as we say, determines the meaning that the word has acquired in such-​and-​such a circumstance of discourse: from then on, the arguments over words can be endless: What did you mean? etc. And it is in the play of the question and the answer that things become clearer or become confused. For there are not only obvious contexts, there are hidden contexts and what we call the connotations which are not all intellectual, but affective, not all public, but peculiar to a circle, to a class, a group, or perhaps even a secret society; there is thus the whole margin hidden by censorship, prohibition, the margin of what is unspoken, criss-​crossed by all the figures of the hidden.316

In hermeneutical terms, the word –​in contrast to lexical units –​never really becomes an autonomous being: To come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired. Rather, what something presents itself as belongs to its own being. Thus everything that is language has a speculative unity: it contains a distinction, that between its being and its presentations of itself, but this is a distinction that is really not a distinction at all.317

Even if we admit that a word is something finite, then certainly the sense will still remain infinite. As Gadamer notes, the sense of a given word is defined on the basis of the words that surround it or are adjacent to it. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of the specific sense of a particular word, because it exists only as long as it is articulated in relation to a linguistic –​but also a non-​linguistic –​context. The meaning of the word is not a reflection of a concrete being, but is subject to constant creation –​it is difficult to speak of its reference –​whose overriding goal is to seek agreement. These considerations clearly justify why a competent translator does not treat dictionary suggestions as the final instance, but determines the meaning of a given expression on the basis of the linguistic reality in which a 3 16 Ricoeur, On Translation, Routledge 2006, p. 26. 317 Gadamer, Truth, p. 470. “Zur-​Sprache-​kommen heiβt nicht, ein zweites Dasein bekommen. Als was sich etwas darstellt, gehört vielmehr zu seinem eigenen Sein. Es handelt sich also bei all solchem, das Sprache ist, um eine spekulative Einheit: eine Unterscheidung in sich: zu sein und sich darzustellen, eine Unterscheidung, die doch auch gerade keine Unterscheidung sein soll” (WuM, p. 450).

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given text functions, taking into account the essence of connotative equivalence in translation.

1.4.3. The Historicity of Language There is no doubt that language evolves along with the development of the human species. Furthermore, by learning a language, man himself assimilates the enormous cultural heritage contained in language structures. This clearly indicates the culture-​making role of language. Notably, as Pawliszyn contends, the “central position” of language in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is closely related to the task of creating a “critical awareness,” which emphasizes the influence of the linguistically expressed tradition.318 Gadamer’s hermeneutical experience of the philosopher is nota bene the experience of tradition, and language functions in his work “only as a historical language.”319 Moreover, in one later text, “The Limitations of the Expert,” he calls attention to “the language in which the thinking experience of many generations has been sedimented.”320 At the same time, he somewhat metaphorizes this notion, becoming in this view –​to use the terminology of cognitive linguists –​a container of sorts in which the concepts have already accumulated, and at the same time repeatedly transformed, their civilization and cultural experiences. In Gadamer’s philosophy, historicity does not only boil down to the fact that language is subject to constant development and evolution over time, it also enables both the existence of tradition and its maintenance in a given community. At this point, following Bronk, it is worth referring to “Gadamer’s history of concepts created as an act of rebellion against the neo-​Kantianist’s history of problems.” This history rejects the existence of so-​called “unchangeable concepts and philosophical problems” and focuses not only on such concepts, but also on the “Begrifflichkeit of philosophy.”321 Gadamer claims that philosophical concepts are historically pre-​established, due to the specificity of the language used in philosophical disputes and its links with common language. For language enables the articulation of human world experience and reveals the tradition the world contains.322 Language contains the historical heritage of past 3 18 Cf. A. Pawliszyn, Skryte, p. 24. 319 Cf. Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, p. 330. 320 Gadamer, “The Limitations of the Expert,” in: Gadamer, Hans Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics, trans. L. Schmidt, M. Reuss, ed. D. Misgeld, G. Nicholso, New York 1992, p. 85. 321 More on it see Bronk, Rozumienie, dzieje, p. 309. 322 See Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie, p. 249.

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generations, including the history of how philosophers understood concepts such as truth. As M. Oziębłowski rightly emphasizes, historicity is present here in two ways: as an “object of experience (transmission of tradition)” and as an “historical entanglement of the interpreter” defining the interpretation of a given message.323 It seems that Gadamer could have been inspired in this respect by Heidegger’s philosophy of speech, especially when considering the impact of history on language.324 Gadamer believes words have no meanings independent of the historical context in which they are used. This has a significant impact on the translation act. A competent translator critically reflects on his or her own place in history and the influence of this state of affairs on the text’s interpretation. Moreover, such a translator also reflects on the historical moment in which the original text was created, taking into consideration the lexical and stylistic means used at the time as well as their etymological foundation, to be discussed in Chapter Three of this monograph.

1.5. Semantics and Hermeneutics Gadamer claims, “Semantics is a doctrine of signs, in particular, of linguistic signs.”325 We should add that these signs are used to achieve a specific goal. When comparing semantics with hermeneutics and showing a particular critical attitude toward the analytical philosophy and logic of language, the benefits of semantic analyses are mainly seen in the fact that they show the holistic structure of language and allow us to realize the “flaws” of formalistic colored expressions. Moreover, quite frequently semantic analyses demonstrate the existence of so-​ called “non-​translability,” which is yet another benefit.326 Gadamer emphasizes that a semantic description carried out precisely may reveal the semantic instability of lexical units, especially when taking into account their historical background. However, such analyses do not exhaust the potential inherent in language per se, because speaking goes beyond the particular factors guiding

323 Cf. Oziębłowski, Hermetyczna możliwość hermeneutyki. Analiza funkcji filozofii hermeneutycznej w koncepcjach Wilhelma Diltheya i Hansa-​Georga Gadamera, Częstochowa-​Kraków 2012, p. 196. 324 See Pawliszyn, Skryte, pp. 27, 30–​31. 325 Gadamer, “Semantic and Hermeneutics,” in: Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 87. “Semantik ist eine Lehre vom Zeichen, insbesondere von den sprachlichen Zeichen” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III, p. 254). 326 Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik,” p. 251.

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a speaker. It seems that Gadamer at this point is recognizing the primacy and domination of language. Although we may have the impression that a person makes lexical choices on their own, it ultimately comes down to the fact that “free” speech is not self-​aware: “ ‘Free’ speaking flows forward in forgetfulness of oneself and in self-​surrender to the subject matter made present in the medium of language.”327 This refers also to understanding and translating texts. Gadamer thus advocates hermeneutical analyses, as in this case it is not language itself that is the focus, but the broadly understood extra-​linguistic sphere: Language is not coincident, as it were, with that which is expressed in it, with that in it which is formulated in words. The hermeneutical dimension that opens up here makes clear the limit to objectifying anything that is thought and communicated. Linguistic expressions, when they are what they can be, are not simply inexact and in need of refinement, but rather, of necessity, they always fall short of what they evoke and communicate. For in speaking there is always implied a meaning that is imposed on the vehicle of the expression, that only functions as a meaning behind the meaning and that in fact could be said to lose its meaning when raised to the level of what is actually expressed.328

This interesting quote clearly indicates the implicitly “smuggled” pragmatism of language in Gadamer’s philosophy. This statement should not come as a surprise, as he often refers to the so-​called occasionality of speaking, claiming that every statement is made for some purpose and for some reason.329 Furthermore, specific expressions make sense only in a specific context.330 The meaning of words

327 Gadamer, “Semantic and Hermeneutics,” p. 87. “ ‘Freies’ Sprechen fießt dahin in der selbstvergessenen Hingabe an die Sache, die im Medium der Sprache evoziert wird”(H.-​G. Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik,” p. 255). 328 Gadamer, “Semantic and Hermeneutics,” p. 88. “Sie geht gleichsam nicht auf in dem, was in ihr ausgesagt ist, was in ihr zu Worte kommt. Die hermeneutische Dimension, die sich hier auftut, bedeutet offenbar eine Begrenzung der Objektivierbarkeit dessen, was man denkt und mitteilt, überhaupt. Der sprachliche Ausdruck ist nicht einfach ungenau und verbesserungsbedürftig, sondern bleibt immer und notwendig, gerade wenn er das ist, was er sein kann, hinter dem zurück, was er evoziert und mitteilt. Denn im Sprechen wird ständig ein in ihn gelegter Sinn impliziert, der nur als hintergründiger Sinn seine Sinnfunktion ausübt, ja der seine Sinnfunktion geradezu verliert, wenn er in die Ausdrücklichkeit gehoben wird” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik,”p. 255). 329 Gadamer, “Semantik und Hermeneutik,” pp. 255 ff. 330 See Gadamer, “Die Begriffsgeschichte und die Sprache der Philosophie,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften IV, p. 6.

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and phrases is flexible and fluent, and can be specified only by means of adjacent phrases.331 Occasionality is a clear “manifestation” of living speech: It follows from this that an assertion never contains the full content of its meaning solely within itself. In logic we have long been acquainted with this as the problem of occasionality. “Occasional” expressions, which occur in every language, are characterized by the fact that unlike other expressions, they do not contain their meaning fully in themselves. For example, when I say “here.” That which is “here” is not understandable to everyone through the fact that it was uttered aloud or written down; rather, one must know where this “here” was or is. For its meaning, the “here” requires to be filled in by the occasion, the occasion, in which it is said. Expressions of this type have, for this reason, been of especial interest to logical-​phenomenological analysis, because one can show that in the case of these meanings, they contain the situation and the occasion in the content of their meaning.332

Like “the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech,”333 occasionality refers in a specific way to translation. Adapting Gadamer’s words, we may say that occasionality makes the translation act possible. The translator must determine the meaning of words and expressions while taking into consideration the neighboring lexical units. Moreover, the translator needs to consider the location of the text in relation to the given discursive reality, domain, literary genre, or type of text, and its function. In the context of the translation process, it is even more important that the reader also defines the meaning of the translation, which entails a particular doubling of the hermeneutical situation. Namely, the translator –​understood as the primary reader –​“creates” the meaning, then the target reader –​in other words, the secondary reader –​revises and recontextualizes it.

3 31 See Gadamer, “Philosophie und Poesie,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften IV, pp. 243–​245. 332 Gadamer, “Language and Understanding,” p. 104. “Es erhellt daraus, daß niemals eine Aussage ihren vollen Sinn-​Gehalt in sich selber enthält. In der Logik hat man das lange als das Problem der Okkasionalität gekannt. Die sogenannten »okkasionellen« Ausdrücke, die in jeder Sprache vorkommen, sind dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß sie ihren Sinn offenkundig nicht wie andere Ausdrücke in sich voll enthalten. Zum Beispiel, wenn ich sage »hier«. Was »hier« ist, nicht dadurch, daß es gesagt wurde oder geschrieben steht, für jeden verständlich, sondern man muß wissen, wo das war oder wo das ist. »Hier« erfordert für seine eigene Bedeutung die Ausfüllung durch die Gelegenheit, die occasio, bei der es gesagt wird. Die Ausdrücke dieser Art fanden deshalb das besondere Interesse der logisch-​phänomenologischen Analyse, weil man an diesen Bedeutengen zeigen kann, daß sie die Situation und die Gelegenheit in ihren eigenen Bedeutungsgehalt einschließen” (Gadamer, Sprache p. 195). 333 Gadamer, Truth, p. 453. “Der logische Ausdruck der lebendigen Virtualität des Redens” (WuM, p. 434).

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The famous words of Umberto Eco come to mind: “The text which reveals itself in its surface layer (or appearance) is of expressive means which need to be actualized by the addressee.”334 If we use Gadamer’s valuable remarks on the juxtaposition of semantics and hermeneutics to reach some translatological conclusions, we may say that the linguistic arrangement of a text as a whole and the analysis of its individual lexical units as well as the semantic structure of its specific content are important, but it seems that the translation act would be incomplete without a hermeneutical analysis. This is because it takes a careful look at the extra-​linguistic layer of the text and also encourages the translator to be critical about what the language units “mean” to him. As Gadamer says, the dictionary only shows in a very schematic way the position of a given lexical unit in the semantic system of a language, and the extent to which it is used in a given communication act.335 This remark is extremely valuable when we look at the translation of poetic works, in which the shape of the words remains far from conventional, yet which themselves express living speech. Even in the case of specialized translations, the methodical consistency in using specific terms is limited. In this respect, we should consider e.g. legal translations. Translators are aware that they cannot rely on one-​sided equivalency because it contradicts individualization, which is so natural in the process of linguistic communication. Finally, it is worth returning to Gadamer’s concept of living speech, or actual speaking, which should characterize the interpreter who speaks a given language freely and naturally. As he states, it is not the man who chooses certain lexical units, but in a natural way the lexical units come to mind in a given communication situation. A person who really knows a given language well does not dwell over single words, but opens up to the overall meaning carried by the language means used by the author of the original text.336 Undoubtedly, this statement is somewhat of a simplification, because careful analysis of individual lexical units does not contradict his recommendation to listen slowly to what the text has to say to the interpreter. So is it possible to reconcile these two fundamentally contradictory demands? The answer seems to be positive. For by this apparent 334 See U. Eco, “Czytelnik modelowy,” [The Exemplary Reader], Pamiętnik Literacki 1987, no. 2, p. 287. See also W. Iser, Apelatywna struktura tekstów: nieokreśloność jako warunek oddziaływania prozy literackiej” [Die Appellstruktur der Texte: Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer Prosa], Pamiętnik Literacki 1980, vol. 1, pp. 259–​280. 335 Gadamer, Semantik, p. 253. 336 Gadamer, Semantik, p. 254.

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contradiction, the philosopher may mean that it is not individual lexical units that direct the interpreter to sense, rather it is the sense that forms in an unhurried conversation with the text that directs the interpreter both to read and understand these units, and then transform them into the target living speech. Including in this matter the context and occasionality is in a way natural. The language –​which is worth repeating –​always sends the translator away from their dictionary or conventional phrases. Therefore, in this interpretative view, we may understand the hermeneutical approach as a significant deepening of subjectivity in the translation process, and at the same time, for this very reason, as a demonstration of prudence and thoughtfulness in making translation decisions. On the one hand, Gadamer seems to stress the interpreter’s freedom to interact with the language, but on the other he reminds us of a critical approach to the way in which the understanding of the text is presented in the target text. Is it possible to reconcile these two issues? To answer this question, we should refer to the overarching goal of hermeneutical theory. As Gadamer often emphasizes, hermeneutics shows its sense and strength not only in the situation of disturbed or significantly impeded communication between the parties, but also in the situation of impeded communication with oneself as an understanding being –​it is about the translator’s attitude toward him-​or herself and to the task he or she undertakes. Significantly, it is also about understanding one’s own limitations and accurately diagnosing one’s language skills in the emerging conflict which the translation process undoubtedly becomes.

1.6. Summary Gadamer’s views on language fit into the broad context of analysis of fundamental philosophical problems. Language is the universal medium through which understanding occurs and in which this understanding takes place. Moreover, language is “the fundamental mode of operation of our being-​in-​the-​ world.”337 In Gadamer’s philosophy, the properties of language discussed in this chapter, which enable the act of human cognition, do not fit into the landscape of concepts that characterize contemporary linguistic approaches, because language is neither a concrete tool for understanding nor a means of communication.

337 Gadamer, “The Universality of Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 128. (“Die Grund­ vollzugsweise unseres In-​der-​Welt-​Seins” H.-​G. Gadamer, “Die Universalität,”p. 219).

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Bronk is right to state that “Gadamer’s particular opinion on language is the result of his philosophy being a history of concepts.”338 “Philosophy deals with the whole of being,” but it is given only in a language that shows the “all embracing form of the constitution of the world.”339 Language is the medium through which the world is revealed.340 Language is also the means by which one comes to an agreement on a given matter. The ideal model for this situation is translation. Notably, in the emergence of contemporary hermeneutic theories, two elements in particular have played an important role in uncovering the phenomenon of language: text and translation. This is also evident in the works of Gadamer, especially in Wahrheit und Methode. Therefore, it is worth taking a closer look at the two aspects mentioned above in order to extract from them what is of greatest interest to us in this work, namely the concept of a translator’s competence. After all, it is in translation that language comes to life and it is in translation that it reveals its fullness. Translation is one of those special phenomena which not only articulates the world but also transforms it.

3 38 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 294. 339 Gadamer, “The Universality of Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 128. “Die alles umgreifende Form der Weltkonstitution” (Gadamer, “Die Universalität,” p. 219). 340 Gadamer, “The Universality of Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 128.

Chapter Two: Translation as the Realization of a Circular Structure of Understanding In hermeneutical philosophy, understanding is a superior philosophical category,341 both “in an ontological and epistemological sense.”342 However, we cannot easily categorize and systematize the term ‘understanding’ from Gadamer’s hermeneutics. There are many reasons for this. Above all, we have to recall the complicated and complex nature of the concept of understanding, and the way in which Gadamer refers to his –​and other authors’ –​views on the subject.343 The difficulties become even greater when we take into account the “co-​existence of different functions of understanding” in Gadamer’s hermeneutics.”344 According to Bronk, for Gadamer, the concept of understanding had undergone “ontologization345 and universalization”346 and was discussed in a methodological context:347 The ability to understand precedes the theory of understanding, which serves (re) explaining (How? Why?) the conditions of understanding. This is why Gadamer tries to go beyond the epistemological and methodological moments of the understanding procedure and see their final, ontological foundation. At the same time, Gadamer seeks to demonstrate the universality of understanding present in all sciences and in every kind of cognition. The realization of these tasks should be done in close connection with the

341 For more about the term understanding, its contemporary concept, the outline of its origins, and the development of its history see Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 99–​120. 342 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 121. 343 Cf. J. Luc, “Czym jest rozumienie w humanistyce? Próba odpowiedzi Hansa-​Georga Gadamera,” IDEA –​Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych, 2013, XXV, p. 125. 344 More on it see Oziębłowski, “Granica czy most? O funkcjach rozumienia w hermeneutyce H.-​G. Gadamera,” Diametros 2006, No. 10, p. 68. 345 We may conclude that Gadamer’s theory of understanding is founded on ontological premises. 346 Gadamer linked the category of understanding with both the being itself and with the whole of cognition. Moreover, he referred, although not directly, to the specific methodological characteristics of the phenomenon of understanding. See Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 121. 347 More on it see Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 121.

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understanding itself, since hermeneutical reflection is an integral part of understanding and any separation from practice is a “dogmatic error.”348

In a way, the first aspect, i.e. the ontologization of understanding, takes as its starting point Heidegger’s thoughts on this phenomenon.349 In Heidegger’s philosophy,350 the measure of understanding is human’s Dasein. Therefore, the emphasis is mainly on the existential side, whereas Gadamer expands this dimension to include categories such as history and language (Geschichtlichkeit, Sprachlichkeit).351 As Bronk notes, understanding is a “universal model of being” for every human being and not just a methodological action in a given context, an idea present in this sense in Gadamer’s works, especially the later ones.352 Moreover, his understanding includes a practical aspect, i.e. the scope of knowledge of a specific field. Therefore, as many Gadamerists emphasize, it sometimes brings to mind the term cognition.353 It is worth recalling Niemczuk, who writes about the understanding of the world in Gadamer’s hermeneutics: “Therefore, the 348 Bronk, “Poznanie religijne a hermeneutyka,” Roczniki Filozoficzne 1982, Vol. XXX, p. 24. 349 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 122–​123. 350 Of course, Heidegger expressed the issue of understanding a little differently before and after the so-​called turn. While before the turn, Heidegger combined “a being” with existence and its temporality, after the turn, he interpreted “a being” as its being, its very own existence. Gadamer seems to have combined both these stances in his hermeneutics. Cf. Sołtysiak, Rozumienie, p. 36. 351 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 122–​123. 352 Notably, Gadamer has often been criticized for moving away from the method to the truth, even though he intended to clearly show in Wahrheit und Methode that hermeneutical experience lies at the basis of any research method. Therefore, it seems wrong to accuse Gadamer of opposing the method, as his aim was to show on the example of such areas of human activity and phenomena as art, history, or language (and thus mainly humanistic phenomena) that scientific experience aimed at discovering the truth is always hermeneutical in nature and that the method itself is subject to time and contextualization, so that certain phenomena cannot be verified by means of available, allegedly objectified methods and techniques. According to Gadamer, in the humanities the world presents itself to the researcher quite differently than in the natural sciences. The humanist must constantly –​to a much greater extent than, for example, the biologist –​revise his or her findings by referring to existing –​and traditional –​cultural artefacts, so that the humanistic cognition is preconditioned to be much more dialogical in its character than is the case with other sciences. 353 Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 122–​123. Bronk states that Gadamer seems to use the term “understanding” interchangeably with “cognition.” Besides, in Gadamer’s work, understanding as a process is by no means the same as understanding as an activity.

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anthropological nature of understanding includes scientific cognition in the hermeneutical experience. This is possible thanks to the element of understanding in scientific cognition.”354 For this reason, we may consider the translation act –​ which is after all a kind of manifestation of anthropological activity –​from a hermeneutical perspective as a special act of cognition. This act does not only entail translating an utterance, which makes it possible to understand a given section, but it also broadens the translator’s competence in a given area and makes him or her understand the specificity or situation of the Other, and –​also by understanding and accepting the Other within oneself –​find his or her own place in the cultural and historical context. This chapter will address the subject of understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, showing how this process unfolds in the context of the translation act. Moreover, I want to focus on the translator’s role, the tasks facing him or her, and the competences a translator must have in order to perform these tasks in a hermeneutical spirit. First, it is necessary to outline the definitions of the three main hermeneutical categories that characterize Gadamer’s concept of translation. Next, I will illustrate the structure of understanding as a hermeneutic circle, one of the main conceptualizations of the translation act in Gadamer’s philosophy, then discuss the competences that the translator interpreting a text must have in order to grasp the full meaning of the message.

2.1. Understanding, Interpretation, Application In the light of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, the translation process can in fact be reduced to three aspects: understanding, interpretation, and application. Interpretation and application are integral parts of understanding just like its ontological conditioning. We should note –​as this is a very important issue in the context of further considerations –​that Gadamer uses the following terms to denote two types of interpretation: Auslegung and Interpretation. In the Polish translation of Wahrheit und Methode, both concepts have been translated as interpretation or, occasionally, as explanation, which causes some inaccuracies when discussing Gadamer’s views. Therefore, I have decided that it is necessary here to distinguish between the two concepts: so-​called interpretative understanding (Auslegung), which (For more see Pawliszyn, Skryte podstawy rozumienia. Hermeneutyka a psychoanaliza, Gdańsk 1993, p. 13). 354 Niemczuk, Rozumienie świata a język filozofii w hermeneutyce Gadamera, Folia Philosophica 1991, 8, p. 116.

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indicates a natural, inherent, more subjective understanding, and interpretation (Interpretation), which indicates a methodical approach to a given text in order to grasp its meaning. This distinction is also present in Heidegger’s work.355 In the context of translation, we should perceive interpretative understanding as the stage of translation when the translator first comes into contact with the original text. In other words, it is the stage of preunderstanding, which triggers the translator’s fore-​knowledge. Because translation is a very specific act, in which, according to Gadamer, the hermeneutical situation is double, the translator who wants to “truly” understand has to apply an interpretation –​i.e. a certain methodical conduct –​in order to achieve well-​established understanding. I am assuming here that a competent translator does not stop at the act of interpretive understanding and, due to the specifics of the performed task, then moves on to the stage of interpretation that serves as verification and necessary revision of the initial understanding.356 In this case, we should understand translation not so much as a broadly perceived interpretation (as some authors want it to be) but as its presentation, or rather as a presentation –​or manifestation or explication –​of well-​established understanding, which the translator achieves through the interpretation.357 This distinction is all the more justified because Gadamer himself explained in the third part of Wahrheit und Methode that the notion of interpretation does not only apply to a strictly scientific one, but also to the reconstruction and extraction of something, including reconstruction and extraction of an artistic nature, enabling the given work to really “appear” or manifest itself. Although Gadamer refers to works of art, it seems that artistic 355 See M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1927 [1986], pp. 148–​152. I owe the thought about the need to distinguish between interpretative and translatological understanding to Radegundis Stolze (e-​mail correspondence). 356 As a potential research perspective for the future, we may point out that translatologists can try to demonstrate to what extent relying only on interpretative understanding affects the shape and tone of a translation, the reception of a given translation, and errors made by the translator. Furthermore, the division into interpretative understanding and methodically established interpretation has the advantage that both concepts can be used as measures of translation quality in translodidactics. 357 See też E. Tabakowska, “O obecności tłumacza,” in: Między tekstem a kulturą. Z zagadnień przekładoznawstwa, eds. A. R. Knapik i P. P. Chruszczewskiego, San Diego 2018. Tabakowska describes translation as “individual interpretation of the source text” (p. 154). Another interesting thought of Tabakowska’s is the one presented as “the translation of an interpretation and the reception of translation as an interpretation.” See e.g. E. Tabakowska, Grzegorz Wasowski na Czarytorium: potłumacz i pomagik, “Porównania” 2016, 19, p. 169.

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reconstruction may also apply to considerations over translation, because it often constitutes a work of art in itself or is its reconstruction, e.g. in the case of poetry.358 Therefore, interpretive understanding (Auslegung) in the translation process is a subjective, intuitive understanding, achieved by activating translational knowledge inherent in the figure of the hermeneutical circle.359 It is inseparably connected with understanding (Verstehen) and thus with translation, behind which it disappears. Therefore, in a way, it is an inner act of speaking to oneself, translating to oneself, explaining to oneself, because everyone understands the text in his own way. However, understanding does not equal interpretation (Interpretation). If we assume that understanding of a text is a translator’s hermeneutic conversation with the text, the interpretation will be a way of explaining its meaning using a specific theoretical-​methodical system based on accepted solutions and methodological premises. Therefore, interpretative understanding is a primitive, internal, but also natural understanding, which is the experience of every human being who understands something because of their previous experience, knowledge and skills, socio-​cultural background, and even their personality or temperament. However, when a text resists the translator, i.e. when there are difficulties in understanding it, the translator starts an in-​depth interpretation, which is sometimes methodically justified. Thanks to it, the translator’s understanding becomes well-​established. Thus, the interpretative understanding is like an initial outline of what will be articulated in the course of a well-​established interpretation. I will explain these stages in the following sections. In Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, understanding (Verstehen), interpretative understanding (Auslegung) and application (Anwendung) are in fact a unity of elements conditioning and defining each other. When referring to J. J. Rambach’s360 Protestant Pietist hermeneutics, he recalls the specificity of the hermeneutical problem of the time, which was divided as follows: subtilitas intelligendi (understanding), subtilitas explicandi (explanation) and subtilitas applicandi (application). These three aspects lead to understanding.361 It is worth noting that they have in their names a common term: subtilitas, which 3 58 See WuM, pp. 376–​377. 359 Stolze, “The Translator’s Approach,” p. 68. 360 Bronk states that Gadamer “took from J.J. Rambach’s Pietist hermeneutics” the concept of application (See Bronk, “Hermeneutyka filozoficzna,” in: Filozofować dziś. Z badań nad filozofią najnowszą, ed. A. Bronk, Lublin 1995, p. 84). 361 WuM, pp. 290–​291.

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means that they are understood not so much as concrete methods, but as special skills requiring sensitivity and extraordinary flair.362 According to Gadamer, who refers to Morus’s summary, we should understand these qualities as the abilities of a man who understands and explains correctly.363 In Romanticism, scholars believed that interpretative understanding and general understanding form an integral whole. However, they did not include in this a third aspect, i.e. application. The rationale for this was that understanding always includes interpretation, i.e. the moment of interpretive understanding. Thus, when we understand something, it means that we interpret it at the same time; to understand something is to interpret it. In Romanticism, scholars also raised the subject of language, which was considered to be an inherent structural ingredient of understanding. Thus, according to Gadamer, understanding became a cognitive category fundamental to philosophy.364 Gadamer, who rejected a strictly Romantic approach to understanding and interpretation, stresses how important the moment of application is, stating that we should define the latter as adapting or matching the meaning of a text to the situation of the broadly defined interpreter, who may be the translator, but also the target audience of the translation or other cultural product.365 Thus, the meaning of a text becomes dependent on the historical, cultural, and social moment in which the subject of the interpretation process is embedded. As Sołtysiak rightly points out, the moment of application is important here inasmuch as it establishes that understanding in fact equals self-​understanding, and thus includes the “human community”366 in its scope. Therefore, in this sense, application is the awareness of one’s own place in the act of cognition, but also, it seems, the awareness of (co-​)being in a certain community. According to Gadamer, we should treat understanding, interpretative understanding, and application as three separate stages of one process. He does not separate these concepts in the same way as Protestant Pietist hermeneutics does. Given the specificity of the translation act, I have decided to enrich this unified process with an additional element, namely, the process of interpretation, meaning the methodical conduct of the translator with the text, based on specific analytical categories, leading to well-​established (linguistically explained) understanding

3 62 WuM, pp. 290–​291. 363 WuM, p. 291. 364 WuM, pp. 290–​291. 365 WuM, pp. 290–​291. 366 Sołtysiak, Rozumienie i tradycja, p. 65.

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that makes possible a translation adequate to a given situation. When adapting Rambach’s work, we may consider these four moments in which understanding unfolds as the special abilities of a person who understands a given text correctly. Therefore, we may consider them to be the determinants of a competent translator’s approach to the text.

2.2. Structure and Elements of the Understanding Process –​ The Hermeneutic Circle According to the assumptions of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, in the translation process we may distinguish the following stages of understanding a source text: 1) projection or anticipation of meaning; 2) verification of initial assumptions; 3) confirmation or rejection of assumptions and, possibly, the search for subsequent (pre)projects or hypotheses. At each stage, the translator considers what the text “talks” about, in other words, what the message refers to –​to which problem –​and what the text’s subject matter is. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, understanding takes on a circular structure, i.e. that of the hermeneutical circle. As Bronk is right to observe, Gadamer’s idea of a hermeneutic circle resulted from “the critique of this concept as presented by Schleiermacher”367 and was inspired by Heidegger’s views in this regard.368 As he aptly states,

367 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 249. Gadamer has serious doubts in this respect, especially with regard to the subjective and objective aspects of the interpretation process. As Gadamer states, when seeking to understand a text, a man does not penetrate into the author’s psyche nor does he identify with the author. What is the most important aspect of this act? The “thing” to which the text refers. Therefore, it is rather an attempt to “penetrate,” or transforming to the point of view from which the author saw the subject. The purpose of the understanding process is not to analyze the formal-​ linguistic aspects of the text, but to reach an agreement on the essence of the matter, issues raised in the message. See Gadamer, Das Problem der Sprache in Schleiermachers Hermeneutik in Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III. Idee und Sprache, Tübingen 1972, pp. 129–​140. 368 After Bronk, we should acknowledge that, in this regard, Heidegger’s views differ significantly from Gadamer’s concept of understanding. Bronk interprets this situation in such a way that Heidegger took up hermeneutical issues in order to develop on their basis the “ontological prestructure of understanding.” On the other hand, Gadamer focuses on how hermeneutics –​freed from the loop of illusory objectivity propagated in different fields of science –​may capture such an important issue as “the history of understanding.” As Bronk further states, for this reason Gadamer referred to Heidegger’s concept of the “circular structure of understanding” which is

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Gadamer’s approach to the discussed concept is treated here in “epistemological” categories.”369 According to Przyłębski, the hermeneutic circle is “one of the most important thought figures of hermeneutic philosophy in general.”370 At the same time, it is one of the best-​known hermeneutical metaphors of human functioning of entities that understand –​argue and interpret –​in the world. Gadamer refers to a well-​known principle, which has its roots in ancient rhetoric: we should understand the whole on the basis of its parts and its parts on the basis of the whole. In so-​called new hermeneutics, scholars apply this principle to the process of understanding.371 As Gadamer argues, one example of the part-​whole relationship can be the situation of learning a foreign language when the student frequently has to understand a whole sentence before he or she understands the meaning and value of the syntactic elements forming the whole sentence structure. We may ask ourselves: how is it possible that we understand a whole sentence, not always knowing the meaning of individual words or expressions? Gadamer explains it as follows: the student is able to construct a complete sentence –​or understand it –​because he or she has some expectations concerning the meaning of the message, i.e. the student makes some initial projections of the whole based on the context, i.e., on the meaning of sentences heard or read before. If necessary, the expectations concerning meaning might undergo some modifications.372 According to Gadamer, a simplified model describing the process of understanding to which the translator is subject can look as follows: The [interpreter’s] task is to extend the unity of the understood meaning in concentric circles. Harmony of all details with the whole is the appropriate criterion of the correct understanding.373

an expression of the “existential prestructure of human being itself.” The conclusions Gadamer draws from Heidegger’s concept of the circular structure of understanding aim to “correct” wrong comprehension of “understanding.” Hence, these conclusions have only a formal character (Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 251–​252). 369 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 249. 370 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 173. 371 Gadamer, “Vom Zirkel der Verstehens,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 2, p. 57. 372 Gadamer, “Vom Zirkel der Verstehens,” p. 57. 373 “Die Aufgabe ist, in konzentrischen Kreisen die Einheit des verstandenen Sinnes zu erweitern. Einstimmung aller Einzelheiten zum Ganzen ist das jeweilige Kriterium für die Richtigkeit des Verstehens.” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Vom Zirkel, p. 57; English translation qtd. after: The Hermeneutic Tradition: from Ast to Ricoeur, ed. G. L. Ormiston, A.D. Schrift, New York 1990, p. 182).

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This thought clearly shows that Gadamer was no stranger to the concept of methodical understanding, because he clearly emphasizes what conditions must be met in order for the understanding to be described as “accurate.” At the same time, however, we should by no means absolutize the “whole,” because the full sense will only be full to the historically located interpreter, and not generally or universally full. Therefore, the fullness of the sense that the interpreter arrives at contains traces of that location, because the interpreter refers to the sense of a given message from the perspective of his or her own place in the world. Sołtysiak presents it interestingly: The sense of the text cannot be completely different from the overall sense of the interpreter’s life. It turns out that understanding is self-​understanding, because the interpreter must find himself or herself in the text’s sense. Then, the interpreter either matches the recognized sense to the interpreter’s overall sense, or the interpreter revises the overall sense.374

This seems to be the basis of Gadamer’s tuning of “all the details into a whole.” The subtle and nuanced sense emerging in this way is always to be adapted to the current situation in which the interpretative act occurs. In a translational context, the circular nature of understanding means that the translator starts the translation with a projection of the text’s initial sense. However, this process does not end at a particular moment. The projection of meaning, and then its verification, continues uninterruptedly until the translator gains full understanding, i.e. until he or she verifies that the individual elements subject to understanding have aligned into a significant whole, taking into consideration their own historical and cultural situation. In Gadamer’s view, though, the hermeneutic circle is not purely formal in nature. It is difficult to distinguish analytical categories for its specification. Moreover, we cannot define the hermeneutical circle either by referring to subjectivity or by invoking the concept of objectivity. As noted, understanding of the text is determined by the so-​called anticipation of meaning, which by its very nature depends on many factors that determine the role and situation of the interpreter. The key actor in the whole process is not only the subject –​ the understander, i.e. the translator –​but also the community in which he or she lives and the tradition to which they belong. Thus, the hermeneutic circle determines how understanding occurs at all,375 because for Gadamer understanding takes place through the transmission of tradition. This is why there 3 74 Sołtysiak, “Rozumienie,” p. 72. 375 WuM, p. 277.

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is no question of a strict definition of understanding as a process either strictly subjectivized376 or objectivized. The only components of the whole process that may somehow be considered objective are, first, the very fact that a given message must always be subject to some kind of understanding and, second, that the interpreter is confronted with a certain text, the meaning of which he or she must understand.377 Therefore, we should state that the process of interpretation is both analytical –​the translator has to understand the whole of the original text on the basis of its individual parts, analyzing the source text on many levels of language and, in a way, dissecting the text into the most basic units –​and synthetic, because the understanding of the parts takes place by grasping the sense of the whole and by referring individual fragments to the location of the text in relation to the socio-​temporal relations in which it may have occurred. In the process of understanding, the horizon of the past and the horizon of the present “blend together.” As Gadamer emphasizes, we should not understand the hermeneutic circle within the framework of a metaphysical metaphor, but rather see that it is inscribed in a logical structure having its independent place in a theory of scientific evidence.378 According to W. K. Yuen, the hermeneutic circle is a kind of “paradigm in terms of which the possibility of translation can be discussed.”379 It may also serve as a good starting point for finding common points between theory and translation practice.380. In the hermeneutic circle, both tradition –​which I will 376 Moreover, Gadamer refrains from interpreting the act of understanding in terms of subjectivity, since this phenomenon clearly indicates that the person who wishes to understand is always set in a particular historical context and in a particular historical community: interpretation and understanding take place as the history reveals itself. In a way, understanding, which is the primordial principle of human being, reveals itself with the realization of the historical effect. However, it seems that in the case of a translation act, the awareness of understanding –​although impossible in Gadamer’s view –​should take place at least to a certain extent, i.e. to the extent to which the interpreter is able to determine the depth of context of a given message and his or her location in history, each time after the hermeneutic circle is set in motion. 377 I consider the text as such to be an objective entity –​and therefore as a set of linguistic signs forming a coherent whole. However, importantly, the sense emerging from each reading of such a text will always be described as subjective. 378 Gadamer, Text, p. 25. 379 W. K. Yuen, “Hermeneutics and Translation,” in: An Encyclopaedia of Translation: Chinese-​English, English-​Chinese, eds. C. Sin-​Wai, D. E. Pollard, Hong Kong 2001, p. 336. 380 Yuen, Hermeneutics, p. 336.

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explore later –​and the very act of translating the message “sets in motion” the translation process, as it is a kind of cultural message based on cultural differences. As H. Risk aptly observes, a competent translator should be able to activate this circle381; in other words, the translator should be able to stimulate awareness of what is known at a given stage, what is directed by preprojections of meaning, and at the same time what is still needed for a methodical or well-​ established interpretation. “But the process of construal is itself already governed by an expectation of meaning that follows from the context of what has gone before”382: an extremely important component of Gadamer’s philosophy, namely preunderstanding.

2.2.1. Preunderstanding In Gadamer’s works, the difficulty of grasping the sense of a message initiates the process of understanding. This is particularly true of the translation act, since, first, translation is a manifestation and metaphorization of one of the ways of overcoming these difficulties and, second, it involves both the strangeness of the initial language itself and, often, the strangeness of content or tradition that the translator encounters. We should agree with O’Keeffe, who notes that translators encounter the greatest problems and difficulties at the very beginning of the translation process: when the principle of the hermeneutical circle begins to work.383 Of course, this is linked to the initial multiplicity of hypotheses to be revised during the translation process. For by nature, at the beginning, there are many more initial pre-​ projects than when finishing a translation. The first necessity in the translation process seen from a hermeneutical perspective is preunderstanding (Vorverständnis). This phenomenon provides a strong foundation for performing the right hermeneutical task, setting priorities, strategies, and translation decisions. As Gadamer emphasizes, an old rule governs this process: interpretation should start from the point at which

381 Risku, Translatorische Kompetenz, p. 98. Chapter four of this monograph deals more broadly with the practicalities of activating the hermeneutic circle in the translation process. 382 Gadamer, Truth, p. 291. “Dieser Vorgang des Konstruierens ist aber selber schon dirigiert von einer Sinnerwartung, die aus dem Zusammenhang des Vorangegangenen stammt” (WuM, p. 275). 383 O’Keeffe, “Prologue to a Hermeneutic Approach to Translation,” in: Translational Hermeneutics, p. 145.

