The Greater Maghreb: Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe 9781498588409, 9781498588416

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Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved. The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

The Greater Maghreb

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved. The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

The Greater Maghreb Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe

Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Edited by David Garcia Cantalapiedra

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL

Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2019 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ISBN 978-1-4985-8840-9 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4985-8841-6 (electronic) TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

Contents

Prologue

vii

Introduction: Europe and the Mediterranean David García Cantalapiedra and Raquel Barras 1 2

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4 5

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The Greater Maghreb, the European Union and the 2016 EUGS David Garcia Cantalapiedra The Maghreb-Sahel Axis: The Threat of Terrorism Rubén Herrero de Castro and Nieva Machín Osés The Evolution of Global Terrorism in Europe : From Al Qaeda to the Islamic State Terrorist Group Gustavo Díaz Matey Transnational Organized Crime in the Greater Maghreb Raquel Barras Tejudo Latin-American Cocaine Trafficking and Its Impact on West African Security Carolina Sampó The Concept of Criminal Insurgency as New Challenge of the International Security Julia Pulido Gragera Migration from and through the Sahel: EU Engagement and Its Impact Aurora Ganz Libyan Interlinked Dynamics in Multiple Scenarios: Spiral of Chaos, Disorder and Violence Soledad Segoviano v

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Contents

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About the Authors

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Index

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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Prologue

This book tries to offer a distinctive focus and study on North Africa and Sahel, creating a new space to analyze the challenges and threats dynamics in the area, his consequences and the responses (mainly coming from his main neighborhood, that is, Europe). The project comes as a convergence point of several research and working groups work in a multidimensional approach although putting emphasis in a different approaches, strategically and functionally. That is, creating a different regional focus, The Greater Maghreb, and trying to analyze the dynamics in this distinctive area through the synergies creates among terrorism and transnational organized crime, and some of his consequences. From this point of view, the book focus on the EU approach toward the area, analyzing critically his problems. Thus the research core project is a UCM/Banco Santander-funded Research Program on the synergies between terrorism and TOC in North Africa-Sahel, the 2016 EUGS and Spanish options 2017–2019. There are also another WG and research groups associate to this effort through dual-hatted researchers and professors as members of the Transnational Organized Crime Observatory-Real Instituto Elcano: WG on Illicit Trafics- Cocaine Traffic; also some contributors worked at the EUroMEsco/Carnegie Research Group Sahel and Security in the Mediterranean; also members of the Observatorio de la Criminalidad Organizada Transnacional Universidad de Salamanca-FLASCO-Universidad de Palermo and la Fundación Rocco Chinnici; and associate members of the Royal United Services Institute, RUSI. Distinctively, most of the authors have been working on Mediterrranean and EU security issues during at least 10 years at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid Research Group on International Security and Cooperation (formely UNISCI, a more than 20 years old research group directed by Emeritus Chair Pr. Antonio Marquina). In 2017, the UCM Research Group obtained a UCM-Santander research vii

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Prologue

grant to focus on the 2016 European Union Global Strategy, the security in the Mediterranean and synergies between terrorism and organized crime. This book is the result of 2 years effort, being the “Greater Maghreb” concept one of the main results of this research project. It describes this new focus: the relation among the countries in North Africa (from Mauritania to Egypt) and Sahel (from West Africa to Chad) due to the different security challenges and dynamics, including organized crime, terrorism, immigration and climate change. Most of the books focus on the terrorism mostly, and some cases adding organized crime. Some of them talks about Sahel only, or West Africa, taking the issue partially without analyzing Maghreb or Libya case in particular. It is rare any reference to other issues than terrorism, lacking the analysis of other influent issues, or a complete and critical approach to strategies and policies by the European Union. This book includes all these issues from a larger and compact, distinctive and sound new approach, create a new region, a new geographic and strategic framework at a time to study and create responses and policies that cannot be developed by only some of these countries, and in fact, push the EU to create a new strategy and differentiate focus. The idea of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) is already obsolete. Despite the action of terrorist groups as Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in the area (formed for previous non-AQ groups), and possible movement of current ISIS affiliates there (Boko Haram), the dynamics and consequences of the security threat and challenges in the area, are not the same that of the Middle East problematic: strategies and policies necessaries to tackle them should be different. Second, the limited cooperation among these countries, and finally the corruption, makes very difficult to establish sound strategies and policies for the area by the own states there and by the EU or the US. In this vein the book starts, as a general framework, with the set of approaches to the Europe-Mediterranean since the first initiatives in the 1970s with the Helsinki Act and European initiatives after the end of the Cold War, above all, since the so-called Barcelona Process in the 1990s and the European Neighborhood Policy in the 2000s. This framework did not lead to satisfactory results by putting them in connection with the investments made, both in economic terms, as humans, as policies and initiatives. Then the second chapter dedicated to the follow-up framework created by the 2016 EUGS, the European Neighborhood Policy and the 2015 Sahel Action Plan, his achievements and problems, with a critical review and an alternative vision and framework based on a new concept and approach, the Greater Maghreb. Then the following chapters try to critically analyzes the dynamic in the area and why is necessary a new approach. In chapter 3, Ruben Herrero and Nieva Machin map the development of terrorism in the Maghreb— Sahel axis, its influence in the area and its consequences. But it also explains the geopolitical nature of the region, developing the concept of both structured and unstructured spaces. The chapter remarks the relevance of the

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Prologue

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terrorist phenomenon and evolution in the area. Threats and challenges for that area itself and global society are also addressed. However, Despite of for Europe, terrorism is not a new problem since it has been a threat to its security for decades. Pr. Gustavo Diaz’s chapter points out that the jihadist attacks committed in Europe have shown that the threat of Islamist terrorism not only lurks from outside the European borders but now also looms within the old continent understanding the nature of the threat is the essential step for posing future solutions is our starting premise, since we consider that all containment measures of this threat need a correct identification of it, since, being honest, groups like Al Qaeda or Daesh/Islamic State are not only terrorist groups. They are material expressions of the concept of the Jihad as a fighting method; they are a refuge-inspiring movement. The chapter considers the evolution of the phenomenon and the description of the main policies of the EU for a better containment of this Darwinist threat. At the same time, Pr. Raquel Barras establishes transnational organized crime in the Great Maghreb as other of the main threats operating in the region, and also a threat, not only for the region, but also for Europe. Due the particular idiosyncrasy of Great Maghreb, the region becomes a principal door and hub for illicit traffics coming from Latin America as well as Asia. Additionally, the chapter underlines the growth of hybrid threats in the region and concretely, the symbiosis between terrorist and criminal groups. All these circumstances have impact to the European Union because the Great Maghreb it is consider Europe’s southern flank in terms of security. At the same time, the book is also focused on the impact of the drug trafficking coming from Latin-America, mainly entering from coastal West African countries bordering Sahel, and the possible adoption of certain modus operandi for the groups acting in the Grater Maghreb. Thus, two chapters develop these aspects: first, Dr. Carolina Campo thinks that drug trafficking is the most important manifestation of organized crime in Latin America and it works as an enhancer of the illegal business. Cocaine, it is only produced in South America and it is a high demanded drug, not only in the US and Europe but also in new markets that are rising. West Africa presents an ideal choice as a logistic center for criminal organizations. In that context, there is a relation between Latin American drug providers and West African dealers that impacts in the increase of drug trafficking and consumption and in West African and Sahel security. State Capture seems to play a key role in order to understand the development of this business, as well as cooperation among criminal organizations (rather than competence). Secondly, Pr. Julia Pulido tries to study the concept of the criminal insurgency, in which she has been working previously in Colombia, as part of the typology of hybrid threats. This concept of criminal insurgency arises, with a clear objective: to consolidate territorial control to carry out the corresponding illegal activity, through the consolidation of networks criminals who operate transnationally—The term “criminal insurgency” begins to

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gain importance in scenarios with a high and periodic intensity of violence caused by rival criminal groups that fight for territorial monopoly as well as for the control of illicit activities, and that come to challenge to the State for the rule of force. This conceptual effort could be used in the study of terrorist-insurgency-organized crime dynamics in Greater Maghreb. Probably, and for the impact on most of the dynamics in the area, to single out the Libya case, was necessary to understand how eight years after the fall of Gadaffi, this country represents a paradigmatic case of ungoverned space, defined by uncertainty and political-military confrontation with significant consequences on different levels and scenarios. Pr. Soledad Segoviano establishes that this situation of insecurity and instability, conditioned by the absence of functional state structures, has led to the intensification of the conflict defined by territorial fragmentation and profound divisions between rival forces where militias power rules unchallenged. Finally, Aurora Ganz establishes the contradictory EU policy and approaches on immigration, mainly produced as a consequence of the violent dynamics in the area. She tries to objectively give a different vision and alternative to one of the most difficult and long term problem for the EU.

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

Introduction Europe and the Mediterranean

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David García Cantalapiedra and Raquel Barras

The Mediterranean region has always been a key strategic scenario for European policy. In this sense, the first pan-European initiative toward the Mediterranean, although in a different context to the current one as it was the one of the Cold War, was carried out in the Final Act of Helsinki, of 1975, 1 in the heart of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which devoted a section 2 to issues related to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, in particular, on “the interrelationship between the security of each participating State and security in Europe in its and the relationship that exists, in the broader context of global security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean region.” 3 It should be noted that this interest in the Mediterranean was reiterated in the subsequent meetings within the framework of the CSCE, both at the Madrid Conference (1980–1983) and at the Stockholm Conference (1984–1986). However, for Western European states, the area was seen as a subsidiary scenario, (the Southern Flank), of the main Eastern and Northern Europe fronts in the context of the Cold War. It is not until the end of this conflict begins that a different vision and treatment will be given to the area and to the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean. The launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, known as the Barcelona Process, in 1995, 4 led to the birth of an ambitious project, which aimed to promote stability and growth in the Mediterranean region. The so-called Barcelona Process was an initiative launched by the EU to found a global partnership between the EU and the following twelve Mediterranean Countries (TPMs): Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. The League of Arab States (EN) and the Arab Magh1

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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reb Union (UMA) (FR) were invited, as well as Mauritania, as a member of the UMA. This association tries to make the Mediterranean a common space of peace, stability and prosperity, through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, and economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation. The association is based on a spirit of solidarity and respect for the specific characteristics of each of the participants. It also completes other actions and initiatives undertaken in favor of peace, stability and development in the region. The first objective of the association tries to favor the emergence of a common space of peace and stability in the Mediterranean (politics and security), a goal to be achieved through multilateral political dialogue, as complementary to bilateral dialogues established by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. In particular, it focused on political, economic and social cooperation, and proposed the association of the then 15 EU Member States and twelve southern Mediterranean countries to address a wide range of economic, social, cultural and political issues and security. With these approaches work was being done, trying to reduce the north-south gap in the Mediterranean, but soon it was found that the results did not fit with the initial goals. And as we will discuss throughout the paper, the EU, aware of the challenges coming from the south, has since tried to establish a zone of security and stability in the short, medium and long term, since the most important security challenges of Europe, come mainly from its southern neighborhood.

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THE 2003 EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY The 2003 European Security Strategy (2003 ESS), imbued with the approaches of the Barcelona Process, paid special attention to the Mediterranean region, something unprecedented until then. In particular, the ESS 5 considered the Southern Mediterranean space as a Strategic Neighborhood, of vital interest, democratic, with the rule of law and human rights. A global objective was also projected toward the southern neighborhood, based on “establishing the neighborhood as the basis for a global role.” 6 Additionally, the 2003 ESS suggested that a well-governed periphery would suit Europe. Neighbors states immersed in violent conflicts, weak states in which organized crime proliferates, dysfunctional societies or demographic explosions, posed a series of problems for Europe. The integration of these adjacent states would increase security, but would also bring Europe closer to conflict zones. It was proposed as an EU objective to promote good governance both East of the European Union and on the shores of the Mediterranean, allowing a close and cooperative relationship. The main problem is that, in the 2003 ESS, the European periphery is unified under the same strategic concept, without differentiating between the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East

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Introduction

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and the Mediterranean. At the same time, the impact of the US strategic vision of the Greater Middle East, 7 and what it implies in terms of transforming the region, impacted also in this position. In this sense, the expansion of the Mediterranean strategic space will be consolidated after the invasion of Iraq, so the definition that appears in the 2003 ESS is not clear and concise, by merging different neighborhoods in a whole program, dismantling the first chapter of the initiative of the Barcelona process. It should be noted in the same way, that this ‘strategic neighborhood’ would coincide with the adjoining areas of the regions where the so-called neighborhood policies implemented by the EU are developed, that is, on the one hand the East and, on the other, the South. The European Union developed subsequently the socalled European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 8 This program is a prominent instrument, developed within the EU since 2004, and which aims to establish certain privileged relations with the EU’s neighboring countries, depending on the results of the expansion of the EU toward Central and Eastern Europe, with the purpose of including in some way the states that were in the periphery of the enlargement like the states of the Caucasus. But, by French insistence, the following countries of the southern periphery were also included: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The following map shows how there was no distinction between the east and south neighborhood in the ENP. In this vein, the principles on which the ENP is based are those promoted by the EU itself, and are mainly focused on the establishment of special relations with the EU’s neighbors, in the south of the Mediterranean and in the South Caucasus (the membership was not planned). This objective is based on the promotion of a sustainable democracy, together with an inclusive economic growth, subject to mutual interest for the respect of common values that is, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good government, the principles of a market economy and sustainable development. In short, it is about the establishment of a common agenda (from 3 to 5 years), where political and economic reforms are addressed, according to the adaptation of the EU legislation, as well as from the development and strengthening of the cooperation and dialogue. After the launching of the ENP in 2005, based on the effects induced by the invasion of Iraq, the aim was to re-launch the Barcelona Process, emphasizing the importance that the Mediterranean still has for the EU. In this way, what has been called Barcelona+10 was set in motion, which once again highlighted the immense differences between the two shores of the Mediterranean, while at the same time there was a wide divergence of situations between the southern states themselves. Also, unresolved issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the aforementioned continued impact of the invasion of Iraq or the reticence of the non-Mediterranean countries of the EU, caused this initiative to be equally unsuccessful. In the same terms, in 2007, and always trying to bring new approaches and instruments to the

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Mediterranean region, given the meager results of the Barcelona process, at the French initiative, the so-called Union for the Mediterranean (UpM) was created. The UfM is created as a multilateral association, on July 13, 2008, at the Paris Summit, with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. The Union for the Mediterranean brings together 42 countries—there were 43 until Syria decided to freeze its participation, in December 2011—and more than 750 million citizens of countries bordering the Mediterranean and the European Union. It is based on the common history of this geographical area and, from a more practical point of view, on cooperation in concrete projects that are more noticeable for citizens and that favor regional integration. The UfM was proposed as the achievement of peace and cooperation with renewed optimism through technical cooperation in projects in six key areas: environment and water, transport and urban development, business development, energy, higher education and research, and civil protection. Thus, new common regional projects are launched in areas such as the economy, the environment, energy and migration. This initiative, however, in its launching process produced ample reticence; on one hand on the part of Germany to focus initially only on the EU Mediterranean states, and, on the other hand, Spain, since it meant a substantial change with the Barcelona process and placed Spain in a less favorable level in its relation with the countries of the south bank with respect to France.

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THE 2008 ESS REVIEW With the stagnation of the Treaty of Lisbon after the Irish blockade, and the crisis and war in Georgia, the French presidency had to limit its aspirations and the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative (SGAR) for the ESDP presented a “Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy: Offering security in an evolving world” that was approved at the last European Council on December 11, 2008. It was considered as an update of the strategy, but, in addition to a blockade with the states of Eastern Europe on the subject of Russia, did not make any improvement or update regarding North Africa and Sahel. “The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working toward deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.” 9

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With that, from the point of view of the threats, there was an inclusion of this threat in the development of the Union for the Mediterranean. 10 Likewise and despite the joint treatment in the 2008 revision, under the heading “Terrorism and organized crime,” they do not face it as a symbiotic threat; that is, on the one hand, the threat of terrorism, and on the other, organized crime. In particular: “terrorism continues to be a major threat to our lives. There have been attacks in Madrid and London, while others have been aborted, and national bands have a growing presence in our continent. Organized crime— in the form of trafficking in drugs, people and arms, as well as fraud and money laundering on an international scale—continues to be a threat to our societies.” 11 On the other hand, in the 2008 review, the work carried out by the EU is appreciated and reevaluated, while recognizing a series of difficulties and pitfalls that did not allow advancing its transformative policies with respect to the South. Among others, “national conflicts, the increase of radicalization, the conflict in the Middle East” 12 are cited. In particular, on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and despite the fact that the EU, through its participation in the Quartet, was cooperating at that time with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the Arab League and other regional partners, it is explicit that the EU was fully committed to the Annapolis Process with a two-State solution, and continues to provide ongoing financial and budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority, as well as capacity-building, among other means through on-the-ground deployment of judicial, police and border management experts. In Lebanon, the Member States provide the essential part of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. Regarding to Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, the reconstruction and the rule of law, though the deployment of the EUJUST LEX mission.” 13 In addition, in other countries of the region, the situation is really worrying, as regards Libya and Syria. In this way, putting the results obtained in a balance, once again it becomes clear that there is no correlation between the efforts made by the EU, in financial, human, diplomatic terms, and the results obtained. In addition, the involvement and positioning of the EU in other scenarios beyond the traditional Middle East, as in the Iran issue or the case of Afghanistan, is observed and it becomes clear that the EU wanted to validate itself as a relevant global player, although in reality it was far from it. In short, it is confirmed once again that the model of liberal democracy that the EU intended to export to the enlarged Mediterranean, has not been achieved, despite the significant means employed.

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Introduction

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THE 2013 EUROPEAN GLOBAL STRATEGY PROJECT The Obama Administration produced a strong reorientation of the United States’ global policy, leaving the review of the strategy carried out in 2008 quite open to the weather. In this context, we can frame a new attempt to update the European security strategy that was initiated by the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden in July 2012, trying to restructure the debate on the role of the European Union as a global actor at a time of immense international changes. So, in 2011, with the beginning of the NATO withdrawal of Afghanistan along with the turn of US foreign policy toward Asia with its Pivot strategy, 14 and, above all after the start of the “Arab Spring” 15 and the intervention in Libya, once again shows the inability of the EU to carry out a coherent and effective foreign policy in a context and with parameters completely different from those of the 1990s. This showed the lack of a European main role in the channeling of these revolts in particular in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and, in another order, in Iraq. The 2013 European Global Strategy project was a quadripartite initiative that aimed to promote the debate and, at a certain point, the orientation, from an academic and civil society point of view, involving in a cardinal way four centers of thought of these States (Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and a group of foundations and European think tanks. The final result was a report entitled “toward a European Global Strategy. Securing European influence in a changing world,” 16 a document that tried to offer a vision of the challenges that the EU had to face, as well as a series of ideas about the role and policies that the EU should carry out to reaffirm the role of the Union itself in that changing international system. In fact, it was an effort to develop a “grand strategy” proposal for the European Union, which entailed great difficulty in reconciling ideas, mentalities, perceptions, interests and procedures throughout Europe. 17 It should be remembered that this initiative took place at a decisive moment for the European Union, just before the European Council in December 2013, (after the German elections, which would mean the creation of the Grosse Koalition), which was to decide on the future of the euro and the EU’s security and defense policy. 18 Probably the introduction of a more solid regional vision is the most original and defined part of the 2013 European Global Strategy report. However, the concept of “strategic neighborhood” will appear more defined in the 2016 strategy; however, this conception does not seem to respond to the creation of an instrument of global projection, but rather to a mechanism of limitation of responsibility and capacity. This position is certainly wrong strategically due to the overlapping of different areas of interest of other actors as shown by the projects “Greater Middle East,” the “Near Abroad” or the “Strategic Frontier,” in the Middle East, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean, although there seems to be a realistic vision

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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to compensate this position through the reinforcement or creation of alliances with the US and other Western allied states (Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, etc.). This seemed to announce the idea of seeking reinforcements through some alliances, but also of accommodation (in cases of lack of interest and divergence) with other great powers such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China. 19 Clearly this position in regions vital to the EU is not sustainable. The lack of real capacity for influence in these areas, demonstrated progressively after the invasion of Georgia, the Arab revolutions, the annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis, also show a lack of coherence between European vital interests, the concept of strategic neighborhood and the European capabilities and instruments that are presented.

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THE 2015 EU SAHEL ACTION PLAN Previously, and as a starting point to undertake an expansion of the strategic environment, the crisis in Mali, in January 2012, was a clear warning to the EU. In particular, the insurgency campaign of Tuareg tribes in Azawad against the government of Mali, which showed signs of great weakness, which resulted in a coup d’état and the offensive of the insurgent groups, with the conquest of cities and barracks that remained abandoned by the Malian military forces. The situation deteriorated and the Bamako government showed growing inability to confront the insurgent groups that were conquering cities and approaching the capital dangerously. In January 2013, the French intervention with the Serval Operation 20 took place, which prevented the implosion of the country and allowed its gradual stabilization, leaving the European Union in evidence because of its inability to mount a joint operation, leaving France to than take the initiative. Given this situation of instability, it is not until 2015 that the EU decided to implement the 2015 Sahel Action Plan. 21 This strategy expanded the security space that had been contemplated and reaffirmed the security-development approach, incorporating a context in which it is recognized that the problem of transnational organized crime is a key element and emphasizing the need for EU-MaghrebSahel cooperation to deal with this situation, which is closer to a comprehensive approach. The security situation of the Sahel region remains extremely volatile, with a particularly precarious situation in northern Mali and around Lake Chad, by means of spill-over effects from the South of Libya and the North of Nigeria. Niger is an important hub and transit country for migratory movements through the Sahel. Challenges linked to the extreme poverty, lack of stability including economic fragility remain as acute as in 2011. Irregular migration and related crimes such as trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, corruption, illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime are thriving particularly where there is weak and/or little presence of

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Introduction

any governmental authority. Migration pressure is mounting, with serious implications both for the countries in the region and the EU. In this way, the expansion of the strategic neighborhood space was, on the other hand, a necessity in terms of the implications of the Arab revolts. In this regard, the EU launches the Sahel Action Plan, which seeks to “emphasize the nexus between development and security.” This Plan establishes a solid basis to achieve the objectives of the EU strategy in the Sahel, as well as strengthening the EU’s attention in four areas: “prevention and fight against radicalization, creation of adequate conditions for young people, migration, mobility and border management, fight against illegal trafficking and organized crime transnational.” 22 The EU rightly emphasizes the importance of promoting synergies between the countries of the region and between the Sahel and the neighboring countries, in particular to explore a common regional space for dialogue and cooperation between the Sahel, the Maghreb and the EU in sectors relevant issues such as security and migration. 23 In this way, the fourth strategic point was also included in the so-called strategic approach, border control and the fight against illicit trafficking and organized transnational crime, also establishing a series of regional and national Sahelian measures for starting up in the 2015–2016 biennium. Unfortunately, corruption is making crime and government in certain areas of the Sahel and West Africa so interrelated that judicial systems and the rule of law really do protect, facilitate and allow impunity, creating de facto a way of life by not stopping and preventing the use of illicit traffic routes. 24 Nevertheless, in the case of the Sahel Action Plan, the EU proposed its actions coordinated with the main regional and international organizations and other partners, especially the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of the States of West Africa (ECOWAS), the Sahel G5, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the World Bank, as well as civil society. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of continuing this close international and regional coordination, including between the EU Special Representative for the Sahel, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Mali and the AU’s High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, in order to create synergies in the implementation of the respective strategies. 25 Thus, after an analysis of the approaches dedicated to the Mediterranean in the successive strategic documents produced by the EU, it is clear that the EU has devoted many efforts and has undertaken various initiatives, particularly toward the Mediterranean region. But this strategic expansion of the EU’s area of interest toward the east and south, was not and has not adequately evaluate, being dragged by events and adopting reactive policies. Currently, it was possible to affirm that these efforts and initiatives have not delivered the expected results. The review of the previous strategic documents, allows observing a series of approaches that are repeated in the different approaches, and that continue to lead to unsatisfactory results by putting them in connec-

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tion with the investments made, both in economic terms, as humans, as policies and initiatives.

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NOTES 1. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Opened on July 3, 1973 in Helsinki and continuedin Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975, it was closed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. 2. See ‘Cuestiones relativas a la seguridad y a la cooperación en la región del Mediterráneo.’ Acta Final Helsinki, 1975, pp. 37–38. http://www.osce.org/es/mc/39506? download=true. 3. Acta Final Helsinki, 1975, p. 13. En http://www.osce.org/es/mc/39506?download=true. 4. Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference—27–28/11/95. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf. 5. Una Europa segura en un mundo mejor—Estrategia Europea de Seguridad. Bruselas. 2003, p. 3. 6. Ibid., p. 6. 7. See García Cantalapiedra, D. Peace through Primacy: la Administración Bush, la política exterior deEEUU y las bases de una primacía imperial. UNISCI Papers. Madrid. 2004. 8. The European Neighborhood Policy governs the EU’s relations with 16 of their closest Eastern andSouthern Neighbors. To the South: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, and to the East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova andUkraine. Russia takes part in Cross-Border Cooperation activities under the ENP, but is not part of the ENP as such. 9. Informe sobre la aplicación de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad-Ofrecer seguridad en un mundo en evolución-. Bruselas, 11 de diciembre de 2008 S407/08, p. 7. http://www. learneurope.eu/files/4013/7509/0820/Informe_sobre_la_aplicacin_de_la_EES.pdf. 10. Ibid., p.10. 11. Ibid., p.4. 12. Ibid. 13. Informe sobre la aplicación de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad-Ofrecer seguridad en un mundo enevolución-. Bruselas, 11 de diciembre de 2008 S407/08, p. 7. http://www. learneurope.eu/files/4013/7509/0820/Informe_sobre_la_aplicacin_de_la_EES.pdf 14. Clinton, Hilary, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Affairs, 11 de October, 2011. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 15. The ‘Arab Springs’ are a series of popular uprisings that began in the Arab countries from the year 2010 and have been maintained today. The countries that have championed these mobilizations are: Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Morocco as well as in the territories of Palestine and Occidental Sahara. It is important to note that the incidence of these movements has not been the same in all countries. In this way, Tunisia held, at the end of 2014, legislative and presidential elections, culminating the political transition and becoming the first Arab country that chooses by universal and direct suffrage its head of state. In another vein, Morocco and Algeria have responded to popular demands by undertaking reform programs. Likewise, other countries have seen their political life agitated but have not been able to meet the demands raised by these social movements. For different view from Spanish point of view see: Priego Moreno, A. “La primavera árabe: ¿una cuarta ola de democratización?.” UNISCI Discussion Papers nº26, pp. 75–93 y López García B, “Paradojas y desafíos de las primaveras árabes.” Res Pública: Revista de Filosofía Política, nº30. 2013, pp. 147–162; García Cantalapiedra, David. “La política de los Estados Unidos tras las Primaveras Árabes,” in Priego, Alberto (coord.). Política exterior de los Estados Unidos. Cuadernos Comillas de Política Exterior, 1, 2015. Pp. 71–86. 16. toward a European Global Strategy. Securing European influence in a changing world. European Global Strategy Project. 28/5/2013. EGS Final.

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17. Real, B. “La cuestión de la representación única de la Unión Europea en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.” Anuario de Derecho Internacional, XXVII, 2011, pp. 555–571. http://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/34871/4/AEDI%2027-2011.pdf 18. Conclusiones—19 y 20 de diciembre de 2013. Bruselas, 20 de diciembre de 2013, EUCO 217/13, pp. 2–11. En http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-217-2013-INIT/ es/pdf 19. For a more complete debate see Garcia Cantalapiedra, David. “toward a European Global Strategy—what needs to be done?” Seminar, EU Centre in Singapore. 22 August 2013. National University of Singapore. http://www.eucentre.sg/?p=4448; also García Cantalapiedra, David: “toward a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World,” EUSA Review (Spring 2013). 20. Military operation in Mali, led by the European Community of West African States (ECOWAS),covered by the UN (Res/CS/2085 of December 20, 2013), whose objective was to stop the advance ofIslamists in the north from the country. 21. Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020. Brussels, 20 April 2015.7823/15.Annex. 22. Ibid. 23. At the regional level, there are political dialogues with the countries of the western migratory route(Rabat Process) and the eastern migratory route (Khartoum Process). These dialogues are based onconcrete action plans and financial resources. The EU has also launched the new regional protection anddevelopment programs (PRPD) in North Africa and the Horn of Africa http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-15-6026_es.htm 24. See Barras, R y García Cantalapiedra, D. Hacia un nuevo y diferente ‘flanco sur’ en el Gran Magreb-Sahel. Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 39, Octubre 2015, pp. 17–32. 25. Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020. Brussels, 20 April 2015.7823/15.Annex.

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Chapter One

The Greater Maghreb, the European Union and the 2016 EUGS

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David Garcia Cantalapiedra

The 2016 European Global Strategy: a response according to the current security challenges in the area? The rethinking of the EU’s security strategy after 2015 has been driven by the growing weakening of the European Union’s global influence, mainly due to the economic crisis, as well as the uncertainty generated by the Brexit. 1 The question we can ask ourselves is: why has the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean been so unsuccessful, and why has the evolution of the EU’s approach in its different initiatives not yielded remarkable results? Are you predestined to commit the same conceptual errors with respect to the South, than the previous strategic approaches? Regarding the enlarged Mediterranean, the unofficial document, entitled “The European Union in a changing global environment” of 2015 of the new strategic reflection, considers the MENA area as an immediate challenge for its security, clearly establishing the disappearance of the clear distinction between internal and external security, although it refers to a general causality that does not respond to the origin of the challenges and threats in both areas. 2 The document reaffirms MENA as an area of responsibility, maintaining the union between the Middle East and North Africa, even though it is clear that the problems, challenges and threats to security are different in both areas. Despite the fact that the Arab revolutions and the progressive wars in Libya, Syria and Iraq have promoted the expansion of terrorism, organized crime (along with their symbiosis) and waves of refugees, this threat is prior to this dynamic, with its own logic and development in North Africa (Algeria especially) and the Sahel and its expansion in its peripheries by the action of groups such as Boko Haram. In this sense, from 2002–2004 there were already counterter11

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rorist cooperative initiatives, led by the US, such as the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2003 and the TSCTI (Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative), 3 and, mainly, since the appearance of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2005, the area acquires its own dynamics in terms of terrorist threat, insurgent groups and transnational organized crime. The great problem, in addition, has been the lack of cooperation between the states of the zone and the corruption that has facilitated the expansion of these threats. 4 In parallel to the strategic review, the EU began the re-evaluation of the ENP, producing a document from the European Commission and the High Representative for the EU on Foreign Policy and Security, which sought to adjust the philosophy, mechanisms and means of ENP to the new situation in the periphery of the EU. In this way, the scope of the area of interest of the ENP has been increased to the peripheries of the periphery of the EU, and has given a greater role to the security issues within this reform, including the issues of terrorism, radicalization and organized crime. 5 In this sense, there is still a very separate treatment, although the nature and dynamics of these threats are different in the Middle East and North Africa-Sahel. It also continued to maintain the inclusion of European states with those of the Middle East and North Africa, despite the fact that internal subdivisions are carried out for the European states (Eastern Partnership (EaP), and for the Mediterranean states ( Union for the Mediterranean), the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq, the new Regional Development and Protection Programs (RDPPs) in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, and cooperation with Turkey, Ukraine, the Arab League, the African Union or the Gulf Cooperation Council. 6 Thus, the 2016 European global strategy once again establishes the MENA area as one of the priority areas for the EU. Paradoxically, it does not talk about neighborhood policy; it continues to unite the Middle East with North Africa and the Sahel, and although it unites North Africa, West Africa and the Sahel with the new vision of spill over neighborhood policy, it continues to complicate approaches and strategies by including the global vision the PalestinianIsraeli problem, Turkey and the Gulf states. Despite the role of some states in the financing of terrorist groups in Libya, the challenges and threats that occur in the area need a separate treatment. On the one hand in terms of strategy, and, on the other, in terms of media, if you want to be operational and have real mechanisms that facilitate the resolution of problems and conflicts. The fourth priority of the MENA point, finally establishes the following postulates (previously raised in the Sahel Action Plan): “systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel.” 7

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A Necessary Re-definition The EU faces a complicated international situation and the geostrategic context, with both endogenous and exogenous factors: the Brexit, the situation and evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the turbulent situation in Turkey, which is shaping up as a partner less unreliable, in an international system more anarchic and with greater uncertainty. Thus the EU faces a periphery of an increasingly complex region: the current geopolitical space integrates not only its ‘traditional neighborhood,’ but also includes a series of states that comprise a geographical proximity strongly connected to the EU that, in turn, it is projected to other more extensive areas, which are equally linked to the vital interests of Europe, such as: the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Arctic, as well as other adjacent maritime routes. On the other hand, it is important to point out what kind of threats the EU must face, in order to be able to stipulate the measures outlined to combat them. Thus, among the main threats in the area of North Africa and the Sahel, include, among others, fragile states, terrorism, organized crime, irregular immigration, as well as other criminal activities, associated with transnational organized crime and those has a strong presence in the area and are threats in constant evolution. 8 Likewise and as indicated in the introduction, we consider that, despite the fact that the strategy is based on a correct diagnosis regarding the evolution of threats, its hybrid nature, as well as its growing interaction for European security as a whole , however, by taking as a starting point the 2003 ESS, and the establishment of the neighborhood policy (ENP), and in accordance with the provisions of the new strategy, observing that the same scheme is repeated in the 2016 EUGS, we consider that the very conception of ENP is wrong, since this mechanism can no longer be the sole framework instrument toward the periphery of the EU to establish the EU’s foreign and security policy. From this point of view, the inclusion of the entire periphery, that is, Eastern Europe-Central Asia-Caucasus and the whole Mediterranean basin and the Middle East in this same framework, produces great imbalances. It is necessary to redefine the EU’s neighborhood policy on North Africa and the Sahel, both geographically and strategically. Therefore it is necessary to identify the changes that have occurred in the region, and, in the same sense, it is important to examine what is happening in the area and what strategy can be implemented realistically, and whether or not it responds to the needs current in terms of security.

