The Growing Power of Japan, 1967-1972: Analysis and Assessments from John Pilcher and the British Embassy, Tokyo 9781898823285

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972 ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENTS FROM JOHN PILCHER AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO

John Pilcher, 1912–1990

The Growing Power of Japan, 1967–1972 Analysis and Assessments from John Pilcher and the British Embassy, Tokyo COMPILED AND EDITED by

HUGH CORTAZZI

__________________________________________________ JAPAN SOCIETY PAPERBACK EDITION Not for Resale __________________________________________________ THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENTS FROM JOHN PILCHER AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO

Compiled and Edited by Hugh Cortazzi First published 2015 by RENAISSANCE BOOKS PO Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP www.renaissancebooks.co.uk Renaissance Books is an imprint of Global Books Ltd © 2015 Global Books Ltd ISBN 978-1-898823-06-3 ISBN 978-1-898823-28-5 (eBook) All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publishers. _______________________________________________________________________________ SPECIAL THANKS The Publishers wish to express their grateful thanks to Julia and Benjamin Bonas, the Great Britain-Sasakawa Foundation, the Japan Society and Sir Hugh Cortazzi for their generous contributions towards the making of this book. _______________________________________________________________________________ British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Typeset in Stone 9.5 on 10.5 by Dataworks. Printed and bound in England by T. J. International

In fond memory of John and Delia Pilcher Sir John (Arthur) Pilcher GCMG, Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun (1912–1990) Lady Delia Margaret (née Taylor) (1917–2003)

Contents

Plate section faces page 198 xi

Foreword – Ian Nish Publisher’s Preface – Paul Norbury

xiii

Acknowledgementsxv Introduction – Hugh Cortazzi

xvii

PART 1: 1967 1.  Sir Francis Rundall’s Valedictory Despatch

3

2.  Japanese Economic Aid

9

3.  The State Funeral for Mr Shigeru Yoshida

20

4.  Japan: Annual Review for 1967

23

PART 2: 1968 5.  Visit of the Secretary of State to Japan, 7–10 January 

33

6.  The Visit of USS Enterprise to Japan

37

7.  Impressions of Contemporary Japan

43

8.  The 58 (Regular) Diet Session

50

9.  The So ˉka Gakkai and the Ko ˉmeito ˉ

54

10. Japanese Economic Success: A British Opportunity

59

11. The Japanese Left

65

12. The Japanese Mood in 1968 

71

13. Mr Sato’s New Cabinet

76

14. Japan: Annual Review, 1968

80

th

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

PART 3: 1969 15.  Revolting Students: Japanese Style

91

16.  Japan’s Science and Technology

100

17.  Labour and Incomes in the Japanese Economy

104

18.  British Week, Tokyo

110

19.  The Merry Wives of Ginza: Women’s Status in Japan

118

20.  The Quality of Life in Japan

132

21.  Japan: Annual Review, 1969

144

22.  The Japanese Self-Defence Forces

153

PART 4: 1970 23.  Osaka Expo ’70: A First Impression

159

24.  The Japanese Mood in 1970

164

25.  Japan’s Economy in the 1970s: The Miracle Excels Itself

170

26.  Japan’s Changing Society and the New Generation

176

27.  Japanese Exports: How Much of a Threat?

187

28.  Japanese Protectionism: Signs of a Thaw?

192

29.  ‘The Rest are Monkeys’: The Japanese Abroad

199

30.  Japan in the 1970s: The Trade Mark and the Sword

211

31.  Japanese Militarism

219

32.  Mishima’s Suicide

222

33.  Japan: Annual Review for 1970 – ‘Economic Man’ Comes of Age

224

PART 5: 1971 – THE SHOWA EMPEROR 34.  The Emperor of Japan: The Man and His Life

235

35.  The Emperor of Japan: Human or Divine?

248

36.  The Emperor and Empress of Japan

261

37. The Visit of the Emperor and Empress of Japan to Europe as Seen from Tokyo

265

38.  Mr Sato’s New Cabinet

274

39.  Relations Between Japan and the United States

279

40.  Japan in 1971: The Rude Awakening

285

Contents

ix

PART 6: SIR JOHN PILCHER’S LAST MONTHS IN JAPAN 41. Japan in the 1970s: ‘Guns and Butter’

299

42. Japanese Export Successes: Cheap, Sweated Labour?

306

43. Basic Japan and the Shifting Mood 1967–71

312

44. The Japanese: ‘Frail Flowers of Opportunism’?

320

PART 7: 1972 – A NEW ERA FOR THE BRITISH MISSION 45. The Lord Privy Seal Brings Concorde to Japan

333

46. The Plebian Mr Tanaka Replaces Mr Sato

337

47. Japanese Investments Overseas

341

48. Mr Tanaka in Charge

345

49. The Japanese on the Road to Peking

351

50. The First Visit to Japan by a British Prime Minister

356

APPENDICES I ‘Sir John Pilcher: Ambassador to Japan, 1967–1972’. Portrait by Hugh Cortazzi

367

II Letter from Kyoto, January 1936

378

III ‘A Perspective on Religion in Japan’ (Lecture at the Nissan Institute, May 1984) 381 IV ‘Is Economic Success Destroying Japanese Traditions?’ (Occasional Paper/Speech, 1975)

388

V Book Review, 1977: Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan

394

VI ‘An Introduction to Japanese Gardens’ (Occasional Paper/Speech. Early1980s?)

398

Index 

415

FOREWORD IAN NISH

S

ir John Pilcher was Britain’s ambassador to Japan from 1967 to 1972. He arrived in the aftermath of the successful Tokyo Olympic Games (1964) when Japan demonstrated to the world her capacity for revival. He left a few months after President Nixon’s visit to China (February 1972) when Japan was loosening the strings which had bound her to the United States since the war’s end. He was appointed to the Japan Consular Service in 1936 as an accomplished linguist in European languages. He was sent for training in the Japanese language to Kyoto with which he had a life-long love affair. A surprising early posting was to Tsingtao, China [Qingdao] where he had to mediate between British interests and local Japanese officials. Pilcher returned to East Asian affairs in 1951 when he was appointed head of the Japan and Pacific Department. It was the time when the first Japanese ambassador had to be appointed to Britain following the signing of the peace treaty. Pilcher was determined that there should be a smooth transition and took a firm line that, in spite of protests, agreement should not be withheld because diplomats of the war period were merely carrying out the instructions of their government. Posted to Japan as ambassador in October 1967, he brought to the post a natural sympathy for the country and a deep knowledge of its culture and religion. His task was to bridge the gap between the awkwardness of the ­post-war years and the rapprochement desired by both sides in order to foster (and improve) trade relations. In retirement he continued his activities for Anglo-Japanese relations through his chairmanship of the Japan Society. One of his last assignments was when he was invited as guest of honour to the conference of the European Association of Japanese Studies held at the ­University of Durham in 1988. We welcome the appearance of this volume. Readers will find a comprehensive blend of official and unofficial papers. Those with the hallmark Pilcher style contain his interpretations of a society in flux and his cultural and spiritual insights. But the volume also contains accounts of the

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

c­ ommercial p ­ roblems of the time collated by Sir Hugh Cortazzi who was himself ­responsible for handling them. All in all, the five years of Pilcher’s embassy appear in retrospect to have been a bridge passage between two distinct phases in Anglo-Japanese relations.

PUBLISHER’S PREFACE PAUL NORBURY

J

ohn Pilcher’s appointment as HM Ambassador to Japan in the autumn of 1967 was both judicious and enlightened. His role was to be that of a bridgebuilder between Japan and Britain following the early post-war years of disenchantment, distrust and detachment that had earlier marked the relationship between the two countries. In addition to his bonhomie and spontaneity he brought to his role an understanding of Japanese civilization and a critical analysis of Japanese a ­ ttitudes and way of life. He had had the good fortune to spend time as a language student in Kyoto before the war. There he came to appreciate ­Japanese culture at its best but as a junior consular official he was also exposed to other less attractive aspects of Japan. An avid reader, he expanded his knowledge of Japan through extensive reading and his acquaintance with the eminent ­historian George Sansom who was Commercial Counsellor at the time. ­Following the undoubted success of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, John Pilcher was to encounter a newly-energized Japan which had set itself on the path to becoming a dynamic industrial and economic giant and within a decade or so after his return to London, the world’s second largest economy. His reports to Whitehall during his five years as head of mission, many written by himself and others prepared by his staff but with his oversight, form the basis of this volume. As such, they offer a valuable record of Japan’s progress at this particular turning point in her post-war history, as well as unique insights into the activities, hopes and expectations of the British government in her dealings with Japan. In addition, for the first time, they provide a platform for John Pilcher, affirmed here as a distinguished scholar-diplomat, whose writings on Japan have hitherto remained largely inaccessible or unknown to most researchers. Hence the additional essays to be found at the end of the volume including one of his early letters from Kyoto, two essays on Japanese religions and Japanese gardens, a book review and an assesment of the impact of economic success on Japanese traditions. It is also with a great sense of satisfaction and symmetry both in terms of the history and the person who is the subject of this volume that it has been edited

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

by Sir Hugh Cortazzi, who was later to follow Sir John Pilcher’s footsteps both as Ambassador to Japan (1980–84) and as Chairman of the Japan Society (1984–94). As the newly-appointed Commercial Counsellor (1966–70) Sir Hugh was to play a key role as a member of John Pilcher’s staff and recalls his own ­contributions to the Pilcher reports sent to Whitehall at that time. On a personal note, in the years following his retirement I benefited from his support and encouragement in those tentative early efforts of publishing on Japan and took the opportunity to urge him to write a memoir. But even with his wife Delia’s gentle prompting, it was not to be. Hence the particular pleasure now of publishing this informative and fascinating collection from the ‘Pilcher archive’ which has been so ably collated by Sir Hugh Cortazzi.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

T

he Editor and Publisher wish to thank Jim Daly and his assistants at the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO) for tracing and copying the ­documents reproduced in this volume. Grateful thanks are also extended to Julia Bonas (née Pilcher) for providing access to her father’s private papers and photographs, some of which are reproduced here. Thanks are also due to the National Archives at Kew which retains the copyright of the official papers included in this volume, as well as to David Blakeley for his careful work in collating, managing and editing the scanned (OCR) documents and for generating the Index.

INTRODUCTION HUGH CORTAZZI

T

he years 1967–72 were particularly significant ones for modern Japan and need to be understood by anyone trying to comprehend the way Japan has developed since and assess its future course. Japan was becoming an increasingly important world power. Its economy was growing fast and its leaders and people were displaying renewed self-confidence. These were the years before growth turned to bubble and over-confidence, but unbridled economic development had led to serious environmental damage. ‘Concentrated and torrential Japanese exports’, as they were termed by some foreign observers, were damaging foreign industries and stimulating protectionist pressures. Japan was reaching a turning point in international relations. 1971 was the year in which the first-ever state visits abroad by a Japanese emperor took place. 1972 saw the return of Okinawa to Japanese rule. By the beginning of the 1960s the Japanese economy under Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s ‘double the income policy’ had more or less emerged from the poverty and destruction caused by the Pacific War. Japan had won international agreement to the holding of the Olympic Games in 1964. (Tokyo was to have hosted the Games in 1940, but these had had to be postponed because of the war in Europe.) The need to prepare for the Games provided an unprecedented stimulus to the construction industry. A new high-speed railway (the Shinkansen popularly called the ‘Bullet train’) was opened first from Tokyo to Nagoya but was extended as far as Kobe in time for the Games. A motorway was built to replace the old Tokaido and expressways involving much tunnelling and bridges were opened in Tokyo. The Tokyo underground system was also expanded rapidly to meet increasing demand and the needs of visitors to the Olympic Games. A fine new stadium designed by the world famous Japanese architect Tange Kenzo, other excellent newly constructed athletic arenas and Olympic-sized swimming pools dazzled many of the competitors and spectators. The political scene in Japan during these years was dominated by Sato ˉ Eisaku who took over as prime minister from Ikeda Hayato in 1964 and lasted in the post until 1972 when he was replaced by the populist Tanaka Kakuei. Sato ˉ

INTRODUCTION HUGH CORTAZZI

T

he years 1967–72 were particularly significant ones for modern Japan and need to be understood by anyone trying to comprehend the way Japan has developed since and assess its future course. Japan was becoming an increasingly important world power. Its economy was growing fast and its leaders and people were displaying renewed self-confidence. These were the years before growth turned to bubble and over-confidence, but unbridled economic development had led to serious environmental damage. ‘Concentrated and torrential Japanese exports’, as they were termed by some foreign observers, were damaging foreign industries and stimulating protectionist pressures. Japan was reaching a turning point in international relations. 1971 was the year in which the first-ever state visits abroad by a Japanese emperor took place. 1972 saw the return of Okinawa to Japanese rule. By the beginning of the 1960s the Japanese economy under Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s ‘double the income policy’ had more or less emerged from the poverty and destruction caused by the Pacific War. Japan had won international agreement to the holding of the Olympic Games in 1964. (Tokyo was to have hosted the Games in 1940, but these had had to be postponed because of the war in Europe.) The need to prepare for the Games provided an unprecedented stimulus to the construction industry. A new high-speed railway (the Shinkansen popularly called the ‘Bullet train’) was opened first from Tokyo to Nagoya but was extended as far as Kobe in time for the Games. A motorway was built to replace the old Tokaido and expressways involving much tunnelling and bridges were opened in Tokyo. The Tokyo underground system was also expanded rapidly to meet increasing demand and the needs of visitors to the Olympic Games. A fine new stadium designed by the world famous Japanese architect Tange Kenzo, other excellent newly constructed athletic arenas and Olympic-sized swimming pools dazzled many of the competitors and spectators. The political scene in Japan during these years was dominated by Sato ˉ Eisaku who took over as prime minister from Ikeda Hayato in 1964 and lasted in the post until 1972 when he was replaced by the populist Tanaka Kakuei. Sato ˉ

xviii

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

was a highly astute politician. Like so many other Japanese politicians at that time he had ‘graduated’ into the ruling (and largely unchallenged) Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the powerful Japanese bureaucracy and had won accolades for his part in leading the preparations for the very successful Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964. The left-wing opposition was split and its policies were seen by the Japanese electorate as unrealistic and generally irrelevant. The main threat to public order came from the student revolts under the aegis of Zengakuren. They caused a great deal of noise and some mayhem, but were kept under control by Japanese riot police. The LDP realized that the Japanese people wanted growth and prosperity and were prepared to put up with political scandals and pollution if this was necessary to achieve a higher standard of living. But pollution reached such serious levels by 1970 that the Japanese government was forced to take drastic action to protect the environment. Traffic in the big metropolitan centres created a choking smog and Japanese factories poured poisonous chemicals into rivers leading to serious health problems. During these years welfare and public services were given a low priority although just enough was done to keep disaffection from growing. The economy was tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Okurasho) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Their officials were the cream of the graduates from Tokyo University. They established their own network with LDP politicians and were able to direct government policies without having to put up with much political oversight. They worked closely with business organizations such as the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and Nikkeiren (Federation of Employers Organizations) which provided most of the funds for the LDP, its factions and its members. The triumvirate of politicians, officials and businessmen was called the ‘Iron Triangle’ and Japan in these years can be seen, to some extent at least, as a command economy. The LDP ensured that they were largely unchallenged in rural constituencies, which were over-represented in the Diet. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries exercised power through the ubiquitous agricultural cooperatives in the interests of the farming lobby and, as they declared, of food security. The ministry maintained strictly protectionist policies. These kept food prices in Japan high and added to inflationary pressures. Other ministries such as the ministries of transportation and construction were run in tandem with transport and construction companies, which provided jobs for civil servants on retirement under the traditional amakudari (descent from heaven) system. ‘Japan Inc’, as it came to be called, did all it could to boost exports and ensure trade surpluses. Large reserves, bolstered by a weak yen, were built up. Imports were limited by both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Foreign capital was only allowed to invest in Japan if there were clear advantages to Japan. Foreign technology was also carefully controlled and manipulated to Japan’s advantage. Foreign complaints about Japan’s alleged unfair trade practices and import barriers grew more vociferous, but the Japanese defended their procedures and claimed that they did not need foreign manufactured goods as they could make all they needed. Japanese savings increased exponentially and were mirrored by capital investment in industry.

INTRODUCTION

xix

In foreign affairs during these years Japan continued to maintain a ‘low posture’. The Japanese recognized that their security depended on the ­US-Japan Security Treaty and the American nuclear umbrella. But this subordinate status began to chafe and when Nakasone Yasuhiro was appointed as Minster for the Defence Agency an attempt was made to promote the image of the self-defence forces and the Japanese were forced to recognize that defence expenditure would have to rise. Nevertheless it came as a serious shock to Japanese leaders when their American allies began to press hard for a more significant Japanese effort so that they could be ready to defend themselves. Japan’s relations with the Americans were subject to a number of other shocks. In particular, American pressure for Japanese restraint over their exports of non-cotton textiles in 1971/72 caused friction. At the end of the period covered in this book the Nixon shocks, not least the American volteface over relations with China, and the economy left the Japanese bruised and apprehensive. The Japanese were given no warning of the Kissinger and Nixon visits to Peking and felt betrayed. They had for so long supported the American line by maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan despite pressure from the opposition and Japanese industry which was interested in developing trade with mainland China. In 1972, they felt free to join the many ready to kowtow to the Chinese. Mr Sato ˉ’s resignation and replacement by Mr Tanaka in 1972 made such a change possible without too much loss of face. No progress was made in these years over the so-called Northern Territories seized by the Russians at the end of the war. The Japanese hoped to gain commercial opportunities in Siberia, but there were no developments of significance in relations between the two countries. British interest in Japan had been stimulated by the success of the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1964. By 1965 it was clear that Japan posed an increasing economic challenge to the industrialized Western world. Japanese exports increasingly threatened the viability of many of Britain’s traditional industries but British business was also beginning to recognize that Japan was a growing market for British exports. At the same time, the British establishment started to realize Japan’s importance as a political power with which Britain needed to repair its relations. Knowledge of Japan in Britain and most European countries was limited and understanding of Japan inadequate. The general images of Japan, common in the Western media, were either of brutal Japanese soldiery or of corny pictures of Mt Fuji and Geisha. Resentments against Japan arising from the Second World War and from the perception that Japanese companies copied ­British designs and undercut the prices of British goods by sweated labour and unfair trade practices still lingered among British politicians and businessmen. General de Gaulle’s contemptuous description of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato as a salesman for transistor radios resonated with complacent British observers. The British embassy in Tokyo did all it could to promote interest in Japan by encouraging visits and helping British visitors. Ministerial and parliamentary interest was also stimulated by the increased reporting of Japanese developments, which followed from the seminal reports in the Economist by its deputy editor Norman Macrae who had first ‘discovered’ Japan’s growing importance in 1962. Both the Economist and the Financial Times ensured, by their reporting, that British politicians and businessmen were increasingly alerted to the fast

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

economic development of Japan, which in turn resulted in a greater willingness in Whitehall to pay greater attention to Japan. In 1967 British trade relations with Japan were difficult. The revised Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had come into force in 1964 but derogations allowed restrictions to continue often under ­euphemisms such as ‘voluntary restraint arrangements’ to continue. Annual ­negotiations whittled away at these restrictions but progress was slow. In 1969 the British side proposed a comprehensive approach which would have opened the way to the ending of most official restrictions although non-tariff barriers would have remained. The Japanese side noting Britain’s application to join the Common Market and wanting an arrangement with the Common Market as a whole procrastinated and no comprehensive settlement could be reached. But Britain made major efforts to expand exports to Japan and in 1969/70 achieved a balance in visible trade. British Week in Tokyo in 1969 was the high point in these efforts. The British were particularly concerned about underlying features of the Japanese scene. They feared that the Japanese sense of uniqueness would be a serious impediment to the process of internationalization and liberalization, which Japan needed to carry out if it were to fulfil its role as (at that time) the major economic and strategic power in East Asia. Embassy reports make frequent references to this problem of ‘Japaneseness’ which is better identified by the Japanese term Nihonjinron. The British embassy in Tokyo were well aware of Japan’s growing importance and Sir Francis Rundall, who was ambassador in Tokyo from 1963 to 1967, persuaded the Foreign Office with backing from the Board of Trade to strengthen the commercial and economic department of the embassy and did what he could to get political relations on an improved footing following the frictions which had arisen from Japanese support for ­Indonesia in its confrontation with Malaysia and the ill feeling against ­Britain caused by British nuclear tests in the Pacific. But Rundall, although he tried hard to learn a little Japanese, had never served before in Japan or the Far East. The diplomatic service, as the foreign service became after the ­amalgamation of the Foreign Office with the Commonwealth Relations Office, was fortunate in being able to draw on a corps of officers who had studied J­ apanese in the pre-war Consular service. Sir Esler Dening, ambassador from 1951 to 1957, and Sir Oscar Morland, ambassador from 1959 to 1963, had both belonged to the Japan consular service and had served in Japan before the war. Sir John Pilcher, another former member of the Japan Consular service, had only recently been appointed ambassador to Austria and had not expected to move so quickly, but he had recognized that he was probably destined to return to Japan when Rundall retired. His appointment to Tokyo came rather earlier than he had expected, as Rundall, whose health was not good, decided to retire at the age of fifty-nine, a year before he reached the then mandatory retirement age of sixty. John Pilcher had begun his career in the Japan consular service as a language student before the Second World War and his experience studying in Kyoto had left a lasting impression on him. He had not served in the British embassy in Tokyo in the post-war years although he had done a stint as head of the department in London dealing with Japan. Instead, he had served in Rome,

INTRODUCTION

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Madrid, Manila, where he was ambassador, and at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London as assistant under-secretary before being appointed as ambassador at Vienna. He and his wife Delia were immersed in European culture and spoke good Italian, Spanish and German as well as French. It was therefore a wrench for him to be transferred in 1967 back to Japan. But he was determined to make a success of his new post and relished the opportunity to renew his association with his beloved Kyoto. Pilcher was a diplomat of the old school. Although he had been initiated into diplomacy through his experience in the consular service and recognized the importance of commercial work, his primary personal interests were cultural. The senior staff of the embassy, when Pilcher was appointed in 1967, consisted of a minister as the ambassador’s deputy, counsellors responsible for political affairs, commercial and economic matters, information, and science and technology. There were also three service attachés for the navy, army and air force, with the rank of naval captain, colonel and group captain. He was content to leave commercial and economic work to me as his commercial and economic counsellor and to the department, which I oversaw. The first secretary economic was John Whitehead and the second/third secretary was David Wright. All three of us went on in due course to become ambassadors at Tokyo. In chancery, Mark Elliott who later became ambassador to Israel and then Norway was an outstanding drafter of political reports. John Figgess, counsellor for information and the press, had been military attaché before being seconded to the diplomatic service. He was a good Japanese linguist and had much experience of Japan having worked in business in Yokohama before the war. John Pilcher set out to modernize British perceptions of Japan and to try to make a new start in Britain’s overall relations with Japan. If this were to be achieved Britain needed a better understanding of the changes taking place in Japan and had to find ways of developing closer relations. He accordingly set great store in ensuring that reporting from Tokyo was thorough and informative. As a writer he had wit, flair and insight and tried to ensure that reporting from Tokyo while he was ambassador would be read in London and influence thinking towards Japan. Pilcher had seen at first hand before the war the threat from Japanese nationalism. As will be seen from a number of the despatches in this volume he drew attention to manifestations of nationalist feeling in post-war Japan. Pilcher’s historical perspective of Japan and his understanding of philosophy and morality led him to write at length about the roles of Shinto, Confucianism, Buddhism (and Zen) in moulding Japanese character and attitudes. It was the failure of Japanese military adventures not their immorality which had led the Japanese instead to seek economic success as their new religion. Japanese introspective self-centredness made them difficult partners, but we had to find a better way to live with them. Pilcher hoped that the first Japanese imperial visits abroad would help to internationalize Japanese attitudes and he devoted much time and effort to preparing the way. But the popular reception given to the Emperor and Empress abroad was a sad disappointment to the Japanese who were forced to realize the depths of their international unpopularity. I do not think that the spate of despatches and think-pieces sent from Tokyo in the Pilcher years would be possible these days and few modern diplomats have either the time or the broad cultural background that John Pilcher had

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

to write with such cultural and historical understanding. Even in his time some officials in London complained of the length and number of despatches from Tokyo. Some readers may find some of the despatches reproduced in this volume rather long, but Pilcher was determined to ensure that the FCO were given a full picture of modern Japan. I do not want to imply by choosing reports covering the years 1967–72 that reporting by Pilcher’s predecessors or successors was inadequate, but there was something special about Pilcher’s understanding of modern Japan and his emphasis on educating London about Japan that makes the key despatches in these years worth reading by more than a few specialist historians. Some of the despatches reproduced here are particularly perceptive. Readers should not miss his first impressions despatch in 1968 and his two valedictory despatches in 1972. His despatch on Expo ’70 is witty and perceptive. His accounts of the changing Japanese mood make particularly interesting reading, but his despatches on the Showa Emperor, especially his piece on the Emperor, human or divine?, should be read by all who want to understand the Japanese attitude to their imperial institution. Did all the work involved in research, writing and distributing these despatches achieve their purpose of educating officials and ministers about Japan? Certainly the departments in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Board of Trade became better informed and were thus better able to brief ministers and to draft planning papers. Some small part of the information sent home from Tokyo must have got through to ministers. They began to take more interest in Japan and wanted to see Japan for themselves. One result was more ministerial visits to Japan culminating in the visit to Japan by Edward Heath as prime minister in 1972 shortly after John Pilcher had retired. The whole gamut of Tokyo reporting in the Pilcher years amounts to many hundreds of thousands of words. The historian can peruse the wide variety of reports from Tokyo, which are preserved in the National Archives at Kew. This book contains, I think, all the more important despatches sent from Tokyo during these years. I must record my thanks to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the National Archives for much help in tracing and copying these reports. In presenting these despatches I have retained the original wording without alteration and almost the only deletions are the formal opening phrases and the final paragraph recording where copies of the despatch in question had been sent. Some spelling has been updated. Pilcher did not of course draft the more routine despatches, which were sent under his signature, but he commissioned and vetted them adding typically ‘pilcheresque’ sentences and paragraphs. He also wrote himself some important ‘think-pieces’ included in this volume Events since 1972 have inevitably shown that some of John Pilcher’s and his embassy’s forecasts were incorrect. Some of John Pilcher’s own observations reflected his prejudices and may be challenged by scholars of modern Japan. But all in all these reports give a generally fair and interesting picture of a key period in the development of Japan in the twentieth century and contain many insights which are as valid today as when they were written. Readers will note that while much has changed much remains the same. There are still fears about Japanese nationalism. Relations with the USA and with China continue to have their ups and downs. Japan has made no progress with Russia over the Northern Territories. Japan still seeks permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Japanese liberalization remains as

INTRODUCTION

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much of an aspiration as before and the concept of Japanese uniqueness has not gone away. Young Japanese are no more globalized than their parents and Japanese women still encounter discrimination. The Chinese economy, on a larger scale of course, is going through the same environmental problems as Japan did forty years ago.

PART ONE: 1967 Sir John Pilcher arrives and takes over from Sir Francis Rundall. Sir Francis Rundall’s valedictory is included to show the continuity in ­interpretation of Japan by successive ambassadors. The only despatch in this section written personally by John Pilcher is his short account of Mr Yoshida’s funeral. The despatch on economic aid gives a fairly full account of the way in which Japanese aid was being used to further Japanese economic interests. The annual review provides a useful summary of the political and economic scene in Japan in 1967. The Japanese economy that year grew at the high rate of 12%.

PART TWO: 1968 The year began with a visit by George Brown, the Foreign Secretary. Sir John Pilcher sent his first impressions of Japan and commented on the Japanese mood at this stage in Japanese development. The visit of the American ­nuclear-powered USS Enterprise aroused violent protest. The Japanese continued to be dependent for their defence on US bases and the US nuclear umbrella but Japanese popular opinion concentrated on Japanese grievances with the Americans and pressure grew for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule. Opposition parties on the left were disunited and weak while the militant Budhist sect Sokagakkai expanded its political influence through Komeito. Japanese militant students disrupted Japanese universities and were a nuisance. The Japanese economy continued its phenomenal expansion and living standards rose fast. British exporters needed to work hard to penetrate the Japanese market while trade relations needed to be put on a new footing.

PART THREE: 1969 This was an important year for British efforts to expand exports to Japan. These centred on British Week in Tokyo, which was attended by HRH Princess Margaret and other VIPs. Comprehensive reports were sent on Japanese science and technology, on Japanese labour and incomes, and on the quality of life in Japan. Sir John Pilcher also sent home his survey of the status of women in Japan in a despatch entitled ‘The Merry Wives of Ginza’.

PART FOUR: 1971 Sir John Pilcher sent a perceptive despatch giving his impressions of Expo ’70 on Osaka and his assessment of the Japanese mood at the beginning of the ’70s.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Another despatch, which I drafted, attempted to describe Japan’s changing society and the new generation. Three despatches on the Japanese economy, on the threat from Japanese exports and on Japanese protectionism focussed on trade issues. Sir John sent a controversial despatch about the way Japanese behaved abroad. The FCO thought it unfair in its strictures and it was not printed for circulation to diplomatic missions. A more important despatch was that on defence which was entitled the ‘Trade Mark and the Sword’. This was sent just before the ritual suicide of the writer Yukio Mishima and the farcical failure of his attempt at a militarist coup d’état.

PART FIVE: 1971 – THE SHOWA EMPEROR Pilcher, in two despatches and a letter, described with wit and historical ­understanding the personality and position of the Japanese Emperor prior to the departure for Europe of the Emperor and Empress. Following their return he summed up the visits. The Japanese were disagreeably surprised by manifestations of their unpopularity. As Pilcher explained, 1971 brought a rude awakening to Japan. Although Mr Sato won the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty relations with the United States soured as a result of the ‘Nixon shocks’. The American decision to open relations with Communist China without giving the Japanese advance warning was seen as a slap in the face to Japan. Insult was added to injury by American pressure for a greater ­Japanese defence effort and for economic measures designed to alleviate economic conditions in the US.

PART SIX: SIR JOHN PILCHER’S FINAL MONTHS IN JAPAN This section contains two routine despatches covering defence and economic issues; these are followed by two valedictory despatches by Sir John Pilcher, in which he looks back on Japanese history and the factors which have determined Japanese attitudes and behaviour. In both, he concludes that Japan would develop into a modern welfare state. He did not foresee the problems which were emerging in the pursuit of welfare. But these do not invalidate the thrust of his arguments. There is some repetition in these two despatches, which indeed reflect much of what he had written in earlier despatches. This was probably why the second and final despatch ‘Frail Flowers of Opportunism?’ seems never to have been printed for circulation. Nevertheless both despatches are well worth reading.

PART SEVEN: 1972 – A NEW ERA FOR THE BRITISH MISSION The reports in this section cover the events in the months of 1972 following Sir John Pilcher’s departure. Mr Sato’s long era came to an end with the election of Mr Kakuei Tanaka as Japanese Prime Minister. He immediately set about repairing relations with China. Britain’s relations with Japan were set on a new footing by the first ever visit by a British Prime Minister in office to Japan.

INTRODUCTION

xxv

APPENDICES REFLECTING JOHN PILCHER’S PERSONALITY AND VALUES I. Biographical portrait of John Pilcher by Hugh Cortazzi. This was first published in British Envoys in Japan, 1859–1972, ed. Hugh Cortazzi with others, Global Oriental 2004. The original version contained quotes from some of John Pilcher’s despatches. These have been omitted from the version published here as the despatches from which extracts were quoted are reprinted in full in this volume. II. Letter from John Pilcher in Kyoto dated 18 January 1936. This letter is included as it reflects his response to Japanese life and culture when he was a young language student serving his apprenticeship in the Japan Consular Service. John had been sent a book about Dürer. This led him to discuss the Japanese spirit and sensitively describe Kyoto with its temples and gardens, which he came to love and admire. Readers may be amused by his comments in this letter on Lady Clive, the wife of Sir Robert Clive, British ambassador to Japan from 1934 to 1937, to whom Pilcher acted as private secretary. But the main interest of this letter lies in its reflection of John’s understanding of nature in Japanese life and culture. III. L ecture given at the N issan I nstitute , at S t A ntony ’ s college O xford on 4 M ay 1984 entitled ‘A Perspective on Religion in Japan’. In this lecture he encapsulates many of his insights into Japanese attitudes and psychology which he had expounded in various despatches. IV. Lecture or paper (undated, but probably 1975) entitled ‘Is Economic Success destroying Japanese Traditions?’ In this paper John Pilcher discusses the Japanese relationship with nature, He deplores the ‘chunky’ concrete of modern Japanese buildings, which he compares with the delicate harmonious wooden houses of the past and abhors the pollution, which has accompanied economic growth. He commends Japanese youth and emphasizes once more the Japanese emphasis on the evanescence of life. V. Review of book by George Ellison Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan, Harvard University Press. Dated 23 March 1977. John Pilcher did some reviewing after he retired, primarily for Asian Afairs – the journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs. This is a good example of his reviewing style and deals with a topic close to his heart. He was a devout Catholic who was deeply interested in the impact of Christianity on Japan. He concludes that the ‘Christian century came too early to influence Japan profoundly’. He notes ‘the points of identity’ between ‘the Christian quest for perfection and the Buddhist approach to enlightenment’. VI. An Introduction to Japanese Gardens Here is perhaps Pilcher at his best, relishing the environment of ornamental Japanese gardens located in the Shinto traditions of symmetry, metaphor, order, balance and harmony reflecting a deeply-held belief that Nature is to be respected. ‘Shinto assumes that man is on a par with Nature and thus with stones and plants as well as animals.’ His insights into the Japanese tradition (in part enveloped by Buddhism), which lies at the core of Japan’s metaphysical traditions, form a preface to an exploration of various imperial classical gardens from earliest times. It includes a long citation from The Tale of Genji where the Lady Murasaki describes in detail the garden layout of Genji’s fictitious palace: ‘…The little wood on the hill beyond the lake, and the bridge that joined the two gardens, the mossy banks that seemed to grow greener not every day but every hour – could anything have looked more tempting?’

1 Sir Francis Rundall’s Valedictory Despatch*

SUMMARY Sir Francis Rundall shares the view of his two predecessors that, despite the changes of the last hundred years, the basic characteristics of the Japanese people have altered little and they are still a race apart. They have a strong sense of ‘national consciousness’, combining a conviction that Japanese ways are superior with a sense of inferiority and some latent xenophobia. This finds expression in pride in the economic recovery already achieved and determination to catch up in sectors where Japan still lags behind. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. The Japanese are also strongly motivated by self-interest. Less concerned than other nations about the ethical content of their actions, they are more adroit at reconciling inconsistent courses of action. In the economic field they sometimes evade the fulfilment of international obligations by behind-the-scenes methods. Other ­Japanese traits include good manners concealing intense emotions, capacity for loyalty and hard work and the habit of an oblique approach. Neither militaristic nor pacific, the Japanese are the world’s greatest pragmatists. (Paragraphs 3–4.) 3. Japan has become one of the world’s strongest industrial Powers. Her tentative efforts to encourage economic co-operation among countries of the Pacific basin are motivated at present by the desire to develop Japan’s economic strength and to promote overseas trade while avoiding political responsibility or alignment. There is no nationalism in the pre-war sense. Japan is unlikely at present to assume a greater share of defending the Free World but would do so if military strength at world Power level became necessary to

*  FJ 3/4 – Sir Francis Rundall to Mr Brown – received 13 July 1967.

4

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

defend Japan’s essential interests. At present Japan is still susceptible to ­American pressure though this is sometimes resisted. (Paragraphs 5–7.) 4. British policy should aim at showing the Japanese that it is in their interest to remain allied with the West. Our influence is limited but we can build on Japanese gratitude for help given in business and Service matters in bygone years. Japan is about to become the world’s third industrial Power and probably our greatest competitor in overseas markets, where there is a case for seeking their co-operation in joint ventures. The Japanese are loyal to friends and honour personal obligations. If we can persuade them to accept us as a friendly country and can establish personal contacts at the highest levels, we can exert an influence greater than our strength. (Paragraphs 8–9.) 5. The Diplomatic Service has kept up with the times. (Paragraph 10.) 6 July 1967

I

t was suggested in a policy planning paper recently prepared in the Foreign Office that, in our dealings with the Japanese, we must always remember that their character is such that they require unusually careful and tactful handling. In this my valedictory despatch I have the honour to offer my own observations on this fundamental point. They are necessarily superficial and subjective, but I should report that after making my preparatory notes I re-read the final despatches of two of my predecessors, Sir Esler Dening and Sir Oscar Morland, both of whom could write with far longer experience of Japan than my three and a half years. I was immediately struck by the similarity of my own views to what they had written, in different ways, in 1957 and 1963. In particular, the moral of our three despatches is broadly the same. It is that, despite all that has happened to them in the last hundred years and in spite of the tremendous social and cultural changes brought about by the war, the basic national characteristics of the Japanese people have altered very little and that they are still a race apart. It follows that some understanding of these characteristics, as they are likely to affect their political and economic thinking, is an essential part of any assessment of their probable reactions. 2. My predecessors have analysed these characteristics and set them in their historical perspective, so whilst strongly recommending that their despatches be re-read I can take advantage of our consensus of opinion and set them out dogmatically. Briefly then, the Japanese are motivated in their dealings with the outside world by a strong sense of ‘national consciousness’, or to put it another way, by a sense of uniqueness of being Japanese. The ingredients of this national consciousness are difficult to separate out, but they include, in my view at least, the conviction that the Japanese sense of values and way of life are superior to those of other peoples, a somewhat contradictory sense of inferiority – particularly with respect to the West – which makes them awkward and insecure when dealing with foreigners, and a residual if largely latent xenophobia due to their long isolation from the outside world. It is easier to give examples than definitions. There is great and justifiable national pride in Japan’s economic recovery since the war as well as a strong competitive spirit to catch up and surpass other countries in any sector of national life in which Japan is still inferior. No major new undertaking is put in hand – new towns are an example



Sir Francis Rundall’s Valedictory Despatch5

– until teams of Japanese have inspected the latest developments in the field on a world-wide basis. The best of these will be taken and probably further improved, because the finished product must excel all others. The tower dominating the 1970 Osaka Exhibition will be the highest man-made structure in the world except for one in the Soviet Union, and so on. I recently inspected the unlovely but essential prefabricated office building which is being erected on my tennis court, and congratulated the foreman on the astonishing speed with which it is being built. He replied ‘Yes’, and smiled that Japanese smile I have come to recognize, compounded of pride, recognition of a tribute justly paid, and a faint overtone of contempt for less efficient and hard-working countries. 3. There is another, and equally strong motivation behind most Japanese policy, that of self-interest. This is not of course a unique trait, but the J­ apanese as a people seem less concerned about the ethical content of their actions and more adroit at reconciling the unreconcilable to their own satisfaction and advantage than almost any other nation. The Government were able, for instance, to announce at a tricky moment just before the outbreak of the recent Arab/Israel war that they would adopt a policy of separating the principle of free navigation from the Middle East crisis, and subsequently to vote for two contradictory resolutions in the General Assembly. In domestic politics the party factions form and re-form continuously although it is periodically announced that all factions have been dissolved. Furthermore, since a major Japanese self-interest is economic strength and increasing exports, they have become adept at the subtle evasion of their international obligations in the economic field. Apparent concessions are nullified by the fine print of domestic regulations and, when this cannot be done without severe international criticism, there is always the utterly reliable long-stop of ‘administrative guidance’. This is a uniquely Japanese system whereby Government ‘guides’ industry and business in accordance with the national interest. The guidance is not mandatory, but it is backed by the most effective financial sanctions: industry lives on loan capital and non-compliance carries the risk that bank loans and credit, which are tightly and centrally controlled, will be cut off. The effectiveness of this system is evinced by the fact that Japan – for reasons connected with her African and South African trade – has virtually stopped direct imports from Rhodesia without having to pass more than a minimum of legislation to this effect. 4. There are other traits which affect and modify Japan’s approach to the outside world. Whilst good manners demand an impassive exterior and concealment of one’s real feelings, the Japanese are an intensely emotional people, given to suicide and with at least their fair share of crimes of violence. They are a very hard-working people with an ingrained sense of loyalty to their employers and to authority which has come down from feudal times. They are an Asiatic people and share the general Asian preference for the oblique rather than the direct approach to a problem. This is true also of their speech; many a visiting businessman has been misled by the polite Japanese agreement which has no firmer basis than a desire not to contradict the honourable foreigner. I do not myself feel that the Japanese can be described either as a militaristic or as a pacific people. They respect military power, certainly, and throughout their history effective power has always been sought and maintained by force of arms, but they are also the world’s greatest pragmatists and would adopt the means, military or otherwise, most suited to gain their ends. Their armed

6

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

forces are adequate for defensive purposes so that, given the American Security Treaty, they are at present spared undue waste of men or materials on national armament. Only an extremist lunatic fringe advocates the return of military power in pre-war terms. This, however, is a pragmatic and not an ethical judgment: as a senior Japanese General said not long ago, ‘The war was wrong because we could not possibly have won it.’ 5. The first stage of Japan’s rehabilitation from the low point of 1945 has been successfully accomplished. She is now one of the strongest industrial Powers in the world, and although per capita income and the general standard of living are still well below the highest Western European standards, the phenomenal rate of economic growth ensures that she will catch up before too long. It is indeed an announced ambition of the Government to reach the standard of living of the United States in the 1970s. Obviously therefore the way in which this economic strength will be used is highly important to us. Japan is at present seeking Great Power status by a slow and calculated spread of her economic influence. She is already an influential, if not yet a very vocal member of the world’s leading financial and economic organizations. She has taken the lead in the Asian Development Bank and in the organisation of economic and technical co-operation amongst her less developed neighbours in South-East Asia. She is seeking, tentatively as yet, to establish a wider area of economic co-operation amongst the countries of the Pacific basin. Motivation at this stage is mainly economic – to promote exports and to spread the load of development aid for South-East Asia amongst a wider group of countries. Whilst there are political overtones, such as the containment of Communist China, they are not yet paramount. There appears in fact to have been little change in Japanese policy during the last three years: the targets of primary importance are still the development of the country’s economic strength and the promotion of her overseas trade, coupled with the avoidance of any political responsibility or identification with any of the Power blocs to an extent which might lose friends and damage exports. But one wonders how long Japan will be able to maintain this enviable position, or indeed whether she will always be content to play such a comparatively limited role on the world stage. At present Japan is broadly on the side of the Free World because the majority of her interests lie in that direction, but I do not think that basically she is ideologically committed in any way and she has kept her economic pipelines open to all the Communist countries including the Soviet Union and China. There is perhaps a certain parallel with Western Germany, but while the broad factors of geography, strategy and trade seem likely to lead to the greater integration of Germany with the Western world they are less compelling in the case of Japan, which is already vastly more powerful, except perhaps in nuclear capacity, than her Asian neighbours. 6. Yet, there is little nationalism in the pre-war sense, apparent at present – perhaps for no better reason than Japan can get what she wants without any sabre-rattling. This might not however hold true if there were a radical shift in the world balance of power such as, for instance, a substantial weakening or withdrawal of United States influence in Asia. One cannot at present see the skilled, pragmatic planners in the back rooms of Japanese Ministries advocating increased armament for its own sake, but the question is certainly being discussed. A senior Foreign Office official told me recently that the last Heads of Mission conference held in Tokyo voted 85 per cent against Japan developing her own nuclear weapons in order to contain China – yet



Sir Francis Rundall’s Valedictory Despatch7

15 per cent favoured it. I doubt whether the Pentagon strategists could easily persuade the Japanese Government to take on a significantly greater share of defending the Free World position in Asia; nor do I think it would be wise to suggest it. But if military strength at world power level should again become necessary to defend Japan’s own essential interests, she could, and I am sure would, quickly expand her already effective forces to meet the need. She has moreover 100 million hard-working people, accustomed to obey authority, backed by immense industrial strength. Some of my more gloomy colleagues see in the Kõmeitõ Party, the political expression of the Sõkagakkai movement, the beginnings of an authoritarian state. I think this is exaggerated, but the party is clearly well organized on familiar totalitarian lines, entirely expedient in policy and wholly dedicated to achieving power in the late 1970s. If there is any danger in this it is most probably that the party could provide a political machine for someone with sufficient personality and political skill to ride it to personal power, but this would seem only possible in a domestic or international situation which gravely weakened the present established order. 7. But this is a long-term speculation. Japan is still feeling her way; she is still susceptible to United States pressure if it is applied strongly enough although she has already begun, with politeness but with increasing determination, to press for the return of the Bonin Islands and of the Ryukyus to Japanese rule. The campaign for this has already reached the stage of concrete planning but it is hard to judge how far the Government are motivated by their desire to deprive the Opposition of a political stick or how much by resurgent nationalism. Yet it is probably not a coincidence that this movement has begun to develop whilst American prestige is diminishing because of the impasse in Viet-Nam. 8. It is present British policy to seek to treat the Japanese as equals, to keep in close contact with them and to convince them that it is to their overriding advantage to remain allied with the West. I am sure that this is our best, and indeed our only policy. We can exercise it most effectively by appealing to Japanese self-interest, but this presupposes a world situation in which Western and Japanese interests march together. The Japanese value us for our pragmatism, political experience and technological know-how, but they tend to look down on us for our economic inefficiency and what they consider to be the bad management of our national affairs over the last twenty years. We cannot expect to move them in matters of great importance to them as they are not, in the last analysis, going to do anything that they do not wish to do unless overwhelming pressure is put upon them. This we can no longer exert. They would marginally regret our withdrawal from South-East Asia as a factor likely to increase instability but I suspect that they would be more than comforted to inherit our markets. Yet in certain circles there is still a memory of the days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and a realization of the debt which the Japanese owe us for their early training in business and Service matters. On this we can and must build. Whether we like the Japanese or not is beside the point: they are on their way to becoming the third strongest industrial Power in the world and probably also our greatest competitor in overseas markets. There is, indeed, a good case already for seeking their co-operation in joint business ventures in third markets whilst we can still provide serious competition for them. 9. I am conscious that this despatch deals almost exclusively with the less desirable characteristics of the Japanese people, but they are likely, I fear, to be the important ones in Japan’s dealings with the outside world. The Japanese

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

have many more lovable characteristics: a genuine capacity for f­riendship once one is accepted; a code of politeness in social intercourse which, though confusing to the foreigner, is helpful and agreeable once one knows the rules; and an almost overwhelming sense of obligation for favours done. If one approaches them properly, with due politeness and without resorting to high-pressure tactics, they are often extremely co-operative. Above all, once a personal relationship has been established with them it brings with it the ethical obligation of an entirely different approach. No people are more inconsiderate to those they do not know – one need only drive in Tokyo traffic to discover this – but few are more considerate to their friends. It should therefore be the aim of every visiting businessman to reach this relationship; he will not achieve much until he does. We can furthermore seek to exploit this trait at national level. The Japanese will listen to their friends and they realise that they have still much to learn about how to conduct political and economic relations with other countries. If they see in us a friendly country, and if personal contact can be established amongst statesmen and officials at the highest level, we can exercise an influence beyond their estimation of our national strength. We can, at the least, enlighten their self-interest. 10. Though irrelevant to the subject at issue one is allowed to be subjective in the last paragraph of one’s final despatch. I have had nearly thirty-seven very happy years in the Consular, Foreign and Diplomatic Services, with interesting work and excellent colleagues. Sitting in a comfortable and air-conditioned office I can contrast my last days in the Service with my first introduction to it, attempting to cope with an unruly mob of seamen in the earth-floored stable which served as a Shipping Office in the Consulate-General at Antwerp. We have come a very long way since those days and both our work and our conditions of Service have changed out of all recognition. But I feel that we have kept up with the times and I am confident that we shall continue to do so. F. B. A. RUNDALL

2 JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID*

SUMMARY

T

his subject acquired special interest following the launching by Japan of the Ministerial Council for South-East Asian Development in 1966 and the inauguration of the Asian Development Bank. (Paragraph 1.) 2. Japanese bilateral governmental assistance developed from reparations. It has been used both to finance exports (especially of heavy goods) and to ‘buy off’ discriminatory trade restrictions against Japan. Terms have been relatively hard and loans have been tied to imports of Japanese goods. (Paragraphs 2–3.) 3. Japanese technical assistance has so far been small in scale, but the Government are now giving it special attention. They rightly think that Japan has a major contribution to make in teaching agricultural techniques. Multilateral aid is small but increasing. The total annual volume of aid has risen steadily over the last 10 years, but as a percentage of GNP it is still some way short of the UNCTAD goal of 1 per cent. (Paragraphs 4–6.) 4. The main emphasis has been on Asia and South-East Asia in particular. Apart from geographical proximity and the commercial incentives, the ­Japanese are conscious of the need to ensure the stability of this area which is vital to their security of communications and ultimately, their national safety. Preoccupation with South-East Asia may also be based on the calculation that it offers more promising and rewarding development and investment opportunities than, for example, the Indian sub-continent. (Paragraphs 7–8.) 5. The Japanese were encouraged to launch the Ministerial Council for South-East Asian Development mainly by the decision of the United States Government to give economic assistance on a massive scale. Japan has concentrated on agricultural assistance – as witness the follow-up Conference on Agricultural Development held in Tokyo last December. She cannot, however, ignore the feeling in many recipient States that industrial development is also needed and that anything savouring of the old client relationship with Japan is no longer appropriate. Japanese industrial power and commercial success,

*  FJ 6/17 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Brown – received 16 November 1967.

10

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

while admired, are also sources of jealousy and even resentment. (Paragraphs 9–13.) 6. In these circumstances the Japanese have adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards recent regional initiatives like ASEAN. They think that their own Ministerial Council is worth keeping in existence. Japan is anxious to ensure in the aid-giving process that donor countries retain a large measure of control and this is one reason for their enthusiastic espousal of the Asian Development Bank. (Paragraphs 14–15.) 7. Japanese bilateral aid has been justifiably criticized for its hard terms and its small size. Part of the difficulty stems from the poor machinery within the Government for planning and budgeting for aid. In addition the Finance Ministry, whose influence is paramount, remain unconvinced that Japan can reasonably afford a much higher level of aid than her present one. They point to the scarcity of capital, badly needed for pressing domestic purposes. It is unlikely that Japan will achieve the UNCTAD goal in the near future, unless there is some radical change. (Paragraphs 16–17.) 8. The recent debate over preferential tariff proposals has emphasized intra-governmental differences, and Japanese anxiety to protect their exports of light industrial products. But the changing structure of Japanese industry may mean that in the longer term Japan will be able to reconcile herself to assisting the industrial development of the poorer countries. (Paragraphs 18–20.) 9. As Japan forges ahead industrially, the gulf separating her from her Asian neighbours will widen and causes for jealousy will increase. The Japanese will have to show a little more tact and consideration than they have displayed on some recent occasions. (Paragraph 21.) 10. The implications for Britain are: (a) We should clearly recognize the commercial motives behind most Japanese aid and the possible adverse effects on British commercial and economic interests. Japan clearly aims to derive the maximum commercial advantage from its participation in the Asian Development Bank. This requires careful handling. (b) We may have opportunities to remind the Japanese of the needs of others outside the narrow limits of the South-East Asian countries. (c) We should not forget that, overall, Japan’s aid plays a useful part in bringing greater prosperity to the under-developed world. At the same time the Japanese are capable of doing more and are not unreceptive to constructive criticism from outside. One good argument is that Japan should be able to afford more as a result of her unnaturally low expenditure on defence. The Secretary of State’s forthcoming visit to Tokyo should be a useful occasion to test Japanese intentions. (Paragraphs 22–25.) 9 November 1967

I

am indebted to members of the staff of this Embassy for the following ­reflections on Japanese economic aid policy. This subject has acquired special interest following the launching by Japan in April 1966 of a Ministerial C ­ ouncil for the Economic Development of South-East Asia and, more recently, the inauguration of the Asian Development Bank, in which the Japanese clearly



JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID11

intend to play a leading role. I have devoted most space to Japanese economic assistance to Asia, where Japanese interest has itself increasingly tended to concentrate. So far as possible I have tried not to burden the body of this despatch with too many facts and figures.

BILATERAL ASSISTANCE 2. Japanese official bilateral aid has developed directly from the large scale reparations programme through which Japan sought in the post-war years to pay for the past. These payments enabled Asian countries to buy the equipment needed to develop their economies and which they could not otherwise afford. As reparations tailed off, it became obvious that other means of loan-finance would be required. The first Japanese Government bilateral loan was in fact extended to India in 1958. Since then there has been a steady and increasing flow of Japanese loans and credit to the developing world. On the Japanese side, there has been a strong commercial incentive from the beginning: Japan’s exports of heavy goods in particular have often hinged on the grant of economic assistance. Some of these goods were the products of infant industries, unready to compete in markets of the developed world, and might otherwise have been unsaleable. In some cases also the Japanese found it necessary to use aid to “buy off” discriminatory import restrictions in countries where wartime memories still lingered or where – as in some African States – the Japanese export offensive resulted in a ludicrously lopsided trade. So far as I know without exception, Japanese loans have been tied to the import of Japanese goods and even the precise nature of these goods has generally been specified in inter-governmental agreements. The rate of interest has been generally relatively high – the standard rate being 5.75 per cent. 3. Japanese aid has not been confined to bilateral loans. A large element of what has qualified as aid in the definition of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD has consisted of deferred-payment credits to finance exports. This element amounted to just under a third of total Japanese aid in 1966, as opposed to something a little under half in the form of bilateral governmental loans. The proportion of the former type of aid to total aid is decreasing, but it is still very large. A further quite substantial portion consists of Japanese private direct investment, which accounted for somewhat less than a fifth of Japanese aid in 1965 and 1966 according to the DAC definition.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 4. Two other small but important elements in Japanese economic aid are the contributions to multilateral agencies and the money spent on technical assistance. The relatively low level of Japanese expenditure in the latter field in comparison with that of other developed countries has been criticized in DAC and elsewhere and needs some explanation. Probably the main factor inhibiting Japanese activity has been the barrier of language: the number of suitable Japanese who have a knowledge of Asian languages, or even a reasonable knowledge of English, is fairly small, and it has been difficult to find suitable candidates to undertake technical training abroad or to devise ways of providing satisfactory instruction in Japan. Nevertheless, this is a field in

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

which Japanese interest has been growing in the course of the last seven or eight years. The Japanese Government at present appear to be giving especially serious consideration to this aspect of aid and it is noteworthy that they have increased the allocation for technical assistance by 50 per cent for the next financial year. Japan has set up a number of apparently successful experimental farms and training centres in a number of Asian countries. Moreover their version of the Peace Corps, known as the Overseas Co-operation Volunteers, though still very small in numbers, seems to be making a useful contribution in some countries. Japanese insistence that volunteers possess technical skills has been sensible and rewarding. The Japanese believe that they have a special part to play in teaching agricultural techniques and methods of rice cultivation, in particular where their own methods are manifestly superior to those employed in South-East Asia. The Japanese are prone to speak of their ties with fellow Asians, but this language can be misleading. It is difficult to detect any general pattern of economic or agricultural development in modern Japan which has its parallel in other parts of Asia. The most common observation on Japan’s own development is that it is in many respects unique, though more ‘Western’ than anything else, if categorization is called for. Although there are now some forty–fifty institutes in Japan dealing with Asian problems, their approach appears to be essentially the same as that of similar institutes in Europe or North America.

MULTILATERAL AID 5. Until recently Japanese contributions to multilateral agencies have been quite small and have represented only a tiny proportion of total Japanese aid. Last year, however, there was a substantial increase and it seems likely that the level will rise further, for example in the form of assistance to the operations of the recently-established Asian Development Bank. The Japanese have promised US$20 million, as an immediate contribution to the ‘Special Fund’ for agricultural development to be administered by the Bank, and they have further pledged a total of US$100 million, as their share of an envisaged total fund of US$400 million to which the Americans are expected to contribute half. Japan has also, rather reluctantly, considered the possibility of making a further contribution to a new ‘Special Fund’ to finance transportation and communication projects, which was suggested at a meeting of officials from South-East Asian States in Kuala Lumpur in September: this seems unlikely to materialize. It may be noted that the Japanese have not done badly out of others’ contributions to multilateral agencies in the past: I am told that they obtained contracts worth twice the amount of their last offering to IDA. For this, if for no other reason, they firmly share the British distaste for proposals to tie this form of aid.

TOTAL VOLUME 6. The total volume of Japanese aid has risen gradually over the last ten years and in 1966 reached a record figure of US$539 million. This compares with a figure of US$180 million in 1957 and US$381 million in 1961. But despite the overall increase, and despite an improve­ment in what might be termed



JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID13

the ‘genuine aid component’ in Japanese assistance, aid as a proportion of GNP has not increased very markedly and its present percentage of 0.69 per cent is still some way from the UNCTAD goal of 1 per cent of GNP, which the Japanese Government are pledged to try to attain, and is itself slightly below the 1965 figure.

THE EMPHASIS ON ASIA 7. Japanese economic aid has been directed to a very large number of countries in almost every continent in the world. In Africa, Latin America and the Middle East commercial motives have predominated, though the Japanese have tried in some cases – such as with their loans to the UAR and Yugoslavia – to curry favour in important non-aligned countries. But the greatest emphasis has been placed on Asia, where commercial and political interests have tended to coincide most closely. The background to this can be briefly described. Initially the Japanese concentrated on assisting their two immediate neighbours, South Korea and Taiwan. In South Korea, where anti-Japanese feeling was intense, aid was the inescapable precondition for political reconciliation. It was given first in the form of reparations and more recently in the form of large loans (US$200 million for South Korea and US$150 million for Taiwan) at a special low interest rate of only 3.5 per cent. Next after these two neighbours Japan turned her attention to the States of South-East Asia. The reasons for her preoccupation with this region – which has become particularly noticeable in the last two years – are various. The area is of course conveniently near. It offers an important and expanding market for Japanese industrial products, especially capital equipment. Japan’s trade with Asia as a whole accounts for about a third of her total trade, and figures recently published indicate that the East Asian region actually took more Japanese exports in the first six months of 1967 than did the United States; these increased by over 20 per cent in a year. This part of the world is also a useful source of raw materials, though its indispensability in this respect can be exaggerated: Japan imports a great many of the raw materials she needs from the developed world and there is no sign of any impending radical change in this. Last, and by no means entirely least, comes security. Japanese Ministers including Mr Miki, the present Foreign Minister, have been increasingly conscious of the need to create conditions of stability in a region of importance to them for their communica­tions and, ultimately, for their own safety. Mr Miki recently made the point in this context that the per capita proportion of total international aid to eight South-East Asian States was a mere US$1.60 compared with US$6 for Africa and US$4.20 for Latin America. 8. At the same time a cynic might add that the Japanese are at least partly attracted to the area by the belief that the economies of some South-East Asian States are already doing quite well and need only limited help to do much better. The Japanese are amongst those who subscribe to the proposition that aid should produce an early return. Mr Miki’s quotation of the above figures may have been inspired less by anxiety than by a desire to deflect more aid to Japan’s principal sphere of interest. Japan has been greatly encouraged by the results, so profitable to herself, of assistance to South Korea and Taiwan – especially the latter, which the Japanese see as the success story of Asian development. By contrast, the continuing vast economic assistance to India

14

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

seems to the Japanese to have served more as a prop against total collapse than an impetus to growth. Seeing the problems of the South-East Asian region to be much more manageable than those of the Indian Sub-Continent, in terms of their own self-interest, the Japanese are probably right to favour the former and to hope that countries like Thailand and Malaysia, whose development has already been impressive, may now be poised to repeat the sparkling performance of Taiwan. 9. There can also be little doubt that the Japanese now feel politically more confi­dent in the South-East Asian region than they did ten or even three years ago. One reason is the overthrow of the Sukarno régime in Indonesia and the ending of confrontation. They have doubtless also been influenced by gradual British dis­engagement from the area and the resultant prospect of a stronger Japanese foothold in the Malaysian Peninsula. But, in terms of aid policy, perhaps the crucial event was President Johnson’s speech at Johns Hopkins University two and a half years ago, when he promised a ‘billion dollars of aid’ to Asia. The Japanese were not slow to see the potential effect of massive American assistance to Asia in terms of commercial opportunities, and their conclusion seems to have been that the best way of sharing in the benefits was to join the aid-giving process themselves. The Americans for their part were not backward in urging this line of thought upon the Japanese and in suggesting that South-East Asia was an area where Japan had a special role to play.

MINISTERIAL COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 10. Such is the background to the launching by Japan of the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South-East Asia in April, 1966, when Economic Ministers from eight South-East Asian States and from Japan met in Tokyo. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, South Viet-Nam and Laos sent full delegates, while Indonesia and Cambodia were represented by observers. Burma declined to attend. India and Pakistan, which do not form part of the Japanese concept of South-East Asia, were not invited. This meeting produced little besides a verbose communiqué, but was nevertheless important, because it brought together in Tokyo for the first time so many Asian ministers dealing with aid matters. It also focused the Japanese public’s attention on the problems of South-East Asian development and helped to stimulate a sense of national responsibility and involvement. This Conference was followed by a more specialized Conference on Agricultural Development in December 1966 and by a second Ministerial Conference held in Manila this spring (when Indonesia was fully represented). The one concrete result of these further Conferences was agreement on the need for a Special Fund to promote agricultural development, to be placed under the control of the Asian Development Bank (see paragraph 5 above).

EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURE 11. The decision to subordinate the Special Fund to the Asian Development Bank was mainly the result of Japanese pressure. From the outset Japan seems to have intended this, realizing that the Bank was better equipped to manage



JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID15

a large development fund than any ad hoc body set up by the rather i­ ncohesive Ministerial Council. The Japanese probably also thought it advisable to defer, at least in form, to the feeling among some of the members of ECAFE – strongly voiced during the last meeting of that organization in Tokyo – that the benefits of assistance should not be confined to one particular area, when other Asian States outside it, such as India and Pakistan, had at least an equal claim to assistance. 12. The basic Japanese attitude towards the Asian Development Bank has been that it should be run on sound banking principles and its funds used to finance viable projects at a commercial rate. In the case of agriculture, however, they have admitted that a different approach may be necessary and they have even envisaged that the Special Fund should finance ‘soft’ IDA-type loans for development in this sector. Most recently Japan has had to modify its demand that the Fund be used exclusively for agricultural purposes, in view of the fact that the Americans have asked that their contribution should also be eligible for basic development projects, such as roads or schools. But the Japanese still seem likely to insist that their own US$100 million contribution be directed solely to the agricultural sector. The Finance Ministry are, I am told, particularly adamant on this point and they have clearly also influenced the present negative Japanese attitude towards the suggested creation of a separate Fund for development of transportation in the region (see paragraph 5). 13. Seen from Japan, the emphasis which has been placed on agricultural development is not unnatural. Japan’s own achievements in this field have been remarkable and in most of the South-East Asian countries agriculture is the most important sector of the national economy. The Japanese are also not keen to encourage projects which will compete directly with their own industries. The States concerned on the other hand are unwilling to accept the dual role of client and supplier of Japanese industry, arguing that rapid and balanced economic growth requires both industrial and agricultural development. Although wartime memories have mostly withered away, the ­Japanese find themselves faced with some resentment of their power and success, and widespread fear of Japanese economic domination. The present Foreign M ­ inister, Mr Miki, has attempted to allay suspicion of his country’s motives by promoting the concept of an ‘Asian Pacific’ diplomacy, one strand of which is that Japan should work in close concert with the other developed countries in the area, thus, it is suggested, blunting the edge of criticism that her actions promote her own ends only. In a different way, the recent South-East Asian tours of Prime Minister Sato have undoubtedly been designed to help dispel suspicion of Japanese intentions.

REGIONAL GROUPINGS 14. On the other side, it is perhaps not entirely far-fetched to see fear of Japan as one of the elements lying behind recent efforts by the South-East Asian countries to establish a regional framework, which is strictly of their own making and without outside participation – ASEAN is the latest example. The Japanese attitude to this kind of development has been one of ‘wait and see’. It remains to be seen whether the Japanese-promoted Ministerial Council for Development of South-East Asia has a secure future, but at any rate it is more than another talking shop and may be worth keeping in existence at least until more acceptable alternatives are shown to exist. The Japanese must derive

16

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

some confidence from their knowledge that they are the one major industrial power in the region, that their money and skills, though grudged, are valued and that any regional economic grouping which excluded Japan would have obvious drawbacks. Politically also, they know they can to some extent counter the weight of Communist China. They also feel with some justice that some of the larger economic bodies for Asia – ECAFE in particular – are too unwieldy to be very effective in the field of aid. 15. In general, Japanese enthusiasm for regional groupings has not been unqualified. They have felt it important to try to ensure, in the aid-giving process, that the donor countries should reserve to themselves a very large say in determining the uses to which aid is put. This has been one of the main reasons why they have given the Asian Development Bank their wholehearted support. Such thinking may also provide part of the explanation for the cautious and negative attitude, which the Japanese eventually adopted towards the recent conference of South-East Asian States in Kuala Lumpur on the development of transportation and communications. They seem both to have come to suspect the motives of the Malaysian sponsors and to have felt that the failure of the regional delegates to establish any priorities for development reflected poorly on the value of this type of meeting, in which the principals came exclusively from the less developed countries.

CRITICISMS OF JAPANESE AID 16. Critics readily say that the terms of Japanese bilateral assistance are too hard and that its volume is too low. There is unquestionably justice in both criticisms, although the Japanese Government have recently taken a few small steps towards softening the terms of bilateral loans. One instance was a recent loan to ­Malaysia, a third of which carried an interest rate of 4.5 per cent; and a more striking example was the extension last summer of a US$60 million credit to Indonesia, which carried an effective interest rate estimated to be only 3 per cent; through the device of an additional interest-free-grant element and especially generous repayment provisions. The Japanese are also understood to be in the process of offering Thailand a US$60 million loan on relatively easy terms. It is interesting to note what seems to be a fairly close correlation between the terms of aid offered and the political importance of the countries concerned: Indonesia and ­Thailand are the largest States in South-East Asia and those to which Japan appears to attach the greatest importance. India, on the other hand, has only been able to secure the most marginal reduction in interest rates from 5.75 to 5.5 per cent. 17. As regards the total volume of Japanese aid, officials are frankly doubtful whether it will be possible to achieve the UNCTAD goal, unless there is some radical change in the way Japanese aid policy is formulated and planned. As I have said, the Government have so far failed to do more than keep pace with the remarkable growth of Japan’s GNP. No change is likely, unless some way can be found of budgeting for annual increases in total aid which will significantly exceed the projected annual growth of GNP. A major difficulty here is the poor machinery for coordinating or reconciling the views of the many ministries interested in aid matters. Foreign Ministry officials have ideas for reform, but their plans have as yet not got off the drawing boards.



JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID17

INTER-MINISTERIAL DIFFERENCES 18. There are indeed important and powerful elements within the Japanese Government who remain unconvinced that Japan can afford a substantially higher level of foreign aid and who fear that, by helping others too much, Japan may destroy the basis on which her own success rests. The Foreign Ministry, as one might imagine, are conscious above all of the expectations of the under-developed countries, while the export-conscious MITI sometimes supports them in the knowledge that there is usually a close correspondence between aid disbursements and cash receipts from exports. But the Finance Ministry, whose influence within the Government machine is by far the most powerful, argues that in Japan capital is scarce and expensive and that there are innumerable better domestic uses for any available money. It is indeed a fact that domestic interest rates are extremely high. Attention is drawn to the undoubtedly considerable needs of Japanese industrial and social development and much play is made of the fact that Japan still ranks only about twentieth among nations of the free world in terms of per capita income. At the present moment this Ministry are calling for a general cutback in Government spending, partly to help the unsatisfactory balance of payments position, and they see foreign aid as a main target for attack. The Foreign Ministry are handicapped, in attempting to resist this kind of argument, by the absence of any strong public interest in aid-giving or of any wide recognition of a special Japanese responsibility. The sole consideration to which they can reliably appeal is that of prestige: the suggestion that, if Japan fails to give specific aid, her international standing will suffer. One unfortunate result of this Government disarray is that potential recipients of Japanese aid often have to endure embarrassingly protracted negotiations before loans are concluded.

PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 19. These basic inter-Ministerial differences were well illustrated in the debate over Japan’s attitude to a world-wide preferential tariff system, devised to assist the under-developed countries. When the idea was first mooted, the Japanese seem to have hoped that other major industrial powers would probably shelve the question. They were visibly embarrassed when the subject came up at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council in Manila. Their anxieties were increased when, in the course of Japan-United States ­Ministerial discussions this autumn, it became clear that the Americans were taking the issue seriously. The Foreign Ministry and the MITI were alive to the argument that, by increasing the purchasing power of developing countries through preferential tariffs, Japanese exports of heavy industrial goods to those countries might be expected to increase. But MITI, and to a greater extent the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture, are also concerned about the loss which Japanese exporters of light industrial products may suffer in third markets in the developed world. All the indications are that this latter consideration will, in the short run at any rate, be the decisive one in ­Japanese calculations.

18

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY 20. Japanese trading interests are in fact world-wide in scale and almost universal in character; it is difficult to consider them on a regional basis, much less in relation only to the developing countries. Trade with the developed countries, accounting for over half of Japan’s total trade, is of vital and continuing importance to her and this latter trade is still substantially based on the traditional Japanese output of light industrial products, such as textiles or woodwork. The economic activity based on this sector balances uneasily against that based on the production of heavy goods, like ships and machinery. The pattern of Japan’s export trade has, however, shifted quite dramatically to the capital-intensive heavy sector in the last ten years (as shown in the table at Annex E) and, if this trend continues, there seems no reason why Japan should not eventually be able to reconcile herself, though with difficulty, to the development of light industries in the countries of Asia and Africa. The Japanese are indeed already finding that some of the manufactured components for their industrial products can be produced more economically in countries like Taiwan, where labour costs are now far lower than in Japan. The way these trade decisions go will have great influence on Japan’s aid decisions; and excuses, such as those which can still plausibly be produced by the Finance Ministry, will be harder to find.

THE CHALLENGE TO JAPAN 21. Many of the difficulties Japan encounters in the field of aid stem from the fact that, while far more advanced industrially than any other State in Asia, her overall level of development is still much below that of the United States and some way below that of the major countries of Western Europe. Japan is fast catching up and, as she does so, her capacity to assist the developing world will increase. At the same time, the Japanese will have to be prepared for a widening of the gulf which separates them from their Asian neighbours, and a sharpening of jealousies and resentments. The Japanese post-war record in Asia has so far been acceptable to the other countries concerned, but mainly because of the ‘low posture’ which has consciously been adopted. Now that the Japanese are turning to a more forward approach, the risks of their making an ill-judged move are growing. Their success or failure will to a large extent depend on their ability to temper commercial self-interest and economic ambition with a genuine regard for the needs and sensitivities of those they are pledged to assist. Recent Japanese performance at some international fora does not give cause for unqualified optimism: at the last ECAFE meeting in Tokyo the Japanese hosts appear to have affronted a number of other Asian States, while the Japanese director of the Asian Development Bank in Manila seems to have done his best to stir up the animosities of the Indians and Pakistanis. Nevertheless, the Japanese are a resourceful and adaptable people, and I have some confidence in their capacity not to forget the lessons of the past.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITAIN 22. There seem to me to be three main implications for our own policy. The first is that we must clearly recognize the commercial motive underlying to a



JAPANESE ECONOMIC AID19

lesser or greater degree almost all Japanese economic aid and that, especially in Asia, we must be fully alive to the threat which this poses to our commercial interests. The Japanese are going to use their position within the Asian Development Bank (in which they already hold a number of key posts including that of the presidency) to the maximum commercial advantage and will try in particular to see that a very large proportion of the contracts awarded by the Special Fund come to Japan. Although the Japanese contribution to this Fund will only be a quarter of the total, they will almost certainly aim to get more than this share of the business and, to judge by their performance in IDA, they may well succeed. I would not go so far as to suggest that we should take the lead in opposing Japanese commercial ambitions. I think that there will probably be times when our interests are actually best served by working with the Japanese and that, when this is not the case, it may often be tactically wiser to concert action with others who stand to suffer the same kind of loss as ourselves. Above all we must be very much on our toes. 23. Secondly, I think that, while we cannot reasonably object to Japan’s present overriding interest in South-East Asia, there may be occasions when we can help to ensure that the Japanese do not lose sight of the needs of others – and particularly the ever-pressing needs of India and Pakistan. I hope that, enjoying as we do good relations with both Japan and the countries of the Indian sub-continent, we may sometimes be able to play a constructive mediatory role. I also recognize that, as the Ministry of Overseas Development have recently suggested to us, there may be times when, by pandering to national ambitions in South-East Asia, the Japanese may tend to pursue schemes, the benefits of which are restricted to one or two favoured recipients, and which may actually hinder the development of the Asian region as a whole. It may be that there will be occasions when we can express a view though I think it is a danger of which the Japanese Government are already to some extent conscious. 24. Finally, I would make the perhaps obvious point that, despite its many imperfections, Japanese economic aid does serve a useful purpose in helping to alleviate the North/South problem and in bringing greater prosperity to the under-developed world. At the same time, I feel sure that there is in fact more which the Japanese could reasonably do in this field. It has been made clear to us in the past that the Foreign Ministry have even welcomed constructive criticism from outside. We cannot dispute the fact that Japan’s per capita income today is still far below that of Britain (only a little above half) and of most countries of Western Europe. But I think that we can legitimately make use of the argument that Japanese military expenditure is quite abnormally low and that this in itself provides a powerful reason why Japan should contribute more in the field of aid, both qualitively and quantitively. Moreover, if the Japanese economy continues to expand at its recent remarkable rate, the argument about relative backwardness will fast lose its force. Your visit will provide valuable opportunities to test the Japanese Government’s opinions on these matters. JOHN PILCHER

3 THE STATE FUNERAL FOR MR SHIGERU YOSHIDA*

T

he Rt. Hon. Arthur Bottomley, OBE, MP, represented Her Majesty’s ­Government at the State Funeral accorded to Mr Shigeru Yoshida in Tokyo on Tuesday the 31st of October. My wife and I accompanied him to the occasion. 2. It was the first State Funeral attempted by the Japanese Government since the war. They were therefore in some embarrassment at how to tackle an event of the sort. Military participation and precision seemed called for, yet militarism is anathema – and was so to Mr Yoshida. Religious observance is unthinkable now that religion and the state have been constitutionally sundered (in practice I note that the Imperial titles still imply quasi-religious prerogatives). Mr Yoshida’s posthumous baptism, reportedly at the instigation of one of his daughters, and the requiem held for him at the Roman Catholic Cathedral further complicated the issue. Whether or not the Imperial Family should participate in the funeral of a commoner, however illustrious, also preoccupied the minds of the Government. 3. In the event the occasion was solemn, dignified and restrained. The new vast octagonal Hall of the Martial Arts, built for the Olympic Games in 1964, was chosen for the occasion: it houses some 12,000 spectators and is a magnified concrete adaptation of the Hall of Dreams at the Horyuji Temple outside Nara dating from the seventh century AD. Its predecessor before the war was dedicated to the solemn cult of martial exercises in the forms of Judo and Karate: the new one has been used by such varied participants as Mr Billy Graham, the Beatles and the Band of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. On this occasion a vast Japanese flag hung from the ceiling and an enormous bank of tens of thousands of white and yellow chrysanthemums led up from a long altar, covered in white silk, to a portrait of the defunct Mr Yoshida, some fifty feet high. On either side of this giant emplacement on high stands were *  FJ 19/1 – 9 November 1967.



THE STATE FUNERAL FOR MR SHIGERU YOSHIDA21

two huge pyramids of pink, yellow and white chrysanthemums in baskets, topped by small forests of Madonna lilies. A board in front of each proclaimed that they came from Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor and Empress (the old-style titles being used). 4. The ashes of Mr Yoshida were brought in by his elder son, the poet and translator of the controversial English classic ‘Fanny Hill’, Mr Kenichi Yoshida. They were taken from him by a trio of very smartly turned out members of the National Self Defence Force, who bore them slowly up by a stair behind the chrysanthemum emplacement and placed them in a prepared niche beneath the portrait – all this to the accompaniment of an over-repeated, but splendidly performed dirge, which continued plaintively throughout. 5. At this point, the Crown Prince and Princess, the younger son of the Emperor, Prince Hitachi and his Consort, Princess Chichibu, Prince and ­Princess Takamatsu, the younger brother of the Emperor, and Prince T ­ omohito, the son of the Emperor’s youngest brother Prince Mikasa (who may be going up to Magdalen College, Oxford, soon), entered in solemn procession, dressed in Western-style funereal garb. 6. After the Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, had gone up to the altar and addressed a moving tribute to Mr Yoshida’s ashes, referring to him throughout as his revered teacher and rehearsing the enormous services he gave to the nation after defeat, four other distinguished dignitaries, the Speaker of the Lower House, the Chief Justice, the Speaker of the Upper House and a former minister of Mr Yoshida’s Cabinet delivered themselves of mercifully short eulogies. 7. Thereafter the members of the Imperial Family placed on a special stand in the middle of the altar small bunches of large white chrysanthemums prepared for the purpose. The members of Mr Yoshida’s family, including his second daughter, the formidable Mrs Aso, and her large family of attractive children, then laid similar bunches to one side of the stand (one member of the family committed the solecism of placing the lesser chrysanthemums, with which he had been provided, on top of the imposing blooms on the Imperial stand). 8. Thereafter the rest of the ceremony followed the same pattern. The special representatives of Foreign Governments and Heads of Missions in Tokyo and their wives were similarly provided with bunches of small chrysanthemums, which they laid discreetly on both sides of the Imperial Family’s contribution. They were then allowed to leave, while the vast concourse of some 6,000 people proceeded to pay their similar and simple tribute which lasted for several hours. 9. The Prime Minister, in praising Mr Yoshida, was tactful enough to say that he followed the guiding precepts set by Sir Winston Churchill and Dr Adenauer. It is, of course, axiomatic that the Japanese public equates him with these two great statesmen. In practice his role in his own country was very similar to that of Dr Adenauer and perhaps less controversial. 10. The only untoward incident was the failure of the Master of Ceremonies to invoke a fifth speaker, the representative of the Kõmeitõ Party (the reforming group inspired by the militant and nationalistic Nichiren Sect, known as Sõkagakkai). He, however, observed his error and stepped down immediately to ask the politician in question not once, but twice, to say his piece. He was greeted only by a fearful, frightful, frantic frown. 11. The expected minor protestations against the cost of the ceremony (some £18,000) and the participation of the military were voiced in the press.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

The alleged excessive subservience of Mr Yoshida to the Americans led the Communist States to avoid special representation at the Ceremony. In practice only eleven states sent special representatives (the Americans, none too tactfully, choosing General Ridgway to be the Chief of their three delegates) and this caused some chagrin to the Japanese Government. 12. Later, on the same evening, the Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, held a reception in his curiously contrived official residence (half Aztec and half Frank Lloyd Wright), where a reasonable degree of conviviality prevailed and where Mr Bottomley was able to meet members of the Japanese Government and many old friends from the Commonwealth.

4 JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1967*

SUMMARY 1967 has been generally a good year for Japan, and Mr Sato’s ­Government is popular: but much is still to be accomplished, and cautious endeavour remains the watchword. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 2. Initiatives in foreign affairs have been confined to Mr Sato’s visits to South-East Asia and the United States. Okinawa is still a major ­problem to be settled, although progress has been made over the return of the Bonins. Relations with China have deteriorated, and with the Soviet Union have improved. (Paragraphs 4–7.) 3. Domestic politics have not been edifying. There is still no ­effective Opposition to the Liberal Democratic Party, and changes in the leadership of the Opposition parties have not injected much realism into their policies. But Japanese democracy continues to work. (Paragraphs 8–13.) 4. The economy has been booming, but may now be in for a period of slower growth. British exports to Japan have increased ­remarkably, but there are still many obstacles and there is no opening for ­complacency. (Paragraphs 14–16.) 5. Successful talks on civil aviation, and the gradual emergence of a balanced view of the devaluation of sterling, have contributed to a generally good year for Anglo-Japanese relations: but the ­Japanese performance over sanctions against Rhodesia is one cloud on the ­horizon. (Paragraphs 17–19.) 29 December 1967

I

enclose a report on Japan in 1967, together with a calendar of events. As I have been in Tokyo for such a short time, I am indebted to the staff of this

*  FJ 1/2 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Brown – received 1 January 1968.

24

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Embassy for the facts and to the Information Counsellor, Mr John Figgess, for the composition of the report. JOHN PILCHER

ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1967 1967 was another good year for the Japanese in nearly every way. They ­maintained the high economic growth rate that is becoming the envy of the world; their automobile production reached a total of about 3,160,000 ­vehicles, making Japan the second largest car manufacturer in the world after the United States; their prestige abroad continued to rise steadily, in keeping with their industrial achievements; their cautious political initiatives, mainly in ­South-East Asia, made a not unfavourable impression; the remarkable stability, which has characterized the domestic scene in recent years, remained undisturbed; and for once the country was spared the scourge of a major typhoon or other natural disaster – a circumstance which contributed to the harvesting in 1967 of an all-time record rice crop. 2. As a result, the beginning of 1968 finds the nation richer and – ­notwithstanding a continuing rise in the cost of living – the majority of the population appreciably better off than they were a year ago. It is not surprising in these felicitous circumstances that recent public opinion polls indicate a greater measure of popular support for Mr Sato and his Government than at any time since he came to power. 3. At the same time a strain on the balance of payments cast a certain gloom and saw to it that, if there is some euphoria observable as a result of this new-found prosperity, there is at least no complacency. An understandable pride in the national achievement is tempered by the knowledge that a great deal remains to be accomplished, for example in the realm of health and welfare, before Japan can claim to have reached the level of Western Europe. For many Japanese of the older generation, brought up in conditions of austerity and tribulation, the unbroken run of good fortune over the last several years seems almost too good to last. They are conscious that their continuing success may inspire not only admiration but also envy, and they are apprehensive lest a false move should stir up latent hostility and lose them the ­much-to-be-desired goodwill of the rest of the world, on which their ­prosperity may finally depend. The gain in national self-confidence during the past year may have lessened these fears, but cautious endeavour remains the watchword. Certainly the imminent assumption by Japan of the ‘world role commensurate with her economic strength’, foreseen by a number of Western commentators, does not seem to be in the cards for 1968. 4. During his first twelve months as Foreign Minister, Mr Miki appeared to bring a greater sense of purpose to his Ministry. There were however few initiatives in Foreign Affairs, other than three much publicized visits abroad by the Prime Minister in the autumn, and commercial considerations continued to be the chief determinant of policy. 5. Mr Sato’s two visits to South-East Asian countries were well received. The major topic of discussion was economic aid. The visits served both to clarify the expectations of the area from Japan and to consolidate Japan’s post-war rehabilitation in South-East Asia.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196725

6. Okinawa remains the main irritant in Japan-United States relations, though the issue has not yet raised as much heat in Japan as American protectionism. On his visit to Washington Mr Sato failed to gain any clear timetable for negotiating the reversion of Okinawa, and secured only the consolation prize of an undertaking for the early return of the Bonin, or Ogasawara Islands. A domestic campaign to stimulate realistic debate on defence and security towards the end of the year was also linked with Japan-United States relations, through the need to educate the Japanese public in advance of the expected debate on the Security Treaty around 1970, and perhaps also through the hope that a greater Japanese contribution to defence would assist the early return of Okinawa. Mr Sato’s apparent conviction of the need for American support may have been behind his unprecedentedly strong endorsement of United States policy in Viet-Nam during his foreign trips. 7. Commercial and other relations with China, adversely affected by the Cultural Revolution, were not improved by Mr Sato’s visit to Taiwan in ­September. In the long term this remains a fundamental dilemma for the Japanese, many of whom still feel a strong sentimental attachment to China and believe that Japan cannot take her proper place in East Asia until this issue is resolved. Relations with the Soviet Union continued to improve ­gradually and came into the limelight with Mr Miki’s visit to Moscow and East ­European capitals during the summer. The Russians talked to Mr Miki about the need to conclude a new “intermediate arrangement” in the absence of a full peace treaty, but there was subsequently no sign of any real give in the Soviet attitude towards Japanese territorial demands or of much progress on joint ­development projects in Siberia. 8. On the domestic front the political scene once again presented the usual less edifying spectacle. Certainly there was no progress during the year towards what, for Japan in the long run, may be the most crucial requirement of all – the emergence of a responsible Opposition party offering the possibility of an alternative Government. 9. The governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) emerged from the elections on the 29th of January with one seat less than it held in the previous Lower House, but with an overall majority of sixty-eight. The party’s share of the vote at the election, however, dropped below 50 per cent for the first time. The election as Governor of Tokyo in April of Dr Minobe, an independent, who was backed by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) jointly, was something of a setback for the Prime Minister. But Dr Minobe has demonstrated that he is in no way bound by the policies of the parties which supported him; while elsewhere the Liberal Democratic Party continued to dominate Japanese politics at all levels. Factionalism within the LDP showed no sign of decreasing and the Prime Minister found it expedient to include members of factions which oppose him within the new Cabinet formed on the 25th of November. But he and Takeo Fukuda, the Secretary-General, who is generally regarded as being on the Right wing of the party, remain very much in control. 10. The JSP, preoccupied as always with doctrinal niceties, and split as badly as ever over the China question, failed to increase their seats in the Lower House elections, despite the golden chance offered by the scandals surrounding the LDP at the time. In August, Seiichi Katsumata, a moderate – by JSP standards – was elected Chairman of the party as a compromise candidate in succession to the Left-wing extremist, Kozo Sasaki, while Koichi Yamamoto

26

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

of the Sasaki faction became the new Secretary-General. Katsumata hopes to head a Coalition with the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito sometime in the next three years, but this prospect seems infinitely remote. 11. Although the DSP did well in the elections, gaining seven new seats for a total of thirty, they still manage to look like a party in decline. The DSP is in fact over-shadowed by the Komeito, the political expression of the neo-Buddhist Soka Gakkai movement, which at its first attempt succeeded in winning twenty-five seats in the Lower House elections. The new Party Chairman, Yoshikatsu Takeiri, now aims at having 140 Komeito men in the Lower House in ten years’ time: success in this, though its chances seem slight, would be a measure of the failure of the JSP to adapt itself to the needs of an advanced industrial society. 12. The JCP gained more votes than previously in the January elections but only one more seat (it now holds five). A Communist mayor was elected for the first time in Japan at Shiojiri in April. The party’s relations with China went from bad to worse; JCP representatives were withdrawn from Peking and manhandled by Red Guards as they left (July). There have been signs of the JCP moving nearer to the Russian Communist Party, although no positive steps have yet been taken. On the extreme Left Zengakuren led two riots at Haneda in October with the avowed purpose of preventing the Prime Minister leaving on his overseas tours, and its leaders were arrested. It is rumoured that the Japan-China Friendship Association “Orthodox Headquarters” instigated and supported the demonstrations. 13. The Diet sat almost continuously from the 15th of February to the 18th of August. Fifteen Bills were passed, the most important being those for increasing Health Insurance charges and enlarging the Self-Defence Forces. The former provoked vehement opposition and led to physical violence in the Diet. The Press, always constant in its sanctimonious criticism of the Diet, decried Diet members’ behaviour and described them as ‘professional wrestlers wearing golden (Diet members’) badges’. The issue of electoral reform was widely discussed but seems no nearer realization. But for all the irregularities, the Diet – and Japanese ‘democracy’ in general – works and things get done. 14. Throughout 1967 economic activity was maintained at a high level marked by increased sales and profits, but the year closed with a cloud on the horizon as it became apparent that the booming economy was placing a strain on the balance of payments. This situation has been brought about by a combination of factors, including high economic growth (now estimated at 12 per cent for the fiscal year 1967); the soaring deficit on invisibles, aggravated by the closure of the Suez Canal and consequent increase in freight rates; the outflow of short-term funds because of high interest rates abroad; the considerable increase in imports stemming from large-scale capital investment and rising consumer expenditure; and the relative dullness, by Japanese standards, of exports. In sum, the economy may well be in for a fairly long period of slower growth than that to which we have become accustomed. 15. Anglo-Japanese trade has continued the upward trend observed in 1966 and a most welcome feature is the remarkable increase in British exports to Japan. Exports for the first ten months of this year amounted to £68,518,000, an increase of 34·1 per cent over the comparable period last year. Re-exports amounted to £3,888,000, an increase of 20·9 per cent. It must be emphasized, however, that the satisfactory achievement of the past year is partly the result of temporary factors such as the Japanese investment boom, and it will require



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196727

a very great effort in 1968 to ensure that our exports do not actually fall by comparison with 1967. 16. This is particularly so because of continuing Japanese protectionism, including the maintenance of quota restrictions and restrictions on invisibles, which continue despite the commercial negotiations which took place in London in March. The faltering steps towards capital liberalization made in July affect only sectors of industries where the Japanese are already immensely strong or where foreign investors are most unlikely to be interested. Japanese competition in third markets, especially in Commonwealth markets, has also presented a growing menace to British manufacturers. It is to be hoped that sterling devaluation will have put our manufacturers in a stronger position to meet this kind of competition. 17. In the civil aviation field, the talks held in November between the British and Japanese aeronautical authorities were surprisingly successful and have opened up possibilities of considerable expansion by the airlines of both countries. It now remains to persuade the Japanese to permit BOAC to join the Japan Airlines-Aeroflot pool over the Siberian route, extended beyond Moscow to London. 18. In other areas of Anglo-Japanese relations it has been rather a mixed year. Rhodesia has been a nagging source of irritation. Although the Japanese continued to co-operate generally in the policy of sanctions, their performance was in some respects thoroughly unsatisfactory. The year ended with the prospect of a quarrel over this issue. In the cultural field, thanks to the excellent work of the British Council, we have scored some modest successes, but the conspicuous absence of outstanding theatrical and musical performances from Britain continues to be a major gap in our cultural relations work. 19. For most of the year we had a reasonably good Press with some ­sympathy for our economic and political difficulties, over Aden for example. But ­devaluation of sterling inevitably came as a blow to our prestige. The first reactions in the Japanese Press were on the whole friendly, reflecting the sympathy expressed by Japanese Government officials and banking circles. But the initial reports were followed within a few days by interpretive articles, which tended to dwell on the stagnant state of the British economy and to make invidious comparisons between the glories of the past and the allegedly sorry state of the Britain of today. Fortunately, there are now signs of a swing back to a more balanced view and, provided the economy shows signs of recovery, we may reasonably hope that no permanent harm has been done. The Japanese remain disposed to like us: let us encourage them in this.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS IN 1967 January 1

First direct live television link between Japan and the United Kingdom.

13–19

The Brazilian President-elect General Costa e Silva visited Japan.

29

The Lower House elections. The Liberal Democratic Party gained an overall majority of 277 seats out of 486.

28

31–11 Feb.

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Anglo-Japanese Civil Aviation Talks in London.

February 3

It was announced that Japan’s two-way trade with Communist China in 1966 had reached the record figure of US$620 million.

11

National Foundation Day celebrated for the first time since the end of World War II.

13

Mr Yoshikatsu Takeiri elected Chairman of the Komeito.

15

55th Special Diet convened.

27–3 Mar.

Anglo-Japanese Commercial Negotiations, London.

March 6

Japan Air Lines inaugurated a round-the-world service.

13–17

Mr Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

15

Construction work began for the 1970 World Exposition at Osaka.

19–2 Apr.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, visited Japan.

28–10 Apr.

Mr Hasluck, Australian Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

April 3–17

23rd General Session of ECAFE held in Tokyo. Mr R. H. Belcher, Ministry of Overseas Development led the British Delegation.

9–12

Mission from the Leicester Chamber of Commerce visited Japan.

15

Dr Ryokichi Minobe elected Governor of Tokyo with support from the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party.

18

Moscow-Tokyo air service inaugurated.

29

First Communist mayor in Japan elected at Shiojiri.

May 7–21

British Pharmaceutical Mission in Japan.

9–19

Herr Willi Brandt, West German Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

13–31

Crown Prince and Princess toured South America.

15–20

Mr Pirzada, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

21

It was announced that 203 members of the Diet had made false income tax returns in 1966.

31–7 June

Mr Manescu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

June 19

Mr Eiichi Nishimura was elected Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party in succession to Mr Suehiro Nishio.

26–1 July

Mr Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon, visited Japan.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196729

30–2 July

Prime Minister Sato visited Seoul for the inauguration of President Park.

July 21

Special Diet session ended.

27

56th (Extraordinary) Diet session convened.

August 6

Resignation of Mr Sasaki and Mr Narita as Chairman and Secretary-General of the Japan Socialist Party.

9–11

First Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference held.

14–22

Mr Desai, Indian Deputy Prime Minister, visited Japan. It was announced that Japan’s GNP in the financial year 1965–66 had become the third largest in the world.

19–25

Seventh International Conference on Biochemistry held in Tokyo.

20

Mr Seiichi Katsumata elected Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party.

26

World University Games opened in Tokyo.

28–30

Japan found ‘guilty’ at a session of the ‘Viet-Nam War Crimes Tribunal’ in Tokyo.

29

Over a hundred people died in floods.

September 1

Bank rate increased to 5·84 per cent.

7–9

Mr Sato visited Taiwan. The Cabinet formally approved the ‘blood debt’ agreement with Malaysia and Singapore.

20–1 Oct.

Mr Sato toured five South-East Asian countries.

21–23

Electronics Symposium in Kyoto.

October 3–19

Visit of the Scottish trade mission.

6–18 and 10–22

British trade promotions took place at two Tokyo department stores.

8–21

Mr Sato visited Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and South Viet-Nam. Riots at Tokyo Airport.

9

A Japan Communist Party announcement denounced Mao Tse-tung for the first time.

20

Former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida died.

21–4 Nov.

London Chamber of Commerce Mission.

26–3 Nov.

Store promotions in Osaka, Sapporo and Nagoya.

27–31

Mr Nyamweya, Kenya Foreign Minister, visited Japan.

30

31

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

The Right Hon. Arthur Bottomley attended Mr Yoshida’s State funeral.

November 5–11

13th World Road Congress held in Tokyo.

9–18

Representatives of the British aerospace industry visited Japan.

10–17

Successful Anglo-Japanese Civil Aviation talks were held; the British delegation was led by Mr R. R. Goodison, c b.

10

The unofficial ‘Repatriation Agreement’ with North Korea was terminated.

14–16

Mr Sato visited Washington for talks with President Johnson and it was announced that the United States would return the Bonin Islands to Japan.

18

Secretary of State’s visit to Japan was postponed.

20

Anglo-Japanese talks at the official level opened, the British side being led by Mr James Murray, c m g.

25

Mr Sato reshuffled his Cabinet.

26

A former Foreign Ministry official was charged with passing classified documents to a North Korean agent.

December 1–2

M. Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, in Tokyo for Franco-Japanese ministerial consultations.

4

The 57th (Extraordinary) Diet was convened.

8

Record year-end bonuses were paid.

5

VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE* TO JAPAN, 7–10 JANUARY 1968†

SUMMARY The visit was unhappily curtailed at the last moment, but almost all the ‘business’ side of the programme was retained. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. The programme, a full and strenuous one, included two sessions of ministerial consultations, several Press engagements, a visit to a factory, and even a Japanese-style dinner. (Paragraphs 3–4.) 3. During the consultations views were exchanged on Viet-Nam, Cambodia and generally on the future of South-East Asia, on Rhodesia, and on economic assistance and commercial relations. The talks were unusually frank and informal, and our views were well understood. (Paragraphs 5–8.) 4. Despite the postponement and curtailment of the visit, it was an outstanding success. The Japanese were much impressed by your clear and positive answers to questions, and have summed up the talks as more meaty than ever. The only unfortunate aspect was that it proved * This was a difficult visit because of George Brown’s drinking habits and aggressive manner. In my memoir Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere, Global Oriental, 1998, (page 123) I wrote: ‘I remember one Sunday evening, John Pilcher had been to the airport to meet George Brown… John Pilcher rang to ask us to join them for dinner to help out with George. I soon realized that George, who was as usual drinking too much, had been trying to bully John. The conversation at dinner became quite heated when he attacked the public schools and the mentality of members of the diplomatic servic. But James Murray, then head of Far Eastern Department gave as good as he got and George, to be fair, did not seem to resent this.’ Fortunately George did not behave to Lady Pilcher (Delia) in the rude way in which he is reported to have spoken publicly to the wife of the British ambassador in Paris. Delia who had a commanding presence was in any case, well able to stand up for herself. † FJ 3/26 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Brown – received 22 January 1968.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

impossible to see anything of the historic and traditional aspects of Japanese life. (Paragraphs 9–11.) 18 January 1968

Y

our visit, to Japan to conduct the sixth round of the regular A ­ nglo-Japanese ministerial consultations was originally planned to take place from the 7th to the 12th of January. It had to be cut short by two days, but happily Mrs Brown was able to stay on for a further three days after your departure on the 10th and thus to carry out the Kyoto part of the programme, arranged by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and by Mr Shima, the Japanese Ambassador in London, who comes from that region. 2. The curtailment of the visit, of which I learned on the eve of your arrival, necessitated a rapid rearrangement of the programme. Thanks to the ­understanding and helpfulness of the Foreign Ministry and of the other organizations concerned – not to mention the heroic efforts of my Information Counsellor – it proved possible to retain almost all the ‘business’ side of the programme. The one casualty was the Japan-British Society (a livelier body than its London counterpart), whose council felt obliged to cancel the reception planned in your honour on the 12th of January (this followed an earlier cancellation of a similar reception, when your original plan to visit Japan in November had to be altered). Mrs Brown’s call on Princess Chichibu, the Patroness of the Society, together with the letter of regret from yourself which has been circulated to Society members, has, I trust, obliterated any damage. 3. During your short stay in Japan, you took part, with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Takeo Miki, in two sessions of ministerial consultations at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. You had an audience with their Majesties The Emperor and Empress and had talks with them and were entertained to luncheon by the Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato. Mr Miki gave a formal dinner in your honour, to which leaders of Opposition parties were invited, and also entertained you to a private dinner at a Japanese-style restaurant in Tokyo, where I think you had your first test in the use of chopsticks (as well as in downing raw fish). I gave a reception, to which a wide range of Japanese dignitaries together with Commonwealth and allied ambassadors and members of the British community were invited, and in the course of which you had a private talk with Socialist leaders of your acquaintance. After your departure Mrs Brown presided at a dinner party in my house to return to the Japanese authorities some of the hospitality received. 4. On your second morning in Japan you visited the large Toshiba Heavy Electrical Factory at Tsurumi outside Tokyo and were able to see at first-hand something of the well planned and neatly executed industrial development responsible for Japan’s extraordinary economic rebirth after the war. You also fulfilled several Press engagements, including a luncheon meeting with the Asian Affairs Research Council, a half-hour television interview with NHK (the Japanese broadcasting corporation) and an appearance at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club on your final afternoon. Your programme was in fact an exceptionally full and strenuous one, carried out with great vigour. 5. During the consultations (full records of which have been sent to your Department by bag) you were able to exchange views with the Japanese Foreign Minister about the Viet-Nam problem and to impress upon him the paramount importance of finding ways of bringing North Viet-Nam to the conference



VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO JAPAN, 7–10 JANUARY 196835

table and of evading pressing the United States to go back on their obligations (a dangerous course for Britain and Japan). You pursued this subject – in a mellower atmosphere – after Mr Miki’s large dinner party. The Japanese were impressed by the lucidity of your exposition and Mr Miki was grateful for your promise – promptly fulfilled – to convey to him any interesting results of your subsequent discussion with Mr Rusk in Washington. My impression is that Mr Miki is now less hopeful than he was some months ago that Japan can herself take helpful initiatives regarding Viet-Nam; but there can be no question of his sincerity in wishing to see an early settlement. 6. You pressed the Japanese to make greater efforts to achieve the goal of 1 per cent GNP in economic assistance to the less-developed, and urged that more be done to ensure the effectiveness of the United Nations mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. You also suggested that, in the field of bilateral Anglo-Japanese commercial relations, it was for Japan to take certain steps to ease the restrictions which still hampered the growth of trade. Though Mr Miki did not appear to be well-briefed on the last two subjects, I am sure that these points were taken. The talks also provided a useful opportunity to exchange views on the complex subject of Cambodian frontiers. 7. The Japanese were particularly interested in British plans in South-East Asia and asked whether the likelihood of accelerated military withdrawal from this area would create a ‘vacuum’. You were able to reassure them that everything possible would be done to avoid such a situation. Mr Miki gave no hint that Japan might herself one day be prepared to play a strategic role, though he is clearly aware that in the economic sphere Japan’s sheer industrial strength and commercial dynamism will assure her a growing influence. 8. Your talks with Mr Miki, Mr Sato and other leading Japanese were throughout conducted with a frankness and openness which created a most favourable atmosphere. The Japanese are normally a reserved and formal people. There is nothing, however, that they appreciate more than reaching a point in their relationships with their fellow-men at which formality can be dispensed with. This rarely happens in their dealings with foreigners. Your warm and forthright approach, however, served to break the ice at once and to create the right contact with Mr Miki, who is himself a more than averagely ‘open’ Japanese. 9. The postponement and the last-minute curtailment of the visit threatened a public relations disaster. I feared that it might be a long time before the Japanese would take us seriously again. In the event this aspect of the visit, thanks to our salvage operation and to your vigorous performance, became an outstanding success. This has been attested by numerous congratulations received from journalists and diplomatic colleagues following your departure. I realize that by a European or American yardstick the manner of questioning to which you were subjected at the Asian Affairs Research Council was hardly inspiring. But this occasion did enable you to explain British policy on such matters as Viet-Nam, Europe and the British economic situation to a very highlevel audience from the Japanese Press, public life and business world. Your clear and positive answers were appreciated and your hefty reply to the doctrinaire question from Mr Mitsu Kohno, the Vice-Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, on the subject of Viet-Nam was especially effective. The results in terms of coverage in the Japanese Press were extremely good. Your appearance at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, though brief, will long be remembered as one of the most enjoyable meetings in the Club’s recent history. Despite your

36

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

late arrival the atmosphere was relaxed, good-humoured and appreciative to a degree. 10. I am only sorry that you were not, in the event, able to see something of the historic and traditional aspects of Japanese life. However, perhaps one experience of raw fish and sake may be enough during a first visit to Japan. I would now, in retrospect, hesitate to recommend to you the ‘bloody clams with spikenards’, ‘truffles and rapebuds’, ‘riverbank with threads of limepeels’ and other ninth century delights to which Mr Shima treated us in Kyoto and with which Mrs Brown grappled with admirable equanimity. It was sad that, after much subjection to modernity, you missed the inward-looking gardens and the temples designed for recollection, which expose the deeper aspirations of the Japanese mind. They contrasted vividly with the remarkable ‘Bullet’ express train from Kyoto to Tokyo whose speedometer (displayed in the bar) often tops 200 kilometres an hour. I hope that another opportunity will present itself for you to sample this and some of the other delights of the old and new Japan. 11. In short, the Japanese have summed up the official talks as more than ever meaty and frank and you have confirmed your reputation as a redoubtable fencer in words. J. PILCHER

6 THE VISIT OF THE USS ENTERPRISE TO JAPAN*

SUMMARY The Enterprise, the largest aircraft carrier and the only nuclear-powered one in the world, lay at Sasebo from the 19th to the 23rd of January, 1968. American warships frequently visit Japan under the terms of the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Opposition to visits by nuclear-powered submarines has been eroded by repetition. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. Both the American and Japanese authorities appear to have hoped that the visit of Enterprise would help to cure the Japanese ‘nuclear allergy’. Opposition parties maintained that the visit was a case for ‘prior consultation’ under the Security Treaty and claimed the ship would bring nuclear weapons to Japan, which the Constitution† forbids. In Tokyo the Trotskyite factions of Zengakuren announced their adamant opposition to the visit. (Paragraphs 3–5.) 3. Leaders of Opposition political parties addressed large rallies at Sasebo. Zengakuren tried to storm the American naval base and by the time the Enterprise left on the 23rd of January 374 people had been injured and sixty-seven arrested. But the crew did manage to get ashore. (Paragraphs 6–8.) 4. Both Japanese and American authorities were surprised at the furore. The Opposition parties have won a publicity battle and the Zengakuren students some public sympathy; the issue united disparate elements of dissent. The Cabinet seems uncertain what to do next and there are differing views on how much attention should be paid to public sentiment. American disappointment has been augmented by the grudging nature of the support given to them by the Japanese over *  FJ 10/11 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Brown – received 6 February 1968. † This is incorrect. The Constitution, which came into force in 1947, is silent on this issue, but a Japanese law forbade the bringing of nuclear weapons into Japan.

38

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

the Pueblo incident, and some Americans may now question Japan’s reliability as an ally. (Paragraphs 9–12.) 5. The Enterprise affair has well illustrated the deep division between the Sato Administration and the neutralist Opposition. Although ­Japanese leaders have been trying to stimulate debate on defence issues the public remains largely indifferent to external threats. For the moment however Mr Sato may prefer to play a cautious game and avoid too open identification with American military policies. (Paragraphs 13–14.) 2 February 1968

T

he USS Enterprise (85,000 tons), the largest aircraft carrier and the only nuclear- powered one in the world together with her crew of 5,250 officers and men, entered the port of Sasebo on the morning of the 19th of January and put out to sea again on the morning of the 23rd of January, 1968. In this despatch I relate some of the singular circumstances surrounding the visit of this ship to Japan and attempt an assessment of the effects which this has had upon Japanese public opinion, domestic politics and Japanese-American relations in general. 2. Under the terms of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, signed in 1960, warships of the United States navy have called regularly at the ports of Sasebo and Yokusuka where there are United States naval bases. It was in November 1964 that for the first time a nuclear-powered vessel – a submarine – arrived at Sasebo and provoked a series of demonstrations. Apart from the general ‘nuclear allergy’ induced by the experience of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were objections on two counts: the fear that nuclear reactors would contaminate the waters and the charge, voiced mainly by the Japan Communist and Socialist parties, that the visits were part of an American ‘plot’ to involve Japan more closely in military operations in South-East Asia. The American authorities calculated that repetition would eventually breed indifference and so the visits continued. This calculation seemed to be correct: according to official statistics, while 53,200 people demonstrated at Yokosuka when the submarine Snook visited that port in May 1966 the numbers of demonstrators had dwindled to some 2,500 by the time of the Seadragon’s arrival last December. The ‘contamination’ fears had been dispelled by a plethora of scientific data and nineteen separate visits by submarines had reduced the demonstrators to a rump of hardened agitators. The Americans evidently calculated that the time was now ripe to escalate the tonnage and bring a larger ship to port. 3. The American Embassy in Tokyo may have known, when they informed the Japanese Government on the 2nd of September that the Enterprise would visit Japan, that Prime Minister Sato would shortly appeal to the Japanese people to take a more realistic view of the external military threat to their country and to play a greater part in their own defence. They doubtless reckoned that the visit of the Enterprise might even help in the slow process of overcoming the Japanese ‘nuclear allergy’ and fit in well with Mr Sato’s own designs. On the 21st of October the Japanese Government ‘approved’ the visit. They had in fact little option since if the visit was for “rest and recreation” the United States Government are obliged, under the Security Treaty, merely to inform the Japanese authorities.



THE VISIT OF THE USS ENTERPRISE TO JAPAN

39

4. The Opposition political parties nevertheless contended that the visit of this gigantic ship constituted a case for ‘prior consultation’ under the terms of the Security Treaty which must take place should there be: (a) a major change contemplated in the deployment of United States forces into Japan; (b) a major change in the equipment of United States forces in Japan; or (c) any question of Japanese territory being used as a base for combat operations. They claimed that the Enterprise was equipped with nuclear weapons and that the arrival of this ‘mobile nuclear base’ would run counter to the Constitution (see footnote above), which forbids the importation of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The Government however stuck to its interpretation and refused to admit that a visit by this ship necessitated prior consultations. They concluded, from an American assurance that the spirit of the Constitution would be observed, that there was no danger of nuclear weapons being brought to Japan. They also turned a blind eye to the fact that on leaving Japan the ship would sail for the ‘Yankee Station’ off the coast of North Viet-Nam. 5. By the time the Diet met at the beginning of December the Opposition were using the visit as an excuse to charge Mr Sato’s Government with violation of the Constitution, plotting to involve Japan in the Viet-Nam war and riding roughshod over the nuclear sensibilities of the public. The exact date of the arrival of the Enterprise was kept a closely guarded secret. To blunt the Opposition’s protests, it was decided that the visit should take place while the Diet was in recess. By the second week in January, however, it was common knowledge that the vessel would arrive at Sasebo sometime between the 17th and the 20th of January. Feverish preparations were made to oppose the visit. There was a foretaste of events to come when the extreme Left-wing Trotskyite factions of Zengakuren (Federation of All-Japan Student Autonomous Bodies) announced that they would oppose the visit by every available means. This organization had already attracted notoriety for rioting at Tokyo airport in October, when Mr Sato left for his tour of South-East Asian countries. On the 14th of January, 131 Zengakuren students were arrested on their way to the station to take the train for Sasebo (a trip of over 800 miles costing about £8 10s a head – a formidable amount for the organization). They carried with them staves, which the police alleged were weapons designed to cause bodily harm. Legal experts have been surprised that they should have been charged under a law which was originally intended to stop gang warfare. For the next few days in Tokyo there were a series of demonstrations, rallies sponsored by political parties, marches past the American Embassy and clashes between Zengakuren students and the police. On the 20th of January students forced their way into the Foreign Ministry and attempted to storm Mr Miki’s study. Fortunately the Foreign Minister was away and the insurgents were repulsed and arrested without much difficulty. 6. Meanwhile the centre of attraction had shifted to Sasebo. Here, besides some 800 Zengakuren members from various universities throughout the country, the leaders of all the Opposition parties had also gathered. On the 17th of January the Komeito (Sokagakkai or Buchmanite-like Buddhists) held a rally

40

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

of some 20,000 persons, which was addressed by the Chairman of the Party, Mr Takeiri. He denounced the visit of the Enterprise as being tantamount to Japan’s co-operation in the Viet-Nam war and roundly declared that, as the Americans would neither confirm nor deny the fact, the ship must be equipped with nuclear weapons. He also alleged that the visit was part of a grand design on the part of Mr Sato to ‘inoculate’ the Japanese people against their ‘nuclear allergy’ and to prepare the way for a return of Okinawa with its nuclear bases intact. The rally attracted considerable interest, for it was the first occasion on which the Komeito had made a political protest of this nature outside the Diet. The Democratic Socialist Party, too, staged a rally of some 10,000 people and the party’s Chairman, Mr Eiichi Nishimura, emphasized that, while his party supported the Security Treaty, it could condone neither the hazards to health posed by the arrival of the Enterprise nor the fact that the Americans would not comment on the nuclear weapon question. Not to be outdone by what had gone before, the Japan Socialist and Communist parties jointly summoned a rally of reportedly 50,000 people, graced by the presence of their respective Chairmen. 7. Several days before the Enterprise dropped anchor on the morning of the 19th of January, Zengakuren had clashed with the police. For the next four days the ‘battle of Sasebo’ continued at sporadic intervals. No one seemed quite sure what were the strategic objectives of the students beyond an attempted ­invasion of the American naval base. Time and again they tried to batter their way through a solid phalanx of police and rush the gates behind, only to be repulsed by a whole range of riot control paraphernalia, including ­high-powered water hoses and tear gas. The fracas was given widespread coverage on the television and bloodstained victims were interviewed before the ubiquitous cameras. By the time the Enterprise had left on the morning of the 23rd of January, after a few had gathered to shake their fists at her departing wake, the figures read one dead (a policeman, of a heart attack), 374 injured (including bystanders and journalists) and sixty-seven arrested. 8. Surprisingly, in spite of all of this, the crew of the Enterprise and the ships which escorted her did manage to get some ‘rest and recreation’ – albeit mostly within the well-guarded precincts of the naval base. Peacefully enough the quartermaster ordered a ton of cabbage and lettuce. The captain held a Press conference, in which he called the visit ‘routine’ and parried questions about the real need for rest, since the crew had already sampled the fleshpots of Hawaii a few days earlier. He adamantly refused comment on the nuclear armament question, permitted journalists to look around the deck, but would permit no peep at what went on below. 9. There can be little doubt that both the American and Japanese authorities alike were relieved at the departure of Enterprise. Although they had, of course, been prepared for some trouble, they were clearly surprised by the furore which this visit had occasioned. The Government indeed had attempted to create a favourable climate of public opinion and 50,000 pamphlets had been distributed at Sasebo. A party of Liberal Democratic Diet members flew out to Enterprise, when she was still on the high seas, to demonstrate their support for the visit and partake of the captain’s hospitality. Notwithstanding these efforts, it was later officially admitted that there had been a ‘lack of public relations’. The Americans for their part failed to take into account that many Japanese would believe that because the Enterprise was driven by nuclear power it followed that she must also carry nuclear weapons. The arrival of conventionally-powered



THE VISIT OF THE USS ENTERPRISE TO JAPAN

41

warships in the port had not provoked such fears. The Opposition parties could claim (partly thanks to Zengakuren) to have scored a publicity victory albeit at heavy expense. They vowed that the struggle would now be taken to the Diet – which is where many commentators felt it should have been carried on in the first place. As one newspaper quaintly put it, ‘the people want the politicians to show a posture of racking their brains and shouldering the destiny of the country’. 10. The Government were probably surprised also at the amount of moral support given to Zengakuren much of which may have reflected sympathy for victimized youth. Bystanders openly obstructed the police and responded to the students’ appeals for funds. The police were also, it seems, somewhat over-zealous. The 5,800-man riot squad, employed at a cost of 200 million yen, came mostly from Osaka, where they were well practised in controlling the riotous labourers of the Kamagasaki slums. The Chairman of the National Public Safety Committee issued instructions that the police were ‘to use their clubs more calmly and with greater composure’. But the police are, it must be admitted, hampered by regulations which do not permit preventive arrest, and by the force of public opinion, which, mindful of pre-war abuses, is reluctant to give them increased powers. Never before in Japan, the newspapers say, have so many people demonstrated on a single issue in one city. This happened, because for once all Opposition parties found themselves agreed to resist any attempts to cure the ‘nuclear allergy’, though this slogan was less the real issue than a convenient rallying cry uniting otherwise disparate forces of dissent. The demonstrators answered the politicians’ call for a variety of reasons, amongst which I would include a general dislike of Mr Sato and his policies, discontent with political jobbery, frustration at the failure of parliamentary Opposition, xenophobia and general boredom. 11. The Government must be dismayed at the attitudes of the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party which had declared themselves for the moment in favour of the present security arrangements. The Cabinet has shown some signs of disagreement on what it should do next. Mr Kimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, told a Press conference that, before approving future calls of this kind, the Government should give ‘careful consideration’ to public opinion. This remark was promptly countered by Mr Fukuda, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, who tried to minimize the importance of public sentiment and declared it Japan’s ‘duty’ to offer facilities to visiting warships under the terms of the Security Treaty. There will certainly be further debate about this. 12. Although all the published indications are that the Enterprise was not carrying nuclear weapons, the refusal of the American authorities to comment, for customary security reasons, has not improved their public image. At the same time the despatch of the Enterprise to Korean waters immediately after the visit, as a show of force against North Korea following the Pueblo’s seizure, served further to heighten Japanese anxieties. Mr Sato interestingly made no reference to defence in his policy speech to the Diet, which met on the 27th of January, and the Japanese have shown themselves prepared, in spite of strong American representations, to make only a rather grudging and belated declaration of support over the Pueblo incident. The Americans have said that the Enterprise will return one day. But they are also well aware that they will have to be careful with the Upper House elections in six months’ time not to embarrass the Government by the timing of a visit. The United States Embassy here are

42

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

additionally worried that the affair will increase doubts in Congress and the Administration about Japan’s “reliability” as an ally. To those who hope that Japan can be persuaded to play some part in the defence of South-East Asia in the future, especially after Britain’s withdrawal from the area, events at Sasebo must have come as a disappointment. 13. The Enterprise affair provides yet another illustration of the deep chasm which separates the Sato Administration from the neutralist and anti-American Left. It conveniently united nationalist and neutralist sentiment and showed that many ordinary Japanese are unhappy about the extent to which reliance on the United States ‘nuclear umbrella’ may mean involvement in America’s wars. Though the capacity of the efficient Japanese police to control large-scale and violent demonstrations, which is already impressive, may improve with new legislation, there are obvious and not very comforting implications for 1970, when the Security Treaty becomes subject to review. The Japanese leaders must draw the rather discouraging lesson that, despite their sporadic efforts over the last two years to stimulate debate on matters of defence and national security, the general public is by and large still unconscious (as I suggested in my despatch No. 45 of the 21st of December) of any serious external threat to Japan: it is in fact concerned mainly to avoid involvement in anything smacking of power politics or nuclear deployment whether American or Communist in origin. Such views are easily criticized as ostrich-like and naïve and I do not think it is beyond the powers of Japan’s present political leadership to inculcate more realistic attitudes. But the Government’s attempts in this direction have so far not percolated very deep and an intensive educational effort will be required if substantial early progress is to be expected. The recent full-scale Viet Cong offensive, together with the signs of Communist intransigence in Korea, may now help to open the eyes of the sceptics to the external dangers. 14. The Government’s immediate reaction, as I have tried to show has been defensive and cautious, and they may decide that the easiest course is to rely on their well-worn policy of seeking the best of a number of worlds: of continuing to rely on American nuclear and conventional protection, while also adopting a superficially independent posture by such means as cultivating ties with the Russians and dissociation from American ‘warlike’ activities. The main snag here – apart from the fact that the Russians themselves are little impressed – is that the United States Administration would seem in their present mood to find this kind of double-faced approach extremely irritating. And although ‘dollar defence’ may have impaired their image of protective omnipotence, the Americans still hold the important trump card of Okinawa, which they will only be prepared to return to Japan, when a number of conditions – including probably a more positive Japanese contribution to mutual defence – are first met. When Mr Sato returned from Washington last November he appears to have been strongly influenced by the latter consideration. But at the present time he seems conscious above all of the neutralist and somewhat xenophobic mood with which the Press and public have reacted both to the Enterprise visit and to the Pueblo incident. Moreover in this and the coming year he will be increasingly preoccupied with the problem of how to cope with the expected violence in 1970. It will be interesting to see which way he moves next. J. PILCHER

7

SIR JOHN PILCHER’S IMPRESSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN*

SUMMARY Do factories now embody the ideals of a warlike race? (Paragraph 2.) The Japanese have gone off at a tangent three times in history, led apparently by their imperial family. Militarism failed and the military misled the Emperor, but the Emperor by his broadcast saved the country from ruin. His standing is as high as ever. (Paragraphs 3–4.) Geography begat cohesion, to which a Confucian structure was given in the period of isolation. The military in the 1930s exaggerated the pattern; national exclusiveness made a mockery of their ‘mission’ to save Asia for the Asiatics. (Paragraphs 5–7.) Defeat taught the Japanese that they are like other men, but an abnormal sense of cohesion remains. They are not quite fully developed individuals and take decisions in groups. Moreover they rely on intuition rather than reason. (Paragraphs 8–9.) The traditional structure remains intact without the exaggeration of the 1930s. Fundamentally the Japanese face the twentieth century from different premises to ourselves. (Paragraphs 10–11.) They are not Westernized and their peculiar qualities contribute to their present success. The consequent difficulties of doing business with them. (Paragraphs 12–14.) Success has brought thirst for consumer goods, but traditional taste has been strengthened in high places. (Paragraph 15.) The Japanese people are likely to be satisfied with their economic success for some time, but they approach a turning point. Having renounced war and relying on others for their defence, they must * FJ 1/6 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Brown – received 19 February 1968.

44

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

now consider standing on their own feet and even perhaps filling the vacuum left by us in South-East Asia. (Paragraphs 16–17.) The problems facing them admit of no military solution, but the need for a wider economic sphere may make the pull of China strong. (Paragraphs 18–19.) They need friends to keep them anchored in the West. In self-interest we should play that role. (Paragraph 20.) 12 February 1968

I

offer some reflections on contemporary Japan as I find it after an absence of some thirty years and four months in the country now. 2. The monk, painter and poet Basho,† visiting the battlefield of Sekigahara, on which the fate of Japan for several vital centuries had been decided, felt moved to address to the empty, green plain the following ‘haiku’: ‘Oh grass of summer, you are all that remains of the dreams of warriors!’ Were he able to revisit his country now, after its recovery from the unprecedented devastation of the last war, and were he to take the famous Bullet train, the sight of the unending factories springing up all along the 300 miles from Tokyo to Osaka might well inspire in him the same reflection as the lush grass on that plain. Into this all too flourishing industrial development (with its lamentable hideosity) have gone the devotion to duty, the energy and the idealism of the ‘kamikaze’ pilots. The dark, satanic mills seem to embody now the aspirations of a race of warriors. The question is for how long. 3. The Japanese in the course of their history have veered in different directions, always seemingly at the behest of their ruling family. Under Prince Shotoku in the seventh century they swallowed the civilization and religion of T’ang China. The Emperor Meiji, after his restoration to the position his ancestors held in the remote past, appeared to sponsor the Westernization of his country and its opening to the world exactly a hundred years ago. It was the present Emperor, who, in the spirit of his reign title ‘Showa’, meaning ‘radiant peace’ (which had hitherto sounded so ironically in Japanese ears), brought the last war to an end by his heroic and dramatic broadcast. He thus in popular estimation saved his country and his people from total annihilation. For this he is accorded unending gratitude. 4. The Japanese, of course, are as hypocritical as others have found us. They know well how to cloak their mundane ambitions in the full panoply of the highest moral obligations. In the 1930s the military – in line with ­long-established tradition – had got the Emperor, the theoretical source of all power, into their hands. They interpreted his will to be the aggrandisement of his empire, in the guise of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’, the Co-prosperity Sphere and helping as an act of Confucian family Piety the sick elder brother, China, on to his feet. Asia was to be saved from the corrosive effect of decadent Western † John Pilcher made a mistake. The famous poem by Basho to which he was referring here was natsukusa ya/tsuwamono domo ga/yume no ato which Donald Keene translates as ‘The summer grass – of brave soldiers’ dreams The aftermath’ is from Basho’s travelogue Oku no Hosomichi and was written near Hiraizumi in Northern Japan and refers to a famous battle which involved the twelth century Japanese hero Minamoto no Yoshitsune.