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understanding is subtly beginning to form, but is not yet fully specified or concrete.384 In fact, this subtle forming of understanding is only a preunderstanding, which, in order for it to become a stage of understanding, needs to be verified and clarified. Scholars refer to preunderstanding as a sine qua non for comprehensive understanding of a text. The understanding may be compared to filling in, or realizing, a first sketch that constitutes an initial projection of meaning. If an interpreter wants to understand a text, he or she must always draft its meaning, for the moment translators capture the initial sense, they project the sense of the message. This initial sense reveals itself because the interpreter reads, posing some questions about the text’s content and raising hypotheses related to the way the target text and language matter may form. However, the initial projections must be subject to necessary correction and revision as the translator dives deeper into the meaning. This is what comprises understanding.385 O’Keeffe rightly confirms that we are in fact dealing here with the basic “geometry” of the hermeneutical circle –​the idea that the understanding of the text is always conditioned by preunderstanding.386 Gadamer states that the essence of the hermeneutic circle –​which is, after all, the basis of understanding –​should be complemented by presupposition of the whole,387 or an initial grasp of the fullness (Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit),388 closely connected with preunderstanding.389 But according to Gadamer, what is an initial grasp of the fullness? Feliga interprets this issue in an interesting way:

384 Gadamer, “Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du? Kommentar zu Celans Gedichtfolge ‘Atemkristall,’ ” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 9. Ästhetik und Poetik II. Hermeneutik im Vollzug, Tübingen 1993, p. 428. 385 Gadamer, Vom Zirkel, pp. 59–​60. 386 Cf. B. O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 151. 387 After O’Keeffe, we could also translate it as full prejudgment. (See B. O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 152). However, I use terms that have been successfully deployed for a long time in Polish philosophical hermeneutics. Further deliberations on the role of the presupposition of the whole in the translation process are to some extent inspired by O’Keeffe’s views from the above mentioned article. 388 Gadamer, Vom Zirkel, p. 61. 389 As it seems, capturing the fullness is a kind of existential experience in general. For more see J. Malpas, Place and Experience. A Philosophical Topography, Cambridge 2004, pp. 79–​80; Malpas suggests that the pursuit of self-​understanding leads us to put our experiences and mental states in a holistic framework.

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Well, for us, only that which has full unity of meaning is understandable. We always assume the full unity, when we read a text. It is only when the text becomes incomprehensible to us that we start to have doubts about the message and try to heal it. Thus, the initial grasp of the fullness that guides our understanding turns out to be content-​specific, because the reader’s understanding is guided by the expectation of meaning, which is transcendent toward the text and which was born out of our own attitude to the matter in question.390

How should we understand this expression in the context of the translation process? Well, in other words, the initial grasp of the fullness is the initial understanding. It enables the translator to enter into a dialog and conduct a hermeneutical conversation; to put it simply, it allows the hermeneutical dialog to begin, then to continue, and in the course of the dialog, to ask specific questions that lead to the simultaneous search for meaning and its formation.391 When we initially “grasp” the fullness of a text, we also assume that the message we are trying to understand is a semantic-​thematic unity which is in many ways right and legitimate and that it “tells us what it is like,” not only in the context of expressing a view on a given topic, but also in the context of the perspective from which the text is emerging. Therefore, when reading someone else’s text, we do not aim to understand how the author of the message sees a given fragment of reality. We rather assume that the text is a testimony to the specificity of that fragment of reality, whose meaning we attribute according to our own place in a cultural and natural context:392 The anticipation of perfection which guides all our understanding thus turns out to be one determined in each case by content. We presuppose not only an immanent unity of meaning, which gives the reader guidance, but the reader’s comprehension is also constantly guided by transcendent expectations of meaning which arise from the relationship to the truth of what is meant. Just as the addressee of a letter understands the news he receives and, to begin with, sees things with the eyes of the letter –​writer, i.e., takes what the writer says to be true-​instead of, say, trying to understand the writer’s opinion as such –​so we too understand the texts which are handed down on the basis of expectations of meaning drawn from our own relationship to the issues under discussion.393

390 Feliga, Czas i ortodoksja: Hermeneutyka teologii w świetle “Prawdy i metody” Hansa-​ Georga Gadamera, Toruń 2014, p. 85. In this context, it would be interesting to analyze the phenomenon of translation against the background of the metaphor of healing. 391 WuM, p. 312. 392 WuM, p. 278. 393 “Der Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit, der all unser Verstehen leitet, erweist sich so selber als ein jeweils inhaltlich bestimmter. Es wird nicht nur eine immanente Sinneinheit vorausgesetzt, die dem Lesenden die Führung gibt, sondern das Verständnis des Lesers wird auch ständig von transzendenten Sinnerwartungen geleitet, die aus dem

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Gadamer repeatedly emphasizes in his texts that understanding means, first and foremost, to reach agreement with the partner of the hermeneutical conversation on the issue in question. Only after this stage is it possible to reach out to the further scope of the message’s meaning and to analyze the purely psychological or historical aspects contained in its content. In other words, only after this stage can interpreters take the views of the message’s author into account, which may or may not be helpful in deciding on the meaning of the whole text. Therefore, the first hermeneutical condition is that the translator must have a prior understanding of the subject matter covered by the text. This is a determining factor for any decisions and arrangements concerning both the uniformity of the sense contained in the whole of the original text and the initial presupposition (assumption) of the whole.394 As Bronk writes, the “default assumption” that a given text is meaningful –​or rational –​ and its content is true always determines the understanding.395 Of course, at the same time, we must assume that the rationality of the text will not always reveal itself to the interpreter, because sometimes the sense of the message will be significantly distorted, for example when the translator finds factual errors made by the author of the original text. Therefore, the anticipation of meaning is connected with one of the most important competences of the interpreter, namely openness or receptivity. As Gadamer states, in addition to understanding the meaning of the text the scholar following hermeneutic rules has to accept the content that is subject to understanding: It may be difficult to understand what is said in a foreign or ancient language, but it is still more difficult to let something be said to us even if we understand what is said right away. Both of these things are the task of hermeneutics. We cannot understand without wanting to understand, that is, without wanting to let something be said.396

Verhältnis zur Wahrheit des Gemeinten entspringen. So wie der Empfänger eines Briefes die Nachrichten versteht, die er enthält, und zunächst die Dinge mit den Augen des Briefschreibers sieht, d.h. für wahr hält, was dieser schreibt –​und nicht etwa die Meinung des Briefschreibers als solche zu verstehen sucht, so verstehen wir auch überlieferten Texte auf Grund von Sinnerwartungen, die aus unserem eigenen Sachverhältnis geschöpft sind”(Gadamer, Vom Zirkel…, p. 62). 394 Gadamer, Vom Zirkel, p. 62. 395 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 255. 396 Gadamer, “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” in: The Gadamer Reader, ed. Richard E. Palmer, Northwest University Press, 2007, p. 129. “Das, was es sagt, mag schwer zu verstehen sein, wenn es sich etwa um eine fremde oder altertümliche Sprache handelt –​schwerer noch ist es, auch wenn man ohne weiteres das Gesagte versteht, sich etwas sagen zu lassen. Beides gehört in die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik. Man

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If interpreters close themselves off from the message, they might be closing themselves off from understanding and agreement. However, opening to what the text intends to say is possible thanks to the mentioned rationality, which, like the geometry of the hermeneutical circle, evokes in the mind of the interpreter circular reflections on the meaning of the message, thus also stimulating the receptivity of the interpreter. Receptiveness makes it necessary then to return to the aspect of expectation of meaning, which guides the work of the interpreter. O’Keeffe properly draws attention to some difficulties related to Gadamer’s theory –​or “model” –​of understanding texts in a translational context.397 First of all, the informational basis of anticipation is a contentious issue: what is the basis for translators when they are creating initial projections of a text’s meaning? Second, it is also a major problem to adapt these preliminary drafts in the act of understanding. O’Keeffe further explains his position by stating that understanding is a circular process requiring repetitive adjustment and update of the initial hypotheses. Therefore, we may describe understanding as a process of “harmonization.” In a way, understanding the individual parts of the message should be in line with the understanding of the whole. However, the process of understanding is also of a processual nature, which means that the understanding of individual passages is only provisional, since full understanding only appears when all initial projections of meaning are confirmed and agreed upon.398 It lies in the nature of the translation process that the translator in some way has to expect harmonization of the last part: the final understanding of the whole. Only then can the translator discover the accuracy of the initial anticipation.399 Anticipation is the key prejudice characterizing a translator’s work. For a person translating a text must assume the existence of the meaning in the initial text, and thus the validity of his or her work. In a way, the translator must also believe that the text refers principally to a concrete existential. Finally, the translator must assume that the text has something to say not only to him or her, and therefore to the intermediary in the given communication act, but above all to the target audience as the interpreter of the given interpretation. Bronk aptly states that the moment of the prejudice is not only a formal component –​an

kann nicht verstehen, ohne verstehen zu wollen d. h. ohne sich etwas sagen lassen zu wollen” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Ästhetik und Hermeneutik,” p. 5). 397 Cf. B. O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 151–​152. 3 98 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 151–​152. 399 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 151–​152.

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assumption that the text holistically reveals the thing it concerns –​but also the conviction that what the text concerns is actually true.400 Therefore, it seems that translators need to have both a pre-​conceived meaning of the work they are going to translate, and also a conviction that it is meaningful to translate a particular text from the socio-​cultural, methodological, ethical, and systematic perspective. This presupposition allows for the translation and its accurate placement in a cultural-​historical context. But it also allows for the identification of certain potential translation problems and substantive errors that need to be corrected by a competent translator during the translation process. Anticipation of the text’s meaning is an integral component of the translation act. Gadamer states that “Translation is an indissoluble unity of a concealed anticipation, an initial capturing of the meaning as a whole and further preservation of what was thereby anticipated.”401 In other words, translation is the manifestation and explication of a previously predicted sense. O’Keeffe rightly points out that we may compare translation to a particularly conceived circular movement between the implicit and the explicit, from the anticipation of and first assumptions of meaning to the constant updating in the process of the continuous creation of the translation product402 –​which is in a way the sum of all the other properly corrected and harmonized projections of meaning.403 In light of the above, we may also understand translation as a special case of aligning all the ontological and linguistic components into a certain whole, which may additionally have aesthetic qualities and values. This movement from the implicit to the explicit is of a processional nature and takes place on both a micro scale –​during the actual translation process, when the translator creates the subsequent parts of the target text –​and on a macro scale. The translation process, a kind of hermeneutical experience, takes the work to a new socio-​cultural reality and thus is final confirmation of the initial projections of meaning established on the micro scale. In a way, the primary goal of the anticipation of meaning is the harmonization of the translation, for the translator, having translated a certain fragment, anticipates subsequent ones on the basis of the part already translated, while at the same time revising and updating previous assumptions. Furthermore, this 400 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 255. In this part of the book, Bronk distinguishes two types of truth: historical and systematic one. 401 “Übersetzen ist eine unlösbare Einheit von implizitem Antizipieren, den Sinn im Ganzen Vorweggreifen, und explizitem Festlegen des so Vorwegnehmens und des Festlegens”(H.-​G. Gadamer, Wie weit schreibt…, p. 205. 402 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 160. 403 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 160.

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anticipation has an uninterrupted character during the translation: I am of the opinion that it continues even after the translation is completed. It opens up to subsequent anticipations of meaning, but now from the perspective of the reception of the work. This is how the hermeneutical translation circle closes. Of course, the sense that the translator has anticipated and preserved is subject to further revision and correction, aimed at confirming or rejecting the decisions already made.404 Translation is only possible thanks to the explicitness of previously captured meaning. Thus, we must agree with O’Keeffe: “translation anticipates itself.”405 We may describe the process in terms of the road a translator has to travel to get to the destination, i.e. to understand the full meaning and create the entire target text. The road in question is determined by an initial understanding of the full meaning. Tholen accurately believes that the inherent characteristic of understanding may be described as incomplete fullness.406 Therefore, at the outset, the translator anticipates not only the meaning of the content to be translated, but also the actions he or she is going to perform. As O’Keeffe states, we may also see the translator as a person grasping the fact –​ of course, of a preliminary nature –​of starting the translation act. In this case, anticipation boils down to capturing a certain “translation project.” The translator, while leaning over the meaning of the message, has already assumed in advance what the translation process is about.407 Interpreting these words, we may also state that in translation, when perceived in terms of projection activities, one does not so much anticipate the meaning of the target text, but de facto presupposes the existence of the translation as a product functioning in a specific medium for a specific community, which implies the need for the translator to perform a kind of preparatory work, the aim of which is to consolidate and

404 The need for the translator to revise his or her own opinions contributes to the rehabilitation of the hermeneutical theory itself, which is often accused of being subjective and pseudo-​scientific. For the revision of the prejudices points to the opposite: the process of reaching the sense is constantly changing and depends on the specific situational context. Correction of assumptions brings to mind the process of testing and verifying the validity of hypotheses, and therefore the relationship between hermeneutics and the assumptions of the scientific method is closer than it seems at first glance. 405 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 160. 406 Tholen, Erfahrung und Interpretation. Der Streit zwischen Hermeneutik und Dekonstruktion, Heidelberg 1999, p. 124. 407 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 160.

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broaden the fore-​knowledge with which the interpreter approaches the hermeneutical task.408

2.2.2. Fore-​knowledge409 As Gadamer states, preunderstanding “comes from being concerned with the same subject.”410 It is the moment when the interpreter first becomes familiar with the source text and its subject matter. Thus, from the perspective of the translation act, we should define preunderstanding as the “initial knowledge the person has when beginning the research activities.”411 This is particularly true of the interpreter’s fore-​knowledge. Bukowski rightly emphasizes that fore-​knowledge is “a general and detailed erudition, which is an extremely important component of an interpreter’s hermeneutical competence.”412 Thus, fore-​knowledge –​which tests the quality and accuracy of the initial ideas –​is also the accumulated experience the interpreter has acquired in contact with the world in the course of interpreting. This is because according to Gadamer understanding is textualized. It is important to realize that readers approach any text having been already preconditioned by the way they interpret and understand the message.413 Moreover, we should recall Gadamer’s opinion that we may understand things that are part of the topic we are familiar with –​and we may read into the text only those elements the interpreter brings into it on the basis of the initial concepts with which he or she started the reading process.414 Moreover, this aspect constitutes the importance of the interpreter’s fore-​knowledge. Before translating a particular text, and even before reading it, the translator resorts to preunderstanding –​or preunderstanding guides the translator –​by referring to the available knowledge about the author of the work, the literary genre, or a given literary tradition. The title and the graphic dimension of the work evoke associations that create individual judgments about the source text. Stolze is right

4 08 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” p. 160. 409 This section was inspired by P. Bukowski. See Bukowski, Hermeneutyczne. 410 “Das im Zu-​tun-​haben mit der gleichen Sache entspringt”(WuM, p. 278; trans. by: PM, p. 280). 411 Januszkiewicz, W-​koło hermeneutyki literackiej, Warszawa 2007, pp. 56–​57. 412 Bukowski, Hermeneutyczne kompetencje tłumacza, p. 134. 413 Gadamer, Wer bin Ich, pp. 436–​437. 414 Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte in der neueren deutschen Philosophie” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, p. 8.

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to stress that: “Understanding is never a matter of fact but has to be searched for in a process of interpretation based on relevant, well-​grounded knowledge.”415 Januszkiewicz correctly states that fore-​knowledge should include “all the features that describe the attitudes and character of the interpreter: the tradition in which he or she grew up, his or her literary interests and even his or her temperament.”416 Stolze is also right in her view that when approaching the hermeneutical task the “translator starts from one’s own familiar world knowledge, and any phenomenon appears subjectively against the backdrop of this given individual fore-​knowledge.”417 Tokarz too states that “in contact with a given work, the translator, as a reader of the original work, activates his or her encyclopedic knowledge shaped from both mental and sensual experiences. These include: education, an accepted system of values, religion, worldview, knowledge of reactions to stimuli, etc.”418 Therefore, an interpreter’s hermeneutical competence must include the ability to conduct advanced meta-​reflection, comprising the ability to diagnose initial thoughts on the basis of interpretative intuition and aiming to carry out a holistic analysis of the problem, which the hermeneutical task undoubtedly is –​in this sense, it will be a translation. The source material of the aforementioned analysis will be the specific concepts present in the text. In a circular manner, the analysis will extract multiple aspects to be interpreted and combined like concentric circles with other operational concepts relevant to the given message. Then, on the basis of these aspects, the analysis will lead to creating a coherent message that includes the cognitive aspects governing the given text fragment. Through this analytical procedure, the interpreter aims to synthesize the meaning that is created simultaneously on the level of interpretation and the level of understanding the interpreter’s place in this procedure of extracting and summarizing meanings. However, in order to carry out such an analytical-​synthetic procedure, the interpreter must demonstrate the ability to reflect broadly on his own cognitive skills and mental states and on the knowledge with which he undertakes the hermeneutical task and which must be revised in order to solve specific translation problems. Nonetheless, metareflection also shows that the translator is able to take into consideration and anticipate a priori the cognitive-​mental features of other participants in the translation

4 15 Stolze, “The Legal Translator’s Approach to Texts,” Humanities 2013, 2, p. 61. 416 Januszkiewicz, W-​koło, pp. 56–​57. 417 Stolze, “The Translator’s Approach,” p. 61. 418 Tokarz, Spotkania Czasoprzestrzeń przekładu artystycznego, Katowice 2010, p. 124.

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process, especially the target readers. In this sense, understanding is in fact self-​ understanding, i.e. locating the meaning of a text on the basis of one’s own experience and on the basis of the predicted cognitive states and experiences of the community the translator operates in –​the interpretative community within which the translation’s reception takes place. O’Keeffe is right to state that while there can be no translation without fore-​ knowledge, we should emphasize that it “is also a function of a certain culture, a culture that values, in advance of any translation, the text which will be translated.”419 Accordingly, by activating fore-​knowledge, the translator selects those aspects which are of great importance in the target culture.420 The translator adapts the message to the reception capacity of the target audience. Fore-​ knowledge is also the translator’s key skill when it comes to placing a given target text against the background of a broader literary polisystem, because each text evinces some sort of prehistory. Fore-​knowledge is not just an initial projection of the text’s meaning, but also “recognition of a kind of debt to culture, which in a way is ahead of the translator.” O’Keeffe explains that in this way the translator sets the hermeneutic circle in motion and starts the translation process.421 Of course, some may argue whether we should understand translational fore-​ knowledge in terms of “preliminary projections of the text’s meaning,” because it seems that fore-​knowledge is not a projection –​at least we should not identify the two concepts with each other –​but rather a projection of meaning that seems to be the manifestation of fore-​knowledge. The circular character of the understanding process, the specific geometry of the circle in deciphering a message, consists in the constant designing and revising of the sense of texts’ individual fragments and the need to activate initial concepts. This is connected with the ubiquitous prejudices which are part of fore-​knowledge or are even the fore-​knowledge itself.422

2.2.3. Prejudice (Vorurteil) The concept of Vorurteil –​prejudgment or prejudice –​is very characteristic of Gadamer’s hermeneutics: Przyłębski calls it a “hallmark” of Gadamer’s philosophy.423 In a way, it constitutes a sine qua non condition of the understanding

4 19 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 162–​163. 420 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 162–​163. 421 O’Keeffe, “Prologue,” pp. 162 ff. 422 See D. Di Cesare, Gadamer, p. 91. 423 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 162.

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process. Bronk emphasizes that, for Gadamer, prejudice –​usually understood in science as an assumption –​takes on “cognitive meaning.” Gadamer “uses partially synonymously” the following words and phrases: Vormeinung, Vorverstehen, Vorstruktur des Verstehens. “However, Gadamer clearly avoids the scientific word assumption (Voraussetzung).”424 The word “prejudice” usually evokes negative associations.425 But Gadamer rehabilitates the notion and, as Bronk aptly puts it, “raises it to the rank of a hermeneutical principle governing the understanding.”426 Taking into consideration the principle that understanding and cognition are guided by prejudice and preliminary views makes it easier to penetrate hermeneutical issues. According to Gadamer, the roots of the negative connotations associated with “prejudice” go back to the Enlightenment. At that time, people usually used the term to indicate a ruling or verdict that had been passed before checking and verifying all the premises indicating a given offence.427 In a sense, prejudices –​being socially and culturally conditioned –​prevent the development of thorough, fact-​based knowledge.428 In this regard, Gadamer refers to Locke –​who claimed that prejudices are based on intellectual inertia –​and to Russell, who considered prejudice to be not subject to rational thinking. Since rationalism and the primacy of reason were of highest importance in the Enlightenment, people believed that history or historicity did not play any significant role in cognition. Hence, people described prejudices as incorrectly formulated judgments, preventing cognition on the basis of reason, a source of considerable confusion and disorientation. Enlightenment thinkers perceived historicity in a similar way, as historicity was also supposed to effectively prevent “finding out the truth.” Therefore, they advocated abstracting from the cultural and historical conditions of our functioning and our place in relation to the surrounding reality. Probably, we should connect this critical attitude of the Enlightenment toward prejudice with the generally

4 24 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 210. 425 To eliminate the negative connotations of this notion, Coreth proposes replacing it with “prejudgment.” Coreth, Grundfragen der Hermeneutik. Ein philosophischer Beitrag, Freiburg-​Basel-​Wien 1969, p. 99, after: Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 211. However, this notion does not fully reflect the specificity of the conception, especially in the context of the translation process and taking into consideration the whole of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 426 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 211. 427 WuM, p. 255. 428 Cf. P. Dybel, Granice, p. 245.

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negative attitude of representatives of that epoch toward any historically conditioned self-​understanding.429 Gadamer takes a completely different position on this issue and claims that prejudice may be both positive and negative. For one, there are so-​called justified prejudices (préjuges légitimes).430 Gadamer transforms the negative connotations associated with this concept into positive ones and treats them as a kind of starting point for more in-​depth reflection on the theory of understanding.431 He illustrates his reflections by referring to three examples from the humanities. The first one concerns biblical hermeneutics –​prejudices are the basis for interpretation of the Bible, which, after all, is identified with the Word of God. Therefore, the Bible’s meaning has a completely different dimension and character when we remove all rationalistic premises. As Gadamer states, Enlightenment thinkers saw this issue differently. They believed we should read the Bible and interpret it as if it were an ordinary text of culture. The second example concerns the so-​called German Enlightenment with its clear boundary between justified, or legitimate, and false prejudices. Unlike the English or French Enlightenment, the German Enlightenment recognized the positive role of prejudices. The third example concerns legal hermeneutics, in which prejudice is treated as a preruling. In this respect, scholars also discuss the concept of prejudgments.432 Dybel suggests we should seek the differences between Gadamer’s and the Enlightenment’s understanding of prejudice in their varying understandings 429 WuM, pp. 245–​250. At this point, we should once again clearly state that in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, understanding is in fact self-​understanding, which, however, should not be understood in terms of “understanding oneself,” but rather as a “simultaneous understanding of oneself and of the other person, since self-​understanding can only be realized through understanding oneself and the other.” (Di Cesare, Gadamer, pp. 87–​ 88). Similarly, self-​understanding may refer to the hermeneutic experience in which the interpreter comes into contact with strangeness and otherness. In this case, the translator begins to understand the text by understanding himself; in other words, understanding his own being in the context of the history and language of his own existence. In Gadamer’s case, understanding the text equals understanding oneself (See WuM, pp. 97–​161), but also, and this is worth adding, one’s own interpretive skills and competences (in Gadamer’s case, understanding the text equals understanding one’s own “I” in the face of the vastness of possibilities with which one can accomplish a hermeneutical task). 430 WuM, p. 255. 431 WuM, p. 256. 432 WuM, pp. 255–​261. See also Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 251–​253.

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of the phenomenon of the historicity of culture.433 He rightly emphasizes that Enlightenment thinkers cut themselves off from history and its place in any form of cognition, while Gadamer opted for a way of developing and assimilating knowledge in which a prominent place would be occupied by a broadly understood historicity434 and, as it were, the process of historicizing man (the interpreter). Thus, in Gadamer’s philosophy, prejudices are positive elements that constitute the process of understanding and cognition. At the same time, they make it possible to reach the truth or even to create it.435 For it seems that we may understand something only by outlining our view of the matter in advance: There is nothing that is simply “there.” Everything that is said and is there in the text stands under anticipations. This means, positively, that only what stands under anticipations can be understood at all, and not what one simply confronts as something unintelligible.436

The process of understanding is of a prejudicial nature; nothing new may be learned unless it is derived from what is already known and familiar.437 Interpreting Gadamer’s words, we may say that in this process of understanding, the translator starts the process of translation by “launching” his own initial concepts, which “put the text in the game.”438 Taking these into account and being aware of them is a sine qua non for seeing what a text is about as well as 4 33 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 260. 434 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 260. 435 It seems that in Gadamer’s view it is right to speak not about the pursuit of truth –​as if there was an “objective truth,” available to anyone who meets certain conditions, and as if there were specific methods and techniques for doing so –​but about its constant creation, depending on the socio-​cultural conditions in which the interpreter is involved. 436 Gadamer, “Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,” in: Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 121. “In Wahrheit nichts gibt, was einfach da steht, sofern alles, was gesagt wird und was da im Text steht, unter Antizipationen steht. Das bedeutet positiv, daß nur, was unter Antizipationen steht, überhaput verstanden werden kann, und nicht, wenn man es wie etwas Unverständliches einfach anstarrt”(H.-​G. Gadamer, “Die philosophischen Grundlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts,” in: Kleine Schriften I, p. 142). 437 In this sense, we may say that hermeneutics has much in common with the methodological paradigm of cognitive science, which also claims that knowledge develops on the basis of what has long been known. See more on this in Gallagher, “Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2004, 11, pp. 162–​174). 438 WuM, p. 375.

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for exploring the meaning of a given statement.439 Bronk states, and we have to agree, that Gadamer’s views on prejudices are an extremely interesting attempt to describe and explicate the process of getting to know reality. For prejudices are not only “the universal foundation of scientific cognition, but also of non-​ scientific cognition.”440 They condition understanding, including the kind of understanding that we may reach by applying specific rules.441 Thus, we may conclude that prejudices also condition understanding as an initial stage of the translation process. The assumption that understanding is prejudiced in nature is by no means, in Bronk’s words, “an act of resignation from the overwhelming power of superstition and its own limitations, but an acknowledgement of what cognition is really about.”442 Prejudices constitute an “organic moment of pre-​ ontological structure… of understanding.”443 They make the interpreter look at a text from the necessary distance and see the otherness inscribed in the original text.444 Moreover, prejudices condition an interpreter’s competences and constitute their ontological structure. We may even say that prejudices decide about the specificity and course of a translation act, define its rationale, allow the moment of cognition and full understanding. They constitute a test of correct understanding, since their compliance with the subsequent interpretation of a given fragment of reality is supposed to be proof of a reliable process of understanding. Contrary to what Enlightenment representatives thought, prejudices do not hinder but facilitate access to truth and knowledge. In the context of the translation process, prejudices consist of unconscious, normative, and practical elements. The ability to verify them is one of the most important components of the translator’s hermeneutical competence.

2.2.4. Verification of Prejudices –​The Translator’s Self-​reflection and Self-​ criticism From hermeneutical perspective, a competent interpreter should carefully analyze any ideas that arise in the interpretation process. Otherwise, there can be

4 39 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, p. 54. 440 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 217. 441 E. Coreth, P. Ehlen, G. Haeffner, F. Ricken, Filozofia XX wieku, trans. M. L. Kalinowski, Kęty 2004, p. 79. 442 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 220. 443 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 261–​262. 444 WuM, p. 253.

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no correct interpretative understanding.445 Competent translators are particularly attentive to unconscious thinking habits and direct their attention primarily toward the text, its “view,” the subject matter, and what it has to say in a given case:446 “For the interpreter to let himself be guided by the things themselves is obviously not the matter of a single, ‘conscientious’ decision, but is ‘the first, last, and constant task.’ ”447 This is of great importance because, according to Gadamer, the prejudices concerning the meaning of the original text do not manifest themselves clearly –​i.e. the translator does not have direct access to them448 –​but must be constantly revised and corrected. Such an approach might prevent misunderstandings. However, this conclusion shows the limitations of the translation act, which is primarily intended as a “bridge” between the thoughts of the author of the source text and the target audience interpreting the translation in an individual way. Gadamer clearly states that at this stage of contact with a text, many “pitfalls” await the interpreter, and therefore, the translator. Furthermore, the success of the translation process depends on whether the interpreter will direct his or her attention to the “thing” that the text discusses. A translator trying to understand a text first projects the meaning –​there may even be several projections –​and the initial reading of the text invariably comes with some expectations concerning its content. However, a thorough revision of these initial ideas (the projection of meaning) always conditions the translator’s competences449 –​especially since unconscious thinking habits and interpretative ideas are inherent in any interpretation process. Competent translators are aware of the need to revise their own thinking, because each revision of their initial projection(s) makes it possible to prepare a new preproject, bringing them closer to grasping the full dimensions of meaning and thus to understanding the text. A translator always runs the risk of making translation errors, which –​as we could empirically demonstrate –​are often the result of unverified, unanalyzed, preliminary interpretative ideas. This is all the more important because –​as Gadamer emphasizes –​developing adequate 445 Dybel aptly interprets this situation by describing it as an understanding in the sense of “intellectual grasp.” Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 80. 446 WuM, p. 251. 447 Gadamer, Truth, p. 269. “Sie dergestalt von der Sache bestimmen lassen, ist für den Interpreten offenkundig nicht ein einmaliger ‘braver’ Entschluß, sondern wirklich ‘die erste, ständige und letzte Aufgabe’ ”(WuM, p. 251). 448 WuM, p. 279. 449 WuM, p. 251.

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preliminary drafts, which are then verified, is the fundamental task of a person who wants to understand.450 Revision of preprojects is permanently inscribed in the geometry of understanding. It is worth recalling Gadamer about the anticipation of meaning: “It is of course necessary for this expectation to be adjusted if the text calls for it. This means, then, that the expectation changes and that the text unifies its meaning around another expectation.”451 He postulates keeping some distance from our own preprojects and even suspending them until there is subjective confirmation of the correctness of the method used in the interpretation. However, at the same time, the philosopher points out that in order to be able to assess their relevance in relation to a given text, it is necessary to go beyond their horizon, to look at them from a different angle. At this point, the interpreter becomes a kind of passive observer, not an active participant of the interpretive game: “It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, provoked.”452 So when translators confront an initial text that is essentially nothing more than the transmission of a certain tradition, they are performing an in-​depth self-​reflection on their own limitations and possible misconceptions. Competent interpreters look at their own judgments from a farther perspective, seeking to maintain a reserved attitude toward them.453 At that point, it is important to be able to preserve what is already known, to question what seems certain and has already been established. In other words, it is the ability to continually interpret one’s own hypotheses and strategically balance one’s own knowledge. The task of a competent interpreter is to rise to the specific generality necessary to evaluate the specificity and quality of the work being performed.454 4 50 WuM, pp. 251–​252. 451 Gadamer, Truth, p. 291. “Freilich muß sich diese Erwartung berichtigen lassen, wenn der Text es fordert. Das bedeutet dann, daß die Erwartung umgestimmt wird und daß sich der text unter einer anderen Sinnerwartung zur Einheit einer Meinung zusammenschließt” (WuM, p. 275). 452 Gadamer, Truth, p. 298. “Ein Vorurteil gleichsam vor sich zu bringen, kann nicht gelingen, solange dies Vorurteil beständig und unbemerkt im Spiele ist, sondern nur dann, wenn es sozusagen gereizt wird” (WuM, p. 283). 453 At the same time, we must emphasize the unreasonableness of striving for objectivity in the translation process. Unfortunately, objectivization in translation is an unrealistic ideal. Therefore, in this case we may speak only of the so-​called partial objectivity of the translator and, it seems, only when the person translating the text retains a specific awareness of his or her own position in relation to the interpretation process. 454 See WuM, p. 288.

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Stolze rightly points out that, regardless of the text, the task of any competent translator is to enter into in-​depth self-​reflection about one’s own knowledge and thus on whether –​at a given moment in time –​understanding of a particular message may be realized,455 or whether it must be postponed and resumed after the translator has filled in any gaps in general or specialized knowledge. Moreover, this is connected with the translator’s “objectivity,” which is very interesting here. A competent translator knows that he or she must confirm the initial, subjectivized, projections of meaning.456 Such confirmation will have the characteristics of objectivity. Let us quote Gadamer: But understanding realizes its full potential only when the fore-​meanings that it begins with are not arbitrary. Thus it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying solely on the fore-​meaning already available to him, but rather explicitly to examine the legitimacy –​i.e., the origin and validity –​of the fore-​meanings dwelling within him.457

This is the basic postulate of the hermeneutical approach to the text. It equally applies to the linguistic preferences of the translator and to entering yet another level of in-​depth self-​reflection: analysis of the linguistic means used by the author of the original text in relation to the historical processes determining the formation of specific meanings, not only with regard to lexis as such, but also to syntax and stylistics. This is an important finding, since Gadamer’s presuppositions relate not just to the text per se, but also to the language used therein: Every text presents the task of not simply leaving our own linguistic usage unexamined –​ or in the case of a foreign language the usage that we are familiar with from writers or from daily intercourse. Rather, we regard our task as deriving our understanding of the text from the linguistic usage of the time or of the author.458

4 55 Stolze, “The Translator’s Approach,” p. 69. 456 WuM, p. 252. 457 Gadamer, Truth, p. 270. “Das Verstehen kommt nun aber erst in seine eigentliche Möglichkeit, wenn die Vormeinungen, die es einsetzt, nicht beliebige sind. Es hat darum seinen guten Sinn, daß der Ausleger nicht geradezu, aus der in ihm bereiten Vormeinung lebend, auf den Text zugeht, vielmehr die in ihm lebenden Vormeinungen ausdrücklich auf ihre Legitimation, und das ist: auf Herkunft und Geltung prüft” (WuM, p. 252). 458 Gadamer, Truth, p. 270 “Jedem Text gegenüber ist die Aufgabe gestellt, den eigenen Sprachgebrauch –​oder im Falle einer Fremdsprache den uns aus den Schriftstellern oder dem täglichen Umgang bekannten Sprachgebrauch –​nicht einfach ungeprüft einzusetzen. Wir erkennen vielmehr die Aufgabe an, aus dem Sprachgebrauch der Zeit bzw. des Autors unser Verständnis des Textes erst zu gewinnen” (WuM, p. 252).

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Critical self-​reflection on the use of language is equally important when seriously considering a text’s content. The interpreter must “break the spell of his own fore-​meanings.”459 As he continues: There can, of course, be a general expectation that what the text says will fit perfectly with my own meanings and expectations. But what another person tells me, whether conversation, letter, book, or whatever, is generally supposed to be his own and not my opinion; and this is what I am to take note of without necessarily having to share it. Yet this presupposition is not something that makes understanding easier, but harder, since the fore-​meanings that determine my own understanding can go entirely unnoticed.460

Thus, a translator’s fundamental task is to prevent any misunderstanding,461 an end that may be achieved by critically considering not only the validity and accuracy of his or her own ideas, but also the nature of the language present in both the original and the target text. Interpreting Gadamer, we may say that translators cannot blindly and uncritically follow their initial projections of meaning,462 nor can they state that they have obtained excellent or complete understanding in the interpretation process, because the translation act is already marked by circularity and not –​as it may seem –​linearity. For linearity would indicate the impossible ideal of conducting certain stages in the translation process and definitely ending the process of interpretation. But we also know that once the translation “slips out” of the translator’s hands, it continues to live its own life, is subjected to successive interpretations, and sometimes gives impulse to creating a retranslation of the same source text. When analyzed hermeneutically, a translator’s competences include the ability to distinguish any interpretative ideas that cannot be confirmed in a situational context apart from the individual and cultural-​historical prejudices in which the translator is somehow “entangled.” The translator must constantly

4 59 Gadamer, Truth, p. 270 WuM, p. 252. 460 Gadamer, Truth, pp. 270–​271. “Gewiß kann es keine generelle Voraussetzung sein, daß das, was uns in einem Text gesagt wird, sich meinen eigenen Meinungen und Erwartungen bruchlos einfügt. Was mir einer sagt, ob im Gespräch, Brief oder Buch oder wie immer, steht ja zunächst im Gegenteil unter der Voraussetzung, daß es seine und nicht meine Meinung ist, die da ausgesprochen wird und die ich zur Kenntnis zu nehmen habe, ohne daß ich dieselbe zu teilen brauche. Aber diese Voraussetzung ist nicht eine erleichternde Bedingung für das Verstehen, sondern insofern eine Erschwerung, als die mein Verständnis bestimmenden eigenen Vormeinungen ganz unbemerkt zu bleiben vermögen” (WuM, pp. 252–​253). 461 WuM, p. 253. 462 WuM, p. 253.

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oscillate between the sphere of subjectivity and objectivity. On the one hand, the translator has access to the “thing” –​the text’s subject matter, i.e. to something strictly defined, concrete. This means the translator has access to a specific fragment of reality that is uniform in its dimension, yet subject to numerous and different readings. On the other hand, the translator has to take into account the historical-​cultural context, which he or she may grasp only partially. The translator must be able to find a compromise in this situation and take into consideration the interpretative conditions –​past and present –​to which he or she has been subjected since the beginning of the translation process. In this sense, the translator smoothly moves from the subjective to the objective sphere. To some extent, the subjective sphere of the translation process includes the translator’s own –​individual –​prejudices, the history and historicity of the understanding itself, the community to which the interpreter belongs, and the numerous contexts on the borderline between past and present that form specific “thresholds of understanding” and which determine in a special way what is understood and what, on the contrary, makes that understanding impossible. Conversely, the objective sphere includes the interpreted message, whose sense will refract differently depending on the interpreter’s historical and cultural perception. The confrontation of one’s initial thinking with the general prejudices connected to the broader cultural-​historical sphere in which both text and interpreter are embedded allows us to distinguish between adequate and incorrect projections. Such a “fusion” of the past with the present, and the subjective with the objective, creates a horizon of understanding. Dybel is right to express doubts as to whether the meaning of “things” is accurately and thoroughly articulated, since in fact, it is important to note the existence of prejudices –​in addition to any interpretative ideas of the interpreter, which appear ad hoc and are stimulated by the act of reading –​that remain outside consciousness but are historically embedded, i.e. the prejudices entangling the interpreter, out of his full control. Perhaps it is enough to be aware of the differences between particular –​or individual –​prejudices and those generalized ones, creating a sphere of cultural-​historical conditions and determining the meaning of cultural products, e.g. a translation.463 Perhaps the “thing” is invariably conditioned by prejudice –​whether individual or general –​and is distinguished each time in a different way, depending on the translator’s situational context. It seems we can consider the “thing” as “objective” –​i.e. the translator

463 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 84–​86.