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A GEOGRAPHICALLY RE-DEFINED MAGHREB-SAHEL SPACE: GREATER MAGHREB The southern part of the ENP has a design that, above all in terms of security, does not respond to the global needs of an area that includes North Africa and the Middle East (MENA zone) when clearly the dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East they are very disparate at least and, in the case of the first, they overflow their instruments as the stipulated geographical area. The MENA vision corresponds almost exactly to the concept coined by the US of the “Greater Middle East,” which responded to the US vision and interests in the area. The gradual loss of the presence and influence of the EU in its periphery has also become a mirage, since the EU had relied on the incontestable authority and influence that the US enjoyed in the area before the end of the Cold War. In this way, and once the US has modified its policy and/or has lost its recognized superiority, the EU, in addition to seeing its resources reduced and having carried out wrong policies, finds itself in a situation in which it is incapable of structure the area where you have to project your influence and capabilities. On the another hand, it cannot speak only about Maghreb or North Africa, but it is necessary to introduce a geographical expansion that includes the Sahel, at least in terms of a vision of security Comprehensive In this sense, the creation of a strategy for the Sahel, broken off from the Maghreb, was a biased, incomplete and late solution, which did not include the expansion of security threats from Mauritania to Libya/Chad and from the Mediterranean to Burkina Faso/ Nigeria. The union of sub-governed spaces, corruption, organized crime and terrorism is the main threat facing the EU and its member states in the Greater Maghreb. In this regard it is important to point out that a new ‘southern flank’ is being formed in the direct vicinity of southern European countries, whose main characteristics are, among others, weak or fragile governments (absence of effective governments that give rise to called sub-governed spaces), endemic corruption, widespread poverty, absence of freedoms, community and ethnic tensions, and proliferation of weapons. Along with this, the increase in extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region as of 2005 has paralleled the growth of transnational organized crime networks in that region. Although there is an intense debate about their relationship, intensity and impact, it is an undeniable dynamic in this area. The EU does not really have a unified MaghrebSahel policy and in terms of organized crime and terrorism, and the Sahel cannot be separated from the Maghreb. There is a limited and partial understanding of the problem both in terms of threats and in viable solutions, irremediably broadened by the action of Boko Haram and overflowing the vision, projection and strategy of the EU. Despite the “Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020,” 9 already analyzed above, the measures taken are small, very recent and probably insufficient and late from the point of view of the

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dynamics and synergy between terrorism and organized crime in a context of corruption. The EU continues to maintain a security-development approach, basically based on a conception of human security, despite the fact that this approach is highly debatable to face such threats. Regarding the specific weight of Europe as an actor in the region, a large part of this strategic problem is due to the lower capacity and weight of the southern states of the EU related to those in Central and Northern Europe. Greater Maghreb Strategically

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Once the issues related to the purely geographical conception of the strategy have been analyzed, we analyze what the strategy proposes in purely strategic terms. In the first place, it is necessary to emphasize that the region itself has a vital interest in geostrategic terms, due to its relevance in the energy field, natural resources, as well as in the migratory field due to its growing demographic weight and positioning in the global chessboard. On the other hand, it is crucial to point out what is happening in the area (North Africa and Sahel) and what the strategy proposes as measures to be implemented, whether or not it responds to current needs, and if it is based on realistic postulates, since it is of something so ambitious. In this sense, it seems

Figure 1.1. The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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difficult to align the actors of Brussels and the member states in a strategy that guides both European security policy and foreign policy and action. 10 In these terms it is important to point out that the EU is, first and foremost, an actor in economic and political matters, having started the path in the field of defense recently, due to the continuous obstructions and restrictions of the United Kingdom and also of the United States. Therefore, it has certain shortcomings in terms of its military capabilities compared to NATO. In addition, the EU must face the endemic influence of the national interest. Additionally, it is important to underline the influence that the events framed within the Arab Springs have had for the ENP itself, and as for example, these facts have contributed to reinforce the European Neighborhood Instrument 2014–2020, that is, the financial part of the ENP, with a budget of 15,400 million euros. 11 Precisely this instrument is conceived as one of the strong points of the EU’s external action. It should be noted that with respect to its neighborhood, and also to the southern neighborhood, 12 the EU remains the largest donor and net issuer of funds (and is expected to remain so), 13 while still prioritizing issues as human rights, justice, civil society, education and youth employment, economic development, and climate change, 14 being some of them far away from the reality in which are living most of the Mediterranean’s south shore countries participating in the ENP. These instruments are implemented through a network of bilateral programs (carried out with each country), as well as with the program called Cross Border Cooperation. 15 Despite these instruments present and parallel to the EU’s external action, the 2016 EUGS proposes a formulation of an external policy that is more in line with the realities, processes and synergies that are currently present in the Maghreb and in the Sahel. In this sense, many of the phenomena present here, such as terrorism, organized crime or the illegal trafficking of human beings are unparalleled with what is currently happening in the Arabian peninsula (except for the presence of some terrorist groups) so it is important to have a clear and concise definition in geographic, strategic and security terms. In this sense, the CSDP should identify the EU interests in the area, create a specific security strategy, and allocate sufficient resources differentiated from those dedicated to other areas of the European periphery. In this regard, the US approach could be taken as an example, which maintains a clearly differentiated AOR between AFRICOM and CENTCOM. The destabilization of these states, falling in situations similar to Libya or Mali would be disastrous for the EU, but specifically for Spain and other EU’s southern states. Thus, the EU promoted the so-called Sahel G5. It was an initiative for the security of the region launched in 2014 with the increased instability in the region started with the Mali crisis in 2013. The destabilization provoked by the armed groups spread across the porous borders, affecting the western area of Burkina Faso and Niger. The G5 Sahel Force, promoted by French President Macron, welcomes these 5 members (Mali, Bur-

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kina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) in order to focus the operational forces in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. The priority objective for this force is the restoration of the governmental authority, facilitate humanitarian aid and protect the displaced people and attack the armed threat, functioning as well as a regional police force. Its annual cost ($500 millions) depends on the financing of the same G5 with the support of the EU, United Nations, the United States and France. Why a New Approach is Needed

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“The world has changed so much since our current strategy of 2003. It is an excellent one, but from a completely different world; a world that allowed the European Union to say that it had never lived in such a secure and prosperous environment. Clearly this is not the case today anymore.” 16 This statement explains the new strategy as an adaption by the EU to the new international environment, based on the December 2013, May 2015 and 25–26 June 2015 European Council decisions; 17 it was established that a Global Strategy of the Union on foreign and security policy should be presented, no later than June 2016. In the same terms, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced, in its 2014 policy guidelines, the need to lock in “for a stronger Europe in terms of security and defense.” 18 Likewise, Juncker reaffirmed the EU’s security policy, channeling it “toward a global, realistic and credible defense in the EU,” as the heading of the document prepared by Paris and Berlin suggests. 19 This proposal is made in a context of a degraded security environment, following the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU. In the same way it seems important to point out why a new strategy is needed: “Our world today is more connected, contested and complex. This makes our global environment more unpredictable, creating instability and ambiguity, but also leads to new opportunities. In the European Union’s neighborhood a set of concurrent and heightened crises create an arc of instability. This will have implications for the Union and the wider world for many years to come. The European Union needs to take a fresh look at this uncertain environment, in which opportunities and challenges coexist. An EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy will enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future.” 20

It can therefore be highlighted that the EU is capable, correctly, of listing, defining and understanding that the international system, as far as security issues are concerned, has changed and we are currently facing a moment, where the whole world is interconnected, in terms of dependency, connectivity, migrations, citizenship as well as development. It is today a more anarchic place, sustaining on the one hand, in a series of uncertainties, regard-

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ing issues and solid actors in the past. With regard to the Mediterranean, the situation is similar: “changes in the global balance of power will be reflected in the Middle East as well. China has adopted a policy of close relations with resource-rich states in Africa and the Gulf region. Russia has also been trying—rather successfully, one might add—to re-gain some of its past influence in the region, and India is expected to make its presence more felt in the future.” 21 Likewise, the EU considers adequately that the world today is a place of deep controversy. In this regard, we consider it important to highlight the numerous conflicts that exist throughout the globe, both in North Africa, the Maghreb and the Middle East, and in the East, as well as the geopolitical positioning of various powers that generate their new crises and new disputes. In this sense, the international system today has many more actors, less and worse leadership, and a more complex agenda than in the past. It is also important to point out that, despite the correct identification of the state of affairs, the new strategy offers perhaps a point of optimism insofar as it considers that it has a series of capacities that it does not possess in reality, as it follows from the following paragraph:

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“The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. This means that Europeans, working with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties.” 22

It is clear that, at present, the EU does not have the precise mechanisms to deal with the threats it has previously identified, and that it must use, as mentioned, its allies and partners, in particular with regard to NATO In this sense, the concept of “strategic autonomy” is derived by virtue of which the EU should be able to protect itself, while at the same time it should be able to respond to external crises and help third parties. In this sense it is important to underline that it is more a wishful thinking on the part of the EU than a real possibility, at least at the present time. On the other hand, the 2016 strategy includes, in line with other security areas, such as NATO, the term resilience, in particular, that referring to companies. In the same terms, and as indicated from national sources, the “idea of resilience constitutes the central concept on which the Strategy rests.” This defines it as the capacity of States and societies to reform support and recover from internal and international crises, on the basis that this capacity is only possible from the existence of a minimum level of democracy, the rule of law and of sustainable development. 23 In this regard, we consider that this term is only being used extensively in the field of security, (just as in its day the term ‘human security’ was coined), as if it were a mechanism in itself with which the societies themselves count (something tangible). In this sense:

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“Precisely because resilience is rather new concept in the European jargon, it will require some fine-tuning and clarification in the implementation of the strategy. If the EU assumes that the Middle East, North Africa and adjacent regions are likely to project instability in the years to come, a strategy of resilience should consider mechanisms of early warning and targeted support to specific territories or sectors in the EU itself.” 24

It should be underlined, therefore, that the approach and direct suffering of European civil societies, as far as their approach to threats to security is concerned, clearly exposes the inability to prevent threats, and therefore to defend the societies, including a conception related to the capacity of absorption by European society and the states. This approach seems to assume that there is no other more proactive and preventive mechanisms before the threats, and leaving everything at the mercy of the capacity of society in its whole to overcome the suffering (caused by the various threats). In the strategy’s approach, the EU must contribute to the resilience of both the Member States and their immediate neighborhood and the international community as a whole. It can be argued that this is a more defensive than a transformative concept, but it is also true that the concept itself integrates the idea of reform, internal and international. 25 However, a remarkable number of experts consider, at best, ‘Resilience’ as an “abstract and malleable” concept (this may also have contributed to its acceptability to policymakers), others not more than an empty catch-phrase, and at worse, as little as an ontological fact. 26 In fact, a key EU document about Resilience, the EU report” Resilience in Practice” establish multiple possible definitions of resilience, repeating the problem observed with the definition of Human Security: the own report recognize this situation in his executive summary establishing “Both the definition and the approach are specific to each organization.” 27 The United States had also had problems in its approach to North Africa and the Sahel, not so much in the identification of threats: “terrorism and violence plagues North Africa and the Middle East,” 28 but in the implementation of the strategy itself. It is considered that “many of the current challenges to peace, security and prosperity are rooted in the instability of the immediate vicinity of the EU and in the changing forms that threats take.” 29 Nevertheless, it is important to underline the perception that the countries of the southern neighborhood have about the EU policies. The following figure shows the cataloging done by the receiving countries, which have meant “warning signals to Brussels and to individual EU countries. By now, the EU and its member states should have a clear idea what policies they cannot adopt toward a region that in terms of size, economic potential, and strategic relevance is just as important as Europe’s Eastern neighbors.” 30

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CONCLUSIONS After almost 25 years since the launch of the Barcelona Process, and the numerous approaches the EU has made to its southern neighborhood, the experience could say that these have not been as efficient as expected, given the situation of instability that emanates from the region. The present strategy, it can be said, also fails to overcome a series of common places and strategic errors, which, as analyzed, are inherited from previous strategic documents and approaches. In this sense the EU’s policy as a whole toward the Mediterranean has not been effective, neither in terms of security, nor economic, nor in terms of democratic development. The weakness of the EU when formulating a common policy toward the Mediterranean, resides mainly in the divergent interests of its member states, the different preferences and priorities within the EU, and the disparity of perceptions of security toward the region. The current situation of the EU, compounded by the economic crisis, the uncertainty regarding the impact of Brexit, as well as the extreme situation of Syria and Libya, shows that the mechanisms undertaken by the EU during these decades have not given positive results. Thus, despite the fact that the EU has tried to carry out a broad process of reviewing its foreign policy and its tools, it is important that these adapt to the complex and changing scenario in which the international system as a whole has become, as particularly the southern region of the Mediterranean and Africa. The EGS 2016 carries out a better definition of geographical spaces, since it includes in some way the complexity of the current world, something that could not be outlined in the 2003 EES. Additionally, the EU finally gets to understand that his vital interest and its future in terms of security, inevitably passes through the south. It is positive that the EU manages to analyze the threats and developments that have suffered since 2003, in issues such as the symbiosis of organized crime and terrorism, for example. Additionally, the strategy does not delve deeply into the issues. In this sense, in most of the sections it is expected that the strategy, once it lists the problems, broadens and deepens in some way the instruments and measures to be implemented. On the contrary, it does not provide clear solutions, being incomplete, or merely descriptive. Another aspect to be highlighted is that, in relation to Libya, it can be said that they elude any type of responsibility or leadership in favor of NATO. Thus, it is understood that after the Brexit, the EU has seen its operational capabilities vanish. At EU level, it is necessary to address the controversial debate on increasing the budget for security and defense, delving into the question of intelligence (in spite of the recent French initiative on an EU Intelligence College), and, particularly, on the issue of real cooperation between EU countries. In the same terms, and pointing out the fact that there is no effective EU cooperation with the countries in the area, it would be important to seek alternative

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solutions with the countries on a bilateral basis, taking advantage of the special relations between certain countries in southern Europe with the countries of the Greater Maghreb. Regarding to organized crime, the fight against this scourge in an integral way is vital. Thus, to attack transnational organized crime, syndicates and networks, in symbiosis with terrorism, especially in the Sahel region, a permanent reinforced cooperation should be established, mainly with France, taking advantage of his presence in the area. This will be an arduous task, due to the high divergence of interests among the EU states toward the region. Finally, taking into account the previous analysis made to the working documents, strategies and reviews, it is evident that the EU is capable of making a good analysis of the security situation, but lacks both the means and the will to put in place real and credible instruments to face the threats that besieged the old continent. Therefore, it will be necessary for the EU as a whole to be aware of the threats it faces and to act accordingly with realism, pragmatism and funding, in line with the statements made. Specifically with regard to North Africa and the Sahel, no major changes are foreseen in terms of its conception, since, as has been pointed out above, the EU is based on postulates and geostrategic conceptions (space and strategy) anchored in the past. It will require more time to change this vision and to understand definitively that the security dynamics in the Greater Maghreb is different, despite of an increasing ISIS presence there, from the Middle East.

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NOTES 1. Mc Shane, D. Brexit: How Britain Will Leave Europe. Tauris, 2015; Eldholm, M. Brexit and the UK’s future. 19 de julio de 2015, Oslo University. 2. “The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an economically diverse region that includes both the oil-rich economies in the Gulf and countries that are resource-scarce in relation to population, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen. The region’s economic fortunes over much of the past quarter century have been heavily influenced by two factors – the price of oil and the legacy of economic policies and structures that had emphasized a leading role for the state. With about 23 percent of the 300 million people in the Middle East and North Africa living on less than $2 a day, empowering poor people constitutes an important strategy for fighting poverty. Through a combination of analytical, advisory, and lending services, the Bank aims to provide poor people with the necessary skills, resources, and infrastructure to improve the quality of their lives. The MENA Region includes: Algeria | Bahrain | Djibouti | Egypt | Iran | Iraq | Israel | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | Libya | Malta | Morocco | Oman | Qatar | Saudi Arabia | Syria | Tunisia | United Arab Emirates | West Bank and Gaza | Yemen.” Banco Mundial, 28 November 2014. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ MENAEXT/0,,menuPK:247619~pagePK:146748~piPK:146812~theSitePK:256299,00.html See 2.2. Rethinking the EU’s approach toward North Africa and the Middle East (MENA). Strategic Review-The European Union in a changing global environment-Executive summary. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/strategic-review-european-unionchanging-globalenvironment-executive-summary 3. García Cantalapiedra, David. “La creación del AFRICOM y los objetivos de la política de EEUU hacia África: gobernanza, contraterrorismo, contrainsurgencia y seguridad energética.” RIE. ARI Nº 53/2007. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/

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d72763804f01876dbd0cfd3170baead1/ARI532007_Garca_Cantalapiedra_AFRICOM_EEUU. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=d72763804f01876dbd0cfd3170baead1 4. See Barras, B and García, D “Hacia un nuevo y diferente “Flanco Sur” en el Gran Magreb-Sahel.” Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal, Nº 39 (Octubre 2015). https://www.ucm.es/ data/cont/media/www/pag-74789/UNISCIDP39-1BARRAS-GARCIA.pdf 5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: the European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 final. 6. EC/HR. Review of the European Neighborhood Policy. Brussels. JOIN (2015) 50 final. 7. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. pp. 34–36. https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/ eugs_review_web.pdf 8. Monzini, P., Abdel Aziz, N., Pastore, F. The Changing Dynamics of Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 2015. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/newmed_monzini.pdf 9. Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020. Bruselas, 20 de abril de 2015 (OR. en) 7823/15. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/04/ st07823-en15_pdf/ 10. Gavas, M, Hackenesch,C, Koch, S, Mackie, J. and Maxwell, S. “The European Union’s Global Strategy: putting sustainable development at the heart of EU external action.” European Think Tanks Group. January 2016, p. 1. 11. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). EU Neighbourhood Info Centre. http:// www.enpiinfo.eu/main.php?id_type=2&id=402#SixENItargets 12. Schumacher, T. Back to the Future: The ‘New’ ENP toward the Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition. CEPOB—College of Europe Policy Brief series. January 2016. https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/schumacher_cepob_1-16.pdf 13. “The European Union is the world’s largest donor of development and humanitarian aid, and that will not change. The Sustainable Development Goals can drive reform of the international system by offering an opportunity to address many problems in one process: namely insecurity, poverty, under-development, climate change and uncontrolled migration. And, ultimately, we seek a system that ensures that everybody gets his or her fair share of the benefits of globalization.” President Donald Tusk, 71st Session, UN General Assembly. 21 September 2016.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/21-tusk-speech-unga/ 14. ENP’s 6 goals: “(1) Fostering human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, equality, sustainable democracy, good governance and a thriving civil society. (2) Achieving progressive integration into the EU internal market and enhanced co-operation including through legislative approximation and regulatory convergence, institution building and investments. (3) Creating conditions for well managed mobility of people and promotion of peopleto-people contacts. (4) Encouraging development, poverty reduction, internal economic, social and territorial cohesion, rural development, perceived to be very far from the reality existing in most of the countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean that are part of the ENP. (5) Promoting confidence building and other measures contributing to security and the prevention and settlement of conflicts. (6) Enhancing sub-regional, regional and Neighbourhood wide collaboration as well as Cross-Border Cooperation.” http://www.enpiinfo.eu/main.php?id_ type=2&id=402#SixENItargets 15. The European Neighbourhood Instrument. ENI CBC Med 2014–2020. http://www. enpicbcmed.eu/enicbcmed-2014-2020; Cross Border Cooperation within the European Neighbourhood Instrument. Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme 2014–2020. European Commission. 17 December 2015. Decision No C (2015) 9133. http://www.enpicbcmed.eu/sites/default/ files/jop_eni_cbc_med_2014-2020_adopted_modified_financial_tables_19.12.2015.pdf 16. Keynote address by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Conference “The EU’s Contribution to Global Rules: Challenges in an Age of Power Shifts.” The Hague, 8 December 2015. http://eeas.europa.eu/documents/hrvpatthehague081215_en.pdf 17. Conclusiones de los Consejo Europeos del 19–20 de diciembre de 2013. Bruselas, 19 de diciembre de 2013 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/es/ec/ 140220.pdf; Conclusiones del Consejo sobre política común de seguridad y defensa (PCSD),

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mayo de 2015 [Consilium 8971/15]; Conclusiones del Consejo Europeo, junio de 2015 [EUCO 22/15]. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/ 18. Jean-Claude Juncker. “Un nuevo comienzo para Europa: mi Agenda en materia de empleo, crecimiento, equidad y cambio democrático.” Orientaciones políticas para la próxima Comisión Europea. Discurso como candidato al cargo de Presidente de la Comisión Europea Estrasburgo, 15July 2014. https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/pg_es.pdf 19. Paris and Berlin push for tighter defence co-operation. Finantial Times. 12 September 2016 https://www.ft.com/content/fd637b0e-7913-11e6-97ae-647294649b28 20. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en 21. Dokos, T (Ed.) The Eastern Mediterranean in 2020: Possible Scenarios and Policy Recommendations. Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 2016. http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/%CE%9D%CE%BF-26-The-EasternMediterraneanin-20201.pdf 22. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. June 2016, p. 17. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/ sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf 23. López-Aranda, R. La Estrategia global de la UE en tres conceptos. Reflexiones Exteriores, Blog del MAEC (13-julio-2016). http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ RedesSociales/Blogreflexionesexteriores/Paginas/20160713.aspx 24. Soler i Lecha, E. y Tocci, N. Implications of the EU Global strategy for the Middle East and North Africa. Opinion 424, July 2016 CIDOB. p. 3. http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/ publication_series/opinion/mediterraneo_y_oriente_medio/implications_of_the_eu_global_ strategy_for_the_middle_east_and_north_africa 25. Ibid. 26. Wagner, W. & Anholt, R. “Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?” Contemporary Security Policy, 2016. p.10 27. EU Commission. Resilience in Practice. Saving lives and improving livelihoods. October 2015.p.9. https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/29156/download?token=TcDjRjBP 28. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. June 2016, p. 13. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/ sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf 29. Comunicación conjunta sobre la lucha contra las amenazas híbridas. Una respuesta de la Unión Europea. Bruselas, 13.4.2016 JOIN (2016) 18 final/2. 30. Dempsey, J. Europe Still Looking Backward at Its Southern Neighbors. Carnegie Europe. 30 March 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63170 . In particular, there is a table prepared with information submitted by analysts from different countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, who consider that European foreign policy toward their respective countries , in a scale of operation, is, in most cases, “confusing.” In this way, the EU’s approach to its southern neighborhood translates into inefficiency, despite the measures, programs and resources invested in all areas.

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Chapter Two

The Maghreb-Sahel Axis The Threat of Terrorism

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Rubén Herrero de Castro and Nieva Machín Osés

The conventional phenomenon of terrorism as it was known, changed significantly after the 9/11 attacks. Prior to this date, the main terrorist groups emerged in the so-called First World countries, operated in a defined environment and their ideological base was predominantly political focused on subverting the political system. In addition, the psychological dynamic that prevailed in them was rational in the sense of valuing the individual survival of its members. Although this more traditional conception of terrorism coexisted with another one of religious base particularly implanted in the geopolitical area of the Middle East, mainly concentrated in the destruction of the State of Israel and attacking western interests, particularly of the United States, that to this day continues existing. After 9/11, a threat arose that had arisen in the shadows, the globalist terrorism of global reach, especially embodied in the al Qaeda group led by Osama Bin Laden. A group based in Afghanistan with franchises in the Middle East, allied with a strategy of secrecy and with technology applied to communications, manifested itself with massive attacks with the intention of expelling Western countries from the great Middle East. They were reasonably countered with technology, the United States’ drone program, use of decisive firepower and civil engineering in those countries where they were most active (Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen). Since 2001 and for a long time they were the international terrorist reference and the main threat to the West and in a weak way their model was replicated in other areas of the world, essentially Africa but without the power shown by the main matrix. But the terrorist phenomenon will suffer a new mutation after the setbacks suffered by the Dron Program and the death of its leader Osama Bin 25

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Laden, who, as we will see later in this chapter, raised and promoted for a long time the implementation of Al Qaeda in Africa as a formula of destabilization and harassment of local regimes and their Western allies. The new face of international terrorism is nowadays the Islamic State that coexists with Al Qaeda, although they do not share methods of implementation and action. The first of these, originated in 2003 in a small terrorist group affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Organization for Monotheism and Jihad led by Abu Musad Al Zarqawi. Upon his death the group adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and came close to being defeated in 2007 by the alliance between US troops and an alliance of Iraqi Sunni tribes, the Sons of Ansar. But major errors of the government of Iraq presided by Al Maliki regarding the integration of these Sunni tribes and the decline of military commitment in the area of the Obama Administration, allowed the group to survive and extend to what it is today. 1 The apparent decline of Al Qaeda, which is not as or at least as drastic as it seems, coincided with the emergence of the Islamic State that broke with the strategy of stealth of the former and seeks its media and geographic expansion, through the commission of brutal crimes that It publicizes explicitly and the occupation of unstructured spaces in the Middle East (Iraq, Libya and Syria) and Africa (Maghreb, Sahel and sub-Saharan area). The implications of this geographical progression were devastating from the point of view of the human security of the area as well as the consequences they have today and could have in the future for Europe, the United States and its global allies. Al Qaeda and Islamic State, share as ideology, Salafi jihadism, and today compete to be its maximum exponent. Recently, and as a result of the estrangement/confrontation between both, the Islamic State claimed the Salafi and Wahhabi heritage, indicating itself as the only and legitimate exponent of the same. They presented themselves in 2014 as the only valid reference of jihadism, in the fulfillment of a divine mission, the defensive jihad against the Muslim enemy that does not agree with its postulates and the offensive jihad against the western powers. The Islamic State expresses that every jihadist who does not support him is on the wrong side of history. 2 In this sense and highlighting the comments, in 2014 an IS spokesman said in April 2014, “Al Qaeda is no longer the basis of jihad.” 3 In turn, Al Qaeda indicated that the Islamic State leader had broken a promise made in private to the then leader of Al Qaeda, al-Zawahiri. 4 Going further in May 2014, al-Maqdisi, spiritual mentor of Al Qaeda and al-Zarqawi, accused the Islamic State of deviating from divine truth, being unfair to the mujahedeen, following the path of extremism, rejecting arbitration and declining reform. 5 This rivalry will help to highlight the regional character of jihadism, once failed the attempts at transnationalization during the last decade of the 20th century. Jihadism is a movement that operates on a “continuum between

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local settlement and transnational aspirations where their actions are often more conditioned by the situation in their countries of origin than might be assumed based on their ideological vocabulary in relation to of solidarity with the community of all Muslims (umma).” 6 This regionalization is greater, and it should be observed since the beginning of the 21st century and particularly since 2011, coinciding with the Arab springs. From then on and without abandoning proclamations of a transnational nature, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State tend to concentrate their efforts in the areas where they operate. This happens in North Africa where “jihadist activity has proliferated as a result of the collapse of Libya and the weakening of the state apparatus in Tunisia. The same applies to the sub-Saharan region.” 7 The regionalization of the fundamentalist terrorist phenomenon in Africa, initially had as reference to Al Qaeda, in the sense that diverse pre-existing and different groups of Al Qaeda. These groups chose to rename themselves with that denomination, due to the powerful psychological load that the name infused and the possibility of raising more funds from the sympathizers of the group led then by Bin Laden. Thus, for example, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia in 2003, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, in Iraq, which would become the Islamic State later and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula of Yemen, can be pointed out. Particularly in the area of North Africa, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was the first terrorist organization in that geographical area to be renamed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in early 2007 and is today one of the most active in the area taking advantage of the end of the regime of Ben Ali and Muammar al-Gaddafi in Tunisia and Libya respectively. 8 Mali and Nigeria experienced similar terrorist outbreaks. In the first, in 2012, various terrorist groups led by Al Qaeda factions came to control the north of that country, although they were later repelled by the French military action known as the Serval Operation, 9 which, under the aegis of the UN, was developed from January 2013 to July 2014. And in Nigeria, Boko Haram, a group initially linked to Al Qaeda 10 burst in force in 2002, and later in 2015, it will join the Islamic State, as we will explain later in this chapter. It is precisely the growth and absorption of dozens of jihadist groups in multiple states of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, in a short period of time, which makes it necessary to qualify this regionalization in the case of the Islamic State. Before addressing the particular cases of North Africa and Sahel, we want to point out, as relevant to our chapter, the distinction that we establish between structured and unstructured spaces. The coordinates of both are of a political, administrative, military and economic nature and are expressed by the degree of efficient and effective state control of a particular area. The

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larger it is, the lower the capacity for maneuver in it by legitimate agents (governments and international organizations) and others of illegitimate nature (terrorist groups and intruders). On the contrary, the smaller control of an area, the greater the possibilities of occupying it and of operating in it various transformations. For example, the Islamic State, through a behavior of extreme brutality managed to occupy areas and established themselves in them, practically without opposition, given the vacuum and/or administrative political chaos. And then, once the spaces have been structured, they acquire the difficulty of transforming them. That explains the complexity of recovering those spaces again and includes them in their original structure, given that the resources to be mobilized are very high. These are unattainable for logistical reasons for the native actors and therefore require that more powerful actors make the rational decision to get involved. That is, they coordinate with each other and with the native actors and exhibit the necessary political will, to implement and conduct the necessary military and civil operations, to restructure again, the spaces that had been conquered (structured in a perverse way) by the groups terrorists It is not enough to defeat and expel the latter, but then the foundations must be laid for the structuring of these spaces, so that they cannot be attacked easily or at a low cost. For a long time, the native and foreign actors have allowed the destructuring to be increasingly deeper, by not taking the necessary measures to avoid it. Well for not having the necessary means and/or not considered directly alluded to by the growing and dramatic situation of Maghreb and Sahel. The consequences of this inaction have developed in a devastating way since the late twentieth century and all kinds of criminal activities have taken over those territories under the cover of poverty, corruption and brute force exhibited by criminal groups. This force has led Islamist terrorist groups to control/structure those latitudes with an iron fist. Every process of inaction has, at least in part, the motivation not to consume resources. Finally, when the time comes to intervene, those resources that were saved, now have to be used multiply, but from a worse position in the environment, which limits their efficiency and extends the restructuring process. This is the undeniable situation that currently indicates and affects the native actors as well as Western actors who at one time did not consider rational/appropriate to intervene. Alluding to the concept of unstructured space, the African continent shows some extreme and relevant vulnerabilities, namely, poverty, structural violence, structural corruption, food insecurity, marginalisation of neglected communities plus regional breakdowns (i.e. Tuareg rebellion in Mali of 2012 or Libyan crisis from 2011 among others), that both Al Qaeda and the Islamic state try to take advantage for their objectives, although both groups currently show different ways of organizing, coinciding in the armed action as a destabilization tool, and the formula to expand both its ideology and seizure of the territory. Thus terrorist groups that operate in areas of these character-

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istics, combine perversely the administrative disorganization, the state of need of the population, the prevailing discontent and the use of criminal and terror practices to structure these spaces for their sinister purposes. We will now analyze the Maghreb area and, in doing so, establish a relationship with the Sahel, given the evident interdependence in terms of security and development. It should be noted that the states of the Maghreb and the Sahel operate around three interconnected axes:

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1. Northeast axis or axis of the Maghreb composed of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. 2. Southeast axis or Sahelian axis composed of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. 3. A central axis between the Maghreb and Sahelian or Saharan axis, which represents the Sahrawi populations of Maghreb and Sahel that act according to tribal and social systems that go beyond the formally established borders. These axes can be contracted or expanded according to the interests of the state’s own agents and the sum of the interactions present in these three axes constitute the geopolitical subsystem of the Maghreb-Sahel. As a general rule, the central governments of the countries involved lose their presence as they move away from their capitals and/or center of power and in those areas of greater des-structuring the Saharan axis become more relevant in terms of security. It has a decisive effect—and not particularly positive at present—on the management of the state agents involved regarding the physical and political isolation of the Saharan axis in particular and the economic stagnation and the effects of climate change 11 on the three axes mentioned. Needless to say, promoting human security in them and having the ability to attract people from the Saharan axis becomes a capital to avoid the action of violent non-state agents in the area. And this can not be done in isolation by the governments of the Maghreb and Sahelian axes, but they must have the essential interactions from their first world partners. We cannot be naive, an objective evaluation of the area shows unequivocally the existence of structural problems of human security that are translated by the lack of economic resources and political will (endogenous and exogenous) in structural security problems and absence of security organizations national or multilateral organizations in this regard. 12 There is then a gap between threats and instruments that adds one more section to the labyrinth of security in the Maghreb and the Sahel. The state actors of the regional subsystem that we have been describing are affected asymmetrically and act too much in terms of their own interests and security without taking into account a medium-term calculation of the causes of human insecurity in the area. In this sense an interesting initiative, the Joint Military Command pro-

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moted by Algeria in 2010 composed of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania with the aim of controlling/combating the actions of AQIM, has hardly produced tangible results as the European Union itself highlights. 13 This type of effort requires a remarkable logistics and coordination capacity, which unfortunately the members of that group did not have then and lack today. It is true that they have improved their capacities, but still far from the necessary level, in order to combat not only terror, but also organized crime that operates in the areas of reference (sometimes jointly with terrorist groups). To this we must add the difficulties to overcome their own geopolitical rivalries. Another renewed security initiative to combat terrorism and organized crime was launched in February 2017, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, also known as the G5 Sahelian Joint Force, formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad and has a contingent of five thousand soldiers from these countries. This initiative is supported by the Council for Peace and Security of the African Union and reinforced by UNSC Resolution 2359 (June 2017). 14 It is true that these countries and others are trying to develop some tools in terms of security and effective combating of terrorism (national security strategies, anti-terrorist laws, improvement of military endowments), but again, they are limited for technical and economic reasons, as well as infrastructures and military intelligence, political corruption and regional rivalries. For example, Mali, 15 improved its technical capabilities and the mobility of its military forces (even so quite scarce 7,800 soldiers/4800 paramilitary/3,000 militia) 16 and these improvements do were not accompanied by others in the field of military intelligence that prevents them from collecting reliable information about the movements of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is important to note that the problems affecting Mali are common with asymmetric configuration in the countries of Saharan and SubSaharan Africa. Organizations such as the African Union and similar ones in West Africa, like the Joint Command and G5 mentioned above, are far from having effective operational capabilities. To this must be added the negative impact of the regional rivalries that operate between the member countries of these coalitions and with respect to other African countries, as well as the calculating role absent from countries such as Morocco and Egypt. It should also be added, cooperation with terrorist groups practiced by some governments, such as the Government of Sudan of President Bashir, considered by the US Department of State as a sponsor of terrorism since 1993. 17 In this scenario, the violent non-state actors advance through the unstructured spaces implanted their bases of operations and their corresponding terror regimes that keep the cycle of human insecurity active in a perennial way creating areas of intolerable violence and added poverty, as well as

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migratory movements that add to those produced by climate change. These violent non-state actors consolidate their activities due to: 18 a. Scarce presence and control of security forces and states over their territories. b. Porosity of borders. c. Lack of economic and development alternatives for broad layers of the population. d. Existence of conflicts and tensions over control of the territory and resources.

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If to these causes, we add the political, technical and administrative shortcomings, we show how the state agents are hardly strong in their capitals and lose operational capacity dramatically as they move away from their nerve centers, producing unstructured spaces of which take advantage the violent non-state agents.

These include the most aggressive al Qaeda groups in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State and Boko Haram in sub-Saharan Africa (although this group has just joined the Islamic State). 19 We will now analyze the first two groups, as a way to better illustrate the direct threat facing the Maghreb-Sahel axis and, by extension, the structured political spaces of the first world allied to these and/or geographically close. We found the testimony of Thomas Joscelyn before the Subcommittee of the United States Congress on Counterterrorism and Intelligence concerning the threat of jihadist groups in Africa enormously revealing and interesting. 20 In the course of the same it is indicated how both groups differ one the other in different aspects although they share an organized and fanatic hatred against the United States and the West. One of its main differences lies in its modus operandi, while Al Qaeda opts for a strategy of stealth and secrecy, that is, hide its organization, attempt and disappear. On the contrary, the Islamic State follows a strategy of public exposure with regard to its structure, attacks and crimes. Al Qaeda has used different brands and franchises during its sinister existence to hinder its tracking, also with the objective of silently winning the support of local populations, as well as organizations, donors and even governments that do not want their support discovered to this organization. Particularly this has been its tactic in Africa, where they have masked its real influence, as Thomas Joscelyn rightly pointed out. For example, there was an alliance in the shadow between Shabaab and Al Qaeda that only came to light after the death of Bin Laden. 21 However, it already existed de facto, although Bin Laden did not wish to attract attention to it in order to avoid further pressure on this group and in this part of Africa. Al Qaeda therefore follows a strategy of growing in the shade, a kind of ghost

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threat. Similarly, the alliance between AQIM and Ansar al Sharia 22 in Libya and Tunisia was known, following the death of its leader Mohammed al Zahawi, who had met in the past with Bin Laden, agreeing to adopt the al Qaeda jihadist program. Or the more than possible alliance of these last ones with Ansar Dine, 23 one of the main terrorist groups of Mali, responsible next to the Movement for the Unity of the Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) of the chaotic situation that this country lives. This strategy followed by Al Qaeda in Africa has led to underestimating its capacity in influence in this continent in which it has two branches AQIM and Shabaab, which Bin Laden understood as regional areas to describe the presence of Al Qaeda in various places. Thus the Emir of AQIM, Abdel Wadoud controls the resources and actions of Al Qaeda in North Africa and Western Egypt, while Emir Ahmed Diriye directs Al Qaeda in Mali and East Africa. In addition to implementing their policies of terror and destabilization, both branches are part of the strategy of recruiting terrorists to strike in the West, as requested by Bin Laden in a message dated May 2010 and addressed to all his cells including those of Africa: “Ask brothers in all regions if they know any brother who is distinguished by his good education, integrity, courage and stealth who can operate in the United States.” 24 Against the clandestine empire of Al Qaeda, the marketing of terror shown by the Islamic State operates, whose presence in Africa has grown notably, especially in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Nigeria. It also advances gaining influence in Algeria, through desertions of small groups previously affiliated with AQIM. 25 If for Al Qaeda, stealth is fundamental as a tactic, for the Islamic State, media noise is essential as a sound image of terror that inspires their financial backers and reinforces the belonging feeling of their followers to the crimson Caliphate led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. 26 Terror is the Islamic State’s tool to intimidate its enemies and local populations from unstructured spaces that it occupies with great ease as we have seen in Iraq, Syria and Libya. The presence of the Islamic State in North Africa has been reinforced with the accession of Ansar Bayt to the Maqdis in Egypt, 27 and this group has gained capabilities to extend its actions. It highlights the expansion and capacity of the Islamic State in the Maghreb, for example the March 2015 attack in the Tunisian capital. And recently, another of the most active and cruel terrorist groups in Africa, Boko Haram, joined the IS in 2015, creating an axis of terror in East Africa with great operational capacity. The growing and intimidating presence of the Islamic State in Africa crosses the borders of the continent that has become a center for recruiting jihadists for the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and Libya. And not only do they reach the Middle East, but their effects are already reaching Europe, where there has even been a presence of IS in Bosnia and the articulated response from Europe has revealed severe problems of political will and coordination. The Islamic State has also managed to capture the latent fanaticism in other

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latitudes, with its program and networks (local and foreign) of foreign fighters and professionals, as well as wives for its native members. The publicity that surrounds all its acts, allows a better follow-up than could/can be practiced to Al Qaeda and can contribute to overestimate its capabilities, which perhaps is part of the group’s objectives, which as it progresses acquires more features of parastatals actors, which at a certain moment can become its Achilles heel, either by acquiring the rational feature of valuing their own survival, or by acquiring the conventional army form. In both cases, more in the second, it allows military action with decisive firepower against it. That is, if the Western powers and affected countries decide to coordinate their military and civilian efforts efficiently. The Islamic State, despite the casualties that it is accumulating as a result of the attacks suffered in Africa and Middle East, by the United States and its allies, and even after its expulsion from Iraq and Syria in 2017, it shows a good capacity to adapt to the binomial situation/environment and manages to survive, like Al Qaeda, protected by the unstructured spaces (conflicted areas of Middle East, Saharan axis and Sahel space for example) and the structural problems that affect all the state agents of Africa. Particularly and unfortunately for Africa, the retreat of both organizations in other parts of the world and the demobilization of their fighters, many of them from the Maghreb and the Sahel, has motivated both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to go to those areas, especially toward the Sahel, where the rate of de-structuring is more evident. Paradoxically, the enmity between al Qaeda and the Islamic State contributes in some way to containing them mutually, although at the moment Al Qaeda seems to recover the leadership of terror in Africa, where the nostalgia for its form seems to be imposed between sponsors and terrorist groups operatives in the Sahel, against the marketing of terror and the indiscriminate actions that include population practiced by the Islamic State. The tool of Al Qaeda for its emergence is through the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) movement, created in March 2017 28 and led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg from Mali. This is a group, which at the moment lends its allegiance to Al Qaeda. Its main objective would be the sahelization of the armed conflict in the area, 29 to the detriment of the Caliphate project sponsored by the Islamic State, proposing the creation of an Islamic region, which recovers the Sahelistan idea, restricting mainly its terrorist operations to the Sahel (Liptako-Gourma triangle) and some West African countries, leaving the Maghreb area to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Unlike Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, its main Western enemy is France, not the United States or Great Britain, which it nevertheless calls enemies because of the support it gives to the French in the Sahel. It is relevant to know the tendency of terror in the Sahel, to analyze the name of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, whose translation means Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims. The keyword is support, interpreted by this group

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as “a specific goal, which is to defeat the enemy troops. Generally, this support is expected from God, but it is strongly recommended to Muslims to lend it to their brothers-in-arms. Several groups used this notion in their banners: al-Nusra Front in Syria; Ansar al-Islam in Burkina Faso; Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in Sinai; and Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya. However, it is the first time that the “support for achieving victory” has gone beyond a specific goal to address Islam and Muslims at large. 30 It is possible to appreciate in this concept on the one hand the overcoming of the traditional division of the Muslims and also to begin the path toward the autonomy of Al Qaeda, to concentrate on the regionalization of its operations, mimicking the terrain and its socio-geopolitical characteristics. However, despite the renewed leadership of Al Qaeda in Sahara and Sahel and the emergence of JNIM, the Islamic State continues to be a relevant player in the area through Boko Haram, which operates in Chad, Niger, Mali, Benin, Cameroon and Nigeria, or Katibat al-Mourabitoun that under the leadership of Abu Walid al-Sahrawi operates in Eastern Mali in the tristate border region of Liptako-Gourma, or the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara that operates in Burkina Faso with renewed impetus since 2018. 31 The latter group is responsible, for example, for ambushing a small group of US Special Forces on the border of Mali with Burkina Faso, killing four US soldiers. 32 In spite of this, it cannot be denied that the Islamic State, with a logistics and an image damaged by its defeats in Syria and Iraq, as well as the growing rejection in the region that produces doctrinal rigor and its anathema against institutions and populations, has lived better times and gives ground to Al Qaeda, leaving many of its role reduced to a label of terror, used by individuals or small radicalized groups. All this has produced that the groups sponsored by Al Qaeda and that operate particularly in the Sahel, are more active and enjoy a better organization for their criminal purposes. The conflict between the two main terrorist groups, far from weakening the intensity of the terror, contributes significantly to increasing instability rates in the area and undermining efforts to achieve peace in some of the violent regional processes opened in the region. The situation in Africa is alarming, converted into a sanctuary for these two terrorist groups and their allies, 33 showing their native governments and their respective Western allies lack of political will and effective coordination in military and civil terms to correct the huge problem of human security that this continent lives and fight with decisive firepower the terrorist phenomenon. Actors such as the European Union already act on the ground, through initiatives such as African Peace Facility, EUCAP-Nestor, EUCAP Sahel-Mali, EUTM Uganda and EUTM Somalia, the European Strategy for the Horn of Africa and for the Sahel. Others, such as France, have contributed military capacity to conduct the Serval in 2012–2014 and from then Barkhane operations. The United States, for its part, acts unilaterally against AQIM and Islamic State and

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collaborates in the reinforcement of African military capabilities, developing bilateral programs through AFRICOM. All these actions, although important, have not achieved the desired effects when facing not only the terrorist phenomenon but also the structural deficiencies of the state agents of the continent. The native security initiatives mentioned above, such as the Joint Military Command and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, represent an interesting starting point in terms of sharing information and coordinating security efforts, but are affected by structural factors such as poverty, corruption, the lack of capabilities to invest in armed forces and security and the administrative breakdown of member states. All this is going to generate spaces of power vacuum with population pockets abandoned to their fate. Then, human insecurity becomes chronic, producing a favorable framework for the expansion of terror. The latter, as we have seen throughout the chapter, is capable of mutating and adapting to the characteristics of the environment. Thus, for example, the new face of Al Qaeda or the JNIM is committed to regionalization and/or establishing perverse symbiosis with the native populations, which they do not consider now targets of their terrorist acts, with the known exception of the Islamic State in this regard. Create, with the unequivocal support of the West, a space of collective security in the area (which includes improvement of the armed forces and improved communication channels between the affected countries) within whose framework the smart power 34 combines war against terror with civil engineering, it can be a rational and possible solution to the rise of terror in Africa, particularly in the areas of the Maghreb and the Sahel. The EU and the United States, in collaboration with various African actors, must combine plans for military assistance, as well as initiatives for the promotion of security, civil engineering, the expansion of democracy and economic development, to solve the chaotic situation to which go doomed Africa. Failure to do so immediately, in a coordinated, decisive and efficient manner, will not only have disastrous consequences for Africa, but also for its immediate neighbors (Europe and the Middle East) and their allies. NOTES 1. Herrero de Castro, Rubén. “Estado Islámico: el sueño de la razón.” El Periódico de Catalunya (16-XII-2014), p. 8, 12 16, 2014: 8. 2. Bunzel, Cole. “From paper state to Caliphate: The idiology of the Islamic State.” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (The Brookings Institution) 19 (March 2015): 11. 3. Al-Adnani, Abu Muhammad. “This is not our methodology, nor will it ever be.” 2014. Cited in Quivooij, Romain, 2015, “The Islamic State,” Policy Report (June 2015), RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, p. 4. 4. Zelin, Aaron. “The war between ISIS and Al Qaeda for supremacy of the global jihadist movement.” Quivooij,Romain,Ibid. 2014. 4.

