The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice [3 ed.] 9781138043145, 9780367370138, 9781315173290

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The Global Public Relations Handbook

In this third edition, The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice offers state-of-the-art discussions of the global public relations industry, blending research-based theory with practice, and presented in essays from both academics and practitioners. This edition’s 28 essays in three sections take into account changes in the global communication landscape especially in the last ten years. The first section contains essays that provide conceptual linkages between public relations and international political systems, economic systems and levels of development, societal culture, different media systems including digital media, and activism. Essays in the second section discuss the communication of various global actors such as corporations (including family-owned enterprises), non-profits, governments (and public sector enterprises), global public relations agencies, IGOs such as the European Union and NATO and “informal” organizations such as hactivist groups, terrorists, and failed states. The third section discusses key global communication issues such as climate change, character assassination as a communication tool, internal communication, risk and crisis communication, public affairs, and public diplomacy. This will be an essential resource for students and researchers of public relations, strategic communication, and international communication. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, PhD, is Professor of Public Relations and Director of the Professional Masters in Corporate Communication program at the College of Media, Communication, and Information, University of Colorado, Boulder. His award winning teaching and research experience spans five continents covering topics such as culture and public relations, globalization and public relations, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Public Relations for Development. Dejan Verčič, PhD, is Professor, Head of Department of Communication and Head of the Centre for Marketing and Public Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and Partner and Knowledge Director in the strategic communication company Stratkom d.o.o., Slovenia. His research focuses on digitalization, globalization, and strategic communication.

The Global Public Relations Handbook Theory, Research, and Practice

Third Edition

Edited by ˇic ˇ Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verc

Third edition published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of the Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with Sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Routledge 2003 Sixth edition published by Routledge 2009 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-04314-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-37013-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-17329-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK

Krishnamurthy Sriramesh dedicates this volume to his parents and to the students and colleagues from whom he has learnt so much over the years

Contents

Foreword Richard Edelman, CEO Edelman Preface Margery Kraus, Founder and Executive Chairman, APCO Worldwide

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Acknowledgments

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Introduction Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

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Contributor Biographies

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Conceptual Foundations of Global Public Relations

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1 Comparative Political Systems and Public Relations: An Overview Laura D. Young and James A. McCann

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2 The Intersection of Political and Economic Systems in Global Public Relations Practice Sandra Duhé, Jolene Fisher, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

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3 Culture: The “Silent” Language is also the “Neglected” Language Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

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4 The Media, International, Transnational and Global Public Relations Dejan Verčič and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

5 The Nexus between Activism and Public Relations

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Ganga S. Dhanesh and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

II Current Key Global Players

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6 Leading an Ethical Industry: Local and Global Professional Public Relations Associations Margalit Toledano and David McKie

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7 The Development and Challenges of Global Public Relations Agencies Donald K. Wright

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8 State Capture and the Demise of Bell Pottinger: Misusing Public Relations to Shape Future Kakistocracies? Ronel Rensburg

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9 Exploring the Complexity of Global Strategic Communication Practice in Government: The Case of the Canadian Federal Government Fraser Likely

10 Global Public Sector and Political Communication

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Vilma Luoma-aho, María-José Canel, and Karen Sanders

11 The European Union and Its Public Relations: Context, Actions, and Challenges of a Supranational Polity Chiara Valentini

12 NATO and Its Communication in the 21st Century

120 131

Barbora Maronkova

13 A New Public Relations for Corporations in the World of Hyper-Globalization Takashi Inoue

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14 Powerful Families, Powerful Influences: Family-owned Enterprises and Public Relations in Asia Ganga S. Dhanesh and Flora Hung-Baesecke

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15 The Global Public Relations Strategies of the “Hacktivist” Group Anonymous Kara Alaimo

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CONTENTS

16 Terrorism and Global Public Relations

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Jesper Falkheimer

17 The Global Public Relations of Failed States

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Greg Simons

III Current Issues Relevant to Global Public Relations

18 Internal Communication with a Global Perspective

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Ana Tkalac Verčič

19 Global Interdependence and Risks: Management and Communication Robert L. Heath

20 Global Crisis Communication

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W. Timothy Coombs and An-Sofie Claeys

21 The Management and Practice of Public Affairs in a Global Context Craig S. Fleisher

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22 Linking Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Creating a New Cadre of Public and Corporate Diplomats Roger Hayes

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23 Public Relations and the Concept of ‘Nations within Nations’: The Case of Bullfighting in Multicultural Spain Jordi Xifra and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

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24 Climate Change Imperatives for Global Public Relations: Who Pays and Who Cares? Judy Motion

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25 Character Assassination and Reputation Management in the Context of Mediated Complexity Sergei A. Samoilenko

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26 Crowdfunding: From Global Financial Crisis to Global Financial Communication Mai Anh Doan and David McKie

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27 Public Relations, Political Communication and Agenda Setting: The Rise of the Micro-Propaganda Machine Thomas Stoeckle and Jonathan Albright

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28 The Role of Public Relations in the Global Battle for Hearts and Minds: From (Liberal) “Democracy Promotion” to the Promotion of “Illiberal Democracy” 309 Ryszard Ławniczak Index

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Foreword

The past two decades have seen a progressive destruction of trust in the institutions of business, government, and media, a consequence of the Great Recession, fears about immigration, the threat to jobs posed by globalization and automation, and the plague of fake news. The result is three trends – disinformation, disruption, and distrust – that now pose serious challenges to our world. Edelman Trust Barometer research shows that people have redirected their trust to more local sources, with “My Employer” emerging as the most trusted institution. People now expect the businesses they work for to take action on pressing societal issues and their CEOs to stand up and speak out. Consumers tell us that they will buy or boycott a brand based on its stand on the issues they care about. This is a time for the PR industry to lead. We must recognize that our new role is not agent, but principal; not advocate, but educator. We must help business address, in word and deed, issues such as automation, climate change, and inequality. We must help build a well-informed populace so that, in this era of rapid change, people can make better decisions for their lives and make their voices heard. At a time when we need reliable information the most, mainstream media is being disrupted. Financial pressures have cut the number of local reporters in half in the United States in recent years. Our research has shown that trust in social media is low, and people also have deep concern about false information being used as a weapon. In this weakened media climate, we must Go Direct to the end-user with highquality information. Every organization, public and private, should have a news operation that speaks to stakeholders through its owned and social channels, and through its leaders and employees. The aim is to supplement mainstream journalism, which should still be the primary means of objective fact-gathering and dissemination. We must be ready to fight for the truth and pledge ourselves to a high ethical standard. As my father, Dan Edelman, our founder, said in a speech a decade ago, “All of us in PR must bring to the office the sense of morality and live by it every day.” We must be the bridge to diverse stakeholders. We must move businesses from operating only in their self-interest to acting in the larger interests of society. xi

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The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice is premium fuel for our new mission. The expert insights offered in these pages will inform, illuminate, and inspire you to roll up your sleeves and get to work. Consider this book an indispensable guide to helping build a more secure, more knowledgeable, and more trusting world. GO DIRECT Richard Edelman President and CEO Edelman, New York

Preface

Over the past few decades, we’ve seen the field of public relations emerge as an academic discipline that is foundational to society. This change is due to the dedication, scholarship, and practical approach of professors such as Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič. Together, they’ve equipped practitioners and students with tangible lessons that demonstrate the true complex and multicultural environment in which we work. The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research and Practice lives its name. These essays focus on the impact of the elements affecting our industry such as political and economic systems, societal, and organizational cultures, and media. For the first time, this edition offers insight on, and from, a full range of global PR players, including associations, agencies, governments, and non-formal activist organizations, giving us the tools to navigate this multi-faceted environment in which we operate. Each chapter is a stand-out highlight of the diversity that makes us our strongest, from case studies around the worlds to the essay authors with a vast array of experiences. No matter where we are, practitioners of our industry must understand the current and ever-changing issues that cut across all sectors, especially global risk and crisis. We can’t face these challenges without an ability to work together and see from multiple points of view. By including deeper dives into the impact of communications outside of the typical business scope, such as the hacktivist group “anonymous,” this edition reminds each of us that our industry must not operate in a bubble, or be solely reactive. To reach our full potential, and to do this profession justice, we need to be out in front of the key issues on the table, and that’s just what The Global Public Relations Handbook succeeds so well in doing My dream has always been to have a place where clients come when they can’t afford to fail. That takes people who are not just passionate but also determined to always do the best for their clients, seeing creative solutions, and bringing new ideas by taking advantage of every angle possible. Thanks to Sriramesh and Dejan, we’re

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arming both our current and future practitioners to be the trailblazers of innovative communication that unites our world. Margery Kraus Founder and Executive Chairman APCO Worldwide, Washington, D.C.

Acknowledgments

A book of this magnitude would not have been possible without the varied help we have received from various sources. Family comes first. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh would like to thank his family and particularly his mother who has been very patient with him while he continued to neglect her to work on this, and many other, projects. Dejan Verčič would like to thank his wife Ana, daughter Marta, and son Matija for making his life perfect. Next, both of us would like to thank the many students and colleagues we have had the pleasure of collaborating with, and learning from, over the past close to three decades! Third, we would like to thank the contributors to this edition as well as the previous two editions. They have brought varied perspectives and experiences – both as scholars and practitioners – enriching the three volumes. We would like to thank Richard Edelman for writing the Foreword and Margery Kraus for writing the Preface to this book helping underscore the need for academics and practitioners to collaborate. We sadly remember four contributors who are no longer physically with us. Ronel Rensburg who had contributed to all three editions passed away after finishing Chapter 8 of this edition. We lost Chris Skinner, who had been a steadfast advocate for this series, a couple of years ago. Stefan Wehmeier, coauthor of the chapter on Germany in the first two editions passed away last year. Adela Rogojinaru, a contributor to the second edition, passed away in 2014. They shall be remembered not just for their chapter contributions but also for the camaraderie and sense of community they shared with all of us. We hope they are smiling at the release of this edition. We would also like to thank our research collaborators from various parts of the world who have engaged with us on various research projects helping enrich our own knowledge while also expanding the body of knowledge. Finally, we would like thank Routledge (Taylor and Francis) for being patient with us and publishing this volume. In particular, we would like to recognize Felisa Salvago-Keyes for helping bring this book to fruition. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh Dejan Verčič xv

Introduction Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

When the first edition of this book was conceptualized at the turn of the millennium, much of the world was enthusiastically celebrating this era of globalization that had begun in the 1990s. In my introduction to the first edition, I had stated that globalization had contributed to increasing the importance of public relations and it was essential for our field to take up the challenge of building relationships across cultures by broadening its horizons both conceptually and in practice – the primary impetus for The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice. Further, I had noted that two principal drivers had contributed to the current era of globalization: the onset of information and communication technologies (ICTs also popularly referred to as “new” technology) and the formation of trading blocs such as NAFTA (signed in 1992), the European Union (EU) (via the Maastricht treaty in 1992), the World Trade Organization (created in 1995) that replaced GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation established in 1989) as an extension of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations). As for technology, when the first edition was being written, Windows Messenger (an integrated version of MSN Messenger) had just been released. The year 2003, when first edition was published, also saw the onset of the earliest social networking and the launch of Myspace, Skype, and LinkedIn. At the turn of the millennium, it was mostly the developed West that was celebrating and was most enthusiastic about the prospects of globalization eying “new and emerging markets” principally in Asia and Latin America. As for trading blocks, when the first edition was under production, China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), after lengthy negotiations, in December 2001. Within a few years of the dawn of the new millennium, globalization had brought significant changes to the “world order” (at least in economics and trade) as eloquently described by Thomas Friedman in his 2005 book The World is Flat. Four years later, coinciding with the publication of the second edition of The Global Public Relations Handbook, the world saw the formation of BRIC by the four leading emerging markets – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – with South Africa joining the group in 2010 to form BRICS.

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As the third edition goes to print, we encounter a world that has changed significantly in multiple ways vis-à-vis globalization. The anti-globalization movement that arguably began with protests at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999 was initially limited to developing nations, trade unions, farm workers, student groups, etc. Those voices were either stifled or ignored. Opposition to globalization is now evident not just from the developing world but also from developed nations. The US elected a president who campaigned on a nationalist agenda decrying free trade and immigration. He has tried his best to upend free trade by imposing tariffs and trying to renegotiate trade deals such as NAFTA. In Europe, after bringing down two Prime Ministers, Brexit is a distinct possibility even if no one seems to know in June 2019 how it may be operationalized by whoever becomes the next Prime Minister of the UK. In continental Europe, the May 2019 EU elections saw a surge by parties that campaigned on nationalism even if their “wave” was not as big as some had predicted. Three of the BRICS countries – India, Russia, and China – have formed an alliance to counter the tariffs imposed by the US and plan on inviting other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to join them at the June, 2019 meeting of the group in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, it is now China that is leading the charge calling for free trade and decrying the tariffs imposed by the US! Further, in June 2019, President Trump threatened trade tariffs on Mexico if it did not actively prevent migrants from Central America moving across its land to enter the US and seek asylum. So, the first of the two factors I had discussed in the first edition – free trade and trading blocs – are not as solid now as they seemed then. As for technology, digital media – once hailed as purveyors of democracy – have proven to be anything but as evident in the confirmed interference by Russia in the 2016 US elections. The lack of any journalistic “gatekeeping,” offered by traditional mass media channels, has been shown to have led to the rampant dissemination of “fake news” and disinformation. Further, it is now evident that the big technology corporations have violated the privacy of users repeatedly without their informed consent in their eagerness to monetize the Big Data they amass with each passing second. Most users of this technology do not really understand it and have unwittingly given up privacy for marginal convenience. Citizens cede the power of regulating such corporate activities to their elected representatives in government. But, given the literacy gap vis-à-vis ICTs, government leaders seem to be clueless as was evident when then US Senator Orrin Hatch asked Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg during a Congressional testimony in April 2018 the following question: “So, how do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for your service?” drawing a smirk and the response: “Senator, we run ads.” It should be noted that video clips of the testimony show that the Senator was reading his questions from a script and this was not an off-the-cuff remark. In June 2019, the US Congress and the Justice Department have opened regulatory scrutiny of four tech giants Alphabet (parent of Google), Amazon, Apple, and Facebook. There is even talk of how big and powerful these tech giants have become and whether they should be broken up much like AT&T and the Bell system was in the 1980s. Chinese tech giant Huawei has been accused of espionage and is at the center of the contentious trade negotiations between the US and China. Clearly, the world had not anticipated the divergence of this era of globalization on the two significant fronts of trade and technology. But there are other inter-related forces at play such as distribution of wealth leading to chasms between the haves and have-nots, the absence of the rule of law, terrorism, drugs, and other nefarious activities, etc. that have contributed to mass migration

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into the developing countries of Europe and the US thereby contributing also to nationalism. Public relations scholarship has yet to extend its focus to these important aspects of the global society. These shifts in the functioning and perception of, and reaction to, globalization in the first two decades of the new millennium form the backdrop of this third edition and have been reflected in the contents of the third edition. The most important takeaway from this edition is the recognition that an interplay of various concepts, players, and issues is evident in global public relations. The five variables presented in Part I provide the conceptual foundation on how political ideology forms the foundation for economic development and infrastructure, societal and organizational culture, media systems (including ICTs and social media), and activism, while noting that each of these five variables in turn influences the others. While this conceptual framework remains the same as the first two editions, all these chapters have been rewritten and updated to reflect the changed world as described above. This conceptual foundation in turn influences the players of global public relations (Part II) and the issues (Part III) relevant to global public relations, while players and issues also influence each other. The three major types of organizations – governments, non-profits (including IGOs) and corporations – are typically thought of when we discuss public relations and global public relations even though as I have previously stated, public relations scholarship has focused almost exclusively on corporations to its detriment ignoring the other two organizational types. This edition focuses on various aspects of the activities of these three types of organizations. More importantly, given the brief history of this era of globalization, this edition recognizes that public relations is not being practiced only by these three types of formal organizations an outlook evident in the previous two editions. For example, we have to recognize that terrorist groups have been some of the more effective practitioners of global public relations even if the goals of such communication are reprehensible. Further, a blend of activism (discussed in all three editions of this volume) and new technology (including social media) gives us non-formal activists such as Anonymous, also discussed in this edition. In the introduction to the first edition, I had also discussed “common problems uniting this world” as a third factor that had contributed to cross-cultural communication. We therefore decided to create an entire section on “current issues” to discuss at least some of the key issues that face the world today including terrorism. Climate change, global financial crises, and rogue (failed) states – such as North Korea – are three of the problems that are very critical to the survival of world and world order as we know it and so have been discussed in this volume along with others such as global risk communication, global crisis communication, crowdsourcing (for information and resources), and global public affairs. Our field has not adequately addressed organizational culture and internal communication as highlighted by the chapter on internal communication. Digital technology has also diversified political communication making it much more nuanced as a “micro propaganda machine” and agenda setter as described in the chapter on the topic. Character assassination is an age-old strategy used especially in political communication, but quite neglected by public relations scholarship until recently, as described in the chapter on the topic. As described in all three editions of this book, culture has not been given its due importance by public relations scholars. The notion of strong cultural bonds keeping people of

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a “nation” coalesced while being part of another cultural “nation” is highlighted in the chapter on the ban on bullfighting in Catalonia in Spain. This edition also highlights that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are key to the economies of most countries in the world but are given scant attention by public relations scholarship as are family-owned enterprises – that can be SMEs as well as large corporations. For that reason, this edition includes a chapter on family-owned enterprises that are quite popular in Asia. Corporations are not neglected as evident in the chapter on hyper-globalization and its effects on corporations. The chapters on the Canadian Federal Government and Bell Pottinger’s involvement in global public relations for a “kakistocracy” provide us with two contrasting case studies in the use of transnational public relations in the government sector. Practitioners of public diplomacy – mostly on behalf of governments – use public relations much more than they admit to, as discussed in the chapter on the subject that also blends use of public diplomacy by corporations. This volume also focuses on public sector enterprises and their use of global public relations – another area neglected by mainstream public relations scholarship. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have played a key role globally throughout history but most recently since the formation of the United Nations. They could not have performed their significant activities without the use of global public relations – having been engaged in it even before the onset of this era of globalization. The chapter on the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide us with insights into the complexity of communication in such organizations. Public relations agencies do play a key role in global public relations representing corporations, governments, and non-profits. For that reason, I thank Richard Edelman and Margery Kraus, heading two of the largest public relations agencies in the world, for writing the Foreword and Preface for this book. Part II begins with a discussion of global public relations agencies blended with ethics. In a major departure from the first two editions, this edition does not present country-specific chapters that sought to describe public relations practices of countries in various regions of the world while also trying to link such practice to the five variables described in Part I. Several factors led to the decision not to include countryspecific chapters. First, a review of scholarship emanating from around the world over the past three decades informs the discerning observer that there is a paucity of empirical research linking public relations in a country with all five variables discussed in Part I. We may have a small set of studies that discuss one or the other of the “environmental” variables – principally culture. The other variables have not been empirically studied linked with public relations. The breadth of concepts to be covered prohibits most researchers from attempting to study all the five variables in a single study. As global public relations research has at least a history of two decades, basing country-specific chapters either almost entirely on conceptual discussion or anecdotal evidence was deemed not to be helpful in advancing the field. The solution would be for networks of researchers to form collaborative teams and study countries of a region using the five variables but that would require a lot of coordination that is not evident currently. Second, because of the need to reduce ethnocentricity, we had to obtain country-specific chapters based on current empirical evidence from all continents (on all the five variables described in Part I), which we deemed did not currently exist. Looking to the future, I hope that as global public relations scholarship matures, collaborative research efforts will generate the needed empirical evidence on all five

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variables from different continents that will make including country-specific chapters in the fourth edition a reality! Clearly such information has immense practical value as well to the profession and so it behooves scholars to embark on such studies as another way of bridging the scholarship-practice divide. It is for this reason that we made earnest efforts in this edition to blend authorship of the chapters from both scholars and practitioners. Finally, I hope young scholars of public relations will embark on comprehensive research projects that assess public relations from various dimensions: public relations as a dependent variable affected by the five variables discussed in Part I, public relations as an independent variable that has an impact on those five variables signifying the society-at-large and public relations itself as a culture reflecting how public relations practice is distinct from allied disciplines such as journalism, advertising, marketing, human resource management, etc.

Contributor Biographies

Editors Krishnamurthy Sriramesh is Professor of Public Relations and Director of the Master of Corporate Communication program at the University of Colorado, Boulder. His extensive teaching experience includes teaching public relations at ten universities in Asia, Australasia, Europe, and North America. His teaching has been recognized with several awards including Teacher of the Year at the University of Florida and Charles W. Redding Teaching Award at Purdue University. His research program covers topics such as strategic public relations, global public relations, corporate social responsibility, and public relations for development. He has received a number of research awards including the prestigious Pathfinder Award from the Institute of Public Relations in 2004 “for original scholarly research contributing to the public relations body of knowledge.” He has also received the 2003 PRIDE award from the National Communication Association (NCA) and the Golden Gator Award (for research) at the University of Florida. He was appointed University Faculty Scholar at Purdue University (2012–2017) as well as Faculty Fellow at Purdue Institute for Civic Communication (PICC) and was a Page Legacy Scholar of the Arthur W. Page Society in 2016. He has consulted with non-profits such as International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) based in Nigeria and the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). He was a member of the Independent Advisory Committee for Humidtropics – a three-continent agriculture research project for four years. He has co-edited several books and published over 90 research articles and book chapters in addition to presenting over 100 conference papers, seminars, and presentations in over 30 countries. He had served as the Assistant Editor of Public Relations Review (for over 10 years) and Associate Editor of the Journal of Communication Management (for over 14 years). He is a member of the editorial board of several journals including Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Management Communication Quarterly, Public Relations Review, Journal of Communication Management, and Public Relations Journal. He was on the Editorial Board of the Digital Review of Asia-Pacific

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(DirAP), Journal of Communication, Journal of Public Relations Research, and the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Public Relations. Dejan Verčič is Professor, Head of Department of Communication and Head of the Centre for Marketing and Public Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and Partner and Knowledge Director in the strategic communication company Stratkom d.o.o., Slovenia. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and he was Fulbright Scholar at San Diego State University, USA, Visiting Professor at the University of Lugano (Switzerland) and Visiting Scholar at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice (Italy). He has published 15 books and his most recent are The Global Public Relations Handbook (2003, 2009 and 2019), The Future Directions of Strategic Communication (2019), Experiencing Public Relations (2018), Communication Excellence (2017), and Culture and Public Relations (2012). His articles have been published in American Behavioural Scientist, Corporate Communication, European Journal of Public Health, International Journal of Strategic Communication, Journal of Communication Management, Journal of Marketing Communications, Journal of Public Relations Research, and Public Relations Review among others. Prof. Verčič is former President of the European Public Relations Education and Research Association (EUPRERA) and a recipient of the Pathfinder Award, the highest academic honor bestowed by the Institute for Public Relations (IPR) in New York. In 1991 he was the founding director of the Slovenian national news agency (STA). Since 1994 he has organized an annual International Public Relations Research Symposium – BledCom. His research focuses on digitalization, globalization, and strategic communication. Dr. Verčič is a regular speaker at universities, academic, and professional meetings around the world. So far, he has lectured in 37 countries.

Contributors Kara Alaimo (PhD) is Assistant Professor of Public Relations at Hofstra University, USA, and author of Pitch, Tweet, or Engage on the Street: How to Practice Global Public Relations and Strategic Communication (Routledge, 2017), which explains how to adapt public relations strategies for different countries and cultures. Her research interests include international and political public relations. She previously served as a communicator in the administration of US president Barack Obama and the United Nations. She contributes to CNN Opinion and Bloomberg Opinion and has published in journals including the International Journal of Communication, Journal of Communication Management, Journal of Public Affairs, Social Media & Society, and Case Studies in Strategic Communication. Jonathan Albright (PhD) is a Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of Journalism and Director of the Digital Forensics Initiative at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, USA. He was previously an Assistant Professor of media analytics at Elon University, and a 2017–2018 Faculty Associate at Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. His research focuses on socially mediated news events, misinformation and propaganda, and platform data accountability. Investigating media ecosystems through mixed-methods computational social science and visual data analytics, his work explores the critical interface between emergent social structures and networked media technologies.

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María-José Canel (PhD) is a full Professor in Political Communication and Public Sector Communication, at the University Complutense Madrid, Spain. Winner of the Victory Award in 2016 (Washington DC), she is a leading scholar on public sector communication (journals: Political Communication, European Journal of Communication, International Journal Press/Politics, Public Relations Review), and has published in different countries (Spain, USA, UK, Italy, Poland, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina). She has a public sector practitioner background and experience in training public sector communicators. She has published nine books, and titles include Public Sector Communication, Government Communication, Political Scandals in Britain and in Spain. An-Sofie Claeys (PhD) is Associate Professor in Communication Sciences at the University of Leuven, Belgium. She received the 2015 Young Scholar Award from the Netherlands-Flanders Communication Association. Her research on crisis communication has appeared in journals such as Journal of Communication, Communication Theory, Communication Research, Public Relations Review, and Journal of Public Relations Research. W. Timothy Coombs (PhD) holds the Abell Endowed Professorship in Liberal Arts in the Department of Communication at Texas A&M University, USA. His primary area of research is crisis communication and he is the creator of Situational Crisis Communication Theory. He is the current editor for Corporation Communication: An International Journal. His research has appeared in Management Communication Quarterly, Public Relations Review, Corporate Reputation Review, Journal of Public Relations Research, Journal of Communication Management, Business Horizons, and the Journal of Business Communication. Dr Coombs has lectured and consulted on crisis communication in China, South Korea, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Indonesia, Belgium, and the UK. Dr Coombs has worked with a variety of consultancies, corporations, and governments. He is currently on the FDA’s Risk Communication Advisory Committee. Ganga S. Dhanesh (PhD) is Assistant Dean of Research and Graduate Studies, at the College of Communication and Media Sciences, Zayed University, United Arab Emirates. She has had experience in corporate and non-profit organizations prior to joining academia. She has published in the areas of corporate social responsibility, internal relations, crisis communication, social media, and strategic communication in books and journals such as Journal of Public Relations Research, Public Relations Review, Public Relations Inquiry, Management Communication Quarterly, Journal of International Management, and Journal of Communication Management. She currently serves as Associate Editor for Journal of Communication Management and is on the editorial board of Public Relations Journal. Her work on CSR in India won the Bob Heath Top Paper Award at the annual conference of the ICA, 2012 and her paper on CSR in the Journal of Communication Management won the Outstanding Paper Award 2013. Mai Anh Doan (PhD) is an Assistant Professor at the University of the Fraser Valley in British Columbia, Canada. Her research interests include public relations, financial communication, the democratization of finance, equality, as well as intercultural studies and international education. Mai Anh started her career as a journalist and worked as Public Relations Manager for multi-nationals. After gathering practitioner experience, she moved to university teaching for RMIT in Vietnam and leading corporate training with an emphasis on communication and public relations. She got her Masters of Arts in Communication Management from the University of Technology, Sydney and her PhD from the University of Waikato, New Zealand, where she also

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taught. Mai Anh has published book chapters and encyclopedia entries, as well as articles in Public Relations Review and other communication journals. Sandra Duhé (PhD, MBA) is Associate Professor, Director of Public Relations and Strategic Communication, and Chair of the Division of Corporate Communication and Public Affairs at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, USA. She brings to the academy extensive experience as a public affairs manager for three international energy companies in financial communication, media relations, crisis and risk communication, brand management, and community outreach. Her research and commentary focus on how political, social, and economic factors influence the relationship-building process between organizations and their publics and have been published in leading journals, texts, and online venues. She is the editor of three editions of New Media and Public Relations (Peter Lang), the author of a forthcoming business text for communicators (Routledge), Educator Vice Chair for the Commission on Public Relations Education, and a member of the PRSA College of Fellows and the Arthur W. Page Society. Jesper Falkheimer (PhD) is Professor in the Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University, Sweden. His research interests are strategic communication in general, and more specific, crisis communication, terrorism, communication management and place branding. For several years he has combined research with university management positions and is currently Executive Director for the Division for Research, Collaboration, and Innovation at Lund University, after six years as Rector for Campus Helsingborg. He is Editor-in-Chief for Journal of Communication Management and Honorary Professor at Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He is also an executive board member of several boards, including one of the major communication agencies in Sweden. He is co-editor (main editors Robert Heath and Winni Johanssen) for the International Encyclopedia of Strategic Communication (2018, Wiley) and published the text-book Strategic Communication: An Introduction with Mats Heide in 2018 (Routedge). Jolene Fisher (PhD) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Advertising, Public Relations and Media Design at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. Through rigorous qualitative methods and development of critical theory, Fisher’s research explores the intersections of new media, gender, and strategic communication for development and social change. Her current work investigates the production and use of digital games as social change tools; the use of organizational transparency for relationship building; and the use of strategic communication pedagogy to build communities of action on university campuses. Fisher received her doctorate from the University of Oregon. Craig S. Fleisher (PhD) is the Chief Learning Officer at Aurora WDC, a professional services firm in Madison, Wisconsin. An IABC life member and former President of international and national professional associations, he has held academic positions as Dean, MBA Director, Endowed University Research Chair and/or Full Professor at the Universities of Windsor, Calgary, Coastal Georgia, Sydney, Tampere, Wilfrid Laurier, and New Brunswick. Author/editor of 14 books including the Handbook of Public Affairs (2005), Assessing, Managing and Maximizing Public Affairs Performance (1997), SAGE Handbook of International Corporate and Public Affairs (2017) and 160+ scholarly articles, he is Associate Editor of the Journal of Public Affairs (Wiley) and served/-es on the Editorial Boards of the Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, Business & Society, Interest Groups & Advocacy, and South African Journal

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of Information Management, among others. His doctorate is from the University of Pittsburgh. Roger Hayes (DBA, ME/IPRA, FCIPR) is a leading international public relations professional with 40 years of experience in trade associations, corporations, consultancies, and governments. He is considered one of the forerunners of the international corporate affairs role, including at Ford and Thorn-EMI. He worked for Burson- Marsteller during the early days of international expansion of the field. He began his career as a Reuters Correspondent in Paris. Having served in various roles at APCOWORLDWIDE in London, Johannesburg, and Delhi for 13 years, Roger is now based part-time in London, also teaching public and corporate diplomacy for one semester as Associate Professor at LKY School of Public Policy, NUS, Singapore. He is also an adviser to the MARPE group of European Universities developing public, corporate, and civic diplomacy courses under an ERASMUS programme. He has published Reframing the Leadership Landscape: Creating a Culture of Collaboration (with Dr. Reginald Watts) by Routledge in 2015. Robert L. Heath (PhD) is Professor Emeritus at the University of Houston, USA. He is the author or editor of 23 books, including handbooks and master collections, and 266 articles in major journals, chapters in leading edited books, and encyclopedia entries. In addition to strategic issues management, he has written on rhetorical theory, social movements, communication theory, public relations, organizational communication, crisis communication, risk communication, terrorism, corporate social responsibility, investor relations, engagement, public interest, and reputation management. His most recent books are the International Encyclopedia of Strategic Communication and the Handbook of Organizational Rhetoric and Communication. Flora Hung-Baesecke (PhD) teaches at Massey University (Albany) in New Zealand. She is the Vice Chair and will be the Chair (2019–2021) of the Public Relations Division in International Communication Association. Flora is on the editorial boards of Journal of Public Relations Research, Public Relations Review (from May, 2019), International Journal of Strategic Communication, Communication Research Reports, and Public Relations Journal. She has won several awards at international conferences. Her research interests include organization-public relationships, CSR, social media, strategic management, and crisis management. Flora is the 2015–2017 Arthur W. Page Legacy Scholar awarded by the Arthur W. Page Center at Penn State University. She is a member of the Arthur W. Page Society, the Secretary General for Overseas Affairs in Public Relations Society of China, a member of the Academic Committee in China International Public Relations Association, and is on the advisory board of International Public Relations Research Conference. Takashi Inoue (PhD) is the Chief Executive Officer of Inoue Public Relations, founded 1970 in Tokyo, and Visiting Professor at Kyoto University’s Graduate School of Management, and the Communications University of China. One of the first public relations professionals in Japan to focus on high-technology, he helped Intel and Apple in the PC Market, and then others in the telecommunications, financial, automotive, pharmaceutical, and aerospace sectors. In the 1980s he was active in United StatesJapan trade-related issues, notably helping avert possible crisis situations in the telecommunications, semiconductor, and automotive industries. In 1997 his company became the first Asian firm to win the International Public Relations Association’s top award, the Golden World Award for Excellence in Public Relations, and in 2015 they won the

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Golden World Award for their work helping the company Concur change Japanese regulations for an innovative new product. He is the author of Public Relations in Hyper-globalization: Essential Relationship Management – A Japan Perspective. Ryszard Ławniczak (PhD) is full Professor at Warsaw University of Technology, and until the end of 2012 the Head of the Department of Economic Journalism and Public Relations. University of Economics, Poznan, Poland. He was Visiting Professor at the University of Melbourne (1991) and California State University, Fresno (1984, 1991). He also served as the economic advisor to the president of the Republic of Poland (1997–2005), and as a consultant to the Polish premier (1994–1997). In 2003 he was awarded the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit by H.M. King Harald V of Norway. He coined the concept of transitional public relations and promotes the econo-centric approach in public relations. He published the first two Polish public relations books in English. In 2007 Ławniczak was mentioned among the 50 leading academic experts in the field of communication in Europe. He has lectured or presented papers in research centers and policy institutes of over 20 different countries. Fraser Likely (MA) is an APR, Fellow and Life Member of the Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS), as well as a Fellow of the Association of Measurement and Evaluation of Communication (AMEC) and Emeritus Member of the Institute for Public Relations Measurement and Evaluation Commission (IPR M&E). Fraser is an Adjunct Professor in the University of Ottawa’s Communication Faculty. His research publications include topics related to measurement and evaluation frameworks and maturity models as well as the history and state of public relations in Canada. He received the Public Relations Society of America’s Jackson, Jackson and Wagner Behavioral Science Prize in 2018 for his research. He is President of Fraser Likely PR/Communication Performance, providing coaching and counsel to Chief Communication Officers (CCOs) on their department’s performance, value, and strategic contribution to their organization’s strategic management processes. Vilma Luoma-aho (PhD) is full Professor of Corporate Communication, and Vice Dean of Research at University of Jyväskylä, School of Business and Economics, Finland. She currently leads major research projects related to young people and social media as well as strategic communication in the public sector. She has published widely in interdisciplinary journals ranging from Business History to Computers in Human Behaviour, and her latest co-authored book, Public Sector Communication – Closing Gaps between Citizens and Public Organizations (2019) deals with measuring intangible assets in the public sector, and she is currently in the process of editing the Handbook of Public Sector Communication (2020). She has a public sector practitioner background, and has helped develop public sector communication in Finland, Spain, and the European Commission. Barbora Maronkova is Director of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine. She joined NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in Brussels, Belgium in 2006 as program coordinator to oversee projects aimed at raising awareness and promote NATO in a number of NATO member states. In September 2010, she became the program manager responsible for designing, planning, and implementing public diplomacy campaigns in the Western Balkans. In 2016, she joined the NATO Press and Media Section as a planning coordinator and Acting Head of the section. On March 1, 2017, she took over as the head of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine. In 2003, she established and headed a Slovak based NGO Centre for

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European and North Atlantic Affairs to contribute to public and academic debate on Slovakia’s membership of the EU and NATO. A graduate of the University of Economics of Bratislava, Slovak Republic, Barbora is an alumna of the CPD Summer Institute and holds a Public Affairs diploma from the Chartered Institute for Public Relations in the UK. She was a non-resident Research Fellow with the USC Center on Public Diplomacy from 2015 to 2017. James A. McCann (PhD) is a Professor of Political Science at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, USA. He conducts research on public opinion, electoral processes, participation, and representation in the United States and cross-nationally. His work has appeared in many scholarly journals, including the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and the British Journal of Political Science. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. David McKie (PhD) teaches Strategic Communication and Leadership and has authored/co-authored six books, over 40 book chapters, 60 refereed journal articles, and countless conference papers on: Action learning and research; change and leadership; complexity theory, creativity and innovation, emotional intelligence, futures; interdisciplinarity, strategic communication, and threshold concepts. For Corporate and Executive Education at Waikato Management School, he teaches the MBA Leadership paper and provides corporate training. He is passionate about delivering education with outcomes and has supervised over 15 PhDs to successful completion and been a PhD external supervisor for universities from Australasia to Europe and the UK. He is also CEO of RAM (Results by Action Management) International Consulting and has experience working as a change, leadership, and strategic communication consultant in the private and public sectors internationally. Judy Motion (PhD) is Professor of Communication in the Environmental Humanities group at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Judy’s most recent research focuses on public discourse, sense making, and change in relation to environmental issues and controversies. Past research has included discourse and identity in organizational change, power and resistance in the implementation of new technologies and the influence of public relations on policy formation. Her latest book, Social Media and Public Relations: Fake Friends and Powerful Public, co-authored with Robert L. Heath and Shirley Leitch, was awarded the Outstanding Book Award in 2016 by the National Communication Association, USA. Judy’s research has been published in a wide range of journals including Public Relations Review, Public Understanding of Science, Political Communication, Discourse Studies, Organization Studies, Media, Culture and Society, Higher Education Research and Development, Management Communication Quarterly, Journal of Business Research, and the European Journal of Marketing. Ronel Rensburg (PhD) was Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, with a demonstrated history of working in the higher education industry. She was skilled in Corporate Communication and Reputation Management, Intercultural Communication, Public Speaking, Research Design, Lecturing, and Higher Education Leadership. This strong education professional graduated from University of South Africa (Unisa). She was a fellow of PRISA and one of the highest NRF-rated researchers in Communication Management/Public Relations in South Africa. Her latest research focused on communication and reputation management during disruption, corruption, and state capture.

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Sergei A. Samoilenko is an instructor in the Department of Communication at George Mason University. Sergei’s research focuses on issues in crisis communication, reputation management, and post-Soviet studies. Samoilenko is a founding member of CARP, the Research Lab for Character Assassination and Reputation Politics. He is the co-editor of Routledge Handbook of Character Assassination and Reputation Management and Deception, Fake News, and Misinformation Online. Karen Sanders (PhD) is full Professor of Politics and Communication and Dean of Research for St Mary’s University, UK. She is co-editor of the Routledge Companion to Journalism Ethics (forthcoming 2020) and member of an international group of scholars researching populist communication. Karen has a special interest in understanding and fostering respectful, effective communication in high-risk organizations and has run training courses on these subjects for hospitals, charities, banks, and universities. She has published widely in interdisciplinary journals including the European Journal of Communication, the Public Relations Review, and the International Journal of Press and Politics. She has authored key texts such as Ethics and Journalism (Sage) and Communicating Politics in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmilllan). Greg Simons (PhD) is currently a Researcher at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University, Leading Researcher in Media and Communication at the Business Technology Institute at Turiba University and a Lecturer at the Department of Communication Science at Turiba University in Riga, Latvia. He is on the Senior Editorial Board of the Journal for Political Marketing. His research interests include: changing political dynamics and relationships, mass media, public diplomacy, political marketing, crisis management communications, media and armed conflict, and the Russian Orthodox Church. He also researches the relationships and connections between information, politics, and armed conflict more broadly, such as the GWOT and Arab Spring. Simons is the author/editor of numerous refereed articles, chapters, and books. Thomas Stoeckle is a doctoral candidate at Bournemouth University’s Faculty of Media and Communication. Originally from Germany, he has lived and worked in the UK since 2000, pursuing a career in media intelligence, most recently at Lexis Nexis. His doctoral research seeks to compare the British and German media systems and public spheres with regard to European themes over the last 30 years. As a lecturer, he teaches PR & ethics, communication measurement and planning, communication psychology, and the history of PR and communication at various universities. He is the founder and co-host of a podcast on data, marketing and communication, TheSmallDataForum (www.smalldataforum.com). Ana Tkalac Verčič (PhD) is a full Professor of Marketing Communications and Public Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, Croatia. She is a former Fulbright scholar and a recipient of the Chartered Institute of Public Relations diploma. Ana Tkalac Verčič has authored, co-authored and edited numerous books including Public Relations Metrics: Research and Evaluation (with B. van Ruler and D. Verčič) and is the author of the first Croatian public relations textbook. She has published more than a 100 papers in various academic journals and serves in various editorial boards such as International Journal of Strategic Communication, Journal of Public Relations Research and Public Relations Review. Throughout her career, Professor Tkalac Verčič has received numerous awards, most recently, GrandPRx, the award for the development of

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public relations as a profession. She is currently the president of the Croatian Public Relations Association. Margalit Toledano (PhD, APR, Fellow PRSA, PRINZ) lectures in Management Communication and Public Relations at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. Inducted into the College of Fellows of the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) in 2007 and into the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) in 2012, she practiced PR for over 20 years and served as President of the Israeli Public Relations Association 1993–1996. Her academic work has appeared in leading PR journals, and Routledge published both her co-authored book, Public Relations and Nation Building: Influencing Israel (2013) and her co-edited book, International Public Relations: Perspectives from Deeply Divided Societies (2017) that won the 2017 National Communication Association’s PRIDE Book Award. Dr. Toledano’s research focuses on issues of professional ethics, dialogue and dialogue facilitation, public relations history, the impact of social media on professional communicators, social marketing as well as topics related to legal communication. Chiara Valentini (PhD) is Professor of Corporate Communication at Jyväskylä University School of Business and Economics (JSBE), Finland. Prior to join JSBE she worked as Associate Professor of Corporate Communication at Aarhus University, Denmark, for almost ten years, and has consulted organizations and public institutions of several countries, including the Italian Representation of the European Commission in Rome, Italy, and the European Movement International Secretariat in Brussels, Belgium. Her research interest focuses on strategic public relations, public and government communication, and crisis communication in the digital environment. Her work has appeared in several international peer-reviewed journals, such as Public Relations Review, Corporate Communication: An International Journal, International Journal of Strategic Communication, International Journal of Press/Politics to name a few. She is the editor of the Handbook of Public Relations (de Gruyter Mouton, forthcoming) and currently working on a project on new technologies and strategic communication. Donald K. Wright (PhD) is the Harold Burson Professor and Chair in Public Relations at Boston University’s College of Communication. He is one of the world’s most published public relations scholars and is an internationally known professor, author, speaker, researcher, strategist, and advisor. Professor Wright has worked full-time in corporate, agency, and university public relations. He has served 28 years on the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Public Relations, spent 24 years as a Trustee of the Arthur W. Page Society, and is a past president of the International Public Relations Association. His awards include the Distinguished Service Award from the Page Society and the Pathfinder Award for research excellence from IPR. His PhD degree is from the University of Minnesota. Professor Wright is a Research Fellow of IPR, an accredited member of PRSA, a PRSA Fellow, an IPRA Fellow, and an IPRA Member Emeritus. Jordi Xifra (PhD) is Professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Barcelona, in which he teaches History of Propaganda and Public Relations, and Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. He is the director of MSc Strategic Communication and Public Relations (joint degree UPF-University of Stirling). His research focuses on the intellectual history of public relations history and the intersection between public relations and film studies. He has published more than 15 books on public relations and public affairs in Spain and South America, some chapters in international books, and his articles have been accepted for publication in Public Relations Review, Journal of

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Public Relations Research, and American Behavioral Scientist, between others. He founded Public Relations Inquiry and he is the current director of Centro Buñuel Calanda, the public foundation that works to preserve and promote the figure and work of Spanish filmmaker Luis Buñuel. Laura D. Young (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia Gwinnett College, Georgia, USA. She specializes in security studies with an emphasis on the impact crises, especially those related to the environment, have on domestic and international society. She has published on a variety of topics, including a forthcoming book on the role the environment played in the formation of states in the pre-modern era.

PART

I Conceptual Foundations of Global Public Relations

CHAPTER

1 Comparative Political Systems and Public Relations An Overview By Laura D. Young James A. McCann

INTRODUCTION The government’s ability to communicate with the public and also control the information the public receives is necessary to influence public opinion and, thus, the policy agenda. Regardless of whether a country is democratic or authoritarian, leaders in all regime types find ways to control the flow of information. The level of control, however, is dependent upon the structure of the government, and, specifically, the amount of open versus closed access points that exist within a system. How firms and organizations communicate is also dependent on the environment in which they function. Globalization has made this task even more challenging as public relations practitioners are no longer confined to communicating with domestic audiences only. As discussed in Part I of this volume, because a nation’s political system, among other variables, influences the practice of public relations, it is necessary to understand these differences in order to adopt effective communication strategies, whether in the private, corporate, nonprofit, or governmental sector. Democracies and authoritarian regimes differ when it comes to the flow of information. Democracies, while still maintaining some control over communications, are much more open than authoritarian regimes. Different factors, though, determine at what level democracies as well as authoritarian regimes will engage in open access to information. New democracies, especially those whose histories are tied to regimes whose transparency was noticeably low, will struggle to engage in open communication practices while mature democracies have the ability to control the flow of 3

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information to protect the government’s interests in much the same way as authoritarian regimes. Cultural differences also matter, including, but not limited to, the level of civil liberties, the amount of legal constraints, the collective identity of individuals, and even the political landscape. These differences shape the way communication flows within society, presenting different challenges for public relations practitioners. This chapter attempts to draw comparisons between different regime types and explains the challenges faced by public relations in each. This chapter is intended to serve as a guide for a reader familiar with public relations literature but new to the field of comparative political systems. The chapter, therefore, begins with a broad overview in the differences between democracies and authoritarian regimes before turning a more specific focus on variations among democracies. The final section of the chapter discusses some of the advancements in the literature on comparative politics and public relations before concluding with thoughts on how practitioners of public relations can utilize the lessons of comparativists when it comes to conducting more effective communication in all societies. DEMOCRACIES VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Political regimes are defined as “the norms and rules regarding individual freedoms and collective equality, the locus of power, and the use of that power” within society (O’Neil, Fields, & Share, 2006, p. 5). Political regimes differ with regard to the level of freedom, equality, and the distribution of power. Democracies have higher levels of individual freedom with less centralized loci of power than autocracies. Autocracies, on the other hand, care less about the overall public good compared to democracies, placing more emphasis on maintaining control of power. These differences create very different policy outcomes and, as a result, marked differences with regard to the overall way in which society, the economy, and the policymaking process function. The flow of communication within democracies and autocracies also differs. Regimes vary with regard to the open and closed access points available for private citizens and public organizations to access information. These differences are not coincidental, but are necessary for each type of government to maintain legitimacy and control over society. Democracies enjoy freer access to information with much less government control than authoritarian regimes. In fact, information transparency is important for facilitating trust in democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan, 1997; Rockman, 1997), while the control of information is vital to authoritarian governments (Taubman, 2007; see also Byman, 2010). Democracies get their authority, and thus legitimacy, from the will of the people, and are therefore more likely to adopt open systems. Open systems allow for more participation by individuals in society and are, consequently, more likely to continually take in new information from those individuals. In short, open systems allow policymakers to hear and respond to signals from the public, “transform that information, and give information back” to the public (Shockley-Zalabak, 1999, p. 43). The more open the system the more likely the government will establish policies that protect the basic rights and freedoms of individuals to access information. This approach allows leaders to anticipate and detect changes that may affect the government’s or an organization’s relationship with citizens. This, what can be seen as, two-way symmetrical communication helps strengthen relationships between organizations and the public sector and leads to better policy and legislation (Eller, 2016).

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Communication is, thus, important and plays a key role in open systems, though it becomes less important in democracies that have less open access points available. Democracies also rely on transparency for increasing legitimacy. Beaumont argues that “achieving a democratic government and increasing citizen confidence in that government” relies, in part, on the openness of the government (Beaumont, 1999, p. 49). Freedom of the press, open court procedures and government hearings, and the participation of citizen organizations and NGOs in the policymaking process are all elements found in democracies which aid in the flow of information, making communication much easier. The more restrictions placed on these elements, the more difficult to engage in public relations at all levels. Closed systems, on the other hand, lack input from citizens and other aspects of society. This makes it more difficult for everyone to benefit from policies because the flow of information is limited. Yet, these same restrictions can benefit some members of society, particularly those vital to upholding the legitimacy of the ruling elite (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005). Because it stymies access to information, closed systems are less appealing in democracies (Walton, D’Andrea, Taylor, Carleton, & Young, n.d.), but preferable in authoritarian regimes which rely little on citizen input and are much more restrictive. These types of regimes benefit from a closed system specifically because it makes it easier to reduce the flow of information, and, thus, transparency in society. This control allows leaders to manipulate public opinion, make communication among all sectors of society more difficult, and, thus, retain their hold on power (Kalathil and Taylor, 2001). China’s control of the media and other types of communications that flow through its borders is so extensive it has been called “unprecedented in recorded world history.” The benefit of this kind of control allows the Chinese government to suppress any kind of collective action, thereby protecting the government from any kind of potential domestic threat to their power (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013, p. 326). China can also suppress any kind of opposition against the government or even control information that may impact aspects of the economy (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005; Zhao, 2008). North Korea also practices almost total suppression of its media, earning it a score of 96 out of 100 on Freedom House’s annual Report on Press Freedom. News outlets are all state-owned and the government has unlimited ability to censor the flow of all communications, including access to foreign news and even the internet, within its borders. Like China, North Korea’s strict control over the flow of information reduces the influence external actors can have on its citizens, the government, organizations, and policies, thereby helping the leader retain his power with little worry of opposition voices rising up against him (Freedom House, DC, 2016).1 Legal constraints impose limitations on the ability of agencies to communicate fully and openly in all types of governments, including democracies. Obviously, legal constraints are greater in autocracies ranging from restrictions on the press to complete government control over all information within its borders. Ethical and legal constraints range within democracies, too, though. These differences can vary in copyright laws, professional codes of conduct, and freedom of information with regard to the press. For example, in the United States 18 USC § 1913 prohibits lobbying by government officials and spending public funds on advertising. This law does not interfere with normal communication activities, though some argue it creates tensions between what is considered public communication vis-à-vis advertising (Liu & Horsley, 2007, p. 379). Regardless, being able to maneuver the different legal hurdles in each country is essential for successful public relations.

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Understanding how and why information is controlled in different regime types is necessary to create effective strategies for engaging in public relations and other forms of communication at all levels of society. The conditions in democracies and autocracies outlined above pose different challenges for public relations depending on regime type. Regardless of whether it is a private corporation or an NGO, organizations have greater access to information and more control over the content of that information in democracies compared to autocracies. Engaging with the public or other organizations in autocracies can be met with roadblocks as these regimes attempt to control the flow of information to the benefit of their own personal agenda. Public relations therefore must find ways to overcome these hurdles in order to achieve success in more restrictive countries. COMPARING VARIATIONS AMONG DEMOCRACIES While obvious differences exist between democracies and autocracies, differences regarding the flow of information are also apparent when comparing democratic regimes. Specifically, the political landscape in democracies is different, with culture and historical events shaping the attitude of governments and citizens. Longevity also matters, with new democracies experiencing issues regarding trust and legitimacy when it comes to information transparency. These differences present unique landscapes within which public relations must learn to operate. First, democracies differ regarding how centralized or decentralized the decisionmaking power is in the country. Decentralized governments distribute power among several units, giving significant authority to local and state governments to establish their own laws. Centralized governments, on the other hand, concentrate power and decision-making in a single unit, with little to no control or input from local governments. Decentralized governments, thus, have more open access points which allows for the freer flow of information between the public and political elites as well as within the government itself. This allows organizations, the public, and the government to gain access to and control the flow of information at various levels. Centralized governments, conversely, have fewer open access points with more restrictions. The flow of information from citizens and organizations to the government’s decision-making body depends on the government’s level of centralization. Since local authorities have the capacity to enact policy change in decentralized systems, the distribution of information takes place at various lower levels of government. This lower level of focus allows citizens and organizations to target a variety of leaders, while gaining access to leaders they otherwise would not have access to in more centralized systems. In centralized systems, though, decision-making power rests overwhelmingly with the central government, taking control away from local authorities. Information must be distributed with a national focus to gain attention from those officials that matter. Centralized systems, thus, increase the burden on communication because the level at which it must reach increases, but also because the tactics that must be used at this higher level must differ from those found in decentralized systems. Thus, if an organization wants to influence the policy outcome of renewable energy in the United States, for example, there are various avenues it can take. While lobbying members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in D.C. is important, because power is decentralized and states have control over their own policy agendas, much more progress has been made at the state level than the federal level with regard to influencing energy policies (Rabe, 2004). This success is due to the open

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access points that exist within decentralized systems which give individuals and organizations the ability to communicate with leaders directly, albeit at a much lower level of authority. Because these leaders still have power to change policy within their state or locality, however, the impact is not inconsequential. In fact, when it comes to progress in energy policy, states took an early lead, surpassing the efforts of the federal government. This success is thanks in large part to the decentralized nature of the political system in the United States which vests states with significant power over policy decisions in this area (Rabe, 2004). Conversely, the more centralized a government is, the fewer there are open access points. This means individuals also have fewer avenues to access the policymaking process. Moreover, because decisions are made at the top, and not at the local level, policy change is more difficult, making the burden of communicating interests much more difficult as well. “Power distance” (Hofstede, 1980) as a variable has been studied by several public relations scholars (see eg. Sriramesh, 1992, 1996) to discuss this difference in the distribution of power within a country. The anti-nuclear movement which took place in the United States and France in the 1970s provides another example. France is a centralized government leaving all decisions with regard to the progress of nuclear energy in the country limited to a few decision makers. The ability to communicate with those leaders by private citizens is limited as a result. Protests were the main tool citizens had to communicate their interests to the government because of the nature of the political landscape. The US, by contrast, has one of the most decentralized governments in the world. When the anti-nuclear movement started in the US, protests were part of the arsenal used to sway public opinion and the policy agenda. Ralph Nader, however, also started an aggressive lobbying campaign which targeted public opinion as well as elected officials at all levels of the government. These tactics were much more effective than the protest-driven tactics employed in France, and, as a result, the US halted construction on new nuclear power plants. France, on the other hand, aggressively pursued nuclear energy making it one of the world’s leading nuclear energy producers (Tourraine, Hegedus, Dubet, & Wieviorka, 1983). The ability of activists in the US to communicate with the general public and officials at various levels within the government produced much more effective results than those activists attempting to sway policymakers in a system like France’s where open access points are much more limited, making communication between the public and the government much more difficult. As the above examples show, understanding how power is distributed in a society is key for understanding to whom and how communication must be targeted (see also Hofstede, 1980, 1991). But, power distance is not the only difference among democracies. There also exists a difference in the level of information transparency between new and more mature democracies. One of the reasons for the lag in transparency in new democracies, especially in places like Eastern Europe, could actually be a result of the lack of transparency in the existing culture of post-communist (authoritarian) societies which Western models of democracy cannot overcome (Linden & Cernock, 2002). Countries affected by authoritarian pasts require strategies that overcome these cultural biases. These strategies must focus on increasing communication in society with specific emphasis placed on generating more public input in the process. As the perception of transparency increases, so, too, does the trust in governments and organizations in society (Oswald, 2010).

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A second reason for the difference in new and mature democracies is due to the capacity of the state. The legal and political structure necessary for promoting communication among organizations is weak in new democracies compared to mature ones. The rule of law and protection of civil liberties, like freedom of the press, for example, can be significantly weaker in emerging verses well-established democracies (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). The lack of institutions to support the flow of information can seriously impact a new democracy’s legitimacy. It is recognized that extending basic freedoms, particularly the role of information, is actually beneficial for increasing the legitimacy of these burgeoning states (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). In addition, without these institutions it can be difficult for communication within society to take place. While in established democracies citizens acquire their political knowledge over a long period of time, usually without making a particular effort to learn about political issues, citizens in new democracies have to cope with a large range of hitherto unknown institutions and procedures. (Voltmer, 2006)

It is necessary, therefore, for public relations to consider the unique challenges faced by new democracies, and help the public navigate the changing landscape in order to strengthen the flow of communication in society. The political landscape found within a democracy also matters. Political differentiation in the media is very evident in Europe, for example, when compared to the US. This difference is attributed to the partisan nature of politics found in the US compared to other European countries, like Italy or Germany. Moreover, Europeans see “the media as a social institution for which the state [has] a positive responsibility” with emphasis on government subsidies to promote pluralism. Europeans also have heavy regulations regarding communications during elections, have banned paid political advertising, and have granted “free air time to political parties instead” (Hallin, 2005, p. 3; see also Cain, Egan, & Fabbrin, 2003). These differences have a significant impact on the influence the media in particular can have on the political landscape since the US has much less control over the media than its European counterparts. In fact, the US interprets the First Amendment to mean limited state involvement in the media. As a result, the US has few laws to prosecute individuals who distribute false or misleading news stories. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) guidelines prevent the “holders of broadcast licenses from broadcasting false information concerning a crime or a catastrophe if the licensee knows the information is false and … knows beforehand broadcasting the information will case substantial ‘public harm’” (FCC, n.d.). 18 USC § 1038 – False Information and Hoaxes applies when homicide or attempted homicide is involved only. This leniency can create issues with regard to unchecked media bias and the distribution of false information, creating a “primarily local, monopoly press” which limits the flow of information due to the deep partisanship which it creates (Hallin, 2005, p. 3). The introduction of the internet exacerbates this problem since the US has almost no restrictions on the flow of information in this medium. The accusations fake news played a role in the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the US is a good example (Parkinson, 2016). In addition to the above factors, many other variables can impact public relations such as social stratification and the nature of personal relationships described by the

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personal influence model (Sriramesh, 1992). Economic development matters, too. For example, People in individualistic societies are generally expected to take care of themselves … but little personal responsibility extends to the broader society, except that which is required by law or by other provisions. In collectivist societies … individual comfort and achievement are subjugated to

the needs of the society as a whole. “Not surprisingly, economic development appears to be a predictor of this metric. Those nations more economically developed tend to be more individualistic and poorer nations tend to be more collectivist” (Freitag & Stokes, 2009, p. 59). Understanding the difference in these viewpoints is essential for understanding how to frame discussions and policies. It is incumbent upon public relations practitioners to take note of these differences in order to learn how to engage effectively. For example, “Because public relations efforts often rely heavily on mass media, planning those efforts based on misperceptions about how media function could do worse than simply render your plan ineffective – it could result in severe damage to reputation and credibility” (Freitag & Stokes, 2009, p. 72). In short, understanding the environment in which one operates is crucial for the success of public relations. COMPARING OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS Theocracies are a form of government where religion dominates society and political system. Religious clerics lead the state and religion forms the foundation for political institutions and laws. Most theocracies are oligarchic with the rule of many being overseen by just a few people. Because of the reliance on strict adherence to holy books, theocracies are authoritarian systems and therefore have little to no open access points. In fact, communication is stifled through restrictions on freedom of speech and the press. In addition, the rule of law is often non-existent as all authority comes from divine beings. These conditions make public relations particularly difficult as the means for distributing information is highly controlled. Like theocracies, military dictatorships are authoritarian in nature, but differ from civilian dictatorship regarding their motivations for seizing power and the way in which they organize their rule. Though most military dictatorships are authoritarian, they can vary significantly regarding their control over aspects of public relations. In fact, some military dictatorships may even gradually return control to civilian organizations while still retaining executive political power. Pakistan, for example, despite being a military dictatorship has relaxed some control and allowed citizen participation in and control over some aspects of society. In addition, leaders are paying more attention to public opinion and have “recognised the importance/need for moulding the public opinion through public relations/publicity” (Naveed, 2013, p. 2). Corporatism is a method through which society is organized into major interest groups with policy negotiations taking place between these groups and the state. Both democratic and authoritarian regimes have corporatist systems. Those which rely on heavier state control and place more restrictions on individuals wishing to take part in the system are less democratic, and are thus less transparent and make communication among all groups in society more difficult. In addition to the level of control and restrictions, corporatist systems can also vary with some relying more on collective collaboration while others focus

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on individualistic competition. The different levels of collaboration and competition “have a significant effect on how governments and government agencies interact with their publics.” In corporatist systems where individualist competition prevails, like the US for example, “[G]overnment agencies … do not need to practice strategic public relations because they expect activist groups to come to them for services” (Somerville & Aroussi, 2016, p. 42). In addition, collaboration typically takes place among the most powerful interest groups leaving many others, especially the public, out of the negotiation process. Singapore, for example, has a more authoritarian form of corporatism, though less so than the Philippines or Indonesia, wherein the government and interest groups are more intertwined with less public input. According to Stephen Milne, “The trade unions, in particular, are closely linked with the government … [and] the NTUC (National Trades Union Congress) includes virtually all the unions.” Leaders of the NTUC “are in constant touch and consultation with the” People’s Action Party and government leaders. In addition, its top leaders often “serve as Members of Parliament and/or on various government boards. The leaders are to some extent interchangeable” and power is much more centralized (1983, p. 177). As a result, input from individuals is limited and communication is more difficult. On the other hand, in places like Canada and Norway where collective collaboration is high, according to Somerville and Aroussi, “the agency must engage in environmental scanning and other forms of strategic public relations to identify groups with whom it has a responsibility to interact.” Rather than the most powerful interest groups dominating the negotiations, the interest of all “groups, the government and society at large” are represented (2016, p. 43). These types of systems are also referred to as “social corporatism” or “social democratic corporatism.” In Germany, for example, the state is much more decentralized and, according to Fuchs and Koch, focuses on maintaining “a balance in business-labor relations.” It takes on the role as an “economic manager” guaranteeing “a framework for the nearly all-encompassing reality of collective bargaining” and operates in a model of concerted action between the national and local levels (1990, pp. 4–8). This model allows for much more input from individuals at all levels of society, and not just from elites. As a result, information is much more transparent and communication among all levels is more likely. Monarchies, on the other hand, are countries ruled by a king or queen. The ruler typically inherits their crown because of birth. The power of a monarch can vary considerably, with some holding only symbolic power to absolute monarchies where the ruler has supreme control. Constitutional monarchies lie somewhere in between with the ruler maintaining partial or restricted control over the government. The type of monarchy in place will determine the environment in which public relations must operate. Absolute monarchies can be as restrictive as authoritarian regimes, with little to no open access points and heavy restrictions on free speech and the press. Even constitutional monarchs, however, may be just as restrictive as absolute monarchs. Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Swaziland, for example, all have constitutional monarchs, but the monarch still exercises considerable political control and has more power than any other entity in the country. The variation in open and closed access points in the above examples highlights an important problem: Public relations practitioners must pay attention to more than just the type of political system that defines a country and look deeper to understand at what level society can interact with the government and how much control the government exerts over society. Even when political systems are the same, as with monarchies for example, the environment in which public relations must operate can vary considerably, thus changing the strategies one must adopt to be successful in different countries.

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CONCLUSION Public relations has a broad “scope that incorporates management responsibilities for long-term planning, allocation of limited resources, and evaluation”. In addition, public relations practitioners “function as advocates for the organizations they represent” (Freitag & Stokes, 2009, p. 5). Comparative public relations should thus focus on developing new practices “specifically for varied sociocultural settings around the world” (Culbertson, 1996, p. 2). To carry out these duties successfully, it is necessary to understand how the flow of communication takes place in different regime types, cultures, and when other factors are present or absent. Furthermore, understanding government constraints on communication can help create strategies for dealing with those controls. Some argue these limitations “can be changed through negotiation, lobbying, and issue advertising.” This requires “public relations practitioners [to] use their contacts and skills to deal with … and minimize the harmful effects of legal constraints” (Mortensen, 1996, p. 312). As described in detail in Part I of this volume, because cultures (broadly defined) vary from country to country, it is important that practitioners of public relations pay close attention to these differences considering that the political culture affects, and is affected by, the other cultures described in the section. In fact, “the practitioner’s credibility and cultural sensitivity frequently decide the success or failure” of public relations. Understanding how the public views themselves can help organizations stay informed so they can act proactively to manage their reputation (Mortensen, 1996, p. 312). In short, “public relations practitioners today are increasingly likely to find themselves in international and cross-cultural environments and must be prepared to lead their organizations and clients through these challenges” (Freitag & Stokes, 2009, p. 21). Thus, cultural metrics are particularly useful for public relations practitioners. Understanding where a country sits on a communication spectrum, for example, can help tease out the central tendencies that exist among different populations offering better insights on what strategies are required. The field of comparative political communication offers promise for understanding the differences that exist among countries, their structures, and the impact these differences have on public relations. First introduced by Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch in 1975, the field attempts to bring together studies on communications and comparative analysis to determine the way different government structures impact communication in their societies. Before this approach was introduced, attempts to understand the different modes of communication were limited to theories which were extrapolated to different societies without taking into consideration the distinctions that may exist. The field has advanced significantly since then, moving away from individual country analysis to large-N comparative studies to make transnational comparisons regarding the communication that takes place within societies. Comparative political communication is, thus, beneficial because it enriches our knowledge regarding effective communication strategies in societies where communication structures may fluctuate (Esser, 2013). Public relations practitioners should focus on this approach in order to ensure success. In sum, globalization has led to an increased need for public relations practitioners to familiarize themselves with different political systems and the variations that exist within them. Without understanding these distinctions, successful communication is more difficult since strategies must be adopted not only for different regime types, but

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even among countries who share a similar political system. These differences shape the way communication flows within society, presenting different challenges for public relations practitioners making a comparative approach to public relations a necessary tool for successful communication. NOTE 1 Secrecy and non-disclosure are necessary for democracies, too; though, too many restrictions can hurt the government’s legitimacy (Sunstein 1986).

REFERENCES 18 USC. § 1038. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 23 Nov 2016. 18 USC. § 1913. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 23 Nov 2016. Beaumont, E. (1999). “Democracy and Public Administration Reform Linked.” The Public Manager. 28:1, pp. 47–50. Byman, Daniel. (2010). “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea.” International Security. Summer 35:1. pp. 44–74. Cain, Bruce E., Egan, Patrick, & Fabbrin, Sergio. (2003). “Towards More Open Democracies: The Expansion of Freedom of Information Laws.” in Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow (Eds.), Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (pp. 115–140). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culbertson, Hugh. (1996). “Introduction.” in H. Culbertson and N. Chen (Eds.), International Public Relations: A Comparative Analysis (pp. 1–16). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Downs, Geore W. (2005). “Development and Democracy.” Foreign Affairs. Sept – Oct 84:5. pp. 77–86. Diamond, Larry & Morlino, Leonardo. (2004). “The Quality of Democracy.” Journal of Democracy. 15:4, Oct., p. 20+. Eller, Dan. (2016). “Expanding Public Sector Communications: Moving beyond Public Affairs to Facilitate Collaborative Public Relations.” Journal on Media & Communications. 3:1, pp. 31–33. 10.5176/23356618_3.1.46 Esser, Frank. (2013). “The Emerging Paradigm of Comparative Communication Enquiry: Advancing Cross-National Research in Times of Globalization.” International Journal of Communication. 7, pp. 113–128. FCC. (n.d.) “Broadcasting False Information.” Consumer Guide. Web 23 Nov 2016 Retrieved from http://tran sition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/falsebroadcast.pdf Freedom House, DC. (2016). “North Korea.” Freedom House. Web. 23 Nov. 2016. Freitag, Alan R. & Stokes, Ashli Quesinberry. (2009). Global Public Relations: Spanning Borders, Spanning Cultures. New York: Routledge. Fuchs, G. & Koch, A. M.. (1990). “Corporatism and ‘Political Context’ in the Federal Republic of Germany.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. February 9, pp. 1–14. Hallin, Daniel C. (2005). “Comparing Mass Media in Europe and the United States.” Insights on Law and Society. Spring 5, pp. 3. Hofstede, G. (1980). Cultural Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London: McGraw-Hill. Kalathil, Shanthi, & Taylor, Boas. (2001). “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution.” First Monday. August 6:8. King, Gary, Pan, Jennifer, & Roberts, Margaret E. (2013). “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silence Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review. (May) 107:2, pp. 326–343. 10.1017/S0003055413000014

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Linden, Ronald & Cernock, Pavel. (2002). Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred. (1997). “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” in L. Diamond, M. Plattner, Y. Chu, and H. Tien (Eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (pp. xxiii–xxxi). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Liu, B. F., & Horsley, J. S. (2007). “The Government Communication Decision Wheel: Toward a Public Relations Model for the Public Sector.” Journal of Public Relations Research. 19:4, pp. 377–393. 10.1080/ 10627260701402473. Milne, Stephen. (1983). “Corporatism in the ASEAN Countries.” ISEAS. 5:2, pp. 172–184. Mortensen, Mauritz Sundt. (1996). “Public Relations: An Alternative to Reality?” in H. Culbertson and N. Chen (Eds.), International Public Relations: A Comparative Analysis (pp. 317–340). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Naveed, Fakhar. (2013). “Origin and Development of Public Relation in Pakistan.” Mass Communication Talk: Public Relations Code. 968: (January 21). https://www.masscommunicationtalk.com/origin-develop ment-of-public-relation-in-pakistan.html. O’Neil, Patrick H., Fields, Karl, & Share, Don. (2006). Cases in Comparative Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Oswald, Jennalane. (2010). “Transparency and City Government Communication.” Doctoral Dissertation. Retrieved from Institute for Public Relations. Parkinson, Hannah Jane. (2016). “Click and Elect: How Fake News Helped Donald Trump Win a Real Election.” The Guardian. (Nov. 14). Rabe, Barry. (2004). Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Rockman, Bert. (1997). “Institutions, Democratic Stability, and Performance.” in M. Heper, A. Kazancigil, B. Rockman (Eds.), Institutions and Democratic Statecraft (pp. 11–34). Boulder, CO: Westview. Shockley-Zalabak, P. (1999). Fundamentals of Organisational Communication: Knowledge, Sensitivity, Skills, Values. New York: Longman. Somerville, Ian & Sahla Aroussi. (2016). “Public Relations, Politics, and the Media.” in Alison Theaker (Ed.), The Public Relations Handbook (pp. 50–75). 5th ed. New York: Routledge. Sriramesh, K. (1992). “Societal Culture and Public Relations: Ethnographic Evidence from India,” Public Relations Review, 18(2), 201–211. Sriramesh, K. (1996). “Power distance and public relations: An ethnographic study of southern Indian organizations.” In H. Culbertson and Ni Chen (Eds.), International public relations: A comparative analysis (pp. 171–190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sriramesh, K. & Verčič, D. (2009). The Global Public relations Handbook. New York and London: Routledge. Sunstein, Cass R. (1986). “Government Control of Information.” California Law Review. 74:3, Article 10, p. 889+. Taubman, Geoffrey. (2007). “A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule.” Political Communication. (December) 15:2, pp. 255–272. Touraine, Alaine, Zsuzska Hegedus, Francois Dubet, & Michael Wieviorka. (1983). Anti-Nuclear Protest: The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Voltmer, Katrin. (2006). “The Mass Media and the Dynamics of Political Communication in Processes of Democratization: An Introduction.” in Katrin Voltmer (Ed.), Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies. New York: Routledge. Walton, Maj Mike, D’Andrea, Capt Christa, Taylor, JOI Paul, Carleton, PAI Steve, Young, Colie. (n.d.). “The Planning Wizard: A Model for Strategic Public Affairs Planning andExecution.” Department of Defense. Retrieved from www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02A2/literature_review.html Zhao, Yuezhi. (2008). Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

CHAPTER

2 The Intersection of Political and Economic Systems in Global Public Relations Practice Sandra Duhé Jolene Fisher Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

In an address delivered to the Foundation for Public Relations Research and Education, then-president and CEO Carl Sloane (1987) of management consulting firm Temple, Baker, and Sloane was prescient in his remarks regarding the interplay of social, political, and economic forces in public relations practice. The two previous volumes of this book, and this volume, have followed a similar conceptual approach in keeping with the relevance of environmental variables to public relations practice. The perspective we provide here is one in which public relations practitioners stand in the midst of these intersecting and inescapable forces that impact both their decisionmaking and programmatic outcomes. Those who function in what we term a higher order of the practice focus on the essential but unpredictable milieu of two-way communication, negotiation, and alliance-building (see also Grunig, 1992), frequently involving terrains and cultures outside of their familiar homelands. Global public relations practitioners represent voices of the majority, the minority, the powerful, and the oppressed, although what Sriramesh and Verčič (2004) argued more than 13 years ago still rings true today. Public relations resources are disproportionately dedicated to corporate self-interests, where they are most readily afforded and implemented. Regardless of the type of organizational practice, whether corporate, non-profit, or governmental; formally established or grassroots; functioning under a roof or entirely online; and driven by profits, advocacy, or outrage, we maintain what we had proposed in the previous edition of this volume. The intersection of political and economic systems unavoidably affects and directs the public relations process in 14

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unique and identifiable ways (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009). We had introduced a political economy framework for public relations as the study of: the inherent tensions, unintended consequences, and inevitable influences economic and political activities concurrently impart to society, as opposed to the study of economics, political science, or sociology, which examines these respective dimensions unilaterally. (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 24)

In that earlier work, we had compared classical, Marxian, neoclassical, and Keynesian theories of political economy; differentiated market-oriented capitalism, collective capitalism, and social market capitalism; and presented political economy research recommendations – all within a first-time public relations framework to aid interdisciplinary study of global practices across cultures (see also, Sriramesh & Duhé, 2009). In this chapter, we add to Young and McCann’s observations on comparative political systems to expand our discussion of the influence of the intersection of politics and economics on public relations with particular emphasis on their global nature. In addition, we discuss level of development as a key ingredient of political economy, which leads us to presenting development communication as a key area where public relations practice has contributed in the past even if scholarship in the field has not fully explained it. As outlined in the introduction to this book, and affirmed in the previous two editions of this book, public relations is inherently interdisciplinary. There is growing support in the literature for a broader view of public relations that incorporates political, economic, and sociological perspectives along the lines of the call for “the dire need for multiculturalism” outlined in Sriramesh (2002). A number of scholars, particularly those outside the U.S., have taken issue with, and offered alternatives to, the overwhelmingly corporate, or managerial, perspective of public relations presented both in practice and scholarship (cf. Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002; L’Etang, 2013; L’Etang, McKie, Snow, & Xifra, 2016; McKie, 2001; Moloney, 2002; Roper, 2005; Sriramesh, 2002). Elmer (2007) was critical of the field’s narrow placement within a capitalist context and its primary concern with organizational support, even when “profits” are not measured in financial terms alone. Such a view, he argued, disregards the interpenetration of economics, culture, and politics (see also Smart, 2003) that is essential to a more complex public relations inquiry. It follows, then, that maintaining “the comforting illusion that controlling complex persuasive techniques along these lines is possible” renders public relations, in Elmer’s (2007) view, as a discipline “ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of the market economy, far less the consequences of globalization” (p. 364). We examine the complexities and the potentials of public relations that flow from interacting political and economic environs in which the practice necessarily functions. We begin our analysis by briefly visiting the political and economic roots of public relations before more thoroughly examining contemporary views of the practice in light of the 2008 financial crisis. This global upheaval of markets sparked doubt in longstanding models of economic thinking, the outcomes of which a limited number of scholars have examined through the lens of public relations. In this essay, we also discuss the intersection of political economy with the level of economic development that helps us link public relations to social development and thereby social good. We conclude in much the same way these authors have by delineating and encouraging further investigation into the political and economic complexities that are inherent to global

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public relations practice and to public relations’ role in national and social development. A combination of these three helps us identify PR4D – Public Relations for Development – as a focus for public relations and global public relations. POLITICS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS The Commentariolum Petitionis is estimated to be the first publication written on political campaigning, dating back to 64 BC for a consul election in Rome (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2013). Quintus Tullius Cicero wrote the pamphlet as an instructional document for his brother Marcus who was seeking the highest office in the Republic at the time. In the document, Quintus highlighted public support, persuasive skill, relationship cultivation, networking among influentials, and generation of goodwill as necessary conditions for being elected. Fast forwarding many millennia to other political purposes, Cutlip (1976) extolled the use of public relations tactics by Sam Adams in the American revolution, which Toledano (2005) later contrasted with the use of public relations practices in the Zionist revolution leading to the formation of the state of Israel. These accounts of political campaigning practices find a home in contemporary public relations practice (Grunig & Grunig, 1992), but yet have historic political grounding and vary in application depending on which part of the world they take place (Toledano, 2005). Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) defined present-day political public relations as: the management process by which an organization or individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals. (p. 8)

The authors noted four points of distinction that make public relations specifically political. It (a) is: expressly organized for political purposes, including not only parties and candidates, but also businesses and interest groups; (b) involves the inseparable combination of communication and action; (c) equally privileges relationships and reputations; and (d) relies on an application model that is situation dependent. In other words, political public relations is more descriptive than prescriptive (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2013). Strömbäck and Kiousis (2013) further differentiated political from corporate practice in that political public relations: (a) relates to the common good; (b) involves a greater number (and complexity) of stakeholders; (c) is subjected to higher levels of transparency and regulatory restrictions; (d) centers on the main currency of ideas and power (as opposed to money); (e) produces winners and losers; (f) is less able to control messaging because of greater dependence on the news media; (g) experiences higher levels of conflict; (h) faces an interest by media and/or opposing parties to manufacture crises; (i) relies much more heavily on volunteer forces; and (j) has measurable outcomes related to votes rather than sales or financial measures. Political public relations scholarship is of growing interest, particularly in the context of digital media. Duhé (2015) found that among a selection of public relations journals, the number of studies that had government and political application has taken a significant surge in recent years, ranging in focus from elections in the U.S. (Adams & McCorkindale, 2013) and Sweden (Karlsson, Clerwall, & Buskqvist, 2013), to blog sites used for diplomacy (Zhong & Lu, 2013), to government-led tourism promotion in Mexico and Brazil (de Moya & Jain, 2013), alongside many others.

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For political economy purposes, however, perhaps the most obvious and complicated mix of public relations and politics is found in the democratization process, which overtly and additionally engages economic and cultural variables. The various accounts of democratization efforts in the prior volume (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009b) made clear how nascent, centrally controlled governments and economies are more apt to be subjected to the propagandist tactics associated with the press-agentry model (see also, Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009a). Furthermore, only a pluralist society that values political, economic, and press freedom is more likely to employ the public information and two-way models of public relations. Several scholars have examined the role of public relations in political, transitional, and democratization initiatives (cf. Ławniczak, 2001; Molleda & Moreno, 2006; Skoko, 2004; White & Imre, 2013), thus further expanding the field’s analysis beyond a strictly managerial approach. Whitehead (1999) skillfully used the analogy of a theatrical production to describe the democratization process, or, in his words, “the confusing multiplicity of events that take place in the interval between the fall of an authoritarian government and the emergence of a democratic successor” (para. 1). The implications of this genuinely dramatic occurrence for public relations practice are worth enumerating here. The process of democratization is ripe for coalition building, mutual understanding, and public dialogue – all components of the normative two-way symmetrical model of public relations (Grunig & Grunig, 1992) – depending on the will and intent of state leaders who essentially are, using Whitehead’s (1999) phrasing, “crafting institutions” (para. 5). The irrefutable struggle for power in a variety of political contexts has been examined by public relations scholars (cf. Goran & Hakan, 2014; Motion, 2005; Rice & Somerville, 2013). Similarly, Whitehead (1999) recognized shifts in a long-standing balance of power as central to the democratizing process. Regime changes naturally lead to the surfacing of underlying conflicts. Whereas incremental changes can be implemented under the radar, so to speak, “systematic changes at the national level must be publicized and forcefully advocated to overcome all the resistance, inertia, and skepticism that would otherwise stymie them” (Whitehead, 1999, para. 9, emphasis added). Although Whitehead (1999) was not writing from a public relations perspective, his use of terminology inexplicably points to the technical functions of public relations. Other concepts tied to public relations in his writings of the drama of democratization include: (a) marginalized publics who are compelled to get involved in the process; (b) persuasive messages that capture public imagination and compel movement toward a new future that is preferable to a denounced past; (c) political leadership who must inspire a new path with not only rhetoric, but also images, distractions, intuition, and an ear for the musicality of language; (d) a long-term commitment to swaying a variety of stakeholders; (e) two-way flows of communication between the rulers and the ruled, and, increasingly; (f) the inability to ignore or disregard publics; or (g) to cease anticipating their reactions to a variety of stimuli. Though politics and public relations are closely tied, politics is but one part of the political economy perspective. Thus, we continue our discussion by examining economic ties to public relations research and practice. ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Ławniczak (2009) observed that much of public relations history comprises the pursuit of corporate and economic interests alongside

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the public relations tactics needed to offset the hostility, and gain favorability, associated with those efforts. He questioned how public relations’ support of neoliberal economic policies that favor markets free from excessive regulation contributed to the downfall of financial, banking, and housing markets felt around the globe (see also his chapter later in this volume). In turn, Ławniczak (2009) highlighted concerns about the related lack of financial, business, and economic knowledge among public relations students and practitioners that can contribute to such devastating outcomes (see also, Duhé, 2013). Similar to our earlier observations (Duhé & Sriramesh, 2009), Ławniczak (2009) noted that although political economy began in the eighteenth century as a holistic, multidisciplinary view of the economy, the dawning of the classical school of economics in the nineteenth century brought what he referred to as the beginning of a “reductionist legacy” (p. 347) that emphasized economic over political and/or social considerations. Calling for a return to a political economy mindset in public relations, he wrote: “For the current crisis, it is necessary to restore a broader framework for understanding the complex national, and international, interactions between economic, political, and social dimensions” (p. 347). Critical public relations scholarship, much of which is cited herein, likewise argues for a broader perspective of public relations practice that goes beyond a singular economic focus on the profitable interests of an organization (see also Ławniczak, 2009). Public relations’ link with economic pursuits is well documented in its U.S.-based history, yet Ławniczak (2009) observed that any reference to “economic context” in both public relations research and pedagogy has been restricted to managerial economics, or the use of economic perspectives strictly to inform organizational decision-making. For example, Cenja, Mandea, Croitoru, and Ciucã (2011) explained how public relations reduces transaction costs, has value similar to advertising, and enhances competitive advantage for profit-seeking firms, yet also stressed the macroeconomic importance of public relations activities generating trust and social welfare McKie and Ławniczak (2009) went as far to suggest that public relations as a field of inquiry take an introspective cue from economists. Specifically, they urged that as economists bring into question a century of classical thinking that led to the 2008 downfall, so, too, should public relations scholars follow suit and revisit their guiding principles by “reorienting their science to deal with real life problems” (p. 336). In the next section, we address some topics of recent rethinking in economics and their relevance for public relations. IS RATIONAL CHOICE STILL RATIONAL? In its most basic form, rational choice theory asserts individual economic actors, when informed about the choices available in a given situation, will reliably and consistently maximize their self-interest (whether pleasure or profit), based on rational calculations (“Rational choice theory,” 2017). Much of economic theory is based on this premise. Related to rational choice is the notion that social phenomena are driven by individual decision-making. That is, there is a presumption that an examination of the thinking of individuals can explain the behavior of the whole. The field of behavioral economics, however, takes issue with the tenets of rational choice and studies why individuals are often quite irrational in their decision-making. Stress, emotion, and a lack of information can lead to irrationality.

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Counter to the assumption of “perfect information” present in most economic models, reality dictates that information is often partial, distorted, unavailable, and/or too voluminous and thus overwhelming for those who need it for decision-making. Economist and Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon’s recognition of these information imperfections led to his groundbreaking work in what he called “bounded rationality” based on the notion that decisions can satisfy even if they just suffice (Herbert Simon, 2009). In Simon’s (2009) view, individuals are unlikely to have access to all information required, and, even if they did, they wouldn’t have the cognitive capacity to process it all. Public relations is a social institution that alleviates informational asymmetries. Included in such public relations activities would be concerted efforts toward establishing a firm’s reputation for quality to ensure repeat sales. The underlying logic is thus: Hidden defects lead to the devaluing of a market. When consumers become distrustful of the quality associated with some product, they withdraw their participation in that market, as do the higher quality producers who grow weary of being associated with low quality practices. What remains, then, are low quality producers and a sub-optimal allocation of societal resources. Nobel Laureate Economist George Akerlof (1970) studied the used car market and made references to this inefficient outcome as adverse selection. Akerlof, along with fellow economists Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for their combined analysis of markets with asymmetric information, concluding that imbalances of information between parties to a transaction can lead to adverse selection and work against efficiencies in competitive markets (“Markets with Asymmetric Information,” 2001). The question of whether rational choice is still rational depends, then, in great part on the availability and quality of information flows in a given context. Stress and emotion may contribute to irrational choice-making, but closer examination would reveal that stress and emotion originate from informational inputs. Whether these information sources are plentiful and accurate, or heavily restricted and propagandistic, speaks to the relevancy of public relations decision-making on both the originating and the receiving end. Political economy is innately linked to national development as the majority of countries of the world are still deemed developing economies/markets. So, we next link the level of economic development with public relations. THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC RELATIONS The United Nations (UN), through the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the five United Nations regional commissions, puts forth an annual report titled World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP). Within the report, the UN places every country into one of three economic categories: developed economies, economies in transition, and developing economies. The criteria used to categorize countries is based primarily on per capita gross national income (GNI), however some parts of the analysis make a further distinction between fuel exporters and fuel importers to add additional nuance to the depiction of economies in transition and developing economies. The general purpose of the WESP report is to paint a picture of economic conditions in a given country, as well as to highlight global economic trends and potential risks.

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The 2019 report makes clear that although overall global economic growth has remained fairly steady, “economic progress has been highly uneven across regions” and “several large developing countries saw a decline in per capita income in 2018” (United Nations, 2019). While the global economy as a whole is predicted to expand, a focus on macro-level economic gains belies important details within nation states. For instance, economic growth tends to be concentrated in urban areas and often does not spread equitably to women and minority groups (United Nations, 2019). Thus, even within the context of a developing economy, the regional, community, and individual-level economic picture varies substantially. The report also points to a number of risks, including global trade disputes and increasing climate related disruptions, that could make existing development challenges greater while adding new obstacles to contend with. While we have already discussed the implications of political and economic systems on the practice of global public relations in this chapter, the context of a developing economy adds additional complexity wherein both material and ideological challenges must be considered. Addressing these challenges is necessary to generating effective public relations practice. It is also important to achieving the goals of international development, as the theories and practice of public relations have much to offer the development field. Although it is not currently addressed in the academic literature, overlaps already exist between these fields. Creating a direct link between the two is worthy of consideration as it both creates an opportunity for the broadening of public relations, and supports the work of international development. As global inequality grows, achieving development related goals is a necessary task. The concept of international development is generally used to denote a field of practice, or industry, that began in the 1940s. While the original catalyst for international development was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe, generating economic growth in newly decolonized nations soon became the primary focus. Although economic growth has remained a dominant focus, “development” has always been a contested concept with a variety of competing meanings imbued upon it (Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1994; Melkote, 2003; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 1998; Sen, 1999). Most would agree that the term “development” speaks to an intentional process meant to improve quality-of-life and create beneficial change (Melkote & Steeves, 2015). Consensus, however, around what “beneficial change” looks like, who is in the best position to enact it, how it should be carried out, and for whom, is much harder to come by (Fair & Shah, 1997; Parpart, Rai, & Staudt, 2002; Wilkins & Mody, 2001). Within the field of development, the theory and practice of development communication (devcom for short), refers to a process of strategic intervention toward directed social change (Melkote, 2010; Melkote & Steeves, 2015; Wilkins & Mody, 2001). Key communication functions utilized in devcom – information dissemination, education, behavior change, relationship building, media advocacy, and issue framing, among other things – will look familiar to those in the field of public relations (Melkote, 2003). And, like public relations, devcom is used by a variety of organizations to achieve very different, and sometimes competing, goals. Historically, the dominant approach to development has been one based on the theory of modernization, which prioritizes capitalist economic development, promotes rationality and objectivity in individuals, and emphasizes technology acquisition and industrialization (Lerner, 1958; McClelland, 1967; Melkote, 2010; Rogers, 1976). The modernization framework prioritizes national and regional economic growth as the catalyst for increasing quality-of-life for individuals and communities, encouraging democratization, and supporting infrastructure development (Melkote, 2003). To achieve the goals

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of modernization, linear communication methods have historically been emphasized, utilizing information sharing through mass media channels and asymmetrical relationship building that prioritizes outside expertise over local knowledge. But parallel alternative approaches to this development framework have always existed, and long-standing critiques of the dominant paradigm have called for more culturally contextual programs that take into account the roles of gender, the environment, religion, and indigenous knowledge in creating sustainable development solutions (Boserup, 1970; Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead, 2008; Mohanty, Russo & Torres, 1991; Spivak, 1988). An approach that values cultural contextual variables is at the heart of the framework of this book also and has previously been advanced as a “dire need” for public relations practice and scholarship (Sriramesh, 2002). Whether feminist, environmental, theological and/or grassroots in nature, alternative approaches to modernization work to disrupt the hierarchical structure of a Westernbased, ethnocentric development model and push for a move beyond economicfocused definitions of change (Melkote, 2003; Melkote & Steeves, 2015). Importantly, development scholars have pushed not just for a different type of development, but for the dissolution of the project of international development altogether, arguing that as a practice it continues a history of colonialism and supports an established global North/South power divide (Chakraborty, 2000; Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1994; McEwan, 2009; Mohanty, 1998; Shome & Hedge, 2010; Spivak, 1988). Broadly speaking, however, approaches to development outside of the modernization framework focus on generating individual and community-level empowerment, rather than macro-level economic growth. In efforts to build equity, social justice, and individual capacities, empowerment-based models of development prioritize two-way, participatory communication approaches meant to build symmetrical relationships (Melkote, 2003). We see parallels between this approach from development communication scholars and the long-discussed notion of two-way symmetrical communication (that evolved into the mixed-motives model) in public relations (see for example L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). Not unlike public relations, which is often inaccurately perceived as operating only in the service of corporate interests, the field of international development struggles with tensions between mainstream conceptualizations of development predicated on a Western standard of economic growth and calls for a more holistic view of the nature of development, its goals and potentialities. Recently, the field has seen a shift towards a neoliberal approach to development, which has allowed for growing involvement by global corporations in shaping goals and outcomes for the developing world (Calkin, 2015; Essex, 2013). But critical scholars have pushed back against this turn, arguing that a neoliberal approach to development brings problematic outcomes for marginalized groups (Alvarez, 1999; Cornwall, 2014; Kabeer, 2015; Karim, 2011; Wilson, 2015). Because the actors invested in the project of development are varied, so too are the goals, scale, and communicative functions seen in development projects. Large bilateral and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have long played a dominant role in shaping the direction of the field, as have global and local NGOs and grassroots organizations. But the fundamentals of public relations, defined as “the strategic communication that different types of organizations use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant publics many of whom are increasingly becoming culturally diverse” (Sriramesh, 2009) have been used by development communication practitioners quite extensively even if they do not acknowledge the role of

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public relations in what they do. In public relations and development communication, there is a call for practitioners to engage in work that questions and addresses the role of unequal power relations. Bringing public relations more clearly into the work of international development can help achieve this goal in both fields. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS We see a confluence of the three areas discussed in this chapter – political system, economic system, and level of development – as being of significant relevance to global public relations. Considering that most of the countries of the world are considered developing countries, the relevance of public relations for development (PR4D) is more apparent now than at any time in history. It is a tragedy that discussions of public relations have not been aligned with development commensurate with ground realities. Overlooking this key role for public relations has also affected the reputation of the field of public relations. We contend that public relations has erroneously been seen as a dissimilar, and even oppositional framework to development communication (devcom) because of the long-standing mischaracterization of public relations as a tool for serving corporate interests. This mischaracterization has severely affected the reputation of the entire field of public relations as “flacks” or “hired guns” that advance selfish interests of corporations. For instance, public relations has not embraced social marketing, much to its detriment, the same way that devcom has embraced social marketing, which uses “science-based social marketing strategies to promote social causes” (Melkote & Steeves, 2015, p. 143). There is general agreement that the social marketing approach “is about influencing behavior, that it utilizes a systematic planning process and applies traditional marketing principles and techniques, and that its intent is to deliver a positive benefit to society” (Kotler & Lee, 2008, p. 8). Audience research, strategic planning, informational campaigns, relationship building, media relations, issue framing, and advocacy are all necessary to achieving the work of devcom. And they are all fundamental to the theoretical and practical work of public relations. And yet, the devcom field has worked to distance itself from public relations even though in practice public relations practitioners often engage in communication for development. For instance, in 2006, the Rome Consensus at the World Congress on Communication for Development stated: Communication for Development is a social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change. It is not public relations or corporate communication. (emphasis added)

Care is taken to explicitly state that devom is not public relations, perhaps in part because the description given by the Rome Consensus could easily be mistaken for a description of public relations. In response to this statement, Servaes (2007) argued that, in fact, within the field of development, “major aspects of many projects and programmes currently being promoted and implemented are nothing but ‘public relations or corporate communication’ wrapped in participatory diffusion rhetoric” (p. 490). Servaes argues for a focus on a development framework of multiplicity, which emphasizes participatory models that stress “the importance of cultural identity of

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local communities and of democratization and participation at all levels … ” (2007, p. 488). Further, Servaes (2009) explicitly states that public relations has a role to play in devcom approaches meant to change attitudes, and in describing behavioral change and advocacy approaches, he outlines what are clearly public relations efforts. The resistance to identifying the nexus between public relations and devcom, then, is not due to a lack of overlap in practice. Rather, it seems to come from the misidentification of what public relations stands for – a manipulative activity on behalf of corporate interests. When positioned only as a corporate function, it is clear that public relations is unable to truly serve the interests of a participatory, sustainable approach to development and social good. But, we argue that when we expand the definition of public relations to reflect its true state, the overlaps, the sharing of theories and practice, and the opportunities for growth in each field that can come from building this connection are undeniable. Others have already begun to make this link. Given its “expertise at relationship building,” Taylor argues that public relations is an effective tool for democracy building and beneficial to the “development of society” (2000, p. 1). While her research considered the role of public relations, and specifically the function of media relations for building public acceptance for democracy in the context of Bosnia, the implications of this research illuminate the possibilities of using public relations in other developing regions. Taylor (2000) argues that “public relations can serve as an important tool for NGOs to achieve their mission” (p. 11), but “research shows that not-for-profit organizations often lack the expertise and sophistication in their public relations efforts that is necessary for maximizing their impact” (p. 6). Thus, greater understanding of the practice of public relations is needed for NGOs and other not-for-profit organizations to effectively do the work of social and political development. These types of organizations, of course, make up a large segment of development actors. Pamment (2015) describes devcom and the field of public diplomacy as “estranged siblings” that have “much to learn from each other” (p. 188). Grunig (1993) and Signitzer and Coombs (1992) have argued that the fields of public diplomacy and public relations should also be understood as sharing conceptual overlaps that both profit from. In his chapter in this volume on the subject, Roger Hayes makes a strong case for the overlap between the two fields. If indeed we should understand public relations and public diplomacy as conceptually connected fields, and if public diplomacy and devcom are “estranged siblings” (Pamment, 2015, p. 188), then it stands to reason that we should consider the shared intellectual positioning of public relations and devcom as well. We have also seen a growth of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs, which is a field fundamentally tied to public relations, used to support development oriented goals in the context of developing economies (Aya Pastrana & Sriramesh, 2014; Popa, 2015). In these instances, public relations looks much like the archetypal image often attributed to it, as CSR serves a corporate (albeit socially focused) function. However, the role of CSR in development is deserving of further exploration. As we witness the not unproblematic growth of corporations taking on the mantel of development actor, an analysis of CSR programs in developing contexts becomes especially relevant (Munshi & Kurian, 2005). Perhaps most important to consider in our discussion of the similarities between devcom and public relations is a statement by Servaes. Servaes (2007) articulates that, in contrast to dominant modernization frameworks of development, the driving idea: in alternative, more culturally oriented versions (multiplicity) is that there is no universal development model that leads to sustainability at all levels of society and the world, that

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development is an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that can differ from society to society, community to community, context to context (p. 485). (emphasis in original)

When taken alongside a holistic understanding of public relations that includes a focus on culture as broadly defined in this book, the relationship between the fields of political economy, level of development, and public relations is clarified – much to the benefit of the field of public relations. It is our hope that, going forward, this relationship can be made stronger as we see great possibilities for both fields when they are in communication with one another. Given the extent to which public relations is involved in various aspects of development communication, it behooves scholars of public relations to claim their rightful place as purveyors of social good – by helping build societies and nations through communication for development. And given the important and pressing goals of development, it would be regrettable if devcom were to not take advantage of the knowledge created within public relations simply because of a misidentification of the field. REFERENCES Adams, A., & McCorkindale, T. (2013). Dialogue and transparency: A content analysis of how the 2012 presidential candidates used Twitter. Public Relations Review, 39(4), 357–359. Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500. Alvarez, S. E. (1999). Advocating feminism: The Latin American feminist NGO ‘boom’. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1(2), 181–209. Aya Pastrana, N., & Sriramesh, K. (2014). Corporate social responsibility: Perceptions and practices among SMEs in Colombia. Public Relations Review, 40, 1–13. Boserup, E. (1970). Woman’s Role in Economic Development. London: George Allen & Unwin. Calkin, S. (2015). Feminism, interrupted? Gender and development in the era of ‘Smart Economics’. Progress in Development Studies, 15(4), 295–307. Cenja, F. I., Mandea, R., Croitoru, M., & Ciucã, N. S. (2011). An economic approach to public relations. Metallurgical International, XVI(12), 128–130. Chakraborty, D. (2000). A small history of subaltern studies. In H. Sharz & S. Ray (eds.), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies (pp. 467–485). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Cornwall, A. (2014). Taking off international development’s straightjacket of gender. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 21(1), 127–139. Cornwall, A., Harrison, E., & Whitehead, A. (2008). Gender Myths and Feminist Fables: The Struggle for Interpretive Power in Gender and Development. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Cutlip, S. M. (1976, Winter). Public relations and the American revolution. Public Relations Review, 2(4), 11–24. Duhé, S. (2013). Teaching business as a second language. Retrieved from www.instituteforpr.org/teaching-businesssecond-language/ Duhé, S. (2015). An overview of new media research in public relations journals from 1981 to 2014. Public Relations Review, 41, 153–169. Duhé, S. C., & Sriramesh, K. (2009). Political economy and public relations. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (eds.), The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice, Expanded and Revised Edition (pp. 22–46). New York, NY: Routledge. Elmer, P. (2007). Unmanaging public relations: Reclaiming complex practice in pursuit of global consent. Public Relations Review, 33, 360–367. Escobar, A. (1994). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2004). The innovativeness-needs paradox and global public relations: Some propositions on the need for international public relations subsidies. Media Asia, 31(1), 3–13. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2009a). A theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (eds.), The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice, Expanded and Revised Edition (pp. 22–46). New York, NY: Routledge. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (eds.). (2009b). The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice, Expanded and Revised Edition. New York, NY: Routledge. Strömbäck, J., & Kiousis, S. (2011). Political public relations: Defining and mapping an emergent field. In J. Strömbäck & S. Kiousis (eds.), Political Public Relations: Principles and Applications (pp. 1–32). New York, NY: Routledge. Strömbäck, J., & Kiousis, S. (2013). Political public relations: Old practice, new theory-building. Public Relations Journal, 7(4). Retrieved from http://apps.prsa.org/Intelligence/PRJournal/Documents/2013Strom backKiousis.pdf Taylor, M. (2000). Media relations in Bosnia: A role for public relations in building civil society. Public Relations Review, 26(1), 1–14. Toledano, M. (2005). Challenging accounts: Public relations and a tale of two revolutions. Public Relations Review, 31(4), 463–470. United Nations. (2019). World Economic Situation and Prospects 2019. New York, NY: Author. White, C., & Imre, I. (2013). Acceptance of democracy and public relations: Attitudes in a transitional country. Public Relations Review, 39(4), 394–397. Whitehead, L. (1999, October). The drama of democratization. Journal of Democracy, 10 (4). Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16997 Wilkins, K. G., & Mody, B. (2001). Reshaping development communication: Development communication and communicating development. Communication Theory, 11(4), 385–396. Wilson, K. (2015). Towards a radical re-appropriation: Gender, development and neoliberal feminism. Development and Change, 46(4), 803–832. Zhong, X., & Lu, J. (2013). Public diplomacy meets social media: A study of the U.S. Embassy’s blogs and micro-blogs. Public Relations Review, 39(5), 542–548.