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realizes that it exists –​while the way in which a translator deciphers the “thing” is subjective, i.e. determined by the way the translator perceives the text. We may neutralize the problematic duality of an exclusive or complementary character464 described above, i.e. the unsolvable dilemma concerning the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, if we consider that despite the differences and diverse cultural-​historical conditions of the translator, there is a sphere of “objectivity” in the sense that the interpreter each time has a task of a certain nature and the same goal to achieve: the translator has to grasp and anticipate the meaning of the text, the “thing” already mentioned many times, and allow understanding and agreement. As already noted, the sphere of subjectivity is inalienable, because the way of discovering a text’s meaning then reaching understanding and agreement will be different depending on the historical era and cultural area in which the source text is embedded, or the ideology professed by both the representatives of the original culture and those of the target culture. This conclusion is in line with Gadamer’s postulate according to which the division into subjective and objective aspects in the interpretation process is not right. Gadamer is unambiguous in his decision about subjectivity and objectivity: Our line of thought prevents us from dividing the hermeneutic problem in terms of the subjectivity of the interpreter and the objectivity of the meaning to be understood. This would be starting from a false antithesis that cannot be resolved even by recognizing the dialectic of subjective and objective.465

A division into subjective interpreter and objective meaning of the text would be too one-​sided and simplistic. The meaning, which is worth emphasizing once again, becomes concrete in interpretation but does not constitute something established once and for all. We may see a certain objectivity only in in the task facing the translator –​namely, the translation of a text understood here not in terms of meaningful content, but in terms of a set of language characters. This

464 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 87–​89. Noteworthy, as Dybel emphasizes, is that the aforementioned duality results from the fact that Gadamer placed his theory “between conceptual patterns typical of metaphysical tradition and the pursuit of exceeding them by demonstrating the historical character of the process of understanding.” 465 Gadamer, Truth, p. 309. “Unsere Überlegungen verwehren uns, die hermeneutische Problemstellung auf die Subjektivität des Interpreten und die Objektivität des zu verstehenden Sinnes aufzuteilen. Ein solches Verfahren ginge von einem falschen Gegenüber aus, das auch nicht durch die Anerkennung der Dialektik des Subjektiven und Objektiven überbrückt werden kann” (WuM, p. 294).

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is also where we can find differences between the linguistic and hermeneutical approaches. Even within the framework of such enormous interpretative potential and great thematic complexity, the tolerance for interpretative ideas must be limited. Although the translator is even obliged to open up to what the text has to say, as an interpreter he or she must also assess the relevance and validity of his or her own initial projections of the meaning found in the original text. In Gadamer’s postulates, we find references to Heidegger’s philosophy and his prestructure of understanding. Heidegger also advocates “securing” the text –​in case the anticipation of meaning proves wrong –​and keeping control over the quality of prejudices.466 However, self-​reflection and self-​criticism do not come down to being aware of the necessity to review and analyze one’s own opinions and expectations. It is also necessary for the translator to be aware of how important anticipation is in translation. When starting to translate, the translator must take into account that the most fundamental activity is to work out an initial plan for handling the text. This means the translator must “anticipate the anticipation” in advance. This is essential in any process of learning or acquiring knowledge, but especially in the translation process, which is both a process of continuously assimilating knowledge and also of producing it.467 A translator who approaches his or her work reflectively and critically already has firm opinions on authority –​another extremely important hermeneutical concept. Gadamer rehabilitates the notion of authority, which in the Enlightenment –​similarly to the notion of superstition –​was undeservedly criticized, as people perceived listening to the voice of authority to be a sign of abandoning one’s own reason, freedom, and judgment. Gadamer restores authority, especially the authority of persons, to its rightful place: “But the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge –​the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence –​i.e., it has priority over one’s own.”468 4 66 Gadamer, Truth, p. 272. WuM, p. 254. 467 See Knowledge in Translation. Global Patterns of Scientific Exchange, 1000–​1800 CE, ed. by P. Manning & A. Owen, Pittsburgh 2018. 468 Gadamer, Truth, p. 281. “Die Autorität von Personen hat aber ihren letzten Grund nicht in einem Akte der Unterwerfung und der Abdikation der Vernunft, sondern in einem Akt der Anerkennung und der Erkenntnis –​der Erkenntnis nämlich, daβ der andere einem an Urteil und Einsicht überlegen ist und daβ daher sein Urteil vorgeht, d.h. vor dem eigenen Urteil den Vorrang hat” (WuM, pp. 263–​264).

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A competent interpreter, aware of his own limitations, shows an open attitude toward authorities, i.e. people whose achievements may provide fuller insight into a given interpretative problem. In the context of translation, we may name here theories, approaches, solutions to translation problems, or typologies and classifications of techniques and strategies developed by renowned theoreticians in this field. A competent translator takes into consideration various positions, especially those of recognized translators, though this does not relieve him or her from undertaking in-​depth critical reflection on each individual translation case. Gadamer does not want to freely follow the voice of a person considered to be an authority in a given field, but rather to critically consider that voice during his own search. In this respect, the translator’s attitude is characterized by a specific intellectual freedom and by the rigor of reason,469 and thus by a particular rationalization in making translation decisions. We should interpret a translator’s self-​reflection and self-​criticism from yet another perspective. As noted numerous times here, the interpreter is required to self-​critically assess his or her level of competence. When referring to Socratic enlightened ignorance or, in other words, to the idea of learned ignorance (docta ignorantia), Gadamer actually speaks of an attitude contained in the statement: “I know that I do not know.”470 In modern translation didactics, scholars relatively often articulate such a view,471 mainly with regard to the analysis of a source text and knowledge of the field it concerns.472 To summarize these considerations, Gadamer states it best: Hermeneutics achieves its actual productivity only when it musters sufficient self-​ reflection to reflect simultaneously about its own critical endeavors, that is, about its own limitations and the relativity of its own position. Hermeneutical reflection that does that seems to me to come closer to the real ideal of knowledge, because it also makes us aware of the illusion of reflection. A critical consciousness that points to all sorts of prejudice and dependency, but one that considers itself absolutely free of prejudice and independent, necessarily remains ensnared in illusions. For it is itself motivated in the first place by that of which it is critical. Its dependency on that which it destroys is inescapable. The claim to be completely free of prejudice is naïve whether that naïvete be the delusion of an absolute enlightenment or the delusion of an empiricism free of

4 69 WuM, pp. 263–​264. 470 WuM, p. 344. 471 See e.g. Translator and Interpreter Training: Issues, Methods and Debates, ed. by J. Kearns, London-​New York-​Delhi-​Sydney 2008. 472 See W. Wills, Knowledge and Skills in Translator Behaviour, Amsterdam-​ Philadelphia 1996.

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all previous opinions in the tradition of metaphysics or the delusion of getting beyond science through ideological criticism.473

A competent interpreter must avoid such naivety. While displaying an attitude of critical prejudice toward the translated message, the translator must simultaneously reflect on his or her own work and productivity. At this point, we see the essence of the concentricity the interpretative circles reveal: a competent interpreter shows in-​depth or at least primary reflection on his own conduct –​meta-​ reflective ability –​and at the same time the translator goes in the direction of meta-​metareflection –​a secondary reflection –​built upon it, when making a hermeneutical reflection on the primary critical prejudice.

2.3. Summary The hermeneutic circle reflects with all its power what the process of translation actually is. It indicates that the translation act comes down to discovering the meaning of a text on the basis of the individual parts available to the reader, and of those parts on the basis of the whole, i.e., the historicity of the text, its embedding in tradition, and its cultural and social conditions. By default, any translation is marked by a specific bias. The translator approaches the source text with preliminary expectations about it, for the translation act is marked by an aspect of assumption. While expecting the full meaning of the content, a competent translator also anticipates the whole translation project and the comprehensiveness of the undertaken activities. Moreover, the translator assumes the meaningfulness of both the message to be translated and the meaningfulness of the actions taken. 473 Gadamer, “Semantic and Hermeneutics,” pp. 93–​94. “Ihre eigentliche Produktivität gewinnt aber die hermeneutische Kritik erst dann, wenn sie die Selbstreflexion aufbringt, ihr eigenes kritisches Bemühen, d. h. die eigene Bedingtheit und Abhängigkeit, in der es steht mit zu reflektieren. Hermeneutische Reflexion, die das tut, scheint mir dem wirklichen Erkenntnisideal näherzukommen, weil sie auch noch die Illusion der Reflexion zum Bewußtsein bringt. Ein kritisches Bewußtsein, das überall Vorurteilshaftigkeit und Abhängigkeit nachweist, aber sich selbst für absolut, d. h. für vorurteilslos und unabhängig hält, bleibt notwendig in Illusionen befangen. Denn es ist selbst erst motiviert durch das, dessen Kritik es ist. Eine unauflösbare Abhängigkeit besteht für es gegenüber dem, das es auflöst. Der Anspruch aus völlige Vorurteilslosigkeit ist eine Naivität, ob sich dieselbe als der Wahn einer absoluten Aufklärung darstellt oder als der Wahn einer von allen Vormeinungen der metaphysischen Tradition freien Empirie oder als der Wahn einer Überwindung der Wissenschaft durch Ideologiekritik” (H.-​G. Gadamer, Semantik, p. 259).

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Of course, it is important to make an in-​depth reflection on one’s own limitations, prejudices, convictions, and initial expectations toward the text. This enables the translator to assimilate the foreign and to understand a message that contains elements of strangeness reflected not only in the language –​a foreign one –​but also in the tradition and history associated with it. Such reflection allows the development of an appropriate attitude toward the concept of authority. A competent translator does not translate uncritically, but approaches the text deeply reflecting on its origins and its horizon. For as Gadamer says, understanding creates a horizon in which the thing that the text relates to may reveal itself,474 but it must be related to the historical context in which both the author of the initial text and the interpreter of the original text, i.e. the translator, are embedded. In hermeneutical terms, understanding of the text stands for understanding “with epistemological parentheses,”475 in which elements from the past and present –​those known to the translator and those unknown –​may exist.476 We should remark that the way a reader understands the text is determined by his or her current knowledge of the issue, and, as J. C. Alderson and M. Short rightly stress, by the “availability” of this knowledge in the “process of reading.”477 This statement is most fully explored in the next chapter, in which I present translation as a concretization of historically effected consciousness.

4 74 WuM, p. 373. 475 See Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 128. 476 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 128. 477 See J. C. Alderson, M. Short, “Reading Literature,” in: Reading, Analysing and Teaching Literature, ed. by M. Short, London 1989, p. 72.

Chapter Three: Translation as a Concretization of Historically Effected Consciousness As just shown, in Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy the understanding of a text is far from being static. Understanding is a process in progress (Geschehen), which consists in making meaning concrete478 and adapting it to the current situation in which the interpreter is embedded. This indicates a clear departure from perceiving this phenomenon only in strictly subjective or only in strictly objective terms. In his reflections, he emphasizes that, contrary to common belief, the process of understanding is also indirectly objective. At this point, Gadamer significantly remarks: “Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated.”479 The process of transmitting tradition –​a kind of a keystone of intersubjective understanding –​is another way in which he reveals the specificity of the translation act and the role of the translator who becomes an intermediary between the past and the present. In this chapter I present translation as a unique process of the concretization of the meaning of the text determined by historical aspects, including tradition, temporal distance, and hermeneutical horizon.

3.1. Translation as a Hermeneutical Experience –​Introduction to the Notion of Historically Effected Consciousness We may describe translation as a hermeneutical experience. But what is this experience and how should this metaphor be understood in the light of Gadamer’s philosophical assumptions? We should begin by explaining his concept of experience: However paradoxical it may seem, the concept of experience seems to me one of the most obscure we have. Because it plays an important role in the natural sciences in the

4 78 WuM, p. 375. 479 Gadamer, Truth, p. 291. Das Verstehen ist selber nicht so sehr als eine Handlung der Subjektivität zu denken, sondern als Einrücken in ein Überlieferungsgeschehen, in dem sich Vergangenheit und Gegenwart beständig vermitteln“ (WuM, pp. 274–​275).

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logic of induction, it has been subjected to an epistemological schematization that, for me, truncates its original meaning.480

According to Gadamer, the deep roots of the term “experience” in the sciences may have contributed to its being relatively overlooked or unrecognized in philosophy. Experience in science has nothing to do with experience perceived in strictly philosophical terms (or even more generally, in humanistic terms). This is because the strict sciences emphasize the inherent feature of experience, i.e. repetitiveness, where subsequent experiments confirm those that have already been carried out, thus giving a study a scientific dimension. Gadamer criticizes such an understanding of “experience,” even though it is related to how people perceive everyday life experience, which also has to be relatively repetitive to be called experience. Moreover, he opposes the empirical-​ rationalistic model of familiarizing reality and does not agree that experience should be understood only in terms of perception or that knowledge should be defined as a set of data obtained through experimental procedure. Referring to Aristotle and Hegel, Gadamer states that experience will never really fall within the scope of science per se, because in fact, these concepts lie at opposite conceptual poles.481 In his view, we should interpret experience holistically and in accordance with practical categories. Bronk rightly points out that experience takes on an “anthropological-​existential character,” because it is also a “recognition of the essential limitation posed by history on men”482 –​for we gain experience over time which simultaneously becomes a determinant of the course of a given experience. It is worth recalling Gadamer: But then this gives the concept of experience that we are concerned with here a qualitatively new element. It refers not only to experience in the sense of information about this or that. It refers to experience in general. This experience is always to be acquired, and from it no one can be exempt. Experience in this sense belongs to the historical nature of man.483

480 Gadamer, Truth, p. 341. “Der Begriff der Erfahrung scheint mir –​so paradox es klingt –​zu den unaufgeklärtesten Begriffen zu gehören, die wir besitzen. Weil er in der Logik der Induktion für die Naturwissenschaften eine führende Rolle spielt, ist er einen erkenntnistheoretischen Schematisierung unterworfen worden, die mir seinen ursprünglichen Gehalt zu verkürzen scheint” (WuM, p. 329). 481 WuM, p. 338. 482 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 153. 483 Gadamer, Truth, p. 350. “Damit aber enthält der Begriff der Erfahrung, um den es jetzt geht, ein qualitativ neues Moment. Er meint nicht nur Erfahrung im Sinne der Belehrung, die sie über dieses oder jenes gewährt. Er meint Erfahrung im ganzen. Das ist jene Erfahrung, die stets selber erworben sein muß und niemandem erspart

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This experience, which is common for the human universe, in a way requires the acceptance of one’s own finitude in history. In that case, what man can be described as experienced? According to Gadamer, such a person deeply reflects upon their own place in the universe, aware that they have no control over what is possible. Through experience understood in this manner, men acquire the knowledge of how to “read” the reality around them and where to set uncrossable boundaries for themselves. Such “experience” hides specific human wisdom and rationality, which are always determined by a person’s entanglement in history and by acceptance of that fact. The result of all experience is cognition: Real experience is that whereby man becomes aware of his finiteness. In it are discovered the limits of the power and the self-​knowledge of his planning reason. The idea that everything can be reversed, that there is always time for everything and that everything somehow returns, proves to be an illusion. Rather, the person who is situated and acts in history continually experiences the fact that nothing returns. To acknowledge what is does not just mean to recognize what is at this moment, but to have insight into the limited degree to which the future is still open to expectation and planning or, even more fundamentally, to have the insight that all the expectation and planning of finite beings is finite and limited. Genuine experience is experience of one’s own historicity.484

This critique of the specificity of “experience” in science also applies in the case of the humanities, where scholars sometimes attempt to objectivize the subject under examination. Przyłębski interestingly states that here Gadamer draws attention to a process that “goes beyond the objectivization of the past,” which is related to the so-​called “mediation” of the past through the present.485 According to Gadamer, what is old cannot be objectivized for the simple reason that the past is not a creation that we “come upon” in an unchanged form –​its interpreters gain werden kann. Erfahrung ist hier etwas, was zum geschichtlichen Wesen des Menschen gehört” (WuM, p. 338). 484 Gadamer, Truth, p. 351. “Die eigentliche Erfahrung ist diejenige, in der sich der Mensch seiner Endlichkeit bewußt wird. An ihr findet das Machenkönnen und das Selbstbewußtsein seiner planenden Vernunft seine Grenze. Es erweist sich als bloßer Schein, daß sich alles rückgängig machen läßt, daß immer für alles Zeit ist und alles irgendwie wiederkehrt. Der in der Geschichte Stehende und Handelnde macht vielmehr ständig die Erfahrung, daß nichts wiederkehrt. Anerkennen dessen, was ist, meint hier nicht: erkennen dessen, was einmal da ist, sondern Einsicht in die Grenzen, innerhalb deren Zukunft für Erwartung und Planung noch offen ist –​ oder noch grundsätzlicher: daß alle Erwartung und Planung endlicher Wesen eine endliche und begrenzte ist. Eigentliche Erfahrung ist somit Erfahrung der eigenen Geschichtlichkeit” (WuM, p. 340). 485 Przyłębski, Gadamer, pp. 37–​38.

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mental access to it from the position they occupy in their own contemporarity, which determines the way they know and understand the past. The essence of this historical mediation is fully reflected in Gadamer’s concept of hermeneutical experience. Bronk suggests that it has the character of a conversation, because it refers to a dialog with the historical message, thus enabling the interpreter to understand things.486 So the hermeneutical experience shows a close connection with tradition,487 which Gadamer describes as a specific language and as a partner in hermeneutical conversation: “For tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with a Thou.”488 This is the highest type of hermeneutic experience489 that remains characteristic of a historically effected consciousness.490 The notion of hermeneutical experience serves Gadamer to explain the process of understanding, and thus also the universalized model of human functioning in the world, hence its key role in his philosophy. It is worth adding after Bronk that in Gadamer’s works, despite the universalization, the hermeneutical experience has most in common with the process of “understanding texts.”491 For in his view, understanding is textualized. From the structure of hermeneutical experience, we may directly derive a prestructure of translation as a way of understanding (translating) the world. The notion of hermeneutical experience as a universal phenomenon common to every human being is compatible with Gadamer’s concept of translation, which also, thanks to its universalized and anthropologized nature, characterizes human functioning per se. Furthermore, just like understanding, we may define hermeneutical experience and, thus, translation, with two other key concepts of Gadamer’s philosophical

486 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 153. At this point, it is also worth emphasizing the meaning of the word “thing” (Sache) in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. As Di Cesare rightly states, we should not confuse this concept with an object (Object). In the hermeneutical context, the thing (Sache) is not reduced to either Kant’s “thing in itself,” nor to Husserl’s “thing itself.” As Di Cesare further points out, according to the etymology of the German word Sache, this is a “matter under discussion” (Streitsache). It seems that his is how we should understand the “thing” that is subject to understanding in the translation process (D. Di Cesare, Gadamer, p. 88). 487 I will elaborate on tradition in the next part of the chapter. 488 Gadamer, Truth, p. 352. “Denn ein echter Kommunikationspartner, mit dem wir ebenso zusammengehören wie das Ich mit dem Du, ist auch die Überlieferung” (WuM, p. 340). 489 WuM, p. 343. 490 I will elaborate on historically effected consciousness in the next part of this chapter. 491 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 152.

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hermeneutics: language and historicity.492 Translation is a hermeneutic experience, because in the process of translation –​as in any other act of interpretation determined by its historicity –​there is an act of mediating the old (and therefore partly alien) and what is modern (more familiar to the translator) because of its linguistic character. The key issue is to decipher the meaning in relation to the current position that is the interpreter’s starting point in the understanding process. In that which is alien and before the past, the interpreter recognizes what is common to human nature –​for in an interpretation act understood in such a way, the symbolization of human existence is revealed, leading to a humanistic cognition directly linked with self-​understanding.

3.2. Effective History493 Effective history494 (Wikungsgeschichte) is the “core” of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, one of the main categories and figures of his philosophical hermeneutics. It continuously defines understanding, because it is closely related to man and his functioning in the world. Therefore, the concept bears visible traces of anthropology. After Soltysiak, we may see in it a resemblance to Heidegger’s “being in the world,” but in Gadamer’s case we are dealing with “being in effective history.”495 The transgression of the specificity of both concepts indicates the primacy of the influence of history on the functioning of the interpreter. The notion of effective history is also connected with historically effected consciousness,496

492 “The hermeneutical experience is determined by an historically effected consciousness, a higher form of historical consciousness, determined by the unity of understanding, interpretation, and application” (Przyłębski, Gadamer, p. 39). 493 We may find a very interesting translation of this notion in the work by Szymczyński, who uses the term “dzieje skutkujące” (resulting history), indicating in a way the inalienable influence of history on existence. See. T. R. Szymczyński, “Wielowymiarowość rozumienia pojęć mythos i logos z perspektywy zasady dziejów skutkujących Hansa-​ Georga Gadamera,” Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 2016, 1, pp. 7–​23). 494 Przyłębski aptly draws attention to the fact that in Polish, effective history is also translated as “historia oddziaływań” (history of influences). The author proposes yet another expression, i.e. “living history,” because, as he explains, Gadamer “means… that part of history which remains in social memory,” which does not pass away irretrievably, but influences human consciousness in the present time (Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 169). 495 Sołtysiak, Rozumienie i tradycja, pp. 51, 59 ff. 496 I will elaborate on this concept in the next chapter.

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because understanding gains its fullness when it takes place at a specific moment in history.497 As in the case of the concept of experience, Gadamer considers effective history in the context of the understanding and specificity of the subject being studied in the humanities.498 He emphasizes that at the very center of this field lies a tradition that in a particular way confirms the uniqueness of the humanities. In the case of the natural sciences, which undeniably also reflects the history of human thought, we may only speak of history in the context of the often-​underlined present state of knowledge. The activities of researchers who carried out experimental procedures in the past are already a part of history, mainly because progress is a result of the sensibility and reliability of research. Therefore, in the case of the natural sciences, historical context is only a secondary issue,499 an interesting addition that has little influence on the current actions of researchers. We may conclude that in the natural sciences, history has a verifying function, confirming or rejecting the validity of findings. It enables constant update of the level of perception of the reality in which representatives of a given research stream are embedded. In a way, research conducted in the past serves to legitimize or delegitimize the position developed by the heirs of scientistic thought and does not engage in a dialog with old thought in a way that would inspire in-​depth reflection in the humanities. For in the humanities, we come across a different perspective. Accordingly, it is not possible to apply the determinants inherent in the natural and exact sciences. The humanities are closely linked to history and tradition, which we may easily notice if we consider after Gadamer that the achievements and findings of humanists are not prone to becoming outdated.500 It is not possible to apply typical scientific measures and numerical indicators501 because there is a greater 4 97 WuM, p. 249. 498 Noteworthy, in Gadamer’s philosophy, humanistic experience is a model of the phenomenon of understanding. 499 WuM, p. 267. 500 WuM, p. 267. 501 An issue worth discussing is the specificity of research conducted by translation scholars, also in relation to the central problem of this monograph, i.e. translator’s competence. Over the years, there has been a peculiar split in terms of perspectives from which translatological research problems were analyzed. Of course, this is closely related to the division into such types of translation as: literary and artistic translation, specialized translation, audiovisual translation, and interpreting. It seems that scholars place the emphasis on the application of an accurate and reliable research method. The old approaches of translation theorists or philosophers (e.g. hermeneuticists) are

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need to ask important questions than to receive concrete answers.502 It seems that a subject under investigation gains importance mainly thanks to the authority of the creator of a given interpretation and its place in the general creative-​ critical activity. Other crucial aspects are the perspective that accompanied the researcher in the study, the theory applied, and even the motive in the light of which the analysis was conducted: We accept the fact that the subject presents different aspects of itself at different times or from different standpoints. We accept the fact that these aspects do not simply cancel one another out as research proceeds, but are like mutually exclusive conditions that exist by themselves and combine only in us.503

Therefore, we may state that humanists, as specific interpreters of the texts of culture, are also participants in a given message of tradition and its mediators. However, it would be wrong to say that the humanities are only about the echo of history. As Gadamer rightly points out, in a typically humanistic study, unlike in the natural or exact sciences, the research interests –​which always take into account mediation through tradition and thus are conditioned by tradition –​remain determined by the perspective of the present day, thanks to which the subject and topic take shape.504 Tradition plays a huge role in humanistic research, because the term is anchored in human existence. In a way, tradition has a chance to speak thanks to men and their functioning in the world. Undoubtedly, today, in the face of the pressure exerted on the representatives of the humanities505 –​i.e. pressure usually connected with the aforementioned increasingly marginalized, and yet the issues that were raised by them constitute the “core” of translation studies. 502 Cf. Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 240. 503 Gadamer, Truth, p. 285. “Wir nehmen hin, daß es verschiedene Aspekte sind, in denen sich die Sache zu verschiedenen Zeiten oder von verschiedenem Standort aus historisch darstellt. Wir nehmen hin, daß diese Aspekte sich nicht einfach in der Kontinuität fortschreitender Forschung aufheben, sondern wie einander ausschließende Bedingungen sind, die jede für sich bestehen und die sich nur in uns selber vereinigen” (WuM, p. 268, pp. 271–​272). 504 WuM, p. 269. 505 Nycz rightly states that: “In recent years, the cultivation of the humanities –​which has always been sensitive to the winds of history –​has been in a zone of markedly increased climatic risk; its traditional forms and methods have ceased to produce results that would be valuable enough, while the new ones have not yet confirmed their usefulness, making us worry about the prospect of a crop failure or an ecological disaster. Certainly, it is not just a Polish ailment; the humanities in the West have been struggling with similar problems and poor well-​being for at least 20 years”. In

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metric indicators –​the “spirit” of the humanities is under threat. Przyłębski discusses this issue in an interesting way: The domination of humanistic cognition by the modern idea of the method, uncritically taken over from natural science, leads to the fact that the sciences of culture (broadly understood humanistic and social sciences) cease to understand themselves, cease to have contact with the basis of their possibilities. They forget that the source of their productivity is the continuity of tradition, passed on in history. It is a reservoir of assumptions that is too often and hastily reduced to what is quantitative, measurable, and easily defined.506

Effective history is mainly about embedding the phenomenon of understanding in a given situational context. As Grondin points out, both philologists and philosophers have explored this concept.507 Since effective history is inextricably linked with effective consciousness, it constitutes at the same time an integral moment of the hermeneutical translation experience and means, as Przyłębski aptly underlines, that understanding per se is culturally and historically conditioned, determined by history, which, according to Gadamer, gains sway over the “finite consciousness” of man.508 At the same time, in Gadamer’s view, historical an attempt to find the causes of the impasse, Nycz concludes: “Scholars name the general causes of this ‘crisis’ quite unanimously. For we are dealing with: (1) the transformation of the typically modern model, assuming the autonomy of individual fields of the humanistic knowledge (at least in terms of subject matter and method), while maintaining theoretically homogeneous criteria for the verification of claims (such as neutrality, objectivity, and universality in particular); (2) the progressive technological-​civilizational-​cultural transformations, whose pace and level effectively hinder a systematic and holistic view, prompting researchers to take fragmentary or aspectual approaches that cannot be legitimately generalized or summed up; (3) the transformations in the status and function of the humanistic knowledge, which today is much more closely related to the needs of the educational and reading market than to ‘pure, autonomous science’ (Nycz, “O jednym z powodów tak zwanego kryzysu (w humanistyce, zwłaszcza polonistycznej),” Teksty Drugie 2001, 1, p. 4). It seems that we could at least partially exploit the above reasons named by Nycz to explain the “reluctance” of contemporary translation scholars to accept the hermeneutical approach in translation. 506 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 169. In the context of this finding, one could be tempted to propose a preliminary thesis that by denying the hermeneutical approach to the translation act, contemporary translatology forgets that “the source of its productivity is the continuity of tradition” (Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 169.). 507 Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsbegriff Hans-​Georg Gadamer, Königstein 1982, pp. 144–​145. 508 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 170.

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consciousness is understood as a“being,” but this also implies its unconscious “being” in relation to the influence of history. Grondin also emphasizes that we may analyze consciousness both as a genetivus obiectivus, i.e. as a situation in which the interpreter is aware of the existence and operation of effective history, and also as a genetivus subiectivus, i.e. as a situation in which effective history takes precedence over consciousness, influencing it immeasurably.509 Moreover, we may distinguish between objectivity and subjectivity in a slightly different way, in terms of the so-​called hermeneutical truth interestingly situated in the grammatized concept of Wierciński: Therefore, we may speak of hermeneutical truth in the sense of a subjective/​objective complement (genetivus obiectivus), which defines a person or an object that is the subject of an action. Hence, the truth of understanding is the truth of what is to be understood. In this sense, it is about the appropriateness or adequacy of understanding. The complement indicates the bearer of the attribute expressed by the noun to be determined (truth). We may also describe the truth of understanding as a possessive complement (genetivus subiectivus), i.e., as a truth that constitutively belongs to understanding as such. This is an understanding of truth that extends to the understanding of the one who understands. Hence, the understander belongs to it and co-​creates what is to be understood. The experience of hermeneutical truth fits into the sense of human existence. Therefore, the truth of understanding is not something that can exist independently of the subject being understood.510

In the context of the translation process, this view seems to be more accurate: the hermeneutical truth of translation will therefore function both as a genetivus obiectivus –​when a given textual unit and the context in which it is embedded are subjected to understanding (in other words, something is understood or someone is understood) –​and as a genetivus subiectivus, i.e. the whole of understanding per se, including whoever wishes to understand, is subject to a kind of perception –​when this understanding comes as if from “within,” i.e. taking into account the situation in which the interpreter finds him-​or herself and over which he has no control. Historically effected consciousness is the moment when understanding can happen at all511 and the effectiveness finds an interesting articulation in Gadamer’s dialectic of asking and answering: “the consciousness of being affected by history

5 09 Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit?, p. 146. 510 Wierciński, “Egzystencja hermeneutyczna jako egzystencja fronetyczna: radykalizm ludzkiej odpowiedzialności,” Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny 2015, p. 206. 511 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301. WuM, p. 285.

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(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewufttsein) is primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation”512 in which the interpreter is placed because of the message he or she wants to understand. The translator is somehow “thrown” into the action of history without having much influence on its course. Following Gadamer, we may say that the translator is obliged to place the meaning of the text in the context in which he or she, as its creator or interpreter, and the recipient of the translation find themselves.513 Although Gadamer postulates the development of the concept of effective history, he does not want to classify it as a separate sub-​discipline –​or one of the facilitative sciences –​of the humanities. He rather wants to see the concept in terms of a way to understand himself more adequately and in greater depth and to perceive more clearly the impact of history on the specificity and quality of understanding.514 For history has a great power of influence, even if it is strongly denied. Gadamer famously states that we may understand a text only if we understand it in a different way each time depending on a given situation, a particular moment in history. This constitutes the “core” of the hermeneutics, which invariably oscillates around historical consciousness.515 History not only shapes reality, but also gives it meaning. It has an autonomous status and dominates over mankind, so that a specific relationship between it and men may be established through a dialog with our prejudices.516 There is great power in effective history: “history is what we are and have always been. It is what binds our destiny.”517 It “governs” human beings and our finitude, making it impossible for us, when thrown into its whirlpools, to assess our position or to develop a full understanding/​agreement in a given case, because the historical constitution of man will always be a kind of limitation and determine the scope of the possible view on any given situation: To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete. All self-​ knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call “substance,” because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and

512 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301. “Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein ist zunächst Bewußtsein der hermeneutischen Sitatuion (WuM, p. 285). 513 WuM, p. 362. 514 WuM, p. 285. 515 WuM, pp. 292–​293. 516 Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte in der neueren deutschen Philosophie,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, pp. 5–​8. 517 “Geschichte ist, was wir je waren und sind. Sie ist das Verbindliche unseres Schicksals” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte,” p. 10).

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limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity.518

3.3. Tradition Tradition is also a fundamental concept in Gadamer. It is an inalienable component of the process of reaching agreement. It is, like the prejudices, the preontological qualifier of both understanding and self-​understanding. After all, tradition always anchors what we can learn and find about ourselves in a specific historical and situational context.519 Similarly to the concept described in the previous part, after its figurative annihilation by Enlightenment thinkers, tradition has lived to see a metaphorical resurrection thanks to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Tradition is the basis of understanding: its message not only triggers the process of understanding aspects of the reality around us, but determines it as well.520 It exists as long as it is subject to processes of understanding and interpretation. Tradition and the actions of the interpreter immersed in it create and activate a hermeneutic circle,521 hence, understanding is generated in the community of tradition and translator. When describing tradition, Gadamer refers to both Enlightenment and Romantic concepts, basically disagreeing with all of them. The representatives of the Enlightenment refer to tradition –​as they do to the notion of the prejudices –​in a very negative way and see in it a reflection of intellectual stagnation and cultural laziness. However, the Romantic vision of tradition –​although presented in terms that are in opposition to the Enlightenment –​is not free from shortcomings either: Romanticism conceives of tradition as an antithesis to the freedom of reason and regards it as something historically given, like nature. And whether one wants to be revolutionary and oppose it or preserve it, tradition is still viewed as the abstract opposite

518 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301“Geschichtlichsein heißt, nie im Sichwissen aufgehen. Alles Sichwissen erhebt sich aus geschichtlicher Vorgegebenheit, die wir mit Hegel Substanz nennen, weil sie alles subjektive Meinen und Verhalten trägt und damit auch alle Möglichkeit, eine Überlieferung in ihrer geschichtlichen Andersheit zu verstehen vorzeichnet und begrenzt” (WuM, pp. 285–​286). 519 Gadamer, “Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 2, p. 40. 520 WuM, p. 266. 521 WuM, p. 277.

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of free self-determination, since its validity does not require any reasons but conditions us without our questioning.522

Gadamer believes that neither the representatives of the Enlightenment nor those of Romanticism were right in the way they understood tradition. When Enlightenment thinkers considered tradition to be a typical manifestation of conventionalized conformism, stupidity, and irrationality, others uncritically praised it, which Gadamer did not understand. According to him, representatives of the Enlightenment and Romanticism both failed to follow the fundamental principles of tradition per se, showing attitudes that we may euphemistically call very extreme. If Enlightenment thinkers claim that tradition cannot be located in the space of reasonableness and see this concept only in terms of a historical return to what is long gone, then the Romantics, in his view, want to see tradition only in its past.523 To Gadamer, such a two-​way radicalization is unacceptable. The way to develop a common position, reconciling both sides, is historical hermeneutics covering tradition, history, and knowledge in continuous cognition.524 Gadamer claims that tradition, as a kind of product of reason, is in a special way connected with human rationality.525 For as Przyłębski aptly says, tradition is a “record of bygone reasonableness.” The elements that make it up function as long as they are valid in the “social practice” of seeking agreement.526 Therefore, we may compare the concept of tradition to an active participant in any historical changes that take place. Gadamer stresses that although completely new things, or even those we are just planning, seem natural –​hence, obviously belonging to the sphere of reasonableness –​they do not in fact belong to this sphere. Even in times as terrible as revolution or war, when things are destroyed

522 Gadamer, Truth, p. 282. “Sie denkt Tradition im Gegensatz zur vernünftigen Freiheit und sieht in ihr eine geschichtliche Gegebenheit von der Art der Natur. Und ob man sie nun revolutionär bekämpft oder konservieren möchte, sie erscheint ihr als das abstrakte Gegenteil der freien Selbstbestimmung, da ihre Geltung keiner vernünftigen Gründe bedarf, sondern und fraglos bestimmt” (WuM, s. 265). 523 WuM, p. 260. 524 WuM, p. 267. 525 WuM, p. 265. Bronk is right to believe that we may consider Gadamer’s attitude in this respect as “moderate traditionalism” –​for tradition stands here in the same line with understanding, and both these concepts determine cognition. Moreover, by enabling man to come into contact with the bygone, tradition broadens the horizon of understanding that is always drawn in the act of interpretation. Cf. A. Bronk, Rozumienie, pp. 241–​243. 526 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 165.

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or dematerialized, there is always something left of the previous era. Moreover, that “something” constitutes much more than man can see or realize. Thanks to the fusion of what is already bygone with what is just being formed, the new can emerge, although it is always somehow embedded in the old. This is how Gadamer explains the connection of tradition with reason, human freedom, and the historicity of cognition,527 emphasizing how man becomes aware of his own history, and how he at the same time creates a reality marked by history.528 Dybel rightly states that in Gadamer’s view, tradition is a kind of “prejudiceness” of prejudices:529 It is what makes every prejudice a prejudice, what makes us understand anything, we always do it from a historical perspective, in the light of certain thoughts, beliefs, views. Therefore, by living in a given way, we always belong to a tradition and this reference is a condition for understanding anything. Therefore, tradition does not only make us understand something concrete, but also makes us understand something at all. In this sense, remaining within tradition is the main source of motivation for our understanding of prejudice.530

Being a body of collectively gathered initial thoughts about the world,531 tradition is a dynamic, flexible, and fluid creation and not a monument or “testimony of memory”532 enclosed in a selective human return to its specific layers. As Bronk says, “the carrier of tradition is not a certain text with a fragment of the past but the continuity of memory.”533 Contrary to popular belief, it does not represent the consolidation of what has already happened, in any form, but, being conditioned by history, is constantly being modified. However, in order to exist tradition needs certain “determinants of constancy and unity,” which means that it must be preserved, cultivated, cared for, and remembered –​otherwise it disappears, either lost or forgotten. Despite this fundamental aspect of the “storage” of the materialized former existence, we should stress that tradition acquires its proper meaning only in contact with the present. In fact, it is

5 27 WuM, pp. 265–​266. 528 Sołtysiak, Rozumienie i tradycja, p. 153. According to Sołtysiak, tradition is not only the genetivus obiectivus –​our awareness of tradition –​but also the genetivus subiectivus, and therefore the awareness –​reason –​defined by tradition. This distinction brings to mind Grondin’s distinction in the context of historical consciousness. 529 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 292. 530 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 292–​293. 531 WuM, p. 279. 532 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 292. 533 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 242.

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thanks to the contemporary times that tradition can exist: “understanding is not so much an activity of the subject as it is an intrusion into a certain process of tradition’s making in which the past and present are constantly mediated.”534 The understanding subject merges with the object being understood: the interpreter always belongs somehow to the past, and the object being understood enters, to a certain extent, the world from which the one who interprets is derived.535 So it is difficult to say that certain works, the transmitters of tradition, are anchored in a certain timeliness. We may, in fact, consider them atemporal. At the same time, thanks to the aforementioned fusion, it becomes possible to mediate between the foreign and the known, since tradition occupies a prominent place between what the interpreter knows from his own experience and what opens up in front of him in the cognition act: “Tradition is not an evil we need to reconcile with, but a complement to man’s ontological and epistemic finiteness, which prevents us from starting anew every time.”536 This is why Gadamer opposes approaching tradition in an objective way. We may find here an obvious association with his approach to the status of language. He claims we are dealing with an anthropological definition of tradition through the place occupied by its interpreter. The objectification of tradition would make it only an object materialized in texts and other cultural monuments. On the other hand, as a specific historical and historically-​effective creation, tradition acquires after objectification a special status as a mediator carrying a specific sense each time –​which is only possible through the articulation of understanding and interpretation, i.e. through a specific hermeneutical experience.537 We may conclude that tradition is not an objective creation subject to cognition for it has no concrete sense we can discover independently of the historical moment in which the interpreter is located. Tradition is rather a polyphonic sphere of meanings constantly changing and updating, each time filling up with meaning at the moment of interpretation. Contrary to Enlightenment ideals, contact with tradition does not limit cognition at all, but, in fact, makes it possible. For tradition also contains the prejudices determining our understanding. A translator who tries to understand a text is already completely “immersed” in and defined by it. The translator is also “immersed” in history and can never evade it.