SIR JOHN PILCHER’S IMPRESSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN45

materialism. When this ‘mission’ did not succeed and the very existence of the Japanese State was threatened, it was obvious to all that the military had not only failed to carry out their interpretation of the will of the Emperor, but also that they had misled him. Far from the prestige of the Emperor suffering from the great humiliation of the first national defeat known to Japanese history, by his courageous broadcast he emerged as the saviour of his country and a man to whom the military had done a great wrong. To the awe his position traditionally inspires are therefore now added sympathy and affection. 5. It is to me of the greatest significance that the Emperor remains at the apex of the Japanese edifice. Without this keystone, the whole structure might well have collapsed (as indeed happened in China in 1911). Japanese morale is based on an excessive sense of nationalism, born of their geographical remoteness from the Asian mainland; they are situated eighty miles off Korea – as though we lay at the same distance off Norway. They tend to think of themselves as being as different from others as dogs from cats. To a dog presumably the highest living dog is The supreme Dog. They emerged from the mists of the past grouped round their Emperor, whom they regarded as on a par with the divinities or heroes of rock, stream, waterfall or grove and with the historic or legendary figures of their past. 6. This abnormal cohesion was given a solid Confucian structure under the ascendancy of the Tokugawa Shoguns (which followed the battle of S­ ekigahara), and was further accentuated by the policy of isolation ­(1636–1868) imposed upon the country. No people has ever been so regimented probably as under the ‘military government’ of the Tokugawas. Every detail of life was prescribed, from the dress permitted to each age and profession, to the proportions of rooms. Frugality and austerity were enjoined on all: ostentation was the nadir of vulgarity. Loyalty was the supreme virtue, before which every other ­consideration had to give way. The sacrifice of self, wife, child and family to further the interests of the superior to whom loyalty was due is the very stuff of Japanese drama to this day. The restoration of the Emperor in 1868 put the correct keystone back on to the edifice and gave Japan the internal strength and backbone to pursue the deliberate policy of modernizing herself and thus catching up with the West, while retaining her singular structure and thought pattern intact. 7. The military in the 1930s exaggerated the pattern. Self-sacrifice became a fetish, to die for the Emperor an end in itself. ‘Thought-control’ saw to it that ‘the heartless legalism of the West’ and its enervating individualism were kept at bay. To be seen with a golf club meant censure for a man, while women with permanently waved hair were summoned to the police station for a severe talking to. In the end the excessive exclusivity inculcated defeated the purposes of the ‘divine mission’. The Japanese soldier proved incapable of understanding the outlook of others or of treating them as comparable human beings. From this springs the cruelty that astonished and shocked the world. It made a mockery of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’. 8. Observing this from afar, I thought that defeat would teach the lesson to the Japanese that they are as other men are. This alone, together with the discomfiture of the military, I thought, should make the Japanese reasonably normal, without necessarily destroying their cohesive structure, upon which their successful national life depends. This has proved to be the case. Exclusivity has gone, even to the point of neutralism and voluntary dependence on others advocated by the Left of Centre. On the other hand, cohesion has

46

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

become so rooted in the national psychology as to seem virtually indestructible; it has become part of the Japanese psyche. The individual Japanese never seems quite fully developed until ripe old age. Alone, he is all too often diffident, inconclusive and awkward; he finds fulfilment in the group. This cohesive, ‘holistic’ tendency of the Japanese means that the group is stronger than the sum of its members. From an individual, no startling decisions can be expected; a group may plan a Pearl Harbor or an economic miracle. 9. Again, the Japanese are not an intellectual race; they rely upon intuition and in a group upon the insensible friction of mind upon mind to find decisions almost instinctively (just as they prefer an object of art to appear to be ‘born’, rather than ‘made’). In this they are vastly encouraged by the typically Japanese development of Zen Buddhism, which holds that enlightenment can never be attained by the intellect through reason, but only by a flash of intuitive perception. The military deduced from this that the reflex action of the warrior in severing a head with a sword, rather than risk pausing to reason with its owner, was morally justifiable. However admirable the effects of Zen on aesthetics, with its anti-rational influence on the national psychology, have been of questionable value. 10. In short, I return after thirty years to find the Japanese national structure intact with the Emperor at its peak. The web of Confucian obligations and the discipline elaborated in the period of isolation still bind the structure together; the schools teach Confucian ethics; loyalty remains the paramount principle. While the military and national exclusivity are out, cohesion is as glutinous as ever. The exaggerations of the system are in abeyance; a mistake no longer leads to suicide. The absence of the secret police has led to an unwonted openness. This in turn gives a superficial impression of ‘normality’ (from our point of view). The young are not so repressed (they can insist on the spouse of their choice), nor are the old so authoritarian. Democracy, in so far as it fits their psychology, has taken root, though racked by the cliquishness, which their holistic tendencies inevitably beget. Underneath – whether they consciously recognize this or not – they still live in the shadow of their own Shinto (pantheist, monarch-revering), post-Buddhist and Confucian world. Conversely, but interestingly enough, they tend to find incomprehensible in us the remnants of our Christian heritage. 11. In their world there is no barrier between man and the rest of creation. Man is a stone among stones, a bird among birds. Other animate and inanimate things have a greater intrinsic significance to them than to us. The fact that portions of the human personality regroup with others on the same plane of spiritual development and move up and down the scale of objects and beings means that for them a table or a plant is closer to the human being. Man is considered in his cosmic setting. He is viewed as a drop in a stream; a passing phenomenon, here one moment and gone the next. The transience of existence, the evanescence of all things and the ‘sadness of matter’ are the inevitable commonplace signs of Japanese conversation and literature. Moreover the world is an illusion: the Calderon-like cry ‘since I am convinced that reality is in no sense real, how can I admit that dreams are dreams?’ haunts their senses – and offers only a poetic escape. 12. Many assume that because they are modern, they must be ‘Westernized’. This is far from the case. They were influenced by the post-Christian idealism and humanity shown by the American conquerors, but fundamentally they approach the twentieth century in fact from different premises to our own.



SIR JOHN PILCHER’S IMPRESSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN47

Loyalty and cohesion have stood them in immensely good stead. They are loyal to their ministry or firm with almost the fervour of religion. Once they enter an organization, they offer themselves to it for life. The web of obligations sees to it that their superiors – theoretically, but usually – look after them for life. Yearly increments of salary are paid to all. Housing is commonly provided. Even wives or husbands might be found by the employers, if requested. Education is often completed by them. Habit demands that civil servants should retire early (just as Emperors in the past retired to a Buddhist retreat, where as monks they ruled the country from behind the ‘screens’). They move into industry, while retaining their sense of loyalty to their former ministry. Hence the ease with which the Government can influence or even direct industry through a vastly extended ‘old boy net’. 13. Their holistic tendencies fit well into the bureaucratic life of the age. They present baffling problems to foreigners. Under their system nothing can be done in a hurry. Prior notice must be given of a point, which will then be studied endlessly by the relevant group, before any decision can be reached. Moreover, generally, the foreigner must himself show an awareness of the principles of loyalty, if he is to make headway. Once the Japanese are ‘engaged’, their sense of loyalty comes into play; they are therefore unwilling to engage themselves, unless they are sure of the other side. It becomes almost a question of making friends, before successful business deals on any scale can be achieved. This is time-consuming and entails frequent visits to Japan, and great patience is required. 14. As to their cosmic outlook, they would maintain that it is more in keeping with the contemporary findings of science. It leads to a certain fatalism, which is the enemy of the busybody. The Confucian ethic makes of harmony in family life and in the nation a prime aim. Both reinforce a preference for quiet collaboration as a means for achieving improvement, which makes for peace in the industrial world. The greater respect for natural objects leads, I suspect, to increased satisfaction in creation, which in turn might account for the pleasure the Japanese evidently derive from their work. I conclude that the maintenance of their singular and different social and mental structure and outlook accounts very largely for their present phenomenal success. 15. Success has had a surprising effect on them and may kill the tradition of austerity, which saw them through their worst years. The public is no longer content with the ancient tradition of austere elegance. An insatiable thirst for consumer goods has hit the whole nation. The seventeen major department stores in Tokyo are more opulent than Harrods and pullulate with buyers. 30,000 people a day poured through our Victorian Exhibition in a store on top of a railway terminus. Every one now aspires to a car, while a television set (seven channels and colour in Tokyo) has become a real necessity of life. Architecture is changing and Western ‘comforts’ (once so despised) are the order of the day. In the higher income brackets a certain happy synthesis of Japanese taste and Western construction and convenience reigns. The offices of tycoons are models of Japanese sobriety, which was anything but the case before the war. Luxury may not therefore quite ruin tradition. 16. The cogent question I started by posing is how long can this economic success satisfy the Japanese mind. The Japanese are an awkward mixture of Prussian respect for order, combined with an Italian sensibility (but without the Italian genius for improvisation). They have been nurtured and sustained on ideals. The war turned many of their ideals into shattered illusions.

48

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

They have in consequence been content to adopt a low posture, to turn in on themselves, to set their house in order and to seek economic prosperity. They are in a fair way to achieving their limited and mundane objectives. They can build more and more motorways and super-express railways; they could even turn to beautifying their cities (a consideration to which they have only just begun to devote themselves). But in many ways they are approaching, more rapidly than they may yet be aware, a turning of the ways. 17. Hitherto they have been able to leave largely on one side the defence of their country, because they felt secure under the shadow of the American umbrella. This enabled them to devote nearly all their resources to more immediately profitable economic development. It allowed them also to indulge in the luxury of neutralism and to let their very understandable ‘nuclear allergy’ run riot. Now China’s nuclear potential, North Korea’s cheeky actions and doubts about the impermeability of the American umbrella, now being nurtured by events in South Viet-Nam, make them realize that they will almost certainly have to increase their capacity to defend themselves. They may have to be prepared to stand entirely on their own feet. This in turn may slow down their breakneck economic rise. 18. It is bewildering for them to be begged to re-arm in their state of healthy reaction against militarism. It is almost comic to be solicited to bolster up ­South-East Asia and to occupy the vacuum we may leave. For us the ­re-arming of a nation with so strong a military tradition as Japan is bound to cause ­anxiety. Their defence forces are already smart and evidently efficient (­ incidentally on land they are equal in number to the limited forces we aspire to retain). I would hazard the guess that militaristic adventure is unlikely to tempt them. The American example is all too vividly before their eyes. They are very conscious of being in the same boat as ourselves. They need a greater trading space. A kind of common market with China is the obvious answer, but the shape and compatibility of the China to come are not yet visible and may not become so for a very long time. ‘If it were just General de Gaulle’, they say with envy. . . Then memories of the Co-Prosperity Sphere inhibit the creation by them of an equivalent to EFTA in South-East Asia. These problems, which obsess every thinking Japanese, clearly admit of no militaristic solution. The temptation in the long run for Japan will rather be to make common cause with China. Whether they succumb to that or not will depend on how China shapes and how firmly they are anchored in the West. Let us not forget, however, that between the Confucian ideal of achieving harmony here and now in this world and the Communist hopes of building a Utopian, classless society, the difference is relatively small. Apart from the national institution of the Imperial Family, Japan is now virtually a classless society. Land reform has eliminated any territorial wealth. ‘Fun’ is exclusively on expense accounts. In my opinion, based on so short a view of contemporary Japan, future danger may well lie in the pull of China. 19. For the time-being, however, I think Basho, were he living, would have been right to conclude that the teeming factories have canalized and made constructive the aftermath of the dreams of the warriors, who led Japan so terribly astray only thirty years ago and whose teachings and antics in Japan and China remain so vividly present to my mind. 20. Meanwhile, I think and hope that we are resuming the habit of friendship with Japan, abandoned after the First World War. The country has gained greatly in stature since the Second World War. Her position on the fringe of



SIR JOHN PILCHER’S IMPRESSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN49

a largely hostile continent makes her seek friends. It is important that she should remain anchored in the West and therefore that she should find the right friends. The part we played in bringing her into the comity of nations and in extending friendship on equal terms in 1902 still moves the Japanese. Like ourselves they are slow to accept others. They accepted us once and I feel sure are willing to do so again. The loyalty they give their friends might be a valuable asset in the commercial competition that must become more acute, and mitigate the worst effects of trade rivalry. We have made a good beginning with your visit. The British Week in 1969 with its attendant ‘attractions’ should keep up the momentum, until the Osaka Expo 70 affords an occasion for a major manifestation of friendship. In addition I hope all concerned will realize the vast public and enormous interest any cultural contribution we can send at any time will command. Newspapers, radio, television and stores vie with one another to foot the bill. There is thus no expense to hold us back. May I end with a plea that we take their offers seriously and deliver at least those goods soon and on time? J. PILCHER

8 THE 58TH (REGULAR) DIET SESSION*

T

he following is a summary of the proceedings of the 58th Regular Session of the Japanese Diet, which began on the 27th of December 1967 and ended on the 3rd of June, 1968. 2. The Diet approved a total of ninety bills out of 108 which were presented to it. Five other bills carried forward from the previous session were also passed. I enclose a list of the more important of these measures and of the international conventions and bilateral treaties which were ratified during the session. 3. In the eyes of the Japanese public, the most important of the treaties ratified was the agreement with the United States which provided for the return of the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands to Japan after twenty-three years of American administration. This had been agreed at the time of the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, to Washington in November, 1967. The return of these lush volcanic atolls to Japanese sovereignty was greeted with emotion by Japanese Politicians and the press; it was heralded as an important step towards regaining control over all the islands still under foreign occupation, but which formed part of Japan proper in the pre-war years. 4. The 300-odd inhabitants, who now reside in the Bonin Islands (compared with some 8,000 before the Second World War), seem however to have mixed feelings about the prospect of becoming again nationals of a country whose language many of the younger generation cannot speak, read or write. In Tokyo there are plans afoot to “develop” the islands as a much vaunted ­tourist paradise. They will also provide port facilities for Japanese fishing vessels, hitherto denied by the American authorities except in the typhoon season. Under the agreement, some Americans will remain to man those ­military installations which the United States will retain for the time being. 5. The Diet discussed at inordinate length the budget for the financial year 1968/69. Although for fifty-two days the budget lay before the Diet – and for seventeen of them the Opposition parties refused discussion – it was a

*  FJ 1/7 – 27 June 1968.



THE 58TH (REGULAR) DIET SESSION51

totally unrelated issue which caused delay. Mr Tadao Kuraishi, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, had enraged the opposition parties and ­embarrassed his own, by forthright remarks which were construed to be unconstitutional. Referring to the interference of foreign warships in Japanese fishing ­operations, he told journalists that Japan needed ‘warships and guns’ to ensure the protection of her fishing vessels and he pointed to the limitations of diplomacy without military backing. In a scornful reference to the Constitution he described it as a ‘foolish thing, like a concubine and providing no firm basis for independence’ and added ‘if only we had atomic bombs and an army of 300,000 men …’. Such remarks by Cabinet Ministers are not uncommon and frequently go unreported. But Mr Kuraishi had earlier expressed impatience with the journalists who accompanied him (as they do all J­ apanese Ministers) from morning till night. This powerful lobby decided that a Minister should learn to treat the press with deference and his remarks were duly published. For the ensuing seventeen days proceedings in the Diet were brought to a halt. Prime Minister Sato had first hoped to weather the storm and retain his Minister whilst reproving him, but he was finally forced to request Mr ­Kuraishi’s resignation. 6. Among those bills approved by the 58th Regular Session, the Overseas Co-operation Fund Law, passed on the 30th of May, is worthy of special mention in the context of Japanese aid to developing countries. It is now possible under the terms of this law for Japan to extend aid in the form of commodities; previously the Overseas Co-operation Fund had been solely used for contributions to the construction of dams, roads and harbours. An immediate result of this has been that the Japanese Government have announced that aid to Indonesia in 1968 will amount to $80 million and may rise to $110 million by the end of the current financial year. This will no doubt mitigate the disappointment of the Indonesian Government, who had been informed at the time of President Suharto’s visit to this country that Japan would not be able to exceed the $60 million already promised. 7. The session was distinguished by the lack of debate on the measures which were passed; in consequence the public was spared the acrimonious scenes, the walk-outs and fisticuffs which marred discussion on some of the issues in the 55th and 56th Diet Sessions of 1967. This does not, however, indicate that the Government and opposition parties were more harmonious in their approach to Parliamentary business; it was rather that the Government, by not presenting controversial measures, did its best to avoid trouble. Bills which were not debated included one to increase the strength of the Maritime Self Defence Force by some 830 men and a measure designed to restrict gifts to political parties. This latter, the Political Funds Control Bill, was shelved after the Diet Sessions of 1967 and, as the Government’s latest proposals were roundly denounced by opposition parties, Mr Sato judged it expedient not to put them to debate. The newspapers have called in question the sincerity of the Prime Minister’s desire to restrict political gifts, especially as the Government’s latest proposals include one which would allow for these to be offset against income tax. The Prime Minister, however, has promised that the bill will be reintroduced at the earliest possible moment. 8. In debate the members of both Houses turned their attention mainly to such issues as the ‘Kuraishi statement’, which I have described above, and other incidents which had embarrassed the Government. The Director-General of the Defence Agency, Mr Masuda, was attacked, following revelations that

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

representatives of an American aircraft company had been given classified papers by a Colonel in the Defence Agency and had been able to make a vast profit on aircraft contracts. Mr Masuda was forced to admit that the Defence Agency was ‘a house of corruption’, though he hotly denied other charges that the Agency was conducting research into bacteriological warfare. The Diet also took much time discussing the allegations that the American nuclear powered submarine Swordfish discharged radioactive materials at the port of Sasebo. This incident was shortly followed by the crash of an American jet fighter from the Itazuke Base in a densely populated area of the city of Fukuoka, with consequent demands that the base should be removed. The opening of a US Army Field Hospital at Oji on the outskirts of Tokyo to treat wounded from Vietnam was a controversial issue throughout the session. 9. The opposition parties were not therefore short of sticks with which to beat the Government. Mr Sato and his Ministers were continually on the defensive and it was noticeable that in debate they did little to defend the Americans from a barrage of press and opposition criticism. Mindful of the need to protect the interests of the Liberal Democratic Party before the elections for the House of Councillors, the Prime Minister described the Oji Hospital as ‘undesirable’ (no matter that the government had been continually consulted and had earlier approved of its construction). The Swordfish incident was ‘unfortunate’ and he asked the US naval authorities to suspend visits to Japanese ports by American nuclear-powered vessels. Following the crash of the American jet fighter at Fukuoka, the Government has made its opinion known that Itazuke Air Base should be re-located. In short, the Government’s attitude towards their American allies on these domestic issues contrasts most noticeably with their failure to make even a peep of protest over the detention by the Chinese of some twelve Japanese citizens in Peking over the last year. The recent arrest of the Peking Correspondent of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal) has brought no talk of retaliatory measures in Tokyo, little press comment and no demonstrations. 10. The 58th Regular Session of the Diet was above all preoccupied with the elections for the House of Councillors, which will take place on the 7th of July. Throughout the session all parties strove to present their views on the political issues of the moment and so influence the electorate. The incidents, which I have mentioned above, merely added local colour to more far reaching discussions on the Mutual Security Treaty and the conditions and timing of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. On these issues, despite a good deal of sound and fury on all sides, the Government’s attitude at the end of the session remained much as it was at the beginning. Mr Sato maintains that the Security Treaty will remain the basis of Japan’s Security System. He now professes to be more optimistic than previously that Okinawa will be returned before 1970 – though there is no evidence that the Americans have given him grounds for optimism. But he has refused to be drawn on the conditions of return and maintains that, until negotiations begin, he will keep the slate clean of any prejudgements. 11. There can be no doubt that this session was a disappointment to Mr Sato and to his close adviser Mr Fukuda, the Secretary General of the Party. The Prime Minister had hoped, following his return from Washington, that he would be able so to conduct himself in the Diet that the Japanese people would become more conscious of their own defence needs and less prone to their ‘nuclear allergy’. The series of incidents which have marred United



THE 58TH (REGULAR) DIET SESSION53

States-Japan relations in recent months prevented this. Furthermore, ­President Johnson’s announcement that the bombing of North Vietnam would be modified and that he would not seek re-election left Mr Sato open to charges that he had too closely identified himself with the Johnson Administration’s policies and its failure to bring the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion – though the Japanese Government have only given the vaguest verbal support to the American position in Vietnam. The Prime Minister was forced to dismiss one minister and fend off the attacks of the opposition on just those issues of national security and Okinawa where he had hoped to take the initiative. There are those within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party who would wish to pull him down when he stands for re-election as Party President at the end of this year. It is believed that the Party will certainly lose some seats in the forthcoming elections. Mr Sato has, however, proved himself to be a durable politician and there is every likelihood that he will continue for a while at least as Party President. But the events of the 58th Regular Session of the Diet may well have injected a dose of caution into his approach to Japan’s relations with the United States. It remains to be seen how he will handle this effervescent question, which the newspapers now call ‘the public nuisance of the Security Treaty’, when the Diet meets again after the elections. JOHN PILCHER

9 THE SÔKA GAKKAI AND THE KÔMEITÔ*

SUMMARY During the past two years the Sôka Gakkai has come to belie some earlier estimations of its potential. (Paragraph 1.) Like its thirteenth century ancestor, Nichiren Buddhism, the faith of the Sôka Gakkai is militant and intolerant; but it has also come to include a potentially dangerous species of Messianic nationalism. (Paragraphs 2–3.) The practice of ‘forcible conversion’ and antipathy to organized religion mixed with politics born of experience of State Shintô, render the movement distasteful to the majority of Japanese; nevertheless it thrives on the membership of the new uprooted city-dwellers, attracted by group activities and by the powerful personality of Ikeda, its President. (Paragraphs 4–6.) In July 1968 the Kômeitô won votes in excess of Sôka Gakkai members and, despite its continued lack of coherent policies, the relative failure of the other Opposition parties may have opened a door to real political power. Within a few years the Kômeitô might even, through coalition, be able to affect the policies of the Japanese Government. (Paragraphs 7–9.) The development of this possibly Fascist organization, which could cause some of the excesses of pre-war Japan to reappear, merits careful watching. (Paragraphs 10–11.) 27 September 1968

O

ne of the constant preoccupations of this Embassy during the past several years has been the growth and potential of the Buddhist organization known as the Sôka Gakkai (Value-adding Society) and its political arm, the Kômeitô (Clean Government Party). During the past months there have been developments which suggest that the analysis of this organization in earlier *  FJ 1/7 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 2 October 1968.



THE SÔKA GAKKAI AND THE KÔMEITÔ55

despatches from this mission, should now be brought up to date. I therefore to submit a further brief account of the place of Sôka Gakkai, both within Japan and within the Buddhist faith, and of certain disturbing vistas now opened up. My account owes much to the researches of Mr Second Secretary Elliott, after his recent visit to the temple on the slopes of Mount Fuji which is the headquarters of the sect, and to the informed advice of local experts on religious matters in Japan. 2. In order to understand the place in modern society of the Sôka Gakkai, it is necessary to know a little about the place of its parent, the Nichiren Sect of Buddhism, in the thirteenth century. Nichiren Shônin was one of a series of “saints” preaching different varieties of Buddhism who founded sects in Japan. His beliefs, arising out of the Tendai Sect, are peculiar in that they specifically include politics within the scope of religious activity, aiming at fostering a kind of national feeling based on a State religion. He foreshadowed in a sense a Buddhist version of the State Shinto religion of the 1930s. The followers of Nichiren were an exclusive body, taught to despise all other sects of Buddhism, and believing solely in the truth revealed in the Lotus Sutra, Saddharma-­pundarîka, a late and apocryphal, but immensely potent and popular, Buddhist scripture. They stand out in the history of Japan for a militant intolerance, even cruelty, which is quite out of character with normal Buddhist practice. 3. The Sôka Gakkai is a lay organization of members of a sub-division of the Nichiren sect. (There are other, more moderate groups of believers in Nichiren Buddhism, some very numerous.) They have in many ways distorted the original teachings of Nichiren, in particular in that they make the astonishing claim that Nichiren himself is the True Buddha for this and all subsequent ages, whose teachings complement those of the earthly Buddha, Gautama Sakyamuni, whose original revelations, they aver, were relevant to his millennium: this epoch needs Nichiren’s interpretation. Moreover, they have concentrated on certain selected phrases from the Lotus Sutra, which they interpret as singling out Japan as the home of the new and wonderful world religion, in which the Emperor is to have his place and from which the conversion not only of India, the original home of Buddhism, which in their view has now fallen into paths of evil, but every country in the world is to originate. The Sôka Gakkai has, however, retained the more pernicious attitudes of the Nichiren sect, notably the denunciation of all others and the claim that politics fall naturally within the scope of religion. In combination, these qualities add up to an organization which is both Messianic and nationalistic, and therefore potentially dangerous: especially so in this country, where recently experienced State worship led to such disastrous consequences. 4. In order to propagate their religion – of which, let it be stressed, the Sôka Gakkai are no more than lay believers, their priests having normal lay avocations – they have adopted a dubious process known as ‘Shakubuku’. This is a type of forcible conversion, often involving various forms of blackmail, by which the weak members of society are persuaded that their real interest lies in joining the movement and surrendering themselves to its teachings. Surrender of this kind is said to bring relief from all ills, physical, spiritual and even financial; but it also commits the believer to a place in society which is viewed with suspicion by the majority of other Japanese. Part of this suspicion is due to the well-founded aversion of the modern Japanese towards organized religion, when blended with politics, as the result of their experiences with State Shintô. The Sôka Gakkai contrives to avoid this stigma to some extent by

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

practising only the sketchiest type of worship, a mere repetition of a formula which is supposed to bring enlightenment if intoned with a pure heart: this worship is directed at a Mandala or schematic representation of the Buddhist cosmos, of which the original, written by Nichiren himself, is in the central temple of the sect and a copy is handed to every new convert. 5. The converts to the Sôka Gakkai – apart from weaker vessels persuaded against their will – come very largely from the female half of the uprooted middle classes of Japanese society, who have left their integrated village communities and find themselves lost and lonely in the vast soulless modern conurbations of contemporary Japan. The men may find fulfilment in their work and firm; the women tend to fret in loneliness. The women are therefore readily attracted by the great emphasis on group activities which characterizes the organization and bring their men along with them. It thus fulfils a real sociological need – although other more genuinely religious bodies strive to do the same thing in less disturbing ways. The regular ‘Cultural Festival’ of Sôka Gakkai, in which some 60,000–70,000 members participate and which is usually held in one of the great stadiums of Japan, is only the tip of an iceberg of mass meetings devoted to song, dance, amateur theatrical presentations, and graced frequently by inspiring messages from the various heroes of the organization. Stage management is its forte. 6. Chief of these heroes is Daisaku Ikeda, the President and infinitely the most powerful man in the Sôka Gakkai. He has a genuinely charismatic appeal to his millions of disciples, for whom he is the Great Teacher, the object of almost hysterical reverence. Under his control, besides the Sôka Gakkai itself, are numerous bodies which in a Communist context we should describe as ‘front’ organizations. Plans have recently been announced to add a housewives’ league and a trade union movement to the already existing musical and other confederations. Of these the projected trade union movement may in time be the most significant, if indeed it succeeds in mobilising the mass of Japanese workers in medium and small enterprises, who at present lack the bargaining strength of those in large industries. Little is likely to come of this for several years: its success will depend on the ability of the Sôka Gakkai to achieve its aim of gaining support from non-members. 7. Ikeda is described by his followers as ‘too big a man for politics’. As a man with a cosmic vision, he could not demean himself, for example, to become Prime Minister (it is said). Nevertheless he wields effective control of the Kômeitô or Clean Government Party, the political arm of the Sôka Gakkai, through its figurehead Chairman and Secretary-General. Until this year it had been generally thought that the growth of the Kômeitô was limited by the growth of the Sôka Gakkai, and that it would never play a significant role on the Japanese political stage. Such at least was the tentative conclusion of Mr Cheke’s despatch of 1966. However the elections to the House of C ­ ouncillors in July of 1968 have cast a new light on the Kômeitô’s prospects. In Tokyo alone the party candidate polled some 300,000 more votes than there are registered members of Sôka Gakkai in that constituency. A similar story may be told of Osaka and of other major centres. It is being said that the Kômeitô has now ‘broken through’; that it has persuaded the voter that it is a party to be reckoned with and that it follows a coherent policy. Moved by this, the Kômeitô has now declared its intention of putting forward seventy-five candidates in the next and more important elections, to the Lower House of the Diet, expected for next year. The present strength of the party in the Lower



THE SÔKA GAKKAI AND THE KÔMEITÔ57

House is twenty-five: it will almost certainly reach nearly double that figure when the elections are held. Most significant is the new decision to abandon the policy of betting only on near certainties and to run candidates in some rural areas – whose inhabitants are less susceptible to the blandishments of the Sôka Gakkai – simply in order to gain experience and bring Kômeitô before a wider public. 8. The advance of the Kômeitô does not appear to rest on any clearer policy than two years ago. The party has come down a little more firmly against the Security Treaty, and (with its eye on the next elections) it has recently stated its unequivocal support for the representation of mainland China in the United Nations, proposing discussions between the leaders of China and Japan with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations. (This policy, however, says nothing about the status of Taiwan.) But the Kômeitô is still a ‘middle of the road’ party, whose only distinction is the ambiguous way in which it claims to hover over the whole complex of political parties, by virtue of its dependence on spiritual rather than earthly guidance. Moreover it still picks up some supporters by its claim to be free from political corruption. The relative success of the Kômeitô may even be accounted for by a similar paradox to that which applies to the Sôka Gakkai: the parent organization seeks to explain away its religious nature by playing down the actual content of its religious expression; the political party attracts the votes of those disillusioned with the other, more coherent political parties, perhaps even because its political thinking is so shallow and ambiguous. 9. Disillusionment with the other political parties is now the single most important factor in the rise of the Kômeitô. Even Liberal Democrat members of the Diet, representing constituencies in which Kômeitô candidates are now to stand for election, are said to have rushed back to these constituencies as soon as the announcement was made. But it is the disarray of the Left which has thrown open wide a door to political power through which the Kômeitô has every intention of passing. I hope to comment in detail on this phenomenon in a separate despatch: here let it suffice to say that the Japan Socialist Party is at a crisis and may be on the verge of fragmentation, the Democratic Socialists show no signs of being able to fill the breach and the small Japan Communist Party is itself riven by internal dissension. In this lies the real importance of the Kômeitô, and the reason for the present despatch. For it is possible now to hazard that the party might, within the next five or seven years, reach its goal of becoming the first Opposition party; that it might then, or even earlier, become necessary for the governing Liberal Democratic Party to take the Kômeitô as its ally, in order to retain control of the Government; and that the guiding policy of the resultant coalition might imperceptibly fall under the sway of the Kômeitô. This is a mere speculation, albeit a popular one, as to one possible outcome. There are many other ways in which the situation could develop. But if it were to turn out in this way, and if, for example, conservative forces within such a coalition were strong enough to force through an amendment of that part of the Japanese Constitution which governs Japan’s defence and security, then we might find that our preconceptions about the future course of this country were rudely shattered. Nobody seriously believes that the Kômeitô’s present identification with Left-wing policies need at all inhibit its leaders from performing a volte-face when it suits their book. 10. The door then is open; we can only guess what use the Kômeitô may make of their opportunity. I have said that the Sôka Gakkai is basically an

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

intolerant and nationalistic body. This I believe to be essentially true in spite of the international activities of its associated organizations, which are strongest on the American continent, but which seem to attract no more than those fringes of society which are always ready to try something new. All their talk about international brotherhood and peace through harmony seems to me to be little more than a facade to cover ideals tailored for the Japanese situation alone. World opinion, I suspect, concerns them little. Whether nationalism of this kind could amount to Fascism is a deeper question. A visiting British political scientist, invited to apply to the Sôka Gakkai certain criteria for Fascism which he had elaborated, discovered that it satisfied every one of them. This, of course, is only one man’s view: but the outward characteristics of the organization are reminiscent in some ways of Europe between the wars. Ikeda is a powerful man, who could at any time throw off his thin cloak of disinterest in politics to become a genuine political leader and he is still only forty years old. 11. In summary, I conclude that neither the Sôka Gakkai nor the Kômeitô have yet reached the zenith of their fortunes. Partly through the disarray of the other political parties, and partly through the unscrupulous processes of recruitment to their so-called faith, the Kômeitô is now a force to be reckoned with. It is distrusted, even despised, by the large mass of Japanese. It may never attain a position of actual power. But it is now possible, as it was not two years ago, to foresee circumstances in which the Kômeitô might gain some real power. In such a situation, the belligerence, nationalism and messianic tendencies which are characteristic of the Nichiren tradition might emerge and assume something of the emotive, mystic force of State Shintô before the war. I trust that concern with material gain, and desire to retain the goodwill of Japan’s international partners, would preserve the Japanese people from such excesses, but the danger of them warrants special care in observing the development of this possibly noxious growth in Japanese society. JOHN PILCHER

10

JAPANESE ECONOMIC SUCCESS: A BRITISH OPPORTUNITY*

SUMMARY Japan’s economic success continues. This year she will overtake Germany to become the country with the third largest GNP in the world, after only the United States and the Soviet Union. She achieves this while correcting a serious balance of payments crisis in record time. (Paragraph 1.) 2. Further plans are aimed at a standard of living for the Japanese equivalent to that in Britain by 1975 and roughly equal to the present-day American standard by 1985. These targets should be achieved. (Paragraph 2.) 3. The secret of Japan’s success lies in a mixture of traditional attitudes (nationalism, loyalty, thrift) and modern circumstances (the opportunity to rebuild after the war, American generosity, low defence expenditure), as well as a good educational system and a lot of hard work. (Paragraph 3.) 4. The pace of development may slacken a little and there will be increasing problems over labour relations, price stability and foreign penetration of the Japanese market. But these should be kept under control in the foreseeable future and Japan will remain a steady and lucrative market. (Paragraph 4.) 5. There is a great opportunity for British exports, which could total more than £375 million a year by 1985. (Paragraph 5.) 6. To achieve this we need to be positive in our approach to the Japanese market. We need to educate businessmen in the potential of the market and in the realities of modern Japanese commercial practice. (Paragraph 6.) * FJ 5/1 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 29 October 1968.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

7. We also need to put our trade relations with Japan on a better footing. We have the opportunity to do this now; if we are serious in our intention of tackling this market, we must meet the Japanese on some of our discriminatory barriers in the very near future. We need a decision now. (Paragraphs 7–8.), 25 October 1968

T

his year Japan will overtake West Germany to become the country with the third largest gross national product (GNP) in the world, surpassed only by the United States and the Soviet Union. The GNP is now expected to rise in real terms by more than 10 per cent in 1968. Japan’s exports to the world at large rose by 25 per cent, to the United States only by more than 35 per cent. This is being achieved at a time when Japan has been suffering from severe balance of payments difficulties and when a policy of quite severe monetary restraint has been in force for most of the past year. A payments deficit of £223 million overall at the end of fiscal (31st of March) 1967 should be turned into a surplus of more than £460 million by the end of fiscal 1968. Foreign exchange reserves should stand at well over £1,100 million by the end of the year; this represents a record figure for Japan and, for the first time, reaches a level higher than our own. 2. The Japanese success story is by no means ended. The current Five-year Plan is being drastically revised upwards by the Economic Planning Agency, while the aim for 1975 is a GNP of £116,000 million, which should give an expected 107 million Japanese a standard of living equivalent to that in Britain. By 1985 the target is a GNP of £162,000 million, giving 116 million Japanese a standard of living roughly that of the United States to-day. 1985 is only seventeen years away. These are not figures plucked out of the air by Japanese economic planners. The Japanese record of reaching and surpassing economic targets is so good that, short of some major economic or world political upheaval (which would probably affect Europe as much as Japan) these standards will in fact be achieved and probably with time to spare. 3. How do the Japanese do it? They have a land area only slightly larger than Britain and virtually no natural resources. A hundred years ago Japan was an isolated and feudal country centuries behind our own stage of development. Twenty-three years ago it was an utterly defeated and demoralized Power with its industry in ruins. There is no single answer to the secret of Japan’s success; there are rather a variety of contributory factors of which the following are the most important: (a)  Nationalism. This was born of isolation, both geographical and historical, and has on occasions been raised to a quasi-religious level. Being Japanese matters to both the company president and the lowestpaid worker. The national interest is so sufficient a rallying cry that it rarely needs to be evoked explicitly; it is just understood as part of the natural order of things: (b)  Loyalty. This is a carry-over from feudal times. It has brought considerable advantages to both sides of industry. For the employee it has meant security of tenure in almost any circumstance, coupled with, in many instances, an impressive range of fringe benefits and a



JAPANESE ECONOMIC SUCCESS: A BRITISH OPPORTUNITY61

paternalism, which together give the Japanese the sense of belonging which he craves. For the employer it has provided an amenable labour force, with a personal stake in the company, still organized very much on a company basis. (c)  Dynamic private enterprise. The Japanese are not impressive individually, but collectively they are capable of astonishing initiative and a well-developed competitive spirit. They are prepared to take risks in already-established fields (for example the large amount of money invested in facilities for building super-tankers) and to enter new fields, if for no other reason than that their competitors are doing so. (d)  Close co-operation between Government, the banks and industry. The Government has traditionally played a large role in industry, first in getting it established, then in renovating large sectors of industry after the war, and now in ensuring an orderly flow of finance into industry and regulating the competition between industrial groupings. This has been accepted by industry, which has, until recently, relied on bank loans for more than 80 per cent on average of their finance. In many cases bureaucrats and industrialists are graduates from the same school or university; these ties are carefully fostered throughout their lives. All this means that economic policies tend to represent a consensus of Government, banks and industry, and are rapidly and effectively applied. (e)  Widespread higher education. At present more than 1,160,000 students are enrolled in 365 universities. Some of these universities may not compare with the standard expected in Britain and a certain number of engineers who are products of the lesser universities fail to measure up to their British counterparts. But the spread of higher education is impressive by any criterion, and the number of engineers produced, as compared to the number of pure scientists, is sufficient to ensure that Japan has a flow of well-educated young men entering industry with a strong engineering bent and looking for production rather than research work. (f      )  A fresh start. The Japanese had to rebuild their industry from scratch in 1945. This gave them an opportunity to relocate industry in areas which made most economic sense; and it enabled them to build modern factories as well as equipping them with up-to-date machinery. (g)  A large pool of labour. Agriculture after the war was in any economic sense grossly overmanned. With the development of new methods and the introduction of mechanization the Japanese have been able to reduce their agricultural labour force drastically, while still maintaining record crops. (h)  American assistance. Both in financial and technical aid the Americans helped the Japanese after the war on a scale second only to the Marshall Plan. This assistance was followed fortuitously by the demand stimulated by the Korean and then the Viet-Nam wars. (i)  Low expenditure on defence. The Japanese have been able to rely on the American nuclear umbrella and their defence budget for fiscal 1968 is still considerably lower than £500 million. This compares with a conservative figure for business entertainment during the year of about £700 million.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

(j)  A high propensity to save. The average Japanese saves almost twice as much of his earnings as his Western counterpart. This is due partly to the system of bonus payments twice a year, which form an integral and quite substantial part of a Japanese worker’s income; partly to natural caution; and partly to the need for a J­apanese to put by for a rainy day, in view of the still under-developed social security system in the country. The low level of public social expenditure has moreover worked in the same direction as the low level of defence costs. 4. This mixture has been responsible, together with a great amount of hard work, for the astounding development of the Japanese economy, which has expanded between 1953 and 1965 at an average annual rate of 9.4 per cent in real terms (cf. United Kingdom 3.1 per cent, Germany 6.8 per cent). There have been many predictions over the past few years that the bubble was about ­ ulner­able as to burst, and the Japanese economy has shown itself to be as v most to business cycles (there have been three clearly marked cycles in the 1960s so far). Japanese forecasters admit that the pace of ­development in the next decade may well be slower than of late, perhaps as low as 7 per cent a year in real terms. They also admit that there will be some extremely difficult problems to be faced, notably price stability, a c­ omparative labour shortage, especially of young trained workers, and the need to open the economy to foreign capital and enterprise to a much greater extent than ever before. But the mood is one of realistic optimism and the attitudes ingrained through many centuries, and of such value now, are not likely to be swept away in the space of a few years. Nationalism and loyalty will retain most of their potency for the foreseeable future, even though labour pressures will cause some tension in management/labour relations. The labour s­ hortage should be confined for some time yet to individual sectors of industry. There are still 5 million people who can come from agriculture to industry; there is still hidden under-employment in the medium and small ­enterprises; and there is still a good and relatively untapped source of labour in married ­Japanese women. Industry itself will increase in ­self-confidence ­ nancial base improves, but excessive competition in fixed investas its fi ment should in some degree be lessened as a result of mergers which are rapidly taking place. A question mark still hangs over prices, but even this problem can be kept within bounds, provided the economy expands at its forecast pace. Japan, in short, is as steady a market as we are likely to find. 5. What does this mean for British exports? At present our exports to Japan amount to something more than £90 million a year, or 2.2 per cent of total Japanese imports. If we could increase this share to 3 per cent (roughly the German share now) our exports to Japan could total £375 million or more a year by 1985. Our invisible trade with Japan already shows a surplus of £100 million a year. Much of this is accounted for by shipping which, in turn, is comprised in large part of cross-trading. This particular form of shipping could become increasingly vulnerable as more countries, including perhaps ­Australia and the United States as well as Japan, demand in one form or another that a larger share of goods originating in their countries should be carried in their own ships. But banking, insurance, civil aviation and travel should all make increasing contributions to the invisible balance in the coming years.



JAPANESE ECONOMIC SUCCESS: A BRITISH OPPORTUNITY63

So should returns on portfolio invest­ment, technical agreements and direct investment. 6. We have so far taken too passive a line towards Japan, coasting along content with the view that, while no doubt it was an interesting country economically, it was altogether too far away and too difficult to come to grips with. We now need a conscious decision to improve our position in the Japanese market. To do this, we need first to educate British businessmen in the realities of the market; then to sweep away the outdated and prejudiced attitudes towards the Japanese. These are a legacy from the war, or a carryover from days when Japanese copying was a regular, and often justified complaint. Japan now has as large a stake in international markets as Britain; both Government and business realize that in this situation they cannot afford to have a bad reputation: with most countries such a reputation is now a thing of the past. We, in turn, cannot afford the luxury of allowing attitudes of even ten years ago to blind us to what is potentially one of the most lucrative markets for both industrial and consumer goods in the world. In the next few months we shall have more than thirty selling missions visiting Japan, many of them in connection with the British Week to be held in Tokyo in September 1969. This will be a useful start, but it will need a stepped-up trade drive to follow it and it should also be accompanied by a major effort in Britain to point out the opportunities which Japan affords. A good start has already been made on this by BNEC [British National Export Council] and the Board of Trade: it is essential that it be carried on after the British Week is over. 7. Our second requirement is to put our trade relations with Japan on a better footing. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation of 1962 was a useful step forward at the time but we have not made a significant move since then. Meanwhile other European countries have continued to dismantle their own barriers to Japanese trade and we are now in the unenviable position of being top of the anti-Japanese discriminatory league. This discrimination is centred almost entirely on textiles and the Japanese are well aware of the particular problems affecting this sector of British industry as well as of the more general balance of payments difficulties which Britain is facing at the present time. They have, therefore, proposed a method of creeping liberalization, which would give them the form of lowering discriminatory barriers without the substance of considerably increased opportunities for trade – which liberalization usually means. A decision in principle in the next few months could be followed by formal liberalization of a selection of items in 1970, but, with the level of imports in these fields carefully controlled until 1973 and by promises of liberalization of the remaining items in 1971 and in subsequent years up to 1973. By then our own balance of payments problems should be well behind us and the textile industry would have been given another five years in which to prepare itself for increased Japanese competition. This would not mean lowering all the barriers at once; it would represent a further significant step on the road to normalizing our trade relations with Japan. It would need, too, to be matched by worthwhile ­Japanese offers and a clear indication that the process of Japanese liberalization, both as regards direct exports and capital, would be speeded up and would not be nullified by administrative restrictions after it had been carried out. 8. The time for a move on our part is ripe. If we can take this opportunity, the Japanese will be prepared to pay heavily for our concessions. The longer

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

the delay, the less the Japanese will be prepared to give in return for rectifying a situation which they will increasingly see as unjustified and discriminatory. If we continue to take a rigid line, a Japanese reaction is inevitable. In the short term, this could harm our plans for British Week and our ­participation in the Osaka Expo 70. More importantly, it could do great harm to our long-term export prospects in this country. If we really intend to tackle this market in a positive way, which I am sure we must do, then a move to meet the ­Japanese by dismantling our own dis­criminatory barriers is essential. We need a ­decision now. JOHN PILCHER

11 THE JAPANESE LEFT*

SUMMARY The Japan Socialist Party, already plagued by electoral defeat and corruption in high places, suffered a further blow in the shape of the collapse of the Party Convention in September. New party leaders have now been elected, but the party may nevertheless, as in 1959, be on the verge of a split. JSP members of the Diet are probably too concerned for their own positions to allow this to happen at once; but the present leaders of the party are unlikely to be able to hold the various warring factions together for long. The decline in the party’s support will continue. (Paragraphs 2–10.) 2. Sôhyô, the largest trade union federation and still the JSP’s major source of support, is a declining but still a powerful force. (Paragraphs 11–12.) 3. The Democratic Socialist Party prospers, but its prospects are limited. (Paragraph 13.) 4. The Japan Communist Party has won many voters by its skilful moderation and its ostentatious independence of both Chinese and Russian domination, but is still a long way from wielding effective power. Nevertheless it is feared by the Government, partly as controller of the bulk of Zengakuren, the militant student union, some of whose factions are already on the rampage; this is likely to be the most serious element of protest against the Security Treaty. (Paragraphs 16–18.) 5. Conclusion: there is no prospect of a strong Opposition united on most issues, and no foreseeable prospect that Japan will ‘go Left’. (Paragraphs 19–20.) 13 November 1968 * FJ 1/3 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 20 November 1968.

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outine correspondence from this Embassy has described the steep decline of the fortunes of the Japan Socialist Party since the elections to the House of Councillors in July and, in particular, the disastrous collapse of the Party Convention in September. In this despatch I summarize these events and attempt to draw in perspective the present aspect of the Left wing of Japanese politics, as it now prepares itself for the struggle against renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1970. 2. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The failure of the Japan Socialist Party in the July elections was attributed partly to the poor selection of candidates, many of whom were chosen for little more than their record of uncritical loyalty and most of whom were too old to have any appeal to the younger voters, and partly to the history of factional quarrels, combined with the absence of any real policy, which has long characterized the party. The inquest on this failure produced the clear verdict that the leadership of the party must resign and that new men should be entrusted with the task of formulating a new ‘action policy’, which would take the JSP into the crucial 1970 struggle. The nature of the new leadership and the general lines of their policy were to be decided at a Party Convention in late September. 3. Even before the Convention could be held, the JSP was cast into confusion by yet another scandal in the series which has recently plagued them, this time involving the Secretary-General, Yamamoto. A member of the party alleged that Yamamoto had received 1½ million yen of political contributions from a sugar refinery in 1962–63, and had failed to place the money in the party treasury. The allegation was published in a popular magazine, and coupled with a further accusation that Yamamoto had employed his mistress as one of his private secretaries. Yamamoto could not deny the charges, and his forced resignation had the effect of bringing the date of the Convention forward by two weeks. More seriously, it stimulated comment on the strange contradiction between the Socialist theory of a class party, devoted to attacking capitalism, and the undoubted fact that not only were some of the Left-wing members of that party involved in financial scandal, but also the remaining leaders of the party were apparently ready to gloss over the scandal in the interest of preserving their own positions. Not only was the JSP inward-looking and over-concerned with the theory of international Socialism; it was even a traitor to its own Socialist theory. 4. The Party Convention broke up in disorder on the 14th of September, after an all-night session which failed to elect new party leaders. The culprits were the extreme pro-Peking Left-wing Heiwa Dôshikai (Peace Comrades S­ ociety), which, in spite of its small following, succeeded in having three members among the twenty-two on the Nominating Committee of the Convention, and was therefore able to block all attempts at a compromise with the moderate factions. When the Convention was resumed on the 4th of October, the party realized that it was useless now to insist on unanimity: by majority vote, therefore, the delegates succeeded in deciding on Tomomi Narita as the new ­Chairman and Saburo Eda as the new Secretary-General. I attach a list of the new Central Executive Committee, also elected at this Convention. Their factional colouring differs slightly from that of their predecessors, in that there are rather fewer members explicitly associated with the Left-wing majority faction led by Sasaki, but in the present factional chaos this is of less and less relevance. In fact it is generally held that the members of the ­Executive Committee rarely consider themselves bound by factional allegiance once elected.



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5. The future of the JSP is now an open question. Many say that it is on the verge of a split. In favour of this argument are those who compare the JSP of 1968 with the party in 1959, the year before the Democratic Socialists’ departure to form their own party. There are some interesting parallels. For example, in 1959 too the Socialists had achieved surprisingly poor results in an election to the House of Councillors, partly owing to the unexpected success of candidates sponsored by the Sôka Gakkai. In 1959, the problem of the Security Treaty was beginning, as now, to attract general attention. There had even been a crisis in Eastern Europe, albeit some three years before, which had given rise to uneasy feelings about Socialism in general. 1959 marks the beginning of the decline of the JSP; could it be that 1968 will be the year of a steeper downward turn in the graph of Socialist fortunes? 6. Against this, there is a reasonable argument that the party would not cut its own throat immediately before an election. The important election in Okinawa is now safely past; but there is also the prospect of an election to the House of Representatives next year, on which hang great political issues. (On a lower level, individual members of the Diet are reluctant to throw their careers into unnecessary jeopardy.) It is also rumoured that none of the leaders really wants a split: Narita and Eda are used to working together, despite their ideological differences, and Eda claims to have observed the beginnings of a feeling of “unanimity transcending factionalism” at the Party Convention in September. 7. Despite this, there are already various indications of the ways in which the party may eventually divide. The Heiwa Dôshikai has renamed itself using for the purpose an unwieldy Japanese phrase, which translates as ‘Association of Comrades for Overthrowing the Security Treaty System’, with the declared intention of attracting wider membership and injecting an ingredient of violence into the anti-American struggle. Support within the party is noticeably increasing. 8. On the right of the Sasaki faction some senior members including ­Yamamoto, the former Secretary-General, and Matsumoto, the former Chief of the International Bureau, have broken away from their faction and formed a new group of ‘realists’ in the middle of the party. Further to the Right, those members of the former Kawakami faction who remained in the party in 1960 are seriously considering a concerted move to join their former colleagues in the Democratic Socialist Party. 9. For the present, I believe that the mainstream of the JSP will hold together, perhaps with a few defectors to Left and Right. But no party leader – certainly not the new Chairman, Narita, who, though officially neutral, is much influenced by Sasaki and his Leftist views – is strong enough to maintain party unity for long. Even Eda’s ‘structural reform’ plans are too dated and too dull for the young party activists. 10. All this has contributed to the deterioration of the image of the JSP before the electors. There is a great gulf between the 13 million JSP voters and the 50,000 who actually pay party membership dues, and again between those 50,000 and the 600 or so who are chosen to attend the Party Convention. The resulting failure of communication indicates the deep division between the theoreticians, who decide the party’s policy, and the mass of people who support it in the hope of social benefit. Marxist theory is of little interest to the Japanese worker, but the party leaders seem unable to present their policies in a more approachable and realistic form. (One glaring example is the

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c­ ontinued insistence by the party doctrinaires on total nationalization.) Until this situation changes – and until the party has papered over its only-too-obvious factional differences – there is no hope of arresting the decline. 11. Sôhyô. Most of the finances of the JSP and the hard core of its support in general come from Sôhyô, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (and a federation of unions somewhat similar to our TUC). Of the 11 million or so Japanese workers belonging to trade unions, some 40 per cent are affiliated to Sôhyô. The membership and influence of Sôhyô have been declining steadily for some years. The unions formed in privately-owned industries are tending to break away, dissatisfied with the uncompromising and militant attitude of the Sôhyô leaders and with their concentration on political rather than economic grievances. This phenomenon bodes ill for the JSP. Moreover, the insistence by Sôhyô that all its members should support the JSP is gradually being eroded, and next year may see the long-awaited decision to allow support for the political party of each member’s choice – in practice, this may mean more support for the Japan Communist Party. 12. However, some three-quarters of the whole membership of Sôhyô are directly or indirectly employed by the Government, under the very wide classification of “public servant” as used in Japan, and therefore provide, not only a regular and certain source of funds, but also a powerful pressure group. This situation at least is not likely to change. The decline of the JSP, although not mitigated by the state of Sôhyô, is essentially due to its own internal disarray. 13. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The second largest trade union federation, on the Sôhyô model, the Confederation of Labour (Dômei), supports the Democratic Socialist Party. Dômei is attracting many of the private unions which have abandoned Sôhyô, and its power has been steadily increasing over the past few years. Similarly, the DSP has improved its position in both Houses of the Diet, most recently in the elections to the Upper House in July of this year. However, the nature of its support is such that the party gains more in the national constituency, a system which operates only in elections to the Upper House, and is less likely next year to increase its representation in the Lower House. The Democratic Socialists, although their policy is one of reasonable moderation, seem scarcely interesting or powerful enough to rival the attractions of the Kômeitô. It is thus rare for much account to be taken of their prospects by experts on the Japanese Left. The party’s importance may grow if it is joined by some Right wingers from the JSP, but no such move has yet materialized. 14. Japan Communist Party (JCP). On the other hand, the success of the Japan Communist Party in the July elections has injected new vigour into that party. Their propaganda and electioneering were skilfully handled. The party contrived to give the appearance of sobriety and moderation, combined with a genuine interest in the problems of the electors, which was ­noticeably lacking in the image projected by the JSP. After its history of flirtation with the two great Communist Powers since 1964 – first the uneasy alliance with China and then, since 1966, the growing trend towards renewal of ties with the Soviet Union – the JCP appears now to have settled down to a ­position of reasonable independence. The cry of “autonomy and independence” has long been prominent among their slogans; since the Soviet invasion of ­Czechoslovakia in August, condemned after some hesitation by the JCP, the party has been able to present its members with clear evidence of its resistance to what it calls ‘Great Power chauvinism’. In this respect the



THE JAPANESE LEFT69

Communists have shown themselves better aware of popular sentiment than Sôhyô, whose ­entertainment of a visit by Shelepin in October was singularly ill-timed. Financially, however, the JCP is still dependent on the Soviet Union: the signs are that relations with the Russians will continue to improve, despite the temporary effect of events in Czechoslovakia. 15. The new image of moderation presented by the JCP is in striking contrast to that of the Japan Socialist Party. With its relatively ample funds and its realistic policy of avoiding either physical violence or violent propaganda at the present stage, the JCP is now said to be the Left-wing force most feared by the Government. However, the Communists are unlikely as yet to increase their membership in the Diet much further. Their opponents in this respect are again the Kômeitô (who themselves claim to be the chief bulwark against Communism in Japan). The JCP also has to contend with a strong though latent national feeling against the Russians, which is apt to extend to Communists in general, however careful their protestations of independence. For the moment the JCP is apparently content to aim at securing more seats in local assemblies and in the trade unions – this, indeed, they may have copied from the example of the Kômeitô. Their present policy, opposed only by a few radical splinter groups, is to develop gradually in the regions and only eventually to seek power in the major cities. 16. Zengakuren (National Students’ Union). Intimately connected with the JCP is the powerful but heterogeneous student organization, known as ­Zengakuren, to which 60 per cent of all university students nominally belong. In 1960 Zengakuren was the most militant centre of opposition to the ­signing of the original Security Treaty. The intensification of student agitation in recent months suggests that this pattern is likely to be repeated. However there are two opposing groups, not to mention a multitude of mutually antagonistic factions, within the Zengakuren itself. I feel bound at least to summarize their intricate relations, although I fear that it is not a subject which makes for easy reading. 17. Most militant is the group of factions which have rejected dependence on the JCP and which have been responsible for almost all of the violent demonstrations in the past year. Within this ‘anti-JCP Zengakuren’, the largest and best-known organization is the Sampa or ‘Three Factions’. This alliance of factions, still less than two years old, has within the last three months shown signs of breaking apart again into a number of component groups, the radical Leftist group being known as the ‘core; faction and its opponents falling into four separate factions united only by their slogan ‘anti-Imperialism’. Outside the ‘Sampa Zengakuren’, a more moderate group, which is also opposed to JCP domination, is the ‘Kakumaruha’; or ‘Revolutionary Marxist’ faction. The total of these anti-JCP groups amounts to some 35 per cent of all the members of the Zengakuren. The remainder are faithful to the instructions of the JCP, which so far have tended to restraint. 18. The fact that the student association of a particular university belongs to Zengakuren does not mean that all the students of that university actively support the aims and methods of the student leaders. Far from it. A recent survey of several major universities showed that three-quarters of all the students questioned did not consider themselves as members of Zengakuren and that they rejected any identification with it; nevertheless they would be counted among the total numbers claimed by Zengakuren. Even among those who do join, many think of Zengakuren principally as an exciting sort of social

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club rather than a political movement. (Incidentally, the same survey showed that apathy towards student unions does not mean apathy towards politics in general; over 80 per cent claimed actively to oppose the Sato Government.) Therefore the active, anti-JCP student agitators are in the minority even of Zengakuren members; and the active potential of Zengakuren as a whole is a minority of the entire student body. Nevertheless the JCP can mobilize its own active supporters, together with a fair number of hangers-on, whenever it so decides. This is the fear of the Government; and, as precedent shows, this is likely to be the most serious element of Japanese protest against the Security Treaty. 19. Conclusion. In short, the Japanese Left is floundering and disorganized. The Japan Socialist Party at present seems incapable of the radical rejuvenation it urgently needs; the Japan Communist Party, together with its student supporters, is a more effective force, but its voice in the Diet is still very feeble (eleven members out of the 736 in both Houses). Any attempts at union between these two parties would be bedevilled by the differences between their ideologies, the JSP apparently unable to shake off its emotional attachment to Peking (imposed largely by a few extremists on the Left) and the JCP now inclining rather towards Russia. Some form of coalition could be achieved, as it was in 1960, for the sole purpose of attacking the Security Treaty. But its scope for action would be limited and it could never be more than a temporary expedient. There is no prospect of any other effective alliance and no apparent cure for the fundamental disarray of the Left-wing Opposition. 20. I conclude that Japan will not in the foreseeable future ‘go Left’. Apart from the lack of unity among the Opposition parties, the present electoral system favours the status quo and diminishes the political effect of any gains they may achieve. The Liberal Democratic Party provides a strong and effective Government, under which Japan is undoubtedly flourishing. There is, of course, room for criticism; a well-organized Opposition, for example, could make great play with the steady increase in the cost of living, which has been particularly steep in recent months and which the Government seems on the face of it to be doing little to contain. There are also other possible dangers. The Government could fall either into complacency or become insufficiently attentive to the popular mood. Another danger is the wide opening left for the expansion of the Kômeitô, which I have described in my despatch of the 27th of September. Yet another possibility is that the extremism of the Left may serve as a catalyst for the crystallization of a Rightist, nationalist reaction, as in Weimar Germany. Despite these dangers, Japan seems bound to continue under conservative rule for as far ahead as can be predicted. In my opinion only a major economic slump – of which there is at present no sign whatsoever – could bring greater success to the Left. We may be thankful that the prospect of a Communist Japan is remote. The tradition of regimentation and subservience to discipline is so strong that the result would be formidable indeed. JOHN PILCHER

12 THE JAPANESE MOOD*

SUMMARY Despite the rosy vista of continued economic expansion, the horizon is not altogether clear for the Japanese. (Paragraphs 1–3.) They are too dependent upon American goodwill, which might change. American opinion might turn against overseas commitments after Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 4–5.) Yet the Japanese in general are not worried by the danger signals: the question mark over China, the instability of Korea and the vital problem of the defence of the Malacca Straits and the Persian Gulf after our departure. (Paragraphs 7–10.) None the less, far-seeing Japanese realize that they must be able to stand on their own feet, without abandoning their low posture in international affairs, which inhibits initiative in foreign policy. (Paragraph 11.) Internally, students and a rootless working population in the big conurbations present grave problems, but continuing economic success could absorb these. (Paragraphs 12–16.) The old, exclusive nationalism remains just beneath the surface and some xenophobia emerges. None of this should become dangerous, unless there were economic distress. (Paragraphs 17–18.) In all probability, however, the United States will continue to be Japan’s best friend and the more balanced outlook fostered by success has come to stay, but it will be hard for Japan to pursue an active foreign policy, however much urged to do so. (Paragraphs 19–20.) 5 December 1968

* FJ 1/3 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 11 December 1968.

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ow that I have been in Japan for over a year, I offer some account of the mood of contemporary Japan as I now find it. 2. In my despatch of the 12th of February, 1968, I hazarded the view that the success of contemporary Japan was to be attributed to the persistence beneath the country’s modern face of fundamental Japanese beliefs. The Confucian emphasis on loyalty and harmony, combined with the Shinto virtues of patriotism, together with a native sense of cohesion and a dash of fatalism, born of Buddhism, to my eye underlay the present economic upsurge. They accounted for the keenness, the devotion to duty and the hard work that brought the industrial miracle about. For the time being, I surmised that economic success satisfied the Japanese as an ideal. Moreover, success had made them more balanced, happier in themselves and thus easier to frequent. 3. The impetus of Japan’s expansion pursues its course, despite fears that balance-of-payments problems would weight it down. The horizon, however, is not altogether serene from a Japanese point of view. In the first place, they feel themselves to be over-beholden to the United States. One-third of their total exports goes to the United States and they are almost entirely indebted to the Americans for their defence. 4. They are therefore dependent to an alarming degree upon American goodwill. This goodwill could change. The American climate of opinion, once the war in Viet-Nam is out of the way, could be less favourable to them. Already there is irritation in the United States that a booming Japan is reluctant to open the door to foreign investment. Then there is clearly the possibility of a revulsion in the United States against overseas commitments. 5. This revulsion will be intensified against commitments in countries where the American presence is not made welcome. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan generally humours the Americans; but it has courted ­American displeasure by unnecessary harping on the return of Okinawa (while taking a humbler line about Russian-occupied territory), while anti-Americanism is the stock-in-trade of the Opposition. In a separate despatch, dated the 13th of November, 1968, I have attempted to show the disarray in which the ­Japanese Left wing find themselves. Their only rallying cry is ­anti-Americanism: down with the American bases and abrogate the Security Treaty are their slogans. Such things are designed to capture the headlines. Moreover, Japanese ­Left-wing attacks on the American hospital at Oji (where American servicemen from Viet-Nam come to recuperate) must have made the worst possible impression on American public opinion. 1970, the year of the renewal of the defence agreement with the United States, may well see a crescendo of dramatic complaint. 6. Yet it is astonishing to discover how content contemporary Japanese are to bury their heads in the sand. It is as though the searing experience of the last war and the almost total destruction of their cities, not to mention the effects of the atomic bomb, have stunned them and made them fail to react to dangers, of which they were only too aware before the war. Thus it would be wrong to say that the average Japanese feels anything but complacency as far as Japan’s relations with the United States are concerned. He is even more complacent about China. 7. There always has been a feeling in Japan that they must have ‘special relations’ with China. The feeling of veneration for the parent of their own ­civilization is probably still deep. The Left and dissident Liberal Democrats make play with their desire to foster good relations with China. There is,



THE JAPANESE MOOD73

however, next to no understanding of how the bullying of China between the wars has made the Japanese hated in that country. China seems to the average Japanese a vast potential market and partner. Unfortunately, how China will develop is a great enigma and question mark and there is very little that Japan can do – short of adopting Communism Chinese style – either to humour China or to influence the course of events. 8. In between lies Korea, which in the past was frequently referred to as ‘the dagger pointing at the heart of Japan’. Perhaps a feeling of guilt on the part of the Japanese makes them happy to avert their eyes from that peninsula. They seem not to wish to take in the dangers inherent in the situation there, nor to have any desire to contemplate the situation that might arise if the whole peninsula became Communist. 9. The situation further south is also not appealing. To begin with, the ­Japanese are conscious of the intense antipathy to Japan in the whole of South-East Asia, which is a legacy of the last war. South-East Asians want Japanese money but not their presence. There is anxiety about what direction American opinion will take after Viet-Nam and a rather ill-mannered ­preoccupation with the effects of peace there on the Japanese economy. In addition, our withdrawal from Singapore could make the future of the Straits of Malacca uncertain. F ­ ilipino excessive claims to territorial waters are worrying to shipping and Indonesian unreliability seems to endanger the Sunda Strait. Nobody here shows the slightest outward sign of caring about the defence of these waterways, so vital to Japanese lifelines, except Mr. Masuda, the former Director-General of the Defence Agency, who repeated three times to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, General Sir Michael Carver, his anxiety about the ultimate effects on Japan of our withdrawal from that region. 10. Bound up with this is the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean and consequent fears that the Russians intend to control the mouth of the Persian Gulf, whence come over 90 per cent of Japanese oil imports. The uncertainty in that region should cast a far greater shadow than it in fact does over the whole of the Japanese industrial world. They have banished thoughts of it, beyond allowing themselves occasionally to feel a vague uneasiness. 11. Really well informed and prescient Japanese, however, do see these dangers on the horizon. They feel that their country is wedged between the United States and China, over both of which Japan has no means of exercising any control. They feel at the mercy, therefore, particularly at this moment, of the United States and in need in consequence of friends elsewhere. They realize that sooner or later they must be able to defend themselves alone and are more or less reconciled to the present Government’s plan to rearm gradually and quietly. They know that their ‘low posture’ in international affairs has paid off and they understand the dangers of any attempt to take positive action. The slightest recrudescence of ‘cockiness’, they know, begets a potent anti-Japanese reaction. Any attempt therefore at a positive foreign policy is fraught with frustrations. 12. If the international political horizon is none too serene, the internal scene could give grounds for worry. The immediate and obvious signs of malaise are offered by the students. This, I think, in Japan is largely a sociological phenomenon. Japanese attend their elementary, middle and higher schools in their provinces. There the student is firmly anchored in society. The old web of obligations envelops him at every turn. His aim is to pass the very severe examinations which will take him to the university and, if possible,

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to the Tokyo or Kyoto universities, which have hitherto been the passports to success in Government service – almost as much the apex of his dreams as it was thirty years ago. (It must be remembered in Japan that Government service still retains its antique prestige and the civil servant his reputation untarnished.) 13. The average student thinks that, having once entered the university, he is in the promised land. The universities scarcely dare to fail students (who may extend their undergraduate course by several years without penalty) and therefore he knows that he will get his degree, virtually whether he does any work for it or not. Moreover, the universities are usually situated far from his home. For the first time, he tastes freedom from parental and local restraint and from the necessity to exert himself to pass examinations. Confined in vast dormitories in hideous surroundings, there is nothing to impose polite restraint upon him. He joins his neighbour’s revolutionary club, as he would a football team, and disports himself with all the pent-up violence of his emotional nature. 14. The problem of workers pouring in to the conurbations of Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka is not altogether dissimilar. Uprooted from his home and from the restraints of local society, the worker seeks fulfilment in devotion to his firm. His wife bears the brunt of rootlessness and loneliness. She falls a prey easily to pseudo-religious movements, such as Sôka Gakkai and its political party, Kômeitô, on which I commented in my despatch of the 27th of September, 1968. In such an organization she at least feels she has a place in society and soon brings her husband with her. In the cramped state of life of contemporary Japanese, leisure is hard to arrange; to belong to an organization, which offers space, may be literally a physical necessity. Sôka Gakkai cashes in on this. Both husband and wife bask in recipe for Fascism, an amalgam of pseudo-religious sentiments, physical jerks and fun. The Kômeitô may yet become a serious element in Japanese political life and could veer in directions all too reminiscent of the mystic nationalism of before the war, but it has evoked antipathies which it may take a long time to overcome. 15. While the present success continues, Japan can absorb rioting students and displaced persons. Society eventually catches up on the students. When they need a job, they find that the firms have already applied to the professors; the professors will have signalled to them the students who have worked and are worth their salt. As most Japanese still remain with the same firm for their whole career, those who have indulged to excess their passion for freedom will find themselves in the less attractive walks of life. 16. If success goes on for a decade or more, it will have moulded the post-war generations in a pattern very different from that of their fathers. It may thus perpetuate the present balance. Should it come to an end or should America curtail Japanese imports or threaten to remove the umbrella of military protection, then conditions could become ugly. 17. In the despatch giving my first impressions of Japan after an absence of thirty years, I expressed the view that the exclusivity, which had bedevilled the Japanese before the war and frustrated the success of their international policies, was in abeyance, but that their old agglutinative tendencies and their great sense of cohesion remained. I sense now that exclusive nationalism is still very close to the surface. The well-educated repress it, but it is there none the less. After the débâcle the foreigner enjoyed a privileged status; this is no longer quite the case and in so far as it is, it is more visibly resented.



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Japanese returning from abroad have told me that they sense a recrudescence of xenophobia in Japan, which they deplore. I personally have noticed slight signs of this, but they are insignificant compared to the rampant suspicion of the foreigner prevalent before the war. None the less the economic recovery is breeding a feeling of superiority. Japanese are less and less willing to deal with foreigners, who are either unable or unwilling to make the effort to understand the Japanese language. 18. I fear that, were economic distress to come, this exclusive ­hyper-nationalism would push to the fore again. With it there would p ­ robably recur a rallying round the Emperor and a recrudescence of worship of the ‘national polity’ among the Right wing and middle-of-the-road opinion. This would, of course, be accompanied on the Left by the advocacy of violent ­Socialist panaceas. All this slumbers now beneath the surface, but it could emerge so easily and must be watched. 19. I conclude, however, that in all probability the present economic momentum will be maintained; the United States will continue to be Japan’s best friend and that it will be some time before the Japanese are confronted by the situation admirably summed up by Professor Arnold Toynbee as the moment when the United States umbrella becomes a lightning conductor. By that time reason, balance and a liberal outlook may well have been so fostered by success that they will have moulded the national character for good. 20. Meanwhile, Japan is unlikely to be able to pursue an active foreign policy, however much prodded to do so. JOHN PILCHER

13 MR SATO’S NEW CABINET*

SUMMARY Mr Sato’s re-election as President of the Liberal Democratic Party was a personal triumph. His new Cabinet, a skilful blend of factional interests, will enable him to retain full control of policy-making. (Paragraphs 1–3.) Mr Fukuda at the Ministry of Finance still has much influence but may have lost ground to Mr Tanaka, the new Secretary–General of the party. (Paragraphs 4–5.) Mr Aichi as Foreign Minister is a pleasant man, but will not depart from the Sato line. (Paragraph 6.) Only two or three of the other new Ministers are more than factional nominees whose success is unpredictable. (Paragraph 7.) One of the first major tasks of the new Cabinet is the Okinawa problem: but attention is also focussed on the battle within the party for succession to Mr Sato. (Paragraphs 8–10.) 13 December 1968

MR SATO’S NEW CABINET

O

n the 27th of November Mr Eisaku Sato was re-elected President of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan for the third time. Three days later he announced the composition of his new Cabinet, in conformity with the accepted practice of an annual reshuffle of Ministerial posts. 2. The Prime Minister Mr Sato’s re-election as President of the LDP was a considerable personal triumph. Although the number of votes against him has increased from 170 in 1966 to 203 in 1968, much of this opposition *  FJ 1/3 – 13 December 1968.



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can be ascribed to the general feeling in the party that two terms is enough for the President. Mr Ikeda, Mr Sato’s predecessor, achieved re-election for his third term in 1964 by an overall majority of a mere nine votes, whereas Mr Sato’s majority was a clear forty-six. This success was due to a number of particular factors, such as the lack of credibility of Mr Sato’s rivals Mr Miki and Mr Maeo, and the absence of any clear alternative policy to that which Mr Sato has directed without serious challenge for the past four years; but, whatever its reasons, the victory has ensured that Mr Sato will remain in effective control for most of the next two years. (Some say that ho will resign after one year: but unless there is a serious change in his fortunes, I cannot see this happening before 1970.) 3. The means of wielding this control is clearly shown in the composition of the new Cabinet. It has been described as a more accurate blending of factional interests than ever before, but at the same time it is calculated to ensure that the real power remains with Mr Sato himself. He seems to have borne no grudges against the factions headed by Mr Miki, his closest rival in terms of votes, or by Mr Maeo: each of these groups has two representatives in the Cabinet, though the two leaders are perhaps naturally excluded. Even some of the minor and hitherto unrecognized factions have been given their turn. But the general complexion of the Cabinet is of a reliable, rather than a sparkling body of men. Of the nine members with no previous Cabinet experience, few are expected to be more than averagely competent in their new roles. The trend is set by the old hands, in particular by Mr Fukuda and his lieutenant Mr Hori. It is their pre-eminence in this rather undistinguished collection, which has led businessmen to welcome the Cabinet as ‘suitable’ and the opposition parties to attack it as ‘reactionary’. 4. The Finance Minister Among the new appointments, close attention has been focussed on three men. Mr Fukuda at the Ministry of Finance has long been considered Mr Sato’s right-hand man and ‘Crown Prince’. He has occupied his present seat before, between July 1965 and December 1966, and during that period won something of the credit for restoring the upward trend of the economy. As Secretary-General of the LDP since December 1966, his power has been great. Despite this and the part which he undoubtedly played in Mr Sato’s victory, his influence is thought now to be somewhat on the wane, because of the other two stars of the present reshuffle, his own protégé, Mr Shigeru Hori, has been rewarded only with the position of Chief Cabinet Secretary. This post, although it carries with it somethig of the duties of a Deputy Prime Minister, is nevertheless considered to be a task rather for the promising than for those who have already arrived. Mr Hori, despite his known allegiance to Mr Fukuda, is a member of the Sato faction. 5. The Secretary-General The third character in this drama is Mr Kakuei Tanaka, also a member of Mr Sato’s faction, but unlike Mr Hori in his inclination rather towards the ‘doves’ than the ‘hawks’ of the LDP. Mr Tanaka is the new Secretary-General of the party, replacing Mr Fukuda, and has therefore established himself as the man at the centre of power, just at the crucial time when elections to the House of Representatives are in the offing and when the party is beginning to cast around for likely candidates for its new President in 1970. 6. The Foreign Minister The post of Foreign Minister has been given to Mr Kiichi Aichi, not one of the most outstanding figures of the LDP, but nevertheless one of the closest of the Prime Minister’s policy advisers. As a former

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official of the Finance Ministry, who has served in London and other capitals as financial Attaché, he has some experience of the world of diplomacy. He is also a fluent speaker of English and French and a likeable personality. Nevertheless he is welcomed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not so much for his past experience, nor even for his reputation as a skilful bureaucrat with a rapid grasp of new ideas, but principally because of his close association with the Prime Minister. Unlike Mr Miki, a man with particularly strong ideas of his own, Mr Aichi can be relied upon both to report faithfully to the Prime Minister and to execute Sato’s policy to the letter. With Okinawa as the crucial problem of the next twelve months it is not surprising that he should place one of his most trusted collaborators in the Foreign Ministry. These speculations have been largely borne out by Mr Aichi’s first statements as Foreign Minister, which have carefully avoided breaking any new ground and which have suggested rather that he sees his role as that of preparing the way for Mr Sato to take his own initiatives. Nevertheless, we shall inevitably be seeing more of him in the coming year, and I shall try to send a more personal view of his character and abilities before his debut at the next round of Anglo-Japanese Ministerial talks. 7. Other appointments Among the other members of the Cabinet few deserve more than passing attention. Mr Ohira, the new Minister of International Trade and Industry, ranks almost with the triumvirate of Fukuda – Hori – Tanaka, as a man of comparative youth, the almost certain successor of Mr Maeo to the leadership of one of the larger factions of the party and a likely contendant for the presidency of the party in the future. The other representative of the Maeo faction, Mr Araki, is also an experienced Minister: his appointment as Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission indicates the importance which the Prime Minister attaches to the maintenance of public order as 1970 approaches, as well as the rapid healing of the rift between the Sato and Maeo factions after the presidential election. By contrast the Miki faction has produced only Mr Kanno (at the Economic Planning Agency), one of the two oldest members of the Cabinet and an expert in his field of economics but with little prospect for the future, and Mr Komoto (Minister of Posts), of whom little is known and who is not expected to do especially well. The most impressive of the representatives of lesser factions is Mr Sakata of the Ishii faction, a young and energetic Minister of Education who is considered as likely to solve the troublesome university problem as anybody. He may be hampered by the number of senior members of the party who have previously served as Ministers of Education and who therefore consider themselves entitled to offer their advice on how to deal with the present situation. The other Ministers are no more than factional nominees, who may turn out to do well, but who are not yet anything more than vague prospects. 8. The next year It is early yet to offer much in the way of speculation about new policies which may emerge from this Cabinet. Mr Tanaka has described its first five major tasks, in order of priority, as: the student problem; Okinawa; Diet procedure; the election system and political funds; and the Security Treaty. In all of these the Prime Minister will certainly take a personal interest. The election to the House of Representatives is confidently expected to be held in the spring or autumn of l969. A solution by then of the political funds issue, as well as some signs of progress on Okinawa, will be necessary to enable the LDP to withstand the rising tide of opposition criticism, which threatens to make further inroads into its overall majority. Of these five subjects, the one which may awake fiercest dissension within the party is Okinawa. There is



MR SATO’S NEW CABINET79

no sign that the alliance of anti-Sato factions has been finally disbanded: Okinawa was the single subject which most obviously united them. Even the Maeo faction, some of whose opposition seems to have been softened, may still be opposed to Mr Sato on this question; the appointment of Mr Aichi, rather than the better-known Mr Ohira, as Foreign Minister was probably due to this difference of opinion. 9. The succession Assuming that Mr Sato sits for most of his two year term, there is likely to be only one more Cabinet reshuffle under his auspices. Until that time, and perhaps even afterwards, the man to watch will be Mr Kakuei Tanaka. At the same time, his rival Mr Fukuda is by no means finished as a contender for supremacy, while Mr Miki and Mr Ohira are waiting for their next chance. But Mr Tanaka, after two years of relative obscurity since his last term as Secretary-General, now has the opportunity to exercise his talent for reconciling opposing views and to weld the party into a coherent whole. He has the reputation of rare skill in inter-party negotiation and he may be able to turn aside some of the shafts of criticism directed by the opposition parties. His role in managing the fortunes of the LDP through the election will be crucial. This is not to say that he will be the next Prime Minister of Japan, but the present reshuffle has at least given him the chance to show what he can do. 10. Mr Sato is watching the jockeying for position among his potential successors with detached interest. He has quoted Mr Yoshida as saying that a man should have ten likely successors. The figure in the LDP now is not quite so high: but Mr Sato has constructed his Cabinet, it is said, so that all the possibles have a chance to shine. Only Mr Miki is left out in the cold. Meanwhile, the shape of Japan’s policy for the next several months is not likely to change, except by the express will of the Prime Minister – and of such a change there is yet to sign. JOHN PILCHER

14 JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1968*

SUMMARY The economic boom continues, but student unrest made most impact on Japanese in 1968. By the end of the year public opinion had turned against the revolting students. (Paragraphs 1–6.) Agitation over the return of Okinawa next caught Japanese attention. Despite realization of the necessity for the American presence there to keep a nuclear umbrella over Japan, South Korea and Formosa, the Japanese indulged their Nationalism by clamouring in and out of season for its reversion. (Paragraphs 7–9.) Relations with the United States, more essential than ever with unrest in Korea and Viet-Nam and with our withdrawal from ­South-East Asia, were not improved by the anti-Americanism of the Opposition and of revolting students and the vacillation of the Government. (Paragraphs 10–12.) Necessity to maintain the “low posture” inhibited a coherent foreign policy. The year ended with tough economic bargaining with the United States, but the latter showed goodwill by returning the Bonin Islands and promising to return some bases. (Paragraphs 13–15.) Meanwhile the vast market expands: we must invade it. We have concentrated on interesting British exporters in the possibilities in a crescendo prior to British Week 1969. (Paragraphs 16–17.) Our standing in the past year was impaired by economic troubles, but much goodwill and faith in us remain. (Paragraphs 18–19.) Japan is in the full ferment of industrial revolution but could become a defenceless giant. (Paragraph 20.) 3 January 1969

*  FEJ 1/7 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 7 January 1969.



I

JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196881

offer some reflections on the Japanese scene during 1968, together with a calendar of the outstanding events that took place during the year. 2. In general the Japanese Government were able to sustain powerfully a booming and purposeful economy, in great contrast to their inability to pursue a coherent policy in matters of defence and to do other than vacillate in their relations with the United States, while control of the student revolt eluded them. As the Financial Times put it in a phrase much quoted here, ‘Japan became an industrial giant without a political castle’. 3. To the foreign observer the continuing industrial boom dominated Japan. The average Japanese had more money in his pocket than ever before and continued to add possessions to his home to a degree deemed vulgar and unworthy hitherto. Austerity, once so extolled, finally went by the board; the old moral restraints were weakened. But Japan overtook Western Germany and became the world’s third industrial nation. Prophets of economic gloom were disproved; the nation sailed unscathed through international financial crises and the gross national product, which rose by 13.3 per cent in 1967, will rise by about a further 12 per cent by the end of the current fiscal year. Moreover in 1968 Japan turned a deficit of some £223 million into a surplus, which enabled her to increase her total reserves by more than 50 per cent in eight months. 4. However, Japanese commentators agree in thinking that student unrest made an even greater impact than accumulating wealth on the national consciousness. This is not so surprising, since there are (pace the Prime ­Minister, Mr Sato) some 1,500,000 students, enrolled in no fewer than 377 full-scale universities. Moreover the prestige of their universities was their pride and their joy, and their output of scientists a vital element in their current upsurge. Post-war legislation made the great advance in liberty of ­placing university grounds outside the jurisdiction of the national police force, except in the case of murder. With memories of the activities of the Kempeitai ­(gendarmerie) and the ‘thought control police’ before the war, this is a highly valued privilege. As the year went on, the conviction gained ground that Left-wing students were planning to use these inviolate enclaves, designed to ­safeguard the untrammelled pursuit of learning, as armed bases for violent attacks upon the Government. 5. Japanese public opinion began by sympathizing with youth in rebellion against what were presented as antiquated university disciplines, despite the force of the tradition of almost excessive reverence for the professor. However, as the spectacle of mass bargainings, kangaroo courts and ‘sardine-tin’ confinement of university dignitaries became more frequent and widely known, the mood changed. Therefore when the Jesuit university (Sophia), significantly under foreign (largely German) management, which is the closest campus to the Diet building and the Governmental centre, had the courage in December to test public opinion by calling in the police to evict revolting students who had occupied key premises, the Press at least appeared to approve and one obvious convenient base for anti-Government activities was eliminated by the drastic step of closing the university. 6. None the less, during 1968 Japan presented in crude form the pattern of a handful of mutually antagonistic, Left-wing students, ranging from orthodox Communists (Chinese and Russian style) to Trotskyites and anarchists, disrupting the whole academic life of the country. Anti-Americanism and pacifism were the only discernible common traits between them: these, together with the Opposition, they exploited to the full.

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7. Next on the list of impressions made on the Japanese consciousness – thanks partly to student activity – was the Okinawa issue. Sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands (of which Okinawa is the chief) was only acquired by Japan in 1874. For centuries the islands had lived between China and Japan, paying tribute to both Emperors. None the less, the fierce underlying Nationalism of contemporary Japanese (perhaps the nearest equivalent to a religion of the majority) became concentrated upon this issue. It was too dangerous to agitate about the Kurile Islands (perhaps even more strategically important to Japan) or about Southern Sakhalin, which are occupied by the Russians, who were anyhow sacrosanct before Czechoslovakia to many of the Left. Led by the revolting students, the national sado-masochistic urge got satisfaction from belabouring the Americans about Okinawa. Too many Japanese found fulfilment in biting the American hand that gave. 8. The Liberal Democratic Government are convinced of the necessity, given the ‘peace constitution’ and the widespread pacifism, of the Americans defending Japan. They know that to do so the Americans must hold a nuclear umbrella over the area. The Japanese nuclear allergy – which all respect – means that this nuclear umbrella must be maintained from outside Japan. Okinawa is essential for this purpose; it is also needed in connection with the defence of South Korea and Formosa and thus for the safety and well-being of the whole area. 9. South Korea is, of course, ‘the dagger pointing at the heart of Japan’; if it went Communist, the strategic consequences for Japan would be very grave. Despite this the Prime Minister, fearful of the force of Nationalism, dared only to say obliquely that the American presence in Okinawa was essential to the safety of his country. Instead, he played along with the Left wing, it is to be supposed because his popularity depended upon it, and associated himself half-heartedly with the endless demands for the return of the island. He first evinced a more honest appraisal in his end-of-the-year messages. 10. In foreign policy Japanese relations with the United States are of paramount importance. One-third of Japanese exports goes to the United States and the presence of the American defence umbrella obviates the necessity for the Japanese to spend more than a fraction of what is necessary on their own self-defence. (Contemporary Japanese spend more on expense-account entertainment than they do on defence – the figures were of the order of £700 million and £500 million in 1968.) Therefore it would seem that the Japanese should have done everything possible to maintain and increase American goodwill. This seemed to have become even more self-evident as 1968 wore on, since, with some hope that the Viet-Nam war may one day be out of the way, there might well be a revulsion of feeling in the United States against overseas commitments in general and particularly against those in countries where American bases are not welcome to the inhabitants. 11. Further, as seen from Japan, our proclaimed withdrawal from Singapore is alarming, since it could prejudice the stability of South-East Asia with its all-important strategic sea lanes, while the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean might endanger Japan’s oil imports, 90 per cent of which come from the Persian Gulf. At the end of the year a reminder of China’s nuclear potential should have heightened the sense of danger. Caught between two giants, Japan should surely have concentrated upon the only one she can influence. 12. It would seem, therefore, on the face of it that the Japanese now need the American defence umbrella more than ever and that they should be in a



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196883

position to defend themselves to an increasing extent. Yet a commentator in a Right-wing newspaper at the end of the year could castigate as the biggest and most disgraceful event in 1968 the observation by the then Minister of Agriculture (who, as a result of it, paralysed proceedings in the Diet for a fortnight and eventually had to resign) that ‘We need guns and warships to ensure the safety of our fishing boats. Our Constitution is no good. We are like the mistress of a foreign Power depending on others for our own protection.’ Meanwhile, on the issue of self-defence, Mr Sato dithers. 13. Indeed, Japan can be said to have no foreign policy commensurate with her economic status. Since the war she has been obliged to assume a ‘low posture’, in order the better to leap forward later on, it had been assumed. However, in practice, the old hatred of Japan engendered by her behaviour during the last war made it impossible for her to take any but the most discreet initiatives in the whole of the Far East. However much she might wish to take a lead, for instance, in organizing the defence of vital waterways in SouthEast Asia, she was inhibited from so doing by the probable reactions of her ­neighbours to her slightest move. 14. Even on the economic front Japan does little to ingratiate herself with the United States. The toughest bargaining over Japanese quota restrictions is at this moment proceeding, with Japan conceding so far only trifles. The ­Japanese fight to retain restrictions as though their fierce Nationalism demanded this satisfaction as a sacrifice. Yet on smooth economic relations with the United States a good deal of their future prosperity depends. 15. The Americans for their part returned the Ogasawara or Bonin Islands to Japan in June and at the end of the year offered to negotiate the return of no fewer than thirty of their bases on the main islands of Japan. This latter gesture took aback the Japanese, who prefer to wallow in grumbles, rather than incur the expense of having to maintain bases for which they have been daily ­clamouring. Even they, however, admit that the Americans have shown goodwill, if not “sincerity” (which more nipponico means answering the truth with the truth or a lie with a lie: insincerity consists in mingling the genres; here the Americans have transgressed partially by answering a half lie with the truth). 16. Meanwhile the Japanese economy expands at a great rate. Exports rose by 25 per cent, imports by only 11 per cent, but there are reliable forecasts of a higher figure for imports in 1969. This presents a clear opportunity for us. Our exports to Japan in 1968 should reach nearly £94 million, but this would represent only 2.2 per cent of total Japanese imports. If we could increase this share to 3 per cent (roughly the German share now) our exports to Japan could rise with the growth of Japan’s economy to total £375 million by 1985. Therefore clearly we must invade this market with consumer and still more important with capital goods. Success will go to the bold and the venturesome. 17. The first steps have been taken. We have tried to interest British ­businessmen in the market: they should get to know the country and also their competitors. With the help of BNEC and the Board of Trade, sixteen different delegations visited Japan in 1968. All left impressed. It is, however, too early yet to say whether some of them may not also have been daunted by the distance, the barrier of language and custom and the slowness and consequent expense of doing business with the Japanese. The risks are great, but the stakes even higher. Meanwhile British Week 1969 has already aroused enthusiasm for this market, as well it should, since Tokyo presents unique facilities for staging a striking British presence in Japan.

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18. Perhaps after that week we may be able to regain some of our standing in Japanese eyes as a modern industrial nation. The Japanese have absorbed a good deal of American anti-British mythology. Our economic difficulties, culminating in devaluation, weakened our position. The teething troubles of the reactor built by us at Tokai Mura, though happily over, I hope, by the end of this year, did us no good in scientific industrial circles. Failure to deliver the goods on time was as usual criticized. We fail even to provide cultural wares, even when the Japanese would meet the expenditure. We appear to ignore the immense value of the favourable background which cultural propaganda can provide. This has been noticed and criticized in the past year. This will be partially redressed by manifestations during British Week in 1969 and Osaka Expo 70. 19. Still, I must once again record that we retain a lot of goodwill from the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when we were the first foreign friend. We live on the legacy of the cultural supremacy we had before the war, when a galaxy of British literati held academic chairs. We still share faith in our monarchical institutions and the Japanese still look to us – rightly or wrongly – as the arbiter of manners. Japanese in the past year greatly valued the visit as Foreign Secretary of Mr George Brown, while Mr Miki, their Foreign Minister, made a point of going to London to renew your acquaintance. Faith was shown by most prominent Japanese in our powers of revival, not least by the Governor of the Bank of Japan. The favourite criticism was that we were so self-satisfied that we had lost the will to work. The Japanese may yet come to wonder, as the hideosity of their cities grows daily more terrifying and the noxious vapours in the air more lethal and as charm evaporates before the eyes of the beholder, whether the economic miracle was after all worth it. That stage was still far off in 1968. 20. In short, Japan booms, despite the internal student troubles, the wrangling with the United States over bases, the lack of a clear-cut attitude towards self-defence and an almost non-existent foreign policy. She is in the full fervour of industrial revolution. Motorways pullulate. She builds railways (another 180 kilometres on to the New Tokaido super-express line) where others tear them up. Giant ships come thick and fast from her yards. She has just completed a palace costing over £15 million for her Emperor. Yet, if she neither courts the United States nor builds up her self-defence capacity, while failing to establish her political standing abroad, she could become a soft crab without a shell; tempting bait for a hungry bear or a dragon. JOHN PILCHER

CALENDAR OF EVENTS IN 1968 January 6

Bank rate raised by 0.365 per cent to 6.205 per cent.

8–9

Sixth Anglo-Japanese Ministerial Consultations held in Tokyo between the Foreign Secretary, Mr George Brown, and Mr Miki.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196885

16–1 Feb.

Visit of Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Baibakov.

19–23.

USS Enterprise, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, calls at Sasebo: violent demonstrations.

January 23

Official announcement of British Week, 1969.

30

Japan declares support for United States position on Pueblo incident.

February 7

Talks between officials of the Soviet Communist Party, including Mr Suslov, and the Japan Communist Party end in agreement to ‘normalize relations’.

13

Visit of Sr de Magalhaes Pinto, Foreign Minister of Brazil.

23

Forced resignation of Minister of Agriculture, Mr Kuraishi, breaks seventeen-day deadlock in Diet proceedings.

26

Students and farmers riot at projected site for new Tokyo International Airport at Narita.

28–30

Private visit by Mr Harold Macmillan.

March 2

Colonel in Air Self-Defence Force arrested on a charge of giving secrets to a commercial firm: his superior subsequently commits suicide ‘to take responsibility’.

6

Agreement with China to renew private ‘memorandum trade’ for 1968. Agreement signed between Japan and the United Kingdom for co-operation over peaceful uses of atomic energy.

26

Appointment of Mr Morio Yukawa as Japanese Ambassador in London given agrément.

28–1 Apr.

Visit of President Suharto of Indonesia.

29–10 Apr.

Mr Nakasone, Minister of Transport, makes repeated appeals for the scrapping of the Yoshida Letter on trade with China and the normalization of relations.

April 8–15

Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia.

11–26

Visit of HMS Devonshire and other ships and of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Fleet.

15

Budget for 1968–69 finally approved in Diet, two and a half months after its first introduction.

18–24

Visit of Chancellor of Austria, Dr Klaus.

23

Agreement on replacement of sterling by French francs for settlement of Japan-China trade.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

May 2–11

USS Swordfish, nuclear-powered submarine, calls at Sasebo: Japanese allegations of an abnormal increase in radioactivity in the port.

14–20

Visit of Prime Minister of Thailand, Thanom Kittikachorn.

16

Tokachioki earthquakes cause widespread damage in northern Japan.

27–30

First conference of Commissioners-General for the Osaka Expo ’70.

June 1

Partial liberalization of technical assistance agreements.

1–7

Visit of HMS Intrepid and other ships and of the Commander, Far East Air Force.

2

USAF jet fighter crashes on to a building of Kyushu University at Fukuoka.

11

Opening of Anglo/Japanese trade talks.

23

Visit of Commander, Far East Land Forces.

24

Mr Ikeda, a member of the Liberal Democratic. Party and former Cabinet Minister, resigns from the party on being charged with accepting a 3 million yen bribe from a private firm.

26

The Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands are formally returned to Japan after twenty-three years of American Administration.

July 7

Upper House elections: Liberal Democratic Party wins over half the seats up for election and retains its overall majority; the Japan Socialist Party loses eight seats; the other parties gain.

14–15

Foreign Minister, Mr Miki, visits London for informal talks.

19

Japan Communist Party sends a telegram of support to the Czechoslovakian Communist Party.

August 1

59th (Extraordinary) Diet convened.

7

Bank rate reduced by 0.365 per cent to 5.84 per cent.

8

First Japanese heart transplant operation performed in Sapporo.

12–18

Visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, Mr Lynch.

14

Resignation of Mr Yamamoto, Secretary-General of the Japan Socialist Party.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 196887

24

Japan Communist Party condemns Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

27–29

Mr Miki and other Ministers attended 2nd Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference in Seoul.

September 8

Mr Ikeda, President of So ˉ  ka Gakkai, proposes direct meetings between the Governments of Japan and China aimed at establishing normal relations.

8–14

Visit of Sr Antonio Carrillo, Foreign Minister of Mexico.

11–14

Japan Socialist Party convention fails to agree on the new party leadership.

October 1

Bank of Japan eases restrictions on city bank lending.

2

Tokyo stock exchange index recorded highest ever on Dow Jones Index: 1,851.49 yen.

4

Mr Narita and Mr Eda elected Chairman and SecretaryGeneral of the Japan Socialist Party.

4–11

Keio Department Store’s Scottish promotion.

14–18

Visit of Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore.

16

Mr Yasunari Kawabata awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

20–25

Visit of Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Sir Michael Carver.

21

Riots in Tokyo and the provinces on the occasion of ‘anti-war day’.

23

Official celebration of the centenary of the Meiji Restoration.

29

Resignation of Foreign Minister, Mr Miki, to stand as a candidate for the Presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party.

29

Announcement of award of KBE to Mr Katsumi Ohno.

November 1–12

Isetan; Department Store’s British brand fair.

10

Election of Chobyo Yara as Chief Executive of Okinawa.

11–16

Visit of Dr Borg Olivier, Prime Minister of Malta.

17

Ground-breaking ceremony for the British pavilion at Expo ’70 in Osaka.

19

B-52 bomber explodes on take-off in Okinawa.

27

Mr Sato re-elected President of the Liberal Democratic Party.

30

Mr Sato announces his new Cabinet.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

December 10

60th (Extraordinary) Diet convened.

17

Cabinet approves policy statement on liberalization of imports within two or three years.

27

61st (Regular) Diet convened.

15 REVOLTING STUDENTS: JAPANESE STYLE*

SUMMARY The warm-up of 1968; two troubled years ahead. (Paragraph 1.) 2. Revolting students in statistical perspective. (Paragraphs 2–3.) 3. The backdrop: Japan’s special scenery. Political planks for an extremist platform. The revulsion from ugliness. (Paragraphs 5–8.) 4. The leading men: The egotism of revolt. Utopian panaceas for the lost. Family backgrounds and the modern miss. Jobs for the revolting boys. Red deans in the making. (Paragraphs 9–20.) 5. The audience: Vicarious vents for reassertive nationalism. The propinquity of violence. (Paragraphs 21–23.) 6. The supporting cast: Domestic schism. Peking’s handshake, and backing from business. (Paragraphs 24–25.) 7. The props: Dying with their boots clean. Guerrilla titles and tactics. (Paragraphs 26–28.) 8. The safety curtain: Police power matched by Government resolve? (Paragraphs 29–30.) 9. The finale?: The factor of chance. Fissures with fires below. The compulsion of heroism. (Paragraphs 31–33.) 18 March 1969

T

he Japanese students’ campaign is in a transitional phase. 1968 saw a series of war exercises, albeit with live ammunition. 1969 will see the broadening of the battle into the national political field, and only later will it be possible to assess what scale of casualties may be inflicted on Japanese society: 1970 is to be the year of truth when the extension of the Security Treaty with the United States will be brought into final question. * FEJ 1/9 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 25 March 1969.

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Nevertheless, as both sides are regrouping, this may be a suitable moment for the attempt to paint the students’ portrait. For the observations which I offer, I am indebted to the erudition of Mr John Morley, Counsellor to this Embassy and to Mr Mark Elliott, Second Secretary. 2. I must at the outset stress the fact that I am dealing only with the small minority, of whatever persuasion or party label, who constitute the extremist element. It is these who will capture a questioning world attention. My generalizations apply only to them. The remainder, discontented perhaps but not committed to violence, are the vast majority, but they do not differ in any marked way from students all over the world. 3. There are today some 1½ million students in 377 full-scale universities; of these, a maximum of 35,000 are labelled ‘activists’, but the obdurate core would, of course, number much less than this. In 1968, serious disputes occurred in 116 universities, leading to some 1,500 ‘street struggles’ in which just over 5,000 students were arrested. So much for statistics. 4. My choice of headings from the theatre may serve to convey something of the dramatic atmosphere of these happenings.

THE BACKDROP 5. Some years ago, there arose in Japan groups of teenage hoodlums who became known collectively as the ‘Sun Tribe’. Their literary High Priest, Shintaro Ishihara (recently elected with overwhelming support to the Upper House of the Diet: wrote of them: ‘They stood erect, like cactus, without looking down to see that they were blooming in barren soil’. This metaphor well describes both the instability and the almost pathetic arrogance of contemporary Japanese youth, but it also brings out, perhaps with reason, their sense of the sterility of the post-war society from which they spring. 6. In previous despatches I have written of the conviction of racial and cultural exclusivity which characterized pre-war Japan, and the nationalism which still lies so close beneath the surface of Japanese society. I would now add the observation that, on the surface and for the present, it is disillusionment with imported democracy and contempt for traditional authority that loom largest on the horizon of discontented youth. The decline of respect for authority, which afflicts them, is, of course, world-wide, but in Japan at least the iconoclastic nature of American culture, blithely unaware of the destructive nature of its own impact though it may often be, must bear much of the blame. The intensity of the students’ emotions must thus be seen against the backdrop of the conformist society which has nurtured them. 7. There are two other factors which differentiate Japanese students from some of their counterparts elsewhere. One is the existence of acute and tangible local political issues to offer planks for a platform. Cries of ‘Ban the Bomb’ at Aldermaston are plaintive and pallid stuff beside the raucous chants of ‘Okinawa’ and ‘1970’ – issues which certainly provide limitless debating points and a handy hair shirt for the political parties and the Press, although they may not fundamentally disturb the apathy of the electorate. 8. Next, it is relevant to bring into the equation the unusual hideousness of the environment in which most young Japanese pursue their studies. After the intense effort which is called for before a student can enter this promised land, it is indeed depressing to find the scenery so drab and lacking in



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distinction. It may therefore be that a more elegant ambiance would impose a degree of respect and impart some feeling of precious things worth preservation. In practice, after the annihilating destruction of the war, the rarity in Japan of any architectural heirloom more than a few years old and the omnipresence of jerry-built monstrosities positively invite vandalism and serve to unleash destructive instincts. Indeed in the overcrowded conurbations with their foul polluted atmosphere, the craving for green fields and clean air may in themselves be driving people to repudiate a society which is bidding fair to earn that unwittingly apposite epitaph for Japan: ‘And the wind shall say: Here were decent godless people, Their only monument the asphalt road, And a thousand lost golf balls.’

THE LEADING MEN 9. Against this general backdrop, the extremist student represents no great change in Japanese distaste for original or speculative thought; nor, fundamentally, has he acquired an international personality. Before the war, Japanese Communists derived their impetus mostly from study of the proscribed texts; nowadays, they derive it, existentially, from action itself. Of a number of extremists recently interviewed, the majority declared that it was through actual participation in demonstrations themselves, and in the impact of current events, that they had developed their attitudes. Relatively few paid informed homage to the international Revolt Pantheon – Mao, Che Guevara, Marcuse and the rest. Some believe that Marx-Lenin was a hyphenated individual and many that Marx was a Russian; at Kyoto University, a group of students were vague about Che Guevara but referred approvingly, if with doubtful relevance, to General Giap. 10. Since the students’ actions, stripped of the verbiage which accompanies and is held to justify them, stem from intense nervous stimulation and profound egotism, it is not surprising that these men are capable of a degree of blind irresponsibility which shocks. Every moment must be portrayed as ‘crucial’. In this they play live to the samurai tradition and the teachings of Zen. Moreover they are brought up on the violence of the Kabuki plays, daily diffused and exaggerated by television. The founder of the 1958 Communist ‘Bund’, Shima, almost put his finger on it years ago when he wrote ‘Witnessing violent scenes . . . led me to think that a revolution is not something to be made, but it is something that comes to happen. Yes, it happens because people are aroused to the occasion by witnessing a heart-piercing scene. Thus, I thought, what we should do was to present to the public a heart-piercing image which would instantaneously crystallize the true meaning of the situation.’ Or, to put it less politely, it is the job of the revolutionary to trail the bloody meat in front of the sharks. 11. More recently, one of the Zengakuren leaders has expressed it with equal coolness: ‘Student radicals are opposed to the principle of ready accommodation to the existing state of affairs and only consider the correctness of a course of action without reference to its effect and support which it might have. In this lies the purity and heroic subjectivity which the activists possess. A defect of this general virtue is that it could have a cold-heartedness

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and lack of compassion. However, such is their stance for bringing down the present political system.’ In other words, the community, however grossly abused, must suffer gladly in the cause of its own ‘re-education’. 12. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the extremist student does not bother to profess a philosophy. Japanese fatalism, born of the Buddhist tradition, and consequent incuriosity towards the day after tomorrow finds comfortable kinship with an ideology of which the perspectives are utopian to vanishing point. This is basically the familiar stuff of the new Left – ‘the great denial’, ‘an end to the one-dimensional society’, ­‘alienation’, ­‘self-creation’, ‘the new Humanism’; I do not therefore analyse here its universal aspects. The Japanese have their own word for it – shutaisei – which does not translate well but has been described as ‘selfhood and social commitment’. They revealingly aver that their task is as much to transform themselves as to transform society, and here again one discerns that the mainspring for action is egotistical. 13. In their claims on society, they resemble their European brethren in demanding reform, while being basically hostile to it as a manifestation of compromise; they would heartily approve of the Vincennes students’ mock conjugation of de Gaulle’s verb ‘participate’: ‘we participate, you participate, they exploit’. To apply Marcuse: ‘They do not crusade against this or that in the existing society but use concrete issues only as an occasion in order to revolutionize totally the present society as a whole.’ Being deprived of recourse to the traditional Oracle represented by the Emperor: having seen the clay feet of their teachers and rulers; wearing not even the tattered remnants of a religious upbringing; being disjoined in many cases from the father – and mother – figures who have so dominated their adolescence, they flounder in the search for answers; and in the end take refuge inevitably in the sort of medicine-chest of syncretic holistic panacea, which, as Hayakawa of San Francisco University wrote thirty years ago, can be presented as a ‘sophisticated and, in our culture, a respectable form of emotional immaturity’. 14. As to their background, these are not the dispossessed, not the chaps with chips in any material sense. The majority of the activists and the ‘interested’ come from the families of managers and officials, proprietors of smallscale businesses and professionals. It can only be a matter for speculation how far their attitudes have been consciously or unconsciously conditioned by their resultant familiarity with the effects of ‘the System’ on their parents and especially on their fathers: but of a large group of activists recently surveyed, one in five was in fact fatherless. Moreover, the ratio of men from small towns and villages – the ‘foreigners’ up from the country – is higher than normal among the activists, which seems to point to further causes of disorientation. 15. Another fascinating field for reflection is the effect on the young male student of the development of the post-war Japanese woman. She must come as quite a change to the youth who up till his university days had been used to running home to an infinitely indulgent mother whom he could treat like dirt whenever he felt like it. The modern miss, however, has a far more critical eye, is successfully exigent and allows her sulks full play; studiedly clicking her emotional abacus to gain her own ends, she is no longer the permissive figure of old. Nor does she greet the young male with the respect to which he used to be accustomed. This does indeed result in deeper daily



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companionship between the sexes. On the other hand, it is always less easy to sustain the belief in one’s heroic image when a pair of coolly appraising eyes shares the same mirror. How far, one wonders therefore, does the modern girl contribute to the lonely conviction of the young man, now frequently far from his family, that nobody, but nobody, understands what he thinks he feels? 16. The students’ attitude towards their seniors manifests itself usually in individual and specific complaints. These as often as not are tokens, albeit genuine ones, of a deep general resentment against what they regard as the degrading relationship forced on them by the teaching staffs. A senior student at Tokyo University put it thus: ‘There is something in the atmosphere of the classroom that discourages discussion with our professors, who give us lectures as though they were disregarding our presence. Those students who are really interested in study are compelled to study on their own. We studied very hard to get into this university, but, now we are in, we are utterly disappointed by what we are given.’ The phrase ‘study on their own’ should not convey the image of diligent individuals poring over their books in self-isolation. ‘Study groups’ are the fashion and 75 per cent of the activists belong to one. Circumstances could hardly be bettered for the development of sullen extremism. 17. Few would deny that the students have a real case. Indeed, their complaints are not limited to the poor quality and perfunctory behaviour of many of their professors, which amounts sometimes to simply cancelling a lecture at a moment’s notice and without a word of explanation. In most of the revolting universities there are genuine and particular grounds of complaint. The most scandalous is the unexplained expenditure of over £2 million by the authorities of Nihon University revealed last May. However, the issues involved range from maladministration and outdated disciplinary methods at the medical faculty of Tokyo University to the provision of university shops, bus services and dormitory accommodation at Wakayama and Saitama universities. Over most of these issues public opinion is on the side of the students, against the group of semi-professional administrators and businessmen who run their institutions for the sake of status or profit rather than academic enlightenment. Few universities have much to attract the respect or affection of their inmates. 18. Even so, an end to these grievances and a degree of satisfaction to the universal demand for ‘participation’ would not pacify the extremists. To them, this would be the sell-out. Nor need they feel inhibited, in going their own wilful ways, by the more distant prospects before them. The system is such that, once they have taken the towering hurdle of gaining entrance to one of the prestigious universities, no one is going to engender loss of face by refusing them a degree. Poor class attendance, as well as poor classroom performance, is more or less taken for granted. Since it is the status of the university which contributes most to getting a job, rather than the individual achievement, a sudden sense of relaxation overcomes those who have succeeded in getting into the university of their choice. Compared with the intense struggle for entrance, there is hardly any competition thereafter. Furthermore, a neat method was concocted years ago to offset any sense of humiliation which a man might feel at failing an examination: rakudai (ploughing) is not mentioned, the In word being ryunen (staying up for another year).

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19. Despite all this, it might be thought that many students with a known record of militancy would be given pause by the prospect of facing a Business Selection Board. The indications are that this might have been so a few years ago, but that, with an increasing shortage of qualified labour, the young man has no need to worry overmuch. If the big firms decide not to take him (and some big employers may no longer be averse to a touch of the firebrand in the people they choose to inject vitality and power of decision into the lower levels of Japanese industries faced with an increasing severity of international competition), the smaller ones will. 20. If he cannot get a job with industry, or one of the more coveted Civil Service departments, the authorities will not be so fastidious as to deny him a job as a teacher. This raises obvious spectres, but Britain too has its complement of such familiars and it is therefore unnecessary to make more than passing mention of the strong Communist (or other ‘revolutionary’) tendencies of very many Japanese university and high school teachers; at Hôsei University in Tokyo, to quote just one instance, it is recorded that thirty of the professors are JCP members, while another forty are ‘sympathizers’.

THE AUDIENCE 21. Left-wing professors are by no means the only ones who nurture sympathy, sneaking or otherwise, for the extremists. The attitude of the public – those who have not themselves been victims of the wrecking – towards student militancy is ambivalent and curiously dissociated from any feeling of personal responsibility. Above all, the issue of police intervention in campus warfare is one which arouses the deepest and darkest instinctive apprehension among those who remember the old days of thought control. Once the police are given free rein, they ask, how long will it be before they begin to abuse their power once again, in order to put down legitimate political opposition? 22. To this it must be added without cynicism that many older Japanese now personally experiencing a recrudescence of nationalism but finding no outlet for it, may take a certain vicarious satisfaction from watching ‘Okinawa’ or ‘1970’ anti-American agitation as a spectator sport at no risk to themselves. On this deeper level of temperament, it may not be too unfair to the Japanese to wonder, whether, in some quarters, there may not be a faintly hollow ring to protestations of shock and horror at student excesses. Violence is never far below the surface of this volcanic people, nuclear allergy or no, and their long spells of quiescence are due primarily to the plug at the bottom of the vent. Thus it is that members of the public, for example those who gathered at Shinjuku Station to watch the riots of last October, may abruptly join in the general mayhem once the plug has been dislodged by the students themselves. 23. Perhaps, significantly, we have also just witnessed the first two occasions on which a crowd of homeward-bound commuters, doubtless normally models of respectability, took offence at some administrative muddle on the railway and proceeded to emulate student tactics by wrecking the station where they happened to be delayed. There thus exist profound differences between the instinctive propensities of the Japanese, and say, the British public when it comes to violence as part of the natural order of things. This is not to say that no voices are raised here in condemnation of the wanton



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destruction. Very much the contrary, and they may prove to have great influence on the outcome. Yet, as regards motivation, it may be personal shame at such an emergence of the dark underside of the national character, rather than civic or humanitarian disapproval, which prompts these voices to protest so roundly.

THE SUPPORTING CAST 24. What of potential allies? There is much talk about joint action programmes with the JCP on the ‘1970’ issue, but it seems probable that in the event and apart from isolated occasions, the underlying irreconcilables of the extremists on the one hand and the JCP Minsei on the other will guarantee the preservation of a faction-ridden status quo. In the eyes of the Japanese new Left, the arbitrary switch of JCP policy to non-violence at the Sixth Party Congress in 1955, and the purge of seventy-odd dissenters which ensued, imparted to the JCP the same exclusive and absolutist aspects which had characterized the Emperor system itself. It is thus difficult to perceive common ground for lasting reconciliation even in adversity. On the other hand, there is no doubt that support for violent methods has been growing in the high schools. According to the National Police Agency, ‘the high school students concerned are no longer merely emergency reserves for the Zengakuren but have grown to be fully-fledged fighting units’ on their own. This is new and it includes some girls’ schools. Even the staunchest policeman might justly quail at the prospect of a Japanese St Trinian’s. 25. As to more positive sustenance, the sources of student funds and supplies are enshrouded in deliberate smokescreens. Of the moral support of Peking, of course, there is no doubt, and Moscow too has broadcast praise of the anti-JCP factions. Actual proof of financial subsidy from Peking is hard to come by, but there are some pointers. On the 14th of January the JapanChina Friendship Association passed a resolution to support the extremists by posters and fund-raising; a well-known member of the Mao Thought Research Institute, who has recently visited Peking, was seen at the head of one attack in the Tokyo University battle; Chinese correspondents based here have held private conversations with student leaders before the fighting, entered the Tôdai (Tokyo University) compound at the height of the battle, and supplied some helmets to the openly Maoist faction of Zengakuren-Shagakudô; the Chinese businessmen’s associations in Japan have put out propaganda for the anti-JCP groups. There is also little doubt that donations from the so-called ‘Friendly Firms’, those which are anxious to promote trade with China and seek favour in Chinese eyes, play a large part in the financing of these quite expensive guerilla operations. This last point is intriguing in so far as many of the ‘Friendly Firms’ are in fact ‘front trading organizations for the business giants, and it is easy to perceive what strange paradoxes this may engender.

THE PROPS 26. It is, however, in their tactics and their trappings that the revolting students are catching the eye of the world. These in fact stem directly from their avowed aims plus the usual sedulous Japanese preoccupation with

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being appropriately dressed for a given occasion. (Anybody who has been to a golf training ground in this country will have noted that the ceremonial donning of all the correct accoutrements tends to take up as much time and effort as the practice itself.) It must be realized that they regard themselves quite literally as engaged in warfare (busô tôsô – armed struggle) against the State, as summarized succinctly by one of the Shagakudô leaders in March 1968: ‘In the past, we have participated in the struggle with wooden staves in a spontaneous manner. From now on, we will organize battalions, companies and platoons. We will go anywhere. There is no alternative but to resort to military action in order to overthrow the régime in power. In 1970, we will follow the “Molotov cocktail formula”.’ These are not empty words; far from being the woolly rabble of many a British procession, the young Japanese warriors of 1969 are organized with some efficiency into, for example, ‘special operation unit’ (tokushu kôsakutai), ‘stone-throwing unit’ (tôsekitai), ‘attack unit’ (totsuge-kitai), ‘wooden staves unit’ (gebabôtai – the first two syllables of which are derived from an abbreviation of the German Gewalt) and ‘First Aid unit’ (kyûentai, staffed by the girl students). 27. In the light of these martial purposes, it is natural and indeed inevitable that equipment to match should be provided. Similarly, it is entirely understandable that students will put up a strong fight to prevent police taking over campus buildings. This is by no means only a matter of prestige; the campus is in a very real sense the rear-echelon area, not only for the students from that university itself, but also for those who come and go between universities all over the country, in order to maintain mobility of forces and keep the police on the hop. 28. There is at present a dispute at one of the Faculties of Kyoto University which is ostensibly concerned with a question of ‘face’ over students’ right to run their own dormitories: behind this, however, lies the determination of the Kyoto activists to prevent the authorities gaining any power to check on the presence in those sleeping quarters of transient agitators from other universities. Similarly, one of the leaders of the Tôdai (Tokyo University) battle has recently been arrested – at Hiroshima, where he is a senior student of the Engineering Faculty. In all this, those concerned have at least assimilated one of the basic tenets of guerilla war, namely, that static forces are defeated before they start.

THE SAFETY CURTAIN 29. So much for the mise en scène. What of the prospects for a long run? There is little doubt that really ruthless action by the police (and conceivably by the defence forces, although the decision to commit these would raise a tempest of public antagonism) would contain the movement, though it would, of course, solve none of the underlying social problems. The police have received budgetary approval for substantial reinforcements in men and material. Their authority will probably, for reasons explained in paragraph 21 above, be applied in what the Americans would call a spotty fashion. In Kyoto, for example, where the Prefectural Governor, though himself a man with an extreme-Left record, is for complex motivations grimly determined that his city shall not succumb to street disorders, we may expect to see the toughest of measures; and indeed, as I write, the Governor has just taken



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the step of ordering 2,500 riot police to the university entrance examination sites without the prior agreement of the university authorities. 30. In Tokyo, however, things may go differently, simply because motivations are different, and the same will apply elsewhere – for example, the site of EXPO ’70. One of the Prime Minister’s unofficial advisers has told us that the reason why he expects the troubles to be severe in 1969 is not that the police will lack strength, but that their orders will never be sufficiently categorical. In other words, he regards this as a contest not of power but of will, and fears that too many ghosts from the past will lay their icy fingers on those who will have to take the final and irrevocable decisions.

THE FINALE? 31. Too many imponderables block the way to a prediction of the outcome. Much will depend on whether, as tenseness develops, the extremists are able to create broader alliances for action, for example with the trade unions. Present indications are that they will not succeed in wooing others into the espousal of violence as a declared principle. Public opinion, moreover, may well harden against them and stiffen the sinews of those who advocate a decisive crackdown. But there is one factor which, in this land of whiteskinned knuckles, could be tragi-comically decisive: sheer accident. It might take only one American aircraft crash, one little squirt of radioactive waste, one girl student killed by an over-zealous policeman, one attack by a riot squad against ‘innocent’ bystanders to swing the train of events dramatically the other way against all cool reason. Thus it is quite impossible to predict how far the fortitude of the security forces will be stretched in the event. 32. As to the fortitude of the students themselves, let us not underestimate the lengths to which these young people will go in their personal quest for heroism; we may feel scorn at their jejune philosophy – ‘a return of extremist infantilism’ as Amendole has termed it – but we should not disregard emotions which crystallize in many ways the neurosis of contemporary Japan. True, some of the gladiators will run away when the going gets rougher in the ring; most might well prefer to be martyrs thrown to toothless lions. 33. Nevertheless, their uprooted and lonely crusade is not something alien to this land, in which, beneath Confucian strata, baleful emotional fires have always burnt. My view is that it will need determined force to plug the fissures. ‘A vaincre sans péril, on triomphe sans gloire’: compulsively dedicated to setting himself and Japanese society at risk, the revolting student must shun the circumspect self-betrayal of compromise in his search for the hero’s laurels: poor chap. JOHN PILCHER

16 JAPAN’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY*

SUMMARY Japan’s research and development effort has increased rapidly of late; though her way of introducing technological innovations is peculiarly Japanese, her industry has achieved the technological level of Western Europe, if not of the United States. (Paragraphs 1–3.) Significant factors which have led to Japan’s technological progress examined. (Paragraphs 4–11.) Japan will continue to be dependent on bought foreign technology; reluctance to rely exclusively on the United States may mean an opportunity for Britain. Japan’s export of know-how will also increase. (Paragraphs 12–17.) If successful contracts are to be concluded a visit to Japan by the United Kingdom businessman imposes itself. (Paragraph 18.) 19 August 1969

I

n my despatch of the 25th of October, 1968, I attempted to outline the principal factors which have been responsible for the economic success of Japan. I did not include in my consideration the subject of Japan’s science and technology. This has now been covered in some detail by my Scientific Counsellor, Dr Manders. The object of this despatch is to indicate how circumstances peculiar to Japan have enabled her to introduce technological innovations with rapidity and to suggest how Britain might profit from her experience and further requirements. 2. The 1967 OECD review of Japan’s science policy pointed out that the finances allocated to the total Japanese research and development effort, both from private and Government sources, had increased considerably in the last decade. The Japanese are acutely aware of the vulnerable position in which they are placed by excessive dependence on foreign technology and are doing *  FEJ 17/4 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 8 September 1969.