CHAPTER

3 Culture The “Silent” Language is also the “Neglected” Language Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

Culture – so central to all human interactions – is arguably the most neglected concept in public relations literature. This chapter focuses on the concept of culture as defined by anthropologists, while noting that the chapter in the previous edition also discussed organizational culture and public relations. The famous anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1973, 1990) referred to culture as the silent language stating: “There is no experience independent of culture against which culture can be measured” (p. 187). He also succinctly described the interrelationship between culture and communication observing that communication is culture and culture is communication. Those of us in communication have often complained that communication is not valued as a “value add” and therefore is neglected by senior managers. Further, there is the normal tendency to believe that all humans have been communicating since birth and so relegate public relations to an expendable technical function with little if any strategic role. It is ironic that our field, which has defined as its core purpose managing communication to build relationships has consistently neglected culture – arguably the single most important influencer of both communication and relationships! This neglect is even more surprising because the need for cross-cultural public relations has grown exponentially in the 21st century owing to this era of globalization (Sriramesh, 2010). A decade ago I had wondered “whether there is such a thing as domestic public relations anymore because of the international outreach of organizations of all sizes and types as a result of the recent spurt in globalization” (Sriramesh, 2009, p. xxv). The interconnectedness of the world is evident in

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many recent examples including the struggle the UK has experienced over the last three years (since the June 2016 referendum) to sever its ties with the European Union – Brexit. The core theme of this essay is that by neglecting culture, our field has lost the opportunity to position itself as a critical function in society with a social role that extends far beyond the erroneous popular notion that public relations is fundamentally a function by corporations and for corporations. Almost 30 years ago, we had hoped that culture would earn its rightful face as a key construct in public relations scholarship: “To communicate to [with] their publics in a global marketplace, public relations practitioners will have to sensitize themselves to the cultural heterogeneity of their audiences … The result will be the growth of a culturally richer profession” (Sriramesh & White, 1992, p. 611). More than a decade later, I had summed up the state of affairs: “Sadly, culture has yet to be integrated into the body of knowledge … Much of the literature and scholarship in our area continues to be ethnocentric” (Sriramesh, 2006, p. 507). Almost 15 years from that statement, public relations scholarship has yet to embrace culture to the extent that its importance warrants on account of globalization that has made this world such a cultural melting pot that breaking up trade alliances (whether it is NAFTA or Brexit) are much harder than expected. In order to explicate the relationship between culture and public relations, this essay expands on the three dimensions I had offered in the only book so far on the topic of culture and public relations (Sriramesh, 2012) thereby providing food for thought on the very identity of the public relations professional. CULTURE AS AN ANTECEDENT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS When viewed as an antecedent for public relations, culture is the “environment” in which public relations is practiced. That means different cultural environments spawn different types of public relations practices. One can also deduce that different cultural environments require different public relations strategies and techniques for effective communication. In this instance, culture becomes the independent variable that determines the nature of public relations – the dependent variable. Almost all of the studies in our field have only addressed this first dimension (eg. Kim, 2003; Rhee, 1999; Sriramesh, 1992; Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999). Many of these studies have used Hofstede’s (1980, 1984, 2001) dimensions of culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity – femininity, individualism – collectivism, and long-term orientation to describe public relations practices in different countries (mostly in Asia). The first of the studies that assessed culture as an “environment” for public relations practice was an analysis of south Indian organizations using personal interviews (Sriramesh, 1988). I had noted that prior to this study, there was no mention of culture’s impact on public relations including in the first body of knowledge study conducted by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) in 1988. As a follow-up to the 1988 study, I conducted an ethnographic analysis of 18 south Indian organizations (Sriramesh, 1992), was perhaps the first study to empirically link societal culture with public relations. Because of the malleability of the culture concept and the complexity of studying it, I had only used the power distance dimension prescribed by Hofstede. The Excellence project addressed both societal and organizational culture first conceptually (Sriramesh & White, 1992; Sriramesh,

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Grunig, & Buffington, 1992) and then empirically (Dozier, Grunig, & Grunig, 1995, Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996). In one of the few non-Asian studies on the culture–public relations nexus, Verčič, Grunig, and Gruing (1996) linked public relations with the first four dimensions that Hofstede identified. The interviewees in their study could not agree on whether a certain cultural idiosyncracy was really Slovenian. Vasquez and Taylor (1994) surveyed 134 members of a Mid-western city’s PRSA chapter to link the first four of Hofstede’s dimensions with the four models of public relations and found a low perception of power distance among their respondents: “American practitioners in this study were not working under heavily controlled or authoritative management” (p. 443). However, the authors were perplexed that their respondents predominantly favored the one-way models in spite of the low power distance. This confirms our observation that authoritarian organizational cultures can exist in egalitarian societal cultures and that public relations practitioners rarely set communication policies (Sriramesh, Grunig, & Buffington, 1992; Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996). Kim (2003) studied a multinational corporation in South Korea in an attempt to link Confucian Dynamism (Hofstede’s fifth cultural dimension) with public relations. The author concluded that in communicating with domestic publics, the corporation used the personal influence model (to be reviewed later in this essay) and attempted to use the two-way models to communicate with international stakeholders. Rhee (1999) is probably the only scholar thus far to have attempted to link all five of Hofstede’s dimensions with public relations concluding that “[A]lthough conceptually affiliated with high power distance … Confucianism may not be detrimental to achieving excellence in public relations” (p. 185). The over-reliance on Hofstede’s dimensions has to be recognized as a lacuna in public relations scholarship given that the author himself had explicitly stated that these dimensions do not describe culture in its entirety. Hofstede studied cultural dimensions that were common across many of the cultures he studied. Cultural idiosyncracies that are unique to a culture often have the most influence on communication and thereby public relations (Sriramesh, 2012). For example, Guanxi – a cultural dimension specific to Chinese culture – is one such unique cultural dimension that has garnered the most attention from public relations scholars (eg. Aw, Tan, & Tan, 2002; Huang, 2001; Hung, 2004; Kipnis, 1996; Tan, 2000). In our study (Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999) we linked the concepts of wa, amae, tatamae, honne – unique to Japanese culture – with Japanese public relations practice. It is worth noting that other concepts unique to Japanese culture such as katachi de hairu (entering self-fulfilment through the rules) or the importance of the business card (meishi) to bring credibility to interpersonal communication have yet to be explored. Needless to say, there is a dire need for studies that identify cultural dimensions that are unique not only to Asia but to societies in other regions of the world as well. The Lewis Model of Cultural Types Cross-cultural consultant Richard Lewis (Hammerich & Lewis, 2013) offered another practically useful way of classifying culture stating that most societies are either Multi-Active, Linear-Active, or Reactive, or some combination of the three. He stated that multi-active cultures are known for showing more passion and emotion. People of these cultures tend to be more talkative, impulsive, people-oriented, and multitaskers. They tend to prefer conversations to written communication and tend to pay

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less attention to rules, schedules, and punctuality. The author gave the example of Hispanic America, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile as good examples of multiactive cultures. People of linear-active cultures are generally seen to be calm and in control. They tend to be more organized, results-oriented, law abiding, and confrontational but polite. They prefer to base their communication on hard facts and are more direct in their communication. They are confident that excellence brings success. Examples are Germany, Switzerland, with the US and UK coming close to being fully so. Reactive cultures are typified by their focus on being courteous and good listeners, responding after reflection, paying attention to nonverbal cues and communication. They are the least confrontational and keep their promises. Vietnam was placed by the author as the most typical with Japan and China coming close. Other countries were plotted by the author along the continuum with the three types forming the tips of a triangle. Although this model has been popular with practitioners, one does not find any public relations studies that have used this model to measure societal culture. One obvious explanation is that the Lewis Model does not offer the kinds of tools to measure culture quantitatively that Hofstede did making Hofstede’s dimensions of culture easier to replicate. Several other dimensions of culture have not been addressed empirically by public relations literature such as time orientation and high and low-context (Hall, 1976, 1990); universalism vs. particularism, specific vs. diffuse, and achievement vs. ascription (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000); mastery-harmony-subjugation to nature; past-present-future orientation; and belief of human nature as being good versus bad (Triandis, 1982). Over-reliance on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions has certainly hurt the field in many ways including broadening its horizons. This brief review also reveals that public relations scholarship has barely explored the role of culture as an “antecedent” for public relations practice even though almost all of the work exploring the culture–public relations nexus has been in this genre of research. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS ON CULTURE A second way of viewing the public relations–culture nexus is when public relations is the independent variable that has an impact on culture the dependent variable. Being a communication function, public relations acts as an agent for acculturation in societies and organizations and is often criticized for its “hegemonic” role. However, one cannot find empirical or conceptual studies that have analyzed the ways in which public relations activities affect culture – whether societal or organizational. We should have taken the cue from an allied field such as mass communication that has studied media effects on society for decades. That stream of research has benefited both scholarship and practice in mass communication and media. Neglecting to empirically assess how public relations practice has affected society has certainly hurt the field in significant ways. For example, this neglect has contributed to the erroneous popular notion that public relations is fundamentally a corporate activity and as a result it propagates corporate hegemony within and across national borders – especially in developing countries. Such corporate hegemony also can translate into cultural hegemony. One should contrast that notion with the many information and developmental campaigns by Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and non-profits especially in the vast developing world that have used public relations strategies and techniques with significant positive impact on societies. Public relations literature is vastly silent

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on such laudable efforts around the world by neglecting to analyze those efforts empirically and draw lessons for public relations practice. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, public relations literature has ceded that worthy field of research almost entirely to scholars in development communication. Our neglect has thus contributed to the popular notion of public relations practitioners as paid publicists for corporate interests. Beginning in the 1980s, public relations scholarship has tried hard to distinguish itself from the field of marketing, which is the primary function of corporations. It is intriguing, however, that we did not focus on the “other” marketing – social marketing, which involves the use of marketing techniques for socially worthy ideas and causes. Social marketing is typified in the statement of psychologist Gerhard Wiebe (1951) who asked the question: “Why can’t you sell brotherhood and rational thinking like you sell soap?” (p. 679). In essence, he advocated the use of communication to motivate socially desirable behaviors, distinct from marketing a product or service. Wiebe proposed five “factors” as influencing the success of “mass persuasion” campaigns aimed at “motivating” socially acceptable “behavior”: the force; the direction; the mechanism; the adequacy and compatibility; the distance (p. 681). After discussing four case studies of radio and television campaigns, the author concluded that mass media can “produce forceful motivation” among audience members aimed at social good. Even the popular author of marketing Philip Kotler has hailed social marketing as a tool that can be used against “the myriad social problems … [such as] illiteracy, drug and alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy, the spread of AIDS, and poor nutrition” (Kotler & Roberto, 1989, p. 3). It is interesting if not ironic that Kotler, who is most identified with marketing (for corporate interests), also made the transition into more socially-conscious marketing. However, public relations continues to neglect aligning with social marketing, which would have been the logical way for our field to break free from “corporate shackles” and instead accurately reflect the reality that public relations has been used by non-profits and governments for doing social good including through information campaigns. Public relations literature has stayed clear of social marketing probably because of its aversion to marketing. For example, Grunig and Grunig (1991, 1998) provided a thoughtful case for why the Excellence study had consistently tried to distinguish public relations from marketing. Whereas one does not disagree with the need to distinguish product/service marketing from public relations for many valid reasons, there is no escaping the fact that social marketing – which is distinct from product marketing – should not have been ignored by public relations scholars. An exception is McKie and Toledano (2008) who advocated that public relations literature embrace social marketing. Distinguishing it from Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), McKie identified non-profits and governments as the primary users of social marketing, thereby signaling one of the ways by which our field can break free from its “corporate” identity. The relevance of social marketing to this essay on culture lies in the fact that a field needs to reflect on its core function and purpose in society. If public relations scholarship had done a better job of reflecting on the field’s impact on culture in a holistic fashion, we would have discovered that indeed public relations greatly affects societal culture through motivational campaigns that help build communities, societies, and nations. Empirical evidence in support of this reality would have aided in improving the reputation of our field – a dire necessity. When it comes to the impact of public relations on culture, another area ignored by public relations scholarship is cultural diplomacy, a subsidiary of public diplomacy. For

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example, Trent (2016a) stated: “Since the mid-20th century, cultural diplomacy through public-private partnerships (PPPs), has been generating lasting people-to-people relationships” (p. 193). The author also stated: Conducting public diplomacy to respond to global demands for human rights, food security, and environmental justice in the face of domestic politics that today are so ideologically polarized is challenging. However, as long as the United States continues to stand for social justice and democratic self-government for all, the role of public diplomacy will be not only to listen to, understand, and influence global publics in the name of U.S. interests, but also to promote relationships with them that are generated by the creative tension of a heartfelt and reasoned communication approach. (p. 5, emphasis added)

The link between public diplomacy and public relations is evident in the italicised words in this description – especially relationship building which we define as a core function for public relations. Adopting the notion of helping an organization engage in a “heartfelt and reasoned communication approach” in order to “listen, understand, and influence global publics” (who are also obviously culturally diverse) should be the goal of public relations in the 21st century. Anthropologist Albro (2016) discussed the use of “transnational applied cultural networks” for diplomacy stating: The relatively recent turn to the pursuit of so-called collaborative diplomacy tends to emphasize trust-building through cooperation around shared objectives and values, and, when carried out by government, often encourages more interagency partnerships in projecting the U.S. image abroad… many geopolitical problems are interconnected and cross-cutting in nature, and so require multiple partners if they are to be effectively addressed. (p. 125)

The field of public relations has so far focused very narrowly on the concept of trust in relationships – principally focused at the level of the organization and seeing which “types” of organizations are trusted over others. Viewing relationships from a cultural perspective extends the horizons of our field by incorporating cooperation, shared objectives, and values, that are not limited at the level of the organization but also at the individual level (discussed in the next section). This would be aligned with Albro’s (2016) “transnational applied cultural networks” that help extend public diplomacy from promoting “one’s own community or national cultural identity” to “facilitating relationships of collaborative storytelling and the co-creation of cultural knowledge” (p. 126). The author concluded that “[T]ransnational applied cultural networks can create new opportunities for public dialogue” (127). Even though the public relations scholarship has been wrestling with the notion of symmetry and thus dialogue for almost 50 years, interestingly there is no mention of public relations in this essay, which is a commentary of how our field has limited its conceptual boundaries by not integrating these fields into scholarship. This state of affairs is also a reflection of how poorly we in public relations have positioned ourselves in relation to the society at large based on reflection of the identity of public relations as a field and the values espoused by individual practitioners. Frame and Ihlen (2018) offer us another example of how public relations affects culture in their discussion of the “cultural appropriation debate” where the cultural codes and traditions of one group are “illegitimately” appropriated by members from outside the cultural group for profit. The authors cite the criticisms levelled against

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pop stars such as Taylor Swift, Miley Cyrus, and Katy Perry for “using braids or mimicking what are seen as Afro-American dance codes” (p. 153). The authors offer wise caution to public relations professionals in terms of cultural hegemony: For public relations professionals, it is thus essential to tread the fine line between referring to cultures and social categories in order to construct meaningful messages which appeal to familiar categories, and reinforcing the underlying social stereotypes… Public relations professionals should be held professionally and socially accountable for the implicit cultural models and beliefs underlying the materials they produce. (p. 154)

One can reasonably conclude, then, that by not reflecting on and empirically evaluating the impact of public relations on culture – both societal and organizational – we have essentially ceded the moral high ground to other communication-oriented disciplines that often look down upon public relations as mere “spin doctoring.” PUBLIC RELATIONS AS A CULTURE The idea here is that public relations should be viewed as a culture in itself. In other words, have we really addressed what distinguishes public relations from practitioners of allied communication disciplines such as advertising, marketing, and even journalism? The activities, rites, rituals, and standing of public relations are distinct from these other communicative disciplines. For most people, within and outside the field, public relations is a “business” function that should help improve “the bottom line” of corporations. This erroneous perspective is not informed by empirical evidence but is mostly a result of conjecture and hearsay – one that continues to get perpetuated because scholars have not really focused on this third dimension of the culture – public relations nexus. Not portraying the use of public relations by governments and non-profit entities (including IGOs) has severely hurt the reputation of the field as one replete with “hired guns” to do the bidding almost exclusively of corporate self-interests including engaging in various unethical practices that seek to help the already powerful in society (as explicated, among others, in Chapter 8 of this volume). Not enough attention has been paid by scholarship to the fact that public relations has been used for more altruistic activities such as building societies and nations or improving the livelihood of people. This neglect has placed public relations in the unenvious position of being seen as “spin masters” rather than the more accurate depiction of a different culture of the field – one that is more socially responsible and not just a tool of corporate hegemony. One sees time and time again that corporations are the least trusted organizations in society (along with some governments) and with good reason. They have a track record of exploiting society and especially the vulnerable in society. Aligning the field almost exclusively with corporate communication, has resulted in public relations being viewed as an exploitive culture rather than an enabling one. It is time for the field to begin to recalibrate itself and more correctly reflect its activities including non-profit public relations. As long as the popular belief is that public relations is predominantly “corporate activity,” the field’s reputation will continue to suffer. This discussion essentially induces us to reflect on the identity of public relations itself. Sriramesh (2012) could not discern any studies that have assessed the “identity” of public relations practitioners and what makes public relations distinct from allied

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communication disciplines such as advertising or marketing. It is interesting to note that many in public relations still prefer to call it a practice as opposed to a profession, further reflecting on the identity crisis. In addition to the “institutional” level of identity discussed above (a meso level analysis), we should also discern the culture at the micro level looking at the culture of individual practitioners. After all, individuals make up organizations and so the characteristics of organizations are nothing but a reflection of the individuals that make up an organization. It is this micro – individual level of analysis that helps us identify public relations as a culture. However, studies that address public relations as a culture are sparse. The use of personal influence (Grunig, Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995; Sriramesh, 1992; Sriramesh, Grunig, & Dozier, 1996) in public relations has been discussed but that discussion has not specifically addressed public relations as a culture. Interpersonal trust building, a key to building relationships, has not been discussed much at all by public relations scholars. Trust has almost exclusively been discussed at the meso – organizational – level by public relations scholars even though much of organizational trust depends on the actions of individuals. The cultural idiosyncracies of individual practitioners plays a significant role in every aspect of trust building including communication. Similarly, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has generally discussed CSR activities or organizations paying very little, if any, attention to how it is the individuals within organizations – such as decision makers and those who have to implement those decisions – who actually set the tone and direction of an organization’s orientation to CSR and thereby the organization’s role in society. CSR discussions are generally divested from discussions of religion and spirituality, both of which play significant roles even in societies that profess secularism. CSR is driven not only by laws and regulations but also by moral codes that individuals within organizations espouse. Therefore, when one recognizes that it is individuals that make up an organization – while conceding that different individuals within an organization have differential levels of power to influence organizational culture – we begin to see the importance of viewing public relations as a culture not only at the meso level of it as a profession but also at the micro level of individual practitioners. Providing empirical evidence of public relations as a culture also helps us identify the link between public relations and organizational culture. In the previous edition of the book, we have discussed the link between societal and organizational culture (Sriramesh, 2009). The role of the public relations practitioner in fostering organizational culture is as yet unexplored. References to the use of public relations in organizational culture has primarily focused on viewing public relations as a tool for internal communication. The role of the public relations practitioner’s own cultural values is often ignored in these discussions. Given that most public relations programs around the world, and public relations literature – especially text books – constantly focus on the “corporate” side of public relations activity, it is safe to assume that the typical public relations practitioner is schooled in the ways of business enterprises. It appears that we simply assume that such unidimensional training also prepares students to successfully contribute to governments (including IGOs) and non-profits. Such an assumption would be erroneous considering that the vision and mission of these two types of organizations is so different from that of corporations. Further, many an undergraduate student still seems to think that “corporate” public relations is the more lucrative and meaningful career option when in fact non-profits and

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governments around the world are using public relations more than corporations and for more varied purposes. Therefore, public relations scholarship is doing a disservice to both employers and future professionals (students of public relations) by not identifying public relations as a culture and thereby clearly delineating the contributions that the field – and every individual practitioner who is a part of the field – can make to diverse organizational types. CONCLUSION Taking a cue from Edward T. Hall’s reference to culture as the silent language and his statement about the reciprocity between culture and communication – culture is communication and communication is culture – this essay contends that whereas communication is neglected by many organizational senior managers, for their part public relations practitioners have in turn neglected culture’s impact on the practice that sees itself as at the center of using communication to build and manage relationships. Extending the conceptualization in Sriramesh (2009) and Sriramesh (2012), this essay has discussed the three ways in which the link between culture and public relations can be understood. First, culture is the environment for public relations practice, which suggests that different cultural environments result in different variations in public relations practice. Almost all the literature in public relations has been restricted to studying this relationship. The second way in which we can discern the culture–public relations nexus is on the impact of public relations on culture. Few studies in public relations have discussed this relationship. Not paying attention to this relationship has contributed to public relations being perceived merely as a corporate function ignoring its more altruistic communication manifestations that help social good. A third relationship is of public relations itself as a culture – distinct from other allied communication disciplines. This self-reflective perspective also has not been studied by public relations scholarship resulting in public relations being misinterpreted by most in communication and outside of it. Neglecting culture has therefore hurt public relations in multiple ways. REFERENCES Albro, R. (2016). Diplomacy and the efficacy of transnational applied cultural networks. In D. L. Trent (Ed.) Nontraditional U.S. public diplomacy: Past present and future. Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, pp. 121–144. Aw, A., Tan, S.K., & Tan, R (2002, July 15–19). Guanxi and Public Relations: An Exploratory Qualitative Study of the Public Relations-Guanxi Phenomenon in Singapore Firms. Paper presented to the Public Relations Division of the International Communication Association, Seoul, South Korea Dozier, D., Grunig, L., & Grunig, J. (1995). Lea’s communication series. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Frame, A. and Ihlen, Ø. (2018). Beyond the Cultural Turn: A Critical Perspective on Culture-Discourse within Public Relations, Public Relations and the Power of Creativity (Advances in Public Relations and Communication Management, Vol. 3, Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1108/ S2398-391420180000003009 Grunig, J. E. (Ed.) (1992) Excellence in public relations and communication management. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Grunig, J. E. & Grunig, L. A. (1991). Conceptual differences in public relations and marketing: The case of healthcare organizations. Public Relations Review, 17(3), pp. 257–278.

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Sriramesh, K., & White, J. (1992). Societal culture and public relations. In. J. E. Grunig (Ed.), Excellence in public relations and communication management (pp. 577–596). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. Tan, S.L. (2000).Guanxi and public relations in Singapore: An exploratory study. Master’s Thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Trent, D. L. (2016a). Cultural Diplomacy Partnerships: Cracking the Credibility Nut with Inclusive Participation. In D. L. Trent (Ed.), Nontraditional US public diplomacy: Past, present, and future. Washington: Public Diplomacy Council. Pp. 191–218. Trent, D. L. (2016b). Introduction. In D. L. Trent (Ed.), Nontraditional US public diplomacy: Past, present, and future. Washington: Public Diplomacy Council. Pp. 1–24. Harry C. Triandis (1982) Dimensions of Cultural Variation as Parameters of Organizational Theories, International Studies of Management & Organization, 12:4, 139–169, DOI: 10.1080/00208825.1982.11656354 Trompenaars, A., & Hampden-Turner, C. (2000). Riding the waves of culture: Understanding cultural diversity in business (2nd ed.). London: Nicholas Brealey Pub. Vasquez, G. M., & Taylor, M. (1994). A cultural approach to public relations research: An extension of Hofstede’s variables to Grunig’s models of public relations. Paper presented at Speech Communication Association New Orleans, LA. Verčič, D., Grunig, J. E., & Gruing, L. A. (1996). Global and specific principles of public relations: Evidence from Slovenia. In H. Culbertson, & N. Chen (Eds.), International public relations: A comparative analysis (pp. 31–65). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. Wiebe, G.D. (1951). Merchandising Commodities and Citizenship on Television. Public Opinion Quarterly, 15 (4), p. 679.

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4 The Media, International, Transnational and Global Public Relations Dejan Verčič Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

The world became a global village in the 20th century (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967) due to the emergence and growth of mass media (both print and broadcast media). The dawn of the 21st century saw new, digital media (primarily enabled by the Internet, social networks and mobile smartphones) that turned the global village into a global living room where digital media connect everyone across the globe. We also live in media (Deuze, 2012). In this new transplanetary reality, globalisation has moved one step further into what Sholte (2008) labelled “globalism”. Transplanetary relations are one aspect of globalism. The other one is supraterritoriality, where communication can extend everywhere across the planet at the same time (transworld simultaneity) and in no time across devices and platforms (transworld instanteneity). While “globalization” was “defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1991, p. 64), due to the Internet, social and mobile communication we are now intertwined into a “network society” (Castells, 2010). In a world in which not only social, but for ever more people also personal lives are mediatised (mediated by media)1, public relations “today has a diversified mix of media at its disposal. It has to work with the increased numbers of touchpoints with all kinds of publics. For communication professionals this is mediatisation in overdrive, or without hyperbole – hypermediatisation!” (Tench, Verčič, Zerfass, Moreno, & Verhoeven, 2017, p. 27; see also Verhoeven, Zerfass, Verčič, Rench, & Moreno, 2018)

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Not every human is integrated equally into this globalised mediated system, but everyone is affected by it, albeit differently. In that respect definitely “Globalization seems to be the hallmark of the 21st century” (Sriramesh, 2008, p. 409). FROM MEDIA TO MEDIATIZATION The 20th century has been a century of mass production and mass consumption. Mass media and public relations were instrumental in linking the two (Bernays, 1923). Working on and with the media has always been the most practiced and visible part of public relations (Swerling, Thorson, & Tenderich, 2014; Zerfass, Verhoeven, Tench, Moreno, & Verčič, 2011). In their textbook, Broom and Sha (2013) noted: “Knowing about the media – knowing how to work with each medium, create content for each, address each medium’s audiences, adhere to specific style requirements, and meet the deadlines of each – is a major part of many practitioners’ jobs” (p. 250). Cameron, Sallot, and Curtin (1997) noted that since the 1960s, more than 150 studies have examined some aspect of the relationship between journalists and public relations practitioners, and in general found that between 25 percent to 80 percent of news content is influenced by the “information subsidies” given by public relations practitioners. But the social roles of both journalists and public relations practitioners had changed by the end of the 20th century. While in the US there was no public relations as understood today at the beginning of the 20th century, newspapers had already achieved widespread adoption. However, by the middle of the 20th century, one could already discern a parity between the numbers of journalists and public relations practitioners. By the end of the 20th century, there were five public relations practitioners to one journalist in the US. That is, “from providers of information subsidies (Gandy, 1982), public relations is fast transforming into media producer and creator of news and stories” (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič, 2016). As the 21st century arrived, political, economic, social and technological changes completely reconfigured what was for a century understood as a (mass) media system. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (which physically separated West Berlin from the rest of Berlin and East Germany but also symbolically divided the whole world between communism and capitalism) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many people believed that, as Fukuyama worded it in a speech transformed into an article in 1989 and in a book in 1992, the world has reached “The End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992): liberal institutions – representative government, free markets and consumerist culture, including liberal media – have surpassed all alternatives. It took only fifteen years for his colleague Kagan (2008) to declare “The End of The End of History.” The notion of “the end of history” and of universalization of liberal (Western) values had an important impact on the international media system: as long as there was “Cold War” going on between East and West, all countries controlled for transborder (transnational and international) communication: mass communication from East to West and vice versa was seen as propaganda, illegitimate and often illegal on the recipient side. The idea of universal appeal of the liberal institutions opened a way for deregulation and liberalization of media systems in the West: radio and television broadcasting that was largely government owned and/or regulated was open for private initiative. New technology lowered costs of media production and distribution. Today, with a smartphone and the Internet, one can produce and distribute a television program practically for free. The same goes for magazines and other print media produced as, and distributed via, websites.

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Another important factor for the transformation of the media system is the dissolution of what Western modernity considered to be essential for the conceptualization of human rights and the rule of law: the notion of privacy. When individuals agreed (willingly and unwillingly) to allow media companies (and governments) to sell their personal data, a whole new media economy emerged: social media (e.g. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter). And with them a new media eco-system developed (which is financed by selling the personal data of social media users, what they view, where they are, what they buy, to third parties, commercial and political). Traditionally, Western media systems were defined by editorial (journalist) and advertising decisions. The second were based on money (advertisers buy media time and space), the first on public interest (variously defined). The new 21st century media system is structured differently and it is composed of four types of media: P – paid, E – earned, • S – social, • O – owned. • •

The PESO (paid, earned, social and owned) model was introduced by Dietrich (2014) and immediately gained popularity for its heuristic value. Paid media consist of communication that can be bought in contemporary media from classical advertising to brand journalism and native advertising (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič, 2016; Zerfass, Verčič, & Wiesenberg, 2016). Earned media are the endorsements of third parties, from journalists to social media influencers. Social media has emerged as a whole new form of communication that recombines word of mouth, earned publicity, paid posts, etc. Finally, owned media are probably the oldest type of mass media (which started as official gazettes published by political and administrative authorities to make their decisions known to their subjects), which, because of technological changes, became accessible to everybody. The most widely-circulated magazine in the world today is a monthly publication of Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Watchtower, with 42 million copies printed in over one hundred languages (Jehovah’s Witnesses, s.a.). These political, economic, social and technological changes are forcing us to rethink what media are. We believe that we should view them not as tools, but as processes along the lines of Silverstone (1999, p. 13) who refers to media “as a process of mediation.” This led Zerfass, Verčič, & Wiesenberg (2016) to propose the concept of strategic mediatization that “blurs what used to be constitutive borders between advertising (paid publicity) and media relations (earned publicity), mass media, and other noncore media organizations, who are creating content either as sources or multipliers.” (p. 502) As we noted earlier, public relations is transforming from being a provider of information subsidies (its traditional role) into a media producer and creator of news and stories. We also see transformations occurring on the media side. What used to be considered professional journalism is, in the new realities of globalised media work, turning into everything else. In their report on the globalization of China’s media reported in The Guardian newspaper, journalists Lim & Bergin (2018) remarked: “The vanishing thin line between China’s journalism, propaganda work, influence projection and intelligence-gathering is a concern to Washington.”

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INTERNATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL MEDIA RELATIONS Small organizations in large countries may still be able to operate on local or national levels, while this is not the case for small countries and large organizations. In Europe, over 90 percent of senior public relations practitioners (often called “Chief Communication Officers”) work internationally on a daily basis: “with nearly quarter of them dealing with 20 countries or more” (Verčič, Zerfass, & Wiesenberg, 2015, p. 787). Unfortunately, this reality is not reflected in research. In their review of academic articles on international public relations published between 2006 and 2011, Jain, De Moya & Molleda (2014) found that 77 percent of the 200 journal articles were concerned with domestic public relations practice in a region/nation other than the US (which also shows that public relations research is still US-centric), while only 18 percent had cross-county analyses and 5 percent dealt with global issues or organizations. From a media relations point of view, this spawns questions about how to practice media relations in different countries around the world, how to practice media relations across borders, and how to practice global media relations. Instrumental for international media relations (as the practice of media relations in a country other than one’s home) are theories of media systems and international comparisons of media use (Rössler, 2008). The normative theories of mass media systems and their relevance to international public relations was previously reviewed by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009). Those normative theories were based on the Cold War ideological divisions and in toward the latter part of their conceptualization, ended up dividing the media around the world into autonomous, i.e. “free” (Western and Social Responsibility media systems), and ancillary, i.e. not “free” (Authoritarian, Communist, and Developmental media systems). With the fall of the “Soviet bloc,” many of the “developing” (i.e. non-Western) countries catching-up with the “developed” (i.e. Western) world, and the onset of ICTs and social media, the relevance of the normative theories of the media discussed between the 1950s and late 1980s is vastly diminished even if some parts continue to resonate (eg. the developmental media theory or the social responsibility theory). We believe that the current environment demands that we use new lenses to describe, and analyse, media systems around the world. There are several organizations monitoring freedom of the press and of the new media (on the Internet), and the most known among them, The Freedom House, clusters countries into three groups: those with free, partly free and not free press and the Internet (https://freedomhouse.org) – in 2017, 31 percent of countries had free, 36 partly free and 33 percent not free press (with “press” here standing for traditional mass media, TV, radio and print), 20 percent of the assessed countries had free, 33 partly free and 34 percent not free use of the Internet. Practitioners should be aware of difference in freedom, regulation and control in their own and any new country into which they would like to develop media relations. While normative theories of the media help us understand differences primarily with regard to how governments regulate media, media use approach helps us study factors influencing audience or publics’ media consumption. In the previous edition, we (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009) had referred to this as “media diffusion.” Rössler (2008) lists several of them, including the system of government, societal culture and communication style, infrastructure for distribution, individual prosperity (including media literacy), digitalization and mobility. Use of different types of media is very much country specific. While in the US or Europe 95 percent and more households

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own at least one TV set, only 44 percent of households in India are equipped with a TV apparatus. This is only part of the picture. Television today can be broadcast terrestrially, via satellites, via a cable or over the Internet. It can have a linear program (as most traditional TV stations), or non-linear (pull) programs (like TV series or movies on a provider such as Netflix). A household can access one or just a couple, or one hundred programs or more; national, regional, or international/ global. Similar differences can be observed for every single medium. It is interesting to note, however, that as we move to newer and mobile media, Asia takes primacy. In 2017, of more than five billion mobile users, over four billion were in Asia-Pacific (Kemp, 2018). While international media relations is concerned with the comparative operation of media relations between countries, transnational media relations deals with how to use media to conduct media relations from one to another country (or among several of them). Many countries, particularly those with partially free and non-free mass media and the Internet, limit or prohibit access of foreign media into their territory. In 2017, of seven and a half billion people living on our planet, more than five billion were mobile telephone users, over four billion used the Internet, and more than three billion used social media (Kemp, 2018). Many countries have banned or blocked different social media, like Facebook in China, or LinkedIn in Russia. But even more countries block trans-border media as a measure of combating terrorist propaganda (Simons, 2018), political disinformation (Barret, Wadhwa, & Bauman-Pauly, 2018; European Commission, 2018) and fake news (Bernal, 2018). Even technology companies can do and have done, this for governments. For example, Twitter has suspended 1.2 million accounts on suspicion of aiding terrorist causes (Reisinger, 2018). Given this reality, it is important to note that the definition of what counts as “terrorism,” or “disinformation” or “fake news” is a political decision and [a]ccording to international law, there are no universal definitions of either “extremism” or “terrorism” and there is “the temptation to misuse the national security argument to a pretext to silence dissenting voices and to restrict freedom of expression at large” (OSCE, 2018). This is not unlike the description of media control by authoritarian, communist, or even the developmental media systems described by the normative theories of the media. We don’t claim that there is not terrorist propaganda, disinformation and fake news in the media, just that practitioners should be wary that these terms are used variously around the world by different actors. For example, what one may describe as a “terrorist” may be a “freedom fighter” to someone else. In the end, the person who has more power and agency in a society may get to define such terms. Although many countries impose limits on transborder media, we are witnessing the emergence of a truly global communication. When monthly active users are compared with the population of countries, we see some interesting patterns: with 1.8 billion users, Facebook was the largest community in the world in 2016, followed by China (1.4 population), India (1.3 billion), WhatsApp (1.2 billion), Instagram (600 million), USA (about 320 million), Twitter, SnapChat, and Indonesia (300 million each), Brazil (200 million), Pakistan (200 million) … (Taylor, 2016). While we may be entering an era of post-truth, post-fact and post democracy (Nothhaft, 2018), [t]he distinctive characteristics of the Internet and the rapid growth of social media have enabled a social world where images and image-based narratives travel freely across

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linguistic, national and cultural borders, leading to the creation of nouveau global publics acclimatized to a culture of visual rhetoric. (Dhanesh, 2018, p. 123)

Globalism, although contested by many, is a reality, in particularly in crisis communication (Coombs, 2017; Downing, 2017; Jin, Austin, Guidry, & Parrish, 2017). Recognition of the globality of media relations got an exceptional expression when Denmark established the Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador, who represents his country not in another country or an international organization, but in relations with the largest tech and media companies around the world. The minister’s mandate is explained on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2018): “The Office of the Danish Tech Ambassador has a global mandate and a physical presence across three time zones in Silicon Walley, Copenhagen and Beijing – transcending borders and regions and rethinking diplomacy.” With the tech industry, primarily media and communications companies that have more members/users than the population of the largest countries and boast market capitalization larger than the GDP of the majority of countries of the world, we discern a complete overhaul of the topology of the world. Global media relations is here, both as an opportunity and a threat: “It demands more work in a more complex environment” (Verčič, 2009, p. 804). PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY In the first edition of the Global Public Relations Handbook, Sriramesh had proposed an approach to understanding media environments around the world especially as far as global public relations is concerned (Sriramesh, 1999). He had advocated a framework of three factors (media control, media diffusion, and media access), which should help the international/transnational/global public relations professional in designing appropriate media relations strategies depending on the part of the world where they need to operate. At its core, those three factors were intended to help the global public relations professional understand the media environment in a country and thus “localize” media relations approaches to suit that environment. That framework was also proposed with the hope of helping researcher study the nexus between media environments and effective public relations practices across different countries. We now present those three factors aligning them to the new media realities discussed above. MEDIA CONTROL Around the world, media content reflects the preferences of elites who have social capital such as the government and politicians or capitalists. Therefore, effective media relations is not possible unless the global public relations practitioner understands who controls media in a particular country or society. It is important to observe at the outset, that media ownership does not imply media control although it surely helps mainly because in different parts of the world media owners also may be involved in other enterprises including politics. In capitalistic economies usually there is also political pluralism and some amount of editorial freedom whereas in developing economies media may be privately owned but their content may be heavily influenced by political interests. In many countries the government may exercise overt and covert control over media content either by owning media or by ensuring the privately

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owned media succumb to government will. This is done in various ways. For example, economic and legal systems are under government control in most countries of the world. The European Commission has for years accused the government of Macedonia for using government advertising as a tool “to undermine editorial independence” (Cvetanoski, 2015). The Freedom House lists Russia and China as “having established near-complete control over domestic media,” and Turkey, Ethiopia and Venezuela for using “political or social unrest as a pretext to crack down further on independent or opposition-oriented outlets.” Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been reported for extending “restrictive laws to online speech, or simply shut down telecommunications services at crucial moments” (Dunham, 2018). Editorial freedom appears to be directly proportional to the level of economic development of a country. Lack of resources often force media in developing countries to succumb to the will of political elites and the government. After studying the relationship between press freedom and social development in 134 nations, Weaver, Buddenbaum, & Fair (1985) remarked that “the stronger the media are economically, the less likely [able] the government is to control these media” (p. 113). Advertisements, which form a large source of advertising revenue (and a means of survival) for private media in many developing countries, are still used by governments to maintain control over broadcast and print media. Other forms of censorship including legal harassment abound in many regions of the world as also personal dangers including kidnapping and worse. Further, it is also not uncommon for political rulers of developing nations to own their own media outlets (usually print media) and use them for controlling public opinion with the sole purpose of maintaining the status quo – their hold over the reigns of power. It is clear that in many developing nations, economic independence is a mirage for most media outlets. In several editions of his book, Bagdikian (2004) discussed the concentration of media ownership in a few corporations. Based on their owners’ revenue from advertising (which reflects their reach), the largest media owners in 2017 were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Alphabet Facebook Comcast Baidu The Walt Disney Company 21st Century Fox CBS Corporation iHeartMedia Inc Microsoft Bartelsmann Viacom Time Warner Yahoo Tencent Hearst Advance Publications JCDecaux News Corporation Grupo Globo CCTV

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21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Verizon Mediaset Discovery Communications TEGNA ITV ProSiebenSat.1 Group Sinclair Broadcasting Gropu Exel Springer Scripps Networks Interactive Twitter

It is worth noting that 20 of these largest media of the world are based in the US. Of the rest, China and Germany have three each (China: Baidu, Tencent and CCTV; Germany: Bartelsmann, ProSiebenSat1.1 and Axel Springer) while four countries have one each (France: JCDecaux, Brazil: Grupo Globo, Italy: Mediaset, UK: ITV). As “Google and Facebook together accounted for 20 percent of global advertising expenditure across all media in 2016,” (Zenith, 2017) they may currently be the largest controllers of media in the world. Facebook employs around 15,000 people who decide about, and execute “the rules, hashing out what the site’s two billion users should be allowed to say”. Facebook calls these people “moderators,” but effectively they are digital censors, and The New York Times calls them “an unseen branch of government” (Fisher, 2018) – a global government that often relies on Google Translate tool to decide what can be published in an unknown language on the other side of the planet. MEDIA DIFFUSION In the first edition of this book and elsewhere, Sriramesh had used the term “media outreach” to refer to the extent to which the media permeate a given society. In the second edition he renamed it as “media diffusion,” for greater clarity. Practicing public relations globally requires that practitioners understand the extent of media diffusion in the countries of their choice so that they are disseminating their messages to the right audience. Media diffusion is all about the audience. Who consumes which media in a given country is a vital piece of information that aids the strategic communication of every practitioner. Media diffusion is affected by the level of illiteracy and poverty in a society. West & Fair (1993) studied the use of what they termed (before the advent of the Internet of course) “modern,” “popular,” and “traditional” media in Africa and highlighted the pitfalls of the improper use of indigenous African media (or “traditional” media) for developmental activities. For example, the authors cautioned that it would be inappropriate to use Mozambique’ s paiva genre of song for “transmission of messages originating in an authority external to the very community that maintains them” because historically the songs are “suited to empowerment of the oppressed vis-a-vis authority” (p. 101). It also would be important for the international public relations practitioner to be cautious in using the Makonde and Makua genre of African sculpture, which is a medium of ridiculing officials (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983, p. 69, cited in West and Fair) and therefore, may be inappropriate for many information campaigns.

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MEDIA ACCESS The flip side of media diffusion is media access. Whereas media diffusion refers to the extent of dispersion of the mass media in a society thereby giving the practitioner an idea of whether the intended audience uses a particular medium, media access denotes the extent to which the citizenry of a society can use the mass media to disseminate their messages. Media access does not remain constant across societies. Sriramesh & Takasaki (1998), reporting on the nature of Japanese public relations, identified press clubs as interlocutors between the media and other publics, including corporations who might want to gain access to the media thereby limiting access to the media in Japan. A savvy international public relations practitioner will recognize that just as an organization’s access to the media is critical, so is the extent to which the media are accessible to those who frequently challenge organizations, such as activists. The gatekeeping function exercised by traditional media (print and broadcast media) has been greatly reduced with the onset of ICTs and social media in the past two decades. Whereas this may seem like “democratization” because it takes away the “control” of a few media editors/gatekeepers, it also can be dangerous not to have such control over media content as was evident in the US presidential elections of 2016 and beyond. Thus, the Internet, social and mobile media are reconfiguring ways in which we think about media access. As Castells (2007) observed, the Internet and wireless communication networks are enabling mass self-communication, “self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that communicate with many” (p. 248) At the time of its emergence and democratization of its use, there was a great expectation that the Internet and information-communication technology will democratise social and global communication. The Cluetrain Manifesto (Levine, Locke, Searls, & Weinberger, 2000) voiced that excitement with the starting thesis: “Markets are conversations” (see also Verčič, Tkalac Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2015). As we have shown in this chapter, that expectation has not been fulfilled, and the Internet is developing from enabler of free communication to an instrument of social (economic and political) control. As any other technology in human history, it has two sides, a positive and a negative one. CONCLUSION The media, paid, earned, social and owned are critical to strategic global public relations. By analyzing who controls the media, how much access various segments of the population have to the media (including the blurring of the gatekeeping function), and finally the extent of media outreach, media relations managers will be better able to strategize their public relations approaches in different countries and around the world. They will be able to discern the nature of challenge they can expect from the media and other sources as well as device strategies of identifying key media (and other) stakeholders who can influence effective media relations. The onset and exponential growth of digital, social, mobile and wearable media with emerging augmented and virtual reality media and artificial intelligence is altering the terrain for global public relations practice. But issues such as the Digital Divide pose interesting avenues for research in how these “new” media contribute to the information sharing dynamics in a society. As we are learn more about these media and their use and abuse around the world, hopefully we are becoming better equipped to both practice and research media relations practices around the world.

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NOTE 1 For “Blurring the lines between personal and organizational identity” see Bonewits Feldner and Tusinski Berg (2017)

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CHAPTER

5 The Nexus between Activism and Public Relations Ganga S. Dhanesh Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

When mighty Amazon announced in February 2019 that it was not going to set up its second mega headquarters in New York after all (despite a US $3 billion package of tax and other incentives promised by the Governor of New York and the Mayor of New York City), the power of grassroots activism was seen as a key factor that forced the corporate giant into the decision. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) claimed victory tweeting: “Today was the day a group of dedicated, everyday New Yorkers and their neighbours defeated Amazon’s corporate greed, its worker exploitation, and the power of the richest man in the world” (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). Her elation appeared at odds with several polls that showed popular support for Amazon’s second headquarters in New York that touted to bring over 40,000 high paying jobs to the area. The power of activist opposition was acknowledged by Amazon in its statement announcing its decision not to proceed with its previous plans taken after over two years of research and negotiations with at least 20 cities. Opposition to Amazon’s second mega headquarters was indicative of the pushback big tech companies have faced at the hands of activists lately. The likes of Facebook have been hauled before a sceptical Congress and their practices challenged in public by policymakers who hitherto had given them a free rein mostly because of vocal activist pressure. In February 2018, high school students turned into activists after a 19-year old gunned down 17 students and staff at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. They organized the March For Our Lives movement to rally for stricter gun control laws, targeting the NRA and NRA-backed politicians. Subsequently, for the first time since 2000, the NRA was viewed more negatively with public support falling to

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37 percent. Delta Airlines, Hertz and MetLife cut ties with the NRA and Dick’s Sporting Goods announced that it would stop carrying assault weapons (www.time.com). On the other side of the world, the South Korean government was heavily criticized for its handling of the 2015 Middle-East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in South Korea, which fueled public anxiety and negatively affected the nation’s economy, with local businesses reporting a sharp decrease in sales and tourism. As a result, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, the oldest NGO in South Korea, filed a class action suit against the government, representing victims and their families. These examples clearly indicate that perceptions of activists as troublemakers and rabble-rousers have given way to viewing them as relevant stakeholders with enormous power to influence the political economy of most countries but certainly the more pluralistic environments. There is a plethora of publics, individually or jointly fighting for equality, justice, peace, religious freedom, economic opportunity, or political ideology across the world, employing radical, moderate, or peaceful strategies. Their targets could be individuals or organizations including governments, companies, and NGOs. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and social media have played a major role in magnifying activism and diffusing it around the world as was seen in the #Metoo movement against sexual harassment that began in October 2017. Public relations scholarship and education have begun to acknowledge the changing representations of activists and activism ever since the earliest versions of Excellence theory positioned them as threats external to the organization that have to be managed (Brooks et al., 2018; Mules, 2018). This chapter builds on the chapter on activism and public relations in the previous edition (Kim and Sriramesh, 2009), by updating literature on activism and public relations published between 2009 and 2019, mapping the major areas of research during this decade, and offering directions for future research. Prior to the review of literature, the chapter will start with a brief review of the theoretical framework on activism and public relations offered by Kim and Sriramesh (2009). ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND ACTIVISM After reviewing various definitions of activism (Browne, 1998; Burstein, 1998; Diani, 1992; Grunig, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983; Tarrow, 1994; Wright, 1996) we had defined activism as: The coordinated effort of a group that organizes voluntarily in an effort to solve problems that threaten the common interest of members of the group. In the process of problem solving, core members of the group attract other social constituents or publics, create and maintain a shared collective identity among members for the time being, and mobilize resources and power to influence the problem-causing entity’s decision or action through communicative action such as education, negotiation, persuasion, pressure tactics, or force. (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 82)

Further, Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had identified two dimensions of activism: confrontational intensity and breadth of issue spectrum. Confrontational intensity refers to the depth or fierceness of activism and can be measured using indicators such as the use and frequency of violent action, and the number of mobilized participants. In

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the case of Amazon’s decision in scrapping its plans for HQ2 in New York, opposition by activists was intense enough to force Amazon to even go against the wishes of its own government supporters such as New York Governor Andrew Como and New York Mayor Bill de Blasio. This was also true of the activism spawned primarily by the high school students of Parkland, Florida as well. The breadth of activism is the variety of issues that activists seek to pursue. Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had posited that the political, economic, cultural, media, and organizational environments influence both these dimensions and had offered a conceptual model that mapped the effects of socio-cultural environmental variables on the extent of activism. Further, they had proposed a conceptual model that mapped the effects of socio-environmental factors (as antecedents) on the extent of activism (societal consequence), which in turn plays a role in the adoption of the generic principles of global public relations in specific societies (consequence on public relations). In essence, the authors had clarified that although viewed as a separate environmental variable, activism indeed is also affected by the other four variables discussed in other chapters in this section (Figure 5.1). Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had concluded that chapter with a call for research on (a) socio-cultural environmental variables that could foster activism in a country, (b) the extent of activism in the country including the history and frequency of activism, the nature and diversity of issues addressed by activists, and the tactics employed by activists, and (c) the relationship between activism and public relations approaches including the types of organizations targeted by activists, organizational responses to activism such as the use of the mixed-motives and personal influence models, building

Political Context Higher Liberal-Pluralism

+

Economic Context Higher Economic Prosperity

+ +

Media Context

Extent of Activism

Open Receiver Systems & Open Message Systems

+

+

+ More Collectivistic; More Masculine; High Uncertainty Avoidance; Low Power Distance; Low Long-Term Commitment

+

Cultural Context Depth of Issues (Conflict Intensity)

Breadth of Issues (Issue Spectrum)

Organizational Context High Ecological Concentration; Stronger and Broader Indigenous Organizations

Antecedent FIG 5.1 Source: Kim and Sriramesh (2009).

Consequence

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a symmetrical system of internal communication and strong corporate culture, and level of ethical consciousness and perceived need for social responsibility. Summarizing the research questions for future research we had also offered the following proposition: A society whose socio-cultural environmental factors are more conducive to fostering greater levels of activism is more likely to necessitate 1) involvement of public relations in the strategic management process, 2) use of the two-way models (or mixed-motive) approach, 3) presence of a symmetrical internal communication system, 4) higher levels of ethical consciousness and social responsibility, and 5) higher levels of knowledge among practitioners for mixed-motive and strategic approaches in responding to activism (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009, p. 94).

We will next review the literature that has been generated on activism and public relations as a way of analyzing the body of knowledge since that call almost a decade ago to see how much of what we had hoped has come to bear and then offer some thoughts on how scholars can expand the body of knowledge vis-à-vis the relationship between activism and public relations. LITERATURE ON ACTIVISM AND PUBLIC RELATIONS FROM 2009–2019 Public relations and activism have been strange bedfellows for a long time, with the literature reflecting reluctant transformations in the uneasy relationship. Scholarship on the public relations – activism nexus can be categorized into three, somewhat overlapping, groups. First, situated within the paradigm of Excellence theory, activism and activist publics were considered a necessary external threat that helped keep organizations more responsive to society and therefore excellent public relations practice (as a symmetrical function) had a role in helping organizations manage that relationship (Dozier & Lauzen, 2000). Second, scholars who have adopted a more critical approach have considered activism as a role that the public relations practitioners adopt within their organizations, actively managing their boundary spanning role as organizational agents as also activists (Dozier & Lauzen, 2000; Holtzhausen 2011; Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002). Finally, scholars have examined the variety of public relations strategies adopted by activist organizations to have their voice heard in the public sphere, while demanding social change (e.g., Brooks et al., 2018; Kang, Kim & Cha, 2018). In one of the most recent studies, Mules (2018) noted that public relations theorizing on activism has been changing from an issues and crisis perspective to a more emancipatory perspective, considering activists and their typically disruptive strategies not just as a problem to be managed by the target organization but as valid and highly creative. Coombs & Holladay (2012) noted how discussions of activism, persuasion/advocacy, and power have “to become part of the discussion in the dominant paradigm” (p. 884). Indeed, a thorough and exhaustive review of literature on public relations and activism published since the previous edition of this volume revealed that public relations scholarship on activism has been healthy, exploring diverse perspectives and strands of research building on previous foundations from the Excellence theory, rhetorical and critical perspectives, etc. We summarize these into three categories:

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1. Theoretical frameworks examining activism including the cultural-economic model based on the circuit of culture framework (Ciszek, 2015; 2016a, 2017a; Curtin, 2016; Han & Zhang, 2009); postmodernism (Benecke & Oksiutycz, 2015; Ciszek, 2016; Dhanesh, 2013; Holtzhausen, 2011); Bourdieu’s thoughts on activism (Wolf, 2018); postcolonialism (Sejrup, 2014); and economic rentseeking from public choice theory (Thompson, 2016). 2. Activist strategies studying various strategies employed by activist organizations, companies, individuals, and publics (Allagui, 2017; Brooks et al., 2018; Fisher, 2018; Toledano, 2016; Weaver, 2010); the effectiveness of activist strategies (Jahng et al., 2014; Stokes & Rubin, 2009); and antecedents of activism (Kang, Kim & Cha, 2018). 3. Digital activism that focus on studies ranging from earlier research on websitebased activism (Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Yang & Taylor, 2010) to later ones on social media-enabled activism (Ciszek, 2016; Maiorescu, 2017; Stokes & Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015) A handful of studies has also examined activism involving specific stakeholders or areas of practice such as internal activism (Curtin, 2016; Dhanesh, 2013; Holtzhausen, 2011; Maiorescu, 2017); political activism (Toledano, 2016; Toledano, 2018); investor activism (Thompson, 2018; Uysal, 2013; Uysal, 2014) and ethnic advocacy and activism (DeMoya & Bravo, 2016). Most of these studies have employed case studies of specific instances of activism to make their cases. We invite your attention to chapters later in this volume such as the one on bullfighting in Catalonia (the concept of nations within nations) and the case of Bell Pottinger in South Africa where different types of activism were evident. The following section will elaborate on the major findings from these three main categories. Theoretical Frameworks Since 2009, no single dominant theoretical framework has been used to examine activism and public relations. A few studies continue to explore specific tenets of excellence theory, especially the effectiveness of the models of public relations. For instance, Kang, Kim, and Cha (2018) examined the role of dialogic communication in triggering activism, while Maiorescu (2017) found that IBM’s union unsuccessfully engaged in an informative and one-way communication style over social media platforms, intended to increase employee engagement in activism. Another set of studies has proposed and examined activism using the culturaleconomic model based on the circuit of culture framework. Han and Zhang (2009) adopted it to analyze a public activist campaign against Starbucks in the Forbidden City and illustrated the role of culture in international public relations within an Internet-based media context, and highlighted the role of new media, specifically blogs, in China and its impact on international public relations practice. Later, Ciszek (2015) proposed the cultural-economic model as a way to examine scholarship of activism and public relations, particularly how activism and public relations need not always be positioned as being antagonistic. Curtin (2016) expanded the basic precepts of the cultural-economic model to offer a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between public relations and activism. Applying the cultural-economic model as a critical theoretical framework, Ciszek (2017a) examined

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articulations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activism, specifically LGBT youth outreach. More recently we used the conceptual framework presented in Part I of this volume to analyze the crisis of reputation that Nestle India faced as a result of activism against its popular Maggi instant noodles brand (Dhanesh & Sriramesh, 2018). This set of studies that integrates understandings of cultural production, consumption, and representation of activism acknowledges the role that culture plays in spawning, and responding to, activism (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009). In addition to the cultural-economic model, another set of studies has employed principles of postmodernism to examine activism and public relations. In the postmodernist view, concepts such as disruption and dissensus versus collaboration and consensus are explored. Holtzhausen and Voto advanced this perspective as far back as 2002 and recent research has added to this approach by empirically examining public relations practitioners as organizational activists. For instance, Dhanesh (2013) examined the conceptualization of the postmodern public relations practitioner as an organizational activist in the context of community relations and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in India and found that practitioners appeared to be dancing a delicate dialectic as organizational activists and agents at the same time. Ciszek (2016) analyzed user-generated comments to posts on Chick-fil-A’s Facebook page, exploring the concept of dissensus including various dissenting perspectives and expressions of dissensus, and proposed dissensus as an area for development in activist and social media research. Benecke and Oksiutycz (2015) employed the postmodernist worldview of public relations activists as change agents to examine the role of public relations in South African society, specifically by studying the principles and methods used by Primedia Broadcasting South Africa’s LeadSA initiative to start and facilitate social dialogue and to contribute to social change. Allagui (2017) employed a postmodernist perspective to discuss the extra-organizational activism of public relations manifested in corporate campaigns for social good in the Middle East. As these examples indicate, the postmodernist perspective has been applied to examine activism and public relations in various non-Euro American contexts, thus adding to the body of knowledge on how specific local conditions affect the application of global principles and strategies of public relations, a goal that the Handbook of Global Public Relations champions. Beyond the excellence theory, the cultural-economic model, and postmodernism there have only been scattered attempts by a few scholars to examine other diverse theoretical frameworks to study activism and public relations. These attempts include Wolf (2018)’s challenge of the functionalist paradigm of excellence theory, proposing an alternative approach to the scholarship of activist public relations based on the ideas of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Continuing this line of critical scholarship, Sejrup (2014), based on theoretical insights from Spivak, Guha, and others analyzed mass-mediated projections of relationships between public relations practitioners in the shape of activist groups and organizations, and subaltern stakeholders for whom they act as public representatives. Finally, in the context of activist investor relations, Thompson (2016) explored the relationship between the concept of economic rentseeking from public choice theory and the practice, institutions and outcomes of activist public relations and argued that activist public relations could be theorized as a practice that seeks to extract rents in the form of benefits from the political arena as a result of persuasive activity.

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The above review makes clear to us that scholars who have examined the link between activism and public relations have run the gamut between the functionalist, interpretive, and critical theoretical perspectives. In addition to proposing and applying various theoretical frameworks to study activism and public relations, a substantial body of scholarship has focused on examining the various strategies employed by activists and their target organizations/publics. Activist Strategies Within this broad area, most studies have examined the different types of strategies employed by activist organizations or individuals in order to attain their goals. Most of the work in this strand of research tends to examine the role and effectiveness of the various models of public relations ranging from one-way asymmetrical to mixedmotive models, including the examination of conflict management strategies. For instance, employing the contingency theory of conflict management, and the conflict resolution strategies posited under the mixed-motive model, Fisher (2018) examined strategies of student activists and institutional responses ranging from pure advocacy to pure accommodation and found that both parties employed advocacy strategies, with only institutions moving along the continuum from advocacy to pure accommodation. Similarly, acknowledging the role of negotiation in the relationship between activists and other entities (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009), Brooks et al. (2018) examined some of the public relations methods employed by a successful prosocial NGO to engage its publics through activism and negotiation. Toledano (2016) explored activist public relations in the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and demonstrated how practitioners may use advocacy, persuasive strategy and facilitation of genuine dialogues simultaneously and ethically to achieve organizational goals, and to seek social change. Stokes and Rubin (2009) employed rhetorical criticism to demonstrate how activists employed asymmetrical strategies of values advocacy and inoculation to win public support against deceptive, probably harmful, organizations, challenging the more collaborative slant of the two-way symmetrical or mixed-motive models. Apart from examining strategies of negotiation and advocacy, Weaver (2010), based on Bakhtin’s theorizing of the carnivalesque, argued that carnivalesque protest comprises a genre of activist public relations, which can disrupt dominant discourses on controversial issues. Employing a case study of the New Zealand group Mothers Against Genetic Engineering, Weaver (2010) demonstrated how the asymmetrical communication strategy of carnivalesque protest could create new spaces for public dialogue about social issues through promoting community relationships and influencing public opinion through emotions. Further, the study argued that carnivalesque protest challenges the idea that collaboration should be a core professional value of public relations practice. In one of the very few studies to employ a survey to examine the effectiveness of activist strategies, Jahng et al. (2014) examined publics’ evaluations of activists’ communication strategies (specifically protests, humiliation, and terrorism) and found that participants evaluated activists’ strategies of protest more positively compared to strategies of humiliation and terrorism. When protest strategies were used, the more likely the participants were to spread the information of activists via social media and had greater intention to donate to activists.

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Although Kim and Sriramesh (2009) theorizing of the relationship between activism and public relations positioned activism as a trigger for organizational responses, including the models of public relations employed, Kang, Kim, and Cha (2018) examined the reverse relationship. They proposed and tested a conceptual model that explains how citizens’ perceptions of dialogic communication by their government during a crisis might affect their intentions to engage in activism against the government. The study found that dialogic government communication could reduce citizens’ distrust against the government and the citizens’ uncertainty about the pandemic crisis. Without dialogic communication mitigating distrust in the government, citizens could experience anger, anxiety, and cynicism, which in turn could encourage citizens to engage in activism against the government, through attending rallies, signing online and offline petitions, and sending letters or emails to public officials to voice their dissenting opinions. The above set of studies examining various strategies employed by activists to further their goals adds to Kim and Sriramesh’s (2009) call for more research into the relationship between activism and the public relations approaches employed, by both activists and the targeted organizations. Continuing the study of activist strategies, but in the specific domain of online spaces, is the last main category of research on digital activism. Digital Activism As previously stated, digital activism has been on the ascendency in the past few years – especially after the popularity of social media – leveraging on the lack of “gatekeepers” to filter out information and thus providing media access to a wide range of individuals and groups. Scholarship on digital activism ranges from earlier studies on website-based activism (Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Yang & Taylor, 2010) to the more recent studies of social media-enabled activism (Ciszek, 2016; Maiorescu, 2017; Stokes & Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015). In one of the earlier studies, Seo et al. (2009) examined how transnational NGOs based in the United States make use of new media tools, specifically websites, blogs, podcasts, and wikis, in their public relations activities and found that promoting the organization’s image and fund-raising were the two most important functions of new media for the NGOs. Similarly, Han and Zhang (2009) analyzed a public activist campaign against Starbucks in the Forbidden City in the context of Internet-based media, and highlighted the role of blogs in China and its impact on activism and international public relations practice. Focusing on the use of websites, Yang and Taylor (2010) examined the relationship-building functions of Chinese ENGOs’ websites and found that although they provide information to members, the public, and the media these organizations do not focus on organizing their publics to participate in environmental social movements. Sommerfeldt (2011) examined activist group websites to study how activists engage in resource mobilization online and found that website features asking visitors to donate, join the organization, and links to other activist groups were the most commonly used. Further, Sommerfeldt et al. (2012) examined why activist organizations do not integrate dialogic features into their websites and found that according to practitioners, website communication is most effective when tied to issue-specific events and addresses the needs of existing and highly involved publics. Practitioners also considered websites as passive communication tools that must be supported with traditional public relations practices. More recently, Veil et al. (2015)

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examined strategies of online activism and demonstrated how traditional activist strategies have been adapted for the online environment. The authors proposed hoax as a strategy to trigger action and demonstrated the effectiveness of social media hijacking as a tactic. They also debunked claims of the lack of effectiveness of “slacktivism” and highlighted the need for collaborative relationships between activist groups, and the need for proactive issues management. Stokes and Atkins-Sayre (2018) examined the use of digital technologies by activists. Specifically the authors discussed how strategic, message-level digital activism can contribute to societal change and proposed the idea of “rhetorical fracturing, or quickly using digital media to puncture a target’s narrative, to create messages that challenge an opponent’s legitimacy to cultivate public opinion, thereby pressuring corporate policy change” (p.149). These studies on digital activism demonstrate how activists have leveraged the changing nature of digital affordances and especially the absence of the gatekeeping function that was evident in traditional print and broadcast media. From the use of relatively passive websites devoid of dialogic features for disseminating issue-specific information to involved publics and requesting members of the public to join and donate, activist organizations now draw on the affordances of social media to engage in tactics such as social media hijacking and rhetorical fracturing. FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION The review of literature on activism and public relations from 2009 to 2019 has revealed a strong, diverse, and vibrant growth in the literature, examining the topic using multiple theoretical perspectives, specifically examining strategies employed by activists, with an increased focus on examining digital activism, and activism in specific areas such as internal activism and financial activism. However, some areas of research highlighted in the previous edition of this book have not been adequately studied. In the previous edition, Kim and Sriramesh (2009) had called for research on (a) socio-cultural environmental variables that could foster activism in a society, (b) the extent of activism in a country including the history and frequency of activism, the nature and diversity of issues addressed by activists, and the tactics employed by activists, and (c) the relationship between activism and public relations approaches including the types of organizations targeted by activists, organizational responses to activism such as the use of the mixed-motives and personal influence models, building a symmetrical system of internal communication and strong corporate culture, and level of ethical consciousness and perceived need for social responsibility. Although research has considered culturally grounded theoretical frameworks to examine activism (e.g., Ciszek, 2015; 2016, 2017a; Curtin, 2016; Han & Zhang, 2009) much more research is needed on other socio-cultural environmental variables such as the level of economic development, the media environment, and political factors that could foster activism in a country. In addition, not many studies have focused on the extent of activism in a country analyzing the history and frequency of activist movements. Although studies have increasingly examined strategies employed by activists (Allagui, 2017; Brooks et al., 2018; Fisher, 2018; Toledano, 2016; Weaver, 2010), more research is required on organizational responses to activism and the factors that affect these responses. Further, although there is a growing body of research on digital activism (e.g., Ciszek, 2016; Maiorescu, 2017; Sommerfeldt, 2011; Sommerfeldt et al., 2012; Stokes & Atkins-Sayre, 2018; Veil et al., 2015; Yang & Taylor, 2010), there needs to be more

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studies on the ways in which digital environments interact with activism, producing newer embodiments of online behavior such as hacktivism, slacktivism, and clickvitism. Although other fields of research have examined these concepts, studies within public relations on these emergent topics are rare. Similarly, except for Thompson (2018) very few studies have examined the intersection of activism and the social responsibilities of organizations. With the increasing shift in examining activism from an externally-orientated issues and crisis management perspective to an emancipatory force for social good (Brooks et al., 2018; Mules, 2018), and with the conceptualization of corporate social responsibility as shared social responsibility among corporations, governments and civil society it will be intriguing to examine the dialectical interplays between activism and corporate social responsibility. We believe that the framework of the five environmental variables discussed in this volume can, and should, be applied to several genres of research. For example, perhaps for the first time, we applied this framework (including the relevance of activism) to crisis communication when we analyzed the reputational crisis that Nestle India encountered when its popular Maggi instant noodles brand was targeted for being contaminated and laced with lead and MSG (Dhanesh & Sriramesh, 2018). In our view, such explications help expand the body of research in domains such as crisis communication by going beyond familiar approaches by also bringing a global perspective to such discussions. To summarize, this chapter has briefly reviewed the conceptual model of the effect of socio-cultural environmental variables on the adoption of generic principles of global public relations proposed by Kim and Sriramesh (2009) in the previous edition of the Global Public Relations Handbook; analyzed three key streams of research on activism and public relations that occurred between 2009 and 2019; and identified future areas of research. REFERENCES Allagui, I. (2017). Towards organisational activism in the UAE: A case study approach. Public Relations Review, 43, 258–266. Benecke, D. R., & Oksiutycz, A. (2015). Changing conversation and dialogue through LeadSA: An example of public relations activism in South Africa. Public Relations Review, 41(5), 816–824. Brooks, K. J., Wakefield, R. I., & Plowman, K. D. (2018). Activism, prosocial public relations and negotiation: The case of St Vincent de Paul. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 23(1), 139–150. Browne, W. P. (1998). Groups, interests, and U. S. public policy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Burstein, P. (1998). Interest organizations, political parties, and the study of democratic politics. A. N. Costain & A. S. McFarland(Eds.), Social movements and American political institutions (pp. 39–56). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Ciszek, E. L. (2015). Bridging the gap: Mapping the relationship between activism and public relations. Public Relations Review, 41(4), 447–455. Ciszek, E. L. (2016). Digital activism: How social media and dissensus inform theory and practice. Public Relations Review, 42(2), 314–321. Ciszek, E. L. (2017a). Public relations, activism and identity: A cultural-economic examination of contemporary LGBT activism. Public Relations Review, 43(4), 809–816. Ciszek, E. L. (2017b). Activist strategic communication for social change: A transnational case study of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activism. Journal of Communication, 67(5), 702–718.

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Coombs, T., & Holladay, S. (2012). Fringe public relations: How activism moves critical public relations toward the mainstream. Public Relations Review, 38(5), 880–887. Curtin, P. (2016). Exploring articulation in internal activism and public relations theory: A case study. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(1), 19–34. DeMoya, M., & Bravo, V. (2016). The role of public relations in ethnic advocacy and activism: A proposed research agenda. Public Relations Inquiry, 5(3), 233–251. Dhanesh, G. S. (2013). Building communities: The postmodern CSR practitioner as a dialectical activist-agent in India. Public Relations Review, 39, 398–402. Dhanesh, G. S., & Sriramesh, K. (2018). Culture and crisis communication: Nestle India’s Maggi noodles case. Journal of International Management, 24(3), 204–214. Diani, M. (1992). The concept of social movement. The Sociological Review, 40(1), 1–25. Dozier, D. M., & Lauzen, M. M. (2000). Liberating the intellectual domain from the practice: Public relations, activism, and the role of the scholar. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(1), 3–22. Fisher, M. T. (2018). Still fighting the good fight: An analysis of student activism and institutional response. Public Relations Review, 44(1), 22–27. Grunig, L. A. (1992). Activism: How it limits the effectiveness of organizations and how excellent public relations departments respond. J. E. Grunig(Ed.), Excellence in public relations and communication management: Contributions to effective organizations (Pp. 503–530). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Han, G., & Zhang, A. (2009). Starbucks is forbidden in the Forbidden City: Blog, circuit of culture and informal public relations campaign in China. Public Relations Review, 35(4), 395–401. Holtzhausen, D. (2011). Public relations as activism: Postmodern approaches to theory and practice. New York, NY: Routledge. Holtzhausen, D. R., & Voto, R. (2002). Resistance from the margins: The postmodern public relations practitioner as organizational activist. Journal of Public Relations Research, 14(1), 57–84. Jahng, M. R., Hong, S., & Park, E. H. (2014). How radical is radical? Understanding the role of activists’ communication strategies on the formation of public attitude and evaluation. Public Relations Review, 40, 119–121. Kang, M., Kim, J.R., & Cha, H. (2018). From concerned citizens to activists: A case study of 2015 South Korean MERS outbreak and the role of dialogic government communication and citizens' emotions on public activism. Journal of Public Relations Research, 30(5-6), 202–229. DOI: 10.1080/ 1062726X.2018.1536980 Kim, J-N., & Sriramesh, K. (2009). Activism and public relations. K. Sriramesh, & D. Vercic(Eds.), A theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice (pp. 79–100). New York, NY: Routledge. Maiorescu, R. D. (2017). Using online platforms to engage employees in unionism. The case of IBM. Public Relations Review, 43(5), 963–968. Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power in and around organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Mules, P. (2018). Changing representations of activists and activism in public relations textbooks. Journal of Communication Management, 23(1), 18–30. Ocasio-Cortez, A. (2019, February 14). Anything is possible: today was the day a group of dedicated, everyday New Yorkers & their neighbors defeated Amazon’s corporate greed, its worker exploitation, and the p owe r o f t h e r i c h e s t m a n i n t h e wo r l d. Re t r i eved f ro m h t t p s : / / t w i t t e r. c o m / a o c / s t at us / 1096117499492478977?lang=en. Sejrup, J. (2014). Awakening the sufferers: Reflections on public relations, activism, and subalternity in postcolonial controversies between Taiwan and Japan. Public Relations Inquiry, 3(1), 51–68. Seo, H., Kim, J. Y., & Yang, S-U. (2009). Global activism and new media: A study of transnational NGOs’ online public relations. Public Relations Review, 35(2), 123–126. Sommerfeldt, E. J. (2011). Activist online resource mobilization: Relationship building features that fulfill resource dependencies. Public Relations Review, 37, 429–431. Sommerfeldt, E. J., Kent, M. L., & Taylor, M. (2012). Activist practitioner perspectives of website public relations: Why aren’t activist websites fulfilling the dialogic promise? Public Relations Review, 38(2), 303–312. Stokes, A.Q., & Atkins-Sayre, W. (2018). PETA, rhetorical fracture, and the power of digital activism. Public Relations Inquiry, 7(2), 149–170.

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Stokes, A. Q., & Rubin, D. (2009). Activism and the limits of symmetry: The public relations battle between Colorado GASP and Philip Morris. Journal of Public Relations Research, 22(1), 26–48. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action, and mass politics in the modern state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, G. (2016). Towards a theory of rent-seeking in activist public relations. Public Relations Inquiry, 5(3), 213–231. Thompson, G. (2018). Social gains from the public relations voice of activist investors: The case of Herbalife and Pershing Square Capital Management. Public Relations Review, 44, 481–489. Toledano, M. (2016). Advocating for reconciliation: Public relations, activism, advocacy and dialogue. Public Relations Inquiry, 5(3), 277–294. Toledano, M. (2018). Dialogue, strategic communication, and ethical public relations: Lessons from Martin Buber’s political activism. Public Relations Review, 44(1), 131–141. Uysal, N. (2014). The expanded role of investor relations: Socially responsible investing, shareholder activism, and organizational legitimacy. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 8(3), 215–230. Uysal, N., & Yang, A. (2013). The power of activist networks in the mass self-communication era: A triangulation study of the impact of WikiLeaks on the stock value of Bank of America. Public Relations Review, 39, 459–469. Veil, S. R., Reno, J., Freihaut, R., & Oldham, J. (2015). Online activists vs. Kraft foods: A case of social media hijacking. Public Relations Review, 41, 103–108. Weaver, C. K. (2010). Carnivalesque activism as a public relations genre: A case study of the New Zealand group Mothers Against Genetic Engineering. Public Relations Review, 36(1), 35–41. Wolf, K. (2018). Power struggles: A sociological approach to activist communication. Public Relations Review, 44(2), 308–316. Wright, J. R. (1996). Interest groups and congress: Lobbying, contributions, and influence. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Yang, A., & Taylor, M. (2010). Relationship-building by Chinese ENGOs’ websites: Education, not activation. Public Relations Review, 36(4), 342–351.

PART

II Current Key Global Players

CHAPTER

6 Leading an Ethical Industry Local and Global Professional Public Relations Associations Margalit Toledano David McKie

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the industry’s ethical challenges and the power of associations to lead a global and ethical industry as a timely and important topic. It is well-timed given the complexity emerging from the increasingly global contemporary digital communication environment (e.g., the worldwide proliferation of social media and the new professional associations that provide services to new subgroups of content managers); it is important as it also concerns the reputation of the industry. After identifying obstacles and the associations’ potential to deal with them, the chapter draws from literature on the sociology of the professions and ethical leadership, to examine the role of public relations associations and suggests new directions. While a comprehensive global study is beyond the scope of this research, the chapter is grounded in a study of the websites of 16 public relations national, and three regional and international, associations. It uses the websites’ content to highlight the weaknesses inherent in voluntary associations and their inability to enforce their codes of ethics. Finally, building on these findings, the chapter concludes with new strategies designed to empower professional PR associations to lead more effectively to a more ethical industry.

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WIDENING THE CONTEXT: PROFESSIONALIZATION, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, AND CODES OF ETHICS Academic writing on public relations associations and ethics, even when looking historically (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2002), tends to restrict their range to public relations literature without considering developments in other fields. Literature on sociology, for example, offers broad definitions for public relations professions, professionalization, and professional associations, which provide a context for examining public relations as in Siegrist’s (2001) relevant observation that professions in general “are characterized by special functions and structures, motives, representations, forms of knowledge, and sociocultural style” and that professionalization “refers to processes affecting the social and symbolic construction of occupation and status” (p. 12154). Siegrist (2001) goes on to observe how professions in general follow a quest for prestige and develop specific organizations (i. e., professional associations) for “collective integration, selfadministration, self-control, and for the representation of their interests” (p. 12155). The sociology of professions also studies the “patterns of organization, types of work, and social status” (Abbott, 2001, p. 12166). Sociologists, however, differ in their appreciation of the role of associations in the development of a profession. In line with most public relations literature (c.f., Pieczka & L’Etang, 2001), prominent early sociologists of the profession situated the professional association as central to the definition of a profession as illustrated in this later paraphrase of their belief that: Professions begin with the establishment of professional associations that have membership rules to exclude the unqualified. Second, they … assert their monopoly, and, most importantly, … give themselves a label capable of legislative restriction. Third, they set up a code of ethics to assert their social utility, to further regulate the incompetent, and to reduce internal competition. Fourth, they agitate politically to obtain legal recognition, aiming at first to limit the professional title and later to criminalize unlicensed work in their jurisdiction. (Abbott, 1988, p. 11)

Abbott (1988) himself does not see the professional association as central to the definition of a profession, and Freidson (2001) takes a more centrist path in relation to the role played by professional associations in the development of a profession. On the one hand, he follows Abbott by claiming that “the importance of associations for the establishment of professionalism has been greatly exaggerated by theorists and that they are not essential for the initiation of institutions of professionalism” (Freidson, 2001, p. 146). On the other hand, he acknowledges the association as “the generic mode of formal organization for professions and, for that matter, any occupation that has congealed into a ‘community’ and seeks control over its own work” (p. 146). An association, in exchange for membership dues, usually provides services and benefits to members that often include a code of ethics or conduct. According to Abbott (1983) “nearly all professions have some kind of formal ethical code” (p. 857). Such codes aim to ensure the quality of professional practice (Janosik, Carpenter, & Creamer, 2006), to set standards for acceptable professional behaviour, and to promote the profession and its members’ status and reputation. Public relations industry bodies in most countries have established codes of ethics for the same purpose but don’t have a universal system for enforcing the code’s

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principles on members. According to Macnamara (2012), the fact that membership in public relations association is voluntary makes the enforcement of codes impossible: Other than in the United Kingdom, where the CIPR [Chartered Institute of Public Relations) has gained a Royal power that affords regulatory powers, PR institutes and associations have no power to enforce codes. Without regulatory powers, PR industry bodies attempting to censure practitioners for unethical behaviour can be liable for defamation or damage. (p. 428)

Another obstacle for public relations associations is the fact that “a substantial number of practitioners are not members of industry bodies … which puts them beyond even the voluntary codes adopted by PR industry bodies” (Macnamara, 2012, p. 438). This weakness is not exclusive to public relations professional associations. Abbott (1983) observed that “large areas of professional function are served by ‘ethically questionable’ practitioners” and so “Informal enforcement of ethics among such peripheral groups seems impossible” so that only “effective competition (driving them out of business) or monopolistic licensure (including them in the zone of formal enforcement) seems effective” (p. 862). This raises large questions. Can public relations associations expel unethical members and use their case as an example for unacceptable practice? Or, should these associations promote the idea of licensing and be scrutinized by a state authority to gain legislative power over unethical members? These questions will be discussed later in this chapter. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CODES In an early study of new legal challenges for professional associations in countries joining the European Union, Evetts (1995) identified the trend of international professional associations “becoming key players in the dynamics of European single market regulations” (p. 763). As globalization expanded, so did the need to analyse “the process of internationalization of professional life” (Abbott, 2001, p. 12168). The International Public Relations Association (IPRA), was established in 1955 “to raise standards of public relations practice worldwide and improve the quality of PR practitioners” (www.ipra.org). In 1961, IPRA adopted a Code of Ethics, which was updated in 1965, 2007, and 2011, and which recommended principles of ethical conduct to public relations practitioners around the world. The new millennium saw the formation of a new international body, the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management (GA), aiming to unify all the national PR professional associations, raise professional standards all over the world, share knowledge for the benefit of its members and be the global voice for public relations in the public interest…. The Alliance works to enhance the collaborative professionalism of the industry among its constituents around the world. (www.globa lalliancepr.org/who-we-are/)

The GA’s code of ethics, adopted in 2003, was ratified by all its member organizations in a declaration of support that served to certify the organization’s adherence to the code’s principles. Nevertheless, two important questions remain. Have the international codes of ethics put forth by such associations increased shared ethical values

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across the world? Have national associations internalized generic ethical values intended to fit public relations practitioners globally? Taylor and Yang (2015) research sought answers to these questions by examining the code of ethics of 41 professional public relations associations and used Centric Resonance Analysis to assess the main concepts, their influence, and their interrelationships. They asked if there was “a core of foundational ethical values or themes that occur in every nation or are there localized cultural values that reflect the unique contexts in nations or regions?” (p. 544). Other recent cross national comparative studies indicate significant links between the sociocultural environment and public relations practitioners’ perceptions and attitudes towards ethical use of social media (Sebastião, Zulato, & Belo Santos, 2017; Toledano & Avidar, 2016). Taylor and Yang’s (2015) findings suggest that “global values that will influence organizational relationships with publics are emerging in professional communication practice” (p. 543). However, the authors did not investigate the implementation of the codes of ethics and so important questions remain: Are public relations associations worldwide enforcing the code on unethical members and, if so, how? Can the publication of a code of ethics satisfy the need for ethical guidance and for enforcement of its principles? Did national associations, in a search for prestige with no sincere effort to educate members about the implications of each ethical values on day-to-day practice, just copy the international ethical values? Or did local associations’ members go through ethical training and internalize these values? We conducted a research study that was a modest attempt to provide empirical answers to these questions. The research analysed 19 websites of public relations professional associations and online information about their codes of ethics, disciplinary procedures, ethics committees, publications of the ethics committee decisions, ethical training activities, and the availability of ethical materials and ethical cases online. Our selection was restricted to websites that were accessible in English. Accordingly, our sample was small and not representative but did include 16 national associations spread across the world (five European countries, four African, three Asian, two North American, and two Pacific nations), two international associations, and one regional association. Our aim was to provide a benchmark “snapshot” at a point in time and to use the simple analysis of the associations’ online content to provide indicative data about the issue of ethical leadership. We found that all the selected associations published a Code of Ethics on their website and India and Kenya proclaimed upfront that their code was inspired by the IPRA code. Five established associations provided evidence on ethical training online activities: the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), the Public Relations Institute of Australia (PRIA), The Pubblic Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ), the Chartered Institute of Public Relations in the UK (CIPR), and the Austrian Public Relations association (PRVA). Six other associations – the two international associations IPRA and Global Alliance, as well as the US (PRSA), the UK (CIPR), and the Australian and New Zealand associations – provided online resources, case studies, videos and other educational materials about ethics and emphasised ethical training. Significantly, for this chapter, nine associations reported on their websites about disciplinary procedures that an ethics committee could use to deal with unethical members. The Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS) describes a formal procedure where members who are judged by the ethics committee and found unethical might be subject to formal expression of disapproval, suspension of privileges, or expulsion from CPRS. The UK’s CIPR has a Professional Standards Panel and an Appeals Panel to deal with ethical breaches. Australia, New Zealand, Ireland,

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Uganda, Singapore, Kenya, and Zambia have established procedures to deal with complaints from members or members’ clients about ethical issues. Inherent Ethical Challenges Part of the public relations industry’s bad reputation comes from practitioners using manipulative, deceptive, and irresponsible tactics to achieve the goals of the organizations they serve. Public relations scholars (e.g., Bowen, 2013; Coombs & Holladay, 2014; L’Etang, 2011) have contended that ethical practice is a core challenge for the profession and Macnamara (2012) openly acknowledges how “the PR industry has struggled to come to grips with the issue of ethics” (p. 428). Public relations practitioners are often torn between their roles as advocates for the organizations they serve, their responsibilities towards the organization’s stakeholders, and their duty to society at large. This, as Coombs and Holladay (2014) point out, is a structural tension: “While the codes of ethics suggest that practitioners should consider the interests of society as a whole, obligations to clients are mentioned more frequently than obligations to the public interest” (p. 49). They go on to point out the reality “that the practitioners work for the client” who “pays the practitioners salary” and, as a result, it “may be unrealistic to expect PR professionals to disregard ‘who pays the bill’ in favor of the public interest” (p. 49). Tensions inherent in the profession surface today in scholarly debates as well as in industry codes of conduct. Taylor and Yang (2015) found the following six major themes that dominated the content of the 41 public relations codes of ethics analysed: “(1) professionalism, (2) advocacy, (3) moral standards, (4) clients’ interests, (5) expertise, and (6) relationships” (p. 543). They conclude that “across the world, public relations associations recognise the dual-responsibility for the profession to serve both clients and society/public’s interests” (p. 553). Most codes of ethics require public relations practitioners to commit to such values as honesty, integrity, transparency and at the same time commit to confidentiality in protecting the confidences of present and former clients and employers. In the UK, the CIPR explains this professional ethical value as follows: Safeguarding confidences, e.g. of present and former clients and employers. Never using confidential and ‘insider’ information to the disadvantage or prejudice of others, e.g. clients and employers, or to self-advantage of any kind. Not disclosing confidential information unless specific permission has been granted or if required or covered by law. (CIPR Code of Conduct. www.cipr.co.uk/sites/default/files/Appendix%20A%20-%20Code %20of%20Conduct%20-%20Updated%20June%202012.pdf)

The contradiction between these values is fundamental and so practitioners are not clearly guided by the industry’s codes of ethics. It is not surprising therefore, that in the competitive environment of the PR industry, many chose unethical practices while ignoring the code of ethics that can’t be enforced anyway. Enforcement Our study of 19 public relations professional associations’ websites, showed that half of the sample reported on disciplinary mechanisms to enforce the code of ethics with an ethics committee. The fact that the other half did not report on any enforcement system, indicates the confusion around PR ethics and the weakness of the associations. IPRA

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explained that as an international association it had no intention to police individual members. In addition, associations that enact disciplinary measures and even publish the ethics committee decisions might expose themselves to legal claims by punished members whose professional reputation, their major asset, has been tarnished by the association. Macnamara (2012) draws from experience to demonstrate this point: “in Australia, at least one senior PRIA official has been successfully taken to court for making censuring statements against a practitioner accused of unethical practice” (p. 428). A similar case in Israel in 2005 was settled out of court and the unethical member was compensated by a significant sum of money that the local public relations association struggled to pay. As mentioned above – the lack of legal status to enforce the code of ethics as well as the fact that too many practitioners choose not to join a public relations association, cripple the associations’ ability to lead an ethical industry. Professional Training and Licensing Based on its over 40 years of experience in enforcing its code of ethics and acting as a court judging few complaints from the industry in the US, the PRSA decided in the new millennium to change its strategy from enforcement to inspiration: “PRSA’s judicial system simply was not practical for a body that had no legal authority over its members” (Fitzpatrick, 2002). Among many challenges involved in the effort to enforce the codes of ethics, PRSA identified the experiences of many other associations that “when members were notified that they were being investigated, many simply resigned rather than go through the judicial process, continuing to practice but outside PRSA’s reach” (Fitzpatrick, 2002). Thus, they replaced enforcement with a new-found focus of helping practitioners learn about ethics and how to avoid unethical behaviour with the help of online resources, case studies, webinars, and ethics quizzes. Providing professional training is indeed a major role of associations in general and should be a core service for public relations associations whose members function in a very dynamic communication environment. However, not many public relations associations provide an ongoing training in ethics (e.g., only six out of the 19 public relations associations studied for this chapter provided ethical resources). The code of ethics by itself is not leading an ethical industry if it is not followed by consistent efforts to train and to provide resources to confused practitioners. A survey of members of the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) found in 2016 that “despite strong commitment to professional ethics only 13% of the surveyed members said that they used the PRINZ Code of Ethics to guide them in the ethical aspect of their jobs” (PRINZ Insight survey 2016). In the absence of enforceable codes of ethics and the effective training programs, the question of licensing keeps returning to the industry’s agenda. In reality, only the Brazilian government requires professionals who wish to join the public relations industry to complete a certain amount of academic training. In the rest of the world, any requirement by a government authority to limit the entry to the profession would be considered obstruction of the freedom of speech and freedom of occupation. Democracy should allow any organisation to employ professionals to represent their interests and to participate in public discussions in the media to ensure the organisation’s position is heard. No public relations professional association would welcome government control of its members. The Brazil experience demonstrates that licensing is also not an effective way to ensure an ethical industry. The military dictatorship regulated the profession there in 1976 for its own interest in the use of political propaganda and violent censorship.

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However, to avoid the regime’s requirements, public relations was practiced in Brazil under different titles (e.g., corporate communication) (Nassar & Furlanetto, 2012). TOWARD ETHICAL FUTURES: STRATEGIES AND A CONCLUSION Despite difficulties, as Lord Carter of Barnes (2011) put in the parallel context of ethical leadership in business in general, “It is not an Impossible Dream” (Carter, 2011, p. xii). One practical idea that might empower public relations associations to discipline members is simple and easy to add to existing procedures but, to the best of our knowledge, remains untried. Public relations associations usually require members to sign a pledge to uphold the code of ethics as part of their application to join. This offers members a distinctive point of differentiation from non-members, who are not committed to an ethical code, and thus might not be trusted or respected by potential clients or societies who value ethics. Currently, many public relations practitioners succeed without becoming members or committing to the code of ethics, which is the crux of the problem. However, what if the practitioners who join a public relations association would add a signed acceptance of the association’s right to judge complaints against them and to publish the decision about their cases? Such recognition might give legal protection to public relations associations against potential liability and defamation cases. Although a small innovation, the change might enable the associations to lead an ethical industry with some legal power without any resort to government intervention. Drawing again from the sociology of the professions, what Johnson (1993) called professional, or “collective altruism or service orientation” (p. 514), could also inspire another way forward. It would involve associations functioning as manifestations of collectives with pro-social goals so that the profession’s “collective altruism … is observable … the client is protected, the community is served, and practitioner privileges are ultimately justified by colleague-imposed codes of conduct” (Johnson, 1993, p. 514). Other strategies worth trying can be found in the small but growing literature on ethical leadership for leaders. Millar and Poole’s (2011) collection, Ethical Leadership: Global Challenges and Perspectives, for example, provides an array of methods (e.g., the GLOBE Leadership Project), diverse geographies and perceptions (inclusive leadership in Nicaragua and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Confucian and Chinese folk wisdom), and challenges (dealing with corporate psychopaths). That collection alone illuminates first world and third world issues and suggests how to connect the two productively. It can usefully be supplemented with Johnson’s (2018) more communication-centered work, especially his sections on “Meeting the Ethical Challenges of Leadership in a Global Society” (pp. 372–413); on making ethical choices in culturally diverse settings; and on tools for ethical climate-building. In conclusion, this chapter makes a case for further empowering professional associations as key leaders in establishing ethical public relations futures. It evaluates the role and effectiveness of public relations codes of ethics and identifies selfcontradicting values in PR codes worldwide. While examining the many ways in which that task is daunting, especially because public relations itself requires neither legal approval nor compulsory membership, the chapter suggests ways forward. It concludes that associations acting for altruistic causes might gain more respect, have more impact on the industry and, in better fulfilling their responsibility for ethical leadership, help restore the reputation of public relations as a practice and industry.

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REFERENCES Abbott, A. (1983). Professional ethics. American Journal of Sociology, 88(5), 855–885. Abbott, A. (1988). The system of the professions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Abbott, A. (2001). Professions, sociology of. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Balters (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioural sciences (Vol. 18, pp. 12166–12169). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Bowen, S. A. (2013). Ethics of public relations. In R.L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public relations (Vol. 1, 2nd ed., pp. 304–306). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Carter, S. C. (2011). Foreword. In C. C. J. M. Carter & E. Poole (Eds.), Ethical leadership: Global challenges and perspectives (pp. ix–xiv). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Coombs, T. W., & Holladay, S. J. (2014). It’s not just PR: Public relations in society (2nd ed.). Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell. Evetts, J. (1995). International professional associations: The new context for professional projects. Work, Employment & Society, 9(4), 763–772. Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2002). Evolving standards in public relations: A historical examination of PRSA’s code of ethics. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 17(2). 89–110 www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.waikato.ac.nz/doi/pdf/ 10.1207/S15327728JMME1702_02?needAccess=true Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: The third logic. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Janosik, S. M., Carpenter, S. & Creamer, D. G. (2006). Beyond professional preparation programs: The role of professional associations in ensuring a high quality workforce. College Student Affairs Journal, 25(2), 228–237. Johnson, C. E. (2018). Meeting the ethical challenges of leadership: Casting light or shadow (6th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Johnson, T. (1993). Professions. In W. Outhwaite & T. Bottomore (Eds.), The Blackwell dictionary of twentieth-century social thought (pp. 513–515). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. L’Etang, J. (2011). Public relations and marketing: Ethical issues and professional practice in society. In G. Cheney, S. May & D. Munshi (Eds.), The handbook of communication ethics (pp. 221–240). New York, NY: Routledge. Macnamara, J. (2012). Public relations: Theories, practices, critiques. Sydney, Australia: Pearson. Millar, C., & Poole, E. (Eds.). (2011). Ethical leadership: Global challenges and perspectives. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Nassar, P., & Furlanetto, M. (2012). Public relations in Brazil: Its history and its challenges. In T. Watson (Ed.). The proceedings of the international history of public relations conference 2012. Retrieved 5 March, 2018 from http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/20495/3/IHPRC-2012-Proceedings2.pdf. Pieczka, M., & L’Etang, J. (2001). Public relations and questions of professionalism. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Handbook of public relations (pp. 223–235). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Sebastião, S. P., Zulato, G. & Belo Santos, T. (2017). Public relations practitioners’ attitudes towards the ethical use of social media in Portuguese speaking countries. Public Relations Review, 43(4), 537–546. Siegrist, H. (2001). Professionalization/Professions in history. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Balters (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioural sciences (Vol. 18, pp. 12154–12160). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Taylor, M., & Yang, A. (2015). Have global ethics values emerged in the relations industry? Evidence from national and international professional public relations associations. Journal of Business Ethics, 130(3), 543–555. Toledano, M., & Avidar, R. (2016). Public relations, ethics, and social media: A cross-national study of PR practitioners. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 161–169. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.11.012.

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7 The Development and Challenges of Global Public Relations Agencies Donald K. Wright

INTRODUCTION As noted communications scholar Culbertson (2009) has explained, prior to the 1980s, development of the public relations industry took place mainly in North America and Europe. Others have pointed out most of the early literature about international public relations consisted of articles designed to help American and other Western practitioners be successful abroad (Cutlip, 1994, 1995; Wouters, 1991). Cutlip’s (1994, 1995) books about public relations history that total more than a thousand pages have fewer than a dozen of them mention anything about public relations practiced outside of the U.S. Sriramesh (2004) notes a solid increase in the study of international public relations as globalization became a reality with the beginning of the 21st century. Freitag and Stokes (2009) indicate that when public relations is practiced in international settings it frequently is combined with related disciplines such as marketing and advertising. Verčič, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1993) note that when public relations is practiced in international settings it is influenced by factors such as culture and politics. Leaf (2012), a long-time Burson-Marsteller executive who held many international assignments, explained it this way, “people in different countries can differ dramatically in their attitudes and reactions to everyday events and situations. What we communicate and how we communicate has to be adjusted similarly if we are to be effective” (p. 7). Molleda (2009) notes many organizations “virtually and physically interact and communicate with … audiences outside their own country of origin to build a dynamic set of relationships” (p. 1). Sharpe and Pritchard (2004) suggest this leads to greater interdependence and interconnectivity among societies, various groups of people, and 73

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organizations worldwide and parallels the evolution of both the practice and the study of public relations all over the world. Wilcox and Cameron (2012) estimate more than three million people now practice public relations worldwide including an estimated 300,000 in the U.S. and 50,000 in the U.K. They also suggest the number of public relations agencies in the U.S. now is between 7,000 and 10,000. ROLE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS AGENCY As pointed out previously (Wright, 2013), most public relations services are provided in one or two different ways. Sometimes they are delivered by public relations and communications specialists employed full-time by an organization. At other times they are provided through business entities formed by a group of communication practitioners and popularly known as public relations “agencies” or “firms.” On some occasions a combination of these is the rule. Public relations agencies have enjoyed considerable success during the past 75 years. While much of this success has surfaced in the U.S., a good portion of it during recent decades has come from operations in other parts of the world. According to PR Week (2017), considered by many to be the world’s leading public relations trade journal, the world’s ten largest public relations agencies generated $5 billion in global revenues during 2016. Seven of these Top 10 firms were headquartered in the U.S. with the other three agencies based in France, the U.K., and China. These agencies also contribute considerably to job creation for public relations practitioners with nearly 45,000 people being employed by the 30 largest global public relations agencies (PR Week, 2017). According to Cutlip and Center (1971), the forerunner of today’s public relations agency was the Publicity Bureau founded in Boston in 1900 by George V.S. Michaelis, Herbert Small, and Thomas O. Marvin. The success of this early firm led to the establishment of others such as Parker & Lee in 1905 headed by George Parker and noted public relations practitioner Ivy Lee. During World War I, when U.S. governmental propaganda was directed by George Creel and the Committee on Public Information, a number of soon-to-be noted public relations people were trained for the industry. This included the noted Edward L. Bernays and Carl Byoir who at the war’s end formed Carl Byoir and Associates which was one of the nation’s major public relations agencies for several decades. The Publicity Bureau was highly successful for several years performing work focused mainly on publicity and press-agentry, much of it with three major clients: AT&T, Harvard University, and America’s railroads. The firm would soon lose several major accounts and some of its best employees moved on to other endeavors (Cutlip, 1994). Several other successful agencies would open for business during the next 25 years but few of them survived after their principals retired. The main exceptions to this trend were Ketchum, Hill & Knowlton, and Carl Byoir & Associates. Ketchum, founded as an advertising agency by George Ketchum in Pittsburgh in 1923, later moved into public relations and remains one of the world’s largest and most successful agencies. Hill & Knowlton was founded in 1927 and remains one of the worldʼs largest and most successful public relations firms. Carl Byoir & Associates was founded in 1930 and remains one of the best known and most highly-respected names in the public relations industry. Byoir died 1957 and the firm continued to function profitably and successfully for two decades before it became part of Hill & Knowlton.

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INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION Cutlip (1994) and Leaf (2012) have pointed out that public relations agencies based in the U.S. have experienced greater success expanding into other countries than firms headquartered elsewhere. A noted exception would be Eric White & Associates. While the American firms Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller were taking their initial steps exploring expansion into Europe, the Australian-based Eric White & Associates was opening offices in London, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. The founder of this firm, Eric White was the public relations officer of the Australian Liberal Party and previously had served as press secretary to Sir Robert Menzies the former Prime Minister of Australia. White’s agency changed its name to Associated Management Services Limited in 1971 and later merged with Hill & Knowlton in 1974 (Brown, 1989; Dwyer, 1961). GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS OF MAJOR PR AGENCIES As Burson explains (2017, p. 175), with the exception of Eric White & Associates, “For three decades, Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton were the only international public relations firms.” That’s why we are profiling the global expansions of both agencies in this chapter. Branching out into the global arena created large financial risks for both of these firms. It’s a well-known fact that Hill & Knowlton’s overseas operations lost money for nearly a decade and Burson-Marsteller also struggled financially during the first years it operated offices outside of the U.S. International Growth of Hill & Knowlton Hill & Knowlton (H&K) was founded in Cleveland by John Hill and Don Knowlton in 1927. It sold to the advertising group J. Walter Thompson (JWT) for US$ 28 million in 1980. JWT was later sold to WPP for US$ 585 million in 1987. The two most thorough sources detailing the global expansion of this company are John Hill’s (1963) book, The making of a public relations man, and Miller’s (1999) detailed history of Hill & Knowlton, The voice of business: Hill & Knowlton and postwar public relations. Miller, a highly-respected public relations historian, has been critical of gaps in the historical literature of the public relations indicating, “If the literature on public relations history is incomplete, the story of its emigration from the United States is even less well documented, both in completeness and in accuracy” (Miller, 1999, p. 151). In some ways the global expansion of H&K was initiated by accident growing out of international communication needs expressed by U.S.-based clients such as Procter & Gamble, Texaco, and Standard Oil of Ohio during the early 1950s. International growth also was facilitated thanks to considerable interest in a public relations audit system the agency developed about this time. Miller claims H&K had established an office in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1949 in connection with client work promoting Colombian trade and tourism in North America. H&K established its first European office in Paris in 1954. Loet Velmans, who would later become head of the agency’s global operations and eventually rise to become H&K’s CEO, managed this Paris office. As H&K’s European operations grew under Velmans’ leadership, the agency established consulting agreements with a number of practitioners from various parts of Europe, many with impressive credentials. Essentially, these PR people worked on

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their own accounts in addition to handling H&K assignments. All of this apparently came with, “An awareness of cultural differences (that) produced a more broadminded international hiring policy than otherwise prevailed” (Miller, 1999, p. 165). H&K’s business operations in Europe would soon expand into Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K. By 1960 H&K was doing business in 30 countries outside of the U.S. and an international coordinating office was established in Geneva but later move to London. For a number of years, H&K would continue to be the most dominant global public relations firm, some suggesting it represented a model that other agencies would follow as they explored the global public relations market. Today H&K operates 87 offices in various parts of the world. Global Expansion of Burson-Marsteller Burson-Marsteller (B-M) was formed in 1953 by Harold Burson and Bill Marsteller, sold to advertising agency Young & Rubican in 1979, and became part of WPP in 2000. The global expansion of B-M has been thoroughly addressed by Burson (2004, 2017) and Leaf (2012), in Burson’s two self-authored books The business of persuasion: Harold Burson on public relations and e pluribus unum: The making of BursonMarsteller and through Heath’s book, The art of perception: Memoirs of a life in PR. After considerable discussion about the benefits of opening an office in London (where everyone spoke English) or Switzerland (for tax reasons), B-M opened its first overseas office in Geneva in March of 1961. Once the decision had been made to base the office in Switzerland, a major reason favoring Geneva was because H&K had an office there without any competition. A good number of the clients of the B-M Geneva office were well-known U.S. companies operating in Switzerland where they could take advantage of significant tax breaks. However, when the U.S. Congress passed the Tax Equalization Bill of 1962, which taxed corporate income earned outside the U.S. at the normal U.S. rate, many of these clients moved their European headquarters to Brussels. That’s the major reason B-M transferred almost half of its European staff from Geneva to Brussels in 1965. About this time, they also moved Robert Leaf from New York to Brussels. Leaf headed the B-M Brussels office for three years and then became manager of all B-M European operations. Once the firm expanded into Asia, Leaf took on the title of International CEO. As overseas business continued to grow for B-M the agency turned to small agencies in the U.K., France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Italy to fulfill its needs. Frequently, in situations where this method of operating yielded business success, these agencies would later merge with B-M. In the early 1970s B-M initiated its original work within the Soviet Union by doing three-year’s worth of work for the Soviet state advertising agency. Several years later the agency expanded into Asia beginning with a joint venture and an office in Tokyo followed shortly by offices in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. The Hong Kong office was particularly important because it paved the way for B-M’s later development in Beijing and other parts of China. The B-M global expansion would continue with the establishment of offices in South America in the mid-1970s, opening operations in Australia (both Sydney and Melbourne) in 1980, and developing offices in India, the Middle East, and Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. Today B-M has 77 offices around the world.