5 34 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 242. 535 Cf. Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 242. 536 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 237. 537 Gadamer, “Philosophie und Hermeneutik,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften IV, p. 260.

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What we should pay attention to is the relationship between tradition (Tradition) and “the handing down of tradition” (Überlieferung) that we find in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Can a tradition exist without the mediation of its components? No, the two concepts are inextricably linked. Just as, in Gadamer’s view, the world does not exist without language nor language without the world, so tradition cannot function if no one transmits it. In other words, to understand means to initiate the process of transmitting, in which the past and the present connect, and to participate in the mediation understood in such a way.538 Gadamer describes this aspect by analyzing the concept of “the classical”: We might say that the classical is a truly historical category, precisely because it is more than a concept of a period or of a historical style, and yet it nevertheless does not try to be the concept of a suprahistorical value. It does not refer to a quality that we ascribe to particular historical phenomena but to a notable mode of being historical: the historical process of preservation (Bewahrung) that, through constantly proving itself (Bewahrung), allows something true (ein Wahres) to come into being.539

It follows from the above quotation that the classical –​which is for Gadamer the model on which the philosopher explains the specificity and phenomenon of the process of understanding –​is exactly such a mediation between the past and the present. However, the stance of the classical to the present remains important in this respect. For Gadamer, the classical contains the essence of what a being is in relation to history (a historical being). Moreover, the classical also contains the essence of means storing the axiological goods in light of the constant flow of time. What the classical is, thus, is also atemporal. However, we should note that it is precisely this atemporal nature that we should consider here as a kind of historical being.540 Thus, timelessness –​or temporal universality –​is also a part of history. It is not only about the historically dependent construction of the “world” of a bygone era, but also about a particular awareness of belonging to it.

5 38 WuM, pp. 274–​275. 539 Gadamer, Truth, p. 288. “Das Klassische ist gerade dadurch eine wahrhaft geschichtliche Kategorie, daß es mehr ist als ein Epochenbegriff oder ein historischer Stilbegriff und daß es dennoch nicht ein übergeschichtlicher Wertgedanke sein will. Es bezeichnet nicht eine Qualität, die bestimmten geschichtlichen Erscheinungen zuzusprechen ist, sondern eine ausgezeichnete Weise des Geschichtlichseins selbst, den geschichtlichen Vollzug der Bewahrung, die –​in immer erneuerter Bewährung –​ein Wahres sein läßt” (WuM, p. 271, p. 274). 540 WuM, p. 274.

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In this sense, Gadamer speaks of the phenomenon of mediating the past with the present through tradition.541 The fact that a translator belongs to a given tradition is obvious. Only thanks to tradition which generates prejudices is the interpreter able to understand anything at all. In the process of translation, tradition is always mediated by the language, so it is more appropriate to speak in this context of a broadly defined linguistic tradition,542 with which one enters into a certain relationship through the horizon –​in other words, a specific range of vision within which the interpreter can perceive the essence and importance of a given message.

3.4. The Horizon Gadamer defines the horizon in the following way: “The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage.”543 Therefore, in such a view, we may perceive horizon as a way of understanding the environment in which the interpreter is located. The metaphorical spatial approach to horizon –​expanding, narrowing, or opening it up –​and putting it into context locates the understanding subject in a specific epistemological position. Since the horizon is subject to shifts, the specifics of the understanding of a given situation are also subject to translocations. Any shift in the horizon is under the influence of, for example, an increase in the interpreter’s knowledge or a change in his attitude toward the surrounding world. Gadamer says that what is modern has many limitations. This is one of the main thematic motifs that characterize the hermeneutical situation. As we may conclude, the horizon is a place that does not allow for an overall vision and, in a way, its physiognomy is surrounded by a circle of perception and transparency.544 According to Gadamer’s view, in order to understand something, one must be “dragged” into the so-​called fusion of horizons, and thus into the sphere where the subject and the object, subjectivity, objectivity, and, finally, intersubjectivity activate. As Przyłębski points out, in Gadamer’s hermeneutics the fusion of horizons means in fact the fusion of the “understander and the understood.” For from the hermeneutical point of view it would be wrong to speak of the realization of understanding only from the perspective of the person interpreting 5 41 WuM, p. 274. 542 WuM, p. 367. 543 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301. “Horizont ist der Gesichtskreis, der all das umfaßt und umschließt, was von einem Punkte aus sichtbar ist” (WuM, p. 286). 544 WuM, p. 286.

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the text.545 Therefore, two planes acting in dialectic motion are important in this case: the subject and the object. We should treat Gadamer’s idea of the historical horizon as the moment in the understanding process when the horizon begins to fade away.546 We find historical functioning to always be in a particular situation, with its own perspective and horizon.547 At the same time, we can speak about the temporalization of horizons. We may distinguish between the horizon of the present, the past, and even the horizon of the future, which is barely visible. The horizon of modernity is made of the interpreter’s initial hypotheses and anticipations. The contemporary horizon is never stable, because it is subject to constant shaping, e.g. because the interpreter uses his or her competences, subjecting certain judgments to revision and, if necessary, modifying them accordingly. This is what meeting with the past and therefore with tradition is all about. We cannot state that the horizons of the present and the past exist independently, for themselves: “Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.”548 Such fusion obviously gives rise to certain difficulties and “tensions”549 between the text and the sphere of the present; in the process of interpretation, we should not remove this tension, but rather base on it and consciously develop it in order to reach full understanding.550 Adopting Gadamer’s metaphor of the horizon in the sphere of the translation act, we may say that the notion of the horizon refers both to the process of translation per se –​when we are indeed dealing with the meeting of the present represented by the translator and the past symbolized by the text –​and to the translator’s competence. During the translation process, we may observe a multi-​horizontal fusion between: 1) the horizon of the translator and the author of the source text; 2) the horizon of the source culture with the target culture; 3) the horizon of the translator and the target audience of the translation; 4) the horizon of the source text’s author and the horizon of the target audience –​notably, this happens indirectly.

5 45 For more, see: Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 171. 546 WuM, p. 290. 547 Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte,” p. 8. 548 Gadamer, Truth, p. 305. “Vielmehr ist Verstehen immer der Vorgang der Verschmelzung solcher vermeintlich für sich seiender Horizonte” (WuM, p. 289). 549 WuM, p. 290. 550 The source of the tensions characteristic of the art is the alienation, which has been repeatedly invoked in this book. However, on the other hand, it is worth recalling that the translation act is created in order to eliminate it, to “get to know” and understand the Other.

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As the horizons merge, different worlds, i.e. different horizons of understanding and perception of the environment, come together. As a result of these multidirectional processes, a specific whole emerges: the translated text, the shape of which is infinitely influenced by hermeneutical consciousness.

3.5. Hermeneutical Consciousness In the translation process, it is important to develop a special kind of consciousness or reflectiveness closely related to the specific hermeneutical task faced by each interpreter. Developed or reflected hermeneutical consciousness that makes it possible to “see what is questionable”551 is reflected in such characteristics as self-​criticism, openness, sensitivity to the “otherness” of someone’s opinion, empathy, or responsibility. Before proceeding with the translation, a competent translator should ask himself a simple question: “Where am I now?” and “what does this place tell me?”552 A truly hermeneutical consciousness, which can also be called a historical consciousness, takes into account the socio-​temporal circumstances in which it is entangled through the interpreter’s actions: When we want to understand sentences that have been handed down to us, we make historical considerations from which it should emerge, where and how these sentences are said, what their actual motivational background –​and thus their real meaning –​is. Hence, if we want to express a sentence as such and present it, we have to express its historical horizon as well.553

We should require such methodical self-​awareness from the translator, which means that his or her understanding process includes not only the anticipation of meaning, but also being aware of their own place in history –​their own historicity. In this way, translators achieve “true understanding.”554 The notion of hermeneutic consciousness in the translator is always historically established and

551 Gadamer, “The Universality of Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 136. “Daβ man das Fragwürdige zu sehen vermag” (Gadamer, “Die Universalität,” p. 228). 552 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 68. 553 “Wenn wir Sätze, die uns überliefert sind, verstehen wollen, so stellen wir historische Überlegungen an, aus denen hervorgehen soll, wo und wie diese Sätze gesagt sind, was ihr eigentlicher Motivationshintergrund und damit ihr eigentlicher Sinn ist. Wir müssen also, wenn wir einen Satz als solchen und vergegen wärtigen wollen, seinen historischen Horizont mitvergegenwärtigen”(H.-​G. Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” p. 56). 554 WuM, p. 254.

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is in a way a combination of two horizons: past and present. This means that translators are aware that they translate a given text in a specific way, because the translation act takes place at a specific historical point, both on a macro scale –​the historical period in which the interpreter is located –​and on a micro scale –​the life stage and related level of the translator’s competence. Historical consciousness allows translators to see their own limitations, open up to what the text says to them, and review their own beliefs. It allows translators to relate the familiar to the foreign. The historical consciousness influences translators in such a way that they do not stop searching with the first idea, but continue to look for the most accurate translation solutions over and over again. Historical consciousness, it seems, is also a factor contributing to the phenomenon of retranslation, since the translator, realizing the historical horizon motivating the message of the original text, may decide to retranslate a text, as is often valid in the context of translating classics. It seems that such was the case with the Polish retranslation by Grzegorz Wasowski of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, published in 2015. The historical consciousness of a competent interpreter consists in recognizing a certain attitude toward the past, taking into account the essence of the tradition and the related initial thoughts and power and persuasion of authority. It is also the awareness of effective history or, more precisely, the consciousness of becoming aware of these factors, or, to use Gadamer’s term, hermeneutical moments of understanding555: “Our historical consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is audible. Only in the multifariousness of such voices does it exist: this constitutes the nature of the tradition

555 Noteworthy, according to Gadamer, it is not possible to follow the principle of effective history in a conscious way, because it controls man’s finiteness. In other words, it is not possible for human knowledge to ever take control over effective history. Therefore, it is rather a kind of hermeneutical moment, in which the understanding realizes and in which the interpreter is entangled. Undoubtedly, a competent interpreter of texts should at least take into account the principle of effective history in order to be able to revise translation ideas and thus come closer to full understanding on this basis. However, the translator cannot claim any right to “control” effective history for it is established above him. Taking into account the principle of effective history in the context of translation comes down to the translator’s intensified consciousness about the fact that the shape of the translation depends not only on –​broadly speaking –​the historical moment in which the translator is located, but also, –​in a narrow sense –​ to the consciousness of the specific horizon determining the interpreter’s cognitive abilities.

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in which we want to share and have a part.”556 Therefore, we may see historical consciousness as the result of “immersion” in the “polyphony” of readings and reinterpretations of the world in which we all coexist. Following this, we may say that the translator, who repeatedly becomes aware of the contemporarity of history by engaging it in a never-​ending conversation, automatically becomes an intermediary in the transmission of tradition, hence, enables the target audience to hear its echoes. It is not easy to develop such awareness, because the translator is always in a specific hermeneutical situation and is not able to go beyond it. Nevertheless, it is possible to clarify or explain this situation, i.e. to refer to the reflected principle of effective history.557 We will now take a closer look at how this reflection is revealed in the translation process, while taking into account the components of the interpreter’s historical functioning: tradition, time distance, and horizon.

3.5.1. Translation and Tradition In the translation process, tradition performs a very important function. It shows interpreters what is past, while making them aware of their place in the present. It is a bridge that enables the interpreter to melt the horizons of the past and the present. It is a process of mediation between present and past and between the alien and the known and learned. For Gadamer, the phenomenon of translation is a model example of the “happening” of tradition and its influence on the implications of history. The translator’s task is to place the message between the sphere of alien and known; between the past and the present,558 but also to identify what is his own, including the alien. The translator always speaks “in between,” i.e. between historically constituted objectiveness and attachment to a particular tradition. Together with the actions taken by the translator, tradition triggers an understanding that may be realized thanks to the hermeneutical circle.559 As Gadamer states, whoever wants to understand –​undoubtedly the goal of every translator –​strongly attaches to what is mediated linguistically

556 Gadamer, Truth, p. 285. “Was unser geschichtliches Bewußtsein erfüllt, ist immer eine Vielzahl von Stimmen, in denen die Vergangenheit widerklingt. Nur in der Vielfachheit solcher Stimmen ist sie da: das macht das Wesen der Überlieferung aus, an der wir teilhaben und teilgewinnen wollen” (WuM, p. 268). 557 See WuM, p. 285. 558 WuM, p. 279. 559 WuM, p. 277.

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through the transmission of tradition. Moreover, such a person has or gets in contact with the tradition that is the source of a given message.560 This seems to be the determinant of the translator’s competence, whose task it is to communicate with tradition, to become aware of this inextricable link and to each time relate the specificity of the transmission of tradition to the translated text. The translator’s attitude toward tradition is also important. How the translator perceives it influences the course of the translation process. In Gadamer’s view, a competent interpreter avoids both Enlightenment dogmatism prioritizing the rational and the Romantic idea that places tradition on a pedestal. On the one hand, translators should not uncritically give in to tradition, but on the other hand, they should take it into account, be aware of it, and identify themselves with it, but not dogmatically.561 It seems that the recommended attitude –​and thus in line with Gadamer’s demands –​is the translator’s constant mediation between showing respect for past achievements and findings, and moving toward innovation and experimentation. The translator must realize that the reality surrounding the interpreter reveals itself in tradition and, moreover, be able to transcend what is openly articulated there. For Gadamer, transgressing tradition is a way to verify one’s own beliefs and obtain partial self-​knowledge, since when the interpreter comes into contact with something unknown, the transmission of tradition leads to a deeper reflection on historical existence.562 We may even state that, thanks to its attachment to the foreign, the translation process within the hermeneutics is the essence of the transmission of tradition. For to the greatest extent possible, while maintaining contact with the tradition from which the translator comes, he or she must express openness to what is different linguistically, culturally, or historically. Therefore, tradition will often influence translators’ choices or the techniques they apply, as they translate from the inside of tradition. Simultaneously, tradition allows creative freedom to the interpreter. As Januszkiewicz aptly points out, “the interpreter should be aware of the baggage that he or she brings to the process of understanding the work, so that this baggage is not a limitation but a creative inspiration.”563 What does it mean that a translator remains in the sphere of tradition? Certainly, we should not understand this in terms of succumbing to prejudices or limiting the criteria of freedom of reasoning. However, as Gadamer writes,

5 60 WuM, p. 279. 561 See Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 291. 562 Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I, pp. 70–​71. 563 Januszkiewicz, W-​koło, 57.

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apart from the fact that human existence has an unquestionable right to preserve freedom and liberty, it is nevertheless connected with certain limitations and conditions. Should we not, then, expect this consciousness from a competent interpreter? It consists in translators recognizing that in each situation, they determine the cognition by the situation they are in. Moreover, this consciousness means that the process of understanding is always determined by the degree to which interpreters come into contact with the community of the past: The conceptual world in which philosophizing develops has already captivated us in the same way that the language in which we live conditions us. If thought is to be conscientious, it must become aware of these anterior influences. A new critical consciousness must now accompany all responsible philosophizing which takes the habits of thought and language built up in the individual in his communication with his environment and places them before the forum of the historical tradition to which we all belong.564

Certainly, we should not ignore the essence of reason and rationality, but as Gadamer points out, the understanding subject is constantly dependent on the historical and cultural conditions in which it operates.565 In a sense, the act of translation is historical cognition –​a situation in which there is self-​ understanding, identification of one’s own being among other historically conditioned beings, and finally recognition of one’s own finiteness in the face of the infinity of the temporal. It is worth recalling the significant words of Gadamer that it is not man who is in control of history, but rather history that is in control of man:566 Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-​examination, we understand ourselves in a self-​evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-​awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.567

564 Gadamer, Truth, p. xxiv. “Die Begrifflichkeit, in der sich das Philosophieren entfaltet, hat uns vielmehr immer schon in derselben Weise eingenommen, in der uns die Sprache, in der wir Leoben, bestimmt. So gehört es zur Gewissenhaftigkeit des Denkens, sich dieser Voreingenommenheiten bewuβt zu werden. Es ist ein neues, kritisches Bewuβtsein, das seither alles verantwortliche Philosophieren zu begleiten hat und das die Sprach-​und Denkgewohnheiten, die sich dem einzelnen in der Kommunikation mit seiner Mitwelt bilden, vor das Forum der geschichtlichen Tradition stellt, der wir alle gemeinsam angehören” (WuM, s. xxix). 565 WuM, p. 260. 566 WuM, p. 261. 567 Gadamer, Truth, p. 278. “Lange bevor wir uns in der Rückbesinnung selber verstehen, verstehen wir uns auf selbstverständliche Weise in Familie, Gesellschaft und Staat, in

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In this respect, an important skill is to distinguish between legitimate and false prejudices. As a competent hermeneut, the translator must consolidate the proposed interpretation somewhere between an attitude characterized by an absolute appropriation of meaning and an approach that boils down to a complete lack of –​or at best, incomplete –​articulation. The hermeneutical task cannot be nullified by improperly decoding the meaning of tradition’s essence or the related concept of authority. The priority of the translation process is to perform a specific task that consists of a series of hermeneutical activities. Tradition is important in this process, but is not an overriding principle –​it can help solve translation problems, but cannot be treated as a decisive factor.568 It seems that reference to tradition is necessary yet in some way prejudiced –​and the translator with an educated hermeneutical awareness undoubtedly takes this factor into account –​but Gadamer calls on interpreters to be careful and thoughtful when approaching the question of tradition and the closely related concept of authority. As Tholen rightly states, the strength and reliability of authority is never given once and for all. It is established according to the specific situation.569 So once again we are dealing with occasionality and contextuality, both of great importance in hermeneutics. Taking into account the essence of authority, and thus, for example, the opinions of experienced translators, is extremely important in the work of any interpreter. In this sense, we may speak of a certain tradition of translation behavior, one which determines translators’ approach and influences their choices. However, one of the competencies of translators is a particular hermeneutical consciousness of the fact that each translation should be treated individually and in accordance with rational reasons. Undoubtedly, moments of tradition influence the translation process, for example, in the form of preferred strategies, translation techniques, or approaches to the source text. It is up to translators, however, whether they will use these uncritically or whether they will base their application on conscious consideration of the validity and accuracy of their conduct. Similarly to authority, the characteristics of tradition are also subject to change, to an evolution that depends on the historical moment in which the translator is located. As Gadamer says:

denen wir leben. Der Fokus der Subjektivität ist ein Zerrspiegel. Die Selbstbesinnung des Individuums ist nur ein Flackern im geschlossenen Stromkreis des geschichtlichen Lebens. Darum sind die Vorurteile des einzelnen weit mehr als seine Urteile die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit seines Seins” (WuM, p. 261). 568 WuM, pp. 261–​262. 569 Tholen, Erfahrung und Interpretation, p. 110.

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The fact is that in tradition there is always an element of freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, and it is active in all historical change.570

Therefore, translators should seek to free themselves from the heritage of the past and tradition, while recognizing that they are constantly in it, that they participate in its message and that it is an important moment in the process of understanding. Tradition binds interpreters to the past and embraces them, but at the same time submits to the will of interpreters, who decide how legitimate it is to submit to its “power” in a given case. In a sense, translation may impose certain solutions, but does not work in an apodictic way. Therefore, it seems the interpreter is not able to control effective history, but may certainly give course and value to tradition, which each time adapts itself to the shaping context of translation. A competent interpreter is aware that when faced with the task of understanding a text, he or she does so from a historical perspective, because they are “immersed” in a particular culture and historical moment. This has nothing to do with subjectivity, since the historical moment and the nature of the community of which the translator remains a member determine the anticipated meaning of the translated text.571 A competent interpreter is aware that the influence of history and tradition will always be different, depending on both the situational context in which he finds himself and the target culture to which the message is directed. Gadamer significantly states: “On the other hand, hermeneutical consciousness is aware that its bond to this subject matter does not consist in some self-​evident, unquestioned unanimity, as is the case with the unbroken stream of tradition.”572 Critical consideration of tradition entails entering into a kind of dialog with it: listening to its reasoning, but at the same time taking into account the validity of its components and the need for their existence.

570 Gadamer, Truth, p. 282. “In Wahrheit ist Tradition stets ein Moment der Freiheit und der Geschichte selber. Auch die echteste, gediegenste Tradition vollzieht sich nicht naturhaft dank der Beharrungskraft dessen, was einmal da ist, sondern bedarf der Bejahung, der Ergreifung und der Pflege. Sie ist ihrem Wesen nach Bewahrung, wie solche in allem geschichtlichen Wandel mit tätig ist” (WuM, pp. 265–​266). 571 WuM, p. 277. 572 Gadamer, Truth, p. 295. “Auf der anderen Seite weiß das hermeneutische Bewußtsein, daß es mit dieser Sache nicht in der Weise einer fraglos selbstverständlichen Einigkeit verbunden sein kann, wie sie für das ungebrochene Fortleben einer Tradition gilt” (WuM, p. 279).

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Tradition, which shapes the identity and status of translators, enables them to more or less understand anything. Moreover, it also determines the quality and manner of that understanding. However, in a dialectic way, it is born out of the pre-​judgements which also gives rise to them573 and in turn is the basis of understanding and its main determinants. Dybel writes that understanding occurs at the “encountered” moment in history,574 which in a way limits the cognitive scope of the understander. When applying this statement to a translational context, we must recognize that tradition allows interpreters to meet the past and also co-​create the present.575 In other words, when creating a target text symbolizing some aspect of the present, a competent translator must take into account the elements of the past in which he or she and the source text are embedded. A competent translator goes beyond the framework of the situation so defined. Again, Dybel: “Tradition is in a way our historical existence taken as a “whole,” in which we are always defined by the cultural past, hence, we are always open to transcend it in our understanding.”576 Even though this statement contains a dose of legitimacy, for he is right about the fact that the past determines our cultural existence, we may question whether tradition can actually be considered a holistic “historical existence.” We may refer to a translator as competent only if he or she both opens up to the voice of tradition and allows it to influence the process of creating the initial text and the reception of the target text, thus submitting tradition, which is in fact a collection of “inherited” historical precepts, to critical reflection. In this sense, tradition refers both to the past and present and gives an interpreter the opportunity to choose where to place the object in question in relation to the specificity of the moment in its individual dimension. Of course, Gadamer’s attitude toward tradition is more ambivalent, but despite the seeming contradictions, these thoughts reveal the sense and exceptional rationality of his argument, which, in addition to respecting the achievements of generations, recognizes intellectual freedom and the choice of an individual who can in part decide to belong to a given tradition, accept it, or (partly) reject its components. A competent translator opens up to all these dimensions: to certain possible transformations of the understanding which the historical tradition has developed, to fully accept the existing situation, or to abandon its main assumptions.

5 73 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 293. 574 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 293. 575 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 293. 576 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 294.

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For a competent translator accepts the view that understanding “lets itself be addressed by tradition.”577 Interpreters characterized by openness recognize that contact with tradition is only the beginning of further inquiry and answers reflected in a proper hermeneutic conversation with the text. They are open to entering the process of handing down tradition. They take into account not only the otherness of the encountered tradition, but also the fact that the very message of tradition has something to say to them. Indeed, this message is the initial text from which the translation process begins.

3.5.2. The Translator and Temporal Distance Sometimes, historical distance –​or temporal distance578 –​causes an indelible difference between the translator and the author of the source text, since the way the text will be understood definitely depends on the historical location of the interpreter.579 Furthermore, the text is part of the whole of tradition, which a competent interpreter –​as discussed in the previous sections of this c­ hapter –​must consider during the translation process. As Gadamer states:

577 Gadamer, Truth, p. 283. “…sich von der Überlieferung angesprochen zu sehen” (WuM, p. 266). 578 It seems that in Gadamer’s view, temporal distance contains in it also spatial distance. Hence, perhaps, it would be worthwhile to see the temporal barrier rather in the context of the interpretative temporal-​spatial distance in which the interpreter is always involved, regardless of whether he or she is aware of his or her position. For temporal differences seem to imply spatial differences. Therefore, after E. S. Casey and P. J. Ethington, I believe that spatiality is an inherent feature of history. See E. S. Casey, “Boundary, place, and event in the spatiality of history,” Rethinking History 2007, 11(4), pp. 507–​512; P. J. Ethington, “Placing the past: ‘Groundwork’ for a spatial theory of history,” Rethinking History 2007, 11(4), pp. 465–​493). Ethington states that history is, in fact, a collection of all places that have been somehow marked by human activity, and therefore knowledge of the past must be considered “cartographic.” Given Ethington’s proposal would allow Gadamer’s concept of time and history to be interpreted in a completely different light. The fusion of the time horizon in hermeneutical optics with the most recent findings made by historians turning toward a vision of history as a set of events taking place in specific places, and thus, to put it mildly, of localized history, would moreover equip translation studies with analytical tools that could then be used to study specific –​historically localized –​translations. 579 WuM, p. 280.

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The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to its interpreter, does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. It is not identical with them, for it is also always codetermined by the historical situation of the interpreter.580

Therefore, being set in a specific socio-​cultural reality, the interpreter has no influence on the processes of a more general nature contained in the influence of history and historicity on the process of interpretation. The situation resembles to some extent the discursive overpowering of the translator by the temporal implications defining the mental images formed in the mind. Any efforts to fight the temporal barrier encountered in translation seem to be of no use, for the interpreter, always under the rule of history, does not nor cannot have influence on the translation repercussions related to this state of affairs. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, time is the keystone of the process in which modernity is immersed. One should not fight it, but rather submit to it.581 Therefore, a competent translator does not seek to abolish the time gap –​even if he or she wanted to do so, the efforts would be in vain –​but treats it as a discussion partner, an undeniable element in the process of understanding the text, and finally “as a positive and productive condition enabling understanding.”582 In this sense, translators may even consider time as an aid in deciphering meaning, an irremovable component of the cognitive processes governing their contact with the text. Therefore, translators should not refer to the temporal distance as a certain “abyss” that cannot be crossed, but rather see it as a component of the phenomenon of understanding, in the light of which the message of tradition is unveiled, expressing the irremovable continuity of memory. Temporal distance is necessary for the translator as it is necessary to shape the correct content of the text, which emerges only by maintaining a special distance and, thus, objectivity toward the actuality established on the basis of certain conditions.583 This is crucial in the context of the translation process. The simplest interpretative implication of Gadamer’s view may be presented thus: after the translation is finished, when translators analyze their work after some time 580 Gadamer, Truth, p. 296. “Der wirkliche Sinn eines Textes, wie er den Interpreten anspricht, hängt eben nicht von dem Okkasionellen ab, das der Verfasser und sein ursprüngliches Publikum darstellen. Er geht zum mindesten nicht darin auf. Denn er ist immer auch durch die geschichtliche Situation der Interpreten mitbestimmt und damit durch das Ganze der objektiven Geschichtsganges” (WuM, p. 280). 581 WuM, p. 280. 582 Gadamer, Truth, p. 297. “als eine positive und produktive Möglichkeit des Verstehens zu erkennen” (WuM, s. 281). 583 WuM, pp. 281–​282.

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and look at it from a distance, they see their work from a completely different perspective. They are able to catch what they did not see during the translation. Thanks to the critical reflection initiated and their distance from what for some time was the main focus of interpretation, some issues become clear only after the whole work has been translated. These include: linguistic and translation errors, incorrect translation strategies or decisions, and inadequate understanding of specific parts of the original text. We should not understand Gadamer’s time distance only in terms of so-​called ancient history and distant historical periods. Hermeneutical historical distance is a concept with a much broader meaning, i.e. it indicates the passage of time that must take place for the understanding of a text to become complete. In translation, this concept gains a new dimension. Thanks to the time distance, translator subjectivity can –​at least to some extent –​be abolished and move into the sphere of objectivity. The translator then becomes an “observer” who now analyzes the translation from the outside: But the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process. Not only are fresh sources of error constantly excluded, so that all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning; but new sources of understanding are continually emerging that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning. The temporal distance that performs the filtering process is not fixed, but is itself undergoing constant movement and extension. And along with the negative side of the filtering process brought about by temporal distance there is also the positive side, namely the value it has for understanding. It not only lets local and limited prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.584

This quote is extremely important as it emphasizes the function of the circularity of temporal transmission of the senses; it shows the role historical distance plays in the translational context and the phenomenon of retranslation inscribed

584 Gadamer, Truth, p. 298. “Die Ausschöpfung des wahren Sinnes aber, der in einem Text oder in einer künstlerischen Schöpfung gelegen ist, kommt nicht irgendwo zum Abschluß, sondern ist in Wahrheit ein unendlicher Prozeß. Es werden nicht nur immer neue Fehlerquellen ausgeschaltet, so daß der wahre Sinn aus allerlei Trübungen herausgefiltert wird, sondern es entspringen stets neue Quellen des Verständnisses, die ungeahnte Sinnbezüge offenbare. Der Zeitenabstand, der die Filterung leistet, hat nicht eine abgeschlossene Größe, sondern ist in einer ständigen Bewegung und Ausweitung begriffen. Mit der negativen Seite des Filterns, die der Zeitenabstand vollbringt, ist aber zugleich die positive Seite gegeben, die er für das Verstehen besitzt. Er läßt nicht nur die Vorurteile, die partikularer Natur sind, absterben, sondern auch diejenigen, die ein wahrhaftes Verstehen leiten, als solche hervortreten” (WuM, p. 282).

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within it. As Gadamer emphasizes, there is no single sense of a text and there is no way we can ever work out such a sense. With the passage of time, social transformation, and the progress of history, the content acquires new meaning, showing new dimensions and interpretative possibilities. The awareness of effective history comes down to the translator taking into account the fact that afterwards another translator may understand the same text differently, influenced by, among other things, time distance. This consciousness also recognizes the fundamental impossibility of closing the horizon of meaning, within which the way of understanding a given content and then carrying out the translation process are realized. History is defined by its own continuation, which in turn implies the inexhaustibility of the sense of a text. As history progresses and the time distance increases, the message of tradition transforms, revealing and exploiting new aspects of meaning. In this way, the text of a translation enters into the historical process –​in other words, it becomes an effective-​historical moment for updating senses historically implied.585 Therefore, we may speak of the ontological-​epistemological nature of the time distance: for the interpreter is historically pre-​embedded and is always in a moment separated by temporal distance from other points in history. On the other hand, the way in which a work is interpreted and understood indicates inalienably how this temporal distance has been treated in a given case and to what extent the interpreter was aware of it. In this sense, we should mention a distinction based on Grondin’s model of the division of effective consciousness –​hence, time distance will be not only genetivus obiectivus, i.e. our awareness of its existence, but also genetivus obiectivus, i.e. our awareness and cognitive abilities as shaped by time distance.

3.5.3. The Translator and the Horizon Although the concept of a horizon is closely related to the history of understanding, it seems appropriate to speak about the translator’s so-​called cognitive horizons in the context of the translation process. As Gadamer states: “Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth.”586 Of course, this has to do with the specificity of the horizon, which by its very nature is dynamic and undergoes certain shifts in accordance with the intellectual capacity 5 85 WuM, p. 355. 586 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301. “In der Anwendung auf das denkende Bewußtsein reden wir dann von Enge des Horizontes, von möglicher Erweiterung des Horizontes, von Erschließung neuer Horizonte usw” (WuM, p. 286).

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of the interpreter. There is no doubt that the broader the cognitive horizon, the more competent the interpreter is, because he or she can see and identify more translation problems, apply more accurate translation techniques and strategies, and make more appropriate decisions. The horizon seems to enable the translator to demonstrate historical meta-​reflectivity, but also to see the limitations of specific translational skills, including evaluating one’s own thinking about the content and meaning of the original text: “A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-​values what is nearest to him.”587 In this approach, we should see horizon as a kind of borderline that includes or excludes the translator in the process of handing down tradition, and as an aspect necessary for triggering the process of circular interpretation, in which one possibility leads to another, eventually leading to various ways of understanding and interpretation. We should understand the horizon as the translator’s meta-​reflective approach to the adequacy of the multiplicity of possible translation solutions. To “have a horizon” is to “interpret broadly,” and therefore –​in the context of the deliberations conducted in this book –​to “translate competently.” As Gadamer states, whoever sees the horizon before them will not be affected by any limitations.588 If the interpreter has a horizon, they see the importance of things in relation to their location and their essence in a wider context. “A person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small.”589 In the case of the translation process, we should understand this as follows. Since each text creates problems of a different nature, a competent translator can prioritize by focusing on what constitutes the essence of the source text. Identifying priorities in the text is a skill which reveals the high competence of the translator. Stolze, the most famous contemporary representative of translational hermeneutics, emphasizes this aspect stating that each text has features distinguishing it from others, hence, we may describe it as an autonomous or individualized entity. This means that in each case the translator must decide what constitutes the so-​called translation dominant in a given text. A dominant may be the phonological features, semantic fields, syntactic forms, or pragmatic structure of the text.590 The translator’s task 587 Gadamer, Truth, p. 301. “Wer keinen Horizont hat, ist ein Mensch, der nicht weit genug sieht und deshalb das ihm Naheliegende überschätzt” (WuM, p. 286). 588 WuM, p. 286. 589 Gadamer, Truth, pp. 301–​302. “Wer Horizont hat, weiß die Bedeutung aller Dinge innerhalb dieses Horizontes richtig einzuschätzen nach Nähe und Ferne, Größe und Kleinheit” (WuM, p. 286). 590 See Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 181.

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is to determine the most important features of each individual text and decide which ones should be focused on. Furthermore, Gadamer’s horizon means reaching the appropriate scale of questions posed to the translator by the process of transmitting tradition.591 The scope and specificity of questions about a text are a testament to a translator’s competence. Again, Stolze believes that in the process of evaluating the original text, it is the translator’s task to make decisions concerning the rightness and legitimacy of using specific translation strategies. If we consider that the text itself reveals its truth to the reader, then we should state that the text provides the reader with information about what its most important aspect is. From a hermeneutical perspective, finding this information is one of the most important components of a translator’s competence.592 A competent translator can see the characteristic features of a given message and establish a hierarchy of translation decisions. In the case of specialized texts, such dominants may be the preservation of proper terminology, e.g. taking into account the differences between two legal systems, or the functional style of the text; in the case of fiction, it might be an author’s specific style and rhythm or the presence of cultural elements, whereas in the translation of philosophical texts, most important is the interpretation of specific concepts and preserving the style of argumentation.593 However, prioritization takes place only when interpreters come into contact with a text: when they allow the message to reveal itself to them. The ability to open up to the message of the text, and therefore be receptive to its meaning, constitutes an interpreter’s hermeneutical competence. It is important that the translator interprets the message while taking into account the autonomous existence of the source text and the perspective in which the author created it. This applies, for example, to historical novels or, generally speaking, to messages created at a particular point in history: The task of historical understanding also involves acquiring an appropriate historical horizon, so that what we are trying to understand can be seen in its true dimensions. If we fail to transpose ourselves into the historical horizon from which the traditionary text speaks, we will misunderstand the significance of what it has to say to us. To that extent this seems a legitimate hermeneutical requirement: we must place ourselves in the other situation in order to understand it.594

5 91 WuM, p. 286. 592 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 182. 593 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 182–​184. 594 Gadamer, Truth, p. 302. “Die Aufgabe des historischen Verstehens schließt die Forderung ein, jeweils den historischen Horizont zu gewinnen, damit such das, was man verstehen will, in seinen wahren Maßen darstellt. Wer es unterläßt, derart sich

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One contentious issue is the question whether such conduct can actually lead to agreement on the matter. Is it not just about getting to know a different horizon? Gadamer states that we should understand an author only in the spirit of the horizon or the historical perspective in which the work was created, and not seek to understand the author’s intentions.595 We should instead see this aspect from a different perspective, i.e. from the point of view of a person who thinks historically. “Entering” into a historically motivated situation, and thereby understanding it is, of course, important in order to have an appropriate temporal horizon in the translation process, but it seems far more important to find such a truth from the contemporary perspective that would be understandable to the translator. As Gadamer convincingly repeats, for this reason, interpreters’ ability to escape from their own views is an outright absurdity and pure illusion. We should not understand these views in terms of the specific position of interpreters, but rather as hypotheses to be corrected on the basis of the hermeneutic circle.596 In this process, translators take into account both their own sphere of understanding and a distant or alien horizon. But is it legitimate to speak about two different horizons: past and present? It seems that Gadamer wants to say the opposite: the horizon seems to be a monolithic cognitive moment in which the letter of the past is interpreted as an integral element shaping the present, while the letter of the present is closely connected with the past: When our historical consciousness transposes itself into historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in any way with our own; instead, they together constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-​consciousness. Everything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a single historical horizon.597

in den historischen Horizont zu versetzen aus dem die Überlieferung spricht, wird die Bedeutung der Überlieferungsinhalte mißverstehen. Insofern scheint es eine berechtigte hermeneutische Forderung, daß man sich in den andern versetzen muß, um ihn zu verstehen” (WuM, p. 286). 595 Gadamer, Die philosophischen Grundlagen, p. 143. 596 WuM, pp. 365–​366. 597 Gadamer, Truth, p. 303. “Wenn sich unser historisches Bewußtsein in historische Horizonte versetzt, so bedeutet das nicht eine Entrückung in fremde Welten, die nichts mit unserer eigenen verbindet, sondern sie insgesamt bilden den einen großen, von innen her beweglichen Horizont, der über die Grenzen des Gegenwärtigen hinaus die Geschichtstiefe unseres Selbstbewußtseins umfaßt. In Wahrheit ist es also ein einziger Horizont, der all das umschließt, was das geschichtliche Bewußtsein in sich enthält” (WuM, p. 288).

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If we apply these words to the translation process, we may refer to “having a horizon” in a manner similar to distinguishing effective consciousness into genetivus obiectivus and genetivus subiectivus. Thus, the horizon will not only be the genetivus obiectivus, i.e. the interpreter’s metareflexivity concerning the existence of the horizon, but also the genetivus subiectivus, i.e. the metareflexivity determined by the horizon and thus by the metareflexivity. Since Gadamer’s horizon is wide enough to encompass our entire historical consciousness, we may conclude that this concept functions in a translation context on two levels: ontological and epistemological. For the interpreter is always in the horizon (being-in-horizon) and at the same time can shape it and somehow individually express its specificity, which becomes apparent in the shape of the given translation. Having a horizon is another of the important determinants of a translator’s competence. By broadening knowledge, developing translation skills and, above all, learning in the spirit of interdisciplinarity, the translator modifies the perception of the specificity of a translation act –​and the perception of a given output message –​and deepens his or her awareness, which refers in the strict sense not only to the methodology of translation, but also to his or her own place in the broadly understood process of understanding the world. As mentioned, horizon is mobile and dynamic, which means an interpreter –​ who has many possibilities to influence his or her level of competence –​can freely shape the horizon. As Gadamer states, the horizon is always marked by a kind of openness: “The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving.”598 The wider the horizon and the more dynamic the changes it undergoes, the more likely it is that the translator will understand the meaning of the original text, i.e. in the broader perspective of himself and the world. Achieving a horizon is important even before the translation process begins. As it seems, it is also an element of foreknowledge: “To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand –​not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.”599 As the authors of Filozofia XX

598 Gadamer, Truth, p. 303. “Der Horizont ist vielmehr etwas, in das wir hineinwandern und das mit uns mitwandert. Dem Beweglichen verschieben sich die Horizonte” (WuM, p. 288). 599 Gadamer, Truth, p. 304.“Horizont gewinnen meint immer, daß man über das Nahe und Allzunahe hinaussehen lernt, nicht um von ihm wegzusehen, sondern um es in einem größeren Ganzen und in richtigeren Maßen besser zu schen” (WuM, pp. 288–​289).

