The Heart of Dogmatics: Christology and Christocentrism in Herman Bavinck [1 ed.] 9783666522116, 9783525522110

Citation preview

Bruce R. Pass

The Heart of Dogmatics Christology and Christocentrism in Herman Bavinck

Pass_Titelei.indd 1

14.09.20 09:29

Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie Edited by Christine Axt-Piscalar, David Fergusson, and Christiane Tietz

Volume 169

Pass_Titelei.indd 2

14.09.20 09:29

Bruce R. Pass

The Heart of Dogmatics Christology and Christocentrism in Herman Bavinck

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Pass_Titelei.indd 3

14.09.20 09:29

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek: The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: https://dnb.de. © 2020, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting: le-tex publishing services GmbH, Leipzig

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2197-3253 ISBN 978-3-666-52211-6

Pass_Titelei.indd 4

14.09.20 09:29

Contents Acknowledgments ..........................................................................

9

Introduction ................................................................................... 11 Christology and dogmatics .............................................................. Introduction............................................................................. Dogmatics as a scientific system .................................................. Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system.............................. The structure of Bavinck’s christocentrism ................................... Conclusion ..............................................................................

23 23 24 37 47 55

Christology and religion .................................................................. Introduction............................................................................. The lifeblood of dogmatics ......................................................... Religious subjectivity ................................................................ The person of Christ and objective religion ................................... Conclusion ..............................................................................

57 57 58 67 75 85

Chalcedon and modernity ............................................................... 89 Introduction............................................................................. 89 The starting point of Christology ................................................ 90 The deficit of Chalcedon ............................................................ 99 A modern orthodoxy................................................................. 112 Conclusion .............................................................................. 128 Christology and the derivation of doctrine ........................................ 131 Introduction............................................................................. 131 Scripture.................................................................................. 132 Ecclesiology ............................................................................. 144 Eschatology.............................................................................. 155 Conclusion .............................................................................. 165 Christocentrism then and now ......................................................... 167 Introduction............................................................................. 167 Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog ...................................... 168 A Websterian touchstone ........................................................... 177 Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval ................................. 187 Conclusion .............................................................................. 196

6

Contents

Bibliography................................................................................... 199 Index ............................................................................................. 219    

in memoriam Alan Hohne (1942−2011)

Acknowledgments It would not have been possible to write this book without the support of many people. It is a revision of the doctoral thesis I submitted to the University of Edinburgh in 2018 and as such, it is wholly appropriate to express gratitude first to my wife, Kate, who once again followed me to the other side of the world to make possible a course of study. The same gratitude is extended to our three children, Joseph, Eden, and Isaac, who left behind friends, family, and sunshine to make a home in dark, cold, and mysterious Scotland. I would also like to thank New College, the University of Edinburgh’s School of Divinity, for awarding me a full-fee scholarship and stipend, which made my studies financially possible. I am grateful too to have received monies from the New College conference bursary, the Kuyper Centre (formerly at Princeton Theological Seminary and presently at Calvin Theological Seminary), and the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities at the University of Cambridge. These funds allowed me to present portions of this research at conferences in Princeton, Boston, Grand Rapids, Sydney, Edinburgh, and Cambridge. I am further indebted to the Ministry Training Scholarship Fund of St James Anglican Church Turramurra, the Trustees of the Rev. and Mrs F.W.A. Roberts Scholarship administered by Moore College, Mr Simon Pillar, and Mr Tim Sims for their generous financial support over the course of three years. Especial thanks must also be given to my supervisor, Dr James Eglinton, who first sowed the idea of a doctorate at New College and who subsequently opened up the many opportunities I have been privileged to enjoy. Dr Eglinton exemplifies godliness and scholarship in equal measure and gave his attention to my work in a very difficult season of life. To the Eglintonians: Cory Brock, Nathaniel Sutanto, Gustavo Monteiro, Cameron Clausing, Ximian Xu, and Gregory Parker, I also express sincere thanks for their combined efforts in reviving Anglophone Bavinck scholarship and for the many stimulating conversations we have had over the years. Special thanks are also in order for my colleagues and friends, Henk van den Belt, who offered valuable comments on my thesis, Gert de Kok and Kylie Giblett, who graciously kept an eye on my Dutch and German translations, Jason Au, who provided useful searches on his Logos software, and Lesley Hicks, who helped ensure that the manuscript was free of typographical errors. George Harinck offered helpful advice on matters historical, Tyler Tritten and David Robinson were excellent conversation partners on all things Schelling and Hegel, and the library staff at the National Library of Scotland, the Vrije

10

Acknowledgments

Universiteit, and New College libraries very kindly sourced (nearly) all of the material I asked for. I am also grateful to the editors for their permission to reproduce in modified form the following previously published material: “The Question of Central Dogma in Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 53:1 (2018), 33−63; “A Mysterious Relationship? Herman Bavinck on Revelation and Reason,” in C. Green/D. Starling (ed.), Revelation and Reason in Christian Theology (Bellingham: Lexham Press, 2018), 154−65; and “Revelation and Reason in Herman Bavinck,” Westminster Theological Journal 80:2 (2018), 237−60. I don’t think a day has gone past in which I have not thanked God for the remarkable privilege of undertaking this research and I am glad to share the fruits of my work with a wider audience. Reading Bavinck closely has reminded me of the precious truth that in life and death, in the present and the future all is ours and we are of Christ and Christ is of God. May these extended musings redound to his glory. Bruce R. Pass Brisbane, Australia

Introduction In the introduction to his expansive account of Herman Bavinck’s doctrines of revelation and inspiration, Jan Veenhof hinted that a systematic analysis of Bavinck had not yet been written.1 In the fifty years since Veenhof ’s monograph appeared, Bavinck scholarship has progressed considerably, yet a case could made that a properly systematic analysis of Bavinck’s theology is still lacking. Subsequent studies have largely focused on a single doctrine or aspect of Bavinck’s thought. Sijtse Meijers investigated the relationship of objectivity and existentiality in Bavinck.2 John Bolt explored the theme of the imitation of Christ.3 Sydney Hielema examined the eschatological orientation of Bavinck’s soteriology.4 Ronald Gleason considered the significance of the mystical union in Bavinck,5 and Dirk van Keulen built on Veenhof ’s earlier work on Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture.6 The reasons that an account of Bavinck as a systematic theologian has not been forthcoming are, however, not difficult to discern. When Rolf Bremmer and Jan Veenhof wrote their monographs, Bavinck scholarship was still in its infancy. The first doctoral theses did not appear until the 1950s, largely because the focus of attention in the Netherlands had shifted toward another figure. In the year following Bavinck’s death, Karl Barth published the second edition of his Römerbrief and as it did in other countries, this work created a sensation. In the words of Gerrit Berkouwer, “[w]e wondered what else, outside of an earthquake … could be felt in such a dynamic and

1 Commenting on Rolf H. Bremmer’s Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961), Veenhof writes “De betekenis van Bremmers boek is vooral daarin gelegen, dat het Bavinck als theoloog tekent tegen de achtergrond van en in zijn ontmoeting met de contemporaraine nederlandse theologie en aldus een levendig beeld ontwerpt van het historische décor van Bavincks dogmatische arbeid ... De gang van Bremmers betoog is nl. niet door systematische maar door historische gezichtspunten beheerst.” Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie. De openbarings- en schriftbeschouwing van Herman Bavinck in vergelijking met die van de ethische theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten and Schipperheijn, 1968), 7. 2 Sijtse Meijers, Objectiviteit en existentialiteit: een onderzoek naar hun verhouding in de theologie van Herman Bavinck en in door hem beïnvloede concepties (Kampen: Kok, 1979). 3 John Bolt, “The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck” PhD University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto School of Theology, (1982). 4 Sydney Hielema, “Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption” ThD thesis Wycliffe College, Toronto School of Theology, (1998). 5 Ronald Gleason, “The Centrality of the Unio Mystica in the Theology Of Herman Bavinck” PhD thesis Westminster Theological Seminary, (2001). 6 Dirk van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek: schriftbeschouwing en schriftgebruik in het dogmatisch werk van A. Kuyper, H. Bavinck en G.C. Berkouwer (Kampen: Kok, 2003).

12

Introduction

alarming way.”7 In the Dutch context, Barth’s reception was influenced by the conviction that he represented a healthy corrective to Neo-Calvinism. NeoCalvinism still had devotees among those who were unconvinced of the merits of Barth’s vision,8 yet Bavinck was largely remembered for his public career and contributions to education. Streets and schools had been named in his honour throughout the Netherlands and there was abiding scholarly interest in Bavinck’s contribution to pedagogy.9 As a theologian, however, Bavinck was a figure whose profile had largely slipped into the long shadows of the previous century.10 Even the centenary of Bavinck’s birth was passed in virtual silence.11 The 1950s, however, saw a renewal of interest in Bavinck, especially among Dutch Americans.12 Bavinck had visited the United States twice, once in 1892 en route to a world Presbyterian Council in Toronto and again in 1908 to deliver the prestigious Stone Lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary. On both occasions, Bavinck received a warm welcome in the institution that would become Calvin Theological Seminary and his writings gained wide acceptance through the commendation of Benjamin B. Warfield and Geerhardus Vos.13 Bavinck’s works were read in Dutch by those who could and his thought was mediated 7 Gerrit Berkouwer, A Half Century of Theology: Movements and Motives (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 40. 8 Bavinck’s immediate legacy was complicated by the competing factions of the Gereformeerde kerken in the late 1920s. Throughout the 1930s, Klaas Schilder and Herman Dooyeweerd, would maintain that a modified version of Neo-Calvinism was the more desirable alternative. The discussion, however, focused largely on Kuyper to the exclusion of Bavinck. 9 In the generation following Bavinck’s death, several studies were published on this aspect of Bavinck’s thought. Fr.S. Rombouts, Prof. dr. H. Bavinck, Gids bij de studie van zijn paedagogische werken (‘s-Hertogenbosch-Antwerpen: Malmberg, 1922); J. Brederveld, Hoofdlijnen der Paedagogiek van Dr. Herman Bavinck, met Critische Beschouwing (Amsterdam: De Standaard, 1927); L. van der Zweep, De Paedagogiek van Bavinck (Kampen: Kok, 1935); Cornelius Jaarsma, The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1936); L. van Klinken, Bavinck’s Paedagogische Beginselen (Meppel: Boom, 1937). 10 For a fine-grained analysis of the broader intellectual currents of this period, see Harinck, “Twin Sisters with a changing character: how Neo-Calvinists dealt with the modern discrepancy between Bible and natural sciences,” in Scott Mandelbrote/Jitse Van der Meer (ed.), Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 346−60. 11 Harinck, “Herman Bavinck,” in G. Harinck/H. Paul/B. Wallet (ed.), Het gereformeerde geheugen: protestantse herinneringsculturen in Nederland 1850–2000 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2009), 437−8. 12 Bavinck’s legacy in Northern America was also complicated by controversy over the issue of common grace, which would result in an ecclesial rift and the formation of the Protestant Reformed Churches in America in 1924. Cf. Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck’s Reception and Influence in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 38:2 (2003), 273−80. 13 For further details of Bavinck’s life and times, see Valentijn Hepp, Dr Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1921); Rolf H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966). The best English-language biography is James Eglinton’s Bavinck: A Critical Biography

Introduction

to the broader Reformed community through Louis Berkhof ’s Systematic Theology,14 which became a popular textbook in many seminaries. By contrast, Barth remained little-known in the United States until English translations of his works began to appear in the 1930s and thereafter his reception among evangelicals was shaped by Cornelius Van Til’s scathing critique.15 It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the first doctoral theses on Bavinck were written by the Dutch diaspora.16 The greatest impulse to Anglophone interest in Bavinck would, however, come some fifty years later in the form of the Dutch Reformed Translation Society’s publication of Bavinck’s magnum opus.17

14 15

16

17

(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020), which makes extensive use of Bavinck’s diaries and other archival material. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1932). Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1946). For the Dutch origins of Van Til’s antipathy toward Barth, see Harinck, “‘How Can an Elephant Understand a Whale and Vice Versa?’ The Dutch Origins of Cornelius Van Til’s Appraisal of Karl Barth,” in Bruce McCormack/Clifford Anderson (ed.), Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 13−41. Anthony A. Hoekema, “Herman Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant,” ThD thesis Princeton Theological Seminary (1953); Bastian Kruithof, “The Relation of Christianity and Culture in the Teaching of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (1953); Sarel Petrus van der Walt, Die wysbegeerte van dr. Herman Bavinck (Potchefstroom, 1953); Eugene Heideman, The Relationship of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959). Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics (4 vol.; Baker Academic: Grand Rapids, 2003−08). Prior to the completion of this project, only shorter works were available in English. The following list of publications available prior to the translation of Reformed Dogmatics is derived from the bibliography compiled by Willem de Wit. “Herman Bavinck Bibliography,” wjdw.nl (blog), February 19, 2013, https://wjdw.nl/2013/02/19/herman-bavinck-bibliography/ (accessed 30.11.2017). Bavinck, “The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition of Communities and Nations,” in Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World Holding the Presbyterian System, Proceedings of the Fifth General Council, Toronto 1892 (Toronto: Hart & Riddell, 1892), 48–55; “Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands,” The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 3:10 (1892), 211−12; “The Future of Calvinism,” Presbyterian and Reformed Review 5:1 (1894), 1–24; The Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures for 1908−09, Princeton Theological Seminary (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909); “Calvin and Common Grace,” in W.P. Armstrong (ed.), Calvin and the Reformation: Four Studies (New York: Revell, 1909), 99–130; “Christological Movements in the Nineteenth Century,” Bibliotheca Sacra 68 (1911), 381–404; “The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands,” Princeton Theological Review 8:3 (1911), 433–60; “The Virgin Birth of Our Lord,” Bible Magazine 1:1 (1913), 50–61; “Death,” and “Fall, The,” in James Orr (ed.), International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia (5 vol., Chicago: Howard-Severance, 1915), 2.811−13, 1092−94; Mental, Religious and Social Forces in the Netherlands: a general view of the Netherlands (Commercial Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce at The Hague, 1915); “Christ and Christianity,” Biblical Review 1:2

13

14

Introduction

The publication of Reformed Dogmatics kindled a global interest in Bavinck and has given rise to further translation projects in English and other languages.18 Major works by Bavinck have been translated into Arabic, Chinese, German, Indonesian, Portuguese, and Russian.19 This wider availability of Bavinck’s writings has in turn renewed scholarly interest in Bavinck. A string of doctoral theses has appeared in close succession,20 historical studies have

(1916), 214–36; The Sacrifice of Praise: Meditations before and after receiving access to the table of the Lord 2nd edn; (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1922); Our Reasonable Faith (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956); Biblical and Religious Psychology (Protestant Reformed Theological School: n.p., 1974); The Doctrine of God (Carlisle: Banner of Truth Trust, 1977); The Certainty of Faith (St. Catharines: Paideia, 1980); “Common Grace,” Calvin Theological Journal 24 (1989) 38–65; “Herman Bavinck on Scripture and Science,” Calvin Theological Journal 27:1 (1992), 91–5; “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 27:2 (1992), 220–51; “Christianity and the Natural Sciences,” in Jitse Van der Meer (ed.), Facets of Faith and Science (4 vol.; Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 47–52; The Last Things: Hope for This World and the Next (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996); In the Beginning: Foundations of Creation Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999); “Herman Bavinck on the Covenant of Works,” in Howard Griffith/J.R. Muether (ed.), Creator, Redeemer, Consummator: A Festschrift for Meredith G. Kline (Greenville,: Reformed Academic Press, 2000), 169–85. For the most exhaustive and up to date bibliography, see https://sources.neocalvinism.org/bavinck/ (accessed 15.6.2020). 18 Older English translations have been updated and reissued. Bavinck, The Sacrifice of Praise (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2019); Philosophy of Revelation (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2018). Other works have been translated into English for the first time. Bavinck, Christian Worldview (Wheaton: Crossway, 2019). 19 https://sources.neocalvinism.org/bavinck/?tp=other_lang; https://www.neocalvinism.org/ research-projects (accessed 12.12.19). 20 Brian Mattson, “Restored to our Destiny: Eschatology and the Image of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” PhD thesis University of Aberdeen (2008); Eglinton, “Trinity and Organism: towards a new reading of Herman Bavinck’s organic motif,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2010); Timothy Shaun Price, “Pedagogy as theological praxis: Martin Luther and Herman Bavinck as sources for engagement with classical education and the liberal arts tradition,” PhD thesis University of Aberdeen (2013); Wolter Huttinga, “Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the relation between God and the world,” PhD thesis Kampen Theological University (2014); Cory Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern: Herman Bavinck’s Appropriation of Schleiermacher,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2017); Nathanael Sutanto, “Organic Knowing: The Theological Epistemology of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2017); Bruce R. Pass, “The Heart of Dogmatics: The Place and Purpose of Christology in the Theological Method of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2018); Jessica Joustra, “Herman Bavinck and John Howard Yoder in Dialogue on the Imitation of Christ,” PhD dissertation Fuller Seminary (2019); Dmytro Bintsarovskyi, “God Hidden and Revealed: A Reformed and an Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” PhD thesis Kampen Theological University (2019); Ximian Xu, “Theology as the Wetenschap of God: Herman Bavinck’s Scientific Theology for the Modern World,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2020).

Introduction

begun to examine the reception of Bavinck in the twentieth century,21 and the potential use to which Bavinck’s thought might be put has increasingly come to the attention of contemporary theologians.22 As illumining as these more recent studies have proven to be, none of them has provided the kind of systematic account of Bavinck as a theologian, or better, an account of Bavinck as a systematic theologian, that Veenhof identified as lacking some fifty years ago. That is, what has not yet appeared is the kind of global reading of Bavinck comparable to Berkouwer’s Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth.23 This study attempts to make a preliminary contribution toward such an end by examining Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system. There is pressing need for an analysis of this element of Bavinck’s thought. Although Bavinck’s theological epistemology has received considerable attention,24 Bavinck’s concept of a theological system remains largely unexplored. Moreover, inattention to this has abetted the confusion that surrounds the question of what comprises the centre of his theology. While some readers dispute the presence of a centre,25 others identify the covenant of grace,26 salvation history,27 grace restoring

21 Ryan Glomsrud, “Karl Barth as Historical Theologian” in D. Strange/D. Gibson (ed.), Engaging with Barth (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008), 100−11; John Vissers, “Karl Barth’s Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 79−86; Ximian Xu, “Appreciative and Faithful? Karl Barth’s Use of Herman Bavinck’s View of God’s Incomprehensibility,” Journal of Reformed Theology 13 (2019), 26–46. 22 Carl Trueman, “Foreword,” in Engaging with Barth, 15; Michael Allen/Scott Swain, Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015); Òliver Crisp/Fred Sanders (ed.), The Task of Dogmatics: Explorations in Theological Method (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017): 27–8, 49–50, 61, 65, 68, 180, 203–07. 23 Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth trans. Harry Boer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956). 24 Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on Perception and Knowing God,” Harvard Theological Review 111:1 (2018), 115–34; Arvin Vos, “Knowledge according to Bavinck and Aquinas” part 1, The Bavinck Review 6 (2015), 9–36; Pass, “Herman Bavinck and the Problem of New Wine in Old Wineskins,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 17:4 (2015), 432–49; David Sytsma, “Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: The Argument and Sources of his Principia of Science,” in Bolt (ed.), Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology, (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2011), 1–49; K. Scott Oliphint, “Bavinck’s Realism, the Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010), 359−90; Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 229−300. 25 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 125; Brian Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology and the Image of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 49; Michael Allen, “Dogmatics as ascetics,” in The Task of Dogmatics, 204. 26 Anthony A. Hoekema, Herman Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant, (Clover: Full Bible Publications, 2007), 57, 198, 214. 27 Hielema, “Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 246, 286−8.

15

16

Introduction

nature,28 or the mystical union as the centre of Bavinck’s theology.29 Each of these proposals, however, disregards what Bavinck himself explicitly identifies as the centre of his system. A case could be me made that lack of clarity over the structure of Bavinck’s thought has fuelled the ongoing disagreement over the character of his material dogmatics. While some readers draw attention to Bavinck’s affinity with post-Enlightenment thought,30 others place heavy accent on premodern commitments.31 Still others acknowledge the presence of both modern and pre-modern idioms yet disagree over whether these “mutually allergenic”32 elements yield a conceptually disjointed result or form a coherent synthesis. Bavinck’s concept of a theological system sheds considerable light on the relation in which modernity stands to orthodoxy in his writings, as Bavinck’s conceptualisation of system is strongly influenced by a coterie of modern thinkers. This study seeks to take the necessary preliminary steps toward a systematic account of Bavinck’s thought by analysing Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system. It will be argued that Bavinck’s system is conceptualised in terms of a central dogma from which all other doctrines derive. Bavinck makes it clear on multiple occasions that this is the case. For example, in the opening chapter of Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck writes, “there is only one dogma, one that is rooted in Scripture and that has branched out and divided in a wide range of particular dogmas.”33 The difficulty, however, is that it is not easy to identify which dogma functions in this capacity. On the one hand, Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a derivative theological system is a strongly attenuated one. That is, Bavinck’s maintenance of Scripture as the formal principle does not allow much room for the material principle of his system to exercise a great deal of control. On the other hand, Bavinck is not consistent in his identification of which doctrine lies at the centre of his system. In order to resolve this difficulty, Bavinck needs to be read extensively, carefully, and charitably. Nevertheless, in spite of these complications, there is good reason to think that the doctrine that lies at the centre of Bavinck’s system is Christology. 28 Heideman, Revelation and Reason, 196; Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 355; Bolt, The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck (Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 155. 29 Gleason, “The Centrality of the Unio Mystica,” 4−46. 30 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 252−5. 31 For example, “Bavinck’s account of the way we come to know is ‘largely a reproduction of Aquinas’s account of sensible representation.’” Vos, “Knowledge according to Bavinck and Aquinas” part 1, 9. 32 Adam Eitel, “Trinity and History: Bavinck, Hegel, and Nineteenth-Century Doctrines of God,” in Five Studies, 101. 33 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.93.

Introduction

The christocentric character of Bavinck’s thought is widely acknowledged,34 yet precisely what it means to describe Bavinck as a christocentric theologian has never been explored in any detail.35 In part, this is perhaps to be attributed to the imprecision with which the descriptor “christocentric” is used and the intuition that this imprecision has become a hindrance to the term’s meaningful use. Christocentric, nevertheless, is an entirely appropriate descriptor for Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system. Yet what must be established is the relation in which Christology stands to the other loci and the degree to which these doctrines stand in a derivative relationship to Christology. To this end, this study will take the form of an extended exegesis of a programmatic statement that appears in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics. It might well be asked why this statement first appears in the third volume, if indeed it is programmatic. This is a question that we will consider in the course of our investigations, but at the outset we would suggest that the reason this statement does not appear until the third volume is that when Bavinck penned the Prolegomena, he simply had not yet arrived at a settled decision on the place Christology should occupy in his system. The reasons for this hypothesis will be presented in the course of our investigations, but let us first consider the content of this statement. In the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck writes, The doctrine of Christ is not the starting point (uitgangspunt), but it is indeed the centre (middelpunt) of the whole system of dogmatics. All other dogmas either prepare for it or are inferred from it. In it, as the heart of dogmatics, pulses the whole of the religious–ethical life of Christianity. It is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας (1 Tim 3:16). The whole of Christology has to proceed from here.36

With this statement, Bavinck articulates with remarkable precision not only which doctrine comprises the centre of his system but also how it functions 34 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 356; Hielema, “Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 11, 295; Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 268; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T & T Clark, 2012), 114−5, 171; Hans Burger, Being in Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed Perspective (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 89, 96; Gleason, “The Centrality of the Unio Mystica,” 98. 35 Marc Cortez, “What does it mean to call Karl Barth a ‘christocentric’ theologian?,” Scottish Journal of Theology 60:2, (2007), 1–17; Ronald J. Feenstra, “Creation and method: critical essays on Christocentric theology,” Calvin Theological Journal, 18:1 (1983), 231−2; Richard A. Muller, “A Note On ‘Christocentrism’ and the imprudent use of such terminology,” Westminster Theological Journal 68:2 (2006), 253−60. 36 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 4th edn; (4 vol.; Kampen: Kok, 1928), 3.254; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274.

17

18

Introduction

in this capacity. Taken individually, each phrase is a portmanteau. Taken as a whole, it comprises a dogmatics in outline. In attempting to understand what this statement means, we shall examine each clause in turn, exploring its conceptual origins and tracing out its implications for Bavinck’s system. The first chapter will take up the theme of the relationship between Christology and dogmatics, which is introduced by the phrase, “The doctrine of Christ is not the starting point, but it is indeed the midpoint of the whole system of dogmatics.” Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system will be examined first. This exploration leads directly to a significant aspect of Bavinck’s theology, which has received sustained attention in the recent literature, namely, the organism. The ubiquity and importance of the organism is well-documented,37 but its function as an organising principle has not been fully explored. As the organism is a recurring feature in Bavinck’s theology, considerable space will be given to examining the idealist background of the organism and the formal properties that it presupposes. An analysis of the distinction between the centre (middelpunt) and the starting point (uitgangspunt) of the system then follows. As will be argued, this distinction is indicative of a shift in Bavinck’s thinking as to which doctrine comprises the centre of his system and how it should function in that capacity. It will be argued that the position outlined in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics forms something of a mediating position, the methodological implications of which shall form the substance of much our subsequent reflection. The second chapter considers the relationship between Christology and religion which is illustrated in the next portion of the statement, “In it, as the heart of dogmatics, pulses the whole of the religious-ethical life of Christianity.” Although our principal interest is Bavinck’s use of the heart and lifeblood metaphor and the relation in which it places Christology to religion, it is first necessary to consider another concept that Bavinck elsewhere identifies as the lifeblood of dogmatics, namely, mystery. The concept of mystery not only clarifies what Bavinck means when he states that the whole of the religious-ethical life of Christianity “pulses” through Christology as the heart of dogmatics, but offers much grist for the mill with regard to the relationship between orthodoxy and modernity in Bavinck’s thought. Although this issue will be discussed more directly in the third chapter, our analysis of the heart and lifeblood metaphor illumines the peculiarities of Bavinck’s mode of dogmatic ressourcement. While Bavinck repeatedly has recourse to the organism to account for the various relations he seeks to suspend, this modern construct is put in service of an essentially pre-modern concept of religion. 37 See especially Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 250−69; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism; Sutanto, God and Knowledge: Herman Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

Introduction

In the third chapter, we will turn our attention to Bavinck’s material Christology. It is relevant to note that there are few very detailed analyses of this doctrine. Brian Mattson and Hans Burger offer chapter-length discussions of Bavinck’s Christology,38 but neither of these studies pursues what Bremmer rightly identified nearly sixty years ago as its distinguishing feature, namely, development.39 Particular attention shall be devoted to this theme, but our analysis of Bavinck’s material Christology will begin with the claim, “It is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας (1 Tim 3:16). The whole of Christology has to proceed from here.” Bavinck’s articulation of a christological starting point counts as one of the most important methodological statements in his entire oeuvre and holds implications for the coordination of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, the real and the ideal, and time and eternity. The implications of this statement will be traced through Bavinck’s account of the deity and humanity of Christ in order to prepare the way for a discussion of the relationship of orthodoxy and modernity in Bavinck’s thought. Some reflections will then be offered on the significance that Bavinck’s Christology holds for the so-called “Two-Bavincks” debate.40 38 Burger, Being in Christ, 87−139; Mattson, 157–201. Chul Won Suh also offers an apt summary. Chul Won Suh, The Creation-mediatorship of Jesus Christ: A Study in the Relation of the Incarnation and the Creation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982), 192−203. 39 R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 251. 40 The “Two-Bavincks hypothesis” refers to a general reading of Bavinck, which draws attention to apparently irreconcilable tensions in Bavinck’s thought and orientation toward the world. Accordingly, the orthodox, confessional Bavinck is perceived to be at odds with a more philosophically inclined alter-ego that became increasingly attracted to the impulses of modernity. David VanDrunen, “‘The Kingship of Christ is Twofold’: Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 162; Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 264—7; Henk Vroom, “Scripture Read and Interpreted: The Development of the Doctrine of Scripture and Hermeneutics in Gereformeerde Theology in the Netherlands,” Calvin Theological Journal 28:2 (1993), 363; Malcolm B. Yarnell, The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville: Boosey and Hawkes, 2007), 49–59; Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 108−11; Heideman, Revelation and Reason, 177–9; Valentijn Hepp, Dr Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1921), 317−18. Several recent studies have challenged this reading, emphasising the synthetic character of Bavinck’s thought. Cory Brock and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck’s Reformed eclecticism: On catholicity, consciousness and theological epistemology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 70:3 (2017), 310–32; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 38; Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 18; Van den Belt, Authority, 250; Harinck, “‘Something that must remain, if the truth is to be sweet and precious to us’: The Reformed Spirituality of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003), 250, 254. It is important to note when considering this question that disagreement over the relationship between orthodoxy and modernity in Bavinck has a long pedigree. During his own lifetime, Bavinck was embroiled in the controversy surrounding Jan Netelenbos’ doctrine of Scripture. Hittjo Kruswijk, Baas in eigen boek? Evolutietheorie en schriftgezag bij de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (1881−1981 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2011), 96−9. Shortly

19

20

Introduction

The fourth chapter turns to what is perhaps the most provocative element of Bavinck’s programmatic statement: “All other dogmas either prepare for [Christology] or are inferred from it.” In order to ascertain precisely what this means, we shall consider three doctrines which are said to derive from Christology, namely, bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Our concern here is not to offer a comprehensive account of these doctrines, but rather to establish the precise manner in which these doctrines are christologically determined. In the course of our analysis, the importance of the aforementioned distinction between midpoint and starting point will emerge more clearly into view. Christological derivation involves little more than christological exegesis in Bavinck’s material bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. However, the relation in which these doctrines are ordered one to another is governed by an overarching concept of continuous incarnation. Our principal concern here is whether this more metaphorical concept of incarnation threatens to displace Christology as the centre of Bavinck’s system. This in turn will lead us to consider whether the doctrine that stands at the centre of Bavinck’s system might not in fact be a highly psychologised yet christologically focused concept of revelation. The fifth chapter surveys the results of the preceding chapters before considering the potential that Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a christocentric system of doctrine might hold for contemporary projects of theological ressourcement. In so doing, we will draw on the writings of John Webster (1955−2016), whose critical appreciation of Bavinck marks him out as the ideal touchstone for assaying the merits of Bavinckian retrieval. While the kinship between these two thinkers can easily be demonstrated, it is not difficult to identify points at which Webster diverges from Bavinck. Specifically, there are pronounced differences in the way Webster and Bavinck move from Scripture to system. Following a detailed analysis of these differences in Webster and Bavinck’s respective conceptualisations of the theological task, we shall offer some reflections on how these differences might inform a project of Bavinckian retrieval and where Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a system of dogmatics may require revision. It is hoped that that the resultant portrait of Bavinck as a christocentric theologian will make a positive contribution to subsequent attempts to understand Bavinck as a systematic theologian. It is also hoped that this analysis will generate fresh approaches to Bavinck’s legacy both on the historical-analytical and the systematic-constructive domains. The aim of this study will be fulfilled, however, if it merely enhances the explanatory power or clarifies the results of after his death, opposing sides laid claim to Bavinck in support of their differing views of the inspiration of Scripture at the 1926 synod of Assen. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 379. A similar disagreement raged in Dutch-speaking circles in the early 1980s as to whether Bavinck was a fundamentalist. Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 168.

Introduction

extant studies. Given that significant areas of Bavinck’s thought remain largely unresearched,41 the results of this study might be fruitfully used to discern the structure of Bavinck’s thought in other theological subdisciplines. The longawaited publication of Gereformeerde ethiek, for example, opens up a significant area of Bavinck’s thought for which his christocentric conceptualisation of a system of doctrine holds special relevance. If indeed, if in dogmatics God descends to us and in ethics we ascend to God, it could be anticipated that Christology functions not only as the centre of Bavinck’s dogmatics but also of his ethics.42 Toward this goal, let us consider what Bavinck means when he asserts that Christology is not only the centre but also the heart of dogmatics.

41 Bavinck’s parliamentary speeches, for example, are highly significant for an understanding of his approach to social ethics. Handelingen der Staten-Generaal: Eerste Kamer (1919–1920) March 5 pp. 571–4; (1918–1919) March 13 pp. 243–6; (1917–1918) April 11 pp. 311–13, April 15 pp. 363–4, July 19 pp. 755–7, 765–6; (1916–1917) April 25, pp. 496–8, May 15 pp. 618–24; (1915–1916) April 27 p. 416, May 26 p. 434; (1914–1915) December 29 p. 105, January 29 p. 147, June 10 pp. 312–13, June 10 pp. 324–8, June 11 pp. 338–9; (1913–1914) January 7 pp. 119–22, March 20 pp. 484–5, March 21 p. 499; (1912–1913) March 12 pp. 432–4; (1911–1912) December 29 pp. 126–8, April 25 pp. 495–7. 42 Bavinck, Gereformeerde ethiek (Utrecht: Uitgeverij KokBoekencentrum, 2019), 47; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Ethics vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 22.

21

Christology and dogmatics Introduction The question of what one was actually writing was unquestionably the most pressing question facing anyone bold enough to compose a multi−volume dogmatics in the twilight of the nineteenth century. Christian thought lay in a Grundlagenkrise. The critical theory of Immanuel Kant had wrought a seemingly irreparable separation of faith and knowledge, the unity of which formed the basis of the conception of theology as scientia Dei, and attempts to bridge this ever-widening gulf were stymied by developments in historiography and the natural sciences.1 For Herman Bavinck, a recent graduate of the University of Leiden and pastor of a Christelijke gereformeerde congregation in Franeker, the outlook for the discipline was bleak. In an article written in 1881, Bavinck would write, The discipline of theology at the moment presents a motley and confused scenario to its practitioners. The figure it cuts in the sphere of the sciences is in many respects pathetic. The impression it gives to the uninitiated is hardly flattering. It is the oldest of the sciences, but it appears the youngest and least practised. One knows so little of whichever and whatever it might be. Concerning its essence and object, principle and method, the most divergent opinions prevail and if one considers any one subject from its sphere, one encounters the same disarray. This is most clearly to be seen in dogmatics. Up to the present day there is still no agreement on the name it should be given, the subject matter with which it deals, the source from which it draws, the standard by which everything should be tested, or the method according to which it should appropriate its subject matter, and it does not look as if it will arrive at the desired unanimity anytime soon.2

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that when Bavinck embarked on writing his own contribution to this genre, he would devote an entire volume to answering methodological questions. Matters of Prolegomena are accorded expansive treatment in Reformed Dogmatics, so expansive perhaps, that the dense argumentation at times occludes its most salient feature. Reformed Dogmatics is a dogmatics that correlates theology to the other sciences and takes pains not to overlook the challenges they pose. It is also a church dogmatics, a dogmatics written for the church and one 1 In the Netherlands, the crisis was particularly acute. Chantepie de la Saussaye, De crisis: kerkelijke tijdvragen (Rotterdam: Wenk, 1868); Allard Pierson, “Ter uitvaart,” De Gids 40 (1876), 185−249. 2 Bavinck, “Gereformeerde Theologie” De Vrije Kerk 7:11 (1881), 497.

24

Christology and dogmatics

which draws heavily on its tradition. Yet pre-eminently, Reformed Dogmatics is a christocentric dogmatics. Its four volumes are conceptualised as a system within which Christology functions as its centre. Reformed Dogmatics, however, was neither Bavinck’s first nor last word on the concept of a theological system. It is certainly the great landmark in Bavinck’s oeuvre, but methodological convictions are more clearly articulated in a number of publications which predate the appearance of the first volume in 1895. Moreover, the place and purpose of Christology was a subject that would continue to occupy Bavinck well after the publication of the final volume of Reformed Dogmatics in 1901. In this first chapter we will trace the development of Bavinck’s concept of dogmatics as a scientific system of the knowledge of God. In so doing, we will encounter an important philosophical construct, namely, the organism. The importance of the organism is difficult to overestimate not only because Bavinck repeatedly has recourse to the organism in the formulation of individual doctrines, but also because the organism yields the formal properties which determine the basic structure of Bavinck’s system. The most important of these is the concept of a fundamental principle, which, when applied to dogmatics as a scientific system, is synonymous with the concept of central dogma. Bavinck’s affirmation of the notion of central dogma remains stable across his theological writings. However, his convictions concerning which doctrine should comprise the central dogma of a theological system did not. In Bavinck’s earlier writings the knowledge of God is said to form the central dogma of his theological system. His later writings, however, plainly indicate that Christology fulfils this role. Yet articulating precisely how Christology functions in this capacity would prove an elusive goal. Bavinck’s later writings especially deliver an intriguing portrait of a Reformed theologian, who was convinced that the solution to the Grundlagenkrise of the nineteenth century lay in Christology, yet was never quite able to articulate the precise form this solution should take. Dogmatics as a scientific system Although perhaps less familiar today, the term dogmatics was common currency at the end of the nineteenth century. In Bavinck’s usage, dogmatics denotes a very specific sub-discipline within theological encyclopaedia. While apologetics, symbolics, and ethics all find their place within Bavinck’s concept of the broader field, dogmatics distinguishes itself from these other sub-disciplines both materially and formally. For Bavinck, dogmatics is, and can only exist as, the scientific system of the knowledge of God and all things in relation to

Dogmatics as a scientific system

God.3 With this pithy definition, Bavinck identifies the definitive characteristics of dogmatics. Materially, dogmatics is the knowledge of God; formally, it is a system. What Bavinck understands under these terms, however, warrants closer scrutiny. That dogmatics is the knowledge of God does not necessarily dispute the characterisation of theology as sapientia, but rather stakes a double claim over and against the Kantian assertion that it is necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.4 In describing dogmatics as the knowledge of God, Bavinck seeks to affirm that God is not merely an object of faith but also an object of knowledge. The further qualifier, “scientific” (wetenschappelijk), indicates the specific type of knowledge that dogmatics exemplifies. The qualifier scientific distinguishes lower, empirical knowledge from the higher, rational knowledge that is constructed from sense data, perceptions, and representations.5 Bavinck writes, In every area there is a difference between ordinary, everyday, empirical knowing and true, advanced, scientific knowledge. Every human has some empirical knowledge of the sun, moon and stars, but this knowledge is a million miles removed from the scientific knowledge of the astronomer. The former only knows the facta; the latter the rationes.6

3 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics 1.38; cf. Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1.13; De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 30. 4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 117. 5 Bavinck classifies mental acts according to their higher and lower functions. The lower function embraces sensation (gewaarwording) and perception (waarneming). The difference between these mental acts is the difference between hearing and listening. It would, for example, comprise the difference between hearing millions of droplets of water and listening to the ocean. The former act is passive, whereas the latter is active. Perception yields representations and empirical apperception, thus bringing the subject into relation with the causes of phenomena. The higher function of the mind Bavinck describes as thought (gedachte). The difference between perception and thought lies in the difference between representation (voorstelling) and concept (begrip), or else the difference between sensible intuition/observation and understanding (kennis). Thought can be subdivided into the acts of understanding (verstand) and reason (rede/weten), and knowledge (kennis) and concept (begrip). Whereas reason consists in discursive thought, understanding is the possession of knowledge. A similar contrast is in view between knowledge and concept. A crucial element of Bavinck’s taxonomy is that kennis stands both above and below reason. Kennis can refer either to the possession of knowledge that is pre-cognitive or post−cognitive. Therefore, there are three ways in which the subject might acquire kennis: faith, reason, and intuition (aanschouwing). Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie (Kampen: Kok, 1923), 88−129. These distinctions are crucial for an understanding of the relationship in which faith is placed to reason. We shall return to these in chapter two in our exploration of Bavinck’s concept of religion. 6 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.615.

25

26

Christology and dogmatics

The knowledge that is specific to dogmatics concerns the rationes of the facta disclosed in divine revelation. While Bavinck places qualifications on the sense in which faith can be said to constitute facta and dogmatics rationes,7 the factarationes distinction plays an important role in Bavinck’s defence of dogmatics as a genuine discipline of scholarly enquiry.8 Somewhat provocatively, Bavinck argues that dogmatics is no less wissenschaftlich for its reliance on a standpoint of faith.9 Rather, the faith requisite to theology is ‘so far from being inimical to human nature and the demands of science that without it there cannot be normal people and a normal science.’10 As a science, therefore, dogmatics stands on a methodologically even footing with the other scholarly disciplines. If the knowledge of God defines dogmatics materially, the defining formal quality of dogmatics is system. In part system is a derivative feature of the scientific character of dogmatics. “System,” Bavinck writes, “is the supreme desideratum in all science.”11 In an address delivered to pastors in Utrecht on

7 For example, Bavinck does not mean that Scripture is a storehouse of facts. “Much more mistaken, however, is the comparison of the New Testament with nature as if both only supply facts and no theory. For though this may be true of nature, it is absolutely not applicable to the New Testament. Holy Scripture does not relate to us the bare fact of the death of Christ in order then to base the interpretation and appraisal of it to everyone’s own taste but from all angles puts that fact in the light of the Word.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.382. This lies at the heart of Bavinck’s criticisms of the methodology of Charles Hodge. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.93−4. Paul Helm has argued that Bavinck’s criticisms of Hodge fall somewhat wide of the mark. Paul Helm, Faith, Form, and Fashion: Classical Reformed Theology and Its Postmodern Critics (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2014), 184−9. Helm raises many valid points but overlooks the way in which Bavinck’s “organic” or “synthetic-genetic” method bears reference to the notion of fundamental principle or central dogma. There is, therefore, a substantive difference between Hodge and Bavinck. The similarities notwithstanding, the main difference between Hodge’s “empirical” and Bavinck’s “organic” method consists in Bavinck’s use of the concept of central dogma. 8 “[Theology] is content with an unscientific reputation and is not ashamed of the cross of Christ but it shall not let itself be expelled from the sphere of the sciences and from the universities without very earnest and reasoned protest.” Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid (Wageningen: Vada, 1902), 50−1. It is important to note that the Dutch term “science” (wetenschap) does not refer exclusively to the natural sciences but to any discipline of scholarly enquiry. As such, it is commensurate with the German term Wissenschaft. 9 “All research proceeds tacitly from the aboriginal convictions of faith, that perception through our senses is reliable, that the world outside of us exists objectively, that the laws of thought lead us to the truth, that there is agreement between thinking and being, between subject and object, between mind and matter.” Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 36. Bavinck’s acknowledgment of common notions is not, however, reducible to common sense realism. Cf. Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid,” 115–34. 10 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.568. 11 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.618.

Dogmatics as a scientific system

16th –17th August 1881, “The For and Against of a Dogmatic System,”12 Bavinck commends the notion of system, largely by arguing that system is a dimension of creaturely existence. Bavinck writes, Everything that exists is systematic. The entire cosmos was created and arranged according to a fixed plan. It is not an aggregate of materials and forces that were accidentally merged. If it were, it would not constitute a cosmos, a unity. But all things are oriented toward each other, exist together in an unbreakable connection, together constitute a system, an organism.13

The collocation of the words “system” and “organism” is highly significant. Bavinck characterises the dogmatic system as an organism in order to defend system from the charge that system renders theology cold and lifeless.14 Bavinck’s point is that when a system is conceived as an organism, it lays out no procrustean bed for Christian doctrine. Rather, system is the most suitable, even natural, mode of ordering the church’s dogmas.15 The reason for this is that such a notion of system derives its origin from God’s own being. Bavinck writes, Our God himself provides us with an even infinitely higher and richer and more glorious system, to behold and admire, he who is one in essence, in three persons, in whom the one identically complete essence dwells hypostatically in a threefold manner. He, the Triune One, shows us in himself the entirely perfect system: origin, type, model, and image of all other systems.16

Organism thus provides Bavinck with a way of grounding the unity in diversity of a dogmatic system in the doctrine of the Trinity. James Eglinton has 12 Bavinck, “Het voor en het tegen van een dogmatisch system,” De Vrije Kerk 7:10 (1881), 449–64; cf. Bavinck, “The Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System,” The Bavinck Review 5 (2014), 90−103. 13 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 90. 14 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 90, 96. It is noteworthy that Abraham Kuyper, in his Encyclopaedie der heilige godgeleerdheid, similarly characterises both wetenschap in general and theology in particular as an organism. Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der heilige godgeleerdheid tweede herziene druk (Kampen: Kok, 1909), 2.638, 640. It would appear, however, that the two thinkers arrived at their conclusions independently. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 38; Van den Belt, Authority, 249. 15 The “church’s dogmas do not stand disconnected alongside one another, but they must be contained within one another … together they constitute an unbreakable whole, an organic unity, a true and complete system.” Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 95. It is noteworthy that, in Bavinck, “dogma” has both a broader and a narrower meaning. Dogmas can be articles of faith as well as wetenschappelijk or “scientific” formulations of those articles. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.33−4. 16 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 92.

27

28

Christology and dogmatics

documented this aspect of the organic motif in some detail.17 The organism, however, implies considerably more than unity in diversity. The organism in Bavinck reflects a suite of formal properties that mirrors the concept of the organism developed by the first generation of post-Kantian idealists.18 This conceptual pedigree, however, has been contested in the more recent secondary literature and because of this, a great deal of the organism’s explanatory power has been overlooked. Mattson and Eglinton, for example, have argued that the Bavinckian organism has little to do with German idealism.19 The origins of Bavinck’s organicism warrant clarification,20 as Bavinck’s reduplication of the formal properties of the idealist concept of the organism forms the basic structure, not only of his concept of a dogmatic system, but also of many of its doctrines.21 In his early Naturphilosophie, Schelling defines the organism as an entity that is both self-generating and self-organizing.22 In so doing, Schelling draws upon Kant’s account of natural purpose (Naturzweck) in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.23 The decisive difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas Kant restricts the concept of natural purpose to the status of a regulative principle,24 Schelling employs it constitutively. That is, whereas in Kant natural purpose functions as a transcendental postulate, in Schelling natural purpose forms an inherent feature of reality. Schelling’s concept of organism, therefore, attempts to bridge the Kantian gulf between the real and the ideal.25 As we shall see, the dynamism of Schelling’s concept of natural purpose is worthy of special 17 See Eglinton, Trinity and Organism. 18 This conceptual pedigree has been noted in earlier studies. Cf. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 267. Veenhof ’s remarks concerning the connections between Bavinck, Schelling, and the heilsgeschichtliche Schule are instructive. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 261. 19 Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 47−54; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 58, 65, 78. 20 Sutanto’s analysis rightly draws attention to the teleological character of the organism but overlooks several of these formal properties. Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 18−22. 21 In identifying Frühromantik with idealism, I follow the argumentation of Frederick Beiser’s “Romanticism and Idealism” 30−46 in Nalia Dassar (ed.), The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Beiser’s identification of romanticism with idealism is also amenable to Bavinck’s reception of these thinkers. Cf. Bavinck’s remarks concerning “absolute idealism.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.215, 223−4, 517. 22 Friedrich W. J. von Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature as introduction to the study of this science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 35−6. 23 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 244−7. 24 For the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 297−8. 25 Bruce Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 7−20.

Dogmatics as a scientific system

attention. As a dimension of reality, natural purpose is conceived of as a ‘free play’ of living forces.26 In Von der Weltseele Schelling would slightly modify this concept such that living force became not merely the principle of the organic, but also an explanation of the correspondence of mechanism and teleology.27 Schelling’s organicism, therefore, represents a subtle yet significant modification of a vitalist conception of reality.28 Schelling’s organicism proceeded hand in hand with his philosophy of identity, whereby subject and object share common origins in the absolute. While Bavinck repudiates this aspect of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,29 he reduplicates the formal properties of the organism. Without drawing out the specific correspondence between Bavinck and Schelling’s concept of the organism, Jan Veenhof has drawn attention to its cardinal features. From his reading of Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, Veenhof identifies four relations that characterise the Bavinckian organism, namely, unity in diversity, the priority of the whole over the parts, the governing and vivifying role of the idea, and the organism’s teleological orientation.30 These are characteristics of Schelling’s concept of the organism. Veenhof, nevertheless, overlooks one feature, which, as we shall see in the following chapters, plays a crucial role in Bavinck’s structuring of individual doctrines. The congruency of mechanical and teleological explanation is an important feature of the organism, which allows both Schelling and Bavinck to apply differing modes of analysis to the self-same entity. Thus, while Veenhof ’s summary is accurate, it can be profitably augmented and reordered in order to bring out more clearly the points at which Bavinck’s concept of the organism corresponds to that of Schelling. First, as we have seen, the organism indicates a relationship of unity in diversity,31 according to which the whole is prior to the parts.32 The unity of the organism, however, extends beyond the relation of the whole to the parts. Just as Schelling had recourse to the organism in order to account for the 26 Beiser, Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36−7. 27 Schelling, Historisch−kritische Ausgabe (3 vol. in 33 pts; Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976−), I.6.254. 28 Thus, mechanical explanation is not rejected out of hand. Mechanical explanation forms a necessary yet insufficient explanation of reality. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 137−141; Lara Ostaric, “The Concept of Life in Early Schelling,” in Lara Ostaric (ed.), Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 48−70. 29 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.252, 292. 30 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 264. 31 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Bos, 1904), 50. 32 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 51.

29

30

Christology and dogmatics

correspondence of the real and the ideal, the Bavinckian organism similarly accounts for the correspondence of the real and the ideal. Bavinck writes, “the world is an organism and was conceived as such. Only then does philosophy and worldview possess the right to and the basis of existence, when from this summit of knowledge subject and object agree, when our rationality corresponds to the principia of all being and knowing.”33 The organism is thus indicative of an epistemological-metaphysical unity. A further dimension of this unity comes to expression in Bavinck’s account of the God-world relation. This comes out very clearly in a passage in which Bavinck discusses the divine counsel. The world-idea is one organic whole. Physis and ethos are most closely interconnected and interpenetrate each other at all times. There is most certainly a distinction, but nowhere is there separation. There is no identifiable point in creation where God’s counsel and governance ends and the independent will and action of the creature begins. Especially in this century the historic and organic view of things has driven out and condemned this Pelagian split at every point. This dualism, furthermore, would deprive the largest and most important part of the world from God’s counsel and place it in the hands of chance and caprice. Indeed, not only God’s counsel and will but the world would in large part be withdrawn even from his knowledge.34

The distinction between the real and the ideal is closely related to the Godworld relation, but it is not identical with it. The divine cannot be reduced to a function of creaturely consciousness. The organism, however, can also be used to overcome the theological dualism which follows from Kant’s critique. Just as the real and the ideal correspond organically, the God-world relation similarly constitutes an organism. Second, Bavinck traces the ground of this unity to a constitutive principle,35 which is manifest in living force (levenskracht). Thus, just as in Schelling the unity of the organism is attributed to living force, the unity of the Bavinckian organism is similarly attributed to living force. Bavinck writes, As soon as we come into contact with an organism, we see at work a force, a principle, a vis vitalis or whatever people may term it, which, rather than being explicable by physical and chemical laws, instead governs them, stands above them, not destroying and suspending them in any way, but putting them in service and directing them. That mysterious, hidden power is exactly what comprises the organic, and is the constitutive and supportive principle of the organic.36

33 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 27. 34 Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 2.338; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.376. 35 “It is the idea that animates and governs the diverse parts of the organism.” Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 44. 36 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 91.

Dogmatics as a scientific system

Moreover, it is the living force of the organism that grounds its developmental character. In common with Schelling, the Bavinckian organism is an entity whose purposed end is not realised until the conclusion of a process of growth and development. Thus, in the same way that Schelling’s organism develops, the Bavinckian organism also develops.37 Third, organism is indicative of the correspondence of mechanical and teleological explanation. Just as for Schelling organic reality admits both mechanical and teleological description, the Bavinckian organism similarly presupposes the compatibility of mechanical and teleological description. Bavinck writes, Viewed from the highest standpoint, all the world is an organic whole, borne by a single thought, led by a single will, and intended for a single purpose; it is an ὄργανον, that is at the same time a μηχανή and a μηχανή, which at the same time is an ὄργανον; a building, that grows and a body that is built; a work of art by the greatest artist and by the greatest architect of the universe.38

Thus, for both Schelling and Bavinck, mechanism and teleology form two complementary descriptions of the self-same entity. Bavinck’s concept of the organism thus mirrors the formal properties of the organism as it was developed by the first generation of post-Kantian idealists.39 As we shall see in the course of our broader enquiry, this suite of formal properties becomes increasingly important for the structure of individual doctrines. Yet with respect to Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system, two of these relations assume heightened significance, namely, development and the constitutive principle. While both of these features warrant further comment, the latter feature in particular will lead us toward the place and purpose of Christology within Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system. In The Science of Holy Theology, a speech delivered in 1883 on the occasion of his induction as professor at the Theological School in Kampen, Bavinck draws 37 Cf. Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 52. 38 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 59−60. 39 The idealist origins of Bavinck’s organicism are also borne out by his sources, which are indicative of an indirect derivation of these ideas from Schelling. In Christelijke wereldbeschouwing Bavinck cites numerous passages from the Logische Untersuchungen of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802—72). Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 27, 44, 59−60; Friedrich Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (2 vol.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1862), 1.5, 6; 2.17, 19, 29, 30, 79 ff., 124 ff., 461. The significance of these references to the Logische Untersuchungen is that Schelling is the ultimate source of Trendelenburg’s knowledge of the organic worldview. Beiser, Late German Idealism, 32−3. Bavinck also cites Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart by Rudolf Eucken (1846−1926) for the meaning of “organic.” This work traces the organic worldview directly to Schelling. Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 42 n. 52; Rudolf Eucken, Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart (Leipzig: Veit, 1904), 135−6.

31

32

Christology and dogmatics

attention to the importance of development for the portrayal of dogmatics as an organism. Bavinck writes, “theological science shows itself therein to be an organism, that gradually grows and thus develops naturally.”40 Development is a prominent theme in Bavinck yet it is important to distinguish what Bavinck understands under the notion of development. Bavinck rejects Hegelian notions of development, which in Bavinck’s view render the truth unattainable.41 Bavinck also repudiates monist concepts of development, such as that of Ernst Haeckel (1834−1919).42 For Bavinck, development is neither an endless process of becoming nor a dimension of materialist necessity, but rather a realisation of the organism’s teleology. More specifically, development in Bavinck is a function of eschatology. For Bavinck, dogmatics only fully emerges when the assimilation of the whole of revelation, the transmission of the knowledge of God from Christ to the church, is brought to completion in the coming age.43 Dogmatics is not the work of a single theologian, or even of a particular church or school but rather, a work of the entire church throughout the ages.44 Thus, “Christian Dogmatics does not yet exist.”45 As indicated above, the development of the organism arises from the organism’s constitutive principle, its living force. The living force of the dogmatic organism is the Holy Spirit. Bavinck writes, “The theology of the church of all ages is no rudis indigestaque moles of opinions and concepts, no labyrinth of errors, but one self-developing and continually self-unfolding whole, strictly

40 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid (Kampen: Zalsman, 1883), 22. One of Bavinck’s trenchant criticisms of Reformed Orthodoxy is the failure on the part of its leading exponents to recognise the necessity of ongoing doctrinal development. Bavinck, “Theology and Religious Studies,” in John Bolt (ed.) Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 50. 41 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.32. 42 Bavinck’s primary objection to Haeckel’s concept of development is its denial of first and final causes. Bavinck, “Creation or Development,” The Methodist Review 83 (1901), 853. Bavinck offers a detailed critique of Darwinism in Reformed Dogmatics, 2.516—20. Bavinck’s attitude toward evolutionary theory, however, may have softened with time. Cf. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith: A Survey of Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 164, 174; Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 50−2; The Philosophy of Revelation, 9−13. The reader who is interested in pursuing these themes should note that care needs to be taken with the English translation of this work. Ontwikkeling is translated as “evolution” rather than “development.” Bavinck will often use the term evolutieleer to distinguish evolutionary theory from the type of teleological development he could otherwise affirm. 43 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.588. 44 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.85, 116. 45 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 94. Or put differently, “absolute theology cannot be identified anywhere on earth. Rather, it must go through the various more or less pure theological developments toward its eventual realisation.” Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 59.

Dogmatics as a scientific system

methodically and architectonically brought to completion by the Holy Spirit.”46 The Holy Spirit, as the living force of the dogmatic organism, leads the Church toward the completion of its dogmatic labours.47 The church is led by the Holy Spirit in such a way that it gradually absorbs this content into its consciousness and reproduces it in its own language. The interpretation, formulation, and systematisation of divine revelation therefore, advances slowly and not without much aberration to the right and to the left. But it does go forward. The Holy Spirit’s leading is the guarantee that it will; he does not rest until he has caused the fullness of Christ − which includes the fullness of his truth and wisdom − to dwell in his church and has filled that church with all the fullness of God (Eph 3:19).48

Wherever the Church fails to discern the Spirit’s witness, it curtails the natural (normaal) development of the organism. Interestingly, it is at this point that system becomes a liability. Bavinck writes, “By misunderstanding the continuing testimony of the Holy Spirit and thus the progressive character that dogmatics must have, the system becomes barren, lifeless, deadly, and destructive, a petrifaction, making those who advocate it either in theory or in practice to be petty, narrow-minded, and parochial.”49 Bavinck, therefore, flatly rejects the notion of theologia perennis.50 Theology is not something that lies in the past, but in the future. This premium Bavinck places on development, however, raises a very difficult methodological question. How can the Church distinguish between natural growth and heterodoxy? Like the coxswain, the dogmatician is to discern the future path from the path travelled. The church’s confessions, as witnesses to the Holy Spirit’s past guidance, occupy a significant place in the church’s discernment of the natural development of dogmatics. The church’s confessions function as boundary markers, which dogmaticians ignore at their peril.51 Nevertheless, the boundary 46 47 48 49 50

Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 46. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.599. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.120. Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 99. “In spite of much good that can be observed in our own nation and also in England, Scotland, and America, the Reformed faith has also experienced a lack of progress and even deformation … To cherish the ancient simply because it is ancient is neither Reformed nor Christian. A work of dogmatic theology should not simply describe what was true and valid but what abides as true and valid. It is rooted in the past but labours for the future.” Bavinck, “Foreword to the First Edition (Volume 1) of the Gereformeerde dogmatiek,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 10. 51 “Fixed paths are given in each part of theological science, from which we cannot deviate without injury either to ourselves or our scholarship.” Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 46−7. The conservative impulse in Bavinck should not, however, be mistaken for conservatism. Bavinck was, in many respects, a more progressive thinker than Kuyper. Cf.

33

34

Christology and dogmatics

markers are not absolute.52 As with all of the church’s dogmatic labours,53 the church’s confessions remain provisional articulations of the truth.54 However, the primary means by which the church is to discern the natural development of doctrine is not the church’s confession but the fundamental principle of the material source of dogmatics. It is here that we see a particularly fascinating example of the way Bavinck melds the idealist construct of the organism with trinitarian theology. In The Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck notes in passing the controversy among neovitalists over whether the cause of life is to be sought in the organism’s living force, or rather in an idea or form that governs the organism.55 Bavinck apparently sought to resolve the dilemma theologically, by applying the trinitarian structure of his principia to the conceptualisation of the dogmatic system as an organism. As has been well-documented,56 Bavinck expands the Reformed Orthodox distinction between the principium essendi and principium cognoscendi of theology to include an internal and external epistemological

52

53

54

55 56

Arie Theodorus van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University in Amsterdam, 1880−2005 a Commemorative History (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 96. For example, in 1920, the year before Bavinck’s death, Bavinck would forward a report to the synod of his denomination identifying articles of the Belgic Confession that required revision. Among the articles identified was the inspiration of Scripture. Bavinck, “Rapport inzake de voorstellen der particuliere synodes rakende de belijdenis,” in Gereformeerde Kerken Nederland Generale Synode, Acta der generale synode van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland: Gehouden te Leeuwarden van 24 augustus – 9 september 1920 (Kampen: Kok, 1920), 154. Thus, the confessions “do not impede a growth in knowledge but keep it in the right course of development.” Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 119. “[Dogmatics is] a scientific exposition of religious truth, an enarratio verbi Dei, a laying out of the thesauri Sacrae Scripturae, a παράδοσις εἰς τύπον διδαχῆς (Rom 6:17), so that in it we possess a form and image of the doctrina coelestis. Dogmatics is thus not itself the Word of God. Dogmatics is never more than a faint image and a weak likeness of the Word of God; it is a fallible human attempt, in one’s own independent way, to think and say after God what he in many and various ways spoke of old by the prophets and in these last days has spoken to us by the Son.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.32; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.55. Bavinck also draws on the distinction between dogma quoad se and dogma quoad nos to affirm the provisionality of dogmatics. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.30. Bavinck cites Josef Kleutgen (1811−83) for this Latin technical term. The citation, however, appears to be mistaken. Josef Kleutgen, Die Theologie der Vorzeit (Münster: Theissing, 1867−74), 1.97. Kleutgen does not use the phrase directly in the passage Bavinck cites. Kleutgen replicates the German equivalent “Lehre (für uns)” on p. 106. The terms do, nevertheless, appear elsewhere in Kleutgen’s writings. Cf. Kleutgen, Beilagen zu den Werken über die Theologie und Philosophie der Vorzeit (Münster, Theissing, 1868), 2.58, 61, 961. In any case, the terms were common currency in contemporary Roman Catholic dogmatics. Cf. Friedrich Brenner, Katholische Dogmatik (Frankfurt am Main: Wesche, 1826), 1.540. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 94. See above, p. 15 n. 24.