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Other Elements of Global Expansion Although John Hill, Harold Burson and their PR firms played a larger role than most in the global development of the public relations industry, others made significant contributions. Today all of the world’s major public relations firms have an international presence and a global reach. Shortly after Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller expanded overseas, Edelman (then known as Daniel J. Edelman, Inc.) established international operations beginning in London with assistance from well-known international practitioner Michael Morley. During this time, international expansion also took place in the Asia-Pacific region with Tokyo-based Taiji Kohara. According to Morley (2009), Kohara founded International Public Relations (IPR), a network of PR firms that had offices in 43 countries in Asia and the Pacific. Later this network would be acquired by Shandwick and today is part of Weber Shandwick, the PR agency second in size to Edelman. As Morley (2009) also notes, one of the UK’s most accomplished communications executives was Tim Traverse-Healy who built Infoplan into a major operation and went on to become an early pioneer in international public relations. A contemporary of Traverse-Healy was Jacques Coup de Frejac long recognized as one of the most influential French PR practitioners. Traverse-Healy and Coup de Frejac were both instrumental in the founding and development of the International Public Relations Association (IPRA) which began in 1955 and provided training, development, and networking opportunities for those who worked in more than one country throughout the public relations industry. Although IPRA did have members who were employed in corporate and governmental public relations they were outnumbered by those who worked with public relations firms and/or served as communication consultants. Other noted leaders during IPRA’s initial years were Sir Tom Fife Clark, John A. Keyser, Dennis Buckle, and Sam Black (the UK); Jean Choppin de Janvry (France); Albert Oeckl (Germany); Göran Sjöberg (Sweden); J. Carroll Bateman, Ed Lipscomb, and Robert L. Bliss (USA); Charles van der Straten Waillet (Belgium); Manos B. Pavlidis (Greece); Roy Sanada (Japan); Anand Akerkar (India); Alain Modoux (Switzerland); Mahmoud El Gohary (Egypt); Betûl Mardin (Turkey); Michael Barzilay (Israel); and Anne van der Meiden (Netherlands). At one point IPRA enjoyed a strong global impact and more than 1,000 members representing more than 100 countries, but today it is only a fraction of that size and influence. Global Holding Companies As we have noted previously (Wright, 1997, 1998, 2013), until the mid-1970s virtually all of the major public relations firms operated as independent agencies many of them partnered with advertising agencies. However, since then several publicly traded global holding companies have purchased a large number of these public relations agencies not only in the U.S. but also around the world. The two largest of these conglomerates are the WPP Group and the Omnicom Group. Omnicom has annual revenue of close to US$15 billion and includes top-ten public relations agencies Fleishman-Hillard and Ketchum. WPP has annual revenue of more than US$10 billion and includes top-ten public relations firms Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton. Other major holding companies and their major public relations firms include Publicis Groupe (MSL Group, formerly Manning Selvage Lee), and Interpublic

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(Financial Relations Board, Golin, and Weber Shandwick). Edelman, the world’s largest public relations agency, continues to operate independently. THE WORLD’S LEADING GLOBAL PR AGENCIES As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate, as of 2017, Edelman is the world’s largest public relations agency with 5,903 global employees (2,625 in the U.S.) and global revenue of nearly US$875 million. Weber Shandwick is the second largest with 4,700 global employees (2,860 in the U.S.) and worldwide revenue of US$808 million. Both of these firms are headquartered in the U.S.; Edelman in Chicago and Weber Shandwick in New York. Unlike most of the other Top 20 global agencies that are owned by major holding companies, Edelman remains independent in terms of ownership and currently operates 76 global offices with 19 in the U.S. This includes 500 employees based in the U.K. and 1,352 working in Asia. Richard Edelman, son of the late founder, Daniel J. Edelman, is the CEO. In 2011, Edelman became the world’s first $600 Million public relations agency. As Table 7.2 shows, although Weber Shandwick has more U.S.-based employees than Edelman, it still trails in U.S. revenue with $459 million to Edelman’s $532 million. Weber Shandwick has 76 global offices with 22 in the U.S. and is owned by the Interpublic Group that is part of Constituency Management Group. The firm was formed in 2001 via a merger between Weber Group, founded in 1987, and Shandwick International, created in 1974. Its CEO is Andy Polansky.

TABLE 7.1 PR Week Global Agency Rankings 2017 Rank

Agency Name

Headquarters

Employees

Global Revenue 2016 (US$)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Edelman Weber Shandwick FleishmanHillard Ketchum MSL Group Burson-Marsteller Hill+Knowlton Strategies Ogilvy Brunswick BlueFocus Cohn & Wolfe Golin MCI Group FTI Consulting ICF/ICF Olson Porter Novelli Sunny Side Up W2O Group APCO Worldwide Vector

USA USA USA USA France USA USA USA U.K. China USA USA Germany USA USA USA Japan USA USA Japan

5,903 4,700 2,800 2,635 3,133 2,700 2,750 2,703 895 2,440 1,405 1,500 996 647 912 720 336 472 672 589

$874,814,426 $808,000,000 $590,000,000 $540,000,000 $498,000,000 $450,000,000 $390,000,000 $375,000,000 $276,522,000 $271,018,736 $218,000,000 $202,000,000 $195,276,941 $191,184,000 $155,566,678 $151,500,000 $124,999,999 $122,715,000 $120,622,100 $106,000,000

Source: “Agency Business Report,” (2017). PR Week, May, p. 68.

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TABLE 7.2 PR Week U.S. Agency Rankings 2017 Rank

Agency Name

Headquarters

U.S.-Based Employees

U.S. Revenue 2016

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Edelman Weber Shandwick FleishmanHillard Ketchum Burson-Marsteller MSL Group Hill+Knowlton Strategies IFC/IFC Olson Golin Ogilvy W2O Group Porter Novelli Brunswick Cohn & Wolfe WE Communications inVentive Health PR Group FTI Consulting Finn Partners APCO Worldwide PMK-BNC

Chicago New York St. Louis New York New York Paris New York Fairfax, VA Chicago New York San Francisco New York London New York Bellevue, WA New York New York New York Washington, DC Los Angeles

2,625 2,860 1,750 1,675 930 565 660 686 725 472 432 510 254 670 477 277 260 448 249 271

$532,900,000 $459,000,000 $440,000,000 $360,000,000 $232,000,000 $175,000,000 $152,000,000 $131,707,108 $126,000,000 $125,000,000 $113,511,155 $110,000,000 $109,117,750 $103,000,000 $83,787,000 $77,150,000 $76,500,000 $73,217,440 $66,474,900 $64,000,000

Source: “Agency Business Report,” (2017). PR Week, May, p. 62.

As Barrett (2017) and others have noted, much of the phenomenal international and domestic success Edelman and Weber Shandwick have enjoyed in recent years can be attributed to the leadership of Richard Edelman at Edelman and to Andy Polansky of Weber Shandwick. Following a considerable global revenue drop of more than $200 million, FleishmanHillard and Ketchum, two other U.S.-based agencies, occupy third and fourth place when the world’s major public relations firms are compared according to global revenues. FleishmanHillard, based in St. Louis had global revenues of $590 million in 2016, including $440 million in US revenue. FleishmanHillard’s President and CEO is John Saunders and ownership is through the Omnicom Group a part of Diversified Agency Services. FleishmanHillard has 83 global offices (37 in the U.S.) and 2,800 global employees (1,750 in the U.S.). This firm has 250 employees in London and 500 in Asia. Ketchum, another Omnicom Group agency, is headquartered in New York with 2,635 global employees (1,735 in the U.S.). This employee pool includes 220 in London and 90 in Asia. Ketchum’s 2016 global revenue was $540 million ($360 million in the U.S.). The firm has 76 global offices (30 in the U.S.). Rob Flaherty is the CEO. Ketchum has enjoyed phenomenal international and domestic growth during the past decade, much of it coming between 2000 and 2012 when Ray Kotcher was CEO (Sudhaman, 2016). These four American-based public relations firms are the four largest in both the nation and the world based upon 2016 revenue. Fifth on the global revenue list is MSL Group that is based in Paris, France, and is owned by Publicis Groupe. Guillaume

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Herbette is MSL’s global CEO and Ron Guirguis is CEO for the U.S. MSL has 117 offices worldwide and 15 offices in the U.S. Global revenue for 2016 was $480 million ($175 million coming from the U.S.). MSL Group has 3,133 global employees with 565 based in the U.S. This firm has 207 employees based in London and 1,325 based in Asia. Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton (operating today as Hill + Knowlton Strategies), the two firms who pioneered European expansion by U.S.-based public relations agencies, wound up sixth and seventh on the global revenue list and fifth and seventh when only U.S. revenue was counted. Both are headquartered in New York and owned by WPP. Burson-Marsteller has 77 offices around the world with 13 in the U.S. Its 2016 global revenue was $450 million ($232 million in the U.S.). This agency has 2,700 global employees and 930 from the U.S. It has 120 employees in London and 850 in Asia. The CEO and Worldwide Chair is Don Baer. Mike Fernandez is U.S. CEO and Margaret Key is the CEO for Asia-Pacific. Harold Burson, who turned 96 years old in 2017, now has the title of Founder and Chairman and remains somewhat active in the firm continuing to occupy his corner office most weekdays. Hill + Knowlton Strategies boasts 2016 global revenue of $390 million ($152 million in the U.S.). This agency reports having 2,750 global employees (660 in the U.S.) with 87 offices throughout the world and 12 in the U.S. Hill + Knowlton has 310 employees based in London and 610 working in Asia. Jack Martin is Global Executive Chairman and CEO while Beth Balsam is U.S. President and CEO. Ogilvy, a WPP firm based in New York, placed eighth in terms of global revenue of $375 million but only wound up tenth on the U.S. list with $125 million. Ogilvy has 2,703 employees around the world with 472 in the U.S. The agency has 86 global offices and nine in the U.S. Ogilvy has 264 employees based in London and 1,365 in Asia. Stuart Smith is Global CEO for Public Relations while John Seifert is Worldwide Chairman and CEO. Two agencies headquartered outside of the U.S. represent the ninth and tenth largest public relations firms based upon 2016 revenue. Brunswick Partners, headquartered in London, U.K., placed ninth with nearly $277 million in global revenue while BlueFocus, based in Beijing, China, was tenth with $271 million. Brunswick Partners claims to have 895 worldwide employees including 24 offices in 14 different countries. Brunswick has 271 employees based in the U.S. and that function of the firm generated revenues of $109 million during 2016. Susan Gilchrest is CEO. Blue Focus (also known as Citizen Relations in some markets) has 2,440 employees. Although most of the BlueFocus business is based in China the firm is in the process of expanding its North American operations out of U.S. headquarters that are based in the Silicon Valley of California. Cohn & Wolfe, based in New York, and Golin, headquartered in Chicago, placed 11th and 12th in terms of global revenue in 2016. Cohn & Wolfe generated $218 million and Golin had $202 million. Cohn & Wolfe, owned by WPP, has 1,405 employees working in 58 offices throughout the world. This includes 13 U.S. offices with $103 million in 2016 U.S. revenue. Donna Imperato is CEO. Golin, owned by the Interpublic Group, claims 53 global offices with nine in the U.S. It has 1,500 employees around the world and 725 in the U.S. where 2016 revenue generated was $126 million. Cohn & Wolf and Golin have relatively equal headcounts in the U.K. and Asia and both agencies generated more than $22 million in each of these markets in 2016. Golin made considerable senior leadership transition news recently when Fred Cook, who

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had been Chairman and CEO, relinquished the CEO’s title. He was replaced by three “co-CEOs” with Gary Rudnick being based in Chicago and having responsibility for the Americas plus finance, human resources, and client management; Matt Neal based in New York and responsible for the firm’s vision, looking after new products, thought leadership, and agency reputation; and John Hughes, based in Asia, being responsible for international operations, global expansion, practices, and partnerships. MCI Group, based in Germany, and 15th in 2016 global revenue at $195 million, was one of three additional agencies based outside of the U.S. who scored in the international Top 20. The other two were Japan based agencies Sunny Side Up and Vector. Sunny Side Up was 15th with $125 million in global revenue while Victor placed 20th with $106 million. The American-based firms rounding out the Top 20 global list were FTI Consulting in 14th place, ICF/ICF Olson at 15th, Porter Novelli in 16th place, W2O Group at 18th place, and APCO Worldwide finishing 19th. FTI Consulting is a business and management consulting firm based in Washington, DC, with sizable public relations operations. It has 647 public relations employees and generated $191 million in 2016 global PR revenue. Steve Gunby is the CEO. ICF/ICF Olson, based in Fairfax, Virginia, just outside of Washington, DC, has grown considerably during the past two years. The firm claims 912 employees worldwide and had $155 million in 2016 revenue. It has 62 offices throughout the U.S. and eight offices in other parts of the world. Principals of this agency are Kris Tremaine, Senior Vice President and division leader of ICF/ICF Olson and Bryan Specht, President of Olson Engage. Porter Novelli at 16th, W20 Group at 18th, and APCO Worldwide at 19th round out the remaining American-based agencies in the global Top 20. Under the leadership of CEO Brad MacAfee, New York-based Omnicom Group firm Porter Novelli has 720 employees, 35 offices throughout the world and reported 2016 global revenue of $151 million. W2O is headquartered in San Francisco, has 13 offices throughout the world, 472 employees, and 2016 global revenue of $123 million. Jim Weiss is CEO. APCO Worldwide is headquartered in Washington, DC, has 672 global employees, and had 2016 revenue of $121 million. The firm has 31 offices throughout the world with six in the U.S. Margery Kraus is Founder and Executive Chairman while Brad Staples is CEO. THE CHANGING NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS Studies conducted each year since 2007 by the European Association of Communication Directors (EACD) and the European Public Relations Education and Research Association (EUPRERA) have explored current practices and future developments of public relations in 50 European countries (European Communication Monitor, 2017). Although public relations in the U.S. and elsewhere used to focus only on what to say and how to say it, this systematic analysis of the growth and development of public relations practice in Europe continues to show evidence that the role of public relations is expanding to the point where each year more public relations people are being asked to help organizations decide what to do and how to do it in addition to what to say and how to say it. Unfortunately, however, studies such as this EUPRERA research continue to point out that many senior managers are not aware of the full range of organizational contributions that public relations functions can deliver. Indeed, results of the 2017 report indicate, “Top managers are perceived to be more interested in the traditional (publicity) function

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of the department and seem to doubt a role for (public relations) in the strategic development of the organization” (p. 91). Meanwhile, Richard Edelman, CEO of the agency that bears his name, has pointed out for the past three years that Edelman has decided “to go beyond the narrow box of PR” in the services it offers (p.30). Steve Barrett, Editor of PR Week in the U.S. claims, “the bigger story is that PR is becoming one cog in a wheel of wider services, as the big agency holding companies crunch vertical disciplines together and go to market with more holistic and horizontal offers” (p.4). Barrett also notes that as Edelman and Weber Shandwick, the world’s two largest public relations agencies in terms of revenue, continue with operational models not built around agency groups or particular markets, both of these firms enjoy positions “significantly more than $200 million ahead of the number three player in the global market” (p.4). Needless-to-say the current state of public relations agencies is extremely healthy today not only in the U.S. and Europe but all over the world. REFERENCES Agency Business Report, PR Week. May. Barrett, S. (2017). Revenue still rising in era of integration and transformarion. In, Agency Business Report, PR Week. May. Brown, M. (1989). Eric White: Still a Human Oyster. Sydney (Australia) Herald July 25, p. 14. Burson, H. (2004). E Pluribus Unum: The Making of Burson-Marsteller. New York: Burson-Marsteller. Burson, H. (2017). The Business of Persuasion. New York: Rosetta Books. Culbertson, H.M. (2009). Foreword. In A.R. Freitag & A.Q. Stokes (Eds.), Global Public Relations: Spanning Borders, Spanning Cultures (pp. xiv–xv). New York: Routledge. Cutlip, S.M. (1994). The Unseen Power. Public Relations. A History. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cutlip, S.M. (1995). Public Relations History: From the 17th to the 20th Century. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cutlip, S.M. & Center, A.H. (1971). Effective Public Relations (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Dwyer, T.J. (1961). The Australian Public Relations Handbook. Ruskin Publishing. European Communication Monitor (2017). Brussels: European Association of Communication Directors and European Public Relations Education and Research Association. Freitag, A.R. & Stokes, A.Q. (2009). Global Public Relations: Spanning Borders, Spanning Cultures. New York: Routledge. Hill, J.W. (1963). The Making of a Public Relations Man. New York: David McKay. Leaf, R. (2012). The art of perception: Memoirs of a life in PR. London: Atlantic Books. Miller, K.S. (1999). The Voice of Business: Hill & Knowlton and Postwar Public Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Molleda, J.C. (2009). Global public relations. Paper written for the Body of Knowledge Project of the Institute for Public Relations. Accessed at: www.instituteforpr.org/global-public-relations/ Morley, M., (2009). How to manage your global reputation: The public relations agency. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (Eds.), The Global Public Relations Handbook (2nd ed., pp. 861–869). New York: Routledge. Sharpe, M.L., & Pritchard, R.J. (2004). The historical empowerment of public opinion and its relationship to the emergence of public relations as a profession. In D.J. Tilson & E.C. Alozie (Eds.), Toward the Common Good; Perspectives in International Public Relations (pp. 14–36). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Sriramesh, K. (2004). Public relations practice and research in Asia: A conceptual framework. In Sriramesh, K. (Ed.), Public Relations in Asia: An Anthology (pp. 1–28). Singapore: Thomson. Sudhaman, A. (2016). Ray Kotcher steps down after 32 years with Ketchum. Holmes Report. January 6. Accessed at: www.holmesreport.com/latest/article/ray-kotcher-steps-down-after-32-years-with-ketchum

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Verčič, D., Grunig, J.E. & Grunig, L.A. (1993). Global and specific principles of public relations: Evidence from Slovenia. Paper presented to BledCom conference. July. Wilcox, D.L. & Cameron, G.T. (2012). Public Relations Strategies and Tactics (10th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Wouters, J. (1991). International Public Relations. New York: amacom. Wright, D.K. (1997). Perceptions of corporate communication as public relations. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 2(4), 143–154. Wright, D.K. (1998). Validating credibility measures of public relations and communications: Interviews with senior-level managers and executives from other corporate disciplines. Journal of Communication Management, 3(2), 105–118. Wright, D.K. (2013). Structure and development of the public relations agency in the United States: Operational structure, clients, fees and talent,”. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 7(2), 136–148.

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8 State Capture and the Demise of Bell Pottinger Misusing Public Relations to Shape Future Kakistocracies? Ronel Rensburg

INTRODUCTION The word kakistocracy hails from the Greek words kakistos (κάκιστος – worst) and kratos (κράτος – rule), with a literal meaning of “government by the worst people.” Power abuse by governments and individual leaders across the world are presently rampant. Disconcerting for the practice of public relations is the employment thereof to encourage kakistocrats around the world. The Bell Pottinger incident in South Africa is a demonstration of public relations counsel for the abuse of power in state capture. The episode, lasting almost two years, saw the demise of the Bell Pottinger public relations agency, the resignation of the president of South Africa Jacob Zuma, and ensuing investigations of other companies and individuals. It weaves a condemnatory tale about how one of the United Kingdom’s best-known public relations agencies caused its own destruction through an irresponsible campaign that was conceived to stoke racial division in South Africa. The first part of this chapter unpacks the Bell Pottinger public relations scandal and its global consequences. The second part considers the lessons that surfaced from the scandal for the future direction of public relations. THE SHAPING OF FUTURE KAKISTOCRACIES The earliest usage of the word kakistocracy dates back to the 17th century, in a sermon preached at the Publique Fast the ninth day of August at St. Maries (Gosnold, 1644). English author Thomas Love Peacock later used the term in his 1829 novel The misfortunes of

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Elphin in which he describes that kakistocracy represents the opposite of aristocracy (Peacock, 1829). American poet James Russell Lowell used the term in 1876 by writing: What fills me with doubt and dismay is the degradation of the moral tone. Is it or is it not a result of Democracy? Is ours a ‘government of the people by the people for the people,’ or a Kakistocracy rather, for the benefit of knaves at the cost of fools? (Fiske, 2011)

The term recaptured recognition during the 2016 US presidential election by critics of Donald Trump when they argued that the United States was in danger of becoming a kakistocracy. One of the prominent notions of kakistocracy is reputation laundering, which comprises a web of interrelated practices that go beyond the economic realm to encompass various social-networking and political techniques. These practices include running aggressive image-crafting public relations campaigns and transnational alliances (Cooley, Heathershaw & Sharman, 2018). Kakistocracies are skulking all over and they are exploiting the persuasive powers of the public relations industry to advocate their cause. Bell Pottinger’s public relations counsel for the agents of state capture in South Africa is but one example and its aftermaths are cautioning the public relations industry on a global scale. The Bell Pottinger agency, on behalf of business acquaintances of scandal-beset then South African President Jacob Zuma, had pursued a racially acrimonious public relations campaign to deflect attention away from President Zuma and state capture attempts. PART ONE: STATE CAPTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA, BELL POTTINGER AND THE GUPTAS The leading actors in the state capture ignominy in South Africa are Bell Pottinger (the now defunct global public relations agency that was based in London and its exponents); the Guptas (a rich South African family with Indian origins); the South African government (headed by South Africa’s former president, Jacob Zuma); and the whistleblowers (the #GuptaLeaks, politicians, journalists, academics, and other individuals that broke the story). State Capture in South Africa State capture is the actions of individuals or groups – both in the public and private sectors – that are manipulating the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own personal advantage (Sutch, in Martin & Solomon, 2018). In South Africa it involved a business family, the Guptas, who had benefited from close ties to President Jacob Zuma, and who had maneuvered themselves into a position where they brandished control over state-owned companies and the latter’s procurement budgets. In so doing they diverted large sums into their own pockets and by association, those of President Jacob Zuma and his family. The unfolding events were disclosed by one of the biggest scoops in the history of South African journalism. In 2017, investigative journalists obtained a trove of emails and documents from the core of the Gupta business empire (Report, 20171). The subsequent revelations, dubbed the #GuptaLeaks, appear to confirm the state capture assumption that investigative journalists have reconnoitered for years. The #GuptaLeaks source mainly consisted of the following news sources: News24, Daily Maverick,

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amaBhungane, Finance: Uncovered and OpenUp (Why you should care about the #GuptaLeaks [an international view], 9 Augustus, 2017). The leaks exposed a multinational money laundering machine, dubbed the Dubai Laundromat in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), into which the Guptas funneled cash that originated from state contracts in South Africa. The #GuptaLeaks have exposed how inducements were facilitated to the Guptas by foreign companies throughout the world. The leaks have further revealed how the Guptas slurped cash out of statefunded rural development programs in South Africa and sent it to Dubai. Multinational auditing firm KPMG waived the transactions through allowing the Guptas to also claim millions in tax-deductible expenses. (KPMG is one of many companies involved in the scandal and is being investigated). The leaks also disclosed that the Guptas acquired a £19 million mansion in an exclusive Dubai neighborhood intended for Zuma’s use – possibly as a kickback. The Bell Pottinger Public Relations Agency Bell Pottinger, a London public relations agency co-founded by Lord Timothy Bell and Piers Pottinger in 1987, quickly became famous being credited with the launch of the career of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lord Bell left the agency in 2016 to set up his own business named Sans Frontieres and took many of the agency’s geopolitical staff with him. The remaining Bell Pottinger employees focused on financial public relations and shareholder communication for companies. Its ownership was independent with eight offices and a headcount of 266 people around the world, 201 in the UK. The agency’s revenue was £34.8m (globally) and £27.9m (in the UK). It has worked on behalf of a range of major corporations across a host of sectors, including Airbus, HSCB and Coca-Cola The agency was also no stranger to controversy as some of its past clients included Syria’s first lady Asma al-Assad, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, and the Pinochet Foundation, as well as celebrities accused of loathsome crimes and in need of public relations counsel (like the Olympic runner Oscar Pistorius directly after his murder charge) (Cameron, 2017). According to James Henderson, Bell Pottinger’s CEO at the time of the scandal, the agency had always been known for its political advice and counsel in capital markets, but was predominantly recognized for its consumer-facing campaigns. Some of the accounts Henderson claimed to have had are (cf Cameron, 2017): • • • • • • • • •

The Singapore government, public transport provider SMRT, and one of the world’s largest commodity traders, Noble Group. Aldar Properties, Abu Dhabi’s largest real estate company and the Saudi Stock Exchange. Amazon and Hitachi Capital in the UK. Cyprus-born entrepreneur and investor Touker Suleyman and advised Aviva, Emirates National Oil Company, and Johnson Press. On the geopolitical side, the Nigerian elections and including lobbying work in the UK on behalf of Russian energy company Gazprom. A South African investment bank, Investec. Richemont, a luxury-goods company held by Johann Rupert. The South African Tourism Board. Oakbay Investments, the holding company of the Guptas.

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Accounts of Duduzane Zuma, son of President Jacob Zuma. It is now common knowledge that the account included wider South African government and business involvement.

The Guptas Three of the main players were the brothers Ajay, Rajesh and Atul (part of a wider Gupta kinfolk) from India who came to South Africa when apartheid ended in the early 1990s and assembled a sprawling, multibillion-dollar business empire in South Africa. They owned Oakbay Investments and had earned outrageous sums of money by leveraging their friendship with South African President Jacob Zuma. They secured lucrative contracts in the field of armaments, mining, and railways through intimidating officials to twist regulations to their will. The key connection was Zuma’s son, Duduzane, whom the Gupta brothers coached for a role as a director – and billionaire shareholder – in the family’s business empire. The Gupta’s ascended to notoriety in 2013 when they persuaded a range of government departments to bend the law, allowing them to land a planeload of 217 guests from India at the high-security South African Air Force base at Waterkloof near Pretoria for the wedding of Vega Gupta to Aakash Jahajgarhia. The South African “wedding of the millennium” was designed to showcase the family’s wealth and influence in their adopted homeland. Their Indian guests were taken to the expansive Sun City leisure complex by a VIP-convoy normally employed for government dignitaries. There the guests interacted with prominent South African politicians and business people. An inquiry, held in response to the public outrage about multiple breaches of national security and protocol, found that “Number One” (a reference to President Jacob Zuma) had extensively obliged the Guptas. The Guptas were able to influence state procurement through Zuma-appointed officials in key positions on decision-making committees. The Gupta empire benefited in many ways: The cash was derived either directly from contracts with state-owned companies won by Gupta-held businesses, or from “success fees” solicited from global companies wanting to do business with South Africa. These included inter alia a Swiss construction company, two German IT giants, a multinational management consultancy, a Chinese state outfit, and the accounting firm, KPMG. The ultimate aspiration of the Guptas was to capture the South African state. Bell Pottinger and the Guptas Considerable evidence that the Guptas had long been the power behind the degraded President Jacob Zuma came to light when Zuma fired South Africa’s esteemed finance minister Pravin Gordhan and replaced him with close Gupta-associate Malisi Gigaba. At the time Gordhan was embroiled in a legal battle with the Guptas whom he accused of stealing billions from South African state resources. As the throttlehold of the Guptas gained attention, the family’s endeavors demanded astounding public relations maneuvers. They sought an imaginative diversion that would draw attention away from them and their state capture dealings, onto their many enemies through an ingenious plan that included public relations campaigns. Through their Oakbay Investments the Guptas hired Bell Pottinger in 2016 at a price of £100,000 a month to burnish their reputation. Bell

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Pottinger was given an assignment that sounded benevolent at its face: enticing grass-roots political activism to further the cause of poor black people in South Africa. But Bell Pottinger signed a client that in due course would entomb it in disgrace and by the following year (July 2017), Bell Pottinger was enmeshed in an international quagmire. In television reports, editorials, and public rallies, Bell Pottinger stood accused of setting off racial tensions through a furtive campaign built on Twitter bots, hate-filled articles on websites, and social media platforms, as well as drafting confrontational political speeches for the partisans of Zuma and the Guptas. All contents were pushing a ruinous narrative: whites in South Africa had seized resources and wealth while they deprived blacks of education and jobs. There is evidence in the #GuptaLeaks that Bell Pottinger was also requested to develop and execute a campaign to besmirch a number of leading academics, journalists and business figures in South Africa, including prominent businessman Johann Rupert of Remgro. The central message for this campaign was propagated with a combustible phrase, “white monopoly capital” (WMC). Ironically, Rupert directs Richemont, which has been a longstanding client of Bell Pottinger at the time the latter took on the Gupta account. Bell Pottinger’s Brief, Mandate and Public Relations Campaign Strategy Bell Pottinger’s brief and mandate was to create a campaign to deflect public attention away from state capture in South Africa by the Guptas, President Zuma, and his advisors and onto fake issues. Bell Pottinger concocted a strategy based on stirring up racial friction through attacking big business as the specific reason for South Africa’s economic sluggishness and consequent rising unemployment (which is amongst the highest in the world). The complete scope of Bell Pottinger’s work for the Guptas is still being investigated, but it includes devising and executing the “white monopoly capital” (WMC) campaign through enlisting the support of a number of pliable South African journalists, academics and researchers; and through a destructive social media campaign. The social media campaign targeted the judiciary, high profile journalists, and academics that began suspecting and questioning Zuma and the Guptas. The phrase “radical economic transformation” was also repeated by numerous politicians in their speeches. How was the campaign conceptualized? The Creative Campaign Concept: Crafting a Treacherous Narrative Bell Pottinger had a division dedicated to political propaganda and appointed Victoria Geoghegan, who was part of James Henderson’s revenue-generating finance team for more than a decade, to oversee its undertakings in South Africa. Bell Pottinger described Geoghegan as a specialist in creative and innovative tactics for modern communication campaigns. The agency claimed that Geoghegan’s close client relationships, professional handling of complex issues, and strong leadership skills made her the ultimate person for a leadership job at their agency. Geoghegan took instructions from President Zuma’s son, Duduzane Zuma. After the campaign brief, she emailed Duduzane that Bell Pottinger was keen to build a long-term partnership with him. Attached to this email was a document titled “Reflections on meeting and next steps” in which Geoghegan set out how she had pondered on their exchanges that resulted in a better grasp of the focus of the campaign. It read (abridged):

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1994 was a seminal year in South Africa’s history. The peaceful handover of power raised the hopes of many, and the expectation of imminent political AND economic enfranchisement was justified. The reality is that whilst political freedom has been attained there is a feeling that expectations of economic empowerment have not been met, with the wealth of South Africa sitting within a small grouping…This feeling is widespread and has been expressed to us in emotive language using phrases such as ‘economic apartheid’ and ‘economic emancipation’. Furthermore, given that a lot of current criticism (for almost all of South Africa’s ills) is directed at President Zuma, and indirectly at the ANC, there is a need to explain in clear, unambiguous language that it is vital ‘economic emancipation’ is addressed. The people of South Africa need to be told that their dissatisfaction is being heard and that concrete actions are being, or will be taken to address them… the message we wish to disseminate is not one that can be sold overnight. For this campaign to be believed and to achieve credibility there will need to be discipline, continuity and consistency over a period, ideally running up to the 2017 elections and beyond. The key to any political messaging is repetition and we will need to use every media channel that we can, to let our message take seed and to grow. (#Guptaleaks, 2017).

Geoghegan provided ideas for the way forward, suggesting that the tactics were not exhaustive and would over time be developed into a more comprehensive public relations strategy: •

• • • •

•

•

•

Create a non-party political narrative around the existence of economic apartheid and the vital need for more economic emancipation. This narrative should appeal to both potential third-party advocates in the business and academic communities and the grass-roots population. Provide assistance and advice on the setting up of a vehicle (the “entity”) to be the public face of the narrative. Whilst the narrative/vehicle is intended to be political party-agnostic, it will create opportunities for political commentary and participation. Bell Pottinger packaged the narrative into speeches, press releases, website content, videos/broadcast content, slogans, and any other material required. The initial project drew on the strengths of both Bell Pottinger and the South African teams – Bell Pottinger’s strategic messaging skills, experience, international reach, and overall brand and credibility, complemented by the South African team’s access to domestic media outlets, digital capabilities, and its incountry network. Utilize compelling research, case studies and data which illustrated that apartheid still existed, and that there was a need for inclusive growth. Bell Pottinger was to analyze the data (for example: power generation, ports) and create factsheets and easily understood collateral for wider dissemination. Engaging media both nationally and internationally. This was to reach the allimportant South African audience, but achieve international endorsement which would add credibility to the narrative and provide feedback to the South African media as well. It was critical that the narrative grabbed the attention of the grass-roots population who must identify with it, connect with it, and feel united by it. In order to reach this audience, the Bell Pottinger and South African teams sought to strategize the appropriate engagement tools, be this radio, social media, and/or slogans, for example #endeconomicapartheid, #growthforall.

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Geoghegan wrote: “Lord Bell will be available for strategic counsel as and when required. We will also have in reserve other divisions (digital, crisis communications) should we need a wider skillset” (#Guptaleaks, 2017).On 20 January 2016, Duduzane Zuma responded to Geoghegan: I am quite happy and enthused by your understanding of what needs to be done and the time frames in which we need to do it in. I have to reiterate that, which you correctly put it, this ‘journey’ is not primarily one to affect the outcome of the elections but to turn the tide of our country’s trajectory in the long term. (#Guptaleaks, 2017).

He added that Geoghegan should forward the invoice to him and also asked for directions on another campaign he appears to have been working on that included dispersing critical information in a short period of time. He further stated: “require assistance whether it be in the designing and creating a hard hitting message along the lines of the #EconomicEmancipation or whatever it is” (Scorpio, Daily Maverick’s investigative unit, 2017). Bell Pottinger’s work for the Guptas was not widely known until November 2016, when a video interview of Ajay Gupta, arranged by the Bell Pottinger agency, leaked to the South African media. The content of the interview was largely trivial, but provided proof that one of the UK’s most famous public relations agencies was counseling the Guptas. An anti-Zuma demonstration in South Africa included anti-Bell Pottinger billboards. One showed a photograph of Geoghegan with blood dripping from her lips and the words “Gupta’s Girl” over her head. A demonstration in front of Bell Pottinger’s offices in London followed. The Campaign Rollout and Fallout The campaign became a narrative that was shaped, created and relentlessly pushed on all media platforms available including The New Age newspaper and the Guptaowned ANN7 television channel in South Africa. Funded trolls and bots ceaselessly besieged anyone who challenged this narrative or posed questions about the Gupta’s transactions in South Africa. Bell Pottinger further usurped power from the factionridden ANC-government, directing its economic policy in public through manufactured slogans and discourse. More than 100 fake Twitter accounts were created, all of them retweeting content from other Twitter accounts with names like @economycapture. Popular hashtags included #WhiteMonopolyCapital and #RespectGuptas. The campaign involved some 220,000 tweets. As the campaign spread, leaders of groups like the ANC Youth League gave seditious speeches condemning the “control” that rich whites had on the South African economy. Leaked emails later showed that the groups received media training, and in some cases funds, from Oakbay Investments (Report 2017). New and radical groups like Black First Land First (BLF)2 – a Geoghegan conception – sprang up, holding public rallies to fulminate against whites and their land ownership. In a related and covert campaign, the Guptas were cast as compassionate people eager to help the exploited people of South Africa. On 19 March 2017, the South African newspapers alleged that Bell Pottinger was behind a social media strategy, using fake bloggers, commentators and Twitter users, in an attempt to influence public opinion and sow racial division in South Africa, as well as targeting media and personalities that were opposed to the Gupta family. The aim of the campaign

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was to portray the Gupta family as victims of a conspiracy involving “white monopoly capital” (WMC) to deflect accusations and evidence of their client’s involvement in corruption and state capture and to suggest that WMC is actively blocking transformation in South Africa. The former minister of finance, Trevor Manuel stated: … the term ‘White Monopoly Capital’ was conjured up by Bell Pottinger on behalf of the Guptas, and filtered into the political discourse to serve their agenda. Since then I have become aware of the specificity of the facts…the term was developed by Bell Pottinger’s Victoria Geoghegan, who in an email to Duduzane Zuma styled ‘White Monopoly Capital’ as a narrative and filtered it into the discourse via Collen Maine, Andile Mngxitama and Mzwanele Manyi. The idea of ‘White Monopoly Capital’ (WMC) is a ruse to draw attention away from our pressing policy priorities. (Manuel, 2017).

In April 2017, Bell Pottinger canceled its deal with the Guptas, citing the increasing social media attacks on their staff and their business as the reason. On 6 July 2017 Bell Pottinger CEO James Henderson issued an apology and announced that the firm had dismissed the lead partner involved in the Oakbay portfolio and suspended other employees so that the agency could determine their precise roles in the event. The lead partner Victoria Geoghegan was dismissed for “inappropriate and offensive” work for Oakbay. Neither this “unequivocal and absolute apology,” nor Henderson’s resignation in September 2017 alleviated the situation . South African companies – ironically some of whom can be considered as “white monopoly capital” – Richemont of Johann Rupert and Investec Bank – terminated their contracts with Bell Pottinger, as did the South African Tourism Board. South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) formally complained about Bell Pottinger’s actions to two UK public relations bodies, the Public Relations and Communication Association (PRCA) and the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR). The PRCA blacklisted Bell Pottinger, finding its conduct unethical. The blacklisting was supported by professional associations worldwide, including the Public Relations and Communication Management Institute of Southern Africa (PRISA). More international clients, including HSBC, Clydesdale Bank, TalkTalk, and Carillion ditched Bell Pottinger. Chime, the agency’s second largest shareholder, abandoned its 27% stake in the agency. Bell Pottinger suffered £8 million worth of client losses in 48 hours prompting massive layoffs. On 12 September 2017 Bell Pottinger collapsed into administration and its actions were widely condemned, including in the British Parliament and by the British High Commissioner to South Africa. Foremost among the complaints against the company was its action of running a racially divisive campaign that has also damaged British relations with South Africa (Czarnecki, 2017). Companies linked to the Guptas – directly or indirectly – began to deal with the consequences of the scandal including ongoing investigations into their business practices. The South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) is pursuing criminal complaints that emerged from an investigation into state contracts and the Gupta-Zuma liaison, which also have ensnared companies like KPMG, SAP, McKinsey, and the Bank of Baroda, to mention just a few. The list of companies is growing.

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PART TWO: LESSONS FROM THE BELL POTTINGER BATTLEFIELD The Bell Pottinger tale offers us many lessons that are fundamental for the welfare of public relations practice and discipline, as well as for others. They reprimand all doubters of the strategic fabric of public relations and ought to convert most public relations agnostics that may still exist. Some of these lessons are optimistic and progressive, but there are also severe warnings. Clearly, Bell Pottinger was not an innocent bystander in this affair. What do these lessons reveal? Client Briefs to Agencies Warrant Careful Scrutiny Clients usually brief agencies thoroughly regarding what is expected of them, and surely the Bell Pottinger exponents expected that they had to promote the reputations of the Guptas and President Jacob Zuma. It became important for South Africans to know the identities of the players that sat down with the agency and gave them their instructions, as Bell Pottinger clearly did not come up with all the ideas exclusively. The concepts and narratives that Bell Pottinger conceived, were clearly in response to a directive from their clients. This could only mean that the original brief that they were given was meant to destabilize the South African economy, political environment, and society. However, an eventual campaign product depends largely on the creativity of the agency team (Moerdyk, 2017). It is rare for any public relations agency to turn down a client or to not accept a brief – specifically when a large fee is on offer. Agencies do not always meticulously probe from whom the brief comes and what the true intentions are. The consequences of the South African account were destructive and the mutilation that Bell Pottinger caused might never fully be grasped. The outcomes of the campaign have created renewed racial tensions in South Arica and these are now continuing. One such outcome is the Black First Land First (BLF) movement and its calls to seize land without compensation in South Africa. Although land redistribution is a reality in South Africa, the aggressiveness of the BLF message has been an incidental, even if dangerous, result of Bell Pottinger’s campaign to create social divisions. This case tells us that public relations has the power to build, or destroy, societal harmony. Sometimes an Apology Is Not Good Enough Bell Pottinger was probably hoping that the outrage and media attention would dwindle after the campaign fallout, but the controversy did not and the agency’s apology was perceived merely as another “spin” in an attempt to put the scandal behind them. Loss of credibility destroys the standing of any communicator. Pressure was kept up on the agency to divulge who gave the brief and what the brief entailed. The rashness of the initial brief and eventual campaign was accentuated when it became common knowledge that the actors in the South African government deemed it fit to take their brief overseas, to the UK, and hire a foreign public relations agency. The concealment of the brief and campaign from South African public relations talent and knowledgeable agencies, added a further layer to the deviousness of the affair (Mulaudzi, 2017). Bell Pottinger’s apology was not accepted. Nor was the idea of Bell Pottinger making recompense by inter alia donating money to the Nelson Mandela Foundation. This gesture was interpreted as a means of evading the dire position of the agency. Lord Tim Bell himself stated in an interview that the media has an “addiction to

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apologies” and that he never advises his clients to apologize (Smith, 2018). The Bell Pottinger incident is an example that in specific catastrophes caused through public relations deeds, apologies are found wanting. “Spin for the Dark Arts” – Strategic Value Taken Too Far? For decades, public relations scholarship has prescribed that the communication function should be part of the dominant coalition, treated as a strategic function, escape the perception of being spin, have a place at the table of corporate boards, etc. The irony is that in the Bell Pottinger case the public relations function was accorded these to the “extreme.” At the same time the strategy was so reprehensible, that an agency tumbled, the president of a country resigned, the country faced renewed racial divisions that could last a long time, and public relations stood exposed as “spin for the dark arts.” As South African brand reputation expert, Solly Moeng explained: Bell Pottinger came close to the edge … Racism is a weak point for South Africans, it’s the one point that could ignite South Africa. And Bell Pottinger should have known that … This is an abuse of our weaknesses in our country. (Plaut, 2017)

Francis Ingham, director general of the PRCA said in an interview that he has never seen anything equal to it. “The work was on a completely new scale of awfulness” (Van Zyl, 2017). The Bell Pottinger campaign in South Africa will go down in the global public relations chronicles as Goebbelesque – but with more advanced technology and power tools at play. Playing One Clients’ Public Relations Strategies and Communication Intelligence off Against Another Bell Pottinger had numerous South African accounts on board. Richemont, a luxurygoods company (with Johan Rupert as Chairman), was a Bell Pottinger client for many years. So too was Investec Bank and the South African Tourism Board. Duduzane Zuma and the Gupta’s Oakbay Investments were relatively new clients for the agency. Notwithstanding that Richemont was a longstanding client, Bell Pottinger used the company as part of the “white monopoly capital” (WMC) narrative in the campaign on behalf of Duduzane Zuma and the Guptas. Simultaneously, other teams at Bell Pottinger worked on reputation-repair messages for the WMC-clients (inter alia Richemont and Investec Bank) to “counteract” negative WMC-perceptions (Report, 2017). In so doing, Bell Pottinger committed the ultimate transgression in public relations practice and ethics – playing its own clients against each other. Generating Narratives to Lure Attention Away from Nefarious Activities Bell Pottinger created an unyielding campaign with the main objective of luring attention away from the real issue – state capture by the Guptas and Jacob Zuma. South Africa’s then minister of finance Pravin Gordhan said in an interview with the Sunday Times: Bell Pottinger’s apology uses ‘white monopoly capital’ as a narrative to cover a vast array of nefarious activities at the behest of‚ and in collaboration with‚ the ‘Gupta syndicate’… The minor admissions made vindicate what we’ve been saying for almost two years – that the

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attacks on institutions such as the national treasury‚ and on individuals and their families was designed to malign them and create a distraction from the activities of the ‘syndicate’.

Gordhan added that Bell Pottinger stood accused of collaborating in a systematic plan to capture the South African state as shown by both the studies by the academics and stated in the report by the South African Council of Churches. They went beyond image management or whatever they thought they were doing. You don’t just cook up things or help to create fake twitter accounts and start labelling people. If you are just a PR agency‚ you don’t get involved in that. (Skiti, 2017)

The creation of narratives is powerful, but power restraint in public relations is formidable. The craftsmanship displayed by the constructors of the South African campaign had its own form of brilliance. Creating narratives that can change hearts and minds is very compelling. However, there is supremacy in grasping the boundaries of a given brief and situation. This was a brilliant communication strategy and it achieved its ultimate campaign objectives. But the value of this textbook public relations strategy will not be remembered for its genius, but for its lack of restraint and the tatters it left behind. Exploiting Public Relations in Political Discourse in Foreign Countries After succeeding tainted Zuma as president of South Africa on 15 February 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa remarked that everyone must be concerned that a foreign public relations agency had been able to effectively poison the political discourse and social rubric of South Africa to advance narrow interests. “It says much about our lack of political cohesion and ideological clarity that Bell Pottinger was able to manipulate some of our own political concepts to fuel confusion and division amongst us” (Eyewitness News, 2017). Julius Malema, leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), called for the Gupta family to leave South Africa: “Not only have they looted our coffers, they have done so whilst using a propaganda campaign relying on unethical means. They have rendered our public discourse toxic with fake news. They do not deserve to be in our midst …” (Cameron, 2017). Tarnishing Country Reputations and Diplomatic Relations The Bell Pottinger scandal has illuminated that reputation laundering is a profitable business for public relations agencies. London is home to a cluster of public relations agencies catering to foreign governments, raising questions about it becoming the global capital of reputation laundering. Bell Pottinger inaugurated the “public relations template” for this rewarding niche and in the process sullied the reputations of individuals, businesses, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the UAE, and India. The threat to diplomatic relations between countries also came to the fore. It became a public relations scandal of significance on a global scale. Bell Pottinger’s creation of parallel political power structures also devalued the British political establishment. Lord Peter Hain (former fierce anti-apartheid activist) stated that only when Bell Pottinger’s lies and fake news in South Africa became wellreported by the South African media and other pursuers did the British media and

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Two British Polluters by Zapiro (available at www.zapiro.com) (Sunday Times, 9 July 2017).

politicians take into account the existence of state capture and corruption and the possible involvement of British companies (Van der Westhuizen, 2018). Everybody Is Entitled to Representation and Public Relations Counsel Any individual, company or political party is entitled to hire public relations agencies and other communication consultancies to assist with campaigns, messaging, and reputation counsel. However, representation does not grant permission for manipulation. When foreign private interests (like the Guptas) use public relations counsel to make millions from the societal and political turmoil they create, it creates a black eye for public relations practice. Beyond Ethics and Morality The debate surrounding public relations ethics is not new. Public relations ethics should be an arduous and perpetual deliberation. The Bell Pottinger saga displays numerous lessons in ethics and morality. As a profession, public relations must sustain and develop itself and be profitable. However, the Bell Pottinger scandal highlighted that there remains a necessity in bridging the discordance between profit and virtue. Lord Bell remarked in an interview (Smith, 2018) that morality is a job for priests, not public relations men [sic]. He maintained that Bell Pottinger merely did what their clients requested of them. He also contended that he was not sure if public relations agencies ever considered the morality aspect of their work, because capital always seems to be far more important than morality! The South African campaign itself progressed into a failure, morally and professionally. It lacked intercultural sensitivity, as well as responsible leadership and chose agency billings over ethical behavior – seeking profit at the cost of virtue. But no business exists in a vacuum and all public relations agencies operate in reality. It is likely that in the real world, profit will seldom lose. Bell Pottinger’s brand of global reputation laundering, hauling commercial and business interests into the politics of sovereign countries, might become a new mode of economic mercenary activity in an attempt to destabilize democracy (Pegg and Wright, 2011). The alleged use of social media by Russia to influence the 2016 presidential elections in the United States tells us that such acts are not isolated or random.

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The Reputation of Public Relations as a Practice and Domain The Bell Pottinger saga left many shattered reputations in its wake, but it incalculably marred the reputation of public relations itself. For an agency that specialized in crisis and reputation management, Bell Pottinger failed to manage its own crisis and reputation when these where most needed. This was a public relations campaign that reached its strategic objectives – however nefarious they were. It exhibited strategic initiatives, achieved the goals of the client’s brief, created awareness, offered information, changed perceptions, fashioned new narratives and became a perfect example of “strategic.” However, in achieving them, Bell Pottinger crafted its own demise, almost rekindled the race war in South Africa, and gave public relations a black eye. CONCLUSION The influence in state capture may be through various institutions of the state, including parliament, government departments, state-owned entities and in some cases the judiciary, or through a corrupt electoral process. One of the factors that distinguishes state capture from corruption is that, while in cases of corruption the result (of policy or regulatory decision) is uncertain, in state capture the outcome is known and is highly likely to benefit those that attempt to, or have been able to, capture the state. In the case of South Africa it was the president, certain senior officials in government and directors in some of the state-owned entities that were allegedly captured. But corruption also entered into the fold. In this instance, it is claimed that the players were the agents used by the Guptas to manipulate decisions in favor of the Gupta business empire. The captors used a well-known public relations company, Bell Pottinger, to give voice and provide vehicles to their endeavors. The Gupta family and its close association with President Zuma and his family has been highlighted and has been a source of great discontent and subject of public debate in South Africa. Evidently, the family systematically benefited from former President Zuma’s stay in power in which its own private interests have significantly influenced the state’s decision-making processes. The extent of the family’s involvement is still being investigated in South Africa. So is the contribution of well-known and established companies like KPMG. Bell Pottinger’s eventual demise was triggered by revelations of its public relations work (equated to “propaganda work”) for the Gupta family, which had been intended to drive inter alia the so-called “white monopoly capital” (WMC) narrative in South Africa as a way of deflecting attention from the maleficent capture of state institutions by President Zuma’s associates. Bell Pottinger had labeled the attacks on the Gupta family as motivated by white monopoly capital as opposed to widespread concerns for probity. The state capture scandal decimated Bell Pottinger’s own reputation, leading to the company’s dramatic ruin and eventual downfall. Professionals and scholars have struggled for a long time to secure the strategic value of public relations and communication management within organizations. This was before Bell Pottinger succeeded in demonstrating how very strategic and powerful public relations can be. The incident that unfolded in South Africa, leaves scholars and practitioners with some existential questions: Has public relations – after this exceptional validation of how strategic its operations can be – caused its own

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reputational disgrace? Will this lead to its eventual ruin? And where does the practice now move from this abuse of power to restore its ethos? In his analogy of communication as a nation state (Peters, 1986), avowed that communication’s legitimacy rests in its power rather than its academic value. The Bell Pottinger case elucidated that public relations retains immense power. It also became a bleak indicator that public relations – when ill-used and manipulated – can become a contrivance in future kakistocracies. NOTES 1 This “strictly confidential” report has recently been released. 2 This movement is currently developing further in South Africa.

REFERENCES #Guptaleaks. (2017). Why you should read the #GuptaLeaks. www.gupta-leaks.com/a-collaborativeinvestiga tionintostatecapture/. Accessed 28 February 2018. Cameron, J. (2017, July). Dummy’s guide: Bell Pottinger - Gupta London agency, creator of WMC. BizNews. Cooley, A., Heathershaw, J. & Sharman, J. C. (2018, January). Laundering cash, whitewashing reputations. Journal of Democracy, 29 (1): 39–53. Czarnecki, S. (2017, November 01). Timeline of a crisis: The fall of Bell Pottinger. prweek.com. Eyewitness News. (2017, July 12). ANC deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa speaking at the SACP’s 14th National Congress in Boksburg on 12 July 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/12/watch-live-cyril-ramaphosaaddresses-sacp-congress. Accessed 30 July 2017. Fiske, R. H. (2011). The Best Words. Portland and Oregon: Marion Street Press. Gosnold, P. (1644). A sermon preached at the Publique Fast the ninth day of August before the honorable members of the two Houses of Parliament there assembled … and published by Authority. (U. o. Archive, Ed.). Accessed10 August 2017. Manuel, T. (2017, June 6). Fikile, do you remember the tears you shed over the Guptas? Daily Maverick. www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-06-09-fikile-do-you-remember-the-tears-you-shed-over-theguptas/#.WrJMKpNub-Y. Accessed 7 July 2018. Martin, M. E. & Solomon, H. (2018). Understanding the phenomenon of “State Capture” in South Africa. Southern African Peace and Security Studies, 5 (1): 21–34. Moerdyk, C. (2017, July 7). Who briefed Bell Pottinger and what did it say? Huffington Post. www.huffington post.co.za/chris-moerdyk/who-gave-bell-pottinger-their-brief-and-what-was-in-the-brief_a_23020668/. Accessed 7 July 2017. Mulaudzi, S. (2017, July 7). South Africans do not care about Bell Pottinger’s apology - it is not enough. Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/07/07/south-africans-do-not-care-about-bell-pottingersapology-it_a_23020435/. Accessed 7 July 2017. Peacock, Thomas Love. (1829). The Misfortunes of Elphin. London: Thomas, Hookham and Old Bond Street. Pegg, D. & Wright, O. (2011, December 8). Wikipedia founder attacks Bell Pottinger for ‘ethical blindness’ The ‘dark arts’. The Independent UK. www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/wikipedia-founderattacks-bell-pottinger-for-ethical-blindness-6273836.html. Accessed 7 September 2017. Peters, J. (1986). Institutional sources of intellectual poverty in communication research. Communication Research, 13: 527–559. Plaut, M. (2017, December). A crushing defeat for the “dark arts”. British Journalism Review, 28 (4): 37–42. Report. (2017). BellPottinger PR support for the Gupta family. Strictly Private and Confidential Report. 24 January 2017. Scorpio, Daily Maverick Investigative Unit. (2017). www.dailymaverick.co.za/section/scorpio/#.WrI_hpNub-Y. Accessed 31 January 2018.

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Skiti, S. (2017, July 13). South Africa needs full disclosure on ‘Gupta syndicate’ - Pravin Gordhan fires salvo at PR firm. Sunday Times. www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-13-exclusive-south-africa-needsfull-disclosure-on-gupta-syndicate-pravin-gordhan-fires-salvo-at-pr-firm/. Accessed 30 July 2018. Smith, B. (2018, March 2). Podcast with Lord Tim Bell. Prmoment. www.prmoment.com/category/watchand-listen/pr-life-stories-the-prmoment-podcast-with-lord-tim-bell. Accessed July 2018. Van der Westhuizen, G. (2018, February 24). Beeld Newspaper. ‘n Lord se stryd teen korrupsie. Naspers. Van Zyl, G. (2017, September 5). Bell Pottinger’s Gupta work the most unethical I’ve ever seen – PRCA DG. Biznews.

CHAPTER

9 Exploring the Complexity of Global Strategic Communication Practice in Government The Case of the Canadian Federal Government Fraser Likely

INTRODUCTION The concept of strategic communication is defined as the “purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh 2007, p. 3). The key concepts within that statement are “purposeful use” and “fulfill its mission.” Purposeful use suggests a formal and planned organization and control of communication through stages of conceptualization, development, approval and execution. Fulfill its mission then suggests that that communication directly furthers the objectives found within overall purpose statements and strategic management plans. This chapter examines the strategic communication practices that the Government of Canada (GOC) employs in developing its purposeful use of communication to further its international mission. It answers the call for “descriptive accounts of public relations practices from individual countries” (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009, p.3), in this case examining the communication practices that further Canadian federal government positioning within an overall global context. This examination attempts to provide considerable depth to this descriptive account, given a dearth of literature on government communication practices. Indeed, national level government communication practices, particularly concerning the complexity of the government communication function, remain largely un-researched (Gelders, Bouckaert, & van Ruler, 2007; Lee, 2008; Likely, Rudolf, & Valin, 2012; Liu, & Levenshus, 2010; Vos, & Westerhoudt, 2008). In particular, research is sparse on the interplay between the practice of communication at a government’s political level and that practiced by its permanent public service (Lee, Likely, & Valin, 2016). 99

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THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT Canada is a constitutional monarchy, with the Queen of the United Kingdom as its titular head being represented in Canada by a Canadian citizen as Governor General (GG). Second, Canada is a decentralized federation with a division of national and provincial legislative powers, roles and responsibilities explicit in the country’s constitution. Third, Canada is a parliamentary democracy with an elected lower house and an appointed upper house. The political party with the most seats and balance of power in an elected House of Commons is asked by the Governor General to form the executive branch of government with its leader becoming Prime Minister (PM). The executive branch consists of the Governor General, the Prime Minister and the Ministers that the Prime Minister appoints to Cabinet. Each Minister is assigned a portfolio by the PM, within which are responsibilities for one or more government departments. These departments are staffed by non-partisan, professional, civilian, public sector employees and led by a Deputy Minister. The executive branch of the federal government is recognized as having authority over international relations, although this power has been devolved upon it and it is not conferred under any constitutional provision. Canada shares the British tradition where the Crown has the prerogative which, in Canada, is exercised by the federal executive branch of government as the Queen’s representative. Within the Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is assigned the lead for the majority of the government’s international initiatives – although Prime Ministers themselves have traditionally taken an active role in international affairs. It is worth noting that various provinces have acquired responsibility in the foreign domain, be it in international organizations or with their own trade offices. The federal government department overseeing most of Canada’s international governmental activity is branded as Global Affairs Canada (the legal name of the department is the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development). That department leads in policy and program areas such as international human rights, international security, promoting trade and opening new markets, foreign direct investment in Canada, humanitarian assistance, development aid, assistance to Canadians travelling and working abroad, international students studying in Canada and passport and documentation authentication. Global Affairs works closely with other government departments (OGDs) such as Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and National Defense. CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM The opportunities to communicate about “global affairs” inside and outside its borders are endless as the country belongs to, and participates in, various international organizations, institutions and agreements. In recent years, Canada has made military contributions to international missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, Libya, Syria/Iraq and Ukraine as well as anti-piracy maritime efforts off the Horn of Africa. As far as foreign aid is concerned, Canada funds over 3,500 international development projects, maintaining 250 offices in 160 countries. As a trading nation, Canada relies heavily on exports and imports to sustain its GDP. Today, exports and imports represent about 65 per cent of Canada’s economic output – one of the highest ratios among the G7 countries and almost twice that of the United States. Canada has signed scores of trading agreements of varying degrees of significance such as the recently renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-European Comprehensive Economic and

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Trade Agreement (CETA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPATPP), and the Canada-Barbados Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Canada is the second largest trading partner for the US, and is also the number one export market for 35 US states. At the same time, Canada is beginning a process of negotiation to complete a comprehensive trade deal with China. Canada is a world leader in mining and the extractive industries, in agricultural and forest products and in energy development and has exported its companies and citizens to other countries, where production practices may have different standards – sometimes leading to conflict. Approximately 300–400,000 immigrants are admitted to Canada each year, the majority from Asia or Africa. Beyond immigration, Canada brings in thousands of refugees annually, with over 40,000 in 2016 – the majority being refugees from Syria. To provide its global affairs assistance abroad, Canada maintains embassies, high commissions and consular offices in 270 locations in 180 foreign countries. Be it for diplomacy, trade, military use, foreign aid, immigration, refugee migration or Canada’s position within international institutions, federal government communication comes with its complexities. These subjects have their various stakeholders and publics, within and without Canada, and these stakeholders have their positions and communication channels and products. Seldom is there consensus on any subject, allowing for clear direction and action, particularly in Canada’s parliamentary and federated political process. Therefore, understanding Canada’s role and influence in global affairs and its use of purposeful communication inside and outside of Canada necessitates a broader consideration of other factors. In particular, this purposeful use of communication in a government communication context requires an understanding of the different layers of communication practice. Canadian federal government communication includes communication from the political level, communication from the departmental communication branch level within the public service and communication from a department’s front-line public service-public interface level. Success at each of these layers is important to the government fulfilling its mission. This chapter will focus on the first two, leaving discussion of government-public purposeful communication at the office door, through call centres, web sites or social media comment boxes or via public meetings, consultations and lobbying. STANDARDS AFFECTING PURPOSEFUL USE IN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT’S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY This section describes the overarching policy standard that governs all Canadian government communication. The Canadian government’s first pan government Communications Policy was approved by the Cabinet of the day in 1987, following a major management review of the communication function across government (Canada, 1988). Subsequently, the government’s Communications Policy was re-worked in 2002 (with minor revisions in 2006) and in 2016. Each iteration brought greater prescriptive detail – with some important exceptions – especially to the government’s commitment to communicating with citizens and with expectations for principles of good communication management by various government actors. Each policy followed a similar format: purpose statement; objectives or principles; policy statements; and communication functions covered by the Policy (i.e. media relations; advertising; internal communication; sponsorships; e-communication; citizen engagement; public opinion research; etc.). How the function was to be managed, particularly regarding

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the assignment of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, was included either as a separate section within the policy or as a second but supporting document, Three overarching policy statements framed the 1988 Policy: • To provide information to the public about its policies, programs and services that is accurate, complete, objective, timely, relevant and understandable; • To take into account the concerns and views of the public in establishing priorities, developing policies and implementing programs; and • To ensure that the government is visible, accessible and answerable to the public that it serves. Both the 2002/2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy included ten such policy statements, expanding on the aspirational notions around government-public communication. Table 9.1 describes some of the more important changes to these policy statements over the three policy cycles. Each of these three policies explicates the government actors covered by the policy requirements. In 1987, this included the Minister, the deputy head or departmental Deputy Minister, the head of communications, communications staff and program and policy advisors in various government departments. The Minister was also given responsibility for defining the communication responsibilities of ministerial staff. Staff in a Minister’s office are also known as “exempt” staff. That is, they are not public servants and are exempt from the legal and regulative requirements under which public servants must work, such as the hiring process under the Public Service Employment Act. Exempt staff are partisan and their work security is dependent on the four-year election cycle and thus the election or re-election of their political party to power and then the support of a Minister (Brodie, 2012). The same actors are listed in the 2002 Policy, with the addition of functional specialists: analysts; researchers; human resource officers; access to information and privacy coordinators; marketing specialists; information technologists; webmasters; graphic artists; librarians, receptionists and; call-centre staff. The 2016 Policy, a much shorter document, does not explicitly include any of the ministerial staff, program, policy and functional specialists listed in 2002 but does provide two additional actors: public servants as spokespersons; and public servants as subject matter experts. Each policy document was a creature of its time (Likely, Rudolf, & Valin, 2012). The first policy was an attempt to find consensus on expectations around government communication with Canadians, and it accomplished that goal. The two subsequent policies both strengthened the original policy statements concerning communication to and with the public and were more explicit in how the policy was to be administrated. The 1987 Policy tried to spell out some basic management requirements for the communication function, to provide the function with a higher degree of legitimacy. It was only partially successful in doing that (Devereaux Ferguson & Johansen, 2005). Rather than being clear on the precise authorities held by a head of communication, the policy spoke of the concept of “shared responsibility.” Its implementation across government was hit or miss, with only some heads reporting directly to the department head and being given full authority over the function. While the second policy in 2002 was slightly expansive on the expectations concerning communication to and with Canadians, it was the prescriptive tone regarding the management of communication that set it apart from both the 1987 and 2016 policies. It was much more detailed and it set clear objectives for authorities, roles, responsibilities and

2002/2006

2016

Explicit: Took into account the concerns and views of the public More explicit: Enshrined listening. Considered the views and interests of the public Touched on official languages Explicit: Enshrined the right of the public to communicate with More Explicit: Enshrined citizen engagement. “… Reach and the GOC in either language engage with Canadians effectively and efficiently in the official language of their choice” Provided information that is accurate, Provided the public with timely, accurate, clear, objective and Explicit: Enshrined non-partisanship. “Information is objective, complete, objective, timely, relevant and complete information factual, non-partisan, clear, and written in plain language” understandable Touched on the role of ministers Explicit: Supported ministers as the government’s primary More Explicit: Enshrined the public service role. “Providing spokespersons impartial advice and support to their minister, who is the principal spokesperson for the department” Silent on new technology Explicit: Emphasized technological innovation and use of new More Explicit: Enshrined digital and social media primacy. Using media digital media and platforms as the “primary means to connect and interact with the public” Reactive approach to media relations Explicit: Required proactive media relations More Explicit: Enshrined multi-channel importance. “Uses a variety of media and platforms to maximize reach, including seeking innovative ways to use technology” Referred to alternative formats Explicit: Reinforced the need for multiple formats More Explicit: Enshrined the importance of social media. “In order to have an effective and open dialogue with an increasingly diverse Canadian public, the government uses innovative digital tools and online platforms” Silent about communicating risk Explicit: Institutions must anticipate and assess potential risks More Explicit: Enshrined a communications branch’s role in risk management. “Integrating communications into their department’s emergency preparedness and crisis management planning” Encouraged co-operation between com- Explicit: Required collaboration within, between and among More Explicit: Enshrined integrative role for communication. munication and other functions departments and agencies “Communications within and across departments are well coordinated and integrated into all government operations” Designated a senior official (referred to Explicit: “The head of communications is the senior official des- Less Explicit: Depreciated the role of head of communication. ignated to support the deputy head” … “Heads of communica- Designated a senior official (any senior official) as head of comhereafter as head of communications) tions are members of senior management and report directly to munications to manage communications to support the deputy head the deputy head”

Encouraged dialogue

1987

TABLE 9.1 Canadian Government Communication Policy Evolution

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accountabilities. Heads of communication didn’t want a second failure and given the times – following a period of government cost-cutting and retrenchment when communication budgets were slashed and staffs decimated – they fought for a policy that gave them clear authority over the full communication function in any department. From 2002 to almost 2010, the communication head was queen of her functional domain, with a policy to back her up as she added employees and repatriated small communication outposts that had developed in policy, program and operations branches (Frappier, & Likely, 2005; Likely, 2004; Redmond, & Likely, 2002a, 2002b). It was a period of expansion, as all three governments in that timeframe greatly increased program spending. But, the 2016 Policy did not re-affirm the authority of the communication head. Gone was reference to directly reporting to the departmental deputy minister as was the reference to authority and accountability for the whole of the communication function. The replacement was simply a list of roles and responsibilities that the head was expected to perform. The power that the head held by virtue of the 2002 Policy evaporated. The 2016 Policy assigned this authority to the head of a central agency, the Privy Council Office (PCO). The PCO is the Prime Minister’s own public service department, and works to support the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) agenda and initiatives. The PCO provides the Prime Minister with direct communication support. This change was symptomatic of greater functional changes in that across government the department and the department’s minister were being subsumed by a more authoritative PCO and in particular a more powerful PMO. Power was centralized in these two offices, especially that relating to government communication. What was added to the policy in 2016, both with regard to communication with Canadians and to the management of the function was reference to the concept of nonpartisanship. Communication would be non-partisan and the communication function would act in a non-partisan manner. This reference was deemed necessary, given this centralization of communication and the closeness with which the PCO was involved with the machinations of the PMO. The 2016 Policy also reflected its time, a time following government scandal and of increasing influence and control held by the exempt communication staff in ministers’ offices and notably in the PMO in the day-to-day communication efforts of the communication function (Kozolanka, 2006). This policy also reflected a more centralized approach to the entire government communication, whether through the PMO or through the central agency, the PCO, Communications and Consultation. This centralization, within the overall communication function in support to overall organizational centralization, is supported by current research. Research by Moss, Likely, Sriramesh and Ferrari (2017) demonstrates that communication functions, being situational dependent, adapt their structures to meet current circumstances. Indeed, flexibility appears to be the key, with communication functions continually assessing and then adopting structures that allow it to best support organizational clients and centres of authority. As noted, this last policy did not refer explicitly to exempt, ministerial communication staff. Neither did it refer to front-line communicators, such as those tasked with dealing directly with the public in-person, on the telephone, or electronically. STRUCTURE AND ROLES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION FUNCTION This section will explore how each “layer” works and works together in furthering a government’s purposeful use of communication. It is within the Minister’s authority to appoint exempt staff to work in the Minister’s Office (MINO). As noted, these

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staff are “exempt” from the formal appointment and employment policies of the Public Service of Canada. Those that are communication staff appointments may have a stronger political background than extensive communication experience, the opposite typically of communication staff in the department. A Minister may appoint a Director of Communications (who would report to the Minister’s Chief of Staff), a Press Secretary and if warranted, one or more Special Assistants-Communications. If a Minister has regional responsibilities, Regional Communications Advisors and Regional Press Secretaries may be appointed as well. In more recent practice as another example of centralization, exempt communication staff are either “placed” in a minister’s office by the Prime Minister’s Office or are approved by the PMO, thus allowing the Minister limited latitude in selection. Indeed, in the last decade, a more matrixed reporting relationship has developed, with the MINO’s Director of Communications and Press Secretary seemingly developing stronger solid line compared to dotted line, functional reporting arrangements. Policy requirements state that exempt staff may ask public servants for information and advice, relay the Minister’s directions and be kept current when communication decisions are taken and operations conducted. But, there is to be a clear division between the roles of exempt communication staff, who give the Minister equivalent professional, though also partisan, advice, and those of departmental communication staff (Canada, 2011). Supposedly, exempt staff are not to give direction on responsibilities that are clearly within a public servant’s operational communication responsibility, although evidence would suggest that advice is given on the quality and approval of communication content and messaging, choice of products and selection of channels/ media. The fact that the framers of the 2016 GOC Communications Policy felt the need, in the third iteration of the Policy, to continually emphasize the concept of “nonpartisan” tells us that what was a grey area with an imprecise line had been crossed either too often and/or too far. In relaying the Minister’s direction regarding the need for communication products (such as media releases, announcements, tours, events, meetings, videos, advertisements, photo ops, blog posts, web site posts, tweets, etc.), which are developed by the communication branch of the department, expectations around messaging, supporting content, language, look and feel are part of the directive. Approval of a department’s draft products rests in the MINO, with the Director of Communications. Traditionally, from the department’s communication branch perspective, these products are seen as “informational” and not promotional – in that they don’t promote the political party nor the government per se. In addition, they “inform” on decisions taken (policies, budgets, legislation, regulations, grants and contributions), not on political or governmental promises made and not yet adopted (for reference to communicating policy information in other countries, see Gelders, Bouckaert, & van Ruler, 2007; Gelders, De Cock, Roe, & Neijens, 2006; Gelders, & Ihlen, 2010). A fine line for which there are many examples of it being potentially erased. Depending on the size of the department, the communication branch could have between twenty and four hundred communication professionals. Typically, the communication head manages executives who lead such sectors as media relations/issues management, strategic advisors (working with internal client functions), web, social media, internal communication, and branch management. Depending on the size of the branch, specialty sub-functions may include social marketing, stakeholder outreach and consultations, planning, research and performance measurement, workload/workflow tasking and approval tracking, and learning/training. The creation of communication products within the branch involves the injection of subject matter

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expertise housed in policy, program or operations branches as well as an extended approval process that involves many senior departmental executives. Once a product is approved in the department, it goes to the Minister’s Office – and then to the Privy Council Office, Communications and Consultation (PCO, C&C). In the times of the first two communication policies, PCO, C&C employed approximately a dozen employees. Besides a couple of communication management and consultation specialists, the majority were assigned accounts. Each was given a number of department communication branches to which they provided product advice if requested but spent most of the time identifying potential risk and tracking pan government communication initiatives. Today, PCO, C&C is led by an Assistant Secretary of Cabinet, Communications and Consultation. Sections reporting to the Assistant Secretary are: Integration (consultations and public engagement; public opinion research; web publishing); the Prime Minister’s Digital Operations (PMweb and design; social media and multi-media monitoring and analysis); Operations (advertising, marketing, editorial analysis and approval); Strategic Communications (departmental communication branch product approvals; pan government strategic communication integration); and Media Centre (traditional media monitoring and analysis). The Assistant Secretary leads a communication group of well over one hundred professionals. The products of each and every departmental communication branch are subject to their approval, for as the 2016 Policy states, they provide: “leadership, challenge, strategic direction, and coordination of departmental and horizontal communications and consultations activities” (Canada, 2016). PCO, C&C vets, as Marland found: sensitive issue; PCO discretion; horizontal issue [e.g., a whole of government matter that touches multiple departments]; specific item in the Speech from the Throne; specific item in the mandate letter; international meetings; over $10M; federal/provincial/territorial; legislations and House of Commons activities; budgetary measures. (2017a).

The same communication product that is approved in the MINO is then forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Office, Communications (PMO, C) in a parallel process. Approximately fifty professionals work in communication roles, including media relations and the press secretary, speechwriting, issues management and PM tours and strategic communication integration. As journalist Chris Hall reported: “…each member of the communications team has unique responsibilities. From coordinating regional media outreach, to working with communications staff in specific departments. They have beats, not unlike reporters at national news organizations….” (Hall, 2009). When PMO, C agrees, having input from PCO, C&C, MINO and sometimes directly from the departmental communication branch, to a staged announcement, an event, a media release, a social media post, whatever the product, it proceeds. At this point, decisions have been taken on who will say what, where, when and how. Unless it is a pan government product with multiple departments and other Ministers involved, the individual department communication branch is now “greenlighted.” The process involved to arrive at PMO, C approval requires distinct documentation, dependent on the product. Recent research underlines the complexities involved: Among the collected materials were forms used for processing inquiries from the media, such as media ‘lines’ and notes for communications opportunities. We also collected media relations strategy templates such as announcement plans, video project proposals, event planning checklists, and key message templates. Also in the set of documents were

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communications calendars and rollout plans, including plans for using social media. These internal instruments illustrate that there are many moving parts to be aligned when the government prepares to make a public announcement. (Marland, 2017a)

GLOBAL AFFAIRS COMMUNICATION Global Affairs is the amalgamation of three previously distinct departments: Foreign Affairs; International Trade; and the Canadian International Development Agency. Various functions including communication merged into a Public Affairs branch under a single head of communication. The head leads six sections: Branch Management; Digital Communications (creative, graphics, marketing; advertising; French and English writing and editing; web; e-communication; travel and consular communication); Strategic Communications (advisory support for Foreign Affairs clients; media relations; media spokespersons; media analysis; public opinion research; social media); Development (advisory support for Development clients; speechwriting); Trade (advisory support for Trade clients); and Public Diplomacy (advisory support for Public Diplomacy clients). In total, the head of communication leads over 150 branch employees. While the departments have merged, there continue to be three Ministers – of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and International Development and La Francophonie – though now under the lead of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was also given direct responsibility for the re-negotiation of NAFTA (Canada, 2017). Each has an exempt status Director of Communications and one or two Press Secretaries. As a result, the department’s Head of Communication must support all three, but separately. Interestingly, the Head, at the level of Assistant Deputy Minister, has not traditionally been a communication professional. The department cycles its diplomats through functional and back office positions between diplomatic assignments. Thus, every two years or so, a new Head of Communication is appointed, often with limited government strategic communication experience. For an inexperienced Head of Communication, it is easier to learn to play a communication support or operational role than a strategic role. That said, the rapid turnover of communication heads over the past two decades suggests that even the learning needed to enact an operational role may well be incomplete by the time the head is moved to another posting. Certainly, the head is dependent on the technical capabilities found in the communication branch as well as the competencies of the branch middle managers. Without a tactically strong, experienced and talented staff, the head could not support the PMO, PCO and Minister’s Office communication triumvirate, given the speed and quality at which government reponse is needed around fast-breaking global issues. Heads have vast diplomatic but no formal communication expertise. Given the centralization of communication within the PMO and the PCO, and given the prominence a Minister of Foreign Affairs assumes by virtue of high profile international issues (recently including the re-negotiation of NAFTA, disagreements with Saudi Arabia on Saudi Arabian human rights, and Russian expansionism in the Baltic) and thus the responsibilities the Minister’s exempt communication staff must shoulder, the department’s communication branch is limited typically to a support and not a strategic role. For the most part, that role only involves the responsibility for the production of communication products as well as the management of the usual multistage approval process prior to dissemination. Due to the rotation of communications heads, it is probably best that the function be limited to a supporting role.

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Recent Global Affairs media releases demonstrate the variety of issues for which each Minister has responsibility. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was fully involved personally in NAFTA negotiations meeting continually in Ottawa, Washington and Mexico City with her American and Mexican counterparts, has implemented sanctions against Myanmar, held meetings on the North Korea crisis including hosting a summit in Vancouver with the American Secretary of State, worked on combatting the Russian destabilizing activities in the Ukraine, announced support for the re-building of Iraq and worked on trade disputes with the United States notably the announcement of various trade sanctions imposed by the President on Canada. The Minister of International Trade is involved with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, announced measures to ensure Canadian companies operating abroad apply ethical business conduct, and advised Canadian business on negotiating trade barriers. The Minister of Development’s involvement includes issues such as the food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, support for Haiti, the United Nations Development Program, West African health initiatives, youth internships and female genital mutilation. The Prime Minister, himself, has had recent involvement in global affairs and international issues, including visits to China, the United States, India, the World Economic Forum in Davos and the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, and preparations for Canada’s 2018 presidency of the G7. The communication products tasked, conceptualized, developed and approved for the Prime Minister’s and the three Minister’s involvement in global strategic communication would have worked their way through the Global Affairs Public Affairs Branch, the MINOs’ Communications, PCO, C&C and PMO, C. CONCLUSION Sriramesh and Verčič wrote about linking environmental variables to public relations practice and stated that the primary variable was a country’s political system (Sriramesh, & Verčič, 2009, p. 5). This chapter has examined that linkage within the Canadian Federal Government – as an integral part of the political system of the country. It draws on previous research that argued that while a GOC communication branch could be managed strategically, the influences of the exempt, political communication layer in a Minister’s Office, and that of the central agencies of PMO and PCO were too dominant to suggest that the branch itself was an important part of the strategic management process. Strategic communication decisions were taken elsewhere (Likely, 2009; Likely, Rudolf, & Valin, 2012). Ensuring that these decisions are informational and non-partisan is a process wrought with difficulty and easy for a line to be crossed (e.g. Toronto Star, 2008, May 26; Winnipeg Free Press, 2006, September 17; Amend, & Barney, 2016; Marland, 2017b; Esselment, 2014). As Marland, Lewis and Flanagan summarized: “The politicization of government communications requires intense control. … As the center of government manages unified messages, government communications become difficult to differentiate from party communications, absent the party logo” (2017, p. 1). The complexities inherent in Canada’s governing processes suggests that strategic communication – “the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007, p. 3) – is the prerogative of the political party elected by citizens. That “purposeful use” could become partisan due to the complexity of the communication function and the lack of a distinct line between the central communication groups and the strength of the

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resources at their disposal, regardless of the statements in the GOC Communications Policy. That same complexity affects strategic communication in a global affairs context. Of course, the generic scenario considered here was one of proactive, planned strategic communication. Should the communication be reactive – in response to issues or crises – then the inherent complexity is pressurized by the shortage of time and the lack of complete intelligence. In the global arena, a nation’s global strategic communication is more than less affected by actions of another nation, of man-made or natural disasters and of international institutions and thus is mainly reactive. REFERENCES Amend, E., & Barney, D. (2016). Getting it right: Canadian conservatives and the “War on Science”. Canadian Journal of Communication, 41(1), 9–35. Brodie, I. (2012). In defense of political staff. Canadian Parliamentary Review, 35(3), 33–39. Canada. (1988). Government communication policy. Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. (Archived). Canada. (2011) Accountable government: A guide for ministers and ministers of state, Annex E.3. Privy Council Office. Retrieved from: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/bcp-pco/CP1-3-2011eng.pdf. Canada. (2017). Minister of foreign affairs mandate letter (February 1, 2017). Prime Minister of Canada. Retrieved from: https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter Devereaux Ferguson, S., & Johansen, P. (2005). History of public relations in Canada. In Robert Heath(Ed.), Encyclopedia of public relations (pp. 111–118). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Esselment, A. L. (2014). The governing party and the permanent campaign. In A. Marland, T. Giasson, and T. A. Small (Eds.), Political communication in Canada: Meet the press and tweet the rest (24–38). Vancouver: UBC Press. Frappier, G., & Likely, F. (2005). Defining leadership roles in the Canadian government. Strategic Communication Management, 9(1), 5–8. Melcrum Publishing. December/January. Gelders, D., Bouckaert, G., & van Ruler, B. (2007). Communication management in the public sector: Consequences for public communication about policy intentions. Government Information Quarterly, 24(2), 326–337. Gelders, D., De Cock, R., Roe, K., & Neijens, P. (2006). The opinion of Belgian government communication professionals on public communication about policy intentions: Pros/cons and conditions. Government Information Quarterly. 28, 281–292. Gelders, D., & Ihlen, O. (2010). Government communication about potential policies:Public relations, propaganda or both? Public Relations Review. 36, 59–62. Hall, C. (2009). Inside the PMO … where communications is key. CBC News: Inside politics blog, November 2. Retrieved from: www.cbc.ca/newsblogs/politics/inside-politics-blog/2009/11/pmo-communications. html Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., Van Ruler, B., Verčič, D., & Sriramesh, K. (2007). Defining strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 1(1), 3–35. Kozolanka, K. (2006). The sponsorship scandal as communication: The rise of politicized and strategic communications in the Federal Government. Canadian Journal of Communication, 31(2), 343–366. Lee, M. (2008). Government public relations: A reader. Boca Raton, FL: CQ Press. Lee, M., Likely, F., & Valin, J. (2016). Government public relations in the United States and Canada. In T. Watson (Ed.), North American perspectives on the development of public relations: Other voices. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Likely, F. Beyond the manager and the technician roles: Exploring an executive or executive leader role for the head of a PR/communication function. International public relations research conference. Miami. Proceedings. 2004.

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Likely, F. (2009). A different country, a different public relations: Canadian PR in the North American context. In S. Krishnamurthy and D. Verčič (Eds.), The global public relations handbook: Theory, research and practice (2nd ed.) (pp. 654–675). New York: Routledge. Likely, F. (2013). Managing strategically: Canadian federal government communication branches evaluated against five of the generic principles of public relations. Journal of Professional Communication, 3(1), 69–96. Likely, F., Rudolf, M., and Valin, J. (2012) The strategic and professional evolution of the Canadian federal government’s communications community over the past 25 years. Proceedings: 3rd annual international history of public relations conference, Bournemouth, UK, July. Liu, B. F., & Levenshus, A. B. (2010). Public relations professionals’ perspectives on the communication challenges and opportunities they face in the public sector. PRism 7(1). Retrieved from www.prismjournal. Marland, A. (2017a). Strategic management of media relations: Communications centralization and spin in the Government of Canada. Canadian Public Policy. March, 43(1), 36–49. Marland, A. (2017b). Government communications under Trudeau. Policy Options. April 18th. Retrieved from: http://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/avril-2017/government-communications-under-trudeau/. Marland, A., Lewis, J. P., & Flanagan, T. (2017). Governance in the age of digital media and branding. Governance: an International Journal of Policy, Administrations and Institutions, 30(1), 125–141. Moss, D., Likely, F., Sriramesh, K., & Ferrari, M. A. (2017). Structure of the public relations/communication department: Key findings from a global study. Public Relations Review, 43(1), 80–90. Redmond, J., & Likely, F. (2002a). Rebuilding communication in the Federal Government of Canada. Strategic Communication Management. Melcrum Publising., 6(6), 14–16. Redmond, J. & Likely, F. (2002b). Mission possible: Renewing the communications function in the Federal Government. Canadian Government Executive. Issue. 18(4), 16–18. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2009). A theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice. In Sriramesh, K. & Verčič, D. (Eds) The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Reasearch and Practice, 2nd edition (pp. 3–21). New York: Routledge. Toronto Star. (2008, May 26). Mum’s the word till message vetted; privy council office plays key role in screening response to even most routine information request. Toronto Star, A.12. Vos, M., & Westerhoudt, E. (2008). Trends in government communication in The Netherlands. Journal of Communication Management, 12(1), 18–25. London Winnipeg Free Press. (2006, September 17). ‘Non-partisan’ privy council spoutstory lines (p. A. 5). Winnipeg Free Press.

CHAPTER

10 Global Public Sector and Political Communication Vilma Luoma-aho María-José Canel Karen Sanders

How nations and city states ensure that their citizens get adequate services, infrastructure and safety is, in most parts of the world, a task for the public sector. Also referred to as authority, governmental, and public administration organizations, public sector and political organizations exist to work together to serve current public needs as well as to collect from citizens the resources required for this task via taxes and fees, for example. The degree to which a public sector organization serves citizens depends on the societal setting, and the responsibilities of public sector organizations range from providing a wide range of universal services (Nordic Welfare states) to providing some general societal goods based on needs (most countries). Though each public sector and political organization is a product of its own time and environment, there seem to be certain trends that unite them globally. Such trends include the austerity of the public sector, new and social media, novel forms of citizen activism and engagement as well as greater diverse citizens and audience fragmentation (Thomas, 2013; Vertovec, 2007). The public relations industry-based Edelman Trust Barometer notes that trust in government has reduced globally (Edelman & Singer, 2015), but this is no different from other sectors, because businesses and NGOs are also experiencing a downturn in trust globally. Most citizens around the world now feel that the public sector system is not working for them, and we are witnessing a unique emergence of populism and far right movements across the globe (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). 111

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To battle these challenges, an emerging trend in governments from different countries has been to establish units to allocate functions related to managing their most valuable assets: the intangibles of citizen trust and organizational legitimacy. For instance, there is the Office of Public Engagement created in the US by the Obama administration, and there are similar offices for the federal government of Canada and the government of the United Kingdom. The Edelman Trust Barometer 2017 suggests that to fix the trust challenge, public sector and political organizations must increasingly engage their citizens while also addressing their fears. This means changing from the traditional modes of one-way information provision to listening and dialogue (Macnamara, 2016), and strengthening the intangible assets that the organizations are built on, such as trust and legitimacy. For public sector organizations, change is becoming the status quo. Public administrators and employees are learning to deal not only with changes in citizen needs but also with the continuous pressure placed on them to develop, measure, and improve their services and organizations. Citizen engagement and public sector employee engagement are among the recent trends in the context of attempts to make organizations more approachable and citizen friendly. Efficiency remains the key word for public sector change, and many of the “drivers of change in the public sector fit into the NPM tendency to create more effective and efficient public organizations” (Kuipers et al., 2014, 15). This chapter seeks to address public sector and political communication globally, representing the first of the three societal sectors often differentiated by their functions and type (public, private, NGOs). The public sector and politics deal with governance of public resources for the benefit of society at large, be it in a more or less democratic environment. Both political and public sector organizations have traditionally been blamed for several societal ills including inefficiency, bureaucracy, serving their own needs above those of others, and corruption. Despite their central task in society, partly due to the complex setting, short-term election cycles, diverse stakeholders, and slightly negative sector reputation, many communication efforts of public and political organizations fail. Communication is proving to be vital for public sector organizations as their impact is seldom clearly visible to outsiders (Sanders & Canel, 2013). Though communication alone cannot solve the many sector-related challenges, this chapter analyzes public and political communication and reflects how public and political organizations could better utilize communication to improve their functions. WHOM DO THEY SERVE? Traditionally public sector organizations and political communication have viewed citizens mostly as passive entities who need to be spurred into action and engagement when needed (such as elections, outreaches, community collaboration, campaigns). Whether public sector and political communication serve citizens, voters, beneficiaries, customers or stakeholders has long been debated in the field (Garnett, Marlowe, & Pandey, 2008; Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; Glenny, 2008). Even the use of the word “citizen” is controversial, as many individuals living within national borders may not have citizenship let alone legal residency. As the title changes, so do citizen expectations: the newer roles emphasize exchange. For example, payment (whether through taxes or other fees), accompanies an expectation that the quality of service should be higher (Thijs & Staes, 2008). Moreover,

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as public services continue to be developed and service design becomes more common, citizens also become producers and co-creators in the context of public sector services. As a result, more emphasis is placed on the nature of engagement between citizen and organization (Bowden et al., 2016). As traditional mass communication has become increasingly outdated (Castells, 2009), public and political organizations are now challenged to reach individual citizens and voters within their cultural bubbles (Sloterdijk, 2011). Individual citizen communication bubbles let in the communication that citizens actively choose for themselves, and instead of pre-tailored mass media content, streams and feeds that citizens self-select from an array of potential messages is preferred. Moreover, as citizens are able to communicate their needs and experiences online in real time and to massive audiences, individual experiences gain in importance, and citizens and NGOs as “experience experts” are beginning to overtake traditional forms of authorities. Hence, public and political organizations are no longer the only authorities in the discussions where opinions are formed, but represent merely one voice among others (Tirkkonen & Luoma-aho, 2011a; Luoma-aho & Vos, 2010). With these changes in the nature of society and citizens, there is an urgent need for the public sector to shift from a “culture of control” to a citizen-centered culture of engagement (Bourgon, 2011, 1–414). HOW IS COMMUNICATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR DIFFERENT? There are several traits of public sector and political organizations that differ from the operation logic of private businesses and non-governmental organizations (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012, 186–206). First, the environment is political and often contested between differing viewpoints so that its communication is challenged by conflicting aims. Public sector resources are more scarce than those of private companies. In addition, public sector structures are more complex, diverse and often harbor uncertainty about objectives and decision-making criteria (Luoma-aho & Canel, 2016), making communication outcomes unpredictable despite clear procedures and guidelines. In the public sector, there is less market competition, and hence authorities have less room to tailor messages to desired publics. There are also fewer incentives to be citizen or customer friendly. Moreover, public sector organizations in Western democracies are more subject to public scrutiny and required to be transparent and accountable to the different constituencies, making all their communication strategies visible. Public sector organizations range from purely political institutions with elected, changing leadership to permanent, neutral and order -type public agencies. In this book, public relations is understood as “strategic communication that different types of organizations use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant publics many of whom are increasingly becoming culturally diverse.” Building on this, we suggest: public sector communication is strategically planned communication between organizations and their stakeholders, enabling public sector functions, within their specific cultural/political settings, with the purpose of building and maintaining the public good. (Canel & Luoma-aho, in press)

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Respectively, The field of political communication is concerned with communication and its role in political processes, systems and institutions … [and] is an area of practice and study related to the human activity of communicating about politics. Politics here is understood as a human activity engaged in by groups where there are diverse interests conciliated by a settled order. (Sanders, 2009, 19)

Both public sector and political communication can be understood to contribute to the quality of democracy and societal resilience (Sanders & Canel, 2013). There is an urgent need for authorities and politicians “to know how to interact with the public” (Thomas, 2013, 786). The demand for better communication stems from several sources, including citizens’ comparisons between the private sector services and public standards of service (Thijs & Staes, 2008). This has introduced the idea of citizen engagement, which for authoritarian societies may take more negative forms ranging from coercion to invading privacy of citizens in the name of public safety. Engaging citizens is a central aim of western democratic public and political organizations today, and we can see an overall attitude change for organizations from holding power over to holding power with citizens (Thomas, 2013). Public sector and political organizations remain fragile if they do not understand the citizens and their new communication needs (Bourgon, 2011, 2009). POLITICAL OR NON-POLITICAL? Not all public sector communication is political in nature. In its broadest sense, the political is irredeemably public in nature and is characterized by action, dialectic, and rhetoric directed towards the attainment or conciliation of diverse ends. In a narrower sense, the term political refers to involvement in party politics or politics in general, understood as the process of achieving and then exercising power. The political nature of public sector organizations can be seen as a continuum ranging from political to non-political communication. In the extreme political communication end of the continuum, communication is related to clearly set political aims that change with a change in political rulers. In the non-political neutral and order type organizations- end of the continuum, communication is about maintaining the public good that only partly reflect the political changes and trends. Most public sector organizations, however, represent something in between the two extreme, as most often the leadership of the organizations may be political but much of the personnel (bureaucrats) may be more permanent. Figure 10.1 displays the continuum. TRUST IN POLITICIANS, TRUST IN AUTHORITIES Despite the fact that citizens can elect their own politicians, there is some Nordic evidence that supports the notion that citizens find it easier to trust non-elected authorities of public sector organizations and institutions than elected politicians (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005, 339–365). Trust has to do with a willingness to grant somebody a discretional margin to do something. It is a “leap of faith” in which the irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability are suspended (Van de Walle & Six, 2014, 4). Trust in the public sector has been defined as

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FIG. 10.1 The political–non-political continuum of public sector communication.

The willingness, within the context of uncertainty, to grant discretion to the other party (an organization, a leader, a citizen, and so forth) in the use of public resources for the provision of public services, from which a certain compliance, or at least a reduction in the desire to control, emerges. (Canel & Luoma-aho, 2019, p. 227)

Of course, a key question is on what foundations is this trust built? For instance, Scammell understands that, in what refers to trust in politics, it derives from politicians’ competence and probity. These are based on perceptions, experiences, effective expectations management, an understanding of citizens’ needs and perceptions and the promotion of citizens’ efficacy and participation. (see Scammell, 2014). What creates trust in politicians and authorities, how to look at the object (is it trust in government? In public administration? In public services?), and the role that communication might play in building trust are issues that feature high on the research agenda. CITIZENS ARE FROM VENUS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, AND POLITICIANS ARE FROM MARS? Like weather on the planet Venus, the citizens adapt to societal and technological changes quicker than organizations and institutions, which is apparent in the public sector and political communication literature. To the extent that public sector organizations and public services are principally led by politicians within an increasingly mediated environment, political communication research helps to address different political constraints on public sector communication. Some scholars have tried to establish boundaries between political/propaganda communication and the more apolitical/nonpartisan communication undertaken by civil servants when providing public services (Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; Glenny, 2008). Looking at the communication undertaken by civil servants in Australia, Glenny (2008) takes what she calls a “bureaucracy perspective” to distinguish communication activities that serve the purpose of governing of the nation from those which promote a political party and/or politician in order to win electoral support. A related issue is

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that of how citizens ought to be included in public sector communication. In relation to this question, an analysis by Heinze, Schneider, and Ferié (2013) of the use of direct communication instruments by German governments, in which they note that most research centers on the exchange between mass media and government without systematically including citizens, also contains a call for a form of communication that helps to foster a greater proximity to citizens. Sanders and Canel conclude that while political communication research has quite rightly highlighted the political purposes of government communication, concepts offered by other research disciplines complement this view by suggesting avenues of study directed at what they see as the civic purposes of government communication: “Building long-term relationships, mutual understanding and citizen engagement become part of what is understood to be government communication and understanding how they are helped and hindered then becomes part of the research agenda” (Canel & Sanders, 2014, 101). The assessment of public sector performance differs from the assessment of private sector goods and services. In the public sector, assessments need to include, in addition to the operational objective of “doing things right,” the more existential and often-political question of “doing the right things” (Thijs & Staes, 2008, 9). The communication between authorities, politicians, and citizens online is not without challenges. Lack of common viewpoints as well as the legal constraints that guide all authority communication online were noted as challenges to interaction (Tirkkonen & Luoma-Aho, 2014). The expression “public sector communication” has seldom been used, and until 1992 no book had dealt specifically with the topic by that name (Graber, 1992). Overall, the longest list of works falls under the term “government communication.” Under the level of “government,” few studies refer to government information management or to government public relations, and there is also only one term (“government reputation”) that deals specifically with intangible assets. All sources agree, however, that engaging citizens will provide several benefits to both public sector and political organizations. TOWARD MORE ENGAGING PUBLIC SECTOR AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION Citizen engagement has emerged as the new trend for public sector organizations, as citizens demand that public sector organizations should be more responsive to their needs and demands (Thijs & Staes, 2008, 8). Engagement as a “vehicle for coproduction, co-creation and co-innovation of public goods” (Bourgon, 2009, 320) is the current ideal for most public sector organizations globally. There are clear advantages to engagement, as it has been proven to foster citizenship values, enhance accountability, improve trust in government, maintain legitimacy, and help to achieve better decisions and to build consensus (Yang & Pandey, 2011; see also Coursey, Yang, & Pandey, 2012; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). However, there is also a negative side to engagement: governmental citizen involvement efforts are costly; involving citizens is not always associated with a better quality of services; and citizens are not equally interested and qualified to take part in public deliberation (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). Serving a diverse public is a challenge for many public sector organizations (Thomas, 2013). As service design becomes more popular in the business sector (Whicher & Cawood, 2013), citizens are starting to expect a similar level of service delivery from

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public sector organizations, challenging the previously often one-way consultation style of public sector communication. The successes of the alleged “post-truth politics” of Brexit, Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, and the failure by Teresa May’s Tories to even win a majority in the 2017 UK elections let alone increase their lead took most political communication experts by surprise. Shortly after Hillary Clinton’s defeat, the Democrat communication strategist Stanley Greenberg wrote an article titled “Why did pollsters like me fail to predict Trump’s victory?” (The Guardian, 16 November, 2016). In an analysis of the British Conservative Party’s 2017 campaign, a distinguished British journalist wrote about the communication failure of the communicators (Parris, 2017) whose simplistic campaign tactics could not disguise the shortcomings of their political clients. These examples demonstrate the difficulty of considering political communication engagement of citizens without thinking about by what means citizens are engaged and for what purpose. Trump’s tweets, with their mixture of forthrightness, irreverence, or downright rudeness, have certainly engaged the attention of the media and a certain segment of the public but it could be argued that they are also contributing to a coarsening of public discourse. More engaging political communication should perhaps be considered in the context of how it promotes a number of connected outcomes including the participation, effective learning, emotional investment (the sense that politics and issues matter) and increased sense of efficacy (the feeling that I matter) of citizens. CONCLUSIONS Public sector and political communication play a vital role in global settings as they enable both the success and failure of nations in the society full of communication. In undertaking the endeavor of moving from a culture of control to a culture of dialogue, of shifting the attitude of holding power over to holding power with citizens, certainly communication can be of help. Joint efforts of scholars and practitioners are required to address the challenges ahead, among which, the following can be mentioned. At a theory level, research is needed to better understand what a fruitful interaction is, and to explore the role communication plays in building intangible value that can enable both social and economic growth in society. In more practical terms, research is needed to find the structures and processes that help citizen engagement actually happens: how should citizens’ feedback be searched, received, processed, and responded to? How can listening be built in to the political and public sector processes? The ultimate issue is how communication can help bringing trust and legitimacy to the core of governance of public and political organizations globally and enable a better dialogue between citizen and the organizations that govern them. REFERENCES Aalberg, T. Esser, F. Reinemann, C. Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. (2017). Populist Political Communication in Europe. New York: Routledge. Bourgon, J. (2009). New directions in public administration: Serving beyond the predictable. Public Policy and Administration, 24(3), 309–330.