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wieku rightly state,600 a complete fusion of horizons may not always happen –​it is not even always necessary. Sometimes it is enough for the interpreter to know the meaning of certain lexical units or be familiar with a given field of knowledge. But the more difficult the initial message, the broader the horizon of the person seeking understanding and agreement must be.601 As it seems, we may interpret Gadamer’s metaphor of the horizon in the context of the translation process in yet another way, which is complementary to the previous readings. Every contact between the interpreter and the original text is an encounter with the process of handing down tradition –​it is a kind of fusion of the interpreter’s and the text’s horizon. Moreover, as Gadamer emphasizes, it is the concretization of the conversation.602 Hence, the horizon broadens each time, and the translation knowledge and experience deepens or consolidates. Translators constantly come into contact with the new and unknown, thanks to which they can develop and broaden their competence. Gadamer’s words are significant: “In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are always combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other.”603 This perfectly illustrates the process of shaping and developing a translator’s competence. The translator’s past experiences and knowledge meld with the new experience of the current translation, overlapping like circles. In such a case, it is difficult to distinguish between the translator’s “old” or past competences and those available to him or her at a given moment in the modern world, because the process of deepening these competences is continuous. Przyłębski very accurately describes this matter: As Gadamer states, in the process of understanding, horizon of the understander and the understood fuse. In the mind of the understander, a new horizon emerges. It is extended by opening to the truth of the understood –​the truth achievable only when instead of incapacitating the understood through objectification, we place it in pre-​established understanding structures with the superiority of methodicality as already outdated, past views and we open ourselves to experience (i.e., the truth), which it contains.604

6 00 See Coreth, Ehlen, Haeffner, Ricken, Filozofia XX wieku, p. 80. 601 Gadamer, Truth, p. 304. 602 WuM, p. 366. 603 Gadamer, Truth, p. 305. “Denn dort wächst Altes und Meues immer wider zu lebendiger Geltung zusammen, ohne daß sich überhaupt das eine oder andere ausdrücklich voneinander abheben” (WuM, pp. 289–​290). 604 Przyłębski, Hermeneutyczny zwrot, p. 171.

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Competent translators draw on past experiences, but at the same time open up to new ones, enriching their knowledge and taking care of their intellectual development. In conclusion, the hermeneutical consciousness, which can be described as hermeneutical reflection, allows interpreters to decide whether the prejudices they express are right or whether they need to be corrected. In this way, interpreters are enriched with new experiences, which then shape the pre-​ conceptions present in each translation process.

3.6. Summary The concept of historically effected consciousness is relevant in the context of a translator’s competence. In the previous chapter, I referred to prejudices as important elements of the understanding process. Moreover, I discussed self-​ reflection, self-​criticism, and the ability to meta-​reflect on initial thinking. I should add that the identification of reasonable and unfounded opinions, or in other words the distinction between free and relevant interpretative ideas, is possible if translators refer both the place of the text and its subjectivity to a given moment in history. After all, a historical echo of immeasurable power always influences men, and the origin of a given subject indicates the contemporary.605 The historical context in which an author created the work is connected with the interpreter’s contemporary context. Such a fusion of two worlds –​two historical moments –​determines the direct confrontation with the “thing” to which the text relates. The tradition, the time distance, and the hermeneutical horizon interact with each other. In the light of the above-​mentioned notions, the specificity of both the principle of effective history and the historically effected consciousness –​and thus the competence of the translator –​are fully revealed. A competent interpreter displays clearly a kind of historical thinking that transforms concepts related to the past while taking into account the current situation of the interpreter himself. Metahistorical thinking involves mediating between concepts from the past and the cognitive processes occurring at the moment of the interpretation process. The translator’s consciousness concerning the fact that he or she translates in a given way because of being historically situated plays an important role here. In the case of translation, this kind of historical metareflexion occurs both in the interpretative understanding and in the case of an interpretation that aims to lead to an established understanding.

605 Gadamer, “Gedicht und Gespräch. Überlegungen zu einer Textprobe Ernst Meisters,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 9, p. 335.

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The translator is not able to erase his or her own views or the way he or she sees the world. As Gadamer states, it would be absurd to run away from one’s own vision of the reality around us.606 According to some authors, dependence on effective-​historical consciousness clearly indicates the relativism in the hermeneutical approach. Nothing could be further from the truth. According to Gadamer, we can establish the existence of relativism only when we leave the position of absolute truth, and there is no such thing as absolute truth in the context of hermeneutics, which questions everything that is fundamental, dogmatic, or axiomatic. Therefore, the competent translator is immersed in history and tradition, but has the ability to transcend them, to take a different stance on a given issue and to open up to new interpretative possibilities. Thus, the competent translator has the ability to demonstrate historically constituted meta-​ reflection. However, for this transcendence to occur in the spirit of historicity, the translator must properly reach the text’s opinion. The translator must conduct a hermeneutic conversation with it.

606 WuM, pp. 374–​375.

Chapter Four: Translation as a Hermeneutical Conversation A discussion about translation in the context of a conversation is fully justified. The act of translation is a communication phenomenon. The agreement and understanding inherent in translation do not meet the criteria of separateness, as both phenomena occur through conversation. The relationship between conversation and language is dialectic. According to Gadamer, conversation enables a language to function in its full dimension, and this in turn can only exist thanks to a conversation that becomes articulated in the language.607 In the third part of Wahrheit und Methode, he emphasizes the existence of a situation of so-​called disturbed or impeded understanding, which is reflected in the linguistic process of translating a conversation conducted by people speaking two natural languages. According to Gadamer, this situation offers an insight into conditions characteristic both of the conversation itself, in the broader sense, and of the particular case of an interpreted conversation –​here in the sense of oral translation. In Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, translation becomes an exemplification and a kind of articulation of an unusual case of dialog, often referred to as hermeneutical. Noting the peculiar role of language as an intermediary in the realization of a hermeneutical experience, Gadamer refers in a special way to interpreting,608 which is an example of an unusual case of conversation. According to Gadamer, the role of the interpreter is very important here, and he or she must place in a specific context the meaning conveyed in the statements of the people involved in the conversation. The task of an interpreter comes down to expressing the sense conveyed by one of the interlocutors in such a way that the one who does not speak the language in question can be “freely” involved in the course of the communication act. In Gadamer’s philosophy, the conversation is thus reduced to a process of understanding. However, a given case of translation shows in a very interesting way how this agreement is realized. We should not of course treat the act of interpreting as a typical conversation, because, according to Gadamer, the necessity of using the services of an interpreter closes the interlocutor to real participation in the exchange of thoughts. In hermeneutical terms, we assume that

6 07 Gadamer, “Gedicht und Gesprach,” p. 336. 608 Interpreting should be understood as “oral translation” here.

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the translation requires interlocutors to adopt and accept a linguistic-​cultural distance that undeniably separates permanently statements made in different natural languages. Furthermore, the interpreter has to agree with the fact that in the case of interpreting, agreement –​which is sometimes very tediously worked out –​is not actually implemented between the interlocutors, but between the interpreters representing the interlocutors. In such a situation it is the interpreters, not the interlocutors, who participate in a kind of meeting of cultures and languages, and it is they who work out the agreement and understanding.609 Such an approach to the difficulties of interpretation confirms Gadamer’s later statement that belief in the reliability of translation must be undermined and disturbed in the hermeneutical view, as translation and interpreting can never really turn into so-​called living speech –​for this, according to Gadamer, is inherently adjacent to the text created in the source language.610 For Gadamer, a conversation conducted with the participation of interpreters is a kind of borderline and extreme case, with even more emphasis on the phenomenon of the hermeneutical process, because the conversation takes place in a double way: the interpreter talks to one party and at the same time passes the message to another party.611 Such a situation, in which the conversation enables us to work out a consensus, shows its full spectrum in the case of text translation, because the conversation becomes hermeneutical precisely when we turn to notation. In many ways, a hermeneutic conversation brings to mind the strongly conventional one, because at the level of both meetings a common language has to be developed that allows the interlocutors to agree on certain issues. The partners of a hermeneutic conversation are the text and the person trying to understand the text, and thus the translator as well. As Gadamer says, hermeneutic partners strive to reach an authentic agreement on a given matter, for speaking about anything becomes fully possible because it is linguistically established and because it is “read” by the other party.612 Notably, in the case of translation, the reader of the text is not only the target audience, but also the translator. However, Gadamer emphasizes the existence of a fundamental difference between translation and a conventionalized conversation. In the case of a translation act, the texts –​the source and the target –​are the partners in a hermeneutical conversation. On the other hand, as mentioned above, there is a broadly

6 09 610 611 612

WuM, p. 362. See Gadamer, Von Lehrenden und Lernenden, p. 333. See Gadamer, Von Lehrenden und Lernenden, p. 333. WuM, p. 365.

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understood reader, i.e. the target recipient of both translation and translator. Thus, the hermeneutical process intensifies and doubles: the conversation takes place between the source text and the translator, and between the already translated text and the target audience. Hermeneutical conversation with the text can take place thanks to its reading. So let us move on to the role that reading plays in Gadamer’s hermeneutics.

4.1. Reading and Translation In Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, reading means grasping a text’s meaning,613and is not just about a semiotic interpretation. It “is a regeneration of speech before the inner ear of the reader.”614 The primary issue is the articulation of the understood speech, while taking into account certain conditions and specificity of the content in order to convey the meaning of the text.615 Although written characters are undoubtedly important, they are only secondary in character. This applies mainly to poetry, but in a broader sense to other written forms as well. In a hermeneutical sense, reading is not only deciphering individual signs, but also trying to reach an agreement with tradition, history, authority, and finally with oneself. The hermeneutical dimension of the text in Gadamer’s philosophy consists in the fact that the message only begins to exist through reading. Texts are “called to life” and “live” because they are read, understood, and interpreted.

613 Gadamer, “Der ‘eminente’ Text und Seine Wahrheit,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 8. Ästhetic und Poetik II. Hermeneutik im Vollzug, Tübingen 1993, p. 287. 614 “nämlich die Wiedererzeugung von Rede vor dem inneren Ohre des Lesenden” (Gadamer, “Poesie und Interpunktion,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften II, pp. 188 ff). 615 For more see: O’Keeffe, “Reading, Writing, and Translation in Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Philosophy,” in: Philosophy and Practice in Translational Hermeneutics, ed. J. Stanley, B. O’Keeffe, R. Stolze, L. Cercel, Bukareszt 2018, pp. 15–​45. The analyzed text is Gadamer’s famous Lesen ist wie Übersetzen. O’Keeffe finds this essay to be in close connection with two other works by Gadamer: Stimme and Sprache and HörenSehen- Lesen. The originality of this interpretation is mainly based on the O’Keeffe’s consideration of the interpretive essence of the so-​called “inner ear.” Even more fundamental in this regard is the fact that according to O’Keeffe, translation and reading are processes that are only partially identical, since the translation act is not capable of triggering the so-​called “transformation-​back,” during which the reading process could mediate a special relationship between the written form and inner listening (p. 43).

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This statement evokes a direct association with theoretical orientations focused on the reader’s role in shaping the sense of the text by locating strongly individualized meanings in it: “Hence, the text is full of white spots, cracks to fill, and whoever sent it predicted that they would be filled, and left them blank for two reasons. First of all, because the text is a lazy (or economical) mechanism that lives at the expense of the added value of the sense that the recipient introduces into it.”616 Barthes interestingly states that this process has a symbolic nature and lasts continuously: “The text is radically symbolic: a work whose integrally symbolic nature one conceives, perceives, and receives is a text.”617 Therefore, texts “live” also through translations, which embody reading, understanding, and interpretation.618 Translations show the truth contained in texts, indicating an ontological moment in the hermeneutic conversation. As Tabakowska is right to observe: Translation –​understood as a process –​is a special case in which, translator’s consciousness combined with rationality recreates and processes images already created and recorded in the word of the Other –​the author of the original. Reading a translation –​ understood as a process –​is a special case in which the reader’s consciousness combined with rationality creates, reproduces, and processes images (re)created and recorded in the word of the Other –​the translator.619

This dialectic relationship between translator and reader of the translation shows not only the inalienability of interpretations in both different processes of reading the content, but also clearly indicates the circularity –​and not the linearity –​of the translation forged in the imaginary act. At the same time, it shows this evocative act in subsequent readings and interpretations. Therefore, the translator is a reader of sorts. However, as Kozak quite controversially states, the difference between a translator and an “ordinary” reader is that in the translation process the translator “puts himself in the position of Barthes’ denotation, which is the last of the connotations.”620 Kozak emphasizes that the translator “puts on the

6 16 Barthes, Sollers écrivain, éd. Seuil, 1979, p. 76. 617 Barthes, Sollers écrivain, éd. Seuil, 1979, p. 76. 618 In a way, such an interpretation of the specificity of “text” in Gadamer’s view allows one to abolish his statement, according to which hermeneutics should not trust the translation, since it will never be a living speech (por. H.-​G. Gadamer, Von Lehrenden und Lernenden, p. 333). 619 Tabakowska, Obraz rzeczy –​słowo –​słowo Innego, “Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne” 2014, 23(43), p. 50. 620 Kozak, Przekład literacki, p. 139.

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text (as if on the Other) a mask,” which happens in accordance with the understanding of the source message as it determines the specificity and quality of this “mask:” “The beauty or the ugliness of the translation depends on the translator’s conceptual horizon, implanted in the original text during the interpretation process.”621 The mask metaphor is controversial in many respects. First of all because of the connotational significance of this lexical unit as it means a covering of the face in order to hide it or to camouflage a specific feature. For this reason, the semantics of the mask carries a pejorative tone. Second, putting on a mask may indicate the unethical behavior of a person seeking to pretend real intentions and actions that are often evil and unworthy. It seems that such a metaphor of translation has little to do with the hermeneutical view even though Kozak wants to see the translator as the hermeneutical “I.” Moreover, such a metaphor even denies the hermeneutical optics. After all, Gadamer looks at translation as an act making it possible for the translator to reach the voice of the Other rather than obscure or twist the sender’s intentions. In Gadamer’s view, reading is like a bridge between different languages. Like translation, reading is also a kind of hermeneutic act. Notably, Gadamer defines translation as the reading of works written in the reader’s native language, which symbolizes the transfer of meaning into another medium and brings to mind a direct association with Jakobson’s concept of intralingual translation or Steiner’s internal translation.622 As Cook accurately states in the hermeneutical spirit: “Reading and translation imply each other. Everything can be seen as reading, everything as translation.”623 Reading is not only an understanding, but also an interpretation consisting of maintaining the right tone, tempo, modulation, and articulation of the “inner voice.” Furthermore, reading is the process of fusing the results of this articulation into an autonomous text unit: for translation is a creative act.624 Therefore, for Gadamer, every reader becomes a translator.625 Reading resembles a journey between languages, cultures, and traditions.

6 21 Kozak, Przekład literacki, p. 139. 622 Cf. Steiner, After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation, London/​Oxford/​ New York 1975. 623 Cook, “Translation as a Reading,” British Journal of Aesthetics 1986, 26(2), p. 143. 624 Gadamer, “Lesen ist wie Übersetzen,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 8, p. 284. 625 See also footnote no. 13 in Marta Skwara, “Translatologia a komparatystyka: serie przekładowe jako problem komparatystyczny,” Rocznik Komparatystyczny 1, p. 12.

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4.1.1. Text After Droysen, Gadamer defines texts as fixed manifestations of human existence and activity. Gadamer states that texts are subject to understanding, which means that they are one of the partners of a hermeneutic conversation. Their meaning can be revealed only thanks to the other interlocutor –​the interpreter. Although the text makes it possible to enclose the thing in question into a linguistic form, it is actually the interpreter who plays the most important role in the whole process.626 Of course, it would be a great simplification to treat the text in Gadamer’s hermeneutics only as a record in the form of a concrete statement or as a literary work, because texts are all manifestations of life. Some could even say that, to Gadamer, texts –​like the very determinants of language –​“live.” They come in various forms, and show a certain activity and efficiency. However, they reach a specific apogee when they predestine themselves to the category of a work of art. For Gadamer, a text can mean a musical work, a film, an opera spectacle, a theater performance, a painting or a sculpture, and thus anything that is subject to understanding and related interpretation. Thanks to the text, the experience undergoes a kind of transformation into structures that allow man to see and understand the world anew, from a different perspective.627 Reaching such a new outlook is possible thanks to translation, which in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is conditio humana. For is not every human a translator translating the reality around them in their own way? And is it not the case that the world is the superior text that enables man to understand himself? Although, as Schmidt aptly points out, the metaphor of translation as understanding the world is quite important for Gadamer, in hermeneutical theory written texts have been placed on a pre-​eminent pedestal –​such works allow people to move freely to other regions of perception, to which, if not for reading, they would never have access.628 Thus, written texts are the essence of any hermeneutical task and their reading is considered a priority in the process of realizing agreement and understanding.629 As Gadamer states: “Everything written is in fact the privileged object of hermeneutics.”630 He rightly reminds us that hermeneutics has always

6 26 WuM, p. 365. 627 Schmidt, Text and Translation, p. 348. 628 Schmidt, Text and Translation, p. 348. 629 WuM, p. 368. 630 “Alles Schriftliche ist in der Tat in bevorzugter Weise Gegenstand der Hermeneutik” (WuM, p. 372).

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aimed at understanding texts. On the other hand, writing as a space that enables the specific materialization of a linguistic form is a key component of the hermeneutical phenomenon. For it is in writing that a peculiar process of neutralization and distancing of meaning takes place –​a special moment in which the signs “break away” from both the author of the text and the potential recipient, and at the same time a moment in which the same signs gain a new dimension, allowing all those interested to access the coded content.631 In Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, we may also describe a text as representing a written manifestation of language, in which various dimensions of temporality merge, though they are not the most important here. Texts make it possible to articulate the content of a written statement, including its cultural-​ historical context, since it is the meaning that constitutes the function of the existence of each type of expression.632 “A text is not to be understood as an expression of life but with respect to what it says.”633 Therefore, we may conclude that from the hermeneutical perspective, the text should be understood not only as a manifestation of man’s cultural activity at a given time, an artifact born of concrete causal actions, but above all as a manifestation of the sense present in a given historical moment. The contact of the interpreter with a text understood in this way brings to mind Tischner’s take on “revealing” hermeneutics:634 “The world around man is like a meaningful text. A meaningful text is given to us in understanding. Understanding is a way of cognition and at the same time a way of human existence in the world around us.”635 In other words, a human is human because he or she understands. However, such a statement is almost too simplistic in the context of the phenomenon of “revealing” hermeneutics. For we should add that the interpreter understands the text, because he or she understands the understanding –​or “projects” it636 –​and therefore is aware of the meta-​understanding, i.e. the specificity, course, and conditions of the hermeneutical experience.

6 31 WuM, p. 369. 632 WuM, pp. 367–​368. 633 Gadamer, Truth, p. 394. “Ein Text will nicht als Lebensausdruck verstanden werden, sondern in dem, was er sagt” (WuM, p. 370). 634 Tischner, “Rozumienie –​dziejowość –​prawda,” Analecta Cracoviensia 1973/​74, 5/​6, p. 349. 635 Tischner, “Rozumienie,” p. 349. 636 Tischner, “Rozumienie,” p. 349. Tischner explains this idea as follows: “It means to capture the essential and necessary features of any possible understanding, without which understanding would not be itself.”

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The concept of text poses a particular challenge to Gadamer, inspiring the philosopher to ask questions about, among other things, the relationship between text and language or about the agreement reached through the text. Furthermore, Gadamer is interested in the universal dimension of written communication. Accordingly, we cannot understand the text only as an object of philological research. “Text is more than just the subject matter and object of literary research,”637 although, of course, a kind of metaphorical objectification also takes place in the hermeneutical process when the text becomes subject to interpretation. As he says, a text only gains its full meaning in the context of interpretation, hence, it becomes a message to be understood only from an interpretative perspective. At the same time, however, we should note a particuliar distinction between the concepts of text and interpretation. Compared to the interpretations, which can be many and varied, the text itself remains an objectified, concrete record of fixed form.638 As Gadamer points out,639 we may find confirmation of this in the etymological history of the word “text” which appeared in modern languages in the following two contexts: 1) as the text of the Bible subject to exegesis; 2) as the text of a song, thus subject to numerous modifications of the musical interpretation of the word. In these cases the text is supposed to explain, clarify, and make things more precise, as if it were an “external body” to which people could refer in case of any doubt or difficulty in deciphering the content “From this early point the word ‘text’ found a wider extension and was used wherever something resists integration into one’s experience and where a return to the supposedly given would provide a better orientation for understanding.”640 Therefore, hermeneutical reference to the text occurs in specific situations, in which a particular statement raises doubts as to its proper understanding, and in which specific difficulties in determining the meaning arise. In Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, we find a typology of such messages, which the philosopher calls incompatible with the authentic quality of a text 637 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” in: The Gadamer Reader, p. 165. “Text ist mehr als der Titel für das Gegenstandsfeld der Literaturforschung” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 31. 638 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 34. 639 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 34. 640 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 168. “Von da hat das Wort überall dort Verbreitung gefunden, wo etwas der Einordnung in die Erfahrung Widerstand leistet und wo der Rückgriff auf das vermeintlich Gegebene eine Orientierung für das Verständnis geben soll” (Gadamer, Text und Interpretation, pp. 34–​35).

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per se. He distinguishes between antitexts, pseudotexts, and pretexts, which could also be called fore-​texts. Gadamer defines the first as linguistic expressions impossible to frame within a text. Clearly, their dominant element is the situational context of the conversation, for example jokes, which –​due to their occasional nature –​the translator cannot reproduce in the way they appeared in their original story. The second type of text that does not conform to the essence of Gadamer’s textuality per se are pseudotexts –​or text-​opposed texts –​which contain elements that do not engage at all in the process of transmitting meaning and do not submit to interpretation procedures. Very often, these are rhetorical elements which play a strictly functional –​or even decorative –​role. The third type that contradicts the true essence of the text are so-​called pretexts, i.e. all the messages whose meaning can be somehow hidden, masked or overt. As an example, Gadamer refers in this context to the strongly ideologized process of shaping public opinion.641 According to Gadamer, such (fore-​)texts contradict the true essence of textuality. In fact, proper, true, authentic texts are literary texts which, with every reading, speak anew and, importantly, “live” after we decipher the meaning they carry, which is not the case with the other types. Literary texts are characterized by their openness to multiple ways of reading, and by a certain fluidity and dynamics of meaning: Literary texts are such texts that in reading them aloud one must also listen to them, if only with the inner ear; and if one recites the text, one not only listens but inwardly speaks with them. These texts attain their true existence only when one has learned them “by heart.” Then they live in memory, in remembrance by the great bards, the chanting choruses [Choreuten], the lyric singers. As if written in the soul, they are on their way to Schriftlichkeit [scripturality]! Thus, it is not surprising at all that in cultures that read, such distinguished texts are called “literature” [what is written].642

This unique character stems from the fact that they do not constitute a closed whole, subject only to the reproduction process, but they mark multiple ways of 6 41 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” pp. 41–​43. 642 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 182. “Literarische Texte sind solche Texte, die man beim Lesen laut hören muß, wenn auch vielleicht nur im inneren Ohr, und die man, wenn sie rezitiert werden, nicht nur hört, sondern innerlich mitspricht. Sie gewinnen ihr wahres Dasein im Auswendigkönnen, par coeur. Dann leben sie im Gedächtnis, des Rhapsoden, des Choreuten, des lyrischen Sängers. Wie in die Seele geschrieben, sind sie auf dem Wege zur Schriftlichkeit, und daher ist es gar nicht überraschend, daß man in Lesekulturen solche ausgezeichneten Texte ‚Literatur’nennt” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 46).

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reading the meaning contained in them, inspiring interpreters to discover content that seemingly does not exist in the text.643 Compared to others, literary texts articulate tradition and are, in fact, one way of manifesting its message.644 It is possible to reproduce them with a variety of interpretative means. It is a small wonder that both their content and their form are important –​especially in poetic texts. This statement becomes even more meaningful when we consider the fundamental principles governing the translational qualities of the sound layers of the translated works.645 Furthermore, literary texts have a special autonomy, inspiring a search for new meanings in their content, which in the simplest interpretation means that every reader can find something in them that speaks only to him or her. Thus, the text defined in this way by Gadamer can be extended, as described above, to all written statements that call for active participation in their reading, for interpretation of the voice articulated in specific language forms, and for creative recreation, because their content is often memorable.

4.1.2. The Translator and the Text The translation shows us that the text is not only understandable but also subject to objectification, i.e. it becomes a thing or an object (Gegenstand), which immediately implies that we may render the content of the text in many ways.646 In the context of the translation act, the text acquires a special meaning, almost the same as that which Gadamer attributes to literature.647 The source text opens itself up to the translator, who not only seeks to reproduce or even shape the original statement, but at the same time to make the text speak anew thanks to the interpretation, each time confirming its particular autonomy. Furthermore, the encounter between interpreter and source text is an encounter with strangeness. Even though this thesis is far from being innovative, it is worthwhile to consider.

6 43 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” pp. 46–​47. 644 For more see Gadamer, “Der ‘eminente’ Text,” pp. 286–​295. 645 For more see Gadamer, “Lesen ist wie Übersetzen,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 8, pp. 282–​284. 646 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 36. 647 Notably, Gadamer does not only mean fiction, but also the whole of humanity’s written output.

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This is not only about linguistically conditioned alienation648 but also about alien content or meaning. In fact, the text is “speech that is subject to alienation”; “speech” that in order to be understood, must revive and reveal its meaning. Gadamer often emphasizes that this is the most important task the hermeneuticist faces.649 A written text fully shows the structure of the understanding process. By making it possible to establish a cultural dialog, the text articulates specific differences that broaden the interpreter’s cognitive horizon as well as the horizon of those to whom the interpretation is addressed. Notably, the category “alien” is an inherent feature of the translation act,650 enabling the confrontation of different cultural elements, and ultimately understanding and agreement. Of course, it is up to translators to what extent certain “differences” will be ignored or unnoticed in the target culture. As Spyrka rightly states, referring to Culler: We may say that it is the secondary receiver who tames the reading process and the interpreter does not tame it but only creates conditions for it. As far as the interpreter's work is concerned, this means that his or her role is to make the text understandable to the secondary recipient at different levels by referring to various cohesive patterns that the secondary recipient does not know. This will enable the secondary recipient to read the text, i.e. to tame it.651

Gadamer postulates this way of taming of text in a similar manner. He wants the concept of a text to be understood in hermeneutical terms, not in grammatical, pragmatic, or strictly linguistic ones. He explains that the hermeneutical perspective is the correct one and therefore is closer to every reader. The text is only a phase in the process of reaching an agreement between the partners in the hermeneutical dialog, and in this sense, we may understand it in many ways. Readers each take their own unique path to enter into a dialog with the transmitted content. Following Spyrka, we could say that each reader adapts the text to their needs, making specific actions aimed at taming the message. This results in differences between hermeneutical and strictly linguistic reading. Moreover, this also applies to the methodology used in the humanities. Gadamer claims a linguist does not seek to reach an agreement on a given matter, but to show the 648 Gadamer describes foreign language in terms of a specific limit experience. Cf. H.-​G. Gadamer, “Grenzen der Sprache,” in: Gesammelte Werke 8, pp. 359–​360. 649 WuM, p. 371. 650 See Lewicki, “Obcość w przekładzie a obcość w kulturze,” in: Przekład. Język. Kultura, ed. Lewicki, Lublin 2002, pp. 43–​52. 651 Spyrka, “Przekład udomowiony –​przekład wyobcowany,” Przekłady Literatur Słowiańskich 2011, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 252.

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way the language functions, often regardless of the content. A linguist does not focus on what the text is about, but on how it comes to a situation in which it is possible to communicate with the help of language signs.652 But hermeneutical analysis deals with something completely different: From the hermeneutical point of view, on the other hand, understanding what is said is the main and only concern. For this, the proper functioning of language is merely a precondition. Another precondition is that an expression should be acoustically intelligible, or that a printed text be decipherable, so that understanding what is spoken or written is at least possible. The text must be readable.653

As Gadamer says, for a linguist agreement on a given matter is not an important goal. Whereas a hermeneuticist –​and therefore also a competent translator –​extends the concept of a text, focusing not so much on formal-​linguistic issues as on an overall understanding of the meaning conveyed in the message. Gadamer writes: “a text must be understood in its own terms.”654 By interaction with the text, the translator seeks agreement on a given thing, recognizing in the process of handing down tradition –​which every text is –​what is truly meaningful and sensible.655 This is what Gadamer’s phenomenon of the understanding process consists of.656 The universal principle of any text interpretation

6 52 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 35. 653 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 169. “Für die hermeneutische Betrachtung dagegen ist das Verständnis des Gesagten das einzige, worauf es ankommt. Dafür ist das Funktionieren von Sprache eine bloße Vorbedingung. So ist als erstes vorausgesetzt, daß eine Äußerung akustisch verständlich ist oder daß eine schriftliche. Fixierung sich entziffern läßt, damit das Verständnis des Gesagten oder im Text Gesagten überhaupt möglich wird. Der Text muß lesbar sein” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 35). 654 Gadamer, Truth, p. 292. “Daß man einen Text aus sich selbst verstehen muß” (WuM, p. 276). 655 Jürgen Habermas also speaks interestingly about program differences between hermeneutics and linguistics: “Linguistics does not concern itself with communicative competence…, it limits itself to ‘linguistic competence’ in the narrower sense … Hermeneutics, by contrast, concerns itself with the experiences of the speaker in this dimension. Further, the goal of linguistics is a reconstruction of the rule system which underlies the production of all the various grammatically correct and semantically meaningful elements of a natural language, whereas hermeneutics reflects on the principal experiences of a communicatively competent speaker (whose linguistic competence is tacitly presupposed) (Habermas, “On Hermeneutics’ Claim to Universality,” trans. K. Mueller-​Vollmer, in: Hermeneutics Reader: Text of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, ed K. Muellera-​Vollmera, New York, pp. 297–​298). 656 WuM, p. 295.

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and the universal principle of hermeneutics –​and therefore the universal task of the translator –​is to reach agreement on a given content and the understanding thereof. As Gadamer says, hermeneutics surrenders to the text.657 Thus, the text is the decisive factor in the understanding process and the hermeneuticist should have special regard for what is said there. Of course, language is an essential component, but mainly because it is the medium through which the translation becomes possible. Most important is the content conveyed through language or –​referring to Gadamer –​the story or narration.658 Undoubtedly, his views on the fundamental rift between the linguistic and hermeneutical approach raise doubts. After all, it is not true that linguists do not see deeper meanings in the textual layer of a work of art. However, one must take into account the historical background of Gadamer’s work and the condition of linguistics at the time, when the primacy of the analytical philosophy of language caused its use to be partly pushed into the background. In Gadamer’s case, this linguistic/​hermeneutical distinction is a natural continuation of his views on the nature of language, which instead of being objectified, should rather become the subject of a communication act; instead of becoming a communication tool, language should simply make communication possible by creating a specific channel that produces agreement and understanding. When reaching an agreement becomes difficult or impossible, the process of reconstructing the text takes place, i.e. the message is dissected, taking into account the semantic literality of the message components. “One can say that if one needs to focus on the wording of the text, that is, on the text as such, this is always motivated by something unusual having arisen in the understanding-​ situation.”659 According to Gadamer, we may call a text a proper text per se only if the content is incomprehensible and if the text itself is a handy tool for finding sense that is not easy to decipher. In this context, it is worth mentioning the obliteration or disappearance of a text. Here, Gadamer gives the example of a note, a scientific announcement, and a letter. In each case, the meaning of the statement most often raises no doubts, especially since it is usually addressed to a specific addressee who exactly knows what the sender had in mind.660 6 57 WuM, p. 295. 658 WuM, p. 279. 659 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 171. “Man kann geradezu sagen: Daß man überhaupt auf den Wortlaut bzw. auf den Text als solchen zurückgreift, muß immer durch die Besonderheit der Verständigungssituation motiviert sein” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 37). 660 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” pp. 37–​38.

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Gadamer states that every time we return to a text in order to better understand its content, we take into consideration its so-​called primary message [Kundgabe], i.e. the primary information that must be understood: “The text should set down the original announcement [Kundgabe] in such a way that its sense is unequivocally understandable.”661 Since both the author of the message and its recipient strive to reach an agreement, or in other words, their goal is to articulate the meaning in a new situational context, then the goal of the statement and its communicative dominant are important. Therefore, the text in Gadamer’s philosophy is only a certain phase in the process of realizing an agreement,662 an authority that can be invoked in order to find a concrete sense or an answer to a question. So for Gadamer, the text inevitably undergoes objectification because, contrary to how the philosopher wants to see the language, the text should serve as a template for overlaying sense, which may appear different each time. To Gadamer, the functioning of legal regulations and the specificity of legal hermeneutics is a model example of such an activity. In this case, the above mentioned references to the text, both by the parties and by the court, become apparent. That is why it is so important to create legal regulations containing the primary message: “Documentation” demands precisely this: that an authentic interpretation must be possible, even if the authors themselves, the legislators or the parties to a contract, are not there. This means that from the outset the written formulation must consider the interpretive free space that arises for the “reader” of the text who has to apply it. Here it is always a matter—​whether by proclamation or codification—​of avoiding strife, of excluding misunderstandings and misuse, and trying to make univocal understanding possible.663

Gadamer treats the law as a text, because it requires constant reference to written rules, a constant returning to the text in order to reach an agreement.664 661 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 173. “Was allen schriftlichen Fixierungen ihre Aufgabe vorschreibt, ist eben, daß diese‚ Kunde’verstanden werden soll.” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 39). 662 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 40. 663 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 174. “Die Dokumentation’ verlangt gerade dies Autoren selber, die Gesetzgeber oder die Vertragspartner, nicht greifbar sind. Darin liegt, daß die schriftliche Formulierung den Auslegungsspielraum von vornherein mit bedenken muß, der für den Leser’ des Textes entsteht, der denselben anzuwenden hat. Hier geht es stets darum –​ob bei der Verkündigung’oder der Kodifikation, gilt gleichviel, Streit zu vermeiden, Mißverständnisse und Mißbrauch auszuschließen, eindeutiges Verständnis zu ermöglichen” (Gadamer, “Text und Interrpetation,” p. 40). 664 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 40.

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The text is an inalienable element of the understanding and interpretation processes, serving as a primary translator between audiences speaking different languages.665 The text participates in the hermeneutic conversation that is possible thanks to it, and influences the way sense forms. In the case of difficulties in deciphering and, to some extent, shaping it, the translator uses an interpretation which allows agreement on a given matter to help achieve well-​established understanding. Here it is worthwhile to linger over Gadamer’s concept of interpretation.666 People have not perceived interpretation very differently over the centuries. Some changes in its perception may have occurred because language has started to be understood differently in philosophy. According to Gadamer, interpretation was defined in terms of relationalism involving the partners of a conversation speaking different languages, and thus was undeniably connected with the translation act. Later, scholars began to refer to translation per se. From that point on in philosophy, the concept of interpretation began to occupy a key place. Interpretation in its entirety determines understanding. It is characteristic not only of the humanities but also of the natural sciences, embodying human cognition. It cannot be regarded as merely an additional or optional procedure for making cognition possible, since it is in fact its inalienable component.667 Here, Gadamer poses a very important question, whether interpretation is about imposing or finding meaning668 as if it had always been there. It seems that in the process of translation these two aspects merge, since the translator’s task is both to understand the initial message and to reproduce it in another language. Therefore, this sense may be found in the source text and extracted from it. But when creating the target text, the translator brings to it his or her own perspective from which he or she understands the message being translated. This perspective is present in the language used, the strategies adopted, and the translation decisions. Thus, a given content takes on a unique, original character. However, the status of the interpretation in the translation act remains a matter of dispute: whether the translator has actually “reached” the meaning of the linguistic substance or instead has formed the meaning with available language resources. The issue boils down to whether the interpretation may be regarded in subjective or objective terms, while taking into consideration the difference

6 65 666 667 668

Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 45. Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” pp. 33–​34. Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” pp. 33–​34. Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 34.

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between sense and meaning, between what is the object of attention in the case of interpretation per se, and in the case of an established or critical interpretation. After Erik D. Hirsch, we may conclude that “the object of interpretation is textual meaning in and for itself and may be called the meaning of the text. The object of criticism, on the other hand, is that meaning in its bearing on something else (standards of value, present concerns, etc.), and this object may therefore be called the significance of the text.”669 Reference to Hirsch would help strengthen the methodological implementation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in the translatological field. Meaning in the interpretation process is something we can discuss in light of the use a reader makes of the interpreted text. On the other hand, sense is something we can discuss in reference to a critique of translation that extracts the sense in order to establish how it is related to the translation context. Of course, we should remember that a critic “possesses a guiding idea against which he can measure his construction.”670 Therefore, in the context of critique, we may speak of an objective –​or rather objectively oriented –​interpretation, because it is anchored in the methodology of conduct adopted by the interpreter. Going beyond the subjective experience of the content with which the critic interacts, he or she sets out specific rules of interpretation, which are anchored in the methodical means of dealing with the text. Thus, the critic enters the objectively activated critical space within which the interpretation –​concerning also the “significance of a text”671–​has been carried out for a specific

669 E. D. Hirsch, “Objective interpretation,” in: Validity in Interpreation, New Heaven and London 1967, p. 211. Hirsch writes even more emphatically about the role of the text: “Textual meaning is not a naked given like a physical object. The text is first of all a conventional representation like a musical score, and what the score represents may be construed correctly or incorrectly. The literary text (in spite of the semimystical claims made for its uniqueness) docs not have a special ontological status which somehow absolves the reader from the demand intrinsically imposed by all linguistic texts of every description. Nothing, that is, can give a conventional representation the status of an immediate given. The text of a poem, for example, has to be constructed by the critic before it becomes a poem for him. Then it is, no doubt, an artifact with special characteristics. But before the critic construes the poem it is no artifact for him at all, and if he construes it wrongly, he will subsequently be talking about the wrong artifact, not the one represented by the text. If criticism is to be objective in any significant sense, it must be founded on a self-​critical construction of textual meaning, which is to say, on objective interpretation.” Hirsch, “Objective interpretation,” p. 211 ff. 670 Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation,” p. 212. 671 Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation,” p. 211.