Dogmatics as a scientific system

foundation. This tripartite division not only makes space for Bavinck to address the subject-object dichotomy within his theological methodology, but also allows Bavinck to offer a more trinitarian account of the ontological and epistemological foundations of dogmatics. Thus, God the Father is the principium essendi, God the Son is the principium cognoscendi externum and God the Holy Spirit is the principium cognoscendi internum of theology.57 Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a dogmatic system as an organism, it would seem, tracks this structure. Bavinck identifies the living force of the organism with the Holy Spirit and the fundamental principle of the organism with the principle that governs Scripture. Hence, in order to discern the natural growth of the organism the dogmatician attends to the guidance of the Holy Spirit by discerning the fundamental principle of Scripture. Hence, “We have naught else to do than to uncover the life−system itself, the fundamental thought, to detect the organizing principle, and to replicate it in concepts.”58 Bavinck writes, The only true principle of the dogmatic system is the one that appoints to every single truth its unique place within the organic whole … and in that manner unfolds organically on all sides in the multiplicity of truths in order again to be brought together organically into the truth itself. Seeking that principle, and from it to draw forth the entire edifice of the truths of dogmatics, is the postulate of the science of theology.59

The dogmatic organism, therefore, is governed by a fundamental principle, which arises from dogmatics’ material source.60 Bavinck’s concept of fundamental principle bears semblance to that of material principle outlined by Alexander Schweizer (1808−88) in his influential Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche.61 The influence 57 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.213−4. It is important to note that the internal foundation of knowing is strictly formal. That is, there is no internal material source. In Bavinck, Scripture functions as the sole material source (principium unicum) of theology. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.506, 86. 58 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 39. Compare the very similar comments in Reformed Dogmatics, 1.618. 59 Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 96. Cf. Bavinck’s summary of the relationship between the Holy Spirit, the church, and Scripture in Reformed Dogmatics, 1.85−6. 60 Bavinck’s conceptualisation of the dogmatic system as an organism would seem to draw considerable inspiration from Ludwig Schöberlein (1813−81), whose Das Princip und System der Dogmatik Bavinck cites. Bavinck, “Pros and Cons,” 96 n. 2; Reformed Dogmatics, 1.86 n. 40. Organism, fundamental principle, and system appear frequently in close juxtaposition in Schöberlein. Schöberlein, Das Princip und System der Dogmatik: Einleitung in die Christliche Glaubenslehre (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1881), 6−8. 61 Alexander Schweizer, Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche 2 Bände (Zürich: Orell-Fuessli, 1854−6), 1.16. For Schweizer’s identification of predestination as the central dogma of Reformed Protestantism, see Die protestantische

35

36

Christology and dogmatics

of Schweizer is particularly apparent in Bavinck’s recount of the history of Reformed dogmatics.62 There, Bavinck speaks positively of the new approach in historical theology that utilised the concept of a fundamental principle.63 It is this notion of a fundamental principle or central dogma that Bavinck appropriates for the structuring of his dogmatic system.64 The question is, what comprises the central dogma that governs Bavinck’s dogmatic system? It is here Centraldogmen, 1.152, 174. Bavinck cites this work at the beginning of this section as a general source and then several times in his narrative of the development of Reformed theology. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.150; Reformed Dogmatics, 1.181, 187, 190 and notes. This derivation will be less clear to readers of the English translation, as the list of sources that appears at the beginning of each chapter in the Dutch original is not replicated in Reformed Dogmatics. 62 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.176−204. In Bavinck, however, central dogma and material principle stand in considerably closer relation than they do in Schweizer. For Schweizer the source of Reformed theology is not Scripture but Gefühl. Cf. Bruce McCormack, “The Sum of the Gospel: The Doctrine of Election in the Theologies of Alexander Schweizer and Karl Barth,” in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 44, citing Alexander Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt, (2 vol.; Zürich: Orell-Füssli, 1844−7), 1.43. In Schweizer, therefore, the material principle is not a dogma, even though dogmas account for what arises from the material principle. The distinction between material and formal principles was commonplace in the nineteenth century. The pairing, however, is potentially confusing, as it does not reflect the Aristotelian distinctions of causality. Somewhat counterintuitively, material principle bears reference to the governing idea and formal principle bears reference to the material source of dogmatics. Bruce McCormack notes that Albrecht Ritschl traced the pairing to August Twesten (1789−1876), Schleiermacher’s successor in Berlin. McCormack, “The Sum of the Gospel,” in Orthodox and Modern, 43 n. 5. Ritschl states that in the search for the guiding principle of Protestant thought, a distinction between material and formal principles first appears in the writings of Johann Gabler (1753−1826). Twesten’s use of the terms, however, reflects an assimilation of the slightly different use of these terms in the writings of Wilhelm M. de Wette and Karl G. Bretschneider. Albrecht Ritschl, Gesammelte Aufsätze (Freiburg im Bresgau: Mohr, 1893), 236, 241−4. Ritschl himself questioned the usefulness of the distinction between material and formal principles, unless it was combined with a final principle, namely the church. Albrecht Ritschl, A Critical History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872), 158. As we shall see in chapter four, Bavinck does just this. See below, pp. 145−8. For Bavinck’s critical evaluation of Ritschl, see Bavinck, “De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl,” Theologische studiën 6 (1888), 369−403. 63 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.176−7. This approach is also reflected in Bavinck’s analysis of the differences between Eastern and Western Christianity. Rather than cataloguing the various individual issues that separate the two traditions, Bavinck seeks a difference in principle. For Bavinck, the former is animated by a philosophical and the latter by a juridical spirit. Bavinck, Het Christendom: groote godsdiensten Serie II — No. 7 (Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij, 1912), 33−4. Cf. Bavinck’s discussion of the difference in principle between Eastern and Western Christianity in Reformed Dogmatics, 1.134−5. 64 Pace Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 49. Mattson goes too far in suggesting that Bavinck shows no interest in a deductive system.

Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system

that one must grapple with the fact that Bavinck’s writings deliver not one, but two answers. Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system In the search for explicit statements in which Bavinck identifies the central dogma of his system, one is confronted with two seemingly contradictory statements. In his earlier writings, Bavinck identifies the knowledge of God as his central dogma. In his later writings, however, Bavinck identifies Christology.65 The secondary literature addressing the question of what constitutes the centre of Bavinck’s theology reflects similar opacity. Some readers of Bavinck dispute the presence of a central dogma.66 Others identify the covenant of grace,67 salvation historical themes,68 the motif of grace restoring nature,69 and the unio mystica as the centre of Bavinck’s theology.70 Each of these proposals, however, is at variance with the two doctrines that Bavinck explicitly identifies as his central dogma. What the double-identification of the knowledge of God and Christology would suggest is that Bavinck’s thought regarding the conception and function of the centre of a theological system underwent a gradual shift and with it, the place and purpose of Christology in dogmatics. In order to understand this shift, 65 Veenhof is correct to note that in the early speech, “Het voor en het tegen van een Dogmatisch Systeem,” Bavinck does not offer any suggestions as to what the fundamental principle or central dogma should be. Veenhof ’s conclusion, however, that this omission indicates Bavinck’s lack of interest in a derivative theological system ought to be queried. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 125. What is more likely to be the case is that at this early stage of his development, Bavinck was still undecided as to which dogma ought to occupy this privileged position. In what follows, we will explore the two doctrines that Bavinck would explicitly identify as the central dogma of his theological system. Mention ought also be made of Bavinck’s passing reference to the doctrine of the Trinity as “the root of all dogmas” and the doctrine of creation as the “fundamental dogma.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.300, 402; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.333, 438. These isolated comments provide further examples of Bavinck’s indecision as to which doctrine ought to lie at centre of a system of dogmatics. 66 Allen, “Dogmatics as ascetics,” in The Task of Dogmatics: Explorations in Theological Method, 204; Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 125. 67 Hoekema, Herman Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant, 57, 198, 214. 68 Hielema, “Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 246, 286−8. 69 Heideman, Revelation and Reason, 196; Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 355; Bolt, The Imitation of Christ Theme, 155. 70 Gleason, “The Centrality of the Unio Mystica,” 4−46. Of the several doctoral theses addressing Herman Bavinck’s theology which have been published since 2001, only Mattson directly addresses the question of a centre. Mattson notes his broad agreement with Heideman, Veenhof, and Bolt. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 3, 20, 237.

37

38

Christology and dogmatics

it is of primary importance to attend to the distinction Bavinck draws between the centre, or midpoint (middelpunt), and the starting point (uitgangspunt) of a theological system.71 This shift may be plotted in three distinct stages, according to the changing referents of these terms. In the first stage the knowledge of God constitutes the dogmatic system’s starting point and midpoint. In the second stage Bavinck identifies the knowledge of God as the system’s starting point, yet Christology is identified as its midpoint. In the third stage Christology is identified as both the starting point and midpoint of a dogmatic system. In what follows, the precise nuances of these terms shall be explored in an attempt to plot the contours of this gradual shift in Bavinck’s thinking. The first stage is exemplified by an article Bavinck published in 1891 in the journal Theologische studiën under the title, “Confession and Dogmatics.” This article addresses the methodological relationship between the church’s confession, religious experience, and Holy Scripture, by mounting a critique of a published lecture by François Daubanton (1853–1920). In the excerpt below, Bavinck draws attention to the fact that even once Scripture is taken as dogmatics’ material source, there remains the further question of which elements of the biblical witness ought to be privileged and how they will be arranged within the system. Bavinck writes, On this there is great divergence of opinion and no wonder, for it is at once the question of the fundamental principle, the material principle of the whole of the doctrine of Holy Scripture. One seeks this in the person of Christ, a second in humanity, a third in the contrast of sin and grace, a fourth in the church or the kingdom of God etc. Presently, many proceed from an anthropological or christological or ecclesiological principle, but the older theology sought that principle and starting point in the knowledge of God. That knowledge, revealed by God himself in nature and Scripture, was the midpoint and the organic principle of the whole of dogmatics. Thus, in this discipline everything, whether directly or indirectly, in casu recto vel obliquo, was related to the knowledge of God, and from there the dogmatic material was organised into a more or less ordered system.72

Two elements of the excerpt of Bavinck’s article warrant our attention. First, fundamental principle, material principle, and midpoint all bear the same referent, namely, the knowledge of God. Midpoint, therefore, is functionally equivalent with the other terms, namely, fundamental principle and material principle.

71 The English translation of Gereformeerde dogmatiek is by no means incorrect in rendering the Dutch word middelpunt as centre, yet the similarity between the terms centre and central dogma potentially masks the distinction Bavinck draws between these terms. I adopt the word midpoint only to make the distinction more apparent. 72 Bavinck, “Confessie en Dogmatiek,” Theologische studiën 9:3 (1891), 273−4.

Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system

Second, Bavinck is not merely rehearsing an historical-theological position.73 Bavinck regards the position of the ‘older theology’ as normative. Taking the knowledge of God as the fundamental principle is the preferable option to the various anthropological, christological, and ecclesiological alternatives. The second stage in the development of Bavinck’s thought can clearly be discerned by the time he pens Reformed Dogmatics. Although the defining features of this second stage are evident already in the first volume (1895),74 its contours are best observed from the vantage point of our programmatic statement in the third volume (1898). Bavinck writes, “the doctrine of Christ is not the starting point (uitgangspunt), but it is indeed the centre (middelpunt) of the whole system of dogmatics.”75 Whereas in the earlier period midpoint and fundamental principle were synonyms, this is no longer the case. Bavinck seeks to distinguish between the centre of a system of dogma and its starting point. The former he identifies with Christology, the latter with the knowledge of God. What is at stake is the degree of control that the fundamental principle exercises over the system. Bavinck would appear to be seeking a way of identifying Christology as the centre of the system without according it complete control. Accordingly, we read in the second volume (1897), that the knowledge of God remains the central dogma of the system. From the very start of its labours, it faces the incomprehensible One. From him it derives its inception, for from him are all things. But also in the remaining loci, when it turns its attention to creatures, it views them only in relation to God as they exist from him and through him and for him. So then, the knowledge of God is the only dogma, the exclusive content, of the entire field of dogmatics. All the doctrine treated in dogmatics − whether they concern the universe, humanity, Christ, and so forth − are but the explication of the one central dogma of the cognitio Dei. All things are considered in light of God, subsumed under him, traced back to him as the starting point.76

Thus, by the time Bavinck writes Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck is seeking to accord Christology some degree of control over the system, yet he is unwilling to allow Christology complete control. Hence, Christology is described as the 73 For Bavinck’s reflections on the historical significance of taking the knowledge of God as the uitgangspunt of a dogmatic system, see Bavinck, “Calvinistisch en gereformeerd,” De Vrije Kerk 19:2 (1893), 69−71. 74 The main contours of the christological derivation of doctrine arise in the first volume. These will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter. 75 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254. Cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274. Also compare Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” in Kennis en leven (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1922), 236, where Bavinck describes the true wetenschap of God has having Christ as its middelpunt. This essay was originally published as “Kennis en leven,” De Bazuin 48:21 (1900), 3−20. 76 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.1; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.29.

39

40

Christology and dogmatics

middelpunt, or centre, of the system, but it is denied the role of uitgangspunt or starting point. This is still reserved for the knowledge of God. The motivation for identifying Christology as the midpoint, or centre, of the dogmatic system is plainly Bavinck’s conviction that Christ is the midpoint, or centre, of revelation.77 In and of itself, this is not new. Already in Bavinck’s speech of 1883, The Science of Holy Theology, the contours of Bavinck’s salvationhistorical concept of revelation are in place.78 What does appear to be new in the second stage of Bavinck’s thought is the relationship in which these contours stand to a system of dogma. By attributing Christology the significance of centre, Bavinck accords Christology a degree of control over the system. As Bavinck goes on to state, “All other dogmas either prepare for [Christology] or are inferred from it.”79 The distinction between starting point and midpoint thus affords Bavinck a way of allowing Christology to exercise some control on the system without granting it absolute control. The reasons Bavinck would not accord Christology absolute control as the starting point of a dogmatic system warrant close scrutiny. Bavinck’s objections to the use of Christology as a starting point are set out in some detail in a passage of the Prolegomena where Bavinck criticises the christological ‘division’ (christologische indeeling) of dogmatics. Bavinck writes, However attractive it may seem at first sight, it is still unusable. It often rests on the false assumption that rather than Scripture the person of Christ specifically is the foundation and epistemic source of dogmatics. However, we know of Christ only from and through Scripture. In addition, though Christ is quite certainly the centre and main content of Holy Scripture, precisely because he is the midpoint of Scripture, he cannot be the starting point. He presupposes the existence of God and humanity. He did not make his historical appearance immediately at the time of the promise but many centuries later. It is, moreover, undoubtedly true that Christ revealed the Father to us, but this revelation of God through the Son does not nullify the many and varied ways he spoke through the prophets. Not the New Testament alone, nor only the words of Jesus, but Scripture as a whole is a Word of God that comes to us through Christ. It is clear, finally that the christological division only permits the development of the loci on God, creation, world, and humanity by way of assumptions and postulates and therefore not in the fullness of their rich significance.80

The first objection Bavinck raises to placing Christology at the head of a system of doctrine concerns taking Christology as the material source of theology. This objection is less straightforward than it seems. There are a number of 77 78 79 80

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.321, 344−5, 380, 402, 474; Philosophy of Revelation, 27. Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 9−10. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.87; Reformed Dogmatics, 1.110.

Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system

possible configurations in which logical priority might be ascribed to Christology without necessarily attributing the function of material source to the person of Christ. For example, if the only epistemic access we have to Christ is the testimony of Scripture, Scripture would still need to be maintained as the epistemological principle of a dogmatic system even if Christology is in some sense logically prior to Scripture.81 Bavinck’s first objection is, however, clarified in the essay he cites at the end of this passage by Julius Kaftan (1848−1926).82 In the light of Kaftan’s essay it becomes clear that what Bavinck is rejecting is the kind of christocentrism exemplified by Paul Lobstein (1850−1922), for whom the source of dogmatics was to be located in the religious intuitions that Christ awakens in the consciousness of the believer. Lobstein’s methodology is thus essentially Schleiermacherian. Both Kaftan and Bavinck, however, regard Schleiermacher’s regressive method as fundamentally mistaken, albeit for differing reasons.83 For Bavinck, ‘[i]t is precisely the error of idealistic rationalism that it equates the organ of knowledge with the source of knowledge ... faith, regeneration, or experience cannot be the source of our religious knowledge, nor the first principle of our theology.’84 Bavinck’s first objection, therefore, is epistemological rather than ontological. It ultimately concerns Schleiermacher’s regressive method rather than the priority of Christology. The second objection is unfolded in greater detail, yet the progression of Bavinck’s logic still appears in somewhat compressed form. Bavinck states, “precisely because [Christ] is the midpoint of Scripture, he cannot be the starting point.” Here the reason that Christ cannot function as the starting point of a 81 As we shall see in chapter four, this turns out to be exactly the case in Bavinck. 82 Julius Kaftan, Zur Dogmatik: sieben Abhandlungen aus der “Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche” (Tübingen: Mohr, 1904), 31−47. 83 Kaftan’s primary objection rests in the fact that he perceives Lobstein to be delivering only a descriptive rather than a prescriptive account of system. Lobstein, on Kaftan’s assessment, reduces dogmatics to an account of the individual theologian’s faith. Dogmatics, however, must dictate what one’s faith should be, not merely what it is. Bavinck agrees with this, but what he still finds lacking in Kaftan is that Kaftan accords the religious subject a normative role in dogmatics. “However much the attempt of Kaftan and Wobbermin to escape subjectivism deserves our appreciation, they nevertheless do not succeed in finding a firm basis for dogmatics. They do not accept revelation and Scripture as these present themselves to us, but, in terms of content and scope, make them dependent on the judgment of the dogmatician. The fact is, Kaftan says, that in our use of Scripture we must let ourselves be guided by the practical ideas of religion, specifically by those of the kingdom of God and of reconciliation ... Hence, we must conclude that the right wing of Ritschl’s school also fails to rise above consciousness-theology.” Reformed Dogmatics, 1.69−70. Although Bavinck finds Kaftan inadequate, the influence of Kaftan on Bavinck is palpable. Bavinck can often be heard repeating Kaftanian catchphrases, such as all of dogmatics is knowledge of God, knowledge of God is the Ausgangspunkt of theology, dogmatics must speak in an absoluten Ton. 84 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.565.

41

42

Christology and dogmatics

system of dogma concerns a particular relationship between temporal and logical priority. The person of Christ may well form the centre, main content, and even the medium of all revelation yet precisely because he does not stand at the beginning of revelation, he cannot be accorded logical priority in dogmatics. Why temporal priority should be a condition for logical priority is not explained in this passage. The answer only emerges more clearly into view, when one considers that history is the fundamental category in Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation. Revelation, for Bavinck, is history, the realisation of the divine idea in time.85 Thus, against Lessing it is the truths of reason that are contingent, not the facts of history.86 Precisely because revelation is a history, what is temporally prior accrues a certain necessity of consequence, and thus a logical order. In virtue of the fact that Christ is the midpoint of revelation, certain dogmas will be logically prior to Christology. Hence, “all other dogmas either prepare for [Christology] or are inferred from it.”87 The logical priority of other doctrines does not, however, exclude a christocentric understanding of what is revealed prior to the Christ-event. Once again Kaftan’s essay illuminates this concern. Kaftan writes, The truth, which Lobstein maintains and emphasises in the demand for a christocentric division of dogmatics, would be formulated more correctly if it were stated that dogmatics’ use of Scripture must be a christocentric use. Indeed, this must therefore be so because it is only thereby guaranteed that we properly interpret and understand revelation from its own centre, and that if we then represent the faith which has appropriated this revelation, each proposition will be christocentrically determined by this proper understanding of revelation.88

In other words, christocentric exegesis is the necessary condition for a christocentric system of dogma rather than a christological starting point. It would seem, therefore, that Bavinck holds that the attribution of logical priority to Christology jeopardises a properly christocentric use of Scripture, because it disturbs the relationship between temporal and logical priority entailed by the fundamentally historical character of revelation. The third objection follows from the previous two and is perhaps the clearest of the three. If Christology is not logically prior to all of the dogmas of a 85 As we shall see, Bavinck’s concept of revelation owes much to the doctrine of divine ideas. See below, pp. 60−1. The influence of German idealism, however, is not absent. The influence of Schelling and Hegel will be discussed further in chapters two and four. See below, pp. 79−83, 158−9. 86 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.378−9; cf. Philosophy of Revelation, 113−41. 87 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274. 88 Kaftan, Zur Dogmatik, 35.

Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system

system, the christological division will only permit their development by way of assumptions and postulates. The negative aspect to this claim relates to Bavinck’s first objection and the positive claim relates to his second. Negatively, on the christological division of dogmatics the rich significance of the subsequent dogmas cannot emerge, because that which is in fact logically prior to all dogmas, namely, the knowledge of God as it is revealed through Christ in Scripture, does not stand at the head of the system. Hence, if the christological division is strictly adhered to, the system suffers from a deficit of material. Positively, the full significance of subsequent dogmas can only emerge by way of unacknowledged presuppositions. In other words, if the subsequent dogmas are fully developed, the source of their content goes unacknowledged. The problem, therefore, is that the system does not reflect its actual logical order. What is important to note in these objections to the christological division of dogmatics is that they centre on a limited range of concerns, namely, the rejection of religious experience as the source of dogmatics, the maintenance of the historical character of revelation, and the integrity of the system’s order. These concerns will need to be kept in mind, when we consider the grounds on which the later Bavinck will entertain the possibility that Christology can function as the starting point of a dogmatic system.89 Before proceeding to Bavinck’s final position, it is important to note the palpable tension in Bavinck’s distinction between centre and central dogma. This tension arises from Bavinck’s conceptualisation of revelation in terms of centre and periphery.90 By definition the centre determines the periphery. But how does the centre of revelation relate to the starting point of a dogmatic system, if the logical progression of the system is determined by the historical, temporally successive unfolding of revelation? It would seem that Bavinck was acutely aware of this problem, as the development of his thought is marked by an ongoing quest for its resolution. The third stage in the development of Bavinck’s thought becomes evident in writings that postdate Reformed Dogmatics. In these works, Bavinck continues to affirm that the Word of God is the sole source of dogmatics, yet Bavinck now acknowledges that the person of Christ can in fact function as the starting point or central dogma of a dogmatic system. This sentiment first appears in The Sacrifice of Praise (1901) where Bavinck writes, 89 The identification of an “earlier” and “later” Bavinck is intended only as a heuristic device. In the first instance, later refers to the works which identify Christology as a starting point or central dogma without qualification. This shift in Bavinck’s dogmatic method coincides with other changes in outlook that will also be explored, such as the identification of the essence of Christianity with the person of Christ, a more sceptical attitude toward deductive principles, and a greater openness toward the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. Broadly speaking, these changes coincide with Bavinck’s move to Amsterdam in 1902. 90 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.383, 420, 438−9, 616; 2.429; 4.98; Philosophy of Revelation, 27.

43

44

Christology and dogmatics

Jesus the promised Messiah, the divinely anointed Prophet and Priest and King − that is in brief the content of the whole of the Christian faith. It is the core of revelation, the heart of Holy Scripture, the pith and marrow of all confession, the central dogma of all the truths of salvation, the centre (middelpunt) from which all the rays of the knowledge of God proceed to the circumference. The person of Christ determines the essence of Christianity.91

Once again, central dogma and centre (middelpunt) enjoy a single referent as it did in the first stage of Bavinck’s thought. The striking significance of the shift from the knowledge of God to Christology becomes clearer in “The Essence of Christianity” (1906). In Christ then, we indeed have the starting point and the midpoint of Christianity, but we have not yet unfolded its full content. We cannot stop with Christ. Precisely because he is the content and the object, the core and the midpoint of the gospel, he is neither its origin nor its final destination. He is the mediator of God and men and therefore points from himself back to the Father, just as he points forward to the future, wherein God will be all in all. There is no opportunity in this essay to broaden these thoughts. However, let us in conclusion be permitted to make this one remark: dogmatics that takes its point of departure in Christology cannot, as we explained, stop there but must stride from here to the unfolding of the rich content that God has granted to the congregation in his Word. The formulation of dogma in its entirety and the whole history of Christianity, of which the formulation of dogma comprises but a part is, according to its essence, no more than the determining and maintaining of the place, that, according to his own witness, belongs to Christ. It is Christ’s place in his relation to the Divine Being, to creation, to the world, to humanity, to the church, to culture, and to all things.92

Here, the distinction between midpoint and starting point is erased. The common referent of both is Christ. Moreover, this does not reflect a lapse in Bavinck’s usage of the terms. The place occupied by God in the earlier stages of Bavinck’s thought is now occupied by Christ. Previously all things were to be considered in light of God, subsumed under him, traced back to him as the starting point,93 but now the person of Christ occupies this pivotal position. Whereas previously the formulation of dogma consisted in the determining and maintaining of the relation of all things to God, now it consists in the determining and maintaining of the relation of all things to Christ, the Divine Being included! 91 Bavinck, De offerande des lofs: overdenkingen vóór en na de toelating tot het heilige avondmaal (Gravenhage: Verschoor, 1901), 55−6; cf. The Sacrifice of Praise: Meditations before and after receiving access to the table of the Lord (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1922), 64. 92 Bavinck, “Het wezen des christendoms,” in Almanak van het studentencorps der Vrije Universiteit voor het jaar 1906 (Amsterdam: Herdes, 1906), 277; cf. “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 46−7. 93 See above, p. 31.

Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system

The reasoning behind this new orientation is difficult to discern. It would seem to be closely bound up with the identification of the person of Christ with the essence of Christianity.94 In itself, this identification is not altogether new. In Reformed Dogmatics the essence of Christianity is conceived christologically. The essence of Christianity is variously described as “the deity of Christ,” or the “absolute self-revelation of God in the person of Christ and the absolute self-communication of God in the Holy Spirit,” or as faith in the person and work of Christ.95 Bavinck can also call Christ the “content” of Christianity,96 a term which, as we shall see in our explorations of Bavinck’s concept of religion, is closely related to essence.97 The simpler identification of the essence of Christianity with the person of Christ reflects a subtle yet significant development in Bavinck’s thinking with regard to the essence of religion. Christology’s function as the central dogma of a theological system would seem to represent a methodological consequence of this development.98 One is reduced to speculation in the attempt to trace out Bavinck’s reasoning, but it is possible that the crystallisation of Bavinck’s thoughts concerning the essence of Christianity led him to consider the chronological priority of Christology in the development of dogma. Accordingly, it is this chronological priority that would seem to form the warrant for Bavinck’s later acknowledgment of the probity of adopting Christology as the starting point of a dogmatic system. In Christianity (1912), an account of the Christian faith commissioned for a series of pamphlets covering the world-religions, Bavinck draws an observation that is very similar to a remark made in Reformed Dogmatics concerning the development of dogma. In Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck notes that something like the doctrine of the two natures was bound to emerge from the church’s confession of the deity of Christ.99 The same observation is made in Chris94 This marks a departure from Calvin’s identification of justification by faith as the doctrine by which the church stands or falls, and as such, numbers among one of the markers that distinguish Bavinck’s theology as Neo- rather than Paleo-Calvinism. “[Justification by faith] is the main hinge on which religion turns, so that we devote the greater attention and care to it. For unless you first of all grasp what your relationship to God is, and the nature of his judgment concerning you, you have neither a foundation on which to establish your salvation nor one on which to build piety toward God.” John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (2 vol.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), III.xi.1, 1.726. 95 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.128; 2.296; 4.108. 96 Reformed Dogmatics, 3.284 n. 133, 1.321. This emphasis continues into Bavinck’s later writings. See also Bavinck, Evangelisatie, Christendom en maatschappij, serie 5, nr. 9 (Utrecht: Ruys, 1913), 10. 97 See below, pp. 82–4. 98 The transition to the simpler identification of the person of Christ with the essence of Christianity, therefore, is an important area of Bavinck’s thought that warrants further research. 99 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.284.

45

46

Christology and dogmatics

tianity, yet Bavinck extends this necessity to the emergence of the discipline of dogmatics. Bavinck writes, From this confession of Jesus as the Christ the history of dogma made its beginning ... Under the leadership of men like Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen and others the Church navigated its way between these two cliffs and gradually arrived at the doctrine of the two natures ... This dogma did not concern an indifferent matter, much less yet an abstract formula, but the essence of Christianity itself … Around this dogma a universal confession − as it were, expanding over all the world − was able to be constructed, for this Christ was the Son of the Father, who in the beginning created the world and formed human beings in his image. He was himself the Mediator of re-creation, who had objectively reconciled and reunited the sin-stained world in his person and work with God and after his ascension poured out his Spirit so that he may gather and strengthen the church by the means of Word and sacrament and renew and sanctify humanity and the world unto a kingdom of God. Christianity announced the birth of a special science, theology.100

Whereas in Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck connects the emergence of the doctrine of the two natures to the confession of Christ, in Christianity Bavinck traces the emergence of a special wetenschap to Christology. The distinction between a single doctrine and the discipline of dogmatics is a fine one, yet it is one that Bavinck himself, nevertheless, upheld. It is the difference between an aggregate and an organism. We will recall that system is the “supreme desideratum” of science.101 What distinguishes a single doctrine, dogma, or even a series of dogmas from the scientific discipline of dogmatics is systematic arrangement. Bavinck appears, therefore, to be mounting a subtly more expansive claim in Christianity. If this is indeed the case, the extension of necessity from a single dogma to a system of dogmatics could well form the warrant for reuniting middelpunt and uitgangspunt in the person of Christ. If this does form the warrant for the new orientation in Bavinck’s thinking, the same nexus of temporal and logical priority that led to the separation of middelpunt and uitgangspunt comprises the warrant for their reunion. The difference, however, lies in the fact that the earlier Bavinck drew his conclusion from the nexus of temporal and logical priority in the historical unfolding of revelation, whereas the later Bavinck draws his conclusion from the nexus of temporal and logical priority in the development of dogma. As we have seen, the earlier Bavinck concluded that Christology could not function as the starting point of a system of dogmatics because Christ is the midpoint of revelation. Because Christ stood in the middle, Christology could not stand at the beginning. The later Bavinck, however, in recognizing that Christology did in fact stand at the beginning of the development of dogma concludes on 100 Bavinck, Het Christendom, 21−2; cf. The Sacrifice of Praise, 64. 101 See above, p. 17.

The structure of Bavinck's christocentrism

this basis that Christology can form the starting point of a dogmatic system. Yet in taking his bearings from the development of dogma rather than the history of revelation, the later Bavinck makes a significant methodological move. In the course of the Prolegomena, Bavinck identifies three elements of dogmatic method: Holy Scripture, the church’s confession, and Christian consciousness. According to Bavinck’s own testimony, “whether or not any one of these factors is used, overestimated or underestimated, and how it is positioned in a modified relation to the remaining two, the starting point of dogmatics as well as its development and content will differ.”102 In taking his bearings from the development of dogma rather than the history of revelation, the later Bavinck recalibrates these three elements in his estimate of what may or may not constitute the starting point of a dogmatic system. The possible repercussions of this recalibration should not be overlooked. What difference might a christological starting point make to the system’s development and content? The structure of Bavinck's christocentrism Ascertaining the difference that identifying Christology as the central dogma of a theological system of dogmatics might make to the development and content of Bavinck’s theology is complicated by a number of factors. First, Bavinck never sought to integrate this new standpoint in his revision of Reformed Dogmatics. The key statements concerning the identity of the central dogma and the place and purpose of Christology were left unchanged.103 Second, when Bavinck penned a subsequent one-volume summary of Christian doctrine in 1909, he did not adopt Christology as a starting point but more or less followed the ordo docendi outlined in Reformed Dogmatics.104 Third, in the writings 102 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.61. 103 Cf. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (Kampen: Bos, 1897), 2.1−2 with Gereformeerde dogmatiek 4th edn; (Kampen: Kok, 1928), 2.2; Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (Kampen: Bos, 1898), 3.253 with Gereformeerde dogmatiek 4th edn; (Kampen: Kok, 1928), 3.254. The fourth edition from 1928 is an unaltered reprint of the second edition which appeared between 1906−11. Eric Bristley, Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), 134. 104 Bavinck, Magnalia Dei: onderwijzing in de christelijke religie naar gereformeerde belijdenis (Kampen: Kok, 1909). The English translation of this work bears a very different title, namely, Our Reasonable Faith. The change in title is odd, especially as Bavinck concludes this book with a final meditation on “the great works of God” (de groote werken Gods). Magnalia Dei, 646. The significance of this work for the development of Bavinck’s thought is not always appreciated. Bremmer describes this work as essentially the same in outlook as Reformed Dogmatics and on account of this, he regards Magnalia Dei as evidence of Bavinck’s

47

48

Christology and dogmatics

where Bavinck affirms the probity of taking Christology as a starting point of a dogmatic system, he seems to mitigate, or perhaps even circumvent, the increased control this grants Christology by maintaining one of the central tenets of the mediating position he articulates in Reformed Dogmatics, namely, the idea that some dogmas “prepare” for Christology.105 This is perhaps the most problematic of the three, as the basis of the assertion that Christology cannot function as the starting point of a dogmatic system is that certain doctrines stand in a preparatory relation to Christology.106 In order to ascertain what difference elevating Christology to the central dogma might entail for Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system, it is necessary to examine the concept of preparation. The first doctrine which prepares for Christology is the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity prepares for Christology inasmuch as the concept of communicability is basic to Bavinck’s Christology. In the person of the Mediator, God communicates himself to humanity.107 Bavinck’s argumentation is terse, yet his basic point is that the basis of divine self-communication in the person of the Mediator lies in God’s intratrinitarian communications. More specifically, it is the integrity of the persons in the intratrinitarian communication that gives rise to the possibility of communication in the person of the Mediator. Father, Son, and Spirit remain who they in their intratrinitarian communications. This integrity of the divine persons in God’s internal self-communication forms the basis of the possibility of incarnation. In the incarnation, “God remains who he is and can yet communicate himself to others.”108 Hence, just as God can communicate himself in se without compromising the integrity of the persons, God the Son can communicate himself to others without compromising the integrity of his person of theirs. Hence, the doctrine of the Trinity grounds

105 106 107

108

dogmatic stagnation. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 376−7. Veenhof, however, rightly notes that although the spirit of Magnalia Dei is that of Gereformeerde dogmatiek, there are noticeable differences (eigen formulieringen) in the way Bavinck articulates various doctrines. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 117. Arguably, these “distinctive formulations,” are evidence of theological development rather than stagnation. Bavinck, Het Christendom, 3; “Het wezen des christendoms,” 264; Our Reasonable Faith, 94, 284, 286. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274−82. Mattson provides a helpful commentary on this passage. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 168−80. One recognises in Bavinck the same structural appropriation of the Anselmian argumentation regarding the necessity of a mediator that one finds in John Calvin and Reformed Orthodoxy. Cf. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 27−8, 90−1, 97, 134, 144. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.275. Mattson rightly draws attention to the importance of Bavinck’s following comment, that it “is also important, therefore, to maintain that it is not the divine nature as such but specifically the person of the Son that became incarnate.” Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 180−2.

The structure of Bavinck's christocentrism

the possibility of divine self-communication in the person of the Mediator without any erasure of the boundary between Creator and creature. Thus, it is the distinction between nature and person in the doctrine of the Trinity that prevents the divine substance from flowing into or becoming identified with creaturely subsistences in the person and work of Christ. The second doctrine that prepares for Christology is creation. Bavinck first indicates two ways in which the doctrine of creation is determinative for the metaphysics of Christology.109 First, the doctrine of creation upholds the idea that it would be impossible that God could create anything identical with his own being. The doctrine of creation, therefore, rules out concepts like the self-actualisation of God in humanity and requires Christology to formulate something like the doctrine of the two natures. The divine nature cannot be said to “become” human in any metaphysical sense. Rather, the Son must be said to assume a human nature. Second, the doctrine of creation is determinative for Christology, insofar as Scripture testifies that humanity is created in God’s image. This kinship between God and humanity rules out more expansive notions of incarnation that might place anthropology and Christology in a more oblique relation. Thus, William of Occam’s claim that God could in fact have taken on the nature of a stone or a plant overlooks this kinship. Bavinck then considers the preparatory function of creation from the perspective of revelation. “Given with and in creation,” Bavinck writes, “is the possibility of revelation and also of incarnation.”110 Bavinck’s point is that the fundamental premise of incarnation, that God can reveal himself, is demonstrated in creation. The structure of this argument is very similar to the argument regarding the preparatory function of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the same way that the possibility of divine self-communication ad extra is given in the actuality of self-communication ad intra, the possibility of special revelation is given in general revelation. Both arguments serve to draw incarnation into a very close relationship to God and creation. Bavinck is, nevertheless, wary of the risks of such a strategy. Thus, Bavinck adds counterweight to his argument. “Generation, creation and incarnation are closely related, even if the latter ones do not necessarily flow from the preceding.”111 What Bavinck does not want to be heard to be suggesting is that the incarnation is necessary either to God or the creation. On the contrary, Bavinck regards the incarnation per se as strictly contingent.112 Bavinck thus

109 110 111 112

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.277. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.277. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.278. Incarnation, however, is necessary for the fulfilment of what God freely ordains. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.370−7.

49

50

Christology and dogmatics

rejects both pantheism and supralapsarian christologies,113 which, according to Bavinck, render the incarnation a necessary consequence of generation and creation. The third doctrine which prepares for Christology is revelation. In contrast with the previous discussion, it is not revelation as the trans-historical reality of the created order, which, as revelation, prepares for Christology. Rather, it is the historical unfolding of revelation that prepares the incarnation. This unfolding is viewed as the self-preparation of the Logos. This self-preparation takes the form of a continuous coming that begins with the act of creation and continues after the fall in salvation history. Bavinck writes, He came continually to his own in theophany, prophecy, and miracle. In that manner the Son prepared the whole world, including Jews as well as Gentiles, for his coming in the flesh … He was in the process of coming from the beginning of time and at last came for good to humanity and made his dwelling in humanity through the incarnation.114

The incarnation is thus woven into the seamless fabric of revelation by the Logos himself.115 The Logos’ self-preparation reaches its conclusion in the election of the θεοτοκος. With Mary’s carrying the embryonic Christ beneath her heart, her nursing of the infant Christ at her breast, and her instruction of the juvenile 113 Bavinck rejects supralapsarian christologies, primarily because Scripture orders incarnation to the atonement and because the election of the Church cannot be separated from the election of Christ as the head of his Church. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.278−80; 2.403−4. Implicitly, Bavinck follows Calvin in this reasoning. “Since all Scripture proclaims that to become our Redeemer he was clothed in flesh, it is too presumptuous to imagine another reason or another end.” Calvin, Institutes, II.xii.4 , 1.467. Bavinck’s rejection of supralapsarian christologies, however, would seem to stand in tension with his infralapsarian view of creation. Mattson rightly notes the robust theological grounds that an infralapsarian creation provides Bavinck for his identification of Adam as a type of Christ. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 176−7. Yet whether Mattson is correct in asserting that this ordering does not suggest a supralapsarian Christology is moot. One could argue that an infralapsarian conception of creation requires a supralapsarian Christology. For example, whom does God permit to fall, if the decree to permit the fall is logically anterior to the decree to create? The question is pressing and it would seem that the only logically consistent answer involves some kind of derivation of the humanity that would fall from a prior decree to become incarnate. Bavinck, nevertheless, would seem to be aware of this problem. The implication of possible humans and possible Christs are among the liabilities of supralapsarianism which Bavinck rejects. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.386. The implicitly supralapsarian shape of Bavinck’s thought and the tension this creates with his rejection of supralapsarianism will be explored in following chapters. 114 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.261; Reformed Dogmatics, 1.280. 115 “The incarnation joins itself to the revelation that came before, both general and special. It stands and falls with it.” Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.261; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3. 280.

The structure of Bavinck's christocentrism

Christ, the preparation which had begun at the creation of the world reached its completion.116 The concept of preparation, therefore, embraces aspects of metaphysical, logical, and temporal priority. The doctrine of the Trinity prepares for Christology metaphysically, inasmuch as the distinction between nature and person forms the ground of the possibility of divine self-communication in the person of the Mediator and divine communicability forms the basis for the possibility of revelation. The doctrine of creation prepares for Christology logically, inasmuch as it demands something like the doctrine of two natures and maintains anthropology and Christology in the closest of relations. The doctrine of revelation prepares for Christology temporally, inasmuch as the whole of history constitutes the self-preparation of the Logos. It is relevant to note that these basic contours are reproduced in the one-volume summary of Christian doctrine Bavinck wrote in 1909. For example, If one wants to understand the incarnation aright, one can say that the generation of the Son and the creation of the world have prepared the incarnation of the Word. Not in the sense that generation and creation already in principle included the incarnation. For Scripture always relates the incarnation of the Son to the redemption from sin and the accomplishment of salvation. Rather, generation and creation, especially the creation of humanity in the image of God, both teach that God is communicable, in an absolute sense within, and in a relative sense outside of, the Divine being. If this were not the case, there would not be any possibility of an incarnation of God. Whoever thinks the incarnation of God impossible in principle also denies the creation of the world and the generation of the Son.117

The concept of preparation would not appear to sustain any changes, in order to accommodate a christological starting point. The pressing question, therefore, is what further control is accorded to Christology, given that the rejection of a christological starting point was predicated on the concept of preparation? Two possibilities come to mind. Christology might be said to stand in an epistemologically, but not metaphysically prior, relation to the doctrine of the Trinity. That is, the doctrine of the Trinity might be said to arise from the church’s recognition of the deity of Jesus Christ and by extension, the deity of the Holy Spirit. Bavinck, however, asserts that the concept of a starting point cannot be purely epistemological. According to Bavinck, a system of doctrine must follow the order of being

116 Both history and revelation, however, continue. 117 Bavinck, Magnalia Dei, 361; cf. Our Reasonable Faith, 324−5.

51

52

Christology and dogmatics

rather than the order of knowing.118 Adopting a christological starting point on solely epistemological grounds, therefore, is excluded. Alternatively, one might view the entirety of God’s works ad extra as a mode of incarnation, based on the notion of a continuous coming of the Logos. In such a scenario, Christology would function as more than a merely epistemological starting point. Bavinck, however, holds an aversion to the supralapsarian Christology that such a schema courts. Beyond these two possibilities, the retention of the concept of preparation denies Christology any further control over the system. One might well ask then, how the position of the later Bavinck differs from the mediating position articulated in Reformed Dogmatics. It would seem that the maintenance of the concept of preparation undermines any real methodological priority that the later Bavinck would seek to ascribe to Christology by allowing it to stand, at least hypothetically, at the head of a dogmatic system. How ought we make sense of this? In the absence of further source material that might shed light on the apparent shift in Bavinck’s thinking regarding the place and purpose of Christology in dogmatics, one can only piece together the available information and suggest a working hypothesis. To that end, certain psychological considerations may be relevant. According to Arie van Deursen, Bavinck was a “born wobbler” (een geboren weifelaar).119 He was intellectually cautious by nature. Bavinck was said to readily identify critical issues and express the need to revise established positions, but divulge little of where he thought potential solutions might lie.120 If this characterisation is correct, the reticence to overhaul Reformed Dogmatics or to blaze a new trail in subsequent dogmatic works might reflect this trait

118 “The system must bear the impress of the ontological order, not of the manner in which a person arrives at knowledge and certainty concerning objective truth.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.529; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.321 n. 74. 119 Van Deursen, “Bavinck en de Vrije Universiteit,” in G. Harinck/G. Neven (ed.), Ontmoetingen met Bavinck (Barneveld, De Vuurbaak, 2006), 26. George Harinck, “Herman Bavinck,” in Het gereformeerde geheugen, 433. 120 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, 94−6; cf. G. Harinck/C. Van der Kooi/J. Vree (ed.), Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende: aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak−Netelenbos, het schriftgezag en de situatie van de gereformeerde kerken November 1919 (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Uitgeverij, 1994), 11, 13, 19, 25; Berkouwer, A Half Century of Theology, 247. An obituary by one of Bavinck’s students also states, “[Bavinck] always sought to penetrate to the bottom of a question and at times found it difficult to come to a definite conclusion.” Johan H. Landwehr, In Memoriam: Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck (Kampen: Kok, 1921), 60. Cit. Bolt, Imitation, 273.

The structure of Bavinck's christocentrism

of indecision.121 The texts themselves, however, suggest that Bavinck simply found himself confronted with a problem he could not solve.122 The irreducibly historical character of revelation, it would seem, presented Bavinck with an insuperable difficulty. With Kant,123 Bavinck acknowledged temporal succession as a necessary condition of cognition, albeit for different reasons. For Bavinck, it was the essentially historical character of revelation that affirmed the necessity of temporal succession for the creaturely apprehension of the infinite. Bavinck writes, “[t]o the limited eye of the creature it successively unfolds its infinite content in the breadth of space and the length of time, so that creature might understand something of the unsearchable greatness of God.”124 The problem this posed to a deductive system is that the desired starting point, Jesus Christ, does not stand at the beginning of the temporally successive unfolding of revelation. Christ stands in the middle of revelation and, therefore, in the middle of history. In Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck attempted to resolve this tension by distinguishing between the midpoint and starting point of a dogmatic system. By means of this distinction, the person of Christ could still comprise the centre of the system even though he does not stand at the beginning of revelation. Bavinck also recognised resources in the centripetal structure of a deductive system which offered a way of resolving the tension. Christ, although standing at the centre of time, functions as a kind of portal for the infinite and, therefore, constitutes the beginning, middle, and end of all things. Thus, the work of Christ “has its central point in time on this earth, but it arises out of eternity, is rooted in eternity, and extends into eternity.”125 121 Bavinck’s caution might also reflect an awareness of the perception that he was more sympathetic to the christocentric Dutch Ethical theologians than he was willing to admit. For example, Andries W. Bronsveld (1839−1924) held that “the man is an Ethical through and through.” Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, 95−6. 122 Willem de Wit, in his “cathartic” reading of Bavinck, finds more than a grain of truth in Hendrikus Berkhof ’s observation that after 1900, “Bavinck increasingly felt that his theological direction was leading to a dead end ... [and] that the modern period needed a much more vigorous renewal of theology than he himself had produced or was able to produce.” Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology: A Report of a Journey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 113. Cit. Willem de Wit, On the Way to the Living God: A Cathartic Reading of Herman Bavinck and An Invitation to Overcome the Plausibility Crisis of Christianity (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2011), 19. 123 Cf. Kant’s second analogy. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 306−16. 124 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.429 [my italics]. 125 Bavinck, Magnalia Dei, 369; cf. Our Reasonable Faith, 332. Bavinck also states this relation conversely. Eternity can equally form the centre and time the circumference. “The truth is that eternity is the immutable centre that sends out its rays to the entire circumference of time.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.429 [my italics]. At first glance identifying eternity with the centre appears to contradict the former description, yet the contradiction is only apparent.

53

54

Christology and dogmatics

Bavinck, nevertheless, was aware of the weakness of his solution. By definition, the centre determines the periphery. The midpoint, therefore, must function as the starting point of the system. Yet the rationes of revelation cannot be inferred independently of the succession of the facta. Bavinck was aware that centre and central dogma, therefore, could not ultimately be separated. The later Bavinck, however, recognised a possible justification for reuniting midpoint and starting point in the person of Christ. The linear unfolding of the history of dogma did in fact proceed from centre to periphery: Christology stood at the beginning of the development of doctrine, from which the dogmatic system would emerge. Hence, the later Bavinck abandoned the distinction between midpoint and starting point, identifying Christology as the starting point of a theological system. It would seem, nevertheless, that Bavinck still recognised that this solution was at best only partial. Bavinck was unwilling to accord Christology the absolute priority that is the prerogative of the starting point of a deductive system. The reason for this unwillingness was that Bavinck could not completely insulate his proposed christological division from the force of his own critique. Because Bavinck’s christological division retained Scripture as its material source, it eluded his first objection. Because Bavinck retained the notion of preparation, he could also evade his second objection. Yet his christological division still lay vulnerable to his third objection. By retaining the concept of preparation, a christological starting point would never reflect the actual methodological order of the system.126 If this reconstruction is reliable, it is worth noting that Bavinck was not alone in facing this difficulty. It is the difficulty of transcendence, with which Protestant theology throughout the nineteenth century wrestled under a string of binary pairings: subject and object, freedom and authority, history and the idea.127 Many of these dualities would yield to Bavinck’s organicism. Equipoise between history and the idea, however, would prove chimerical. Bavinck had attempted to solve this problem by positing the ideal as the centre of history, but his proposal would ultimately run aground on what he perceived to be the In Reformed Dogmatics time is conceptualised as a finite circumference determined by a bare mathematical point. In Magnalia Dei Bavinck specifies what is stated elsewhere in Reformed Dogmatics, namely, that Christ is the centre of history. The tensions notwithstanding, the basic idea that the person of Christ represents a nexus of the finite and the infinite is clear. 126 Unless that is, Bavinck were to reconsider the possibility of a thoroughgoing actualism. 127 Dorner’s summation of Schleiermacher provides a good example. “Now Schleiermacher, by his recurrence to the fundamental Reformation views, united freedom and authority, personal appropriation and tradition, the ideal and the historical, upon the foundation of religion or faith, in the evangelical sense of the word.” J. A. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology particularly in Germany viewed according to its fundamental movement and in connection with the religious, moral, and intellectual life (2 vol.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1871), 2.376−7.

Conclusion

irreducibly historical character of revelation. If revelation were to be dehistoricised, it would be rendered epistemically inaccessible. Thus, Christology could never function as the starting point of a dogmatic system precisely because it stands at the centre of revelation, even if it might be viewed as giving rise to and ordering the whole for the very same reason. Conclusion The relationship between Christology and dogmatics in Bavinck is thus fluid and complex. It is fluid, inasmuch Bavinck’s thought develops and it is complex, inasmuch as Reformed Dogmatics represents a mediating position between the beginning and end of this development. The later Bavinck’s identification of Christology as the central dogma of a system of dogmatics represents a subtle yet significant shift in the place and purpose of Christology in his theological method. It is a subtle shift insofar as it introduces no new concepts. Bavinck had previously drawn heavily on the construct of a fundamental principle or central dogma for his concept of a dogmatic system and christocentric exegesis had always informed the basic shape of his theological reflection. Yet it is a significant shift for the fact that it reflects a movement away from the moorings of Reformed Orthodoxy, whether understood according to Bavinck’s own reading of the sources or those that would identify predestination as its material principle. While the Reformed Orthodox identified the knowledge of God, and nineteenth-century figures such as Schweizer identified the doctrine of predestination, Bavinck himself would identify Christology as the fundamental principle of his concept of a system of Reformed dogmatics. Whether this reflects a return to what Richard Muller describes as the “soteriological emphasis and christological centre of the theology of Calvin and his contemporaries,” or the influence of christocentric Ethical theologians, such as Chantepie de la Saussaye, is a line of historical enquiry that warrants further research.128 Yet, articulating precisely how Christology can function as the starting point of a theological system presented insuperable difficulties. These difficulties stem from seemingly irreconcilable elements of Bavinck’s concept of revelation and his concept of a dogmatic system. Revelation in Bavinck takes the form of history. Revelation is irreducibly historical and the successive unfolding of revelation in history forms the necessary condition for its cognition. Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system by contrast is centripetal. The system is determined by a fundamental principle which governs the various relations that

128 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 10.

55

56

Christology and dogmatics

bestow unity on its parts. To his own satisfaction, Bavinck could not reconcile the unfolding of revelation in history with the centripetal structure of a dogmatic system. Christology formed the starting point of the historical development of the dogmatic system and the person of Christ is the centre of revelation, but the precise relationship in which these histories stood to one another defied explanation. Thus, the later Bavinck ceded the legitimacy of the christological division of dogmatics but was unwilling to attempt it. Until the antinomy of the historical and the ideal admitted a more comprehensive solution, Bavinck chose not to commit pen to paper. These tensions notwithstanding, it remains completely clear as to why Bavinck held that Christology must form the starting point of a dogmatic system. As the centre of revelation, the person of Christ comprises the essence of Christianity. A scientific system of the knowledge of God could only reflect the same structure. It would seem, therefore, that Bavinck was convinced that the solution to the Grundlagenkrise of the nineteenth century lay in Christology, yet he was never quite able to articulate the precise form this solution should take. A solution to this crisis would, however, lie not only in being able to articulate the methodological relationship between Christology and dogmatics, but also in being able to articulate the more fundamental methodological relationship between dogmatics and religion. Bavinck accords this important aspect of theological methodology expansive consideration and, as we shall see in the following chapter, Christology plays the central role.

Christology and religion Introduction In the previous chapter we began to explore Bavinck’s concept of a theological system and the place Christology occupies within it. As we saw, Christology forms the centre, even the central dogma, of Bavinck’s concept of a system of doctrine. Any account of the place and purpose of Christology in Bavinck would, however, remain incomplete, were it not to attend to the further qualification of Christology as the “heart” of dogmatics. Bavinck writes, “In it, as the heart of dogmatics, pulses the whole of the religious-ethical life of Christianity.”1 The image of Christology as a beating heart is a striking one. It portrays dogmatics as a dynamic, living entity and Christology as the vital organ of the system. It is also ostensibly organic imagery. As we saw in the previous chapter, dogmatics is an organism, a living and dynamic entity that grows and develops over time. The characterisation of Christology as the heart of dogmatics extends this metaphor, enfolding an additional claim concerning the relationship between dogmatics and religion. As the heart of dogmatics, Christology mediates between the two categories. This additional function is an important one, because in the same way that an ellipse possesses not one but two centres, Christology could, conceivably, constitute the centre of dogmatics without necessarily functioning as its heart. The goal of this chapter is to trace out the relationship of Christology and religion. Yet in order to do so, it is first necessary to consider an earlier statement in Reformed Dogmatics, which identifies mystery as the lifeblood of dogmatics. At first glance it would seem that this takes us far afield from the relationship of Christology and religion. On closer examination, however, one finds that this is not the case. The earlier statement forms the complement of the later statement and provides valuable insights into the heart and lifeblood metaphor. We shall then consider Bavinck’s account of religious subjectivity, in order to ascertain precisely how the religious-ethical life of Christianity animates the dogmatic organism. We shall then return to the heart metaphor and the centrality of the person of Christ for Bavinck’s conceptualisation of objective religion. In both descriptions we see how Bavinck has recourse to the organism, in order to offer an account of the universality and particularity of religion and to articulate what it means for Christology to function not only as the centre, but also the heart, of a dogmatic system.

1 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274.

58

Christology and religion

The lifeblood of dogmatics On the opening page of the second volume of Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck writes, “[m]ystery is the lifeblood of dogmatics.”2 This is no rhetorical flourish. The word mystery can be found on virtually every page of Bavinck’s writings. For example, Bavinck states that the world is full of mystery and is itself a mystery.3 The origin of things is a mystery.4 Gravity and force are a mystery.5 The power of nature is a mystery.6 Animals are riddles.7 The union of body and soul is a mystery.8 Heredity is a mystery.9 Extraordinary personalities are a mystery.10 Every individual person is a mystery,11 but an eternal uncreated person especially is a mystery.12 The Trinity is a mystery.13 The relationship between creation and providence is a mystery.14 The origin of sin and evil is a mystery.15 The incarnation is a mystery.16 Christ’s resurrected humanity is mysterious.17 The life of the church is a mystery.18 The means of grace are a mystery.19 Scripture is an enigma.20 Faith is a mystery.21 Regeneration is mysterious.22 The psychology of religion is a mystery,23 and more specifically, the junction between nerve stimulation and the psychic event is a mystery.24 Epistemology is riddled with mystery.25 Moral life is a riddle,26 as is the connection 2 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.29. 3 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.485, 496; Philosophy of Revelation, 87. 4 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.412, 506. 5 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 93. 6 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.438. 7 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 42. 8 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.583. 9 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.113. 10 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 120. 11 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.69. 12 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.429. 13 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.452. 14 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.608. 15 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.608; 3.53, 69, 72, 101, 109, 145. 16 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274, 301, 304. 17 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.443. 18 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.384. 19 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.484, 532. 20 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.384. 21 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.503. 22 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.592; 4.51, 154, 636. 23 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.586. 24 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 90. 25 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.442; Philosophy of Revelation, 72. 26 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.69.

The lifeblood of dogmatics

between life and suffering.27 Death is a mystery.28 The state of final holiness is a mystery.29 Mortals being rewarded with immortality is a mystery.30 Freedom, responsibility, punishment, suffering, death, grace, atonement, reconciliation, and prayer are all mysteries,31 and consciousness, language, freedom of the will, and religion are all enigmas.32 Christianity as a whole is a mystery, as is existence itself.33 In short, everything is a mystery.34 The first thing which must be observed regarding the frequency with which Bavinck uses this term is how closely this resembles modern theologians at the end of the nineteenth century. Mystery could almost be described as the Leitmotif of modern theology. For example, in the second of the Modern-Positive Vorträge by Richard Grützmacher (1876−1959),35 we read the following: The more recent negative theology actually replaces the term revelation with that of mystery. If one makes the effort to look out for this term in the writings of anyone from this circle, one is astounded how often it is used, to the point that one could virtually deem it the central motif of their theology; in the very least it plays a comparable role to that of the Logos in the theology of the early church.36

Bavinck’s use of the term, however, differs considerably to that of his “negative” contemporaries. Unlike Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, and J.F. Wilhelm Bousset, − theologians Grützmacher singles out for particular criticism − Bavinck does not use the term mystery to denote the tenets of faith as unknowable or inexplicable. Rather, Bavinck’s use of the term is reminiscent of the magisterial Reformers.37 In the Bondage of the Will, Luther opines, “[this] touches on the secrets of His Majesty ... it is not for us to inquire into these mys-

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.176. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.184. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.636. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.439. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.618; Philosophy of Revelation, 198. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.519. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.312; 1.368. “Everywhere and in every area of life we finally run into mystery.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.106. 35 Bavinck cites this lecture in his discussion of the term mystery at the end of the Prolegomena. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.621 n. 55. 36 Richard Grützmacher, “Die Theologie der Offenbarung und die Theologie des Geheimnisses,” in Modern-Positive Vorträge (Leipzig: Deichert, 1906), 38–39. 37 Todd Billings makes this same observation, contrasting Bavinck’s approach to mystery with Gordon Kaufman and Sally McFague. Todd Billings, Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 91.

59

60

Christology and religion

teries, but to adore them.”38 Similarly, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin writes, ‘It is, indeed, true that in the law and the gospel are comprehended mysteries which tower far above the reach of our senses ... his wonderful method of governing the universe is rightly called an abyss, because while it is hidden from us, we ought reverently to adore it.”39 In their emphases on divine mystery neither Luther nor Calvin suggests that God cannot be known. Rather, Luther and Calvin simply maintain that an exhaustive description of what God has revealed exceeds the limited powers of creaturely knowers. Mystery, therefore, presents another example of how Bavinck appropriates an ostensibly modern term within a pre-modern frame of reference.40 Bavinck uses mystery as a limiting concept over and against the doctrine of divine ideas. The doctrine of divine ideas was mediated to Protestant theology by William Ames (1576—1633) and became a common feature of Reformed Orthodoxy.41 In the nineteenth century, the doctrine of divine ideas found new impetus through the revival of scholarly interest in Plato that had flourished in German universities since the 1790s. Bavinck, therefore, may have come into contact with this doctrine through a variety of sources.42 The doctrine of divine ideas traces creation to an exemplar in the divine mind and thus views creation as an instantiation and embodiment of divine thought. This notion appears with some frequency in Bavinck’s writings. For example, we read in Reformed Dogmatics that “the entire world is a revelation of God, a mirror of his attributes and perfections. Every creature in its own way and degree is the

38 John Dillenberger, Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings (Garden City: New York, 1961), 195. 39 Calvin, Institutes I.xvii.2, 1.213. 40 Self-consciousness offers another example. Bavinck connects this distinctly modern idea to the thought of Augustine. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 63, 66. See Pass, “Herman Bavinck and the Cogito,” Reformed Theological Review 74:1 (2015), 30−2. Yet Bavinck also projects ostensibly modern ideas back into the tradition. For example, Bavinck identifies the feeling of schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit as latent in Calvin’s semen religionis. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 43. 41 Muller, “Calvinist Thomism Revisited: William Ames (1576–1633) and the Divine Ideas,” in K. Comerford/G. Jenkins/W. Torrance Kirby (ed.), From Rome to Zurich — Between Ignatius and Vermigli: Essays in Honour of John Patrick Donnelly, S.J. (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 103–20. 42 Van den Belt notes that Kuyper had acquired his knowledge of the doctrine through the works of Jan Woltjer (1848−1917) and Ludwig Schöberlein. Van den Belt, Authority, 267. It is likely that Bavinck was introduced to divine ideas through the same channel as Kuyper, and, as we have seen, Schöberlein is an important source for Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a dogmatic system. See above, p. 35 n. 60. Bavinck’s writings do, however, attest to a familiarity with the doctrine through the writings of Polanus, Zanchius, Aquinas, and the Church fathers. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.206 n. 115. Cf. Sytsma, “Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology,” 46.