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Bourgon, J. (2011). A New Synthesis of Public Administration: Serving in the 21st Century. Ontario, Canada: School of Policy Studies and McGill-Queenʼs University Press. Bowden, J., Luoma-aho, V. & Naumann, K. (2016) Developing a spectrum of positive to negative citizen engagement, In Brodie, R., Hollebeek, L. & Conduit, J. (Eds.) Customer Engagement Contemporary Issues and Challenges (pp. 257–277). London: Routledge. Canel, M.J., & Sanders, K. 2014. Is it enough to be strategic? Comparing and defining professional government communication across disciplinary fields and between countries. In M.J. Canel, & K. Voltmer (Eds.), Comparing Political Communication Across Time and Space: New Studies in an Emerging Field (pp. 98–116). London: Palgrave. Canel, M.J. & Luoma-aho, V. (2019). Public Sector Communication. Closing Gaps between Citizens and Public Organizations. New York: Wiley Blackwell. Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coursey, D., Yang, K., & Pandey, S.K. (2012). Public Service Motivation (PSM) and support for citizen participation: A test of Perry and Van den Abeele’s reformulation of PSM theory. Public Administration Review, 72 (4), 572–582 Denhardt, J.V., & Denhardt, R.B. (2015). The new public service revisited. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 664–672. Edelman, D., & Singer, M. (2015). The New Consumer Decision Journey. McKinsey & Company. Online: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/the-new-consumerdecision-journey. Garnett, J.L., Marlowe, J., & Pandey, S.K. (2008). Penetrating the performance predicament: Communication as a mediator or Moderator of organizational culture’s impact on public organizational performance. Public Administration Review, 68 (2), 266–281. Gelders, D., & Ihlen, Ø. (2010). Government communication about potential policies: Public relations, propaganda or both? Public Relations Review, 36(1), 59–62. Glenny, L. (2008). Perspectives of communication in the Australian public sector. Journal of Communication Management, 12 (2): 152–168. Graber, D. (1992). Public Sector Communication: How Organizations Manage Information. Washington: CQPress. Heinze, J., Schneider, H., & Ferié, F. (2013). Mapping the consumption of government communication: A qualitative study in Germany. Journal of Public Affairs, 13 (4), 370–383. Kuipers, B.S., Higgs, M., Kickert, W., Tummers, L., Grandia, J., & Van Der Voet, J. (2014). The management of change in public organizations: A literature review. Public Administration, 92(1), 1–20. Kumlin, S. & Rothstein, B. (2005). Making and breaking social capital. The Impact of welfare-state institutions, Comparative Political Studies, 38, 339–365. Luoma-aho, V., & Canel, M.J. (2016). Public sector reputation. In C. Carroll (Ed.), Sage Encyclopedia of Corporate Reputation. New York: Sage. Luoma-aho, V. & Vos, M. (2010). Towards a more dynamic stakeholder model: Acknowledging multiple issue arenas. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 15(3), 315–331. Macnamara, J. (2016). Organizational Listening. The Missing Essential in Public Communication. New York: Peter Lang Verlag. Sanders, K. (2009). Communicating Politics in the Twenty-First Century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sanders, K., & Canel, M.J. (2013). Government Communication.Cases and Challenges. London: Bloomsbury. Scammell, M. (2014). Consumer Democracy. The Marketing of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Sloterdijk, P. (2011). Bubbles, Spheres I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thijs, N., & Staes, P. (2008). European Primer on Customer Satisfaction Management. (Primer). The Netherlands: European Institute for Public Administration & European Public Administration Network. Thomas, J.C. (2013). Citizen, customer, partner: Rethinking the place of the public in public management. Public Administration Review, 73(6), 786–796. Tirkkonen, P., & Luoma-aho, V. (2011). Online authority communication during an epidemic: A Finnish example. Public Relations Review, 37(2), 172–174.

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Tirkkonen, P., & Luoma-Aho, V. (2014). Authority crisis communication vs. discussion forums, swine flu. In M. DiStaso, & D. Sevick Bortree (Eds.), Ethical Practice of Social Media in Public Relations (1st ed., pp. 192–204), New York: Routledge. Van de Walle, S., & Six, F. (2014). Trust and distrust as distinct concepts: Why studying distrust in institutions is important. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 16 (2), 158–174. Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054. Whicher, A., Swiatek, P. & Cawood, G. (2013). An Overview of Service Design for the Private and Public Sectors. Cardiff, NSW: See Network. Yang, K., & Pandey, S.K. 2011. Further dissecting the black box of citizen participation: When does citizen involvement lead to good outcomes? Public Administration Review, 71(6), 880–892.

CHAPTER

11 The European Union and Its Public Relations Context, Actions, and Challenges of a Supranational Polity Chiara Valentini

INTRODUCTION Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950 The European Union (EU) is the most advanced regional political and economic entity in the world. Since its inception the EU has been presented with questions concerning nation building issues, specifically how to create a European polity that could contribute to peacemaking, economic growth, and empowering civil society. Fundamentally the EU is a socially and politically constructed project of integration among European nation-states to reduce fragmentation, instability, and the pursuit of unilateral, destructive policies. It is less of a traditional nation-state but more than a traditional international organization (Valentini, 2008). It is a union of independent nation-states, who have relinquished part of their national powers in return for representation within EU institutions. In many respects, the political status of the EU is unique, as it is a supranational polity that functions in some policy areas as a federation since its power is above member states’ legislation, and in other policy areas as a confederation of independent states, similar to an intergovernmental organization, because it can provide some guidelines but decisions and agreements reached are not enforceable, and member states are free to decide whether and to what extent to follow them (Valentini, 2008, 2013). Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU 120

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has gained increasing power in enacting new legislation in Europe, and has become a key player in international and trade relations. Thus, it serves as an interesting case for discussing global public relations because of the complexity of conceptualizing, developing, and implementing strategic communications by a sui generis organization that constantly faces the need “for establishing symbiotic relationships with relevant publics, many of whom are culturally diverse” (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009, p. xxxiv). This chapter presents and discusses the context, actions, and challenges faced by the EU in communicating to and with its diverse publics. It starts by offering a short review of the context as well as actions undertaken since its inception. This review makes no claim of completeness as it is primarily meant to offer an understanding of the environment and organizational settings that fundamentally impact the way global public relations is conducted by the EU institutions. The chapter concludes by addressing global public relations challenges in relation to the EU. THE CONTEXT: ORIGIN, STRUCTURE, AND ORGANIZING To understand the context of global public relations in relation to the EU, one must start from its environment, its origins, structure, and organization. Along the description presented in Part I of this volume, Valentini (2017) defines an environment as “an arrangement of political, economic, social, and cultural factors existing in a given context that have an impact on organizational processes and structures” (p. 839) as well as the “large variety of stakeholders and how these interact and act upon organizations” (p. 839). The form of communication chosen for interacting with the environment is determined by the organizational settings as much as cultural and institutional requirements, which, in the case of the EU, are quite complex and multilayered. The EU was established in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, but was preceded by the European Economic Community (EEC), which dates back to post World War II when securing long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the devastated European continent became an important priority for European leaders. Creating a community of countries with common political and economic goals paved the way to the creation of a more formalized supranational structure of peaceful national collaborations. The European Economic Community was established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome and had as its primary goal the creation of a common economic market among six nation-states – Belgium, France, West Germany,1 Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Through the years, the EEC brought political stability and increased economic growth to the six-founding countries. After the formation of the EU, the six expanded to the current 28. Yet, it is expected that in the coming years, one member state, the United Kingdom will leave the EU as a result of the referendum in the summer of 2016.2 The EU has also increased its competences to cover a wide range of policy areas beyond economic ones, including social and cultural policies, agriculture, fisheries, the environment, consumer protection, transport, energy, security, and justice, and many others. Today, the EU comprises diverse supranational, independent institutions with legislative, executive, and judiciary powers including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union also known as the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, and financial institutions such as the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank (Nugent, 2010). The EU also operates through intergovernmental negotiated decisions by the member

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states that gather together, for instance, in the European Council. The European Council has no legislative powers, but acts as a body that issues guidelines to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, which are the main policy-making institutions (Valentini, 2013). The European Commission has executive powers and so drafts and proposes legislation based on its own initiative, but also on the suggestions made by the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union or by other external political actors. The European Commission comprises a President and 27 commissioners who are responsible for one or more policy areas. The European Commission is also responsible for monitoring that EU legislation, once adopted, is implemented (Nugent, 2010). The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have legislative powers and are both involved in the approval of EU legislation. The European Parliament is the only institution whose members are directly elected by European citizens. It comprises a President and 751 members across seven political groups representing the left, central, and right political positions. The Council of the EU represents the executive governments of the EU’s member states and comprises a Presidency and a council of ministers (one per member state) that changes ministerial composition according to the policy area under discussion (Nugent, 2010). From an organizational point of view, EU institutions can be considered public sector organizations operating in an international context (Valentini, 2008). Similar to public sector organizations, they have a political nature and are subjected to complex and unstable environments. They are expected to fulfill legal and formal requirements, and thus tend to have less autonomy than other types of organizations and more rigid procedures. Their objectives are broad and they serve many diverse publics (Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016; Gelders, Bouckaert, & van Ruler, 2007). Similar to public sector organizations “they are affected by the same forces, low management relationships with different publics, transparency and accountability of information versus security and high versus low public involvement” (Valentini, 2008, p. 56). They differ from public sector organizations of nation-states because EU institutions are not comparable in terms of power and public acceptance with national institutions nor they can be wholly considered outsiders, distinct from the national ones, seeking to promote their national interests in other countries (Valentini, 2008). The supranational nature of the EU makes communication to and with publics even more important. For political institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, communication is the means through which legislative drafts are shared and discussed and negotiated among political actors and relevant publics. Historically, communication has also been an important instrument for seeking public support so to be able to increase the EU supranational political power through legislative integration. For administrative institutions such as the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors, communication is an instrument to handle the relationships between these institutions and its diverse sets of publics. THE ACTIONS: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN FOSTERING THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT Within the EU context, communication has been essential to further develop the European Economic Community into a more integrated community first and later a union of member states. It has served the purpose of creating an institutional

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legitimacy that was not there when the head of states of the six-founding nationstates signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Valentini & Nesti, 2010). Specifically, communication has, and still does, serve four fundamental functions for the EU: First, it increases public knowledge on policies and thus enhance electoral participation; second, it allows for more public participation in policy-formulation and decision-making by giving information about issues at stakes, positions, and procedures; third it promotes the accountability of political representatives; and lastly it enhances political responsiveness by improving political actors’ knowledge of citizens’ preferences (Valentini & Nesti, 2010, pp. 6–7). It is important to note that, at the very beginning of the European integration project, European leaders were not concerned about engaging, and had very limited interested in informing, the general public. Thus, communication was a sporadic activity, and not necessarily strategic. The main purpose of EU communications was to notify key influential publics from the academic, political, and economic elites about the agreements and progress made in the economic integration with the intent to eventually influence the opinions of the general public. These key elite publics, often referred to as “multipliers,” were considered the “communication bridges” between EU citizens and the EU institutions, as they were chosen because of their “highly-developed communication skills that enabled them to influence those who came in contact with them, directly or indirectly” (Terra, 2010, p. 50). Communications were, however, scarce and not strategically oriented. Those multipliers had their own discretion in deciding what to share about the EU and in which manner based on what they considered relevant for their audiences. After two decades of political work to produce EU legislation that integrates new policy areas and a general recognition that most EU citizens did not show either interest or sufficient knowledge to understand the new political developments in the European Community, in the early 1970s the community developed a specific information policy with concrete communication objectives. The EU information policy was essentially a political document on how the EU and its institutions should keep the citizens informed. Yet, this information policy has been described as a bureaucratic form of arcane policy – a policy whose main aim was to passively provide access to EU information (Brüggemann, 2005). Its implementation showed the very nature of how the EU understood its role of public communicator. Communication was limited in scope and quantity, fulfilled mostly basic transparency and accountability requirements, and yet did so through a language that was not easily comprehended by those outside the political environment. Public relations initiatives were almost nonexistent. A first change of communication approach was visible during the first half of the 1980s with a new information and communication policy. EU political leaders’ concern about how the EU was represented in the news had increased and there was a need for professional advice to cope with media scandals, blame games, and the general mediatization of news and information (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Hood, 2011). The new policy sought to increase EU visibility and relevance among the news media and EU citizens through more professionalized communication by dropping bureaucratic, fact-based, and administrative communications for a more accessible, receiver-centered one. Public relations activities of EU institutions were part of the implementation of the EU information and communication policy, supporting the promotion of European values and identity through diverse campaigns and cultural initiatives targeting EU citizens. During this period, symbolic communications (Grunig, 1993) were important instruments for developing a shared appreciation of

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the European integration project among the culturally diverse EU publics. Public relations was mostly asymmetrical and information driven and was not aimed at increasing dialogue with relevant publics or engage citizens in political debates in the different policy-formulation stages. EU public relations activities were, thus, primarily focused on the image and reputation management of political leaders and EU institutions. During the 1990s, the EU experienced an important political crisis when French and Danish citizens rejected via national referenda the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty that had created the EU. Additionally, some institutional scandals and the constant low support of, and knowledge about, the EU among EU citizens triggered a substantial shift in the communication approach of the EU institutions including their choice of public relations activities. First, there has been an increasing professionalization of communication through hiring more public relations and communication experts across a number of institutions and units. Until then most communication activities were performed by civil servants with no specific communication training or education, whose approach to communication was mostly limited to documenting EU political discussions and activities. Second, a new communication strategy in a new communication policy was proposed in early 2000 that aimed at increasing the engagement of specific public groups with the European integration project through dialogue-oriented initiatives (Valentini & Nesti, 2010). In particular, the new communication policy sought to increase the participation of national civil society organizations in the development and dissemination of specific EU contents, but also in organizing educational and issue specific events at local levels where citizens could meet and discuss political matters. In recent years, EU institutions have also tried to leverage the interactive nature of the Internet to find alternative channels to communicate to and with citizens. EU PUBLIC RELATIONS TODAY: COMMUNICATIONS TO RATHER THAN WITH PUBLICS Public relations activities in public sector organizations are very diverse and are often disguised under the general activities that take place in government communication. Essentially, the function of public relations in the EU is the strategic management of information and communication activities directed to specific publics, either internal or external to the institutions, by providing information, raising awareness, and influencing public attitudes or even behavior towards specific issues and policies. For the most EU communication has been characterized by a public information model (Grunig & Jaatinen, 1999), which helps the EU meet transparency, accountability, and legal requirements of keeping their constituents informed about their actions, but it is a model that has minimal contributions toward increasing EU institutions’ public engagement. Public relations activities at the EU level are not as centralized as one may expect. Each EU institution has its own communication professionals in charge of diverse internal and external communications. In some EU institutions, communication is centralized in a specific unit. For instance, in the European Commission, a specific unit called Directorate General (DG) for Communication is in charge of all communications and public relations activities of this institution and of more general EU-wide campaigns. In other EU institutions communication is performed in decentralized units specifically dedicated to certain policy areas. These communication specialists

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represent the bulk of government communication officers in charge of institutional and/or unit specific communications whose main function is to help public understanding of the EU policies and increasing awareness of the political decision makers’ roles and the functioning of the institutions (Laursen & Valentini, 2013). Coordination among EU institutions on what to communicate, how to communicate, and in which circumstances to communicate is not systematic, even though general guidelines for EU communication exists (Valentini, 2013). The EU has primarily targeted the news media and civil society as key multipliers and disseminators of their activities with the intent of wining the hearts and minds of EU citizens by convincing them of the value of a supranational polity and showing that the very essence of the EU is meeting the democratic expectations of its EU constituents in providing a stable, democratic, and free society. Reaching out to EU citizens directly or via these multipliers, however, has not been so effective. The complex institutional and political nature of the EU, coupled with its multicultural environment, makes building relationships with key publics an extra difficult task for public relations professionals. According to Valentini and Laursen (2012), one of the major problems in EU relations with its public is that the EU has focused predominantly on political information and political communication rather than on communicating with EU citizens through increasing opportunities for political dialogues. The latter would assume communications oriented at encouraging EU citizens participation to political debates, discussion on policy-formulation and voting. Other studies (e.g. Anderson & McLeod, 2004; Laursen, 2013) have shown that this problem is partly related to institutional constraints and the general understanding of communication in public sector organizations that must promote a culture of impartiality, neutrality, and transparency and, at the same time, secure smooth and rapid political negotiations of legislative acts which often are possible if a certain level of secrecy among those involved is maintained. Because political actors are highly concerned about their public image, they tend to avoid overexposing themselves, their positions, and negotiation tactics before an institutional agreement is reached. Thus, secrecy increases these political actor’s maneuvering power in different EU policy-making stages (Laursen, 2013; Laursen & Valentini, 2013), but reduces public scrutiny of these political actors’ behaviors and hampers opportunities for public engagement in open political discussions. A further problem with the EU capacity of reaching out to the general public is essentially the limited ability of speaking with one voice when it comes to internal – the Union – matters. Paradoxically, EU institutions have shown on several occasions to compete against each other than cooperate for media attention (Martins, Lecheler, & de Vreese, 2011). This is particularly evident among the main policy-making institutions because these institutions have different political interests in communicating their role to the news media, and in their specific political agenda (Valentini & Laursen, 2012), even within their own institutional settings (Laursen & Valentini, 2013). It is important to note that the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union have a great interest in showing to their publics that each of them is a legitimate political actor promoting the Union interests by showing the contribution of own specific political actions. Yet, given the highly political nature of these institutions, their political agenda, and positions in relation to diverse issues may diverge. Because of this long and sometimes strenuous negotiations across institutions, but even among single member states in the case of the Council of the European Union and/or among political parties in the case of the European

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Parliament, may occur. In these institutions, most of the public relations activities are performed by communication professionals in the form of political public relations and political marketing. In this function, communication professionals work either at a party level, or as personal political communication advisors, and/or spokespersons, taking care of the image of specific EU political parties or representatives, such as the presidents of the three policy-making institutions. The goal is to frame political discussions into discourses and ideas that reinforce the particular institution or party or political leader’s image. But this can result in presenting the EU to its publics through many different and possibly conflicting views. As a consequence, the multi-vocality of EU has not facilitated, but it has hindered the public understanding of the main issues and questions that are at stake in the political agenda. The recent vote by a majority of UK citizens to leave the EU in a public referendum is an illustrative example of the deficient knowledge of the value of being part of the EU and the limited knowledge of the UK citizens of the implications of such a decision (Galbraith, 2017; Koch, 2017). Overall, the big problem of EU information and communication policy is the lack of a clear coordination and alignment in what should be communicated among the different EU official sources. This has impaired public appreciation of the EU and the significant work of its institutions as actual instruments for advancing EU society and supporting policies that address very real European but also global problems. CURRENT CHALLENGES As extensively described in Part I of this volume, the nature of public relations practiced in a country is influenced by five major environmental variables. Detecting, analyzing, and finally using these factors for public relations planning is, however, a big challenge in the case of the EU because it is not a country but a supranational polity characterized by a multicultural environment and a diverse range of political, economic, social, legal, and media systems. The first major setback in setting up a public relations strategy for the EU is fundamentally its supranational polity nature and the management of public relations in a hybrid political system in which national political systems still play a key role. What is the best strategy to address key public concerns when the EU should represent the position of the entire Union but national political systems and priorities diverge widely among member states? The EU comprises member states from Western and liberal countries but also many former Soviet bloc countries, whose historical roots are still evident in their governing approach. An illustrative example is the 2017 uprising by the general public in Romania after their government passed an emergency degree that weakened anti-corruption legislation and offered potential amnesty for those convicted of corruption (Fishwick, 2017, February 6). This shows that hegemonic actions perpetuated by political leaders in the EU are still occurring despite the impetus of the EU in fostering democracy and democratic practices. Even among member states with similar political systems, public relations activities may be hindered by differences in political, social, and economic priorities. So, the socialist political agenda of Nordic countries which typically expect more public sector spending and social caring often clashes with those liberal, capitalist EU countries that want more liberalization. In this environment of political differences, not only do political discussions and negotiations within the EU institutions become more difficult, but the

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strategic communications of those issues, and managing EU political responses and subsequent legislation become a public relations challenge. Similarly, EU public relations aimed at increasing public support and appreciation for the EU work in advancing EU society and supporting policies that address very real European problems is thwarted by the very legal nature of the supranational polity and its effective powers in regulating EU society across different policy areas. Even though most of the EU countries have a similar legal system, that is based on civil law (excluding Ireland and the UK which are based on common law), a number of differences that are closely linked to the political and economic developments of each member states still exist. Harmonization of legislation across EU countries has been, and still is, happening. Yet, delays, alterations, and even non-compliance with supranational policies have occurred because member states still retain the possibility to decide when, to what extent, and how to conform to the approved EU laws in many policy areas (Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, & Sprungk, 2010; Mbaye, 2001). These affect the general expectations and opinions of EU citizens, who are often not aware that the lack of, or limited implementation of an EU law is often imputable to their national governments and not to an EU negligence (Thiel, 2008). Culture is also a complex element in EU public relations. Working for an EU institution has boosted a common organizational culture to increase the support for the European integration project among EU officials and civil servants who come from all over Europe and thus have very different motivational interests in working for the EU while also bring their own cultural and national differences to their work in the EU. Even among correspondents of large national news media, who are typically based in Brussels where most EU institutions are located, an EU cultural assimilation has been seen. Such acculturalization dissolves, in parts, journalists’ differences based on nationality and media systems and makes EU news coverage less biased (Spanier, 2010). Yet, a complete cultural assimilation among the average EU citizen has not yet occurred. Recent public surveys show indications that feelings of being European have slightly decreased in the last years, but still two out three citizens of EU countries feel European (Eurobarometer, 2017, 2019). For a supranational organization as the EU, news media are traditionally a top priority in communication activities. EU media relations have been quite challenging on different levels, mostly because of the diversity in EU media systems and media agendas. The problem is not simply a linguistic one, that can be solved with translations, but rather on what is considered newsworthy, from a national point of view. Historically the EU institutions have targeted elite transnational news media such as the Financial Times and The European Voice which are typically pro-European affairs hoping for a spin-off effect in national, regional, and even local media outlets. However, research (Laursen & Valentini, 2013; Spanier, 2010; Thiel, 2008) has shown that only highly educated and EU concerned publics consume these transnational media, and that these elite news media do not reach average EU citizens who prefer to get information from local, regional, or national news outlets and in their own language. But local, regional, and national news outlets offer limited coverage of EU topics and when they do, they often take on a cynical approach towards the EU and downplay the EU position for the national one (Gleissner & de Vreese, 2005; Trenz, 2008; Valentini, 2013). In part, this is because national news media find it more newsworthy to cover the position of their national institutions and political actors and these have no interest in linking the supranational level with the national electorate, nor communicating the EU because it is not considered rewarding or advantageous to gain political voting (Pollak & Slominski, 2014). Thus, the average EU citizen is exposed to

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less EU news and this tends to more negative than the information that those elite publics who access transnational news media receive on EU activities. The increasing professionalization of communication specialists in the EU institutions of the last ten years has partially addressed this problem. More public relations professionals from diverse member states have been hired to communicate with national journalists not only in the local language but according to the news value and specific news interests of the member state. This glocal approach in handling media relations has paid back to the EU in terms of more visibility and better news coverage. However, it is not without problems. Besides technical issues such as the time lag that is caused by translating EU communications in 23 official EU languages, there is a constant unease in the communication outcomes. Even if the EU communication professionals today come from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds, conveying a specific meaning when communicating to EU publics may not happen, since the receivers of those communications “have many different political and cultural communication contexts in which they receive and understand a message” (Spanier, 2010, p. 200). CONCLUSIONS This chapter has outlined and discussed the complex nature of the EU public relations as an illustrative example of global public relations efforts of a supranational polity. The European integration process is never over as new political, social, and economic challenges continuously emerge forcing the EU and its member states in enacting new policies, laws, regulations, and relationships. Within this scenario, public relations and communication activities play a key role in fostering mutual and beneficial relationships between the EU institutions and nation-states, their citizens and other key publics, as well as international relations between the EU and non-EU countries. Yet, as this chapter has outlined, complex organizations such as the European Union requires a transversal approach in planning global public relations. An approach that takes into consideration the interplay of the different infrastructural variables (politics, economics and activism) with the environmental ones (culture and media). Within the EU context, measures of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity have effects on policy outcomes, redistribution, and the provision of public goods and these, in turn, affect how communication is strategically conceptualized and managed to effectively creating symbiotic relations among the EU institutions and their relevant publics. NOTES 1 It is important to note that at the beginning of the European integration project, only West Germany was part of the European Economic Community. At the end of World War II, Germany was split into two blocks, the West under control of the Allies and the East under the Soviets. West Germany was fundamentally a capitalist economy and saw in the European integration project a way to draw economic prosperity and political legitimacy, hence its interest in joining the group of western European countries in the European Economic Community. Germany was only reunified in 1990. The reunification extended the European Community membership to the East block as well as other international agreements that West Germany made in the early decades. For a detailed discussion on Germany, post-war political changes and the EU, see Anderson, 1999. 2 In June 2016, UK citizens had the opportunity to vote to remain or leave the supranational union, after a long political discussion on the role of UK in the EU. Different arguments were presented for the pros and cons of the UK membership. A majority of citizens who voted decided to leave after more than forty years of membership – the UK joined the European Community in 1973. The political, economic

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and social consequences of this decision are still unclear. For more information on the UK historical relations with the EU and the implications of their departure, see Galbraith, 2017; Koch, 2017; MacShane, 2015.

REFERENCES Anderson, J. (1999). German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, P.J., & McLeod, A.I.L.E. (2004). The great non-communicator? The mass communication deficit of the European Parliament and its press directorate. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(5), 897–917. Börzel, T.A., Hofmann, T., Panke, D., & Sprungk, C. (2010). Obstinate and inefficient: Why member states do not comply with European law. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), 1363–1390. Brüggemann, M. (2005). How the Eu constructs the European public sphere. Seven strategies of information policy. Javnost - The Public, 12(2), 57–73. Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (Eds.). (2014). Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Eurobarometer (2017). Standard Eurobarometer 87, Spring 2017. Public opinion in the European Union. Report, European Commission, May 2017. Eurobarometer (2019). Special Eurobarometer 486, Europeans in 2019 . Report, European Commission, March 2019. Fishwick, C. (2017, February 6). 27 years of corruption is enough: Romanians on why they are protesting. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/06/27-years-of-corruption-is-enough-romanians-onwhy-theyre-protesting?CMP=share_btn_link Fredriksson, M., & Pallas, J. (2016). Characteristics of public sectors and their consequences for strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 10(3), 149–152. Galbraith, J (2017). Europe and the world after Brexit. Globalization, 14(1), 164–167. Gelders, D., Bouckaert, G., & van Ruler, B. (2007). Communication management in the public sector: Consequences for public communication about policy intentions. Government Information Quarterly, 24, 326–337. Gleissner, M., & de Vreese, C. (2005). News about the EU Constitution. Journalistic challenges and media portrayal of the European Union Constitution. Journalism, 6(2), 221–242. Grunig, J.E. (1993). Image and substance: From symbolic to behavioral relationships. Public Relations Review, 19(2), 121–139. Grunig, J.E., & Jaatinen, M. (1999). Strategic, symmetrical public relations in government: From pluralism to societal corporatism. Journal of Communication Management, 3(3), 218–234. Hood, C. (2011). The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy Self-Preservation in Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Koch, I. (2017). What’s in a vote? Brexit beyond culture wars. American Ethnologist, 44(2), 225–230. Laursen, B. (2013). Transparency in the Council of the European Union: Why journalists don’t get the full picture. Journalism, 14(6), 771–789. Laursen, B., & Valentini, C. (2013). Media relations in the Council of the European Union: insights into the Council press officers’ professional practices. Journal of Public Affairs, 13(3), 230–238. MacShane, D. (2015). Brexit: How Britain Left Europe. London, UK: I.B. Tauris. Martins, A.S., Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C.H. (2011). Information flow and communication deficit: perceptions of Brussels-based correspondents and EU officials. Journal of European Integration, 34(4), 305–322. Mbaye, H.A.D. (2001). Why national states comply with supranational law. Explaining implementation infringements in the European Union, 1972-1993. European Union Politics, 2(3), 259–281. Nugent, N. (2010). The Government and Politics of the European Union (7th edition). Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Pollak, J., & Slominski, P. (2014). The Silence of the shepherds: How the Austrian Parliament informs its citizens on European issues. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 20(1), 109–124.

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Spanier, B. (2010). Chapter 8: Trying to square the circle- the challenge of being an EU commission spokesperson. In C. Valentini & G. Nesti (Eds.), Public Communication in the European Union. History, Perspectives and Challenges (pp. 191–216). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2009). The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice. New York, NY: Routledge. Terra, A.L. (2010). From information policy to communication policy: First steps towards reaching European citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. In C. Valentini & G. Nesti (Eds.), Public Communication in the European Union. History, Perspectives and Challenges (pp. 49–66). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Thiel, M. (2008). European public spheres and the EU’s communication strategy: From deficits to policy fit? Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9(3), 342–356. Trenz, H.-J. (2008). Understanding media impact on European integration: Enhancing or restricting the scope of legitimacy of the EU? Journal of European Integration, 30(2), 291–309. Valentini, C. (2008). Promoting the European Union: Comparative Analysis of EU Communication Strategies in Finland and in Italy. Jyväskylä, FIN: Jyväskylän Yliopisto. Valentini, C. (2013). Political public relations in the European Union: EU reputation and relationship management under scrutiny. Public Relations Journal, 7(4), 1–22. Valentini, C. (2017). Environment. In C.R. Scott & L.K. Lewis (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Organizational Communication (pp. 839–858). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Valentini, C., & Laursen, B. (2012). The mass media: A privileged channel for the EU’s political communication. In L. Morganti & L. Bekemans (Eds.), The European Public Sphere: From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action (pp. 129–146). Brussels, BE: Peter Lang. Valentini, C., & Nesti, G. (2010). Public Communication in the European Union. History, Perspectives and Challenges. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

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12 NATO and Its Communication in the 21st Century Barbora Maronkova

NATO AND ITS COMMUNICATION IN 21ST CENTURY NATO is a political-military organization of 29 sovereign nations that has, for over 69 years, withstood decades of security challenges and continues to provide for peace and security of its territory and populations. An Alliance, based on values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights has to adhere to the highest principles of our free world. One of them is accountability to its over 930 million citizens spread across the Atlantic Ocean from Alaska to the Baltic and the Black Sea. Therefore, how the Alliance communicates with the world matters – both to its citizens and for its credibility and transparency. The founding members of NATO understood the importance of informing public opinion. On 18 May 1950, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest decisionmaking body, issued a resolution in which it committed itself to: “Promote and coordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving responsibility for national programs to each country.” In August 1950, a modest NATO Information Service was set up. The Three Wise Men report, issued in 1956 at the height of the Suez Crisis, enhanced the non-military aspects of cooperation and coordination amongst the Alliance leading to greater political consultation. It urged for greater cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural areas as well as information fields. The article 15 of the Report highlighted the following: It has also become increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public

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understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army. (NATO, 2008)

The report provides detailed recommendations on how to improve NATO’s public information through cultural projects, foreign exchanges, seminars to teachers, distribution of educational materials in schools, fellowships, and academic chairs as well as tours for journalists, etc. According to the report, the important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rested primarily with national information services. The promotion of information about, and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavor by the organization and its members. Sixty nine years later – years that witnessed major technological and communication revolutions – the tools and functions might have changed, but the key principles remain. In 2003, the merger of NATO Office of Information and Press with the Science for Peace Program saw the creation of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. It has undergone a series of structural changes since then to better adapt to the new communication environment and the needs of the Alliance. The role of the Public Diplomacy Division is to communicate and to develop programs to help raise awareness and understanding of the Alliance and Alliance-related issues and, ultimately, to foster support for, and trust in, the organization. The North Atlantic Council and NATO Secretary General provide overall direction to NATO’s communication and public diplomacy derived from political decisions. NATO works in committees composed of its member states since all decisions are taken by consensus. NATO’s Committee on Public Diplomacy acts as an advisory body to the Council in areas of communication, public engagement, and media. As a political-military organization, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division cooperates with the military arm of the Alliance, through the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters and its two strategic military commands – the Supreme Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Supreme Allied Command Operations (ACO). This structure allows for closer coordination of NATO’s communication between its member states together with the political and military components of the Alliance. The Secretary General of NATO acts as the main spokesperson for the Alliance and is the Head of its strategic communications. The Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy manages and coordinates NATO’s daily strategic communication posture on his behalf. Today, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division stands on three key pillars – the press office, people-to-people engagements, and digital communication. The Division develops annual strategic planning through its Annual Communications Strategy in which it sets out clear objectives for its communication in support of key political priorities of the Alliance. It defines its key target audiences and develops strategies of implementation using its tools and communication channels. The emergence of new technologies and the plurality of voices together with an ever-changing security environment led to the build-up of NATO’s strategic communication that is today firmly attached to the political consultation, military activities, and communication efforts of the Alliance. Every era brings new challenges to which NATO responds by taking corresponding political decisions that require proactive and transparent communication efforts.

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Evolution of NATO’s Public Diplomacy and Communication in the Modern Era • The first decade after the end of Cold War The focus in the first decades of 21st century was on pursuing NATO’s reputation and relevance in the new security environment following the end of the Cold War, the first enlargement of the Alliance towards the former Warsaw Pact countries and the years of bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia. The role of public diplomacy towards both “old member states” and new aspiring member states, as well as towards dozens of new NATO partners across the globe resulted in stronger outreach efforts toward these audiences. The enlargement period of the Alliance to Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade of the 20th century brought about the need to increase public awareness and understanding of NATO in these countries. Some of the aspirants such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and others faced a lukewarm embrace of a potential membership from its citizens. For example, the level of public support in Slovakia for NATO membership reached around 37% in 1996, increased to 58% in 1997 but fell dramatically to 30% during the 1999 NATO air-campaign in Serbia. Whilst NATO doesn’t have a prescribed level of public support necessary for joining NATO, a favorable support for NATO membership by majority of its citizens is an important indicator when assessing the readiness to join. Strong public diplomacy campaigns, led by individual countries and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, have brought new experiences and expanded its role in managing its public diplomacy programs. NATO established a network of NATO Contact Point Embassies across its partner countries in which embassies of NATO member states act as focal points of information on NATO. Today, NATO works with over thirty Contact Point Embassies around the world. The opening of new relationships and forging new partnerships with NATO in countries of the former Soviet Union required active public diplomacy outreach to address decades of anti-NATO Soviet propaganda. According to research by Vasil Sikharudze, NATO Manfred Woerner fellow (2001–2003), in addition to the old stereotypes, the coverage and public discussion of NATO in the nineties in Russia was dominated by the ongoing Balkan Wars in which NATO was portrayed as an instrument of the United States. Enlargement into Central Europe and particularly including the Baltic countries was met with suspicion in Moscow. In Ukraine, the majority of citizens (47%) did not consider a discussion about NATO as their priority, citing international standing and formulation of relations with Russia as their key concerns. In light of the signature of two important political agreements in 1997 – the NATO-Russia Founding Acting and the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, NATO decided to open public information offices in Moscow and Kyiv. Their role was defined by former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana as the following: To provide information on NATO affairs in order to satisfy a very great thirst for information on the Alliance. It is important, therefore, that NATO becomes fully transparent and understood. The need for good, accurate information about NATO is therefore greater than ever. (NATO, 1997)

• Entering the 21st century The 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September and the subsequent launch of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan led to a new era for NATO –

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managing a grand coalition of contributing nations in a different cultural environment, expansion of its cooperative security in forging new partnerships across the globe on the sidelines of emergence of a new digital age. Necessity brings opportunities – when during the NATO operation ISAF in Afghanistan stakeholders complained about lack of media coverage and media outlets responded by citing financial constraints and hard access, NATO developed its own capability – the NATO TV Channel. Creating an internal team of experienced video-journalists who could embed with ISAF troops and provide first-hand reporting from Afghanistan, supplementing the missing imagery and feeding it to the broadcasters free of charge, proved to be an excellent project. Today, NATO TV Channel changed its focus from Afghanistan to other stories, following NATO troops into exercises, portraying NATO’s naval missions and highlighting its cooperation with partner nations. This era was also characterized by the emergence of social media. As Philip Seib from the USC Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism argued in a video blog for NATO in 2012, social media offer intriguing ways to deliver messages to publics that may have been inaccessible in the past. For an international organization keen to use its soft power, such as NATO, developing its own social media capabilities ensures that its soft power will continue to be relevant. A decade later, social media became an integral part of the daily work of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other social media platforms are important tools in getting NATO’s message out to its diverse audiences and facilitate two-way communications. During the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, an additional task emerged – that of a synchronized communication that goes hand in hand with decision-making. As a result, NATO adopted in 2009 its definition of strategic communications. It is a coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communication activities and capabilities in support of alliance policies, operations, and activities in order to advance NATO’s aims. These activities and capabilities include five disciplines: public diplomacy, public affairs, military public affairs, psychological operations, and information operations. • The era of disinformation and propaganda The Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in the early winter of 2013, followed by Russia’s support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine and its illegitimate and illegal annexation of Crimea, were accompanied by widespread state-sponsored propaganda against Ukraine and NATO Allies. In unleashing hybrid warfare tactics and using propaganda and disinformation, Russia prompted NATO to undertake the biggest reinforcements of its collective defence since the Cold War. In the face of such coordinated disinformation campaign, NATO’s communication challenge was not only to debunk the propaganda, but also to communicate to its citizens the values on which the Alliance stands. Judy Dempsey from Carnegie Europe framed the problem very eloquently in October 2017: “NATO needs to explain to a wider public that Russia’s aim is to break the transatlantic bonds between Europe and the United States and undermine Europe’s democratic institutions by supporting populist, anti–European Union and anti-NATO movements.” The former NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow stated at the NATO Public Diplomacy Forum in Brussels in February 2015:

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We must continue to rebut Russian propaganda: not by engaging in tit-for-tat, but by deconstructing propaganda, debunking Moscow’s false historical narrative, by exposing the reality of Russia’s actions, and by restating the international rules it is breaking. We must also continue to tell a compelling story about who we are, what we do, and why we do it. And we must stand united in our actions, because actions will always speak louder than words. (NATO, 2015)

NATO’s Multifaceted Response to the New Security Environment in Europe NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division adopted a multifaceted approach towards these challenges by taking steps to ensure its citizens of NATO continued value as a security provider, by proactively communicating the important political decisions taken as a result of Russia’s new assertive behavior, deconstruct Russia’s propaganda, and strengthen its support for Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other partners exposed to Russian hybrid warfare actions. The individual actions undertaken by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in each of the cases are described in further details below. Communicating to NATO’s Citizens Russian propaganda is aimed at undermining the democratic principles of NATO Allies and the transatlantic bond. The political decisions taken at subsequent NATO Summits in 2014 and 2016 such as the reinforcement of its defense capabilities, the decision for the deployment of Allied troops to Poland and the Baltics, strengthening of NATO’s maritime posture in Baltic and Black Sea and the need for increased defense spending were accompanied by strong and proactive communications. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division used the entirety of its toolbox of people-topeople engagement, press engagement, and digital presence to reach out to its citizens. A new approach to communication – through a British government communication model of OASIS campaigns – was adopted in early 2017. The campaign is defined as a planned sequence of communications and interactions that leads to a defined, measurable outcome by identifying clear measurable objectives, target audiences, strategy, and implementation followed by evaluation. The first campaign – #WEARENATO – launched on 23 May 2017 aims to improve understanding of the organization and its values among citizens of member countries. The Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Tacan Ildem, commented on this enhanced communication effort for PR Weekly: “Our continued success depends on our citizens understanding the essential role that NATO plays in our security, on which our prosperity is based. We will remain fully transparent and proactive in explaining our essential work to the outside world” (Ildem, 2017). The campaign integrates various forms of NATO’s public diplomacy and communication activities as well as PR elements including digital, mass media, advertising and sponsored events encompassed in a toolkit that can be tailored to each member state needs and languages. Communicating Political Decisions and Military Deployments in Allied Nations By implementing the biggest reinforcements of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War, NATO had to step its defence spending and strengthen its defense

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posture through military deployments, conduct of military exercises and setting up of new NATO Force Integration Units and two new multifunctional operational headquarters across Central and Eastern Europe. Strategic communications that was originally developed for NATO’s operations and missions, had to be adapted and reinforced in order to ensure smooth coordination between the political and military structures of NATO and variety of member states. Creating a strong network of NATO’s strategic communication professionals became an important priority. Strategic communication and crisis communication became an integral part in planning of NATO’s exercises and military deployments. Daily engagement with journalists across all NATO members is an important part of the communication efforts. The Public Diplomacy Division’s Press and Media office provides regular on the record and background briefings to media on topics varying from NATO’s defence planning and logistics to relations with Russia together with regular press conferences and press appearances by the NATO Secretary General, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, and NATO’s highest military commanders. Press tours of NATO exercises are also organized to offer a first-hand experience to journalists. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division also pursues a very active public engagement program with civil society. NATO’s officials speak at high level security conferences – from NATO Secretary General’s public appearances at the Davos World Economic Forum and the Munich Security Conference to other platforms known to the world security community – Halifax Security Conference, Brussels Forum, Globsec, the Riga conference, and many others. Both press and public appearances allow NATO to proactively push out its messages and engage with audiences. Debunking Russian Propaganda NATO is targeted by false news, fake social media posts, and trolls almost on a daily basis. Examples are plenty from a fake phone call of the NATO Secretary General to the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on 3 February 2017, distorted headlines from the interview of the NATO Secretary General on Rossya 1 on 24 April 2017 “NATO Prepares for War” to false information claiming that NATO is amassing 3,600 tanks at Russian border. In a consistent drive to fight propaganda with facts, NATO engages daily on air, print, and social media. In the early days of Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine, NATO created a platform on its website, called “Setting the record straight.” It collects and showcases relevant facts and figures that counter false claims about NATO. In addition, a myth-busting factsheet was produced displaying the most frequent Russian myths about NATO and debunking them with correct and verifiable information. The factsheet became so popular amongst NATO visitors and journalists that short video clips with then-Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow were produced debunking the five biggest Russian myths on NATO. Social media is another area where NATO can strike back against disinformation. NATO officials such as the NATO Spokesperson are very active on Twitter, often rebutting real-time false information about NATO and pushing for corrections of wrong media reporting and misleading headlines. Despite the numerous challenges facing NATO’s cooperation with Russia, NATO keeps its Information Office open in Moscow. It facilitates public diplomacy projects and provides a platform for civil society dialogue. It organizes visits by Russian academics and students to NATO HQ and engages with Russian media.

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Cooperation with Partners NATO acknowledges that it cannot fight disinformation alone. It needs partners in this endeavor such as individual member states, active grass-root activists, and nongovernmental organizations and other international organizations for example, the European Union. Cooperation in the area of hybrid warfare and strategic communications between NATO and the EU was reinforced by the adoption of a series of measures of joint cooperation in December 2016 following the NATO Summit in Warsaw. The independent NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia acts as a training and analytical hub to the Alliance on wide-ranging topics on strategic communication, disinformation, and propaganda. NATO also joined the European Center of Excellence on Countering Hybrid Warfare that opened in 2017 in Helsinki, Finland together with the European Union. NATO provides assistance to partner countries that are particularly affected by Russian hybrid warfare and disinformation such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. It provides platforms enabling practical exchanges in information and best practices in countering Russian propaganda such as the Hybrid Warfare Platform project between NATO and Ukraine, the yearly NATO Georgia Public Diplomacy Forum and press tours of journalists to NATO events. NATO, through its offices in Ukraine and Georgia, is actively assisting the local authorities in establishing their own strategic communication governmental systems. CONCLUSION In the constantly changing fast paced world, NATO remains a key pillar of the postSecond World War international order. In its public diplomacy and communication efforts, it engages on a daily basis with hundreds of pundits, journalists, students, and experts across the Alliance and the world at-large. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division strives to be ahead of new public diplomacy and communication developments. Through gatherings of experts in public diplomacy forums, social media forums, annual public affairs, and strategic communication conferences, it brings together expertise that serves to improve its communication posture. It continues to evolve and adapt – ten years ago, it started to build up its digital presence. Five years ago, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division launched its new measurement and evaluation program and two years ago, it sought a new, integrated communication model to sharpen its approach and focus. Whilst there can always be room for improvement, the constant search for new and modern techniques for how to reach its audiences and deliver its message pushes the Division to innovate. As Mark Twain once famously said: “The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightning and a lightning bug” (Good Reads). If NATO wants to succeed in remaining relevant to its citizens, continue generating public support for its actions and safeguard its key values in face of fake news and propaganda, it needs to find the right words. BIBLIOGRAPHY Butora, M., Butorova, Z. (1998). Slovakia and the World. Democracy and Discontent in Slovakia, p. 179 Dempsey, J. (2017). Eastern Europe’s Yawning Gap. Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe blog. Retrieved from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73566?lang=en.

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Good Reads. (n.d.) Quotations of Mark Twain. Retrieved from https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/4957-thedifference-between-the-almost-right-word-and-the-right. Accessed on 23 August 2019. Ildem, T. (2017). NATO Launches #WEARENATO Campaign with MHP and Agenda. PR Week. Retrieved from www.prweek.com/article/1435828/watch-nato-launches-wearenato-campaign-mhp-agenda. Maronkova, B. (2016). NATO’s Embrace of Digital Outreach. CPD Blog. Retrieved from https://uscpublicdi plomacy.org/blog/natos-embrace-digital-outreach. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. About Strategic Communications. Retrieved from www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-communications. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (1950). Resolution. Retrieved from www.nato.int.https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17208.htm. Accessed on 23 August 2019. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (1997). Speech by the Secretary General. Retrieved from www. nato.int. https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm. Accessed on 23 August 2019. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2008). Report of the Committee of Three. Retrieved from www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2014). Russia’s Accusations – Setting the Record Straight. Retrieved from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110882.htm?selectedLocale=en. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2015). Meeting the Strategic Communication Challenge. Retrieved from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117556.htm?selectedLocale=en. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2016). Communications and Public Diplomacy. Retrieved from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69275.htm. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2017). NATO-Russia. Setting the Record Straight. Retrieved from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. (2018). Relations with European Union. Retrieved from www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm?selectedLocale=en. Seib, P. (2012). The Power of Soft Power – NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in Digital World. WE NATO Video Blog. Retrieved from https://communicationleadership.usc.edu/news/we-nato-philip-seib-and-thepower-of-soft-power/. Sikharulidze, V. (2003). Public Opinion Trends with Regard to NATO in Post-Soviet Countries during 90-ties. NATO Manfred Woerner Fellowship 2001-2003. Retrieved from www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/sikharu lidze.pdf. UK Government Communication Service. Guide to Campaign Planning. Retrieved from https://gcs.civilser vice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/6.3938_CO_GCS-Campaign-Planning_FINAL_A4_111017.pdf. Velsic, M. (1999). Support of Slovak Citizens for EU and NATO. Research of Institute for Public Affairs. Retrieved from www.ivo.sk/390/sk/vyskum/podpora-obcanov-integracii-sr-do-europskej-unie-sa-upevnilaa-podpora-vstupu-do-nato-sa-stabilizovala.

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13 A New Public Relations for Corporations in the World of Hyper-Globalization Takashi Inoue

EMERGING HYPER-GLOBALIZATION The word “globalization” often appears in news articles, titles of lectures, and ordinary conversation but does it adequately explain the dramatic changes occurring around us today? I believe not. The world we now live in has gone beyond “globalization” to a world of “hyper-globalization” that changes not only the fundamental realities for which corporations must operate, but brings deep sociological change, affecting how we behave, and how we understand our world. This has profound consequences for corporations and their use of public relations. The high level of international trade and deep economic integration that started at the end of the 20th century is only one force bringing about profound transformation. While economists have started to use “hyper-globalization” to explain the great surge in international business, here it is used to describe the new environment coming into being by what I call the three forces of hyper-globalization. As hyper-globalization continues to accelerate, skillful use of public relations suited for this new environment will determine the most successful global leaders and their corporations. THREE FORCES OF HYPER-GLOBALIZATION Hyper-globalization is not just the same environment of the late 20th century only with far more cross-border business, but rather it is a new and very different environment. It is a world where a corporation’s stakeholders are now globalized. It is one

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where your stakeholders not only receive messages from your company, but where they use social media to communicate back to the company and to even participate in the shaping of its products and services. It is an environment where a reality-show TV host, non-politician, was elected president of the United States in 2016. The mainstream media must now compete with non-journalist influencers using social media. It is not surprising that the term “fake news” has suddenly appeared and become widely used. However, all of these things are what we can see happening around us, but the new technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, and artificial intelligence (AI), which are still in the early stages of development, have the promise of creating yet unseen, extensive, rapid, and explosive change that will further effect both business and society. We are all impacted by this new environment. We start our day checking the Internet for news, reading, and sending email. We do so from a smartphone made by a global manufacturer that creates its products, using design centers in one country, engineering in another, manufacturing in various possible locations, and with components sourced from a global supply chain. We communicate via social media with friends, family, colleagues, and business partners located globally with the understanding that distance in an Internet connected world is no longer a barrier to communication. As we travel from place to place our smartphone generates information about our location and movements, and when we arrive at work, our Internet browser records our movements in cyber-space. If we purchase items at a store or online, we contribute to the creation of big data, which will be mined and analyzed to understand and influence buying behavior. This very different world is being driven as shown in Figure 13.1 by three forces of hyper-globalization: (1) Economic force, (2) Human communication via the Internet force, and (3) Technological disruptive force. Corporations must understand these forces and apply the power of public relations to skillfully navigate in these very challenging times. Economic Force As a word “globalization” is actually relatively new. Harvard Business School’s Pankaj Ghemawat found in his research that it was only at the end of the 19th century that the word “global” came to be used to mean “world scale.” Not until the 1940s did the word “globalizing” begin to appear. Surprisingly, it took another

FIG 13.1 Takashi Inoue’s three force of hyper-globalization. Source: Takashi Inoue (2018), Public Relations in Hyper-Globalization, p.12

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decade until the word “globalization” first appeared in 1951. Using the catalog listings of the U.S. Library of Congress, Ghemawat found that in the 1990s the library listings still only showed fewer than 50 new titles being added annually that were related to “globalization.” However, he found that during 2002 through 2008 the number had jumped to more than 1100 new titles per year, related to “globalization” (Ghemawat, n.d., p. 1). Economist Jagdish Bhagwati in his classic book, In Defense of Globalization, describes what he calls “economic globalization” as a positive force that results in the “integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment by corporations and multinationals, short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 3). In other words, in today’s hyper-globalization, corporations are locating the various functions of product design, development, and manufacturing globally, resulting in a world of high economic integration. In 2013 economists Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler started to use the term hyper-globalization to describe the high degree of economic integration and high volume of international trade that began at the end of the 20th century and that has continued into this new century. They described four stages of globalization, starting with the Industrial Revolution. In the first stage from 1870 to 1914 world trade flows as a share of GDP jumped to 16% from the 9% level that had existed during the older agrarian economy. However, in the second stage from 1914 through 1945 world trade flows collapsed to 5.5% due to the rise of widespread trade protectionism and the First and Second World Wars. The third stage began after the Second World War, where global trading gradually returned to the level of the first stage. We are currently in the fourth stage, which Subramanian and Kessler call the stage of “hyper-globalization,” that began in the 1990s with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that began in 1995 (Subramanian & Kessler, 2013, p. 4). Human Communication via the Internet Force Looking beyond economics, we can see that a second force of hyper-globalization involves globalized communications. Back in the 1960s Marshal McLuhan first coined the term the “global village” (McLuhan, 1962, p. 40). Some 30 years before the widespread use of the Internet, McLuhan argued that electronic communications, especially television, were bringing the events of the entire world into everyone’s living rooms, and thereby making events that are taking place in far-off cultures and places seem like local events. Today the Internet has greatly expanded many times over from that simpler “global village” of the 1960s. In the 21st century, the Internet has become an integral part of our daily lives, especially with the rise and proliferation of social media. While it was only in 2006 that Facebook became available to the public, by the end of 2017 it had 1.4 billion active monthly users; and Twitter, the online news and social networking service that also started in 2006, by the end of 2017 had 330 million active monthly users globally (Statista.com., 2017). With Facebook reaching close to 2 billion active users the term the “global village” has a far wider and deeper meaning. Yet, McLuhan’s main point remains true that electronic communication is fundamentally changing how we perceive our world, and how we behave in it. The Internet and social media from Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, QZone, and so many more, has

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created a new reality. We as individuals and corporations are no longer the same. In many ways hyper-globalization can be thought of as the “new global village.” Technological Disruptive Force In addition to economic trade flows and deep economic integration across national borders, and global digital communications of the Internet and social media, there is also the collection of technologies currently emerging, as previously noted, such as IoT, big data, and AI. This 3rd force of hyper-globalization can perhaps be best characterized by the word “Singularity.” Futurist, computer scientist, inventor, and author, Raymond Kurzweil is a leading proponent of the “transhumanism” movement and has written and spoken extensively about Singularity. He sees a future in which both the hardware and software of computers will be developed to emulate human intelligence. But more than that, we will “merge with our technology” and our scientists will “operate 1,000 times faster than contemporary humans (because the information processing in their primarily nonbiological brains is faster)” (Kurzweil, 2005, pp. 35–40) In Kurzweil’s future world computers start to acquire human-like intelligence resulting in profound changes to the point where “we won’t experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century – it will be more like 20,000 years of progress” (Kurzweil, 2001). He sees this being reached by the year 2045, although many others in the AI field think it will not likely happen until the next century. Not surprisingly, Kurzweil as a futurist looks forward to such a world, and he and others can describe how many things will be so much with Singularity. However, if one could go back in time to the start of the Industrial Revolution and talk to the famous writer of science fiction of that time, Jules Verne, and ask him about the future, he might explain all the wonderful ways that the new technologies of his time would transform the old agrarian society into the modern industrial world. Yet, he probably would not predict the tens of millions of deaths that would occur in the 20th century’s two world wars. Today global terror has become all too familiar, and the threat of war seems to be on the increase. The point is that the 21st century will certainly experience massive changes for both the better and the worse. Public relations as the activity of stakeholder relationship management offers to provide the skill needed by corporations to contribute to the increase of the good and decrease of the bad effects to be found in this world of hyper-globalization. PUBLIC RELATIONS SUITED FOR HYPER-GLOBALIZATION The kind of public relations for this world of hyper-globalization is the activity by which an organization achieves its goals and objectives along the shortest path through a continuous strategic stakeholder relationship management process of symmetrical two-way communications, self-correction, and ethics that seeks wide mutual benefit. Corporations will likely face a higher probability of becoming overwhelmed by a crisis in a world of instant communications, alternative-media, and fake news. The world of hyper-globalization that is emerging presents us with both new threats and opportunities. In the future the more successful businesses will need to use a new type of public relations for the 21st century that is focused on relationship management, and that puts ethics at the center of its activities. It is proposed here that such a new public relations will allow businesses to more consistently achieve objectives

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through continuous self-correction and ethics as they endeavor to adjust to what will likely be very rapid, dynamic, disruptive, and continuous change. Relationship Management Rather Than Communication Management Perhaps the central insight of public relations is that organizations succeed by not just producing goods or services that customers want, but succeed by motivating, inspiring, and collaborating in positive ways with its many publics as stakeholders. Or more simply, public relations helps businesses achieve goals through stakeholder relationship management. This has always been true, but in hyper-globalization it is far more difficult and far more important. For example, a company needs to attract and retain talent, who will be part of employee stakeholders, but they also need to motivate and inspire them to design, and build the next generation of new, innovative, superior products and services. There are the company’s suppliers and the entire supply chain and the dealers and sales and marketing professional that as stakeholders need to become an inspired part of the company’s efforts. Because a company does all of this within the rubric of societies, where its customers and business operations are located, it must obtain permission and cooperation from governments. Public relations provides the expertise to manage all these many relationships, without which a company cannot efficiently and consistently accomplish its goals. Public relations has long been explained as the process of communicating with specific target publics. Moreover, scholars such as Grunig and Hunt have documented that effective public relations involves two-way symmetrical communications with a company’s publics that includes the utilization of feedback, for which they write: “Citizens speak up, often forcing organizations to make changes the citizens demand” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, pp. 8–10). The company uses public relations to send the “right” messages to the “right” publics to influence them in ways favorable to the company, but at the same time it needs to listen to what those publics communicate back and then to respond accordingly. Effective public relations communicates with words, images, and symbols to build powerful brands and create strong corporate reputations that attract and retain customers. In the most successful cases, brands make those customers into enthusiastic fans that even come to identify to a certain extent who they are in terms of the company’s products that they buy and use. In this way public relations activities can be described as communication management, but the central point to be realized is that the end objective of those public relations activities is managing a company’s relationships with its many stakeholders for the purpose of achieving its goals. Carlos Ghosn, Chairman of Renault-Nissan until he was recently fired amid ethics questions, explained the link between achieving corporate goals, stakeholder relationship management, and public relations: If you look at the companies who are struggling, it is not always because the vision is wrong, it is because they have not been able to clearly articulate that vision to motivate and connect to employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders, and so on. So there is a clear imperative for global leaders to understand, value, and build their public relations skills. (Ghosn, 2017, p. 200)

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The Self-Correction Model Having helped a number of large corporations during times of crisis, the author developed the Self-Correction Model (SCM), by which a corporation can place ethics at the center of everything it does (Inoue, 2002, pp. 24–27). The idea of self-correction can seem obvious, but when you look at the continuous incidents of corporate scandals that take place, it should be clear that it really is not accorded any importance. The purpose of the SCM is to make clear the workings of an ethics based system of self-correction that a company can embed into its activities. While public relations is stakeholder relationship management, in order to survive hyper-globalization, public relations for the 21st century must also be ethical. This is because in this new environment, when a crisis occurs, responses must be made very quickly, almost in real-time. The company with an ethics based self-correction function at its core will be more able to take a proactive stance, demonstrating to its stakeholders that it is putting ethics and the interests of the public ahead of its own, which is the key to surviving a crisis. The SCM model has three elements: ethics, symmetrical two-way communication, and self-correction based on human free-will. Ethics The first element, ethics, can be thought of as behavior based on moral actions. Going back to ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, ethics has been defined as the habit of moral virtue. Shimazu Tadayoshi (1493–1568) in 16th century Japan, during the SENGOKU waring states period, was a feudal lord of Satsuma, which was one of four regional powers behind the Meiji Restoration and is now Kagoshima Prefecture, wrote in retirement his own version of the classic Japanese poem the IROHA UTA, “that conveyed Confucian moral principals in an easily comprehensible manner” (Hall, 1991, p. 399). While his poem reflects his Buddhist beliefs, he may have also been influenced by Christianity, since his son, Shimazu Takahisa (1514–1571), as the domain lord had welcomed St. Francis Xavier to Japan in 1549. In our times ethics has come to be thought of in terms Jeremy Bentham’s “utilitarianism” of seeking the “greatest good” for the greatest number of people, and Immanuel Kant’s deontology view of ethics as a duty to help the poor and weak (Inoue, 2018, p. 16). To explain this more simply, we can say that “ethics” can be thought of as pursuing happiness by doing what is good rather than evil. For a company, ethics can be thought of as a constant guide, like the lighthouse on the coast, guiding ships to safety away from the rocky shore. While philosophers can argue endlessly about the precise meaning of the word “ethics,” when an unexpected event occurs putting the company in a crisis, organizational stakeholders will know without any philosophical debate, if you have acted ethically or not. Stakeholders are human beings and can be thought of as having an internal ethical compass. If a corporation builds ethics into its very DNA, it is more likely to avoid scandals and make the right decisions more often than not. When a crisis does occur, its stakeholders are likely to stick by a company that is able to make non-superficial self-correction base on ethics to get the business back on track. A company that has a strong ethical sense, where ethics is at the core of everything that it does, will be able to survive a crisis and at times even come out ahead. In contrast, a company that has ignored making a conscious

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decision to build ethics into its activities will likely not be able to suddenly start acting ethically when a crisis occurs. This becomes very clear during crisis management. Crisis Management depends heavily on communication with the media and through the media to a company’s stakeholders. In a crisis, where everything happens fast with little time for reflection, where you have to respond before enough facts are known, no amount of skillful media relations nor carefully crafted press releases will substitute for ethical behavior. The lack of ethics will come through very clearly to your stakeholders, which includes the company’s employees. Stakeholders will quickly judge unfavorably a company that is trying to cover-up unethical behavior, and management that is more concerned about its own survival than about doing the right thing for its stakeholders. Symmetrical Two-Way Communication The second element is “symmetrical two-way communication,” which provides the communication and feedback necessary for relationship management. It also provides the information needed by the third element of self-correction. For the SCM to function within a company requires the free-flow of information, which can often be blocked by a company’s organization hierarchical structure. It can also be blocked by top-management that actively prevents and discourages criticism. This is particularly a problem for cultures where the awareness of hierarchies is strongly felt throughout the culture, such as in Japan. It can result from senior executives that have struggled their entire careers to make it into the top positions and are too concerned with protecting themselves from criticism. For this reason it is important to maintain Democracy from the nation state down to individual companies as the best way to ensure that the free-flow of symmetrical two-way communication is valued and actively protected. Self-Correction Based on Free-Will Central to understanding self-correction and its part in the SCM is the need to recognize that God has given human beings free-will. We are free to do what is ethical, but also free to ignore ethics and pursue self-interest at the expense of the greater good. We are able to make self-correction, because as human beings we have a sense of selfawareness that comes from a thought process called “meta-cognition” in philosophy and physiology, and which enables us to make judgements in terms of right and wrong. Unlike the understanding given by other scholars in which mere “adjustments” are made in response to stimuli, the concept of meta-cognition is central to the working of the SCM. A corporation can be said to truly have a self-correction function, when the individuals themselves, who make up the corporation, conduct all their business activities ethically. Moreover, self-correction is a continuous process of making many corrections both small and large throughout the organization, and not just in times of crisis. Just as change for an individual only ends with death, so for an organization self-correction is a never ending process of sustainable growth. Very successful organizations will use self-correction guided by ethics to adjust to changes in the surrounding environment to achieve goals and to improve stakeholder relationships by making meaningful corrections leading to change that transforms the company.

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Integration of the Three Elements of the Self-Correction Model Ethics provides the moral guidepost that determines the “right direction.” Symmetrical two-way communications provides the data to determine deviation from the right direction. Self-correction is the activity of returning to the right direction. In this way, the SCM works to establish in the company effective stakeholder relationship management, which is to say public relations, in which its activities are grounded in ethics and uses symmetrical two-way communications to make continuous selfcorrections that result in a win-win outcome for both the company and its stakeholders. Regardless of the extent to which “Singularity” turns out to be true or not true, it is without question that we must be prepared for much more rapid and extensive change. While this makes it vital that companies have executives with the public relations skill needed for relationship management with globalized stakeholders, it also requires executives to embed ethics into the corporation. The origins of the model can be traced back to the work of Walter B. Cannon in the 1930s. Cannon advanced the concept of homeostasis, which is the auto-regulation in living organisms, as a model for how human beings adjust to changes in society (Cannon, 1932/1959, pp. 213–228). Norbert Wiener, added the element of information feedback to further explain self-control in response to changes in the external world. The author has illustrated the Cannon and Wiener’s concept of homeostasis with feedback in Figure 13.2 (Inoue, 2015, p. 259). However, the SCM replaces “self-adjustment” with “self-correction” in recognition of our unique ability as human beings to freely choose, unlike other creatures that have no choice but to react to changes in the environment. We can choose to be ethical or to ignore ethics and just follow self-interest. It is for this reason that a company must do more than simply use the word “ethics” in its mission statement, but must actively embed a functioning self-correction system. It must recognize the many forces working

FIG 13.2

Cannon-Wiener Self Adjustment Model

Source: 2015 Takashi Inoue, Public Relations: Relationship Management, 2nd Edition, p. 259.

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against the free-flow of two-say communications and against our choosing selfcorrection following the ethical path. With that understanding, the company can then build a system that actively works to keep ethics at the center of all its activities. Although the idea of self-correction is common place in so many things, for a company to avoid scandal and to survive a crisis a functioning system of selfcorrection needs to be explicitly stated and concretely implemented. The SCM provides the fundamental understanding needed. The outside events that put a company in crisis require a response or “counter corrective action.” Those responses can then be plotted on the X/Y graph shown in Figure 13.3, thereby making clear the nature of the self-correction process. The analysis used evaluates responses as either a “proactive” or “reactive” stance. When the ethical sense is strong, self-correction becomes proactive, because there is a desire to change the “self” in recognition of having been wrong. Without ethics, the response is only passive due to outside forces. Reponses are plotted along the X axis. The far left is labeled “reactive” and the far the right “proactive.” Then the content of the response is evaluated for the degree of change. Two extremes of the Y axis are “superficial” or “substantial” change. Substantial change is plotted above the X axis, while superficial change is plotted below. At the onset of a crisis, especially if it is first reported in the press before the company on its own can announce its occurrence, the stance taken will likely be “reactive” and the content “superficial.” However, the subsequent responses will begin to differ depending on how strong the ethical sense and commitment to self-correction is functioning within the company. When the ethical sense is strong, the company’s responses will begin to be more proactive, as it reflects on the nature and causes of the crisis, and will also gradually become more substantial, finally ending up in the upper right quadrant, when the crisis is resolved. In contrast, the company lacking a strong commitment to ethics will remain more or less in the lower left quadrant with responses that continue to be reactive and superficial, and crisis resolution leaves the company greatly weakened and with relations with stakeholders damaged, especially customers, employees, and investors. In extreme cases resolution is followed by the dissolution of the company.

FIG 13.3 Four Evaluation Areas of Self-correction

Source: 2015 Takashi Inoue, Public Relations: Relationship Management, 2nd Edition, p. 266.

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Conclusion In the 21st century, corporations face a new environment of ever-increasing economic integration of global business, where human communication via the Internet and social media is instantaneous, global, truly two-way, blurring sociocultural differences, and where the pace of change from disruptive new technologies will accelerate and lead us to a coming world of Singularity. Leaders of corporations must look with wide open eyes at this radically new environment of hyper-globalization. Realizing corporate strategies always requires communicating your vision to stakeholders, especially employees, investors, and customers, but this new environment only makes that task more challenging and more vital as these same stakeholders become globalized. To survive and prosper the most successful corporations will recognize that their success depends on getting goals and objectives accomplished through stakeholder relationship management with globalized stakeholders. Moreover, they will understand how this new environment makes it absolutely essential to embed a continuous self-correction function centered on ethics, as the best way to both prevent and survive a crisis. In other words, as hyper-globalization brings unprecedented rapid change, the most successful corporations will gain competitive business advantages by applying public relations guided by ethical self-correction. Given the many global crisis points today in places such as Hong Kong, North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, Syria, and the many yet to come, if we are to avoid repeating a tragedy like the Second World War, corporations must be responsible to society through public relations to maintain world peace. Future research should document best practices of successfully embedding a self-correction function based on ethics, and how it then allows a corporation to more consistently achieve goals and also make a more meaningful contribution to sustainability of society for future generations. REFERENCES Anon, 2017. Statista.com. [Online] Available at: www.statista.com/statistics/ [Accessed 12 February 2018]. Bhagwati, J., (2004). In Defense of Globalization. New York City: Oxford University Press, Inc. Cannon, W., (1932/1959). Jintai no eichi (The Wisdom of the Body). New York: W. W. Norton & Co (Sogensha). Ghemawat, P., n.d. Globalization of Markets. Globalization Note Series. Ghosn, C., (2017). Responses to Questionnaire for the book “Public Relations for Hyper-Globalization: Essential Relationship Management - A Japan Perspective”. Yokohama: s.n. Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T., (1984). Managing Public Relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Hall, J. W., (1991). The Cambridge History of Japan. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Inoue, T., (2002). The Need for Two-Way Communications and Self-Correction. IPRA FrontLine, November, 11, pp. 24–27. Inoue, T., (2015). Paburikku Rireshionzu: rireshonshippu manejimento (Public Relations: Relationship Management). 2nd ed. Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha. Inoue, T., (2018). Public Relations in Hyper-globalization: Essential Relationship Management – A Japan Perspective. London: Routledge. Kurzweil, R., 2001. The Law of Accelerating Returns. [Online] Available at: www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-ofaccelerating-returns [Accessed 28 November 2017]. Kurzweil, R., (2005). The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. s.l.: Viking. McLuhan, M., (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Subramanian, A. & Kessler, M., (2013). The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics.

CHAPTER

14 Powerful Families, Powerful Influences Family-owned Enterprises and Public Relations in Asia Ganga S. Dhanesh Flora Hung-Baesecke

Before the multinational corporation, there was family business. Before the Industrial Revolution, there was family business. Before the enlightenment of Greece and the empire of Rome, there was family business. Is there any institution that is more enduring or universal than family members working together to earn their daily bread? - William T. O’Hara, Centuries of Success, 2004, p. xvii The phrase “family business” often suggests mom-and-pop stores, small to midsized companies, operating with a local focus. However, this description fails to capture the powerful influences wielded by large family-owned/-controlled enterprises such as Samsung in South Korea, Tata Group in India, and Wal-Mart in the USA. Members of the Global Family Business index, created by the Center for Family Business at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, account for a combined US$6.5 trillion in annual sales, enough to qualify as the third-largest economy in the world after the U.S. and China, and employ around 21 million people, averaging 42,000 people per company. Definitions of family-owned enterprises vary. To qualify for the Global Family Index, a privately held firm must have a family that controls more than 50percent of the voting rights. For a publicly listed firm, the family should hold at least 32percent of the voting rights. Credit Suisse defined large family-owned companies as publicly traded companies with market capitalization of at least US$1 billion, and family-owned stakes of at least 20percent. This chapter has adopted the definition of family-owned 149

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enterprises as those where the family owns a significant share and can influence important decisions (Bjornberg, Elstrodt, & Pandit, 2014). In the global universe of family-run businesses, Asian enterprises have consistently made their mark. In Credit Suisse’s Global Family 900, a list of the 920 largest family-owned companies in the world across 35 countries, more than 64percent were from Asia. Eight out of the top 21 companies were from Asia, specifically India, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Family 500 Index has 14 Asian companies in the top 100, from India, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Some of the oldest family-run businesses are found in Japan, tracing back their lineage to over 40 generations (O’Hara, 2004). While the top 50 of Asia’s richest families have firm roots in Asia, their conglomerates have worldwide presence, and collectively they are worth around US$519 billion (Blankfeld, 2016). Many of these family-controlled businesses play a crucial role in the development of their countries. For instance, Samsung, a family-controlled conglomerate, contributes to over 20percent of South Korea’s GDP (Park, Li, & Lien, 2015). These enterprises exert strong influences not only on the economic environment of nations, but also on social, political, and media environments. In India, the Tata family exemplifies social responsibility leadership, being deeply involved with nation building since the late 19th century. They ushered in industrialization in India by pioneering its textiles, steel, energy, and hospitality sectors and set up research and educational institutions (Dhanesh, 2015a). They established India’s first steel plant in 1907, the Indian Institute of Science in 1911 and India’s first airline in 1932. Bjornberg et al. (2014) attributed the success of family-owned businesses in emerging markets to multiple enablers such as deep understanding of their contexts of operation, considerable influence with regulators based on a long history of personal relationships, greater accountability based on the family’s reputation, commitment to social causes, longterm orientation, and family values that influence day-to-day operations. The diverse and strong influences exerted by family-owned enterprises and the enablers that drive them have implications for the practice of public relations. The global public relations framework described in Section I of this volume posits that public relations practice across the world is influenced by political, economic, media, societal and activist cultures in which firms are embedded (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). Despite the potent influence of family-owned enterprises and the specific characteristics that drive their success, public relations research has not yet focused on the role and characteristics of family-owned enterprises in shaping public relations practice. In addition, scholars have called for more research on non-Euro-American contexts (Sriramesh, 2009) of public relations practice. This chapter answers that call by focusing on family-owned enterprises, especially in Asia, a continent that is home to more than half the world’s population and contributes to almost one-third of global GDP (ADB, 2017). However, Asia is diverse and there are similarities and differences among businesses in terms of contribution to and impact on the societies they are located in. In this chapter, we offer a broad overview of family businesses in Asia, drawing examples from six countries that most often feature on lists of top family-owned businesses in Asia – India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. INDIA Seventeen of Asia’s 50 Richest Families hail from India (Blankfeld, 2016). Family businesses have played an important role in nation building, employment generation,

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and wealth creation in India. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016) study on family businesses found a strong sense of pride in family business leaders in India, many of who reported their businesses as making a strong and positive contribution to society. For these businesses, economic aspects were just as important as ethics, socially responsible business practices and the welfare of the community (Dhanesh, 2015b; PwC, 2016). The influence of family-owned enterprises on the social, political, and economic environment in India can be traced to as far back as the early days of industrialization (1850 to 1914), when newly-rich business families set up trusts and institutions such as schools, colleges, hospitals, and museums. Examples include the Gujarati and Parsi business communities of Bombay led by Jamshetji Jejeebhoy, Jamshedji Tata, and Sir Dinshaw Petit. The Tata Group’s investments in industries such as steel, airlines, chemicals, textiles, power, and hotels helped to set the foundation of the fledgling Indian economy. Some of these family-owned firms were also pioneers in social responsibility leadership as far back as the early days of industrialization, particularly in employee and community relations. Tata Steel introduced eight-hour working days in 1912, long before it became mandatory in other countries. The planned Tata townships built around its industrial facilities, also exemplify the Group’s focus on employee well-being and community building. Spurred by open hostility from the British, Indian business families such as the Birlas even played a role in supporting India’s nationalist movement for independence from British rule (Sundar, 2000). Not only did these family-run enterprises contribute generously to the freedom struggle, but they also contributed to various social and cultural causes associated with the nationalist movement, such as the emancipation of untouchables and rural development. After independence, several businesses helped set up institutions for higher education and scientific and technical research and art academies. Family-owned enterprises in India have been seen as socially responsible because of both moral and economic imperatives. They are often driven by the vision of the founder and the desire to do the right thing as well as ensuring the longevity of the firm, the creation of goodwill in society, and enhanced relationships with employees. They are committed to the long-term and that commitment is evident in the investments they make in local communities and the infrastructure of the country. The apparent dialectic between moral and economic drivers has been explained using the ancient Indian notion of dharma, a pluralistic notion which incorporates both a sense of duty and consequences arising from commissions and omissions in discharging that duty (Dhanesh, 2015b). While family-owned businesses in India have played an important role in nation building, their expanding circle of influence has stoked trouble as well. When India’s largest company, Reliance Industries Ltd., owned by the Ambani family, announced that it was taking over one of India’s largest media companies – Network 18 Media and Investments Ltd, that included TV channels (CNBC TV18, CNN-IBN, CNN Awaz), websites (firstpost.com, moneycontrol.com), magazines (Forbes India) and entertainment channels (Colors, MTV and Homeshop Entertainment) among other businesses – it caused a furor raising questions on corporatization of media, diversity and plurality of opinion, and suppression of dissenting and divergent views (Rajagopal, 2017). A thorough review of the literature revealed that except for a handful of studies on public relations in India (Bardhan, 2003; Bardhan & Sriramesh, 2006; Patwardhan &

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Bardhan, 2014; Sriramesh, 1992, 1996; Vilanilam, 2011) there is hardly any literature on public relations practices in family-controlled businesses in India. However, tracing the history of public relations practice in India revealed that the House of Tatas in Bombay set up the first public relations department in the private sector in 1943 and the Tatas offered the first course in public relations in 1958 (Sriramesh, 1996). The Tatas have been credited with demonstrating industry leadership, particularly in community and employee relations as far back as the early part of the 20th century, even before the concept of CSR became popular in the rest of the world. More generally, media relations has been equated with public relations and image-building, implying the prevalence of the press agentry, public information and asymmetrical models (Bardhan, 2003; Bardhan & Sriramesh, 2006; Sriramesh, 2000). However, the personal influence model, predicated on close relationships between practitioners and influential individuals in the media and the government, was the most popular model (Sriramesh, 2000). More recently, the practice has been moving toward greater glocalization, professionalization and adoption of multiple models of public relations (Patwardhan & Bardhan, 2014). SOUTH KOREA The power and influence of family-owned businesses in economic and political environments is evident in South Korea as well. The country’s economic scene has been dominated by groupings of diversified conglomerates called chaebols, usually controlled by a wealthy family. Examples include Samsung, LG, Hyundai Motor, and the SK group. The recent drama of bribery and corruption that has led to the impeachment of the president and the indictment of companies such as Samsung demonstrates the close connections between family-run businesses and the government. A glance back at history shows the rise to power of chaebols in South Korea. The government, in a bid to rebuild the country after the Korean War and eager to solicit help from the private sector, extended unstinted support including tax breaks and other economic incentives to the chaebols. The chaebols flourished, helping trigger a strong economic recovery for the nation. Although strong government leadership and sound economic planning drove Korea’s economic recovery, the efforts of the chaebols were considered the real catalysts for economic development (Yoo & Lee, 1987). However, deep collusion between the government and the chaebols led to allegations of undue political influence, bribery, and corruption scandals, eventually generating public distrust of the powerful chaebols (Kotch, 2004). The recent episode of bribery and corruption that led to the impeachment of the former South Korean President Park Geun-hye in March 2017 and the indictment of companies such as Samsung demonstrates the close connections between family-run businesses and the government. Park was accused of colluding with her friend, Choi to pressure conglomerates, including electronics giant Samsung, for millions of dollars in donations to two non-profit foundations Choi controlled in return for business favors including government support for a major restructuring of Samsung. After losing her presidential immunity in March 2017, Park was charged with bribery, abusing state power, and leaking state secrets. Samsung’s head, Lee Jae-Yong, was jailed for five years in August 2017. The corruption drama has fueled numerous mass protests in South Korea, stirring deep discontent against the close collusion among the government, the political elite, and family-run conglomerates that dominate South Korea’s economy (BBC, 2017). The scandal has also provoked closer scrutiny of non-

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profit foundations run by business conglomerates. South Korea’s competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission, has initiated a probe into whether founding families use charity as a cover to maintain power without paying billions of dollars in taxes (Kim, Lee, & Einhorn, 2017). Although there is hardly any literature on public relations specifically in familyowned firms in South Korea, literature refers to public relations practices in chaebols, which are predominantly family-controlled and hence, fits in with the focus of this chapter. The term hong-bo refers to public relations and means disseminating information widely. Public relations in South Korea is also equated with publicity and media relations, often employed to counter backlash against the wrongdoings of the chaebols and their collusion with the government (Kim, 2009; Lee, 2013; Park, 2001). Reflecting this focus on media relations, the models of public relations practiced in South Korea are predominantly press agentry and public information (Park, 2003; Yoo & Jo, 2014) enacted through the personal influence model (Lee, 2013; Sriramesh, Kim, & Takasaki, 1999). In a more recent study, Shin, Lee, Park, and Kim (2014) found that social media and internal communication are two of the recent issues that public relations leaders are most concerned about. JAPAN While the examples offered from India and South Korea illustrate the complex interplay of positive and negative impacts of family-owned businesses in India and South Korea, Japan presents a different story, of extreme longevity of firms. Family businesses in Japan have defied the well-known adage that family-owned businesses would not outlast three generations. Some Japanese family-owned businesses have thrived for over 40 generations. Japan has seven out of the 10 oldest companies globally and the highest concentration of old family businesses by GDP, population, and landmass (Schwartz & Bergfeld, 2017). Before World War II, the Japanese economy revolved around zaibatsus – a set of family businesses operating under the umbrella of family-owned holding companies (Amann, Jaussaud, & Martinez, 2012). The four major zaibatsus were Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Mitsui. Although after World War II, the zaibatsus were dissolved under American occupation, the matrix model of family-owned businesses did not die out. Instead, the current economic landscape in Japan is dominated by the kieretsu, a network of large multi-industry conglomerates such as Sumitomo, Mitsui, or Mitsubishi, whose roots can be traced to pre-war holdings run by single families or clans. Among the reasons for the success of Japanese family-run businesses, one of the most important has been the family system that foregrounds family values, especially seniority and social relations where trust is privileged over achievements. Values of family culture such as diligence, frugality, obedience, and protection of firm reputation dictate employee behavior further reinforcing the impact of culture as described in Part I of this volume. Some of these values also reflect a sense of social responsibility in the reconstruction of the society and economy in the post-war period (Goydke, 2016). Japan’s family businesses value the retention of family ownership and preservation of the business and its traditions for forthcoming generations. According to a KPMG Global Family Business Survey, 80percent of firms had a family member CEO, three out of five were 100percent family-owned, and the remaining companies were more than 50percent family owned (Kurata, 2014). Although there are a handful of studies on public relations in Japan (CooperChen & Tanaka, 2007; Inoue, 2003; Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999; Takano, 2013;

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Watson & Sallot, 2001; Yamamura, Ikari, & Kenmochi, 2013), there is hardly any scholarly work on public relations practices in family-run firms in Japan. However, since family firms dominate the economic landscape of Japan, the findings of these studies would reflect practices in family-owned firms as well. In Japan, the term used for public relations is kouhou, which means to “widely notify” indicating the focus on models of one-way dissemination of information (Watson & Sallot, 2001; Yamamura et al., 2013). The predominance of this model also implies close connections with the media, strengthened through the practice of the kisha press club system (Cooper-Chen & Tanaka, 2007; Inoue, 2003) wherein practitioners cultivate relationships with journalists who belong to the relevant kisha club, foregrounding the prevalence of the personal influence model (Sriramesh & Takasaki, 1999). Yamamura et al. (2013) noted that in the early part of the 20th century, companies adopted paternalistic employee management practices such as lifetime employment and provision of employee welfare including schools for workers. Entrepreneurs in the Meiji era (1868–1912) made contributions to society by building universities, museums, and hospitals. However, after the Allied Forces imported the modern practice of public relations into Japan following World War II, it soon became equated with publicity and consumer relations. In the 1970s public relations practices revolved around battling criticism surrounding the rising tide of consumerism and industrial pollution. In the early 1990s, corporate scandals and crises forced companies to switch from reactive crisis management to more proactive forms of corporate social responsibility. The concept of kyosei, or a “spirit of cooperation” often drives CSR in Japan where companies and individuals work together for the common good. It also continues to be closely associated with the well-being of employees (Witt & Redding, 2012). FAMILY-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CONFUCIAN VALUES IN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND TAIWAN In this section, we will start by discussing the common characteristics of family-owned enterprises in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan followed by a discussion of local/regional differences within the area. Historically, this region, including the Chinese family-owned businesses, was greatly influenced by the teachings of Confucius (Yan & Sorenson, 2004). Studies also demonstrated that Confucian values contributed to the economic achievements in these three regions (Kirkbridge & Tang, 1992; Richter, 2002). ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Greenhalgh (1994) posited that Taiwan’s economic miracle and prosperity were a result of economic policies, and Taiwanese family-owned enterprises. Taiwan was Japan’s colony for 50 years (1895 to 1945) before the Chinese Nationalists took Taiwan at the end of the World War II and it became “Free China,” in contrast with China, which came under a communist regime. In the 1950s, with the economic support from the US government, Taiwan opened its market to foreign enterprises. At the same time, the Chinese Nationalists reformed the economy and encouraged each family to participate in the nation’s effort in enhancing the economy in Taiwan. Over the years, some family-owned enterprises grew and expanded into international conglomerates. In Hong Kong, besides being the world’s freest economy, Chinese family-owned enterprises are also a major cornerstone of the economic development in this

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former British colony (Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). Fukuyama (1995) contended that these enterprises are the major economic players in Hong Kong, and more than 50percent of the total capitalization of the Hong Kong stock market is in the control of 10 families. Most of the family enterprises are in the manufacturing industry (with their factories in China), and real-estate development (Shapiro et al., 2003). China started adopting the market economy in the late 1970s. Since then, market activities can be seen in the country’s state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, where up to 80 to 90percent of the latter are mostly family owned (Yan & Sorenson, 2004). CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE FAMILY-OWNED ENTERPRISES We start this section by summarizing research relevant to the topic. We will then discuss how family-owned enterprises have developed in these countries. Yan and Sorenson (2004) summarized the major themes related to how familyowned enterprises in the PRC (the Peopleʼs Republic of China) react to the business environment: collective, family, and interpersonal values. In appreciating collective values, being in harmony with others in the society is considered important. Family values suggest that the family is the prototype of all social organizations, and a basic unit in a society. Junior members show respect to senior members and senior members carry the responsibility for junior members. For interpersonal values, whether a relationship is hierarchical (differences in status or seniority) or among friends, building trust, collaboration, and reciprocity are the important principles. As a result, economic activities are built upon collaboration instead of competition. Shapiro et al. (2003) saw Chinese family-owned enterprises as unique business institutions that reflect Confucian values, institutional structures, and authority. Tan and Fock (2001) contended the Chinese family business was the combination of the family social system and the economic system in which it operates. A unique feature of Chinese family enterprises is familism, even if these strong family ties in business come at the expense of other relationships in the society. Fukuyama (1995) and others contended that with strong family ties in business operations, family members were usually preferred and favored in decisions on promotion, appointment, recruitment, and succession plans. A negative effect in a tight family-controlled enterprise is the distrust towards non-family members (Fukuyama, 1995). Tan and Fock (2001) contended that, given this distrust, the management style in such cases tended to be conservative and highly controlled inside the enterprise. The emphasis on familism in the Chinese family-owned enterprises also manifests itself in their reliance on human and social capital and networks (Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). In addition to familism, another characteristic of Chinese family-owned enterprises is authoritarianism, which emphasizes the status of senior people in an organization (Tan & Fock, 2001). This phenomenon can be explained by the peculiar interpersonal relationships in a Chinese society. Scholars have discussed Wu Lun (the Five Cardinal Relations), which describe relationships in a Chinese society. The five cardinal relations are “the relationships between sovereign and subordinate, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, spouse and spouse, and friend and friend” (Huang, 2000, p. 224). These relationships also govern the hierarchy in a society. Hence, the management in a family enterprise expects respect for senior management and devotion to work. In addition, from the standpoint of Confucian ethics, hard work is encouraged as it is expected to bring wealth and prosperity for the future.

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Following the discussion above, a Chinese family-owned enterprise is conventional in management, distrusts outside members, and has a centralized power structure inside the company. In addition, the members can be highly motivated because it is family business and they have it in their hands to ensure the company’s success. We now turn to describe the development of family-owned enterprises in this region. Taiwan According to statistics, the top 10 family-owned enterprises controlled 13 of this region’s financial and business conglomerates, with a combined market value of more than NT$6 trillion (about US$198 billion), about 25.7percent of Taiwan’s stock market’s total value (Huang & Chang, 2010). Similar to the situation in Korea and Japan, these conglomerates are important players in finance, basic infrastructure, food, clothing, transportation, entertainment, etc. As a result, a large portion of the daily expenses by members of the public in Taiwan flows to these conglomerates. With so much control over market activities in Taiwan, the potential negative consequences are similar to what happened in Korea, such as high-profile bribery scandals, involving money and political power (Huang & Chang, 2010). Yet, the family ownership of the conglomerates in Taiwan does not necessarily imply negative corporate developments. Jiang and Peng (2011) studied family-owned enterprises in several Asian countries and their research showed interesting findings: when the CEO of the enterprise is from the family, the company usually has good performance. Furthermore, when the family has control of the corporate ownership and the CEO is from the family, there was found to be positive corporate performance in Taiwan. These findings can be seen in action in conglomerates such as Foxconn, Evergreen, and Formosa. Ellsworth (2002) contended that the influence of familism in Taiwan is stronger than that in Korea. A notable characteristic of this influence in Taiwan is the extension of this concept to the society at large as the Taiwanese companies considered they had responsibilities to the society. The economic development and the rise of family-owned enterprises in the 1970s created economic miracles for Taiwan (Amsden & Chu, 2003). Yu et al. (2015) indicated the necessity for Taiwanese conglomerates to engage in CSR activities. In this era of globalization, these family-owned conglomerates face pressure and expectations on corporate performances when they go global. Consequently, to convince the global community and markets that these conglomerates are socially responsible and good corporate citizens, participating in CSR initiatives such as environmental protection is considered significant. In addition, being able to engage in CSR activities reinforced the affective perception of socio-emotional wealth, meaning “the collective perception of family members toward a business founded and controlled by the family” (Yu, Ding, & Chung, 2015, p. 384). Hong Kong According to Credit Suisse, among the top family-owned business in the world, two are from Hong Kong: Sun Hung Kai Properties and CK Hutchison Holdings. Despite the influence of the British colonial period, these family-owned enterprises in Hong Kong are still under the influence of Confucianism, and social interactions in business are conducted via interpersonal relationships or within family networks

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(Shapiro, Gedajlovic, & Erdener, 2003). Kraar (1996) articulated the context of developing business relationships with these family-owned enterprises, “For a new partnership, a personal reference from a respected member of the Chinese business community is worth more than any amount of money you could throw on the table” (p. 92). China By 2009, in China, family business had become an important and growing private economy and accounted for 60percent of China’s GDP (Cai, Luo, & Wan, 2012). The business model of family-owned enterprises is relatively new to China. Similar to other family-owned enterprises in the region, being loyal to family and continuing the family heritage are considered essential to family-owned enterprises in China. In addition to this common characteristic, in the specific context of China, maintaining good relationships with the party and the government for ensuring good corporate reputation is also essential for these companies (Hofman, Moon, & Yu, 2017). The stock market in China was originally intended for large state-owned enterprises only. It wasn’t until 2004 that “the Small and Medium Enterprise Board” was established at the Shenzhen Stock Market that the number of private enterprises listed on the stock markets started to increase. Up to 2007, there were 420 family enterprises listed on the stock market. Similar to other emerging markets, the ownership structure is concentrated with family CEOs being commonly appointed in the companies. An interesting research finding also illustrated that family CEOs are positively related to the company’s performance (Cai et al., 2012), a similar phenomenon to the one found in Taiwan (Jiang & Peng, 2011). Lin (2010) contended that the business practices of family enterprises in China reflected certain expectations on their responsibilities towards the society. Even though Confucianism highly values familism, the idea of profit-seeking by business is greatly discouraged. Hence, Ruskola (2000) posited that, to not highlight the true nature of business behaviors, family enterprises used the rhetoric of family kinship extension to gain recognition from the government. Moreover, with the current legal requirements in China, it is expected of corporations to extend their responsibilities not only to their families but also to a larger social community. This is a concept similar to the modern CSR view – corporations should not only be accountable to the shareholders but also to the stakeholders (Lin, 2010). CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTICE AND RESEARCH Research has confirmed that family-owned enterprises outperform non-family-owned enterprises in Asia. These companies have also contributed to the economic growth of several Asian countries. Even though there are extensive studies done on how public relations contributes to organizational effectiveness, no research has been done yet on incorporating the unique characteristics of family-owned enterprises in Asia into the body of knowledge in public relations research. With the discussions on family-owned enterprises in Asia, we elaborate the implications for public relations research and practice in the following ways. Examples discussed earlier reveal the multiple contradictions that are unleashed when the influence of these corporations extend far beyond the economic realm.

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Often called upon to help in national freedom movements as in the case of India; and build nations following economic or political crises as in the case of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, these enterprises have contributed to nation building through employment generation and economic recovery. Driven variously by the vision of founders, a deep commitment to the long term, family values, and care for the welfare of employees and local communities, these family-owned enterprises have often entered the social realm through socially responsible initiatives aimed at strengthening national infrastructures. Just as Confucianism has been used to explain the characteristics of family-owned enterprises in the region, in India, the ancient concept of dharma has been employed to address the complex interplay of moral and economic imperatives that drive the involvement of companies beyond the economic realm. However, dancing a delicate dialectic, the influences of these powerful firms often spillover into less desirable areas such as the corporatization of media, and close nexus between government and businesses, as seen from the examples in India and South Korea. The characteristics of family-owned enterprises in the area can be summarized by the following key words: familism, Confucian values, a strong work ethic, distrust of non-family members, authoritarianism, and importance of interpersonal relationships (Guanxi), which is commonly seen in Asia. These characteristics can become hurdles when these enterprises go global. For example, transparency in corporate governance and ethical conduct are expected by the government and various publics. A centralized power structure in corporations, which only favors family members, may discourage innovation and corporate talent development. Even though research has shown that family CEOs do have a positive influence on corporate performance, public relations can contribute by reminding senior management of the values of diversity and inclusion and transparency in business conduct. The value and benefits of building interpersonal relationships in business can enhance trust and collaborations for family-owned enterprises. This kind of interpersonal relationships was first identified by Sriramesh in his research on South India. Called “personal influence model,” it was widely used in depicting the specific cultural context of public relations in Asia (e.g., J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995; Sriramesh, 1991, 1992, 2000; Sriramesh et al., 1999). The personal influence model of public relations refers to public relations practitioners’ developing personal relationships with key journalists, government officers, politicians, or activist groups that could influence the effectiveness of an organization’s public relations efforts. The model does not only apply to Chinese societies. This kind of public relations practices can also be seen in Korea where personal influence could be adopted to manipulate media stories (Jo & Shim, 2004), and Japan where public relations practitioners used personal influence for favor-granting and favor-gaining (Sriramesh et al., 1999). However, such personal relationships in the Asian context still nowadays may lead to the impression of corporations bypassing required legal and regulatory procedures. This applies even more when corporations establish close ties with government officials. What public relations can contribute to ease this concern is to remind corporate management of a proper code of conduct and government regulations such as to ensure ethical behavior and corporate reputation. The collectivist nature of the Chinese societies and teachings from Confucianism demand corporations to become good corporate citizens and contribute to society.

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Public relations can help family-owned enterprises in their CSR contributions by encouraging them to extend the scope of responsibilities to only on family members but different stakeholders around the organization. At the same time, public relations can constantly communicate with stakeholders on their CSR efforts to develop favorable reputation for family-owned enterprises. To conclude, this chapter has highlighted the importance of studying the role and characteristics of family-owned enterprises and their implications on the practice of public relations. It has also triggered some broad questions for future study. What do close connections between government and business imply for public relations practitioners as the ethical conscience keepers of the organizations they represent? How can practitioners traverse the multiple dialectical contradictions unleashed when corporations, essentially economic creations, enter spaces of nation building and governance? How can practitioners navigate the complexities of a corporatized media environment, especially while representing divergent, or marginalized voices? How can practitioners manage the tensions between deeply entrenched cultural and family values while navigating the complexities of a globalized environment? REFERENCES ADB (2017). Data shows 50 years of changing Asia. Retrieved from www.adb.org/news/infographics/datashow-50-years-changing-asia. Amann, B., Jaussaud, J., & Martinez, I. (2012). Corporate social responsibility in Japan: Family and non-family business differences and determinants. Asian Business and Management, 11(3), 329–345. Amsden, A.H., & Chu, W-W. (2003). Beyond late development: Taiwan’s upgrading policies. Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Bardhan, N. (2003). Rupturing public relations metanarratives: The example of India. Journal of Public Relations Research, 15, 225–248, DOI: 10.1207=S1532754XJPRR15032. Bardhan, N., & Sriramesh, K. (2006). Public relations in India: Review of a programme of research. Journal of Creative Communications, 1, 39–60. doi.10.1177=097325860500100103. BBC (2017). South Korea’s presidential scandal. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37971085. Date accessed, August 13, 2019. Bjornberg, A., Elstrodt, H-P., & Pandit, V. (Dec 2014). The family-business factor in emerging markets. McKinsey Quarterly. Retrieved from www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/winning-in-emerging-markets/ the-family-business-factor-in-emerging-markets. Blankfeld, K. (Nov 2016). Billion-dollar clans: Asia’s 50 richest families 2016. Forbes Asia. Retrieved from www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld/2016/11/09/billion-dollar-clans-asias-richest-families-2016/ #a9488be5dfe4. Cai, D., Luo, J-H., & Wan, D-F. (2012). Family CEOs: Do they benefit firm performance in China? Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29, 923–947. Cooper-Chen, A., & Tanaka, M. (2007). Public relations in Japan: The cultural roots of Kouhou. Journal of Public Relations Research, 20(1), 94–114. doi.10.1080/10627260701727036. Dhanesh, G.S. (2015a). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in India: A dialectical analysis of the communicative construction of the meanings and boundaries of CSR in India. Public Relations Inquiry, 4(3), 287–303. Dhanesh, G.S. (2015b). Why corporate social responsibility? An analysis of drivers of CSR in India. Management Communication Quarterly, 29(1), 114–129. Ellsworth, R. (2002). Leading with purpose. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. London: Hamish Hamilton. Goydke, T. (2016). Japanese family businesses. In P. Haghirian (Ed.), Routledge handbook of Japanese business and management (pp. 48–58). New York, NY: Routledge.

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Shapiro, D.M., Gedajlovic, E., & Erdener, C. (2003). The Chinese family firm as a multinational enterprise. The International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 11(2), 105–122. Shin, J-H., Lee, J., Park, J., & Kim, K.H. (2014). Past, present and future public relations in South Korea: Issues, work environments and leadership. In B.K. Berger & J. Meng (Eds.), Public relations leaders as sensemakers: A global study of leadership in public relations and communication management (pp. 171– 185). New York, NY: Routledge. Sriramesh, K. (1991). The impact of societal culture on public relations: An ethnographic study of South Indian organizations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. Sriramesh, K. (1992). Societal culture and public relations: Ethnographic evidence from India. Public Relations Review, 18(2), 201–211. Sriramesh, K. (1996). Power distance and public relations: An ethnographic study of Southern Indian organizations. In H.M. Culbertson & N. Chen (Eds.), International public relations: A comparative analysis (pp. 171–190). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sriramesh, K. (2000). The models of public relations in India. Journal of Communication Management, 4(3), 225–239. Sriramesh, K., Kim, Y., & Takasaki, M. (1999). Public relations in three Asian cultures: An analysis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(4), 271–292. Sriramesh, K., & Takasaki, M. (1999). The impact of culture on Japanese public relations. Journal of Communication Management, 3(4), 337–352, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/eb023497. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2009). A theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (Eds.), The global public relations handbook: Theory, research and practice (pp. 3–21). New York, NY: Routledge. Sundar, P. (2000). Beyond business: From merchant charity to corporate citizenship: Indian business philanthropy through the ages. New Delhi, India: Tata McGraw Hill. Takano, K. (2013). McDonald’s Japan: A case study of effective public relations. Public Relations Review, 39, 60–62. Tan, W-L., & Fock, S.T. (2001). Coping with growth transitions: The case of Chinese family businesses in Singapore. Family Business Review, 14, 123–152. Vilanilam, J.V. (2011). Public relations in India: New tasks and responsibilities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. Watson, D.R., & Sallot, L. (2001). Public relations practice in Japan: An exploratory study. Public Relations Review, 27, 389–402. Witt, M.A., & Redding, G. (2012). The spirits of corporate social responsibility: Senior executive perceptions of the role of the firm in society in Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and the USA. SocioEconomic Review, 10(1), 109–134. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwr026. Yamamura, K., Ikari, S., & Kenmochi, T. (2013). Historic evolution of public relations in Japan. Public Relations Review, 39, 147–155. Yan, J., & Sorenson, R.L. (2004). The influence of Confucian ideology on conflict in Chinese family business. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 4(1), 5–17. Yoo, J-W., & Jo, S. (2014). A comparative analysis of the perception of public relations in Chinese and South Korean newspapers. Public Relations Review, 40, 503–505. Yoo, S., & Lee, S.M. (1987). Management style and practice of Korean chaebols. California Management Review, 29(4), 95–110. Yu, A., Ding, H-B., & Chung, H-M. (2015). Corporate social responsibility performance in family and non-family firms: The perspective of socio-emotional wealth. Asian Business & Management, 14(5), 383–412.

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15 The Global Public Relations Strategies of the “Hacktivist” Group Anonymous Kara Alaimo

Much has been written about best public relations practices for advancing pro-social causes globally (Alaimo, 2017). However, the public relations literature has until now been silent on the strategies of Anonymous, a group of global hackers that has captured the world’s attention since 2008. This chapter analyzes the group’s public relations strategies, to identify what other groups can learn from them about best global public relations practices on the Internet, the reputational threats posed by international cyber criminals, and how to respond to them. Since 2008, Anonymous, a global group of hackers, has maintained a high profile on traditional and social media worldwide through its attacks on prominent targets including governments, corporations, and terrorists. The group’s first major claim to fame was its Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assault on the Church of Scientology – an attack that overwhelmed the Church’s website so that it went offline. Anonymous has now achieved such notoriety that Islamic terrorists are jealous. Coleman (2014, p. 15) reported that the resident anthropologist for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service – Canada’s version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – told her that “jihadists … were impressed by the level of media attention Anonymous attained.” Members of the group are known as “Anons.” As Olson (2012, p. 7) explained, Anons are “often dubbed hactivists – hackers with an activist message. From what anyone could tell, they believed all information should be free, and they might just hit your website if you disagreed.”

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According to a former member, the group does not have specifically defined goals, however it seeks to fight censorship and government control and promote free speech. Although some of its members have been arrested for fraud, hacking, and cyberstalking, Anonymous has attracted sympathizers and fans for its attacks on unsavory targets such as terrorist organizations (Sands, 2016). As Herwig (2011) observed, Anonymous has not only gained a sizeable collection of adversaries and critics – including government agencies, IT security companies and digital rights advocacies who criticise its methods – it has also won scores of secret and not so secret admirers, especially among the highly social media literate, digital creative class. The reputation of its members as defenders of truth and seekers of knowledge, digital avengers who cannot be lied to because they will hijack the emails of those who try, seems to strike a chord with many.