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purpose. Hirsch describes this distinction by referring to August Boeckh: “interpretation is the construction of textual meaning as such; it explicates (legt aus) those meanings, and only those meanings, which the text explicitly or implicitly represents. Criticism, on the other hand, builds on the results of interpretation; it confronts textual meaning not as such, but as a component within a larger context.”672 We may even say after Tokarz that interpretation –​combining all the components of the translation process and conditioning the manifestation of the “secondary intentional object,”673 which the translation is –​is revealed by the fact that the translator states that the text he or she wants to understand has started a polemic with the interpreter. This polemic –​in other words, resistance –​is in fact inherently inscribed in the specificity of translation, since the source text, being a message written in a foreign language, creates in the translator a feeling of alienation from the very beginning, even when the content seems to be devoid of any language-​related difficulties. A competent translator should act like a philologist when editing a given text to make it understandable. Therefore, the translator must be vigilant and cautious about the translated content. So what is the function of the interpreter? Although Gadamer does not diminish the role of the interpreter in the whole creative process, he often emphasizes the primacy of the text and the power that it has over its interpreter. Of course, the contribution of the interpreter remains visible, because the target text created in the translation process is a tangible product. But Gadamer draws attention to the interpreter’s “hiding” in the content of the text and not in its subject matter. This is the specificity of the relationship between the text and the interpreter. The “hiding” has no negative repercussions, because it implies the fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) –​that of the text’s with the reader’s. Therefore, from a hermeneutical perspective, the process of the translator’s “disappearing” is a priority of the translation process: “Indeed, the process of understanding a text tends to captivate and take the reader up into that which the text says, and in this fusion the text disappears!”674 However, it seems we should not treat “disappearing” in pejorative terms (as does, for example, Lawrence Venuti in his concept of the translator’s “invisibility”) but rather as an inherent property

6 72 Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation,” p. 210. 673 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 169. 674 Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” p. 180. “Das Verständnis eines Textes tendiert daher dazu, den Leser für das einzunehmen, was der Text sagt, der eben damit selber verschwindet” (Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” p. 46).

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of the translation process, allowing the text to “emerge” as a hermeneutical conversation partner who has something to tell the reader. Gadamer does not fully agree with Schleiermacher either.675 He believes that when an interpreter tries to understand a given text, he or she should not at all costs seek to empathically “feel” the situation in which the author found himself when creating the work. The translator can only transpose his or her “self ” into a given perspective –​ideological, social, emotional, historical, cultural –​which was also the author’s starting point when creating the initial text. Thus, the translator can indirectly present his or her views in this medium. This reminds of E. D. Hirsch, who writes that “the interpreter’s job is to specify the text’s horizon as far as he is able, and this means ultimately that he must familiarize himself with the typical meanings of the author’s mental and experiential world.”676 What does this mean in the context of the translation process? Well, in a hermeneutical perspective, the translator, heading for the anticipation of the fullness discussed in Chapter Two, should treat the interpreted content as relevant and reliable and should not attempt to argue with it.677 As Gadamer states: We are moving in a dimension of meaning that is intelligible in itself and as such offers no reason for going back to the subjectivity of the author. The task of hermeneutics is to clarify this miracle of understanding, which is not a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in a common meaning.678

Therefore, the translator does not try to understand the author’s motives, but rather focuses on the text and on grasping its meaning. Although some issues concerning the author and the era in which he or she created the text may help the translator to place the text in a specific situational context,679 Gadamer appears to rule out biographical aspects as data that could significantly influence a reliable interpretation. It is worth repeating that, in his hermeneutics, to understand means to first understand a given “thing” or matter and only then the author’s view:

6 75 WuM, p. 277. 676 Hirsch, “Objective Interpretation,” p. 223. 677 WuM, p. 276. 678 Gadamer, Truth, p. 292. “daß wir uns in einer Dimension von Sinnhaftem bewegen, das in sich verstädlich ist und als solches keinen Rückgang auf die Subjektivität des anderen motiviert. Es ist die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik, dies Wunder des Verstehens aufzuklären, das nicht eine geheimnisvolle Kommunion der Seelen, sondern eine Teilhabe am gemeinsamen Sinn ist” (WuM, p. 276). 679 See Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 105–​107.

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Experience teaches: nothing stands more in the way of a real understanding between two people than when someone claims to understand the other’s being and his opinion. “Understanding” to be ahead of all counter-​speeches actually serves no other purpose than to keep the other person's claims at bay. It is a way of not letting them tell anything.680

This rightly emphasizes that the author’s thought is an obstacle in the interpretation process. In Gadamer’s philosophy, understanding the author and understanding his words are separate criteria, because when we are trying to “understand” the author, we do not give the floor to the “thing” the author wants to tell us about. Moreover, displaying a characteristic receptiveness, the interpreter should be able to open up to the tasks posed by the interpreted text:681 But is it necessary to have knowledge of what the poet himself thought about a poem? All that matters is what the poem actually says, not what its author intended and perhaps did not know how to say. Of course a hint from the author regarding the raw material of his subject ‘matter’ can be useful even for a perfectly self-​contained poem, and can guard against misunderstanding. But such hints remain a dangerous crutch. When a poet shares his private and occasional motives, he basically displaces what has been balanced out as a poetic configuration toward the side of the private and contingent –​which, in any case, is not even there.682

680 “Da lehrt die Erfahrung: nichts steht einer echten Verständigung von Ich und Du mehr im Wege, als wenn jemand den Anspruch erhebt, den anderen in seinem Sein und seiner Meinung zu verstehen. ‘Verstehend’aller Gegenrede des anderen voraus zu sein, dient in Wahrheit zu nichts anderem, als sich den Anspruch des anderen vom Leibe zu halten. Es ist eine Weise, sich nichts sagen zu lassen”(Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte,” p. 9). 681 WuM, p. 295. 682 Gadamer, “Who Am I and Who Are You?,” in: Gadamer, Heinemann, Krajewski, Gadamer on Celan: “Who Am I and Who Are You?” and Other Essays, State University of New York Press, 1997. “Bedarf es der Auskunft über das, was ein Dichter sich bei seinem Gedicht gedacht hat? Es kommt doch wohl allein darauf an, was ein Gedicht wirklich sagt –​und nicht, was sein Verfasser meinte und vielleicht nicht zu sagen verstand. Gewiß kann der Wink des Verfassers, der auf den unverwandelten Zustand des ‘Stoffes’ weist, auch bei einem in sich vollendeten Gedicht von Nutzen sein und vor Fehlversuchen des Verstehens bewahren. Aber es bleibt eine gefahrliche Hilfe. Wenn der Dichter seine privaten und okkasionellen Motive mitteilt, verschiebt er im Grunde das, was sich als dichterisches Gebilde ausbalanciert hat, nach der Seite des Privaten und Kontingenten –​das jedenfalls nicht dasteht” (Gadamer, Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?, pp. 383–​384).

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Thus, Gadamer warns interpreters against being too eager in obtaining additional information about the author of the text. He believes that such a situation is in fact a danger zone for the interpreter, for it may happen –​which is why he does not recommend it at all –​that the interpreter will obtain information the author himself did not have. Gadamer claims that even if the additional information could actually help, only the interpreted work can actually decide on its validity.683 This is a realistic approach to the question of the author’s role in the process of understanding and interpreting a text. According to Gadamer, the biographical information the interpreter draws on does not support the precision of understanding.684 At the same time, he warns against interpretative impressions and prejudices that may prove to be unfounded and ineffective. Therefore, ultimately, it is advisable for the interpreter to reflect on the merits of his or her own insights, verifying hypotheses on the basis of available sources. When referring to the example of reading a poem, Gadamer interestingly states that: The poem also says more than one or the other hears. Understanding does not want to recognize what someone meant. It is about something more –​something that neither the poet knows nor anybody else can say and which is neither arbitrary nor subjective.685

It seems that Gadamer has in mind an element which he repeatedly mentions, i.e. the “thing” (Sache) to which the message refers. It is a kind of text dominant, which only glimmers through from the formal structure of the text and which we should treat as a specific and necessary “key” to finding a work’s sense and meaning. However, this “key” is not formally made available by the author –​ who may not even be aware of it –​but is to be decrypted by the interpreter, who then has to make this “key” available to the recipients. The “key” is such an element of a given work that must be preserved in the translation process, even at the cost of losing other important textual elements, hence, it somewhat resembles Barańczak’s semantic dominant. True understanding, including the self-​understanding necessary for an accurate translation, activates only when the 6 83 Gadamer, “Wer bin Ich,” pp. 428–​429. 684 Gadamer, “Wer bin Ich,” p. 440. It is noteworthy that in Gadamer’s view the biographical criterion may coexist with other planes of the work, but should never exist autonomously. 685 “Auch das Gedicht sagt mehr, als der eine oder andere heraushört. Das Verstehen will nicht wiedererkennen, was einer gemeint hat. Es geht um mehr –​um etwas, was weder der Dichter weiβ, noch irgendein anderer sagen kann, und was doch nicht beliebig oder subjektiv ist. Wie es ist, wird zu fragen sein” (Gadamer, “Ende der Kunst?,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 8, Ästhetik und Poetik I. Kunst als Aussage, Tübingen 1993, p. 216).

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translator concentrates on what the text is about –​what the “thing” is to which the message refers. In the context of the translation act, self-​understanding is necessary for translators to be able to see the distance between them and the translated text and thus their own limitations, so as to supplement their knowledge or improve specific skills in order to perform their work competently. Moreover, it is necessary to realize the conditions of the translator as an interpreter of the alien. Interpreters always refer the interpreted meaning to the way they see themselves and the world around them.686 The translator’s goal is primarily to establish a special bond with a text that becomes comprehensible when it has meaning for the person interpreting it.687 Paraphrasing Celan’s words, to whom Gadamer often refers, we may say that the translation act is the act of creating and finding a word that emerges each time in a different form, depending on the specific life situation in which the interpreter is located.688 In this respect, as Gadamer states, there is no point in assuming the “mastery” that should link the creator and translator. A competent translator is not a genius whose task is to equal the author of the original in every way, but an interpreter who is supposed to first reach the original sense of the text by interpreting it689 and then reach the translation recipients, who should be allowed to interpret on their own.

4.2. The Dialectics of Question and Answer –​the Translator’s Dialog with the Text Paraphrasing Gadamer, we may say that translation is a “conversation that is a circle closed by the dialectic of question and answer.”690 The hermeneutical dialog begins by taking into account the difference between the text, which is after all a partner in the hermeneutical conversation, and the interpreter’s “self.” A conversation is the process of building intersubjective understanding, which is, in a way, translation’s primary goal. It is reliable when the participant turns to the Other, recognizes the Other’s point of view, and identifies himself with the Other. Since conversation in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is in fact a term used to 686 This is the essence of the application –​the integral moment of understanding –​which I discuss in more detail in section 4.3. 687 See Gadamer, “Das Problem der Geschichte,” p. 9. 688 Gadamer, “Wer bin Ich,” p. 431. 689 WuM, p. 294. 690 Gadamer, Truth, p. 391. “Das Gespräch ein in die Dialektik von Frage und Antwort geschlossener Kreis” (WuM, p. 366).

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describe translation –​i.e. a metaphor for translation –​it can be stated that a reliable translator is a person who opens up to the encounter with the text and with what it has to say.

4.2.1. The Essence of the Question The structure of a question is inherent in every hermeneutical experience. Therefore, the question is an essential part of the translation process. Chapter Two discussed the circular structure of understanding, which consists, among other things, of starting with initial interpretative hypotheses and then revising them. Verification of the accuracy of the initial expectations takes place thanks to the hermeneutical conversation the translator conducts with the text by asking specific questions. Gadamer is a kind of “ambassador” of the question. He claims that each statement comes out of something and each one contains assumptions that we discover gradually.691 As Gadamer says, a question makes sense, which means that it is “directed.” Therefore, the sense of the question boils down to establishing a kind of signpost which determines the answer, because the very posing of the question directs the person asking it to the content it concerns: “When a question arises, it breaks open the being of the object, as it were.”692 Asking questions is much more difficult than answering them.693 Those who think they always know better will never ask a good question. So what does the ability to ask a question involve? Let us give quote Gadamer: In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, and that means knowing that one does not know. In the comic confusion between question and answer, knowledge and ignorance that Plato describes, there is a profound recognition of the priority of the question in all knowledge and discourse that really reveals something of an object. Discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open by the question.694

6 91 Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit?,” p. 54. 692 “Das Aufkommen einer Frage bricht gleichsam das Sein des Befragten auf ” (WuM, p. 345). 693 Gadamer states that these people find the asking easier than answering and aim only at uncritically proving that they are right (WuM, p. 345). 694 Gadamer, Truth, p. 357. “Um fragen zu können, muß man wissen wollen, d. h. aber: wissen, daß man nicht weiß. In der komödienhaften Vertauschung von Fragen und Antworten, Wissen und Nichtwissen, die Plato uns schildert, kommt mithin die Vorgängigkeit der Frage für alles sacherschließende Erkennen und Reden zur Anerkennung. Ein Reden, das eine Sache aufschließen soll, bedarf des Aufbrechens der Sache durch die Frage” (WuM, p. 345).

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Therefore, the ability to inquire is closely related to attitudes that require self-​ reflection and self-​criticism. Translators must become aware of their own ignorance and ask questions in such a way that they are as inclusive as possible, since Gadamer’s question has an open status, which means the answer is always unconstituted and indefinite. This is also what constitutes the sense of the question. Without an open answer space, there can be no reliable inquiry. However, the openness of the question is not unlimited. The horizon remains a specific measure of its limits. As Gadamer states, the question has to be posed so as to make sense and relate to a specific issue.695 This should also be required of competent translators. The questions they pose to the text both before and during the actual translation should be open, though at the same time limited by the specific thing –​the horizon –​the translator wants to know. So how does one ask the right question? According to Gadamer, it is necessary to start by establishing the premises on which we build our knowledge on a given subject. In other words, to ask the right question, one has to start from what one already knows about the given thing. The premise in such an approach will mean a starting point for further reasoning, a basis for further stages of the interpretation process. Whether an interpreter asks the right question depends on whether he or she starts with true or false assumptions. The wrong question, or a misdirected one, cannot lead to the answer we need in the interpretation process. These reflections direct Gadamer toward one of the most important aspects of his hermeneutics, namely, what sense is: “Sense is always the sense of direction for a possible question. Correct sense must accord with the direction in which a question points.”696 The question plays such an important role in the interpretation process because it has immense –​though indirect –​influence on how the target reader understands the sense of the text. The question is to highlight the “thing” that the message is about –​to bring to the fore what should be found in the reading. In Gadamer’s work, the philosophy of the question is in line with the meaning of “sense,” which each time may break down differently as a result of which particular premise the interpreter followed at the outset. As stated above, the question should be open, which means that it should both disclose the correctness of a particular statement and rule out its inaccuracy. This is why asking questions

6 95 WuM, p. 346. 696 Gadamer, Truth, p. 358. Sinn ist eben stets Richtungssinn einer möglichen Frage. Der Sinn dessen, was richtig ist, muß der von einer Frage gebahnten Richtung entsprechen” (WuM, p. 346).

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is necessarily connected with the process of acquiring knowledge: to answer the question is to enter the path leading to knowledge, even though, as Gadamer emphasizes, there is still a long way to reach cognition, which happens only after the contradictory exemplifications are eliminated and the counter-​arguments advanced are proven to be incorrect and unreliable.697 Knowledge is not created on the basis of the answer but on the basis of the question, because knowing means to refer to the arguments directed against the other party, to take into account the broader context of a given issue, and to analyze in detail all the pros and cons. Therefore, in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the path to knowledge is an analytical but also a dialectical process. To have knowledge is to have questions that do not give simple answers and give rise to contradictions. Deciding which way to go is looking for an answer, the optimal solution to a given problem. But it is worth repeating that in the process of asking questions, we assume an awareness of our ignorance, i.e. knowing about not knowing. To ask a question, it is necessary to realize that the opinions employed to interpret the text have a hypothetical status; to verify them properly it is necessary to pose the appropriate question. As Gadamer states, specific ignorance leads to a specific question. Each idea that comes in the form of the interpreter’s initial concept transforms into a structure of the question. For the idea always assumes a certain openness and thus also includes the question. According to Gadamer, this is how new ideas are born –​thanks to the fact that a specific question arises and is then directed into an open space that ultimately leads to an answer. Therefore the question is both natural –​because it resembles in a certain sense the coming of an idea –​and methodical, for there is a so-​called art of asking, composed of certain rules, the mastery of which can guarantee entry to the path to knowledge. What is this art of asking? For Gadamer, the interpreter who can master the art of asking is the one who wants to know. Since to have knowledge is to have questions, the art of questioning will be familiar to the interpreter who wants to discover through the questions asked. Such an interpreter strives for self-​development and self-​education and is curious about the world. In the context of the translation act, the art of questioning is not about defending oneself against initial expectations or interpretative hypotheses, but about assuming freedom and openness to various possible interpretations of the translated content. Moreover, it cannot rely on looking for simple and quick answers. Finally, it cannot even be defined as a specific, learned skill. The art of questioning, which reflects certain natural predispositions of the interpreter, is, in fact, the

697 WuM, p. 346.

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art of thinking, since it does not boil down only to asking specific questions, but also to persevering with them, which shows an attitude of particular openness through persistent searching.698 This search for meaning through contextualized questions is obviously related to equating the concept of philosophy with the history of philosophy, which Gadamer did, being inspired by Hegel. For Gadamer, philosophy is the history of philosophy and vice versa, which can be simply translated into the essence of the interpretation process. Since every question we ask comes from our knowledge and at the same time influences how this knowledge will be shaped as a result of the asking –​e.g. in the target reader –​ it means that the question must be placed at the very center of the reasoning process and deciphering of meaning. For it is the question that guarantees the inexhaustibility of the sense of the message. There are as many senses and interpretations as there are questions. The answer narrows the search and simultaneously indicates the partial success of the search. By proper asking, interpreters fulfil their most important mission: recognizing sense. In this context, Gadamer mentions even the logical structure of open questions.699 In light of this notion, we may conclude that competent translators have preliminary expectations about the meaning of a text, but in order to understand something well, they have to open themselves up to the view contained within it. The translator needs to listen to the text and recognize its meaning through questioning which is talked down by the text. Without receptive openness to this process, an adequate translation is impossible. As Gadamer contends: The hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in part so defined. This places hermeneutical work on a firm basis. A person trying to understand something will not resign himself from the start to relying on his own accidental fore-​meanings, ignoring as consistently and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through what the interpreter imagines it to be. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something.700

6 98 WuM, p. 346. 699 See WuM, p. 344. 700 Gadamer, Truth, p. 271. “Die hermeneutische Aufgabe geht von selbst in eine sachliche Fragestellung über und ist von dieser immer schon mitbestimmt. Damit gewinnt das hermeneutische Unternehmen festen Boden unter den Füßen. Wer verstehen will, wird sich von vornherein nicht der Zufälligkeit der eigenen Vormeinung überlassen dürfen, um an der Meinung des Textes so konsequent und hartnäckig wie möglich vorbeizuhören –​bis etwa diese unüberhörbar wird und das vermeintliche Verständnis umstößt. Wer einen Text verstehen will, ist vielmehr bereit, sich von ihm etwas sagen zu lassen” (WuM, p. 253).

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Openness to what the text is about allows the translator to hear the “thing” it contains. But what is hidden behind Gadamer’s metaphorical statement about “hearing” what the text is trying to convey? It seems that he is concerned, on one hand, with placing the certainties in parentheses, and on the other with not giving in to the first associations that come to mind, which may threaten the interpretation process if they are included in the hermeneutical circle and treated as indicators of rightness without deeper reflection and without a properly directed question. Reut accurately describes this situation: “Asking seems to us easier than answering, but this is only true if our question is overtaken by the certainty of what the answer is supposed to look like, or if we do not think about the thought’s direction at all.”701 Therefore, openness allows us to grasp the substantive issues covered by the message,702 but also to understand the questions answered in the message. Seeing questions is a special skill every researcher should possess in order to be called a researcher which, undoubtedly, a competent translator also deserves to be called. But what does Gadamer mean by seeing questions? It is worth recalling his words: To see questions is to break open the self-​contained wall of pressupositions which dominates our thinking and knowledge. Someone who cannot get through this wall and see new questions and give new answers is not a true scholar. In every statement, a certain question-​situation marks the horizon of sense.703

Thus, seeing a question is nothing more than an interpreter’s opening up to potentially different ways of reading the text, sometimes even denying the already established ways of seeing the world around us. A good translator is aware that preliminary interpretative hypotheses, though they may seem pertinent and appropriate, must be subject to many revisions. This is why it is so important to show an open attitude toward what the text is about. A reliable translator is a hermeneut, and not a person hermetically closed in his or her

701 Reut, “Nauka, pytanie i dialog. Wstęp do analizy hermeneutycznej koncepcji uniwersalności rozumienia,” Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 1995, 1747, p. 34. 702 WuM, p. 363. 703 “Fragen sehen heißt aber, aufbrechen können, was wie eine verschlossene und underchlässige Schicht geebneter Vormeinungen unser ganzes Denken und Erkennen beherrscht. So aufbrechen können, daß auf diese Weise neue Fragen gesehen und neue Antworten möglich werden, macht den Forscher aus. Jede Aussage hat ihren Sinnhorizont darin, daß sie einer Fragesituation entstammt” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Was ist Wahrheit, pp. 54–​55; translation after: Gadamer, “Cóż to jest prawda?,” p. 42).

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thoughts and expectations of the text, a person who reads it understandingly. It is worth looking at what this statement means in the context of the translation act.

4.2.2. Reading in an Understanding Way It has been shown that the conversation between an interpreter and a text, like any hermeneutic conversation, has a question and answer structure. As Gadamer emphasizes, its conduct requires a certain art –​a specific ability to try to find a compromise taking into account the different views contained in the text –​the art of posing questions. Thanks to it, the interpreter can challenge any initial idea of a source text’s meaning and then revise it. Dialectics is about extracting from the text the most important “thing” it concerns. The interpreter’s conversation with a text is not merely a metaphor but also a reminder of what lies at the source of communication. It is a hermeneutic phenomenon in which not only the interpreter asks the text, but the text itself asks questions. The first question arises when tradition transmits it, when it becomes an object of interpretative understanding. Gadamer stresses that to understand a text means to understand the question that the text asks. As shown in the second chapter, this becomes possible because the translator has gained a hermeneutical horizon that allows outlining the direction of the text’s sense and obtaining the horizon of the question:704 Thus a person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the question—​a horizon that, as such, necessarily includes other possible answers.705

Therefore, sense depends on the question it answers, and thus goes beyond what is said in it. This is also the logic of conduct in the humanities. It is the logic of the question. Gadamer refers to R. G. Collingwood,706 the author of the logic of the question and answer, according to whom a text can only be understood if

7 04 WuM, pp. 351–​352. 705 Gadamer, Truth, p. 363. “Wer verstehen will, muß also fragend hinter das Gesagte zurückgehen. Er muß es als Antwort von einer Frage her verstehen, auf die es Antwort ist. So hinter das Gesagte zurückgegangen, hat man aber notwendig über das Gesagte hinausgefragt. Man versteht den Text ja nur in seinem Sinn, indem man den Fragehorizont gewinnt, der als solcher notwendigerweise auch andere mögliche Antworten umfaßt” (WuM, p. 352). 706 WuM, p. 352.

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one understands the question to which the text is an answer. In this sense, a text is analogous to any work of art, which, like the text, is understood most fully when one identifies the question to which a given painting, sculpture, or poem is the answer. The answer lies in the text. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this is the most essential axiom that takes the form of an initial grasp of fullness.707 When starting the process of translating a message, the translator has to initially determine what the text is about and diagnose the question the content answers. Therefore, the translator’s goal is to reproduce the question answered in the source text. However, how should one understand this unclear postulate? Already at the moment of handing down tradition, a given text or some other trace of cultural and historical creation appeals to the interpreter, triggering initial expectations as to the meaning of the content and motivating the creation of interpretative hypotheses. But what does the translator have to do to find the answer to this initial question? According to Gadamer, in such a case, one should start by asking oneself, crossing the pre-​determined hermeneutical horizon, and opening to possible ways of reading the meaning contained in both the text and the influence of tradition.This is why it is so important to constantly contextualize and cross the originally outlined boundaries to go beyond what was apparently articulated. This is why the hermeneutical phenomenon of understanding, interpreting, and translating should be reduced to a continuous going beyond mere reconstruction. As Gadamer repeatedly stresses, translation is not just reconstruction –​it is a process in which such aspects as tradition, history, time distance, or hermeneutical horizon help to better understand the translated text and become indispensable in its proper interpretation. The translator must take into consideration not so much what the author of the message actually meant but rather what might have been obvious to the author in the process of writing the work, in other words, the cultural-​historical context: Understanding the word of tradition always requires that the reconstructed question be set within the openness of its questionableness –​i.e. that it merge with the question that tradition is for us.708

Accordingly, the relationship between the phenomenon of understanding and asking shows the true dimension of hermeneutical experience, including the true dimension of translation. On the other hand, the deepest essence of the 7 07 WuM, pp. 352–​353. 708 Gadamer, Truth, p. 367. “Ein Wort der Überlieferung, das einen trifft, verstehen, verlangt immer, daß die rekonstruierte Frage in das Offene ihrer Fraglichkeit gestellt wird, d. h. in die Frage übergeht, die die Überlieferung für uns ist” (WuM, p. 356).

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question itself is openness to the possibility of grasping the text’s meaning in different ways. As Gadamer says, it is not so much about reaching the truthfulness, but about reaching the meaningfulness of interpretative ideas. Is it even possible to reach truthfulness? Understanding, interpreting, and translating are activities characterized by constant “suspension.” To Gadamer, no interpreter is able to determine whether the sense he or she has found is true. However, it seem that in the light of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, it is possible to speak of the relevance or appropriateness of sense, and therefore of certain requirements or criteria that characterize the behavior of a competent translator. Gadamer emphasizes the so-​called understanding of dubiousness (Verstehen der Fraglichkeit)709 that is closely related to asking. Just as it is impossible to separate understanding from expressing concrete opinions on a given issue, it is impossible to separate the understanding of dubiousness from asking the text. How should we understand this in the context of a translation act? A competent translator is one who, above all, sees not so much the translation problems as the general problematic nature of the text, taking into consideration the possibility of certain contentious issues within the message. In order to do so, the translator must first “enter” a conversation both with the text and with himself or herself, analyzing his or her own course of thought and embracing current interpretative possibilities. As Gadamer contends: “A person who thinks must ask himself questions.”710 Thus, we reach the conclusion put forward by Gadamer, namely that understanding is always more than just recreating someone’s view. These words also apply to the translation act, which, in hermeneutical optics boils down mainly to a dialectical act. In this light, the concept of problem becomes very interesting. Problems are specific questions that emerge and whose sense should be sought in the motive of posing them.711 Every problem encountered by the translator in a text opens up a field for hermeneutic conversation, thanks to which the person translating the text finds the optimal solution. In this sense, the translation act is not a process of solving translation problems –​as the vast majority of contemporary translators want to see it –​but a conversation that is constantly initiated by and through a text. It is a dialectic of questions and answers that allows the phenomenon of understanding to materialize.

7 09 WuM, p. 357. 710 Gadamer, Truth, p. 368. “Wer denken will, muß sich fragen” (WuM, p. 357). 711 WuM, p. 359.

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This is closely related to the situational horizon. Understanding reading means first of all taking into account the context in which the work is located, and second, posing specific questions based on the aspect of situativeness of the interpreted message. Gadamer states that according to good hermeneutical principles, if necessary one should reach into the whole work and seek help in the remaining works of the given author.712 Stolze also advocates a strictly hermeneutical analysis –​in Gadamer’s spirit –​and not a translatological analysis of the original text. Stolze postulates asking the text questions about its location in a given culture or historical context, about the author, and about the moment and circumstances of the creation of a given work.713 Analysis of the situational context, but generally the whole reading of the source text, requires patience, especially when the translator is dealing with texts of a high level of difficulty, such as poetry. Gadamer emphasizes that it is the patient reader who actually experiences reading, because true reading is unhurried reading. Gadamer emphasizes that with such attentive reading, sometimes neither special scholarly interpretation nor additional information concerning the text is necessary.714 The second issue is multiple readings. Gadamer states that works, especially poems, with particular difficulties of interpretation, require careful and long reading.715 The creational aspect is also significant: Reading and interpreting written words is so far removed from the writer, his mood, intentions, and unspoken tendencies that the understanding of the meaning of the text takes on the character of an independent production, which, in turn, resembles the art of the speaker rather than behavior of his listener.716

In this way, Gadamer emphasizes the interpreter’s autonomy and independence. As a result, the interpreter becomes, in a way, the co-​author of an unhurriedly created work. The reading process, inextricably linked to interpretative understanding, gives the interpreter a wide range of possibilities for finding the sense contained in the work’s content. Thanks to the interpreter’s activity, the text starts to become active and unfolds. The element responsible for this process is the 7 12 Gadamer, “Denken im Gedicht,” in: Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 9, pp. 351–​352. 713 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 107. 714 Gadamer, Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?, p. 383. 715 Gadamer, “Gedicht und Gesprach,” p. 341. 716 “Umgekehrt ist das Lesen und Auslegen von Geschriebenem so sehr von dem Schreiber, sei-​ner Gestimmtheit, seinen Absichten und seinen unausgesprochenen Tendenzen entfernt und abgelöst, daß die Erfassung des Textsinnes den Charakter einer selbständigen Produktion empfängt, die ihrerseits mehr der Kunst des Redners als dem Verhalten seines Zuhörers gleicht” (H.-​G. Gadamer, “Rhetorik,” p. 236).

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so-​called lexical sphere. The words are the answers to the questions asked by the translator in the ongoing hermeneutical conversation with the text. As Gadamer emphasizes, understanding words is the most important task in reading and interpreting a given work. It is not about understanding individual lexical units, but about the unity of the sense figure into which the content is arranged: The unity possessed by the figure of meaning of poetic speech can still be dark, laden with tension, split, cracked, and brittle—​the polyvalence of the words is determined in completing the meaning of the speech and permits one significance to resound and others simply to resonate. Such unambiguousness is necessarily characteristic of all speaking, even that of poésie pure.717

This is in fact the essence of Gadamer’s philosophy of language. In this respect it is important to remember about the need to concretize the word, to place it in a broader context, especially as it closes the questions contained in the translation process. On this occasion, Gadamer mentions the important features of text interpreters. They have to show prudence and inquisitiveness already at the aforementioned level of the word, although –​again worth emphasizing –​it is only one of the many levels that together form the overall sense of the text.718 Furthermore, the key aspect is the text’s consistency. It is an overriding condition for obtaining an interpretative accuracy that indicates that all planes of the work are being taken into account and leads to an understanding founded on the positioning of the text in a specific communication situation. At this point, application –​another important concept characterizing Gadamer’s hermeneutics –​is at stake.

4.3. Application The process of interpretation invariably applies the understood text –​which is “always contextual by nature”719 –​to the current situation in which the interpreter exists. This process is closely linked to understanding (Verstehen) and

717 Gadamer, “Who Am I,” p. 129. “Das kann eine noch so dunkle, spannungsvolle, rissige, zersprungene und brüchige Einheit sein, die die Sinnfigur dichterischer Rede besitzt –​die Polyvalenz der Wörter legt sich im Vollzug des Redesinnes fest und läßt die eine Bedeutung sich ausschwingen, andere nir mitschwingen. Darin ist Eindeutigkeit, die allem Sprechen mit Notwendigkeit signet, auch dem der poésie pure” (Gadamer, Wer bin Ich, p. 429). 718 Gadamer, Wer bin Ich, p. 429. 719 Shusterman, “Spotkanie Gadamera z Derridą –​spojrzenie pragmatysty,” Przestrzenie Teorii 2016, 25, p. 313.

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interpretative understanding (Auslegung). By understanding, the interpreter captures the sense from an individualized perspective and “positions” the text according to the specific situation he or she is in. According to Gadamer, application –​just like interpretative understanding and understanding –​is an inalienable component of the hermeneutical process.720 Therefore, he refers to the old hermeneutical rules, when it was considered obvious that hermeneuticists were obliged to match their interpretations to the current situation in which the text opened itself to the reader. In this respect, Gadamer refers to the role of Hermes. Today the role of translators has changed somewhat, because not only do they have to translate a given statement from one language to another, but at the same time they have to present or adjust the translated meaning in such a way that it corresponds, according to the interpreter’s opinion, to the situation in which the message will be understood by the target audience.721 This thought illustrates how much responsibility Gadamer gives to the interpreter, whose task is to diagnose not only the sense emerging from a given conversation, but also the impact that the translation of this sense can have on those concerned. According to Gadamer, both activities –​which have been artificially separated for the purposes of this text –​constitute in fact one complex process, i.e. understanding of the text is closely intertwined with the adaptation of its sense to a given situation, while the updating of the sense reveals the direction and specificity of the interpretation of a given message. Gadamer directs the reader’s attention to important points in common for the hermeneutics practiced by philologists and the hermeneutics used by lawyers and theologians.722 He emphasizes that application has become the common denominator of the multiple interpretation techniques and has been recognized as an inherent factor in the understanding phenomenon, which is evident in legal and theological hermeneutics, where the relationship between a text and the sense that the application of the text acquires at the particular moment of interpretation becomes unique. This happens for example in a court –​if we mean a set of laws –​or in an ecclesiastical sermon –​if we are focusing on a text of revelation. As he rightly points out, lawyers do not follow law by references to history, but by the concreteness of laws and their interpretative position. Therefore, if a text is to be understood correctly, it must always be understood anew and always in a different way, because understanding is application (“Verstehen ist

7 20 WuM, pp. 291–​292. 721 WuM, p. 292. 722 WuM, p. 292.

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hier immer schon Anwenden”723). This is why in Gadamer’s hermeneutics there can be no finite interpretation, let alone a finite translation –​these are always endless conversations in becoming. The translation of certain textual elements depends on many factors: the historical situation, the target audience, the purpose of the translation, the ideological expression of the work. With the “movement of the historical horizon,” the perception of the role and performance of the translation also changes: this explains the predilection to domesticate the earliest translations of a translation series. Understanding, interpretative understanding, and application reflect the “integration” of the three aspects that each interpretation procedure generally fulfils, whether it is about interlingual translation, lyrical recitation, or musical performance. Various functions, e.g. cognitive, normative, and reproducible ones, intertwine here and express the interpreter’s subjectivity and location in a given historical moment.724 Thus, Gadamer departs from the demands of the hermeneutic Romantics, who propose an approach strongly influenced by the psychologization of the interpretation process. He advises relying rather on assumptions developed within the framework of legal and theological hermeneutics for purely methodological issues. As always, Gadamer refrains from deciphering the intentions of the author of the original text, leaning toward accepting the text’s primacy, opening up to the mediation of history and reaching out to the sources of tradition.725 Analysis of a text’s situativeness shows the relationship between the whole text and its detailed parts. Gadamer defines understanding as the situation in which the interpreter applies the sense contained in the text to a specific situation that symbolizes the detail. Therefore, the application co-​determines the understanding as it directly affects the interpretation’s perception –​and thus the translation –​by the target audience. However, how should we understand the relation of the whole, i.e. the general, to the part, i.e. the detail, in the context of a translation act? The general stands by no means for the generality or generalization of the sense but for the text itself –​what it says to the interpreter, how it speaks, and what it brings with it. On the other hand, the detail indicates the interpreter’s place and his or her specific hermeneutical situation.726

7 23 724 725 726

WuM, p. 292. WuM, pp. 294–​295. WuM, pp. 294–​295. WuM, p. 307.

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4.3.1. Competences of the Legal Translator We may use the exemplary significance of legal hermeneutics, written about in the second part of Wahrheit und Methode, to analyze the competences that a translator working professionally with legal texts should have. Gadamer’s reflections on the attitudes of a lawyer and legal historian toward a legal text shed light on the specific interpretation of texts in legal translation. Although he distinguishes between the interpretative attitudes of the lawyer and the historian of law, we may conclude that in the hermeneutical sense, the competent conduct of a legal translator combines the attitudes characterizing both approaches. Referring to Betti, Gadamer sees the difference between a lawyer and a historian of law primarily in the fact that the former interprets legal regulations by making them concrete, while the latter does not start from the concrete, but strives to determine meaning by constructively analyzing the specific area in which regulations are in force, the application of a given law, and the changes that have occurred in its formation. This does not exhaust the role that lawyers and law historians actually play. A lawyer, unquestionably, is concerned specifically with the law per se, about how to apply the rules. However, even then the meaning of law must be put into historical perspective in order to clarify specific findings made only on this basis. The law historian plays a similar role, but his aim is to decipher the meaning of legal regulations. However, as Gadamer stresses, trying to find echoes of the past in legal regulations is not enough. A historian of law perceives the past from the perspective of the present, because the latter is embedded in the present. Therefore, the hermeneutical situation of both lawyer and historian of law is similar: the aim is to expect sense.727 It is about reflecting on the premise of cognition and anticipation, or the presupposition of fullness, but articulated a little differently. Thus, while lawyers seek to make legal regulations more specific –​because they apply them and refer to them in specific situations –​the ambition of law historians will be to generalize meaning, i.e. to show the concreteness of the legal situation in a given period of history against the background of other ongoing political-​historical, cultural, and social processes. According to Gadamer, legal hermeneutics is an excellent exemplification of the temporal relationship between past and present. In fact, it is a matter of perceiving and accepting sense that has been formed, which cannot be recognized without taking into account two factors: the tradition in which a given type of

727 WuM, p. 310.

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law is embedded and the current position of the interpreter. This means that both the historian of law and the lawyer are somehow obliged to have historical understanding –​i.e. historically embedded understanding –​because the tradition reaching the interpreter in the form of a specific message has something to say to the contemporary. Legal hermeneutics is important here in that it fully reveals the spectrum of historical hermeneutics728 reflected in the translation of legal texts. As Stolze rightly stresses,729 law is created, then develops over the centuries as “a system of social convention that regulates the orderly living together of the people within their own culture.” Therefore, the application of the law is both social and international. She emphasizes that there is a well-​known discrepancy between the common law applied in Anglo-​Saxon countries with its typical precedent, and the law created in most countries on the European continent, derived from Roman constitutional law. Today, she points out, we also deal with EU directives, African, and Asian law, among others.730 A legal translator belongs to a specific tradition and on its basis assesses and evaluates specific differences between specific terms or concepts. Thus, we are dealing with a “fusion” of legal-​historical horizons and of two incompatible traditions. In the case of legal translations from English into Polish, it will be a “fusion” of the horizon of common law traditions with continental law. This is the first area where application plays an important role. The translator must find his or her own legitimization in reference to the text to be translated and start a hermeneutical dialog with it about the place occupied by legal tradition and the specific legal system in a given communication. Gadamer aptly sees that this legitimization resembles the relationship between a fixed point and the perspective in a picture. This interesting statement suggests that the role of the interpreter is not to find the point “on the map” or take a specific position, but to reach the wider perspective already determined by the message being translated. In the context of translation, finding one’s own legitimization both in reference to the text and the legal tradition, and in relation to the message being translated, means the concretization of meaning –​application. In fact, Gadamer clearly states that application makes us understand that the text refers to the situational context in which the message originated.731 Analysis of the original text’s 7 28 WuM, p. 311. 729 Stolze, “Aspects of Translation in the Field of Law,” in: Knowledge and Management in ESP Training, ed. by J. Maliszewski, Częstochowa 2013, p. 18. 730 Stolze, Aspects of Translation in the Field of Law, p. 19. 731 WuM, p. 317.