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5. Bunzel, Cole. “From paper state to Caliphate:The idiology of the Islamic State.” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (The Brookings Institution) 19 (March 2015): 30. 6. Steinberg, Guido&Weber, Annette. “Jihadism in Africa. Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances.” SWP Research Paper (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) RP5 (June 2015): 10–11. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Díaz Alcalde, Jesús. “Mali: decisiva y contundente reacción militar de Francia para frenar el avance Yihaidista.” Documento de análisis 6/2013. Madrid: Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 1 23, 2013. 10. Europapress. 10 17, 2014. https://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-quienboko-haram-grupo-islamista-nigeriano-detras-secuestro-200-ninas-20140505154245.html 11. Garcia Cantalapiedra, David & Herrero de Castro, Rubén. “Cambio climático: modelos e impacto en la seguridad alimentaria en el Mediterráneo,” in Marquina Antonio (ed) Una devastación incipiente. La seguridad alimentaria en el Magreb, Madrid: UNISCI, 2013. 12. Arteaga, Félix. “Real Instituto Elcano.” realinstitutoelcano.org. 2014. http://www. realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/publicacion?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/publicaciones/informe-el 13. European Union External Action Service. “https://eeas.europa.eu.” Edited by EEAS. 2011. http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf 14. Dentice, Giuseppe. “Euromesco Policy Brief.” Euromesco.net. February 2018. https:// www.euromesco.net/pub33lication/terrorism-in-the-sahel-region-an-evolving-threat-oneuropes-doorstep/ 15. Lankhorst, Marco. “Peacebuilding in Mali: Linking Justice,security and reconciliaton.” Policy Brief (The Hague Institute for Global Justice) 6 (November 2013): 1–16. 16. Martin, Guy and Kruger, Anton. http://www.defenceweb.co.za. 8 8, 2013. http://www. defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31482:mali-military& catid=119:african-militaries 17. Secretary of State. US Department of State. s.f. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151. htm 18. Arteaga, Félix. “Real Instituto El Cano.” realinstitutoelcano.org. 2014. http://www. realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/publicacion?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/publicaciones/informe-el 19. BBC.com. 3 7, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2015/03/150307_ ultnot_nigeria_boko_haram_estado_islamico_az . 20. Joscelyn, Thomas. “www.longwarjournal.org.” 06 30, 2015. https://www. longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ansar-al-sharia-libya-fights-on-under-new-leader.php . 21. BBC. BBC.com. 02 10, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16979440. 22. The group after the attacks against the United States Diplomatic Mission in Libya. An attack managed negligently by the Obama Administration that has led to the scandal known as BenghaziGate. (Herrero de Castro, Bengasi Gate, el Impeachment 2013 23. Banco, Erin. International Business Times. 06 29, 2015. https://www.ibtimes.com/islamist-extremists-linked-al-qaeda-launch-offensive-southern-mali-1988201. 24. Joceylin, T. Terrorism in Africa: The Imminent Threat to the United States 2015. —. www.longwarjournal.org. 04 29, 2015. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ terrorism-in-africa-the-imminent-threat-to-the-united-states.php . 25. Lieberman, Ari. Frotpage Mag. 12 02, 2014. https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/ 246553/islamic-state-widens-its-bridgehead-north-africa-ari-lieberman 26. In writing this chapter he was gravely prostrated by injuries received in a US military action against him. However, in full use of his mental faculties, he maintained his unquestionable leadership. Various rumors have spread about his death. Today (2018) the Pentagon considers him alive. 27. (Anom 2014) Al-monitor. Al-monitor.com. 12 1, 2014. https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2014/12/egypt-ansar-maqdis-sinai-spread.html

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28. Altuna Galán, Sergio. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Real Instituto Elcano. 06 1, 2018. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ARI70-2018-AltunaGalan-JNIM-propagandaanalysis-al-Qaeda-project-Sahel 29. Ghanem-Yazbeck, Dalia. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 06 23, 2017. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/jihadism-in-the-sahelaqims-strategic-maneuvers-for-long-term-regional-dominance 30. Bassou, Abdelhak. www.ocppc.ma. Edited by OCP Policy Center. 04 05, 2018. http:// www.ocppc.ma/publications/violent-extremism-sahel-birth-third-generation-terrorism 31. Riskline.com. www.riskline.com. 11 02, 2018. https://www.riskline.com/articles/theemerging-terror-threats-in-burkina-faso 32. Dentice, Giuseppe. “Euromesco Policy Brief.” Euromesco.net. February 2018. https:// www.euromesco.net/pub33lication/terrorism-in-the-sahel-region-an-evolving-threat-oneuropes-doorstep/ 33. A detailed list of jihadist and Salafist groups operating today in Africa and other continents can be found at, Jones, Seth G., “A persistent threat,” 2014, RAND Corporation at www.rand.org. It is particularly relevant that the activity of most of these groups in the African continent dates from the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. 34. Efficient combination of hard power and soft power.

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Chapter Three

The Evolution of Global Terrorism in Europe From Al Qaeda to the Islamic State Terrorist Group Gustavo Díaz Matey 1

“Terrorism will continue to be a threat for the world, Europe, our citizens, our security and our way of life for the foreseeable future. Last year, (2017) while jihadist-inspired attacks increased, so did our preventive actions—with at least 11 attacks foiled. This is the strongest testament to the necessity of working together to defeat terrorism.”

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—Dimitris Avramopoulos, European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship

INTRODUCTION In general terms, terrorism is a political weapon that tries to influence political decisions in a way that cannot be achieved using different means. Nowadays the terrorist threat is a polyhedral phenomenon and its correct understanding will be an essential step for its better containment. That is why finding a definition of the problem will be the starting point, in order to give the most accurate possible solution to this threat. In this sense, we start from the premise that the terrorism salafist jihadistrooted that Europe is suffering today, but also the rest of the world, has its maximum expression on Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the dense network of cells and interconnected elements that have succeeded it after September 11.

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The development of global terrorism manifested itself at first in the shape of high impact attacks and later in the form of less sophisticated and more frequent attacks that have permeated into the occidental collective imagination fostering a state of insecurity and of fear of the possibility of an imminent attack in any place. Bursting, like this, into the European agenda as a threaten both to regional and international security that needs to be fought. In this regard, understanding the nature of the threat is the essential step for posing future solutions is our starting premise, since we consider that all containment measures of this threat need a correct identification of it, since, being honest, groups like Al Qaeda or Daesh/Islamic State are not only terrorist groups. They are material expressions of the concept of the Yihad as a fighting method; they are a refuge-inspiring movement It is frequent, facing imminent threats of this nature, to look for solutions in the present time, but for understanding a phenomenon, we have to pay attention to its origins and not only focus on the here and now. A problem of this kind of nature cannot be exclusively battled with short-term measures; it has to contemplate short, medium and long term measures, to which it is necessary to get to know the origins and characteristics of the phenomenon, without disregarding the dynamics that underpin it.

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How Did We Get Here? The Slope of the Islamic World The word Islam denotes more than 14 years of history, a community of 1,400 million of believers and a great diversity of religious and cultural traditions. 2 Islam is an heterogeneous and complex phenomenon, that goes way further than simply religious-related issues. In fact, in Islam there is no separation between earthly and divine or godly issues, so the main objective is to perpetuate the figure of the Prophet on Earth through the figure of the Caliph. Koran is the only book written in a concrete moment that, for the Muslims, has the words that God transmitted to the Prophet. The Ulema in the Islamic tradition is not the mediator between the believer and God, it is ‘simply’ the interpreter of the divine word, so it does not exist the figure of the Church as an Institution as it happens in Christianism. Since the conquest of Al-Andalus in 711 and of Jerusalem in 1187, and despite the splendor that the Islamic civilization reached with the Ottoman Empire; during the last three centuries Islam has lost its leadership, dominance and splendor that formerly had, due to the pushing of the modern West and the fast modernization of the Middle-East that started with the landing of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 (and, with him, Western imperialism) and that would end up fading out with the end of the Istanbul Caliphate in 1924. All that, linked to the deep disputes between Sunnis (to which the schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hambali belong) and Shiites (that gather ismaelits, alevis, alauits, zaydis and Ithna Asharis), that started after the death of the

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Prophet Mahoma not agreeing on who should assume leadership, despite sharing their faith on the Koran and on the hadiths of the Prophet, they differ in their interpretation and in the role that religious authorities and Mahoma’s descendants should play. Sunni identity is the dominating side of Islam, prevailing in countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. 3 Shiites, on their side, are supported by Iran and despite that Syria has a majority of Sunnis, since 1970 its regime has been governed by the alauits. In the whole region, sectarian violence has increased in the recent years, and even while it is true that poverty generates crime and violence, it is important to qualify firstly that poverty itself does not get to the appearance of violence with political aims automatically. 4 Historically, violence and instability have played an important role when it comes to prioritize loyalty to the identitarian values. After the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, as an example, minorities in Iraq and Syria are in power situations, which will contribute to the sectarian rigidity in both countries, and that along with the secularist ideas after the abolition of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, will promote the emerging of a hidden sectarianism present in the fighting against European colonialism. Old divisions between Sunnis and Shiites, promoted since the Iranian revolution of 1979, have contributed to the emergence of sectarian conflicts in Muslim countries, ‘terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan.’ 5 At this point, it is important to start from the premise of the fact that, despite the extremist ideas and the jihadist Salafist ideology are based on a radical interpretation of the Islam; the whole Muslim religion is not representative of those acts. Relatively speaking, it would be as identifying Ku Klux Klan with the Christianism. 6 The Development of the Jihadist Ideology Despite the fact that for Muslim tradition the world is divided between the house of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and the house of war (Dar al-harb), inhabited by unfaithful, and that the Christian crusades spread a lot the idea of the Jihad, the formulation of the jihadist ideology has a relatively recent origin. However, it is not about a phenomenon born in the attacks of September 11 (even though from that date has experimented an important increasing), but its origins come from decades before, from the 60’s of XX Century and the fight for the control of the colonial states. 7 Radical Islam that we are experimenting today—Islamic fundamentalism—is not an homogeneous movement, existing several interpretations according to the country or the faction that we analyses. But all these radical movements have in common the fact of considering that the Islamic world has taken a wrong path and that it is necessary to come back to the origins

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overthrowing apostate governments. 8 Jihadist Salafism is based on historical roots of Islam under the desire of gathering together all Muslim communities under a common leadership based on religious ideals. Contemporary Islamic activism is based on the ideas of Hassan al Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and of Mawlana A. Mawdudi and the Jamaat I-Islami of India in 1941. Both movements share an anti-imperialist and anti-Western sentiment. Together with them, the Sunni Egyptian Sayyid Quth is key to understanding the Sunni Islam that emerged in the decade following the Iranian revolution. In spite of this, the ideological contributions of the jihadist groups with a national orientation cannot be disdained, since the first terrorist groups in the Middle East had a secular, Marxist, nationalist and anti-Western ideological base. Its origins can be placed in the European colonialist context, being strongly influenced by the movements of Latin America, North Africa, and Southeast Asia and, interestingly, also by the strategies carried out by the Israeli groups against the British protectorate and all those groups that try to overthrow a regime of government in a specific country. 9 Along the same lines, the eclipse of pan-Arabism (Nasser and Sadat) placed fundamentalism as the most attractive alternative for those who thought there was something better than the existing tyranny in Arab countries. In this way, the Islamic fundamentalist movements already claimed as a political goal the restoration of an Islamic State based exclusively on the Koran. Its ideology was based on the promise of establishing a fair society, like that of the early days of Islam, against corrupt governments, low morale and economic misery. The events of the Palestinian Black September of Anan revealed the popular discontent mobilized by leftist forces against authoritarian regimes that had failed militarily. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a new ideological variant emerged based on armed struggle and religious rigorism. The Afghan jihad was of paramount importance in the global evolution of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, since it became the cause that unified all the militants to this cause. It will be these groups who, subsequently, export the Afghan experience to other places of conflict, such as Bosnia, Egypt and Algeria. However, this stage of concord and fraternity did not last long, the Islamic fundamentalism as an amalgam of different social groups combined by a common ideology, began to dismember due to the invasion of Kuwait by the army of Saddam Hussein in August 1990, precipitating the decline of the Movement as a whole. Subsequently, the actions of the West did not help and, unfortunately, they were penetrating in the fundamentalist imaginary.

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Global Islamist Terrorism: From Terrorism of the Fourth Generation to the Idea of Al Qaeda as a Concept Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 produced significant changes in the security agendas of Western countries, placing the terrorist threat at the top of the list, the truth is that throughout the twentieth century terrorism has been used as a political weapon throughout the world, in order to influence and, ultimately, change the actions of governments. It is commonly accepted that terrorist organizations are ‘Darwinian’ in the sense that they try to learn from their predecessors. They are therefore evolutionary and mutant in character, to be able to adapt to the environment in which they must act and, in this sense, the ‘new’ terrorism characterized in the terrorist group Islamic State, is a manifestation of the changing nature of the armed conflict. In particular Al Qaeda, like today the Daesh/Islamic State, already based its strength on the constant search for new vulnerabilities and innovative ways of asymmetric conflict to evade detection and cause the maximum possible damage. The evolution of the terrorist phenomenon dominates the element of change, which has forced to reevaluate and rethink old theories and partially obsolete ideas about its containment and, therefore, all proactive measures, among which the work of the intelligence services is included, to anticipate and contain new attacks, they must start from the knowledge of the patterns that the ‘new’ Islamist terrorists are developing. Jihadist-rooted terrorism is based on radical Islamism, which has been called Islamic fundamentalism. Its maximum expression is at first in the Al Qaeda organization and in the dense network of groups, cells and more or less interconnected elements that have happened after 9/11 giving shape to the global jihadist movement until arriving today at the birth of the Islamic State or Daesh. 10 However, although international jihadist Salafist terrorism cannot be considered a single homogeneous movement, there being different interpretations depending on the country, or the faction that applies it, they all share a common characteristic, that the Islamic world has taken a wrong path and the only solution is the return to the authentic Muslim way of life and the overthrow of the apostate governments. The reasons for this Islamic radicalism can be found in the failure to impose foreign political-economic models and the decentralization of religious authority of Sunni Islam makes, among other factors, that a manipulation of religion by certain extremists who ironically lacked mostly of some kind of credential or religious studies, be easy. To this must be added what are called catalytic events, that is, events that radically transformed the region. These were the Iranian Revolution, the Afghanistan War, the Gulf War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 9/11 attacks, and the Iraq War (where for

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the first time following the decolonization process, the West takes on the responsibility of rebuilding a Muslim country).

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FROM THE IDEA OF AL QAEDA AS A CONCEPT TO THE CREATION OF THE TERRORIST GROUP ISLAMIC STATE The fact that these groups should no longer be understood as organizations but as ideological movements, and can no longer be considered as a homogeneous movement, reveals the exploitation they have made of the Salafi Jihadist ideology, which has seen a means of global diffusion in Internet and new technologies, promoting autonomous actions in Western countries without connection on many occasions with the central structure. 2011 is an important year for the evolution of the phenomenon of jihadist Salafism, not only due to the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011, but also due to the impact of Arab Springs in countries such as Syria or the withdrawal of troops of Iraq at the end of 2011 and its consequences on the consolidation of the Islamic State. It is important to note that, despite its speech full of references to 'authentic' Islam, groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State Group and its affiliates, use religion as an instrument to advance their own political ends. 11 Religious references, in this way, serve to mobilize and attract their combatants, taking advantage of these elements to create a collective identity. 12 For all these reasons, the modern motivations that have prompted an identity resurgence based on rigorist views of Islam, have much to do with the destabilization produced by the ‘war on terror,’ initiated by the United States in 2003, in countries fragmented as Syria, Iraq and Libya. Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is considered the first promoter of what has now become the terrorist group Islamic State or Daesh. Al Zarqawi longed to emulate Nur al-Din Zangi (1118-1174), a Muslim leader who promoted the union of the Arab territories and the expulsion of the Crusaders. In 1999, this Jordanian founded the jihadist group Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant), renaming him as Jama'at al-Tawid wa al-Jihad shortly after. Five years later, he swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda, with which his formation was named as Al Qaeda in Iraq. 13 In this sense, the terrorist group Daesh/Islamic State, is born as an evolution of Al Qaeda in Iraq. 14 At that time, Al Zarqawi found a favorable scenario to show himself as part of the resistance against the occupation of the United States and against the sectarian government of Al Maliki. For many Sunnis, this occupation was interpreted as part of an international campaign to empower the Shiites, so they welcomed groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq. 15

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Over time and within this framework, Al Qaeda in Iraq announced its union with five other insurgent groups,—although not with the Iraqi Islamic Army, the main Iraqi jihadist group—to form the Shura Council of the Mujahideen. On June 7 of that year, a US military operation killed Al Zarqawi. Four months later, on October 13, 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Omar Al Baghdadi. Between 2009 and 2010 the terrorist group Islamic State suffered the loss of a significant group of its high-level members (34 of 42) including its leader, Abu Omar al Bagdadi, (who was protected from al Zarqawi at the time of the ISI's proclamation in 2006 and leader of the Shura Mujahideen Council) and his war minister, Abu Ayyub Al Masri. 16 With the progressive success of the coalition's campaigns, the growing need for security in Afghanistan and the electoral promises, in October 2011, the United States announced the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq. President Obama thus fulfilled his election promise, stating that ‘the Iraqis had already assumed full responsibility for the security of their country’ and that ‘the war in Iraq would end at the end of the year.’ 17 This was the perfect juncture for the consolidation of the terrorist group that we now know as the Islamic State. 18 The reason why the terrorist group Islamic State managed to consolidate and evolve so quickly can be found by analyzing the characteristics of the areas it has managed to control. Areas marked by abusive governments, lacking participatory democracy and effective justice agencies, with few opportunities for social growth, in which violence and lack of security were, and are, present (USAID, 2016). This context, under the framework of the ‘Arab Springs,’ 2011 marked the beginning of peaceful demonstrations in Syria against the Alawite government of Bashar Al Assad that were severely repressed. This repression catapulted the beginning of a civil war that has resulted in a humanitarian crisis of great impact and that has given oxygen to the terrorist group Islamic State in the absence of control of large areas of Syria. The incorporation of new territories to the Caliphate has allowed the terrorist group Daesh/Islamic State to control key strategic natural resources for its self-financing. On the other hand, in Iraq, sectarian divisions were already present in the era of Saddam Hussein (1979–2003). With the fall of Saddam Hussein, the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the banning of the Ba'ath party and the failure to reconcile the people linked to it, thousands of people were left unemployed and were attacked by the new regime. 19 For all these reasons, the overthrow of Saddam did not guarantee a transition and a plural and democratic government; in fact, the sectarian violence increased with the new government of Nouri al-Maliki, perceived as a pre-eminently Shia regime, which disregards and excludes the Sunni community. Nouri al-Maliki ex-

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ploited his political power in order to place Shiites at the head of government security bodies and civil ministries; excluding, arresting and condemning to death, under accusations of terrorism, Sunni members of different ministerial portfolios. 20 The sectarianism applied by al-Maliki in the Government was reflected in the gradual displacement of the population toward segregated areas according to the origin, thus materializing sectarianism. The protests that would begin under a peaceful tone in 2012 in Al Anbar against sectarianism would be severely repressed in 2013, which exacerbated the peaceful dynamics of the protests that would adopt an armed character, causing a sharpening of the already existing divisions and a promotion of the insurgency. 21 The al Qaeda branch in Iraq began to employ a rhetoric of resistance to Shiite access to power, which was when Zarqawi began to recruit those exBaathists who came to him after the dismantling of the Iraqi Armed Forces. He once counted in his ranks with a considerable number of followers and after entering Mosul in 2014, he went on to consolidate his power in the territories under his control, establishing his capital in Raqa. 22 Abu Bakr al Bagdadi would declare the caliphate “al Dawla al Islamiyah al Iraq wa al Sham,” 23 on June 29, 2014, in the middle of Ramadan, selfproclaimed caliph of Islam, under the name of ‘Caliph Ibrahim.’ 24 Three months later, Shiite Haider Al Abadi became Prime Minister of Iraq, without this appointment announcing the political demise of al-Maliki (which in fact became his Vice President) or significant improvements to the evolution of the conflict in the country. This situation would evolve until the end of 2017 when the international coalition managed to snatch practically all the territory that the Islamic State came to control in Syria and Iraq and opening, therefore, a new situation for the containment of this threat in the security agendas of all the world and in particular in the European ones. Leaving, thus presenting a military front to return to the idea of the Al Qaeda of 2003 focusing on being a transnational ideological movement with independent branches. 25 In 2014, bridging the gap with Somalia in the 1990s, it looked like it would be the first time in modern history that an armed organization was on the verge of creating a new state by combining terrorist tactics and a war of traditional conquest, but the drift of the campaign against the Islamic State at the end of 2017 had eliminated any hint of continuity of the state dream. 26 In fact, Al Qaeda published on April 23, 2017 a statement entitled ‘Al-Sham will not surrender to anyone but Allah’ announcing that the strategy of the Islamic State of direct confrontation and defense of territory ‘inch by inch’ had failed and was the moment to leave the concept of territorial control aside and to return to the strategy of guerrilla war by joining other Muslims around the globe in a strategy of global jihad. 27

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Terrorism in the Security Agenda of the European Union The jihadist attacks committed in Europe have shown that the threat of Islamist terrorism not only lurks from outside the European borders but now also looms within the old continent. Although, of course, there have already been deadly attacks on European soil, such as the attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the assassinations of Toulouse in 2012 or the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014, the expansion of the Islamic State (ISIS, in its acronym in English) 28 since June 2014, the flow of Europeans traveling to the areas controlled by ISIS, in Syria and Iraq, to join their ranks intensified at first 29 until 2015 and today after the almost total loss of territory contracted by ISIS at the end of 2017 the number of returnees has fallen considerably according to the latest Europol TESAT report. 30 As a derivative, this situation has meant an increase in radicalized elements on European soil, without direct contact with the main organization that carries out less sophisticated attacks with fewer victims, but with a greater frequency. These attacks have three lines, mainly. Attacking indiscriminately ‘ordinary’ citizens such as the London bombings of March and June 2017, Barcelona in August 2017, Trébes in March 2018. Attempting against authority symbols such as the Paris bombings in February, June and August 2017, or Liege in May of 2018 or beat symbols of the western way of life such as the bombing at the Ariana Grande concert in May 2017. The European authorities are fully aware of this danger. The 2015 annual report to the European Parliament of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, already pointed out that “the criminal activities and barbaric violence of the jihadist terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Islamic State, or associated with it, they represent a great threat to the Middle East and North Africa region, to Europe and possibly to world peace and stability.” 31 Despite ‘or due to’ the evolution of the military offensive against ISIS in Syria and Iraq since the end of 2017 where the Islamic State has lost practically all the territory it controlled, the level of terrorist alert is still very high. In fact, if in 2006 there were, according to Europol 142 terrorist attacks on European soil (13 of them of Jihadist character) in 2017 there were 205 attacks (33 of them of this nature), 32 in fact the French Ministry of Home Affairs has already admitted that its country ‘disrupts attacks on a daily basis’ and Europol figures in 1,219 detainees in 2017 for terrorism in Europe. 33 Put on alert since the attacks of the Jihadist Islamist court of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, in London July 7, 2005 but especially since the attacks in Paris, between January 7 and 9, 2015, against the satirical weekly French Charlie Hebdo and against a supermarket of Jewish products in which 17 people died—in addition to three terrorists—and despite the Paris attacks of

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November 2015, the European Union seeks and implement different measures to prevent Salafist-style terrorist attacks, stop the jihadists, locate and arrest those responsible for recruitment cells, stop the journey of Europeans to Syria and Iraq and stop cyberterrorism and proselytizing through social networks.

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Europe in the Global Theater of Operations of Jihadist Terrorism and the Emergence of the Islamic State For Europe, terrorism is not a new problem since it has been a threat to its security for decades. However, in general terms, it has been confronted as a domestic problem, within Europe itself. The Islamic State, Al Qaeda and the Islamist organizations linked to them act, on the contrary, in a global theater of operations in which Europe occupies a key position. The approach to this threat, therefore, should be different. Unfortunately, the sense of urgency forced by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 prevented, at the time, developing coherent strategies and shared visions in order to provide the European Union with mechanisms capable of guaranteeing security and reducing the possible risk scenarios while eradicating the violence of the social imaginary. The current situation is the result of this strategic negligence. 34 The situation, therefore, is different and Europe is facing a traditional threat with a new face. We cannot speak only of terrorism of Islamist jihadist character where we must take into account the sectarian struggle, mechanisms of national reconstruction in different States but also migration and integration policies within the Union. We must contextualize this threat (that of terrorism) because of the 205 terrorist attacks carried out on European soil in 2017, 137 were of an ethno-nationalist nature and only 33, as we have already pointed out, of a jihadist nature. 35 A different Europe for a Different Threat: New Internal Context of European Countries Of the 1,400 million Muslims that exist in the world, in Europe there are officially 19 million. 36 As the now former Secretary of State for Security of Spain, Francisco Martínez, said in 2015, “nowadays, we are witnessing an increase in the processes of radicalization in shorter periods of time.” 37 As Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard point out, although the first generation of extremists in Europe came, mostly, from asylum and refugee concessions (individuals with a clear political activism before entering Europe), 38 today the profile of radicalized individuals is different, that of young citizens of immigrant descent who are radicalized for various reasons but who have

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in common the little or no contact with the matrix of the terrorist organization. 39 The impact of the international economic crisis on all the different member states of the Union and the failure of immigration and integration policies are two of the causes that have given rise to a youth uprooted, frustrated and with very few possibilities for the future within European societies. This does not mean that all young people who do not find a future in the countries of the European Union experience processes of radicalization, or that they are excluded from society. 40 But if a minority, which is also unable to fit within the framework of their communities represented here in Europe, will find in that return the origins of their ancestors and the guilt of the host State a ‘valid’ exit to their frustrations. The distant enemy has become the enemy nearby. Citizens with full rights, who know the language, the laws and reside in our territory, thus become pawns ready to hit with the tremendous difficulty that this implies in terms of containment policies. In the words of Fernando Reinares, “young people who, in a critical period of their individual life cycle, go through an identity crisis for which the IS is offering a solution.” 41 The lack of integration or the failure of multilateralism, are not the only sources or paths of radicalization in recent years in Europe. Prisons are another of the main focuses of radicalization. Not only because of the feeling of revenge on the jailer, but also because of the sense of personal unity over the ‘he is like you.’ 42 Finally, if we understand that radicalization does not necessarily imply terrorist action, although it is the previous step, something that tends to be overlooked when studying the processes of radicalization are the subjective personal issues that lead to an individual and not to another to move from having radical ideas to identifying violence as necessary to carry out this necessary change, present in these radical ideas. Internet has enormously helped to crystallize this type of processes by making available to people with radical concerns, propaganda, training and operational planning. The reasons why the attacks of the wrongly so-called lonely wolves proliferate in the West, individuals, without a direct relationship with the terrorist organization that responds to a process of radicalization that is becoming more and more rapid, can be found in a dispersed mixture of factors. 43 What seems clear is that the police files of the perpetrators of the jihadist attacks committed on European soil in recent years were already known by the authorities before the attacks were consummated. They all share elements: in almost all the cedules there are criminal records for common crimes or investigations for links with terrorism. Almost all, in addition, had been imprisoned previously. But there is a factor that is repeated in all the biographies: they are European descendants of Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb or

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sub-Saharan Africa, stuck in their phase of social ascent as a result of a life framed in the suburbs of the cities in which they lived. 44 ‘The exit against their frustration is Islamist terrorism, which makes them feel part of a community. They are subjects with a European passport but feel that they are victims of socio-economic marginalization on the part of the majority society, which inevitably leads to a state of frustration regarding their future prospects in the host society. Years ago the exit to that frustration was the rap and the common delinquency. But now they are the jihad and the Islamic State. In the Turkish neighborhoods of Berlin, for example, you can see the transformation of their youth: if these guys were formerly part of bands dedicated to street harassment, today they are dressed impeccably and behave like good Muslims,’ as Miguel Ángel Cano Paños points out. 45

The radicalization materialized in the Jihad fills the void of frustrated young Muslims in their vital expectations and those offered by the Uma¸ as the homeland of all Muslims.

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Containing the Threat in Europe The increase and nature of attacks in Europe, both of a massive, planned and sophisticated nature, as well as of a spontaneous or individual nature, 46 have shown that attacks ideologically motivated or planned by jihadist terrorist groups can take place at any time unexpectedly. 47 Since the publication of the Security Strategy of 2003, the European Union has come a long way in the fight against jihadist terrorism, taking into account three aspects: guarantee the security of citizens, prevent radicalization and defend values and cooperate with international partners. In this sense, already in 2005 the European Council adopted the European Union's strategy against terrorism, supplemented by the Plan of Action against Terrorism, approved by the European Council in 2007 and revised in 2011 and in June 2014 in light of the new events related to the Islamic State. 48 In December of that same year, the Council adopted general guidelines for the implementation of said strategy. 49 And on September 19, 2007, the figure of the European Coordinator on terrorism was created. 50 Following the emergence of the Islamic State, the Union published two specific strategies to address it, the Counter-Terrorist Strategy for Foreign Combatants in Syria and Iraq and the Regional Strategy for Syria, Iraq and the Threat of Daesh. 51 Subsequently, in January 2016, the European Counterterrorism Center (ECTC) was launched and in April the directive to harmonize the use of databases with the names of passengers in the Union. 52 But one of the most important milestones in this regard was the Directive 2017/541 of the Parliament and the Council of March 15, 2017, to combat terrorism. 53 On July 6,

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2017 the European Parliament published the Decision to establish a special committee on terrorism 2017/2758 (RSO). 54 Finally, on September 12, 2018, on the occasion of the State of the Union speech, the need to promote the creation of a European public prosecutor with the capacity to fight against transnational terrorism was published. 55 However, despite the various efforts within the European Union to give a common vision to the terrorist phenomenon, there is still no common vision of this phenomenon and the responses to the terrorist phenomenon vary from country to country. The lack of interoperability of European legal systems is a clear example of this argument and is clear, for example, in the situation of Mamoun Darkazanliy before the arrest warrant that Judge Garzón filed against him as head of the al Qaeda cell who tried in Madrid and the refusal of German to extradite him. The implementation of the aforementioned European Union prosecutor's office, capable of acting on terrorism issues, could greatly improve this situation. Similarly, the European Commission has also expressed its willingness to increase cooperation between the intelligence and security bodies of the member countries to expedite the exchange of information as well as their intention to strengthen the Schengen area.

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To Recap In this chapter we have dealt with the background, the historical context and the structural problems that have led to the emergence of narrative and Jihadist Salafist terrorism and its impact on the European Union. In conclusion, after considering the evolution of the phenomenon and the description of the main policies of the EU, we can point out that for a better containment of this threat, imaginative thinking will be key, in order to be able to anticipate new forms of action of the terrorist threat. But anticipation based on imagination must be based on adequate knowledge of the threat, from past actions, relationships, modus operandi and ways of relating and communicating. Based on this knowledge, and with a correct monitoring of the individuals of which we have evidence, we can minimize the impact of the threat and dismantle possible attacks before they occur. In this sense, containment and prevention are key when fighting against the terrorist phenomenon. Although in the short term it is a matter of identifying cells and avoiding long-term attacks, it will be essential to dismantle the terrorist narrative since terrorism acts on behalf of a social base that seeks to be confused with society as a whole. Any coherent strategy around the terrorist phenomenon must be based on being prepared, having the capacity to protect the different sources with which to commit attacks (proactive response), being able to persecute the different terrorists and all those who support them, and finally, have the ability to prevent attacks along with the ability to recover and ‘fit’ those that cannot be prevented.

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The very model of society with which terrorists want to end up, paradoxically, serves as a base to camouflage and go unnoticed. Extremists in Europe, use European values based on privacy and civil liberties and legal systems of European countries.

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NOTES 1. Gustavo DÍAZ MATEY PhD. Senior Lecture at Complutense University—Madrid [email protected] 2. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “In the Age of ISIS, Who’s a Terrorist, and Who’s Simply Deranged?,” New York Times, 17 July, 2016, in: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/ world/europe/in-the-age-of-isis-whos-a-terrorist-and-whos-simply-deranged.html?_r=0 ; See also: Kepel, Gilles. La yihad: expansió n y declive del islamismo. Barcelona: Península, (2001) 3. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, and Pew Research Center. Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population. (2009), p. 1. 4. Mockaitis, Thomas R. The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, (2008), p. 45. 5. The Sunni-Shia Divide, Council on Foreign Relations, at: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/sunni-shia-divide 6. McCants, William F. The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. 2016, see also: Stern, Jessica Stern, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. Harper Collins UK, 2016. 7. Global Terrorism Database, in: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 8. Lewis, Bernard. La crisis del Islam: guerra santa y terrorismo. Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2003, p. 6. 9. In the 90s of the 20th century, for example, al-Gama's al-Islamiyya, and the Tanzim, alJihad (against Mubarak), the GIA, or the Muslim Brotherhood Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Basayev group in Chechnya. 10. Jessica Stern, «Obama and terrorism», Foreign Affairs 94, n.° 5, (sept. 2015). 11. Lister, Charles R. The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. 2017; see also: Jordá n, Javier. Profetas del miedo: aproximació n al terrorismo islamista. Pamplona, Spain: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2004. 12. Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2003, p. 172; See also: David Rapoport the Fourth Wave: September 11 in the history of Terrorism, Current History 100 (650), (2001). 13. errill, W. Andrew. The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security. Carlisle, Pa: U. S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 2014, p. 14. 14. Moubayed, Sami M., and Juanjo Estrella. Bajo la bandera del terror: un viaje a las entrañ as del Dá esh. Barcelona: Pení nsula, 2016, p. 93–94. 15. Gerges, Fawaz A. El viaje del yihadista: dentro de la militancia musulmana. Barcelona: La Vanguardia Ediciones, 2007. 16. Laub, Z., abril-mayo 2016. La Politique du Conseil de Sécurité de I’ONU. En: s.l.: Défense Sécurité Internationale; Also see: Jordán, J., 2015. Daesh En: Cuadernos de Estrategia 173. La Internacional Yihadista. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, at: http:// www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/CE_173.pdf. 17. David Petraus, How We Won in Iraq,Foreign Policy, (October 29, 2003), at https:// foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/ 18. R. Bardagí, “Raíces del Estado Islámico,” Expansión, (December 2015); Cockburn (2015): ISIS the return of the jihad, Ariel, p.55; S. Walt, “ISIS as a revolutionary State,” Foreign Affairs 94, No. 6, (December 2015). 19. Bremer L. Paul, My year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Simón and Schuster,2017; See also: Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.), L. Paul Bremer, and Edwin Meese. Defending the American Homeland: A Report of the Heritage Foundation Homeland

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Security Task Force. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2002; Also see: Bremer, P., 2003. Coalition Provisional Authority Order number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society. 20. Javier Jordan, Incidencia del terrorismo de inspiración yihadista en Estados Unidos y Europa Occidental: un análisis comparado, Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 37. March 2015. 21. Jordá n, Javier. 2014. “The Evolution of the Structure of “Jihadist” Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of Spain.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 37, no. 8: 654–669. 22. For a year and a half Raqa had been under the control of the Nusra Front. 23. t would be the first time since Ataturk abolished the caliphate on March 3, 1924, that a group declared a caliphate for the Muslim community as a whole. 24. The following months were characterized by important territorial conquests for them, among which are Mosul (June 10, 2014), Tikrit (June 11, 2014) and Tal Afar (June 16, 2014). 25. Shaul Mishal y Maoz Rossenthal, 2005. Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organization. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, p. 283; Mockaitis, T. R., 2007. En: The «new» terrorism: myths and reality. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, p. 39; Raufer, X., 2003. Al Qaeda: A different diagnosis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26. 26. Luis de la Corte, “When the Islamic State lost its State,” Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos IEEE, 111/2017. 27. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, April 30, 2017, at: https:/ /www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/21198/; Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Al Qaeda-Islamic State Rivalry: Competition Yes, but No Competitive Escalation,” Terrorism and Political Violence, (2017); Adib Bencherif, “From Resilience to Fragmentation: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Jihadist Group Modularity,” Terrorism and Political Violence, (2017); S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, “Theory of the rise of al-Qaeda,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, (2017); Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda's Resurrection” Council on Foreign Relations March 6, 2016, at: https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection?utm_medium=social_share& utm_source=tw 1/8. 28. To deepen the emergence and development of the Islamic State, read Cockburn, Patrick: “ISIS: The Return of the Jihad,” Barcelona, 2015, Ariel. 29. The New York Times: “Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts, September 26, 2015 ( http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-entersyria -to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html? _r = 0 ): see also: The Telegraph , April 1, 2015, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ islamic-state/11508132/Islamic-State-v-alQaeda-the-battle-within-jihad.html 30. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018): “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018,” https://www.europol.europa.eu/activitiesservices/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018 31. European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2015 on the annual report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, point 46. 32. 10900 terrorist incidents in 2017, with 26,400 victims third consecutive year down since the peak of 2014 with 17,000 incidents, at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_ Overview2017_July2018.pdf; see also: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018): “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018,” https://www. europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism -situation-andtrend-report-2018-tesat-2018 , p. 9. 33. Declarations of Bernard Cazeneuve to the radio station France Inter on August 29, 2015. 34. Federico Aznar Fernandez “Approaches to the phenomenon of terrorism,” IEEE, March 10, 2015. 35. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018): “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018,” https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018 36. The notes are different on the set of Muslims in Europe. 37. July 29, 2015.