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much to develop their technological independence. Their efforts to develop their capabilities in the field of nuclear power, space technology and marine technology (the three so-called ‘big sciences’) are particularly noteworthy. 3. Japanese industry as a whole is as advanced technologically as that of Western Europe, if not of the United States. It may be useful to outline some of the factors which have made this possible. There is a tendency for Western scientists and technologists who have visited Japan to return to their own countries with a mixture of relief and disappointment; relief at their d ­ iscovery that there is no magic success formula denied to them, but, for the more perceptive, disappointment that their own environment does not contain the basic factors on which the Japanese industrial success is founded. These are the factors which I outlined in paragraph 3 of my despatch of last October, all of which help to explain how the Japanese have been able to implement industrial innovations so rapidly. 4. The decision to innovate is, of course, made primarily by industrial management, but the manner in which factors peculiar to Japan influence this merits closer examination. 5. The risk element. Naturally the Japanese, like their counterparts in other nations, consider carefully the potential market for a new product, before investing the very large sums now usually necessary for the introduction of radical departures in manufacturing techniques. The extensive market research effort of individual companies, backed by the findings of the many committees constituting the Supreme Export Council, undoubtedly decreases the probability of error in the assessment of market potential. Thus, the existing high confidence level, based on the continued success which the Japanese have enjoyed for many years, is further increased at the very beginning of the decision-making process. 6. Other factors which, apart from their favourable effect on the total industrial environment, also reduce the risk element, are first the consumer durable boom. The consumer boom in products of a relatively high technological content – e.g. colour television sets and cars – has provided firms in a novelty-conscious home market, protected from outside competition, with the opportunity both to buy know-how from outside and to develop their own technology. It is perhaps worth noting that the Japanese spend proportionately about one-third more on consumer durables than the British. 7. Next, the labour scene. Japanese management-labour relations are changing only slowly and are still relatively stable. The continuing assurance of employment for life increases significantly the receptivity of all grades of employees to the introduction of the latest techniques. Indeed, management stands to lose some of the high level of respect shown by employees if it does not adopt the most effective production methods, thereby increasing the status of the company in relation to that of its competitors. 8. Then, the Zaibatsu. The high degree of interdependence of the individual elements – the manufacturing, trading and financial organizations within these large consortia – provide top-level planners with continuous access to a wide range of reliable information covering the entire operation from funding of the project to world marketing. This enables them to eliminate many of the unknown factors, such as the performance of outside organizations, in their assessments. The diversity of products, from consumer to capital goods, made by the various manufacturing elements of the Zaibatsu provides a wide variety of skills and knowledge on which planners can draw and which enables them

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to produce integrated plans for large projects such as those which fall within the areas covered by the ‘Big Sciences’. 9. Reduced foreign competition. Clearly, potential competition, both domestic and foreign, is an important consideration at all stages of investment planning. Japanese companies are well protected against foreign competition by Japan’s import restrictions and the importance which they attach to this factor has been clearly shown in the discussions on inward capital liberalization: even the Japanese car industry, now with the second highest production in the world, pleads that it is technologically, financially and organizationally unfit to counter direct United States competition in Japan. Again the risk element is reduced. 10. Technological induction. We should also remember that the Japanese reliance on the purchase of new techniques from abroad has brought with it a built-in reliability factor, since they buy only from well-established firms with a high reputation who, in many cases, have already demonstrated the value and reliability of the resulting product. This policy eliminates many of the unknowns which are inherent in introducing new production techniques. 11. Lastly, finance. Over 82 per cent of the capital of Japanese industry is held by banks; equity capital therefore plays a much smaller role than in the West. Firms are not constrained to work from one year’s financial report to the next to the same degree as in the West; one result of this is that heavy capital investment may be expended in one year, where elsewhere it would be necessary to phase it over a three to five-year period. 12. Opinion is divided on the extent to which the Japanese will continue to rely upon imported advanced technology and on the growth rate which she will be able to achieve in building up her own resources. It might be argued, for instance, that her vast and apparently endless research and development investment in the electronics industry eventually will lead to complete independence in this field, whilst her comparatively low investment in the aerospace area, where large capital sums would be needed, might justify a high degree of dependence on foreign know-how. The recently signed United States-Japan Space Co-operation Agreement is evidence of such a policy. 13. Clearly the decision will depend not only on the product areas but on many other factors, such as the country from which she buys, since restrictive clauses in the know-how agreements may affect her ultimate marketing potential. There are signs that the attitudes of some American firms are hardening and it is rumoured that certain United States firms, who have shown reluctance to enter into know-how agreements, have been persuaded to do so only by the intervention of the United States Government. Such political pressures may be absent in the future, particularly if Japanese firms show unwillingness to co-operate on market restrictions – e.g. COCOM. 14. There are, therefore, indications that the Japanese may in the future lean further towards Europe and away from the United States for the technology which they decide to buy. This view is supported in some measure by the increasing number of study missions which are being sent to European countries as well as to the United States, to investigate the potential in areas of advanced technology, such as the computer industry and automatic process control. 15. British firms have hitherto shown considerable reluctance to sell really advanced technology to Japan, probably with the justifiable fear, based on pre-war experience, that the Japanese will adapt and improve upon it faster



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than the originator. There are, however, exceptions, notably ICI and Shell, who have derived considerable benefit from directly- negotiated agreements, whilst the National Research Development Corporation has found a profitable market in Japan for the results of British research and development. 16. Many Japanese, very few of whom understand the problems which we in Britain face, are truly astonished that, with our enviable history of scientific and technological achievements, we virtually give them away to other nations who industrialize them and reap the benefits. Our production, management and marketing capabilities earn little respect, and indeed we have much to learn from the Japanese in these fields, but they have a high regard for what some term our ‘brain industry’ and are very willing to buy its products – but only the very latest. I have already mentioned the difficulties of persuading British industrialists to sell advanced technology to the Japanese, but it should be possible to raise our share in this market to rather more than the current value, which is only about 6 per cent. America, of course, takes the lion’s share, but West Germany’s 11 per cent is nearly double our own, and the visit of her Minister of Science, Dr Stoltenberg, in September last year may well result in a further increase. 17. We should also remember that Japan’s advances in science will gradually improve the quality and quantity of her technology and that much of it will be available for export. British firms who enter into agreements with the Japanese in the near future are likely to be in a favourable position, through the contacts which they make, to benefit in the longer term from these developments, perhaps through cross-licensing. 18. The high growth rate of the Japanese market offers potential rewards which justify considerable effort and a certain amount of risk, but licensing and joint venture agreements, like other business negotiations with Japan, cannot be conducted entirely from the home base; it is also necessary to see at first hand the conditions of the country, to seek the best advice available from all sources and then, having chosen a suitable partner or licensee, to negotiate the agreement with a high degree of trust, goodwill, patience and determination. 19. Perhaps, not being a scientist, I could end on a note which could justify a certain optimism on our part. We are heirs to the Christian tradition, whereby perfection is not of this world. We are constantly spurred on to further efforts by the conviction that whatever we achieve could be bettered: hence our innate inventiveness. The Confucian world, to which Japan ultimately belongs, sees things otherwise: harmony is the goal in this world and this is to be clamped like a mould upon human affairs. This mould is in itself right and not susceptible of improvement. Hence the relative uninventiveness, which has come to afflict (Professor Needham notwithstanding) the Sino-Japanese world. Painstaking research characterizes their system but its rigidity and lack of spontaneity seem hitherto to have retarded the flash of inventive genius. JOHN PILCHER

17 LABOUR AND INCOMES IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY*

SUMMARY Gloomy prognostications of a labour shortage in Japan are lent ­apparent substance by recently-published statistics of the excess of vacancies over secondary-school leavers. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. These statistics may not be entirely reliable. But there is indeed a shortage of skilled workers in the manufacturing industry, which is beginning to have an effect on production. (Paragraphs 3–4.) 3. One reason lies in the greater attractions of white-collar work to the new generation, which is tending to be better-educated; hence tertiary industry expands. This situation will gradually deteriorate. (Paragraphs 5–8.) 4. Meanwhile wages soar, and fringe benefits bring the worker’s lot nearly up to that of his counterpart in Britain. (Paragraphs 9–10.) 5. The faults which Japan must overcome lie rather within the wage structure: excessive discrepancies between large and small industry, between young and old, between town and country. (Paragraphs 11–13.) Moreover there is obvious under-employment in the tertiary (service) industries. (Paragraph 14.) 6. Redeployment of labour, recruitment of women, raising of the retirement age and greater automation are all therefore necessary. Labour shortage and wage increases are not yet slowing the Japanese rate of growth, but the Government will soon be forced to act. (Paragraphs 15–16.) 10 September 1969

*  FEJ 5/5 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 17 September 1969.



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here has been much talk in Japan during the last few months of a ­growing labour shortage, which might threaten the continued growth of the ­Japanese economy. In this despatch I examine the extent of the alleged ­shortage, its effect on the wage and employment structure and ways in which the shortage may be mitigated. 2. The single piece of hard evidence, which has lent most apparent plausibility to the claim that there is a serious labour shortage, was contained in the Labour White Paper published by the Japanese Government at the end of June. Statistics must always be treated with some circumspection, but in this White Paper the Ministry of Labour nevertheless makes the startling statement that the ratio of vacancies to school-leavers had climbed by March 1969 to the unprecedented figure of 5:7 for eighteen-year-olds and 4:9 for fifteen-year-olds. This would mean in effect that only some 15–20 per cent of vacancies at this level are filled. Against a background of rising prices, and of increases in wages which have broken all records in the last two years, a labour shortage of these dimensions, if it were repeated across the board, would indeed be serious. 3. The first caveat that I must make concerns the reliability of these statistics. They are based on the returns of the Public Employment Security Offices (Labour Exchanges) scattered throughout the country, through which, by an impressive use of computer techniques, employers and applicants are put in touch with each other. A majority of school-leavers use these employment offices. However, there are many other methods open to the employers for recruiting their new workers; and the fact that a vacancy is not apparently filled through the formal employment office channels does not by any means prove that it is not filled by, for example, recruiting trips through the remote farming communities. Similar statistics for the labour market as a whole, which purport to show that there is a general excess of vacancies over job applications of 1.4 times (excluding school-leavers), are even less reliable; the employment offices process only 20 per cent or so of all job applications. Unfortunately these statistics provide the only available means for assessing supply and demand in the Japanese labour market, although the Ministry of Labour, aware of the need to construct an efficient employment policy, is even now working on ways of creating a comprehensive system of statistics. 4. Nevertheless there are a number of significant trends in the labour market which should be examined. In mid-1968 there were said to be nearly 2 million unfilled jobs in Japanese industry. Nearly l½ million of these were in the manufacturing industries, and represented about one-fifth of all employment in this sector. The construction industry was also short of its putative complement by 330,000 men, or some 30 per cent; one reason for this high figure may be the frenetic increase in construction caused by the advent of Expo ’70. Of the manufacturing industries, only one-third claimed at the beginning of this year that they were up to strength in their skilled and non-skilled labour, and nearly half of them claimed that shortfall of labour had a noticeable effect on their production figures. However, interestingly enough, this shortage was not repeated in the clerical and managerial sections of manufacturing industries, some 14 per cent of which admitted to being slightly over strength, and a further 68 per cent of which were fully up to strength. 5. This last fact points to another characteristic of the labour shortage in Japan; it is much less intense among white-collar workers and in what is known generally as tertiary industry, notably the wholesale and retail trades and the service industries. In the early 1960s the secondary industries, notably

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­ anufacturing and construction, were riding high on the crest of industrial m expansion and were the most popular of all employment from the point of view of the school-leaver. Between 1961 and 1964 this position was swiftly eroded, and by 1965 the manufacturing and construction industries had dropped from the top to the bottom of the scale, being replaced by the retail trade and the service industries. The figures of the Public Employment Security Offices showed in 1968 that, while less than one-fifth of the demand of the manufacturing industries for fifteen-year-old school-leavers was filled, the wholesale and retail trades were still able to attract enough eighteen-year-old school-leavers – the bulk of their intake – to fill one-third of all vacancies. 6. The relatively comfortable position of tertiary industry may serve as a pointer to one of the chief reasons for this trend. One of the strongest motives which inspires Japanese youth in the late 1960s is the driving ambition to reach a higher level of education. In 1960 nearly 40 per cent of fifteen-yearolds went straight from their ‘middle school’ into employment, the remainder staying on to the Japanese grammar school equivalent. By 1967 this figure had dropped to little over 20 per cent. The story is similar at the age of eighteen, where more and more school-leavers are trying, some of them successfully, to go on to university. This has hit the manufacturing industries, which still recruit over 60 per cent of all middle school-leavers, especially hard. In general, too, higher standards of education have brought an increased reluctance to engage in manual or ‘blue-collar’ labour, as opposed to the more comfortable and generally more profitable white-collar work of the service industries and the retail trade. Salaries for Japanese blue-collar workers generally compare unfavourably with salaries in other industrialized countries, but fringe benefits and expense accounts make them much more generous than they seem at first sight. The trend away from blue-collar jobs has been compounded by the gradually dropping numbers of school-leavers, as the post-war ‘baby boom’ or ‘bulge’ moves up the population spectrum and out of the school-age group. 7. The effects of these various influences will continue and intensify. There is no sign of the ambition for higher education slackening, and a prediction for 1975 suggests that there will only be 180,000 middle-school leavers entering employment in that year, as opposed to 450,000 in 1967. By the same year the number of university graduates, now under 200,000, will have risen to 300,000 – and university graduates expect higher salaries. The tendency for tertiary industry to expand at the cost of secondary as well as primary industry (agriculture) has been strong for some years: of a labour force of 50 million, under 10 million or about 19 per cent are now engaged in primary industry, although this is still a very high rate for an industrially advanced country such as Japan, over 17 million or 34 per cent on secondary industry and over 23 million or 46 per cent on tertiary industry; the figures only four years ago were of the order of 26 per cent primary, 32 per cent secondary and 41 per cent tertiary. Meanwhile the influx of labour to industry from agriculture has been declining slightly as farming conditions improve and amalgamation of small-holdings into large units is still not permitted. The birth rate continues to decline, and one long-term prediction has it that by 1995 about one-quarter of the whole Japanese population will be over fifty-five, the current standard retirement age. 8. These figures show, I believe, that there is a genuine labour shortage, at least among skilled and non-skilled ‘blue-collar’ workers in the manufacturing industry, which is beginning to have some effect on production. Many



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­ uthorities discount the effect of this for the time being: but they agree that a there is a strong likelihood that this situation will continue and grow more serious unless corrective action is taken. Before examining the areas in which such corrective action might be taken by the Japanese, I should touch on the question of wage increases, which bears at least some relation to labour shortage. 9. The relation lies mainly in the strength of the bargaining counter which the unions have acquired in their annual battles against employers. They know that their employers cannot afford to lose their services. They know also that the employers can very well afford to pay higher wages, with business so obviously booming. As a result, the employers in 1968 conceded increases of wages amounting to 14.2 per cent in nominal and 8.5 per cent in real terms, the steepest increase for fifteen years. These figures are an average of all employment; in the largest private firms, and especially in some of the smaller firms which had done less well in previous years and are now seeking to catch up, the increases are even more startling. Predictably too, the starting wage offered to lure the precious school-leaver has soared everywhere by more than 17 per cent. 10. With the national average wage riding high at something over £65 per month, not including the considerable annual bonus of four to five months’ wages on average, and with the cost of living rising steadily but not at so fast a rate, the level of income in Japan is by no means as bad as the unions’ often carefully chosen statistics would seem to prove. The unions have pointed out that, for example, although the average of hours worked per month has marginally decreased this year to 192.7 (it was 202.7 in 1960), the real wage per hour worked is still only a quarter of that earned by the average American and barely over half that earned by an Englishman. However, these figures do not take into account the wide range of fringe benefits which employers provide for their workers as a supplement to their wages. An impressive, but not in the least improbable, list of benefits provided by ‘most large companies’ was published a year or so ago by an employers’ association: it included company hostels or houses, at rents below one-fifth of the market price; ­low-interest loans; dental treatment, ‘beauty shops’, libraries, hospitals; cooking and ­flower-arrangement schools; educational subsidies; gifts on marriage or similar occasions; sports grounds; holiday facilities by the sea or in the mountains; and a ‘home-helper service’. There were also insurance and superannuation schemes of various kinds. It is difficult to reckon the exact cash value of these provisions, but one likely estimate, taking into account the difference in cost of finding accommodation on the open market, is that they add something like 35 per cent to the value of the monthly wage. On top of this there is the annual bonus, paid in two parts in summer and at the New Year, which has averaged a total of about £350 per head in the last year. Paternalism in Japanese industry is still strong, and the workers have come to expect it. One recent survey gave, as one question, the choice between working under a man who asked no more of his staff than the regulations provided, but who did nothing for them out of hours; or a man who was sometimes unreasonable in his demands upon his staff, but who would go out of his way to help them outside matters directly related to work. The overwhelming majority chose, and indeed would probably expect, to serve under the latter. 11. The lot of the Japanese worker, therefore, is scarcely inferior to that of his counterpart in Britain – at least so far as total earnings and benefits are concerned. The faults which Japan must correct in this field lie rather in the

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wage structure itself. There is still a large, although diminishing, discrepancy between wages paid in large industry and those paid in the mass of small and medium industries which occupy a large part of Japan’s labour force. (This discrepancy extends also to the general problem of labour shortage itself, the large industries having come to feel the pinch of difficult recruitment some years later than the smaller industries, and still finding their task relatively easier.) Wages in firms employing less than a hundred people, for example, are still only at about 65 per cent of those in concerns of 500 men or more. 12. This discrepancy is accentuated by the steps recently being taken by the bigger firms to correct another anomaly, the low starting wage which is offered even to university graduates. It is traditional in Japanese society for men in their early, even in their late, twenties to live with their parents even after they are married and have children, and the custom has naturally grown up that employers need not pay their employees a ‘living wage’ until they are about thirty. However, this tradition is fast being broken down, partly as a result of the greater mobility of society and the move of the children of country homes into the big cities, and earlier marriage is becoming more common. Even so, a university graduate can still expect no more than an average of about £40 a month as starting salary, and a school leaver only £30. These figures may be much lower in concerns employing only a hundred men or less. The plight of the medium and small industries, in this and other respects, figures in the slogans of every Centre and Left-wing political party, but neither they nor the unions (which reckon few of their members outside the larger industrial concerns) are capable of doing much to correct the imbalance. Nor can they do much about a related anomaly, the tradition whereby wages and pensions are based almost entirely on length of service, thus acting as a strong deterrent against mobility between industries. In the larger companies this structure is changing towards the European pattern, but the development is slow and it is doubtful whether a radical restructuring of the Japanese wage pattern will be achieved in less than a generation. 13. The concentration of Japanese industry, particularly the manufacturing industry, in the large cities contributes to the integralities of the labour scene. The demand for labour in the cities climbs steeply every year, and employers have to spend large amounts of money on recruiting trips to the remoter areas of Japan to persuade graduates of country schools to come up to the bright lights. (These recruiting trips, incidentally, impose a considerable financial burden on the smaller industries, as it may cost as much as £100 a head – spent on travel, small bribes, even visits to the factory by the parents of the prospective employee – to recruit labour in the distant areas.) The Government has plans to deploy industry further afield, but many employers are reluctant to take the gamble of leaving the ‘megalopolis’ or urban strip between Tokyo and Osaka and place themselves at a disadvantage with their competitors on transport costs and convenience. 14. The most obvious anomaly is one which is common to other countries than Japan, but not so intense nor so evident in daily life – the excess of labour employed in the tertiary industries. Every department store and office in Tokyo appears to be supplied with vast numbers of ingratiating girls whose sole function is to welcome the visitor and occasionally supply him with cups of tea. Thousands of tiny firms exist only to transport consumer goods from one point to another in the unnecessarily long chain of distribution which seems to be traditional to Japan. Mr Reginald Cudlipp has written in the Guardian for the



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16th of July, that it is only obsession with the assembly line which inspires all the talk about a labour shortage, and a cut in the numbers of idle office workers, shop assistants and hotel clerks could produce surprising results. This is perhaps more easily said than done, particularly as reluctance on the part of the eighteen-year-old to soil his hands with manual labour, even of a skilled variety, becomes more marked. Nevertheless there is obviously scope for largescale redeployment of labour, if only this could be achieved. 15. One further aspect of redeployment relates to women and to the old. There is still a strong tradition that woman’s place is in the home, although the number of women engaged in part-time work increased, according to the rather imprecise statistics, from about 700,000 to about 920,000 between 1964 and 1968. A campaign to bring more women into work might well achieve useful results. Another step that could have immediate effects would be to persuade firms to raise the present retirement age from the strangely low figure of fifty-five. The life-expectancy of the Japanese increases every year, and is now higher than our own; in the political and many other fields increased age is a sign merely of increased authority. There appears to be no reason why workers should not be kept on at least until sixty, but very few of the largest concerns have so far broken their tradition of retirement at fifty-five. The decreasing birth rate – which has caused politicians recently to express open concern that Japan may be on the decline, and call for greater efforts to produce more Japanese – is another reason why the need to raise the retirement age will soon become urgent. 16. In addition to the redeployment of Japan’s existing labour resources, the shortage of labour will also have to be alleviated by still more automation. In the last few years much of the high rate of investment in productive capacity has been concentrated on labour-saving machines. This trend will need to be intensified and positive Government action to encourage this may be necessary. Hitherto productivity has kept pace with wage increases. However, if the existing level of wage increases were maintained, and at the same time the effects of a labour shortage were to become apparent in a markedly lower rate of increase in production, Japanese industry could face serious internal problems and become less competitive internationally. As yet, there is no sign of such developments; the state of the labour market is not slowing down the Japanese rate of growth. Indeed, present Japanese fears are that the rate may be too rapid to avoid unacceptable inflationary pressures. But if the present labour shortage in certain sectors of Japanese industry continues to develop without direct action being taken by the Government to reverse the trend, inflationary pressures are likely to be generated which could in the long run undermine Japan’s prospects of maintaining her current high growth rate. JOHN PILCHER

18 BRITISH WEEK, TOKYO, 1969*

†

SUMMARY Introduction. Special contribution of Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret and of Lord Snowdon. (Paragraph 1.) The problems of tackling a city the size of Tokyo. (Paragraphs 2–3.) The build-up. The value of missions and sample shows. (Paragraphs 4–6.) The special role of the department stores and of culture. (Paragraphs 7–9.) Special events. (Paragraph 10.) Industrial aspects of British Week. (Paragraphs 11–14.) The contribution of the services. (Paragraph 15.) The Centrepiece Exhibition. A tribute to the COI. (Paragraph 16.) Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon. (Paragraph 17.) The popular journals. (Paragraph 18.) The President of the Board of Trade. (Paragraph 19.) The Lord Mayor of London. (Paragraph 20.) An assessment of the Week. Regarded from a broad point of view, it achieved its main objectives of expanding exports, improving our image in Japan, attracting attention to the Japanese market and helping Anglo-Japanese relations. (Paragraphs 21–26.) The importance of follow-up. (Paragraph 27.) Some errors. (Paragraph 28.) The co-operation of the Japanese authorities. (Paragraph 29.) Conclusion. Basically a success. (Paragraph 30.) 16 October 1969 * This should be read together with Ben Thorne’s personal account of British Week in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX †  FEJ 6/548/7 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 23 October 1969.



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‘British Week’ was held in Tokyo from the 26th of September to the 5th of October, 1969. For a brief space of ten days Britain came in force to this, the largest metropolis in the world. The impact created was greater than I or my staff had ever dared to hope. Much of the credit for this is due to the planning and great efforts of the British National Export Council, the Board of Trade, British business firms here and in London, the British Council, and, not least, the staff of this Embassy. But we owe a particular debt of gratitude to Her Royal Highness the Princess Margaret, magnificently backed up by the Earl of Snowdon: their personalities and dedicated hard work impressed and attracted the attention of many millions of Japanese, who have not yet been won over to Republicanism from their Monarchical traditions by American or other foreign influences. 2. I understand that the authorities had rejected out of hand any suggestion that the British Week formula for export promotions should be tried in such metropolitan centres as Paris or New York. Yet we decided to tackle the largest city in the world in a country utterly different from anywhere we had tried before. In terms of population, the target, Tokyo, with 11 million people, seemed at first sight too vast and diffuse for the formula. In consequence, in the early stages the idea was to concentrate solely on the central Ginza area, but it soon became clear that, in view of the growing importance of some of the suburban centres, such as Shibuya, Shinjuku and Ikebukuro, our net would have to be cast much wider. 3. Our basic worry all along was that the vast department stores, which dominate the retail trade in imported consumer goods (over 70 per cent of such imported goods are sold through these stores), would refuse to co-operate in a joint venture of this size. Certainly they had never done so before and remain bitter rivals and competitors. But in the end, as a result of over two years of cultivation and effort, all the main department stores took part and most on a major scale. We also feared that the major Japanese newspapers, with their mutual jealousies and with their vast circulations and serious, if not pontifical approach, would either ignore or scorn us. Here again, despite some near misses, occasioned inadvertently by a well meaning co-operative advertising scheme, we achieved massive support and, to my mind, astonishing coverage. 4. I do not propose to go into details about the planning and build-up. These are already available to those who need to know in BNEC and the Board of Trade, while the lessons to be learnt will be covered in separate reports by members of the British Week Office of this Embassy. I must, however, stress certain vital aspects from the point of view of this post. The first was the value and contribution made to the commercial success of the Week by the series of research and selling missions which had visited Japan (in the final run-up year there were over thirty such missions). We could hardly have coped with more (indeed even this number was a great strain on our resources), but we could and should have had more sample shows. The sample shows which were organized were generally an outstanding success, but there were none from, for instance, the hardware and allied trades. BNEC, the Board of Trade and we ourselves tried our best but failed to arouse the interest of these trades: they missed a real opportunity. 5. Secondly, I must mention the inward missions or buyers from the department stores, which BNEC had to sponsor under a special arrangement (since they would not fit into normal practice). While the actual buying of the stores on these missions was sometimes disappointing, the psychological value of

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the invitations was an essential catalyst in bringing about the co-operation of the stores. 6. Finally I must draw attention to the efforts of all those in London in the British Council, the Board of Trade, the museums, etc., responsible for the organization of the imposing and indispensable cultural effort, and especially for the great variety and excellent quality of the exhibitions which the department stores demanded. 7. Tokyo presented peculiar problems, not least because of its size and its anachronistic wholesale and retail distribution system, but it had one great advantage over my previous post, Vienna, where another British Week has just been held. There it looked as though the officials concerned would have to cope with some thousands of small shops. Here, in Tokyo, we could concentrate on the twenty major department stores and the 400 supermarkets and speciality shops dealing in foreign goods. But, as I have already pointed out, the department stores were fierce competitors and all demanded, as the price for their participation, cultural exhibitions of the highest calibre. To induce museums, galleries and private collectors in Britain to trust their treasures to a foreign department store in a far off, earthquake prone land, required great patience and persuasive power. Fortunately, the successful store promotions and exhibitions, held at two major stores in Tokyo in the autumn of 1967, provided a valuable precedent and we owe much to Mr John Lowe of the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery and to Dr Harden of the London Museum, who came out in 1967 and again in 1969, for their valiant and successful efforts in persuading their colleagues and friends to lend. But if only we could have got more and better things, our impact would have been all the greater! For the really important treasures, sponsorship is no problem; for the not quite first rate, we have to pay. It is perhaps worth recording that one major department store turned down an interesting and important collection of Royal portraits from the National Portrait Gallery, on the grounds that the artists were not well enough known. If we are to continue to interest the stores here in promoting our goods, we shall have to make even greater efforts to meet their appetite for cultural bait in the future. 8. I do not propose to discuss in detail the actual events or programme of British Week. For those who are interested, these are set out in detail in the printed programme (1 million copies of the Japanese were distributed), but certain features must be pointed out. We were determined to avoid, if at all possible, the outdated beefeater image and in this I think that we were largely successful, but at the same time we could not evade giving our customers what they were determined to have. This meant, for the department stores, cultural or generally historical exhibitions, although I am glad to say that one was persuaded to stage a Rolls Royce exhibition and another an exhibition of modern photographs and prints. 9. The educated Japanese public at large has an insatiable appetite for culture, of which other countries have been quicker to take advantage than we have. It was therefore all the more important to support British Week with a really strong cultural programme. The Board of Trade contribution to this (£15,000) was, I understand, no higher than in other Weeks, and served only to finance a very small part of the cultural events, the cost of the remainder of the programme being found from commercial sponsors, both British and Japanese, with generous and welcome assistance from the British Council. In the event the London Philharmonic Orchestra’s three concerts in Tokyo were



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sold out weeks in advance and very large audiences attended Julian Bream’s two recitals and the performances by London’s Festival Ballet. A major Henry Moore Exhibition in the National Museum of Modern Art was visited by 49,700 people during its six weeks showing. Other parts of the cultural programme were designed to interest and attract economists, language experts, publishers and the literary world, Mr Angus Wilson’s lectures and book signing sessions having a particularly effective impact on the latter, with promising results in terms of book sales. 10. We also needed for the ordinary people something more popular. We had soccer, rugby, Highland games, a rose competition (graced by that colourful figure, Mr Harry Wheatcroft), Frank Ifield and Cliff Richard as pop stars and, most popular of all, eight London buses, all commercially sponsored. The London buses, however outdated they may appear, were the most photographed item in British Week, after Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret herself, and special guards had to be provided to ensure that in the press to get on they were not pushed over. 11. A British Week is, of course, essentially a consumer goods event, but non-electrical machinery is still the largest item in our exports to Japan and my commercial staff were at pains to broaden the scope of the Week to cover our more technically advanced equipment. We were fortunate in getting enthusiastic support from the Scientific Instrument Manufacturers’ Association (SIMA) and the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC). A very suitable site for an exhibition was obtained in the Science Museum and a joint venture with fifty firms participating was put on for eleven days for an invited audience. A very satisfactory attendance was achieved and the exhibitors were well pleased with the interest shown in their equipment, with the orders placed and with the prospects for future business. 12. The Week was also used by defence sales for a display of marine and defence equipment on RFA Stromness and, although I had some qualms about this attracting the unwelcome attention of the student demonstrators, I am glad to say that the exhibition was regarded by the organizers as a success. Certainly considerable interest was aroused in certain items of equipment. 13. In the industrial context I must further mention the Atomic Energy Presentation put on by the Nuclear Power Group on the 26th of September, 1969. This was well attended by important people in the atomic energy world in Japan and should have helped to develop interest in the advanced gas cooled reactor system. I am indebted to Mr Hotchen, First Secretary, Atomic Energy, at this Embassy, for the organization of this Presentation. 14. Japanese electrical appliances, radio and sound equipment are well known throughout the world, but it is a gratifying fact that it is still possible to sell ‘coals to Newcastle’. An exhibition of British hi-fi equipment, which is much admired by Japanese connoisseurs, and of home appliances (paraffin stoves have been a major British export to Japan in recent years) was held in Central Tokyo on the premises of a major rival, the Sony Corporation of Japan. It attracted good audiences and a favourable Press. 15. A major contribution to British Week events was made by the services. The five military bands were very popular and added notes of pomp and gaiety to the Tokyo scene wherever they played. HMS Fearless provided not only a dormitory for the visitors, but also a location for parties and an attraction to young and old. The service drivers and cars tried valiantly to cope with Tokyo’s

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crowded traffic and impossible addresses. I should like to record again my thanks to all concerned. 16. Finally among British Week exhibits, I must refer to the Britain in Tokyo exhibition in the Hall of Martial Arts (the Budokan, which was put up specially for the Olympic Games). We could not have found a more prestigious place for our central exhibition, but no one had ever tried anything of the kind there before and it presented peculiar problems and opportunities to the designers, because of its octagonal shape, its great height, and the rising tiers of seats around the central amphitheatre. The Central Office of Information in fact did a magnificent job. As the visitor entered down a specially built staircase, his first view was of Nelson’s Column and of backcloths of British scenes including St Paul’s, Regent Street, a new town, etc. The inventive Britain section which started the exhibition was impressively done and aroused much interest. The section devoted to the Council of Industrial Design gave a valuable glimpse of our contributions in that sphere. The bookshop and the post office were deservedly popular. The pub, the Lord Nelson, did very well with its Scotch, but alas, the Japanese have little taste for British beer. The food, the wool textiles, the room settings and the carpets were all well displayed. The last section on Anglo-Japanese relations aroused much interest and took the whole exhibition on to a different and non-commercial plane. I am more than ever convinced that we were right to include this and only regret that more space could not be found for it. Certainly I think it was this section which ensured that the exhibition as a whole had such a distinguished galaxy of visitors, including, what must be a major precedent, visits by every member of the Imperial Family, headed by their Majesties the Emperor and the Empress, and by the Prime Minister and many members of the Japanese Cabinet. The attendance of over 125,000 over ten days was less than some people had hoped, but at all popular hours the exhibition was packed and the quality of the visitors is not in dispute. The Japanese who entered, as in my original conception, was at once transported to Britain. 17. I mentioned in the opening paragraph the contribution made by Her Royal Highness the Princess Margaret to the success of the Week. I will not go into details of her programme, but I must comment briefly on a few points. I am sure that we were right in urging that Her Royal Highness should arrive before the Week began and spend her first few days as the guest of the ­Japanese Government. As a result the Japanese Imperial Family, the Government and the public all had a chance to get to know the Princess and this ensured that when the Week began she was already a popular figure. She and Lord Snowdon won them all over and this not only greatly increased the ­publicity for the Week itself but ensured their more enthusiastic co-operation. Her Royal ­Highness and Lord Snowdon carried out a very tough programme with the greatest distinction, style and good humour. In three days they visited ­nineteen department stores and shops, in all but three of which were separate cultural or other exhibitions. Their constant interest and charm greatly pleased their hosts and undoubtedly helped to attract the crowds into the stores. The Japanese police were outstandingly efficient and gentle in their control of the unprecedentedly vast and happy crowds which greeted the Royal visitors with marked warmth. 18. There were no unpleasant or difficult incidents of any kind; this, of course, greatly disappointed the ‘sea dragons’ from the British popular Press. We did our best for them, even giving them seats in Royal cars on occasions



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and feeding them with the kind of story which any intelligent journalist could make into an amusing piece for a suburban housewife. But no, every Japanese in a kimono was a Geisha and they had to invent a story about the opening of the pub. Lawrence Durrell could have done so much better with a little fiction of this kind. The truth was that the photographers, especially Pathé News, disobeyed all the rules and frustrated the efforts of the barmaids to provide us all with the drinks we badly needed. However, even as fictitiously reported by the Daily Express, the story added some imaginary spice. 19. Hardly had our Royal visitors left than the President of the Board of Trade arrived, two days ahead of schedule. The Japanese authorities responded very well and in the event I think that a useful and interesting programme was arranged for Mr Crosland and Mr Hughes, Second Secretary at the Board of Trade. Apart from visiting various British Week events, the President was able to have official talks with both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry, and thus gave a valuable push to the crucial trade talks at present being conducted in London. Mr Hughes was also able to follow up with senior officials, not only in the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but also in the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. 20. The Lord Mayor of London and the Lady Mayoress, with their train, were our final visitors. At first the Governor of Tokyo, Mr Minobe, who is a modern Socialist and who was persuaded that his opposite number was the Chairman of the Greater London Council, was not very interested. But in the event he entered into the spirit of the occasion with zest and good humour. To greet the Lord Mayor in his formal regalia, Mr Minobe even put on for the first time in his life formal Japanese dress. The Japanese in general were somewhat puzzled by the pomp and circumstance to which they are no longer accustomed, but found the visit an interesting reminder of past finery and the Press gave it good coverage. 21. The Week thus passed very smoothly. There were inevitable moments of tension, of pomp, of fun, and I am glad to say, even of straight farce. Tiring though it was for all of us, we managed to enjoy it all, thanks to the immense good humour of all concerned. My best moment was the commandeering of a double-decker London bus to convey seven Imperial Princes and Princesses from the Centrepiece Exhibition to the Embassy. What a chance for the ‘sea dragons’ and the photographers, but by this time they were exhausted by their labours and were doubtless sipping pink gins once more in the seedy haven of the Press Club. 22. It is too early yet to assess the final results of the Week, but my preliminary conclusion is that it was not only a success, but that we also largely achieved our main objectives. I have always regarded the Week in Tokyo in the broadest context and believe that, looked at in this way, the expenditure of money and effort has been justified in terms of the national interest. 23. Our first objective was, of course, to increase British exports to this major market, which is growing faster than any other in the world. According to figures provided by the Japanese department stores, their purchases of British merchandise will this year be 36 per cent up on last year. This figure is generally confirmed by the statistics of our exports of consumer goods to Japan in the first eight months of this year. Sales of British goods during the Week are all very much higher than usual. Some figures quoted to us of percentage increases were indeed astronomical and most stores reported increases in total

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sales of over 30 per cent, as compared with the same period last year. Our total exports to Japan in the first eight months rose by over 33 per cent, which is about double the overall rise in Japanese imports. We have thus managed to increase our share in the market and our total exports to Japan may in 1969, with luck, top the £120 million rank – still much too small but moving in the right direction. 24. Our second objective was to create a new image of ourselves in Japan. In the past few years, with sterling and our balance of payments in constant trouble, many Japanese have been inclined to dismiss us as out of date and lazy. The Press reports of British Week and the figures of visitors to British Week events (one store reported over 1 million visitors to their City of London exhibition, while most other exhibitions received visitors in the six figure range) suggest that they will be much less inclined to take this line in the future. Our scientific and technical prowess, our high quality production, and our determination to try to penetrate the market could not be missed. 25. The third objective was to bring Japan as a market before the British exporters, big and small. The valiant efforts of BNEC in this field deserve special mention. Over 500 British business visitors came to Tokyo for the Week – much more than we or the agents could cope with – and we are due for almost as many BNEC sponsored missions in the coming year as we had in the last. The serious Press, especially the Financial Times, gave excellent coverage and so have even some of the more popular papers. But some of the reporting has been just silly and we must try to influence the major British papers to employ a higher calibre of journalists in Japan, the importance of which in the world and for ourselves is increasing all the time. 26. Our final objective was to bring Britain and Japan closer together and to revive the friendly relations which existed in the past. We can no longer afford in this day and age the animosities and fears engendered by Japanese competition of the ’thirties or by Japanese aggression of the ’forties. We must, like the Australians, pursue a new course. There is still, especially among the older generation, a respect for our traditions, our heritage and our manners. Let us ensure that the younger generation in Japan respect our vitality as well. British Week has, I think, made a real contribution to this. 27. British Week was not, of course, an end in itself. Its success will depend on the follow-up; this must consist not only of what we, the Board of Trade and BNEC can achieve, but also of the enhanced efforts of British businessmen, whose interest in the market must be maintained and developed. Japan is so different from other markets that I and my staff have to spend much of our time on basic education. This is a right and proper role for us to play. It is also right that we should do all we can to encourage and help in promotions of all kinds, but in the last resort success or failure rests with the British businessman, who must be given the right incentive and help to make greater efforts in Japan. When we have had time to digest the results more fully, I propose to submit some more general observations on this and on export promotion in general. 28. Of course there were mistakes and errors of judgment in some of our planning. It would be complacent not to admit this, and one often wishes that one had hindsight, more pairs of hands and more money. The sending out of thousands of invitations in two languages to addresses difficult to discover and with an inefficient postal system was a nightmare. Gatecrashers at the opening party almost turned it into an impassable throng, through which a way had to



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be fought for the Royal party (but the resultant squash was deemed a complete success, at least by the young). Street decorations in a city of this size might have been better concentrated or even the expenditure used to greater purpose on some other aspect. But these are fairly minor points and I see no advantage in detailed post-mortems. The one really jarring note (and what a noisy and repetitive one) was the film première of ‘Battle of Britain’ The Germans reacted well to it, but it was ill-chosen. A cheerful film was required. 29. I cannot close this despatch without mentioning the warm co-operation of the Japanese authorities, central and municipal. But for their forbearance, it would not have been possible to stage our British Week at all. I would like therefore to record my thanks to them, to the Imperial Family for their interest, and, not least, to Her Imperial Highness Princess Chichibu, who helped and supported us unstintingly throughout by attending practically every British Week event. 30. To sum up, British Week, Tokyo, thanks to the co-operation and hard work of all concerned, and to the enthusiasm inspired in all by Princess ­Margaret and Lord Snowdon, was a success and, in my view, a real c­ ontribution to the national interest. Moreover the warm feelings inspired in Imperial and Governmental breasts may yet stand us in excellent stead. J. PILCHER

19 THE MERRY WIVES OF GINZA: WOMEN’S STATUS IN JAPAN*

SUMMARY Despite a universal curiosity, the subject of Japanese womanhood has engendered some odd popular fallacies. (Paragraph 1.) To understand her position today, glances back into history are necessary. A first glance back, at her ancient forebears, shows a sharp contrast with her public image today. (Paragraphs 3–4.) A second glance back: the importation of Chinese culture initiated her decline until its nadir in the seventeenth century. However a strong rider must be entered: her effective role in society belied appearances even if her individual personality were stunted. (Paragraphs 5–9.) Today, to all appearances, she has been dramatically emancipated. She has a new nominal status in law and in public life, and her education has been revolutionized. (Paragraphs 10–13.) A third glance back: these reforms were legalized by the occupation authorities after the Second World War, but their origins go back to the Meiji Restoration. (Paragraphs 14–15.) Yet another rider must be entered: was she in fact so suppressed and is she in effect so emancipated? (Paragraphs 16–18.) On closer examination, the realities are not so sunny in office and factory, in homes and in personal relationships. The Japanese do not necessarily share Western concepts of ‘love’ and marriage. (Paragraphs 19–23.) There exists a curious impersonality towards matters sexual. The world of the geisha is illustrative. (Paragraphs 24–26.) Unaccustomed leisure for women derives from present demographic trends. The processes of adaptation create fundamental strains and questionings. (Paragraphs 27–32.) *  FEJ 18/6 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 28 October 1969.



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These stresses are not unique to Japan but special factors render them exceptionally severe. A certain reaction has set in. (Paragraph 33.) Thus this ‘revolution’ in the status of women as individuals is much less absolute than might seem. (Paragraph 34.) Irreversibly, her distant prospects are brighter. The personality of the Japanese male should also be the gainer in the long run. (Paragraph 35.), 21 October 1969

J

apan, for the foreigner, is a land abounding in optical illusions. One of the most deceptive of its natural phenomena is the Japanese woman. Views of her in the eye of the stranger have veered wildly between equally ­improbable extremes. The Dutch trader of the seventeenth century who wrote ‘These people neither make love nor woo’; the well-wisher at London Airport in the twentieth who so predictably leers his warning against ‘those geeshas’ to the departing voyager; the devotee of the Quaint who visualizes Japanese women as fragile figurines from a Sullivan setting of some Lafcadio Hearn libretto; the travel-blurb dupes who expect to encounter the world’s most liberal ladies along the neon paths of downtown Tokyo; the espousers of the doormat myth who enquire whether they still have to bind their feet. There is no end to the misapprehensions, nor any, judging by the invariable questioning of our visitors, to the universal curiosity. Indeed, such curiosity is not misplaced, for if the men of Japan are seen to be evolving into pre-eminent economic bipeds (‘animals’, in this context, has latterly become a dirty word here), what, it is fitting to ask, is the female of this formidable species making of herself in the meantime? In this despatch I attempt to resolve into better focus the distorted images of both past and present. For this exposé of das Ewig-Weibliche I am indebted to the ingenuity and erudition of Mr John Morley, Counsellor to this Embassy. 2. It is not feasible to take the measure of the mini-skirted specimen of 1969 without many a backward glance at her forebears. Is she as emancipated as they say, and if so from what? Mrs Etsu Sugimoto’s charming autobiography offers a suggestive text: ‘The hearts of Japanese girls are no different from those of girls in other countries, but for centuries, especially in samurai homes, we had been strictly trained to regard duty, not feeling, as the standard of relations between man and woman.’ Indeed, but it was not always so. There is no reason to suppose that the women of ancient Japan were any less redoubtable, whether in politics or in love, than their fabled cousins of South-East Asia; nor would it appear that they were downtrodden by their men as female personalities in their own right – and this, as we shall see, is what much of the fuss of 1969 is really all about. The poetry of the seventh and eighth centuries is rich in a passionate romanticism which betokens the reverse of any denigration of women: ‘I loved her like the leaves, the lush leaves of spring, That weighed the branches of the willows ... Where we two walked together, While she was of this world.’

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writes one of the great contributors to the eighth-century ‘Collection of a Myriad Leaves’ [Manyoshu]. Admittedly, such aristocratic products of the Nara Court may not be representative, but they nevertheless offer a striking contrast to the lyrical sterility of similar circles in a later age. 3. From this it is a far cry to the mandatory public mien of the young ladies of today. In the department stores, on radio and television, in buses and at stations, winsome baby-bird voices charm the newcomer by their unfailing politeness and madden the habitué by their remorseless monotony. It is not the mothers or children who feel any need for these dulcet chirpings, these elaborate outpourings of the meekest speech-form of the Japanese language. It is a demand by the male which, being dutifully met, lends an aura of enhanced virility to his own studied gruffness. To what historical transformation does this bear residual witness? 4. It goes back as far as the introduction of Chinese civilization into Japan in the sixth century. Not even the most ardent partisan of that great achievement would claim that it gives a square deal to one-half the human race. What the feminine mind might not unreasonably term its leukemia virus took many hundreds of years to penetrate into the Japanese bloodstream; but already in the eighth century the promulgation of the Taihô Civil Code brought laws based on the Chinese patrilineal family system, with severe discrimination against women in regard to property and marriage. By the beginning of the Kamakura period in the twelth century her status had continued downhill, and by the sixteenth she had lost all rights to property and was deprived even of a share in the possession of her own children. She could be divorced by no more than a three-line writ declaring that she ‘was not pleasing’ or that she ‘did not fit in with the family ways’. This is not entirely a thing of the past: a 1967 social survey revealed that, out of a large sample of causes for divorce cited against the wife, one-quarter were ascribed to ‘friction with the husband’s lineal ascendants’ (though this statistic must be taken with reserve, since such a charge, being respectable, is frequently trumped up in order to avoid loss of face by the disclosure of true and much more delicate reasons). 5. The historical process did not stop with discriminatory legislation. While Buddhism in the fifteenth century was teaching that Woman was an agent of devils, born to prevent Man from following the True Way, the Confucian ethic which served as a totalitarian underpinning for government in a tumultuously emergent nation was sprayed like defoliant over the women of feudal Japan. The tuning-fork for those baby-bird voices was struck in the seventeenth century when the evolution of sexual apartheid reached its full in-glory. The lowly status of women was then explicitly hallowed by various Confucian scholars, of whom the most dogmatic wrote a notorious thesis on ‘The Greater Learning for Women’, according to which: ‘A woman regards her husband as Heaven. She must not oppose him and invoke the wrath of Heaven. If he is licentious, jealousy will make her face and speech fierce and threatening, so that her husband will abandon her in disgust.’ Her nature was innately subject to five evils: willfulness and disobedience; rage and ill-will; tendency to slander and abuse others; jealously, and shallow understanding. Her only chance of acquiring merit, therefore, lay in total meekness and limitless self-sacrifice. Men, in other words, had never had it so good. An evanescent phenomenon? Behold what a t­ wentieth-century autobiographer tells us she learned at her mother’s knee: ‘Submission is



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the utmost womanly virtue. Unselfishness, sacrifice and endurance, that is all-sufficient for women.; (However, before condemning this as monstrous or depraved, we should do well to bear in mind what misogynists of other nations, including the British aristocracy, were advising on the subject in about the same era: ‘A man of sense’ wrote Lord Chesterfield; only trifles with them, plays with them as he does with a sprightly and forward child; but he neither consults them about nor trusts them with serious matters.’) 6. Is it then from this former state of virtual slavery that these unfortunate women are now being released? Have we witnessed in Japan the end of an impossibly repressive social ethic? If this were so, the task of contemporary analysis would be easy; but the realities are subtly different, and, in order to interpret 1969, a strong rider to this account of the past must here be entered. One cannot apply to an entire people the standards of an aristocratic minority. Doubtless the author of the ‘Greater Learning’ saw his treatise as a blueprint for society in general, but equally without doubt it must have seemed unreal and even comic to many. Such grim severity could not have applied alike to prince and commoner, to town and c­ ountry; it never did and it never has. Certainly, the stiff-upper-lip tradition of the samurai enjoined the training of women along lines of the narrowest possible gauge, and there is abundant evidence that they were so educated even after the Meiji Restoration. ‘The majority of intellectual men of that day’ writes Mrs. Sugimoto ‘allowed the women of their families to remain narrow and ignorant.’ But much significance attaches to her use of the limiting adjective ‘intellectual’. Among less-endowed mortals, the traders and farmers for example, a relatively earthy way of life allowed to women a far more dynamic role that some of the over-eager beavers of today would have us believe. In the household they were dominant, in the omnipotent family council their voices, albeit tactfully muted, could be decisive; and much of the bowing and scraping which they performed was probably more a public deferring to accepted conventions than the expression of an intimate subservience. The sardonic versifiers of the eighteenth century had pungent comments to make on the marital relationship at brass-tacks level: ‘When it’s of his wife A fellow’s afraid, The money rolls in, “She suckles her baby: On the shelf You’ll find some sardines”’ After he’s scolded His wife too much, It’s he who cooks the rice. This sounds somewhat akin to the realities of life in the little suburban apartments of modern Tokyo. 7. Moreover, even the sacrifice demanded of women of samurai families was not some wanton sociological perversion. Self-renunciation as an ideology was of the very essence of the aristocratic order of things. Just as a woman was expected to evince selflessness for the sake of her husband, so was he for the sake of his feudal lord and thus onwards up the ladder. Bushidô may have been a little inhuman and not a little boring, but it was undeniably lofty in

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its concept and consistent in its application. Bad luck on women, indeed, to find themselves relegated to the bottom of the ladder; still, what was required of them did not amount to a purely arbitrary victimization without roots in the accepted culture of the times. 8. Despite this rider, such a severe Gleichschaltung could not, according to modern lights, have been enforced without creating deep legacies of strain. It may have been part of women’s training for marriage ‘not only not to express, but not even to become conscious of potentially disruptive personal desires’, but it must remain doubtful how far such heart-washing could be carried: ‘Oh my man is so unfeeling! Had he said he hated me, Or could not bear to live with me, I might loathe and detest him. But oh! this bond and tie with parents– A bond he cannot cut or slip.’ During this whole era, the emotional growth of women was cribbed, cabined and confined like that of bonsai trees, and there is no reason to suppose that concubines fared any better than wives. They both might, in personal relations, achieve contentment, but not joy, and there seems to be in Japanese women, then as now, a particular capacity for joy of a quite simple and elemental kind. The system worked because it was rigidly imposed with no option but suicide, and because in the age of Japan’s isolation no one had access to other standards as a basis for comparison. But typical of its underlying psychological cruelty was the sankin-kôtai system by which the wives of provincial daimyô were compelled to reside in the capital city for six months of the year as hostages for the good behaviour of their husbands. 9. The social trend had its impact on dress fashions. The kimono and obi, so pleasing to the eye in their materials and colours, belied the confinement they actually were to those who wore it. The elaborate hairdressings of the period prevented women from actively moving about for fear of disarranging the style. In Tokugawa Japan the shuffling of female feet was an acknowledged sign of submissiveness, and it was considered more modest to walk with the knees and toes turned in. 10. Whatever good there may have been in the resulting social system, the combined concepts of meibun (pre-ordained status of high and low) and dansonjohi (a neat portmanteau word meaning man-noble-woman-base) could hardly survive the humanistic scrutiny of the age succeeding Japan’s long isolation from the world. Yet Tradition has still not given up the struggle, and I shall return to this after looking at the ‘revolution’ which has ostensibly wrought such marked changes in the face of Pitti-Sing. 11. Statistics, irksome though they be, are the most telling indicators of feminine advance in professional and public office since the Second World War. The voting rate for women in national elections for years past has been of the order of 70 per cent of those eligible, and some twenty seats are usually graced by them in the National Diet. Two have attained Cabinet rank. They figure prominently in commissioned public offices. Recently they were holding 30 per cent of the membership of Mediation Commissions of Family Courts, 28 per cent of membership of Public and Child Welfare C ­ ommissions,



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11 per cent in the Civil Liberties Commissions, 13 per cent in the Social Education Commissions and 12 per cent in the Board of Education. In 1969 women for the first time outnumbered men in elementary school teaching, although with 50.3 per cent they still have some way to go before emulating Britain’s 75 per cent. Women as paid employees represented 33 per cent of the total paid labour-force in 1967, and the most significant aspect of this is that over 40 per cent of them were married compared with 24 per cent in 1960. The Labour Standards Law enunciates the principle of equal pay for men and women, but in practice the average wage of women workers is still only about one-half that of their male counterparts. The average length of women’s service is just over four years; at the accepted ripe age for marriage they are ‘tapped on the shoulder’ with a strong hint that it is time they departed. The Governmental Women’s Bureau has not been slow to point out that in direct consequence they have ‘limited chances of promotion as well as a lower wage level’. Japanese management has little difficulty with the feat of paying lip-service to the law with its tongue well in its cheek. 12. The prior education of Japanese girls has made even more remarkable strides. Elementary education is compulsory anyway, but of the 953,000 girls who completed it in 1967 71 per cent advanced to senior high schools, compared with 46 per cent in 1955. Higher education shows a truly startling increase: in May 1967 394,000 women were enrolled in higher institutions compared with 26,000 in 1950. This 1967 figure represents one girl in every ten in the eighteen to twenty-one-year-old age-group. 13. Superficially, the mainspring of all this was the new Constitution imposed on Japan in 1946 by those zealous American reformers who overruled the assertions of diehards like Konoe that the enfranchisement of women would ‘retard the progress of Japanese politics’. Under the stimulus of MacArthur’s SCAP, women were declared to be thenceforth ‘equal under the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations’; marriage ‘shall be based on mutual consent’ and ‘maintained through mutual co-operation, with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis’. Today, there is legal equality in divorce and inheritance. Women have full political suffrage and there is no legal bar to their tenure of political office. They have equal rights to education and, nominally, equal rights to employment and pay. The feudal family system was broken up, and with it went, at least in theory, the intricate structures of affinity and obligation which had acted as the tie-rods of Japanese society for centuries. ‘Filial piety, which forms the fundamentals of peace and order in the country, is also to be destroyed in consequence of the constitutional revision. These laws will enable the son to marry a girl against the will of his parents, change his living-place, spend money and other property ignoring the wishes of his parents, divorce a respectable wife without the consent of his parents. I fear the new Constitution’ said a Conservative member of the Diet at the time. Perhaps he was not so square after all. Be that as it may, the 1946 reforms looked for all the world like a triumphant parade of transpacific-style emancipation, with the League of American Women as blue-haired drum-majorettes at its head. 14. In reality, however, the movement had indigenous origins going back much further than this. Perhaps stimulated by the acid comments of incoming foreigners, Zenji Iwamoto pointed out as long ago as 1885 that Western scholars considered the position of women within a country as an indication

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of its level of civilization: ‘In present-day Japan, the condition of women is such that Japan cannot be considered a civilized or cultured country . . . we must exert ourselves to the improvement of their condition; by combining Western women’s rights with the traditional virtues of our women, we will produce models of perfection.’ Little did he know what was to be involved in the achievement of that eminently desirable amalgam. 1887 saw the publication of Yukichi Fukuzawa’s scathing attack on ‘The Greater Learning for Women’, stressing the importance of economic independence for women, the necessity for them to be accorded property rights and opportunities to use their intelligence and education. Yet, despite the ferment of those days after the Meiji Restoration, any quick leap from words to deeds was not to be expected in a matter so fundamental to society. Indeed, just as the ‘Greater Learning’ itself should be taken with a large pinch of salt as a reflection of the true state of affairs in the seventeenth century, so must the writings of Fukuzawa and his kin in the nineteenth. As his biographer sadly notes: ‘Fukuzawa failed entirely to put his precepts into practice in the upbringing of his own daughters. He left their education entirely to their mother, who was “very conservative and convinced of the innate inferiority of women”’. One daughter was ‘never allowed out alone, never allowed to express her opinion in the presence of her elders, never allowed to speak to guests when they came to the house . . . and was allowed next to no contact with men until her marriage at the age of eighteen, and even then her opinion was not consulted’. 15. However, possibilities for self-development outside the bounds of needlework and the tea ceremony did open up. Mission schools, from 1870 onwards, blazed some of the trails, and in the milestone year of 1871 five girls were actually sent to the United States to receive a Western education; one of them subsequently founded the first women’s college in Japan. In 1901 Jinzô Naruse established the Japan Women’s University for the express purpose of ‘educating women as human beings and as members of the community’. The next quarter of a century saw the rise and fall, amidst many vicissitudes, of feminist movements which had to struggle against strong popular opposition not only from all classes but from both sexes. Waspishly stung as ‘Japanese Noras’ after their vehement espousal of the cause of Ibsen’s heroine, they defiantly trumpeted their battle-cries along the lines of: ‘The New Woman is neither satisfied with life as an ignoramus nor as a slave to the male ego. The New Woman is eager to destroy traditions and laws established solely for the convenience of the male.’ How they would have applauded Amanda’s retort to Elyot in ‘Private Lives’: ‘It doesn’t suit women to be promiscuous.’ ‘It doesn’t suit men for women to be promiscuous.’ Nevertheless, despite the emergence of powerful voices like that of Fusae Ichikawa and her New Women’s Organization (Shin Fujin Kyôkai) of 1917, it was to be many years before this eagerness was requited. Things were given a slight push here and there. Birth control started to attract attention in the early twenties, while the Great Earthquake of 1923 brought women into sudden limelight as sturdy welfare workers in times of crisis. Nevertheless a Civil Rights Bill was too big for any movement to float. Time and again it foundered on the hard promontories of tradition, when success seemed close



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at hand. Finally, the floodtide of totalitarianism in the ’thirties submerged all such dangerously liberal manifestations. 16. Thus, at the beginning of the Second World War, Japanese women still had few legal rights, were still nominally subservient to the male, apparently owed him obedience before all else. But once again we must be wary if we are not to misinterpret the contemporary scene. Those who remember those days see things a little differently. We are told that Tanizaki’s Makioka Sisters (by Junichiro Tanizaki) is an accurate reflection of the times. If so, it was the married women of the Makioka family who held the preponderance of effective power in handling the affairs of the clan, and it was frequently they who were fighting most strongly for the preservation of the old values. The men gave royal sanction, so to speak, but it was the women who passed the Bills, scheming, negotiating, arranging, predicting their husbands’ reactions and maneuvering them in advance; and if the problem-child spinster sister was a virtual prisoner – which indeed she was – her prison was fashioned not by the men but by the family system as a whole, in which the women played the discreet lead except when the formalities required them to disclaim it. If this was true of a well-to-do merchant family in Osaka, how much more so it must have been of the farming and fishing villages where no one would have either the time or the inclination to study the intellectual commentators. A Professor of Social Anthropology has said that in such communities, the women ‘constituted a major source of labour and had significant influence, though not obtrusively. Their power was not explicitly displayed. But they were actually very different from the stereotyped image of Japanese women meekly subservient to men.’ 17. Finally, the Second World War brought them perforce out of the remnants of their chrysalis. They became quite simply essential to running the nation in addition to giving it birth, and it would seem that they did both extremely well. There could be no great retrogression when the men came home in such grimly depleted numbers. 18. Now in 1969, on the face of it, Pitti-Sing is doffing her kimono, discarding her fan, taking her place beside rather than behind her man, and achieving a new parity after an overlong devaluation. But a closer look at the offices, the factories and the homes of contemporary Japan engenders doubts. 19. In the offices and the factories two traditions do not die easily. Since the beginning of the Meiji era employers have regarded young women as the natural reservoir of cheap labour. With a wage system based on degree of education and length of service, girls leaving school at fifteen or sixteen and heading for the earliest possible marriage formerly provided countless pairs of nimble hands at cut-price rates. But now, seven out of ten of these erstwhile drudges decline to leave school so conveniently, and join instead in the universal scramble for more education. In so doing they warp the proper nature of the labour market as seen by the bosses, and the latter are not slow to give play to their disapproval. Secondly and conversely, women college graduates run up against long-standing attitudes towards marriage and their-proper-place-is-the-home, and find themselves regarded askance, especially in fields to which they are traditionally foreign. This antagonism is not limited to subterranean growling. In 1966 the President of Kumamoto University put the cat among the pigeons by publicly advocating the restriction of women’s entrance to the universities. In the same year the

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Nihon Keizai Shimbun circulated an article calling on all good men and true to reassert their traditional hegemony over women and exalt the qualities of the lord and master. The latter as an employer having of course everything to lose, including money and privilege, by treating women on anything like an equal footing, it is not without success that he puts up a strenuous resistance. As a would-be career lady had wearily confessed: ‘What I think all the time is that I went to university, but mine is the face of a graduate in painful collision with the bastions of society, the face of an office lady [O.L. is standard Japanese slang these days] mentally unsettled as one of the marriage reserve, wearing the serious expression of a middle-aged woman desperately searching for a new lease of life.’ Out of all women who completed their higher education in March 1966 only some 60 per cent had found a chance of employment by the time of their graduation, compared with 82 per cent for men. One Tokyo girl graduate in psychology tells us that she is happy to have secured a job with a Research Institute in the suburb of Meguro. Her starting salary is 25,000 yen a month, or £300 per annum in the world’s most expensive economy. An Embassy driver, at his debut, gets just double this. 20. A Professor of Tokyo University has put her finger on it thus: ‘Women have undoubtedly been emancipated and their status has been improved so far as the system, legal or otherwise, is concerned. The same, however, cannot be said about their social awareness or their level of life. The sense of frustration which had accumulated under the pre-war legal and social systems simply exploded after the war, thus creating the impression that women have greatly changed. Nevertheless we may find little change in their social awareness or their level of life once the explosion quiets down.’ 21. The attempt to discern what she includes under the heading ‘level of life’ takes us from offices and factories into homes and personal relationships. Legislation can create a framework for the dignity of the Second Sex, but it cannot in one generation eradicate from the mind of the Japanese male the rooted prejudice of centuries. From birth the boy-child has traditionally deferred to its father and elder brothers while being permitted to wreak indignities unreproved on its mother and sisters. Instincts of domination die the harder when the regimentations of male adult life add their repressions through the working day. The dog forbidden to bark in public feels the greater need for something docile to bark at in private. One of the strongest stimuli to the Japanese libido is said to be the small expanse of bare skin which the kimono leaves exposed at the base of the neck; it may be no coincidence that this is the area which would be meekly offered to the down-stroke of a samurai sword. At all events, it comes as a shock to hear fathers and husbands bellowing monosyllabic commands to the ladies round the house. One quite understands why they feel impelled to do it; but only the blindest believer in that misconceived adage ‘Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner’ could find it palatable in a sophisticated society. It is also hardly likely that unusually nerveux males imbued with superabundant egotism will make the most efficacious lovers. Indeed, a lady with a wide circle of friends in Tokyo has confided that four out of five of the wives of her acquaintance privately utter fervid complaints on that score. Would it be a calumny to add that the congenital inability of the Japanese male to improvise, if projected into the bedchamber, may well deprive his advances of that spontaneous élan which elicits, so they say, the most heartfelt response? 22. It is strange to realize how little, compared with Western youth beset by sweet agonizing, his Japanese counterpart is preoccupied by what we



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would call love as distinct from sheer sex. Of a hundred young people in Kyoto who were asked to name the three events in their past life which they regarded as the most significant, only ten of the men and only five of the girls mentioned love at all. Among 730 youngsters who were asked whether they had charted their personal future, only three – all of them countrymen – thought of mentioning marriage. And yet, among a wide sample of students of both sexes at Kyoto University, the proportion expecting to marry was as high as 97 per cent. Inherently dangerous though such statistics are, it does seem that the whole marriage game in Japan may still be regarded as a somewhat automated process. 23. It also indicates that the old system of the arranged marriage is not as defunct as sturdy individualists may like to claim. In effect it has become shaded off into something not far different from the state of affairs in ­Southern Europe. If a husband is indeed selected for a girl by inter-family negotiations it is becoming normal for the couple to embark on a relatively protracted engagement to see whether they have any appeal for each other, instead of accepting the family Diktat as a sort of instant obligation. Girls may have their own ideas about the love-marriage, but they also ruefully recognize their limitations, especially in the rural areas. In a group of villages in Hokkaido they plaintively expressed their very simple difficulty that, not having been brought up with boys, they did not know any; their inclination would therefore be to use the services of the customary go-between or ask their parents to help them. The effective impact of foreign films on young men’s courting conduct is probably shallower than might be expected. Certainly such influences are regarded as positively baneful by many of their elders. As to freedom of choice to marry a foreigner, the very idea can still cause paroxysms of anxiety among respectable middle-class parents. A member of this Embassy has even been invited by a Japanese businessman friend to accept the odd assignment of finding a nice safe Gaimusho husband for his air-hostess niece, whose parents are in panic lest she engage herself to one of the many Europeans who show her unwonted gallantry on her travels. 24. All this goes some way towards accounting for the curiously detached attitude towards matters sexual which manifests itself in many Japanese women; this, plus the fact that, until the American cultural heritage reached Japan, the human body was not regarded as an object of prurient inquisitiveness. In a country which has been used to construing indecency as a greater exposure of the body that the situation necessitates – than which there could not be a definition more healthy or less erotic – nudity has, as it were, been seen but not looked at. Thus there is still, about Japanese girls trying to be sexy in public, an embarrassingly amateur quality which conjures the image of some nubile but callow Roedean sixth-former playing Salome. One expects at any moment to hear that coy little giggle and see that little hand flying up to cover the mouth in the age-old Japanese gesture of decorum; and all too often one’s foreboding is realized. There is not the slightest reason to suppose, however, that this three-little-maids-from-school Schwärmerei betokens the innate qualities of the female, as against the childish affectations which the male has obdurately wished upon her. 25. The same element of impersonality is carried over into that milieu of such prime interest to the visitor, the world of the ‘geisha’ and her lesser sister the bar-hostess. Are they, everyone asks, prostitutes? The best way to discover the answer to that question is not to ask it. The word connotes an

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absolute moral categorization which is without meaning in Japan, where no religion dictates a code of sexual behaviour. Yet social sanctions of a different order receive a prudent deference. Geisha are very often kept mistresses, but this personal side of their lives is rigidly segregated from their profession; they cannot be bought over the counter. The bar-hostess, similarly, is in the job for the salary, and this remains her primary consideration. She may well have a good family background and a good enough education, but she prefers working from 6.30 p.m. until midnight to an office day, where her sister will earn a quarter of her monthly stipend. She too divides her life into neat compartments with a ruthlessly clear notion of what belongs to which. Many a tourist has had a rude shock on discovering that the charmer on whom he has apparently been making such an irresistible impression the whole evening will gently repel further advances at closing-time and leave him poorer by most of his wallet into the bargain. His bewildered resentment is the measure of his incomprehension of this most delicately poised of professions. Yet the lady will in all probability have no objection to taking a temporary mate, provided only that she finds him truly congenial. In this event she will not dilly or dally once she has made up her mind, and will thereafter remain blithely compliant, provided only that her consort does not forget to give her regular ‘presents’. (The possible approach of her marriage into a totally different sector of society she would regard as an irrelevance to everything except the ridiculously convoluted ethical systems concocted by foreigners.) Thus she too cannot be bought, but woe betide if she is not rewarded. Herein lies the paradox which has baffled the many who seek to affix Western definitions to these ladies whose generic name of ‘geisha’, let us remember, means nothing more than a person trained in the arts. It would be crude to categorize too closely the arts in question. 26. The profession, they say, is in any case a dying one. It is ever harder to find recruits who are prepared to undergo the arduous training of the true geisha. After all, any girl with reasonable looks and personality can sign on in a bar with no training at all (not even a knowledge of English, though an elementary competence in match-tricks is an advantage) and earn much the same sort of income without incurring obligations. Given assiduous attendance at her place of employment and perhaps an episodic contrat sentimental, she can earn a quarter of a million yen a month; this is two and a half times the salary of the Police Superintendent who is responsible for her ‘amusement quarter’. Above all, she can thereby achieve personal freedom from her parents, because with this sort of money she can afford her own apartment, which is more than our Meguro psychology graduate will ever be able to do. Does she not think of marriage? Yes, she does, but not necessarily with any wistfulness. ‘Once I was married, I should have to stay at home with nothing to do.’ 27. It is the ‘nothing to do’ which is new in marriage for women other than country folk. The word ‘leisure’ has been taken tel quel into the Japanese vocabulary, so lively and sensitive a topic has it become in public discussion. Relevant to the whole people, it has special import for the city housewife: here is one of the really big changes since pre-war days. There are three reasons for it: the decline in the birth-rate; the increase in expectation of life; and the availability of labour saving machinery in the home. 28. Not only has the break-up of the feudal system led into the concept of the ‘nuclear family’ as the basic social unit, with a consequent drop in



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time-consuming clan obligations. This apart, whereas before the war the Japanese wife could expect to breed five children, she now, if we average her out rather quaintly, produces only two-and-a-third. She does so, again on the average, between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. 29. Moreover, her life expectation has increased as dramatically as her productivity has diminished. In 1947 she could hope to live until she was just over fifty; now she is likely to survive into her seventies. Thus, whereas in the old days she would have been heading resignedly for the grave by the time all her children were in their teens, she can now look forward to liberation from child-bearing by the time she is thirty, and twenty-five years of existence after her children are grown up. What is she to do with this lengthy and unprecedented span? 30. As to her earlier married days, no longer – at least in the cities – does she have to rise at six in order to prepare the rice for breakfast. If she has no automatic cooker the family may well have succumbed to the ready lure of protein-enriched Corn Flakes (the Japanese are among the world’s greatest suckers for alimentary additives). Her tiny home choc-àbloc with the time-saving gadgets dinned into her admass consciousness by the Mitsubishis and the Toshibas, and with only two or three progeny to service, she can be free of chores disconcertingly often through the day. If you are an American sociologist with a rational view of human nature you may convince yourself that her thoughts will then automatically turn in charity to the well-being of her fellow-creatures. ‘Their post-war education’ writes a lady of the United States Information Service in that distressing jargon they hold so dear: ‘motivates a sense of community awareness and concern about civic problems. The growing momentum of their voluntary aid organization . . . is one important reflection of the good force which we helped release.’ There is indeed an increase of voluntary work in the towns, although such activity for the benefit of persons other than kith and kin cuts across deep-rooted mores. In farming communities the world over spare time hardly exists anyway. However, in cities which are ill-equipped with public amenities women lack stimuli as well as precedents for the profitable use of free hours. Even with seven television channels operating (in Tokyo), the screen cannot entirely fill their vision until the children come home from school and take their place in front of it. Thus the problem of leisure, for people to whom until recently it has seemed almost morally reprehensible, becomes increasingly knotty. 31. Many seek release from incipient boredom by joining the growing army of paid workers. Others take the same course against their inclinations because the husband’s salary is hopelessly inadequate to cope with rising prices in the midst of a keeping-up-with-the-Tanakas consumer boom. The young ones get jobs without difficulty; those over thirty-five run into managerial prejudices and are not so welcome, though they may gain acceptance as the labour shortage worsens. These new initiatives by married women, however, tend of course to multiply problems within the household. The set patterns of Japanese family life undergo further dislocation. Teenage offspring turn into ‘key children’ and account to no small degree for the upswing in juvenile delinquency. Mothers, traditionally carrying the total burden of responsibility for the care of the adolescent, feel guilty in ­consequence and, being powerless to change matters, demand that the fathers assume unprecedented obligations in the home.

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32. Perhaps most significant in the long run, young wives, whether they take jobs or not, begin to envision a new shape in the marital relationship. The young woman who works the same hours as her husband–and undergoes the same anguish as a commuter–no longer takes so kindly to her allotted role of waiting on him hand and foot when they both arrive home in a state of near-exhaustion. Conversely, if she is a stay-at-home, she becomes less acquiescent. Having had time to twiddle her thumbs and brood, she comes to question her spouse’s sacred right to take his diversions in the company of others, when and where he will, instead of offering her due attentions and a salve for her ennui. Indeed, some of her number have begun to take condign revenge on the errant husband by patronizing an increasing array of bars run by hosts instead of hostesses and catering specifically for the forlorn distaff trade. 33. These turbulences are of course common to all contemporary industrialized societies and it would be a great mistake to think that Japan, uniquely, is heading in a Gadarene helter-skelter for the cliff-edge of a social nervous breakdown. Yet there are two related reasons why in this country the strains should be exceptionally severe. The first is the hectic tempo of change, with the added distortion that the pace was to some degree artificially forced by foreign pressure in the wake of total defeat; Japan really needed a generation to find her way in equipoise up to and through the crash reforms of 1946. The second, as we have seen, is the deep entrenchment in the Japanese spirit of the supposedly immutable values which are now being brought into question. In the eyes of some, men stand to lose everything but their chains, which, they hope, will continue to bind them tightly together as groups of individuals in the old well-tested way; and many, especially women, are discovering to their disquiet that what they had resented as the chafing of a shackle was to some degree also the reassurance of a harness. 34. Thus, the ‘revolution’ in the status of woman proves on most counts to be far less dramatic than might appear. In the old days, as our backward glances have shown, she was not the helpless, hapless creature of legend. Conversely, neither has she attained in 1969 the personal human standing which society no longer has the right to deny her. She is neither so unrealistic, nor so impressed by the pantomime of the rat race, as to demand that she be accorded full parity with executive man. Her bid is a more intimate one on a much deeper level of consciousness. 35. Looking in conclusion beyond present dishevelment, relationships between Japanese men and women will surely find a new equilibrium in due time. It is hard to imagine that there can now be a deep recession into former perspectives. ‘The fact that Japanese women of today can behave so unreservedly towards men’ said Chie Nakane of Tokyo University in a recent interview ‘simply means that it has become possible for them to express their influence openly. It does not mean that weak women have suddenly become strong. It is not a qualitative change but a conditional one.’ True, but it is a conditional change of immense significance. It is, as I said at the beginning, what much of the fuss of 1969 is really all about. Not being subjected to arduous infantile disciplines, because she is not considered sufficiently important, the Japanese female is more naturally spontaneous, more flexible, more free-moving than the male. She is, so to speak, quicker on the draw all round – and is increasingly gaining the nerve to demonstrate it. He, having a closer affinity with the vegetable kingdom than with the



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animal, has hitherto seen no human incongruity in training his women, like runner-beans, up any stick that happens to suit his predilections. Many of his number, aware that the stake is a self-importance gained partly as a levy on feminine humiliation, will doubtless fight a determined rearguard action. But the innately tough and supple qualities of the Japanese woman, no longer in bond to an enforced abnegation, must gather power as catalysts in the future shaping of the national character. She, in her own eyes, will add to her stature as an individual personality; he, in his, may experience a corresponding contraction of his own ego. It will do him, and the world, no harm. So if in the course of the next generation or two – it will not be quicker than that – the Japanese male sheds some of his porcupine quills, let us not fail to slip a fitting bouquet into the small but so very capable hands of his consort. 36. Meanwhile, are they really merry, those wives of Ginza? They still have a profound sense of the ‘sadness of things’ and of the transience of existence; but at least they would always have agreed with Piers Plowman that ‘chastity without charity shall be chained in Hell’. JOHN PILCHER

20 THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN*

SUMMARY Many Japanese are offended by the description ‘economic animal’, since it appears to imply criticism of the subordination of aesthetic and other higher values to the needs of production. This view of Japan needs to be seen in proper perspective. This is provided by means of a commentary on a Government White Paper on ‘National Livelihood’. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 2. The quality of life is becoming a matter of political interest in Japan and could be taken up in the forthcoming electoral campaigns. (Paragraphs 4–5.) (Memorandum) 3. The overwhelming importance attached to economic expansion at the expense of a deteriorating environment and welfare facilities no longer goes unquestioned. The White Paper gives a penetrating assessment of the present Japanese environment. The diversion of resources from economic growth towards an improvement in the quality of life in Japan could affect Japan’s international competitive power, while public realization in Japan of the possibilities of improved living conditions could win support for the Opposition parties. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 4. Evidence of the material prosperity of the Japanese consumer and of his propensity to save is given through selected statistics. (Paragraphs 4–6.) 5. The White Paper then sets out the environmental hazards and discomforts – the ‘dark areas’ – which beset the Japanese consumer and mar Japanese prosperity, e.g. atmospheric pollution, inadequate housing and overcrowded trains in the cities; dangerous congestion on the roads, a shortage of doctors, and general depopulation in the

*  FEJ 18/6 – Sir John Pilcher to Mr Stewart – received 3 November 1969.



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countryside; and social problems arising from a sense of a ‘spiritual vacuum’ among the young. (Paragraphs 7–10.) 6. The people in general are not contented. Japanese levels of achievement lag behind the United States and Western Europe in fields such as the availability of certain amenities (in which the United States tops the list) and the provision of certain public services (in which Britain scores top marks). (Paragraphs 11–13.) 7. The paper identifies five target areas requiring urgent attention from the Government: health; social security; standards of ‘comfort’ in daily life, including sanitation and housing, opportunities for ‘creative activity’ including libraries; and equality of opportunity, particularly in careers. (Paragraphs 14–18.) 21 October 1969

T

he words ‘economic animal’ have, albeit in a sadly mangled way, entered the Japanese language as an English or American importation. They are now much used by the Japanese, but they know full well that, as a description of the kind of human being that post-war Japanese society has produced, they are not intended as undiluted praise. In fact many Japanese have chosen to be insulted by the term, rather as they would be by the abbreviation ‘Jap’, even when this is used in all innocence by quite well-meaning foreigners. 2. The phrase touches the Japanese on two sensitive points. The first is that the foreigner may be calling him an economic animal because he thinks that Japan does not concern itself sufficiently with the political implications of economic success. The second, to which I devote this despatch, is that the foreigner may be criticizing Japan for creating a modern industrial society where everything is subordinated to production. It does not matter how much you ruin your towns aesthetically, pollute your rivers with effluent, kill your children on the roads or poison them more slowly with the factory fumes and exhaust gases, provided only that your Gross National Product and your per capita income rise and that your tiny houses are crammed fuller and fuller with better and larger colour television sets. To judge from much of what we read in even the more thoughtful sectors of the British Press, this image of Japan must be fairly widely diffused in Britain and nothing that the short-term visitor, however observant, can see for himself will do other than confirm it. A corrective, however, seems necessary to a fuller understanding of Japan and this I should like to provide in the form of a memorandum written by Mr Second-Secretary Elliott on the basis of a Government White Paper called the ‘National Livelihood’. 3. Mr Elliott’s memorandum rightly draws attention to the intensely political nature of the White Paper. It was issued by the Economic Planning Agency and may once have been intended as a statistical sociological survey on which policies could be based. It leaked to the Press and having become a political issue was passed by the Cabinet only after the deletion of phrases which appeared to recommend the diversion of resources from simple economic growth to an improvement of welfare facilities. 4. It remains to be seen whether the White Paper leads to results and whether it is taken up by the Government or Opposition in the context of the electoral campaign, which may well open in the next month or two. The effect on Japan’s economic development of a conscious shift to expenditure

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designed to improve the quality of life in Japan could be considerable. It is too early to say whether such a shift will occur and it is easy to claim cynically that ever-fatter pay packets will always remain the politicians’ aim, however much the environment declines. With the rise, however, of the Kômeitô (Clean Living Party), the political wing of the evangelical Buddhist movement, the Sôka Gakkai, matters may not always remain so simple; the Kômeitô is very adept at collecting votes from the concrete down-to-earth grievances which the more traditional parties sometimes appear to ignore. 5. With all this in mind, I think the moment appropriate to draw your attention to the fact that the quality of life in Japan is now, perhaps for the first time since her industrial revolution began a century ago, becoming a matter of political interest. I expect this encouraging trend to continue. JOHN PILCHER

MEMORANDUM THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN Since the war, as the world knows, economic growth has been the prime object of Japanese policy. There are no signs that this policy will materially change in the near future. But in recent months dissident voices have come increasingly to be heard, arguing that a country’s prosperity cannot be judged by Gross National Product alone, and hinting that the time may soon come – may indeed be already upon us – when more attention should be devoted to social policies which do not have a direct and immediately beneficial effect on Japan’s rate of growth. These voices are not yet strong enough to warrant an actual shift of priorities. But they reflect a concern with the deterioration of the Japanese environment, which is real and potent enough eventually to provide a valuable weapon in the hands of those who seek to dethrone the cliques and interest-groups which at present rule the country. 2. The latest textbook to be adopted by the apostles of this belief is, strangely enough, a Government White Paper; that relating to the ‘National Livelihood’, which was published on the 10th of August over the imprint of the Economic Planning Agency. Even before its publication this White Paper made the front pages of the national Press, when it was rejected in draft by the Cabinet and sent back for the deletion of certain offending phrases; these phrases, in the estimation of the growth-advocates led by the Minister of Finance, appeared to state it as Government policy that resources should be diverted from promoting economic growth pure and simple to improving Japan’s international standing in the provision of certain welfare facilities. Nevertheless, even amended, the White Paper remains a useful and penetrating assessment of the present Japanese environment and its defects. It also identifies a number of fields into which Japan’s abounding prosperity could and should eventually be diverted. 3. In the belief that this paper could at best be a document of some political significance in coming years, and that at worst it contains some useful statistics, I have attempted to summarize its conclusions in the present memorandum. I have interlarded pure summary with a few personal observations,



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but have not tried to paint too vivid a picture of the discomforts of Japan as experienced by a foreign resident. Equally, I have not felt able to draw any far-reaching conclusions at this stage, either economic, although it is clear that a large shift of resources into the types of social investment mentioned could have a marked effect on Japan’s powers of international competition and on her growth rate; or political, although increased public realization of the scope for more Government spending on social welfare could greatly increase the support for a genuinely Socialist Party, or even one prepared to wave Socialist banners such as the Kômeitô.

CONSUMER EXPENDITURE 4. The central theme of the White Paper is that the apparent prosperity of the Japanese consumer is in fact hedged about with so many environmental hazards and discomforts that in many respects he is considerably worse off than his Western counterpart; moral – don’t be complacent, Japan has a long way to go. (The same moral might be put forward by the pure-growth advocates, but with a different emphasis.) Developing this theme, the paper proceeds first to examine various aspects of the consumer’s material prosperity. The average Japanese, as one might expect, is spending more than he was in 1960, and growing prosperity has meant that a larger share of his income can be devoted to non-essential expenditure on items such as recreation and housing. To a Western reader the strangest figures are those given for expenditure and travel and holidays; although the numbers of Japanese who travel for pleasure has risen by nearly 8 per cent in four years, still scarcely over half of the population makes any pleasure trip in a year, the average being about two trips each of about two days. Moreover, the Japanese custom of ‘group travel’ – busloads of schoolchildren or housewives or employees of a particular firm thronging to well-known beauty spots – dies hard; 40 per cent of all travel is still undertaken in this form, and only 30 per cent is classed as family travel. International travel of course poses particular difficulties for the Japanese in their isolated geographical situation, but the figures for 1968 of about 150,000 Japanese travelling overseas for pleasure, even though it does represent an increase of about 25 per cent over the previous year, is still tiny when compared with a population of 100 million. 5. Much of the rest of what emerges from the analysis of consumer expenditure is predictable. 95 per cent of households possess a television set; well over 80 per cent possess washing machine and refrigerator as well. Ownership of colour television has soared from 5.4 per cent to 13.9 per cent in the last year, and 17.3 per cent of households now own a car. 56 per cent of all single women have their own sewing machine, and 40 per cent of all single men have their own television set. (The most popular ‘consumer durable’ among single men, oddly enough, is a hair drier, owned by nearly 65 per cent – which tells one something about the Japanese man’s pride in his personal appearance.) One trend of interest to the British exporter is the growing taste for imported goods, especially foodstuffs (nearly half the population now use some form of imported food) and clothing (21.8 per cent of Japanese possess some item of imported clothing).

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SAVINGS 6. By way of gradual transition from the superficial abundance of material goods to the fundamental dismay at poor social provision, the paper next goes on to discuss the need for the Japanese earner to put a large proportion of his income into savings, as an insurance against disaster for which he cannot rely on State provision. The extraordinary Japanese propensity to save has often been quoted as one of the props of their economic success, but it is interesting to see it quantified. 94 per cent of all Japanese households now have savings of some kind, the proportion having risen from 91.5 per cent in 1967. The average amount held has also risen by some 12.8 per cent to Y970,000 (about £1,140) per household, a figure which is almost double that of only five years ago. The majority of all savings is held in bank deposit accounts, but about a quarter of all savings is in the form of life insurance, whose popularity has been increasing sharply in recent years and is highest among the lower income groups. By far the most common motive for saving is the need to provide a cushion against illness or disaster, although a strong second is the desire to provide for a child’s education (an especially active concern recently, in a society which depends so much on the right school background) or marriage.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS 7. Having sounded a warning note, in the section on savings, the paper comes into the open with an amply-documented survey of the dark areas which mar Japan’s prosperity. Throughout this passage there is a suggestion that discontent has advanced from being an individual concern to being a general social malaise, and that it is now a question no longer of physical hardship – as might have been the case after the war – but of psychological complaint against the strains of modern living. The specific problems mentioned, in each case with a comment that the Government could do more to alleviate them, cover seven general areas. The first is ‘public nuisances’, the portmanteau phrase used to cover atmospheric and water pollution, noise and vibration in the great cities. Personal observation of anybody who has lived in Tokyo or Osaka does not need the reinforcement of scientific statistics to appreciate the deterioration in recent years, although such statistics are amply available; perhaps easier to grasp is the simple statement that the number of complaints against ‘nuisances’ of this nature over the whole of Japan rose from 10,529 in 1964 to 27,588 in 1967. 8. Second on the list is housing, the principal bugbear of the Japanese urban dweller. Here an impressive, but not always very revealing, array of statistics is brought into play. 28 per cent of all households in Tokyo have some justifiable complaint about the size or condition of their accommodation (the number who actually complain is of course far larger). The average size of all rented accommodation in the six major cities is only 23 square metres, well below the international standard – and this includes houses as well as apartments, although the Japanese are capable of describing as a house the most minuscule and ramshackle of two-storey edifices. (Taken together with the figures for ownership of television sets and washing machines, these statistics are



THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN137

startling; it is by no means uncommon to find nine-tenths of the available floor space in a bachelor apartment occupied with expensive and sophisticated electrical equipment, among which the proud owner stretches himself out to sleep with something of the agility of a contortionist.) Rents have more than doubled in the past seven years. Even the terms for mortgages are severe, with interest ranging from 8 per cent to 12 per cent, and the maximum term set at fifteen years. With the price of a new two or three-room house in Tokyo standing at the equivalent of £8,000 or more it is not surprising that many young couples still choose to marry late or live with their parents. To amplify these figures one needs to understand that even new Japanese houses are flimsy wooden constructions with tiny, inconvenient rooms, packed higgledy-piggledy into the smallest conceivable space between two extant buildings; there is no ‘semi-detachment’, no terracing, and rarely more than two or three square yards of garden space. 9. One solution to the housing problem is to move further out into the suburbs, where a rash of new building is springing up at about sixty or seventy minutes’ travelling time from central Tokyo. But this merely aggravates the next problem, that of traffic congestion. The most-used commuter railway line into Tokyo now runs at what is charmingly described as ‘294 per cent capacity’ in rush hour, the official limit being 100 per cent. (300 per cent is reckoned to be the absolute physical limit, at which no passenger can move a muscle.) Most of the other lines in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoyo are at 240 per cent, the level at which it is not even possible to read a magazine. On the roads, too, the situation is appalling: of 139 major crossroads in Tokyo only twenty are adequate for their present flow of traffic, and fifty-eight are past saturation point; an index of congestion taken in Osaka shows that traffic jams there have nearly doubled in the last two years. Most serious and sensational of all are the road casualty figures, where the number killed in 1969 is expected to reach well over 16,000, and those injured to top the million. And the passion to own a car, abetted by the mounting domestic production of cars, shows no sign of slackening. 10. The remaining four ‘dark areas’ are perhaps not quite so critically opaque, although they all cover problems which are frequently aired in Japan. They are, first, health, by which the paper means in practice the grave shortage of doctors who are willing to practise in the remote rural districts, where there are less than half as many doctors per head (of the often widely-scattered population) as there are in the big cities. Then old age, principally the disillusionment bred among the over-fifties when they are forced to retire while still in their prime, or else accept a considerable fall in earnings. Next comes depopulation, or the well-known social phenomenon by which whole families desert their remote farming communities for the prospect of better wages and conditions near the major cities, thus lowering the morale of those who remain and affecting the whole range of community services – fire prevention, snow clearing and such like – which depend on an adequate local supply of labour. Finally a complex loosely entitled social problems, and ascribed in the paper to what the Japanese have begun to call a ‘spiritual vacuum’, most evident in the post-war generation and producing such results as an increase in the number of runaways, of juvenile crime including apparently motiveless violence and, of course, the disarray of the warring factions in Japan’s universities.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

ATTITUDES 11. At this point the authors of the paper pause to survey what they have discovered, and to try to analyse what exactly is wrong in the state of Japan. Despite their superficial affluence, Japanese do not, from all the evidence, consider themselves well off, or even, on the whole, better off than they were (say) a year ago. One survey even showed that the proportion of those who expected their way of life to improve in the future was actually tending to decline. Why should this be? To explain the apparent lack of satisfaction derived from material prosperity, the paper produces the interesting theory that, as everybody now possesses more or less the same items of luxury (such as television sets), and mass communications rub in this fact so that nobody can be unaware of the boom in consumer durables, therefore nobody feels himself to be any better off than anybody else. Luxuries, in fact, cease to be luxuries as soon as everybody has them, and in Japan the feeling that you must not lag behind your neighbour is particularly strong. This attitude is reinforced by the absence of clearly-defined rich and poor classes in Japan, which has now reached the pitch where 89 per cent of those questioned in a recent survey can describe themselves as ‘middle class’. To this not unhappy, but certainly not positively contented people, the manifest faults of the social environment (already described) come as an especially distressing blow, creating tensions and conflicts.

THE ROAD TO AFFLUENCE 12. Recognizing that little can be done to rein back the consumer boom or reintroduce an awareness of luxury, the paper now sets itself to tackle the environmental causes of tension and conflict which it has identified. This it does by establishing standards to be aimed at in each of the fields which are considered most urgent; and the standards are, quite simply, the general level of achievement in the United States and Western Europe. Here comes the most revealing and most often-quoted part of the paper, in which Japan is weighed in Western scales and (usually) found wanting. Here too come some of the passages most antipathetic to the apostles of economic growth pure and simple; the paper mentions Japan’s swift movement up the international table of Gross National Product and per capita income, only to discount its effect and point out that a simple increase in personal incomes could actually be detrimental to the ‘quality of life’ in Japan. 13. Japan’s standing in relation to the United States, Britain and certain other West European countries is graphically illustrated in a single table of percentage relationships, part of which I reproduce as an annex to this memorandum. This table gives figures for achievement in a number of aspects of social welfare, divided (rather arbitrarily) into ‘activities’ (relating to matters within the sphere of personal choice) and ‘environmental factors’ (which are out of the individual’s control and depend entirely on Government action). Only in a few items does Japan match up to the Western standard, and in ‘environmental factors’, particularly those which involve actual physical provision (of, for example, paved roads, main drains, parks, libraries and telephone services), she lags well behind. Britain, incidentally, scores top marks on the average of all ‘environmental factors’, and is only slightly behind the United



THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN139

States and Sweden on ‘activities’ (this latter principally because of the still relatively small proportion of all children who go on to grammar and higher education in Britain) – the moral is that Britain is still about the most pleasant place in which to live.

TARGET AREAS 14. Analysing and expanding these statistics, the paper proceeds to identify five ‘target areas’, in which it behoves the Government to act in order to bring Japan up to standard. The first is health, including medical provision and nutrition. In terms of life expectancy the Japanese record is now very good (despite their road accident figures); they claim their death rate to be the lowest in the world, and even their infant mortality rate is lower than ours and surpassed only by Sweden of the countries cited. Japanese children are taller, heavier and stronger – although some source has produced figures to show that they also tire more easily. But the diet of the average Japanese is still a sore subject among the nutritionists. In 1967 the average daily intake of calories, though better than in the ’fifties, was still only 2,456, as against 3,220 for the United Kingdom and similar figures for other Western countries. Japan ranks especially low on intake of animal protein; meat and fish, although their consumption is increasing rapidly, still form only a tiny portion of the diet (one sliver of chicken on a bowl of rice is quite a common dish), and over half of all food value, in terms of calories, is derived from rice and other cereals, as against less than a quarter in the West. Strictly, though, this cannot be counted as a cause of complaint. Traditional eating habits are deep-seated, and relatively few Japanese would wish to change their diet, even were they given the chance. 15. A loose complex of questions is the next to be considered, under the general heading of security. Once again Japan’s record is good in many respects; there are relatively few industrial accidents, and the crime figures have been steadily decreasing and are now lower than in most countries. Even on the roads the number of accidents is low when compared to the size of the population, although it is shockingly high compared to the number of cars in the country (2.5 fatal accidents per thousand cars in a year, compared with 0.8 in Britain). The recent flood of electrical goods, combined with a curious blind spot about safety precautions, makes for large numbers of accidents in the home. But the principal complaint under this heading concerns the inadequacy of social security provision, mostly pensions. We have been told how great the dependence still is on individual savings. The reason becomes clear when one realizes that a Japanese over sixty-five now receives a State pension of barely 10 per cent of the national average Wage, compared with between 35 per cent and 45 per cent in the West. The situation is improving, and one reason for the low figure may be that the social security scheme has been under way for only a relatively few years, compared with other countries. Nevertheless this is an obvious gap, which could be filled by direct action from the Government. 16. The next target area is, again broadly, described as ‘comfort’. Some may doubt quite how essential to comfort are all the ingredients chosen; for example rather more than one might expect is made of the statistic that there are only 5.9 privately-owned telephones to every 100 Japanese, as against just over 10 to every 100 British, and 37.4 to every 100 Americans. (Certainly the Japanese

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set great store by the possession of a telephone, and indulge in interminable conversations to settle even the slightest point.) More universal is the feeling that car ownership is a necessary part of comfort, and Japan is striving to reduce the discrepancy between one car to every thirty Japanese (1968), as against one to every six British and one to every two and a half Americans (both 1965 figures). But the White Paper has the sense to realize that unless something is done about the appalling condition of Japanese roads in good time, increase in car ownership will merely breed further congestion. Only 10 per cent of all Japanese roads are surfaced; over 40 per cent of roads even in the metropolitan area of Tokyo are mere gravel or dirt, and the density of traffic in Tokyo and Osaka is already up to American standards, even with car ownership at its present level. The picture is similar for many of the amenities considered essential in Britain. Only 17 per cent of the country, and only between 30 per cent and 60 per cent of the major cities, is equipped with main drainage. 9.2 per cent of houses have flush lavatories. Just over half the total number of houses in Japan have bathrooms (although this is admittedly a considerably higher proportion than in France, and the public bath-house system is highly developed in Japan). The area of park space available to each inhabitant of the great cities is only a tenth of that prevalent in Europe and America – less than a square metre per person in Tokyo. Even in newly built housing there are fewer rooms to the house, more people to each room, and less overall floor-space than in the West. This whole area is the one in which Japan ranks lowest in the international comparisons, and where conditions in Japan are most clearly inferior to those obtaining in other industrialized countries. 17. The final two areas seem to have been chosen with the incidental purpose of giving Japan something of a reassuring pat on the back. They are entitled, first, ‘creativity’; and, finally, ‘equality’ Under ‘creativity’ are included all those aspects of life which contribute to making the individual a full and inventive personality – and this naturally provides an excellent opportunity for quoting a few complacent figures about the proportion of Japanese who go on to higher secondary (76.8 per cent) and higher (16.5 per cent) education. Only the United States, and perhaps Sweden in the case of higher education, can surpass these figures. The paper admits to a few resultant problems – six applicants for every university place in the current frenzy for educational advancement, as against four only ten years ago; shortage of university teachers, so that a third of all lecturers and professors hold two concurrent appointments in different universities; inadequacy of libraries to meet increased demand. But the whole tone of this section suggests that the disadvantages are only incidental and to be expected. No attempt (wisely) is made to analyse the root causes for the turmoil which is afflicting so many of Japan’s universities at present. The only snag is the scarcity of opportunity for creative use of leisure, provided for example by public libraries, parks, even swimming pools – the result being that the average Japanese spends almost half of all his spare time simply gazing at television. 18. Similarly under ‘equality’, although there is a large gap between the wealthiest Japanese and the national average, the barriers of class, whether erected by birth or wealth, are considered to be lower in Japan than in many countries. The paper even claims that the possibility of mobility between jobs has now increased to the point where young people may change their employment as frequently as they wish (in fact, because of the



THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN141

built-in inducements to stay in the same employment, most people do not wish to change). There is, admittedly, a general realization that a person must have been to the right university if he is to succeed in his career, and educational snobbery is coming to be perhaps the strongest of the existing social prejudices. But here again there is a chance for a quiet pat on the back, because the large numbers going to Japanese universities mean that there is a fair sprinkling of students from lower paid and manual workers’ homes, in a higher proportion than in most countries. Only in the private (fee-paying) universities do students from the higher income groups heavily outweigh their less endowed coevals. In the league of egalitarianism, the paper concludes, Japan is doing pretty well; and whether or not this enhances the quality of life in Japan, judging from statistics alone they are right.

CONCLUSIONS 19. At the outset of this memorandum I hinted at a few personal views of the significance which this White Paper could have. Rather than enlarge on them now, I should prefer simply to summarize the conclusions drawn by the authors of the paper themselves. Looking back over their argument, they perceive that there is no real sense of prosperity in Japan (at least of individual prosperity). This attitude is fostered by an awareness of the gap which still separates Japan from other advanced countries, a gap which few Japanese ever tire of remarking upon. Some of Japan’s faults are caused by her physical nature, and cannot be remedied. To attack the others the paper proposes three general lines of action. First, industry should be persuaded of the need to examine the possibly harmful effects of any contemplated technical innovation, irrespective of the financial gain which such innovation could bring. Secondly, the individual should be encouraged by providing him with more leisure and controlling the effects of rising prices, to express his own individuality and improve the environment in which he lives. Thirdly, administration of the social and public services should be simplified, and more public funds be made available for social investment. These conclusions are not in themselves especially inspired. The interesting thing is that it is necessary to draw them at all. If the mere fact that they have been drawn is enough to build up any momentum, we may perhaps find that the next set of conclusions is rather more illuminating; maybe even, in the fullness of time, that something begins to be done. 21 October 1969

ANNEX (SEE PARAGRAPH 13) The figures are calculated in relation to the country which scores highest on each particular criterion: that country’s score is taken as 100. All data are for the year 1965. Other countries surveyed are Sweden, West Germany, France and Italy.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Criterion

United States

United Kingdom 98.5

Japan

Nutrition (calories, etc.)

100

Health (infant mortality and lifespan)

70.9

Education (ratio in noncompulsory)

100

29.3

50.8

Leisure (amount, car and television ownership, overseas travel)

100

58.1

19.7

Housing (number of rooms)

87.5

100

61.8

Security (crime and accident figures)

39.1

100

67.1

Welfare provision (compared with national income)

38.0

69.0

32.0

80.5 (Sweden: 100)

54.9 82.5

(West Germany: 100) All ‘activities’

100

95.3 (Sweden: 96.4)

67.8

Sanitation (water/drains)

95.1

100

33 2

Education (staffing ratios)

67.8

100

60.2

Leisure (libraries, parks in cities)

100

73.7

7.7

Security (police and fire services)

100

55.9

60.2

Communications (postal and telephone)

74.8

53.3 (Sweden: 100)

39.6



THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN JAPAN143

Transport (railways, paved roads)

42.2

100

25.4

Health (doctors, nurses, hospital beds)

63.3

71.8 (Sweden: 100)

54.7

All ‘environment’

97.2

100

44.0

21 JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1969*

SUMMARY Introduction. (Paragraphs 1–2.) Agreement on the return of Okinawa in 1972 leads to consideration of Japan’s role in new era of 1970s. LDP’s election victory indicates that alliance with United States will be maintained. (Paragraph 3.) Japan is at present facing choices in direction of her basic policies. The popular mood still wants prosperity at home and no foreign adventures, but there are signs of cautious movement towards a more self-reliant stance. (Paragraphs 4–5.) Relations with China and the Soviet Union remain cool. In spite of anti-United States student violence, the Government is committed to the United States alliance. (Paragraph 6.) Domestically, affluence increased, and the balance of payments strengthened. Some steps were taken to head off a possible revaluation of the yen. While the economy faces certain problems, prospects are good and Japan is expected to overtake Britain in per capita income by the mid-1970s. (Paragraphs 7–8.) Anglo-Japanese relations followed an even and unexciting course. British Week was a success, but its longer-term effect on exports remains to be seen. Our exports have increased but should be doing better. Our exports to Japan face restrictions but British restrictions on certain imports also exist. The British offer to negotiate reciprocal liberalization of trade, which was repeated during the visits of Mr Crosland to Tokyo and of Mr Ohira to London, has not yet found an adequate response. (Paragraphs 9–10.) Mr Aichi and Mr Kiuchi also made Ministerial visits to Britain. Such occasions are important for Anglo-Japanese relations at present * FEJ 1/7 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 20 January 1970.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1969145

when the Japanese tend to under-estimate Britain because of our economic difficulties. Expo 70 next year may, like British Week in 1969, provide opportunities to redress the balance. (Paragraph 11.) 1 January 1970

I

offer some reflections on Japan during 1969, together with a calendar of the main events which took place during the year. 2. In general Japan during the year continued her economic boom with unabated energy, but apart from her success in securing from the United States the return of Okinawa in 1972 remained cautious and hesitant in her foreign affairs. 3. Japan in 1969 was psychologically as well as chronologically on the threshold of the 1970s. For the Japanese the agreement which Mr Sato obtained from President Nixon in November on the return of Okinawa in 1972 marked the end of the quarter-century which they regard as the ‘post-war era’. As agreement became increasingly certain, Japanese thoughts switched to consideration of the attitudes and policies which the c­ ountry, with its growing political and economic strength, should adopt in the new era ahead. The success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in winning yet again a very comfortable majority at the general elections held five days ago means that the problems of this new era will be tackled by a Government with a mandate to maintain the alliance with the United States. The first serious test of this mandate will come when the Security Treaty comes up for review next summer, but already it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the outcome will be continuation of the treaty. 4. 1969 was the year in which the Janapese realized perhaps for the first time since the war that they might have to face a parting of the ways in the near future. Mr Dean Acheson’s dictum about Britain – that she had lost an empire but not yet found a role – applies just as well to Japan. But the Japanese situation has always been clearer cut. Until they had completed their post-war reconstruction, they could not make their voice felt again; until pre-war memories of copying and dumping, not to mention wartime memories of cruelty and aggression, had faded, they dare not raise such voice as they had. Year after year of the Japanese economic miracle made foreign observers impatient to know the answer to the question which they alone, and not the Japanese, were asking: what would Japan do with her newlyfound wealth and influence? She could use it to rearm and by the mere fact of acquiring armaments place herseft on a more independent footing with the United States. Or she could remain under the American defence umbrella and continue to use her wealth to raise the standard of living of her own people, not in simple per capita terms (by which reckoning she still lags well behind North America and Europe), but in terms of environmental and social investment. Or she could direct her attention overseas, both by investing commercially and by increasing aid. 5. The Japanese are still unable to give the answer to this question, but 1969 has at least been the year in which they have faced up to it. A pre-electoral mood lasting almost the whole year induced official caution on such subjects as rearmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and only stimulated official pronouncements on vote-catching subjects like the control of ‘public nuisances’ such as air pollution and the creation of a better e­ nvironment.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

On the other hand the movement of public opinion during the year gave some hint of how much latitude the new Government will enjoy in deciding Japan’s course. The Japanese voter still goes primarily for prosperity at home and no foreign adventures; but perhaps because he believes that he can afford a little of it now, he no longer reacts as violently as ten or twenty years ago to the thought of Japan having some defence capacity of her own. One public opinion poll last year found 80 per cent in favour of this, while another found that about 15 per cent – a high figure in this country – thought that she should have nuclear weapons. These signs of change will not be lost on the Government, who will no doubt be encouraged by them to press on with the considerable defence expansion envisaged in the longterm estimates for 1972–76. But memories of this year’s continuing troubles among the students and the workers, largely provoked by issues of foreign policy, and the knowledge that every yen spent on arms still sends shudders down South-East Asian spines will ensure that the new Government, in the absence of a real and immediate threat, makes haste very slowly. When in Washington Mr Sato for the first time went some way towards committing Japan to a share in the defence of Taiwan and Korea, but it is doubtful how much he would be able to do, except offer facilities to the Americans, if trouble brewed up there in the near future. As for Viet-Nam, he was very careful not to take too overt a Pro-American stand and it seems unlikely that even a precipitate American withdrawal from that region would do more than accelerate the pace of Japanese thinking on the long-term defence of their trading routes and investments. But even though Mr Sato’s remarks were in a relatively low key and in some cases made only at American instigation, he could not avoid having some degree of greatness thrust upon him. The former American Ambassador here, Edwin Reischauer, sometimes exaggerates Japan’s power, but there is some truth in his recent comment that ‘by 1972 it will be clear that the United States can maintain a military presence in the Western Pacific and continue a useful if limited role . . . only in fact if Japan approves and in fact encourages her in this’. 6. In the meanwhile Japan’s relations with China remained cold, with the Government determined to ‘keep its options open’ – such as they are – and looking ahead to the happier days which, they hoped, might follow the death of Mao Tse-tung. Similarly, her relations with the Soviet Union continued cool and ambivalent; partly as a counterpart to their pressure on the Americans over Okinawa and partly with an eye to the approaching general elections the Government began to press the Russians for the return of the four islands – the ‘Northern Territories’ – still unrightfully occupied by the Soviet Union, but, as in the case of China, were cautious in their moves and careful not to prejudice their chances of taking part in the economic development of Siberia. However, despite incessant anti-American demonstrations, often involving serious violence, by students and workers’ organizations during the year, the alliance with the United States remained the sheet anchor of Japanese foreign policy, and this in practice meant that no real re-orientation was possible. 7. These political uncertainties during the year found no reflection in the economic sphere, where the boom continued and affluence increased. The balance of payments surplus for the fiscal year ending in March was $1,627 million, and Japanese reserves had increased to $3,236 million at the end of October. In the fiscal year 1968 Japan’s exports rose by 25 per cent, while



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1969147

imports only increased by 12 per cent. Exports continued to rise sharply in the first nine months of the fiscal year 1969 despite some fears of a downturn in the American economy, but imports also rose at a somewhat faster rate than before. 8. This led to some speculation about a possible revaluation of the yen. But the Japanese authorities are firmly opposed to revaluation and took various steps to decrease the pressure, including increased yen financing of imports, greater opportunities for the export of capital and increased aid. It is open to question whether these measures, together with some slow progress towards liberalization of the remaining quota restrictions will alter the pattern sufficiently to prevent an eventual revaluation. Many Japanese, however, are not yet convinced that Japan will be permanently a creditor nation and concentrate on the imbalances still remaining in the economy. In particular they see an increasing shortage of certain types of labour which could, they think, lead to a spiralling of costs. They also emphasize the need for increases in social investment and the restructuring of agriculture and medium and small enterprises. On the whole, however, the prospects for the Japanese economy are good and it is likely that Japan will surpass us in per capita income by the mid-1970s at the latest. Private capital investment has remained at a very high level (up 32 per cent in the fiscal year 1968–69). This together with an increase in wages rates of about 15 per cent and fears that international trade will not expand so fast in 1970 caused the Japanese authorities to tighten the money supply in September when bank rate was increased to 6.25 per cent. But productivity has risen by almost as much as wages, and inflation has been kept in check. 9. Political relations between Britain and Japan followed an even and unexciting course during the year. For a brief moment they were shaken early in the year by spiteful exchanges in the Press of both countries revolving around the alleged maltreatment in Japan of dogs imported from ­Britain (which at its peak led to a demonstration of Japanese dog-lovers and their pets outside this Embassy), but this was short-lived. It was mainly in the economic field that our relations had their glories and problems. Thanks to British Week in Tokyo (26 September–5 October) and the visit for that occasion by Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon, glories predominated. The Week largely achieved our main objects of increasing British exports, especially consumer goods, of putting over Japan to the British businessman, and of refurbishing our image in Japan, with special emphasis on our progress in the fields of technology and science. The Week would have been a success in its own right, but the extent of this success would unquestionably have been much reduced but for the personality and charm of Princess Margaret and her husband. Its longer-term effects on our exports remain to be seen. In the first nine months of the year Britain exported to Japan £91.8 million worth of goods which was an increase of 34.6 per cent on the same period of 1968, and our total exports to Japan in 1969 are likely to amount to more than £120 million. Exports of consumer goods rose by about 52.5 per cent. This compared with an increase in ­Japanese imports of approximately 14.2 per cent and brought our share of Japanese imports to 2.2 per cent. This was a step in the right direction, but is still not good enough. Japan has the second largest gross national product in the non-Communist world, but is only our seventeenth best market. With the growth in Japan’s gross national product and per capita income, there

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will be an increasing market for sophisticated machinery and high quality consumer goods. 10. Our exports to Japan, however, remain subject to restrictions, including some quotas, on a certain number of our products, and various non-tariff barriers which combined to act as a psychological deterrent. It has been our aim in the current trade negotiations in London to obtain the removal of these barriers. But we could not expect to achieve this unless we were prepared to treat Japan on a completely equal footing and remove the remaining discriminatory restrictions which we ourselves maintain on Japanese exports of textiles and pottery to the British market. The time had clearly come when a further major step was needed to complete the process started by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1962. A bold and imaginative offer was therefore made to the Japanese in June which provided for the freeing of all Anglo-Japanese trade in the early 1970s. Unfortunately the Japanese response has so far been dilatory, unimaginative and rather negative. The opportunity was taken of the visit for British Week of the then President of the Board of Trade, Mr Anthony Crosland, to press our proposals to the Japanese, and our offer was further reinforced during the visit which Mr Ohira, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, made to London in October. The Japanese are beginning to recognize the psychological value of the proposed settlement with us, but have been preoccupied with their talks with the Americans on both trade liberalization and on textile restraints. Moreover, they are also having talks with other European countries and wish to get the maximum concessions from all countries concerned for the minimum of offers on their part. 11. Other Ministerial visits during the year included that of the Foreign Minister, Mr Aichi, to London for the annual Ministerial consultations in May and that of Mr Kiuchi, Minister of State for Science and Technology, in November. Neither visit was intended to produce spectacular results, but both assisted in presenting Britain as a partner still to be reckoned with. This is important, for the present time, when we have to the Japanese mind all but pulled out of their part of the world and have not yet succeeded in gaining membership of the Common Market, is a difficult one in Anglo-Japanese relations. This is not because of any major outstanding bilateral problems – not even the remaining quota restrictions deserve this description – but because there is a danger of Japan under-estimating us as a purely European country which has yet to get into our own local first league while our countrymen in Britain fail to spot quickly enough, especially in terms of commercial opportunity, what kind of league Japan is now playing in. British Week in Tokyo last year provided opportunities for redressing the balance which were successfully exploited, but we must make sure that the same will hold good for our participation in Expo ’70 in Osaka next year when the next Annual Review in this series comes to be written.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1969149

D. R. ASHE.[CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES] CALENDAR OF EVENTS IN 1969 January 10

Japan decides to buy 104 Phantom F-4E jet fighters from the United States.

13–18

Visit of Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey.

18–19

Siege of Tokyo University; police capture Yasuda Auditorium after a long battle with Left-wing students. Entrance examinations for 1969 cancelled by Government order.

February 4

General strike on Okinawa averted at last moment; day of protest against B-52 bombers.

13

Japan-Soviet civil aviation talks in Tokyo end with signing of a new agreement, providing for Japan Air Lines to operate a direct route to Moscow from 1970, and increasing direct services.

24

Fair Trade Commission notifies Yawata and Fuji Iron and Steel Companies that it will allow their merger if certain conditions are met.

March 1

Ministry of Finance announce that Japan’s foreign exchange reserves have exceeded $3,000 million for the first time in history, having grown by over $1,000 million in a year.

10

Prime Minister states in Diet for the first time that Japan will press for the reversion of Okinawa without United States nuclear arms.

23

Ichiro Kato elected President of Tokyo University by a large majority, after acting temporarily as President during the disputes.

25

First ‘forced vote’ of the current Diet session, over the Government Bill to raise national railway fares by 15 per cent. DSP ready to compromise with LDP; JSP and Komeito promise bitter opposition.

April 1

Budget for 1969–70 finally approved in Diet at Y6,739,500 million, an increase of 15.8 per cent over the preceding year.

4

Communiqué issued in Peking, recording agreement that ‘memorandum trade’ should continue during 1969, sharply attacks Japanese Government; Japan decides not to react strongly.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

9–15

State Visit of King and Queen of Afghanistan.

15

United States reconnaissance aircraft based near Tokyo shot down by North Koreans.

17–18

Japan-Canada Ministerial consultations held in Tokyo.

18

Birth of Princess Nori, third child of Crown Prince and Crown Princess.

21–22

Ministry of Education publish series of directives to tighten Government control of the universities.

23–30

Visit of Ardeshir Zahedi, Foreign Minister of Iran.

28

Okinawa Day; 5,000 students fight police in central Tokyo.

29

Japan-Soviet fisheries talks end in agreement, but are described by Japanese as the toughest ever.

May 2

Japanese dog-owners march in protest against allegations in British newspapers of Japanese cruelty to imported British dogs.

4–13

Visit of British Parliamentary delegation, led by Mr John Cronin, M P.

12–13

United States Secretary of Commerce Stans holds discussions with Japanese Ministers about Japanese textile exports to the United States.

17–21

Visit of Federal German Chancellor, Dr Kiesinger.

18

Vice-President of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries announces agreement with Chrysler Corporation for joint car manufacture in Japan after liberalization.

23–25

Visit of Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, Dr Stevens, and other Ministers.

26

Opening of Tomei Expressway linking Tokyo and Nagoya.

31

Foreign Minister departs for talks in Washington.

June 9–11

Fourth Ministerial meeting of ASPAC held at Ito.

12

Launching of the Mutsu, Japan’s first nuclear-powered ship.

15

Peaceful demonstrations in Tokyo by a union of Left-wing extremist groups to commemorate anniversary of 1960 Security Treaty struggles.

18–25

Visit of Paul Hartling, Foreign Minister of Denmark.

23–28

Visit of Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.

July 3

Japan takes up seat for first time as member of United Nations Disarmament Committee.



JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1969151

8

Tokyo District Court gives opinion that existing Japanese law does not authorize application of COCOM restrictions.

13

Japan Socialist Party loses heavily in Tokyo Metropolitan elections, where LDP regain first position and Kõmeitõ and JCP register striking successes.

July 15

Speaker and Deputy Speaker of House of Representatives resign because of opposition criticism of their handling of the Health Insurance Bill. Takechiyo Matsuda elected as new Speaker.

18

News breaks in United States Press that a leakage of toxic gas affected twenty-four United States personnel on an Okinawan base.

29–31

Seventh meeting of Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Tokyo at Ministerial level.

August 5

61st regular Session of Diet closes in confusion, passing Government Bill to control university disputes, but failing to pass fifty other Bills. President of House of Councillors offers his resignation, but it is refused.

17

New universities control law comes into effect, and most national university presidents declare their opposition to it.

26–28

Third Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference held in Tokyo.

September 1

Bank rate raised from 5.84 per cent to 6.25 per cent. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed between Japan and Rumania in Tokyo.

4

Foreign Minister departs for talks in Moscow and Washington.

20

British pavilion for Osaka Expo ’70 completed, dedicated and handed over. Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon arrive in Tokyo for British Week.

26 Sept.–5 Oct. British Week attended by Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon, the President of the Board of Trade, the Lord Mayor of London, HMS Fearless and others. October 1

Opening of 16th University Postal Union Congress in Tokyo (until 14 November).

4

Visit of Gabriel Valdes, Foreign Minister of Chile.

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14

Government announce that 50 per cent foreign investment in the Japanese motor car industry will be permitted as from 1 October, 1971.

21

Anti-War Day marked by violent student demonstrations in Tokyo, signalling the start of the ‘1970 struggle’.

22–26

Visit of Maurice Schumann, Foreign Minister of France.

30

Fair Trade Commission approved Yawata-Fuji merger.

November 8

Five detainees arrive back from Peking.

17

Sato leaves for talks with Nixon. 1,500 persons arrested during riots.

December 2

Dissolution of Diet; elections called for 27 December.

8

IAEA technical meeting in Tokyo considers effectiveness of verification procedures stipulated in the non-proliferation treaty.

9

Foreign Minister Aichi, conferring with Soviet Ambassador, restates Japan’s intention to claim return of the ‘Northern Territories’.

13

Aichi and Sato express desire to hold official talks with China.

15

United States military authorities announce withdrawal of Mace-B missiles from Okinawa.

17

Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office announces that China is to release Samejima, Peking correspondent of Nihon Keizai Shimbun after eighteen months’ detention.

22

China agrees to a six-month extension of the unofficial Japan-China Fishery Agreement.

27

General election gives LDP convincing victory; JSP lose heavily.

22 THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE FORCES IN 1969*

SUMMARY With an eye to the general elections, Government leaders exercised customary discretion in public statements on defence policy. The ‘peace vote’ is still influential. Despite discreet Government encouragement, the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) continue to suffer from low recruitment and popular disapprobation. (Paragraph 1.) American agreement to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, and the Liberal Democratic Party’s comfortable victory in the elections have stimulated the gradual reappraisal of Japan’s future defence requirements. Inclusion of known ‘hawks’ in the new Cabinet, and private suggestions that, despite recent signature of Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan must eventually acquire nuclear weapons. Mr Sato acknowledged the importance Japan attaches to security of Korea and Taiwan, but has taken care to avoid antagonizing powerful neighbours to the West. (Paragraph 2.) Japan’s armaments industry is developing, and she may export military equipment. Given the rapid growth of the Japanese economy, even a modest increase in percentage of GNP allocated to defence expenditure would give Japan considerable military strength. Build-up of conventional forces may alarm South-East Asian countries, but should not greatly disturb Russia or China. (Paragraph 3.) Expansion of Japanese SDF creates opportunities for United Kingdom exports of defence equipment, but Japan will endeavour to create an independent defence industry. (Paragraph 4.)

* FEJ 10/2 – The British Chargé d’Affaires in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 13 February 1970.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Tribute to the role of the British Armed Services during British Week. (Paragraph 5.) 6 February 1970 1. 1969 was election year in Japan and Government leaders were consequently even more cautious than usual not to overstep the mark in their public pronouncements on defence policy. Japan still remains at a stage in her development where there are more votes to be obtained by cultivating the ‘peace mood’ which has characterized this country for the last quarter of a century than by playing up nationalist aspirations for Japan in a military sense to resume her rightful place in the world. But beneath this veil of discretion the Government has steadily encouraged the growth of the SelfDefence Forces. Even so, the fact that membership of the armed forces still fails to carry much glamour or social prestige and that they suffer from considerable difficulties in recruitment still testify to their peripheral place in Japanese society. They are far from being outcasts now, but politicians continue to draw their own conclusions about the extent to which public opinion, even twenty-five years after the defeat of the Imperial forces, would welcome manifestations of official approval or recognition. 2. This situation is not inconsistent with the existence of abundant evidence that during 1969 Japan has begun to think seriously about regional ­ ashington defence. Too much should not be made of Mr Sato’s references in W last November to Korea being ‘essential’ and other areas in the Far East being ‘of serious concern’ to Japan’s defence. Remarks of this kind were part of the price which he paid to secure the promise, on the eve of a general ­election, for the return of Okinawa in 1972. The Japanese authorities continue in fact to be very careful not to name any of their powerful neighbours to the West as possible aggressors. Nevertheless, with the election safely over, there has been a change of mood in the political world which could have important consequences for the future of the SDF. In the first place Mr Sato has brought into his Cabinet a number of known ‘hawks’, all of whom wish to see a militarily strong Japan and some of whom chafe at Japan’s continued reliance on the United States even on the generous terms which Japan has obtained for herself today. Among them are one or two who, in the context of the recent debate on whether to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have privately said that Japan must eventually have nuclear weapons. 3. Despite the remote possibility that, even now that she has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan may one day wish to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, there is no cause to draw alarmist conclusions yet. The development of the Japanese armament industry has for some years been a foregone conclusion and is bound to occur pari passu with her industrial expansion; efforts will be made to sell Japanese arms abroad. As for the actual growth of the SDF, this can continue on a gradual curve, the cost remaining a mere 1.5 per cent of the gross national product, and yet give Japan great military strength. The countries of South-East Asia may well become concerned about this, but so long as Japan confines herself to conventional forces, she is not likely greatly to alarm Russia, China or for that matter the United States. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that the foreseeable consequences of the military build-up will be, first of all, an increased capacity for self-defence if trouble should break out again in the Korean peninsula and, secondly,



THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE FORCES IN 1969155

the potential capability of sending, constitutionally or unconstitutionally, considerable numbers of troops to nearby South-East Asian countries if she feels that her essential national interests are threatened there. 4. The Service Attachés at this post serve the function not only of m ­ ilitary observers but of salesmen of British-made defence equipment. They have fully exploited the limited possibilities open to them in 1969 and they predict greater opportunities for the Fourth Defence Programme (1972– 76), contracts for which are now the subject of fierce competition. But we must not overestimate our chances of really large-scale arms sales in Japan. ­Japanese procurement has for many years now been very largely directed towards the United States, and in so far as the Government have moved away from this policy they have shown determination to manufacture for themselves, a policy on which after all Japan’s success as a nation has been traditionally built. Our task is to locate the relatively few areas where Japan’s technology still lags behind or where her requirements are small enough for it to be cheaper for her to buy than to build. There is good money to be earned in supplying even a modest proportion of the total needs of armed forces as large as those of Japan, but if waste of effort is to be avoided, careful direction will be needed. 5. On the representational side the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, and the military bands of all the armed services played an important part in ensuring the success of the ‘British Week’ in September and October last year. D. R. ASHE (Chargé d’Affaires a.i.)