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situativeness remains crucial: identifying the main legal system under which the text was created732; its cultural background –​law is a set of rules dependent on the cultural context; the discursive field of the text, i.e. the field of law to which the translated text belongs; and the target reader, who, depending on his or her status, determines the process of assessing the adequacy of a given type of equivalence. Thanks to this stage, which consists in positioning the text in relation to the components of the legal tradition, the translator can proceed to an appropriate terminological analysis.733 Moreover, the legal language itself may cause many difficulties to the translator. As Matulewska points out, “the features of the legalese significantly affect the quality of translation.”734 Matulewska lists archaisms, euphemisms, polysemy and homonyms, vulgarisms, metaphors, false friends, neologisms, synonyms and quasi-​synonyms, terms with blurred meaning, and legal definitions, rightly stating that the characteristics of legalese are described “much less frequently among the factors affecting the quality of translation.”735 This is a pity, because there is no doubt that knowledge of translation techniques in this respect constitutes the undeniable competence of the translator. The above considerations make it possible to conclude that apart from the ability to analyse based on a thorough knowledge of legal terminology in a given field and translation knowledge, the legal translator must also be skilled in historical, i.e. historically embedded understanding. The task is to understand historical tradition in a way that also understands the unity of meaning. Confirmation of this statement can be found in Stolze,736 where she states that the translation of legal texts does not –​and cannot –​consist in the transfer of elements of a given culture, but only in the “transparent formulation of information” contained in the original. In this case, then, we may refer to the translation as a secondary “product” that facilitates understanding of the source message.737

732 A. L. Kjaer, “Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Sprache und Recht bei der Übersetzung von Rechtstexten der europäischen Union,” in: Übersetzen von Rechtstexten: Fachkommunikation im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rechtsordnung und Sprache, Hrsg. P. Sandrini, Tübingen 1999, p. 65. 733 H. Kalverkämper, “Textuelle Fachsprachen-​Linguistik als Aufgabe,” in: Fachsprache und Literatur, Hrsg. B. Schlieben-​Lange & H. Kreuzer, Göttingen 1983, p. 155. 734 Matulewska, “Jakość przekładu prawniczego a cechy języka prawa,” Język, Komunikacja, Informacja 2008, 3, p. 62. 735 Matulewska, “Jakość przekładu prawniczego a cechy języka prawa,” p. 53. 736 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s…, pp. 59–​61. 737 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s…, pp. 59–​61.

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In other words, the target text fulfills its function when it allows recipients to access the source text. This resembles Gadamer’s reversal of Plato’s mimesis, image, and copy theory, saying that a copy of the image, which in the specialized translation of legal texts is represented by the target text, only resembles the original. Its function is purely instrumental: it indicates the initial message, but has no autonomous existence, so when it fulfils its role it disappears.738

4.4. Gadamer’s Model of Knowledge739 4.4.1. Bildung –​Who is an “Educated Translator”? An important concept in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is Bildung, usually translated as education, teaching, formation. Therefore, this concept –​embodying the aspect of acquiring knowledge and the process of shaping it, while indirectly “building” one’s self –​is of key importance in the humanities, because development, education, deepening knowledge, and broadening horizons are inscribed in human nature. As he emphasizes, the roots of this understanding of Bildung go back to the Romantic era,740 although traces of the attitude defined as Bildung can also be found in the works of medieval philosophers. Gadamer says that now, education is culturally conditioned and mostly refers to the natural abilities of man.741 The immanent feature of education is its processuality, because it is closely intertwined with the inherent human need to shape and form. In light of this, it would be appropriate to distance oneself somewhat from the often over-​used, almost enlightened phrase “the purpose of education.” To Gadamer, education cannot be defined in categories, because it must go beyond the development of our natural predispositions. Nevertheless, he explicitly states that at the same time education comes from this development.742 So what is the difference between education and in-​depth development of predispositions and abilities?

7 38 WuM, pp. 134–​144. 739 I have decided that Gadamer’s model of knowledge best fits thematically in the last part of this chapter, being a kind of summary of the attitude that a competent translator should display. 740 Gadamer even states that Bildung is the most brilliant idea of the eighteenth century (WuM, p. 7). 741 WuM, pp. 7–​8. 742 WuM, pp. 8–​9.

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Gadamer defines developing a given predisposition as a means to achieving a specific goal. He recalls the example of learning foreign languages. The exercise material contained in a textbook designed to teach a foreign language is in this sense only a means, not an end in itself, and acquisition of the material serves to develop specific language skills: listening, reading, writing or speaking. The situation is different in the context of the educational phenomenon. In this case, the student “absorbs” everything that has to do with the experience of acquisition. In this understanding of education, there is no room for a means to a goal that Gadamer interprets in mechanical terms and which disappears once it fulfils its role: “Rather, in acquired Bildung nothing disappears, but everything is preserved.”743 He is mainly concerned with the acquisition moment closely related to historical understanding. This observation leads him to the recognition that education, embracing the whole of human experience understood in such a way, determines the existence of the humanities.744 Therefore, education is about universalizing one’s viewing perspective. Gadamer quotes Hegel, who believes that succumbing to all cases of particularism is not only a sign of a lack of ability to think abstractly but also, simply, a sign of a lack of education per se. Hegel –​discussed in Wahrheit und Methode –​ states that man’s task is to abstract himself from the situation he finds himself in and from the points of view of others, thus making it possible for a person to feel dignified.745 However, such a take on education does not entirely correspond to Gadamer’s, who sees this concept not so much as a process, but as a phenomenon in its constant updating; not so much a final phase, but a harmonious state of mind and intellect indicating moral-​emotional maturity. Gadamer emphasizes the existence of “feeling,” “tact,” and “eloquence,” none of which can be “learned” or mechanically replicated.746 Feeling is inextricably linked to memory, which should be seen as a human cognitive ability, but also as a component of the historical narrative belonging to the human community. Memory is shaped by its activation by the events in which a person takes part, hence, it is not just a learned ability. As Gadamer clearly points out, there is also the phenomenon of Nietzschean “forgetting,” which is not so much an attempt to erase something from memory, but rather an attempt to go out into the generality, i.e.

743 Gadamer, Truth, p. 10. “Vielmehr ist in der erworbenen Bildung nichts verschwunden, sondern alles aufbewahrt” (WuM, p. 9). 744 WuM, p. 9. 745 WuM, p. 10. 746 WuM, p. 12.

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the ability to look at certain matters from a different perspective.747 We could even say that in this Nietzschean sense, we forget to know and thus learn more. Gadamer sees a similar meaning in Helmholtz’s concept of “tact,” understood as an attitude marked by sensitivity and the ability to decipher and accept information of a sensory nature despite a lack of knowledge in a given area. In other words, it is the innate ability to perceive certain sensations in a concrete situation. Tact, for Gadamer, is also a way of knowing: Thus someone who has an aesthetic sense knows how to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly, high and low quality, and whoever has a historical sense knows what is possible for an age and what is not, and has a sense of the otherness of the past in relation to the present.748

It is a kind of sophistication and intuitive conduct marked by accuracy, rightness, and dignity. This issue concerns the reliability of our actions and the evaluation of those actions by the environment in which we are embedded. In Gadamer’s view, education is more than the exploitation of processuality, which in a way is supposed to ensure the acquisition of specific, very often practical skills. Intellectually and spiritually established maturity is essential; for example, a thorough study of tradition is not enough if one does not develop a specific sensitivity to the cultural products of human activity. Thus, we may conclude that in the context of training competent translators, a thorough study of translation theories or strategies is no longer enough if adepts of the art of translation do not previously acquire tolerance or openness or develop a sensitivity to the Other, to other points of view, and to the beauty of the language in its varieties and discursive versions. Education should be characterized by one’s receptivity to what is different, including in particular different cognitive perspectives, but also by distancing from oneself and one’s life attitude. For Gadamer, education is the development of a specific intuition of correspondence:749 The universal viewpoints to which the cultivated man (gebildet) keeps himself open are not a fixed applicable yardstick, but are present to him only as the viewpoints of possible others. Thus the cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of a

7 47 WuM, p. 13. 748 Gadamer, Truth, p. 15. “So weiß, wer ästhetischen Sinn besitzt, Schönes und Häßliches, gute oder schlechte Qualität auseinanderzuhalten, und wer historischen Sinn besitzt, weiß, was für eine Zeit möglich ist und was nicht, und hat Sinn für die Andersartigkeit der Vergangenheit gegenüber der Gegenwart” (WuM, p. 14). 749 WuM, p. 15.

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sense. For every sense –​e.g., the sense of sight –​is already universal in that it embraces its sphere, remains open to a particular field, and grasps the distinctions within what is opened to it in this way. In that such distinctions are confined to one particular sphere at a time, whereas cultivated consciousness is active in all directions, such consciousness surpasses all of the natural sciences. It is a universal sense.750

In this view, education is characterized by a specific universality, coming wide circles, and “moving to a more universal viewpoint;”751 and it even inclines toward synthetizing. We may say that generality is the “core” of the educational process, the essence of the tradition of humanistic research. According to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, an educated person opens up to otherness and to the acquisition of knowledge from different domains, but treats it as a starting point for developing his own views –​hence the need for a sense of generality to avoid narrowing down the possible sources of inspiration that may become the foundation of Bildung. As Zarębski correctly observes, Bildung consists of numerous factors: the tradition in which we grew up, the culture we have acquired, the language we use on a daily basis. These factors considerably influence how we perceive the world.752 How should we interpret this thought in the context of the topic addressed here? It is worth mentioning again that the basis of the hermeneutical approach to the translation act is the translator: his or her predispositions, abilities, and attitudes, i.e. his or her competence. Translational hermeneuticists prioritize the essence of these elements over text analysis.753 In this view, scholars pay special attention to the translator’s development as a responsible “creator” of the text. Competent translators never really finish their education in philology or 750 Gadamer, Truth, p. 16. “Die allgemeinen Gesichtspunkte, für die sich der Gebildete offenhält, sind ihm nicht ein fester Maßstab, der gilt, sondern sind ihm nur als die Gesichtspunkte möglicher Anderer gegenwärtig. Insofern hat das gebildete Bewußtsein in der Tat mehr den Charakter eines Sinnes. Denn ein jeder Sinn, z.B. der Gesichtssinn, ist ja insofern schon allgemein, als er seine Sphäre umfaßt und sich für ein Feld offenhält und innerhalb des ihm so Geöffneten die Unterschiede erfaßt. Das gebildete Bewußtsein übertrifft nur jeden der natürlichen Sinne, als diese je auf eine bestimmte Sphäre eingeschränkt sind. Es selbst betätigt sich in allen Richtungen. Es ist ein allgemeiner Sinn“ (WuM, p. 14). 751 M. Vilhauer, Gadamer’s Ethics of Play. Hermeneutics and the Other, Plymouth 2010, p. 65. 752 Zarębski, “Sellars i McDowell o percepcji i wiedzy empirycznej,” in: Percepcja. Między estetyką a epistemologią, ed. R. Konik, D. Leszczyński, Wrocław 2010, p. 93. 753 The hermeneuticists of translation do not want to talk about two separate texts, but rather about one, which is the effect of fusing horizons.

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linguistics, but are aware of the need for lifelong intellectual growth and the necessity of being open to the unknown. A translator should naturally be interested in many fields of science, not just in those aspects which are mainly in the language or specific field in which he or she translates. Today, people frequently mention lifelong learning in the context of professional translators. To some extent, this reflects Gadamer’s concept of Bildung, which, as Eberhard points out, means continuous self-​education.754 Future translators usually study linguistics or philology. However, this should only the first stage in their development. In this respect, a proactive attitude is important. Many contemporary translatologists agree on this,755 although it seems that in fact they only focus on issues somehow related to translation skills and therefore to the praxis sphere. On the other hand, there is something more to Gadamer’s Bildung –​self-​education in all possible existential fields. It is also about erudition, which greatly influences the way the translator’s knowledge is activated, which in turn has great influence on the foreunderstanding and understanding of the initial text in the translation process, especially when one considers that the translator must act simultaneously on many levels: linguistic, cognitive, socio-​cultural.756 In relation to the translation act, we may describe Gadamer’s concept of Bildung as an attitude comprising the constant acquisition not only of new knowledge, but of new life experiences as well, allowing the translator to find himself or herself in new situations. Dybel, who wants to see the universal category of Bildung as a combination of “learned” or “theoretical” knowledge (sophia) with “innate” knowledge (phronesis), gets it exactly right.757 This seems to be particularly important in the case of interpreting as it requires from the interpreter familiarity with the world and general knowledge. Stolze says an interpreter must know how to deal with new output, regardless of his or her learned and educated specialization. Today, in the era of globalization, translators are required to have the corporate ability to adapt to a specific work environment, to react quickly to emerging difficulties, and to continuously 754 Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics. A Basic Interpretation with Some Theological Implications, Tübingen 2004, p. 62. 755 See Biel, “Training Translators or Translation Service Providers? EN 15038: 2006 Standard of Translation Services and its Training Implications,” The Journal of Specialised Translation 2011, 16, pp. 61–​76. 756 See M. Davies, D. Kiraly, “Translation Pedagogy,” in: Concise Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics, ed. by M. Berns, Oxford 2010, p. 401. 757 Dybel, Granice rozumienia…, p. 111. In section 3.4.2., I discuss the mentioned types of knowledge.

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self-​educate.758 Although the increasing specialization of translators is one solution, there is no doubt that even in such cases it may happen that the translator will have to deal with issues traditionally outside the field within which he or she translates. For example, in fiction there may be legal terms, and in a specialized text there might be terms from different fields. There is also no doubt that a translator with a broad general knowledge of current events in the world and of cultural life will have no problems with understanding allusions hidden in the original text or with wordplay, especially important in literary or audiovisual translation.

4.4.2. Phronesis, Sophia, Techne Gadamer, according to Dybel, sees the initial form of application in the ancient concept of phronesis, i.e. “practical wisdom” or “intelligence.”759 As Gadamer clarifies, this concept already appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the philosoher states that phronesis refers to man’s conduct in life and the attitude to existence “in general,” but is invariably approached in a specific situational context.760 Referring to this ancient tradition, Gadamer divides knowledge into two types: phronesis and sophia, and also considers the concept of techne. It is necessary to consider which of these concepts are relevant to the translation process and to what extent they can all be indicators of an interpreter’s competence. As Gadamer points out, the concepts of phronesis and sophia were first developed by Aristotle, then further analyzed by the peripatetic school. Sophia is the theoretical knowledge acquired through learning, while phronesis is the practical, innate knowledge related to human sensitivity and receptivity.761 Dybel interestingly states that “man does not acquire any phronesis type of knowledge in the process of education or upbringing” as it is already in the man, almost from the moment of birth.762 This knowledge is thus more difficult to define, more elusive, more problematic in terms of its framing or “rules of conduct”; on the other hand, it manifests itself only in concrete life situations, when the right decision is made.763

7 58 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 9. 759 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 101. 760 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 101 ff. 761 WuM, p. 17. 762 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 103 ff. 763 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 103 ff.

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If we put this in the context of translation,764 we may say that sophia refers to specific translation theories and their scientific assumptions and methods determining the way in which the translator deals with a text. This, however, fails to account for the individual situation of the interpreter, let alone the historical moment in which a given message was embedded. In that case, any situation in the position of the interpreter is rejected. Phronesis is a more general knowledge. It is not possible to write it into a particular scheme, because it manifests itself each time in individual situations and in individual decisions about a given subject. Phronesis is not universal knowledge that can be used at any time, but one that depends on particular factors influencing the translation process.765 This interpretation is in line with what Gadamer says about practical knowledge. The choice is conditioned by the situation and indicates the responsibility that the person making the decision takes.766 Therefore, in the case of translation, phronesis will boil down to making translation decisions based on the situational context in which the translator, the author of the source text, and the recipient of the target text are located. In this case, theoretical knowledge cannot be the decisive instance, as a competent translator is aware that it may not be useful in a given situation. Of course, this is related to the previously discussed priorities that a competent translator must take into account in his work. Phronesis knowledge is reflected in the ability to “position” the text properly, taking into account such aspects as the origin of the text, its belonging to a specific cultural-​historical area, the literary genre, the author’s intellectual biography.767 This is where the translator’s experience plays an important role, i.e. how many years he or she has been working in his profession and what experience he or she has had with similar texts. It may be that the translator has already made convergent decisions in the past, and thus can almost intuitively make the right translation choice in similar situations. Intuition, which should be considered an important component of translator competence, plays a key role in the concept of phronesis. For intuition determines the interpreter’s behavior in a specific situation and can influence decisions. Following Dybel, it can be stated that here the “difficult-​to-​objectivize”

7 64 I refer to Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 104 ff. 765 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 103 ff. 766 Gadamer, “Die Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt,” in: Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III, p. 200. 767 See Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 106 ff.

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elements are the ones that count. However, these are practically impossible to translate into the teaching of translation theory.768 Theoretical sophia knowledge is completely different, as in each case the interpreter uses a similar, methodologically determined course of action, regardless of the essential cultural context of the statement and the positioning of the text. Gadamer does not deny completely the concept of norm, but definitely rejects the overly abstract generality that characterizes it.769 By emphasizing the essence of the concept of application, Gadamer brings the sense of norm down to the process of concretization. Dybel rightly notes that the two types of knowledge discussed may be considered as components of Bildung.770 Such a solution is relevant in the context of the translation act, the result of which should be a specific combining of theoretical knowledge and so-​called practical wisdom, and whose common and binding element is the translator’s special attitude, i.e. Bildung. In his deliberations, Gadamer distinguishes yet another kind of knowledge in opposition to phronesis, namely techne. The relationship between them reflects in a nutshell the interplay between “truth” and “method.” Techne means the ability, sometimes also referred to as craftsmanship, to perform a specific action or object. One may learn it and lose it. Not without reason, such knowledge is called techne. The name clearly indicates the technicization or mechanization of a given activity and the need to maintain a given skill through its systematic use. In the context of translation, we may refer to techne when a person has developed specific translation skills, such as those related to the use of modern computer programs supporting translation. A break in their use may result in the significant loss of acquired skills. This is not the case with phronesis which, as discussed, is general knowledge largely indicating the interpreter’s specific attitudes and behavior rather than the skills learned. While phronesis is the wisdom that directs a translator’s actions (praxis) and influences the decisions in a given situational context, techne is only a skill (poiesis) that to some extent controls the production of a specific translation.

4.5. Summary From Gadamer’s stance, translation takes the form of a peculiar hermeneutical conversation, in which the partners are the translator and the text which plays the role of the Other. As he emphasizes, the text does not speak to the interpreter 7 68 Dybel, Granice rozumienia, p. 105. 769 Gadamer, Vernunft im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1976, p. 70. 770 See Dybel, Granice rozumienia, pp. 93–​115.

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like a partner in a real conversation, because it is the interpreter who must make the text speak. Furthermore, inducing it to speak is nothing more than dialectical asking and answering –​asking a question related to the answer the interpreter anticipates. Understanding is born in dialog and the text is a space open enough to enable reaching the main purpose of the translation act: understanding and agreement. As rightly pointed out by Tokarz, the text becomes a kind of “transmitter”771 that outlines the way to interpret and understand the its content. Understanding is born in reading, in the process of so-​called understanding reading, during which the translator –​in accordance with his or her own interpretative perspective –​brings a unique approach to the sense of the text being translated. At the same time, in this understanding that takes place during the reading of the text, there is self-​understanding and consequently a cognitive transformation. Therefore, as a conceptualization of the hermeneutic conversation expressed in a well-​established and understandable reading, translation is an expression of the Other, but through oneself, through the competent drawing and accentuation of similarities and differences at different levels of interpretation. To quote Tokarz, in the translation act hermeneutical conversation is “reduction and sublimation at the stage of deverbalization.”772 A hermeneutic conversation gains its fullness through the language in which it is conducted. Thanks to it, horizons fuse together, which takes place in the process of understanding texts. It also makes it possible to continue the dialog which starts with the beginning of writing the target text. We may conclude that translation is a linguistically conditioned process of establishing an agreement with the world.

7 71 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 199. 772 Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 170.

Concluding Remarks The hermeneutical turn in translation studies made primarily by Fritz Paepcke –​ a student and close friend of Hans-​Georg Gadamer –​then continued by authors such as George Steiner, Radegundis Stolze, Larisa Cercel, Brian O’Keeffe, and Douglas Robinson, changes the focus from the linguistic and pragmatic aspects of translation to its ontological and epistemological conditions. Furthermore, the turn clearly reveals a strictly anthropological direction, because the translator and his or her competence have taken a central place in the hermeneutical reflection on the act of translation. The hermeneutic turn in the approach to translation began through the works of great philosophers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-​Georg Gadamer. It is no exaggeration to say that they set the tone for contemporary translational hermeneutics, mainly developed by German researchers. The “age” of the hermeneutics of translation is a disputable issue. On the one hand, it is well known that translation was already hermeneutically embedded for good in the nineteenth century, mainly in Schleiermacher’s work, but, on the other hand, the sub-​ discipline is relatively young, for more conscious efforts to “institutionalize” it date back only to 2009. Therefore, the direction of its development will become more concrete in the next few years. But we may already distinguish the most characteristic aspects of this sub-​discipline as outlined by Stolze: subjectivity, historicity, reflectiveness, the processual character of the translation, and its phenomenological elements. One of the most important issues here remains understanding, which, in priniciple, is the sine qua non of each translation. A competent translator must correctly understand and interpret the initial text, taking into consideration its situational context, thus following Gadamer’s application (Anwendung). Understanding initiates the translation act and is an essential part of the cognition process, which then leads to self-​understanding, and thus to getting to know oneself, as translators learn in this way to see both their skills and limitations, and to “diagnose” the state of their own knowledge in a given area. In a translation act understood in this way, rationalization and a particular kind of pragmatism become apparent. In the hermeneutics of translation, understanding is closely related to elements of language, interpretation, history, and application. To reach agreement and self-​understanding, the subject of the translation process establishes a hermeneutical dialog with the text, thus avoiding pure subjectivity and relativism. The translator should not claim the right to realize just any interpretative

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ideas, because the task is to constantly revise any initial views, thoughts, and presuppositions concerning the sense of the text. This is why, in translational hermeneutics, scholars attach so much importance to dialog and empathic confrontation with the alien and incomprehensible. The conversation with the text to which the translator must open himself remains the criterion of accuracy and reliability of understanding. Thus, Gadamer proves that contrary to what critics of the hermeneutical approach to translation commonly believe, his proposal has room for the principle of truthfulness and the fairness of the interpreter’s conduct. Translation is primarily a linguistic act characterized by difficult communication. In this sense, it becomes a double hermeneutic process, and a situation of special distance between the translator and the other party to the conversation –​ whether it is a message spoken by a given person in the case of interpreting, or the output of a particular author in the case of written translation, or a text understood in the broadest sense of the word, namely, as any object subject to an act of cognition. This distance is only one of many barriers to be overcome in the act of translation. In Gadamer’s philosophy, how one understands both source and target text are connected with interpretation, an issue inherent in the translation process. As a specific interpretation, translation inevitably causes some exaggeration or amplification of the text and sometimes may lead to serious impoverishment. In Gadamer’s view, translators, as interpreters, take on a special hermeneutical task –​they enable an understanding that could otherwise be completely unreachable or only partially possible. They participate in shaping the sense of the message, in a specific dialectical exchange of questions and answers. But what is this sense that hermeneuticists so often discuss? Analysis of Gadamer’s work clearly shows that sense does not constitute a whole accessible to the interpreter, on which the partners of a hermeneutical conversation may agree. The sense is only a direction, which can take on a different form and character each time. Translation is like an ongoing, uninterrupted conversation, only indicating to the interpreter what direction to go in. In Gadamer’s view of hermeneutics, one cannot speak of an objectively existing sense that we may construct using a strictly applied method. In other words, reaching the sense means going in a specific direction, using specific language means. So how should we understand interpretation in this context? Interpretation is an intersubjective process, the result of a specific cognitive approach. It directly links with understanding and then with agreement. In their work, translators strive to reach an agreement both with the author of the initial message and with the recipients of the target text, revealing the duality of

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the hermeneutical process. This creates a completely new message. We cannot reduce translation to mere re-​creation. We must describe it as an autonomous text based on another oral or written statement that starts to “live a life of its own,” whereas the translator –​according to Gadamer –​is a negotiator, an intermediary in reaching the agreement. He or she remains to some extent still present in the text, not as a concrete person, but as an element on the way to reaching agreement between the two parties.773 It is worth mentioning after O’Keeffe that the translator is recognized by Gadamer.774 Moreover, the translator is a lens concentrating in the specificity of his or her activity many difficulties connected with the interaction with the text.775 Although Gadamer does not discuss interpreter or translator competences, careful analysis of his works allows us to draw a clear conclusion that his deliberations concerning the accuracy or correctness of understanding are prominent. These statements often take on a normative character. He emphasizes that we should not see his theory of understanding as an interpretation of certain rules and principles. He frequently mentions the specific conditions of the process of adequately understanding a text. Moreover, he often supports his comments with examples indicating certain attitudes of the interpreter that can make it possible or even impossible to understand a message. Gadamer refers to translators both from an intralingual and interlingual perspective, although the dominant character of the former is more visible. The translator is also a negotiator enabling communication between representatives of different worlds: cultures, traditions, histories. Ultimately, the translator is a humanist, constantly searching for a way to achieve self-​understanding and activate effective-​historical consciousness by critically applying learning. Gadamer’s translator has an almost universal dimension. The translator’s activity –​which boils down to offering help in reaching an agreement between the participants of a hermeneutical conversation –​is not just of a strictly linguistic nature: it transforms into intermediation of a material and territorial kind. This is why in terms of hermeneutical philosophy the translation act becomes a process of constant negotiation, especially since, as Bronk says, “the hermeneut… is not satisfied with finding a sense that is directly imposed, but seeks further layers of meaning.”776 773 Cf. Piecychna, “The Act of Translation in Hans Georg Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language,” Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 2012, 28 (41), pp. 161–​182. 774 O’Keeffe, Prologue to a Hermeneutic Approach, p. 145. 775 O’Keeffe, Prologue to a Hermeneutic Approach, p. 145. 776 Bronk, Rozumienie, p. 25.

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According to Gadamer’s assumptions, there is no single correct interpretation –​nor any single correct translation –​because the translation process is about the text itself, about conveying its meaning so that it speaks again and consequently reaches the target audience. The process of understanding consists not so much in a specific transfer of a given content but rather in its constant transposition making it semantically collapse, each time for a different reason. This is what the “historical existence” of the translated text is about. The text does not close down in one of its variants, but opens up new possibilities, both in terms of interpretation and reception. As Gadamer contends, if we were to talk about interpretation or translation in terms of relevance or correspondence, we would achieve nothing. Each translation is realized in an exceptional, unique hermeneutical situation.777 The same applies to the attitude of competent translators who must be aware of their own relative position and, importantly, who know that their translation is a result of factors over which they, historically speaking, are not in control. The sense brought to and shaped in the target text is largely based on the experience of translators, who enrich the translation with their own perspective or historical setting. However, we should not reduce this setting to a category of subjectivity or occasionalism. Like any interpretation, translation must meet certain requirements, which means that, despite its specific shape in the space of intersubjectivity, it is characterized by a specific objectivity determined by the act of translation itself. Above all, translation is the realization of understanding as a circular structure. When starting the process, the translator already has certain foreknowledge and bases his or her preunderstanding on it. However, the translator must subsequently revise any associated initial expectations as to the meaning of the text and, if necessary, modify them depending on the further direction of the process of understanding. Furthermore, translation concretizes the translator’s effective-​historical consciousness. Competent interpreters approach a text in a special way, activating their historical thinking. Translators are aware of their anchoring within a particular culture, but must also take into account the cultural backgrounds of both the author of the source text and the recipients of the target text. Translators do not run away from their own views, nonetheless they approach them in a critical manner. During the translation process, they introduce their own concepts, but also analyze them with deep thought, so as to reach the meaning of the text. That is why the aspect of application is so important. Hermeneutics has restored its

777 WuM, p. 375.

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due status. Text has in Gadamer the status of an objective being, although one which may be interpreted in many ways, depending on the situational context and who interprets it. However there can be no question of relativization, since translation, like every communicative act, is essentially linguistic and conveys invariably one sense –​although differently interpreted and presented –​which we should see as a partial objectivization of the translational activity. On the other hand, as has been noted, translation is the concretization of an effective-​ historical consciousness, and is therefore each time the result of the temporal-​ social specificity within which the process of interpretation occurs. Discovering meaning takes on the form of a hermeneutic conversation, during which the horizons of the interpreter and the text fuse, then fill with meaning during the translation process. In Gadamer’s view, the translation act makes the past contemporary or even updates it. Reading it in an understanding way, as an individual entangled in a given cultural-​historical situation, reveals to the translator his or her place in a particular realm of the world. However, making the past contemporary can only happen by adopting a linguistic interpretation that makes it possible to concretize the sense understood and then shaped by the translator. The task is not only to grasp the “thing” to which the text refers, but also to work out a space for it, to give it a “voice” expressed in linguistic form. Hence, if the conversation becomes a meaningful fulfilment, for Gadamer, then, the language will be its clarification and thus the transition phase necessary to reach agreement. The plane of translation is language that is the basis of both understanding and agreement. The act of translation becomes reality through language, and it is through this language that mediation between the cognitive subject –​the translator –​and the object being learned –​the thing the source text deals with –​is possible. Language is also a kind of mirror reflecting the translator’s competence since linguistic awareness is an essential component for high quality translation. We may conclude that the limits of a given interpreter’s language are in fact the limits of understanding and, consequently, of “understanding”. In a way, language is a common space for the communication that takes place between translator and text and between the translator and the target audience. Tradition is another such common space for understanding and agreement. The translator remains “immersed” in it, and is at the same time exposed to the related effective history, prejudices, authority, and time distance. Importantly, the translator participates in and creates its message. We may divide understanding in the translation process into two complementary aspects: interpretative understanding and well-​ established understanding, to which a methodical interpretation leads. Interpretive understanding

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is included in the preunderstanding, as the interpreter approaches the message being translated with a certain amount of experience and knowledge. However, according to Gadamer, this is not a means leading to understanding. Such a means may be methodical interpretation, which becomes necessary when the translator encounters resistance from the text and comes into contact with alien elements that may cause difficulties in understanding the given content. In that case, the translation is unique, because the translator comes into contact with the alien from the very beginning, before he or she translates either from or into a foreign language. Therefore, in addition to interpretative understanding, it is important to revise one’s own interpretative hypotheses, usually in the form of proper interpretation. For only what is understood can be translated, and in order to understand a text written in a foreign language –​and by a person from a different cultural area –​the translator has to demonstrate a number of competences, including openness to the views of another person and other cultures, receptiveness, self-​criticism, self-​reflection, intuition, empathy, sensitivity and, above all, broad knowledge. The ability to express oneself, the ability to use rhetorical means, curiosity about the world, and sensitivity to a text and its aesthetic layers are also important. In the light of Gadamer’s philosophy, knowledge of a given language does not constitute a separate competence, because language is an integral element of the phenomenon of understanding, including interpretative understanding. Hence, following Gadamer’s interpretation of Habermas’s words, we may say that a competent translator understands a text by being able to transpose (controlled) alienation from the level of the intuitive to that of reflective behavior, thus shaping the proper attitude for Bildung.778 From the perspective of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, the model of a translator’s competence may look as follows:

778 See Gadamer, “Rhetorik,” p. 239.

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Meta-metareflecon

Metareflecon

Reflecon

Bildung

Atude: empathy, openess, intuion

Abilies

Fig. 1  Model of a translator’s hermeneutical competence based on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics

The presented model shows its hierarchical character and the circularity of the translator’s hermeneutical competences among which the most important elements are mental competences, namely the level of meta-​metareflection and the subsequent level of metareflection. In a way, the individual components of this model are “wrapped” in successive layers related to a particular aspect of the translator’s competence. The most decisive components, such as meta-​ metareflection or metareflection, reach mostly to the outer layer of the circle. Therefore, a competent translator shows in-​depth reflection –​defined in Chapter One as primary reflection –​on how to proceed in the process of translation. This will then be the capacity for meta-​reflection while moving at the same time toward a superstructured meta-​metareflection –​a second reflection –​when the translator enters the level of hermeneutical reflection on the prejudicial nature

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of the primary reflection. Meta-​metareflection and meta-​reflection fund the interpreter’s reflectiveness, i.e. another mental competence consisting in a kind of internal dialog about one’s historical, cultural, and social context. The Bildung circle concerns various types of knowledge that the translator has –​not only knowledge strictly related to the field in which he or she has been formally educated, but also extensive general knowledge about the world. The subordinate categories in such a model of hermeneutical competence are certain psychological and social attitudes: empathy, intuition or openness, and the praxis sphere –​i.e. the practical skills that a competent translator should demonstrate in the translation process, like the ability to revise one’s own prejudices, conduct a dialog with a text, interpret it, or set priorities. These competences are arranged into concentric circles, so that the individual components are not mutually exclusive, but often overlap and influence each other immensely. In Gadamer’s view, translation and the translator/​interpreter’s attitude are not so much an “act” of subjectivity –​which is often the aim of critics of the hermeneutical approach to translation –​but a way of being, or a way of realizing the translation. Although a translator’s consciousness is not subject to objectivization, it forms as an intersubjective space that makes it possible to realize the understanding taking place as a result of history and historicity. Moreover, the way of interpreting depends not only on the subject of the cognitive, but also on the subject of the cognition. In this sense, in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, we may see –​to follow Tokarz –​an ongoing negotiation dialog between “epistemological objectivism and subjectivism” that indicates a certain similarity between –​as the author states after Bartmiński –​the hermeneutical approach and the cognitive programs.779 The initial text should be interpreted as a work that cannot be limited to a specific historical horizon –​in a way, the text will remain contemporary forever, subject to so-​called historical update or modernization of the past. Therefore, we may describe a work subject to translation as a work of timeless contemporaneity,780 maintaining, however, its own individuality, a space merging elements of both strangeness and familiarity. In terms of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, we may compare a translation in a manner similar to how he juxtaposed philosophy and music.781 Since according to him, music is only that in which both aliquots and all the resulting sound effects interact, including the summative sound-​expression ability that those

7 79 See Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 169. 780 See Gadamer, Ästhetik und Hermeneutik, p. 2. 781 See Gadamer, Begriffsgeschichte als…, p. 249.

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aliquots are able to evoke in a particular aesthetic experience, then the translation made by a competent translator is only that in which the words interact with both their sound and semantic aspects, taking into account the cultural-​ historical context in which these words fit in each case. However, analyzing this theory, it is difficult to establish on its basis a hermeneutical method for dealing with a text. Therefore, the hermeneutical approach to translation and translator competence should not so much be seen as a clear solution, but rather as describing the attitude of a person whose aim is to understand the Other. It is obviously advisable to master certain translation methods, but a translator will only apply them properly if he or she first opens up to both what the translated text concerns and to the essence of self-​understanding. According to Gadamer, the translator –​as a reader of the original –​should know as much as possible in order to correctly interpret the translated message. At the same time, translators should be aware that they will never really know enough. Within this kind of reflection is the special attitude of a competent translator, namely Bildung, combining the three Gadamerian types of knowledge: sophia, phronesis, and techne. Gadamer often evokes the ideal of a humanist researcher. It is no exaggeration to say that a competent translator is such a person. In the translation process, factors like one’s attitude toward ethical issues or ideological stances play an important role. Of course, the translator’s hermeneutical approach is marked by a specific subjectivity, though we should distinguish the translator’s inalienable subjectivity as the subject of the translation act from the subjective behavior of such a person in the course of the relevant translation activities. The hermeneutics of translation clearly indicates that despite taking into account the essence of the translator’s subjectivity, certain objectified factors that characterize every translation process must be adhered to. Of course, there can be no question of a total “neutralization” of the translator’s conduct, especially when translating fiction. Analysis of Gadamer’s views clearly shows that methodological awareness will not protect translators from being subjectivized, because they are always involved in the historical particularity of their own being. The pursuit of an “objective” rendering of the translated text seems in this case to be an unjustified illusion. This is contrary to the specificity of the translation act itself. It also contradicts the actual location of the translator as a participant in a given moment in history. Therefore, we should address the “matter” to which the text refers from a certain perspective, taking into account a specific aspect, so that the said “matter” can occur at a different historical moment and be understood by a target audience marked by its own specificity. A translator cannot become an anonymous entity isolated from all historical and cultural influences,

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whose role would boil down to the transfer of linguistic data only. Moreover, the translator should not avoid the pre-​judgments that shape him or her, but use them skillfully to revise interpretative hypotheses, develop knowledge, and improve translation skills. When evoking an ideal researcher, Gadamer names yet another important element, i.e. imagination. “It is imagination [Phantasie] that is the decisive function of the scholar. Imagination naturally has a hermeneutical function and serves the sense for what is questionable. It serves the ability to expose real, productive questions, something in which, generally speaking, only he who masters all the methods of his science succeeds.”782 The confrontation of one’s own historical horizon with the historical horizon of the source text allows one to develop a perspective from which the translator can most accurately present the “issue” extant in the translated text. But does this perspective enable the translator to reach the truth? In the light of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the interpreter undoubtedly stands between this truth and the method. It seems that in the case of a translation act it is not possible to choose both ways at once. In modern translation studies, scholars pay attention to many methods, techniques, and strategies, but it is worth considering whether they actually lead the translator to the truth contained in the text, whether there is an objective method by which the “correct” translation becomes possible, and whether this truth is available to the interpreter at all. Does not the translation act –​in hermeneutical terms –​really boil down to achieving truth, while realizing that this is an unrealizable goal? And does this conscious renunciation of a certain ideal and awareness of the essence of understanding not reveal the essence of the translator-​hermeneuticist’s competence –​an essence that underlies both the awareness of one’s own possibilities and also one’s own limitations? These are important questions, open for further discussion, and absolutely worth asking because they are in fact more important than the answers –​as the hermeneuticists often stress. In terms of hermeneutical philosophy, we may describe translation as a game in which the translator is a participant, a player in a special position between art 782 Gadamer, “The Universality of Hermeneutical Problem,” p. 136.“Phantasie ist die entscheidende Aufgabe für den Forscher. Phantasie meint hier natürlich nicht ein vages Vermögen, sich allerhand einzubilden, Phantasie steht vielmehr in hermeneutischer Funktion und dient dem Sinn für das Fragwürdige, dem Freilegen-​ Können von wirklichen, produktiven Fragen –​was im allgemeinen nur dem gelingt, der alle Methoden seiner Wissenschaft beherrscht”(Gadamer, “Die Universalität,” p. 227).