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38. Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard (2015): Eurojihad, New York, Cambrigge University Press, p.41: Reinares, “toward a social characterization of jihadist terrorism in Spain.” 39. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018): “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018,” https://www.europol.europa.eu/activitiesservices/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018; ver también: (Arquilla, John and David Ronfeld, 2001, p. 7). 40. As Javier Jordán points out, analyzing the members of the cells of the 11 M in Madrid, “the members of the cells were socially integrated according to socio-economic indicators, but they felt psychologically alienated by the hostile society in which they lived; in: Javier Jordán, Fernando Mañas and Nicola Horsburgh, “Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, No. 1, (January 2008). 41. F. Reinares, “Yihadismo global y amenaza terrorista: de al-Qaeda al Estado Islámico,” ARI 33, Real Instituto Elcano, (1st July, 2015), p.8; Los jóvenes árabes pierden la fe en la democracia, El País, 21 de abril de 2015. 42. Carola García-Calvo and Fernando Reinares, “Procesos de radicalización violenta y terrorismo yihadista en España: ¿cuándo? ¿dónde?,” DT Real Instituto Elcano, 16 noviembre, 2013; Zohar Neumann, “Islamists and Incarceration,” The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 8 December, 2004; Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard (2015): Eurojihad, New York, Cambrige University Press, p. 41. 43. A radicalization that as Shadi Hamid points out is not a consequence only of economic or social issues. 44. R. Blanco, Patricia, “Los autores de los últimos atentados comparten origen, antecedentes y fe,” El Pais, 22 February, 2015; see also: “Ayoub El-Khazzani, un SDF, squelettique et paumé, selon son avocate,” Le Monde, 24 August 2015, in http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/ article/2015/08/23/ayoub-el-khazzani-un-sdf-squelettique-peu-instruit-et-paume-selon-sonavocate_4734452_3224.html; On the background of the terrorists of the attacks in Barcelona see: https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Solo-miembros-celula-terrorista-antecedentes_0_ 677882344.html; Fernando Reinares y Carola García-Calvo. Un análisis de los atentados terroristas en Barcelona y Cambrils Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 12/2018—1/2/2018 at: http:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari12-2018-reinares-garciacalvo-analisis-atentados-terroristas-barcelona-cambrils 45. Miguel Ángel Cano Paños (2010): Generación Yihad: la radicalización islamista de los jóvenes musulmanes en Europa, Madrid, Dykinson; see also Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Bernard “Eurojihad: Pattern of Islamist Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe” 46. “Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks,” Europol, The Hague, 18 January, 2016. Pag.: 8. 47. Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers, John Sloboda, “Respuestas globales a amenazas globales Seguridad sostenible para el siglo XXI,” Fride working papper 27, 2006, in: http://fride.org/ download/WP27_SegSust_ESP_sep06.pdf 48. Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, (Brussels 2007); Council of the European Union. EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. Brussels, (January 2011), at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33275; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1412582464618& uri=LEGISSUM:l33275 49. Council of the European Union, Response to the terrorist threat and recent terrorist attacks in Europe (Brussels 2017) at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-againstterrorism/foreign-fighters/ 50. Council of the European Union, Counter-terrorism-coordinator, (Brussels march 2004), at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/ 51. Council of the European Union, Outline of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign fighters , Brussels, (January 2015), at: http://data. consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5369-2015-INIT/en/pdf; Council of the European Union, EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh Threat , Brussels, (March 2015), at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/03/st07267_en15_pdf

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/; European Council, Declaration of the members of the European Council on the fight against terrorism , on February 12, 2015, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2015/02/ 150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism /; see also: Abellán, Lucía: “Europe toughens its fight against Islamist terrorism,” El País, January 16, 2015. 52. Council of the European Union, Council adopts EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive (Brussels April 2016), at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2016/04/21/council-adopts-eu-pnr-directive/ 53. European Parliament, Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA /(Brussels March 2017), at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1412582464618& uri=CELEX:32017L0541 54. European Parliament Legislative Observatory, Decision on setting up a special committee on terrorism, its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office 2017/2758(RSO), (Brussels 2017), at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en& reference=2017/2758(RSO); see also: European Parliament Legislative Observatory, ), Nominal composition of the special committee on terrorism (Brussels 2017), at: http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2017/2833(RSO) 55. State of the Union 2018: A reinforced European Public Prosecutor's Office to fight cross-border terrorism, 12 September, 2018, in: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-185682_en.htm

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Chapter Four

Transnational Organized Crime in the Greater Maghreb Raquel Barras Tejudo

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INTRODUCTION Organized crime has become a changing phenomenon. Globalization is a great opportunity for transnational organized criminal groups’ activities because of more accessible and faster communications, financial flows or increase of international interchanges and travels. It is important to note that organized crime affect all States (supply countries, transit countries or demand countries). Organized crime is a global threat to international security and it demands a global response. Unfortunately, transnational crime in multiple categories continues to grow in every region. Transnational organized crime is a very profitable business. The revenues generated got estimated to range between US$1.6 trillion and $2.2 trillion per year. 1 The main criminal activities are: terrorism; drug trafficking; small arms and light weapons trafficking and also Weapons of Mass Destruction; human trafficking; prostitution networks; organ trafficking; trafficking in cultural property; counterfeiting and pirating of pharmaceuticals, consumables, luxury goods; illegal wildlife trade; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; illegal logging; illegal mining; crude oil theft; extortion; corruption; money laundry; traffic of toxic waste; piracy. Indeed, organised crime has infiltrated on every corner of society. Notably, in North Africa and Sahel countries, unresolved conflicts and terrorist activity create today an unprecedented escalation of transnationally organised crime. 2 In this sense, I am using the concept of ‘Greater Maghreb’ in the same terms as AFRICOM 3 approaches. I am using this regions’ conceptualisation because I consider it more correct to approach to a region with com57 The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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mon security problems. Greater Maghreb region as a whole is one of the most critical areas in the world when we mention security. Most of the countries in those areas are affected by terrorism, extremism, illicit traffics or illegal activities. This chapter aims to analyse the illicit flows that are present in the North Africa and Sahel region. The movement of people and goods associated with nomadism, transhumance, trade and migration. Conversely, these transfers have connections with illicit trafficking and violence, caused by the presence of armed groups and criminal conglomerates, which operates in the region with total impunity. The first part tries to conceptualize the Greater Maghreb region. Secondly, the chapter analyses the main criminal groups which operate in the region. At the same time, the chapter describing the principal routes for illicit flows in the area, mapping the criminal activity. Additionally, the chapter focuses in the purposes and financial capacities of the groups in the region, concretely the link between terrorist and criminal groups. Finally, as a conclusion, the chapter will describe security implications that illicit activities have in the Greater Maghreb region.

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Greater Maghreb Region Countries in North Africa 4 and the Sahel 5 share common security problems, however, in terms of political, economic and social challenges, it is essential to distinguish between the Maghreb and the Sahel countries: North Africa countries (except Libya since 2011), are more developed countries than Sahelian (poorest in the world) accordingly with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 6 The whole region is afflicted with “conflicts, unresolved internal tensions, political instability, state fragility, widespread power vacuums, vast uncontrolled and permeable frontiers, institutional weaknesses, corrupt regimes, illicit trade (drugs, humans, weapons and raw materials, such as precious stones, ivory, gold, platinum, wood or oil), violent extremism and terrorism or migrant smuggling mafias.” 7 The region, also have ungoverned areas: “A place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behaviour . . . the term ‘ungoverned areas’ encompasses under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas as well as ungoverned areas” 8 and failed States, 9 ethnic and religion tensions, an area with a huge impact in terms of energy and raw materials, poverty and inequality as well as an important demographic dividend (the region is one of the most dynamic

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zones in the world in terms of population growth). 10 In addition, climate change as well as desertification work as driving force for the political challenges such as: economic migrants, inter-ethnic conflicts and extremism. 11 It is necessary, to have into account region’s orography and geography particularities. In the continent, there are vast borders with no control; largely deserted territories with no population; regions with no control of any State; and unrecognised frontiers by some groups. On the other hand, lack of security, the presence of terrorist and jihadists groups, armed groups, violence among populations caused by scarcity resources, criminal groups. Regarding the maritime approach, it is necessary to underline the importance of Macronesia, a maritime region composed of five archipelagos of Atlantic: The Azores, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Madeira and the Savage Islands (closest to the African continent). Additionally, in Africa, Bijagós Archipelago (Guinea Bissau), composed for 82 islands, only 21 are inhabited. The place, with wide areas of coast where anchor comfortable combined with many runways uncontrolled 12 and also ineffective policing, bribable governments, and a relative lack of international attention. 13 Complexity in the region was increased by the apparition of new actors, which fight among them for the protection of illicit trade. The existence of secessionist (in case of Mali or Sudan), jihadist, criminal groups, as well as people whom contraband constitute a real way of life, make more difficult this puzzle of traditional desert contraband. UNODC, in the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), 14 has reached more than 13,675 direct beneficiaries and generated concrete results across the region in the main areas linked to crime. Attending States’ capacities, there are a vast difference among countries in North Africa and Sahel. For instance, countries like Morocco, Algeria or Egypt have more State capacity to face with these problems. One of the most relevant problems it is corruption, State capacities, ports authority and frontier personnel, and lack of resources to realize a proper inspection of the huge contents which arrive to different areas in the continent, for instance in the Africa Horn or West Africa. By countries, some of them offer good characteristics for crime proliferation, we can consider countries such as GuineaBissau (considered the first narco-State in the world, 15) Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, Guinea-Conakry, Ecuadorian Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mauritania and Morocco 16 as countries where illicit traffics are more extended. Together with these structural factors, the region had had a spin-off of instability and uncertainty: ‘Arab Springs.’ 17 In this sense, there has been a series of phenomena such as new wars and conflicts (as well as emptiness of power), which have important repercussions in some countries of the MENA region, as is the case of Syria, Libya, Iraq or Mali, leaving aside the case of Yemen.

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Criminal Actors and Networks in the Greater Maghreb The existence of trafficking groups in the Sahara-Sahel is not new. Since the middle Ages, North Africa and Sahel region were a proper focus of the trade routes through which merchandise traffic occur (gold, slaves, salt). In the late nineteenth century began to expand, thriving on contraband of subsidized Algerian and Libyan goods traveling to northern Mali and Niger. This trade has got dominated by Algerian and Libyan merchants, Malian and Nigerian Arab traders increasingly established themselves in the sector. 18 “Long-standing commercial and social networks that are frequently based on families and communities specializing in trade are spread across trading hubs in different countries; those networks have been growing closer since decolonization in the 1960s.” 19 In consequence, the boundaries between licit and illicit trade got blurred. Since the Algerian Civil War in 1992, armed groups had have established in the region. For instance, in early ’90s Hadj Bettou was arrested, an Algerian smuggler active in arms trafficking; they also have activity in Niger, in 1998. 20 “The threats to state stability in the region have diverse sources and take different expressions. These include secessionist armed struggles and terrorism in Mali and Niger and unstable narco-states in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea financed by the influx of money from the trafficking of South American cocaine.” 21 Consequently, organized crime has increased in the area. Greater Maghreb region has become a new hub for illegal activities. Organized crime groups have the basis upon the region, and they have developed a net as well as ‘stops,’ drawing the ‘new criminal routes’ by human trafficking, as well as drugs, and also illegal merchandise as medicaments, raw material, oil, etc. On the frontier between Algeria, Mali and Mauritania operate Saharawi groups. They have created intricate cigarette smuggling networks. They try to reach Morocco and northern Algeria. It is the case of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 22 a former deceased AQIM commander has become an important cigarette smuggler across the Sahara, 23 he was known as ‘Mr. Marlboro.’ 24 Another example is that Nigerian mafia it is specialized on prostitution, and also, they have an essential activity regarding cybercrime as well as drug traffic. Another group which have related illegal activity are the Touaregs. 25 Particularly, they have control among vast arid sahelian regions. Since always, they had contraband with tobacco, hash and slaves. Some time ago, Nigerian drug gangs were an essential presence on the global trafficking scene. Recently, South American traffickers have been target the ‘failed states’ along the Gold Coast. In Mauritania, during the presidency of Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya’s, it was an alliance between members of the Smacid, Ouled Bou Sba, and Rgeybat tribes, and these tribes’ controlled smuggling activity. 26

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In the continent, West Africa has become the hub of flow of cocaine from South America into Europe. All this causes the police effectiveness regarding the previous routes (through Europe) that remain more dangerous for the traffickers. “Geographically, West Africa makes sense. The logical things are for the cartels to take the shortest crossing over the ocean to West Africa, by plane—to one of the many airstrips left behind by decades of war, or by drop into the thousands of little bays—or by boat all the way. A ship can drop anchor in waters completely unmonitored, while fleets of smaller craft take the contraband ashore.” 27 Africa is a place where most critical criminal networks have confluence. There is the presence of criminal organizations from Latin America (cartels), concretely Colombians, 28 Venezuelans, Mexicans, and Brazilians. 29 On the other hand, there is also a presence of European criminal syndicates such as Italian ‘Cosa Nostra’ and ‘’Ndrangheta,’ 30 as well as Spanish groups (from Galicia) and France. There is also the presence of people from Eastern Europe (Ukraine) in the region involving in drug trafficking. Including in those groups, it is essential to highlight the presence of Chinese Triads whose had developed a joint venture with most of the African states, at the economical but also at the military and industrial level. Triads operate in almost the whole continent, mainly in the places with maritime coast as well as extractive industries. 31 Nonetheless, it was not until the beginning of the 21st Century that its presence became a real issue in the region. Additionally, Libya current situation after ‘Arab uprising’ was also another factor of instability for the region, regarding arms trafficking, because of uncontrolled Gadhafi’s arsenal, a spin off for the situation in Northern Mali (Azawad region 32 ) with the touaregs as well as islamist insurgency in 2012. The same arsenal, supplied weapons, particularly MANPADs in the whole sahelian region. Recently, Centro African Republic and Ivory Coast, but also Sudan after 2015, are another weapons suppliers. 33 Moreover, “over the past decade the displacement of narcotics supply lines has placed the remote and marginalised Sahara-Sahel region on the international drug route to the European market.” 34 On the other hand, after Gadhafi Regime, in Libya the situation regarding smuggling mafia was unacceptable. In August 2017, a group of sub-Saharan men got sold as slaves in Libya. This issue was generating the indignation and also an inflexion point related to smuggling mafias. Moreover, illegal trade and fuel exploitation in Libya is another critical aspect of the civil war. In this sense, the Tripoli Government demanded the legitimate ‘National Oil Company’ be under the supervision of the National Unity Government, accordingly to UN resolutions. 35

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Mapping Criminal Activity in the Greater Maghreb 96 percent of the USD 31.5 billion in illicit flows generated annually in conflict areas goes to organised criminal groups, and this money is helping to fuel violent conflicts. Criminal groups are operating in the area with impunity. Governments’ absence, lack of authoritarian regimes’ and permeable frontiers contribute to this favourable situation for the crime. Additionally, corruption at the institutional level as well as the collaboration of the local population (for some ethnic groups’ traffic it is an income supply). Mapping illegal activity is essential. 36 In the Greater Maghreb criminal groups are organized by activities and ‘markets.’ In this sense, the leading countries in the region linked with drug and narcotics trafficking are Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. Moreover, in most of the cases, Spain, Portugal, UK, USA and South Africa are the recipient States. In the case of human trafficking, the countries and zone of activity are all West Africa, mainly around Benin, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. The recipient states are other West African countries, North America, Europe and the Middle East. In the case of drugs, there are three main routes of traffic. First, Northern route (the traditional one): Caribe, Azores, Portugal/Spain. Cocaine is transported from South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador as well as Venezuela) to European Union through the Atlantic Ocean by boat to the main ports in Spain, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Big ports like Valencia, Antwerp or Rotterdam are black holes for drugs. For instance, Valencia receives more than five million containers a year. 37 Second, the intermediate route departs from South America to Cape Verde islands, as well as Madeira and Canary Islands to Western Europe. Thirdly, in the African route, the drug is sent to West Africa (Atlantic coasts) and then to Portugal and Spain. Here there is also another subroute, called the ‘western Sahara route,’ which uses the traditional distribution channels of hash and trafficked people. 38 Finally, the drug gets pass via the Sahel to North Africa and finally arrive in Europe, concretely to Portugal and Spain (Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona), but also other places like the United Kingdom. Cocaine arrived from Latin America has the entrance door into the continent principally by West Africa. “While in previous years, West African countries were the main transit area for cocaine trafficking, North African countries are increasingly also being used as a transit route for cocaine originating in South America and on its way to Europe. According to UNODC, cocaine reaches Africa by various routes, but it mainly arrives directly from South America or indirectly via the Sahel region and West Africa or, to a lesser extent, via Europe. Opiates originating in Afghanistan are transiting through Africa and then being trafficked onward to Europe, North America and other consumer markets.” 39

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According to UNODC data, the seizure of West Africa by Colombian and other drugs cartels (there is also the presence of Mexican cartels like Sinaloa and Zetas in West Africa countries 40) is increasing considerably. Since 2003, 99 percent of all drugs seized in Africa got founded in West Africa. Regarding quantity, “between 1998 and 2003, the total quantity of cocaine seized each year in Africa was around 600 kg. However, by 2006, the figure had risen five-fold and during the first nine months of last year had already reached 5.6 tonnes.” A Liberian ship—named Blue Atlantic—was intercepted by the French navy, with 2.4 tonnes of pure cocaine in 2008. 41 Recently, “most of the cocaine coming into Guinea-Bissau is brought by mules travelling from Brazil, most of the students, according to the police chief. In 2017, airport agents caught 14 mules, carrying 8.65 kilograms of cocaine.” 42 Regarding arrivals, ships loaded with cocaine from Latin America, which were transiting on open waters, under a flag of fishing or private boats. As a consequence, by proximity in between the African coast and the European continent in some points, to reach Europe for traffickers is not that difficult. Another type of cocaine arrival is via illegal flights. Different kind of private aeroplanes, previously tricked (for having more autonomy or capacity), are used for transport drugs. Those planes get land in specific lonely places. ‘Air Cocaine’ is an anecdotic case; it is a Colombian cartel that had 8 planes. 43 This illegal airline is managed by Russian pilots, transports cocaine between Latin America and Africa. The way in North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa are enormous. There are quarters especially inhabited just for narcotraffickers and contrabandists, like Gao in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 44 Cocaine arrives by plane to Mauritania, by boat to Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leona, Liberia or Ivory Coast. The drugs that have landed in Mauritania get the pass to Mali via Gao, then to Niger, (where Al Qaida has routes’ control together with Colombian traffickers. Afterwards, the drug travels to Chad and then arrives into Libya; the current situation in Libya is perfect for traffickers, and they use the country as a hub. After Libya, the drug is distributed to Europe by boat, from ports in Libya and Egypt. From Libya, the drug arrives directly to Italy; and in the case of Egypt, the drug gets sent to Romania, which is the gateway to Europe from the east. 45 In the case of hash, there was an evolution in the region. In 2010, more than 90 percent of cannabis had concentrated in Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania and Morocco. 46 Nowadays, seizures of cannabis resin reported by Morocco increased further in 2016 to nearly 237 tons, while Algeria and Egypt reported a significant decline in seizures. 47 Frequently, traffickers used light aircraft from Morocco to Southern Spain as well as Portugal. The drug gets thrown from the light, or the transport landed by hiding it on rural places, and then the drug is recollected by the organisation on an accorded place. 48 Significant cannabis resin originated in Morocco is still going to Spain by plane as well as by ship. Nonetheless, it is crucial to

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Figure 4.1.

point an emerging trafficking route for cannabis resin using Libya as a major transit hub, it gets trafficked across the Mediterranean, mainly to Italy, and from there onwards to several destinations. 49 Nonetheless, there is another critical hash movement: from the north of the continent to the south. Hash arrives in Mauritania, and from there, there are two different routes. In one hand, a route that comes from the north of Mauritania to northern Niger. On the other hand, the route called ‘hope route’ is located in the south of Mauritania and connects Nouakchott with Bamako as well as with Niger. 50 It is essential to add that there is also a growing methamphetamine production in the region. In 2010, 78.4 kg of amphetamine got intercepted at Lagos airport. In 2011–2012, two methamphetamine laboratories got detected in Nigeria. In this case, the routes are very different—the primary market for West African-made ‘meth’ in East Asia, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. On the same terms, Japanese authorities had detected regular methamphetamine traffic coming from Africa, concretely Nigeria, Senegal, Benin and Cameroon. The Modus Operandi is simple: sending small quantities on commercial flights, with Asiatic countries as destination such as South Korea, Malaysia or Thailand. Let’s not forget that over 13 billion cigarettes in the Maghreb have an illegal origin in 2016. According to UNODC, the total value of illicit tobacco traded in North Africa is thought to exceed US$1 billion and also more than 60 billion cigarettes a year (from 400) which got purchased on the black market.

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Smuggling people is one of the 21st Century dramas. “Human Traffic” is defined as: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people, by means of the threat or use of force or other kind of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another one, for the purpose of exploitation.” 51 Spanish Police have notice of the routes: firstly, smuggled people arrive in Nigeria by plane. From Nigeria, there are 2 main roads: a) Niamey (Niger), Gao (Mali), and finally Reggane (Algeria); b) Cano (Nigeria), Agadez (Niger), and Tamanghasset—In Safaj (Algeria). From northern Algeria smuggled people go (by foot) to Ceuta and Melilla. Another route is from Bamako (Mali), by bus to Gao, and then to the north of Algeria to arrive at Gibraltar. Another one it departs from Dakar to Nouakchott (Mauritania) and from the capital of Mauritania to Nuadhibu, where boats take them to Canary Islands destination. There is also a direct route from Western Sahara, concretely from El Aiun, where a fishing boat transports the people to Fuerteventura (Canary Islands); from Lagos and Port Harcourt (Nigeria) as well as from Monrovia (Liberia), it keeps people in a merchant's vessel narrowed to Cape Verde and Canary Islands. 52 Criminal groups who smuggle people from African countries are very active. Capitation is easy: they learn about the differences in living standards in Europe and Africa, as well as between Morocco and Spain. They are used to hand false documentation to smug people. Travelling this way has a cost

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of US$1.000–2.000. The modus operandi is simple: they have people in both countries (departure and arrival); they have also used contacts in the receiver country. They have control over people and still have contact with the victim when they arrive at the final destination. In most of the cases, it exists a debt with the organisation; to obtain the payment, smugglers use menaces, violence as well as voodoo. Smuggling people routes are in constant change. For instance, the political situation in Italy and its hard opposition to the European migration policies have a direct impact into smuggling routes. Meaning that, on three of the Mediterranean routes, there is an increase, in the Western route (via Spain) together with the Eastern route (Greece) regarding the Central route (Italy). The ‘Aquarius’ case has had major influence into mafias’ routes for smuggling people. In this sense, the smugglers had changed their routes on the triple borders of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, and they send people through Algeria in detriment of Libya. Weapons illicit trade in the Greater Maghreb gets linked to another kind of illicit activity. Uncontrolled weapons in the area, feed insecurity and criminality. Ten years ago, main countries linked with fire weapons trafficking were: Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Senegal. Conflictive zones in the region are increased in the last years, configuring an intricate arms smuggling route. As we said before, the embargo imposed on Libya stimulated contraband and conflicts in Algeria, norther Niger, and Mali turned the region into a major arms trafficking hub. But there are also other conflict zones such as Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria, which contributes to the arms smuggling. The presence of rebels and local manufacturers of small fire weapons became fuel for the pre-existing conflicts. Recently, “Libya has been the centre of weapon proliferation for more than 40 years. Qaddafi’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya amassed one of the largest and most diverse conventional weapon stockpiles than any African country. The regime used this stockpile in its border conflicts, to supply a wide range of governments and rebel groups across Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.” 53 Also, it got founded a seizure of weapons of the same model and serial number, similar in the Sahel than in Syria. This issue is a fact that demonstrates either the mobility of the jihadists between areas of conflict. 54 After 2011 Arab uprisings “recruiting fighters for non-jihadist groups in Syria (such as the al-Farouq Brigades [kataib al-farouq] and Descendants of Saladin Brigade [liwa ahfad Salaheldin]—both associated with the Free Syrian Army). These recruiters—who later developed connections with some of the jihadist groups and fire weapons smugglers operating in Tunisia—reportedly, they were paid $3,000 per recruit.” 55

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Figure 4.3.

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Figure 4.4.

Environmental crimes “have grown to the point where they account for 64 percent of illicit and organised-crime finance or between US$22.8 billion and US$34 billion of the criminalised economy on fragile states in or near conflict areas.” 56 Environmental crime is the third largest criminal sector worldwide: illegal exploitation of oil, gas, gasoline and diesel, forestry crimes, illegal fisheries, illegal mining, illegal wildlife, illegal trafficking and dumping of toxic and electronic waste, this is a consistent income revenue for terrorists. On Niger Delta, in 2009 UNODC estimated 55 million oil barrels got smuggled each year. When it comes to Nigeria, non-state armed groups, like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, and Niger Delta Avengers benefit from the proceeds of oil theft. 57 Oil traffic was the predominant source of income for the Islamic State in 2014 and 2015. It also happens in Libya and Nigeria. For instance, “Al-Shabaab makes an estimated US$20 million, where half of it is from illicit charcoal trade and the rest on

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other taxation.” Morocco experiences a wide variety of illicit hydrocarbon origins. The stolen illicit hydrocarbon from Nigeria is laundered through Ghana’s Salt-pond Field and sold on to the SAMIR field in Morocco, which also exports it. In the same way, Algeria has noticed of smuggling hydrocarbon, 9.4 million barrels in 2013. The demise of the Qaddafi regime in mid-2011 generates a battle control of natural resources (main oil) among militias, tribal groups, warlords 58 in Libya. Besides, the controversy between the main two ways of thinking in the country makes more difficult the situation. On one hand, the Tripoli Government of National Unity (since 31st March 2016), and, on the other hand, the House of Representatives in Tobruk, commanded by the General Haftar and National Army Support. It is not an exclusive issue from the Sahel region, because also it happens in Mexico or Brazil. It is also important to note attacks of terrorist group to critical infrastructures in the region. For instance, in January 2013, Al Qaeda linked militants affiliated with Mokhtar Belmokhtar attack Tigantouirine gas facility near Amenas, Algeria, taking more than 800 people hostage and killing 40. In May 2013, attack on a French owned uranium mine in Arlit, Niger, as well as military base 150 miles away in Agadez. Other illegal economies such as diamonds (Sierra Leone and Liberia), gold and other precious metals, stones and timber (Sierra Leone and Liberia), as well as oil (Nigeria) or illegal fishing are another sort of organised transnational crime. Particularly, smuggling illegal goods, mineral and natural resources and cash crops have a high impact in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leona. As in late 2013, illicit trade in Ivorian diamonds got estimated at USD 12–23 million per year. 59 Also, northern Niger regions like Zinder and Agadez are rich in uranium and oil, with concessions mined mainly by French, Chinese and Canadian firms. 60 Receptive continents are Europe and North America. 61 If we refer to timber (wood species, such as rosewood and mahogany), estimated USD 14.8 to 17 billion. Nonetheless, “the illegal exploitation of high-value endangered wood species; illegal logging of timber for sawn wood, building material and furniture; illegal logging and wood laundering through plantation and first agricultural companies to supply pulp to the paper industry; the use of vastly unregulated trade in wood, fuel and charcoal to conceal illegal logging.” 62 Other illicit traffic are antiquities/wildlife. Interpol considers that borders do not restrict environmental crime, and it can affect a nation’s economy, security and even its existence. Interpol also indicates the same routes used to smuggle wildlife across countries and continents are often used to smuggle weapons, drugs and people. Indeed, environmental crime often takes place

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hand in hand with other offences such as passport fraud, corruption, money laundering and murder. For example, “Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were named and ashamed for allegedly fuelling the illegal ivory trade. Despite having a larger amount wiped out their elephant production, three of the countries were believed to be importing and selling tonnes of ivory which got poached in nearby countries, according to a new report from conservation watchdogs.” 63 In most of the cases, the final destination in Asia, particularly China and, in less quantity, India. In the last years, it was an increase in the prevalence of fraudulent medicines. World Health Organization estimates approximately 30 percent of the drugs distributed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are counterfeit. Early 60 percent of drugs purchased in the Gulf of Guinea fall under the falsified quality classification by World Health Organization. 64 There are also criminal groups in the region specialised on ‘cyber crimes’ such as advance fee fraud/money, free fraud gangs or syndicates in Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leona. Money laundry is another criminal activity that affects the region as well as in the whole continent. In most of the cases, criminal as well as terrorist groups use another kind of criminal activities to hide money targeted by financial sanctions. For criminal actors, it is crucial to launder profits of criminal activity or to convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and that it remains easily transportable. Finally, it is important to note that in most of the cases Africa is not the last stop of illegal products. However, it seems that a change is taking place when it comes to drug consume on the African continent. According to “2013 report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), while the use of traditional drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, seems to be declining in some parts of the world, the abuse of prescription drug and new psychoactive substance is growing. Africa is emerging as a target for the production and traffic of illicit substances, making the continent more vulnerable to the drug, crime, as well as health and development related challenges.” 65 For instance, “Nigeria was highlighted in 2009 by the UNODC as a high-risk country among seven of the eight West African countries assessed as major crime areas.” 66 Regarding other illicit flows, for instance, the dramatic situation of smuggling people, principally Europe but also the Gulf States, became the main receptive areas. Narco-Jihad in the Greater Maghreb Organized crime is increasing across the World. It has become a global threat represented in a confluence of conflicts everywhere: from Africa to the Mid-

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dle East and the Americas, and showing a distinctive linkage to international terrorism. The proliferation of non-State actors in North Africa is increasing: armed groups, insurgent movements, ethnic militias, organised crime groups, contrabandists, traffickers as well as extremist religious groups. All of these circumstances contribute to generating an essential increment of violent extremism and terrorist activity, sometimes linked with criminal groups creating a hybrid hazard. 67 Conflict and terrorism are today funded on an unprecedented scale by transnational organised crime and by illicit revenue from natural resources. 68 Instability is the cause of other problems in the region, for instance, the proliferation of terrorist groups in the region. 69 Terrorist attacks have increased from 400 in 2007, to overpass 2.000 in 2016. This means that there are different terrorist groups in the North Africa—Sahel such as AQIM (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb), 70 Boko Haram (Nigeria), Al Shabaab (Kenya and Somalia), Islamic State (Libya and Middle East) as well as its ‘wilayat’ 71 overspreads across the Islamic world. Some of these groups have been reedited; this is the case of “Jamaat Nusrat Al Islam wa Al Muslimin,” a new terrorist group which owns the main jihadist groups in the Sahel. Iyad Ag Gahli, mythic Touaregs leader from Ansar Dine, announced in Mauritania this quote: “one flag, one organization, one emir.” This group is the most significant terrorist group in the region of Mauritania, Mali, southern Algeria as well as Niger. ‘Al Murabitun’ is the same case: it is a salafist group created on August 2013, by MUJWA and Mokhtar Belmokhtar. In Mali, there are different actors: terrorist groups as JNIM, Ansar ad-Din, local militias like GATIA or MSA, MNLA with the Northern Mali Touaregs, Movement (MTNM), and other kind of actors, like Sultan Oild Badi, Tahirou hama, Touaregs and the Fulani among others. There is a junction between crime and terrorism in the Greater Maghreb. In most of the cases, there is a symbiosis between the criminal and terrorist groups. Jihadists dedicate to other illicit activities, as migrant smuggling mafias, as well as the drug caravans. All this means that a new phenomenon was created in the region: narco-jihad. Those actors share characteristics as operability, clandestinely and routes. Among these groups there are growing links. For instance, the capacity of criminal cartels for smuggling people, permission to the terrorist who infiltrates into the smuggled people groups, and pass over controls. Concretely, in this area, “extremist groups, traffickers and local communities support one another, and there is a reciprocal expectation of what each group can bring to benefit the other, in terms of financial inducement, information, intelligence and local knowledge of routes and oases.” 72 For a moment, in Mali, tribes from the North were protected by terrorist organizations. Tribes are making contraband and AQIM claim for taxes in

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his control areas; in Libya some groups are dedicated too smug people and narcotics. At the same time, Boko Haram do profitable business with cocaine and heroin trafficking. 73 Another relevant example of junction between jihadist and contrabandist is to claim the independence of Azawad region, in Northern Mali. Concretely, “static political projects in northern Mali must now be interpreted on light of dynamics as protection and extraction. In particular, customs system of ’droits de passage’ (passage rights) has been transformed.” Lucrative crime business allows the finance of terrorist groups. When terrorist’s organizations got financed by illegal activity, it makes danger more challenging to deal with, because terrorists have better access to weapons and resources. At the same time, cartels gain more power and influence when they cooperate with terrorists. 74 The main problem is that drug traffic is a very profitable method 75 (this is not a new issue FARC in Colombia gained 78 percent income from narco-traffic, as well as in Afghanistan, where mujahidin have controlled opium business). 76 For extremist groups illicit smuggling is a fundamental pillar. According to Interpol data, “ISIS/Daesh made an estimated USD 10 million a month.” JNIM in the Sahel “makes an estimated USD 5–35 million respectively, from illegal taxation, donations, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes, drugs and illegal taxation”; Al-Shabaab “receives an estimated USD 20 million, half of the illicit charcoal trade and the rest from other forms of taxation” and Boko Haram “has made an estimated USD 5–10 million, mainly from taxation, bank robberies, donations from other terrorist groups and ransom kidnapping.” 77 Consequently, terrorist metamorphosis activity together with organized crime in the region got degenerated in criminal groups who ‘forget’ their original vindications for a very profitable business. Also, “smuggling and smoking are forbidden by some strains of extremist ideology—most notoriously Salafism—some terror groups are not directly engaged in such illicit efforts, instead taxing smugglers’ activities, and/or receiving income from protecting their convoys.” 78 Groups whose incomes come from drugs smuggling are creating this joint venture known as ‘Narco-jihad’ in the Greater Maghreb Sahel. Most of Islamist terrorist organization’s doctrinal bases have been also been strongly influenced and financing by Persian Gulf States for the expansion of Wahhabism and Salafism. In the same terms, if the Taliban in Afghanistan or jihadist in North Africa-Sahel and the drug lords “use the Islamic rhetoric to give righteous grounds for their actions, then this very same rhetoric must be used and backlashed against them, in order to unveil their hypocritical and counterintuitive stance.” 79 Have those groups on a contradiction between their faith and their financing methods?

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In the Greater Maghreb space, armed groups, terrorists and smugglers have used multiple methods for supporting themselves. Additionally, it got diminished on members of an ideological profile and there was an increase of criminal groups and cells, who act as ‘sub-contractors.’ 80 The decrease of theological individuals could explain why there are more and more terrorist groups linked with drug traffic, which are composed of relatively less loyal fighters to an Islamic theological spectrum.

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CONCLUSIONS Around the World criminal networks emerge. Regarding wrong routes, Africa, and concretely West Africa and then Greater Maghreb becomes one on the main doors of the drug sent from Latin America or Asia. However, there are not only drugs. Mafias use the same routes as routes of migratory flows. These routes are also used by transnationally organised crime groups, which have illegal activities of fire weapons traffic, money laundry, and other illicit traffic. Illicit traffic frequently occurs parallel with other activities. In consequence, the Greater Maghreb together with West Africa had registered a remarkable increase within the illicit traffics. Countries that belong to Greater Maghreb are the poorest in the world. In the region States are weak, criminal groups have supplanted in some aspects to the government. Fertility trend, as well as stress between urban and rural populations, are the perfect storm for places where poverty and lack of social services, infrastructures and opportunities are structural. Poverty in Greater Maghreb-Sahel region it is extreme, and some people have no choice than illicit activities. All these circumstances are pushing people into criminal networks; also people are leaving the continent. Unprecedented immigration fluxes become one of the most relevant challenges for the European Union as well as for the African continent itself. Other consequences of criminal activity in the region are under-development itself. Transnational organised crime networks in Greater Maghreb stems from the fact that few alternative activities produce similar enrichment. Also, illicit products presence’ have other effects on product’s prices.’ Most common products are smuggled across the border because of demand and increase on price, which incentives ‘black market.’ Instability in the Sahel has benefit extremist groups. For that reason, there is a joint venture between jihadist and traffickers, while terrorist keep funding their activities with illegal trade. Terrorist groups are increasingly relying on smuggling contraband goods to fund their activities. Consequently, narcojihad is a phenomenon increasing in the region, and it could be worst in the future because of the proliferation of different terrorist and militias groups

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with a religious orientation. It is essential to understand the dynamic of competing for political claims and armed movements in the zone. In conclusion, criminal know-how in the region it is very consistent because of the kind of actors, networks and characteristics. Thereby, deteriorating insecurity and instability across North Africa and Sahel are exposed to have a problem in the future, because it’s utopia to think that there are tools to fight. Moreover, some of the Sahelian initiatives focused on the securitisation of the territory. Fight against crime and border control has become of primary importance. However, also, it is to fight against corruption. In most of the frontiers, there is surveillance, but the main problem is corruption. Additionally, interconnected local communities with criminal networks, as well as recruited collaborators who serve to this groups. The Greater Maghreb is Europe’s’ instability door. Closing the door to illicit traffic in the region could be very difficult and painful for its local population. The key point furthermore securitisation gets to be developing countries’ capacities in different fields. Nonetheless, it seems to become complicated if it does not exist other best alternative to optimise life conditions and more profitable than a crime.

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NOTES 1. Transnational Crime and the Developing World. Global Financial Integrity. May 2017, p. 13. https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf 2. Nellemann, C.; Henriksen, R., Pravettoni, R.; Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Schlingemann, M.A.J, Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (Eds). 2018. World Atlas of Illicit Flows. A RHIPTOINTERPOL-GI Assessment. http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AtlasIllicit-Flows-FINAL-WEB-VERSION-copia-compressed.pdf 3. Particularly, US position: European command, AFRICOM and Central Command (where it includes the Middle East). García Cantalapiedra, D. “La creación del AFRICOM y los objetivos de la política de EEUU hacia África: gobernanza, contraterrorismo, contrainsurgencia y seguridad energética.” RIE. ARI nº53/2007. 4. North Africa region includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. 5. The Sahel region includes parts of northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the southernmost part of Algeria, Niger, the northernmost region of Nigeria, central Chad, central and southern Sudan, the extreme north of South Sudan, Eritrea, Cameroon, Central African Republic and the northern reaches of Ethiopia. Zoubir, Y: (2017), “Security Challenges, Migration, Instability and Violent Extremism in the Sahel” in Geopolitical Turmoil and its Effects in the Mediterranean Region. IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2017, pp. 134–140. 6. Human Development Indices and Indicators 2018. Statistical Update. UNDP. pp. 8–11. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_summary_human_development_statistical_update_ en.pdf 7. Barras, R. and García Cantalapiedra, D. (2015). Hacia un Nuevo y diferente ‘flanco sur’ en el Gran Magreb-Sahel. UNISCI Journal, Nº 39. October 2015. Retrieved from https://www. ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-74789/UNISCIDP39-1BARRAS-GARCIA.pdf 8. Lamb, Robert D. (2008): “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens.” Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project. Prepared for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, p. 18.

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9. Mallett, Richard: ‘Beyond Failed States and Ungoverned Spaces: Hybrid Political Orders in the Post-Conflict Landscape.’ eSharp, Issue 15: Uniting Nations: Risks and Opportunities. 2010, pp. 65–91, en http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_153492_en.pdf 10. Barras, R. “Climate change and demographic trends: security challenges in the Sahel” in “The Sahel: Europe’s African Borders,” EuroMesco—IEMED (April 2018), https://www. euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMeSCo-Joint-Policy-Study-8_The_Sahel_ Europe_African_Border.pdf 11. Barbot, M. Executive Secretary of United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification at the United Nations (UNCCD). 12. Pérez, A. L. (2014), “Mares de cocaína. Las rutas náuticas del narcotráfico.” Grijalbo, México. 13. Stephen Ellis, West Africa’s international drug trade, African Affairs, 108/431, (2009): 171–196. 14. The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel [S/2013/354], endorsed by the Security Council in June 2013. S/2013/354. 15. The Guardian. How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco-state. 9th March 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/09/drugstrade 16. Sansó, D. “¿Por qué África?: desentrañando la geopolítica criminal del tráfico ilícito de cocaína entre América Latina y Europa (vía España).” Real Instituto Elcano 7/2018, April 2018. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/2902f0df-7d6b-442d-8856c70ae58ad121/DT7-2018-SansoRubertPascual-Africa-geopolitica-transito-cocaina-AmericaLatina-Europa-Espana.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=2902f0df-7d6b-442d-8856c70ae58ad121 17. Bowen, Jeremy. (2012): The Arab uprisings. Simon & Schuster. 18. Scheele, J, “Circulations marchandes au Sahara: Entre Licite et Illicite,” Hérodote 142 (3/2011), pp. 143–162. 19. Lacher, W. Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region. The Canergie Papers, September 13, 2012. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https:// carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region-pub49360 20. Wehrey, F. and Boukhars, A. (2013) “Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara.” Brookings Institution Press, April 2013, p. 63. 21. Tham Lindell, M and Mattsson, K. Transnational Threats to Peace and Security in the Sahel. June 2014. Ministry of Defense Sweeden. FOI-R--3881—SE. 22. Bel Mokhtar, a veteran of the Algerian jihadist scene and one of the most prominent AQIM figures, spent a decade forging relationships, building influence with the communities in the Azawad desert, proselytizing especially among the Arabs. It is not MEE, 2016. GhanemYazbeck, D. Jihadism in The Sahel: Aqim’s Strategic Manoeuvres for Long-Term Regional Dominance. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 23 June 2017. https://carnegie-mec. org/2017/06/23/jihadism-in-sahel-aqim-s-strategic-maneuvers-for-long-term-regionaldominance-pub-71413 23. Wehrey, F. & Boukhars, A. (2013) “Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara.” Brookings Institution Press, April 2013, p. 63. 24. There is no consensus regarding he is alive or death. Bachir, M. and Khider, N. “Armed Islamist leaders in Libya claim al-Qaeda’s Belmokhtar is still alive.” 13 June 2018. El Majalaa. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-libya-mokhtar-belmokhtar-alive-qaeda-aqimislamic-state-1799384986 25. Moraleda, M. “The Tuareg people and their role in the conflict in Mali.” IEEE. Opinion document nº 75/2013, 14 August 2013. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/ 2013/DIEEEO75-2013_Tuaregs_MMoraleda.pdf 26. Ibid. Wehrey, F. & Boukhars, A. (2013) . . . 27. Senior official at the US’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 28. The Colombians have established links with several countries in the region such as Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo.