The lifeblood of dogmatics

embodiment of a divine thought.”43 Like the first generation of post-Kantian idealists,44 Bavinck was attracted to Neo-Platonism for the potential it held for bridging the gulf Kant’s first Critique had opened between the real and the ideal. Bavinck writes, But the conviction can, therefore, rest only in the belief that it is the same Logos who created both the reality outside of us and the laws of thought within us and who produced an organic connection and correspondence between the two ... But insofar as things also exist logically, have come forth from thought, and are based in thought (John 1:3; Col 1:15), they are also apprehensible and conceivable by the human mind.45

The doctrine of divine ideas thus furnished Bavinck with both a means of maintaining an absolute distinction between God and the world and a means of bridging the epistemological gulf between the ideal and the real. If the doctrine of divine ideas secures divine immanence, the notion of mystery safeguards divine transcendence. This function of the term has been overlooked in the secondary literature, precipitating notable interpretative problems in connection with the relation of revelation and reason in Bavinck.46 One possible reason for this is that Bavinck acknowledges the fact that the New Testament does not use mystery to limit what we can know of God. Bavinck writes, “The New Testament term μυστήριον … does not denote an intellectually uncomprehended and incomprehensible truth of faith but a matter that was formerly hidden in God, was then made known in the gospel, and is now understood by believers.”47 But this is not the primary way in which Bavinck uses the term. More commonly, Bavinck uses the term to indicate something akin to the relative and absolute mysteries described by Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider (1776−1848), whose Systematische Entwicklung aller in der Dogmatiek Bavinck cites in his discussion of the term.48 43 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.530−1. Bavinck also emphasises that the divine intellect alone cannot account for the instantiation of these ideas and that this difference separates Christianity from Platonism. Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 49−50. 44 Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 61, 64, 66. 45 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.231. 46 For example, Eugene Heideman makes the questionable claim that in Bavinck reason knows no limits other than the limits of revelation. Heideman, Revelation and Reason, 236. 47 Bavinck, Reforwmed Dogmatics, 1.620. 48 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.621 n. 55. The English translation identifies Bavinck’s source as the 1841 Leipzig edition, but Bavinck only cites a page number without identifying which edition he consulted. Unfortunately, this page number does not correspond to the discussion of mystery in either the 1819, 1826, or 1841 edition. The relevant passage can, however, be found on pp. 171−3 of the first volume of the 1826 Reutlingen (Grözinger und Schauwecker) edition.

61

62

Christology and religion

Bretschneider unfolds a tripartite taxonomy, according to which mystery can be understood either as a disclosed secret according to the New Testament sense of the term, as relative mystery, or as absolute mystery. The second sense in which Bavinck uses the term mystery corresponds to Bretschneider’s relative mysteries. Like the New Testament sense of the term, the second sense also concerns matters that are inherently apprehensible. It differs, however, from the New Testament sense in one very important respect. Whereas mystery in the New Testament sense refers to a truth that was previously unknown yet is now known, mystery in this second sense of the term pertains to what is presently unknown. Recurrently, this use of the term appears at the conclusion of Bavinck’s not infrequent rhapsodies on the rapid progress of science. Bavinck can regularly be heard waxing lyrical on the subject of scientific progress, yet almost without fail these paeans conclude with a confession that the world remains a mystery.49 For example, in Modernism and Orthodoxy, Bavinck states “[o]n the path of science, according to Pierre Loti who declared some years ago in the French Academy: there opens a door at every turn, which does not lead to the light, but to another, long, dark corridor, at the end of which you again find another door, and so it proceeds endlessly.”50 This second use of the term mystery, therefore, is indicative of the asymptotic character of creaturely knowing. All that exists is inherently knowable,51 yet the human mind will never know all that exists. The third way in which Bavinck uses the term mystery corresponds to Bretschneider’s absolute mysteries. This third sense of the term differs from the second inasmuch as it indicates an entity that defies human reason qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Importantly, many of these mysteries in Bavinck are also mysteries in the New Testament sense. These are mysteries that can be known by faith but remain indemonstrable to reason. For example, Bavinck 49 For example, towards the end of a discussion of the merits of empirical psychology, Bavinck concludes, “[a]fter all physiological investigation the mental act of perception remains as mysterious as before.” Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 72. 50 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie (Kampen: Kok, 1911), 9−10. As such, this second use of the term indicates Bavinck’s verdict on the ongoing Ignorabimus controversy, a controversy concerning the limits of scientific knowledge which had raged for decades following a provocative lecture delivered by Emil Du Bois-Reymond on August 14, 1872 at the 45th Versammlung deutscher Naturforscher und Ärtze. Rather than extolling the powers of natural science, Du Bois-Reymond drew attention to its limits. For an overview of the controversy, see Beiser, After Hegel: German Philosophy 1840−1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 97−132. For Bavinck’s direct engagement with Du Bois-Reymond, see note 13 Philosophy of Revelation, 321−2; “Christianity and Natural Science,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 81−105; De voornaamste problemen der tegenwoordigen dogmatiek bk 11; Bavinck Archive, 57. Historical Documentation Centre, Vrije Universiteit. 51 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 207−8.

The lifeblood of dogmatics

can state that although the Apostle Paul was unable to penetrate the mystery of godliness (1 Tim 3:16), he still knew its content.52 Hence, of mysteries in this third sense there may be γνῶσις, but there is no καταλήμψις.53 Typically, Bavinck uses the term mystery in this sense in connection with the point of contact between Creator and creature. For example, in Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck states “in all that God reveals, we finally encounter an impenetrable mystery at the point where the eternal touches the temporal, the infinite the finite, the Creator the creature.”54 It is important to note that mystery, according to this third sense of the term, not only qualifies the object of knowledge but also the cognitive process under which subjects apprehend the object. This process is often described as “mystical” and invariably pertains to religion. Bavinck writes, Religion is communion with God ... That communion with God is a mystical union. It far exceeds our understanding. It is a most intimate union with God by the Holy Spirit, a union of persons, an unbreakable and eternal covenant between God and ourselves, which cannot be at all adequately described by the word “ethical” and is therefore called “mystical.” It is so close that it transforms humans in the divine image and makes them participants in the divine nature.55

It is important to note that in this description of religion, Bavinck is not simply asserting that the cognitive process resists logical analysis. This knowledge obtains in the mystical union, which for Bavinck bears an ontic dimension and that the faith-knowledge of religion arises from the mystical union. Although this is highly relevant to our purpose, we shall postpone an exploration of the mystical union until the following section. At this point, it suffices to say that the concept of mystery, as understood in the second and third senses of the term, limits the degree to which mundane and extramundane objects may be apprehended by creaturely knowers. Yet this still does not fully explain the function of mystery as the lifeblood of dogmatics. Why would our noetic limitations animate dogmatics? An answer to this question only emerges into view, if one considers why Bavinck thinks that the provisional and incomplete character of creaturely knowing is neither a lamentable consequence of the fall, nor an aspect of our human condition to be rescinded in the future glory. 52 Bavinck, “Het Wezen des Christendoms,” 274; cf. “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 45. 53 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.47. 54 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.93; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.586. 55 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.304. Bavinck is, nevertheless, always quick to dissociate the mysticism he can affirm from the mysticism of figures such as John Scotus Erigena or Jakob Böhme. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.528−9.

63

64

Christology and religion

For Bavinck, creaturely apprehension never passes over into comprehension. Comprehension surpasses knowing that and knowing what, and penetrates to knowing how. As such, comprehension constitutes the knowledge of an object’s inner possibility.56 Only God possesses such knowledge, because he alone summoned the world into being and sustains it by the Word of his power. Because God possesses this knowledge, he possesses the authority to “unknow” the world by destroying it. It is, therefore, only by analogy that creatures might be said to comprehend objects. To a lesser extent, a creature might be said to comprehend objects which they can make or break. An engineer, for example, might be said to comprehend her bridge or a composer his symphony, but even the engineer and composer’s knowledge of these objects is subject to epistemological regress. Bavinck writes, There are few things we comprehend ... I comprehend, or think I comprehend, the things that are self−evident and perfectly natural. Often comprehension ceases to the degree a person digs deeper into a subject. That which seemed self−evident proves to be absolutely extraordinary and amazing. The farther a science penetrates its object, the more it approaches mystery. Even if on its journey it encountered no other object it would still always be faced with the mystery of being.57

Comprehension, therefore, is metaphysically beyond creatures.58 Were human beings able to comprehend rather than merely apprehend objects of knowledge, it would amount to “the deification of humanity and the erasure of the boundary between the Creator and the creature.”59 Apprehension, rather than comprehension, is the knowledge that is proper to creatures. The primary reason Bavinck gives for this is that “comprehension excludes amazement and admiration.”60 In their inability to comprehend, creatures are moved to awe.61 The awe-inspiring function of mystery becomes particularly important when the object under contemplation is God. When creatures apprehend God, they are confronted by transcendent depths that they will never comprehend and “faith turns into

56 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.619; cf. Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 54. Although Bavinck extends comprehension well beyond the categories and forms inherent to a priori synthesis, he echoes Kant in restricting comprehension to the knowledge the creator possesses of the objects of their production. “[R]eason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 109. 57 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.619. 58 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.69; “Kennis en leven,” 225−6. 59 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.190−1; “Kennis en leven,” 224−6. 60 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.619. 61 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap (Kampen: Kok, 1904), 58.

The lifeblood of dogmatics

wonder; knowledge terminates in adoration; and their confession becomes a song of praise and thanksgiving.”62 Thus, it is in the evocation of worship that mystery functions as the lifeblood of dogmatics. In its stimulation of praise, mystery conditions theology as a “doxology to all God’s virtues and perfections, a hymn of adoration and thanksgiving.”63 This doxological definition of dogmatics forms an important qualification of Bavinck’s definition of dogmatics as a science. For Bavinck, dogmatics is a science and for that reason deserves to be practised in the university.64 Nonetheless, it is an irreducibly ecclesial science.65 Dogmatics itself is an act of worship and it is also ordered to further acts of worship. This churchly character of the theological sciences is emphasised in many of Bavinck’s writings, but nowhere more clearly than in his academic orations. For example, The Science of Holy Theology begins with a protest against the secularisation of theology, quoting the following lines of a publication by one of Bavinck’s former professors, Lodewijk Rauwenhoff (1828−89). Theology must be secularised … its right to maintain its place at our universities on an ongoing basis, its prospects of high esteem in the eyes of practitioners of the other sciences, its chances of awakening renewed affection in the next generation, it all depends on the degree to which it satisfies the demands of … secularisation.66

Although the speech defends theology’s status as a science among the sciences, Bavinck also asserts that the practice of this science is a form of worship, and for this reason, Bavinck will define theology as θεοσέβεια, θεοζωια, θεουργια.67 Bavinck takes up this same theme and develop it further in subsequent academic orations. For example, in Religion and Theology, Bavinck declares, “[theology] is a holy work. It is a priestly service in the house of the Lord. It is itself religion, a serving of God in His temple, a devotion of heart and mind to the glory of His Name.”68 It is crucial, however, to observe the contingency of mystery’s function as the lifeblood of dogmatics. Mystery in and of itself does not move creaturely 62 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.584; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.621. 63 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.112. “The more it reflects on God, the knowledge of whom is its only content, the more it will be moved to adoration and worship.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.29. 64 Cf. Pass, “Herman Bavinck’s Religion and Theology: An Introduction,” Reformed Theological Review 77:2 (2018), 75−84. 65 “There can and may never be any talk of a distinction between what is ecclesial and what is scientific.” Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 61. 66 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 6. 67 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 44. 68 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 62.

65

66

Christology and religion

knowers to worship. A doxologically irresponsive mind is still capable of constructing a scientific edifice from the mysteries that have been revealed. In the same way that divine mysteries can elicit fides historica as well as fides salvifica, they can also give rise to a theologia irregenitorum. Bavinck insists, however, that a theology of the unregenerate corresponds as little to true theology as fides historica does to fides salvifica.69 Although Bavinck affirms this possibility, he does not elaborate on precisely how a theology that has mystery for its lifeblood would differ from a theology of the unregenerate.70 Would a theology of the unregenerate be formally identical with a theology wrought in mystical communion with its object?71 It is difficult to imagine how it could be, but Bavinck’s point is clear. Such a theology, however perfectly formed, would remain a mere cadaver. No praise would pulse through its lifeless heart. Mystery, therefore, is a formal property of dogmatics, yet its lifegiving properties are contingent upon the Holy Spirit’s evocation of worship. Dogmatics is vivified when the mysteries the dogmatician apprehends invoke a doxological response. Therefore, the characterisation of the religious-ethical life of Christianity as the lifeblood of dogmatics in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics does not stand in tension with the characterisation of mystery as the lifeblood of dogmatics in the second volume. The identification of the lifeblood of dogmatics with the religious-ethical life of Christianity simply affirms that it is the worship that mystery evokes that animates theology. In the same way that blood itself is not life but stands in an instrumental relationship to corporeal 69 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.615. 70 Interestingly, Bavinck describes a theologia irregenitorum as “form without content” in his first academic oration. Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 43. This statement is more carefully qualified by the paragraph Bavinck added to the 1906 revision of the first volume of Reformed Dogmatics cited above. 71 Bavinck’s description of religion as mystical union is relevant for this question. Bavinck acknowledges an ontological dimension to the believer’s union with Christ. Bavinck denies that the mystical union is substantial or physical, but he insists that the unio mystica exceeds a merely ethical relation, that is, mere agreement of disposition, will, and purpose. The ontic dimension is also confirmed by Bavinck’s description of the mystical union as a union “in being and nature.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.262; 4.250, 577; “Kennis en leven,” 219−20. Presumably, the denial of any substantial union bears reference to any immediate union with the divine nature. The ontological dimension of the union, therefore, would seem to obtain mediately. That is, it involves the believer’s union with the humanity of Christ. As we shall see in the following section, Bavinck attempts to offer an account of the epistemological consequences of the ontological dimension of regeneration in such a way that the structure of our anthropology remains unaltered in the mystical union. Van den Belt’s comments on the way Bavinck grappled with the question of the physical effects of grace are pertinent to this. Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace: A Shift in Emphasis Towards the Internal Work of the Spirit,” The Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29:1 (2011), 51.

Religious subjectivity

life, mystery stands in an instrumental relation to the life of the dogmatic organism. Nonetheless, some important elements of the lifeblood metaphor remain unclear. Under what conditions does the apprehension of mystery become a doxological response and in what relation does knowledge stand to the broader category of religion? Answers to these questions emerge into view, if one takes into consideration Bavinck’s fine-grained description of religious subjectivity. Religious subjectivity Bavinck is highly critical of nineteenth-century concepts of religion. What is intriguing, however, is that Bavinck does not fault them for being too subjective. Rather, they are not subjective enough. For Bavinck, modern conceptualisations of religion invoke an emaciated anthropology. Whereas Jesus defined religious subjectivity in terms of the command to serve the Lord God with all one’s heart, soul, mind, and strength (Luke 10:27), each of the predominant streams of thought in the nineteenth century had reduced religious subjectivity to but one of these.72 According to Bavinck, these streams of thought could be categorised according to whether they had reduced religion to doing, feeling, or knowing. These categories in turn correspond to the predominating influence of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. Conceptualisations that followed Kant defined religion as morality. Thus, religion is not knowing or feeling, but doing. Those that followed Schleiermacher concurred with Kant’s critique of knowledge yet defined religion as feeling. Those that followed Hegel, however, sought a radical reassertion of religion as knowledge, and characterised religion as the penultimate stage of the journey of Geist toward absolute self-consciousness.73 Religion for Bavinck, however, “is other than and higher than all those views; religion must not just be something in one’s life, but everything.”74 The reliability of Bavinck’s reading of these thinkers perhaps requires further investigation, but for our purposes it is interesting to note that Bavinck recognised upstream Christological implications for any diminution of religious subjectivity. If religion is defined in terms of only one faculty, whether it be knowing, doing, or feeling, it opens up the possibility that Christ has left the others unhealed. Reversing the logic of Gregory of Nazianzus’ dictum,75 72 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 48. 73 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.254–68. 74 Bavinck, “The Philosophy of Religion (Faith),” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 29; cf. Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 93−4. 75 “The unassumed is the unhealed.” Gregory Nazianzus, Letter 101, “To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius,” in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (ed.), A Select Library of Nicene and

67

68

Christology and religion

Bavinck reasons that modern conceptions of religion essentially strip the Mediator of one of one or more dimensions of his humanity and, therefore, of one or more of his offices. Bavinck writes, To be a mediator, to be a complete saviour, he had to be appointed by the Father to all three [offices] and equipped by the Spirit for all three offices. The truth is that the idea of humanness already encompasses within itself this threefold dignity and activity. Human beings have a head to know, a heart to give themselves, a hand to govern and to lead; correspondingly, they were in the beginning equipped by God with knowledge and understanding, with righteousness and holiness, with dominion and glory (blessedness). The sin that corrupted human beings infected all their capacities and consisted not only in ignorance, folly, error, lies, blindness, darkness but also in unrighteousness, guilt, moral degradation, and further in misery, death, and ruin. Therefore, Christ both as the Son and as the image of God, for himself and also as our mediator and saviour, had to bear all three offices.76

Thus, Bavinck can offer Christological reasons for why religious subjectivity must be co-extensive with our agency. Bavinck argues that if religion does not embrace all our faculties, doubt is cast doubt on whether Christ assumed a fully human nature. Religion must be viewed as co-extensive with human agency. Yet to say nothing more than this would be insufficient. Religious subjectivity cannot be merely the sum total of the creature’s various capacities and abilities. If this were the case, there would be nothing distinctive in religion and religious subjectivity would simply be subjectivity in general. For Bavinck, religious subjectivity is universal, but it is also particular. In order to articulate the universality and particularity of religion, Bavinck has recourse to the organism. Bavinck explicitly describes both human beings individually and humanity as a whole as an organism.77 Although something of what this means is evident from the context of these statements, careful attention must also be paid to passages where Bavinck does not use the word organism but describes humanity in terms of the formal properties that the organism presupposes. Specifically, Bavinck will describe human beings and humanity as a whole as having a “centre” and as governed by a “fundamental principle” or “animating principle.” Hence, just as the organism is constituted by a centre, or fundamental principle which governs the unity of the whole, so too is humanity. The principle that Post−Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Second Series (14 vol.; New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1905), 7.440. 76 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.367. 77 “[J]ust as the cosmos is an organism and reveals God’s attributes more clearly in some than in other creatures, so also in man as an organism the image of God come out more clearly in one part than another”; “humanity in turn is to be conceived as an organism” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.555, 577.

Religious subjectivity

governs human beings and humanity as a whole is the religious relation. That is, the religious relation governs the multiple relations in which human beings stand, and, for this reason, human beings and humanity as a whole can be characterised as an organism. A good example of this can be found in Bavinck’s discussion of the difference between religion and morality in the Prolegomena. There, Bavinck states that “while human beings stand in a relation to the world, they also stand in a unique and distinct relation to God as a personal being … The relation to God is then the primary and central relation that governs all other human relations.”78 To put this in more philosophical language, one might say that the religious relation conditions the unity of consciousness. But in describing the religious relation as the central relation which governs all relations, Bavinck invokes the organism. Just as the organism is constituted by a centre, or fundamental principle, which governs the unity of the whole, so too is a human being. Another example is to be found in Bavinck’s essay, entitled “Philosophy of Faith.” Bavinck writes, [I]f we want to do full justice to religion, we must return to the central unity in man that is the basis for differentiating his faculties and which in Holy Scripture is often designated the heart, from which proceed all expressions of life in mind, feeling, and will. Reformed theologians sought that central point for religion in (as Calvin called it) the seed of religion or sense of divinity, and in the Christian religion theologians went behind faith and conversion to regeneration, which in principle is a renewal of the whole man. When they took a position in this centre of man, they saw opportunity to avoid all one-sidedness of rationalism, mysticism, and ethicism, and to maintain that religion is the animating principle of all of life.79

Once again, the word organism is not mentioned but the properties of the organism are clearly on view in the portrayal of religion as the “centre of man” and as the “animating principle of all life.” The specific benefit of characterizing religion as an organism is that it offers a philosophical explanation for the universality of religion that will accompany Bavinck’s affirmation of Luke 10:27. Religion, according to Bavinck, is universal because it pervades the entire organism from centre to periphery. Notably, Bavinck connects the idea of the organism to Calvin’s semen religionis. The centre of the organism is the seed of religious subjectivity. Because religion is a seed, it grows and extends to all the various “expression of life.” That is, it extends to mind, feeling, and will. The seed thus distributes religion from the centre to the periphery of our agency. What is especially noteworthy in the passage cited above is the way that the constitutive principle of the anthropological organism undergoes the same 78 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.263. 79 Bavinck, “The Philosophy of religion (faith),” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 29−30.

69

70

Christology and religion

bifurcation as the constitutive principle of the dogmatic organism that was discussed in the previous chapter. In the same way that Bavinck draws a distinction between the principle of the dogmatic system and its living force, Bavinck draws a distinction between the centre and animating power of the religious subject. The heart, Bavinck writes, is the centre of man − its fundamental principle.80 The animating power, however, is regeneration − its living force. This bifurcation serves an Augustinian account of primary and secondary agency. That is, it upholds a strictly monergistic account of religious subjectivity that maintains the integrity of the religious subject. Thus, the Holy Spirit is the animating power and the human heart is the centre of religious subjectivity. Hence, human beings and humanity as a whole are organisms and their subjectivity is organic for the fact that all the relations in which they stand are governed by the religious relation. Before we proceed any further, it is worth briefly noting the Christological benefits of Bavinck’s organic account of religious subjectivity. By portraying religious subjectivity as an organism Bavinck can account for the ontic dimension of the unio mystica in a way that avoids the difficulties one might otherwise encounter in substance metaphysics. Elsewhere Bavinck describes the transformation wrought by the Holy Spirit in the believer’s union with Christ. Bavinck writes, The continuity, unity, and solidarity of the human being are not broken by regeneration. Rather, a tremendously important change is brought about in them … In a very mysterious and secret way regeneration has its beginning and its midpoint in the core of the human personality, in his selfhood, so to speak (Gal 2:20), but from there it spreads out to all the abilities of the person.81

What the Holy Spirit transforms is the “midpoint” of the organism. This transformation conditions the subject as a whole yet because the structure of the organism remains intact, there is continuity of agency and thus of personhood. Precisely what changes is left unstated, yet whatever change does take place affects neither the “continuity,” “unity,” nor “solidarity” of the religious subject. Bavinck’s organic anthropology provides a conceptual apparatus requisite to the affirmation of this transformation. Grace transforms the religious subject in her union with Christ, yet grace does not change either Christ or the religious subject into a different person. Returning to matters more immediately at hand, the organism provides Bavinck with a means of accounting for the universality of religion. The religious relation governs all relations, delivering an inherently religious character to all of the acts of the human subject. But what of religion’s particularity? This 80 “The heart is the centre of religion.” Reformed Dogmatics, 1.266. 81 Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 427.

Religious subjectivity

question could be framed as follows: the religious subject has a centre, but what is the central act that the religious subject performs? Bavinck offers a specific answer. “Knowledge,” writes Bavinck, “is primary. There can be no true service of God without true knowledge.”82 It is important to note how the priority of knowledge corresponds to Bavinck’s philosophy of mind. Bavinck firmly rejects the Kantian notion of a faculty of feeling,83 primarily because it would require the knowledge and the will to cede some of their domain, a move which Bavinck considered to hold disastrous consequences for theology.84 Bavinck acknowledges only two faculties, the faculties of knowing and desiring. Bavinck regards the former to be prior to the latter. However, the knowing faculty is not in and of itself religious in any special sense. On the contrary, religious knowledge is a particular knowledge. Religion “originates only when a human enters into a real personal relation (eene werkelijke, persoonlijke relatie) to the object of those representations.”85 But under what epistemological conditions does one enter into a personal relation with the object of mental representations? Bavinck is reluctant to bind what he regards as ultimately mysterious to the finitude of a philosophical or even theological description. For Bavinck, the knowledge of God “is above the familiar dichotomy of knowing and doing, elevated far above the familiar dichotomy of theoretical and practical, embracing head and heart together and enlisting both understanding and will into its service.”86 Yet 82 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.268. Pace Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern,” 262. For further discussion of this point, see below, n. 84. 83 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 62. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 92. 84 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 69−70. In this passage, Bavinck identifies Schleiermacher’s location of the essence of religion in feeling as a prime example of these consequences. In Beginselen der psychologie Bavinck blames the dualism of theology and science, faith and history, the ethical and metaphysical, grace and nature on granting feeling a domain of its own between the knowing and desiring faculties. Although Bavinck explicitly blames Schleiermacher for this error, he also appropriates much of Schleiermacher’s conceptualisation of religion. This point is made convincingly and in some detail by Cory Brock. Brock’s account of Bavinck’s concept of subjective religion, however, has some inaccuracies. Brock notes that, for Bavinck, feeling is subsumed under the knowing faculty, but then states that religion “is not first a knowing” [italics original]. Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern,” 24, 262. As indicated above, Bavinck states explicitly that religion is first a knowing. The reason that knowledge is primary is that Bavinck acknowledges only two faculties and attributes priority to the intellective faculty (kenvermogen) over the desiring faculty (begeervermogen). Brock’s statements concerning the essence and end of religion also require nuancing. Brock writes, “the heart of religion, rather than a knowing (about) or doing (moral action), is the fact that human beings ‘feel themselves totally dependent’ because ‘human beings are totally receptive and absolutely dependent on God.’” Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern,” 262−4. Because the feeling of absolute dependence in Bavinck is a function of the kenvermogen, knowledge must be said to lie at the “heart” of Bavinck’s conceptualisation of religion. 85 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.266. 86 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 222.

71

72

Christology and religion

in spite of these protestations, Bavinck offers a fairly elaborate answer to this question. In describing the personal relation that is constitutive of the knowledge that lies at the centre of religious subjectivity, Bavinck draws on the distinction in the Dutch language between weten and kennen.87 In broad terms Bavinck uses this distinction to account for the difference between cognitive and pre-cognitive modes of knowing. While this difference yields the particularity of the personal relation, the difference between weten and kennen cannot be accounted for in terms of the difference between impersonal and personal knowledge. Within the framework of Bavinck’s Logos metaphysic all knowledge is personal. Bavinck refuses to dichotomise the knowledge of objects and persons.88 All knowledge is personal for the fact that everything that exists is an embodiment of the Logos, the second person of the Trinity.89 Nevertheless, some modes of knowing are more personal than others. Knowledge conveyed by speech, for example, is more personal for the fact that speech reveals something of the speaker and to the degree that the speaker speaks of themselves, the knowledge imparted becomes all the more personal. Bavinck writes, “words are the expression of thoughts, revelations of a hidden, internal, personal life … In words a person imparts to us their life, their soul, their personality.”90 Knowledge, therefore, lies on a spectrum of increasingly or decreasingly personal knowing. Thus, kennen can be said to be more personal than weten. The difference between weten and kennen, however, is one of kind rather than degree. Weten distinguishes itself from kennen insofar as it consists in the knowledge of causes. Hence, weten is necessary and universal, but kennen is contingent and individual.91 Weten also distinguishes itself from kennen, insofar as weten represents a discursive mode of thought. By contrast, kennen is non-discursive or pre-cognitive. The general features of the knowledge of God in which the personal relation consists, therefore, could be described as follows. It is knowledge that is more personal than impersonal, contingent and individual rather than necessary and universal, and non-discursive rather than discursive. Yet this narrowing still 87 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 233. 88 Bavinck would in likelihood have been attracted to much of Martin Buber’s I and Thou. Bavinck’s Logos metaphysic, nevertheless, resists the exclusivity of “you” and “it” forms of address upon which Buber insists. Bavinck, therefore, could never concur with statements such as, “he is still a metaphor, while you is not.” Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 161. 89 Furthermore, human intellection is actualised in participation with the Logos. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.232. 90 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 208. 91 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 112, 114.

Religious subjectivity

does not yield the particularity of religion. God is but one of many possible objects that might be known in this manner. What is it, then, that qualitatively distinguishes the knowledge of God from the knowledge of any other object and thus establishes the particularity of religious subjectivity? This question cannot be answered without a closer examination of that in which Bavinck understands personal knowledge to consist. Personal knowledge, according to Bavinck, consists in a negation of space. It is “an appropriation of what is outside and facing us, a removing of the obstacles which keep us apart, a negation of the space which separates us.”92 To explain this statement, Bavinck draws on the use of ‫ ידע‬in the Old Testament. The examples of Adam’s knowledge of Eve and God’s electing knowledge of Israel demonstrate that this negation of space has physical, mental, spiritual, transhistorical, and covenantal dimensions.93 As far as this negation of space pertains to the knowledge of God, it is crucial to observe that God’s personal knowledge of the elect originates in eternity and suffuses the whole of salvation history. It is a progressive negation of the space that separates God and humanity that begins with the placing of the angel before the perimeter of Eden to the sounding of the last trumpet. At the Parousia, this negation of space is finally complete. Given that this negation of space has physical, mental, spiritual, transhistorical, and covenantal dimensions, it is plain that it is comprehensive or universal. The negation of space, however, is also particular. It “is a spiritual appropriation, an expression of affinity of soul.”94 We should note, however, that “spirit” and “soul” in Bavinck are not synonyms. Souls are centres of consciousness. Bavinck can speak of vegetative, animal, and human souls as subjects of consciousness.95 What differentiates the human soul from its vegetative and animal counterparts is its spirituality. A distinguishing feature of the spirituality of the human soul is its higher powers of consciousness. To lower consciousness belong the functions of sense, perception, and association. To higher consciousness belong intuition, language, and reason. Because 92 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 233. 93 Hence, Bavinck can also say that “covenant is the essence of religion.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.569. 94 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 233. 95 Bavinck would, therefore, seem to embrace some form of panpsychism. However this ought to be understood, it is clear that Bavinck is a committed anti-materialist. Bavinck mounts a range of arguments in support of a body-soul dualism. Transcendental arguments defend the claim that it is necessary to distinguish between consciousness and the subject of consciousness. Empirical arguments are directed at the insufficiency of strictly mechanical accounts of causality. Bavinck will also argue that materialism cannot offer adequate account of the philosophical problem of individuation. Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 34−42; cf. De overwinning der ziel, (Kampen: Kok, 1916), 12.

73

74

Christology and religion

intuition, language, and reason are higher activities of consciousness, plants and animals can have no personal knowledge of human beings and human beings can have no personal knowledge of plants and animals.96 Spirituality, therefore, is a necessary condition for personal knowledge. Spirituality is not, however, a sufficient condition for personal knowledge. Personal knowledge requires an “affinity of soul.” Here, Bavinck’s distinction between soul and spirit comes to the fore. Angels mirror God in their spirituality but on account of their immateriality, possess no soul.97 Just as there can be no personal knowledge between a human being and an animal for the fact that animals lack higher consciousness, there can be no personal knowledge between angels and human beings for the fact that between angels and human beings there is no affinity of soul. Among creatures, personal knowledge is a capacity which is unique to human beings. Situated between the animals and the angels, possessing both a material body and a spiritual soul,98 human beings alone are capable of personal knowledge. What is crucial in Bavinck’s description of personal knowledge is the way that the criterion of “spiritual appropriation” and “affinity of soul” is sufficiently capacious that it accommodates personal knowledge between human beings, yet it excludes the knowledge of God. For human beings to acquire personal knowledge of God, a Mediator is required. God is Spirit and does not possess a soul. Hence, it is only in union with Christ,99

96 Thus, it is crucial to observe that Bavinck places kennis both above and below weten. Kennen is prior to weten, insofar as weten requires thoughts, and not merely associative representations. Kennen, however, is also posterior to weten, insofar as kennis is also synonymous with verstand. This presents an opportunity for confusion with respect to the relation in which wetenschap stands to kennis. Wetenschap is knowledge, yet it is not intuitive or personal knowledge. Wetenschap is the knowledge of causes and necessary relations and remains qualitatively distinct from intuitive and personal forms of kennis. Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 88−93, 109−14, 125−30. 97 Spirit, therefore, would seem to be “more” immaterial than soul. Materiality and immateriality shall become an important consideration in our later explorations of Bavinck’s anthropology. See below, pp. 161−3. 98 Concerning the human being’s spiritual soul, one encounters an interpretative conundrum very similar to the conundrum of the double referent within the principium cognoscendi internum of theology. Cf. Pass, “Wineskins,” 446−7. Bavinck identifies the Holy Spirit, but he also affirms that the soul animates the body as the living force of religious subjectivity. The problem of the double referent with respect to the human organism can, however, be resolved along similar lines to the resolution of the double referent within the principium cognoscendi internum. In the same way that Bavinck identifies both faith and the Holy Spirit as immanent and transcendent internal principles of the knowledge of God, Bavinck identifies both an immanent and a transcendent principle of organic life. 99 Helpfully, this clarifies what Bavinck means when he states that the essence of religion is mysticism. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.172.

The person of Christ and objective religion

who does possess a human soul, that there can be any personal knowledge of God.100 The particularity of religious subjectivity, therefore, is a personal relation that arises from the knowledge of God that is bestowed on the religious subject in union with Christ. This personal relation comprises a taking up “reality as divine reality into oneself, a conjoining to the person himself of whom the word testifies,”101 and it obtains in the mystical union. In Christ, one takes up reality as divine reality into oneself. The personal relation thus transforms the subject and conditions their entire agency. The religious relation becomes feeling and doing and thus embraces the entirety of the subject. It is this expansive vision of religious subjectivity that Bavinck regards as the life which pulses in the heart of dogmatics: a worship of head, heart, and hands. Given that the religious-ethical life of Christianity arises in a personal relation in and with Christ, it is not difficult to appreciate the centrality of Christology in the relationship between dogmatics and religion. As we now turn to consider the heart metaphor more directly, we need first to consider what thus far has been assumed rather than stated. That is, we need to consider Bavinck’s conceptualisation of religion in terms of the subject-object dichotomy. The person of Christ and objective religion In his conceptualisation of religion, Bavinck draws a distinction between religio objectiva and religio subjectiva. Objective religion concerns that which is normative in religion.102 If subjective religion is what the religious subject knows, does, and feels, objective religion is what ought to be known, done, and felt. Because it is God’s “incontestable and inalienable right to determine how He will be recognised and served,”103 objective religion is parallel to objective revelation. In objective revelation that God makes known objective religion. Bavinck’s assertion that Christology functions not only as the centre but also the heart of dogmatics arises from this congruence of objective religion and objective revelation. Because the person of Christ is the centre of revelation,

100 Hence, in continuity with the Reformed tradition Bavinck regards Christ as the mediator of religion before the fall. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.558. But if affinity of soul is a necessary condition for the personal knowledge of God, would not this make the incarnation more than incidentally necessary? This is another example of the way Bavinck’s commitments lean in the direction of a supralapsarian Christology. 101 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 222. 102 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.238. 103 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 15.

75

76

Christology and religion

he is also the centre of objective religion.104 Yet it is precisely because of this congruence that Bavinck would eventually seek to articulate a positive relation in which Christ stands to other religions. Because all religion, whether true or false, arises as a subjective response to objective revelation (viz. objective religion), Christ also stands in some positive relation to world-religions. Bavinck’s articulation of this positive relation dates from his revision of the Prolegomena in 1906, which reflects a more positive assessment of the merits of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. In what follows, we will trace out these connections in order to show how Bavinck came to regard the person of Christ as the organic constitutive principle of objective religion. We will then briefly consider the way Bavinck then distinguishes true from false religion by means of Hegel’s concept of “absolute religion.” While Bavinck consistently criticised the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, in later he years he came to a greater appreciation of its apologetic usefulness.105 104 Yet, as with our explorations both of the central dogma of Bavinck’s dogmatic system and the lifeblood motif, there is a second potential candidate for the centre or heart of religion, namely, the doctrine of the Trinity. Bavinck writes, “[The doctrine of the Trinity] is the core of the Christian religion, the root of all dogmas, the substance of the new covenant … Truly, it does not concern a metaphysical doctrine or philosophical speculation, but the heart and the essence of the Christian religion … In the doctrine of the Trinity beats the heart of all God’s revelation for the redemption of humanity.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.300−1; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.333. The double referent will be less obvious to those who read Bavinck only in English, as the word “heart” is curiously omitted in the English translation. The identification of the doctrine of the Trinity as the core of the Christian religion is original to the first edition of Gereformeerde dogmatiek and Bavinck leaves it unaltered in the revised version. Cf. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (1897), 2.312. How, then, might we understand this double identification? A few suggestions might be offered. First, Bavinck’s conceptualisation of the essence of Christianity would appear to undergo a parallel process of development. In the same way that Bavinck eventually arrives at the conviction that Christology stands at the centre of a system of doctrine, he eventually arrives at the conviction that the person of Christ constitutes the essence of Christianity. Second, the later identification Christ with the essence of Christianity does not necessarily contradict Bavinck’s identification of the Trinity with the essence of Christianity. As will be argued below, incarnation functions as the constitutive principle of the organism that is the God-world relation. This schema comes to clearer expression in Bavinck’s doctrine of the imago Dei. As we shall see in our exploration of Bavinck’s account of this doctrine, Trinity ad intra yields organism ad extra, but it is specifically the decree to become incarnate that constitutes the organism of God’s external works. See below, pp. 124−5. 105 Van den Belt documents a shift in Bavinck’s thought with regard to the significance of other religions and a greater appreciation for the discipline of religious studies (godsdienstwetenschap) in the period from 1890 to 1910. By way of summary, Van den Belt observes that the “result does not differ too much, but the methodology does.” Van den Belt, “Religion as Revelation? The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View from a Reformed Orthodox to a Neo-Calvinist Approach,” The Bavinck Review 4 (2013), 9−31.

The person of Christ and objective religion

This is most clearly to be seen in the way the later Bavinck could describe all religions as Erlösungsreligionen, or “religions of redemption.” This is absent in the first edition of Reformed Dogmatics but is included in the revision of the Prolegomena published in 1906 and other works of the Amsterdam period. The term originates with Hermann Siebeck (1842−1920), who used it to denote the class of religions which belong to the third and final stage of the history of religions. Passing through previous stages of nature-religion and moralityreligion, redemption-religion represents the final stage of a process of historical development.106 In the first edition of the Prolegomena, Bavinck expresses opprobrium for this schema, as it robs revelation of its supernatural character and resists the Reformed schematisation of the covenant of works and covenant of grace.107 Yet a shift can be discerned in Bavinck’s thought in connection with his engagement with the arguments outlined in Introduction to Religious Studies by Cornelis Tiele (1830−1902). Redemption, according to Tiele, is not the primary characteristic of the socalled higher religions. Rather, it is intrinsic to all religion. Hence, all religions are an expression of redemption-religion. Critics of this conceptualisation of religion would point out that locating the essence of religion in redemption communicates very little about any specific religion, as the evil from which one seeks to be delivered must also be defined.108 This, nevertheless, is precisely what Bavinck found attractive in Tiele’s appropriation of Siebeck’s idea.109 The very indeterminacy of the concept of Erlösungsreligion would allow Bavinck 106 Hermann Siebeck, Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosopie (Freiburg: Mohr, 1893), 101−61. The broader background of the concept is to be found in Hegel and Schleiermacher. Cf. Claus−Dieter Osthövener, “Das Christentum als Erlösungsreligion,” in Ulrich Barth und Claus-Dieter Osthövener (ed.), 200 Jahre “Reden über die Religion”: Akten des 1. Internationalen Kongresses der Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft, Halle 14.−17. März 1999 (Berlin: De Gruyter 2000), 685−97. 107 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (1895), 1.47. 108 Carsten Colpe, “Erlösungsreligion” in Hubert Cancik/Burkhard Gladigow/Matthias Samuel Laubscher (ed.), Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe: Apokalyptik-Geschichte (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990), 2.325. 109 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.286; Philosophy of Revelation, 163. Cf. Cornelis P. Tiele, Inleiding tot de godsdienstwetenschap (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen, 1897–1899), 2.66, 110, 214−15. Bavinck also speaks of a longing for redemption, which is universal to humanity. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.421. A genuine question can be posed to Bavinck at this point. If the religions arise from general revelation, how then can they legitimately be described as Erlösungsreligionen, especially if what distinguishes general from special revelation is its soteriological character? Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.342. Perhaps general revelation only discloses humanity’s need for redemption. This would explain why Bavinck describe false religions as essentially autosoteric. Bavinck, Het Christendom, 23. Yet Bavinck also speaks of general and special revelation intermingling until the call of Abraham. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 188. Hence, false religions appropriate a faint echo of special grace. Presumably this echo is the promise of a redeemer (Gen 3:15).

77

78

Christology and religion

to distinguish between higher and lower forms of religion in a way that does not elide the categories of truth and error.110 Bavinck would conceptualise true religion as the exact correspondence of objective and subjective religion.111 False religion, however, is the incomplete or partial correspondence of objective and subjective religion,112 and this is what allows Bavinck to place Christ in a positive relation to the world-religions. In the same way that evil bears no positive metaphysical status, false religion could be said to represent a privation of the good. False religion, moreover, often reflects some positive moral content. False religion, therefore, could be described as a false appropriation of true revelation. Figures like Mohammed and Buddha ought not be regarded as the instruments of Satan, but as vessels of common grace.113 It is in the later Bavinck’s description of the religions that one recognises the formal properties of the organism not just in the descriptions of objective revelation but also in the descriptions of objective religion. False religion, in the revised Prolegomena, is described as an impure degeneration (onzuivere verbastering) governed by a leading idea (leidende idee) and dynamic power (drijfkracht). All religion, therefore, can be described as an organism. False religion, however, is the unnatural growth of the organism. Bavinck writes, In the religions one then has to distinguish between pure development and impure degeneration ... one must judge the essence of a religion, not by its lowest beginnings, but by its later highpoints, just as one can only know the child from the mature adult and an acorn from the oak that grows from it. But then that highest must already have been inherent in the lowest as its leading idea and dynamic power.114

False religion, therefore, is a neoplasm, a growth in the organism governed by an alien principle and living force. This principle is still redemption, given that all religion is Erlösungsreligion. But the principle of the false organism is a mutation of the true principle.115 The later Bavinck thus appropriates elements of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule in his attempt to portray the unity and diversity of religion as an organ110 111 112 113

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.286; Philosophy of Revelation, 306−7. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.279. Cf. Van den Belt, “Religion as Revelation,” 29. In the early 1890s Bavinck could say that Mohammed and Buddha could not be viewed as instruments of Satan. Bavinck, “Theology and Religious Studies,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 55. Connecting historical faith or false religion to common grace would appear to be a later development in Bavinck’s thought. Cf. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 409, 430. 114 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.289−90; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.317−8. 115 But note that Bavinck can still lay great emphasis on the antithesis of true and false. Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, 85−8, 99.

The person of Christ and objective religion

ism.116 Yet the direction of Bavinck’s logic is important to observe. Bavinck does not adopt the structure of reasoning of the history of religions school. That is, Bavinck does not proceed empirically, observing that redemption is common to all religions and then concluding from this observation that redemption must be the essence of religion. Bavinck commences with the premise that objective religion is co-extensive with revelation and interprets the frequency with which the notion of redemption occurs among the religions as a confirmation of this premise. In other words, redemption is not religious because it is universal, but rather, redemption is universal because it is religious.117 The direction of Bavinck’s logic is especially important to observe in connection with the characterisation of Christianity as “absolute religion.”118 Bavinck maintains that Christianity’s status as the absolute religion cannot be determined by a process of empirical observation. The very notion of absoluteness militates against any such process. “Without a doubt,” Bavinck writes, “nature and history allow us to view magnitudes only relatively. They put no absolute measure in our hands. Faith alone provides this.”119 Absolute religion in particular is especially ill-suited to analysis by the comparative method. Furthermore, how could the absolute Erlösungsreligion be subjected to any kind of evaluation by minds and hearts that themselves stand in need of redemption? On the contrary, absolute religion stands over the knowing subject in authoritative critique and claims its absolute status for itself.120 That is, Christianity proclaims itself to be absolute religion. “The Christian religion presents itself as the absolute religion, it demands and must demand that we take all of our thoughts captive to the obedience of Christ.”121 In this characterisation of Christianity as absolute religion we hear an unmistakable allusion to Hegel, whom Bavinck regarded as the progenitor of the history of religions school.122 For Hegel, absolute religion is the highest 116 For further exploration of Bavinck’s attitude toward the history of religions school, see Jan N. Bremmer, “Een mislukte ontmoeting: Bavinck en de godsdienstwetenschappen” in Ontmoetingen met Bavinck, 47−61. It is noteworthy that Troeltsch also uses the terms principle and essence as functional synonyms, and, as Walter Wyman, notes, this reflects a melding of the Hegelian and Schleiermacherian conceptualisation of Christianity as an ideal, developmental reality. Walter Wyman, The Concept of Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Theological Heritage of Schleiermacher (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 73−8. 117 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.328. 118 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 43−6; The Sacrifice of Praise, 76; Philosophy of Revelation, 222, 228−9. 119 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 43. 120 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.505, 595; “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 41. 121 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 46. 122 Bavinck, “Theology and Religious Studies,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 52–3.

79

80

Christology and religion

manifestation of religion. “The thought, the principle, the idea of absolute religion is … that God, that absolute Being from beyond (das jenseitige absolute Wesen) has become man.”123 Accordingly, absolute religion is a process of selfconsciousness, Geist coming to know itself as universal essence and universal reality. In this process of self-consciousness, the divine source of life which transcends humanity is recognised as its own.124 The decisive event which enables this realisation is the appearance of the unique God-Man for whom absolute Geist became the “I” for consciousness. In Hegel’s view, this is the specific feature of Christianity that qualifies it as absolute religion.125 For Hegel, incarnation represents the human recognition of the compatibility and identity of the categories of divine and human.126 Geist is particularised in the sensibly perceptible man Jesus yet in the man Jesus, Geist remains only immediately self-conscious and has not attained to the notion qua notion. “Geist as an individual self is not yet equally the universal Self, the Self of everyone.” Only as the universal self-consciousness of the community does the individual overcome the disparity of objectivity. Only in the community is Geist realised both in and for itself.127 The allusion to Hegel in Bavinck’s identification of Christianity as absolute religion points to certain similarities between the two thinkers. Both Hegel and Bavinck view Christianity as the highest manifestation of religion. The incarnation also plays a pivotal role in both thinkers’ conceptualisation of absolute religion and Bavinck’s teleological view of revelation resonates with Hegel’s teleological view of the self-consciousness of Geist.128 Nevertheless, the absolute occupies fundamentally different places in the thought of Bavinck and Hegel. Bavinck regarded Hegel’s conceptualisation of religion and philosophy as successive phases of a single process as a “total misconstrual of the essence of religion.”129 For Bavinck, form and content cannot be so mechanically related that complete change in one would leave the other unaltered. Bavinck’s disagreement with Hegel over the relationship of religion and philosophy can 123 Georg W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Realphilosophie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969), 268. 124 Raymond K. Williamson, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 82, 267. 125 Williamson, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, 171. 126 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 3.76−7. 127 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 462−4. 128 “This revelation in Christ and in his Word is a means, not an end … Therefore, the whole of revelation must be transmitted from Christ to the church, from Scripture to consciousness.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.557; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.588. This significance of this statement will be further explored in chapter four. See below, p. 146. 129 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.257.

The person of Christ and objective religion

be traced to a more fundamental disagreement over the relation of essence and existence. In stark contrast to Hegel, Bavinck ascribes priority to the real over the ideal.130 It is because of this fundamental disagreement that Bavinck was more sympathetic to the thought of Schelling. The reassertion of the real over the ideal in Schelling’s late period constitutes a deliberate attempt to invert the Hegelian relationship of religion and philosophy.131 As John Laughland observes, “Schelling believed that Hegelian conceptualism was irreligious because it accorded divine capacities to human reason … His own God, unlike Hegel’s, was absolutely real and revealed.”132 According to Schelling, God is unvordenklich. God is the ultimate reality prior to all thought. Knowledge of the absolute, therefore, is only accessible in divine revelation. To the amusement of many his contemporaries, Schelling sought in the concept of revelation a basis for a new philosophical system.133 The product of a long gestation, Die Philosophie der Offenbarung unashamedly takes aim at Hegel, whose chair Schelling had come to occupy in Berlin. Proceeding from the fact of revelation, the Christian religion is portrayed, not as occupying a penultimate position in the history of Geist, but rather, as its highest and most eminent manifestation.134 For Schelling, the incarnation represents the focal point of this manifestation. Christ is the Inhalt, or content, of Christianity.135 By this Schelling does not mean that Christ is the historical source of Christian doctrine, but that incarnation constitutes the fundamental dynamic within revelation.136 For Schelling, the incarnation is the completion of a process in God. Schelling, however, conceives of this process in such a way that what changes is not who God is for Godself, but God’s external relation to the world. Hence, God the Son is not consubstantial with the Father but is an extra-divine personality, who possesses the divine glory as the actuality of God.137 God

130 “Consciousness presupposes and follows being.” Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 7. 131 This reassertion can also be felt in Schelling’s earlier writings. Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy, 178−9. 132 John Laughland, Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 141. 133 Schelling, System der Weltalter: Münchener Vorlesung 1827/28 in einer Nachschrift von Ernst von Lasaulx (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), 13. 134 Schelling, Sämtliche Werke (2 vol. in 14 pts; Stuttgart/Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856−1861), II.4.34. 135 Schelling, Werke, II.4.35. 136 Thomas F. O’Meara, “Christ in Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation,” Heythrop Journal 27:3 (1986), 278. 137 Schelling, Werke II.4.37, 40.

81

82

Christology and religion

cannot be God apart from Christ, but God remains, nevertheless, who He was before the incarnation.138 It is not difficult to see why Bavinck’s sympathies lay closer to Schelling than Hegel.139 Nevertheless, Bavinck and Schelling ultimately held to very different concepts of revelation. For all Schelling’s insistence on the historical character of revelation, the historical Jesus is still attributed only passing significance in Schelling’s Christology. The person and work of the historical Jesus still belongs to the husk of history that philosophy must penetrate. Hence, for Schelling revelation ultimately resides in a “higher” history rather than in history itself.140 Bavinck recognised this difference and the implications it holds for the concept of revelation. Commenting on Schelling and Hegel’s speculative philosophy, Bavinck notes that “the idea that God becomes man in a specific person and subsequently suffers and dies for the sin of others is unthinkable.”141 Furthermore, in Schelling what is free and personal stands over against that which is necessary and organic. Hence, “in divine understanding there is a system, but God himself is not a system, rather a life.”142 Schelling, therefore, could never describe revelation as an organism, because revelation is free and personal. Despite these differences, Bavinck recognised the considerable explanatory power of the structure of Schelling’s philosophy of revelation.143 Often with explicit reference to Schelling, Bavinck describes Christ as the inhoud, or “content,”

138 For a close analysis of Schelling’s Christology, see Tyler Tritten, “Christ as Copula: On the Incarnation and the Possibility of Religious Exclusivism,” Analecta Hermeneutica 6 (2014), 1−21. 139 Schelling’s name also appears at the head of a list of writers, “who otherwise in many respects oppose the confession of the Reformed church” yet have recognised “the rich meaning of the gospel of grace.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.218 n. 130. An even more remarkable affirmation is Bavinck’s comment that “Schelling’s attempt to interpret mythology along trinitarian lines … is more than a genial fantasy.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.333. 140 Schelling, Werke II.4.219, 249. 141 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.351. 142 Schelling, “Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhangenden Gegenstände,” in Werke I.7.399. 143 George Harinck overlooks the significance of Schelling’s Philosophie der Offenbarung in his exploration of the background of Bavinck’s own work of the same title. George Harinck, “Why was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?” in John Bowlin (ed.), The Kuyper Centre Review Volume Two: Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 27−42. Although Bavinck repudiated Schelling’s theogony, he could see some merit in his speculative trinitarianism. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.111−2; 2.330−1. Moreover, Bavinck cites Schelling’s philosophy of revelation as a precedent for his own. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 24 n. 30, 25.

The person of Christ and objective religion

of Christianity.144 Bavinck utilises the notion of “content” in the same way that Schelling does. For Bavinck, Christ is the fundamental principle of revelation and because Bavinck sees no inherent antagonism between that which is free and personal and that which is necessary and organic, Bavinck can characterise both revelation and a system of dogmatics as organisms. Bavinck thus conflates elements of Schelling’s later religious philosophy with his earlier philosophy of nature. This becomes most apparent in the essay “The Essence of Christianity,” where inhoud and middelpunt appear as mutually explanatory terms. Here, Bavinck characterises Christ not as the preacher of an original Gospel but rather as the content and object, the core and midpoint, of that original Gospel.145 Content and midpoint appear as functional synonyms, indicative of the fact that Christ is the constitutive principle of what is revealed. If one recalls that objective revelation and objective religion are co-extensive in Bavinck, it requires no huge leap to see how the person of Christ can function as the constitutive principle not only of true religion,146 but also of false religion. Thus, it would seem that Bavinck appropriates the structure of Schelling’s philosophy of revelation for the purpose of distinguishing the particularity of Christianity within a universalised concept of religion. Christ is the content of Christianity, which in turn is the “perfect” Erlösungsreligion,147 or the absolute religion. Even though Christ is not the content or constitutive principle of the various organisms that are false religion, there is some residue of objective revelation which is being appropriated in false religion. By virtue of the fact that the person of Christ is the content of this revelation and therefore also of objective religion, he can be placed in a positive relation to these religions. 144 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.321; 3.284 n. 133, 548; “Het wezen des christendoms,” 26; Evangelisatie, 10. 145 “Maar als Christus waarlijk is wat de gemeente van Hem belijdt, als Hij dus maar niet de prediker doch de inhoud en het voorwerp van het Evangelie, ja in zijn persoon en werk het Evangelie zelf is, dan is daarmede het onderzoek naar het wezen des Christendoms nog niet ten einde gebracht ... Want juist omdat Hij de inhoud en het voorwerp, de kern en het middelpunt van het Evangelie is, is Hij er de oorsprong niet van, noch het einddoel.” Bavinck, “Het wezen des Christendoms,” 26; cf. “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 46−7. The English translation masks this parallel, by mistakenly rendering the term inhoud as “subject” rather than content. 146 Bavinck’s identification of Christ as the essence or content of Christianity should not, however, be understood as an abstraction of the person from, or the privileging of the person above, the work of Christ. Bavinck explicitly rejects the assertion that the mystical union constitutes the essence of religion for the fact that it does exactly this. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.392. This is also the reason why the mystical union cannot be the centre of Bavinck’s theology. 147 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 46. See also the important discussion of the essence of objective religion in Bavinck’s Stone lectures, where Bavinck places the claim that Christ is the essence of Christianity in a salvation-historical context. Philosophy of Revelation, 192−3.

83

84

Christology and religion

It is precisely the ascription of the content or essence of Christianity to the person of Christ that allows Bavinck to do this. Yet this is not the only reason that Bavinck identifies the content or essence of Christianity with the person of Christ. Essentialising Christianity in this way also allows Bavinck to differentiate true from false religion within Christianity. In an age of increasing pluralism, Bavinck sought to articulate an objective minimum by which true religion could be identified. Bavinck writes, “Here the ways part, not between Roman Catholics and Protestants, between orthodox and liberals, or between whatever churches and parties, but between those who accept this witness of Jesus in a childlike manner and those who reject him, if not by mouth, certainly with their hearts.”148 In this regard, Bavinck’s essentialisation of Christianity serves the same ends as Clive S. Lewis’s notion of “mere” Christianity.149 Bavinck seeks to define true religion in such a way that denominational boundaries and the divisions between intellectual factions are rendered relatively porous.150 At the same time, Bavinck also seeks to quarantine true religion from what he regards as an invidious threat. Bavinck writes, Today there are many who seek a middle road, who are willing to know about Jesus but only a Jesus who was the first and the clearest in explaining the gospel of the fatherhood of God. They talk about the Christentum Jesu as true Christianity. They consider Jesus not as the Christ but as the first, outstanding Christian. They are willing to be part of a faith like that of Jesus, or a faith through Jesus, meaning a faith that was first made possible through Jesus and that is created and strengthened by being impressed with his person. But they have no need for a faith in Jesus, a faith that is directed to Christ himself, and in him directed to the Father. Such people are in an equivocal position: they appeal to Jesus but actually deny him. If Jesus is not the Christ, the anointed of the Father, the mediator of God and men, then he is nothing special to us. He is on a par with all other founders of a religion and with all preachers of morality and our Christian religion is no more than a sublimer Nomismus as Lepsius called it and does not rise above the Jewish view of the gospel.151

In a rare moment of unguarded speech, Bavinck identifies this threat as apostasy and there is no mistaking whom Bavinck has in mind. Harnack’s Christianity

148 Bavinck, “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 46. 149 Clive S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (London: Fontana, 1955). 150 Bavinck, De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk (Kampen: Zalsman, 1888); cf. “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 27:2 (1992), 220−51; Modernisme en orthodoxie, 18−23. Bavinck’s irenicism is well documented in the secondary literature. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 385; Brock and Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck’s Reformed eclecticism,” 313–19. 151 Bavinck, “The Essence of Christianity,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, 46.

Conclusion

is Judaism by another name.152 As we shall see in greater detail in the following chapter, the deity of Christ is an irreducible minimum in Bavinck’s estimate of true religion. The strands of Protestantism that do not acknowledge the deity of Christ, therefore, are manifestations of false religion.153 Bavinck thus portrays objective religion as an organism in which the person of Christ forms its constitutive principle. The person of Christ functions as this principle because objective religion is coextensive with objective revelation and the person of Christ constitutes the centre of the latter category. Although it departs from the leading idea and living force of the true organism, false religion retains a residue of the true because it represents a false appropriation of true revelation and because Christ is the content of that revelation, he can be placed in a positive relation to false religion. The assertion that Christology functions not only as the centre but also the heart of dogmatics arises from this relation in which objective religion stands to objective revelation. The Bavinckian system, therefore, could never be governed by two centres, one charged with the responsibility of organizing its dogmatic material and the other with the task of mediating its religious lifeblood. Christology necessarily forms the nexus of dogmatics and religion. In the same way that the person of Christ is definitive for true and false religion, Christology is determinative for whether dogmatics will live or die. That is, if material Christology moves beyond certain parameters, the organism risks heart failure. Conclusion “Religion,” Bavinck writes, must “be the element that inspires all theological research. It must be the heartbeat one hears softer or louder in every dogma.”154 The heart and lifeblood metaphor gives expression to this conviction. The heart of dogmatics is indicative of the place Christology occupies in the relationship between dogmatics and religion. Christology stands at the nexus of dogmatics and religion as the doctrinal formulation of that which comprises the essence of objective religion. The heart metaphor communicates something akin to what Calvin expresses in his Institutes, when he states, “We see our whole salvation and all its parts are comprehended in Christ.”155 What is distinctive to Bavinck, 152 Cf. Johannes Lepsius, Adolf Harnack’s Wesen des Christentums (Berlin: Reich Christi-Verlag, 1903), 23−5. 153 Berkouwer accords insufficient weight to these clearly marked lines of exclusivity. Berkouwer, Zoeken en vinden: herinneringen en ervaringen (Kampen: Kok, 1989), 47−8. 154 Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 62. 155 Calvin, Institutes, II.xvi.19, 1.527.