As such, Anons have become known as part of what is now called “‘the fifth estate’: the hackers, leakers, independent journalists, and bloggers who serve the critical role that once fell to ‘the fourth estate,’ the mainstream media” (Coleman, 2014, p. 84). Coleman (2014, p. 129) described the group’s 2010 attack on companies including Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal in retaliation for the companies’ decisions to cut off services to WikiLeaks as “the first large-scale, populist, full-bodied online protest.” However, some Anons have less principled motivations. Coleman (2014, p. 19) noted that before “Anonymous unexpectedly sprouted an activist sensibility, the brand had been used exclusively for what, in Internet parlance, is known as ‘trolling’: the targeting of people and organizations, the desecration of reputations, and the spreading of humiliating information.” And when some Anons wanted to violate the group’s principles of targeting those who impede free expression and not attacking mainstream media organizations, they simply formed another group – called LulzSec – to attack people online with no motivation other than generating laughs (Olson, 2012, p. 244). Interestingly, Anonymous maintains its prominence by employing many traditional public relations strategies, including attaching itself to causes that are already high profile; aiding reporters; using humor and hyperbole; and promoting engagement (Coleman, 2014; Olson, 2012). However, because members of the group are, quite literally, anonymous, the group lacks a coherent brand identity. Yet even this shortcoming also redounds as an advantage to Anonymous, by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability that keeps observers wondering what the group might do next. The next section will discuss some of the group’s major public relations strategies, before considering their effects on other organizations. ATTACHING ITSELF TO CAUSES THAT ARE ALREADY HIGH PROFILE One of the major strategies that Anonymous uses to generate publicity is attaching itself to causes that are already dominating media coverage. For example, in the year 2015, the group took on the terrorists who staged the massacre at the Paris offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the Ku Klux Klan, the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump – stories which topped international headlines. Mastroianni (2015) noted that, even if the group “didn’t produce much in the way of tangible outcomes” and made missteps, its high-profile targets gave the group “a year full of headlines and trending hashtags.”

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The group has also benefited from what according to The Economist (2013) internet aficionados call the Streisand Effect. Named after the American singer and actress Barbra Streisand, the Streisand Effect describes how efforts to suppress a juicy piece of online information can backfire and end up making things worse for the would-be censor. For example, the Church of Scientology was angered by the public release of a video in which actor Tom Cruise discussed Scientology. In the video, “Cruise raved about the principle and merit of being a Scientologist in an incoherent and egotistic way,” saying things such as, “we are the authorities on getting people off drugs. We are the authorities on the mind. We are the authorities on improving conditions.” (Huang, 2015, p. 11). As Huang (2015, p. 20) noted, “to Scientology’s dismay, the more it attempted to criticize Anonymous and suppress the Tom Cruise interview video, the more viral the video was spread.” AID AND PROTECTION TO THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA Another reason for Anonymous’ high profile is that it has helped itself by helping the media. The group has released dramatic, well-timed press releases, YouTube videos and other social media content (Coleman, 2014, p. 184; Olson, 2012, p. 71). As Olson (2012, p. 410) observed, “Anons could grab headlines by simply tweeting a threat.” Coleman (2014, pp. 181–182) also argued that the group attained positive media coverage by giving exclusive access to sympathetic reporters. “There was a confederacy of about half a dozen outsiders given extra access in exchange for functioning as Anonymous media mouthpieces,” she wrote, naming Steve Ragan of the Tech Herald, Parmy Olson of Forbes, Quinn Noton of Wired, Amber Lyon of CNN, and filmmaker Brian Knappenberger as among the group. “Most [Anons] worked with journalists as respectfully and transparently as the clandestine nature of Anonymous allowed … to gain publicity for their causes … but they also sought, whenever possible, to carefully manage their own image.” The group’s rules also insist upon the protection of the media. Olson (2012, p. 7) explained that one of the group’s few decrees is “don’t attack the media, since they could be purveyors of a message.” Despite the ban on hacking media organizations, Anons did attack the website of Gawker after the site called hackers mass bullies (Olson, 2012, p. 151). The rule against hacking the mainstream media has also turned out to be flimsy in other ways. When Anons discovered in 2011 that they could hack Fox News but it was a media organization and “had not done anything egregious lately,” Anonymous members simply created a new spin-off group to conduct the operation, which they called LulzSec (Coleman, 2014, p. 248). As Olson (2012, p. 248) explained, their motivation for attacking Fox was simply “shits and giggles.” LulzSec went on to hack the website of PBS NewsHour, posting an elaborate fake story about the late actor and rapper Tupac Shakur which claimed, “Tupac Found Alive in New Zealand.” (Olson, 2012, pp. 259–261). Anons not acting under the auspices of the group also helped hack the website of Britain’s The News of the World in 2011, posting a false story claiming that its owner, Rupert Murdoch, had died. The headline proclaimed, “Media Moguls Body Discovered” in his garden (Olson, 2012, p. 353). And when journalists don’t cooperate, the group can be vicious. As Coleman (2014, p. 186) reported, they have also “often tore [sic] or trolled journalists to pieces.” The group has also consistently lied to the media. One Anon falsely claimed to be a neighbor of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former head of the International

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Monetary fund who was accused of rape, and provided commentary about StraussKahn that was reported in hundreds of newspapers (Coleman, 2014, p. 29). Likewise, in 2010, Anonymous claimed that the reason it attacked the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) was because the MPAA had hired the Indian company Aiplex to attack sites on which copyrighted material is shared. Coleman (2014, p. 99) noted that Anonymous managed, using propaganda material alone, to convince the media (and many of its own members!) that the MPAA had hired Aiplex; there is no evidence to support this claim. Instead it is now widely believed that Aiplex had been hired by the Bollywood movie industry. And yet on September 20, 2010, scores of reputable news outlets, including Reuters, published statements in the following vein, despite flimsy – nonexistent, really – evidence: “MPAA.org and the Web site of Aiplex Software, a company the MPAA hired to target sites where piracy was rampant, were incapacitated for much of the day, according to the piracy blog TorrentFreak.” Duping reporters was an organic part of Anonymous culture: ‘Lying to the press’ was common in Anonymous, for understandable reasons. Here was a network of people borne out of a culture of messing with others, a paranoid world whose inhabitants never asked each other personal questions and habitually lied about their real lives to protect themselves. It was also part of Anonymous culture to make up random, outrageous statements. If, for instance, someone was about to leave his or her computer for a few minutes to get coffee, he or she might say, ʻBrb, FBI at the door.ʼ Not only was there a sense of a higher purpose to Anonymous that made it seem okay to inflate figures and lie to the media; Anons were also part of a secret institution that no one in the real world understood anyway. … Anons particularly disliked journalists … asking, ʻSo who are you attacking next?ʼ or pushing for a quick quote. A few would first exaggerate, saying that there were tens of thousands of people attacking a site. At one point an Anon told a magazine reporter that Anonymous had ʻcoloniesʼ all over the world and a physical headquarters, and that its name was based on a real man named Anonymous. … ʻSo who is Anonymous?ʼ a reporter asked about the supposed man. … ʻHe’s this guy,ʼ the Anonymous supporter said. ʻHe lives in our headquarters in West Philadelphia.ʼ That was actually an Internet meme: tell an elaborate story, then catch the person out by quoting the introductory rap to the sitcom The Fresh Prince of Bel Air. (Olson, 2012, pp. 122–123)

HUMOR As the above example also tells us, one of the major characteristics of Anonymous content is the use of humor. For example, the group declared December 11, 2015 “Troll ISIS Day,” calling on social media users around the world to create and share content mocking the terrorist organization. One of the group’s posts on Twitter featured an image of rubber ducks dressed as Islamic State terrorists and called the group “#Daeshbags” – a play on Daesh, the Arabic acronym for the name of the Islamic State (Mastroianni, 2015). Another featured a terrorist hitting a piñata (Lidgett, 2015). Coleman explained that “terrorists – ISIS – are seen as one of the most humorless of organizations on planet Earth.” On the other hand, she said, “Anonymous, who are all into humor, are using their offensive brand of humor to make that point that terrorists don’t have a shred of humor” (Lidgett, 2015). Indeed, a key

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tactic utilized by Anonymous has been what the group refers to in internet slang as “lulz.” Lulz was a variation of the term lol – “laugh out loud” – which had for years been tagged onto the end of lighthearted statements … A more recent addition to web parlance, lulz took that sentiment further and essentially meant entertainment at someone else’s expense (Olson, 2012, p. 14). For example, when the group attacked the Church of Scientology, it engineered search engines so that “evil cult” popped up when people looked up the Church online (Mastroianni, 2015). It also ordered pizza and escorts – for which the group didn’t pay – to arrive at Scientology churches (Huang, 2015, p. 15). These tactics are nothing if not funny. Olson (2012, p. 187) explained the formula. A key Anon who used the pseudonym Topiary eventually learned there was a fine line between success and failure when it came to the public side of Anonymous. “There had to be humor, so a meme or two, but definitely not too many,” he later remembered. “There had to be something inexplicable – a kind of what-the-fuck-am-I-seeing.jpg, so Batman attacking a shark with a light saber.” Finally, there had to be something blatantly obvious to pick on. HYPERBOLE The group has also used hyperbole, especially in response to criticism. For example, after Fox News referred to the group as “the Internet Hate Machine” in a segment, Anonymous appropriated the name and uploaded a YouTube video proclaiming: We are the face of chaos and the harbingers of judgment. We laugh at the face of tragedy. We mock those in pain. We ruin the lives of others simply because we can … A man takes out his aggression on a cat, we laugh. Hundreds die in a plane crash, we laugh. We are the embodiment of humanity with no remorse, no caring, no love, and no sense of morality. (Coleman, 2014, pp. 1–2)

Similarly, after the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) reported that Anonymous could target the country’s power grid, one Anon joked, “that’s right, we’re definitely taking down the power grid. We’ll know we’ve succeeded when all the equipment we use to mount our campaign is rendered completely useless” (Coleman, 2014, p. 14). PROMOTING ENGAGEMENT While members of Anonymous may operate underground, they use popular social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook to spread their messages to the masses and attract the attention of traditional media organizations (Huang, 2015, p. 23). Coleman (2014, p. 6) noted that Anonymous’ publicity videos “have become a vernacular institution unto themselves.” Their social media content promotes engagement, or participation in their cause. For example, Troll ISIS Day gave the group’s audience a specific call to action, asking people around the world to join in attacking the Islamic State online. As Anonymous posted on the Internet, “do not think you have to be a part of Anonymous, anyone can do this and does not require any special skills” (Mastroianni, 2015). Similarly, when the group attacked the Church of Scientology, it invited others to get involved, recommending that they “document the demonstration. … posting images and videos of your heroic actions all over the Internet is bound to generate win, exhorting other Anonymous to follow your glorious example” (Huang, 2015,

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p. 28). The initiative was organized on a public wiki, so anyone who wanted to get involved could change anything on the page (Schultz, 2008). Anonymous has also practiced two-way communication by soliciting and responding to feedback. Grunig and White (1992) explained that two-way symmetrical communication, which is practiced by excellent public relations practitioners, requires that organizations engage in genuine dialogue with their audiences and be open to changing as a result of their conversations. As Schultz (2008) noted in his analysis of the group’s campaign against the Church of Scientology, organizers and communicators adapted and listened to their audience; feedback shaped the movement. You can see a clear shift in Anonymous’ direction in response to audience members’ comments in late January. Had Anonymous simply continued on as it began (i.e. through illegal harassment), it is unlikely that the group would have gained much/any worldwide support. LACK OF CONTROL OF BRAND IDENTITY Herwig (2011) argued that “Anonymous, the collective identity, is older than Anonymous, the hacktvist group – more to the point, I propose that the hacktivist group can be understood as an application of Anonymous, the collective identity.” Herwig noted that the actual identity “Anonymous” started on 4chan.org, where the name of all authors of posts automatically showed up as “Anonymous” – a user interface policy called “forced anonymity.” Coleman (2014, p. 16) contended that the group has “become the quintessential anti-brand brand, assuming various configurations and meanings, even as it has also become the popular face of unrest around the globe.” Huang’s (2015, p. iii) study of media coverage of Anonymous and the group’s social media posts found that “Anonymous commits itself to building a distinguishable brand identity as a defender of freedom of speech.” Huang (2015, p. 3) reported that “Anonymous’s attempt at building its brand identity is to fan media frenzy and engage in social media to make its logo, slogans, and manifesto identifiable in the politics of the Internet.” Most of its announcements use the tagline “We Are Anonymous. We Are A Legion. We Do Not Forgive. We Do Not Forget. Expect Us.” Offline protestors have worn Guy Fawkes masks, borrowed from the British novel and later Hollywood movie V for Vendetta which Herwig (2011) noted “is now widely recognised as Anonymous’s iconic look.” Herwig argued that “Anonymous’s appearance with masks is not coincidental. The collective identity itself serves as a mask, allowing the bearer to do and say things that would otherwise be out of bounds.” Coleman (2014, p. 75) noted that the mask also “functions as an eternal beacon, broadcasting the symbolic value of equality.” Coleman (2014, p. 271) explained that Hollywood and Madison Avenue typically try to appropriate countercultural forces to harness their cache for profit. In the case of the mask, however, “Anonymous has taken a symbol popularized by Hollywood and made it revolutionary. It is a prime example of counter-commodification, a rare occurrence.” Anonymous’ distinctive iconography also features headless men wearing black suits (Coleman, 2014, p. 5). The group’s Twitter page describes Anonymous as “this headless hydra.” Huang (2015, p. 5) explained, in Greek mythology, a hydra is a many-headed serpent whose heads grow again as they are cut off, killed by Hercules eventually. But a “headless hydra” is a snake with no head to be chopped off, no vulnerability to be exploited. Thus, by likening Anonymous to a “headless hydra,” it implies that there are no leaders in Anonymous to be singled out, either for lionization or discredit.

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Coleman (2014, p. 17) argued that “the group’s bold, Hollywood-style aesthetics strike a familiar chord in the society of spectacle.” As one Anon told her, “I am the master of the spectacle. This is my art, ma’am” (2014, p. 20). However, because members of the group need to literally stay anonymous in order to maintain the group’s identity and avoid prosecution, Anonymous ultimately forfeits control over its brand identity. As Huang (2015, p. 2) reported, with no leaders and spokespeople in the picture, the media, especially the Western mainstream media, has played a vital role in consuming and (re)shaping Anonymous’s public image. The media portrayal of Anonymous oscillates from a group of juvenile pranksters to digital vigilantes, or even a horde of cyber criminals or terrorists. Without revealing member identities, the group can do little to counter these depictions. Similarly, Huang (2015, p. 24) noted that when Anonymous was accused of hacking epilepsy support forums to insert flashing animations which could cause seizures in people who have the disease, the group denied the charges but “it was hard to change the mainstream media’s narratives. After all, how could a leaderless, non-membership and decentralized collective disassociate itself from some shadowy operations?” Coleman (2014, p. 69) noted that the incident left “a dark statin on the name Anonymous.” Another public relations challenge for Anonymous is that, as Gregg Housh, a former member of the group, explained, anyone who wishes to use the group’s name to advance any cause can do so. “The act of saying you are, means you are,” he said. “That’s how little control anyone has over the brand” (Sands, 2016). It also means that members of the group often disagree on actions taken by other members. “I don’t think you’ll be able to find an Anon that won’t be upset about at least one op [operation],” Housh said (Sands, 2016). As Keller (2013) observed, “the group’s hazy message, with no spokesmen, leaders, or firm political plans to provide steady direction, isn’t helped by an ideology that veers between extreme left, extreme right and mainstream concerns.” Although this lack of control over its identity is clearly a downfall of the group, it can also work to its advantage in another sense. Cyberwarfare expert David Gewirtz has noted that Anonymous is remarkable for its unpredictability. From a strategic perspective, he said, this is a disadvantage because “they tend to knee-jerk reactions that might have unintended consequences” (Cohen, 2015). However, from a public relations perspective, the group’s capriciousness serves as another element of its mystery, generating suspense that makes the group all the more fascinating to follow. PUBLIC RELATIONS CHALLENGES TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS Many of the tactics used by Anonymous – such as practicing two-way communication, promoting engagement, and creating spectacles with dramatic content that rapidly goes viral – can inform the cyber strategies of other global public relations practitioners who work to advance more mainstream causes. However, the willingness of other hackers to attack organizations just for lulz poses a threat to every person and organization on the Internet today. A report by Acunetix (2011) found that web hacks impose the following costs on corporations: • Loss of customer confidence, trust, and reputation with the consequent harm to brand equity and consequent effects on revenue and profitability; • Possible loss of the ability to accept certain payment instruments e.g. Visa, Mastercard

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• Negative impact on revenues and profits arising from any falsified transactions and from employee downtime; • Website downtime which is in effect the closure of one of the most important sales channels for an e-business; • The expenditure involved in repairing the damage done and building contingency plans for securing compromised websites and web applications; and, • Legal battles and related implications from Web application attacks and lax security measures including fines and damages to be paid to victims. Organizations should begin preparing their responses to such potential attacks yesterday. Software such as firebell, created by the global communications firm Weber Shandwick, allows organizations to view faux social media posts that opponents might use to attack, practice responding to them in real time, and see how simulated actors such as reporters and social media users react. That’s just one way that organizations can begin making plans and practicing their responses to the world in case they become the next targets of Anonymous. REFERENCES Acunetix (2011). Web hacking: Is your data really safe? Retrieved from www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/ web-hacking/ Alaimo, K. (2017). Pitch, tweet, or engage on the street: How to practice global public relations and strategic communication. New York, NY: Routledge. Cohen, P. (2015, November 16). Anonymous hackers’ group declares war on ISIS. CBS News. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-hackers-declare-war-on-isis/ Coleman, G. E. (2014). Hacker, hoaxer, whistleblower, spy: The many faces of Anonymous. New York, NY: Verso. The Economist (2013, April 16). What is the Streisand effect? Retrieved from www.economist.com/blogs/ economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-effect Grunig, J. E., & White, J. (1992). The effect of worldviews on public relations theory and practice. In J. E. Grunig (Ed.), Excellence in public relations and communication management (pp. 31–64). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Herwig, J. (2011, May 11). Anonymous: Peering behind the mask. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.the guardian.com/technology/2011/may/11/anonymous-behind-the-mask Huang, J. (2015). Values and symbolism in Anonymous’s brand identity (Master’s dissertation). Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/69ed/732e4eadd08418008cc3b24a70e4c040dad0.pdf Keller, A. (2013, November 7). Dozens (yes, dozens) show up for Anonymous’ million-mask march. Newsweek. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/dozens-yes-dozens-show-anonymous-million-mask-march2810 Lidgett, A. (2015, December 12). Troll ISIS Day: Measuring the effectiveness of Anonymous’ campaign against the Islamic State. International Business Times. Retrieved from www.ibtimes.com/troll-isis-daymeasuring-effectiveness-anonymous-campaign-against-islamic-state-2223168 Mastroianni, B. (2015, December 31). 2015 was a huge year for Anonymous hackers. CBS News. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-hackers-isis-donald-trump-2015/ Olson, P. (2012). We are Anonymous: Inside the hacker world of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the global cyber insurgency. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Sands, G. (2016, March 19). What to know about the worldwide hacker group ‘Anonymous’. ABC News. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/US/worldwide-hacker-group-anonymous/story?id=37761302 Schultz, D. (2008, February 18). Anonymous vs. Scientology: A case study of digital media. Mediashift. Retrieved from http://mediashift.org/2008/02/anonymous-vs-scientology-a-case-study-of-digital-media005/

CHAPTER

16 Terrorism and Global Public Relations Jesper Falkheimer

INTRODUCTION Terrorism is a historical and contemporary phenomenon that may be analyzed from different perspectives. This chapter seeks to describe and reflect upon terrorism as a global public relations process and issue. This may sound strange but it is indeed legitimate if we accept that terrorism as acts of violence were never “just ends unto themselves; rather, they were and are part of a larger process of communicating a message and generating a desired response” (Tuman, 2010, p. 31). In this context, terrorist acts are strategic communicative acts using persuasive means of communication to reach a collective political, religious, social, or ideological mission. Viewing terrorism as communication is not new and has been put forward before, e.g. by Schmid and Graaf (1982, pp.14–15): “terrorism can best be understood as a violent communication strategy.” Contemporary terrorism (Neumann, 2009) has effects at different levels. First and foremost, terror attacks affect victims all over the world. Second, terrorism affects public opinion, public attitudes, and behavior, the level of trust in governments, national and international political legislation, and so forth. Public relations strategies and activities are used by terrorists as well as governments, trying to counteract recruitment and the possible negative consequences at different levels. Today, terrorism is global and transnational and there is an increasing need to develop effective contra-terror public relations strategies to counter the professionalization of communication by terrorists. The exposure and publicity that follows terror attacks are crucial for terrorists. The intended communicative effects – creating horror, uncertainty, undermining democracy, and increasing political polarization – may even be at the very core of terrorism. Terrorist 170

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attacks are usually planned to get a message through (Richards, 2004), have high news value, follows the media logic, and have political, opinion and societal effects (Crijns, Cauberghe, Hudders, 2017). Terrorists’ penchant for publicity has been emphasized for decades. The then Prime Minister of the U.K., Margaret Thatcher, concluded in a speech in 1985 that “we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.”1 This may be even more complicated today than in 1985 due to the increased speed of information and digital media evolution as well as changes in the traditional media system. Terror attacks quickly become media events attracting global interest; the live coverage of terrorist attacks may be positive since citizens get informed faster, but may also achieve the terroristsʼ target of getting attention and creating horror. Terrorist groups may also communicate directly with their peers and potential recruits through new media technologies, and plan their attacks in a way that maximize the attention at a global scale. Public relations is of course not only about publicity and media relations, despite journalists tendency to “view PR as solely focused on influencing journalists and gaining media publicity” (Macnamara, 2016, p. 133). If one equates terrorism communication with publicity, terrorism does not have a lot in common with modern public relations, but with simple propaganda. However, Picard (1989) emphazizes that the goals of terrorism are not only publicity, and that terroristsʼ communication strategies are significantly more sophisticated: Labeling perpetrators of terrorism as seekers or publicity for their own sake is simplistic and ignores their very significant efforts to direct news coverage to present their cause in favorable ways and to disassociate groups from acts that will bring significant negative responses to the cause. (ibid., p. 14).

Later studies reinforces that terrorists in contemporary society plan and conduct (unethical) public relations activities strategically and in a well thought out manner (e.g. Richards, 2004; Falkheimer, 2016). Daesh, or the IS, is a well-known example of a terrorist group that has developed professional media strategies to gain their purposes. This chapter reflects upon global terrorism and public relations from different approaches based on earlier research and secondary data. In the first section, definitions and the evolution of terrorism is described. Selected research about terrorism with relevance for public relations is presented, in addition to a short recap of the communication history of terrorism. Secondary data from the Global Terrorism Database is also used to highlight a global framework. The following section is devoted to understanding how terrorism relates to public relations. Public relations researchers seldom focus on terrorism or contra-terrorism but there are earlier research worth relating too. In the last sections of the chapter some final conclusions are made, partly supposed to increase interest for further research about terrorism and public relations, which is of high societal relevance. TERRORISM – A SHORT HISTORY OF A DEBATED CONCEPT Terrorist acts with political, religious, or ideological motives have a longer history than the concept of terrorism. Archaeologists have found artifacts outside Mosul in modern day Iraq showing how Assurnasirpal II, king of Assyria 883–859 BC, exercised terror against civilians during their conquests (Matusitz, 2013). During the 1st

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century AD Jewish fundamentalists, called Zealots, practiced terror in their battle against the Roman empire and its allies. The Zealots became notorious for stabbing people to death in public places and thereby creating exposure and horror. The Muslim group Islamilites, later called Assassins, practiced terror in the 11th century in a similar manner to the Zealots, killing people with daggers in public places, often during religious weekends to get maximum attention. Despite these historical examples the term terrorism does not occur until the end of the French Revolution in the 18th century. The Revolutionary Jacobins and its leader Maximillian Robespierre then introduced le régime de la terror with public trials, executions, and persecutions in pursuit of the ideas of the revolution. As a concept, terrorism is very hard to define. The reasons behind this are several. One reason is that terrorism is also a political rhetorical concept, aiming to create political effects in conflicts. Terrorists obviously name themselves other things, such as freedom fighters, jihadists, or nationalists. In non-democratic states terrorism is sometimes used as a label to dehumanize political opponents. Another reason is that terrorism as a concept has vague boundaries: when does terrorism turn into guerilla warfare or war? A third reason is that terrorism seems to be connected to time and place: “If, for instance, an act of political violence occurs at a significant distance (geographically, or psychologically) from the observer, the tendency is to give it a more neutral or benign name” (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirch-Hoefler, 2012, p. 76). There are three basic forms of terrorism (Tuman, 2010): state terrorism (when authoritarian states use political violence), national or domestic terrorism (targeting the state) and transnational terrorism (based in global networks, targeting states, international institutions, or movements). There is no need for going further into the definitional debates here. Instead we can lean on one of the established definitions: Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation usually, though not exclusively, to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider group than the immediate victims of the violence, often to publicize a cause, as well as to coerce a target into acceding to terrorist aims. (Ranstorp & Wilkinson, 2005, pp. 3–4)

From a contemporary perspective the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 were the beginning of a new world security era. The Cold War between the superpowers Soviet Union and the USA had been over for a decade. But the moment when the four hijacked aircrafts flew into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Arlington County and crashed outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, a new security paradigm was established. The new paradigm is characterized by asymmetric warfare between transnational terrorist networks and governments in several countries over the world. Neumann (2009) defines this “new terrorism” as characterized by transnational networks, based in fundamentalist religious ideologies and using even more brutal methods than before. Islamist fundamentalist terrorism is crucial for the establishment of this new global paradigm: in that its aim was sustained opposition to the entire “Western” economic, cultural, and belief system, with no negotiable end to their campaigns, and whole populations seen as legitimate targets. Attacks, and the possibility of attacks, are supposed to change enemy policy by means other than the traditional method of battlefield superiority. One of their aims is to convince public opinion that the price for supporting a particular policy is too

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high, as well attracting support from potential sympathisers following retaliation for the initial attack. Conflicts are fought worldwide in a complex arena across the whole spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks, and involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors, motivated not only by politics or ideology, but also profit.2

Since 2001 a number of spectacular and tragic terrorist attacks, often associated with Islamist fundamentalist groups and since 2014 especially with the Daesh (also called IS), have taken place. On October 12, 2002, an Islamic terrorist group conducted a bomb attack at nightclubs and at the US Consulate on Indonesian island of Bali, with 202 deaths as a consequence. Between 23 and 26 October 2002, Chechen separatists held over 800 people hostage at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow. When Russian special forces stormed the theater and injected gas, all of the separatists were killed as well as over a hundred of the hostages. On March 11, 2004 (911 days after the September 2001 attacks), Islamist terrorists conducted several bombings at Madrid train stations that killed 191 people. The same year, between 1 and 3 September 2004, Chechen separatists and Islamist terrorists took over a school in Beslan, a town in North Ossetia in the south Russia. The hostage situation dissolved when Russian security forces ended up in a shoot-out with the terrorists, killing probably 31 terrorists (the number of deaths in Beslan are not confirmed3). At least 338 people were killed, many of them school children. The following year, July 7, 2005, an Islamic terrorist attack was conducted on underground trains and a bus in London with 52 deaths. Between 26 and 28 November 2008, a number of Islamist terrorist attacks in India were carried out, including a major attack on a hotel in Mumbai all leading to the killing of 175 people. On July 22, 2011, a right wing extremist engaged in two attacks in Norway: a bombing in the government area in Oslo with eight deaths, and a massacre on the island of Utöya, seat of the Labor Party Youth association AUF’s annual summer camp, with 68 deaths. On April 15, 2013, homemade bombs were used at the Boston Marathon finish in the US to injure several and kill three. The attacks were followed by an intense pursuit of the two terrorists, connected to Islamic fundamentalism and Chechen separatism. The attacks in Norway and Boston differed from the patterns of earlier terrorist attacks as they were planned and executed by individual terrorists with unclear ties to terrorist networks. They were motivated by internet propaganda and followed open instructions on how to develop bombs and so forth. The lone terrorists with no clear connection to formal terrorism cells or networks have become an increased threat. Some of the more recent attacks, e.g. the attacks in Paris, France 13 and 14 of November 2015 (killing 130 persons) and the attacks in Brussels, Belgium March 22 in 2016 (killing 35 persons), were coordinated group attacks. But there are also several examples of attacks that seem to be more random, carried out by one individual. One example is the attack with a truck in Nice, France, July 14, 2016 (killing 84 persons) and the attack in Stockholm, Sweden, April 7, 2017 (killing 4 persons). The terror attacks mentioned above all got massive exposure in Western media and societies, but they are not representative of terrorism at a global scale. TERRORISM: GLOBAL INCIDENTS AND TRENDS The horrible terrorist attacks mentioned earlier may imply that terrorism is a contemporary phenomenon and that terrorist attacks are predominantly executed in the Western world.

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But terrorism is not, as already acknowledged, a new phenomenon and terror attacks take place to a greater extent in other parts of the world than in the United States and Europe. It is a fact that the number of terror attacks has increased strongly worldwide since 2010. The open source data base the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), based at the University of Maryland in the US, contains a register of terrorist events since 1970, with the latest open statistics from 2015. The database includes domestic, transnational, and international terrorism events. A terror attack is defined as a violent act aimed at attaining a political, social, economic, or religious goal. The database shows some relevant patterns from a global perspective. The number of incidents and casualties is at a low level in the Western Europe and the US, especially when one compares to the situation in the 1970s and in other parts of the world. The worldwide increase in terror incidents and casualties mainly refers to a startling wave of attacks in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia during the last decade. Still, the European and US public opinion rates the risk for terrorism very high. According to a public opinion survey by the European Commission, DirectorateGeneral for Communication (2015),4 terrorism is viewed by the European citizens as the most important security challenge. Fewer citizens find economic and financial crises or the climate change to be high security risks. The data is from 2015 and since then there have been several terrorist attacks in Europe, so the assumption is that the perceived risk has probably increased. The attacks in Europe have also direct effects on public opinion in the US, which may not be a surprise. The US public opinion does not differ very much from the European public opinion. A Gallup (2016) survey of the public risk perception in the US shows that terrorism has become one of the main perceived risks since 2014. Twice as many US respondents rate terror attacks in their own country as a critical risk compared to the climate change. All together US citizens rate terrorism (cyber terrorism and international terrorism) and the development of nuclear weapons in Iran as the major threats.5 PUBLIC RELATIONS AND TERRORISM As terrorism, public relations is a debated concept with many definitions. Traditionally researchers focus on how public relation is or may be practiced in corporate or public organizations in liberal-democratic systems. Theories and models are often normative and based on a belief that public relations may be based in an ethical reasoning. Following the logic of Grunigs et al (e.g. 1984) fundamental research on public relations practice, one may relate non-ethical public relations to history. The press agentry or publicity model defines this form of public relations, which is supposed to be uni-directional, manipulative, and only focused on persuasion. This definition is actually very close to how propaganda is defined, as: “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). Or in other words propaganda is biased, ideological, simplified, exaggerated, and totally avoiding argumentative exchange or interaction (O ´Shaughnessy, 1996). The field of terrorism and public relations may be viewed as a Pandoraʼs box – opening it up may mean that all kinds of evils fly out. Holbrook (2014), one of few terrorism researchers that has put public relations in center of interest, concludes that: “A more profitable approach, therefore, combines some elements and conceptualisations of propaganda into a wider framework of PR initiatives that is relevant to

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the context of terrorism” (p. 145). As always, it depends on which perspective you take. One may analyze public relations and terrorism from four different perspectives: (1) How terrorists use public relations (then defined similar to propaganda) to reach their goals; (2) How democratic states or governmental organizations use public relations as contra-terrorism strategies; (3) How the public opinion responds, reacts and makes sense of terrorism in a communicative sense; (4) The role of media and terrorism (for terrorists, governmental organizations and the media audience). There are examples of earlier research about terrorism and public relations6 but all together this field is rather under-researched, at least when compared to closely related areas such as media studies (e.g. Falkheimer & Olsson, 2014). Some researchers connect terrorism to crisis communication, such as Canel and Sanders (2010, p. 450) analyzing the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Media scholars and political scientists sometimes enter public relations-oriented issues. One example is a study of the relationship between the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US and media, where Norris, Kern and Just (2003, p. 3) conclude that the media should be seen as a double-edged sword. Media coverage can benefit terrorists by giving them exposure, spreading their political messages, and accidentally encouraging further attacks and networks. But the media coverage of terror attacks may also lead to the states and governments strengthening their position and increasing their ability to impose controversial sanctions and implement new legislation without debate, which may be democratically problematic. Following the 9/11 attacks, the debate on terrorism as public relations has been intensified (e.g. Holbrook, 2014; Richards, 2004; Somerville & Purcell 2011). This research relates to terrorists communication strategies as well as the governmental “war on terror” (launched by then US President Bush) creating increased polarization as a basis for war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and with global geo-political consequences. The first steps towards the professionalization of terroristsʼ public relations occurred in the 1970s when the German RAF, Rote Armee Fraktion, systematically began to evaluate the media coverage of their attacks (Rothenberger, 2014). Richards (2004, p. 171) researched the 9/11 terroristsʼ public relations strategies and concluded that the timing of the two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York was adapted to the media conditions to ensure that there would be plenty of cameras capable of catching the second attack. Tuman (2010) believes that terrorism should be seen as rhetorical communication with several target groups. Falkheimer (2016), analyzing the communication strategies of Daesh (IS), concludes that the social media strategies are professional and follows the same logics and trends as major corporations do. In a recent study of public perceptions of terrorism in Belgium, conducted before the attacks in Brussels 2015, Crijns, Cauberghe and Hudders (2017) found that the role of the traditional media as information providers is still crucial, that communication managers need to adapt to different public risk involvement levels, that the Prime Minister has a core role as primary communicator for creating trust, and that the governmental public relations “have to strive for communication that reflects reliability, experience and honesty” (p. 231). CONCLUSIONS Public relations and terrorism is an under-researched area. Considering the increased number of terrorist attacks, especially outside the Western world, the

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professionalization of terroristsʼ communication strategies and activities, the strong effects on issues of high relevance for global public relations, such as trust, legitimacy, and public opinion, there is a need for more research about terrorism and public relations. Research about terrorism and public relations may focus on the terroristsʼ strategies and activities but may also be directed towards governmental efforts to use public relations to counteract the terroristsʼ targets. There are some research efforts focusing terrorism in the Western part of the world, but there is a lack of studies that are directed towards the nations and regions in the world where most terrorism attacks occur. NOTES 1 2 3 4

www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096 http://oecdinsights.org/2016/09/11/the-new-terrorism/ http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/europe/beslan-school-siege-fast-facts/index.html Special Euro Barometer 432 (2015). Europeans’ attitudes towards security, Survey co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/arch ives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf 5 www.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterrorism-among-top-three-threats.aspx 6 This includes both public relations and strategic communication, but I do not go into definitional discussions about differences between these two concepts here.

REFERENCES Canel, M. J. & Sanders, K. (2010). Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks: Framing a Response to the 2004 Madrid Bombing and 2005 London Bombing. In Coombs, T. & Holladay, S. (Eds.) The Handbook of Crisis Communication (pp. 449–466). West Sussex: Blackwell. Crijns, H., Cauberghe, V. & Hudders, L. (2017). Terrorism Threat in Belgium: The Resilience of Belgian Citizens and the Protection of Governmental Reputation by Means of Communication. Public Relations Review, 43, pp. 219–234. Falkheimer, J. (2016). Digital Media and New Terrorism. In Coombs, T., Falkheimer, J., Heide, M. & Young, P. (Eds.) Strategic Communication, Social Media and Democracy: The Challenge of the Digital Naturals (pp. 143–152). London: Routledge. Falkheimer, J. & Olsson, E-K. (2014). Depoliticizing Terror: The News Framing of the Norway Terror Attacks 22nd of July 2011. Media, War and Conflict, 8(1), pp. 70–85. Gallup. (2016). https://news.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterrorism-among-top-three-threats.aspx Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing Public Relations. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Holbrook, D. (2014). Approaching Terrorist Public Relations Initatives. Public Relations Inquiry, 3(2), pp. 141–162. Jowett, G. & O’Donnell, V. (2012). Propaganda and Persuasion (5th edition). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Macnamara, J. (2016). The Continuing Convergence of Journalism and PR: New Insights for Ethical Practice From a Three-Country Study of Senior Practitioners. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(1), pp. 118–141. Matusitz, J. (2013). Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction. Los Angeles: Sage. Neumann, P. R. (2009). Old and New Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Norris, P., Kern, M. & Just, M. (2003). Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public. New York: Routledge. O´Shaughnessy, N. (1996). Social Propaganda and Social Marketing. European Journal of Marketing, 30(10–11), pp. 62–75. Picard, R. G. (1989). Press Relations of Terrorist Organizations. Public Relations Review, 15(4), pp. 12–23. Ranstorp, M. & Wilkinson, P. (2005). Introduction. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17(1–2), pp. 3–8. Richards, B. (2004). Terrorism and Public Relations. Public Relations Review, 30(2), pp. 169–176.

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Rothenberger, L. (2014). Terrorism as Strategic Communication. In Holtzhausen, D. & Zerfass, A (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication (pp. 481–496). London: Routledge. Schmid, A. P. & Graaf, J. de. (1982). Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media. London: Sage. Somerville, I. & Purcell, A. (2011). A history of Republican Public Relations in Northern Ireland from ‘Bloody Sunday’ to the Good Friday Agreement. Journal of Communication Management, 15(3), pp. 192–209. Tuman, J. (2010). Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2012). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. In Horgan, J. & Braddock, K. (Eds.) Terrorism Studies: A Reader (pp. 76–90). London: Routledge.

CHAPTER

17 The Global Public Relations of Failed States Greg Simons

States engage in global public relations for a multitude of reasons and motivations. In this chapter, global public relations is discussed in the context of a failed state’s communication with different foreign publics in order to meet a particular goal or objective. As such, it forms the intersection of public relations and public diplomacy. Global public relations may in general be a popular and somewhat common theme, where the emphasis often is on the powerful countries (such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China), but what is less common is the global public relations of other, lesser known or weaker, states (Freitag & Quesinberry Stokes, 2009). Given this lack of literature about the global public relations of less powerful states, this chapter explores the global public relations of failed states. There are a number of central questions that need to be posed in order to better visualize how and why global public relations campaigns are organized. What are the goals and objectives of a failed state when they engage in global public relations? How do they operationalize the programme? This chapter will initially engage in understanding global public relations. As this is about countries making use of global public relations, the connections to public diplomacy will also be explored. The topic will then shift to defining and explaining failed states, which will be the basis for understanding the possible motivations for them to use global public relations. Zimbabwe and North Korea will be used as two examples to illustrate how this communication looks in practice and why it takes

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place (in terms of strategic state goals). The results reveal a very diverse approaches and reasons for communicating. WHERE GLOBAL PR AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MEET In an era of globalization and mediatization, individual countries become much more accessible and observed by global media and publics. They are compared and contrasted with other countries in terms of their level of development, attractiveness, and policies that influence the construction of a national image, together with the perception and emotions of stakeholders that are created (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2015, p. 62). This has created an increasingly crowded marketplace of countries that have been vying and competing for attention by communicating to world publics that has rapidly increased with the end of the Cold War (Wang, 2006, p. 94). In terms of understanding global public relations, it is necessary to understand where the communicating entity is physically located and with which publics it must build relationships. This book defines the term Public Relations as the strategic communication that different types of organizations use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant publics many of whom are increasingly becoming culturally diverse. Communicators seek to pre-emptively have their voices heard (i.e. their interests) in cross-national settings (including in conflicts) through the cultivation of open lines of communication between them and global publics (to governments, business community, general public, and other groups, and individuals). As the demand and practice of public relations goes global, attempts have been made to understand and predict the process and its effects. The first section of this book has discussed the conceptual underpinnings of global public relations practice and scholarship and those are relevant to this chapter as well. Sriramesh (2010) contends that the 21st century is typified by the process of globalization, which has increased the importance and diversity of public relations (because of cross-national and cross-cultural aspects) that is conceived and practiced. At the same time, globalization has highlighted what he refers to as being the extreme ethnocentricity that currently exists in public relations practice and scholarship. This ethnocentricity also refers to the assumed identity of public relations, which is often perceived as being a form of communication that was conceived in the United States in the 20th century. However, it has been contended that public relations has a much longer and more diverse history as indicated, for example, in the Asian context (Sriramesh, 2004). These contentions posit that using a one-size-fits all approach in practice and research will lead to disastrous results. When researching and analyzing public relations within a global public relations setting, there is a need to take a more nuanced and considered approach appreciating the diversity that is the hallmark of a global analysis of any phenomenon. Within the sphere of global public relations, there are four functions that are of particular relevance to this chapter: 1) National identity and promotion; 2) managing corporate reputation; 3) crisis communication; and 4) communicating locally (Freitag & Quesinberry Stokes, 2009, pp. 97–99). With respect to this particular chapter, the function of interest is national identity and promotion. Within critical modernism, a certain dialectical tension exists, which is “the relationship between the traditionally modernist values of public relations and the possibility of critical modernism that questions the underlying assumptions of these very modernist values with the goal of illuminating the ideological biases of modernism” (Pal & Dutta, 2008, p. 173). This could be, for example, invoking the rights of a marginal state to “defend” itself against Western “colonialism” or military aggression. Thereby, the communications

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are aimed at revealing the existing contours of power, but at the same time attempting to create the opportunity of the communicator to step outside those contours. Sriramesh and Verčič stated that “the critical relationship between the mass media and public relations cannot be overstated” (2001, p. 111). Furthermore, Sriramesh (2010) proposed a framework of three factors that help us understand media culture in a society – media control that refers not only to media ownership but more importantly to the extent of editorial freedom in a particular media system; media access that measures the level of access to mass media by various segments of a society; and media outreach that refers to the level of diffusion of mass media in a particular society – media use and consumption by different segments of society. Access to the mass media – the ability to influence media content – whether directly or indirectly, is a crucial aspect in getting the message to the intended audiences. Mass media are understood as being instrumental in the social construction of reality. Two basic approaches to this research have been identified: the first focuses on the social construction of reality being a key aspect of the relationship between culture and society; and the next addresses the social construction of reality as a product of media effect (Adoni & Mane, 1984, p. 323). The second aspect is of interest and relevance to this chapter, especially the intended construction of a symbolic and subjective reality (Adoni & Mane, 1984, p. 332; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, Sasson, 1992). Because this chapter focuses on the public relations activities of failed states, a theoretical connection does exist with public diplomacy through the practice of foreign policy (L’Etang, 2009; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). But firstly, what is public diplomacy? A concise definition of function and intent is “public diplomacy [ … ] deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy” (Jowett & O’Donnell 2012, p. 287). In spite of a relative infancy in research that links public relations and public diplomacy, it has been noted that “the two disciplines share similar philosophical and practical dimensions.” Furthermore, those connections were particularly evident on “the topic of strategy with the government as a pivotal actor in conducting international public relations or engaging in political and socio-economic strategy, or designing messages aimed at improving a country’s image or engaging in brand or reputation strategies” (Vanc & Fitzpatrick, 2016, p. 436). It has been argued that on a functional level “PR is part of the practice of diplomacy responsible for international communications and media relations as well as cultural diplomacy, which aims to enhance personal relationships between representatives of the host and target countries” (L’Etang, 2009, p. 608). A term that unites the practices of global public relations and public diplomacy is the notion of negative public relations. Before defining the nature of this concept, it is necessary to state that this operates at two different levels. One of those informational levels is an externally imposed negative brand and/or reputation upon an entity, where emphasis is placed upon negative political, economic, and social factors. This imposition may be beyond the control of the entity being targeted as outside actors are driving and controlling those information flows. The other informational level is a consciously self-projected negative brand and/or reputation by an entity that directs those communications in order to attain an advantage in international relations. Negative public relations is a communicational mechanism that is intended to create relationships of fear and/or uncertainty between the target public and the communicator. If externally imposed, it could be used to try and restrict the operational and policy choices of the target country, but making them less attractive and reducing the possibility of empathy with the country in question and its leadership. At the

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same time, increasing the operational and policy choices of the communicator. This can be observed within the context of recent regime change operations (Simons & Chifu, 2017). When the negative public relations communications are self-projected, it can be an indicator of a defensive posture by the communicator. The intention is to create information flows that seem to elevate the perceived levels of uncertainty and risk, thereby enabling pathos through cultivating a sense of fear.1 This is contingent upon the intended audience “believing” a negative event scenario, which creates a negative relationship with the target audience based on a desire for aversion, which can be used as a means of leverage and bargaining by a state otherwise has little or nothing to bargain with. WHAT IS A FAILED STATE? An important first step when discussing the issue of failed and fragile states is the controversial nature of even the idea, let alone the definition. For those that accept the notion and existence of failed states there are some associated characteristics of the state that involves the disintegration of a political body to the very point where basic conditions for citizens and the responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function as they ideally should. This can include the inability of the state to provide public services and the state’s inability to interact with other states as a fully functioning member of the international community (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007; Newman, 2009; Rotberg, 2003).2 There is a negative stigma associated with being labeled a failed state. From a reputational perspective it can carry risks in attracting foreign investment, tourism, and while deterring security threats. Taking the above mentioned aspects into account, the following definition of a failed or failing state seems cogent to this chapter: A state in which the government is incapable of exercising its major functions, defending borders, or making key decisions. (Shiraev & Zubok, 2016, p. 155)

A number of different failed states have been identified, often signaled by a spectacular disintegration and collapse. Some of those that have gained recent media attention include Afghanistan, Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007; Newman, 2009, p. 427).3 However, there is no firm consensus on a definition of the term “failed state” and there are criticisms concerning the very validity of such a label. What are the objections and criticisms of the term “failed state” and its connotations? There is the issue of a lack of consensus on an exact and concise definition of the concept of “failed state” (Nay, 2013), which renders it vulnerable to being used arbitrarily (Call, 2008; Luke & Ó Tuathail, 1997), in a sensationalist manner or even as a “Western myth.”4 Others have been more critical of the term, referring to it as an enabling mechanism for military intervention by Western states in other countries (Nay, 2013, pp. 331–332; Verhoeven, 2009). Yet another set of critiques argues that there is an over-generalization in some cases of failed states, such as the turbulent area of North-West Pakistan where there is little government control versus the situation in the rest of the country (Lieven, 2011, pp. 19–21). While keeping these criticisms in mind, and assuming that a failed state does exist, it does present a number of problems and obstacles to overcome for such a state in an ever increasingly crowded global marketplace of state’s seeking attention through their global communications. Now to turn to the topic of applying how and why failed states employ

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global public relations campaigns, using the two country examples of Zimbabwe and North Korea. There are a number of reasons for choosing these two countries in particular, both of which, to some extent are controversial. Given that there are various other countries that are associated with being failed states, such as Afghanistan, or Somalia or even Iraq, why this choice? The motivation is several fold. Certainly there are aspects of North Korea and Zimbabwe that fit the failed state criteria, such as their inability or limited ability to ensure a fair and equitable standard of living for their citizens in the borders of the respective countries. A second point is the issue concerning the quality of governance (for example corruption capacity to deliver services to the public or authoritarianism), the safety and security of individual citizens (freedom of expression and the equitable application of rule of law), and the economic problems encountered by both of the countries perhaps exacerbated by international sanctions. However, both countries have governments that are in control of decision making, but this also means that they also possess the will and means for engaging in global public relations. THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OF TWO FAILED/FAILING STATES: ZIMBABWE AND NORTH KOREA This chapter discusses Zimbabwe’s and North Korea’s use of global public relations in order to meet state-directed goals and objectives. An initial point to be noted is that the international reputation of both contries are inextricably linked with the image and reputation of their leaders, Robert Mugabe and Kim Jong-un, respectively. Robert Mugabe rose to power in Zimbabwe after the process of decolonization in 1980 and he continues to rule the country at 93 years of age. He uses nationalism and coercion as a means to retain political power. For example, he modified Donald Trump’s slogan “America for Americans” to “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans.”5 Kim Jong-Un is more secretive as his birth date is understood to be somewhere from 1982–1984. He is often compared to his grandfather the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, the first leader of North Korea. When his father Kim Jong-Il died in 2011, Kim Jong-Un was declared the national leader and inherited the world’s fourth largest military.6 According to Reporters Without Borders 2017 index, Zimbabwe is ranked 128 and North Korea 180 (last place) in the Press Freedom ranking.7 Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press 2017 rate Zimbabwe as being 74/100 (not free)8 and North Korea at 98/100 (not free).9 These rankings are indicative of an extreme lack of freedom in the national media and information systems of the respective countries. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 ranked Zimbabwe at 154th place and North Korea at 174th place (out of 176).10 Such a situation has negative effects on the population, the functioning of the state and economy. According to The Economist’s Intelligence Unit, the Democracy Index of 2016 put Zimbabwe at 140th place and North Korea in last place at 167.11 These results are indicative of an unfree and non-democratic society in both cases, according to these international indices. Zimbabwe is a failed state using the definition adopted by this essay (Francios & Sud, 2006, p. 160) and North Korea is considered as being a failed/failing state (Call, 2008, p. 1491). North Korea is a country that has been called a failed state by some,

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but others do not classify as being one.12 At times, emotional, and not rational, reasons are given to justify placing North Korea in the failed state category. North Korea is the last Stalinist state, a one-man dictatorship that also joined the nuclear club in 2006. Kim Jong-un, the youngest son of Kim Jong-il, was declared as his father’s successor after the latter passed away. It is in essence a failed state trying to suppress its people. It could be called fascism in its worst form as there is no free opinion, people are murdered in case someone speaks out against the “Great Leader,” citizens are being watched at all times, everything is being censored and foreigners who enter the country are closely monitored and cannot speak with locals about what is going on in the country. Citizens are being told what to do, what to say and even what to wear at all times.13

There is certainly an issue that exists between labeling a state as failing or failed and an actual example, though there is certainly the aspect of reacting to a label regardless of whether it is factually true or not. Failed states, as any other states have definite reasons and motivations to communicate to the global public, they also face a number of constraints and restraints in doing so (tangible resources and an image/ reputation ‘problemʼ). There is a need to understand and recognize differences in assumptions of public relations practice and theory. Failure to do so potentially produces a number of negative effects. 1) Reduces the chances of the public relations lens in successfully understanding “how organisations in other cultures use communication to adapt their relationship with relevant publics.” 2) Limits the ability to use knowledge and practical experience from other cultures to inform our understanding of the practice of public relations (Botan, 1992, pp. 152–153). Such observations need to be kept in mind when dealing with such subjects of study as failed states. “Mainstream” Western, especially from the US and UK, practices and approaches are not the only manner of global public relations practice as other actors are present and active, but using different approaches and means to the problem of connecting with international publics. Zimbabwe One of the countries that provides a significant challenge for public relations practitioners is Zimbabwe. It is a country that makes the international news headlines for all of the wrong reasons – corruption, political violence including against any opposition to the status quo, hyper-inflation, empty shop shelves, and a seemingly endless list of state challenges and problems, which affects public perception and opinion of the country (Mugobo & Wakeham, 2014, p. 303). This is a country that is characterized as being on the verge of collapse or in the process of collapsing.14 It has endured numerous natural and manmade disasters. The country’s precarious situation means that it falls well within the stated criteria for determining a failed state. Given the poor international image of the country and the general lack of resources and capital to assist in developing it, a range of weaknesses and threats confront any communicator from the very outset. Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe were one of the few potential clients that Lord Timothy Bell (formerly of the PR firm Bell Pottinger Private) turned down a contract for bettering Zimbabwe’s image for being too controversial.15 This was not the sole controversy for global public relations firms in their dealings with the country. In 2008, the global marketing and advertising agency

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Young and Rubicam (Y&R) sold its stake in its Zimbabwean associate Imago Young and Rubicam following the involvement of the local associate in the election campaign of President Robert Mugabe.16 In general, there is a realization that the brand image of Zimbabwe needs effective management, through global public relations campaigns. In addition, the Zimbabwean government does not possess a monopoly on communicating the image of the country as there are activist groups that also communicate internationally – usually portraying the country as a failed state. In March 2009 the Zimbabwean government announced the need to communicate a rebranding of the country in order to attract foreign investors and international tourists as well as to retain qualified citizens (Hurombo, Muzondo, & Kaseke, 2014, p. 61). These priorities were subsequently confirmed at a later stage too. At a stakeholder’s consultative meeting on branding in Bulawayo, the senior principal director in the Office of the President and Cabinet Ambassador Mary Mubi noted that negative public attitude and perception had a bad effect on the Zimbabwean image. “Why manage the country’s image? We cannot afford to be isolated, we are a global player. That means countries are competing (to foster tourism, investment and enhancing exports).”17 The communication logic is simple: a more positive country image and brand will enable to country to attract a more positive image that will result in their ability to attract tourism, investment, and to boost trade. However, the Zimbabwean government does not possess a monopoly on the country’s national image. In 2002 an initiative was launched by a group named Save Zimbabwe PR Team. They approached a firm called Chelgate to launch a public relations campaign that targeted government abuses. “They explained the need for an international PR campaign addressing human rights abuses carried out by supporters of the ruling ZanuPF party in the country, and highlighting the plight of a population faced by starvation.”18 The campaign sought to spread information, material, and messages that sought to reduce any possible sense of legitimacy of Mugabe and his government in order to build international pressure on him to step down from office. Such campaigns tended to produce a counter-global public relations campaign that used the narrative latent colonialism and the interference of foreign Western governments in the affairs of the Zimbabwean state.19 This is an example of a defensive form of global public relations that is intended to try and protect or deflect any potential damage from an external global public relations campaign to weaken the incumbent political regime. The government of Zimbabwe has been launching communication campaigns with concrete goals and objectives, which were directed by the state too as opposed to opposition and/or activist groups. Between 2013–2014, a number of journal articles appeared on the topic of the government of Zimbabwe’s attempts to use global public relations as a means to rebrand itself as a destination for tourism (Hurombo, Muzondo & Kaseke, 2014; Mugobo & Wakeham, 2014; Ndlovu & Heath, 2013). Global public relations was used for rebranding the country as a tourist destination. The slogan “Africa’s Paradise” was compromised through a starkly contrasting existing counter-narrative of starvation and economic collapse that appeared in mass media content, which in 2011 was changed to “Zimbabwe: A World of Wonders” (Ndlovu & Heath, 2013, p. 948). The existing negative narrative needed to be compromised before a new projected “reality” could stand a chance of success. This seems to be an attempt to reshape the perceived relational experience of the communication, the earlier slogan

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was not sustainable owing to a significant gap in perception and expectation of the word of the communication and the deed of experience in the country. The motivations and potential rewards for the global public relations campaign to re-brand Zimbabwe are clear, and there is much at stake: In Zimbabwe, where tourism has been recognised as a tool for employment creation, poverty reduction, and economic well-being, rebranding the destination should result in positive business growth and profitability. (Ndlovu & Heath, 2013, p. 954)

Such observations have been confirmed by other studies, which place great emphasis on the need for weak or failed states to communicate effectively in the global arena in order to try and overcome their tangible challenges and obstacles (Hurombo, Muzondo & Kaseke, 2014; Mugobo & Wakeham, 2014). Emphasis and intention of the communication is therefore oriented towards projecting and generating a positive image in order to cultivate opportunities in a country that otherwise lacks potential. But, “the destination needs to achieve acceptance from the international community, based on changed economic and political conditions in the destination” (Ndlovu & Heath, 2013, p. 954). The intention of the administration’s global public relations is to project a more positive and attractive image of Zimbabwe as a country and a destination, and it is rooted in the notion of a positive emotional attraction. Chitiyo and Kibble (2014, pp. 18–20) noted that if Zimbabwe was to be successful in attracting investment, careful attention needed to be paid to two key things. One of those is nation brand, which is measured by external perceptions categories (such as exports, tourism and immigration, investment, governance and people, and competitive advantage). It also needs to adapt its business diplomacy to capitalize on any competitive advantage it possesses. As to whether the communications have been a success or not, it is a mixed bag. “Zimbabwe’s [nation brand] has improved significantly since 2008 but remains low even among its peers and there is much work that must be done to improve it and build local and external confidence” (Chitiyo & Kibble, 2014, p. 20). Tourism has certainly been a success story after the near collapse of the industry in 2009. Reports released by the Zimbabwean Tourism Authority reveal a trend, with 40, 518 tourist arrivals in 2009 (Tourism Trends, 2009, p. 12) and in 2015 there were 2, 056, 588 (Tourism Trends, 2015, p. 32). However, it has been more difficult to attract Direct Foreign Investment, especially when Zimbabwe was ranked 47th out of 52 African countries according to nation-brand competitiveness by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2013, by 2015 the ranking was 39th place (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015: 18). A long-term target of US$1 billion in Direct Foreign Investment (FDI) has been set by the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable SocioIn 2015, Zimbabwe attracted Economic Transformation (ZimAsset).20 US$421.2 million, however this figure dropped to US$294.66 million in 2016. Some of the critique that explains the decline in FDI referenced poor economic conditions, worsening relations with the West, and governance as contributing factors.21 In spite of the fact that Robert Mugabe has been toppled from power, Zimbabwe’s national interests remain the same, with a focus on stimulating the economy through such programmes as increasing tourism and encouraging direct foreign investment. The next country case uses a very different goals and global public relations strategy.

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North Korea Understanding North Korea’s attempts at joining the nuclear weapons club can be viewed as somewhat of a PR disaster, i.e. to create positive relationships with its intended target audience. Is it possible to understand from another perspective and point of view, whilst still using the PR lens to comprehend and explain the motivation to create communicational relationships to influence the intended policy outcomes? This notion contends that it is possible, although the logic and context need to be understood, which requires thinking outside the commonly conceived and practiced frameworks at times. North Korea not only delivers its communication in words, but also as actions, to the global audience. Cho (2017) also challenges the popular view that communication campaigns (although using the concept of nation branding) are intended for generating purely positive images (propaganda), and also using North Korea and its show of military strength and power as a case in point. Instead of referring to “positive” images, Cho argues that the process is about “added value” (2017, p. 2).22 The yardstick from which success is measured and conveyed is strength and power. This was seen in the opening of a new residential block in Pyongyang in the spring of 2017 by the North Korean Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju who declared “the completion of this street is more powerful than 100 nuclear warheads.” The intended message is that “North Korea still possesses economic power, despite international sanctions over its nuclear programme and the rising threat of military conflict with the US.”23 In general, North Korea has very little in terms of its ability to bargain with or negotiate in order to influence stronger military powers that may be hostile to it. Therefore, the logic to gain access to and use of nuclear weapons became that of a bargaining chip (Bradner, 2000), especially in the wake of the declaration by then US President George W Bush of the Axis of Evil during his State of the Union speech in 2002 that was soon followed by the US-led military operations to remove the leaders of different countries, starting with Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, an attempt was made Syria soon after and Cuba that has been a long-term target of regime change. At later stages Cuba, Libya, and Syria were added to the list.24 The Axis of Evil reference compelled China to issue a warning to the US not to pursue “actions that it may come to regret and for which there will be consequences” (Wu, 2005, p. 40). After the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, China issued a statement that called for a US withdrawal and a political settlement that took in to account Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.25 This seems to be symptomatic of a wider and long lasting war of words and threats between the US and North Korea (Howard, 2004). Rather than being seen as an example of “failed diplomacy” (Pritchard, 2007), from a North Korean perspective it could well be perceived as a “triumph” in of negative global public relations.26 North Korea’s motivation and logic for communications seems to be an attempt at camouflaging potential weaknesses (by distraction) and to reduce the likelihood of possible threats to the regime (namely a US-led military attack and regime change). There is a tendency for North Korea to portray its actions and intentions as being defensive and in response to threats posed by the United States and its allies. When the US aircraft carrier Carl Vinson was diverted when in the spring of 2017 in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests, North Korean media (such as the state news agency KCNA) carried this message, which was in turn carried by international media. “This goes to prove that the US’s reckless moves for invading the DPRK have

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reached a serious phase. [ … ] The DPRK is ready to react to any mode of war desired by the US.”27 The themes of blame and “reckless actions” appear in many public statements by North Korean officials in the media, such as threats of retaliation in the case of sanctions (characterized as being “reckless actions”),28 and the US as the “culprit” – “if war erupts, no matter who caused the pre-emptive strike, the United States will be held responsible.”29 This situation seems to allude to the intersecting of public relations and public diplomacy. There is a clear element of reactive global PR in North Korea, which is based on the above analysis. When the US announced in April 2017 that it would send a fleet to the area as a means of deterring any further North Korean “provocations,” the rapid response was to test launch a missile, which actually failed on launch, thereby undermining the credibility of the North Korean threat.30 Nuclear tests seem to be used as a public relations exercise in the negotiation process of North Korea’s international relations interests and priorities, such as an attempt to trade halting nuclear tests if the US and South Korea halt their joint military exercise.31 The timing of the tests is not coincidental and has a strong element of political symbolism in it, such as the launch of a missile in to the Sea of Japan at a time when US President Donald Trump was preparing to meet his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.32 The whole process is played out publicly in the mass media outlets that is readily seen by the general public and policy makers alike, where public opinion and perception can potentially influence and potentially restrict policy options. The credibility and effectiveness of the threat needs to be perceived as being real and likely in order to induce fear and uncertainty as to the scale and cost of any possible war (Howard, 2004, p. 825). Hence there needs to be an element of believability in the negative global PR message, which is supplied through media articles that confirm the threat as being real, such as in the Independent with the headline “Kim Jong Un ‘Would Nuke Los Angeles’ if his Rule was Threatened, North Korean Defector Reveals.”33 A long-term ally of North Korea, China has been steering a tricky path between US pressure and their support for the country. The rising tensions that take the form of a tit-for-tat exchange provoked a strong Chinese response from the Chinese Foreign Minister – “If they let war break out on the peninsula, they must shoulder that historical culpability and pay the corresponding price for this.”34 The reluctance of China to readily abandon their ally provides North Korea with some more bargaining power in their international relations communications and choices. Kim’s calling Trump “Dotard” versus Trump’s naming Kim as the “Rocket Man”35 exchanges between Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump tend to validate the thesis that this is good global negative PR as it puts North Korea at the center of world events and gives them much more influence and leverage than would otherwise be the case. Not to mention Trump is playing a losing rhetorical game by playing by their rules. This is seen in the nature of public opinion and perception in South Korea, which now begins to see the United States as being a significant security threat to their country. 70 per cent of respondents in South Korea saw US power and influence as being a major threat to the country,36 and this was before the war of words between Trump and Kim heated up. After Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea in his debut address to the United Nations General Assembly,37 which some noted as having “echos” of the Axis of Evil speech by George W Bush to Congress. Interesting, there are some commentators that note the use of caution by North Korea in their rhetoric as they leave themselves a way out of a situation of war that they

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cannot win,38 unlike Trump’s rhetoric that leaves him little room for compromise or manourve. The result was North Korea’s opportunity to characterize the United States as a military aggressor39 and Trump as being “mentally deranged.”40 Another result is Trump’s UN speech presented an opportunity for North Korea to broaden its military options as a means of “self-defence,”41 whilst the US was forced to react to events. At times the US message has become split, on the one hand referring to North Korea’s war claim as absurd42 and US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis saying that the US wanted a diplomatic end to the crisis in an attempt to tone down the rhetoric.43 At the same time as Trump is threatening to destroy an entire country. The net result is a greatly heightened sense of risk and fear created by the uncertainty created by such emotional rhetoric. A lot has happened in terms of the coercion, diplomacy, name calling used in the indirect and direct communications between the main actors of North Korea’s global public relations that makes use of nuclear weapons. The development of nuclear weapons was initially a strategy of survivial by the North Korean leadership, through deterring possible military attacks by the United States. The lesson of Iraq in 2003, seemed to convince North Korea of the need to develop an operational arsenal or face invasion and regime change. This situation has evolved, where North Korea found it had the ability to become a global player that had the ability to bring a superpower to the negotiating table in order to discuss “denuclearisation” of this arsenal. A result is that, if North Korea gave up its nuclear arsenal it risks its state security and global relevance, which is a massive sacrifice to make. CONCLUSION An apparent supposition of the current ethnocentric wisdom44 and convention exists that communications attempts are intended to creat a positive relationship between the messenger and the target audience. But, can the opposite be true, creating negative relationships based upon the projection of pathos (of fear, risk, and uncertainty) and the appearance of hard power? A different logic is at play, but still based upon attaining national goals and interests through the power of negative communications. This is greatly influenced by the nature of the political regime, the culture and identity of the country that is communicating as well as the media system. Activism is also an observable component at play here in these cases, both Mugabe and Kim have used violence to decimate their opponents, which reinforces the negative relationship with different stakeholders. An important aspect in carrying and delivering the communication to the publics are mass media outlets. Although the goals of the global public relations are different in the two case studies presented, the similarity between them is that this is a deliberate and conscious attempt by both North Korea and Zimbabwe to have their official interests and concerns relayed to international publics and challenge the standard international media narrative that transits a negative brand and reputation of the two countries. In terms of the relevance and application of the three concepts under media culture, both Zimbabwe and North Korea exercise strong domestic control of media content. However, this restriction does not apply within the context of international media for obvious reasons. This is more a question of media outreach, North Korea uses a dramatic use of words and deeds and Zimbabwe attempts to go with an attractive brand approach, the content is then carried by

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international media (the intention). Both countries have tried innovative means to capture the attention and coverage of the international press and their own means (through state news agencies, websites, or social media) to cultivate open lines of communication. The result concerns the media access component, to create a compelling story carried to a wide audience as possible. This message, if carried, becomes available to foreign governments and publics alike. A carry on effect is to influence global public attitudes on the formation and execution of their foreign policy. This gives a clear connection between the global public relations of North Korea and Zimbabwe and public diplomacy, which aims to influence the attitudes of international publics on the formation and execution of foreign policy. The nature and intent of the global public relations demonstrate great diversity in approach and intent. When looking at the nature and likely outcome of Zimbabwe’s communications, it appears to be an attempt by a country with many weaknesses and threats to try and re-join the world community by offering and projecting a positive message to the world public in order to attract. North Korea, on the other hand, takes an entirely different approach and intent. Instead of trying to attract the global publics, the attempt seems to be to repel them with messages of uncertainty and risk, which is used as a bargaining chip in international relations. In other words this is an attempt to remain isolated from the world community, the North Korean leader’s personal brand and image supports the image of uncertainty and risk. NOTES 1 A sense of fear is enabled when two conditions are simultaneously met: 1) the fear that something bad can happen, for example nuclear attack; and 2) that something negative can be personally experienced, “my” country can be attacked with nuclear weapons. 2 Failed States. (n. d.). Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failedstates.html 3 Fragile States Index 2016. (n. d.). Fund For Peace. Retrieved from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings2016 4 Ross, E. (June 28, 2013). Failed States are a Western Myth. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguar dian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/28/failed-states-western-myth-us-interests; Beehner, L. & Young, J. (July 17, 2012). The Failure of the Failed States Index. World Policy Blog. Retrieved from www. worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/07/17/failure-failed-states-index 5 Burke, J. (February 21, 2017). Robert Mugabe Marks 93rd Birthday With Praise for Donald Trump. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/21/robert-mugabe-93rd-birthdayzimbabwe-president-donald-trump 6 Szoldra, P. & Bondarenko, V. (April 18, 2017). How North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un, 33, Became One of the World’s Scariest Dictators. Business Insider. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com/kimjong-un-life-2016-9/#many-north-koreans-see-kim-jong-un-as-a-youthful-version-of-great-leader-kim-ilsung-7 7 Index Details: Data of Press Freedom Ranking 2017. (n. d.). Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table 8 Countries are ranked from 0 (best freedom) to 100 (worst freedom), according to indicators on the legal, political and economic environment by Freedom House. For more information please see https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-methodology. It should be noted that Freedom House is an “NGO” funded by the United States Government. Zimbabwe Profile 2017, Freedom House, Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/zimbabwe (accessed September 27, 2017). 9 North Korea Profile 2017, Freedom House, Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/2017/north-korea (accessed September 27, 2017). 10 Corruption Perception Index 2016. (January 25, 2017). Transparency International. Retrieved from www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

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11 Democracy Index 2016. (n. d.). Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from www.eiu.com/topic/democ racy-index 12 Pearson, J. (December 11, 2011). Why North Korea is not and Should not be Regarded as, a “Failed State”. CESRAN International. Retrieved from http://cesran.org/why-north-korea-is-notand-should-not-be-regarded-as-a-failed-state.html 13 Hatef. (April 18, 2012). North Korea: A failed state and the hegemony of the failed leaders. CNN Ireport. Retrieved from http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-777898 14 Zimbabwe Country Profile. (August 10, 2016). BBC News. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-14113249 15 Beckett, A. (December 9, 2013). Dodgy Regime? Unruly Protesters? Bell Pottinger Can Help. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/09/bell-pottinger-tim-bell-pr-interview; Guma, L. (March 17, 2008). Zimbabwe: International PR Firm Turned Down Mugabe Contract. All Africa. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200803172031.html 16 Ndlela, D. (June 23, 2008). Zimbabwe: Global Ad Agency Dumping Firm Over Mugabe Campaign?. Biz Community. Retrieved from www.bizcommunity.co.zw/Article/238/12/25708.html 17 Kazunga, O. (December 9, 2016). “Zimbabwe’s Brand Imaging Needs Proper Management to Lure Investors”. Chronicle. Retrieved from www.chronicle.co.zw/zimbabwes-brand-imaging-needs-proper-man agement-to-lure-investors/ 18 Hill, A. (January 31, 2003). Campaigns: Zimbabwe is Targeted Over Govt Abuses – Media Relations. PR Week. Retrieved from www.prweek.com/article/169526/campaigns-zimbabwe-targeted-govt-abuses— media-relations 19 Ayinde. (March 15, 2007). U.S. and Britain are Fuelling Violence in Zimbabwe. Africa Speaks. Retrieved from www.africaspeaks.com/articles/2007/1503.html 20 For more information on the strategy and economic blueprint refer to the following – www.theopc.gov. zw/index.php/zim-asset. 21 FDI to Zimbabwe Down 30 per cent to US$295 Million in 2016. (January 31, 2017). The Financial Gazette, Retrieved from www.financialgazette.co.zw/fdi-to-zimbabwe-down-30-percent-to-us295-millionin-2016/ (accessed September 27, 2017). 22 This is connected to the nation building process where the state seeks to gain domestic political legitimacy or foreign political recognition. 23 Kaiman, J. (April 13, 2017). Why a North Korean Leader Called a Gleaming New Neighbourhood “More Powerful Than 100 Nuclear Warheads”. LA Times. Retrieved from www.latimes.com/world/asia/ la-fg-north-korea-neighborhood-20170413-story.html 24 Gardner, F. (December 20, 2003). Who’s Who in the “Axis of Evil”. BBC News. Retrieved from http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1988810.stm 25 China’s Position on the US War in Iraq. (March 26, 2003). Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. Retrieved from www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhot spots/mideast/ylk/t537117.htm 26 “Negative” global PR is intended to reflect the intention to create and maintain a negative relationship between the messenger and the intended target audience through the projection of negative emotions, for example through the use of fear. 27 North Korea Vows Response to “Reckless” US Navy Move. (April 11, 2017). AFP in Space War. Retrieved from www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_vows_response_to_reckless_US_Navy_ move_999.html 28 Staff Writers. (April 4, 2017). North Korea Threatens to Hit Back Over Sanctions. AFP in Space War. Retrieved from www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_threatens_to_hit_back_over_sanctions_999. html 29 Shim, E. (April 6, 2017). North Korea Issues Warning to “Culprit” United States. UPI. Retrieved from www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/04/06/North-Korea-issues-warning-to-culprit-United-States/ 8471491509755/ 30 Sang-Hun, C., Sanger, D. & Broad, W. J. (April 15, 2017). North Korean Missile Launch Fails, and Show of Strength Fizzles. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/northkorea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_th_20170416&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781 31 Smith, D. (January 10, 2015). North Korea Will Suspend Nuclear Tests If US Calls Off South Korea Military Drills. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/north-korea-sus pend-nuclear-us-military-drills-south-korea 32 Sevastopulo, D. & Jung-a, S. (April 5, 2017). North Korea Fires Missile as Trump and Xi Prepare to Meet. Financial Times. Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/7d25f61c-1993-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87

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33 Sharman, J. (January 25, 2017). Kim Jong Un “Would Nuke Los Angeles” if his Rule was Threatened, North Korean Defector Reveals. Independent. Retrieved from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jong-unnuke-los-angeles-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-icbm-missiles-defector-us-leader-a7545011.html 34 Mullany, G., Buckley, C. & Sanger, D. E. (April 14, 2017). China Warns of “Storm Clouds Gathering” in US-North Korea Standoff. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/ world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear.html?emc=edit_th_20170415&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781 35 Chaitin, D. (September 21, 2017). “Dotard” Goes Viral After Kim Jong Un Disses Trump, The Washington Examiner, Retrieved from www.washingtonexaminer.com/dotard-goes-viral-after-kim-jong-undisses-trump/article/2635246 (accessed September 22, 2017). 36 Poushter, J. & Manevich, D., Pew Research Centre. (August 1, 2017). Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats, Retrieved from www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/glo bally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ (accessed September 27, 2017). 37 Manson, K., Sevastopulo, D. & Harris, B. (September 19, 2017). Trump Threatens to “Totally Destroy” North Korea, Financial Times, Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/a3487cbc-9d3b-11e7-9a864d5a475ba4c5 (accessed September 20, 2017). 38 Choe Sang-Hun. (September 26, 2017). Behind North Korea’s Bluster, Some See Caution, The New York Times, Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/asia/north-korea-war-donald-trump.html? emc=edit_th_20170927&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49872781 (accessed September 27, 2017). 39 Sevastopulo, D. & Manson, K. (September 25, 2017). North Korea Accuses Trump of Making Declaration of War, Financial Times, Retrieved from www.ft.com/content/f43863bc-a20e-11e7-9e4f7f5e6a7c98a2 (accessed September 26, 2017). 40 Kaiman, J. (September 21, 2017). Kim Jong Un Says “Mentally Deranged” Trump will “Pay Dearly” for Threat Against North Korea. LA Times. Retrieved from www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-north-koreakim-jong-un-trump-20170921-story.html (accessed September 22, 2017). 41 Gladstone, R. & Sanger, D. E. (September 25, 2017). North Korea Says it has the Right to Shoot Down US Warplanes. The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/asia/ trump-north-korea.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (accessed September 26, 2017). 42 Staff Writers. (September 26, 2017). US Labels N. Korea “War” Claim Absurd, as Pyongyang Boosts Defences, AFP in SpaceWar, Retrieved from www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_labels_N_Korea_war_clai m_absurd_as_Pyongyang_boosts_defences_999.html (accessed September 27, 2017). 43 Staff Writers. (September 26, 2017). US Wants Diplomatic End to N. Korea Crisis: Mattis, AFP in SpaceWar, Retrieved from www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_wants_diplomatic_end_to_N_Korea_crisis_ Mattis_999.html (accessed September 27, 2017). 44 “Ethnocentric wisdom” is in reference to the notion of a presumption of a standard “cookie cutter” approach to PR, which is especially exemplified by the development of its theory and practice in the US, and excluding or marginalising other “non-standard” practices and approaches.

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III Current Issues Relevant to Global Public Relations

CHAPTER

18 Internal Communication with a Global Perspective Ana Tkalac Verčič

Internal communication is a multidisciplinary field of practice and study. Positioned between public relations, human resource management, and marketing – it is simultaneously a part of various organizational functions while not being a part of any. Scholars have mostly researched it by using organizational and managerial theories (Thompkins, 1987), organizational communication (Goldhaber, 2002; Jablin & Putam, 1987; Jablin, Putnam, Roberts & Porter, 1987), organizational psychology (Drenth, Thierry, de Wolff, 1998; Lowenberg & Conrad, 1998) and in recent years – public relations (Men & Bowen, 2016; Ruck & Welch, 2012; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012; Welch, 2012). Today, the importance of internal communication is amplified by various changes in the business environment such as globalization, deregulation, and economic crises. Research shows an erosion of employee trust in organizational leadership all around the world (Coats, 2005; Jiang & Probst, 2015; Tanner, 2011). Additionally, massive employee reductions have greatly affected their level of loyalty towards their organizations (Tkalac Verčič, 2016). The concept of trusting your employers is becoming a thing of the past. For internal communication, in the organization, this means an increased need for sincere, two-way communication. High levels of differences in salaries between average employees and top management bring further problems. Finally, globalization, which has affected how organizations operate in different parts of the world, means new challenges for internal communication (Erkkila, 2010). Globalization in the marketplace means that internal communication in multicultural organizations must respect employees’ cultural profiles and adapt the organizational

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messages to effectively communicate with the global employee base (Apud & ApudMartinez, 2008). As same authors state “Global organizations that are best able to reconcile and leverage cultural differences will acquire noticeable advantages in the marketplace” (para. 3). Additionally, technology which helps bridge geographical distances and connects markets and organizations brings new issues into the mix (Mitić, Nikolić, Jankov, Vukonjanski & Terek, 2017). Even though internal communication has gained importance as a discipline it has “yet to establish a clear raison d’etre.” (Helsby, 2002, p. 3). To grow, the function needs to establish clearer links with business objectives and have a stronger focus on strategy instead of tools (Helsby, 2002). WHAT DOES INTERNAL COMMUNICATION MEAN? Communication in organizations represents transfer of information, ideas, attitudes, and emotions from one person to the other person or group, most often with the intention of modifying behavior (Bahtijarević-Šiber & Sikavica, 2001). It involves different aspects of receiving and sharing information and in this respect, represents one of the basic activities of organizational management, significant for organizational success (George & Jones, 2006; Robbins & Judge, 2007). Communication is an important element of communication effectiveness (Dickson, Rainey & Hargie, 2003; Hargie & Tourish, 1993; Robson & Tourish, 2005; Ruck, Welch & Menara, 2017; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). Internal communication is repeatedly identified as a part of communication practice that is growing in significance (Zerfass, Tench, Verhoeven, Verčič & Moreno, 2010; Welch, 2012). It creates and maintains communication systems between employers and employees. Communication with employees begins before they join the organization and continues after they leave it. Even though the terms employee communication and internal communication are often used as synonyms, authors have underlined the difference in scope of those two areas (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). Kalla (2005) describes internal communication as an integrated function of four different disciplines: business communication, organizational communication, management communication, and corporate communication: “Internal communication is defined as integrated internal communication, i.e. all formal and informal communication taking place internally at all levels of an organisation” (p. 304). These four disciplines include not only classical employee relations and the technical corporate communication function but also efficient knowledge sharing, the creation of motivation and security, and the development of managersʼ communication skills and capabilities (Friedl, 2009; Kalla, 2005). According to Broom and Sha (2013), internal communication has four main purposes. Primarily, it is used to acculturate employees and help them understand the values of an organization. It is in-charge of helping employees be informed about all the important news in the organization. Additionally, employee communication should be used for listening and through that gaining a better understanding of its employees. Finally, internal communication should be used for fostering interpersonal communication among employees. Both globalization and new technologies drastically affect how all of these purposes occur. Communication should be two-way so that employees can freely participate in the exchange of information. A Delphi study of European internal communication experts (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012) showed that managers believe that internal communication should motivate employees and, through this, create value for the

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organization. We concluded that internal communication primarily includes an exchange of information among organizational members in order to create understanding. Further, we found that globalization has extended the boundaries of organizations beyond national political borders and thus created a heterogeneous workforce that calls for crosscultural communication – a complex process. The definition of internal communication needs to reflect this reality. Only when cross-cultural parameters of internal communication are set will it get the recognition as an independent domain that it seeks. WITHIN WHICH ACADEMIC AREA (AND HOW) IS IT MEASURED? Empirical research in applied communication shows that internal communication is one of the five key responsibilities in public relations practice (Lurati, Aldyukhov, Dixius & Reinhold, 2010; Swerling, Sen, Bonefeste & Rezvan, 2009; Zerfass, Tench, Verhoeven, Verčič & Moreno, 2010). Internal communication is becoming one of the most significant areas in corporate communications (Quirke, 2008; Smyth & Mounter, 2008; Wright, 2009). Internal communication experts agreed that management and psychological theories were most useful in internal communication, with some of them naming language studies, media studies, and marketing (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). Most of the respondents stated that internal communication belongs in communication studies but with a great influence of management and human resource theories. The methodology of internal communication measurement therefore stems mostly from these academic disciplines. Organizations should monitor their internal communication since their success depends on employees’ abilities to exchange information (Downs & Adrian, 2004). Even though a lack of communication is not the only reason for organizational problems, Hargie and Tourish (2002) underline that various organizational difficulties could be avoided with better organizational communication policies. Globalization underlines this problem with people from different cultures interacting and exchanging information in ways not typical for their own culture. This makes it especially important to assess how well people are communicating internally (Downs & Adrian, 2004). THE OUTCOMES OF GOOD VERSUS BAD INTERNAL COMMUNICATION Robson and Tourish (2005) claim there is significant evidence that connects internal communication and a higher chance of organizational success. Hargie and Tourish (2002) conclude that an increase in internal communication quality brings a series of useful organizational outcomes. Quinn and Hargie (2004) agree that the key value of good organizational communication is the relationships organizations have and through that it is a part of organizational efficiency. Dickson et al. (2003) claim that there are numerous studies which connect an improvement in communication practices and various positive organizational outcomes. In their analysis Clampitt and Downs (1993) determine that good internal communication leads to increased productivity, reduced absenteeism, led to higher quality of services and products, increased the level of innovation, and resulted in fewer strikes and thereby a reduction in total expenses for the organization. Snyder and Morris (1984a) prove that two communication variables – the quality of communication with superiors and exchange of information with peers – positively correlated with some measures of total organizational success. On the other hand, bad organizational communication led to a number of negative consequences. For example, when people work in isolation or share only a minimum of information,

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positive change is slowed (Hargie & Tourish, 2002). Hargie and Tourish (2002) also found that a lower quality of interdepartmental communication creates a feeling of isolation and dissatisfaction and through that correlates with lower levels of involvement in the process of decision making. This also means that insufficient information exchange leads to insecurity and increases alienation. According to Welch (2012), internal communication supports effectiveness with contributions to internal relationships and with improving communication among employees and senior managers. If successful, internal communication can promote awareness of threats and opportunities and increase understanding. It can, however, also pose a threat when communication is poor. As Hargie and Tourish (2002) conclude, the globally competitive economic climate underlines the importance of organizations applying positive communication policies which will in turn ensure significant competitive benefits. WHERE DOES INTERNAL COMMUNICATION BELONG IN THE ORGANIZATION? It seems there is a lot of confusion among top management when it comes to the position that internal communication should have in the organization. Occasionally it is perceived only as a messaging service. On the other hand, some see is it as key change agent that can help organizations with various issues (Helsby, 2002). In organizational practice, there are different versions of internal communication organizational positioning. Organizations are often confused on which function should “own” internal communication (Helsby, 2002). As in scholarship, numerous functions claim internal communication practice such as human resource management, change management, organizational development, marketing, management, corporate strategy, public relations, and corporate communications (Tkalac Verčič, 2016). The position of internal communication within an organization is determined by the size of the organization, its culture, management style, financial resources, employee characteristics, organizational expectations, and changes in the organizational environment. The research by Helsby (2002) indicated that internal communication is mostly located in communications departments, which is the preference of most practitioners who believe “that the role can be both disadvantaged and under-exploited if it sits in either HR or marketing.” (p. 3). The internal communication manager can report to the human resources manager, corporate communications manager, or directly to the CEO. However, in practice, there are “few if any directors of internal communication sitting alongside the other directors in the boardroom” (Smith & Mounter, 2008, p. 13). Most internal communication practitioners are not awarded management status and report to corporate communications or (slightly less often) to human resource management. According to some scholars of marketing, internal communication is a part of a wider, internal marketing concept, since internal marketing covers all contacts with internal stakeholders. However, in practice, this is rarely true. Often, internal communication departments are better informed about customers, than about employees. Internal communication based on marketing principles should be the key to creating strong psychological contracts between employees and their organizations and should be responsible for promoting the brand to internal publics (Sinčić Ćorić & Pološki Vokić, 2009). Our Delphi study (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012) revealed that European internal communication experts believed in the importance of strong connections between internal communication departments with human resource management, marketing, and change management. However, internal communication

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should be a part of corporate communication departments, positioned high enough in the organizational structure, for best organizational results. WHAT ARE THE KEY CHANNELS OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATION? Valuable communication depends upon choosing an adequate message and sending it in formats convenient to employees. Employees have expectations and these will influence how they evaluate internal communication (Cameron & McCollum, 1993; Welch, 2012). During the last few years, the environment of internal communication has significantly changed, mostly under the influence of new technologies. Modern organizations use a range of channels to reach their internal audiences – from traditional, face-to-face communication to printed publications, electronic media, and social networks. All internal media – print, electronic, and face-to-face – can be effective if the media used are considered acceptable and appropriate by employees (Welch, 2011). Since channels vary in level of complexity, formality, cost, and capacity, it is essential that the organization and its management consider the needs and preferences of employees, resources, speed of data transfer, sender goals, and message and receiver characteristics in choosing the best channels to reach internal publics. Internal communication departments have to modify their communication media to address messages in different cultures (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). Key factors for success in multicultural internal communication include professional cultural competence, responsive and proactive circumstantial or environmental perspective, and understanding of the internal communication media environment (Molleda, 2008). NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION AND EMPLOYER BRANDS For organizations around the world, their attractiveness, profitability, and future operations depend on their willingness to put employees first and recognize them as the most important stakeholders for organizational development (Aggerholm, Andersen & Thomsen, 2011). This underlines the importance of concepts such as engagement, reputation, and employer branding. Engagement is frequently used as the umbrella term that encompasses organizational efforts to involve stakeholders in organizational activities and decisions. It is also often interchanged with involvement and dialogue (Lewis, Hamfel & Richardson, 2001). Internal communication is the key part of organizational context in promoting employee engagement (Bakker, Albrecht & Leiter, 2011). In public relations, the focus on relationship management has led to using engagement as the new paradigm within which organizations try to integrate, interact, and collaborate, with their stakeholders (Edelman, 2008; Taylor & Kent, 2014; Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017). Open and effective communication strategies played an important role in engagement (Welch, 2012). Communication experts often use engagement as the measure with which they estimate their stakeholder’s experiences in connection with cognitive and behavioral consequences which can help the organization’s bottom line (Jiang, Luo & Kulemeka, 2016). Engagement is most frequently linked with organizational behavior and studies focused on employee engagement (Brodie, Hollebeek, Juric & Ilic, 2011; Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017). Even though Welch (2011) saw employee engagement being in the domain of internal communication, the relationship between specific dimensions of

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internal communication satisfaction and employee engagement is rarely explored (Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). Internal communication has the biggest potential in transferring organizational values to employees thus engaging them into accepting organizational goals (Bindl & Parker, 2010; Pugh & Dietz, 2008; Wiley, Kowske & Herman, 2010). In modern global organizations engaged employees represent a competitive advantage (Macey & Schneider, 2008). Ruck and Welch (2012) have shown how employee engagement depends on robust internal communication and how organizations which have better internal communication have a four times higher chance of having engaged employees. We explored this relationship further (Tkalac Verčič & Pološki Vokić, 2017) and found that internal communication was one of the bases for employee engagement. Specifically, internal communication satisfaction was significantly related to, and affected, the level of employee engagement. So, it seems undeniable that internal communication can increase engagement through enabling communication perceived as appropriate by employees. This can only be accomplished with an insight into employee views (Welch, 2012). When it comes to reputation, most authors agree that it is a combination of the internal and external perceptions of an organization (Balmer & Gray, 1999; Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Gummesson, 2002; Tkalac Verčič & Verčič, 2007). Corporate reputation is important for corporate success (Kay, 2004, according to Martin, 2009). Some authors believe that reputation is an aggregation of identity and image (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & van Riel, 1997). From this perspective communication directed toward internal publics is vital in reputation management (Ahmed & Rafiq, 2002; Tkalac Verčič & Verčič, 2007). The concept of employer brand is also closely connected to reputation (Ruiz, García & Revilla, 2016), occasionally as a protector of it (Burke, Martin & Cooper, 2011). Academic research aimed at exploring reputation and employer brands shows a certain overlap on the conceptual, methodological, and empirical level (Hendriks, 2016). Exploring the area of corporate reputation and employer branding is a promising area for public relations research, particularly when centered on internal communication. If public relations experts decide to claim the area of reputation management, it is necessary for them to understand how strategic policies and communications can shape the quality of the different factors that build reputation (Tkalac Verčič & Sinčić Ćorić, 2018). GLOBAL INTERNAL COMMUNICATION Internal communication has additional challenges when examined from a cultural context (Smith, 2013). We have strongly suggested a revised view of what constitutes an organization (Tkalac Verčič, Verčič & Sriramesh, 2012). The view of the world as a global village suggests that both boundaries and characteristics of organizations are changing. This new order implies an increasingly cross-national and cross-cultural internal communication department. This is why the discussion on the impact of culture on internal communication is ever more important. New technologies add to this complexity in which global communication has to be consistent internally and externally (Gură u, 2008). Various structural decisions have an impact on the way internal communication is managed and coordinated (Neill & Jiang, 2017). On the other side, internal communication departments across the world are quite similar. They all strive to communicate the organization’s culture, vision and mission to their employees, and facilitate communication between management and employees by opening lines of communication (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). However, cultural differences do play a significant role

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in how those internal communication departments are managed (Neill & Jiang, 2017), since patterns in message coding, perception, and response types are culturally bound. Cross-cultural awareness can be developed through expanding it from a monocultural team to a cross-cultural internal communication council with representatives from organizations key regions. This approach is more effective in multicultural organizations through translating the message by meaning instead of translating it by language (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). In an increasingly globalized world it is quite easy to make a mistake of interacting and communicating with all cultures the same way (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009). For instance, the role of language (Louhiala-Salminen & Kankaanranta, 2012) is vital for the functioning of an organization and its internal communication department. To successfully manage internal communication in different cultural contexts it seems necessary to recognize cultural diversity without judging it and to try and avoid cultural blindness which ignores differences among cultural identities (Adler, 2002). But the relationship fostered by the internal communication department should build a strong bond with all employees across transnational environments (Neill & Jiang, 2017). The key to effective cross-cultural internal communication is to develop cross-cultural competence within the internal communication department, to make the team aware of the effect of culture on their work and to ultimately develop knowledge and skills designed specifically for an internal multicultural communication team. (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008)

Understanding internal communication in an organization includes understanding its culture (Broom & Sha, 2013). Sriramesh and Verčič state “communication influences and is influenced by culture” (2009, p. 9). In the same way, internal communication is inseparable from culture. Internal communication definitely has the potential to spread to all parts of organizations. Its responsibility is increasing with the number of messages employees have to process. It can only grow through building skills which help in consulting the top management. Through this internal communication has an opportunity to become a strategic business discipline (Helsby, 2002). However, it is necessary for internal communication professionals to conquer the challenge of serving multifaceted communication needs in increasingly complex organizations and among very diverse employees (Welch, 2012). “In a way, internal communication departments can become the driver for harnessing the power of cultural synergy within a global corporation” (Apud & Apud-Martinez, 2008). REFERENCES Adler, N. J. (2002). International dimensions of organizational behavior. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western. Aggerholm, H., Andersen, S. E., & Thomsen, C. (2011). Conceptualizing employer branding in sustainable organizations. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 16(2), 105–123. Ahmed, P. K., & Rafiq, M. (2002). Internal marketing: Tools and concepts for customer-focused management. Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann. Apud, S., & Apud-Martinez, T. (2008). Effective internal communication in global organizations. Retrieved from www.iabc.com/effective-internal-communication-in-global-organizations/ Bahtijarević-Šiber i Sikavica (ur.). (2001). Leksikon menedžmenta. Zagreb: Masmedia. Bakker, A. B., Albrecht, S. L., & Leiter, M. P. (2011). Key questions regarding work engagement. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 20(1), 4–28.

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CHAPTER

19 Global Interdependence and Risks Management and Communication Robert L. Heath

Risk management and communication are timeless aspects of human existence, and therefore have become increasingly relevant to global interdependence. Groups’ (bands and tribes) abilities to identify, avoid, or mitigate risks historically accounted for their resilient survival and prosperity. The history of humans is one of dealing with each other, as interests collide and relationships flounder over what constitutes risk and how it should influence individual and collective behavior (Heath & McComas, 2015). Historically, survival has often depended on the ability to identify and respond strategically to dangerous animals, climate effects, bacteria, and viruses. Some dangerous animals were also a source of food, but killing them often required skill and teamwork. Because of their biological nature and extended contact with children who lack sufficient risk defenses, women were often at high risk. Changes in weather (climate even) could produce abundance or starvation. Travel, especially migration, could be dangerous because bands and tribes encountered were not necessarily willing to share resources. Even if a new group was welcomed, it could fall into a trap. For these essential reasons, culture, as defined and discussed in the first part of this volume, is risk-centric. Through cultural transmission, humans have used narratives to hand survival lore on to subsequent generations. Elders told tales of great hunters, great hunts, and skilled offensive and defensive strategies needed to be safe. Those moves became part of the stories that offered instructional narratives for subsequent generations to follow. Elders told tales of “others” to warn listeners about them or to be alert to seek them as allies. Group narratives developed to specify which clans could marry into which other clans so as to avoid inbreeding. Whether to create ordered, normative behavior or explain existence, narratives have long accounted for 205

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the unknown, the spiritual. Origin stories were not matters of fantasy or curiosity, but of risk management. They were normative, and helped people to know as best they could the forces of uncertainty. They addressed not only origin, but afterlife. Stories described virtues useful for personal and group survival. Great heroes and heroines served the group, but often asked for loyalty in return. Places such as religious centers (churches and temples) were set aside for cultural instruction. This introduction based on details about early human existence sets up the discussion of modern global risk interdependence because what was featured above (even in prehistory) is not different in nature and purpose from today except in scope. As discussed in the introduction to this volume and in Part I, humans are far more interdependent and interpenetrating today than they were when they painted cave ceilings in what is today’s northern Spain and southern France. As a band, they might stand threateningly at the bank of their side of a river in prehistory to scare away intruders. Today, similarly, the regime in North Korea says, “We will be taken seriously. We will test weapons. We learned by example that shows of weakness and willingness to denuclearize lead to regime change.” When immigrants entered the United States in the late nineteenth and up to the mid-twentieth century at Ellis Island in New York, medical screening sorted the healthy ones who were let into the country from the unhealthy who were sent back. Books such as 1491 (Mann, 2011, see also, 2012) describe the cultures of indigenous peoples in the Americas before they were interrupted and even destroyed by explorers from Europe. However problematic global risk management and communication had been before the great age of European exploration, it dramatically changed the dynamics of global interdependence. Even before that sequence of events, there had been centuries of regional contact, exploration, trade, disease exchanges, war, shared invention, and utter destruction. As is demonstrated by trans-boundary terrorism, global transmission of disease, or migration of organisms that harm food production (such as that which affects banana production), risk is a global matter. So, global issues of risk management and communication are timeless and relevant to today. To help us understand these matters, this chapter draws on discussions of the nature of risk management and communication that feature four major streams of risk analysis. Using this discussion of risk, the chapter features risk management and communication as public relations challenges and uses three risk cases to demonstrate the operant interpenetrations of uncertainties, harms, interests, and well-being. Researchers over the past six decades have developed and used these analytical means to investigate the dynamics and dimensions of global risk in the attempt to help people to be safer and healthier. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DYNAMICS AND DIMENSIONS OF RISK Peoples are globally interdependent (interpenetrating) and variously at risk often by what some do in the presence of others and to one another. As always, some risks are created by others (e.g., terrorism); some are self-inflicted (e.g., substance abuse). Risk is always about uncertainty, the predictability of risk manifestation, magnitude of harm (or benefit), and the effect on those that are harmed. Risks are often asymmetrical. What benefits some may harm others, or others may be blamed for harms that befall some. Risk assessment is variously pragmatic and moral. What is done (by some or many) to understand risk, mitigate risk, or amplify risk – that is a matter of pragmatic risk functionality. Is risk evenly distributed across communities, do benefits balance or offset harms, and are parties responsible for risks accommodative and engaged with others in ways that advance fully functioning societies? That is the moral dimension.