23 OSAKA EXPO ’70: A FIRST IMPRESSION*

SUMMARY The Expo’s motto is ‘progress’ and ‘harmony’: progress in humour and a certain harmony of insanity can be descried. (Paragraphs 1–4.) The Japanese set the tone by creating a ‘Festival Plaza’, avowedly both fabulous and absurd, in which the opening ceremony took place. (Paragraphs 5–11.) Most designers seem to have sensed the lunatic air to some extent, but the Swiss and the Canadians deserve first prizes. (Paragraphs 12–22.) The contents veer from the frenetic to the static and much nonsense will be written about their significance. (Paragraphs 23–24.) The writer sees great hope in the Japanese daring to be humorous, but fears that the success of this fun fair will promote vulgarity. (Paragraphs 25–27.) He sees little evidence of any synthesis of occidental and oriental taste emerging. (Paragraph 28.) The British pavilion is neither fabulous, absurd nor straightforward, but betwixt and between. Its ‘architect’s building’ and serious intent may wear well. (Paragraph 29.) 26 March 1970

T

he international exhibition at Osaka, known as ‘Expo ’70’, duly opened its doors on the gusty, snowy morning of Saturday, 14 March, 1970 2. Its motto is ‘progress’ and ‘harmony’. The sententious, of whom there are many in Japan, maintain that this means the marriage of occidental progress with the oriental concept of harmony and are deducing great principles therefrom. To treat it thus, I submit, is to fall into the Germanic error of reading

* PXX 1/OSAKA/6 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 31 March 1970.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

transcendental truths into Mozart’s ‘Magic Flute’ and of failing to recognize in it the inconsequential Viennese pantomime transformed by genius. This is basically a fun fair with touches of near genius. 3. From what I have so far been able to see, if there is progress to record at Expo ’70, it may perhaps be in the happy direction of humour. It forces the question: can it be that the Japanese are at last beginning to be able to laugh at themselves? That would indeed be progress and at a timely moment when their economic might is about to burst upon the world. 4. If there is any harmony to be descried, it seems to me to be found, not in any Confucian sense, but in its very reverse: namely in the remarkably high level of insanity, shown by all the best exhibitors. 5. Most surprising of all to me is that the Japanese themselves deliberately set the pattern of this lunacy. Their greatest architect, Kenzo Tange, whose Roman Catholic cathedral in Tokyo is the masterpiece of contemporary ­Japanese building, combined with a roguish artist, Taro Okamoto, to create the central focal point of the whole exhibition: the Festival Plaza. 6. Here a giant rectangular roof, itself a tangle of contorted tubes, floats in the air: a fantastic structural achievement. There dangle from it – for sheer fun – useless gadgets, the very caricature and reductio ad absurdum of contemporary factory contrivance. 7. Through this monstrous and intentional nonsense rises up and protrudes the Tower of the Sun. This strange conceit reveals on one side a grinning face of the sun in Aztec mood, set about with benign green rays; on the other side it shows a leering, lecherous grimace. The whole is topped askew by a brazen insect visage, by turns of surprised malignity or ingenuous vacuity. 8. This whole contraption has been held by the humourless to represent the vital principle and very spirit of the universe itself. Mercifully – and surprisingly – its author deflated this nonsense by stating roundly that he wished only to create something both ‘fabulous’ and ‘absurd’; something in short to cheer up this drab world. He has succeeded in his aim and to my eye, together with Tange’s mock factory roof, set the tone for the whole Expo. 9. The opening ceremony rubbed in the joke. Beneath the grinning face of the Tower of the Sun and staring at the jangled complexity of steel above their heads sat in solemn array – in the perishing cold – the entire establishment of Japan It was perhaps kindly meant that the grinning rather than the leering face of the Sun should stare down upon her erstwhile (?) terrestrial progeny, His Majesty the Emperor. 10. Was it a coincidence that he in his turn, despite the illustrious ancestry here so mockingly portrayed, was precluded by the Constitution even from opening the exhibition, since the experts decreed that to do so would have been a political act? In this scene of expectant hilarity His Majesty could only read therefore a message of goodwill: one sentence of Sitwellian length. 11. The Crown Prince it was who pressed the button that set the lunacy in motion. No political act that, it would seem. Here symbolically enough the young took charge and filled the space with milling merriment. Even the ghastly robot with blinding electronic flashes disgorged from joints – from which belched clouds of sweet vapours – a girls’ band, a drum majorette. With deafening noise and cannonades and against a background of humour – of the fabulous and of the absurd – the huge fun fair burst into life. 12 Perhaps the designers of most nations almost sensed the juvenile spirit of fun that would prevail. Certain it is that so many of their creations are



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in harmony with the general mood. Thus to add a surrealist touch most seem, in order to oblige presumably the minority passenger by plane, to have chosen some mythical spot in the air from which their creations should best be viewed. 13. From above in the sky I am willing to believe that the Japanese set of pavilions does look just like the five petals of the sweet scented plum (prunus mume), which form the exhibition’s emblem. But ‘what heart could have thought you? – past our devisal (O filigree petal!)’ (Actually the petals were born of Tange’s exuberant sense of fun.) The mortal on the ground can see only five large gasometers, five giant drums or, if you will, five bandboxes suspended in the air. 14.True, at night, illuminated in different colours, they have a certain charm and even gaiety. Moreover to shoot up into a bandbox by rapidly moving stair to the top is certainly an uncommon experience; to wander gently down inside the drum through static scenes of Japan’s past has merit. There, flourish for ever plastic gardens, where no leaf withers and no gardener treads. 15. Even the Central Office of Information, from which no insanity could possibly – it goes without saying – emanate, have produced a sober contribution in nearly the same vein. Not a bandbox certainly, but a tailor’s flat cardboard box of considerable dimensions, suspended from four vermilion gantries. The squashed superstructure of some giant ship with cranes at rest? 16. No moving staircase rushes viewers up; they proceed appropriately by staid gangway as into the belly of some stranded dirigible. But here too the viewer from the air is treated for good measure to a vast Union Jack atop the box. The terrestrial being, however, is at least led on by the splendid calligraphy from the hand of the erudite Governor of Osaka, proclaiming unmistakably in huge vermilion characters: ‘Britain’. 17. Even the Russians follow the pattern. A gigantic swirling wall, white on one side and red on the other rises to a tower, which easily dominates the entire scene. Yet the purpose of the whole huge structure baffles the tripper on the land; it reveals itself at once to one aloft as no less than a blow-up of a giant’s hammer and sickle, 18. The United States, on the other hand, more sober even than ourselves, eschew this fashion altogether, but in their way they contrive to achieve the very ultimate in absurdity in an exhibition: they have no outward visible presence whatsoever, whether from air or land. Theirs is the flattened top of some vast, white mushroom, just ripe to burst up through the sod. An almost invisible rump to oppose to the sky-piercing Soviet flamboyance: the low posture with a vengeance. The mystery is how to delve down to the halls beneath this incipient fungus. Once below, all is sweetness and light and straightforward, static showmanship. 19 The Australians are unashamedly lunatic in more conventional, fun fair style, yet they pose a problem of interpretation: is their effort a vast, concrete kangaroo’s tail, holding, just clear of the ground, a dustbin lid? Not according to them: they prefer to interpret their curving concrete mass as the fine, lacy outline of Hokusai’s wave in the famous print. In this case, presumably, it is about to break and shatter the lid in its grip. 20 The French do their best with sparkling puffballs, but two countries easily o’ertop the rest and come out joint firsts in the lunatic stakes: none other than the staid Swiss and our own worthy Canadian cousins. Both have cocked a snook at functionalism – indeed at any form of rationality.

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21. The Swiss put their money on a vast, spreading metal tree, bearing as sole fruit an apparent infinity of electric light bulbs. Perhaps this may evoke to some the shimmering heights of snowy peaks. It has been held by the more fanciful to symbolize scientific precision. 22. There can be little doubt that the Canadian contribution is a monument of some significance to delirium tremens. Four quadrilateral pyramids, cased on their three outer sides in looking glass, frame a pond over which rotate glass parasols, streaked with waving bands of colours. On the drab, cold opening day, the psychedelic reflections cheered the heart. The full effects of this inspired insanity must await the scorching rays of the July sun: the refractions then should awaken the dead. 23. As to the contents I have so far seen, these range predictably from surrealist juxtaposition (New England tomb stones and weather vanes with moon capsules and lunar rock in the American pavilion) to straight rollicking, noisy show-biz (favoured by the Russians). The terror of the ‘static’ and the ‘trad’ lead those with real treasures to offer (among them ourselves and the French) towards the original, the restless and the fussy–for fear of seeming corny and as old as they are? In the end, the pavilions with simple single intent (the Portuguese to show their historic ties with Japan; the Ceylonese to display one single sapphire; Hong Kong to attract tourists or the Nepalese to permit the viewer to contemplate in peace the majesty of the Himalayas), despite their lack of technique and perhaps dull approach, may come to please the most. 24. The Expo is vast. It embraces two museums of real significance; masterpieces (some from Britain) can there be seen in rare and illuminating company. Specialized pavilions, from electronics to Pepsi Cola, may yield great ­revelations to the connoisseur. The full gamut would take ten days at least to ­evaluate. I have so far only seen what two exhausting days can disclose. 25. Much nonsense and a great deal of ‘high sentaunce’[sic] will be written about it all. It certainly marks a stage in Japanese rehabilitation in their own eyes. There will be much irritating self-congratulation, even disquisitions on the essential supremacy of the oriental spirit (so disquieting to those who remember this Leitmotif of the fevered, mystic nationalism of the 1930s). But pride is in place. 26 After my brief visits, it does represent to me a great achievement, from which some hope can be derived and, of course, some despair. The hope derives from the fact that this disciplined, serious, head-boy-in-the-class people have actually dared to create the fabulous and the absurd for their own entertainment and edification. The whole school and university population of Japan will see this and it will set a lighter trend. This might even result in a more balanced, more humorous outlook. 27 The despair lies in the fact that the success of this gigantic fun fair will encourage those vulgar ‘Disneylands and ‘paradises’, which are already eating up the fair face of the land, as disastrously as the economic miracle spawns corroding factories. An American lady of the blue-rinsed widow type asked me in one of the most beautiful, secluded and rarified of Kyoto gardens: ‘Don’t you just feel you are in Disneyland?’ She sensed more sooth than she knew; under the impetus of Expo, it may soon become a Disneyland and in plastic at that. 28. There is little evidence throughout of that elegant synthesis of East and West, which has been the ideal of thoughtful Japanese and of which there are rare and beautiful examples even amid the brashness of modern Tokyo At Expo, the traditional is too slavish; the much photographed pagoda an



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outrageous pastiche. Only Matsushita (the giant electric concern) dares to be ‘astringent’: the essential Japanese aesthetic quality. The tone is sheer enjoyment, the accent on the juvenile. I would not expect any profound influence on taste. Only with luck some wider appreciation of the outside world and a lighter, more healthy mood. 29. How do we come off in all this? It almost stands to reason that we are neither fabulous nor yet absurd; but neither are we bold enough to adopt the simple, the straightforward and the static. The three that combine these qualities, the Japanese, the Americans and the Russians, are likely to win popularity. Nor do we entice the greedy with inviting restaurants, like Belgium, Portugal or Hong Kong; there is not even a British pub. Perhaps in the long run our ‘architect’s building’, well seen from one of the main entrances, and our serious intent (normally so valued in Japan) will come to wear well. Staid? Respectable? Why not? We shall certainly get our fill of visitors (so far 16 per cent of the total) and are popularly rated in the first five in point of interest. 30. In short, this is a fun fair with foreign peep shows of educative value for the Japanese young, now in unprecedentedly unbuttoned mood. One vast joke? Was it planned as such? As Arthur Waley might have said, I would suppose so: I would hope so. It would be rash to go further than that. JOHN PILCHER

24 THE JAPANESE MOOD IN 1970*

SUMMARY Success is the dominant factor. Okinawa is to be returned, the Security Treaty with the United States is likely to continue and the GNP goes on rising. They have achieved their aim of playing the industrial game as well as Europe and the United States, and Osaka Expo ’70 draws world attention to their prowess. (Paragraphs 1–5.) Self-satisfaction, without excessive smugness and cockiness is the order of the day. (Paragraph 6.) The reasons for their success are thought to be their sense of loyalty, search for harmony and high educational standards, but prosperity may gradually break these down. (Paragraphs 7–10.) What to do with wealth is sensed to be a problem. The old austerity has gone and the floodgates are now open to the expensive b ­ y-products of leisure. (Paragraphs 11–15.) Prosperity is in fact making the Japanese more normal, but is sapping the sources of their strength. (Paragraphs 16–17.) Discontent with the quality of living will lead to urban expenditure; defence will absorb more money. (Paragraphs 18–19.) The Japanese remain parochial and more self-absorbed than ever. Geography, history and institutions have given them an abnormal insularity and sense of cohesion, which leads to the excessive ­nationalism which instinctively underlies all their policies. ­(Paragraphs 21–22.) They possess no scale of values common to themselves and others and are thereby handicapped in international relations. Moreover they rely on subjective intuition. (Paragraphs 23–24.) So far unpopularity has put a brake on active foreign policy in Asia. Now their interest centres even more on Australasia, the American continent and Africa, where this applies less. (Paragraph 25.) * FEJ 18/3 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 7 April 1970.



THE JAPANESE MOOD IN 1970165

Their economic might may run away with them, but so far their expressions of intent are statesmanlike. (Paragraph 26.) We are treated condescendingly, but there is a disposition to like us and, with our economy in order and as part of Europe, we might enjoy consideration. (Paragraphs 27–28.) Only through integrating Japan into world organizations and through friendship can we hope to put a brake on Japanese nationalistic policies. Perhaps the excitement of ever-increasing wealth will in fact do the trick? (Paragraphs 29–30.) 3 April 1970

I

n my despatch of 11 December, 1968, I tried to describe the Japanese mood as I then sensed it to be. I now offer an assessment of the national temper as I find it in 1970. 2. A conviction of success is the dominant factor. The Prime Minister has settled the future of Okinawa. This largely artificial issue none the less had come to mean for the Japanese the one considerable outstanding legacy of the war. There remain, of course, the Russian-occupied islands (Habomai and Shikotan), but they are relatively uninhabited. By eliminating Okinawa the Prime Minister was able to take away the chief grouse and rallying point of discontents within Japan. 3. Now the prospect is that the Security Treaty with the United States will continue, without the alarming demonstrations against it forecast for 1970. Misgivings about the treaty are held in widely different sections of the population, from those who wonder when the American umbrella will prove a lightning conductor to those who, like the present Minister of Agriculture, do not like the feeling of being ‘the kept mistress of the United States’. This sentiment would probably be echoed by the present head of the Defence Agency. In general, however, the Japanese people are relieved that the status quo seems likely to continue. 4. Above all the gross national product continues to rise and everybody has more money in his pocket as each year goes by. The Japanese people, moreover, have drawn world attention to themselves at this moment of economic success by the Osaka Expo ’70 and wish to show off their increased national prosperity and achievements. 5. The mood in general therefore is one of delight at having achieved the objective they set before themselves after their defeat. They intended to pull themselves up by their economic endeavours and to show that they could play the industrial game better than Europe and, if possible, as well as the United States. 6. In these circumstances it would be surprising if there were not a certain air of self-satisfaction and if this were not accompanied by some slightly condescending wonder at why others, initially better placed, should not have done so well. To me, however, it is remarkable that the Japanese are not showing a greater degree of smugness and that the cockiness, which they displayed to excess before the war and which continues to show itself intermittently, has not re-emerged more clearly in the present rather heady circumstances. 7. There is a good deal of self-satisfied comment on how they have achieved their economic miracle. Their loyalty and consequent patriotism and the Confucian pursuit of harmony have come in for a good deal of fulsome praise,

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as has their traditional addiction to education: all rightly so in my opinion. Their loyalty to their firm, their Ministry and their country and the fact that, in order to achieve harmony, they eschew giving rise to envy, together with their studious disposition, are, to my mind, chiefly responsible for their success. 8. The care with which the business executive tries to look like his e­ mployees, works in an office not aggressively superior to those of his staff and on occasion wears the dungarees of the trade, makes for harmonious social relations. It has led to a remarkable degree of egalitarianism. Outwardly one of the most extreme examples in the modern world of a capitalist, free-enterprise State, Japan is in fact as closely controlled, dirigiste and integrated as a Socialist State. Its inhabitants so far share the ‘subfusc’ image. 9. All, however, now sense that prosperity is bringing changes, which may undermine to some extent the very virtues that brought it about. For instance young men, quizzed by newspapers, will state that they would change their jobs if offered better conditions. This goes against the accepted pattern of loyalty to the firm, with the corresponding certainty that the firm will never sack the employee. Further the old pattern of concealing wealth as far as possible is breaking down under the temptation of consumer goods. 10. In the past it was almost de rigueur to try to appear worse off than the Jones’s. Now the lure of colour television sets, rice cookers, refrigerators, deep freezers, electric blankets, air conditioning and the like has done its work. ‘My home-ism’ (the cult of the four ‘Cs’: colour television, air cooler, car and carpet), as they term it, has seized the land: the old austerity is going overboard and no doubt the good effects of the pursuit of harmony will be the next casualty. 11. What to do with wealth has become a very real problem. In the past works of art were acquired and stored away. In old age a museum would be founded and the objects put on display for the delectation of the people. This carries on. Oil magnates and the owners of private railways still vie with one another in this meritorious course. 12. However everyone now aspires to own a motor car, even if traffic conditions limit its uses very severely. Gardens have already been sacrificed to car ports, without which a licence is not obtainable. Land values are so high in the big cities that, just at this moment when possessions accumulate, there is less and less space in which to put them. Flats are becoming more and more the order of the day and the rents paid for them in a month by the rich are often more than for a whole year for comparable accommodation in London. The middle classes generally still live in poky, inaccessible and poorly ventilated blocks, hastily constructed after the destruction of the war and little better than an East European slum. The beauty of the traditional style of living has been killed by prosperity. 13. The amassing of country estates is out of the question. The land reform, perhaps the most striking of the American innovations, originally prohibited the retention of more than 2½ acres (one hectare) of arable land. Even this reform, which brought immense relief to the agricultural worker, is breaking down in practice. The workers pour into the town, but there are more still to come. Modern machinery makes it possible for fewer people to cultivate larger spaces. Therefore bit by bit, on largely legitimate grounds, holdings are getting bigger. None the less anything in the form of an estate, as we understand the term, cannot exist. 14. The most therefore that the wealthy can have is a beach cottage or a modest retreat in the mountains. Large cars, yachts, polo ponies, private



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­aeroplanes – all the things on which the rich spend their money elsewhere – have not so far been thought appropriate under the harmony principle. 15. Now, however, many feel that the floodgates are slowly about to open. The man who can at this moment descry the Honda of motor boats will clearly make a fortune. People will gradually go in for all the expensive by-products of leisure and profit. 16. In other words prosperity means that the Japanese are gradually becoming more normal. There is even a physiological aspect to this. The young eat what we would consider a normal diet. They are larger and better looking than their forebears. The milk-fed look is not uncommon. They have just as much difficulty about sitting on the floor as Europeans. Moreover they laugh – unashamedly and openly. I took part in an academic procession at a university recently. The sight of so many dons clad in gowns caused the young to put their heads back and yell with laughter. This would have been unthinkable thirty-five years ago. 17. But, as they become more normal, they know that they are sapping the real sources of their economic progress. Their sense of loyalty wanes; their respect for harmony diminishes. These principles lie behind the acceptance so docilely of ‘administrative guidance’ by Japanese industry: it is no coincidence that Ministries are not finding it quite so easy to bring their clients to heel. The veneration for the teacher and the professor has broken down: perhaps the universal disrespect for authority creeps slowly in. 18. Then again dissatisfaction with what is popularly called ‘the quality of living’ increases. Air pollution; the whittling away of the beauties of the landscape, in a country devoted to the cult of nature; the hideous morass of the big cities; the ever-smaller houses and the longer commuting hours: all these things will gradually demand more and more attention from the Government. Increasing sums will have to be spent on amenities in the cities and, of course, on social welfare. 19. A further burden to be borne will be defence. A general mistrust of the military remains. They misled the Emperor and put him into the position of having to surrender to save his people from annihilation from the atomic bomb. This formula is still valid, but there is a sense (which current Russian manoeuvres planned to take place in this area may have increased) that they must be able to stand on their own feet as far as that is possible in modern terms. In other words the Defence Agency must shake off American influence in the self-defence forces and become autonomous in conventional warfare by the end of the fourth defence build-up, in 1976. Even the atomic allergy has declined, though real horror at the after-effects of the atom bomb dominates many consciences. The necessity of spending more money on armaments therefore looms up. 20. When it comes to looking at the world in general, success has caused a certain self-absorption. The Japanese have always been very parochial. Cut off for centuries by geography, living behind a formidable and really surrealist language barrier, almost entirely out of touch politically during the 250 years of seclusion before 1868, they are the most insular of all peoples and their culture the most ingrown. 21. Although the origins of the race are still by no means clear, they formed a homogeneous whole for a longer period than the rest of us. Moreover their monarchy is, after the Papacy, the oldest living human institution. Their long history, insularity and homogeneity have produced an abnormal sense

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of cohesion which, encouraged by the search for harmony, has played so pre-eminent a part in their present upsurge. This is likely to remain. Unfortunately it leads easily to an excessive nationalism, which colours – wittingly or unwittingly – their every act. 22. It is basically this which makes them shy away from their adopted course of trade and capital liberalization. Foreigners, once let in, will not play the game by the same rules; they will upset the apple-cart. Yet the Japanese realize that, in their present state of affluence, they must, however unwillingly, run this risk. 23. Moreover the Japanese possess no scale of values of universal application. Shintô, their indigenous cult, applies only to Japan and is concerned with the heroes of the Japanese race and the cult of the land. Buddhism is too much of a pessimistic philosophy of life, based on detachment from this illusory world, to supply a strong and transcendental code of morals for here and now. In practice, all Japanese virtues and ideals tend to apply to themselves and to themselves alone. Perfection to them – like the God Emperor in the past – is in this illusory world and can be achieved by obeying the traditional precepts of good conduct. Perfection is not an unattainable ideal, to which every act can only be an approximation, as it is for us, heirs to Christianity. Although indifferent to the practice of their ancient cults, they are the heirs to centuries of indoctrination. They are thus in no strong position to attract the sympathies, let alone the hearts of others. This will prove again a great handicap in their international relations, since it makes them of all people the least able to understand others and the world’s worst mixers. 24. Add to this their anti-logical bias, due to their lack of a ladder of thought, such as Aristotle provides. This leads them to excessive reliance upon ­intuition and perception. Being so racially minded and cut off from their fellow men, their perceptions and intuitions can scarcely coincide with those of others. Without a scale of values of universal application, their flashes of enlightenment tend to have little outside relevance. Thus, with all the ease of ­contemporary communications, the Japanese people, for all their education and pursuit of knowledge, remain basically insulated from others and this in the decades to come must be a handicap. 25. Hitherto, unpopularity from the last war, which was partly created by bad behaviour, resulting from their exaggerated sense of racial exclusiveness, has caused them in practice to adopt a low posture, at any rate in Asia. They know that Asians want their money, but not their presence or control. Now, however, South-East Asia means less to them than it did, although ­Indonesia with its vast resources remains an attraction, despite some despair about the political situation there. Moreover they recognize the real importance to them of the Malacca Straits, especially for their essential oil supplies. (India’s views on foreign policy could cause, therefore, great alarm with their advocacy of Russian presence in the Indian Ocean: 95 per cent of their oil comes from the Persian Gulf and through the Malacca Straits.) The countries that are really vital to them now are those from which they derive their raw materials: Australasia in particular, Canada, Latin America and Africa. In their relationships with these countries, their unpopularity with their fellow-Asians does not impede them. 26. They have achieved their immediate post-war objective and are not at his moment certain where they wish to go. They are carried along on a wave of surging prosperity and this may satisfy them for a long time to come. But their



THE JAPANESE MOOD IN 1970169

economic might may, whether they wish it to do so or not, force them into taking a more active and forceful part in world affairs. In this their excessive racial exclusiveness and nation-bound morality, plus the facts of international life (e.g. the military strength of Communist China, the propinquity of Russia and their dependence on the United States as a market and a source of supply), may be the only brakes upon the successful fulfilment of what could become exclusively nationalistic policies. There must be set against this, however, the pre-eminently sensible nature of their pronouncements up to date. What could be more statesmanlike than Mr Sato’s speech on international affairs on 14 February? 27. Where do we come in their scheme of things? Many would still like to look upon us as the teacher of old; such reserve for us that slightly condescending approval which our compatriots sometimes bestowed upon the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They still admire genuinely our cultural achievements. They will only respect us as a Power in the world when we have proved our economic health. They tend to ascribe to inefficiency, laziness and faulty social structure our recent difficulties, and to underrate us accordingly. Where is ‘my country right or wrong’ (so appealing to the Japanese mind) and what has become of the team spirit we once preached, they ask. The spectacle of withdrawals East and West of Suez does not inspire admiration. 28. If we get into the European Community then the whole entity will inspire considerable awe in Japanese minds. The awe will spring not only from an appraisal of the economic strength of the EEC as a unit, but also from the very real respect they feel for European culture as a whole and for European inventiveness and resource. 29. In short the mood of the moment here is one of self-satisfaction with the progress attained and bewilderment about where to go. They know that the virtues, which have brought about the economic miracle, are likely to be scaled down by success. Nationalism, whether conscious or not, may not be altered by prosperity; it is omnipresent in an almost biological form. All their policies will be dictated by it. 30. The only way to mitigate the prospect of selfish and possibly unwelcome nationalistic behaviour on the part of Japan seems to me to be by doing everything possible to increase Japan’s participation in world organizations of all sorts and kinds. There they would be restrained by the opinions of others. On our own front, by proving our economic worth, by developing trade, by encouraging respect for our general achievements and by cultivating friendship, we might be able to influence Japan’s actions to a small extent. Perhaps, as some aver, the Japanese will be so satisfied with their new-found wealth – with having escaped from the bondage of Asia into the company of the affluent – that they will seek to avoid a positive foreign policy? They have after all done so well without one up to date. JOHN PILCHER

25 JAPAN’S ECONOMY IN THE 1970s: THE MIRACLE EXCELS ITSELF*

SUMMARY The new Economic and Social Development Plan for 1970–75 forecasts a doubling of Japan’s GNP and an annual growth rate of 10.6 per cent. This should generate the resources needed to achieve the plan’s aims for increased social and infrastructure investment. (Paragraphs 1–7.) 2. Forecasts for the 1980s are equally optimistic. After overtaking Britain and Europe, the Japanese economy should begin to approach in size that of the United States. (Paragraph 8.) 3. Japan will lead the world in steel and in many other industrial sectors by 1975. Its international trade will continue to grow, strengthened by close co-operation between Government and industry to maintain economic growth. (Paragraphs 9–12.) 4. Potential weaknesses exist, and inflationary pressures have appeared. These should not, however, seriously threaten Japanese growth in the short term or the attainment of the plan’s objectives. (Paragraphs 13–17.) 5. Britain’s exports to Japan have doubled over the last four years, and are still rising. If the momentum is maintained, they could be close to £400 million by 1975. (Paragraphs 18–19.) 6. Japanese exports present a threat to our own in markets around the world. (Paragraphs 20–21.) 7. Japanese restrictions on imports and capital investment are still too numerous for an economy of such strength. Britain can help to increase Japanese understanding of their international economic responsibilities. We must continue pressing in our bilateral trade negotiations for the removal of restrictions on both sides. The J­ apanese must * FEJ 5/2 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 26 June 1970.



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be taken to task in international economic fora on their ­continued protectionism. More contact is needed between Britain and Japan in the economic sphere at the official level. (Paragraphs 22–26.) 18 June 1970

I

am indebted to the resource and acumen of Mr Third Secretary D. J. Wright for this illuminating commentary on the Japanese economic miracle, which I submit as worthy of serious attention and study. 2. When Norman Macrae of The Economist described the Japanese economic miracle as the ‘Risen Sun’ in 1967, it was envisaged that the economy might continue growing at the then amazing rate of about 8.2 per cent a year. The startling growth in world trade over the last two years, coupled with even greater economic drive within Japan, has now obliged the Government in its new Economic and Social Development Plan to revise that estimate upwards to a growth rate of 10.6 per cent a year until 1975. 3. During the last two years the Japanese economy has expanded to produce a nominal GNP of $166,395 million in 1969 (a 17.3 per cent increase over fiscal 1968); a balance of payments surplus in the same year of $2,283 million and foreign exchange reserves growing with such embarrassing speed that the ­Japanese Government has been forced to take measures to slow down their growth. Two years ago international currency pressures centred on the Deutschemark. It is now the Japanese Government which is faced by demands for a revaluation of the yen to bring it into line with Japan’s competitive power. 4. Against this background of proven economic strength, the new Economic and Social Development Plan attempts to reassess the social objectives as well as the purely statistical forecasts for the first half of the 1970s. It implicitly recognizes that the social, political and economic elements of Japanese life have been totally committed to achieving the economic miracle, which has dazzled the rest of the world, and have largely neglected the social problems and distortions which it has produced. 5. The plan declares its aim to be the development of ‘an economic society rich in humanity’. Its tone is strong and aggressive: ‘Incomes rise, personal consumption is flourishing, unemployment has almost disappeared, the balance of payments is in surplus, the country’s economic influence on the rest of the world is considerable, and yet the inequalities remain. The modernizing of agriculture and small businesses is delayed, the consumer price spiral continues unabated, pollution, traffic congestion and the destruction of the natural environment are rampant.’ 6. The economic forecasts are clear and confident. The GNP will rise by 10.6 per cent between 1970 and 1975 to reach $388,888 million. Exports, which in fiscal 1969 reached $16,400 million, will grow by some 14.7 per cent annually to reach $37,400 million in the fiscal year 1975, while imports, which were $12,700 million in the same period, will grow annually by some 15.3 per cent to reach $29,600 million by the same time. The annual balance of payments surplus will reach $3,500 million. Capital investment will increase annually by 12.6 per cent and industrial production by 12.4 per cent, to reach an index figure of 392 from the base of 100 in 1965. Steel production, for instance, is expected to reach 160 million tons by 1975. It is hoped that the extra reserves of economic strength generated by this growth will be dedicated to tackling the social inadequacies and deficiencies.

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7. The Government’s average annual investment on public utilities and social welfare is expected to rise at the rate of 13.5 per cent a year (compared with 10.7 per cent from 1963 to 1968). At the same time consumer prices will, it is hoped, be held down to a rise of 4.4 per cent per annum, wholesale prices to 1 per cent, while the per capita income will rise to $2,780 (compared with the present $1,289) overtaking Britain by about 1974. 8. The spirit of unrivalled optimism and confidence in the future of the economy is not restricted to Government-sponsored forecasts or official economic planning. It can also be found in the forecasts of the independent Japanese economic research organizations which go well beyond 1975 and into the 1980s. For instance, economists predict a sevenfold expansion in the size of the economy between now and 1985, bringing the GNP up to the colossal figure of almost $833,000 million and the per capita income to $5,480 a year. Having already outstripped the economies of Britain and other ­European c­ ountries in sheer size, Japan might reach its final goal of overtaking the United States per capita income in the 1980s if it maintains a growth rate of over 8 per cent. Japanese exports are expected to grow to $69,500 million by 1980 and imports to reach $59,500 million. 9. The Government plans that by the end of the 1970s Japan’s range of exports will have expanded and that its markets will not be as geographically distorted as they are at the moment, with over 30 per cent of exports going to the United States. This may be difficult to achieve. However, Japan expects to benefit from the enlargement of the EEC, from moves towards a Pacific Free Trade Area and from increased buying power in the developing countries of the world. 10. It is vital to Japan’s trading strategy that, having become the major world supplier of ships and electrical equipment, the world’s largest exporter of steel and the second largest exporter of automobiles, Japan should expand its exports of chemicals, computers, non-ferrous metals and machinery. By 1975 the list of Japan’s firsts, in terms of the largest scale of production in the world, will have grown to include steel, aluminium, automobiles, synthetic textiles, fibre and petroleum products. 11. There can be no doubt about the strength and trading potential of an economy with these massive production levels, and with even greater ones envisaged for the 1970s. Stability of export prices during the last decade looks like continuing, so long as the high level of productive capital investment can be maintained and rises in productivity absorb Japanese costs. The economy is geared to exporting through its massive trading houses, Government emphasis on exports and strong domestic demand, which has expanded by 16.6 per cent annually over the last ten years. 12. Japan’s propensity to import and to consume has been low compared with the West; the percentage of imports which are industrially unproductive, i.e. consumer-directed luxury goods, has been minimal, compared with the massive part of the import bill occupied by raw materials. The Government works in close co-operation with industry in ensuring that economic growth is maintained and that no interests, even though they may represent legitimate social considerations, interfere with the need to be competitive, expansive and economically successful. The nation is geared, not to economic survival, but to economic ascendency. 13. There are, however, some potential weaknesses in the economy. These do not mean that the Japanese will not succeed in achieving the aims of the



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Economic and Social Development Plan, but they do represent new economic problems for Japan, which, if not tackled firmly and decisively, could develop into the same serious long-term problems in Japan as they have already done in other developed countries. Inflation has begun to appear in Japan in a form not previously experienced. Wages rose by over 15 per cent in 1969, exceeding the rise in productivity for the first time since the end of the war. They look like registering a 17 per cent rise in 1970. 14. Other inflationary pressures have also begun to appear: a consumer price rise of almost 6.4 per cent in fiscal 1969, and a wholesale price rise of 4.1 per cent, which partly reflects the increases in costs following wage settlements. These developments could strike at the stability of Japanese export prices, which, coupled with productivity increases in excess of wage settlements, has been fundamental to Japan’s economic achievements in the past fifteen years. The Economic and Social Development Plan forecasts an annual increase of 12.1 per cent in wages, 3.8 per cent in consumer prices and 1 per cent in wholesale prices, which contrast strongly with recent developments. 15. An annual growth rate of 10.6 per cent, with simultaneous increases in Government and private investment, will not help to restrain price rises or wage increases, especially at a time when the labour force is only likely to grow at 1.1 per cent annually. Japan, however, still has 19 per cent of its working population engaged in farming. A reduction in the agricultural work force, more employment of married women and a reduction of the size of the service sector working population could help to alleviate the shortage of labour. But it will still require considerable technological advance, greater investment in research and development and a reallocation of resources into capital intensive industries to make up for the disappearance of the easily available and relatively cheap labour which has been such an asset in the past. 16. Greater investment in housing, the social infrastructure and welfare facilities is planned for the 1970s and will exert some strain on Japan’s pool of investment resources. Achieving the targets set for these fields depends wholly upon maintaining the high rate of growth which has been forecast. This, it is planned, should provide the excess investment capacity to channel into these areas. If, however, the choice ever had to be made between increasing social capital or maintaining industrial investment to keep up Japan’s economic growth, the Japanese would probably sacrifice social investment. 17. These are the problems. They should not, however, radically affect Japan’s performance until after the mid-1970s. The intensive capital investment of the 1960s has meant that 64 per cent of Japanese machinery is under ten years old, compared with only 37 per cent in Britain. Products and techniques have already been developed for which there will be strong international demand well into the 1970s. These factors and the unrivalled strength of its balance of payments position have given Japan a sound base for the 1970s, from which to tackle the problems which are now beginning to appear. 18. The first implication for Britain of these developments is the potential market for British exporters which Japan represents. Britain has already had considerable success. Our exports to Japan have doubled over the last four years; they rose by a massive 31.4 per cent in 1969. They are again on the increase this year; by the end of April they were already 21 per cent up on the same period in 1969. But with an import bill which is expected to increase by 15.3 per cent annually until 1975, and with our other competitors eyeing this growing market, further effort must be made to ensure that the opportunities

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which have been presented and the links which have been fostered should not be lost. 19. Compared with the scale of Britain’s exports to other countries in the developed world, whose economies are a fraction the size of that of Japan, Britain’s exports to Japan are still small. If the Japanese economy begins to vie in size with that of the United States, our exports should also move in the same direction. Assuming that they were to continue to rise by about 20 per cent annually, they could be close to £400 million by 1975. One of the main tasks of my Commercial Department must continue to be to encourage British exporters to take full advantage of the prospects which the Japanese market offers. 20. The prospect for Britain’s exports in Japan in the 1970s is counterbalanced by the competitive threat which Japan represents in third markets. This has already been keenly felt in South-East Asia, particularly Malaysia and ­Singapore, in the United States and to some extent in Australia. It can be expected to grow in Latin America, in Africa and also in Europe. J­ apanese competitiveness, the quality of Japanese products and the highly effective ­Japanese method of exporting through the trading houses mean that no ­international market can be regarded as beyond their capability for rapid and decisive penetration. Exporting is not a subsidiary activity of Japanese industry: it is an essential component of business. 21. To meet this competition, which can only expand and become even more intensive, British business must show the same determination as the Japanese in studying overseas markets, offering the same services and keeping to their commitments on delivery dates. The British Government, on the other hand, must be sure that a British company can meet what the Japanese have and can offer, both in terms of market intelligence and credit facilities. 22. Beyond our trading interest in the Japanese economy, there is a deeper economic interest which is both bilateral and multilateral. Japanese residual import controls are far too numerous for a country with such a strong economy. Japan’s controls on capital movements and upon the freedom of entry for foreign companies are stricter than those in any other developed country. Japan’s administrative system and psychological approach to international trading mean that non-tariff barriers to trade are likely to be greater here than elsewhere. 23. The basic official and industrial attitude towards imports, which are not of direct value to the economic expansion or the trading position of Japan, remains that they are unnecessary, unwelcome and largely to be discouraged. The increase in Japan’s balance of payments surplus is, however, forcing the more long-sighted to accept in principle the need for a more liberal attitude to imports. Japanese Government and Japanese business have sought to make Japan an exporter of finished goods to the developed and the developing world and largely self-sufficient in satisfying domestic demand. The forecast that Japan will have a balance of payments surplus of $3,500 million by 1975 is not yet balanced by a realization that this means deficits of similar proportions for Japan’s competitors. The Japanese need to be brought to an understanding of the realities of international commerce and economic co-operation. 24. One way in which Britain can influence the Japanese is through our bilateral trade negotiations with the Japanese, where we have offered a removal of all restrictions on Japanese exports to Britain, provided equivalent opportunities in the Japanese market are available for British exports. We must



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maintain our offers and our requests. We must re-emphasize at every a­ vailable opportunity the importance of this offer to Japan as a precedent for the removal of other nations’ restrictions on her exports. 25. We must also pay closer attention to the positions which the Japanese adopt in international economic and financial fora, and take every opportunity of impressing upon them the need for Japan to move more positively in the direction of liberal trading policies. They should be taken to task on the question of the need for continued protection of certain industries and they should be made aware that there is no illusion among their international trading partners about the strength and the competitiveness of their economy. The United States textile issue has shown the strength of the feeling that Japan is only out to gain from the open-door policy of other countries. Japan must learn that the growth of protectionism in the United States can only damage its own position as a trading nation. 26. The strength of the Japanese economy is now an established fact. Japan’s influence on international economic and trading problems can only expand. It will be in our interest to increase and broaden our contacts with the ­Japanese Government at all levels. It goes without saying that one of the main f­ unctions of this Embassy is to cultivate the friendship of Japanese officialdom. More than this is, however, necessary. Closer contact between British officials in London and their counterparts in Tokyo is now essential. Political contact with Japan is more frequent. But senior British officials from London still make little direct contact with their influential Japanese opposite numbers. Officials in Japan play a more important role than in almost any other developed country. Many areas remain in which contact is slight but where Britain has an immediate interest and Japan growing strength. More contact would ensure that British views are heard and understood and that the Japanese are made more aware on a personal level of opinions and arguments on issues in which they are directly involved internationally. JOHN PILCHER

26 JAPAN’S CHANGING SOCIETY AND THE NEW GENERATION*

SUMMARY The face of Japan has been changing faster than anywhere else. There has been a revolution in Japanese agriculture and Japan now produces a surplus of rice with a declining agricultural population. Urbanization has developed very fast in line with the colossal increase in production since the war. Prosperity has changed the whole face of Japan. (Paragraphs 1–6.) The habits of the Japanese people have been changing equally fast. Food, clothing, housing, leisure are all more like an industrialized country of the New World than typical of Asia. Television is the new drug. (Paragraphs 7–11.) Popular attitudes are also being transformed. Family relationships are less important. Women lead a more normal life, but Japan is still the paradise of the expense account. The teacher has lost much of his prestige. The lifelong employment system is being modified. Even the Civil Service is undergoing changes. The young are largely indifferent to the Imperial Family. Political forms are accepted so long as Japan’s living standard improves. But the Japanese are still essentially inward-looking and basic nationalism has not changed. (Paragraphs 12–22.) The new generation is very different from the pre-war generation. Their attitudes are egalitarian and materialist. Ethical concepts are brushed aside. For the first time the Japanese have begun to know the real meaning of prosperity. Their first aim is to improve the standard of their life. (Paragraphs 23–26.)

* FEJ 18/4 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 10 July 1970.



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Japanese economic success may ultimately succumb to p ­ rosperity, but not for some time. The main threat to political stability is ­external, but the rootlessness of the new generation has left a sense of f­ rustration for which post-war Japan has so far failed to provide the answer. If it cannot do so, violence could result although liberal and pacifist ­feelings have developed strong roots. (Paragraphs 27–34.) The new Japan is likely to be more self-confident but equally self-centred in foreign fields. Despite increasing contacts with the foreigner, foreign ways are still disliked. Japan’s goals are still primarily economic, but they cannot yet approach them from a broad and longterm angle. The combination of Japan’s instinctive nationalism, her failure to achieve intellectual and moral concord with other nations, and her overwhelming economic and consequent political power, will increasingly lead her to assert herself in the years to come to the discomforture even of her closest friends. (Paragraphs 35–40.) For Britain the prospect ahead is disquieting; by ourselves we count for little now in Japanese eyes. But the position could change if we enter the Common Market, an organization the strength of which Japan already respects and cannot afford to ignore. (Paragraph 41.) 3 July 1970

I

submit some observations on the changing society of Japan. These have been prepared by Mr Hugh Cortazzi, Commercial Counsellor to this Embassy, who has drawn upon his long experience of this country and people and his unique knowledge of their surrealist language. They should be read in conjunction with my two despatches on the Japanese Mood, of 3 April, 1970, and on the Economic Miracle, which excels itself, of 18 June, 1970. 2. The increased pace of technological development and the political and economic consequences of the last war have brought changes everywhere. In the non-Communist world, the speed with which the pattern of Japanese life has been transformed has probably been greater than anywhere else. This has meant not only superficial variations in environment and habits, but also basic alterations in attitudes, especially in the new post-war generation.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 3. Japan was primarily an agricultural country until the First World War, when the industrial revolution, which started in the Meiji period with the reopening of Japan in 1868, really got under way. Even up to the Second World War, the farming population played a dominant part in Japanese life. The farmer was still regarded as second in importance to the soldier. Immediately after the Second World War, Japan reverted for a brief time to a subsistence agricultural economy. In the last twenty-five years all this has radically changed. Although some 19 per cent of Japan’s population are still employed on the land, and the crowds who visit Expo ’70 seem so frequently to consist of country peasants, the facts are that the farmers have been leaving the land in increasing numbers, while at the same time production has so developed that Japan now produces a surplus of rice. This has been essentially due to the revolution in agricultural techniques. After the war the basic problem for Japan was the reform of

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land holdings, to ensure that the peasantry were no longer dependent on the money-lenders. Indeed the American-inspired land reform was probably the greatest success of the occupation. Now the problem is how to consolidate land holdings, so that large-scale farming can be developed and Japan’s agricultural population further reduced to alleviate Japan’s growing labour shortage. 4. Prosperity has now come even to the smallest and most remote villages. Every family, of course, has its television set and many have colour television. Practically every farmer has his tractor and other machines and is no longer dependent on rice, wheat and Japanese vegetables. Fruit farming has been encouraged and there is a proliferation of chicken farms, pig farms and small dairies. At the same time the countryside is disfigured by Coca Cola signs, cafés and ‘leisure facilities’; small and medium-scale factories mushroom everywhere. The farmers increasingly owe their prosperity to these factories, which have come to the countryside to find labour. The farming families, who are entirely dependent on agriculture for their income, are rapidly decreasing and practically every family now earns more from outside activities than from pure agriculture. This is despite the colossal subsidies which the Government have put into agriculture. Now the problem which the Government face, with the vast surpluses of rice which have been assembled, is how to cut down production. Subsidies have to be given to farmers to leave land fallow – something quite unthinkable even ten years ago. 5. Japanese towns have been expanding, while the countryside has declined. The pace of urban development, especially around the megalopolis of Tokyo or such centres as Nagoya and Osaka, has been stupendous. Twenty years ago Tokyo had one underground railway. Today there are seven lines in operation with two more under construction. Twenty years ago the vast majority of Tokyo’s population lived in small houses of their own or one-roomed apartments in wooden barracks. Today vast housing complexes, consisting of dull uniform ferro-concrete blocks, have grown up inside the city’s borders and in new towns developed on the outskirts. Yet, because of the vast hordes which have poured in from the countryside, the overcrowding for the commuter and the lack of adequate housing are still the most striking features of urban life today in Japan. Urbanzation has gone so far that the area from Tokyo to Osaka is likely soon to be one vast industrial belt in which almost half the population of these islands will live. 6. After the war, Japanese industry was almost utterly destroyed, but investment has been such that Japan’s gross national product overtook our own two years ago and bids fair to reach American standards by the 1980s. This has involved vast building projects, not only of roads and factories, but also of railways, ports and cities. It has also meant, because of the serious shortage of land in Japan, reclamation of vast areas of shallow sea. Whereas someone who had not visited London since 1950 and returned in 1970 would have little or no difficulty in recognizing the landmarks and finding his way, someone returning to Tokyo, who only knew the city in the years immediately after the war, would have the greatest difficulty in getting his bearings. Where he expects to find sea, he is liable to find factories. Where he thinks to see his old house or a favourite restaurant, he may discover a vast apartment block or a new ferro-concrete office building. Where he expects a country lane, he will find a modern motorway. All these changes have produced new problems, which twenty years ago would have been unthinkable. The fashionable problem everywhere is that of pollution, but in Tokyo and Osaka its solution



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really is becoming vital for survival. These changes have also brought new habits and demands.

CHANGING HABITS 7. The revolution in habits has made Japan much more like an industrialized country of the New World than a typical Asian country. A striking example is the Japanese diet. Twenty years ago the Japanese still lived on the traditional fare of rice, pickles, some vegetables and fish, with a rare addition of a little meat, and even more rare, a little milk. Today Japan’s average daily calorie consumption has risen to nearly 2,500. Bread, meat, eggs and milk, while not quite yet the staple fare of the Japanese as a whole, form part of the diet of most people. Western-style restaurants, as well as Japanese restaurants specializing in meat, proliferate and Western-style hotels are gradually supplanting the old Japanese inns, while some Japanese delicacies are being Westernized. 8. Western clothing was adopted by many in the Meiji era after the opening of Japan, but quality remained poor until very recently. Now the younger Japanese women rarely wear traditional dress, except at New Year, or for occasional celebrations, and the average man no longer possesses traditional Japanese clothes other than the bath robe. Above all both sexes have become fastidious about their Western-style clothes. They have demanded the best in quality, but are now coming to expect the latest in fashion as well. 9. Japanese houses and apartments are also changing. Whereas before the war the average Japanese house was entirely Japanese in style, with the ­exception of one room (usually the family’s study), today many houses and apartments are built entirely in Western fashion with the exception of one Japanese-style room (probably for grandmother). Furniture, which in the past was sparse and hardly necessary except for storage, is now one of the essentials of modern living. The change has not been out of choice, but of necessity. ­Japanese houses sprawl and land values soar; they demand gardens and these have long been sacrificed to carports and their upkeep is onerous. Only in fastidious restaurants, particularly in Kyoto, can the old style of living still be savoured. 10. With all this has come the leisure boom. Pachinko (pinball machines), the craze after the war, is still popular and ‘pachinko parlours’ are built in every new housing centre, but competition from bowling alleys and amusement facilities of all kinds is increasing. The craze for baseball and other forms of Western sport rivals America. Golf is pursued with ever-increasing enthusiasm and application by the company directors and the managing élite, who form Japan’s establishment. The beaches pullulate with people and the peace of the mountains is shattered by busloads of trippers. While the roads everywhere are so crowded at week-ends with families on outings that 10 miles an hour can be taken as a good average, ‘My car’ has now indeed been adopted into the Japanese language as a single word to describe this phenomenon. 11. But the most significant new habit is the drug of television. It is not only in every house, but in every restaurant and in every bedroom in every hotel. There are seven channels in Tokyo and the possession of a colour television set is now a status symbol. Television advertising has created an entirely new set of wants and radically altered peoples’ attitudes. It is also an important purveyor of popular education.

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CHANGING ATTITUDES 12. With these new habits have developed new popular attitudes. The most striking and important change has been in the attitude towards the family. While Japanese of all ages still have a strong sense of family, the old family traditions are much more lightly regarded by the under forties than by the pre-war generation. This means that paternal authority is far less than it ever was in the past. Children are much more prepared now to defy their parents and married couples want to live in separate houses or apartments. Even the idea of maintaining the family name is laughed at by some of the younger people, although the old tradition of the son (or the husband) brought in from another family to marry the elder daughter and adopt the family name is still continued by the old upper classes. 13. Arranged marriages still seem very much the rule, but arrangements are far more informal than they ever were and the girl has a lot more say than she ever did in the past. Certainly she says ‘no’ much more often and does not expect to have to make up her mind after one brief meeting and the perusal of a few carefully selected and flattering photographs. Significantly, popular modern Japanese novelists write primarily of love matches and the feeling among many people is that, while the superficial form of the arranged marriage may be maintained, in the future it will – and indeed is already in some cases – simply be a cover for a love match. The Japanese women today (see my despatch of 16 October, 1969, entitled ‘The Merry Wives of Ginza’) may still not have the varied life of their counterparts in Northern Europe, but conditions are much better than they ever were before. Couples court openly, occasionally go away together (even if most couples seen on trains seem to be on honeymoon!) and even sometimes go out to parties together. 14. Prosperity has brought another significant social change: the virtual disappearance of the domestic servant. Now, unless a man is a company president, he is unlikely to be able to find, let alone employ, a maid. While it is still almost unthinkable for the Japanese man to do the washing-up, more and more men can be seen taking their children out while their wives do the housework at the week-end. There is a growing feeling among the younger people that they must do more for their wives and children than they did in the past, even if this only means taking home a small present of Japanese delicacies after a night on the town ‘with the boys’ or with business partners. 15. The old Japan of the gay quarters has been replaced by the paradise of expense account entertainment with cabarets, bars and new expensive ­restaurants going up every day. Geishas and hostesses are, however, becoming more and more expensive as wages rise and labour becomes shorter, while the prostitutes’ reward in Tokyo is said to compare with the highest in the world. Many Japanese are making hay while the sun shines, thinking that in a few years the girls will price themselves out of the market and the tax-man will catch up with this beckoning reservoir of cash. For Japan still spends more on entertainment than on education or defence. This, of course, accords with the wishes of the average Japanese male, partly at least because living conditions at home have become cramped and generally lacking in grace. It is only in Japanese restaurants that he can savour the old style. As living conditions improve, costs rise, female influence increases and demand alters, this system can hardly survive without modification.



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16. Attitudes to education have also greatly altered. The post-war reforms of the educational system and the extremism of the teachers’ union have led to antagonism between parents and teachers. Children and students have also come to question the authority of their teachers in a way which would have been unthinkable in the past. This new thinking has indeed played an important part in the troubles which have developed in the last few years in the universities, and the reactions of the university authorities have done little to re-establish the traditional authority of the teacher or the sensei. Now even Tokyo University, which has in the past been the main source of the l­eaders of Government, industry and commerce, is having to modify its systems. Entrance examinations are to be changed in an attempt to get away from the ‘examination hell’, which has caused so much neurosis among Japanese youth. Another difference in education is the decline of the self-made type of student, who, on very little money, made his own way by part-time earnings or arbeit. The students today are much better off than they ever were, but feel that they are still losing out in comparison with other young people in Japan, who are earning increasingly good salaries. 17. A basic feature of Japan’s economy has been the lifelong employment system. This was a feature of the Confucian training so long inculcated, whereby loyalty to family, country and firm was the cardinal virtue. The search for harmony similarly meant that employers looked after their employees for life. It is still true that most young men aim to join a firm and stay with it for life, but there is much less willingness today to accept low salaries in the knowledge that the escalator will eventually provide a reasonable standard. The feeling that the same work demands the same pay is not yet by any means universal, but it is having its effects. Some people think that, in ten to fifteen years’ time, the whole pay structure of Japan will have so altered, with the result that the position in Japan and Europe will be basically the same. Perhaps the changes will take longer, but certainly the brighter young men, who have lived abroad, are much less willing than in the past to accept the old hierarchical system in business and are demanding quicker promotion for ability. Moreover juniors are not only demanding, but getting, more power. 18. Even in the Civil Service, the traditional stronghold of Japanese hierarchy, changes are taking place, though the official still retains his prestige in society so far largely unimpaired. Other universities than the old Imperial universities at Tokyo and Kyoto are supplying at least a few graduates. The younger officials are becoming more impatient with the system and will sometimes even openly criticize their superiors. The section chiefs, who used to treat their subordinates like dirt, are finding it more and more difficult to get away with dictatorial behaviour to their juniors and industry sometimes rebels against bureaucratic authority. The textile industry certainly has given the textile bureau of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry a rough ride on the tricky problem of the restraints on non-cotton textile exports to the United States. 19. It is not surprising that, in these circumstances, the attitude to the Imperial Family is changing too. The older generation still retain the great respect for the Emperor of the past and a certain awe for the Imperial Family still prevails. The young people, however, seem largely indifferent. This is a by-product of prosperity and success as well as of the defeat, in which the Emperor is so bound up in their minds. Nevertheless, those who knew the Japan of before the war cannot escape the conclusion that, in time of need,

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the Imperial institution would be likely once again to provide a rallying point for this deeply patriotic nation. 20. The new generation similarly seems sceptical about the old-style politicians, but, so long as their standard of life continues to improve, they are probably ready to accept the system as it stands. Certainly the majority of the new generation have little enthusiasm for politics. On the other hand, the built-in tendency to settle problems by discussion and consensus inclines them towards some of the forms of democracy which they have adapted in a typically Japanese fashion. Thus free discussion is an accepted norm. On the other hand, the idea that the majority should force the minority to accept decisions, by overruling their views rather than convincing them of the correctness of the majority opinion, if necessary after compromise and concession, is regarded as the very opposite of democracy in Japan. The fact that this type of Japanese democracy, despite many faltering moments, has brought such prosperity speaks powerfully in its favour. 21. Although the post-war generation have come to know, through television, Expo ’70 and foreign visitors, much more about other countries and this has reduced their parochialism, far fewer Japanese have so far travelled abroad than their equivalents in other advanced countries; therefore most Japanese are still basically inward-looking. This is not only due to geography; it is also a result of language isolation. Knowledge of foreign languages, let alone of foreign psychology or outlooks, has not yet penetrated very far. This is one of the causes of the failure of their pre-war adventures. 22. Japan’s post-war economic success, however, has largely obliterated the consciousness of failure, which resulted from defeat in the war. In any case for the new generation the war is just a bit of history. National pride is now in Japan’s economic achievements. This, together with the conviction that Japan is unique, is probably as strong in the new as in the older generations. Basic nationalism is thus perhaps the one attitude which has not really changed.

THE NEW GENERATION 23. The picture is of a society in flux which is breaking away from many of its roots, although individualism has hardly yet developed very far and the herd instinct continues to control many Japanese reactions. It is also a society where the generation gap is particularly striking. The last war was a watershed everywhere, but here it was more than the end of a generation; it was the beginning of a revolution and the economic changes it brought are leading to a radically new approach. 24. A major feature of this new world is the worship of egalitarianism. In fact Japanese society is not so much egalitarian as meritocratic. Birth and connections are still important when it comes to finding a wife. They also have some value when looking for a job, but basically nowadays Japanese parents look for money rather than birth in the prospective bridegroom or bride, while Japanese employers look first for ability and education. Japan may not in practice be all that more egalitarian than Britain, but the Japanese undoubtedly believe that they are and that their society, by its egalitarian features, is more modern and adapted to the new industrial state of affairs than that of Britain. The hierarchical system of Japanese business and Government might



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be considered as giving a lie to this egalitarianism, but hierarchy is breaking down and in any case is becoming more and more meritocratic. 25. More striking is the outward materialism of the new generation. The old Confucian and Buddhist ideals doubtless persist in the subconscious. They are the very stuff of Japanese traditions and thought, as Christianity and the Greco-Roman world mould our every act, whether we are conscious of it or not. On the surface, however, in Japan the old ideals have not just been blunted and modified; for practical purposes for much of the youth of Japan today they are not known or, in so far as they are known, are openly regarded as irrelevant. Metaphysical speculation has never had much appeal to the Japanese; they preferred, like the Chinese in the past, to concentrate on a pattern of practical behaviour based on a limited number of ethical concepts. Now even traditional ethics have, to a very large extent, gone by the board. For a long time their teaching was taboo. Of course the traditions of loyalty and patriotism have not yet, been eradicated, because they are still an integral part of Japanese tradition and life, but there is much less overt reference to them, except on the part of the old. Prosperity makes them increasingly less efficacious in the young. Soon they will become part of the background rather than the essential framework of society, which they have been hitherto. 26. For a country whose traditions have been frugal, not to say Spartan, suddenly to encounter prosperity can be shattering. That Japan has so far survived so well the temptations of prosperity says much for the strength of Japanese traditions and the fabric of the old society. While many of the older generation in Japan wonder where Japan is going and deplore the decay of the old values, the younger generation are quite clear what they want. For the first time they have begun to know the real meaning of prosperity. They are determined to see this continue until Japan is on the level of the United States. They would indeed like Japan not only to become first in GNP but first in income and first in standard of living. It is the last of these which, of course, underlines the essential conflict in modern Japan. That is between the goal of ever-increasing production and the goal of better living.

IMPLICATIONS 27. Will prosperity then undermine the loyalty, hard work and frugality on which the Japanese economic miracle has been based? Will Japan sooner or later succumb to inflationary pressures of rising wages not covered by increases in productivity? This is what the Japanese think has been happening in Britain and what they are inclined to call the ‘English disease’. Although Japanese society has been changing very fast and the disease may be unavoidable in the long run, there seems no reason to think that the Japanese will really catch it before the late 1970s at the earliest. By then, of course, Japan’s economic strength will be so much greater and her industry so much more modern than that of any other country that they may be better able to adapt their society to ward off the evil effects of the disease. 28. With, increasingly, only memories of their former basic ethical beliefs (which, however, only applied to themselves alone), with a Constitution imposed from abroad and with a Government and industry hitherto entirely dedicated to economic ascendency, can political stability be maintained as the new generation picks up the reins of power? The fact is, however, that political

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stability in Japan is likely to depend more on the development of the economy and on external factors than on the nature of the new society. 29. As my despatch of 18 June propounded, there seems no reason to suppose that, barring unforeseeable developments in the world economy, Japan’s economy should not continue, at least for the first half of this decade, to expand at a rate faster than in any other country in the world. In this case there will be no economic reason which could affect the political stability of the country. 30. Externally, the Chinese threat – and to a lesser extent relations with Russia – provide the main danger. If Communist China were to achieve such a position of ascendency in South-East Asia that it threatened Japan’s nearest and most vital interests, this would undoubtedly be reflected in a growth of extremism in Japan. The Left would no doubt thereby be encouraged, while the Right might react equally strongly. 31. Again the very rootlessness and materialism of the new generation could also threaten this stability. It is certainly possible to sense in the new generation a frustration that economic ascendency cannot overcome. This rather than any deep-seated beliefs or understanding of the issues involved accounts to a large extent for the support which the opposition were able to muster for their recent demonstrations against the automatic renewal of the Security Treaty and for the odd outbreaks of violence which have occurred. Compassion and consideration for others or for that matter humility are not qualities which come naturally to the Japanese of any generation and the youth of today are no exception. Modern Japan has certainly not yet learnt how to provide satisfactory openings both physical and psychological for the youth of tomorrow or to inculcate other than in relatively limited spheres, such as those of a firm or organization, the concepts of mutual human respect which are so essential for the satisfactory development of a society. 32. If Japan cannot find some way towards achieving these requirements, then the violence, which has long been endemic in Japanese history and which the old ethics in their decay still encourage, may not be contained. Such violence could in turn provoke a Right-wing reaction. The defence forces would not sit back and let a situation reach revolutionary proportions. If such a danger were imminent the Right could also rely on the wholehearted support of business and to a lesser extent on the Civil Service and of the Liberal Democratic Party. However, the Japanese Press is now a firm defender of ‘liberal’ measures; although it might crumble in the face of a real crisis, its power should not be underestimated. Moreover, the post-war generation has become attached to the ‘liberal’ ways of the post-war society. Therefore police violence or any recrudescence of the ‘thought’ repression of the pre-war days would find little sympathy anywhere in Japan today. This is a happy fact which has restrained the Government in their repression of student violence. 33. Fortunately, too, the new generation, although its knowledge of war tends to be historical rather than personal, is emotionally committed to ‘peace’ in a way which goes beyond that of almost any other country. The nuclear allergy arising from the attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki of August 1945 is declining but is by no means dead. The defence forces are not now despised or rejected in the way that they were and tend to be accepted as a necessary evil. But they arouse no popular enthusiasm. The idea of constitutional reform to alter Article 9 (the no-war clause) has been eschewed by the Sato Government who realize that such proposals would cause a furore; in any case most Japanese



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do not care two hoots for such niceties and are generally content to accept the present illogical system. Even the proposals to raise the Defence Agency to a Ministry or to adopt the previous system of service ranks are passed over from year to year in order to avoid controversy. 34. It is, of course, to those who have not found their place in the rat-race of post-war meritocratic Japan – or to the increasing number of those for whom the modern materialism provides no real satisfaction – that Sôka Gakkai, the extremist Buddhist organization and its political arm, Kômeitô, appeal. Sôka Gakkai’s approach is primarily religious and nationalist, though it has its materialist and autocratic tinges. Kômeitô, on the other hand, while equally dogmatic, is concerned very largely with material success. Their success in recent years has been primarily because living conditions and individual happiness have been sacrificed to production. Now the emphasis of Government thinking begins to turn towards improvements in the environment and towards raising the real standards of living, as opposed to mere income levels. This, if successful, must inevitably undermine the appeal of Kômeitô. Thus it seems probable that, while Kômeitô may grow to some extent, it is unlikely in the foreseeable future to represent a really serious threat to the fabric of Japanese politics. 35. Will the new generation demand or force changes in Japanese foreign policy? Will the Japanese – who are still essentially inward-looking and concentrating on the goal of creating a Japan with living conditions on American standards – be compelled, in order to achieve these aims, to move towards a more aggressive foreign policy? The answers to these questions too are primarily to be found in external factors, such as whether Japan can obtain the raw materials, which she needs to feed her industry, and the markets, which she must have to sustain it, by the methods which she has pursued so far since the war. The answers will also depend on the extent to which the Japanese are forced to assume a greater responsibility for their own defence. The new generation’s attitude to this is basically that, while they would like to feel independent in defence matters, and accept the gradualist approach of the present Government, they are only prepared to pay the cost in so far as this can be met painlessly out of Japan’s high growth rate. 36. Much the same is true of their attitude to aid. 1 per cent of GNP has been accepted as a target and the feeling is that this can soon be allocated without Japan really noticing the cost but even so every Japanese will be determined to see that they get good value for money. Philanthropy in international affairs is not understood by the average Japanese and he finds it very hard indeed to understand that his own enlightened self-interest may in future demand more untied aid. 37. Japan’s political role in most foreign fields has been negative, while her businessmen have concentrated on the economic objectives. The new generation may well be more positive, especially if this is necessary to achieve their economic aims. They will certainly have more self-confidence. This is not necessarily a bad thing. So often Japanese self-confidence has disguised an inferiority complex: this is now vanishing. Unfortunately, however, Japanese self-confidence in the future is likely still to be combined with an insularity, aggravated by linguistic isolation, the remains of an inward-looking code of morals and a pride in their own achievement, which in some will certainly amount to arrogance.

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38. Unfortunately too Japanese inward-lookingness means that they remain essentially protectionist in their economic outlook. They cannot bear the influx of foreigners with their unsympathetic manners and actions into their closed preserve. They cannot yet see – and this goes for many of the new generation too – that their long-term interests lie in the adoption of really liberal trading policies, even if it means that such foreign influence is in their midst. 39. Perhaps, as some aver, in pursuing solely economic policies, Japan may have found the secret of re-establishing herself in the world. By proving that her economic drive can benefit the whole of Asia, can she not attain the position that the pursuit of old-fashioned politics backed by force would never give her? Many Japanese of younger generations are convinced that this is the case and here again they like to think that they are in the vanguard of contemporary progress and embarked on practices that can heal the wounds of their past misdeeds. 40. I personally believe that their continuing inability to look at the world and their long-term interests from other than a parochial standpoint, combined with their ingrained feeling of uniqueness which has left them with an almost biological nationalism, will prove their greatest handicap. Magnificent and attractive as their cultural heritage is, significant as their Buddhist traditions are for this culture, these now play a subsidiary role in this prosperity-worshipping country, as ugliness increasingly encroaches on the beauties of the countryside and the civilization of the past. Shintô, in so far as it has any role, only serves to inflate their pride in their race and land. The Japanese have the remains of a Spartan code of ethics, suited to a race of warriors, but they possess no transcendental code of morals applicable to others as well as themselves. Right and wrong are purely for Japanese and among Japanese. This will make them hard to live with in the world at large, but they themselves are likely to suffer most from their limitations. To my mind their combination of instinctive nationalism, of failure to achieve intellectual and moral concord with other nations and of overwhelming economic and consequent political power, will inevitably lead them to assert themselves to the extreme discomfort even of their closest friends. 41. In general, from the purely British point of view, the picture, which emerges from this summary analysis of a changing society, is disquieting, principally because we have not so far been able to achieve a fraction of their economic success. Our task must continue to be the trite one of keeping in touch with and getting to know and to understand the forces at work in Japan and trying through trade and cultural contacts to contribute to Japanese understanding of where their long-term interests lie. Only through friendship can we on our own hope to influence them. The threat to our own interests, however, comes primarily from the astonishing extent to which the new Japanese society has moulded itself to achieve Japan’s economic goals. This has made Japan a formidable competitor in international markets. The one bulwark visible is the Common Market, which by our accretion would become even stronger than Japan. We should then be part of an entity, which the Japanese already respect and could not ignore. JOHN PILCHER

27 JAPANESE EXPORTS: HOW MUCH OF A THREAT?*

SUMMARY A recent OECD report has suggested that Japan’s export success may lead to greater resistance to her goods in certain markets. The Mills Bill and other American Protectionist moves would seem to be cases in point. (Paragraph 1.) Japan is now the world’s fourth largest trading power. She should overtake us in the next eighteen months, the Germans in the next three or four years; and she could overtake the Americans by 1985. She would then be the largest trading nation, responsible for one eighth of total world trade. (Paragraph 2.) Japan has almost doubled her exports in the past four years, while world trade has gone up by nearly 50 per cent. This year her exports are conservatively predicted to rise by 14.3 per cent. (Paragraph 3.) Japan’s export record owes a lot to the buoyancy of world trade. But stable export prices for the past ten years, a determined attack on world markets and an extraordinary concentration on capital investment have been chiefly responsible. (Paragraph 4.) The content of Japan’s exports has moved sharply towards heavy engineering products; her top three exports items are steel, ships and cars, which together account for nearly 27 per cent of her total exports. (Paragraph 6.) There is always the fear that over-investment will lead to excessive competition and excess production and that Japan will unload surpluses on world markets. There is no sign that this has been happening to any great extent or that it is part of Japan’s strategy for the future. (Paragraph 7.)

*  FEJ 6/8 – 11 August 1970.

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More worrying is the possibility of Japan switching to other markets, when she encounters difficulties in traditional areas, such as the United states and South-East Asia. (Paragraph 8.) The speed with which Japan has penetrated markets, particularly in the United States and South-East Asia, has been remarkable. But it will almost inevitably produce problems. (Paragraphs 9–10.) If problems do arise, the one large sophisticated market as yet relatively untouched by the Japanese is Western Europe, Japan provides only 1.6 per cent of total West European imports. (Paragraph 11.) 7 August 1970

T

his year’s OECD economic survey of Japan suggests that Japan’s export success may lead to greater resistance to her goods in certain markets in the form of either fiercer competition from domestic suppliers or ‘other defensive actions ranging from ‘voluntary restraint’ of exporters to compulsory quota restrictions’. In supporting one such ‘defensive measure’, not exclusively but primarily aimed at Japan, Mr Stans, the American Secretary of Commerce, has apparently said that ‘the United States is Uncle Sucker, the only open market in an increasingly protectionist world’. The American frustration with Japan on the economic front has been building up for some time and it now seems to be boiling over. This may therefore be an opportune moment to look at one or two aspects of the pattern of Japan’s exports, about which I accordingly offer some observations (the work of Mr First Secretary John Whitehead). 2. Japan has recently become the world’s fourth largest trading power after only the United States, West Germany and Britain (she is of course the third largest power in terms of Gross National Product). In the past year she has overtaken the French and is now breathing down our necks. It is reasonable to assume that she will overtake us in the next eighteen months and West Germany in the next four or five years. By 1985 she could be the world’s largest trading nation responsible for one-eighth of all world trade. 3. Japan’s exports in 1969 totalled just about $16,000 million, while her imports were nearly $12,000 million (as calculated on the IMF basis). As a combined total they were equivalent of about 6 per cent of total world trade. In the last four years Japan has nearly doubled both her exports and imports, while world trade has gone up by almost 50 per cent. This year, at a time when the Japanese themselves are looking for an easing in the pace of world trade expansion, the Supreme Trade Council has set targets for exports to expand by 14.3 per cent – and the Council has traditionally been very conservative. In Japanese terms, of course, this figure does represent a noticeable slowing down from the 23 per cent rise in 1969. 4. The Japanese export performance has owed a great deal to the general buoyancy of world markets in the past two-and-a-half years. But it has also been the result of remarkably stable export prices. The overall export price index rose by a mere 1 per cent between 1965 and 1968. Although it jumped 2.7 per cent in 1969, the level then reached was scarcely higher than it had been ten years earlier. The performance has also been achieved by a determined and co-ordinated effort to obtain increasing shares in all of the world import markets. But the background has been an extraordinary concentration on capital investment which has led to a situation where perhaps more than half of all private capital stock in Japan has been installed in the past five years.



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5. Japan has also taken care to identify products which will be export winners of the future and has invested mainly in these. Ten years ago their export best ten in order of value were steel, cotton goods, ships, clothes, radios, synthetic textiles, cars, toys, footwear and porcelain, Last year the order had changed to steel (13.5 per cent of total exports), ships (7.5 per cent), cars (6.2 per cent), metal goods (4.8 per cent), radios (3.6 per cent), synthetic textiles (3.2 per cent), clothes, optical goods, tape recorders and television sets. 6. Despite Japan’s export-success, however, the country is not experiencing an export-led boom. The chief factors contributing to the present extended period of economic prosperity have been a continued high level of domestic demand and private investment. While these factors have contributed to such a rapid increase in the GNP that the Economic Planning Agency was forced to produce a completely revised forecast for the Japanese economy for the next six years, the Japanese seem to have expected that exports would rise generally in line with the actual results. But it is also fair to add that it has been possible to run the economy at its present level only because of the very good performance of Japanese exports, which has ensured the enviable combination of rapid growth and a favourable balance of payments position. With a sizeable invisible drain, amounting to $1,400 million in 1969, and with a reliance on imports for raw materials, which should rise to 90 per cent by the end of the 1970s, the need to ensure that exports remain buoyant will be vital. 7. There is always the fear that over-investment will lead to excessive competition and excess production and that Japan will seek to unload these unwanted surpluses on world markets at very low prices. There have been several well-publicized cases of Japanese dumping, particularly in the United States and Australia, and there have no doubt been others elsewhere which have not been pursued for lack of manpower or time to launch a thorough investigation. But I do not believe that this is a necessary or significant element in the Japanese export success story. The OECD has pointed out that the ratio of commodity exports to total demand has remained fairly steady at about 10 per cent for the last ten years and ‘shipments of industrial products abroad did not, on average, keep pace with the expansion of home market sales’. There are, however, some signs that Japan will try to change this ratio in some lines. It has been suggested for example that the proportion of automobiles exported should rise to 20 per cent of total production while present steel plans are geared to an export percentage of 25 per cent by 1975. But in both cases, and despite Japan’s recently announced plan to produce 160 million tons of steel by 1975 which has raised many eyebrows, the proposed increase in the export share is the result not of excess production but of the need to earn foreign exchange. 8. Of greater potential concern is the Japanese reaction when their goods meet increased resistance in fast developing markets in the form of import quotas or imposed ‘voluntary export restraint’. Such resistance is now being shown in the United States, which takes 31 per cent of all Japanese exports. Resistance may also occur in other areas, which can no longer absorb or pay for the continually increasing flood of Japanese goods. There were signs that this might have been happening in some measure already in South-East Asia, which takes 28 per cent of total Japanese exports. India and Vietnam have been singled out by the Japanese as two countries which cut back on imports from Japan, because of balance of payments difficulties last year.

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9. The speed with which Japan has penetrated markets has been b ­ reath-taking. In the United States, for example, Japan’s market share increased from 8.9 per cent in 1962 to 12.9 per cent in 1968. In South-East Asia, the comparable figures were 14.2 per cent in 1962 and 23.2 per cent in 1968. But the surge in individual export items in the past two years has been even more astounding. While total Japanese exports to South-East Asia went up by $1,500 million or 54 per cent between 1967 and 1969, exports of foodstuffs (mainly surplus rice) have gone up by nearly three times, while exports of ships increased by 2.3 times. Textiles of manmade fibre increased by 82 per cent. In 1969 alone there were some particularly sharp increases in exports to individual countries. Exports to Indonesia, for example, rose by 61 per cent (imports were also up by 57 per cent), while exports to Singapore increased by nearly 50 per cent and Japan’s trade balance with that country is now running nearly 5–1 in Japan’s favour. 10. Japan’s exports to the United States have been even more remarkable. Between 1967 and 1969 they rose by $2,000 million, or 65 per cent. Exports of automobiles went up by 3.5 times, TV sets 2.3 times, machinery, chemicals and radios all doubled, and textiles went up 41 per cent. Steel exports increased by 36 per cent between 1967 and 1968, but dropped slightly in 1969 as a result of the ‘voluntary export restraint’ agreement which remains in existence until next year. But perhaps the biggest reason for the frustration in Washington to which the Mills Bill is at present giving vent is the remarkable turn-round in Japan-US trade. In round figures trade in 1960 was $1,000 million in favour of the United States (Japanese exports $1,000 million, imports $2,000 million); in 1969 it was $1,000 million in favour of Japan (exports $5,000 million, imports $4,000 million). An additional reason for American frustration, of course, has been Japan’s very slow progress towards liberalization of her own import quotas and of capital. 11. The major part of Japan’s exports is in the heavy engineering and chemical fields; in 1969 they amounted to 69.2 per cent total exports and the percentage is rising steadily each year. If Japan does run into difficulties in the United States and/or South-East Asia, the obvious alternative sophisticated market which has so far remained comparatively untouched is Western Europe, taking only 13 per cent of Japanese exports. In 1969 Japan provided only 1.6 per cent of Western Europe’s imports; comparable figures for Japan’s market share are 13 per cent for the United States and 24 per cent for SouthEast Asia. 12. In drawing attention to these figures, it is not my intention to be alarmist. This would inevitably lead to greater protectionist stirrings, of which there are already too many to be seen around the world. Fortunately in Japan there are at long last increasing signs that many of the leading politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen are coming to recognize not only the value of free trade, but the role which they must play in maintaining it. My purpose is rather to draw attention to the very large role which Japan already plays in international trade, which is a natural corollary of her extremely rapid economic growth; and to emphasize that this role will continue to increase for the foreseeable future at the same pace if not faster. This will be particularly true of Japan’s trade with Western Europe, where we can reasonably expect her at least to quadruple her market share over the next decade. 13. There are, I suggest, two points here. The first is that Japan for a considerable number of years has been single-mindedly channeling her resources



JAPANESE EXPORTS: HOW MUCH OF A THREAT?191

into productive investment. While this has brought its own unfortunate side effects in the deterioration of the environment, Japan is now reaping the full reward of this investment (which is still continuing at a very repaid pace) in the form of a booming economy on which to base a thriving export trade. In a few years we shall probably be unable to compete with the Japanese on anything like equal terms in a lot of export fields; but if we are to do so at all, it will be vital for us to draw the lesson from Japan’s investment policy. 14. The second point is that, while we should not run for cover behind rising protectionist barriers, it would, I suggest, be to our advantage to consider with other European countries how best to meet the challenge posed by the inevitable Japanese trade drive of the next few years. JOHN PILCHER

28 JAPANESE PROTECTIONISM: SIGNS OF A THAW?*

SUMMARY Japan’s economic success can be explained by such factors as a high rate of private capital investment made possible by a high level of personal saving and low public expenditure on defence, roads, housing and schools. (Paragraphs 1–3.) Explanations by Japanese usually omit two important ingredients: Japaneseness and apartness. The combination of these two elements has ensured that in many respects Japan has remained a closed country and a closed market. (Paragraph 4.) Some elements which have contributed to the economic miracle may weaken or disappear in the future. Breaking down the barriers of Japaneseness and apartness will be difficult. It can only be done gradually. (Paragraph 5.) The Japanese desire to protect Japan and her economic achievements from what they consider to be foreign encroachment explains why policies designed to ensure freer trade or easier capital movements occupy senior Ministers and officials so much and are debated at such length in the Press. (Paragraphs 6–7.) Recent moves in these fields have been hailed in Japan as a big step forward. We can expect to hear more of this from Japanese representatives at international meetings. (Paragraph 8.) Such Japanese claims are based on two programmes: one to reduce items subject to restrictive import quotas; the other to permit much more foreign investment in Japanese industry and commerce. (Paragraph 9.)

* FEJ 5/2 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 29 September 1970.



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Despite these programmes, Japan is still a long way from fulfilling her obligations under GATT, the IMF and OECD. (Paragraph 10.) On capital movements the Japanese are toying with a new theory of investment. (Paragraphs 11–12.) They are also considering the possibility of a further round of tariff cuts. If they were to make such a proposal, it would represent their first initiative in international trading arrangements. (Paragraph 13.) Recent Japanese moves are not dramatic; but they add up to a noticeable change in attitude. It is a pity they could not have come earlier, but Japan needed a good reason of her own to change her policies. A forward look at Japan’s trading needs in order to support her economy has now provided this. (Paragraphs 14–15.) The Japanese are remarkably inept at putting their policies in a favourable light. We should, however, give credit where credit is due; and we should do our best to bring the Japanese out of their isolation. There are considerable dangers in not doing so. (Paragraphs 16–18.) 25 September 1970

I

n this despatch, prepared by Mr John Whitehead, First Secretary (Commercial) in this Embassy, I put forward some observations on the recent Japanese moves to ease some of their restrictions on trade and capital movements. I hope to set these in perspective and to suggest some conclusions which might be drawn from these developments. 2. If you ask a Japanese the secret of his country’s economic success, he will smile with pleasure and repeat to you a set-piece explanation which he will have perfected over countless tellings and retellings. The foreigner never tires of asking this question, hoping that on some occasion the secret of a new elixir will be vouchsafed to him and that some point which others have missed will be disclosed. The Japanese never wearies of repeating his theme, proud of the success story on which it is based and confident of the unique combination of circumstances, characteristics and policies which have made it possible. 3. He will explain that the cardinal point is a continuously high rate of private capital investment, judiciously orchestrated by the Government and the bigger banks, who are primarily responsible for making available the necessary finance. He will add that capital is available, because of the very high level of private saving (which has been running at nearly 20 per cent of personal disposable income for some years compared to our own level of 8 per cent) and a very low level of public expenditure on items such as defence (a mere 0.7 per cent of GNP compared to our 7 per cent), roads, housing and schools. He will further tell you that labour has until recently been very plentiful, that wages have been low (but are now rising very quickly at 15–20 per cent a year), that management-labour relations are on the whole very good, and lastly that the Japanese work very hard. 4. The explanation can become more or less detailed and sophisticated, depending on the individual who asks the question, but two important ingredients in the success story will usually be omitted, although they are implicit in everything the Japanese will tell you. The first is Japaneseness, which gives all Japanese a sense of fierce patriotism and loyalty to the group, whether family, factory, or country, and which provides them with a framework in which to operate and an incentive for working hard. The second is a sense of national

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

apartness, which stems from isolation, both geographical and historical. The two are a potent combination. As I pointed out in my despatch of 7 April on ‘The Japanese Mood in 1970’, they make the Japanese look inward, and they give him a strong feeling that in most, if not all, things the Japanese way is best. They place a premium on conformity; they permit the Government and the establishment to wield immense power; they dampen the curiosity of the average Japanese about the outside world, whether it be about foreign thought or foreign goods. For all the upheaval since the war, because of this combination of Japaneseness and apartness Japan has in many respects remained a closed country and a closed market. 5. The foreigner, who so admires Japan’s soaring economic growth rate, is probably also looking for the signs of decadence, which he feels must inevitably become apparent sooner or later. He looks for the tell-tale indicators of labour shortage, inflationary wage claims, industrial disputes and balance of payments crises. In the past, the Japanese have experienced several of the latter and in the not too distant future many of them expect to suffer from the former in fair degree. But the foreigner who is well acquainted with Japan often despairs of changing the Japanese mentality, of breaking down some of the barriers associated with the feelings of Japaneseness and apartness. To do this involves a gradual process of bringing the Japanese out into the world of international politics and economics and of binding him into the organizations which have been set up to deal with problems in these fields. At the same time it is necessary to peel away the layers of protective attitudes and protectionist legislation with which Japan has surrounded herself. 6. For the past twenty years Japan has found her well-being and her greatest source of pride in her economic achievements. It is hardly surprising therefore that any attempt to remove the protective casing from the economic jewel should send a shudder through every patriotic Japanese breast. It is not then to be wondered at that the decisions on whether to permit Japanese freely to buy chewing gum from the United States or seaweed from Korea should be the subject of so many Cabinet meetings; that whether to permit foreign biscuit manufacturers or Detroit tycoons to bring their money to invest in Japan, albeit in carefully circumscribed enterprises, should be the subject of interminable discussions between Japanese officials and industrial leaders; or that decisions to permit total foreign investment in Matsushita or Sony stocks to rise from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the total issued shares should be debated with such intensity and at such length in weekly magazines and should be proclaimed with such a flourish in leading articles of all the main newspapers. 7. It is against this background that any Japanese moves towards freer trade and movements of capital must be seen. It is in the face of this ingrained protectionist mentality that any Japanese moves towards ‘liberalization’ (which word is used to describe any relaxation of the barriers to foreign goods or capital) must be taken. Such moves are not merely the adjustment of technical regulations; they are the dismantling of a further part of fortress Japan – a process which the majority of Japanese have looked forward to with foreboding and a feeling that once the barriers have come down, Japan will never again be the same. 8. Seen in this way, Mr Fukuda’s statement that recent moves to permit greater foreign investment in a much wider sector of Japanese industry represent ‘an historic, an epoch-making event’ seems not to be quite the staggering hyperbole which it at first appears. This is the view from inside Japan. It looks



JAPANESE PROTECTIONISM: SIGNS OF A THAW?195

very different to many observers outside; as one Japanese official put it, ‘I know the Americans think it is too little, too late.’ Nevertheless, the Japanese are in some measure right to take credit for meeting recent American protectionist moves with a programme of measures designed to speed up liberalization of their own restrictions, rather than retreating behind their own protectionist barriers, as some influential Japanese were advocating. The Nihon Keizai, Japan’s most important economic newspaper, recently suggested that Japan’s representatives at the IMF meeting in Copenhagen this month and at the resumed Four-Power Talks at Geneva at the beginning of next would be able to hold their heads up high as the representatives of a country committed to the cause of free trade. The paper continued that, by introducing in the past few weeks a whole series of measures designed to ease restrictions on trade and capital movements, Japan was fast becoming the country most committed to liberalization in an increasingly protectionist world. Since we can expect ­Japanese representatives at international meetings increasingly to take this line, it is worth looking at the substance of this claim. 9. The Japanese claim rests on two main planks: firstly, the programme to reduce the number of import items still subject to quota restrictions from ­ninety-eight to forty by the end of 1971; and secondly, the capital liberalization programme designed to permit direct foreign investment in a ­progressively wider field of Japanese industry. This capital liberalization programme began very modestly in 1967 and has recently passed through its third round. A fourth round is expected in the autumn of 1971, by which time the Japanese consider that this programme, or at least stage one of it, will be complete. Both programmes were conceived some time ago, but until the last few months little worthwhile progress had been made on either. The measures recently announced, however, represent a noticeable quickening of the pace in both fields, although in neither have there been developments of direct major ­importance to Britain. For the Japanese, however, they do represent a ­considerable step forward. Psychologically the situation in Japan has changed in the last few months and it is reasonable to hope that, even if increasing protectionism around the world should lead Japan to re-impose some restrictions, the likelihood of the Japanese returning to the ultra-protectionist mentality that was so familiar during the 1960s is much diminished. 10. Japan is still, of course, a long way from fulfilling the commitments to remove all restrictions on the inflow and outflow of goods and capital which she entered into at the time of her accession to the IMF, GATT and OECD in the early 1960s. By the end of 1971 Japan will still maintain quotas on forty items, which she admits should be liberalized in due course; and even if these items were freed, there would still be restrictions on a further forty-eight items, for which she claims special dispensation from GATT on the grounds that the goods are strategic or of vital importance to a particular sector of the economy. Japan is admittedly not alone in being seriously in breach of the GATT by maintaining these restrictive quotas, but she still has one of the longest lists of ‘illegal’ restrictions and, even by the end of 1971, it is unlikely that she will have done more than range herself alongside the more restrictionist-minded European countries such as Italy and France. 11. Japanese moves towards the liberalization of capital movements are even less satisfactory and it seems almost certain that, when the latest measures are discussed in OECD at the end of this month, the Japanese representatives will face strong criticism. The Japanese are likely to meet this by propounding a

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new theory of capital movements. This theory starts from the point of view that almost completely free capital movements between industries in different countries, which the OECD has so strongly endorsed and which the Japanese are coming to refer to as the Anglo-American way of investment, has been tested and found wanting. In support of this, the Japanese point to the nationalization of numerous foreign enterprises, particularly in strategic sectors of the economies of less developed countries. They also refer, with meaningful glances, to the difficulties caused in some West European countries by massive American investment, which in certain fields such as the automobile and computer industries amounts to virtual domination. 12. The Japanese are now busily working on a new theory, which makes a virtue of their own present practice. This suggests that direct investment by one country in the manufacturing industry of another should be limited to the establishment of no more than ‘equal partnership companies’, where foreign investment will be restricted to 50 per cent or less. In this way the Japanese suggest that many of the problems of ‘exploitation’ can be avoided, while still ensuring that the recipient industry and country can benefit from the induction of foreign capital, technology and management skills. The Japanese do not maintain that a 50 per cent foreign investment should be the maximum in all cases; they merely hold that at this stage it should be the general rule and they point to their own quickly developing overseas investment programme as an example of the sort of balance which should be struck. According to them, of 239 cases of investment in overseas manufacturing companies in the last year only 37 represent 100 per cent Japanese holdings and the vast majority are ‘around the 50 per cent mark’. If this new Japanese way of investment finds favour with some other countries, and provided the Japanese do not themselves breach it to any great extent, we may well find that the Japanese will consider their capital liberalization programme to have been completed by the end of 1971. At that time about 80 per cent of Japanese industry will in theory be open to foreign investment up to 50 per cent; a further 10 per cent will have been opened completely to foreign capital without any limitation; and the remaining 10 per cent, consisting principally of public utilities, mines, defence industries and possibly certain aspects of the computer industry, will in principle remain closed to any foreign investment. 13. Apart from their two main programmes for the liberalization of trade and capital movements, the Japanese are also beginning to give some thought to the problem of tariffs. Their consideration is still at a very early stage and any proposals which they may eventually produce will almost certainly be long-term. The chief impetus for this study appears to have come from a forward look by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry at Japan’s trading position by the mid-1970s. By that time the Japanese foresee much of Western Europe inside an expanded EEC with various preferential trading areas attached to it. In order to obtain satisfactory access to this trading block as well as to the North American continent, Japan is beginning to realize the need for another round of tariff cuts between the main industrialized countries. This has already been dubbed ‘The Japan Round’ in the Press here. The Japanese have a lot of work to do on these proposals before they will be in a position to launch them. They are in any case presumably calculating that they have still much time in hand until the Kennedy Round and the negotiations for the expansion of the EEC are completed. But the idea is nevertheless an example of Japan’s more positive interest in the international trading system



JAPANESE PROTECTIONISM: SIGNS OF A THAW?197

and provides an indication that Japan may in the not too distant future be prepared to launch proposals on her own initiative. 14. None of the developments to which I have just referred is dramatic in itself, but taken together they add up to a noticeable change in attitude. What prevented the Japanese from moving in this way two years or even a year earlier? It would not have forestalled American protectionist moves over non-cotton textiles, but it might have done much to strengthen the hand of the United States Administration in resisting the more extreme demands for protectionist policies aimed principally at Japanese exports. The Japanese argue that their industry in many fields was not competitive internationally and their balance of payments position was too fragile to allow a rapid increase in the import of foreign goods. These arguments have been repeated by Japanese apologists so frequently in recent years, when the Japanese were making virtually no moves towards liberalization, that repetition of them now somewhat naturally produces an impatient response. With the exception of 1967, an unusual year in world trade, the Japanese balance of payments has been in sizeable surplus since 1965. Admittedly the Japanese economy is unbalanced due in large part to the two-tier structure of industry – the enormously large and powerful industrial groups centred round names such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo as well as the large and successful individual companies such as Hitachi and Matsushita are oddly matched with the thousands of very small, almost family, enterprises which still exist in such fields as textiles, leather goods, agriculture and the distribution sector. But more could obviously have been done; yet Japan chose not to play a role compatible with her overall economic power. 15. The change in the Japanese attitude over the past two years has been brought about by a combination of factors; pressure from abroad, chiefly by the Americans but in which our own proposals to Japan have played a smaller, complementary, part; a rapidly increasing realization of Japan’s economic power; fear that pressure for the revaluation of the yen might build up to an irresistible degree before the barriers to trade had come down and the parallel internal reorganization of some parts of the economy had taken place; and a desire to remove the discriminatory restrictions still imposed by some other countries on some of her own exports. All these played a part; but perhaps the most important element of all has been a thorough reappraisal of the conditions needed for the continued rapid expansion of the economy. As fourth largest trading power in the world, as a creditor country with an economy geared to a rate of expansion of more than 10 per cent a year in real terms for the next five years, and with a need to increase exports by roughly 20 per cent a year for the foreseeable future, Japan has at last found a reason close to home for adopting the course of more liberal trading practices and freer capital movements. Japan is not large enough to be a self-sufficient economic power; nor does she belong to any major regional trading group. Faced on the one hand with protectionism from the Americans and on the other with increasing regionalism from the Europeans, Japan has gradually realized the need for her to do something to maintain the momentum towards freer trade. 16. Since the change in attitude is taking place essentially at a time of Japan’s own choosing and for her own best reasons, it is not surprising that it is also taking place in a Japanese way – in fits and starts, and with remarkably little finesse or consideration of how it can best be presented to other countries. One of the side-effects of Japan’s isolation is the abysmal showing of

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most Japanese at international meetings. They achieve their ends more often than not by dogged persistence and a remarkable ability to avoid concessions or by keeping their heads down and saying nothing. In either case they win few friends and little admiration. Moreover, Japan still appears to be intent on having her cake and eating it, by clinging to a formidable range of non-tariff barriers and the widespread use of ‘administrative guidance’, which even the Japanese admitted last year were reducing imports from the United States, for example, by at least 10 per cent 17. On bilateral as well as multilateral matters we must continue to bargain toughly with the Japanese. We should never miss a trick, for they do not respect one for it and would only interpret it as weakness or stupidity. Moreover, our own position, vis-à-vis the Japanese, is becoming increasingly unbalanced as their power surges ahead. The leverage which we can exert on them is therefore limited. The Japanese themselves see us increasingly as a prospective member of the EEC and much of their attitude to us in our bilateral trade negotiations over the past year and a quarter can be attributed to this point of view. In the final analysis, therefore, the Japanese will expect us to act as a near-member of the EEC. They will see differences of approach between us and the EEC as useful gaps to exploit, although their lack of experience and finesse may prevent them from doing so effectively. 18. Our stake in Japan is not great in comparison to that in Europe or the United States. But our interest in ensuring that Japan comes out of her lonely economic eminence and plays a more constructive role in trading, economic and financial affairs is considerable. Therefore I submit that we should do what we can to encourage Japan’s present tentative steps towards liberalization. We should give credit where credit is due, and we should recognize and do what we can to strengthen Japan’s new appreciation of her role in defending a liberal régime of international trade against United States protectionism and increasing regionalism in other continents. As far as our EEC preoccupations allow of it, I suggest that we should get more into the habit of taking the Japanese into our confidence whenever our interests coincide. Japanese co-operation is increasingly worth having. JOHN PILCHER



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John and Delia Pilcher meet ‘Twiggy’ at an Embassy reception given by Hugh Cortazzi on 30 October 1967.



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2

John Pilcher and Ben Thorne accompany Princess Margaret on a visit to the British Week exhibits held in Tokyo from 26 September to 5 October 1969. 3

Hugh Cortazzi (2nd from left) and Ben Thorne (far right) promoting Scotch Whisky during British Week, Tokyo, 1969.



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John Pilcher welcomes Prince Charles at Haneda Airport in April 1970 (to visit Expo’70) and introduces Embassy staff members. Hugh Cortazzi is third from right.



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5

John Pilcher introduces Prince Charles to a leading Kabuki actor during the Prince’s visit to Japan in April 1970.



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6

John and Delia Pilcher bid farewell to Emperor Hirohito prior to his departure for Britain at the start of the imperial tour of Europe, October 1971.



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7

Emperor Hirohito rides in the state coach with Queen Elizabeth during the imperial visit to Britain, October 1971.



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8

The Emperor and Empress visit the Japanese Garden at Kew during the state visit, 1971.

9

The Lord Chamberlain (left) on behalf of the Queen, bids farewell to Emperor Hirohito at Heathrow Airport (with Hugh Cortazzi in attendance acting as interpreter) at the end of their state visit to Britain, 8 October 1971.



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10

Sir John (in retirement) and Lady Pilcher in their Japanese-inspired garden at their home in Barnes, London.

29 ‘THE REST ARE MONKEYS’: THE JAPANESE ABROAD*

(INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO TOKYO DISPATCH OF 21 AUGUST 1970) As Editor I hesitated about including this dispatch in this volume. In 1970, I advised Sir John Pilcher against sending it. The assistant under-secretary Michael Wilford and Stanley Tomlinson, the deputy ­under-secretary, all thought the dispatch misguided, but it represented one view in the embassy and I decided that it should be included although it was not printed in the FCO for circulation. The following are extracts from the comments made at the time by Michael Wilford and Stanley Tomlinson: I find Tokyo’s despatch on the Japanese abroad a most peculiar document. I suppose that I have seen as much as others of Japanese tourists abroad, whether in Hong Kong, London, Washington or in South-East Asia generally. But I have seen nothing to justify the strictures put upon them which are basic to Sir J. Pilcher’s despatch. They cleave together, of course, but I have never seen them anything other than well-behaved. I dare say that they do get drunk occasionally, but if they do they seem to do it discreetly. Much of the material of which the despatch is based has come from Malaysia and is related to Japanese efforts to win contracts. It does seem as if they go a bit far sometimes, but on the other hand I myself feel a little bit like wishing that some British businessmen had as much ‘go’ as the Japanese. K.M. Wilford I held this up in order to have a word with Sir John Pilcher. He duly called on me today and we had some discussion of the reporting from *  FEJ 18/3 – 27 October 1970

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Tokyo. I said that in general we were very pleased with what we got although I myself normally only saw telegrams and despatches… I then turned to this particular despatch. I said that the picture it painted of the Japanese abroad was one which I did not recognize. I was out of date on what now went on in Japan itself but I thought I knew something about the way the Japanese behaved abroad. It was true that the Japanese were unpopular in, for example, South-East Asia. This seemed to me to be not a function of their personal behaviour but related (a) to memories of the war; (b) to the fact that their presence in the area was once again conspicuous; and (c) to their commercial methods and to their practice of offering what often amounted to no more than normal commercial terms in the guise of aid. I was, of course, aware from other reports from Tokyo that the Japanese were now more sensitive than ever about the impression they make when they go abroad. And it was, of course, true that tourists who moved around in large parties tend to give a faintly ludicrous impression. All the same, quite a number of readers of the Tokyo despatch in question had been puzzled by the assumptions in this despatch that the Japanese abroad tend to behave positively badly and go in for frequent public inebriation. 2. Sir John took all this in good part and said that he had had qualms about this despatch himself. He had recognized that the choice was to rewrite it all or to let it go and he had, perhaps mistakenly, decided to let it go. I do not think that he will now be in any way surprised to find that it is not printed. 3. Mr Cortazzi, who came to see me yesterday, told me that he had tried to prevent the despatch of this particular report since he thought that the general impression it gave was misleading. F.S. Tomlinson 13 October 1970

‘THE REST ARE MONKEYS’: THE JAPANESE ABROAD† SUMMARY Antipathy and bewilderment concerning the behaviour of the Japanese abroad are on the increase. It may be possible at least to dispel some of the bewilderment. (Paragraphs 1–3.) The cultural isolation of the average Japanese creates in him a deep feeling of social insecurity once he leaves his native soil. He becomes a paradoxical mixture of superiority and inferiority complexes. (Paragraphs 4–13.) The concept of comparative ethics is foreign to the Japanese. He finds it impossible to perceive how the transposition of his domestic manners into differing cultures can cause such offence. (Paragraphs 14–18.) Memories of Japanese brutality are still vivid in many minds. The causes of this sado-masochistic streak in the national character are complex. (Paragraphs 19–21.) †  FEJ 1/29 – 1 September 1970



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The ‘politeness’ of the Japanese, so often quoted, would better be termed ‘punctiliousness’. He has in fact little overall feeling of social responsibility in our sense of Christian charity. (Paragraphs 22–25.) His business practices are currently arousing strong resentment despite his nominal correctness in adhering to contracts. (Paragraphs 26–31.) It might be imagined that he would be particularly circumspect in SouthEast Asia; but this is not so, because he lacks the ability to see himself as others do. (Paragraphs 32–33.) The epithet ‘Ugly’ cannot be confined to the behavioural field, though new eating habits are improving the physical appearance of the new generation. (Paragraph 34.) Great concern is now being felt in Japan about this ‘Ugly’ image. Steps are being taken to improve it, but the language problem is particularly severe. (Paragraphs 35–37.) Given enough time, however, the Japanese should be able to apply sufficient of a corrective to acquire reasonably cosmopolitan modes of public behaviour. Yet this very process will further erode the traditional culture of Japan and may even threaten the bases of its industrial society. (Paragraphs 38–40.) 21 August 1970

I

subbmit some observations upon the Japanese public image, prepared by Mr John Morley, Counsellor to this Embassy. I agree with his conclusions. It seems to me important that the reasons for Japanese unpopularity abroad should be better understood. I hope that the freshness of his comments will throw useful light on a difficult subject. 2. This is a time when, as never before, globe-trotting homo nipponious has every reason, in his public comportment, to Get It Right. Yet he seems to have an uncanny propensity for Getting It Wrong. An intelligent Japanese director of industrial research recently commented airily in private: ‘Of course, in this part of the world, only we and the Chinese count for anything; all the rest are monkeys’. Yet their notorious disdain for lesser peoples en voie de sous-développement is by no means the only motive force behind the misdemeanours of the Japanese in other lands. At a time when distressing anecdotes are on the increase, it may be helpful to attempt an analysis of the national qualities which are bidding fair to earn the soubriquet: ‘the Ugly Japanese’. 3. There are two aspects of people’s reactions to ugly behaviour on the part of the Japanese: one is their instant antipathy to it and the other is their bewilderment as to why the Japanese should do such things. I do not expect that the present analysis can do much to modify the antipathy; but I hope it may go a little way towards dispelling the bewilderment. 4. Of necessity, I have to presuppose for this exercise an ‘average’ Japanese – the adjective being taken to exclude a multitude of truly cosmopolitan men of affairs of whatever age, plus many of the younger generation who go to such lengths to acquire an ‘international’ personality. This ‘average’ Japanese, then, responds to situations intuitively, instantly and, where strangers are concerned, defensively. On encountering a foreigner, the instinctive reaction is to insert him gently but with finality into a cage, an impalpable cage made

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of sidelong glances, suppressed smiles and an indrawn hiss of breath. This is not necessarily hostile; it is simply an automatic reflex akin to what might be expected of a well-bred Englishman seeing something with a fluorescent green body alighting from a flying saucer: either to greet it warily, but civilly withal, in the hope that it might be taught to play cricket; or to run like a stag. 5. The analogy can be carried to the point of saying that to this ‘average’ Japanese, Foreign Parts are indeed on something of a par with Outer Space. His geographical and cultural isolation (as I explained in my despatch of April 1970 on ‘The Japanese Mood’) has been so absolute that he still cannot regard himself and his race as part of the wider world. It is difficult to understand the near-terror which he may well feel as an individual at the prospect of actually going there, although he will take all necessary comfort if he can remind himself that during his voyage he will be warmly wrapped up in a group. His whole childhood has been spent in absorbing the belief that the worst thing in life is to be laughed at: how, in Outer Space among the strange ways of the greenly-fluorescent hominids, can he possibly hope to avoid eyes which will criticize and mock? 6. Well, he thinks, there are of course hominids and hominids. In the West, they are very sophisticated creatures, from whom the Japanese have learned all their technology and who scientifically made a shambles of the sacred homeland only a quarter of a century ago. These are the disconcertingly casual hominids with easy manners (just imagine, they do not even exchange ­visiting-cards when they are first introduced) and publicly self-assertive wives; who seem quite happy taking people at their face value; who help people with no apparent regard for the obligations which unsolicited assistance creates between Japanese; who move around in a world of facile fellowship with such blithe assurance – how can anyone, plunged into this (to him) uneasy flux of relationships, be sure to escape the faux pas and the consequent ridicule, so much more important than escaping calumny? 7. It is this agony of social insecurity which Japan Air Lines subtly exploited for a recent advertising campaign. Its television ‘shorts’ showed a series of little episodes where the Japanese traveller to, for example, San Francisco met a social situation which would send an unconditioned person into writhings of embarrassment and indecision. Should he or should he not, in Japanese terms, take it upon himself to follow a girl who has just left her shopping-bag in the telephone-booth? This JAL passenger, however, suavely and without a single nervous twitch restored the bag to the young lady, as she was borne away on a tram, and was treated to a brilliant smile as his reward. What could be more reassuring, therefore, than to fly JAL? Subliminally, it is powerful medicine. 8. Yet relatively few travellers can completely relax even after dosage with this sort of tranquillizer. Despite the economic miracle and the soaring GNP, despite EXPO and the Bullet Train, despite all these wonders, homo nipponious still finds it hard, in the West, to shake off the social incompetence which descends on him once he is away from Japan. Believing, as he has been trained to believe, that everything Japanese is in almost mystical fashion superior to anything else, his sudden collision with alien cultures engenders an uneasy feeling that perhaps after all this concept is not sacrosanct. From this point onwards he starts to lose his bearings. Hence the bizarre compound of superiority and inferiority complexes which has led one observer to comment: ‘They don’t really have either when they are abroad – they just have “iority”.’



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9. Officials of international organizations have tended to assess Japanese delegates as self-effacing to the point of non-existence. They bow, they smile, they suck their teeth – and they never say a damn thing. This inconspicuousness is not, in the final instance, a function of true modesty; it is not the innate timidity of the rabbit peeking out of its burrow, but the watchful quietude of the fox hiding up outside the chicken-run, acutely aware of the odds. Thus, in the twinkling of an eye, any Japanese may swing over dramatically into aggressiveness. 10. However, until that point is reached, the only excess of which he is likely to be regularly guilty in the West, apart from relative peccadillos involving the misuse of lamp-posts, is over-tipping in hotels. Here he is not just copying his American prototype: the American over-tips because he likes to be generous and because his unit of monetary thought is the dollar rather than the cent; the Japanese over-tips because he cannot bear a sneer, even from a bell-boy, and because his unit of monetary thought is the expense account rather than the privy purse. 11. He will dutifully eat European food and even pretend to like it. Perhaps he does like it; but, after a week abroad, he will be inwardly slavering for a bowl of raw fish, beautifully arranged and decorated in the classical way that, unaccountably, never seems to penetrate the imagination of the unaesthetic chefs of the West. Any foreigner exposed to a prolonged diet of Japanese food – other than the very best – may be forgiven for concluding that the natives stop cooking their dishes at the point where the French start cooking theirs; yet the Japanese reaction at the other end of the world was summed up not long ago in a little verse which goes: ‘European food – Every blasted plate Is round.’ Thus in gastronomy, as in other fields of the applied arts, the cultural abyss can be bottomless. 12. The depth of this exclusivism is truly hard to grasp. If it does not apply to Western music, for which the Japanese have an insatiable appetite, this is only because music can have a directness of sensuous impact which bypasses ingrained aesthetic criteria. With other arts, it is not so much that the Japanese are defeated by the superhuman effort which is demanded from them if they are to break out of the tight circle: rather, it simply appears to many of them that any such effort would be inappropriate. Their inbred education, as I have said, has generated a deep sense of the uniqueness of all things Japanese. ‘We Japanese are different’ is their instinctive response – and the ‘difference’ is always, implicitly, in an upward direction. So why should they subscribe to the standards of behaviour of others? 13. In former days, it went even further than this. The precisely defined norms of Japanese punctiliousness were in fact sumptuary laws extending upwards, through the hierarchy, to the feet of the Emperor in person. To transgress against them was therefore to offer direct insult to what the J­ apanese regarded as divine authority. Within Japan, such a heinous offence was punishable by instant death at samurai hands. Thus, by extension, when any ­Japanese, with his totally blinkered education, found himself abroad and dealing with foreigners who knew nothing of the Japanese code and unwittingly failed to

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observe it, he would assume that the barbarians were deliberately besmirching the Imperial image and deal out sudden and savage retribution accordingly. Residual emotion of this sort may well operate to this day in the Japanese subconscious, even allowing for the disestablishment of the Emperor’s divine position. 14. The abyss of communication explains, for example, why Japanese abroad will permit themselves to get startlingly drunk in public and utter crudities on the scale of the British businessman who once shouted ‘There’s an entrance for nigger waiters at the back’ to the Indian Ambassador making his entry to the ‘Bal de l’Année’ in Brussels. In Japan, the release into alcohol is untrammelled by fears of retribution. What is said when flown with wine, be it complimentary or the reverse, is expunged from the record the moment the party is over. Until recently, this had general application to deeds as well – to hold a man responsible for what he did when drunk (including causing mayhem on the roads) was held to be un-Japanese and therefore, synonymously, unethical. The load of responsibility which bears on every man is so great that it is only ‘right’ to seek regular escape from it in drunkenness. 15. Moreover, as I have pointed out in my dispatch of 5 December 1968 on ‘The Japanese Mood’, there is no such thing as comparative ethics for the Japanese: if it is ‘right’ in Japan, it should by definition be ‘right’ everywhere. When two young Japanese students were arrested not long ago for proclaiming ‘Spain is a stupid country’ in a Madrid bar, their harassed parents here based their demands for Ministerial assistance on the plea that ‘they must have been drunk’. 16. By the same token, the cohorts of Japanese tourists who process round Hong Kong, Bangkok and Manila behind their leader with his little flag arouse both ridicule and resentment, but for the wrong reasons. People talk about the ‘new invasion’ or assume that these bizarre visitors go about thus for fear of contamination by the natives. They are in fact far too shy to cope with their own direction-finding in the little English at their disposal. However, much more fundamental, this is how they go and have always gone sightseeing in their own land. Dutifully, from their earliest schooldays, they have trotted in orderly flag-led groups through their national shrines, pausing only to take pictures of each other against some suitably hallowed backdrop, as if to provide Fuji-Coloured proof positive that they duly fulfilled their norm of the day’s allotted culture. It would be the most unnatural thing in the world – indeed it would spoil all the fun – to dispense with such inborn collectivism just because one were no longer in Japan. Yet to the ‘outsider’ (to the Japanese, foreigners do not really become ‘insiders’ even in their own countries), inevitably, they look like either a contingent of Boy Scouts on their way to Rally, Rally, Rally at the Jamboree or a squad of guerrillas in civvies on its way to take over the Post Office. Neither of these resemblances is likely to make them universally loved or admired. 17. This is the more so when they may at any time suddenly swerve away from crocodile-procession docility and give vent to the sort of hysterical exhibitionism which, as much as their cruelty, convinced people during the Second World War that they must be sub-human. Witness a story from Hong Kong: ‘About two years ago at Lok Ma Chau on the border, I was talking to some local Chinese Hakkas who concerned themselves almost totally with the tourist trade. Without any warning, we were inundated by a



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total of about 120 Japanese, descending from three vast ­air-conditioned coaches. Each one, it seemed, was festooned with either two or three cameras and miscellaneous photographic equipment. They swarmed all over the stalls there, trying on and occasionally walking off with Mandarin hats or opium pipes, shrieking with delight and in general having an immensely good time. Then a young, bespectacled J­ apanese with a mouth full of gold grabbed an opium pipe from one tray, a hat from another, jabbed the one in his teeth, put the other on his head, seized two young and fetching girls firmly round the neck, pulled them in towards him so their three heads were almost touching, and shrieking with mirth ordered his friends to take as many photographs as possible. The rage which filled the face of every Chinese in sight at this treatment of young Hakka womanhood was marvelous to see. Then followed a great snatching back of hats, pipes, and various other things – obviously bewildering the misguided Japanese tourists. In five minutes they had succeeded in infuriating a group of Chinese dependent on their continued presence’. 18. It is, of course, memories of the uncanny hysteria of Japanese brutality to prisoners-of-war which colour the view of so many people who now regain contact with them. Many learned theses have been written in explanation of the sado-masochistic streak in the Japanese character. None is entirely convincing. Some historians say that their cruelty stems from the inherited accumulated repressions of 250 years of total police-state rule under the Tokugawa, intensified by the Kempeitai and Thought Control in the ‘thirties. This explanation must imply that the Japanese were relatively mild people in the pre-Tokugawa eras, whereas the available evidence hardly points in that direction. Some ethnologists say that their cruelty is related to natural environment, and that people who have always been as close to nature as the Japanese will tend not only to offer instinctive worship to Mount Fuji and cherry-blossom, but also to behave with the same blind ruthlessness as earthquakes and typhoons; this theory would need careful checking in other lands which boast the same phenomena. 19. Some sociologists point out that Japanese child education inculcates, alongside the strictest imaginable respect for the father-figure, a literally striking permissiveness towards the so-called weaker sex; and conclude that brutality towards ‘lesser peoples’ (a term which of course embraces prisoners-of-war in Japanese eyes, since to be taken captive was the ultimate degradation of human honour) is merely a natural projection in adulthood of being beastly to mother and sisters in youth. There may be something in this, provided it can be satisfactorily demonstrated that women have never been comparably beastly to each other. 20. Then there is the earthy Freud/Spock school – typified by Geoffrey Gorer writing on Japan – which puts the whole thing down to long-suppressed rage at the alleged severity of Japanese methods of forcing their babies to become house-trained; but the trouble about Gorer was that he had never actually set foot in Japan. Finally, there are those who assert that all armies are apt to behave in this fashion because, if you have been trained to kill, a little torture comes that much easier, and that the Japanese are worse than others only in a matter of degree. Also, their own special brand of brutality appeared the more outlandish because, as with all other activities, they felt more comfort-

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able doing it in groups. This point of view may have gained some weight as a result of recent sad episodes involving the US Army in Vietnam. Perhaps the truth lies in a synthesis of at least some of these pet theories. At all events, the memories are there, and people will not be slow to give voice to them in the face of revived Japanese arrogance. 21. The fact that the historical matrix of this arrogance is slowly disintegrating may not necessarily make things better and could, at least for the time being, make them worse. For the underlying compulsiveness of the national temperament remains; it has merely shifted its focus. The old Imperial Miracle of Japan’s creation and destiny may have been replaced, as an object of worship, by the economic miracle of outstripping the West at its own game. But the new arrogance, unlike the old, has a core of nagging uncertainty (the ‘economic-animal syndrome’), which could merely result in a paradoxical intensification of its outward expressions of boorishness. 22. In any case, the whole concept of a pan-human consideration for the needs and susceptibilities of strangers at one’s elbow has been alien to the un-Christian Japanese. Certainly he has the reputation of being admirably polite and helpful to foreigners in his homeland; and so, on the whole, he is. However, this is a quite recent phenomenon and does not spring from that quality which we recognize as human charity. It should really be termed ‘punctiliousness’ rather than ‘politeness’. Its sources lie firstly in habits formed during the American occupation, when the vanquished, blessed with direct Imperial sanction, thought it only appropriate to defer to the victor; secondly, in an amiably didactic streak in the national character which makes the ­Japanese delight in telling other people things about their country, even if it is only the way to the Station; and thirdly – and sadly – to the decline of good manners in the West, which, once one has become benumbed to it, renders the Japanese contrast more immediately striking. 23. But apart from foreigners and his own close hierarchy of family and employer, the Japanese has little conception of overall social responsibility; or rather he has had little until recently, for all these things are beginning to change. Traditionally, at all events, he never asked for whom the bell tolled – not because he knew that as a member of humanity it tolled for him but because, unless it was tolling for his grandmother or Company President, which he would have known already, it need be no concern of his. It is this which accounts for the distressing contrast between the exquisite orderliness of the traditional Japanese home and the repellent filth of their beaches and mountainsides. 24. Thus, when he is abroad, in what he regards as a hopelessly diffuse social environment, he is lost. His own unique closed-shop hierarchy can no longer be an infallible touchstone. He either feels the weight of too much liberty and is flattened into silence under it, or revels in it as a giddy novelty – usually to his own dramatic discredit. He cannot recognize a generalized human courtesy by which persons will give way to other persons simply in order to oil the wheels of society. To him, the abrasive friction of competitiveness is of the very stuff of life. 25. To burr a prospective buyer into rawness with aggressive sales techniques, as he is now doing in so many quarters, is on a natural par with Japanese motoring practices in which it is preferable to risk a major accident rather than give way. To give way, to make concessions – except as pure tactics – cannot be an act of grace if a social conscience is lacking; it can only spell



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failure. And the shame of failure as a Japanese businessman, these days, is not far different from the shame of being taken prisoner twenty-five years ago. It is better, when the chips are down, to die – or risk causing death, as any foreign owner-driver in Japan will bitterly testify. 26. In business, then, success is the only criterion – immediate tactical success, since your Japanese, by nature, is not given to assessing the durable consequences of his actions. That his commercial practices of the moment may prove counter-productive on the morrow will not disturb his myopic stare at today’s objective. We are told from Malaysia, in connection with a multi-million Malaysian Railways’ deal: ‘There was ferocious competitive bribery from Japanese interests (HITACHI). We have no means of knowing the size of the bribes offered by the Japanese to the Malaysian principals. We do know that the General Electric Company representative here was offered M$250,000 to delay submission of his tender so that it would fail to meet the deadline. A team of twenty-six HITACHI executives flew into Kuala Lumpur in order to picket all the Malaysian officials involved. Once it became clear that they were up against serious competition, the Japanese became exceedingly aggressive, ringing officials at their homes and offices and demanding interviews with even more senior and important people, the Japanese team clearly implied to the Malaysian officials with whom they dealt that, failing satisfactory answers from them, the Japanese would go over their heads and arrange matters with unfortunate ­consequences for the recalcitrant juniors. This pressure had only embarrassing ­counter-effects. One of the Chinese directors of Malaysian R ­ ailways stated that he was “damned if he would let these little yellow bastards have the contract”. (It was in fact won by GEC.)’ 27. The Japanese do have a good reputation for adhering to contracts, and in a literal sense this is merited. Yet this is no bar, in their eyes, to a blatant lack of commercial integrity in the contracts themselves. Again from Malaysia: ‘The Malaysians have now discerned that, however cheap Japanese capital goods may be in comparison with others, spare parts are not only difficult to get but are priced at grotesque rates. One Japanese contractor admitted his profit margin came from spares. The Malaysians have learned to look hard at Japanese projects to make sure that all the bits are there. A Television complex was let out piecemeal, on Japanese advice, to a number of Japanese suppliers. While all the bits were compatible, the Malaysians needed items not in the tenders to put the whole thing together and so it cost them millions more than the budgeted figure’. 28. This is not just an effort to soak the foreigner. The marketing of adulterated goods under misleading labels is very common practice within Japan. It is even hallowed in a popular proverb: ‘Yoto o Kakagete Kuniku o uru’ ‘Cry wine but sell vinegar’.