85

86

Christology and religion

however, is a more fine-grained account of the relationship between true and false religion. If objective religion is conceptualised as being co-extensive with revelation, then one must be able to articulate the relationship in which the person of Christ stands to false religion. In order to do this, Bavinck draws on the same organic conceptualisation of revelation from which objective religion necessarily arises. Objective religion is an organism in which the person of Christ functions as its constitutive principle. Within this construct, Bavinck reconciles the immanence of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule with the transcendence of Schelling’s late religious philosophy. Objective religion is an organism which develops according to a fundamental principle. This principle, however, is not to be found in a “higher” history, but in history itself, in Jesus of Nazareth. False religion represents an aberrant growth in the organism because it departs from this fundamental principle as it unfolds in history. The lifeblood metaphor forms the complement of this account of objective religion. Whereas the heart metaphor gives expression to the proper coordination of dogmatics to objective religion, the lifeblood metaphor gives expression to the proper coordination of dogmatics and subjective religion. Subjective religion nourishes the life of the organism. The lifeblood metaphor, therefore, communicates something very similar to what Calvin asserts in the Institutes, where he writes, “we cannot say that, properly speaking, God is known where there is no religion or piety.”156 What is distinctive to Bavinck, however, is his more fine-grained religious anthropology. Bavinck reaffirms that the heart of religion is the firm and certain knowledge of faith in Jesus Christ, yet in a highly creative way that navigates a path between the Schleiermacherian, Hegelian, and Kantian alternatives of the nineteenth century. With Schleiermacher, Bavinck can affirm the essence of subjective religion as mysticism. With Hegel, Bavinck can identify the particularity of subjective religion with knowledge. With Kant, Bavinck can emphasise subjective religion as the ethical life of Christianity. Bavinck’s organicism, however, avoids the one-sidedness of these thinkers. Knowledge is primary yet in the initiation of a personal relation with the divine object of knowledge, this knowledge unfolds the entire religious-ethical life of Christianity. Christology, therefore, forms the nexus of religion and dogmatics. Objectively, Christology is the heart of the organism, the doctrine which mediates the religious lifeblood from centre to periphery. Subjectively, the religious lifeblood is quickened in the union with Christ. Thus, the heart and lifeblood metaphor gives expression to the relationship between Christology and religion, viewed through the lens of the subject-object dichotomy. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that religion, and especially mystery, performs a central 156 Calvin, Institutes I.ii.1, 1.39.

Conclusion

role in Bavinck’s material Christology. As we shall see in the following chapter, Christology, for Bavinck, is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας.

87

Chalcedon and modernity Introduction Thus far we have considered the implications of Bavinck’s claim that Christology forms the centre and heart of a dogmatic system. In the first chapter we examined the sense in which Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system can be described as christocentric and the limitations Bavinck places on Christology as the centre of a dogmatic system. In the second chapter we considered the relationship between dogmatics and religion and the central place Christology occupies in this relationship. In both chapters, the organism looms large. Repeatedly, Bavinck has recourse to the formal properties of the organism in order to offer a more philosophically robust account of the theological claims he is advancing. We now turn to Bavinck’s material Christology with the purpose of observing how the concrete particulars of the doctrine that comprises the centre and heart of dogmatics shed light on Bavinck’s theological method. As we shall see, Bavinck’s Christology illustrates much of what we have encountered thus far. In particular, Bavinck’s account of the person of Christ also provides a good example of where he thought dogmatics needed to develop and where it must remain the same. Our explorations begin with the methodological claim of our programmatic statement, namely, that the “mystery of godliness” must form the starting point of Christology. The clarity of this statement notwithstanding, it is a statement that requires some unravelling. Patience with this process, however, yields a clear picture of the premium Bavinck places on the deity of Christ and the priority he accords the church’s confession. From here we proceed to Bavinck’s account of Christ’s humanity. Bavinck’s account of the humanity of Christ evidences a critical yet appreciative appropriation of modern theology and an attempt to advance Chalcedonian Christology beyond its perceived inadequacies. In closing, we shall consider what light these aspects of Bavinck’s Christology shed on a topic which has attracted considerable attention in the secondary literature, namely, the relationship between orthodoxy and modernity in Bavinck’s thought. We shall consider the way that Bavinck’s own efforts to chart a course between these straits brought him to reconsider the explanatory power of deductive principles, whether orthodox or modern. We shall also consider whether the doctrine that comprises the centre and heart of Bavinck’s theology presents an heuristic device for understanding the relationship between these elements of his thought.

90

Chalcedon and modernity

The starting point of Christology In the programmatic statement, the implications of which we have been tracing, Bavinck plainly identifies a methodological starting point for Christology. Immediately following his comments regarding the function of Christology as the centre and heart of dogmatics, Bavinck declares, “[Christology] is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας (1 Tim 3:16). The whole of Christology has to proceed from here.”1 Despite the clarity of this statement, ambiguities arise when one begins to consider what it actually means. For example, does the mystery of godliness function as a material or merely formal starting point, and what precisely does Bavinck understand under the phrase, “mystery of godliness”? In order to grasp the meaning of this polysemous phrase, it is necessary to attend to the contours of the broader argument Bavinck has been mounting up to this point in his account of the person of Christ. Paragraphs 358–61 of Reformed Dogmatics present a there-and-back-again narrative concerning the deity of Jesus of Nazareth in modern Christology.2 Beginning with Kant, the narrative traces the various ways in which the deity of Christ had been set aside. Covering a range of important figures including Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling, the narrative concludes with the renaissance of high Christology at the dawn of the twentieth century. Here, Bavinck cites Johannes Kunze (1865−1927), Peter T. Forsyth (1848−1921), Johannes Steinbeck (1873−1968), Carl Braig (1852−1923), Paul Arnal (1871−1950), Andrew M. Fairbairn (1832−1912), and Johannes Baljon (1861−1908) as theologians in whose writings “the truth and value of the deity of Christ has again been rightly placed in the foreground.”3 Although this story is ostensibly set in the nineteenth century, Bavinck tells it in a way that emphasises that the denial of Christ’s deity is not a modern phenomenon. Indeed, Bavinck views many of the christological views he discusses as modern recurrences of the ancient heresies.4 Bavinck’s assertion that the mystery of godliness must form the starting point of Christology comprises the denouement of this longer narrative, which would suggest that the mystery of godliness invokes the deity of Christ. In support of his assertion, Bavinck identifies several reasons why the deity of Christ must form the starting point of Christology, each of which is related to theology’s calling to preserve true religion.5 We will recall that Christology forms the nexus of dogmatics and religion. The “life” of both, therefore, depends 1 2 3 4 5

Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.259−74. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.273 and note. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.259. For theology’s role of preserving true religion, see Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 57−8.

The starting point of Christology

on this doctrine not transgressing certain boundaries. In Bavinck’s material Christology we see that the deity of Christ comprises one of these boundaries. If Christology does not adopt the deity of Christ as its starting point, the dogmatic lifeblood becomes vulnerable to septicaemia. Bavinck writes, “the Christian religion, that is, the true fellowship between God and humans, can be maintained in no other way than by the confession of the deity of Christ.”6 Yet one might well ask, on what grounds can Bavinck make such an assertion? There are multiple ways in which the person of Christ might be maintained as the content or essence of Christianity apart from a confession of his deity. In support of this assertion, Bavinck offers two reasons. First, for Christ to fulfil his mediatorial office, he must be divine. Nothing short of the hypostatic union could equip the person of the mediator to establish the religious relation between God and man and as we have seen, this relation arises from a personal knowledge of God which obtains only in union with the mediator.7 Christ’s deity, therefore, forms the presupposition of communion between God and creatures. Bavinck writes, “For if the incarnation is impossible either from the side of God or from the side of humankind, then neither can religion truly consist in communion between God and creatures.”8 Second, for Christ to be the content or essence of Christianity, he must be its object of worship. The worship of a sub-divine Christ would be tantamount to idolatry, because deity is the only ground which justifies worship. Christ must, therefore, be held to be divine.9 Bavinck writes, “For if Christ is not truly God, he is only a human being. And however highly he may be placed, he can neither in his person nor in his work be the content and object of the Christian faith.”10 The reasoning is cogent, yet a host of possible counterarguments could be raised. There are multiple ways of conceptualizing mediation that would not necessarily compromise an absolute distinction between Creator and creature.11 Similarly, the worship of a Christ who is not the God-Man yet is in some sense 6 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.284. 7 See above, pp. 74−5. Hence, even in the state of integrity, Bavinck grounds the religious relation in the Christus incarnandus, the mediator unionis. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.558; 4.685; De algemeene genade (Kampen: Zalsman, 1894), 41. 8 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.305. 9 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.286, 318−9. It is pertinent to note that Bavinck expresses his appreciation of the efforts of the mediating and speculative theologians who sought to recover the centrality of Christ in religion and dogmatics. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.300. Nevertheless, because these theologies fail to uphold the personal deity of Christ, they compromise the Church’s worship. 10 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.284. 11 For example, mediation of the divine could be viewed as a property of creaturely consciousness. Dalia Nassar, “Immediacy and Mediation in Schleiermacher’s ‘Reden Über Die Religion’” The Review of Metaphysics 59:4 (2006), 807–40.

91

92

Chalcedon and modernity

divine might be justified in several ways.12 As if anticipating such a response, Bavinck mounts an argument that exposes the consequences of worshipping a sub-divine Christ. Bavinck writes, As soon as one has taken this position, reverence for the person of Jesus falls away. The attempts to hold Paul, John, or the church in general responsible for the creation of the dogmatic Christ all still proceed from a certain piety toward the person of Jesus. One tries to safeguard him from the delusions, which his disciples formed with respect to his person and thus, in a certain sense, excuse those errors. Yet with further development this need also falls away. Reverence toward the person of Jesus no longer exerts any restraint. Jesus himself was already complicit in the errors of his church. The so called historical explanation leads to the mythological and the symbolic, and these in turn prepare the way for the psychological and the pathological … there have in recent years arisen men who regard Jesus as a victim of heredity who suffered from epilepsy, paranoia, and hallucinations, who fostered megalomaniacal ideas about himself, and when he became disillusioned in his expectations with respect to people, he sought to get back on top by a tour-de-force.13

Bavinck argues, therefore, that denying the deity of Jesus of Nazareth is a slippery slope. Once the ground of Jesus’ deity has been ceded, reverence for Christ devolves into irreligion. Although slippery slope arguments are notoriously “slippery,” it has to be acknowledged that Bavinck can cite some extraordinary examples in support of his contention.14 Yet any self-respecting Ritschlian or Schleiermacherian would (presumably) have been just as appalled as Bavinck by portrayals of Jesus as a paranoid, epileptic megalomaniac. Moreover, any self-respecting Ritschlian or Schleiermacherian would also strongly object to the claim that their christologies stand in any causal relation to such portrayals. Again, as if anticipating this response, Bavinck garners support from the bellicose critic of liberal Protestantism, Eduard von Hartmann (1842−1906).15 12 Bavinck himself discusses a number of these potential justifications. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.317. 13 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.251−2; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.271−2. 14 Albert F. B. den Dulk, Der Irrgang des Lebens Jesu (2 vol.; Stuttgart: Dietz, 1884−5); Jules Soury, Jésus et la religion d’ Israël (Paris: Fasquelle, 1898); Emil Rasmussen, Jesus: Eine vergleichende psycholopathologische Studie (Leipzig: Zeitler, 1905); Georg Lomer, Jesus Christus vom Standpunkt des Psychiaters (Bamberg: Handels−Druckerei, 1898); Charles Binet-Sanglé, La folie de Jésus (2 vol.; Paris, 1908−10); Arthur Heulhard, La mensonge Chrétien (Jésus Christ n’a pas existé)(Paris: A. Heulhard, 1908); Oskar Holtzmann, War Jesus ekstatiker? (Tübingen: Mohr, 1903); Julius Baumann, Die Gemütsart Jesu nach jetziger wissenschaftlicher, insbesondere jetziger psychologischer Methode erkennbar gemacht (Leipzig: Kröner, 1908). See Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics 3.272 n. 89. 15 While today Von Hartmann is largely forgotten, in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century he enjoyed considerable fame. Von Hartmann’s Philosophie des Unbewussten ran to eleven editions during in his own lifetime. Bavinck’s interest in Von Hartmann accords with their

The starting point of Christology

While von Hartmann was no friend of orthodoxy,16 he regarded liberal Protestantism as a subversion rather than recovery of original Christianity.17 In Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen Theologie, von Hartmann writes, Liberal Protestantism could no longer in any sense claim the right to assert that it remains within Christianity, besides which, with all its shallow optimism and trivial deism, it was just as incapable of presenting religious needs with a useful conceptual basis to replace what it had abandoned as the Straussian materialism, and that it was, to put it in a nutshell, equally irreligious and unchristian.18

Whatever the merits of Von Hartmann’s arguments or of the various reasons Bavinck gives for the claim that the deity of Christ forms the only bulwark against irreligion, it is important to note that the warrant rests elsewhere. These arguments support Bavinck’s contention, but ultimately the deity of Christ is upheld on the basis of the church’s confession. If we return to Bavinck’s statement that the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας must form the starting point of Christology, we should recall that Bavinck has also just described the renaissance of high Christology at the end of the nineteenth century as a restoration of the bond that must be preserved between dogmatics and the church’s confession.19 Moreover, 1 Timothy 3:16 numbers among the oldest Christian confessions.20 Hence, in asserting that the mystery of godli-

16

17

18

19 20

common interest in Schelling. Von Hartmann identified Schelling as the decisive influence on his thought. Beiser, After Hegel, 185 and notes. Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophie des Unbewussten (Leipzig: Haacke, 1902), xiii. Von Hartmann did not criticise liberal Protestantism because he sought to defend historical Christianity. Rather, Von Hartmann’s speculative religious philosophy called not only for new wineskins, but also for new wine. Eduard von Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen Theologie (Berlin: Duncker’s Verlag, 1880), 28−9. Bavinck also draws on other radical figures, such as Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Overbeck, in his critique of liberal Protestantism. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.352 n. 102; Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 10, 35, 39; Hedendaagsche moraal (Kampen: Kok, 1902), 44, 73−4. Karl Barth too would employ the same strategy. Ryan Glomsrud, “The Cat-Eyed Theologians: Franz Overbeck and Karl Barth,” Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 16:1 (2009), 37−57. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.261 n. 58. In rendering Selbstzersetzung as “self-replacement,” the translator appears to have confused the German term Zersetzung (subversion) with Ersetzung (replacement). Von Hartmann, Krisis, vii. This is Von Hartmann’s own summary of his Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft (Berlin: Dunckers, 1874). For an analysis of Bavinck’s appropriation of von Hartmann, see Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 123−50. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.273−4 and notes. “The common Hellenistic term ὁμολογουμένως occurs only once in the Past., where it serves to introduce the hymn to Christ in 1 Tim 3:16 … Perhaps there is here for primitive Christianity an echo of the concept of ὁμολογία.” Otto Michel, “ὁμολογέω,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (ed). Gerhard Friedrich, (10 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964−76), 5.213.

93

94

Chalcedon and modernity

ness is the starting point of Christology, Bavinck is asserting that the church’s confession must form the starting point of Christology. Here, the influence of Martin Kähler (1835−1912) is palpable.21 For Kähler, “Christian language about Christ must always take the form of a confession or a dogma.”22 The reason for this is that the testimony of the Apostles is the only access we have to Jesus of Nazareth and these testimonies are confessions of faith. The apostolic witness does not consist of “reports of impartial observers who have been alerted to [Christ’s] presence, but, rather, the testimonies and confessions of believers in Christ.”23 Throughout his account of the person of Christ, Bavinck reiterates Kähler’s claims. Bavinck emphasises that the sources in our possession are insufficient for the writing a biography of Jesus, that the apostolic preaching is the only explanation that can be given of Jesus’ life and works, and that attempts to do otherwise always lead to a minimisation or outright denial of Jesus’ deity.24 Bavinck’s christological method, nevertheless, differs from Kähler’s in one crucial respect. Kähler avoided drawing a clear distinction between the content of Christianity and its foundation, largely because he eventually came to reject the inspiration of Scripture.25 Kähler wrestled with the inspiration of Scripture for many years,26 but ultimately drew the conclusion that the doctrine was incapable of insulating Christian faith from the deleterious effects of historical criticism. For Kähler, defending the accuracy of every detail of the biblical text was a methodological burden too heavy to bear, because even the most trivial detail potentially endangered what was irreplaceable in Christianity, namely, faith in divine revelation.27 Kähler could uphold Scripture as the normative 21 Kähler is also a decisive influence on some of the theologians Bavinck cites who led the renaissance of high Christology at the end of the nineteenth century. Eckhard Lessing, Geschichte der deutschsprachigen evangelischen Theologie von Albrecht Ritschl bis zur Gegenwart Band 1: 1870−1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2000), 327; Alistair McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology 1750−1990 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 112. 22 Martin Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), 68. 23 Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus, 92 (italics original). 24 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.407. Bavinck cites Martin Kähler, Der sogennante historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus (Leipzig: Deichert, 1892); Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung (Leipzig: Deichert, 1898); Angewandte Dogmen 2nd edn; (Leipzig: Deichert, 1908). 25 Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus, 113−6. Cf. Martin Mencke, Erfahrung und Gewissheit des Glaubens: das Gewissheitsproblem im theologischen Denken Martin Kahlers (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2001), 93−100. 26 Christoph Seiler, Die theologische Entwicklung Martin Kählers bis 1869 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1966), 78. 27 Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus, 114. It is pertinent to note that Kähler’s rejection of the doctrine inspiration is connected to his identification of the doctrine with Irrtumslosigkeit.

The starting point of Christology

source (Quelle) of theology,28 but not as theology’s foundation. Rather than affirming Scripture as the foundation of theology, Kähler preferred to speak of Jesus’ saving work being “accessible” in the church’s confession.29 The ambiguity of this position was not lost on Kähler’s contemporaries. Wilhelm Herrmann (1846−1922), for example, criticised Kähler precisely for this failure to distinguish between faith’s foundation and its content.30 If the church’s confession should simply be accepted as Kähler would lead one to believe, then the church’s confession is functioning as the foundation of the Christian religion. If, however, the church’s confession is not the foundation of faith, then the claim for its authority is left unaccounted for. Herrmann’s perceptive critique of Kähler demonstrates the material difference between Kähler and Bavinck’s affirmation of the church’s confession as the starting point of Christology.31 Unlike Kähler, Bavinck draws a clear distinction between foundation and content. For Bavinck, Christ is the content of Christianity, but Scripture is its foundation.32 Thus, when Bavinck speaks of the church’s confession as the starting point of Christology, it is the church’s inscripturated confession to which he refers. Bavinck, therefore, agrees with Kähler that the preached Christ is the real Christ. Yet the preached Christ is the real Christ in Bavinck because the real Christ simply is the Jesus of history.33 It is important to note that the express purpose of Kähler’s refusal to identify Scripture as the foundation of theology was to evacuate Scripture from the range of historical critical enquiry. Kähler sought to secure the dogmatic use of Scripture within a sturmfreies Gebiet, or a “safe-zone.” Bavinck, by contrast,

28 29

30

31

32 33

Notably, Bavinck’s account of the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture studiously avoids the language of infallibility or inerrancy. Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus, 143; Kähler, Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre (Leipzig: Deichert, 1893), 48−52. Kähler, The So−Called Historical Jesus, 114. Martin Mencke offers an excellent summary of Kähler’s position: “Therefore, the content of faith ought not merely be derived from the individual believer or from a general notion of God-consciousness. The content of faith explicates faith and its experiences in their givenness, because it does not understand itself by itself, from itself. Rather, in light of its content, faith becomes intelligible to itself. The consciousness of the Christian serves not as the source (Fundort) but vantage point (Standort) for apprehending the articles of faith.” Mencke, Erfahrung und Gewissheit des Glaubens, 266. Hayo Gerdes, “Die durch Martin Kählers Kampf gegen den ‘historischen Jesus’ ausgelöste Krise in der evangelischen Theologie und ihre Überwindung” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 3:2 (1961), 186. Herrmann and Bavinck are in agreement about what is lacking in Kähler, but they offer very different solutions. For Bavinck’s criticisms of Hermann, see Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.68, 545−6, 558. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.279. And this is why Bavinck could never have inspired the dialectical theology of the twentieth century in the way that Kähler did.

95

96

Chalcedon and modernity

had no such intentions. Like Kähler, Bavinck welcomed historical critical enquiry, yet unlike Kähler Bavinck expressed confidence that its results would eventually vindicate the claims of the church’s confession. “As does the study of Scripture, so also does dogma-historical research always again set the seal of truth on the church’s confession of the deity of Christ.”34 This confidence should not, however, be taken to imply that Bavinck admits any burden of historical proof. Bavinck accords historical enquiry merely a posteriori significance in his methodology.35 Partly, this is because historical enquiry at best yields a contingent certainty.36 Historical certainty, therefore, cannot function as a theological a priori.37 For Bavinck, the requisite certainty can only be found in the conviction that God has spoken.38 The certainty of faith is thus a divine certainty into which the church is admitted. It arises from the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, who bears witness to the Word of God.39 By securing the certainty of faith in this way, Bavinck can adopt an offensive, rather than

34 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.284. To an extent, this confidence has paid dividends, inasmuch as the worship of a divine Christ is now generally thought to be original to (at least strands of) first−century Christianity. Murray J. Harris, Jesus as God: The New Testament Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992); Richard J. Bauckham, “The Sonship of the Historical Jesus in Christology” Scottish Journal of Theology 31:3 (1978), 248−60; Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006); Martin Hengel, Studies in Early Christology (London: T & T Clark, 1995); Nils A. Dahl, Jesus the Christ: The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991); Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2005); Simon J. Gathercole, The Pre-Existent Son: Recovering the Christologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). 35 Thus, the findings of Wilhelm Baldensperger (1856−1936) feature prominently in Bavinck’s account of Jesus’ Messianic consciousness but they do not function as load-bearing beams in his argument. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.248−9 and notes. Interestingly, Bavinck on occasion cites critical scholars such as Carl Heinrich von Weizsäcker (1822−99) and Julius Wegscheider (1771−1849), in order to defend the continuity of the presentation of Jesus in the Synoptics with the apostles’ presentation of the Christ. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.252 n. 28, 283 n. 130. 36 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.314. 37 “For a dogma is not based on the results of any historical−critical research but only on the witness of God, on the self-testimony of Holy Scripture.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.441. 38 Bavinck’s Prolegomena is essentially a trinitarian exposition of the phrase, Deus dixit, which bookends the volume. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.30, 590. The phrase is appropriated from the Syntagma Theologiae Christianae of Amandus Polanus (1561−1610). Van den Belt, Authority, 243. 39 For a detailed examination of this issue, see Herman Bavinck and Henk van den Belt, Geloofszekerheid (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2016).

The starting point of Christology

merely defensive, posture toward the threat posed by historical criticism.40 The best example of this strategy can be found in the fifth of Bavinck’s Stone lectures. After playing off historicism and positivism, Bavinck elevates Dilthey’s observation concerning the significance of Christianity for the development of universal history to a normative claim.41 That is, Bavinck makes the person of Christ the transcendental postulate that secures the possibility of history.42 Hence, Bavinck does not seek to liberate the church’s confession from history, but rather makes it the presupposition of history.43 Bavinck’s prioritisation of the church’s confession, therefore, is both like and unlike Martin Kähler’s. Like Kähler, Bavinck alleviates himself of the need to demonstrate that the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith are one and the same but in stark contrast with Kähler, Bavinck does not view historical enquiry as an irrelevance to Christology.44 Christology, for Bavinck, is not suprahistorical (übergeschichtlich).45 It is irreducibly historical. Thus, refusing to sever the Gordian knot, Bavinck binds history and revelation in the closest possible relation, confident of their eventual reconciliation.46 The price of Bavinck’s 40 In this respect, a Bavinckian echo can be heard among the dialectical theologians. Karl Barth famously appropriated the dictum Deus dixit from the Prolegomena to Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics. Van den Belt, Authority, 244 n. 69. 41 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 136 n. 34; cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Erster Band (Leipzig: Duncker, 1883), 123−6. 42 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 140. 43 For an excellent summary of responses to the problem of history in nineteenth-century Dutch theology and where Bavinck fits within these responses, see Harinck, “Twin Sisters,” in Nature and Scripture, 2.319−31, 340−6. 44 For the irrelevancy of historical criticism for dogmatics in Kähler, see Carl Braaten, “Martin Kähler on the Historic Biblical Christ,” in The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New Quest for the Historical Jesus (New York: Abingdon, 1964), 87. 45 In Kähler the precise meaning of übergeschichtlich is ambiguous, but it would seem that Kähler does not intend to signal any ontological separation between the preached Christ and the real Christ. “The term übergeschichtlich would appear to be an ontological category, but for Kähler it has more to do with an axiological and personal mode of thought. It appears to speak of something in a sphere above history, yet Kähler intends to emphasise the connection with history.” Bengt Hägglund, “Martin Kählers teori om det överhistoriska i kristendomen,” Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift 48:4 (1972), 162. 46 “The more we penetrate in our thinking to the essence of history, as to that of nature, the more we grasp its idea and maintain it, the more it will manifest itself as rooted in revelation and as upborne by revelation; the more it will lift itself up to and approach that view of history which Christianity has presented and wherewith Christianity in its turn confirms and supports revelation in nature and in history.” Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 135. In Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck offers a series of christological reasons for binding history and revelation in the closest possible relation. Because Christ is like us in every way except sin, he must be subject to the laws of time and space. The revelation of God in Christ, therefore, cannot be conceived of as above or parallel to history in some sense. If Christ is the content of

97

98

Chalcedon and modernity

unambiguous identification of divine speech with Scripture, however, is high. One might say that Bavinck trades historical for hermeneutical difficulties. Bavinck no longer needs to demonstrate that the Jesus of history corresponds to the Christ of faith, but it becomes incumbent on Bavinck to demonstrate how. That is, Bavinck needs to offer an account of the internal coherence of the biblical attestation and this is not without its difficulties. Bavinck acknowledges, “the reports about the main events, say, the time of Jesus’ birth, the duration of his public activity, the words he spoke at the institution of the Lord’s Supper, his resurrection etc., are far from homogenous.”47 This lack of homogeneity, however, threatens neither Scripture’s perspicuity nor its sufficiency.48 In the same way that only contingent certainty can be demanded of any given historical explanation of the correspondence of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, no more can be demanded of hermeneutics. For Bavinck, it is precisely because Scripture speaks with many voices, that its many voices “leave room for a variety of views.”49 Thus, the methodological priority Bavinck places on the church’s confession ultimately derives from a form of divine self-consciousness to which the church has been admitted. Scripture claims to be the Word of God, the Holy Spirit bears witness to the truthfulness of this claim, and this witness becomes the certainty of the believer. This will of course seem insufficient to more than the historical positivists among Bavinck’s readers. Nevertheless, Bavinck cannot be described as a fideist for the simple fact that historical enquiry retains an a posteriori role in his method. Definitive proof of the incompatibility of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith would problematise Bavinck’s claims. Bavinck, however, forces historical criticism to bear the impossible burden of furnishing this proof. Bavinck, therefore, sees no need to exclude historical enquiry from the christological task. On the contrary, historical enquiry must

revelation, revelation does not merely occur in history but is history. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.379−80. 47 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.447. 48 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.475−94. Bavinck notes that because of this lack of homogeneity, Scripture will always be the first cudgel to be taken up against the church’s confession. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.283. Thus, Bavinck is quite fond of the proverb attributed to the Swiss theologian Samuel Werenfels (1657−1740), “every heretic has his prooftext.” Bavinck cites the proverb in Dutch rather than German, (ieder ketter heeft zijn letter). It is important to note, however, that it always forms part of his plaidoyer for the adequacy of Scripture. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.475; “Confessie en dogmatiek,” 268; Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 66; De Theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye. Bijdrage tot de kennis der Ethische Theologie (Leiden: Donner, 1884), 58. Thus, the fact that Scripture can be misread is not a sign of its insufficiency. 49 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.447.

The deficit of Chalcedon

be included in the christological task. Revelation is history, has a history, and as a consequence, stands to be vindicated by history. The deficit of Chalcedon Bavinck thus asserts that the deity of Christ must form the starting point of Christology. This emphasis on the importance of Christ’s deity, however, does not come at the expense of Christ’s humanity. Bavinck maintains the basic Anselmian reasons for the necessity of the incarnation. The Christ must be fully human if he is to perform his work. Given this high view of Christ’s deity and humanity, it is not surprising that Bavinck holds the Chalcedonian symbol in high esteem. Bavinck affirms the doctrine of the two natures and is willing to defend it from its nineteenth-century detractors. Bavinck even regards the two natures doctrine as a necessary entailment of the confession of Christ’s deity. “This confession,” Bavinck writes, “had to lead and – under Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian – did lead to the doctrine of the two natures.”50 Yet like any other aspect of the church’s sub-apostolic confession, the symbol itself remains contingent. In the future, the doctrine of the two natures may well be superseded by a more adequate formula.51 But for the time being (voorstands), the doctrine of the two natures remains the best option.52 Bavinck’s defence of Chalcedon, however, belies a reluctant acknowledgment of its inadequacies. Bavinck writes, “it is forever being advanced that [the doctrine of the two natures] fails to do justice to the human nature of Christ and makes any human development in him an impossibility.”53 From the vantage point of Roman Catholic and Lutheran Christologies, Bavinck cedes that this charge is valid. “Both Lutheran and Catholic Christology … contain within them a docetic element. The purely human development does not come into its own in them.”54 This fault, however, does not derive from the symbol itself. The docetic element of Roman Catholic and Lutheran Christology can be traced to the shortcomings of the further development of Christology within Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. Specifically, Roman Catholic and Lutheran articulations of the communicatio idiomatum left the Chalcedonian 50 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.254. 51 “[Theology] is a progressive science ... it stops neither at Chalcedon nor Dordrecht. It is deeply convinced that in these times and those to come God shall be pleased to cast more light on what in Holy Scripture still lies hidden and shrouded in mist.” Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 47. 52 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.288; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.304. 53 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.308. 54 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.309.

99

100

Chalcedon and modernity

symbol vulnerable to the charge that Christ’s humanity is eclipsed by his deity. “In reaction,” Bavinck writes, “theologians in the nineteenth century swung over to the other extreme and denied the deity of the Lord.”55 The emphasis on development that characterises modern Christology, therefore, represents an overreaction to the missteps of Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism.56 Nevertheless, Bavinck regards the modern cure as worse than the pre-modern disease. Roman Catholic and (pre-modern) Lutheran christologies still maintain the essential christological starting point, even if they offer an inadequate account of Christ’s humanity. Reformed Christology, by contrast, upholds this starting point, while avoiding the Lutheran and Roman Catholic shortcomings. “The Reformed,” Bavinck writes, “understood the communication of the gifts in such a way that human development in Jesus was possible.”57 Bavinck thus argues that Reformed Christology exonerates the Chalcedonian symbol from the charges levelled by its modern detractors. Because Reformed Christology formulates the communicatio in such a way that it accommodates development, its maintenance of the deity of Christ does not come at the expense of his humanity. Bavinck’s own Christology offers an account of the development of Christ’s knowledge, morality, and power.58 Rolf Bremmer notes that this emphasis on development is a distinguishing feature of Bavinck’s Christology and that it signals Bavinck’s basic agreement that the attention paid to the humanity of Christ since Schleiermacher represents the proper path of development that

55 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.309. 56 Of course, Bavinck does not put it as baldly as this. Kuyper, however, does. Modern Christology, according to Kuyper, is essentially a bad Lutheran solution to a Lutheran problem. Abraham Kuyper, De vleeschwording des woords (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1887), 146. Given that this work appears at several points in Bavinck’s footnotes, it is likely that Bavinck offers a sanitised version of Kuyper’s narrative. Bavinck’s greater restraint probably reflects his mindfulness that one of the most prominent critics of Chalcedon was not a Lutheran, but a Reformed theologian. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999), 391−8. 57 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.294; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.309. Although Bavinck does not explicitly cite Dorner here, he echoes Dorner, who notes the “importance attached by all the Reformed to truly human development.” J. A. Dorner, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1862), 2.341. This work appears in the general bibliography at the beginning of the chapter of the Dutch revised edition. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.214. It would seem that Dorner is an important source for Bavinck. Many of Bavinck’s ideas sound an echo of Dorner. For an excellent summary of Dorner’s supralapsarian Christology, see Edwin Chr. Van Driel, Incarnation Anway: Arguments for Supralapsarian Christology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 33–62. The precise relationship between these two thinkers is a topic that is worthy of further research. 58 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.311−16.

The deficit of Chalcedon

theological reflection on the person of Christ should follow.59 The importance Bavinck attaches to development, however, begs a number of questions. In the first place, it is striking that Bavinck simply accepts at face value the legitimacy of the modern emphasis on development. There is no discussion of whether or why development ought to be taken as the defining feature of human nature. Development is simply accepted as the touchstone of Christ’s true humanity. Moreover, Bavinck portrays Reformed formulations of the communicatio idiomatum as arising from their inherent interest in development. The degree to which development was a live concern for Reformed Orthodoxy is debatable. Reformed theologians assume the development of Christ’s humanity, but development rarely features as an operative concern in their Christology. Our exploration of Bavinck’s account of the humanity of Christ, therefore, needs to begin by probing Bavinck’s Reformed sources and his anthropological assumptions. Bavinck’s historical claims shall be examined first, in order to cast his constructive interest in development in sharper relief. The anthropological premium Bavinck places on development shall then be traced to its theological roots. Stephen Holmes speaks of a distinctively Reformed emphasis on development and growth in the person of Christ.60 This claim warrants close scrutiny. It is certainly true that Reformed Orthodox theologians do draw attention to the way Christ grew and learned new things under the enabling of the Holy Spirit,61 but it is relevant to note the place development occupies in their reasoning. In the main, development is assumed on account of the biblical witness and functions as the middle term of the argumentation, rather than a predicate of the conclusion. That is, where development is mentioned, the argumentation focuses on explaining why the development that is assumed does not compromise the divinity of Christ, particularly when Reformed theologians are arguing against the Socinians. In Bavinck’s discussion of Christ’s noetic development, the sources Bavinck cites reflect these general characteristics.62 For example, Gomarus discusses the increase of wisdom in Luke 2:52 in the context of what can be properly predicated of the divine nature.63 Voetius addresses the increase of Christ’s knowledge within his consideration of the question of whether 59 R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 251. 60 Stephen R. Holmes, “Reformed Varieties of the Communicatio Idiomatum,” in Stephen R. Holmes/Murray Rae (ed.), The Person of Christ (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 86. 61 Cf. Van den Belt et al., Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 2.80−99. 62 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.312 n. 224. 63 Franciscus Gomarus, Opera Theologica Omnia (Amsterdam: J. Jansson, 1664), 1.309−10. Bavinck’s actual reference appears to be mistaken. There is no reference to development in Christ’s knowledge on p. 196. Bavinck could be referring to the chapter entitled “De Scientia Christi,” which also deals with Luke 2:52. Gomarus, Opera, 1.257−66.

101

102

Chalcedon and modernity

Christ exercised faith.64 Turretin mentions development only in passing when he considers whether Christ was omniscient. In the passage Bavinck cites from the Commentarius by De Moor, development is not even mentioned.65 Only Vitringa, reflecting the characteristically Cocceian emphasis on historical progression, speaks of the need to reserve space for development in the human nature of Christ, so that the perfection of Christ’s humanity is shown to be fulfilled after the resurrection.66 Development, therefore, features only as a corollary of other more fundamental concerns. The modern sources Bavinck cites reflect a similar pattern.67 Development is assumed and taken as indicative of Christ’s true humanity but never comprises more than a subsidiary concern. Kuyper, Lucassen, and Meyer all defend the claim that Christ exercised faith during his earthly ministry.68 Shedd’s focus is the problem of dual consciousness in a single subject.69 But none of these thinkers address development directly as a predicate of Christ’s humanity. This pattern becomes even more apparent in Bavinck’s discussion of Christ’s development in morality and power. In the first edition of Gereformeerde dogmatiek Bavinck can cite no further sources in support of his own claims.70 In the second edition Bavinck adds a footnote to a single essay by Karl Bornhäuser (1868−1947).71 What makes this all the more notable is that there are numerous

64 Gisbertus Voetius, Selectae Disputationes (5 vol.; Utrecht, 1648−69), 2.155. Heppe references the same work by Voetius along with excerpts drawn from Leonard van Rijssen (1631−1716). Heinrich Heppe, Dogmatik der evangelischen reformierten Kirche (Elberseld: R. L. Friedrich, 1861), 2.315. 65 Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (3 vol.; Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 2.327; Bernardinus De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus in Johannes Marckii Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elenchticum, 3.804. 66 Campegius Vitringa, Doctrina Christianae (9 vol.; Arnhemiæ: Joannis Henrici Moelemanni, 1761−1781), 5.246. 67 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.313 n. 224. 68 Kuyper, De vleeschwording, 152; Het werk van den heiligen Geest (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1888), 2.281 ff.; Carl Lucassen, “Der Glaube Jesu Christi,” Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1895), 337−47; Augustus Meyer, “Der Glaube Jesu und der Glaube an Jesum,” Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1900), 621−44. 69 William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (3 vol.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1889), 2.283−4, 306−7. To Shedd’s own arguments from analogy Bavinck adds his own, focusing on the problem of how the humanity of Christ might exercise limited knowledge of his divine personhood. 70 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (1898), 3.297. 71 Karl Bornhäuser, “Die Versuchung Jesu nach dem Hebräerbrief,” in Friedrich Giesebrecht/Rudolf Kögel (ed.), Theologische Studien: Martin Kähler zum 6. Januar 1905 dargebracht (Leipzig: Deichert, 1905), 69−86. Bornhäuser explores the compatibility of Jesus’ deity, which excludes the theoretical possibility of sin (non potuit peccare) as well as the affirmation that Jesus experienced temptation.

The deficit of Chalcedon

Reformed sources upon which Bavinck could draw to support the precise contours of his own argument. Bavinck, however, cites none of them. The reason for this is that the Reformed tradition neither conceptualises the points Bavinck raises in terms of development nor addresses them under the rubric of the person of Christ. For example, Bavinck’s discussion of moral growth centres on Christ’s learning obedience and his experience of temptation. Bavinck argues that because Christ possessed a truly human nature, he possessed a natural dread of suffering and death. Facing the prospect of suffering and death, Jesus was continually confronted by the choice between yielding to this dread or resisting it. Jesus’ habitual resistance thus reflects an ongoing moral development, which began in the wilderness and reached its climax at the crucifixion.72 Bavinck’s argument for Christ’s moral development, therefore, makes appeal to Christ’s active obedience. Christ’s active obedience, although a commonplace in Reformed theology, is not traditionally conceptualised as an aspect of the development of Christ’s person but rather as an aspect of Christ’s work. The same can be said of Bavinck’s argument for Christ’s development in power. After noting that all of Christ’s works are attributable to both to his divinity and humanity, Bavinck draws attention to biblical texts, which indicate that Jesus only began to exercise the full extent of his power in the state of glorification. Hence, it is only following the resurrection that Christ receives the name that is above every name and all power in heaven and on earth.73 Bavinck’s argument for Christ’s development in power, therefore, draws on the status duplex. The status duplex, however, is not traditionally conceptualised as an aspect of the development of Christ’s person. Rather, it is usually discussed as an aspect of Christ’s work.74 Both the sources Bavinck does cite and the ones he cannot cite expose what could be seen as overreach with regard to his claims regarding the place of development in Reformed Christology. While the Reformed formulations of the communicatio do accommodate development in Christ and while Reformed theologians do assume that Christ’s human nature developed in the course of his boyhood, very few, if any, Reformed theologians who uphold the twonatures doctrine explicate the humanity of Christ in terms of development. Thus, while Reformed Christology may have left room for development, it is Bavinck himself who offers an account of the humanity of Christ that is built on 72 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.313−15 and notes. 73 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.316. 74 Bavinck naturally offers a more extensive commentary on these themes in his account of the work of Christ. It is notable, however, that these themes are discussed twice. This forms a parallel with Bavinck’s discussion of faith in the first volume in chapter three, principium internum and again in the fourth volume in chapter eight, De weldaden des verbonds. Van den Belt, Authority, 273−4.

103

104

Chalcedon and modernity

the concept.75 The reasons for the prominence of this theme emerge into view, when one examines the moorings of Bavinck’s organic anthropology. These moorings will emerge into view if we first consider Bavinck’s susceptibility to modern Christology’s seductive idea. In De vleeschwording des woords Kuyper cautions his readers against what he describes as modern Christology’s seductive idea. This idea is that the incarnation itself is not a step in Christ’s humiliation but is necessary for the development of humanity. Kuyper writes, Like most of the recent ideas of the modern orthodox theologians (who have acquired them from the ancient false teachers), so too, this concept is, as one can see, in every respect seductive. If, in following their trail, one allows oneself to be seduced into deciding these holy questions by reason, the danger is indeed great, that our foot triggers the snare and the net comes over our head.76

Thus, according to Kuyper, approaching the incarnation from the standpoint of anthropology rather than soteriology is a fatal step. Bavinck, nevertheless, views this step as one that must be taken. Bavinck views the incarnation as playing an integral role in the development of humanity. It is worth noting, however, that in taking this step, Bavinck is not entirely bereft of support. Bavinck adheres to a minority report within Reformed Orthodoxy, which denied that incarnation simpliciter can be described as a step in the humiliation.77 The primary reason for this dissenting view is that if incarnation in and of itself were a step in the humiliation, the state of humiliation would persist into eternity. Thus, because Christ does not cease being a man in the state of glory, incarnation cannot be viewed as a step in the state of humiliation.78 The support this lends Bavinck is the way that it allows incarnation to be ordered to multiple ends. Because incarnation is a necessary condition of Christ’s humiliation but not the first step in Christ’s humiliation, incarnation also serves the development of humanity.

75 This is, perhaps, Bavinck’s subtle yet distinct contribution to Reformed Christology. 76 Kuyper, De vleeschwording, 41. 77 Although Bavinck does not indicate any sources specifically, he is in agreement with Wilhelmus À Brakel (1635−1711), whom Kuyper cites in connection with this position. Kuyper, De vleeschwording, 190; cf. Wilhelmus À Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books: 1999), 1.575−6. 78 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.310. The incarnation rather, must be viewed as an act of “condescending goodness” (nederbuigende goedheid), a phrase which ostensibly derives from Dorner. Cf. Dorner, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, 340. As previously noted, Dorner’s History appears among the sources listed at the beginning of the chapter in the Dutch revised edition. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.214. The scope of his influence on Bavinck warrants further research.

The deficit of Chalcedon

For our purposes, what is of relevance in the difference of opinion between Kuyper and Bavinck is the grain of truth Bavinck acknowledges in modern Christology. While Bavinck regards it as deeply mistaken that theologians such as August Neander (1789−1850), Richard Rothe (1799−1867), Johann Lange (1802−84), Matthias Schneckenburger (1804−48), Philipp Keerl (1805−95), Karl Liebner (1806−71), Hans Martensen (1808−84), Karl Kahnis (1814−88), and Willibald Beyschlag (1823−1900) no longer viewed the incarnation as only incidentally necessary and had rejected the deity of Christ, Bavinck does not repudiate their interest in development.79 On the contrary, Bavinck views development as an integral feature of human nature. Bavinck, however, accounts for this feature in a very different way to the abovementioned theologians. Bavinck regards development as an integral feature of humanity’s teleological constitution. The springboard for this derivation is the subtle contours of the imago Dei in the Economy of the Covenants between God and Man by Herman Witsius (1636−1708).80 Bavinck, however, reformulates Witsius’ account of the imago Dei according to the structure of the organism. The details of this remarkable example of theological retrieval and the implications it holds for Bavinck’s Christology are complex and need to be stepped out carefully. By the late seventeenth century Reformed theologians had come to view the divine image as bearing antecedent, formal, and consequent aspects, categories which correspond to the ontological, ethical, and teleological dimensions of human nature.81 Under this schema, the covenant of works had come to be viewed as a “transcript” of the imago Dei. That is, the covenant of works corresponds to the formal, or ethical, aspect of the divine image.82 What is distinct to Witsius is the way he more explicitly describes the consequent or teleological aspect of the imago Dei in terms of its fulfilment. For Witsius, man does not have the “full image” of God until heaven. The image is completed when constancy is 79 Bavinck identifies these theologians by name in the Dutch first edition. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (1898), 3.251; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.262−3. 80 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.550 n. 66. 81 À Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, 323; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1.466; Herman Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man: Comprehending a Complete Body of Divinity (3 vol.; New York: Thomas Kirk, 1804), 1.62. 82 Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, 1.196. This represents the endpoint of a development, which can be traced to Wolfgang Musculus (1497−1563) and Zacharias Ursinus (1534−1583), who had connected the presence law in the garden to the notions of a general or natural covenant. Wolfgang Musculus, Loci communes (Basel, 1563), 231−2; Zacharias Ursinus, Summa theologiae, qq. 10−19, in August Lang, Der Heidelberger Katechismus und vier verwandte Katechismen … mit einer historisch-theologischen Einleitung (Leipzig: Deichert, 1907), 153−6. Cit. Muller, “The covenant of works and the stability of divine law in seventeenth−century Reformed Orthodoxy: a study in the theology of Herman Witsius and Wilhelmus À Brakel” Calvin Theological Journal 29:1 (1994), 87 n. 40.

105

106

Chalcedon and modernity

added to the other virtues Adam had possessed in his pre-lapsarian state.83 Bavinck subtly reworks Witsius’ more explicitly progressive account of the image by mapping it onto categories of being and becoming. Accordingly, the antecedent aspect of the divine image corresponds to what it is.84 The formal and consequent aspects of the divine image correspond to what it will become. The image of God, according to Bavinck, is thus complete, when viewed from the point of view of ontology. When viewed from an ethical and teleological point of view, however, the image is incomplete, even in the pre-lapsarian state. Bavinck coordinates this ethical and teleological completion of humanity with the notion of human nature existing in and for itself. An individuated human nature exists in and for itself as personality.85 Human nature, however, only reaches completion in its existence in and for itself as a corporate personality. The reason for this is closely connected to what it means for humanity to be the image of God. God is only fully imaged in humanity as a corporate personality. A single human being cannot fully image God. This is not to say that an individual personality does not image God. Ontologically, the individual personality does 83 Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, 1.129. 84 Here, a notable element of Bavinck’s subtle modification of this definition of the imago Dei is his explicit inclusion of the body in the metaphysical aspect of the imago Dei. Unlike Witsius, Bavinck does not limit the image to the spiritual and immortal nature of the soul. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.559; Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, 1.62. 85 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.291; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.306. Personality is a massively important category in nineteenth-century theology. Karl Barth, famously,would describe personality as the “Idol des Jahrhunderts” (idol of the century). Yet even Barth posits his own reconciliation of these concepts in the first edition of his commentary on the letter to the Romans. Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief erste Vassung, 1919, ed. Hermann Schmidt (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985), 271−3. While Bavinck’s definition has a Hegelian ring to it, he appropriates it from the arch-Neothomist, Constantin von Schäzler (1827−80). Von Schäzler defines person as “ein für sich seiendes Vernunftwesen,” or a “Fürsichsein.” Constantin von Schäzler, Das Dogma von der Menschwerdung Gottes: im Geiste des hl. Thomas (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 1870), 3−4; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.306 n. 205. Bavinck cites two further sources in connection with the notion of personality, Geschichtsphilosophische Untersuchungen über den Befriff der Persõnlichkeit (Langensalza: Beyer und Söhne, 1907) by August Richter and Persönlichkeit: christliche Lebensphilosophie für moderne Menschen (Schwerin: Bahn, 1906) by Emil Pfennigsdorf. Pfennigsdorf explicitly seeks to reconcile a Christian worldview with what he regards as the fundamental motifs of modernity, namely, personality and development. Pfennigsdorf, Persönlichkeit, vi−viii. Pfennigsdorf prosecutes this task by combining the kind of orthogenetic conception of evolution championed by neo-vitalists such as Karl Ernst von Bär (1792−1876) with Schleiermacherian notions of religiöses Bedürfnis. Pfennigsdorf, Persönlichkeit, 331−2. Bavinck too, it would seem, is sympathetic to these ideas. Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 59; Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 60; Modernisme en orthodoxie, 19−20, 26 n. 32. Bavinck, therefore, attempts to synthesise the modern concept of personality with the classical distinction between the principium quod and the principium quo of an individual substance of a rational nature.

The deficit of Chalcedon

image God. An individual personality, however, only comes to image God fully as it exists in and for itself as corporate personality. This, as we shall see, is the being and becoming of the divine image. To account for the relationship between the being and the becoming of the imago Dei, Bavinck has recourse to the organism. Bavinck writes, The image of God is much too rich for it to be completely realised in a single human being, however richly gifted they may be. It can only be somewhat unfolded in its depth and riches in a humanity counting millions of members. Just as the vestigia Dei are spread over many, many works in both space and time, so too the imago Dei can only be fully portrayed in a humanity whose members exist both successively and contemporaneously. Yet just as the cosmos is a unity and receives its head and master in the human being and just as the vestigia Dei, scattered throughout the entire world, are recapitulated and actualised in the imago Dei of the human being, so too humanity in its turn is to be conceived as an organism, that, precisely as such, is finally the fully developed image of God.86

Before we proceed any further, it is important to note why it is that Bavinck needs the organism, or something like the organism, in order to account for the claim that God is only fully imaged in humanity as a whole. Mere physical unity is insufficient to establish the notion of corporate personality.87 As a mechanical explanation of what unites human beings, the physical unity of the human race comprises a necessary yet insufficient condition for its corporate existence. What is further required is an ethical-teleological explanation. Without an ethical-teleological explanation of the unity of humanity, one would only have an aggregate of individuals. Yet even if such an ethical-teleological explanation might be found, it still remains to be demonstrated that both descriptions bear reference to the self-same entity. How is it that this aggregate of individuals exists as a corporate entity? It is here that the organism once again proves its usefulness. As we have seen, the constitutive principle of the organism accounts for the correspondence of mechanical and teleological description. In order to account for the unity of humanity, Bavinck deploys the constitutive principle of the organism as an explanation of the federal constitution of humanity.88 Bavinck writes, Only in [the covenant of works] does the ethical – not the physical – unity of mankind come into its own. And this ethical unity is requisite for humanity as an organism. Gen86 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.538−9; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.577. 87 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.578. 88 For a helpful exploration of the relationship between Bavinck’s federal theology, the imago Dei, and original sin, see Nathaniel Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck on the Image of God and Original Sin” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:2 (2016), 174−90.

107

108

Chalcedon and modernity

erally speaking, the law of architectonics everywhere requires the monarchical system. A work of art must be controlled by a single thought; a sermon must have a single theme; a church comes to completeness in a steeple; the man is the head of the family; in a kingdom the king is the bearer of authority; as an organic whole, an ethical community, the human race is not conceivable without a head.89

The constitutive principle of the organism, therefore, is the federal head of humanity, the testator of the covenant of works. Adam, therefore, is the constitutive principle of the organism of the old humanity and Christ is the constitutive principle of the new humanity.90 Bavinck thus recognises in the oude schrijvers latent potential for a more robustly developmental anthropology. Bavinck reconfigures the tripartite structure of Witsius’ account of the divine image according to the bipartite structure of the organism.91 That is, Bavinck identifies the antecedent-ontological 89 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.578. The organism allows Bavinck to posit solutions to a number of problems associated with the federal account of the imputation of original sin as it relates to the incarnation. If the two humanities are discrete organisms, they share the same mechanical but not the same ethical-teleological relation. Hence, Adam, Christ, and the church all share in the same weakened flesh by virtue of the mechanical relation held in common, but Christ does not share in the ethical-teleological relation of original sin which governs the Adamic organism. Thus, because Christ only shares in the mechanical relation of Adamic humanity, his flesh bears weakness but not guilt. “The exclusion of [Joseph] from his conception at the same time had the effect that Christ as one not included in the covenant of works, remained exempt from original sin and could, therefore also be preserved in terms of his human nature, both before and after his birth, from all pollution and sin. As subject, as ‘I,’ he did not descend from Adam but was the Son of the Father, chosen from eternity to be the head of a new covenant.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.294. The organism also offers answers to some of the more speculative questions surrounding the virgin birth. For example, the organism offers an explanation as to why the Logos could not in fact have been conceived naturally or have assumed a human nature that had already existed as a person. If the virgin birth is an integral feature of Christ’s representative function, it becomes a necessary condition of the incarnation. Christ could not, therefore, constitute the organism of redeemed humanity if he were he conceived naturally or had he assumed a pre-existing human nature. Cf. Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 324. 90 The formal properties of the organism, therefore, are crucial to understanding the place of the covenant of works in Bavinck’s anthropology. In this regard Brian Matson’s otherwise salient observations require augmentation. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 237, 240. 91 The consanguinity of Bavinck’s aims with those of Schleiermacher here is notable. Jacqueline Mariña notes that in Schleiermacher, Christ perfects human nature, that Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the decree removes the distinction between nature and super−nature, and that humanity in Schleiermacher is teleologically ordered to its perfection in Christ. Jacqueline Mariña, “Christology and anthropology in Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in Jacqueline Mariña (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161−2, 168. These are all Bavinckian desiderata. The organism thus

The deficit of Chalcedon

aspect of the imago Dei with “the real” and the formal-ethical and consequentteleological aspects with “the ideal.” Thus, Bavinck can say that the image is, yet also becomes.92 It is being and act, and Gabe und Aufgabe.93 Development, therefore, is an integral feature of Bavinck’s concept of human nature because he conceives of humanity as an organism. But a full account of why Bavinck views development as constitutive of human nature cannot rest here. The ultimate reason why Bavinck regards development as an integral feature of human nature lies in his ontology of revelation. Because Scripture describes humanity as the image of God, Bavinck views human nature as a subcategory of revelation.94 Revelation is necessarily ever increasing and ever proceeding, because the finite cannot contain the infinite. Anthropology, as a subcategory of revelation, bears these same characteristics. “The image of God,” Bavinck writes, “is not a static entity but extends and unfolds itself in the forms of space and time.”95 Yet because God is personal, the image of God is not merely the revelation of infinite substance, but rather the revelation of “absolute personality.” This “triple unfolding” of the divine substance is not fully imaged in the individual

92

93

94 95

allows Bavinck to realise some of the aims of modern Christology without abandoning the Chalcedonian symbol. Cf. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 63, 140. Eglinton rightly notes the novelty of this statement but is mistaken in suggesting that it “portrays the human being as one person in whom two distinct ontological realities are reflected.” Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 124. Bavinck never uses the term “being” absolutely in connection with human beings. In absolute terms, being is only predicable of God. “God alone is absolute being, the ‘I shall be, who I shall be.’ For all creatures, including the spiritual and psychic, are subject to the law of becoming.” Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 51. In contexts where Bavinck describes creaturely realities in terms of being and becoming, being invokes ontology as distinct from teleology. For Bavinck, there is only one ontological reality reflected in humans. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.577. Bavinck would appear to derive this distinction from Hermann Cremer, “Ebenbild Gottes” in Albert Hauck (ed.), Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche 3rd edn; (24 vol.; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1896−1913), 5.114. Bavinck does not cite Cremer’s article directly, but it is listed in his bibliography. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.656. Cremer describes Gottesbildlichkeit as bearing three aspects, namely, Gabe (gift), Aufgabe (task), and Bestimmung (purpose). Bavinck drops the third term, presumably in order to allow these categories to coalesce with the binary structure of the organism. Task and purpose thus form the ethical-teleological relation of Bavinck’s Aufgabe. Gift and task, however, are not antithetical categories in Bavinck’s thought. In Bavinck, as in Reformed Orthodoxy, the divine image is bestowed on humanity in the covenant of works as a gift. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.571; cf. Muller, “The covenant of works and the stability of divine law,” 91. The gracious character of the task, Bavinck acknowledges, is the sliver of truth in the Roman Catholic doctrine of the donum superadditum. The Aufgabe is, in this sense, a gift that is added to the Gabe. For Bavinck, man is the image of God insofar as he is truly human and truly human to the extent that he is the image of God. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.555. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.577.

109

110

Chalcedon and modernity

but rather in “all those processions, by which human nature achieves its full development in the individual, in the family, and in humanity as a whole.”96 Ultimately, this is why Bavinck views the new humanity rather than the incarnate Son as the full image of God.97 The humanity of Christ cannot image God exhaustively; Christ is the pinnacle but not the sum of revelation. Quantitatively, there is a fuller imaging of God in the organism of the new humanity.98 Thus, although the second person of the Godhead is the constitutive principle of the image, the image itself is triune.99 It is important to see how Bavinck’s ontology of revelation actually redirects the impulse that Kuyper feared in what he refers to as the “modern orthodoxy.” Kuyper was suspicious of relating the incarnation to the development of humanity for the fact that it potentially jeopardises Christ’s deity. Bavinck, however, sees development as a central concern for a genuinely Chalcedonian Christology. In himself, God is yet as he is toward us, he becomes. Thus, one cannot speak of becoming in the doctrine of God, but one must speak of becoming in divine revelation. Revelation must become because it is necessarily expansive. Thus, if development is a necessary dimension of revelation, it forms a necessary dimension of Christology. Bavinck can afford development this space in his Christology because he affords greater scope for act in divine revelation without necessarily collapsing act into being. Bavinck’s affords this greater scope for act by allowing the work of Christ to more thoroughly determine his account of Christ’s person. Thus, doctrines which would usually be treated under the work of Christ inform the development of Christ’s humanity. The same is true of Bavinck’s anthropology. What humanity does as the imago Dei is allowed greater scope for determining what humanity is as the imago Dei. Yet just as theogony is excluded, so too is anthrogony. Being is informed by act but being is never reduced to act.100 Rather, being and becoming coinhere as discrete aspects of the organism.101

96 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.305−6. 97 Eschatology, therefore, is central to how Bavinck conceptualises humanity’s imaging of God’s eternity. Pace Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 124. 98 The revelation of absolute personality, therefore, only comes to completion in the church. The implications of this statement will be traced further in chapter four. 99 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.554. This is important for correlating the centrality of Christology in Bavinck’s system of doctrine to its trinitarian principia. 100 The relationship between being and becoming in Bavinck’s organicism, therefore, is not identical to the relation of ontology and teleology in the Aristotelian fourfold causality. Unlike the relationship between ontology and teleology in Aristotle, the correspondence is indirect rather than direct. 101 Thus, Bavinck maintains that the modern fascination with the development of Christ proceeds from a misguided application of the notion of becoming. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.263.

The deficit of Chalcedon

Thus, formally, it would seem that Bavinck avoids the danger Kuyper highlights in modernity’s seductive idea. Bavinck approaches Christology from the standpoint of anthropology without cost to the deity of Christ. Yet materially, it is not entirely clear whether Bavinck succeeds in offering an account of the development of humanity. As we have seen, Bavinck draws on the organism to account for the development of humanity. Humanity becomes inasmuch as it realises its ethical-teleological vocation. The development of the organism, however, is not strictly ethical. Organisms are governed by a natural rather than an ethical purpose. Organic development, therefore, is an ontological category. The question this raises for Bavinck is whether the development of the anthropological organism necessarily embraces anything more than the fulfilment of humanity’s Aufgabe, the covenant of works. It would seem that this is the case as it is precisely for this reason that Bavinck describes Christ’s development within his account of Christ’s work rather than his person. As we have seen, Bavinck’s description of Christ’s development derives largely from subjects that would traditionally be discussed under the rubric of Christ’s work. The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether an ethical concept like the covenant of works is really commensurate with the natural purpose of the organism. It would seem that the “transcript” of original righteousness cannot offer the kind of natural teleology that the organism demands. This would seem to be the reason that Bavinck can say very little about what natural development looks like in Christ’s humanity. The few comments Bavinck is able to offer are restricted to the relationship in which the sinless humanity of Christ stands to that of Adam. Bavinck describes Christ’s human nature as standing both above and below Adam’s. That is, Christ’s human nature (during his earthly ministry) is more naturally developed than Adam’s (before the fall) and in this sense, stands above Adam’s. Yet Christ’s sinless flesh is weakened flesh and in this sense, it stands below Adam’s. Yet consider the way that this problematises the relationship in which development stands to the fall of Adam. Bavinck observes that much natural development is occasioned by the fall. Bavinck writes, The human nature in Christ was much more highly developed than Adam’s, for in the state of integrity there was simply no occasion for many affections (gemoedsaandoeningen), such as anger, sadness, pity, compassion, and so on. But Christ did not just visit us with the inner movements of God’s mercy. Rather, in his human nature he opened for us the abounding world of the mind (gemoed) that in Adam’s case did not and could not yet exist.102

102 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.296−7; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.311.