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29. Julien, S. “The Sahel as a Drug Transit Zone: Actors and Political Consequences.” Hérodote, 2011/3 (No 142). https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_HER_142_0125--the-sahelas-a-drug-transit-zone-actors.htm 30. Herrero de Castro, R. and Barras, R. “Globalización y crimen organizado. Mecanismos de lucha contra el crimen transnacional: La inteligencia.” Inteligencia y Seguridad 6 (2009). 31. B. Berry La Verle, Glenn Curtis, Seth Elan y Rexford Hudson (2003), Transnational Activities of Chinese Crime Organizations, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Crime and Narcotics Centre, Directorate of Central Intelligence, Federal Research Division, Washington. 32. For more information about Azawad region claim for of independence see Grégory Chauzal, G. and van Damme, T. “The roots of Mali’s conflict.” Clingendaen, March 2015. CRU Report. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/3_a_ playing_field_for_foreign_powers/ 33. John Campbell, “Armas en el Sahel.” CFR, November 2016. 34. Strazzari, F. “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali.” Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre (NOREF), January 2015. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Strazzari_NOREF_ Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf 35. UN/RES/SC/ 2362 (2017): “Extends until 15 November 2018 the authorizations and measures related to the attempts to illegally export crude from Libya and extends its scope to petroleum; specify the designation criteria; extends the mandate of the Group of Experts until November 15, 2018.” UN/RES/SC/2259 (2015): “Endorses and grants international legitimacy to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) to form a Government of National Agreement (GNA) composed of a Presidency Council and a Cabinet of Ministers.” UN/RES/SC/2146 (2014): “Authorizes Member States to inspect on the high seas the vessels designated by the Committee for attempting to illicitly export crude oil from Libya; decides to impose a series of measures against the designated vessels; extends the mandate and increases the number of members of the Group of Experts.” 36. I used the main reports of UNODC as well as Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 37. “Spain: Europe’s new cocaine gateway.” El País. 4 July 2018. 38. Op. Cit. Sansó, D. “¿Por qué África?: desentrañando . . . 39. International Narcotics Control Board. 2017 Report, p. 62. 40. “Africa: New drug traffiking group.” El Universal, Mexico, July 2017. 41. Análisis situacional del narcotráfico. Una perspectiva policial, Comunidad de Policías de América (AMERIPOL), 2013, http://www.flacsoandes.edu.ec/libros/digital/54531.pdf 42. Still a narco-state? Guinea-Bissau’s illegal drug economy. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime. 27 March 2018. http://globalinitiative.net/guinea-bissau-illegal-drugeconomy/ 43. Lost another plane (a Boeing 727), in 2009 trying land in the Sahel. The plane had the device modified to carry out transatlantic flights. Op. cit. Barras, R. and García Cantalapiedra, D. (2015). Hacia un Nuevo y diferente . . . 44. Ibid. 45. Op. Cit. Sansó, D. “¿Por qué África?: desentrañando . . . 46. International Narcotics Control Board. 2011 Report. 47. Ibid. 48. Berlanga Varo, J. A. (2015), “Lucha contra el tráfico de drogas y delitos conexos buscando el compromiso y la implicación de los países productores y de tránsito,” in Pérez Álvarez, F. and Zúñiga, L. (dirs.), Instrumentos jurídicos y operativos en la lucha contra el tráfico internacional de drogas, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, Pamplona, pp. 422–425. 49. International Narcotics Control Board. 2017 Report. 50. “Terrorismo y tráfico de drogas en África Subsahariana.” International collaboration Project between the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE) and the Military Institute of Documentation, Evaluation and Prospective of Algeria (IMDEP). http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/ fichero/docs_trabajo/2013/DIEEET01-2013_IEEE-IMDEP.pdf

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51. Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Human Trafficking; especially Women and Children; supplementing United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 52. National Spanish Police | Office of the General Commission of Foreign Affairs and Borders http://www.comunidad.madrid/sites/default/files/doc/justicia/operativa_policial_oct_ 17_modo_de_compatibilidad.pdf 53. Report: Investigating cross-border weapon transfers in the Sahel. Conflict Armament Research. November 2016. 54. How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb. International Crisis Group. Middle East and North Africa Report N°178. July 2017. https://d2071andvip0wj. cloudfront.net/178-how-the-islamic-state-rose_0.pdf 55. Op. Cit., p. 8. How the Islamic State Rose . . . 56. Nellemann, C.; Henriksen, R., Pravettoni, R.; Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Schlingemann, M.A.J, Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (Eds). 2018. World Atlas of Illicit Flows. A RHIPTOINTERPOL-GI Assessment. http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AtlasIllicit-Flows-FINAL-WEB-VERSION-copia-compressed.pdf 57. Ibid. 58. In May 2014 the anti-Islamist insurgency which was initially located in the city of Benghazi. A month later, a coalition of militias from cities in western Libya formed the Libya Dawn (terrorist coalition) and conquered Tripoli. Mezran, Karim & Toaldo, Mattia. “Libya Can’t Save Itself.” Politico, 23 March 2017. 59. UNSC data, 2014. 60. Illicit Financial Flows. The economy of illicit Trade in West Africa. OECD, 2018, p. 90. http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/IFFs-The-Economy-of-Illicit-Trade-inWest-Africa.pdf 61. De Andrés, A. P. West Africa under attack: drugs, organized crime and terrorism as the new threats to Global Security. UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 16 (January 2008), p.206. https:/ /www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72513/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf 62. EUROPOL data 2015. 63. Op. Cit. De Andrés, A. P. West Africa under attack: drugs . . . 64. UNIDO data 2018. 65. Aishatu Yusha’u Armiya’u, A. “Drug abuse and crime in West Africa: what prospects.” Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). 66. Ibid. 67. Alonso, R. “El terrorismo yihadista: una amenaza híbrida.” Cuadernos FAES (enero/ marzo 2015), en: http://www.fundacionfaes.org/uploaded/061080%20ROGELIO%20ALONSO.pdf 68. Op. Cit. Nellemann, C.; Henriksen, R., Pravettoni, R.; Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Schlingemann, M.A.J, Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (Eds). 2018. World atlas A RHIPTO-INTERPOL-GI Assessment. http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Atlas-IllicitFlows-FINAL-WEB-VERSION-copia-compressed.pdf 69. Echevarría, C: “Malí y el resto del Sahel occidental como escenario privilegiado del activismo yihadista salafista” Research Document 22/2017 “Grupos militantes de ideología radical y carácter violento. Área del Sahel.” IEEE, (diciembre 2017), en http://www.ieee.es/ Galerias/fichero/docs_investig/2018/DIEEEINV22-2018_Mali-SahelOccidental_Yihadismo_ CEcheverria.pdf 70. Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an organization created in 1997, in Algeria, as a split of the so-called Islamic Armed Group.In 2006 he linked with Al Qaeda. AQMI remains mainly in Algeria. Ammour, L. D. “Les défis de sécurité dans la zone saharo-sahélienne et leurs répercussions dans the mediterranéenne region,” paper presented at The IX International Seminar on Security and Defense in the Mediterranean. A shared vision for the Mediterranean and its neighbourhood, organized in Barcelona by CIDOB and Ministry of Defense. October 2010. http://www.sedmed.org/analisis_ssm/documents/semIX/laurence_ aida_ammour.pdf 71. One of the most active is ‘Wilayat Siani’ is an Egyptian local jihadist group, which has sworn allegiance to the main Islamic State group. Although there is no agreement in this regard,

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the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) considers that Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) is the group from which the Islamic State arm has been formed in the Sinai. ‘Wilayat Sinai’ is located in the Sinai Peninsula, in Egypt, and is fed by the discontent of the population with the Egyptian State, with the particular presence of Bedouin groups in their ranks. “Spotlight on Global Jihad” (June 7–13, 2018). The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-global-jihad-june-7-13-2018/ See also, Puckova, E. “The re-emergence of Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis in Egypt illustrates the internal divisions of the IS Wilayat Sinai.” ESISC, European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, (18 May 2017) http://www.esisc.org/publications/briefings/the-re-emergence-of-ansar-bayt-almaqdis-in-egypt-illustrates-the-internal-divisions-of-the-is-wilayat-sinai 72. Political Stability and Security in West and North Africa. Highlights from the conference. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, April 2014, p. 96. https://www.canada.ca/ content/dam/csis-scrs/documents/publications/NorthWestAfrica_POST_CONFERENCE_E_ SOURCE.pdf 73. Ibid, p. 24. 74. Barras, R. “El F lanco Sur como un arco de inestabilidad a las puertas de Europa.” UNISCI, March 2016. 75. I will develop this issue in next pages. 76. ‘Narco-Jihad’—Haram money for a Halal cause? Publication Study Paper. European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS). https://www.efsas.org/publications/studypapers/%E2%80%98narco-jihad%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-haram-money-for-a-halal-cause/ 77. https://www.interpol.int/en 78. Dr. Ghanem-Yazbeck. Smoking Kills: Smuggled Cigarettes a Key Source of Terrorist Group Funding. The Daily Journalism. 2015. 79. Ibid. 80. Political Stability and Security in West and North Africa. Highlights from the conference. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, April 2014, p. 96. https://www.canada.ca/ content/dam/csis-scrs/documents/publications/NorthWestAfrica_POST_CONFERENCE_E_ SOURCE.pdf

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Chapter Five

Latin-American Cocaine Trafficking and Its Impact on West African Security 1

Carolina Sampó 2

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INTRODUCTION Organized crime, understood as a particular way of committing crimes, is characterized by a certain level of planning and coordinated participation of several individuals 3 who act with the purpose of obtaining a material benefit, most of the times being measured in millions of US dollars. 4 Organized crime can adopt different forms that we call manifestations 5 in order to achieve their goals. As Bartolomé 6 points out the distinct characteristics of organized crime are: diversification, transnationalization and interaction. Since their activities are not excluding, they tend to act in multiple fields, they do not limit their business to a single State and they act as global decentralized networks. Even though we can mention at least five manifestations of organized crime, such as counterfeit, money laundry, trafficking of small arms and light weapons, illegal exploitation of natural resources, human smuggling and human trafficking, in Latin America the most important one is drug trafficking, particularly cocaine flows. Cocaine is only produced in three Latin-American countries: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, in that order. But consumers are distributed around the word, being the United States (US) the biggest market, followed closely by Europe—Specially the United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands—and with a growing demand in Asia, Oceania and also in Africa. According to the last Word Drug Report there are 18.2 million cocaine consumers in the world and the global cocaine manufacture for 2016 is estimated in 1,410 tons, 79 The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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which means an increase of 25 percent from 2015. 50 percent of the global cocaine users are placed in North America, 25 percent in Western and Central Europe and the remain 25 percent is located in Africa and, to a lesser extend, Asia and Oceania. 7 In a few words, the cocaine market has increased constantly in the last years and the consumption has expanded to non-traditional areas. Organized Crime, especially networks that traffic cocaine from LatinAmerica to Europe—through Africa—are a threat to the Security of the States where they act. The objective of this paper is to show that West Africa has become a relevant route for cocaine traffickers in order to supply the European market and that this strategic choice made by smugglers by changing part of their routes, has an impact in Western African Security. This article will be divided into four parts considering the dynamics among criminal organizations from different regions and the impact that cocaine flows have on the Security of transit and destination countries. In the first part, we will describe the big picture, explaining how the cocaine illicit market works. Second, we will analyze the dynamics of cocaine flows between Latin-America and West Africa. Third, we will focus on the impact that the cocaine trafficking has on the Security of African States, particularly the ones in West Africa. Finally, in the conclusions, we will highlight the impact that cocaine flow has on West Africa.

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Cocaine Flows: From Latin-America to Europe In Latin-America, Drug Trafficking is the most important manifestation of organized crime, the one that leads illegal activities in the region. Nevertheless, money laundry, human trafficking and smuggling of small arms and light weapons are closely related to Drug trafficking which works as an enhancer of the illegal business. As we have already pointed out, organized crime uses diversification in order to maximize profits. Weapons are central to develop the violence—direct or indirect—needed to perpetuate the domain of criminal organizations in regions where the State seems to be absent. Human trafficking is a subsidiary business that provides an extra service for those who traffic drugs as well as for those who consume them. Money Laundry, on the contrary, is a need for traffickers. Since the money they get from the illegal market must be “laundered” in order to be used in the legal market, criminal organizations will develop legal and illegal business. The legal ones will provide a facade to their spurious business. 8 Cocaine is a drug with high demand, especially in Europe and the US. But new markets are rising, not only across the countries that were transit routes but also among States from Africa and Oceania. Even though the most significant flow of cocaine continues to be from South America—especially Colombia—to North America and the second route ends in Europe—sometimes

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going through Africa—it is possible to identify new corridors to Asia— China and Israel are the principal destinations—and to Oceania, particularly Australia. The appearance of Australia as an emerging cocaine market has to do with the fact that in the United States a kilo of cocaine costs between 4,000 and 50,000 dollars while in Australia the price ranges from 137,000 to 222,000 per kilogram. 9 In this scenario, security is no longer thought as a problem between States, as the Wesphalian approach used to consider. States are the most prominent actor in the International System but not the only ones. On the contrary, non-state actors and transnational dynamics have been incorporated to the multidimensional Security approach, which is more accurate to explain the current world. The Security Agenda nowadays is composed by heterogeneous issues that potentiate themselves and consider non-conventional threats such as organized crime and terrorism. 10 Hence, regions as LatinAmerica and Africa that seemed to be peaceful when concerning interstate conflicts, turned out to be the most violent and insecure areas of the world, given the importance of non-state actors and non-conventional threats. Non-Conventional Threats have a significant impact on governance. The most important effect of that impact is that the State is no longer capable of controlling its borders and territory and may not have the monopoly of violence. 11 As Woodward 12 points out, the fragilization process of the States and the fact that they lose control of some areas of its territory make the space more attractive to criminal organizations. Due, grey areas appear generally close to borders. The incentives generated by the States and the increasing levels of production and drug trafficking in Latin America have contributed to the proliferation of criminal organizations. Those criminal organizations do not work alone. On the contrary, they work as a network in order to lower risks and increase profits. As Aning and Pokoo 13 points out: “West Africa presents an ideal choice as a logistical transit center for drug traffickers: its geography makes detection difficult and facilitates transit; the region boasts well-established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates; and a vulnerable political environment creates opportunities for operation.” Cocaine smuggling started in a small scale around 1950 thanks to Lebanese and Nigerian diasporas that established commercial networks. Then, in the 1980s drug trafficking bloomed on a larger scale and, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, traffickers consolidated their activities using corruption as a tool. However, by the end of the 1990s criminal activity in West Africa was driven by fragmented networks and actors that interacted eventually. 14 Nevertheless, by the beginning of the century, West Africa consolidated itself as a region of transit due to the networks established between Latin-American criminal organization and their African partners—mostly Nigerians and Ghanaians.

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According to the World Drug Report 15 two-thirds of the cocaine that ends in Europe, arrives through West Africa. We can identify five hubs in Africa: 1. The Atlantic Coast, being Guinea-Bissau a key player but Guinea and Senegal also play a part. 2. The Sahel-Saharan route, that starts in Mauritania and expands to Mali, Argelia, Niger and Libya. 3. The Bight of Benin, that starts in Ghana to Niger through Togo and Benin. Sometimes traffickers also use Nigeria, Cote D´Ivore and Burkina Faso. 4. South Africa. 5. Angola— (see figure 5.1). 16 Lacher 17 points out that “The overland routes across the Sahel and Sahara toward Europe are diverse, and there is little evidence for sustained major flows on any single route. Cocaine is transported from the coastal hubs—in this case, Guinea or Mauritania—overland to northern Mali and on to Morocco, Algeria or Libya.” Aning and Pokko 18 agrees and adds that from the Sahel, cocaine is transported to Europe by land and air. There is no doubt that West Africa has become a good alternative to older cocaine routes. Traffic of cocaine has an impact on local and regional security that is tied to the role developed by the State in the drug flow. It is not the same if it is a place of transit, a place of transit and consumption or a place of consumption. West Africa started being a transit area, but the left overs of cocaine flows transformed it into a consumption market as well. Cocaine Flows between Latin-America and West Africa

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In recent years, West Africa has grown from a minor trafficking route for cocaine exports to a major hub. 19 According to a United Nations Report 20

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“From around 2005, a series of very large (hundreds of kilograms) cocaine seizures were made, en route to or in West Africa. At the same time, hundreds of cocaine couriers were detected on commercial flights originating in West Africa and destined for Europe” suggesting that Latin-American traffickers had changed their strategy by using West Africa as a way station. Cocaine was then smuggled to Europe through the north of the continent by a network of traffickers organized and with a large diaspora in the old continent. The impossibility to monitor the West African coasts in addition to the degrees of corruption and state capture—as we will see below—have transformed the Western Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Guinea into transshipment platforms. “This has been facilitated by the growing linkages between drug cartels in Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil with counterparts operating (mainly) in Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Nigeria.” 21, 22 Most of cocaine cargos appears to cross the Atlantic Ocean from LatinAmerica to Europe in large “Mother-ships” modified to carry tons of cocaine. Once in the cost of Africa, the cargo is offloaded to smaller vessels in order to be distributed to different stocking places. 23, 24 Aircraft are also used to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Some of them are commercial planes from the second-hand market and others are smaller aircrafts modified in order to have the autonomy needed to reach the African Coast and to carry as many tons of cocaine as possible. Once in Africa, the cocaine is moved by land or using small craft in order to take the drug to the European coast. 25 Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and even Tunisia seem to be the countries used by criminal organizations to smuggle cocaine to Europe and open a gate to the rising Asian market. The most important ports in Latin America are placed in Brazil and Venezuela. Colombian cocaine is smuggled mainly to Venezuela and leaves South America in order to reach West Africa by sea—through Cabello port—or by air, considering that it is the closest point to Guinea Bissau. Concerning Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine, Brazil, particularly the Santos port—located in San Pablo—is used to send the drug to West Africa. Colombian cocaine sent from Venezuela by sea follows the so called “Highway 10—a reference to the 10th degree of latitude that connects the northern part of Latin America.” 26 Apart from the ships, around 60 illicit aircraft regularly traffic cocaine from Latin America to Europe taking advantage of the limited air control. Once in West Africa the drug is transported in small quantities by couriers on commercial flights, by smugglers across the Sahara or by mules in regular flights. 27 According to Chalk 28 “Venezuela’s role as a primary transshipment hub has expanded considerably since 2005, when President Hugo Chávez terminated all cooperation with DEA on the grounds that its agents had been engaged in espionage activities against his government.” After that episode,

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seizures have dropped considerably. Hence, United States Authorities claim that government officials are accomplices of criminal organizations and Venezuela has become a premier transit zone in Latin-America for cocaine delivered to Europe. As with Venezuela, shipments are dispatched via littoral states off the West African coast, where Guinea-Bissau acts as the key point of entry. 29 Apart from Venezuela, Brazil and to some extend Argentina and Uruguay constitute export hubs for shipments across the Atlantic Ocean, especially of Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine. 90 percent of the former and 70 percent of the latter are export using Brazilian, Argentinian and Uruguayan ports. 30 In fact, the increase in the use of containers in commercial ships have made the detection very difficult for law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, diverse operatives have shown that the routes from Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela are very active. Yet it is important to highlight that criminal organizations change strategies constantly in order to lower the risks of being captured. According to the World Drug Report 31 “African countries report Brazil (58 percent) as the most frequent departure/transit country for cocaine trafficked to Africa in the period 2010–2015, followed by Colombia (20 percent), Chile (10 percent) and Peru (8 percent).” When it comes to the countries of the region, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Mali and Niger are the most frequent transit countries. As we can see, the routes are checked by the information gathered by the UNODC. “Cocaine transiting Africa over the period 2010–2015 was reported to be destined mainly for countries in Europe (80 percent; notably Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), followed by destinations in North America (15 percent; mainly the United States) and Asia (4 percent; China and Malaysia).” 32 From Latin America the West African coast can be reached by ships from Brazil or Venezuela, considering that during daylight the ships “remaining motionless by day, covered in blue tarpaulins to avoid detection from the air. The journey can be completed in four to five nights travelling this way.” 33 Aircrafts of different sizes are also used, as we have already pointed out, departing from Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia considering the lack of infrastructure and control of the West African countries. Guinea Bissau is the first stop in the drug traffickers plan of action. The country receives between 30 and 50 tons of cocaine a year. 34 Not only because it is the closest point to South America but also because there is an archipelago of uninhabited islands well-known as a center for smugglers where it is easy to leave the cargo and load it into smaller ships. 35 Also, the State weakness is reflected in the fact that there is only a ship to patrol the 350kms coastline and the archipelago. 36 The Bissagos archipelago formed by 88 islands, 18 principals, is 48 kms away from the coast—5 hours from Bissau—in an area where governmental officials have no resources to guar-

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antee the sovereignty of the State. Formosa, Caravela, Orango, Roxa, Orangozinho and Uno are the islands that cover more than 100 km² and can be easily used by criminals due to their geographic position (see figure 5.2). Orango is the closest to Latin America and the easiest to reach using a big ship, even though it is not the only one criminals use for their business. Lebanese criminal organizations are also present in Guinea Bissau. 37 Hezbollah, a “terrorist group with links to the Lebanese diaspora, relies on independent, transnational criminal specialists in West Africa with close links to the drug trade for money laundering, document forgery, and other criminal activities” 38 (Brown, 2013: p.23). In Latin America, especially in the so-called “Tri-Border area” between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, there is also a very big Lebanese diaspora that has been pointed out for drug trafficking. In fact, in February 2016, the DEA arrested several members of the diaspora being accused of working with the Colombian FARCs in order to supply the cocaine market in Europe. 39 Hence, it is not a surprise to discover that Lebanese diaspora may be involved in the cocaine trafficking from Latin America to West Africa. According to Shaw, Drug trafficking in Guinea Bissau could be developed because Latin American smugglers looked for a group of interlocutors in West Africa. The entrepreneurs “who had had previous contacts with illicit drug traffickers in Europe and Latin America, and at the same time were close to political power” 40 were very useful to establish the business. In addition, it was also necessary to work with Guinea Bissau politico-military elite in order to guarantee the entrance of the cocaine. Mali is also a very important territory for drug traffickers. On the one hand, it is at the center of the Sahelian corridor that links West Africa and the Maghred—used for centuries by smugglers. On the other hand, the north of the country is a heaven for terrorist organizations such as AQIM and the Movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) that provides protection and support to criminal organizations moving cocaine through the area to Europe in exchange for money for their cause. 41 The desert made the job of law enforcement agencies almost impossible since it is a territory that cannot be controlled effectively. Also, as Marc, Verjee and Mogaka points out “The protection given by the state to some local elites and influential businessmen, as well as to local armed groups that were involved in trafficking in order to maintain influence in the north, is often cited as one of the reasons for the rapid spread of trafficking in the region.” 42 As a result, LatinAmerican criminal organizations see northern Mali as an accessible and profitable staging point that is halfway between South America and Europe. 43 As De Andrés 44 points out, the analysis of seizures in West Africa and destinations markets show the presence and interaction of three different and complementary trafficking structures: the first, led by foreign operators, move large, multi-tons shipments of cocaine from Latin America (Colombia

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Figure 5.2.

via Brazil and Venezuela) to West Africa by the use of ships, private yachts, and more recently private airplanes. The second is operated by well-established local trafficking networks, mainly Nigerian and Ghanaian, who buy directly from foreign drug trafficking networks shipments up to a couple of hundred kilos of cocaine which is then either sold on regional markets or rerouted via human couriers to final destinations in Europe and South Africa. (. . .) Finally, the wider availability of cocaine at wholesale level and the consequent development of a regional market have generated a new figure of operators, the “free lancers.”

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Even though the bulk shipments to West Africa appear to be controlled by Latin-American Criminal Organizations, their African partners play a role in getting into and distributing the drug in Europe. 45 According to the West African Commission on Drugs 46 the criminal networks include active members in Europe, North America, Africa and Latin-America and diasporas play a central part at the time of establishing connections between drug producers, cartels, enablers and dealers. According to Brown, 47 Latin-American groups employ West Africans in order to handle their shipments in Africa and pay them with cocaine. Hence, two parallel systems have risen: on the one hand, larger quantities of cocaine in control of Latin American organizations that are shipped to West Africa and, on the other hand, smaller quantities of drug owned by West African delivered using couriers. Moreover, a drug market has risen in Africa due to the left overs of these operations. Cocaine and crack consumption keep growing in that region. Latin American criminal organizations from Mexico, Venezuela and Surinam are present in West Africa. 48 Colombians and Mexicans work not only with Italian mafias such as the N´Drangheta in order to smuggle the cocaine to Europe but also with Ghanaian and Nigerian criminal organizations that distribute and move the drug through West Africa. Also, as Chalk 49 highlights, West African syndicates—especially the ones based in Ghana and Guinea Bissau—play an important role in the African cocaine supply as well as the Ndrangheta, which arranges and facilitates the distribution of cocaine in Europe, having established a presence in Latin-America in order to control all the stages of the process from production to street distribution. Apparently criminal organizations work together but do not trust each other enough to leave their business in the hands of their partners. Nevertheless, they need the protection, knowledge and skills of the local traffickers in order to lower the risks. That is why West Africans, Italians and Latin Americans have some presence in the regions where they work with other organizations. Not surprisingly, Latin Americans have established some representations in West Africa in order to negotiate not only with Ghanaian and Nigerian partners but also with the Ndrangheta. West African drug traffickers also have established some presence in Latin America, especially in Brazil—particularly Nigerians—in order to control part of the business. Finally, the Ndrangheta have established some key points in Latin America and in West Africa. Impact on African Security In the last 15 years West Africa has become a major transit and repackaging hub for cocaine coming from Latin-America and going to European markets, but also a growing consumption destination. The practice started around

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2005 as a result of a strategic shift of Latin American cartels, driven by the growth of the European demand. It also contributed that European law enforcement activities forced Latin-American criminal organizations to look for alternative routes in order to continue trafficking. 50 As well as the fact that older routes such as the ones through Mexico and the Caribbean have risen the cost for traffickers due to the role played by cartels and police patrol. Apart from the health issues that drugs bring on, it is necessary to highlight the serious security threat that is posed by organized crime and specially drug trafficking at regional and State level. 51 In this context, it is important to point out that weak states—almost all African States are weak—”lack the financial and institutional capacity to control their borders or to tackle transnational criminal activities within their boundaries.” 52 Consequently, criminal organizations find incentives to use those areas in order to develop their business which leads to the capture or criminalization of the State. Apart from the fact that detection of illegal activities is difficult for the formal security apparatus considering the way drug traffickers connect with local leaders, establish and operate informal networks, the security apparatus frequently covers for traffickers. 53 Corruption but particularly State Capture make it extremely difficult to contain and fight organized crime, since the State is used in order to develop their business. According to Aning and Pokoo, a big security threat arises from the ability of criminals to infiltrate not only the security apparatus but also key positions in different government agencies. Therefore, criminal organizations are able to influence customs, border agencies, police corps and the armed forces in order to ensure their well-being. In this context, it is necessary to define State Capture. According to De la Corte Ibañez and Gimenez Salinas Framis 54 the State is captured when transnational organized crime extended its influence on politics and conditions the formulation, interpretation and application of norms through corruption and intimidation. The State can be captured in different degrees, but in Africa it is easy to see the most developed model of State capture. Hence, in some cases we can speak about Narco-States, which is the extreme of criminalization. In that case, the economy of the country depends on the incomes that drug trafficking leaves in the territory of the State. 55 Even though it is possible to identify several States that have been captured by organized crime, it not so easy to find a Narco-State. Nevertheless, Guinea Bissau seems to be the first one. 56 But in Africa it is also necessary to highlight the “State Complicity” as Lacher 57 calls it and we understand it is a State that has not yet be captured but eventually would be. In this scenario, States allow organized crime to enable terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

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(AQIM) to grow and expand. The terrorist organizations in exchange provides security to criminal organizations. 58 Also, according to Aning and Pokoo AQIM is “alleged to be engaging in criminal activity in the Sahel, notably kidnapping and drug smuggling, to finance operations.” 59 Therefore, it is possible to think on the convergence of crime, terror and insurgency, as Miklaucic and Brewer 60 points out. That is to say:

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Violent nonstate actors, including terrorist organizations and insurgent movements, seek to collaborate with criminal networks—and in some cases become criminal networks—in order to finance acts of terrorism and purchase the implements of destruction and killing (. . .) On the other hand, many transnational criminal organizations have adopted the techniques of terrorist violence—sometimes referred to as the “propaganda of the deed”—as a central element in their strategic communication plans and a way of intimidating their rivals. 61

Criminal organizations can then: 1. Capture the State or 2. Infiltrate the State up to the point of creating a Narco-State. At the same time, they can converge with terrorist and insurgent organizations, using captured States or Narco-States as heavens that provides sheltering for them. In West Africa we can find the two models in different degrees. Then, it is important to highlight that the actions of criminal organizations can threat political and economic stability of States and regions. The annual corruption perception index helps to understand the degree of State Capture that African States suffer. According to Transparency International’s last index, 62 Guinea Bissau is one of the most corrupted States in the world and occupies the 171 position—of 180. The other West African States are not far at all. On the contrary, the most corrupted countries seem to be the ones used by criminal organizations to traffic cocaine into Africa. From the hub in the Atlantic Coast, Guinea Bissau and Guinea share the position. From the Sahel-Saharan route, Libya occupies position 171, followed by Mauritania in position 143, Mali in position 122 and Argelia and Niger (112). Finally, the hub located in the Bright of Benin—the least frequently used by cocaine smugglers—counts with Nigeria in position number 148, followed by Togo (117), Niger (112), Benin (85) and Ghana (81). It is not a coincidence that Venezuela, the State that delivers most of the cocaine departing from Latin-America, occupies position 169. The relation between Latin-American and African drug trafficking organizations is profitable and has not increased the levels of violence in Africa. On the contrary, the amounts of money that drugs move seem to be tempting enough to capture government officials, so they will allow drug smugglers to traffic through their borders and territories. On the other hand, traffickers from both continents are not interested in fighting each other. On the contrary, an equilibrium seems to have been reached among them and they

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do not look for the extension of their domains in new territories. Nevertheless, in Africa there have been some incidents between native criminal organizations that have shown that peace is sustainable as long as organizations respect each other’s territories. In short, the impact of cocaine trafficking in Africa can be summarized in four points. In the first place, even though we are not able to determine whether the fragility of African States is a cause or a consequence of drug trafficking, we cannot deny that the vicious circle works clearly. While West African countries create the incentives for the criminal organizations to use their territories in order to make their business work, the institutions become more fragile especially when it comes to law enforcement. Second, once the criminal organizations have penetrated not only public but also private institutions thanks to corruption, the State is captured or criminalized—as a Narco-State—so all actions will contribute to make cocaine trafficking easier and more profitable. In addition, in West Africa and the Sahel it is necessary to highlight the convergence that seems to take part between criminal organizations and terrorists, especially from AQIM. But it is also important to understand that it is not a result of cocaine flows. Nevertheless, terrorist organizations have benefited economically from their new alliance with criminal organizations. Third, it is important to understand that the economies implied in this illegal business are so fragile that the money that organized crime leaves can really change the life of politicians and ordinary people. The breeding ground is set by poverty so organized crime counts with an “army” willing to work for them. Finally, West Africa stopped being a route of transit and despite the low incomes it has become a territory of consumption that continuous growing. As Alemika 63 points out, the effects of organized crime are not noticeable but they are unquantifiable. Nevertheless, the impact they have on West African societies can be reflected in violent conflicts, political instability, social deprivation—poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, mortality rates—absence of social services, lack or deterioration of infrastructure and public services as potable water, roads, rails, electricity among others. All these factors contribute to keep West Africa as an underdeveloped area, with captured States that allow drug smugglers to supply a demanding European market. In Ghana, for example, drug money has supported the election of members of parliament, weakening their accountability and undermining democratic institutions. In Mozambique, the business community has complained of unfair competition from drug traffickers, whom it accuses of evading customs excises and container inspections. In Guinea-Bissau, the drug trade has exacerbated political instability, including the double assassination of President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira and Chief of Defense Staff General Batista Tagame Na Wai. And in Kenya, increasing drug use is linked to

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robbery, Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and broken families. 64

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FINAL REMARKS The dynamics established by criminal organizations from Latin-America and West Africa are quite different from the ones established by criminal organizations in their controlled territory. Far from being competitive, cooperation between these drug trafficking organizations seems to be the most common behavior. In contrast with what happens in Latin-America where violence rises continuously, West Africa have not shown violence as a problem related to drug illicit market competition. We believe that even though intimidations play an important part, the model that criminal organizations have developed prevent a violent environment. As we have mentioned, criminal organizations with business in West Africa have established representations in the other parts of the production, trafficking, selling drug process. Hence, West African criminal organizations are now present in Latin-American countries in order to control the way cocaine trafficking is taking place as well as they have contacted their diasporas to make the distribution in Europe easier. On the other hand, LatinAmerican criminal organizations have sent some representatives to the West African countries in order to control the trafficking and distribution process. Finally, transnational organizations such as the Ndrangheta or the Lebanese diaspora are also present during the first part of the process—production and trafficking from Latin-America to West Africa—but also in the second step, once the cocaine is in West Africa and has to be distributed in the region and to Europe. Since the criminal organizations involved in cocaine trafficking do not jeopardize the business or existence of their partners, violence is not present in the way we usually see it in Latin America. Considering that every drug trafficking organization has its own portion of the illicit market, it does not seem probable that violence would escalate. Nevertheless, the weak part of the business is the one related to the capture of the State. Even though criminal organizations have shown how easy it is to guarantee cocaine flows using money to corrupt government officials, a State that cannot offer stability it is always a danger. Criminal organizations also need some certainties about who is in charge. Hence, if a country is too volatile, it may be a problem to operate there since criminal organizations do not know with whom they have to make the arrangements. This could be the case of Guinea Bissau where coups de ệtat are often and presidents do not usually finish their terms. But, due to the military and their influence on the political

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arena, business continues taking place in what it is considered the first narco state of the world. Nevertheless, there are some parts of West Africa that are not controlled by States. On the contrary, terrorist groups such as AQIM, are the key players. The ones that are able to guarantee the movement of cocaine through that territory, as we have seen in northern Mali. It is important to highlight that these organizations are not a result of drug trafficking. On the contrary, they take advantage of the power they have earned in areas where the state is not able to exercise their sovereignty—mostly desert zones—in order to collect money, they use to fight for their cause. Thus, it does not seem to be a convergence scenario but a convenient one. Criminal organizations are extremely flexible not only when it comes to their structure—which guarantees the impossibility to dismantle them—but also when it is related to the strategies they developed in order to traffic cocaine efficiently. West Africa appeared as a more relaxed and less controlled area that the direct shipments to Europe, so the organizations chose to change a large part of their routes. It may happen again, depending on the incentives presented by potentially different alternatives. Nowadays, even though seizures have fallen, the Western African hubs seem to be very profitable for drug trafficking organizations. In fact, we believe that the reduced number of seizures responds to the degree of State Capture, due to corruption of governmental officials and the lack of resources needed to control the flows that pass the borders. Economic failures help ordinary people as well as government officials to be tempted by criminal organizations in order to work for them. Thus, it is necessary to point out that Africa is the poorest region in the world and some of the countries involved in drug trafficking are so poor that their GDP is equal to what criminal organizations left in a couple of months. Despite the economic capacity of African countries, the region has become a rising market for cocaine trafficking due to the left overs of criminal organizations supplying Europe’s demand. In a few words, West Africa counted with several incentives for criminal organizations to establish their hubs in order to supply Europe with cocaine. Once the route grew, due to corruption, the weak stability of West African countries was jeopardized by the capture of the State. Nevertheless, criminal organizations needed some stability in order to guarantee their business, so they agreed not only with military and government officials but also with non-State organizations as some terrorist groups placed in the area. Consequences of cocaine trafficking for West Africa seem to be focused on the weakness of the state and the exploitation of the critical economic conditions. Thus, in order to improve the control law enforcement agencies must exercise, it is necessary to strengthen democratic institutions in different ways. First, it is important to work on the civilian control over the mili-

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tary. Second, it is imperative to guarantee clean and periodic elections as well as the terms of elected officials. Third, economy must improve and offer a future to the youth in order to avoid their work for criminal organizations. Fourth, corruption of government officials and the use of power to their own benefit must be punished. Finally, the State should be present and accessible for ordinary people. Otherwise, their legitimacy will go to criminal organizations. Apart from the work that is needed to be done in West Africa, it is imperative to work on the cocaine demand that comes from Europe. On the contrary, the route will continue working and criminal organizations will find the way to prevent the strengthen of democratic institutions.

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NOTES 1. This article is part of the proyect J143, from the Universidad Nacional de La Plata, called “El sistema mundo en el siglo XXI y el ejercicio de la fuerza, desde los atentados del 11S hasta el conflicto de Crimea. Estudios de casos (Medio Oriente, Pacífico, Europa Orienta y Sudamérica) y los medios empleados y los debates en el Derecho Internacional Público (“Nuevas Amenazas,” drones, misiones de paz, ejércitos privados)” 2. Researcher at Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Conicet)— Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI), Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP). Assistant Professor at Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Coordinator of the Center of Studies on Transnational organized crime (CeCOT), IRI—UNLP. PhD in Social Sciences for the UBA, Master in International Studies for the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT) and Bachelor in Political Science (UBA). [email protected] 3. De la Corte Ibáñez, L & Giménez-Salinas Framis, A. 2015. Crime.org. Barcelona: Ariel Editorial. 4. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2010. “The Globalization Of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment.” Vienna: United Nations. http:// www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organizedcrime-threat-assessment_html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf. 5. Sampó, C & Troncoso, V. 2017. El crimen organizado en América Latina: Manifestaciones, Facilitadores y reacciones, Madrid: Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado 6. Bartolome, M. 2006. La seguridad internacional en el siglo XXI, más allá de Westfalia y Clausewitz. 1st ed. Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 7. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2018. “World Drug Report.” Vienna: United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018. P. 30, 33. 8. Sampó, C. 2017. “Una Primera Aproximación Al Crimen Organizado En América Latina: Definiciones, Manifestaciones Y Algunas Consecuencias.” In El Crimen Organizado En América Latina: Manifestaciones, Facilitadores Y Reacciones, 23–40. Madrid: Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado. 9. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2018. “World Drug Report.” Vienna: United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018. P. 33. 10. Sampó, C., and M. Bartolomé. 2013. “Seguridad Y Violencia En El Actual Escenario Latinoamericano: De La Teoría A La Praxis.” Relaciones Internacionales, no. 45: 22. http:// sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/32396. 11. Sampó, C., and M. Bartolomé. 2013. “Seguridad Y Violencia En El Actual Escenario Latinoamericano: De La Teoría A La Praxis.” Relaciones Internacionales, no. 45: 22. http:// sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/32396. 12. Woodward, S. 2006. “Fragile States: Exploring the Concept.” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).