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29. A similar piece of sharp practice was discovered in the case of the Malaysian Satellite Tracking Station, with the additional savour of high level bribery. Two officials of the Department of Telecommunications invited to Japan for technical discussions saw a great deal of Tokyo night life, but not even so much as a piece of fuse wire. In the meantime a seven-man team arrived in Kuala Lumpur to fix the deal in the absence of the Telecommunications technical advisers. 30. Of course, such goings-on are by no means foreign to the businessmen of other nations. It would be absurd to brand the Japanese as uniquely steeped in skullduggery in a world of pristine correctitude. Yet none of us can escape the feeling that after their record in the Thirties and Forties, there is something exceptionally obnoxious about the insensitivity of the Japanese compared with similar shortcomings in other peoples. Perhaps only the Germans can succeed in generating a similar strength of emotional revulsion. 31. It might have been imagined that if the disorientation of the Japanese in the West leads more often than not to a Cheshire-cat posture, in which he is apt to vanish save for a spectral smile, in South and East Asia he really would attempt to be even more circumspect in his personal behaviour. Not so. In this region, any logical awareness that the peoples on whom he increasingly descends must be eyeing him warily, with their wartime memories intact, is more than offset by his ineradicable feeling of racial superiority over all save the Chinese: ‘all the rest are monkeys’. Thus, he tends on balance to behave compulsively worse than in the West. The Japanese in Kuala Lumpur who recently bellowed in his cups: ‘We will make sure we do not lose World War Three’ is unlikely to have convinced his audience that he was now a harmless civilian selling bicycles, as opposed to a platoon commander riding one. 32. Onlookers tend to ask querulously ‘But do they never realize….?’ How can they? To see oneself as others do is, of course, the essence of that saddest deficiency in the Japanese character, a true sense of humour. Moreover, we tend to be the more flabbergasted by the Japanese if we assume that, being ‘Asians’, they will have a deeper instinct for local proprieties than we do ourselves. They possibly could have – but not until they have both acquired a deeper humour and divested themselves of some of their cultural blinkers. Even then, in the eyes of their beholders in the former Greater ­Co-prosperity Sphere, (‘Asianness’ being something more clearly discernible to the Asia-watcher than to the Asian himself), it is doubtful whether any putative Asian affinities can outweigh the identification of Japan with the former Imperialist powers. After all, it is emotional antipathy to those powers which constitutes so large a segment of the very feeling of Asianness. Thus does the bogy of the ‘Ugly Japanese’ begin to find its unfortunate credibility. 33. Nor can the epithet ‘Ugly’ be confined to the behavioural field. ­Ex-Ambassador Kawasaki’s shattering mot bracketing Japanese physically with pygmies and Hottentots raised sufficient of a furore among his compatriots to establish its relevance. Certainly the new generation of Japanese, lengthened and straightened by proteins galore, is growing better-looking with each year that passes, but these are not yet the ones who are seen pushing and waddling their way round South-East Asian golf courses. Any large group of humans lacks beauty to the extent that it looks undifferentiated, and nothing in the world has looked less differentiated than a large group of Japanese. 34. Reports on all these ominous matters are finding their way back to the home Government and top business circles (except possibly from the Japanese Ambassador in Singapore, who himself appears to be one of the worst culprits,



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to judge by the horror-stories of truly ‘Esprit de Corps’ stature reaching us from the High Commissioner). Here in Japan, they are being accorded the sort of owlish analysis which characterizes the modern Japanese approach to things like ‘Images’. Study groups have been set up: publicity has been arranged. Murakami of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) sums it all up: ‘In short, in advanced countries, the Japanese have an intention to melt into them from their side and association of Japanese nationals into isolated groups is limited to some extent. But is it not that, in developing countries, fellow-Japanese are apt to gather, because they are unable to speak any local language or become used to local food or customs and manners, not to speak of associating with local people? I think it is impossible to correct such things soon, but I expect this especially of young people in the future’. 35. He goes on to say that since October 1969, JETRO has been running a ‘Trade College’, where, as ‘the most important matter’, the aim is to ‘cultivate internationalists by teaching local customs and manners’ and also ‘local languages as well as the English language’. The intake is only 120 students a year, but Murakami hopes that, in the course of the next decade, 1,200 men destined for top leadership will be able to exercise an influence out of proportion to their limited numbers. 36. Certainly, language is one of the great hurdles. The Japanese are bad linguists, partly because their teaching systems are archaic and partly because of their shyness. Even in English, which is now universally learned in schools, they can appear downright rude when such is by no means their intention, simply because they have no feel for modes of expression other than their own. In the Japanese language, requisite ‘respect’ frills are prescribed for them in the most systematic way. Deprived of these conventions and faced with the lack of ‘social’ differentiation in the English language, they cannot improvise courtesies in the casual way which comes naturally to us. Thus, a Japanese will say ‘I shall come to your office at ten’ – because that is what it says in his text book. To tack on an informal ‘if that’s all right’ or ‘How would it be if…’ is far too idiomatic an ad lib for his grasp of the language. 37. With all these deeply-rooted snags, the corrective cannot be speedily applied. The Japanese have lost an Empire and not yet found a soul; large chunks of the old soul may linger on, but these are not what is required for contemporary export. ‘Is it not’, says the Sankei newspaper questioningly ‘that there is no alternative but to wait for the self-awakening of the individual, after all?’. This pregnant thought can lead one forward to speculate how far the qualities which Japan must develop to make herself acceptable internationally will be the very ones which may lead to her ultimate crisis as an industrial nation. The awakening power of the individual and the abandonment of exclusivism…. how far are these processes compatible with the Japanese recipe for domestic success and indeed with the whole character of Japanese civilization? 38. Be that as it may, it is the international and not the domestic destiny which mainly concerns us here. For centuries, the Japanese did the crawl, heads well down, in their own little pool; now they have learned, in that same pool, to do the butterfly, heads now in, now out; will they be able to go breast-stroking across the seas, heads arched high, without dislocating their spines? Even for champion gymnasts, it will be a strain. But my estimate is

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that they can do it. I am not now speaking of any diminution of underlying Japanese commercial aggressiveness; this, as I have stressed in my despatch of 3 July 1970, on ‘The New Generation’, is likely to increase rather than d ­ iminish. My concern here is only with their acquisition of reasonably cosmopolitan modes of public behaviour. 39. I believe that, given enough time, they should at least be able to attain the nicely-mannered bloody-mindedness of the French. The ‘average’ ­Japanese I have been portraying may still be in the majority, but the upcoming ­sceptical iconoclastic generation is snapping at his heels. There are not just the Uprooted Ones, gazing resentfully across a generation gap. Senior officials, deeply worried by the feedback of horror-stories, are beginning to stimulate and even goad them into a deeper understanding of the world. I have just listened to the Defence Agency chief haranguing, with great effectiveness, a group of naval cadets going off on a training tour around the world. His theme was that they must at all costs get out of their cultural shells, keep their minds wide open, overcome their silly shynesses, try to behave easily and above all make friends for Japan. It was invigorating and encouraging stuff; and he is not a lone voice. 40. It may take a generation for the change to become apparent as the consumer society rolls on its way. There is no possibility that if the economic miracle persists through the Seventies, young people enjoying its benefits will have any instinct to revert to the old isolationism – in which alone, let us however remember, the pure traditions of Japanese austerity could continue to flourish. The Japanese, adepts at the consensus, have never had much difficulty in reconciling Gods. They married Buddhism to Shinto with no trouble at all; it is well on the cards that they can now contrive, with the additional deification of Mammon, an Olympian ménage à trois within the limits of tolerable stress. Sadly, though it can hardly come to pass without sacrifice. If they succeed, humanity will stand to gain a colleague but lose a culture. JOHN PILCHER

30

JAPAN IN THE 1970s: THE TRADE MARK AND THE SWORD*

SUMMARY Is the old militarism dead, quiescent or about to be revived? (Paragraphs 1–2.) The persistence of the traditional outlook and morality is the basis of Japan’s present prosperity. The imperial institution is intact. (Paragraphs 3–4.) Militarism took the blame for defeat. The Japanese people accepted the peace clause in the American-designed constitution with conviction. (Paragraphs 5–6.) Consequently, under the American umbrella they could concentrate on economic recovery, without expenditure on armaments, but dependence upon the Americans for defence could not satisfy them for ever. (Paragraphs 7–8.) The economic miracle brought a foreign policy based solely on economic considerations. This too could not last for ever. The ­Americans began to ask the Japanese to stand more on their own feet and this led to some perplexity in Japanese public opinion. (Paragraphs 9–12.) By 1970 all the lessons of the war had become slightly dimmed. It was decided to rehabilitate the Self-Defence Forces in the public mind and then to accustom the public to accept greater expenditure on armaments. To achieve this the Prime Minister appointed the dashing Mr Nakasone. (Paragraphs 13–14.) Mr Nakasone unfortunately allowed certain disquieting symptoms to appear. (Paragraphs 15–19.) * FEJ 10/5 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 19 November 1970.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Moreover the Emperor has been conferring titles and decorations on the war dead, while senior officers from the former imperial forces have re-emerged in advisory capacities. (Paragraphs 20–23.) These matters depend upon the policies outlined in the White Paper on Defence, increasing expenditure with interesting observations about nuclear defence. (Paragraphs 24–26.) Thus the stage is being set for the Self-Defence Forces to undertake seriously the defence of Japan, within the framework of the Security Treaty with the United States. The danger is not that the Japanese may recreate militarism, but that their increased economic power might tempt them to use their forces in certain secondary circumstances to impose their will, though this is unlikely because of the many restraints on their freedom of action. In conclusion, it seems highly probable that Japan will pursue economic policies with the sword in the hand not too much in evidence. Ill effects might be noticed in the unlikely event of an economic collapse. Prosperity on the other hand seems to have produced in them a balanced frame of mind. (Paragraphs 32–40.) 19 November 1970

A

ll those who knew Japan before the last war and students of Japanese history must perforce ask themselves whether contemporary Japan is too good to be true. Do the myriad chimney stacks of factories that nearly link Tokyo with Osaka really represent ‘all that remains of the dreams of warriors’ (as I suggested in my first impressions despatch of 12 February 1968)? 2. Did the last of the Shoguns, General MacArthur, really change the ­country as radically as the statesmen of the Meiji Period in the second half of the last century or Shõtoku Taishi in the seventh century? Or does the old Samurai lurk within the modern economic man biding his time for a judo throw? In other words, is the old militarism dead, quiescent or about to be revived? I offer some observations on this crucial topic. 3. I have maintained that the secret of the successes of contemporary, as of Meiji, Japan lies in the tenacious retention of the remnants of her traditional outlook on life and ingrown system of morality. Certain it is that beneath the modern trappings the abnormal sense of cohesion, brought about by geographical isolation, comparative racial homogeneity and a formidable language barrier, is as alive as ever. The political isolation of the Tokugawa Period and its totalitarian regimentation have also left indelible marks. Loyalty and the cult of harmony in human relationships still, though decreasingly, move men’s minds and Japan remains the land where the team spirit flourishes most. 4. The central point around which this self-consciously different society revolves – the imperial institution – is still intact. The Emperor may no longer be a ‘manifest Divinity’, but he is the highest living Japanese and the Japanese feel themselves still to be intrinsically distinct from others. Moreover he is not quite divorced from divinity, in that he worships at the shrine of his acceptedly deified grandfather, the Meiji Emperor, and reports events to his heavenly ancestors at Ise. If viewed with less mystic awe, he has gained in affection, since, by humiliating himself even unto surrender, he saved his people from annihilation by modern weapons of war, atomic and incendiary.



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5. The military, by their overweening adventures, had put the Emperor into the ignominious position of having to surrender: all the odium for the national disaster therefore fell on them. They had led the nation to ruin. To a pragmatic people this meant that the policy of the military – their ‘way’ – had proved itself to be wrong. It was inconceivable to a proud people that Japan should not rise again, but it must be by other means. 6. It was therefore with conviction that the Japanese people accepted the peace clause in the American Shogun’s constitution. Revulsion at the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and experience of the destruction of their cities by fire led to a reaction against atomic weapons in particular, but also to a distaste for armaments in general. 7. Secure under the American umbrella and unencumbered with the burden of armaments, the defeated Japanese, aided and abetted by their conquerors, concentrated all their energies on economic recovery and then on e­ qualling in productivity and wealth their principal victor. This would be their ­self-justification and their revenge. Considering the adulation of revenge in tale and theatre and the veritable cult of violence during the long feudal period, dramatic and harrowing reactions to the conqueror and to defeat were to be expected. The sadistic excesses of a minority of students have so far been the sole manifestation of this ugly side of Japanese tradition. The sagacity and generosity of the American occupation must be given much credit for this mild outcome. 8. Yet to be dependent upon others and not to stand on their own feet is repugnant to the Japanese. In their hearts the parents of the revolting students protesting against the continuance of the Security Treaty with the United States agreed basically with their young. They could not remain the ‘kept mistress’ of the United States for ever (as the Minister of Agriculture put it and paid for it by temporary resignation). 9. Meanwhile the ‘economic miracle’ happened. As success came, the ­Japanese felt they had discovered a new way of life based solely on economic materialism. To create an egalitarian meritocracy became their ideal. Their foreign policy should be based solely upon economic considerations. Other nations like ourselves, they thought, were still enmeshed in the power politics of the past. Not for the Japanese the expense of maintaining ever more costly armaments. This money should be put into increasing the gross national product. With their sense of loyalty and patriotism and their team spirit, they could go on from strength to strength. Let America and Russia hold the ring. 10. Such a dream could not last for ever. Vast China with its antipathetic outlook and hatred of Japan was a nagging reality. Then ironically enough the Americans, under whose inspiration the peace clause had been written into the Constitution, began to feel the pinch and took to admonishing the Japanese to stand more on their own feet in the matter of self-defence. The Western world in general started criticizing the Japanese for not playing a role consistent with their newly acquired economic might. Their less well disposed competitors saw in increased expenditure on armaments a useful brake on the Japanese economy and a rich market for their own wares. There was even talk of Japan stepping into our shoes in South-East Asia, when we were about to disappear from the area. 11. All this was extremely perplexing to Japanese public opinion. They had renounced the use of arms, except for self-defence. They had espoused with enthusiasm a pacifist foreign policy. They had despised their military for

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having brought them to defeat. They thought they had embarked on a new course full of glorious prospects and then the former victors begged them to take up the old burden and regress to the power politics of the past. 12. We have reached therefore a moment confusing to Japanese thought. It had to come and indeed is part of the process of standing again on their own feet, which the Japanese had to – and by and large wished to – face. It presents the old diehards with an opportunity for a comeback: we must look out for this. But to those who knew the old Japan, the miracle is that the contemporary Japanese tackle the problem with such relative calm and sense. 13. Naturally by 1970 memories had become dimmed. The atomic ‘allergy’ was weaker; antipathy to the military was less evident. Prosperity had made self-defence an obvious goal; indeed the forthcoming withdrawal of the ­Americans from Okinawa, so long desired, made its necessity self-evident. What was needed was a policy of rehabilitating the ‘Self-Defence Forces’ in the public mind, as a first step, and then of accustoming the public to accept greater expenditure on armaments as a matter of necessity. In the ­contemporary world atomic weapons had to be stomached as a fact of life. Thereafter Japan might be able to make some show of standing on her own feet. The process of national rehabilitation would then be complete. 14. With all this in mind no doubt, the present Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, appointed a dashing and attractive young politician to the post of Director-General of the National Defence Agency and thus at the head of the Self-Defence Forces (all that Japan has hitherto felt justified in maintaining under the ‘peace’ Constitution) in the form of Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone. He has set about accomplishing all these goals with a zest and display that sometimes invite misinterpretation. He thus tests out Japanese public reactions and can always be repudiated if these prove too unfavourable. 15. Unfortunately in the process Mr Nakasone has allowed certain symptoms to appear, which are disquieting and should not be overlooked. I feel obliged to enumerate them, but they should be seen against the background I have attempted to sketch. Naturally, a people traditionally so devoted to the martial arts (and now to physical health), who invented Kendo, Karate and Judo (enjoying a recrudescence among the young) must always be watched with a wary eye. The urge to catch the other man off balance and throw him is in their blood. I do not personally think they will succumb to it, if only because prosperity – the economic way – has been so astonishingly successful. The old militarist virtues have lost their appeal; they were based on austerity. Austerity is a thing of the past. 16. Further the fear of being swallowed up by colonizing Powers justified their policy of seclusion in the seventeenth century, owing to fear of Spanish machinations. As they awoke from seclusion after 1868, the danger appeared even greater with the Dutch, ourselves and the Russians in control of so much in this area. This was held to justify their concentration on acquiring effective military might in the last century. Then its use was condoned to push back the frontiers of Japan to a safe distance. The situation has now changed. Why therefore resuscitate policies based on conditions which are no longer relevant, especially when the present ones have brought such enormous benefit to the whole nation? 17. None the less the twentieth anniversary parade of the Japanese ­Self-Defence Forces, held in Tokyo on 1 November before the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House of Representatives – incarnations of the principle



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of civil control over the military – filled foreign observers with mixed feelings. They had seen several thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen, equipped with modern armaments filing past with their faces set in that fearful, frightful, frantic frown, which the Japanese traditionally regard as the appropriate countenance for a warrior to present to the world on a martial occasion. That, of course, awoke unpleasant memories of the past to those who had experienced Japanese militarism thirty years ago. But this was inevitable. A little sinister was the indifference shown by Japanese critics to the whole proceedings. 18. What seemed novel was the presence of schoolboys, boy scouts and representatives of the civil support staff, not to mention two legions of drum majorettes. They were there to symbolize the involvement of the people and the unity of civil and military, which Mr Nakasone thinks indispensable to a proper rehabilitation of the Self-Defence Forces in the public mind. 19. More questionable, but part of the same process was the appearance of veterans, obviously dating back to the old imperial armed services. They were presumably to represent continuity of tradition. So were, no doubt, sixteen evocatively soiled and apparently blood stained flags, showing the rising sun in all its old splendour. They had a place of honour in the parade, although the programme made no reference to them. They may not have been what they looked, the resurrected colours of the old imperial forces, since these were all supposed to have been burnt ceremonially on Japan’s surrender in 1945, but they were evocative enough of past glories. 20. So much for the outward show at the parade. More important has been the two million-odd posthumous titles and military decorations conferred by the Emperor on the dead of the last war on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender over the past five years. This recognition of sacrifice for the country by countless individuals caught up in the great tragedy had to come. What is less easy to condone is the display in army museums of the photographs, uniforms and other personal belongings of senior commanders executed as war criminals along with the accoutrements of other national ‘heroes’ of the past (whose exploits, though hallowed by time, may have been equally immoral). 21. Important again has been the re-emergence of senior officers of the old imperial armed forces to act as grand counsellors to the new Self-Defence Forces, which they have hitherto affected to despise. They have even appeared in public at appropriate functions. Significantly, the Emperor recently granted an audience for the first time since the war to senior officers of the Self-Defence Forces, thereby marking their regained respectability. Old imperial military ranks, prohibited since 1945, are coming back into unofficial usage in the forces. 22. The senior officers of the Self-Defence Forces chafe in converse about their civilian overlords and clearly regard Mr Nakasone as of insufficient military weight to lead them back to complete rehabilitation: only a general could do that. The old spirit is therefore alive and abuses of it must be watched. 23. The Japan Ordnance Association, representing the industrial giants of the ‘economic miracle’ and including several revered survivors of the pre-war military leadership, now meet regularly with Mr Nakasone and his senior staff. They have already advocated publicly the expansion of the Japanese armaments industry, including the export of arms, and, in one of two individual cases, the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan. 24. Most of these measures follow from the policies now outlined in a White Paper on Defence which was published two days before the parade

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

I have mentioned. This presents persuasively to the nation the need for Japan to look to her own defence in a world still afflicted by strife between armed nations. It outlines a plan for increasing the establishment and equipment of the Self-Defence Forces during the ‘fourth defence build-up’ from 1972 to 1976. Expenditure is likely to reach £2,000 million in 1976 (as opposed to £670 million in 1970). The White Paper claims that, although the Japanese Government intend to maintain their policy of excluding nuclear weapons from their territory, whether in their own hands or in those of their allies, the Constitution nevertheless would allow them to possess them if they wished. 25. It was against this background that the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs felt able to discuss the issue of atomic weapons calmly with Mr Anthony Royle, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, during his visit to Tokyo last month. He said then that Japan would probably have ‘missiles’ by 1975, but not nuclear warheads. 26. The White Paper, though its language is vague on that point, suggests that in the modern world, a nation cannot feel safe without some form of nuclear defence. This is still to be provided by the United States under the Security Treaty (itself not immutable), but the question raised is whether Japan will not one day have to make and use them on her own account. 27. In other words, the stage is now being set for the time when the ­Self-Defence Forces, adequately armed and rehabilitated in the public mind, could effectively undertake the task of defending Japan, within the f­ ramework of the Security Treaty with the United States. In the process of rehabilitation, some recourse has been had to the old military traditions of Japan. The sanction of the Emperor, once the tool of the military, has been invoked. The old experts have become involved in plans for rearmament. In the background the basic virtues of loyalty and patriotism are still present; the sense of ­cohesion remains. The ingredients for a military revival are all there. Will they be misused? 28. The danger is not so much that the Japanese Government will intentionally recreate militarism, but that increased power in the world could tempt them to play a greater role backed by military power. Overwhelming economic and consequent political power will inevitably lead them to become increasingly involved in the affairs of other countries. 29. Japanese hard-headed self-centredness, springing from a lack of any moral system applicable to others than themselves, might mean that they would have little patience with nations not willing to accept the ‘right’ course and might well tempt them to impose the ‘right’ answer on them willy nilly. It is in an effort to put things straight in such circumstances that the Japanese might on some occasion be tempted to look to their rehabilitated armed forces. 30. On the other hand, the restraints on their freedom of action are immense. Military confrontation with Russia or China – the only Powers who might aspire to gobble them up and thus excite antique phobias – is out of the question. The Japanese will be dependent on the United States both economically for their major export market and for a long time for any nuclear weapons and will thus remain under American restraining influence. 31. It is only in relatively minor matters, involving, say, policing actions among the smaller Powers of South-East Asia that they might have the freedom to deploy their might. The old gunboat diplomacy and the limited display of force might become a temptation. I personally doubt whether they would risk giving way to it. Revived militarism would thus have little scope, beyond



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perhaps assuring the safe transport of imports and exports on which the new Japan lives. It would be a matter of enhanced prestige. 32. Therefore I conclude that for the time being at least the factory chimneys do represent in general most of what remains of the dreams of warriors. In future, however, the world must accustom itself to reckoning with a much more independent Japan. That is to say a Japan that has not only redeemed herself in her own eyes by equalling in economic might her chief conqueror, the United States, but which is willing and able to stand on her own feet militarily and accept a great measure of responsibility for her own defence. This may well make her a much less tractable and agreeable international colleague. But have we not all of us in our newspapers at least begged her to adopt more positive policies, consistent with her economic might? Can we assume that we shall find her policies palatable? 33. The effects will make themselves felt gradually. Internally, Mr Nakasone has already established himself in all but the status of a Minister of Defence, in that he holds regular discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister; he has pulled up the Defence Agency with him from its formerly subordinate ranking to something very close to being a ­Ministry of Defence. 34. In this he is on the way to making a complete return to normality. Even neutral Austria has a Minister of Defence. It is surely inconceivable that with a probably shrinking American presence and influence in Asia Japan should not have that inevitable concomitant of full sovereignty. Ironical though the twist of circumstances may be, their pacifist foreign policy in pursuit of economic ends will acquire greater weight by having the reputation of a rehabilitated armed force behind it. 35. Memories of the Second World War and the lessons to be learned from it fade. But the old with their rancours also recede. The middle aged look more realistically at the facts: Mr Nakasone represents that group. The young on the other hand have been emancipated by prosperity from the restraints of the past. They breathe a wider air. They will not, I think, accept the myths of the past nor the rigours of the old ‘way of the warrior’ based on austerity and self-sacrifice. They are less complicated than Mr Nakasone’s generation and their turn will come. 36. True, the more thoughtful among the young are bewildered by the lack of other than material gain as a goal in their lives. Many sense the absence of a code of morals or even system of thought that they can share with others. They flounder, but I venture the opinion that the old militarism will not capture their imagination. 37. There must remain the danger that Ersatz religions or false ideologies will occupy their minds. It is conceivable that the vacuum could be filled by devils worse than those defeat drove out. We must be alive to this. But prosperity is the best palliative and, as far as I can judge, it is likely to continue (my despatch of 18 June 1970). 38. It is rash to predict, but I hazard that, neither a phoenix nor a dove, Japan will continue to pursue her trade marks further and further and that the sword in her other hand will not be too much in evidence. The Japanese should after all by analogy with the past have become unbearably cocky by now. I am impressed by the moderation and sense they now usually show, when their achievements would justify more obvious pride. 39. The lapses I have enumerated are small; I would only expect them to bear truly evil fruit if unexpectedly the economic miracle failed and Japan fell

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

again on hard times. That is unlikely. Prosperity appears to have gone a long way towards curing their complexes and to have induced in them a more balanced frame of mind: long may it continue. 40. This generally optimistic appraisal does not blind me to the possibility of a recrudescence of the old mystico-nationalist military spirit: it is a major task of this post to watch and to analyze any symptoms that appear. No verdict can be more than conjectural as seen at a given moment. I have tried to assess the situation at this time; I hope I may not have to revise it in a pejorative sense. JOHN PILCHER

31 JAPANESE MILITARISM?*

I

n your letter FEJ 10/5 of 29 July about Nakasone you said that you were ­looking forward to my assessment of his role in deciding Japan’s future defence policies. This is an extremely difficult subject, as you know well from your own deliberations in London, and is the theme of much argument here in Tokyo too. I know that I mentioned my intention of writing a despatch about it in my letter 10/22 of 5 June, but I really do not feel that I am yet in a position to offer you the definitive assessment which you want 2. Absorbingly interesting though his meteoric rise since taking over the Japan Defence Agency has been, I think that we should not exaggerate Nakasone’s role in the defence field. His own fortunes after all are relatively unimportant in reaching a conclusion about the major issue with which we are confronted: is Japan moving towards increasingly nationalist policies and, if so, are they likely to take a militarist trend? If the answer is yes, then ­Nakasone’s role is that of the eye-catching charismatic trend-setter, who has had the good fortune to find himself in the van of a general current of opinion at the right time. If the answer is no, then he becomes little more than a shooting star, an ambitious politician on the make who is drawing the maximum advantage from the particular appointment which for the time being has fallen to his lot. 3. As I have said before – for example, in my despatch on The Japanese Mood of 3 April – nationalism, or patriotism as some would have it, is instinctive to Japanese; this holds good now just as much as it did before the war. But Japanese nationalism takes a form unique in the world and has no parallel in any other country; this is inevitable given Japan’s geographical and political isolation for so many centuries, her self-centred system of ethics and the rigid system of hierarchical obedience to which they gave rise. And as her economic and consequent political influence grows, so the confidence and a­ ggressiveness * FEJ 10/5 – Letter from Sir John Pilcher to John Morgan, Head of Far Eastern Department in the FCO – received 13 August 1970.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

of her nationalism will increase. This I think, is a fact of international life which we simply have to accept. But nationalism and militarism are two different things, and it is here that we run into difficulties in trying to determine where Japan is heading. There is still something very nineteenth century about Japanese patriotism and, especially among the old pre-war generation who are still in positions of power in Government and industry, the old virtues of military valour still have a strong appeal. Moreover, although some of the younger generation mock the samurai spirit and the old traditions, I am not so sure that this goes by any means for all the post-war young. Indeed, the improved morale in the ­Self-Defence Forces[can be seen as] one of Nakasone’s most notable ­achievements, applies just as much to the young soldiers in the ranks as to their seniors in the Defence Agency. Certainly we have come a very long way since the Self-Defence Forces were something close to shame-faced social pariahs, mainly valued for their role in dealing with natural disasters. More important to my mind, however, is the absence of any real protest in Japan against Nakasone’s pyrotechnic displays and the increased publicity which they have gained for the ­Self-Defence Forces. Nearly all the protests against reviving Japanese ‘militarism’ have come from outside this country, and this suggests to me that the rehabilitation of the armed forces, of which he is the vivid manifestation, has at least the acquiescence if not the full support of the great majority of the nation. This, of course, does not mean that we are witnessing the revival of Japanese militarism as distinct from nationalism; the claim can perfectly validly be made that the rehabilitation of the armed forces is merely one aspect of the rehabilitation of the nation itself. 5. But I must admit that I have some qualms. Japanese politicians, including Nakasone himself, may be perfectly sincere now in their pronouncements about their rejection of any militarist resurrection and of any desire to play a military role in international affairs. I cannot help wondering, however, whether they are the masters of the general trend which I think I perceive. As with nations fighting decline in their fortunes, there is an irresistible logic facing nations on the rise. Even if she does not like it, Japan faces the prospect in the coming ten years, say, of having greatness thrust upon her. She is already the second economic power in the western world and is being urged by other countries to play her proper role in international affairs, and this process is likely to be accelerated as the United States disengage to some extent from this part of the world. Even if they do not, Japan’s position of pre-eminence will not be materially altered. Equally, even if the non-communist countries of the area dislike it, still nursing their old memories of the last war, they will have no alternative in practice but to turn increasingly to Japan for economic and possibly also political support. This might be all right with any other country, but in the case of Japan I fear that this trend may lead to serious difficulties in the end. Her overwhelming economic and consequent political power will lead her to become increasingly involved in the affairs of other countries, and her hard-headed self-centredness will mean that she has little patience with nations which do not immediately accept the ‘right’ (Japanese) course and may well tempt her to impose the ‘right, answer on them willy nilly. And it is in putting things right in such circumstances that I fear that she may on occasion look to her armed forces. In saying this I am not of course contemplating any direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or with China, but am thinking rather more in terms of isolated ‘police’ operations among the lesser countries



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of South-East Asia. And even then I must emphasize that I am peering into the fairly distant future, say ten or fifteen years from now. 6. As things at present are the fact that the military led Japan to disaster and the final humiliation of surrender still precludes them in public estimation from taking any leading role. The business managers now in control have led them to unprecedented prosperity. To so materialist a society this is conclusive proof that the militarists must be under control. Long may this last. It is, however, the thesis of this letter that power might force them down paths they would at present repudiate. 7. All this, I am afraid, is rather nebulous, but this is a subject on which there can really be no certainties. Perhaps I can sum the position up by saying that I believe that a revival of Japanese nationalism is already in progress and that the Japanese armed forces will have a perfectly respectable place in this. I do not think that we are witnessing a revival of militarism as distinct from nationalism in anything like the style of the pre-war era, but I cannot help wondering whether Japan’s idea of her proper role in the world in ten or fifteen years’ time may not include some use of her armed forces in policing this part of the world. JOHN PILCHER Note: This led Percy Cradock of the Planning Staff in the FCO to comment on 19 October 1970: Sir J. Pilcher seems to be hedging his bets in this letter. In our planning paper on Japan we envisaged a resurgence of militarism and an active Japanese military rôle in South-East Asia as a possibility for ‘Rogue elephant’ Japan, and perhaps for ‘Gaullist’ Japan. But in his letter Sir J. Pilcher seems to be suggesting that such militarism could well become a feature of the sort of Japan which is likely to emerge if present trends are projected forward for ten years. I find it hard to believe that this will be the case. I think that, as our paper argued, only a major social crisis in Japan (perhaps brought on by a recession in world trade) or a serious accident to Japan/US relations (which could derive from a total US retreat from Asia) would be likely to set Japan on a militarist course. In any other circumstances the penalties in terms of her relations with the US, China and the Soviet Union, and in terms of her own economic growth are likely to be sufficient restraints. This is also broadly the US view.

32 MISHIMA’S RITUAL SUICIDE*

I

nflamed by his own writings and disgusted by the m ­ aterialism and lust for money of his compatriots, Mishima tried to stage a romantic coup d’etat to re-establish the antique virtues of Japan in the manner of the February Incident of 1936. He had persuaded himself that the Self-Defence Forces, alone among contemporary japanese, had left in them some spark of the old spirit of self-sacrifice for emperor and country. They did [?Grp Omitted] not respond to his harangue. Instead they jeered. There was nothing left for him to do but take his life and thus register in final sincerity his protest against the age. 2. He thought the Self-Defence Forces would rally to his cry that the constitution cheated them of their vital role in ­society. The move towards rehabilitating them, however, had gone too far. Ironically enough, to most observers Nakasone seemed already to be on the way to achieving much of what Mishima desired. His sacrifice was thus in vain. But, he was a writer of considerable talent, his end achieved the status of tragedy. 3. He indeed proved his willingness to die for an ideal, which in itself moves Japanese, even when the ideal is false. But the manner of his end seemed too theatrical, too contrived to convince entirely. There was too much of d’annunzio about him. The stagey uniforms of his young followers detracted from the solemnity of the scene. The fact that students were involved and that one died with him disgusted opinion. Letter from Sir John Pilcher to John Morgan in the FCO of 27 November 1970

*  FEJ 18/8 – Tokyo telegram to the FCO of 28 November 1970



MISHIMA’S RITUAL SUICIDE223

MISHIMA’S SUICIDE No sooner do I get off to you my long promised despatch on militarism [The TradeMark and The Sword] than Mishima’s suicide proves that the old ­samurai can lurk within the modern economic man and attempt a judo throw. Of course, Mishima was not exactly a modern – or indeed a normal – man. 2. The lack of response from the young men in the Self-Defence Forces, harangued by Mishima before his act, seems to bear out my contention that the old militarism will not capture the imagination of the young. 3. Press comment has tended to underline the lack of what one of the newspapers called ‘a spiritual anchor in the rising tide of economic prosperity’ and to deduce that ‘there was something very much amiss in the spiritual upbringing of people who can only express themselves in a resort to violence’. 4. I warned you of the possibility that the vacuum in the outlook of youth could be filled by worse devils than those defeat drove out. Mishima’s attempt is, of course, a resurrection of the pre-war exaggeration of the way of the warrior (bushido). I do not expect that devil to recapture their minds. I would expect to catch on something that is harder to foresee and could take us by surprise, such as the noxious tenets of some strange syncretic religion of which many flourish here. 5. It will take some time before the Japanese themselves can understand and evaluate Mishima’s act. I have spoken with many prominent persons, all of whom regard it as an anachronism, which they think will not fire youthful minds. It remains to be seen…. [Editor’s Note: I cannot find any trace of John Pilcher ever sending a full assessment of Mishima’s suicide, but he may well have thought that this was adequately covered in has annual review for 1970 (see below)].

33

JAPAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1970 – ‘ECONOMIC MAN’ COMES OF AGE*

SUMMARY Until 1970 economic success had mesmerized the Japanese: this was the vindication they needed after defeat. (Paragraphs 1–3.) In 1970 the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine became clear to them. The price for the impending return of Okinawa and the pull-out of American combat forces from Japan, despite the automatic continuation of the Security Treaty with the United States, peacefully achieved, was increased expenditure on self-defence. (Paragraphs 4–6.) Memories of militarism, which led to the disaster of twenty-five years ago, made this distasteful to Japanese opinion. The ebullient Director of the Self-Defence Agency tried to rehabilitate the Services in the public mind, overplaying his hand in the process. (Paragraphs 7–9.) Then Mishima’s ritual suicide aroused fears of a return to the Way of the Warrior, until it was seen in its theatrical perspective as an individual protest against the materialism of the age. It has, however, disturbed minds. (Paragraphs 10–15.) Pollution and the defence of the ‘quality of life’ came to preoccupy the public. The whole direction taken by ‘economic man’ was called into question. (Paragraphs 16–20.) Now the Japanese must step on to the international stage. Knowing their limitations, they started hesitantly by taking part in the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia and wishing to have a seat in the Security Council. (Paragraphs 21–24.) * FEJ 1/1 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 7 January 1971.



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They must now tackle the crucial issue of relations with Communist China, which take preference over relations with Russia, hampered anyhow by the issue of the Russian-held Northern Islands. (Paragraphs 25–26.) Trade relations with the United States were soured by the ­American request that Japan restrict voluntarily her exports of non-cotton textiles to America. This confused Japanese opinion urged by the Americans to liberalize their own market. (Paragraphs 27–31.) Relations with Britain were smooth with the balance of trade in our favour, but trade negotiations stagnated, because the Japanese wished first to see how our arrangements with the Common Market went. (Paragraphs 32–35.) Meanwhile the Japanese economy boomed and exultation in its achievements found expression in Osaka Expo ‘70, which marked its coming of age. Foreign participation had a great educative effect on every Japanese. (Paragraphs 36–38.) The Emperor and Empress entertained two Heads of State or their representatives a week during Expo and this has aroused in their Majesties a desire to travel abroad, unprecedented in a reigning J­apanese Monarch. It would symbolize for the Japanese their ­acceptance again into the comity of nations. (Paragraphs 39–40.) 7 January 1971 1970 appears to the Japanese as a watershed. Before it came the long steep climb to economic success under American protection. Then, secure in their remote islands, they could concentrate on increasing their gross national product and hope that pacifist economic policies would suffice to replace the power politics of old. Not for them the drain of resources that modern armaments impose. 2. Before 1970 there had been admonitions from outside that Japan, having become an economic giant, should assume greater responsibilities in the world at large. She should be a better neighbour and consider the needs of the under-developed countries in a more altruistic spirit. She must liberalize imports from abroad and allow foreign capital access if she wished others to go on purchasing her products. 3. Until 1970 such issues, however, had not impinged seriously upon the nation at large. The man in the street was lapped in satisfaction at having made the grade; that was enough for him. To have passed France, Britain and then Western Germany in production and to be well on the way to catching up with his principal conqueror, the United States, was success beyond his wildest dreams. It wiped out all the ignominy of defeat; here was a pacific revenge in modern style and all attributable to the sweat of his brow. He had achieved an egalitarian meritocracy that could outdo the best. 4. Just when he had achieved this peak in 1970, the outside world began to assume a greater importance for him. The Nixon Doctrine pointed the way. The Americans were slowly pulling out of Viet-Nam and would demand greater co-operation from all their partners in Asia. The Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, had come back from Washington at the end of 1969 with promises of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 in his pocket.

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This seemed excellent news to begin with to the average Japanese. He had been stirred to disproportionate patriotic fervour at the ‘plight’ of his remote compatriots still under American control. When he came to consider the meaning of American withdrawal and the cost he would have to pay, he was not so happy. Then the lesson was finally brought home to him by the American announcement at the end of 1970 of the eventual removal of all their combat forces and fighter aircraft from Japan by the end of 1971. 5. True, the Security Treaty with the United States continued automatically in force in June 1970. The threats of violence by the Opposition and the students came to nothing, although a million people paraded the streets of Tokyo in largely peaceful protest. Speculation by the end of the year that the treaty would be unlikely to last beyond 1975 brought a new sense of insecurity to the average man. 6. Although he had periodically wondered, in Professor Arnold Toynbee’s words, when the American umbrella would become a lightning conductor and bring down upon his head the fury of the Communist world, he began to realize how comfortable he had been beneath its benevolent shade. In other words, in 1970 the man in the street took in that more would have to be spent on self-protection. 7. To many this was welcome; it is irksome to so proud a people as the Japanese to have to rely on others to defend them. On the other hand the average Japanese remembers only too clearly the plight to which militarism brought his country only twenty-five years ago. The ‘military way’ had been completely discredited in his eyes. Time has blurred the pattern a bit, but a determination not to fall back into those ancient ways still grips him. Above all the Government must never again be influenced unduly by the military, let alone be allowed to fall into their hands. 8. Thus he viewed the necessity to rearm with mixed feelings and some distrust. Mr Sato appointed as Director of the Self-Defence Agency – the nearest the Japanese have so far permitted themselves, out of respect to the Peace Clause in the American-drafted Constitution, to a Ministry of Defence – Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, an ebullient and able young politician. He made it his main task to rehabilitate the ‘Self-Defence Forces’ as a respectable calling in the public mind. 9. In this he overplayed his hand a little, inviting suspicions of a return to the Way of the Warrior (Bushido). These were naturally voiced most stridently by Communist China, but were echoed in the Western world and endorsed by the Japanese Opposition, not to mention the students. Unfortunately for Mr Nakasone, the dramatic and tragi-comic ritual suicide in November of contemporary Japan’s best-known novelist, Mr Yukio Mishima, lent some substance to such beliefs. 10. Here was this distinguished literary figure, with his great international influence, immolating himself in the headquarters of the Eastern Army, in the name of the antique military spirit. Moreover his connections with senior officers in that Agency seemed to imply that his views must find some sympathy there. The countenancing of his private troop, the Shield Society (Tate-no-kai), by self-defence and university officials left a sinister impression. Even the man in the street realized with some anxiety that this could be used as propaganda against Japan by her enemies without and within. 11. Mr Sato parried the blow by saying that Mr Mishima was insane. More cleverly Mr Nakasone had previously told the Foreign Press Club that the



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Tate-no-kai were only Mr Mishima’s private ‘Takarazuka Girls’ (in the town of Takarazuka near Osaka there is a theatre famous for reviews, in which all the parts, male and female, are taken by beauteous girls, thus reversing the tradition, whereby in classical Kabuki and Noh only men perform). This wounding, but probably justified, comment would certainly have cost him his life in pre-war militarist Japan. 12. Fortunately for the cause of moderation in Japan, the details gradually revealed the real nature of the tragedy. It was seen to be a travesty of the traditional seppuku (ritual suicide). First of all the uniforms of the Tate-no-kai were discovered to have been designed by a French couturier: this was enough to discredit them. Then the jeers of officers and men of the ­Self-Defence Agency at the harangue to which they were subjected were seen to have been the humiliation that forced him to take his life. The suicide of the young follower, who had first decapitated him, was at once seen as an Achilles and Patroclus affair (later underlined by the lucubrations of a medium). 13. The coup d’état was thus revealed to have been ill-prepared melodrama, with a background that inspired ribaldry. It could not very well incite young hotheads to similar extremes. It came to be seen rather as the natural culmination to a literary dream; the climax to a self-created and self-acted drama; the final and logical act of a man who, like D’Annunzio, glorified action for its own sake. In short a last publicity stunt. It was contrasted with the suicide of the humble guardian in the Kyoto Museum of Modern Art, after a ­Toulouse-Lautrec drawing in his care had been stolen. Here the ancient sense of responsibility was alive: this was a true seppuku. 14. Still, in Japan the resort to extremes is always a respectable way out. People instinctively admire a man who will die for his ideals, whether they approve of them or not. The kindest interpretation of Mr Mishima’s action was that he wished thereby to protest in uttermost sincerity against the materialism and greed of contemporary Japan. He did this in the name of the antique virtues of self-abnegation, devotion to duty and adoration of the Emperor, which he felt to be sadly in abeyance. 15. Seen thus, his action commands respect and troubles many consciences. As a result Mr Nakasone feels obliged to walk very gently and has indicated that this is not the moment to visit Europe and thus draw attention to himself. He cannot now accept Lord Carrington’s invitation to examine how our defences tie in with NATO, although this is a matter of the highest interest to him, with all its bearings on the subsequent course of Japanese self-defence within the United States orbit. 16. This whole episode disquieted the man in the street. He was further assailed directly and physically by the ever-growing problem of pollution. Tests at traffic crossings in Tokyo in the summer revealed the extent of ­lead-poisoning, engendered by the polluted atmosphere, while the appearance of ‘photo-chemical smog’ added an alarming and disagreeable new ingredient. Strange maladies, attributed to untreated industrial effluents, made their appearance. The second half of the year brought great preoccupation with measures to stem the pestilence. 17. Finally a special session of the Diet was called, which passed fourteen Bills to contain the trouble and the Government decided to set up an Agency of Environment Protection, headed by a Cabinet Minister. This seemed good pragmatic treatment, but unfortunately the public sensed that big business would pull every string to avoid expenditure on the necessary apparatus.

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They feared their hold over the Liberal Democratic Party in power, whose principal supporters they are. It would be easy for them to say to some effect that expensive curbs would slow down that joyful rise in the gross national product. Nevertheless, anti-pollution expenditure is planned to rise rapidly. 18. Partly as a result of such fears and encouraged by Mr Mishima’s suicide, doubts about the whole direction the nation had chosen to take came to be expressed more and more. Industrialization was seen – as only the foreign observer has understood it hitherto – to be destroying the whole charm of life in Japan. To preserve the ‘quality of life’ became a slogan. It was not just pollution that had to be curbed: that was only the final straw. The whole of a beautiful land, inhabited by people particularly sensitive to the moods and charms of nature, was being eaten up inexorably and swiftly by ever-growing industries, moved by private greed and not by the real good of the people. Soon there would be no Japan left to venerate and love (Shinto, the basic religion of every Japanese, boils down to little more than this). 19. Tokyo is the supreme example of wild development. Haphazard in its layout round the old feudal castle of the Tokugawa family, it was, like London, a collection of overgrown villages converging into one another. Off the chaotic main roads were tiny lanes, similar to the Hutungs of Peking, where people lived. You could, like the White Rabbit for Alice, open a modest door in an undistinguished rat-hole of a lane and find within an exquisite garden and a withdrawn, secluded house, where you could forget the hurly-burly without and sit in quiet contemplation. Beauty has always been understood to be a very private, hidden thing in Japan. Now carports – necessary before you can acquire a motor licence – have long since gobbled up the gardens. The traditional houses, despite their essential modernity, their harmony with nature and fluidity of planning have given place to concrete blocks of minute and generally shoddy flats in the modern idiom, for each of which you may have to pay for one month a rent that would enable you to enjoy far greater space, not to say charm, for a whole year in Europe. Office blocks ineluctably devour the few remaining oases of calm. The city has become a concrete jungle of nightmarish proportions, beside which even New York appears a haven of rest. With more money in his pocket, rents being higher than on Manhattan, the Japanese has to commute in appalling conditions – freezing in winter, stifling in summer – from further and further away. 20. Suddenly in 1970 the horror of all this has begun to become obvious to him. Is it all worth while? Certain it is that the Government from now on will have to pay great attention to all that goes by the name of urbanization. There was once a tradition of this. Kyoto, the old capital, which almost alone preserves some of the delights of the past, was laid out on a regular practical plan, dictated by Chinese geomantic considerations in the year 794. They could do it again now, but for soaring land values. 21. Troubled inwardly by doubts about the whole direction his country has taken, the Japanese now finds himself called upon to play a greater role in the world at large. This is probably a more daunting prospect to so isolated and ingrown a nation than is generally realized. His education has fitted him to sense all the niceties of behaviour within his own world and to lay enormous stress on getting them right. He feels utterly lost when confronted by standards which he has not been trained to gauge.



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22. This is particularly alarming when the standards are far more fluid and less cut and dried than those to which he is used. He feels lost in uncharted seas. To commit a solecism is really intolerable to him: rather than run the risk, he would far prefer the isolation of the Tokugawa period. This innate feeling, reinforced by a knowledge of the ineptitudes of the militarist period and the hatreds to which they gave rise, make him hesitant. This is reinforced by evidence of his continuing and perhaps increasing unpopularity, particularly among his Asian neighbours. 23. Towards the end of 1970 there was much public expression of such apprehensions and a good deal of self-criticism. Japanese lack of true humility was stressed. The absence of positive religious convictions was blamed for the absence of good works, even in their own islands; this was contrasted with the educational establishments and the hospitals, which the Western world has everywhere contributed. 24. All this is very healthy and may lead to great improvements, but it comes at the precise moment when Japan must start acting on the world scene. Her first efforts were correspondingly humble. She took part in the Djakarta conference on Cambodia and was happy to be able to participate thus in an Asian attempt to ease crisis by sending a Vice-Minister to follow the matter up in Moscow, London and Paris. Again Mr Sato told U Thant, when he visited Expo ’70 at Osaka, that Japan wished to see the constitution of the United Nations amended to enable Japan to be seated as a permanent member of the Security Council. 25. But on the crucial issue of Communist China, which will always be the main long-term preoccupation in all Japanese minds, Mr Sato did not budge until the end of the year, when he promised reconsideration of the problem. This has become necessary after Canadian and Italian recognition of Peking and the success of the Albanian resolution at the United Nations. Moreover the degree of trade, negotiated under the so-called Memorandum agreement this year, was only permitted by the Chinese, after the Japanese had agreed to strong criticism of their own Government in the final joint communiqué. This was greatly resented in Japan. Again Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, between the Ryukyus and Taiwan, was disputed by the Communist Chinese because of suspected oil deposits in the adjacent sea. Relations with China thus loom up at the end of the year as a major problem of the immediate future. 26. As to relations with Russia, the Japanese hesitate to improve these by taking a larger and more obvious part in the development of maritime Siberia, lest the Chinese should hold this against them. Moreover the ­Russian-held islands to the north are a perpetual impediment to any real amity. 27. As if all that were not enough, the year ends without any solution having been found to the problem of non-cotton textile exports to the United States. These the Americans wish the Japanese to reduce voluntarily under threat of protectionist legislation if they do not do so. The average Japanese therefore sees the protective role of the United States being gradually withdrawn, which is worrying enough, despite the automatic continuation in force of the Security Treaty (now on a yearly termination at the request of either side basis). He also sees the scope for increasing exports to the United States market being gradually curbed by protectionism. One-third of Japanese exports go to America; this is in consequence basic to his continued prosperity.

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28. He is confused by the pattern: the United States have been clamouring for a larger share in the Japanese market and have been the principal protagonists of liberalization. With immense circumspection and reluctance the Japanese have gradually and guardedly followed their advice. Now he sees the Americans going into reverse, when it suits their own political interests. Further, the arguments so far adduced in support of their request have not convinced the Japanese. 29. The Government, well aware of all the implications and perhaps secretly committed by some understanding in return for the promised reversion of Okinawa, have – significantly enough – not been able to bring their own textile industry to reach any acceptable compromise. Meanwhile the matter assumes disproportionate importance and considerable acrimony has been engendered. 30. It bids fair to exacerbate American-Japanese relations, but the textile dispute must be seen as only one of a number of problems which have arisen between them. These are undergoing a period of readjustment owing to the new maturity and power of the Japanese economy. Although the Japanese have been fighting hard on the textile issue they are beginning to realize that their export competitiveness and weight are demanding a new approach in their international relations. Further moves to open up the Japanese domestic market are not enough. The Americans, the while, expect understanding, if not gratitude, from the pet pupils they feel they have treated with such generosity for so long. 31. It would be in the general interest to take the heat out of the problem. Otherwise I fear that bad relations between Japan and America might well seem to Communist China the moment to play some of the many cards she holds to win over the Japanese Government to some of her ways of thought. This is at least a permanent danger, but fortunately one that is unlikely to influence Mr Sato. He has recently been elected for the fourth time as chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party and thus Prime Minister with two more years to run. With the Socialist Opposition in disarray, the Kõmeitõ (Clean Government Party) in temporary disgrace, because of attempts at censoring a book unfavourable to themselves and the Communists too weak to cause real trouble, he is in the securest of saddles, provided only he tackles with sufficient seriousness the pollution and quality of life issue. Moreover he now has under his direction a riot police, who seem able to control public demonstrations with the minimum of violence. He has thus mastered student manifestations. Public disapproval of student excesses appears to have done the rest. 32. Meanwhile relations with ourselves proceeded smoothly enough. We maintained a comfortable trade surplus: our exports to Japan totalled approximately £147 million, as opposed to our imports from Japan which reached £130 million. In addition we had a sizeable surplus in invisible trade, which more than made up for the drain caused by the purchase of ships built in Japanese yards. 33. Following the success of British Week in Tokyo in 1969, department store promotions pullulate and have been organized with profit in the provinces. They are expedients, however, which can only continue to be effective by increasing the quality and uniqueness of the exhibits. The Japanese public becomes yearly more sophisticated and difficult to please, while the quality of locally produced consumer goods (unlike that of life itself) improves the



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whole time. Trade missions and visitors pour in: many reveal the inadequacy of British education about the Far East. 34. Anglo-Japanese trade negotiations, which began auspiciously in 1969 with far-reaching and bold offers on our part, became bogged down in 1970, because the Japanese at first thought the return price high and then that it might be prudent to see first how our arrangements with the Common Market fared. They probably felt it useless to reach agreements with us, which we might later wish to modify. 35. Despite the troubled consciences, which I have tried to delineate, the Japanese economy boomed. The symbol of their success, the gross national product, though its glory in the popular mind as a goal in itself was somewhat tarnished, rose by nearly 11 per cent in real terms. There looks like being a continuing surplus on trade account; exports are expanding at some 20 per cent a year which sets up tensions in other domestic markets. Foreign exchange reserves are increasing fast and already stand at US$4,400 million. There is increasing debate about ‘orderly marketing’ and inevitably more speculation about the revaluation of the yen, for which Japanese companies are beginning to prepare themselves. Wages rose by 18 per cent and the cost of living by 7 per cent. There is increasing debate about the need to control the rise in the cost of living and also to moderate wage increases, which have recently been outpacing prices and productivity. 36. Satisfaction with their overall successes was dramatically expressed in the international Expo ’70 at Osaka. This was seen as the outward symbol of their coming of age as ‘economic man’. Over 64 million Japanese visited it during the six months of its duration. Some 2 million foreigners made the journey. 8 million people of all nationalities visited our pavilion alone. 37. Dedicated pompously enough to ‘harmony and progress’, Expo turned out to be a gorgeous and surrealist fun fair, as ‘fabulous and absurd’ as its architects expressly wished it to be. The unprecedentedly vast covered central plaza, with its grotesque tower of the sun, set the tone; this was followed by the Japanese industrial pavilions, replete with all the sophisticated conceits which contemporary science could devise. 38. How could staid foreign Governments, self-consciously parading their wares for the enlightenment of far away orientals, compete with such inspired lunacy? They failed to gauge the mood; they were too dull, respectable and didactic. Cosmic achievements, however, drew the crowds to the American and Russian pavilions. Foreign participation was, none the less, well worth while, because of its educative effect. The appetite of the people of Osaka for expensive cultural manifestations seemed insatiable. Our own New Philharmonia Orchestra, late on the scene at the worst moment of the year, had the warmest success. Two-thirds of Japan visited the site; the remaining third participated in the events on television. Admirable lectures on radio and screen brought countries home to the Japanese, of which they had previously barely heard. Their history, traditions and cultures have become generally known. For so isolated a people this was an immense gain. 39. The Emperor and Empress received an average of two Heads of State or their representatives a week during the six months of Expo. Their Majesties appear to have relished the novel experience greatly. No guest was more welcome to them than His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. Now they have given public expression to their desire to travel abroad. This would be a considerable event, since no reigning Japanese Monarch has ever left the

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country in recorded history. It might really mark the coming of age of the new Japan and her acceptance again as an equal in the world. It would be taken to do so by the Japanese people. 40. If the year 1970, therefore, was a watershed between the delighted acceptance of the role of economic man and the anxious questioning of the very basis of his existence, it also saw great exultation in his achievements. JOHN PILCHER

34 THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: HUMAN OR DIVINE?*

SUMMARY The religious background A description of Shinto: the worship of the islands, natural phenomena, people, Emperor and the Imperial Family of Japan. Its inculcation of purity, freshness and rededication; the range of its cult, from the sublime to the ridiculous. (Paragraphs 1–8.) Shinto was realized to be a firm basis for nationalism after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. (Paragraphs 9–11.) As a religion it was no match for Buddhism, but it was regarded as the birthright of Japanese; all were therefore Shintoists, most Buddhists as well. (Paragraphs 12–15.) The mystique of the Emperor was built up before the Second World War by every modern means. It had been bolstered also by Chinese thought, but, whereas the Emperor of China held the mandate of heaven which could be removed, the Japanese Emperor was inviolate, owing to his descent from the Sun Goddess. (Paragraphs 16–21.) While Buddhism tolerated perforce Shintoism, Christianity would not admit the divine in Japanese institutions. It was proscribed in the seventeenth century and only permitted to proselytize in 1878. The Japanese tended to consider themselves first Shintoists and then Christians, with consequent conflicts of conscience. (Paragraphs 22–26.) Shinto is behind the patriotism and team spirit which have given Japan its contemporary success. Its pragmatic attitude regards success or failure as basic criteria and its beliefs apply solely to Japanese. (Paragraphs 27–28.)

* FEJ 26/1 – The British Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 3 March 1971.

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The Emperor is now officially human, but this may be only a form of words: his basic position remains. He sums up the best and the worst in Japanese concepts. (Paragraphs 29–30.) The constitutional foreground The Meiji Constitution of 1889, promulgated by the Emperor on the Prussian model to clothe in Western garb the Japanese emperor-centric State lasted until 1946. (Paragraphs 31–35.) The American-drafted Constitution of 1946 defines the Emperor’s position as a limited constitutional monarch. General MacArthur abolished State Shinto and the teaching of its doctrines in a directive and, by virtue of an Imperial Rescript, the Emperor stepped down from his divine pedestal. The aristocracy were abolished in 1947. (Paragraphs 35–40.) The Japanese Government set about interpreting the new Constitution in their own manner. The discreet behaviour of the Emperor has so far helped the working of the Constitution. (Paragraphs 41–48.) Conclusion: Background and Foreground co-exist The Emperor is now a human constitutional monarch, who remains head of a denationalized but living national cult, which considers him divine. (Paragraphs 49–50.) 3 March 1971

I

submit some observations on the position today of the Emperor of Japan. I deal first with the religious background and the less tangible aspects of his unique role, and then the more prosaic constitutional foreground, before hazarding a paradoxical conclusion.

THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND 2. Japan first emerges clearly from the mists of history in the sixth century AD, when the Japanese took over with avidity the whole civilization of T’ang Dynasty China, lock, stock and barrel. Until they had done this, they had no system of writing and thus no records. Their institutions, however, were even then defined clearly enough. The head of the Yamato (later written with the characters for “great harmony”) race represented to his people the highest living being and his ancestry was said to go back to the Sun Goddess. She in a singular parthenogenesis gave birth to the dynasty reputedly at about the same time as the foundation of the city of Rome. Modern research (lèse-majesté before the last war) places the beginnings of the realm at approximately the second century a d. 3. The ancient annals summing up the early vicissitudes of the race, known as the Kojiki and the Nihongi, were not committed to writing, however, until the eighth century a d. They are a collection of the naïve and the sophisticated, but they had to be taken in their entirety au pied de la lettre, until, after the defeat of Japan, the American occupation relegated them formally to the world of mythical sagas. What is relevant in them is that the Emperor, scion



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of a nameless dynasty, emerges in his role as head of the indigenous cult. This in turn only took on the name of Shinto or ‘way of the gods’ (or ‘heroes and spirits’, as I would prefer to phrase it), when it became necessary to distinguish it from Mahayana Buddhism with its ‘saints’, which came over in the seventh century as part of the Chinese cultural occupation. 4. Shinto has repeatedly been likened to Greek religious beliefs. Exultation in the beauties of the land plays a primary part in it. The divine is seen to be immanent in all things in Japan. Any singular object can therefore be the subject of worship, such as a tree, a rock, a river, a waterfall or a mountain. Shinto is also the cult of the Yamato race, to which, like the Japanese islands themselves, ‘gods’ had given birth. The heroes of the past, in the Greek manner, are therefore considered particular manifestations of the divine and are worshipped as such. The Emperors were thought to sum up the qualities of their people and their land and thus to be ‘manifest divinities’. Their family was the living link connecting the divine origins of land and people with the present. 5. Shinto is therefore the quintessence of the Japanese spirit. When it comes to examining its precise doctrines, these evaporate. They are nowhere clearly defined or laid down and are thus subject to endless fanciful interpretation. They represent simply ‘the Japanese Way’: the cult of the Emperor, the Imperial Family, the heroes of the land and the natural phenomena of Japan. 6. Purity is a basic principle and lustral practices are intimately connected with its cults. The hands and mouth are washed before taking part in its ceremonies. To this the national addiction to the bath owes its origin. The cult of purity and the genuine makes raw food, where the real taste comes through, seem preferable to the ingenious but complicated precepts of Chinese cooking. Like the British housewife, the Japanese puts her faith in the quality of her materials: hence the horrors of Japanese ‘cooking’ and their masochistic addiction to raw fish. 7. Purity is allied with freshness. Shinto shrines must be both in the simplest primeval manner, but at the same time fresh, new, clean and spick and span. Hence the rebuilding every twenty years of the shrines at Ise which are then rededicated solemnly to the Sun Goddess, in the antique manner, nothing changed. Stress is laid on the importance of this continual rededication. All objects of the cult should have primeval qualities. All offerings are placed on plates made for preference with the elbow and not the wheel to conform with primitive practice. Fire is lit by friction of wood. Shinto shrines should therefore exude primeval simplicity and purity. The sacred groves of Ise have been venerated since the dawn of time and have acquired a numinous quality, indefinably, but powerfully felt and proper to places long loved and venerated. Its high priestesses recall the Vestal Virgins. 8. Its cults range from the deeply serious to the frivolous. The shrines at Ise have something of the Holy of Holies about them, while those at Inari, dedicated to the manifest divinity of foxes (fraught with attributes in Japan), border on the absurd and the obscene in the best tradition of classical antiquity. Every village, every section of a town, even every apartment house and office block has its shrine, covering the whole gamut of Shinto worship from the sublime to the ridiculous. 9. As the sole and exclusive possession of the Japanese race, Shinto is a powerful cement for nationalism. This was sensed by the early reformers, after the restoration of the Meiji Emperor in 1868 to the position his ancestors were thought formerly to have held. 10. Before that date and since the beginning of the twelfth century the Emperor had been living, devoid of executive power in virtual seclusion, surrounded by

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his court in the Imperial Palace at Kyoto. During those centuries the purely religious and divine aspects of his position alone sustained it. Temporal power was in the hands of dynasties of military generalissimi or ‘Shoguns’, who ruled through a feudal system. A complete distinction between the court nobility and the military aristocracy arose. This came to an end with the abdication of the last Tokugawa Shogun in 1867, when the boy Emperor (later to become the Meiji Emperor) was brought from the old capital, Kyoto, to the seat of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Yedo, which was then renamed ‘Tokyo’ or ‘eastern capital’. In 1868 he was installed in the Tokugawa castle, which is now the Tokyo Imperial Palace, and the country was opened to relations with the rest of the world. 11. With his restoration came a renewal of the dominance of Shinto. As a result, until 1878, other religions, including Buddhism and Christianity, were proscribed. Shinto became associated, like Confucianism in China, with State occasions and in the form of ‘State Shinto’ came to be the official cult (the word ‘religion’ was avoided), until demoted by the American reformers of the Occupation. Japan therefore, before the assumption of Chinese civilization and again after 1868, centred round Shinto. 12. Shinto, however, was no rival for a transcendental religion with scriptures exuding philosophies grounded in Indian thought, but tinged with Greek, Persian, even Nestorian Christian and, of course, Chinese concepts. Buddhism therefore swept Japan from the sixth century a. d. onward, in successive waves of sects holding sometimes diametrically opposite views. These views ranged from salvation by faith alone (a far cry from the teachings of Gautama Sakyamuni) and direct rebirth in the ‘western paradise’ of the Bodhisattva (saint) Amida to the self-reliance of Zen with its more positive denial of the existence of God and of the soul. All preach the evanescence of all things, the transience of existence and hold detachment from mundane toils and the attainment of nothingness, the void, as supreme ideals. Every individual has it in him to become a Buddha. 13. Since Shinto is considered to be the birthright of every Japanese, the belief came about that Japanese could belong to other religions as well without betraying their fundamental Japaneseness. Thus Emperors espoused Buddhism with great devotion. Their Shinto high priestly functions, however, presented difficulties and those who were pious Buddhists found it impracticable to profess their faith fully until after abdication. This was one of the factors which made abdication so prevalent among Emperors. They retired from the onerous function of carrying out the rites and ceremonies according to Shinto practice to espouse a life of piety and great aesthetic charm in the seclusion of elegant ‘detached palaces’, which they built for themselves in Buddhist temples in the foothills surrounding the old capital, Kyoto. These still enchant the visitor. 14. There grew up a convenient system, whereby Buddhist hierarchical denominations were bestowed upon Shinto divinities, who came to find their place alongside saints, guardian kings, angels and other celestial personalities of Indian inspiration. Hence the common word ‘Shimbutsu’, still in use today, to describe the concept ‘divine’, which literally means ‘gods and buddhas’. This state of affairs continued until after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Shinto was rigidly detached from Buddhist practices and gradually became the State cult. 15. Both Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples had become the hereditary possessions of families, who provided priests and monks for generation after generation. In some cases cujus regio, ejus religio prevailed. Thus many called themselves primarily Shintoists or Buddhists, simply because the heads of their



THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: HUMAN OR DIVINE?239

family traditionally belonged more to one or other. All were ipso facto Shinto, the vast majority Buddhist as well. 16. Perhaps under Western inspiration – perhaps indeed fired by the mystique they found surrounding the Hapsburg dynasty – the Japanese reformers in the middle of the nineteenth century set about building up the position of the Emperor as a ‘manifest divinity’ and as the father and high priest of his people. They used all modern means of education and communication to this end, until the cult of the Emperor reached the peak of exaggeration attained just before the last war. 17. Even as far ago as the sixth century ad, Chinese thought, perhaps not accurately understood, had also played its part in strengthening the mystical role of the Emperor. The Chinese considered their Emperor to be the intermediary between heaven and earth. His was the mandate of heaven. It was his duty through good example in the Confucian tradition to inspire his people to desire the good and to achieve harmony. By performing correctly the rites and ceremonies, he ensured the co-operation of heaven for his dynasty and people and the success of the harvests. Standing on the marble slab at the apex of the pyramidal Altar of Heaven in Peking, the Emperor communed with heaven, while the appropriate sacrifices were carried out around him. 18. Chinese notions and later, particularly during the period of seclusion before 1868, Confucianism in its latter forms, were added to Shinto practices and served to enhance the position of the Emperor. One crucial idea, however, made no appeal to Japanese thought. To the Chinese the Emperor could forfeit the mandate of heaven. If he was thought by inappropriate actions (or even through sheer bad luck) to have offended the firmament, he could and should be removed. Hence in part the successive dynasties in China. The Japanese Emperor was inviolate, since his source of divinity came from no mandate of heaven, but stemmed from the Sun Goddess in the mists of antiquity. This is a vital distinction and one that gives a special flavour to all Japanese thought. 19. In the decade before the last war, all the ancient observances, whether of Japanese or Chinese origin, were carried out to the letter. Thus, when the Emperor passed in front of this Embassy, as he was frequently obliged to do, since it faces the moat of the Imperial Palace and lies between two of its main entrances, golden sand was strewn upon the road. Police lined the route, facing the crowd and with their backs to the Imperial cortège. It was the height of discourtesy to look down upon the Emperor, therefore the police asked all to descend to the ground floor and blinds had to be pulled down in all upper windows along the route. This did not, of course, prevent the Japanese gratifying their human curiosity by peering as best they could round the blinds. 20. The divine person was not measured by his tailor. His reflection in a looking-glass served for that purpose (the cut of the Emperor’s suits suggests that the practice may still continue). The Emperor was (and is) never named; his personal name is not used and his family has no name. He was referred to as the ‘son of heaven’ (now not in use) or ‘heavenly monarch’ (still valid). His reign title – in the present instance the inappropriate one of Showa or ‘radiant peace’ – was and is used for dating (we are currently in the year Showa 46). After his demise, His Majesty will be known as the Showa Emperor. All this conforms with traditional Chinese usage. 21. When therefore in 1946 the Emperor was obliged after defeat to step down officially from being a manifest divinity, he was perhaps performing

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an impossible feat. To a people who believe in the immanence of the divine in everything in Japan, the head of the race must remain the most divine of Japanese human beings, whether he is actually referred to officially as such or not. No doubt the separation of Shinto from State and its current classification on a par with other religious denominations makes sense to the rational European mind, but not so, I suggest, to the Japanese. To them the very fact of being a Japanese is of religious significance in itself. You may, as a Japanese, belong to other religions as well, but Shinto, with the Emperor at its head, is a common denominator and this attitude still prevails. 22. Buddhism, with the exception perhaps of the hyper-patriotic Nichiren sect (which recently begat the Sõkagakkai and its political counterpart the Kõmeitõ or ‘pure government party’), was pessimistic and egocentric, but it tolerated all religions in a spirit of mild but cynical compassion and detachment. The Japanese people had long come to consider Shinto to be concerned with the serious business of life and Buddhism with the more problematical hereafter. Thus weddings became invariably to be performed at Shinto shrines, while funerals were generally the concern of Buddhist priests. Buddhism had long accommodated itself to this: not so Christianity (and Islam). 23. It was the exacting nature of Christianity, which refused to admit the immanence of the divine in institutions and objects simply because they were Japanese, that led to its suppression so brutally by the Tokugawa Shogun Iyeyasu at the beginning of the seventeenth century and also to the seclusion of the country. Christianity and foreign influence or intervention must be rigidly excluded. Christianity’s success and its presumptions, it was felt, might undermine the foundations of the State. It might upset that comfortable pyramid capped by that manifest divinity the Emperor, and then administered by the Shogun through his military adherents, the local barons or Daimyo and their feudal retainers. 24. When Christianity was again permitted to proselytize in 1878, the ­Japanese attitude that you were first a Japanese and thus a Shintoist and then a Christian continued and virtually (but never de jure) prevails now. The conflict of conscience became acute and harrowing as the years advanced towards the beginning of the Second World War. You had to pay homage to the State cult, whether you were Christian or not, in exactly the same way as the Roman Emperors obliged their subjects to venerate the official gods (Emperors included) as a necessary civic act in the first three centuries of the Christian era. 25. In China it was possible for the famous Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci in the seventeenth century to advocate the acceptance of Confucianism by Christians as the State philosophy and civic cult, because the Chinese Emperor received his mandate from heaven and ‘heaven’ could be equated with the Godhead. Had the Vatican accepted his point of view, the whole history of China might have taken a different course. 26. In Japan the Sun Goddess and Shinto mythology could scarcely be adapted to Christian theology. Therefore the keenest supporters of the separation of Shinto from the State after the war were the members of Christian denominations. Buddhists were long inured to the inevitability of tolerance. Now the matter is in hot debate in the case of the Yasukuni shrines. The main Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is dedicated to the memory of all those who have died for their country and it has branch shrines in every province in the land. They therefore were the nub of mystical nationalism, the shrines sacred to the cult of self-sacrifice for the State and the Emperor. With the rehabilitation in the public mind of the essential nobility of those who gave their lives for



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their country in the last war and with the general spirit of letting bygones be bygones that now prevails, many would like to see these shrines again maintained by the State. This is regarded – probably rightly – by Christians and by liberal opinion as a dangerous step towards State and Emperor worship, which, carried to excess, led Japan to disaster. It has so far been resisted. 27. In general Shinto with the Emperor at its head is the fount and origin of Japanese contemporary achievements. It lies behind Japanese patriotism, self-abnegation and sense of cohesion, which, reinforced by the Confucian principles long taught, account for the current economic upsurge of Japan. It underlies the loyalty and team spirit which have enabled Japan to beat the West at its own game. It is also allied with the cult of harmony (the origins of which are essentially Chinese), which implies a disposition to seek harmonious relationships in this world as a duty, always provided, of course, in Japan the harmony is pitched in a Japanese key. 28. Inevitably the pursuit of wealth for its own sake will undermine these qualities. However, since the divine is thought to be everywhere immanent, there is nothing wrong or even criticizable from a purely Shinto point of view about the accumulation of wealth. For them, whatever is is right. W. S. Gilbert somehow sensed this attitude when he made Pish-Tush in the Mikado sing: ‘and I am right and you are right and all is right as right can be’. It is this acceptance of the universe that makes success or failure, rather than right or wrong, the basic criteria of the Japanese. It is this that earns them the fame of being an irreligious people. I hope I have shown that simply being Japanese and following the Japanese way form a religion. The Japanese cannot be said to lack a religion nor to fail to carry out its precepts. They are not amoral, but their morality, like their religion, is applicable solely to themselves. This is a source of strength as well as their great weakness. 29. Is therefore His Majesty the Emperor considered to be human or divine? Officially he is human; in practice his divinity, such as it was – and not to be confused with the Christian (or Islamic) concept of one transcendental Godhead – remains. He reports to his heavenly ancestors at Ise and communes with them there. He prays to his deified grandfather at the Meiji Shrine, the most popular place of worship in Tokyo. He carries out in private innumerable rites and ceremonies in his priestly role, traditionally concealed from outside observers. He remains the living link with the past, the unbroken thread in Japanese history (adoption notwithstanding). 30. Thus the Emperor is at once the symbol of what is best in the Japanese character and of what is worst. He inspires the nation to feats of loyalty and self-sacrifice, but he also sums up their racial, cultural and religious exclusivity, which cuts them off from others and makes them so disliked. With no recognition of any scale of values other than their own; with no sense of the divine outside and above this world; with no feeling that their exertions can only be an approximation to that which is right, to that which is perfect, the Japanese are odd men out in this world.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOREGROUND 31. After 1868 the reformers felt the need to fit Japan into the contemporary world and persuade others to treat her seriously as a sovereign independent nation. Other Western countries had Constitutions; Japan must have one too.

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On the other hand, there was no question of a Constitution being sought by the people to curb or regularize the power of the sovereign. No such need was felt. There was no question of extracting a ‘magna carta’ from the ruler, but rather an attempt to clothe in Western (mostly Prussian) garb pre-existing Japanese ideas of the restored Emperor-centric State. 32. The Constitution prepared by the Prime Minister of the time, Prince Itoh, after exhaustive studies abroad was promulgated by the present Emperor’s grandfather, the Meiji Emperor, on National Foundation Day in 1889. Article 1 stated: ‘The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal’. Article 3 read: ‘The Emperor is sacred and inviolable’. The initiative in constitutional amendment was reserved exclusively to the Emperor. He had the power to issue ordinances, both regular and emergency, and the power unconditionally to declare war, make peace and conclude a treaty. As his highest advisory body, there was the Privy Council. In addition there grew up the extra-constitutional, extra-legal body of advisers known as the ‘Elder Statesmen’ or Genro, to shield as well as to strengthen the institution and the person of the Emperor. As a result, the executive branch of the Government became all powerful with the absolute authority of the Emperor behind it. 33. In practice the military enjoyed quasi-independence of action. This was not based on any identifiable article of the Constitution but on the Emperor’s power to issue ordinances. The custom grew up whereby the General Staff appointed serving officers as Ministers in the Government. By withdrawing their Minister they could wreck any Government contemplating action that displeased them. 34. Prince Itoh avoided ephemeral detail and built the Constitution to last. Except for the Second World War, it would almost certainly have been in force today. But it was subject to interpretation from the moment of its promulgation and its most famous interpreter, Professor Tatsukichi Minobe (the father of the present Governor of Tokyo), did not preach the simple view of an absolute divine monarch. His theory that the Emperor was the highest organ of the State, with the ultimate right to carry out the executive functions of the State, became the dominant legal interpretation of the Constitution during the liberal period from the First World War until 1935, when he was attacked in the Diet and his works proscribed and considered as heresy. From that time on, when incidentally I had my own first experience of Japan, Emperor worship rose in a crescendo. 35. In the Constitution promulgated after defeat in 1946, the Americans outwardly swept all this away. Chapter I of the new Constitution is entitled ‘The Emperor’ and consists of eight articles (which I enclose as an Annex) which define the Emperor’s position in detail. He was to be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, but to derive his position from the will of the people, with whom sovereign power resides. The Cabinet was to be responsible for all acts of the Emperor in matters of State and the Emperor might only act in matters of State at all within clearly defined limits. The Emperor might only appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet and the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet. He might neither receive property nor make gifts therefrom without the ­authorization of the Diet. 36. The preamble to the Constitution sets the tone of all that follows, but does not even mention the Emperor’s name. It reads in part: ‘we the Japanese people . . . do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do



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firmly establish this Constitution’. This omission was a deliberate attempt by the drafters to demote the Emperor from his pre-war status. 37. These provisions must, however, also be seen in conjunction with two other acts of the Supreme Commander (or last of the Shoguns as many see him), General MacArthur, which were intended to kill for ever the idea that the Emperor was a manifest divinity. In December 1945 General MacArthur issued a directive entitled ‘Abolition of Government sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control and dissemination of State Shinto’. This directive forbade not only to Shinto but to the followers of all other religions or philosophies the dissemination of teachings which advocated the mission on the part of Japan to extend its rule over other nations and peoples by reason of (a) the doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other States because of ancestry, descent or other origin; (b) the doctrine that the people of Japan are similarly superior to other people; and (c) the doctrine that the islands of Japan are similarly superior to other islands. 38. In issuing this directive, General MacArthur was not tampering with the Meiji Constitution, which did not touch on the question of Shinto by name, but was undoing a quantity of legislation which had ensured massive financial and moral support to Shinto and turned it into the State cult. Neither did the directive make it impossible to continue such formal practices and ceremonies as Imperial and Ministerial visits to the Shrines at Ise. Moreover the aristocracy were not abolished until 1947. 39. The second act which preceded the promulgation of the Constitution was the issue on 1 January, 1946, of an Imperial Rescript, the significant paragraph of which reads: ‘We stand by the people and we wish always to share with them in their moments of joy and sorrow. The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.’ 40. This made an apparently clean sweep of all that constituted State Shinto, but it is equally important to note the threads of continuity which remained and without which the whole fabric of the Japanese State could scarcely have survived the shock of 1945. In the first place, it was nothing new to the ­Japanese to adjust the Emperor’s position according to the political needs of the moment. He had in practice never been an absolute monarch in an executive sense. He had always been manipulated by contending groups of his subjects. This was strikingly true for the seven centuries, during which the Emperor lived in seclusion and executive impotence in Kyoto, while dynasties of Shoguns ruled the land. The military continued the tradition up to 1941. 41. Again, the Japanese Government after defeat was able gradually to assert more Japanese interpretations of the Constitution than its American drafters intended. The Cabinet had only been given a few days to consider the redraft of the new Constitution, which General MacArthur had substituted for the original Japanese proposal. It was in no position to insist on retaining any features of the Meiji Constitution. It was a big enough success just to have retained the Emperor, both for his own sake and, as the then Prime Minister Shidehara once said in so many words, as a guarantee that private property would remain inviolate in a revolutionary age. Once again the practical needs of a group of the Emperor’s loyal subjects were inextricably mixed with the mystique of the Emperor in the best spirit of Shinto pragmatism.

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42. Once they had swallowed the pill, the Conservative Governments of immediate post-war Japan concentrated their efforts on limiting what they saw as the damage to the Emperor’s position. Thus the Minister of Education of the time did not hesitate to say that, while the new relationship between the Emperor and his people should be formally that of sovereign and subject, it should be in practice that of ‘father and sons’. Thus Shinto practice and Confucian ideas were retained. 43. Moreover, it was laid down that teachers would not be permitted to criticize the Imperial régime. The Government would not even give a clear admission in debate that the Emperor was no longer the source of the supreme will of the Japanese people. It took refuge behind complicated theories, notably one that, if sovereignty is to be understood as signifying the real source of the motive power of the activities of the State, or the will of the State, it will be found to reside in the people as a whole, ‘including the Emperor’. 44. Since then the dust has settled on these disputes and the present constitutional position of the Emperor is not a burning issue. When the revision of the Constitution is mentioned, amendments to the articles on the Emperor’s position take a very secondary place to the burning question of Article 9 on the renunciation of war. The new Constitution can be said to have worked satisfactorily for very nearly twenty-five years. That it has done so is in part due to the character of the Emperor. Despite some examples of personal courage when confronted by military arrogance in the 1930s – examples adduced by post-war apologists, but which seldom amount to a very significant use of the Imperial authority or rebellion against the status quo thrust upon him – the Emperor has been content both before and after the war to fulfil his constitutional role without much positive display of character. 45. It could be argued that a stronger man might have saved Japan from its disastrous course and thus never have been put into the position of having to renounce formally his own divinity. But it is equally true that a stronger personality, used to great prerogatives under the older Constitution, might have been tempted to step out of line during the post-war years and thus put in jeopardy the future of Japan as a monarchy. 46. The quiet way in which the Emperor has carried out his public role as a figure-head, while devoting himself in ways scarcely known to the public to the Shinto rituals required of him by tradition, has kept the monarchy out of politics. He has never in the guise of messages to the people issued statements which could be remotely interpreted as political. His interviews with the Press have been few and far between and confined to details of his family life and hobbies. Only once did his tongue slip when he referred to Okinawa as ‘Okinawa Prefecture’ well before its reversion to Japan was a foregone conclusion. 47. The politicians, the Press and public opinion have generally reciprocated. No cases have come to light where the Government has tried to cheat by using the Imperial position for its own political stratagems, by arranging for example for the Emperor to delay or hasten any of his constitutional acts in connection with the promulgation of laws, the convocation and dissolution of the Diet or the proclamation of a general election. Historians wishing to press the personal influence of the sovereign in such a matter as the choice of one political leader over another as Prime Minister will find scant material in post-war Japan. 48. Therefore I conclude that the actual constitutional position of the Emperor, the foreground, suits the present mood of the Japanese people.



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Monarchy is at its best venerated and liked and at worst tolerated for what it symbolizes. The small minority who would like to restore more formal power to the Emperor scarcely get a hearing. The background, however, remains, whether consciously perceived or not, and of course influences all those brought up before and during the last war. The young in this era of success show great indifference (though they are subconsciously more conditioned than they know). This could be changed by age: the Japanese develop late as individuals and seldom start seriously thinking on their own before their forties, when they turn to their traditions more and more, until in old age they seem to embody them. Disaster might cause the people to rally instinctively around their central institution.

CONCLUSION: BACKGROUND AND FOREGROUND CO-EXIST 49. In practice General MacArthur’s Constitution put the Emperor back in the position in which his forebears found themselves for seven centuries before the Meiji Restoration of 1868: with no executive powers but sustained by the veneration of the people. This position he clothed in constitutional dress. Instead of a Shogun and his feudal retainers, the Emperor has to contend with an all-powerful Diet, dominated by industry and economic man. Now, however, he has no aristocracy to support him. He continues to be the key figure and participant in the national cult of Shinto, which reveres him and his ancestors as ‘manifest divinities’, although General MacArthur by a decree denationalized the national cult (the formal position) and forbade it to teach its own beliefs. Moreover under foreign compulsion the Emperor formally in a Rescript demoted himself from being a divinity. He is thus for the record human, but in practice a ‘manifest divinity’ as well. 50. These inconsistencies are a mere bagatelle in the life of the world’s second oldest living human institution (exceeded in age only by the Papacy). In any case the Japanese take such paradoxes in their stride, brought up as they are on Zen koan’ (the paradoxical conundrums that Zen masters give their pupils to solve intuitively, but not intellectually). They have a greater aptitude than the White Queen for believing impossible things, even before breakfast: they positively revel in ambiguity. Hilaire Belloc might have written especially for their case the refrain ‘Oh never, never let us doubt what nobody is sure about. JOHN PILCHER

ANNEX 1 CHAPTER I. THE EMPEROR Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.

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Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of State, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor. Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of State as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to Government. The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of State as may be provided by law. Article 5. When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of State in the Emperor’s name. In this case, paragraph 1 of the preceding article will be applicable. Article 6. The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet. The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet. Article 7. The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of State on behalf of the people: Promulgation of amendments of the Constitution, laws, Cabinet orders and treaties. Convocation of the Diet. Dissolution of the House of Representatives. Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet. Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers. Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve and restoration of rights. Awarding of honours. Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law. Receiving, foreign Ambassadors and Ministers. Performance of ceremonial functions. Article 8. No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.

ANNEX 2 HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR Born 1901. Proclaimed Crown Prince 1916. The eldest son of The Emperor Taisho. He received his elementary education at the Peers’ School. He was instructed in the traditional Japanese way of devotion and self-sacrifice by the two heroes of the Russo-Japanese War. These were General Nogi, Headmaster of the Peers’ School until his suicide at the death of the Emperor Meiji in 1911, and Admiral Togo, who supervised the Emperor’s further education by special tutors until 1921. In 1921, he visited a number of European capitals including London. This, the only time that he has left Japan and indeed the first time that a Crown Prince or Emperor had left Japan within recorded history, apparently made a very strong impression on him. He is reported to have been particularly struck by the comparative ease and lack



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of protocol at the Court of King George V. As a result of the growing insanity of his father, Emperor Taisho, he was proclaimed Regent in 1921 and became Emperor in 1926. Until 1945 he was in theory all-powerful, being the Divine Ruler whose will every Japanese was expected to serve to the point of death itself. The Emperor appears, however, to have allowed himself to be manipulated by the powers behind the Throne. This was probably due to his somewhat diffident and inarticulate nature, and to the absence of any strong personalities who could have helped him to make his views felt. It it thought that his rare firmness at the time of the 26 February Revolt in 1936 led to the swift and condign punishment which was meted out to the ringleaders. Opinions differ, but it is at least possible that he might have used his vast potential authority to prevent the outbreak of the Pacific War to which he is known to have been opposed. He certainly displayed considerable courage four years later when it was his decision which led to the acceptance of unconditional surrender. The drama of his broadcast has been recorded in ‘Japan’s Longest Day’. At the behest of the Occupation Authorities he renounced his own divinity, though this was probably not a very difficult decision as he is believed to have been a lifetime sceptic on this point. The Emperor has emerged with age as a benignly paternal figure looking the part of a constitutional monarch, whose duties he now performs. He receives regular briefings from scholars and men of affairs on domestic and political questions, listens with care, and passes sage comments. He is regarded as an expert on marine biology, and has published several books on the subject, at the rate of approximately one a year since the early 1960s. Although he is more approachable than before the war when he was the object of awe and fear, the attitude towards him of the average Japanese, particularly the younger ones, is now generally one only of polite deference. The visits of Princess Alexandra to Japan in 1961 and 1965 afforded proof of the Emperor’s admiration for the British Royal Family, which derived in great part from his meeting with Edward, Prince of Wales, in England in 1921, and from the latter’s subsequent return visit to Japan. Princess Margaret in 1969 attained warm relations with the Emperor and the Prince of Wales carried on the tradition in 1970. Prince William of Gloucester was posted to this Embassy for nearly two years from 1968 to 1970 and Prince Michael of Kent was received by the Emperor in 1971. The Emperor is deeply interested in consequence in the British Royal Family and his behaviour is confessedly influenced by their example, which he is said to study with great care. Married Princess Nagako, daughter of Prince Kuni 1924.

35 THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE*

SUMMARY My recent despatch ‘The Emperor: Human or Divine?, attempted to explain the religious background and the constitutional foreground to the Emperor’s role; I now attempt a description of the Emperor’s life and its setting. (Paragraphs 1–2.) The setting Until 1868 the life of the Court in the old capital of Kyoto was centred round the preservation of the traditional Court life. (Paragraphs 3–7.) After the Meiji restoration the emphasis was more on the Emperor as the centre of the national existence; now, since defeat, the personality of the Emperor has become of great importance, yet Japanese education does not aim at developing an individual personality. It has been difficult therefore for the Imperial Household to know how to present the monarchy. The British Royal Family have been the approved models and the current State Visit has been planned in that context. (Paragraphs 8–12.) The personalities The present Emperor did not fit the heroic image of his militant advisers, nor was he to attain perfection in any of the traditional arts. Instead he turned to marine biology in which field through painstaking devotion he has become a good scholar. The Emperor is a mild, reserved, diffident man. His insistence on surrender at the end of the war to preserve his people from annihilation by atomic bombs and his meek acceptance of his post-war occupation role * FEJ 26/1 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 19 May 1971.



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showed a certain toughness of fibre. He did not, however, feel strongly enough to prevent his military committing excesses upon others. His marriage has been a happy one and the Empress fulfils her role with dignity and charm. (Paragraphs 13–22.) The family are close; but the Crown Prince causes anxiety by his introvert personality†. The Crown Princess has attained a popularity of her own. The families of the Emperor’s brothers tend to lead more contemporary lives. ­(Paragraphs 23–30.) The religious duties These are shrouded in secrecy, though it is known that the Emperor still performs most of his former religious functions as god to god. (Paragraphs 31–33.) The constitutional duties All the Emperor’s duties are ceremonial and clerical. He had a busy timetable last year owing to Expo ‘70 in Osaka. His travels outside Tokyo are infrequent these days but he has visited most parts of Japan since the war. The annual Imperial Poetry Party is the sole survivor of the Court’s former role as arbiter of national culture. The formality of this and other ceremonies is rigid. ­(Paragraphs 34–40.) The daily lives A new palace was completed three years ago, which has an impressive exterior, but their Majesties live a life of simple boredom in a less pretentious structure in the corner of the huge castle grounds in the centre of Tokyo. They have villas in the country which they visit several times a year. (Paragraphs 41–45.) Conclusion Bourgeois respectability and tranquility amounting to extreme boredom characterize their lives. They hardly ever attend social functions outside the established course of duty. This is left to the rest of the family. Personal diffidence and an education aimed at cultivating introversion account for an inability to project their personalities. Doubts have been cast on the ability of the monarchy to survive. The personality of the Crown Prince aggravates these doubts. However in the final analysis the Emperor’s education produced a man whose very meekness may have averted a disaster which a stronger character might have exacerbated. (Paragraphs 46–50.) 19 May 1971

I

n my despatch of 3 March on ‘The Emperor of Japan: Human or Divine?’ I discussed the religious background and the constitutional foreground to

† Sir John Pilcher is unfair in his critical comments on the Crown Prince, the current Emperor of Japan.

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His Majesty’s position, reaching the conclusion that formally for the record he is human, but none the less a ‘manifest divinity’, in the Shinto meaning of the term, for his subjects. I suggested that the element of paradox in this duality does not disturb Japanese minds, used as they are to a long tradition of ambiguity and to relying on intuition rather than intellect. 2. I now offer some observations on how their Majesties the Emperor and Empress in practice pass their daily lives, but first I try to portray the setting in which they live and then, with some diffidence, the personalities involved. In the preparation of this dispatch, I am indebted for the details to material exceptionally provided by the Imperial Household Agency and to the researches of Mr Melville Guest, Second Secretary in this Embassy.

THE SETTING 3. During the centuries of seclusion, which lasted until the restoration of the Meiji Emperor in 1868, the life of the Japanese Court in Kyoto centred round Shinto observance and the preservation of the essentials of the Japanese tradition of civilization, dating from the Heian period (a d 794 to 1120). That golden moment at the Court has been brilliantly preserved for posterity in the great novel of the Lady Murasaki Shikibu, The Tale of Genji which the late Dr Arthur Waley translated so beautifully for the reader of English. Its atmosphere was also caught in all its fresh evanescence by the Lady Sei Shonagon, Lady Murasaki’s more malicious rival, in her Pillow Book, now edited in English with great erudition by Dr Ivan Morris. 4. In those works, the rites and ceremonies loom in the background; the foreground is occupied by the complex processes of social intercourse, in which the ability to turn a verse, appropriate to every circumstance, and then to write it with elegance on the correct and scented paper (which in turn had to be attached to the right spray of flowers) spelt civilization and education. 5. Such occupation with the minutiae of the every-increasing refinement of the minor pleasures of life, extending to such matters as archery (a philosophy of life in itself), football and incense smelling (an all engrossing art), continued throughout the centuries and indeed received renewed impetus when later the tea ceremony (originally a religious exercise: a moment of undisturbed quiet contemplation of harmony with nature between tried friends) and flower arrangement added further accomplishments to be mastered. 6. All these arts gave birth to ‘schools’ with their respective ‘ways’ of life. Each school revealed its secrets only to its own disciples (the tradition carries on in this age of economic man: in the concrete jungle of contemporary Tokyo tea ceremony and flower arrangement ‘masters’ and their schools dispensing esoteric doctrines represent really big money). The Court was considered the repository par excellence of these rather feminine arts; the masculine and martial arts were in general left to the military aristocracy (the Daimyo) and their retainers (the Samurai), who under the Shogun (or Generalissimo) wielded all the actual power in the land. 7. The Court latterly became impoverished and made a living out of ­teaching among other things the secret traditions of the writing of poetry with all the refinements of calligraphy, but they rarely imparted full knowledge, except to fellow Court nobles or their relatives. This state of affairs virtually persisted until the establishment of universities opening knowledge to all after 1868.



THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE251

Before then, for an appropriate consideration, an example of Imperial calligraphy could be acquired. By the skilful use and the purveying of their monopoly of the civilized arts, the Court and, be it said, the Emperor himself subsisted, poor and powerless but lapped in the veneration of the people. 8. After the restoration of 1868 and the recreation of the ­Emperor-centric State, the sovereign came to be seen as the symbol of the whole nation, ­military included. The ‘enervating atmosphere’ of the Court at Kyoto was deliberately excluded. The role as mystic head of the Japanese family and as a manifest divinity was gradually built up. The masculine arts came within his purview. The Emperor on his white charger, for whom every Japanese male would esteem it the highest honour to sacrifice his life, took the place of the priestly fount of civilization concept of the past. Western monarchies were studied; Kaiser Wilhelm II was for a time the model. Later, for the present Emperor, King George V and Edward Prince of Wales became, after his journey to Britain in 1921, the principal sources of inspiration. 9. Now, after the unprecedented defeat, when, under the Constitution, sovereign power in Japan became formally vested in the people, it is to the British monarchy (and perhaps to a lesser extent to the Belgian example) that the Emperor and his advisers look for guidance on how to orientate their behaviour and attitude. They study with avidity all evidence that reaches them and have seen for instance television films many times over. Shorn formally of divinity, yet with a divine aura about them; denuded of both Court and military aristocracy and greatly reduced in material possessions (at one time almost to the point of the impoverishment of before 1868, so that at least the lesser members of the Imperial Family still perform duties, such as opening exhibitions, for a hefty consideration – oh so carefully concealed from foreign eyes), they now have to rely far more upon personality to make an impression upon their people. 10. The development of personality has never been an aim of Japanese education. On the contrary, the suppression of the individual, in order to make him fit into the pattern of the family and the State, was their ideal. The emphasis was upon duty. Later, once processed and fitted into the pattern, individuality could develop. The present Emperor was cast in this mould and by great exemplars: first by General Nogi, until he and his wife committed suicide to accompany their adored sovereign, the Meiji Emperor, into the other world on his death, and then by Admiral Togo, the hero of the Russo-Japanese War. But, once moulded, he was never allowed to develop as an individual as a result of the policy of the military to emphasize the mystique and seclusion of the living divinity. 11. The problem, since the war, has been how to expose the Emperor and members of the Imperial Family to their people, when by upbringing and tradition they could not have acquired the personalities, which may well now be necessary to win and sustain the affection and respect of their subjects. The view popularly held amongst foreigners in Japan is that the stuffy courtiers of the Imperial Household Agency prevent the members of the Imperial Family from making due impact upon the people, because they remain petrified in the tradition of the divinity hedging them around, which they wish to preserve. 12. I believe the reverse to be the truth. The Imperial Household are longing to discover how best to organize an Imperial life in tune with the times. It is basically for this reason, I think, that His Majesty’s State Visit to Belgium and then to Britain has been conceived and His Majesty’s known desire to revisit

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Europe encouraged and brought to fruition. I append a description of the origins and functions of the Imperial Household Agency at Annex 1.

THE PERSONALITIES 13. The present Emperor of Japan (known in Japan only as ‘Tenno Heika’ or His Majesty the Heavenly Monarch, but who wishes to be called in Europe ‘The Emperor Hirohito of Japan’) conformed to the pattern of duty to the nation laid down for him, but never to the triumphant figure of the God King of which his military after 1868 had been dreaming. Neither did he approximate to the quintessence of courtly refinement and prowess in the arts, to which so many of his ancestors had aspired. 14. The proclivity to amorous pursuits and the virile nature of his restored grandfather, the Meiji Emperor, were not passed on to him, nor did he inherit the tendency to mock heroic posturing of his insane‡ father, the Taisho Emperor. He was no fit leader on a white charger. Myopia may have made that role difficult for him, as it does even walking now (which supposedly accounts for his tendency to shuffle). Perhaps myopia led him to the microscope and research. Science became his enthusiasm (to the dismay of his militant advisers) and marine biology and to a lesser extent botany his preferred subjects, in which he has built for himself the reputation of being a good scholar. 15. All his leisure moments at the seaside at Hayama (where his villa recently burnt down) and at his house in the mountains at Nasu are devoted to these pursuits. Even in Tokyo he spends three afternoons a week, when he can, working in the laboratory he has established near the modest residence in which he lives privately within the massive walls of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Much mystification surrounded his publications on these subjects until recently, but now they are published openly and the Empress has even designed covers for some of them. 16. The Emperor is therefore by temperament and inclination essentially the mild, but dedicated professor. No extravert he: knowledge must be prized out of him. Words come hardly to him, though his delivery is emphatic. Timid reserve characterizes him; the ambiguity of silence would be more his forte than the withering rebuke. He is essentially a man of peace, diffident and almost humble about his own role, sceptical probably about its holy attributes. He was thus the least endowed by nature and upbringing to stand up to the pretensions of his turbulent military subjects and both physically and morally unequipped to cut them down. 17. His health is supposed to be good (and he is certainly cossetted by his doctors and details of his anatomical functions released to the Press to the point of indelicacy), but his uncertain gait and jerky head movements suggest that he may have suffered mild strokes. 18. In the backwash of centuries of political inactivity, he let things of which he could not approve take their course, until one day, stirred by the possibility of the annihilation of his own Japanese race by the atom bomb, ‡ The Imperial Household have always asserted that the Taisho Emperor was not insane, but was ill.



THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE253

he brought himself to the point of commanding the unthinkable: surrender (inadmissible in the code of the warrior). A fossil from remote ages of human development (as Professor Arnold Toynbee put it), he yet had at that moment the courage to defy those who thought they summed up the traditions of his race. That was his finest hour. Later with humble dignity, he played the role demanded of him by the American occupation. 19. All of this required a toughness of fibre, which events had hitherto not revealed in him. On the other hand, it must be observed that he was not, with his circumscribed outlook, moved sufficiently to take the plunge, when he saw his own soldiers massacring others. The shameful rape of Nanking, the disgraceful treatment of prisoners of war and fellow Asians may have moved him, but not to the point of the expression of horror they should have evoked. He confined himself, it seems, to disapproval, which his nearly culpable meekness did not let him turn into action. This again reveals the inadequacy of the Japanese moral outlook, confined as it is to the exigencies of their own land and race. 20. His marriage with the Empress had been fraught with tedious intrigue and took on some of the connotations of a love match. Certainly middle-class morality settled upon them both; not even the inauspicious arrival of four daughters could induce him to try to sire a son by a concubine (as the Meiji Emperor had gladly done), to the horror of the Court. Not a breath of scandal appears to attend their marriage. 21. The Empress, smiling and good humoured, accommodates herself to the Emperor’s scientific pursuits, while attending to her own love of painting and music. His tomes are matched by her volumes of creditable, if unoriginal paintings. The Emperor suffers her limited performances on the piano, but does not accompany her to concerts, in which Her Majesty takes great delight, her favourite composers being Beethoven and Chopin. She performs the role of gracious appendage with dignity and charm. 22. While the Emperor carries out symbolic planting and harvesting of rice in the fields within the Palace, the Empress makes the traditional contribution to encouraging rural industries by tending silkworms. Both are too modest to speak foreign languages, and conduct interviews only through interpreters, but both study English and French with assiduity. 23. Their ‘inner family’ consists of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess and their two sons and one daughter. They usually meet for dinner once a week and also on important family occasions. They are very closely knit. The marriage of the Crown Prince to a commoner and thus outside the charmed circle of Court nobles has brought much needed new blood into the family and was probably designed to do so. The almost normal upbringing of the three grandchildren, it is hoped, will produce more contemporary personalities in the Imperial circles better able to hold their own in the present world 24. The Crown Prince himself, however, despite the attentions of the Quaker governess, Miss Vining, is as buttoned up as his Imperial father, though he reveals himself to those to whom he has become accustomed to be well informed and even scholarly, and more interested in events than he at first sight would lead one to think. He shares the Emperor’s scientific interests. Supposedly caught in the system, I cannot but think that he acquiesces in it more than his advisers would wish. The Crown Princess, on the other hand, though traditionally subservient in manner, has become a much admired personality in her own right.

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25. The younger son, Prince Hitachi, and the four daughters do not feature in the intimate inner circle. He is amiable and not unintelligent, but curiously immature, while the daughters, having married outside the family are no longer considered Princesses and seldom see their parents. Princess Hitachi has much charm, but the pair make a dim impression. 26. This is not at all the case with the fourth daughter, the former Princess Suga. She has married a banker of the family of the former Princess of Satsuma and has considerable personality of a very contemporary kind. She speaks excellent English, but is momentarily subject to some disapproval, since, against the wishes of the Imperial Household Agency (according to rumour at any rate), she works as a consultant in an Italian boutique in the basement of one of Tokyo’s less desirable hotels. She and her husband move much in international circles and enjoy considerable popularity. Both are, for Japanese, almost aggressively ‘with it’. Of the remaining three daughters, one has already died, one is divorced and the other lives a bourgeois life far from the glare of publicity. 27. To complete the picture, the Emperor’s widowed sister-in-law, Princess Chichibu, and two brothers with their wives, Prince and Princess Takamatsu and Prince and Princess Mikasa, are all very much in evidence, both in the purely Japanese scene and in international circles. 28. Princess Chichibu is by far the most popular and beloved member of the Imperial Family. She was the daughter of the Japanese Ambassador in London, Mr Tsuneo Matsudaira, and was educated partially in Britain. She is the generous and enthusiastic patroness of all Japan-British undertakings in Tokyo. She acts as the favourite aunt to her nephew and great nephews. Her life has given her a breadth of understanding of world problems, which must be of the highest value to the Imperial Family as a whole. She is their adviser in private on all matters concerning the forthcoming State Visit to Europe. 29. Prince and Princess Takamatsu are known as ‘Their Available Highnesses’, because of the alacrity with which they accept invitations. He has that Aztec profile, associated with the Imperial Family and the Court aristocracy, to perfection, but is exceeded in his intelligence by Princess Takamatsu, herself a Tokugawa of the family of Shoguns, who prides herself on her appreciation of French culture and on being the best dressed member (with the finest jewels) of the Imperial Family. 30. Prince and Princess Mikasa lead a slightly more retiring life, though he lectures at times on comparative religion (when in English with truly ghastly hesitancy), while the Princess herself puts in the lantern slides in the best amateur tradition upside down. In Prince Tomohito, however, they have produced a son with pronounced extrovert tendencies and of considerable PR value in the Japanese scene. He relished every moment of his time in England, when he was an extramural student at Oxford. His younger brother is now to study in Australia at Canberra University. Prince Tomohito represents the reverse of the problem which the Imperial Household face with the Emperor and Empress. He has too much personality and initiative, but these I think contemporary Japanese concede to be faults on the right side. He is concerned with preparations for this year’s Winter Olympic Games at Sapporo in the northern island of Hokkaido. I enclose family trees at Annex 4.



THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE255

THE RELIGIOUS DUTIES 31. Because of the role which State Shinto played in whipping up mystical nationalism leading to war, the Imperial Household are not at all anxious to reveal much about the Emperor’s religious functions. Indeed, these have always been somewhat screened from public eyes. The fact is however that he venerates his ancestors, reports all important events to his ancestress, the Sun Goddess, at Ise (usually from his own shrine within the palace, which is a branch of the Great Shrines there), and performs ceremonies analogous to those of the former Emperors of China to ensure harvests and keep the spheres in motion (at the spring and autumn equinoxes). 32. Each ritual entails sometimes lengthy ceremonial in traditional costume, not only for the Emperor and Empress, but often involving all the members of the Imperial Household. As he is descended from a god and a manifest divinity, he addresses his forebears on an equal plane. 33. Discussion of such matters with Japanese produces, however, extreme embarrassment, both because of implications of war guilt, in so far as State Shinto could be held to be basically responsible for the whole debacle of the Second World War, but also lest archaic vestiges of cherished primeval beliefs should arouse mirth amongst the uninitiated.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES 34. The constitutional duties of the Emperor are, of course, entirely ceremonial and clerical. Each year he has to sign or append his seal to over 3,000 documents sent to him by the Cabinet or the Imperial Household Agency. He is said to regard the fulfilment of his clerical duties with the same degree of painstaking caution, as he does the several hundred audiences he is required to grant annually. 35. The holding of Expo ‘70 in Osaka last year involved him in unprecedented feats of activity. He gave twenty-one formal banquets for important foreign visitors to Expo (including the Prince of Wales) and gave audiences to many others. The Prime Minister and certain senior Cabinet Ministers make periodical visits to report on the conduct of national affairs. 36. The Emperor normally attends yearly two or three formal openings of sessions of the Diet. In May he is present at the annual award ceremony of the Japan Academy and in June the award ceremony of the Japan Academy of Arts. Both the Emperor and Empress attend an annual memorial for those who died in the last war (the posthumous award of decorations to over 2 million men killed in the war came to an end last year). 37. He visits, sometimes with the Empress, industrial enterprises and institutions devoted to social welfare. As an indication of the extent of these visits (which have become less frequent of late), during the period of occupation at the end of the war he travelled 30,000 kilometres on these pursuits and spent in all 165 days out of Tokyo. 38. Their Majesties leave Tokyo twice on regular annual visits to attend the Arbour Day Festival in the spring and the National Athletic Meeting in the autumn. The choice of prefecture for each of these is different every year, so that they have been able to visit each of the forty-six prefectures in the country

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at least once since the war (they have in fact visited some prefectures several times). These two regular engagements are often made an excuse for a more extended tour of the area. For example on their way to this year’s Arbour Day Festival in Shimane Prefecture, they visited Hiroshima and the Monument to the Victims of the Atom Bomb in 1945 for the first time. 39. These visits away from Tokyo always receive wide Press coverage. In particular last year they visited the Expo ‘70 site at Osaka three times and toured most of the more significant pavilions there. They will probably go to the Winter Olympics in Hokkaido next year. Such visits, however, are kept down to a bare minimum; presumably at least in part because of the tiring effect upon their Majesties. 40. Almost the sole vestigial survival of the former role of the Court as arbiter and dispenser of culture is the annual Imperial poetry party. Their Majesties compose thirty-one syllable traditional poems (known as waka). The public are asked to submit poems and do so, to the number of some 40,000 a year. A dozen of these are selected for prizes which are classed. It would be rash for a foreigner to animadvert upon the contributions. Suffice it to say that they are in the most rigid traditional mode, long since discarded by all poets of originality and spirit in Japan. None the less their Majesties’ contributions are always extolled and those of the Meiji Emperor still receive commendation, perhaps above their strict merit. This and all other award-giving ceremonies are marked by extreme formality. This is particularly true of the ceremonies for the award of Imperial decorations of 1st class or higher, at which the Prime Minister himself hands the decoration to the Emperor to give to the recipient.

THEIR MAJESTIES’ DAILY LIVES 41. The Imperial Palace within the walls and moats of the old castle of the Tokugawa family was destroyed by fire bombs during the war. It occupied only a small corner of the vast grounds within the total enclosure. It has now been rebuilt at a cost of £16 million in an extremely effective modern idiom, strongly influenced by traditional Japanese criteria. Its architect, however, disagreed with officialdom on the decoration of the interior, with the result that a secondary and less gifted man completed it. 42. The exterior of bronze with a copper roof is extremely impressive in its purity of line and severity, relieved by the creation of an exquisite garden. The interior reveals all too clearly the fact that furniture played no part in Japanese tradition. Until contemporary times Japanese sat on the floor and regarded ‘furnishings’ as vulgar. Western interiors were thought to be filled with ‘clutter’, ministering chiefly to the ego of the owners. Second-rate furniture, hideously patterned carpets, ill-understood chandeliers and inappropriately lurid wall paintings spoil what might have been a truly grand and imposing set of reception rooms. 43. There is a State banqueting hall, beautiful outside, a set of State rooms and less grand reception rooms, forming three sides of a dignified square with a smaller and more intimate set of reception rooms off it. Their Majesties, however, only use the palace for formal occasions, preferring to live themselves in their modest house hidden in the grounds and unseen by any but the intimate members of the Imperial circle.



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44. Their Majesties in practice live a very homely life in their private residence. His Majesty rises early at 7 o’clock and after a Western breakfast (porridge he inherited from his sojourn at Blair Atholl, but to this he adds a vegetable salad, which sounds of more transatlantic inspiration). He proceeds to his study at 10 o’clock to deal with official documents. He frequently lunches in his study without returning to his residence and works normally until 5 o’clock in the evening. He dines at 6 o’clock, as is the custom of the majority of his subjects, who are not subjected to the lengthy commuting endemic to Tokyo, then takes a bath, changes into casual clothes and spends the evening watching television, reading, or talking with visiting members of the Imperial Family. He watches the news on television assiduously, enjoys the serials and plays on it and follows keenly Japanese wrestlers (Sumo), some of whose ceremonial antics are said to originate from his mythical ancestors. 45. Their Majesties have been by repute particularly happy at their seaside villa some thirty miles south of Tokyo and their house in the mountains at Nasu. There the Emperor indulges in his hobbies. Pollution in his beloved Sagami Bay, however, has forced him to build a new villa at the end of a peninsula some ninety miles south of Tokyo, which is about to be opened. He visits these country houses some ten times a year. The historic palaces in Kyoto belong under the Constitution to the State and are fully used only for coronations, but His Majesty occasionally stays in that of the Emperor abdicant, which he invited Princess Margaret to use in 1969.

CONCLUSION 46. The Emperor and Empress therefore lead a life of bourgeois respectability and tranquility, visited frequently by the more intimate members of their family. They never accept invitations from private individuals and, indeed, often when travelling prefer to eat box lunches or dinners provided for them by their own kitchen. The Emperor neither drinks nor smokes. This is probably for health reasons, but he is no doubt well aware that both his father and grandfather died of illnesses caused by alcohol poisoning. 47. They do entertain foreign Heads of State and Ambassadors and invite other foreign diplomats to pay their respects at the New Year and on His Majesty’s birthday. The Crown Prince and Crown Princess accept invitations from Ambassadors to meet other royalty. The other members of the Imperial Household will attend functions given for them. On the whole they lead lives of extreme boredom. Duty dominates the Emperor’s existence. 48. Both the Emperor and the Crown Prince suffer from introvert personalities, the Emperor being meek to an excessive degree, while the Crown Prince appears sullen, perhaps sulky. When openly venerated as manifest divinities, it was not necessary for them to reveal their personalities, which in any event their education had served to dampen rather than develop. Now the role of constitutional monarch presents great problems for the organization of their public lives which cause grave anxiety to their advisers. The Emperor has long been accepted as he is, but more will be expected of the Crown Prince. The Crown Prince’s children will almost certainly grow into contemporary figures with greater character. 49. Will the monarchy survive until the grandchildren can take the limelight? That is the question which the Imperial Household and members of the

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Imperial Family ask themselves. I think it will, since the monarchy survived powerlessness and poverty for several centuries. The Civil List shows that the generosity of the Government towards the Imperial Family has not increased. To venerate it is part of the Japanese tradition and habit. This will I think persist, though I must in fairness conclude that the principal protagonists are not well suited to face the contemporary mass media. The public in turn learn of their Sovereign principally through these media. 50. Yet it may be a good thing that it would be hard for the Emperor and the Crown Prince to inspire by their personalities those excesses of patriotism, which could again lead to trouble. Had His Majesty displayed more character, he might have aided and abetted his military and brought the country to ruin in a Hitlerian Götterdämmerung. Had he had a nobler scale of values, he might have opposed them, but probably without success. His limited moral sense was not outraged by the ill deeds of his fellow countrymen, but did induce him to face the ignominy of surrender, which a stronger Japanese character might have shunned, to prevent his own people suffering. His meekness has stood him in good stead. JOHN PILCHER

ANNEX 1 IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AGENCY AND THE IMPERIAL HOUSE COUNCILS Before the Second World War there existed two powerful extra-constitutional institutions, the ‘Genro’ or elder statesmen and the Imperial Household ­Ministry whose proximity to the Emperor invested them with great influence in the conduct of national affairs. The Imperial Household Ministry was an organ of the Court; its three most powerful members were the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister himself and the Lord Chamberlain, probably in that order. 2. After the war the three laws which were enacted to give statutory direction in all matters of the Imperial Household came into force simultaneously with the Constitution on 3 May, 1947. These are the Imperial House Law (Law No. 3 of 1947), the Imperial House Economy Law (Law No. 4 of 1947) and the Imperial Household Agency Law (Law No. 70 of 1947). Before the war there was an Imperial House Council composed largely of members of the Imperial Family, including minors. There were then fourteen families as opposed to the present three. Under the Imperial House Law, the post-war Imperial House Council is now limited to ten members of whom only two are members of the Imperial Family. The Prime Minister and six others are members ex officio while the tenth member is a Supreme Court Judge. The Council has powers over matters which concern the ‘continuance and dignity’ of the Imperial Family. These include, inter alia, matters of the succession, marriages, regency and membership. 3. The Imperial Household Agency was created to take the place of the Imperial Household Ministry which was abolished together with the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. It is composed of stewards, chamberlains, masters of ceremonies, their respective deputies, secretaries and technicians and has responsibility for the management of the everyday life and the ceremonial affairs of all the Imperial Family. With the abolition of the Court nobility



THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE259

and the former military aristocracy the Imperial Household Agency has to some extent taken their place as the Court of the Emperor. For some reasons best known to themselves they have frequently run into conflict with the Government who have wished the Imperial Family to follow the example of the greater freedom enjoyed by most other monarchs. Nevertheless, for reasons given in the despatch, the Agency officials are apprehensive of over-exposing the Imperial Family to the public gaze. 4. Most of the Imperial Family’s property and investments were handed over to the State during the occupation. The Imperial House Economy Council has responsibility for the administration of relations between the Imperial Family and the State over questions of property. There are no members of the Imperial Family on the Council. It is responsible for recommending to the Diet the scale of the annual appropriations to be made to the Imperial Family and to the Imperial Household Agency. The traditional practice of keeping the Imperial Family on a shoe-string budget has not waned as can be seen by the following appropriations for the 1971 financial year:

£ (1). The Imperial Household Agency (wages and general expenses)

2,534,600

(2). All the Imperial Family

2,410,500

(a) Expenses for ceremonies, entertainment, etc. (b) The ‘Inner Family’ (including the Crown Prince and his family and the Emperor’s daughters) (c) The rest of the Imperial Family

2,238,500 110,300 61,695

(i) P  rince Takamatsu, Prince Mikasa, Prince Hitachi

9,640 each

(ii) P  rincess Takamatsu, Princess Mikasa, Princess Hitachi, Princess Chichibu

4,820 each

(iii) Children of (i) who have come of age

2,900 each

(iv) Children of (i) who are minors

970 each

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ANNEX 4

36

THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN*

O

n the 8th June the Japanese Imperial Household Agency tried out two experiments in European usage, preparatory to the Imperial State Visit to Europe in the autumn. His Majesty The Emperor for the first time received in audience a foreign journalist, Mr Anthony Joly de Lotbinière of BBC Television. I was present at the audience: indeed I was responsible for it coming about. Again for the first time, Their Majesties The Emperor and Empress held an informal luncheon for two foreigners: my wife and myself. These commonplace events seem so singular in this setting that they perhaps merit a description. From it some light may be thrown on the problems of conversing with Their Majesties. 2. The audience for Mr de Lotbinière was the subject of a good deal of prior discussion in Japanese circles, since it set what might prove an awkward precedent. Moreover the Imperial Household Agency were agog to see how His Majesty could handle the situation. I was primed by the Grand Master of the Ceremonies that they wished this occasion to have the air of an informal conversation. It was in no circumstances to be an interview, nor could it be treated as such. Mr de Lotbinière was fully apprised of all this. Heated discussions on how to proceed were going on audibly within the audience chamber up to the last moment, as we waited without. 3. In the event the soothing and avuncular tones of Mr de Lotbinière allayed the obvious fears that a thrusting journalist in the American style would seek to needle ambiguous information out of His Majesty, which was clearly bothering the minds of his household. The Emperor, however, was very ill at ease to begin with and at first had some difficulty in getting any words out at all. I mentioned in paragraph 17 of my despatch of 18 May that His Majesty suffers from jerky movements of the head. These became so agitated that I found it hard to look at the ‘dragon face’, which in the past so stunned with awe the privileged beholder. If we as a race are given to humming and hawing, we yield the palm in this respect to the Japanese. A prodigious number of ‘er’s * To Sir Denis Greenhill KCMG OBE, PUS, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London SW1 – 23 June 1971

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and ‘ah’s went on before His Majesty brought himself to offer some words of greeting. When he does bring himself to the point of utterance, his voice is loud and harsh. 4. By convention in Japan it is rude to breathe on people. Instead the breath is drawn in sharply, which makes them hiss like snakes. Moreover, sincerity is evinced by producing the voice from the very core of the person. Interest is shown by keeping up a veritable ‘bourdon’ from the pit of the stomach – a continuous ejaculation of deep-seated ‘ah’s and ‘eh’s. A combination of all these customs, with the disconcerting movements of the head thrown in, produced what was to me an almost alarmingly comic spectacle. 5. Again, the Japanese language, like the German, puts the all essential verbs at the end of the sentence; they govern the entire meaning of the phrase. It often happens in both languages that the speaker, by the time he needs to terminate his phrase, has forgotten how he meant to do so and thus the whole is rendered meaningless. This is very apparent in the case of The Emperor, who is nearly always obliged to end up with ‘I remain with this hope’, whether it follows on logically or not. The amalgam of all these circumstances in the solemn air of a vast and austere audience chamber produced in your humble servant a prodigious desire to laugh. 6. Mr de Lotbinière was, however, splendid in his best urbanely deferential and considerate manner. Obviously enough he asked His Majesty about his previous visit to Europe in 1921. His Majesty explained that his time in England had made the deepest impression upon him. Perhaps because he and his brothers were about the same age as Edward Prince of Wales and the other sons of King George V and Queen Mary, he had in consequence, he felt, been treated as though he were a son of the house. This had made the most delightful impression upon him, which had remained with him for the rest of his life. What he interpreted as the benignly paternal attitude of King George V was the most touching of his experiences. 7. Asked whether he had seen the film of the Royal Family, His Majesty replied that he had and that it had given him the sensation of having already met those members of the Royal Family who had not visited Japan. This was of great assistance to him in his forthcoming visit. He congratulated the makers of film, which he thought to be a masterpiece. 8. Mr de Lotbinière then asked His Majesty which of the many changes that had occurred during his reign seemed most significant to him. Here His Majesty, after even more humming and hawing à la Japonaise than usual, said that, of course, to a visitor the changes in his own environment must seem of great importance. Indeed this had been altered completely. On the other hand, what the visitor might not so readily perceive was that his heart had remained constant throughout in its affection for his people and in its devotion to their interests. 9. Asked about his hobbies and whether he had enough time for them, His Majesty said something about his interests in marine biology and botany, to which he devoted what spare time he had. Of course he would like to give much more time to them, but his devotion to duty was stronger than to his personal pursuits. 10. The relief of the Imperial Household at The Emperor’s relatively astute handling of Mr de Lotbinière’s mild questions and their pleasure that Mr de Lotbinière showed such soothing restraint in his manner and in the substance of his enquiries were palpable.



THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN263

11. The second half of the experiment was to take place one quarter of an hour later, during which I just had time to get home, change into morning dress and reappear. Out of consideration for this and because the audience had lasted far longer than they had anticipated, Their Majesties, delayed their appearance by some ten minutes. Consideration and affability characterized the occasion. 12. There were also present the Grand Master of the Ceremonies, Mr Shima, and the Grand Chamberlain, Mr Irie (both of whom will be in attendance upon Their Majesties during the European tour), a former Ambassador acting as translator but sitting with the party at the table, and a couple of court officials. Mrs Ohno, the wife of a former Japanese Ambassador in London acted most helpfully as Lady in Waiting to The Empress. We were urged not to stand upon ceremony but to converse freely and were assured that this was what their Majesties wished. 13. Normally at formal luncheons given to foreign ambassadors The Emperor and Empress sit together flanked by members of the Imperial Family and thus well insulated from any guests. On this occasion we were seated in the European manner, my wife on The Emperor’s right and I on the right of The Empress. Operation getting used to European ways began. 14. Nobody made any attempt to converse and The Emperor had the usual difficulties before bringing himself to use the ‘voice of the crane’ at all. Fortunately it was easy to plunge into the topic of the forthooming tour and the extent Their Majesties were looking forward to it was immediately obvious. The Empress made no attempt to broach any topic whatsoever and clearly no-one else was going to utter a word in the Imperial presence. 15. I therefore felt impelled to raise matters horticultural, in which Their Majesties are both deeply interested in their different ways. Talk of Kew Gardens and the laboratories there took up some time. Then, prompted by Mrs Ohno, I raised the topic of the carriage drive from Victoria Station and what Their Majesties might be able to see on the way. His Majesty had been very greatly struck by Westminster Abbey and looked forward to passing it. He expressed himself to be delighted at the prospect of visiting the Abbey later to lay a wreath. Conversation fell upon the gilt bronze effigies of the Plantagenets (contrasted with the slightly older gilt bronze figures which adorn one of the temples near Nara). His Majesty showed particular interest in the Chapter House which had served as the meeting place of the House of Commons. Perhaps these points might be borne in mind when Their Majesties are taken round the Abbey. 16. Westminster Hall had made a profound impact upon him and I assured him that he would see it at a distance. The Banqueting Hall in Whitehall and the fate of Charles I then came up, as did the origins of St James’s Palace. Clearly The Emperor is relatively well grounded on matters of history, as I had already had occasion to note when he and Professor Arnold Toynbee discussed for some hour the role in Asian civilization of the successor states to the Empire of Alexander the Great in India. Their influence even impinged on Japan. 17. My wife found English cloths and Scottish tweeds fruitful topics. The imperial interest in tartans became apparent. Folklore is a respectable topic in Japan. 18. Their Majesties exuded kindness and consideration throughout, but to those unacquainted with the inhibitions of Japanese social intercourse, the occasion might have seemed one of extremely stilted and protracted civility.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

His Majesty became progressively more animated during the audience and still more so during the luncheon. I was able to move him to mirth and small gusts of laughter continued long after my unworthy jokes had been digested and forgotten or dismissed by the others. Still I fear that conversation may always prove heavy-going, even though this will be mitigated by the evident benevolence of Their Majesties. 19. The fact is that the art of conversation as such has never been generally practised in Japan. Even intimate friends commune with nature in silence at the tea ceremony. Silence is the correct refuge when in doubt and embarrasses nobody. Only the European is stimulated by their silence to indulge in prodigies of conversation which must seem undignified revelations of lack of self-restraint to his hosts. This is unavoidable. Only when inebriated can restraint commonly go (usually to excess) and wit sometimes flow. 20. I have frequently conversed with Their Majesties in Japanese at receptions when the general hum of conversation has to some extent obliterated my mistakes. On this occasion and in front of assembled silent courtiers I felt very self-conscious at venturing into Japanese since polite usage appropriate to the Court is a veritable art in itself. In my turn I must have given Their Majesties equal – or greater – occasion for suppressed mirth. JOHN PILCHER

37 THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN TO EUROPE AS SEEN FROM TOKYO*

SUMMARY The visit was inspired by the desire of the Emperor to relive his happy experiences in 1921 but the idea also found favour in Japanese official minds. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 2. It might set a trend among young Japanese which could benefit both Japan and the world at large. (Paragraphs 4–5.) 3. The risk in Japan of Left-wing, and to a much lesser extent Rightwing, demonstrations. Incidents in Europe were not therefore quite such a shock as might have been supposed. (Paragraphs 6–9.) 4. Familiarity with America had led the Japanese to suppose that the last war had been forgiven and nearly forgotten but in the event only a few Japanese now deplore the unforgiving nature of Europeans. Many Japanese think that the Emperor should have responded to The Queen’s reference to the past. (Paragraphs 10–15.) 5. Ceremonial events in Britain very markedly stole the show, despite the alleged chilliness of the crowds. (Paragraphs 16–17.) 6. The Japanese people relieved to welcome their Majesties back from the tour. (Paragraphs 18–19.) 7. Contrast between the Emperor’s impassive demeanour in public and his relative degree of animation in private. (Paragraphs 20–21.)