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On this latter point, analysis presented in this chapter reasons that the ability of societies to understand, manage, and communicate about risk is indivisible from their ability to function fully (Heath, 2006; Heath & O’Hair, 2009). The quality of community, and society, is inseparable from individuals’ ability to address, mitigate, benefit from, and engage one another over citizens’ right to safety, health, equal treatment and benefit, and environmental quality (Heath & Palenchar, 2009). Such matters are timeless discussions of science-based pragmatism, coupled to morality: Religion, spirituality, and risk democracy. Traditionally, discussions of risk management and communication acknowledge how these matters are multi-dimensional, multi-layered, polyvocal, and multi-textual. That principle is featured in the three cases below which analyze global interdependency and champion the need for collaborative engagement. To elaborate, many illustrations can be used to emphasize risk multi-dimensionality. Cancer treatment, including surgery, can subject the human body to extreme exposure to toxic chemicals and radiation which may heal or only prolong suffering. Many factors/dimensions lead to and result from complex interactions in such diagnosis, treatment, and etiology, as well as communication about such matters and the concomitant efforts to make enlightened choices. And, the cause of the cancer can be exposure to harmful substances (such as asbestos spikes, chemicals in tobacco, and viruses encountered through sexual contact). As such, risk management and communication address core issues regardless of the kind of risk, conditions that foster or mitigate it, or contexts in which it occurs. One issue centers on how safe is safe (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). That universal question demands that sound science and moral philosophy are needed to determine the likelihood that a risk event will occur, under what conditions, to affect what populations, and in what ways that satisfy or offend moral preferences. Is driving 20 mph in a school zone (while not being distracted) sufficiently cautious to keep from harming a child, for instance? If a population is assured that some chemical or GMO will cause “acceptable” risks, how truly “acceptable is acceptable?” That guideline presumes that absolute safety is unlikely and therefore sufficient (relative and precautionary) safety is the rule. Of related interest is the question: How fair is safe (Rayner & Cantor, 1987)? The gist of that question is complex, including the matter of whether the rewards of risk are greater than the harms (e.g., motherhood and chemical manufacturing). Another perspective of fairness is whether some population is harmed by a risk or whether the standard of safety is skewed (biased) against a population by factors such as race, gender, age, or income – or a combination of all. Some risks are naturally skewed in terms of fairness, such as by gender or age. The young and the old are often more easily harmed than other populations. Women incur risks of childbirth quite differently than men. Before turning to the discussion of the four dominant streams of risk management and communication theory, two points need to be made. The first is particularly relevant to the past three decades of public relations and risk communication research. This point grows out of, and refines, the preference for symmetrical, dialogic (rather than monologic), two-way communication. Risk discourse is better when it is dialogic and two-way or multi-way (multi-vocal, multi-textual). However, very effective risk communication can be one-way, even prescriptive and threatening (including the imposition of law such as requiring pet owners to vaccinate pets and quarantine sick ones). One-way communication, for instance, is best when residents are strategically told to evacuate or to shelter-inplace as a hurricane or typhoon approaches. Community response efficacy depends on

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people’s knowing what response to a risk’s manifestation is correct/preferred and what signal triggers the preferred response (such as a siren, weather alert, or telephone/online alert to shelter-in-place). When severe weather threatens, a city’s mayor may tell citizens to evacuate and warn those who do not do so to write their social security or driver’s license number on their arm so their body can be identified. If a chemical release occurs in a community with major petrochemical facilities, local citizens are instructed to shelter-inplace. In Australia, apps allow one swimmer (or bystander) to alert others virtually in real time when a white shark has been spotted, for instance. All of this communication option avoids having to debate what might be the best response when an event is upon us. Second, the quality of risk communication is measured in many ways, but one of the most important is the extent to which such communication increases (before, during, and after an event) response efficacy. Response efficacy (a sense that knowing and doing the right action to be safe) is likely to increase in direct proportion to expert efficacy (judgment of experts), individual efficacy (knowing what to do and being able to do it), and community efficacy (knowing how the community is supposed to respond and trusting that will happen). Roberto et al. (2009) summarized insights into the extended parallel process model which reasons that efficacy mitigates dysfunctional communication, assessment, and response. Industries that create risks (and by extrapolation communities where risks occur and from which they may benefit) gain legitimacy to the extent that risk generators are known to engage in reflective management, build trust, and use pre-crisis communication to increase community response efficacy (Heath & Lee, 2016). Relationships in risk management and communication are highly complex, multidimensional, and multi-layered. One relationship factor identified by Kasperson (1992, 1988)) focuses on how a risk becomes amplified by media coverage, by what media and reporters/commentators say, how much it is covered, and how it is cross-covered. Similar concerns exist when communicating across international borders or across cultures (Kasperson, & Stallen, 1991). Borders and cultures bring up questions regarding (safety/fairness) in regard to the levels of risk tolerance, the attitudes toward risk cost/ reward ratios, and which population are harmed or benefited. If people on one side of a national border benefit from the industrial use of a river’s water, they may evaluate the risk and communicate about it differently than people across the border who happen to be downstream and may suffer contamination. Not only does the latter group not enjoy any of the benefits that accrue to those upstream, but they may suffer the harms. A classic example of this cost/reward imbalance occurred centuries ago; bodies of plague victims often were placed in rivers, thereby passing the risk to citizens living downstream. Cross-border conflict can lead to hostilities – or aligned interests and coordinated decision making. Risk management and communication relationships presuppose that how they are modeled cannot be limited to a one-organization/one-public relationship. The modeled relationship is better defined as multi-stakeholder and multi-stake-seeker. Stakes are rewards and other resources that are held or sought as empowering. So, each organization has many relationships – those with its stakeholders/stake-seekers (Ss). They in turn have their own complex relationships, and so forth. It is best to presume multiple organizations (Os). Thus, and this is imperative for global risk issues, the model is best stated as OsSsRs: multiple organizations, with multiple stakeholders/seekers, with multiple relationships (Heath, 2013). This may be best explained in terms of the complex relationships and global interdependencies of the World Health Organization. By combing these factors, a model of risk governance can be imagined (Fra Paleo, 2015), which necessarily presumes a global perspective. Risks, their benefits and harms,

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affect people with indifference to national/state boundaries. The key is to focus on interests, rather than borders, as interests can stop at, or cross, borders. If we assume that stakeholding is related to interests, we can affirm that stakes (whether powerful or trivial) can be, and are, employed as expressions of interests. Thus, in the case of Ebola, people within communities and across boundaries had co-defined interests, stakes, and competing as well as compatible approaches to risk governance. Cultures, communication, and risk management traditions, concerns, reflective management, and response efficacy all come to the fore when interests collide and people collaborate in the face of risk manifestation. As organizational and textual layers, how well do the parties involved in the risk governance of Ebola work together to minimize individual, group, national, and crossborder risks? Is the governance effort to manage the issues related to the risks such that communities work together or fight with one another? Do communication practices socially amplify risks, or set them in proper proportion based on sound science, moral/cultural judgement regarding the dramaturgical relationship between risk bearers, bearers’ advocates, generators, arbiters, and informers (Palmlund, 1992, 2009)? One way to conceptually bring these dimensions of risk management and communication into perspective is to understand the cross-model implications of four approaches to global interdependence. FOUR PARADIGMS: STREAMS OF THE DISCIPLINE With little direct coordination and without a single theoretical focus, four paradigms emerged over recent decades to give scope and purpose to the study and implementation of risk management and communication. These discussions originated in response to iconic events and key challenges, whether for instance the methyl isocyanate (MIC) release in Bhopal, India, or the near disaster at the nuclear generating facility at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, or at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. Even global impact epidemics originate with local focus, and only become matters of global interest once important populations or major countries/economies are threatened; SARS, Ebola, AIDS, and malaria have long had global health implications as Zika is having today. Such health problems occur at international and local levels. Locally, Zika is associated with health experiences (standing water and no screens on windows) of poor people but it also migrates on the wings of mosquitoes. Global risk occurs when local risks are elevated by and become global risks. Each of the dominant four research orientations is affected by key factors of one another. The four are interdependent, but each features a unique set of variables and concerns. Each is influenced by dialogic and discursive approaches to the co-creation of meaning relevant to the principle of deliberative democracy. The overarching challenge is to build communication infrastructures that are sufficiently robust and collaborative to achieve maximal individual, expert, and community efficacy. Psychodemographic Assessments/Preferences This paradigm of risk studies grew out of psychological and sociological assessment of the factors that affect individuals’ (or groups’) risk assessment and raise or lower their risk tolerance. Typical of such research, Fischhoff et al. (1978; see also, Slovic, 1987) found that experts base their risk perspectives on science-based probabilities of harm, even fatality, while lay people’s evaluations are based more on the perceived

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characteristics of the hazard. One demographic characteristic is that women tend to be less risk tolerant than men especially when a risk is based on exposure to a technology (such as chemicals or radiation) and/or related to children’s health and safety. Long lists of risk assessment factors came from such analysis, including the perceived degree of control (personal or expert), the affected population (including children, the elderly, and even animals), and whether the risk impact is slow in developing (such as cancer) or its onset is more rapid (such as exposure to a deadly virus such as Ebola – four to six days). This paradigm explains risk perception preferences, including fairness. As much as this approach discusses biases as to what types of individuals think about risks, it also focuses attention on how biased assessments confound risk management and communication. For instance, elites often think that what affects them is serious, but what affects poor people, and especially those that are poor and of color (for instance) is less serious. Recent events, assessments, and mitigations in Flint, Michigan regarding lead levels in drinking water demonstrate such dysfunctional bias. The Flint case resulted from decisions by Michigan state officials. To save money, they switched city domestic water sources to the Flint River. Previously, Flint’s water had come from Detroit which obtained it from Lake Huron. The Flint River is notorious for its lack of cleanliness. The switch occurred in 2014, and by 2016, high levels of corrosiveness were detected by industrial facilities such as General Motors (Flint River water is highly corrosive) and by public health officials. By a series of official mistakes and misjudgments, citizens drank contaminated water. The water caused lead in pipes to make its way to citizens. A local physician, Mona Hanna-Attisha discovered elevated levels of lead, especially in children. Flint’s population believed it was not well served by state officials because it is primarily poor and African-American. Sound Science Paradigm Medical and epidemiological research attempts to identify the root causes of risk occurrence, affected populations, conditions of amplification and mitigation, and such. The mental models approach (MMA) presumes that sound science creates a decision platform based on unbiased, scientific assessments of the causes, effects, and mitigations of specific types of risk. Morgan et al. (2002) offered one of the most insightful explanations of this paradigm. It starts with scientific assessment of a risk’s likelihood, and then extends analysis to the cause, impact, and the most responsible response to risk. It uses science to define the level of risk, the entities most likely to be benefited or harmed, and what should be done, by whom, and in what way to mitigate and/or prevent risk or its impact. The starting point for risk communication, according to this paradigm, is to seek to understand what experts think and then to use facts and reasoning to move the assessments of targeted populations to concur with judgments based on sound science. Critical Risk Assessment and Communication Paradigm Anthropologist Douglas (1992) noted that cultural biases affect risk assessment, management, and communication not out of ignorance but as matters of personal empowerment. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, Beck (1992) could argue that modern society had become a risk society, especially addressing how people were increasingly exposed to technical risks associated with capitalistic industry. Douglas, Beck and Rayner (e.g., Tansey & Raymer, 2009) have argued that people’s perceptions and value judgments cannot be slighted in the assessment, management, and communication of risk.

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This critical perspective reasons that cultures change as people (especially elites) see advantages to themselves and to society through dramatic changes, such as industrialism. So, one culture argues that the benefits of industrialism are such that they justify the risks, especially since those risks are born by lower income people, who may be migrants and/or minorities such as people of color. Without rejecting the role of science, the critical perspective seeks to peel back layers of accommodative culture to ask whose science and whose interests are driving risk assessment, management, and communication. Thus, for years (and even at times currently) miners in the USA were told that companies did not compensate workers for health damage, bodily harm, or death because they knew the risks when they agreed to join this dangerous work for pay. Similarly, around the globe, workers in high-risk contexts are exploited, and even enslaved to serve others’ economic benefits. As much as critics condemn such cultural exploitation, it is predictable that cultures develop strategies to pay respect, even homage, to workers who risk their health and lives to provide for their families and to the economy. Soldiers are given medals. Mothers are given a day of honor. Hegemonies twist and turn in strange ways as communities critically critique and adjust to risk. INFRASTRUCTURAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION PARADIGM This paradigm seeks to embrace and integrate the other paradigms. It champions the role of discourse and places/arenas (physical and metaphorical) where assessment, management, and communication practices and obligations are discussed as matters of risk governance (see Heath & O’Hair, 2009; McComas, 2014; Renn, 2009, 2014). Terms such as transparency, authenticity, reflection, and respect become important to the viability of infrastructures. This paradigm favors dialogic, discursive forces that lead to effective factvetting and decision-making institutions and co-created meanings that arise from risk democracy. In association, voices of various experts and policy makers along with individual risk bearers must be brought together to create systems and forge shared perspectives that appropriately assess, mitigate, and respond to risks that may be unevenly borne throughout any community or larger society. This paradigm reasons that individual, expert, and community efficacy are focal points for determining whether a community is properly organized to plan and communicate about various risks in ways that make it resilient. Public hearings are essential. Community input is imperative. This model presumes that experts, community leaders, and concerned citizens need places and means by which to achieve wise assessments, policies, and actions regarding risks. As much as it would seem that these four paradigms, based on substantial amounts of research and theoretical investigation, could inform successful global risk management and communication, they also point to the exact places, factors, and interests that lead to failure. To further explore those paradoxes, and to emphasize the multi-dimensionality, multilayeredness, polyvocal nature, and multi-textuality of risks, the next section focuses on three trans-national cases: Climate Change, Public Health, and Chemical Risk Exposure. THREE GLOBAL CASES: CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND RISK EXPOSURE Climate Change Discussions of climate change began by observation (expert and lay-public), data gathering, and policy recommendation. That’s the process, but perception/assessment, culture,

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interests, and infrastructures become supportive and confounding factors. Matters regarding the nature, extent, causes, and impact of global warming are not only a matter of scientific inquiry, but heavily connected to industrial processes and reputations, marketing, politics (layered from global to community levels), and fraught with cultural implications. Such implications become layered when companies (certainly industries) have more wealth and power than countries and peoples who may contribute to, but also suffer from, the greatest amount of climate change impact. Texts of such matters become a tangle of scientific jargon and methodologies, data gathering capabilities, credibility, concurrence, complex probabilistic analysis, and power/ knowledge influences. Competing texts can attribute climate change causes to developing nations, sovereignty, profitability, and even cultural/religious interpretations. As such, rising temperatures can be judged to be the result of CO2 (resulting from human activities), industrial/non-industrial sources, natural sources, related matters – such as deforestation, and even the will of God. In the case of climate change, then, voices present texts based on science, that counter science, and even denigrate it. Texts claim that conclusions (scientific and non-scientific) regarding climate change are based on hoax, anti-industrial critiques, advocacy for alternative fuel (solar and natural gas versus coal), bad-science, agenda-science, and on and on. Industrial interests claim that climate science kills jobs. Critics of science point out that it is based on probabilistic assessment of data (which can be generated to prove a point) rather than precise assessment of causality. Politically, the root cause is actions by “others,” but the harms of mitigation fall on “us.” International trade is a key text that leads to blame-placing and argument ground-shifting. In the absence of overarching scientific and public policy (government and quasigovernmental agencies) organizations, individual countries, and key members of the scientific community have advocated the development of alliances as infrastructures. In lieu of other global coordination on climate change, the United Nations seeks to exert leadership direction and coordination. This action was a partial confirmation of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 which was partially enacted in 2005 to set emission limit standards. Failure to participate, agree, and meet the standards was governed more by national will than penalties (stakes) for ignoring or flaunting the agreement. Next, the Copenhagen Agreement called delegates to the 15th session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to Paris in 2015. Merely participating in this discussion was challenged, and politicized. Critics assured that the outcomes were not binding and did not commit participating countries to specific actions. In Paris, 197 countries agreed to standards that could abate greenhouse gases, such as holding the increase of average temperature to below 2 degree C rise above pre-industrial levels. As of October 2017, 168 of the 197 signatories had ratified the Paris protocol with the United States famously withdrawing from it under an administration that avowedly is against globalization. The integration of such layered efforts is limited by national (industry within and across nations) pressures to appear more agreeable than is likely the case. Political wrangles occur within nations which invariably compromise global efforts to understand and abate climate change. Large corporations, primarily those based on hydrocarbons, play a vital role, and they are global in their presence and effect. Of the paradigms noted above, all offer insights into the struggles of risk management and communication on climate change. Science points out how interdependent and layered events and processes add to global temperatures and CO2 totals and averages. As science wrestles with the multi-dimensionality of the factors that are alleged

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to warm the climate, so too textuality is multi-dimensional and multi-layered. It is the product of many voices in varying degrees of discord as to cause, effect, liability, and corrective policy. Textuality offers a grand example of the challenges of risk governance which test the limits of language to parse the twists and turns of cause, effect, and responsibility. Global risk management and communication currently have no better example of the discourse processes and normative functions of management and communication than that of climate change. People within and across boundaries perceive and attribute the nature of the problem and its causes differently. Rich nations see their economic prosperity to be in peril if harsh measures are agreed to and implemented. Rich countries and global industries generate the most debate by contesting the accuracy of the data and its probabilistic implications. Poor nations lack scientific data, power/knowledge influence, but often have more moral discourse appeals. For instance, it is expected that eleven low-lying islands in the South Pacific might disappear because of rising sea levels. Also, coastal residents, many of whom depend on the seas, are likely to suffer because of rising sea levels, as are many species and corals because of warming of oceans. Critical assessments as well as scientific debates look for infrastructures of risk governance, which are tentative at best and substantially fragile to the task of bringing sound science to public policy. Public Health (Bacteria and Virus) In recent years, attention continues to focus on public health challenges such as malaria, which are prehistoric. Risk harms disproportionately accrue to poor, darker skinned humans, and to animals (such as chickens) on which they rely for sustenance. At the global level, the World Health Organization is one of the key players, as are several foundations, NGOs, and even nations that are not directly affected. However, in such matters, industrial activity often gives rich nations incentives to do more for public health in poor nations than simple charity would suggest. For instance, diseases in Africa (Ebola, malaria, Marburg hemorrhagic fever), in rural China and other Asian regions (SARS, swine flu, and avian flu), and elsewhere affect commercial processes. For instance, employees and their families in the oil and gas industry are exposed as they live in, and travel to and from, African nations. Respiratory diseases can travel across the globe at the speed of jet flights and affect national and local public health resources. A person who became infected with SARS at a wedding reception in Hong Kong traveled to Canada, thereby infecting a new region. One irony of such risk management responses is the fact that government officials (as Governor Christie did when he quarantined a nurse who had worked with Ebola patients) and the general population stigmatized Canadian health providers who worked with SARS patients and then could not acquire childcare which was needed to allow them to work. Many national health policy groups (such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, Health Canada – Global Public Health Intelligence Network), foundations, and NGOs monitor bacterial and viral infections, study them, develop containment protocols, refine diagnostic techniques and protocols, and seek cures. As discussed above, some of these diseases fit well into the perceptual/psychodemographic profile. They may disproportionately harm children and older people. They even affect health workers which leads to tensions regarding how those workers need to behave, whether they should be quarantined, for instance, and what protocols and protective gear are needed for safe contact with victims. Battles over Ebola quarantine protocols occurred in the US when

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two health care workers became infected while attending patients. Some were required to quarantine when they returned to the USA after providing medical care – a matter that became a political hot potato when government officials differed with the medical community on safety procedures. Risk Exposure (toxic and Hazardous Chemical/Manufacturing Processes) The modern era of chemical risk monitoring and management began with the MIC release in Bhopal, India, in 1984. Union Carbide India Limited was a subsidiary of the principal based in the USA. The reason for the release is contested ranging from slack management and poor maintenance of storage facilities, poor training of local staff about the risks in storing the toxic chemicals, to sabotage. Risk assessment experts claimed that the manufacturing process used for holding manufactured MIC prior to using it for canned pesticides was unsafe. Because that same process was used in communities in Texas and West Virginia, a chemical exposure risk came home to roost. Such events led activists to lobby for the Risk Management Plan (RMP) which required chemical manufacturers (individual plants and clusters of plants) to create and report worst case scenarios. That led to the creation of the Responsible Care effort (first adopted in Canada, then imported to the USA and now used across the globe by company members of the trade association, American Chemistry Council) by which improved operating and communication standards were developed and implemented to protect industry from severe regulation and communities from exposure to harmful chemicals. Communities had the right to know which chemicals were stored and transported near residents. The chemical manufacturing industry developed material data safety sheets (MSDS) that reported the name, nature, precautions, and exposure responses to specific chemicals. Such sheets were used locally and globally as a means for standardizing chemical warnings that could guide, for instance, emergency response efforts. Shipments of chemical include such sheets. Each cargo vessel, for instance, is labeled to alert emergency responders as to what chemicals were contained in it. Since these sheets include handling and response protocols, emergency response teams anywhere in the world can know how to respond in the safest manner. Such codes were placed on trucks and train cars that transport chemicals so that first-responders could easily identify the chemicals being hauled in the event of an accident, spill, or explosion. MSDS’s have been communication battlegrounds if first-responders or citizens allege that they were unclear or misleading. The industry worried that they could be used in litigation as an a priori acknowledgement of responsibility. Activist groups obtained MSDS forms and uncovered reports of chemicals manufactured in specific locations. In the USA, they posted the chemicals by zip code; thus, concerned citizens could use computers to learn about the chemicals that were manufactured, stored, and transported in their communities. Because most chemical manufacturing companies are headquartered and/or operate in the USA, and in Europe, but also operate in the rest of the world, protocols developed in the USA spread across the globe. As these protocols developed in the USA, they were applauded as risk democracy, communities’ right to know, ask questions, and voice concerns. Nerdy engineers and safety experts of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) are charged with investigating fires, explosions, and other releases of chemicals. Investigations are designed to identify and remediate engineering, manufacturing, and operating flaws in the name of increased

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safety. Reports by such investigative boards (replicated around the globe) are intended to protect the safety and health of people and other living things. Such boards are part of, and create, infrastructures where risks are investigated and policies are improved. They apply sound science in their investigations, but are cognizant of the psychodemographic sensitivities that are relevant to risk event mitigation. For instance, they recognize the importance of community emergency response protocols that educate children, parents, and school officials on shelter-in-place procedures. Communities where chemical manufacturing occurs understands that zero risk management is unlikely so safety response protocols are needed. That judgment is sensitive to the critical approach to risk assessment, management, and communication. In such communities, public meetings are routinely scheduled and conducted in ways that require plant facility managers and their safety experts to report on incidents, note the root causes of such incidents, the corrective measures taken, and the response protocols implemented. However cynical one may be, reflecting critical and cultural approaches to risk management and communication, these citizen advisory meetings are clearly implemented in the spirit of risk democracy and aligned-interest risk governance. CONCLUSIONS Over the past 60 years (largely starting with worries about atomic energy and asbestos) substantial amounts of sound science, critical judgment, sensitivity to lay publics’ idiosyncratic assessment, and commitment to fully functioning risk communication infrastructures have occurred. Such matters press into an unholy alliance, progress, profit, safety, and critical hostility that calls for ever higher standards of corporate social responsibility. During such battles, issues are debated to address how safe is safe, and how fair is safe. Litigation, legislation, and regulation battles often demonstrate how misaligned interests can be. But through reflective communication practices and management philosophies, safety remains important in a world that can seem troublingly unsafe. That point, in this context, ignores other topics such as asymmetrical war, invasion, terrorism, technologies, genetically modified organizations, drought, starvation, and myriad other risks to public health. As is often the case, matters of clarity, credibility and understanding are particularly important criteria for the judgment of qualitatively better or inferior risk management and communication. However, outcomes are also vital sources of criteria. Safety and well-being are two. Others include efficacy: individual, expert, community, and response. Another criterion is resilience, the will and ability to recover from the impact of a risk occurrence. REFERENCES Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London, UK: Sage. Douglas, M. (1992). Risk and blame. London, UK: Routledge. Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe enough? A psychometric study of attitudes toward technological risks and benefits. Policy Sciences, 9, 127–152. Fra Paleo, U. (Ed.) (2015). Risk governance: The articulation of hazard, politics and etiology. Dordrecht: Springer. Heath, R. L. (2006). Onward into more fog: Thoughts on public relations’ research directions. Journal of Public Relations Research, 18, 93–114.

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Heath, R. L. (2013). The journey to understand and champion OPR takes many roads, some not yet well traveled. Public Relations Review, 39, 426–431. Heath, R. L., & Lee, J. (2016). Chemical manufacturing and refining industry legitimacy: Reflective management, trust, precrisis communication to achieve community efficacy. Risk Analysis, 36, 1108–1124. Heath, R. L., & McComas, K. (2015). Interest, interest, whose interest is at risk? Risk governance, issues management and the fully functioning society. In U. Fra Paleo (Ed.), Risk governance: The articulation of hazard, politics and etiology (pp. 117–134). Dordrecht: Springer. Heath, R. L., & O’Hair, H. D. (Eds.) (2009). Handbook of risk and crisis communication. New York, NY: Routledge. Heath, R. L., & Palenchar, M. J. (2009). Strategic issues management (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Kasperson, R. E. (1992). The social amplification of risk: Progress in developing an integrative framework. In S. Krimsky & D. Golding (Eds.), Social theories of risk (pp. 153–178). Westport, CT: Praeger. Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. S., Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, J. X., & Ratick, S. (1988). The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk Analysis, 8, 177–187. Kasperson, R. E., & Stallen, P. J. M. (Eds.) (1991). Communicating risks to the public: International perspectives. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Mann, C. C. (2011). 1491: New revelations of the Americas before Columbus (2nd ed.). New York: Vintage Books. Mann, C. C. (2012). 1493: Uncovering the new world Columbus created. New York: Vintage Books. McComas, K. A. (2014). Perspective on “Four Questions for Risk Communication”. Journal of Risk Research, 17, 1273–1276. Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A., & Atman, C. J. (2002). Risk communication: A mental models approach. UK: Cambridge University Press. Palmlund, I. (1992). Social drama and risk evaluation. In S. Krimsky & D. Golding (Eds.), Social theories of risk (pp. 197–212). Westport, CT: Praeger. Palmlund, I. (2009). Risk and social dramaturgy. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 192–204). New York: Routledge. Rayner, S., & Cantor, R. (1987). How fair is safe enough? The cultural approach to societal technology choice. Risk Analysis, 7, 3–13. Renn, O. (2009). Risk communication: Insights and requirements for designing successful communication programs on health and environmental hazards. In R. L Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 80–98). New York: Routledge. Renn, O. (2014). Four quesitons for risk communication: A response to Roger Kasperson. Journal of Risk Research, 17, 1277–1281. Roberto A. J., Goodall, C. E., & Witte K. (2009). Raising the alarm and calming fears: Perceived threat and efficacy during risk and crisis. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 285–301). New York: Routledge. Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 230, 280–285. Tansey, J., & Raymer, S. (2009). Cultural theory and risk. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 53–79). New York, NY: Routledge.

CHAPTER

20 Global Crisis Communication W. Timothy Coombs An-Sofie Claeys

INTRODUCTION The past decades there has been an increasing interest within the field of public relations in crisis communication. This research interest has led to the development of theories such as Image Repair Theory (Benoit, 1995) and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007). These theories have received broad recognition and inspired a large amount of empirical studies worldwide (Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010). However, most of the research that led to these theories and resulted from them is rooted in the United States (Luoma-aho, Moreno, & Verhoeven, 2017). Those studies that do apply these theories elsewhere are usually situated in other Western cultures. Several researchers have therefore argued that more research is needed to examine whether or not the crisis communication guidelines and strategies from these theories are applicable to nonWestern, for instance Asian, societies (e.g., Huang, Wu, & Cheng, 2016; Lee, 2004; Lyu, 2012). Given the need for more insight regarding the global effects of crises and crisis communication, this chapter offers a brief review of crisis communication research in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This allows us to examine how the research domain has developed in each region and what differences in crisis communication and the impact of crises have been established so far. Based on this overview, we can conclude which elements need to be taken into account when attempting to apply crisis communication theories globally. However, more research is needed because

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existing global crisis communication research sometimes lacks nuance. Therefore, we will offer suggestions for both theory and practice with regard to global crisis communication. CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN THE U.S. Crisis communication began to emerge as an identifiable sub-field of public relations in the 1980s. This is when practitioners and academic researchers began writing and talking about crisis communication consistently. The early writings were basically lists of what to do and what not to do in a crisis. In the 1990s, theories for crisis communication began to emerge (Coombs, 2014). The U.S. crisis communication literature has been dominated by Image Repair/Restoration Theory (IRT) and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). These theories serve as the guides for the review of U.S. crisis communication research. Both theories are organizational-centric in that they consider how managers in organizations can, and should, use communication during a crisis. Furthermore, the outcomes used to assess effectiveness are related to organizational concerns such as reputation and purchase intention. IRT evolved primarily from work in rhetoric mixed with research from account analysis. The list of crisis response strategies identified in IRT is still the most comprehensive and thoughtful in crisis communication. IRT holds that communication is goal directed and a primary goal in a crisis is to protect the organization’s reputation. Moreover, there is only a need to engage is crisis communication when there is an unfavorable situation (crisis) and the organization is held responsible for that situation (Benoit, 1995). People often confuse being organizational-centric with a sender perspective but the two are not isomorphic. IRT does have a sender perspective with a focus on management communicating to stakeholders. IRT relies heavily upon rhetorical case studies to identify how crisis response strategies were used and to speculate on the effects of those crisis response strategies on the organization and its stakeholders (e.g., Brinson & Benoit, 1999). SCCT draws upon the crisis response strategies of IRT but is driven by Attribution Theory, hence is a cognitive-based approach to crisis communication rather than a rhetorical approach. SCCT is concerned with the cognitions and emotions generated by crisis situations and how crisis communication can both affect and be affected by those cognitions and emotions. Attributions of crisis responsibility are the cognitions at the core of SCCT. The amount of responsibility stakeholders attribute to an organization affects stakeholder perceptions of the organization (reputation), behaviors toward the organization, affect toward the organization, and which crisis response strategies should be most effective in that crisis situation (Coombs, 2007). While centering on the organizational response, SCCT is guided by how stakeholders (the receivers) are interpreting the crisis and crisis communication rather than being focused on the sender’s perspective. For instance, SCCT holds that crises are a result of stakeholder perceptions and the theory attempts to understand how stakeholders react to crisis communication efforts. SCCT’s cognitive orientation is the reason the research is predominantly experimental. Various studies have sought to verify if key variables in SCCT are related as identified in the theory (Coombs, 2007) and to establish cause and effect relationships between crisis responses and stakeholder reactions (perceptions, behaviors, and affect) (Ma & Zhan, 2016). SCCT holds that any crisis that creates victims, stakeholders

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adversely affected by the crisis, must engage in instructing and adjusting information. Instructing information tells stakeholders how to protect themselves physically from a crisis while adjusting information helps people to cope psychologically with a crisis (Sturges, 1994). Instructing information would include evacuation warnings, and recall announcements. Adjusting information includes expression of sympathy, counseling, corrective action to prevent a repeat of the crisis, details about the crisis itself, and reimburse of expenses related to the crisis (Holladay, 2009). SCCT prescribes that crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility require only instructing and adjusting information while crises with high attributions of crisis responsibility would benefit from the addition of an apology and/or compensation. The experimental studies have generally supported the recommendations of SCCT (Ma & Zhan, 2016). Researchers have critiqued both IRT and SCCT for ignoring culture (Dhanesh & Sriramesh, in press). Both theories were developed in the U.S. to help account for reputational concerns and crisis communication in a U.S. environment, hence culture was not a part of their original conceptualization. The theories never sought to dismiss or deny culture. Moreover, both theories have recognized the value of adding culture when people seek to apply the theories outside of the U.S. or similar contexts (Coombs, 2014; Wen, Yu & Benoit, 2012). IRT and SCCT are national theories of crisis communication that reflect their country of origin. Any national theory will need adaptation and require the consideration of culture when people seek to use it as an international theory of crisis communication. CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE Because most crisis communication theories have originated in the U.S. (Luoma-aho et al., 2017), several case studies have examined whether or not these theories can be generalized to a European context. A number of case studies has, for instance, shown that politicians confronted with sex-related scandals in the U.S. and Europe should use different approaches in order to safeguard their reputation. While former U.S. President Bill Clinton eventually managed to restore his reputation damage through an emotional apology in the Lewinsky scandal, Dominique Strauss-Kahn could not satisfy the French public with a similar response whereas Silvio Berlusconi’s defensive reaction did seem to be sufficient for the Italian public (Garcia, 2011; Xifra, 2012). These political case studies offer a first indication that the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies varies across cultures (Xifra, 2012). One explanation that has been offered is the dominant media system in the country in which a crisis occurs. According to Garcia (2011), Italy belongs to the Mediterranean Model where media are considered a means of ideological expression. In the U.S., however, the media are part of the free market and journalists have a tradition of investigative reporting techniques and an emphasis on scandal. Given the fact that the media are often the ones to determine the way in which crises are framed (cf. Coombs, 2007), the public’s perception of a crisis can strongly vary between cultures with different media systems and traditions. A second element that may explain why people from different countries will respond differently to crises and crisis communication are Hofstede’s (1985) cultural dimensions. People are considered to develop a specific mentality during their childhood that is shaped by their culture (Garcia, 2011). This mentality is expressed through the dominant values of a culture, which can differ in terms of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism and masculinity (Hofstede, 1985).

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Italy belongs to the group of high-power distance cultures, whereas the U.S. are characterized by low power distance (Garcia, 2011). The consequence is that scandals involving persons in power are simply what is expected in countries like Italy. People in the U.S. feel they have the right to challenge authority. Therefore mortification and corrective action are more feasible in this context. The importance of power distance and uncertainty avoidance was also stressed in a case study of the European CocaCola crisis in 1999 (Taylor, 2000). The American company initially claimed that Belgian school children that felt ill after drinking Coca Cola had been influenced by mass hysteria. Even though the crisis indeed appeared to be a case of mass hysteria, this corporate response backfired in European countries that score high on uncertainty avoidance (i.e. Belgium, France, and Spain). These countries fear the unexpected, are low risk taking, and have a concern for safety and explicit rules. As such, each of these countries reacted very strongly to the alleged tainting. In addition, the initial lack of response by Coca-Cola’s CEO was perceived negatively by these nations because in high-power distance nations people tend not to trust those in power. Another case study compared Denmark to the Arab World (Gaither & Curtin, 2008). When a Danish newspaper published cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 2005, Danish food company Arla Foods saw an end to its rapid growth in the Middle East. Many of the crisis messages offered by Arla Foods to Arab consumers appeared ineffective. An explanation may be that the Arab World ranks higher in power distance than Denmark and is more collectivist in nature. Besides the role of the media and the cultural dimensions that determine the public’s response to crises, other elements will also affect the impact of an international crisis. These factors, however, may be more difficult to grasp or to predict. A study in 43 European countries has shown that there are many crisis situations and reactions all over Europe and these differ greatly by region (Verhoeven, Tench, Zerfass, Moreno, & Verčič, 2014). A comparison between Finland and Spain shows a number of differences in how crises are perceived, which crises occur more or less frequently and which reactions are offered in response to a crisis (Luoma-aho et al., 2017). Explanations for these findings were sought in the trusting nature of Finns, the value they attach to honesty, the amount of corruption in Spain, etc. This offers an indication that adapting crisis communication to specific countries may not be as easy as simply estimating how each country scores in terms of uncertainty avoidance or power distance. Specific background knowledge of a country, its habits, its current affairs, and its past may be necessary to manage a crisis appropriately. This is consistent with Sriramesh & Verčič (2009) advice to consider infrastructural ingredients for understanding international public relations. CRISIS COMMUNICATION IN ASIA Even though non-Western cultures are no longer ignored in crisis communication studies, research taking the West as a context and the U.S. in particular still dominates the field (Lyu, 2012). A growing number of studies therefore examine crisis communication in an Asian context in order to investigate how crisis communication occurs and plays out in non-Western cultures (e.g., Dhanesh & Sriramesh, 2016; Huang, Lin, & Su, 2005; Huang et al., 2016; Lee, 2004; Pang, Jin, & Ho, 2016; Zhou & Shin, 2017). One of these studies illustrates two notable differences between Hong Kong consumers and findings from research in a Western context (Lee, 2004). First, Hong Kong consumers seem more accepting toward a no-comment response,

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whereas no comment is considered not done in most Western crisis communication guidelines. This is confirmed by a content analysis of 93 academic journal articles about crisis communication in three Chinese societies (i.e. Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) which concludes that no comment is a strategy that is often used in Asia, along with overall attempts to cover crises up (Huang et al., 2016). Second, when comparing three rather accommodative strategies (i.e. apology, compensation and corrective action), the compensation response had a more positive effect on Hong Kong participants than the apology response. Asian consumers may consider an apology too much as a routine and ritualistic behavior because it is commonly used in their society. A third interesting element in Asian crisis communication appears to be that justification is a very popular strategy (Huang, 2006). Justification implies that although an organization in crisis is indeed responsible for the event, the standards being used by its accusers to evaluate the impact of the crisis are not appropriate. The frequent use of justification in China has been related to the fact that Chinese culture is characterized by a high-contextual and indirect communication style (Huang et al., 2016). This may also explain why Chinese organizations will be more inclined to use strategic ambiguity in their crisis communication and why they will avoid the use of “extreme” tactics such as attacking accusers or apologizing to the public. A survey of public relations and public affairs managers from Taiwan additionally revealed the use of a crisis communication strategy that has not been discussed in Western crisis communication studies, namely diversion (Huang et al, 2005). Diversion entails showing regards while not apologizing, differentiating, and creating a new issue. The use of this strategy is another indication that the use of strategic ambiguity is striking in an Asian context. The importance of strategic ambiguity is not surprising because Chinese people emphasize interpersonal relationships and therefore might tend to avoid direct confrontation (Huang et al., 2005). A number of other explanations for why the effects of crises and crisis communication might differ between Asian and Western societies have been discussed in the literature. With regard to Hofstede’s (1985) cultural dimensions, the collectivistic nature of Asian societies is considered most crucial in understanding how crisis communication affects these publics (Huang et al., 2016). As a consequence, mainland China tends to take up the collective interest when making decisions, especially when these concern the national government. While these cultural dimensions have received fairly little attention in Asian crisis communication research, it seems worth exploring further. Besides the collectivist nature of Asian countries as an explanation for differences with Western crisis communication, differences between specific Asian countries have also been found. A different response to the melamine-tainted milk powder crisis offered by an organization from mainland China and an organization from Taiwan has been ascribed to the dominant media systems in Taiwan (Lyu, 2012). In their liberal media system, the media are the watchdog for both corporations and the government which appears to have stimulated a different response compared to that of the company based in mainland China. Besides the emphasis on interpersonal relationships, the dominant media systems, and differences in cultural dimensions, a final element that can determine crisis communication in Asia is the tradition of face-saving and face-giving. Face-saving is related to notions of respect, reputation, dignity, and prestige and face-saving in front of out-group members especially is extremely important in Chinese communities as

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well as other East Asian countries (Wen, Yu, Benoit, 2012). Attempts to save face for oneself and giving face to others result in the tendency to cover up crisis situations (Huang et al., 2016). This also explains why Chinese organizations will prefer corrective action over mortification (Wen et al., 2012). LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION Global crisis communication has emerged as an identifiable thread within crisis communication research with various articles and highlighted by the publication of the Handbook of International Crisis Communication. Research within this subdomain has resulted in relevant findings for both theory and practice. When a multinational organization is confronted with an international or global crisis, one single strategy probably will not suffice for a cross-cultural audience. The difficulty then is to determine how the global crisis communication strategy of an organization should be tailored to specific cultural backgrounds. Two elements to take into account could be the dominant media systems that are at play and how each country scores in terms of Hofstede’s (1985) cultural dimensions. However, an important conclusion from crosscultural crisis communication research should be that each region has its own history, its own economic situation, its own habits, its own political background, and hence requires its own approach. This is consistent with Sriramesh & Verčič (2009) point that international public relations is shaped by such factors as the political system, the economic system, societal culture, media systems, and activism. Dhanesh and Sriramesh (in press) have illustrated how these factors do affect international crisis communication with their examination of how Nestlé India handled the Maggi noodle crisis. The Dhanesh and Sriramesh study advances our understanding of how culture does shape international crisis communication. And while countries in some regions can be quite similar, such as the United States, others can have much variation, such as in Europe and Asia. Therefore, it is crucial for organizations that operate at a global level to realize that crisis communication needs to be carried out in close consultation with national communication departments or national PR-agencies. Such close collaboration can help establish the sensitivities in each country and its current affairs (Zhu, Anagondahalli, & Zhang, 2017). The strong reaction of Belgian consumers and politicians to the Coca-Cola crisis, for instance, cannot simply be reduced to cultural dimensions. Belgian consumers’ fear and response were rooted in the fact that Belgium had been confronted with an outbreak of the meat dioxin crisis only a couple of weeks earlier. In addition, despite interesting findings from existing research on global crisis communication, the global crisis communication research overall lacks nuance. The focus has been on the need for comparative studies and the often-repeated belief that crises are becoming more global or perhaps international. Those are both useful points but are broad rather than nuanced. Not all crises are international. In fact, most crises are local. In the U.S., for example, there are over 300 food recalls per year and over 3,000 hazardous chemical releases. The vast majority are local crises—restricted to the U.S. market or location. Sometimes in a food recall, it is a foreign company distributing in the U.S. but the crisis is still within the U.S. market. To be an international crisis, the crisis needs to be salient in multiple nations that have very different cultures relative to crisis communication. BP’s Deep Horizon was international, Arla Foods coping with the Mohammed cartoons boycott was international, and the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 was international. Are these

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typical crises or are these black swans? Focusing too much on black swans is problematic because we overlook what is needed to cope with white swans. As noted earlier, IRT and SCCT are local theories. This does not mean, however, that these theories do not apply outside the United States. On the contrary, Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007) explains that an organizational response should be guided by the public’s view of a crisis and resulting attributions of responsibility. Companies should be aware that the public’s interpretation of a crisis will differ between countries. So while a crisis might seem like a victim crisis in one country, it can be considered a preventable crisis in another country. Therefore, while that former country may be pleased with instructing, the latter will require a rebuild strategy. As such, it is critical for various countries or distinct cultures to apply these theories to their own local characteristics or even develop local theories. These local theories must then address three points: what counts as a crisis, what attributions of crisis responsibility do people make about crises, and how do people react to various crisis response strategies. These three factors help us to understand how people make sense of crises and crisis response strategies thereby providing the critical components necessary to construct an effective crisis response. Understanding these three points about crisis communication is consistent with Kent & Taylor (2007) recommendations for international public relations including understanding how meaning is created examining strategic considerations. Mapping local theories provides two key assets. First, managers have insights that can help tailor their crisis responses to local crises. Second, those interested in international crises would have a foundation for comparing crisis communication practices. We shall return to these two points shortly. Practitioners can draw upon the local knowledge when there is a need to engage in crisis communication across cultures. As public relations has shown, there is value in (1) understanding how the local culture defines public relations (Sriramesh, 1992) and (2) tapping those insights for international public relations efforts. The same holds true for crisis communication. Local crisis communication theories/models should then be the foundation for building international crisis communication theories/models. Local theories/models can be built by adapting existing models and seeking unique insights from specific cultural factors. As this chapter has noted, various researchers have sought to adapt existing U.S.-based crisis communication theories to other cultures. Such studies provide keen insights into the adaptions that is necessary. An, Park, Cho, & Berger (2010), for example, showed how collectivism shaped reactions to crisis response strategies that included firing employees. Others have sought to locate specific cultural factors that influence crisis communication. Goby & Nickerson (2015) revealed the role of religion in understanding crisis communication in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Falkheimer & Heide (2006) argued that crisis communication needs to understand the culture as defined by the people in the culture. Researchers need to understand the sense making of the stakeholders involved in the crisis. They recommended using what they called a constructionist ethnicity-based perspective (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). Zhu et al. (2017) examined how culture affects perceptions of crises and attributions of responsibility. As noted early, we believe crisis sense making should be driven an understanding of the crisis, attributions of crisis responsibility, and reactions to crisis response strategies. This is one of several possible methods for locating the unique insights about specific cultural factors that could affect crisis communication.

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The local theories/models provide the foundation for the international theories/ models. Practitioners can use the local theories/model to guide their crisis communication. The practitioners could anticipate how they would need to adapt their crisis messages to specific cultural contexts. The local theories/models can identify differences between crisis communication that can benefit researchers and practitioners. Researchers could explore and elaborate on why the differences and similarities exist. The local theories/model provide useful guidance and rationales for the comparative research. REFERENCES An, S.-K., Park, D.-J., Cho, S., & Berger, B. (2010). A cross-cultural study of effective organizational crisis response strategy in the United States and South Korea. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 4(4), 225–243. Avery, E.J., Lariscy, R.W., Kim, S., & Hocke, T. (2010). A quantitative review of crisis communication research in public relations from 1991 to 2009. Public Relations Review, 36(2), 190–192. Benoit, W.L. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brinson, S.L., & Benoit, W.L. (1999). The tarnished star Restoring Texaco’s damaged public image. Management Communication Quarterly, 12(4), 483–510. Coombs, W.T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163–176. Coombs, W.T. (2014). Editor’s introduction: Crisis communication—a field emerges. In W.T. Coombs (Ed.), Crisis communication (pp. xxv-xivi). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dhanesh, G.S. & Sriramesh, K. (2016). Crisis and risk communication in India. In M. Loffelholz, A. Schwarz, & M.W. Seeger (Eds.), The handbook of international crisis communication research (pp. 302–312). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Dhanesh, G.S. & Sriramesh, K. (in press). Culture and crisis communication: Nestlé India’s noodle case. Journal of International Management, 24(3), 204–214. Falkheimer, J., & Heide, M. (2006). Multicultural crisis communication: Towards a social constructionist perspective. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14(4), 180–189. Gaither, T.K., & Curtin, P.A. (2008). Examining the heuristic value of models of international public relations practice: A case study of the Arla Foods crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 20(1), 115–137. Garcia, C. (2011). Sex scandals: A cross-cultural analysis of image repair strategies in the cases of Bill Clinton and Silvio Berlusconi. Public Relations Review, 37(3), 292–296. Goby, V.P., & Nickerson, C. (2015). The impact of culture on the construal of organizational crisis: Perceptions of crisis in Dubai. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 20(3), 310–325. Hofstede, G. (1985). The interaction between national and organizational value systems. Journal of Management Studies, 22(4), 347–357. Holladay, S.J. (2009). Crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of chemical accidents. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21(2), 208–217. Huang, Y.-H. (2006). Crisis situations, communication strategies, and media coverage: A multicase study revisiting the communicative response model. Communication Research, 33(3), 180–205. Huang, Y.H., Lin, Y.H., & Su, S.H. (2005). Crisis communicative strategies in Taiwan: Category, continuum, and cultural implication. Public Relations Review, 31(2), 229–238. Huang, Y.-H.C., Wu, F., & Cheng, Y. (2016). Crisis communication in context: Cultural and political influences underpinning Chinese public relations practice. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 201–213. Kent, M.L., & Taylor, M. (2007). Beyond excellence: Extending the generic approach to international public relations: The case of Bosnia. Public Relations Review, 33(1), 10–20. Lee, B.K. (2004). Audience-oriented approach to crisis communication: A study of Hong Kong consumers’ evaluation of an organizational crisis. Communication Research, 31(5), 600–618.

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Luoma-aho, V., Moreno, A., & Verhoeven, P. (2017). Crisis response strategies in Finland and Spain. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 25(5), 223–231 Lyu, J.C. (2012). A comparative study of crisis communication strategies between Mainland China and Taiwan: The melamine-tainted milk powder crisis in the Chinese context. Public Relations Review, 38(5), 779–791. Ma, L., & Zhan, M. (2016). Effects of attributed responsibility and response strategies on organizational reputation: A meta-analysis of situational crisis communication theory research. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(2), 102–119. Pang, A., Jin, Y., & Ho, B.M.K. (2016). How crisis managers define ethical crisis communication practice in Singapore: Identifying organizational factors that influence the adoption of ethical stances. Media Asia, 43(3–4), 191–207. Sriramesh, K. (1992). Societal culture and public relations: Ethnographic evidence from India. Public Relations Review, 18(2), 201–211. Sriramesh, K. & Verčič, D. (2009). A theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (Eds.), The global public relations handbook (pp. 1–19). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sturges, D.L. (1994). Communicating through crisis: A strategy for organizational survival. Management Communication Quarterly, 7, 297–316. Taylor, M. (2000). Cultural variance as a challenge to global public relations: A case study of the Coca-Cola scare in Europe. Public Relations Review, 26(3), 277–293. Verhoeven, P., Tench, R., Zerfass, A., Moreno, A., & Verčič, D. (2014). Crisis? What crisis? How European professionals handle crises and crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 40(1), 107–109. Wen, W.-C., Yu, T.-H., & Benoit, W.L. (2012). The failure of ‘scientific’ evidence in Taiwan: A case study of international image repair for American beef. Asian Journal of Communication, 22(2), 121–139. Xifra, J. (2012). Sex, lies, and post-trial publicity: The reputation repair strategies of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Public Relations Review, 38(3), 477–483. Zhou, L., & Shin, J.H. (2017). Does stealing thunder always work? A content analysis of crisis communication practice under different cultural settings. Public Relations Review, 43(5), 1036–1047. Zhu, L., Anagondahalli, D., & Zhang, A. (2017). Social media and culture in crisis communication: McDonald’s and KFC crises management in China. Public Relations Review, 43(3), 487–492.

CHAPTER

21 The Management and Practice of Public Affairs in a Global Context Craig S. Fleisher

The management and practice of public affairs (PA) has been impacted greatly by globalization, especially in the last two decades when technologies and digitization have created cross-border issues for organizations to respond to in their external, nonmarket, public policy, or sociopolitical environments. These issues are more complex, raise levels of risk, create greater uncertainty, and can generate doubt (CRUD) among senior executives and their organizations. Globalization compels new concerns, controversies, orientations, and thinking among business, community and political leaders in order for them all to constructively address and adapt to it (Lenn, 1996, p. 436). Unlike the days before social media (SM), top managers no longer have the luxuries of relative invisibility, distance, or time before their organizations address them. Institutions and stakeholders also have been dramatically changed by globalization, thus creating new and larger arenas within which dynamic and interactive STEEP (social, technological, economic, ecological, and political) concerns need to be solved (Fleisher, 2017, p. 24). Finally, because of path dependencies in cultures (as broadly addressed in Part I of this volume), globalization increases the challenge of generating actionable issue and stakeholder intelligence. Public affairs (PA) refers to communication activities between an organization and its public policy stakeholders about issues of mutual interest. Public policy refers to institutions of public governance, officials who are responsible for developing or enforcing public policy, processes whereby citizens of a nation state establish laws and regulations, and the stake-seeking actors who aim to influence governance policies. Among the most popular public affairs communication (PAC) activities are government affairs/relations, issue management (and advertising), lobbying (including direct 226

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and grassroots) and political actions, public advocacy, community relations and social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. The fact that organizations and stakeholders have related interests does not indicate that the interests will be equal in any sense, but rather that their resolution can, and may, be competitively influenced by both parties to a greater or lesser extent (Keim & Baysinger, 1988). The management and practice of PA has become a critical skill that resides in the Board of Directors and C-suites of organizations engaged in business-government-society work across national boundaries (Harris & Fleisher, 2017, p. 1). As a long-time observer, researcher, consultant and/or participant (i.e., activist) in the public affairs field in well over two dozen different nations, I have examined organizational trends over three decades to understand what drives practice, policy, and strategy development. There are many structural ways the field has changed dramatically from the 1960s when individuals first started examining globalization and PA, and the pace of change caused by democraticization (Sriramesh & Verčič, 2003, p. xxiii) and digitization (Meli & Grefe, 2017, p. 181) appears to be unrelenting for most PA practitioners and executives who operate in international, multinational, or global organizations (Harsanyi & Allen, 2017, p. 66). A GLOBAL LENS TO UNDERSTAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS Though public affairs practitioners and their organizational departments, functions, or units have often responded reactively to globalization, there have been increasing efforts by multinational organizations to improve communication with their stakeholders. The framework applied in this chapter to consider globalization and public affairs was originally developed by David Baron (1995) to describe an approach to integrated market and nonmarket strategies. This approach was further augmented by Bach & Allen (2010) and others including this author resulting in the IA-cubed model, which recommends that analysts can understand the nonmarket environment by answering a sequenced set of six questions – with the six factors, three starting with the letter “A” and three with an “I” as follows: 1) What is the Issue? 2) Who are the Actors who care about and will be involved in trying to resolve the issue? 3) What are the actor’s Interests? 4) In which Arena (-s) will actors aim to settle the issue? 5) What Information moves the issue in these arenas? 6) What Assets do the actors bring to the table that will help them prevail in these arenas? It is the complex, dynamic, and ongoing interaction of these factors that the PA professional must address on a 365x24x7 basis. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF PA ISSUES Issues are defined as controversies or matters in question that occur between an organization and its stakeholders. In PA work, these issues are typically directed at, or referred to, public policy institutions, makers, or processes for their resolution. Issues have always crossed borders rather easily, but today’s issues can do so at a pace not previously seen due to advances in mobile telecommunication/videoconferencing, computerization,

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digitization, the internet, and social media. Issues are generally thought to have life cycles, and PA practitioners manage these over a period of time by applying unique communication strategies and tactics based on which phase of the life cycle the issue is moving, part of the larger issues management roles they play (Mahon, 2017, p. 537). There are typically no shortages of domestic and multinational issues that organizations must address, though different groups or industries will have unique arrays of them at any point in time. Among the most prominent issues that PA communicators address globally are: 1. Bilateral or multilateral trade: Who can trade with whom and on what terms? 2. Ecological/Sustainability/Climate change: How can physical resources, like energy, water, forests, or air, be conserved, distributed, preserved, and protected? 3. Employment: Who can work where and under what conditions? 4. Human rights: Are citizens’ human rights being respected and protected? 5. Immigration/Emigration: Who can live where and under what conditions? 6. Information/Media: What should people know and be hearing about? 7. Property: Who has the rights of ownership of assets? 8. Security/Safety: How can citizens be kept from experiencing harm? 9. Welfare (economic, social): How well are citizens living? These issues are often contentious, long-standing, hard to identify at their sources or causes, and resist local efforts to resolve them. Many of them are better characterized as “wicked” (Camillus, 2008, p. 98) matters, as opposed to conventional ones that are more easily amenable to policy and other common sociopolitical solutions, because they don’t have obvious answers, are difficult to resolve, and often sit outside the responsibilities of any singular organization. Wicked issues are often the ones that ultimately sway stakeholders and decide political elections. As such, those PA practitioners who can “move the needle” on these issues are typically among the most critical employees in their organizations and communities. ACTORS ON THE GLOBAL PA STAGE On the global stage, there are unique actors in the form of global or transnational movements and organizations that transcend the idea of any individual or single nation-state. They are not primarily controlled or funded by the policy organs of any particular government. These organizations are constantly trying to find a balance between their aims and activities in multiple nations and deal with trade-offs between being both global and local at the same time (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002) – often known colloquially as the portmanteau of global and local – “glocal.” Operating glocally is thought to have been coined by business persons in Japan and translated to English back in the 1980s by Akio Morita, Sony Corporation’s founder. Being glocal means that executives develop strategic direction on a global basis but allow for the flexibility to adapt certain elements to localized needs. These actors are ever-present in the global PA environment and include individuals who work on behalf of: 1. Globally-focused organizations: These would include most United Nations efforts and its organs such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International

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Organization for Standardization (ISO), the World Health Organization (WHO), or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Multinational trading groups such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, (COMESA), the European Union (EU), Organization for American States (OAS), or OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Multilateral banking organizations: AfDB (African Development Bank), AsDB (Asian Development Bank), Central American bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), European Investment Bank (EIB), or World Bank. Transnational or international cause-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Transnational Foundations: Among the best funded of these foundations would be the Al Maktoum Foundation, Azim Premji Foundation, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Li Ka Shing Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Garfield Weston Foundation, and Wellcome Trust. Transnational Religions: Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, Muslims, or Roman Catholics, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, etc. Multinational corporations (MNCs) or enterprises (MNEs): Among the largest of these are Amazon, Apple, General Electric, Nestle, Royal Dutch Shell, Toyota, Vodaphone, Volkswagen, and Walmart.

Although these actors have their headquarters in one nation-state, their primary activities span many countries and are not centrally directed by a government or nationals of any single country. Because of their transnational or global focus, they are often powerful stakeholders in terms of influencing the activities of any individual nation. Lastly, they often conduct PA activities on their own right with the intent on influencing a country’s choices and behaviors in their particular areas of focus. THE INTERESTS OF ACTORS AND ACTIVISTS Actors in the global PA environment often have unique concerns about the issues that concern them, causing them to make demands of public policy officials both in respective nation-states and the transnational or global organizations that aim to provide governance. Interests nearly always go into the realm of ethics. As such, interests expressed in PA matters in and across most nation-states involve questions of fairness, principles, right and wrong, harms and benefits, and how they are to be distributed. Actors take their ethical considerations to public policy makers (i.e., either elected executives, lawmakers, regulators or judges/magistrates) for hearing and desired resolutions in various arenas where these discussions and debates are supposed to occur in most nation-states. At the point that the actors do formally take their interests into the arenas to be heard by public policy makers, they cross the definitional line and become activists, or those actors who have progressed from passive listeners to active stake-seeking participants (Fassin, 2010, p. 39) in public policy processes. THE ARENAS IN WHICH THE ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED Actors and activists often take their interests to various transnational and global institutions so that their voices can be heard and their demands may be formally made. These

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arenas are where elected or appointed public policy makers ply their trades. They can operate at several different levels of aggregation, ranging from global arenas in the most macro sense, to local communities or townships on the micro-end. There are usually some forms of executive leadership, legislative power, and judicial arenas in the majority of nation-states. They are commonly represented in the following: 1. Executive branches/Cabinets: The organs that hold responsibility for public leadership by executing and ensuring the administration and enforcement of laws and public policies. The top officer in the executive branch is often known as a president, prime minister, or premier. This arena can wield great power, and because of this, it is often a target that activists seek to influence through their behavior and communication activities. 2. Legislative Bodies such as Parliaments/Congresses/Assemblies: These are the supreme legislative bodies in democratic societies that are typically comprised of elected representatives who make laws for their citizens being duly elected to their posts and usually also oversee governmental activities via the means of hearings and related inquiries. They are often the primary focus of activist influence, and lobbying activities are the most commonly used form of PA activity for trying to influence them. 3. Judicial: These arenas are made up of courts, which can range from supreme, Circuit/Regional, magistrates (local) and municipal levels or their equivalents. Laws are interpreted and subsequently applied based on those judgments within these arenas. Though not an arena that is typically viewed to be susceptible to influence by PA practitioners or activists, there is evidence that more policy than ever before is being decided by the courts and that PA activities targeting judicial bodies can be effective in some cases (Holcomb, 2017, p. 517). 4. Media (traditional and social): Though these are not direct bodies by which policy is made, they can be critical in indirectly influencing what happens in any of the other three arenas where public policy is formally developed, executed, or administrated. It is in this arena where the traditional communication activities done by public relations or corporate communication specialists is most frequently and can best be applied for accomplishing PA purposes.

THE INFORMATION USED TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT PA MATTERS Actors in the arenas who are working on issues try to achieve their objectives by communicating data and information that persuades lawmakers to see their interests as being aligned with those of the larger society that is being impacted. Data and information are typically exchanged, though not necessarily in equivalent measure, between sides. It is often because of this selective sharing that having the right data or information at the right time and the capability to deliver it can make a difference. This set of circumstances demonstrates the importance of having intelligence that guides the activists or the PA practitioners’ steps through the often-complex public policy process. Intelligence can be even more important when addressing regulatory matters because that is often the realm of experts and the organizations or activists often have better data than the regulatory agencies and their experts.

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THE ASSETS USED TO INFLUENCE POLICY In a global economy, organizations seeking competitive advantage know they need to address social, political and environmental issues as part of their strategy, and not just focusing on business, commercial or profit-seeking elements as their aim (Bach & Allen, 2010). There are no shortages of PA-specific tools and techniques that a PA unit would be able to use in influencing their nonmarket environment (Showalter & Fleisher, 2005). Assets in a global PA context would include those resources and capabilities that enable and can be used by organizations to potentially influence the outcomes of debates about issues held in public policy arenas. In the global practice of PA, these can take on several prominent types: 1. Human: This includes all of those individuals who are active in trying to influence the evolution of issues. For most organizations, this would comprise their staff members and employees whose main roles are in the PA communication field, volunteer advocates (i.e., executives who advocate on behalf of their organization, the grassroots, etc.), contracted and permanently employed lobbyists, issue managers, compliance and regulatory specialists, and lawyers who interact regularly with governmental officials. 2. Financial: Monies that are used on behalf of PA aims. In some countries – both authoritarian and democratic, companies are allowed to exchange currencies for influence. This can range in nature from the unethical and possibly illegal ones (bribes) to the legal (political action committees or PACs). 3. Data and Information: As described earlier, having access to particular ideas about how to resolve issues can be a critical asset used to influence public policy. This asset can be particularly influential when trying to influence regulatory agendas, because they are amenable to the presence and provision of specialist information that only limited numbers of stakeholders are likely to have. 4. Reputation: An intangible asset, reputation refers to the collective judgments of an organization based on assessments of financial, social and environmental impacts attributed to the organization over time (FT.com/lexicon, 2017). Organizations with stronger reputations or are held in higher esteem by public policy officials are usually better positioned to competitively influence the outcome of many issue resolutions and public policy debates. 5. Time: An increasingly scarce asset for any individuals involved in trying to resolve complex public policy matters, this includes the number of hours, days, weeks, or years spent in advocacy, lobbying, and before related PA negotiation activities. One increasingly important strategic PA element is for a stakeseeking organization being able to establish the definition of an issue debate, or framing it (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) early as a means of setting the “rules of the game” or the playing field on which the issue’s resolution will be played out.

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES OF THE GLOBAL PA PRACTITIONER OR MANAGER Individuals who hope to practice public affairs in a global context must exhibit certain technical skills, knowledge, abilities and/or experiences (KSAEs) in order to perform

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effectively. Though there are different levels of PA activity spanning the lower-level technical, managerial and highest executive levels where PA practitioners work in organizations, among the most prominent competences that have been noted by researchers would be the following (Fleisher, 2003; Shaw, 2005): Technical Competencies (Key behaviors): 1. Adaptability (Remains flexible and open to new ideas; Able to encourage others to make desired changes; Thinks and acts effectively under pressure; Persists towards solutions; Makes necessary adjustments to daily routines; Identifies ways to incorporate new practices into existing ones). 2. Advisory Assistance (Able to manage multi-directionally – upwards, downwards, horizontally; Assists colleagues to understand and execute PA communication aims; Develops specifications to use in soliciting professional services from external providers; Generates advice with respect to ethical conflicts and how to resolve them; Provides accurate and timely guidance; Seeks out and solicits information to solve problems; Supports leadership by managing PA information and resources). 3. Awareness – external and organizational (Considers the organization’s goals and resources in work efforts; Demonstrates understanding of the organization’s functions and responsibilities; Identifies subject matter experts to respond to external requests; Knows when and how to escalate issues for attention; monitors and scans all media for developing and emerging issues; Identifies opportunities based on unique sociopolitical and cultural needs; Demonstrates good understanding of government processes and public policy institutions). 4. Collaboration (Identifies, organizes, facilitates, and/or sustains mutually beneficial partnerships and alliances with internal and external activists and stakeholders; Maintains positive, productive and professional relationships; Interacts with others to share information and achieve goals; Works towards goals that benefit the team, which includes contributing ideas and participating in team activities appropriately; Fosters an environment that emphasizes knowledge sharing and group participation; Facilitates ethical agreement by resolving differences of opinions; Resolves conflicts, confrontations and disagreements positively and constructively; Identifies when to seek additional outside counsel; Serves as a PA expert for other staff; Serves on committees – e.g., task forces, working groups – to analyze and improve administrative processes and procedures; Coordinates efforts with applicable stakeholders to ensure awareness, share information, and provide updates until completion). 5. Communication (Asks the right, appropriate questions; Clearly and effectively conveys ideas and information verbally and in writing; Actively listens and summarizes or paraphrases what others have said to verify understanding; Ensures that regular communication occurs based on the needs of the work, the individual, management, or the situation; Uses analogies, case histories, stories, visuals, and other techniques to tailor communications to specific audiences; Identifies and uses effective communication channels and methods – e.g., presentations, electronic dissemination, social media – appropriately tailored to the audiences; Utilizes skill in presenting information, analysis, ideas, and positions in a clear, succinct, accurate, convincing manner). 6. Data Gathering and Analysis (Scans for, monitors, analyzes and investigates upto-date information from various sources and formats; Analyzes data in order to draw conclusions and identify cause and effect relationships to support

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leadership decisions, recommend a course of action, or solve organizational issues; Documents sources and validates accuracy of information to resolve inconsistencies; Conducts ad hoc and standard analyses in response to customer needs, incorporating knowledge of parallel, ongoing projects into analysis for customers; Gathers, compiles, and interprets pertinent data using various data collection techniques; trends in data that indicates issues, problems, or opportunities, and determines if action is needed; Leverages external networks to ensure all relevant information is integrated into analysis and interpretation of data; Meets with others to understand their needs or concerns in order to ensure data, analytics, and reporting are used appropriately; Seeks additional resources when gaps and inconsistencies or variances in data are found). 7. Innovativeness (Identifies, organizes, facilitates, and/or sustains mutually beneficial partnerships and alliances with internal and external stakeholders; Achieves and maintains positive and productive relationships; Works with others to share information and achieve goals, which includes contributing ideas and participating in team activities appropriately; Fosters an environment that emphasizes timely knowledge sharing and group participation; Knows when to seek additional outside counsel; Serves as a PA subject matter expert for other colleagues and staff; Coordinates efforts with applicable stakeholders to ensure awareness, share information, and provide updates until completion). 8. Message Development and Delivery (Knowledge of the production, communication, and dissemination of information and ideas to inform via all pertinent media; Analyzes information needs and develops plans and communications deliverables to meet these needs; Plans evaluations, applies metrics, and conducts research to measure the success of PA communication activities; Refines communications plans based on the results of audience research and organizational priorities; Writes a variety of communications or both internal and more prominently external audiences tailored to their having different levels of education, interest, and points of view; Applies knowledge of computer-based information systems and technologies, internet applications, and technologies to plan, design, and evaluate web sites and pages). 9. Planning (Anticipates problems and mitigates risks; Assesses relative importance of activities and assignments; Adjusts priorities when appropriate; Coordinates with others when problems or conflicts occur that might impact the timely completion of work; Determines necessary sequence of activities and the efficient level of resources needed to achieve goals, Implements or utilizes strategic plans on a daily basis; Uses available resources to get more done with less without losing focus; Regularly provides work in status updates and negotiates adjustments in timelines or scope of work as appropriate; Organizes work, sets priorities, and determines resource requirements; Recognizes and addresses the interdependences of activities and resources; Uses time effectively and prevents irrelevant issues or distractions from interfering with work completion).

CONCLUSION There are no shortages of issues for organizations to communicate about or negotiate with governmental and public policy makers, and organizations in all sectors and industries typically employ PA specialists to support their goals. This chapter

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recommended and detailed an IA-cubed model for understanding the nature of interactions that occurs in global public affairs. Managing and practicing public affairs in a global context remains challenging and rewarding work for communicators who have the appropriate competences. More positively, better aligned, controversy and harmreducing social and political outcomes will occur for society as a result of successful global PA efforts. REFERENCES Bach, D., & Allen, D. (2010). What every CEO needs to know about nonmarket strategy. MIT Sloan Management Review, 51(3), 41. Baron, David P. (1995). Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components, California Management Review, 37(2), Winter, pp. 47–65. Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (2002). Managing across borders: the transnational solution. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. Camillus, J. C. (2008). Strategy as a wicked problem. Harvard Business Review, 86(5), 98. Fassin, Y. (2010). A dynamic perspective in Freeman’s stakeholder model. Journal of Business Ethics, 96 (1), 39. Fleisher, C. S. (2003). The development of competencies in international public affairs. Journal of Public Affairs, 3(1), 76. Fleisher, C. S. (2017). Corporate public affairs: revisiting the development of the field. In Harris, P.& C. S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of international corporate and public affairs(pp. 23–39). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. FT.com/lexicon. (2017). Definition of corporate reputation. Accessed June 5, 2017 at: http://lexicon.ft.com/ Term?term=corporate-reputation&mhq5j=e1 Harris, P., & Fleisher, C. S. (2017). Introduction: the continuing development of international corporate and public affairs. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of international corporate and public affairs (pp. 1–16)., Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. Harsanyi, F., & G. Allen. (2017). Achieving the strategic potential of public affairs. In Harris, P. & C. S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of international corporate and public affairs (pp. 65–81). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. Holcomb, J. (2017). Influencing the legal and judicial process. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of corporate and public affairs (pp. 517–533). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. Keim, G., & Baysinger, B. (1988). The efficacy of business political activity: competitive considerations in a principal-agent context. Journal of Management, 14(2), 163. Lenn, D. J. (1996). International public affairs: managing within the global village. In Dennis, L.B. (Ed.), Practical public affairs in an era of change: a communications guide for business, government, and college, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Mahon, J. (2017). Corporate issues management. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of international corporate and public affairs (pp. 534–549). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. Meli, A. & E. Grefe. (2017). Public affairs and information science/systems. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of international corporate and public affairs (pp. 165–183). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. Shaw, P. (2005). The human resources dimensions of public affairs: staffing, training, career paths, competencies and salaries. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), Handbook of public affairs (pp. 123–144). SAGE. Showalter, A. & C. S. Fleisher. (2005). The tools and techniques of public affairs. In Harris, P. & C.S. Fleisher (Eds.), Handbook of public affairs (pp. 109–122). SAGE. Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. Studies in public opinion: attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change, (p. 133). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sriramesh, K., & Vercic, D. (Eds.). (2003). The global public relations handbook: theory, research, and practice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

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22 Linking Public Relations and Public Diplomacy Creating a New Cadre of Public and Corporate Diplomats Roger Hayes

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT In the 1970s public relations agencies, mainly American, expanded their networks beyond New York and London to different parts of the world. In doing so, they helped the export of products and services, and the setting up of local plants by their clients, initially in Europe and then gradually in other parts of the world from the former Soviet Union to China. Consultants, mainly from government departments and journalism, were tasked to generate “positive press coverage” without the benefit of direct daily flights, mobile phones, or e-mails, let alone having expertise about those markets and cultures. They were guided only by their experience of the US and the UK and, with luck, help from a local person. As this Handbook illustrates, now most countries have “full service” agencies, with local and international professionals servicing clients, including in the last frontier – the Middle East and Africa. They are asked to provide more than just “positive press coverage.” It includes strategic communications, digital and traditional media relations, crisis and issue management, internal communications, public affairs, and stakeholder research in a multi-cultural, multi-stakeholder, multi-platform world. But is the profession, as such, doing enough to satisfy these demands? In the last half-century, not least in the last decade and especially in the last two years, public relations has been operating in an increasingly challenging and complex environment, one of more regulation, empowered stakeholders, the decline of public trust in institutions, eroding barriers between countries and institutions, an interdisciplinary approach to concepts and fields of study, criticism of overly Western-centric 235

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interpretations, and the struggle to find the balance between self and societal interest. Not only has there been a diffusion of power from governments to private and third sector organizations but also a shift in the center of economic gravity from North America and Europe, both east and south, particularly to China and India. THE JOURNEY – ADDING TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE BY “JOINING THE DOTS” There is thus an increasing need to join the dots between disciplines, adding to the relatively immature theory and practice of public relations, where the demand is greater than the quantity and quality of supply, especially in the still emerging markets of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, a world where, increasingly, there is crossfertilization between practitioners from different cultures, polities, and economies and between public relations academics, but very little interchange between practitioners and academics. This is needed to invest more in the balance of rigor with relevance. One fruitful area of study has been the practical if insufficient theoretical overlap between public relations and the even newer discipline of public diplomacy. In short this means communication by a “home” government to connect with the citizens of other countries to move “host” governments towards desired ends. Cull (2009) defined public diplomacy by stating that it “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies, encompassing dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy, namely the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries.” According to him this involves one or more of intelligence gathering, advocacy, cultural activities, educational exchanges, and international broadcasting. Corporate or business diplomacy has emerged as an important subset of public diplomacy, which itself evolved from international relations and public administration, whereas the corporate dimension has only recently come under the microscope of business schools in a parallel path to public diplomacy and public relations. Further research, theoretical development, and increased exchanges between practitioners and academics of a range of disciplines is needed to create a new cadre of public and corporate diplomats. This can be achieved by integrating not just public relations and its related fields of corporate social responsibility and public affairs, but possibly embracing other ideas, such as sustainability, strategy, leadership, governance, and conflict resolution. This has implications for skills, training, and teaching, as well as or recruitment. CHANGE, CULTURE, CONNECTIVITY, COLLABORATION In their analysis of the context in which public relations operates, Hayes and Watts (2015, Introduction) warned: Couple the collusion of global forces with the convergence of economics, politics and culture, there is no new normal. The new normal must be navigated, negotiated, networked and a narrative built around it. There will be as much collaboration as competition, requiring a greater need to listen, learn, link and lead.

This is characterized by the interaction of a variety of disciplines in a more integrated way than hitherto, because senior management and policymakers are more concerned with strategic actions and long-term delivery than process or tactics. In emerging

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countries in particular, where aspects of communication such as branding, affairs, corporate social responsibility, crisis management, and employee engagement are seeing exponential demand, the offerings are largely compartmentalized and tactical, unsupported by much academic rigor and applied research. This is made worse by the imposition of ethno-centric, Western-imposed experiences and methodologies on often diverse and context-specific cultures (see, for example, Sriramesh, 2002). As a result of this perspective and the shortfall between reality and aspiration, some public relations research reviewing public diplomacy has been conducted to see if it can shed light on how the public relations discipline can become more globally professional by drawing on the strengths of both disciplines, plus that of corporate diplomacy. One important attempt was the study of NATO’s communication analyzing the integration of public diplomacy, public relations, and other communications functions designed to project hard and soft power (Van Dyke and Verčič, 2009). The authors raised questions about convergence and credibility that must be addressed in practice and theory: “Unfortunately public relations scholars have been slow to study this convergence” (Van Dyke and Verčič, 2009, pp. 838–839). This could make public relations more relevant and credible in more parts of the world and to a whole variety of private, public, and not-for-profit sector institutions (Hayes, 2012; MacNamara, 2011). The founding fathers of the global public relations industry had the highest ideals. They wanted nothing less than to use the discipline to help the world unite in the aftermath of World War II. The guiding principles were truth, dialogue, and the public interest (Traverse-Healy, 2014). Indeed, the International Code of Athens, which was adopted by the International Public Relations Association in 1965, focused on the fault line in the evolving profession between persuasion and manipulation, on the one hand, and, on the other, a more dialogic approach balancing organizational with societal interest, underpinned by values. An intense discussion has built up around the convergence of public relations and public diplomacy, particularly in terms of distinguishing public relations from propaganda. “The tender minded or soft school of public diplomacy involving longer-term cultural objectives owed a lot to public relations, despite the ʻpersuasion industriesʼ being blamed for ʻthe messʼ public diplomacy was in” (Snow, 2009, p. 9). Snow argued that whereas traditional public diplomacy is governments talking to global publics, new public diplomacy involves the way both governments and other groups, such as companies, charities, and citizens, influence public attitudes and opinions abroad that influence foreign policy (Snow, 2009). James Grunig, who led the Excellence Project that formed the building blocks of a significant section of scholarship, argued that the discipline needed to identify its core values if it is to be respected rather than reviled. He argued for “a form of public relations in which collaboration becomes the major idea and skill that we offer organisations to help them rise above the wrangle in the marketplace” (Grunig, 2000, p. 45). Many practitioners believe this to be overly idealistic when working for some governments and companies, especially in some emerging countries. Perhaps this is why journalists still refer to public relations dismissively as “spin” and why some practitioners have downplayed the term public relations in favor of reputation management or strategic communications. THE CULTURAL GLUE The growing internationalization of the discipline resulting from globalization and the growth of internet accessible, cross-frontier networks formed by NGOs, governments,

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and multinational corporations have been described as the “strategic communication that different types of organization use for establishing and maintaining symbiotic relationships with relevant publics, many of whom are increasingly becoming culturally diverse” (Sriramesh, 2010, p. xxxiv). As described in Part I of this book, culture is defined broadly to include economic and political variables, levels of activism and the media landscape, but it is the importance of culture that was the trigger for public relations to take an interest in the separate discipline of public diplomacy. Indeed, a Delphi study on the priorities of public relations research suggested the relationship between these two disciplines was among the top ten issues, given the importance of culture (Watson, 2007). As long as public relations scholarship looks beyond its original theory and the limited scope of the public relations literature, given the speed and democratization of information, there is hope that the rapid international developments of the practice will lead to new cultural, political, and social insights. That is, broadening and deepening the body of knowledge could make the profession more strategically relevant and credible. Perhaps public diplomacy is the point of departure not only to learn from each other but to link more closely to strategy, leadership, governance, and sustainability, as well as international relations, conflict resolution, and peace studies. These are key areas of concern for business leaders and policymakers, not to mention the growing number of social investors and cause-related NGOs (Hayes and Watts, 2015). Universities and their centers for public diplomacy can increasingly provide the three Cs of public diplomacy – crossroads, conversations, and culture – as they denote it: Public diplomacy, that grand, hard to capture process by which societies and cultures speak to each other beyond the narrow channels of formal, state to state diplomacy. … Public diplomacy increasingly can and must accomplish what traditional governments can no longer be expected to accomplish (or are no longer willing to fund) due to political and economic realities. (USC Public Diplomacy, 2017)

If public diplomacy seeks to influence the behavior of foreign governments via influencing their citizens, that is, shaping public opinion, then this is similar to public relations. However, with diplomacy mixed in with the promotion of products and services, there is an even closer link to public relations, which plays into the hands of those international relations scholars who still view public relations with suspicion. Snow (2009) suggested that relationships might be the best predictor of actual future behavior, shifting the focus from a reactive to a more dialogic stance, which parallels some thinking in public relations scholarship. The term public diplomacy became an alternative to propaganda in the age of Kennedy and Khrushchev (Cull, 2009). Indeed, Cull referred to the “new” public diplomacy, drawing attention to its changing context and practice with the end of the Cold War in 1989. This included a broader array of international actors, the advent of digital technologies, and the growing assimilation of new techniques drawn from marketing, such as branding and product public relations, which can be deployed for governments wishing to promote tourism or attract investment. City and nation branding is another type of initiative that sometimes considers public diplomacy alongside exports, tourism and foreign direct investment, and which embraces communications skills.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN A DIGITAL, DIFFUSE, DIVERSE, AND DISRUPTIVE WORLD In this four D’s world resulting from interdependence and interconnections, it has become important to distinguish between hard or military power and soft power, which is linked to culture, the power of attraction and ideas. The term, developed by Joe Nye, is a key construct of public diplomacy. The new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging or direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and facilitating networks among non-governmental parties at home and abroad. (Nye, 2005)

Nye refers to a new environment, a multi-stakeholder, multi-issue, and multi-media landscape, which is all about building relationships and facilitating networks. The trend has accelerated as more informal institutions became involved, with all kinds of organizations developing public diplomacy policies of their own. International relations theorist and commentator Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that foreign policymakers still focus primarily on state-based foreign policy messaging tools, “where states still exert power, but side by side with corporate, civic and criminal actors in a web of networks” (Slaughter, 2017). In practice, newer forms of public diplomacy and more sophisticated approaches to nation branding can improve a country’s prosperity and foreign policy. But public relations theory does not appear to support this, despite public diplomacy “being as much a communications phenomenon as a political one” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86). Fletcher (2016), former UK ambassador to Lebanon (a position which required e-diplomacy skills, with e-mails replacing the telegram as the main means of communication between diplomats in the host country and the capital in the home country), contended that a public diplomat is “a communicator and campaigner”. Corporate diplomacy has also been seen as a potential contributor, especially in relation to corporate social responsibility in public diplomacy outcomes. Key issues for research into the role of the private sector are the “motives and intentionality” of corporate efforts as well as the “strategic coordination” between corporations and home and host governments (White, 2015). Of course, public relations scholars are increasingly researching public relations and public diplomacy, which is encouraging. It has also been noted that “there is no single discipline delivering public diplomacy’s intellectual agenda. However, public relations can engage in the development of public diplomacy as a discipline” (MacNamara, 2011). MacNamara conducted a comparative analysis of the concepts and principles of public diplomacy and public relations as described by the Excellence Theory. Similarities, as well as differences, were observed between the fields of practice, and several concepts of diplomacy were identified to improve public relations that could inform public relations theory and practice (MacNamara, 2011). Former UK diplomat Shaun Riordan, while alerting scholars and practitioners to the dangers of overusing the term “diplomacy” to the extent that it confuses a profession with a practice (terms such as cultural diplomacy, city diplomacy, and digital diplomacy), argued for a radical restructuring of diplomatic services, replacing hierarchies with network structures and the creation of new forms of global governance that incorporate NGOs and the private sector (Riordan, 2005). However, he conceded the term business (or corporate) diplomacy, given that international companies are increasingly dealing directly with foreign governments and publics, which impacts domestic reputation. Incidentally, business diplomacy is viewed more as companies

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seeking commercial ends, while corporate diplomacy emphasizes more its social and environmental responsibilities – corporate social responsibility (Kochar, 2013). But this distinction deserves further research and debate by the public relations fraternity and within other disciplines. The problem is that business (or corporate) diplomacy has largely been researched by management theorists developing ideas largely in parallel with international relations and certainly public relations. MacNamara underlined that: corporate diplomacy would require corporations to engage in on-going dialogue with publics guided by specific principles and with mechanisms in place to balance power, amortise conflicts, facilitate negotiation and maintain relationships even in the face of outright disagreement (2011).

This hypothesis implies a more formal, structured approach to public relations, public affairs, and corporate social responsibility activities, together with an added diplomatic dimension, which different theorists describe in different ways. CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: MORE STAKEHOLDERS, GREATER EXPECTATIONS There has long been pressure from activists who have urged multinational corporations to do more. A few international companies have taken their responsibilities seriously, spawning the popularity of corporate social responsibility, which is linked to sustainability and characterized by the adoption of a longer-term view beyond the quarterly earnings report. This phenomenon has been around since the 1980s as a result of a number of corporate crises ranging from oil spillage to tax evasion, and legitimacy issues, such as violating human rights along the supply chain and abusing consumer data. Partly due to economic vicissitudes and the significance of the sustainability brought to the fore by greater transparency and digital usage, there is no place to hide and the scrutiny of corporations has intensified. Ironically, despite the disruptive impact of technology, new applications such as blockchain have assisted companies wishing to implement the traceability of sources, whether the use of forced labor in fishing or deforestation in palm oil production. Globalisation has changed the roles and relationships between multinational corporations, governments, NGOs, local pressure groups and society. To survive in today’s international business landscape, multinational corporations need to create legitimacy by interacting and building on positive relationships with all stakeholders. (Ruel, 2013)

As Ruel describes it, business diplomacy is different from lobbying or strategic political activity (public affairs). It implies a holistic approach by international companies to cope in the international arena. Representation, communication, and negotiation are key in such an approach. As such, it is vital that whatever term is used, given the complexities and interdependence between economics, politics, and society at an international level, companies develop their own business diplomacy competences. In addition, multinational corporations have developed “representative mechanisms” to manage complex global relations, requiring interaction with multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, and national governments, not to mention the “standard setting” among various industry sectors, often within the UN Sustainable Development Goals. “Because companies have exacerbated environmental problems and caused conflict, they are therefore key to fixing these problems as part of governance and sustainability mechanisms and reforms, requiring leadership and accountability” (Porter and Kramer, 2011).

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Doing business in today’s international environment requires multinational corporations to move away from one-sided shareholder models and instead become active members of stakeholder networks.1 Corporate diplomacy is an emerging concept within the management literature, but sometimes it takes a broader stakeholder primacy approach. Scholarship has focused on the communication processes and instrumental benefits associated with it-how managers negotiate stakeholder relations, an umbrella concept that encompasses scholarship from corporate social responsibility, International Relations, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, in which multinational corporations address social issues and governance gaps, leading to wider societal benefits, beyond simply corporate public relations. (Westermann-Behaylo, Rehbein, Fort, 2015)

These writers have also called on business executives to assume the role of “corporate diplomats,” although in practice such roles are sometimes filled by former foreign service diplomats. Whether such roles might include direct support for public diplomacy efforts remains uncertain, given governments have neither the will nor often the budgets to fulfill all public needs. This dichotomy plays to the wider debate surrounding the future of capitalism. Corporate diplomacy entered the public relations practice lexicon in the early 2000s, and was deemed to occupy the space beyond public relations to public affairs. “It’s thinking ahead … combined with astute networking and relationship building” (Kraus, 2006), and the link was highlighted at the public relations World Congress in Beijing in 2008. Ultimately successful corporate diplomacy depends on a very special cadre of people, who have the experience, communication skills, and political savvy to work successfully in the space where the goals of corporations, governments, and civil society converge. “Corporations serve a diplomatic function because of their political and cultural, as well as their technical and economic clout” (Grupp and Hayes, 2008, p. 10). At the time Kraus explained that when multinational corporations begin to play a role beyond just goods and services and emerging countries leverage economic development, their power and scale is such that they need a diplomatic corps of their own to “open the right doors, say the rights things, interpret local culture, as well as the economic and political context” (Kraus, 2006). Despite public affairs being a bridge between public relations and public diplomacy, and its subset corporate diplomacy, the literature of public relations lacks the required knowledge base of how multinational corporations operate in the international political and diplomatic domain (Kochar, 2013). One example of joining the dots relating to the role of business was research undertaken in South Africa. The “Pretoria School of Thought” emphasized strategic as opposed to tactical communications and the link with governance, leadership and sustainability (De Beer, Rensburg, Steyn, 2013). Gregory and Willis (2013) also made the connection between a more strategic role for heads of public relations, public affairs, and corporate social responsibility inside corporations linked to governance, ethics, leadership, corporate character, and relational capital, all requiring “contextual intelligence” (a core skill of diplomats), especially in a networked, multi-stakeholder, global environment. Yet “Despite being discussed for more than five years, corporate diplomacy has received relatively little scholarly analysis, the concept mainly preached in professional business texts, a handful of corporate papers, speeches, websites and blogs” (MacNamara, 2011).

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A MORE HOLISTIC, STRATEGIC APPROACH IS NEEDED Business diplomacy and corporate diplomacy remain unclearly defined, and are mostly studied in business schools. Public diplomacy has fared better in recent times. International relations, economics, business/management, public relations, public affairs, and corporate social responsibility are all related topics. Even leadership, governance, and conflict resolution/peace studies, although all linked to the social sciences, are not yet viewed holistically. This is holding back the further development of public relations, if the profession still wishes to call it that. (Public affairs is preferred by governments and the profession in Europe; strategic communications or reputation management by consultancies, heads of corporate affairs by multinational corporations or, sometimes, Chief Communication Officers (CCOs).) This despite the fact that this topic plays into the wider debate around the legitimacy of capitalism, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, and the need to engage stakeholders beyond customers and shareholders to employees, the wider community, and even investors. Indeed, public relations and public affairs executives are often viewed as “ambassadors” acting as “boundary spanners,” negotiating conflict and differing expectations among a variety of stakeholders. It is certainly true that this offers an approach to geopolitics and non-commercial risk management based on the practices and mindsets of diplomats. Indeed, there are examples of former diplomats being taken on by multinational corporations to handle at least the relationships with foreign governments and corporate social responsibility efforts, even if they are not called corporate diplomats! Scholars and practitioners alike must conceptualize, theoretically develop and practically expand the field, especially given the rising activism and expectations of more stakeholders, even investors, urging companies to create not just economic, but social value. The father of stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984), very early on talked of “reconciling corporate social responsibility, sustainable development and a stakeholder approach in a networked world, requiring navigational tools, a winwin for shareholders and stakeholders.” If only he had been listened to then. Now leaders and managers, with their advisers are beginning to formalize their environmental, social, and governance practices, requiring new skills, competencies, experiences, and teams. What could help the global public relations and related profession is to learn from the cultural sensitivity and geopolitical skills of diplomats, while public policy civil servants, including diplomats, would do well to borrow from the communication, media, and marketing knowledge of the private sector. At the 2018 World Economic Forum at Davos, sometimes known as “the private sector UN,” a call was made that business must work with other institutions to reshape their operating environments and balance local community and employment contributions with global business imperatives (Schwab, 2018). It is significant that at the same time, customers are boycotting brands they disapprove of (e.g. guns in the US), some CEOs are becoming political activists (around climate change), there are more employee whistleblowers (sexual harassment, gender equality) and companies are increasingly taking responsibility (often in consortium with others in the sector) for the whole supply chain acting responsibly (e.g. child labor in the cobalt industry). Finally, both the practitioner and academic discourse to date has focused on Western models of capitalism and governance, with capitalism in Asia far more state or

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family-based, often with a gap between legislation and rules enforcement. In this part of the world, in particular, more research needs to be done on how public relations and related disciplines can be better utilized to meet growing stakeholder expectations (Florini, 2014). The topic of corporate diplomacy, alongside public diplomacy, is a promising avenue for further practitioner and scholarly attention, with its implications for skills, recruitment and training/qualifications in public relations and associated fields. CREATING A NEW CADRE OF CORPORATE DIPLOMATS: IT’S STILL REPUTATION, RELATIONSHIPS, AND RESPONSIBILITY This will require CEOs and their advisers, including CCOs and heads of corporate affairs, to instill a culture of life-long learning, multi-dimensional mindset, with its implications for new structures, systems, and skills, not least a collaborative, “trisectoral” approach embracing the private, public, and not-for-profit sector in international environments. From corporate communications and media relations to public policy and risk management, social investment, listening, and dialogue internally and externally need to be aligned in a broad diplomatic function. Joe Nye in his work on “soft power” wrote about the key skill of “contextual intelligence,” perhaps the most important requirement in all those involved in this team effort. This refers to an understanding of the history and culture of a country, and an ability to analyse, frame, and position the players and situate them strategically. Incidentally, it is unlikely that this function can ever be linked entirely to one individual. As is often the case, it may work alongside strategic communications, internal communications, public affairs, and corporate social responsibility. Usually “Command and Control” works alongside a “Conversations and Collaboration” mindset, depending on the structure, culture, and motives of the organization, just as the traditional state system coexists with the networked environment. Thus, the scope for studies and experience needs to be widened. Corporations with a soft, diplomatic approach are better able to manage external pressures and obtain a “licence to operate” than those with combative attitudes (Ruel, 2013). Authentic communications can break through the wall of mistrust. Consumers now view a business social purpose as a major source of differentiation, which should involve employees. It is significant that the report from the Global Public Relations Alliance on a capabilities framework (Global Alliance, 2018) refers to businesses’ social purposes as a key skill, alongside leadership, ethics, collaboration, and a cosmopolitan mindset. Educators could use this framework to base the curriculum for educating the profession. But the dots will need to be connected between disciplines and further research undertaken to create a new theory that can be applied to practices, whether in the Western world, emerging countries or differently organized Asian economies and polities. There is a dire need for a more dialogic and diplomatic approach to stakeholder engagement involving a relational approach. Yet despite growing opportunities for public relations as a result of new media, advising governments and public-sector organizations as well as NGOs, a broader role for business, and complex issues requiring reframing the narrative and engaging with a broader eco-system of stakeholders, there remain challenges. The picture is uneven: public relations has a poor reputation, seen as largely tactical and superficial. Above all, there exists a skills deficit, particularly in relation to the broader competencies and experiences needed. It is

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no longer enough to understand data, technology, and content, but the fact that, for instance, hierarchical structures tend to be undermined by disruptive technologies or that authoritarian capitalism and the internet may not be suited to one another requires contextual intelligence. Doing the right thing is complicated in today’s marketplace. Relationships with stakeholders operating across and within countries, especially high context cultures, remain a challenge. There are far more questions than answers concerning, especially, culturally contingent aspects. Sometimes it seems as if business exists purely to enrich the small elite, yet with its resources and expertise, relationships with stakeholders can enrich the world. Reputation building simply for the purpose of securing higher brand value could threaten the values and therefore the “character” of the organization. As risk becomes more complex, transparency more radical and reputation more costly, the mission of the corporate or public diplomat becomes more and more relevant. The task of organizations, whether multinational corporations, NGOs, governments, or multi-lateral agencies like the UN, is to reframe the narrative, raise the bar higher, join the dots linking different disciplines, academics, and practitioners meeting to share best practice and above all, acquiring new skills. So, as we look ahead, the world is crying out for a new cadre of corporate and public diplomats. NOTE 1 A recent book, “Corporate Diplomacy: Building Reputation and Responsibility for Shareholder Value” (Henisz, 2014), emphasizes shareholder value.

REFERENCES Asghar, R. (2017, March 20). A golden age dawning for public diplomacy [Blog post]. Retrieved from https:// uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/golden-age-dawning-public-diplomacy. Cull, N. (2009). Public Diplomacy Before Guillon: The Evolution of a Phrase. In N. Snow, & P. Taylor (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 19–23). New York and London: Routledge. De Beer, E., Rensburg, R., & Steyn, B. (2013). Chapter 18 The Pretoria School of Thought - From Strategy to Governance and Sustainability. In K. Sriramesh, A. Zerfassm, & J. N. Kim (Eds.), Public Relations and Communication Management. New York and London: Routledge. Fletcher, T. (2016). The Naked Diplomat. UK: Williams Collins. Florini, A. (2014). The public roles of the private sector in Asia: The emerging research agenda. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 1(1), 33–44. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman/Publishing. Global Alliance for PR and Communication Management (2018, April). Global capabilities framework. Retrieved from www.globalalliancepublicrelations.org/capabilitiesframeworks. Gregory, A., & Willis, P. (2013). Strategic Public Relations Leadership. New York and London: Routledge. Grunig, J. (2000). Collectivism, collaboration and societal corporatism as core professional values in public relations. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(1), 23–48. Grupp, R., & Hayes, R. (2008). Gold Paper No. 17: Public Relations and Collaboration. Dorking and England: IPRA. Hayes, R. (2012). Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Symbiosis and Reformulation (unpublished doctoral dissertation). UK: Henley Business School. Hayes, R., & Watts, R. (2015). Reframing the Leadership Landscape: Creating a Culture of Collaboration. New York and London: Routledge.

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Henisz, W. (2014). Corporate Diplomacy: Building Reputation and Relationships with External Stakeholders. Austin, TX: Greenleaf Publishing. Kochar, S. (2013). Corporate diplomacy (unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Florida, USA. Kraus, M. (2006, January-Febuary). Global business diplomacy: Raising the bar. Foreign Policy Magazine, Washington, DC. MacNamara, J. (2011). Corporate and organisational diplomacy: An alternative paradigm to public relations. Journal of Communication Management, 16(3), 312–325. Nye, J. S. (2005). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, Oxford: Oxford Publicity Partnership. Porter, M., & Kramer, M. (2011). Creating shared value. Harvard Business Review, 3. Riordan, S. (2005). Dialogue-based public diplomacy: A new foreign policy paradigm?. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Ruel, H. J. M. (2013). Diplomacy Means Business. Windesheim and Netherlands: Zwolle, (NLD). Schwab, K. (2018, February 9). Private-sector public diplomacy at Davos [Blog post]. Retrieved from https:// uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/private-sector-public-diplomacy-davos. Slaughter, A. M. (2017). The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies for Connection in a Networked World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Snow, N. (2009). Rethinking public diplomacy. In N. Snow, & P. Taylor (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 3–9). New York and London: Routledge. Sriramesh, K. (2002). The dire need for multiculturalism in public relations education: An Asian perspective. Journal of Communication Management, 7(1), 54–77. Sriramesh, K. (2010). Globalisation and public relations. In R. Heath (Ed.), Public Relations Handbook (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Traverse-Healy, T. (1988). Gold Paper No. 6: Public Relations and Values Compared. Geneva, Switzerland: IPRA. Traverse-Healy, T. (2014). CREDO, Self-published. Van Dyke, M., & Verčič, D. (2009). Public Relations, public diplomacy and strategic communication: An international model of conceptual convergence. In K. Sriramesh, & D. Verčič (Eds.), The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research and Practice (pp. 822–839). New York and London: Routledge. Watson, T. (2007). Public relations research priorities: Adelphi study. Journal of Communication Management, 12(2), 104–123. Westermann-Behaylo, M. K., Rehbein, K., & Fort, T. (2015). Enhancing the concept of corporate diplomacy: Encompassing political corporate social responsibility, international relations and peace through commerce. The Academy of Management Perspectives, Perspectives, 29(4), 387–404. White, C. (2015). Exploring the role of private-sector corporations in public diplomacy. Public Relations Inquiry, 4(3), 305–321. White, C., & Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2018). Corporate perspectives on the role of global public relations in public diplomacy. Public Relations Journal, 11(4). Zaharna, R. S. (2009). Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives. In N. Snow, & P. Taylor (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 86–100). New York and London: Routledge.