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13. Alemika, E. 2013. “Organised Crime and Governance In West Africa.” In The Impact Of Organised Crime On Governance In West Africa, 10–19. Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10200.pdf. P. 3. 14. Dechery, C., and L. Ralston. 2015. “Trafficking And Fragility In West Africa.” Fragility, Conflict, And Violence Group. Washington DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/handle/10986/20638. 15. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2017. “World Drug Report.” Vienna: United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017. 16. West African Commission on Drugs. 2014. “Not Just In Transit. Drugs, The State and Society in West Africa.” http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report/. 17. Lacher, W. 2012. “Organized Crime and Conflict In The Sahel-Sahara Region.” Carnegie Papers, Middle East. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf . P. 7 18. Alemika, E. 2013. “Organised Crime and Governance In West Africa.” In The Impact Of Organised Crime On Governance In West Africa, 10–19. Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10200.pdf. 19. Brown, D. 2013. “The Challenge Of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance And Human Security In West Africa.” The Letort Papers Carlisle. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1151.pdf. 20. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2009. Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa. Threat Assessment, Vienna. Disponible en P. 3. 21. Luengo-Cabrera, j., and A. Moser. 2016. “Transatlantic Drug Trafficking Via Africa.” European Union Instituto for Security Studies (EUISS). https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195720/ Alert_3_Narcotics.pdf. 22. Since the configuration of criminal syndicates changes very often it is almost impossible to map criminal organizations. Hence, we are going to work with the nationality of drug trafficking organizations. 23. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2009. Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa. Threat Assessment, Vienna. Disponible en http://www.unodc.org/res/cld/ bibliography/transnational-trafficking-and-the-rule-of-law-in-west-africa_-a-threatassessment_html/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf 24. As we have described in the previous section, the Hubs in West Africa are located, by order of importance, in the Atlantic Cost, in the Sahel-Saharan corridor and in the Bright of Benin. 25. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2009. Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa. Threat Assessment, Vienna. Disponible en http://www.unodc.org/res/cld/ bibliography/transnational-trafficking-and-the-rule-of-law-in-west-africa_-a-threatassessment_html/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf 26. Chalk, P. 2011. “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, And Response.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf . P. 9 27. Brown, D. 2013. “The Challenge Of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance And Human Security In West Africa.” The Letort Papers Carlisle. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1151.pdf. 28. Chalk, P. 2011. “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, And Response.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf . P. 10 29. Chalk, P. 2011. “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, And Response.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf . 30. Chalk, P. 2011. “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, And Response.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf . 31. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2017. “World Drug Report.” Vienna: United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017. P. 33.

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32. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2017. “World Drug Report.” Vienna: United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017. P. 33. 33. Vulliamy, E. 2008. “How a tiny West African country became the world's first narco state” The Guardian, Sun 9 Mar 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/09/ drugstrade 34. Mallinder, Lorraine “Still a narco-state? Guinea Bissau’s illegal drug economy” march 27, 2018. http://globalinitiative.net/guinea-bissau-illegal-drug-economy/ 35. Loewenstein, A. 2016. “How Not To Fix An Africa Narco State.” Foreign Policy. https:/ /foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/06/how-not-to-deal-with-an-african-narco-state-guinea-bissau/. 36. Marc, A., Verjee, N. and Mogaka, S. 2015. The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa. Washington DC: Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank. 37. Figueira, D. 2012. Cocaine trafficking in the caribbean and west africa in the era of the mexican cartels. Iuniverse. 38. Brown, D. 2013. “The Challenge Of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance And Human Security In West Africa.” The Letort Papers Carlisle. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1151.pdf . P. 23 39. “Hezbollah moving 'tons of cocaine' in Latin America, Europe to finance terror operations” The Washington Times, June 8, 2016. Available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2016/jun/8/hezbollah-moving-tons-of-cocaine-in-latin-america-/ recovered 10/30/2018 40. Shaw, Mark. 2015. “Drug Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, 1998–2014: The Evolution of An Elite Protection Network.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53 (03): 339–364. doi:10.1017/s0022278x15000361. P. 345 41. DREAZEN, Yochi “ welcome to cocainebougou” Foreign Policy, March 27, 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/27/welcome-to-cocainebougou/ 42. Marc, A., Verjee, N. and Mogaka, S. 2015. The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa. Washington DC: Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank. P. 37. 43. DREAZEN, YOCHI “welcome to cocainebougou” Foreign Policy, March 27, 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/27/welcome-to-cocainebougou/ 44. De Andrés, A. (2008). West Africa under attack: drugs, organized crime and terrorism as the new threats to global security. UNISCI Discussion papers, [online] 16 (January 2008). https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72513/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20%20Andres.pdf . P. 11 45. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2009. Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa. Threat Assessment, Vienna. Disponible en 46. West African Commission on Drugs. 2014. “Not Just In Transit. Drugs, The State and Society In West Africa.” http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report/. 47. Brown, D. 2013. “The Challenge Of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance And Human Security In West Africa.” The Letort Papers Carlisle. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1151.pdf. 48. Brown, D. 2013. “The Challenge Of Drug Trafficking To Democratic Governance And Human Security In West Africa.” The Letort Papers Carlisle. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1151.pdf . P. 8. 49. Chalk, P. 2011. “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, And Response.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf . 50. Shuberth, M. 2014. “The Impact Of Drug Trafficking On Informal Security Actors In Kenya.” Africa Spectrum 49 (5): 55–81. http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-7820. 51. Aning, K., and J. Pokoo. 2013. “Drug Trafficking And Threats To National And Regional Security In West Africa.” Background Paper No. 1. Ghana: West Africa Commision on Drugs. http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Drug-Traffickingand-Threats-to-National-and-Regional-Security-in-West-Africa-2013-04-03.pdf. 52. Shuberth, M. 2014. “The Impact Of Drug Trafficking On Informal Security Actors In Kenya.” Africa Spectrum 49 (5): 55–81. http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl? urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-7820. P. 59.

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53. Aning, K., and J. Pokoo. 2013. “Drug Trafficking And Threats To National And Regional Security In West Africa.” Background Paper No. 1. Ghana: West Africa Commision on Drugs. http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Drug-Traffickingand-Threats-to-National-and-Regional-Security-in-West-Africa-2013-04-03.pdf. 54. De la Corte Ibáñez, L & Giménez-Salinas Framis, A. 2015. Crime.org. Barcelona: Ariel Editorial. 55. De la Corte Ibáñez, L & Giménez-Salinas Framis, A. 2015. Crime.org. Barcelona: Ariel Editorial. 56. O´Reagan, D., and P. Thompson. 2016. “Advancing Stability And Reconciliation In Guinea-Bissau: Lessons From Africa’S First Narco-State.” Washington DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a600477. pdf . 57. Lacher, W. 2012. “Organized Crime And Conflict In The Sahel-Sahara Region.” Carnegie Papers, Middle East. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf. 58. USAID. 2013. “The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide.” United States Agency For International Development. Brooke Stearns Lawson, USAID, and by Phyllis Dininio, Management Systems International. https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/1860/Development_Response_to_Drug_Trafficking_in_Africa_Programming_Guide.pdf 59. Aning, K., and J. Pokoo. 2013. “Drug Trafficking And Threats To National And Regional Security In West Africa.” Background Paper No. 1. Ghana: West Africa Commision on Drugs. http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Drug-Traffickingand-Threats-to-National-and-Regional-Security-in-West-Africa-2013-04-03.pdf . P.8 60. Miklaucic, M & Brewer, J. 2013. Convergence: illicit networks and national security in the age of globalization. Washington DC: NDU Press. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/ Documents/Books/convergence.pdf 61. Miklaucic, M & Brewer, J. 2013. Convergence: illicit networks and national security in the age of globalization. Washington DC: NDU Press. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/ Documents/Books/convergence.pdf p. XV–XVI 62. Transparency International. 2017. Annual Corruption Perception Index. https:// www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 63. Alemika, E. 2013. “Organised Crime and Governance In West Africa.” In The Impact Of Organised Crime On Governance In West Africa, 10–19. Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10200.pdf. P. 21. 64. USAID. 2013. “The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide.” United States Agency For International Development. Brooke Stearns Lawson, USAID, and by Phyllis Dininio, Management Systems International. https://www.usaid.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/1860/Development_Response_to_Drug_Trafficking_in_Africa_ Programming_Guide.pdf. P 3.

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Chapter Six

The Concept of Criminal Insurgency as New Challenge of the International Security Julia Pulido Gragera 1

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INTRODUCTION Given the scenario of interaction and transversality between the elements that are a part of the international system, new risks and threats to international security are produced whose nature does not share the traditional boundaries that until the last ten years prevailed in the global landscape. The consolidation of so-called complex criminal phenomena, 2 a term that is used to designate the convergence and multidimensionality of International Terrorism and the amalgam of offenses labeled as Organized Crime, along with the confusion in the cataloguing of conflicts, risks and threats that do not share a clearly defined typology involve a scenario whose answers go beyond the conventional. This causes a perceptive change in the traditional concept of Security in which begin to perceive contexts of securitization of the defense and militarization of security that leads to considering multidimensional and cross / multidomain scenarios. In this context, the emergence of complex criminal phenomena 3 with a typologically ambiguous nature in the traditional categorizations of threats, causes the parameters traditionally established in the identification of illicit activities to be altered, which motivates an analysis of both the typing of networks and, from a strategic level, the objectives and spaces of territorial and economic control of organized crime groups. In this scenario of uniqueness in terms of the typology of criminal activities, the phenomenon of criminal insurgency arises, with a clear objective: 97 The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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Consolidate territorial control to carry out the corresponding illegal activity, through the consolidation of networks criminals who operate transnationally. For this, as I will be explained below, these groups will implement traditional operating procedures of the traditional insurgency, which will condition the responses of the States, forcing them to execute securitization strategies. In this sense, government policy traditionally focused on the safeguarding of national security exclusively from the point of view of the configuration of territorial strategies, with a focus on the protection of internal security, cause in the long term a situation of international autarky caused by the delay in matching international security and defense plans to the requirements that globalization in its broad spectrum demands. Cooperation on strategies, policies and procedures in the field of international security poses complimentary options in the implementation of means and capabilities to respond to situations with complex criminal phenomena 4 or situations of hybrid conflicts that are non-conventional in nature. One of the mistakes that western states have made in recent years, is the cataloguing of criminal acts in a typology of criminal phenomena already assumed in regulatory corpuses by the legislator and the justice system. An example of this is punishable acts of a violent and bloody nature that have a social impact and that use the conventional characteristics of terrorist groups. In this sense, these groups are already classified as terrorist groups without observing whether their nature, structure and objectives correspond to such classification. Hybrid scenarios are framed, among other threats by, insurgency or protoinsurgency groups, defined these ones by García Guindo as “an instrumental activity, that can help to increase its recruitment base, draw the attention of the domestic and international public in search of economic, political and moral support and also to establish differences when compared to other groups or rival factions seeking to consolidate themselves.” 5 Even when such violence does no longer inspire social mobilization, its coercive character feeds (albeit forcibly) the collective action and in turn generates a progressive wear that undermines and shakes the structure of the government who is unable to meet the essential task of ensuring protection and security to the population. 6 Proto-insurgencies that carry out acts of terrorism to achieve their objectives, but it must also take into account complimentary activities such as people trafficking, money laundering and the use of mafias to encourage indiscriminate illegal immigration to Europe, which later can be used as transit routes for insurgents or terrorists. All this amalgam of threats that until recently were treated individually with ad-hoc responses, requires at present a multifaceted and comprehensive preventive and offensive treatment. This hypothesis would be valid if we consider a projection of this neoinsurgency through the use of communication and technological advances that

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globalization provides, as a way to strengthen the legitimacy of its power in the subjugated areas that they control, and used as a strategy for the recruitment of westerners. We must not forget “failed states” in the typology of threats to security, or threats that come from State entities that create regional instability. The actions of states like Russia, China or Iran in Central and South America, recreating scenarios typical of the Cold War, pose the urgent need of a revision of the strategic objectives that involve a restructuring of security concept through a defensive and offensive balance, increasing and strengthening state force projection means.

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Phenomenon of Criminal Insurgency as a Threat to Security One of the academic debates that are currently being developed is focused on considering whether the activities of the large groups of organized crime correspond to the phenomenon of criminal insurgency. There is no doubt that many states, specifically Latin Americans, are facing situations of extreme violence caused by cartels, gangs, gangs and other violent non-state actors that, in many cases, combine paramilitary tactics with actions close to terrorist activities to achieve their objectives. The term “criminal insurgency” begins to gain importance in scenarios with a high and periodic intensity of violence caused by rival criminal groups that fight for territorial monopoly as well as for the control of illicit activities, and that come to challenge to the State for the rule of force. Coined to define a type of non-traditional insurgency, whose objective is focused on obtaining benefits from organized crime groups, through territorial positioning 7 through the implementation of typical operating procedures of the traditional insurgency , this complex criminal phenomenon begins to position itself in subgovernmental spaces 8 or ungovernability, producing confusion in the assessment of the threat and operational and action procedures, due to the indeterminacy of its nature. 9 Arratia establishes the combat procedures of criminal insurgency as low intensity conflicts. This has a direct impact on the State, since they try to threaten its integrity by adopting it as an objective. Secondly, it is configured as a postmodern phenomenon, in which the actors are non-stanzas and call themselves “criminal soldiers,” as opposed to transnational groups of organized crime, which are characterized by the opening of illicit competitive markets without any type of political-state objective. 10 Therefore, a thin line has been established when identifying whether a state is suffering from a sharp rebound in the presence of criminal groups, or if it is the germ of creation of “no go zones” in metropolitan places. Considered as the new combatants of postmodernity, the actors of the criminal insurgency recreate scenarios characterized by an absence of state

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influence, where the State does not arrive, and whose objectives, in addition to obtaining benefits for their illicit activities, focus on impersonating to state institutions, establishing control in areas where they are unpunished. 11 In this sense, one of the differentiating elements in the definition of large groups and criminal insurgent groups are the operational combat procedures characteristic of low intensity conflicts. Although, many specialists qualify defining characteristics according to the country in which they occur. In this way, the conception of criminal insurgency in Mexico brings a political and paramilitary nature, as a consequence of the permanent confrontation between the Security Forces and the different cartels for the preservation of their criminal business. 12 Considered a variant of the traditional insurgency, the phenomenon of the criminal insurgency presents a great difficulty to be counteracted, not by the identification of the actors, since they are more easily typified by their belonging to different criminal groups, even, you can reach consider relevant when establishing reactive policies. 13 For the challenges posed by neutralization or minimization, since traditional counterinsurgency strategies and police strategies are not operationally effective. 14 A phenomenon that, increasingly, is positioning itself in Latin American States forcing to devise unconventional strategies, with a clear positioning of Armed Forces units in urban areas but not with an identified counterinsurgency purpose. 15 Criminals are assuming the monopoly of the police force's own strength. Due to the impossibility on the part of the police groups to face the urban combat procedures with the means and capacities of the police, since this type of insurgencies use operating procedures characteristic of the traditional insurgency like terrorism or subversion, reaching territorial conquest by imposing the governability of criminal groups. 16 However, the presence of Armed Forces in Latin American states such as Brazil, brings certain doubts and fears regarding their procedures of action. In the words of Daniel Sansó-Rubert: “The democracies of Latin America have proven to be poorly prepared to face the challenge of developing strong civil institutions, democratically controlling the Armed Forces, and at the same time, turning them into effective instruments for the protection and security of citizens.” 17

That is why, in addition to establishing state policies and strategies to combat the scourge of organized crime, it is necessary to implement the corresponding democratic controls, based on transparency policies to achieve the effectiveness sought. 18 Coupled with the effectiveness of state policies, we must not forget the motivations of criminal groups, since they mark and determine their operational positions. In this way, Ioan Grillo points out that, depending on whether a cartel aims to indiscriminately attacks against the civilian population, or

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if the criminal group tries to impose a monopoly of force in a given territory, we will be referring well to its own activity. Terrorist groups, or to be considered authentic “Lords of War.” 19 Given this situation, from the state level, on the one hand, a positioning and combination of both public and private security elements is required to determine both the preventive objectives and clarify the performance competencies. On the other hand, assess whether the capabilities and traditional police means are able to cope with an urban combat situation by operating procedures of low intensity. Until now, and in the international scene, the separation of power, between security and defense organizations, were imposed by the understanding of the areas of classification of the threat. That is why, at present, the prevention and treatment of phenomena such as the criminal insurgency require a combination of elements of security and defense of the State, since it is developed in a multidimensional spectrum. The traditional pillars on which the security policies of the States were based are shaken by a situation of convergence between urban combat procedures and conventional illicit traffics. The police strategies are not enough to be able to confront the new conflict scenarios that start from areas with little coercive presence of the State, but they impact on the security level of the urban places. According to this, what measures can the States take when, is necessary a much more active presence of the same through its security forces is necessary, but the criminal operating procedures are similar to urban guerrilla tactics? However, the current proposals for counterinsurgency strategies aimed at establishing an “Integral Approach” 20 in which not only the military component, but also the political and diplomatic one, are difficult to implement due to the very dynamics and objectives of the criminal insurgency. Do not forget that the main difference between the traditional insurgency and the criminal one is the ideological motivation. In the traditional insurgencies, 21 the objectives of territorial control are based on questions of a political nature, essentially with Maoist characteristics, while the criminal type is aimed at obtaining economic benefits from illicit activities, therefore, it is not possible to “win hearts and minds” 22 of the population, when it is subject to the will of the criminal group. Faced with this situation, the debate continues on whether the concept of security as it has been focused so far is useful to explain current phenomena and threats. Traditionally, it has been considered that security was focused on safeguarding national interests against any external or internal threat, that is, it resembled this concept with the security of a State. Secondly, the essentially military nature of the threats. And finally, the clear identification of both the origin and the nature of those threats. 23 This approach is no longer valid at present. In terms of threats, they are no longer constrained by the existence

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of borders, they do not necessarily have a military nature and the identification of them, are, in most cases, confusing. The definition and consolidation of hybrid or non-conventional threats 24 is what has led to the emergence of the need to establish a new concept of Security. The Colombian case can be established as an example of the study of the phenomenon of the criminal insurgency. One of the issues that most concern the development of the Colombian post-conflict, is the conversion of the nature of guerrilla and paramilitary groups into large criminal groups or consolidate emerging groups or BACRIM that act creating impunity enclaves or areas of sub-government. 25 The phenomenon of “narco-war” 26 create a breeding ground in which the political pretensions raised by historical insurgent groups have given way to the economic objectives and positioning of their “market” by criminal organizations. This poses a double perspective: on the one hand, a possible conversion of guerrilla groups into new fronts of criminal insurgency. Secondly, due to the relocation and positioning of organized crime groups that migrated to other states in the region, given the power vacuums produced by the demobilization policies. 27 In this sense, a new security approach is indispensable, restructuring both the Armed Forces and creating a solid Intelligence Community, without falling into the strategic error of reducing troops and budgets with the justification that the traditional threat of the State has diminished. This fact can be considered by criminal groups as a sign of vulnerability. 28 For this reason, the Colombian State has a double challenge. First, updating security policies in the face of new scenarios far removed from the traditional insurgency conflict, and second, from a tactical and operational level, achieving balance in the exercise of the functions of its Armed Forces and the Police, to achieve greater effectiveness in the fight against organized crime. In short, leave aside a stato-centric approach to security, 29 to give rise to a conception of it in transversal terms, introducing new variables that suppose the emergence of violent non-state actors that put in danger political, economic and social stability, to achieve its objectives. In this sense, for Colombia, it is essential to identify its strategic security priorities, differentiating the vital interests from the conjunctural ones focused on a transformation of the Intelligence Community. 30 It should not be forgotten that the change in the center of gravity and the nature of the threats should not imply a limitation and reduction in the number of personnel dedicated to both Intelligence and the Armed Forces, since, at present, responses to threats Hybrids are established with both military and civilian means and capabilities. 31

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Multifaceted Hybrid Scenarios: toward New Counterinsurgency Scenarios Undoubtedly, the redefinition of the concept of Security causes the evolution of the defining characteristics of traditional geopolitics, 32 which, according to Westphalian criteria, are established under state and continental parameters. At present, the consolidation of illicit traffics and transnational criminal networks requires the establishment of analysis of territorial flows and positions that do not coincide with the border delimitations. The eminently economic objectives of the criminal organizations make it necessary to establish alliances, convergences and loyalties, which contributes to a transnationalization of the activity. 33 In this way, the absence of borders as physical as the increasing use of the dimension of cyberspace to achieve illicit activities, make more evident the need to establish multidimensional security policies and multi-domain, which position the hot spots regarding the activities of criminal groups that, to a large extent, blur post-Westphalian state borders. This causes the recreation of a criminal reality with invisible borders and with the creation of para-governance zones far from those legally established by the States. 34 In relation to this, the international system is facing a process of securitization 35 continuous and rising that provokes a militarization of the Security and a securitization of the defense. 36 In spaces where protoinsurgency or organized crime groups begin to position themselves for territorial control, the State's response to the implementation of effective policies that cut off the rise of non-state powers is a priority issue. For this, there is no doubt that the rule of law must be maintained, which entails having police forces capable of confronting non-traditional enemies, but situations characteristic of low intensity and asymmetric conflicts, not so much from a point of view. Capabilities, but from the approach of the assumption of the legality or illegality, show a considerable advantage. One of the current characteristics prevailing in the international reality is the changing world in relation to established traditional criteria. The Hobbesian view of the State and the configuration of strategic policies of both government units and international organizations in preventive and reactive areas are in need of revision and restructuring. The delimitation between internal and external security and the configuration of both military and police forces has been overcome depending on if the subject relates to defense matters or criminal offenses. Currently, military means are established in the anti/counter-terrorist fight and police units are used as trainers in training programs in post-conflict scenarios.

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From the point of view of preventive control, the intelligence policies of the states must adapt to the evolution of government and power structures that are emerging under the name of “sub-governments” 37 that get confused with “failed states” or territorial spaces occupied by insurgencies. Since the rise of the phenomenon of organized crime the debate about sub-government spaces or areas is not only focused on groups characterized by using terrorist acts but it can also be moved into intra urban areas such as those that have emerged in capitals like Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, etc.; where common criminals and organized criminal groups or BACRIM roam anarchically in the favelas. 38 Traditionally, the field of strategic intelligence has been considered as restricted to National Security, including that related to in and out-of-area military intelligence. But the natural evolution of the concept of security, bound largely by the multidisciplinary and the transversality of the phenomena considered, such as hybrid threats and risks, at present cover areas on which only very specific action methodologies were applied. All this changed, and the methodologies both for data analysis and identification of warning indicators that allow for a subsequent proper risk assessment are constantly evolving in order to reduce the threshold of uncertainty that affects all areas where security becomes indispensable. 39 The debate therefore is not about what should be improved in the preventive or intelligence policies but rather what strategies must be established in the coexistence of traditional and hybrid threats and especially in those areas where legitimate governments coexist with groups that can be considered as proto-insurgent by nature. 40 Therefore, one of the issues currently of great concern to western governments is to identify the risks and threats and adapt state responses to them. Since Hoffman coined the term “hybrid war,” 41 the projection of this name to other threats has been constant. Hence we observe the cataloguing of complex phenomena with the hybrid adjective in all its variants. An example is the identification of hybrid conflicts, hybrid threats, hybrid spaces, etc. From this we gather that the current international reality is not comparable with the reality ten years ago, in which academics and political decision makers were trying to find under technical criteria the best way to restructure both the functions and the systems of intelligence, for example to the new forms of Islamic terrorism, 42 or they were trying to match police procedures to crimes that were strictly catalogued as ordinary crimes in the field of internal security. From the point of view of the participation of states in international operations, one of the issues that affect state defense policies is their participation in said operations and the adequacy of their military assets and capabilities in theater. In recent years it has been observed that most of the conflicts in

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which states have taken part have been of an intra-state nature, caused by ethnic strife, secessions or struggles for natural resources. If during the last three decades academics and experts have been questioning the viability of traditional counterinsurgency strategies based on the universalization of its approaches 43 highlighting the classic “Hearts and Minds” 44 or those focused on the Cost-Benefit, 45 at present the need to establish a type of counterinsurgency that is global in nature and scope following the Three Pillars of COIN model proposed by Kilcullen 46 seems to be one of the most successful. One of the key issues is the establishment of collaboration and cooperation networks between the actors involved in the counterinsurgency strategy, characterized by a multidisciplinary approach 47 and controlling what Kilcullen considers the three fundamental pillars: The Security Pillar (military, police, building a Human Rights framework, etc.); the Political Pillar (the establishment of support, achievement of legitimacy and the implementation of DDR5 measures); and finally the Economic Pillar (achievement of industrial and commercial measures, the promotion of economic development, etc.). 48 But all of these approaches, including the Global War on Terror doctrine implemented by Bush after the 9/11 attacks and the so-called Operations Other Than War (OOTW) 49 that cover the whole spectrum of operations not considered as conventional war, a vulnerable element remains that from a tactical and operational point of view contrasts with the future of international operations: strategic unilateralism in military interventions.

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Bottom-Up Coin Strategies from Operational Planning One of the reasons why COIN doctrines and strategies are questioned is its universal application to insurgent conflicts in any part of the world without taking into account the specificities of the State, its idiosyncrasy, strategic or geopolitical features, etc. When a State on its own applied these types of strategies, it could reach its desired objectives, albeit with reservations. A classic example of this is the participation of the United States in the Vietnam War. The adaptation to the environment and flexibility to changes used to be easier when only one country was involved. Future operations involve the participation of more than two military forces of different nationalities so the knowledge about the State in conflict should be harmonized between the coalition. Although one strategy or theory that is currently being implemented in military interventions emerged as a new approach to civil-military participation, it would not be wrong to see it as a new counterinsurgency doctrine from which COIN strategies could be derived and made ad-hoc in each conflict zone. This is the Comprehensive Approach.

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The Comprehensive Approach advocates a combination of actions that go beyond the purely military to manage international crisis, introducing “diplomatic, informational, economic, political or civil” elements. 50 Complex and changing scenarios that include a wide range of non-state actors such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, gave the motivation to reflect on whether the sole application of military force was really the solution to the conflict. The multifaceted nature of the threats and the complexity of the conflicts in the theater of operations, prompted the states to expand not only the capacity of civil-military cooperation but to establish synergies between all the actors that in a strategic way are involved in a conflict on all levels. 51 In this sense, the list of actors is also extended in the decision-making process for the resolution of a crisis, making all the actors involved a part of the process. As a result, the plurality of actors involved greatly reduces the threshold of erroneous decisions by including multifactorial perceptions. 52 In this regard, the proposal to establish counterinsurgency strategies from the bottom-up in the pre-planning stage before operations is an appropriate procedure if the strategy is to implement actions in a State with a hybrid insurgency. That is, prior knowledge of the theater of operations is essential for a strategy of this nature to do its job. If traditionally a strategic approach accompanied by ad-hoc tactical and operational actions has been developed, future COIN actions must be characterized by doing the opposite. In a colloquial way we could say that these on-demand operations according to the conditionals of the conflict scenario discussed in the pre-operational planning stage so as to promote the adequacy of the military assets and capabilities to the future theater of operations. The bigger the knowledge about the social groups, customs, motivations, etc., the easier the operational planning will be. Therefore, there is a constant feedback between the intelligence and the military. 53 Thus, it is fundamental to have a Command Unit and to reinforce cooperation between the different Armed Forces. Along with that, strengthening the level of commitment of states in the international security and collective defense organizations is basic for the synchronization in the development of the COIN strategy. Finally, without the implementation of an effective and efficient political and military intelligence, this model could not be developed. CONCLUSIONS Undoubtedly, the redefinition of the concept of Security causes the evolution of the defining characteristics of traditional geopolitics, which, according to Westphalian criteria, are established under state and continental parameters.

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At present, the consolidation of illicit traffics and transnational criminal networks requires the establishment of analysis of territorial flows and positions that do not coincide with the border delimitations. The eminently economic objectives of the criminal organizations make it necessary to establish alliances, convergences and loyalties, which contributes to a transnationalization of the activity. In this way, the absence of borders as physical as the increasing use of the dimension of cyberspace to achieve illicit activities, make more evident the need to establish multidimensional security policies and multi-domain, which position the hot spots regarding the activities of criminal groups that, to a large extent, blur post-Westphalian state borders. This causes the recreation of a criminal reality with invisible borders and with the creation of para-governance zones far from those legally established by the States. In relation to this, the international system is facing a process of securitization continuous and rising that provokes a militarization of the Security and a securitization of the defense. In spaces where protoinsurgency or organized crime groups begin to position themselves for territorial control, the State's response to the implementation of effective policies that cut off the rise of non-state powers is a priority issue. For this, there is no doubt that the rule of law must be maintained, which entails having police forces capable of confronting non-traditional enemies, but situations characteristic of low intensity and asymmetric conflicts, not so much from a point of view means and capacities, but from the approach of the assumption of the legality or illegality, where the groups of criminality, show a considerable advantage.

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NOTES 1. This Chapter is linked to the research project “ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM AND LEGAL PERSON PENAL LIABILITY.” DER2016-79705-R project. Salamanca University. 2. Pulido Gragera, Julia. and Sansó-Rubert, Daniel. “A Phenomenological Analysis of Terrorism and Organized Crime from a Comparative Criminological Perspective” Journal of Law and Criminal Justice. December 2014, Vol. 2, N. 2, pgs. 113–131. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. García Guindo, Miguel, “Movimientos insurgentes: El papel, capacidades y respuestas de los Estados,” Revista Política y Estrategia, N. 123, pgs. 35–52. 2014. 6. Ibid. 7. Sullivan, John (2012): From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America. Implications for Global Security. Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, p.4. en https://halshs.archivesouvertes.fr/halshs-00694083. 8. Keister, Jennifer. “The Illusion of Chaos. Why Ungoverned Spaces Aren´t Ungoverned and Why That Matters.” Policy Analysis. Cato Institute. N. 766. December 2014. 9. Ibid.

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10. Arratia, Esteban: “¿Insurgencia criminal?: La cambiante naturaleza del crimen organizado transnacional en Mé xico y Centroamé rica,” Estudios de Seguridad y Defensa, nº 5 (junio 2015), pp. 39–83 en http://esd.anepe.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Libro_ESD_5.pdf#page= 39. 11. Ibid. 12. Bunker, Robert. “Fighting Irregular Fighters: Defeating Violent Non-state Actors,” Parameters, vol. 43, nº 4 (2014), p. 43. 13. Arratia, Esteban. Op. cit. 14. Pulido, Julia y Sansó-Rubert, Daniel. Op. Cit. 15. Pulido, Julia and García Cantalapiedra, David. “Las amenazas híbridas, la Insurgencia Criminal y el nuevo espacio de seguridad trans/multi-dominio: hacia la necesidad de una nueva concepción de la seguridad.” II Seminario AEPDIRI sobre Temas de actualidad de Relaciones Internacionales, 26 de enero de 2018. Escuela Diplomática. Madrid. 16. Sansó-Rubert, Daniel. Democracias bajo presión. Estado, fuerzas armadas y criminalidad organizada en América Latina:¿ éxito o fracaso de la estrategia de contención militar. 2017. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Grillo, Ioan. El Narco: inside Mexico’s criminal insurgency. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012. 20. Pareja Rodríguez, Íñigo. and Colom Piella, Guillem. “El Enfoque Integral (Comprehensive Approach) a la gestión de crisis internacionales.” ARI. Real Instituto Elcano. Madrid. 2008. 21. García Guindo, op. Cit. 22. Dixon, Paul. “Hearts and Minds” British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:3, pgs. 353–38. 2009. 23. Lipschutz, Ronnie. On Security. Columbia University Press. 1995. 24. Hoffman, Frank (2007): Conflicts in the 21th Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Foreign Policy Studies. Arlington. 25. Pulido, Julia. Nuevos retos para la inteligencia estratégica ante el desarrollo de las amenazas híbridas. En Criminalidad organizada trasnacional: una amenaza a la seguridad de los estados democráticos. Tirant lo Blanch, 2017. p. 591–610. 26. Sullivan, John, op. cit. 27. Pulido, Julia. Op. Cit. 2017. 28. Ibid. 29. Murillo, Carlos: “El crimen transnacional organizado como insurgencia no política: la experiencia Centroamérica,” Desafíos, nº28 (marzo 2016), pp. 177–211 en http://dx.doi.org/10. 12804/desafios28.2.2016.05 30. Pulido, Julia. Op. Cit. 2017. 31. Ibid. 32. Parker, Geoffrey. Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. London, Croom Helm. 1985. 33. Sansó-Rubert. Op. Cit. 2017. 34. Ibid. 35. Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole. & de Wilde, Jaap. Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1998. 36. Pulido, Julia and García Cantalapiedra, David. Op. Cit. 2018. 37. Keister, Jennifer. Op. Cit. 2014. 38. North, Douglas. et al. “Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A new Approach to the Problems of Development” Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. Washington. 2007. 39. Pulido, Julia and Sansó-Rubert, Daniel. Op. Cit. 2014. 40. García Guindo. Op. Cit. 2014. 41. Hoffman, Frank.op. cit. 2007. 42. Pulido Gragera, Julia. “La Cooperación Internacional entre Servicios de Inteligencia,” Al Servicio del Estado: Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia en España. Revista Arbor. Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC). N. 709. 2005.

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43. García Guindo. Op. Cit. 2014. 44. Dixon, Paul. “Hearts and Minds” British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:3, pgs. 353–38. 2009. 45. Long, Austin. On “Other War. Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency” Research, Rand Corporation Ed. 2006. 46. Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press. 2010. 47. García Guindo. Op. Cit. 2014. 48. Kilcullen, David. Op. Cit. 49. García Cantalapiedra, David. and Díaz Matey, Gustavo. (2008). “EE.UU, el uso de la inteligencia y la doctrina de contrainsurgencia norteamericana: lecciones para Afganistán.” Documento de Trabajo. Real Instituto Elcano. DT 54/2008.22/12/2008. http://www. realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/dt54-2008 . 2008. 50. Pareja Rodríguez, Íñigo. and Colom Piella, Guillem. Op. Cit. 51. Colom, Guillem. “El Enfoque Integral en los Conflictos Híbridos” in VV.AA. El Enfoque Multidisciplinar de los Conflictos Híbridos. Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa. Ministerio de Defensa. Madrid. Pg. 25. 2012. 52. Herrero de Castro, Rubén. La Realidad Inventada. Percepciones y Proceso de Toma de decisiones en Política Exterior. Plaza y Valdés. Madrid. 2006. 53. García Cantalapiedra, David and Díaz Matey, Gustavo. Op. Cit. 2008.

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Chapter Seven

Migration from and through the Sahel EU Engagement and Its Impact

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Aurora Ganz

The populations in the Sahel are some of the most mobile in the world. Migration has been a coping strategy to survive the harsh conditions of the arid environment of the region since the dawn of time. Nomadism has provided a response to seasonal droughts, more so since climate change and land degradation have affected local agriculture, exacerbating economical and social distress. Human flows in the Sahel tend to be mostly circular; migration toward Europe represents only a small portion of the overall regional movements. However, European concerns over the human inflows coming from the Sahel are increasing. The Sahel is expected to become the epicentre of irregular migration to Europe as a result of the region’s chronic poverty, the structural lack of governance, the new waves of conflicts and the prolific activity of criminal networks that manage human smuggling and trafficking. The EU’s rising efforts to halt migration from the Sahel is reinforced by evidence of increasing terrorist activities in the area. Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other extremist groups are very active in West Africa, Nigeria, Niger and Mali. The fear of radicalised individuals entering Europe by joining migratory flows has prompted the EU’s engagement in the region through policies that integrate migration, security and development. In particular, the EU has established the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for the Sahel in support of initiatives and project that halt migration. Moreover, the EU has launched three capacity-building missions—one in Niger and two in Mali—under the Common Security and Defence Policy framework, to enhance border control and security. The chapter explains migratory flows from and through the Sahel and assesses their impact on Europe. It then proceeds by analysing the policy responses of the EU and the 111

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logics behind them, focusing on the Union’s comprehensive approach to security, migration, and development. Although European presence in the region has had some positive outcomes, the chapter argues that the securitymigration-development nexus increases securitisation, demonises migration, overshadows development and imposes EU agenda over local and localised needs, interests and priorities.