* FEJ 26/4 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 5 November 1971.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

8. The visit gave immense pleasure but it has administered a jolt to the memory, which should not be allowed to make the Japanese turn in on themselves. (Paragraphs 22–24.) 5 November 1971

I

n paragraph 11 of my despatch of 19 May on ‘The Emperor of Japan: The Man and His Life’, I pointed out the difficulty experienced by the Imperial Household Agency in discovering how to expose the Emperor and members of the Imperial Family to their people, when, by upbringing and tradition, they could not have acquired the personalities, which may well now be necessary to win and sustain the affection and respect of their subjects. I suggest that it was in this context that the visit to Europe found favour in Japanese official minds. 2. The visit to Europe (of which I enclose the itinerary) was basically inspired by the desire of the Emperor to relive happy moments he recalled from his only other journey abroad as Crown Prince in 1921. In this he was powerfully encouraged by the Empress, who had never left the shores of Japan and eagerly desired to do so. The Imperial Household Agency, while disclaiming that the initiative came from their Majesties (since the Emperor is now precluded from any political act) favoured the project, because they wished their Majesties to see how other royal families tackled the problems of the contemporary age. That it was also desirable to return visits in the case of Belgium and Germany and follow-up the many royal visits to Japan made by members of the ­Netherlands and the British Royal Families gave a valid excuse for the trip. 3. Ever since 1964, when legislation passed the Diet providing for the appointment of a temporary Regent when the Emperor was unable to attend to matters of State because of travel or any other reason, the Imperial Household Agency and the Government have blown hot and cold upon the project. The evident delight of their Majesties in receiving the flow of foreign dignitaries, who came to Japan to visit the Osaka Expo in 1970, finally brought the matter to a head. His Majesty felt that, with his growing years, this might be the last opportunity for him to make such a journey and that, if he did not take it now, it would be too late. Indeed, up to the last moment the Japanese people wondered whether his health was sufficient to stand up to the strain. 4. There were underlying reasons which may have moved prescient and forward-thinking Japanese to encourage the trip. Many now know that ­Japanese racial exclusivity and their inward-looking civilization and morality are impediments to progress in the contemporary world. They would like to see Japanese becoming international figures, moving easily among the statesmen of the world. The willingness of the Emperor and the Empress at their advanced age to undertake a trip, involving mixing with many nationalities, they thought would encourage young Japanese to feel that they should try to emulate them. It might set a trend, which could in the long run be of benefit to Japan and in my view to the world at large. 5. Japanese educationalists are well aware that their unpopularity springs as much from their rabid insularity as from their deeds in the last war. There was therefore this constructive purpose in the minds of many. 6. The fact that it was the first time that a reigning Emperor of Japan had ever left the Japanese islands, at any rate in recorded history, added an extra dimension to the visit in the eyes of Japanese subjects. The older Right wing



THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN267

did not like the idea of this manifest divinity and repository of all the Japanese virtues and traditions leaving the Empire of the Gods. 7. Conversely the Left wing saw in the trip a nefarious plot on the part of the Imperial Household Agency, in league with the reactionaries and militarists, to enhance the position of the Emperor in the eyes of his subjects and thus to pave the way for a recrudescence of the manic nationalism of the past, which had led the nation to the folly of the Second World War and the humiliation of defeat. 8. Certainly fear of Left-wing and to a much lesser extent Right-wing demonstrations led to security precautions on a gargantuan scale, when their Majesties proceeded to the airport on 27 September to start on their journey. The route was literally lined with policemen and the evening before swarms of detectives scoured the route and the environs of the palace for hidden missiles. If any such were found, the news was not divulged. 9. Thus, from the word go, the Japanese public were prepared for a visit which might suscitate untoward reactions. That later incidents took place in Denmark, Britain, Holland and Germany at least was not therefore quite such a shock to Japanese opinion as might have been supposed abroad. 10. On the other hand, when Japanese think nowadays about foreigners at all, they think of Americans. The Occupation was overwhelmingly American and the tourists of today are dominated by the travelling transatlantic bluerinsed widows. The Occupation forced Americans to take the Japanese very seriously into their scheme of things. This familiarity with the Japanese seems to have cancelled out in American minds latent resentment at the treatment of American prisoners of war. 11. It must be recalled that the Japanese set out deliberately to humiliate white prisoners of war in the eyes of their former colonial dependents. The Americans ­ hilippines are as suffered from this policy as much as any. The events in the P poignant and appalling as anywhere else. Familiarity with post-war Japan – and perhaps a sense of responsibility for the improved educational system and thus the current national outlook that followed therefrom – have made it possible for the Americans to overcome their emotions and to forgive. 12. Knowing this, it was a certain shock to the Japanese to find that ­Europeans had not quite forgiven them for the humiliations to which they were exposed. The Japanese are used to resentment for a variety of political reasons, but the American example had led them to suppose that the last war had been forgiven and nearly forgotten. 13. In these circumstances therefore it strikes me as commendable that the Japanese Press and people took as calmly as they did the incidents which occurred. Only a few persons continue to write to the Press deploring the unforgiving nature of the Europeans. 14. On the contrary many thought and said that the Emperor should have tried to wipe the slate clean, by responding to The Queen’s reference to the bad relations of the past. Indeed, no sooner had their Majesties returned to Japan than questions about this were posed to the Imperial Household Agency. They declared that His Majesty could not have done so, because that would have been a political act, from which he is precluded by the Constitution. This did not, however, prevent His Majesty from referring in Germany to the shared unhappy state of defeated nations, but this discrepancy did not pass unobserved by Japanese. 15. Therefore on balance, perhaps the rather mean destruction of the cryptomeria the Emperor had just planted did serve as a tangible reminder

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

that Europeans, like South-East Asians, find it hard to forgive the calculated ­brutalities of the past. This may be salutary. The Dutch protests hurt more. The burning of the Japanese flag was felt to be insulting and my Netherlands colleague has been somewhat cold-shouldered in consequence. 16. In general terms the Imperial progress was followed ardently on ­television and was seen as a splendid series of theatrical occurrences, among which the events in Britain, because of the pomp and circumstance and the brilliance of the weather, very markedly stole the show. Only the Japanese flag floating above the Lorelei during the Imperial progress on the Rhine came near to evoking the enthusiasm which the carriage procession immediately called forth. 17. The alleged chilliness of the crowds did not greatly surprise (your humble servant remembers that during the State Visit of the Austrian President, who is after all the representative of a country markedly popular in Britain, received no more outward signs of pleasure, until, on the way to the airport, the Austrian flag was mistaken for the colours of Manchester United, when a roar of applause burst forth, which mistakenly warmed Austrian hearts). What most touched Japanese viewers on television and readers of the copious accounts in the Press was the enormous trouble taken by Her Majesty The Queen, His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh and the Royal Household in making flawless preparations. This more than outweighed any shock of realization that the misdeeds of the past still remain alive. 18. The perhaps foolhardy attempt to visit seven European countries between 27 September and 14 October was dictated by the Imperial priestly functions. He had to be back in time to reap symbolically the rice in the special field in the Imperial Palace. Such consummation of the ties between a manifest divinity and the forces of nature could not be delegated even to the Crown Prince. 19. Realizing the strain upon their Majesties, the Japanese people were immensely relieved to find them on their return in more relaxed form than before their departure. They were delighted to learn that the beaming face of the Empress had broken through to some extent the barriers of race, culture and education. 20. The impassive myopia of His Majesty, which may have been the real cause of the lack of enthusiasm in the crowds, was not commented upon. The Japanese public was left to conclude that the charm of both their ­Majesties’ presences had contributed to thawing relations between Japanese and ­ ­Europeans. 21. They could not, unfortunately, see the relative degree of animation, which His Majesty contrived to display, when in conversation with Her Majesty The Queen and Princess Anne. Not since the visit of Princess Margaret has His Majesty openly shown such delight in conversation, but this was hidden from Japanese eyes. Some did, however, note that in public His Majesty seemed only delighted at the sight of mammals and reptiles and that he evinced real enthusiasm when confronted with a panda and outlandish lizards. 22. In conclusion, the Imperial Visit, from a Japanese point of view, caused far more pleasure and pride than pain. Had the Japanese not been so preoccupied with sending in the suite personages who could not overshadow the Emperor and Empress, the Visit might have been more attractive for the ­European public. Their Majesties’ youngest daughter was in fact present in London during part of the Visit incognita. Had she been in the carriage procession, it would have been surprising if cheers had not gone up.



THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN269

23. Alexander Pope declared that ‘forgiveness to the injured doth belong, but he ne’er pardons who hath done the wrong’. It is not given to all to achieve the nobility of forgiveness and this may be regrettable, but it is all too easy for the miscreant to forget and this is ignoble. The visit gave immense pleasure, but also administered a healthy jolt to the memory. 24. The present is a painful interlude in Japan. President Nixon has dealt a series of body blows, under which the Japanese reel. The American ascendancy has lost its magic: the Japanese may well feel that they can no longer turn with confidence to the States. Wherever else they turn, they experience difficulties. Russia would welcome them, but this would alienate China. China and South-East Asia have long memories and have not forgiven past Japanese misdeeds. Now Europe reveals itself to be equally resentful. If this realization leads to redoubled efforts to gain the fair opinion of the world, no harm will have been done. 25. It should not, however, be allowed to go so far as to make the Japanese turn in on themselves. This could in the long run induce a feeling of being alone and misunderstood, which could engender a recrudescence of the manic nationalism of the 1930s. It would not be wise to cold shoulder the world’s third economic power. 26. If the Visit encourages the healthy outward looking tendency of young Japanese, it will have made a real contribution. It may help to diminish ­Japanese insularity and egocentricity. JOHN PILCHER

ANNEX I THE PROGRAMME OF THER IMPERIAL MAJESTIES VISIT TO EUROPE 27 September a.m.

Leave Tokyo International Airport Arrive at Anchorage (actually p.m., 26 September) Meeting with President Nixon

p.m.

Leave Anchorage Arrive Copenhagen. Stay at the Royal Hotel

28 September a.m.

Sightseeing (including Kronborg Castle) Luncheon with the King and Queen of Denmark at Fredensborg Palace

p.m.

Visit to the Japanese Embassy in Copenhagen Stay at the Royal Hotel, Copenhagen

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

29 September a.m.

Leave Copenhagen Arrive at Brussels; met by the King and Queen of the Belgians Visit to lay a wreath at the grave of the Unknown Soldier Luncheon with the King and Queen of the Belgians at the Laeken Palace

p.m.

Visit to the Brussels Town Hall Reception of the Diplomatic Corps in Brussels Banquet given by the King and Queen of the Belgians at the Royal Palace Stay at the Royal Palace

30 September a.m.

Visit to the Antwerp Town Hall Luncheon given by the Mayor of Antwerp aboard the Flandria Sightseeing round the Port of Antwerp

p.m.

Sightseeing in Antwerp Visit to the Japanese Embassy Attend a concert given by the Belgian Government at the Palais des Beaux Arts Stay at the Royal Palace

1 October a.m.

Visit the Town Hall of Charleroi Sightseeing in Charleroi Luncheon given by the Mayor of Charleroi

p.m.

Banquet given by their Imperial Majesties at the Royal Palace Stay at the Royal Palace

2 October a.m.

Arrive Paris Luncheon with the President of the French Republic

p.m.

Sightseeing in Paris including a visit to Notre Dame. Visit to the Japanese Embassy in Paris Stay at the Hotel Crillon



THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN271

3 October a.m.

Visit to the Louvre

p.m.

Stay at the Hotel Crillon

4 October a.m.

Visit to Versailles Palace

p.m.

Stay at the Hotel Crillon

5 October a.m.

Leave Paris Arrive Gatwick Airport, London to be met by HRH Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon Carriage procession from Victoria Station to Buckingham Palace Luncheon with Her Majesty The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh at Buckingham Palace

p.m.

Visit to Westminster Cathedral to lay a wreath on the grave of the Unknown Soldier Visit to the Queen Mother at Clarence House Presentation of Addresses by members of the Greater London Council and the Westminster City Council at St. James’s Palace State Banquet at Buckingham Palace Stay at Buckingham Palace

6 October a.m.

Receive members of the Diplomatic Corps at St. James’s Palace Visit to the Royal Society Luncheon given by The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at Hampton Court Palace

p.m.

Visit to the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew Reception given by City of London at Guildhall followed by a banquet given by the Lord Mayor of London also at Guildhall Stay at Buckingham Palace

7 October a.m.

Visit to the Linnean Society Visit to the Zoological Society of London and the London Zoo

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p.m.

THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

His Majesty the Emperor visits the British Museum (Natural History) Her Majesty the Empress visits the British Museum, Blooms­ bury Their Majesties attend a reception given by the Japan Society, The Nippon Club, The Japan Association and the Japan Chamber of Commerce at Claridges Banquet given by their Majesties at the Japanese Embassy in London Stay at Buckingham Palace

8 October a.m.

Leave Heathrow Airport, London Arrive The Hague Audience with Queen Juliana of the Netherlands Sightseeing in Amsterdam and Rotterdam Visit to the Japanese Embassy in The Hague

9 and 10 October Leave The Hague Arrive Geneva Visit to the International Red Cross Committee Sightseeing on Lac Leman Audience with the President of the Swiss Republic at the Hotel Beau Rivage Stay at Hotel Beau Rivage 11 October a.m.

Leave Geneva Arrive in Bonn; met by the wife of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mrs Heinemann Luncheon given by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany at the President’s official residence

p.m.

Visit to Bonn Town Hall Receive members of the Diplomatic Corps in Bonn Banquet given by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mrs Heinemann Stay at the Chancellor’s official residence

12 October a.m.

Their Imperial Majesties take a boat down the Rhine as far as Koblenz

p.m.

Visit Cologne Town Hall and sightseeing in the precincts of Cologne Visit to the Japanese Cultural Centre in Cologne Dinner party given by their Imperial Majesties at the residence of the Japanese Ambassador Stay at the Chancellor’s official residence



THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN273

13 October a.m.

Sightseeing in Bonn Luncheon given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mrs Willi Brandt at the Chancellor’s official residence

p.m.

Leave Bonn and stop over at Anchorage

14 October p.m.

Arrive at Tokyo International Airport

38 MR SATO’S NEW CABINET 1971*

SUMMARY Mr Sato’s new Cabinet will probably be his last. It was formed amidst evidence of growing popular frustration with long Liberal Democratic Party dominance. (Paragraph 1.) An LDP Prime Minister cannot ignore the demands of powerful faction leaders when forming his Cabinet. Behind factional manoeuvring lie the massive resources of the zaikai (business and financial world). (Paragraph 2.) Mr Sato has always shown skill in manipulating the factions. But ten years of rapid economic growth and unchallenged dominance by the LDP in Japan have given rise to daunting new domestic and foreign problems. (Paragraph 3.) Nevertheless Mr Sato seems to have left it to his successors to pursue new initiatives. He has chosen strong men for the top posts. Priority will be given to United States-Japan relations, reflation of the economy and liberalization. (Paragraphs 4–5.) Men of experience have been chosen to deal with domestic crises in the medical world, education and agriculture. (Paragraph 6.) The Defence Agency will move out of the limelight to consolidate Mr Nakasone’s achievements. Mr Nakasone has done well for himself. (Paragraph 7.) Introduction of some but not much young blood. Mr Sato has favoured the Ohira, Nakasone, Fukuda and Funada factions but took revenge on Mr Miki for daring to oppose him last October. (Paragraphs 8–9.) The new Environment Agency will have a hard fight to make its mark. (Paragraph 10.)  FEJ 1/13 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 9 July 1971.

*



Mr Sato’s New Cabinet 1971275

The new Cabinet is a tribute to Mr Sato’s special skills but despite Mr Sato’s solemn pronouncements it will be unlikely to do more than deal with urgent problems. The Prime Minister has achieved the return of Okinawa; he may not wish to become too embroiled in other major problems facing Japan. (Paragraph 11.) 9 July 1971

T

he Cabinet which was reconstructed by Mr Sato on 5 July will almost certainly be his last. He has now been in power for six years and eight months, longer than the late Mr Shigeru Yoshida and indeed longer than any modern Prime Minister of Japan. Technically, he still has another sixteen months as President of the Liberal Democratic Party, a position which is virtually commensurate with the post of Prime Minister. Nevertheless, after such a long tenure and twenty-three years of dominant Liberal Democratic Party Government, a mood of popular frustration with the seemingly indestructible political status quo has begun to manifest itself. My purpose in this despatch is to describe in more detail the composition of the new Cabinet and its relevance to the daunting problems in domestic and foreign affairs with which it will have to deal. 2. Factionalism is a phenomenon which is by no means peculiar to ­Japanese political parties. In some countries it leads to a multiplication of ­political parties: certain Western European countries are good examples of this. In others the formation of factions is transitory, depending largely on the concentration of power at any given time. It does not necessarily breed long-term loyalty or solidarity, so the demarcations are vague. In the Liberal ­Democratic Party in Japan, with 302 seats in the Lower House of the Diet and a comfortable overall majority, the factions and their leaders are clearly defined, well publicised bodies. The leaders of the principal factions have their eyes constantly on the Presidency of the LDP. The relinquishment of this ambition would mean the relinquishment of their raison d’être. In another sense, the greater the ­influence of a factional leader with the party leadership, the greater his chances of gaining Government and party posts for his faction – and J­ apanese politicians regard their positions with often undignified s­ elf-interest. There is therefore a perpetual struggle for advantage. Patronage plays an ­all-important role, while behind all the manoeuvring lie the massive resources of the financial and business world. An LDP politician who does not have the confidence of the zaikai, as it is called, has little hope of the top party post. An LDP Prime Minister is first and foremost the President of the LDP. He must therefore consolidate his own position by arrangement of the factional interests beneath him, before committing himself to questions of policy. This explains why 102 members of the LDP have had Ministerial experience since 1960. 3. Mr Sato has remained in power largely because of the consummate skill with which he has manipulated the factions. In all his four Cabinets he has achieved success in balancing the need to satisfy the demands of faction ­leaders with the need to place competent men in important posts. The new Cabinet however presented Mr Sato with an unexpected problem. Not only was he confronted as usual by the need to satisfy factional demands and yet to find men with appropriate skills for the respective portfolios, but he was presented a mere week before with some unexpectedly poor results in the regular Upper House elections. The Japanese public have shown little enthusiasm for the

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

successful conclusion of the Agreement for the return of Okinawa, which Mr Sato seems to regard as his principal achievement. They are now far more interested in protecting their own immediate interests and living conditions. That the LDP could find no better central campaign issue than Okinawa ­illustrates clearly the gap which has grown between the party and the people, while the various factions manoeuvre towards the succession. The present discomfort of the LDP has brought out in sharp relief how much they depend on the present gerrymandered electoral system, which gives excessive weight to the rural vote. Now those rural interests conflict with the steps Japan must take to adopt the responsibilities of a wealthy world Power. The recent ­elections have shown just how sensitive to unpopular policies this t­ raditional base of support can be. Indeed herein lies one aspect of the paradoxical ­difficulties of the LDP. In the single-minded and miraculously successful rush to economic prosperity during the last decade, the party skilfully gauged the changing mood of the people and pre-empted the slogans of the Opposition by ­transposing them into action. The world tended to stand by and marvel in anticipation of the inevitable stagnation which never came. Industry ground out a ­phenomenal growth record; people rushed to the cities and no one really cared about the destruction of the beauty of the land and personal inconvenience. Now the world wants Japan to make some sacrifices and the Japanese want to enjoy their prosperity and yearn for the beauty of the land they knew. But they do not want to jeopardize their rapid economic growth. 4. The LDP will probably have to move uncharacteristically fast to keep pace with changing domestic and foreign moods. They may indeed ultimately be forced to transform the structure of the party in order to remain in power. However, the presentation of his fourth Cabinet seems to show that Mr Sato is prepared to leave the refurbishing of the party image to his successors. He is primarily concerned with achieving the return of Okinawa and the mending of fences with the United States, while simultaneously arranging the appointment of a successor who will not throw the party into confusion. It is widely believed that Mr Fukuda, sixty-six, the new Foreign Minister, has the inside track in the succession race, but he faces stern opposition from Mr Tanaka, fifty-three, the new Minister of International Trade and Industry, who is, personally, a great deal more popular within the party. But Mr Tanaka is not a university graduate; he is a self-made man of great ability and attractiveness. Mr Fukuda is a dessicated, though brilliant, former bureaucrat of the Ministry of Finance, who graduated from the old Tokyo Imperial University. His pedigree is faultless and he has the all-important backing of the zaikai. Together with Mr Hori, who now holds the enormously influential post of Secretary-General of the LDP, these men have been the stalwarts of the Sato Administration. Faced as he is with urgent domestic and foreign problems, Mr Sato could not afford to exclude them from his Cabinet. He decided to use their ability and influence in two vital posts, in the hope that he might thereby also prevent an open power struggle. Mr Fukuda may be able to invest the slightly declining Ministry of Foreign Affairs with more prestige, but he may accede less to the wishes of its officials than Mr Aichi before him. Moreover his position on China, which will probably be influenced by his close relationship with the reactionary Mr Kishi, may remain even more inflexible than that of Mr Sato himself. If he can achieve a working co-operation with Mr Tanaka, the two could prove a formidably effective combination. On the other hand, a confrontation of these two titans could also have the most devastating results



Mr Sato’s New Cabinet 1971277

for Government and party. Mr Sato will need all his skill in harnessing their energy and that of the rather blunt new Minister of Finance, Mr Mizuta. All three will place immediate priority on the successful passage of the Okinawa Agreement legislation through the Diet in October and on the amelioration of relations with the United States. Mr Fukuda’s prestige in the United States is allegedly great. In this respect alone he is probably as good a choice as Foreign Minister as Mr Sato could have made. Both he and Mr Tanaka have already pledged themselves to strive for the settlement of outstanding economic problems in United States-Japan relations. 5. Mr Mizuta and Mr Tanaka have promised to take urgent steps to reflate the economy and stimulate domestic demand with a view to also holding off increasing external pressure for a revaluation of the yen. However, Mr Mizuta, who has had previous experience in this post as well as in Mr Tanaka’s, has so far proved uncompromising on the question of yen revaluation. It is difficult at this stage to predict how either will face the question of liberalization of remaining trade restrictions. 6. For the posts of Health and Welfare Education and Agriculture and Forestry Mr Sato chose three men with past experience. On 1 July over 70,000 doctors (whose Japan Medical Association usually provides a solid and influential phalanx of support for the LDP) resigned from the Government health insurance scheme over the Government’s proposals for the scheme’s reform. The new Health and Welfare Minister, Mr Saito, has already plunged into negotiations with the Japan Medical Association. The Central Education Advisory Council has recently produced proposals for a sweeping reform of the national education system. The new Education Minister, Mr Takami, is a tough proponent of conservatism, unlike his gentler predecessor. Finally, the new Agriculture and Forestry Minister, Mr Akagi, who as a party envoy of Mr Sato earlier this year went to Moscow to plead the case of the Japanese fishing industry, has the monumental task of persuading farmers to cut back rice production. He seems unlikely, however, to tackle reform of the obsolete food distribution system, which is a primary cause of inflation, 7. The Defence Agency has gone to Mr Masuhara, a somewhat aged member of the Upper House, who spent many years in the Agency as a bureaucrat. He will be expected to take the Agency out of the limelight it enjoyed under Mr Nakasone during the previous Cabinet (on which I commented in my despatch The Trademark and The Sword). He will attempt to consolidate the increase in efficiency and morale, which has been achieved under Mr Nakasone and to carry out the re-equipment programme initiated by him. Mr Nakasone himself must be satisfied with his appointment to one of the three principal party posts, Chairman of the Executive Council, which he needed in order to augment his influence within the party. It had been thought that he would have to give up any hope of this coveted post, in order to give some of the other members of his faction a taste of power. The fact that Mr Sato let him have it both ways will not be overlooked. Mr Nakasone will have been able to satisfy the demands of an unruly faction, while nevertheless pursuing his own personal ambition for the party Presidency. 8. Mr Sato may have been bending to pressure for the injection of younger blood into the Cabinet when he appointed Mr Takeshita, forty-seven, as Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Mr Hiraizumi, forty-one, as Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. However it is more likely that the appointment of Mr Takeshita, a protégé

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of Mr Tanaka, is due to Mr Tanaka’s refusal to succeed Mr Hori as Chief C ­ abinet Secretary and to the need to have a Tanaka man as Cabinet spokesman to balance the pro-Fukuda Mr Hori as Secretary-General and party spokesman. 9. Mr Maeo’s willingness to fill the post of Minister of Justice helped Mr Sato settle an old factional debt he had incurred when Mr Maeo supported his fourth term as party President. Furthermore the grant of two more Cabinet posts and one top party post to Mr Maeo’s old faction (now led by Mr Ohira, the former Foreign Minister) has prevented a possible break between Mr Sato and the second largest faction and perhaps even drawn it closer to supporting Mr Sato’s likely candidate for the succession, Mr Fukuda. Thus it was the Ohira and Nakasone factions and to a lesser extent the Fukuda and Funada (the Speaker) factions which did best. The Prime Minister took sweeping revenge on the followers of Mr Miki who gained a solitary insignificant Cabinet post. Mr Miki, whose liberal views have already isolated him from the bulk of the party, paid the penalty for opposing Mr Sato for the party Presidency. 10. Only Mr Yamanaka, Director of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, was retained in his post. He has been primarily responsible for liaison between the Japanese Government and the Government of the Ryukyus. His retention is due to the unexpected trust he has established with the crusty Chief Executive there, Mr Yara. There has been an addition of one post to the Cabinet, that of the Director-General of the Environment Agency. The Agency was only established on 1 July and is the much publicized Government answer to the demand for a special organ to deal with the multifarious problems of pollution. However the Agency is likely to suffer initially from a lack of legislation dealing with pollution and unequal competition from such Ministries as International Trade and Industry and Agricultural and Fisheries. 11. The Prime Minister has made solemn resolutions to deal positively with the many serious questions facing the Government. It is not easy at this stage to estimate his sincerity. Indeed there has already been widespread criticism of the new Cabinet as being yet another example of Mr Sato’s special skill in balancing the factional interests of his unwieldy party, rather than a genuine attempt to appoint men capable of formulating policies relevant to the needs of Japan both at home and abroad. This Cabinet has the air of one formed to take care of the most immediate problems facing the Government, while the Liberal Democratic Party solves its own internal succession problems. It does contain a wealth of experience, but it is a somewhat aged experience, which may rest content with finding solutions to the most immediate problems. The Prime Minister will probably be happy to leave complicated long-term decisions to his successor. It is possible that, although Mr Sato has satisfied most of the important factional interests, he will not risk remaining in power until the actual return of Okinawa. This is currently expected in April or July next year. The longer he remains, the greater is the danger of a damaging power struggle within the party. The peaceful return of Okinawa will assure him a place in one chapter of history. He may well wish to be remembered for this and devote his remaining months in office more to handing over the party in good shape to a successor of whom he approves than to taking initiatives. JOHN PILCHER

39 RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES*

SUMMARY The Press expose the bad state of relations between Japan and the United States. Given defeat, occupation and the different characteristics of the two peoples, the wonder is that they are as good. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 2. American influence in Japan was not always paramount. Europe played a large part in the modernization of Japanese institutions before the war. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was part of this process. However the Japanese extracted more out of the alliance (and the current American version of it) than they put in. (Paragraphs 4–8.) 3. Defeat in war proved to the Japanese for a time that the American way was the successful one. The Occupation was generous and some reforms have had far-reaching consequences. (Paragraphs 9–12.) 4. The Japanese set out to out-do the Americans at their own game: an unexceptionable revenge. However, just as this was about to be achieved, change in the United States image in Japanese eyes began with the Nixon doctrine. Now they see a weaker United States turning back on the principles they advocated by asking the Japanese to stand militarily on their own feet and to restrict their exports to the United States. (Paragraphs 13–16.) 5. Then the sudden announcement of Mr Nixon’s proposed visit to China was a great blow to the Japanese, shattering the illusion of a special relationship; yet the Japanese reluctantly admire this daring stroke of policy. (Paragraphs 18–21.) 6. Worst of all, the demigod conquerors seemed made of clay. The American model became no longer so attractive. Mercifully many  FEJ 3/304/2 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 12 August 1971.

*

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Japanese understand the American viewpoint. The Nixon initiative has forced them to reassess their position. They are trying to solve the economic quarrel by speeding up liberalization. (Paragraphs 22–26.) 7. Both Mr Sato and Mr Rogers are working to mend relations as quickly as possible. The Japanese know that they must rely upon the United States for a great deal yet. The Americans may in future look at the Japanese more realistically too. Now that the honeymoon is over, we should try and help both countries to find a new compatibility. (Paragraphs 27–33.) 12 August1971

T

he Japanese Press has shown for some months an obsessive and nearly hysterical interest in the bad state of relations between Japan and the United States. In this despatch I attempt an assessment of these relations, as seen from Tokyo; I realize that from other angles they may take on quite a different aspect. 2. To me the wonder is that relations between Japan and the United States are as good as they are. Given the unprecedented defeat, largely at the hands of the Americans and then the American military occupation of the Empire of the Gods, a logical observer would certainly have reached the conclusion that by now the bitterest of rancours, accompanied by fearful plots for revenge, must certainly have taken root and be flourishing in Japan. Seen in this perspective, the present undoubted strains seem relatively mild and certainly normal. 3. Basically the Japanese and the Americans are poles apart. The Japanese are insular, inward-looking, so nationalistic that to be a Japanese is a religion in itself, proud and sensitive. They are Prussians with an Italian sensibility: ‘aesthetic considerations’ really count for them. They are calculating, prudent and usually considerate, but utterly lacking in spontaneity. There could scarcely be a greater contrast than between them and the generous impetuosity of the extrovert Americans. A perhaps excessive respect for efficiency for its own sake alone seems to unite them. Yet the Occupation was by and large from the point of view of both sides a masterpiece. 4. Before the Second World War American influence on the vital institutions and the thought of Japan was surprisingly small. The Americans after all banged on the door in the middle of the last century and were the first to get inside it after it was opened. In consequence the ‘Black Ships’ of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris, the first American Consul, together with his probably fictitious girl friend, Okichi-san (prototypes of Pinkerton and Madame Butterfly), have passed into Japanese mythology. It was not, however, to the Americans that the Japanese turned, when they set about modernizing their institutions. 5. In the all important matter of education in which they were already proficient, they turned to the centralized French example. The French, too, until the Franco-Prussian War, after which the Germans supplanted them (characteristically enough), furnished their military model; their navy followed our pattern. The Constitution of the Emperor-centric State, dropped from on high in 1889, showed the influence of Bismarck. 6. Neither did the Americans arrogate to themselves in the case of Japan the role of the Oriental’s best friend, which they once prided themselves on having established with China. That part fell to ourselves as the result of the



RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES281

Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Americans never approved of this, always seeing Japan as a risk in the Pacific, and finally they induced us to abandon it in 1923. It was in some sort replaced by the London Naval Agreement ratified in 1930. 7. Study of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its vicissitudes might be salutary for the Americans, now that they find themselves in a similar position as a result of the Japanese American Security Treaty of 1960. They would find that the Japanese habit of proving rather better than their word and of extracting more than they give were lessons learnt the hard way by us between 1902 and 1923. The Americans, however, persist in expecting more of their pupils after their benign occupation and tutelage. 8. Whatever liberal winds reached these tight little islands blew from our shores, rather than from the land of the free. America was chiefly known and judged in the Japan of between the wars by its image projected in Hollywood films. It was deemed a matriarchy, whose highest ideals, the Japanese military used to say with contempt, were apparently incarnate in the body of an eighteen-year-old being of the female sex. American mothers, they thought, would never let their sons fight and die far from home. One blow should knock America out. 9. Experience in the war and then defeat and the Occupation changed all that. Japanese pride demanded that those who could conquer the Empire of the Gods must themselves be of superlative excellence – demigods at least. The military ‘way’ of the Emperor-centric State having proved itself to be wrong, they must discover and assimilate the successful American ‘way’, which had proved itself to be right – for success and failure are right and wrong in Japanese eyes. 10. Having largely spurned American example in the past, they took to it with a vengeance. They were greatly helped in this by the innate generosity shown by the Americans and by the palpable honesty of their intentions. They were in fact won over by the success and common sense of the American occupation. 11. The basis of education was transformed and co-education even raised its head. The Constitution was refurbished in conformity with American thinking. The sovereignty of the people and the supremacy of the elected Diet became naturalized in Japan under American influence. The much needed land reform was carried out. Shinto was disestablished and might no longer preach its own doctrines. The Emperor no longer ostensibly ruled as a manifest divinity or by virtue of myths. He was designated in the 1947 Constitution as ‘The symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.’ 12. These reforms were espoused in many cases with conviction; of none was this truer than of the peace clause in the Constitution, whereby Japan renounced armed forces. Only with difficulty did the Japanese contrive to maintain ‘Self-Defence Forces’, under an Agency not a Ministry. The nuclear allergy, natural in the guinea pigs of the atomic experiments, aided this revulsion against militarism, which had so obviously and demonstrably proved itself to be wrong. 13. As was only to be expected, many of these ‘improvements’ gradually underwent a sea change and did not turn out as their American instigators intended. But the Japanese never wavered in their determination to build up their sacred land into a Power again and took the American example as a model to that end. This time, however, it was to be an economic Power, pursuing

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peaceful commercial purposes. It was to overtake in scale the economy of the United States. This would be Japan’s unexceptionable revenge. The Japanese would point out a new economic way for the rest of the world to follow, if they had the requisite team spirit, loyalty and stamina, which they themselves so powerfully displayed. 14. Just as this dream seemed about to become a reality, America, the great model, turned and suffered a perhaps fatal change in Japanese eyes. First of all the Nixon doctrine of withdrawal from Asia raised doubts about the American ultimate intention to honour the Security Treaty and to defend her faithful pupil. With it went American promptings to the Japanese to stand on their own feet and to be ready to defend themselves if need be. 15. Next and equally disturbing, after having urged the liberalization of trade and investment on Japan for two decades, the Americans went back on their own principles by asking the Japanese to restrict exports to the United States of one product after another leading finally to the great textile row. Nay, further, just as Japanese exports in general to the United States were achieving what the Japanese took to be a well-earned success, by proving themselves to be up to the highest international standards, the Americans started accusing the Japanese of ‘dumping’ and other unfair trade practices. The Japanese therefore saw one-third of their export trade potentially in danger and reacted with anger and alarm. 16. Even the agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, which was to remove a last survival of defeat and of the American occupation, threatens to turn sour. The United States legitimately hoped for some gratitude from Japan for their generosity, but this boost to relations between the two countries is in jeopardy. The agreement is under attack from two sides: from the textile and protectionist lobby in the United States Senate and from the Japanese, who resent the retention of so many United States military bases in Okinawa and who suspect that the Americans are keeping nuclear weapons on the island. 17. Behind, however, the volte-face about armed forces and commercial principles, the Japanese saw looming the unpalatable fact of American weakness. Was the admired demigod, who had known how to lay them low, really only a figure of clay? This was the deeply disturbing suspicion, which could indeed upset their policies and actions. The American lack of success in VietNam, when they had contrived the impossible by defeating mighty Japan, was somehow humiliating, as well as deeply unsettling. The weakness of the dollar completed the unhappy picture: vulgarly put, America lost face in Japanese eyes. 18. Then came the unkindest cut of all: the proclamation of Nixon’s journey to Peking – his pilgrimage to Canossa. This came unexpectedly like the sudden frightening cry of the Zen master, supposed to alarm his pupils into an awareness of enlightenment, kwatsu!. It woke the Japanese up to the realities of their position. It shattered the illusion of the special relationship with the United States, which the Japanese fancied that they had established. 19. The Americans knew that China was all important to Japan, by its propinquity and by common traditions. They knew that how to achieve better relations with China was a major subject of debate in Japan. Yet the Japanese were kept in greater ignorance than the Pakistanis of Kissinger’s movements and Nixon’s intentions. ‘Oh Kissinger of death’ they cried.



RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES283

20. Here again was a profoundly alarming volte-face. The Japanese had thought that it was the Americans who had wished to put China in Coventry and had exerted efforts for so long to make others keep her there. Then suddenly, under the spell of ping pong diplomacy, they jettisoned the structure of their own building. Certainly in Japanese eyes they were guilty at the least of the highest inconsideration in not consulting Japan. Moreover they knew the delicacy of Japan’s relations with Taiwan. 21. Yet, just as the charmless secretly long to be loved, so the Japanese, so rigid and unspontaneous themselves, cannot refrain from admiring flexibility and daring strokes of policy in others. Current pique barely conceals applause. Nevertheless it has put Japan on the spot and made her undertake the hateful task of making quick decisions. 22. From all this emerges the fact that the American model has no longer the attraction it once had. Doubts about its military, economic and political efficacy gain momentum. Its value as an ally seems less certain. None of this is very healthy. The people are rightly perturbed, not least the Americans in Japan. 23. I have deliberately given the Japanese side to the picture, but mercifully the American viewpoint is becoming better understood here. The Japanese realize that they have been too cautious in liberalizing their trade policies. They would argue that, after the experience of total defeat, they are reluctant to face competition with the industries they have so painfully built up, until they are absolutely certain of their ability to stand up to it. 24. They know that the Americans think the Japanese take a dog-in-themanger attitude and that they find them lacking in feelings of gratitude, even of friendship. This has penetrated their consciousness and there is much earnest endeavour going on to seek to improve the Japanese image; there is talk of orderly marketing and of how to avoid damage to the economies of other countries. Stern treatment at the hands of the Common Market has perhaps encouraged these promising tendencies. But so far the Japanese Government have resisted the view that a revaluation of the yen would help to remove some of the stress and strain with the Americans and their other trading partners. 25. At any rate the Nixon thunderbolt has given all to think feverishly. The Prime Minister has performed prodigies of verbal tightrope walking, standing pat on his consistent attitude, yet permitting underlings to go far beyond it. Finally he felt inspired to beat his breast in public for the outrages upon China perpetrated by the Japanese in the past and to pledge his willingness to follow or precede Nixon’s example and make the fateful journey to Peking himself. In the end the Japanese position on the United Nations issue favouring the entry of China but against the expulsion of Taiwan has come to coincide with the American stance. 26. Meanwhile the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has been cajoled into speeding up its normally slow and cautious pace of liberalization of both imports and capital investment with the avowed intent of spiking American criticisms, thus proving that the American viewpoint has been grasped and taken to heart. 27. Perhaps the most encouraging outcome of these storms and stresses is that both parties express determination to stop the rot. Mr Sato in reconstructing his Cabinet recently gave his new Foreign Minister, Mr Fukuda, chosen because he is known to have the confidence of the Americans, as his first task the mending of relations with the United States.

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28. Meanwhile, the American Secretary of State speaking to the Japan Society of New York, while rehearsing the American position that Japan’s economic policies must be subject to the same criteria as those of other major developed countries, did stress that Japan and the United States, working together in co-operation with others can make a decisive contribution toward stability and strength of purpose in the Pacific and towards the growth of economically healthy and politically representative societies. 29. Now talk of the Emperor visiting the United States and of Mr Nixon coming to Tokyo before Peking fills the Press and seems to show evidence of resipiscence [sic] on both sides. 30. Perhaps therefore there is reason for mild optimism. The Japanese know that for a decade to come they must rely upon the United States nuclear deterrent. They must therefore make the Security Treaty work. This entails putting up with United States prevarications, as they see them. On the other hand, by their change of direction over China, the United States have, unwittingly perhaps, undermined to some extent their strongest allies in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party. They have weakened the position of their supporter, Mr Sato, and given an unwelcome fillip to his Left and Right-wing opponents, who in turn for different reasons wish to diminish American influence in Japan. 31. I conclude therefore by hazarding the assertion that the attraction of America will from now on never be so strong again in Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese need the Americans for some time to come. Both sides wish to patch matters up and on the surface can well do so. 32. The Americans on the other hand may genuinely be deeply chagrined by the rather belated realization of Japanese egocentricity and may find it hard to persist in viewing the Japanese as their apt and efficient pupils. Realism, ever present on the Japanese side, may from now on be more evident in American calculations as well. 33. With the inevitable and natural end to the Pinkerton-Butterfly honeymoon, we should, I submit, encourage the Americans to view the end of the affair as a perfectly normal occurrence. We had a similar experience in our time, but let divorce supervene. Now that the Japanese are at last aware of their own shortcomings, the Americans should surely try, try and try again and we should aid and abet. JOHN PILCHER

40 JAPAN IN 1971: THE RUDE AWAKENING*

SUMMARY Exultation in the increasing Gross National Product waned and preoccupation with pollution, the quality of living and relations with Communist China worried all Japanese. (Paragraphs 1–7.) 2. The settlement of Okinawa caused little satisfaction. To the north the Russians held on to the islands seized. (Paragraphs 8–9.) 3. Successive American volte-faces caused wide consternation. The American doctrine of withdrawal from the Far East forced the Japanese to contemplate the necessity of defending themselves; the Americans had advocated liberalization, but wished to curtail Japanese imports, just when the Japanese were building these up under American tuition as they thought. (Paragraphs 10–14.) 4. The ‘Nixon shock’ of his journey to Peking, taking China out of the corner, shook all Japanese. (Paragraphs 15–17.) 5. The Opposition collared the vexed problems of relationship with China and quality of living. Mr Sato however, despite everything, remained in the saddle. (Paragraphs 18–19.) 6. Lastly came the dollar crisis. The Japanese knew their own shortcomings in American eyes but felt the Americans should put their own house in order. (Paragraphs 20–23.) 7. Mercifully the Japanese now know the nature of their problem: they rebuilt their country too fast and too successfully. They must now turn their attention to improving the quality of living and providing social amenities. (Paragraphs 24–27.)

 FEJ 1/1 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 31 December 1971.

*

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

8. The world pattern did little to lessen disquiet. Dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf and India’s flirtations with the Soviet Union, preoccupied many. (Paragraphs 28–29.) 9. Relations with Britain were happily normal. The Japanese understood Britain’s motives for joining the Common Market. (Paragraphs 30–32.) 10. In 1971 the Japanese felt a little cold-shouldered and may value British friendship more in consequence. They felt however a sense of power for the first time since the Second World War. (Paragraphs 33–35.) 31 December 1971

I

submit some observations about the state of Japan in 1971, together with a list of the principal events during the year. 2. 1970 in Japan marked the apogee of glorification of the Gross National Product. The International Expo at Osaka was the final exultation in the success of the ‘economic way’ which Japan had espoused ever since defeat. Militarism had led her to disaster; the economic way, patterned on that of the United States, was to lead her to untold prosperity without bloodshed and was to open new paths for all mankind to follow. 3. Already at the Osaka Expo there was a new tendency to laugh slightly at their own achievements. By 1971 this had turned to less cheerful criticism. Pollution preoccupied everyone. Although the Japanese islands are larger than the British Isles, only one-sixteenth of their surface can be cultivated or, what is now more relevant, is fit for industrial sites. Therefore, it became apparent that the Japanese islands already harboured rather more effluent-producing factories than their area could well take. How to combat the resulting pollution preoccupied everyone. 4. In addition to pollution, housing, town planning and the amenities of existence thrust themselves to the forefront. By 1971 hundreds of thousands of Japanese were visiting countries all over the world. They observed that even the humble in Europe, without the soaring GNP to which the Japanese had become accustomed, were far better housed and enjoyed a more agreeable environment. In short, the ‘quality of living’ in a booming up-soaring economy was seen to be far less than in countries half as productive. 5. In addition to the malaise which these new preoccupations produced came some heart-searching about the general direction Japan was taking. Morality hitherto had been based upon an austere code of virtues suited to a basically poor society. This was felt no longer to be applicable and yet, what was to take its place? 6. On top of these heart-searchings came the vexed problem of relations with Communist China. All Japanese feel an affinity with Chinese civilization, owing to the ideograms they share and the many cultural traditions they have in common. 7. Perhaps only the very well informed realize all the problems involved in achieving normal relations with China, but the Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, did find it appropriate to beat his breast in public and acknowledge the maltreatment the Japanese had meted out to the Chinese ‘elder brother’ during the last hundred years.



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8. Meanwhile, the settlement of Okinawa, designed to ease JapaneseAmerican relations, proved thorny. The inhabitants of Okinawa were cantankerous in their insistent demands. They wished nerve gas to be removed, but not through their villages. They wished to be united to Japan, but not on the terms negotiated by Mr Sato’s Government. Little goodwill accrued to either the Japanese or the United States Governments. Students, hard put to it to find a cause to which to devote their irrepressible energies, rioted about the settlement of Okinawa. 9. To the north the Russians firmly held on to the islands they had acquired at the last moment during the war and showed no signs of even admitting the existence of a Japanese grouse on that score. No doubt they were saving them up as bait to be deployed at the right moment. 10. With all these uncertainties in the air came the disturbing series of American volte-faces. Mr Nixon’s Guam doctrine seemed to spell the beginning of the end of American hegemony and effective intervention in Far Eastern affairs. Yet to the Japanese, the United States/Japan Security Treaty would be a necessity for a decade at least. 11. The inability of the American Government to put an end to the war in Viet-Nam was seen by the Japanese as in some sense humiliating. The ­Americans had contrived to conquer Japan – the Empire of the gods – but they could not deal with those Viet-Namese. 12. Then the Americans, who had inserted the peace clause in the Japanese Constitution, began suggesting that they, the Japanese, should rearm and take their fair share in defending themselves. The Japanese had espoused the peace clause with conviction. Rearmament for them was a highly contentious issue. In addition, any move in that direction was a most unwelcome gift for Chinese propaganda about neo-militarism in Japan. However a reluctant Diet did approve an increased defence expenditure for the next five years (though otherwise a series of mishaps imposed a ‘low posture’ on the Self-Defence Forces). 13. Next the Americans who had persistently advocated liberalization, the abolition of trade barriers, quotas and semi-governmental restrictions (administrative circulars from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the like) wished the Japanese to curtail their exports to the United States when it suited their interest. This seemed illogical and unfair to the Japanese. 14. The Japanese had after all followed the American example. They had eschewed vengeance in the classical manner and had devoted themselves with American help to building up their industrial capacity. Just as its success was proved, the United States turned against them. The long-drawn-out quarrel over non-cotton textile exports finally ended in an agreement at the end of the year, but the strong-arm tactics of the Americans aroused considerable bad feeling in Japan. 15. Lastly came the rude ‘Nixon shock’, as it is known in Japan, when the President of the United States announced his intention to go to Peking. The Americans had insistently demanded that China be kept firmly in the corner. Now President Nixon saw fit to bring her out of it. 16. He knew that to do so unannounced to his allies, the Japanese, who were so preoccupied by their relationship with China, would be to touch a most sensitive nerve. He apparently argued that their exasperation would be sterile: where could they turn? Not to Russia, since this would irritate the Chinese; not to China, now that they had the vast success of the leader of the free world

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going to do his kow-tow to them; not even to Europe, where disinterest and distrust predominated. This apparent calculation behind the ‘Nixon shock’ annoyed the Japanese most of all. 17. Stunned by a sense that ping pong diplomacy had somehow outmanoeuvred them and filled with the idea that the Americans were getting in first and outsmarting them, delegation after delegation of varying degrees of official, political and commercial personalities poured from Japan to Peking, willing to denounce their Government and the policies of their country for any blessed sign of Chinese approval: none was forthcoming. 18. The Opposition, of course, espoused the normalization of relationships with China as one of their major principles, just as they took over the defence of the quality of living and the necessity for huge sums to be dedicated to urbanization and social welfare. 19. Meanwhile Mr Sato was given to understand more plainly than is usual internationally that he alone and the peace treaty with Taiwan he upheld stood in the way of normalization of relations with China. Mr Sato is a very robust and resilient man. He took it in his stride. He performed some dexterous movements in skating over the thinnest of ice. As the year ends he remains in power for a few more months at least. Someone must succeed him, but there is no one in sight with the same air of well-being. The favourite, Mr Fukuda, by comparison is frail, less popular and with little public appeal. 20. Finally after the series of American volte-faces came the dollar crisis. The American economic giant had feet of clay. Moreover he wished to export his troubles to others. Respectable countries like Great Britain had been forced to the distasteful decision of devaluing the sacred pound to safeguard themselves, but the Americans wished others to make these sacrifices on their behalf. When the currency settlement finally came, the dollar devaluation took some of the sting out of the price the Japanese had to pay. 21. Of course, prescient Japanese knew that they had been too selfish, too self-centred, too blinded by their own interests. They had underestimated the volatile, impetuous qualities of the generous American extrovert. They had haggled and niggled to the point when the Americans had become exasperated. 22. The second ‘Nixon shock’, or ‘dollar shock’, as the Japanese called the package of American economic measures, hit them at a less than usually resilient moment. The Japanese economy was in one of its cyclical troughs, owing to over-investment in many industries. Some businesses and some of the older industries will suffer from yen revaluation, though the abolition of the 10 per cent surcharge is an alleviation. On the other hand, the newer industries will be able to take revaluation in their stride, and some will benefit from the cheaper raw materials. 23. Unfortunately, the Japanese protested so much about the damage these American measures would cause that they have in some measure brought about the very problems they feared. They have talked themselves into a deeper recession, and it will take some months more for the economy to recover its normal thrust and ebullience. 24. Moreover, by the end of 1971 far-sighted Japanese know very well that their troubles stemmed from the fact that they were too eager to rebuild their country laid waste by the war and defeat. They worked too fast and too hard and were too successful. They must now calm down. Whether by introducing a five or even a four-and-a-half-day week, by lengthier holidays, by encouraging



JAPAN IN 1971: THE RUDE AWAKENING289

leisure pursuits; by hook or by crook they must get back to the enjoyment of living, which still remained with them despite poverty and austerity before the last war. 25. If they do not do this, troubles will increase with all their clients and competitors, notwithstanding revaluation and ‘orderly marketing’. Their unpopularity, which the Imperial Visit to Europe brought home to them again and which they know to be far more acute in China and South-East Asia, will land them in considerable trouble. 26. The mercy is that well informed and enlightened Japanese are doing what they can to turn zeal into other directions besides that of increasing production. Even the Imperial Visit to Europe was taken as a supreme sanction for interesting themselves in other people’s civilizations and ways of life. 27. There is a realization that their former insularity, given a mystical, manic tinge by Shinto – the worship of land, race and State – can no longer serve them well. What they need is a leisurely sport like cricket, days of relaxation offered by horse-racing, and a more gentlemanly attitude to work. They have lived in order to work; many are determined that they shall learn to work only in order to live. 28. Although more money in the pocket brought contentment to the majority, disquiet troubled the thoughtful in 1971. The general world scene did nothing to allay this. The Japanese have always been worried by their dependence on overseas sources for their fuel and raw materials. The ganging up of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries emphasized again their dependence on foreign oil companies and in particular on oil from the Persian Gulf. The Iranian seizure of the Tumbs Islands passed relatively unnoticed, but may come to be seen as a menace, since 90 per cent of their oil supplies come from the Persian Gulf. 29. Mrs Gandhi’s flirtations with the Soviet Union and repeated rumours of Russian presence in the Indian Ocean further serve to arouse apprehension. The Indo-Pakistani conflict underlined this. Our own withdrawal from ­Singapore emphasized the importance of the Straits of Malacca and their control to the Japanese economy. 30. In this troubled pattern relations between Japan and Britain remained happily normal. The Imperial Visit aroused great pleasure, particularly at the splendour and detail of the preparations. The warmth of the reception accorded by the Royal Family more than outweighed minor incidents. 31. The Japanese understood British motives for joining the Common Market, but they were apprehensive of the European attitude towards Japan. Through typical Japanese myopia, they had missed the chance of binding us to a more liberal commercial agreement. Now it is too late for Britain to take independent initiatives of this kind. The Common Market members are united in their determination to keep a safeguard in their commercial agreement and keep a tight rein on Japanese export expansion in their markets. 32. It is very unfortunate for Japan that the time for settling their commercial relations with Europe should have coincided with the American quarrel and the general fear of the diversion of Japanese goods from the A ­ merican market. Diversion or no, Japanese exports to Europe and to Britain are certainly rising, admittedly from a very low level, but at a rate too fast for comfort.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

33. I conclude that during 1971 the Japanese came to feel themselves a little cold-shouldered in the contemporary world. Friendship with them is difficult, as we learned during the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and as the Americans have recently had occasion to perceive because of their excessive egocentricity. Yet surely it is worth an effort to cultivate this nation which, despite the brakes which concentration on improving life at home must impose, is likely to become perhaps the world’s greatest producer. 34. Perhaps it was not just coincidence that led the Japanese Prime Minister, so debonair despite his problems, to attend this year’s dinner of the JapanBritish Society. This was seen as a mark of singular favour. 35. In short, 1971 brought a rude awakening to Japan: the Nixon shocks caused flashes of enlightenment. The Japanese were forced to reappraise their whole position in the world and the direction they were taking. If they found much to alarm them, they also discovered their hitherto little used power in the contemporary scene. Their actions in a sense had precipitated the whole international financial crisis: their voice counted in the Council of Ten. For the first time the vista opened to them of Japan playing a key role in world affairs. J. PILCHER

ENCLOSURE CALENDAR OF EVENTS IN 1971 January 1

Imports of ten items of interest to Britain, including whisky, liberalized.

13

The Government announces a supplementary Budget of Y263,321 million.

19

Bank rate lowered by 0.25 per cent to 5.75 per cent.

26

Ministry of International Trade and Industry announce the formation of the Petroleum Development Corporation to search for oil overseas.

29

Ishibashi (JSB) attacks MITI in the Diet for granting a licence to Ishihara Sangyo to build a factory in Yokkaichi in spite of knowledge of likely pollution from the factory.

31 Jan.–6 Feb. Mr Anthony Grant attends Consultative Shipping Group Meeting in Tokyo. February 2

It is announced that Japanese investment in Taiwan in 1970 reached a record high of $28,530,000.

9

DSP Convention ends; Nishimura re-elected Chairman for the fourth time.



JAPAN IN 1971: THE RUDE AWAKENING291

10

Zengunro (Okinawa Baseworkers’ Union) begin a fortyeight-hour strike against proposed reduction of baseworkers after the return of Okinawa.

11

Aiichiro Fujiyama and the Memorandum Trade Delegation leave for Peking.

12

It is announced that land which had been allocated for forcible requisition under the Land Reform Law but still not apportioned, will be returned to its original owners at a price of Y2.50 per tsubo (3.3 square metres).

March 1

Memorandum Trade communiqué signed in Peking. Japan/USSR crab fishing talks begin in Moscow.

18

Japanese steel industry announces plan to reduce exports to the United States by 3 per cent.

20

It is announced that 800 companies represented by 1,500 employees would attend the Canton Trade Fair.

23

The political parties (excluding the JCP) agree to a formula for the return of land requisitioned under the Land Reform Law (see 12 February).

March 28–29

Senior LDP members meet Wang, Deputy Leader of the Chinese table-tennis team.

31

The Supreme Court refuses to reappoint as judges certain members of the Seihokyo (Young Jurists’ Association) on the grounds of sympathies with the Japan Communist Party.

April 1

Tariff reductions agreed under Kennedy Round are fully implemented.

6

Communist Party of Soviet Union 24th Convention opens: JCP and JSP delegations attend.

11

First round of local elections held throughout Japan; 72.36 per cent turnout. Minobe (Socialist) gains record majority in Tokyo: Osaka goes Left.

12

Exports for the 1970 fiscal year announced as $20,000 million.

15

Prime Minister publicly encourages Takeo Noda, LDP, to visit Peking.

20

Japan/USSR crab fishing talks reach a stalemate: Akagi is despatched as a Special Envoy to Moscow.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

21

Fourth Defence Plan revealed.

24

London Symphony Orchestra conducted by André Previn comes to Japan to give performances in Tokyo and Osaka.

25

Nishimura resigns as DSP Chairman.

27

JDA announces Budget of Y5.8 billion for Fourth Defence Plan. Japan’s population reaches 104,660,000 (including Okinawa). Nishimura (DSP) dies.

May 1

Under pressure from the farming lobby in LDP, the Government raises the producers’ rice price, but announces its intention to hold the consumers’ rice price at its old level.

7

Bank rate lowered by a further 0.25 per cent to 5.5 per cent.

14

Private Railway Workers’ Unions hold twenty-four-hour strike.

21

JSP announces agreement for co-operation with DSP and Komeito in the Upper House elections.

24

65th Regular Diet Session ends.

31

70,000 doctors resign from National Health Insurance system. Industrial production drops by 4.5 per cent in May compared with April.

June 11

The Economic Planning Agency announced that the GNP for the 1970 fiscal year was Y72,718,100,000, i.e. for the first time it had exceeded $200,000 million.

17

The signing of the agreement for the return of Okinawa takes place simultaneously in Tokyo and Washington.

21

The textile industry finalizes its plans for autonomous restrictions on exports to America (to take effect from 3 July).

27

The Ninth Election for the House of Councillors takes place.

29

Imports of twenty items, including black tea, are liberalized.

30

The Mitsui Mineral and Mining Company is found guilty of polluting the environment and is ordered to pay Y57 million in compensation to victims of illness caused by the pollution.

July 1

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development yen bonds worth Y11 billion are floated.



JAPAN IN 1971: THE RUDE AWAKENING293

2

Joint communiqué signed in Peking by visiting Komeito mission and China/Japan Friendship Association.

3

A TOA domestic flight crashes in Hokkaido with all sixtyeight passengers and crew killed.

4–11

Mr Melvin Laird, United States Secretary of State for Defence, visits Japan.

5

Mr Sato reshuffles his Cabinet.

July 14

The 66th Special Diet Session opens.

16

General Motors and Isuzu sign an agreement whereby General Motors takes over 34.2 per cent of Isuzu’s shares. Kenzo Kono (LDP) defeats the official LDP candidate in an election for President of the Upper House; the end of a tenyear tenure of that post by Yuzo Shigemune.

17

Mr Nixon announces his decision to visit Peking by May 1972.

24

End of Special Diet Session.

27

The bank rate is lowered again by a further 0.25 per cent to 5.25 per cent, its lowest point for thirty years.

28

A meeting between Mr Sato and Mr Takemi, President of the Japan Medical Association, brings a solution to the National Health Insurance System problem.

30

An ANA domestic flight collides with an ASDF fighter plane and crashes with all aboard (162 people) lost.

August 1

Director-General of the Defence Agency, Masuhara, and Chief of the Air Staff, Ueda, resign to take responsibility for the crash of the ANA plane. Implementation of first round of Japanese Generalized Preferences Scheme.

2

Naomi Nishimura becomes Director-General of the Defence Agency.

2–6

World Scout Jamboree held on slopes of Mt Fuji.

3

Ikko Kasuga is elected Chairman of the DSP.

4

Implementation of Fourth Round of Liberalization of inward capital investment.

11

The Japan/Korea Ministerial Consultations end; Japan agrees to extend a loan of $200 million to Korea.

15

Mr Nixon announces his economic measures.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

16

The Tokyo Stock Exchange plunges by a record margin following the announcement the previous day of Mr Nixon’s new economic measures.

17

An emergency session of the Cabinet is called to deal with the situation following Mr Nixon’s announcement; meanwhile Japanese foreign reserves climb above the $10,000 million mark.

25

Wang Kuo-chuan arrives in Japan to attend the funeral of Kenzo Matsumura; he is met at the airport by Opposition Party leaders and Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita.

27

For the first time in six years a fall is announced in rice production.

28

The yen is floated.

September 9

The removal of poison gas from American bases in Okinawa is completed. The Eighth Regular Japan/United States Joint Economic Committee opens in Washington for two days.

16

Three policemen killed during operations for the forcible requisition of land for the new Narita International Airport.

21

Komeito Convention opens: Takeiri, the Chairman, is stabbed by a religious fanatic. United States Government announces that it will impose import restrictions on textiles unless an inter-Government agreement is established by 15 October: the textile industry announces its refusal to co-operate.

22

The Prime Minister announces that Japan will co-sponsor the Reverse Important Question and Dual Representation Resolution at the United Nations General Assembly.

23

The Government announces special compensation measures for small and medium enterprises to avert the effects of the Nixon economic measures.

27

Their Imperial Majesties depart for Europe.

28

The Tokyo University Space Research Centre successfully launches Japan’s first scientific satellite ‘Shinsei’.

29

The Niigata district court awards substantial damages to plaintiffs seeking compensation for personal injuries suffered from pollution of the Agano River area by the Showa Electric Company.



JAPAN IN 1971: THE RUDE AWAKENING295

October 1

Imports of twenty items, including confectionary and biscuits, are liberalized.

chocolates,

sugar

2

The Peking Government and the Dietmen’s League for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China issue a joint communiqué in Peking.

8

The Government announces that Okinawan dollars will be exchanged at the rate of Y360 to the dollar: the American Embassy in Tokyo protests.

12

The Government agrees on a supplementary Budget of Y24 billion.

14

Their Imperial Majesties return from Europe.

15

Japanese and United States Governments sign a provisional agreement for the restriction by Japan of textile exports to the United States.

16

The 67th Extraordinary Diet Session opens.

21

Fujitsu and Hitachi, the top two computer manufacturers announce a merger to compete with foreign computer manufacturers. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development yen bonds worth Y12 billion are floated. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry request the Electrical Appliance Industry and the Automobile Industry to impose independent restrictions on its imports to the United States.

25

At the United Nations the Albanian Resolution wins overall support while the Reverse Important Question Resolution, cosponsored by Japan, is defeated.

27

The Japan Socialist Party, the Kõmeitõ and the Democratic Socialist Party present motions of no confidence against the Foreign Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry to the Extraordinary Session of the Diet: they are both defeated by overwhelming margins.

30 Oct.– 5 Nov.

The Right Hon. Frederick Corfìeld visited Japan on the occasion of the Nagoya Air Show.

November 2

The United States Senate unanimously passes the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

9

Supplementary Budget is passed by the Diet.

9–13

The Secretary of the United States Treasury, Mr Connally, visits Japan.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

10

One riot policeman murdered in Okinawa during unprecedently large demonstrations held there against the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

11

Chou En-lai rejects the letter sent secretly through Governor Minobe of Tokyo by Hori, Secretary-General of the LDP.

17

The LDP forces a vote on the Okinawa Reversion Bill in the Diet Committee for the reversion of Okinawa; Diet business is held up for five days while party leaders discuss a compromise on the procedure for voting on the Bill on the floor of the Lower House.

19

An estimated 500,000 people take part in peaceful demonstrations throughout the country against the Okinawa Agreement; over 2,000 students are arrested for violence in separate rallies.

24

The Okinawa Reversion Bill is passed by the Lower House by 285 (LDP) votes to seventy-three (Kõmeitõ and DSP) votes. The JSP and JCP boycott the session.

28

It is announced that Mr Sato will hold talks with President Nixon at San Clemente on 6 and 7 January 1972.

29

The appreciation of the value of the yen against the dollar since floating on 28 August exceeds 10 per cent for the first time.

December 3

The Director-General of the Defence Agency, Nishimura, is forced to resign for making injudicious remarks at a Press conference. Esaki is appointed in his place; the fourth DirectorGeneral in 1971.

19

Mr Sato expresses confidence that the 16.88 per cent increase in the value of the yen against the dollar announced the previous day will not harm the Japanese economy.

21

Chinese and Japanese delegates sign a joint communiqué in Peking clearing the way for agreement for Memorandum Trade for 1972.

23

The Okinawa Reversion Bill becomes law.

24

Minoru Takita, President of the Japanese Confederation of Labour for seventeen years resigns. Amaike is appointed as his successor.

28

Bank rate is lowered by a further 0.50 per cent to 4.75 per cent.

41

JAPAN IN THE 1970s: GUNS AND BUTTER*

SUMMARY Little has changed since my report of November 1970. The ­Self-Defence Forces have had to contend with several changes of political leadership and attacks on their Budget. Their national image has also suffered. (Paragraphs 1–5.) The re-emergence of China and the realignment of international trade and exchange rates have shaken various post-war certainties. Against this background the Japanese military have remained realistic in their outlook. Their planning has been rendered uncertain by US pressures to buy American arms. (Paragraphs 6–10.) There have also been internal pressures, ranging from the power of the Defence Manufacturing Industry to the problems of nuclear armament. Civilians remain firmly in control of the Japanese military. (Paragraphs 11–15.) The materialistic outlook of the young contrasts with the ideals of their elders. The Constitution, though a foreign imposition, is still popular. Patriotism is a religion. (Paragraphs 16–20.) Foreign hostility to Japan’s trading practices and wealth could be dangerous. However Japanese reactions to recent economic shocks give reason for hope. The country is faced with the dilemma of how to employ its reserves of wealth. The probability is that, after a slow start, expenditure on welfare will rise. (Paragraphs 21–23.) The dangers are outweighed by the hopes. Japan is still firmly set upon peaceful paths; as time passes, a more cosmopolitan generation * FEJ 10/1 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 27 January 1972.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

will replace its seniors bringing with it more hope for the future. (Paragraphs 24–26.) 27 January 1972

I

n my despatch of 19 November, 1970, entitled ‘The Trade Mark and the Sword’ I posed the question whether the old militarism in Japan was dead, quiescent, or about to be revived and I reached the conclusion that there did indeed exist a certain potential for reversion to former modes, reinforced by a dimming of wartime memories and a heightened self-confidence arising from national pride in economic achievement. I tried to deal with the various symptoms of this mood, but, after giving attention to the available evidence, I hazarded the view that the danger of excessive military influence in Japanese politics, domestic or foreign, was slight and would be likely to remain so for at least as long as Japan’s present unprecedented prosperity continued. 2. In the meantime, there have been certain developments which merit attention, but by and large my Service advisers and I find that there is no reason to vary significantly from the reasoning and conclusions of the despatch under reference. None the less, the mood has changed slightly and, though the mixture remains much as before, I have the honour to offer some observations, with the assistance of my Defence Attaché, on the situation as it seems to be developing.

FORCES LOW POSTURE 3. Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, when Director-General of the Japan Defence Agency, carried out a policy of rehabilitating the Defence Forces as an accepted part of the community. As explained in my last despatch, his success led to misinterpretation in some circles abroad. The progress to public acceptance was somewhat marred by the dramatic suicide on 25 November, 1970, of Yukio Mishima in an army headquarters, which gave rise to fears of recrudescence of the old military aspect. Notwithstanding its initial impact, Mishima’s sacrifice has had little subsequent influence to date. 4. Mr Nakasone left the Defence Agency in a political reshuffle on 5 July, 1971. He was followed by three elderly and self-effacing politicians in the space of only six months: Mr Keikichi Masuhara, dismissed after the air crash mentioned below, Mr Naomi Nishimura who lost office on 3 December, 1971, following some tactless off-the-record remarks about the UN, and Mr Masumi Esaki, the latest incumbent belongs to a ‘dove-ish’ faction and will doubtless proceed cautiously to avoid further controversy. 5. These rapid unsettling changes came at a crucial time for long-term defence budgetary planning. The same period saw an air crash on 30 July, 1971, which involved an Air Self-Defence Force trainer and a domestic airliner causing the loss of 168 lives – a new world record. There was also the apparent involvement of former servicemen in the murder of a sentry by student political activists. This substantiated reports that the Forces are a target for revolutionary subversion. The public image has been further damaged by confrontations with local interests as the Self-Defence Forces have taken over bases from the US Forces. All this and the external ­influences



JAPAN IN THE 1970s: GUNS AND BUTTER

301

described below have led to pressures and delays affecting the Defence Budget. However, recent developments, including Cabinet approval of a 1972 Defence Budget which showed less cuts than had been anticipated, suggest that the Government is now about to give substantial approval to the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan. The current Budget shows an increase of 19.7 per cent over expenditure in 1971, while the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan will probably involve the expenditure of £6,500 million by 1976. This compares with £3,375 million spent during the Third Defence Build-up Plan which ends this year. 6. The two Nixon shocks of 16 July and 15 August happened, therefore, at a moment when the armed forces in Japan were perforce adopting a low posture. They naturally led to a re-evaluation of the role of the armed forces in the future. It seemed to the Japanese as though a happy state of affairs, which had existed for more than twenty-six years, was about to come to an end. The old certainties of growing prosperity and influence under the benevolent patronage and military umbrella of the US began to crumble. Simultaneously a neighbouring China, hitherto considered chiefly as a natural market for Japan’s expanding gross national product, suddenly came to the fore as a major factor in world politics. Thus the distasteful necessity of taking positive steps to put relations with China on a proper footing became imminent. An exercise in salvaging what need not be lost and in making the best accommodations consistent with national dignity proceeds apace. 7. For some time now China has pointed to the recrudescence of ­Japanese militarism. In the litany so frequently intoned by the Chinese leaders the abnormal development of the Japanese economy points inevitably to ­militarism. Recently, however, there has been a suggestion that a truly independent Japan capable of defending herself might not be intolerable to the Chinese. However, this would mean the breaking of all security ties with the US, presumably so that China could dominate this unattached Japan.

MILITARY REALISM 8. Certain it is that Mr Nixon’s Guam doctrine, coupled with the intended withdrawal from Viet-Nam, has forced the Japanese to consider very seriously how best they can achieve self-reliance in Defence. The military are convinced of the necessity to improve both their equipment and capabilities along the lines of the draft Fourth Defence Build-up Plan. They continue to regard the USSR as the most probable aggressor against whom they must arm. Equally, they do not expect any true rapprochement with China in the foreseeable future. The future of Taiwan and its neighbouring islands must bulk large in their calculations.

US PRESSURES 9. The second Nixon shock, known here as the ‘dollar shock’ also had immediate consequences. Somewhere in the package sought by the Americans was a commitment that Japan should support, with more purchases, the ailing but politically powerful US armament industry. Arguments have been adduced to

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

show that much hardware originally planned for production or research by Japanese domestic concerns could be purchased more cheaply off-the-shelf from the US. Such arguments seem to have found favour with the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, but the Defence Agency and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry have resisted them with success. 10. In some cases the superior performance of a more expensive Japanese weapon-system and in others its technological spin-off, have been adduced against purchases from the US. There is also doubt in Japanese minds as to how far the over-sophisticated weapon-systems evolved for the short term and largely low-grade US conscripts really fit the needs of the well-trained and well-educated volunteers of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces. Logistic considerations and doubts about the wisdom of putting too much trust in super Powers have also been used as arguments to beat back US pressures.

JAPANESE PRESSURES 11. Behind lie the aspirations of the Japanese armament industry itself. Many people in Japan see a greater danger in an industrial complex manipulating military policy and extending military potential than in a recrudescence of militarism in its classical sense. There is no doubt that industrialists control contemporary Japan and that by comparison with them the military occupy a humble situation. 12. However, it would be false to ascribe to the Japanese weapons industry even a fraction of the power, let alone the world-wide influence, of its US counterpart. At present all the Japanese firms involved are subsidiaries or members of large groups in whose total activities arms manufacture plays a very small part. Most armament development is projected and supervised by organs of the Japan Defence Agency and exports remain slight. For the present it seems likely that the Japanese will do their best to nourish their home industry, even though this results in more expensive equipment, both as an insurance policy to guarantee adequate national independence and also with a view to future technological and commercial gains.

NUCLEAR PROSPECTS 13. The possibility of Japan acquiring her own nuclear weapons remains political dynamite. It is admitted that in present circumstances, now aggravated by US policies, Japan must look to her own defence as soon as she can in a world still afflicted by strife between armed nations and in which a nation cannot feel safe without some form of nuclear defence. But it would still be outside political possibility for any democratic Japanese Government today to proceed overtly towards a breach of Japan’s three nuclear principles, i.e. no possession, no admission and no manufacture. I am none the less of the opinion that these principles could be breached by the end of this decade. 14. There have been intimations that a certain dynamism now attaches to the question. Official US assessments implying that Japan may ‘go nuclear’ have been revealed. Steps have certainly been taken towards the acquisition of uranium enrichment technology and the Japanese space programme could be the basis for creating a delivery system. By contrast, a leading



JAPAN IN THE 1970s: GUNS AND BUTTER

303

J­apanese industrialist has suggested that his country might rent its share of the US nuclear umbrella, both to dispense with the need for the creation of a national deterrent and also to satisfy US demands for financial support costs without damage to the Japanese armaments industry. Clearly there is a requirement for continuing attention to be devoted to trends and developments in this matter.

CIVILIANS IN CONTROL 15. In all of the above matters the military are advisers rather than principals and it is natural that they should formulate a wide selection of contingency plans. Although they may not enjoy perfect communication or agreement with the civilian Ministries, the Self-Defence Forces still remain under civilian control, bureaucratic and political. It is only natural that this displeases some officers, but the status quo is fully accepted by the vast majority of servicemen.

THE POPULAR MOOD 16. The major parties remain deeply divided over defence. The Left hopes for non-aggression pacts with China and the USSR obviating any need for self-defence. The Liberal Democratic Party, more realistically, see a continuing need for dependence upon the US for some years, which they and their industrial paymasters hope to reduce by stages. 17. Japanese public opinion is largely suspicious of any regression to militarism which caused them so much pain and which failed. It is also emotionally disposed to good relations with China which are inimical to Japanese involvement in US strategic dispositions. This seems to dispose them against the present Government, as does their new disenchantment with more economic progress merely for its own sake. Still the conviction that they succeeded in reconstructing their country with immense success buoys them up and deters them from favouring other solutions. 18. The young of Japan, political activists excepted, seem more interested in establishing themselves materially than in becoming involved in the problems of a wider world. Their elders, the men who took part in the Second World War, must occasionally dream of heroic military exploits. It would not be natural if they did not think that the ideals of the young were meek compared with those they were taught to admire in their youth. 19. Even in the matter of the Constitution, it seems unlikely that, smarting as some do under its foreign imposition, they will really try to amend it. Its status as the peace constitution has great popular appeal and the Opposition parties probably can retain the necessary one-third of seats in the Diet to veto any attempted revision. 20. Being a Japanese is a religion in itself, which makes the whipping up of hyper-patriotism an easy matter. The Chinese therefore are not wrong in picking up news of memorial services and exhibitions in honour of Japanese war martyrs. They note all attempts to reintroduce State subsidies to the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead; but the Japanese themselves are equally critical.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

THE TEMPTATIONS 21. Japanese military theorists have defined hostile economic measures against their trade as stages in a hypothetical process of escalation from peace to war. Given the Japanese history and character, their burgeoning overseas investments could bring a desire to protect them. Their aggressive pursuit of markets could also arouse foreign hostility leading to exclusion and consequent Japanese emotional over-reaction. So far Japanese reaction to the severe shocks in their relations with the US recently have led rather to self-reflection and a better understanding of how they provoked the impulsive Americans rather than into any thoughts of, let alone preparation for, revenge. 22. In my recent despatch on yen revaluation I stated my belief that there were more difficulties to come from Japanese competitiveness. Europe has yet to come to terms with the new pressure from Japanese exports. It is a truism that if Japanese prosperity falters, thoughts will more easily turn to military solutions. Especially will this be so if the Japanese believe the fault lies in a ganging up by foreign Powers. This problem demands care and statesmanship on the part of the Americans and Europeans. On the Japanese side there are welcome signs that they realize the dangers and will do their best to avoid them.

THE CURRENT DILEMMA 23. Meanwhile Japanese currency reserves mount and the real income of the Japanese people continues to grow. The problem before the present leaders is how and when to spend this wealth. In the past the choice would very likely have been between guns or butter. At this moment hesitantly and with the almost excessive caution which has characterized the actions of the present Japanese Government, more is to be disbursed on butter. Pollution control, housing, schools, hospitals, drainage, improved retirement pensions, shorter working hours and cheaper imported food are the desiderata of the masses at the moment. Demands for the creation of more social capital grow daily. Compared with an increase of 19.7 per cent in expenditure in the new Budget on the Self-Defence Forces, public works expenditure will rise by 26.3 per cent. These figures compare with an expansion of 21 per cent for budgetary expenditure as a whole.

OUTLOOK: GENERALLY SET FAIR 24. I have adumbrated certain dangers, real or potential, that exist in Japan today. To ignore these would be ill-advised but credit must be given where it is due. The Government, however tentatively, seem to have set the nation’s feet upon the path to a welfare State, living at peace with its neighbours with the expectation of mounting prosperity. The great mass of the people would wish to follow this path. Their hopes are reflected in the framework of present policy which is based upon the furtherance of national interests by diplomacy, non-interference and the granting of aid.



JAPAN IN THE 1970s: GUNS AND BUTTER

305

25. Such dangers as exist tend to recede daily as the passing of time brings on the death or incapacity of the Meiji (1867–1912) and Taisho (1912–26) generations. The interim (Showa born before the Pacific War i.e. 1926–41) generation is likely to be overshadowed or influenced by the pressures of the energetic group that follows it, just as it has been the instrument of its positive predecessors. 26. The young, though as immersed in their national culture as any other Japanese generation, nevertheless seem to be striving genuinely towards less absorption with their unique status as Japanese. Many of them are trying to overcome their innate insularity and may in time achieve an international outlook and status. They have been born to prosperity, peace and rather more freedom than the vast majority of the human race: perhaps their understanding of this will enable them to avoid the nationalist excesses of their forbears.

JOHN PILCHER

42

JAPANESE EXPORT SUCCESSES: CHEAP, SWEATED LABOUR?*

SUMMARY Outdated prejudices against cheap Japanese goods and modern fears of Japanese competition in Europe lead the uninitiated to feel that Japan relies on sweated labour. (Paragraph 1.) 2. In fact, Japanese average income levels equalled European levels in 1969; they have continued to increase by 15 per cent per annum and at the present rate could equal US levels by 1980. (Paragraphs 2–3.) 3. Relatively low basic wages are greatly increased by a system of bonuses, overtime and special allowances, while the larger corporations operate very extensive welfare and subsidy systems for their workers. The Government is encouraging the trend towards adoption of a fìve-and-a-half and five-day week. (Paragraphs 4–6.) 4. Male employment in big companies is usually for life. L ­ ong-serving staff receive disproportionately higher wages than their juniors; the employment structure results in considerably lower wages for women; thus companies with a high proportion of young or female staff have smaller wage bills. (Paragraphs 7–8.) 5. Wage rates are lower in the smaller companies; the big companies can thus cut costs by subcontracting. Most of the industries which ­ bove-average are particularly competitive in the export market pay a wages; Japanese investment policy and production techniques have in the past kept productivity increases ahead of wage increases. ­(Paragraphs 9–12.) 6. Wage increases are now overtaking productivity and the ­expectations of the ordinary worker are causing significant increases in labour costs. Nevertheless Japanese exports will continue to be highly * FEJ 5/7 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 20 April 1972.



JAPANESE EXPORT SUCCESSES: CHEAP, SWEATED LABOUR?307

competitive while the increasingly affluent domestic market offers great opportunities to foreign exporters. (Paragraphs 13–15.) 20 April 1972

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larms were sounded in Europe last year that President Nixon’s economic measures in August would lead to the flooding of British and European markets with Japanese goods which had been turned away from the American market. Even before the emergence of these new fears the old pre-war prejudices against large quantities of cheap and nasty ­Japanese products had not completely died. All this renewed anxiety has been aggravated by the uncomfortable knowledge that Japanese products in many fields are now of unimpeachable quality. The uninitiated have been led inexorably to the conclusion that, if sophisticated products can be so competitive, then they must have been produced by cheap labour. In addition the industrious Japanese are believed to work long hours for their modest remuneration. 2. In my despatch of 10 September, 1969, I estimated that, because of a combination of basic wages and a multitude of bonuses and allowances, the average Japanese worker received almost as much as his counterpart in a Western industrialized country. That was two-and-a-half prosperous years ago. Although international wage comparisons are extremely difficult to make, I venture some comment upon the latest figures for Japanese wages and also attempt some predictions for the future.

WAGE LEVELS 3. If incomes had reached some European levels in 1969, they must have surpassed all but a few by now. Wage increases of over 18 per cent in 1970 and nearly 17 per cent in 1971 mean that for the last five years incomes have risen by about 15 per cent per annum. They have more than trebled in money terms since 1960 and doubled in real terms. The Economic Planning Agency forecast during the boom year of 1970 that, provided Japan maintained a real annual growth rate of 10.4 per cent per annum, wages would continue to increase annually in money terms by 15 per cent. At this rate of increase the remuneration of Japanese workers will be second only to the Americans by 1975 and could equal them by 1980. 4. Basic wages paid to Japanese employees are but a part of their takehome pay. Twice yearly bonuses play a very important role. Efficiency allowances, housing allowances, family allowances and others are all included in the monthly payment. And then there is overtime. It is often held that the Japanese work long hours but do not receive overtime payments for it. In fact, the basic wage in manufacturing industry represents about ­three-quarters of the workers’ income in companies with more than thirty employees. The other quarter is divided evenly between overtime and other allowances. In 1971 monthly wages in manufacturing industry were Y61,185 (£78·05); on top of that the average employee received a bonus twice a year amounting to the equivalent of Y19,825 (£25.30) monthly. Bonuses amount on average to over three and a half months’ wages. In other words, a weekly wage averaged out over the whole year would be about £23.85.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

5. Wages, even when special allowances, overtime and the bi-annual bonus are taken into account, do not tell the full story. Good employers provide a surprisingly wide range of fringe benefits to their employees. The social services of the Japanese state are not yet so generous as the British, though they are expanding rapidly. The company has therefore provided insurance and superannuation schemes, cheap housing, medical and dental care, as well as educational subsidies. In addition the company may offer holiday accommodation and sports facilities, help with hobbies of all kinds, libraries, beauty shops and even home help service. The value of these benefits is considerable, but cannot be estimated in financial terms for purposes of comparison.

HOURS 6. How many hours do the Japanese have to work to earn this? Over 90 per cent of the Japanese labour force works a six-day week. More and more firms are now moving to a five-and-a-half or five-day week, and the Government is encouraging this trend. The average employee in manufacturing industry in 1971, however, worked only 184.3 hours in one month. This compares with 202.7 in 1960. Perhaps he spent more hours at his workplace than these figures indicate. He may even have worked some hours without remuneration, but this is unlikely in large firms where union supervision is close. Many Japanese are not so desperate to get away as soon as they can from their desks or lathes. Within the cocoon of his factory or business the Japanese finds a second home and a social life. Some observers attribute a part of Japanese economic success to the poor housing conditions and lack of recreation possibilities in Japanese homes.

WAGE STRUCTURE 7. The majority of Japanese are employed by their companies for life. When a Japanese worker joins a company, he immediately jumps on to a curve on a wages graph. He stays on it for life and only moves to another in exceptional circumstances. The starting point of the curve is determined according to education. Taking the example of a young worker with Nippon Steel Corporation, his basic starting monthly salary at eighteen would be Y47,000. His colleague after thirty years with the company receives Y110,000 a month. These figures do not include special increases for managers or allowances for a wife and children. This means that older labour is more expensive. Thus a company’s wage bill depends to a great extent on the average age of its workforce. This is an important factor in labour costing. 8. The fact that many women employees retire at about thirty means that their average wage calculated the Japanese way is considerably less than that of the men. Actually up to the age of thirty there is very little difference between the basic wages of men and women doing the same work in large firms. The main difference occurs later, when large family allowances are paid to male workers. Furthermore, when women retire, usually for family reasons, at an early age, they lose their place on the seniority curve. Should they be re-employed at a later stage, they receive only the wages and allowances of parttime workers, which are, of course, by then much smaller than those of their



JAPANESE EXPORT SUCCESSES: CHEAP, SWEATED LABOUR?309

long-serving contemporaries. Most female workers employed in ­manufacturing industries are either between the ages of twenty and twenty-four or forty and fifty-four. Under this system those industries or firms, which employ a greater proportion of females and young workers, inevitably enjoy lower labour costs. In the longer term, some of this advantage may evaporate as the average age of the labour force rises.

SMALLER FIRMS 9. The wages of workers in smaller firms of thirty employees or less are generally between 60–80 per cent of those in large firms. The hours are also often a good deal longer. Welfare benefits are naturally fewer and the guarantee of employment for life in the traditional way is impossible. A corollary of the national employment policy has been a virtual guarantee of employment for workers in large firms, while allowing small firms to take the risks which stem from fluctuations in economic conditions. This is reflected in the remarkably high level of bankruptcies of small firms, while only one large firm has gone under since 1960 and that was eventually saved by amalgamation.

SUBCONTRACTING 10. One of the common practices of some large firms is to subcontract a great deal of their work to smaller firms. There are several important reasons for this. If business conditions deteriorate, then old contracts can run their course without any obligation for renewal; nor does the large firm have the additional worry of lay-offs. Moreover, since labour is cheaper in smaller firms, large firms are able to set lower prices and also tight delivery dates which the smaller firms are obliged to meet to assure their survival. Some managements, too, are not averse to achieving fantastically high – if somewhat bogus – productivity figures by contracting out their labour intensive processes. It is not, of course, unknown in Britain for workers to be better off with the larger and more prosperous companies. But this practice of subcontracting does provide labour at a discount for a proportion of Japanese industry. This is, however, a wasting asset; the differential between wages in small firms and larger firms has been narrowing and the practice of subcontracting is decreasing in some industries.

WAGES IN EXPORT INDUSTRIES 11. Averages of wages over the whole field of manufacturing industry must obviously hide considerable differences between the industries. The question may be asked whether wages in those Japanese industries which compete so effectively in export markets are much lower than the average. Six industries are particularly effective in overseas markets – domestic electrical, heavy electrical, iron and steel, shipbuilding, chemicals and automobiles. In Annex 1, I have provided a table comparing wages in these six industries, which offer the greatest threat to Britain in domestic and foreign markets. While wages in the electrical industries are a little lower than the average, because of the high proportion of female workers, in the iron and steel, shipbuilding, chemical

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

and automobile industries the reverse is true. They pay higher wages than the national average. Subcontracting plays some part in some of these industries, particularly automobiles, though many of the suppliers to this industry have grown rapidly in size and are no longer paying much lower rates. In chemicals the nature of the operation rules out subcontracting. This is also true, of course, of the automobile and chemical industries in Britain, and British wages in this sector may still have the edge over the Japanese.

PRODUCTIVITY 12. As for productivity in these six industries, the rise has been exceptionally high – higher than the annual increases in wages. For example, in the electrical industries productivity over the past ten years has risen by 350 per cent compared with a wage increase of 300 per cent. In the textile industry wages have increased much more than productivity, but the automobile and steel industries have surpassed even the electrical industries in their productivity increases. It is the intensity of Japanese investment and their genius in largescale production methods, which are the basis for this remarkable result.

THE FUTURE 13. Will Japanese wages continue on their sharply rising course in the future? Is it conceivable that the prediction, based on a projection of present trends, that Japanese wages will equal American by 1980 can come true? And, if it comes true, will this remove or moderate the competitive threat to some of our industries? The ability of Japanese industry to pay the staggering pay increases over the past ten years has been based on the equally impressive rises in productivity. Except in the years of cyclical recession, productivity increases exceeded wage increases until 1968. In that year for the first time wage increases caught up and have subsequently overtaken productivity. This discrepancy has increased during the present recession, when plant is not being used to capacity in a number of industries. 14. In my view the remarkable productivity increases of the 1960s are going to be more difficult to sustain during the 1970s, while the workers are not likely to accept a drastic slowing down of their annual wage increases to which they have grown accustomed. They may accept temporary reductions in the rate of increase during periods of economic recession. The present wage negotiations between the unions and companies will provide interesting evidence of how determined labour is to maintain their rate of advance, whatever the financial situation of the company. In the future we can expect the number of hours worked to fall until a European-type five-day week is reached, and this again will tend to push up costs. On the other hand, I do not believe that the ­Japanese propensity to save and invest is likely to change rapidly, nor do I believe that the special factors making for harmony and co-operation between labour and management in Japanese companies will disappear quickly. 15. My very hazardous prediction is therefore that Japanese labour costs per unit of production will rise more than in the previous decade, but they may still rise less than in Europe or America. Wage levels will move rapidly ahead of European, and may approach the American in ten years or so.



JAPANESE EXPORT SUCCESSES: CHEAP, SWEATED LABOUR?311

J­apanese exports will continue to be very competitive and increasingly so in the most advanced industries. On the other hand, the Japanese domestic market would be extremely rich and, provided Japan continues along the present liberal path, would offer opportunities to determined exporters comparable to markets in the US. JOHN PILCHER

ANNEX JAPANESE AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES IN 1971 BY INDUSTRY (Male factory workers) Monthly Payments Y

Bonus Payments (monthly average) Y

Total monthly Payments Y

Domestic electrical appliance industry

59,300 (5,100)

17,400

76,700

Heavy electric machinery and equipment industry

65,200 (6,400)

19,400

84,600

Iron and steel industry

85,900 (14,700)

19,200

105,100

Shipbuilding industry

90,500 (16,500)

23,400

113,900

Chemical industry

73,700 (6,900)

24,300

98,000

Automobile industry

71,800 (11,200)

18,200

90,000

All manufacturing industry

70,000 (10,400)

16,300

86,300

Note: The figures in parentheses indicate average monthly payments for overtime (included in the monthly payments).

43 BASIC JAPAN AND THE SHIFTING MOOD 1967–72*

SUMMARY The Foundations. Shinto and its exclusivity made an excellent basis for national cohesion after 1868. It remains, demoted somewhat by General MacArthur. (Paragraphs 2–7.) 2. Confucian morality and the reverence for education are important elements in the Japanese foundation. (Paragraphs 8–11.) 3. These elements were deformed by militarism in the 1930s, but the American occupation redressed the balance, placing the restored Emperor back in much the same position he was in before 1868 (and since the twelth century). (Paragraphs 12–16.) 4. After the occupation reforms, ‘economic man’ became the foundation of a new order, ‘the economic way’. (Paragraphs 17–20.) 5. The gibe of the ‘economic animal’ first punctured this concept. The excess of economic success brought its nemesis. (Paragraphs 21–22.) 6. The Nixon shocks combined to bring a wave of realism, of understanding of their bad image in South-East Asia and China. (Paragraphs 23–28.) 7. Realism brought an understanding of the necessity for social expenditure, because of decline in the amenity of living, despite the increase in Gross National Product. (Paragraphs 29–35.) 8. The Opposition espoused the necessity for social expenditure and advocated peace treaties and non-aggression pacts with China and Russia. Even the ruling Liberal Democratic Party would like this too,

* FEJ 1/2 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 4 April 1972.



BASIC JAPAN AND THE SHIFTING MOOD 1967-72313

but hope to retain the security treaty with the United States as well. China exercises an excessive fascination. (Paragraphs 36–38.) 9. The Japanese now know that they must curb their upward surge and indulge in orderly marketing. They become more international. All this is in our general interest. We should offer them the benefit of our experience with the welfare state. (Paragraphs 39–44.) 4 April 1972

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fter four-and-a-half years in Japan I offer some observations on what seem to me to be the salient characteristics of this ebullient country and on the mood prevalent in the spring of 1972. La Rochefoucauld commented that the commonest fault of those who try to penetrate a subject is not to fail to reach the point, but to pass it. At the risk of grotesque simplification, I have tried not to lose the point.

THE FOUNDATIONS: SHINTO 2. Being a Japanese was – and is – a religion in itseff. Shinto is the birthright of every Japanese. According to it, the divine is everywhere thought to be imminent in the islands of Japan and in the Japanese race. This means that any grain of dust in Japan can become a Kami (literally this originally meant a ‘superior person’ or being, but later it came to be written with the Chinese character for a spirit). The Kami of every remarkable natural phenomenon – waterfall, tree or rock – in Japan is venerated. Any member of the Japanese race can become a Kami. The Emperor, the head of that race, is a ‘manifest Kami’. Many Japanese can show you a shrine where an ancestor is publicly venerated as such. 3. Despite their disparate early origins, no doubt isolation accounts for the Japanese belief that they are not as others. The linguistic barrier exaggerated the effects of insularity and still cuts them off from easy spoken or written relationship with the rest of the world, except through translation. 4. When, as a result of the American knocking at the door in the middle of the last century, the Japanese eventually opened their country to relations with the rest of the world after two-and-a-half centuries of isolation, they restored the Emperor from mystic seclusion in Kyoto and placed him again at the head of affairs. They embarked on new courses, but built their new State on old foundations. 5. They at once sensed the need for national cohesion, in order to be able to face up to the pressures and dangers of the outside world. Above all they felt that they must not become a colony. It was basically a fear of this at the hands of the Spaniards from the Philippines that had led them to close the country to all outside contacts, except minimally with the Dutch, at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 6. In 1868 the danger seemed much greater. Technologically they had slipped behind. Shinto, the national cult, hitherto long overshadowed by Buddhism, seemed the answer and its simple tenets were inculcated and exaggerated to the point where, by 1941, the whole nation was very nearly willing to sacrifice themselves to a man to carry out ‘the will of the Emperor’.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

7. This basic religion remains, although wisely demoted from being the State cult by General MacArthur. It accounts for the innate self-centredness of all Japanese. It lies behind ‘Japan Incorporated’, recently discovered by the Americans and now beloved of all journalists. It must be taken for granted that with such an ideology, even though attenuated now, the Japanese cannot help but act always with the interests of their country at heart. ‘My country right or wrong’ is the very essence of their outlook.

THE FOUNDATIONS: CONFUCIAN MORALITY 8. Add to this the whole structure of Confucian morality, drummed into the people during the years of seclusion by the Military Government of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and you have the secret both of Japanese success and failure. Loyalty to the family, the concern, the country and the Emperor grafted on to the basic Shinto tenets made a formidable structure. 9. The cult of harmony – of eschewing actions which might arouse envy, of seeking always harmonious personal relationships – added a vital quality to their abnormal sense of cohesion, born of isolation and insularity. It thus becomes a religious duty, sustained by the Confucian concept of life, for the individual to dedicate himself to working in harmony with his fellow Japanese for the greater glory of Japan.

THE FOUNDATIONS: THE CULT OF EDUCATION 10. Moreover, every Japanese learns the hard way that nothing is achieved in life without sustained effort. Learning the language at once teaches him this. There is no easy way round the arduous necessity of mastering Chinese characters and their phonetic adjuncts, the hiragana and katakana syllabaries. Learning is a hard business requiring the utmost dedication. 11. Already before 1868, literacy, with all that means in achievement for the individual brought up to use this surrealist language, was higher than in Europe. Respect for education – also a Confucian import – means that employers demand high standards of their employees. To the basic cohesive, nationalistic disposition must be added the acceptance of hard work as a fact of life.

THEIR DEFORMATION BY MILITARISM 12. All this was splendid fodder for militarism in the 1930s. Patriotism became incandescent. The eight points of the compass, as they are here termed, were to be united under one Japanese roof and the world was to march forward in harmony under the inspiration of the Emperor of Japan. The military overreached themselves. Their dreams evaporated. The ultimate humiliation of defeat found them condemned by their own people for having misled their venerated Emperor and for having failed to carry out his will. In Japanese terms: right is what profits Japan: wrong the reverse. The military had proved themselves to be wrong.



BASIC JAPAN AND THE SHIFTING MOOD 1967-72315

THE OCCUPATION REDRESSES THE BALANCE 13. It was the greatest blessing for the world that General MacArthur took control of the occupation after defeat. For all his airs of an oriental satrap – and despite the sycophantic court with which he is accused of having surrounded himself – he did see the basic issues clearly and he acted with almost missionary zeal. The disestablishment of State Shinto, the reduction in the mystic appeal of the Imperial institution, the remoulding of the educational system and the land reform, are great monuments to his genius. The fierce attachment to civilian Cabinet control of every institution, including the Monarch, the self-defence forces and the police, was inspired by him. 14. The Emperor requested an interview with the Shogun (Generalissimo) MacArthur and said: ‘I come to you, General MacArthur, to offer myself to the judgment of the Powers you represent as the one to bear responsibility for every political and military decision made and action taken by my people in the conduct of this war.’ MacArthut’s refusal of this offer, which moved him to the marrow of his bones, was certainly justified in the short term. It won over the Japanese people and made his cherished inculcation of new principles tolerable to them. In the long term, if the principles have stuck – to the world’s great advantage – it may be basically because of this. 15. In practice, General MacArthur put the Imperial Institution back to the position of venerated impotence in which it had survived for some seven centuries. Instead of the Military Government (Bakufu) of the Tokugawa Shogun, sustained by their territorial nobility (Daimyo) and their henchmen (Samurai), the Emperor now has to contend with a Prime Minister as Shogun, elected from within the dominant political party, and an all-powerful Cabinet (Bakufu) and their henchmen, the great industrial concerns. 16. Only now he is deprived of the support of his nobility (both court and military), who resigned in 1947 out of a sense of shame for not having served their Emperor as they should. The Emperor may not now so much as accept a present without Cabinet approval, nor may he receive an Ambassador without their recommendation.

THE NEW ORDER: ‘ECONOMIC MAN’ 17. The industrialists have now succeeded to the power wielded by the militarists of the 1930s and to the long succession of Shogunate Governments dating back to the beginning of the twelth century. Their great concerns profit from the cohesion and patriotism of the Japanese people and their excessive dedication to work.

THE ‘ECONOMIC WAY’ 18. Confronted with the unthinkable humiliation of defeat, all set out with praiseworthy and perhaps unexampled vigour to build up their country afresh. It was to pursue a new ‘economic way’, which was to supplant the ‘way of the warrior’ (Bushido). An ever increasing Gross National Product was to be the country’s new glory. This was to be attained peaceably. Mankind was to be led to greater prosperity by Japanese example. This was to be the ­justification of the

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

new Japan: their unexceptionable revenge was to be to outdo the ­Americans at their own game. 19. When I arrived in 1967, these ideals of ‘economic man’ held complete sway. They reached their apogee in the Osaka International Exposition of 1970 under the idealistic banner of ‘progress and harmony’ (my despatch of 3 April 1970, expounds the Japanese mood then, while that of 26 March 1970, portrays the climate evoked by that exuberant exhibition). An almost messianic urge to lead mankind down ever more prosperous economic paths was in the air. 20. Perhaps the Japanese had succeeded where others had failed in finding a middle way (so dear to Far Eastern minds) between Communist planning and Capitalist competition. The tentacles of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry kept all on the rails; formal plans and informal admonitions were everywhere effective. Were not Japanese industrial concerns like Communist trading units working to a plan, self-sufficient (no-one could know what the right hand paid the left), able to charge what they deemed the situation demanded internally and externally? Yet they were saved from planners’ stagnation by the fierce competition between themselves (inspired by the concomitant and obverse of Confucian loyalty: jealousy).

IMPACT OF THE ‘ECONOMIC ANIMAL’ CONCEPT 21. At about this point the phrase ‘economic animal’ made its appearance. It fitted only too well and caused first immense disgust and then s­ elf-questioning. Next pollution, disturbance of the ecology and dissatisfaction with the ‘quality of life’ raised their heads. The euphoria vanished and self-criticism became the order of the day. Where after all was Japan going? Had she not sacrificed everything to economic development? Travel abroad had become the rage. The more prescient tourists told how people lived much better and fuller lives in countries where the Gross National Product rose scarcely at all.

THE EXCESS OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND ITS NEMESIS 22. Then the very success of the ‘economic way’ was seen to bring grave problems. The United States, which had set Japan on that path, found Japanese imports of non-cotton textiles more than they could assimilate. Gradually other Japanese products became equally unwanted. The United States, which had been hammering at the Japanese to ‘liberalize’ imports of goods and capital investment now took the opposite line where their own country was concerned. This was alarming and perplexing at first.

THE NIXON SHOCKS AND THE NEW REALISM 23. Next came the Nixon shocks, seen here as embarrassing volte-faces, halfhated and half-admired by this unspontaneous and rigid people. Doubt of American reliability assailed their minds. The Nixon doctrine of withdrawal from Asia seemed to threaten their safety. The Peking visit opened up the disagreeable probability that the Americans had deliberately stolen a march



BASIC JAPAN AND THE SHIFTING MOOD 1967-72317

on them. The ‘economic way’ seemed less realizable and old-fashioned power politics in which the Japanese were in no way ready to play an adequate part, seemed to have staged a comeback. 24. The fresh wind of realism blew away their post-war idealism and revealed them to themselves as a very rich land, unduly dependent on the United States for its defence and on the world in general for its raw materials. Reliance upon others does not at all appeal to the Japanese race, proud in its exclusiveness. Vigorous steps were deemed necessary to redress the gross imbalance.

THE ‘UGLY JAPANESE’ 25. At this point a shrewd appraisal of the dislike engendered in others by the ‘ugly Japanese’ made itself felt. The hostility of South-East Asia impinged and was epitomized by the continued refusal of the Filipinos to ratify the long negotiated treaty of commerce with the Japanese. 26. The understanding of Chinese distaste and contempt drew several public confessions of guilt and remorse from both the Prime Minister, Mr Eisaku Sato, and the Foreign Minister, Mr Takeo Fukuda. It was felt that the Chinese, having achieved the impossible by inducing the hated leader of the other world, President Nixon, to come to Peking to bow before them, would no longer be interested in making the slightest nod in the direction of Japan.

RUSSIAN BLANDISHMENTS 27. The Russians on the other hand did. Oil in Siberia, perhaps even with a pipe-line to Japan, developed by Japanese concerns, was a powerful inducement to a country importing almost all its oil from the distant Persian Gulf. The possibility of a return of the islands in the north, annexed since the war by the Russians, was an added inducement. Still, to court Russia meant to antagonize China further and could nullify any attempts to get into China’s good graces. 28. Therefore the Japanese find themselves politically in an awkward fix. Internally they are disillusioned with the path they have pursued since the war and are beginning to be horrified at what they have done – and continue to do – to their land. They are at the same time becoming aware that they can no longer pour forth goods all over the world in increasing quantities, without antagonizing their markets and creating perhaps insoluble problems for themselves.

THE FUTURE 29. What therefore can they do about it? First and foremost, I think, they will concentrate now on achieving a welfare state. First the necessities of civilized living: roads, housing and drains will command their attention. Then public amenities, parks – all that makes the charm of living which they have neglected in their successful concentration on achieving an ever higher Gross National Product. ‘Economic man’ is a tarnished symbol: ‘civilized man’ must replace it.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

SOCIAL EXPENDITURE 30. The whole social infrastructure needs repair and enlargement. Their cities are more atrociously ugly than any others in the world. Tokyo has no consciously produced beauty at all. Civic pride has begotten almost nothing. The remains of the old castle, with its extensive grounds in which nestles almost un-espied the new Imperial Palace, is the sole charming but haphazard remnant of the past and only veneration for the Imperial institution has barely saved even that from destruction. 31. Every day land is reclaimed from Tokyo Bay. It is immediately put to profitable economic use. More petrochemical works, more electric power stations, belch more polluted fumes into the atmosphere of the capital. No attempt whatsoever has been made to create an agreeable waterfront, a park, a marine drive; only an extension of the concrete jungle brings greater confusion and discomfort. The criss-cross of bridges creates a greater tangle every day and might thrill the schoolboy: it has become for me a symbol of the horrors which contemporary ‘progress’ has in store.

DECLINE IN AMENITY OF LIFE 32. As to ordinary living, the old way has almost disappeared, without a satisfactory substitute having been discovered. The traditional Japanese house needed space and staff to maintain it. It was a way of life in itself. It symbolized the harmony between man and nature, which Japanese used to strive to achieve. The garden was an integral part of the house. The interior was austere but elegant. 33. Possessions were vulgar and kept out of sight, except for one picture or pot. The astringent taste which avoided the showy and vulgar and preferred the natural to the contrived has vanished. The old aesthetic is nearly no more and no new set of values has replaced it. Taste itself, which traditionally in Japan governed so much, has nearly vanished. 34. The value of land has sky-rocketed; and space is at a premium; staff is non-existent. All therefore now live in box-like flats of minute proportions. Possessions are no longer considered vulgar show. With less space, they are overwhelmed by what they used to call ‘Western clutter ministering only to self-esteem’. 35. Vast works are needed before urban life can reach the standards of Europe. The whole of the eastern seaboard of Japan has become one megalopolis, which must be taken in hand if life is to become tolerable to its inhabitants, many of whom are now realizing that, despite the money in their pockets, the quality of their lives deteriorates daily. 36. Of course, the Opposition has long made social expenditure its shibboleth, as it has normal relations with China (which exercises a magnetic pull over all Japanese) and Russia. Here the Japanese are caught geographically between three giants: the United States, China and Russia, with no peace treaties even with two of them. The Opposition would urge them to rectify this and to negotiate in addition non-aggression treaties. This achieved, Japan could at least lessen its dependence on others by shaking finally free from its security treaty with the United States. 37. The United States/Japanese Security Treaty has long been anathema to the Left and the excuse for students’ unrest. This is partly due to



BASIC JAPAN AND THE SHIFTING MOOD 1967-72319

e­ mbarrassment at the outward perpetuation of the national defeat. Yet the Japanese ­Government know that for ten years to come they need the treaty for their safe-keeping. Yet they do not relish being the ‘kept woman’ of the United States and it is probably right to say that every Japanese would prefer a situation in which they can dispense with that role. Therefore, I think that the Japanese Government of whatever colour will move in the direction of non-aggression pacts with China and Russia, if they can achieve them. Indeed Mr Fukuda has stated he would like this and the Security Treaty too. 38. The Nixon visit to Peking has aroused fantastic and injudicious ­emulation. The Japanese business world know perfectly well that China will only buy what she can pay for in the most competitive market with least strings attached. Yet the pull towards China, which represents their Greece and Rome, seems stronger than our gravitation towards a Europe far closer to ourselves. No Chinese rebuffs seem to discourage them. They seem determined at whatever humiliating cost to be on terms with their vast neighbour. 39. Looking at the world in general, they know that they can now only expand their markets by being in the good books of their customers. ‘Orderly marketing’ is thus beginning to be seen as desirable from the point of view of self-interest. It is the topic of the hour. They need to export in order to pay for their essential imports and raw materials. Yet their exports only represent 13 per cent of their Gross National Product. Therefore they could modify them to the point necessary and may well do so. They could also ensure their supply of raw materials by investing abroad and this they are likely to do in a big way. 40. The saving grace is that the Japan of 1972 knows that it must relax and modify the zeal of its subjects. What was appropriate to a defeated nation, proudly re-establishing itself in the world, is now out of place. Moreover they know that the religion of being a Japanese, which made the economic miracle possible, is inimical to their image in the world. They must become more international or decline. Before the war they were blissfully ignorant of their defects: now they are aware of them and will try to correct them. 41. It is, I submit, in the interests of the world at large that Japan should become a welfare state and pay long overdue attention to urbanization and the amenities of life. They should try to relax, starting with a five-day week and continuing with the delightful possibility of greater recreation and attention to the charms of living. 42. Here it seems to me that we should do everything possible to encourage them, since we have achieved a welfare state where people derive far more from existence than in Japan. We have much to show and our encouragement could be an important factor. 43. Even the present Prime Minister, Mr Sato, has talked of the necessity of the establishment of a welfare state. It is true that this rang a little out of tune, like the Churchillian advocacy of milk for babies after the war. The Liberal Democratic Party, however, will not maintain its lead if it does not devote itself to the welfare of the people and if it continues to leave all grievances to be exploited by the Opposition. 44. ‘Orderly marketing’ we need; in return for this, let us offer the ­encouragement of our own considerable successes in social institutions. JOHN PILCHER

44

THE JAPANESE: ‘FRAIL FLOWERS OF OPPORTUNISM?’*

SUMMARY ROOTED IN AN ARCHAIC WORLD

An outlook akin to archaic Rome still animates the Japanese and inspires their present actions; it is the basis of their nation and of its success. (Paragraphs 1–9.) EDUCATION AND THE SCAFFOLDING

This is strange in a nation so dedicated to self-instruction, but the language forces a hierarchical mould on them; education is highly formalistic and spontaneity absent; the individual is caught in the ‘form’, which supports him within Japan, but is left to the vagaries of his nature, without a moral code, when outside the Japanese system. (Paragraphs 9–15.) LACK OF SCAFFOLDING LEAVES THE INDIVIDUAL NAKED

This accounts both for the bad behaviour of the Japanese in the last war and the excesses of students now. (Paragraphs 15–18.) BUDDHISM DOES NOT FILL THE MORAL BREACH

Buddhism could remedy matters. But treats the world as illusory, while Zen inculcates an anti-intellectual bias, which perhaps accounts for Japan’s lack of any written philosophy. (Paragraphs 18–23.) *  FEJ 1/2 –8 June 1972.



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INBRED AND SELF-CENTRED

The Japanese, therefore, are unashamed opportunists without a moral code of universal application and as such a potential danger, but their pragmatism accepts that militarism having failed is bad; Democracy Japanese style is deeply rooted. (Paragraphs 24–28.)

IN FUTURE A WELFARE STATE?

The economic way and the mirage of ever increasing GNP no longer attract; the excesses it produced and pollution lead Japanese towards greater expenditure on social infrastructure and a welfare state; meanwhile there is a slight danger of the communist solution appealing to such moral opportunists. (Paragraphs 28–32.)

TO BE TAMED BY WARY FRIENDSHIP

Therefore we should accept them as they are and try to tame them through friendship and co-operation, but with wary eyes open; we should use our experience in international finance and the welfare state to influence them. (Paragraphs 32–35.)

CONCLUSION

Fortunately there are prescient Japanese aware of their own shortcomings and out to remedy them; ‘Frail flowers of opportunism’ was the phrase used by an influential official. (Paragraphs 35–40.)

EPILOGUE

The writer recalls gratefully his experiences of Japan and the help of his colleagues; he concludes that men of wide culture should be sent to Japan and records the sadness of his departure. (Paragraphs 41–46.) 8 June 1972

T

here was once an evocative photograph of the atomic power station at Calder Hall, taken from between the remaining stones of a druidic monument: it symbolized the new magic, seen from the hearth of an antique but forgotten cult. I suggest that a similar scene could typify modern Japan, with the significant difference that in Japan the antique cult would still be alive.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

ROOTED IN AN ARCHAIC WORLD 2. That cult would be the animating force behind the drive towards a modernity we do not yet know (may we long remain in ignorance of it!). It would be the creator of the economic morass, which strangles as it enriches, and of the concrete jungle, which daily devours the land. In the midst of these excesses of unbridled ‘progress’, it is as though Silbury Hill and the barrows of Salisbury Plain were still centres of active veneration and the dark science of Stonehenge were understood and continued to inspire the land. 3. Thus, before the Emperor undertook his nostalgic journey to Europe in 1971, he sent an Imperial Messenger to report his intention to his supposedly first human ancestor, the Emperor Jimmu, at the shrine before his tumulus at Kashiwara, in the centre of Yamato, the cradle of the modern Japanese state. He himself informed personally his ancestress, the Sun Goddess, at her rather inaccessible Grand Shrine at Ise, which is the Holy of Holies of his family and of the land. There, symbolically enough, his great aunt is the chief priestess. The Prime Minister frequently journeys to Ise to give account of his ­government. 4. I agree with Lafcadio Hearn that the national religion of Japan, Shinto or ‘the way of the gods’, is the mainspring of Japan. To its believers, which in practice means to every Japanese, Japan is the Empire of the gods. Any grain of Japanese dust can become a god; it stands to reason that any – if not all – J­apanese can and do become gods after death; the Emperor is a living ­manifest god. Until very recently – and perhaps still in practice, if not in theory – government and religion were not separate. 5. The more celebrated among the myriad gods receive a cult. The ­imperial mausolea are particularly venerated. So sacred are they, that they have never been excavated; whether this state of affairs should continue or not is at ­present, significantly enough, in hot debate in the Diet. The temptation to archaeologists is great: for instance the tumulus of the Emperor Nintoku outside the modern Osaka is larger than the pyramid of Cheops. This vast mound, supposedly untrodden by man since its construction, covered with trees and surrounded by water (the shape of a giant keyhole), can be seen from the air when approaching Osaka airport. The artifacts within would clearly reveal much. 6. The important fact is that this national cult, though no longer the state religion, in practice still moves all Japanese actions. It gives to Japanese a religious foundation for their patriotism and for their feeling of racial apartness. It is a powerful cement, which binds them together and makes it a sacred duty to work for the greater good of their country and their race. But it imposes a barrier between them and others, matched only by the linguistic wall built by the strange development of their singular language. Both may prove incompatible with harmonious existence in the modern world. They lie behind much of the dislike the Japanese inspire in it. 7. In the all too modern shops, institutions and apartment houses of contemporary Tokyo, there is always a Shinto shrine to the local god or to the deceased members of the family. Veneration is paid to these. The myriad gods and spirits are thought to be omnipresent. (The dead are cremated and the wooden tablet kept on an altar shelf in the home.) The family will recall their dead and offer on the right occasion, for instance, to the tablet of a father, his favourite dish. I have known this to be done at an intimate family party.



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8. In fact as Lafcadio Hearn puts it: ‘The dead remain in this world haunting their tombs and also their former homes and sharing invisibly in the life of their living descendants. All the dead become gods in the sense of acquiring supernatural power. The happiness of the dead depends upon the respectful service rendered them by the living.’ 9. This cult takes the mind back to the Lares and Penates and the customs of archaic Roman society. The wife abandons the veneration of the memory of the past members of her own family and devotes herself to that of her husband’s line. She is dead to her own family. Thus in the middle of the trappings of hyper-modern economy, the basic pattern is that of primitive Greece and Rome. As my distinguished predecessor, Sir Charles Eliot, put it: ‘it is strange that this ancient ceremonial paganism should have survived among an unusually intelligent and progressive race’.

EDUCATION AND THE SCAFFOLDING 10. This is the more surprising in a race so dedicated to education and self-instruction. The extraordinary nature of the language – an Altaic grammar expressed in Chinese ideograms, which do not fit it – is a great burden to acquire. There is no easy way round the mastering of Chinese characters: thus, the schoolboy discovers at once that hard work is the only key to acquiring knowledge. This habit of mind sticks with him for life. 11. The language has no plurals or genders and its verbs no persons. It would thus be incomprehensible without varying the verbs, nouns and expressions, according to the person referred to: oneself or the person one is talking to or about. Thus mentally and inescapably every Japanese must always be placing himself correctly vis-à-vis the person he is addressing. The language is ­hierarchically arranged and this is of its essence. The educated man is the one who can manipulate with elegance the nuances in this hierarchical structure. 12. Add to this the Confucian principle of ‘harmony’ so dear to every ­Japanese, which demands that harmony be maintained during the brief sojurn in this world, and you could conclude that for the Japanese politeness is all. Certainly the correct expression produces, as an infallible reflex, a polite reply. Unfortunately politeness goes with complexity and the simple expression is thus nearly always rude and invites an impolite retort or action. 13. Certainly there is no such thing as spontaneity in the system. Everything must be calculated or thought out, otherwise everyone is at sea. There is in such a system much double talk of ‘sincerity’. This in practice means to answer the truth with the truth, but also a lie with a lie. The unforgivable is to mix the genres. Again the aim is to place the other under an obligation or to exploit it while evading finding oneself in that position. If so placed, the obligation must immediately be discharged – for instance by giving a present or biting the hand that gave. 14. Because of the system, Japanese education has always been exaggeratedly formalistic and it has devoted little concern to the development of the individual. The form is all important and the individual must conform to it and know how to juggle with it. Anything can be said or done, provided the form is respected. The form acts as a sort of scaffolding, which keeps the individual straight; without it, in the words of a German colleague, ‘he collapse like pudding’.

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15. In other words, within Japan and among Japanese, in a society in which everyone knows and respects the form, the Japanese system works admirably in its rigid, unspontaneous way. The individual Japanese abroad, surrounded by people who do not even suspect the existence of the form, is utterly at sea. He has not been trained to stand on his own feet. He distrusts intellectual solutions and relies on intuition. Shinto gives him a sense of being different and superior to others, but offers him no code or morality. Left to himself, he assumes an arrogance due to his status as a Japanese, but he behaves in accordance with his basic nature. Thus the bad man, restrained in Japan by the form, with a sense of shame but no inkling of sin, behaves abroad unabashedly badly: the good man may, of course, exhibit laudably his virtue.

LACK OF SCAFFOLDING LEAVES THE INDIVIDUAL NAKED 16. I submit that the evil behaviour of the Japanese during the last war was basically due to these factors – and of course to a traditional contempt for the prisoner of war, aided by a deliberate policy to humiliate the former colonial rulers in front of their erstwhile Asian subjects. They were to be shamed in public, than which nothing is worse to the Japanese mind. In practice the Asians were shocked by Japanese cruelty and did not react as the Japanese had anticipated. They still despise the Japanese for their behaviour then. 17. The educational reforms introduced by the American occupation modified slightly Japanese attitudes. The young are more self-reliant and more generally normal. Still the outrageous behaviour of students at the university – where for the first time in their lives (and probably the last, as they feel) they are far from home and family restraint – must be accounted for. There they experience freedom from much of the scaffolding that had propped them up from childhood and which will again take complete charge of them for the rest of their lives, once they have started a career. Their heartless hooliganism and complete lack of compassion even for their fellow students show only too clearly how the lack of moral training leaves the individual at the mercy of his basic instincts and nature. 18. The merciless behaviour of dedicated adolescent revolutionaries even to one another again exhibits this at its worst. The whole Japanese nation has been shocked by their ruthlessness and depravity. Many realize that this sprang from a lack of grounding in any moral code, other than conformity to the form against which those individuals had, of course, rebelled.

BUDDHISM DOES NOT FILL THE MORAL BREACH 19. Unfortunately Buddhism, which could supply the lack of principles and curb the rampant opportunism, deals almost exclusively with the after life and does not concern itself sufficiently with this illusory, ‘floating’ world (the Ukiyo of the colour prints). It retreats into attitudes of compassion and sweet melancholy. It advocates largely abstraction from the hurly-burly of life. It is superimposed upon Shintoism, to which it has accommodated itself for centuries. It is permeated with ‘the sadness of things’. 20. An offshoot of the sect of Nichiren Buddhism has, however, sprouted a political party, the Kõmeitõ, which stands for purity of rule and has achieved



THE JAPANESE: ‘FRAIL FLOWERS OF OPPORTUNISM?’325

a certain following (it at present has seventy members in the Diet out of a total of 491). It behaves in a manner reminiscent of Buchmanism. It espouses vague syncretic tenets, supposed to embody the finer points of all religions (such sects abound in Japan) and tries to convince foreigners, that it is worthy of confidence, despite the notoriously jingoistic lucubrations of its original founder, Nichiren Shõnin, which it nevertheless holds, constitute the Buddhist Law as revealed for this millenium. 21. The Zen Sect of Buddhism has attained without doubt the apex of Japanese cultural achievement. Denying the existence of God and the soul (and paying scant attention to Buddhas or Bodhisattvas), it teaches that salvation can only be discovered by man within himself, by contemplating his true nature and that of his surroundings. As the Portuguese Jesuit, Joaˉo Rodrigues (1562–1633), put it: ‘from what they see in things themselves, they attain by their own efforts to a knowledge of the First Cause’. Our own mediaeval masterpiece, ‘The Cloud of Unknowing’, is a good preparation for its study. 22. Having attained enlightenment, Zen priests may return to the world. Their despisal of the intellect and their insistence on the primacy of intuition and perception have, however, had a stultifying influence on Japanese thought, while inspiring artists to their finest expressions. The almost complete lack of any system of philosophy, formulated in words, in the Japanese tradition may be in part due to the influence of Zen. According to Zen, philosophy must be lived instinctively, as an animal, untrammelled by thought, pursues intuitively the call of its nature. A Hamlet is anathema to them. 23. In a sense the traditional Japanese house was an externalization of a philosophy of life, in which Zen played no small a part. The house had to be of natural wood and be placed athwart a garden without violating nature. House and garden formed one whole; man lived in harmony with nature. Now concrete apartment blocks have destroyed all this. Modern Japanese intellectuals ask themselves whether such an externalized philosophy can continue to exist, if its externals are no longer in evidence. I think it has very nearly vanished.