111

112

Chalcedon and modernity

One should not fail to notice that Bavinck can be heard to suggest that had Adam never fallen, he would have remained naturally under-developed. The human affections Bavinck identifies specifically, such as anger and sadness, could never have obtained in the state of integrity. Natural development thus appears to be contingent on the fall. If this is what Bavinck really thinks, then it implies considerably more than felix culpa. It would seem that Bavinck’s concept of development requires sin. Perhaps this is the danger of which Kuyper warns in modernity’s seductive idea. Even if this is not the case, precisely how Christ’s human nature stands both above and below Adam would seem to defy description. Which human activities or properties are to be predicated of a) an unfallen, undeveloped human nature, b) an unfallen, naturally developing human nature, c) a fallen, naturally undeveloped human nature, d) a fallen, naturally developing human nature, e) a fallen yet redeemed, naturally developing human nature, and f) a glorified and naturally developed (or eternally developing) human nature?103 Bavinck offers no answers. It is, therefore, difficult to see how this does not cast a pall over Bavinck’s rather strident claim that Chalcedonian Christology in its Reformed guise does in fact offer an adequate account of development in the person of Christ. Bavinck’s Reformed sources do little more than affirm the reality of development as attested in the biblical witness. A generous reading of Bavinck would cede that an impressive schema is presented under which development could be conceptualised. The material content of this development, however, is unspecified. A modern orthodoxy If the priority accorded the church’s confession of the deity of Christ characterises Bavinck as an orthodox theologian, the emphasis placed on development in Christ’s humanity characterises him as a modern theologian. Bavinck’s Christology thus offers an interesting point of reference in the ongoing debate surrounding the “Two-Bavincks hypothesis.”104 Given what we have seen of Bavinck’s appropriation of modern thinkers in his Christology, there can be no question as to the veracity of Gerrit Berkouwer’s statement regarding the undeniable presence of modern motifs in Bavinck’s otherwise gereformeerde

103 To these categories one might add the unfallen yet weakened, naturally developing human nature of the person of Christ during his earthly ministry. 104 See above, p. 19 n. 40.

A modern orthodoxy

theology.105 But what is the significance of these modern thoughtforms? This is perhaps the unanswered question of the controversy. In his study of Bavinck’s reception of Schleiermacher, Cory Brock rightly points out that the case in point is not whether Bavinck was an orthodox theologian who was attracted to modern culture, but whether and to what degree Bavinck can be described as a modern theologian.106 In this final section, I would like to explore what light Bavinck’s Christology sheds on this question. Naturally, the answer at which one arrives depends on what one understands under the terms “orthodox” and “modern.” In some respects, delimiting what should be understood under these descriptors is more difficult than working out how they apply to Bavinck’s theology. In an attempt to advance the discussion surrounding the Two-Bavincks hypothesis, three observations shall be made. The first concerns the historically modern character of Bavinck’s conception of dogma and the second and third observations concern what Bavinck himself understood under the terms modern and orthodox. These observations shall then be drawn together, with a view to ascertaining whether Bavinck’s own evaluation of the character of his theology provides an adequate answer to our question. First, from an historical viewpoint, Bavinck’s affirmation of a developmental dogmatics is unmistakably modern. It is only after the Enlightenment that the church’s doctrine begins to be viewed as something that develops with the course of history.107 Bavinck’s acknowledgment of the development of doctrine, therefore, is one of the primary features that distinguish his theology as Neo- rather than Paleo-Calvinism. As we have seen, Bavinck cherishes little interest in mere repristination. Rather, he views dogmatics as a living organism. This places him among a group of nineteenth-century thinkers, such as Georg W.F. Hegel (1770−1831), Johann Adam Möhler (1796−1838), Nikolai F.S. Grundtvig (1783−1872), Alexei Khomyakov (1804−60), John Williamson Nevin (1803−86), and John Henry Newman (1801−90), who in varied ways 105 Berkouwer, Zoeken en vinden, 55. The precise nuances of Berkouwer’s statement about these onweersprekelijke motieven have stood at the centre of the two Bavincks controversy. John Bolt had originally translated onweersprekelijk as “irreconcilable.” Bolt has graciously acknowledged Nelson Kloosterman’s correction. Bolt, “Herman Bavinck on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further Reflections,” The Bavinck Review 4 (2013), 77; Nelson Kloosterman, “Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck” presented at the conference A Pearl and a Leaven: Herman Bavinck for the Twenty-First Century at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Missouri, on 19 September 2008. 106 Brock, “Orthodox yet Modern,” 43. 107 This is not, however, to suggest that doctrine was thought to be immutable in pre-modern times. Jaroslav Pelikan, Historical Theology: Continuity and Change in Christian Doctrine (London, Hutchinson, 1971), 37.

113

114

Chalcedon and modernity

drew upon organic metaphors to account for the church’s historical development.108 Organicism, nevertheless, comes in many stripes and shades and it is precisely here that caution must be exercised. Is the fact that Bavinck trades in the currency of modernity sufficient warrant for characterizing him as a modern theologian? Here, everything turns on what is understood under Bavinck’s use of the organic metaphor. Organic metaphors enjoy a long pedigree in the Christian tradition.109 Even Vincent of Lérins, to whom the famous definition of orthodoxy is attributed,110 acknowledged qualitative and quantitative increase (amplificetur) in the Church’s comprehension of what it confesses and he illustrated this increase with recourse to organic imagery.111 The scope and extent of doctrinal development that Bavinck is willing to acknowledge is, therefore, determinative for the question of whether Bavinck’s interest in development marks him out as a modern theologian. A case could be made that Bavinck’s concept of development lies closer to the Vincentian than the Hegelian end of the spectrum. Second, in Bavinck’s parlance the term “modern,” when used as a descriptor of theology, bears a narrower frame of reference than that which is historically modern.112 In this, Bavinck is no different to his contemporaries. Bavinck’s concept of modern theology is basically the same as that of the Remonstrant theologian Karel Roessingh (1886−1925). Roessingh characterises modern theology as a radicalisation of liberal (vrijzinnig) tendencies that were already well in place by 1850 in the Netherlands.113 At its core, modernism stands opposed to supernatural concepts such as special revelation and miracles. This opposition 108 Pelikan, Historical Theology, 56−7. 109 The conceptual precedent for the organicism of the nineteenth century is well documented. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 255−6; Oliver Crisp, Retrieving Doctrine: Explorations in Reformed Theology (London: Paternoster, 2010), 173−5. 110 Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, creditum est. 111 Vincent of Lérins illustrates orthodox doctrinal progress in terms of the growth from childhood to adulthood and seed to harvest. Patrick Dorrian, A Translation of the Commonitory of St. Vincent of Lirins (London: Parker, 1874), 52; cf. Vincenz von Lerinum, Commonitorium pro Catholicae fidei antiquitate et universitate adversus profanes omnium haereticorum novitates (Freiburg.: Mohr, 1895), 34. 112 Hence, while James Bratt provides numerous valuable insights in his analysis of the historical context of Bavinck’s Stone lectures, they have limited bearing on the narrower question of whether Bavinck’s theology can be described as modern. James D. Bratt, “The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 1908” The Bavinck Review 1 (2010), 4–24. 113 Karel H. Roessingh, Het modernisme in nederland (Haarlem: Bohn, 1922); cf. Cornelis M. van Driel, Schermen in de schemering: vijf opstellen over modernisme en orthodoxie (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007), 9. Like Roessingh and Van Driel, Bavinck traces the intellectual roots of modernism to the supranaturalism of the eighteenth century for which Bavinck holds no affection. Supranaturalism, in Bavinck’s estimate, was deistic in its doctrine of God, Pelagian

A modern orthodoxy

can be traced to the rationalist critique of revelation. Modern theologians regard themselves as the true heirs of the magisterial Reformers, who had undertaken a critique of authority yet left the task unfinished.114 Pruning religion of its supernatural appendages is the final stage of ecclesial renewal which began with the birth of Protestantism. Bavinck’s own description of the moderne richting is similar. Bavinck acknowledges the complexity and variegated character of theological modernism, but he still sums up its various strands as adhering to a rejection of the supernatural and a refusal to adopt revelation as a methodological starting point.115 For Bavinck, this refusal characterises modernism as a radically negative theology, which shows “itself strong in destroying, but weak in the work of reconstruction.”116 Hence, “modern” is not a catch-all descriptor for theological movements that might be historically modern. Notably, Bavinck himself excludes “Ethical” theology, a movement derivative of Vermittlungstheologie, from the trends he would describe as modern.117 The cardinal difference between modern and Ethical theologians is the latter’s rejection of the unbelief of the former. Thus, while Bavinck can fault Ethical theologians on multiple points, he sees Ethical theology as proceeding from a standpoint of faith and can, therefore, describe Ethical theology as a source of “rich blessing” for the Netherlands.118 On modern theology Bavinck bestows no such praise. As we saw in the previous chapter, Bavinck regarded Harnack’s Essence of Christianity as apostasy.119 Yet even so, in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I, Bavinck could imagine what George Harinck has termed a “theistic coalition.”120 That is,

114

115 116 117

118 119 120

in anthropology, and Arian in Christology. Bavinck, “Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands” The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 3:10 (1892), 211−12. This notion of the completion of the Reformation carries a particular innuendo in the Dutch context. The Nadere Reformatie, or continuing reformation, was a seventeenth century Dutch movement strongly influenced by English Puritanism. Derk Visser, “Nadere Reformatie,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation (Oxford University Press, 1996). Retrieved 30 Aug. 2018, from http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195064933.001. 0001/acref-9780195064933-e-0981. Bavinck, “Recent Dogmatic Thought,” 209−28; “Moderne theologie,” De Vrije Kerk 14:6 (1888), 253−86; Modernisme en orthodoxie, 19−20 and notes. Bavinck, “Recent Dogmatic Thought,” 218. Cf. Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 25−7. Kuyper was not at all sympathetic to this exclusion. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 17−8. For Bavinck’s detailed critique of Ethical theology, see Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye. Bavinck, “Recent Dogmatic Thought,” 222. See above, pp. 84−5. George Harinck, “‘Die kleine Frucht einer sehr groβen Erwartung.’ Die protestantischen Kirchen in den Niederlanden und ihre Bemühungen um gesellschaftliche Verantwortung im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Hans−Georg Ulrichs/Veronika Albrecht-Birkner (ed)., Der Erste

115

116

Chalcedon and modernity

Bavinck could imagine a broader Christian solidarity which could, at least in theory, include some modern theologians. The conditions of membership in such a coalition warrant close attention, as they highlight precisely what Bavinck rejected in modern theology. The clearest description of these conditions are to be found in the provocative rectoral address Bavinck delivered at the Vrije Universiteit in 1911, Modernism and Orthodoxy.121 At one point in this speech, Bavinck seeks to outflank modernists by arguing that the religious commitments of the “malcontents” among their ranks belie a belief in the supernatural.122 Bavinck’s point is that practical religion is the real litmus test of a theologian’s commitments and that many moderns are more orthodox than they would like to acknowledge. Bavinck states that “modern theology in general thinks and lives from the Christian tradition much more than it presumes to,”123 which is one of the reasons that Bavinck regards the terms orthodox and modern as inadequate descriptors of what really divides the various theological factions in the early decades of the twentieth century. Thus, there are some within the modern camp whose theological commitments are ambiguously modern and with such moderns, “orthodox” Christians should express solidarity. This is important for understanidng Bavinck’s rejection of modern theology and yields an important qualification of this rejection. While Bavinck rejects modern theology’s anti-supernaturalism, he recognizes that there are modern theologians who implicitly affirm some aspects of historic Christianity. Bavinck’s rejection of modern theology, therefore, leaves space for a kind of shared identity with the “malcontents” among the moderns. Weltkrieg und die reformierte Welt (Neukirchen−Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 276; “The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion: A Case Study of Herman Bavinck’s Engagement with Modern Culture,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29:1 (2011), 74−6. Arguably, what Bavinck sought was a christological, rather than a merely theistic, coalition. 121 Bremmer describes Modernisme en orthodoxie as Bavinck’s last significant theological work and his definitive word (grote antwoord) on the subject of modernism. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 117. Bavinck’s contribution numbers among many Dutch publications addressing this theme at the time, such as J.F. Beerens, Wat is het onderscheid tussen orthodox en modern? Voor de gemeente beantwoord (Wageningen: n.p., 1911); H.M. van Nes, Modern of orthodox (Barn: Hollandia, 1911); D. Bins jr., Dooreengelopen kleuren. Het onderscheid tusschen orthodox en “Orthodox” en “Modern” overwogen (Groningen: n.p., 1912); A.H. de Hartog/C.J. Niemeijer, Het principieel verschil tusschen “Orthodox” en “Modern” overwogen (Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1915); Gerard van der Leeuw, Ethisch: modern of orthodox? (Utrecht: Ruys, 1923). Cit. Harinck, “Die kleine Frucht,” 276 n. 10. 122 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 21. On “malcontents” among the moderns, see Van Driel, 130−74. As could be anticipated, such a strategy elicited strong opinions both for and against. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 129−35. 123 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 15.

A modern orthodoxy

This, however, is not the only qualification that must be added to Bavinck’s rejection of modern theology. Bavinck recognized that all of the factions of nineteenth-century Protestantism shared a common agenda. Modern, Ethical, and orthodox theologians alike were all pursuing a reconciliation of ancient Christianity and modern culture, and importantly, Bavinck did not think this was a mistake. Bavinck writes, All trends and factions are in greater or lesser measure busy in Neubau, and they are exerting themselves in this work in order to reconcile ancient Christianity with modern culture. That is not a peculiarity of any one trend, for example, of the moderns, but of all trends without exception. The question is simply, whether with this exertion to reconcile Christianity [with culture] one retains or loses its substance. That this reconciliation is sought in such varied ways, should not cause any amazement, for that with which natural and historiographical scholarship, technology and global transportation, and the whole of modern culture inundates us, is so overwhelmingly rich and powerful that nobody has yet been able to bring unity and harmony to his thinking and living.124

This common agenda informs the common ground Bavinck shares with modern theologians. Modernism is but one manifestation of the pan-Protestant attempt to reconcile ancient Christianity with modern culture.125 What Bavinck rejects in modern theology is not reconciliation itself but the way in which modern theologians attempt this reconciliation. Bavinck distinguishes the modernist attempt at reconciliation from his own by means of a distinction between a modern wereldbeeld – a modern “image” of the world, and a modern wereldbeschouwing – a modern worldview.126 The distinction between wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing essentially corresponds to the epistemological distinction between representation and idea. Whereas the modern wereldbeeld pertains to the phenomena as they are perceived in modernity, the modern wereldbeschouwing pertains to the modern interpretation of the phenomena. Bavinck devotes considerable space in the opening pages of Modernism and Orthodoxy to drawing out the implications of this distinction. The long résumé of the state of the sciences draws attention to the degree to which the image or beeld of the world had changed in the course of the nineteenth century. This modern image need not and should not be rejected. The mistake of modern theology, however, derives from the adoption of a new worldview which governed its interpretation of the phenomena. Bavinck writes, 124 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 15−6. 125 Bavinck’s stance towards Roman Catholicism as it relates to the relation of Christ and culture is an important subject, which lies beyond the scope of this enquiry. 126 R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 134. Bavinck’s use of the term beschouwing, admittedly, is not strictly consistent but the distinction between wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing is clear. Cf. Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 9, 23, 25−6, 28, 37, 39.

117

118

Chalcedon and modernity

[Modernism] accepted without criticism a worldview which was put forth as the truth and at once abandoned all Christian doctrines at its demand. The question did not even occur to it, whether it may not have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Above all it wanted to be modern, “up to date,” but because of that, as theology, it became a faithful copy of the rationalism of the eighteenth century.127

According to Bavinck, modernity should only have precipitated a change of bathwater. The modern wereldbeeld can and should be embraced, yet this new representation of the world must remain subject to the idea that governs historic Christianity. That is, the modern wereldbeeld can and must be interpreted from the standpoint of a Christian worldview. It is worth noting that the acceptance of the modern wereldbeeld that Bavinck advocates extends to biblical criticism.128 In one of the most striking statements of the speech, Bavinck claims that the hermeneutic which accepts rather than rejects the insights of biblical criticism has been the standpoint of historic Christianity. Remarkably, Bavinck likens theologians who reject biblical criticism to the pagan emperor, Julian the Apostate. We oppose the tactic of Julian the Apostate, who deprived Christians of science and the right to teach and in the name of orthodoxy wanted to drive them back onto the obsolete standpoint. We assert the right to teach, using all the resources that science and culture put in our service, in order to better understand God’s truth in general and special revelation and make it our spiritual possession more intimately than before. So we are grateful, that we gain deeper insight into the organic character of revelation and inspiration, that the historical circumstances under which the prophets and apostles appeared, spoke and wrote, may be ever better understood by us, that we can more accurately trace out the paths down which Christ has led the founding of his church and the development of his truth. In principle this has been recognised by theology in all times.129

Bavinck’s point, therefore, is that modern scholarship, including biblical criticism, is to be embraced yet this embrace need not generate a “modern” theology. Modern theology only arises when the modern beeld is interpreted according to the modern beschouwing. Bavinck, therefore, is committed to a reconciliation of Christianity and culture, but one which is governed by the Christian worldview. The very purpose of Bavinck’s distinction between wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing is to facilitate such a reconciliation. In this respect, Bavinck bears some semblance to the Modern-Positiv movement, which flourished in the years leading up to

127 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 20. 128 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 12−13. 129 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 36.

A modern orthodoxy

the outbreak of World War I.130 Modern-positive theology sought to sought to construct a new Vermittlungstheologie capable of reconciling the concepts of revelation and development.131 Like Bavinck, the modern-positive theologians held that orthodoxy had conceived of revelation in too narrow terms yet they were opposed to the anti-supernaturalism of modernism. Modern-positive theologians also maintained that development must be conceived along idealist rather than materialist lines.132 Yet in spite of Bavinck’s obvious sympathy with its aims, Bavinck displays a wry ambivalence toward the results of the modernpositive reconciliation of Christianity and culture.133 What Bavinck detects in modern-positive theologians is the tell-tale signs of the kind of reconciliation he rejects.134 That is, Bavinck regards the modern-positive reconciliation as having yielded to the modern beschouwing and this is simply unconscionable. “[B]etween church and world, reformation and revolution, ancient and modern lifeview no reconciliation, no transaction, no ‘mediation’ is possible.”135

130 For a perceptive critique of this movement from the side of modernism, see Gerald B. Smith, “The Modern-Positive Movement in Theology” The American Journal of Theology 13:1 (1909), 92−9. 131 That Bavinck also sought to reconcile these concepts is reflected in a lecture Bavinck delivered to students in Utrecht in March 1907 under the title Openbaring en ontwikkeling (Revelation and Development). One bullet point in Bavinck’s lecture notes reads as follows, “VIII. Is there only an opposition? No. Revel. & develop.” Bavinck Archive, 366. Historical Documentation Centre, Vrije Universiteit. 132 Of the modern-positive theologians, Richard Grützmacher (1876−1959) stands closest to Bavinck, as he, unlike most other representatives of the movement, upheld the doctrine of inspiration and saw less need of disposing of the thoughtforms of orthodoxy. Lessing, Geschichte, 294−6, 299−300. Bavinck seems to have read Grützmacher with interest. We noted earlier how Grützmacher’s Modern−Positive Vorträge stand in the background of Bavinck’s concept of mystery. See above, p. 59. In Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck engages with other publications by Grützmacher, such as Wort und Geist: eine historische und dogmatische Untersuchung zum Gnadenmittel des Wortes (Leipzig: Deichert, 1902). Notebooks held in the Bavinck Archive at the Historical Documentation Centre at the Vrije Universiteit reflect further engagement with works published subsequently. 133 One detects a note of irony in Bavinck’s comment that the efforts of the modern-positive theologians “have not been received all that favourably” (niet al te gunstig ontvangen) by the feisty Hermann Cremer. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.143−4; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.168−9. 134 This is also the basic conclusion of a doctoral thesis on the Modern-Positiv movement that Bavinck supervised during his later years at the Vrije Universiteit. Jan Thijs, De moderne positieve theologie in Duitschland (Wageninen: Zomer, 1917), 177, 199−213, 218−9. 135 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 7; cf. Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 10. Katherine Sonderegger’s description of Bavinck as a mediating theologian, therefore, requires further qualification. Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), xxi.

119

120

Chalcedon and modernity

Thus, Bavinck rejects modern theology. This rejection, however, must be coordinated with Bavinck’s affirmation of modern theologians’ aim of reconciling Christianity and culture and his affirmation of a kind of solidarity with modern theologians whose religious commitments overlap with his own. Third, inasmuch as Bavinck uses the distinction between wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing to distance his theology from modernism, he also uses this distinction to portray what is historically modern in Neo-Calvinism as native, rather than foreign, to the Reformed tradition. That is, Bavinck argued that his emphasis on the developmental character of dogmatics was not an innovation but a part of the Reformed tradition’s principled progressivism and that Neo-Calvinism’s affirmation of the modern beeld and rejection of the modern beschouwing simply reflects this. In certain respects, this argument is even more audacious than his attempt to convince the “malcontents” of their belief in the supernatural. For example, the modernist Leiden professor Bernardus Eerdmans (1868−1948) poured scorn on this claim, repeatedly asserting that Neo-Calvinism was a movement that merely took the old Reformed terminology and filled it with modern content, and for that reason it could be described as neither orthodox nor modern.136 Modernism and Orthodoxy seeks to defend the claim that the Reformed tradition is progressive. Bavinck writes, [O]n the one hand in the name Reformed there lies within it a connection to the past, historical continuity, and maintenance of the Christian confession, just as those in the Reformation in like manner cleansed the Holy Scriptures of Roman errors. On the other hand [there lies] the demand and obligation to continually review the doctrine and life of one’s own person and household and further, of our whole environs, according to these scriptural and historical principles. Reformati quia reformandi and vice versa.137

Bavinck thus argues that the charge that Neo-Calvinism is neither orthodox nor modern is false, because so-called orthodoxy entails an intrinsically revisionist 136 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 5 and note. Bavinck cites the following sources: Bernardus Eerdmans, “De Theologie van Dr. A. Kuyper,” Theologische tijdschrift (1909), 209−37; “Bijzondere openbaring,” Theologische Tijdschrift (1910), 377−96; “The Progressive Element in the Reformed Churches of Holland,” in The Christian Commonwealth, the Organ for the Progressive Movement and Social Ethics (1910), 436; “Wandlungen der calvinistischen Orthodoxie im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert,” in Fünfter Weltcongress für freies Christenthum und religiösen Fortschritt (Berlin: Schöneberg, 1911), 430−42. For further background to the controversy, see R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 115−21. 137 Bavinck, Modernisme en orthodoxie, 17. For the possible and probable origins of Bavinck’s phrase Reformati quia reformandi, see Theodor Mahlmann, “‘Ecclesia semper reformanda.’ Eine historische Aufarbeitung. Neue Bearbeitung,” in Torbjörn Johansson/Robert Kolb/Johann Anselm Steiger (ed.), Hermeneutica Sacra. Studien zur Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 382−4, 420−36.

A modern orthodoxy

element. To be Reformed does not entail trans-historical doctrinal immutability. Rather, being Reformed entails an orientation toward further reform. As Bavinck writes in the foreword to the first edition of Gereformeerde dogmatiek, “to cherish the ancient simply because it is ancient, is neither Reformed nor Christian.”138 The Neo-Calvinist acceptance of the modern wereldbeeld and rejection of the modern wereldbeschouwing, therefore, is not an expression of double-mindedness. Rather, it is the embodiment of the true spirit of Reformed Orthodoxy. To draw these observations together, Bavinck uses the distinction between the modern wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing to distinguish his modern orthodoxy from modern theology. More specifically, Bavinck uses the distinction between beeld and beschouwing to allow for the appropriation of modernity within the historically Reformed framework of his thought and to defend the orthodoxy of Neo-Calvinism from its detractors. Yet a nagging question remains. Might not the distinction be just a little too convenient? The primary indicator that it may well be is that Bavinck’s use of his sources resists such a division. In the course of our investigations we have seen how Bavinck adopts Schweizer’s notion of a material principle,139 a good deal of Schelling’s natural and religious philosophy,140 elements of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule,141 and what Kuyper describes as modern Christology’s “seductive idea.”142 It is questionable whether what Bavinck appropriates from these thinkers can be legitimately subsumed under the rubric of beeld to the exclusion of beschouwing. What Bavinck appropriates from these thinkers is a conceptual framework for the interpretation of phenomena. For example, the notions of Erlösungsreligion and absolute Religion that Bavinck appropriates from the religionsgeschichtliche Schule are not just a beeld, an empirical presentation of the data, but are means of subsuming the religious phenomena under general concepts. Similarly, what appeals to Bavinck in Schweizer’s conception of a material principle is a mode of historical-theological enquiry that penetrates the surface of the phenomena and yields their governing idea. The same can be said of Bavinck’s appropriation of Schelling. Although Bavinck trims away the Identitätsphilosophie of Schelling’s earlier natural philosophy and the theogony of his later religious philosophy, what remains is not a mere image or representation but an explanation of coherence. The distinction between wereldbeeld and wereldbeschouwing, therefore, would seem to stumble over the fact that what Bavinck appropriates of modern thinkers pertains to the idea rather than merely the representation. 138 139 140 141 142

Bavinck, “Foreword to the First Edition,” 10. See above pp. 27−8. See above pp. 28−31, 81−4. See above pp. 76−8. See above p. 104.

121

122

Chalcedon and modernity

Bavinck’s definition of modernism, therefore, is in certain respects problematic. It is clear that what Bavinck understands under the beschouwing of ancient Christianity includes a supernatural concept of God, a standpoint of faith, and the authority of Scripture, but it is less clear how Bavinck’s appropriation of the conceptual framework of thinkers who do not maintain these presuppositions would not tar his beschouwing with the modern brush. Bavinck, nevertheless, does not leave us without an answer. Bavinck’s response is that thoughtforms that are conducive to the development of theology and defence of the truth can be extracted without remainder from the beschouwing in which they are embedded.143 This is because Scripture itself demands no specific philosophy.144 That is, it does not prescribe the use of particular thoughtforms. What Scripture does teach, however, is a specific beschouwing, namely, the organic beschouwing.145 To the degree that this organic view is maintained, so too is the purity of the reconciliation of ancient Christianity and modern culture. Beschouwing, therefore, enjoys something of a first order status, whereas thoughtforms function as second order quantifiers. Thus, the temporal qualifiers ancient and modern are ultimately irrelevant. It follows, then, that the moderne beschouwing is not an accident of history but a falsehood of reason, a reversion to the inorganic beschouwing of paganism.146 Whether the thoughtforms employed under this beschouwing are historically ancient or modern matters little. The theologian is free to appropriate either or both without prejudice. What matters is the beschouwing. Yet it is precisely this elevation of the organic beschouwing to the status of a first order principle taught by Scripture that exposes what is dubious in Bavinck’s definition of modern theology. As we have seen, Bavinck’s organicism is closely related to Schelling. Can Bavinck demonstrate that what he appropriates from Schelling is subservient to an idea taught explicitly in Scripture? That is, does the organism merely illustrate the idea that is taught by Scripture or does it superimpose an idea upon Scripture? Karl Barth raises a similar question with regard to the vestigia trinitatis in the first volume of his Church Dogmatics. He asks whether this concept illustrates or interprets the Holy Trinity.147 We might well pose Barth’s question to Bavinck. Does the organism illustrate or interpret the Trinity? As Eglinton has pointed out, Bavinck’s organicism represents a refinement of the vestigia trinitatis. In Bavinck, Trinity ad intra yields organism ad extra.148 Might it not be possible, then, that in the idea of the organism 143 144 145 146 147 148

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.608. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.609. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.281; Reformed Dogmatics, 3.298. Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid, 9−13, 28−9. Barth, The Church Dogmatics (4 vol. in 13 pts; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), I.1, 345−6. Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 68, 131−2.

A modern orthodoxy

we have a modern Trojan horse which has been allowed entry into Bavinck’s Ilium, and in whose belly we hear a threatening clank?149 Henk van den Belt has noted this same problem in his analysis of Bavinck’s epistemology. It is not always certain whether Bavinck’s general epistemology controls his theological epistemology or vice versa. That is, it is not always clear whether the subjectobject dichotomy or the trinitarian principia has the epistemological upper hand.150 Bavinck’s Christology both resolves this question and compounds the problem. The complexities of precisely how and why this is the case are worth tracing out, as they expose the nub of the problem. Consider the following statement in which Bavinck plainly states that the organism is an entailment of the incarnation. Bavinck writes, Against this dualistic and atomistic view (beschouwing), Scripture posits the organic. In the one, God comes to all, not in appearance but in truth. There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. Yet it depends therefore, as much on his divinity as it does on his true and complete human nature. If one essential constituent in the human nature of Christ is excluded from true unity and communion with God, then there is an element in creation that remains dualistically alongside and opposed to God.151

Bavinck claims that Scripture posits the organic view. The basis of this assertion is the incarnation. In the one mediator, God comes to all. The person of Christ thus functions as the constitutive principle of the organic God-world relation. Because God became flesh, there is no “element in creation that remains dualistically alongside and opposed to God.” The hypostatic union, therefore, forms the basis of the unity in distinction of the series of binary oppositions that the organism reconciles: subject and object, the real and the ideal, the mechanical and the teleological, and the one and the many. Inasmuch as the person of Christ forms the basis of the organic God-world relation, one can conclude that Bavinck’s theology is controlling his philosophy.152 Organism, therefore, is an entailment of incarnation. Before we turn to consider whether this really is the case, it is worth noting how this qualifies

149 150 151 152

Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, 335−6. Van den Belt, Authority, 282. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.281; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.298. In this respect, Bavinck’s organicism enjoys a logical advantage over Schelling’s. Although Schelling could mount a transcendental argument for the reality of the organism, Kantians would always be able to claim that it cannot be disproven that mechanism alone offers an adequate explanation of reality. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 164, 167. Bavinck’s organicism is immune to this critique, if the God-world relation is actually revealed. It is for precisely this reason that Schelling turned to the concept of revelation in his later writings.

123

124

Chalcedon and modernity

Eglinton’s observation that Trinity ad intra yields organism ad extra. The organism does exhibit vestiges of the Trinity, yet the constitutive principle of the organism ad extra is the decree to become incarnate. This can be corroborated by other descriptions of the God-world relation which portray the cosmos as an organism that is governed by the divine counsel. In the second volume of Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck writes, In short, the counsel of God and the cosmic history that corresponds to it must … be viewed as a systemic whole in which things occur side by side in coordinate relations and cooperate in the furtherings of what always was, is, and will be the deepest ground of all existence: the glorification of God. Just as in any organism all the parts are interconnected and reciprocally determine each other, so the world as a whole is a masterpiece of divine art, in which all the parts are organically interconnected. And of that world, in all its dimensions, the counsel of God is the eternal design.153

The decree thus functions as the constitutive principle of the organism of the cosmic history of the world. Yet the question this raises is, how does Bavinck order the various elements of the decree? Specifically, how does Bavinck order the decree to become incarnate to the decrees? Here, it is relevant to note that one of the reasons Bavinck cites for describing the God-world relation as an organism is that he wants to maintain a coordinate rather than subordinate relation between the ends and means of the decree. This holds important implications for the decree to become incarnate. Bavinck faults Reformed Orthodoxy for portraying the relation between the divine decree and its realisation in purely causal, or mechanical, terms. This holds relevance for the relationship in which election stands to reprobation within the divine decree. Reprobation might be said to result in the glory of God but it ought not be placed in a direct causal relation to this end. To explain how this could possibly be the case, Bavinck has recourse to the indirect correspondence of mechanism and teleology in the organism. Reprobation (mechanism) and the glory of God (teleology) correspond, yet only indirectly. That is, reprobation results in the glory of God but it is not the means to this end.154 This would seem to offer an elegant solution to the problem of how God is not the cause of sin. Yet if incarnation is the constitutive principle of the organism, it would demand a supralapsarian Christology. That is, if the decree to become incarnate governs the indirect identity of reprobation and election, then it must be logically prior to all else in the decree. Bavinck, however, rejects 153 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.392. 154 Bavinck bears some similarity to the supralapsarian William Twisse (1578−1646) in his coordinate ordering of the means and ends of the divine decree. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.390−2.

A modern orthodoxy

supralapsarian christologies. For Bavinck, the necessity of the incarnation is strictly soteriological. It would seem, therefore, that Bavinck’s characterisation of the God-world relation as an organism presupposes a consistently inconsistent supralapsarianism.155 Consider the following: a) incarnation is the ground of the organic God-world relation, b) the fall is logically prior to creation, c) the incarnation is contingent on the fall.156 While a) coheres with b), but it does not cohere with c). This lack of consistency is an important consideration for evaluating a thinker as architectural as Bavinck. For all his talk of system, Bavinck is reluctant to tie off all the loose ends. In fact, at the critical juncture, namely, the place the incarnation occupies in the ordering of the decrees, Bavinck refuses to square the circle. In light of this, the question that must be asked is whether organism really is an entailment of the incarnation. Bavinck’s claim ought not go unchallenged. What is the nature of this entailment? Is it necessary or merely possible? That is, is the organism only one of many possible explanations of the God-world relation or is it the only one? The question is pressing, because the distinction between beschouwing and beeld can only be maintained if the organic view is a necessary entailment of the incarnation. If the incarnation admits alternative accounts of the God-world relation, then the organic view would be relegated to a second order status. Bavinck’s distinction between beeld and beschouwing would then fall away because it could not be maintained that Scripture posits the organic view. This, in turn, would have significant implications for the manner in which Bavinck justifies his use of modern thinkers. Without the beeld-beschouwing distinction, Bavinck could still quarantine his own theology from modernism, but he would need to do so by defining modernism in terms of individual quantifiers rather than on the basis of a principle. That is, modern theology might be defined by the rejection of a series of individual doctrines such as a supernatural concept of God, special revelation, and a standpoint of faith. But it could not be defined in terms of the rejection of a scriptural beschouwing.

155 One gains the distinct impression that Bavinck is describing his own position when he writes, “Accordingly−and fortunately!−supralapsarianism is consistently inconsistent. It starts out with a bold leap forwards but soon afterward it shrinks back and relapses into the infralapsarianism it had previously abandoned.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.388. This consistent inconsistency should not, however, be confused with an unsystematic systematic theology. David Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 45. Bavinck would, in all likelihood, view Kelsey’s notion of singularity as deriving from an atomistic beschouwing. 156 See above, p. 50 and note.

125

126

Chalcedon and modernity

There is reason to believe that Bavinck himself may have ceded this point. In his last years, Bavinck grew increasingly dissatisfied with deductive thinking. This dissatisfaction first emerged in the context of tensions with Kuyper over the attempted merger of the Kampen Theological School with the Vrije Universiteit.157 Much of this tension arose from the question of “Reformed principles.” By 1915 Bavinck could publicly state, “The application of Reformed principles, as Dr Kuyper would have it, may be commendable, but may effect little change in the factual situation, because such an application of purely abstract definitions may not be able to provide any concrete answers. Thus, much space ought always be allowed for difference of opinion.”158 This scepticism regarding Reformed principles does not reflect a new theological anti-foundationalism on the part of Bavinck. The word “principle” (beginsel) in this instance does not bear reference to a philosophical principium or starting point. Indeed, there is little to indicate that Bavinck ever questioned the status of Scripture as the foundation of theology.159 Rather, the point at issue concerns the reliability of deductive principles in moving from Scripture to the lived world. Whereas Bavinck had earlier expressed considerably greater confidence in such principles, towards the end of his life he was no longer so sure. In a statement contained in a notebook from 1919, in which Bavinck recorded his thoughts concerning the controversy over Jan Netelenbos’ view of Scripture,160 Bavinck evidences profound scepticism regarding the possibility of a deductive reconciliation of ancient Christianity and modern culture. For a time one thought one could solve everything with ‘principles’, theoretically, deductively, but reality took no notice. It persisted and erected a barricade against abstract principles. The facts were mightier than the principles. Culture stood upright in all its power. That then, is also what is common in all these phenomena. The distinction and antithesis between Christ and culture could be felt once again at the beginning of this century, but deeper and sharper than before. One thought the reconciliation had been found, lived for a time under this sweet illusion, and rejoiced. But disappointment soon followed, once the reconciliation of Hegel, Schleiermacher, the Vermittlungstheologie, and Neo-Kantianism had been put to the test throughout the course of the nineteenth century. 157 Bolt, Imitation, 278−82. 158 A. Anema/H. Bavinck/P.A. Diepenhorst/Th. Heemskerk/S. de Vries Czn, Leider en leiding in der Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1915), 48. For the relationship between Kuyper and Bavinck, see R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 13−64. Bremmer’s discussion is fascinating, but incomplete. A comprehensive study of the relationship between these two important figures remains to be written. 159 Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 149. 160 Jan Netelenbos (1874−1934) was a gereformeerde pastor in Middelburg, who embroiled Bavinck in the controversy surrounding his own views regarding the authority of Scripture. For a brief description of the controversy, see Kruswijk, Baas in eigen Boek, 96−9.

A modern orthodoxy

And because now in Christianity Scripture has taken a central place, one can say, that everything turns on Holy Scripture, on its authority and exegesis, on its warrant and use, in relation to the contemporary time. It is the problem of the ages: Christ and the world, the Gospel of the cross and Greek wisdom, belief and unbelief, what do you think of the Christ?161

In these notes, it is difficult not to see Bavinck numbering himself among those who for a time lived under the “sweet illusion” of the reconciliation of ancient Christianity and modern culture. As we have seen, Bavinck’s own attempt proceeded on the basis of a deductive principle, namely, the organic worldview. A younger Bavinck had sided with Kuyper against Alexander de Savornin Lohman (1837−1924),162 arguing that Reformed principles implied something more than fidelity to the Scriptures.163 The older Bavinck is less certain.164 Bavinck does not question the possibility of moving from Scripture to the lived world, but he does question whether one can do this by means of a principle. If one cannot, then it follows that Scripture does not teach a principle. The degree to which these doubts gained purchase on Bavinck’s thinking is difficult to tell.165 If they did, Bavinck may have been willing to cede that the distinction between a modern wereldbeeld and a modern wereldbeschouwing is a little too convenient. What then, is the significance of the modern thoughtforms in Bavinck’s theology? Their significance might be summarised as follows: Bavinck is unequivocally “orthodox” on account of his unqualified acceptance of a supernatural concept of God, special revelation, and the deity of Christ. Bavinck is also plainly “modern” on account of his developmental conceptualisation of 161 Harinck/Van der Kooi/Vree (ed.), Als Bavinck, 50−1. 162 In 1895 Alexander de Savornin Lohman (1837−1924), who had taught law at the Vrije Universiteit since 1884, became the subject of an internal inquiry. The committee, headed by Bavinck, was supposed to establish whether de Savornin Lohman’s instruction adhered to Reformed principles as required by Article Two of the university’s charter. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 236; Bolt, Bavinck on the Christian Life: Following Jesus in Faithful Service (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015), 128−9. 163 R. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966), 104. 164 This is reflected in the inevitable comparisons between Kuyper and Bavinck shortly after their almost simultaneous deaths. Kuyper was deductive, whereas Bavinck was the more inductive thinker. Tjeerd Hoekstra, “Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck,” Gereformeerde theologisch tijdschrift 21 (1922), 101. Cit. Bolt, Imitation, 272. 165 Bavinck certainly continues to describe reality in organic terms. For example, in 1917 Bavinck could still be heard arguing for “organic suffrage” in the Dutch Parliament. Handelingen der Staten-Generaal: Eerste Kamer (1916–17) May 15, 618–24. The precise relationship in which the organism stands to deductive principles in Bavinck’s later thought warrants further research

127

128

Chalcedon and modernity

doctrine, acceptance of the modern wereldbeeld, and commitment to the reconciliation of Christianity and modern culture. Whether Bavinck appropriates the thoughtforms of modernity to the exclusion of their governing idea is, however, a moot point. In the same way that the soil of the field colours the hands of the farmer, it is difficult to see how the thoughtforms of modernity do not leave their trace on Bavinck’s orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is not entirely accurate to say that Bavinck’s theology lies between modernism and orthodoxy.166 Bavinck’s theology is best characterised as a modern orthodoxy. It is orthodox for the fact that it upholds a series of first order quantifiers taught by Scripture. It is modern inasmuch as these quantifiers are conditioned by the thoughtforms of modernity. Orthodoxy, therefore, takes the place of the subject and modernity the predicate. Conclusion Bavinck’s account of the deity and humanity of Christ discloses two further features of his theological methodology. First, Bavinck’s claim that the mystery of godliness must form the starting point of Christology is indicative of both the theological premium Bavinck places on the deity of Christ and the methodological priority Bavinck accords the church’s confession. The former concerns Christology’s task of preserving true religion. It is only when Christology upholds the deity of Christ that the system’s lifeblood can be maintained in good health. The latter concerns Christology’s dependence on the church’s confession. The deity of Christ can only be maintained, if the inscripturated confession of the church functions as Christology’s foundation. Second, Bavinck’s elevation of development to a defining attribute of Christ’s true humanity offers one indication of where and how Bavinck thought dogmatics must develop. Whether Bavinck succeeds in offering such an account is perhaps moot. Bavinck encounters difficulty in accounting for the becoming of the divine image in categories that do not draw on the work of Christ for their material content. Moreover, it would seem to make the fall necessary to the development of humanity. Bavinck’s material Christology also yields important insights into the relationship of orthodoxy and modernity in his thought. If Bavinck’s account of Christ’s deity is indicative of orthodoxy and his account of Christ’s humanity of modernity, orthodoxy and modernity do not stand in equipoise in Bavinck. Bavinck’s Christology has a starting point and that starting point is the church’s (inscripturated) confession of the deity of Christ. Bavinck is thus orthodox before he is modern. Orthodoxy and modernity, nevertheless, like the two 166 Pace Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 167.

Conclusion

natures of the Chalcedonian symbol, are joined inseparably and indivisibly, without confusion or change. The onweersprekelijk modern motifs in Bavinck’s theology, therefore, do not bear witness to two Bavincks but rather, an hypostatic Bavinck. One might say, therefore, that both orthodoxy and modernity are to be predicated of the person. The christological basis for the organism, however, problematises his attempted reconciliation of ancient Christianity and modern culture by means of the organic beschouwing. The organism must be a necessary rather than merely possible entailment of incarnation, if the organic view is to govern the reconciliation. Bavinck plainly thought that the organism is a necessary entailment of the incarnation, although his waning confidence in deductive thinking in his final years raises at least a question mark over this claim. We shall continue our exploration of deductive principles in the following chapter, which addresses the explicitly deductive aspect of Bavinck’s system. The precise contours of Bavinck’s christological derivation of doctrine and the relation in which these contours stand to the organism yield crucial insights into what it might mean to describe Bavinck as a christocentric theologian.

129

Christology and the derivation of doctrine Introduction “The doctrine of Christ is not the starting point, but it is indeed the centre of the whole system of dogmatics. All other dogmas either prepare for it or are inferred from it.”1 So, writes Bavinck in the programmatic statement we have been tracing. In chapter one we considered the limitations Bavinck places on Christology as the centre of his dogmatic system. We also briefly examined why Bavinck considers the doctrines of the Trinity, revelation, and creation to be logically prior to Christology. Having considered what it means for Christology to be the heart of dogmatics in chapter two and Bavinck’s material Christology in chapter three, we now turn our attention to the other side of the equation to consider Bavinck’s claim that the doctrines that do not prepare for Christology are inferred from Christology. Here, we will consider three loci, namely, Scripture, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Our aim in this chapter is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of these doctrines, but to identify precisely how these doctrines are inferred from Christology. As we shall see, the christological determination of these doctrines is very closely related. In important ways, Bavinck’s doctrine of the last things arises from the christological determination of his doctrine of the church, the principle elements of which are in turn to be found in Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture. Nevertheless, the degree to which Christology is permitted to shape each of these doctrines varies. The differences to be noted in this regard offer concrete examples of the claim that Christology forms the centre but not the starting point of Reformed Dogmatics. Before embarking upon our exploration, it is worth reiterating that interest in otherwise important features of Bavinck’s bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology will be suspended in favour of examining the claim that these doctrines are christologically derived. Much that is noteworthy in Bavinck’s account of these doctrines, therefore, will be passed over. While the deficit of such an approach is plain, it yields benefits crucial to our enquiry. First, the christological derivation of these doctrines exposes the relationship between the various loci of Bavinck’s system and their subordination to the psychological structuring of his doctrine of revelation. Second, the more architectonic account of these doctrines that will emerge yields important insights into the degree of control Christology exercises within Bavinck’s system. Third, focusing on the architectonic relationship between these individual doctrines allows a question mark to be raised over Bavinck’s claim that the doctrines that do not prepare for Christology 1 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254; cf. Rweformed Dogmatics, 3.274.

132

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

are in fact inferred from Christology. This question mark in turn leads us to consider what it is that might in fact be governing the derivation of doctrine in Bavinck’s concept of a dogmatic system. Scripture In Reformed Dogmatics, the doctrine of Scripture comprises a subdivision of the doctrine of revelation.2 In considering the christological derivation of Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture, it is important to note the way that the broader category is also christologically determined. The fundamental category in Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation is “embodiment” (belichaming). Revelation is the embodiment of the divine intellect and will.3 “The entire world,” Bavinck writes, “is a revelation of God, a mirror of his attributes and perfections. Every creature in its own way and degree is the embodiment of a divine thought.”4 Similarly, “[c]reation and new creation are works of God in time but simultaneously an embodiment of his eternal counsel.”5 The metaphor of embodiment proceeds from Bavinck’s appropriation of the doctrine of divine ideas, which, as we noted in chapter two, plays a significant role in Bavinck’s refutation of the Kantian critique of knowledge.6 The fundamental medium of this embodiment is language, and texts constitute a further visual signification of this embodiment. Bavinck writes, “But just as thought embodies itself in words, so words are embodied in a text. And language itself is nothing but an organism of signs, of audible signs, and the audible sign naturally seeks stability in a visible sign, in writing.”7 Texts, therefore, are a particular subcategory of the embodiment of divine thought.

2 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.348−465; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.377−494. Bavinck presents his account of Scripture in three sections, Openbaring en Heilige Schrift, De Theopneustie der Schrift, and De Eigenschappen der Schrift. The English translation obscures this division by combining the previous section Openbaring en Natuur with the first section of Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture to form one longer section, “Revelation in Nature and Holy Scripture.” 3 Heideman rightly notes the importance of the characterisation. Heideman, Revelation and Reason, 137. 4 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.530−1. 5 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 30. 6 See above, p. 61. 7 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.349; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.377. It is unfortunate that the English translation here renders organisme as “body,” as this statement provides a very important connection between the notion of organic inspiration and the Christological analogy. The English translation also fails to reflect the distinction between the notion of text (schrift) and that of Scripture (De Schrift).

Scripture

They are not just the embodiment of ideas but “the ἐνσαρκωσις” of words.8 Thus, Bavinck can describe the text of Scripture as the σαρξ of divine speech.9 The comparison of Scripture with the incarnation has a long pedigree in Christian theology. Among the church fathers, the incarnational analogy can be traced at least as far back as Origen.10 In medieval exegesis the analogy appears under the motif of the verbum abbreviatum.11 In the more robustly realist expositions of the analogy, the attributes of Scripture are said to mirror the historia Christi. John Wyclif, for example, regards the weakness of Scripture as a mirror in which we see the weakness of Christ. Just as Christ as the Word assumed perishable flesh and was liable to injury and death at the hands of sinners, so too, the Word is united to vellum and is liable to scribal error and the blasphemies of the impious.12 Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy has much in common with Wyclif.13 Like Wyclif, Bavinck also views Scripture as recapitulating the historia Christi. Bavinck writes, “Christ bore a cross, and the servant is not greater than its master … [Scripture] shares in his defamation and arouses the hostility of sinful humanity.”14 Bavinck, however, avoids Wyclif ’s analogy of union. Bavinck nowhere describes God’s word as being united with human words. Bavinck also locates Scripture within a much broader notion of embodiment that encompasses the historia revelationis. 8 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.349; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.378. 9 The description of Scripture as the σάρξ of divine speech recurs with some frequency. For example, “In its entirety, from start to finish, [Scripture] is thought given flesh, the incarnate word.” Bavinck, “Eloquence,” in James Eglinton (ed)., Herman Bavinck on Preaching and Preachers (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2017), 38. “Just as the Word that is the Logos has assumed true human nature in Christ, so too the word of God’s will has become flesh in our human language in law and Gospel.” Bavinck, Roeping en wedergeboorte (Kampen: Zalsman, 1903), 212. “What God wished to communicate of himself to human beings has become flesh, weak, has entered into human existence, thought, life and history; it bears a historical character, yes even stronger it has become writing (inscripturatio), written with ink on paper, printed etc. The form is completely human from beginning to end.” Harinck/Van der Kooi/Vree, Als Bavinck, 58; cit. Van den Belt, Authority, 258. 10 Johannes Feiner /Magnus Löhrer (ed.), Mysterium salutis: Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965), 1:303. The analogy may extend even further to Ignatius of Antioch. Cf. Joseph H. Crehan, “The analogy between verbum Dei incarnatum and verbum Dei scriptum in the Fathers,” The Journal of Theological Studies 6:1 (1955), 88. 11 Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis (3 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 3.140−6. 12 Ian Christopher Levy, “John Wyclif ’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture in its Christological Context,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003), 234–9. 13 It is unclear whether Bavinck draws on Wyclif directly for his use of the incarnational analogy. Bavinck cites Wyclif ’s De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae (3 vol.; Leipzig: Dietrich, 1904), describing it as “the most remarkable and extensive treatment of the doctrine of Scripture.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.407 and note. 14 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.440.

133

134

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

Bavinck maps the whole of objective revelation onto the Christ-hymn of Philippians 2:1–11. Like Christ, revelation as a whole charts a path of descent. Bavinck writes, in “prophecy and miracle revelation descends so low and so deeply that it does not despise even the lowest forms of human and specifically religious life as a means.”15 The nadir of this descent is Scripture. “To be able fully to enter the life of humankind and for it fully to become its possession, revelation assumes the μορφή and σχῆμα of Scripture.” Defining features of Bavinck’s Christology are also reflected in the comparison of Scripture with the incarnation. In the same way that the incarnation in and of itself does not constitute a step in Christ’s humiliation,16 neither does inscripturation in and of itself initiate the humiliation of divine thought. Rather, it is the purpose of inscripturation that determines its humiliation. Just as the “Logos himself does not merely become ἀνθρώπινος, but δοῦλος, σάρξ,” so too, the word of revelation assumes an imperfect (onvolkomen) and inadequate (gebrekkigen) form to become the “the servant form of revelation.”17 In the secondary literature, it has been frequently noted that the incarnational analogy plays a prominent role in Bavinck’s defence of the inspiration of Scripture.18 The apologetic potential of the incarnational analogy is, arguably, what commends it to Bavinck’s use.19 The incarnational analogy provides a theological explanation of the hermeneutical difficulties that the reader encounters in the self-testimony of Scripture. Scripture claims to be the word of God,20 but there are “phenomena and facts that are hard to reconcile with that self-testimony.”21 To account for these phenomena in such a way that they do not pose a challenge to the self-testimony of Scripture, Bavinck aligns them with the Son’s assumption of weakened flesh. Thus, just as the weakness of Christ posed a stumbling block to his self-testimony, so too, the weakness of Scripture poses a stumbling block to its self-testimony. Moreover, the weakness of Scripture is a necessary condition of its function in the economy of salva-

15 16 17 18

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.380. See above, p. 104. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.352; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.380. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 169, 173; Meijers, Objectiviteit en existentialiteit, 73; Van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek, 112; Van den Belt, Authority, 258. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 420−1, 443. 19 The organism too functions in this capacity. “Many and very serious objections are raised against this view of the inspiration of Scripture … Nonetheless, the organic view of inspiration does furnish us with many means to meet the objections advanced against it.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.439, 442. 20 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.401−2, 423−4. 21 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.419.

Scripture

tion.22 Yet it is specifically the sinlessness of Christ’s weakened flesh that plays the central role in Bavinck’s crafting of the analogy. Bavinck argues that just as the assumption of weakened flesh poses no threat to Christ’s impeccability, neither does the weakness of Scripture threaten its truthfulness. “The inscripturation of the word … invites us to recognise that dimension of weakness and lowliness, that servant form, also in Scripture. But just as Christ’s human nature, however weak and lowly, remained free from sin, so also Scripture is sine labe concepta.”23 The phenomena, therefore, may be difficult to reconcile with Scripture’s self-testimony, but this difficulty is indicative only of a truthful frailty. “Scripture,” Bavinck writes, “has become flesh and blood” and is “like us in all things except sin.”24 Christology also determines the scope of the inspiration and authority of Scripture. These limitations are well-known.25 “Scripture,” Bavinck writes, “is not designed to be a manual for the various sciences.”26 Bavinck affirms therewith that Scripture is not a principium for other disciplines in the same way that it is for theology. Bavinck further limits the inspiration and authority of Scripture to its religious-ethical character. The statements of Scripture, therefore, cannot be read in isolation from their soteriological purpose.27 Bavinck does not, however, seek to exclude the authority of the means from the authority of the end. Whatever the Bible affirms, particularly with regard to historical events, is true, even if it does not conform to the conventions of modern scholarship.28 In this way, Bavinck circumscribes the scope of the inspiration of Scripture by its purpose. The range of Scripture, nevertheless, is unlimited in every respect. Because there is a religious dimension to the whole of life, the Bible is a word for family and society, even for science and art.29 In the first instance, the christological determination of these limitations proceeds from Jesus’ own view of Scripture. Jesus perfectly discloses the Father 22 “The word of revelation assumes the imperfect and weakened form of Scripture, but only in this way does revelation become the good of humankind.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.380. 23 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.406; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.435. 24 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.443. 25 Jack Rogers and Donald McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 390; Richard B. Gaffin, “Old Amsterdam and Inerrancy?” part 2, Westminster Theological Journal 45 (1983), 232. 26 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.444. 27 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.444. 28 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.447. Koert van Bekkum has sought to develop this aspect of Neo−Calvinism. Koert van Bekkum, “Zekerheid en Schriftgezag in neo-calvinistsche visies op de historiciteit van de Bijbel,” in Koert van Bekkum/Rien Bouw (ed.), Geloven in zekerheid? Gereformeerd geloven in een postmoderne tijd (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2000), 77−108. 29 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.445.

135

136

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

not only in his person but also in his work. Jesus’ view of Scripture, therefore, is necessarily authoritative. If Jesus erred in this respect, he would not have fulfilled his prophetic office. Bavinck writes, Not only is Jesus holy and without sin in an ethical sense (John 8:46) but also intellectually he is without error, lies, or deception. It is absolutely true that Jesus was not active in the field of science in a restricted sense. He came to earth to make known the Father and to accomplish his work. The inspiration of Scripture on which Jesus makes pronouncements is not a scientific problem but a religious truth. If he erred in this respect, he was wrong at a point that is most closely tied in with the religious life and can no longer be recognised as our highest prophet in religion and theology either.30

Yet the christological determination of the inspiration and authority of the Bible also proceeds from what Bavinck is and is not willing to affirm with regard to the content of Christ’s speech. These limitations are evident in the passage cited above, yet they are made even more explicit in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck writes, [O]ne may not infer, however, that in various domains Jesus could err (dat Jezus op verschillende terreinen dwalen kon). This, admittedly, is currently being taught in broad circles to escape Jesus’ authority in the matter of his view on demon possession, his eschatological predictions, and especially in relation to the Old Testament. But in so doing one violates the Christ himself. Granted, Jesus did not give instructions in any human science, nor did he come on earth for that purpose. He came to make known to us the Father and to carry out his work. But to that end he also needed to know that Father in his revelation and works and hence whether the Old Testament was, or was not, the Word of God. This was knowledge not of a purely scientific but of a religious nature, one that was of the greatest importance for the faith of the church. One who in this respect charges Jesus with error comes into conflict not only with his divine nature but also with his prophetic office and with all the testimonies in which he ascribes his teaching to the Father (John 7:16; 8:26, 28, 38; 12:49–50).31

As the context indicates, the various domains upon which Christ did not err are not different disciplines of knowledge, but the various topoi of his teaching. This is made clear in Bavinck’s illustration of the counterclaim. When Bavinck states that Jesus’ errancy in various domains “is currently being taught in broad circles,” he offers the examples of Jesus’ teaching on the subjects of demon possession, the eschaton, or the Old Testament. On such matters, Jesus did not err. Bavinck does not, therefore, attribute a generalised or universal personal inerrancy to Jesus. This is evident in the caveat that Jesus did not give instructions “in any human science.” However, this caveat should not be taken as an acknowledgment that 30 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.398. 31 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.312−3; cf. Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.298.

Scripture

Jesus did in fact err when he spoke beyond the remit of his prophetic office. Bavinck refuses to speculate; he neither affirms nor denies this possibility. What Bavinck can affirm, however, is that with respect to the impartation of the knowledge the Father entrusted to the Son, Jesus did not err. The limitations of this claim are in turn brought to bear on the inspiration and authority of Scripture.32 Bavinck writes, All those facts in Scripture are not communicated in isolation and for their own sake but with a theological aim, namely, that we should know God unto salvation. Scripture never intentionally concerns itself with science. Christ himself, though free from all error and sin, was never, strictly speaking, active in the field of science and art, commerce and industry, law and politics. His was another kind of greatness: the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth … The same is true for Scripture. It too is religious through and through, the word of God unto salvation … it is not a scientific book in the strict sense.33

Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy, however, has provoked strong criticism. These criticisms warrant close scrutiny, as they expose potential methodological cracks in Bavinck’s christological derivation of the doctrine of Scripture. Gerrit Berkouwer, for example, thinks that the notion of union is inherent to the analogy itself. In his book, Holy Scripture,34 which engages in some detail with Bavinck, Berkouwer argues that even where hypostatic union may be denied, some form of union remains. The incarnational analogy thus courts bibliolatry.35 While the major premise of Berkouwer’s argument is sound, the minor premise ought to be probed a little further. Direct union with a creaturely entity would indeed hold implications for worship and Bavinck’s discussion of the worship of Christ and the mediate character of the incarnation suggest a keen awareness of these doxological implications.36 Moreover, Bavinck regards simplicity as a non-negotiable feature of the doctrine of God and any kind of union other than that of incarnation would pose a threat to divine simplicity.37 32 Henri Blocher overlooks this narrowing of Christ’s personal inerrancy in his discussion of the significance of Bavinck’s use of the phrase sine labe concepta. Henri A. Blocher, “God and the Scripture writers: the question of double authorship,” in Donald A. Carson (ed.), The enduring authority of the Christian Scriptures (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 531 and note. 33 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.445. 34 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). 35 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 203−4. 36 Bavinck argues that the person of Christ is the proper object of worship, but not on account of his mediatorship but rather on account of his deity. This in turn offers one important reason for affirming that the divine and human natures are not united immediately but mediately, that is, through the person of the Son. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.275−6, 316−19. 37 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.176−7.

137

138

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

Yet the grounds upon which Berkouwer claims that the incarnational analogy in and of itself entails the concept of union are unclear. In Bavinck’s use, the analogy centres on the claim that creaturely means pose no hindrance to divine revelation and on the identity of divine and human speech. With regard to the latter, the precise point of comparison in Bavinck lies not in any union but in the distribution of the predication. Scripture is wholly, rather than partially, the Word of God and wholly, rather than partially, the word of human authors in the same way that Christ is wholly divine and wholly human.38 Importantly, Bavinck says nothing about the conditions under which the predication occurs. Bavinck’s recourse to the Thomist concept of participation may be of relevance in this regard,39 but in Bavinck’s use of the analogy there is no specific indication of the metaphysical arrangement under which the predication obtains. Berkouwer’s criticism of Bavinck, therefore, gains little purchase without further substantiation of the claim that the analogy itself presupposes the concept of union. Six further objections to the incarnational analogy are raised in Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch by John Webster.40 Although Webster does not mention Bavinck by name, Berkouwer’s reading of Bavinck forms the backdrop of these criticisms.41 The objections Webster raises are as follows: i) the analogy threatens the uniqueness of the incarnation, ii) incarnation and inscripturation are in no way equivalent realities, iii) the analogy makes an ontological claim that divinises the Bible, iv) no divine properties can be predicated of a creaturely entity, v) no divine properties can be predicated of anything that stands in an instrumental relation to God, and vi) the analogy courts dualism.42 The fourth of these objections offers the most suitable point of entry to Webster’s misgivings. In proscribing the predication of divine properties of Scripture, Webster seeks to guard against encroaching on the integrity of God’s being. As such, there can be no question of a union of divine and human factors, but only of the mystery of the human words as God’s Word.43 Although it is not entirely clear from Webster’s sketch, this would suggest that the human words of Scripture function as the words of God and could in certain senses be identified as the words of God. Webster affirms both the suggestio verborum and a necessary relation between the words of Scripture and their instrumental role in God’s

38 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.435. 39 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.232. 40 John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 41 Webster, Holy Scripture, 23 n. 21. 42 Webster, Holy Scripture, 23, 26. 43 Webster, Holy Scripture, 23.