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Mobility in the Sahel: An Overview The definition of the limits of the Sahel region is not unanimous. The region lies within the broader Sahara zone and stretches from the Atlantic Coast of West Africa to the Red Sea. The EU approach to the region assumes that Mauritania, Mali and Niger are “the three core Sahel states” and recognises “parts of Burkina Faso and Chad” as part of the area. 1 Cross-border flows are a constitutive feature of Sahel: nomadism, economic migration and forced displacement coexist and imply constant movement within and beyond the region. Along with regional trends, each one of the states that form the Sahel region presents peculiarities that need to be taken into consideration when assessing migratory flows, their drivers and their impacts. The outlook on migration trends by country also sheds light on eventual disconnections between the local realities and existing EU initiatives. While the exact numbers of migrants are hard to record, general trends are easier to identify. The hotspot for migration from the Sahel and the sub-Saharan countries to Europe is Niger, which acts as both an origin country and a major transit point for trans-Saharan flows. Most of Niger’s inflows come from Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Nigeria and West Africa; in particular Senegal, Gambia, Mali, the Guineas, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast enter Niger via Burkina Faso. Niger provides a key transit point along the route that connects Africa to Europe via Libya: although there are no exact data on the amount of migrants reaching Europe, the IOM and the EU calculate that between 60 percent and 90 percent of West African migrants travel through Niger to reach Libya. Surveys conducted on arrivals estimate that up to 75 percent of migrants who reached Italy in 2017 passed through Niger. In 2016 and 2017 respectively, 330 thousand and 69 thousand migrant from Niger and neighbouring countries transited via Niger. 2 Recent statistics have also registered the largest volume of flows in and out of Niger in May 2018. It is estimated that more than 326 thousands people are displaced in the country. 3 Niger’s central role in migration flows has been growing to the extent that Italy’s former Ministry of Interior Marco Minniti described Niger as the southern border of Europe. Agadez has become a major transit hub for West African economic migrants, including those coming from Mali and Burkina Faso, who head to Libya and finally Europe in search for working opportunities. These are mainly young men who decide to migrate to support financially

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their large families. The city also hosts people from Central Africa, including Chad, the Central African Republic and Cameroon, who are escaping the spread of violence caused by Boko Haram and local extremists groups, especially in the rural poor areas. It was reported that these flows seek to reach Algeria and then finally Europe. Mali is also an important transit point for trans-Saharan movements, especially for migrants coming from Guinea, Senegal and Gambia. Most of the flows that cross Mali stay in West Africa; those that move toward Europe take either the road that heads to Libya or the one that goes via Burkina Faso, Niger, and Libya. Migrants and refugees from Mali tend to migrate to neighbouring countries and they represent only a small percentage of total sea arrivals in Italy—2.2 percent in 2016. 4 Compared to Mali and Niger, the other three countries play a less incisive role in migratory movements. Chad is an important origin, transit, and destination country for migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries, especially the Central African Republic. The country provides an alternative to the more common migratory routes via Mali and Niger, especially for the national migrants and individuals from Cameroon and Sudan. Burkina Faso lies at the crossroad of flows between costal West African countries and land-locked countries and serves as an origin and a transit point. The national government of Burkina Faso has expressed concerns over larger and more frequent inflows crossing its territory, given the lack of state’s capacity and resources to deal with the issue. Mauritania sits on the old Atlantic route to Europe and in the early 2000sserved as a major transit point for sub-Saharan migrants heading to Spain. Currently Mauritania too hosts migrants, especially from Mali, but also from Senegal, Guinea, and Algeria. For almost half of those individuals in transit via Mauritania, Senegal is the main destination point; the other half usually seeks to reach France, Mali, Spain, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Congo, Morocco, and Belgium. Although intraregional flows represent the largest percentage—up to 80 percent—of Sahel migratory movements, migration toward Europe has increased in the past decade, mainly as a result of persistent conflicts and increasing violence in the region. These flows tend to happen outside legal regulatory frameworks: according to the IOM, since 2012 “regular” migration has dropped almost by 50 percent. Two main migration routes connect the Sahel to Europe: the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) and the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR). These have replaced the Atlantic route that in the early 2000s connected migrants from Mauritania and Senegal to Europe, via the Canary Islands. Since 2016 the Central Mediterranean Route is the principal route of human flows to Europe. It connects both West African countries and countries in the Horn of Africa with departure points in North African countries, especially Libya, from which individuals cross the Mediterranean to reach Italy. According to the UNHCR, the majority of refugees and migrants arriving in Italy by sea are from Sub-

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Saharan Africa. 5 Much of the CMR route follows old, established paths for both legal and illegal movement of people and goods across North Africa. Along this route, certain hubs play an important role: as mentioned above Agadez in Niger is one such hub, as is Sebha in southern Libya. The route through Libya opened up and saw an increase in flows following the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, as a result of a decrease in law enforcement capability and capacity and the on-going political instability in the country. This consolidated the prominence of the CMR as the main route for Sahel nationals, reaching Libya mostly passing through its border with Niger. The second route, transiting via Algeria to Europe, usually follows the path of the Western Mediterranean Route, which heads to Spain. Since 2017 this route has been used much more than in previous years, especially given the recent socio-economic distress of Algeria and the political crisis of Morocco. Although flows have overall decreased in the past year, arrivals to Spain, mostly by sea, have continued to grow: 2018 registered the highest number—almost 35,000—with most crossing from Morocco either via the Alboran Sea in the western Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar, or a new route with departures from west of Tangiers; it was also estimated that more than 5,300 migrants and refugees crossed by land to Ceuta and Melilla. Records of migrants coming into Spain show that Malians represent the third largest country of origin, after only to Morocco and Cote d’Ivoire. Overall, Africans arriving into Europe represent a vast majority. Data from the UNHCR 6 on the most common nationalities of individuals arriving into Europe by sea via the Mediterranean routes in 2017 identifies Guinea in first place (18,100), followed by Syria (14,600), and then Morocco, Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Cote d’Ivoire, Algeria and Eritrea. Under European pressure, African governments have adopted tougher responses to mobility and to border control. Rather than discouraging migration, this has pushed migrants to find alternative, less secure routes, risking their life by crossing the Sahara and travelling across rivers and mountains during winter and raining seasons. For instance, to avoid the checkpoints and the security controls of Agadez, migrants are now passing through the Sahara desert, loosing access to water sources and basic services, and increasing their exposure to death. Harsher migration policies and tighter border security has enlarged covert migrant movements, principally those managed and controlled by human traffickers. 7 In spite of the surge of law enforcement across the Sahel, the activity of the criminal groups who organise and facilitate migration flows from the Sahel to Europe has not been affected much: the Sahel and subSaharan Africa remains one of the main sources of trafficking victims to Western and Southern Europe. In particular, studies revealed that Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso are key source countries for women and children trafficked for domestic labour exploitation and

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prostitution. 8 Migrating to Europe has become progressively more dangerous: the risks of crossing inhospitable terrains and unsafe maritime routes sum to the dangers of increasingly professionalised criminal networks. Unsafe routes mean also higher costs for migrants and consequently higher exposure to debt bondage, which may coerce migrants into situations of trafficking. Mistreatment by state authorities in the current context of high hostility toward mobility adds on to an overall grim picture. Detention centres and camps in Niger and Libya lack basic services and often create conditions of abduction, exploitation and abuse. In 2018 death rates in the Mediterranean have increased by more than 50 percent; 9 human right violations and abuses continue to be reported, with migrants witnessing death and torture during the route; thousands of migrants that perish in the desert remain unrecorded.

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Drivers and Modalities of Migration in the Sahel The drivers of migration can be hardly found in single, independent causes; usually complex economic, social, political and environmental dynamics come into play. In the Sahel, these include a very inhospitable climate, socioeconomic underdevelopment, violence, conflict and the fragility of the states, which has favoured the emergence and consolidation of extremist and criminal groups. Overall, intraregional mobility is a constitutive element of the socio-historical development of the Sahelian states. Africa’s porous borders have facilitated these flows, which have historically developed informally. The establishment of regional treaties to grant freedom of movement within West and East Africa has further enhanced mobility: data calculates that cross-border movements rose from around 50 thousands in the early 2010s to more than 250 thousands in 2016. Drivers and modalities of migration vary, although some trends are stable. Migratory movements across the Sahel tend to be circular and concern equally the rural and the urban communities. Sometimes migration has provided a response to the uneven allocation of resources; sometimes it has been the result of the historical and cultural consequences of post-colonialism and the imposition of borders that did not reflect tribal and ethnic divisions. Empirical studies have showed that in the Sahel migration is “a common strategy used by households to increase livelihood and strengthen social resilience.” 10 More broadly, people have been moving across the region in search for better living conditions. Voluntary migration in the Sahel has been driven by a multiplicity of economic motives, such as the search for employment, higher salary, and economic independence, especially in the light of the region’s economic volatility. In some cases, economic drivers interlink with culture: migration represents a way of living for most of the rural communities of the area. In fact, a significant part of the Sahel populations relies on agriculture and pastoral activities, which,

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due to the inhospitable climate, have traditionally been based on transhumance and nomadism. The Tuareg population, for example, has habitually migrated across and beyond the western Sahel, crisscrossing Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Libya and Algeria. Social causes, like education, family reunification, or marriage, have also pushed Sahelians to cross borders. The increasing demographic pressure of the region also interplays with migration trends. The Sahel is one of the annual fastest-growing regions: in the last 30 years, birth rates have experienced an increase of up to 120 percent. 11 Projections expect the six countries’ population—currently of approximately 90 million people—to jump to 240 million by 2050. 12 Given the dire economic conditions of all Sahel states, where almost half of the population lives below the poverty line, the demographic boom has affected food security, employment, health services and general stability, providing further incentives to people to move. In the last decades, some migration trends have changed and its drivers have diversified. In particular, recent movements from the Sahel are emerging as a symptom of the rising exposure to political and economic instability and the security crises that have aggravated chronic structural weaknesses. Along with voluntary movements and economic migration, forced and mass displacement has resulted from violent conflicts, political turmoil, persecution, and overall insecurity. Notably, three main events have exacerbated migration trends, increasing forced displacement: the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the Mali conflict, and the Libyan war. The Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 and the spread of its violent extremism from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in 2014 are considered to be the greatest single cause of displacement in the Lake Chad basin. 13 The armed conflict that started in the North of Mali in January 2012 caused a migration crisis of significant size and scope, both within and outside of Mali. 14 This has had a sever spill over in Burkina Faso and Niger. In particular, the conflict has resulted in large-scale displacements and irregular flows toward neighbouring countries, especially Niger, toward Libya and finally Europe. The conflict in Libya and the downfall of Gaddafi have also affected trans-Saharan migration. The breakdown of Libya’s tough border security has created new opportunities for human traffickers and smugglers, increasing the number of travels to Europe. Corrupted officials and local militias involved in human smuggling and trafficking have been facilitating border crossing. Moreover, Libya was traditionally a recipient country for the West African work force. After the breakdown of the country’s economic system, economic migrants, who could no longer find labour opportunities in Libya, started moving toward Europe. As a result of these conflicts, cross-border movements have increased, especially from Libya, Mali and Nigeria to Chad and Niger, which are now receiving large flows of asylum seekers. Although to a lesser extent, movements from the Sahel to Europe have also grown.

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Climate change has emerged as ‘a threat multiplier and a supplementary stress factor’ 15 that triggers migration, as a way to escape the exposure and the vulnerability to the region’s natural hazards. In particular, environmental factors like droughts, floods, land degradation and desertification directly contribute to displacement across the Sahel region. In 2013 it was noted that the Sahel had been hit by severe droughts three times in seven years, when normally it would have been very 10 years. Environmental degradation is expected to continue: temperatures in the Sahel might increase by 3 to 5 degrees Celsius by 2050 and possibly 8 degrees Celsius by 2100. 16 This is likely to result in higher mobility. Climate change has proved to intensify rural-urban migration and cyclical mobility within and across borders to escape famine, lack of resources and unstable climates, and to enhance livelihoods. In 2011 Burkina Faso experienced heavy flooding, which resulted in a severe famine for almost 18 million people. More recently, the country has experienced a lack of rainfall, which has severely affected soil fertility and productivity, pushing farmers to leave their houses. Similarly, people living around the Lake Chad basin have been suffering from food security, since the Basin’s area has shrunk by 90 percent in the past 40 years.

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Migratory Flows through and from the Sahel: A Security Concern for the EU Looking at history one would assume that mobility is structural to human development. The case of human flows across the Sahel throughout history would confirm it. Cross-border movements have provided a stabilising and shock-absorbing effect in a region torn by chronic poverty, lack of resources and conflict. However, the legitimacy and normality of migration are questioned. In particular, after 9/11, migration has been absorbed into the discourses and practices of (in)security that have been driving the political debate of the 21st century: migration is now perceived as a threat to security. For instance, mobility through and from the Sahel is seen as a destabilising factor, which undermines security not only at the national or even regional levels, but also beyond the Sahel borders. The EU is particularly concerned with human flows from the Sahel toward Europe; especially as worries about the actual ability of Sahel countries to control migratory movements, elicit trafficking and criminal networks rise. Since conflicts and violence has escalated in the 2010s, the fragile states of the Sahel have not been able to counter rising instability and conflict across the region either through individual or joint responses. Although the establishment of the Sahel G5 has provided a common mechanism to enhance economic and security cooperation, its institutional weaknesses jeopardises its effectiveness. In this context, the EU leadership has emerged as the most active, as well as the most credible, source of support to security in the Sahel. Since its early engage-

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ment in the region, the EU was quick to align its cooperation with Sahel countries to the European agenda; in particular, the EU has succeeded in transforming migration the top priority of the joint agenda. Following the 2015 migrant crises, when more than a million people crossed the European borders outside its legal frameworks, Europeans have become more hostile to migrants. Anti-migration parties have become more popular and anti-migration sentiments have caused an increase in racist violence. It should be noted, however, that recent trends of human flows toward Europe have been decreasing consistently: 2018 marked a 41 percent drop in arrivals to Greece, Italy and Spain compared to the previous year. 17 Yet, migration from the African coasts has become the major factor of distress at the regional and national levels of European politics. As a result, the outbreak and the continuation of crises and conflicts in the Sahel have generated much alarmism within the Union, especially as the fear for new waves of migrant, refugee and radicalised individuals moving toward Europe rises. Europeans argue that, had the region to collapse, the EU would be the main target of jihadists, migrants, and refugees fleeing political, economic and human insecurity. Radicalisation is also seen as a factor of risk that could spread from the Sahel into Europe through larger inflows. The UN Special Envoy for the Sahel Hiroute Guebre Sellassie believes that up to 41 million youth under 25 years of age in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger alone face hopelessness and are at risk of radicalisation or migration. 18 Jiihadism has grown in the Sahel in the past decade: extremist groups are currently operating, either as loose cells or as regional affiliated of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and ISIS, especially in Mali. Cross-border flows have more and more been interlinked with the risks coming from radicalisation and extremism: as it is not possible to control the identity of all the undocumented migrants that reach Europe, migration is felt to increase the risks of terrorists infiltrating and attacking European cities. Migrants are perceived to be more vulnerable to radicalisation, as well as to provide easily recruitable work force for extremist groups. Although there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity 19 that could affect Europe, it is important to understand European perception as a driving logic of the EU’s engagement in the Sahel and the development of policies based on the security-migration-development nexus. Migration from the African shores to Europe has therefore become the emblem of the interconnected vulnerability between Europe and Africa, including the Sahel. European narratives conceive the Sahel as the EU’s southern geopolitical border. 20 This belief is in line with the increasing attention the Union is giving to the internal-external security nexus, which has prompted the Union to engage more with third countries to leverage the impact of their external instabilities on the EU’s own security. The logics behind this approach are explained in the following section.

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The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Migration from and through the Sahel: Security, Migration and Development With rising numbers of migrants coming into Europe, especially from the African shores, the Union has embraced the idea that unwanted inflows of migrants threaten its own security. This approach has shifted discourses and practices of migration management, moving from the attention on development to the emphasis on border control. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU’s approach to mobility tended to couple migration management with development, especially in Africa. For instance, the 2006 Joint EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Development aimed at curbing cross-border movements through local economic growth and social development. In particular, the Declaration affirms that ‘productive investments, trade, employment, labour migration and effective social and economic policies can help reduce migration.’ 21 However, since the end of the first decade of the 2000s migration has gradually moved from the development agenda into the EU’s security framework. Migration governance has then become about border management and control. This has had several repercussions. Migration is perceived as a threat to national security and stability. The interconnection between social, economic, political, cultural and contextual factors in the definition of this new threat has pushed for a Comprehensive Approach, which underlines the need for broader, cross-cutting, holistic solutions to insecurity. With regards to migration regimes, crosscutting responses imply creating mechanisms that do recognise the variety of drivers behind migration, but also identify a correlation between security and development, as well as security and migration. Moreover, the new perspective on migration has emphasised the transnational nature of the “emerging” challenge of migration and recognised interdependence beyond borders. This has blurred the line between internal and external security: internal security depends also on external security, that is security in third countries. This has resulted in the process of externalisation of EU borders, which allows the EU to participate in border control beyond its own territory. In the case of migration, externalisation implies supporting capacity building and providing equipment for border patrolling and security operations in third states. This aims at halting human flows from African countries before they reach the European shores. The EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which is the overarching framework of the Union’s external migration and asylum policy, is rooted on both the idea of the security-migration-development nexus and of the externalisation of borders. While originally the GAMM was established in 2005 to enhance dialogue and cooperation with third countries, in 2011 it was updated to emphasise the security risks of migration and the need for border control. This has evolved in the current securitised approach to migration: identifying migration with security, the EU’s migration regime

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relies now on extended security practices of surveillance, patrolling and exclusion mechanism. The EU logic of externalisation and its focus on security drives also the relations between Europe and Africa, including Sahel countries, especially with regards to migration management. Since the mid-2010s, the EU has put in place numerous institutional frameworks in place that tackle, either directly or indirectly, migration from the Sahel. These have the specific objective of limiting arrivals to Europe. In an effort to address European concerns over cross-border mobility in the larger context of Africa, the 2015 EU-Africa Valetta Summit recognised the need to ‘address the root causes of irregular migration’, such as poverty and unemployment. Security, humanitarian assistance and development are merged in a policy unicum. Following Valletta, the EU launched the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa worth 2.8 billion euro of which 52 percent—around 843 million euro—for the G5 Sahel countries alone. 22 The original idea for the EUTF for Africa was to limit the Fund to the Sahel region, as a financing mechanism to operationalize the EU Regional Action Plan (RAP) 2015–2020 and the EU Strategy For Security And Development for the Sahel. The strategic thinking behind this large investment can be found in the four pillars of the RAP, which include (1) preventing and countering radicalisation; (2) creating appropriate conditions for youth; (3) migration and mobility; and (4) border management and the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime. These pillars are designed principally to tackle EU main problem, namely the unprecedented numbers of migrants coming through the Sahel to the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea in order to travel to Europe by supporting a mix of securitymigration-development objectives. Based on the security-migration-development triad, the Fund aims at supporting the economic development of the Sahel communities, as well as enhancing border security in key origin and transit countries. However, it is actually border control, law enforcement capacity and short-term security measures that are attracting most of the aid flows and receiving the largest technical support. By looking at the EUTF budget allocation, it emerges that the EU’s approach is not aligned with African priorities, especially in terms of economic development. The EU’s engagement with Niger is an example: the country received 86 million euro for the 2014–2020 period, becoming the largest per capita recipient of EU aid globally. The money was destined to good governance and conflict prevention, but it was then allocated to projects that fight trafficking and smuggling. This has resulted in enhanced policing and securitisation. Following the EU’s pressure to tackle migration, Niger adopted a new legislation for the criminalisation of all forms of smuggling in 2015 and is currently discussing a new National Strategy to Counter Irregular Migration, based on a securitising mix of border management, prevention, prosecution, protection and return. This approach was also perceived as the main strategy to ensure and grant

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EU’s financial support. However, this has so far proved to be not effective. As cross-border flows continue and more importantly, larger dire socio-economic conditions remain, there is limited evidence that these measure bring long-term benefits. 2018 has recorded the largest number of people entering and leaving Niger; a data that call for reflections upon the consequences of current policies and securitised logics. Moreover, the case of Niger shows that the prominence of border control in EU initiatives has downgraded existing efforts to enhance human development in a country where in 2015 life expectancy, education and per capita income ranked second to last on the global scale. Overall, the Fund prioritises development activities mainly in origin countries, rather than Lower Income Countries and Least Developed Countries. According to an ECOWAS representative, “the creation of the Africa Trust Fund responds to the EU’s political appetite to use development funding for migration objectives and has opened a venue for the potential securitisation of development instruments.” 23 The emphasis on security is not only affecting development, but also alternative, non-punitive migration regimes. A narrow amount— around 3 percent—of the Fund is given to regulate migration, for instance by creating pathways for safer, regular mobility within the region and in Europe. The EU’s persistent focus on security is best explained by the EU missions under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is the EU framework for defence and crisis management. These capacity-building missions include EUCAP Sahel Niger (2011), EUCAP Sahel Mali (2014) and EUTM Mali (2013). The CSDP activities in the Sahel were originally established to fight organised crime in Niger and to promote democratisation in Mali. These have gradually moved toward the mobilisation of forces against smuggling and “irregular” migration: following the 2015 migrant crisis, the EUCAP’s mandate has been shifted completely toward migration. 24 For instance, a permanent contingent from EUCAP Niger has been set in Agadez to collaborate with local authorities to prevent migration and border crossing. Under this mission, Frontex is currently collaborating with Niger to control the 350-kilometre border with Libya. As a part of its comprehensive approach to migration, the EU has also provided financial support—up to 100 million euro—to the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, a regional military cooperation effort that the EU lobbied strongly to achieve. This regional-led security initiative puts in place a set of military and enforcement responses to cross-border suspicious activities, including the permanent deployment of armed forces along borders. The current intentions and the future plans of the EU seem to reaffirm the tendency toward the securitisation of migration and its emphasis on security: the EU has expressed the desire to establish a fourth and, possibly, a fifth EUCAP military mission in the region in the coming years. The tendency to criminalise migration will most likely continue. The 2017 EU’s Malta Declaration endorsed border control as “a

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key element of a sustainable migration policy (. . .) to stem illegal flows into the EU.” As of 2018, the anti-migration sentiment is mounting. This has resulted in a series of measures, which have made mobility increasing difficult and risky: in particular, the EU imposed restrictions to NGOs involved in search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean; while Italy, a main destination and transit point for Mediterranean crossing, has closed its ports.

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The Impact of EU Approach on Sahel Migration Since the mid 2010s Europe has experienced larger and more frequent inflows of migrants from Africa, as well as a spike of anti-migrant sentiments across its public opinion. As a consequence, the EU has made migration management its top priority. This has resulted in the more incisive and direct participation of the EU in African affairs through crosscutting policies aimed at fostering security and development. As political and economic instabilities across the Sahel have increased in the past decades, the region has become a pivotal are of interest for the Union. The numerous initiatives the EU has carried out have had some positive outcomes. The EUTF for the Sahel has provided a flexible and rapid source of funds. More broadly, the strong presence of the EU in the region is a positive factor in its own: European attention has raised global awareness, enhanced regional and international cooperation, favoured diplomacy and encouraged stability and peace building. This has had repercussions also at the domestic level of African countries: by pressuring states, the Union is acting as an ambassador of domestic good governance and human rights. According to NGOs on the ground, the EU’s financial interventions are contributing to community resilience. For example, projects in Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali are enhancing livelihood opportunities. In theory, the logics behind the EU Comprehensive Approach and the security- development nexus have the noble intention to increase socio-economic benefits by extending the scope of the missions, and to reconnect humanitarian intervention and long-term development. However, de facto, the EU’s interventions have largely favoured security over development and they have demonised migration. The impacts of this approach are manifold. First, the current security-migration-development approach to mobility in the Sahel distorts the reality of migration processes in the region, as well as of migration tout court. Rather than an emerging threat, trans-Saharan flows are structural to human development and the livelihood of the Sahel communities. Cross-border mobility is a coping mechanism to the unwelcoming environmental conditions of the region, as well as a source of economic opportunities for local families and businesses. Thus, in many cases migration acts as a stability factor, by granting conditions for subsistence and survival and also by producing economic benefits for individual households and the whole society. Blocking movements can have the unde-

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sired effect of creating or exacerbating animosity and conflicts, which in turn may trigger refugee crises and mass displacement. Policies that aim halting migration have also proved to be unable to deter movements and accept reality: human mobility will always exist, as a form of resilience, an ambition to improve one’s conditions, or a consequence of war, prosecution, poverty and climate change. Furthermore, securitised migration regimes may not be effective in achieving their objectives, and have contradictory outcomes: the harsher measures taken by the EU against migration from Africa and the Sahel have created an incentive for migrants, regardless of their legal status, to stay in Europe and even try to bring their families. Many have also argued that European anxiety toward inflows is exaggerated by a distorted perception of the phenomenon: only a minority of migrants from the Sahel—around 20 percent—move toward Europe. Both the alarmist and the optimistic perspective fails in recognising two aspects of current migratory trends and their impact on the EU. First, the real dimensions of migration should be given only on mid or long term trajectories. Short-term data do not provide a reliable picture of these flows. Second, the rise of anti-migration sentiments and the related violence that is spreading across the continent shows the lack and failure of serious, long-term policies of integration. The focus on short-term effects and the narrow objective of reducing flows have overshadowed the need for improving asylum, resettlement, local integration and protection of vulnerable people. Similarly, current EU interventions neglect the differences between migratory trends, especially the diversity of local political economies of migration and the economic benefit that migration could bring to certain contexts. The overemphasis of security, and its unbalanced relation with development, is also problematic. Restrictive migration policies based on punitive measures, higher control and surveillance and the criminalisation of movements increase the risks of unsafe journeys and the exposure to trafficking. Currently the EU’s involvement in the Sahel overlooks the (in)security conundrum. Enhancing the role and the capacity of local military forces and the law enforcement agents may result in a rise of abuses at the expenses of civil liberties. This has proved to be particularly true in the Sahel, where the rule of law and human rights are weak. It is unclear what measures are in place to guarantee accountability and transparency from local government and their security professionals. More importantly, the security-migration-development nexus is not giving enough space to human rights and the protection of migrants. EU’s renew engagement in the Sahel has emerged out of the sense of emergency raised by the 2015 crisis. This has affected the extent and nature of the initiatives. By looking at the EUTF Sahel budget allocation, it emerges that the EU is favouring its own agenda, rather than aligning its policies to African priorities, especially in terms of economic development. The investments in Niger are an example: 86 million EUR destined to good governance and conflict

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prevention was instead allocated to border control. A further disconnection emerges also in terms of what “crisis” is an emergency: while most of EU attention is focused on the exodus toward Europe, the African counterparts believe that other intraregional humanitarian catastrophe, like the Lake Chad Basin crisis, should receive most support. This seems to decrease the level of agency that the Sahel counterparts hold when negotiating with the EU. A major weakness of EU’s involvement in the region is the relations with the territory. EU initiatives are perceived by the counterparts as detached from the reality of the local context. This poses two main challenges. On one side, there is an absolute need for local ownership, which so far has been overlooked. On the other, the EU needs to learn how to navigate a complex environment, where governance is weak. Local governments in the Sahel states may not be able to implement efficient policies and EU’s engagement may result in expensive and ineffective projects. EU’s engagement in the Sahel raises important questions on the future of migration regimes. Although every country has the legal right to protect its borders, the EU principle of externalisation and the EU’s active participation in Sahel’s border management challenge the very significance of borders. Moreover, border control should be moved by logics of protection, rather than punitive thinking. By looking at the Sahel, it has emerged that the emphasis on security is hindering the original attention on development. The restriction of mobility is preventing people in need to resort to legal mechanisms, while giving larger space to criminal networks. The security-migration-development nexus is also controversial in the definition of aid, as development assistance should be detached from security objectives, to address the actual fragilities and vulnerabilities of local communities.

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NOTES 1. European Union External Action Service, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 2016. 2. IOM, Niger Flow Monitoring Overview 2016—2017, 21 February 2018. 3. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Niger: Country Operation Update, May 2018, 12 June 2018. 4. European Commission, Migration Profile MALI, 2017. 5. UNHCR, Central Mediterranean Route Situation, January—December 2018. 6. UNHCR, “Europe Keydata Q1–Q3 2018,” November 2018. 7. UN Human Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,” 13 September 2018. 8. US Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2017,” 2018. 9. UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys—Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe’s Borders,” 2018. 10. See Scheffran, Jürgen, Elina Marmer, and Papa Sow. “Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: Social networks and co-development in Northwest Africa.” Applied Geography 33 (2012): 119–127. 11. Carbone, Giovanni, “Out Of Africa Why People Migrate,” ISPI, October 2017.

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12. Harsch, Ernst, “The new face of the Sahel: Grassroots initiatives promote changes in livelihoods,” UN:Africa Renewal, November 2017. 13. UNHCR, “Nigeria Situation 2017—Supplementary Appeal,” 2017. 14. IOM, “Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective,” June 2013. 15. Vigil, Sara. “Climate Change and Migration: Insights from the Sahel,” in “Out Of Africa Why People Migrate,” eds. Carbone, Giovanni, ISPI October 2017. 16. John F. May and Jean-Pierre Guengant, “Les défis démographiques des pays sahéliens,” Études 4206 (2014): 19–30. 17. UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys—Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe’s Borders,” 2018. 18. Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, Special Envoy for the Sahel, Security Council briefing on the situation in the Sahel, 25 November 2015. 19. UN Human Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,” 13 September 2018. 20. See for example, European Parliament, DIRECTORATE B, “A Coherent EU Strategy For The Sahel,” May 2011. 21. Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22–23 November 2006. 22. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/the-eu-partnership-with-the-sahel_en.pdf 23. HAUCK, Volker; KNOLL, Anna; CANGAS, Alisa Herrero. EU Trust Funds–Shaping more comprehensive external action. ECDPM Briefing Note, 2015, no 81. 24. https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/05/22/niger-europes-migrationlaboratory

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Chapter Eight

Libyan Interlinked Dynamics in Multiple Scenarios Spiral of Chaos, Disorder and Violence Soledad Segoviano

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APPROACHING TO LIBYA SCENARIO Seven years after the Arab Spring and the fall of Qadaffi, Libya stands as a singular case of fragmentation, 1 confrontation and violence. Libya constitutes an ungoverned space, defined by the dynamic and interdependent confluence of three different and twisted scenarios where multiple and diverse actors, with competing interests, fight for power, influence and resources to impose their respective objectives in the absence of state structures. One scenario of internal violence and fragmentation with two rival coalitions controlling different territories; a second scenario dominated by transnational trends 2 and forces that generate complex and interlinked transnational networks of different nature—criminal, terrorist, even humanitarian—with significant power and influence to drag the external intervention of powerful regional and extra-regional actors in order to protect and impose their particular national security visions and interests in a context of unstable and precarious balance of power, conforming, thus, the third scenario, defined by the convergence of simultaneous proxy conflicts. Internal Dynamics The first steps from a post-revolutionary scenario to democracy in Libya were initially assumed with a limited and cautious climate of optimism. Libya counts with enormous proven hydrocarbon reserves. Based on esti127 The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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mates, Libya holds the largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, the ninth-largest amount globally, and the fifth-largest amount of proved natural gas reserves on the continent. 3 After the revolution, Libya rapidly restarted its hydrocarbon production, faster than anyone expected, 4 injecting in the energy market an oil production of 1.5 million barrels per day (bdp), along with 3 billion cubic meters of gas 5 (bcm). In addition to the fast hydrocarbon sector reactivation, post-revolutionary Libya also experimented a renaissance of civil society activism, 6 displayed through the emergence of diverse and numerous organizations willing to participate in the incipient process to democracy. But the most important asset in this initial optimistic environment was the promising political progress based on a roadmap to follow, 7 initiated by the National Transitional Council (NTC), established in February 2011 by members of exiled opposition, which called for parliamentary elections to choose a Prime Minister and form an interim government, responsible of the appointment of a Constitutional Drafting Assembly 8 in order to elaborate a constitution to be submitted to a popular referendum. 9 After the elections held in July 2012, with the participation of the two main and opposing political parties, National Force Alliance (NFA) and Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party (JCP), 10 NTC transferred power to the newly elected General National Council (GNC). 11 This peaceful replacement seemed to be a first and important step toward the construction of central state apparatus based on confidence and legitimacy for the new elected authorities. Despite these encouraging initial developments, the political and security situation in Libya deteriorated rapidly between 2012 and 2014 as a result of different and cumulative factors with multiplier effects, mainly derived from competing interests between the main rival political parties and associated forces. Situation that led to an inevitable escalation of violence that finally would culminate, in 2014, in a dramatic civil war with no clear victory for any of the fighting sides. After four years, this situation has grown into a stalemated conflict between rival coalitions, defined by the convergence of simultaneous and interlinked political, security, economic and social tensions 12 that are damaging the precarious state institutions, nourishing the continued growth of non-state armed groups, 13 leading the country to a deadlock situation defined by chaos, violence and fragmentation. Precisely, one of the main reasons to understand the escalation of violence in the initial phases of the Libyan transition process was the inability of the political authorities (NTC and GNC) to monopolize the use of force, disarming, demobilizing and rehabilitating (DDR) the armed rebel militias that leaded the uprising against Qadaffi regime. A political failure that took to the militiazation of Libya society, 14 a process defined by the proliferation of armed groups, arising from the spontaneous, fragmented and unstructured civil society mobilization against Qadaffi repressive regime, 15 with multitude and

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divergent power interests, without any sense of cohesion over the state future, but, paradoxically, responsible for providing security for transitional political authorities in charge of leading the transition process toward a functional and democratic state. In fact, the Libyan security situation deteriorated after the fateful decision of NTC to create a hybrid security sector 16 integrating and subsidizing revolutionary militias into and through state apparatus. 17 Thus, while NTC claimed central authority, alleging internal legitimacy and international support, militias invoked the legitimacy of arms, 18 as providers and guarantors of security in a domestic context defined by political divisions and increasing polarization and competition for power. In this sense, the elections held in July 2012, in the first phase of Libyan political transition, acted as a catalyst for the attraction of multiple and diverse local power centers and multitude of armed groups willing to coalesce into broader alliances 19 to defend their local, specific and fragmented interests. After the elections, the newly elected GNC, as new epicenter of power in Libya, became, at the same time, a major center for power competition and rivalry among multiple forces orbiting around NFA and JCP, where armed groups were able to manipulate and to capitalize the extreme weakness of GNC to impose their own goals. 20 Both coalitions, trying to exclude and marginalize their political rivals in the GNC, resorted to enlisting allied militias 21 to pursue their respective agendas, encouraging the enrollment in non-state armed formations, 22 instead of developing official security forces, 23 a wrong strategy that allowed militias to retain independence, gain power and, ultimately, exert control over the state institutions, sowing the seeds of warlordism. 24 None of the successive governments that emerged from the GNC managed to stop subsidizing these militias putting them under control. 25 The inability and the lack of political will to break down these armed groups resulted in the exponential increase in the number or fighters under the government payroll, around 200.000, at the beginning of 2014. 26 So, instead of transitional security guarantors, armed groups, allied with different political factions, became strong non-state security actors, supposedly protecting, but controlling and hindering the work of state institutions, putting at risk the roadmap drawn to a viable political transition to democracy. This was evidenced between 2013 and 2014, when different militias, affiliated to a particular region, tribe or ethnic group, got into a spiral of confrontation, in a permanent fight for power, resources and political concessions, that led the country toward a dangerous climate of distrust, polarization, radicalization and fragmentation that would culminate in civil war. A quick chronological summary 27 demonstrates to which extent the country had crumbled three years after the revolution against Qadaffi. In mid-2014, the security and political situation worsened when Ahmed Maiteeq, backed by Misrata islamist militias, one of the most powerful groups emerging from 2011 revolution, located in the northwest of the country, was designated as Prime Minis-

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ter of the GNC. On May 16, a Qadaffi-era General, Khalifa Haftar, launched the Operation Dignity in alliance with Zintani militias, located in the western Nafusa Mountain region, in order to combat Islamist and jihadist militias with an established presence from the Gulf of Sirte to the northeast of the country, in cities such as Sirte, Darnah, Ajadabiya and Benghazi. 28 Meanwhile, in response to this challenge, Islamist factions decided to create a united front to contain Haftar’s offensive. On June 20, these Islamist groups announced the establishment of Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Councils (BRSC), an umbrella alliance of Islamist forces, including Ansar al Sharia in Libya (ASL) and the 17 February Martirs Brigade, 29 to confront Haftar’s forces, integrated by Libya’s extinct security establishment. On June 25, just a month after the Haftar Operation Dignity, new parliamentary elections were scheduled, resulting in significant gains for the anti-Islamist coalition, at the expense of Misrata faction that previously dominated the GNC. This loss of power led to the formation of a new Islamist front called Libyan Dawn, a coalition of militias from the region of Tripolitania, headed by Misrata forces. On July 13, this Islamist bloc launched Operation Libya Dawn to oust Haftar’s forces from their positions in Tripoli. In August, after intense struggle, Libyan Dawn took control of the capital, 30 proclaiming the GNC as its official parliament, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the elections held in June 31 and, consequently, the authority of the new elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HOR), that opted instead to retreat to the city of Tobruk, in the eastern province of Cyrenaica. One year later, on March 2, 2015, HOR appointed General Haftar as Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA). This fragmented and radicalized domestic panorama, become even more complicated with the presence of the Tuareg and Toubou factions, both pan-saharan ethnic groups located in southern Libya, with swinging goals and shaky tactics, pivoting in favor of the coalition that could better grant their interests, linked to the control of smuggling routes in the Sahel and border regions, a lucrative business where militias also converge to obtain illicit and alternative funding formulas when public revenues decrease. Transnational dynamics In this scenario of violence and chaos, post-revolutionary authorities could not and cannot control the Libyan vast borders: 2,500 miles of land borders and 1,250 miles of sea borders. 32 Porous frontiers opened to infiltration of illicit transnational actors, as terrorist jihadist organizations and different criminal networks, with deals in arms, commodities/goods and people, in a context of permanent and massive influx of migrants and refugees travelling 33 south to north to reach Europe. The progressive decomposition of the state as a direct consequence of the permanent political and military confron-

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tation for the control of resources—particularly hydrocarbon sector, strategic sites and key infrastructures such as airports and border crossing, 34 and for the control of institutions—such as Central Bank of Libya (CBL), the National Oil Company (NOC) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), 35 inevitably, has led to the accelerated deterioration of the formal economy 36 and the consequent reduction of state resources available for armed groups supporting rival coalitions. In view of this challenging situation, empowered militias have found in illicit activities of smuggling networks new opportunities for business and income generation. This explosive convergence between militias and different armed groups, simultaneously attached to political-military coalitions and smuggling networks, 37 operating in porous borderlands has resulted in an escalation of goods, drugs, arms, and human beings trafficking, situation that has reinforced the three main pillars of Libya’s war economy: a flourishing smuggling industry, as a critical component of this war economy; the use of extortion; and a blatant predation on state resources. 38 Thus, the inability to control people and borders by Libyan authorities has been exploited by jihadist transnational organizations as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS). Groups that contemplate Libya as a destination point for its jihad and, at the same time, as a launch platform for terrorism, given the privileged geographical location of Libya, a crossroad with projection toward Sahara, Sahel, the Middle East and Europe, especially the southern region of the country, considered as a sort of hub for terrorists groups resupply and reorganization 39 strategies. There are numerous Islamist jihadist organizations in Libya, some with limited local/regional projection, as Derna Mujahidin Shura Council or Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, and others with national/transnational aspirations 40 as Ansar Al Sharia Libya 41 and AQIM. However, one the most relevant groups affecting the conflict dynamic in Libya is the Islamic State, 42 a brutal jihadist organization with a defined transregional strategy of expansion toward ungoverned spaces like Libya. At the beginning of 2014, once strengthened in the framework of the Syrian civil war, the group decided to make Libya one of its main settlements. The country had important advantages for the expansion of the terrorist organization: 43 a political, institutional and security vacuum to penetrate; ethnic/tribal differences; an optimal geographical location; and energy resources, 44 especially relevant to meet the funding needs of the organization, The group first established control in the coastal city of Derna in 2014, next to the Egyptian border, and considered one of the main bastions of Islamist resistance to Qadaffi 45 regime. In 2015, when they began to lose positions in Derna, due to increasing military pressure, the organization chose to retreat to Sirte, also a coastal city in the central region of Libya, between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, close to the oil crescent, 46 between Tripoli and Tobruk, capitals of competing political institutions. 47 In February 2015, IS communicated its presence in Sirte

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sending a message of terror through its propaganda channels, publishing a video showing the mass beheading of 21 Egyptians copts, captured three months earlier in Sirte. Following the video release, Egypt decided to respond through retaliatory airstrikes against IS positions in eastern Libya, military action that received the support of HOR authorities and, conversely, the strong condemnation of the Tripoli GNC. To confront this dangerous escalation, UN, with the support of international community, decided to initiate a negotiation process between rival coalitions to bring stability to the country and help to combat the growing IS expansion. On December 17, 2015, the representatives of the two rival parliaments, HOR and GNC, signed in Skhirat, Morocco, the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), a deal to form a national unity government to contain the spiral of violence and chaos, aggravated by the penetration of IS in Libya’s own fighting dynamic. The agreement established a nine-member Presidential Council (PC) that would name a new government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), which had to be backed by Tobruk HOR, institution that, on the other hand, would remain as the legitimate parliament of the country, while GNC representatives would be integrated into the consultative High Council of the State. Faiez al-Serraj would head the new GNA and the two governments linked to HOR and GNC would be dissolved. Despite most states recognized the institutions emerged from the LPA, the PC and the GNA, in August 2016, the HOR decided not to endorse the GNA, alleging important disagreements. Instead of encouraging conciliation between the two opposing blocs, the UN brokered deal led to the emergence of two new rival power poles: the GNA, headed by Sarraj, established in Tripoli since March 2016; and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and forces affiliated, led by General Haftar, who progressively had expanded their control over the eastern Libya. At the end of 2016, again, the country was immersed in a new deadlock situation derived from the confrontation between the two leaders: Serraj, who alleged the legitimacy based on the support of the international community but lacking military might; and General Haftar, commander in chief of the LNA, but unable to unite the country militarily and without diplomatic international recognition. Thus, at this moment, Lybia is suffering four interlinked conflicts: 48 the LNA vs. GNA, 49 basically because of the Haftar’s frontal opposition to the perceived strong links between the GNA and the Islamist groups active in the east 50 of the country; a second crisis, situated in Tripoli, where two groups vie for power, the pro-GNA militias; and the militias supporting the General National Salvation (GNS) front, integrated by former GNC members with Islamists tendencies, led by Khalifa al Ghawil, who rejected the LPA. 51 These two armed groups compete for the control of smuggling profits in the capital, where anti-smuggling militias 52 also emerged hoping to obtain EU funds to counter human smuggling. Converging in this scenario, there is still

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a third ethnic/tribal nature conflict located in the southwest of the country, where Tuaregs and Tebou groups compete fiercely for the profits of the Libyan war economy; and, finally, Libya suffers a fourth scenario of violence, an internationalized conflict, 53 defined by the confrontation between jihadist Islamist groups, supported by external pro-Islamist regional powers, and a disparate coalition of national and international 54 anti-Islamist forces. A deteriorating situation conveniently exploited by IS, an extremely violent jihadist group that thrives on environments of violence, chaos and disorder, especially suitable for its survival.