INBRED AND SELF-CENTRED 24. The Japanese without a philosophy or moral code of universal application are thus exceedingly difficult members of an international community, in which all are now perforce neighbours. The aphorism ‘the Nipponese are hard to please’ is only too true. They are so ingrown and self-centred that they are scarcely aware that the other man has a point of view at all – let alone one to be considered seriously. Worst of all, they possess no code of morality of more than local application within Japan and between Japanese. Outside their own society, in which the form supports them and a sense of shame restrains them, they trust to their own individual natures. They indeed know no firm line of conduct, other than opportunism in the interests of Japan and this for them is a hallowed duty. 25. Their basic outlook could easily be whipped up again into rabid nationalism. Moreover they are an open prey to the self-pitying emotion of being misunderstood – like the Spaniards, who cling so masochistically to the leyenda negra. Like bees round their queen, they are always ready in mental

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self-­defence to cluster about their manifest god of an Emperor. It is easy for them to persuade themselves again that their mission in this world is unique. 26. Fortunately for the world, in an amoral society such as Shinto creates, success or failure are irrefutable: they are final arguments. The military led the Empire of the Gods to defeat: they therefore were indubitably and inescapably wrong. I do not think they could stage a come-back: they are damned. 27. Still, there is little or no privacy in Japanese life; perhaps for this reason the Japanese value secrecy so highly. Pearl Harbor showed how they can keep a secret. With this in mind, I have pondered on whether they might not even now be harbouring some atomic surprise, with which to confound the world. I think it extremely unlikely and scientific opinion rules it out, but to hold the suspicion may be salutary. 28. Moreover democracy à la japonaise has again taken root. The Prime ­Minister and cabinet play the roles of the Shogun and bakufu (military ­government) of the past. The Emperor is back in the position of p ­ olitical impotence, in which he found himself for seven centuries before his ­ ­‘restoration’ in 1868. There is a great hankering to attain a consensus (of opinion) due to the cultivation of the principle of ‘harmony’, and a revulsion against what General Franco used to call ‘the tyranny of the 50% plus one’. The principle of civilian control is firmly established and almost ludicrously defended. The press is free; the land of open access. 29. However, the economic way, espoused as the means to rehabilitate themselves after the war, has now also lost its attraction. Rampant, go-getting, ‘aggressive’ (a favourite adjective in post-American occupation Japan), materialistic opportunism is now seen to have destroyed the amenity of living and to be extinguishing all the cherished harmony with nature. Moreover it has brought them up against others, unwilling to take their soaring exports. Perhaps it is even now proving itself to be wrong by their pragmatic standards.

IN FUTURE A WELFARE STATE? 30. What will replace it? All the present indications are that the people will demand a welfare state, devoting itself to urbanistic housing, parks and the preservation of what remains of nature. This would entail vast expenditure on ‘social infrastructure’. Mr Herman Kahn thinks they will carry this out and create, with all their energy and team spirit, an earthly paradise. I doubt it: the rot has advanced too far. 31. Meanwhile, the vivid mixed metaphor, penned by a famous US Ambassador during the Second World War, seems as true today as when he wrote it before the end of hostilities: ‘if we place a fence around Japan and leave her to stew in her own juice, we shall be creating a festering sore with permanent explosive tendencies’. Either that – or cold-shouldered and misunderstood, she might succumb to the neighbouring communist ideal. Under American tutelage egalitarianism has been enthusiastically espoused. Chinese success and pressure and Russian enticements could make this communist solution attractive to Japanese opportunism. 32. Therefore I submit that it must be taken for granted that the Japanese are egoistic opportunists, encouraged thereto by an exclusive nationalist cult. All their actions spring from this, from their reluctance to liberalize to their



THE JAPANESE: ‘FRAIL FLOWERS OF OPPORTUNISM?’327

habit of taking and never giving, if they can possibly avoid it. The effective presence of the foreigner in their midst would upset their apple cart, besides they had enough of him during the occupation. One foreigner on a board, advocating laying off men instead of finding schemes for employing them on other projects, they feel, could cause widespread havoc.

TO BE TAMED BY WARY FRIENDSHIP 33. Yet the phenomenon is in our midst and we have to live with it. I have in a preceding despatch submitted that with our eyes wide open and with no illusions, we should seek to tame it by friendship and to co-operate with it, when it suits our purposes. This will require the utmost wariness and skill, but I suggest that it can and should be accomplished. It will require all the patience and caution, which the Japanese themselves expend upon attaining their own way. When it comes to the point, we can be as stubborn as they are and have the advantage of a more inventive turn of mind. 34. Mercifully, there are many thoughtful people of influence in Japan, who are perfectly aware of the dangers of their introspective, nationalist outlook and who wish to create ‘internationally minded’ Japanese. Their views find a wide echo among the young and among those who realize that racial exclusivity is the real cause of their unpopularity abroad. Much earnest endeavour in the right direction is going on. 35. Moreover, foreign travel has opened many eyes. The language barrier has become oppressive. Music and the visual arts jump this hateful barrier and strike straight at the emotions. Hence the amazing popularity and extraordinary influence of concerts and exhibitions. The thirst for acquiring the English language is as insatiable, as their lack of aptitude for it astonishes. There is important work in plenty for the British Council.

CONCLUSION 36. In conclusion therefore I find myself in complete agreement with the new Vice-Minister (Permanent Under-Secretary in our parlance) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was quoted in the Asahi Evening News of 19 April, 1972 as saying that he finds the Japanese ‘narrow minded and egoistic, lacking an international outlook and barren of philosophy’. He adds ‘in short they are frail flowers of opportunism’. 37. His use of the adjective ‘frail’ merits attention; the Japanese, led by their geography, always see themselves thus. The impermanence of existence is forced on them by nature. Earthquakes, tidal waves, typhoons and fires rub the lesson in. Here today and gone tomorrow like the cherry blossom, no sooner out than scattered by the winds, is a commonplace of Japanese conversation. The transience of existence and the evanescence of all things are forever on their lips. After all Tokyo was twice destroyed in a lifetime, first by the great earthquake of 1923 and then the fire bombs of 1945. Small wonder that they hoard and save against another disaster. Rich as they are, their nature bids them beware of spending. 38. Such enlightened self-criticism by a high official is all to the good. Moreover the probable direction Japan will take is in our interests. The creation of a

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welfare state will absorb energy and money. Investment abroad to which they gradually and reluctantly bring themselves, may solve the problem of excessive concentration on exports, by enabling them to pay for their necessary imports of raw materials. Since we once adopted that method with such success in the past and since we have a working welfare state to exhibit, we should, I have suggested, use these considerable assets in our relations with the Japanese. 39. Morally the Japanese are indeed frail flowers of opportunism, but in my estimation the bush upon which they grow is tough as steel and has deep roots going back to the primeval conditions of an archaic world. The past and the present everywhere mix, but nowhere more evocatively than in Japan, where the very word for the Japanese people in the Chinese characters used (pronounced in Japanese Nihonjin or in the Cantonese dialect of Chinese Jepênjen, hence the word ‘Japanese’) means ‘Sun Origin People’. How could they therefore forget their Shinto heritage? 40. I find therefore the old flaws intact though in milder form. We are not immune from them ourselves. We are all sometimes opportunistic, but against our better conscience. We feel obliged to pay with hypocrisy the homage of vice to virtue and at least to cloak our deeds with high moral purposes. The Japanese are openly in pursuit solely of their own interests. Yet I leave Japan heartened by the courage shown by prominent Japanese in drawing public attention to their shortcomings. This augurs well for the future.

EPILOGUE 41. I have had the luck to have been able to study four facets of this extraordinary people during my official life: first their manic nationalism in the 1930s; then their exquisite aestheticism in Kyoto (where I lived in the precincts of a Shinto shrine and sat at the feet of Zen Buddhists), before witnessing the conduct of their military in occupied China during the war; now I have been able to watch their excess of economic success, after the medicine of defeat and the shrewd reforms of General MacArthur. 42. Anything I have learned has been due to the inspiration given to me personally by Sir George Sansom and Dr Arthur Waley and by acquaintance with the scholarship of my predecessors, Sir Charles Eliot and Sir Ernest Satow. Dedicated colleagues in this Embassy have filled in the great gaps in my knowledge and to them I express my profound gratitude for their generosity of spirit and their unfailing co-operation. To all who have worked with me so unselfishly for nearly four decades I owe an infinity of thanks. 43. To achieve friendship with Japanese is no easy task. First, only a strong and adaptable character breaks down the barriers. Next he must have something to offer and interests, which can be shared. It is not sufficient to be able to speak Japanese; success depends on being able to discourse about matters of mutual interest and significance in it. One for whom the firmament revolves only around Japan alone bores the Japanese, yet a knowledge of the Japanese background and achievements is essential. 44. Therefore I submit that persons of wide education and experience should be sent to Japan. It is very important that they should see it from a certain perspective. I regret not having acquired a deeper understanding of China or more than a superficial acquaintance with Russia and the communist world. Better understanding of both would have helped me greatly here. Lastly the



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Japanese eventually get used to and come to like the presence of a foreigner, which argues for leaving people longer at a time in Japan or, as in my case, bringing them back after different experiences for a second tour. 45. I regard myself as much better versed in matters European than Japanese. The interest I have in the arts, architecture, music, history and traditions of our own civilization afforded the potential for strong links with Japanese of all tastes and perhaps a criterion for evaluating their achievements. My very long association with France and my youthful and later my official relations with Italy, Spain and Austria are far deeper than with Japan. I hope that this background helped me to view Japan with a certain objectivity as a fascinating phenomenon in world society. 46. Finally, I have always left all the posts in which I have had the honour to serve with great sorrow. If it had been otherwise, it would have been a terrible confession of failure. To say goodbye is too positive: characteristically enough the Japanese for it begs the question and leaves the conclusion to the reader; ‘sayo nara’: ‘since it must be so’ . . . . JOHN PILCHER

45

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL BRINGS CONCORDE TO JAPAN*

SUMMARY A BAC survey team arrived at short notice in Tokyo in March to request Japanese assent to a plan to bring Concorde here in June. The authorities, who had not been adequately forewarned, rejected the plan as impossible. (Paragraphs 1–3.) 2. The Embassy mounted a long drawn-out campaign to secure Japanese agreement to the visit of Concorde with the Lord Privy Seal on board. (Paragraphs 4–5.) 3. Preparations for the visit advanced in the hope of eventual ­Japanese agreement, which was finally forthcoming on 10 May. ­(Paragraph 6.) 4. Last-minute changes in Concorde’s time of arrival detracted from the publicity impact of the arrival. (Paragraphs 7–8.) 5. The Ministerial part of the visit and the programme of ­demonstration flights were most successful. (Paragraphs 9–10.) 6. Concorde had a bad Press on environmental grounds, but on balance the visit was a success. (Paragraphs 11–13.) 23 June 1972

I

report upon the visit to Japan from 12 to 15 June of the Right Hon. Earl Jellicoe, Lord Privy Seal, on the 002 Concorde Prototype. 2. The idea of a Concorde display tour to the Far East and Australia was first put forward by the Department of Trade and Industry and the British Aircraft Corporation in Feburary this year. It was not until the middle of March that this Embassy was given instructions to contact the Japanese authorities to ask * MUA 8/312/3 – The British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 23 June 1972.

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for their agreement to a visit to Japan by Concorde, and was asked to assist a BAC survey team which would arrive within a few days. We attempted over a holiday weekend to prepare what ground we could with the Japanese authorities and to make the application less like a bolt from the blue. Not unnaturally, however, the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) were upset by the suddenness with which the survey team’s cut-and-dried plan was presented for their approval. No country likes to be confronted with sudden proposals of a kind which present technical and political difficulties and this is particularly true of Japan, where the national temperament and system of decision-making by consensus demands that new plans should be gently and discreetly floated before serious discussion can commence. 3. BAC’s impetuosity resulted in the refusal of their application by the JCAB. The chief reason given was the fact that, because of delay in the opening of the new international airport at Narita, the present airport of Haneda was already intolerably congested and therefore physically incapable of taking Concorde and its support aircraft for even a few days. If Concorde could come in the autumn, it was argued, there would be no difficulty in accommodating it. 4. We therefore returned to the charge with the Japanese, mentioning that we hoped the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry would come on his planned visit to Japan in Concorde and saying that the tightness of Concorde’s tour schedule made it imperative that if our Concorde were to come to Japan it must come in June. By 31 March it was clear that parliamentary business would make it impossible for Mr Davies to come on Concorde. However it was decided that efforts should continue to get Japanese agreement to a Concorde visit in June, with Lord Jellicoe on board. 5. Thus there began a war of attrition, whereby this Embassy strove to persuade the Japanese Government on political grounds to reverse the decision of its chief aviation authority, while simultaneously we attempted to wear down the many and cogent technical objections of the JCAB. Neither side’s position was helped by the appearance in the Press of articles reporting that the JCAB had firmly rejected the application for the visit. These articles put JCAB in a position from which a retreat without loss of face would be a slow and difficult process. Throughout April and early May we plugged away on both political and aviation fronts. Our campaign had the dubious assistance of the Mainichi Newspaper Company, whose offer to assist with publicizing the visit and with facilitating the necessary clearances had been accepted some weeks before. It turned out that the Mainichi –– normally a pillar of the establishment – was to fall into complete disgrace and disarray following revelations that one of its staff had been acquiring secret telegrams by stealth from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly the Mainichi’s influence in these matters was less than we had reason to expect, and in the event it was pressure exercised by this Embassy and by Jardine Matheson and Company, the local BAC agents, which won the day. 6. It was not until 10 May, four-and-a-half weeks before Concorde’s planned arrival, that the JCAB felt able to announce that, on the basis of detailed ­technical information now available to it, it had reversed its previous decision and agreed to Concorde visiting Japan in June. Meanwhile, p ­ reparations for the visit had been advancing on the assumption that permission would ­eventually be forthcoming. With the assistance of Japan Air Lines, who were very ­co-operative, Jardine Matheson were able to produce a scheme which would allow Concorde all the facilities it required at Haneda Airport.



THE LORD PRIVY SEAL BRINGS CONCORDE TO JAPAN335

­ rrangements were also made, with some difficulty, for the support aircraft. A The Embassy, with the full co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged a programme for the Lord Privy Seal which included calls on the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Transport and other Government leaders. We suggested Lord Jellicoe should bring with him a personal message from Mr Heath to Mr Sato. This idea found general favour and was eventually implemented with success. 7. The many and intricate arrangements for the visit had barely been completed when it was learnt on the morning of 10 June, the day before Concorde’s expected arrival, that a fault in the aircraft’s weather radar would necessitate twenty-four hours delay. We succeeded, after frantic telephoning, in alerting all those concerned and in gaining the grudging approval of the JCAB for the new arrival time. The following day it transpired that, since 12 June was Philippine Independence Day, Manila Airport, where Concorde was to be parked overnight, had to be cleared by 7 a.m. to permit the ­Philippine Air Force to stage fly-pasts. This would entail Concorde’s arriving at Tokyo one hour earlier than expected – a plan which we feared would be u ­ nacceptable to the already much put-upon authorities here. In the event an all-night ­telephone campaign by Mr Wakefield, the Commercial Counsellor, carried the day, and we received at last the grudging acquiescence of the JCAB. 8. Well before the Concorde’s arrival Japanese Press reporting of adverse comments and distortions of fact in the British, European and US Press had primed the strong local environmental lobbies. However some f­avourable ­articles had also appeared. These should have culminated in a splendid dramatic arrival with large crowds turning out to watch. The delay and muddle over the timing of the arrival meant that the aircraft slipped in almost ­unnoticed. Sunday crowds had been disappointed. Television companies had had their plans for prime time disorganized. Disgruntled journalists had to get up early on the morning of 12 June, without even being certain when and where the aircraft would actually arrive. Concorde and the Lord Privy Seal finally arrived at 10.15 a.m. on 12 June. 9. The Ministerial part of the visit went very well. Lord Jellicoe expressed to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Her Majesty’s Government’s interest in the closest possible relations with Japan. With the Ministers of the Environment, of Transport and of Science and Technology, he emphasized our interest in joint collaboration in their respective fields. To all Ministers Lord Jellicoe was able to state the case for Concorde authoritatively and to deploy the defensive arguments on environmental questions. Lord Jellicoe’s visit carried on the Ministerial contacts most successfully which were begun this year with the visit of Mr Davies and will culminate with the Prime Minister’s visit in September. He also called on the Speaker of the Japanese Upper House and the Director-General of the Civil Service Agency. At social functions which included a traditional Japanese dinner given by the Permanent Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lord and Lady Jellicoe met many influential Japanese. 10. Although the imminent end of the Diet Session and departure from office of the Japanese Prime Minister with its consequent political activity prevented any Ministers accepting the offers of seats in the test flights, these went off smoothly and successfully. The top officials of Japan Air Lines, some influential Diet Members and specialist aviation journalists went on the flights and uniformly praised the comfort of the aircraft.

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11. Despite this the Concorde received a bad Press during the visit. Press conferences at the airport on arrival and after each test flight, and a major Press conference in Tokyo the last afternoon enabled Lord Jellicoe and others to put the positive and defensive case for Concorde fully on the record. But the Press were unconvinced. The aircraft was clearly smoky and sounded noisy on the tarmac, even if not on take-off or landing. Although told repeatedly that these faults would be corrected in the production aircraft reporters did not make this very clear in their articles. The measurements of sound in ‘phons’ by official and unofficial groups were used selectively to play up the noise level question in particular. The story, for the Japanese Press, was not one of technological achievement so much as of bad environmental effects. 12. So ended an exercise which appeared to place heavy reliance on the ­British genius for muddling through in an enterprise upon which no strict logician would have embarked in the first place. The organization of BAC impressed neither the Japanese authorities nor ourselves. For various reasons, BAC are not using one of the large Japanese trading companies who might have wielded greater influence with the Japanese authorities than their ­British agent was able to do. This placed a very heavy burden on this Embassy. And it is difficult to think of any local objective which would not have been better served by waiting until such time as the new model with its quieter and smokefree engines could come to this country at a time convenient to the Japanese and show itself to be at least no more harmful environmentally than the present generation of subsonic airliners. 13. Nevertheless I feel that on balance the visit was a success. Although the Press gave Concorde generally bad reviews, questioning the necessity for supersonic travel, yet there was also an undertone which genuinely, if somewhat enviously, hailed it as a superb technical achievement. The fact that this revolutionary prototype aircraft could operate so far from home in a busy international airport must have impressed informed observers, and the worst bogies of shattered window panes, etc. have been dissipated. Japan Air Lines have expressed themselves satisfied with the way in which the visit went off without technical problems and appear well enough persuaded that the operational specifications they have set will eventually be satisfied. P. A. G. WESTLAKE

46 THE PLEBEIAN MR TANAKA REPLACES MR SATO*

SUMMARY Mr Sato a traditional Japanese politician of great personal charm and skill. His party nevertheless continued to lose support. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. Mr Tanaka a self-made man of a type not hitherto considered appropriate to lead the party and govern Japan. (Paragraph 3.) 3. Mr Sato’s success in doubling the national income and handling student unrest. His failures over pollution and the quality of life. (Paragraphs 4–5.) 4. Foreign affairs and the reversion of Okinawa. (Paragraphs 6–8.) 5. Liberal Democratic Party contrived to maintain a large Diet majority on a minority of popular votes cast. The causes of complaint which Mr Sato failed to remedy but which his successor might be bold enough to tackle. (Paragraphs 9–11.) 6 July 1972

M

r Eisaku Sato has resigned as President of the Liberal Democratic Party and Prime Minister of Japan after seven years and eight months in office. At an extraordinary party conference of the LDP on 5 July, Mr Kakuei Tanaka was elected President of the party and on 6 July confirmed in the Diet as the new Prime Minister. 2. I believe that subsequent history will say of Mr Sato that in handling the factions in his party he was a traditional Japanese politician of great personal charm and consummate skill. One could say of the Japanese regime of this period, as was said, I think by Bagehot, of an earlier phase of British democ-

* FEJ 1/3 – The British Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 6 July 1972.

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racy, that no one had the smallest inkling of the matter unless they recognized that government by a club was ‘a standing wonder’. Under this style of management, Japan achieved amazing economic growth with remarkably few stresses. But there was one fatal flaw: over a period of more than twenty years the Liberal Democratic Party and its lineal ancestors lost the support of the electorate at a steady rate of a little over 1 per cent per year. Mr Sato could not reverse this trend, and the members of the club reluctantly came to the conclusion that Mr Sato had to go. 3. He will be remembered as the last, but by no means the least, of a series of patrician Prime Ministers. As the younger brother of Nobusuke Kishi (Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960) and a protegé of Shigeru Yoshida (Prime Minister from 1946 to 1954), Mr Sato comfortably fitted the traditional mould of the well-to-do, well-connected, Tokyo University-educated gentleman, the only type hitherto considered appropriate to head the Liberal Democratic Party and to govern the country. The election of Mr Tanaka has put an end to this tradition, at least temporarily. Mr Tanaka is without respectable antecedents, lacking a university education, and yet enormously successful; in short, the archetypal self-made man, and one who is privately despised as a parvenu among some sections of the LDP. 4. When Mr Sato took over as Prime Minister in November 1964 he inherited from Mr Kishi and Mr Ikeda a plan to double the national income by 1970 . This grandiose plan was fulfilled and exceeded. Mr Sato also promised Japan stable growth and a massive increase in ‘social capital’ in the form of welfare, housing, parks, etc. These promises came to nothing. This was partly because of a basic lack of political will, and partly because of an understandable complacency at the continuing high rate of economic growth, which according to the laissez-faire philosophy of Japanese conservatism ought to leave social problems to solve themselves by creating prosperity for all. 5. Indeed the technique of masterly inactivity, of waiting for opinion to crystallize and seeming to be in the van of that opinion, was one of the most enduring traits of his Government. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this was his handling of student unrest which was at one time threatening to bring advanced education to a standstill. The unrest has virtually petered out – its only monument the incredibly well equipped and disciplined riot police – while violence is now confined to a lunatic fringe. As against this, however, Mr Sato failed to move fast enough on the issue of pollution and the quality of life, and a record of quiet success in overseas diplomacy was suddenly set at naught when Mr Nixon seized the initiative in relations with Peking. 6. Mr Sato’s first achievement in foreign affairs was to effect a long overdue settlement with South Korea, which led to the establishment of regular diplomatic relations and, through the granting of substantial Japanese credit, contributed to the stability and development of that country. Mr Sato’s personal diplomatic qualities contributed in no small part to the lessening of Korean suspicions of Japan. He also directed Japan towards somewhat closer relations with the Soviet Union, a policy in which he was aided by a parallel Soviet readiness to improve relations. 7. Rather than continue the tentative moves begun by his predecessor towards a rapprochement with China, Mr Sato based his policy on a close alignment with the US Government. From many points of view this was a



THE PLEBEIAN MR TANAKA REPLACES MR SATO339

wise and prudent policy. It left the Japanese free to concentrate on economic development and enabled them to do so in security. But it made them also little more than clients of the US on most foreign policy matters. 8. During the first half of Mr Sato’s Premiership Japanese and US interests continued to coincide sufficiently for this policy of compliance to be presented to the Japanese people (and in the main to be accepted by them) as the natural policy of a prudent and patriotic statesman; but unfortunately for Mr Sato President Nixon cut the ground from under his feet by his unilateral decision to visit Peking. Soon after came the measures to defend the dollar which were not even thinly disguised as directed anywhere but against Japan. It appeared that the Japanese Government’s concern for the interests of the US had never been reciprocated. Mr Sato received the brunt of recriminations from the Opposition, the Press and from many within his own party, yet with the full reversion of Okinawa only months away, he was in less of a position to jeopardize its return than ever before. He got Okinawa; but this achievement, to which he had long looked forward, was overshadowed by the aftermath of the Nixon shocks as well as by dissatisfaction shown by the Okinawans themselves. And his earlier rejection of any accommodation with Communist China, mainly at American behest, drove Japanese relations with China into a dead end, from which he was unable to rescue them. 9. Mr Sato’s period of office has seen the average income of ordinary ­Japanese rise to unprecedented heights. But along with this has gone inflation, land shortage, pollution – all causes for complaint and dissatisfaction. The action he took was too little and too late. Mr Sato set up an Environmental Agency in 1971 but otherwise was not prepared to curb manufacturing business, which was making Japan prosperous. One could be excused for supposing that GNP was synonymous with gross national pollution and that both went up together. 10. One is led to wonder how Mr Sato contrived to survive so long as to come within a few months of holding the record as the longest in office of Japanese Prime Ministers. He was helped by the weakness of the political Opposition, which during its two decades in the wilderness had become increasingly fragmented into mutually antagonistic groups. He also took exceptionally skilful advantage of the political system. I have already mentioned that throughout Mr Sato’s Premiership the Liberal Democratic Party suffered a steady, if slow, decline in electoral support. At the 1967 election its share of votes cast dropped for the first time below 50 per cent. Yet by a cunning deployment of resources within the multi-seat constituencies, and by Mr Sato’s refusal to do more than talk about long-overdue electoral reforms, the LDP has hung on to a large Diet majority. Nor was Mr Sato effectively challenged within his own party. The death soon after he took office of his two most dangerous rivals allowed him a breathing space in which to consolidate his position. 11. It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to identify the issue which, if handled differently, might have made Mr Sato’s departure from office less rancorous than in the end it was. It is arguable whether he could have initiated some sort of new relationship with Peking without thereby forfeiting American trust. It is now widely accepted that if Mr Sato had been able to put into practice by, say, 1968 the policies of which he had talked in 1964, Japan would not have been forced into a confrontation with the

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United States over trade, and the value of the yen and would not now be in her present state of a gross imbalance between economic progress and lack of social amenity. In extenuation it should be pointed out that none of Mr Sato’s advisers suggested remedial measures until it was too late for them to be effective. Nevertheless the blame has been firmly attached to Mr Sato. It remains to be seen whether his successor will be bold enough to apply to the solution of these problems the benefits of the resources that the economy, by growing too fast for its own good, will place at his command. P. A. G. WESTLAKE

47 JAPANESE INVESTMENTS OVERSEAS*

SUMMARY It is frequently said of Japan that she is now trying to do by economic means what she failed to do during the Pacific War. (Paragraph 1.) 2. One aspect of this is the increase in Japanese investments overseas. After a slow beginning following the war, these have recently been increasing rapidly, reflecting Japan’s healthy balance of payments position. Originally these investments were designed to secure raw materials for Japan’s industries and to promote her exports, but the motives now are more complex. (Paragraphs 2–9.) 3. Japanese investments overseas do not appear to be very different from those of other countries. (Paragraphs 10–11.) 4. Japan does not seem to be embarking on widespread economic conquest. The scope for new investment within Japan and in China. Any question of the four corners of the world being under one ­Japanese (economic) roof is not today’s business. (Paragraphs 12–13.) 29 August 1972

I

t is frequently said of Japan that she is now trying to do by economic means what she failed to do during the Pacific War by military means. It is certainly true that with the present and prospective large surpluses of balance of payments on current account Japan would be well placed to establish an economic hegemony in South-East Asia or other selected countries. But if there is such an intention, which is possible, the execution of it still lies in the unforeseeable future. For the time being Japanese direct investment overseas is quite modest (although according to recent Japanese estimates it could somewhat exceed Britain’s present level by 1980) and Japan’s surplus energies are likely to be taken up with other objectives.

* FEJ 6/17 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 29 August 1972.

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

2. Japan first started investing overseas again after the Second World War in 1951. The pace throughout the 1950s was, however, slow, and by 1960 the accumulated value of direct foreign investments was only $289 million. The growth rate started to accelerate, however, and by 1965 the accumulated total had reached $956 million, with an annual outflow of around $150 million. As Japan’s balance of payments grew stronger in the latter half of the 1960s, foreign investment started to boom, and by the end of March 1972 the accumulated total had reached $4,475 million with an annual outflow of around $900 million. Restrictions on outward investment were finally lifted in June 1972, although the major steps towards liberalization had been taken eleven months earlier. 3. North America has taken the largest share of these investments, with 25·6 per cent of the total. Asia is not far behind with 23·1 per cent, followed by Europe (16·1 per cent), Latin America (15·6 per cent), Oceania (8·7 per cent), the Middle East (8·3 per cent), and Africa (2·6 per cent). By industry, the distribution as of March 1971 was raw materials development 33·7 per cent (of which mining accounted for 31·3 per cent), manufacturing 26·8 per cent, and other industries, largely financial and commercial, but including real estate, accounting for the remaining 39·5 per cent. Within Europe, Britain might appear to have been one of the most favoured countries, with $589 million of the total Japanese investment in Europe to date of $723 million. However, the vast bulk of this is probably accounted for by Japanese financial activities in the City of London, which are now very extensive, and often involve international groupings with only a small part of their operations in Britain. On the other hand, as far as manufacturing facilities are concerned, Japanese companies surprisingly have not found the central area of the EEC very attractive for investment. Apparently, the welcoming attitude, financial incentives, cheaper labour, and sometimes language advantages, in Britain are thought to offset the benefits of proximity to the main markets and the more stable labour relations in some of the countries on the Continent. 4. In the early days Japan’s foreign investments were regarded either as a way of securing stable supplies of raw materials (e.g. iron ore in Australia, petroleum in the Middle East, timber and pulp in North America), or as a means of promoting Japan’s export trade, with the large trading houses setting up sales organizations in North America and Europe. Gradually, however, Japan’s motives started to change, although the demand for raw materials has continued, and indeed will continue in the future, to provide a major impetus to foreign investment. More emphasis started to be placed on manufacturing facilities, and this trend has continued to the present. 5. There were initially two reasons for this move. First, as wages started to rise in Japan it became cheaper to manufacture those labour intensive commodities, which had characterized Japan’s early post-war economic growth, in countries with lower wages. Examples of this were the establishment in Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong of Japanese textile firms and plants assembling electrical appliances using imported Japanese components. Secondly, certain highly protected markets could not be penetrated by direct exports from Japan, and plants were established behind the tariff walls to serve these areas. Thus an early example of manufacturing investment was the setting up in 1956 of an iron works in Brazil to get round the barriers for the protection of the domestic industry.



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6. More recently other motives have served to increase manufacturing investment overseas. Japan’s pollution problems have become acute. Because her size and geography dictate the placing of industries alongside major population centres, the more obnoxious industries are having a hard time finding new sites in Japan. One answer to this problem is to build the plants overseas, and this is already taking place in such industries as pulp and paper manufacturing. This trend can be expected to accelerate in the future, with the oil refining, steel and metal refining and smelting, and chemical industries, amongst others, being forced to move overseas. 7. A more important factor, however, is Japan’s recent over-success at exporting. Ever more countries are becoming hostile to rapidly expanding imports from Japan and are threatening to put up barriers against them. As a result more Japanese firms are seriously thinking of placing manufacturing facilities either in those countries with the most important markets, or else in adjacent third countries that have other advantages to offer, such as cheap labour or preferential trading agreements. Since the US was one of the first countries to impose serious barriers against Japanese exports, and since also this is the largest single market in the world, it is not surprising that Japanese industry has started to invest heavily there. Sony has built an assembly plant for colour television sets in California, and Sanyo, Hitachi and Matsushita plan to do the same in Canada. Toyota and Nissan have assembly plants to construct completely knocked down (CKD) cars in Canada, and are studying the feasibility of building lorry plants in the US. Other industries which have followed suit include ball bearings, petrochemicals, textiles, food products and toys. In all, forty manufacturing companies in the US are either owned or controlled by Japanese businesses. 8. The latest move in this field is again by the two largest motor ­manufacturers, who have decided to build assembly plants for CKD vehicles in Ireland. The tariff on cars imported into Ireland is 75 per cent (with the UK enjoying a preferential rate of 22 per cent), whereas the tariff for CKD vehicles is only 17.5 per cent. Furthermore, Ireland will join the EEC in ­January 1973 thereby giving access to a far larger market than the domestic one. Although on the fringe of this market, Ireland possesses relatively abundant cheap labour, and it could be used as a base from which to supply the rest of the EEC, although both Toyota and Nissan deny that they have this in mind. 9. Japanese business has also invested heavily overseas in real estate. ­Tourism from Japan is growing rapidly and to cater for this, Japanese hotel and leisure companies are expanding rapidly in such fields as hotels, golf courses and country clubs. Private Japanese citizens also have been buying land and property overseas, either for use as holiday homes or else for speculative purposes, whilst Japanese shipping companies own extensive port and warehousing facilities. 10. How successful will Japanese investment be? It is difficult at present to judge, since the bulk of Japan’s investment is not yet well established. A recent Export-Import Bank survey of 775 firms with foreign investments found that about half the projects surveyed were profitable. The most common reason given for lack of profits was that firms had begun production only recently, thereby implying that they expected to operate profitably once the running-in period was over. On this basis Japanese firms seem to be neither much more, nor less, successful with their overseas operations than are other companies. Of the factors that have contributed to the phenomenal

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economic growth in Japan, such as abundant capital, good labour relations, and close and special ties between Government and industry, only the first can be readily exported to other countries. Japanese employers are likely to be treated no differently by trade unions, Governments and the law than are other employers in foreign countries. 11. In view of Japan’s continued insistence on joint venture terms for many categories of foreign investment in Japan, it is interesting to see what her industry’s practice is when it wishes itself to set up overseas. The survey carried out by the Export-Import Bank showed that in 60 per cent of the projects the Japanese company owned 50 per cent or less of the capital whereas 100 per cent Japanese ownership was to be found in only 17 per cent of the cases. Two reasons have been given for this. First, many countries, especially amongst the developing countries, insist on local participation in these projects, and second, Japanese companies have considered in the past that they did not have the financial resources to start new ventures overseas on their own, and were quite happy to take on partners. This is perhaps surprising since three-quarters of such ventures have a paid-up capital of $1 million or less. 12. On this evidence, it seems fair to say that Japan does not seem to be embarking on widespread economic conquest. There is no current mood or slogan equivalent to the pre-war military slogan ‘eight corners of the world under one (Japanese) roof’. But to continue the metaphor, I would say that although not even the foundations for walls, let alone the roof, are showing above ground, it would be prudent to look at the nature of the pile-driving which is going on. There seems to be two current elements in this: one is the present Government’s interest in improving Japanese infrastructure; the other is the kind of social engineering which might lead in a decade or two to a Sino-Japanese entente. 13. The Japanese are likely to embark on ambitious plans for their own islands as suggested in a book by Mr Tanaka, the Japanese Prime Minister, which was published this summer. Progress towards a rapprochement with China is rapid and is currently attracting the full glare of headlines, although the pace may slacken greatly after a first agreement is reached. In the context of this despatch, the point which is relevant, is that the scope for new investment within Japan, if as seems likely this becomes a major objective of the ruling party, and the scope for investment in China may absorb so much energy that any question of the four corners of the world being under one Japanese (economic) roof is not today’s business. F. WARNER

48 MR TANAKA IN CHARGE*

SUMMARY Mr Tanaka was born in 1918, the son of a poor farmer, and had only primary education. He studied at night classes, built up a construction business, and went into politics at the end of the war. (Paragraphs 1–5.) 2. Helped by Mr Sato, Mr Tanaka became the youngest ever Minister of Posts in 1957. He was subsequently Finance Minister, Secretary-General of the party and Minister of Trade and Industry. Meanwhile he became very rich with the expansion of his private construction company. (Paragraphs 6–7.) 3. After the Nixon shocks Mr Tanaka emerged as a strong candidate to replace Mr Sato as Prime Minister, though Mr Fukuda was the heir apparent. He played his cards well. He let it be known that he favoured normalization of relations with China and produced a best-selling book with ideas for decentralizing industry in Japan. He promised an open and responsive administration. He lined up other serious contenders behind him. In July this year he won the Presidency of the party by a considerable margin and thus became Prime Minister (Paragraphs 8–13.) 4. Although his Cabinet is disappointingly elderly Mr Tanaka has made a good start and is popular. On China and foreign policy he has been cautious and will delegate to the Foreign Minister. He appreciates Japan’s trade problems but will negotiate toughly. He will concentrate on internal affairs. (Paragraphs 14–18.) 5. Mr Tanaka likes golf, lives simply but is surrounded by the appurtenances of wealth. He is not at ease at Western social functions and speaks practically no English. He has energy and a good brain and a reputation for being decisive. He is also good at personal * FEJ 1/3 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 31 August 1972.

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relations and has a sense of humour. His sincerity comes across, with no chip on his shoulder. (Paragraphs 19–21.) 6. To sum up he is a refreshingly new type of political leader in Japan. He will defend Japan’s interests and will not be bullied, but one can do business with him. We shall have to deal with him for some years to come. On him will depend his party’s success in the critical elections due in three or four years’ time. (Paragraphs 22–23.) 31 August 1972

N

ow that Mr Tanaka has been in office for over a month I should attempt to describe his background and characteristics in more detail and make an assessment of the man who is likely to be in control of Japanese policies for at least the next three or four years. 2. Mr Tanaka was born in 1918 in Niigata Prefecture (in north-west Japan) son of an impoverished farmer who had tried various jobs, including horse dealing and failed at them all. The son was educated only to primary level, but is said to have shown great promise. He had a good brain and plenty of energy. 3. On leaving school he first used his strong build to get a job as a labourer on a construction site. Then at the age of sixteen he came to Tokyo with only a few yen in his pocket to work as a builder’s apprentice, a cub reporter and a clerk. He attended intensive night classes in constructional engineering, mathematics and English. At the surprisingly early age of nineteen he had amassed enough capital to set up his own small building company. 4. It is hard for anyone who does not know Japan to realize how exceptional it is for someone without university education to reach the top. 5. In 1939 Mr Tanaka was drafted to Manchuria when he served as an infantryman on the Mongolian frontier. According to his own story he was invalided out of the army in 1941 after an attack of pneumonia. His career from then until the end of the war is not very well known, but his renewed construction business is said to have flourished through lucrative ­Government contracts. Mr Sato himself is said to have been legal adviser to Mr Tanaka’s company at this time and may have introduced him to political contacts. In 1946 he stood for the House of Representatives and lost. He stood again the following year and was elected for his home ­constituency in Niigata. He joined the Democratic Party (one of the ancestors of the present Liberal Democratic Party) and was very briefly Parliamentary ­Vice-Minister of Justice during the Socialist coalition Government from June 1947 to February 1948. In the struggle over the Cabinet’s policy of n ­ ationalizing coal mining Mr Tanaka was at this time accused of accepting the equivalent of £1,000 in return for his official influence against nationalization. He was indicted on a charge of corruption and detained in a remand centre in Tokyo, from which he conducted a vigorous campaign to clear his name. Charges were dropped for lack of evidence, and he was released in January 1949. 6. In 1948 he had joined the Liberal Party (another ancestor of the Liberal Democratic Party). He worked up through the party machine. The fact that he was something of a protégé of Mr Sato, who was himself a protégé of Mr Yoshida, no doubt helped Mr Tanaka in becoming the youngest ever Minister of Posts and Telecommunications between 1957 and 1958. From 1961 to 1962 he held one of the important party posts, Chairman of the



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LDP Policy Board. From 1962 to 1965 he was Finance Minister, first under Mr Ikeda and then under Mr Sato. This key post, which he achieved at a young age, brought him great influence within the party and in financial circles. From 1965 to 1966 and again from the end of 1968 until 1971 Mr Tanaka was Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, a position rated by politicians as equivalent to the top three or four Cabinet posts. He ran the party organization, raised the funds and dispensed patronage. Traditionally some of the party funds rub off on to the politicians themselves. Partly perhaps by these means and partly by the expansion of his construction company’s activities, Mr Tanaka made a great deal of money. He built a large modern house in Tokyo and is now reported to be worth more than £10 million. 7. From July 1971 to July 1972 Mr Tanaka was Minister of International Trade and Industry. He held this post at a particularly difficult time. However, he achieved beyond expectations a relatively favourable truce in the textile dispute with the US and later avoided the stigma which attached to Mr Sato and many of his Government as a result of Nixon’s dollar shock and Japan’s unwilling revaluation. 8. After the Nixon shocks it was only a matter of time before Mr Sato would have to hand over leadership of the party. Mr Fukuda, the e­ x-bureaucrat, relaxed and sophisticated, was the heir apparent. But Mr Tanaka began to emerge at the beginning of 1972 as another strong contender. Mr Fukuda had incurred the odium of Japan’s humiliation over the China policy. He also came under attack for the secrets case in which details of Okinawa negotiations were leaked to the Press. He was a man of sixty-seven, and there began to be a feeling that he was not perhaps decisive enough to take charge of Japan’s affairs at this critical time when her relationships with the major Powers were in the melting pot. 9. Mr Tanaka sat tight and played his cards well. The finesse with which he managed to represent himself as a loyal disciple of Mr Sato, and yet a new broom, verged on genius. He did not commit himself on foreign policy issues and he was careful not to criticize Mr Sato openly, but he let it be thought that he would be sympathetic to the rapid normalization of ­relations with Communist China. He developed his thoughts on the internal development of Japan in a book called ‘The Reconstruction of the Japanese ­Archipelago’ which has now become a best seller (400,000 copies sold). The book grew out of a party study group of which he was chairman and was largely written by people devilling for him. Its popularity can be attributed to the popularity of its nominal author. It is simply written, with many facts and figures. What it does is to draw attention in an uncompromising way to the problems of modern Japanese society such as overcrowding and ­pollution and sketch out a plan by which these problems could be tackled. Broadly speaking this involves the decentralization of industry to reduce the extreme ­concentration in the areas around the present major cities and to bring industrial benefits to Japan’s rural areas. Improvement of the ­environment is not, in Mr Tanaka’s view, incompatible with maintaining fast growth. The ideas are not completely worked out – a committee has now been set up to try and translate them into positive recommendations for action – and have been criticized as exporting pollution to the Japanese rural environment (and allowing contractors and real estate operators to make a killing), but it is a bold conception which on the whole has caught the imagination of many people.

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10. As Mr Sato clung to office in the spring of this year, partly to see through the Okinawa reversion, the critical question was who would be the best vote getter for the Liberal Democratic Party in the forthcoming elections. Many of the middle ranking members of the party began to feel that Mr Tanaka with his younger more decisive image would be the man most likely to ensure their own re-election. 11. Mr Tanaka was also skilful in inter-party manoeuvres. He persuaded the other serious contenders, Mr Ohira and Mr Miki, to line up with him in an anti-Fukuda front. At a critical stage Mr Nakasone, an ambitious young politician who was another minor contender, was persuaded to throw in his lot with Mr Tanaka. Mr Fukuda was left with the Right wing of the party and the support of the conservative business circles. 12. When Mr Sato announced he would resign and the campaign for the leadership of the party opened in earnest Mr Tanaka’s star was still rising. He judged the mood of the people correctly in promising to provide an open and honest administration. The last years of Mr Sato’s bland paternalistic style of Government had created a popular mood of disillusionment. Mr Tanaka promised to seek the participation of all the people in forming his policies and to destroy the old tradition of bureaucratic Government. 13. The end result of these trends, and of the astute tactics of Mr Tanaka and his supporters, was that he won the Presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party by a considerable margin on 6 July. In the first vote Mr Fukuda had been only six votes behind him but the alliance with the Ohira, Miki and Nakasone factions held and most of their votes swung behind Mr Tanaka in the second vote, giving him a majority of 110. One week later, as leader of the majority party, Mr Tanaka was formerly invested as Prime Minister of Japan. 14. It is too soon, of course, to judge Mr Tanaka’s performance as Prime Minister. His first major decision disappointed his admirers. Except for the few prominent politicians who had played a major part in his campaign, such as Ohira, Miki and Nakasone, Mr Tanaka chose a Cabinet of old lags. Debts had to be paid to the various factions that had supported him and he was unable to break the system whereby senior party members expect a Cabinet portfolio as a reward for long service. The junior Ministers he selected were younger and it is expected that after he has fought, and won, his next election he will replace most of his present Cabinet with younger more energetic personalities. 15. In most respects, however, Mr Tanaka has won the approbation of the Press and public for his approach to Government. He has spoken directly and sincerely and sometimes bluntly to the Press, eschewing the evasions of his predecessor. Through television he has also spoken in his straightforward way to the people. A mark of his popularity is the way people call him by the affectionate nick-name ‘Kakusan’. He has made a point of consulting business leaders and labour leaders. In each case he could say that their background was his own. He has also expressed his intention of initiating discussion and dialogue with the opposition parties with a view to seeking a consensus where possible. He has kept the respect of civil servants, which he had previously enjoyed. They like his human qualities and his ability to make decisions. But they have also been gratified by the way he has refused to be bounced on several issues on which the Press have been trying to influence the Government.



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16. The most prominent of these is China, with which the Press are obsessed, and where every detail of Japan’s developing relationship with China is treated like a lead story. Mr Tanaka has been properly cautious on this matter. He has stressed the importance of acting with the full support of the party. He created a committee within the party to seek a consensus on this issue and thus to neutralize those Right-wing elements who are still opposed to closer relations with China. On this and other foreign policy issues Mr Tanaka has been quick to stress that the prime responsibility is that of the Foreign Minister. His general approach to Government appears to be to delegate as much as possible to the Ministers and senior officials responsible. 17. On the other main international issue, the imbalance of trade with the US and the disturbances in the European markets caused by the diversion of Japanese exports, Mr Tanaka has again shown a statesmanlike face. He well appreciates the problem, as the former Minister responsible. He has made the right noises about the importance of finding solutions. But from the Japanese point of view he has not given away any cards. I would judge that Mr Tanaka is well aware of the pitfalls and problems ahead on trade issues. He will leave the details to his officials and the consensus process. He may occasionally shove them in the right direction but he will always be a tough negotiator for Japan’s interests. 18. In general Mr Tanaka has made it clear that he is concentrating on domestic problems, which is the field he knows best. His scheme for the dispersal of industry is being looked at by experts. He must be thinking of the forthcoming Budget and how to tackle inflation. Pollution will be in the forefront of his mind as one of the subjects on which he has promised decisive action to the people. So far there are no signs that he will not get the co-operation of Japan’s major industries in finding a sensible solution. 19. Physically, Mr Tanaka is tough-looking and energetic, but not athletic. He has a rasping crow-like voice, which is very distinctive. This partly comes from a goitre, associated with a hyper-thyroid condition, which is reputed to be one of the reasons why he perspires heavily, dislikes heat and carries a fan around with him (conveniently a symbol of traditional Japan). His main hobby is golf, which he plays to a handicap of eighteen most weekends. He also likes riding. A more aesthetic hobby is his interest in Japanese calligraphy. Some of his aides fear that despite his robust looking frame Mr Tanaka’s health may suffer if he continues to work at the pace he is going; always ready to see everyone, discuss anything, etc. He rises early but goes to bed early. He has a wife and two daughters who are rarely heard of (in addition to an ancient mother in the country and a younger brother who helps run his construction business). But though his tastes are simple he is surrounded by appurtenances of wealth. His large modern house in Tokyo has been the cause of some public criticism, and the four-and-a-half-acre estate which he has recently bought up in the hills of Karuizawa, belonging to a former aristocrat, has not escaped public attention. A recent newspaper article explained how Mr Tanaka and his subordinates appeared rude and unmannerly to the wealthy people living in the hills of Karuizawa. On the other hand, the article went on, to the masses he was a rich general whom they admired for his achievements. As another paper put it: ‘the rags to riches story of the Prime Minister parallels that of the Japanese nation itself’.

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20. Mr Tanaka has made few trips abroad and is not at ease at Western social functions. He speaks practically no English, though he understands a limited amount. 21. The public has summed up Mr Tanaka as ‘the computerized bulldozer’, a widely current phrase. This emphasizes his energy and his quick mind. He has a good head for figures. It also stresses his reputation for quick decision-making and quick action. Like other Japanese, Mr Tanaka believes in decision-making by consensus; but he believes in a quick consensus. Inevitably he is seen by many as being too impulsive. I have said that Mr Tanaka has been popular with the civil servants who work with him. I expect this comes from a combination of his powers of decision-making, his balance and fairness and his humane qualities which make him conscious of those working for him as individuals. He has the reputation of sizing up men and situations quickly and well. He has a good sense of humour which helps him in all his social contacts, including with foreigners. Basically he is a sincere man and it comes across. He is also a man who appears to have no chip on his shoulder as a result of his humble background and upbringing. 22. One can sum up Mr Tanaka perhaps by saying that although he is a Japanese with limited experience of the outside world he is also, for foreigners as well as for Japanese, a refreshingly new type of political leader in Japan. He has the qualities which should enable one to do business with him and I do not think that Britain’s and the West’s relations with Japan will be adversely affected by his coming to power. What he will always do is to bear Japan’s interests primarily in mind, and be tough in defending them. He is not the sort of man who can be bullied. This is one of the reasons why the Japanese have taken to him at this crucial time in their development as a nation. 23. It is likely that we shall have to deal with Mr Tanaka as Prime ­Minister of Japan for some years to come. Although the Liberal Democratic Party has been losing votes consistently in the past years the electoral system is so weighted in favour of country areas that they are sure at least to retain power at the next election, which Mr Tanaka may call at the end of this year to obtain public endorsement for his policies. What happens in the elections after that, say in three or four years’ time, is another question. The Liberal Democrats could lose their absolute majority then and it could be a turning point for Japan. The fortunes of the Party at that crucial future moment will very much depend on Mr Tanaka’s successes in the coming years. FRED WARNER

49

THE JAPANESE ON THE ROAD TO PEKING*

SUMMARY A new era in Sino-Japanese relations will be launched by a visit to Peking this autumn by the Japanese Prime Minister Mr Tanaka. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. The problem of relations with Taiwan still giving trouble. The Chinese have not shown their hand. (Paragraph 3.) 3. But the Japanese feel that the Chinese are in general only too pleased to come half way to meet them. (Paragraph 4.) 4. Mr Tanaka from an early stage opted for a rapid normalization of relations. The Chinese reacted with surprising speed and warmth. If China needs normal contacts with the outside world why should China stop at mending her fences with the US? (Paragraphs 5–6.) 5. Japan also needs China. The Japanese seek a greater freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy. Furthermore something of a regional mood seems to be emerging. (Paragraphs 7–8.) 6. Mr Tanaka’s immediate need is for a success in China relations which will look well at the next general election. (Paragraph 9.) 7. The Chinese will presumably expect formal assurances of ­‘non-aggression’ but there is no sign of tough demands. A successful visit is virtually assured. (Paragraphs 10–11.) 8. The Japanese dream of restoring the brotherhood of the two great Asian nations. China seems to open up an Aladdin’s cave. ­(Paragraph 12.)

* FEJ 3/301/1 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 14 September 1972.

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9. In the longer term both sides will probably be very cautious, and once the euphoria of normalization is over a better balance should assert itself in Japan. (Paragraph 13.) 14 September 1972

W

hen Mr Tanaka goes to Peking this autumn, he will be the first Japanese Head of Government to visit the People’s Republic since its foundation. We have all been conscious of the drama of President Nixon’s visit to Peking, but perhaps it is not so easy to appreciate how revolutionary is the prospect that the Japanese and Chinese Governments may finally agree to enter into diplomatic relations and settle the differences that have existed between them since the war. An editorial in a Japanese newspaper said the other day that the normalization of relations with Peking would be the most important event for Japan since her resumption of independence in 1952. 2. For the Japanese people, Mr Tanaka’s visit will represent not merely a formal act of normalizing relations with all the eventual consequence of setting up Embassies, but it will be an act of reconciliation between the two great rival East Asian civilizations, which in the Chinese view are still technically at war. If one goes by the Press, public opinion in Japan has always been in favour of reconciliation with mainland China taking the line that ‘We must apologize for causing them great trouble in the past.’ 3. Ever since the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan in 1952 there have been internal pressures on the Japanese Government to embrace Peking and throw over Taiwan. Successive Japanese Governments maintained an uncompromising stand partly to please the US but partly on account of a substantial historical, emotional and commercial link with Taiwan. The Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tells me that the problem of relations with Taiwan is still giving his Government much trouble. The Japanese would, of course, like to have their cake and eat it in the sense that they hoped that the Chinese Communist Government would allow them to keep some kind of official contact with the authorities in Taiwan while appearing to meet the principle of breaking diplomatic relations. But the Chinese had so far declined to say what they wanted. The ‘self-appointed emissaries’, who had been going to Peking as representatives of the Opposition parties, had simply not raised the issue because it was embarrassing to them and they preferred to talk to the Chinese about pleasant things. The Government might be faced with the embarrassing position where Mr Tanaka would be going to Peking without knowing exactly where he stood on all this. 4. The Japanese Government, however, have been fortunate in the timing of all these developments. The pro-Taiwan lobby in the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Mr Okinori Kaya and the former Prime Minister Kishi, and the overt resistance to popular pressures within Japan virtually collapsed following President Nixon’s visit to China. If this had happened at an earlier stage in the last two decades, more especially at the time when the Chinese were trying to reinforce their claims by trade sanctions, the Japanese Government would now be in an ignominious position vis-à-vis the Chinese. But contrary to all previous expectation, the Japanese feel that in general the Chinese are only too pleased to come half-way to meet them.



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5. As I reported in my despatch about Mr Tanaka, even when he was still one of Mr Sato’s principal lieutenants, he let it be thought that if chosen to be the next Prime Minister he would favour a rapid normalization of relations with China. As soon as he took office as Prime Minister he made a statement saying that his Government would carry out his previously declared intention. The Chinese reacted with surprising speed and warmth. Almost every statement by a Japanese Minister, however cautiously phrased, welcoming better relations with China, found a quick response in Peking, and quite minor statements on both sides were blown up by the Press. The Chinese appointed a senior representative to head the Memorandum Trade Office in Tokyo and the Japanese secured agreement that a China expert in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs should serve in their office in Peking. Then came ballet diplomacy. The Shanghai Troupe came to play to enthusiastic audiences in Japan and the Chinese sent with them Mr Sun to make official contact with the Japanese Government. He saw the Foreign Minister and Mr Tanaka himself. These developments soon created a climate of opinion, egged on by a Press that has taken the lead in advocating closer links with China, in which a personal visit by Mr Tanaka to Peking was seen as a natural way of inaugurating a new relationship. 6. The Chinese reaction has been so warm that it has seemed from here as if the Chinese leaders had firmly decided on a change of policy. The coming to power of a new Prime Minister in Japan created an admirable pretext for his change but there were various indications that the Chinese would have been prepared to do business even with Mr Fukuda if the latter had succeeded to the Premiership. The Chinese began to be seen as demandeurs in Japanese eyes. If Sino-Japanese relations are looked at in isolation any number of esoteric reasons can be suggested, but as seen from here there seems to be one comprehensive hypothesis. If China needs normal contacts with the outside world why should China stop at mending her fences with the US? 7. For her part Japan also needs China. The Japanese would like their foreign policy to be more independent and think that they can secure greater freedom of manoeuvre by establishing relations with Peking. In this sense the Japanese are attempting to do in a similar way what Dr. Kissinger was doing when he was promoting President Nixon’s visits to Peking and Moscow. The Japanese are finding that their opening up with the Chinese is giving them greater weight with the Russians. The Russians have been increasingly forthcoming in their approaches over peace treaty negotiations as the Japanese relationship with China has developed. No doubt the Japanese may also be able to play the Chinese card against the Americans if required. 8. Furthermore, I suspect that we should not underestimate the common desire in both countries, despite their widely differing social and political structures, to reassert the influence in the world of their ancient race and civilization. Such a community spirit, if it develops, could not, of course, be usefully expressed in terms of a common market given the irrelevance of tariffs to a Communist economy but, quite apart from the recent stampede by Japanese businessmen to get in on the China act, there is an indefinable feeling in the background that there are ways in which Japan and China could usefully co-operate not only commercially and for the exploitation of China’s resources – though this is important – but also so far as policy towards other regional blocs is concerned.

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9. Finally, the most pressing motive on the Japanese side is Mr Tanaka’s need for a success on his China policy for the next elections. He was made leader by securing a majority over Mr Fukuda in voting among party caucuses and has yet to seek the endorsement of the electorate as a whole. He will want to do this with some achievement to his credit and the best chance now looks to be if he can report a success on his China policy: an election pledge redeemed. Mr Tanaka seems likely to convene an extraordinary session of the Japanese Diet (which does not normally meet in the autumn) to report on his return from Peking and if as expected he is successful an election could follow. 10. I have noticed references, in the frank conversations that we are now having with Chinese leaders, to their continuing suspicions about Japanese policies. It would be interesting to know whether these suspicions are gradually being whittled away as the Chinese learn more about modern Japan or whether they are seeking to normalize relations despite their worst apprehensions. As seen from Tokyo, the overtures from Peking offering a non-aggression treaty seemed to argue that Mr Chou En-lai has no serious fears in the matter but needs some ammunition to allay the disquiet of others. 11. What will happen when Mr Tanaka goes to Peking? The Chinese will presumably expect the Japanese to convince them of their lack of any hostile or militaristic intentions; in particular Mr Tanaka may have to undertake that the Japanese will not try to bolster Taiwan, economically or politically. The Chinese may, of course, come up with tough demands at the last minute. All we can say is that, as seen from here, there is no sign that the Chinese will spring any such surprises. Given the forthcoming attitude which the Chinese seem to be radiating, a successful visit is virtually assured. Fortunately, Mr Tanaka is well able to take with him a substantial guest gift on the economic side which in less favourable circumstances might have been called reparations but which can now be called economic co-operation. 12. If I may add a highly personal comment on the situation I have felt during my very short time in this country that the Japanese at this moment are utterly bewitched by the prospect of renewed relations with China. This does not apply so much to the Government, who are now aware of the limitations and difficulties ahead. But, for most of the public, a spell is cast by the dream of establishing the brotherhood of the two great Asian nations which was so dear to the leaders of the Meiji Restoration but which has never yet been achieved. For the Japanese business community, on the other hand, China seems to open up an Aladdin’s cave. Many industries (steel, ship-building, electronics, chemicals and others) have heavily over-invested in the recent years of the Japanese boom and now that they have met increasing resistance to their products in Europe and America, some of their investments are barely profitable or even utilized. A new outlet in China would give just the margin necessary to restore large profits, particularly if backed up by a market for capital goods in Siberia. Never mind if the Chinese can’t pay; a benevolent Japanese Government will pay for them by means of reparations, aid, soft loans (whatever you like to call it) dressed up as commercial loans to save the face of the Chinese. Maybe it won’t happen but this is the prevailing hope. 13. In the longer term it seems clear that the two countries will establish normal relations and a modus vivendi which may indeed serve to reduce tension in this part of the world. Both sides are presumably aware of the limitations of their relationship given their different political and economic systems. I infer, therefore, that although some of the existing barriers to intercourse between



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Japan and China will come down, both sides will probably be very cautious because the impact of two such different civilizations on each other could, otherwise, be disruptive of both. Japan could, I suppose, go neutralist and there could be a long-term risk of the Japanese being pulled over the line by the Chinese if the current obsession with China were to continue indefinitely. However, once the euphoria of normalization is over a better balance should assert itself in Japan on this question. F. A. WARNER

50 THE FIRST VISIT TO JAPAN BY A BRITISH PRIME MINISTER*†

SUMMARY The objectives of the visit. The importance of establishing close understanding between the European Community, North America and Japan. Conflict could only damage the interests of all. The defence of particular British industrial interests. Future co-operation with Mr Tanaka’s Government. (Paragraphs 1–2.) 2. During a crowded programme, which called for resolute endurance, Mr Heath was able to establish firm relations with Mr Tanaka. (Paragraphs 3–4.) 3. Political discussions showed no real difference of views. The Japanese problem of future relations with Taiwan after a settlement with China. A bid for permanent membership of the Security Council. (Paragraph 5.) 4. Mr Tanaka’s great interest in British views on international monetary reform and the future of the European Community. He agreed to further exchanges of views on oil supplies. (Paragraphs 6–7.) 5. Hope that the Japanese would honour understandings reached on bilateral trade questions. The need to liberalize Japanese imports and foreign investment. Advocacy of the merits of British aero-space and nuclear achievements. The high tariffs on whisky and wool. An indication of Japan’s intention to become a major importing ­country. (Paragraphs 8–9.) 6. Exchanges with leading British and Japanese businessmen. ­(Paragraphs 10–11.) * See also biographical portrait of Sir Edward Heath by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI ed.Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental 2007. † FEJ 3/548/1 – Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – received 28 September 1972.



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7. Audience given by the Emperor. A television interview and Press conference. (Paragraphs 12–13.) 8. The visit was a great success. Much public attention given to Britain and satisfaction that Mr Heath should have wished to establish close relations with Japan. The Japanese have been made to crystallize their views on Europe through the agency of Britain. The visit strengthened a growing feeling that Japan must reconsider its economic practices and find ways of working with all other major partners in the world trading and monetary system. (Paragraphs 14–15.) 28 September 1972

T

he Prime Minister, the Right Hon. Edward Heath, MBE, MP, visited Tokyo as the guest of the Japanese Government from 16 to 19 S­ eptember. Although Japanese Prime Ministers have several times paid official visits to London, Mr Heath is the first British Prime Minister ever to have taken the trouble to come to Japan. The visit was undoubtedly a great success and should yield valuable results. I enclose copies of the programme and of the joint communiqué. 2. Before leaving London, the Prime Minister told the Press why he would be going to Japan. He reminded them that, at Bermuda last year, he and President Nixon had spoken of the great importance of establishing the closest possible understanding between the enlarging European Community, North America and Japan. He was now accepting an invitation to go to Tokyo because, with a new Japanese Prime Minister in office, the present was a good moment to do so. The Japanese were hoping to form new relationships with Communist China and the Soviet Union; they should not forget Europe. From 1 January, 1973, with the accession of Britain and other new members, the European Community would become the greatest trading unit in the world. The US, the European Community and Japan must consult and work together in trade and monetary matters and must avoid conflict, since this could only damage themselves and the world system as a whole. As for particular British interests, he would argue that Japanese exports should not be unloaded on the UK in such a way as to damage British industry and that Japan should make easy the import of foreign goods and investments. Finally, he believed that personal relationships were the strongest foundations for international relationships and he felt the need to know Mr Tanaka and his Government in order to be able the better to co-operate with them. 3. To achieve these aims and to learn something at first hand of that specialized evolutionary phenomenon, modern Japan, the programme had to be crammed with events which called for the Prime Minister’s most resolute endurance, a quality in which as usual he was not lacking. Old Japan was represented by the Toshogu Shrine in Nikko, magical ritual dancing, the eerie ­wailing of ancient Gagaku music and the claptrap of a geisha-attended ­Japanese dinner eaten off the floor (so to speak). Modern Japan was represented by its leaders in many walks of life. 4. Mr Heath was able, through a veil of interpreters, to establish firm relations with Mr Tanaka during three-and-a-half hours of talks. The two Prime Ministers also sat together during a rather oppressively formal dinner at Mr Tanaka’s house and a much more lively meal to which Mr Heath invited Mr Tanaka in return. The latter was clearly very interested in what the Prime

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Minister had to say. He accepted an invitation to visit London next year. He agreed readily that personal messages should be exchanged from time to time on important matters. The first of such messages has already been sent from No. 10, and the continuance of such a correspondence will do more to bring Britain and Japan together and ensure Japanese co-operation than anything else one can think of. 5. The political discussions with Mr Tanaka, and also with Mr Ohira, showed no real difference of views between us. Mr Tanaka said that he would carry through to its conclusions his policy of establishing relations with Communist China (and at the time of signing this despatch it looks as if he has succeeded in doing so). He added, of course, that the problem of future relations with Taiwan was causing him much trouble. Japan’s trade with Taiwan was still greater than with Communist China and Japan had undoubted obligations to the Government of Taiwan which had been so friendly in the past. He could not say what the future relations between the two countries would be but he referred wistfully to Britain’s former success in maintaining an Embassy in Peking and a Consulate in Taipei. He said that after going to Peking he would hope to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union but that this could only be on the basis of the return to Japan of full sovereignty over the four islands to which they lay claim; two or three islands would not suffice and there would be no treaty unless all were returned. He could not foresee the early reunification of Korea but good relations between Japan and China would contribute to stability in the area. Both Mr Tanaka and Mr Ohira said that whatever the development of relations with China and the Soviet Union, they would continue to have the closest possible relationship with the US. Mr Ohira said that the Security Treaty would be maintained in all its aspects, but no clear explanation was given as to how this would be interpreted in the light of American commitments to Taiwan. It was agreed that an early end to the war in Viet-Nam was desirable but that this should be of such a kind as not to discourage further American concern with the safe security of the area. Finally, Mr Tanaka asked for British help to get permanent membership of the Security Council for Japan. Mr Heath promised to consider this sympathetically but drew attention to the very serious obstacles. 6. The discussion of economic and financial matters was more significant and Mr Tanaka showed great interest in British views on international monetary reform. His main preoccupation (and it was also that of most of the ­Japanese to whom the Prime Minister spoke) was to know what would happen to the European Community after 1 January and whether Britain was prepared to play an active part in preventing it from becoming an inward looking protectionist bloc. Mr Heath repeatedly said that he could not speak for Europe and he refused a Japanese proposal to include in the communiqué a passage calling for a multilateral international safeguard on the grounds that the British view could only be expressed after full consultations with our future European partners. On the other hand he argued that the record hitherto of the European Community in steadily increasing its foreign trade, and its fine performance in giving foreign aid, made it quite clear that Europe had not been ‘inward looking’ in the past. Nor was it more protectionist than other important trading countries. There was no reason whatever to expect this to change. He gave Mr Tanaka a full account of the kind of things which would be discussed at the European summit and on the nature of the problems of international monetary reform by which we were confronted. He turned aside a



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question by Mr Tanaka on whether the pound would be devalued on our entry into Europe. Mr Tanaka seemed to be reassured by everything that was said. 7. Oil supplies were also discussed. Mr Tanaka made it clear that Japan was considering large oil investments, not only in Eastern Siberia but also in the Middle East and perhaps elsewhere. Mr Heath pointed out the dangers of competition between the major oil importing countries if they allowed their international companies to bid each other up in this field and he argued the need for intergovernmental discussions if we were not to be held to ransom by oil producers. This seemed to be rather a new point to Mr Tanaka and he readily agreed to further exchanges of views. 8. Bilateral trade matters were discussed against the background of Mr Davies’ visit to Japan earlier in the year, the subsequent discussions between British and Japanese representatives of the man-made fibres, ball-bearings and television industries, and the trade talks held this month between Sir Max Brown [permanent secretary Board of Trade] and Mr Tsurumi. The Prime ­Minister said that he hoped that the understandings reached in the course of all these talks would be honoured by the Japanese; he pressed hard for the liberalization of Japanese imports and foreign investment in Japan; and he spoke of the merits of Concorde, of British Government backing for Rolls Royce RB-211 aero-engines and of the British nuclear achievement. He asked for an end to high tariffs on British whisky and wool. 9. Mr Tanaka said that the Japanese economy was growing too fast and this caused a most difficult problem of how to dispose of the products. Much more Japanese investment must go into the social infrastructure instead of productive industry. Japan should and would become a major importing country and liberalize foreign investment. Indeed he agreed with Mr Heath’s view that the next round of GATT negotiations should lead to an all-round reduction in tariffs. Japan would increase aid to developing countries gradually to 1 per cent of the Gross National Product (with 0.7 per cent official Government aid) and this was also the target figure for Japan’s annual trading surplus. The specific matters raised by Mr Heath were all under consideration. The Japanese Government would reconsider the matter of Generalized Preferences for Hong Kong. 10. Much the same ground was covered in Mr Heath’s speech at the lunch given for Japanese businessmen by the Japanese economic organizations. In reply Mr Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said . . . ‘the Japanese business community intend to spare no efforts for voluntary control of exports of the products in question (poly­ all-bearings and colour television) so that the (British) market ester fibres, b will not be disturbed. On the other hand, we will try to take concrete steps for the promotion of manufactured goods from your country such as by despatching a Buying Mission to England.’ Similar views were expressed by a group of ten leading Japanese businessmen with whom the Prime Minister afterwards met for an interesting hour’s discussion. But they added that British businessmen must make more effort to seize opportunities open to them in Japan. 11. As for these British businessmen themselves many of them were able to meet the Prime Minister at a reception organized by the admirable Japan-British Society. Mr Heath also had nearly an hour’s talk with the executive committee of the British Chamber of Commerce. They have told me that they drew much comfort from his interest in their affairs and from the opportunity to organize

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their ideas a bit and to air their favourite project for a British Trade Centre here. I am glad this was so, for they need encouragement and an impulsion to fresh and imaginative efforts. 12. The Prime Minister was also received in audience by the Emperor and lunched in the airy and beautiful new Palace. By the end of the meal the habitually silent and constrained atmosphere of the Court when foreigners are present was lifted and an unwonted cheerfulness prevailed. His Imperial Majesty was patently interested to hear from Mr Heath about developments in Europe on which I judge that he never hears from his own Ministers. 13. Finally Mr Heath met a large number of Japanese from all walks of public, business and artistic life at a reception which we gave during the last two hours of the visit. I apologize for the dizzying speed with which these persons were brought up to Mr Heath and snatched away from him to make room for more, but the effect has been to produce throughout Tokyo a chorus of gratified and laudatory comment. The Prime Minister’s television interview and Press conference were also most successful and ensured, together with much firm guidance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a highly friendly and favourable reporting of the visit and of Anglo-Japanese relations generally by the whole Press. 14. I conclude this despatch, as I opened it, by saying that the visit was a great success. Mr Tanaka is a vigorous and assertive man who will leave a strong mark on Japanese political life and policies. He is likely to remain Prime Minister for at least the next three years. It is therefore of great importance that there is now a link of understanding, trust and interest between him and our own Prime Minister. The channel of communication opened with him must yield valuable results. Much public attention has been given to Britain and there is clear satisfaction that Mr Heath should have wished to come here and establish close relations with Japan. There is a much surer understanding of British views and aims and a feeling that to say that Japan and Britain have much in common is not just politeness but a valuable and significant truth. Doubts about the future development of British policy and of the enlarged European Community have been assuaged and the temptation to prepare for joint Japanese-American action to contain a protectionist Europe has been largely removed. 15. As a newcomer to Tokyo I am diffident about offering strong personal opinions. But it seems to me that this visit, following upon our insistence that Anglo-Japanese trading relations must be straightened out, has obliged the Japanese (and Mr Tanaka in particular) to lift their eyes for a while from the all-absorbing task of fixing up their relations with China and the Soviet Union and of solving their serious troubles with the US. Europe was being overlooked. Now they have been made to crystallize their views on Europe through the agency of Britain. The process has been a healthy one. It has strengthened the growing feeling here that Japan has reached a point in its development where it must reconsider its economic practices, and that it must understand its own part in the highly interdependent world trading and monetary system and find ways of working together with all other major partners in that system. It goes without saying that such a result would be an outstandingly good one. FRED WARNER



THE FIRST VISIT TO JAPAN BY A BRITISH PRIME MINISTER361

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ The Right Honourable Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, visited Japan from 16 September until 19 September at the invitation of the Japanese Government. This was the first official visit of a British Prime Minister to Japan. Mr Heath was received in audience by Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress and was given a luncheon at the Imperial Palace. Mr Kakuei Tanaka, the Prime Minister of Japan, gave a dinner at his official residence in honour of Mr Heath. Mr Heath also attended a luncheon given jointly by the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan Foreign Trade Council and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He was the guest of honour at a reception given by the Japan-British Society, which Her Imperial Highness Princess Chichibu was graciously pleased to attend. Mr Heath held talks with Mr Tanaka, the Prime Minister, and Mr Masayoshi Ohira, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on a wide range of subjects of common interest to Britain and Japan. They agreed that it was most opportune to hold these talks at a moment of far-reaching and swift changes in international relations both in Europe and in Asia which were of vital concern to both their countries. The talks were held in a frank and cordial atmosphere and demonstrated once again the extremely close and friendly relations which exist between Britain and Japan, as exemplified by the visit of Their Imperial Majesties to Britain last year. The talks revealed a close identity of view on international problems and gave expression to the determination of the two countries to work together to promote peace and stability in the world. The two Prime Ministers discussed the prevailing international situation and the prospects for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and welcomed recent signs of détente. Mr Tanaka explained the objectives of his forthcoming visit to the People’s Republic of China and Mr Heath welcomed this as a significant contribution to peace and stability. Mr Heath spoke about the forthcoming meeting of Heads of State and Government of the enlarged European Community and exchanged views with Mr Tanaka about the enlargement of the Community. He emphasized the importance which the United Kingdom attached to the achievement of a satisfactory commercial relationship between the enlarged Community and Japan. Mr Tanaka expressed his hope that the European Community would adopt outward-looking policies and that Britain would exert her influence within the Community to achieve this. Mr Heath confirmed that the British Government would continue to maintain an outward-looking attitude. The two Prime Ministers exchanged views about the international monetary situation. They agreed that international monetary stability was of vital importance and pledged their Governments to work for early progress towards reform of the monetary system. The two Prime Ministers expressed their confidence that the fresh round of multilateral trade negotiations within the framework of the GATT due to open next year would stimulate continuing expansion of world trade. To this end amongst other measures a substantial further reduction of world trade barriers would be necessary. The two Prime Ministers discussed the state of commercial relations between Britain and Japan. In particular, they examined the prospects for securing more stable trading conditions and a further growth of investment between

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the two countries and agreed that the recent meetings of officials reflected the determination of both Governments to work towards their objective. The two Prime Ministers discussed the application of Japan’s Generalized Preference Scheme to Hong Kong. Mr Tanaka agreed to re-examine the list of Japanese exceptions on the occasion of the overall review of the scheme which will take place in the near future. Mr Heath exchanged views with Mr Ohira about recent developments in Asia. The two Ministers welcomed the steps being taken spontaneously by the Korean people towards the reunification of their country and expressed the hope that nothing would prevent progress towards this. They hoped that there might be an early end to the fighting in Indo-China so that its people could be free to settle their own future. They agreed about the urgent need for the international community of a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East. Mr Heath also discussed with the Japanese Ministers pollution control and civil aircraft, as well as the opportunities for scientific and technological collaboration between the UK and Japan. In this context, the two Prime Ministers recognized the need to improve the quality of life of the peoples of their countries. Both Prime Ministers were personally convinced of the vital importance of this task, and considered that the problems confronting Japan and the UK in this field were in many respects similar. Experience gained by the two Governments in dealing with such matters should be made readily available to each other. The two Prime Ministers further agreed on the need for increasing aid to the developing countries from all the developed countries to enable them to overcome their economic problems and improve the welfare of their peoples. Mr Heath invited Mr Tanaka to pay a return visit to London. Mr Tanaka accepted this invitation with pleasure. Mr Heath also said how much he and his colleagues looked forward to welcoming Mr Ohira to London for the annual Ministerial talks in 1973.

PROGRAMME OF THE PRIME MINISTER’S VISIT TO JAPAN, 16–19 OCTOBER 1972 Saturday, 16 September 1715

Arrival by RAF jet at Tokyo Airport in torrential rain. Met by Mr Tanaka, the Japanese Cabinet and representatives of the Diplomatic Corps. Free evening at Embassy

Sunday, 17 September Morning free. 1230–1915

Train trip to Nikko. Sightseeing of Toshogu Shrine, with a Tea Ceremony and a performance of traditional Court Music and Dance

2000–2230

Japanese style dinner party given by Mr Ohira, Foreign Minister, at Shinkiraku Restaurant, Tokyo



THE FIRST VISIT TO JAPAN BY A BRITISH PRIME MINISTER363

Monday, 18 September 1000–1225

Talks with Prime Minister Tanaka

1230–1400

Luncheon in honour of the Prime Minister given jointly by the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Japan Foreign Trade Council

1400–1500

Informal discussions with a selected group of senior Japanese businessmen

1530–1645

Talks with Foreign Minister Ohira at Iikura House

1810–1855

Reception given by the Japan-British Society of Tokyo at the Imperial Hotel in the presence of HIH Princess Chichibu

1900–2130

Banquet given by the Prime Minister and Mrs Tanaka at the Prime Minister’s official residence

Tuesday, 19 September 0915–1000

Meeting with British commercial representatives at British Embassy

1035–1135

Television interview Association)

1215

Audience of TIM the Emperor and Empress, also attended by other members of the Imperial family

1245–1420

Court luncheon

1500

Meeting with British Embassy staff

1540–1630

Second round of talks with Prime Minister Tanaka

1715–1815

Press conference held by Japan Press Club and Tokyo Foreign Correspondents Club

1900–2015

Informal dinner given by Mr Heath at the British Embassy for Mr Tanaka, Mr Ohira and Mr Nakasone

2015–2230

Reception given by HM Ambassador

2300

Departure from Tokyo Airport by RAF jet

with

NHK

(Japan

Broadcasting

APPENDIX I

Sir John Pilcher Ambassador to Japan, 1967–72 HUGH CORTAZZI

(Originally published in British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972, edited and compiled by Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2004)

J

ohn Pilcher (1912–90), British Ambassador in Japan between 1967 and 1972, helped to revive Anglo-Japanese friendship after the Second World War and was long remembered with affection both in Japan and by his friends and colleagues. John was short and rotund with a balding head. He was witty and amusing with a fund of stories. He was also very well read, an accomplished linguist and a man of broad culture. He was modest, courteous and hospitable. A convert to Catholicism, he was sincerely religious, but he was tolerant and understanding of those who did not share his beliefs. He took a particular interest in Buddhism and appreciated the Buddhist and Shinto elements in Japanese culture. He was an amused observer of Japanese idiosyncrasies and his love of Japan was rarely tinged with annoyance at the unpleasant elements which can be encountered there. His second name was Arthur, but in Japan he did not use all three initials, reading JAP, as he knew how sensitive Japanese had become about this abbreviation. John Pilcher was born in Quetta (now Pakistan) in 1912 where his father, a Royal Engineer, was at that time a lecturer at the Staff College. He was the only child of elderly parents who were very musical. He came to England in 1921. His parents, who lived in Bath in Georgian comfort, encouraged his interest in music and wanted him to become a good linguist. So as a small boy he often stayed with relations in Normandy and spent some time in Italy and Austria. As a result he soon became fluent in French, Italian and German. His school days were spent at Shrewsbury where he found the regime barbaric and was delighted when he could escape to the civilized atmosphere of Clare College, Cambridge. John had become fascinated by the classical architecture

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of Bath and he at first wanted to study architecture, but doubted whether he would ever find a sufficiently wealthy patron to pursue what was for him more a hobby than a means of earning his living. He therefore decided to study Spanish and perfect his Italian. Somewhat surprisingly one of his hobbies at Cambridge was beagling. One of the first Japanese he met at Cambridge was Yoshida Kenichi, the eccentric son of Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s first prime minister after the war. Another Cambridge acquaintance who later became a good friend was Itoh Eikichi, later chairman of Itohchu, the large Japanese trading house. At this stage, John had no idea that Japan would play such a major role in his life. It was suggested to him that he should join the diplomatic or consular service where his knowledge of languages would stand him in good stead. Although he failed to turn up for the economics paper John was accepted for the Japan consular service.

EARLY CAREER IN JAPAN Together with another language student Tom Bromley, who became a good friend, John made the usual sea journey to Japan, arriving in February 1936 in time to witness the revolt of young turks in the army on 26 February in what came to be called the Ni-ni-roku jiken. John later told Peter Martin, who was ­British Council representative in Kyoto at the time he became ambassador, that he had waded ashore on to a beach from a ship’s cutter because the ship would not or could not enter Yokohama. In a lecture entitled ‘A Perspective on Religion in Japan’ delivered at the Nissan Institute on 4 May 1984, John said that the incident in which ‘the young military showed their conviction that they alone could properly understand and interpret the will of the revered Emperor’ confronted him at once ‘by Japanese religious beliefs and their contemporary expression’. John and Tom Bromley shared the language students’ flat which was above the offices but which now forms part of the chancery. They had a maid of all work who had several children by one of the embassy’s drivers. When they found their bills escalating they remonstrated with her. In dudgeon she walked out after locking the doors and throwing the keys down the lavatory. Jimmy-san who was later the butler at the residence when John Pilcher became ambassador recalled seeing John climbing up the drain-pipe to get into the flat through a window. John was given the task of acting as private secretary to Sir Robert Clive who was then British Ambassador. He found Clive ‘a rather pompous old bird’ who was getting deaf. Clive was reputed to be having an affair with the wife of the French military attaché. Lady Clive, in a desire to annoy her husband, was said by John to have filled the ambassador’s study with birds at whom Clive in frustration would from time to time hurl books. John Pilcher did not at first take to Japan but his interest in the country was encouraged by George Sansom, the eminent scholar of Japan, at that time commercial counsellor, and his wife Katherine who befriended him. He also became a close friend of Ashley Clarke, who was head of chancery at the time and who later became a distinguished ambassador in Rome. They used to enjoy amateur dramatics and played duets together. His growing interest in Japanese civilization led him back to his European roots and he began to take instruction in the Catholic faith.



Ambassador to Japan, 1967–72369

After Sir Robert Craigie came out as ambassador to Japan, John, who had at one time wondered whether he should ask for a transfer from Japan, persuaded the authorities in the embassy to allow him to go to Kyoto to study away from the distracting pressures of the embassy. John ‘. . . was completely bowled over by the beauty of the great Buddhist temples of Nara and Kyoto’. [He] . . . studied Japanese at the feet of a Zen priest (of Shokokuji, one of the great Zen temple complexes of Kyoto), who was occasionally prevailed upon by the authorities to leave with me thoughts of the National polity, of Shinto inspiration and then much in vogue. The great Suzuki Daisetsu inspired studies in Zen. I had therefore to try to understand the dual principles behind Japanese Life: Shinto and Buddhism and the influence of Confucianism on civic structure. John had a small Japanese-style house with a tiny Japanese garden near Nanzenji. In his lecture of 4 May 1984 John commented that during his two years in Kyoto he lived ‘. . . in the grounds of a Ryoˉbu Shintoˉ, establishment, separated from its Buddhist element after the Meiji Restoration. Behind my house was a waterfall under which it was meritorious to stand and pray. I could, therefore, feel the omnipresence of Shinto ˉ around me.’ He enjoyed working in the garden and was able to employ a cook who could produce Japanese and Western cuisine and a young maid called O-Haru-san who looked after him very well. He became thoroughly ‘tatamisé’ to adapt a Japanese word in the French way. He bought a bicycle and explored Kyoto’s temples and gardens. He did not play golf or bridge and was able to concentrate on Japanese culture. He became fascinated by aspects of Japanese language. He particularly enjoyed learning abstruse and grandiloquent terms of address which amused his acquaintances. His interest in Japanese art was encouraged by the friendship which he developed with Kawai Kanjiro ˉ – the famous potter and leading figure in the Mingei movement who lived in Kyoto. Through Kawai and the English potter, Bernard Leach, with whom he had a distant family connection, he got to know Yanagi So ˉetsu and Hamada Sho ˉji who had founded the movement. One Japanese scholar whom he saw frequently was Professor Jugaku Bunsho ˉ who was translating Dante’s Inferno and Paradiso into Japanese and who was very interested in William Blake. John who could recite long passages of Dante was able to help the Professor. Jugaku Bunsho ˉ’s daughter recalls how when she returned from school she would often find John ensconced sitting crosslegged on a cushion. He would join the family for meals and much enjoyed Mrs Jugaku’s home cooking and simple Japanese fare. She describes him as going around in a greenish suit and brown soft hat. Despite the growing militarism in Japan, the Jugaku household remained a haven of free speech and pacifism. Professor Jugaku had an imperial connection and this may have helped to ensure that when John visited them he was not generally troubled by the police or the Kempeitai who were highly suspicious of all foreigners in Japan at this time. But John’s other Japanese friends who feared that their telephone calls were being tapped were increasingly reluctant to receive visits from him although at times, in order to avoid

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embarrassment to his friends, he used to leave his bicycle around the corner when making calls. Professor Jugaku’s daughter recalls John’s sense of humour and his ability as a mimic. When imitating a Japanese Shinto priest, for instance, he would do an exact copy of the priest’s walk. On hot summer days John, when he came to their house, would strip off and wallow in a cool bath. Afterwards he would put on the yukata which the household kept for him and then sit on the verandah enjoying the cool of evening. John was worried that the Jugakus might be in need and kept in touch with them. He managed to visit them in Kyoto in 1948 when he was on an official tour of the Far East despite the difficulties of travelling in Japan at that time. Mrs Jugaku was delighted to see him again when he returned as British ambassador in 1967. She found that he had not changed and still retained his sense of humour and his knowledge of the language of Kyoto.

PONSONBY FANE John had known the Ponsonby Fane family in Somerset at their estate at Brympton d’Evercy near Yeovil, and naturally renewed his acquaintance in Kyoto with the eccentric Richard Arthur Brabazon Ponsonby Fane, who always wore ‘. . . haori hakama, surmounted by a decayed woollen scarf with the ravages of moth in evidence on it. It had been knitted for him by the Dowager Empress, widow of the Taisho ˉ Emperor.’ Ponsonby Fane who ‘imbued’ John ‘with his sense of the fascination of Shinto was ‘. . . a convinced Anglican and led a dual life as a sage studying Shinto in Kamigamo outside Kyoto and as a cricket-loving country squire in Somerset’. Peter Martin recalls John’s account of Ponsonby Fane’s funeral. This was apparently a bizarre affair which was attended by Ponsonby Fane’s sister who was described by John as a ‘hearty extrovert daughter of the shires’ who comported herself in nonchalant style throughout her stay in Kyoto. When she visited her brother’s house she could not find a chair on which to sit: so she plonked herself down on the tokonoma and proceeded to eat a banana from the elegant display set out on a precious dish where she was sitting. Subsequently, Ponsonby Fane’s nephew and niece who came out to wind up his affairs discovered that he had a huge sum in his Kyoto bank account. They tried unsuccessfully to transfer this sum to England. So they drew the money out in cash. The niece then alleged that she was pregnant and was in such a delicate state that she would have to be carried onto the NYK vessel which was to convey them to America. Arrangements were accordingly made, no doubt with John Pilcher’s connivance, for her to be taken to the ship lying on a mattress stuffed with yen. As soon as the ship reached US territorial waters she had a miraculous recovery from her pregnancy and managed to convert the yen into dollars with the help of the ship’s purser.

TSINGTAO All good things have to come to an end and in 1939 John was instructed to report to the British consular post at Tsingtao initially for six weeks although in the event he had to stay for over a year. His job was to act as a link between



Ambassador to Japan, 1967–72371

the consulate general, which was normally staffed by members of the China consular service, and the Japanese military authorities who were making life difficult for the British there. Pilcher did not enjoy his time in Tsingtao. The consul general had fortified himself within the compound and John found him an unsympathetic boss. John had been horrified on arriving in Shanghai to see a British woman kick a Chinese rickshaw puller and to discover that the average British resident in China at that time had only learnt enough Chinese to tell their servants to get out. The British residents in Tsingtao who objected to doffing their hats to portraits of the Emperor did not understand the value of politeness. John was accused by the consul general and some residents of being pro-Japanese, but having seen the best of Japan in Kyoto he now saw some of the worst features of Japanese behaviour outside their own country. In 1940, while serving in ­Tsingtao, he was received into the Catholic Church with a German priest officiating.

LONDON, ROME, LONDON In 1941, before the war with Japan began, John was transferred to London. He travelled home via Manila and the USA. From there he managed to get a place on a flying boat to Lisbon where he made the acquaintance of Norman ­Douglas, the author and authority on Italy. On his arrival at Bristol from Lisbon the customs officers were very suspicious of John’s address-book in Japanese and refused to let him enter Britain until they had confirmed his bona fides with the Foreign Office. The ship on which he was originally to have travelled from the USA was sunk with all his effects on board. In London John met Delia Margaret Taylor, the Irish Catholic daughter of a retired army officer. John did not participate in the pastimes of the landed gentry such as riding, hunting, shooting or fishing and Delia’s family did not approve of the match. So Delia who had been acting as a land girl for the war effort left home and John and she were married privately. While John worked at the Ministry of Information, Delia joined the Council for Music and the Arts, the forerunner of the Arts Council. One of John’s tasks at the ministry was to help cheer up the young students of Japanese from the forces studying at the School of Oriental and African Studies, some of whom were reported to be suffering from stress as a result of the pressures of learning quickly such a difficult language. I was not stressed out but I shall always recall the talk which he gave us in late 1943. He enlivened our day with his humour and his mimicry sitting down on the floor and doing his Kabuki act.

POST-WAR YEARS The Pilchers found a home in Chelsea. In the immediate post-war period the pressure of work in the information department at the Foreign Office in which John was then working declined and John was able on most days to get home for lunch and a snooze. One day, there was a telephone call from the Foreign Office who were worried because the ceiling in John’s office had fallen down and they could not find him! In 1948 I called on John in his office in Carlton House Terrace to discuss a letter which Ron Dore and I had jointly written to The Times complaining about the ban imposed by the American occupation authorities in Japan on the sending of books to Japan. In the same year, John

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was posted to Rome as first secretary information. His excellent Italian and extravert personality made him an ideal choice for the job and the Pilchers greatly enjoyed life in Italy. In 1951 he was promoted to counsellor and made head of ‘Japan and Pacific Department’ in the Foreign Office. He thus became responsible for seeing through the ratification of the Peace Treaty with Japan, concluded at San ­Francisco in 1951 (the Treaty came into force in April 1952). This was a difficult period in Anglo-Japanese relations. There was still strong resentment against Japan not least because of the maltreatment of British prisoners-of-war but also because of widespread fears of unfair competition from cheap imports of Japanese-made textiles and sundry goods, allegedly made by sweated labour. John did his best to get ministers to take a more objective view of Japan but it was an uphill task. He used to say that whenever he put up a memorandum on policy towards Japan, Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, would simply write on the submission: ‘I do not like the Japanese. A.E.’ I was at that time a second secretary in Tokyo and had to spend a great deal of time on negotiations with the Japanese authorities on a United Nations Status of Forces Agreement. This was required to cover bases for UN forces operating in Korea who until the Peace Treaty with Japan came into force had been provided with facilities by the occupation authorities. We received repeated instructions which were increasingly unrealistic to ensure that UN Forces continued to operate ‘under the American umbrella’. One day I managed to get a telegram to London approved which inadvertently contained a startling mixed metaphor. ‘Surely it is time that we gave up flogging the dead horse of the American umbrella’! This caused ribald mirth in London and John Pilcher sent Arthur de la Mare, then head of chancery in Tokyo, a four-page letter in long hand in which there was a mixed metaphor in every sentence. Sadly the letter has not survived.

MADRID, MANILA, LONDON, VIENNA John’s next post was as minister in Madrid, first under Jock Balfour, and then under Ivo Mallet, ‘an old acid drop’. John and Delia much enjoyed their five years in Madrid. As Franco was still in charge in those days and his government was generally ostracized, they did not have a single ministerial visit. John did, however, have to deal on one occasion with George Brown who was a Labour MP, later to become Foreign Secretary when John was in Tokyo as ambassador. John was in charge of the embassy which was at San ­Sebastian where the Spanish government in those days spent the summer months. George Brown demanded an audience with Franco. This was not at all easy to arrange at any time least of all for a ‘socialist’. But John knew Franco’s confessor and managed to fix the appointment. He felt it desirable to brief George before the audience and asked the Browns to lunch at a famous fish restaurant. Brown commented: ‘I suppose any old fish restaurant is good enough for an out-of-office socialist.’ John pointed out that the restaurant was very exclusive and expensive. George arrived for the lunch rather the worse for wear, but John managed to sober him up in time for the meeting which went reasonably well. From Madrid, John was posted as ambassador in Manila which he had thought from his first visit in 1941 was ‘the bottom’ in the Far East. In fact, however, he and Delia who were determined to like wherever they went greatly



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enjoyed the Philippines. They travelled widely in the air attaché’s De Havilland Dove and developed a liking for the people and their culture. Their ability in Spanish and the fact that they were both Catholics no doubt helped. They were very hospitable and John coined the phrase (only to be used in strict privacy!) that the recipe for a good party was a mixture of ‘Flips and Brits, Dips and shits’. (Inevitably this was adapted when John eventually became ambassador in Japan.) From Manila, John returned to London as assistant under secretary in charge of information and culture. This should have been just the job for him, but he found it a frustrating experience as there was never enough money to do anything worthwhile, especially in cultural relations. He asked to be appointed as minister to the Vatican but was told that no Catholic could fill this post at the Holy See. Instead, in 1965, he was appointed ambassador to Austria. Harold Caccia, then Permanent Under-Secretary, had become fed up with ambassadors who did not enjoy Vienna and wanted someone like John, with his capacity for getting on with people and enjoying life, to go there. Moreover, John spoke Austrian German. Once again John and Delia were in their element. They were amused by Viennese society and snobbery and they both adored music. But in 1967 he was told that he was being appointed to Tokyo on promotion to replace Tony (Sir Francis) Rundall who was retiring early owing to ill health. Pilcher managed to postpone his departure until after the Salzburg Festival.

AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN John and Delia arrived in Tokyo in October 1967 and he remained ambassador to Japan until his retirement in the summer of 1972. For John, although he was immersed in European culture, it was great fun to be back in Japan. They soon made an impact on the Tokyo social scene. They entertained widely and became well known for their cultural interests especially their enthusiasm for music. They developed particularly good relations with members of the Japanese Imperial Family, especially Princess Chichibu, and with their diplomatic colleagues. But their circle of friends which included intellectuals, artists, potters and priests, was much wider than that of the normal diplomatic merry-go-round. They took every opportunity to travel especially to John’s beloved Kyoto. They usually stayed at the Miyako Hotel where according to Peter Martin, John ‘had great fun addressing the maids . . . in ornately old-fashioned Japanese with a wealth of subjunctives, largely incomprehensible to them’. By his informality and his clear liking for the Japanese and Japanese culture, John Pilcher added a new dimension to Britain’s relations with Japan. It would be unfair to his predecesors to imply that they had not worked hard to improve relations but they had generally lacked the personal warmth he displayed. Certainly he helped to interest British ministers in Japan and to improve understanding in Britain of Japan. John did whatever was necessary as ambassador. He enjoyed his work and was conscientious, but he was not a workaholic. He realized that commercial and economic work was becoming increasingly important and as his commercial and economic counsellor I found him always ready to support our efforts even if, as he readily admitted, he did not understand economics. (John never made up for the fact that he missed his economics paper when he joined the

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consular service before the war. Ben Thorne remembers him asking one day, no doubt with his tongue in his cheek, ‘What is an economic?’) He teased me frequently about the flood of trade missions which we had to look after ­referring to them as ‘Hugh’s peddlers and meddlers’, but he greatly enjoyed briefing them about Japan. They were usually enthralled as he explained to them the intricacies of the Japanese language and aspects of Japanese culture. The groups usually called on him before coming on to a reception which I was giving for them and would often arrive late because John would not or (could not) cut short his performance. I would ring through to his study to remind him that my guests were arriving, but John soon got wise to this and simply picked up and put down the telephone receiver. In the end I had no alternative but to arrange the briefings at a different time. John was also always ready to support our representations for trade-related concessions. One day. I had persuaded him to give a lunch for Raymond Bell, a dour senior official from the UK Treasury whom John found difficult as did we all. The lunch had gone well not least because John had hit it off with, for a Japanese Ministry of Finance official, an unusually cultured individual. At the end having said goodbye to the Japanese guests John turned to Raymond Bell and declared: ‘Do you know what Hugh is making me do this afternoon? I have to go with him to see the Minister of the Agriculture to discuss the tariff on biscuits!’ He said the word ‘biscuits’ with much emphasis and contumely. I wondered if John would explode when Raymond Bell replied: ‘Well, Ambassador, that is what you are paid for!’ The culmination of our trade promotion efforts was ‘British Week in Tokyo’ in the autumn of 1969. Every Japanese department store in Tokyo agreed to put on a promotion of British goods at the same time. We had a major exhibition of Britain in the Budo ˉkan and a scientific instrument exhibition at the Science Museum. John was at first rather doubtful about the plans, but when he had grasped fully what was intended and realized the scope for the combination of commerce and culture, he was enthusiastic and active in promoting the success of the week. He insisted on joining many of the planning sessions. Ben Thorne who was in charge of the British Week Office, remembers one occasion when a meeting was called in the ambassador’s study in the residence at 9 o’clock in the morning, but the chief information officer from the Department of Trade and Industry, Arthur Savage, had not turned up. Eventually, he arrived clearly under the weather. John determined to adminsiter his favourite remedy. The butler was summoned to bring a glass of dark liquid. This was John’s cure-all, Fernet Branca. Arthur was made to drink this foul-tasting potion. He managed to get it down before dashing for the door.

BRITISH WEEK British Week attracted many VIPs from Britain. Princess Margaret accompanied by Lord Snowdon, was invited to Japan to open the Week and visit the various exhibition sites. John and Delia were in their element although having the Princess and her entourage for a lengthy stay could not have been restful. All went well including the ball which the Pilchers gave when the Princess would not go to bed. Prince William of Gloucester had been sent to work in the embassy and John had allocated him to work under me in the commercial department. Commercial work was not his métier and I gave him the task of



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organizing his cousin’s programme. This caused many problems and I had to have frequent recourse to John Pilcher to sort out royalty! Another of our VIP visitors for British Week was the then Lord Mayor of London who was one of the more pompous city gents. He determined to wear his robes and thought himself at least the equal of the Governor of Tokyo even though his ‘domain’ was a mere square mile. One evening, at a reception at the embassy, the Lord Mayor, finding Pilcher on his right, declared: ‘No one stands on my right except the Queen.’ John who had suffered much from the man’s pomposity stormed back: ‘I am the Queen’ which, in so far as he was the Queen’s representative, was correct. Shortly after British Week on 28 October 1969, John signed a despatch which had been long in gestation entitled ‘The Merry Wives of Ginza: Women’s status in Japan’ [see Ch. 19]. In the opening paragraph he acknowledged his debt to John Morley, an embassy counsellor, in the drafting of this despatch, but it had all the hallmarks of a genuine Pilcher piece. The despatch begins: ‘Japan for the foreigner is a land abounding in optical illusions. One of its most deceptive phenomena is the Japanese woman.’ After noting that ­Japanese men were not good at sex Pilcher asked: ‘. . . would it be a calumny to add that the congenital inability of the Japanese male to improvise, if projected into the bedchamber, may well deprive his advances of that spontaneous elan which elicits, so they say, the most heartfelt response?’ He commented that ‘. . . . there is still about Japanese girls trying to be sexy in public an embarrassingly amateur quality which conjures up the image of some nubile but callow Roedean sixth-former playing Salome’. In conclusion he asked: ‘Are they really merry, those wives of Ginza? They still have a profound sense of the sadness of things and of the transience of existence, but at least they would always have agreed with Piers Plowman that “chastity without charity shall be chained in hell”.’ Among the many visitors to Tokyo the Pilchers had to look after was George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, and his wife. I realized, when John rang me up on the Sunday evening after they had arrived and asked us to help them over dinner, that despite the episode in San Sebastian recorded above, George was being difficult. He had arrived not in the best of spirits (perhaps because he had already had too much of the liquid sort). George was argumentative and cantankerous. It soon became clear that the only way to deal with him was to stand up to him and not allow him to get away with his bullying. One visitor who charmed us all was Harold Macmillan. Senior staff were invited to listen to him for an hour or so. He was a great raconteur. He recalled that after the Great Earthquake in Yokohama in 1923 Macmillans, the ­publishers, had been generous to Maruzen, the Japanese booksellers, allowing them extended credit. Maruzen remembered this generosity and had received Harold Macmillan with great courtesy. John Pilcher also liked another visitor, Arnold Toynbee, whom he took to an audience with the Emperor, with whom he had an extended discussion considerably overstaying the time allowed. Expo ’70 in Osaka was another major event in John’s time as ambassador. He had recommended the appointment of John Figgess, whom he had known since before the war, as British Commissioner General. They got on well and had many cultural interests in common. Unfortunately, this could not be said of Pilcher’s relations with Robert John, the consul general in Osaka, who had an unerring capacity for rubbing people up the wrong way. In particular Robert John refused to acknowledge the prime significance of Kyoto!

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The most important British visitor to Expo ’70 was Prince Charles. The Prince of Wales was still a young man in his last year at Cambridge. This was his first official visit abroad. John Pilcher took the Prince round his favourite sites in Kyoto and expounded about Japanese Buddhism and culture. The Prince, who was very impressed by what he was shown, remembered John Pilcher with affection and respect.

STATE VISIT TO LONDON The highlight of his time as ambassador in Japan was the State Visit by the Emperor Hirohito (Sho ˉwa) and the Empress to London in the autumn of 1971. The Sho ˉwa Emperor, although he was barely seventy, walked and talked like an old man and conversation with him was difficult. The Emperor was not received with any warm acclaim in Britain, and the tree which he planted at Kew was pulled up in protest at Japanese treatment of prisoners-of-war; nevertheless, there was none of the rude and intemperate protests which marred the visit of the Heisei Emperor Akihito in May 1998. The Sho ˉwa Emperor was particularly pleased by the restoration of his banner as a Knight of the Garter and by his appointment as an honorary Fellow of the Royal Society. John Pilcher for his part was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun as a member of the Emperor’s suite. John’s sense of humour rarely deserted him. He also had a quick wit and was an expert in repartee. Few of us can remember for very long witty remarks we have heard, but Brian Hitch, who was head of chancery in Tokyo, recalls one good example. John Pilcher was in the Rolls with the Governor of Hong Kong whom he had just collected from the airport. As they passed the parliament building in Tokyo the Governor asked what it was. John replied ‘The Diet’. The Governor commented that he thought that was a way of eating to which John riposted: ‘Like the Diet of Worms.’ John liked to shock the prim and there was an element of prep-school humour in him. He used to have fun writing his name in characters which could be read pe-ru-cha where pe was the character for fart, ru meant stop and cha meant tea. If he was leaving early in the morning it was always said to be at ‘sparrow fart’. He liked to recall, too, the reply of the keeper at the zoo to a question from the Sho ˉwa Emperor on his visit to London in 1971 about why the pandas had failed to mate: ‘He mistook the orifice, sir.’ John’s child-like qualities appeared in his desire to win at scrabble which he and his guests played at the embassy villa at Chu ˉ  zenji. Jimmy Abraham, the naval attaché, remembers how John would cheat shamelessly at the game, looking over his opponents’ shoulders. He certainly did not believe that ‘silence is golden’. Carmen Blacker recalls that ‘. . . once when invited to Chu ˉ  zenji for the weekend with Joan Martin they left the Ambassador’s residence at 4.30 am and John treated them to an unquenchable flow of anecdotes from then until dusk. He was particularly memorable on the subject of the “long, long scarf” worn [in Kyoto before the war] by old Mr Ponsonby Fane day and night.’ John stayed in Tokyo until after the Queen’s birthday party in June 1972 and left with a flourish on Concorde which was on a proving flight in the Far East.



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RETIREMENT After his retirement, John took on a number of jobs in the city which enabled him to travel widely including to Japan and South America. He particularly enjoyed taking his friends and business associates to Kyoto where he could expound to them on his pet themes and charm them with his wit and erudition. But he was not a bit conceited or pompous. He just wanted everyone to enjoy themselves. He did his duty conscientiously for the societies connected with the countries where he had served. For the Japan Society he did two separate three-year stints as chairman of the council and did whatever he could to further Anglo-Japanese understanding. Unfortunately the Proceedings of the Society do not include the texts of his two lectures to the Society as he did not prepare anything in writing. The only piece by him in the Proceedings is one which he prepared for visitors to Japan entitled ‘Conservation, East and West’ (Japan Society Proceedings No. 115, March 1990, pp. 7–12). The flavour of this piece is conveyed by his opening sentence: ‘I suspect that we are all brought up on La Rochefoucauld’s dictum that “the sole excuse for copying is to show up the faults of the original”.’ He concludes by relating how he took some Japanese architectural students to Thaxted: ‘Their only comment was that we were primarily concerned with the exteriors and were relatively disinterested in what went on inside. They would tend to view the matter, they said, from the inside out. You may think that there is some validity in their view.’ Sadly, John Pilcher never wrote his memoirs. He could not see why anyone should be interested in what he had done or thought. I hope that in this short piece I have at least proved him wrong in this respect. When he died in 1990, having suffered from Parkinson’s disease and a stroke, Japan and John’s colleagues lost a good, charming, understanding and amusing friend.

APPENDIX II

Letter from Kyoto, January 1936

January 18th 1936 Written above the salutation: I took the part of Jaques in a production of ‘As You Like It’ which was rather a success. It was a great undertaking but I think well worth it. My dear Prisca*, Very many thanks indeed for the truly lovely book you sent me. Really, am most frightfully pleased to have it. Dürer is an artist that I admire enormously, but about whom I have hitherto been somewhat vague. It is particularly interesting too to compare his works with Japanese painting and drawing. In a great many ways he is the very antithesis of everything Japanese, but at times he comes very near to achieving affects at which they aim. His tremendous vigour and versatility are thoroughly Western as is also the restless and over-ornate spirit that pervades most of his work. The Japanese achieve elegance by means of simplification; we so often pile on complications. In many respects ‘Modern’ art has much in common with the much talked of Japanese spirit. Talking of the Japanese spirit, I managed to spend three weeks just before Christmas in Kyoto. As you no doubt know Kyoto was the capital of Japan though not always the actual seat of government from 808 to 1868 and it still is the cultural and artistic centre. They moved the capital to Tokyo to break with the old tradition and also to evade the power of the priests. Kyoto didn’t mean much to me, I am afraid, until I began to study Japanese history, but now I must say I consider it one of the greatest cities in the world. I rushed around it Baedeker in hand, nosing out obscure statues and frescos in remote temples and grappling with recalcitrant priests in true German-tourist-in-Italy style! It is an astounding place; it was laid out at the beginning of the IXth century as a vast gridiron plan in the model of the T’ang dynasty capital of Chang’an. Soon after its ‘opening’, it had 800,000 inhabitants and so must have been the largest city in the world at the time and for long afterwards. Milan was the largest city in Europe in the Middle Ages and it had barely 100,000 inhabitants. The temples, of which there are literally thousands, cluster round the outside of the city; there are practically none in *  Picasa Profanter, from an old Innsbruck family, was daughter Julia’s Godmother. In the 1930s John studied German and stayed with her family. In the 1950s, she worked in the Austrian embassy, London, under Prince Schwartzenberg.



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the centre itself. The site reminded me of Innsbruck, though the mountains are nothing like so high and the valley far broader. There is almost all over Japan a clear feeling in the air that often reminds me curiously of Austria. Of course, all the buildings in the place are of wood, the houses are mostly two-storied, although there are one or two vast sky-scrapers in the à la Americaine style. The scale is of course all very small and dolls-houselike, which makes many of the temples seem far larger than they really are. However, the Japanese, unlike the Americans, do not generally seek to impress one by mere bulk. I will try and describe one of the temples thus: You go through a wooden gate capped with a curly tiled roof into a long piazza, down one side of which runs a stream, on the other bank of which is the wall of the temple precincts. You cross the stream by a bridge, go under a vast gatehouse with big over-hanging eaves and find yourself face to face with two huge temples joined together by a gallery. You leave your shoes in charge of an old lady – old ladies are the speciality of Japan as they are also of Bath! – go up about ten shiny wooden steps across a wooden platform and through the sliding doors with paper panes into the temple. The vast shutters which go in front of the paper sliding doors lift up and are suspended by iron rods coming down from the eaves. Inside the temple is a vast hall; the floors are made of soft bamboo matting which gives as you walk on it. From the roof hang a few gilt lanterns, but otherwise it is empty. Railed off as in a Christian church are three altars, which present the most magnificent spectacle. The walls behind them are gilt and on this gold background are painted exquisite bold pine trees or a large sweeping tree peony. The altars themselves are extremely simple with only a vase filled with pine branches and one filled with symbolic gilt lotus flowers, seeds and leaves. The whole effect is one of restrained gorgeousness. When a service is going on it is particularly impressive. They use all the panoply of hoary religions such as incense – of which there is the greatest variety in Japan – burning candles etc. etc. People say their prayers squatting on the floor. Attached to nearly all of the famous temples is a palace. For a long time it was the fashion for Emperors to abdicate – a sore topic at the moment – to become monks; thus most of the temples had palaces to which the e­ x-Emperors retired. At first sight they seem rather higgledy-piggledy erections, but really they are very skilfully laid out and take advantage of a view or to enable some cunning piece of gardening to gain full effect. They consist of a series of pavillions or ‘wings’ joined by passages, which are generally open on both sides and often cross ponds etc. etc.! Inside a wide passage – separated from the verandah which always goes round the house under the eaves, by wooden shutters with opaque paper panes that can all be removed – goes outside all the rooms. The rooms themselves are a gorgeous sight. Their walls all consist of sliding doors above which there is often fine wood carving. The ceilings are coffered and painted. The sliding doors are generally gilt and on the gold background splendid theatrical scenes are painted, sometimes only pine-trees or flowers, but often lively historical scenes or exciting animals. The floors again are all bamboo matting. It is about 3 inches thick and beautifully laid in the most precise manner. Each mat is a certain regular size – about 2 metres long by 1 metre wide. The Japanese always speak of a room as being of so and so many mats. The gardens play an integral part in the arrangement of the house. A Japanese garden is of course a very different thing from what we mean by a garden. To begin with it consists of rocks, shrubs, trees and water; flowers other than flowering shrubs have no place in it. It is best likened to a picture. It is laid out by a garden-artist and all the owners have to do is to preserve it in that state. A Japanese in a space of about 3x5 metres can create the illusion of

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a rugged landscape; rocks barely 50 centimetres high seem like towering crags. Some of the gardens to the palaces are perfectly lovely and extremely restful to the eye. There are however some strange gardens which tend to seem rather an over refinement of preciousness. You sometimes find a courtyard surrounded by a low stone wall painted white. The courtyard is spread with sand which is raked into precise and beautiful patterns; there may be a couple of stunted trees or a flat stone or two to break the severity! Such ‘gardens’ are said to be of great beauty by moonlight. Many of the temples contain magnificient statuary. The Buddhists used vast statues to impress and overawe the people in much the same way that the Christian Church compelled awe by building vast stonevaulted churches. I am very thrilled and interested in the sculpture; there is one temple at Nara which has had nothing added to it since the year 710. The sculpture in it is simply superb. It was made just at the time the Japanese first came under Chinese influence; they were lucky in the period they chose to copy, for China was having her greatest period – the T’ang dynasty. It is debatable whether the Japanese have chosen a good time to copy Western Civilization! Anyhow the statues I was talking of are now the sole surviving perfect examples of T’ang art at its best. I wonder whether in a few hundred year’s time scholars will have to go to Japan to research the few remaining remmants of Western civilization?! An interesting speculation! To turn to other matters I have awfully stupidly lost your lovely long letter, for which many thanks indeed, in which you say what sort of a sash you want. Do write again and précisez the matter. I am so very sorry not to have done anything about it; I feel so naughty?! I am going to ask you sometime to get me a Loden mantel – a large green flowing one. I do such a lot of walking in mountains etc. and they are so very useful specially for sleeping in. After New Year’s day I went off walking for two days with a couple of friends. We spent the night in a very rustic and not altogether savoury inn; and I longed for a Loden mantel to sleep in. Could you possibly get me one? I will pay you back of course. One that would fit Anton would fit me. Not too fearfully expensive. If you do, could you have it addressed to H.E. The British Ambassador, British Embassy, Tokyo, and have my initials J.A.P. put in the corner? Hope it isn’t a fearful bother. I have been private secretary to the Ambassador, which was quite interesting, but the Ambassadress is a bit of a trial. I think I have described her to you. She says and does many amusing things in a very tactless manner, but as Private Secretary I am much too much at her mercy to be able to think her funny! Besides it is a never ending job and interferes horribly with my Japanese. I have a Japanese examination in a little over a month and I feel I know practically nothing about it at all, which is very depressing. I seem to have to do nothing but examinations et j’en ai vraiment assez. I am delighted that you got on so well with Madam Vallani; I really do think she is a dear. I am sorry you were put off by his appearance, but I really do respect him intellectually. Anyhow I hope your French benefitted. I speak so much more French here than German. I don’t seem to know many of the German community. We are rather grateful here for the German policy of turning out the Jews, for we now have amongst the refuges a really first-rate doctor which we hadn’t before, and several really excellent musicians! I refrain from discussing the abdication; you have probably heard all the arguments on both sides. I think it altogether deplorable! All good wishes for 1937 – and very many thanks – yours John.

APPENDIX III

A Perspective on Religion in Japan [Given at the Nissan Institute, Oxford, 4 May 1984]

I

t is, of course, presumptuous of me to put before you thoughts on such a complicated subject as religion in Japan. My only excuse is that I feel encouraged to do so by my own experiences, which you may not have shared. No sooner had I arrived in Tokyo in January 1936 than the ‘ni ni roku’ (26 ­February) incident took place. The young military showed their conviction that they alone could properly understand and interpret the will of the revered Emperor. I was therefore at once confronted by religious beliefs and their contemporary expression. Then I spent two years in Kyoto living in the grounds of a Ryobu Shinto establishment, separated from its Buddhist element after the Meiji Restoration. Behind my house was a waterfall under which it was meritorious to stand and pray. I could therefore feel the omnipresence of Shinto around me. I, of course, met and have since tried to read the works of Richard Arthur Brabazon Ponsonby-Fane. He imbued me with his sense of the fascination of Shinto. He was incidentally a convinced Anglican and led a dual life as sage studying Shinto in Kamigamo outside Kyoto and as cricket-loving country squire in Somerset. There his lovely country house with pre-Norman romanesque remnants, late mediaeval front and Inigo Jones-inspired wing can now be visited. Do note its name and address: Brympton d’Evercy, near Yeovil; it is next door to Montacute. His great nephew is making a go of exhibiting it as a great country house. His name is Charles Clive-Ponsonby-Fane and the telephone number is West Coker (093–586) 2528. His great uncle dressed for the part. In Japan he was always seen in Haori hakama, surmounted by a decayed woollen scarf with the ravages of the moth in evidence on it. It had been knitted for him by the Dowager Empress, widow of the Taisho Emperor. Needless to say, I was completely bowled over by the beauty of the great Buddhist temples of Nara and Kyoto. I studied Japanese at the feet of a Zen priest, who was occasionally prevailed upon by the authorities to leave with me thoughts of the National polity, of Shinto inspiration and then much in vogue. The great Suzuki Daisetsu inspired studies in Zen. I had therefore to try to understand the dual principles behind Japanese Life: Shinto and Buddhism and the influence of Confucianism on civic structure.

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I soon came to the conclusion that the central fact in Japanese existence is isolation. The Japanese islands are four times as far from the Asian mainland as we are from France. They lie off Korea, which in turn is a peninsula not unlike Scandinavia. Geographically they were extremely cut off. Whatever their diverse origins, the stocks from which the Japanese spring early fused into virtually one race, with one language and no system of writing. There was no recorded invasion until the Mongol attempt in the thirteenth century. In their isolation the primitive Japanese conceived of themselves and the islands they inhabited as offsprings of divinities, while the Imperial House, which gradually extended its rule over Yamato, was considered to be descended from the Sun Goddess. The Emperor was a manifest divinity. As the islands of Japan were of extreme beauty and varied terrain, it was easy for the Japanese to consider any place of distinction to be divine. Thus mountains, rocks, waterfalls, outstanding trees all had their divine owners, to whom reverence must be paid. There are few more moving sights than the waterfall of Nachi, with the copper ‘gohei’ (normally paper emblem of the divine), proclaiming the spot to be sacred to its god. Primitive Japanese expected reverence to be paid to the islands, the race and its ruler. Complicated statements of belief were not required. There were few religious injunctions. Ritual purity and lustrations were prescribed. L ­ ooking glasses – which must reflect the truth – usually symbolize Shinto divinities. Many Shinto festivals take the form of carrying the symbol in state to a specially prepared shrine, before which ritual dances and music are performed. These have been preserved from the earliest times. Echoes of T’ang ceremonial can still be heard, for instance at the moving brazier-lit festival of the Kasuga Shrine at Nara. Certainly, the shrines and sacred groves of the divinities exude a numinous quality, which is powerfully felt. There are few places so pregnant with atmosphere of a holy kind as the shrine of the Sun Goddess at Ise and perhaps equally the great shrine at Idzumo. The Ise shrine is rebuilt every twenty years and the timbers of the building given away to worthy recipients, who treasure them for generations. The shrine itself probably represents a palace of prehistoric times. Nothing has been intentionally altered and offerings for instance are still given on dishes thrown not on the wheel, but moulded on the elbow. Thus to visit Ise is to step back into the mists of time. Yet the government and the Emperor report all serious issues and decisions to the Sun Goddess at Ise. Idzumo is equally evocative. There is a long low building there, in which the myriad gods of Shinto gather to spend the month of October. Moreover there is a conical hill, on which the foot of man has never trod. At shrines you can buy prophecies on bits of white paper. The faithful keep the favourable prophecies, but attach to the under branches of the trees in the sacred precinct any prophecies they do not like. They give the impression of snow flakes upside down. Both Ise and Idzumo recall Stonehenge and Avebury, with the cults to which they were dedicated still being practised. It is as though, for example, the Druids still existed and their cults were tolerated by the contemporary religion of Christianity. Therefore the Japanese people have the feeling that the mysteries of their traditional religion are being practised as they were at the very dawn of history. This gives a powerful sense of continuity and stability.



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Shinto festivals are cheerful, and intended to be performed by people with purity of spirit. The lesser and rural festivals are bacchanalian in character. In the fifth century AD and onwards the influence of Chinese writing and thought and religion came to bear ever more heavily on the country. The primitive religion I have been describing had to be given a name, which it had hitherto lacked: it became known as Shinto or the way of the gods. Here at once the problem of the word used and usually translated as God poses itself. The Chinese character employed means a spirit. The Japanese expression in the indigenous language is ‘kami’ or ‘superior person’. Kami is, however, rather less than a god (let alone God) in our usage. All deserving Japanese become kami. The myriad spirits of Shinto sound less imposing than the myriad gods, but it is probably a more accurate translation. The Emperor is considered to be a manifest spirit. In China the Emperor ruled, because he had the mandate of Heaven. In practice, if all went well he continued to have this mandate. If things went wrong, he lost the mandate: hence the changing dynasties of China. Moreover, the Chinese system was that the Emperor alone communed with Heaven. At the altar of Heaven in Peking, he prayed at the apex, while burnt offerings were consumed all round. It was his business to maintain the correct relations. Heaven, as used by the Chinese and by Confucius is much nearer to our concept of God. The Emperor of Japan on the other hand ruled because he was a manifest spirit descended from the Sun Goddess. He was not therefore theoretically movable. Shinto with the Emperor at its head gave a religious backing to the state, which was of great significance in the making of early Japan. Largely swamped by Buddhism for centuries, it came into its own again with the restoration of the Emperor Meiji in 1868, when it once again was made the foundation of the State. Indeed Prince Ito when visiting European capitals to seek inspiration for his constitution of 1889 is said to have received advice from authoritarian German and Austrian officials to make maximum use of this excellent cohesive adjunct to the Japanese state. Of course, Japanese ­scholars during the later Tokugawa period had been extolling the virtues of Shinto and had been longing to restore the Emperor to the position he had originally held, before Chinese influence and thought had obscured some of his erstwhile significance. To return to the sixth century AD, with the advent of a system of writing, which the Japanese had hitherto lacked, came Confucian thought. This the Japanese treated as a philosophy of statecraft and not as a religion as such. The Confucian emphasis on filial piety, on the search for harmony and the influence of the behaviour of the good man continued to influence them throughout their whole history. They are still to be noted in the behaviour of contemporary Japanese. On the negative side the secondary position of Japanese women is a legacy of Confucian teaching. Far more outwardly visible was Buddhist influence. Indeed Buddhism became the chief link between Japan and the rest of the outside world. It brought Japan into the Indian world of metaphysical speculation. Buddhist priests, usually Chinese and sometimes coming to Japan through Korea, brought different sects of Mahayana Buddhism to Japan and received the powerful support of the Imperial Prince known as Shotoku Taishi. He was a sort of Alfred the Great and the first individual of note produced by Japan on the world stage. He gave every encouragement to Buddhist priests and himself caused to be founded the most spectacular monument to come down from the seventh century AD, namely the Horyuji Temple outside Nara.