CHAPTER

23 Public Relations and the Concept of ‘Nations within Nations’ The Case of Bullfighting in Multicultural Spain Jordi Xifra Krishnamurthy Sriramesh

In October, 2017, the Catalan government (so-called Generalitat) held a referendum on whether Catalonia should become an independent nation, which was passed by the Parliament of Catalonia as the Law on the Referendum on Self-determination of Catalonia. The referendum had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain the previous month after a request from the Spanish government, which declared it a breach of the Spanish Constitution. Additionally, in early September the High Court of Justice of Catalonia had issued orders to the police to try to prevent the plebiscite, including the detention of various persons responsible for its preparation. Due to alleged irregularities during the voting process as well as to the use of force by the National Police and Civil Guard, international observers invited by the Generalitat declared that the referendum failed to meet the minimum international standards for elections. The referendum asked voters to respond with “Yes” or “No,” in response to the question: “Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a republic?” The result was a resounding “yes” with 2,044,038 (92.01%) voting for independence and 177,547 (7.99%) voting against on a turnout of 43.03%. The Catalan government estimated that as many as 770,000 voters were unable to cast their ballots as polling stations were closed because of police crackdowns. Defending the vote, former Catalan leader Artur Mas stated: “We want to decide a new political future. All nations have a right to do so and mature democracies respect that” (The Guardian, November 10, 2014). This referendum, and the continuing political and legal wrangling between Madrid (capital of Spain) and Barcelona (capital of Catalonia) serves as the backdrop of this case study of the intersection of culture and public

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relations. Whereas culture – as seen by the anthropologists – is very much central to this chapter, we also discuss political culture (as manifested in issues management), and activist culture thereby displaying one of the central notions of this book as outlined in Part I – the five variables discussed therein overlap to a great extent even though they may be discussed individually as separate chapters. The chapter on culture and public relations (in Part I) outlined three ways in which the nexus between public relations and culture can be explored. Extending from that discussion, this chapter discusses the notion of “nations within nations” where distinct cultural groups that consider themselves as a homogenous entity and hence a “nation” (in this case the autonomous region of Catalonia) may find themselves within the political borders of another nation (in this case Spain). In our view, Spain is a classic example of nations within a nation as evident in the case we have selected for this analysis. The case study of the ban on bullfighting in Catalonia is interesting to public relations scholars, for several reasons. Was this ban a political or cultural victory? Was the ban a victory of Catalan nationalism against the nation of Spain? Was this ban representative of the clash between “tradition” (centuries old habit of bullfighting) and “modern” values (animal rights activism)? We find in this case study the confluence of a number of cross-currents such as the nationalism of the Catalan and their penchant for some sort of “independence” from the dominant Spanish culture, and the ways in which advocates of the ban used issues management principles and activism to advance their cause. It is interesting to note that the parliament of another Spanish autonomous region, the Canary Islands, banned bullfighting in 1991 as a result of the initiative led by a deputy of the Spanish conservative party, Partido Popular. But on the other hand, it is also true that parliament did not ban Catalan fiestas in which, the bull is tortured but not killed. BULLFIGHTING IN SPAIN AND CATALONIA Spain would be the first country that comes to the mind of most people when the word “bull fighting” is uttered. To appreciate the deep significance of bulls and bullfighting to the Spanish self-image and culture, one needs to see the starkly black Osborne bull – also known as “bullboards” (Block, 2007). Inaugurated in 1957 in Spain, these billboards were originally only 13 feet high and cut from a single piece of wood – to advertise the well-known Veterano Brandy. Today, ninety “Osborne bulls,” each supported by fifty-five tons of scaffolding, function as prominent landmarks along highways throughout Spain. In 1994, The Spanish government, declared the Osborne bull a part of the Spain’s National Heritage (Brandes, 2009, p. 784) – a cultural heritage, we observe. The origins of bullfighting in Spain can be traced to ancient Rome – Emperor Claudius used it as a substitute for gladiatorial combat, which he had banned (albeit for a short time). Bullfighting spread from Spain to its Central and South American colonies. It spread to France in the 19th century (Abella, 1993). The Spanish introduced bullfighting on foot around 1726. This type of fighting drew more attention from the crowds and thus the modern corrida, or fight, began to take form, as riding noblemen were substituted by commoners on foot and Spain came to be popularly known as the “home of bullfighting.” In Catalonia, the earliest recorded bullfight took place in 1387, although, as elsewhere in Spain, it was not until the early 19th century that bullfighting in the region took its form as a modern spectator sport. By the early 20th century, bullfighting had become one of the major entertainment attractions in Catalonia. The region still preserves some of the oldest bullrings in Spain, such as the Plaça Clarà in Olot (built in 1859), and the bullring in Figueres (1894). A bullring built in 1897 in Girona was

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demolished in 2006 (Abella, 1993). The only operating bullring in Catalonia, La Monumental in Barcelona, was closed after a finale of 17 fights were held in 2011. This compares to 285 fights organized in the Community of Madrid (with a similar population to Catalonia) during 2011. A ban on bullfighting in Catalonia was approved by the Catalan Parliament on July 28, 2010, following a petition (or popular legislative initiative) organized by the Prou! Platform (Catalan for “Enough!”). The petition attracted 180,000 signatures. The parliamentary vote was 68 votes for and 55 against, with nine abstentions. The ban came into force on January 1, 2012. CAMPAIGN FOR/AGAINST BULLFIGHTING: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TUG-OF-WAR Opposition to bullfighting is not new. Since its introduction in Spain, bullfighting has been controversial and has met with criticism and even bans. Charles III of Spain, influenced by the Count of Aranda, banned bullfighting in 1771. However, his subjects ignored it and continued to enthusiastically support new bullfighters. Francisco de Goya even had a collection of engravings on bullfighting. Charles IV of Spain again banned bullfighting in 1805. After the Peninsular War (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Peninsular_War – cite_note-2), throughout the 19th century, the Spanish Parliament frequently debated the ban. In 1877, the Marquis de San Carlos deputies proposed another ban, which was rejected for fear of being too unpopular. Today, the defenders of animal rights lead the charge against bullfighting. However, the Catalan case is special. Portraying bullfighting as an element of the dominant Spanish culture, some groups advocated for the ban to show Catalan cultural nationalism. Although the then president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, stated that he didn’t believe that the Catalan ban was “a Catalan victory,” and the Spanish government asked that the ban not be politicized, the conflict had nationalistic overtones. In response to the ban in Catalonia, the Community of Madrid (headed by Esperenza Aguirre, President of the conservative Spanish nationalist party) chose to “reinforce the Feast of the Bulls,” initiating the process for declaring bullfighting “Bien de Interés Cultural,” a category of the Spanish heritage register. In October 2011, the Spanish Senate (with a Socialist majority supported by the Catalan nationalists) rejected the conservative proposition to declare bullfighting as “Bien de Interés Cultural.” After that, the conservative Partido Popular party filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court against the Catalan law banning bullfights from 2012. Meanwhile, in Catalonia, civil society in favor of bullfighting also was mobilized, using the same resources that had been used by groups opposed to bullfighting. This initiative received support from some conservative media. Of particular note was the support received by the Spanish nationalist newspaper La Gaceta, which, on October 14, 2011, handed out a sheet to collect signatures with each copy of newspaper (90,000 in total). With this brief description of the case, the next sections will review three streams of literature that help us analyze the case of banning bullfighting in Catalonia and linking them with public relations: culture, issues management, and activism. SPANISH CULTURE: “NATIONS WITHIN A NATION” According to Brandes (2009), bullfighting is more closely associated with Spanish national identity than baseball is to that of the United States. Marvin (1988) contended that the cultural significance of the bullfight is

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suggested by its general popular image as something quintessentially Spanish, by the considerable attention paid to it within Spain, and because of its status as an elaborate and spectacular ritual drama which is staged as an essential part of many important celebrations. (p. XV)

The author also observed that the torero, or bullfighter, has long been a heroic figure occupying a special place in Spanish popular culture. Those observations concerning the centrality of bulls and bullfighting to Spaniards, both historically and contemporaneously, are more than confirmed by the enormous number and variety of proverbs that focus on bulls and the bullfight in general (Mitchell, 1991). It is this link to Spanish culture that also makes bullfighting less acceptable to other cultures within – the nations within what, to the rest of the world, is the country of Spain. Spain is hardly the homogeneous nation contrary to the perception of outsiders unfamiliar with the fact that Spain consists of three main “minority” nations: the Catalans, the Basques, and the Galicians. Each of these cultures has its own language (not dialect), cuisine, history, and culture and all three have tried mightily over the centuries to maintain and increase their cultural uniqueness and political independence from Madrid – icon of the Spanish state. In addition, the influence of Islamic culture in the Andalusian region allows us to approach to it as the fourth culture of Spain. A brief description of each culture helps establish why we use the term “nations within nations” in this chapter. Catalonia Catalonia is an autonomous region in the north-eastern corner of Spain with Barcelona as its capital. For hundreds of years before the unification of Spain in 1469, Catalonia had its own empire in the Mediterranean controlling the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and Sicily. Catalonia was the center of the Industrial Revolution in Spain and became the economic capital of the entire country, while political power was based in Madrid. Because of their national pride and economic wealth, the Catalans have had an often uneasy relationship with the central government and the majority of people in the region have wanted more autonomy or even full independence. During the dictatorship of Franco (1938–1978) the Catalan language and culture were severely oppressed. Teaching, and even speaking Catalan was illegal but this only transformed the language into a political tool and it survived underground. Today the Catalan language is taught in all schools in the region and even immigrants from other parts of Spain, Latin America, and Africa speak it. Catalan language TV and radio, newspapers, and magazines, novels, plays, and poetry all help keep the Catalan “nation” and culture alive and thriving. Apart from the region of Catalonia, the language and its dialects are also spoken in Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Andorra, and the North-west of Sardinia. It is the most widely spoken “minority” language in Spain and the number of speakers is actually growing. According to the government of Catalonia, more than 6 million people speak Catalan in contrast with 4.5 million people who spoke it in 2007 (www20.gencat.cat/portal/ site/Llengcat?newLang=en_GB). Over the past thirty years, the sources of opposition to bullfighting within Catalonia have grown in parallel with the growth of separatist sentiments. Most Catalans readily declared the bullfight to be a Castilian rather than pan-Spanish custom, and

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they believed that it should be permanently banned within Catalonia. They also objected to public displays of the bull, a symbol of the hated Spanish state, which, under Franco, attempted to obliterate their language and distinctive customs. Consequently, one of the main objectives of Catalan nationalists has been to rid Catalonia of the Osborne bull (described at the beginning of this paper), which they have done successfully with the banning of bullfighting. We next offer a brief overview of the three “minority” cultures (nations) of Spain to highlight the differences in cultures within one political boundary. Basque The Basque Country is an autonomous region in north-central Spain with its own unique culture and language. Its language Euskera is not related to any other existing language in the world. No one knows the origin of Basques with one school of thought proposing that they are the original inhabitants of Europe, pre-dating the Celts and other tribes (Ayala, 1986). The Basques are traditionally a sea-faring people and fishing was, and is, a very important part of the Basque culture and economy (Castells et al., 2008). During Franco’s dictatorship Basque language and culture was also oppressed similar to Catalan. This oppression led to the creation of the group ETA which, sadly, is what most people unfamiliar with Spain associate with the Basque Country today. This terrorist organization was founded in the 1960s and became the most effective terror organization in Europe. ETA – “Euskadi Ta Askatasuna” (Basque Homeland and Freedom) – was formed mainly to win independence for the Basque Country through political and military action (Castells et al., 2008). On October 20th, 2011, ETA declared an “end to armed struggle” and renounced its campaign of terrorist violence after more than half a century. Galicia Galicia is an autonomous region in the north-western corner of Spain. The Galicians are a Celtic race, related to the Irish, the Scots, and the Welsh. Many aspects of Galician culture such as dance and music are very similar to Irish and Scottish culture (there is even a Galician version of the famous Scottish bagpipe, the gaita) but the Galician language is a Romance language that has descended from Latin (García-Cárcel, 2012). Galician, or gallego, is almost identical to Portuguese and some people regard it as a Portuguese dialect rather than a separate language. Andalusia Andalusia has a wide array of social customs, many of which have their roots in Islamic traditions integrated into the area under Muslim rule. Each sub region in Andalusia has its own unique customs that are closely tied to a combination Catholicism and local folklore. Traditional dress in Andalusia tends to be colorful and involves various head coverings confirming a Muslim past. Andalusia doesn’t have a specific language with Andalusian Spanish being one of the most widely spoken forms of Spanish in Spain, and because of emigration patterns has influenced American Spanish as well. Rather than a single dialect, it is a range of dialects sharing some common features; among these is the retention of more Arabic words than

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elsewhere in Spain, as well as some phonological differences compared with Standard Spanish (Ayala, 1986). Reactions from These Non-Dominant Cultures (Nations) to Bullfighting Central as the symbol of the bull may be, the bullfight, and even bulls themselves, have come under serious attack from several politically active segments of Spanish society. From this perspective, some authors (e.g. Mitchell, 1991; Brandes, 2009) consider, first, an ethno-nationalist opposition. In Catalonia, large, potentially ferocious bulls have come to represent Castille, synonymous with the oft-despised Spanish centrist state. In fact, rightist opponents of enhanced autonomy for linguistically and culturally distinct regions such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, have adopted the silhouette of the Osborne bull in the countryside as their unifying symbol (Brandes, 2009). Over the past thirty years, the sources of opposition to bullfighting within Catalonia had grown parallel with the growth of separatist sentiments. Most Catalans readily declared bullfighting to be a Castilian, rather than pan-Spanish custom, arguing that it should be permanently banned in Catalonia. They also objected to public displays of the bull, a symbol of the hated Spanish state. It is worth noting here that most of this opposition is nationalistic rather than ethical – the mainstay of animal rights activists opposed to bullfighting. BULLFIGHTING AS ISSUES MANAGEMENT In addition to analyzing the ban on bullfighting as a cultural issue, we have chosen two other variables discussed in Part I – political system (in the form of issues management here) and activism – to link the case of Catalan ban on bullfighting to public relations although several other streams of thought are equally relevant. Since Howard Chase coined the term “issues management” in 1977, much of the literature has focused on how issues management can help corporations respond more robustly to their critics such as civil society but our case is not bound by that orientation. Ewing (1987) stated that issues management “is about power” (p. 1) signifying how important strategic communication can be to establish primacy in society. Heath (2004) stated that issues management “…helps a variety of organizations serve stewardship roles … [and that it is] a vital part of activism, issue-relevant nonprofits, and government agencies.” Many themes discussed within issues management are relevant to this case. In 2003 Catalan separatists launched a campaign against the Osborne bull by initially painting some of the billboards in the colors and pattern of the Catalan flag. They decorated other billboards with white, cloud-like marks, so that the bulls looked like cows. Still unhappy with any remnant of this Castilian symbol in their midst, they dismantled the structures by early December 2003 (Brandes, 2009). Having thus made a statement about their intentions, Catalan nationalists then turned to the practice of bullfighting. They garnered a fair amount of popular support in this effort from a variety of sources including animal rights activists who may not have had Catalan nationalism as their focus. Clearly, the coalition against bullfighting had myriad hues and not all were fighting for Catalan nationalism as indicated in a 2007 survey finding that about 81% of Catalans opposed bullfighting (Brandes, 2009). Surveys showed that Catalans and Gallegos were the least interested in the sport and the Andalusians the most. Given that bullfights are popularly known as the “fiesta

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nacional” – national festival (Marvin, 1988, p. 52), the opposition by Catalan separatists was hardly surprising. In December 2006, 37 towns and cities in Catalonia declared themselves “antitaurina” (against bullfighting). In 1997, motivated by a growing awareness that bullfights might provoke emotional trauma, the Catalan Parliament declared that children under the age of 14 could not attend these events because of their violence and gore (Brandes, 2009). Protests ensued and the following year the law was modified permitting 14-year olds to witness bullfights if accompanied by adults. Apart from nationalist and political groups, one of the most important allies for the cause against bullfighting were animal rights advocates. One of the most active Spanish organizations in this campaign is the Asociación Defensa Derechos Animal (ADDA). This group employed the internet effectively in the struggle to outlaw bullfights. In June 2006, the internet was used to rally youth to demonstrate against bullfights in front of Spanish Embassies located in at least seventeen countries including the United States. To draw attention to their cause, the demonstrators wore nothing but plastic bull horns and skimpy undergarments (Brandes, 2009). The web site www.latortura.es disseminated gory “videos of torture,” as it called them – graphic close-up shots of bulls in agony. The nationalistic campaign also received support from animal rights advocates throughout Europe – popularly known as “animalists” (animalistas in Spain; animalistes in France and animalisti in Italy). With this overview, we now use the issue life cycle offered by Crable and Vibbert (1985) to discuss the anti-bullfighting campaign. Crable and Vibbert (1985) extended this stream of research and offered what they called the “issues life cycle” consisting of five phases (potential, imminent, current, critical, and dormant) and posited that only issues that go through the first four phases result in legislative action resulting in laws that regulate corporate activities. Even after an issue has resulted in public policy, it does not die but only remains dormant until another set of activists invoke it as an issue that needs to be resolved and try to advance it through the four stages of the lifecycle seeking a solution that is more amenable to them. We will next assess how the animal rights advocacy groups in Catalonia advanced the issue of bullfighting through these phases of the life cycle (including the dormant phase) ensuring success of their campaign. Potential Status The campaign was launched in August 2006 by the interest group Plataforma Prou! (Stop!) – founded by a group of citizens who were disenchanted that Catalan politicians did not heed the sentiments of the over 80% Catalonians who wanted to end bullfighting in their land. The group began the campaign by setting up a website (www.prou.cat/) that, among other things, helped collect the 50,000 signatures required to force the Parliament of Catalonia to discuss, and vote on, the issue. Imminent Status The interest group Plataforma Prou! had succeeded in getting a significant number of Catalonians interested in the issue, thus proving that the “potential” of the issue had been accepted by “others” thus moving the issue to imminent status. One of those “others” was the separatist political party (in the government), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, for whom bullfighting was a symbol of the dominant Spanish culture. In parallel, Plataforma Prou! built alliances with others members of civil society, and

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received the support of another political party created only for abolishing bullfighting (Partido Animalista). In addition, some celebrities, specially from other regions of Spain and from abroad (such as the British actor Ricky Gervais), stated their support to the abolition of bullfighting through a video in Youtube1 cementing that the issue had firmly moved into the imminent status. Current Status Crable and Vibbert (1985) stated that an issue is in the current status when it becomes part of the social agenda. In this stage, the role of mass media is crucial. The antibullfighting issue reached this status in November 11, 2008 when the popular initiative (supported by 180,000 signatures) was admitted for discussion by the Catalan Parliament and approved one year later (December 18, 2009) with groups representing the two sides of the issue protesting in front of the Parliament building representing the dichotomization of the issue: the Plataforma Promoció i Difusió de la Festa that favored continuation of bullfighting in Catalonia, and a mix of members from different groups for animals’ rights. In addition, until the final decision of the Catalan Parliament in 2010, the groups opposed to bullfighting held demonstrations in front of the Plaza de Toros Monumental, then the only active bullring in Barcelona, to attract the attention of international tourists – with great efficacy. During the parliamentary debate, an animal rights group called Plataforma Prou! was engaged in various issues management strategies. In particular, it made deft use of media relations and its website with frequent updates – both of which were crucial for the interest group with meager resources. Interestingly, the government didn’t take a position on the issue and had no media relations activities. In fact, all political parties permitted their members to vote based on their conscience – rather than issuing a party-ling whip – saying they considered the issue a personal and emotional one, not political. For this reason we can find some dissonance between emotions and political convictions among Catalan politicians as illustrated in the statement of JosepAntoni Duran, the leader of the Catalan nationalist party Unió Democràtica that considered the ban a national identity issue: “Banning full fighting is not a question of national identity” (La Vanguardia, 3/4/2010)2; and Alicia Sánchez, the leader of Catalan section of Spanish national and conservative party, Partido Popular (Popular Party, today in the government) said: “I enjoy bullfighting and I am against the ban” (La Vanguardia, 3/4/2010).3 Critical Status The issue ascended to critical status in December 2009 when the Catalan Parliament approved the onset of the legislative procedure that would lead to ban bullfighting in the nation. The communication strategy of Plataforma Prou! was well planned to ensure constant pressure on the parliament. It announced the support of different celebrities such as Ricky Gervais, to the media. All the main newspapers of Spain and Catalonia (El País, El Mundo, ABC, La Vanguardia, El Periódico) covered the event. For its part, Plataforma Promoció i Difusió de la Festa presented the press with a manifesto defending bullfighting and opposing its abolition. During this period other actors used media relations and advocacy advertising strategies and tactics to further dichotomize the issue. In June 2010, La Monumental de Barcelona Funciones Taurinas, owner of the only bullring in Barcelona, began an advertising

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campaign on the headrests of Barcelona taxis promoting bullfighting.4 Three months earlier, Pedro Balañá, the CEO of this company and the most prominent businessman of Catalan entertainment industry declared in a press conference that attendance at bullfighting spectacles had been growing since 2003.5 The most nationalistic tactics against the ban came from Spanish nationalist parties, which tried to turn the issue into a political one rather than one about animal cruelty. The March 2010 press conference of the President of the government of the region of Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, to announce her intention to include the history and tradition of bullfighting as a crucial part of Spanish cultural identity in secondary school curriculum received the most media attention. As one of the most popular leaders of Partido Popular, Aguirre also organized a tour of different regions governed by Partido Popular, as Valencia and Murcia, to build an alliance to protect bullfighting stating: “Bullfighting is an art and deserve to be protected, such as monuments or museums ( … ) Goya, Picasso, García Lorca ( … ) Hemingway and Orson Welles, have considered bullfighting as an art” (La Vanguardia, 3/6/2010, p. 16). Plataforma Prou! responded with its own media campaign against the efforts to turn the issue6 into a nationalist discussion and continued its campaign for obtaining support from celebrities including football players such as Carles Puyol (the leader of Barcelona Football Club).7 Prou! also garnered the support of experts such as the Humane Society Veterinarian Medical Association (HSVMA) that sent a letter to the President of Catalan Parliament to urge the Parliament of Catalonia to disregard statements that suggest that the bull does not suffer greatly during its time in the ring.8 This argument was the paramount one used by supporters of bullfighting. Activists also ensured that since the beginning of the legislative process to ban bullfighting in Catalonia, the Catalan parliamentarians received a steady flow of letters and manifestoes favoring the abolition of bullfighting.9 Proponents of banning bullfighting were further buoyed when a group of 273 eminent scientists from 16 countries sent a statement to the Catalonian Parliament demanding the end of bullfighting: the mistreatment of animals is a very serious and worrying issue that affect society and the repercussions of which are very significant for the welfare of the people. It is increasingly clear that a world that allows the abuse animals is a world less safe for humans.10

In contrast, the Catalan government remained silent with the Minister of Culture only stating that the decision on this issue was a legislative one and that the Catalan government would respect the parliament’s decision.11 This doesn’t mean that the Catalan government did not experience nationalism from this issue. This answer is a form of democratic legitimation of the decision. With this kind of justification, the government endorses the issue to the parliament (democratically elected by people of Catalonia). The same reason has been used in the claim for the independence from September 2013. The use of this argument was a rhetorical tactic. On July 28, 2010, the Parliament of Catalonia voted to ban bullfighting in the region from July 2012. With this policy resolution, the issue entered the dormant status that Crable and Vibbert had identified. Indeed, one of the claims of the supporters of banning bullfighting is to ban all the events in which animals are used. One of the most traditional Catalan festivals is the correbous (“fire bull”), in which people run behind bulls whose horns are lit with fire, as if they are torches. So, for the groups that defend the rights of animals, the banning of correbous is the next goal.

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However, the proponents of bullfighting did not remain dormant for long. Some provincial chapters of the most important conservative party in Spain, the Partido Popular, have tried to declare bullfighting as a cultural heritage in response to the ban. In March 2012, the Federation of Bullfighting Organizations (Federación de Entidades Taurinas) presented 590,000 signatures to the House of Representatives to endorse another popular legislative initiative to declare bullfighting “Bien de Interés Cultural” the Spanish equivalent of UNESCO’s Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity12 so that regions like Catalonia could not ban it. Dormant Status With the ban instituted by the autonomous government of Catalonia, the issue was not put to rest – exactly as described by the life cycle of an issue. The Spanish government deemed bullfighting as a “cultural heritage” and, much to the chagrin of the Catalonian “nation,” the ban was ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Supreme Court on October 5, 2016. In its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that “preservation of common cultural heritage” was essential and that the Catalan Parliament had exceeded its authority in instituting the ban. The key difference in perception here related to whose cultural heritage and whether the term “common” was relevant given the differences in culture between the “nations” within the Spanish nation. Needless to say, the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court was received with outrage by most Catalans as reflected by Neus Munte, spokeswoman for the Catalan government, who stated that the Catalan government would “set to work immediately to ensure that the ruling has no practical effect” (The Guardian, October 20, 2016). That was in stark contrast to the glee at the ruling expressed by ex-president of the Madrid region Esperanza Aguirre who tweeted: “Bulls return to Catalonia. Millions of Spanish and international fans celebrate the decision.” The rage, and the battle, continue. Activism Issues management is closely linked to activism. Along with citizens and the government, activists form the three-legged stool that is issues management. As described in the chapter on activism (Part I), activists form the major force that threaten corporations thus creating the need for corporations to engage in issues management. Currently there is scant empirical evidence linking public relations with activism although two decades have passed since L. Grunig (1992) offered conceptual links between public relations and activism by defining activism as an effort by “a group of two or more individuals who organize in order to influence another public or publics through action that may include education, compromise, persuasion, pressure tactics, or force” (p. 504). Kim and Sriramesh (2009) discussed the conceptual linkages between socio-cultural factors and activism and offered research questions and propositions to advance empirical research linking these two key variables. The chapter on activism in this volume has extended those discussions. We use the case study of the ban on bullfighting in the Catalonian region of Spain to provide an example of the nexus between activism and public relations. Social movements in Spain have played an important role throughout its history, but especially in the last three decades since the arrival of modern democracy after Franco’s dictatorship. The country has seen many types of social movements rise and this activist arousal has involved different social and worker groups and labor unions.

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The main reasons of activism were the recognition of civil rights, an outcome achieved in 1978, when the Constitution was approved. After 1978, activism centres around political activism aimed at obtaining greater recognition for political and financial autonomy for regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia. Although the terrorist group ETA has not relinquished its arms (a ceasefire has been in place since September, 2012), independence-oriented activism does exist and manifests itself regularly in the streets of cities such as Bilbao and San Sebastián. In Catalonia, the nationalist movement is represented by both the autonomous government and important groups in civil society. Animal rights groups were mobilized and lobbied for legislation to protect these rights in different autonomous regions. Thus, the Parliaments of the regions of Madrid, Murcia, Catalonia, and the Canary Islands approved this legislation. However, only the Canary Islands banned bullfighting in 1991. The civil platform against bullfighting in Catalonia (Prou!), can be linked with Catalan nationalism, because bulls are not specific to Catalan culture, as opposed to “dominant” Spanish culture, along with flamenco (curiously, a sign of Andalusian culture). CONCLUSION The primary purpose of this chapter is to highlight that political boundaries that determine what we call as “nation-states” often belie cultural boundaries. The notion of “nations within nations” has been coined to emphasize that cultural distinctiveness often induces populations to rebel in various ways to assert their uniqueness. We have used the ban (and subsequent reversal) of bullfighting in Catalonia to discuss the impact of culture on public relations by studying Spain as a nation containing nations – unique cultures – within what we see as the nation of Spain with its distinct political boundary. The case also helps explicate the impact of the political system (including the role of the judiciary) as well as activism on public opinion and public relations. We have highlighted how the Franco regime imposed Spanish “culture” on these unique nations that they accepted begrudgingly at the point of a gun. With the dawn of democracy, nationalism has erupted – sometimes violently such as the actions of ETA – but also legislatively as seen in the Catalonian ban on bullfighting. We have argued that banning bullfighting is a political decision with cultural motives, because Catalan nationalism is a cultural nationalism that turns political when it is used as an argument and ideology by national political parties. Importantly for public relations scholars, the campaign to ban bullfighting in Catalonia had strong international allies such as animal rights groups and international celebrities – helping immensely for media relations. This case has also highlighted the usefulness of issues management to study how issues spawn and develop into activism and then into successful social movements. Communication has been key in all stages of the development of this issue to its final conclusion. Looking to the future, we believe that more studies are needed from around the world that can showcase the role of unique cultural idiosyncrasies in public relations thus expanding the body of knowledge and making it less ethnocentric. NOTES 1 www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_mPhAZYEyo 2 www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20100304/53897201411/duran-dice-que-prohibir-los-toros-no-es-identi tario.html

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3 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100304/53896635409/sanchez-camacho-asegura-que-disfruta-en-la-fiestay-se-opone-a-su-prohibicion.html 4 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100616/53947449565/la-monumental-contrarresta-el-movimiento-antitaur ino-con-una-campana-en-taxis.html 5 www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100317/53897700925/balana-asegura-que-las-corridas-de-toros-ganan-pub lico-en-catalunya-desde-2003.html 6 www.abc.es/agencias/noticia.asp?noticia=338981 7 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=30 8 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=34 9 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=36 10 www.prou.cat/n.php?id_noticia=36 11 http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/2010/07/25/pagina-16/81064365/pdf.html?search=toros 12 www.publico.es/espana/426814/590-000-firmas-para-declarar-los-toros-bien-cultural-en-catalunya

REFERENCES Abella, C. (1993). Historia del toreo. Madrid: Alianza. Ayala, F. (1986). La imagen de España. Madrid: Alianza. Block, J. (2007). Bully for Them. American Way, 15, 51–66. Brandes, S. (2009). Torophiles and torophobes: The Politics of bulls and bullfights in contemporary Spain. Anthropological Quarterly, 82(3), 779–794. Castells, L., Cajal, A., & Molina, F. (Eds.). (2008). El País Vasco y España: identidades, nacionalismos y estado (siglos XIX y XX). Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco. Crable, R. C., & Vibbert, S. L. (1985). Managing issues and influencing public policy. Public Relations Review, 11(2), 3–15. Ewing, R. P. (1987). Managing the new bottom line: issues management for senior executives. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin. García-Cárcel, R. (2011). La herencia del pasado: Las memorias históricas de España. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Grunig, L. A. (1992). Activism: How it limits the effectiveness of organizations and how excellent public relations departments respond. In J. E. Grunig (Ed.), Excellence in communication and public relations management: Contributions to effective organizations (pp. 503–530). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Heath, R. L. (2004). Issues management. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public relations. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage. Kim, J-N., & Sriramesh, K. (2009). A descriptive model of activism in global public relations research and practice. In K. Sriramesh and D. Verčič (Eds.) The Global Public Relations Handbook (Revised Edition, pp. 79–97). New York, NY: Routledge. Mitchell, T. (1991). Blood sport: A social history of Spanish bullfighting. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

CHAPTER

24 Climate Change Imperatives for Global Public Relations Who Pays and Who Cares? Judy Motion

Failure to understand and address climate change will have significant ramifications for the public relations profession. This chapter seeks to understand how a justice orientation for public relations may be deployed to shape climate change action. The scientific consensus is that we are living and working in the Anthropocene age of human-induced climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014). Yet, there is a lack of clarity about the meaning of the term “climate change.” At a most basic level, there can be a tendency to conflate the terms weather and climate. A simple distinction is that weather refers to “events” (Allen, 2003, p. 891) whereas climate refers to weather “systems” (Egan and Mullin, 2016, p. 357) or “patterns.” Climate change science is concerned with long-term pattern changes rather than daily or seasonal change (Rocklöv, 2016). Australian environmental advocate and academic, Tim Flannery, summarized climate change in this way: “our earth is warming, and will continue to warm in proportion to the volume of fossil fuel we burn” (Flannery, 2015, p. 5). Discursively, climate change has been very deliberately positioned as controversial and an ideological predilection – something to be believed rather than understood. Public relations is deployed to play both sides of the controversy: campaigns are designed to advocate for climate change action or also to negate and deny climate change science. As described in the first part of this volume, Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) identified a level of activism as a significant infrastructural ingredient in international and global public relations that provides provides both challenges and opportunities. Citizens, nongovernment organizations, and nations engage in efforts to mitigate climate change that may be broadly categorized as activism including opposition to fossil fuel extractivism, acknowledgement of the anthropogenic nature of climate change, calls for a reduction 258

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in CO2 emissions, and legal redress (Flannery, 2005, 2015; Rushbridger, 2015). As part of the discursive contestation involved in climate change action, public relations is expected to navigate and negotiate issues about liability and care. A range of justice questions related to liability and care are embedded in advocacy campaigns for climate change action including what is at stake, whose interests are being served, and who wins and who loses? Public relations has tended to deploy Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a mechanism for addressing such questions and issues. Here, as a counter to the dominance of CSR, an environmental justice approach is adopted to examine the discursive shifts that ensue from positioning the environment at the center of concerns. In particular, the concepts of guardianship and personhood are explored to offer insights into the possibilities for global public relations initiatives to mitigate climate change action. The aim of this chapter is to shift the ideological focus to ontological and epistemic concerns about climate change.

LIABILITY: WHO PAYS? Asking the question, “who pays?” focuses attention on a range of fiduciary and financial responsibilities that may be commonly considered to be outside the parameters of public relations. Yet, if public relations is to realize its role in contributing to a “fully functioning society” (Heath, 2006, p. 94), then public relations, in its many forms, needs to help nations, organizations, and citizens make sense of climate change and the associated liabilities – obligations and responsibilities – for climate change. This involves a discursive shift from ideological debates about believing in climate change to epistemic engagement with what is known and what needs to be actioned. Public relations also has an obligation to ensure that we understand “who pays” in terms of experiencing the impacts of climate change – who or what will experience climate change first and experience it most markedly? Moral arguments have been disappointingly ineffective in mobilizing change in some government and corporate responses. Moving beyond moral pressure and expectations that CSR will address climate change means that public relations has to be deployed to lobby for climate change action in the form of treaties, regulations, and legal redress. Many past attempts to agree upon a system of global climate governance stalled due to individual nations prioritizing their own interests. However, on December 12, 2015, the Paris Climate Change Conference adopted a new climate treaty. Known as the Paris Accord, or the Paris Agreement, it marked a global commitment “to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, making specific reference to the 2°C goal, and even an aspirational reference to the 1.5°C goal” (Savaresi, 2016, p. 5). These ambitious goals included mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation such as capacity building, finance, and technology transfer (Savaresi, 2016, p. 5). Notably, the Paris Agreement reversed the justice principles of the earlier 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Among the reversals were such things as removing equitable differentiations between the obligations of developed and developing nations; self-determination by nations/states on how they intended to reduce their CO2 emissions; and the establishment of a framework to review progress rather than the previous approach of setting targets and a timetable to achieve them (Clémençon, 2016). The risks and liabilities “associated with a global transition towards low-carbon societies” (Savaresi, 2016, p. 8) were to be managed by individual nations. Although the provisions of the Paris Agreement seem inadequate from a justice perspective – and potentially ineffectual – the Agreement has been perceived to offer credence and legitimacy for climate change action.

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Recently, the Paris Agreement has been destabilized by the Trump administration’s announcement withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement. However, several states including Hawaii and California have determined that they shall remain committed to the agreement and therefore liability remains a hotly contested issue to be resolved by future global governance initiatives. Still, the role for public relations is clear – at a political level it must support climate change mitigation treaties, regulations, and policies while at a societal level it needs to support a low carbon way of life.

FROM CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO JUSTICE Shifting our focus from a global governance perspective to corporate public relations departments and consultancies helps us highlight a number of significant limitations to the usual application of CSR to environmental issues such as climate change. Although CSR is a useful tool for reminding corporations of their broader obligations to society and the environment, it does not protect organizations or guarantee the advancement of social and environmental justice. CSR is predicated on notions of a “collective environmental conscience” (Allen, 2003), that, while essential, does not take into account the risks of climate change liability including: Operational Risk (disruption of company operations), Insurance Risk (increased premiums and/or uninsurability), Regulatory Risk (regulation of greenhouse emissions and ensuing compliance costs), Shareholder Risk (shareholder activism and disruption) Litigation Risk (costs resulting from “climate litigation”) Capital Risk (inability to raise capital) Competitive Risk (loss of economic opportunity) (Climate Action Network Australia (CANA), 2003)

Although this list is indicative, it doesn’t specifically mention the presence of risk to profitability but it does suggest disruption will be intense and far-ranging. From a public relations perspective, we would also need to add, for example, governance responsibilities, media relations, brand damage, and reputational risk as tools that can help communicate environmental issues. Even though CSR has proved useful for public relations professionals and their clients, organizations need to pay particular attention to, and prioritize, climate risk and liabilities rather than hope that CSR will take care of issues related to climate change. To be blunt, the complexities of climate change require a more sophisticated mechanism than CSR for addressing such challenges. CSR is predicated upon an approach in which risk and obligations are calculated by determining how to offset financial impacts with social and environmental good work. A significant problem is that a key tenet of CSR is the need to keep its three pillars – economic, social, and environmental obligations – in balance. However, according to Ihlen and Roper (2014), the balance metaphor defines and justifies how sustainability and sustainable development are operationalized in CSR. The authors argued that “balance” is a discursive strategy for ensuring that profitability is not subordinate to social and environmental concerns. Thus, balance is not about an equal emphasis on each of the three pillars; instead, it supports neo-liberal discourses deployed to defend the status quo and ensure profitability is prioritized. In a time of climate change, balance can no longer be the deciding principle. A damaged or irreparable environment will eventually override financial and social considerations. For

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organizations, timely responses will mean less financial risk and liability. A key responsibility for those in public relations, then, is to reconfigure the focus from a discourse of CSR to justice practices. Such an undertaking requires mobilized global networks that prioritize climate justice and open up a new vocabulary for thinking through the ways in which environmental and social issues are subordinated to economic concerns. In practice this means a focus on vulnerabilities, adaptability, sustainability, protection, and preservation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Scholarly understandings of environmental justice draw heavily upon the work of Nancy Fraser (1998, 2001) who discusses social justice in terms of inequalities and a broadening of political and cultural contestation. Fraser (2001) identified this contestation as a struggle for equitable redistribution of resources, recognition of identity/ status, and participation. Framing social justice in this way makes it possible to problematize institutionalized patterns of cultural value, governance structures, and decision making processes. Boundaries between various forms of justice are permeable and dynamic; environmental justice claims have social and cultural dimensions; and environmental concerns are generally subordinate to social concerns. Schlosberg (2013, p. 51) offered a broad definition of environmental justice that encompasses multiple forms of “environmental disadvantage,” not only human vulnerabilities related to the environment, but also for the natural world itself (Schlosberg, 2013, p. 51). Environmental justice claims generally include attempts to preserve, protect, or reclaim space and place; assertions of identity, culture or meaning; and struggles for inclusion, power, control, or autonomy. More recently, notions of care (de la Bellacasa, 2011) and attachment (Groves, 2015) have been explored in relation to environmental justice and indicate the emergence of affective considerations that are absent in considerations of CSR. The term “climate justice” is more specific and describes how fairness and legality will be applied to the predicament of humans. The problem with this definition is that by taking human impacts as a starting point, impact on non-human or more than human entities are neglected or rendered invisible. As discussed in the section on CSR above, the key approaches to climate justice are distributive or “burden sharing justice” and corrective or “harm avoidance justice” (Caney, 2014, pp. 125–126). However, Caney (2014, p. 141) argues that these approaches fail to take into account what he terms the “Power/ Responsibility principle” in which those with power have a responsibility to protect people from the existential threats posed by climate change. The emphasis shifts from a focus on “responsibilities to reduce emissions and to engage in adaptation” to the “explicitly political responsibilities that are needed if we are to avoid severe climatic changes” (Caney, 2014, p. 147). Pursuit of justice is most often driven by citizens and non-government organizations. However, a challenge for those advocating action is that climate change has brought about weather improvements and thus climate change is viewed positively. Egan and Mullin (2016) state that that scientific emphasis on mean temperatures does not equate with how people experience weather. Experiences of daily weather have been mostly positive and therefore determine how people understand climate change (Egan and Mullin, 2016). This finding has important implications for science communication – apocalyptic, dystopian messages and future scenarios do not correspond to the public’s experiences of present perceptions and conditions (Egan and Mullin, 2016). Although these findings apply to the United States, it seems doubtful that widespread public pressure is likely to drive climate change action. Instead, as we try to understand the implications for public relations, several recent developments offer insights to help us understand what climate change will mean

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and how we may best care for our climate. These developments are notable because they offer insights into alternative ontological and epistemic ways of thinking through climate change action. In the following sections two instances of how care is instantiated are examined to contribute to the discursive repertoire of climate change action.

WHO CARES: PROTECTORS AND GUARDIANS Climate change action is directed at preventing the extraction of fossil fuels and encouraging divestment from such industries. The campaign against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), a project run by the Dallas-based Energy Transfer Partners, that would connect the North Dakota shale oil fields with the eastern pipeline networks in Illinois, focused on arguments about climate change and potential toxic leaks into drinking water. A range of national and international opponents including indigenous nations, environmentalists and war veterans, united to protest the pipeline in 2016. The Standing Rock Sioux tribe was at the center of the protests and sought to advance indigenous sovereignty, land rights, and protect the environment. A clear disjuncture between the ways the pipeline was promoted and and the issues prioritized by particular publics was evident. In an online article/factsheet published by Energy Transfer Partners that is titled “Dakota access pipeline facts” a claim was made that DAPL “is the safest and most environmentally sensitive way to transport crude oil from domestic wells to American consumers” and that it among the “most technologically advanced pipelines in the world” (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.). The fact sheet explained that approval involved review by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and regulators in North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois. Further facts are provided such as the cost of the project ($3.8 billion), that the project “crosses almost entirely private land, often already in use for other utility easements,” that “DAPL does not [bold in original] cross the Standing Rock Sioux reservation,” and that “the United States Army Corps of Engineers alone held 389 meetings with 55 tribes regarding the Dakota Access project” (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.). The fact sheet expressed respect for the Standing Rock Sioux tribe concerns along with an intention to continue to work with the tribe to address concerns. The factsheet then diverged from facts with the following statements: Recently, their interests have been overtaken by politically-motivated, anti-fossil fuel protesters who are using this issue as a cover for their often violent and extremist efforts to cause disruption. Their actions deny private property rights and freedoms to the landowners who are near and adjacent to the Standing Rock Reservation and deny American citizens and businesses the energy they need to produce jobs and build a vital and healthy economy. The behavior by some of these extremist organizations is not only criminal but dangerous to themselves and others, and we join with law enforcement and others in asking them to obey the rule of law. We will continue to defend the rights we have been granted through proper and legal venues, and the rights of Americans to reduce foreign dependence on fossil fuels to power our economy and warm our homes. (Energy Transfer Partners, n.d.)

It is evident that the factsheet was also intended to persuade – the views expressed were subjective and the language used was clearly emotive. Positioning theory (James, 2014; Motion, 1997, 2000; Roper, 2005; Wise and James, 2013) offers public relations insights into issues of representation and meaning that may be salient for thinking through climate change action. Actors attempt to deliberately control how people understand an issue by

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opening up or closing discursive possibilities or positions for opponents in order to achieve a particular outcome (James, 2014; Motion, 1997). Within the excerpt quoted above three discursive positions intersected – nationalism, capitalism, and justice – to justify DAPL as exemplified by terms such as “freedom,” “rights,” “jobs,” and “economy” that served to position DAPL as an economic justice issue. In contrast, protesters were positioned as political, violent extreme, and criminal. The factsheet sidestepped denigrating the Sioux protesters – and thus avoids claims of explicit racism – and opts, instead, to denigrate those who support the Sioux. The implication, however, is that the Sioux are guilty by association. Within public controversies, issues of identity and recognition are mobilized to explain and defend certain community positions or exemplify particular social relations such as empathy and collective care. A significant feature of the justice discourse was the Sioux tribe positioning and identification as “water protectors.” This descriptor served as a mobilizing position that spanned multiple boundaries and opened up rightsbased claims. Indigenous ways of thinking about human relationships with nature accentuated guardianship – responsibility and protection of the interests of water – and enacted indigenous ways of understanding the world. Embedded in this approach is a distinct ontological orientation that conveys a more intimate and spiritual affinity with nature that carries particular obligations. The term “water protectors” functioned as a deliberate rejection of the activist label and associated negative connotations. The notion of protesters as water protectors was a mechanism for claiming symbolic power and implicitly repositioning those who promoted DAPL as water wreckers and destroyers. Justice discourses function as sense making narratives for inserting a diverse range of values into governance processes. Protesters offered an alternative justice framing raising concerns beyond safety and risk by invoking environmental justice claims complemented by calls for indigenous sovereignty. These clashing justice discourses are indicative of a contested moral order, particularly in relation to corporate neo-liberal responses to climate change versus collective cultural values and responses. The Standing Rock campaign attracted global media attention and support. Although President Obama rejected a critical permit for the DAPL as one of his last actions, President Trump ordered the resumption of the pipeline construction soon after his inauguration (Levin, 2017). During completion of the pipeline three minor oil spills occurred, confirming protesters’ claims and concerns (Rice, 2017). A federal judge ruled in June 2017 that Energy Transfer Partners did not adequately consider the environmental impacts of a possible oil spill and ordered a review (Associated Press, 2017). The outcome of the review was announced in December 2017; Energy Transfer Partners were ordered to work with local tribes and the Army Corps of Engineers to develop a coordinated response plan by April 1, 2018 (Volcovici, 2017). Although the pipeline project was not shut down as protesters advocated, risk reduction and independent oversight have been instigated. Like many controversies, the final resolution relied upon legal interventions and judgements. This is a critical insight for public relations – not only do we need to integrate climate change liabilities and an ethic of care, we also need to consider the legal implications. The concerns and attachments of a broader range of social actors need to be integrated into decision making and their worldviews taken into account. Protection and guardianship of the environment are fundamental to indigenous ways of thinking and prioritizing care above other concerns – CSR fails to prioritize these ontological modes of thought, sensitivity and responsibility. Yet, ontological dimensions of environmental issues that incorporate alternative ways of making sense of reality and our engagement

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with the environment may increasingly offer more relevance and resonance for broader publics. In the next section on personhood, the argument shifts beyond the discourses of care and the moral arguments of guardianship to consider changing legal contexts and conditions that influence the governance of climate change and related public relations practices.

PERSONHOOD: LIVING ENTITY STATUS A legal ruling that has potential implications for climate change action is that the legal rights accorded to a person are being granted to a non-human environmental entity. In 2017 the Whanganui River [Maori translation – Te Awa o Whanganui] in New Zealand was recognized as a living entity with full legal rights and India accorded the Ganges River and its tributary, the Yamuna River, living human status (Safi, 2017). Personhood, ascribing the rights of a person to an environmental entity, is predicated on the value of rights-based claims along with an ethic of care that involves communities in the governance and protection of the environment. Cultural, environmental, and spiritual perspectives that evolve from community spaces and organizing have driven this initiative – primarily the activist work of indigenous people and environmentalists. Although it is not yet clear what this legal development will mean in practice, legal recognition means that polluting or damaging such entities is the equivalent of harming a person and may, therefore, accord communities greater power. From a public relations perspective, this trend is a significant shift from current, deeply-compromised and commercialized ways of thinking of the environment as a resource to be exploited. The following case study of the Whanganui River offers insights into the notion of personhood and alternative ways of thinking about environmental entities. The Whanganui River, located in the North Island of New Zealand, winds its way 290 kilometers west from its source, Mount Tongariro, to the Tasman Sea. Today, the river connects remote Maori settlements, farmland, and rural and coastal towns. The Whanganui River is marketed as a tourism attraction – images of the river highlight drifting mist, deep gorges, wild bush, calm serene waterways, and occasional navigational challenges of white water rapids. For the indigenous people of New Zealand, the Maori, Whanganui River has mythical and spiritual significance. The Maori proverb, Ko au te awa. Ko te awa ko au. [English translation: I am the river. The river is me] reflects a worldview about a sacred connection with nature that contrasts with many western discourses of mastery over nature and undermines the nature – culture divide that sustains environmental exploitation. For the Maori, the river is a living being with its own life force (mauri). Assertion of that worldview has been litigated through the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission of inquiry, that investigates and makes recommendations for government to address Maori claims and grievances. In the longest running legal case in New Zealand, traversing 140 years, a settlement was reached in 2012 that granted the river legal identity with the rights, duties, and liabilities of a legal person. This settlement, passed into law in March 2017, recognizes Maori kinship with the river rather than an a more traditional ownership or management model. Oversight of the river’s legal rights will be undertaken by a Maori and a government official. A week after the New Zealand law, judges in India ruled that the Ganges and Yamuna rivers and their tributaries would be “legal and living entities having the status of a legal person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities” (Safi, 2017). Like the Whanganui River, the Ganges has sacred significance. Yet, efforts to clean the polluted Ganges have not succeeded. Legal custodians will now be responsible for conserving and protecting the

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rivers and a management board will be established. The case arose from complaints that state governments were not cooperating with federal efforts to establish a panel to protect the Ganges (Safi, 2017). A lesson for public relations is that these justice initiatives may be community or government driven. Environmental justice, in these instances, has moved beyond notions of disadvantage to incorporate rights, duties, and responsibilities along with an alternative mode of litigation. Personhood has important implications for thinking through issues of liability and care in relation to climate change. Although, perhaps the significance of this development is primarily symbolic, the threat of litigation may reduce carbon emissions and environmental damage. Or perhaps climate will be accorded living entity status. Climate is clearly a natural phenomenon but is it possible to argue that climate is an environmental entity that should be accorded human rights? We could, perhaps, draw upon international precedence and borrow from the Japanese who have designated the Nigoshide technique for creating milky white porcelain as an Important Intangible Cultural Property (Saito, 2005). Could climate be designated an essential intangible environmental entity with human rights? And if it were to be accorded human rights, how could climate harm be measured and attributed? The challenge for public relations professionals is to understand how this way of thinking and legislation will advance climate change action and their role in bringing about such legislation. For activist communities, the challenge is to harness guardianship discourses and personhood litigation in ways that meaningfully transform climate politics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Finding ways to mitigate and address climate change is a complicated problem for public relations. This chapter has introduced the notions of guardianship and personhood, as justice-driven ways of thinking through issues of liability and care. It argues that a CSR approach to climate change is deeply problematic when thinking in terms of liability. Although CSR is seemingly a “balanced” approach, it is primarily about protecting profitability and therefore climate change is narrowly conceived and ideologically invested. Environmental justice is a more powerful, holistic mode of thinking through climate change. Environmental justice, here, is not only about disadvantage – it is about reconfigured relationships with nature and recognition of our connections with and emotional attachments to nature – a kinship/partnership model. Conceived in this way, environmental justice is intertwined with social justice involving recognition and redistribution of rights and participation in decision making. In particular, climate change issues of liability and care point to a global mission for public relations in promoting shared responsibilities for the environment. Exploration of issues of guardianship and water protection highlighted the positioning maneuvers, value of strong global network of activists, awareness of risks, and the importance of continual pressure on extractive industries as mechanisms for climate change action. The personhood examples help us learn about valuing indigenous ways of thinking and spiritual connections or emotional, empathetic connections with the environment. For public relations theory, guardianship and personhood may help the field move beyond ideologically invested models of mastery over nature, a resource-dominant view of the environmental and a schismatic way of thinking about the relationship between nature and culture. Repositioning climate change as an epistemic and ontological concern reconfigures the role of global public relations – science, justice, and the emotional and experiential dimensions drive climate change action. Practically, guardianship and personhood offer a way of working through complicated or contested multi-layered governance models for climate change action.

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CHAPTER

25 Character Assassination and Reputation Management in the Context of Mediated Complexity Sergei A. Samoilenko

INTRODUCTION In September, 2012, a YouTube trailer for the film Innocence of Muslims suddenly came to prominence. The movie contained disjointed dialogue and sloppy editing, and was clearly intended to offend Muslims by targeting the character and actions of Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. It depicted Muhammad as a child of uncertain parentage, a pervert, and a homosexual, and questioned the origin and validity of the Koran. This depiction resonated with common stereotypes held in the Middle East that the West is anti-Muslim and morally degraded. The movie release was supported by the infamous Florida pastor Terry Jones who had been known for the long courted controversy of proposing International Burn the Koran Day (Kleidosty, 2014). Symbolically, massive demonstrations against the film broke out on September 11, 2012, the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Innocence of Muslims soon became a serious issue on the international political agenda: violent protests took place in many Muslim nations and European countries, resulting in the deaths of several people. The film became even more notorious after Susan Rice, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, erroneously linked terrorist attacks on the U.S. consulate and CIA facility in Benghazi, Libya in September, 2012 to the global protests triggered by the movie. Opponents subsequently accused the Obama administration of downplaying a terror attack for political reasons. This incident is illustrative of how the world has become more complex. In today’s global society, large events happen more often than in the past, mainly due to an increased number of individual actions. As this example shows, multiple networked groups and individual actors constantly incite the public to support their causes or 268

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mobilize against political regimes. Essentially, “we are in a period of fluctuations in which individual action remains essential” (Prigogine, 1999, p. 138) and may have serious consequences for the whole system (Gladwell, 2000; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997). Any fluctuations in the social system are accompanied by increased entropy manifested via the surge of offensive communication behavior (e.g., belligerent populist rhetoric, hate speech, and public insults). These individual manifestations may subsequently disturb social order and lead to new issues and conflicts. Clearly, “each bifurcation point has beneficiaries and victims” (Prigogine, 1999, p. 136). The Innocence of Muslims is a case study of an online character attack on a religious figure that resulted in some serious reputational damage for the United States. A substandard YouTube video composed of hate speech and stereotypical clichés, produced as a prank by an amateur producer, went viral, fueling public outrage all over the world and causing a prominent scandal at the highest level of U.S. and international politics. A complex society is a risk society. In the context of globalization, most reputational risks result from structural transformations triggered by the development of information technologies. The nature of political and corporate competition implies that reputational crises stem from the actions of invested stakeholders. New technological innovations also enable agents with malicious intent to cause tangible reputational damage to their targets. Eventually, aggressors resort to various defamation practices, known collectively as character assassination. “Character assassination (CA) is the deliberate destruction of an individual’s reputation” (Icks & Shiraev, 2014, p. 4). One example is a political “smear campaign,” which is composed of various character attacks in the form of spoken insults, negative campaign ads, caricatures, or materials containing misinformation. Broadly speaking, this concept can be selectively applied to social groups and organizations, especially when CA methods get used by strategic actors during contested (and often adversarial) interpersonal, intergroup, and interstate interactions resulting in reputational losses for various parties involved (Samoilenko et al., 2020). The complex nature of highly mediated events often impedes public relations specialists from controlling for multiple reputational risks and responding to new emergencies and crises. Few organizations and governments can keep up with the pace of events while maintaining their immunity to the multiplicity of reputational risks. As Dezenhall (2014) put it, many organizational leaders appear to have “a glass jaw” when faced with a new character attack. This chapter argues that character assassination (CA) is becoming a systemic norm. Although CA appears to be as old as human civilization (Icks & Shiraev, 2014), academic research has done very little to interpret its nature, causes, and outcomes in highly mediated and competitive contexts. This concept of character assassination was originally addressed by political scientists (Davis, 1950; Shiraev, 2014), and has been discussed only episodically in political communication and propaganda studies (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Schultz & Pancer, 1997). This chapter intends to examine the functional characteristics of CA, rather than address its ethical considerations. First, it explores the concept in the context of field competition. Next, the issues of CA and reputation management are discussed under the conditions of globalization and new communication technologies. Specifically, this chapter helps address the emerging challenges that CA-related events pose to various publics. Finally, the chapter discusses the prospects of locating the CA framework within the literature on reputation management.

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CHARACTER ASSASSINATION AS FIELD COMPETITION STRATEGY In different societies, the relevant norms and values of social order require all members to be regarded on the basis of their possession (or non-possession) of respected status markers, such as appropriate education, professional affiliation, or hierarchical position. All members of society are expected to uphold certain accepted norms of appropriateness and credibility in order to continue participating in social interactions. Most individuals are required to comply with public expectations across several dimensions: the social dimension includes recognized norms of social interaction; the expressive dimension refers to various forms of authenticity; and the functional dimension deals with professional qualities and competencies. “The fulfillment of expectations in open societies depends on trust, and this trust is based on reputation” (Imhof, 2016 p. 175). Thus, reputation serves as the assurance of a social actor’s intention to maintain the existing social order. The social world has become more intersubjective and is now configured by multiple actors engaged in a continuous struggle for influence. The notion of field struggles refers to multiple networks of relationships built and maintained by committed actors intensely competing for resources, namely status and control of the social rules (Bourdieu, 1991). Since the size and perceived significance of capital legitimizes their power status, these contestants naturally attempt to accrue, preserve, or convert various types of resources. The value of this capital is determined by wealth, rare qualifications, or powerful social networks. Some forms of capital, such as prestige, may have merely symbolic influence. Symbolic capital is acquired through “a reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honorability” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 291) and helps social actors publicly assert their power status. The owners of valuable capital seek to preserve its value and resist attempts to subvert it (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). These two goals cannot be achieved without public support or approval. Typically, all members of society claim to possess the set of socially approved personal qualities and competencies required to reproduce social order. Eventually, they engage in face-to-face negotiations with each other to acquire and maintain desired social identity and legitimacy (Goffman, 1959). In this sense, face refers to “socially situated identities people claim or attribute to others” (Tracy, 1990, p. 210). In social interactions, actors tend to employ communication strategies that allow them to appear credible to others. These impression management strategies refer to various forms of strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982) that are selected by individuals to create and maintain desired and appropriate face in relevant contexts. Impression management is used to project social competence, induce compliance, or construct and protect impression integrity (Metts, 2009). In everyday interactions, individuals constantly make choices concerning their public image that are consistent with approved social values and rules for social interaction. In competitive contexts, all actors are compelled to constantly invest resources in symbolic products and seek help from public relations or media professionals. The notion of “impression management” can thus be applied to professional practices of image or reputation management (Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Public relations specialists and political consultants help individuals and organizations improve their reputation by zooming in on attractive personal characteristics while downplaying all other facets of their identity. When someone’s face is threatened, there is a tendency to counteract these threats with preventive facework. When the face is lost, an individual is motivated to restore it through corrective facework to avoid the feeling of

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discomfort over disrupting the social order (Metts, 2009). This helps build overall social capital, a network of “institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). In highly contested environments, individual and collective actors constantly seek to reframe and impose their definition of reality on the public. The nature of competition sometimes involves the use of deliberate strategies and tactics intended to challenge or weaken the public image of other contestants. According to Cupach and Metts (1994, p. 4), face threats occur “when someone’s desired identity is challenged.” Inevitably, this face threat involves the public reevaluation of the individual’s character, including the way this character was formerly perceived and judged by others. The term “character” includes a moral dimension, attaching value judgments to a person’s behavior and experience (Samoilenko et al., in press). Certainly, one’s perceived character must be socially approved – and one’s reputation positive – before attacks can be made (Shiraev, 2014). Some prominent forms of symbolic capital, such as high social status or rank, are associated with greater public expectations with regard to one’s demeanor. Predictably, this symbolic capital tends to increase the probability of reputational risks for its holders. As a matter of fact, higher reputation is associated with a greater probability of public outrage during a reputational crisis due to disappointed hopes and expectations (Imhof, 2016). For example, one traditional strategy to maintain a strong public profile and high legitimacy is to court constant media attention. However, a high profile is a double-edged sword. Prominent public figures become targets of character attacks during electorate campaigns or other competitive selection procedures that provide favorable conditions for various attackers. Essentially, character attacks indicate that the target holds high social status (an important or esteemed social position), represents a competitive ideology, or supports a widespread cause. These attacks may take the form of character assassination campaigns that are preplanned, sustained, and strategically executed by their producers (Icks et al., 2017; Icks & Shiraev, 2014; Samoilenko, 2016; Samoilenko et al., 2018). The concept of “character assassination” refers to both the process (e.g., a defamation campaign) and the outcome of this process (e.g., a damaged reputation). An act of character assassination is represented by three main characteristics: it targets an individual; it is intentional; and it is directed at the public. Unlike ad hominem attacks, many CA assaults do not have to take place in the context of a debate. They may involve covert operations composed of erasing from memory (Icks & Shiraev, 2014) or strategic deception, such as rumors and conspiracy theories (Samoilenko, 2017). A character assassination event is a multidimensional process that is best examined based on five factors: the Attacker, the Target, the Medium, the Audience, and the Context. This framework is closely examined in Samoilenko et al. (2020). In a tight race, a character attack may be sufficient to cause a substantial drop in the polls, potentially securing a victory for the attacker’s chosen candidate. At the societal level, the reputational damage incurred can lead to declining confidence in leadership and an erosion of public trust (Imhof, 2016). Yet the outcomes of CA efforts are most extensive and significant for the targets of these attacks. Not only may this individual fall from grace and confront threats to his or her social status, but the process of character assassination may eventually lead to the “death” of the character. The damage sustained in an attack can last a lifetime.

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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF REPUTATION MANAGEMENT Scholars argue that communication processes should no longer be studied within national contexts alone (Wessler & Brüggemann, 2012). This volume (Part I) suggests that contemporary public relations issues should be discussed in connection to structural changes produced by globalization and technological innovations. In addition, this chapter addresses the effects of mediatized politics and declining trust in institutions as critical issues of reputation management. Globalization and New Technologies The fabric of the social world today is constantly transformed through technological innovations and media practices that eventually lead to deep mediatization (Couldry & Hepp, 2017) or the continuous construction of the social reality by the media. In the context of globalization, local communities became more susceptible to international scandals and reputational crises resulting from “the compression of the world” and the heightened “consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992, p. 8). Our national agendas and activities become influenced by the individual actions of people in other countries. For instance, many of the fake news websites that emerged during the 2016 U.S. election have been traced to a small city in Macedonia where teenagers were producing sensationalist stories to earn cash from advertising (Subramanian, 2017). The course of events in complex systems is particularly affected by timing and the speed of unfolding actions initiated on social media networks. The 24/7 news cycle changed the concept of deadlines, and is itself progressively becoming a “Twitter cycle” that requires constant news supply. It has also increased the sheer volume of content needed to fill this space twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Rivera and Karlsson (2017) go so far as to suggest that the 24/7 news cycle is a contributing factor in the rise in CEO dismissals. The same can be said of celebrities’ shifting status. In October 2017, it took Harvey Weinstein less than two weeks to fall from being the most powerful Hollywood mogul to being fired from his own company, rejected by his wife, and expelled from the Motion Picture Academy and the Producers Guild of America’s board of directors. The subsequent “Weinstein Effect” rippled across the world as the “#MeToo” hashtag, originally created to denounce misogynic behavior and sexual harassment, became a global movement (Cook & Simons, 2017). Increased online visibility and transparency present additional problems for organizations and their leaders. According to Aon’s 2017 Global Risk Management Survey, “damage to brand and reputation” is the number one threat; the survey found that public companies have an 80 percent chance of losing at least 20 percent of their equity value due to some type of reputation issue. For a company to be highly regarded, its CEO needs have a visible public profile (Weber Shandwick, 2015). At the same time, higher visibility is associated with increased public scrutiny and, therefore, the potential for additional reputational risks. The 2014 Deloitte Global Survey suggests that staff’s online behavior poses the greatest risks to a company’s reputation. Inappropriate tweets or videos with sensitive content may negatively impact the CEO’s reputation and organizational image. In September 2017, after @tedcruz, the official Twitter account of Senator Ted Cruz liked a pornographic tweet, the Texas senator became the target of viral mockery online. His name began trending on Twitter and was temporarily linked in the media to an explicit video. According to Cruz,

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the mishap was “an honest mistake” by a staff member who had accidentally hit the wrong button (O’Keefe & Selk, 2017). The Internet has become fertile ground for character attacks, incivility, and deception. Moreover, the anonymity offered by the Internet is routinely abused by users who engage in unrestrained and manipulative practices, such as trolling, cyberbullying, and harassment (Ambedkar, 2017). A nine-country study suggests that governments and individuals are using propaganda on social media to manipulate public opinion worldwide (Woolley & Howard, 2017). Users themselves may contribute to the distribution of falsehoods by sharing fabricated news, both knowingly and unknowingly (Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcomb, 2016). Numerous online information sources lead audiences to rely on heuristics and social cues to determine the credibility of information. Rumors and conspiracy theories originating with anonymous sources prove especially dangerous in contexts where “the original source is lost or no longer responsible for verifying the proposition” (Walton, 1996, p. 196). For instance, in mid-August, 2016, after watching an out-of-context video, far-right bloggers and influential conspiracy theorists spread rumors about Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s health within their communities to such a degree that the claims became a topic of discussion on Fox News, Jimmy Kimmel Live, and NBC News, as well as at Donald Trump rallies (Cheadle, 2016). Mediatization Issues In 2017, the Mason CARP lab released a report stating that the media ecosystem has significantly transformed in recent years, becoming extremely conducive to incivility and CA practices (Icks et al., 2017). Different systemic issues (including declining profitability, massive restructuring, and resource challenges) undermine the media’s ability to cover basic news, much less undertake nonpartisan investigative journalism. The decline in journalistic standards (e.g., independent interpretation of events) and frequent media bias (e.g., high dependence on the government agenda – see Entman, 2004) have become more evident in recent years. A primary concern is the increasing mediatization of society and culture (Hjarvard, 2008), or “the growing intrusion of media logic as an institutional rule into fields where other rules of defining appropriate behavior prevailed” (Esser & Matthes, 2013, p. 177). One critical impact of mediatization is that the production of news content has become ever more dictated by commercial imperatives and consumers’ expectations, rather than substantive policy issues. The logic of the media system, as discussed in Part I of this volume, also comes to substitute for the primary functions of an institution. To take the example of the famous O. J. Simpson case, Thaler (1997) argues that the media did not simply report the case, but were instrumental in creating a spectacle that hijacked American culture. The aforementioned 24/7 news cycle also leads to the “tyranny of speed over accuracy” (Dezenhall, as cited in Icks et al., 2017) that is displayed when additional fact-checking is sacrificed on the altar of the drive to publish sensational content ahead of competitors. Several studies (Esser, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999) address the effects of imposing a media market logic on a political news content. These include: promoting sensational features of political events; focusing on conflict rather than compromise; relying on emotions, polarization, and stereotyping in storytelling; presenting political news from “soft news” angles and using “episodic framing:” and spotlighting fragments of the political discourse, packaged in catchy phrases and compelling

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visuals. Entman (1989) defines the three main characteristics of all daily media coverage arising from production biases: simplification, symbolization, and personalization. In other words, elaborate narratives must be distilled down to familiar symbols, slogans, and cognitive associations. Dramatic scripts, the stories and actions of archetypal characters (heroes and villains), should be easily recognized by any audience and relate to ordinary people’s mental scripts and expectations. The adoption of media logic by a political system produces a hybrid of mediatized politics (politics overly dependent on the needs and rules of mass media). The personalization of politics is evidenced by a political news content constructed around personalities rather than institutions and social issues. Since the media format is limited to presenting selected fragments of political life, media professionals tend to prioritize the personal traits of political actors (Gilens, Vavreck, & Cohen, 2007). Clearly, the media are likely to support those actors who fully embrace the media logic, including favoring “politicians with telegenic image, popular rhetoric and marketable messages” (Esser, 2013, p. 172). Thus, the personal attributes of political actors become important criteria in determining popular acceptance of their issues and policies. The media logic obligates politicians to adapt to the soft news format and constantly participate in shaping news coverage of daily events. As a result, issue politics are exploited by political performers that have gained the prominance of celebrities (Esser & Matthes, 2013). Another aspect of mediatization is the rise of negativity in political discourse. Following the Watergate scandal, American journalism moved toward a more confrontational style of politics (Bai, 2014). “With malice toward all” (Moy & Pfau, 2000), many contemporary journalists advance their careers through confrontainment. This approach exploits the function of critical watchdog journalism according to a commercial logic (Esser, 2013). Most popular opinion formats in mass media outlets evidence a heavy dose of insulting language, name-calling, dramatic negative exaggeration, and mockery (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014; Prior, 2013; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). A recent analysis of news coverage during the 2016 general election concluded that coverage of both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump was overwhelmingly negative in tone and extremely light on policy (Patterson, 2016). Negativity is quite profitable in times when Americans are polarized in their affective attachments toward partisan groups (Iyengar & Westwood 2014; Mason, 2015) and more divided in terms of trait perceptions of presidential candidates. An overall dependence on sensational headlines and clickbait content made news organizations vulnerable to disinformation and manipulation during the 2016 election campaign. Marwick and Lewis (2017) argue that the mainstream media were susceptible to manipulation from the far-right press due to a number of factors, including a proclivity for sensationalism. This policy contributes to creating a media environment in which rumors, conspiracy theories, and character attacks on public figures thrive. Arguably, the high dosage of emotional influence in news coverage normalizes incivility and confrontational public discourse, thus making mediated CA campaigns more acceptable (Maisel, 2012; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Subsequently, continuous exposure to negativity and uncivil behavior is associated with deepening distrust in institutions, including the media themselves. Institutional Crisis One primary characteristic of today’s global society is the growing public distrust in democratic institutions (Raine & Perrin, 2019). Public trust in many traditional authorities, like

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political institutions and the media, fell from public grace. Surveys reveal that, “less than one fifth of the general public believes business leaders and government officials will tell the truth when confronted with a difficult issue” (Edelman, 2013). A 2017 study further found that two-thirds of Americans believe the mainstream press publishes fake news (Easley, 2017). This trend is alarming because it leads to increasing political cynicism and decreasing political participation (Opdycke, Segura, & Vasquez, 2013). Indeed, “(dis)empowered citizen[ry]” appears on the list of main global risks (World Economic Forum, 2016). Under the conditions of “trust deficit,” there is a great demand for new voices to trust. With influence being distributed away from traditional institutions, “peer-influenced media now represents two of the top three most-used sources of news and information” (Edelman, 2016). According to Prior (2013), ideologically one-sided activist media have disproportionate political influence. The proliferation of media sources and the reemergence of more partisan news outlets has reinforced “tribal divisions, while enhancing a climate where facts are no longer driving the debate and deliberation” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 67). Niche media facilitate people-to-people connections, but also make individuals more vulnerable to misinformation that corresponds to their basic worldview. Since the Internet favors simplicity over complexity, there are many “experts” and opinion leaders who constantly produce content based on opinions rather than facts and spread misinformation and conspiracy theories (Beauchamp, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Scholars raise concerns about “the vulnerability of democratic societies to fake news and the public’s limited ability to contain it” (Lazer et al., 2017). In the U.S., political polarization is arguably leading to a “culture war” between conservatives and progressives that is associated with confrontational dynamics, incivility, and negativity (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006). Thus, media fragmentation creates more competing frames, driving the divergence of political attitudes to ideological extremes and thus further undermining trust in institutions. In the context of institutional legitimacy crisis, there are multiple opportunities for charismatic leaders and populists (Pillai, 1996). The 2016 U.S. presidential election was not only characterized by an increase in “nasty politics,” but also by the rise of populist rhetoric. Populist politicians often use character attacks strategically to shock the audience and steal the media spotlight (Jensen & Bang, 2017). For example, between June 2015, when he declared his intention to stand for president, and December 2016 just after he was elected, Donald Trump issued 289 insults via Twitter (Lee & Quealy, 2019). This inflammatory rhetoric may have nothing to do with character assassination, as it may not seek to cause reputational harm, but merely to conjure political ratings, generate hype, and manipulate public opinion. Herbst (2010) considers incivility a strategic tool that can be used by politicians in electoral campaigns. The practice of incivility has negative consequences for civil debate, which is a requirement for a well-functioning deliberative democracy. Studies concur that negative emotions are directly related to judgment formation and distract people from deliberating on the relevant campaign arguments (Esser & Matthes, 2013; Kühne et al., 2011). Another concern is the rise of popular comedians, who are increasingly replacing the traditional press as primary opinion leaders. A report on the media habits of Americans finds that many adult Internet users get their news from two Comedy Central staples, The Daily Show and The Colbert Report (Mitchell et al., 2014). Caricatures and negative portrayals of politicians play a significant role in

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helping people form opinions. Studies demonstrate the correlation between watching late-night comedy and increased negativity and lower support for presidential candidates (Baumgartner, Morris, & Walth, 2012; Morris, 2009). There is a belief that comedians are sometimes better at breaking news than traditional journalists because they are legally less vulnerable and are held to entirely different, nonjournalistic standards (Dockray, 2017). Indeed, they can be very powerful in their role as whistleblowers or truth-tellers; recent events have demonstrated that comedians can launch a series of reputational avalanches. For example, it was Hannibal Buress, an American stand-up comedian, who “broke” the Bill Cosby story in 2014, even though women had been speaking up for years. At the same time, scholars argue that tabloid journalism and television entertainment have normalized personal ridicule and serve as a breeding ground for unjustified personal attacks leading to character assassination (Lichter, Baumgartner, & Morris, 2015; Lichter, Farnsworth, & Canieso, 2017). IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH This chapter posits that character assassination as a social and cultural phenomenon is becoming a systemic norm. Given the defining structural issues outlined in this chapter, the current media environment has become highly vulnerable to character assassination. A multidisciplinary scholarly approach is required to better understand the complexity of CA phenomena. Many historical methods of character assassination are still prevalent and frequently practiced (Samoilenko, 2016; Samoilenko et al., 2017). Hence, CA campaigns should not only be discussed in terms of causes and effects of human agency but also in relation to the irreversibility of processes in complex social systems. The systems approach is recommended to make sense of CA events in globalized and fast-paced social systems. Dezenhall (2014) argues that reputational attacks are becoming worse because of three main reasons: the speed with which information can be shared; the volume of information; and the venom behind the allegations. These factors may combine to create a “fiasco vortex,” a runaway crisis of snowball effects that magnify destructive information and spread beyond the point of no return. As previously mentioned, complex systems are known for non-linear dynamics within their components that may vary from a high degree of stability to very unstable behavior, depending on the context. When the dynamics within a complex system are close to a tipping point (Gladwell, 2000), even relatively small changes in initial conditions may cause far-reaching consequences. (This is known as the butterfly effect – see Lorenz, 1963). As the intensity of small perturbations and issues increases, pressure may build up over time and then erupt suddenly, leading to system breakdown. Any emergency or incident triggers a domino effect, where myriad events occur in response to one small push. Subsequently, the situation passes the threshold of “critical instability” and moves toward an acute crisis that may take an unpredictable direction and even disintegrate into “chaos” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997). In some cases, the toxic media ecosystem makes it almost impossible for most social and political actors to claim the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In complex systems, the impact of negative information is specific to content and context, and becomes substantial under some circumstances. There are a handful of variables that affect who and what becomes a target, and which targets survive and thrive. These include: the complexity of the case, the degree of harm, the target’s real

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and perceived vulnerability, the adversary’s degree of motivation, the availability of invested constituents, and other factors (Icks et al., 2017). Such factors as the public image and likability of victim and attacker often determine media reactions to scandals. Charisma appears to make targets of attacks less prone to CA campaigns (Seiffert-Brockmann, et al., 2018). Certain character traits and personal values can also influence the outcome of CA attempts. Government agencies should explore this knowledge to interrupt a chosen path of attack and influence adversaries’ decisions and actions (Tinker, as cited in Icks et al., 2017). Future studies should help us better understand the impact of social capital as a safeguard in the various contexts of character assassination discussed above. There is no consensus on how to best respond to character assassination, since it comes in multiple shapes and forms. That being said, there are multiple factors that determine the effectiveness of reputation management. This chapter contends that the same logic can be attributed to the use of social media during reputational crises. Dezenhall (2014) notes that social media are usually counterproductive as defensive narrative devices. Social media are a vehicle of dispersion, an offensive technology that is good for building awareness. Using social media to fight a crisis usually makes it worse, because whoever owns the most negative information will hijack the media agenda. For example, in April, 2014, an innocent tweet from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asking its followers to post pictures that included NYPD officers sparked a torrent of criticism from the Internet. The #MyNYPD hashtag was hijacked by a number of users, who produced hundreds of photos that purported to show police brutality carried out by NYPD officers, leading to national coverage of the Twitterstorm (Robbins, 2014). In crisis management, social media should be used to gather insight about a topic, gauge the volume and intensity of conversations about clients, and understand what users find newsworthy (Icks et al., 2017). Continuously monitoring online conversations enables crisis managers to stay updated about their progress and counter falsehoods when necessary. Apologies and image repair strategies are popular solutions during crisis situations but have their limits. These limits depend on the nature of the crisis, the truth of the allegations, and the power of invested stakeholders. According to Johnson and Murphy (as cited in Icks et al., 2017; Johnson, 2018), image repair strategies may help some nonprofits resurrect their image in the wake of a financial scandal (for example, firing the CEO rebuilds some positive feelings toward the scandalized nonprofit). However, in most cases, image repair strategies fail to undo any of this damage, and in rare cases even seem to backfire. A response to a reputational attack must be anchored in good judgment, and with consideration for the consequences of responding, at what speed, in what proportion, and for what duration. Political actors’ impression management skills remain crucial under conditions of public distrust in major institutions (Cornfield, 2017; Icks et al., 2017). As long as public confidence in national institutions remains low across the Western world, charismatic leaders will seem attractive. Political leaders who can establish greater authenticity than their rivals are perceived as better political candidates. Generally, media hype about some scandalous behavior may have little impact on the public. According to Castells (2009, p. 254), “since politicians are considered to be generally unreliable by a majority of people, the disenchanted citizen must choose the unreliable person who is most akin to her/his values and interests.” Indeed, people often show support for political actors if they manage to show commonality of

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interests with the voter (Lupia, 2013). A candidate who expresses concern about the welfare of citizens might influence voters to judge him/her more positively regardless of whether this candidate would actually implement the promised policies (Teven, 2008). McCloskey (as cited in Icks et al., 2017) argues that Trump’s rhetoric during the 2016 U.S. presidential election reflected a belief that character would not be decisive in a presidential race any time soon. Trump’s strategy was therefore to abandon character altogether and instead focus entirely on being authentic, even if that meant being authentically terrible. Traditionally, public relations operate from the communication management perspective, helping government authorities and corporations produce instrumental knowledge to control and solve problems in the social system. The issues addressed in this chapter suggest that more than ever before, professional communicators are expected to assimilate into emerging online communities and become a valuable resource for their members. Public relations need to become synergetic with their communities of interest, listen to a collective pulse of various groups, and finds ways to contribute to the welfare of their members. Communication scholars can help society in many ways. First of all, we can respond to increasing demand for constructive approaches to resolving the issues of incivility, misinformation, and populist rhetoric in public discourse. There should be more discussion on how to reincorporate ethical standards into civic communication and media practices. Second, we should invest more heavily in science and media literacy education in order to help the public develop critical skills for analyzing the quality of mass media and popular culture. In other words, we should study how to raise good information consumers, which likely involves teaching people how to understand, analyze, evaluate, and produce media messages. Third, we should support and constantly test various fact-checking initiatives and platforms intended to determine the veracity and accuracy of political and scientific publications. Essentially, we should study and test approaches that neutralize the adverse effects of misinformation and protect individuals and professional communities against future CA attempts. “Image prepare,” a formulation suggested by Compton (as cited in Icks et al., 2017), seems particularly promising as a conceptual model for studying (and protecting against) character assassination. Pre-emptive inoculation and image prepare strategies should be considered counter-strategies against character assassination. The proposed framework provides multiple opportunities for academic scholarship in an area that has yet to be addressed in sufficient depth. By studying the impact of individual or collective character attacks, scholars should act “like doctors studying a disease.” We must understand the disease to know how to counteract it and fight against it (Leonato, 2017). A multidisciplinary scholarly approach is required to better understand the numerous variables that contribute to the complex character assassination process (Icks et al., 2017; Samoilenko, in press). Scholars have yet to understand how character assassination enables strategic actors to attain their goals within the current media ecosystem. We need to examine hybrid campaigns composed of both CA and misinformation strategies as new social phenomena of online communication. Future studies should particularly address the cognitive and emotional impacts of memes, altered images, and video materials on public reaction to CA campaigns.

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CHAPTER

26 Crowdfunding From Global Financial Crisis to Global Financial Communication Mai Anh Doan David McKie

That the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is now part of public discourse just through its GFC initials is one of many signs of the international financialization of life. Moreover, as Shiller (2012) observes, the “part played by the new financial technologies … has become a matter of public as well as intellectual concern” (p. vii). Despite these testaments to the ubiquity and importance of contemporary finance and financial technologies (or fintech), public relations scholars give them little attention. Financial public relations, sometimes called financial communication, or loosely covered by the more restricted term of investor relations, occupies a modest space in the public relations literature. At the same time, technologies, while being one of the most frequently researched topics in financial public relations, are often discussed at surface level and limited to website study (Doan and McKie, 2017). At the level of society, and in many different academic fields, discussions of how technologies and social media are increasing, or could increase, democracy have taken place. These range from citizen journalism through India’s iPaidaBribe.com, which crowdsources evidence on government corruption, to healthcare, where consumers use technology to manage health-linked behaviors and to rebalance power differences between doctors and patients toward the latter. Yet the considerable potential of fintech to open economically egalitarian pathways has received little attention. To narrow that gap, this chapter considers two recent crowdfunding campaigns in New Zealand and reviews equity crowdfunding (ECF) possibilities in China. In looking at democratic potentials in fintech, it opens up how they might contribute to improving the reputation of financial public relations in particular and public relations 283

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in general. It argues that the lack of attention to fintech in public relations divides the field from developing a range of desirable directions such as the suggestions by the thenDirector General of UNESCO in his foreword to the Global Public Relations Handbook (Sriramesh and Verčič, 2009). In this foreword, Matsuura (2009) encouraged the discipline of public relations to use information and communication technologies to open up venues for exchange and discussions, especially ones about democracy. The absence also cuts fintech off from the trend of publics becoming more multinational and multicultural (Sriramesh, 2009) at a time when contemporary financial markets keep expanding their global reach. Such trends pass relatively unnoticed in financial public relations, and so too do key issues of the age, notably, public awareness of the growth of economic inequality (Milanović, 2016; Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). This is neglect that hides possible pathways for financial public relations scholarship and practice to take the lead in fostering inclusions and decreasing inequality. This chapter suggests not only how crowdfunding can increase and promote greater financial democracy, but also illustrates how it can be an effective public relations tool for increasing financial equality through opening opportunities. These approaches align with recommendations that public relations learn about building reputation from economics. For example, even after the GFC, enough economists held to “a vision of a better world based on increasing resources and allocating them justly and rationally” to ensure that their “aspirations and successes have earned … reputational capital” (McKie, 2010, p. 92). We contend that financial public relations offers economic openings to reduce inequality and gather similar reputational capital by aligning with economics Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller’s (2012) proposals for democratizing and humanizing finance through financial innovation. We argue for expanding Shiller’s ideas through financial public relations consciously adopting a more prosocial role to promote financial equality across the globe. By focusing less on, say, mergers and acquisitions, and more on educating ordinary investors, and people who want to invest, financial public relations can contribute to a more economically equitable society. We ground this argument, in recent studies of one financial innovation, crowdfunding, to highlight its potential for democratizing financial access and widening ownership. At the same time, we locate crowdfunding in relation to two other important coordinates: Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) global public relations framework, and the World Bank (2013) crowdfunding investing ecosystem. CROWDFUNDING AND DEMOCRACY The World Bank (2013) usefully described crowdfunding as “an Internet-enabled way for businesses or other organizations to raise money in the form of either donations or investments from multiple individuals” (p. 8). As a fundraising method, crowdfunding has been around for over a century (Freedman and Nutting, 2015), but contemporary crowdfunding powered by the Internet and technologies only emerged about a decade ago and is growing at an exponential rate. Fleming and Sorenson (2016) estimated that global crowdfunding reached over US$34 billion in 2015 from less than one billion in 2009 and Turan (2015) observed that crowdfunding is often considered a forerunner in financial innovation and a game changer in the financial landscape. The World Bank’s (2013) report confirmed crowdfunding as “an

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innovation in entrepreneurial finance that can fuel ‘the Rise of the Rest’ globally” (p. 4) and so reduce inequalities internationally. Shiller (2012) envisioned post-GFC finance as having the potential to democratize finance. Crowdfunding opens opportunities for everyday investors who have small savings but are looking out for better returns (Srnicek, 2016). Heminway (2014) states that these investors are diverse in their genders, social groups, economic classes, motivation, and locations and so form a heterogeneous investment crowd. Because funders “meet” fundraisers and their project directly on crowdfunding platforms without having to go through another intermediary, they can reduce time, costs and the potential bias (e.g., against small investors) of the middlemen (Mollick and Robb, 2016). Benefit sharing schemes work slightly differently in crowdfunding. Other platform businesses, particularly social media networks, are often criticized for self-interest. For example, as Taylor (2014) observes, they benefit from user participation and investment while returning only temporary entertainment, reputation, and connections to the users. ECF, on the contrary, involves explicit calculations of future benefits for investors. ECF investors participate primarily for these financial rewards (Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Ordanini Miceli, Pizzetti, & Parasuraman, 2011). Some companies give investors voting rights to take part in company operations. As such, investors, the people who drive platform success, can receive tangible benefits from community participation, expertise exchange, and financial returns. On the other side of the equation, crowdfunding enables access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) who often struggle to find capital for their expansion (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). By providing a fresh source of funds, crowdfunding levels the investment playing field. Previously, SMEs could either go to financial institutions such as banks, or to angel investors and venture capitalists, or use what Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2011) call the 3F (i.e., family, friends, and fools). However, available funding from the 3F is often relatively small (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2010) and, since the 2008 GFC, SMEs access to bank capital was limited by stricter lending requirements (Harrison, 2013b). ECF can help by bypassing the usual financial intermediaries and connecting entrepreneurs directly to a wider public who might, as a group, hold substantial accumulated capital. More SMEs are likely to take up this opportunity because direct access to capital, and the reduction in time spent on preparing documentation and meeting collateral or listing requirements also means lower capital acquisition costs (Ibrahim, 2014). At the broader societal level, online crowdfunding virtually eliminates geographic distances between participants, and so can facilitate engagement and idea development from different points on the globe (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015; Mollick and Robb, 2016). Greater participation can also generate jobs, greater productivity, and higher GDP (Best, Neiss, & Jones, 2012). While crowdfunding is still concentrated in developed markets, the World Bank (2013) argues for developing countries mobilizing existing resources to leapfrog ahead without going through the same length of transitions as in developed nations. Crowdfunding is not without potential downsides. Risks are pervasive. Investors in crowdfunding often have low financial literacy, and/or can display herd behaviors, and/or do not have enough shareholder protection, and/or find it difficult to monitor business performance. The businesses involved are themselves usually start-ups or early stage companies who, typically, have high failure rates,

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provide limited exit options, and face information asymmetry. Even crowdfunding platforms can be biased (Hu, 2015) and, according to Galuszka and Brzozowska (2017), the democratizing impact of crowdfunding is limited. Langley and Leyshon (2017) similarly argue that the practice of crowdfunding might not be as open and egalitarian as others claim. For crowdfunding to fully realize its potential, the World Bank (2013) suggests a crowdfunding investing ecosystem that builds on economic regulations, entrepreneurial culture, community engagement, and technology. To an extent, this ecology overlaps with the framework for global public relations proposed by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009). The next section will shift from considering crowdfunding’s theoretical possibilities to practical illustrations through actual campaigns before returning to these two frameworks. CROWDFUNDING INITIATIVES AND FINANCIAL PUBLIC RELATIONS Democratizing Access When a private beach in Awaroa in the South Island of New Zealand was advertised for sale through tender in December 2015, two brothers-in-law in Christchurch started a civic crowdfunding campaign to buy it back and gift it to the people of New Zealand. Within 25 days, the campaign gathered contributions from about 40,000 New Zealand individuals and institutions who, in concert, raised NZ$2,278,171.09 (approximately US$1.5 million). Together with some support from the New Zealand government and another charitable trust, the campaign won the bid. The beach now has permanent access for the public, including visitors to New Zealand (Givealittle Abel Tasman Beach, 2016). This campaign illustrates crowdfunding being used as an effective tool for public relations to contribute to a fully functioning society in two aspects: by mobilizing resources and by efficient communication (Doan and Toledano, 2018). Unlike websites whose main function is to disseminate information, crowdfunding platforms are designed to help fundraisers succeed in fundraising. According to the campaign initiators, the Givealittle platform shared the campaign’s egalitarian purpose and “bent over backward” (Gard’ner & Major, personal communication, April 07, 2016) by providing additional technical and professional support. Moreover, crowdfunding platforms, because of their legal status and business function, can, and do, gather both financial and non-financial resources (Heminway, 2013). Choudary (2015) identified how crowdfunding platforms rely on a strongly developed community or network of users to encourage interactions. In the Awaroa beach case, Givealittle had a campaign page with an interactive Q&A section, and an update tab as well as space for pledgers to leave comments. Information on the platform page was easy to share with the campaign’s Facebook page. This helped ensure message consistency while maximizing outreach. Since the platform has already built a name for itself, the campaign organizers could leverage its reputation rather than developing a new website from scratch. This meant that the organizers, as grassroot activists with limited resources, could focus on crafting engagement and message strategy. Doan and Toledano (2018) found that high consensus on a community cause – based on shared values and concerns among members – along with positive and inclusive discourses running consistently throughout the campaign, were among the main reasons for the campaign’s success.

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Keeping Local (Jobs) in the Age of Globalization Demonstrations against globalization are often instigated by anger at overseas organizations reducing local employment. One recent record-breaking crowdfunding response, again from New Zealand, shows its high social value. In early 2017, Mondelez, the multinational owner of the confectionary brands Cadbury and Trident, decided to shut down its Cadbury chocolate factory in Dunedin as part of its global cost-cutting exercise (Stock, 2017). A local city councilor teamed up with others to launch an ECF campaign inviting the public to invest in the newly formed company, Dunedin Manufacturing Holdings (DMH). DMH was to partner with a local artisan chocolate factory, OCHO, to expand its operation and hire those made redundant by the Cadbury factory shutdown. In just 30 hours, the campaign reached NZ$2 million, also the maximum limit allowed for a crowdfunding (Financial Market Authority, n. d.-a) in a year, with contributions from 3,570 investors (Anderson, 2017; Miller, 2017; Roy, 2017a). The Awaroa beach example was a civic crowdfunding campaign where people contributed money for a greater cause without receiving specific individual rewards in return. In contrast, the Dunedin chocolate campaign was an ECF venture where, in addition to 20% discount on their OCHO purchase, investors would also receive dividends should the company make a profit (Pledgeme, 2017), and have voting rights that give them a say in how the company is managed (Anderson, 2017). Since New Zealand does not yet have a secondary market for crowdfunded shares, this means that investors are in for the long term and will be directly impacted by company performance. However, the pragmatic benefits seemed to blend with a more altruistic investor purposes of bonding with the community, “to keep jobs local” (Roy, 2017a) and of maintaining chocolate-making as part of “a national identity” (Roy, 2017b). In both campaigns, support poured in not just from New Zealand but from around the world. The global input testifies to the extensive reach of crowdfunding, although, in ECF, national regulatory requirements still apply and have a bearing on financial public relations. For instance, the New Zealand Financial Market Authority (n.d.-b) only permits wholesale, or accredited, investors with prior experience to invest from overseas. Other countries also impose national restrictions for external capital through crowdfunding. The US, for example, does not allow crowdfunding investors to invest in foreign companies (Harrison, 2013a) and Canada does not allow investment into non-Canadian ECF platforms (Alois, 2017). Financial public relations needs both to communicate with, and to educate, investors about these differences. In addition, it is crucial that financial public relations advocates for the international dimension of rules (Shiller, 2012) act to further the egalitarian prospects of crowdfunding. Could China Lead the Way? At present, different prospects occur in different parts of the globe. For example, according to a recent Economist report: “By just about any measure of size, China is the world’s leader in fintech” (“Chinese banks are not far removed”, 2017, p. 55). Zhang et al. (2016) attribute the drivers of robust alternative finance in China to the size of the national economy, the Internet user base of 668 million people, the mostly unregulated market, and the participation of institutional ownership of platforms.

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While the biggest segments of Chinese alternative finance market are various types of lending (peer-to-peer consumer and business and real estate loans), ECF in China is already a serious world player estimated to gain over half (US$50 billion) of the World Bank’s (2013) developing world’s crowdfunding revenue, which is projected to be US$96 billion in 2025. Unlike in other countries where ECF is often smaller than other types of crowdfunding, in China it is the mainstream crowdfunding practice (Li, 2016). The research thinktank Nesta (2017) estimated that the number of equity crowdfunding platforms in China skyrocketed from 32 in 2014 to 130 in 2015, with the total fundraised amount increasing fivefold in the same period. From a macro perspective, the Program of 13th five-year-plan for national economic and social development, approved by the 12th National People’s Congress in 2015, has acknowledged crowdfunding as an important tool for promoting mass entrepreneurship and innovation (Xu and Ge, 2017). In addition, in 2015, China’s national gross savings were at US$5.3 trillion, accounting for 47.9% of GDP. This is one of the highest savings rates in the world (World Bank, 2017) but there are limited formal investment outlets for these monies. The official opening of ECF in China could therefore create an effective investment tool for the public. From a micro perspective, individual funders already account for 86% of ECF in China and they are highly Internet-savvy and growing fast (Zhang et al., 2016). In terms of technology, Chiu, Ip, and Silverman (2012) found that many Chinese social media platforms are more advanced (e.g., in containing many more interactive features and having them earlier than their counterparts elsewhere). Renren and Sina Weibo are excellent examples of social media networks with such features (Crampton, 2011). In terms of online behavior, Chinese participants prefer to access not only company information, but also non-brand-related posts or activities that help increase socialization between company and users, and among users (Men and Tsai, 2012). In short, Chinese crowdfunding platforms are ideally positioned to take advantage of their communities’ immersion in social networks for information. In addition, their willingness to share information and help each other already feature strongly in their collectivistic culture (Chu and Choi, 2011; Men and Tsai, 2012, 2013). Moreover, Li (2016) found that because ECF in China is mostly done through syndication (i.e., investment groups with the leading investors), communities of investors already exist formally. Platforms, through their financial public relations efforts, could activate these communities to encourage members to discuss risks and risk management, and to increase their knowledge of investment terms and processes, and, therefore, further their participation in financial activities (Song, 2015; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). CROWDFUNDING, FINANCIAL PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL As these cases suggest, the potential for more equitable finance has survived the GFC. To maintain it at the global scale will require education and communication (Shiller, 2012). Financial public relations could undertake that task, and by doing so, contribute to increasing the overall reputational capital of public relations in general. Financial public relations, as a public relations specialization, fits with Sriramesh and Verčič’s (2009) comprehensive conceptual framework but, as a general framework for global PR, it did not cover issues specific to financial public relations and crowdfunding.

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Accordingly, to explore these specifics, we augment it with the World Bank’s (2013) crowdfunding investing ecology. While all four elements of this ecology – economic regulations, entrepreneurial culture, community engagement and, technology – feature in the Sriramesh and Verčič model, three important issues, for financial public relations in the age of global finance, are absent. First, as an interdisciplinary field joined by communication, finance, marketing, and securities law compliance (NIRI, 2003), financial public relations is also subjected directly to strict laws and regulations imposed by financial market authorities. These laws and regulations are specific and beyond the legal structure and national boundary Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) mentioned (e.g., the participation of overseas investors discussed already). Contemporary financial public relations, while adhering to these requirements, also needs to advocate for the internationalization of capital regulations to keep up with the rapid socialization of global finance (Terry, Schwartz, & Sun, 2015). Second, to make finance more accessible to everyone – whether it be wholesale/ accredited or first-time investors, start-ups, or not-for-profit organizations – participants need to understand both the benefits and risks. This is especially true for such innovative products as crowdfunding. Traditionally, international efforts in increasing financial literacy have had limited impact (OECD, 2016), but crowdfunding platforms have the capacity to make financial education more collaborative. Already, forwardlooking and competitive platforms exceed the minimum legal requirements of checking an ECF investor’s understanding of basic terms and risks, and minimal legal requirements (e.g., displaying risk warning statements). They also mobilize interactive communication functions to encourage dialogue and discussion (Wroldsen, 2013). With these functions, members could draw from what Surowiecki (2004) calls the wisdom of the crowd to spot suspicious information and/or to simply share relevant general knowledge and investment knowledge, and/or to learn from each other. Crowdfunding platforms that foster such initiatives already exist. In the UK, the platforms Crowdcube and Seedrs have discussion forums and buttons to connect directly with fundraisers; and in New Zealand, Snowball Effect provided a series of offline investment talks around the country. Because the majority of equity crowdfunders are first-time investors (Baeck, Collins, & Zhang, 2014), such support can build confidence and increase competence in assessing investment opportunities and risks. The third issue that financial public relations could influence concerns technology. Our examples illustrated how crowdfunding as a fintech initiative drove society towards being more inclusive, and achieving more egalitarian goals. As people increasingly experience the impacts of big data, artificial intelligence, and the internetof-things, fintech public relations can help them to be aware “of fundamental information about the workings of the system” (Shiller, 2012, p. 235) to fully participate. Financial public relations could explain the underlying mechanisms of fintech, or foreground power plays among participants, or advocate for greater platform transparency. CONCLUSION The chapter situated financial public relations as an important area in its own right in many areas of the world. It also identified a gap between financial public relations and public relations in general as a divide restricting democratic and prosocial moves to increase equality nationally and internationally. It used two campaigns to illustrate situations where some of the democratizing potential can be realized. It also highlighted the

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importance of technology and the macro environment in boosting the impact of fintech in ECF. The chapter ended by highlighting the following three areas for financial public relations futures: promoting cross-border capital flow through international laws and regulations; increasing financial literacy through collaborative education; and examining technologies underpinning fintech. REFERENCES Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2011). Friends, family, and the flat world: The geography of crowdfunding. NBER Working Paper, 16820 Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2013). Some simple economics of crowdfunding. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from www.nber.org/papers/w19133. Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2015). Crowdfunding: Geography, social networks, and the timing of isnvestment decisions. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 24(2), pp.253–274. 10.1111/ jems.12093. Alois, J. (2017). International investors: Can US crowdfunding platforms accept foreign money? Retrieved from www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/06/101691-international-investors-can-us-crowdfunding-platformsaccept-foreign-money/ Anderson, L. (2017). Plans for Dunedin chocolate company unveiled. Radio NZ. Retrieved from www. radionz.co.nz/news/national/337118/plans-for-dunedin-chocolate-company-unveiled Baeck, P., Collins, L., & Zhang, B. (2014). Understanding alternative finance: The UK alternative finance industry report 2014. London, UK: Nesta and the University of Cambridge. Retrieved from www.nesta.org.uk/ publications/understanding-alternative-finance-uk-alternative-finance-industry-report-2014. Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T., & Schwienbacher, A. (2010). Crowdfunding: An industrial organization perspective. Prepared for the workshop Digital Business Models: Understanding Strategies, pp.25–26. Paris, June 10. Best, J., Neiss, S., & Jones, D. (2012). How crowdfund investing helps solve three pressing socioeconomic challenges. Retrieved from https://healthycrowdfunder.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/cca-government-whitepaper2.pdf Bimber, B., Flanagin, A. J., & Stohl, C. (2005). Reconceptualizing collective action in the contemporary media environment. Communication Theory, 15(4), 365–388. “Chinese banks are not far removed”. (2017). The age of the appacus: In fintech, China shows the way. The Economist, February 23. Retrieved from www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21717393advanced-technology-backward-banks-and-soaring-wealth-make-china-leader Chiu, C., Ip, C., & Silverman, A. (2012). Understanding social media in China. McKinsey Quarterly, 2(2012), pp.78–81. Retrieved from www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/under standing-social-media-in-china. Cholakova, M., & Clarysse, B. (2015). Does the possibility to make equity investments in crowdfunding projects crowd out reward-based investments?. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(1), pp.145–172. Choudary, S. P. (2015). Platform scale: How an emerging business model helps startups build large empires with minimum investment. Boston, MA: Platform Thinking Labs. Chu, S.-C., & Choi, S. M. (2011). Electronic word-of-mouth in social networking sites: A cross-cultural study of the United States and China. Journal of Global Marketing, 24(3), pp.263–281. Crampton, T. (2011). Social media in China: The same, but different. China Business Review, 38(1), pp.28–31. Doan, M. A., & McKie, D. (2017). Financial investigations: Auditing research accounts of communication in business, investor relations, and public relations (1994–2016). Public Relations Review, 43(2), pp.306–313. Doan, M. A., & Toledano, M. (2018). Beyond organization-centred public relations: Collective action through a civic crowdfunding campaign. Public Relations Review, 44(1), pp.37–46. 10.1016/j. pubrev.2017.10.001 Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis - The critical study of language. London, UK: Longman. Financial Market Authority. (n.d.-a). Crowdfunding. Retrieved from https://fma.govt.nz/investors/ways-toinvest/crowdfunding/

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Pledgeme. (2017). OCHO and Own the Factory. Retrieved from www.pledgeme.co.nz/investments/290-ochoand-own-the-factory Roy, E. A. (2017a). Charity and the chocolate factory: New Zealanders raise $2m to save industry. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/charity-chocolate-factory-new-zealanders-raise-2msave-industry. Roy, E. A. (2017b). Sweet success? New Zealand crowdfunding campaign raises millions in bid to save chocolate factory. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/09/sweet-success-newzealand-crowdfunding-campaign-raises-millions-in-bid-to-save-chocolate-factory. Shiller, R. J. (2012). Finance and the good society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Song, C. (2015). Financial illiteracy and pension contributions: A field experiment on compound interest in China. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580856 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580856 Sriramesh, K. (2009). Introduction. In K. Sriramesh & D. Verčič (eds.), The global public relations handbook: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 1–24). New York, NY: Routledge. Sriramesh, K., & Verčič, D. (2009). The global public relations handbook: Theory, research, and practice (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. Srnicek, N. (2016). Platform capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). The price of inequality. New York, NY: Norton. Stock, R. (2017). Mondelez’s global $4 billion cost-cutting drive behind Dunedin Cadbury factory closure. Stuff. Retrieved from Mondelez’s global $4 billion cost-cutting drive behind Dunedin Cadbury factory closure Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies, and nations. New York, NY: Doubleday. Taylor, A. (2014). The people’s platform: Taking back power and culture in the digital age. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books. Terry, H. P., Schwartz, D., & Sun, T. (2015). The future of finance - Part 3 - The socialization of finance. Retrieved from www.parksquare.com/uploads/insights/TheFutureofFinance_Part_3_03-13-15.pdf Turan, S. S. (2015). Financial Innovation - Crowdfunding: Friend or Foe? Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 195, pp.353–362. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.06.334. Van Rooij, M., Lusardi, A., & Alessie, R. (2011). Financial literacy and stock market participation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), pp.449–472. Wroldsen, J. S. (2013). The crowdfund act’s strange bedfellows: Democracy and start-up company investing. Kansas Law Review, 62, pp.357–401. Xu, D., & Ge, M. (2017). Equity-based crowdfunding in China: Beginning with the first crowdfunding financing case. Asian Journal of Law and Society, 4(1), pp.1–27. World Bank (2013). Crowdfunding’s potential for the developing world. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17626. World Bank. (2017). Gross savings (current LCU). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. GNS.ICTR.CN?locations=CN Zhang, B., Deer, L., Wardrop, R., Grant, A., Garvey, K., Thorp, S., … Gray, Y. (2016). Harnessing potential: Asia-Pacific alternative finance benchmarking report. The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance at Cambridge Judge Business School, The Tsinghua University Graduate School of Shenzhen, The University of Sydney Business School. Retrieved from www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/alternativefinance/publications/harnessing-potential/#.WKOLGlV96Uk

CHAPTER

27 Public Relations, Political Communication and Agenda Setting The Rise of the Micro-Propaganda Machine Thomas Stoeckle Jonathan Albright

“What is a fact? … The effort to state an absolute fact is simply an attempt to give you my interpretation of the facts.” Ivy Lee “You’re saying it’s a falsehood and Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts to that.” Kellyanne Conway

SETTING THE SCENE: BREXIT, TRUMP, POST TRUTH, FAKE NEWS & TRUST On 3 March 2017, a joint declaration by The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, took note of “the growing prevalence of disinformation (sometimes referred to as “false” or “fake news”1) and propaganda in legacy and social media, fueled by both States and non-State actors, and the various harms to which they may be a contributing factor or primary cause.”2 Such arbiters of the English language as the Oxford Dictionaries and Collins Dictionary are 293

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contributing to the same discourse – the former declaring “post truth” as the word (or phrase) of the year 2016,3 and the latter announcing that “fake news” is their word (or phrase) of the year 2017.4 Oxford Dictionaries defines post truth as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (2016). Collins Dictionary defines fake news as “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of news reporting.” The political events of 2016 helped to bring these interrelated topics to the forefront of public attention (Castela, 2017). The outcomes of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (usually referred to as Brexit) on 23 June, and the 2016 United States presidential election on 8 November, which saw Donald J. Trump elected as the 45th President, can be seen as a transformational shift in the relationship between politics, the media, and the public. Mark Thompson, the current CEO of The New York Times Company (and a former Director-General of the BBC, and Chief Executive of Channel 4 in the UK), discusses the impact of political, social and technological change on political and public language in his essay Enough Said (Thompson, 2016).5 Where honesty, authenticity, and truth are required to stimulate constructive discourse, he finds spin, evasiveness, and dishonesty. In fact, instead of authenticity, political discourse is marked by what he describes as authenticism (p. 152), a term closely related to populism: For authenticists, what matters most is not argument, but story: their ‘truths’ are inextricably bound up with the narratives they tell about their community. The facticity of a given claim matters less than its fit with the narrative. If something feels true, then in some sense it must be true. (p. 155)

In this chapter, we discuss the use and abuse of language – not least, the term fake news – as it relates to recent events. We will argue for a clearer, more distinct definition of terms to form the base for further qualitative and quantitative exploration (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Levinson, 2017; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). We explore the emergent challenges of online political propaganda and new technologies in the wider context of political marketing, military information operations, and public relations in historical perspective, and in examining the structural changes in the media ecosystem that have contributed to the formation of a “micro-propaganda machine” (Albright, 2016). First and foremost, however, we discuss these issues as forms of mediated human communication, with concepts of truth and trust as core ingredients (Anderson and Rainie, 2017; Halff & Gregory, 2015). Trust is central to our understanding of sociocultural and psychological phenomena (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Markova & Gillespie, 2007). It is also central to functional public relations. However, often, and increasingly so, the public relations literature describes trust as being in short supply (Fawkes, 2015; Phillips, 2015).6 Public relations, in a very practical sense and for the purposes of this paper, is discussed in the context of what is seen by some as political public relations, despite the “disconnect not only between practice and theory in political public relations, but also between theory and research in public relations, political science, political communication and political marketing” (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013, p. 3). The cultural, political and indeed anthropological perspective applied here (and in the vast majority of books and papers on public relations, or pretty much any social scientific discipline) is that of WEIRD, that is, Western,

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Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). Whilst it can be argued that a Global Public Relations Handbook ought to look at the world through a wider, more inclusive lens, for the purposes of this chapter and its main focus – the modern challenges of political communication and the evolution of public relations within a fragmenting and transforming media ecosystem – the WEIRD angle is adequate. In our view, it parallels very closely with the conceptual framework of this volume as described in Part I. It addresses recent, salient political events in Great Britain and in the United States in the context of fake news and the erosion of concepts such as trust and truth, in communication that is largely taking place in the English language. We will first focus our attention on the history of the field, before discussing multi – and transdisciplinary concepts of contemporary public relations. This is followed by a review of the relationship between public relations and agenda setting as a model of media effects. In examining the continuous transformation of the mediasphere, and the growing role of social media and social platforms in the dissemination of news and information, we then address the challenges of computational propaganda and what is increasingly seen as a global information disorder (where military and civil information operations, i.e. the strategic use of purposive persuasive communication, increasingly converge). This new and constantly evolving environment requires new concepts such as the dynamic relationship between aggregate flows and individual participation in mass communication, and agenda directing as a more fluid model to help explain the workings and effects of participatory political communication and polarization. The chapter concludes with thoughts about the evolution of public relations as part of the transformational shifts in technology and society that we are presently experiencing. Understanding the present in historical perspective There are many ways in which to tell the history of public relations, and how the history leads to the present. Our understanding of the present allows us to look to the future in terms of how public relations will be taught and how it will be practiced. One of the problems with the study of public relations history is that there is no single history of its development globally, instead one encounters a number of different and unrelated public relations histories often limited to cultural entities such as “Western liberal societies,” single countries or regions (Butterick, 2011). In this chapter, we will focus on the perspective that sees public relations as having evolved out of propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Kunczik, 2009; Moloney, 2006; Willke, 1998). The term propaganda originated in the Latin title of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide), an institution within the Catholic Church, founded by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 to promote missionary work in the New World, as well as in European countries where Protestantism was gaining influence (Soules, 2015, p. 4f). The relationship between public relations and propaganda has always been fraught. Scholars (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Kunczik, 2009; Moloney, 2006; Willke, 1989; Grunig & Hunt, 1984) often associated the birth of public relations with the work of the US Committee on Public Information (CPI), set up by Woodrow Wilson in 1916 and led by George Creel. Edward Bernays, widely credited as the ‘father of public relations’ for bringing social scientific inquiry to the field (Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Tye, 1998), although he shares that honor with Ivy Lee (see Du Plessis, 2000, p. 10; Grunig & Hunt, 1984), directed the CPI’s Latin News Services and participated in the 1919 Peace Conference as a member of Woodrow Wilson’s peace commission (Ewen, 1996).