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and language. This metaphor subtly shows the relationship between the source text and the person translating it. The text draws the translator into a peculiar game and incorporate them into the game when the first anticipation of meaning, the first foresight of the text’s meaning, appears. We may say that the only question that remains is who the actual subject of this game is. Does the translator or the text guide subsequent translation decisions? Gadamer’s phenomenology of the game in the context of translation is an issue that deserves further study. In this respect, questions about the ontology of the game as a structure of understanding or about the aspect of (inter)subjectivity are particularly interesting. The translation, being a “mental portrait”783 of how the translator understood and interpreted the translated content, triggers the circulation of successive interpretations, which means that there is no ideal understanding. Therefore, it is worthwhile to conclude this reflection on the translator’s competence with these words of Gadamer: “But I will stop here. The ongoing dialog permits no final conclusion. It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word.”784 Let these reflections on translator’s competence from a hermeneutical perspective be a prelude to further discussion on this topic. Let them inspire us to look at the translator and his or her work from other points of view, seemingly incompatible with the present day. Let them motivate never-​ ending conversations –​the kind of conversations that true hermeneuticists conduct. Let them encourage us to ask the great questions which will determine the direction of the further development of translation philosophy, because such questions determine the whole of human knowledge and activity.785

783 See Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 166. Tokarz explains her idea as follows: “In translation, two mental spaces meet through linguistic and imaginary transfer, which often happens in a different time and space than the original” (Tokarz, Spotkania, p. 166). 784 Gadamer,“Afterword,” in: Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 581. 785 Cf. Gadamer, Hermeneutik als theoretische, p. 318.

Coda: Hermeneutics of Translation, Where Are You Heading? In recent years, we have witnessed a reactivation of the hermeneutic approach to translation. The activities of such researchers as Radegundis Stolze, Larisa Cercel, and John Stanley are worth mentioning. Since 2009, these authors have been regularly organizing symposia on topics related to the place and role of hermeneutical aspects in translation, writing extensively on the subject, and working on the development of research methods appropriate to the interpretative views adopted. In fact, the hermeneutical identity of a translation is an issue that is difficult to question. A few years after the publication of Gadamer’s magnum opus, Palmer very aptly emphasized in one of his works that contemporary, widely understood hermeneutics exploits many interesting analytical categories from within the problematics of specific translation: culture, otherness, understanding, or text.786 In addition, we encounter here a peculiar feedback. Since the early 1970s, researchers with a keen interest in the translation act have drawn much inspiration from strictly philosophical considerations on issues such as language, strangeness, understanding, and interpretation. One noteworthy example is Fritz Paepcke who without too much exaggeration can be considered the “father” of the modern translational hermeneutics and who was largely inspired by the works of his friend Hans-​Georg Gadamer. Another example could be Radegundis Stolze, a distinguished translation theoretician who, in creating her own translation theory, largely based it on the hermeneutical philosophy of language as seen by Friedrich Schleiermacher, Martin Heidegger, or Hans-​Georg Gadamer. Both in the hermeneutic and the translation process, the starting point is an individual entangled in specific cultural, social, and ideological relationships. In the light of hermeneutics, the human being strives to understand his or her place in society at a given moment in history. By the same token, according to translation studies, the translator sets himself or herself the important task of reaching the meaning of the text, trying to understand not only what the text says, but also to identify his or her own place in relation to the content being translated. Therefore, the relationship between hermeneutics and translation studies should be unquestionable. The development of the hermeneutical school –​or

786 Cf. R. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory, Evanston 1969, p. 31.

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hermeneutical turn –​in translation studies seems right, justified. Moreover, it seems to be a clear consequence of the similarity between both areas. However, the concepts that translation theorists or practitioners use to refer to hermeneutical tendencies in the theoretical systems of translation or in translation reflection require clarification and systematization.

Hermeneutics of Translation Studies or Hermeneutics of Translation? According to Cercel, the beginnings of contemporary hermeneutic reflection on translation date back to Romanticism.787 At that time, Schleieiermacher –​ who presented the methodological basis of the hermeneutical aspect of translation –​Goethe, Novalis, Humboldt, and others dealt with the problems of translation. They treated hermeneutics and translation as mutually permeating areas. As Cercel emphasizes, the subject of translation is also present in many of the works of such leading representatives of hermeneutical philosophy as Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Gadamer. The hermeneutical reflection on translation is visible in writings about strictly literary aspects and, naturally, on literary translation. In this respect, we should mention above all Steiner and Apel. These authors follow the trail blazed by their Romantic predecessors. However, it is difficult to find in their works any attempt to approach the phenomenon of translation in a strictly methodical way. Nevertheless, Cercel rightly points out that despite its incomplete or even fragmentary character, the literary turn in translational hermeneutics offers interesting insight into the discussion of the hermeneutical aspects of the translation act, especially those relating to the translation of fiction.788 According to Cercel,789 the literary movement in the hermeneutics of translation emerged in the 1970s and we may consider it an answer to the then dominant linguistic paradigm in translation, or more precisely to the research of the Leipzig School of Translation. At the time, there was a shift in the way scholars thought about translation –​the translator became the central component, while the rigid reference framework, such as the source text, target text, or linguistic categories, became secondary. In the initial phase, the most prominent scholars who shaped this new turn were Paepcke –​one of the first authors to 787 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik. Historische und systematische Grundlegung, St. Ingbert 2013. pp. 11–​13. 788 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, pp. 11–​13. 789 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, pp. 13–​14.

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initiate the hermeneutic turn in translation studies –​and Forget. Moreover, Stolze –​Paepcke’s pupil –​started to work in this circle and tried to systematize the theoretical considerations of her teacher and, among others, Kupsch-​Losereit.790 Stefanink and Bălăcescu also studied the problems of the hermeneutics of translation. Over time, the hermeneutical turn in translation has been enriched by issues specific to the linguistic and cognitive paradigms.791 This diversity, which is visible in the hermeneutical reflection on translation, has led to an attempt to characterize the hermeneutics of translation in terms of its specificity. We should start with the now “institutionalized” concept, frequently encountered since 2009, i.e. translational hermeneutics, which appears in the titles of both publications and conferences devoted to hermeneutics of translation. As Stolze, Cercel, and Stanley emphasize in Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm,792 translational hermeneutics, which we could translate literally into Polish as hermeneutyka translacyjna –​and which I will continue to call the hermeneutics of translation –​includes the work of renowned hermeneuticists who often refer to the category of translation in their philosophical deliberations, i.e. Martin Heidegger, Hans-​Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur; works in the field of literary studies, by e.g. George Steiner or Friedmar Apel; and the hermeneutical approach to translation initiated by Fritz Paepcke and continued by, among others, Radegundis Stolze.. Thus, I limit its scope to theoretical and methodological reflection on translation as undertaken by philologists, linguists, literary experts, and translators. In such an approach, its main representatives will be, for example, Paepcke, Stolze, Larisa Cercel, John Stanley, Ioana Balacescu, and Bernd Stefanink. These are authors who, based on the concepts inherent in the optics of philosophical hermeneutics, analyze the way in which a translation unfolds in the context of its place in a given cultural-​historical structure. The second research approach encompassing the philosophical hermeneutics of translation includes the philosophical reflection on translation undertaken by those developing philosophical hermeneutics in the twentieth century –​especially Martin Heidegger, Hans-​Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur –​and contemporary hermeneuticists, who in their research refer to the category of translation, placing it mainly in the ontological sphere.793 Therefore, the philosophical 7 90 See Kupsch-​Losereit, Vom Ausgangstext zum Zieltext, Berlin 2008. 791 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, pp. 13–​14. 792 Cercel, Stolze, Stanley, “Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm,” in: Translational Hermeneutics First Symposium, eds. Stolze, Cercel, Stanleya, Bucarest 2015, p. 22. 793 See for instance Kearney, Paul Ricoeur and the hermeneutics of translation, “Research in Phenomenology” 2007, 37(2), pp. 147–​159; G. Heffernan, “Understanding

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hermeneutics of translation comes down to philosophical reflection on translation as the realization of two important hermeneutical categories –​understanding and interpretation. From a philosophical perspective, translation is a category of an ontological nature, based on the “explanation and interpretation” of the world. In the linguistic dimension, translation is seen here as secondary to the “translating of the world.” The third research area specified by Stanley, Stolze, and Cercel –​thus falling within the scope of the hermeneutics of translation –​has developed mainly thanks to literary scholars and translators interested in literary translation. I believe that this third area falls within the boundaries of the first one, i.e. the hermeneutics of translation studies. From this perspective, the hermeneutics of translation would be the overarching direction, including the hermeneutics of translation studies and the philosophical hermeneutics of translation –​broad reflection on translation undertaken by hermeneutically oriented philosophers. At the same time, we could consider the hermeneutics of translation to be a kind of interpretation of translation understood not only in interlingual but above all intralingual and intersemiotic categories, to use the terminology coined by Roman Jakobson.794 Finally, it is important to distinguish so-​called hermeneutical translation,795 i.e. the type of translation act in which the translator conducts an in-​depth interpretation of the source text, taking into account such categories as the situational Husserl’s Language of Essences: Hermeneutical Observations on Translation in Phenomenology,” in: Philosophy and Practice in Translational Hermeneutics, eds. Stanley, O’Keeffe, Stolze, and Cercel, Bucarest 2018, pp. 47–​75. 794 In the light of the above considerations, we should add that the term translational hermeneutics should actually be reserved only for translation studies. Translational hermeneutics would therefore refer to research on translation from a hermeneutical perspective, with particular emphasis on its methodological potential and emphasis on interlingual translation –​which I will discuss further in this section. On the other hand, the hermeneutics of translation would be in this perspective a broadly understood reflection on translation as a function of culturally-​creative human activity in all its possible dimensions, taking into account translation as the principle governing the understanding of all cultural artefacts –​translation understood in this way will often be subject to metaphorical treatment. This book is situated at the interface between the hermeneutics of translation studies and the philosophical hermeneutics of translation. 795 Although we may consider the translation act to always become a hermeneutical translation –​after all, translators must understand and interpret a given source message –​we should stress at this point that any such translation will be different from the hermeneutical translation specified above. This is because within the framework of the latter, interpretative activities and well-​established understanding are

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background of the message, the social and temporal aspects of its creation, the biography and views of the author and the translator, the discursive meaning of the text, the semantic field and the rhetorical and stylistic means, and the syntactic, logical, stylistic, and lexical correctness of the target language. Below, I describe hermeneutical translation on the example of a procedure proposed by Stolze, who divided the translation process into two phases: translational reading and writing.

Hermeneutical Translation796 In the light of the considerations conducted in the previous parts of this book, hermeneutical translation may be called a proper translation act preceded by a reliable interpretation procedure,797 for example, so-​called translational reading and translational writing.798 Stolze suggests that the indicative categories to which the translator should pay attention are: situational context, discourse field, semantic dimension, and predictive mode. The translator begins by taking into account the text’s situational context, concentrating on the context in which the translated work is set, the tradition and culture from which the work originates, the time and place of creation, the author, the place of publication, etc. The information obtained influences a translator’s decisions and translation strategies. In a sense, analysis of the situational context is a well-​established preunderstanding. We clearly see here a reference to Gadamer’s figure of the hermeneutical circle and the hermeneutical conceptualization of translation as a circular structure of understanding. As Stolze emphasizes, depending on the type of text, the hermeneutical circle continuously changes its character. Translators must take into account the situational context even before they start translational writing. This first phase enables the translator to identify the known elements and those which conscious elements of the translation process and are based on the “methodically shaped wisdom” mentioned in the previous part of this monograph. Therefore, in hermeneutical translation, the translator always refers the “translated reality” to the one in which he or she is embedded. 796 This section has already been published in a slightly modified way in Piecychna, Multidimenstionality of Translational Hermeneutics: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives, Białystok 2021. 797 “A thoroughly conducted interpretation procedure” means that the translator reads the source text, gradually moving away from what the text means to him and gradually getting closer to what the text meant to the author and reader of the original and what it may mean to the target reader. 798 We may consider this proposal to be one of the methodological manifestations of hermeneutics of translation studies.

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remain alien –​either in a cultural context or in the context of a specific scientific field.799 According to the representatives of translational hermeneutics, a translator can only translate a text on the basis of what he or she has managed to understand: in order to understand the initial message, he or she has to activate the hermeneutic circle, and thus, link the new information with what he or she already knows. All the categories described above are linked to each other and remain in strict relation. The hermeneutical understanding of the text is based on the sequential realization of the following levels of the source text: situational context, discourse field, meaning dimension, and predicative mode. The realization of these elements allows the translator to obtain as much information about the text as possible, an important complement to the strictly linguistic information occurring at the level of the formal text structure. We may compare translational reading to creating a global, cognitive plan to present an understandable message in a creative and empathic way. This stage precedes the next phase of the process, i.e. translational writing. Translators play here the role of co-​authors who realize the circular structure of well-​established understanding and strive to take into account the author’s intentions, while being aware of the requirements set by recipients in the target culture. Stolze gives the translation a dimension of creative activity, because the translation act is not a re-​creation of the original text, but rather the creation of an autonomous work. According to Stolze, “the impulse to formulate in the target language” is a “cognitive movement”800 in the spirit of intuitiveness, while the search for the most appropriate words to render the original is based on the “linguistic creativity”801 of the translator. Like Gadamer, Stolze states that translation is not about the “conscious application”802 of language rules but about “transformation into living speech.” In this respect, the appropriateness of each translation is very important –​for from a hermeneutical perspective, it may be only an alternative to approach to the issue. There is no perfect translation, although at the same time translators should strive to optimize its quality.803

7 99 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 105–​113. 800 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 135 801 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 135 802 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 135 803 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 128–​136.

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Stolze, who often refers to Gadamer’s philosophical assumptions, states that the translation process has a circular structure and consists in the translator reviewing the interpretation hypotheses. A willingness to question one’s own decisions and ensure that the translated fragments are accurate is an important part of the translator’s competence. According to Stolze, formulating a translation text is an “autopoietic system” associated with the cognitive process of activating the translator’s knowledge. Translational writing realizes in an evolving process of “text formulation and repeated optimalization,”804 characterized by preliminariness and –​like translational reading –​circularity. According to Stolze, translators do not “apply certain rules” but, by creating a translation, they communicate with the recipients, with “intuition and subjectivity”805 as important features of this process. As Stolze states, even if in the process of communication the use of language –​theoretically speaking –​means the application of linguistic rules, in practice, it is reduced to an activity that oscillates between rules and creative freedom. This means the translator’s ability to analyze certain issues from other points of view, to search for new ways of expression, to discover how different linguistic phenomena in the text are linked, and –​importantly from a hermeneutical perspective –​the willingness to revise one’s own thinking about both understanding of the original text and making concrete translation decisions that directly influence the translation.806 In translational writing, decision making is not about the choice of a particular grammatical form, but rather a semantic search for the most accurate expressions. Hence, in hermeneutical translation, semantics and stylistics are more important than grammar. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider the potential target audience.807 Orientational categories in translational writing are: text genre, coherence, style, and function.808 Below, I present the main assumptions of Stolze’s hermeneutical translation theory in the form of tables.

8 04 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 138. 805 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 139. 806 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, p. 141. 807 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 139–​149. 808 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 153–​176.

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Tab. Radegundis Stolze’s Characteristics of Translation Process809 TRANSLATION-​ AL READING Understanding

Literature

Specialized texts

SITUATIONAL country, epoch, CONTEXT publisher, author, cultural community, reality, geographical names

field of science, time of text creation, author, method of publication

DISCOURSE FIELD

social environment in a given culture, author’s ideology, world image in the text, literary genre, mode of text presentation

scientific discipline, research discipline, text type, communication level (expert/​layman), text’s function

MEANING DIMENSION

titles, key words, isotopic webs, culture-​specific associations, metaphors, thematic strings

Terminological conceptualization (definition/​ deduction vs. convention/​ interpretation)

PREDICA-​ TIVE MODE

author’s point of view, idiolect, deictical expressions, grammatical tense, irony, quotations, intertextuality, language register

speech acts, structure of expressions, passive voice, cohesion, footnotes

809 Stolze, The Translator’s Approach, pp. 127, 175.

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TRANSLATION-​ AL WRITING

Formulation

General Language

Specialist Language

TEXT’S GENRE

text’s genre, fiction/​non-​fiction, text’s shape, illustrations, word order/ syntax/sentence structure, visual side

the way the text is presented, layout of the content, illustrations, fonts, the shape of the text from an editorial point of view (number notation, typography, verbal and verbal-​digital elements of the text, editorial composition)

COHERENCE

titles, isotopic webs, paradigmatic compatibility, synonyms, allusions, proper nouns, geographical places, systematic environment

status of equivalent terms, concepts specific to a particular field or research discipline, vocabulary, logic in text structure, names

STYLISTICS

mode, grammatical tense, prosody of the emotional layer, indirect speech, suspense, wordplay, metonymy, alliteration, rhymes

text blocks, functional style, phraseology, passive voice, specialized language metaphors, impersonal expressions

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FUNCTION

author’s intention, text structure, target audience, intertextuality, scene visualization

communication goal, macrostructure, address expectations, compliance with certain standards in creating a particular type of text

Hermeneutics of Translation Studies and the Hermeneutics of Translation810 In hermeneutical reflection on translation, subjectivity remains an important issue. The central element of translation activity is language, which is influenced by many factors: temporal location, knowledge, the life experience of a person, etc.811 Historicity is also a decisive factor as language is subject to constant change over the centuries. This is also true of translation as evidenced by retranslations and adaptations of classics. It is not possible to find the “perfect sense” of a given text. One reason is the fact that we may express an identical message in many different ways.812 We cannot separate the subjectivity of translation decisions from the influence of the global cultural-​historical space on the translator.813 There is no absolute objective truth that is valid for everyone and forever. Importantly, all subjective beliefs must be properly motivated and explained so that people can accept them in a given context.814 In a translation approached from a hermeneutical perspective, phenomenological elements are also important because all objects are perceived by individuals in a specific way, from a specific perspective. In this sense, we may call translation not only a hermeneutical act, but also a phenomenological one. As Stolze rightly points out, in ontological terms “things have a quasi objective identity,” but we can experience it only indirectly. The phenomenology of

810 In the first part, this section is based on the translation paradigm of translation by Stolze described in detail in her monograph The Translator’s Approach. 811 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, pp. 13–​14. 812 See Eco, Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione, Milan 2003. 813 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s Approach to Text, p. 57. 814 Cercel, Stolze, Stanley, Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm, p. 25.

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things becomes culturally determined –​a fact not insignificant in the case of translations as they are historically and culturally determined.815 Stolze emphasizes the importance of circularity and the process character of the translation act. Accordingly, the final translation or final solution of a given translation problem simply does not exist. As Paepcke has noted, a translation is a so-​called “hermeneutical sketch.”816 It is an attempt to adequately express a given sentence or fragment, which because of its specific circularity has no end. The translation is always subject to addition, correction, and modification, because the meaning of the text is determined by a number of factors, including holistic preunderstanding.817 The last aspect characterizing the hermeneutical paradigm in translation is reflection. According to Stolze, translators should strive to demonstrate responsibility for the work being created, which means a proper understanding of the source text, making the translation speak to the target audience so that it becomes “living speech.” Translators should be aware of their socio-​cultural status and influence on the final shape of the translation.818 In light of the above, it is worth considering what the hermeneutics of translation means.819 To Cercel, it is a direction of thinking that focuses on problems inherent in the phenomena of understanding and interpretation and the subjective relations between them.820 For representatives of translational hermeneutics the most important element is the translator, who unquestionably has the greatest influence on the final shape of the translation. According to Cercel, hermeneutically oriented translators are mainly interested in how the subjective factor of the translation process –​i.e. the translator –​can be subject to objective studies on the specificity of the translation act, including not only literary but also specialized audiovisual translation and interpreting. It is not the text itself and the related linguistic problems that are important, but the course of the translation process,821 which brings the

8 15 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s Approach, p. 58. 816 See Paepcke, Im Übersetzen leben –​Übersetzen und Textvergleich, Hrsg. K. Berger, H-​M. Speier, Tübingen 1986, p. 86. 817 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s Approach, p. 58. 818 Stolze, The Legal Translator’s Approach, p. 58. 819 In this section, I base mainly on Übersetzungshermeneutik. Historische und systematische Gundlegung by Larisy Cercel (2013). 820 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, p. 16. 821 Cercel, Übersetzungshermeneutik, p. 21.

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hermeneutics of translation closer in character to the recently developed cognitive translatology. As Cercel rightly points out, in a holistic view of the translation act, hermeneuticists deny the legitimacy of the “binary oppositions” often stressed in translation methodology. These include: “source text/​ target text, source language/​target language translatability/​non-​translatability, literal/​free translation, specialized languages/​belles lettres, form/​content, etc.”822 Hermeneutically oriented translators are not interested in the question of whether a given “text unit is translatable or untranslatable,” but in how the translation act of a particular message is performed. They do not focus on the problem of equivalence between source and target texts, but ask themselves how the culturally conditioned content of an output text –​“cognitively present in the translator’s mind”–​ can take a specific language form in the form of a target text.823 Undoubtedly, we should agree that it is not only translational hermeneutics that has made the translator the central figure of the translation act. The place of the translator as an element of the inalienable translation process and as an individual subject to inescapable influences, is of interest to researchers of other trends, approaches, and orientations in translation studies. In this respect, we should mention the cultural turn initiated by Susan Bassnett, Theo Hermans, and André Lefevere, or the sociological-​ideological turn, which focuses on the role of the translator in the social structure, the status of literary and specialist translators, the influence of society on the type and way of translating of a given work, and the ideological conditions of the translator’s work and the reception of translations. Moreover, in 2009 a proposal was made824 to establish another category in the whole series of turns in the history of translation studies, the so-​called Translator’s Turn. In view of the above, we may suggest that all the trends of research in which the relationship between translators and the culture in which they are embedded, and the historical/​social context in which a given text is placed, should be considered –​due to the universal character of hermeneutics –​as areas belonging to hermeneutical translation studies. Just as in hermeneutical philosophy it is important to reflect on the historicity and finiteness

8 22 Cercel, Stolze, Stanley, Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm, p. 29. 823 Cercel, Stolze, Stanley, Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm, p. 29. 824 Wolf, “The Sociology of Translation and Its ‘Activist Turn,’ ” in: The Sociological Turn in Translation and Interpreting Studies, eds. C. V. Angelelli, Amsterdam/​Philadelphia 2014, p. 7.

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of men and on how they interpret the world around them,825 in hermeneutical translation studies we linger over translators’ historicity and how they interpret the text as part of a larger cultural-​historical world. However, coming back to the status of the hermeneutics of translation studies –​ or translational hermeneutics –​we cannot consider the explanations given above concerning its very essence to be exhaustive. The “holistic view of the translation act” seems to be characterized by other theoretical-​methodological approaches toward the process. Similarly, we may say that the “translator’s motivations” or the cultural determinants of the message “cognitively present in the translator’s mind” are nothing innovative. So it seems that translational hermeneuticists have a considerable problem with specifying the research field which, paradoxically, they so clearly advocate. This is even more complicated by the fact that they themselves stress that translators may accept the research paradigm of translational hermeneutics if it is combined with findings made by cognitive linguistics. Indeed, they are right about this, especially since hermeneutics and cognitive science have more in common than it would seem at first glance.826 Nevertheless, the status and specifics of translational hermeneutics, even after enriching it with the latest findings from cognitive sciences, still seem unclear. How, then, should we perceive translational hermeneutics? Difficulties related to its classification and definition have their source in the so-​called multiplicity of hermeneutics and their complex profile. Hermeneutics can, for example, be a philosophical direction, the art (ability) of interpretation and understanding, or a field of a particular discipline, e.g. legal hermeneutics. We may consider the hermeneutics of translation studies to be –​like legal hermeneutics, biblical hermeneutics, philological hermeneutics, musical hermeneutics, or literary hermeneutics –​a specific variety of hermeneutics that refers to the practice of interpreting and understanding a translation as a peculiarly understood autonomous work in a given literary-​cultural-​social system. However, here we encounter yet another problem. We may define translation in many ways: as a target product, as a process of creating a target text, but also as a subject of translation, linguistics, literary and cultural studies. Therefore, it seems apt to see translational hermeneutics as a practice of interpreting both

825 Scholtz, “Czym jest i kiedy istnieje ‘filozofia hermeneutyczna,’ ” Studia z filozofii niemieckiej, Vol. 1, Hermeneutyczna tożsamość filozofii, eds. S. Czerniak, J. Rolewski, Toruń 1994, p. 59. 826 For more see Gallagher, “Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2004, 11(10–​11), pp. 162–​174.

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the sense of the target text and the sense of the translation activity that also covers the course of the translation process, and thus the “motivations that guide translator’s behavior” as postulated by L. Cercel, R. Stolze, and J. Stanley. But what does the practice of interpreting a work like a translation consist of? Let me refer to the concept of musical hermeneutics as defined by Maria Piotrowska.827 Following Piotrowska, who sees musical hermeneutics as the “specific use of knowledge provided by the history and theory of music,”828 I would argue that translational hermeneutics can also be defined not so much as a sub-​ discipline of translation –​as it is sometimes seen –​but as a “specific use of knowledge” which translational hermeneutics understood in this way can draw from the history and theory of translation, the history and theory of literature, or the history and theory of language, among others.829 And just as “music is not self-​ explanatory, but rather needs an extremely complex context of biology, history, philosophy, language, and other music,”830 similarly, translation can only explain itself through its use in various (re)configurations. Additionally, like in musical hermeneutics, these contexts –​or complete wholes –​are not given directly or imposed from above, so in the interpretation of a translation’s meaning, they must be worked out anew every time. As Piotrowska aptly states: “The whole, in which a musical phenomenon is only one of its components, is for musical hermeneutics a ‘text’ in the broadest sense of the word.”831 This should also be the main task of translational hermeneutics: to discover the contextual whole in which the translation is embedded as a target product and as a translation activity. And what is the hermeneutical procedure for studying the “translation phenomenon?” To answer this question, I will refer again to Piotrowska’s apt observations: All in all, therefore, the hermeneutical procedure looks like this: being driven by intuitive sense of meaning, a hermeneuticist builds a meaningful world of “something musical.” Moreover, he or she builds it right away under the particular pressure of the awaiting verification, and that means nothing more than that the process of searching for meaning is reaching the truth under extreme tension. Because of this ruthless

827 See Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna: teoria i praxis,” Studia Theologica Varsaviensa 1987, 25(2), pp. 179–​199. 828 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna: teoria i praxis,” p. 179. 829 Of course, the list remains open, because translation studies, as a kind of interdiscipline, draws on various disciplines and areas of knowledge. 830 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna,” p. 184. 831 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna,” p. 184.

Hermeneutics of Translation Studies and the Hermeneutics of Translation 245 criticism, it is still happening in musical hermeneutics, just as it is in philosophical thinking: posing a problem and criticizing it are one and the same thing.832

I agree with the postulates of Piotrowska, thus, I consider the interpretation of a translated work to be possible when it is embedded in the praxis of the figure of the hermeneutical circle. This means that we must understand and interpret translation –​both as a work and as an act of creation –​in the optics of translational hermeneutics in relation to how the work functions with regard to the other contexts that build it, and form a specific whole: the epoch in which the translation was created, the biography and “philosophy” of the translator, the language characteristic of a given historical period, other translations of the same work, other cultural creations created at that time, and the cognitive “climate” of the epoch, i.e. for example, the emotions characteristic of that epoch or the way in which fundamental human values were understood. At the same time, this interpretation assumes the self-​critical consciousness of the translator-​ researcher, who, according to the demands of the New Historicism, shows a methodical self-​reflexivity in relation to his or her own place in history. Due to the specificity of the phenomenon of translation, it is not possible to lose sight of the dimension of translational initialization, that is, of a text that in a way gives the impetus for translation. Thus, when applying a hermeneutic approach to the study of translation, the translator follows the principle of circularity, and in choosing the translated work as the center of his or her interpretative and research activity, situates it in ever different interpretative contexts and in a dialog with its starting point, the source text. “The interest of hermeneutics is directed toward a particular point of gravity; its interpretation revolves around this point of gravity.”833 In my opinion, to show what form this kind of interpretative activity should take, and to state what, in a given case, will have to be considered as this “center of gravity” or “central predisposition of the epoch,”834 is the future of translational hermeneutics and at the same its “to be or not to be” in the field of translation studies.

8 32 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna,” p. 186. 833 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna,” p. 187. 834 Piotrowska, “Hermeneutyka muzyczna,” p. 193.

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2. Works by Hans-​Georg Gadamer in English Gadamer H.-​G., Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer, D. G. Marshall, London, 2004.

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Index of Names A Adab Beverly J.  15 Ahrens Barbara  22 Alderson J. Charles  136 Alves Fábio  16 Andruczyk Krzysztof  Angelelli Claudia V.  242 Apel Friedmar  232–233 Arthos John  53 Aristotle  37, 48, 50, 58, 61, 74, 138, 214 Augustine St.  54 B Bakhtin Mikhail  87 Bălăcescu Ioana  24 Balcerzan Edward  27 Baran Bogdan  46, 77 Barańczak Stanisław  27, 192 Barthes Roland  176 Bartmiński Jerzy  226 Bassnett Susan  242 Baumann Klaus Dieter  22 Berger Klaus  241 Bergson Henri  45 Berman Antoine  19, 20, 26 Berns Margie  213 Betti Emilio  206 Biel Łucja  213 Blumczyński Piotr  32 Bobowska-​Nastarzewska Paulina  16 Boeckh August  189 Braver Lee  45, 127 Bronk Andrzej  13, 18, 31, 42, 45–​47, 56, 59, 64, 72, 73, 75, 92, 95, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 116–​118, 123, 126, 138, 140, 143, 148–​150, 221 Bruneaud Karen  23

Brzezicka Barbara  16 Brzozowski Jerzy  26, 27, 29, 42 Bukowski Piotr  17, 18, 26, 27, 32, 120 Bultmann Rudolf  34 C Canullo Carla  19, 21, 22 Carroll Lewis  155 Casey Edward S.  162 Cassirer Ernst  45, 47 Celan Paul [Paul Antschel]  114, 191, 193 Cercel Larisa  13, 22, 24, 29–​31, 175, 219, 231–​234, 240–​242, 244 Chesterman Andrew  15, 24 Chruszczewski Piotr  106 Collingwood Robin George  199 Cook Deborah  177 Coreth Emerich  123, 126, 170 Costache Adrian  20 Cratylus  50, 52 Croce Benedetto  83 Culler Jonathan  183 Curtius Ernst Robert  34 Czerniak Stanisław  243 Czesak Artur  17 D Dabaghi Azizollah  23 Darwish Housamedden  19 Davidson Donald  71 Davidson Scott  19 Davies Maria  213 Dąmbska-​Prokop Urszula  27 De Gennaro Ivo  20 Derrida Jacques  21, 203 Desai Kiran  23 Descartes René  45

262

Index of Names

Di Cesare Donatella  25, 26, 33, 122, 124, 140 Dollerup Cay  15 Dorn Ines  22 Dybel Paweł  43, 44, 123–​127, 131, 132, 149, 157, 161, 213–​216 Dybiec-​Gajer Joanna  15, 17 E Eberhard Philippe  213 Eco Umberto  99 Ehlen Peter  126, 170 Emad Parvis Ethington Philip J.  20 F Feliga Piotr  114, 115 Foran Lisa  16 Forget Philippe  77, 233 Friedlander Paul  34 G Gadamer Hans-​Georg  13, 17–​19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 31–​101, 103–​118, 120, 122–​207, 209–​216, 219–​229, 231–​233, 235–​237 Gallagher Shaun  125, 243 Gander Hans-​Helmuth  45, 80 Gil Alberto  24, 30 Goethe Johann Wolfgang  231 Goffman Erving  21 Gomola Aleksander  17 Goodwin Phil  21 Göpferich Susanne  15, 16 Grondin Jean  19, 47, 75, 77, 144, 145, 149, 165 Groth Miles  19 Grucza Franciszek  40 Gurczyńska-​Sady Katarzyna  64, 70 H Habermas Jürgen  184, 224 Hadot Pierre  16

Haeffner Gerd  126, 170 Hafiz Divan  21 Hansen-​Schirra Silvia  22 Harris Brian  16 Heffernan George  233 Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich  37, 40, 138, 146, 147, 197, 210 Heidegger Martin  17–​21, 25, 29, 31, 34, 37, 38, 40, 45, 74, 96, 104, 106, 109, 110, 133, 141, 219, 231, 232, 233 Helmholtz Hermann von  211 Hemmat Amrollah  21 Herman Paul  19, 242 Hermans Theo  242 Herold Susanne  23 Heydel Magda  17 Hirsch Erik D.  188–​190 Humboldt Wilhelm von  37, 60–​ 64, 232 Husserl Edmund  34, 47, 140, 234 I Ionescu Tudor  25 Iser Wolfgang  99 J Jaeger Werner  34 Jakobsen Arnt Lykke  16 Jakobson Roman  177, 234 Januszkiewicz Michał  18, 120, 121, 157 Jervolino Domenico  24 K Kaindl Klaus  15 Kalinowski Marian Leon  126 Kalverkämper Hartwig  22, 208 Kant Immanuel  140 Karimnia Amin  22 Kasten Madeleine  19 Keane Niall  33 Kearney Richard  233 Kearns John  134

Index of Names

Kharmandar Mohammad Ali  22 Kielar Barbara  41 King Lee Tong  23 Kipling Joseph Rudyard  21 Kiraly Donald C.  16, 213 Kjaer Anne Lise  208 Knapik Aleksandra R.  106 Kohlmayer Rainer  24 Konik Roman  212 Korycińska-​Wegner Małgorzata  26 Kozak Jolanta  27, 28, 175–​177 Krein-​Kühle Monika  22 Kreuzer Helmut  208 Kristeva Julia  24, 25 Krüger Ralph  22 Krysztofiak-​Kaszyńska Maria  26 Kupsch-​Losereit Sigrid  233 L Ladmiral Jean-​René  24 Lee Hyang  19 Lefevere Andre  242 Leibbrand Miriam Paola  23 Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm  45, 50, 51, 61 Leszczyński Damian  212 Levinas Emmanuel  19–​21 Lewicki Roman  183 Locke John  123 Loddegard Anne  15 Lohmann Johannes  45 Lorenc Włodzimierz  38 Lörscher Wolfgang  15 Luc Joanna  103 Lukas Katarzyna  32 Lukszyn Jerzy  51 Lullus Rajmund  45 M Maitland Sarah  22 Maliszewski Julian  207 Malpas Jeff  45, 80, 114

263

Manning Patrick  133 Marinescu Paul  19 Matulewska Aleksandra  208 McDowell John  65, 212 Mees Inger M.  16 Mezei Gábor  23 Mikołajczyk Hubert  49, 89 Mora Francesco  220 Morus Tomasz  108 Mueller-​Vollmer Kurt  184 N Nerczuk Zbigniew  16 Neubert Albrecht  15 Nowotniak Justyna  Niemczuk Maria  104, 105 Nicholas of Cusa Nietzsche Friedrich  20 Novalis [Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg]  45, 232 Nycz Ryszard  143, 144 O O’Keeffe Brian  19, 113, 114, 117–​ 120, 122, 175, 219, 221, 234 Oliva Mirela  19, 24 Oliveira Paulo  19 Olson Alan M.  82 Orozco Mariana  15 Owen Abigail  133 Oziębłowski Mariusz  49, 69, 78, 87, 89, 96, 103 P Paepcke Fritz  17, 26, 30, 77, 219, 232, 233, 241 Paganine Carolina  20 Palmer Richard E.  18, 19, 116, 231 Panahbar Ehsan  21, 23 Parlog Aba-​Carina  23 Pawliszyn Aleksandra  46, 78, 95, 96, 105 Piecychna Beata  221

264

Index of Names

Piotrowska Maria  16, 17, 244, 245 Plant Kathryn  47 Platon  34, 50, 58 Plotyn  16 Pöchhacker Franz  15 Pollard David Edward  112 Pomian Krzysztof  Pommer Sieglinde E.  24 Poręba Marcin  264 Presas Marisa  15 Przyłębski Andrzej  34, 47, 69, 74, 77, 89, 92, 110, 122, 139, 141, 144, 148, 152, 153, 170 Pym Anthony  15 R Rambach Johan Jacob  107, 109 Rao Sathya  20 Rembierz Marek  49, 89 Reut Maria  181, 198 Ricken Friedo  126, 170 Ricoeur Paul  17, 19–​21, 23, 28, 94, 110, 232, 233 Risku Hanna  15, 113 Robinson Douglas  19, 24, 30, 219 Rolewski Jarosław  243 Rosnerowa Hanna  16 Ruggiu Luigi  22 Russell Bertrand  123 S Sady Wojciech  64, 70 Sandrini Peter  208 Sartre Jean-​Paul  47 Schäffner Christina  15 Schalow Frank  20 Scheler Max  66 Schleiermacher Friedrich Daniel Ernst  17, 19, 109, 190, 219, 231 Schlieben-​Lange Brigitte  208 Schmidt Dennis J.  80, 81, 178

Schmidt Lawrence Kennedy  31, 79, 95 Schmitt Peter Axel  23 Scholtz Gunet  243 Schreiber Michael  22 Shadd Deborah M.  19 Short Mick  136 Shusterman Richard  203 Sin-​Wai Chan  112 Skwara Marta  177 Sławiński Janusz  27 Sneller Rico  19 Snell-​Hornby Mary  14, 24 Socrates  50 Sołtysiak Marek  48, 49, 89, 91, 104, 108, 111, 141, 149 Speier Hans-​Michael  241 Spyrka Lucyna  183 Stanley John W.  13, 22, 24, 175, 231, 233, 234, 240, 242, 244 Stefanink Bernd  24, 25, 233 Steiner George  17, 21, 28, 29, 32, 177, 219, 232, 233 Stolze Radegundis  13, 17, 24–​26, 30, 39, 79, 106, 107, 120, 121, 129, 154, 166, 167, 175, 190, 202, 207, 208, 213, 215, 219, 231, 233–​238, 240–​ 242, 244 Sznajder Paweł  53, 75, 86 Szymczyński Tomasz R.  141 T Tabakowska Elżbieta  106, 176 Tholen Toni  119, 159 Tischner Józef  179 Tokarz Bożena  28, 29, 121, 136, 189, 217, 226, 229 Thomas Aquinas St.  53, 55 Toury Gideon  15, 21 Turk Horst  Tyupa Sergiy  16, 17

Index of Names

U Urbaniak Marcin  71, 78, 89 V Varne Jennifer  25 Vico Giambattista  45 Vilhauer Monica  212 W Wasowski Grzegorz  106, 155 Wawrzyniak Zdzisław  27, 40 Weiland Annette  23 Weinsheimer Joel C.  92, 93 Weissbrod Rachel  21 Whyatt Bogusława  15 Wienen Ursula  22

265

Wierciński Andrzej  145 Wierzbicka Anna  70 Wills Wolfram  134 Wittgenstein Ludwig  20, 21, 47, 67 Wolf Michaela  242 Wysłouch Seweryna  27 Y Yan L.  19 Yuen Wayne K.  112 Yun Seong-​Woo  19 Z Zarębski Tomasz  212 Ziomek Jerzy  27

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