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There it is possible, with a little imagination, to sense the extraordinary, inspiration this edifice must have brought to Japan at that time. It is almost entirely a T’ang Chinese design. The Golden Hall contains Buddhist triads of gilt bronze, which astound by their beauty of proportion and their heavenly calm. Even more impressive, in a small nunnery which is part of the Horyuji complex, there is a statue of the Fifth Buddha in the series of five, of which Gautama Sakyamuni (the earthly Buddha) was the Fourth. This Messianic Buddha is known as Miroku Bosatsu in Japanese or Maitreya in Sanskrit. His is the figure much portrayed in Korea at the same epoch, as those who have visited the current Korean exhibition in the British Museum will know. The Miroku in the Chugu-ji is perhaps the supreme masterpiece of Buddhist art everywhere. It has a heavenly tranquillity, self-assurance and power, which make a visit to it one of the great experiences in this world. Significantly, in front of it, stands a miniature statue of Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess. Buddhism, being the first transcendental religion to be practised in Japan, must have made a prodigious impression on the Japanese at the time. Emperors and Empresses fell over backwards to support it, while the Emperor Shomu’s widow gave her husband’s posssessions to the Todaiji in Nara, where they have been kept ever since in the famous storehouse Shosoin (780 AD). The building of the Todaiji was in itself an almost miraculous event. Unfortunately, history has not dealt with it too kindly and what we now see is a rebuilding on a slightly smaller scale and the remains of a great statue of the Vairocana Buddha badly damaged by fire. Still the Todaiji is the largest wooden building in the world and can deeply impress the visitor. Different waves of Buddhist sects reached Japan and the numbers of temples surrounding Nara became perhaps uncomfortably oppressive. The Emperor Kwammu, therefore, decided to move the capital from Nara to Kyoto in 794. Immediately, temples sprang up around the outskirts of the great city built on the model of Chang’an in China. This was laid out according to the precepts of Chinese geomancy. It was protected by the mountains to the North, East and West and was open to the South. There was a handy mountain named Hieizan to the North-East, which is the quarter whence evil influences come. On Hieizan was soon erected a powerful complex of temples belonging to the Tendai sect. They were deemed to add to the protection of the city from the ill-famed quarter. To the South of the city there arose the great Toji belonging to the Shingon or esoteric sect. This was founded by one of the great names in ­Japanese history: Kutai or, as he became known, Kobo-Daishi. He is credited with inventing the Kana syllabaries, still used for grammatical convenience and for transliterating foreign words. He also founded a veritable city of temples at Koyasan not far from Osaka (816 AD). The founding of Kyoto, then known as Heian or capital of peace and tranquillity, marked the beginning of a brilliant period in Japanese civilization which was to prove only too transient. From the end of the ninth century until 1120 or so, the Heian period had a great aesthetic flowering No doubt you have all read those feminine masterpieces ‘The Tales of Genji’ and the pillow book of ‘The Lady Sei Shonagon’. Perhaps you will have read them in the superb translations of Arthur Waley and Ivan Morris. You will recall that Buddhist priests were always called in times of sickness and death and that the chanting of the Sutras was a very important part of their duties. They mostly



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belonged to the Shingon sect with its extremely complicated philosophical pattern and emphasis on magic and spells. By this time Mahayana Buddhism had reached a point of proclaiming that not only sentient beings, but also non-animate objects such as dust, could become eventually a Buddha and enter Nirvana or the great void. This was some distance from what is held to be the chief doctrine of Gautama ­Sakyamuni who declared that cause produces effect. He held that a good life engenders another good life and that detachment from this world and its evil is the goal of the religious man. Love and remorse must equally be erased. He denied the existence of the soul, so that the precise method whereby one life begets another is the subject of endless complexity. Suffice it that somehow or another portions of like sanctity or evil join up with similar portions of another. The preoccupation of Buddhism with the after-life gives to the Japanese an enormously wide horizon. Looking backwards through aeons of previous existences and forward to an infinity, at which point the detached can eventually enter oblivion, means that the individual sees himself as a small drop in an infinitely great expanse. Here today and gone tomorrow is very much the atmosphere. When the military began taking over the running of Japan as ‘Barbarian Subduing Generalissimi’ in the twelth century, the mood was for some simplification of Buddhist niceties. Thus, there emerged the Pure Land sect which maintained that for the individual the solution was simply to die steadfast in the faith and calling upon Amida ‘The Lord of the Western Paradise’. Thus, the individual could attain at once rebirth in the western paradise. Amida and Kwannon (Avalokitesvara) were bodhisattvas who could have attained infinity or the void, but offered themselves up to help suffering mankind. They vowed not to attain Buddhahood in Nirvana until every sentient being had first been helped to enter the western paradise. This sect is far the largest in contemporary Japan and its founders Honen Shonin and later Shinran are probably the most widely revered Buddhist luminaries in Japan. They exemplified the Buddhist virtue of compassion. Last to arrive in Japan was Zen Buddhism which had achieved vast success in China particularly during the Sung Dynasty. This was rather a cuckoo in the Buddhist nest. Its pundits proclaimed that the letter killeth. Moreover, man cannot be saved by relying upon the strength of others, as the Pure Land professed. Man can only find salvation within himself. Therefore, Zen lays enormous stress upon contemplation and meditation. It brought with it from China a Taoist flavour. Its temples are adorned by two figures from its Chinese past, known in Japanese as Kanzan and Jitoku: both are drunk and one is brushing away rubbish while the other is mocking the scriptures. This sect does have statues of what we think of as the earthly buddha. Gautama Sakyamuni, but its methods of teaching had little in common with the other sects. Its pupils are given conundrums (koaˉ  n) to solve. This they must do intuitively and not by exercising reason. Their masters are known to stike their pupils and in this process to help to induce, through shock, feelings leading to enlightenment or Satori. The pupil knows that he has suddenly found a solution to the world and his master will guarantee this, but, since it is all a question of intuition, it is hard if not impossible to define.

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In contemporary Japan, therefore, the primeval Shinto background remains. Over 70 million Japanese describe themselves as Shintoists. On the other hand, over 81 million say they are first and foremost Buddhists. The fact is that most Japanese are both at the same time. Shinto has a myriad spirits to be revered and can add a few more without embarrassment. The Buddhist perspective is so vast and the numbers of personalities involved so infinite that it can give equivalent rank to the whole paraphernalia of Shinto. In the past Buddhism and Shinto shared buldings and it was not until after the Meiji restoration that Shinto was separated from Buddhism (which was for a time proscribed). There is no deep enmity or rivalry between them, indeed, odium theologicum is not characteristic of the Japanese scene. Buddhist priests took precautions when visiting Ise, for example. Only one Buddhist leader was vitriolic about his contemporaries and curiously enough he has begotten the one Buddhist sect active in contemporary Japanese politics (Soka gakkai). Its founder Nichiren based all on the Lotus Sutra. He gained enormous credit for having predicted the Mongol invasions of Japan in the twelth century. Since Japan entered the modern world, great social changes naturally begot new needs. In the Tokugawa period every person had to belong to the Buddhist sect which happened to have a temple in his village. This had a great effect of dampening down sectarian enthusiasm. You just had to belong whether you believed in the sect or not. Moreover in the Tokugawa period there was an enormous recrudescence of Confucian influence. Perhaps a combination of these factors has helped to give us the contemporary Japanese spectacle of a search for harmony rather than divisive religious enthusiasms. However, new religious sects pullulate. There remain from the primitive past shamanistic beliefs, which have been beautifully portrayed by Dr Carmen Blacker in her Catalpa Bow. Ecstatic ladies have felt inspired to found several of these sects and the Japanese tradition of wearing several religious hats at once enabled them to put forth syncretic codes of belief and behaviour. Shinto is divided into four parts: Imperial Shinto, Shrine Shinto, Sect Shinto and State Shinto (which was disestablished by MacArthur). Therefore, if you are a contemporary Japanese you would be a Shintoist for most of your life unless caught by Buddhist speculation, but your end and funeral and thereafter would be firmly in Buddhist hands. The fact that Christianity, Judaeism and Islam are exclusive sects has told against them. A Japanese is not willing to give up his Shinto birthright and his Buddhist mise en scène to worship one God in exclusivity. Of course, with their traditions, if a Japanese does make the jump he becomes an excellent Christian. It is however not surprising that the numbers of Christian believers are very low. There are approximately 353,000 Catholics and 387,000 Protestants out of a total population of 120 million. Moreover, the Japanese tendency to syncretic thought means that many think they can revere the Christ while retaining their indigenous beliefs. This on occasion in the syncretic sects can lead to some confusion. I remember vividly a department store, which shall be nameless, putting up a splendid Christmas tree in the 1930s capped by a teddy bear crucified. Of course, Western children play with teddy bears at Christmas and the remaining hairy Ainu sacrifice a bear in their religious ceremonies. Christianity is somehow concerned with the crucifixion of Christ. Hence the teddy bear crucified seems a good way out. For me this sums up a whole area of misunderstanding much of which is on our side. Think of the European ladies



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who turn statues of what they think of as ‘Buddhas’ into an electric lamp. That to me comes into the teddy bear crucified bracket. Most Japanese households have a Shinto Shrine or ‘godshelf’ in their houses, at which offerings are made to the genius loci. They will also have a Buddhist altar, containing the tablets of deceased members of the family. Every new office block will have its Shinto Shrine. Mankind is seen by both Shinto and Buddhism as on a par with natural phenomena, beasts, birds, rocks and trees. This has given the Japanese their love of nature and feeling for harmony with nature. Moreover, illusion and reality obsess the Japanese. ‘Since 1 am convinced that reality is in no sense real, how can I admit that dreams are dreams?’ asked Saigyo Hoshi (1118– 1190). This is the opposite view to Calderon de la Barca, who, in his ‘Life is a Dream’, asks ‘What is life? A frenzy. What is life? An illusion, a shadow, a fiction; and the greatest good is small, because all life is a dream and dreams are dreams.’ A tough gossamer thread divides these conceptions.

APPENDIX IV

Is Economic Success Destroying Japanese Traditions? [1975 Occasional Paper/Speech – details unknown.]

J

apan has long been skilled at adapting the ways of others to her needs. Sui and T’ang dynasty China were the models for the reforms of Shotoku Taishi in the seventh century, which transformed the visual aspect of the coun­ issionaries, try by encouraging the adoption of Chinese forms. The European m who arrived in the middle of the sixteenth century, set off a vogue for ­European decorative motifs, comparable to the craze for chinoiserie in Europe in the eighteenth century. The missionaries came up by sea from the south and in truly Greek fashion were dubbed ‘Barbarians’. Hence the artistic trends they inspired came to be called ‘Southern Barbarian Art’. There is a splendid museum dedicated to the subject in Kobe. But the real impact from the West (or as the Japanese term it the ‘Western Ocean’) came after the opening of the country to relations with the rest of the world after the Restoration of the Emperor to the visible apex of power in 1868. Then it became a question of catching up with Western technology in order to be able to confront the world. Again the outward aspect of Japan suffered a great change. On each of these three occasions the Japanese traditional outlook asserted itself. A bureaucracy entirely on the Chinese model gradually bent itself to Japanese needs and customs. Confucianism indeed became a code of moral conduct, but Chinese principles were only adopted up to a point. Behind the Japanese reaction lay the indigenous cults of Shinto, the way of the gods, given this name to distinguish them from Buddhism. Shinto holds that the very islands of Japan and the Japanese race itself sprang from gods and goddesses. The Imperial family trace their ancestry back to the Sun Goddess. All Japanese can join the myriad ranks of Shinto divinities after death; the Emperor is a manifest divinity. It follows, therefore, that everything Japanese is worthy of reverence by Japanese and that all remarkable natural phenomena and ­Japanese who have done great deeds should have their individual cults. Provided due reverence is shown, exclusive belief is not required. Thus, it proved for centuries possible for a Japanese to show the necessary respect for



Is Economic Success Destroying Japanese Traditions?389

Shinto and be a pious Buddhist at the same time. But Shinto gave a powerful meaning to being a Japanese. It lay behind that abnormal sense of cohesion and instinctive patriotism, which have stood Japan in particularly good stead since the last war. It gives them permanently that Battle-of-Britain feeling. The very paucity of its tenets and its intrinsic simplicity enable it to survive contact both with China and the West. It gives the Japanese the strength to remain inwardly true to themselves, despite immense changes in the externals of existence. The fact that it and the imperial dynasty are sensed to go back to the ‘mists of time’ (in practice the third century A.D.) make both highly evocative and moving. The Japanese way of life grew up largely under Shinto inspiration. Respect for nature in Japan was a corollary to belief in its divine origins. With this came a reverence for materials. Man was not seen as intrinsically superior to nature, but rather as an equal: a stone among stones. He should live in harmony with nature and with the beasts and birds. He should not seek to impose himself upon nature, but rather to cooperate with it. His best creations were often those in which nature played a part. Thus the potter would welcome the hazards of the kiln; the musician would use a flute as little touched by the hand of man as possible. The bass flute or shakuhachi would be as near to a natural piece of bamboo as possible; its player would thus feel he was playing through nature. Works of art should seem to have been born rather than made. These ideas became externalised in the Japanese house. Ideally it should be to a man what a nest is to a bird, neither too much nor too little for his essential requirements. It should be built of unstained wood, making use of the grain, texture and even blemishes in the material. The house should sit like a person in a field, without interrupting the rhythm of nature. It was raised off the ground and paths appeared to continue underneath it. The practical considerations of Chinese geomancy applied to it. It always faced due South to get the maximum sun in the winter; the overhanging eaves were exactly designed to let in the rays of the low winter sun, but to keep the hot vertical sun of summer out. The oneness of structure and garden was emphasised by the sliding shutters, which formed its walls; these could be removed and the interior opened to the garden. The house itself was a timber framework, surmounted by a massive roof. Within the framework the dispositions were fluid. The outer shutters – amado – were made of wood – or after 1868 of glass – and slid into box containers, so that the whole side of the house could be opened up. The inner shutters – shoji – were of opaque paper; when closed they diffused a calm, moonlike light. Internal sliding screens – fusuma – were of thick, but light, papier mâché. The floors were made of mats of uniform size, one metre by two metres. These, called tatami, not only governed the scale of the house, and its rooms, but dictated the necessity to remove shoes. They were made of thick rice straw, covered with woven reed matting. They were to be sat upon and therefore not to be trodden upon by shoes or sandals. Outer shoes, therefore, had to be left at the door. Felt slippers could be worn in passages, but ‘tatami’ demanded bare feet. Once accustomed to tatami and the discipline they impose, our habits appear slovenly and uncouth. No wonder the French have invented the word ‘Tatamisé’ to describe the foreigner gone Japanese. There was virtually no furniture, unless built in, as in the exquisite Katsura palace, recently visited by the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh. Because the whole side of the house could be opened up, the immediate surroundings became of the highest importance. The garden became a

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picture contained by an aspect to be viewed from points in the rooms. It was a picture that must be beautiful at all seasons. For this reason evergreens became greatly prized; if they flowered like camellias, well and good. Flowers were an additional but not essential bonus. Flowers, loved for their own sake, would be grown in pots, out of sight, to be brought out only in their prime. Once the great artist had laid out the garden, it was the task of the owner to keep it perpetually in the same state. Preening, tidying and pruning were his lot; should a tree die, it must at once be replaced by one as identical as possible. Because of the cult of nature, rocks were immensely prized. They kept the composition together. Water real or fictitious was an essential ingredient. The knack of moving fully grown trees had been practised since the Tang dynasty in China. ‘Instant gardening’ was therefore the rule. Seclusion was important to insure privacy; this was carried to a fine art, banks being raised and planted up in such a way that the surrounding features of the landscape emerging above seemed to be part of the garden. The ‘borrowed landscape’ thus achieved is their version of our ‘hahas’. By contrast with the severe interiors, the view of the garden gave an almost baroque effect; it became furnishing. It could also provide, as in certain Zen temples a severe contour conducive to inward meditation.

BONSAI In cities it became the fashion to replace nature by miniature landscapes. Unable to grow a real tree, a perfectly proportioned dwarf tree in a pot yet enabled the owner to imagine himself contemplating a natural mountain scene. This is the true meaning of the cult of bonsai, which has invaded us and achieved so prominent a place at the Chelsea Flower Show. Indeed, the creation of a pleasing view in tiny and seemingly unpropitious circumstances became a great national art and is one of the most endearing of Japanese achievements. Even food came to obey the same aesthetic. Food should be as natural as possible – none of your rich Chinese sauces. Hence the passion for raw fish and the preponderance of ‘les crudités’. It should be a treat for the eye, which may take hours of preparation. It must be eaten in the right room, with the right scroll picture in the alcove and the appropriate flower arrangement. Skilled service and a beautiful view complete the scene. Beauty in Japanese tradition has always been regarded as a secret thing. The street of natural coloured wooden houses could be drab; in winter it could take on a depressing grey. It was monotonous since it was vulgar to display individual caprice. Once inside, the garden, invisible from without, comes as an astonishing surprise. It is like the moment when the White Rabbit opens the door from the hole into the garden in Alice Through the Looking Glass. In summer the scene can be breathtaking. The delight of living virtually in the open air in the intense heat has to be experienced. The natural colours within soothe the nerves and convey an impression of freshness. There is no clutter to disturb. Peace and harmony reign. In winter, which is very cold, but bright and dry, the scene can be momentarily as enchanting. The leaves of the maples are brighter than flowers and emplacements of chrysanthemums often enliven the view. In the middle of the day for half an hour life can seem possible, but as the shadows fall and



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the inner opaque shutters are closed, a cold gloom descends. The closing of the outer shutters gives a certain protection, but at the cost of shutting out the remaining light. To sit in a room, with no furniture in it, in cold gloom is a daunting experience. A feeling of dreadful loneliness overcomes you. No wonder that ‘loneliness’ is so terrible to the Japanese. A charcoal brazier may warm the tips of the fingers, but its token glow serves only to emphasize the cold. Life is only tolerable in the brief afterglow of a boiling bath and muffled in quilted kimonos. Even the table placed over the brazier – an arrangement called kotatsu – surmounted with an eiderdown, round which four can sit, write or eat, is of little avail, although the sensation of warmth coming up out of the neck and sleeves has its points. The plight of the elegant persons portrayed in the paintings of the Kano school as they huddled in their exquisite but cumbersome clothes in near darkness round the dimunitive brazier must have been hard indeed. I can well imagine it, since I lived for two years in a traditional house of modest charm in Kyoto, the old capital, in the late thirties. The summers were heavenly. The inner paper shutters – shoji – were replaced by ones of brown reeds, through which whatever breeze there was circulated in the dog days. Gardenias, permitted because evergreen overcame the ‘musty odours’ (as the Americans call them) of summer damp. It rains incessantly during the summer. The flowers of the night flowering convolvulus, called evening faces – yugao – by the Japanese, in pots wafted their sweet but astringent scent into the house. The waterfall dripped with a refreshing note. Insects, which in pre-D.D.T. days pullulated, gave merry chirps. The bell insect which acts as a burglar alarm in reverse, kept up its incessant mock tintinnabulation, until frightened into a silence more awful than the din of any electric device. In fact I lived in close proximity with nature, aware of every mood and variation. Autumn had its particular charms. The nip in the air was invigorating, the first charcoal burning, in the braziers promised some semblance of warmth sufficient for the season; but then winter began with its black cold, unrelieved by the cheerful glow of a fire. The sight of the camellias and the sweet scented plum in the snow gave indeed momentarily delight, which dissipated itself even more quickly than the effects of bath or hot rice wine beaten up with an egg. I came in fact to know the seasons almost too intimately. It was, however, an immense privilege to have been able to live with them in such harmony (most prized of all qualities). When I was in Kyoto, forward-looking spirits were seeking ways of combining this severe astringent but poetic way of living with certain modern comforts. After 1868 it became quite common to add a Western-style study to the traditional house. This solved the problem of bookshelves; moreover it had a wooden floor and thus armchairs became possibilities. You cannot place chairs on tatami except as a version of skis which permit those to slide over the surface. Faced with ‘Western clutter’ and having lived without furniture, Japanese had to confront the tricky problems of Western taste. All but the rare few fell for a Prussian, plushy heaviness. The few tried to adapt Japanese principles to Western furnishings. This they did with increasing success. Many took up a tatami mat in their sitting room and constructed a pit deep enough to take the legs with an electric heater at the bottom. You could therefore ‘sit’ at a table, placed over the pit, without cluttering up the room or upsetting the perspective – for the foreigner a comforting form of kotatsu. Every Japanese room must be viewed from the floor.

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When I returned to Japan eight years ago, such beginnings had begotten great developments. As Tokyo came to be rebuilt more permanently after the destruction by fire in the last war, more and more attempts were made with ever greater assurance to apply Japanese taste to ‘modern’ s­ teel-and-concrete buildings. The metal frameworth replaced on a vast scale the traditional wooden structure of the house. It had become no longer a question of tacking on a Western study to a Japanese house, but rather of including one room with tatami for the grandparents in flats of entirely modern construction. The value of land had ruled out gardens and any but the smallest individual houses in the traditional manner. Rents became astronomical and anxious parents were constrained to build houses for their children on every available square inch. Car ports ousted gardens. Then individual blocks of contemporary aspect took over the remaining traditional houses. Gone were the cooperation between man and nature and the intimate association between the two. The few traditional houses that remained were invariably expensive restaurants, where the rich insisted still upon eating in the old manner and with the correct surroundings, which they could no longer achieve in the home. Inside the glass palaces, with which we are all too familiar throughout the world, the prescient put paper shutters (shoji) behind the glass, to give the old serene moonlit illusion. They employed natural colours on the walls; the grass wallpapers, now so popular with European decorators, were universally employed. The steel framework permitted rooms to be divided by papier mâché sliding panels (fusuma). Japanese atmosphere was thus somewhat artificially constructed. The imposing buildings, which banks everywhere think appropriate to their image, were flanked by ‘gardens’ with traditional aspects, many of them strikingly and stonily monumental. The chunky concrete manner was matched by a new form of municipal gardening. The old harmony with nature seemed far removed; the intimate relationship in scale between man and nature vanished; secrecy and intimacy had disappeared altogether. Only in the new Imperial Palace did Junzo Yoshimura contrive to endow a building on a vast scale with the traditional principles of design. Externally it blends beautifully with its gardens. But who other than the Emperor now has the necessary space to achieve that affect? Anyway, it would be quite unseemly for an ordinary mortal so to display his wealth. Economic success also brought pollution in its train. This further discouraged the traditional way of life, so intimately bound up with nature. No longer did people wish to enjoy the summer living virtually in their gardens. What gardens remained had lost their privacy and were overlooked increasingly by tall blocks. To own an air conditioner was now the desire of all. Shut out by those noisy machines from contact with the outside world in summer and imprisoned within by central heating of a transatlantic intensity in the winter, the old style of living has all but vanished in the big cities. The opening and closing of the shutters in a traditional house are wearisome tasks. A house can never be left open. It must frequently be closed when a wind gets up. Moreover the very emptyness of the rooms means the discipline of tidiness; a pencil left around immediately offends the eye. In other words a traditional house without staff is a severe task master. It is easy only to keep clean. Shoji and fusuma need constant attention and repair. The tatami need replacing; there is nothing so pleasing to Japanese sensibilities as the sight and smell of fresh tatami. Such delights, however, cost more and more. The traditional house in the city has become a great luxury. Some charming ‘villas’



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are maintained by the big firms for the use of their staff and for entertaining purposes, but they have become institutions, far removed from the old intimacies. In short, the latest wave of outside influence upon Japan has resulted in the virtual demise of the traditional Japanese house and the way of life it embodied at least in the cities. A pale shadow continues to exist in Kyoto, even outside the show pieces. The question Japanese intellectuals ask themselves is whether the philosophy of life which the traditional Japanese house so beautifully represented can continue to exist. In its basic elements of reverence for the land and race of Japan I think it can. The Japanese spirit, which survived the imposition of Chinese civilization and transformed it, can certainly come to terms with modernity up to a point. Bit by bit, the old respect for nature may have a modifying effect. At this moment, however, economic success and the thirst for gain have caused the virtual elimination of nature, whenever it stood in the way. Hills have been flattened, plains levelled with a devastating ruthlessness. Holy sites have been vulgarised; a fun fair has been built on the top of Mount Hiei, which guarded Kyoto with its crest of temples from the evil influences from the fatal North-East. Harmony, though still proclaimed as the ideal, no longer exists between man and nature. The young in Japan are refreshingly open; they put their heads back and laugh. The snigger behind the hand only survives in the elderly. That inward-looking inhibited look loses out. Self-effacing lack of individuality is not the ‘in’ thing. Brash enjoyment has taken its place. Loyalty, team spirit and keenness to do the job well still survive. The underlying spirit is still willing, but the externals go with each year. Still, in an earthquake-racked land, there is no disposition to deny the evanescence of existence and the transience of all things. Here to-day and gone to-morrow, like the cherry blossom dropping its petals before its flowers are fully out. It may still be possible to say with Saigyo Hoshi: ‘since I am convinced that illusion reality is in no sense real, how can I admit that dreams are dreams?’ The mood, however, is nearer that of Calderon de la Barca, who, in his play ‘Life is a Dream’ (la Vida es Sueño) said: ‘Life is an illusion; life is a frenzy; life is a dream, but dreams are only dreams’. There is a subtle difference . . . . .

APPENDIX V

Book Review

George Elison: Deus Destroyed: the Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan. Harvard University Press, £16.85 23 March 1977

____________________________________________________________________ The ‘Christian Century’ in Japan (1549 to 1639) has recently been the subject of many excellent works, but no author has placed it quite so solidly in its ­Japanese context as George Elison. The heroism of the Jesuits, mainly ­Portuguese but led by the Spaniard, who became St Francis Xavier, has frequently been appraised. Their amazing initial successes are common knowledge. Their industry in founding institutions has long been the subject of wonderment. The fortitude of the newly-won faithful in resisting persecution has become legendary. The cat–and-mouse policies of Hideyoshi and then Tokugawa Ieyasu have seemed baffling. Now George Elison has showed all those strands in the perspective of Japanese history and stressed their relevance for the emergence of Early Modern Japan and thus by extension for contemporary Japan. When the Jesuits arrived, Japan was in a period of transition from the chaos following the breakdown of the Ashikaga Shogunate. The country was divided between warring nobles, the Senkoku Period. Each group was out for itself. The unifying factor, the Emperor, was in revered, but powerless seclusion in Kyoto (Miyako, the capital). Nevertheless, to attain his mandate of Shogun (or Generalissimo in charge of the Bakufu or military government) was the aim of the mighty. This was finally achieved by Tokugawa Ieyasu and his family maintained the Shogunate until 1867, after which, with the ‘restoration’ to real power of the Meiji Emperor Modern Japan was borne. The appearance of the Jesuits coincided with the struggles of, first, Oda ­Nobunaga and then Hideyoshi to attain hegemony over all Japan. Their significance and usefulness was assessed by both ‘condottieri’ in the light of the exigencies of their personal struggles. Convictions were scarcely involved. Trade with Portugal seemed to be at stake: that was attractive enough to all parties and not least to the local daimyo, needing firearms in their p ­ erpetual skirmishings. The Jesuits were thus worth cultivating for strictly material reasons. Japan had known Buddhism, imported from India through China and Korea, for nearly a thousand years. Christianity coming up from the South



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(by way of Goa, Macao and the Philippines, discovered by Spain in 1521) was at first seen to be following the same path and pattern and was taken for a new version of Buddhism. As various Buddhist sects had and were causing civic trouble in Japan (the Tendai monks of Hieizan and the Honganji addicts), a new sect which had so immediate a success appeared to be perhaps a means of keeping them in check. Hence the initial friendliness of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. Then there was Confucianism, which had animated the early Japanese attempts in the seventh century to emulate the Chinese bureaucratic system. It was to stage a come-back and Neo-Confucianism was to become the guiding system of morals in Tokugawa Japan, which in turn was the period of incubation of modern Japan. ‘Manners makyth man’ was therefore very much ingrained in Japanese society. The Form was important even in Senkoku Japan. Loyalty, the family system and the cult of harmony in this life came to dominate Japan. Some of the Jesuits reached an understanding of Japanese psychology and behaviour rarely equalled in modern times. They sensed the importance of conforming to Japanese standards of behaviour and even of elegance. They could not always live up to their intentions and their habits were soon judged uncouth and uncivilized and thus indicative of subversive thought. To a very homogeneous people even their long noses were an offence. As to their hearty consumption of flesh, this was thought merely repugnant. Southern Barbarians (Nambanjin) they became, and the epithet is applied to the art they influenced. It was, however, their placing of the focal point of loyalty, God/Deus, outside Japan, indeed outside this world, that repelled and baffled Japanese. Their attitude caused the Japanese to fear that they wished to transfer the sovereignty over Japan to Deus and his vicar in Rome – perhaps to the King of Spain, already in possession of the Philippines. Moreover, it was an affront to the Shinto concept of Japan as the Land of the Gods and the Emperor as a manifest divinity sprung from the Sun Goddess. The adoption of Deus as the Supreme Authority would upset the whole system, whereby the Shogun derived his mandate from the divine Emperor. Buddhism had never pushed matters to their logical extreme. Buddhists had accommodated the Japanese scheme of things into their outlook. Moreover, they postulated, instead of a Divine and Omnipotent Being a Non-Ens, as George Elison deftly terms the Nothinguess of Buddhist aims. Buddhism had not proved destructive of Shinto and with rare exception had eschewed odium theologicum. Not so the Jesuits. It was not surprising that a Buddhist monk should condemn them and their teachings in these terms: ‘Those who adhere to a religion which wants to usurp sovereignty betray their ruler and their obligations to their land. Those who do not venerate their ancestors disregard their parents’ virtue and their debt for their upbringing. Those who do not pray at the gods’ mausolea undercut the customs of the country to which they owe their very lives. Those who love their own religion only to hate strongly those of another faith do not know what the communion of friend and friend means. Those who burn temples and shrines and burn sacred scriptures and images commit actions which damn them to the three realms of suffering . . . . .

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Meanwhile Spanish Franciscans, lacking Jesuit tact, had shown that disunity existed in the Christian camp. The Dutch, with an apparently less subversive version of Christianity, had appeared and encouraged fears of Latin Catholic machinations. They offered the possibility of trade, which it seemed easier to control. For an amalgamation of all these reasons Hideyoshi decided to ban the missionaries and the Tokugawa Shogun to prohibit Christianity altogether and virtually to close the country to all normal relations with the rest of the world. Trade through the Dutch Factory at Deshima in Nagasaki harbour continued and allowed the Tokugawa Shogun to monitor what was afoot in Europe. The persecution of Christians assumed the horrifying proportions we all know. Apostasy was to become the official goal and this was achieved in some notable examples and in particular in the case of Fabian Fucan (Fukansai Habian). He wrote an effective apology for Christianity, which he later revoked and cancelled out with his ‘Deus Destroyed’, which forms the title of George Elison’s book. He gives it in full translation, together with other anti-Christian texts of varying importance. A reading of George Elison’s admirable book leads to the conclusion that the Christian Century came too early to be able to influence Japan profoundly. Firstly, the missionaries were men of the counter-reformation come only to teach and not to learn. They were pre-Copernicans and had not much science to teach in advance of that known to the Chinese, the traditional fount of Japanese learning. Their importance to Japanese history lay in their causing the Tokugawa Shoguns to initiate the policy of Sakoku (seclusion). During the period of seclusion, the Tokugawas achieved a totalitarian state, regulated according to Neo-Confucian precepts, which laid the foundations for Modern Japan. It was a period of inward-looking thought. Aizawa was able to adumbrate the course of mystical nationalism which was to characterize the period before World War II. To quote George Elison: Deus was a sham. But Japan was the Land of the Gods. Irrationality can be a positive element of propaganda, and Aizawa indulged in it freely. The construction of the myth of Japan’s unique sacred character is his most significant contribution to history. The Emperor of Japan and the Divine Progenitrix, Amaterasu Omikami, were consubstantiated. Out of this theory arose the doctrine of the “kokutai”, the mystical body of Japan. Others amended Aizawa’s doctrine to signify that the Japanese Emperor was the supreme and absolute value. This was indeed the unsurpassable symbol: it was divine, natavistic, and familial at once.” Thus it was formally until 1945. The discovery of love, the great contribution of Christianity to Japan was not to come until the nineteenth century. The search for affinities is an even more modern phenomenon, which now continues and gives promise of deeply important results. ‘The Cloud of Unknowing’ and Meister Eckehart point the way. The Christian quest for perfection and the Buddhist approach to enlightenment are seen now as having points of identity. As George Elison quotes: Mahayanist, Taoist and Zen thought are very much [in] accord with the thought of St Thomas on the transcendence of God. The ­Ultimate Reality is incomprehensible, innominable, and ineffable because of its



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transcendence; it is called Nonbeing because of its supra-substantiality. The doctrine of the eminence of the Deity in the Buddhist, Taoist and Zen thought reveals a striking similiarity to the doctrine of the eminence of the Christian Deity in the super-natural order. Alas, the Christian Century came too early for such glimpses of verity. Yet St Francis Xavier has left a continuing resonance, as those who have seen his diminutive corpse at Goa being venerated by vast crowds, only a fraction of whom share the Christian faith, can affirm. The Jesuits live in the decorative patterns of genius they inspired in the prolific screen painters of the period. Perhaps they set the Japanese off on their quest for the new and the strange from beyond China and India, which was three centuries later to become a passion and prove so fruitful We must be thankful to George Elison for a masterly discussion of these deeply significant matters. His original and erudite vocabulary arrests the attention. JOHN PILCHER

APPENDIX VI

An Introduction to Japanese Gardens [Occasional paper/speech – details unknown. Early 1980s?]

Photographs: Courtesy Hugh Cortazzi

J

apan is as much part of the Chinese world as the British Isles are of Europe. Neither can be understood without reference to their wider identity. Their originality exists in the enchanting variations they created on common themes. Both China and Japan are richly flowered botanically, so much so that the Chinese still refer to their country as ‘the central flowery land’. Both are in the northern temperate zone, with cold dry winters and hot damp summers. Before Japan took over Chinese civilization from the seventh century AD onwards, there existed a national cult, which came to be known as Shinto or The Way of the Gods. This is an expression of delight in the beauties of nature, in the existence and achievements of the Japanese race and in the very islands of Japan. Any remarkable phenomenon from a splendid tree to a striking rock, a waterfall to a cliff can be an object of worship. It will have its divinity (kami in Japanese; shin in Sino-Japanese and hsien in Chinese). According to Shinto thought all departed Japanese become kami, while the Emperor is a ‘manifest kami’. Gods and goddesses gave birth to the islands of Japan and the Emperors descend from the Sun Goddess. Her shrine at Ise, to which Emperors and contemporary governments still report, is set in a magnificent natural park, complete with fast-flowing river. Primeval forests tower over the modest but sacrosanct buildings (rebuilt in the original primitive style every twenty years). Again at the shrine at Izumo the park contains a conical hill on which no human foot is reported every to have walked. Both – and thousands of others – retain the numinous quality of the sacred groves of antiquity. Water plays a large part in the lustral rites of Shinto and may account for the Japanese preoccupation with cleanliness. Shinto assumes that man is on a par with nature and thus with stones and plants as well as animals. Nature is therefore respected. Shinto shrines in



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c­ onsequence fit into the landscape, which carries on irrespective of them. That landscape presents a richly beautiful scene; the scented plum and cherries (Prunus x yedoensis) in spring, followed by azaleas, Paulownia and ­magnolias, crowned by maples in autumn, all silhouetted against a background of ­evergreens. There is a feeling that the habits of antiquity are best suited to Shinto worship; they emphasize that Shinto goes back to the mists of antiquity. Thus the shrine buildings represent palaces of early times. Offerings are made on earthenware vessels moulded not on the wheel, but the human elbow. Clean simplicity is the hallmark of Shinto. Even in modern Japan, every skyscraper will have its Shinto shrine (usually on the roof) to the divinities of the place, to which due reverence is paid. Indeed, reverence is what Shinto demands. For centuries (from 575) Shinto was to be overlaid by Buddhism, which brought to Japan a philosophy and beliefs of universal application, as opposed to the local and parochial admonitions of Shinto restricted to Japan. Yet up to the present day most Japanese conceive of themselves as belonging to both Shintoism and Buddhism. Many Japanese think of Shinto as dealing with the affairs of this world; naming and wedding ceremonies belong to its sphere. Death and the world beyond are the province of Buddhism. Shinto ­divinities were accommodated in the vast Buddhist pantheon. The myriad divinities of Shinto were more than counterbalanced by the infinite numbers of those who, having attained enlightenment, become Buddhas. According to Mahayana Buddhism (the Great Vehicle, in which form it reached Japan) every grain of dust could eventually become a Buddha. Buddhism did not change the ­Japanese attitude towards nature. It added importance by suggesting that portions of the departed could combine with fragments of others, who had reached the same degree of spiritual advancement, to constitute, for instance, plants. In theory, therefore, natural objects became worthy of greater consideration. Moreover, Buddhism inculcated the importance of meditation, in harmony with nature, thereby fulfilling the role in Japan played by Taoism in China. In China from very early times hunting parks on a huge scale were considered important supports for the Emperor. In them large lakes or ‘seas’ were considered essential, with islands called after the mythical abodes of the immortals (themselves hsien). There were sundry ‘detached palaces’ for rest and recreation and artificial mountains some hundreds of feet high composed of rare and striking stones. Multitudes toiled at the construction of these parks. Forests in full growth were transplanted into them. The Emperors and their courts were ferried around the lakes with boats with dragon prows. The last spectacular imperial residence and seat of government was constructed by the Ming dynasty in Peking. There the ‘forbidden city’ with its gardens and the remains of the Summer Palace show the genre to perfection, although on a relatively small scale, compared with their predecessors. In China, according to the official Confucian principles, formality surrounded the Emperor and Government. The actual palace itself was therefore constructed on the strictest geometrical principles. In this it outdoes Versailles itself. All buildings face due south and are crowned by vast roofs, the eaves of which exclude the nearly vertical rays of the sun in summer, but permit the lower rays in winter to enter and thus to warm the interior. The evil influences from the North-East are excluded by a five pointed artificial hill. In the Palace presided the Emperor, one of whose main functions was to act as mediator between heaven and earth. He had the mandate of heaven, until

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he was thought to have forfeited it. The great number of subsidiary palaces had each two symmetrically planted cypress trees in front of their main halls. Rocks were treated like abstract sculpture. The Japanese were well aware of these vast parks and palaces which successive dynasties in China created. Envoys actually visited them during their construction. They never copied them in their entirety. Perhaps the Emperors of Japan, secure in their position as descendants of the Sun Goddess, did not feel the need for such architectural and landscape support. Nara was laid out symmetrically on the model of Hsian in 710, but the Japanese probably even then felt more at home with balance than symmetry. For instance the main hall of the Imperial Palace for centuries has been flanked by an orange tree balancing a sweet scented plum (Prunus mume). In China the more poetically inclined mandarins, oppressed by Confucian formality and the burden of the rites and ceremonies, longed to escape to a rustic hermitage in the mountains, there to meditate under Taoist influence upon the transience of all things and the evanescence of existence. There through ‘inactivity’ they might float with the spirit of the universe and like the stream which reaches the sea, however many obstacles lay in the way, they would attain their goal. As only a fortunate few could achieve such an existence (like Po Chu-i) the majority had to make do with a garden within the cramped city walls. There expressive rocks did duty for the wildly-shaped mountains, while miniature trees in perfect proportion represented forests. The scholar’s study in the garden took the place of the rustic hut. Sitting in it, the scholar could imagine himself contemplating wild mountain scenery and floating over forests through caverns measureless to man. Moreover, in landscape paintings (which reached their apogee in the Sung dynasty) it became de rigueur to depict a scholar’s retreat up tortuous mountain paths and beneath huge overhanging crags. Looking at the painting, the scholar could indulge in an imaginary but perfect Fusswanderung. The idea of a hermitage in the mountains appealed equally to the Japanese, while variants of the Chinese scholars’ gardens became the traditional ­Japanese garden. The scholar’s study became the rustic tea ceremony ‘hut’, which took the place of the mountain retreat. Japanese mountains are tamer (though volcanic) than their Chinese equivalents and the plants more verdant, while the ground in favoured spots is covered with a carpet of green cedar moss. Still the scenery behind Nikko, where Lake Chuzenji spills over a cliff and rushes down a wild valley, while a sacred mountain towers overhead, attains truly the proportions of a Sung dynasty landscape. A Buddhist temple, associated with a famous monk, Kukai or Kobo Daishi (died 816), gives a focal point. The monk is credited with the invention of the Kana syllabary of some fifty-one letters; used for grammatical convenience in writing Japanese. The modern road has fifty-one bends and the traveller may recite the syllables as he passes; they form a Buddhist prayer, concerned with illusion or reality. In Nara, which remained the capital of Japan from 710 to 793, Buddhism may have got too much the upper hand. Perhaps for this reason the Emperor Kwammu decided to move the capital, first to Nagaoka and then to what is now Kyoto. According to Shinto, death meant pollution and therefore, on the death of an emperor, there had to be a move to another palace. However, since the construction of Nara on the lines of Chinese capitals, the change to a new city was a more serious undertaking. This time (795) a new capital



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had to be laid out. Chinese geomancy was carefully studied. After a false start at Nagaoka, a plain, protected from evil influences from the North-East by Mount Hiei, sheltered to the west, north and east by mountains, but open to the south, was selected. Mount Hiei was soon to be covered by temples of the Tendai Sect of Buddhism – a further protection. Two rivers flowing from north to south watered it, while a few miles to the south there was a confluence of rivers coming from Arashiyama, Uji and Lake Biwa. There on a gridiron plan based on the T’ang capital Ch’angan, was laid out the new capital of Peace and Tranquility (Heian), later to be known as just Miyako (the capital) or Kyoto (capital of capitals), until in 1868 the ‘restored’ Emperor Meiji moved the capital from Kyoto to Yedo, which was then called Tokyo or ‘eastern capital’. Kyoto became the main scene of action. The site was beautiful. The north/south avenues had canals flowing south and were named; the east/west roads were numbered in words. Contemporary Kyoto, although it has moved towards the east, maintains the same arrangements. The Imperial Palace occupied a central site to the north. Being constructed of wood, the city was much subject to fires. Only few buildings of note escaped the flames. The Imperial Palace was last reconstructed in 1855. Reconstruction, as with the Great Shrines at Ise, was taken for granted. Buddhist temples grew up all round the city on the slopes of the surrounding hills. Heian gave its name to a period of history (795 to 1195) and to a degree of civilization never surpassed in Japan. It was a moment when aesthetics ruled supreme. There have come down two literary works, which give a superb picture of the time, both by ladies of the Court at the beginning of the eleventh century: The Tale of Genji by the Lady Murasaki Shikibu and The Pillow Book of the Lady Sei Shonagon. Both have been translated excellently by Arthur Waley1,  2 and by Ivan Morris.3, 4 In them the reader can see the preoccupation with form and the correct way of doing everything. The Emperor was concerned almost exclusively with the rites and ceremonies. How to turn a correct poem on the right paper was the highest aspiration. Tactful management of love affairs was highly esteemed. It is scarcely surprising that the actual government of the country was neglected by the Court. To be sent as a provincial Governor was considered a disgrace. The standards of Heian were unique and alone satisfied the courtiers. Inevitably there arose hardier persons willing to face up to the rigours of provincial life, who took over the actual ruling of the country in the name of the venerated Emperor. First the Fujiwaras ran Japan (894–1195) and the pattern was repeated again and again. Yoritomo took the capital 300 miles to the North-East to Kamakura, where starker conditions prevailed. The title Shogun or Generalisimo was bestowed by Emperors on their de facto rulers. Dynasties of Shoguns ruled in the name of the Emperor. The Ashikaga Shoguns (1338) returned to Kyoto and created the Muromachi period, in which the taste of Sung China predominated. This ended in devastation and civil war (1500), to be succeeded by Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and then the Tokugawa family until 1867. All this time, however, the prestige of the Emperor, however impoverished, was maintained and ‘Kyoto taste’ was venerated and practised by the Court. It became fashionable for Emperors to abdicate and retire to a temple, which they proceeded to adorn. Sometimes shoguns followed suit. Therefore Kyoto is surrounded by retreats of great beauty, complete with gardens.

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During this long period, Kyoto was the sole centre of intellectual and artistic life. It was there that garden culture was principally practised. There had been gardens in Nara and an Empress is recorded as having a pond garden (circa 610). Stones were arranged in accordance with the latest style in Ch’angan. After the move to Kyoto gardens really started to proliferate. To begin with, the court nobility lived in pavilions of Chinese inspiration known as ‘shinden zukuri’. Each pavilion was a separate entity facing south joined to others by raised, covered passages. Stepping stones (to become a cliché) were a practical necessity. The areas in between, known as ‘tsubo’ (a measure of space) had plants placed by rocks in them to suit the taste of the occupant of the pavilion. The main pavilion fronted onto a lake of a size to permit boating. There were wings, known as Fishing Pavilions to the lake on either side, and a stream wound its way to the lake from the north east and left the lake towards the west. There was a space covered with white sand in front of the main pavilion for functions. One perfect example of this style remains in the Byodo-in or Phoenix Hall at Uji near Kyoto. The main pavilion, however, is occupied by a statue of Amida, Lord of the Western Paradise. Amida, the Lord of Boundless Light (like the personification of Mercy – Kwannon), renounced entry to Nirvana in order to help suffering mankind. All who died steadfast in the faith may be reborn at once into his Western Paradise. Ponds filled with lotus and with islands in them represented his paradise garden and came into fashion during the Fujiwara Period. The lotus rises unsullied above the mire of the pond, like the free spirit above the evil of this world. The original layout at what is now known as the Golden Pavilion is another example.

Byodo-in, Kyoto



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Byodo-in, Kyoto

The outer walls of the pavilions in shinden zukuri had shutters, which could be hooked up. At the right season of the year therefore the occupants could virtually be living in the open air. This suited their concept of harmony with nature. In the fictitious palace occupied by the amorous Prince Genji, each of his lady friends had a tsubo garden planted to suit her choice. Of his mansion the Lady Murasaki writes (Tale of Genji Part III, ‘A Wreath of Cloud’, chapter 3, pages 430–1 and chapter 6 pages 478–9): He effected great improvement in the appearance of the grounds by a judicious handling of knoll and lake, for though such features were already there in abundance, he found it necessary here to cut away a slope, there to dam a stream, that each occupant of the various quarters might look out of her windows upon such a prospect as pleased her best. To the southeast he raised the level of the ground, and on this bank planted a profusion of early flowering trees. At the foot of this slope the lake curved with especial beauty, and in the foreground, just beneath the windows, he planted borders of cinquefoil, of red-plum, cherry, wistaria, kerria, rock-azalea, and other such plants as are at their best in springtime; for he knew that Murasaki [his favourite] was in especial a lover of the spring; while here and there, in places where they would not obstruct his main plan, autumn beds were cleverly interwoven with the rest. Towards the end of the third month [then April], when out in the country the orchards were no longer at their best and the song of the wild bird had lost its first freshness, Murasaki’s Spring Garden seemed only to become every day more enchanting. The little wood on the hill beyond the lake, and the bridge that joined the two gardens, the mossy banks that seemed to grow greener

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not every day but every hour – could anything have looked more tempting? ‘If only one could get there!’ sighed the young people of the household; and at last Genji decided that there must be boats on the lake. They were built in the Chinese style. Everyone was in such a hurry to get on board that very little time was spent in decorating them, and they were put into use almost as soon as they could float. It was possible to go by water all the way to the Spring Garden, first rowing along the Southern Lake, then passing through a narrow channel straight towards a toy mountain which seemed to bar all further progress. But in reality there was a way round, and eventually the party found itself at the Fishing Pavilion (on the main lake). Here they picked up Murasaki’s ladies, who were waiting at the Pavilion by appointment. The Lake, as they now put out towards the middle of it, seemed immensely large, and those on board, to whom the whole experience was new and deliciously exciting, could hardly believe that they were not heading for some undiscovered land. At last, however, the rowers brought them close in under the rocky bank of the channel between the two large islands, and on closer examination they discovered to their delight that the shape of every little ledge and crag of stone had been as carefully devised as if a painter had traced them with his brush. Here and there in the distance the topmost boughs of an orchard showed above the mist, so heavily laden with blossom that it looked as though a bright carpet were spread in mid-air. Far away they could just catch sight of Murasaki’s apartments, marked by the deeper green of the willow boughs that swept her courtyards, and by the shimmer of her flower-

Kinkaku-ji, Kyoto



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ing orchards, which even at this distance seemed to shed their fragrance amid the isles and rocks. In the world outside the cherry blossom was almost over; but here it seemed to laugh at decay, and round the Palace even the wistaria that ran along the covered alley ways and porticos was all in bloom, but not a flower past its best; while here, where the boats were tied, mountain kerria poured its yellow blossom over the rocky cliffs in a torrent of colour that was mirrored in the waters of the lake below. Only remnants of these cheerful delights are to be discovered to-day. The Saga Detached Palace (also known as the Daikaku-ji), though reconstructed, gives an idea of what living in shinden-zukuri-style entailed. Its pond, the ­Osawa-ike, remains nearly intact, with some indication of its islands of the immortals and its waterfall. The cheer, so evident from Lady Murasaki’s description, has gone from it. That is even more true of the sole surviving pond of the Divine Spring Garden (Shinsen-in) of the original Imperial Palace. The Saiho-ji (better known as the Moss Temple or Koke-dera) has been through vicissitudes, but remains substantially intact. It was a paradise garden and continues a very perfect homage to nature. Its carpet of more than forty kinds of moss and its apparently unstudied planting of trees make it a delight, to which its dry stream and sophisticated rockwork compel surprised admiration. It should be seen during the rainy season (May to August) when its mosses take on a rich green colour. Moss requires careful cultivation and must not be trodden on. It is covered with pine needles to protect it from frost. The Moss Temple was probably originally laid out by Chinese or Korean workmen. Later it became a Zen sanctuary.

Kinkaku-ji, Kyoto

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Saiho-ji, Kyoto

Saiho-ji, Kyoto



An Introduction to Japanese Gardens407

Nearby the Tenryu-ji shows the influence of the Northern Sung dynasty. Here rocks are used to create an illusion of mountains in perhaps some bow to the great park at Kalfang (Ken Yu). The arrangements of the boulders are subtle and discreet and the stonework round the bridge is particularly worthy of note. Like most of the temples round Kyoto it served as a background for an Empress and an Emperor. The Ashikaga shoguns in retirement showed excellent taste. Ashikaga ­Yoshimibu added a pavilion of Chinese inspiration which gave its name to the paradise garden of the Saion-ji family. As the Golden Pavilion it survived three hundred turbulent years, only to be burnt down by a deranged novice monk after the Second World War. The lake was designed for use and the scene should be seen from a boat slowly. The last of the Ashikaga Shoguns (Ashikaga Yoshimasa) set about the creation of the Silver Pavilion to the East of the city (begun 1466). The site was beautiful, bounded by a mountain, but it was on a smaller scale. The pond had a complicated outline and there are classical allusions to the features. There are two emplacements of the white sand, one forming a broad version of Mount Fuji and connected with moon viewing and the other a raised and patterned bed. Time seems to have increased their scale, but their true significance – other than whim – is not known. Alongside the main hall is the tea ceremony room of Soami (1472–1523), where the shogun abdicant must have spent many hours. Its restraint and astringent taste were the beginning of a new era in Japanese art, which the success of Zen brought about.

Ginkaku-ji, Kyoto

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Ginkaku-ji, Kyoto

Zen (Chen in Chinese) was a latecomer to the Buddhist scene. It was supposedly brought to China by an Indian priest called Bodhidarma. He taught that the scriptures were of little avail; only by searching his own interior could man find enlightenment. Self-reliance, as opposed to reliance upon others (for instance). Meditation could lead to enlightenment (satori). Perhaps the anti-intellectual nature of Zen appealed to the military mind. Bodhidarma is reputed to have meditated in front of a blank wall for seven years until his legs dropped off (he is now represented as the head that bounces back, known as a toy called Daruma to all Japanese schoolchildren). The T’ang Emperor is said to have visited him to ask him what is the truth? Bodhidarma without turning round wrote in the sand the two characters ‘not know’. In temples there are usually scrolls of the two mad monks (in Japanese Kanzan and Jitoku), both drunk; one mocking the scriptures and the other sweeping away rubbish. With the advance of Zen came the cult of the Way of Tea and this in turn exercised a profound influence on Japanese taste. The tea ceremony room or hut came to be a rustic edifice nine foot square (four and a half Japanese mats). It combined the functions of the Chinese scholar’s study, so important in Chinese gardens, and the mountain retreat, which many aspired to possess. It must above all be simple and rustic. It should be to a man, what a nest is to a bird. There in its natural coloured interior, where nothing jars, five friends should be able to meet and take a ceremonial bowl of tea, before discussing works of art. In the contemporary world this is like a psychological cold bath. For those who have room, the tea ceremony hut should be approached by a separate path through a quiet garden of evergreens. There should be an outside waiting room, where the visitors can discard their



An Introduction to Japanese Gardens409

cares, and a stone basin to wash away impurities. These requirements brought a sobriety far removed from the Heian taste into Japanese gardens. Seen thus, the Way of Tea is in harmony with the Taoist and Zen ‘Ways’. Since Kamakura days, the military had introduced rougher habits. Gone were the colourful Heian gardens in favour of evergreens, rocks and stepping stones. A garden, it was considered, should be beautiful at all seasons and not dependent on the flowering habits of plants. Azaleas were pruned ruthlessly to look like green boulders, until they burst into flower. Thus camellias were permissible, but not roses, which are a sorry sight when not in flower. Somewhat irrationally tree peonies in raised stone beds were allowed, as were the rather untidy Platycodon grandiflorus. Even chrysanthemums (the national flower) are reared in pots out of sight and placed strategically in the garden, when in flower. This does not prevent temples making a speciality of ‘grass flowers’ (herbaceous plants); one has a pink of unrivalled beauty and the famous Hase-dera (a scenic spot near Nara enjoyed from the earliest times) cultivates numerous kinds of tree peonies. The monks even contrive, using oiled paper coifs, to induce some to come out in the snow. This is a sight to be enjoyed with the accompaniment of ‘sake’ (rice wine). Camellias out in the snow are similarly venerated. The fallen flowers make coloured patterns in the snow on the ground. Shinden-zukuri were now a thing of the past. The age of the shoin began and continues to the present day. The shoin is virtually a built-in deck looking through shutters onto the garden. With it goes the tokonoma or alcove, originally used for a Buddhist statue, but later to display a painting or pot or a flower arrangement. The scale of shoin-zukuri became smaller. Matting (tatami) came to cover all rooms where people sit. The main room of the house would face south as before, but the garden would be designed as a picture to be seen from inside independent positions. Indeed, a person actually walking in the garden would be out of scale and probably destroy some subtle false perspective. Stroll gardens became a hangover from more spacious times. The Japanese house as we now know it started to come into being with the creation of the Silver Pavilion tea house. Imperial gardens on a certain scale were created. The Shugaku-in north-east of Kyoto is on a European scale and contains a variety of structures. It was used for recreation by the Emperor Gomizunoo. It is beautifully set and the surrounding hills form a huge borrowed landscape. The view of the lake with its bridge is particularly successful. The garden of the Sento Palace (the Palace of the Emperor Abdicant) within the Imperial Palace in Kyoto is a large stroll garden, the main feature of which is the beach of pebbles and the wistaria, which envelopes a covered bridge. Most successful of all, as described by the Lady Murasaki, is the Katsura Detached Palace. This was created on the site of an old garden near the Kaburayama River south of Kyoto by an Imperial Prince (Toshihito) in 1620. It is a self-contained entity, hidden from the outside world. Every detail has been endlessly considered. The right angle bends mean that the visitor soon feels he has entered another world. Stepping stones for the Imperial Palanquin with cedar moss in between set the stage for the wonderfully functional interior. Built-in cupboards, exquisite fingerplates to the doors, charmingly organized plumbing, everything blends in to a harmonious whole. There is a stand for moon viewing, but the intricacies of the garden design invite to a stroll. No Chinese things adorn the garden, but

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Shugaku-in, Kyoto

Sento-Gosho, Kyoto



An Introduction to Japanese Gardens411

Katsura Detached Palace, Kyoto

tea ceremony rooms and a Buddhist temple. The lake is more complicated than its Heian predecessors would have been. There are more imaginative details, such as headlands with a stone lantern like a lighthouse at the end. Although elaborate, the Palace is in perfectly astringent taste and must be considered the last word in Japanese domestic architecture. If taste moved away from show and splendour, the newly arrived military men had their moment of glory, not to say vulgar display. Their castles were picturesque enough and their interiors were gorgeously decorated by sliding screens painted by artists of the Kano School. The Castle in the Second Ward or Nijo-jo in Kyoto is an excellent example of this. Its garden suits the style. Hideyoshi’s Peach Mountain (Momoyama) Palace set a voluptuous tone. Portions of it remain and in front of one of them, given to the Nishi Hongwanji Temple in Kyoto, is the Tiger Glen (Kokei) stone garden. Here on a Chinese scale great rocks suggest a mountainous scene, from which emerges a river of white sand. We are back here to the Sung Dynasty landscape painters. Again Hideyoshi for tea ceremony entertainment set about embellishing the garden of the Sambo-in Temple in the Daigo-ji east of Kyoto with an army of stones. His petromania vies with that of the Chinese Emperor Hui-tsung. The result is surprisingly satisfactory and produces a restful and festive appearance. Hideyoshi’s adventure to Korea led to the import of stone lanterns, which became antiquities. More interesting are the developments inside the Mountains of Zen. These agglomerations of temples recall the Oxbridge pattern. Each has communal buildings: a ceremonial gateway of considerable scale; then follow halls for images, for instruction and for meditation. The main mansion is that of the

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THE GROWING POWER OF JAPAN, 1967–1972

Daisen-in, Kyoto

Konchi-in, Kyoto



An Introduction to Japanese Gardens413

Konchi-in, Kyoto

Arch-Abbot. But in addition there are an indefinite number of subsidiary temples (like Oxbridge colleges) occupied by an Abbot and a few disciples each. It is among the subsidiary temples that some of the most lovely and imaginative gardens can be found. In the Daitoku-ji, north of Kyoto, is the Daisen-in with its glorious rockwork in the Sung landscape tradition. A stream of white sand issues from these surprisingly realistic mountains, flows under a bridge past a stone like a junk and emerges into the garden of plain sand in front of the main hall of the temple. This sermon in stones can be read as the journey through life until Nirvana is attained. Other subsidiary temples offer a wide variety of charms. The Ryoko-in has an elegant doorway opening into a romantic path, lined with pine trees, until a right-angled turn takes the visitor into a different world. The temple buildings look onto a charming but slightly dark garden; suddenly there is a low doorway, on the other side of which lies a courtyard with stepping stones, white sand, all in dazzling light. The Myoshin-ji is the most complete of the Zen enclaves and the Nanzen-ji contains gems of great beauty in the garden of the Arch-Abbot’s lodging and in the lovely Konchi-in. The most famous of Zen gardens is, of course, the Ryoan-ji, on its own behind a Heian lake to the north of Kyoto. This needs careful analysis. It is called the Garden of Crossing Tiger Cubs. It consists of five cunningly placed groups of not very remarkable stones, which have a little moss at their bases. They could be islands in a tranquil sea or, as the Arch-Abbot of a neighbouring temple maintains, peaks of consciousness in the sub-conscious..... The visitor to its peaceful beauty could exclaim with Saigyo Hoshi (1115–1190) as translated by Arthur Waley5: ‘Since I am convinced that Reality is in no sense Real, how can I admit that dreams are dreams.’

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Ryoan-ji, Kyoto

NOTES Waley, Arthur (1926) The Tale of Genji by Lady Murasaki. Rothwell & Dunworth, Dulverton, UK. 2  Waley, Arthur (1928) The Pillow-Book of Sei Shonagon. George Allen and Unwin, London. 3  Morris, Ivan (1971) The Tale of Genji by Lady Murasaki. Kodansha International Ltd, Japan and California. 4  Morris, Ivan (1967) The Pillow-Book of Sei Shonagon. Oxford University Press, London. 5  Waley, Arthur (1919) Japanese Poetry the ‘Uta’. Oxford University Press, London. 1 

INDEX

Abraham, Jimmy (naval attaché), 376 Acheson, Dean, 145 Adenauer, Dr, 21 Afghanistan, King and Queen of (State Visit), 150 Africa, 13, 18, 164, 168, 174, 342 Agano River, 294 Agency of Environment Protection, 227 agricultural development, 12, 14, 15 Aichi Kiichi, 76, 77, 78, 79, 144, 148, 152, 276 aid, 9, 51, 87, 145, 147, 185, 200, 304, 354, 359, 362 bilateral, 10 development, 6 economic, 9–19, 24 foreign, 358 air crash, 86, 293, 300 Akagi, Mr, 277, 291 Alexandra, Princess, 247 Amaterasu Omikami (Divine Progenitrix), 384, 396 American continent, 58, 164 American culture, 92, 127 American defence umbrella, 82, 145 American Embassy, 38, 39, 295 American Protectionist moves, 25, 187, 195, 197 American Security Treaty, 6, 281 American Shogun, 213 Amida (‘The Lord of the Western Paradise’), 238, 385, 402 Amsterdam, 272 Anchorage, 269, 273 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 7, 84, 279, 281, 290 Anglo-Japanese Civil Aviation Talks (London), 28, 30

Anglo-Japanese Commercial Negotiations (London), 28, 35 Anglo-Japanese friendship, 367 Anglo-Japanese ministerial consultations, 34, 78, 84 Anglo-Japanese relations, 23, 27, 110, 114, 144, 148, 360, 372, 377 Anglo-Japanese trade, 26, 148 Anglo/Japanese trade talks, 86, 231 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, 63, 148 Anne, Princess, 268 Anti-War Day, 87, 152 Antwerp, 8, 270 Arab/Israel War, 5 Arashiyama, 401 Arbour Day Festival, 255, 256 arranged marriage, 127, 180 ASEAN, 10, 15 Ashikaga Shogunate, 394 Ashikaga Shoguns, 407 Ashikaga Yoshimasa, 407 ‘Asia for the Asiatics’, 43, 44, 45 Asian Affairs Research Council, 34, 35 Asian Development Bank, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 ‘Asian Pacific’, 15 Aso, Mrs, 21 ASPAC, 150 ‘Association of Comrades for Overthrowing the Security Treaty System, 67 atomic bomb, 38, 51, 72, 167, 212, 248 atomic energy, 85, 113, 321 Atomic Energy Commission, 277 atomic experiments, 281 atomic weapons, 213, 214, 216 ‘attack unit’ (totsuge-kitai), 98

416 INDEX

Australasia, 164, 168 Australia, 29, 62, 164, 174, 189, 254, 333, 342 Australians, 116, 161, 329 Austria, 85, 217, 367, 373, 379 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 169 Automobile Industry, 295, 310, 311 automobiles, 24, 172, 189, 190, 196, 309, 310 Avalokitesvara, 385 azaleas, 399, 409 B-52 bomber, 149 B-52 bomber explosion, 87 BAC, 333, 334, 336 bacteriological warfare, 52 Baibakov, Mr (Soviet Deputy Prime Minister), 85 balance of payments, 17, 24, 60, 63, 72, 116, 144, 146, 171, 173, 174, 189, 197, 341, 342 balance of payments crises, 59, 194 Balfour, Jock, 372 Bangkok, 204 Bank of Japan, 84, 87 banking, 15, 27, 62 ‘Barbarian Subduing Generalissimi’, 385 Barca, Calderon de la, 387, 393 bar-hostess, 127, 128 baseball, 179 Basho, 44, 48 Bath, 367, 379 bath (room) (house), 140, 237, 257, 370, 391, 408 BBC Television, 261 Beatles, 20 Beethoven, 253 Belcher, R. H. (Minister of Overseas Development), 28 Belgians, King and Queen of the, 270 Belgium, 163, 251, 266 Bell, Raymond (UK Treasury), 374 Belloc, Hilaire, 245 ‘Big Sciences’, 101, 102 bilateral aid, 10, 11 bilateral assistance, 9, 11, 16 bilateral loans, 11, 16 bilateral problems, 148 bilateral trade, 35, 170, 174, 198, 356, 359 bilateral treaties, 50 Bismarck, 280

Biwa, Lake, 401 ‘Black Ships’, 280 Blacker, Carmen, 376, 386 Blake, William, 369 blue-collar workers, 106 BNEC (British National Export Council), 63, 83, 111, 116 Board of Trade, 63, 83, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 148, 151, 359 Bodhidarma, 408 Bodhisattva, 325, 385 Bodhisattva (saint) Amida, 238 Bonin Islands, 7, 23, 25, 30, 50, 80, 83, 86 Bonn, 272, 273 bonsai, 122, 390 Bottomley, MP, Rt. Hon. Arthur, 20, 22, 30 Brandt, Herr Willi (West German Foreign Minister), 28, 273 Bream, Julian, 113 Britain, 10, 18, 19, 27, 35, 42, 59, 60, 61, 63, 96, 100, 103, 104, 107, 111, 112, 114, 116, 123, 133, 138, 139, 140, 144, 145, 147, 148, 161, 162, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 182, 188, 195, 225, 251, 254, 265, 267, 268, 286, 288, 289, 290, 309, 310, 341, 342, 350, 357, 358, 360, 361, 371, 373, 374, 376 British aero-space achievements, 356 British aerospace industry, 30 British Chamber of Commerce, 359 British Council, 27, 111, 112, 327, 368 British exports, 23, 26, 59, 62, 80, 113, 115, 116, 135, 147, 173, 174 British hi-fi equipment, 113 British Isles, 286, 398 British Museum (Natural History), 272 British Pharmaceutical Mission, 28 British policy, 4, 7, 35, 360 British Royal Family, 247, 248, 266 British Trade Centre, 359 British Week, 49, 63, 64, 80, 83, 84, 85, 110–17, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 154, 155, 230, 374, 375 Bromley, Tom, 368 Brown, George, 33, 84, 372, 375 Brown, Mrs, 33, 34, 36, 110, 372, 375 Brown, Sir Max (permanent secretary Board of Trade), 359 Brussels, 204, 270 Brympton d’Evercy (Yeovil), 370, 381



INDEX417

Buckingham Palace, 271, 272 Buddhist cosmos, 56 Budokan, 114 ‘Bullet’ express train, 36, 44 Bullet Train, 202 bushido, 121, 223, 226, 315 busoˉ toˉsoˉ (armed struggle), 98 Butterfly, Madame, 280, 284 Byodo-in, 402, 403 Caccia, Harold (Permanent UnderSecretary), 373 Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri (Foreign Minister of Turkey), 149 Calder Hall, 321 California, 343 Cambodia, 14, 33, 35, 224, 229 Cambridge, 367, 368, 376 camellias, 390, 391, 409 Canada, 150, 168, 343 Canadian, 159, 161, 162, 229 Canberra Univerity, 254 Canton Trade Fair, 291 capital liberalization programme, 27, 102, 168, 195, 196 Carrillo, Sr Antonio (Foreign Minister of Mexico), 87 Carrington, Lord, 227 cars, 101, 137, 139, 187, 189 Carver, Sir Michael, 73, 87 Castle in the Second Ward, 411 ‘Catalpa Bow’, 386 Central Education Advisory Council, 277 Central Office of Information, 114, 161 Ceylon, 28 Ceylonese, 162 Chang’an, 378, 384 Charleroi, 270 Charles, Prince, 376 Charles I, 263 Che Guevara, 93 Cheke, Mr, 56 Chelsea, 371 Chelsea Flower Show, 390 chemicals, 172, 190, 309, 310, 354 Cheops, pyramid of, 322 cherries, 399 Chesterfield, Lord, 121 Chichibu, Princess, 21, 34, 117, 254, 259, 361, 363, 373

China, 6, 23, 25, 26, 44, 45, 48, 57, 68, 71, 72, 73, 82, 85, 87, 97, 144, 146, 152, 153, 154, 213, 216, 220, 221, 255, 269, 276, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 299, 301, 303, 312, 313, 317, 318, 319, 328, 338, 341, 344, 345, 347, 349, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360, 380, 389 People’s Republic of, 361 pre-Communist, 238, 239, 240, 383, 384, 385, 388, 390, 394, 397, 398, 399, 400, 408 China/Japan Friendship Association, 293 Chinese threat, 184 Chobyo Yara (Chief Executive of Okinawa), 87, 278 Chou En-lai, 296, 354 Christian, 46, 103, 200, 235, 240, 241, 379, 380, 386, 395, 396, 397 Christian Century in Japan, 394 Christianity, 168, 183, 235, 238, 240, 383, 386, 394, 395, 396 chrysanthemums, 20, 21, 390, 409 Chrysler Corporation, 150 Churchill, Sir Winston, 21, 319 Chu ˉ  zenji, 376 Chuzenji, Lake, 400 City of London, 116, 271, 342 civil aviation, 23, 27, 62 Civil Liberties Commissions, 123 Civil Rights Bill, 124 Civil Service, 96, 176, 181, 184 Clare College (Cambridge), 367 Clarence House, 271 Claridges, 272 Clarke, Ashley, 368 Clean Government Party, 54, 56, 230 Clive, Sir Robert, 368 ‘Cloud of Unknowing, The’, 325, 396 COCOM, 102, 151 COI, 110 Cologne, 273 Common Market, 148, 177, 186, 225, 231, 283, 286, 289 Commonwealth, 22 Communist China, 6, 16, 28, 169, 184, 225, 226, 229, 230, 285, 286, 339, 358 Concorde, 333–6, 359, 376 Confederation of Labour (Do ˉ mei), 68, 296

418 INDEX

Confucian, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 72, 99, 103, 120, 160, 165, 181, 183, 239, 241, 244, 312, 314, 316, 323, 383, 386, 399, 400 Confucianism, 238, 239, 240, 369, 382, 388, 421 neo-Confucianism, 395, 396 Connally, Mr (Secretary of the United States Treasury), 295 Copenhagen, 195, 269, 270 Co-prosperity Sphere, 44, 48 Corfield, Right Hon. Frederick, 295 Cortazzi, Hugh (Commercial Counsellor), 177, 200 Court Music and Dance, 362 Couve de Murville, M. (French Foreign Minister), 30 Cradock, Percy (Planning Staff, FCO), 221 Craigie, Robert, 369 crime figures, 139 crimes of violence, 5 Cronin, MP, John, 150 Crosland, Anthony, 115, 144, 148 Crown Prince, 21, 28, 150, 160, 249, 253, 257, 258, 259, 268 Crown Princess, 21, 28, 150, 249, 253, 257 Cudlipp, Reginald, 108 ‘Cultural Festival’, 56 Cultural Revolution, 25 Czechoslovakia, 68, 69, 82, 87 Daikaku-ji, 405 Daily Express, 115 daimyo, 122, 240, 250, 315, 394 Daisen-in, 412 Daitoku-ji, 413 dansonjohi (man-noble-woman-base), 122 Daruma, 408 Davies, Mr (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry), 334, 335, 359 De Havilland Dove, 373 Defence Agency, 51, 52, 73, 165, 167, 185, 210, 217, 220, 274, 277, 293, 296, 300, 302 Defence Budget, 61, 301 defence expenditure, 59, 61, 153, 287 Defence Manufacturing Industry, 299 democracy, 23, 26, 46, 92, 182, 321, 326

Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 26, 28, 40, 41, 65, 67, 68, 149, 290, 292, 293, 295, 296 demographic trends, 118 Dening, Sir Esler, 4 Denmark, 150, 267 Denmark, King and Queen of, 269 Department of Telecommunicatons, 208 depopulation, 132, 137 Desai, Mr (Indian Deputy Prime Minister), 29 Deshima, 396 Deutschemark, 171 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 11 Devonshire HMS, 85 diet (food), 139, 167, 179, 203 Diet, The, 26, 28, 39, 40, 41, 56, 57, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 78, 83, 85, 92, 123, 149, 151, 152, 227, 242, 244, 245, 246, 255, 259, 266, 275, 277, 281, 287, 290, 295, 296, 303, 322, 325, 337, 339, 354, 376 Dietmen’s League for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relation with China, 295 Divine Spring Garden (Shinsen-in), 405 divorce, 120, 123, 254 Djakarta Conference on Cambodia, 224, 229 ‘dollar shock’, 288, 301, 347 Dore, Ron, 371 Douglas, Norman, 371 Dow Jones Index, 87 Druids, 383 Durrell, Lawrence, 115 Dutch, 119, 214, 268, 313, 395 Dutch Factory, 396 East Asian region, 13, 14 East Europe, 67 Eastern Army, 226 Eastern Siberia, 359 Eban, Mr (Israeli Foreign Minister), 28 ECAFE, 15, 16, 18, 28 Economic and Social Development Plan (1970–75), 170, 171, 173 ‘economic animal’, 132, 133, 206, 312, 316 ‘economic man’, 212, 223, 224–32, 245, 250, 312, 315, 316, 317



INDEX419

Economic Planning Agency, 60, 78, 133, 134, 189, 292, 307 economic recession, 310 economic recovery, 3, 4, 75, 211, 213 economic strength, 3, 5, 6, 24, 145, 169, 171, 183 economic success, 43, 47, 59–64, 71, 72, 100, 133, 136, 165, 177, 182, 186, 192, 193, 224, 225, 308, 312, 316, 328, 388–93 ‘economic way’, 214, 282, 286, 312, 315–16, 317, 321, 326 Economist, The, 171 Eda Saburo, 66 Eden, Anthony, 372 education, 47, 59, 61, 116, 118, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 136, 140, 166, 168, 179, 180, 181, 182, 203, 205, 228, 239, 308 educational system, 59, 181, 267, 315 Edward Prince of Wales, 247, 251, 262 EEC, 169, 172, 196, 198, 342, 343 EFTA, 48 electric power stations, 318 Electronics Symposium (Kyoto), 29 Eliot, Sir Charles, 323, 328 Elison, George, 394, 395, 396, 397 Elliott, Mark, 55, 92, 133 Emperor of China, 235, 255 Emperor-centric State, 236, 242, 251, 280, 281 Empire of Alexander the Great in India, 263 Empire of the Gods, 267, 280, 281, 287, 322, 326 enfranchisement of women, 123 English language, 11, 209, 253, 327 Environment Agency, 274, 278 environment deterioration, 191 ‘environmental factors’, 138 Esaki Masumi, 300 Europe, 12, 35, 58, 60, 102, 140, 145, 164, 165, 170, 174, 181, 198, 227, 228, 252, 254, 261, 262, 265, 266, 279, 286, 288, 289, 294, 295, 304, 306, 307, 310, 314, 318, 319, 322, 342, 354, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 378, 388, 396, 398 European Community, 169, 356, 357, 358, 360, 361 European food, 203

exports, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 26, 60, 72, 82, 83, 110, 146, 147, 150, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 181, 187–91, 197, 217, 225, 229, 231, 279, 282, 287, 289, 291, 292, 295, 302, 304, 306, 311, 319, 326, 328, 341, 342, 343, 349, 357, 359 Fair Trade Commission, 149, 152 Fascism, 54, 58, 74 Fearless HMS, 113, 151 Federation of Economic Organizations, 361, 363 female workers, 309 Figgess, John (Information Counsellor), 24, 375 Filipino, 73, 317 Finance Ministry, 10, 15, 17, 18, 78 financial sanctions, 5, 128 Financial Times, The, 77, 81, 116 ‘First Aid unit’ (kyu ˉ  entai), 98 First Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference, 29 First World War, 48, 177, 242 fish, 139, 179, 372 raw, 34, 36, 203, 237, 390 fishing, 50, 51, 125, 277, 291 Five-year Plan, 60 Foreign Correspondents’ Club, 34, 35, 363 foreign policy, 71, 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, 84, 146, 164, 168, 169, 185, 211, 213, 217, 339, 345, 347, 349, 351, 353 Foreign Press Club, 226 Formosa, 80, 82 Four-Power Talks (Geneva), 195 Fourth Defence Build-up Plan, 167, 216, 292, 301 Fourth Defence Programme, 155 France, 140, 141, 152, 195, 225, 329, 382 Franco, General, 326, 372 Franco-Prussian War, 280 Fredensborg Palace, 269 Free World, 3, 6, 7, 17, 287 French, 78, 85, 161, 162, 188, 203, 210, 227, 254, 280, 389 French language, 253, 367, 369, 380 fringe benefits, 60, 104, 106, 107, 308 Fucan, Fabian (Fukansai Habian), 396 Fuji Iron and Steel, 149 Fuji Mount, 55, 205, 293, 407

420 INDEX

Fujitsu, 295 Fujiwara Period, 401, 402 Fujiyama Aiichiro, 291 Fukansai Habian, 396 Fukuda Takeo, 25, 41, 52, 76, 77, 78, 79, 194, 274, 276, 277, 278, 283, 288, 317, 319, 345, 347, 348, 353, 354 Fukuoka, 52, 86 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 124 fusuma, 389, 392 Gagaku music, 357 Gaimusho, 127 Gandhi, Indira (Prime Minister of India), 150, 289 Garden of Crossing Tiger Cubs, 413 gardens, 36, 137, 161, 162, 166, 179, 228, 256, 318, 325, 369, 379, 380, 389, 390, 392, 398–414 GATT, 193, 195, 359, 361 Gaulle, General de, 48, 94 Gautama Sakyamuni, 55, 238, 384, 385 GEC, 207 Geisha, 115, 118, 127, 128, 180, 357 General Assembly, 5, 294 General Motors, 293 Geneva, 195, 272 Genro (‘Elder Statesmen’), 242, 258 George V, King, 247, 251, 262 German language, 367 Germany, 6, 59, 62, 266, 267, 272, 273 Gilbert, W. S., 241 Ginkaku-ji, 407, 408 Ginza, 111, 118, 131, 180, 375 Gleichschaltung, 122 Goa, 395, 396 God, 238, 325, 383, 386, 395, 396 ‘gohei’, 382 Golden Hall, 384 Golden Pavilion, 402, 407 golf, 45, 93, 98, 179, 208, 343, 345, 349, 369 Gomizunoo, Emperor, 409 Goodison, R. R., 30 Gorer, Geoffrey, 205 Gotterdammerung, 258 Governmental Women’s Bureau, 123 Graham, Billy, 20 Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, 376 Grant, Anthony, 290

Great Earthquake (Yokohama, 1923), 124, 327, 375 Greater Co-prosperity Sphere, 208 ‘Greater Learning for Women, The’, 120, 124 Gross National Product (GNP), 9, 13, 16, 29, 35, 59, 60, 81, 133, 134, 138, 147, 153, 154, 164, 165, 170, 171, 172, 178, 183, 185, 188, 189, 193, 202, 213, 225, 228, 231, 285, 286, 292, 301, 312, 315, 316, 317, 319, 321, 339, 359 Guardian, The, 108 Guest, Melville (Second Secretary), 250 Guildhall (City of London), 271 gunboat diplomacy, 216 Habomai, 165 Hague, The, 272 ‘haiku’, 44 Hall of Dreams, 20 Hall of the Martial Arts, 20 Hamada Sho ˉ ji, 369 Hampton Court Palace, 271 Haneda (Airport), 26, 334 Hapsburg dynasty, 239 Harden, Dr (London Museum), 112 Harris, Townsend, 280 Harrods, 47 Hartling, Paul (Foreign Minister of Denmark), 150 Hasluck, Mr (Australian Foreign Minister), 28 Hawaii, 40 Hayakawa, 94 Hayama, 252 Heads of Misssion Conference, 6, 21 health, 40, 133, 137, 139, 214 health and welfare, 24 Health Insurance, 26, 151, 277 Hearn, Lafcadio, 119, 322, 323 Heath, MP, Right Hon. Edward (Prime Minister), 335, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363 Heathrow Airport, 272 heavy engineering, 187, 190 Heian period, 250, 384, 401, 409, 411, 413 Heinemann, Mrs (wife of the President of the Republic of Germany), 272 Heisei Emperor Akihito, 376



INDEX421

Heiwa Doshikai (Peace Comrades Society), 66, 67 herbaceous plants, 409 Hideyoshi, 394, 395, 396, 401, 411 Hiei Mount, 393, 401 Hieizan, 395 Hieizan (mountain), 384 higher education, 61, 106, 123, 126, 139, 140 Himalayas, 162 hiragana, 314 Hiraizumi, 44 Hiraizumi, Mr, 277 Hirohito of Japan, Emperor, 252, 376 Hiroshima, 38, 98, 184, 213, 256 Hitachi, 197, 207, 295, 343 Hitachi, Prince, 21, 254, 259 Hokkaido, 127, 254, 256, 293 Holland, 267 Holy of Holies, 237, 322 Holy sites, 393 homo nipponious, 201, 202 Honda, 167 Honen Shonin, 385 Hong Kong, 162, 163, 199, 204, 342, 359, 362, 376 Honganji addicts, 395 Hori Shigeru, 77, 78, 276, 278, 296 Horyuji Temple (Nara), 20, 384 Ho ˉ sei University, 96 Hotchen, Mr (First Secretary, Atomic Energy), 113 House of Commons, 263 House of Councillors, 52, 56, 66, 67, 151, 292 House of Representatives, 67, 77, 78, 151, 214, 246, 346 housing, 47, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 173, 176, 178, 179, 192, 193, 286, 304, 307, 308, 317, 326, 338 Hui-tsung, Chinese Emperor, 411 Hutungs of Peking, 228 hyper-nationalism, 75 hyper-patriotism, 240, 303 IAEA, 152 Ibsen, 124 Ichikawa Fusae, 124 ICI, 103 IDA, 12, 15, 19 Idzumo, 382

Ifield, Frank, 113 Ikebukuro, 111 Ikeda Daisaku, 56 Ikeda Hayato, 54, 56, 58, 77, 86, 87, 338, 347 IMF, 188, 193, 195 Imperial Family, 20, 21, 43, 48, 114, 117, 176, 181, 235, 237, 251, 254, 257, 258, 259, 263, 266, 363, 388 Imperial House Council, 258–9 Imperial House Law, 245, 246, 258 Imperial Household, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254, 255, 257, 258, 262 Imperial Household Agency, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 258–9, 261, 266, 267 Imperial Household Agency Law, 258 Imperial Household Ministry, 258 Imperial Messenger, 322 Imperial Palace, 238, 239, 252, 256, 268, 318, 361, 392, 400, 401, 405, 409 Imperial Palanquin, 409 Imperial Poetry Party, 249, 256 Imperial Rescript, 236, 243 Imperial State Visit to Europe, 261 Imperial Throne, 245 import controls, 174 import quotas, 189, 190, 192 imports liberalized, 88, 195, 225, 283, 290, 292, 295 imports from Japan, 9, 74, 188, 189, 230, 295, 311, 316, 343, 356, 372 imports into Japan, 5, 13, 26, 62, 63, 73, 82, 83, 116, 147, 170, 171, 172, 174, 188, 189, 190, 198, 217, 319, 328, 359 imports of Japanese goods, 9, 372 Inari (shrines), 237, 385 Income average, 306, 339 India, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 55, 150, 168, 189, 263, 286, 394, 397 Indian Ocean, 73, 82, 168, 289 Indian sub-continent, 9, 14, 19 Indonesia, 14, 16, 29, 51, 85, 168, 190 Indo-Pakistani conflict, 289 industrial accidents, 139 industrial achievements, 24 industrial development, 9, 10, 34, 44 industrial disputes, 194 industrial powers, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 16, 17 Inferno (Danté), 369 Innsbruck, 378 insurance, 62, 107, 136, 277, 302, 308

422 INDEX

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 292, 295 International Red Cross Committee, 272 International Revolt Pantheon, 93 Intrepid HMS, 86 Ireland, 86, 343 Irie, Mr (Grand Chamberlain), 263 Ise (shrines), 212, 237, 241, 243, 255, 322, 382, 386, 398, 401 Ishibashi (JSB), 290 Ishihara Shintaro, 92 Ishihara Sangyo, 290 Isuzu, 293 Italian, 47, 229, 254, 280 Italian language, 367, 368, 372 Italy, 141, 195, 329, 367, 371, 372, 378 Itazuke Base, 52 Ito, Prince, 383 Itoh Eikichi, 368 Itoh, Prince, 242 Iwamoto Zenji, 123 Izumo shrine, 398 Japan Academy, 255 Japan Academy of Arts, 255 Japan Air Lines, 28, 149, 202, 334, 335, 336 Japan Airlines-Aeroflot, 27 ‘Japan and Pacific Department’ (FO), 372 Japan Association, The, 272 Japan-British Society, 34, 290, 359, 361, 363 Japan-Canada Ministerial consultations, 150 Japan Chamber of Commerce, 272 Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 359, 361, 363 Japan-China Fishery Agreement, 152 Japan-China Friendship Association, 26, 97 Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office, 152 Japan-China trade, 85 Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB), 334 Japan Communist Party (JCP), 25, 26, 28, 29, 38, 57, 65, 68, 69, 70, 85, 86, 87, 96, 97, 151, 291, 296 Japan Defence Agency, 219, 300, 302 Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 209

Japan Foreign Trade Council, 361, 363 Japan Medical Association, 277, 293 ‘Japan Round, The’, 196 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 40, 57, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 86, 87, 149, 151, 152, 291, 292, 295, 296 Japan Society, 272, 377 Japan Society of New York, 284 Japan Women’s University, 124 Japanese American Security Treaty (1960), 281 Japanese bilateral aid, 9, 10, 16 Japanese Communists, 93 Japanese Constitution, 57, 287 Japanese diet (food), 179 Japanese Diet, 50, 354 Japanese foreign policy, 146, 185 Japanese goods, cheap 207, 306 Japanese Government, 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22, 38, 51, 53, 54, 81, 105, 114, 149, 171, 174, 175, 216, 230, 236, 243, 278, 283, 302, 304, 319, 334, 339, 352, 353, 354, 357, 359, 361 Japanese houses and apartments, 137, 179, 206, 318, 325, 389, 392, 393, 409 Japanese mood, 71–5, 171, 194, 202, 204, 219, 220, 316 Japanese people, 3, 4, 7, 38, 40, 43, 52, 58, 165, 168, 176, 211, 213, 232, 240, 242, 243, 244, 265, 266, 268, 304, 315, 328, 339, 352, 383 Japanese Press, 27, 35, 184, 267, 280, 335, 336 Japaneseness, 192, 193, 194, 238 ‘Japanese Way, the’, 194, 237, 241, 389 Japan-South Korea Ministerial Conference, 29, 87, 151 Japan-Soviet civil aviation talks, 149 Japan-Soviet fisheries talks, 150 Japan-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (Tokyo), 151 Jardine Matheson, 334 JCP Minsei, 97 Jellicoe, Right Hon. Earl (Lord Privy Seal), 333, 334, 335, 336 Jesuit, 240, 325, 394, 395, 397 Jesuit University (Sophia), 81 Jimmu, Emperor, 322 Jitoku, 385, 408



INDEX423

John, Robert, 375 Johnson, President, 14, 30, 53 judo, 20, 212, 214, 223 Jugaku Bunsho ˉ , Professor, 369, 370 Juliana of the Netherlands, Queen, 272 Kabuki plays, 93, 227, 371 Kaburayama River, 409 Kahn, Herman, 326 Kalfang (Ken Yu), 407 Kamagasaki slums, 41 Kamakura, 401 Kamakura period, 120, 409 Kamigamo, 370, 381 ‘kamikaze’, 44 Kanno, Mr (Economic Planning Agency), 78 Kano School, 391, 411 Kanzan, 385, 408 karate, 20, 214 Karuizawa, 349 Kashiwara, 322 Kasuga Ikko, 293 Kasuga Shrine (Nara), 382 katakana, 314 KBE award, 87 Kato Ichiro, 149 Katsumata Seiichi, 25, 29 Katsura Detached Palace, 409, 411 Katsura palace, 389 Kawabata Yasunari, 87 Kawai Kanjiro ˉ , 369 Kawasaki (ex-Ambassador), 208 Kaya Okinori, 352 Keio Department Store, 87 Kempeitai (gendarmerie), 81, 205, 369 kendo, 214 Kennedy Round, 196, 291 kerria, 403, 405 Kew Gardens, 263, 271, 376 Kiesinger, Dr (Federal German Chancellor), 150 kimono, 115, 122, 125, 126, 391 Kimura, Mr, (Chief Cabinet Secretary) 41 Kinkaku-ji, 404, 405 Kishi, Mr, 276, 338, 352 Kishi Nobusuke, 338 Kissinger, 282, 353 Kiuchi, Mr, 144, 148 Klaus, Dr (Chancellor of Austria), 85 Knight of the Garter, 376

koˉan, 245, 385 Koblenz, 272 Kobo-Daishi, 384, 400 Kohno Mitsu, 35 Kojiki, 236 Koke-dera, 405 ‘kokutai’, 396 Komeito mission, 293 Ko ˉ meito ˉ  Party (Clean Government Party), 7, 21, 26, 28, 39, 40, 41, 54–8, 68, 69, 70, 74, 134, 135, 149, 151, 185, 230, 240, 292, 294, 295, 296, 324 Komoto, Mr (Minister of Posts), 78 Konchi-in, 412, 413 Kono Kenzo, 293 Konoe, 123 Korea, 42, 45, 71, 73, 80, 146, 153, 154, 194, 293, 342, 358, 372, 382, 383, 384, 394, 411 kotatsu, 391 Kuala Lumpur, 12, 16, 207, 208 Kumamoto University, 125 Kuni, Prince, 247 Kuraishi Tadao, 51, 85 Kurile Islands, 82 Kutai, 384 Kwammu, Emperor, 384, 400 Kwannon (Avalokitesvara), 385, 402 Kyoto, 29, 34, 36, 127, 162, 179, 181, 228, 238, 243, 248, 250, 251, 257, 313, 328, 368, 369, 370, 371, 373, 375, 376, 377, 378, 381, 384, 391, 393, 394, 400, 401, 402, 407, 409, 411, 413 Kyoto Museum of Modern Art, 227 Kyoto University, 74, 93, 98, 127 Kyushu Museum of Modern Art, 227 Kyushu University, 86, 93, 98, 127 labour pool, 61 labour shortage, 62, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 127, 178, 180, 194 Labour Standards Law, 123 Labour White Paper, 105 Laird, Melvin (United States Secretary of State for Defence), 293 land reform, 48, 166, 177–8, 281 Land Reform Law, 291 language barrier, 11, 167, 212, 327 Latin America, 13, 168, 174, 342 Leach, Bernard (English potter), 369 League of American Women, 123

424 INDEX

Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore), 28, 87 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 23, 25, 27, 40, 41, 52, 53, 57, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 86, 87, 144, 145, 149, 151, 152, 153, 184, 228, 230, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 284, 291, 292, 293, 296, 303, 312, 319, 337, 338, 339, 346, 347, 350, 352 libraries, 107, 133, 138, 140, 142, 308 life-expectancy, 109, 129, 139 lifelong employment, 176, 181 Linnean Society, 271 London, 27, 28, 34, 78, 84, 86, 111, 112, 115, 144, 148, 166, 175, 178, 199, 219, 228, 229, 246, 254, 263, 268, 271, 272, 357, 358, 362, 371, 372, 373, 376 London bus, 113, 115 London Festival Ballet, 113 London Museum, 112 London Naval Agreement, 281 London Philharmonic Orchestra, 112 London Zoo, 271 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, 258 Lord Mayor of London, 110, 115, 151, 271, 375 Lotbinière, Anthony Joly de, 261, 262 lotus flower, 379, 402 Lotus Sutra, 55, 386 Louvre, 270 Lowe, John (Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery), 112 Lower House, 21, 25, 26, 27, 56, 68, 275, 296 loyalty, 3, 4, 59, 216 Lynch, Mr (Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland), 86 MacArthur, General, 123, 212, 236, 243, 245, 312, 314, 315, 328, 386 Mace-B missile, 152 Macmillan, Harold, 85, 375 Macmillans (publisher), 375 Macrae, Norman, 171 Madrid, 204, 372 Maeo, Mr, 77, 78, 79, 278 Magalhaes Pinto, Sr. de (Foreign Minister of Brazil), 85 ‘Magic Flute’, 160 magnolias, 399

Mahayana Buddhism, 237, 384, 385, 396, 399 Mainichi Newspaper Company, 334 Makioka Sisters, 125 Malacca Straits, 71, 73, 168, 289 Malaysia, 14, 16, 29, 174, 199, 207 Malaysian Peninsula, 14 Malaysian Railways, 207 Malaysian Satellite Tracking Station, 208 Mallet, Ivo, 372 mammon, 210 Manchuria, 346 Mandala, 56 Manders, Dr (Scientific Counsellor), 100 Manhattan, 228 ‘manifest kami’, 313, 398 Manila, 14, 17, 18, 204, 371, 372, 373 Manila Airport, 335 manners, 3, 5, 84, 116, 186, 200, 202, 206, 209 Manyoshu (Collection of a Myriad Leaves), 120 Mao Thought Research Institute, 97 Mao Tse-tung, 29, 93, 146 maples, 390, 399 Marcuse, 93, 94 Mare, Arthur de la, 372 Margaret, Her Royal Highness Princess, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 147, 151, 247, 257, 268, 271, 374 Maritime Self-Defence Force, 51 martial arts, 214, 250 Martin, Peter, 368, 370, 373 Maruzen (bookseller), 375 Marxist theory, 67 Marx-Lenin, 93 Mary, Queen, 262 Masuda, Mr, 51, 52, 73 Masuhara Keikichi, 277, 293, 300 Matsuda Takechiyo, 151 Matsudaira Tsuneo, 254 Matsumoto (Former Chief International Bureau), 67 Matsumura Kenzo, 294 Matsushita, 163, 194, 197 meat, 139, 179 Mediation Commissions of Family Courts, 122 medical care, 308 provision, 139 meditation, 385, 390, 399, 408, 411



INDEX425

meibun (pre-ordained status of high and low), 122 Meiji, Emperor, 44, 212, 237, 238, 242, 246, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 383, 394, 401 Meiji Constitution, 236, 243 Meiji era (period), 125, 177, 179, 212, 305 Meiji Restoration, 87, 118, 121, 124, 235, 238, 245, 248, 354, 381, 386 Meiji Shrine, 241 Memorandum Trade Delegation (to Peking), 291 Messianic nationalism, 54, 55, 58 Michael of Kent, Prince, 247 Middle East, 13, 342, 359, 362 Middle East crisis, 5 Mikado, 241 Mikasa, Prince, 21, 254, 259 Mikasa, Princess, 254 Miki Takeo, 13, 15, 24, 25, 34, 35, 39, 77, 78, 79, 84, 86, 87, 274, 278 militarism, 20, 43, 48, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 219–21, 224, 226, 281, 286, 300, 301, 302, 303, 312, 314, 321, 369 militaristic, 3, 5, 48, 214, 354 Military Government (Bakufu), 45, 314, 315, 326, 394 military power, 5, 6, 216 Mills Bill, 187, 190 Mingei movement, 369 Ministerial Council for Economic Development of South-East Asia, 10, 14 Ministerial Council for South-East Asian Development, 9 ministerial visits to England, 144, 148 Ministry of Agriculture, 17 Ministry of Finance, 76, 77, 149, 176, 302, 374 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 78, 276, 302, 327, 334, 335, 352, 353, 360 Ministry of Information, 371 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 115, 181, 196, 283, 287, 290, 295, 302, 316 Ministry of Labour, 105 Ministry of Overseas Development, 19, 28 Minobe Tatsukichi, Professor, 242 Miroku (Chugu-ji), 384 Miroku Bosatsu (Messianic Buddha), 384

Mishima Yukio, 226, 227 Mission Schools, 124 MITI, 17, 115, 290 Mitsubishi, 129, 197 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 150 Mitsui, 197 Mitsui Mineral and Mining Company, 292 Miyako, 394, 401 Mizuta, Mr (Minister of Finance), 277 Mongol invasions, 386 Mongolia, 346 Monument to the Victims of the Atomic Bomb (Hiroshima), 256 Moore Henry Exhibition, 113 moral code, 186 Morland, Sir Oscar, 4 Morley, John, 92, 119, 201, 375 Morris, Dr Ivan, 250, 385, 401 Moscow, 25, 27, 97, 149, 151, 229, 277, 291, 353 Moscow-Tokyo air service, 28 Moss Temple, 405 Mozart, 160 multilateral aid, 9, 12 Murakami (JETRO), 209 Murasaki Shikibu, Lady, 250, 401, 403, 405, 409 Murasaki’s Spring Garden, 403 Murray, James, 30, 33 Mutsu (first nuclear-powered ship), 150 Mutual Security Treaty, 52 Myoshin-ji, 413 Nachi, 382 Nagako, Princess, 247 Nagaoka, 400, 401 Nagasaki, 38, 184, 213, 396 Nagoya, 29, 74, 137, 150, 178 Nagoya Air Show, 295 Nakane Chie, 130 Nakasone Yasuhiro (Minister of Tranport), 85, 211, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 222, 226, 227, 274, 277, 278, 300, 348, 363 Nambanjin, 395 Nanzenji, 369, 413 Nara, 20, 263, 369, 380, 381, 382, 384, 400, 402, 409 Nara Court, 120, 382 Narita International Airport, 85, 294, 334

426 INDEX

Narita Tomomi, 29, 66, 67, 87 Naruse Jinzo ˉ , 124 Nasu, 252, 257 National Athletic Meeting, 255 national average wage, 107, 139, 140, 310 national character, 75, 97, 131, 200, 206 national characteristics, 4 ‘national consciousness’, 3, 4, 81 National Foundation Day, 28, 242 National Health Insurance system, 292 ‘National Livelihood’ (White Paper), 132, 133, 134 National Police Agency, 97 National Portrait Gallery, 112 national psychology, 46 National Public Safety Committee, 41, 78 National Research Development Corporation, 103 National Self Defence Force, 21 nationalism, 3, 6, 7, 45, 58, 59, 60, 74, 80, 82, 83, 91, 92, 96, 162, 164, 168, 169, 176, 177, 182, 186, 219, 220, 221, 235, 237, 240, 255, 267, 269, 325, 328, 396 Needham, Professor, 103 Nelson’s Column, 114 Nestorian Christian, 238 New England, 162 New Tokaido super-express line, 84 New Women’s Organization (Shin Fujin Kyo ˉ kai), 124 New York, 111, 228, 284 New Zealand, 29 NHK, 34, 363 Nichiren Buddhism, 54, 55, 324 Nichiren Sect, 21, 55, 240 Nichiren Sho ˉ nin, 55, 56, 58, 325, 386 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), 52, 126, 152, 195 Nihon University, 95 Nihongi, 236 Niigata, 294, 346 Niigata Prefecture, 346 Nijo-jo, 411 Nikko, 357, 362, 400 Nintoku, Emperor, 322 Nippon Club, The, 272 Nippon Steel Corporation, 308 monthly salary, 308 Nirvana, 385, 402, 413

Nishi Hongwanji Temple, 411 Nishimura Eiichi, 28, 40, 290, 292 Nishimura Naomi, 293, 300 Nissan, 343 Nissan Institute, 368, 381 Nixon Doctrine, 224, 225, 279, 282 Nixon, President, 145, 152, 269, 280, 283, 284, 287, 293, 294, 296, 307, 317, 319, 338, 339, 352, 353, 357 ‘Nixon shock’, 285, 287, 288, 290, 301, 312, 316–17, 339, 345, 347 Noda Takeo, 291 Nogi, General (Headmaster of Peers’ School), 246, 251 Noh, 227 non-aggression pacts, 303, 312, 318, 319, 351, 354 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 145, 152, 153, 154 North America, 12, 145, 196, 342, 356, 357 North Viet-Nam, 34, 39, 53 North/South problem, 19 ‘Northern Territories’, 146, 152 Norway, 45 Notre Dame, 270 nuclear achievements, 356, 359 ‘nuclear allergy’, 37, 38, 40, 41, 48, 52, 82, 96, 184, 281 nuclear armament, 40, 299 nuclear contamination fears, 38 ‘nuclear family’, 128 Nuclear Power Group, 113 nuclear powered aircraft carrier, 37, 38, 85 nuclear powered submarine, 37, 38, 52, 86 nuclear prospects, 302–30 ‘nuclear umbrella’, 42, 61, 80, 82, 303 nuclear weapons, 6, 37, 39, 40, 41, 146, 153, 154, 215, 216, 282, 302 nutrition, 139, 142 Nyamweya, Mr (Kenya Foreign Minister), 29 obi, 122 Occupation, the, 178, 206, 213, 236, 238, 247, 253, 259, 267, 279, 280, 281, 282, 312, 315, 324, 326, 327, 371, 372 Oceania, 342



INDEX427

Oda Nobunaga, 394 OECD, 11, 100, 187, 188, 189, 193, 195, 196 office lady, 126 Ogasawara Islands, 25, 50, 83, 86 O-Haru-san, 369 Ohira Masayoshi, 78, 79, 144, 148, 274, 278, 348, 358, 361, 362, 363 Ohno Katsumi, 87 Ohno, Mrs (wife of former Japanese Ambassador to in London), 263 oil supplies, 168, 289, 356, 359 Oji, 52, 72 Okamoto Taro, 160 Okichi-san, 280 Okinawa, 23, 25, 40, 42, 52, 53, 67, 72, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 87, 92, 96, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 164, 165, 214, 224, 225, 230, 244, 275, 276, 278, 282, 285, 287, 291, 292, 294, 296, 337, 339, 347, 348 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, 295 old age, 46, 137 Old Japan, 180, 214, 357 Olivier, Dr Borg (Prime Minister of Malta), 87 Olympic Games (1964), 20, 114 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 289 Osaka, 29, 41, 44, 56, 108, 125, 136, 137, 140, 178, 212, 227, 231, 291, 292, 322, 384 Osaka Expo ’70, 5, 28, 64, 74, 84, 86, 87, 148, 151, 159–63, 164, 165, 225, 229, 231, 249, 255, 256, 266, 286, 316, 375 Osawa-ike, 405 Overseas Co-operation Fund Law, 51 Overseas Co-operation Volunteers, 12 overseas investments, Japanese, 196, 341–4 Oxford, 21, 254 pachinko (pinball machines), 179 Pacific basin, 3, 6 Pacific Free Trade Area, 172 Pacific (Ocean), 281, 284 Pacific War, 247, 305, 341 pacifist foreign policy, 213, 217 Pakistan, 14, 15, 19, 367

Pakistanis, 18 papacy, 167, 245 Paradiso (Danté), 369 Paris, 33, 111, 229, 270, 271 Park, President, 29 Pathé News, 115 patriotism, 72, 165, 183, 193, 213, 216, 219, 220, 235, 241, 258, 299, 314, 315, 322, 389 paulownia, 399 peace clause, 211, 213, 226, 281, 287 ‘Peace Constitution’, 82, 214, 303 Peace Corps, 12 Peach Mountain (Momoyama) Palace, 411 Pearl Harbor, 46, 326 Peers’ School, 246 Peking Government, 295 Peking, 26, 52, 70, 91, 97, 149, 152, 228, 229, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288, 291, 293, 296, 316, 317, 319, 338, 358, 383, 399 Pentagon, 7 People’s Republic of China, 352, 361 Pepsi Cola, 162 Perry, Commodore, 280 Persian Gulf, 71, 73, 82, 168, 286, 289, 317 personal obligation, 4 Petroleum Development Corporation, 290 Phantom F-4E jet fighter, 149 Philippine Air Force, 335 Philippine Independence Day, 335 Philippines, 14, 29, 267, 313, 373, 395 Phoenix Hall, 402 Pilcher, Lady Delia, 33, 371, 372, 373, 374 Pillow Book, 250, 385, 401 Pinkerton, 280 Pinkerton-Butterfly honeymoon, 284 Pirzada, Mr (Pakistan Foreign Minister), 28 Pish-Tush, 241 Pitti-Sing, 122, 125 Plantagenets, 263 platycodon grandifloras, 409 Po Chu-i, 400 Political Funds Control Bill, 51 pollution, 132, 136, 145, 167, 171, 178, 224, 227, 228, 230, 257, 278, 285,

428 INDEX

286, 290, 292, 294, 316, 321, 337, 338, 339, 343, 347, 349, 392, 400 pollution control, 304, 362 Pope, Alexander, 269 Portugal, 163, 394 post-Buddhist and Confucian world, 46 post-war economic success, 182, 342 post-war rehabilitation, 24 preferential tariff proposals, 10 preferential tariffs, 17 pre-Tokugawa eras, 205 Previn, André, 292 Prince of Wales, His Royal Highness the, 231, 247, 251, 255, 262, 376 ‘Private Lives’, 124 Private Railway Workers’ Union, 292 Privy Council, 242 productivity, 109, 129, 147, 172, 173, 183, 213, 231, 306, 309, 310 protein, 129, 139, 208 Prussian, 47, 236, 242, 280, 391 Public and Child Welfare Commissions, 122 Public Employment Security Offices, 105, 106 Pueblo incident, 38, 41, 42, 85 purity, 93, 235, 237, 324, 383 ‘quality of living’, 164, 167, 285, 286 Queen Mother, 271, 262 Quetta (now Pakistan), 367 quota restrictions, 27, 83, 147, 148, 188, 195 race apart, 3, 4 ‘radiant peace’, 44, 239 radioactive waste, 99 raw fish, 34, 36, 203, 237, 390 raw materials, 13, 168, 172, 185, 189, 288, 289, 317, 319, 328, 341, 342 Red Guards, 26 Regent Street, 114 Reischauer, Edwin, 146 ‘Repatriation Agreement’ with North Korea, 30 reparations, 9, 11, 13, 354 restoration of the Emperor, 45 retirement pension, 304 Reverse Important Question and Dual Representation Resolution (UN General Assembly), 294, 295

revolting students, 91–9, 213 ‘Revolutionary Marxist’ faction, 69 Rhine, 268, 272 Ricci, Mateo (Jesuit missionary), 240 rice, 24, 121, 129, 139, 166, 176, 177, 178, 179, 190, 253, 268, 277, 292, 294, 389 rice cultivation, 12 rice wine, 391, 409 Richard, Cliff, 113 Ridgway, General, 22 ‘Risen Sun’, 171 roads, 15, 51, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 178, 179, 192, 193, 204, 228, 317, 401 rock-azalea, 403 Rogers, Mr, 280 Rolls-Royce, 112 Rolls-Royce RB-211 aero-engines, 359 Rome, 236, 319, 320, 323, 368, 371, 372, 395 Rotterdam, 272 Royal Botanic Gardens (Kew), 271 Royal Marines, 155 Royal Navy, 155 Royle, Anthony (Parliamentary UnderSecretary of State), 216 Rumania, 151 Rundall, Sir Francis, 3 Rusk, Mr, 35 Russian Communist Party, 26 Russians, 25, 42, 69, 73, 82, 146, 161, 162, 163, 214, 285, 287, 317, 353 Russo-Japanese War, 246, 251 Ryoˉbu Shintoˉ, 369, 381 Ryokichi Minobe, Dr, (Governor of Tokyo), 25, 28, 115, 291, 296 Ryoko-in, 413 Ryukyus, 7, 82, 229, 278 ryunen (staying up for another year), 95 Saddharma-pundarika, 55 Saga Detached Palace, 405 Sagami Bay, 257 Saigyo Hoshi, 387, 413 Saiho-ji, 405, 406 Saion-ji family, 407 Sakata, Mr, 78 sake (rice wine), 36, 409 Sakoku (seclusion), 396 Salzburg Festival, 373



INDEX429

Sambo-in Temple, 411 Samejima (Peking correspondent of Nihon Keizai Shimbun), 152 ‘Sampa Zengakuren’, 69 samurai, 93, 119, 121, 126, 203, 212, 220, 223, 250, 315 San Francisco, 202, 372 San Francisco University, 94 San Sebastian, 372, 375 Sankei newspaper, 209 Sansom, Sir George, 328, 368 Sanyo, 343 Sapporo, 29, 86, 254 Sasaki faction, 26, 67 Sasaki Kozo, 25, 29, 66, 67 Sasebo, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 52, 85, 86 Sato Eisaku, 15, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53, 70, 81, 83, 87, 145, 146, 152, 153, 154, 169, 184, 214, 225, 226, 229, 230, 280, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 293, 296, 317, 319, 337, 338, 339, 340, 345, 346, 347, 348, 353 satori, 386, 408 Satow, Ernest, 328 Savage, Arthur (Department of Trade and Industry), 374 savings, 62, 136, 139, 192, 193 SCAP, 123 School of Oriental and African Studies, 371 schools, 15, 33, 46, 73, 107, 108, 123, 192, 193, 304 Schumann, Maurice (Foreign Minister of France), 152 Science and Technology Agency, 277 Science Museum, 113, 374 Scientific Instrument Manufacturers’ Association (SIMA), 113 Scottish trade mission, 29 Scottish tweeds, 263 Seadragon, 38 Second Sex, 126 Second World War, 4, 48, 118, 122, 125, 177, 204, 217, 235, 240, 242, 255, 258, 267, 280, 286, 303, 326, 342, 367, 407 Security Council, seat on, 224, 229, 356, 358 Security Treaty, 6, 25, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 52, 53, 57, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 78, 91, 145, 150, 164, 165, 184, 212,

213, 216, 224, 226, 229, 281, 282, 284, 287, 318, 319, 358 Sei Shonagon, Lady, 250, 385, 401 Seihokyo (Young Jurists’ Association), 291 Sekigahara, 44, 45 Self-Defence Agency, 224, 226, 227 Self-Defence Forces (SDF), 26, 153–5, 222, 223, 226, 281, 287, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304 self-interest, 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 18, 185, 275 Senanayake, Mr (Prime Minister of Ceylon), 28 Senkaku Islands, 229 Senkoku Period, 394, 395 Sento-Gosho, 410 Sento Palace, 409 Seoul, 29, 87 seppuku (ritual suicide), 227 Seventh International Conference on Biochemistry (Tokyo), 29 Shagakudo ˉ leaders, 98 shakuhachi (bass flute), 389 Shanghai, 371 Shanghai Troupe, 353 Shelepin, 69 Shell, 103 Shibuya, 111 Shield Society (Tate-no-kai), 226 letter, 85 State Funeral, 20–2 Shigemune Yuzo, 293 Shikotan, 165 Shima, Shigenobu (Grand Master of the Ceremonies), 263 (Japanese Ambassador to London), 34, 36, 93 Shimane Prefecture, 256 shinden zukuri, 402, 403, 405, 409 Shingon (esoteric) sect, 384, 385 Shinjuku, 96, 111 ‘Shinsei’ (Japan’s first scientific satellite), 294 Shinto, 46, 72, 168, 186, 210, 228, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 250, 251, 281, 289, 312, 313–14, 322, 324, 326, 328, 367, 369, 370, 381, 382, 383, 387, 388, 389, 395, 398, 399, 400 Shiojiri, 26, 28 ships, 18, 172, 187, 189, 190, 230 shoin-zukuri, 409

430 INDEX

shoji, 389, 391, 392 Sho ˉ toku Taishi, 44, 212, 384, 388 ‘Showa’, 44, 239, 305 Showa Electric Company, 294 Shrewsbury, 367 Shugaku-in, 409, 410 Siberia, 25, 146, 229, 317, 354 sightseeing, 204, 269, 270, 272, 273, 362 Silva, General Costa e (Brizilian president-elect), 27 Silver Pavilion, 407, 409 Singapore, 14, 28, 29, 73, 82, 87, 174, 190, 208, 289 Sino-Japanese entente, 344 Sino-Japanese relations, 351, 353 Sino-Japanese world, 103 Snook (submarine), 38 Snowdon, Lord, 110, 111, 114, 117, 147, 151, 271, 374 social change, 4, 180, 386 social problems, 98, 133, 136, 137, 171, 338 social responsibility, 200, 206 social security, 62, 133, 139 social services, 308 social welfare, 135, 138, 167, 172, 255, 288 Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC), 113 So ˉ hyo ˉ  (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), 65, 68, 69 Soka Gakkai (Value-adding Society), 7, 21, 26, 39, 54–8, 67, 74, 134, 185, 240, 386 Somerset, 370, 381 Sony Corporation of Japan, 113, 194 South African trade, 5 South Korea, 13, 80, 82, 338 South Viet-Nam, 14, 29, 48 South-East Asia, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 24, 33, 35, 38, 42, 44, 48, 73, 80, 82, 83, 119, 154, 168, 174, 184, 188, 189, 190, 199, 200, 201, 213, 216, 221, 269, 289, 312, 317, 341 Southern Barbarians (Nambanjin), 388, 395 Southern Europe, 127 Southern Sakhalin, 82 Soviet Union, 5, 23, 25, 59, 60, 68, 69, 144, 146, 220, 221, 286, 289, 291, 338, 357, 358, 360

Spain, 204, 329, 395 Spanish Fransiscans, 395 Spanish (language), 214, 368, 373 Speaker of the House of Representatives, 214 Speaker of the Lower House, 21 Speaker of the Upper House, 21, 335 Special Fund, 12, 14, 15, 19 sports facilities, 107, 308 St James’s Palace, 263, 271 St Paul’s, 114 standard of living, 6, 59, 60, 145, 183, 185 Stans (United States Secretary of Commerce), 150, 168 State Funeral, 20 State Shinto, 54, 55, 58, 236, 238, 243, 255, 315, 386 State Shinto Rescript, 236 steel, 160, 170, 171, 172, 187, 189, 190, 309, 310, 328, 343, 354 steel industry, 291, 310, 311 Stevens, Dr (Prime Minister of Sierra Leone), 150 Stoltenberg, Dr (West Germany Minister of Science), 103 Stonehenge, 322, 382 Stromness RFA, 113 Suez Canal, 26 Sugimoto Etsu, 119 Suharto, President, 51, 85 Sui dynasty, 388 suicide, 5, 85, 122, 227, 246, 251 Sukarno, 14 Sumitomo, 197 Sun, Mr, 353 Sun Goddess, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 255, 322, 382, 383, 384, 388, 395, 398, 400 ‘Sun Tribe’, 92 Sunda Strait, 73 Sung Dynasty, 385, 400, 401, 411, 413 superannuation schemes, 107, 308 superiority complex, 75, 200, 202, 208 Supreme Export Council, 101, 228 Supreme Trade Council, 188 Suslov, Mr, 85 Suzuki Daisetsu, 369, 382 Sweden, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 sweet scented plum (prunus mume), 161, 391, 400



INDEX431

Swiss Republic, President of the, 272 Swiss, 159, 161, 162

Times, The, 371 Tito (President of Yugoslavia), 85 To ˉ dai, 97, 98 Todaiji (Nara), 384 Togo, Admiral, 246, 251 Tokachioki earthquake, 86 Tokai Mura, 84 Tokugawa, 205, 228, 254, 256, 394, 401 Tokugawa castle, 238 Tokugawa Japan, 122, 212, 229, 383, 386, 395 Tokugawa Shoguns, 45, 238, 240, 314, 315, 396 Tokyo Airport riots, 29, 39 Tokyo Bay, 318 Tokyo Stock Exchange, 87, 294 Tokyo traffic, 8 Tokyo University, 74, 95, 97, 98, 126, 130, 149, 181, 338 Tokyo University Space Research Centre, 294 Tomei Expressway, 150 Tomlinson, Stanley, 199 Tomohito, Prince, 21, 254 Toshiba Heavy Electrical Factory (Tsurumi), 34 Toshiba, 129 Toshogu Shrine (Nikko), 357, 362 Toulouse-Lautrec, 227 Tower of the Sun, 160, 231 Toynbee, Professor Arnold, 75, 226, 253, 263, 375 trade relations, 60, 63, 225 trade unions, 56, 65, 68, 69, 99, 344 traffic congestion, 137, 171 Trotskyite, 37, 81 True Buddha, 55 True Way, 120 Tsingtao, 370–1 Tsurumi, Mr, 359 TUC, 68 TV sets, 190

Taiho ˉ  Civil Code, 120 Taisho, Emperor, 246, 247, 252, 370, 381 Taiwan, 13, 14, 18, 25, 29, 57, 146, 153, 229, 283, 288, 290, 301, 342, 351, 352, 354, 356, 358 Takamatsu, Prince, 21, 254, 259 Takamatsu, Princess, 21, 254, 259 Takami, Mr, 277 Takarazuka, 227 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 26, 28, 40, 294 Takeshita Noboru, 277, 294 Takita Minoru, 296 Tale of Genji, The, 250, 385, 401, 403, 404 Tanaka Kakuei, 76, 77, 78, 79, 129, 276, 277, 278, 337–40, 344, 345–50, 351, 352, 353, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363 T’ang China, 44, 236, 378, 380, 382, 401, 408 Tang dynasty, 384, 388, 390 Tange Kenzo, 160 Tanizaki Junichiro, 125 Taoist, 385, 396, 400, 409 tatami, 389, 391, 392, 409 tatamisé, 369 Taylor, Delia Margaret, 371 Tea Ceremony, 124, 250, 264, 362, 400, 407, 408, 411 telephones, 139 television sets, 47, 101, 133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 166, 178, 179, 189 temples, 36, 238, 263, 369, 378, 379, 380, 381, 384, 385, 390, 393, 395, 401, 407, 408, 409, 411, 413 Tendai monks, 395 Tendai Sect, 55, 384, 401 Tenryu-ji, 407 textiles, 18, 63, 114, 148, 172, 189, 190, 197, 225, 294, 316, 343, 372 Thailand, 14, 16, 86 Thanom Kittikachorn (Prime Minister of Thailand), 86 Thant, U, 229 Thaxted, 377 Thorne, Ben, 110, 374 ‘thought control’, 45, 81, 96, 205 Tiger Glen (Kokei), 411

UAR, 13 ‘ugly’ image, 201, 208, 317 Uji, 401, 402 ultra-protectionist mentality, 195 UNCTAD, 9, 10, 13, 16 Union Jack, 161 uniqueness, 4, 186, 203

432 INDEX

United Nations, 28, 35, 57, 229, 283, 294, 295 United Nations Disarmament Committee, 150 United Nations Status of Forces Agreement, 372 United States, 6, 7, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 30, 35, 50, 53, 59, 60, 62, 66, 71, 72, 73, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 100, 101, 102, 124, 133, 138, 140, 142, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 154, 155, 161, 169, 170, 172, 174, 175, 181, 183, 188, 189, 190, 194, 198, 217, 220, 225, 227, 229, 230, 274, 276, 277, 286, 291, 313, 316, 317, 318, 319, 340 United States Embassy, 41 United States forces, 39, 152 United States Government, 9, 38, 42, 102, 197, 287, 294, 295 United States Information Service, 129 United States-Japan relations, 279–84 United States-Japan Space Co-operation Agreement, 102 United States-Japan Security Treaty, 37, 91, 164, 165, 212, 213, 216, 224, 226, 287, 318 United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, 38 United States navy, 38 United States Press, 151 University Postal Union Congress (Tokyo), 151 Upper House, 21, 41, 68, 86, 92, 275, 277, 292, 293, 335 US Army Field Hospital (Oji), 52 US Army, 206 US Forces, 300 US pressures, 299, 301, 302 USAF jet fighter crash, 86 USS Enterprise, 37–42, 85 Utopian classless society, 48 Valdes, Gabriel (Foreign Minister of Chile), 151 Value-adding Society, 54 Versailles, 399 Versailles Palace, 270 Vestal Virgins, 237 Victoria Station, 263, 271 Vienna, 112, 372, 373 Viet Cong offensive, 42

Viet-Nam, 7, 33, 34, 35, 39, 52, 53, 71, 72, 73, 80, 146, 189, 206, 225, 282, 287, 301, 358 Viet-Nam War, 39, 40, 61, 82 ‘Viet-Nam War Crimes Tribunal’ (Tokyo), 29 Vining, Miss (Quaker governess), 253 wage structure, 104, 108, 308–309 wages, 104 low basic, 306 bonuses, 306 overtime, 306 special allowances, 306 Wakefield, Peter (Commercial Counsellor), 335 Waley, Arthur, 163, 250, 328, 385, 401, 413 Wang (Deputy Leader of Chinese tabletennis team), 291 Wang Kuo-chuan, 294 Washington, 25, 30, 35, 42, 50, 52, 146, 150, 151, 154, 190, 199, 225, 292, 294 ‘way of the gods’, 236, 322, 383, 388, 398 way of the warrior (bushido), 223, 224, 226, 315 Weimar Germany, 70 welfare, 24, 338, 362 welfare expenditure, 299 welfare facilities, 132, 133, 134, 173, 306 welfare state, 304, 313, 317, 319, 321, 326–7, 328 West, the, 4, 7, 44, 45, 48, 49, 102, 139, 140, 153, 154, 202, 203, 206, 208, 241 West Coker, 381 West Germany, 60, 103, 141, 142, 188 Western clothing, 179 ‘Western clutter’, 318, 391 Western education, 124 Western Europe, 18, 19, 24, 100, 101, 133, 138, 188, 190, 196 Western Germany, 6, 81, 225 Westminster Abbey, 263 Westminster Cathedral, 271 Westminster Hall, 263 Wheatcroft, Harry, 113 white-collar work, 104, 105, 106 Whitehall, 263



INDEX433

Whitehead, John (First Secretary), 188, 193 Wilford, Michael, 199 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 251 William of Gloucester, Prince, 247, 374 Wilson, Angus, 113 Winter Olympic Games (Sapporo), 254, 256 wistaria, 403, 405, 409 ‘wooden staves unit’ (gebaboˉtai), 98 work hours, 107, 130, 304, 307, 308, 309, 310 World Scout Jamboree (Mt Fuji), 293 World University Games (Tokyo), 29 Wright, D. J. (Third Secretary), 171 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 22 Xavier, St Francis, 394, 396 xenophobia, 3, 4, 41, 42, 71, 75 Yamamoto Koichi, 25, 66, 67, 86 Yamanaka, Mr, 278 Yamato, 236, 237, 322, 382 Yanagi So ˉ etsu, 369 ‘Yankee Station’, 39 Yasukuni Shrine, 240, 303 Nobel Prize for Literature, 87 Yawata, 149 Yawata-Fuji merger, 152 Yedo, 238, 401

Yeovil, 370, 381 Yokkaichi, 290 Yokohama, 368, 375 Yokusuka, 38 Yoshida Kenichi, 21, 368 Yoshida Shigeru, 275, 338, 368 Yoshimura Junzo, 392 yugao, 391 Yugoslavia, 13, 85 yukata, 70 Yukawa Morio, 85 Suicide, 222–4, 228, 300 Zaibatsu, 101 zaikai (business and financial world), 274, 275, 276 Zen, 93, 238, 245, 282, 320, 369, 382, 390, 396, 405, 407, 408, 409, 411, 413 Zen Buddhism, 46, 325, 328, 385 Zen koan, 245 Zengakuren, 26, 37, 40, 41, 65, 70, 93, 97 Zengakuren (Federation of All-Japan Autonomous Bodies), 39 Zengakuren (National Student’ Union), 69 Zengakuren-Shagakudo ˉ , 97 Zengunro (Okinawa Baseworkers’ Union), 291 Zoological Society of London, 271