Scripture

communicative self-presence.44 What Webster would seem to deny is that one may then take the further step of identifying the words of God with the Word of God and in so doing, ascribe to Scripture the status of divine revelation. This cannot be done, Webster asserts, without turning the Bible into a quasi-divine artefact.45 Webster’s objection to the incarnational analogy, therefore, derives from a more fundamental concern over the objectification of revelation. For Webster, revelation cannot be objectified apart from the predication of divine properties, as revelation is identical with God’s triune being in its active self-presence.46 Moreover, revelation bears a noetic dimension but is not reducible to mere epistemology.47 The noetic dimension of revelation, therefore, cannot be objectified in isolation from its ontological dimension. Even if Scripture were to record divine thought in the suggestio verborum, these ectypal thoughts are improperly described as revelation. Such thoughts would not manifest divine presence but would rather stand in an instrumental relation to the communication of God’s triune being in active self-presence. The difference between Webster and Bavinck thus lies in the relation of the real to the ideal in divine revelation. Bavinck would agree with Webster that the subjective appropriation of revelation does not obtain apart from God’s active self-presence; revelation is apprehended solely under the agency and in the presence of the Holy Spirit.48 Bavinck would disagree with Webster’s claim that the objectification of revelation entails a concomitant claim on God’s being, such that to describe Scripture as objective revelation entails the ascription of divine properties to Scripture. For Bavinck, this claim projects the relation of divine knowing and being ad intra much too far into the effects of divine knowing and being ad extra.49 Knowing and being are identical in se but not quoad nos.50 Bavinck allows considerably more metaphysical space between God’s archetypal and ectypal knowledge. In the ectype it is possible to speak 44 Webster, Holy Scripture, 38−9. 45 Webster, Holy Scripture, 25, 28. Webster articulates similar concerns in a later essay, “Domain of the Word,” in The Domain of the Word (London: T &T Clark, 2012), 13. 46 Webster, Holy Scripture, 14. 47 Webster, Holy Scripture, 16. 48 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.213. 49 “[T]hough closely connected with God’s being, [the divine counsel] may not be equated with that being, nor therefore with the Son, that is, the Logos. It stands in the same relation to God’s being that world-consciousness stands to God’s self-consciousness. God’s self-knowledge is not exhausted in the world any more than his power or any of his virtues is. Yet the world is a suitable instrument, in a creaturely manner, for the revelation of all God’s attributes.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.334; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.375. 50 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 225−6.

139

140

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

of an objectification of divine knowing in a manner that holds no ontological consequences for God’s being. The reason for this is that while there are no real relations within the being of God,51 distinctions may be drawn between his attributes as they are known from his works.52 Thus, the claim that Scripture embodies divine thought makes no further claim on divine presence than the claim that creation embodies divine thought.53 Webster’s objections, however, are not limited to the conceptualisation of revelation in the Reformed tradition but also extend to its putative consequences. The first of these is that the objectification of revelation irretrievably untethers revelation from divine agency. Webster states, Objectification happens when biblical inspiration is expounded in such a way that it makes revelation available after the manner of a worldly entity and not after the manner of God. In an objectified account of revelation, the inspired product is given priority over the revelatory, sanctifying and inspiring activities of the divine agent. But properly understood, inspiration does not mean that the truth of the gospel which Scripture sets before us becomes something to hand, constantly available independent of the Word and work of God, an entity which embodies rather than serves the presence of God. Inspiration does not spell the end of the mystery of God; it is simply that act of the Spirit through which this set of texts proceeds from God to attest his ineffable presence. Inspiration is a mode of the Spirit’s freedom, not its inhibition by the letter. Once again, pressure to move in a different direction often comes from epistemological concerns – from the need to secure Scripture’s foundational status as inconcussum fundamentum veritatis and principium cognoscendi by reference to inspiration. In effect, inspiration can become “the purest form of epistemological apocalyptic,” knowledge without eschatology; and this dogmatics must eschew.54

The lack of direct engagement with Bavinck hinders a deeper probing of these claims, but it would seem that the distinction between the principium cognoscendi externum and principium cognoscendi internum, with which Bavinck associates the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively, 51 That is, no real relations aside from those of the (consubstantial) persons. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.331−2. 52 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.124−8, 136−7. 53 Here, Bavinck’s recourse to the Thomist concept of participation is also relevant. “Says Thomas: just as we look into the natural world, not by being in the sun ourselves, but by the light of the sun that shines on us, so neither do we see things in the divine being but by the light that, originating in God, shines in our own intellect. Reason in us is that divine light; it is not itself the divine logos, but it participates in it.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.232. Bavinck returns to the imagery of the sun and its rays in his doctrine of Scripture. “All the revelations and words of God, in nature and history, in creation and re-creation, both in the Old and the New Testament, have their ground, unity, and centre in him. He is the sun; the individual words of God are his rays.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.402. 54 Webster, Holy Scripture, 33.

Scripture

offers a prima facie answer to Webster’s charge that regarding inspiration as a permanent property of Scripture renders it independent of the Word and work of God. Moreover, the claim that an objectified account of revelation deprives theological epistemology of eschatology would seem premature. As our exploration of the christological determination of Bavinck’s ecclesiology and eschatology will show, revelation is a fundamentally eschatological concept in Bavinck.55 The second of the consequences Webster identifies is that securing Scripture’s foundational status by means of an objectification of revelation brings faith’s certainty to rest on something other than God. Webster writes, [I]nspiration is not foundational but derivative … To reverse this direction … is to make inspiration into a formal property insufficiently coordinated to the gospel content of Scripture, and to render the communicative presence of God contingent upon proven conviction of the text’s inspiredness … Faith’s certainty is grounded in God alone, not in inspiration; faith is “founded” on Scripture, not because of its formal property as inspired but because Scripture is the instrument of divine teaching which proceeds from God. Within such a context, talk of inspiration will have its place; detached from that context, it goes awry.56

The unwelcome consequence is that divine communicative presence becomes contingent upon proof of the inspiration of Scripture or shifting the certainty of faith from God to a doctrine. The difficulty with these claims is that Bavinck repeatedly states that Scripture is αυτοπιστος.57 Thus, no discursive proof is necessary for acceptance of Scripture as an epistemological foundation.58 Moreover, Bavinck’s identification of the Holy Spirit with the principium cognoscendi internum brings his account of the certainty of faith to rest not on a doctrine about God but on God himself. This is also reflected in Bavinck’s statements that the final ground of all faith and theology is Deus dixit.59 This would seem to offer a prima facie answer to Webster’s concern but as mentioned previously, the lack of direct engagement with Bavinck hinders a deeper probing of Webster’s concerns.

55 Also noteworthy in this passage is the way Webster frames the two principle Bavinckian metaphors as mutually exclusive descriptors. According to Webster, viewing Scripture as the embodiment of revelation precludes viewing Scripture as the servant-form of revelation. 56 Webster, Holy Scripture, 32. Note that once again, embodiment and servanthood are framed as mutually exclusive alternatives; inspiration as a formal property of the text precludes its instrumental use. 57 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.457. 58 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.436. 59 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.30, 590.

141

142

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

Webster’s objections to the use of the incarnational analogy, therefore, ultimately rest on deeper concerns surrounding the noetic dimension of revelation and its objectification. If the noetic dimension of revelation may legitimately be objectified, Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy does injury neither to the divine being nor the uniqueness of the incarnation. Moreover, Bavinck’s use of the analogy does not necessarily entail the consequences Webster fears. A prima facie case can be made that Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture neither untethers revelation from divine agency nor renders divine communicative presence contingent upon proof of the inspiration of Scripture. A final suite of objections to the incarnational analogy is raised by Henri Blocher in an essay addressing the double-authorship of Scripture.60 Blocher’s net is cast a little wider than Berkouwer and Webster, inasmuch as he refers not only to Bavinck and Kuyper’s use of the analogy but refers briefly to the use of the analogy by theologians such as John Chrysostom and Rupert of Deutz.61 Blocher’s criticism turns on a distinction between substances and acts. Blocher writes, “[b]ibliology deals with the cooperation of two persons and one act, speech-act, with qualities one should not think of as substances! There is little warrant for representing the divine discourse as pre-existent and adding a human expression, as a kind of second nature, in the event of inspiration.”62 In certain respects, this criticism echoes those of Berkouwer and Webster. Blocher recalls Berkouwer’s concern about union, when he invokes the idea of “adding” a human expression to divine speech. Blocher also recalls Webster’s concerns over the objectification of revelation, when he insists that a speech-act is not a substance. Blocher differs from Berkouwer and Webster, however, in that he cedes the predication of formal properties, such as authority, to Scripture. The warrant for this resides in the function of Scripture as an extension of divine agency. Formal properties may be predicated of Scripture because the predication ultimately bears reference to the speaker whose speech Scripture extends.63 Blocher also differs from Berkouwer and Webster in his approbation of the fundamental motif of Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation. Whereas Webster rejects the notion of embodiment,64 Blocher affirms that “the text embodies the illocutionary act.”65 At this point it becomes difficult to discern the material difference between Blocher’s proposal of Scripture as the embodiment of an illocutionary act and Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy. As we have 60 61 62 63 64 65

Blocher, “God and the Scripture Writers,” 497−541. Blocher, “God and the Scripture Writers,” 531. Blocher, “God and the Scripture Writers,” 532. Blocher, “God and the Scripture Writers,” 533. See above, pp. 140−1 nn. 54−5. Blocher, “God and the Scripture Writers,” 532.

Scripture

seen, Bavinck avoids language of addition or union. The material difference, therefore, between Blocher’s and Bavinck’s notion of embodiment is slender or non-existent. A common difficulty with these criticisms of Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy is that they ignore both Bavinck’s recognition of the limitations of the analogy and the limited ends to which the analogy is employed.66 Moreover, there is no suggestion in Bavinck that Scripture, as divine revelation, involves a union of substances or addition of creaturely speech to the pre-existent Logos. The point of purchase in Bavinck’s use of the analogy is twofold. First, creaturely weakness poses no hindrance to truthful communication. In the same way that Christ’s flesh poses a stumbling block but does not preclude the possibility of divine revelation, the creatureliness of Scripture poses a stumbling block to but does not preclude the possibility of divine revelation. Second, there is no contradiction in the double predication of the divine and the creaturely. Scripture is at once the Word of God and the word of the human authors in like manner to the way that Christ is at once fully divine and fully human. Nevertheless, Webster’s objections ought to give pause for thought. If there is a problem with Bavinck’s use of the incarnational analogy, then it exposes an underlying defect in his doctrine of revelation and perhaps even his doctrine of God. If, however, the metaphysical claims that undergird Bavinck’s conceptualisation of revelation are sound, his use of the incarnational analogy would not seem to fall afoul of the dangers Berkouwer, Webster, and Blocher identify. One can only surmise that Bavinck would respond to these criticisms with the adage, abusus non tollit usum.67 Both the incarnational analogy and its internal logic provide instructive examples of Bavinck’s claim that Christology forms the middelpunt but not the uitgangspunt of Bavinck’s theological system. Bavinck’s starting point is Scripture’s self-testimony, yet the person and work of Christ form the lens through which Bavinck reads this self-testimony. Jesus’ own view of Scripture and his impeccability form the hermeneutical lens through which Bavinck considers what it might mean for Scripture to be the Word of God. Bavinck’s christocentric determination of the doctrine of Scripture, therefore, proceeds primarily from his christocentric exegesis.68 Yet it does not proceed entirely from a christocentric reading of Scripture. Christology, it would seem, stands logically prior to Scripture. Bavinck writes, “incarnation leads to Scripture … Scripture is the product of God’s incarnation in Christ.”69 The question 66 In his notebooks Bavinck even writes, “it is only an analogy, nothing more.” Harinck/Van der Kooi/Vree, Als Bavinck, 56. 67 Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.605. 68 See above, p. 42. 69 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.380.

143

144

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

this raises is, how can Scripture be christologically determined, if Scripture forms the uitgangspunt of his dogmatic system?70 A provisional answer to this question must await our consideration of the christological derivation of Bavinck’s ecclesiology and eschatology. The considerably more complicated relationship of middelpunt and uitgangspunt in these doctrines sheds light on the christological derivation of Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture. Ecclesiology If one were to read only the relevant chapters in the fourth volume of Reformed Dogmatics, the christological derivation of Bavinck’s ecclesiology could easily be missed. Bavinck’s ecclesiology is set out in three chapters. The first chapter traces the essence, attributes, and marks of the church, the second addresses the church’s government, and the third considers the church’s power.71 In the first of these chapters, Christology is a muted theme. The essence of the church is identified as the gathering of believers in accordance with the etymology and biblical usage of the words ἐκκλησία and ‫קהל‬.72 The christological metaphors of the New Testament receive no special privileges. The church is the body of Christ, but it is also described as the bride, sheepfold, and brethren of Christ, the building, temple and house of God, the branches of the vine and the children of God.73 The christological metaphors, moreover, are not related specifically to Christology but are subsumed under the doctrine of election. The church represents the body of Christ inasmuch as it is elect in Christ.74 All of this is somewhat unexpected, given the place Bavinck attributes to ecclesiology in the Prolegomena. In the first volume of Reformed Dogmatics, ecclesiology is portrayed as the perfection of revelation, a concept, which as we have seen is christologically determined. The church is thus characterised as the subjective prolongation, even the consummation, of the incarnation. Bavinck writes,

70 The question becomes more acute when one considers Bavinck’s insistence that Scripture cannot be accorded a subordinate place within the doctrine of the church. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.86. 71 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.8. This ordering is common in Reformed Orthodoxy. Cf. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3.vii−x. 72 “All this makes it incontrovertible that in its essence the church is a gathering of true believers.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.298. 73 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.298. 74 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.298.

Ecclesiology

The purpose of revelation is not Christ. Christ is the centre and the means. The purpose is that God will again dwell in his creatures and reveal his glory in the cosmos: θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. In a certain sense this too is an ἐνανθρωπησις τοῦ θεοῦ, an incarnation of God. To achieve this purpose the word of revelation passes into Scripture. Thus, Scripture too is a means and an instrument, not a goal. It is entailed by the incarnation of God in Christ and in a certain sense is its continuation, the path along which Christ makes his dwelling in the church, the praeparatio viae ad plenam inhabitationem Dei. Only, in this indwelling it then has its τέλος, its end and goal (1 Cor 15:28).75

In the Prolegomena, therefore, ecclesiology is an entailment of Christology and, as such, a sub-division of the doctrine of revelation. The church is indicative of a broader account of divine immanence, the end of which is a plenary indwelling of God. The process by which divine immanence is realised is one of continuous incarnation. In order to appreciate the form that continuous incarnation takes, it is necessary to attend to the trinitarian and psychological structure of Bavinck’s conceptualisation of revelation. Bavinck orders the concept of revelation according to the congruent binary pairings of objective-subjective and external-internal. These psychological categories are then mapped onto the operations of the second and third persons of the Holy Trinity. Thus, objective, external revelation corresponds to God the Son and subjective internal revelation corresponds to the person of the Holy Spirit.76 Accordingly, the historia revelationis is divided into an objective dispensation which corresponds to the work of the Son and a subjective dispensation which corresponds to the work of the Holy Spirit. Together these dispensations constitute the continuous coming of God to his people.77 Revelation from the fall of humanity to the incarnation forms the continuous, objective coming of the Logos.78 Until the incarnation, this coming is noetic.79 75 76 77 78

Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.352; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.380−1. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.213. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.505. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.280. This has already been spelled out in the Prolegomena: “In a sense God’s becoming human starts already immediately after the fall, inasmuch in his special revelation God reached back deeply into the life of the creation, linked up with the work of his own providence, and so ordered and led persons, situations and events, indeed the entire history of a people, that he gradually came close to the human race and became ever more clearly knowable to it. But it reaches its culmination only in the person of Christ, who therefore constitutes the central content of the whole of special revelation.” Reformed Dogmatics, 1.344. 79 Bavinck subsumes miracles and other acts of God under the noetic dimension of revelation. God’s Word is an act and his activity is his speech. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.336. This continuous coming of the Son, however, is not for that reason any less personal. See above, p. 71. For Bavinck, all knowledge is personal and all revelation, self−revelation (zelfopenbaring). Bavinck, Gererformeerde dogmatiek, 1.315; Reformed Dogmatics, 1.343. For the nineteenth-

145

146

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

The incarnation, however, inaugurates a new dimension of objective revelation. In contrast with all prior revelation, the revelation of Jesus Christ reveals not just the mind but the being of God. The incarnation thus comprises the apex of objective revelation. The dispensation of subjective revelation begins at Pentecost with the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The subjective dispensation represents a profound heightening of divine immanence. Not only is objective revelation noetically internalised by the Holy Spirit, but Christ comes to indwell the church in the person of the Holy Spirit. It is on account of this indwelling, that Bavinck can describe the church, in a metaphoric sense, as the continuation of the incarnation. For our purposes, the most important feature of Bavinck’s bipartite division of revelation is its teleological order. Objective revelation is ordered to subjective revelation. Objective revelation is only ever instrumental, provisional, and incidental.80 What is final, enduring, and essential is an internalised, subjective knowledge of God. The telos of revelation, therefore, is not Christ but the church. Bavinck states this plainly at the end of the Prolegomena where he states, “revelation in Christ and in his Word is a means, not an end … Therefore, the whole of revelation must be transmitted from Christ to the church, from Scripture to consciousness.”81 Christology, therefore, is of architectonic significance for ecclesiology. Not only is the church a continuation of the incarnation, but the church represents the telos of revelation as a whole. Whereas the embodiment of revelation in Christ is of penultimate significance, the embodiment of revelation in the church is of ultimate significance. It is this architectonic significance of Christology that makes its absence in the fourth volume of Reformed Dogmatics so striking. Little further is said of how the church perfects revelation or how this concept relates to the description of the church according to its essence, government, and power. Bavinck’s material ecclesiology thus provides an instructive example of the ambiguities precipitated by Bavinck’s identification of Christology as the centre but not the starting point of a dogmatic century background to the concept of self-revelation, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (3 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991−7), 1.222−4. 80 Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.213. John Webster’s comments on Thomas Aquinas’ description of the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity are well worth noting. “The language of instrumentality, perhaps initially alarming, does not diminish the full reality of the Word’s becoming flesh. It simply indicates that this ‘becoming’ and all that follows from it is ‘assumption,’ that assumption does not compromise the integrity of the two natures, and that the assumed nature is to be understood not from its historical phenomenality, but from the divine person and act of the one who assumes it.” Webster, God Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology (2 vol.; London: T & T Clark, 2016), 1.48−9. Talk of instrumentality, therefore, is unproblematic. The provisionality of this revelation, nevertheless, gives cause for some concern. 81 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.557; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.588.

Ecclesiology

system.82 Precisely how the account of the church’s essence, government, and power relates to the more architectonic account of the church as a continuation of the incarnation is left unexplained. The lack of clarity in this relationship is further complicated by the introduction of the distinction between the church as organism and the church as institution. The complexities of this further distinction, however, hold the key to the christological derivation of Bavinck’s ecclesiology. The organism-institution distinction is introduced in paragraphs 491–2 within the context of Bavinck’s treatment of the church’s essence.83 In his discussion of the essence of the church, Bavinck takes pains to affirm that its unity is real rather than ideal. The church is one in its existence in heaven (ecclesia triumphans) and on earth (ecclesia militans). On earth, the church is one in its existence in all places (ecclesia universalis) and in particular places (ecclesia particularis). To account for this unity Bavinck has recourse to the organism. “The church of Christ,” Bavinck writes, “is an organism in which the whole is prior to the parts.”84 The organism, therefore, serves to offer a more philosophically robust defence of the unity of the component parts of the church. Matters are complicated, however, by the fact that Bavinck proceeds to use the term in two further ways in order to account for a series of markedly different contrasts. In the first instance, Bavinck pairs the concept of the organism with the concept of the institution, in order to contrast the church as passive and active, as gathering and gatherer, as coetus and mater fidelium.85 The purpose of this pairing is to account for the claim that the church is both an end in itself and the means to that end.86 Matters, however, are complicated by the fact that Bavinck pairs the organism with the institution to draw another distinction. The distinction between the church as institution and the church as organism also serves to differentiate modes of activity by which the church’s essence is manifest. Bavinck writes, “The church as gathering is manifest in both the institution and the organism. Its distinguishing mark is the pure administration of the Word and the confession and conduct of believers. It is arranged both institutionally and charismatically.”87 The terms “charismatic” and “institu82 See above, pp. 47−55. 83 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.300−07. 84 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.301. This reiterates a very similar statement Bavinck makes in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics where he asserts, “[t]he church is an organism, not an aggregate; the whole, in its case, precedes the parts.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.524. 85 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.311; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.330. 86 Pace Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 192. The distinction between the whole and the parts belongs to Bavinck’s characterisation of the church as an organism, but not to the distinction Bavinck draws between the church as organism and church as institution. 87 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.332.

147

148

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

tional” and the relation in which they stand to the organism and the institution warrant brief explanation. Under the notion of “organic” or “charismatic” arrangement, Bavinck does not have specific charismata in mind but rather the divine grace that is common to the church. Thus, the distinguishing mark of the church as organism is brotherly love. “Institutional” arrangement does not in the first instance bear reference to denominational organisations or structures, but rather the exercise of the means of grace.88 Thus, “the essence of the church [is] manifest in two ways: in the administration of Word and sacrament … and in the witness and walk by which [believers] distinguish themselves from the world as well as from other churches, that is, in the church as institution as well as in the church as organism.”89 The importance of this further distinction lies in the fact that it is the institutional activity that stands in an instrumental relation to the church’s telos. That is, it is specifically through the exercise of the means of grace that the church’s essence is realised. The institution, therefore, forms an irreducible dimension of the church. This emphasis on the necessity of the institution forms a counterbalance to Bavinck’s acknowledgment of its provisional and contingent character. The institutional activity of the church is necessary to the manifestation of its essence, yet it is only necessary “inasmuch as the church on earth is a church in process of becoming.”90 Once the gathering has been fully gathered and emerges in all its eschatological fullness, the institutional activity of the church will have served its purpose. Bavinck writes, In heaven all offices and means of grace will pass away because the kingdom of God will be complete and God will be all in all. But on earth this is different. As the gathering of believers the church is itself used by Christ as an instrument to bring others to his community. Through it Christ administers his mediatorial office in the midst of the world. Thus, from the very beginning, the church appears on the scene in a dual form. It is a gathering of the people of God in a passive as well as an active sense. It is simultaneously a coetus and a mater fidelium, or by another description, at once an organism and an institution.91

Bavinck, nevertheless, takes pains to emphasise that the provisionality of the institution is not indicative of the priority of the organism. Bavinck stresses, “the two are given in conjunction and continually interact with and impact each other.”92 The reasoning at this point holds relevance not only for the organism88 89 90 91 92

Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.330. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.314. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.329. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.311; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.329−30. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.332.

Ecclesiology

institution relation, but also for the christological derivation of Bavinck’s dogmatic system. The institution is necessary to the organism because “office and gift, the administration of the Word and the sacraments and brotherly love and the communion of the saints, are all grounded in the operations of the glorified head of the church through the Holy Spirit.”93 Hence, in all the church’s activity, Christ is the subject. This is one of the few instances where the organisminstitution distinction is correlated to the deeper christological structuring of Bavinck’s ecclesiology. Although Bavinck does not explain why the fact that Christ is the subject of both organic and institutional modes of activity should preclude the priority of one mode over the other, his reasoning emerges more clearly into view when one considers the relation in which the organic and institutional activity of the church stands to the doctrine of God. To attribute priority to the organism over the institution in such a way that the organism becomes independent of the institution would implicitly separate the operations of Word and Spirit. It would indicate that the “charismatic arrangement” of the church might obtain apart from the means of grace. For Bavinck, this is unacceptable as it contravenes the order of the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit. “The Holy Spirit in all his operations, including that of regeneration, is bound to Christ, from whom he takes all things.”94 Hence, the institution is the necessary precondition of the organism in the same way that the mission of the Spirit presupposes the mission of the Son. The term “organic” thus functions in three distinct ways in Bavinck’s ecclesiology. First, organism describes the essence of the church and attracts at least some of the formal properties of the organism that we have already encountered. According to this first sense of the term, the various parts of the church comprise a whole, according to which the whole is prior to the parts. Second, organism is paired with institution to indicate a contrast between passivity and activity. In this second sense of the term, organism distinguishes the finality of the church from its instrumentality. Third, the organism-institution distinction delineates a further contrast within the church’s activity. According to this third use of the term, organism distinguishes the charismatic from the institutional activity of the church. The question that must be posed, therefore, is, how do the second and third uses of the term cohere with the first? If one has not made acquaintance with the complexity of Bavinck’s use of the term mystery,95 one might be forgiven for assuming that Bavinck is simply confused. Bavinck’s use of the term mystery encourages one to read him charitably and to seek order 93 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.305. 94 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.331. 95 See above, pp. 58−63.

149

150

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

amongst the complexity of the phenomena. Before suggesting an answer to this question, however, it is worth considering briefly what precipitated this confusing state of affairs. The pairing of the organism with the institution does not originate with Bavinck, but rather with Kuyper.96 Kuyper had initially mapped the distinction across the categories of the invisible and visible church, although later he would qualify this schema by introducing a mediating category of the visible organic church.97 The basic purpose of Kuyper’s organism-institution distinction, especially in its later articulation, was the radical contingency of the institutional manifestations of the church.98 Bavinck was highly critical of this elevation of the organism over the institution.99 In Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck voices his criticisms judiciously and avoids directly identifying Kuyper with his criticisms,100 but his strong dissatisfaction with Kuyper’s more radical account of the institution’s contingency can be felt in the following statement drawn from an article he published in De Bazuin. It is completely mistaken therefore, to set up a dichotomy between the church as organism and the church as institution and to place the former high above the latter and to play off the former against the latter. The institution is precisely the organisation, the singular, the necessary, the irreplaceable organisation of the so-called church as organism. The latter has no identifiable address other than the institution. It is not revealed in any association or corporation of human design but in the God-given institution.101

96 “Kuyper’s original contribution to the ubiquitous organicist ecclesiologies of his day had been to bring the institution and organism together as equally essential aspects of the church.” John Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the modern age: Abraham Kuyper’s struggle for a free church in the nineteenth-century Netherlands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 86. 97 For the early distinction see Kuyper, “Geworteld en Gegrond” De Kerk als organisme en instituut (Amsterdam: de Hoogh, 1870). For Kuyper’s later view see Kuyper, Tractaat van de Reformatie der Kerken (Höveker and Zoon: Amsterdam, 1883); Encyclopedie der heilige godgeleerdheid (3 vol.; Amsterdam: Wormser, 1894), 3.183−225, 545−69. 98 Pace Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 199. Cf. Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the modern age, 89−90. Eglinton’s comments concerning the mutually supportive and concatenous relationship of the organism and institution are correct with respect to Kuyper’s early sacramental ecclesiology, but Eglinton overlooks significant changes in Kuyper’s thought that accompany the emergence of the mediating category of the visible organic church. 99 Cf. R. Bremmer, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 281−2. 100 Kuyper appears nowhere in the footnotes where Bavinck implicitly opposes his views. 101 Bavinck, Roeping en wedergeboorte, 105. One can only wonder what Bavinck made of the fact that Kuyper stopped going to church. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, 129; Jan de Bruijn, Abraham Kuyper: A Pictorial Biography trans. Dagmare Houniet (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 139.

Ecclesiology

Bavinck does not identify Kuyper by name, but the target of these criticisms is obvious.102 It is Kuyper who dichotomises the organism-institution distinction, Kuyper who elevates the organism above the institution, and Kuyper who considers the church as organism to reveal itself in Christian associations and corporations.103 This background elucidates the polyvalence of the organism in Bavinck’s ecclesiology. Like Kuyper, Bavinck locates the essence of the church in the gathering of believers but unlike Kuyper, Bavinck views the contingency of the institution as a function of its eschatology. For Bavinck, the church as organism only becomes manifest apart from the church as institution at the Parousia. Like Kuyper, Bavinck holds that the institutional activity of the church does not exhaust its agency in the world,104 but unlike Kuyper Bavinck does not view the means of grace as incidental to the manifestation of the church on earth. It 102 This, however, is not to suggest that Kuyper is Bavinck’s sole interlocutor. The terms are Kuyper’s, but Bavinck frames his articulation of the organism-institution distinction as a middle way between Schleiermacher and Möhler. Bavinck writes, “Confusing the distinction between the church as institution and the church as organism with that between the visible and invisible church, Schleiermacher states that Protestantism das Verhältniss des Einzelnen zur Kirche abhängig macht von seinem Verhältniss zu Christo, while Catholicism das Verhältniss des einzelnen zu Christo abhängig macht von seinem Verältniss zur Kirche. And according to Möhler, in the mind of Rome, the visible church is prior to the invisible church, while among Lutherans the reverse is true.” Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.311; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.330. Bavinck superimposes the organism-institution distinction onto his engagement with Schleiermacher and Möhler, although Schleiermacher and Möhler do not make explicit use of the categories of organism and institution in the passages Bavinck cites. Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 103−8; Johann Möhler, Symbolik, oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten nach ihren öffentlichen Bekenntniβschriften 6th edn (Mainz: Kupferberg, 1843), 419−24. 103 This of course is not to suggest that Bavinck opposed the formation of Christian associations and organisations. He merely objected to directly identifying these organisations with the organic church. 104 While an adequate account of Bavinck’s understanding of the church’s calling lies beyond the scope of our enquiry, it can be summarised by stating that Bavinck holds that the church must avoid the twin evils of conformity to the world and flight from the world. A withdrawal from state and society for Bavinck reflects a denial of the doctrine of creation. John Bolt frames this neatly under the metaphors of leaven and pearl, which derive from Bavinck’s appropriation of the biblical parables (Matt 13:33, 45−6). Bolt, “Pearls and Leaven,” The Bavinck Review 1 (2010), 86−9. Bavinck’s view of the church’s calling is closely related to his conceptualisation of common grace. Cf. Bavinck, “Common Grace,” 35−65; Reformed Dogmatics, 4.435−40. While the differences in Bavinck and Kuyper’s view of Christ’s mediatorship (which also lie beyond the scope of this enquiry) deliver important differences in their respective understandings of common grace, the basic concept remains the same. Bavinck was in agreement with Kuyper’s famous statement, “Though the lamp of the Christian religion only burns within that Institute’s walls, it shines out through its windows to areas far beyond, illuminating all the sectors and associations that appear across the wide range of human life and activity.”

151

152

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

would seem, therefore, that the organism-institution in Bavinck represents an attempt to reframe Kuyper’s categories and align them with the relation of the teleological-mechanical relation of the organism. As we have seen, the construct of the organism in Bavinck indicates not only a relation between the whole and the parts but also the correspondence of the teleological and the mechanical.105 Unlike the relation between the whole and the parts, the correspondence of the teleological and the mechanical refers to two modes of description of the same entity. The organism-institution distinction similarly bears reference to two modes of description. In the first instance it applies to the description of the church as coetus and mater fidelium. Accordingly, the church is both gathering and the gatherer, passive and active, product and producer. The distinction between gathering and gatherer does not pertain to the relation between the whole and the parts. Rather, it forms two contrasting descriptions of the self-same entity. Thus, the gathering depends upon its instrumental function for the realisation of its being. The further contrast between charismatic and institutional reflects a similar function. Here, organism and institution refer to two contrasting modes of activity by which the essence of the church manifests, namely, charismatic activity and institutional activity. It is not that part of the church manifests institutionally and part of the church charismatically. Rather, these are coextensive descriptions of the self-same entity. The plausibility of relating the organism-institution to the teleologicalmechanical relation of the organism is borne out by the following statement, which coordinates the first, second, and third senses of the organism with a relatively clear explanation of their referents. Bavinck writes, Also according to the Reformation it is the case that the church as the gathering of believers does not take shape without the use of means – from an operation of the Holy Spirit detached from the Word ... according to the testimony of Scripture, fellowship with Christ is bound to fellowship with the word of the apostles (John 17:3; 1 John 1:3). As it is in the natural world, so it is in the spiritual. Every human being is a product of communion, and the individual believer is born from the womb of the believing community. The universal church is anterior to the particular church and to individual believers just as in every organism the whole precedes the parts. The church of Christ is indeed a mother, but she is that not only as institution but also as organism. Believers are simultaneously producer and product.106

Kuyper, “Common Grace,” in James D. Bratt (ed.), Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 194. 105 See above, p. 31. 106 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.331−2.

Ecclesiology

Here, the reason given for why the whole is prior to the parts is that the use of means is necessary for the realisation of the church’s essence in space and time. The partitive relation of the organism is thus portrayed as a necessary corollary of the distributive relation. The gathering of believers does not take shape without the use of means, “just as in every organism the whole precedes the parts.” In the phrase, “just as in every organism the whole precedes the parts,” organism is used in the first sense but in the phrase, “The church of Christ is indeed a mother,” organism is used in the second sense of the term. That is, the organism bears reference to the contrast between the church as coetus and mater fidelium. In the phrase that follows, “but she is that not only as institution but also as organism,” organism is used in the third sense of the term. Bavinck’s point is that the mater fidelium manifests itself not only in institutional activity but also in charismatic activity because the coetus and mater fidelium bear reference to the self-same entity. There is a complexity to the use of the term organism in Bavinck’s ecclesiology that exceeds the characteristic structural complexity of his thought, such that one cannot help but wonder whether the pairing of organism and institution represents a Kuyperian fly in the Bavinckian ointment. Had Bavinck described the organism-institution relations under the categories of gatheringgatherer and institutional-extrainstitutional, all of this would be much clearer. Yet Bavinck apparently feels compelled to reduplicate the term organism for these relations, in order to initiate an intervention against Kuyper. Before we consider how the organism-institution distinction clarifies the relationship between Bavinck’s material ecclesiology and the christological derivation of ecclesiology intimated in the Prolegomena, it is worth briefly observing how the three uses of the term organism map onto Bavinck’s presentation of the church according to its essence, government, and power. As we have seen, the first use of the term, which describes the relation of the whole to the parts, pertains to the essence of the church. The second and third uses of the term, however, being paired with the institutional activity of the church, bear reference to the government and, therefore, to the power of the church. The particular significance of the third use of the term lies in Bavinck’s affirmation, with Kuyper, that the institutional activity does not exhaust the church’s agency. Governing, for Bavinck, is neither the sole activity of the church nor the sole manifestation of its power. As well as the institutional, there is also an organic exercise of divine grace, according to which the church functions as a leavening agent in the structures of state and society.107 This organic exercise of 107 Here the accent falls on the ontology of grace. Grace is not a donum superadditum. Therefore, it serves neither to suppress or kill the natural but to free it from sin. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.437.

153

154

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

grace, however, depends upon the church’s institutional activity for the simple reason that the Spirit is not operative apart from the Word; the extra-mural ecclesial leavening of a society does not obtain apart from the regeneration of its members by the means of grace. While the organism is put into service of the description of the church according to its essence, government, and power, it would also seem that the organism forms the conceptual bridge between Bavinck’s material ecclesiology and the christological derivation of ecclesiology intimated in the Prolegomena. This conceptual bridge emerges into view, when one considers parallels that may be observed between Bavinck’s ecclesiology and his account of the imago Dei. The divine image, we might recall, is yet it becomes; it is both Gabe and Aufgabe.108 Act thus stands in an instrumentally constitutive relation to being. That is, what the image does is necessary for the realisation of what the image is. The same is true of the church. The church both is and becomes; it is a coetus, yet it is also the mater fidelium. Act is similarly instrumentally constitutive of the church’s teleology. It is through the church’s institutional activity that the gathering is realised. In both cases, act does not constitute being, but stands in an instrumental relation to the teleology of being. In the discussion of Bavinck’s anthropology in chapter three, we noted that the relation of act and being has much to do with Bavinck’s concept of revelation.109 Revelation is yet also becomes because the finite cannot contain the infinite. We also noted that it is this ontology which provides Bavinck with theological warrant for characterizing revelation as an organism. It is here that we arrive at the nexus of Bavinck’s material ecclesiology of the fourth volume and the christological derivation of ecclesiology articulated in the first volume of Reformed Dogmatics. The rationale for the characterisation of the church as an organism in the fourth volume of Reformed Dogmatics proceeds from the christological derivation of the church in the Prolegomena. The logic proceeds as follows: i) Bavinck recognises theological warrant for a philosophical description of revelation in terms of the organism, ii) Bavinck views the divine image and the church as sub-categories of revelation, iii) Bavinck recognises theological warrant for characterizing the divine image and the church as organisms. This logic also illustrates how Christology functions as the middelpunt of Bavinck’s theological system without functioning as the uitgangspunt of his ecclesiology. Scripture forms the uitgangspunt of Bavinck’s material ecclesiology. Bavinck’s ecclesiology begins with the biblical terms ἐκκλησία and ‫ קהל‬and builds up an account of the church according to its essence, government, and power. Within this description, the organism bears merely formal significance. The organism assists 108 See above, p. 107. 109 See above, p. 109.

Eschatology

in the ordering of the material content of Bavinck’s ecclesiology according to its essence, government, and power. The theological warrant for the use of the organism, however, proceeds from Bavinck’s Christology, the middelpunt of Bavinck’s theological system. Bavinck can characterise the church as an organism because the church is the continuation of the incarnation.110 The arrangement is consistent and ingenious, yet it also prompts questions. It is clear that the notion of continuous incarnation arises from the presence of Christ in his church by the Holy Spirit, but what is the warrant for identifying this unfolding movement of divine immanence with incarnation? This question concerns the relationship between Christology proper and the broader, metaphoric concept of incarnation. While Bavinck’s eschatology clarifies this relationship, it would seem that the clarification only renders the question more urgent. Eschatology At first glance, the christological derivation of eschatology would appear to be the least opaque of the three doctrines under consideration. In the fourth volume of Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck writes, eschatology “is rooted in Christology and is itself Christology.”111 Yet precisely what it means for eschatology to be Christology is less straightforward than it seems. The context of the statement that eschatology is Christology is Bavinck’s discussion of the relationship between the first and second coming of Christ. In the first instance, eschatology is Christology in the sense that the second coming completes divine judgment. Bavinck writes, “[b]ecause Christ is the saviour of the world, he will return once again as its judge. The κρισις that he precipitated by his first coming he completes with his second coming.”112 The sense in which eschatology is Christology, however, extends beyond the completion of judgment. The full freight of the statement emerges more clearly into view, if we consider a passage in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics, which addresses the relationship between the first and second comings of Christ. In his account of the person of Christ Bavinck writes, “The single coming of the Messiah divides into two: one for the purpose of salvation, the other 110 Veenhof, therefore, is not quite correct when he likens Bavinck’s concept of system to what Otto Weber describes as “formal” rather than “material” systematics. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 124; cf. Otto Weber, Grundlagen der Dogmatik (2 vol.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972), 1:68−79. There is a deductive element to Bavinck’s concept of system, but the distinction between uitgangspunt and middelpunt chastens its pretensions. 111 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.685. 112 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.667; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.685.

155

156

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

for judgment; one for preparation, the other for completion.” Here, Bavinck indicates that the first and second comings form a single coming and that the incarnation effects a bifurcation, whereby the soteriological and juridical aspects of the incarnation are separated. This claim is then illustrated with a quotation from Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu by Bavinck’s contemporary, the New Testament scholar and professor at the University of Gieβen, Wilhelm Baldensperger (1856–1936). “Das Messiaswerk wird Heilswerk; es entwindet sich der Eschatologie und mündet ein in die Soteriologie.”113 This quotation warrants closer scrutiny, as its appropriation is crucial for understanding what Bavinck means when he asserts that eschatology is Christology. The quotation implicitly portrays the eschatology of the Old Testament as a river flowing into the sea. In the same way a river winds in its course and eventually flows into the sea (einmünden), the work of the Messiah, according to Baldensperger, becomes the work of salvation. It winds its way out of eschatology and flows into soteriology. Unfortunately, this metaphor is lost in the English translation of Reformed Dogmatics, primarily because the verbs entwinden and einmünden are rendered “extricates” and “becomes part of.”114 The loss is significant, as the metaphor indicates the precise nature of the transformation Baldensperger describes.115 In the chapter from which the quotation is drawn, Baldensperger places the Sermon on the Mount in the context of second Temple Messianic expectation.116 Baldensperger’s metaphor illustrates the way Jesus’ preaching transforms messianic expectation in like manner to the transformation of fresh water into salt water as a river reaches the sea. The transformation is profound, yet it is simultaneously the most natural of resolutions. The significance of the Baldensperger description of the resolution of eschatology in Christology lies in the fact that it illustrates the relationship between 113 Wilhelm Baldensperger, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit. (Strassburg: Heitz und Mündel, 1888), 114. Cit. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.226. 114 “The work of the Messiah becomes the work of redemption: it extricates itself from eschatology and becomes part of soteriology.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.248. The verb entwinden indicates an energetic writhing, as when wrestlers free themselves of their opponent’s grasp. Einmünden, however, which is indicative of the resolution of a river in the sea or also possibly of one street merging into another, should be taken as the metaphor’s dominant verb. Taken together, Baldensperger’s language suggests an energetic twisting and turning of a river surging toward its destination. 115 The subtlety of the metaphor is, admittedly, very difficult to reduplicate in English. The translation offered in Reformed Dogmatics might be improved by rendering Baldensperger’s phrase as follows, “The work of the Messiah becomes the work of salvation. It twists and turns out of eschatology and flows into soteriology.” 116 Baldensperger, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, 107−18.

Eschatology

the first and second coming, which forms the immediate context of Bavinck’s statement that eschatology is Christology. If the second coming of Christ completes the first, Bavinck’s point in asserting that eschatology is Christology would appear to be the same. Eschatology is Christology because the second coming completes a single, continuous coming of God to his people. Eschatology, therefore, is not a futuristic addendum that stands in isolation from preceding doctrines. Rather, eschatology is christological through and through. Thus, if one were to extend Baldensperger’s metaphor, the first coming represents something of an estuary. With the first coming of Christ, the waters of Messianic expectation are transformed into New Testament soteriology. The transformation is complete, yet because the single coming of Christ divides into two, the river has not yet reached the sea. The coming of Christ only reaches completion at the second coming. At that point, the one continuous coming of God to his people reaches its goal. Yet precisely how the second coming of Christ completes the first coming of Christ deserves further investigation. As we have already seen, the Parousia completes the coming of Christ, insofar as it constitutes the final triumph over Christ’s enemies. Bavinck notes, however, that the significance of the Parousia extends beyond Christ’s redemptive work. The Parousia also brings creation to its intended goal, because the incarnate Son is the causa finalis of all that has been made. Bavinck writes, “In accord with Scripture, we can go back even further. The Son is not only the mediator reconciliationis on account of sin, but even apart from sin he is the mediator unionis between God and his creation.”117 Christological completion, therefore, is a teleological concept. Yet it also bears an ontological dimension. Bavinck continues, Not only is the second coming ideally and logically linked with the first, there is between them a real bond as well. Just as the Old Testament was a continual coming of God to his people until in Christ he came to live bodily among them, so the dispensation of the New Testament is a continued coming of Christ to his inheritance in order in the end to take possession of it forever. Christ is not only he who was to come in the days of the Old Testament and actually came in the fullness of time. He is also the coming one, ὁ ἐρχομενος and the one who will come ὁ ἐρχομενος ἡξει, (Heb 10:37; cf. Rev 1:4, 8 etc.).118

There is, for Bavinck, an ontological continuity between the first and second comings. This continuity, as we have seen, is pneumatological. Christ continues to come to his inheritance in the person of the Holy Spirit.119 The Parousia thus 117 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.667; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.685. 118 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 4.667−8; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 4.685−6. Cf. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 555, 559. Bavinck also cites Baldensperger in connection with the notion of continuous incarnation. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.280 n. 123. 119 Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.250−2.

157

158

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

marks the completion of God’s continuous coming to his people.120 Importantly, this completion marks the beginning of a new indwelling, an indwelling of a higher order.121 In the eschaton, objective revelation is internalised to such a degree that θεοπνευστια becomes the portion of all God’s children.122 Christological completion, therefore, marks the completion of the work of the Holy Spirit such that God imbues glorified humanity in an unprecedented way. It is difficult not to notice the way in which Bavinck’s notion of christological completion bears more than passing semblance to Hegel’s description of the history of Geist.123 In both thinkers the church of the diesseits is a continuation of the incarnation that has not yet fully taken ideational form,124 a kind of halfway-house between individual self-consciousness and universality. In both thinkers the church still awaits the “negative moment,” the vanishing of the self in θεοπνευστια. In this regard, it is notable that in the period before he had developed his organism-institution distinction, Kuyper had espoused a very similar incarnational ecclesiology, whose Hegelian hue did not go unnoticed. In one of Kuyper’s early sermons, he writes, The incarnation of God, which is only begun in the incarnation of the Word, is completed through the dwelling of the Christ among us, through the coming of the Holy Ghost….The Church is not just a collection of Jesus’ followers, no, it is in the full sense the body of Christ, the rich organism in which not only his spirit but Christ himself lives on.125

Andries Bronsveld (1834–1929), a staunch opponent of Kuyper of a Schleiermacherian mien, would leave no doubt as to what readers should make of this. Bronsveld writes, “what else is it but Christian-tinted Hegelianism?”126 120 Pneumatology and Christology in Bavinck do not stand side by side. The filioque is of utmost importance for Bavinck’s ordering of the two loci. “The sending in time … is most intimately bound up with the eternal procession in the divine being … There has been an eternal procession of the Son and the Spirit from the Father in order that, through and in them, he himself should come to his people and finally be all in all.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.321−2. 121 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.329. 122 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.357; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.385. 123 Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 462−3. 124 It is to be remembered that both the German term Geist and the Dutch geest are semantically broader than the English word “spirit,” embracing the concept of mind. 125 Kuyper, “De Menschwording Gods: Het Levensbeginsel der Kerk (1867),” in Predicatiën, in de jaren 1867 tot 1873, tijdens zijn Predikantschap in het Nederlandsch Hervormde Kerkgenootschap, gehouden te Beesd, te Utrecht, en te Amsterdam (Kampen: Kok, 1913), 258. Cit. Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the modern age, 63. 126 J.C. Rullmann, Kuyper-Bibliographie (3 vol.; ‘s-Gravenhage/Kampen: Bootsma/Kok, 1923–1940), 1.26–7. Cit. Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the modern age, 63.

Eschatology

Thus, neither Kuyper nor Bavinck, it would seem, was entirely immune to Hegelian influence.127 Nevertheless, the differences between Hegel on the one hand and Bavinck on the other are plain. Bavinck rejects Hegel’s sublation of religious representation in philosophical concept,128 affirms the deity of Christ, and conceptualises christological completion as a heightened personal indwelling of God in humanity. A fundamental similarity remains, however, in the way Bavinck relates the first coming to the second in terms of completion. The similarity lies in the fact that christological completion has a lot to do with thinking. Bavinck’s account of the visio Dei in the second volume of Reformed Dogmatics brings this tension into sharper focus. There, Bavinck affirms that the future blessedness of humanity lies in the beatific vision. With the tradition,129 Bavinck takes the nature of this sight to be intellectual rather than physical, as Scripture plainly testifies to God’s invisibility.130 The mechanism by which this intellectual sight obtains can be gleaned from Bavinck’s philosophy of mind. In Beginselen der psychologie, the term aanschouwing appears as a synonymous for intuition.131 Intuition (aanschouwing) and faith (geloof), constitute the two first order functions by which the mind acquires knowledge.132 Because faith passes away in the eschaton, the visio Dei necessarily obtains by intuition.133 An important quality of this intuition is that it is psychologically immediate. Bavinck makes this clear when he states that the knowledge of God will be known “directly, immediately,”134 and that the visio Dei is mediated neither by Scripture nor by nature.135 The question this raises for christological completion is, what is the significance of the physical presence of Christ for an internal, psychologically immediate knowledge for which all means become unnecessary? Seeing the risen Christ would seem to form no part of the visio Dei.136 Were the second 127 Cf. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 260. Adam Eitel’s comment that the Hegelian tropes in Bavinck warrant further research is reasonable. Eitel, “Trinity and History,” 103. 128 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.257. 129 Cf. Joshua Schendel, “The Reformed Orthodox and the Visio Dei,” Reformed Theoloigcal Review 77:1 (2018), 24−44. 130 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.190; 4.722. 131 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 113. 132 Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 111. Reason (redeneering), we might recall, is a second order function of the intellect. See above, p. 25 n. 5. 133 Bavinck, “Kennis en leven,” 225. 134 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.722. 135 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.720. 136 What is missing in Bavinck is the kind of reflection on the place of Christ’s flesh in the beatific vision that is characteristic to medieval thinkers such as Robert Grosseteste or Puritans like Thomas Watson. See Brendan Case, “‘More splendid than the sun’: Christ’s flesh among the reasons for the incarnation” Modern Theology. Published 22 July 2019. https://onlinelibrary.

159

160

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

coming understood as an entirely spiritualised event, it would not be difficult to see how it might complete the process of internalisation Bavinck describes.137 A further coming of God to his people that elevates the illumination of the Holy Spirit to an immediacy that renders all means redundant would sit comfortably with an immaterial Parousia, yet Bavinck rejects this.138 The return of Christ, according to Bavinck, is a physical event.139 It would seem, therefore, that the return of Christ merely precipitates the transition from a mediate to an immediate knowledge of God in analogous manner to the way in which the ascension of Christ fulfilled the conditions necessary for his outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Yet if this exhausts the significance of the physical presence of Christ, it becomes difficult to recognise the specifically christological character of christological completion. The problem is, in many respects, the same problem Jürgen Moltmann identifies in John Calvin’s reading of 1 Corinthians 15:28.140 For Moltmann, Calvin’s exegesis of this passage renders Christ superfluous in the eschaton. If the redeemed enter into a relation with God that is characterised by immediacy, the humanity of Christ is surely redundant. Such a view of mediation, Moltmann fears, can lead to what can only be described as a docetic Christology.141 Richard Muller rescues Calvin from this dilemma, by pointing out that Calvin does not view the humanity of Christ as any less significant for the relation between the redeemed and God. Rather, Calvin’s writings would suggest that the immediacy of the relation between the redeemed and God in the eschaton results from a heightening of the mystical union rather than any dissolution of

137

138

139 140 141

wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/moth.12540; Thomas Watson, The Beatitudes: or A Discourse Upon Part of Christ’s Famous Sermon on the Mount (London, 1660; Wing (2nd edn) / W1107), 258–65. The internal, psychologically immediate character of christological completion draws attention to the shortcomings of Hans Boersma’s regrettably superficial assessment of the place that the visio Dei occupies in Bavinck’s eschatology. “Whereas formally [Bavinck] acknowledged that the beatific vision is the ‘core and centre’ of eternal life, in actuality it never really took on this role within his eschatology. Bavinck was simply too much interested in the hustle and bustle of human activity in the hereafter to give any real thought to a positive articulation of the beatific vision.” Hans Boersma, Seeing God: The Beatific Vision in Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 40. “However much the image and the reality may be intertwined, the appearance of Christ, the resurrection, and everything associated with the judgment are drawn too realistically to give us the freedom to spiritualise everything.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.701. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.718. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation & Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 256−9. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 259.

Eschatology

the hypostatic union.142 Hence, it is not that Christ’s humanity recedes but that ours advances.143 It would seem that a similar arrangement is in place in Bavinck, although Bavinck is explicit on matters that are perhaps ambiguous in Calvin. First, the psychological immediacy of Bavinck’s concept of the beatific vision entails no ontological immediacy. The beatific vision may be immediate, but it remains a thoroughly finite, or ectypal, knowledge of God.144 Second, Christ continues to mediate this knowledge to humanity. At the Parousia, Christ ceases to function as the mediator reconciliationis, but he remains the mediator unionis. Third, Christ continues to exercise the triplex munus at the eschaton. For Bavinck, the threefold office is not exclusively a function of Christ’s redemptive work but is indicative of his true humanity.145 Christ’s humanity, therefore, is not superfluous to Bavinck’s concept of the beatific vision or the notion of christological completion. Christ remains fully human in the eschaton. Christ’s humanity is also necessary to his continuing role of the mediatior unionis. What is less clear in Bavinck is the significance of the body for human nature. The ambiguity is heightened by Bavinck’s anonymous quotation of the famous dictum of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702−82),146 “Leiblichkeit ist das Ende der Werke Gottes.” Bavinck (mis)quotes the proverb in the context of his argument for the identity of the resurrection body with the body that is laid aside at death.147 In the context of Bavinck’s argument, this proverb underlines Bavinck’s affirmation of the necessity of the body to human nature. Oetinger, however, upheld the notion of double corporeality espoused by Bernard Nieuwentijt (1654–1718).148 According to this theory, a person is in possession not only of a visible body, but also an astral (siderisch) body. Furthermore, this astral body enjoys priority over the visible body as it constitutes the spiritus rector,

142 Muller, “Christ in the Eschaton: Calvin and Moltmann on the Duration of the Munus Regium” The Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981), 48. 143 Muller, “Christ in the Eschaton,” 44. 144 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.190. Billings also draws attention to this feature of Bavinck’s account. Billings, Union with Christ, 85. 145 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3.482. 146 Oetinger was a Swabian Pietist influenced by Bengel’s eschatological reading of Scripture and numbers among the intellectual forebears of Schelling and Hegel. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.167. 147 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.694. Bavinck mistakenly exchanges “Werke” for “Wege.” Cf. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Biblisches und emblematisches Wörterbuch, Dmitrij Tschižewskij/Ernst Benz (ed.), (Hildesheim: Olms, 1969), 407. 148 Nieuwentijt was a Dutch philosopher, mathematician, physician, magistrate, and theologian. As a philosopher, Nieuwentijt was a follower of Descartes and an opponent of Spinoza.

161

162

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

the principle that governs the person. For Oetinger, therefore, it is the invisible rather than the visible body that is constitutive of corporeality.149 How much or how little of Oetinger’s anthropology Bavinck’s quotation presupposes is difficult to discern.150 Even if Bavinck does entertain the existence of astral bodies, they do not diminish the materiality of post-resurrection corporeality. While Bavinck’s lengthy argumentation against chiliasm emphasises the New Testament’s spiritualizing of Old Testament prophecy,151 he denies that this spiritualizing compromises the materiality of the new creation. Bavinck writes, Present in the New Testament there is undoubtedly some spiritualisation of Old Testament prophecy … but this does not confine blessedness to heaven. This cannot be the case as is basically evident from the fact that the New Testament teaches the incarnation of the Word and the physical resurrection of Christ; it further expects his physical return at the end of time and immediately thereafter has in view the physical resurrection of all human beings, especially that of believers. All this spells the collapse of spiritualism, which if it remains true to its principle – as in Origen – has nothing left after the day of judgment other than spirits in an uncreated heaven.152

Furthermore, Bavinck restricts the hermeneutical parameters of the New Testament’s spiritualizing by insisting that the matter of the post-resurrection body must be consubstantial with the pre-resurrection body. Hence, at the resurrection there is a change in matter and form, but not in substance.153 It would seem, therefore, that materiality is not an amissible feature of corporeality or human nature. Glorified humanity, according to Bavinck, continues to be both bodily and material. The capacities and limitations of corporeality, nonetheless, would seem to undergo a transformation. Bavinck says little of what this transformation might entail. The only hints that can be gleaned from Bavinck’s eschatology are the words which bring his four volumes to a close. In the final paragraph of Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck writes,

149 That is, the invisible rather than the visible body is “der eigene Leib.” Oetinger, Biblisches und emblematisches Wörterbuch, 407. 150 Bavinck’s misquotation of the proverb would suggest that the proverb floats free from its original context. Bavinck does, nevertheless, evidence some familiarity with Oetinger both from primary and secondary sources. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.64, 107, 162, 167, 169, 372; 2.184, 253 n. 264, 492, 566 n. 7; 4.62, 656, 658, 707. Oetinger is mentioned in connection with astral bodies in Bavinck’s historical recount of the views for and against psychopannychism. Bavinck Reformed Dogmatics, 4.613. 151 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.658−82. 152 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.718. 153 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.696.

Eschatology

Time is charged with the eternity of God. Space is full of his presence. Eternal becoming is wedded to immutable being. Even the contrast between heaven and earth is gone. For all the things that are in heaven and on earth have been gathered up in Christ as head (Eph 1:10). All creatures will then live and move and have their being in God, who is all in all, who reflects all his attributes in the mirror of his works and glorifies himself in them.154

This would suggest that when God is all in all, his being will pervade reality in such a way that the divine attributes presently conceived to be incommunicable will become communicable. The language of the wedding of eternal becoming to eternal being would suggest that the mechanism by which this communication obtains is a heightening of the mystical union. If this is the case, it would suggest that the psychologically immediate knowledge of the visio Dei forms an analogue of Christ’s self-consciousness. In the same way that the human nature is united mediately to the divine nature yet Christ’s knowledge of his divine personhood is psychologically immediate, so too, the church’s knowledge of God remains theologically mediate yet becomes psychologically immediate in glory. Christological completion, therefore, is corporeal. While the material conditions of corporeality will be transformed, corporeality in the eschaton remains material. A corporeal Christ, moreover, remains a necessary feature of christological completion. The psychologically immediate knowledge of God in which christological completion consists does not transcend Christ but is mediated by Christ. This knowledge, furthermore, attains to an even profounder christiformity on account of its immediate character, insofar as it forms an analogue to Christ’s self-consciousness. There is, nevertheless, a tension in Bavinck’s extension of Christology into a broader concept of christological completion. It would be inaccurate to say that incarnation becomes a general principle in Bavinck, because the uniqueness of the incarnation is scrupulously circumscribed, but the extension of Christology into a broader concept renders the dogmatic significance of Christology, narrowly conceived, somewhat opaque. The broader category applies counterpressure against the claim for the centrality of the narrower category. The broader category compounds the internalizing trajectory of revelation such that it is the self-consciousness of Christ, which seems to determine the doctrines which lie downstream from Bavinck’s material Christology.155 Because the person of Christ belongs to that 154 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.729−30. 155 This impression is compounded by works that post-date Reformed Dogmatics, which make Christ’s self-consciousness foundational to his person and work. Elaborating on what is noted of Jesus’ “high” and “lofty” self-consciousness in Reformed Dogmatics, 3.251, 269, Bavinck writes the following in Het Christendom, 15−16:

163

164

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

which is instrumental, provisional, and incidental in revelation, it is difficult to see how Christology, narrowly conceived, determines the doctrines that do not prepare for Christology rather than a concept of revelation as a function of immediate self-consciousness. If the person of Christ occupies a somewhat ambiguous place in Bavinck’s eschatology, it is relevant to note that Bavinck’s eschatology bears a markedly unfinished character. The chapter on eschatology in Reformed Dogmatics is much shorter and includes a great deal more proof-texting and biblical survey than the other loci. The unfinished character of Bavinck’s eschatology, however, probably reflects less on Bavinck than it does on the development of dogmatics in general. Bavinck himself complains that eschatology is the least developed of the dogmatic loci.156 If there is any indication of the direction which Bavinck anticipates the future development of the locus might take, it is to be found in a throwaway remark in his musings on the universality of the Parousia, where Bavinck can be heard to suggest that future technological advances may hold the key to a great many eschatological puzzles. Bavinck writes, The inventions of the past century − for the purpose of mutual contact, the exercise of community, hearing and seeing things at a great distance - have shrunk distances to a minimum; and it is likely that they are a mere beginning and prophecy of what will be discovered in the centuries ahead. The doctrine of the last things certainly has to reckon with all these things.157

The implication to be drawn from this passing comment is that television, the internet, and three-dimensional simulation open new theological vistas that lay beyond Bavinck’s horizon. Is this to suggest that were Bavinck alive today, “[Jesus] is a complete and true human being … But at the same time there is at the foundation of his whole appearance and activity, of his words and deeds, such a mighty and elevated self−consciousness that gives everyone the impression that he is far and high above all people ... That self-consciousness expresses itself occasionally in a self−witness, that would be regarded in any other person as delusional ... In everything he is fully human, yet at all times he knows that he is more than a human. Already as a boy of twelve years, he himself is conscious of an inner communion with the Father and he says that he must be busy in his things. And this communion is never disturbed and never broken … This mighty self−consciousness, that contains nothing less than that he stands in a completely unique relationship to the Father and that he is his Son in a special sense, forms the ongoing foundation of his Messiahship.” Christ’s self-consciousness thus performs something of an actuating role, accomplishing the purpose of the divine decree in space and time. Self-consciousness, it would seem, not only has gained the upper hand at the level of system but has also penetrated Bavinck’s material Christology. 156 Bavinck, “The Kingdom of God, The Highest Good,” The Bavinck Review 2 (2011), 168. 157 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.692.