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To understand the aforementioned political events of 2016, political public relations and its related fields of practice and research, including political marketing and political campaigning need to be seen in a temporal perspective. Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) state that “[w]hile political public relations as a concept and research field is rather new, the practice of political public relations is probably as old as politics and society itself” (p. 1). Walter Lippmann’s influential work on the limitations of democracy and democratic government (1922) referred to “press agents, publicity agents … publicity men” (p. 344). He quoted the then famous journalist Frank Irving Cobb, who succeeded Joseph Pulitzer as editor of the New York World in 1904, to make the case: what I do know is that many of the direct channels to news have been closed and the information for the public is first filtered through publicity agents. The great corporations have them, the railroads have them, all the organizations of business and of social and political activity have them, and they are the media through which news comes. Even statesmen have them. (p. 344)

The field of psychology is also integral to public relations. Lippmann’s contemporary Edward Bernays (a nephew of Sigmund Freud) saw public relations as an applied social science, drawing on psychological and sociological theories that he had been exposed to by his uncle as well as models and insights when he laid its foundations in the first half of the 20th century (Botan & Hazleton, 2010; Grunig & Hunt, 1984; St. John, Opdycke Lamme, & L’Etang, 2014). However, historically, the association of public relations activities with propaganda, as evidenced in Bernays’ own work (Bernays, 1923, 1928; also Lippmann, 1922)7, has led to psychology being associated with purposeful and targeted persuasion and manipulation (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012; Moloney, 2006), rather than contributing to a more rounded understanding and explanation of human behavior and decision-making (Edwards & Hodges, 2011; Perloff, 2017). Concepts of Public Relations Today Public relations comes in many shapes and guises. Moloney (2006) mentions a tally of 472 definitions as proof of its “terminological inexactitude” (p. 5). He then goes on to offer this pragmatic, outcome-oriented definition: “PR is always persuasive, communicative behaviour designed to win a margin of benefit in a pluralistic competition for advantage” (p. 6). Since the publication of Grunig and Hunt’s Managing Public Relations (1984), and the research program popular as the Excellence Project, Excellence Theory has become the leading paradigm in the theory and practice of public relations (Grunig & Grunig, 2008). In his paper on critiques of Grunig’s concept, Kenny (2016) concludes that As public relations evolves in synchrony with digital technologies and greater citizen demands for equitable participation […] educators and professionals need to move beyond the Excellence Theory in order to fulfil the present and future potential of the public relations industry. (p. 88)

A recent review of the literature on public relations revealed few references to communication theory (van Ruler, 2016). This indicates that in the literature on public

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relations (and, it is assumed, also more generally in practice and academy), communication (as well as psychology) is usually treated as a given (Anderson, 1996; Toth & Heath, 1992). This matters because the challenges engulfing public relations – concerning its identity and legitimacy amid an evolving disruptive public and social mediasphere (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011; L’Etang, McKie, Snow, & Xifra, 2015; Macnamara, 2013; Moloney, 2006; Motion, Heath & Leitch, 2015) cannot be addressed adequately without robust theoretical models and clear definitions of concepts. There is great analytical potential in viewing the challenges and opportunities for public relations and communications for organizations and society through the lens of various scientific disciplines – psychology, sociology, anthropology, behavioral economics, neurosciences (Bandura, 2001; Edwards & Hodges, 2011; Falk, 2012; Schapiro & Ambrose, 2015; Weber, 2015). As mentioned before, the connection between psychology and public relations is not a novelty. The focus on public relations as applied social psychology (White, 2000), with human communication, behavior, and decision-making at its core (Harris, 2004; Kahneman, 2011), generates a continuous view from the past to the present, toward the future. Whilst we consider disruptive change through new media channels (Motion, Heath & Leitch, 2015), new technologies, artificial intelligence, machine-learning, and big data (Klewes, Popp & RostHein, 2017), we also recognize that methods of influence, persuasion, and social engineering might have evolved (Davis, 2013; Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 2017), but the social and psychological mechanisms are still more or less what they were 100 years ago, when Edward Bernays worked for the Committee on Public Information (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). From information subsidies to weaponized narratives: the symbiotic relationship between agenda setting and public relations When agenda-setting theory was first formulated and empirically tested, public relations activities did not feature as an influence on the media agenda. More generally, when looking at how the news media influenced the public – not by telling them what to think, but what to think about (Cohen, 1963, p. 13) – the research started from the content of the news, not from the sources of the news (Macnamara, 1993). When agenda setting is understood as “the transfer of salience from the media agenda to the public agenda” (Carroll & McCombs, 2003, p. 36), and the main tenet of public relations is understood as “the management of communication between an organization and its publics through the media” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 6), then it seems obvious that public relations plays a central and strategic role in the process of setting public agendas through the media. Agenda setting is concerned with the influence of the media on public opinion, and to arrive at a broader, more holistic understanding of how agendas form, one needs to look at the news media itself: who or what influences, who sets the media agenda? McCombs and Shaw (1993), looking back over 25 years of agenda-setting research, addressed the question: “who sets the public agenda” as leading the early stages of agenda-setting research, whereas later, the focus shifted to “who sets the media agenda?” Besides various analytical approaches that look at the sociology of news and factors that influence the daily production of news, the authors point to the following research context:

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Also relevant to the broad question of who sets the media agenda are Breed’s (1955) classic theory of news diffusion – an area now called intermedia agenda-setting, which has been supplemented with new research on the role of public relations […] – and the tradition of gatekeeping research in journalism – whose perspective has been transformed by the theory of agenda setting. (McCombs & Shaw, 1993, p. 61)

Intermedia agenda setting, or agenda building, became the object of academic research in the 1980s, when researchers began to look into the drivers of mass media coverage (Ognyanova, 2013). This shift in focus from influence on the public agenda to influence on the media agenda also introduced public relations into the research mix. For a long time, intermedia agenda setting was seen as an extension of older models of top down, opinion leader relationships where outlets such as the New York Times and the Washington Post yield significant influence over its peers (Atwater, Fico, & Pizante, 1987; Breed, 1955). There has been a range of empirical studies investigating the transfer of salience – both on object level (first level agenda setting), and on attribute level (second level agenda setting) through the provision of information from third parties to the media, and then from the media to the public (De Moya, Kim & Kiousis, 2010; Ragas, Kim & Kiousis, 2011; Sheafer & Weimann, 2005). This has firmly brought the public relations function into the theoretical mix of agenda setting, as a key factor influencing what the media reports on: Agenda building has been a key theoretical backdrop for examining public relations contributions to public opinion about issues, organizations, and people. (De Moya, Kim & Kiousis, 2010, p. 7)

Structural changes, resulting in economic pressures on the news production process, have created a type of journalism – fed by pre-packaged material, rather than researched, investigated, systematically fact-checked news – which is often described as “churnalism,” for example, by Jackson and Moloney (2015) who interviewed public relations practitioners to examine the role of the information subsidy and editorial subsidy (a more tailored, “page ready” version of a press release) in modern media relations. The concept of the information subsidy – providing the media with ready-made newsworthy information packages such as news releases – was formulated by Oscar Gandy (1982). Its influence on news media was first empirically tested by Judy VanSlyke Turk (1985). It has since become central to the idea of integrating public relations into agenda building as a constituent part of agenda setting models: Central to exploring agenda-building […] is the concept of “information subsidies,” such as source-provided news releases, advertisements, speeches and related materials, which attempt “to intentionally shape the news agenda by reducing journalists’ costs of gathering information.” (Ragas, Kim & Kiousis, 2011, p. 258)

Intermedia agenda setting has value as a concept to explain how content forms and flows between channels. In order to keep pace with emergent technologies, new channels, and new user behaviors (Vargo & Guo, 2016; Weimann & Brosius 2016), some of its basic assumptions need to be revised. Harder, Sevenans, and Van Aelst (2017) suggest questioning “one, that media agendas should be measured on an issue level;

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two, that fixed time lags suffice to understand overlap in media content; and three, that media can be considered homogeneous entities…” (p. 1). The role of social media channels and platforms is increasingly becoming a focus of agenda-setting studies and literature reviews (Skogerbø, Bruns, Quodling & Ingebretsen, 2016). This raises an interesting question when it comes to the direction of influence, and effects on participants in the agenda-setting process: Do social media (re)introduce a more active role for the public? Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang and Bae (2014) discuss new concepts and ways to describe the dynamics of public attention in the context of the emergence and proliferation of social media channels and platforms and conclude that “agenda setting … is not a one-way pattern from traditional media to a mass audience, but rather a complex and dynamic interaction” (p. 193). McCombs himself discusses the idea of “reverse agenda-setting” (McCombs, 2004). Reverse agenda setting is also present in Joseph Stiglitz’s analysis of the dynamics between media and society from the perspective of media capture (Schiffrin, 2017): cognitive capture by media can lead to cognitive capture by society. The media help shape the views of the members of society, and if the media are captured, their reporting can give rise to the acceptance of views within society that reflect those interests. (Stiglitz, 2017, p. 20)

The problem of machine generated content (as opposed to genuine news) is so far largely seen as a problem of either content collection in the research process (Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang & Bae, 2014), or as a technical fact-checking problem (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016), rather than as a genuine threat for the formation of informed public and political opinion in Western societies (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Computational propaganda and global information disorder The issues outlined here go beyond the role of public relations in society, beyond the effects of fake news and online political propaganda, and even beyond the relationship between politics, the media, and society. We are faced with a global information disorder, characterized in a recent Council of Europe report as information pollution at a global scale; a complex web of motivations for creating, disseminating and consuming these ‘polluted’ messages; a myriad of content types and techniques for amplifying content; innumerable platforms hosting and reproducing this content; and breakneck speeds of communication between trusted peers. (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 4)

The authors quoted the EU East StratCom Task Force in outlining the Russian approach to disinformation campaigns: the dis-information campaign is a non-military measure for achieving political goals. Russian authorities are explicit about this, for example through the infamous Gerasimov doctrine and through statements by top Russian generals that the use of ‘false data’ and ‘destabilising propaganda’ are legitimate tools in their tool kit. (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 34)

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Framing the role of information as a strategic tool has a tradition going back to Sun Tzu, who stated that the key to winning 100 battles is “to know your enemy and to know yourself.” The history of public relations is closely interwoven with wartime campaigns to specifically inform and disinform a target audience, both at home, and on the side of the enemy. We previously mentioned the Creel Committee in the US, and propaganda was and is a staple of military activities worldwide (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012). This kind of strategic disinformation campaign is therefore by no means a Russian prerogative. Van Dyke and Verčič (2009) discuss the reversal of the separation between propaganda, public relations and diplomacy in the West as part of the fight against terrorism: As planning for the war against terrorism matured, government public affairs specialists and diplomats began working closely with military psychological operations (PsyOps) specialists, who are sometimes perceived as the contemporary equivalent of World War I and World War II era propagandists. Reversing 20th century efforts to separate propaganda from public relations and diplomacy, Western nations and alliances began to integrate these and other communication functions within programs like information operations, perception management, and strategic communication. (p. 917)

In the age of global interconnectivity, big data and neural networks, information operations and psychological warfare have become an ever more central part of global military planning and strategy (Nelson, 2013). In US military doctrine, information has joined the classic four battlespaces of land, sea, air and space as a fifth dimension (Kiyuna & Conyers, 2015). This is where we can observe a blending of military influence techniques with overt and covert purposive persuasive communication online. A 2017 study by the Oxford Internet Institute Computational Propaganda Research Project focused on political communication and the manipulation of public opinion through computational propaganda in Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the US found challenges to a free and fair flow of information in all countries. The use of social media for the manipulation of public opinion is widespread and systematic, the study concluded. Computational propaganda here is defined as the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks … Computational propaganda involves learning from and mimicking real people so as to manipulate public opinion across a diverse range of platforms and device networks. (Woolley & Howard, 2016, p. 6)

The challenge, then, is to develop a better systematic and methodological understanding of the transformational changes in information and communication technology and their effects on society, culture, politics as they pertain to public relations (understood as a global field, however with largely local implications). The following section will look at this in more detail. AGGREGATE FLOWS, INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION To expand on the “theoretical mix” concept of propaganda, persuasion, and agenda setting introduced in the previous section, the evolutionary changes in public information

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systems occurring since the early days of mass communication and reception studies must be taken into account. For example, Althaus and Tewksbury (2002) argue that most agenda-setting research tends to compare “aggregate trends in the public agenda to aggregate trends in the news agenda” through the “mass persuasion” and “natural history” approaches described by McCombs, Danielian, & Wanta (1995, p. 180). More specifically, as Bennett and Manheim (2006) maintain, the audience of the mass broadcast era have evolved into a fragmented hybrid: The combination of social isolation, communication channel fragmentation, and message targeting technologies have produced a very different information recipient than the audience members of the Eisenhower era … they have gained greater command of their own information environments, often participating in multiple, fluid social networks oriented to self-expression. (p. 215)

Within the divergent and rapidly changing information ecosystem, Bennett and Manheim (2006) describe a broader shift towards the “decline of a social membership society” in lieu of a “lifestyle network society.” Likewise, Couldry (2011) posits that the rise of social-networking sites suggests “a new type of mediated center in which the focus is not on central media institutions…but ourselves, our friends, and family, and our horizontal social world” (p. 215). Front and center in this new news ecosystem are networked individual members of “the people formerly known as the audience” (Rosen, 2006). More recently, however, persuasion strategies [micro]target individuals through the application of “differentiated” data (Bennett & Manheim, 2006, p. 216) for the purposes of agenda setting, real-time debate framing. This form of controversy seeding sets up the key mechanisms through which public relations tactics, what Moloney refers to as “weak propaganda” (2006), or strategies employed to ensure certain messages reach certain individuals at the desired time. While contemporary public relations strategies increasingly focus on reaching individuals through online social networks, empirical studies of individual-level agenda setting are less common than for the group level, likely due to what Althaus and Tewksbury (2002) note as “few observable effects at the individual level” (p. 183). AGENDA DIRECTING AND PARTICIPATORY TECHNO-POLITICS The combination of communication channel fragmentation, participatory information gathering, and differential data targeting for the purposes of selective information exposure has implications for the notion of agenda setting. Not the least in that it disrupts the pluralistic construct of the public the emerging media ecosystem introduces a number of challenges for researchers and practitioners to consider when dealing with conceptualizing how information circulates within the emerging mediascape. For one, programmatic (i.e., automated) advertising and algorithmic delivery mechanisms mean that information exposure and media diets are often theorized and understood at the aggregate level (e.g., “trending topics” and “viral stories”). Yet, a complex amalgamation of data including consumer habits and preferences, lifestyles, locations, and other personal details collected about targeted individuals, as well as from their friends, families, and co-workers. The opaque tracking interfaces and algorithmic delivery systems helping to ensure information reaches us, including our news, and the networked and groups we frequent at different times and across different locales have become commonplace.

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Bennett and Manheim (2006) describe emerging message-targeting technologies as functioning to link “specific [information-related] cases with specific [personal and group] attributes” (p. 216). It also helps to establish a groundwork by interpreting the supply-side notion of Howard’s “computational propaganda,” including the push of misinformation and false stories which spread online and through platforms such as Twitter and Facebook during the 2016 U.S. election (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). At the center of this agenda-setting mechanism, Vargo et al. argue, is partisan media: The online nature of emerging media may make it more attentive to all online information, including fake news. Taken all together, online partisan and nonpartisan media were closely intertwined with fake news websites, producing an extremely complicated and uncertain online mediascape. (2017, p. 17)

Similarly, Daniel Kreiss (2012) “digital two-step flow” sets up a situation whereby political content is produced with the intention of its target audience sharing such information across a range of different tools and for multiple user motivations, including politics. Returning to the idea of message propagation and “virality” presented earlier in this piece, Jenkins (2013) argues that information is not usually passively spread as part of a biological or “carrier-host” process. Rather, as Kreiss’ proposition argues, the more personal, relevant, affirming, and anger-provoking messages are designed, the better they will be received by certain audiences, who engage with and and further (re)circulate the ideas and news across the network. BaldwinPhilippi describes this process as more of a “controllable strategic device” rather than a form of blind contagion (2015, p.70). While micro-targeting and profiling individuals with collected data can help create the right conditions for the rapid intra- and extra-group circulation of propaganda, in the process of disseminating information Lippmann called the “world outside,” like the press, platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram function as directional conduits of information for their users (Napoli & Caplan, 2017). Thus, given the time spent deliberating on the importance of the press’ “attention-directing function,” Althaus and Tewksbury consider “whether the nature of agenda setting by the news media might change as the technologies of news dissemination adapt to the formats of new communication media” (2002, p. 180). News and political messages, including propaganda, might still be disseminated through a broadcast, or “top-down” model, but the means whereby it enters users’ groups and social networks, and ends up at their top-of-minds is markedly different than in the broadcast era. THE AGENDA-DIRECTING MODEL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION By selecting the messages that are most likely to result in increased engagement, and by serving promoted messages through algorithms giving them special placement and presence in users’ feeds (as well as elsewhere online), while the press might influence many of the people, issues, and events that are deserving of public attention, platforms such as Facebook often decide who will get to see it in the end, and in what contexts the messages will be received, interpreted, and circulated (e.g., political, emotional, conversational). While McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) statement about the news media playing a key role in setting the public agenda still holds true – the media not necessarily telling us “what to think” but rather “what to think about,” an updated hybrid model should be considered, as a breed of new intermediaries have emerged.

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These platforms promote and demote information in real time; as metrics are input into algorithms and subsequently processed, platforms don’t bring us our news (many would argue this is still a dominant function of the traditional media), but they do tend to bring us the news that we are likely to talk about and share. This is particularly the case with political campaigns and politically-themed messaging, which Baldwin-Phillipi (2015) describes as a “hybrid of a mass public and a networked communication model that attempts to gain the widest audience for messages” (p. 71). Within the online media sphere, particularly for political blogs, there exists a different definition of “widest possible audience” than for the mass media. For instance, Mike Gruszczynski (2015) points to a number of studies (e.g., Robertson et al., 2013; Baum and Groeling, 2008; Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, 2010) that suggest digital sources of news have less incentive “to carry an air of objectivity” because they lack the constraints posed by professional journalistic norms and values, advertiser relationships, and maintaining their subscription base, which is true for mainstream print and broadcast media. Because of the economy of information flows, individuals who seek out political information online have no incentive to frequent news sources that cater to political moderation, especially when any number of sources comporting to their beliefs litter the Internet. (p. 115)

Moreover, Gruszczynski (2015) notes that political blogs’ “opinion-driven nature, coupled with ideological proclivities” allows these smaller digital news sources to “have more leeway to fixate on any number of controversies for extended periods of time.” CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK In this chapter we have observed that the growing influence of online partisan media on political communication and democratic decision-making in western societies marks a new quality of propaganda (Vargo & Guo, 2016; Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen, 2018). We are currently experiencing a transformational shift in the relationship between politics, the media, and the public. In our attempt to deal adequately with what is generally labeled as the “fake news problem,” we distinguish between disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation in our mapping out the global information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Rojecki and Meraz identify “factitious informational blends” (or FIBs) as a new form of misinformation driving speculative politics in the dynamics of information transmission and agenda setting (Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). Their paper also highlights the fact that “the distinction between disinformation and propaganda on the basis of appeals to reason and emotion, respectively, rests on the dubious claim that these human capacities do not interact” (p. 28).8 The dynamics between messages appealing to reason and those appealing to emotion is a central theme of recent research into political public relations and agenda setting. Concepts are evolving with the continued fragmentation of communication channels and the disruptive and transformative role of social media platforms. The hybrid model of mass communication and networked communication is supported by concepts of intermedia agenda setting, agenda directing, and third-level agenda building (Kiousis & Ragas, 2015). The global disinformation challenge must also be seen

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as a form information warfare, in the sense that influence techniques which have been honed in a military context (Nelson, 2013) are now applied in non-military strategic communication (Botan, 2017). Public relations in general, and political public relations in particular, has to continue to evolve as part of a wider evolution of society and technology – both as a practice, and an academy. In order to remain relevant, this paper proposes that something of a paradigm shift is required: toward more interdisciplinarity, toward more evidence-based science, toward more integration of micro (behavioral psychology) and macro (social psychology) perspectives (Botan, 2017). Brown (2015) calls this “The Public Relations of Everything”: a reconceptualization of the field, away from the management of organizational communication, and toward an integrated human science. For Brown, political public relations is not a subdiscipline. On the contrary, “what is political about PR cannot simply be siphoned off into the subdiscipline of public affairs. public relations is not political in part but thoroughly – structurally, historically, continuingly” (p. XiX). NOTES 1. Experts advise against the use of the term fake news, as it is both inadequate to describe the complex underlying phenomena, and also misappropriated to label disagreeable news coverage in general (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Wardle & Derakhshan instead propose the use of misinformation (inadvertent sharing of false information), disinformation (deliberate creation and sharing of false information) and malinformation (truthful information intended to harm 2. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda. Retrieved from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: www.osce.org/fom/302796 3. www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named-2016-word-of-the-year-byoxford-dictionaries/ 4. www.theguardian.com/books/2017/nov/02/fake-news-is-very-real-word-of-the-year-for-2017 5. Throughout this chapter, when language is mentioned, it generally refers to English – as the lingua franca of the Internet, but also as the main language of Great Britain and the United States. The political language that Mark Thompson refers to is thus usually also expressed in English. Correspondingly, the cultural and political perspective is that of liberal Western societies. 6. The annual Edelman Trust Barometer study found a “Global Implosion of Trust in their 2017 study (www.edelman.com/news/2017-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-global-implosion/), and CEO Richard Edelman, in a speech in October 2017, called for a new “PR Compact” and “collaborative journalism” to regain trust through accountable, ethical behaviour (www.holmesreport.com/latest/article/to-restoretrust-a-new-pr-compact-is-needed-richard-edelman-tells-national-press-club) 7. Accounts of PR history routinely state Lippmann’s influence in the work of Bernays (Ewen, 1996). Jansen’s analysis of Bernays’ “calculated reversal of Lippmann’s argument” (2013) however shows that the two men had very different views of propaganda. Lippmann was highly critical and sceptical of what he described as the “manufacture of consent” (1922), whereas Bernays’ “engineering of consent” was an endorsement of social engineering, with propaganda a necessary and expedient technique. 8. The Cartesian error of separating reason and emotion has long been challenged. Lisa Feldman Barrett’s “theory of constructed emotion” (Feldman Barrett, 2017) is perhaps the most promising current concept: away from preconceived ideas and mechanistic concepts, and toward a more dynamic, fluid model of continuous construction of emotions based on social interactions. Her idea of an emotional climate of a culture allows to link individual (brain) development with social-cultural development.

REFERENCES Albright, J. (2016): The #Election2016 micro-propaganda machine. Medium, 18 November. Available at: https://medium.com/@d1gi/the-election2016-micro-propaganda-machine-383449cc1fba#.nax547fvh Allcott, H. & Gentzkow, M. (2017): Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), pp. 211–236.

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28 The Role of Public Relations in the Global Battle for Hearts and Minds From (Liberal) “Democracy Promotion” to the Promotion of “Illiberal Democracy” Ryszard Ławniczak

The leading world powers – the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, and most recently Russia and China, have been resorting in peaceful times to their public diplomacy and “soft power”: culture, investment, academia, foreign aid and, most recently, social media, and cyber space – to influence other countries in the world and to “win the battle of hearts and souls.” Particularly the American leaders were strongly convinced that “the United States has a ʻmissionʼ to spread democratic values and the liberal policies model abroad”(Sedaca & Bouchet, 2014, p. 5). That is why the “democracy promotion” program became the cornerstone of the US foreign policy and since the end of the Cold War, democratic liberalism has been the dominant model in national development. The topic falls within the framework of social theory, among others in specific fields like comparative political systems (Almond, 1956), comparative economic systems (Gregory & Stuart, 1989) and in the public relations theory in concepts like public relations and promotion of democracy (Taylor, 2000; Bardhan & Weaver, 2011), transitional public relations (Ławniczak, 2016) and image restoration theory (Benoit, 1995). This chapter argues that in different regions of the world public relations strategies and instruments were, and continue to be, used to fulfill that “democracy promotion” mission trying to impose a certain political and socio-economic model of democracy: labeled as “liberal,” or more recently, also “illiberal.” However, the analysis of this chapter is limited to the non-military “liberal democracy” promotion efforts on the part of the U.S. administrations and other Western governments aimed at the former socialist/communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, it covers also the public diplomacy strategy and instruments used by 309

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some of those “societies in transition” (Mygind, 1994) to defend and promote their own models of democracy, defined after Victor Orbán as “illiberal democracy.” This study focuses mainly on the political transition based on the accepted definition of “democracy promotion” as formulated in the Chatham House study (Sedaca & Bouchet, 2014, p. 3) as “the widest range of actions that one country with all the actors can take to influence the political development (underlining added) of another towards greater democratization.” THE U.S. “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” MISSION Since the end of the WWII, different U.S. administrations have put forward the argument that democratization and market economy implanted in foreign countries will increase the American security and help to achieve economic objectives. Among the principal targets of this democracy promotion mission have been the so-called transitional states, formerly part of the so-called “Soviet bloc” but also countries of Latin America, the Arab and Islamic world, particularly since September 11, 2001. The U.S. World Dominance Stage “Democracy promotion” has been an important part of the Western liberal order that has been nurtured and defended by the U.S. since WWII. It was designed to secure U.S. power relations and domination in the world, obviously only complementary to the military hegemony. One should mention the two aspects of this concept: the economic and the political one as it was based on the belief that democracy can exist only in the market economy. Parallel to the efforts to implant the market economy model, (see Ławniczak, 2001, 2005, 2016; Szondi, 2014; Tampere, 2003; Wedel, 2000) the U.S. and the EU members states also rendered their “democracy assistance” with the intent of imposing “a particular model of democracy” (Sussman, 2010, pp. xv, XVIxvi). The most efficient and influential institution of “democracy assistance” in the former socialist/communist countries is NED (National Endowment for Democracy) that was founded in 1983. It was designed as not a governmental but a semiautonomous, semi-private organization with the aim of channeling money, equipment, political consultants, and other expertise to other countries in order “to strengthen democratic electoral processes … through timely measures in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces” (Sussman, 2010, p. 45; Damrosch, 1989, p. 19). NED supported financially new non-communist politicians and leaders, their parties, and groups. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems was among the providers of training and technical assistance. Besides the NED assistance to “democracy promotion” also the USAID initiated the Support for East European Democracy (SEED). Its primary goal was “to promote democratic and free market transitions in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Poland, with its “Solidarity” labor movement and charismatic leader Lech Walesa, was considered as the first communist country designed as a potential target for “regime change.” Similar to Sussman (2010, p. 128), and according to Bernstein, the United States providing the democracy assistance for Poland: did all of the things there are done in countries where you want to destabilize a communist government and strengthen resistance to that. We provided the supplies and

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technical assistance in terms of clandestine newspapers, broadcasting, propaganda, money, organizational help and advice. And working outward from Poland the same kind of assistance was organized in the other communist countries of Europe. (Bernstein, 1992)

Bernstein was not quite precise as the same type of political support was also provided for Russia and its former Asian republics. The final result of the U.S.-led Western “democracy promotion” efforts was: • imposition of a “set of economic and political prescriptions on developing and post-Communist transitional countries.” (Barma & Ratner, 2006); and • the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, as well as the “regime changes” in Russia and most of the other post-socialist/communist countries but only in the first stage of transition. The victory of the Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński in the Polish parliamentary elections in the autumns of 2006 and 2015, Victor Orbán’s party electoral success in 2010, together with appointing V. Putin as acting President in 1999 have encouraged a hypothesis that – just like in Peru (Freitag, 2004), campaigns promoting liberal democracy and the neoliberal model of the market economy are in fact fruitful only for some time. It simply confirmed the thesis that “Such global electioneering on behalf of neoliberal capitalism is likely to lead to resistance in targeted countries as they become wiser to these means of political manipulation, particularly by outside forces” (Sussman, 2006, p. 14). Backlash against the American-Style “democracy Promotion”: the Defense Stage With the collapse of the Soviet Union 25 years ago, Francis Fukuyama proudly announced “the end of history.” In his opinion, capitalism along with liberal democracy had won. Fukuyama could not have been more wrong about “the end of history.” The beginning of the 21th century has proven that the era of competing ideologies is far from being over. Not only because authoritarianism is quite successfully competing with liberalism and Islamist fundamentalism or because it is spreading around the world. More importantly, the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, and the “Occupy Wall Street” type of protests have proven that the marriage of free market economics and liberal democracy is incapable of creating political and socioeconomic systems benefiting the majority. The End of the U.S. Persuasion Power In effect, the beginning of the 21st century has brought an end to the U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy persuasion power because: 1. “The American dream” is no longer appealing and the U.S. government lacks credibility as a messenger and partner with key foreign audiences (Brown, Green, Wang, 2017, pp. 11–12). The main reasons for that situation worth mentioning are: a) the consequences of “fake news” about “the weapons of mass destruction” and the following: the invasion of Iraq, as well the and declaration of “War on Terror” after 9/11 (Zaharna, 2014);

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b) the so-called “Saudi Effect”: the hypocrisy of the U.S. foreign policy, e.g. by promoting democracy, and on the other hand supporting the Saudi government, not necessarily the best example of democratic standards; c) the consequences of the failed Arab spring; d) the negative image effect of “the right to own guns;” f) Donald Trump’s arrival to power which has tarnished the international image of the U.S. (Pew Report, June 26, 2017). 2. The disapproval of the “Washington Consensus” prescriptions after the 2008/ 2009 financial crisis manifesting themselves around the world (Rodrik, 2006). According to the Pew Research Center report of November 2, 2009, (p. 1) the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly.

All the above mentioned factors, coupled with many other have led the prominent scholar R.S. Zaharna to the conclusion that “International sentiment toward America quickly went from outpouring of global sympathy and support immediately after the 9/11 attacks to a palpable wave of anti-Americanism” (Zaharna, 2014, p. 11). At the micro level, the PR industry has tried to come to rescue of the “banksters” like Wells Fargo, AIB and others (theJournal.ie, October 14, 2017), by immediately starting image repair campaigns to defend the blemished reputation of the greedy financial sector. For the image repair at the macro level, Zaharna suggested the new relational approach to the US public diplomacy ( 2014, p. 184) “to create and sustain bridges among hearts and minds.” The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, and/or” Autocratic Governments around the World No wonder that in line with the above mentioned decline of the persuasion power of the American-type democracy and the market economy, one can observe the rise of a concept of “illiberal democracy.” It has already been foretold in 1997 in the famous and controversial article published by Fareed Zakaria in “Foreign Affairs” (November/December), and analysed more deeply by Rodrik and Mukand in their article “Why Illiberal Democracies Are on the Rise?” published by Project Syndicate (2015). As could be expected, from the very beginning this notion has been widely discussed and often challenged by both theoretician and journalists and politicians (e.g. Atanassow, 2017; Isaac, 2017; Bozóki, 2017; The New York Times, March 9, 2016). The popularity of the notion of “illiberal democracy” is most closely linked to the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán who presented this concept in his already famous speech in Tusnadfurdo (Baile Tusnad) on July 26, 2014. This notion is also commonly associated with other well-known political leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Xi Jinping of China, or Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the ruling party in Poland. In his Tusnadfurdo speech Victor Orbán stated among others, that: The most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful. Today, the stars of international analyses are Singapore,

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China, India, Turkey, Russia ….. We needed to state that a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy. Moreover, it could be and needed to be expressed, that probably societies founded upon the principle of the liberal way to organize a state will not be able to sustain their world-competitiveness in the following years, and more likely they will suffer a setback, unless they will be able to substantially reform themselves. ……in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is a illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom… the central element of state organization, but instead includes a different, special, national approach. (Website of Hungarian Government, July 30, 2014)

REVERSAL IN GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO (LIBERAL) DEMOCRACY: CAMPAIGNS TO DEFEND AND PROMOTE “ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY” It is obvious that the gradual appearance and the eventual strengthening of governments that undermine the principles of the generally applicable model liberal democracy violated the global interests of the United States, the dominant European Union countries, their international corporations, and financial institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank. They initiated world campaigns to discredit such undemocratic/ autocratic regimes as the governments of China, Putin’s Russia, Turkey, and recently V. Orbán’s Hungary or Poland. On the other hand, in defense of their reforms and interests, the governments of these countries were forced to apply their own strategies of public diplomacy. I define this type of strategy as “home-grown transitional public relations,” to distinguish it from “foreign imposed transitional public relations,” applied to introduce the liberal type democracy and neoliberal model of market economy in the former socialist/communist countries (Ławniczak, 2016). Only after some time, when it turned out that such an alternative model of “illiberal democracy,” contrary to the aforementioned mass criticism, became attractive also to other countries (especially the developing ones), did the respective governments the promotion stage of this model. The biggest paradox here seems to be the fact that both at the stage of defending the model of “illiberal democracy” and in its promotion, active participation of the best-known, globally operating Western PR agencies should be noted (e.g. Ketchum, Burston Marsteller, Hill+Knowlton, FleishmanHillard Inc, Ogilvy Public Relations, and Edelman. (South China Morning Post, Friday, April 22, 2016)). The Defense Stage to Counter the Global Campaign of Discrediting the Illiberal/ Authoritarian Governments The Inefficiency of the Russian Cultural Diplomacy After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new socio-political system and the post-1991 economic chaos coupled with the “contradictory image” of Boris Yeltsin caused a persisting Russian identity crisis (Lebedenko, 2004). Opinion polls carried out in the West revealed that Russia was primarily associated with vodka, the KGB, mafia, and the Kalashnikov rifle . Such a negative perception by the international community was considered to be a major hindrance not only to Russia’s closer integration with the West but also with major international organizations. This was arguably a major foreign policy objective as well (Osipova, 2014). However, these attempts have been largely ineffective in bringing about affection for or a widespread positive

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attitude towards Russia. They could not be effective because for a long time, Russia’s public diplomacy practice emphasized mainly a cultural exchange/cultural diplomacy approach rather than the American-style media diplomacy approach. This is largely because Russian culture (ballet, music, literature) is highly developed while its media is still not globally integrated. Landmarks in recent exchange and cultural diplomacy have included among others events like the Bolshoi Theatre performances around the world, promotion of world famous Russian literature and music, e.g. Dostoevsky, Rachmaninoff, Pasternak (New York Times, January 21, 2007). However that form of public diplomacy, designed rather to defend Russia’s image abroad, was highly insufficient taking under consideration the Western domination of global media. In the early 2000s, after Vladimir Putin came to power the “image problem” turned into an “urgent” issue for the new President. The primary goal of Russian public diplomacy became to project a more positive image of itself in the international community. The Successful Hungarian “Home-Grown Transitional PR” After winning the 2010 elections, Prime Minister V. Orbán questioned the liberal socio-economic model prevailing in Hungary. In 2014, as already mentioned above, he stated explicitly that “the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state.” In seeking to achieve such a model of development, Orbán shocked the international financial markets and unnerved investors, as well as European and international institutions, with the following radical steps: • In the political sphere: changing the Constitution, and regaining controlover the media through media reforms. • In the economic sphere, introducing among others: controversial pension changes; new taxes on banks and mostly foreign-owned businesses; renationalization (or de-privatization) of several companies; punitive corporate taxes on foreign multinationals; an unorthodox, high-risk fiscal-recovery strategy designed to force the International Monetary Fund out of Hungary’s business; a declaration that he will not extend a 20 billion euro loan deal with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund and will no longer submit its policies to oversight other than that of the EU. Orbán had no doubts that the international financial circles and international organizations he offended with his radical economic policies would take revenge on both his country and him personally. In fact, it did not take much time before the global campaign discrediting Orbán’s reforms started. According to Schoeplin (2014), “the international media have run a quite unbelievably vicious campaign against Hungary. Plausibly backed by a sophisticated public relations operation” (p. 2). One could expect such reaction because in the event that the radical reforms introduced by Victor Orbán’s Government succeeded, they would encourage other countries to follow. Hence, for the reforms to succeed, the change of the model of communication policy was also absolutely essential. The new model sought liberation from foreign-imposed transitional public relations and the application of a new variety – home-grown transitional public relations (Ławniczak, 2016). It was recognized by the Orbán government that sound communication inwards and outwards would be key to the success of its radical and unorthodox reforms (Kaiser, 2010). The former involved explaining the basic concept, purpose, and benefits flowing from them, in order to get public support for its implementation and to

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win elections. For the latter, outwards, it meant strengthening the international communication in defense of Hungary’s image and to promote the reasons, concepts and rationality of the change, to encourage both foreign investors as well as expand international cooperation. The communication strategy was based on the following guidelines: • Inwards, constantly remind the voters that “this government is ‘different’ and functions ‘differently’ to the previous government” (Kaiser, 2010, p. 120); Hungary is now presented with a major opportunity which its voters have opened up with their choice for change; • Outwards, the Hungarian Government have adopted a two-pronged strategy of communication: on the one hand, it stresses that in Hungary there is nothing terrible happening with no totalitarianism or compromising of people’s rights; on the other, the Government underlines its strong social mandate and its political independence from other states.

The Defense Campaigns of the Chinese Public Diplomacy In the early years of the 21st century the Western media and politicians were confronted by the fact that “China is now emerging as both the world’s most dynamic economy and its largest source of capital” (Financial Times, May 30, 2007). Having accumulated official foreign exchange reserves of $1,202 billion by March 2007, China can now afford a large scale public diplomacy (Aoyama, 2007) using its soft power for its “charm offensive” (Kurlandtzick, 2007) which has two aims: • the first, to improve its international image (defensive stage), and • the second (concealed until the 19th Party Congress), to promote its “socialist market economy” model as proven and effective for social and economic success. China has gone on public relations defensive campaigns primarily in the face of the mounting international criticism of its handling of violent riots in Tibet and its subsequent crackdown, including the protests that have marred the international torch relay leading up to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008. Among other steps undertaken by official Chinese media, the Dalai Lama was blamed for orchestrating the March 14, 2008 riots in Lhasa, and the unrest that followed in other ethnic Tibetan areas, as part of a bid for independence and to spoil the Olympic Games. In its efforts to improve its image abroad China has, among other steps, also engaged international PR agencies (Hill+Knowlton, Ketchum, Ogilvy Public Relations, Fleishman-Hillard, and Edelman), as reported by the South China Morning (April 22, 2016). From Defense to an Offensive: the Promotion Stage At the beginning of the 21st century, as a result of the rising oil prices both Russia and China have strengthened their economic potentials and positions in the global economy. “In Putin’s mind, the United States attacked first in the information war. Russia is now strong enough to retaliate” (Ignatius, 2017). On the other hand, the economic potential and prestige of the United States suffered. In such circumstances,

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these major US competitors, together with smaller transition countries, joined the defensive stage to the offensive stage: promotion of their own competitive model of democracy and market economy – labeled by their Western opponents as the “illiberal democracy.” The Spread of the Hungarian Illiberal “Disease” At the end of December 2017, in contrast to 2010 when Hungary was in a state close to bankruptcy, the economic situation is stable, and Hungary is experiencing the highest growth in the EU (www.tvn24.pl). As a result, politicians in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and lately also the Czech Republic can see that Orbán’s experiment is both economically and politically successful. They see no negative consequences in weakening democratic institutions or going against liberal values, they regard Orbán as a role model and are trying to adapt some of his policies. Hungary’s story has become this way an East European story confirmed by headlines like: “More Hungary in Eastern Europe” (openDemocracy, August 27, 2014); “Eastern Europe Marches Right” (DEMOCRACY, December 11, 2017). While observing this growing popularity of Orbán’s model of illiberal democracy, one may conclude that Hungary has reached the stage of applying the soft power of attraction for offensive purposes – promotion of an alternative to liberal democracy. This happens not without sophisticated public diplomacy directed outwards. To communicate outwards, the following foreign communications tools are applied, to name a few (Szily, 2013, p. 4): • the Hungarian ambassadors “pen militant letters to the editor right away, should they read articles critical of Hungary;” • the “movement for the intellectual defense of the homeland” aiming at reacting to any form of criticism of Hungary has been encouraged; • Orbán himself as a charismatic leader and excellent communicator who “shocked Europe with his outspoken defense of rigid policies” (Sounders, 2011, p. 2); and • the actions of dynamic Communication Minister, Zoltan Kovacs who is very efficient in defending his government reforms, including writing open letters to the editors of FORBES, Financial Times, Washington Post, and other influential newspapers.

Russia Declares the Information War and the End of the U.S. Global Information Domination According to Professor J.S Nye, already in 2012 President Putin was aware that “soft power is a complex of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals … without the use of force, through information and other means of influence” (Nye, 2017). But in Nye’s opinion he misunderstands soft power because the declared “information warfare” goes well beyond soft power. Russia is not yet able to use it for offensive purposes, as an instrument of “competitive attractiveness.” Instead, “Information warfare can be used offensively to disempower rivals, and this could be considered ʻnegative soft powerʼ. By attacking the values of others, one can reduce their attractiveness, and thus their relative soft power” (Nye, 2017).

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Willy-nilly, Professor Nye is forced to admit that so far “Russian information warfare has been somewhat successful in terms of disruption, but affecting the 2016 U.S. election somewhat it has failed in terms of generating soft power” (Nye, 2017). It was confirmed by Prime Minister Theresa May in her speech on November 13, 2017 when she stated that “Russia repeatedly violated the airspace of several European countries, and mounted a sustained campaign of cyberespionage and disruption. This has included meddling in elections, hacking the Danish Ministry of Defense and the Bundestag, among many others” (The Scotland Times, November 14, 2017). The theoretical background of the new Russian offensive chaos theory of political warfare is already known as “The Gerasimov Doctrine” published in February 2013. According to Gerasimov, “the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have acceded to the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness….All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character” (Mckew, 2017). The “non-military means” applied by Russia in that guerrilla type of information warfare embrace a whole range of actors and tools: troll farms, automatic bots, hackers, social media, media leaks, and fake news and many others. However, there are media outlets like the RT and Sputnik which are the major elements of the extremely efficient Russian information warfare. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in the declassified version of its report on Russia’s interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential elections, the RT (Russia Today) has more YouTube viewers than Al Jazeera English, BBC World, or CNN. It lags however behind in Twitter and Facebook followers (Beauchamp, 2017). With the beginning of 2016, beside the first Russian activities under the information war banner, another important and historical moment is worth noticing: the official declaration of the end of American global information domination. On February 4th, 2016, Andrey Krutskikh, senior adviser to President Putin announced that just like in 1948, a year before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb ending the era of the U.S. atomic monopoly “We are at the verge of having, something’ in the information arena, which will allow us to talk to Americans as equals” (Ignatius, 2017). Very soon this shocking truth could be confirmed by the U.S. intelligence report quoted above, as well as quite sensational headlines in world media, like a November 19, 2014 article in “BBC World Tonight” titled: “Is US monopoly on the use of soft power at the end?”. It was followed in 2016 by equally sensational titles like: “America is Losing the Cyber Information War” ; “U.S. losing ʻinformation warʼ to Russia,” (The Washington Free Beacon, April 28, 2017). In spite of those rather alarming and pessimistic opinions, an American expert on information warfare rather optimistically emphasizes in his analysis that as for today, “The Russians know they can’t compete head-to-head with us – economically, militarily, technologically – so they create new battlefields. They are not aiming to become stronger than us, but to weaken us until we are equivalent” (Mckew, 2017). The New Chinese Stage of Public Diplomacy after the 19th Congress of the CPC The 19th Congress of the CPC should be treated as a milestone in the Chinese foreign policy strategy. It marked its basic shift, namely: the abandonment of Deng Xiaoping low-profile foreign policy and emphasizing that under Xi Jinping China strives now for a central role on the world stage. China’s growing

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power positions in world affairs allows today the Chinese leadership believe that their country can serve as a model for other countries and as a leader in the effort to guarantee global public goods. (Esteban, 2017)

In the opinion of the Guardian (Tuesday 24 October 2017), “Xi has pledged to lead the world’s second largest economy into a ʻnew eraʼ of international power and influence.” This new era defined by Xi’s Thought of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” had been written into the party charter. An analysis of the documents of the 19th Congress lead to a conclusion that the Chinese leadership is increasingly conscious that it is important for the country to enjoy a positive image abroad. That is why the diplomatic and PR efforts have to be redoubled to transmit the message that China is not a threat to anyone – which should be interpreted as a historical shift from the defensive to the offensive public diplomacy stage. China perceives its soft power a little broader than the original concept – as anything outside of military and security relations. In the Chinese approach it includes not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also coercive economic and diplomatic ties such as aid and investment, as well as participation in multilateral organizations. The Chinese public diplomacy offensive, intensified after the 19th Congress, is first of all directed towards developing countries of Africa, Latin America, Southeast and Central Asia. In particular, the Chinese public diplomacy tries to underline that it is now the leading export market for 32 countries, presenting concrete initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the One Belt and One Road Initiative. This way China demonstrates its readiness to contribute actively to the economic development of other countries. As for the other tools of the Chinese public diplomacy, the 19th party congress confirmed that the spread of Chinese language and culture seems to be the cornerstone of it together with promotion of Confucianism and the notion of the Harmonious Society. By May 2014, 480 Confucius Institutes have been established around the world with 1,000 more to be established by 2020 (Xinhua, October 2, 2006). Along with the official contacts and visits, China communicates with the outside world using also other tools of public diplomacy such as: • staging of major international events like the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, or the Universal Exposition in Shanghai in 2010); • launching intensive programs of educational exchange. The launch of the so-called Cooperation Forums with different developing countries seems a particularly useful tool for promoting Chinese “modes of development” or, in other words, the model of the “Beijing Consensus.” In its editorial published shortly after Xi’s closing address, the party’s official news agency, Xinhua (October 24, 2017) proudly underlined that China’s success proves that socialism can prevail and be a path for other developing countries to emulate and achieve modernization. China is now strong enough, willing, and able to contribute more for mankind. The new world order cannot be just dominated by capitalism and the West, and the time will come for a change.

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What the Chinese communist party official documents label as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Western analysts (Barma & Ratner, 2006) classify as “illiberal capitalism” but they must agree with the official tone of the 19th Congress that: China’s leaders have, over the last quarter-century, developed a strategy of illiberal capitalism that has demonstrated its ability to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction without causing significant fissures in authoritarian control. ….By demonstrating the viability and achievements of an illiberal capitalist model for growth, China has become an exporter of ideas to a developing world weary of democratic liberalism – and a financier for those eager to play copycat.

The Western PR Industry in Service of “Illiberal Democracies” As the two critical scholars observed, “Liberal public relations practice…leads to public relations being used to build relationship with local power holders who do not necessarily pursue or support principles of equity and democracy” (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011). This quite paradoxical truth has been confirmed by Freedom House stating that: For decades now, an expanding cadre of US political consultants, public relations specialists, and blue-chip law firms have been earning generous fees from many of the world’s autocracies, dictatorships, and petrostates ….. In 2016, Reuters reported that five major public relations firms had competed for a contract to improve China’s image abroad. (Freedom House, Freedom at Issue Blog, of June 29, 2011; https://freedomhouse.org/blog/ flacks-autocrats-american-growth-industry)

Investigative journalists were able to provide a sufficient number of examples informing the world public opinion that: “sister public relations (PR) firms, Ketchum in Washington DC and GPlus in Brussels … contracted to work for Peskov (Putin’s press spokesperson) and the Kremlin media team;” “BGR Gabara was a key PR firm that.. worked on Kazakhstan image;” “Tony Blair contacts enabled Kazakhstan to recruit high level PR firms such as Portlands Communications as well as other numerous others from around Europe;” US PR firm Qorvis’ work for China includes “real-time monitoring for Twitter, Facebook forums, blogs and other social media in the English language” (Equal Times, March 17, 2015). To help to restore its public image abroad, as well as persuade the foreign investors not to withdraw from Hungary, the Orbán government appointed two London PR and lobbying firms: Financial Dynamics – to handle financial communication; and Project Associates – to do PR on political issues (Bryant, 2011). CONCLUSION The main thesis of this study is as follows: the public relations purpose, in some countries at least, has transformed from (liberal) democracy promotion to promotion of “illiberal democracy.” Since the end of the Cold War the “democracy promotion” program has become the cornerstone of the US foreign policy, and democratic liberalism has become the dominant model for national development of most of the world’s regions. The PR industry was, and still is, actively engaged in promoting the American version of liberal democracy and the market economy, according to Washington Consensus prescriptions. Behind the scenes, PR agencies and consultants effectively

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assisted in using the American soft power, supported the assistance public diplomacy programs of institutions like the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and NED (National Endowment for Democracy). The victory of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged Francis Fukuyama to proclaim “the end of history.” In his opinion, capitalism, along with liberal democracy, had won. Fukuyama could not have been more wrong because the beginning of the 21th century has proven that the era of competing ideologies is far from being over. It happens not only because authoritarianism is quite successfully competing with liberalism, but also Islamist fundamentalism is spreading around the world. More importantly, the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, and among others the failed Arab revolutions, provided enough arguments that the marriage of free market economics and liberal democracy is incapable of creating a political and socio-economic system benefiting the majority. In effect, new phenomena may be observed: the end of the U.S. public diplomacy persuasion power and its strategic communication world dominance, followed by the rise of “illiberal democracy.” The governments of countries labeled authoritarian/non-democratic were forced to defend, and at the later stage even promote their own model of “illiberal democracy.” They used for this purpose their own version of “home-grown transitional public relations and public diplomacy.” This chapter reveals two paradoxes: the first is that the United States, from which modern public relations, Facebook, Twitter, and Google come, at this stage seems to be losing the cyber information war and world communication dominance. Secondly, Western agencies and PR consultants help the governments of “illiberal democracy” to defend and even promote this hostile and competitive version of the political system. Conclusion: it is not the ethical considerations that rule, but “money is the king.” REFERENCES Almond, G.A. (1956). Comparative Political Systems. The Journal of Politics, 18(3), pp. 391–409. Aoyama, R. (2007). China’s public diplomacy. Waseda University Research Paper. Waseda University, pp. 1–22. Atanassow E. (2017). Illiberal Democracy and Conceptual Clarity, Report from a Debate. Public Seminar, (August 4). Retrieved from: www.publicseminar.org/2017/08/illiberal-democracy-and-conceptual-clarity. Bardhan, N.C & Weaver, C.K. (Eds.) (2011). Public Relations in Global Cultural Contexts: Multi-paradigmatic Perspectives.London and New York: Routledge. Barma, N., & Ratner, N. (2006). China illiberal challenge: The real threat posed by China isn’t economic or military it’s ideological. Democracy, Fall, No. 2. Beauchamp, Z. (2017). The key findings from the US intelligence report on the Russia hack, decoded. Vox, (January 6). Retrieved from: www.vox.com/world/2017/1/6/14194986/russia-hack-intelligence-reportelection-trump. Benoit, W. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies. New York, NY: State University of New York Press. Bernstein, C. (1992). “The Holy Alliance: Ronald Reagan and John Paul II”. Time. February 24. Online edition. Bozóki, A. (2017). Illiberal democracy belongs to the hybrid regimes reflections on Jeffrey C. Isaac’s illiberal democracy. Public Seminar, August 2. Brown, K.A., Green, S.N., & Wang J.J. (2017). Public diplomacy and national security in 2017: Building alliances, fighting extremism, and dispelling disinformation. Report produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington: CSIS. Bryant, Ch. (2011). Hungary wants a face lift. Financial Times, March 4. Retrieved from: http://blogs,ft,com/ beyond-brics/2011/03/04/hungary-want-a-face-lift.

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Esteban, M. (2017). The foreign policy of Xi Jinping after the 19th Congress: China strives for a central role on the world stage. Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute. Freitag, A. (2004). Peru’s Fujimori: The campaign to sell the administration’s neoliberal policies. In Tilson, D., Alozie, E.C. (Eds.), Toward common good. Perspectives in international public relations (pp. 83–102). Boston, New York and Sydney: Pearson. Gregory, P. R., & Stuart, R. C. (1989). Comparative economic systems. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Ignatius, D. (2017). Russia’s radical new strategy for information warfare. Washington Post, (January 18). Isaac, J.C. (2017). Is there a illiberal democracy? A problem with no semantic solution. Eurozine, (August 9). Kaiser, H. (2010). Upheaval in Hungary. KAS International Reports, 7, pp. 110–120. Kurlandtzick, J. (2007). Charm offensive: How China’s soft power is transforming the world. Washington, DC: New Republic Book. Ławniczak, R. (Ed.). (2001). Public relations contribution to transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Research and practice. Poznan: Printer. Ławniczak, R. (Ed.). (2005). Introducing market economy institutions and instruments: The role of public relations in transition economies. Poznan: Piar.pl. Ławniczak, R. (2016). A post-socialist/communist perspective. From foreign-imposed to home-grown transitional public relations. In J. L ’Etang, D. McKie, N. Snow, J. Xifra (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Critical Public Relations (pp. 213–225). New York, NY: Routledge. Lebedenko, V. (2004). Russia’s National Identity and Image-Building. International Affairs, 50(4), pp. 71–77. Mckew, M.K. (2017). The Gerasimov Doctrine, Politico. (May 9). Mygind, N. (1994). Societies in Transition. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School. Nye, J.S. (2017). Information warfare versus soft power. Project Syndicate,(May 19). Osipova, Y. (2014). New Russian Public Diplomacy: Conceptualization, Practice and Limitations. Retrieved from: files.isanet.org/…/d8f26c6d8298478ea6920dfaf0f3aed2.pdf. Rodrik, D. (2006). Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. Journal of Economic Literature, XLIV(December), pp. 973–987. Rodrik, D, Mukand, S. (2015). “Why Illiberal Democracies Are on the Rise?” Retrieved from: www.huffington post.com/…rodrik/illiberal-democracies-on. Schoeplin, G. (2014). Hungarian elections and after. Hungarian Review, 4, July 6. Sedaca, N.B. & Bouchet, N. (2014). Holding steady? US democracy promotion in a changing world. London, UK: Chatham House. Sounder, D. (2011). Hungary’s Victor Orban and the ascent of Europe’s democratic authoritarians. Retrived from http://dogsounders.net/2011/01/hungary-orban-fides/ Sussman, G. (2006). The myths of “Democracy Assistance”: U.S. political Intervention in post Soviet Eastern Europe. Monthly Review, 58 (2). Retrieved on May 3, 2013, from http://monthlyreview.org/2006/12/01/. Sussman, G. (2010). Branding Democracy. U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe. New York: PETER LANG. Szily, L. (2013). Getting the wrong message across. The Budapest Times, 11 (35), August 30– September 5. Szondi, G. (2014). Hungary. InT. Watson (Ed.), Eastern European perspectives on the development of public relations: Other voices (pp. 41–54). London, UK: Routledge. Tampere, K. (2003). Public relations in a transitional society, 1989-2002. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities, Vol 8. Taylor, M. (2000). Toward a public relations approach to national building. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(2), pp. 178–210. Wedel, J. E. (2000). U.S. assistance for market reforms: Foreign aid failures in Russia and the former Soviet bloc. The Independent Review, IV(3), pp. 395–418. Zaharna, R.S. (2014). Battles to bridges: U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy after 9/11. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Zakaria, F. 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), pp. 22–43.

INDEX

Page numbers Figures are given in italics, Tables in bold, and notes as: [page no.]n[note number].

3F investors 285 9/11 attacks see September 11, 2001 terror attacks 24/7 news cycle 272–273

A Abbott, A. 66–67 absolute monarchies 10 activism 51–62 bullfighting 247, 251–252 chemical risks 214 climate change 258, 265 definition 52 environmental variables 52–54 issues management link 255–256 literature on 54–59 “new” technology xviii public affairs issues 229–230 strategies 55, 57–58 theoretical frameworks 55–57, see also “hacktivism” adaptability 232 adjusting information 219 advertising 41, 45 advisory assistance 232 advocacy strategies 57 Afghanistan, NATO in 133–134 Africa, media diffusion 46, see also individual African nations African National Congress (ANC) 90 agencies Bell Pottinger case 86–87 client briefs 92 development/challenges of 73–83 “full service” agencies 235 international expansion 75–76

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rankings 2017 78–79 role of 74 world leaders 78–81 agenda directing 301–303 agenda setting propaganda and 293–308 public relations symbiosis 297–300 aggregate flows, propaganda 300–301 Aguirre, Esperanza 254–255 AI (Artificial Intelligence) 142 Akerlof, George 19 Albro, R. 33 algorithmic delivery mechanisms 301 Allagui, I. 56 Allen, D. 227 the Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Althaus, S. 301, 302 altruism 71 Amazon company, activist opposition 51, 53 An, S.-K. 223 ANC (African National Congress) 90 Andalusia, Spain 249, 250–251 animal rights group campaigns 251, 253 Anonymous group 162–169 anti-globalization movement xvii Arab World, crisis communication 220 Arabic languages, Andalusia 250–251 Artificial Intelligence (AI) 142 Asia agencies operating in 76–77 capitalism 242–243 crisis communication 220–222 family-owned enterprises 149–161 associations 65–72 blacklisting 91 Codes of Ethics 66–69

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licensing 70–71 strategies 71 Assurnasirpal II, king of Assyria 171 asymmetric information 19 Atkins-Sayre, W. 59 Atlantic Community see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Attribution Theory 218 Australia political organizations 115 professional associations 68, 70 authenticism/authenticity 277–278, 294 authoritarian regimes/authoritarianism communication 3–6 comparisons 9–10 family-owned enterprises 155 “illiberal democracy” 313–315 authorities citizens’ relationship 115–116 trust in 114–115 autocracies 4, 312–313 awareness 232 Awaroa beach, New Zealand 286–287

B B-M agency see Burson-Marsteller agency Bach, D. 227 bacterial infection risks 213–214 Bagdikian, B. H. 45 “balance” strategy, climate change 260 Baldwin-Philippi, J. 302–303 Balkan Wars 133 Baltic countries, NATO membership 133 banking organizations 229 Barcelona, Catalonia 246, 253–254 Baron, David 227 Barrett, Steve 79, 82 Basque Country, Spain 249, 250 Beaumont, E. 5 Beck, U. 210–211 behavioral economics 18 Bell Pottinger case 84–98 Bell, Timothy 86, 90, 92, 95, 183 Benecke, D. R. 56 “beneficial change” concept 20 benefit sharing schemes 285 Bennett, W. L. 301–302 Bentham, Jeremy 144 Berlin Wall, fall in 1989 40 Berlusconi, Silvio 219 Bernays, Edward 295–297, 304n7 Bernstein, C. 310–311 Bhagwati, Jagdish 141 biases risk perception 210 safety standards 207 bifurcation points 269 Black First Land First (BLF) 90, 92, 97n2 Blumler, Jay 11 borders, risk management 208–209 brand communication 143, 184–185, 199–200, 238–239 brand identity, Anonymous group 167–168 Brandes, S. 248

Brazilian associations 70–71 breadth of activism 53 Brexit 29, 117, 293–300 bribery scandals 152 British Polluters cartoon 95 British rule, India 151 Broom, G. M. 40, 196 Brown, R. E. 304 Brzozowska, B. 286 bullfighting 246–257 campaign for/against 248 as issues management 251–256 “bureaucracy perspective” 115 Buress, Hannibal 276 Burson, H. 75, 80 Burson-Marsteller (B-M) agency 75, 76–78, 80 Bush, George W. 186–187 business/corporate diplomacy 235–245 the butterfly effect 276

C CA see character assassination Cameron, G. T. 40, 74 Canadian Federal Government 99–110 Canadian Public Relations Society (CPRS) 68 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 162 Canel, M. J. 116 Caney, S. 261 Cannon, Walter B. 146 Cannon-Weiner model 146, 146 capital field competition 270–271 for SMEs 285 capitalist economies 44, 242–243 care issues, climate change 259, 261–264 carnivalesque protest 57 Castells, M. 47 Catalonia bullfighting 247–248, 251–252, 253–256 culture 249–250 independence referendum 246–247 Center, A. H. 74 Central Europe, NATO’s enlargement 133, 136 centralization communication practice 104–105, 107 democracies 6, 7 EU communication 124 chaebols, South Korea 152–153 change agents 56 “character”, use of term 271 character assassination (CA) as field competition 270–271 mediated complexity context 268–282 process and outcomes 271 structural issues 272–276 Charles III of Spain 248 Chase, Howard 251 Chechan separatists 173 chemical risk monitoring 214–215 China communication control 5 crisis communication 220–221 crowdfunding initiatives 287–288 digital activism 58

INDEX

economic development 154–155 family-owned enterprises 154–158 media control 46 mediatization 41 North Korea and 186–187 public diplomacy 315, 317–319 Chitiyo, K. 185 Chiu, C. 288 Cho, E. J. R. 186 Choudary, S. P. 286 Ciszek, E. L. 55–56 citizen engagement, public sector 112–114, 116–117 citizen trust in government 112 public sector 114–115 citizens of NATO 135 politicians’ relationship 115–116 public sector serving 111–113, 116 use of term 112 city branding 238 Clampitt, P. G. 197 classical school of economics 18 client briefs, agencies 92 clients’ strategies, Bell Pottinger 93 climate change 211–213, 258–267 “climate justice” 261 Clinton, Bill 219 Clinton, Hillary 273–274 closed access points, political systems 10 closed systems 5 Cobb, Frank Irving 296 Coca-Cola crisis 220, 222 Codes of Ethics enforcement 66–67, 69–70 professional associations 66–71 cognitive-based approach, crisis communication 218 Cold War 42, 133 Coleman, G. E. 162–163, 165, 168 collaboration 9–10, 232, 236–237 collective altruism 71 collective collaboration 9–10 collective identity, Anonymous group 167 collectivist societies 221 comedians, news presentation 275–276 Committee on Public Information (CPI), US 295 communication Anonymous group 167 convergence of types 237 crowdfunding 283–292 culture as 28, 36 European integration project 122–124 failed/failing states 179–181, 184–186, 188 governments 58, 99–110 internal 195–204 via Internet 141–142 micro-propaganda 293–308 narrative strategies 94 NATO, 21st century 131–138 operational role 107 political systems 3–13, 108 power of 97 products for 105–106, 108 public affairs 226–227, 230–232 public diplomacy 236–238, 315–316

324

public sector 111–119 risks 205–216 Self-Correction Model 145–146 structure and roles 104–107 terrorism as 170 variables 197 communication intelligence 93 communication management character assassination 278 relationship management and 143 terrorism, public opinion of 175 communist countries, “democracy promotion” 310–311 community response to risk 207–208, 215 comparative political systems 3–13 competition corporatism 10 field strategy 270–271 complex, risk, uncertainty, and doubt (CRUD) issues 226 complex society/systems 268–282 computational propaganda 299–300, 302 confidentiality 69 conflict management 57 confrontainment 274 confrontational intensity, activism 52–53 Confucianism 144, 154–155, 156–158, 318 conspiracy theories 273 constitutional monarchies 10 “constructed emotion” 304n8 contextual intelligence 243, 244 Cook, Fred 80–81 Coombs, T. 54, 69 Copenhagen Agreement 212 corporate/business diplomacy!! 235–245 holistic/strategic approach 242–245 responsibility 243–244 stakeholder expectations 240–241 corporate practice culture 35–36 political practice difference 16 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 23 activism interplay 56, 60 climate change 259–263 corporate diplomacy 240 family-owned enterprises 154, 156, 159 individual practitioners 35 corporations xviii–xix Anonymous’ challenges to 168–169 hyper-globalization 139–148 marketing 32 trust 34 corporatism 9–10 corrective facework 271 corruption 96, 152 Cosby, Bill 276 Couldry, N. 301 Council of the European Union 122, 125 country reputations 94–95 country-specific studies xix–xx Coup de Frejac, Jacques 77 CPI (Committee on Public Information, US) 295 CPRS (Canadian Public Relations Society) 68 Crable, R. C. 252–253 creative campaign concept 88–90

325

INDEX

credibility, public diplomacy 237 crisis communication 56, 60, 144, 147, 217–225 Asia 220–222 Europe 219–220 United States 218–219, 222 crisis management 96, 145, 274–276, 277 critical approaches, activism 54 critical modernism 179 critical public relations 18 critical risk assessment 210–211 cross-cultural communication 197, 201 crowdfunding 283–292 access to 286–287 democracy and 283–287 CRUD (complex, risk, uncertainty, and doubt) issues 226 Cruz, Ted 272–273 CSR see corporate social responsibility Culbertson, H. M. 73 Cull, N. 236, 238 “cultural appropriation debate” 33–34 cultural bonds xviii–xix, 237–238 cultural difference internal communication 200–201 nation-states 256 political systems 4 cultural diplomacy 32–33, 313–314 cultural–economic model, activism 55–56 culture 28–38 bullfighting campaign 248 communication as 28, 36 of control/dialogue 117 crisis communication 219, 222–223 definitions 238 EU public relations 127 family-owned enterprises 155–157 globalization challenges 226 Hofstede’s dimensions 29–30, 219, 221–222 Lewis’ model of types 30–31 “nations within nations” concept 248–251 nature division 264 political systems 11 public diplomacy and 237–238 public relations connection xx 28–38, 247, 256 risk communication 205, 208, 211 Cupach, W. R. 271 Curtin, P. 55 Cutlip, S. M. 16, 73–75

D DA (Democratic Alliance) party 91 Daesh see Islamic State terrorists Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project 262–263 data communication 230–231 data gathering/analysis 232–233 decentralization corporatism 10 democracies 6–7 EU communication 124–125 deep mediatization 272 defence reinforcements, NATO 135–136 Delphi study 198, 238 democracy communication 3–6, 145

crowdfunding and 283–287 fintech 283–284 variations of 6–9 “democracy assistance” 310 “democracy promotion” 309–321 defensive stage 311–319 offensive stage 315–319 Democratic Alliance (DA) party 91 democratization process, political economy 17 Denmark crisis communication 220 media diffusion 44 devcom see development communication developing economies 44–45, 285 development communication (devcom) 20–24 development concept 20–21, see also economic development Dezenhall, E. 269, 276–277 Dhanesh, G. S. 56, 222 dharma concept 151, 158 dialogic government communication 58 dialogue culture 117 Dickson, D. 197 dictatorships 9 Dietrich, G. 41 digital activism 58–60 digital context, public diplomacy 239 digital media xvii diplomacy, overuse of term 239, see also cultural diplomacy public diplomacy diplomatic relations 94–95 direct foreign investment (FDI) 185 discursive positions, climate change 263 disinformation agenda setting 299 complex society 278 growing prevalence of 293 media diffusion 43 propaganda distinction 303 Russia 134–137 use of term 304n1 Doan, M. A. 286 Douglas, M. 210–211 Downs, C. W. 197 Dubai Laundromat 86 Duhé, S. 16 Duran, Josep-Antoni 253

E earned media 41 East Germany, EEC membership 128n1 Eastern Europe, NATO’s enlargement 133, 136 Ebola virus risks 209–210, 213–214 ECF see equity crowdfunding economic development democracies 9 family-owned enterprises 152, 154–155 levels of 19–22 economic force, hyper-globalization 140–141 economic inequality 284 economic systems 14–27, 44–45 Edelman agency 77–79, 82 Edelman, Richard xix 82

INDEX

Edelman Trust Barometer 111–112 EEC see European Economic Community Egan, P. J. 261 Ellsworth, R. 156 Elmer, P. 15 embassies, NATO member states 133 emerging markets 236–237 employee communication 195–204 employee engagement, international communication 199–200 employer brands 199–200 energy policies, United States 6–7 engagement, use of term 199, see also citizen engagement employee engagement stakeholder engagement Entman, R. M. 274 entropy 269 environment, definition 121 environmental justice 259, 261, 265 environmental variables activism 52–54, 60 EU public relations 126 equity crowdfunding (ECF) 285, 287–289 ETA see Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ethical codes 66–71 ethical industry leadership 65–72 ethics Bell Pottinger incident 95–96 definition 144 interests’ relationship 229 public relations models 174 Self-Correction Model 144–148 ethnocentric wisdom 188, 191n44 ethnocentricity 179 EU see European Union EUPRERA (European Public Relations Education and Research Association) 81–82 Europe agency operations 75–76, 80 crisis communication 219–220 integration project 122–124 media differentiation 8 European Commission 122, 124, 125 European Council 122 European Economic Community (EEC) 121, 128n1 European Parliament 122, 125–126 European Public Relations Education and Research Association (EUPRERA) 81–82 European Union (EU) 120–130 Brexit 29 communication functions 123 NATO communications 134–137 origin/structure/organization 121–122 public communication 124–126 public opinion on terrorism 174 security environment 135–137 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 250, 256 Evetts, J. 67 Ewing, R. P. 251 Excellence theory 52, 54–56, 237, 239, 296 exempt communication staff 102, 105, 107 exports, Canada 100–101 expressive strategy 270 externally imposed negative public relations 180–181

326

F face negotiation 270–271 face-saving tradition 221–222 Facebook 46, 141 “factitious informational blends” (FIBs) 303 failed/failing states 178–192 fairness, safety and 207 “fake news” 293–300 globalization 272 hyper-globalization 140 institutional crisis 275 media diffusion 43 use of term 304n1 false information 8 familism 155–157 family-owned enterprises 149–161 cultural characteristics 155–157 definitions 149 implications for public relations 157–159 FDI (direct foreign investment) 185 fear, sense of 181, 189n1 federated political process, Canada 101 “fiasco vortex” 276 FIBs (“factitious informational blends”) 303 field competition strategy 270–271 field struggles 270 financial communication 283–292 financial crisis 283–292 financial public relations 283–292 financial resources, public affairs 231 financial technologies (fintech) 283–284, 289 Finland, crisis communication 220 fintech see financial technologies Fischhoff, B. 209 Fisher, M. T. 57 Flannery, Tim 258 Fleming, L. 284 Fletcher, T. 239 Flint River case 210 Fock, S. T. 155 foreign investment, failed/failing states 185 foreign relations 94 Frame, A. 33–34 France, nuclear energy policy 7 Franco’s dictatorship 249–250, 256 Fraser, Nancy 261 free market economics 311 free press 42, 45 free trade xvii free-will 145 Freedom House 182, 189n8 Freeman, R. E. 242 Freidson, E. 66 Freitag, A. R. 73 French Revolution 172 Friedman, Thomas xvi Fukuyama, F. 40, 155, 311, 320 “full service” agencies 235 functional field competition strategy 270 functional societies 206–207 functionalism and activism 56–57 fundamentalist terrorism 172–173 fundraising platforms 283–292

327

INDEX

G GA (Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management) 67 Galician region, Spain 249, 250 Galuszka, P. 286 Gandy, Oscar 298 Ganges River case study 264–265 Garcia, C. 219 Geoghegan, Victoria 88–91 “The Gerasimov Doctrine” 317 Germany 46, 128n1 Gewirtz, David 168 GFC (Global Financial Crisis, 2008) 283–292 Ghemawat, Pankaj 140–141 Ghosn, Carlos 143 Gigaba, Malisi 87 Glenny, L. 115 Global Affairs Canada 100, 107–108 global agencies development/challenges of 73–83 rankings 2017 78 world leaders 78–81 Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management (GA) 67 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 283–292, 2008 global holding companies 77–78 global information disorder 299 global information domination, US 316–317 global interdependence, risks 205–216 global professional associations 65–72 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 174 “global village” concept 141, 200 global warming see climate change globalism 39, 44 globalization CA/reputation management 272–273 cultural challenges 226 definition 39 ethnocentricity 179 local jobs retention 287 public affairs approach 227 use of term 139–141 globally-focused organizations 228–229 glocal approach 128, 228 Goby, V. P. 223 GOC (Government of Canada) 99 Golin agency 80–81 Google, advertising 46 Gordhan, Pravin 87, 93–94 governance model, risk 208–209 Government of Canada (GOC) 99 government communication 58, 99–110, 116 government organizations xviii culture 35–36 media control 44–45 trust in 111 Greenhalgh, S. 154 Gregory, A. 241 Grunig, J. E. 30, 32, 73, 143, 167, 174, 237, 296 Grunig, L. A. 30, 32, 73, 255 Gruszczynski, M. 303 GTD (Global Terrorism Database) 174 guardianship concept, climate change 259, 262–265

Gupta family 85–93, 96 Gurevitch, Michael 11

H H&K agency see Hill & Knowlton agency “hacktivism” 162–169 Hain, Peter 94 Hall, Chris 106 Hall, Edward T. 28, 36 Han, G. 55 hard power 239 Harder, R. 298–299 Hargie, O. 197–198 Hayes, Roger 23, 236 hazardous manufacturing processes 214–215 health risks 213–214 Heath, R. L. 251 “hegemonic” role organizations 34 public relations 31 Helsby, Nick 198 Henderson, James 86–88, 91 Herbst, S. 275 Hill & Knowlton (H&K) agency 74–76, 77, 80 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 29–31, 219, 221–222 Holbrook, D. 174 holding companies 77–78 holistic approach, corporate diplomacy 242–245 Holladay, S. 54, 69 Holtzhausen, D. R. 56 homeostasis concept 146 Hong Kong crisis communication 220–221 economic development 154–155 family-owned enterprises 156–157 Housh, Gregg 168 HR (human resources) 198 Huang, J. 164, 167 Hughes, John 81 human assets, public affairs 231 human communication see communication human resources (HR) 198 humor strategy, Anonymous group 165–166 Hungary 312–316, 319 Hunt, T. 143 hybrid warfare 134, 137 hyper-globalization 139–148 hyperbole strategy 166

I IA-cubed model, public affairs 227 ICTs see information and communication technologies “identity” justice discourse 263 of public relations 34–35 IGOs see intergovernmental organizations Ihlen, Ø. 33–34, 260 “illiberal democracy” 309–321 “image prepare” model 278 image repair/restoration theory (IRT) 217–219, 223, 277, 312 imports, Canada 100

INDEX

impression management 270, 277 incivility strategy 275 India climate change action 264–265 family-owned enterprises 150–152, 153, 158 organizational culture 29 indigenous concerns, climate change 262–264 individual decision-making, rational choice theory 18 individual participation, propaganda 300–301 individual practitioners, culture 35–36 individualist competition 10 industrialization 150–151 information communication 105, 230–231 information and communication technologies (ICTs) xvi–xvii, 47, see also “new” technology information policy, EU 123 information subsidies 40, 41, 297–300 information transparency see transparency “information war” 316–317 “informational” communication products 105 infrastructural risk management/communication 211 Ingham, Francis 93 The Innocence of Muslims film 268–269 innovativeness 233 Inoue, Takashi 140 institutional crisis 274–276 “institutional identity” 35 instructing information 219 intelligence communication 230 interdependence of countries, risks and 205–216 interests PA actors/activists 229 stakes as expression of 209 intergovernmental negotiations, EU 121–122 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) xix, 31–32 intermedia agenda setting 298 internal communication 195–204 channels 199 functions 198 good versus bad 197–198 measurement of 197 position in organization 198–199 purposes 196 international activities, governments 100, 107 International Code of Athens 237 international communication, employee engagement 199–200 international crisis communication 222–224 international development project 21 international ethical codes 67–71 international expansion, agencies 75–76 international public relations changing nature of 81–82 media 39–50 International Public Relations Association (IPRA) 67–68, 77 International Public Relations (IPR) network 77 internationalism, Canada 100–101 Internet bullfighting ban campaign 252 character assassination 273, 275–276 free press and 42 globalization 39

328

hyper-globalization 140–142 media access 47 usage in 2017 43 interpersonal relationships, family-owned enterprises 158 Interpublic holding company 77–78 investor relations 283–292 IPR (International Public Relations) network 77 IPRA see International Public Relations Association Iraq, US-led military operations 186, 188 IRT see image repair/restoration theory Islamic State terrorists 165–166, 171, 173, 175 Islamilites 172 Islamist fundamentalist terrorism 172–173 issues definition 227 in PA work 227–230 “issues life cycle” 252–255 issues management bullfighting case 247, 251–256 critical status 253–255 current status 253 dormant status 255 imminent status 252–253 potential status 252–256 Italy, crisis communication 219–220

J Jackson, D. 298 Jahng, M. R. 57 Jain, R. 42 Japan, family-owned enterprises 153–154, 158 Jenkins, H. 302 Jewish fundamentalists 172 Jiang, W. 156 Johnson, C. E. 71 Johnson, T. 277 Jones, Terry 268 journalism agenda setting 298 confrontainment 274 decision-making 41 information subsidies 40 South Africa 85 judicial arenas, PA issues 230 justice approach, climate change 259–263, 265 justification element, crisis communication 221

K Kagan, R. 40 kakistocracies 84–88, 97 Kang, M. 55, 58 Kant, Immanuel 144 Kasperson, R. E. 208 Keller, A. 168 Kenny, J. 296 Kent, M. 223 Kessler, Martin 141 Ketchum agency 74, 79 Kibble, S. 185 Kim, H. 30, 52–54, 53, 58, 255 Kim Jong-un 182, 187

329

INDEX

Kiousis, S. 16, 296 Kohara, Taiji 77 Korea 156, 158, see also North Korea South Korea Kotler, Philip 32 kouhou concept 154 Kovacs, Zoltan 316 Kraus, Margery xix 241 Kreiss, Daniel 302 Krutskikh, Andrey 317 Kurzweil, Raymond 142 kyosei concept 154 Kyoto Protocol 212

L Langley, P. 286 language choice of 304n5 of “fake news” 294–295 internal communication 201 Spanish regions 249–251 Laursen, B. 125 Ławniczak, R. 17–18 laws see legislation Leaf, Robert 73, 75–76 legal constraints, autocracies 5 legal implications, climate change action 263–264 legal status, professional associations 70 legal structure, democracies 8 legal systems 45 legislation bullfighting ban 254–255 EU 122, 127 financial public relations 289 legislative bodies, PA issues 230 Lewis’ model of cultural types 30–31 Lewis, R. 274 Leyshon, A. 286 Li, J. 288 liability issues, climate change 259–260 liberal democracy 309–321, see also democracy… liberal institutions, mediatization 40 Libya, US-led military operations 186 licensing professional associations 70–71 Lin, L-W. 157 linear-active cultures 31 Lippmann, Walter 296, 302, 304n7 living entity status 264–265 local crisis communication 222–224 local jobs, globalization threats 287 local professional associations 65–72 lulz tactics 166 LulzSec group 163–164

M Maastricht Treaty 120–121, 124 McCombs, M. E. 297, 301, 302 machine generated content 299 McKie, D. 18, 32 McLuhan, Marshal 141 Macnamara, J. 69–70, 239–240 Madrid, Spain 246, 249 Maiorescu, R. D. 55 Malema, Julius 94

malinformation 304n1 management conflict management 57 crisis management 96, 145, 274–276, 277 impression management 270, 277 public affairs 226–234 risks 205–216, see also communication management issues management relationship management reputation management Manheim, J. 301–302 Manuel, Trevor 91 Maori culture 264 market economies 155, 310–311 marketing 32, 198, see also social marketing markets, asymmetric information 19 Marland, A. 108 Marvin, Garry 248–249 Marwick, A. 274 Mas, Artur 246, 248 mass communication 113 mass media 40, 180, 253 Mastroianni, B. 163 material data safety sheets (MSDS) 214 Matsuura, K. 284 Mattis, Jim 188 May, Theresa 317 media 39–50 21st century 44 access to 47, 58, 180 Anonymous group connection 163–165 Bell Pottinger incident 92–93, 94–95 bullfighting ban campaign 253–254 character assassination 277–278 control of 44–46, 180 crisis communication 219 differentiation 8 ethics 145 EU communication 125, 127–128 family-owned 151–153 hyper-globalization 140 NATO communications 134, 136 North Korea 186–187 PA issues 230 risk management 208 Russia 314 terrorist communication 171 United States terror attacks 175, see also social media media agenda influences on 297–298 participatory techno-politics 301 media capture 299 media diffusion 42, 46, 239–240 media outreach 180, 188–189 mediated complexity, CA/reputation management 268–282 mediatization 39–41, 272, 273–274 mediatized politics 274 mental models approach (MMA) 210 Meraz, S. 303 meso level analysis, culture 35 message development/delivery, PA practitioners 233 message-targeting technologies 302 meta-cognition process 145

INDEX

“#MeToo” movement 272 Metts, S. 271 micro level analysis, culture 35 micro-propaganda 293–308 military activities NATO Allies 135–136 propaganda 300 US-led 186 military dictatorships 9 military organizations 132, 136 military power see hard power Millar, C. 71 Miller, K. S. 75 Milne, Stephen 10 Minister’s Office (MINO), Canada 104–106 “minority” nations, Spain 249–251 misinformation 303, 304n1 MMA (mental models approach) 210 MNCs/MNEs see multinational corporations/ enterprises modernism 179 modernization process 20–21 Moeng, Solly 93 Molleda, J. C. 73 Moloney, K. 298, 301 monarchies 10 money laundering 86 morality 95–96 Morgan, M. G. 210 Morley, M. 77 Morris, J. H. 197 Moss, D 104 MSDS (material data safety sheets) 214 MSL Group 79–80 Mugabe, Robert 182, 183–185 Mukand, S. 312 Mules, P. 54 Mullin, M. 261 multi-active cultures 30–31 multi-stake-seeker model 208 multi-stakeholder model 208 multiculturalism, Spain 246–257 multinational banking organizations 229 multinational corporations/enterprises (MNCs/ MNEs) 229, 240–241 multinational trading groups 229 multipliers, EU communication 123, 125 Munte, Neus 255 Muslim nations 268 Muslim rule, Andalusia 250

N NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) 108 narratives 88–90, 93–94, 205–206, 297–300 nation branding 185, 238–239 nation building 151, 158, 190n22 nation-states cultural difference 256 public sector 122 national borders 208–209 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 310 national ethical codes 67–71 national health policy groups 213 national rifle association (NRA) 51–52

330

national terrorism 172 national theories, crisis communication 219 nationalism 248, 251–252, 254, 256 “nations within nations” concept 246–257 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization nature–culture divide 264 NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 310 negative public relations 180–181, 190n26 negativity, mediatization 274 negotiation strategies 57, 270 neoliberal economics 18, 21, 311 Nestle India case 56, 60 Neuman, W. R. 299 Neumann, P. R. 172 “new” technology xvi, xviii, 272–273, see also information and communication technologies New Zealand climate change action 264 crowdfunding initiatives 286–287, 289 professional associations 68, 70 news cycle, social media 272–273 news media agenda setting 297–298, 302–303 comedians’ presenting 275–276 dissemination 302 EU communication 125, 127–128 individual participation 301 mediatization 274 “trust deficit” 275 NGOs see non-governmental organizations Nickerson, C. 223 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 58, 113, 229 non-political communication 114, 115 non-profit organizations xviii–xix, 31–32, 35–36 Nordic countries, EU membership 126 normative theories, media 42 norms, character assassination 269 Norris, P. 175 North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 108 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) communication, 21st century 131–138 cooperation with partners 137 public diplomacy, modern era 133–135 North Korea 5, 182–183, 186–189 NRA (national rifle association) 51–52 nuclear energy policy, France 7 nuclear weapons/tests 186–188 Nye, J. S. 239, 243, 316–317

O Oakbay Investments 87, 90–91, 93 OASIS campaigns, NATO 135 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria 51 Oksiutycz, A. 56 Olson, P. 166 Omnicom Group 77, 79, 81 one-way risk communication 207 online activism 59–60, see also digital activism online media audience 303 online training, associations 68 open access points, political systems 6–7, 10 open systems 4

331

INDEX

Orbán, Viktor 312–314, 316, 319 organizational activists 56 organizational-centric theories 218 organizational culture 31, 35 organizations Anonymous’ challenges to 168–169 constituents of 200 globally-focused 228–229 internal communication 195–204 practice, types of 14 trust 33–34 types xviii 14 origin stories 206 Osborne bulls 247, 250–251 owned media 41

P PA see public affairs PAC (public affairs communication) 226–227 paid media 41 Pamment, J. 23 parallel process model, risk response 208 Paris Accord/Agreement 212, 259–260 Park Geun-hye, South Korean president 152 Parkland, Florida, school shooting 51–53 participatory techno-politics 301–302 Partido Popular, Spain 254 PCO see Privy Council Office PCO, C&C see Privy Council Office, Communication and Consultation Peacock, Thomas Love 84–85 Peng, M. W. 156 personal influence model 30, 152, 158 personalization, mediatization 274 personhood concept, climate change 259, 264–265 persuasion 300–301 persuasion power, US 311–312 PESO (paid, earned, social and owned) model 41 Peters, J. 97 planning 233 Plataforma Prou! group 252–254 PMO see Prime Minister’s Office PMO, C (Prime Minister’s Office, Communications) 106 Poland, “democracy promotion” 310–311 policy standards, Canada 101–105, 103 political, use of term 114 political activism 256 political blogs 303 political campaign, bullfighting ban 254 political communication 3–13, 108 Canadian Government 101 citizen engagement 116–117 EU institutions 126 micro-propaganda 293–308 non-political communication continuum 115 public sector 111–119 political culture, Spain 248 political decisions, NATO 135–136 political development 310 political economy 14–27 political leaders, authenticity 277–278 political–military organizations 132, 136 political–non-political communication continuum 115

political organizations, communication 111–119 political polarization, agenda directing 302–303 political public relations 16, 293–308 political regimes, definition 4 political systems comparing 3–13 economic systems intersection 14–27 Spanish regions 251, 256 political transitions, “democracy promotion” 310 politicians 114–116 politics media control 44–45 mediatization 274 South African discourse 94 Poole, E. 71 populist politicians 275, 294 positioning theory, climate change 262–263 “post truth” 117, 293–300 postmodernism 56 Pottinger, Piers 86 power of communication 97 family-owned enterprises 149–161 soft versus hard power 239, 243 power distance 7, 30, 220 “Power/Responsibility principle” 261 PR Week journal 74, 78–79 PR4D see Public Relations for Development PRCA (Public Relations and Communication Association) 91 press clubs 47, 154 press freedom 42, 45 “Pretoria School of Thought” 241 preventive facework 270–271 Prime Minister’s Office, Communications (PMO, C), Canada 106 Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Canada 104–105, 107 PRINZ see Public Relations Institute of New Zealand Prior, M. 275 Pritchard, R. J. 73–74 privacy, media 41 private sector business diplomacy 242 family-owned enterprises 149, 157 Privy Council Office, Communication and Consultation (PCO, C&C), Canada 106 Privy Council Office (PCO), Canada 104, 107 profession definition 66 sociology of 66, 71 professional associations 65–72, 91 professionalization 66–67, 128, 175 propaganda definition 174 disinformation distinction 303 micro-level 293–308 origin of term 295 psychology association 296 public relations distinction 237 Russia 134–137 “protectors” concept, climate change 262–264 protest strategies, activism 57

INDEX

PRSA (Public Relations Society of America) 70 psychodemographic assessments/preferences 209–210, 215 psychology 296–297 public affairs communication (PAC) 226–227 public affairs (PA) assets influencing policy 231 corporate diplomacy and 241 global actors 228–229 issues 227–230 management/practice 226–234 practitioner/manager competencies 231–233 strategic communication 242 public agendas, media 297 public diplomacy Chinese policy 317–319 definitions 180, 236 “democracy promotion” 309–310, 314 four Ds of 239–240 persuasion power 311–312 public relations overlap 23, 32–33, 179–181, 187, 235–245 three Cs of 238 transitional public relations 313 Public Diplomacy Division, NATO 132, 134–137 public engagement, NATO 136 public health risks 213–214 public opinion, terrorism 174–175 public policy assets influencing 231 institutions of 226 public relations agenda setting relationship 297–300 antecedents 29–31 contemporary concepts 296–297 as culture 34–36, 247 definitions 113, 174, 179, 296 public relations–activism nexus 51–62, 255 Public Relations and Communication Association (PRCA) 91 public relations counsel, entitlement to 95 public relations–culture nexus 28–38, 256 Public Relations for Development (PR4D) 16, 22 Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) 68, 70 Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) 70 public sector citizens’ relationship 115–116 EU institutions as 122 political communication 111–119 trust in 114–115 public trust, institutional crisis 274–275 publicity, terrorism 171 publics EU communications to 124–126 relationship management 143 Putin, Vladimir 314, 315–317

Q Quinn, D. 197 Quintus Tullius Cicero 16

332

R Ramaphosa, Cyril 94 rational choice theory 18–19 Rayner, S. 210–211 reactive cultures 31 reactive stance, self-correction 147 reality construction, mass media 180 regulations, financial public relations 289 relationship-building 28 relationship management 142–143, 146, 148, 243–244 religious fundamentalist terrorism 172–173 religious matters, public affairs 229 rent-seeking 56 reputation ethics and 69–70 organizational 199–200 reputation laundering 85, 94–95 reputation management Bell Pottinger 96 corporate diplomacy 243–244 mediated complexity context 268–282 public affairs 242 structural issues 272–276 reputational assets 231 reputational capital 284, 288–289 reputational crisis, Nestle India 56, 60 resilience 215 response efficacy, risk 207–208, 215 responsibility, climate change 261 Responsible Care standards 214 reverse agenda setting 299 rhetorical communication 187–188, 218 Rice, Susan 268 Riordan, Shaun 239 risk dynamics/dimensions of 206–209 exposure 214–215 interdependence and 205–216 risk assessment 206, 210–211 risk communication 205–216 criteria for 215 disciplinary streams 209–211 quality of 208 risk governance model 208–209 risk management 205–216 risk society 269 Roberto, A. J. 208 Robson, P. J. A. 197 Rodrik, D. 312 Rojecki, A. 303 Romania, EU membership 126 Rome Consensus 22 Roper, J. 260 Rössler, P. 42 Rubin, D. 57 Ruck, K. 200 Rudnick, Gary 81 Ruel, H. J. M. 240 Rupert, Johann 88 Ruskola, T. 157 Russia cultural diplomacy 313–314

333

INDEX

“democracy promotion” 311, 313–315 disinformation campaigns 299 “information war” 316–317 NATO’s relationship 133–137 terrorist attacks 173 safety, risk management 207, 215

S Sánchez, Alicia 253 Sanders, K. 116 Scammell, M. 115 SCCT see Situational Crisis Communication Theory Schlosberg, D. 261 Schoeplin, G. 314 Schultz, D. 167 science paradigm climate change 258 risk communication 210 Scientology, attack on 162, 164, 166–167 SCM see Self-Correction Model security environment, EU 135–137 security paradigm, terrorism 172 Seib, Philip 134 “self-adjustment” model 146 Self-Correction Model (SCM) 144–145, 148 evaluation areas 147 integration of elements 146–147 self-presentation 270 self-projected negative public relations 180, 181 September 11, 2001 terror attacks 133, 172, 175 Serjup, J. 56 Servaes, J. 22–24 Sha, B.-L. 40, 196 Shapiro, D. M. 155 “shared responsibility” concept 102 Sharpe, M. L. 73–74 Shaw, D. L. 297, 302 Shiller, R. J. 283–285 Shin, J-H. 153 Sholte, J. A. 39 Siegrist, H. 66 Sikharudze, Vasil 133 Silverstone, R. 41 Simon, Herbert 19 simplification, mediatization 274 Simpson, O. J. 273 Singularity 142, 146 Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 217–219, 223 skew see biases Slaughter, Anne-Marie 239 Sloane, Carl 14 Slovakia, NATO membership 133 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) xix, 285 “smear campaigns” 269 SMEs see small and medium-sized enterprises Snow, N. 237–238 Snyder, R. A. 197 social capital 271 social justice 261 social marketing approach 22, 32 social media activism 58 agenda setting 299–300

Anonymous group 165–167 Bell Pottinger’s campaign 88, 90–91 character assassination 273, 277 China 288 control 45–46 emergence of 41 ethical issues 95 hyper-globalization 140, 141–142 NATO’s capabilities 134, 136 PESO model 41 public affairs issues 230 timing and speed of 272 social movements, Spain 255–256 social psychology 297 social responsibility 151, see also corporate social responsibility social, technological, economic, ecological, and political (STEEP) concerns 226 socialism, China 318–319 societal culture 31 socio-cultural variables, activism 53–54 sociology of professions 66, 71 soft power 239, 243, 309, 316 Solana, Javier 133 Sommerfeldt, E. J. 58 Sorenson, L. 155 Sorenson, O. 284 sound science paradigm 210 South Africa corporate diplomacy 241 state capture 84–97 South Korea 52, 152–153, 158 Soviet Union dissolution 1991 40, 313 former countries of 133 Spain bullfighting 246–257 crisis communication 220 spectacle, masters of 168 “spin” 34, 92–93 Sriramesh, K. activism 52–54, 53, 58, 255 climate change 258 crisis communication 222 culture 34, 36 family-owned enterprises 158 financial public relations 288–289 global agencies 73 internal communication 201 mass media 180 media 44, 46–47 political systems 15, 108 stakeholder engagement, public diplomacy 243 stakeholder ethics 144–145 stakeholder expectations, corporate diplomacy 240–241 stakeholder network 241 stakeholder relationship management 142–143, 146, 148, 244 stakeholder theory 242 stakes, risk management/communication 208–209 state capacity, communication 8 state capture 84–98 state failure 178–192 state terrorism 172

INDEX

STEEP (social, technological, economic, ecological, and political) concerns 226 Stiglitz, J. E. 299 Stokes, A. Q. 57, 59, 73 strategic ambiguity 221 strategic approach, corporate diplomacy 242–245 strategic communication culture 238 definition 99 governments 99–110 NATO 132, 134, 136–137 public affairs 242 purposeful use 99, 101–104 strategic deception practices 278 strategic mediatization 41 strategic value Bell Pottinger 96–97 “spin” 93 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique 164–165, 219 Streisand Effect 164 Strömbäck, J. 16, 296 structural changes, CA/reputation management 272–276 structural tensions, ethical codes 69 Subramanian, Arvind 141 substantial change concept 147 superficial change concept 147 supranational polity, EU 120–130 supraterritoriality 39 Surowiecki, J. 289 sustainability, CSR and 240 symbolic capital 270–271 symbolization, mediatization 274 symmetrical communication 21 symmetrical two-way communication 145–146, 167, 207 syndication 288 Syria, US-led military operations 186 systemic norms, character assassination 269

T Tadayoshi, Shimazu 144 Taiwan economic development 154 family-owned enterprises 156 Takahisa, Shimazu 144 Takasaki, M. 47 Tan, W-L. 155 Tata Group, India 150–152 Taurinas, Funciones 253–254 tax breaks, US agencies 76 Taylor, A. 285 Taylor, M. 23, 30, 58, 68–69, 223 tech companies/industry xvii, 44 technical competencies, PA practitioner/manager 231–233 techno-politics 301–302 technological disruptive force 142 technologies financial public relations 289 fintech 283–284, 289 ICTs xvi–xvii 47 limitations of studies 283 message-targeting 302

334

STEEP concerns 226, see also “new” technology terror attack, definition 174 terrorism 170–177 Anonymous attacks on 162–163, 165–166 as communication 170 debate over 171–173 definitions 172 disinformation campaigns 300 global incidents 173–174 history of 171–173 media diffusion 43 Spanish regions 250, 256 trends 173–174 in the US 133 Tewksbury, D. 301, 302 textuality 212–213 Thaler, P. 273 theocracies 9 Thompson, G. 56 Thompson, Mark 294 Three Wise Men report 131 Toledano, M. 16, 32, 57, 286 Tourish, D. 197–198 tourism 184–185 toxic manufacturing risks 214–215 trade flows 141 trading agreements 100–101 trading blocs xvi, xvii trading groups 229 “traditional” media 46–47, 164–165, 230, see also media… training activities, associations 68, 70–71 transitional public relations 313, 314–315 transitional states 310 transnational foundations, public affairs 229 transnational public relations 39–50, 58 transnational terrorism 172 transparency 5, 7, 272 Traverse-Healy, Tim 77 Treaty of Rome, 1957 123 Trent, D. L. 33 Trump, Donald 85, 117, 187, 260, 263, 274–275, 278, 293–300 trust in authorities 114–115 cultural perspective 33, 34–35 employee communication 195 in government 111–112 institutional crisis 274–275 political communication 293–300 in politicians 114–115 “trust deficit” 275 truth, political communication 294–295 Tuman, J. 175 Turk, Judy VanSlyke 298 Twitter 90, 141, 272, 275 two-way symmetrical communication 145–146, 167, 207 Tzu, Sun 300

U UK see United Kingdom Ukraine NATO communications 137

335

INDEX

Russia’s relationship 133–134 UN see United Nations United Kingdom (UK) Bell Pottinger incident 84, 91 Brexit issues 29, 293–300 crowdfunding platforms 289 diplomatic relations 94–95 referendum on EU membership 29, 121, 126, 128n2, 293–300 United Nations (UN) public affairs 228 WESP report 19–20 United States (US) 11th September attacks 133, 172, 175 agencies operating in 76, 78, 80–81 Canadian exports 101 climate change issues 262 crisis communication 218–219, 222 “democracy promotion” 309–313, 315–316 energy policies 6–7 global information domination 316–317 institutional crisis 275 media 8, 46 NATO communications 134 North Korea’s relationship with 186–188 persuasion power 311–312 power distance 220 presidential election, 2016 293–300 public opinion on terrorism 174 risk exposure protocols 214–215 state capture 85

V Valentini, C. 121, 125 Van Dyke, M. A. 300 Vasquez, G. M. 30 Veil, S. R. 58–59 Velmans, Loet 75 Vercˇič , D. agencies’ development 73 climate change 258 crisis communication 222 culture 30 disinformation campaigns 300 financial public relations 288–289 internal communication 201 media 41, 180 strategic communication 108 Verne, Jules 142 Vershbow, Alexander 134–135 Vibbert, S. L. 252–253 “virality”, message-targeting technologies 302 visibility problem, reputation management 272 voluntary ethical codes 67 Voto, R. 56

W W20 Group 81 war tactics 134, 137, 300 “water protectors” 263 Watts, R. 236 weaponized narratives 297–300

#WEARENATO campaign 135 weather–climate change distinction 258 Weaver, D. H. 45, 57 Weber Shandwick agency 78–79, 82 Weiner, Norbert 146 “Weinstein Effect” 272 WEIRD (Western, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) societies 294–295 Welsh, M. 198–200 WESP (World Economic Situation and Prospects) report 19–20 West Germany, EEC membership 128n1 Western, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies 294–295 Western public relations, democracy 319 Whanganui River case study 264 White, Eric 75 White, J. 167 “white monopoly capital” (WMC) 88, 91, 93, 96 Whitehead, L. 17 wicked issues 228 Wiebe, Gerhard 32 Wiener, Norbert 146 Wilcox, D. L. 74 Willis, P. 241 WMC see “white monopoly capital” Woerner, Manfred 133 Wolf, K. 56 women’s risk tolerance 210 World Bank, crowdfunding 284–285, 289 World Economic Forum, Davos 242 World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) report 19–20 World War II, EEC formation 121 WPP Group 77, 80

X Xi Jinping 317–318

Y Yamamura, K. 154 Yamuna River case study 264–265 Yan, J. 155 Yang, A. 58, 68–69 Yeltsin, Boris 313 Yugoslavia, former countries of 133

Z Zaharna, R. S. 312 zaibatsus, Japan 153 Zakaria, Fareed 312 Zapiro cartoon 95 Zealots 172 Zerfass, A. 41 Zhang, A. 55 Zhang, B. 287 Zhu, L. 223 Zimbabwe 182, 183–185, 188–189 Zuma, Duduzane 87–88, 90, 93 Zuma, Jacob 85, 87, 92–94, 96