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Regional and Extra-regional Dynamics This complex situation has brought about the intervention of external powers, aligned with different ideological/tribal/ethnic/local/regional groups on the ground to vie for power and influence on behalf their own and specific interests. While tribal/ethnic and local/regional can be considered main indigenous causes to explain conflict and violence in Libya, ideological confrontation between Islamist and non-Islamists 55 groups is especially relevant to connect with a wider regional dimension linked to MENA region where this Libyan rift mirrors the divisions 56 that have taken form across MENA region after the Arab Spring. In Libya, two proxy wars 57 are taking place. One overt regional proxy war, where Islamist and anti-Islamist forces combat in competing national/international alliances: Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia supporting anti-Islamist Haftar 58 LNA and associated forces; and on the other side, Turkey, Sudan and Qatar 59 backing Libyan pro-Islamist factions. At the same time, there is a second covert internationalized proxy war, where some specific Western countries, 60 allied with regional powers in changing and opaque alliances, combat jihadist groups linked to IS or AQ, 61 as a subsequent phase of the Long War against Terrorism led by the US since 11S attacks. Terrorism influx from Libya is also a preeminent concern among southern neighbors in the Sahel 62 region, especially for Niger, Chad, and Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, 63 given their perpetual weakness to exert and effective control over their vast frontiers, even to lead a military intervention in Libya. Failed sub-saharian states heavily dependent on foreign support and intervention 64 to confront the persistent and resilient threat of jihadist groups, operating from southern Libya, specifically from the Fezzan region, considered as a hub of terror organizations and criminal networks. Besides this jihadist threat, different criminal activities 65 linked to the smuggling industry, especially on human beings and weapons have developed in and from Libya 66 affecting primarily to its western neighbors, Tunisia and Algeria. Countries motivated not only by their particular national interests focused on improving borders controls 67 to contain the negative impacts of the smuggling activities in their respective territories, but also interested in countering

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internal radicalization 68 as a consequence of the radical ideological influence of the returnees from Syria and Iraq, who might decide to reinforce the jihadist networks in this North African countries from the Libyan soil. Western countries represent another group to consider, particularly, Italy, France and the United States. Regarding to Italian priorities in Libya, these are concentrated in political, commercial and energy interests, 69 especially in Tripolitania region, main departure point 70 for migratory flows on their way to Europe; and also main strategic location for ENI investments on Libyan hydrocarbon sector. 71 Italian authorities have developed an intense political and diplomatic work acting as mediators in negotiations between the two opposing coalitions based in Tripoli and Tobruk, addressing the diverse and competing interests of tribal leaders, local authorities and civil society representatives and, at the same time, trying to improve the security conditions 72 to guarantee the viability of the Libyan state institutions. While Italy has prioritized the political and diplomatic approach, France and the US have opted to put the emphasis on counterterrorism policy. However, while France is leading a clear pro-intervention strategy in the Sahel region since 2013, developing different military operations, such as Serval, Barkhane or G5 Sahel initiative, 73 reactivating strategic French military bases in Northern Chad 74 to monitor and contain jihadists groups penetration, operating from Fezzam region, into France’s area of influence around Niger and Mali, the US has been more ambiguous over the intervention in Libya. Since 11S attacks in 2001, the US has developed a strong military power projection toward MENA and Sahel regions 75 from the strategic site of Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti, the primary base of operations for US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the Horn of Africa, 76 the only permanent US base in Africa, a key location at the entrance to the Red Sea with a wide projection to Bab el Mandeb Strait, Arabian Peninsula and the Sahel regions, operated, among other uses, for covert counterterrorism missions, according to a light footprint approach 77 to prevent public debate, against jihadists terrorist groups operating in this wide, trans-regional and ungoverned geographic area integrated by North Africa and Sahel regions. In this sense, neither Obama nor Trump Administrations are willing to become involved in an overt military campaign in Libya. At the moment, US specific goals in Libya are focused on pushing IS out of Libyan soil from US external locations dispersed across African continent and divided in three different categories: forward operating sites (FOS); cooperative security locations (CSL) and contingency locations (CL) 78 in order to increase US crisis-response force projection. In 2017, the number of these sites escalated to 46 US locations scattered across 24 African countries. 79

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The case of European Union The European Unión (EU) also has important security interests in Libya. There are significant threats/challenges to be considered: 80 the destabilization impacts of Libyan crisis in North Africa and Sahel regions, as a direct consequence or geographical proximity to Europe; jihadist terrorism; geopolitical competition with Russia; and, especially, migration flows, considered a main challenge and a strategic priority. Once analyzed briefly the situation in North Africa and the Sahel, considered as the first challenge, it is beyond dispute to recognize that jihadist terrorism from Libya represents a real threat for EU; however, at the present, this threat can be considered as of limited impact. Of the three waves 81 of jihadist terrorism in Libya, Afghan veterans, Iraq fighters and Libyan combatants in Syria, only the latter group can be categorized as expansionist, while the first two waves, 82 clustered around Ansar Al Sharia Libya and the Shura Councils, have a domestic/regional dimension. EU must admit a disturbing reality: jihadist terrorism in Europe is primarily a home-grown problem, 83 involving European citizens with a similar/general profile: young second generation immigrants or converts, 84 very often immersed in episodes of frustration and social exclusion with a strong sense of youth identity culture for whom violence represents an existential option. Russia aspirations in the Mediterranean represent a third important challenge for the EU. However, although Libya constitutes a geopolitical motivation for the Kremlin, the country cannot be considered, for the moment, a priority from the Russian perspective. Haftar coalition counts on Egypt and UAE as main allies and, on the other hand, the construction of a naval base in Benghazi 85 would require, besides massive investments, minimum security and stability conditions that neither Tripoli nor Tobruk can guarantee, even in the long term. No doubt, migration represents the main challenge/concern for EU security interests. What is perceived as a massive, constant and uncontrolled migration flows 86 toward Europe, has become the main political point of friction, distrust and division between European institutions and Member States and among European Member States, whose respective governments, concerned primarily for their short-term electoral gains, have put the emphasis on a securitization approach, prioritizing securitized and quick-fix responses to shore up European borders and to curb migratory flows, perceived as an existential threat for their constituencies in Europe. So, conditioned by divergent Members States perspectives and security interests, EU policies in dealing with migration challenge from Libya, especially since 2014–2015, have been developed through a two track approach: one based on a more comprehensive and diplomatic understanding, fostering the dialogue and negotiations with both, domestic and international actors; 87 and a second one, more pragmatic and securitized modus operandi, focused on border enforcement/

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externalization operations. 88 Based on this security-driven approach, EU has adopted different measures and policies to project its presence in Africa through civilian and military missions, moving its frontiers south to the Sahel. This strategy of border externalization to contain migratory flows, instead of tackling the root causes of migration in origin countries, 89 has contributed to exacerbate the problems 90 in these states, as the Libyan case, encouraging the competition between rival actors in the fight to obtain EU support and resources. Furthermore, this strategy has been reinforced with a political narrative that links migration and terrorism, spreading the idea that jihadist terrorists are entering in Europe en masse on migrant boats. 91 The presence of IS in Derna and Sirte validated this discourse, reinvigorating, therefore, the securitization approach, what has contributed to swiftly reframing 92 the Libyan conflict into a migration crisis 93 for Europe. That is why in the aftermath of a major tragedy in the Mediterranean in April 2015, 94 the Council of the European Union launched the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)-mission EUNAVFORMED-Operation Sophia 95 on June 22, 2015 with an initial mandate focused on disrupting the business of human smuggling and trafficking networks. 96 Since then, Operation Sophia has successively been prolonged and extended with different and complementary tasks, 97 such as: implementation of UN arms embargo; training Libyan coastguards to combat human smuggling, or surveillance and information-gathering activities 98 on illegal oil exports from Libya. However, Sophia has raised important issues and questions related to unintended consequences 99 derived from the development of this operation. Some questions are whether a humanitarian mission should be assigned to the military, 100 or expressed in another way, whether high defense capabilities should be used for humanitarian purposes. In the same token, Sophia has raised concerns over the perception it has contributed to generate safer routes 101 in Central Mediterranean, attracting the presence of multiple actors such as Frontex and different humanitarian NGOs involved in rescue operations and, therefore, blurring its deterrent role to migrants and smugglers. Furthermore, while the primary objective of Sophia was to disrupt the smuggler’s business model 102 based on human trafficking, migrant smugglers have adapted its operating procedures to the requirements and conditions of the new environment by using pneumatic rafts, where migrants are abandoned to their fate, at the limit of Libyan territorial waters, 103 in the proximity to Sophia’s area of operation in international waters. The lack of authorization to operate in territorial Libyan waters 104 has forced the EU to face important obstacles to the successful implementation of Sophia mandate, particularly in those activities related to the training of Libyan militias in their new assigned role as coast guards, paradoxically, one of the most important tasks entrusted to Sophia mandate in 2017, 105 where EU has poured tens of millions of dollars 106 into provng support to Libyan coast guard operations off the coast. However, important

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humanitarian NGOs, as Doctors without Frontiers, have presented allegations against Libyan coast guard misconduct, documenting abuses and acts of violence against helpless migrants. 107 Despite this unquestionable reality, European leaders continue considering these reconverted militias as key allies, since the effective power in Libya is mostly in their hands. 108 On the other hand, EUBAM (EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission), the civilian CSDP mission in Libya, is also immersed in important contradictions and limitations. This mission was launched in 2013 to help Libyan authorities and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to improve border control and management as a consequence of deteriorating security conditions 109 in Libya. After the civil war, and in the negotiation framework of Skhirat Agreement, this mission was renewed successively in 2015 and 2016 to provide advisement on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and capacity building 110 to the GNA. In 2017, the Interim Strategic Review of EUBAM was released stressing the need to reinforce the border management toward the Sahel region to develop a broader border management framework 111 in order to put greater attention to Libyan southern borders, with the objective of connecting EUBAM to other EU missions such as EUCAP Sahel. 112 However, Libya represents a paradigmatic example of hybrid security sector where militias have absorbed significant quotas of state authority and legitimacy, 113 forcing the state institutions to share power, given its condition of security providers and main guarantors of state survival. While, EUBAM mandate forces the mission to deal with GNA, 114 considered as the authority responsible for SSR programs, excluding other non-state actors such as militias and other armed groups, effective local providers of security for internationally recognized GNA viability. This effort of centralization on behalf GNA, decided by EU institutions to avoid the negative effects of the decentralization/atomization of power in hands of a plurality of competing armed militias implies the exclusion of non-state actors that, paradoxically, represent an important component of the state structural power, undermining, in this way, the intended success of the EUBAM mandate to develop through SSR programs an integrated border management to strength state security structures to better control the irregular migration and the trafficking of human beings 115 considered as a security priority for EU. These contradictions have decisively contributed to invigorate the interlinked interests between armed militias and smugglers of migrants who have discovered the possibilities of making huge profits, 116 not only in detentions centers in Libya, 117 where migrants suffer from exploitation and humiliation, but also through the criminal market developed in Europe. A large-scale market constituted by multiple and growing criminal networks that thrive on the large and permanent supply of vulnerable migrants, particularly unaccompanied children, 118 conceived as profitable commodities instead of human beings.

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CONCLUSIONS The state institutions disintegration after the fall of Qadaffi regime in 2011 has resulted in political and security power vacuum filled by a wide constellation of non-state actors, such as tribal/ethnic communities, local councils, NGOs, armed militias, constituted in civil and military organizations that have succeeded in establishing new political structures to project and defend their specific communities interests, both in a collaborating and competing fashion, in a political context defined by chaos, disorder and violence. This situation has led to the emergence new and powerful local actors organized, in most of the cases, in militarized communities and criminal networks that have contributed to erode, even more, the already fragile Libyan state power structures, granting, at the same time, the guarantee for state institutional survival. The rivalry of the new political authorities in permanent competition for the control of power, influence and resources and, on the other hand, unable to provide the necessary security conditions to manage a successful transition to democracy, has inevitably led to the territorial fragmentation and institutional division of the country—East-based GNA vs. West-based HOR, supported by LNA, with their respective associated militias—paving the way for a prolonged destabilization of Libya with significant impacts on local, regional and international levels. This situation of instability, uncertainty, fragmentation and violence, where armed militias with lucrative connections with criminal transnational networks operate unchallenged through porous frontiers exposed to jihadist terrorist penetration in the absence of the state apparatus, is reinforcing the militia component of Libyan securitization, preventing the establishment of a stable institutional framework in which a recognized central government can implement a gradual stabilization of the country, demobilizing and integrating the armed militias into the state security apparatus. The ceasefire agreement taken in July 2017 between President Serraj and General Haftar to hold elections in December 2018 represented a relevant step toward reconciliation. Despite the initial optimism, the situation in Libya remains deeply fragmented and complicated with continuous clashes between rival militias and occasional terrorist attacks, forcing to delay the elections calendar, now to be held, apparently, in the spring of 2019. For the moment, it is difficult to foresee if elections will bring any progress to reconciliation and stabilization of the country if the rival political coalitions cannot neutralize armed militias, a very difficult task in a state defined by the militiaization of politics. NOTES 1. Narbone, Luigi: “Introduction: Local dynamics of Conflict in Syria and Libya,” in: Narbone, Luigi, Agnès Favier and Virginie Collombier (eds.): Inside wars: local dynamics of

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conflicts in Syria and Libya, p.1, Rome, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Middle East Directions, 2016, p. 1: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/41644/Inside%20wars_2016.pdf 2. Aliboni, Roberto: “A hard diplomatic transition in Libya: What response from the EU and the 5+5 dialogue?,” in: Aliboni, R., H. Ben Salem, M. El Sagezli, A. Dias and B. Nabli: Conflict in Libya: a multidimensional crisis, state of play and paths toward a sustainable peace, p. 40, Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Med Think 5+5 Network, 2017: https://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/historic-de-publicacions/policystudies/2.-conflict-in-libya-a-multidimensional-crisis 3. US Energy Information Administration: “Country analysis brief: Libya,” pp. 1–3, November 19, 2015, in: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/ Libya/libya.pdf 4. According to International Energy Agency in a March 13, 2013 report, cited by: Houslohner, Abigail: “Libya’s oil sector makes quick recovery after 2011 revolution,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2013: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libyas-oilsector-makes-quick-recovery-after-2011-revolution/2013/03/16/a9042efa-8655-11e2-9d71f0feafdd1394_story.html?utm_term=.ea0d325ebc48 5. Samuel, David: “How Libya blew billions and its best chance at democracy,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, August 7, 2014: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-07/ libya-waste-fraud-erase-billions-in-national-wealth, cited in: Engel, Andrew: “Libya as a failed state: causes, consequences, options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, Number 24, (November 2014), p.1: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Documents/pubs/ResearchNote24_Engel-3.pdf Engel: “Libya as a failed state…”, op., cit., p. 4 Ibid., p.3 Research Notes, Number 24, (November 2014), p. 1: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote24_Engel-3.pdf 6. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 4. 7. Ibid., p. 3. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Poljarevic, Emin: “Libya: a case study of a failed revolution,” Scientific Cooperations, 2nd International Conference on Social Sciences, 2–3 April 2016, Istanbul, Turkey, p. 76: http:/ /ase-scoop.org/papers/IWAHS-2016/6.Poljarevic_IWAHS.pdf 11. Arraf, Sari: “The war report 2017, Libya: a short guide on the conflict,” The Geneva Academy of International and Humanitarian Law, June 2017, p.2: https://www.genevaacademy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/ Lybia%20A%20Short%20Guide%20to%20the%20Conflict.pdf 12. Eaton, Tim: “Libya’s war economy. Predation, profiteering and State Weakness,” Chatham House, The Royal Institute for International Affairs, Research Paper, Middle East and North Africa Programme, (April, 2018), p. 12: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/ files/publications/research/2018-04-12-libyas-war-economy-eaton-final.pdf 13. Ibid., 14. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 5. 15. Poljarevic: “Libya: a case study. . .” op., cit., p. 74. 16. Toaldo, Mattia: “Libya: security, economic development and political reform,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, LSE International Development, Sit/WP/04/16, p. 4: https://www.feseurope.eu/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/events/Maerz_2016/FES_LSE_Libya._security_ economic_development_and_political_reform_Toaldo_2016_02_23.pdf 17. When the interim defense minister, Osama Juwaili, asked the rebel militias to keep their weapons to secure Tripoli after 2011 uprisal instead of disbanding, see: Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 5. 18. Ibid., p. 4. 19. Boserup, R.A. and Virginie Collombier: “Militarization and militiaization: dymamics of armed group proliferation in Egypt and Libya,” Middle East and North Africa Regional Archi-

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tecture (MENARA), Working Paper, Nº 17 (October 2018), p. 11: http://www.menaraproject. eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/menara_wp_17.pdf 20. Ibid., 21. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 5. 22. This is the case of two non-state security bodies created by transitional government: The Supreme Security Committee (SCC), attached to Ministry of Interior, with functions as auxiliary police; and Libya Shield Forces, under the orders of Ministry of Defense, see: Wehry, Frederic: “Libya’s military menace,” Foreign Affairs, July 2012: https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/libya/2012-07-12/libyas-militia-menace 23. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 5. 24. Wehry,: “Libya’s military menace,” op., cit., cited in: Ibid., 25. Arraf: “The war report 2017. . .,” op., cit., p.2. 26. Salah, H.: “Libyan militias and the quest for national unity,” Human Rights Watch (HRW), 27 (October 2015): https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/27/militias-and-quest-libyanunity, cited in: Arraf: “The war report 2017. . .,” op., cit., p. 2. 27. Based on the analysis of the situation elaborated by Sari Arraf: “The war report 2017. . .,” op., cit., p. 3. 28. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 2. 29. This organizations has at different occasions cooperated with AQIM and IS, given their shared interests of fighting Haftar’s forcers: Sizer, Lydia: “Libya’s terrorism challenge: assessing the salafi-jihadist threat,” Middle East Institute (MEI), Policy Paper 2017-1 (October 2017), p. 5: https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PP1_Sizer_LibyaCT_web_0.pdf 30. Reeve, Richard: “Libya’s proxy battlefield,” Oxford Research Group, ORS Briefing, (January 2014), p. 2: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/libyas-proxy-battlefield 31. Ibid., 32. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 3. 33. Ibid., 34. Boserup and Collombier: “Militarization and militiaization. . .,” op., cit., p. 14. 35. Ibid., p. 15. 36. Eaton, Tim: “Libya’s war economy. . .,” op., cit., p. 23. 37. For further information on the relationship between smugglers and armed groups, see: Ibid., pp. 10–19. 38. According to Tim Eaton, Ibid., p. 7. 39. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 11. 40. Eriksson, Mikael and Elias Bohman: “The second Libyan civil war: security developments during 2016–2017,” Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), FOI-R—4571—SE, (February 2018), p. 15: https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4571-SE 41. To study the successive generations of jihadists in Libya in order to situate Ansar Al Sahria, see: Fitzgerald, Mary: “Jihadism and its relationship with youth culture and ideology: the case of Ansar Al Sharia in Libya,” in: Narbone Luigi, Agnès Favier and Virginie Collombier, Inside Wars. . ., op., cit., pp. 44–49. 42. Eriksson and Bohman: “The second Libyan civil war. . .,” p. 15. 43. According to Collombier, Virginie and Seif Eddin Trabelsi: “The Islamic State in Lybia: strategy and reality on the ground” in Narbone Luigi, Agnès Favier and Virginie Collombier, Inside Wars. . ., op., cit., p. 50. 44. Ibid., 45. Ibid., 46. Ibid., p. 53. 47. Ibid., 48. According to the analysts of the Clingendael Institute, the situation in Libya is getting worse as a consequence of multiple and interrelated conflicts, each developing different dynamics, resulting in the failure of the Skhirat Agreement signed in December 2015, see: Kars de Brujine, Floor El Kamouni-Jansen and Fransje Molenaar: “Crisis alert 1: Challenging the assumptions of the Libyan conflict,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingen-

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dael, July 2017, pp. 1–2: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/crisesalert-1challenging-the-assumptions-of-the-libyan-conflict.pdf 49. Ibid., p. 3. 50. Ibid., 51. Ibid., p. 8. 52. Ibid., 53. Ibid., p. 11. 54. Ibid., 55. Poljarevic: “Libya: a case study. . .” op., cit., p. 77. 56. Engel: “Libya as a failed state. . .,” op., cit., p. 3. 57. Reeve: “Libya’s proxy battlefield,” op., cit., p. 1. 58. Mezran, Karim and Arturo Varvelli: “Libyan crisis: international actors at play,” in: Mezran, Karim and Arturo Varvelli, Atlantic Council and ISPI: Foreign Actors in Libya’s crisis, Milano, LediPublishing, 2017, pp. 18–19: https://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/LIBIA_ 2017/LIBIA_WEB.DEF.pdf 59. Ibid., p. 19. 60. Particularly France and the US: Reeve: “Libya’s proxy battlefield,” op., cit., p. 1. 61. Ibid., 62. Ibid., p. 3. 63. Ibid., 64. Lounass, Djallil: “The Libyan security continuum: the impact of the Libyan crisis on the North African/Sahelian regional system,” Middle East and North Africa Regional Architectures (MENARA), Nº 15 (October 2018), p. 21: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_15. pdf 65. Ibid., p. 3. 66. Ibid., 67. Mezran and Varvelli: “Libyan crisis: international actors. . .,” op., cit., p. 20. 68. Ibid., 69. Surana, Kavitha: “Italy’s last-ditch effort to stabilize Libya,” Foreign Policy, (January 13, 2017): https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/13/italys-last-ditch-effort-to-stabilize-libyarussia-haftar/ 70. Mezran and Varvelli: “Libyan crisis: international actors. . .,” op., cit., p. 20. 71. Proglio, Gabriele (ed.): Decolonizing the Mediterranean: European colonial heritage in North Africa and the Middle East, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, p. 42: https://www.cambridgescholars.com/decolonising-the-mediterranean ENI: “Eni makes a new gas and condensates discovery offshore Libya”: https://www.eni. com/docs/en_IT/enicom/media/press-release/2017/04/Eni_makes_new_gas_condensates_ discovery_offshore_Libya.pdf ENIpedia: https://www.eni.com/enipedia/en_IT/international-presence/africa/enisactivities-in-libya.page ; these interests in Libyan hydrocarbon sector are being threatened by IS, when two suicide bombers attacked the Libyan National Oil Corporation headquarters in Tripoli last September 10, see: Stephen, Chris: “One step forward, two back in Libya,” Petroleum Economist, (October 5, 2018): http://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politicseconomics/middle-east/2018/one-step-forward-two-back-in-libya 72. Liga, Aldo: “Playing with molecules: the Italian approach to Libya,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), April, 2018, pp. 22–24: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/ files/atoms/files/playing_with_molecules_the_italian_approach_to_libya.pdf 73. Didier, Brice: “The regionalization of counterterrorism strategies in the Sahel: the G5 as a challenge for transatlantic relations,” College of Europe Policy Briefs, June 2018: https:// www.coleurope.eu/page-ref/cepob-college-europe-policy-brief-series 74. Stratfor: “Chad: France’s overlooked African citadel,” Stratfor Assessments, September 13, 2016: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chad-frances-overlooked-african-citadel See also: Burgess, Stephen: “Military intervention in Africa: French and US Approaches compared,” Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ), Vol. 9, Nº 2, 2nd Quarter 2018, pp. 10–21: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-09_Issue-2/ 2018_2_e.pdf

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75. US also operates from its Mediterranean fleet, the strategic NATO bases in Sicily and Crete and the Bases of Rota and Morón, in Spain, see: Reeve, Richard and Zoë Pelter: “From New Frontier to New Normal: Counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel-Sahara,” Remote Control Project, Oxford Research Group, London, 2014, p. 14: http://remotecontrolproject.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sahel-Sahara-report.pdf, cited in: Segoviano Monterrubio, Soledad: Chapters: “Oriente Medio y el Norte de África” and “África,” p. 66–67, in: Ayala Marín, José Enrique (coord.) and Segoviano Monterrubio, Soledad, Xira del Pilar Ruiz Campillo and Javier Gil Pérez: Alianzas y cooperaciones de seguridad y defensa en el siglo XXI, DT OPEX 81/2016, Madrid, Fundación Alternativas, 2017: http://www.fundacionalternativas.org/public/ storage/opex_documentos_archivos/cace8c8c9fcbf6cd22108fbf7ab9221b.pdf 76. Commander, Navy Installations Command, Command under Chief of US Naval Operations (CNIC): https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_ djibouti.html 77. A long-distance war developed during the second Obama Administration through precision airstrikes operations alternative to Bush war option, based on heavy “boots on the ground” approach, see: Tecott, Rachel: “The double-edged legacy of Obama war,” War on the Rocks, February 9, 2017: https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/the-double-edged-legacy-of-obamawar/ 78. Turse, Nick: “Secret US military documents reveal America’s war fighting footprint in Africa,” The Huffington Post, (April 27, 2017), p. 3: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ secret-us-military-documents-reveal-americas-war-fighting-footprint-in-africa_us_ 5901ffdae4b0af6d718c3f3b 79. Ibid., p. 1. US military presence in the continent has been experimented a constant expansion since September 2012 terrorist attack on the US Mission in Benghazi, killing the US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens. See also: Morgan, Wesley and Bryan Bender: “America’s shadow war in Africa,” Politico, (October 12, 2017): https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/12/niger-shadow-war-africa243695 Trevithick, Joseph: “What you need to know about why US Special Operation Forces are in Niger,” The drive, (October 6, 2017), en: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14923/ what-you-need-to-know-about-why-u-s-special-operations-forces-are-in-niger Korzun, Peter: “Africa: continent where US Military wages shadows war,” Strategic Culture, (October 28, 2017), en: https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/10/28/africacontinent-where-us-military-wages-shadow-wars.html Morgan, Wesley: “Behind the secret US war in Africa,” Politico (July 3, 2018), en: https:// www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005 80. Kars de Brujine, Floor El Kamouni-Jansen and Fransje Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security interests at stake in Libya?,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, July 2017, pp. 1–2: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/ crisesalert-2-european-security-interests-at-stake-in-libya.pdf 81. Fitzgerald: “Jihadism and its relationship with. . .,” in: Narbone Luigi, Agnès Favier and Virginie Collombier, Inside Wars. . ., op., cit., pp. 44–45. 82. Brujine, El Kamouni-Jansen and Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security. . .”op., cit., p. 2. 83. Ibid., p. 5. 84. Roy, Oliver: “Who are the new Jihadis?” The Guardian, April 13, 2017: https://www. theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis 85. Brujine, El Kamouni-Jansen and Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security. . .”op., cit., p. 11. 86. Ibid., p. 12. 87. Loschi, Chiara: “EU response to the Libyan crisis: shallow impact with short term vision,” Open Democracy (May 25, 2018), p. 3: https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africawest-asia/chiara-loschi/eu-response-to-libyan-crisis-shallow-impact-with-short-term-vis ; see also: European Council on Foreign Relations: “The Mediterranean and migration: postcards from a crisis”: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration 88. Loschi: “EU response. . .,” op., cit., p. 3. 89. Ibid.,

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90. Ibid., 91. Brujine, El Kamouni-Jansen and Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security. . .”op., cit., p. 6. 92. Loschi: “EU response. . . ,” op., cit., p. 3. 93. Ibid., 94. Bonomalo, Alessandra and Stephanie Kirchgaessner: “UN says 800 migrants dead in boat disaster as Italy launches rescue of two more vessels,” The Guardian, April 20, 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/italy-pm-matteo-renzi-migrant-shipwreckcrisis-srebrenica-massacre 95. For more information, see: EUNAVFORMED-Operation Sophia: https://www. operationsophia.eu/about-us/ 96. Loschi, Chiara, Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari: “The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya: Bridging theory and practice,” EUNPACK (EUNPACK Project, a conflict sensitive unpacking of the EU comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis mechanisms), Working Paper, (January 2018), p. 2: http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/ publications/2018-01-31%20D6. 2%20Working%20paper%20on%20implementation%20of%20EU%20crisis%20response%20i n%20Libya.pdf 97. Ibid., 98. For this task, Sophia established relations with other international actors: FRONTEX, EUROPOL UN Mission UNSMIL, UNHCR, INTERPOL, NATO, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and NATO as well as different humanitarians NGOs, see: Tardy, Thierry: “Operation Sophia ’s world: changes and challenges,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), (November 2017), p. 3: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ EUISSFiles/Brief%2032%20Operation%20Sophia_0.pdf 99. Ibid., p. 3. 100. Ibid., 101. Ibid., p. 4. 102. Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari: “The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya. . .,” op., cit., p. 3. 103. Tardy: “Operation Sophia ’s world. . .,” op., cit., p. 4. 104. Loschi: “EU response to the Libyan crisis. . .” op., cit., p. 3. 105. Ibid., 106. Raghavan, Sudarsan: “Libya’s coast guard abuses migrants despite EU funding and training,” The Washington Post, July 7, 2017: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_ east/libyas-coast-guard-abuses-desperate-migrants-despite-eu-funding-and-training/2017/07/ 10/f9bfe952-7362-4e57-8b42-40ae5ede1e26_story.html?utm_term=.c12a28636845 107. Doctors without Frontiers: Libya time running out for 800 migrants and refugees held in Zuwara, May 4, 2018: https://www.msf.org.uk/article/libya-time-running-out-800-migrantsand-refugees-held-zuwara 108. Raghavan: “Libya’s coast guard abuses. . .” op., cit., 109. Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari: “The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya. . .”op., cit., p. 9. 110. Ibid., 111. As cited in The Interim Strategic Review of EUBAM, released in May 2017: Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and EU Liaison and Planning Cell, Brussels, 15 May 2017, cited in: Ibid., pp. 9 and 27. 112. Ibid., p. 9. 113. Loschi: “EU response to the Libyan crisis. . .”op., cit., p. 4 114. Loschi, Raineri and Strazzari: “The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya. . .,” op., cit., p. 11 115. Ibid., p.9 116. Brujine, El Kamouni-Jansen and Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security. . .”op., cit., p. 13 117. To document Libyan coast guard abuses in Libya, see: United Nations Mission Support in Libya and United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: Detained and

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dehumanised: Report on human rights abuses against migrants in Libya, December 13, 2016: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf Amnesty International: Shameful EU policies fuel surge in detention of migrants and refugees, May 16, 2018: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2018/05/libya-shamefuleu-policies-fuel-surge-in-detention-of-migrants-and-refugees/ 118. Brujine, El Kamouni-Jansen and Molenaar: “Crisis alert 2: European security. . .” op., cit., p. 14; see also: EUROPOL: Situation Report: Criminal networks involved in the trafficking and exploitation of underage victims in the European Union, The Hague, October, 2018: https:/ /www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/criminal-networks-involved-in-traffickingand-exploitation-of-underage-victims-in-eu

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Index

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2003 European Security Strategy (2003 ESS), 2–4 2008 ESS Review, 4–5 2013 European Global Strategy Project, 6 2015 European Sahel Action Plan, vii, 7 2016 European Global Strategy, vii, 11, 13, 17 Abu Musad Al Zarqawi, 26, 44–45, 46; Al Qaeda in Iraq-the Organization for Monotheism and Jihad, leader of, 26, 44–45 African Union (AU), 7, 13, 29, 30 AFRICOM (US AFRICA COMMAND), 15, 17, 35, 57, 134 Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, 27 Al Qaeda, vii, 13, 25–27, 30, 31–35, 39, 40, 43, 44–45, 46–47, 48, 51, 68, 118; AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 13, 30, 31–33, 34, 60, 70, 85, 88, 89, 90, 92, 111, 132 Al Shabaab, 31, 32, 67, 70, 71 Ansar al Sharia, 31, 34 Ansar Dine, 31, 70 Arab Springs, 17, 27, 31, 45, 59 Al Murabitun, 70

CENTCOM (US CENTRAL COMMAND), 17 Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), 15, 121, 138 Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 1 Criminal Insurgency, vii, 97, 99–100, 101, 102; Definition and goals, 97, 99; BACRIM, 102, 104 Drug Trafficking, vii, 57, 61, 79, 80, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92; Cocaine, vii, 60, 61, 62–63, 69, 79–81, 81–87, 87, 89, 90, 91–92, 92–93 Economic Community of the States of West Africa (ECOWAS), 7, 13, 121 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 4, 11–14, 17 European Counterterrorism Center (ECTC), 50 EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), 119 Europol, 45, 47 EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for the Sahel, 111, 120, 122, 124 G5 Sahel, 11, 17, 29, 35, 120, 121, 134

Boko Haram, vii, 11, 14, 27, 31, 32, 34, 70, 71, 111, 113, 116, 118

“Highway 10,” 83 Human Security, 15, 18, 19, 26, 29, 34

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Hybrid Threats, vii, 104; Hybrid conflicts and Hybrid scenarios, 98, 104; Hybrid war, 104; Hybrid insurgency, 106 Islamic State/Daesh, vii, 26–27, 27–28, 31, 32–34, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44–45, 46–48, 50, 67, 70, 132; Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 32, 45; “al Dawla al Islamiyah al Iraq wa al Sham,” on June 29, 2014, declaration of the Caliphate, 46; International Jihadist Salafist Terrorism, goal of, 43

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Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), 26, 33, 35, 70, 71 Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 17 Libya, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 44, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63–64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 82, 83, 89, 112–115, 116, 117, 121, 127–138; Ansar al Sharia in Libya (ASL), 128; Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Councils (BRSC), 128; Central Bank of Libya (CBL), 130; 17 February Martirs Brigade, 128; Government of National Accord (GNC), 132; General National Salvation (GNS), 132; Government of National Accord (GNA), 132; Haftar, General Khalifa, 68, 128, 132–133, 135, 138; Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), 132; Muammar Gaddafi, 1, 27, 114, 116; Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party (JCP), 128; National Force Alliance (NFA), 128; National Transitional Council (NTC), 128, 130; National Oil Company (NOC), 61, 132 MENA (Middle East and North Africa), 1, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21n2, 133, 134 Migration routes, 113; Central Mediterranean Route (CMR), 113, 114; Western Mediterranean Route (WMR),

113 Mogherini, Frederica High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 47 Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Mr. Malboro), 60, 68, 70 Movement for the Unity of the Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), 32, 70, 85 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 67 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 6, 17, 18, 20, 50 Niger Delta Avengers, 67 Northern Mali Touaregs, Movement (MTNM), 70; Greater Middle East, 4, 7, 14 Organized Crime, vii–1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11–17, 20–21, 30, 57, 60, 69, 71, 79, 80, 81, 88, 90, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107; Al-Shabaab, illicit charcoal trade by, 67; Cosa Nostra, 61; Human Traffic, definition of, 65; Islamic State, oil traffic by, 67; FARC, 71, 85; MANPADs, 61; N’Drangheta, 61, 87; Tri-Border area, 85; Lebanese diaspora, 85 Regional Development and Protection Programs (RDPPs), 13 Resilience, 18, 19 Serval and Barkane Operations, 7, 27, 35, 135 Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 13 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 2, 4, 5, 13 United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), 59, 61, 63, 67, 69, 84 United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), 59

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About the Authors

David García Cantalapiedra, PhD, He is Professor at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. He also teaches US Foreign Policy at the Spanish Foreign Service School and he is lecturer at the Joint Staff Course in the Spanish Armed Forces School. Currently, he is Director, UCM Research Group on International Security and Cooperation, and Member, WG on Organized Crime and illicit trafficking at the Real Instituto Elcano. He has been member at the Strategic Study Group on Migration, Special Immigration Committee, National Security Department at the Office of the Spanish Prime Minister. Previously, he was Senior Analyst on US Foreign Policy at the Royal Elcano Institute, and worked for NATO as Fellow, Strategy Review Group in Afghanistan, and as member of a WG on NATO Nuclear Posture (USDTRA-NATO Nuclear Policy Planning Directorate) between 2008 and 2011. Recently, he was also 2017 EU Centre Fellow in Singapore on AsianEU Security Cooperation. Ruben Herrero de Castro, PhD, is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science of the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM). He has published La realidad inventada. Processes of perception and decision in Foreign Policy (2007), prologued by Pr. Robert Jervis-, John F. Kennedy and Vietnam: the fall of Camelot (2011) and Allies: Transatlantic Relations of the 21st Century (2015). He is focused on Decision-Making Processes in IR, and political analyst in various media and international opinion journalist in Spain. Nieva Machín Osés, PhD, her specialty is human security and international relations and has participated in different projects on Mediterranean, EU,

147 The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

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About the Authors

Food Security and Climate change in the UCM. She has been lecturer at the Rey Juan Carlos University and Staffordshire University. Gustavo Diaz, PhD. He is Associate Professor on International Relations at the UCM and member of the Editorial Board in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. He has been working on intelligence in the public-private realm during the last 10 years, including for the Spanish agency ICEX on economic intelligence, also coordinating some European projects.

Copyright © 2019. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Raquel Barras, PhD. During the last 10 years, she has worked as an advisor at the Office at the Spanish Prime Minister in different positions, as well as at the Spanish National Parliament. Currently, she is also lecturer in International Relations at Complutense University of Madrid, focusing in Maghreb, Sahel and organized crime and terrorism. She has completed different postgraduate courses at Georgetown University, Harvard University, and IESE Business School. Julia Pulido, PhD, is Professor of International Relations and Security at the European University of Madrid, coordinating this Bachelor Degree. She is Professor of International Relations and Security at the European University of Madrid, and Director, Research group “Public policies, international security, and global governance” at Universidad Europea de Madrid. She is currently member, Salamanca University Observatory on Transnational Organized Crime and, and also member at Elcano Royal Institute Working Group on Illicit Traffic and Criminal Networks. Likewise, she was professor in the Master of Strategic Intelligence and Prospective at Colombian Army Intelligence and Counterintelligence College, as well as, trained tasks for the Colombian Army in Analysis and Methodology of Intelligence. Carolina Sampó, PhD. She is Researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Argentina. She also teaches at Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI), Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) and Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). She studied at the Center for Hemispheric Studies for Defense, National Defense University, Washington DC. She is an expert on Transnational Organized crime and conflicts. Her last book is La transformación de las Fuerzas Armadas en América Latina ante el crimen organizado. Real Instituto Elcano-Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército de Perú. February 2019. Madrid Soledad Segoviano, PhD. Associate Professor of International Relations at Universidad Complutense in Madrid. Fulbright fellow and MA in International Relations for the Columbia University. Diploma in Advanced Studies The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington

About the Authors

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of Defence by the Center for Studies of National Defence (CESEDEN), Ministry of Defence, Spain. She is currently focused on energy security and intelligence/covert action studies.

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Dr. Aurora Ganz holds a PhD from the War Studies Department of King’s College London and lectures international relations at UCL Department of Political Science. Aurora is a critical scholar who works on the proactive, constant and diffuse involvement of security logics and practices in the everyday. Her work as a researcher in think tanks and international organizations has focused on the criminalisation and securitisation of migration in the US, Europe and the Sahel. She is currently working on a new project, exploring the forms of resistance and protest that emerge as a reaction to the securitisation of migration.

The Greater Maghreb : Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Strategy for Europe, edited by Cantalapiedra, David Garcia, Lexington