Conclusion

he would entertain the possibility of a virtual Parousia? A Bavinckian account of the Last Things would at least reckon with this possibility. Conclusion If one thing emerges with the utmost clarity from our exploration of Bavinck’s bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology it is that the christological derivation of doctrine proceeds under the overarching concept of revelation. Scripture, the church, and the last things are, each in their own, way sub-categories of the doctrine revelation, a doctrine which itself is christologically determined. Revelation in Bavinck is fundamentally embodiment; Scripture is the flesh of divine speech, the church is a continuation of the incarnation, and the doctrine of last things speaks of christological completion. Bavinck preserves the uniqueness of the incarnation within this broader, more metaphorical notion of Christology largely by psychologizing his doctrine of revelation. Bavinck qualifies revelation in terms of its externality and internality, and objectivity and subjectivity, the former category standing in instrumental relation to the latter. Yet it is precisely this psychological structure that allows the christological determination of the concept of revelation to skirt the metaphysical risks that the christological derivation of doctrine courts. Bavinck can characterise Scripture as the flesh of divine speech, the church as a continuation of the incarnation, and the doctrine of last things as christological completion without threat to the uniqueness of the incarnation, precisely because these characterisations do not encroach on Christology more narrowly conceived. Yet the extension of Christology into a broader category renders the dogmatic significance of Christology somewhat opaque. Bavinck lays hold of material corporeality with white-knuckled resolve, yet it becomes difficult to see how the ordering of objective to subjective and external to internal, does not precipitate the virtual eclipse of the incarnate Christ when revelation reaches its telos. The problematic relation of Christology proper and the broader, more metaphorical concept of christological completion exposes a key difficulty with Bavinck’s claim that Christology functions as the centre but not the starting point of his system, a difficulty which becomes acute in Bavinck’s christological derivation of the doctrine of Scripture. As the principium cognoscendi externum of Bavinck’s system, Scripture belongs at the head of the ordo docendi. Yet if Christology “leads” to Scripture, it is hard to see how Christology does not occupy this position. How should the methodological priority of Christology be understood? The relationship between Bavinck’s material ecclesiology and the christological derivation of the church intimated in the Prolegomena can be brought to bear on this difficulty. In the same way that the organism does not

165

166

Christology and the derivation of doctrine

enjoy priority over the institution on account of the instrumental significance of the institution, Christology does not enjoy priority over Scripture on account of Scripture’s instrumental significance for the knowledge of Christ. In the same way that the institution forms the necessary precondition for the realisation of the organism, Scripture forms the necessary epistemological precondition for Christology. In the same way that there is no organic manifestation of the church apart from the institution, there is no knowledge of Christ apart from Scripture. For this reason, Scripture can retain its place at the head of the ordo docendi. Just as the person of Christ is the centre and not the starting point or telos of the dogmatic system, the person of Christ is the centre but not the starting point or telos of revelation. But as we intimated toward the end of the first chapter, it is difficult to see how this arrangement escapes Bavinck’s own critique of the christological division of dogmatics. If Scripture is a “product” of the incarnation, placing Scripture at the head of the dogmatic system does not seem to reflect the order of the system. This raises the question of the suitability of continuous incarnation as a description of the broader category of divine immanence that is on view when Bavinck speaks of christological derivation of doctrine. Bavinck’s own hesitation on this point is telling. The church, according to Bavinck, can only “in a certain sense” be described as an incarnation. It is a metaphoric instance of incarnation because the concept that grounds the metaphor would seem to be revelation as a function of Christ’s immediate self-consciousness. Hence, eschatology is Christology, insofar as God comes to imbue his people in such a way that their knowledge of him mirrors, or perhaps even becomes a function of, Christ’s own. It would seem, therefore, that although the person of Christ forms the centre of Bavinck’s dogmatic system, the doctrines that do not prepare for Christology are not, strictly speaking, inferred from Christology. These doctrines, rather, might be more accurately be described as being “apocalyptically” rather than christologically determined. Thus, in Bavinck we do not have knowledge without eschatology, as John Webster feared might follow from placing Scripture at the beginning of a dogmatic system. What we have in Bavinck is not the “purest form of epistemological apocalyptic” but rather the purest form of epistemological eschatology. The doctrines that do not prepare for Christology would appear to be derived from the immediate self-consciousness of Christ. What does this mean for the derivation of doctrine in Bavinck? Put simply, it means that the doctrines which are inferred from Christology are derived from a psychologised yet christologically focused concept of revelation. How this informs an understanding of Bavinck as a systematic theologian and whether this type of christocentrism holds constructive potential for contemporary Reformed theology will be addressed in the following chapter.

Christocentrism then and now Introduction Over lunch in an Aberdeen restaurant on 31st  October 2011, John Webster was asked the following question by the external examiner of a doctoral thesis that he had been supervising. “When you have a theological question, to whom do you first turn on your shelves for help?” Webster replied, “For many years it would have been Karl Barth, but now I would say Herman Bavinck.”1 Webster’s wideranging theological interests are well known,2 but this anecdote may surprise many. There is little evidence in Webster’s later writings of anything more than a passing interest in Bavinck.3 Yet for those familiar with both thinkers, it is not difficult to see what Webster would have appreciated in Bavinck and the trained eye will, at various points, recognise traces of a modest project of Bavinckian retrieval. By the same token, it is not difficult to identify points at which Webster would have held reservations concerning Bavinck’s conceptualisation of the theological task. Webster does not voice these criticisms directly, but there are points at which Bavinck adopts an approach which Webster viewed as alien to the task of systematisation. It is this appreciative yet critical reception that makes Webster the ideal guide for a consideration of the constructive potential that Bavinck’s christocentrism holds for contemporary Reformed theology. Yet the precise manner in which Bavinck’s thought might prove to be a useful resource can only emerge upon continued probing of its strengths and weaknesses. The goal of this concluding chapter is to make a modest contribution to the kind of preliminary investigation necessary for projects of Bavinckian ressourcement. In order to indicate where Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a christocentric theological system might hold promise for contemporary Reformed theology, we will first present a synthesis of the findings of the previous chapters. The aim will be to identify the 1 Private correspondence with Garry Williams, who was the external examiner, 24.4.18. 2 Ivor J. Davidson, “In Memoriam: John Webster (1955–2016),” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:4 (2016), 369. 3 Bavinck is mentioned sparingly in Webster’s footnotes. There are but two references to Bavinck in Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 25, 100; two references in Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 41, 86; two references in Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 61, 92−3; three references in God Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology (2 vol.; London: T&T Clark, 2016), 1.94, 136, 139; and a single reference to Bavinck in “ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι: on the inspiration of Holy Scripture,” in J.G. McConville/L.K. Pietersen (ed.), Conception, Reception, and the Spirit: Essays in Honor of Andrew T. Lincoln, (Eugene: Cascade, 2015), 247 n. 9.

168

Christocentrism then and now

primary colours with which a portrait of Bavinck as a christocentric theologian might be painted. We shall then proceed toward a critical appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of Bavinck’s conceptualisation of the theological task in conversation with Webster. Here, our aim will be to discern why this appreciative critic found Bavinck so helpful in the consideration of theological problems. Finally, we shall offer some reflections on how these differences inform judgments about where Bavinck offers a sound model to follow and where his conceptualisation of a christocentric system may require revision. Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog We noted at the beginning of this study that in the years since Jan Veenhof ’s landmark study, a systematic analysis of Bavinck as a theologian, or perhaps better, an analysis of Bavinck as a systematic theologian, has still not been written. Our aim has been to offer a preliminary study toward such an end by probing Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a dogmatic system as refracted through the programmatic statement that appears in the third volume of Reformed Dogmatics. Arguably, this statement offers the most concise summary of Bavinck’s concept of a theological system and the place and purpose of Christology within it. Before we sum up the findings of the previous chapters, let us return once more to this statement. Bavinck writes, The doctrine of Christ is not the starting point, but it is indeed the centre of the whole system of dogmatics. All other dogmas either prepare for it or are inferred from it. In it, as the heart of dogmatics, pulses the whole of the religious—ethical life of Christianity. It is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας (1 Tim 3:16). The whole of Christology has to proceed from here.4

This statement is of immense importance to an understanding of Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system for the fact that it qualifies Bavinck’s rejection of the christological division of dogmatics.5 As we saw in the first chapter, Bavinck is unconvinced that the christocentrism broadly derivative of Schleiermacher offers a sound methodological pattern for dogmatics. The statement cited above shows that Bavinck does not, however, reject the construction of a theological system according to which Christology functions as its centre. Rather, what Bavinck seeks is a careful balancing of material and formal principles whereby Christology functions as the centre of a theological system without exerting absolute control over it. Bavinck thus rehabilitates 4 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 3.254; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 3.274. 5 See Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.110.

Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog

the concept of a christocentric theological system, articulating the parameters within which such a system may be constructed. A chapter was devoted to each of the clauses of this statement in order to unravel precisely what is being claimed. In the first chapter, we examined Bavinck’s concept of a theological system and the claim that Christology forms its centre but not its starting point. Attention was paid to the development of Bavinck’s thought, identifying three subtly different conceptualizations. This process of development makes sense of conflicting statements as to which doctrine ought to function as the central dogma of Bavinck’s system. The claim that Christology functions as the midpoint but not the starting point of a theological system thus represents something of a mediating position between the earlier identification of the knowledge of God and the later identification of Christology as the central dogma of Bavinck’s system. In the second chapter, we examined the further qualification that Christology functions not only as the centre of the system but also as its heart. Our attention here was primarily directed to the question of how the heart and lifeblood metaphor should be interpreted and how it might further qualify the function of Christology as the centre of a theological system. Here, we were confronted once more with two different referents for the metaphor. The apparent tension caused by the identification of both mystery and the religious-ethical life of Christianity as the lifeblood of dogmatics can, however, be resolved by observing the way that Bavinck views mystery as the property of dogmatics that evokes religious subjectivity. Describing Christology as the heart of dogmatics concentrates the relationship between theology and religion on a single doctrine. The third chapter considered the contours of Bavinck’s material Christology and what it might mean to assert that the mystery of godliness forms its starting point. Here, we noted that this assertion bears reference to the methodological priority of the deity of Christ and the church’s confession. Bavinck upholds a two-natures Christology, but he also acknowledges the inadequacies of the subsequent use of the Chalcedonian formula and attempts to offset these with a more robust account of the development of Christ’s humanity. As such, Bavinck’s Christology provides a good example of Bavinck’s ideal of a modern orthodoxy and offers a useful lens through which the ongoing debate surrounding the “Two-Bavincks” hypothesis might be viewed. Finally, the fourth chapter considered the manner in which doctrines that do not prepare for Christology are derived from Christology. By taking soundings from Bavinck’s bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology, we attempted to discern precisely what christological derivation means for Bavinck. Here, we saw that christological derivation concerns the conceptualisation of the relationship between doctrines in the system. While these soundings shed light on the distinction between midpoint and starting point discussed in the first

169

170

Christocentrism then and now

chapter, they also raised a question mark over whether these doctrines do in fact derive from Christology or whether a psychologised yet christologically focused doctrine of revelation might not stand at the centre of Bavinck’s system. Thus, our exitus from Bavinck’s programmatic statement into the warp and woof of his material dogmatics yielded important insights into the character of Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system. To make full use of these insights, however, there is need of a corresponding reditus. The detail must be synthesised and summarised, if it is to be rendered serviceable to any practicable description of Bavinck as a theologian. Given Bavinck’s description of Christology as the centre and heart of dogmatics, it is not unreasonable to describe him as a christocentric theologian. Of course, precisely what this term means when it is applied to Bavinck needs to be carefully qualified. Such qualifications should not, however, consist merely in caveats that in various ways seek to minimise the degree to which Bavinck derives the content of doctrines from Christology. As important as these are, the character of Bavinck’s christocentrism will be misconstrued unless it is located within the matrix of desiderata which make up Bavinck’s fine-grained conceptualisation of the theological task. That is to say, Bavinck’s christocentrism is to be located within the methodological commitments which constitute Bavinck’s response to the Grundlagenkrise in which Protestant dogmatics lay at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, Bavinck’s christocentrism is best described as systematic, vitalist, and ecclesial. First, Bavinck’s christocentrism is systematic. The systematic character of Bavinck’s theology proceeds from the conceptualisation of dogmatics as scientia, knowledge. The characterisation of dogmatics as scientia is not intended to overturn the traditional alternative, sapientia, as much as it offers a rebuttal of the Kantian critique of knowledge. Bavinck affirms that although dogmatics arises from faith and cannot be separated from faith, it does not for that reason cease to be knowledge. Yet dogmatics differs from the knowledge of God that the believer acquires by faith inasmuch as dogmatics constitutes a “scientific” (wetenschappelijke) knowledge of God. That is, it seeks not merely to know that but to know how. Because dogmatics is scientia in precisely this sense, system is its supreme desideratum. Bavinck, however, is careful to assert that system is not something that is imposed upon the church’s doctrines. Rather, the system of the knowledge of God is to be discerned from the inner structure of dogmatics’ material source, Holy Scripture. By tracing out the principle that governs Scripture, the theologian will construct a system of doctrine. Much of our exploration of this trait took place in the first chapter. There we paid close attention to Bavinck’s assertion that there is a principle that governs the system. The eventual identification of Christology with this principle is significant for several reasons. First, that Bavinck embraces the Schweizerian

Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog

notion of central dogma demonstrates that he is conceptualising a theological system in a distinctly modern way. Bavinck is not simply repristinating Reformed Orthodoxy but embracing the notion that a system of doctrine is determined by a leading idea. Second, that Bavinck identifies Christology, rather than predestination or the knowledge of God, as the material principle of Reformed theology suggests some affinity with the Dutch Ethical theologians. Third, the fundamental difference between Bavinck’s christocentrism and the Schleiermacherian christocentric division of dogmatics lies in the way that the material principle of dogmatics is not permitted to subvert its formal principle. Thus, even though Bavinck will identify Christology as the starting point of dogmatics in the latter decades of his life, this assertion is maintained in concert with the conviction that certain doctrines prepare for Christology. The limitations Bavinck places on Christology with respect to the deductive structure of his system is apparent in his material bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. The striking feature of Bavinck’s account of these doctrines is the way the christological metaphors stand very much in the background. For example, the christological metaphors are not permitted to play anything more than a minor role in Bavinck’s ecclesiology for the fact that other conceptual categories enjoy greater prominence in the New Testament’s description of the church. Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture reflects a similar pattern. Bavinck takes as his starting point the self-testimony of Scripture, namely, that Scripture is the Word of God. Bavinck only draws on the christological analogy in order to account for this claim. The control that Christology exerts over the system lies principally in the way in which doctrines are ordered one to another. Bavinck orders bibliology, ecclesiology, and eschatology to the doctrine of revelation, which is conceptualised as continuous incarnation. Yet it is the Hegelian residue of this characterisation of revelation as continuous incarnation that raises the question as to whether the doctrine that stands at the centre of Bavinck’s system is in fact Christology. There is much to suggest that it is something akin to the self-consciousness of Christ that determines the order of Bavinck’s system. Before we leave the descriptor “systematic,” some mention must be made of the difficulties Bavinck encounters in constructing a christocentric system that maintains Scripture as its material source. In the first chapter we explored the question of whether the derivation of a centripetal system from the linear unfolding of revelation in Scripture proved an insoluble problem for Bavinck. Arguably, the tension generated by the attempt to derive system from Scripture in this way is what stands behind the system’s consistently inconsistent character. Bavinck is an architectural thinker, yet there is also a reluctance to tie off all of the system’s loose ends. This displays a steady resolve not to allow architectural elegance to become the chief desideratum of his system. Whether or not one regards this as a virtue or a vice hangs largely on whether one regards the

171

172

Christocentrism then and now

move from Scripture to system as well-judged. If one regards the derivation of a centripetal system from the linear unfolding of revelation in Scripture as mistaken, the cognitive dissonance that emerges at various points might be viewed as a symptom of this error. If, however, one views this way of moving from Scripture to system as sound, Bavinck’s inconsistency might be regarded as a necessary element of his commitment to the biblical witness. Second, Bavinck’s christocentrism could be described as vitalist. This descriptor is not intended to identify Bavinck directly with philosophical vitalism, yet it is chosen because Bavinck’s organism mirrors the formal properties of the organism as it was developed by the first generation of post-Kantian idealists. The organism is the primary means by which Bavinck seeks to close the gap between knowing and believing, a methodological problem of the first order during the Neo-Kantian revival in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century. In the organism, Bavinck recognised a device by which he could maintain a link between theological and general epistemology and more broadly, between God and the world. The organism, however, also provided Bavinck with a way of reconciling logical conundrums within his material dogmatics. Because the organism overcomes the opposition of the whole and the parts, the real and the ideal, and the mechanical and teleological by granting a constitutive role to the concept of living force, the organism lends itself to trinitarian description. Bavinck aligns the person of Christ with the principle of the organism and the Holy Spirit with its living force. In this way, Bavinck blends German idealism with the doctrine of the Trinity. Bavinck’s christocentrism is vitalist in the sense that he conceptualises dogmatics as an organism. This has two important aspects. First, this indicates that dogmatics is the product of spiritual life. The subject matter of dogmatics quickens its practitioners and dogmatics itself is the product of this regeneration. This aspect of the characterisation of dogmatics as an organism is communicated by the heart and lifeblood metaphor. Christology is not just the centre but also the heart of dogmatics and as the heart of the theological system, Christology distributes its religious lifeblood from centre to periphery. The special contribution of the organism, howeer, is its balancing of the concentration of the relation between theology and religion on Christology. Christology might constitute the heart of dogmatics, but the Holy Spirit comprises its living force. Second, the characterisation of dogmatics as an organism indicates that dogmatics is subject to a process of growth. The development of doctrine was a fundamental problem for historical theology in the nineteenth century. The organism furnished Bavinck with a way of accounting for divine providence over this development. The Holy Spirit, as the living force of the organism, governs the growth and development of dogmatics from Pentecost to the Parousia.

Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog

Perhaps the most significant element of this second aspect of the characterisation of dogmatics as an organism is the way that it qualifies dogmatics as an ecclesial discipline. Dogmatics is not the work of an individual theologian or even a select group of individual theologians drawn from any one strand of the Christian tradition. Rather, dogmatics is the work of the universal church. This offers Bavinck the opportunity to develop an account of a corporate inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. As the living force of the dogmatic organism, the Holy Spirit directs the growth and development of dogmatics by means of the creeds and confessions. These documents are the fruit of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, not within individual members of Christ, but within the church. Theological practitioners thus discern the future path of the development of dogmatics from these instances of the corporate inner testimony of the Holy Spirit who stands sovereign over its course of development. Importantly, this portrayal of dogmatics as an essentially ecclesial enterprise reveals the close connection between our second and third descriptors. That is, a central component of the characterisation of dogmatics as an organism is its ecclesial character. The progressive character of dogmatics which arises from its characterisation as an organism provides another insight into the modern character of Bavinck’s theology. Whereas in antiquity theological innovation was viewed with suspicion, the idea that dogmatics develops is a largely modern idea. The modern character of Bavinck’s theology also comes to the surface in Bavinck’s appropriation of modern philosophy, of which the organism comprises but one example. Although Bavinck rejects the much of the thought of Schelling and Hegel, he makes considerable use of their apparatuses. It is important to note, however, that the reason Bavinck can appropriate the thought of those with whom he otherwise stands in profound disagreement is that he believes that content is distinguishable from form without remainder. That is, the thoughtforms of Kant or Schleiermacher, for example, can be distilled from the system in which they are couched and appropriated within the framework of historic Christianity. It is equally important to note that this conviction proceeds on the governance of the system by a principle. Because the system of doctrine is governed by a principle, this principle can, at least in theory, quarantine the system from the potentially deleterious effects of modern thoughtforms. Third, Bavinck’s christocentrism is ecclesial. We have already touched on the manner in which Bavinck views dogmatics as a collective enterprise of the church of all ages. It is crucial to note, however, that the form of Bavinck’s dogmatics also proceeds from this conviction. Because Bavinck views dogmatics as a collective enterprise of the universal church, considerable space is reserved for historical theology in Bavinck’s presentation. Bavinck always prefaces his own views with a history of the development of doctrine and frames his own views

173

174

Christocentrism then and now

within the context of the tradition. This commitment to historical theology reflects the conviction that there is no conflict between the claim that dogmatics is a science and the claim that dogmatics is a product of the church. It is important to note that this claim was considerably more controversial at the dawn of the twentieth century than it is today. “Ecclesial” and “scientific” were viewed by the religionsgeschichtliche Schule as virtual antonyms. Dogmatics simply could not be scientific, if it were ecclesial. Bavinck’s maintenance of the unity of these terms reflects his conviction that faith, whether viewed individually or collectively, forms the principium cognoscendi internum of theology. While it is not a source of knowledge, the church is the organ by which the knowledge of God is both received and transmitted. The term “ecclesial,” however, bears reference to two further aspects of Bavinck’s christocentrism. First, the term ecclesial preserves the historical relation in which Bavinck stood to figures who placed renewed emphasis on the church’s confession, yet unlike Bavinck, did not regard Scripture as the foundation of theology. The connection between Bavinck and these other theologians is important as Bavinck’s contribution to theology is best evaluated not in isolation from, but in the company of his Seelenverwandte. Emil Brunner makes this point well in the context of his assessment of the immense influence of Karl Barth on twentieth-century Protestant thought. Brunner writes, Protestant dogmatics has received a very powerful increase of vitality through the Luther revival in Sweden and Germany, and through the “Dialectical” theology. We would be unjust to the achievements of men like Kähler, Schlatter, Bavinck, Billing and Aulen were we to designate Karl Barth as the one and only thinker who has revived Protestant dogmatics.6

Brunner draws attention to the fact that Bavinck belonged to a generation of Protestant theologians who turned to the church’s confession in search of a way beyond the apparent impasse of orthodoxy and modernity. The significance of Bavinck’s contribution to Protestant dogmatics, therefore, is best assessed in a broader selection of theologians. Second, the term “ecclesial” offers the current discussion of whether there may be one or more Bavincks a category that not only yields greater purchase on Bavinck’s method but also dissolves the apparent dichotomy of orthodoxy and modernity. As we saw in the third chapter, Bavinck himself expressed disdain for the terms orthodox and modern, preferring the descriptor “Reformed.” Importantly, what Bavinck understood under the term “Reformed” is a commitment to a principled progressivism. The antonym of orthodoxy, therefore, 6 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God Dogmatics: Vol 1 (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 93. To this list one might add the Scottish theologians Peter T. Forsyth, and Hugh Mackintosh.

Bavinck als (christocentrische) theoloog

is not modernity but heterodoxy and heterodoxy is a phenomenon that is both ancient and modern. Arguably, the term ecclesial gains even greater purchase on Bavinck’s commitments, as Bavinck locates the Reformed strand of Protestantism within the catholicity of Christianity and the church. The Reformed tradition may, in Bavinck’s view, offer the purest expression of Christian life and doctrine but it is not the only expression of life and doctrine that is properly characterised as Christian. Hence, in writing a specifically Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck does not look merely to the fathers of Reformed Orthodoxy but to a wide range of ancient, mediaeval, and modern thinkers. Bavinck’s christocentrism, therefore, can be described as systematic, vitalist, and ecclesial. While these descriptors leave a great deal unsaid, they chart its broad parameters accurately and in so doing, do not leave the wrong things unsaid. Bavinck’s methodologically attenuated christocentrism is located within this matrix of commitments which constitute his response to the crisis of foundations in which Protestant dogmatics found itself at the close of the nineteenth century. The question that must be posed, therefore, is whether this response transcends the context in which it arose. Does Bavinck’s christocentrism amount to anything more than a nineteenth-century answer to nineteenth-century problems? Robert Covolo has answered this question in the affirmative, suggesting that Bavinck offers a mediating alternative between the enchanted world of Schleiermacher and the resolute alterity of Barth. Covolo argues that Bavinck presents such an alternative because he affirms christocentric exclusivity without denying the possibility of general revelation.7 Yet given that most of the Reformed tradition could affirm this, what qualifies Bavinck specifically as an alternative to Schleiermacher and Barth is unclear. What is it that is unique to Bavinck? The need for precision is accentuated by the fact that recent scholarship has shown that greater similarity exists between Schleiermacher and Barth than was previously thought.8 Hence, if Barth and Schleiermacher actually occupy

7 Robert Covolo, “Beyond the Schleiermacher-Barth Dilemma: General Revelation, Bavinckian Consensus, and the Future of Reformed Theology,” The Bavinck Review 3 (2012), 30–59. 8 McCormack, “What has Basel to Do with Berlin? Continuities in the Theologies of Barth and Schleiermacher,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 23 (2002), 146−73; Matthias Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A Systematic-Theological Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Some have gone so far as to suggest that Barth is more accurately characterised as a mediating theologian and ought, therefore, to be numbered among Schleiermacher’s heirs. Glomsrud, “Karl Barth and Modern Protestantism: The Radical Impulse,” in R.S. Clark/J.E. Kim (ed.), Always Reformed: Essays in honour of W. Robert Godfrey (Escondido: Westminster Seminary California, 2010), 111; McCormack, “Revelation and History in Transfoundational Perspective,” in Orthodox and Modern, 37.

175

176

Christocentrism then and now

the same end of the pew, there may be little space for Bavinck to fit in between.9 While there are frameworks within which Covolo’s comparison might gain traction,10 the question as to whether Bavinck only proposes solutions to a previous generation’s quandaries remains. Even if Bavinck can be located theologically between Schleiermacher and Barth as Covolo suggests, how valuable might that be if Reformed theology has since moved on? Here, we need to pause to consider the very real sense in which Reformed theology has moved on. In the years immediately following Bavinck’s death, Karl Barth took Bavinck’s distinctive emphasis on divine revelation in a very different direction. Thus, as much as Barth may have benefited from Bavinck,11 Barth 9 Covolo’s proposal is further complicated by Bavinck’s ideological proximity to Barth’s vociferous critic, Cornelius Van Til (1895−1987). As Laurence O’Donnell has documented, Bavinck’s influence on Van Til runs deep. Laurence R. O’Donnell III, “Neither ‘Copernican’ nor ‘Van Tilian’: Re-Reading Cornelius Van Til’s Reformed Apologetics in light of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” The Bavinck Review 2 (2011), 71–95. 10 Covolo’s proposal might, for example, gain some traction on the taxonomy of Hans Frei’s Types of Christian Theology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Bavinck might well be located between Schleiermacher and Barth on Frei’s types, as Bavinck clearly does not belong to types one or five. Bavinck is neither a rationalist nor a fideist. There are also good reasons to think that Bavinck does not belong to Frei’s second type. He does not erect a comprehensive structure of reality that is governed by either general criteria or dogmatics. This is the difference between Carl Henry (1913−2003), whom Frei nominates as the evangelical representative of type two, and Bavinck (see Frei, Types, 3, 24, 44−6), and this is also why George Hunsinger suggests that Bavinck would make a better conversation partner than Carl Henry in postliberal-evangelical dialogue. George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 360 n. 69. Bavinck also does not belong to type three, in which Frei locates Schleiermacher. Bavinck seeks a correlation between theology and the other sciences, but he seeks a correlation in which theology is determinative. Bavinck would seem to belong with Karl Barth in type four, yet he plainly belongs somewhere to the left of Barth. For Barth, revelation has a history but is not itself history; it occurs within history yet never becomes a predicate of history. McCormack, “Afterword: Reflections on Van Til’s critique of Barth,” in Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism, 374. For Bavinck, history is a predicate of revelation. Revelation not only occurs in history but can also be identified with history. Even if one accepts the broad parameters of Frei’s taxonomy and his somewhat controversial reading of Barth, difficulties remain, primarily in the conceptualisation of revelation. Revelation is an important category for Schleiermacher, Bavinck, and Barth yet in the schema of each thinker, divine revelation is conceptualised in significantly different ways. 11 For Barth’s reception of Bavinck, see John Vissers, “Karl Barth’s Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 79−86; Glomsrud, “Karl Barth as Historical Theologian,” in D. Strange/D. Gibson (ed.), Engaging with Barth (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008), 84−112; McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909−1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 337−59. Glomsrud argues that closer attention should be paid to Barth’s use of Bavinck as an historical source. Many years ago, Otto Weber noted similarities between the formulation of Barth’s doctrine of election and that of Bavinck. Weber, Grundlagen der Dogmatik, 2:480 n. 9,

A Websterian touchstone

did not extend Bavinck’s thought but rather transcended it. Thus, while Bavinck and Barth were cobelligerents in their rejection of liberal Protestantism, their respective christocentrisms point in different directions. While Bavinck’s looked back across the clear vistas of the long nineteenth century, Barth’s groped the threatening darkness of the twentieth, and of the two, Barth’s christocentrism would prove the more influential. Yet the fifty years since Barth’s death have provided the hindsight necessary for a critical probing of his thought. Among those who have articulated misgivings about the ultimate success of Barth’s project, John Webster counts as the most promising Post-Barthian interlocutor with whom one might start a conversation about Herman Bavinck. Webster’s interest in Bavinck arose in the latter stage of his intellectual development during which time he came to reconsider the merits of Barth’s christocentrism, countenancing the possibility that some of Barth’s steps need to be retraced.12 A Websterian touchstone Webster’s translation to the University of Aberdeen in 2003 provides a convenient chronological marker for the development of his thought inasmuch as it was during Webster’s tenure at Scottish universities that the theological emphases that had begun to emerge during his time in Oxford were more roundly developed. Chief among these emphases numbers the methodological priority that the triune being of God holds for his works. Ivor Davidson argues that the main impulse for Webster’s intellectual development came from his close engagement with the works of John Owen and Thomas Aquinas.13 Davidson, however, cautions against regarding the later Webster as “an unreconstructed

485 n. 7. Barth’s description of the persons of the Trinity as “modes of being” (Seinsweisen) reflects possible dependence on Bavinck. Cf. Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 2.271; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2.304. Bavinck himself, however, derives the term “modes of being” (bestaanswijzen) from Dorner. Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine I. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 447–53. A further point of contact between Barth, Bavinck, and Dorner is the notion of “absolute personality.” Alan Torrance suggests that Barth was influenced at least to some degree by Dorner’s conceptualisation of God as absolute personality. Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: trinitarian description and human participation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 242−3. As we have seen, absolute personality is an important category in Bavinck’s doctrine of God. See above, p. 109. 12 “John was conscious of a need to emerge somewhat from Barth’s shadow, and to find other theological resources on matters where he felt Barth was deficient, not least on creation.” Davidson, “In Memoriam,” 369. 13 Davidson, “In Memoriam,” 369.

177

178

Christocentrism then and now

Thomist” or as having embarked on “some neo-Reformed scholastic path.”14 Webster drew on past thinkers in order to gain clarity about present problems but was not contemplating a simplistic return to the past. If we keep this brief sketch of Webster’s theological development in mind, the broad parameters of what Webster found helpful in Bavinck emerges into view. In Bavinck we see a similar commitment to the priority of the being over the works of God and a constructive appropriation of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Reformed Orthodox theologians. Yet like Webster, Bavinck does not simply repristinate the legacy of Thomas or Reformed Orthodoxy. Rather, where Bavinck views their conclusions as inadequate or as requiring qualification, Bavinck draws on the insights of modernity in his appropriation of their thought. A good example of the pattern of theological retrieval common to both thinkers is their mutual affirmation of Thomas’ assertion that the possibility of creaturely theology arises from God’s self-knowledge. In his essay, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” Webster writes, “God knows himself and all things: on this rests the possibility and actuality of creaturely theology.”15 This is also a pervasive trope in Bavinck. While the sentiment is expressed throughout Reformed Dogmatics, the clearest articulation of this conviction is to be found in The Science of Holy Theology, where Bavinck writes, Everything, as Thomas Aquinas puts it, finds its place not as partes (members) of species (kinds) or accidentia (accidents), as something relatively independent next to God, but God is the sole object and everything else is taken up and organized in relation to Him … The whole of our science is thus theological, theocentric. It never depends on what we think of these things and in what relation they stand to us, but solely on God’s view about himself and of all things by his own light and from his own standpoint. It depends in this way on the knowledge of himself that he wills to reveal to us.16

Having affirmed this dictum, both thinkers will immediately qualify the qualitative difference between God’s knowledge of himself and our knowledge him by drawing on the distinction first introduced to Reformed Orthodoxy by Franciscus Junius (1542−1602) between the archetypal and ectypal knowledge of God. 14 Ivor J. Davidson, “Introduction,” in Webster, The Culture of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 40. 15 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 136. Cf. “Biblical Reasoning,” in Domain of the Word, 118. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (61 vol.; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964−81), Ia.1.6 resp., 1.23. 16 Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid, 30−1. In Reformed Dogmatics, however, this classical idiom acquires an idealist accent. While Bavinck will speak of divine self-knowledge he more frequently speaks of divine self-consciousness (zelfbewusstsein), often because he engages directly with the claims of pantheist conceptualisations of the Absolute. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.192−6, 209−10, 250; “Kennis en leven,” 207−08.

A Websterian touchstone

Webster continues, “[a]rchetypal theology is God’s self-knowledge; ectypal theology is the knowledge of God possible for finite rational creatures.”17 Bavinck likewise states, “God’s self-consciousness is archetypal; our knowledge of God drawn from his Word, is ectypal.”18 Bavinck, however, expresses mild criticism of Reformed Orthodox divines’ use of this distinction. While upholding the distinction between archetype and ectype, Bavinck views the older divines as having sharply separated God’s self-knowledge from the content of divine revelation. God’s self-knowledge must, Bavinck asserts, be related organically to our knowledge of him.19 Webster makes a very similar claim. Webster holds that the discontinuity between created and uncreated intelligence cannot be construed as absolute. Rather, the difference between archetypal and ectypal theology must be conceptualised as a “distinction-in-relation.”20 While Webster provides no explicit references to Bavinck, the mode of theological retrieval and common convictions is suggestive of the possibility that Bavinck lies just under the surface of these remarks. This possibility is heightened by the kinship to be observed between the formulation of Webster and Bavinck’s principia theologiae. Webster opens the second subsection of “The Principles of Systematic Theology” with the following statement: The Holy Trinity is the ontological principle (principium essendi) of Christian theology; its external or objective cognitive principle (principium cognoscendi externum) is the Word of God presented through the embassy of the prophets and apostles; its internal or subjective cognitive principle (principium cognoscendi internum) is the redeemed intelligence of the saints.21

The methodological division between theology’s principium essendi and principium cognoscendi is a standard device of Reformed Orthodoxy and Webster provides a footnote that indicates his familiarity with Richard Muller’s exposition of these themes in the first volume of his magisterial Post-Reformation

17 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 139. 18 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.107. 19 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2.195. From what we have seen of the meaning of organic in Bavinck, relating God’s self-knowledge to the content of revelation draws on the suite of formal properties inherent to the philosophical construct of the organism. To directly identify divine self-knowledge with revelation would be to compromise divine aseity yet they must be viewed as in some sense being indirectly identical. Thus, divine self-knowledge and revelation can be viewed as being indirectly identical inasmuch as they coinhere as discrete aspects of the organism. 20 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 139. 21 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 135.

179

180

Christocentrism then and now

Reformed Dogmatics.22 A bifurcation within the principium cognoscendi of theology, however, is foreign to Reformed Orthodoxy itself, constituting a Bavinckian innovation on the tradition.23 In Bavinck, the pairing recurs with some frequency and is used to structure the Prolegomena to Reformed Dogmatics.24 This precise combination of terms appears only once at the very end of Muller’s discussion.25 Hence, while it is possible that Webster derives the distinction between principium cognoscendi externum and principium cognoscendi internum from this singular instance, it would seem likely that Webster derives these terms from Bavinck. The derivation of Webster’s principia from Bavinck rather than Muller is also suggested by Webster’s appropriation of a further Bavinckian idiom that appears on the same page of Reformed Dogmatics that summarises Bavicnk’s threefold principia. Bavinck writes, “revelation cannot be external only but must also be internal. For that reason, a distinction used to be made between the principium cognoscendi externum et internum, verbum externum et internum, revelation et illuminatio.”26 In “Biblical Reasoning,” Webster makes this same point. Webster writes, “[c]reaturely knowledge of God is made possible by the operation of the verbum extemum, that is, by the presence and action of the eternal Word. To this external Word there corresponds the verbum internum, that is, the presence and action of the Holy Spirit by whom cognitive fellowship between God and creatures is consummated.”27 Like Bavinck, Webster uses the Reformed Orthodox distinction between the verbum externum and verbum 22 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 2nd edn. (4 vol.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). 23 Van den Belt demonstrates not only that the terminology is unique to Bavinck but also that the idea of a principium internum is rare, if not absent, in Reformed Orthodoxy. Van den Belt, Authority, 238, 247−9. 24 See Pass, “Revelation and Reason in Herman Bavinck,” Westminster Theological Journal 80:2 (2018), 239−40. 25 The terms appear at the conclusion of an extended argument in the course of which Muller asserts that Maccovius and Alsted identified the inwardly known Word of God as the principium internum of theology. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1.442−3. Van den Belt disputes this claim, arguing that Maccovius and Alsted do not identify a principium internum. Unlike Bavinck, Reformed Orthodox divines did not use the terms internum and externum in order to account for the subject-object dichotomy. Van den Belt, Authority, 142−6. 26 Bavinck, Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1.184−5; cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 1.213. Bavinck does not provide a reference, but he probably is referring to the use of verbum externum and verbum internum in the works of Voetius and Turretin. But note that the referent of verbum internum in these works is faith, not theology. See Van den Belt, Authority, 175. Bavinck would seem to see the verbum internum of faith as parallel to the principium cognoscendi internum of theology. Van den Belt draws attention to the fact that the Reformed Orthodox did not draw this conclusion. 27 Webster, “Biblical Reasoning,” in Domain of the Word, 119.

A Websterian touchstone

internum to account for the correspondence of the presence and action of the Word of God in Holy Scripture with that of the Holy Spirit. Once again, it is possible that Webster may have derived this distinction from Muller who references Rijssen’s use of this term,28 but it would seem likely that Webster also derived this pairing from Bavinck. The point to be made in all of these observations, however, is not genetic. It is possible that Webster derived none of these ideas from Bavinck. The point to be made is that these are the elements of Bavinck that would have resonated with Webster as he made closer acquaintance with Bavinck in Reformed Dogmatics. There is, nonetheless, one instance in which Webster does invoke Bavinck directly. Webster’s reception of Bavinck would appear to have been a significant factor in his reappraisal of the unease that he had previously expressed with traditional accounts of the inspiration of Scripture. Significantly, this reconsideration went hand in hand with Webster’s ongoing re-evaluation of the legacy of Karl Barth. In an essay published in 2015, Webster states, Lecturing on dogmatics for the first time, Barth worried that verbal inspiration effects “a false stabilisation of the Word of God,” which changed the mystery of God’s act of revelation into “direct revelation,” forgetting “the indirect identity of the Bible with revelation,” and making Scripture into a deposit of revealedness. The worry is, however, misplaced: verbal inspiration does not eliminate what Barth later called “God’s action in the Bible,” but simply indicates one kind of action that God performs in relation to Scripture. Verbal inspiration is an extension of (not a replacement for) the theology of divine instruction.29

This is significantly different from Webster’s earlier discussions of the relationship between Scripture, revelation, and inspiration in Holy Scripture.30 As we have seen, in Holy Scripture Webster holds some sympathy with Barth’s worry. The later Webster, however, has come to regard this concern as unfounded. What brought about this change of mind? In the following paragraph of Webster’s essay, we gain a clue. After defending the clumsiness of the description of the biblical authors as God’s secretaries or amanuenses, Webster writes, “More importantly, verbal inspiration is an instance of inner motion rather than mechanical efficient causality, and so accords with the principles of Christian teaching about the creative and recreative works of the Spirit as the giving of life.”31 In the footnote 28 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1.442. 29 Webster, “ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι,” in Conception, Reception, and the Spirit, 246. 30 See above, pp. 138–42. In attempting to trace the chronology of the development of Webster’s doctrine of Scripture, it should be noted that Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch is a revision of Webster’s Scottish Journal of Theology Lectures delivered at the University of Aberdeen in 2001. 31 Webster, “ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι,” 246–7.

181

182

Christocentrism then and now

that accompanies this sentence, Webster states, “In this connection, the notion of ‘organic inspiration,’ set out at length by Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics 1, 387–448, and more briefly by Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 139–79, deserves attention.”32 From this we may conclude that Bavinck’s account of this doctrine played some role in Webster’s change of mind. The question this raises, however, is why Bavinck’s notion of organic inspiration did not allay the earlier Webster’s concerns about a false stabilisation of the Word of God. As we saw in our exploration of Webster’s criticisms of the incarnational analogy in chapter four, Webster evidences only indirect awareness of Reformed Dogmatics in Holy Scripture. Webster engages with Bavinck’s ideas largely through Berkouwer’s summary of them. It would appear, therefore, that the catalyst in Webster’s reappraisal of the verbal inspiration of Scripture was direct engagement with Bavinck in the pages of Reformed Dogmatics. In this regard, attention should be paid to the way Webster’s essay singles out the pneumatological aspect of organic inspiration for special praise. Holy Scripture reflects a limited awareness of this aspect of organic inspiration. Webster only cites Bavinck’s Our Reasonable Faith, the English translation of Magnalia Dei, when he speaks of the “Christological-pneumatological clarification of the nature of Scripture” that enables theology to make the “all-important move” of distinguishing the biblical texts from revelation without necessarily separating them from revelation.33 The more extensive elaboration of the role of the Holy Spirit in Bavinck’s trinitarian economy of divine communication to be found in Reformed Dogmatics would seem to be what Webster found helpful. In his 2007 essay, “Theologies of Retrieval,” Webster identifies Bavinck as a rich source for projects of retrieval for precisely this reason.34 Webster’s appreciation of Bavinck’s trinitarianism will become an important consideration when we come to consider the close affinity that is to be observed between their respective 32 Webster, “ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι,” 247 n. 9. Unfortunately, Fred Sanders overlooks the importance of Bavinck’s notion of organic inspiration for Webster’s reflection on Scripture. Fred Sanders, “Holy Scripture under the Auspices of the Holy Trinity: On John Webster’s Trinitarian Doctrine of Scripture,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 29:1 (2019), 4−23. 33 Webster, Holy Scripture, 40. 34 “Trinitarian doctrine has long suffered from the cramping effects of, on the one hand, the assumption that theistic construals of God are more basic than trinitarian teaching, and, on the other hand, critical histories of orthodoxy which appeared to relegate it to the status of an accidental development. Particularly in English-language theology, the last thirty-five years have witnessed the doctrine’s renewal It is not that the doctrine ever disappeared from view (it is basic to Roman Catholic school dogmatics and massively present in, for example, Protestant dogmaticians like Dorner and Bavinck).” Webster, “Theologies of Retrieval,” in Kathryn Tanner/John Webster/Iain Torrance (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 595.

A Websterian touchstone

conceptualisations of a christocentric theological system. But before we consider this element of consanguinity, it must also be stated that the esteem in which Webster held Bavinck is unlikely to have been uncritical. A careful reading of Webster discloses specific points at which his conceptualisation of the theological task differs from Bavinck. For example, in “Principles of Systematic Theology,” Webster illustrates the way that the conceptual idiom of systematic theology must remain subservient to biblical categories, citing the negative example Geerhardus Vos (1862−1949). Readers who are familiar with Vos and the relationship in which he stands to Neo-Calvinism will immediately recognise the relevance of these criticisms for Bavinck.35 In his otherwise laudatory remarks on Vos’ inaugural lecture as Professor of Biblical Theology at Princeton Seminary, Webster takes exception to what is implied under Vos’ geometrical illustration of the difference between systematic and biblical theology. Vos states, “Systematic Theology endeavours to construct a circle, Biblical Theology seeks to reproduce a line.”36 To Webster’s way of thinking, this illustration suggests a separation of the intelligence that is historically discursive from the intelligence that is purely analytical, or more simply put, a separation of the ideal from the real. Webster’s concern is that the distribution of two complementary modes of intelligence across different theological subdisciplines precipitates two problems. First, the mode of intelligence of logical analysis is implicitly accorded primacy over the mode of intelligence manifest in the biblical witness. Second, in devolving the canonical reading of Scripture onto another subdiscipline, systematic theology’s idiom is allowed to drift away from that of Scripture and its mode of argumentation is reduced to logical analysis.37 Webster’s basic point, therefore, is that this conceptualisation of the relationship between biblical and systematic theology tempts the theologian to think that reason can deliver improvements upon Scripture. When the theologian succumbs to this temptation, divine ineffability is neglected through a softening of the distinction between apprehending and comprehending. While we do not know whether Webster may have harboured these concerns as he read 35 Although Vos and Bavinck are by no means identical, they held each other in high esteem and their personal lives and scholarly interests intersected at numerous points. See Harinck, “Herman Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1(2010), 18−31. They were frequent correspondents and intimately acquainted with each other’s work. James Dennison (ed.), The Letters of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2005). 36 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 147. Cf. Geerhardus Vos, “The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and as a Theological Discipline,” in R.B. Gaffin (ed.), Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation. The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), 23. 37 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 148.

183

184

Christocentrism then and now

Reformed Dogmatics, this criticism gains purchase on Bavinck. As we have seen, Vos’ illustration mirrors the movement in Bavinck from the sequential unfolding of revelation to the centripetal structure of a theological system.38 On occasion, Bavinck also makes statements that bring the reader to question whether he may in fact have fallen prey to the temptation that Webster identifies. For example, in the Prolegomena to Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck writes, It may seem that in the process of forming concepts and judgments and conclusions we are increasingly moving away from the solid ground beneath the edifice of our knowledge and are soaring into the stratosphere. It seems strange, even amazing, that, converting mental representations into concepts and processing these again in accordance with the laws of thought, we should obtain results that correspond to reality. Still, one who abandons this conviction is lost.39

The conversion of mental representations into concepts and the processing of the biblical witness in accord with the laws of thought is precisely what concerns Webster in Vos’ lines and circles. In the passage reproduced above, there is a privileging of logical analysis and a commendation of the movement away from the idiom of Scripture. Of course, as Webster goes on to say, avoiding missteps in the movement from Scripture to system is an art rather than a science and an art that is “informed and directed by the principles of theology, deeply internalized and by immersion in the texts and thought patterns of the Christian tradition,”40 and given the congruence of Bavinck and Webster’s principia and the degree to which Bavinck did deeply internalize and immerse himself in the texts and thoughtforms of the tradition, we should not immediately assume that Bavinck was a theologian who could not discern the altitude at which his feathers would melt. Yet there is reason to think that Bavinck’s movement from Scripture to system does falter at precisely the point Webster identifies. As we have seen, Bavinck’s concept of a system of dogmatics is based on the notion that there is a theological principle that governs the configuration of Christian doctrine. The dogmatician’s task is to discern the presence of this principle in Scripture and order the system accordingly.41 As we have seen, Bavinck affirms the availability of this principle because he views Scripture as an organism.42 In his discussion of the limitations of theological intelligence, Webster firmly denies the availability of any such principle. Webster writes,

38 39 40 41 42

See above, pp. 37−47. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.231. Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 148. See above, p. 35. See above, p. 40.

A Websterian touchstone

[T]he matter of systematic theology is not present to creatures in the form of a principle from which all else can be deduced, but as an historically extended set of asymmetrical relations between the uncreated God and the creatures whom he draws into fellowship with himself. This set of relations in time is not only the matter of systematic theology but also its setting or historical horizon, the field within which it occurs. The construction of theological system is an activity within this unfinished history, undertaken at one point in the unfolding economy.43

Webster thus denies what Bavinck affirms. According to Bavinck, a principle is available to creatures by which the asymmetrical relations of Scripture may be synchronised. Webster’s disavowal of the construction of a theological system on the basis of a principle suggests that he would query Bavinck’s equation of the centrality of Christ in Scripture with the constitutive principle of the organism. As Barth points out in his survey of Protestant theology in the nineteenth century, the organism is not to be found Scripture but was an idea that was imposed on Scripture by the heilsgeschichtliche Schule.44 The equation of the central function of Christ in Scripture with the function of the organism’s constitutive principle is a conversion of categories of the sort that Webster explicitly rejects. It is important to note, however, that Webster’s objection to making the historical-discursive mode of intelligence of the biblical texts subservient to an analytical mode of intelligence that systematises doctrine does not necessarily entail the rejection of a christocentric theological system. Webster held reservations about the strongly deductive species of christocentrism according to which Christology functions as the cognitive and ontological source of all doctrines. The specific shortcoming of this kind of christocentrism is that it allows “discrete teaching about the person and work of Christ” to annex “the fundamental role which earlier theologies more naturally recognised in teaching about the Trinity.”45 Webster was not, however, willing to dismiss out of hand what he describes as a “less straightforwardly deductive” christocentrism. In his

43 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 144−5. 44 In the context of a discussion of Beck’s affinity with German Frühromantik, Barth writes, “That the truth of revelation must form an ‘organism,’ a ‘tree of life’ with root and crown, and that the genetic method must be the real one – this and the whole burdening of the matter with such conceptuality was not taken by Beck from the Bible.” Barth, Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Geschichte und ihre Vorgeschichte (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1994), 569. Cit. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 267. 45 Webster, “Christology, Theology, Economy. The Place of Christology in Systematic Theology,” in God without Measure, 44. Webster expresses similar sentiments in his earlier analysis of Eberhard Jüngel’s christocentrism. Cf. Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to His Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 134.

185

186

Christocentrism then and now

essay “Christology, Theology, Economy. The Place of Christology in Systematic Theology,” Webster writes, Another, less straightforwardly deductive conception of the relation between Christology and other doctrines – one which on occasions Barth also maintained – considers Christology, not as in and of itself the basis, centre or starting-point of everything else, but rather as a principal part of Christian teaching having wide dispersal across the doctrinal corpus by virtue of the fact that it is an integral element of the doctrine of the Trinity.46

Indeed, Webster can be heard tacitly affirming the probity of placing Christology at the centre of a theological system when he states that no “element in a system of theology is unrelated to Christology: to contemplate any of its parts is to have one’s mind drawn irresistibly to the name and figure of Jesus Christ.”47 The burden of this essay, nevertheless, is to articulate the methodological considerations that any christocentric system of doctrine must respect. In the concluding lines of this essay, Webster sums these concerns with the following words: And so when systematic reflection is directed to God as first truth, the incarnation is not left behind, because to apprehend this first truth is also to apprehend that the eternal Word participates in God’s infinite communicative and creative goodness and is the exemplary cause of God’s works in time. When these material − trinitarian − principles govern the content and proportions of a systematic presentation of Christian teaching, the place, extent and formative role of Christology will be properly delimited and secured.48

A christocentrism according to which Christology functions as midpoint rather than a starting point conforms, therefore, to the kind of christocentrism Webster can countenance. Both Bavinck and Webster reject the kind of derivative christocentrism according to which Christology functions as the cognitive and ontological source of all doctrines. Bavinck and Webster also seek to apprehend that manner in which the eternal Word participates in God’s infinite communicative goodness and can be identified as the causa exemplaris of God’s works in time. Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a theological system as an organism, however, embodies the movement from Scripture to system that Webster disavows. Differentiating between these two Bavinckian commitments is of the highest importance for understanding the way in which Webster might be used 46 Webster, “Christology, Theology, Economy,” in God without Measure, 44. 47 Webster, “Christology, Theology, Economy,” in God without Measure, 57. 48 Webster’s closing remarks summarise these considerations. Webster, “Christology, Theology, Economy,” in God without Measure, 58.

Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval

as a touchstone for assaying the merits of Bavinckian retrieval. In the final section of this chapter we shall offer some preliminary thoughts as to how this might be done. Yet in keeping with the parameters of this study we shall limit our comments to Bavinck’s conceptualisation of a dogmatic system in which Christology functions as its centre and heart. Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval There is much in Bavinck’s systematic, vitalist, and ecclesial christocentrism that is true and beautiful and, potentially, of use for contemporary Reformed theology. Theological retrieval, nevertheless, involves not only identifying what one might exhume but also what is best left to the worms. A project of Bavinckian ressourcement, therefore, depends as much on identifying what is ultimately unsuccessful as it does on identifying what is true and beautiful. Yet it would be a mistake to appropriate or discard elements of Bavinck’s thought arbitrarily. Bavinck is an architectonic thinker for whom the parts of a theological system draw their meaning and significance from their place in the whole. The preliminary task of retrieval must, therefore, begin with the order in which any given doctrine stands to the whole. That is, a critical appropriation of Bavinck will be able to demonstrate the continuity with which it stands to his thoughtforms by means of such an analysis. We have suggested that the thought of John Webster, a theologian with whom Bavinck’s thought resonates and whose critical reflections on the theological task offer insight into potential flaws in Bavinck’s christocentrism, provides a suitable framework within which the preliminary evaluative work associated with a project of Bavinckian retrieval might take place. The specific concern identified in our attempt to draw on Webster in this way is Bavinck’s approbation of the translation not only the content but also the form of Scripture into a conceptual idiom. The risk Webster identifies in this process is entailed neither by the assumption that Scripture bears an orderly character, nor that it possesses a centre, nor even in identifying the person of Christ as the centre of Scripture.49 The risk lies in the conversion of the linear asymmetry of Scripture into a centripetal system. As we have seen, the characterisation of both Scripture and 49 From the earliest times, the church has discerned the inner coherence of Scripture by means of a christological hermeneutic. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (5 vol.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971−89), 1.11−26, 141−55; Jacob A. Rodriguez, “Irenaeus’s Missional Theology: Global Christian Perspectives from an Ancient Missionary and Theologian,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 59:1 (2016), 131−45; Paul M. Blowers, “The regula fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith,” Pro Ecclesia 6 (1997), 199−228.

187

188

Christocentrism then and now

dogmatics as an organism furnishes Bavinck with the warrant for doing this. The question we would raise, therefore, is whether Bavinck’s use of the organism precipitates any of the negative outcomes that Webster anticipates. The first observation that must be made on this count is that the organism does not, generally speaking, determine the formulation of doctrine but merely orders the systematisation of doctrines. We have noted the way that Bavinck superimposes the organism on the trinitarian structure of his principia theologiae. Thus, the foundation of theology is God the Father, Son, and Spirit and the organising principle of the system is Christology. The point of coalescence is theology’s principium cognoscendi externum, the self-revelation of God in Christ. One might query the logical coherence of this arrangement,50 but the ideational architecture is clear.51 The principle that Bavinck derives from Scripture to order the system is made methodologically subservient to the trinitarian moorings of Bavinck’s principia. Bavinck thus denies Christology the status of starting point, a denial which in turn prevents Christology or the organism from annexing the role Bavinck assigns to the Holy Trinity in his theological methodology. The organism does, nevertheless, subvert this order in another way. The organism threatens to displace Christology as the centre of the system. The reason for this is bound up with the purpose for which the organism is deployed. As we saw in chapter one, the purpose of the organism is the reconciliation of subject and object, the demonstration of the unity of the real and the ideal, the whole and the parts, and of mechanism and teleology. The reconciliation of all of these binary pairs is secured by a reification of natural purpose.52 The reason that the organism is responsible for the displacement of Christology at the centre of Bavinck’s system is the way Bavinck marries the teleology of the organism to the outworking of the divine decree. That is, Bavinck superimposes the teleology of the organism onto eschatology. One of the results of this superimposition is that revelation in the diesseits is ordered to revelation in the jenseits. That is, objective revelation is ordered to subjective revelation. Viewed in this light, it is not difficult to see how the organism generates the psychologizing impulse we observed in the fourth chapter. The person of Christ is the centre of objective revelation. Revelation as a whole, 50 One might legitimately demand a clearer explanation of why the distinction between midpoint and starting point ought not be regarded as nonsense. That is, one might query the meaningfulness of the assertion that Christology is the centre of the system, if it does not function as its starting point. 51 It is also worth noting that this coalescence has a pneumatological dimension. The Holy Spirit, who is the principium cognoscendi internum of theology also functions as the “living force” or levenskracht of the dogmatic organism. 52 See above, p. 28.

Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval

however, is ordered to an internal, immediate, subjective knowledge of God in the eschaton.53 Because of this, Christology, as the centre of the system, is displaced by the teleology of Bavinck’s organic conceptualisation of revelation. There is an irony in this. Although Bavinck drew upon the organism in order to free theology from the dualism of subjective idealism, the organism introduces a bias toward absolute idealism in Bavinck’s own theology. As we have seen on several occasions, Bavinck resists this bias when he denies logical entailments of these arrangements. For example, we noted the way that a supralapsarian Christology would sit comfortably with the structure of his system yet Bavinck disavows it.54 This serves as a good example of how Bavinck does not allow the centripetal structure of his system to determine its material content. The result of Bavinck’s resistance to this bias is the consistent inconsistency that we noted earlier. Yet given that this inconsistency arises at least in part from Bavinck’s use of the organism, it is worth considering whether the organism could be excised from Bavinck without fatally compromising the structure of his system. There is much to suggest that it could. Although the organism is integral to the structure of the system, it belongs to its philosophical apparatus and for Bavinck, the philosophical categories that a theological system might employ are strictly contingent.55 Bavinck writes, “theology is not in need of a specific philosophy … what it needs is philosophy in general.”56 Bavinck is consistent in this regard. The organism is only ever accorded an a posteriori role in the formulation of doctrines. For example, in Bavinck’s bibliology we noted how the organism does not establish Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture but only undergirds it.57 Similarly, the organism does not establish Bavinck’s doctrine of the imago Dei, but contributes a logical description of its inner structure.58 Scripture does not depend on the organism in order to remain the Word of God any more than humanity depends on the organism in order to bear the divine image. The organism could, therefore, be trimmed from Bavinck’s dogmatics without cost to its material content. It is also important to note that trimming the organism from Bavinck’s apparatus would not leave it bereft of categories. Bavinck draws on an eclectic range of ancient and modern thinkers. An organismectomy,

53 See above, p. 158. 54 See above, pp. 124–5. 55 Perhaps the one exception to this is Bavinck’s ecclesiology. The organism-institution pairing forms an integral component of Bavinck’s material ecclesiology. The removal of the organism from this doctrine would require significant reconstruction. 56 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1.609. 57 See above, pp. 132−8. 58 See above, pp. 106−9.

189

190

Christocentrism then and now

therefore, would at least in theory be possible and there is also much to suggest that it would be desirable. In the first place it is worth noting that the philosophical apparatus of the system would be strengthened rather than weakened by its removal. The organism does remarkable things, but its basic weakness is that it claims too much. Naturzweck certainly offers a possible, even likely, explanation of the world as we experience it but for all we know, reality could well be reducible to mechanical explanation. For all we know, naturally occurring functions and forms could still be produced by mechanisms.59 Kant’s critique of vitalism, therefore, rings true: We can by no means prove the impossibility of the generation of organised products of nature through the mere mechanism of nature … Whether, therefore, the productive capacity of nature may not be as adequate for that which we judge as formed or combined in accordance with the idea of ends as well as for that which we believe to need merely the machinery of nature, and whether in fact things as genuine natural ends (as we must necessarily judge them) must be based in an entirely different kind of original causality, which cannot be contained at all in material nature or in its intelligible substratum, namely, an architectonic understanding: about this our reason, which is extremely limited with regard to the concept of causality if the latter is supposed to be specified a priori, can give us no information whatever.60

If we transpose the argument into a theological key, we could also add the objection that a transcendent purpose does not necessarily presuppose natural ends. That is, even if natural ends could be proven, they do not stand in any necessary relation to transcendent ends. To suggest that they do is to turn the doctrine of creation into a bridge between natural teleology and the divine decree and this, arguably, has potentially dangerous consequences. To these criticisms we might also add that subsequent philosophical grammars have brought to light new ways of overcoming the subject-object dichotomy that avoid the psychologizing tendency of the organism. In particular, we have in mind the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations begins with a quotation drawn from Augustine’s Confessions, in order to invoke the interiority that has played a determinative role in the development of Western anthropology.61 Thus, it is with no small hint of irony that Wittgenstein 59 Beiser, Romantic Imperative, 163, 165. 60 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 260. This is why Bavinck needed to claim that the organic view is taught by Scripture. Precisely because teleology is not a logical entailment of nature, the reality of the organism is something that must be revealed. Or to state it a different way, if Scripture teaches the organic view, then the presupposition of ends becomes immune from Kant’s critique. 61 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 4th edn; (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 5.

Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval

interrogates the modern conception of the self by taking as his starting point Augustine’s reflections on the acquisition of language by means of the socially conditioned habits of gestures, facial expressions, play of eyes, movement of limbs, and tones of voice. Wittgenstein does so in order to explore the possibility that meaning does not lie concealed behind signs, but rather resides at the surface. Although a thoroughgoing implementation of Wittgenstein’s insights would require a wholesale disassembly of Bavinck’s philosophical commitments,62 both the notion of Lebensform63 and the theory of speech-acts hold considerable explanatory power for the theological claims Bavinck advances.64 If speech is the primary mode of divine praxis, Scripture might be conceptualised as the Lebensform of the church.65 Wittgenstein, however, does not offer the only possible, or necessarily the best, approach to the philosophical problems with which Bavinck wrestled. Substantial work has been done in the domain of religious epistemology in recent years with fascinating results. Bayesian cognitive science and Reformed epistemology present two contrasting schemas which indicate radically different ways past the impasse of the subject-object dichotomy.66 Yet rather than seeking an alternative philosophical construct to replace the organism, projects of retrieval might also consider deflating or paring back the role that is played by philosophical constructs in Bavinck such that exegesis performs a more structural role in the system. This is what Webster recommends as the appropriate alternative to Vos’ movement from line to circle. Webster writes, In terms of the construction of a systematic theology, these principles will be best expressed by the substantial presence of exegesis, showing that Scripture is doing real work,

62 Yet this might be exactly what is required in a project of Bavinckian retrieval. In The Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck plots the same trajectory Wittgenstein traces from Augustine to Descartes with the conclusion that dogmatics must become not less, but more psychological. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 63, 209. 63 For what is meant by “forms of life,” see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 238. 64 For an exploration of the complementarity of Kevin Vanhoozer’s appropriation of speechact theory and Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture, see Pass, “Upholding sola scriptura today: some unturned stones in Herman Bavinck’s doctrine of inspiration,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 20:4 (2018), 517−36. 65 For helpful preliminary excursions charting this territory, see Michael Coors, “Theologische Texttheorie: theologische Erkundungen zur Textualität der Heiligen Schrift zwischen Ludwig Wittgenstein und Johann Andreas Quenstedt,” Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 51:4 (2009), 400−26; Christopher J. Insole, “The truth behind practices: Wittgenstein, Robinson Crusoe and ecclesiology,” Studies in Christian Ethics 20:3 (2007), 364−82; Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein 2nd edn; (London: SPCK, 1997). 66 Matthew Benton/John Hawthorne/Dani Rabinowitz (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

191

192

Christocentrism then and now

not simply furnishing topics to be handled in a non-Scriptural idiom or proofs for arguments constructed on other grounds. Scripture must be the terminus ad quem of systematic theological analysis not merely its terminus a quo. Similarly, conceptual inventiveness, so central to the systematic enterprise, must go hand-in-hand with conceptual transparency, since systematic concepts are simply windows through which we may glimpse the biblical landscape and its ultimate horizon in God.67

Webster is not advocating a naked biblicism, but rather a disciplining of conceptual analysis such that it remains within the conceptual domain of Scripture. This is what Webster means when he speaks of systematic concepts as “windows through which we may glimpse the biblical landscape” or of Scripture as the terminus ad quem of systematic theological analysis. Philosophy will inevitably play some role in the process of forming systematic concepts, as it is impossible to generate concepts without the aid of categories, but it will not furnish the system with its load-bearing beams. These are to be provided by exegesis. This is the “real work” to be performed by Scripture in the task of systematisation. While it can hardly be said that Scripture does not do real work in Bavinck, Scripture is not the terminus ad quem of his system. In the bending of the biblical lines into systematic arcs, Scripture forms the uitgangspunt, but it does not form its eindpunt. Exegesis does not perform any prominent role in the way Bavinck develops the formulation of doctrine or in the construction of the system. Ironically, Geerhardus Vos drew his readers’ attention to this in his insightful review of the second volume of Gereformeerde dogmatiek. Vos writes, “the masterful manner in which the historico-doctrinal sections are constructed makes one all the more regret that, comparatively speaking, the biblico-exegetical foundation of the dogma appears somewhat neglected.”68 It is possible that with this passing remark, Vos touches on a weakness of Reformed Dogmatics. Exegesis cannot be viewed as a merely preparatory task in systematic theology. As Webster rightly points out, the substantial presence of exegesis in systematic theology prevents proofs from being constructed on other grounds. Occasionally, we see this happening in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics. In certain instances, the organism controls the formation of systematic concepts. Bavinck’s conceptualisation of revelation as an organism provides what is perhaps the best example. The conceptualisation of revelation as an organism yields Bavinck’s concept of continuous incarnation which delivers the conclusion that Christ is the centre and means of revelation but not its goal. As we 67 Webster, “The Principles of Systematic Theology,” in The Domain of the Word, 148. 68 Vos, “H. Bavinck. Gereformeerde dogmatiek – vol. 2,” in Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation, 486. Whether or not Vos’ own lectures in systematic theology make up this deficit is thus an interesting question to pursue. Vos, Reformed Dogmatics (5 vol.; Bellingham: Lexham, 2012−14).

Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval

saw in chapter four, the danger this courts is the reduction of the concepts of revelation and incarnation to a function of immediate self-consciousness. Thus, the question Barth raises with regard to the place of the vestigia trinitatis in the doctrine of the Trinity,69 to which we referred in our exploration of Bavinck’s deductive principles, becomes pressing. Does the organism interpret or merely illustrate the concept of revelation? That is, does the organism illustrate convictions about the nature of revelation which are grounded in the biblical witness or does the organism actually supply these concepts? The question is difficult to answer with any certainty because, as we have seen, Bavinck often denies what would seem to be the logical entailments of his conceptualisation of revelation as an organism. An immaterial Parousia, for example, would sit comfortably with the claim that Christ is the centre and means of revelation but not its goal. Bavinck, however, rejects this. One might argue that Bavinck’s denial of an immaterial Parousia shows that the organism is not determining the material content of doctrine. Yet the need to deny a logical entailment of a systematic concept might also suggest that something has gone awry in the concept’s formulation. Arguably, the surest method of ensuring that the right kind of inconsistency is generated in the systematisation of doctrine is allowing exegesis to play a constitutive role in the formulation of concepts. Note, however, that this will never eliminate inconsistency in the system. Precisely because “the matter of systematic theology is not present to creatures in the form of a principle” but rather as an “historically extended set of asymmetrical relations between the uncreated God and the creatures whom he draws into fellowship with himself,”70 the biblical modes of intelligence will never coalesce into a matrix of exceptionless causality. To suggest that they could would be to confuse ectype for archetype. It would be to claim a knowledge of God’s works that transcends the creaturely medium of their revelation. System, therefore, will always be marked by imperfection. The task of the systematic theologian is to discern the place at which imperfections rightly belong. The difficulty of this task is that, in the main, a misjudged use of analytical reason generates symmetry rather than asymmetry. Reason, by its very nature, strives after concord and agreement. This is why the organism delivers much of the architectural beauty of Bavinck’s system. The theologian, however, must discern where such beauty conceals a misstep. Such is the process of discerning an appropriately inconsistent consistency. The question this raises for projects of retrieval is, what would Bavinck’s system look like in the absence of the organism? The following reflections might be offered. First, Christology could still be cast as the centre of the system. The 69 See above, p. 122. 70 Webster, “Principles of Systematic Theology,” in Domain of the Word, 144−5.

193

194

Christocentrism then and now

system itself, however, would not be governed by a principle. Christology might be viewed as the “centre” on account of the way in which no element in the system is unrelated to Christology, but the control Christology exerts on the system would not be absolute. Moreover, its distribution would be irregular. The irregularity of the relation in which Christology would stand to other doctrines is the right kind of inconsistency for the simple reason that the person of Christ is both the pre-existent second person of the Holy Trinity and the man born of a virgin. This irregularity might, however, be better described as asymmetry. Because the relation of Christ’s deity to his humanity is asymmetrical, the relation between Christology and other doctrines in the system ought to reflect an analogous lack of symmetry. It is especially worth noting that Bavinck preserves this asymmetry when he speaks of some doctrines preparing for Christology and others deriving from it. Untethering system from the organism would also have the benefit of freeing the development of dogmatics from narratives of progress. One might still view dogmatics as essentially incomplete and subject to the sovereign providence of the Holy Spirit and maintain that dogmatics reaches consummation in the eschaton, but separating the historical development of dogmatics from the teleology of the organism will leave more room for its devolution. Bavinck cedes that the path of development might be a tortuous one, but his conceptualisation of dogmatics as an organism does not leave sufficient conceptual space for a history of stasis, decline, or even irreversible decay. And one should note that Bavinck’s eschatology actually requires this space. Bavinck anticipates mass apostasy in the period before Christ’s return. In the final chapter of Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck writes, Among believers as well there will be extensive apostasy. Temptations will be so powerful that, if it were possible, even the elect would be caused to fall. The love of many will grow cold, and vigilance will diminish to the extent that the wise will fall asleep along with the foolish virgins Apostasy will be so general that Jesus can ask whether at his coming the Son of Man will still find faith on earth.71

If this is what will happen in the church, it cannot be expected that dogmatics will remain unscathed or grow from one stage of maturity to the next. Dogmatics too is subject to temptations. Theologians may neglect their vigil. Conceptualising dogmatics as an organism, however, leaves insufficient space for this. Untethering dogmatics from narratives of progress does, nevertheless, hold implications for the task of theological retrieval. If one cannot make any simple 71 Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4.674.

Assaying the merits of Bavinckian Retrieval

identification of the results of the church’s theological labours in any given period of history with the growth of the dogmatic organism, the methodological significance of the church’s confession becomes a little more unclear. In fairness to Bavinck, we should note that the tradition holds a fundamentally contingent and revisable status in Bavinck’s theological methodology and that the church’s confession is viewed as the organ rather than as the source of the knowledge of God. This contingency, however, stands in tension with the characterisation of dogmatics as an organism. If the Holy Spirit guides the development of doctrine in the way that the living force of the organism directs its growth, the past path of development stands in a sequentially necessary relation to the future. Thus, the historical necessity of the growth of the organism stands in tension with the contingency of the church’s confession. There may yet be ways of coordinating the historical necessity of the development of doctrine and the contingency of the church’s confession for projects of theological retrieval. Untethering system from the organism would, however, simplify the task. Second, the organism is unnecessary for the conceptualisation of Christology as the heart of dogmatics. It is possible to assert that religion is the element that inspires all theological research and to characterise it as the heartbeat one hears softer or louder in every dogma without recourse to the organism. The organism is similarly unnecessary for the conceptualisation of subjective religion as proceeding from a personal relation and embracing the entirety of one’s agency. The organism hardens the heart and lifeblood metaphor into a set of formal properties which need not be embedded in the metaphor itself. The metaphor is capable of standing alone even if it lacks the formal properties that offer a more precise description of what the metaphor seeks to illustrate. We should note, however, that the organism is integral to Bavinck’s conceptualisation of objective religion and that the organism allows Bavinck to apply the structure of special revelation to the category of religion. Without the organism, therefore, Bavinck would not be able to place the person of Christ in a positive relation to world religions. This might not, however, be such a bad thing. Theologically, the derivation of a general principle under which all religions are to be subsumed is problematic. The problem lies less with the movement from phenomenological description of religious observance to a deductive theory of religion than it does with the implications it holds for the particularity of Jesus Christ. The incarnation is nested in the historical matrix of God’s dealings with his covenant people. This relation, therefore, is not only historically distinct but also theologically distinct. A potential consequence of deriving a general principle of religion from this relation is the reduction of the incarnation to a general principle. That is, incarnation is no longer a unique instance of the relation established by God with the creatures whom he draws into fellowship with himself, but a concept which accounts for very human

195

196

Christocentrism then and now

attempts to establish such a relation. This is another point at which the organism potentially interprets rather than illustrates in Bavinck’s theological system. As we have noted, Bavinck denies that the incarnation can be reduced to a general principle. Yet this is a logical entailment of deriving a general principle of religion from the conceptual structure of special revelation. The removal of the organism, therefore, would not only make better sense of this denial but also safeguard the particularity of the incarnation. Conclusion If for many years Protestant theologians have turned to Karl Barth when they stood in need of help in solving one or another theological problem, they may now also find a suitable conversation partner in Herman Bavinck. Bavinck’s concept of a christocentric system is a monument to his concerted efforts to bring order to the chaos of Protestant dogmatics at the dawn of the twentieth century. Given that a century later there is perhaps even more disagreement over the source from which it draws, the standard by which it should be tested, and the method by which it should appropriate its subject matter, Bavinck’s careful reflection on the theological task hold even greater value for contemporary Protestant dogmatics. Bavinck’s systematic, vitalist, and ecclesial christocentrism provides clear answers to these questions and offers another example of a less straightforwardly deductive conception of the relation between Christology and other doctrines than that, which, in the main, is advocated by Barth. For Bavinck, Christology does not comprise the unconditional basis of all theological thought. Rather, Christology exercises only a limited degree of control over the systematisation of doctrine on account of the trinitarian foundations from which Bavinck’s formulation of doctrine proceeds. As such, Bavinck seeks to ascertain Christ’s place in his relation to the divine being, to creation, to humanity, to culture, to the church − in short, Christ’s place in relation to all things. For the simple reason that no thinker’s writings ought to be appropriated uncritically, Bavinck’s systematic, vitalist, and ecclesial christocentrism requires a framework within which the preliminary evaluative work of theological retrieval can be done. The points of contact to be observed between Bavinck and John Webster suggest that Webster provides one such framework. Webster’s conceptualisation of a trinitarian economy of communication, detailed reflection on the relationship between Scripture and theology, and judicious evaluation of the legitimacy of a christocentric system of doctrine draw attention to much that is beautiful and true in Bavinck. A close reading of Webster, however, also points to where Bavinck’s conceptualisation of the theological

Conclusion

task may be misjudged. On this count, projects of Bavinckian retrieval would do well to reconsider the utility of the organism. Apart from its philosophical liabilities, the organism aids and abets a psychologising tendency which on occasion yields worrying outcomes in Bavinck’s material dogmatics. Potential Bavinck-retrievers might consider more recent philosophical grammars which not only commend themselves to the theological claims Bavinck seeks to advance but also skirt many of the risks associated with the organism. Projects of retrieval might, however, also consider whether affording exegesis a more substantial role presents a wiser alternative. Dogmatics stands in need of categories but it is best safeguarded from the speculative tendency inherent to all schematisation when Scripture comprises not only the starting point of the system of doctrine but also its endpoint. Such a system would be one in which Christology still functions as its centre and heart, but it would do so in an even less straightforwardly deductive way.

197

Bibliography Primary sources Bavinck, H. Gereformeerde ethiek (Utrecht: Uitgeverij KokBoekencentrum, 2019). − Geloofszekerheid (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2016). − Gereformeerde dogmatiek. 4th edn; (4 vol.; Kampen: Kok, 1928). − Beginselen der psychologie 2nd edn; (Kampen: Kok, 1923). − “Kennis en leven,” De Bazuin 48:21, (1900), 3−20. Republished in Kennis en leven (Kampen: Kok, 1922), 203−40. − “Rapport inzake de voorstellen der particuliere synodes rakende de belijdenis,” in Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland Generale Synode, Acta der generale synode van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland: Gehouden te Leeuwarden van 24 augustus – 9 september 1920, (Kampen: Kok, 1920), 152–4. − Reden in Handelingen der Staten-Generaal: Eerste Kamer (1919–1920) March 5 pp. 571–4, (1918–19) March 13 pp. 243–6, (1917–18) April 11 pp. 311–13, April 15 pp. 363–4, July 19 pp. 755–7, 765–6, (1916–17) April 25, pp. 496–8, May 15 pp. 618–24, (1915–16) April 27 p. 416, May 26 p. 434, (1914–15) December 29 p. 105, January 29 p. 147, June 10 pp. 312–13, June 10 pp. 324–8, June 11 pp. 338–9, (1913–14) January 7 pp. 119–22, March 20 pp. 484–5, March 21 p. 499, (1912–13) March 12 pp. 432–4, (1911–12) December 29 pp. 126–8, April 25 pp. 495–7. − De overwinning der ziel (Kampen: Kok, 1916). − Het Christendom: groote godsdiensten Serie II — No. 7 (Baarn: HollandiaDrukkerij, 1912). − Modernisme en orthodoxie (Kampen: Kok, 1911). − Magnalia Dei: onderwijzing in de christelijke religie naar gereformeerde belijdenis (Kampen: Kok, 1909). − “Het wezen des christendoms,” in Almanak van het studentencorps der Vrije Universiteit voor het jaar 1906 (Amsterdam: Herdes, 1906), 251–77. − Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Bos, 1904). − Christelijke wetenschap (Kampen: Kok, 1904). − Roeping en wedergeboorte (Kampen: Zalsman, 1903). − Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid (Wageningen: Vada, 1902). − Hedendaagsche moraal (Kampen: Kok, 1902). − De offerande des lofs: overdenkingen vóór en na de toelating tot het heilige avondmaal (Gravenhage: Verschoor, 1901). − Gereformeerde dogmatiek 1st edn; (4 vol.; Kampen: Bos, 1895–1901).

200

Bibliography

− De algemeene genade (Kampen: Zalsman, 1894). − “Calvinistisch en gereformeerd,” De Vrije Kerk 19:2 (1893), 49−71. − “Confessie en dogmatiek,” Theologische studiën 9:3 (1891), 258−275. − “De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl,” Theologische studiën 6 (1888), 369−403. − De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk (Kampen: Zalsman, 1888). − “Moderne theologie,” De Vrije Kerk 14:6 (1888), 253−286. − De Theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye. Bijdrage tot de kennis der Ethische Theologie (Leiden: Donner, 1884). − De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid (Kampen: Zalsman, 1883). − “Gereformeerde Theologie,” De Vrije Kerk 7:11 (1881), 497–509. − “Het voor en het tegen van een dogmatisch system,” De Vrije Kerk 7:10 (1881), 449–64. − Openbaring en ontwikkeling Bavinck archive, 366. Historical Documentation Centre, Vrije Universiteit. − De voornaamste problemen der tegenwoordigen dogmatiek Bavinck archive, 57. Historical Documentation Centre, Vrije Universiteit. Harinck, G./Van der Kooi, C./Vree, J. (ed.), Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende: aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak-Netelenbos, het schriftgezag en de situatie van de gereformeerde kerken November 1919 (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Uitgeverij, 1994). (English translations) − Reformed Ethics vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019). − “The Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System,” The Bavinck Review 5 (2014), 90−103. − “The Kingdom of God, The Highest Good,” The Bavinck Review 2 (2011), 133−70. − “Foreword to the First Edition (Volume 1) of the Gereformeerde dogmatiek,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 11−17. − “The Philosophy of Religion (Faith),” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 25−31. − “Theology and Religious Studies,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 49−60. − “Christianity and Natural Science,” in Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 81−105. − Reformed Dogmatics (4 vol.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003—08). − “Herman Bavinck on the Covenant of Works,” in Howard Griffith/J.R. Muether (ed.), Creator, Redeemer, Consummator: A Festschrift for Meredith G. Kline (Greenville: Reformed Academic Press, 2000), 169–85.

(English translations)

− In the Beginning: Foundations of Creation Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999). − “Christianity and the Natural Sciences,” in Jitse Van der Meer (ed.), Facets of Faith and Science (4 vol.; Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 47–52. − The Last Things: Hope for This World and the Next (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996). − “Herman Bavinck on Scripture and Science,” Calvin Theological Journal 27:1 (1992), 91–95. − “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 27:2 (1992), 220−51. − “Common Grace,” Calvin Theological Journal 24:1 (1989), 35−65. − The Certainty of Faith (St. Catharines: Paideia, 1980). − The Doctrine of God (Carlisle: Banner of Truth Trust, 1977). − Our Reasonable Faith: A Survey of Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). − Biblical and Religious Psychology (Protestant Reformed Theological School: n.p., 1974). − The Sacrifice of Praise: Meditations before and after receiving access to the table of the Lord (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1922). − “Christ and Christianity,” Biblical Review 1:2 (1916), 214–36. − Mental, Religious and Social Forces in the Netherlands: a general view of the Netherlands (Commercial Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce at The Hague, 1915). − “Death,” in James Orr (ed.), International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia (5 vols.; Chicago: Howard-Severance, 1915), 2.811−13. − “Fall, The,” in James Orr (ed.), International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia (5 vols.; Chicago: Howard-Severance, 1915), 2.1092−4. − “The Virgin Birth of Our Lord,” Bible Magazine 1:1 (1913), 50–61. − “Christological Movements in the Nineteenth Century,” Bibliotheca Sacra 68 (1911), 381–404. − “The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands,” Princeton Theological Review 8:3 (1911), 433–60. − “Calvin and Common Grace,” in W.P. Armstrong (ed.), Calvin and the Reformation: Four Studies (New York: Revell, 1909), 99–130. − The Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures for 1908–09, Princeton Theological Seminary (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909). − “Creation or Development,” The Methodist Review 83 (1901), 849−74. − “The Future of Calvinism,” Presbyterian and Reformed Review 5:1 (1894), 1–24. − “Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands,” The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 3:10 (1892), 209−28.

201

202

Bibliography

− “The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition of Communities and Nations,” in Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World Holding the Presbyterian System, Proceedings of the Fifth General Council, Toronto 1892 (Toronto: Hart & Riddell, 1892), 48–55. Eglinton, J.P. (ed.), Herman Bavinck on Preaching and Preachers (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2017). Secondary sources À Brakel, W., The Christian’s Reasonable Service (4 vol.; Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books: 1999). Allen, M., “Dogmatics as ascetics,” in Oliver Crisp/Fred Sanders (ed.), The Task of Dogmatics: Explorations in Theological Method (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 189−209. Allen, M./Swain, S., Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015). Althaus, P., Die Christliche Wahrheit: Lehrbuch der Dogmatik (2 vol.; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949). Anema, A./Bavinck, H./Diepenhorst, P.A./Heemskerk Th./De Vries Czn, S., Leider en leiding in der Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1915). Aquinas, T., Summa Theologiae (61 vol.; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964−81). Baldensperger, W., Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit (Strassburg: Heitz und Mündel, 1888). Barth, K., Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Geschichte und ihre Vorgeschichte (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1994). − Der Römerbrief erste Vassung, 1919 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985). − The Church Dogmatics (4 vol. in 13 pts; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956–75). Bauckham, R.J., Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). − “The Sonship of the Historical Jesus in Christology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 31:3 (1978), 248−60. Baumann, J., Die Gemütsart Jesu nach jetziger wissenschaftlicher, insbesondere jetziger psychologischer Methode erkennbar gemacht (Leipzig: Kröner, 1908). Beerens, J.F., Wat is het onderscheid tussen orthodox en modern? Voor de gemeente beantwoord (Wageningen: n.p., 1911). Beiser, F., After Hegel: German Philosophy 1840–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

Secondary sources

− “Romanticism and Idealism,” in N. Dassar (ed.), The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 30−46. − Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). − The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (London: Harvard University Press, 2003). Benton, M./Hawthorne, J./Rabinowitz, D. (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Berkhof, H., Two Hundred Years of Theology: A Report of a Journey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989). Berkouwer, G., Zoeken en vinden: herinneringen en ervaringen (Kampen: Kok, 1989). − Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). − A Half Century of Theology: Movements and Motives (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). − The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956). Billings, T., Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011). Binet-Sanglé, C., La folie de Jésus (2 vol.; Paris, 1908−10). Bins jr., D., Dooreengelopen kleuren. Het onderscheid tusschen orthodox en “Orthodox” en “Modern” overwogen (Groningen: n.p., 1912). Bintsarovskyi, D., “God Hidden and Revealed: A Reformed and an Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” PhD thesis Kampen Theological University (2019). Blocher, H.A., “God and the Scripture writers: the question of double authorship,” in D.A. Carson (ed.), The enduring authority of the Christian Scriptures (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 497−541. Blowers, P.M., “The regula fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith,” Pro Ecclesia 6 (1997), 199−228. Boersma, H., Seeing God: The Beatific Vision in Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018). Bolt, J., Bavinck on the Christian Life: Following Jesus in Faithful Service (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015). − The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013). − “Herman Bavinck on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further Reflections,” The Bavinck Review 4 (2013), 64−93. − “Pearls and Leaven,” The Bavinck Review 1 (2010), 86−8.

203

204

Bibliography

− “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck’s Reception and Influence in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 38:2 (2003), 263−80. − “The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck,” PhD dissertation, University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto School of Theology (1982). Bornhäuser, K., “Die Versuchung Jesu nach dem Hebräerbrief,” in F. Giesebrecht/R. Kögel (ed.), Theologische Studien: Martin Kähler zum 6. Januar 1905 dargebracht (Leipzig: Deichert, 1905), 69−86. Braaten, C., “Martin Kähler on the Historic Biblical Christ,” in C. Braaten/R. Harrisville (ed.), The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New Quest for the Historical Jesus (New York: Abingdon, 1964), 79−105. Bratt, J.D., Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013). − “The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 1908,” The Bavinck Review 1 (2010), 4–24. Bremmer, J.N., “Een mislukte ontmoeting: Bavinck en de godsdienstwetenschappen,” in G. Harinck/G. Neven (ed.), Ontmoetingen met Bavinck (Barneveld, De Vuurbaak, 2006), 47−61. Bremmer, R.H., Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961). − Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966). Brenner, F., Katholische Dogmatik (2 vol.; Frankfurt am Main: Wesche, 1826). Bretschneider, K.G., Systematische Entwicklung aller in der Dogmatiek (Reutlingen: Grözinger und Schauwecker, 1826). Bristley, E., Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008). Brock, C.C., Orthodox yet Modern: Herman Bavinck’s Use of Friedrich Schleiermacher (Bellingham: Lexham, 2020). − “Orthodox yet Modern: Herman Bavinck’s Appropriation of Schleiermacher,” PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, (2017). Brock, C.C./Sutanto, N.G., “Herman Bavinck’s Reformed eclecticism: On catholicity, consciousness and theological epistemology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 70:3 (2017), 310–32. Brunner, E., The Christian Doctrine of God Dogmatics: Vol 1 (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014). Buber, M., I and Thou: a new translation, with a prologue and notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970). Burger, H., Being in Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed Perspective (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2009). Calvin, J., Institutes of the Christian Religion (2 vol.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960).

Secondary sources

Case, B., “‘More splendid than the sun’: Christ’s flesh among the reasons for the incarnation,” Modern Theology. Published 22 July 2019. https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/moth.12540. Colpe, C., “Erlösungsreligion,” in H. Cancik/B. Gladigow/M.S. Laubscher (ed.), Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe (5 vol.; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990), 2.323−9. Coors, M., “Theologische Texttheorie: theologische Erkundungen zur Textualität der Heiligen Schrift zwischen Ludwig Wittgenstein und Johann Andreas Quenstedt,” Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 51:4 (2009), 400−26. Cortez, M., “What does it mean to call Karl Barth a ‘christocentric’ theologian?,” Scottish Journal of Theology 60:2 (2007), 1–17. Covolo, R., “Beyond the Schleiermacher-Barth Dilemma: General Revelation, Bavinckian Consensus, and the Future of Reformed Theology,” The Bavinck Review 3 (2012), 30–59. Crehan, J.H., “The analogy between verbum Dei incarnatum and verbum Dei scriptum in the Fathers,” The Journal of Theological Studies 6:1 (1955), 87−90. Cremer, H., “Ebenbild Gottes,” in A. Hauck (ed.), Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche 3rd edn; (24 vol.; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1896−1913), 5.113−18. Crisp, O.D., Retrieving Doctrine: Explorations in Reformed Theology (London: Paternoster, 2010). Cross, R., The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Dahl, N.A., Jesus the Christ: The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991). Davidson, I.J., “In Memoriam: John Webster (1955–2016),” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:4 (2016), 360−75. − “Introduction,” in J. Webster, The Culture of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 1−42. De Bruijn, J., Abraham Kuyper: A Pictorial Biography (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014). De Hartog, A.H/Niemeijer, C.J., Het principieel verschil tusschen “Orthodox” en “Modern” overwogen (Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1915). De la Saussaye, C., De crisis: kerkelijke tijdvragen (Rotterdam: Wenk, 1868). De Lubac, H., Medieval Exegesis (3 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). De Moor, B., Commentarius Perpetuus in Johannes Marckii Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elenchticum (7 vol.; Lugduni-Batavorum: Apud Luzac et Van Damme, 1761−71). Den Dulk, A.F.B., Der Irrgang des Lebens Jesu (2 vol.; Stuttgart: Dietz, 1884−5).

205

206

Bibliography

Dennison, J., The Letters of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2005). De Wit, W., On the Way to the Living God: A Cathartic Reading of Herman Bavinck and An Invitation to Overcome the Plausibility Crisis of Christianity (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2011). − “Herman Bavinck Bibliography,” wjdw.nl (blog), February 19, 2013, https:// wjdw.nl/2013/02/19/herman-bavinck-bibliography/ accessed 30.11.2017. Dillenberger, J., Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings (Garden City: New York, 1961). Dilthey, W., Die Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Erster Band (Leipzig: Duncker, 1883). Dorner, J.A., A System of Christian Doctrine I (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975). − History of Protestant Theology particularly in Germany viewed according to its fundamental movement and in connection with the religious, moral, and intellectual life (2 vol.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1871). − History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ (5 vol.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862). Dorrian, P., A Translation of the Commonitory of St. Vincent of Lirins (London: Parker, 1874). Eglinton, J.P., Bavinck: A Critical Biography (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020). − Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T&T Clark, 2012). Eitel, A., “Trinity and History: Bavinck, Hegel, and Nineteenth Century Doctrines of God,” in J. Bolt (ed.), Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2011), 101−28. Eucken, R., Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart (Leipzig: Veit, 1904). Feenstra, R.J., “Creation and method: critical essays on Christocentric theology,” Calvin Theological Journal 18:1 (1983), 231−2. Feiner, J./Löhrer, M. (ed.), Mysterium salutis: Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik (6 vol.; Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965). Frei, H., Types of Christian Theology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Gaffin, R.B., “Old Amsterdam and Inerrancy?” part 2, Westminster Theological Journal 45 (1983), 219−72. − Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation. The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980). Gathercole, S.J., The Pre-Existent Son: Recovering the Christologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). Gerdes, H., “Die durch Martin Kählers Kampf gegen den »historischen Jesus« ausgelöste Krise in der evangelischen Theologie und ihre Überwindung,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie

Secondary sources

3:2 (1961), 175−202. Gleason, R., “The Centrality of the Unio Mystica in the Theology Of Herman Bavinck,” PhD dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary (2001). Glomsrud, R., “The Cat-Eyed Theologians: Franz Overbeck and Karl Barth,” Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 16:1 (2009), 37−57. − “Karl Barth as Historical Theologian,” in D. Strange/D. Gibson (ed.), Engaging with Barth (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008), 84−112. − “Karl Barth and Modern Protestantism: The Radical Impulse,” in R.S. Clark/J.E. Kim (ed.), Always Reformed: Essays in honour of W. Robert Godfrey (Escondido: Westminster Seminary California, 2010), 92−114. Gockel, M., Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A SystematicTheological Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Gomarus, F., Opera Theologica Omnia (2 vol.; Amsterdam: J. Jansson, 1664). Grützmacher, R., Wort und Geist: eine historische und dogmatische Untersuchung zum Gnadenmittel des Wortes (Leipzig: Deichert, 1902). − “Die Theologie der Offenbarung und die Theologie des Geheimnisses,” in Modern-Positive Vorträge (Leipzig: Deichert, 1906), 25−44. Hägglund, B., “Martin Kählers teori om det överhistoriska i kristendomen,” Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift 48:4 (1972), 145−92. Harinck, G., “‘Die kleine Frucht einer sehr groβen Erwartung’ Die protestantischen Kirchen in den Niederlanden und ihre Bemühungen um gesellschaftliche Verantwortung im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in H.G. Ulrichs/V. Albrecht-Birkner (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg und die reformierte Welt (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 272−95. − “‘How Can an Elephant Understand a Whale and Vice Versa?’ The Dutch Origins of Cornelius Van Til’s Appraisal of Karl Barth,” in B. McCormack/C. Anderson (ed.), Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 13−41. − “The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion: A Case Study of Herman Bavinck’s Engagement with Modern Culture,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29:1 (2011), 60−77. − “Why was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?,” in J. Bowlin (ed.), The Kuyper Centre Review Volume Two: Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 27−42. − “Herman Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 18−31. − “Herman Bavinck,” in Het gereformeerde geheugen: protestantse herinneringsculturen in G. Harinck/H. Paul/B. Wallet (ed.), Nederland 1850–2000 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2009), 433−42. − “Twin Sisters with a changing character: how Neo-Calvinists dealt with the modern discrepancy between Bible and natural sciences,” in S. Mandelbrote/J.

207

208

Bibliography

Van der Meer (ed.), Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions (2 vol.; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 329−82. − “‘Something that must remain, if the truth is to be sweet and precious to us’: The Reformed Spirituality of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003), 248−62. Harris, M.J., Jesus as God: The New Testament Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992). Hegel, G.W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). − Jenaer Realphilosophie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969). − Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God (3 vol.; New York: Humanities Press, 1962). Heideman, E., The Relationship of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959). Helm, P., Faith, Form, and Fashion: Classical Reformed Theology and Its Postmodern Critics (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2014). Hengel, M., Studies in Early Christology (London: T&T Clark, 1995). Hepp, V., Dr Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1921). Heppe, H., Dogmatik der evangelischen reformierten Kirche (Elberseld: R.L. Friedrich, 1861). Heulhard, A., La mensonge Chrétien (Jésus Christ n’a pas existé) (Paris: A. Heulhard, 1908). Hielema, S.J., “Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” ThD thesis, Wycliffe College, Toronto School of Theology (1998). Hoekema, A.A., Herman Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant (Clover: Full Bible Publications, 2007). Holtzmann, O., War Jesus ekstatiker? (Tübingen: Mohr, 1903). Hunsinger, G., Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000). Hurtado, L.W., Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2005). Huttinga, W., Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the relation between God and the world (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 2014). Insole, C.J., “The truth behind practices: Wittgenstein, Robinson Crusoe and ecclesiology,” Studies in Christian Ethics 20:3 (2007), 364−82. Joustra, J., “Herman Bavinck and John Howard Yoder in Dialogue on the Imitation of Christ,” PhD dissertation Fuller Seminary (2019). Kaftan, J., Zur Dogmatik: sieben Abhandlungen aus der “Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche” (Tübingen: Mohr, 1904). Kähler, M., The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964).

Secondary sources

− Angewandte Dogmen 2nd edn; (Leipzig: Deichert, 1908). − Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung (Leipzig: Deichert, 1898). − Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre (Leipzig: Deichert, 1893). − Der sogennante historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus (Leipzig: Deichert, 1892). Kant, I., Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). − Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Kelsey, D., Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). Kerr, F., Theology after Wittgenstein 2nd edn; (London: SPCK, 1997). Kleutgen, J., Die Theologie der Vorzeit (5 vol.; Münster: Theissing, 1867−74). − Beilagen zu den Werken über die Theologie und Philosophie der Vorzeit (3 vol.; Münster: Theissing, 1868.) Kloosterman, N.D., “Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck,” presented at the conference A Pearl and a Leaven: Herman Bavinck for the Twenty-First Century at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Missouri, on 19 September 2008. Kruithof, B., “The Relation of Christianity and Culture in the Teaching of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (1953). Kruswijk, H., Baas in eigen Boek? Evolutietheorie en Schriftgezag bij de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland 1881–1981 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2011). Kuyper, A., “Common Grace,” in J.D. Bratt (ed.), Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 165−201. − Encyclopaedie der heilige godgeleerdheid 2nd edn; (3 vol.; Kampen: Kok, 1909). − Encyclopedie der heilige godgeleerdheid (3 vol.; Amsterdam: Wormser, 1894). − Het werk van den heiligen Geest (3 vol.; Amsterdam: Wormser, 1888). − De vleeschwording des woords (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1887). − Tractaat van de Reformatie der Kerken (Höveker & Zoon: Amsterdam, 1883). − “Geworteld en Gegrond” De Kerk als organisme en instituut (Amsterdam: de Hoogh, 1870). Landwehr, J.H., In Memoriam: Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck (Kampen: Kok, 1921). Laughland, J., Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). Lepsius, J., Adolf Harnacks Wesen des Christentums (Berlin: Reich ChristiVerlag, 1903). Lessing, E., Geschichte der deutschsprachigen evangelischen Theologie von Albrecht Ritschl bis zur Gegenwart Band 1: 1870–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000). Levy, I.C., “John Wyclif ’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture in its Christological Context,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003), 227−40.

209

210

Bibliography

Lewis, C.S., Mere Christianity (London: Fontana, 1955). Lomer, G., Jesus Christus vom Standpunkt des Psychiaters (Bamberg: HandelsDruckerei, 1898). Lucassen, C., “Der Glaube Jesu Christi,” Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1895), 337−47. Mahlmann, T., “‘Ecclesia semper reformanda.’ Eine historische Aufarbeitung. Neue Bearbeitung,” in T. Johansson/R. Kolb/J. Steiger (ed.), Hermeneutica Sacra. Studien zur Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 381−442. Mariña, J., “Christology and anthropology in Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in J. Mariña (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 151−70. Matthews, B., Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011). Mattson, B., Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology and the Image of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012). McCormack, B.L., “Afterword: Reflections on Van Til’s critique of Barth,” in B. McCormack/C. Anderson (ed.), Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 366−80. − “Revelation and History in Transfoundational Perspective,” in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 21−40. − “The Sum of the Gospel: The Doctrine of Election in the Theologies of Alexander Schweizer and Karl Barth,” in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 41−62. − “Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just How “Chalcedonian” is It?,” in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 201−34. − “What has Basel to Do with Berlin? Continuities in the Theologies of Barth and Schleiermacher,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 23 (2002), 146−73. − Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909–1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). McGrath, A.E., The Making of Modern German Christology 1750−1990 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994). Meijers, S., Objectiviteit en existentialiteit: een onderzoek naar hun verhouding in de theologie van Herman Bavinck en in door hem beïnvloede concepties (Kampen: Kok, 1979). Mencke, M., Erfahrung und Gewissheit des Glaubens: das Gewissheitsproblem im theologischen Denken Martin Kahlers (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2001). Meyer, A., “Der Glaube Jesu und der Glaube an Jesum,” Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1900), 621−44.

Secondary sources

Michel, O., “ὁμολογέω,” in G. Friedrich (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (10 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964−76), 5.199−220. Möhler, J., Symbolik, oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten nach ihren öffentlichen Bekenntniβschriften 6th edn; (Mainz: Kupferberg, 1843). Moltmann, J., The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation & Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). Muller, R.A., “Calvinist Thomism Revisited: William Ames (1576−1633) and the Divine Ideas,” in K. Comerford/G. Jenkins/W.T. Kirby (ed.), From Rome to Zurich — Between Ignatius and Vermigli: Essays in Honour of John Patrick Donnelly, S.J. (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 103−20. − Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008). − “A Note On ‘Christocentrism’ and the imprudent use of such terminology,” Westminster Theological Journal 68:2 (2006), 253−60. − Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 2nd edn; (4 vol.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). − “The covenant of works and the stability of divine law in seventeenth-century Reformed Orthodoxy: a study in the theology of Herman Witsius and Wilhelmus À Brakel,” Calvin Theological Journal 29:1 (1994), 75−101. − “Christ in the Eschaton: Calvin and Moltmann on the Duration of the Munus Regium,” The Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981), 31−59. Nassar, D., “Immediacy and Mediation in Schleiermacher’s ‘Reden Über Die Religion’,” The Review of Metaphysics 59:4 (2006), 807−40. Nazianzus, G., “Letter 101, ‘To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius,” in P. Schaff/H. Wace (ed.), A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Second Series (14 vol.; New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1905), 7.439−43. O’Donnell, L.R. III, “Neither ‘Copernican’ nor ‘Van Tilian’: Re-Reading Cornelius Van Til’s Reformed Apologetics in light of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” The Bavinck Review 2 (2011), 71–95. Oetinger, F.C., Biblisches und emblematisches Wörterbuch (Hildesheim: Olms, 1969). Oliphint, K.S., “Bavinck’s Realism, the Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010), 359−90. O’Meara, T.F., “Christ in Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation,” Heythrop Journal 27:3 (1986), 275−89. Ostaric, L., “The Concept of Life in Early Schelling,” in L. Ostaric (ed.), Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 48−70.

211

212

Bibliography

Osthövener, C.D., “Das Christentum als Erlösungsreligion,” in U. Barth/C.D. Osthövener (ed.), 200 Jahre “Reden über die Religion”: Akten des 1. Internationalen Kongresses der Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft, Halle 14.−17. März 1999 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), 685−97. Pannenberg, W., Systematic Theology (3 vol.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991). Pass, B.R., “The Heart of Dogmatics: The Place and Purpose of Christology in the Theological Method of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2018). − “Upholding sola scriptura today: some unturned stones in Herman Bavinck’s doctrine of inspiration,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 20:4 (2018), 517−36. − “Herman Bavinck’s Religion and Theology: An Introduction and Translation,” Reformed Theological Review 77:2 (2018), 75−135. − “Revelation and Reason in Herman Bavinck,” Westminster Theological Journal 80:2 (2018), 237−60. − “Herman Bavinck and the Cogito,” Reformed Theological Review 74:1 (2015), 15−33. − “Herman Bavinck and the Problem of New Wine in Old Wineskins,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 17:4 (2015), 432−49. Pelikan, J., The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (5 vol.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971−89). − Historical Theology: Continuity and Change in Christian Doctrine (London, Hutchinson, 1971). Pfennigsdorf, E., Persönlichkeit: christliche Lebensphilosophie für moderne Menschen (Schwerin: Bahn, 1906). Pierson, A., “Ter uitvaart,” De Gids 40 (1876), 185−249. Price, T.S., “Pedagogy as theological praxis: Martin Luther and Herman Bavinck as sources for engagement with classical education and the liberal arts tradition,” PhD thesis University of Aberdeen (2013). Rasmussen, E., Jesus: Eine vergleichende psycholopathologische Studie (Leipzig: Zeitler, 1905). Richter, A., Geschichtsphilosophische Untersuchungen über den Befriff der Persõnlichkeit (Langensalza: Beyer und Söhne, 1907). Ritschl, A., Gesammelte Aufsätze (Freiburg im Bresgau: Mohr, 1893). − A Critical History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872). Rodriguez, J.A., “Irenaeus’s Missional Theology: Global Christian Perspectives from an Ancient Missionary and Theologian,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 59:1 (2016), 131−45. Roessingh, K.H., Het modernisme in nederland (Haarlem: Bohn, 1922).

Secondary sources

Rogers J./McKim D., The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979). Rullmann, J.C., Kuyper-Bibliographie (3 vol.; ‘s-Gravenhage/Kampen: Bootsma/Kok, 1923−40). Sanders, F., “Holy Scripture under the Auspices of the Holy Trinity: On John Webster’s Trinitarian Doctrine of Scripture,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 29:1 (2019), 4−23. Schelling, F.W. J., System der Weltalter: Münchener Vorlesung 1827/28 in einer Nachschrift von Ernst von Lasaulx (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990). − Ideas for a philosophy of nature as introduction to the study of this science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). − Historisch-kritische Ausgabe (3 vol. in 33 pts; Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976−). − Sämtliche Werke (2 vol. in 14 pts; Stuttgart/Augsburg: Cotta, 1856−61). Schendel, J., “The Reformed Orthodox and the Visio Dei,” Reformed Theoloigcal Review 77:1 (2018), 24−44. Schleiermacher, F.D., The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999). Schöberlein, L., Das Princip und System der Dogmatik: Einleitung in die Christliche Glaubenslehre (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1881). Schweizer, A., Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche (2 vol.; Zürich: Orell-Fuessli, 1854−6). − Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt (2 vol.; Zürich: Orell-Füssli, 1844−7). Seiler, C., Die theologische Entwicklung Martin Kählers bis 1869 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1966). Shedd, W.G. T., Dogmatic Theology (3 vols.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1889). Siebeck, H., Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosopie (Freiburg: Mohr, 1893). Smith, G.B., “The Modern-Positive Movement in Theology,” The American Journal of Theology 13:1 (1909), 92−9. Sonderegger, K., Systematic Theology: Volume 1, The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015). Soury, J., Jésus et la religion d’ Israël (Paris: Fasquelle, 1898). Suh, C.W., The Creation-mediatorship of Jesus Christ: A Study in the Relation of the Incarnation and the Creation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982). Sutanto, N.G., God and Knowledge: Herman Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology (London: Bloomsbury, 2020). − “Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on Perception and Knowing God,” Harvard Theological Review 111:1 (2018), 115−34. − “Organic Knowing: The Theological Epistemology of Herman Bavinck,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2017).

213

214

Bibliography

− “Herman Bavinck on the Image of God and Original Sin,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:2 (2016), 174−90. − “Two theological accounts of logic: theistic conceptual realism and a reformed archetype-ectype model,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79:3 (2016), 239−60. Sytsma, D., “Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: The Argument and Sources of his Principia of Science,” in J. Bolt (ed.), Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2011), 1−49. Thijs, J., De moderne positieve theologie in Duitschland (Wageninen: Zomer, 1917). Tiele, C.P., Inleiding tot de godsdienstwetenschap (2 vol.; Amsterdam: P.N. van Kampen, 1897–9). Torrance, A.J., Persons in Communion: trinitarian description and human participation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996). Trendelenburg, F.A., Logische Untersuchungen (2 vol.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1862). Tritten, T., “Christ as Copula: On the Incarnation and the Possibility of Religious Exclusivism”, Analecta Hermeneutica 6 (2014), 1−21. Trueman, C., “Foreword,” in D. Strange/D. Gibson (ed.), Engaging with Barth (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008), 13−16. Turretin, F., Institutes of Elenctic Theology (3 vol.; Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1979). Van Bekkum, K., “Zekerheid en Schriftgezag in neo-calvinistsche visies op de historiciteit van de Bijbel,” in K. van Bekkum/R. Bouw (ed.), Geloven in zekerheid? Gereformeerd geloven in een postmoderne tijd (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2000), 77−108. Van den Belt, H., “Religion as Revelation? The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View from a Reformed Orthodox to a Neo-Calvinist Approach,” The Bavinck Review 4 (2013), 9−31. − “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace: A Shift in Emphasis Towards the Internal Work of the Spirit,” The Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29:1 (2011), 41−59. − The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust (Leiden: Brill, 2008). Van den Belt, H./Faber, R./Beck, A./Den Boer, W. (ed.), Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, (Leiden: Brill, 2016). Van der Leeuw, G., Ethisch: modern of orthodox? (Utrecht: Ruys, 1923). Van der Walt, S.P., Die wysbegeerte van dr. Herman Bavinck (Potchefstroom, 1953). Van Deursen, A.T., The Distinctive Character of the Free University in Amsterdam, 1880−2005 a Commemorative History (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).

Secondary sources

− “Bavinck en de Vrije Universiteit,” in G.Harinck/G. Neven (ed.), Ontmoetingen met Bavinck (Barneveld, De Vuurbaak, 2006), 25−33. Van Driel, C.M., Schermen in de schemering: vijf opstellen over modernisme en orthodoxie (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007). Van Driel, E.C., Incarnation Anway: Arguments for Supralapsarian Christology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). VanDrunen, D., “‘The Kingship of Christ is Twofold’: Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 147−64. Van Keulen, D., Bijbel en dogmatiek: Schriftbeschouwing en Schriftgebruik in het dogmatisch werk van A. Kuyper, H. Bavinck en G.C. Berkouwer (Kampen: Kok, 2003). Van Nes, H.M., Modern of orthodox (Barn: Hollandia, 1911). Van Til, C., The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1946). Veenhof, J., Revelatie en inspiratie. De openbarings- en schriftbeschouwing van Herman Bavinck in vergelijking met die van de ethische theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten and Schipperheijn, 1968). Visser, D., “Nadere Reformatie,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation (Oxford University Press. Retrieved (1996) accessed 30 Aug. 2018, from http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195064933. 001.0001/acref-9780195064933-e-0981. Vissers, J., “Karl Barth’s Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” Calvin Theological Journal 45:1 (2010), 79−86. Vitringa, C., Doctrina Christianae (9 vol.; Arnhemiæ: Joannis Henrici Moelemanni, 1761−81). Voetius, G., Selectae Disputationes (5 vol.; Utrecht, 1648−69). Von Hartmann, E., Philosophie des Unbewussten (Leipzig: Haacke, 1902). − Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen Theologie (Berlin: Dunckers Verlag, 1880). − Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft (Berlin: Dunckers Verlag, 1874). Von Lerinum, V., Commonitorium pro Catholicae fidei antiquitate et universitate adversus profanes omnium haereticorum novitates (Freiburg im Bresgau: Mohr, 1895). Von Schäzler, C., Das Dogma von der Menschwerdung Gottes: im Geiste des hl. Thomas (Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder, 1870). Vos, A., “Knowledge according to Bavinck and Aquinas” part 2, The Bavinck Review 7 (2016), 8–62. − “Knowledge according to Bavinck and Aquinas” part 1, The Bavinck Review 6 (2015), 9–36.

215

216

Bibliography

Vos, G., Reformed Dogmatics (5 vol.; Bellingham: Lexham, 2012−14). − “The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and as a Theological Discipline,” in R.B. Gaffin (ed.), Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation. The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), 3−24. − “H. Bavinck. Gereformeerde dogmatiek – vol. 2,” in R.B. Gaffin (ed.), Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation. The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1980), 485−93. Vroom, H., “Scripture Read and Interpreted: The Development of the Doctrine of Scripture and Hermeneutics in Gereformeerde Theology in the Netherlands,” Calvin Theological Journal 28:2 (1993), 358−71. Weber, O., Grundlagen der Dogmatik (2 vol.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972). Webster, J., “Domain of the Word,” in The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 3−31. − “The Place of Christology in Systematic Theology,” in F.A. Murphy (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 611−27. Republished as “Christology, Theology, Economy. The Place of Christology in Systematic Theology,” in God Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology. 2 vols., London: T & T Clark, 2016), 1.43−58. − “What Makes Theology Theological?,” Journal of Analytic Theology 3 (2015), 17−28. Republished in God Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology (2 vol.; London: T&T Clark, 2016), 1.213−24. − “ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι: on the inspiration of Holy Scripture,” in J.G. McConville/L.K. Pietersen (ed.), Conception, Reception, and the Spirit: Essays in Honor of Andrew T. Lincoln (Eugene: Cascade, 2015), 236−52. − “Principles of Systematic Theology,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11:1 (2009), 56−71. Republished in The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T &T Clark, 2012), 133–49. − “Biblical Reasoning,” Anglican Theological Review 90:4 (2008), 733−51. Republished in The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 115−32. − “Theologies of Retrieval,” in K. Tanner/J. Webster/I. Torrance (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 583−99. − Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London: T&T Clark, 2005). − Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). − Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).

Secondary sources

− Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to His Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Williamson, R.K., Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). Witsius, H., The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man: Comprehending a Complete Body of Divinity (3 vol.; New York: Thomas Kirk, 1804). Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations 4th edn; (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). Wood, J.H., Going Dutch in the modern age: Abraham Kuyper’s struggle for a free church in the nineteenth-century Netherlands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Wyman, W., The Concept of Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Theological Heritage of Schleiermacher (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983). Xu, X., “Theology as the Wetenschap of God: Herman Bavinck’s Scientific Theology for the Modern World,” PhD thesis University of Edinburgh (2020) − “Appreciative and Faithful? Karl Barth’s Use of Herman Bavinck’s View of God’s Incomprehensibility,” Journal of Reformed Theology 13 (2019), 26−46. Yarnell, M.B., The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville: Boosey & Hawkes, 2007).

217

Index

A Ames, William 60 Aquinas, Thomas 15–16, 60, 146, 177–8 Astral bodies 161–2 B Baldensperger, Wilhelm 96, 157–8 Barth, Karl 11–13, 15, 36, 93, 97, 106, 122–3 Bavinck, Herman As an ecclesial theologian 173–5 As a systematic theologian 170–2 As a vitalist theologian 172–3 Character 52–3 Contribution to pedagogy 12 Reception in the USA 12–13 Translation projects 14 Beatific vision 159–161 Berkouwer, Gerrit 11–12, 15, 52, 85, 113, 137–8, 142–3, 182 Blocher, Henri 137, 142–3 Bornhäuser, Karl 102 Bremmer, Rolf. H 11–12, 19–20, 27, 47–8, 84, 100–01, 115–17, 120, 126– 7, 137, 150 Bretschneider, Karl G. 36, 61–2 Brock, Cory C. 14, 19, 71, 84, 113 Brunner, Emil 13, 174 C Calvin, John 13, 45, 48, 50, 55, 60, 69, 85–6, 113, 160–1 Certainty of faith 52, 96, 98, 141, 193 Chalcedon 89, 99–100, 109–10, 112, 129, 169

Pass_Index.indd 219

Christ, Jesus Active obedience of 103 Deity of 90–9 Developmental humanity of 19, 99–106, 108–11, 128, 169 Mediator 44, 46, 48–9, 51, 68, 74–5, 84, 91, 123, 137, 148, 151, 157, 161 Personal inerrancy of 136–7 Christianity Catholicity of 115–17, 175 Content of 44–5, 81–3, 85, 94–5, 97 Essence of 43–6, 56, 71, 73–4, 76, 83–4, 91 Christocentrism Schleiermacherian 40–2, 108–09, 168, 171, 175–6 Barthian 17, 175–7, 185–6 Christology Communicatio idiomatum 99, 101 Continuous incarnation 20, 145, 155–66, 171, 192 Impeccability 111, 135, 143 Jesus of history 19, 94–9 Necessity of the incarnation 48, 99, 125 Preparation for 48–55 Two-natures doctrine 49, 51, 99, 103, 129, 137, 146, 169 Supralapsarian 45–6, 146, 169 Virgin birth 13, 108, 194 Common grace 12, 78, 151 Confession, the church’s 33–4, 38, 44–7, 65, 82, 89, 91, 93–9, 112, 120, 128–9, 147, 169, 173–4, 195 Covenant of works 14, 77, 105–09, 111

14.09.20 09:32

220

Index

Covolo, Robert 174–5 Creation, doctrine of 37, 49, 51, 151, 190 Cremer, Hermann 109, 119 D Daubanton, François 38 Davidson, Ivor 167, 177–8 Decree, divine 50, 76, 108, 124–5, 164, 188, 190 De Moor, Bernardinus 102 De Savornin Lohman, Alexander 127 Divine ideas 42, 60–1, 132 Dogmatics As an organism 27–36 As a science (wetenschap) 24–5 As a system 26–7 Development of 32–3, 36, 47, 56, 113, 120, 122, 164, 172–3, 194 Material and formal principles 16, 35–6, 38, 55, 121, 171 Dorner, Isaak A. 54, 100, 104, 177, 182 Du Bois-Reymond, Emil 62 E Ecclesiology 144–55 Eerdmans, Bernardus 120 Eglinton, James P. 12, 14, 17–19, 27–8, 109–10, 122, 124, 133, 147, 150 Election 50, 124–5, 144, 176 Embodiment 60–1, 72, 132–3, 141– 3, 146 Eschatology 155–65 Ethical Theology 53–4, 115, 117, 171 F Frei, Hans 176

Pass_Index.indd 220

G Gleason, Ronald 11, 16, 17, 37 Gomarus, Franciscus 101 Gregory of Nazianzus 67 Grützmacher, Richard 59, 119 H Haeckel, Ernst 32 Harinck, George 12–3, 19, 52, 82, 97, 116, 183 Harnack, Adolf von 59, 84–5, 115–16 Hartmann, Eduard von 92–3 Heart and lifeblood metaphor 17–8, 21, 57–67, 71, 75–6, 83, 86, 169 Hegel, Georg W.F. 16, 32, 67, 76–7, 79–82, 86, 90, 106, 114, 126, 158–9, 161, 171, 173 Henry, Carl 176 History of religions school 43, 76–7, 78–9, 86, 121, 174 Holmes, Stephen 101 Hodge, Charles 26 Humanity As an organism 105, 107–08, 111 Development of 110–12 Federal constitution of 107–08 Imago Dei 76, 105–10, 154, 189 Soul and spirit 73–5, 106 I Idealism Absolute idealism 28, 189 First-generation post-Kantian Idealism 28, 31, 42, 61, 172 Ignorabimus controversy 62 J Junius, Franciscus 178

14.09.20 09:32

Index

K Kaftan, Julius 41–2 Kähler, Martin 94–7, 102, 174 Kant, Immanuel 23, 25, 28, 30, 53, 61, 67, 71, 86, 90, 123, 132, 170, 173, 190 Kuyper, Abraham 12, 27, 33, 60, 100, 102, 104–05, 110–12, 115, 121, 126– 7, 142, 150–3, 158–9 L Laughland, John 81 Lobstein, Paul 41–2 M Mediating theology 91, 115, 119, 126, 175 Modern-Positive theology 59, 119 Modern theology 59, 89, 112–24 “Malcontents” 116–17, 120 Möhler, Johann 113, 151 Moltmann, Jürgen 160–1 Muller, Richard A. 17, 49, 55, 60, 105, 109, 160–1, 179–81 Mystery 58–67 Of godliness 63, 89–91 Mystical union 16, 63, 66, 75, 86, 161, 163 Mysticism 63, 69, 74, 86 N Neo-Calvinism 12, 76, 120–1, 135, 183 As distinct from Calvin 45, 113 Netelenbos, Jan 19, 126 Nieuwentijt, Bernard 161 O Oetinger, Friedrich C. 161–2 Organism Centre and periphery 43, 54, 69, 86, 172

Pass_Index.indd 221

221

Constitutive principle 28, 30–2, 69–70, 72, 76, 83, 85–6, 107–10, 123–5, 154, 172, 185 Correspondence of the real and the ideal 19, 28, 30, 61, 109, 123, 172, 188 Development 31–3 Living force 29–35, 70, 74, 78, 85, 172–3, 188, 195 Mechanism 29, 31, 73, 80, 107–08, 123–4, 152, 172, 188, 190 Teleology 28–33, 107, 111, 123–4, 152, 172, 188–90, 194 Unity in diversity 27, 30, 78 Whole and the parts 27, 29, 35, 38, 124, 147, 149, 152–3, 172, 188 Owen, John 177 P Participation 72, 138, 140 Parousia, the 73, 151, 157–8, 161, 164–5, 172, 193 Personality 70, 72, 81, 106–07 Absolute 110, 177 Philosophy of mind, 25–6, 62, 71, 73–4, 159 Apprehension and comprehension 53, 64, 67 Personal knowledge 72–5, 91 Principles, Reformed 126–7 R Rauwenhoff, Lodewijk 65 Religion, Development of 77–9 Erlösungsreligion 77–9, 83, 121 Objective religion 75–6, 78–9, 83, 85–6 Subjective religion 67–75 True and false 86, 90, 128 Reprobation 124–5

14.09.20 09:32

222

Index

Revelation 20, 26, 32–3, 40–7, 49–50, 53–6, 59–61, 72, 75–80 Ritschl, Albrecht 36, 41, 59, 94 Roessingh, Karel 114–15 S Schelling, Friedrich W.J. von 28–31, 42, 81–3, 86, 90, 93, 121–4, 161, 173 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 36, 41, 54, 67, 71, 77, 79, 86, 90–2, 100, 106, 108, 113, 126, 151, 159, 168, 171, 173, 175–6 Schöberlein, Ludwig 35, 60 Schweizer, Alexander 35–6, 55, 121, 170 Seed of religion 60, 69 Self-consciousness 60, 67, 80, 98, 139, 158, 163–4, 166, 171, 178–9, 193 Scripture 132–44 Shedd, William G.T. 102 Siebeck, Hermann 77 Supralapsarianism 50, 52, 75, 100, 124–5, 189 T Theological system Principia 30, 34–5, 74, 103, 110, 123, 135, 140–1, 165, 174, 179– 80,184, 188 Central dogma 16, 24, 26, 35–9, 43–5, 47–8, 54–5, 57, 76, 169, 171 Centre (midpoint) 15–18, 20–1, 24, 37–47 Distinction between foundation and content 94–5

Pass_Index.indd 222

Relationship between biblical and systematic theology 183–5 Starting point 17–20, 38–47 Tiele, Cornelis 77 Trendelenburg, Friedrich A. 31 Trinity, doctrine of 27, 34–5, 37, 48–9, 61, 76, 82, 96, 110, 124, 131, 145, 172, 177, 179, 182, 185–6, 188, 194 Vestiges of 122–3, 193, 196 Troeltsch, Ernst 79 Turretin, Francis 102, 105, 144, 150 Two-Bavincks hypothesis 19, 113, 169 V Van den Belt, Henk 15, 18, 27, 60, 66, 76, 78, 96–7, 101, 103, 123, 133–4, 180 Van Til, Cornelius 13, 176 Veenhof, Jan 11, 15–19, 28–9, 37, 48, 114, 134, 155, 159, 168, 185 Vincent of Lérins 114 Vitringa, Campegius 102 Voetius, Gisbertus 101, 180 Vos, Geerhardus 12, 183–4, 191–2 W Weber, Otto 155, 176 Webster, John 20, 138–43, 146, 166–8, 177–88, 191–3, 196 Witsius, Herman 105–06, 108 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 190–1 Worldview 30–1, 106, 117–19, 127 Wyclif, John 133

14.09.20 09:32